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L162 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from University of iiiinois Urbana-Champaign Aiternates https://archive.org/detaiis/historyofitaiian01 king A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY a;fe;, .'-:>y/ / \- ■ V ■ o; r Trieste ISTKIA ('iiMoJica ^AntfPes Jh/nto .Spol«i iTerni> THlanior ^SajiKiSle^anij It *,'* t . 'NiV ^ *J ■> KlSSO' Velletni 57'rc AP I T I N ATA''i|!?^ j'*t' ''e/-e N. l^y7'~\3.?Ariano ,, (j ,/ T^SfeS^terno, '>^Potciiza ^ \ fi.^ASlLl CATA Ponza Ischia*** ra^liarl. Jhrjia TVapiuii, Marsala^ MAP OF ITALY AT BKGINNING OF 1848. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY BEING A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ITALY FROM 1814 TO 1871 BY BOLTON KING, M.A. Now all these things happened unto them for ensamples" VOL. I NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER’S SONS 153-157 FIFTH AVENUE 1899 Printed by Ballanttne, Hanson 6* Co. Edinbxirgh l< 58 K TO MT MOTHER AND MT WIFE dt Si 'v PREFACE This book is, as its title indicates, a political history only ; of social and religious life, of literature and art and science it only treats, when they border on the field of politics. Incomplete as such a work must be, the specialization is necessary, before a wider synthesis can picture the full national life. A foreigner, writing the history of a country not his own, has his loss and gain. He cannot wholly grasp the subtle essence that makes the spirit of its life and insti- tutions; he cannot penetrate the side-lights, that often mean more than the patent facts, or understand each deli- cate inflection of the nation’s voice. But what he loses in intimacy and colour, he may gain in perspective and impartiality. He is better able to see the problems in their true proportions, and neglect the noisy controversies of the moment for more abiding issues. His detachment from party makes him less likely to be biassed ; and though the world is small and its dividing-lines much the same every- where, it is easier for him than for the native critic to be Pair. I have done my best to do justice to all sides, though r have not attempted to conceal my sympathies. I make no 5-pology, if I have said hard things of the Papacy. For Catholicism as a religion I trust I have shown all respect ; :he Papacy qud political institution is subject to political 3riticism, and I have said less than the truth rather than nore. My object in writing this book has been a twofold one. First, I have endeavoured to give a trustworthy account of a viii PREFACE'- chapter of modern history which has been most inadequately dealt with both at home and abroad. Outside a few limited studies, there is hardly an English or even a French writer who has treated the Italian history of the century with much pre- tence to accuracy or research ; and bulky as is the material published in Italy, Italian historians have not been success- ful in weaving the material into any very well-proportioned or readable whole. My second aim has been to make the re-birth of a noble and friendly nation better understood in a country which knows little really of Italy. The English- man’s knowledge of the Italian Revolution is summed, it has been said, in the belief that it had something to do with Garibaldi and a red shirt. A leading London newspaper recently urged the Italians in all seriousness to take some steps in the direction of Cavour’s Free Church, forgetting that this was done a quarter of a century ago ; and many a lecture on their recent troubles would have been spoilt by a rudimentary knowledge of their history ol the last forty years. The tie, that united so closely the English and Italians of the last generation, seems slackening, and it needs more mutual knowledge to cement the sympathy again. For the materials of the book I have had recourse to almost all the published matter of any importance (nearly 900 works in all), except (a) contemporary journals as a rule, and (h) some literature out of print and not to be seen in England. I hope that these pages do not suffer seriously from either omission. From such small acquaintance as I have with the Italian press of the Revolution, I have found it of no great value, and it is remarkable how little such a book as Gori’s Storia della rivoluzione italianay based on a careful study of the newspapers of the time, adds to our knowledge. The second omission has been due to an inability to consult any library outside England. The splendid collection of modern Italian books at the British Museum has few gaps, but it has some, and it is singularly deficient in the govern- / PREFACE ix mental publications of the Kingdom of Italy. Hence I have only been able to study the proceedings of parliament after 1859 in isolated collections of speeches, and I have not seen all the Green Books, which were first published in 1865. It is easy, however, to exaggerate the value of official publi- cations. Foreign Offices have so carefully bowdlerized their “ books ” — blue, yellow, green, — that they generally conceal Iwhat the historian most wants to know. They are, says Signor Bonghi, “ only the stuff in the shop- window.” “ In- discretions,” he adds, “supply the true materials;” and to discover the springs of diplomacy, the writer finds that his safest reliance is in memoirs, letters, reported conversations. Down to i860 the Italian historian is choked with the abundance of these. The eagerness of the Italians to pub- lish everything, however trivial, that bears on the Kevolution, reaches almost to a literary mania. But the student, who wades through the dismal morasses of correspondence, can pick up gems. Even of “ documents,” as to whose talismanic i7irtue I own to something of a heterodox scepticism, there is iao small wealth. Historians owe much to the Kevolution |;or publishing the records of the governments, which it upset n 1848 and 1859* Italian statesmen have allowed papers to oe published, which by diplomatic canons should have been lidden in the most secret recesses of the Foreign Ministry ; juiminating of course in that masterpiece of “ indiscretion,” ua Marmora s Un pd piu di luce. Even the Archives, down it least to i860, have been to a certain extent opened to a ew historians, such as N. Bianchi, Nisco, Sansone. None he less it is true that all recent history must be more or ess provisional, till the cupboards of government offices give ip their secrets, and letters and memoirs, now withheld, see he light of day. This applies in Italian history especially o the period since 1 860. Here, though we have the great iollection of Kicasoli papers and many records of considerable hough less importance, we wait for the papers of Minghetti X PREFACE and Rattazzi, Crispi and Visconti-Venosta, before the his- torian can tread safe ground. Still, in spite of this caution, I doubt whether future research will seriously modify the conclusions that can be drawn from existing material. Of the defects of this book no one can be more conscious than the author. In spite of every care, it has no doubt its misjudgments and its inaccuracies. I shall value the kindly offices of any whose criticisms may enable me to correct these. I wish, in conclusion, to acknowledge my indebtedness to my friend Mr. Okey for very valuable assistance ; to the authorities at the British Museum; to M. Pierre Armmjon; to M. Claparede ; and to Messrs. Dent for their permission to reprint a portion of my Introduction to Mr. Okey s translation of Mazzini. BOLTON KING. Gaydon, Warwick, November 1898 . I CONTENTS PART I PREPARING FOR REVOLUTION CHAPTER I NAPOLEON taly in the Eighteenth Century, i. Napoleon and Italy, 2. Eesults of the French Rule, 2. Eugene Beauharnais, 3 ; parties at Milan, 4 ; the Austrians occupy Lombardy, 6. Napoleon at Elba, 6. Murat : his campaign, 7, and death, 8. The Congress of Vienna, 9 ; and the Pope, 9 ; Piedmont and Austria, 10 ; annexation of Genoa, 10. Position of Austria in Italy, ii. The national opposition, 12. CHAPTER II TBE CARBONARI I he Restoration in Piedmont, 14, Lombardy- Venetia, 14, Tuscany, 15, the Papal States, 15, Naples, 16, Sicily, 16. Its character, 17 ; Francis of Modena, 18. Discontent, 18. The Carbonari, 19. The Co7icili. atore, 22. Revolution of Naples : Naples, 1815-20, 22 ; revolution breaks out, 23 ; constitution granted, 23 ; Murattists and Carbonari, 24; Sicily, 1815-20, 24; revolution of Palermo, 25; Naples and Sicily, 26 ; Florestano Pepe attacks Palermo, 27 ; Austria and Naples, 28 ; Parliament repudiates FI. Pepe’s treaty, 28 ; the king goes to [ Laybach, 29 ; the Austrian invasion, 30. Revolution of Piedmont : the Carbonari in Piedmont, 31 ; Charles Albert, 31 ; the army : rises, 33 ; Charles Albert Regent, 33 ; the revolution collapses, 34. j Character of the revolution, 35 ; weakness of feeling of Unity, 37. Ferdinand’s revenge, 38, and death, 39. Charles Felix, 39. xi XU CONTENTS CHAPTER III SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY Piedmont : its growth, 41, and character, 42 ; the House of Savoy, 42 ; ^ government, 42 ; nobles, 43 ; clergy, 43 ; army, 45 ; the class system, 45 ; justice, 46 ; education, 47 ; trade, 47 ; Genoa, 48 ; peasants, 49 ; Piedmontese hegemony, 50. Lombardy- Venetia : the Austrian rule, 51 ; Milan under the Kingdom of Italy, 52 ; the bureaucracy, 52 ; taxation, 53 ; justice, 54 ; clergy, 54; education, 54; censorship, 55 ; local government, 56; the Con- gregations, 57 ; state-trials, 58 ; police, 58 ; Lombard character, 59 ; nobles, 59 ; middle classes, 60 ; peasants, 60 ; nationalist sentiment, 61. CHAPTER IV SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY— {Continued) Modena, 63. Parma, 64. Lucca, 65. Tuscany : Eossombroni, 66 ; Leopold II., 66 ; Tuscan government, 67 ; the Tuscans, 68 ; the Georgofils, 69 ; clergy, 69 ; education, 70 ; peasants, 70 ; Tuscan life, 71. Papal States : the theocracy, 72 ; the Curia, 72 ; administra- tion, 74 ; trade, 74 ; local government, 75 ; law, 76 ; justice, 77 ; police, 78 ; the Inquisition, 79 ; the Jews, 79 ; education, 79 ; religion and morality, 81 ; condition of the people, 82; Romagna and the Marches, 82 ; separatist movement in Romagna, 83 ; Umbria, 83 ; Agro Romano, 84 ; Rome, 84. CHAPTER V SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY— {Continued) Naples ; the new land system, 87 ; theory and practice, 87 ; justice, 87 ; local government, 88 ; education, 88 ; corruption of government, 89 ; nobles, 89 ; clergy, 90 ; educated classes, 90 ; trade, 91 ; city of Naples, 91 ; peasants, 92 ; political indifference, 94. Sicily: character, 94 ; Home Rule, 95 ; land system, 96 ; peasants, 96 ; malendrinaggia^ 98 ; want of education, 99. The Elements of the Italian Nation, 99 ; church, loi ; nobles, 102 ; middle classes, 103 ; universities, 104 ; artisans and town labourers, 105 ; peasants, 106. The oppression, 107 ; absence of political life, 108 ; dawn of patriotism, 109. CONTENTS Xlll CHAPTER YI THE LATER CARBONARI poMANTiciSM, no; in Italy, in; Manzoni, 112; the Antologia, 113; ; Mazzini, 114. The Later Carbonari, 114. Position of Austria^ 115. The Concistorio, 116. The Papal States, 1820-30: Leo XII.’ 117; the Zelanti Cardinals, 117; the Liberals in Romagna, ns! Revolution of Central Italy : Francis IV.’s plots, 118 ; revolution at Bologna, 119; the Temporal Power, 119; Non-intervention, 120; collapse of the first revolution, 121 ; the “new era,” 122 ; the Memo- randum of the Powers, 122 ; second revolution of Romagna, 123 ; the French at Ancona, 124 ; character of the Revolution, 124. CHAPTER YII YOUNG ITAL Y leaction against the Carbonari, 126; Mazzini, 126; Young Italy, 127. Piedmont, 1824-30, 132 ; Charles Albert, 133 ; becomes King,’ 135 • Mazzini’s plot, 136; Savoy Expedition, 136. Naples, 1824-34! , Francis I., 137 ; Ferdinand II., 137. Tuscany, 1830-40, 139. Modena, 1831-40,140. Papal States, 1832-40: Gregory XVL, 140 ; Bernetti and the Centurions, 141 ; Lambruschini, 142. The Depression, 1833-37, 143. The literary revival, 144 ; Giusti, 145. Revolutionary : movements, 145 ; Sicilian rising of 1837, 146 ; Muratori rising, 147 • the Bandieras, 147. ’ CHAPTER YIII THE MODERATES eaction against Young Italy, 149. The social reformers, 150; Scien- ' tific Congresses, 150; railways, 150. The Moderates: (i.) The New Guelfs, 152 ; Gioberti’s Primato, 153 ; (ii.) The Piedmontese School, 156; Balbo’s Speranze dPtalia, 157; D’Azeglio, 158; his ' Ultimi Gasi di Romagna, 160 ; the Albertists, 161. Charles Albert’s ' Reign, 162 ; his reforms, 164 ; railway schemes, 165 ; the King and I Austria, 166 ; growth of Liberalism, 167 ; tariff- war with Austria, ' 167 ; the King and the Moderates, 168 XIV CONTENTS PART II THE REVOLUTION CHAPTER IX PIO MONO Pros IX., 170 ; the amnesty, 172 ; the cult of Pius, 173. Charles Albert and Pius, 174; the Scientific Congress at Genoa, 174. The Austro- Jesuit opposition, 174- The Liberals in the Curia, 175 ; theModerates in Romagna, 176 ; the Radicals, I 77 - Tuscany : Pisa and the Jesuits, ,77 ; the secret press, 178 ; the Florentine Liberals and the censor- ship 179. The Romans, 179; the “Great Conspiracy,” 181. Metter- nich 182 ; Occupation op Ferrara, 183 ; Charles Albert promises to help the Pope, 184. The Citizen Guard at Lucca, 185, and Florence, 186 ; the Feasts of Federation, 186. The three progressive states, 186 ; the Commercial League, 187 ; Charles Albert in October, 188. The Lunigiana question, 189. CHAPTER X THE CONSTITUTIONS Europe at the beginning of 1 848, 191- Schemes of war in Italy, I92- The Lombard revival, 193 ; the railway question, 194 ; Lombardy in 1847, 195 ; the Romilli demonstration, 195 ; Nazaris peUtion, 196; Manin at Venice, 196 ; Radetzky, 196 ; the Tobacco Riots, 197- The constitutional question, 197 ; the economic question, 19 , bread riots, 199 ; revolt of Leghorn, 199- The Constitutionalists 2 ot ; in Tuscany, 200 ; in Piedmont, 200 ; Cavour, 201. Naples and Sicily, 203 • the rising in Calabria, 203 ; Moderates and Radicals at Naples, 203 ; Sicilian Revolution, 204. The Constitution in Naples 205 ; in Piedmont, 206 ; in Tuscany, 207 ; at Rome, 207 ; the Statutes, 210 ; theocracy and constitution at Rome, 21 1. CHAPTER XI THE NATIONAL RISING The French Revolution of 1848, 213. The Jesuits, 213. in Lombardy, 214. Preparations for war in Piedmont 216. Thb Five Days op Milan, 216. The National Rising at Venice, 220 CONTENTS XV in the Lombard cities, 222 ; in the Duchies, 223, Tuscany, 223, Papal States, 223, Naples, 223 ; character of the rising, 223. Pied- mont and the rising, 224 ; Charles Albert declares war, 226. CHAPTER XII THE WAR Radetzky’s retreat, 227 ; the Milanese after the Five Days, 227 ; Piedmon- tese advance, 228 ; the two armies, 229 ; the Volunteers, 229 ; Santa Lucia, 232. Beginnings of division, 232 ; Albertism, 233 ; Piedmont and the League, 234. The Pope and the war, 234 ; the Allocution OF April 29, 236. Naples : Ferdinand and Bozzelli, 236 ; the Troya ministry, 237 j the Counter-Revolution, 239. Charles Albert and the national movement, 240. Lombardy : the question of Fusion, 241 ; Lombards and Piedmontese, 242 ; the Provisional Government, 242 ; the plebiscite, 244. ; CHAPTER XIII ^ j THE WAR — {Continued) I usion in Venetia, 245, and at Venice, 246 ; Piedmont and fusion, 247 ; results of fusion, 248. The war in Venetia : Nugent’s advance, 248 ; Cornuda, 249 ; Thurn’s attacks on Vicenza, 250. Piedmontese in- action, 250; Curtatone, 251; second battle of Goito, 251; loss of Vicenza, 252, and of Venetia, 252. Palmerston’s negotiations, 253. Piedmont and the war, 255. Sommacampagna, 257 ; Custozza, 257 ; Volta, 258 ; the retreat, 258 ; the defence of Milan, 259 ; the Sur- render OF Milan, 260. ' CHAPTER XIV MODERATES AND DEMOCRATS The Salasco armistice, 261. France and Italy, 262. “ The People’s War ” 263 ; the Austrians at Bologna, 264. Moderates and Democrats, 265. Piedmont : Pinelli ministry, 266 ; negotiations for peace, 266 ; ; the war party, 267 ; fall of the ministry, 269. Tuscany : Ridolfi ministry, 269 ; the Democrats, 269 ; Capponi ministry, 270 ; Leghorn j revolt, 270 ; Montanelli-Guerrazzi ministry, 272. Papal States : i Mamiani ministry, 273 ; Fabbri ministry, 277 ; Rossi ministry, 277 ' VOL. I. h XVI CONTENTS CHAPTER XV THE DEMOCRATS IN POWER Rossi’s Death, 280 ; the Pope flies, 282. The Papal Question : the Pope at Gaeta, 282 ; Antonelli, 283 ; Gioberti and the Catholic Powers^ 284 ; France and the Papacy, 285. The League, 286 ; the Federative Congress, 287 ; the Constituent, 288. Rome in November, 289 ; demand for a Constituent, 290 ; Muzzarelli ministry, 291 ; the Moderates in Romagna, 291 ; the Roman Constituent, 291 ; The Republic Proclaimed, 292. Tuscany : Montanelli and Guerrazzi, 293 ; the Tuscan Constituent, 294 ; the Grand Duke’s flight, 294 : the Provisional Government, 295 ; the Grand Duke goes to Gaeta, 296. CHAPTER XVI NOVARA Piedmont under Gioberti, 297 ; the Democratic opposition, 299 ; Gioberti and Tuscany, 300 ; he resigns, 300. The Austrians in Lombardy, 300. Italy and war, 301 ; the war-fever in Piedmont, 303. The truce denounced, 304 ; La Cava, 305 ; Mortara, 305 ; Novara, 306 ; Charles Albert abdicates, 306. CHAPTER XVII NAPLES AND SICILY Naples ; Bozzelli ministry, 307 ; Calabrian revolt, 308 ; parliamentar; opposition, 309 ; the reaction unmasks, 309 ; Ferdinand at Gaeta, 310 parliament dissolved, 310. Sicily: Sicilian independence, 3^1 - ' • forfeiture of the throne, 312 ; royalisfl’ King, 315 , - - the national guard, 318 ; Ultimatum of Gaeta, 318 ; the war, 319 : the last struggle at Palermo, 320. CHAPTER XVIII THE CENTRAL REPUBLICS Tuscany : Guerrazzi, 321 ; the republicans and the government, 322 ; question of union with Rome, 323 ; the reaction, 324 ; Guerrazzi dictator 325 • THE Counter-Revolution, 326. Rome: the Executive CONTENTS xvii Committee, 326 ; Mazzini, 327 ; the Triumvirate, 327 ; the Eepublic and the Church, 328 ; tolerance of the government, 329 ; its weakness, 330; outrages at Eome, 331, and Ancona, 331 ; the people and the republic, 331. Policy of Gaeta, 332 ; French policy, 333 ; Oudinot’s Expedition, 334; fight of April 30, 335; De Lesseps’ negotiations, 336 ; Austrian invasion of Eomagna, 336 ; negotiations broken off, 337 ; siege, 338 ; fall of the city, 340 ; Garibaldi’s retreat, 340. CHAPTEE XIX VENICE UNDER MANIN Venice: fusion repealed, 341 ; Venice and France, 342; the blockade, 342 ; Manin’s government, 343 ; the bombardment, 344 ; the surrender, I 345. Manin, 345. j The Causes of Failure, 347 ; provincial jealousies, 347 ; political - divisions, 348 ; want of statesmen, 349 ; defects in national character, 350. The spirit of the movement, 351 ; Ugo Bassi, 351. PART III THE TEN YEARS’ WAITING \ CHAPTER XX I I PIEDMONT AFTER NOVARA, THE REACTION I Piedmont : after Xovara, 353 ; revolt of Genoa, 354 ; question of prolong- ' ing the war, 354 ; The Constitution saved, 355 ; D’Azeglio premier, 356 ; the terms of peace, 356 ; the Proclamation of Moncalieri, 359. The Hegemony of Piedmont, 359 ; the refugees, 360 ; Turin, 360. I Papal States : the people and the Eestoration, 362 ; the French at Eome, 362 ; the Eed Triumvirate, 363 ; Napoleon’s letter to Edgar Ney, I 364 ; the Motu-Proprio of Portici, 364 ; the Pope returns to Eome, 365 ; Ultramontanism, 365. CHAPTER XXI THE REACTION— {Continued) Naples : Ferdinand’s absolutism, 367 ; the constitution suspended, 368 ; the political trials, 368 ; Gladstone’s Letters, 369. Tuscany : the i CONTENTS counter-revolutionists, 370 ; the Grand Duke, 371 ; the Austrian occupation, 371 ; the Grand Duke’s return, 372 ; the constitution suspended, 373. Lombardy-Venetia ; military rule, 374 ; Karl von Schwarzenberg, 375 ; Kadetzky uncontrolled, 375. The Austrians in Romagna, 376 ; Modena, 377. Parma, 378. League and Concordats : position of Austria, 379; paternal government, 379; the Catholic school, 380 ; the Austrian League, 381 ; the Concordats, 382. Strength and weakness of the reaction, 383. CHAPTER XXII CAVOUR Difficulties of Piedmont, 385 ; the Conservative reaction, 387 ; parties in the Chamber, 387; Rattazzi, 389. D’Azeglio’s policy, 390; the struggle with Rome, 392 ; The Siccardi Laws, 394 ; Fransoni’s defiance, 395 ; more anti-clerical measures, 396. Cavour, 397 ; be- comes minister, 399 ; his financial policy, 400 ; Free Trade, 401. CHAPTER XXIII THE HEGEMONY OF PIEDMONT The Hegemony of Piedmont, 402 ; Victor Emmanuel II., 403 ; Piedmont and Austria, 405. Louis Napoleon, 406 ; the couf d'dat, 407 ; tl.e Deforesta Press Law, 408. The connuhio, 409 ; Cavour leaves the ministry, 410; Civil Marriage bill, 410; D’Azeglio resigns, 41 1 ; Cavour premier, 41 1 . The Republicans, 412 ; Mazzini, 412; L> n- bardy, 1850-52, 413 ; the republican conspiracy, 413 ; the Milan pmt, 414 ; the sequestrations, 415 ; Cavour’s protest, 416. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY CHAPTER I NAPOLEON 1814-1815 Italy in the Eighteenth Century. Napoleon and Italy. Results of the French Rule. Eugene Beauharnais ; Parties at Milan ; the Austrians occupy Lombardy. Napoleon at Elba. Murat ; his campaign and death. The Congress of Vienna, and the Pope ; Piedmont and Austria ; Annexation of Genoa. Position of Austria in Italy. The national opposition. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there was little consciousness in Italy of any national existence. The memory, indeed, of days when Rome gave her laws to the western world had never been forgotten. The policy of the Guelfs was at bottom a half-understood struggle to free Italy from foreign rule. But even when the eighteenth century saw the practical extinction of the Spanish domina- tion, saw Austria confined to the north and Piedmont advancing in its slow, patient march, Italians were still content with the loose concourse of petty states that took the place of a nation. The latter half of the century was an age of peace and reform, the age of Joseph II. and Leopold I., of Tannucci and Beccaria. It left Italy fairly prosperous, fairly advanced in social legislation, but a country whose life was in its memories and its arts, the beautiful woman-land of poetry, to be sung and caressed and coveted, but debarred from liberty and independence. The French Revolution broke roughly in on this, on the soft luxuriousness, the polished immorality, the show of VOL. I. A 2 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY religion. The invasions of 1796 and 1801 tumbled the princelings; and the creation of the Napoleonic republics and kingdoms roughly swept away for ever the old political 1 and social order. Italy was the only country where Napoleon intentionally encouraged the spirit of nationality. Contemptuous as he was of the men who helped to fight his battles and fill his treasury, he foresaw that unity of manners and language and literature was bound sooner or later to make a single nation of Italy.^ Pride in his Italian descent, sympathy for the historic home of Csesarism, the traditional policy of France which bade him erect here a barrier against Austria, made his Italian schemes dear to him. In more senses than one Napoleon is the founder of modern Italy. Materially and socially she gained much from the French rule. It abolished feudalism, where it still survived, gave her uniform and enlightened laws, opened a career to talent, stimulated industry into new life. The dissolution of the monasteries helped to redeem the national debt and revo- lutionised the land system. Primary schools covered all , Lombardy and Naples. Italian soldiers brought back from Napoleon’s campaigns a proud name for bravery and endurance, and the whole nation braced itself to a more strenuous life. Politically the results of Napoleons system were as far-reaching. The prestige of the princes was shaken for ever. The ten states of the peninsula had vanished; the east — Piedmont, the Genovesate, Parma, Tuscany, and the Papal States up to the Apennines rhad been annexed to France; Lombardy, Venetia, Modena, Romagna, and the Marches formed the kingdom of Italy under the emperor’s stepson, Eugene Beauharnais, as viceroy; Naples was a dependant kingdom under Muiat. The three states had many mutual connections, and even something of a common administration. Thought and speech, though not yet free, were less stifled than under the old order. The middle landed and professional classes had a share in the government ; and though in the annexed 1 Memoires de Napoleon, III. ii8, 119; Louis Napoleon, hides Napoldon- ^ iennes, 150. NAPOLEON 3 i provinces the civil service was filled with Frenchmen, in ( the kingdom of Italy every official save the viceroy was ^ a native. But Napoleon fell, and with him his Italian creation. I His work, in spite of the good it wrought, had clashed too [ much with national sentiment and prejudices. Over 60,000 : Italians had perished in Spain and Russia for a cause that was not their own ; the financial burdens were heavy ; the : political police and censorship betrayed that the Empire land liberty could not live together; the cities resented the plunder of their art-galleries; Napoleons affronts to the Pope, offended the religion and patriotism of the mass ef Italians. But his work survived his rule, and the memory •of the Kingdom of Italy remained enshrined with the [patriots, a glorified ideal, its tyranny and its burdens forgotten, “ an augury and an incitement to greater things.’’ His enemies were forced to recognise the national life, to Iwhich he had given birth; and in the last great struggle j against him, the Allies had tried to rouse the country with I the cry of Italian Independence. In 1814 the Napoleonic system was crumbling fast in [Italy as elsewhere. When the emperor fell back across the [Rhine in the preceding autumn, he ordered Eugene to evacuate Italy and join him with his forces. The viceroy refused ; he was not altogether disloyal, and he indignantly refused to share in the treachery that Murat was contem- plating ; but in his half-hearted way he loved his adopted 3 ountry, and hoped in the Empire’s impending wreck to match the crown of Northern Italy for his own head. To ^eep his fortune independent of Napoleon’s was indeed his mly hope of success, for the French rule had become hateful, lince the disasters of the Russian campaign had thrown its ailings into blacker prominence. The army and much of he civil service were faithful to him ; and a few others, who aw in his crown the fairest hope of Italian independence, :ave him a lukewarm backing. But he was too closely )Ound up with the order that was passing; Italian patriot l-s in a way he was, he was still a Frenchman ; the im- [norality of his court, the dishonesty of many of his officials. 4 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ■ his refusal to turn against the emperor, all helped to destroy his remaining shreds of popularity. At Milan the mass of opinion was divided between the partisans of Austria and the so-called Italian Party. All who cared only for peace, all who still regarded France as the greater danger, all who, in Foscolo’s phrase, “ were willing to bow to any foreigner who promised them the thousandth part of what he robbed them of,” were preparing the road for Austria s return. They remembered the mild semi-independence of Maria Theresa’s and Joseph’s reigns; during the past year the Viennese statesmen had been profuse in promises to respect liberty and nationality ; and there were honest patriots, who hoped to win from them Home Rule and something of constitutional liberty. But the majority of the Milanese nobles were as opposed to Austria as to Eugene, and under the lead of Federigo Gonfalonier! they organised the “ Italian Liberal Party.” Their policy belied their name; so long as they secured the independence of the existing Kingdom of Italy they cared little whether it were under an Austrian or an English or an Italian prince. Few had any thought of a bigger national life. Gonfalonier! himself perhaps had some conception of an united Italy under the House of Savoy ; ^ but the majority thought more of preserving for Milan its metropolitan rank and court, of ivinnmg hack for the Lombard nobles the privileges that the French had destroyed ; none would accept the one man who might have saved Italian freedom. Eugene, deserted by the nobles, saw that his only chance lay in summoning the electoral colleges (the pseudo-representative element in Napoleon’s constitution) and appealing to the people. But he shrank from a step which seemed to stamp him as disloyal to Napoleon. He took a cowardly middle course, and asked the Milanese Senate to take the responsibility he himself declmed, and beo- his crown from the Allies. The senate substituted a "pale eulogy of the viceroy, which showed too plainly that it was weary of him. It was itself, however, hardly ■ Casati, Confalonieri, I. 84, 261 ; Bonfadini, Mezzosaolo 78. 157 ; Eianchi, Diplomazia, I. 79 , 448; Botta, Storm, 1 \. 531-532- For the full Ijianczu, X. I'y, J . Tr 1 TT titles of works referred to in the footnotes, see Bibliography in ^ ol. II. NAPOLEON 5 5 more popular than Eugene, and the rival parties outside ; combined to overthrow senate and viceroy together. As soon as the news of Napoleon’s abdication arrived, the : Italian Party seized the weapon that Eugene had refused, ■ and demanded the convocation of the electoral colleges. The mob was set in motion to frighten the senate into : acquiescence (April 20, 1814), and when it had sacked the • senate-house, it hurried off to find a victim in Prina, the s hated Minister of Finance. Half- murdering him, they ; dragged his still living body through the streets till it was mangled past recognition. With whom lay the responsi- ' bility of the crime is a problem still unsolved. Some of the Austrian party doubtless wished to furnish a pretext ' for occupation ; Confalonieri was charged with playing a ! more or less guilty part, and probably he helped to raise a storm, which escaped his control, and went to excesses ; he did not foresee.^ Pino, the commander of the garrison, : hoping perhaps to win a crown, as his brother-generals, i Bernadotte and Murat, had done before him, had neglected I to send the troops that might have saved Prina’s life. But i whatever share of guilt lay with each party, the advantage rested with the friends of Austria. Eugene’s army indeed iwas eager to march on Milan and avenge Prina’s death, but I the viceroy shrank from civil war. The senate quietly disappeared, and the municipal council appointed a pro- visional regency, composed almost solely of the men, whose interests stopped short at the old Duchy of Milan, and who were willing to see it parted from the destinies of Italy and under Austrian rule. The electoral colleges were summoned, but only from the small fraction of the kingdom, that ‘‘ spoke the pure Lombard dialect.” To satisfy public opinion, the regency sent Confalonieri to the Allies to ask for indepen- dence and a constitution ; but consciously or unconsciously they were playing the Austrian game. When Confalonieri arrived at Paris, he found that the fate of Lombardy was sealed. Eugene had already tamely surrendered to Belle- 1 Casati, op. cit.,1. 81-85, 267-270; Botta, op. cit.,TV. 533; Maroncelli, Addizioni, ii; Bonfadini, op. cit., ii 3 ) 14? j Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, I. 385— 386 ; Lezat de Pons, ^]tudes, 63-64 ; D’Ancona, Confalonieri, 210-21 6 A HISTOEY OF ITALIAN UNITY garde, the Austrian general, and abdicated (April 26); and Bellegarde, using gentle words, arrived late in May at Milan, where he threw off the mask, and proclaimed the annexation of Lombardy to the Austrian Empire. But his position was still not secure. An edict dissolving the Freemason Lodges showed how much he feared the secret societies, which the French had left behind. The army was prepared to support Murat, and only the cowardice of its generals and Pino’s treachery delayed the plot, till Bellegarde could take his pre- cautions and send the generals to the prison of the Spielberg. Even then the Italian patriots did not despair. So long as Napoleon was at Elba, he might return to power, and the triumph of the reaction had identified his cause with the people’s. Negotiations ran briskly between him and the patriots, who hoped that he might yet lead the Italians to victory, and make their national unity his last great work.^ Another man was trying^ to attach the Nationalist and Napoleonic parties to himself. Joachim Murat had risen from humble origins to be one^ of Napoleon’s greatest generals, his brother-in-law, and King of Naples, a fearless soldier, a good-natured ruler, but luxurious, capricious, unprincipled, with little real affection for his people, and an overweening belief in his own state- craft. His position had long been a dangerous one. His independent policy had drawn down on him^ Napoleon’s anger, and the emperor was prepared to sacrifice him to the Neapolitan Bourbons, if it served his designs. On the other hand if Napoleon fell, the Allies were little likely to spare his lieutenant. Between the two dangers he saw his safest course in winning Italian affection. As early as 1 8 1 1 he had been ready to pose as the champion of Italian autonomy against France. But he was equally leady to trim to the Allies; he had intrigued with them ^ in 1813, before he went to Dresden to command Napoleons cavahy, and early in the next year (January ii) he concluded a 1 Bianchi, op. cit., I. 78, quoting from La verite sur les cmt jours ; Cantu, Cronistoria, II. 33-35 ; Castlereagh Correspondence, series II 21 1 See Napoleon’s curious remarks in Wellington, Supp. Despatches, IX. 269. >v len he escaped from Elba, Talleyrand thought that he would go to Italy and raise the flag of Italian Independence. NAPOLEON 7 secret treaty with Austria (to which England was a party), by which she promised him Naples and a slice of Papal territory in return for his recognition of her claims to Lombardy/ But neither side was sincere ; Austria was in- triguing to depose him, and he was negotiating with Eugene for a common defence of Italy. Eugene’s comparative loyalty to Napoleon prevented an understanding with one whom he regarded as a traitor; and with the emperor’s fall and the entry of the Austrians into Lombardy, Murat’s position became daily more critical. It was the maxim of the Allies, that, except where it was inconvenient to their own ambitions, the “legitimate” governments should be everywhere restored, and in their eyes Murat could only count as an usurper. Still they would probably have left him in possession, for at present they had no actual proof of his duplicity, and failing proof. Lord Liverpool urged that honour and prudence alike forbade any attempt to oust him.^ But while pleading his cause to the Allies, and protesting his especial devotion to Austria, Murat was corresponding with Napoleon, and again making overtures to the Italian patriots. He hurried on reforms at Naples long-delayed. The purchasers of church lands, fearing that a restoration would confiscate their properties, were united in his support ; and his generals, who were the real power in the country, were prepared to back his designs, if he would grant a constitution. Napoleon’s escape from Elba decided him to make a bold bid for Italian favour. Parrying his generals’ demands, he marched his army northwards, and, raising the cry of Italian Independence, declared war against Austria (March 30, 1815). The Pope, though he had professed his sym- pathy,^ fled from Borne, and Murat overran the Marches and Umbria. Defeating the Austrians at Cesena, he ad- vanced to Bologna ^ and Modena ; and had he gone on ^ Pepe, Memoirs, I. 2^6 ; Colletta, Storia, II, 181 ; contra Poffffi, Storia, 1. 18. 2 WelliDgton, op. cit., IX. 212, 399, 486-492, 496-497 ; Castlereagh, op. cit., I. 432 ; II. 3, 243 ; Bianchi, op. cit., I. 4-5. ^ Maroncelli, op. cit., 18, ^ Where Kossini composed a Hymn of Independence for him. 8 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY boldly to Milan, be might have rallied the veterans of Pied- mont and Lombardy to bis flag, and for tbe moment at least bave crushed tbe Austrians. But Bentinck’s treacher- ous advice ^ dissuaded him ; and when be learned that England’s professed friendliness was only a cloak, and found little enthusiasm for bis cause outside Bologna, be fell back by slow stages. He was still successful in several skirmishes, and a pitched battle at Macerata (May 3) was undecided. But tbe same night tbe news came that tbe Austrians bad captured Ac^uila, and were cutting off bis retreat. Tbe loyalty of bis generals was doubtful; tbe retiring troops were more or less demoralised. He still hoped to rouse tbe Neapolitans by granting a constitution, and prolong tbe defence behind tbe Volturno. But bis fleet surrendered to tbe English, tbe Anglo -Sicilian forces were advancing from tbe south, tbe Neapolitans themselves were paralysed by panic ; and Murat, recognising that bis case was desperate, gave up bis sword to tbe English admiral. Tbe last hope of Italian freedom bad vanished, but tbe restless indomitable man made one more bid for power. Obliged after Waterloo to fly from tbe White Terror in Provence, be retbed to Corsica, where be found himself still strong in tbe lustie of Napoleon’s memory. Encouraged to try what bis prestige could win in Italy be started in September for tbe Neapo- litan shore. But bis ships were scattered by a storm, and be landed with a handful of men at Pizzo m Calabria. His appeals to tbe people found no response, and be was easily captured. In vain tbe English tried to save bis bfe, in vain be claimed to be tried by bis peers, tbe sovereigns of Europe. Tbe Bourbons were resolved upon bis doom, and tbe bold adventurer who, from whatever motive, bad been tbe first champion of Italian independence, bad a mock trial, and was shot in cold blood. Now that Napoleon was crushed, tbe Allies made baste to bury their pledges. Tbe Congress of Vienna bad abeady ^ Bianchi, op. cit, I. 169 ; see Wellington, op. cit., IX. 593* 2 The rumours that he was decoyed by the Bourbon government were probably unfounded. See Riv. stor. del risorg., I. 987, in review of De Sasse- nay’s Les demurs mots de Murat. NAPOLEON 9 sealed the fate of Italy. England and Austria repudiated with small compunction the promises their generals had made in their name. The sovereigns had had their use of the national spirit, and threw it over when it claimed its pay ; all but the Czar Alexander put off the mask of liberalism, and Castlereagh told the Lombard deputies that constitutions were ‘‘ expensive experiments.” To the states- men at Vienna the Italian question was merely one of political equilibrium, and De Maistre in vain protested that nations are something in the world.” ^ Besides, Italy was a convenient spoil, where portions might be carved for im- portunate claimants of thrones. But though the Allies were at one in ignoring Italian aspirations, each had its theory as to the methods of partition. England amL-Bussia could not allow the peninsula to become an appanage of Austria. They would perhaps have preferred her entire exclusion ; but Russia was greedy to swallow new territory in Poland, and to smooth her way to this was ready to compromise in Italian questions. Austria was confirmed in her earlier possession of Lombardyrand^^^ Venetia (already held for the eight years between Campoformio and Presburg) and the Valtelline. But neither Metternich’s proposal to abolish the Temporal Power in her favour,^ nor his more modest attempt to secure a slice of Romagna, found any encour- agement from the Allies. Still, in the early days of the Congress, there was no thought of restoring the northern Legations to the Pope ; Pi^ussia wanted them for the King of Saxony, Alexander for his new client Eugene Beauharnais, Francis of Modena for himself. It was not till Napoleon had landed from Elba and bid for the Pope’s support by offering to guarantee his dominions in their entirety, that the adroit diplomacy of Cardinal Consalvi won back Romagna. Even now the Allies wished to grant it Home Rule,^ and it needed all Consalvi’s strategy to secure full rights of sovereignty for his master. ^ De Maistre, Correspondence, II. 8 ; La Maison de Savoie, 21 ; see Cantu, op. cit., II. 89-90. De Maistre at this time was Piedmontese ambassador at St. Petersburg. 2 Bianchi, op. cit., I. 7. ^ This was the Aldini scheme of Home Rule, see below, Vol. II,, p. 17. lo A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Foiled in Central Italy, Austria turned for compensation to the north, and found a yet stiffer foe in Piedmont. Either state recognised that there was no lasting room in Italy for both. Early in the Congress Piedmont made a bid for Lombardy; but though five years before the Allies had arranged to give it to her, she now found herself unsup- ported.^ Austria retaliated by a long and persistent effort to gain the Upper Novarese, which gave the command of the Simplon. But though the Powers were willing to let her take Lombardy, they had no desire to see her too powerful, and in spite of English support, she had to content herself with the Ticino frontier. In its early days the Congress had intended to give Savoy to France ; but the Piedmon- tese played a helpful part in the Hundred Hays, and the Allies, anxious after Waterloo to weaken France by every possible means, were glad, in spite of Austria s protest, to reward them with the ancient patrimony of their kings. Austria, baulked again, was probably intriguing to bar from the succession the Carignano branch of the Savoy House, and thus, as King Victor Emmanuel had no children, to eventually secure the throne of Piedmont through the female line for the Austrian Duke of Modena.^ But Victor Emmanuel would have no dictation from the Austrians ; and when they seemed indisposed to withdraw their troops from Alessandria, the king was prepared to fight rather than suffer their lengthened presence in his territory. In vain Austria spread before him offers of favourable alliance, and schemes of an Italian league under her own presidency. To escape her special tutelage, he was willing, at He Maistre s advice, to join the Holy Alliance. It was from no good will towards her that Piedmont came from the Congress with a territorial gain. The Allies had decreed the doom of Genoa. “ Republics were no longer fashionable,” as the Czar told the Genoese deputation ; the Congress, always possessed by dread of French aggression, wished to see a military state in possession of the Riviera, 1 Bianchi, op. cit., I. 51, 57, 58. I can find no support for the statement in Gualterio, op. cit., I. 500, and Pinelli, Storia, II. 393, that England offered Lombardy to Victor Emmanuel on condition of his granting a constitution. ^ Bianchi, op. cit., I. 108-114. NAPOLEON 1 1 and Castlereagh, who thought less of English honour than of crippling France, was quick to repudiate Bentinck’s pledges to the Genoese that their independence should be respected/ Their country was consigned to its old rival, Piedmont. In vain they protested against a “ foreign domination ” ; in vain they offered to sacrifice the republic, if only they might keep their independence, or at least Home Rule. They pleaded to deaf ears, and Genoa was tossed a few poor crumbs of local government for her solace. At the time, however, it seemed doubtful whether the annexation would add to the strength of Piedmont. The old enmity between the two states, the incompatibility of a semi-feudal despotism and a commercial democracy, made men despair of any real fusion. But the pressure of a common despotism and common commercial interests were too strong for ancient grudges, and the removal of one more boundary helped on the unity of Italy. But while Piedmont alone among Italian states came out stronger from the Congress, Austria, in spite of her re- buffs, had won for herself a commanding power in Italy. Indirectly her strength reached far beyond the limits of her own provinces. Austrian princes ruled in Tuscany, and Modena, and Parma. She garrisoned by treaty rights Piacenza, and Ferrara, and Comacchio ; some day she hoped to have the whole of Romagna.^ She had almost unlimited control over the duchies of the Po valley. Tus- cany, though it stood out against her larger claims of suzerainty, bound itself to make neither peace nor war without her consent. Ferdinand of Naples had concluded a secret treaty, pledging himself to make no separate alliances, and grant no liberties to his subjects beyond those which obtained in Lombardy and Venetia. But strong as Austria was, the very fact of her pre- dominance roused more or less suspicion in almost every It is difficult to say whether Bentinck had any authority from the English Government for his promises. Castlereagh denied it ; Wellington, op. ciL, IX. 64 ; Castlereagh, op. cit., I. 434. But from ih. II. 18, 221, it would appear that Bentinck made his promise with Castlereagh’s knowledge. Bianchi, op. cit., I. 222 ; Gualterio, op. cit., III. 338 ; Gouvernement Temporel, 109 ; contra Metternich, Memoires, III. 82 ; see Riv. stor. del risorg. I. 340. 12 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Italian Court. Piedmont, fronted by the unbroken stretch of the empire from the Ticino to the Carpathians, feared for her very existence. The Pope, knowing well that Austria s designs on the Legations only slumbered, could not but be suspicious of her every move. Tuscany was ruled by patriotic statesmen, who struggled long and successfully to free their country from her tutelage. Already there were signs of open opposition. Piedmont had killed the schemes of an Austrian league; Rome refused with coolness the alliance, which Metternich offered her as the best protection against the gates of hell” ; the two states joined with Tuscany to reject proposals, which would have given him control of the postal communications of the peninsula. The princes might fall back on her in a struggle with their subjects, but they would never willingly become her vassals. The spirit of Italian independence had reached even to the Courts. And vague and disorganised though it was, the sense of a common nationality was making quick strides among the people. Genoa, it is true, was as yet irreconcilable to Turin ; the Milanese had tried to sever their lot from that of North Italy ; Venice wanted her old independence ; Sicily and Naples were at bitter feud. But in spite of all, com- munity of memories and wrongs was consolidating a national sense, and the contrast of the Restoration with the enlighten- ment of the French rule was creating a movement hostile alike to native oppression and Austrian domination. For a moment patriots had hoped that Murat would free, perhaps unite, all Italy.^ Now they were beginning to look to the House of Savoy as the “ one Italian race of princes,” and though Piedmont was reluctant to sink herself in a wider state, Lombards' and Romagnuols were looking for the day when she must expand into a North Italian king- dom. And though they were very few” who as yet dared hope in an united Italy, there were plans abroad among the thinkers to reorganise the peninsula in a federation of three constitutional states, which would leave no room for either Austria or the Temporal Power. ^ Gouvernement Temporcl, 97 * CHAPTEE II THE CARBONARI 1815-1824 The Eestoration in Piedmont, Lombardy- Venetia, Tuscany, the Papal States, Naples, Sicily. Its character; Francis of Modena. Dis- content. The Carbonari. The Conciliatore. Revolution of Naples: Naples, 1815-1820; revolution breaks out; constitution granted; Murattists and Carbonari; Sicily, 1815—1820; revolution of Pakrmo ; Naples and Sicily ; Florestano Pepe attacks Palermo ; Austria and Naples ; Parliament repudiates FI. Pepe’s treaty ; the king goes to Laybach ; the Austrian invasion. Revolution of Piedmont : the Carbonari in Piedmont ; Charles Albert ; the army rises , Charles Albert Regent ; the revolution collapses. Movements in Modena and Romagna. Character of the revolution ; weakness of feeling of Unity. Ferdinand’s revenge and death. Charles Felix. The Congress of Vienna partitioned Italy into eight states. Piedmont and the Austrian provinces divided the north; the Papal States, ^Tuscany, the petty duchies of '’Modena, ,5. Parma, and ^ Lucca occupied the centre; the kingdom of ^ Naples covered the southern mainland and Sicily. Parma was given to Maria Louisa, the Austrian princess, who had been Napoleon s wife ; Lucca went to another Maria Louisa, of the Spanish Bourbons who reigned at Parma before the revolution. All the other states, except the suppressed republics of Venice and Genoa, returned to their old rulers. As in Spain and Germany, the princes were welcomed back not only by the friends of the old order but by the mass of the^ people, to whom they represented the national protest against French absorption. Even a tyrant like Ferdinand of Naples met the same welcome that greeted the better princes. Safe on their thrones, better and worse alike set themselves to undo the revolution. It was impossible. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ^deed, to ignore mucli of the reform that the French had introduced ; but even where the form of the new order was preserved, the Restoration tried to kill its spirit Victor Emmanuel was welcomed back to Piedmont with clamorous loyalty. He had the qualities of his race; he was kindly and well-intentioned. But he hated innovation ; all reform smacked to him of revolution, and now that he had, as he believed, the revolution at his feet, he hastened to sweep away its every trace. He threatened to recognise no law passed during his exile, to own no civil servant who did not figure in the directory of the year when the French drove him out. The anachronisms of the old order came back, the legal abuses, the feudal privileges, monasteries and ecclesiastical courts, the disabilities of Jews and Protestants. For the moment it was feared that civil marriages contracted under the French rule would not be recognised, that pur- chasers of church lands would be compelled to surrender. ^ But the Restoration was soon shorn of its worst excesses. ^ Victor Emmanuel found himself forced to compromise with the passive resistance of his people. The directory of 1798 was quietly dropped; provincial councils were instituted; the prerogative was less used to override the law. ^ Officials of the French period found their way into the Ministry itself, and the accession to office of Prospero Balbo (1817), their most distinguished administrator, seemed to herald further reforms. But though some real progress was made, tne Jesuits crept back, and critics complained that the govern- ment still united the worst features of the old order and of the French rule, — the obscurantism of the first, the political police and centralization of the latter. The mass of the Lombards and Venetians were well pleased when the Austrians, in taking possession, erected the provinces into a kingdom, and instituted the Central Congregations,^ which in time, it was hoped, would grow into^representative institutions. The new rule, Metternich promised, should “ conform to Italian character and customs, and it seemed as if the rights of nationality were to obtain recoo-nition even from the Austrian government. All the o 1 See below, p. 57. THE CARBONARI 15 more pungent was the disappointment, when' the Lombards found that the taking phrases were empty words. The Austrian law was introduced; contrary, it seems, to Met- ternich’s advice, Austrians and Tyrolese seized on the higher posts in the administration; conscription was enforced in spite of the promises of 1814. The emperor let it be known that he “wanted not learned men, but submissive and loyal subjects”; and the brutality and insolence of the Austrian soldiery showed the Italians in what light they were regarded by their new rulers. In l.uscany the reaction was less pronounced. No at- tempt was made indeed to restore Leopold I.’s liberal local institutions, which Napoleon had sacrificed to his centraliza- tion. But though most of Napoleon’s Code was swept away, Leopold’s Code, which came back again, was in some respects as advanced. The Tuscan statesmen of the Restoration were not blind to the world’s growth : the Grand Duke, it is said, would have given a representative Parliament, but for the veto of Vienna.^ The police system, execrable in theory, was mild in practice; after angry debate with Rome the monks were restored to only a' part of their possessions, and the J esuits, as in Lombardy, were rigorously shut out. Rome was saved by Consalvi from the worst extremes of reaction. Many of the ecclesiastics would have welcomed a root-and-branch destruction of the French reforms, and the prayer of the great Roman nobles for a lay government was scornfully tossed back; Pius VII., the gentle, amiable Pope, whom Napoleon had dragged into captivity, could easily have been won to the bigots. But Consalvi returned triumphant from Vienna, and his success at the Congress made him master of the government. The state, which he had saved, he hoped to make strong by centralization and moderate reform. He had learnt, with the other statesmen of Europe, how much of the strength of France lay in the anity of her administration. He was no blind reactionary, md, though far from being a Liberal, he was sensitive to :he opinion of Europe, and wished to see the Papal ^ Tivaroni, Dominio Austriaco, II. 5. 1 6 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY dominions creditably governed and tbeir peoples prosperous. Even the Papacy, he saw, must recognise “ the new habits, new opinions, new lights, which political economy had fortified and spread.” His aim was to create a strong bureaucracy, immediately dependent on the Pope, and free alike from control of cardinals and people. The Legates who ruled the provinces were made to feel that they were no longer sovereign princes as of old. But, though Jonsalvi earnestly attempted to moderate the excesses of the restora- tion, he was not able, perhaps he hardly wished, to prevent it from bringing back many of the old abuses, the feudal privileges, the obsolete administration, the uncertain and complicated law. Church lands were restored, and the pur- chasers imperfectly indemnified; the Jesuits were solemnly reinstated. And when the great cardinal tried to reform the law and encourage education, the growing opposition foiled him ; he had the support of the nobles and educated middle classes, but he found himself baffled by priestly and popular antagonism, and Pius timid scruples. He gave up reform in disgust, and devoted his remaining years to the embellishment of Rome. At Naples, Ferdinand, obliged to outbid Murat, had prepared a proclamation promising a constitution (May i, 1815), but suppressed it when the news came of his rival s rapid downfall. The government kept its hand on the 4 migr 6 s and clergy, who returned hot for revenge. But though the purchasers of church lands were recognised, the ^migrSs got back their property, and the promised amnesty found limited observance. Sicily, which had sheltered the kina’ in his exile, was rewarded with true Bourbon ingrati- tude The old Norman Constitution had remained intact till 1812, when an attempt on the part of the king to tax without consent of Parliament led to a quarrel be- tween crown and barons, and, under the influence of Lord William Bentinck, who commanded the English garrison, the popular party carried what was practically a copy of the English Constitution. Liberties, to which the king had 1 Sansone, Rivoluzione, 274; Colletta, Storia,\ll. 410; Gualterio, Rivol- gimenti, II. 169; Pepe, Narrative, 86. THE CARBONARI 17 sworn, and England given her moral guarantee, might seem secure m spite of triumphant reaction. But the court at Naples feared the contagion of parliamentary government so close at hand; and Ferdinand, by his treaty with Austria,' had implicitly pledged himself to abolish the constitution. The English Government, after some hesitation, ^ was per- suaded to throw over the Sicilians, and A’ Court, the British minister at Naples, lent himself to undo Bentinck’s work, and perjure his country in Sicilian eyes. The ancient autonomy of Sicily was destroyed by an Act of Union (December 1816), which joined the island to Naples, and abolished the Sicilian flag and army. Despite a remnant of illusory privileges, Sicily had lost its independence ; every one realised that it had lost its constitution too, and that, though parliament was still nominally recognized, it would' never be summoned again. Ferdinand and Castlereagh, in defiance of legal right and plighted word, had reduced the proud and ancient state to an appanage of Naples.^ Reactionary, however, as the Restoration was, it was not cruel. The nobles and clergy sometimes thirsted for pro- scription, but, with the exception of Ferdinand, the princes who returned were men of honesty and elevated purpose. However unable to understand the spirit of the new age they had the welfare of the people at heart, and their government between 1814 and 1820 was mild and in- creasmgly so. But to the men of the Restoration the French rule had meant the breaking-up of the moral safe- guards on which society rested. It had, so they thought not without reason, weakened religion and endangered the family. They insisted on the re-establishment of strict paternal authority over the young, on the repeal of civil marriage and of the Napoleonic law of divorce. Education WAS given up to the clergy, security was taken for the ^ See above, p. ii. 2 MeUernich, Memoires, III. 8o ; Castlereagh, op. cit, III j. ^ British and Foreign State Papers, 1816-17, 552-564 ; Biar ^apoli, 534 ; castlereagh, op. cit., II. 112, 113, 237; Parliamentary ' Commons," une 21, 1821; Bela Sidle; Sicily and England; Pal - ^(^ggio ; Fyffe mdern Europe, II. 88 n. The Sicilians called Bentinck dliam the Good nd A’ Court “ William the Bad.” ’ VOL. I. B i8 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY obUgatory teaching of Catholic doctrine, the Universities were suspected and watched by the police. They had then- best exponent in Duke Francis of Modena. The prince, who has been painted, perhaps justly, as the worst t^ant of modern Italy, was in private hfe a patient, kmdly, courteous man, a devoted husband and father, a capable and hard-working ruler. His interest in his people was very real. He wished to see justice speedy, taxation light and regular; he aided ivith easy loans the needy peasants of his state ; in time of famine his generosity was princely. He tried to raise public morality by a bastardy law and t e reclamation of the fallen. But beyond the rudiments of morality and material well-bemg his light failed. He dreaded the political results of education, though a pnerous patron of art and such research as was safely dissevered from politics. The teacher who led the young li'f rM doctrines was in his eyes the greatest of smners. it a prince’s sacred duty, at whatever cost to himself and subjects, to save society from Liberalism and its disinteg- rating influences. For this he supported the nobles and priests restored the suppressed monasteries, scattered dis- tinctions broadcast, for “rich proprietors,” he said, “are always grateful to any one who gives them titles. An more than on baronial favour or priestly education he relied on the sword of the magistrate. In the “epidemic of criticism and insubordination, which leads to the loss o eternal salvation and of earthly tranquillity,” it was “a false philanthropy,” he thought, to punish lightly. “The Liberals he said, “ are sinners ; pray for their repentance, but punish the unrepentant.” ^ mild as the reaction was, it was bound to come ir 't with aU that was progressive in the nation. Mle class, which had learnt its strength under 'le, found its commerce paralysed by the cusi t divided state from state, by the obsolete 1 GalvR Cantli, Croni. commercial spe. TV., III. 126-140, 194; Bianchi, Ducati, I. 74» 75 ! >-142. I am inclined to discredit the stories of his respecting which see Tivaroni, op. at., I. 61 1, 624. THE CARBONARI ic, economy that still informed the law; it angrily resented the return of privilege, of arbitrary law, of clerical assertion, of intellectual stagnation. The armies, which had caught the democratic sense, which even in its worst times was present in the Napoleonic system, chafed at the loss of social liberties, the promotion of imigr 6 officers, the presence of the domineering Austrians, whom they had so often defeated. Theories of constitutional liberty thrived in such a ground. Russian agents during Alexander’s brief spell of Liberalism busily encouraged them. English travellers brought an atmosphere of freer life. The proceedings of the English and French parliaments, the movements of the Greek Hetairia, were keenly watched. There was brisk hterary^ life m the north and centre, and all the younger generation read Alfieri and Foscolo and translations from Germany and England. Everywhere, so far as the police and the ^censorship would allow, men were dreaming or discussing the hopes, vague and speculative for the most part, of national regeneration. Disappointed Liberals, civil servants who had lost their posts, cashiered officers and soldiers of the grandu armie longed for the unclouding of the freer day, whose dawn Napoleon had brought. For the first time since Guelf days something of a national party came into life under the auspices of the Carbonari. They were practically an offshoot of Italian Freemasonry, with similar statutes and ritual,^ but with a more definite political aim. The Freemasons had long been numerous and influential in the south of Italy, and the new society was founded by republican refugees, who fled from Joseph Bonaparte’s rule to the Abruzzi and Calabria. They were joined by others, whose only point of sympathy was a common hatred to French rule ; and thus from the first it was uncertain whether they should be counted as re- publicans or royalists. But they were obviously useful allies against the French, and as such were encouraged by Ferdinand and Bentinck. Murat in the latter years 01 his reign tried to win them, but in vain, and their oppo- sition hastened his fall. After the Restoration Ferdinand ^ Saiut-Edme, Carhonari, 7-8. 20 A HISTOKY OF ITALIAN UNITY naturally persecuted the men who had helped him to his throne, and his minister Canosa patronised the Calderari, the rival society which terrorised the Liberals, till Austria, anxious for some measure of decent government, persuaded Ferdinand to dismiss Canosa and dissolve them. Whether persecuted or protected, the Carbonari spread apace through southern Italy. Their democratic and communistic doc- trines, their Christian phraseology swept in converts of dif- ferent parties; their dim power satisfied men who were groping for authority in a state, whose official government commanded no respect ; their fantastic symbolism appealed to an uneducated people, traditionally susceptible to the esoteric and mysterious. They started with a high moral ideal ; their leaders hoped to purify society, and initiate an ill-defined socialism, inspired half by Christianity, half by the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Their enigmatic • prophecies were inspired by Christian mysticism ; ‘‘ Christ, they said, was the first victim of tyrants,” and the crucifix hung in every Carbonaro lodge.^ They were even tender to the religious orders and the Pope, and sometimes dreamt of a reformed Catholic church that he would lead. Theii rules breathed the austerest morality; severe penalties threatened any immoral or dishonourable conduct from a member, and persons of ill-fame were rigorously excluded from the lodges, till, as large numbers thronged for admis- sion, the officers relaxed the strictness of the scrutiny. It is more difficult to say what was their political creed. It was imparted to the higher, grades only, and the^ rank-and- file were contented with vague formulas of liberty and resistance to tyrants.^ The more elaborate doctrines of the leaders seem to have been a strange compound of Konaan Imperialism and the democratic semi- socialistic teachi£ig of Rousseau’s school. Sometimes they aimed at a federal government under the presidency of the Pope, sometimes at 1 Frost, Secret Societies, I. 214, 222 ; Cantii, op. cit., II. 130 ; Leopardi, Nar- razioni, lo ; Saint-Edme, op. cit., 15, 97 ; Cretineau-Joly, Veglise romaine, though the latter’s documents are of doubtful genuineness. 2 The oath of the highest grade, pledging them to exterminate kings, was a mere form : Pepe, Memoirs, II. 277. THE CARBONARI 2 1 an united Italy with Rome for its capital ; ' but the fantastic constitutions, which they loved to build, ran through every varying shade of republicanism and democratic monarchy, though the idea of Italian Independence was always present. A large number were more or less republicans, but the loose organization of a society, whose only links were personal and hierarchic, prevented any real unity of principle. They were practically a vast Liberal association, but with more power to destroy than to create. The threads of their complex organization were held by a supreme lodge, which sat at Naples. They had an elaborate administration of justice, with courts and juries, and penalties of boycotting or rarely of death j and their independent laws and execu- tive were accepted by the people, as more trusted than those of a government associated with every cruelty and " treachery. From Naples they spread northwards. The Carbonari, the Guelf Knights, the Adelfi of Piedmont and Parma, the Federali of Lombardy were hardly distinguishable sections of the great conspiracy, which prepared the revolution of 1820-21. The earliest public symptom of the new spirit appeared ip Lombardy, where it took a social and literary form. Disaffection had grown apace in the Austrian pro- vinces, as hope in the Emperor’s “ paternal ” government broke down. But the political instincts of the Lombards were too weak to allow of more than passive discontent. Active interest was confined to a section of the nobles and middle classes, especially at Milan and Brescia. Their chief was Confalonieri ; but his aristocratic sympathies, thinly veneered with the more popular spirit of Napoleon’s army, his Voltairean scepticism which had nothing in common with the new religious Liberalism, his want of stability and scrupulousness, made him an ill leader of a party of reform. He and his followers introduced steam- boats, spinning jennies, gas; they popularized Lancaster’s methods of education. In the salons of Milan they met ^ Saint-Edme, o^. cit., 38-40, 1 12-157; Hiv. stor. del risorg., I. 560-562; (^rte segrete, I. 143 ; Cantii, op. cit., II. 125 ; Heckethorne, Secret Societies, 108 ; Del governo austriaco, 1 1 7. 22 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY the Liberals of France and England — Madame de Stael, Byron, Hobhoiise, Brougham. The Romanticist literature was just beginning to reach Italy,^ and the new school founded the Conciliatore magazine, under the editorship of the gentle irresolute poet, Silvio Pellico, to wean their countrymen from the pedantry and unreality of the classical school. At first the government was contented with a paper attack, and writers of the old school were paid to decry the patriotism of thinkers, who sought their inspira- tion in Germany or England. But the Austrians soon saw the danger of the movement ; the new periodical “ smelt of the charcoal of the Carbonari,” and harassed and mutilated, till little was left of it but its name, it died after a year’s existence (October 1819); and the party plunged into conspiracy, as the schemes of the Carbonari matured for revolution. These schemes were ripest in the south. After the first wave of the Restoration Ferdinand’s rule had been more corrupt than tyrannical. The law was codified on French models ; there was little interference with speech or writing ; provincial and district councils made a skeleton of local administration estimable in theory. But no one trusted the government; Ferdinand’s word had been too often broken, and the royalist terror of 1799 could never be forgotten. The peasants groaned under the tyranny of their landlords, the drastic forest laws, the revival of con- scription. The national pride was hurt by the presence, till 1817, of an Austrian army of occupation, by the humiliation, when in the following year the King's anxiety to save his soul surrendered the traditional independence of Rome. The government was rotten and blundering; the new local bodies were kept in careful leading-strings ; justice was abused in the interests of the rich. Wide distress added to the discontent ; the cotton and brandy industries had declined as soon as the Peace opened the ports of Europe ; the corn and oil trade was crippled by the inter- ference of the government. Terrible famines and epidemics, 1 See below, p. in. THE CARBONARI 23 regarded by the populace as the divine chastisement for Murat’s death, left a trail of woe behind. Such a rule, feeble, undignified, corrupt, made a fair seed-bed of conspiracy. The Carbonari were becoming the real government of the country. Malcontents from every class joined them — the overtaxed small proprietors, the lower ranks of the civil service, unsatisfied office-hunters, many of the lower clergy. The army, ill-disciplined and smarting under a reduction of its privileges and the partiality shown to the 6 mi'gr 4 s, was largely affiliated ; the magistrates joined perforce. There was no longer the careful scrutiny of noviciates ; all sorts and conditions were admitted; and at whatever sacrifice of the society’s high standard, it could count its numbers by tens of thousands. The provincial militia, numbering over 50,000 men, fell into its hands. The militia had been organized to protect the country from the brigands by Guglielmo Pepe, a young Calabrian officer ; a Carbonaro himself, he was preparing to turn them to political uses, and a plot to seize the King with the Emperor of Austria and Metternich only failed through a misadventure.^ Pepe was maturing the con- spiracy, when he was anticipated by a military revolt. The bloodless Spanish Revolution inspired two young cavalry officers, Morelli and Salvati, to imitate that model of military democracy. Deserting with a troop of cavalry from their depot at Nola, they marched to Avellino, cheering for king and constitution (July 2, 1820).^ Disconnected as the movement was, its success showed how ripe the country was for revolt. In forty-eight hours the Revolution had spread through the Capitinata and Basilicata, a day later it had reached the Terra di Lavoro in one direction, and Puglia in the other, and several regiments had followed Pepe to the insurgent camp. There were now at least 1 2,000 armed constitutionalists at Avellino, and Pepe was preparing to take the offensive, when on the night of July 5 the King, “ of his own free will,” granted a constitution, but without defining its terms. Suspicious of the King’s sincerity, the Carbonari ^ Pepe, Memoirs, II. 182-183. ^ The Neapolitan Kevolution inspired Shelley’s Odes to Naples and Liberty. 24 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY demanded the Spanish Constitution of 1812,^ under which a parliament of a single chamber oversaw every detail of the executive. It was a masterpiece of doctrinahism, complicated and unworkable ; few or none knew more of it than that it was ultra-democratic. But it made a popular cry, and the King’s eldest son, Francis, who had been appointed Regent, was swept away by the tide and proclaimed its adoption. Army and people hailed it with ignorant enthusiasm ; the Regent swore to defend it with his blood ; the King pro- fessed himself a happy man to have lived to grant it, and swore fealty to it on the Gospel. The ministers resigned when the constitution was granted, and their place was taken by statesmen of Murat’s time. In comparison with the Bourbonists they were in a way Liberals, but they had been trained in a school that had little popular fibre in it, and they looked with suspicion on the more democratic Carbonari. Pepe alone among them represented the forces that had made the Revolution. It was inevitable that they should come into conflict with the Carbonaro organization. Not that there was, as they fancied, any real danger of disorder ; fears of agrarian laws or attacks on the Church were absurd, when the strength of the Car- bonari lay among the landed proprietors, and the Spanish Constitution tolerated no religion but Catholicism. But none the less they were a state within the state ; they controlled the militia and the local bodies, and the courts were afraid to proceed against their members. Even Pepe for a time was inclined to put them down with a high hand.^ The position, difficult enough in itself, was complicated by a revolution in Sicily. The Sicilians were exasperated by the loss of their independence, by the ingratitude of the King, by the odious subjection to Austria. The old local government had been destroyed, and the restraint which the new system laid on baronial tyranny was dearly bought by enslavement to a corrupt bureaucracy. The departure of the English garrison at the Peace had been followed by ^ Text in La Farina, Storia, V. 169. 2 Carrascosa, MemoireSy 135. THE CARBONARI 25 a scarcity of money and fall in prices, and the peasant could obtain no corresponding reduction in his rent. The mis^y, which was mainly due to economic changes, was set down to the loss of independence. So strong was the hatred to the rule of Naples, that in the greater portion of the island it hid the deep divisions that parted the propertied classes from the masses. To the nobles independence meant the return of feudalism, immunity from the better laws of the mainland, a free hand to monopolise the soil and lord it over their vassals. To the masses in the towns it brought vague hopes of plunder, or at best of agrarian decrees. It was only a few, the heirs of the Liberals of 1812, who saw in a return to parliamentary government a road to progress and reform. The news of the Revolution at Naples reached Palermo on the festival of its patron-saint, Santa Rosalia, and the city’s great holiday (July 14). The Spanish Constitution was hailed with enthusiasm, and it seemed for the moment as if Sicilians and Neapolitans might forget their differences in the common Liberal triumph. But the nobles dreaded the new development, for the Spanish Constitution would be fatal to their power ; some of the Liberals themselves were at one with them in wanting separation or Home Rule; and the earlier notes of reconciliation were drowned in the cry for independence and the Sicilian constitution of 1812.^ The puzzled crowd found its vent in sacking the house of the hated General Church, and destroying the tax-offices. But generally it was the blind tool of the nobles, and it was to serve their own ends that the nobles persuaded the Viceroy jto allow it to arm itself from the government’s stores. At ! first the troops had been inclined to fraternize, but the generals were frightened when they saw how events were j drifting, and on the 17th the soldiers attacked the mob and were ignominiously beaten. But the barons had used a 'double-edged tool. The prisons were forced, and the escaped convicts made the mob even more ready for mischief than before. Two of the great peers were barbarously murdered ; ^ Sansone, Rivoluzione, 28 et scq. ; Fa min, Revolution, 21 ; Colletta, Storia, II. 378; Palmieri, Saggio, 323 ; Afan di Rivera, Sicilia 24. 26 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY plunder and assassination terrorized the city, and a Junta of i nobles and “ consuls ” of the artisan crafts tried in vain to stem the disorder. It was not till they had taken the con- victs and unemployed into their pay and enrolled them into squadre, that modified order was restored. The riot made the insurrection a hopeless one from the i start. Power had passed to a coalition of feudalism and anarchy. The Liberals feared that an independent Sicily would be the sport of foreign powers, or that its parliament would he controlled by the barons ; and though if the Union were preserved, the Sicilian deputies would be in a minority at Naples, they hoped to win from a free government re- forms that a king had refused. Messina and much of the east of the island were loyal to Naples. Through the centre and west the officials and middle classes followed the Liberals of the capital, and savage faction-fights raged I through the island between the friends of the Spanish Con- stitution and the masses, whose hatred of their employers and sympathy with the Palermo mob made them fierce par- tisans of the Constitution of 1812. The Palermitans sent the squadre of the capital to help their friends. The squadre, which reappear at every crisis of Sicilian history, were irre- gular hands, sometimes of peasants armed and officered by the local lord, sometimes of criminal or semi- criminal prole- tarians from the cities, capable at times of reckless braveiy, but easily discouraged ; on the whole, of little military value, and often a terror to the populations they professed to de- fend. They carried fire and sword through the districts that refused allegiance to the capital; Caltanisetta was sacked and burnt, and the opposition was cowed in two-thirds of the island. But there was intimidation on both sides, and it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that with the great mass of Sicilians in the Avest and centre the one absorbing motive Avas the passionate demand for independence. The neAvs roused beAvilderment and indignation at Naples. Exaggerated rumours of the atrocities exasperated the people ; the Liberals regarded the movement as feudal 1 Sansone, op. cit., 76-77, 84-89, loi ; Famin, op. cit., 86, 132-133 ; Pepe, Memoirs, II. 334 ; Palmieri, op. cit., 365, et seq. THE CARBONARI 27 and reactionary, and the refusal to accept the Spanish Con- stitution seemed the working of mere faction. Except in Calabria, they were unanimous in calling for severe repres- sion. But the government hesitated. The King, perhaps with deliberate design to sow dissension, had promised the Sicilians the Constitution of 1812,^ and he and the Regent were playing the barons with hopes of Home Rule. At the end of August (August 31) the Regent, with the consent of the ministers, offered a separate parliament, provided that the island as a whole demanded it ; but at the same time Florestano Pepe, the brother of the minister, was sent with 7000 men to frighten the home-rulers from their programme, and give the government its chance to escape from its promises.^ Advancing with his troops on Palermo, Pepe found the Junta ready to come to terms. The propertied classes were willing to accept any compromise as an escape from anarchy. They had organized a citizen-guard, which had had daily skirmishes' with the assassin gangs, and was beginning to control the capital. The Junta willingly ac- cepted Pepe’s promise to grant an amnesty, and refer the decision between Union or Home Rule to a representative assembly of the island (September 22). But the mob, frenzied by fears for its own safety (for the amnesty specially excluded common crime), and impelled by their wild passion of patriotism, turned on the Junta as Pepe’s accomplices, and fired on the citizen guard. Again the gangs, superior in numbers and courage, were easily victorious; again the prisons were opened and palaces were sacked, while Pepe was attacking by land and sea. Ten days they fought him with desperate bravery, and again and again he was driven back, till his position became critical. But reaction was in full tide at Palermo. All but the mob were sick of the anarchy, and pillage, and savagery ; the squadre had lost ter- ribly in the ten days’ fighting, and each day saw more who were weary of the struggle. On October 5 one of the nobles cajoled the unconquered people into surrender. The terms that were offered and accepted, repeated Pepe’s earlier pro- ^ Sansone, op. cit., 23, 58, 59. Ih., 112-114, 306; Pantaleone e Lumia, Memoire, 216-218. / / 2 8 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY posals, but stipulated that in any case Sicily should remain under the crown of Naples, and accept the Spanish Con- stitutiond Sicily had been conquered, but a more'formidable danger was showing on the horizon. The Revolution had broken like a thunderclap on Metternich s security ; it had been his boast that he had built a system safe from revolutionary disturbance, and the Neapolitan rising “ upset all his calcula- tions.” Already threats were heard from Vienna, and it became more than probable that Austria would attempt to strangle the new-born constitution. But the Neapolitans were rejoicing in their deliverance too much to think of danger. The taxes were paid before they fell due, and the better-to- do enrolled themselves in the militia. Parliament met on October i , and the King again swore to protect the constitu- tion. There had been pressure, perhaps intimidation, at the elections; but the majority of the deputies were moderate men, taken almost exclusively from the middling proprietors and professional classes ; well-meaning amateurs, their heads full of schemes of reform, but inexperienced, and preferring rhetoric to legislation. Despite the show of peace and har- mony, the future was thick with difficulties. Nothing had been done to prepare the country for invasion. The Car- bonari seemed bent on cowing or superseding parliament. The reactionary party was recovering from its first shock, and a Bourbon s word could never be relied on. There was only too much ground to suspect that treason was hatching in the palace, and that the feeble ministers were making themselves its tools. Parliament opened with a fatal blunder. Florestano Pepe’s treaty had laid the foundations of peace with Sicily, and the islanders had offered 10,000 men for the common defence. Blinded by the prejudice against the Sicilians, the Chamber repudiated the treaty (October 15), and the ministers were only too ready to escape behind it from their obligations. It was as dishonourable as it was fatuous, but Pepe protested in vain against the unworthy act. General Colletta was sent to supersede him, and the new 1 Famin, op. cit, 141-187 ; Colletta, op. cit., 395, 396. THE CARBONARI 29 governors stern rule produced a show of order. But Sicilian hate only smouldered the more. Except in the eastern provinces, deputies to the parliament at Naples were elected only under pressure or by the official vote. The Sicilian Carbonari were preparing a general conspiracy through the winter, and the Neapolitans not only lost the Sicilian contingent, but had to keep 6000 of their best troops to overawe the island. Parliament then turned to attack the ministry. The men who composed it had neither the training nor the capacity for the times. They were afraid of popular forces, they felt how little they had in common with a democratic movement, they knew the strength of Austria; and their policy, so far as they had one, was to temporize, to hamper the revolution, to humour the King and Metternich ; and so with good fortune to save the country from invasion. But they were the King’s dupes. Ferdinand knew that Austria would never sanction the constitution, and when the allied sovereigns invited him from Troppau to meet their adjourned conference at Laybach, he asked permission of parliament to go (December 6), and meant to dissolve it by force, if it refused.! There were two feasible policies before the deputies. They might with good prospect of success have bid for the support of France, and appeased the Allies by consenting to a house ol peers and a large increase in the power of the crown.^ Or, deposing Ferdinand in favour of his son, and throwing down the gauntlet to Austria, they might have roused the country to a brave defence and carried the revolution across the Papal border. They did neither. Guglielmo Pepe alone stood for the bolder alter- native. The Carbonaro doctrinaires would not abate an iota of the constitution ; but anxious to give no pretext for invasion, perhaps trapped by the prospect of getting rid of the king, they resolved that he should go. The King wrote amiably from Laybach about his ^ La Cecilia, Memoir e, 26 ; Carrascosa, Memoir es, 237. 2 Palma, Napoli, 237, 238; Le comte D., Precis, 41 ; Carrascosa, op. ciL, 230, 231; Bianchi, Diplomazia, II. 37; Wellington, Supp. Despatches, N.S., I. 401. 30 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY greyhounds. Then, dropping the mask, he warned his j ministers that the Allies were determined to put down the constitution, and with feeble apologies announced his concurrence in their plans. Despite the suspicions of the Powers, Metternich had won their consent to send an ‘ Austrian army to restore him to absolute power.^ Nothing was left now but to make a brave defence. There was still j no small chance of success. The government could put | 40,000 regulars and at least as many militia into the field. | Even if the army were driven back along the coast, parlia- j ment could retire to Calabria, and keep up a defence in the | Apennines, which would weary out the invader. Piedmont, ; though the Neapolitans did not know it, was at the point of rising ; revolution was fermenting in Romagna and the Marches, and a prolonged resistance might have stirred a movement there, which would cut the Austrian communi- cations. The people were eager for war;^ all that was I needed was a vigorous lead. But of this there was none ; the Regent was playing a double game ; the incurable { optimism of the government gave the reactionaries free play ; parliament buried its head in the faith that because its cause was “ innocent,” nobody would attack it. The army distrusted its officers ; there was no matured plan of defence; and it was not till the last moment that the militia was called out. The Austrians crossed the Po late in January, and advanced slowly southwards. The Neapolitans, who mus- tered between 40,000 and 50,000, half of them militia, were divided into two bodies ; the first corps, under Carrascosa, | defending the line of the Garigliano, the second, under Pepe, occupying the Abruzzi passes. It would probably have ' been wise strategy to remain on the defensive. But Carras- oosa and Colletta, who was now minister of war, were dis- j posed to treat with the enemy and it was possibly the | knowledge of this that induced Pepe, who had the whole i ^ Castlereagh, op. cit., IV. 3 12-3 17, 350, 372. ^ Pepe, Narrative, 31, 33, 38; Id. Memoirs, III. 108, 128, 135; Voce del Popolo, 1 19; Colletta, op. cit., II. 434. 2 Carrascosa, op. cit., 330-331 ; Colletta, op. cit., II. 435 ; Pepe, Memoirs, III. 143-144- THE CARBONARI 31 Austrian army in front of him, to cross the frontier and attack them at Rieti (March 7). The militia fought well for the raw soldiers that they were, and retreated in good order after seven hours’ fighting. But defeat destroyed their confidence; proclamations from the King, threatening death and confiscation to all who resisted, scared the popu- lation, and the army melted away among the mountains. At Naples the guards declared for the King, and parliament, giving up the game, humbly appealed to his clemency. The Austrians entered Naples without another blow (March 23). Three days after Pepe’s defeat at Rieti the Revolution broke out in Piedmont. The whole strength of Piedmontese conservatism had mustered to wreck Prospero Balbo’s efforts for reform, and the discontent became the more acute for the hopes that he had raised. Constitutionalism became the fashion of the young nobles, and the army was led by men who had fought at Austerlitz, to whom Austria was always the enemy, and who dared to think that Piedmont must “ choose between vassalage to her and the Italian crown.” The Carbonari gathered together the threads of discontent. But whatever it was elsewhere, in Piedmont Carbonarism was not republican. Victor Emmanuel’s ani- mosity to the “white leeches” of Austria was still smoul- dering, and De Maistre was intriguing at St. Petersburg for a North Italian kingdom under Russian protection.^ The Carbonari were not entirely building on sand, when they looked to the King to champion them and draw the nationalists of all Italy to his flag.^ But before the war of independence came, the conspirators wished to secure reform at home, and the majority determined to demand the Spanish Constitution. Even to this they fondly hoped the King would accede, and to assist them they looked for the con- nivance of Charles Albert, the young Prince of Carignano, and heir presumptive to the crown. He came of a younger branch of the House of Savoy. His father had copied Philippe £galite in miniature at the ^ Bianchi, Diplomazia, I. 454. ^ Id. Santa Rosa, no; Santa Rosa, Memorie, 31. 32 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY time of the revolutionary wars ; himself had been brought up at Paris as a French citizen, had held rank in Napoleon s army, and been a Count of the Empire. He was now twenty-two years old, tall, manly, devoted to arms ; brave and proud, but without strong affection, and with a youth’s morbid sensitiveness for his own freedom. The Liberals had long looked to him as the one prince from whom they might find real sympathy. Monti had sung his praises, and the prince had not concealed his hopes of reform and independence. Though it might suit him at court to parade an orthodox horror of modern thought, he openly encour- aged the Liberals, and had relations with the Carbonari, though probably he was never initiated into the society. The Neapolitan revolution fired him with ambition to lead n the nationalists, to drive the Austrians from Italy, and extend the bounds of Piedmont. ^ I The plan of the conspirators was to extort the Spanish Constitution, then move the army rapidly across the Ticino^ join their forces with the conspirators, whom Confalonieri was preparing for revolt at Milan and Brescia, overpower the denuded garrisons,^ and cut off the Austrian retreat from Naples. They took for granted that the Piedmontese troops would win an easy victory, and the Lombards promised to summon a representative assembly to vote on the question of fusion with Piedmont. An accidental affray at Turin between the university students and the military (January 1821) brought the exasperation against the government to a point, and for two months the court and the people faced each other. Early in March the real or supposed discovery of the plot decided the Liberals to rise at once. They only waited to pledge Charles Albert to the revolution, and an interview took place between the prince and some of the leading conspirators. Of what passed there, we have directly conflicting statements ; but the probability is that the prince promised his ad^ when satisfied that no hostility was intended against morrow, 1 Cantu, Conciliator e, 164 2 There were 13,000 Aust, ops left in the North : Castlereagh, op. cit., IV. 375, 378 ; Casati, cL ■ 1 18 ; Carte segrete, II. 195- 3 Vol. II., Appendix A THE CARBONARI 33 1 frightened and penitent, above all, anxious to have no share I in suborning the army, he betrayed the secret to the govern- jment. Discovering his defection, the Turin conspirators I tried to defer the rising ; but their accomplices in the garri- j son at Alessandria, whether ignorant of the prince’s treachery jor impatient of waiting, proclaimed the revolution and (the Spanish Constitution, and saluted Victor Emmanuel las King of Italy (March 10). In the capital itself the students clamoured for the constitution, and the garrison began to waver (March 1 2). The officers refused to march against the rebel city, and the movement seemed to have friends in the government itself. In the Council the Queen was alone in opposing concession. The King, perhaps, had pledged himself to the Powers at Laybach to part with none of his absolute authority ; but he shrank from a resistance that meant civil war, and when the garrison threatened to bombard the city, unless the constitution were granted, he , solved the dilemma by abdication. It was a heavy blow to the conspirators, who had been careful to proclaim their (loyalty, and boasted that they were setting the King free to follow the promptings of his Italian heart.” Before his abdication he had appointed Charles Albert regent, pending the arrival of the new king, his brother Charles Felix. The young prince, left alone and uncounselled (for the ministers had resigned), had a task beyond his years. He was loyal to the royal family, but tied by his relations with the in- surgents ; he had to save the capital from anarchy, the country from foreign occupation. He probably knew how unready the army was to fight the Austrians. To a deputa- tion that urged the immediate adoption of the constitution, he replied that he was ready to die for the royal cause, isvhich he represented ; but a day later, as the garrison grew QQore threatening, and the Notables, whom he consulted, idvised surrender, he granted the Spanish Constitution r under the stress of circumstances and to preserve the state :)0 the new King.” For the moment he seemed to revert to Ms earlier enthusiasms ; he spoke of union with Naples lind national glory, and made no secret of his nationalist sympathies to the Lombard messengers, who came from VOL. I. c 34 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Confalonieri to urge him to march to Milan.^ But he was frightened back by an uncompromizing manifesto, in which Charles Felix refused to recognize any concessions ; and when he received from the new King a peremptory order to go to Novara, he secretly fled with a portion of the garrison. After this there was little hope for the Revolution. Confalonieri played an ambiguous and irresolute part, and the Lombards would take no action till the Piedmontese had crossed the frontier. The Genoese indeed rose angrily on receiving Charles Felix’s manifesto, the reserves came up well to join their colours, and the Revolution was willingly accepted in many of the cities. But the capital was cold ; the nobles disliked the Spanish Constitution, and after | Charles Albert’s desertion the moderate men lost hope and ■ drifted away. The new ministers might have done some- thing to rouse the country, but they had no stuff for vigorous action. Santa Rosa, perhaps the only earnest man among them, tried, when it was too late, to give life to the Revolu- tion by a rush on Lombardy. “ Sink domestic differences and hasten to the Ticino; Lombardy waits for you, and France is stirring.” It was the one hope of success. But the soldiers had lost their enthusiasm, and more and more troops went over to the loyalist camp at Novara. The tidings of Rieti deepened the gloom, and the Turin ministers | in despair, Santa Rosa dissenting, accepted Russian media- tion in the hopes of staving off an Austrian invasion. But Charles Felix on the one side and the Alessandrian Junta on the other would have no compromise. The Austrians crossed the Ticino, and the constitutional troops advanced on Novara. To the last they refused to believe that the loyalist regiments would fight on the Austrian side. But the patriotism of the army had little root, and the 9000 constitutionalists found themselves confronted by an almost equal force of Piedmontese and a large Austrian contingent. 1 Leopardi, op. cit, 253; Poggi, Storia, I. 346; Bollati, Fasti, 1 . 13; Pallavicino, Memorie , I. 22-23 ; Arrivabene, Intorno, 118 ; Mario, Mazzini, 32 ; contra Martini, Storia, IV. 210 n. ; Brofferio, Miei Tempi, XII. 20. In view of the passages in Pallavicino and Arrivabene, it is impossible to believe Confa- lonieri’s denials in Casati, op. cit., I. 30, 45, 108-112. THE CARBONARI 35 A battle outside Novara (April 8) ended in their easy rout. The Austrians occupied Alessandria, and Genoa after securing the escape of the fugitives made a tame surrender. The Revolution had ended in complete discomfiture. It . never had the stuff of success in it. Its sudden collapse in the south pointed to some deep-seated weakness, for Neapo- litan soldiers had proved their worth against Massena and in Napoleons campaigns. It had, indeed, great difficulties • to face ; the hideous blunder in Sicily, the treachery of ; King and Regent, the European coalition made success not I easy in any event ; but the Austrian forces were not over- whelming, and the Revolution might have triumphed but for its own mistakes. It fell into the hands of men who had little sympathy for it ; and if it proved the abnegation of the Carbonari, it proved their great unwisdom that they handed the government to men, whose whole training taught them suspicion of the Liberal movement, made them tem- porize and compromize, and wait on events. There could be no harmony under such conditions, and the rivalry of Pepe and Carrascosa was typical of the suspicions that divided Carbonari . and Murattists all through. Ostensibly they worked together, but the want of trust on either side drove the Carbonari to organize an extra-legal power which para- lyzed the executive. But a deeper-seated weakness than Murattist lukewarmness or Carbonaro suspicion was the want of stability in the people. The Neapolitans, now as always, rushed into the Revolution, and rushed out of it again. They welcomed it, they cheered for it, they were willing [even to march to Avar, but the first defeat discouraged them, .and they had no fibre in them for a long and desperate defence. Had they had something of the reckless bravery lof the Palermo mob, they might have triumphed ; but Neapolitan nervelessness stood in sharp contrast to Sicilian [virility, and Naples lost her chance of the hegemony of Italy. In those days, Avith the memory of Murat behind her, Avhen |the House of Savoy had yet won little place in Italian ■imagination, Naples, mistress of one-third of the peninsula, might have taken the lead of Italian destinies, and changed the course of Italian history. It was a lucky day for Italy, 36 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY when the Bourbons and their unstable subjects missed this, but not the last, opportunity. In the north there was even less chance of success. In Naples, at all events, the Revolution had been democratic ; here it failed even to interest the masses. The anglo- maniac young nobles wanted a House of Peeis, and the Lombard grandees looked to the Piedmontese to restore the lost privileges, which Austria refused to give them back. The army had learnt in the French wars to regard itself as arbiter of the nation’s politics, and cared little to consult the people for Avhom it professed to act. Had the Revolution triumphed, it Avould have left the country under a parliamentary aristocracy as exclusive as English Whigs. But though less popular, the Piedmontese Revolu-j tion had a higher note than at Naples. It was not simply] the revolt of discontent, the protest of individual rights' and ambitions debarred of outlet ; there was the rebellion of sentiment, which Alfieri and Foscolo had inspired, and which looked vaguely forAvard to the golden future of a great free Italy. But the honest and well-meaning^ men Avho led it Avere sentimentalists, Avho mistook words; for facts, enthusiasts for liberty and independence, but avRIi little comprehension of their meaning. With great capacity I for self-illusion, great ignorance of the feeling of the country,; they neglected the detailed preparation which earns success,: and were easily discouraged when the dramatic and sensa- tional changed to need for patient endeavour. They made no attempt to summon parliament ; the Alessandrian leaders styled themselves the J unta of the Italian Federation, but their political vicAvs stopped short at a North Italian King- dom. They were full of the one-man idea, Avhich had sur- vived from the Napoleonic rule, and thought success assured, if they had a prince’s patronage. In the educational or social uplifting of the masses they had little interest. Ex- cept to reduce the price of salt, no social legislation marked the rule of the provisional government. Theh politics Avere of the barracks and draAving-room, not of the market-place. Santa Rosa stands preeminent among them,^ but even he, pure and disinterested as he Avas, had no masculine democratic THE CARBONARI 37 fibre. Nurtured on Rousseau and Foscolo, he had all the passive virtues ; but his unpractical, dreamy nature was helpless in the face of popular apathy and Austrian steel. Both Revolutions were alike in proving how weak was the sentiment of Unity. A few like Santa Rosa hoped to combine the national forces of north and south ; Man- zoni had an ode ready on Italy, “ one in arms, in speech, in laws, in heart.” But the Piedmontese conspirators left the Neapolitans in ignorance of their plans, and delayed their rising till the Neapolitan movement was nearly doomed. Piedmont, Lombardy, Romagna, Naples, Sicily, each had its unconnected policy, sometimes with divergent or hostile aims. The Piedmontese and Lombards were already dis- puting whether Turin or Milan should be the future capital.^ The Sicilians were so dominated by hatred of Naples, that after the repudiation of Florestano Pope’s treaty many of them welcomed the Austrians and rejoiced in their success. The Neapolitans preferred to sacrifice the national cause rather than give Sicily home rule, and rejected the appeal from the nationalists of the Marches to carry the Revolution into Papal territory.^ It was clear that the work of the Carbonari was on wrong lines or incomplete. The Liberal movement had yet to become popular and national. The Revolution had its feeble echoes through the Po valley. At Modena Francis had been frightened from his plottings with the Pope against Austria, to crush an incipient revolt. Conspiracy was busy in Romagna, where the “American Hunters” drilled in the forest of Ravenna, md Byron stored his house with arms for a rising that failed to come off.^ Now the whole country lay crushed, md at the mercy of the victors. The statesmen at Lay- bach had been prompt to stamp out the Revolution, but they vere anxious not to exasperate the country by an excessive severity. Austria, indeed, permitted herself the luxury of ^ Archivio Triennale, I. 72, 73. 2 Martini, op. cit., HI. 255. ^ Moore, Byron, 441, 468; Carte segrete, 1 . 205, 208, 303, 407; Del Cerro, Polizi.a, 134-140. He thought the conspirators “wanting in principle.” 38 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY a persecution, infamous even among her own state-trials, and sent Confalonieri (his life saved by his wifes heroic importunacy),^ and many another of his comrades to the Moravian fortress-prison of the Spielberg, where the Emperor Francis played with his victims like a cat with maimed birds, and whose horrors Pellico’s pen has made the symbol of Austrian cruelty. Metternich allowed Francis of Modena to wreck a revenge as savage.^ But elsewhere he thought it prudent that a veil should be drawn over the past. He insisted that Ferdinand should make a small concession to Liberalism by increasing the power of the Provincial Councils, and giving Sicily an independent civil service, II with a separate though subordinate Council under the) Viceroy. But the Bourbon was thirsting for revenge, and no counsels of expediency were likely to deter him. \ Massacre, indeed, was now more than the times 'would .l swallow ; but he was successful in removing the veto ■: that the Allies had put on persecution. The civil service, the army, the beneliced clergy were purged of all who had Liberal sympathies. Men were arrested quicker than the-, courts could try them; public whippings made Naples aghast ; and though the Austrians interfered to save the i revolutionary officers (except Salvati and Morelli) from death, thirty were sent to an island penal settlement to ^ sleep on the bare ground and starve.^ Ferdinand recalled Canosa and the Jesuits to complete the work.^ Holocausts were made of suspected books, and a catechism, founded 1 For Teresa Confalonieri, see Mrs. Browning’s lines “ Spielberg’s grate, At which the Lombard woman hung the rose Of her sweet soul by its own dewy wmight, To feel the dungeon round her sunshine close, And pining so, died early, yet too late For what she suffered.” For Metternich’s attempt to induce Confalonieri to inculpate Charles Albert (which I see no reason to doubt), see Gualterio, Rivolgamenti, I. 63, 66, 67; Tabbarrini, Capponi, 168; Andryane, Memoires, 11 . 59, 62; Cantu, Con- cUiatore, 152, 192. _ o -r, i. ht 2 Among those who escaped was Antonio Panizzi, of British Museum fame. 3 Gabriel Eossetti was among those who escaped, the re fellon in Cantu, Cronistoria, II. 234, 256. See his song against THE CARBONARI 39 on Bossuet, was burnt because it contained a reference to love of country. Heavy import-duties stopped the intro- duction of foreign or Italian literature, the minister Medici confessing that his object was to keep the people ignorant. Again and again the government struck savagely at the Carbonari. No Liberal was safe, and fearful of proscription many hed to the mountains, or roamed the country in armed bands. Assassination on both sides marked the violence of political feeling ; and when Vesuvius broke out in eruption, and inhospitable Rizzo ^ was submerged by a tidal wave, the superstitious populace remembered Murat’s death, and marked it as an omen for the Bourbons. And even when Ferdinand’s revenge was sated, the sordid chronic oppression, the measureless corruption, the burdens of the Austrian occupation, which, before they left in 1827, cost the country three years’ revenue, stereotyped the misery of the land. And though, after a financial crisis in 1824, the government made some fiscal reforms, its meddlesome fears still hampered trade. Medici refused to sanction societies for improving the mulberry or lighting toAvns with gas ; “ associations,” he said, “ are hurtful to the state, for they enlighten the people, and spread Liberal ideas.” In the midst of the discontent and misgovernment, Ferdinand’s death brought his long reign of sixty-five years to a dishonoured close (January 4, 1825). The rule, which had begun with Tannucci’s reforms, had changed at the French Revolution to the savagest, wickedest tyranny ; had encouraged Fra Diavolo and his bands to make the streets of Naples run with blood; had woven its long shameless tissue of broken pledges and fierce revenge and unspeak- able corruption. A brutish, illiterate, superstitious tyrant, Ferdinand had made the name of Bourbon for ever execrated in the land. In Piedmont Charles Felix emulated his royal relative in the severity of the reaction ; but Piedmontese traditions saved it from the wantonness and indecency of Ferdinand’s misrule. Charles Felix was not cruel by nature ; but he looked on the Revolution as the accursed thing, and meant 1 See above, p. 8. 40 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY to stamp it out. The son of an Infanta, the son-in-law of Ferdinand of Naples, Charles Felix was an absolutist of the straitest sect. Even his own ministers savoured to him of revolution, and he assumed a lofty scorn for an innovating generation. ‘‘ The King,” so he laid down, “ is the only person empowered by God to judge of the fittest means to compass the welfare of his subjects, and it is the first duty of a loyal subject not to complain.” But he had no qualifica- tions for playing the grand monarch. Alone among the princes of Savoy, he was no soldier. He “ was no King to be bored,” and he hated alike state business and court ceremonial. Of poor presence, superstitious, irritable, he had few friends, and his chroniclers have dealt hardly with him. : Meanwhile, Liberal Piedmont lay stunned. Twelve i thousand Austrians remained to cow the country. The i exiles scattered to Spain and ‘^Vance and England,^ to Egypt and South America; Santa Rosa taught languages i at Nottingham, till he went to meet a hero’s death at s Sphacteria. Still there was progress; some of Balbo’s j projects of judicial reform were carried through ; agricul- tural science was taught, the drama encouraged, literature protected and stifled. And slowly Charles Felix broke to a certain extent from his Austrian and Roman friends. He had his quarrels with the Pope on ecclesiastical taxation. After the first fit of gratitude to Austria, he remembered i her earlier unfriendliness. He grumbled at Metternichs j insolence, and the protracted occupation of Alessandria ; i and though he encouraged Austria to stay at Naples, he j rejected her proposals for common action against the Liberals, and lost no opportunity to parade his sovereign independence. ^ A Committee, on which Hume and Whitbread sat, was formed to relieve the refugees. CHAPTER III SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITAL Y Piedmont : its growth, and character ; the House of Savoy ; government ; nobles ; clergy ; army ; the class system ; justice ; education ; trade ; Genoa ; peasants ; Piedmontese hegemony. Lombardy-Vbnetia : the Austrian rule ; Milan under the Kingdom of Italy ; the bureaucracy ; taxation ; justice ; clergy ; education ; censorship ; local government ; the Congregations ; state-trials ; police ; Lombard character ; nobles ; middle classes ; peasants ; nationalist sentiment. Piedmont The Kingdom of Piedmont was the creation of centuries of patient statecraft. From lords of a few Burgundian fiefs, the Counts of Savoy had come to possess the second greatest state of Italy, and hold high rank among the secondary powers of Europe. It had not been an easy work. Mid- way between the French and Austrian powers, a battle- ground in every war between the great hereditary enemies, the little state again and again ran the danger of extinction. But the House of Savoy sold its help to the highest bidder, and generally found itself on the winning side. In the seventeenth century it was the only power in Italy that held its own against the Spanish domination. Early in the following century it won Alessandria and the Lomellina as the price of its help to Austria and England. Twenty-five years later a French alliance secured for it Novara. In the war of the Austrian Succession it returned to the alliance with Vienna, and gained the country up to the Ticino. There was hardly a treaty but it crept on to some new fragment of territory, and at the outbreak of the French Revolution the Kingdom of Sardinia, as diplomatists called it, comprised the north-western Italian plain to the Apennines, Sardinia, Nice, and Savoy. It was not a very noble policy ; 41 42 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY as a Belgian diplomatist observed, geography hardly allowed the Kings of Piedmont to be honest. But it was the only alternative to extinction, and begging the morality of it, the Savoy princes and their statesmen showed a masterly skill and perseverance. “ The policy of the Court of Turin,” wrote Horace Walpole, ‘‘has the subtlety of the air it breathes ” ; and Chesterfield extolled its diplomatists as the model for his generation. The history of the little state moulded its temper. The people of the “ Subalpine ” Kingdom, like its princes, were stubborn, wary, serious, with a military pride and concentra- tion of purpose rare in Italy. Hardly Italians, speaking French or their own half-Proveneal dialect,^ with little sense of heritage in the past of Italy, they despised litera- ture and art, and were happy in the mephitic dulness that stifled strangers in Turin. More shrewd than inventive, their agriculture was backward, their industries hardly existent. For political or religious liberties the mass of the people cared nothing. Hence they accepted with undemonstrative loyalty the paternal military absolutism of the House of Savoy. Its princes were men of high ability and sense of duty. Brought face to face with their subjects in the long struggle for existence, they had identified themselves with the nation. The court was stern, hardworking, simple; the govern- ment an honest, unprogressive, punctilious bureaucracy ; its exchequer one of the best regulated in Europe. It had its analogies with Prussia, and much of its system was con- sciously modelled on hers. It fostered commerce, en- couraged nascent industries by royal patronage and a strict protective system. It guarded the masses from pressing grievances, made humane laws for the relief of the poor, protected farmers from unfair rents, legislated to safeguard leaseholders, levied forced loans on the rich to procure corn in time of famine;^ till the French rule popularized the ^ A 1 fieri : “Italian speech is contraband at Turin.” Even at a much later date, when the Piedmontese had learnt to write Italian, they were lavish of French idioms. 2 Bianchi, Monarchia, I. 192-196, 211-213; Avvocato milanese, Opuscoli, I. 1 29-147 ; Sclopis, Legislazione italiana, III. 222. By a law of 1762, repealed ^ PIEDMONT 43 new laissez-faire economy, and made all efforts vain to return again to the traditions of a restrictive paternal rule. But of political rights or social progress neither prince nor people recked. As elsewhere in Italy, person and property and honour were at the mercy of the police, though in quiet times their powers lay dormant, and, except when it was frightened, the government was too much bound by pre- cedent to be capriciously tyrannical. The right of register- ing laws, which attached to the Senate or Supreme Court, as to the French parlements, was of small real value, for its members were nominees of the crown, and not as in France hereditary holders of office. The magistrates, the one genuine element of opposition, were gradually degraded. The communes had their Councils with considerable liberties, and Turin and Genoa had their municipalities ; but though there was a skeleton of provincial local govern- ment, the provinces were ruled by military governors, the cities by the commandants of the garrisons. In the words of a Piedmontese noble there was only a king who com- mands, a nobility which supports him, and a people which obeys.” The nobles, like their king, strict, economical, proud, were a military caste. New creations brought in a certain element of Liberalism, but the older peers, tenacious of their feudal rights, lived a life of patriarchal simplicity, and though often kind and generous to their vassals, ruled them with a heavy hand. The younger sons, left portionless by the strict laws of entail, monopolized the higher posts in the army and civil service ; but they worked hard and strove to live worthily of their families and nation. The clergy were kept in comparative subservience to the state. Ecclesiastical property paid its share to the revenue, and it was the traditional policy of the law courts to restrict clerical jurisdiction. The traditions of the Piedmontese by the French, but apparently re-enacted in 1814, any person renting a house in Turin under a written agreement might, on the determination of his tenancy, prolong his lease. The rent might be raised, but not unreason- ably, and there was reference to an arbitrator with plenary powers. The Senate of Turin tried to minimise the operation of the law as being “ against the tenor of liberty.” 44 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ' Church were Gallican, though the Restoration saw their gradual decay. The bishops were nominated by the crown, and in Savoy the decrees of Trent had never been recog- nized. Even Charles Felix and Charles Albert, devoted as they were to the Papacy, suffered no infringement of their prerogative. But the clerical yoke weighed heavy on the i) people. The Jesuits returned in i8i8; Charles Felix dis- liked them, Charles Albert protected them, but under both reigns alike they slid into greater power, winning a mighty influence through their schools, which educated a large proportion of the boys of the richer classes. The “ Society of Catholic Friendship,” whose object seems to have been to defend the Church alike from Liberals and government, was powerful in the aristocracy, and by its proselytism and doles won many of the army and the poor. Religions, other than the Roman Catholic, were only tolerated ; even in 1845 no Protestant chapel was allowed in Turin outside I the walls of the embassies. The Protestant Waldenses, despite the ancient protection of England, might not hold office, or send their children to school outside their ovm valleys. Mixed marriages were unrecognized by the state, and as late as 1838 their issue, illegitimate in the eyes of the law, were liable to be taken from their mothers and baptized in the Catholic faith.^ The Jews were excluded from public office and the universities. And the Church bound a grievous burden on the whole national life. Every Piedmontese was driven to communicate at Easter ; shops were compulsorily closed on religious festivals ; cabinet ministers observed fast-days on pain of losing office ; twice a year classes were suspended at the universities for a week of religious observance. There were over 300 monasteries and convents on the mainland and 100 in Sardinia,^ some of scandalous repute. The ecclesiastical courts, despite the opposition of the judges, reserved all cases to which a cleric was a party, all matters of conjugal rights, of tithes, of blasphemy, and heresy. But the Church was content with 1 Boggio, Chiesa e Stato, 153-155 ; Bert, Valdesi, 278, 284-285 ; v. Kaumer, Italy, I. 247-248. - Serristori, Statistica, 4-5 ; this is probably an under-estimate, in 1854 there were 604 in all. PIEDMONT 45 outward conformity. The clergy themselves often bore an indifferent name. Among the richer classes religion was the handmaid of fashion, and though there was no overt scepticism, there was little fervour and abundant hypocrisy. Despite th^ frequent and splendid ceremonies of its churches, Turin was perhaps the most immoral city in North Italy. Even more than clergy and nobles, the pivot of the Piedmontese system was the army. Hereditary traditions, the necessities of their position, ambitions, more or less defined, of expansion in Italy, made the kings of Piedmont maintain a force disproportionate to the size of the state. Three-quarters of the revenue went to support the army and navy, and the little country could put 70,000 men into the field. The generals, indeed, had seldom any qualifica- tion but their birth ; they were martinets in the barracks, blunderers in the field. There was little promotion for officers from the middle classes, and the prizes of the service went to the crass and ill-educated cadets of noble houses, for it was a maxim at the War Ministry that “books make a soldier unlearn his trade.’' But the officers were brave, the men, even when they hated the service, docile and strenuous, and in those days of low military efficiency, the Piedmontese army was no contemptible force. Nobles, clergy, army were all part of the machinery for keeping the people loyal to one religious and monarchical creed, for making Piedmont respected among its grasping neighbours. The whole social life of the country was per- meated by the discipline and narrowness of military rule. The princes were “ by necessity and choice drill-sergeants.” Young men were absolutely under the control of their fathers till twenty-five years of age, considerably so even in mature years. The country was, as Alfieri called it, “ a noble prison.” Turin, with its streets mapped out in rec- tangular precision like a Roman camp, was “half barrack, half cloister.” Close guilds of masters and men carried a rigid organization into industry. The sharpest distinction of classes was preserved. The nobles were, perhaps, the most exclusive aristocracy in Italy ; ^ a scion, who married ^ Martini, Storia, TV. 334-339. 46 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY below his station, was disinherited, and those who, like Massimo D’Azeglio, broke through the rigid caste laws, were ostracized. The middle classes were divided among them- selves by minutest distinctions of etiquette. The lower ranks of the civil service and the magistrates formed almost hereditary castes. It was in vain that Charles Albert in later years tried to bring the different sections of the aris- tocracy and bourgeoisie together. No class could escape the atmosphere of ignorance and prejudice. Even the artisans, well as they responded to later changes, had little of the alertness of their Lombard brothers. | The French rule, which lasted with one brief interval li ffom 1798 to 1814, brought indeed a considerable advance, j S lowly and grudgingly Victor Emmanuel and his brother s were compelled to make concessions to the new spirit they j found on then return. For all this, the institutions of I Piedmont were far in arrears of those of Western Europe. Piedmontese law was a medley of Roman and Canon law, of royal edicts, local customs, and decisions of the courts, without attempt at codification. The Genovesate retained ^ the French civil and commercial codes ; the Duchy of Aosta i had its special laws ; even small towns had then pecuhar i customs or exemptions. The criminal law, at least in the i letter, was worthy of the middle ages. Forgers might be strangled in public, and their bodies burned ; death was the : penalty for sacrilege, for all but the smallest thefts, for bear- ■ ing the challenge to a duel. If the evidence was insufficient | for conviction, a reduced penalty might be mfficted. The judges were on the whole honest and able, but in spite of the efforts of De Maistre and Prospero Balbo, they were still removable, and down to 1822 were partially paid by suitors’ fees. And justice was impossible in face of the royal prerogative, which overrode the decisions of the courts, and used its “ paternal equity ” to set court favourites above the law. Even when the reforms of 1822 swept away some of the worst abuses, there was still no pubhcity of justice, no cross-examination, no adequate rules of procedure.^ ^ Avvocato milanese, op. cit., IV. 29 et seq. ; Dal Pozzo, Observations; Sclopis, op. city III. 218, 24k PIEDMONT 47 In education the country was equally behindhand. Charles Felix, in 1822, ordered schools to be provided for boys in every commune, but no grants were made before 1 846, and the poorer communes disregarded the law. In 1845 hardly more than half of them had schools,^ and the great majority of the artisans and peasants were illite- rates.^, It Avas not till 1846 that public elementary education was extended to girls, and the whole financial responsibility thrown on the Provincial Councils. There was a better provision of secondary schools, and the state made grants in aid ; but Latin and Greek were the only subjects well taught, and there was no instruction in modern history or languages, and little in science. Priests were almost the only schoolmasters and professors, and their ferule drilled the pupils to unreasoning obedience or drove the intelligent to rebellion or despair. Prospero Balbo attempted to supply lay teachers by founding normal schools (1817), but his scheme apparently Avent under in the reaction of 1821, till Charles Albert alloAved Cesare Alfieri to revive it tAventy- three years later. The Universities of Turin and Genoa were in almost as evil case. After 1821 the Jesuits seized on them ; the traditional Jansenist theology of Turin Avas discouraged, and no student Avas admitted without certificate of confession and communion. Professors and students alike Avere spied on, and the least mark of independence brought expulsion, Avith its sequel of exclusion from public office and the liberal professions. And though Piedmontese scholarship survived all discouragement, such literature as there was was courtly and nerveless. The double censorship, civil and ecclesiastical, Avas perhaps the severest in Italy; and until the reforms of the ’40s eased the way, the path of learning Avas streAvn Avith every obstacle that timidity and prejudice could accumulate. Trade Avas more kindly looked on. As in Prussia, it ^ Pareto, Genova, II. 428-430, whose authority I prefer to Serristori, op. cit., 27, 28; and Mittermeier, Condizioni, 203. In 1848, however, four-fifths had schools. 2 Riv. stor. del risorg., I. 91. -912 ; Eandi, Saluzzo, I. 316-317; Sacchi, Istru- zione, 29 ; Brofferio, Parlamento, V. 307. In Sardinia a successful scholar’s prize was to whip his competitors. 48 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY was all important for the ends of the government that the people should be prosperous. King and nobles vied in pro- moting production. The raw silk of the Po valley, the olive-oil of the Genovesate, the wines of Asti and Voghera began to win a wide repute. But the government more than undid its work by the restrictions with which it ham- pered industry. Protection discouraged inventiveness ; high duties well-nigh ruined the trade of Genoa, and developed an enormous contraband along all the frontier. Provincial customs- lines cut off Piedmont from Savoy, and both from ;i the Genovesate. There were practically no banks. Dovm jl to 1838 letters were distributed in the capital only thrice a week. Under such conditions industry found it difficult to compete with the products of Lombardy and Tuscany, much less with those of other western countries, and the foreign trade reached a total of only £ 7 , 000,000 a year. Still the country bore many marks of prosperity. Population, though it grew slowly, was nearly as dense as that of Lombardy, denser than that of Great Britain of the time. In 1820 Turin and Genoa each numbered nearly 100,000 inhabi- tants. The commercial interest however was weak in Piedmont itself. In Genoa, on the other hand, it was rooted deep in the very life of the people. The Genoese merchant inherited the commercial tradition of centuries; but simple, careful, parsimonious as he was, he had not suffix* ent enterprise to fight against the revolutions of trade city low. The Indian trade was fa Trieste was a dangerous rival; a business with Marseilles; protective of agriculture crippled the import and when the government came to dues on foreign vessels, it only d: benefiting native shipping. The that, with a general reduction of d its position as a commercial cent the shipowners prevented the re while stagnant trade meant povn industrial population of the cit had brought his iing to England; f tarifis crippled s in the interests .n corn and wine ; hef by raising the lem away without raders pointed out Genoa might regain ut the opposition of ill 1842, and mean- i worse to the thick le Genoese workman PIEDMONT 49 was serious and hardworking, thrifty when he had the chance, fairly sober. His whole character was at the opposite pole to that of the Turin artisan ; he was restless, insubordinate, ready to assert his rights against employers ; he made a poor soldier but a better citizen. And this anti- pathy reflected the old political antagonism. It was only among the thoughtful middle classes that there was any tendency to approach the Piedmontese ; the poor and the patricians alike idealized their old independence, and for a time hated Piedmont more than Austria. And when the hope of independence died away, and Genoa merged its hopes in those of Italy, its affinities were with Milan rather than Turin, and however loyal it grew to be towards the House of Savoy, its influence was always cast against the leadership of Piedmont. Outside Genoa almost the only occupation of the people was agriculture. One-fifth of the population were land- owners,^ and in the valleys of the Alps and Apennines and in the olive country of the Eiviera there were many peasant proprietors, sometimes farming well, in other places miser- ably poor. Most of the plain country was in the hands of landlords, generally absentee, and sometimes on bad terms with their tenantry. The mezzaiuoli farmers,^ who in some districts occupied all the land with their holdings of ten to sixty acres, were comparatively prosperous and independent. Elsewhere the tenants were afraid to farm well, lest their rents should be raised ; it was a growing practice for land- lords to take the farms into their own hands, and the evicted tenants became landless labourers, downtrodden by bailiffs, wretchedly fed and housed.^ The government tried to pro- tect the tenants by giving the courts power to reduce rents in time of dearth alike to yearly tenants and leaseholders, it tried to check evictions by legislating for the extension of small holdings; but the policy seems to have been too much in opposition to the economic doctrines of the time ^ V. Eaumer, ojp. cit., I. 264. So too in 1871 ; Beauclerk, Rural Italy, 119. ^ See below, p. 71 n. ^ Eandi, op. cit., II. 63; Avvocato mUanese, op. cit,, V. 418-419; Pareto, Genova, 114; at a later date, Beauclerk, op. cit., 120-126. For the pauperism which followed, see Mittermeier, op. cit., 167. VOL. I. D A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 50 to have commanded much success^ And whatever govern- i ment might do, the endemic stagnation infected agriculture, and, except on the fertile pastures and ricefields of the plain, its methods were inferior to those of Lombardy and the Duchies. Here and there in later years there were improv- ing landlords, and there was a great advance in agricultural theory. The meadows and mulberries of the Lomellina were : cultivated with intense and increasing care. But as a rule any improvement in practice broke down before the con - ' servatism of the peasants and the contracts of tenancy, which | forbade any change from the customary methods of farming. . Taking them in the mass, the Piedmontese were a stolid, ) patient people, with narrow ideals but great powers of perse- verance and attainment. And the government, however stupid and unprogressive, was painstaking and patriotic;^ inferior as it was in many respects to that of Lombardy, i it was far more popular, just because it was national. Instinctively it was felt that the hegemony of Italy was j passing to the Subalpine Kingdom. Its population barely I exceeded one-half of that of Naples and Sicily ; in wealth and intelligence it stood below Lombardy; it was imperfectly fused with the Genovesate, and one-fifth of its subjects were of another race and tongue beyond the Alps. But the solid qualities of the people made amends for inferiority in num- < bers or wealth. If the House of Savoy had kept them in I tutelage, cowed and docile in matters political, it had trained < them to a manly, martial character, rare in Italy. These i uninteresting Boeotian peasants could fight and endure, and • were capable of loyalty and sacrifice. And the traditions | of the government impelled it to a forward policy. East- 1 wards to Milan had been for centuries the motto of its princes. Lombardy was always to them the “ goodly 1 artichoke,” to be stripped leaf by leaf from the Austrians. And now the old policy of territorial growth had been touched by a nobler conception. De Maistre was the*, prophet of the new school, which pointed to the Italian, crown, and bade Victor Emmanuel “ forget the throne of 1 V. Raumer, op. cit, I. 304 ; Avvocato milanese, op. cit., V. 291-292, 312-394 j j Eandi, op. cit., II. 66. LOMBARDY-VENETIA 51 Piedmont and think of that of Italy.” ^ The nobles might still boast their Provencal origin and despise the pure Italian blood ; the bureaucracy might regard Italy as an “ appendix of Piedmont.” But the greater vision of Piedmont leading Italy in a war of national redemption seized more and more on men’s minds after 1814. Even to Victor Emmanuel and Charles Felix in their worst days Austria was the enemy ; and it was only the greater fear of revolution, which kept them from breaking with her. Sooner or later a life and death struggle was bound to come ; and it was to the prince and people of Piedmont that the patriots of all Italy were learning to look for light and leading. Lombardy-Venetia Though the emancipation of Lombardy and Venetia was the dream of every Italian patriot, Neapolitan and Roman and Piedmontese might well envy the institutions, under which their inhabitants lived. The Austrian Empire was too strong, too much in evidence, to condescend to the in- decent corruption of a petty tyranny. Its civil service had its settled traditions of capacity and method; and though the improving spirit of Joseph II.’s time had gone, his reforms remained. German officialism might be slow and unsympathetic; national susceptibilities and habits might be sacrificed to Austrian interests and centralization; the false position of the government inevitably produced abuses of police, and rare fits of pitiless despotism. But there was a regularity and robustness of administration, an equality before the law, a social freedom, which, except in Tuscany and Parma, was without its parallel in Italy. As Lombardy in the early half of the eighteenth century gradually passed into Austrian hands, it had shared in the reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II. After Napoleon’s early conquests, Milan had become the capital of the Cisal- pine Republic, and afterwards of the Kingdom of Italy. The territory of the Venetian Republic, which in 1797 had been ^ La Maison de Savoie, ii ; Bianchi, I. 46; for a similar doctrine in 1791, see Id. Monorchia, III. 452-453. 52 A HISTORY 0 . XIAN UNITY sacrificed to Napoleon’s pc strategy, was permitted in 1806 to become part of the new kingdom. Milan became an European capital, the home of a brilliant, court, the first y city of Italy in literature and industry and social enterprise, j Lombard engineers built the Simplon Pass, Lombard archi- tects completed the Cathedral of Milan, Lombard soldiers shared in the glories of Napoleon’s campaign; Monti and h F oscolo made Lombard literature known through Europe. | Had Austria after the Restoration granted a generous : measure of Home Rule, she might not improbably have re- ^ conciled the provinces to her sway. Unfortunately plighted , word and expediency alike bowed before the evil lesson of | centralization that the European Powers had learnt from t Napoleon. The moral of the national movement of the ji past six years was lost on men, who thought they could ji make of the loose Austrian Empire a compacted whole like } France. German and Slav and Italian were to be fitted to l one measure ; “ the Lombards,” said Metternich, “ must f forget that they are Italians.” The entire Austrian law,/ civil and criminal, was re-introduced without regard for native prejudices and customs. Almost every vestige of independent administration disappeared. The Viceroy, Im- perial Archduke though he was, was a mere puppet to be | danced by the Aulic ministers. Feuds between viceroy and j provincial governor, between governor and chief of police, | made it easier for the Departments at Vienna to keep the threads of rule in their own hands. In spite of Metter- nich’s anxiety to make concessions to Italian opinion, Ger- mans and Tyrolese filled almost every higher post in the civil service and on the bench.^ Austrian handbooks weie used in the primary schools, Austrian law and history were taught to the exclusion of Italian in the Universities; chemists were compelled to use the Austrian pharmacopeia. Not a road could be made, not a dyke built, mthout re- ference to Vienna ; manuscripts had often to pass the Viennese 1 For Metternich’s opinion, see his Memoires, III. 93 ; for the neglect of his recommendations, Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, III. 408 ; Casati, Rivdazioni, I. 19, 227 ; Schonhals, Campagnes, 23. In 1848 there were 410 civil servants 0 German birth : Jl Veglio of April 15, 1848. I LOMBARD Y-YENETIA 5 3 censorship before they could be published. The govern- ment had the characteristic faults and virtues of a bureau- cracy: it had all the evils of irresponsibility — corruption, sluggishness, want of initiative. The quick Lombard wit, used to the business-like enterprise of Beauharnais’ rule, sniffed at German stupidity, and told how the post of municipal engineer was abolished at Milan “because the city had got on for centuries without one ” ; how memorials were pigeon-holed for five years before an answer was vouch- safed ; how soldiers’ boots were sent from Venice to Vienna to be cobbled. Yet the Austrian rule, slow and crass and timid as it was, showed a good deal of patient working out of problems and encouragement of national prosperity. At a later date the government was bitterly assailed for its financial burdens. Austria’s Italian provinces, it was said, contributed out of proportion to their just liabilities. It is true that heavy surpluses, sometimes half of the whole revenue, went to the expenses of the Imperial government ; it is true also that on a basis of population Lombardy and Venetia paid double their share. But wealthy Lombardy could not be on a footing with poor Carinthia ; she paid less in proportion to her riches than Lower Austria, the most favoured province of the Empire, and it is probable that on a basis of wealth she paid no more than her quotum.^ Taxation none the less was heavy. The peace revenue came to the level of the war budgets of the French rule ; the land-tax rose till in time it far exceeded the promised maxi- mum of 20 per cent, of net revenue, and swallowed one- third to one-half;^ the salt monopoly raised the price to eleven times its natural value. But the charges of heavy increases in the taxes were, except in the case of the land- tax, unfounded ; ^ and despite some disingenuous attempts ^ British and Foreign Review, XXVIII. 570-573 and table ; T^goborski, Finances, IL 362; Bonghi, Pasini, 689 et alibi; Valentini, Perequazione ; Meneghini, Condizione, 97-99; Cantu, Milano, I. 165-166; 32 iC,mi, Proprietd, iio-iii ; Bianchi-Giovini, Gravami, 5; Lettere ad A. Panizzi, 116, 127; Rac- colta dei decreti, II. 75 ; Correspondence — Italy (1847-49), 99- 2 See below, Vol. II., p. 13. ^ Zajotti, Veritd, 312-3 13, 327 ; Jacini, op, cit., 108 ; Venezia e le sue lagune, II. 368-^69; contra Misley, Ultalie, ill, 207. 54 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY to repudiate debts to local bodies and tamper with charitable funds, the management of the finances seems to have been on the whole honest. Nor, except for political offences, was Austrian justice especially open to attack. It had many of the defects common to the Italian codes of the time ; the public were not admitted to the courts, the defendant was not allowed counsel or permitted more than a limited perusal of the depositions against him ; there was no jury, and often too , much suspicion of police influence. But its main defect was rather that it was unsuited to Italian habits, and that not a few of the judges were foreigners.^ There wa^^ absolute equality before the law ; there were no special courts, except in political trials; clerics, as a rule, were tried before the ordinary tribunals. The civil code, which dated from 1814, was in some respects in advance of the Code Napoleon, and the peasants welcomed it for the protection it gave them against their landlords. In church affairs the government was the most pro- gressive in Italy. The traditions of Joseph II. s time were still alive ; the priest was looked on as a state official, and if he refused to co-operate in public education or the relief of the poor, he might be punished.^ Though the police helped the bishops to check the sale of Diodati’s Bibles, Protestants and Orthodox had perfect religious liberty, and the J ews had few disabilities beyond that of holding office.^ As a conse- quence probably of the state’s control, the clergy were the best educated and the most public-spirited of Italy. In the two provinces there were only 1000 monks ; and though the Jesuits were allowed to return to Venetia in 1843, they never gained a footing in Milan, where Qaysruck, the German archbishop, “ had enough to do with his priests. In education, too, Lombardy was far ahead of the rest of Italy, except Parma and Lucca, perhaps abreast of any 1 Statements as to their number are contradictory. Compaq op. cit., 63, with Pallavicino, Memorie, I. 55, and Bianchi-Giovini, op. 2 Lorenzoni, Instituzioni, II. 21. 3 I cannot, however, reconcile Carte segrete, II. 363, with Canti I. 187. LOMBAKDY-VENETIA 55 European country of the time. Elementary education was, in theory at least, compulsory on both sexes from six to twelve years; as late back as 1786 restrictions had been placed on child labour ; all but the smallest communes were obliged to provide schools. In Lombardy, in 1834, 68 per cent, of the boys and 42 per cent, of the girls of school age attended,^ though there was still little teaching for girls in Venetia, and the attendance of both sexes was irregular in the rural districts. Infant schools on the model of Kobert Owens were introduced in 1829, and here alone in Italy were patronized by the government. A careful gradation carried on the scholar from the primary school. Every considerable town had a ‘‘ major elementary ” school, which took the pupil to grammar and Latin and sometimes science. Secondary education began with the gymnasiums of which each of the large towns owned at least one, and went on to the twelve more advanced Lyceums. There were Univer- sities at Padua and Pavia, each with about 1500 students, whose explosive Liberalism was the terror of the police ; and though the professors were too often foreigners, much be- fooled by the scholars, or mere agents of the government, the Universities stood second only to those of Bologna and Naples.^ The censorship was perhaps the lightest in Italy. It is true that the law of 1815, which explicitly allowed political criticism, was a dead letter; that no political journals could be published without permission of the chief censor at Vienna ; that after 1821 all foreign books had to pass the same ordeal. Eomances that “ had no scientific merit,” writings that “ offended against the rules of style and purity of language ” were proscribed ; Balzac and Bentham, Victor Hugo and Macchiavelli, Hallam and Kabelais were alike consigned to the list of forbidden literature.^ But in quiet times the prohibited volumes were almost openly sold ; much of the censorship was a well-meant attempt to ^ Sacchi, Istruzione, 1 1 ; Lorenzoni, op. cit., II. 59. In the province of Ber- gamo*90 per cent, of both sexes attended. ^ For education generally see Sacchi, op. cit. ; Lorenzoni, op. cit., 11 . 49 et seq. ; Cantii, op. cit., I. 228-241 ; Mittermeier, op. cit., 192-198. ^ Dante too in Venetia, according to Riv. star, del risorg., I. 489. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 56 suppress unclean books; scientific and non-political and sometimes theological literature was left tolerably free, and ;i there was an openness and activity of thought at Milan that at one time, at all events, was unequalled in Italyd One- third of the journals of the peninsula, and in 1842 nearly one-half of its literary publications, appeared in the two i provinces.^ In local government they were the only states of Italy I which enjoyed an effective system. All proprietors, includ- ing women, had the franchise, and the wide diffusion of landed property made this often nearly equivalent to house- hold suffrage. In the smaller communes (with less than 300 proprietors) the whole body of electors met twice a year, and the initiative of important business lay with them, an executive committee of three administering the com- munal business in the intervals. In the larger communes the meeting disappeared,^ and the administration vested entirely in a Council of thirty to sixty members. In the chief cities the executive was given to the Podesta and his Assessors, but the consent of the Council was requisite for any new departure. The communes supported the schools, the local police, the by-roads, and occasionally the priest; | they controlled the local sanitation, the police, the parochial charities, and had powers, subject to the consent of the central authority, to carry out public works ; the meetings or coun- ; cils elected the school-teacher and the public doctor and midwife, who, here as elsewhere in Italy, were paid by every commune to attend the poor gratuitously. On the whole, the central authority made little use of its powers of con- trol, and the spirit of local government was strong and self- ' assertive. But in proportion as self-government approximated to 1 D’Azeglio, Ricordi, 450, 453 ; G. Torelli, Ricordi, 14; Chiala, Dina, I. 17. 2 Many details of the censorship in Riv. stor. del risorg., I. 489-521. The cast of a play might not include a bad King, unless there was a good King too. Hume’s History was allowed to circulate at Venice, but not at Milan. ^ There was a tendency for councils to take the place of meetings. Out of 809 communes in Venetia, 450 had councils in 1819, and 583 in 1853 ; 117 had uffizio proprio, which made them more independent of central officials. Morpurgo, Saggi, 120. LOMBARDY-VENETIA 57 national representation, the fears of the autocracy emascu- lated it. In each of the seventeen provinces sat a Provincial Congregation, on which the noble and untitled proprietors and the nineteen royal cities each had their representatives. Their powers were limited; they managed the provincial finances, supervised those of the communes, and had a cer- tain control over roads, rivers, and charities ; but they played small part in the public life of the country. The Central Congregations of Lombardy and Venetia failed still more to realize the hopes that they would become active political powers. “A constitution,” said the Emperor Francis, “would break down the confidence which should exist between a prince and his people.” But it was necessary in 1 8 1 4 to pacify his Italian provinces with a show of representative govern- ment, and the Congregations were empowered to present the prayers of the Lombards and Venetians. But they were expressly debarred from legislative functions ; candidates for election had to show a high property qualification, and were subject to the government’s veto. Their functions were only those of local bodies ; their one substantial power, the right of petition, was little used by men who represented only a section of the people, and, except by accident, in- cluded none but such as were acceptable to the government. They made one effort in 1825 to procure legal and fiscal reform and the exclusion of foreigners from the civil service. But no answer was made to their prayer, and their next petition, in 1838, to increase the number of the Emperors Italian body-guard, only made them ridiculous. The people, who regarded them as “Well-paid to get Engrossed in liospital administration,” ^ lost interest in them and their work. Wherever the political fears of the government came into play, there was the same sharp contrast with the real and sober value of the ordinary administration. In frank moments the government confessed that it had no moral force behind it, and the sense that there was no safety-valve ^ Giusti. A HISTOEY OF ITALIAN UNITY 58 for discontent kept it in perpetual terror of conspiracy. The law, comparatively mild and wise in all else, was in matters of state- concern systematically, cynically iniquitous. The bastinade, starvation, belladonna were used to extort con- fessions.^ And when the defendant in a state-trial at last came into court, he found himself without counsel, without seeing the depositions against him, without the protection of publicity, confronted by a packed bench of Austrian or Tyrolese judges. Mere expression of political discontent sufficed for conviction and a lingering death in the Spiel- berg. In times of popular commotion or epidemic crime the giudizio statario enabled the authorities to dispense with formalities, and sentence without appeal. The political police^ were probably no better and no worse than in Piedmont or at Rome; there was less in- i terference with personal liberty, but more espionage, more ■ fussy surveillance of private life. They delighted to collect each petty detail of the lives of suspects — a mass of in- formation, which has probably proved more valuable to the historian than it ever did to the government. The Emperor Francis, a hard, unteachable official, scared to monomania by Kotzebue’s assassination, embodied his ideal of government in the police spy. Men of every station were in the pay of the sbirri, from the cardinal and noble or the dilettante who m’ote odes to its chief, down to the common spy, the outcast of society, who earned his two francs a day by garnering more or less untruthful gossip from the cafe or the street. The letters of the general public were opened “with interesting results.” A normal state of fussy suspicion agitated the bureaus of the police ; endless scares of Bonaparte plots or of English and Russian intrigues filled their verbose reports ; English travellers and harmless artists like Rossini and Vernet were shadowed. A worse fate befell the native suspect ; he might not emigrate or travel abroad without their leave ; secret influences could prevent him from obtaining office. A ^ Misley, op cit., 23 ; Casati, Confalonieri^ I. 52-65. 2 It must always be remembered that the sbirri were more for political purposes than to preserve law and order ; hence the hatred of them. LOMBARDY-VENETIA \ 59 professor was dismissed for referring to Pope Julius \cry of “Out with the foreigner”; it was necessary even .to obtain their leave to hold a private ball. All through the government ran the same intermingling of good administration and political tyranny. But on the whole the Lombards, shrewd, genial, tenacious, were but too ready to acquiesce in a rule that secured their material interests and their amusements, however fatal it might be to the finer sides of civil life. Milan, though fallen from her high estate, was still busy, brilliant, sceptical, dissolute. At Venice, save for brief intervals of higher feeling, all sense of dignity had gone, and nobles and plebeians “ neither thought nor felt.” Her aristocracy fawned on Austria, her middle classes had neither enterprise nor influence, two-fifths of her population received charitable relief. The Austrians knew well how to play on this demoralization. They gave heavy subsidies to the opera, and a greater glut of carnival splendour was their ready panacea for political excitement. The time-honoured feuds, which divided Milan from Brescia or Venice, were quietly fomented ; and the noble, who showed interest in public affairs, found himself under the government s frown. It was only by slow degrees that any class rose above these temptations. Each city had its group of noble families, for the most part engrossed in money-making or frivolity. But at Brescia and Milan there was a better spirit. The powerful and wealthy Milanese nobles came in time to recognize that they could not regain their privileges, and their exclusiveness made way for a friendli- ness towards the middle classes, that contrasted well with the class-spirit of their peers at Turin. Confalonieri had won many of them to his cause, and they never forgot or forgave the insult thrown at their order by his cruel doom. The heavy land-tax helped more generous instincts to keep alive a certain flame of patriotism ; and their sons and daughters were brought up to regard the Austrians as hardly tolerated aliens, to be flouted and boycotted at theatre or ball. But the nobles were of comparatively small importance. 6o A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Lombardy was preeminently a country of the middle classes ; they owned the greater part of the land ; they were enterprising and successful in trade. The shrewdness and artistic faculty of the Lombard made industry flourish through all discouragements, and their land was, with the exception of Belgium, the most densely populated state of Europe. The silk trade advanced by leaps and bounds, and gave employment to large numbers of spinners through- out the hill country. The cheese industry of Lodi and Crema was famous; the cotton manufacture was growing, and sugar refineries had been built. The first insurance society was founded in 1827; Milan was lighted with gas in 1843. however much the long peace might help trade, the Lombard manufacturers had to pay the price of belonging to the Austrian Empire. A heavy and com- plicated tariff crippled trade and encouraged contraband;’- and down to 1822 a customs-line along the Mincio was a never-failing irritant. The trade of Venice, at all events till she was made a free port in the ’30s, was sacri- ficed to the interests of her rival Trieste. Verona was ruined by German competition ; Brescia was compelled to close her armouries, because the War Office sent its orders to Germany. The mass of the people, as everywhere in Italy, was agricultural. One in eight of the population was a pro- prietor, and their number was increasing.^ In the mountain districts every peasant was an owner, and though his tiny farm was heavily mortgaged, his common rights curtailed by an Enclosure Act, his home and food of wretched quality, he preferred his independence to comfort. In the hills and non-irrigated plains property was nearly as much divided, but was cultivated, as a rule, in Venetia rack-rent, in Lombardy by tenants under various form mezzedria, or on perpetual leases at fixed rents, sometm '.nturies old. The population was very thick, rents wei h, and the 1 English stuifs, charged 6o per cent, ad valorem d re sold at 15 per cent, advance on the untaxed value : Witt, Societes sec 2 So Cantii, op. cit. v. Raumer, op. cit., I. 155-156, sa} n eleven ; in the province of Bergamo there was one property to evei nhabitants : Rosa, Bergamo, 44. LOMBARDY-VENETIA 6i fairdly income was almost invariably supplemented by silk- spinning at home. Here (at all events in Lombardy, for Venetia was always behind her more prosperous sister) the peasant was at his best ; he was poor, but less so than in France, his food wa3 very plain, but his house and clothing were comparatively good. These conditions were reversed in the irrigated plain, which lay between the Ticino and the Adda. Here the staples of agriculture changed from vines and mulberries to rice and maize and rich pastures of temporary grasses, famous for their cheese.^ Large farms of frorn 200 to 700 acres were held on short leases of the English type by wealthy and educated farmers. The peasant had no hold on the soil except in the precarious tenure of an allotment. His food was probably no worse than that of the peasants of the hills, the pellagra was not as yet the scourge it has been since ; but in character the labourer of the plains was immeasurably inferior. Badly educated, nomadic, housed in huts of canes and mud, hating his employer and landlord, sometimes poverty-stricken to despair,^ he was a dangerous element in the state. Even in the low country east of the Adda, where the farms were smaller and the labourer better off, he had little of the independence, which characterized the peasant of the hills. And alike in plain and hill the peasant often found in the Austrian government a protector against his more present enemy, the rack-renting landlord. If it were not for the cruel eight-years’ military service, he would have had little material cause of complaint against the alien rule.^ But even the apathetic Lombard and Venetian could not be fed by peace and prosperous trade alone. To the finer spirits among them the Austrian bureaucracy, because it was Austrian, was more odious than the crying tyrannies of ^ The irrigation works cost on the average £28 per acre ; rents ran from ;^2 to ;^ii per acre ; the best meadows yielded twenty-five to thirty tons of grass per acre, or fed sixty cows on fifty acres : Beauclerk, op. cit., 183-188. ^ His wages in 1845 were is. per day, Cantti, op. cit., I. 166, in 1882 they appear to have fallen to 6^d. a day : Beauclerk, op. cit., 19 1. ^ Jacini, Proprietd,, passim; Bowring, Report, 94-99 ; Canth, op. cit., I. 184- 185; II. 150-160; Beauclerk, op. cit., 169-233; Carte segrete, I. 256-257; Morpurgo, Saggi ; Visconti-Venosta, Valtellina. 62 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Rome and Naples. Civil servants and soldiers, and a few ricL conservatives might denationalize themselves ; ^ rack- rented tenants and their labourers might care more for agrarian than nationalist politics ; material prosperity might sometimes smother the patriotism of manufacturer and artisan; Venice might be sunk in lethargy. But even Venice, brooding over the lost glories of the Republic, would at times chafe at the sullen domineering stranger; ; and at Milan and in every Lombard city and through the Alpine valleys a fierce hatred of the Austrian gradually took possession of the best in every class. To noble, and shop- keeper, and artisan, as Mazzini’s teaching filtered into every rank, the white uniform of the Austrian soldier meant a tyranny to be endured only so long as force compelled. 1 A catechism, used in the elementary schools, taught that “ God punishes with eternal damnation soldiers who desert their sovereign.” CHAPTEE IV SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY— [continued) Modena. Parma. Lucca. Tuscany : Fossombroni ; Leopold II. ; Tuscan government ; the Tuscans ; the Georgofils ; clergy ; education ; peasants ; Tuscan life. Papal States : the theocracy ; the Curia j administration ; trade ; local government ; law ; justice ; police ; the Inquisition ; the Jews ; education ; religion and morality ; condition of the people ; Komagna and the Marches ; separatist movement in Komagna ; Umbria ; Agro Bomano; Rome. Modena South of the Po, between Lombardy and Tuscany, lay the little Duchies of Modena and Parma. Modena, which reached from the lower Po across the Apennines to a piece of coast at Massa and Carrara, with a population of half a million, had been modelled to conformity with Duke Francis’ ideal of sovereignty.^ In theory the state teemed with benevolent provisions for the people; but the facts of a personal despotism inevitably clashed with the ideal. The taxes were heavy, the law, both civil and criminal, was bad, arbitrary, secret. Eoyal decrees could override the law ; political suspects, against whom there was no proof, could be detained in prison, “ till the truth came out.” Under the French rule there had been activity and enterprise, and Modena had been famous for her school of administrators. Now all was crushed under the dead weight of Francis’ suspicions. The free communal government was first weakened, then destroyed. Elementary education did not exist save in a very few towns ; secondary schools were almost a monopoly of the Jesuits; the University was ruined by the new discipline which the Duke introduced after 1821. The censorship was in the hands of Sanfedist ^ See above, p. 18. 63 64 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY fanatics, who made Dante a forbidden book,^ and allowed no literature to enter the state except such as received their i sanction. There was little trade ; Avhile the government protected its subjects’ eyes by prohibiting the use of matches, 2 its high tarifis made commerce impossible.^ Such merchants as there were, were mainly Jews and Swiss, and the former suffered under every disability that Francis j suspicions could invent. The only industry of importance was the marble trade of Carrara. The bulk of the popula- I tion were peasants, almost all proprietors, careful tillers of j the niggard soil of the mountains ; often harassed by ^ officials, often living a hand’s-breath from starvation, but ;l devoted to the government, and furnishing Francis at need ' with Sanfedist volunteers. Parma ! The bordering Duchy of Parma presented every contrast to Francis’ dark rule. The state, with its thickly-planted population of 450,000, had in the ’20s the most en- lightened government in Italy. Napoleon’s widow, idle and dissolute as she was, was a generous and well-meaning ruler, and her ministers seconded her likings for indulgent and comparatively liberal government. The French law had been retained, had been even improved on, as m the equality it made between male and female heirs. There! were no privileges before the law, trials were public, the iudges independent. A council of state was consulted on all leo'islative projects. The police were comparatively innocuous, and the maintenance of the French Concordat kept the clergy in check. Parma was the only state in Italy where Jews were admitted to the civil service. The law carefully protected the mezzahiolo tenant.^ The country was ahead of all Italy in its education. Most of the com- munes had schools for boys, and 20 per cent, of the popula- tion attended them or the private girls’ schools. 1 Valery, Voyages, 21 1. 2 Giusti, Efistolario, 134. 3 V. Raumer, Italy, I. 307-308. LUCCA 65 Lucca Least among the little states, its destinies closely linked to those of Tuscany, was the tiny Duchy of Lucca, placed among the Apennines, and along the coast between Carrara and Pisa. Its area was but 320 square miles, its dense population 150,000. The Congress of Vienna had pro- mised that its constitution of 1805, which was to a certain extent representative, should be preserved, but the pledge was forgotten, and even the ecclesiastical independence of the state was gradually surrendered. But the government was not intolerant or cruel ; the Duchess, though bigoted, was generous, and won sufficient favour from the Liberals of Italy to make them in 1831 think of her son, Charles Louis, as a possible leader of the Revolution. But Charles Louis was soon the laughing-stock of Italy; he became a Protestant, apparently from a whim, then returned to the Catholic Church; he made a Yorkshire groom, Thomas Ward, his prime minister; his extravagance and dissolute- ness won for him from Giusti the title of ‘‘ the Protestant Don Juan.” The country was comparatively prosperous, yielding much wealth from its famous oliveyards, though insufficient for its thick population, which emigrated in large numbers. There was a certain measure of free-trade, and a considerable industry in silk and wool and cotton. There were many schools, and, though less than half were gratuitous, the attendance was high. The secondary schools were good, and the University boasted 25 professors and 180 scholars. Tuscany The Tuscan government was the only one outside Piedmont and Parma, which was willingly accepted by its subjects. But in principles and methods the governments of Florence and Turin stood in sharpest contrast. There was a certain truth in Mazzini’s criticism that the velvet glove only hid the gauntlet ; but compared with the other VOL. I. E 66 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY governments of Italy, the Tuscan was mild, tolerant, en- lightened. Reform of a kind was a tradition with the . descendants of Leopold!, the first Austrian Grand Duke, i one of those Liberal sports, which appear from time to time i in the Hapsburg family-tree. Fossombroni, the premier, ] was a quiet-loving, unenthusiastic man, who carried into the government his motto, “ The world goes of itself.” : Stagnation, he thought, was a cheap price to pay for the j absence of crises. Careless of principle, capable of energy | but self-indulgent, both inclination and statecraft prompted ! him to drug the people into dull contentment. The men j of mediocrity, with whom he filled the civil service, were '< toM not to he over-zealous but content themselves with drawing their pay. But he had served under Napoleon, and liked a name for tolerance and progress; again and again he gave shelter to the refugees from Romagna and Naples; he allowed the Florentines to send help to the Greek insurgents ; he favoured Charles Albert’s claims to the Piedmontese throne. There is some evidence that in later life he favoured representative institutions, and won his master to ineffective acquiescence.^ Leopold II., the prince in whose name he governed after 1824, was a worthy, pains- taking bourgeois, whose chief interest it was to superintend drainage works, and visit his experimental farms in straw-hat and gaiters. Giusti satirized him as the “ Tuscan Morpheus,” whom — “ Itcli of glory pricks to drain Pockets and fens ” ; but like his premier, he loved a repute for tolerance, and he was too good-natured, and in a dim kind of way too patriotic, to be an oppressive ruler. Unfortunately, he was a Hapsburg prince ; and though he resented unsought dictation from Vienna, and Fossombroni’s masterly states- manship prevented Tuscany from becoming a mere Austriaq fief, Leopold could hardly fail to be affected by subtkj family influences. Outside high politics, however, his Tuscan softness helc 1 Zobi, Storia, IV. Documents, 208 ; Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, I. 246. TUSCANY 67 its own. The ordinary law was mild as the people who lived under it. Leopold I. s criminal code had been in its day a model to Europe, and it was improved, when many principles of French law were introduced after 1832. Trials were public, bail was allowed, the death penalty was rarely inflicted.^ Even the police were infected with the universal slackness, and provoked Metternich’s indig- nant remonstrances. But though seldom cruel, they were minutely vexatious. Many minor offences came before them under a procedure secret both to defendant and public; espionage was active; nowhere was there more violation of the secrecy of the post, and such adepts were the Tuscan police in the art, that the Milanese government applied for their reagents to decipher the invisible ink of treasonable correspondence. They irritated or amused the public with the usual vagaries of a fussy officialism; and when Giotto’s portrait of Dante was discovered in the Bar- gello, the colours were altered in the repainting, lest they should suggest the revolutionary tricolor.^ The censorship suffered little criticism of the government ; but prohibited books were often sold openly on the bookstalls, foreign literature was admitted freely except by fits, and Vieusseux’s library at Florence was the only place in Italy, where men could freely meet to discuss political questions, or read the leading European journals. Florence was the one city, where Alfieri’s and Niccolini’s plays could be presented on the stage. Taxation was light and equable. There were no mono- polies or guilds to strangle trade : the import duties were the lowest in Europe, and Tuscany was the Mecca of free- traders;^ so unrelenting was the devotion to industrial freedom, that in its name no tariff of cab fares was allowed at Florence.^ There was indeed no lack of governmental 1 After a capital sentence in 1829, f^e crowd nearly lynched the execu- tioner, and apparently there were no more executions after this. Mittermeier, Condizioni, 114, ^ Horner, Giusti, 90 ; see Guerrazzi, Memorie, 80. ^ See the Blue Book, drawn up by Sir John Bowring in 1837 J its analysis, however, of the Tuscan fiscal system is incomplete. For the effect of Free Trade in mitigating commercial crises, see Poggi, Storia, I. 482. 4 Till 1859. 68 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY enterprise in certain directions. Miicb. of the Maremna was drained, a cadastral survey completed, the port of Leg- horn revived. The railway between Leghorn and Pisa, opened in 1844, was one of the earliest in Italy. But these reforms owed themselves to Fossombroni’s and his Grand Duke’s passion for engineering schemes. Where they were not equally interested, the administration was paralysed by its own lethargy. The army was neglected and despised ; kept up partly from treaty obligations, partly for the sake of the military bands. The officers, with few exceptions, were the most worthless scions of the richer classes ; recruits were drawn from the scum of the people, and convicts were relegated to the so-called penal regiments. The judges shared in the general corruption, and the decay went on, till in the ’30s the Tuscan Bench was notoriously tainted and uncertain. The civil service had learnt that the government hated earnestness and connived at pecula- tion ; the ministers had little control over their departments, and Fossombroni’s system sank to inevitable rottenness. Though the local franchise was popular, the municipalities had lost real power, and were mere instruments for collect- ing taxes. Tuscany was historically “ an aggregate of communes more democratic than the United States,” but they were not even allowed to levy their own local rates. Their officials were nominated by the central government, and cringed to their real masters, the police. The government reflected the character of the people, its easy-going materialism, its dislike of hardness, its “ poisonous gift ” of a tolerance that came less of conviction than want of earnestness. Manners were more gentle than moral ; there seemed to be no stuff for great deeds. Critics complained of the gallantry without passion, the wit without decorum, the tolerance without dignity of Florentine society. Among the richer classes a sinecure in the civil service was the very path to beatitude. The feuds of opera-dancers, the rivalries of Donizetti and Verdi, the excitement of religious ceremonies absorbed their feeble energies. Ener- vation, the fatal heritage of the Medici, was fostered by the elegant scepticism of the aristocracy, and the prevalence of TUSCANY 69 a somewhat sordid comfort. Tuscany was perhaps the most prosperous state in Italy ; but as Gino Capponi lamented, it was “ a Garden of Paradise without the tree of knowledge and without the tree of life.” It was in Giustis words “ good-humour at top and good-humour at bottom,” a mild, mediocre life, with little of bad in it and less of good. There was nothing of the patrician in the Florentine nobles. Descended from the bankers and merchant-princes of medieval Florence, they were still traders and farmers. The best were zealous social reformers, and the society of the Georgofils, like the writers in the Conciliatore, promoted economic studies, schools, savings-banks, which slowly but certainly made their mark. Raffaello Lambruschini and Enrico Mayer became the apostles of elementary and secondary education ; Liberal landed proprietors like Ridolfi and Capponi and Bettino Ricasoli devoted themselves to agricultural improvements and the education of the peasantry, founding agricultural shows, experimental farms, village even- ing schools, doing their best to supply the gap that the indifference of the government had left.^ They were worthy , philanthropic, country gentlemen, but too attached to their mansions and vineyards to risk them in a hazardous revolu- tion. Most of them thought with Vieusseux, that ‘‘ politics meant nothing and social customs everything,” and it is largely due to them that there was so much that was doc- trinaire and flaccid and unpractical in the later reform movement. The church in Tuscany was as much in subjection as in Lombardy. The government refused to admit the Jesuits or relax the laws of mortmain. The church was part of the machine for keeping things quiet ; in Fossombroni’s scheme there w^as no place for a zealous clergy. The 6000 monks and friars were a corrupting influence in the country districts ; the 9000 secular clergy, often ordained without proper train- ing, were conspicuous neither for morality nor learning.^ But the government never, down to 1846, forgot the erastian traditions of the last century, and saved Tuscany from the ^ Ricasoli, Lettere, I. 39. ^ Zobi, op. cit.^ IV. 308 ; Del Cerro, Polizia, 153. 70 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ecclesiastical tyranny "whicli enslaved Piedmont and desolated Romagna. With a debased civil service and an ignorant priesthood education was under bad auspices. The government patron- ized the universities of Pisa and Siena ; but little was taught beyond law and medicine, and even in these the instruction was second-rate, and the work spoilt by the absence of a sound elementary foundation. There were few secondary schools, and at Pistoia alone they were under public control. There were elementary schools for boys, generally gratuitous, in almost every commune ; but though in the towns some were fairly good, the rural schools were very indifferent, and the attendance reached only to one- tenth of those of school age.^ There was practically no teaching for girls. The Georgofils tried to supply the deficiences and overcome the difficulties caused by the isolation of the mezzaiuoli farmers and the absence of village life. But the government showed an intermittent opposi- tion to the pupil-teacher system, and it was introduced almost by stealth, and to a very limited extent. And when in later years the progressive section of the ministry pro- jected a national system of elementary schools, they were not sufficiently in earnest to prevent the intrigues of Rome from wrecking the scheme. The non-interference of the government, which was fatal to the schools, should have helped industry. But there was not sufficient energy in the country to give it the prosperity of Lombardy. Though there were a few nourish- ing manufactures of silk, wool, and straw hats, and a good many little iron mines near the coast, the total number of industries was small, and Florence and Leghorn were the only cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants. The mass of the people was agricultural. Nearly one half were proprietors,^ a third were farmers, most of them cultivating under the mezzedria system, which, however much it may 1 Bowring, Report, 57, 60; Ricasoli, op. cti., I. 131 ; ^&rx\stox\, Statistica, 149, 150; contra Sacchi, Isti'uzione, 45. 2 Bowring, Report, 11. Cini, Della iassa, 28, says that in 1835 there were 132,000 landowners, which would give rather more than one-third of heads of families. TUSCANY 71 have checked progress, at all events secured to the tenant a modicum of comfort.^ More than half the country was mountain or maremna, but competent judges pronounced the agriculture of the Valdarno superior to that of the Lothians.^ The economic standard of the peasants was indeed not high ; but their houses were comparatively good, and their position was secure. Among the increasing class of farm labourers there was at times acute distress, and though begging was forbidden in Florence, there was much of it elsewhere. Taken however as a whole, the rural population, clever and shrewd, but ill-educated and easy- : going, was wrapped in a sordid but not uncomfortable security. The general distribution of property, combined with the absence of education and political life, made the masses conservative and averse to change. Class animosity seemed almost absent. The traveller, seeing the prosperity and contentment of the country, looked on Tuscany as one of the favoured spots of earth. But the fair structure was built on an unsure foundation. Alike in the better and worse sides of Tuscan life there showed the same fatal want of moral energy, the same lack of the finer virtues. Under- neath the polish of Florence and the contentment of the peasantry lay an absence of the more virile elements of national being. Monotony and uneventfulness in private life, a want of statesmanship and administrative chaos in public life ; an almost entire absence of local government and education ; a standard of comfort too much and too little to stimulate ; all were a worse school of progress than was the discipline of Piedmont or the unendurable misrule of Rome or Naples. It was only in turbulent Leghorn, with its rough, seafaring population, or among the students of Pisa and Siena, that there were any germs of real and fruitful life. ^ Under the mezzedria system the landlord advanced all or part of the capital, and took in return for rent and interest a certain proportion of the produce, generally from one-third to one-half. The mezzaiuoli tenants often had a sort of customary fixity of tenure. See Capponi, Scritti, I. 389, et seq. (translated in Bowring, Eeport, 40-46) ; Id., Lettere, III. 151-161. ^ Laing, Notes, 460 ; Cobbett, Tour. 72 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN HNITY Papal States The States of the Pope stretched from the Latin coast f across the Campagna and the Tiber valley, over the high- lands of Umbria and the Central Apennines to the Marche? of Fermo and Ancona ; thence turning northwards along l narrow strip of country between the Tuscan Apennines and the sea, they spread into the fertile plains of Romagna, and were bounded by the Po. In 1827 the census gave a population of two millions and a half. The dominant note of the country, marking it of? among European states, was its government of priests. The Catholic world held it essential to the Pope’s honour and prestige that he should possess the prerogatives of a prince. Diplomacy beheved that as such he was less likely ► to be a puppet of one of the great Powers. “ God has i entrusted the state,” Avrote Cardinal Bernetti, “ to His Yicar l on earth for the freer exercise of the Pontifical primacy throughout the world.” The theory demanded an inde- pendent territory, ovming the Pope as sovereign. But the Roman court was not content with a rule, whose only differentiating mark was its ecclesiastical prince. Long after the creation of the Papal dominion, the Popes had trans- formed their temporal sovereignty into a theocratic govern- ment, and the state became an appanage of the Roman priesthood. It was the theory of the Church that only ecclesiastics might administer a government of divine appointment ; they made its laws and ruled its provinces, sat in its law courts, directed its education and its pohce. The Sacred College of Cardinals, which elected the Pope, was torn by factions and eaten through by French and Austrian intrigues. “Cajolery, promises, plots, betrayed without trace of shame,” so wrote a Piedmontese ambas- sador, “ are the chi'onic symptoms, which reappear in the history of every conclave.” ^ Each of the four great Catholic Powers possessed a veto, and the election often resulted in ^ Bianchi, Diplomazia, III. 34. See Salvagni, Corte Homana, III. 122 et stq., 178 et seq. PAPAL STATES 73 the choice of a weak, colourless man, who mounted the throne stricken in years, and under pledges to the party which elected him. ‘‘ The radical vice of the Roman government,” said Chateaubriand, “ is that old men appoint an old man like themselves, and he in turn makes none but old men cardinals.” ^ The party-leader became Secretary of State, whose first work was to reverse the traditions of his predecessor. “ Every Pope’s rule,” ran the Roman pro- verb, “ is the last one’s enemy ; ” and the new officials, who came in with each new Pontiff, made haste to feather their nests before they in turn were displaced.^ The great officers and heads of departments were the more fortunate or power- ful of the Roman hierarchy, and governed by its grace. The prelates, or monsignori, not necessarily priests, who held most of the chief posts in the government, Avere often obscure adventurers, who found the prelature an easy road to Avealth or a cardinal’s hat. Bigoted, timid, luxurious, sometimes vicious, they formed an exclusive and tyrannical oligarchy,^ which differed from a feudal aristocracy only in that many of its members Avere self-made men. A few scholars, a fcAv ecclesiastical statesmen of ability, a few old men of simple, pious worth only set in blacker relief the general Avorldliness and frivolity of the Roman court. ^ Outside Rome the government was still in the hands of great ecclesiastics. Cardinals ruled the four Legations of Romagna — Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna, Forli;^ prelates the less important delegations of the other provinces. Only between 1831 and 1836, and to a very limited extent after 1849, were laymen allowed to hold these offices. Though 1 Chateaubriand, M 6 moires, IV. 451, 465. He adds that the ambassadors could not now dictate the choice of a Pope unless they used heavy bribery : Ih. 470. 2 Galeotti, Sovranitci, 144, 253 ; D’Azeglio, Lettere inedite, II. 194-195. ’ D’Azeglio, Scritti postumi, 159; Bianchi, op. cit., III. 167-168, 397 ; Carte segrete,!. 303, 344-345, 377 ; D’Ideville, Journal, II. 124. In 1848 the average pay of ecclesiastics in the civil service was 782 scudi ; of laymen, 234 scudi. See below, Vol. II., p. 9. ^ Liverani, II papato, 81-86; Galeotti, op. cit., 143; Carte segrete, I. 375; Farini, Roman State, I. 142 ; Bianchi, op. cit., III. 403, 405 ; D’Azeglio, U Italic, 141 ; Pantaleoni, Idea italiana, 58-59, 108 ; Mamiani, Scritti, 492 ; Gaiani, Roman Exile, 59 ; Perfetti, Ricordi, 14. ® In 1832 Urbino-Pesaro and Velletri were made Legations. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 74 nommally responsible to the Secretary of State, a legate or j delegate was, in spite of Consalvi’s efforts to bridle them, an | almost independent prince. “ A cardinal,” said Pellegrino Rossi, ‘‘ is a prince at Rome, a pacha in the provinces.” They i claimed to impose taxes at discretion; they misread or j neglected orders from Rome. One cardinal made his police tear down Consalvis edicts, another created new capital offences unknown to the law. Sometimes tyrants, some- times sinecurists, their rule with few exceptions was one long misgovernment. “ Vanity, money, fear,” said a prelate, “ have ruled this country for several centuries.” ^ In con- trast with the painstaking bureaucracies of Piedmont and Lombardy and the tolerance of Tuscany, Papal administra- tion was characterized by ferocious bigotry and effrontery of corruption. To its ecclesiastical rulers, all that savoured of the nineteenth century — railways, telegraphs, free trade, vac- cination, modern literature — were the work of a spirit fatal to the Church. The finances, especially at a later date, were in the utmost confusion. Consalvi and Leo XII., indeed, kept income and expenditure fairly balanced; but under Gregory XVI. all pretence of order vanished. The treasurer was irresponsible; from 1835 to 1844 no statement of accounts was published till in after years; from 1837 onwards there was no proper book-keeping or audit. The public debt kept leaping up in time of peace, and so reckless was the bori^’owing, that a loan from the Rothchilds was taken up at a discount of 35 per cent.2 Taxation, indeed, was not heavy ; ^ but trade was injured ’ by customs-barriers, by want of railways and good roads, by the jobbery and officialism of the government. The hemp of Romagna, the wool of the Agro Romano might have developed a flourishing commerce. But there was little I Gouvernement temporel, 102. ^ Spada, Rivoluzione, I. 160. Spada, who was a pious bankers clerk, observes that the Rothchilds “as Hebrews were not bound to believe in the divine promises made by Jesus (Jurist as to the stability of the Catholic Church.” See Gennarelli, Governo pontificio, 11 . 581. 3 According to Pujos, Legislation, 104, Rossi put the taxes per head in 1848 at one-third of those in France or England; but the comparative poverty was probably in equal proportion. See Bianchi, op. cit, III. 394. PAPAL STATES 75 intercourse across the Apennines ; travellers crawled along the wretched roads; brigands, though Consalvi and Leo did something to put them down, infested parts of the country, especially near the Neapolitan frontier, and it was found necessary to cut down trees near the roads, as in England of the thirteenth centuryd Every province had its different standard of weights and measures ; the use of gas was illegal ; charters were rarely and grudgingly granted to chambers of commerce.^ There were few manufactures beyond a struggling wool and silk industry ; there was no marine, no foreign trade except from Ancona. Bounties and protection only crippled production the more, and the woollen industry languished, though clergy and officials were at one time practically forbidden to wear stuffs of foreign wool.^ High duties gave birth to an organized contraband with all the mercantile machinery of clerks and insurances.^ Economic knowledge was indeed medieval or non-existent. A prelate high in control of the Exchequer refused to study political economy, because its books were ‘‘ pernicious and on the Index.” When prices of food were high, the com- munes were compelled, public opinion assenting, to purchase supplies and sell at an artificial cheapness. And to keep prices low at Home, corn might be moved across a parish boundary, only when it went in the direction of the capital. Nor were there any local liberties, at least in the ’20s, to temper the misrule. The old vigorous muni- cipal life had been crushed by the French, and Consalvi swept away the little that was left. There was, indeed, a framework of communal government, but the powers were nominal. The governor, who ruled each district, controlled the police, administered summary justice, tyrannized over the communes, unchecked so long as he displaj^ed a due obsequiousness to his ecclesiastical superior. And though ^ V. Raumer, op. cit., II. 52 ; Gavazzi, Four Last Popes, 68. The brigands once carried off a whole seminary, masters and pupils. On another occasion 9000 soldiers guarded the roads to protect the King of Prussia from capture. ^ In one charter it took five articles to define the position of the Porter. ® Miscellaneous Edicts, No. 27 ; see Galli, Cenni, 258, and Bowring, Report, 82-84, for opposite views respecting bounties. ^ Farini, op. cit., I. 147. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 76 his despotism might be somewhat tempered in the towns, j the villages were at his mercy. To conciliate the Powers, H Bernetti framed at a later date an elaborate scheme of provincial councils. On the surface it was perhaps the most liberal law of the kind in Italy. Each council was ^ to be elected indirectly by the communes of the province ; but none but landed proprietors were eligible, the councils met once only in the year, and debated with closed doors. Opinions differed as to their work ; at all events, whether through their fault or not, they wore the muzzle of the government and after the first few years it was rare for men of position to sit upon them. The general law was of a piece with the rest of the government. Before 1831 there Avas no serious attempt to codify it, and it Avas still a monstrous compound of enact- ments of every age, obsolete and uncorrelated.^ To men Avho had tasted of the simplicity and equity of Napoleon s code. Papal laAV seemed a plunge back into medievalism. Consalvi, indeed, had retained the French commercial law, had sAvept away most of the baronial courts, and abolished suitors’ fees. But his promises of codes came to little, and under Leo the modest reforms he had made nearly disappeared aofain. Even the Civil Code, Avhich Bernetti introduced in 1831, though based on the Code Napoleon, retained many of the abuses of the older laAV. It gave special sanction to entails ; it forbade divorce under any circumstances ; it alloAved no property to pass to Avomen in cases of intestacy ; it invalidated wills Avhich omitted legacies to the Church. The Avhole judicial system w^as complicated beyond expres- sion. Up to 1831 there were at Rome fifteen separate jurisdictions, besides the private courts of barons and religious corporations ; and the Pope’s “ most holy auditor ” could quash proceedings or verdict in any court. Bernetti’s reforms SAvept aAA^ay much of this ; the Pope’s auditor dis- appeared, and a better system AA-as inaugurated in the provinces. But at Rome much of the old machinery remained, and the greatest abuse of all, the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, Avas left untouched. Canon law ^ Sauzet, Rome^ 198-202 ; Pianciani, Rome des Papes, III. 243, et seq. PAPAL STATES 77 ruled the principles of government, and by the canon law the priest had a sacred character. It followed that cases, to which he was a party, must be tried by men of his own order, that his punishments must be on a lower scale than those of laymen.^ Under various pretexts the ecclesiastical courts were constantly encroaching on the ordinary law. Widows, orphans, the servants of prelates, were swept within their jurisdiction ; they decided on cases of church property and charities, of sexual immorality and blasphemy. And while ecclesiastics could be judged only by ecclesiastics, prelates monopolized the bench in the high courts, that tried laymen and cleric alike. They sat in the Segnatura, the Rota, the Sagra Consulta ; they were a majority in the Exchequer Court and in the criminal court of the Aitditor Cameroe. The young prelates, who were placed on the bench as a stepping-stone to better posts, were venal and incapable. The real work was done by the lay assessors, the “ auditors,” who, being without responsibility or pay, were the tools of the government or of the richest suitor. The provincial judges, though laymen, bore no better repute; all were removable, most were miserably paid. They were often young and untried men, foisted into office by powerful patronage, ignorant, corrupt, too closely connected with the administration to be impartial. Only in particularly scan- dalous instances would the government interfere; and a judge, convicted of forgery, was known to have received pension instead of punishment.^ The procedure of the courts was often equally discredited. Pleadings before the Rota and Segnatura were in Latin, and before 1831 the same rule applied in many of the lower courts. On the pretext of preventing intimidation of witnesses, the public were excluded from all the more important criminal cases. Every encour- agement was given to informers; no bail was allowed; before Bernetti’s reforms no criminal defendant might o cross-examine ; and though after 1831 he was nominally permitted to select his own counsel, the advocate, who made a genuine defence, was liable to be punished. Even more 1 See Minghetti, Uetat, 5. * Farini, op. cit., I. 158. 78 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 1 iniquitous was the procedure, that obtained in cases of i treason and sedition. Here even after 1831 no cross- • examination was allowed ; men were sentenced without knowing who their accusers were ; their counsel was ap- d pointed by the court, and often worked for conviction.^ It !| was treason, punishable with death and confiscation, to be present at a meeting of a secret society ; the galleys for life were the penalty for being privy to the escape of an affiliate (unless he were a relative), or to an attempt to proselytize. Sacrilege, however innocent of political complexion, was con- structed into treason and punishable with death. Political convicts were deported to “ unhealthy localities,” or confined with criminals “ contrary to the law of nations,” or chained for life to the walls of their cells.^ 'The police were more than ordinarily vexatious. “They can,” complained a pamphleteer in 1846, “imprison a man, banish him, exercise surveillance over him, refuse his pass- port, confine him to a district, deprive him of civil rights, rob him of office, forbid him to carry arms or leave his house at night. They open his letters in the post, and make no attempt to conceal it. They can invade his house and seize his papers, they can close shops and cafes and inns, and fine us at their pleasure.” Espionage was general ; they had domestic servants in their pay ; men were arrested at the bare hint of the parish priest. There were at one | time 3000 political suspects at Pome, confined to their i houses between sundown and sunrise, and driven to con- j fession once a month. There was special surveillance of I what a police document termed “ the class called thinkers.” Too busy to spare time for the protection of person and: property, it sometimes seemed as if they were in league with criminals against the propertied classes.^ 1 Whiteside, Italy, II. 292; Pianciani, op. cit., III. 244, 266, 286-288; Galetti, Memoria, 7. 2 Orsini, Memoirs, 31 ; Pianciani, op. cit., III. 343 ; D’Azeglio, Iltimi Casi, 99. For the administration of law generally, see Raccolta delle leggi, VII. ; Pujos, op. cit.; Guizot, Memoires, II. 439-442 ; Vesi, Rivoluzione, 78-86; Farini, op. cit., I. 158-161 ; Pantaleoni, op. cit., 13-14- 3 Un Galantuomo, /uciiW^zo, 41-42; Gaiani, 07). cit., 207, 259-260; Carte segrete, II. 32-33; About, Question romaine, 170; Orsini, op. cit., 248; Raccolta delle leggi, V. 680. PAPAL STATES 79 They found efficient allies in the Holy Office of the Inquisition. While the police harried the people in their ^aily lives, the Inquisition collected the secrets of the confessional,^ and launched its spiritual thunders on the unconforming. An edict is extant, issued by the Inquisitor- General of Pesaro in 1841, commanding all people to in- form against heretics, Jews, and sorcerers, those who have impeded the Holy Office, or made satires against the Pope and clergy. A brother-inquisitor threatened excommunica- tion against any who were privy to and did not denounce those “ who worship the devil in their hearts.” ^ Unsavoury stories were told in later years of skeletons and instruments of torture found in their dungeons at Eome.^ Their most hapless victims were the Jews. Though Jewish capital sup- ported the trade of Romagna and Ancona, and their co- religionists financed the Holy See, they were compelled to wear a badge, and prohibited from acquiring land. Leo forbade them to travel without leave, and confined them to the Ghettos after nightfall. Under the Lambruschini mis- rule their lot was even worse; the Jews of Ancona and Sinigaglia were forbidden to “ have friendly relations with Christians, or bury their dead with funeral ceremonies ; and an attempt was made to drive them from the province by an order, doubtless evaded, to sell their property, real or personal. While the Inquisition coerced the people into outward conformhy, the government tried to kill out heterodoxy and sedition by crippling education. Its critics said that its maxim was ‘‘ to tolerate vice and proscribe thought.” Ignorant people,” said a Monsignor to D’Azeglio, ‘‘ are easier to govern.” There was indeed no lack of educational insti- tutions ; traditions of days, when the church had protected learning and Italy had planted thick her Universities, ■ 107 ; Carte segrete, I. 136, 369 ; Orsini, op. ^ Niccolini, Pontificate, 106 nt., 232. Gennarelli, Lutti, I55'“i59 » Miscellaneous Documents, No. 14. ^ I state this with considerable reserve. There is no doubt that the skeletons and instruments of torture were found, but there is some suspicion -hat they were placed there after the Inquisition had been expelled. See iol. II., Appendix E. 8o A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY had not been entirely effaced. But education was mono- polized by the clerics, and enervated by a rigid and absurd cmTiculum. No person might teach without the sanc- tion of the bishop; in spite of Dominicans and parish clergy and local authorities the Jesuits got secondary edu- cation into their own hands; the Ignorantelh Brothers, unpopular for their questionable pedagogy and morality, supplied the staff* for many of the elementary schools ; even in the Universities the majority of professors were ecclesi- astics. The church managed education no better than law or finance. Elementary teaching, even such as it was, faded to reach large sections of the people. Boys’ schools were maintained by the commune in the great majority of tovms and villages, but the teaching was of a poor order, and the peasants used them little. There was practically no ele- mentary education for girls, for mixed schools were strictly prohibited, and public opinion was prudish and opposed to female learning. It was estimated that only two per cent, of the population attended school, and even in Rome the proportion was only one in ten.^ In the secondaiy schools the scholars stagnated under a dreary course of Latin gram- mar and scholastic metaphysics. Of machinery for higher teaching there was a superfluity. There were two great Universities at Rome and Bologna ; smaller ones at Perugia, Ferrara, Camerino, Macerata, Fermo. Bologna still retained some of her old prestige, and the Roman University boije a fair repute. But the professors were appointed by com- petition, and were liable to summary dismissal, modem hterature and political economy were excluded ; down to 1835 at Bologna, and probably later elsewhere, Latin was I the compulsory medium for lectures in theology, law, and metaphysics, even to a certain extent in medicine. The government was always tormented by the fear that the Universities might become centres of Liberalism. In order to matriculate it was necessary to produce the governor’s 1 Bowring, op. cit., 85, 89; Tonrnon, Etudes, 87; Serristori, op. cit., 229; Mittermeier, op. cit., 210-21 1 ; Sacchi, op. cit., 63. - “Ove la maggior decenza esige sec. 83 of Leo’s Bull. See About, op. cit., 71. It was said that a teacher of veterinary medicine was obliged to lecture in Latin ; Pianciani, op. cit., III. 145 - PAPAL STATES 8i and bishop’s certificates of ‘‘ good religious, moral, and poli- tical conduct ” ; ^ and nobody was admitted, “ who had given any cause for suspicion of rebellious tendencies.” And alike to students and adults the lawful literary diet was of the meagrest. The Jesuits forbade the study of Dante in their schools ; private circles to read economic books were forbidden; in the ’30s a censor struck out some verses referring to the motion of the earth.^ It was of course impossible that any native literature of worth could flourish ; and except where they were surreptitiously obtained or con- nivance was paid for,^ the great bulk of Italian and foreign publications were excluded. Most modern books of high repute, most newspapers were placed upon the Index.^ By means like these the rulers hoped to keep orthodoxy im- maculate ; perhaps all the more because of them, free- ohought spread fast among the cultured classes, and sapped 3he authority of the Papal See. It was impossible that it should be otherwise. The strictest moral laws were in monstrous contrast to the moral axity of those who administered them. While attendance it church and communion at Easter were obligatory, the laily traffic in sacred offices, the jugglery in eternal salva- ion was shameless as in Luther’s day. While men were lenied the physician’s aid if they refused the sacraments,^ iovert freethought was rife in the Roman hierarchy. The :ensorship kept the theatres pure, but left the churches entres of intrigue. Children, who at school were com- telled to strictest religious observance, heard from the pulpit ulogies of devout highwaymen, whom the saints protected rom the gallows. Fiscal necessities kept the lottery open n Sundays, while shops and cafes had to close. There was 0 doubt a purer section of the hierarchy which cherished an leal of a godly state, but the vexatious jurisdiction of the ^ Raccolta delle leggi, II. 8. 1 ^ Campanella and Niccolini, op. cit., 149; Gaiani, op. cit., 105; Ming- |)tti, Ricordi, I. 47, 223. ^ Curci, Vaticano regio, 168. ^ Of English papers, the Times was “suspected” ; the Standard, Morning \ronicle, and Examiner, and “in general all the Protestant and Tory papers,” ere “adverse to’religion”; the Globe and Observer were “ indifferent.” — Orsini, 'emoirs, 257. ^ Farini, op. cit., I. 137. VOL. I. F 82 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY stricter ecclesiastics only prejudiced the cause of morality. Illegitimate children were excluded from the universities; confession was refused to those who did not denounce blas- phemy and fornication ; an archbishop of Smigagha ordered betrothals to be broken off if the parish priest refused his sanction, and forbade young men and women to pay more than three visits to each other’s houses. The good men, who prompted the compulsion of virtue, were more m fault in their methods than their aims ; but viewed m con- nection with the lives of some of their colleagues, it seemed the very organization of hypocrisy.^ ^ i m Such was the misrule that held high com’t m the Tem- poral Dominions of the Pope, with stagnation and discontent often anarchy and sheer misery for its fruits. A travelled Irish fudge pronounced that the Pope’s subjects were e only people in Europe more wretcEed than his own country- men ■ and though the popular conception of their backward- ness and unhappiness took inadequate account of Romagnuol vigour, it was not much exaggerated. The very disgus produced by the hypocrisy of the government proved per- haps the moral safeguard of the people ; but no industry or ability could make a state prosperous in the face of a corrupt administration and an economic system that strangled trade. And the nearer to Rome, the more miserable was the decay of the country and its inhabitants. In the eastern por- tions of the state the misrule had not had time to 'wrec all traces of prosperity. Romagna and the Marches had down to the days of the French rule enjoyed a large measure of independence, and in consequence they were comparatively prosperous and advanced. There was i vigorous middle class in many of the cities, and the Rornag nuol artisan was perhaps the finest specimen of Ita hai^ manhood. Bologna was the most important manufactuimg centre in the state ; Ancona was the only port that boasted a trade. Even the peasants here, farming on mezzedria tenures, were comparatively prosperous. The hemp industrj of the Romagnuol plain was thriving ; and along the coasi . Bianchi, op. oil., III. 4.1-414; 11 . 3 , 8, " > I. 369; Gennarelli, Lutti, 160-161 ; Id., Ooverno fontvfino, I. 324. Misce laneous Edicts, No. i8. PAPAL STATES 83 provinces as far as Fermo the culture of the soil was fairly good. But the exactions of brigands and Centurions ^ at times brought misery on the thrifty farmers, and the Sanfedists ^ found zealous defenders of the faith among the unemployed* Their comparative prosperity and intelligence were prob- ably the chief cause of the perpetual unrest, with which the trans-Apennine provinces seethed. The hereditary feuds of the Middle Ages transmuted themselves into bitter and bloody struggles between Liberals and Sanfedists. Romagna was the unfailing seed-bed of conspiracy ; and through the Legations ran a vast network of secret correspondence, which had never been betrayed. The bulk of the Liberals were separa- tists. There was no homogeneity between the eastern and western portions of the state ; the barrier of the Apennines parted off the Legations and the Marches from Rome, and their affinities lay with the provinces that had formed the Kingdom of Italy. The cities of Romagna could never forget their lost liberties, granted them by old treaties, which Napoleon had swept away, and Consalvi had refused to restore. They looked on the Papal Government as a pledge-breaker, and most of all Bologna, proud of its history, its university, its trade, ill-dis- guised its hatred of rival Rome, the home of the venal bureau- cracy that plundered the state. Better the Turks than the Pope,” ran the Romagnuol proverb ; and many would have even taken Austrian rule, if it would free them from his tyranny.^ Even in the ’30s statesmen like Rossi and Bernetti saw that Home Rule was the only means of preserving the Adriatic provinces to Rome ; ^ and the separatist feeling came to the fore at every crisis in the history of the state. The inland provinces on the western slope of the Apennines showed a progressive deterioration. The hill districts of Umbria were not far behind Romagna in pro- sperity. But there was less virility and self-reliance, more sentimental attachment to Rome, and the Liberals were strong only in a few towns. South and west of Umbria, 1 See below, pp. 116, 141. i 2 Carte segrete, I. 354, 360-361, 454 ; Cantu, Cronistoria, II. 282, III, 127 n. ; Gualterio, op. cit, I. 143 ; D’Azeglio, Ultimi Casi, 52. I ^ Guizot, Memoires, II. 451-452 ; Chateaubriand, Memoires, IV. 379; Poggi, Storia,!. 151. 84 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY in the Comarca, all traces of prosperity rapidly disappeared, except in the small hiU-district of Frosinone. The great entailed and mortmain properties began, and as the traveller neared Rome, he found the population more and more sunk in ignorance and brutish squalor. The climax v as reached in the desolate solitudes of the malaria- smitten Agro Romano, which stretched along the coast-line south- wards from Civita Vecchia, Here the great Roman families, whose estates stretched to portentous magnitude in Italian eyes, had their patrimonies.^ The land, naturally fertile, but almost valueless through neglect, was let at very low rents, in huge farms averaging 1500 acres and reaching in one instance to over thhty square miles. AVhat had once been the centre of Roman civilization was now the home of a few ragged and fever-stricken herdsmen. Migrant labourers came in gangs from the hills in harvest- time, the high wages overcoming the terror of the malaiia, which decimated then* ranks, and made the work a fearful , lottery. In spite of its native richness, the average produce was one-third of that of Romagna, and the population of the pro^unce of Civita Yecchia was thhty-five to the square mile. 1 Rome naturally occupied a position by herself. In a sense, the city was only the suburb of the Papal court. ^ The reverence which surrounded the centre of Cathohc Chiisten- dom, the pomp of cardinals and nobles, the daily procession of mystic ceremony tied the Romans to the Pope b}- stiong bands that were absent in the rest of the state. The native aristocracy was parasitic and exclusive in a sense little knovTL in Italy, jealous of the ecclesiastical power, but bound by tradition to the Papacy. The professional and mercantile classes were Liberals, but they were few in number, and without a municipal authority to give expres- sion to their wishes. The Roman populace was biave, alert, comparatively educated ; but the pride of a supposed ^ Prince Borghese owned 100,000 acres. 2 Toumon, Etudes, 1 . 310; GaUi, Cenni, 182, 207 et seq. ; according to 76 . 205, the produce was 2^ bushels per acre. A special tax was imposed in 1832 for killing wolves: Raccolta delle leggi, VI. 21. See also About, op. cit., 274- 276 et alibi; Chateauvieux, Travels; Didier, Campagne; and for its condition in 1882, Beauclerk, RuraZ Italy, 72-81, 86, 87, 104. PAPAL STATES 85 classical descent and the demoralization of lavish charities ^ made it idle and quarrelsome, and the lower strata led a life of infinite degradation. Rome, in fact, as Metternich said, was like a magnificent theatre with bad actors.^ Its churches were “ full of monuments, but empty of people.” On the surface the most moral of European cities, in reality it was corrupt as any.^ There was little industry ; the streets swarmed with beggars; large numbers of the poor were ; hangers-on in the households of prelates and nobles, and had I learnt to wear the badge at least of servility. In Sismondi’s j words, all Romans wore either the tonsure, or livery, or rags. For the Pope the populace had an unbounded reverence ; they were interested in the pomp of the Prelacy, and even in the ecclesiastical small- talk; but they profoundly disbelieved in its virtues, and relished the pasquinades which lashed the I abuses of the government and the vices of the great. Still they had little sympathy with Liberalism ; the spoilt children of the state, they despised the progressive middle classes. It was not till Gregorys reign that a change came over them. His life and character were little calculated to ! stir their loyalty. Young Italy made many converts, and i Lamennais’ Words of a Believer are said to have made a deep impression on the more thoughtful. Though much of the old sentimental loyalty survived, the men whom the Trasteverines followed in the ’40s were earnest democrats, with little love for a Pope, unless he threw his lot in with them. Still, even in later times, except in the early years of Pio Nono and under Mazzini’s republic, Rome was perhaps the least Italian of Italian cities. The Papal influence was always .strong; the foreign residents and visitors distracted their I clients from politics. And though the majority were probably I always passively nationalist after 1846, though they hated I and despised the Pope’s government, they gave a poor backing to the efforts outside to free them, and gave some colour to the argument that Rome was not Italian, but cosmopolitan. ^ On New Year’s Day 1848 the Senate distributed 120,000 lbs. of bread and 30,000 lbs. of meat. 2 Metternich, Memoires, III. 201. He adds, “I cannot understand how a Protestant can turn Catholic at Rome.” 3 Liverani, op. cit., 124-125, 251; Gregorovius, Diari romani, 129; Dicey, Rome, 35 ; About, op. cit., 48-50. CHAPTEE V SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY— (continued) Naples : the new land system ; theory and practice ; justice ; local government ; education ; corruption of government ; nobles ; clergy ; educated classes ; trade ; city of Naples ; peasants ; political indiffer- ence. Sicily : character ; Home Kule ; land system ; the peasants ; malendrinaggio ; want of education. The Elements of the Italian Nation : church ; nobles ; middle classes ; universities ; artisans and town labourers ; peasants. The oppression ; absence of political life ; dawn of patriotism. Naples In tlie south of the peninsula, covering three-eighths of its surface, lay the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, the “ Two Sicilies ” of diplomatic language. Character, geo- graphical position, the bitter feud between Neapolitan and Sicilian, made it the most distinctive and isolated of Italian states. The two countries, which were held together merely by the common pressure of the government, had their different traditions and aspirations, their character and social life most dissimilar. Naples shared in the reform- ing movement of the eighteenth centmy. Charles III. reduced the privileges of the nobles ; Acton in the earher years of his ministry designed the gradual abolition pf feudalism. But the French Revolution frightened the government back into extremes of reaction. The Bourbon court, driven into Sicily by the French, returned in 1799 to wreak its revenge, and under Nelson’s willing patronage^ Fra Diavolo and his crew outran their royal master’s orders and made Naples red with civil blood. years later the French advance again made the court take refuge behind the English arms in Sicily, and Naples for nine 1 For his atrocious conduct see Hervey-Saint-Denys, Histoire, 236-253. 86 NAPLES 87 years came under the Freneh rule, first of Joseph Bonaparte, then of Murat. Feudalism was abolished; the great majority of monasteries were dissolved, and their immense properties were sold or let on perpetual leases. Entails became illegal, and many of the large feudal estates passed into the hands of creditors ; communal lands were divided into small holdings and let to the poorer inhabitants. The land- system was revolutionized at a blow, and great slices of the country were bought up by small proprietors. There were now a million landowners, or one in five of the population. It is true that many of the properties were too small to yield an independence ; that others were bought up by speculators ; that to some extent the change only increased the number of little tyrants of the middle class, who owned both land and capital.^ Yet the French legislation went far towards democratizing the social struc- ture. Murat left Naples free from feudalism, with a reformed law, an ordered finance, a more stable land-system. Civil institutions had advanced four centuries in the nine years of French rule. And though the Restoration undid much, it left the law, the church, the land, in theory at least, in harmony with modern conditions. No other state in Italy could boast institutions so advanced : no government, save the Pope’s, was so utterly degraded in practice as that which afflicted Naples and Sicily under the Bourbon rule. It was the same story of corruption in every branch of the administration. Naples had the most enlightened code of justice in Italy. The courts were generally open to the public; there was a modified system of bail; a defendant might select his own counsel and cross-examine. In prac- tice too often caprice was the only law. Secret orders in council overrode the codes; the crown interfered to pro- tect Bourbonists or persecute Liberals; the police were empowered to try suspects by their own secret and illegal procedure, to liberate convicted men, or detain those acquitted by the courts. Prisoners were flogged, torture ^ Bianchini, Napoli, 551-552; M. L. R., Saggio, 54, 298; Franchetti, Pro- vincie napolitane, 125-126; Chateau vieux, Lettres, I. 28. I cannot believe the figures in Bodio, Movimento economico, 48. 88 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY was connived at or encouraged ; ^ the prisons, though the official regulations were good, were “ gulfs of hell. An almost universal corruption completed the wreck of justice. Assassinations in full day went unpunished if the criminal had friends in office; and everywhere there were informal societies with common bribery funds to get enemies con- demned and friends acquitted. So too in local government, the law was good, the facts^were vicious. Each of the fifteen provinces of the mainland had its council appointed by the government, with powers to assess taxes, to execute public works, to control main-roads and public societies, with liberty to criticise officials, to propose reforms of administration, to discuss matters of general import to the state. The communal councils controlled by-roads, elemen- tary schools, vaccination, the maintenance of foundlings. But the fabric, so liberal in principle, was spoilt by the corruption of the government and the tyranny of the local magnates. The public vote, which elected the communal council, often only voiced the orders of the ex-feudal lord, whose nominees plundered in his interest the estates of the commune and wasted its forests, wffiile the officials leagued themselves to the conspiracy.^ In education the gulf between theory and practice was as great. By a law of 1 8 1 o every commune, except the smallest, was bound to have its primary school, every province its secondary school. But nothing was done to bring the children to them. Even in Naples itself there were but four gratuitous public schools, and only one in three of school age attended. For girls there was practically no provision. In the provinces it was worse. The bishops did their best to frustrate the efforts of the Education Ministry to open schools. There were whole communes without a literate peasant ; and how general was the igno- rance, is shown by the law that required that one-third of the members of a town council should read and write. 1 Nisco, Francesco 37 ; Carlo Poerio, etc., 38-39 ; Settembrini, Protesta, 28 ; see also Correspondence — Naples (1848), 95. ^ Franchetti, op. cit., passim; Bianco di Saint- Jorioz, BHgantaggio, 48-49; Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, II. 246. NAPLES 89 The secondary schools, with a few notable exceptions at Naples, suffered from the same “grecism” that afflicted the intermediate education of all Italy. The University bore a high name, its classes were crowded, and its pro- fessors kept to some extent their independence; but the idle life and enervating atmosphere of the capital too often demoralized the young provincials. Everything — law, local government, education, — was tainted by the corruption that had eaten through the public service. The government was “a pyramid with priests and police for its base, and the king for its apex,” and from top to base reigned the same callousness to the commonwealth. The Bourbon court treasured all the vices of the family. Under Francis, courtesans ruled it; under Ferdinand II., priests. One of Ferdinand’s brothers worried a creditor to death with his mastiffs ; another’s bravoes carried to his harem his neighbours’ wives and daughters. Corruption found good soil at such a court. In Francis’ reign ‘‘justice, titles, high offices were brought to the hammer. “ The man who pays for a post,” said the King, “wants to keep it, and is loyal.” ^ Ferdinand’s Jesuit confessor kept an open sale of office ; the Ministry of the Interior was a market of jobbery ; at Palermo places in the civil ^ service were publicly sold. High officers of state manipulated the corn duties to help their own speculations, and the Home Minister took for his private collection the finest discoveries of Pompeii. His subordinates copied him ; no official could be sued without royal sanction, and they made good use of the immunity. “ Every civil ser- vant, said an official report, “makes what he can out of his office. In collusion with contractors, they s^j^randered the public monies ; the police levied blackmail, and carried on a contraband trade ; they warned the Calabrian brigands when danger threatened, and sheltered them when osten- sibly in pursuit. The corruption had free play, because there were no strong elements of opposition. Many of the nobles were well contented with a system, which gave them a rich share ^ Nisco, Francesco 6, 22. 90 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY of the plunder. Others had been drawn to Naples and ruined by its luxury and vice. The great landlords of Calabria were less often absentees than in the rest of Italy, and their influence proportionately greater ; but they loved the misrule, and their custom of allowing only one son of a family to marry demoralized the country-side. The church was silent as the nobles. It had always been subservient to the government ; and when it tried after the Restoration to assert its independence, it found that the hand of the crown was not shortened. And though the Concordat of i8i8 gave it some privileges, and marked a surrender to Rome unknown before at Naples, it only tied the clergy more-eom- pletely to the interests of the absolutism. The 26,000 priests and 20,000 monks and nuns ^ were one in thirteen of the population. But the ill-fame of bishops and priests alike, their petty tyranny and injustice, the knowledge that many of them were spies of the government robbed them of moral weight. Nor was there any virile intellectual ele- ment. Some of the traditional culture was left, at all events at Naples and in Calabria ; but there was little that was worthy of the country that had produced Pythagoras and Thomas Aquinas, Bruno and Campanella and Vico. Much of it was a rude, forgotten land, with little oases of civiliza- tion in a great waste of ignorance or superstition. An almost prohibitive duty kept out foreign books ; and though there was latitude for economic discussion, and keen contro- versies were waged over free-trade and the land-tax, no purely political writings were allowed. The educated— class was | small — a crowd of lawyers, a few literary men of high attain- | ments, — and they lacked the stamina and patriotism of their j fellows in North and Central Italy. Such writing andj thought as there was, had little in common with the rest of the peninsula. It was not till the study of Dante grew and ■ spread, and the revival that followed Ferdinand II. s accession stimulated literature, that any serious effort was made to assimilate speech and thought to that of Upper Italy. > So Serristori, Due Sicilie. At a later date Crisp! (Scritti, l86) puts the total number at 70,000. ^ Settembrini, Ricordanze, I. 56, 57. NAPLES / The trading— class, too, was small and unimportant. While the Continental System lasted, there had been a cer- tain fictitious prosperity in The production of cotton and brandy, but both industries collapsed with the Peace, and the influence of the Physiocrat economists kept prejudice strong against manufactures. After the crisis of 1824 the government tried to encourage industry by lavishing bounties and protective duties and abolishing the guilds. But protection did little to stimulate, and it was not until the short-lived confidence in the government that obtained from 1831 to 1834, that there was any serious progress. Even then the imports remained small ; the staple export was olive-oil ; the manufactured exports were insignificant, , mainly spirits, silk of a high quality, and gloves. The meddle and muddle of the government still hampered en- terprise ; and the King restricted banks and dissolved insur- ance societies, because they expected interest on their capital.^ In contrast with the halLbarbarous condition of much of the country stood Naples with its veneer~~of civilized luxury, and its unfathomed depths of degraded life, with all the vices and few of the virtues of a metropolis. At this time it was by far the largest city in Italy, with a popula- tion of over 300,000. The capital was the spoilt child of the government; while peasants were dying of hunger, great sums were lavished on its theatre of San Carlo; it had enormous charities, and after 1830 the government made large grants for its poor. There was a traditional understanding that the Bourbons should leave the paupers of the slums to their idleness and crime, if they supported it at need, to cow the respectable and progressive classes. The lazzaroni numbered at least 40,000;^ a demoralized, idle mob, hardened by suffering, brutalized by superstition, with the anarchical instincts of licensed pariahs, ready at a call to massacre artisans and tradesmen, and loot in the interests of church and throne. Already the ccLiiwTTOb ex- isted, with its dreaded secret organization, to shelter crime ^ Gualterio, 0^. cit, II. 273 ; La Farina, Storia, II. i68. 2 Lady Morgan, Italy, II. 393. 92 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY and levy blackmail.^ A want of enterprise and manliness weighed on the whole city. The cultured classes, acute and inquiring though they were, made no sustained effort for their principles ; the municipal government was corrupt as all else ; the civic guard was an armed faction under the orders of the police ; the draconic laws against beggars were a dead letter ; and in the Foundling Hospital nine infants out of ten died of starvation. But the gay, thoughtless, gesticulating Neapolitan was no type of the bulk of the population. Five-sixths of the workers were employed on the land. From the mountains of the Abruzzi in the north the country sloped down to the fertile Terra di Lavoro, to Naples and Sorrento on the west ; on the east to the flat pastoral district of the Capitinata on the Adriatic, to the Basilicata round the Gulf of Taranto, i and Puglia with its rich vineyards and oliveyards in the heel of Italy ; while the Apennines formed a continuous back-bone do’vvn the centre, through the Principati to Calabria in the i toe. By nature a great portion of the land was exceedingly fertile, but neglect and bad^-government had made large tracts well-nigh useless. Immense stretches of land, Avhich only needed the drainage of the rich alluvial soils, were given over to malaria. Lake Fucino, which had been drained under Claudius, had been allowed to make pestilent the great valley round it ; the mountain district of La Sila in Calabria was deserted save by banditti and wandering herdsmen; the vast Tavoliere di Puglia, stretching for seventy miles along the Adriatic, was, despite the protests of the economists, kept in the state of natural pasturage to which it had been devoted since the fifteenth century. All through the southern portion of the country the want of thoroughfares crippled the agriculturist. Carriage-roads, i along which the mails crept at the rate of fifty miles a day, were very few ; in some districts of the interior it was i almost impossible to travel on horseback in winter ; even I fifty years later, in the province of Aquila, one-third of the communes had not even a proper cart-road. It is small I wonder that agriculture showed few signs of progress, that ^ Monnier, La Camorre ; and below, Vol., 11 . p. 184. NAPLES 93 the bulk of the grain and wine and oil were of poor quality. It was only in the Terra di Lavoro, and round Bari, and in the oliveyards of Gallipoli, that there was any better culture. Despite the French legislation, a large proportion of the cultivators rented their farms, often on onerous terms, and paying exorbitant interest to the usurious landlord or private loan-monger. Sometimes, as in the Basilicata, much of the land was let on short improvement leases, the landlord finding everything, and at the end of the tenancy taking land and crops with little or no compensation. In the western provinces the system of tenure varied, mezzedria farms alternating with yearly tenancies or large holdings on long leases. But almost everywhere the peasants were practically the serfe of their lords, tied hand-and-foot by their indebtedness, driven by poverty and the keen com- petition for land to accept the cruel contracts imposed on them.^ The tax-gatherer took what the landlord left. The very heavy land-tax was rigorously exacted from the famine- stricken peasants, and to pay the hated grist-tax implements and houses were often seized. Salt, which was a government monopoly, was so dear that the people were sometimes unable to buy it. And though there were districts where the squalor of the peasants had disappeared, their general condition was one of more or less degraded and savage poverty. The small proprietors, who had sufficient land of their own, were hardly better off. The labourers, though wages were sometimes comparatively high, had a precarious lot. And the land- system, though it showed so admirable in statistics, proves on examination rotten as the rest of the social fabric. In some parts, as in Calabria, there was i severance between rich and poor rare in Italy. The imtilmmini kept the peasants and labourers in a state of >erfdom, grinding their faces in abject poverty, corrupting ^ Franchetti, op. cit. ^ passim ; De Augustinis, Condizione, 156; C. D. V. 7 enm, 34, 38; Della Valle, Considerazioni ; Bianco di Saint-Jorioz, op. cit., 18, 24-125; Villari, Lettere meridionali, 55-59; Laing, Notes, 396; Beauclerk,' Ural Italy, 43-46. Already, in 1835, the farmers were feeling the effects of oreign competition “even from America.” The communes tried sometimes 0 provide a remedy for usury: v. Raumer, Italy, 11 . 251. The recent rapid •xtension of land-banks is, it is to be hoped, killing out the usurer. 94 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY their family honour. Their miserable condition, their superstition more pagan than Christian, their brutish ignor- ance seemed sometimes to have killed all moral sense. “ Theft,” wrote one who knew them, ‘‘ is their second nature, almost their necessity ” ; and sometimes a whole village, seized with a common passion for crime, would leave their ploughs to plunder and murder. Brigandage had for genera- tion^ been endemic in some of the mountain districts ; under the French rule it had taken a political colour ; when its Bourbon patrons returned, it became frankly criminal. At times sentries had to guard the whole length of road from Capua to the Papal frontier. The Calabrians went about armed to the teeth ; and the roving banditti were recruited from the murderers, who “ went into the country,” while the scent was fresh on their wild deeds of violence. From such a people no steady politieaU^ivity could be expected. There was of course a considerable class above the level of actual poverty— the middling proprietors, the merchants of the towns, the tradesmen who had retired to their small estates. It was from these, doubtless, that the Carbonari of 1820 drew their strength. But they were a minority, too often a corrupt and fibreless minority. The mass of the people were sunk in an ignorance and misery, which left no room for hope or progress. An ears of civilization and sunderance of interests were likely for generations yet to prevent Naples from marching in line vith the rest of Italy. N Sicily Sicily and Naples were members of one state, but they were parted by a bitterness as intense as that which divided 1 Ireland from England. Differences of race and-history and i character made it impossible to fuse the mainland and; island. The large admixture of Norman and Saracen and, Berber blood in Sicily, the semi-tropical climate, the longi parliamentary tradition had produced a character that had nothing in common with that of the mainland. In con- trast to the lazy, vivacious, shallow Neapolitan, the Paler- SICILY 95 mitan was silent, laconic, brave. Though the Sicilian was wanting in resource and perseverance, and though his southern blood and the absence of intellectual outlet made him subject to wild bursts of sexual passion and savage vengeance, yet he was generous and chivalrous, he had virility and a rough kind of loyalty. A Sicilian rarely betrayed another ; while the Neapolitan was a courtier by nature, he was rugged and independent, and Ferdinand I. had found him unsusceptible to court favours. Thanks to his seven centuries of parliamentary history he had more interest in public affairs, a patriotism which was all the intenser for its narrowness. And despite the lawlessness of Palermo and its neighbourhood, despite the murders four times more numerous than in Piedmont and the universal prevalence of theft, there was not the same depth of corrup- tion that prevailed on the mainland.^ History combined with difference of character to sever the two peoples. From the Sicilian Vespers to l^ 5 Sicily had been independent of Naples. Even when joined under one crown, it had kept its own flag, its parliament, and separate administration. The struggle between crown and barons in 1812 had only confirmed the Sicilians in their rights ; and when, four years later, the Bourbons stole their liberties, the free past beckoned to them with ever more alluring fascination. Feudalists and Liberals might endanger the common cause with their quarrels, but the same intense love of independence ruled them all. The very clergy and monks redeemed their ignorance and wealth by their fervid patriotism. On all classes weighed the oppression of the Bourbon government. “The Sicilians are barbarians; we have come to civilize them,” boasted the Neapolitan oflicials, and they treated the island “ beyond the Faro ” as a conquered province. The Sicilians repaid them with a hate that embraced both court and people of the ruling race. There was little sympathy between the Liberals of Palermo and Naples, still less respect or loyalty to the crown. It followed that Sicily had no share in the common life of 1 Palmieri de’ Micciche, Perishes, I. 258, 263 ; Famin, R6volution, 4 ; Nisco, Ferdinando IL, 34 ; Pasqualino, Letters, 8, 9 ; La Masa, Documenti, I. 41. 96 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Italy, that in its bitter hostility to Naples it turned rather to England, to Russia, to France, to any Power that would secure its independence of the mainland. It was only at a later date that the Italian spirit reached them, that they learnt to appeal to Italy against Naples, and seek for freedom by merging themselves in the bigger fatherland, of which Sicily and Naples would be equal and independent provinces. The nature of the Neapolitan rule was sufficient of it- self to create the repulsion. It is true that Sicilians and Neapolitans were fellow-sufferers, that the government was little, if at all, more corrupt and tyrannical than it was on the Mainland. But its bitterness lay in its being an alien rule. In some respects, indeed, the laws of Naples were in advance of their own, and the Neapolitan Liberals might I regard their imposition as a gain to the cause of progress, i But while they provoked the unresting hostility of^ the ^ nobles, they were too much opposed to the national tiadition j to be acceptable even to the down-trodden masses. This I was especially apparent in the attempts to reform the native I land-laws. Feudalism had been nominally abolished m 1 8 1 2, ; but in a half-hearted way, that contrasted with the root-and- branch reforms which the French had carried out at Naples. Numberless questions of detail were left to be decided by the courts (there were many still pending in 1838), and for some time the presumption of the courts went in favour 01 the lords. In spite of legislation to facilitate the sale^ of - encumbered estates, there was none of the wide distribution : of property which had taken place at Naples. A league 1 of latifondisti protected the interests of the big proprietors, | and the few commercial men, who purchased land, ranged i themselves on their side. Here and there the commons j were divided into small holdings, but the great majority of the people were landless, and it was only in the rich Conca d’Oro round Palermo, and in the neighbourhood of Messina and Marsala, that small properties could be found. Nine-tenths of the soil belonged to the barons-nnd prelates, and one noble’s princely estate stretched for thirty miles. The insecurity and unhealthiness of the fields drove the people to live almost entirely in towns; in three large SICILY 97 provinces only two per cent. lived in the country; and the great reaches of natural pasturage, without villages or trees much of It smitten with malaria, with little produce save the food of scattered herds, stretched over what had been the granary of Italy. The farms were leased for short terms at rack-rents ; and the middleman-farmers, with insufficient capital for their enormous holdings (many ranged from 2000 to 5000 acres), sublet the corn land in small parcels to peasants paying rent in kind, advancing the seed and sup- plying oxen for the plough, and taking sometimes three- quarters of the produce in return. So much was the peasant at their mercy, that his plot, when rent^and interest were paid barely allowed him a subsistence. But he could legally claim enough food to save him from starvation, and such was the uncertainty of employment, that he preferred to have a rack- rented holding rather than work for wages.^ culture was necessarily primi- implements were of antique shape, and as late as i860 threshing was done by treading. It was only in the neighbourhood of large towns, where the land was held by small proprietors, that there was any effort to improve. he vine;^ds of Marsala, and the orange and lemon gar ens o the Conca d’Oro alone showed of what the land was capable. Even where there was disposition to improve, the government did what it could to discourage It. Down to 1819 all corn for export had to be deposited in bonded warehouses {caricatoi), where the export duty was collected. _ When these were abolished, the want of roads still practically stopped the trade in grain. Means of com- munication were lacking even more than on the mainland; was not till 1828 that carriages could travel from Messina .0 Balermo, and for long years after the interior was inac- cessible to them. Robbers infested the rough tracks, that fftL island communication in the greater part Memorie; Palmeri, Saggio ; sf n ^0 ,06 34; Cordova, DiZd, , 11. 2«9-3o 6; Villari, op. cit., 31-36. ame“e?re‘snSf VOL. I. G 98 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY The backwardness of its agriculture was the more serious, because Sicily had little commerce ^ industries were the wine trade of Marsala'and the sulphur mines round Caltanisetta and Girgenti, and these were worked by foreign enterprise and capital. Doivn to 1824 there was no free trade even with Naples, and protection crushed all attempts to create a commerce. Wretched, indeed, was the condition of the people. The sulphur- workers lived in a degradation hardly reached by the white slaves of early factory days in England. The agricultural labourers, going long distances to their work froin their squalid homes in the towns, earned but from five to seven shillings a week. The peasants, sober and bar - workino- as they were, were weighed to the ground with usury robbed bare by the exactions of grist-tax and land- tax, to escape from which they would sometimes forsake their holdings, and turn to the more profitable call ot ^ briffandacre. All were slaves to the corruption and tyi'anny : of the Intendants and their underlings; slaves too to the barons, whose armed retainers terrorized them, and whose feudal dues and jurisdiction, though abolished at law, remained as customs, against which they dared not rebel. From high to low there was no respect for the law ihe government never scrupled to break it; the officias pro- bated it to their own greed; the nobles employed their retainers to assassinate their enemies. It is small wonder that crime was organized to an extent hardly credible in Western Europe. The vast households of the nobles, the criminal gangs of Palermo, the orange-growers of the Conca d’Oro (descendants of the old bravoes of the barons), the middlemen of the centre of the island formed a vast unseen conspiracy, before which justice was powerless and govern- ment paralyzed.^ It was this malendrinar/gto or mafia, wtiicn has made part of Sicily the despair of constitutional, as it was then of despotic government. But while, because of it, severe, almost cruel, repression 1 V Eaumer, op. cit., II. 308, 309: Centrallizzazione, 142; Mottillarol Eeminiscenze, 164 ; contra, Bracci, Memorie, 48. 2 Villari, op. cil., 34> 35 : Ciottl, Palermo, 6, 7. SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY 99 has been a necessity, the unhappy island has needed and not had the patient work of a generation to heal its igno- rance and poverty and superstition. Of education there was then, as long after, almost none ; even the children of the nobles were often hardly literate. And though there was limited amount of culture and a few men of real ability . Palermo spent ten times as much on its foundlings as on its schools, and professors at Messina University had less than a gendarmes pay. The religion of the people was a pagan superstition. The Church was, indeed, very powerful; monks swarmed, and their property, untouched by the Revolution exceeded m value that of all the other monasteries of Italy’ ui. their dirt and their wealth.^ Santa Rosalia ranked above the Redeemer to the Palermitans ; and the sulphur-workers of Girgenti, after an explosion, broke their image of the Madonna, and sub- p hshed luxury of Palermo, it was a lawless, semi-barbarous people, bred in a school of violence and force; a nation of nobles and proletarians, with no middle-class, with few local mstitutions, with nothing to hold them together save the feudal tradition and the intense common pride of race. But while Sicily has been and remains one of Italy’s greatest problems, while normal settled government there seems still a dream, its people has a strength and an independence, a half-Oriental dignity, a latent fire, which has always made them the hope of the advanced patriots of Italy. The unbelievers in Italian nationality would point to the wide (hversity of character, which parted the inhabitants of ,he different states. There seemed little in common between he heavy, painstaking Piedmontese and the light-hearted e dissolute proletarian of Venice or Naples ; between the rentle, mtelligent Tuscan and the passionate, sullen Sicilian- •etween the activity and enterprise of Genoa or Lombardy •nd the dead stagnation of the Comarca. There was no ommon Italian stock; Teuton blood predominated in the nrth, Greek blood in the Basilicata and Puglia; Arabs and Jormans and Spaniards had left their traces in Sicily, while lOO A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY , the old Italic and Etruscan stocks remained, perhaps with > little mixture, in Tuscany and Umbria and the Abruzzi Uifferent governments had trained them to varying soci habits and widely dissimilar land systems, to activity oi stac^nation of industry, to high or low standards of edu- cation. Feudal customs were still strong in Piedmont and | Naples and Sicily, while in Lombardy and Tuscany they were half-forgotten memories. But the_ existing states had , not even the merit of recognizing the minor affimties of e j populations. Romagna gravitated to the states of the Lin • the Abruzzi and the Principati had more m common i with the Roman border-country than with Calabria. Siciy was divided less from any Italian state than from Naple , and the worst municipal rivalries were between cities of the sZe state. And beneath the differences ran a common likeness The remoteness of Piedmontese and Reapolitan was no greater than that which divided Norman and Pro- vencal, Prussian and Bavarian, English and Irish, and the ’rich mixture of blood promised a TtaH had virility and many-sidedness. Despite the dialects, Italy had a common- tongue, a common name, a common naemory of the days when she had ruled the world; and history was very rei where every district had its traditions of the great men and deeds of Rome. She had a common literatwe a common possession of Dante and Ariosto and Macchiavelli. ThTgreal barrier of the Alps meant more than a geo- graphical expression, and necessities of trade itHhe day a-ainst the partition of the peninsula. Despite the ieabuSes of Piedmont and Genoa, of Naples and Sicdj, o Romaona and Rome ; despite the interests that pleaded t e fndTpince of each petty metropolis; despte the gi-eater differences that parted North and South it ° thinkers like Napoleon and Alfieri and Mazzini that senti- and expediency alike would ^eacyhe different fractions to merge themselves m a great united Italy. To the hasty traveller belongs the monopoly of generalizimr on the Italian character ; a historian must go lelicately even when he deals with particular sections and districts.^ Of the various classes that made up the Italian lOI SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY people, first in power without doubt came the 150,000 ecclesiastics. The nearer, indeed, to Rome, the more the abuses of the Church stank in the nostrils ; but none the less the presence of Rome gave an unique power to its hold on Italian minds ; and its subtle net of influence reaching to every commune and hamlet in the land, its pomp of power, the support, however grudging, of the civil arm, its control of the schools, its authority over the marriage rite, its claim to open and shut the gates of heaven, gave it an unmeasured influence over a religious and imaginative, often superstitious, people. For the Italians were essentially not only religious, but Catholic. A little rationalism had filtered in in the last century ; there was a certain fashion- able scepticism at Florence and Milan ; hypocrisy often held high state in church and court. But the masses of the people, high and low, even when they did not accept the whole Catholic doctrine, even when they abominated the Roman court or satirized the clergy, gave willing adhesion to the Catholic faith and ritual, and felt a sentimental pride in the possession of the Papacy. The attacks of the govern- ments on the Church in the last century had already faded into a not very cordial alliance between it and the state. The attempts of after years to reform the discipline of the Church always aimed at reforming it within the pale of Catholicism;^ the abolition of ecclesiastical abuses, that followed the rise of constitutional government, was careful to disclaim hostility.^ And at this moment it seemed not impossible that the ChurcR might range itself with the nation. Though it had thrown in its lot with the Restora- tion, many a parish priest, many a monk, was a patriot and in a way a Liberal. Each revolution contributed its batch of martyr-priests. Especially in Lombardy and Sicily, the fire of patriotism burnt bright in sacristy and monastery. Sprung largely from the people, they shared the people’s poverty^ and hopes ; and the earlier years of Pio Nono proved how easily the clergy might have been won to the ^ See below, Vol. II., p. 125-6. 2 below, p. 393 ; Vol. II., pp. 3, 126 ^ In 1867 the average stipend of a parish priest was 795 lire (under i^32) ; Frigyesi, V Italia, 355. 102 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY national cause, if Rome had led the way. But the collapse of Pius’ brief Liberalism showed that the Roman Curia could never become national, that, without far-reaching changes in its constitution, it, the most worldly and unteachable of courts, can never accept reform, that the Temporal Power stands, and must always stand, between Papal claims and Italian rights. It was often said that Italy possessed no landed -a^stoc- racy. This was true in the sense that there were few terri- torial magnates, and that even such as there were, were, except perhaps in Sicily and Calabria and in later years in Piedmont, absentees and dwellers in towns, and therefore had little of the influence of the English landed peer. The unnumbered counts of the north and centre, the dukes and princes of the south cheapened the prestige of a title. In Naples and Venice and Rome the nobles were corrupted and degen^te. In all the political vicissitudes of the century the creation of a hereditary second chamber never seriously entered the \ head of an Italian politician. None the less their power i was great, and often deserved. In Sicily they were omni- potent, both because of their wealth and because they shared the great political passion of the people. The brilliant aristocracy of Milan made its wealth and capacity felt through Lombardy. The best of the nobles of Florence, sprung from the great mercantile families of the republic and the Medici rule, had identified themselves with all that i was most progressive and improving in Tuscany. The i military nobility of Piedmont, crass and out-of-date as it was, kept much of its feudal prestige and tradition of simple, ] solid patriotism. There was an unpretentiousness of life in their vast uncomfortable palaces, where they would rather see a masterpiece of the great painters than an easy chair or a warm fireside. And on the whole the Italian nobility, except in Piedmont and at Rome, was not exclusive. In Tuscany, and partially in Lombardy, it had sprung from the bourgeoisie, and everywhere constant fresh creations fed it with new blood. The Universities, the free social life ■oP the cities, the comparative absence of great wealth fused it more or less with the class beneath it. Its courtesy to all SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY 103 classes awoke the marvel of German observers. And though much of it was worthless and discredited, there was a sec- tion of high note in every state, which identified itself with the best hopes of the nation. Every Liberal, even every Revolutionary movement could find its noble leaders; and if the middle classes can claim Mazzini and Manin, Gioberti and Farini and Rattazzi, the nobles can boast that Santa Rosa and Pallavicino, D’Azeglio and Cavour and Ricasoli, the Bandieras and Pisacane sprang from their ranks. But the best life of the nation was in the middle- classes. They had felt their power under the French rule ; Modena had had its famous school of civil servants ; as engineers, as scientists, as writers, men of ability had had their chance. No class, therefore, suffered more from the repression, to which they were condemned at the Restoration. The civil service offered few attractions, for it meant selling help to the oppressors, and there was little hope of promotion, while in Lombardy the Austrians, in Piedmont the nobles, in the Papal States the monsignori monopolized the higher posts. Literature was a thorny path, with censors watching at every corner to crush out originality or check the smallest incur- sion into politics. Italy indeed was fairly rich in writers ; she had her philosophers in Galluppi and Rosmini and Romagnosi, her poets in Leopardi and Niccolini, her scholars in Mai and Mezzofanti, her novelist in Manzoni. But Rossetti and Berchet had been driven into exile ; and not only was political and social, even economic, literature almost killed out, but the expense and delay and uncertainty of obtaining the censor’s imprimatur checked authorship of every kind. Literature often passed with difficulty from state to state ; the total number of new books and editions published in Italy in 1835 was 2811, and the majority of these were probably reprints; in 1833 there were less than 100 periodicals, mainly scientific or commercial.^ The official gazettes, it was said, gave more space to the affairs of India and Japan than to those of Europe, and had no intelligence of contemporary politics. The Antologia was the only periodical, that took a place among the great Euro- ^ Cantu, Milano, I. 73 ; Id,, Cronistoria, II. 387. 104 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY pean reviews. Of journalism proper there was none. There Avas hardly more outlet in trade. Protective duties and customs -barriers, the absence of a common coinage or common weights and measures, the official discouragement of banks were fatal to a vigorous manufacturing or com- . mercial life. Except in some of the Lombard cities, and at Genoa and Leghorn, mercantile enterprise Avas hardly known. There Avas no at all important manufacture, except a silk- spinning industry in Lombardy and Piedmont; no great staple exports, except the raw silk of the north,^ the olive- oil of the Genovesate and Lucca and Naples, the sulphur of Sicily. The Avhole export trade of the country A\^as probably under A 1^.000,000. Thus, Avith little opening in the civil service or literature or trade, the young men who left the Universities croAvded into laAv or medicine, to SAvell the ranks of the educated unemployed, bitterly feeling the social oppression, which snuffed out their ambitions and doomed them to an idle and profitless existence. The bright spot in middle-class life AA'as the Universities: The country boasted tAventy-four Avith some 14,000 students. Those of Bologna and Naples bore a high repute; Turin, Rome, Pavia, Padua, Avere justly proud of their position. It is not easy for an Englishman to realize AAdiat a part Italian Universities played in the life of the country; ahvays to the front in every national movement, destroying social barriers by their free democratic life, exercising through the great number of their scholars a preeminent influence on the action of the educated classes. It Avas not Avithout reason that the governments suspected and harassed them. It Avas the Universities that supplied the spiritual fuel for the nationalist movement, that gave it its thinkers, its writers, sometimes its fighters. It Avas the professors at Bologna who led the revolution of 1831, professors and students from Pisa and Pavia and Genoa, AAffio Avere the soul of the volunteers in 1848, and who made up the largest section of Garibaldi’s Thousand. The students might be often de- sultory, sentimental, excitable ; but there Avas a purity of 1 Valued in 1835 at ^^12,000,000; the olive-oil trade perhaps reached ;^2,ooo,ooo to ;^3,ooo,ooo. SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY 105 life and motive, a devotion to ideals, a readiness to pulse with the nation s life, to act rather than criticize, to follow their heroes even to the battlefield or dungeon, that made them the very salt of Italian society. The same causes, that cribbed the life of the middle classes, depressed the artisans. Their material condition, indeed, was comparatively a tolerable one ; though often far below a level of comfort in food and housing, the cheap living of a warm climate and the steadiness of an inelastic trade kept them from want. Of class ambition there seems to have been little. Italian manufacture was still mostly in the domestic stage, and there is little evidence of friction between masters and men. Besides, in Piedmont at all events, to strike was a crime, unless the courts decided that it was with just cause.^ Socialistic feeling was almost entirely absent, even in 1848. In a country, too, where they pro- bably did not exceed 15 per cent, of the population, the artisans were too humble a factor to play any large part in the national life. ^ But they were alert, intelligent, often fairly educated, highly skilled in some minor industries. There were gondoliers and master-workmen at Venice of no little culture ; Guerrazzi s father, an artisan of Leghorn, was well read in the classics and Dante. And though the artisans, as a body, took little or no part in the earlier revolutions. Young Italy brought politics home to them, and they were the backbone of the Liberals in the later nationalist movement. The Five Days of Milan, the defence of Venice and Bologna proved their sturdiness and patriot- ism. The stratum below them varied much in the different cities. In Genoa and Leghorn and Palermo there was a mass of rough and uneducated unskilled labourers, of tough and manly fibre, but with wild passions, that drew them into every revolution and seldom left it unstained by crime. Rorne^ had its populace of proud Trasteverines, idle, de- moralized by charities, but generous and brave ; at first ihe Pope’s loyalist supporters, afterwards his bitterest foes. Naples had its 40,000 lazzaroni, Venice its crowd of unem- doyed poor, both in their squalor and superstition a danger ^ Economic Journal, December 1893. % io 6 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY to the state, though in time the Venetian nature hardened to a robuster patriotism, while that of the Neapolitan seeme But Italy was essentially a non-industriai-country.^ Only six cities, Naples, Rome, Milan, Venice, Palermo, Turm^Tiad over 100,000 inhabitants^ The capitals of the eight states had an united population of less than a million. Probably, at least 6 o per cent, of the people depended direotljr-Dn agriculture,^ though, as in Sicily, this did not necessarily mean a village life. And miserable indeed was the plight of Italian tillage. Great tracts of the richest soil m Europe were given over to the malaria. With the continuous de- ■ struction of forests, that went on in the earlier decades of ■ the century, the rivers made ever wider waste with their j uncontrollable floods. And apart from the rich pastures • and ricefields of parts of Lombardy and Piedmont, or the i minute culture of the Valdarno, or improved olive and vine- i yards and orange groves in a few favoured or progressive ^ districts, the land gave a miserable return. The yield of 1 wheat was twelve bushels per acre ; ^ the vines were, for , the most part, carelessly cultivated, and the wine made m i primitive fashion. The agricultural societies and improv- ; ing landlords had hardly come into existence, and even: a quarter of a century later their attempts to improve/ methods and breeds and machinery made little miFession on the crass obstinacy of the peasants. The condition of , the agricultural classes corresponded. The statistics of wide diffusion of property are somewhat deceptive ; many of the, small freeholds belonged to tradesmen, others were too small/ to yield a living.^ In the districts, indeed, where peasanti 1 In i8lo Naples exceeded 300,000 ; the others ranged between iTO,ooo andg .00 oo^ Genoa'^and Florence had over 90,000 ; Bologna and Leghorn abou.t rot^.c:^rSndra^^^^ 'cultural popu! r : TrB:;S'op. O. U comd not have bee. “-I ' SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY 107 ownership or mezzedria tenancy was general, the farmers, though living hard and miserably housed, had a fixity of tenure and a certain security against privation, which made hfe tolerable to an abstemious people. The peasants had a bright-hearted childlike enjoyment of the present ; in sexual morality and sobriety they perhaps stood unequalled in Europe. But below them, little noticed by governments or revolutions, but laying up its store of trouble for the future, lay the sore and aching mass of Italian rural poverty Their misery unrelieved save by the princely charities,'^ the famous hospitals and orphanages (and in the south ’even these failed), the agricultural labourers of Sicily and the Lombard plains, the rackrented peasants of parts of the Comarca and Campania, the migrant harvestmen, whom poverty drove from the Abruzzi to sow the Maremna with their bones,^ had a lot of hopeless misery, beside which that of the English factory slave or Irish peasant was bright. ^ But the material-misery of the rural masses had compara- tively little attention from the Liberals. It was inevitable that a movement, whose strength lay in the middle classes and whose doctrines were those of the old Liberal school’ ihould give more thought to the abuses of the government than to the social condition of the disinherited. Through ill Italy the despotism, against which they rebelled, varied inly in degree. The Austrian rule indeed had its redeem- ng features in its fair and dignified judicial system and ts admirable schools; that of Tuscany in its enlightened Timinal law and free trade ; that of Piedmont in its strict -nd honourable civil service. Taxation, though high in re- ition ^to the poverty of the land, was only crushing in the 'outh. But outside Lombardy- Venetia and Parma there ^as no serious system of national education. In Piedmont as 2,871,439, or 13.13 of the population, with an average-sized holding of 71 ectares.^ The size of holding was smallest in Lombardy, Naples, and Pied- ont ; highest in Tuscany, Komagna, the Marches, and Umbria : Galeotti rima legislatura, 142. ’ ^ Mittermeier, Condizioni, 127-145 ; see below, Vol. II., p. 305. 150-154) Gori, Rivoluzione, 278. “ In 1834, II lire per head in the Papal and Neapolitan states, 13 in iscany, 19 in Piedmont ; at the same time, 45 in France • M L R 'ygio, 261. . . iv., j8 a history of ITALIAN UNITY and the Papal States and Modena the law was cumbrous, antiquated, severe to a degree that discredited justice ; it was only in the northern states that the Bench bore a creditable name. Exceptional courts protected the clergy in Piedmont and the Pope’s dominions ; there was no trial by jury, no hail except in Naples and Tuscany; the criminal courts were open tp the public only in Tuscany and Parma, and to a limited extent in Rome and Naples. The whole bias of judicial procedure was against the defendant even in ordinary crime, still more where the government was concerned ; and in times of civil commotion every infamous art was employed to secure conviction. Every state had its I secret tribunals to follow in the wake of each political plot, c with moral, sometimes physical, torture to assist them. And 3 behind the secret tribunal stood, responsible to itself alone, | sometimes half-independent of the government, the terrible ( power of the sUrri. Their spies were in the cafes, in the | theatres, in men’s households; the confessional, the school, the post yielded to them their secrets, and the man whoj came under their suspicion was doomed for life. They s could ruin his career at the University, in the civil service, ) in trade ; they could prevent him from travelling, or sending his children to be educated away from home. And though ^ the higher officials no doubt seldom acted from other than i political motives, the common sbirro often used his power to , crush his private enemies. It was this petty persecution of individuals, the cynical denial of justice, the intolerable interference in the privacy of home, that maddened Itahans.i and drove them to desperate protest and conspiracy. It was a minor grievance in comparison, that the poli-: tical life of the nation was driven underground.^ Buti Italians could not be content, whde there was no right ol public meeting or association, while even agricultural anai scientific societies were only tolerated and often froTOea on, while there was little liberty of speech or writing, and it was only on purely economic questions that criticism of the government was tolerated. France, Spain, Portuga had their parliaments ; but Italians had no control oye. taxation, no responsible executive, not even a consultatiw SOCIAL CONDITION OF ITALY 109 voice in legislation. Even local government had little chance of vitality, for Napoleon had done much to destroy the vigorous municipal life of Italy, and the Restoration had no desire to revive it. The rural communes indeed had everywhere far greater powers than an English village pos- sesses at the present day ; but, judged by the continental standard, their liberties were not very wide, and they were subject to the petty and capricious interference of the central government. The municipalities of the great towns were under practically the same conditions. Provincial councils existed in Lombardy-Venetia, Piedmont, Naples, and after 1832 in the Papal States, but nowhere except in the Austrian provinces had they any vigorous life or independence. The Central Congregations of the Austrian provinces were m theory the germ of representative institu- tions ; but the fears of the government kept them tightly in hand, and it needed the great national impulse of 1847 to give them voice. It was small blame to the Italians, if they lacked the commonplace virtues of citizenship, if they put their faith m theories and programmes, and wanted in patience and prac- tical capacity. These were the inevitable results of a system, that allowed no political training or responsibility. But the taunts of Lamartine and Niebuhr, that Italy was the land of the dead, were only the expression of foreign spleen or ignorance. The ferment that produced three revolutions in ten years, and the ever-recurring crop of small conspiracies ; the patriotism that rose up undiscouraged after each defeat' that sent Italian men to the scaffold and Italian, women to widowhood, that for thirty years toiled and suffered in un- quenchable faith, bore testimony to the life that was within. CHAPTER VI THE LATER CARBONARI 1823-1832 E0MA^-TICISM : in Italy ; Manzoni ; the zlntofojm; Mazzini. The Later Carboxari. Position of Austria. The Goncuimo. The Papal States I82T-TO- Leo XII.; the Zelanti Cardinals; tLe Liberals m Eomaina ^Revolution of Central Italy ; Francis IV.’s plots ; revolution at Bologna; the Temporal Power; Xon-intervention ; collapse of the first revolution; the “new era”; the Memorandum of the Powers; second revolution of Romagna; the French at Ancona ; character of the revolution. Meanwhile the revolutionary movement-was only quiescent. Thouo-h it seemed crushed by the failure of the Neapohtan and Piedmontese revolutions and the fate of the Lombard conspirators, it had really entered on a new phase. The Conciliatore began the transition from the mere blind revolt against despotism to the thoughtful constructive movement, which cared more for intellectual and moral progress than for political change in itself. The movements of 1820-21 were in Italy the finale of the drama, which began with the French Revolution ; the last struggles of the half-democratic half-military idea, which had governed the Napoleonic age. New forces, partly a development from it, partly a reaction ac^ainst it, were coming into play. ^ The Romanticist movement was much rnore than a phase of literary development. The Classicist school, against which it was a protest, was as much a phenomenon of politics and society as of literature; and as^ such Napo- leon had appropriated it and turned it to his ends. Its style harmonized well with a system, that was based on positive and commonplace views of life, and dreaded the progressive and sphitual elements of national existence. THE LATER CARBONARI 1 1 1 Its framework, modelled on the myths and history of Imperial Rome, was an instrument to the hands of one who took the Caesars for his model. Its paganism appealed to a generation bred in the scepticism of the Revolution. It was inevitable therefore that the reaction against the Napoleonic order should seek a new form of literary expres- sion. The Germans went back to their national traditions, and discovered that the peoples of modern Europe had a history and legends and popular life, worthy of epic and lyric. But while the new school supplied the fire for the War of Liberation, inspired its songs, filled Germans with the belief in a great Fatherland, the spirit, that followed it from its medieval sources, made it the tool of the reaction, and its ultimate results in Germany were conservative and clerical. Even before the Restoration the movement had passed to France. Men, who were weary of a system which lived entirely in the obvious and matter-of-fact, took refuge in the kingdom of dreams, and turned to the fantastic and marvellous. The logic of the Revolution had started from so many false premisses, that common-sense itself was dis- credited. The Revolution had apparently failed, and men turned to the past, with which it had violently broken, the past of monarchy and Catholicism. The great religious re- action, which He Maistre and Chateaubriand led, found in Romanticist literature matter and style exactly fitted to its purpose. They made it a revolt of art against science, of the spiritual against the material, of conventional morality against sensualism, of artificial society against the equality of man. In France, therefore, as in Germany, Romanticism, at all events in its earlier stages, helped the reaction. But even here by correcting the one-sidedness of the Revolution, and by being in its essence a protest against the present, it inevit- ably became in the long run a revolutionary influence. When it passed to Italy, more from Germany and Eng- land than from France (it had as its teachers Byron and Macpherson,! Schiller and Goethe), it took from the first a Liberal imprint. In Italy Catholicism had been practically unchallenged by the Revolution, and there was no room for ^ Ossian was immensely popular. I I 2 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY a religious reaction. Romanticist literature sent the Italians, like the Germans, back to their past ; hut their traditions, which Sismondi had lately popularized, were of republics and vigorous civic life and democratic victories over German feudalism. A few who, like Monti, clung to the classicist tradition, attacked the new school as a foreign importation, but its writings were accepted as the literature of progress by the great mass of earnest men. Romanticist,” said Pellico, “ is synonymous with Liberal.” The keen literary life of Milan, full of humanitarian sympathies, protested against the sterile classicist literature, whose “ ideas,” in Manzoni’s indictment, “ were impotent for good or evil, whose teaching was neither of duty nor hope, of glory nor wisdom.” Roman- ticism inspired Berchet to sing of the “ inexhaustible woe ” of Italy. Foscolo had been to some extent under its influ- ence, and his Jacoi^o Ortis was full of the despondency of the German school, inevitable where t3rranny shut up every outlet for endeavour ; and its purity of passion and self- renunciation, its worship of Petrarch and Dante, its de- spairing but fervid patriotism, made it a power among the younger generation. But the prophet of Italian Romanticism was Alessandro Manzoni. He was a grandson of Beccaria, a genial, sensible Milanese, large-hearted and tolerant, a Gallio among enthusiasts; at heart, however, an ardent Catholic, whose “ Sacred Hymns ” were full of the religious note. His Tragedies teemed with veiled political teaching, and their choruses became in after years the marching songs of the Volunteers. In 1827 he published I Promessi Sposi, and the famous novel easily lent itself to the allegory intended by its author,^ of Italy sundered from her peace by foreign rule and social tyranny. Martzoni went to the people for his studies of character ; he discarded the romance of chivalry as much as the mythological poem, and his work had a true demo- cratic ring. But whatever were the political lessons that he meant to teach, Manzoni was convinced that the times were not ripe for revolution. His country must be morally healed before she could be politically regenerated. Practical Chris- ^ Cantu, Manzoni, 183-190; see Settembrini, Litteratura, III. 320-324 Bersezio, Regno, III. 167. THE LATER CARBONARI I tianity, justice, self-sacrifice, were the only road to liberty and so he preached a patient, dignified quietism, that had more to do with morals than politics. ■ In close connection with Manzoni and his school, Vieus- ^ seux, the Florentine librarian, and the Liberal noble, Capponi, I founded (1820) the Antologia in imitation of the Edinburgh I Review. Though its circulation was smalV its influence was great : the leading Italian writers of the time. Carlo Troya, Tommaseo, Leopardi, Colletta, Mazzini, wrote in its pages. I Its object was “ to represent Italian society and its moral ( and_ literary needs, to make Italy know itself, to bring before Italians a national and not a municipal ideal.” It was more defimtely political than Manzoni’s work ; it was more closely in touch with the social reform movement, and in many respects was the direct precursor of the Moderate Nation- alists. And round the Antologia grew up an eager group of Dante students in the footsteps of Foscolo and Gabriel Rossetti, and a school of history, which Romanticism had directed to the past glories of Italy. Carlo Troya at Naples, ^esare Balbo, the son of Prospero, at Turin, Capponi at Florence, made the middle ages known to their countrymen; and Rossetti and Berchet in their exile were writing patriotic songs and fierce philippics against Pope and princes.® But history and romance only irritated men, who were wearmg out their souls in rage against a brutal tyranny. Sensible and masculine as was much of Manzoni’s teaching, its reverence for the priest, its acceptance of the whole Catholic dogma could not content those who hated the one and doubted the other. “ Manzoni grumbled, where Alfieri gnashed his teeth;” and a gospel, which taught non-re- sistance and universal forgiveness, rang false to men who fretted under present political wrong. The first note of opposition came from a young Leghorn lawyer, Guerrazzi j (1 027). Like the Komanticists, he drew his scenes from 1 ^ VOL. 1. H 1 14 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ( the great medieval days of Italy. His writings, bitter, misan- thropic, hopeless, were the protest of a generous soul agamst . oppression, and had a trumpet-note that told of revolt ano l battle. But his cynicism went far to spoil his work, and a sounder protest against the defects of Italian Romanticisr n came from Mazzini. He had learnt discontent from Byroi i and Foscolo, but had got a manlier fibre from the Bible ani 1 Dante and Roman history. Romanticism, he objected ii i brilliant but not quite fair criticism (1828), belonged to tht ; individualist school ; it had no sense of personal or national mission, and therefore could not found a literature. It mus« become practical and political and didactic, and concent itself with the revival of national life. To a certain extentj. Mazzini was himself a Romanticist, but with him the school became intensely patriotic and radical. With Manzoni poliJ tical reform was to come through the personal ; with Mazzm:, personal reform was to come through, the political. Hc) made Romanticism a battle for liberty and^ independence,. “It aims,” he said, “at giving Italy an original nationa .1 literature, to voice eloquently the ideas and needs of thje social movement.” ^ | / Romanticism is the starting-point of modern pohtica| /schools in Italy. In the sphere of ideas it marked the clos 4 of the Carbonaro period ; it was the direct precursor alike of I Young Italy and the Moderates. But as yet its influenoo was only imperfectly felt in political action. Manzoni s system of moral reform required time ; Mazzini was not yet known as a politician. Politics were still in a transitional stage, retaining much of the old purely negative Libera, 1 school, but with a new view of patience and earnestness, and something more social and constructive. _ The nmii dh-ection of the reform movement still lay with the bonari. After the collapse of the Neapolitan Revolution, they had moved their Supreme Lodge to Pans, still the Mecca of European democracy. The society ceased to oe purely Italian ; its chiefs, Lafayette, Pepe, and Louis Philippe, 1 Pesenti, Romanticismo. 2 Mazzini, Opere, II. 6o, 138. 1 THE LATEK CARBONARI uj If f f r “rzinirjr appeared, and it became the unthinking instrument ef m tTlac^foT^ though they were, had little democraS ifnrdei^iat;r^^^^ ’ ‘‘iadfhTr*''^ else they had in common, the Carbonari 4 ny a vounritT?' sf red equally in the hatred of Austria. o» «s»» lawyers— were spies— cardinals, officers, JtalLs ‘‘aTeTlrffiE?;EE' But^?^" ftir'pS stdZrz " ““ «' '""5 We'nr cLSEnTCcTs f Sfples I ; «•»“. u- -9. Rivolgimcnti, 1. 463; Manno, Informa- A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 1 16 and there was a great and growing suspicion between the- Papal See and the great erastian Empire. i The common distrust shaped itself into something of anJ ‘ active alhance. Of the details of the Concistorio little ir a certainly known ; of its existence there can be no doubr a The restless Duke of Modena had turned to new schemes oi i enlarge his dominions, this time at the expense of Austriic 1 and he found a party in the Church. Ever since the reaction i of 1799 there had been a more or less defined society h^i “ Sanfedists ” ^ (followers of the Holy Faith), the “Daail Quixotes of militant Catholicism,” in touch with, if not fusust into, the Calderari of Naples and the Catholic Society of Piedn mont. Reactionary and ultramontane and intolerant as theit were, they had a strain of nationalist sentiment, which mad 3 l them regard Austria with unfriendly eyes as heiress of thd- Ghibelhne attack upon the Papacy. How far the Sanfedists ^ merged themselves in the more organised Concistorio, how ) far the latter expanded into a general plot, we can only . guess. At all events Francis had some sort of understanding! with the Zelanti ^ of the Papal Court, possibly with thee Kings of Piedmont and Naples, to partition Italy afresh at the expense of Austria and the House of Lorraine. Fo^ this he was willing to approach the Carbonari, or at leasR that section which, under the name of Guelfs, looked kindhe on the Papacy, and hoped to make it the rallying point o)f the national movement. There was much obscure intriguingo for a compromise on a common nationalist policy.^ 's Jfc All the time, underneath the workings of Carboaa^ri ancil Concistorio, the popular discontent was making an explosion’ sooner or later inevitable. Romagna was now the focu^^, round which ever}^ conspiracy centred. Hitherto the comk ^ Compare the “Congregation” in France and the “ Apostolicals ” inj Spain. , - See below, p. 1 17. a ^ An estimate of the Concistorio must depend largely on the credit to be given to Didier’s Rome Souterraine, especially I. 146-153, first published in 1833.® See also Witt, SocieUs Secretes, 26-33 ; Saint-Edme, Carbonari, 207-212 ; Cantu}, Cronistoria, II. 137-138; III. 411-412; Carte segrete, II. 56, 67, 83, 90, 3^4 III. 50-60, 96-99; Bianchi, Ducati, I. 318-319; Gualterio, op. cit., I. 42-433 Poggi, Storia, I. 546-549, 558 ; Casati, Confalonieri, I. 94. THE LATER CARBONARI ii; parative mildness of Consalvi’s rule, and the absence of an army possessed by Carbonaro ideas bad saved the Papal jStates from revolt. But every year the mrsgovernment '*grew more intolerable. Consalvi bad only been able to j-jpostpone the reaction. He lived to see it triumphant, and ibis enemy, Della Genga, Pope (August 1823). In spite of 'age and sickness, Leo -XII. was an alert and busy ruler. His settled aim was to establish the theocracy in its strictest form, to restore the pre-Revolution order, to exterminate all shapes of Liberalism. His “ Congregation of State made the Cardinals once more supreme over the government. He gave the nobles back many of their privileges, placed educati^ and charities in the exclusive grip of the clergy, disqualified the Jews from holding property and drove them itO' hear sermons. It was part of his scheme that the hierarchic state must be free from foreign intrusion, and for this Leo was prepared to throw down the gauntlet to Austria, which little relished the prospect of aggressive ultramontanism. His nationalism, such as it was, was not the only well-meant chapter in his policy. However obscur- j antist and impossible it may have been, he had, no doubt, a dream of a state preeminent in piety and orthodoxy, where, though Liberals might be fiercely persecuted, the plain moral ' virtues would flourish, and government provide for the bomfort of a conforming people. There were efforts to ^reform Roman morals, so drastic as to induce an exodus of Ihigh-placed sinners to more tolerant Tuscany. Leo’s edicts hhow some care for the Roman poor, and his educational ---r.’ w<® ’■’t'j]: ''' -'hmi ■'s p^n . ^f’^u :^r •• ■ *»,. 4^' ye > ^yj.’ i'' j ’* ^'' l^_ , --1 - »■- , . . - ... ^ % I .;■ f. ■■ .*ir;V?^.-*!*i' - yiV'B^ , * '.^r, '.'i; ■"iff ^i ,-V 4’t'''^«r.-;^v4'f '‘^''^'»hfe’^ifen'■'!fe 'A' ,i . , , ' , • -.t^. > . : jt ■ I-/, * (1? 'I* '•! > i '•to#^rl,f •.' r •"}'!miaNi^j^\ *|!i; tif 'c.iS' ' •<'4.; 'yVyv'**’* '■'* ■ '■’■ ‘. •'.•V^' ■* ■ ■■ . ri*®! ■ -..• .?rv.:'. ■ 'r ■ ^ ‘ ' W-;^\ liu'jA ' !♦/ 1 V , it? ' ■* 4>- ^ r ^ i-.. • \r I ;;^ ./ ,}& '‘t^/l-. .'7 :-il CHAPTER VII FO lIN G I T A L Y 1331-1844 Reaction against the Carlonari; Mazzini ; Young Italy, Piedmont, 1824-30; Charles Albert; becomes King; MazziiAs plot; Savo) Expedition. Naples, 1824-34 ; Francis I. ; Ferdinand 11 . Tuscany, 1830-40. Modena, 1831-40. Papal States, 1832-40 ; Gregory XYI.J Bernetti and the Centurions ; Lainbrnscliini. The Depression, 1833- 37. The literary revival; Giusti. Revolutionary movements; Sicilian rising of 1837 ; Muratori -ising ; the Bandieras. None the lees it left a bitter sense of failure in the minds of the younger Liberals. It humiliated them that a few thousand Austricans should have boon enough to crush the national rising, that the masses should have shown such apathy, that the leaders should have proved themselves so unequal to their work. The Carbonari twice had led a popular rising, and twice had failed. A new organisation was needed with more vitality and force than theirs. The movement found its leader in Guiseppe Mazzini, the young critic of the Romanticists. He was born at Genoa in 1805, and was almost a youth when he contributed to the Antologia. When his literary career was ruined by tlie suspicions of the Piedmontese government, ho threw himself into political agitation, and at twenty-five years found himself a prisoner. In the fortress of Savona the young conspirator worked out his revolutionary scheme. The Carbonaro revolutions had \ failed, so ran his criticism, because l lieir loaders were men of pnall capacity or originality, seleete^^■.^‘«l)», • ' pf^ . ■ >^" ..A.;. - . . Jt.r iJi-o* , ... .'VlrflS vAP.' * *.v.;rifli» , i^mir . A A* K-*/ : fl; .f *brjr»> . -•' ' * '* ' ^ i] > J aA !j Wk 1 ■ '■• • . ;r/^- * *y‘- 'A ■:!?M^',«rMt*^ 4W£>-! ' as' "1^. ..^i L-» ‘fV> ■ VT^ 7 <* -,| 'i'l-.i.'\'i ■ ''»/! %'Jnfe . S It '-.i '.■.»» , , T ■ , ■ ■ •'iv.'.V .;..0ii'’' ■-‘^’ '• -'-t , , '• "i ■*%«■ ■' *'* . f-o- >• |^•^ • r 'j ■ '^ ■ h • ■ • T- ; '.VKJV >'.••' (,0"'-t>-.‘ ’ j * ■",»' 7 ,r >' '» i^yiudv? I Vj /it : ,.. ; ,f-" -i-tl ' ■'7' . I*’* ‘ ' 'V 128 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY from the insults of officials, from the oppression of the privileged and rich ; then and then only, when the masses begin to stir, point to Lombardy and preach war on the Austrian.” An.d at the same time Young Italy, true uj its religious mark, must satisfy a nobler thirst. There was not only the xVustrian to fight, but the dissensiors and vices, the impatience and hopelessness, that come of servitude.” Passionately Yazzini appealed to writers to give themselves to practical work ; to biang literature to the people, to tell them of their history in books and almanacks and pamphlets, “Emancipate the intedlect ; In the name of your country and your own glory, march.” And to inspire them, he lifted up the v'sion of the new Italy, a highly-organised democratic state, free iroiu diplo- matic entanglements, ruled on new and bold lines in the interest of the people. The belief in a national mission | was the corner-stone of his politics. Like Gioberti after him, the current depreciation of his country drove him into h3^perbole, and he painted Italy initiating ii new life among the nations, Rome a third time the world’s teaclier, reconciling' . . . . . . ^ Roman justice and Christian altruism in the new social gospeld This new Italy must be republican and indivisible, j The royalists in Piedmont, he owned, possibly in the other states, might join in the attack on A_iistria ; the advantages that a royal leader would bring were obvious — the standing army, the treasure, the comparative absence of diplomatic difficulties. But these would bo more than neutralized by the jealousies, which woidd assuredly alienate the other princes. The circumstances of Italy, all her traditions, all her great memories, he claimed for republic- anism. A royalist war of liberty, even if it brought a constitution in its wake, would leave the social fabric still unmended. And in the Republic Mazzini saw the ideal commonwealth, where privilege was banished, where the poor were made the state’s first care, where association and education opened an infinite vista of progress.'"' With 1 /i., I. 40, 73, 82; III, 307 ; V. 73, 250-252. He spoke of the “moral primacy ” of Italy ten years before Gioberti: Mario, Mazzini, 207, - Mazzini, Opere, III. 212-224, 235-24'/ ; Mario, o'p.cit., 206-207. - v‘ Y. ...^v •'■ •c, •■ » • VN. ' -i Y^t ■-! 1 '■ . '.'■u ' ■*'''' i V, L ,.i. 'i <*5 . •/ ■> ... AV'Lo,'. A- ^ - Wv ni'v':' x:x:' '■ f ; ^ . Jilt'd ^ r '• V, ' - V> 'rU:. f| • , :.;• - • ;iVi ^ ,'.■< ^, '.Of! - ' '■ i- ' '■ •■■^' ■■ ■■ '■ v-' ' ■■ '• ■‘, ''‘. • '' ■■■" ‘ ■^'- ■ -■ ■' "' 'v ‘ - ■■ ■ ' ^ ■• ' . at - ' ' ■' . • n. ;•’, ; . . i/jti 'i‘ ■!■• ■ ’’’X,):'' '" . '*■ i_ , ■■: \rr m ife': i 1,. ' ’ . : ij-.; ■':< ■• ■•= ■ '. ■ .xm ,i :■ • xiy % ■ .. ;;■ ' 'ivfi- :^ii- ■■ '■^XxhA ' ''' ' '. : •/; , -A;.:’ ' *n ' . „; • .A. . ..,,;.—', .ij’i^A ■■ ^^'’ SS;,»;’A ' *■*' ■ ( ■•■'■I n •'■•'' m ■^\ '‘iA ■ 'i, .',. • At'Af'V ■ •’ ' .!,f.>-'‘i:. si j ''’l^vl i.V ! <’’'• ilJ# ul MiL iiU-C'ir ■•* ■ ...-5, 'lU,-/ ^ "^K ;jr/ ■' ;h|:V. ' ',. 'X -a;. ^ ) i.'ii’jo ' , ‘vij'i/i] -Mi' -. •> '■ Ailr • XI ' ' '■ :nt 't\i' ‘ .< •,i .. fA. ! < • -ii t ' ♦v^’j !)ii| r> } ■i li v i» .fi ■( / tf ' »tw \ in >a*»* f' * YOUNG ITALY ,2^ such a vision before their eyes, the people, bo had nor- snaded himself, would rise in mass to expel the Austrians, lie always had beforo him the example of the Spanish! _V\ ar of Liberation. The standing armies might bo swept into the movement, but the burden of the war must bo homo by volunteers. Muoli of Italy was • admirably mado for guorill.a fighting : the Alps and Apennino.s, the Lombard plain with Its network of canals. Austria could not st.and ho believed, before the strength of twenty-five millions of ineu, imdisciphned though they be. Even dearer to Mazzini than the Ilopublic was Itali.an ' Unity. _ Few as yet dared to believe in its po.ssibility. ' Irovmcial life, m spite of Napoleon’s work of ccntr.aliz,t tion, was still strong; provincial .animosities, though on the wane, were too deeply rooted to disappear in one generation. Each capital rejoiced in its little court, and clung jealously to its metropolitan prestige. The armies were attached each to its prince, and felt no iDterc.st in ttay. Ibo Papacy was irreconcilably hostile to a oreat Italian state. The House of S.avoy, however it mio-ht nx Its eyes on a North Italian Kingdom, had no thoimht of fusion with the Centre or South. It was Mazzini’s tiiith th,at made an united Italy possible, that led men XbTOnd the existing fact, beyond the schemes of federation that till now had been the utmost bourn of national lopo on to wh.at seemed the utopian and impossible, but which his teaching was to make the gospel of ids nation. Only through unity, ho believed and made them believe, could Judy bo strong anu democratic; only when Horne became bei- capital, could .she bold her place among the nations of Lurope and teach a nobler ideal of government.^ \ 1u.1g .such were the amis of revoiution, its iustrument must bo the secret society. It was easy for critics to attack the “sects, - to say with Foscolo, that “ wdiile Italians a.spired to liberty, they conspired to servitude." The .lefeols of the secret society were obvious; its mv.stery and ritual played to a feeble sentimentalism that was a bad school for .action • the clnols had an uncontrolled and irres])onsib]c power, that 1 Minzhii, tVov, I. lu, 1,8, 3:4 ; iij, 4,0-,,, * V01..L ^ .. • a ‘'•?j4jJirl!lu.V'4i».r» f.'p.A'-V ^Jwl'.'tf'^ '•'r'*'* ■,ir ,‘' " ; :u.i .;/*?« '■•5 . I- .’ a* •■'‘f V . AJ , || r'li «A2l*Ji i \ 130 A l-ilSTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY iiiiNit lead t]i0 F.ociety into snon cuts by iruuluy p.jths, • ]>aper perfection, its easy coastitution-buildiog gave a/dis- tasto lor couiinonplace endeavour. Ma:/zii:d could nui ■'i'oang Italy iroin being the prey of the detective and ageni gyre vovaf ear ; even he resorted to the wire-pulling and the dictatorial impatienco, with which his enemies accurately enough reproached him. But there was no alternativo. a country where the inildost criticism of government vva- punished, wliore there was not even a germ o^' ropreaont^, live institutions, secret organisation and the secret press were the only resources left to the reformer. In after years when the princes had been touched by the natiouelisj, spirit, it was safe for D’Azeglio to preach “ conspiracy in the liglit of day,” In the '30s, open agitation meant military law and the state prison. Mazzini s liope.s have been realized only in part. Soerci societies have generally been powerless against tlie gold and steel of an omnipresent government; they have none the less been potent disseminators of ideas. Mazzini s work, from its clear high dawn to its dark and misty clo.so, broke ineftectually against the obstacles that must meet the pure revolutionist ; — the forces of inertia, whicli count for legions i on the side of an established government ; the irnpossibiliiy of making an ill-armed and uiidisci])lmed population step into j the field to lace bayoxiets and artillery ; and even if success comes at first, the ignorance of management and afiairs that paralyses the amateur statesman, unless he has trained administrators behind him. And Mazzini, with all his energy, all his enthusiasm lor details, somehow did not make things march. He always underrated the obstacles in front of him. He was, even apart from the irritability which may bo pardoned to his misfortunes, a difficult man to work with. In old ago lie bGcairie, as many a conspirator tends to be, a mere mischief-maker. Nor was he more successful in moulding his-country to liis ideal The Republic, tbo social reconstruction, have proved a dream. The foWner was p'obably neither possible nor desiralilo ; and in time Mazzini himstdf, save in moments of obstinate unreason, came to realise that Italy was too conservative, too monarchical,'' ■ "^ liiMi^'' ' "ssj- ‘"'nSlr •■ .* ; , SyiiH' > ^•* ■ '»": . «•. ' ' _ ..ft- .J^Cx :>)iiJ . fe .» ,1 1^* ivl, ' .- v'^j^a’^^ipl^ 7,1 / J, rdKisi'i ' «■> 'i : "‘. -\>#W Wy r! . ^ •.r: -r- -.'! -i^iL viV^niBil' y.,- . ■ : .inn /?• tivo T™ ,«'V>‘^« ,_ - ^lb*'"l'. • • ■'"'Jj’f /.'V; 1( '^p'ti-jr.'.O'f'iV'ft). ;1''l‘>')_*'’>’';' y>P'M ■■‘■0'9' . ‘ 1 ' - - f /W- •** ‘ ** ' •'^1*^' -r .w--^ * ' %.c* ; ...■ .4(.' > ; '■ ■ I jp ; C'>| • ^ ^ • f •/? 7 T • ;7 ' V -j 'Vi;r'■« ' .;V *.-.><» „• ' fc*‘‘ “r\. :; i.-i.. '/rU'ii VM,. .. ’ . u „ ■; ■-(■fiiSa'.Ai.'iMa y 'it HJIJNG ITALY 131 / pcrliaps too stagnant, for his titanic themes Nnnn / !.o n.ulc Italy His „,istakes in a tion lna;o boon faL,? bn anco, by rn.glUy and frnitfu influonoo. Jt 'Z 7ot ino.ifl«jt{| -- r> rrA.ii i! '■ -' .i:-®*!— fl •.'! »! r,::.r.* < • ^32 A liibiOi:i Oir" ^ ])ir)naclG wlicre lie has no rival, a propiiet to Italy and {.> liio vs^orld. ihe immcdiato result of Alazzini’s leaching was to fan to a blaze the einbors of [talian nationality. Apart iVoja questions of unity or federation, of nionai’chy or republic it concentrated Italian politics on the vital point of iiulc- pcndenco. All tlio memories or Homan greatness, the revived study of Dante, tho tradition of the medieval struggle with tho “ barbarian," of tho Lombard League and Pontida, the new' sense of nationality that had con(|uored Napoleon, and which Mazzini was formulating into an article of democratic faith, all combined to make alien rule yet more intolerable, and added to tho hopes of Italian IndopL- dence the passion of a religious instinct. Mazzini, like many of the Carbonari, looked to Piedmont ns the starting-point l| of the national movement. Pordinand 11.. liad forgotten his • brief mood of Liberalism/ and destroyed for ever the chances | of Neapolimn hegemony. Romagna^ was discredited by her ' recent failure. Despite the unprojnising materials in Pied- mont, there was a growing conviction among the more far- sighted patriots that here lay tho fairest hopes of Italy. Tim stubborn recalcitrancy of the Savoy KiDgs to Austria's/ ertorts to draw them in her train, the military strength of the little kingdom, the fiery Liberalism of Genoa, tii(3 vicmity to Milan and the Aiistidan border, the still flickering belird m Charles Albert, all conspired to iriake Piedmont , the cynosure of Italian ambitions. ! On tlie surface, however, tho state made little sign of responding to these hopes. Its quiet dull progress its com- paraUve prosperity were ill calculated to stimulate tlm faint and leaderless Liberalism of the time. Still there w'cre marks ot propssivo feeling, wliich found encouragement in the hpanrsh and Greek revolutions, and liad its relations with the new Gmbonansm. In 1830 a plot to extort a constitution! was fec'bly hatched by Broheno and Giacomo Durando, and ' had Us partisans in the army and. bar. Again the conspirators looked for Charles Albert's patronage, but they had built * Bee below, p. 138. .... -... .rt.; •/ ^ ", ■• -■’“ .1X1^ V : •/ ■ IV.?' . •V'i avi-''.: ■ I ■ ■;■ «.'*»ra'' ■; . ,;;’i ■■ .:„.:„-..ii f,;:; v< 'f ’ A (,' './ • , .' •>-0i ■•'■ - ■ r ..•ii'ii.» ' r“^“ "‘ ' '1^ ■f». .t.'‘*vf ' ’' m ^ ... ■ ■■■■■"" ■!■ M ' ' 'jSjii;’' r ■ J ‘■"'►I YOUNG ITALY UY3 Iheir liopes on sand, and (.heir ill-laid schemes paused, till the government had scent and nipped them. At. the ino^nent Charles Felix died, and Charles Albert ascended the throne (April 1831). It was not without difficult}^ that he had preserved his title to the crown. His cousin had gone to the Congress at Verona (1822), to persuade tlie Allies to bar him frorri the presumptive heirship. If tlie Salic Law were re- pealed in J^iedmont, Francis of Modena would succeed through the rights of his wife, a daughter of Victor Emrn.amieh But Ittjssomhrojii enlisted France and Russia in Charles Albert’s eaiiso, and. Ta-llcyrand threatened Avar rather than see one, iv'ho Avas practically an Austrian prince, master of Piedmont and Savoy. Mctternich, Avhatevor may liaAn) been his secret ivishes, dared not favour a course so counter to the principles of legitimacy ; and Charles Felix, finding encouragement in no quarter, a.bandonod his purpose for the time. But it appear^s that, despite Wellington’s protest, he persuaded tlie Congress to extract from the young prince a pledge to preserve tlie established monarchical constitution.^ Probably 1)0 still hoped to disinherit him ; he kept him in a sort of exile at h’lorence, and it Avas only after repeated petitions, that lie allowed him to prove his loyalty to the cause of nionarchy by fighting in the French army against tho i^panisli Liberals. When the prince returned Avith a name for briiiiant courage, he Avas coldly forgiven, largely at the suit of iVetternicli ; “ but so fearful was the king of latent hibcralisin, that he extorted a promise from the prince that on his accession he AAmuld govern by the advice of a reactionary council, “and preserve tlie organic form of the ^)onarch3^”^ dhc persecution left abiding marks on Charles Albert’s character. Ho had persuaded himself of his loyalty in ; ho dreaded standing ill in the eyes of monarchical _ clliUjy.on, Dcspa/ches, JV. S., I. 300, 308, 411, 427-429, 61 1; Met.tor- w ^hnu'ires, HI. 526-527 ; .Bianchi, Diplomazia, I. log; 11 . 114, 120, 169- III. 25-3S ; Vajra, Carlo Alberto, 141, 14S, 151- dr’ taken by Francis of Modena, see Galvani, Francesco ■’ 5 ? •• Pofrgi, Storia, 554, 560 ; 11 . 7. XaUu ; Biancbi in ChiriositA e riccrchcy - 1.' ^ agree with Tivaroiii in believing Mctternich. - -Beiti, A! fieri, 77. '"Mi ^ I i7>;s ♦r T« w ::r '• ) •■1,(C^ ,, ^ ,. . ' •■ .3H^ |«#i i ■ ’* '^**^*^ k'SilSlf ' ) i .•'/'iui.K im! o^)«^^.i!v^^. J. :’ rirt. ’ .4 •( _; y-'l\»i;t iii'a /jJ9%o^ {i Of mui .^'1 . ^ .•*— , ... I .IlftwltiVn'i * -lli* z .f» ^] -.mv. iifi ^S-? >M >>vinc; ^ »■-'.• .y^a^.%t iwiyjcT /2 il)lif . ydJ V - . ^ . . ifirafci’'b f «5^^^ e^it- ^:)hf't^D od -.ii i'l*^ >*- f'tf -a . "fj 'kii^' ,.(1. v(>l*.-', ' ■-I 'l<>,1*«ii««tvivUc#'«'j'w»^ ''fci(i;> vskiin, iy r.'j^ 134 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY and respectable Europe ; and though he could never foraly^ the wrong which Austria, so he believed, would ha re him, he humbly begged the Emperor’s advice and licked the dust before Charles Felix. The Liberals, though he i seems to have hinted to them that his progressive beliefs were not dead,^ execrated him ; Berchet wrote o^ him that — “ In every clime an exile’s curse Arraigns thee traitor.” But for all that the king and the court distrusted him. He chafed at the misunderstanding ; he brooded over the version of his conduct, which was accepted at the palace, and which after all was truer than the one he had invented to quiet his own conscience. The brilliant cynical youth grew morbid and apocryphal;^ he mingled gallantry and religion ; he wore a hair-shirt and fasted. The religious j mood grew upon him ; he became a devotee, easily played ' on by confessor and Jesuit, timidly scrupulous to prove himself a good son of tJie Church and g;ain Papal sanction for his acts. He was conscientious, but his conscience gave divided allegiance to the God of righteousness and the God of the Jesuits. He paltered y/ith truth to justify himself; his unhappy introspective mind preferred to brood over others’ injustice rather than face its own weakness; his sentiments were noble, but he had no courage to put j them into practice. He had his silent enthusiasms ; he was affectionate to his intimates, though not to his family; bo had a high sense of royal duty, and proved himself in aftei years a wise and reforming King. But through all his life he played hide-and-seek with Liberalism ; he was at heart, and still more in profession, an absolutist, a monarch proud of his historic throne, who would “ never make terms with the revolution.” Constitutions he abhorred, for they led to evil party strife and made a discord in the national har- mony.^ Ho scorned the July Monarchy and its popular' ^ Cibrario, Notuie, 41 ; Nisco, Storia, If. 274. * Bianchi, Carlo Alberto, 8 ; Manno, Per no:::c, 23. ^ Manuo, Ppicclegin, 222-225; Bianclii, Dij.lomazuc, V. 90; Coita de regard, Dcrnierci anncc 3 , 571. UU.!'.y HO Vik-:- ii . -!- Ill il^t,. 5. iijji >via}h9(fpijh0i> •, o..va - • «u r*^iMjjA .:^j! ■^’ Zif..^ '(Vltnud^ ^ ' I iitJT e'liw.ilQ •■’•fb * f. ,4 uviiro.*'’) . w,!li«J S' ■*«« tns’-lj 0'S b "Mi pa Vji^i , ", • 5W'^'’ '4W». •: — -’£9 '« s ‘^' “iV^Nint -*& ' * ■ A ,|l - '**■* ' ' 0 •.■vhcl), flJ l>-us’ is"'* iAiti . is V7f ** ;^sj^cybfi4^rerauU. t^iU h&u^lr . . f,.#4 rk*u> A;li V VMI lUt I^Tx’ liairf’ir jbfin V t t l£U 4 ^ 1' d 0r . 3?hf '*( iW^3? J;' .?^^T. h(fz ^ ,* '.» W. ItHlB' jfTri-'OTf*; r* ' ir<‘.'i'^" vi<,.> .4> 4 ’. , .jrt -'Viw. iTrixt^'? ♦'ifi -A ^ * 51 » tv .i«fv;.-nr/.. « If? i-- ‘ ^ » ri' _fjJ U* • H ! !'• ’‘ iV^v-i.'i jbf^irre 'fjitfUi.i:^ • %^Ci nH ■;‘*u[fj‘,^?;i ti’ ncS-if f^iw pT^ t^f I 0 .^H tfsi ir/l ,Hi4 ii^W n| )ui>*rnw»? /XT e ' . f4J!h- riu dto^ ' « »«i4 i %- uH ’ ACti.v*ir.:[ ohr! iifiSit-? "■V x-A vj'irtfci •' -44' 4^ ^iOili fijiffl i'S 2} a. ^ ^ ^ >« %£ ’v; iUfe* . ^-bo^ **1.4 wn ..fci'w, f , * fAftjn liiiA Itfui Vi?.:;. ■*:.•«■ o;f..,p '.I. ;■'. ^ •»*< .l>i--.rfvri l>Jl oi ,J| ~‘l " ‘i'*f li3? ‘ ' * 'firfiyHiij -iS" '-'III '* si , .;vtt ' , \ ■’ 4, ; .■l^iA^'^^'•'w>'i <'i-'vitf'«4 . ' ■.’ .1;'; /-••'Sv. '"VW’, y'- .lY' ,>>*»Jnili *• ' 4 Ai ■'A -i.1 YOUJSTG ITALY ; ho tu)neci young Clamillo Cavour ont, of liis liouso- Lohi for •' v/antiDg to play tbo Jacobin.” But wl\ile in theory ]-jC was the bej]ievo]cnt despot, in pi’actico ho bent before over;/ resolute minister. Throiigliout his life lie ever shrank from corning to a decision, and went down to posterity as “ King Wobble.” ^ Bravo and chivalrous on the battlefield, "half friar, half knight,” he was a coward in the council charnher, who baffled opposition by delay, and manoeuvred out of office the ministers whom he feared to meet in argu- jnont; always hankering after popularity, but delighting in tliC secrecies of intrigue and loathing publicity ; a strange compound of the worldly amd the martyr spirit, no hero, but a pciplcxed, scruple-harassed man, the victim of a fatal indecision between the authority of convention and the nobler promptings of his heart. It was his fate through life to bo regarded as the ](uidor of a cause lie dreaded. On his accession the Liberals kr.)hed for largo and bold reforms. “ Everybody,” said Dal I'ozzo from Paris, “ expects a constitution from Charles Albert.” The King had doubtless a more or less definite programme of reform; now, as in 1821, he v/ished to make oflico independent of class, to reform the army, to encourage iudustr}', to further social freedom. Could he have relied on Prench protection, he would perhaps, despite his pre- judices, haA'C granted some form of constitution ; but Louis rhilippo’s bands were too busy at home, and Charles Albert know tliat, unless he had France behind him, Austria would fight rather than see free institutions in Piedmont.^ Besides ho was hampered by his pledge to the Allies, timid and cautious as over, anxious not to take sides too much or alionato either party. He reappointed his cousins re- ftetionary ministers, but by their side he placed the Liberal lawyer Barbaroux. He promised large reforms in education ^lud Ia^v ; ho appointed a Council of State, which had always cs;istod in constitutional theory, but he narrowed its scope ^ovn iroin its first broad lines to insignificant proportions. ^ /iV Ti-rUenrifj. See belovr, p, i8S. vill 254 ; BrofForio, Piemoiitc, III. 13 ; contra D’llaiissou- olHiquc c^ldricurc, I. 34, 248. See Bosio, ViLlamarina, 25. •C > -"'I m\ ' ,.?'* " “■'* ‘ ' " ^ ::.>^w :>l g ! -H ,j(T;jV ,1 ■ (it:is^p :''-v\T:i^_'£^'^; • . I • V ^ ^ , ^ IX •.■ .'.4^ ■' ' .-,n*!H »_>vW(W«V,.; , ■ «»ii) f I ♦4*0’^ ■ '\t^y)^i't(H *,:. *'>i I . ■ ■' Mn " * ■ V't ' Twf.v i' ....jv.v \ •T'';! ' -, ,5^u- > .i vwl'tio A /•’.'? .4^ i»^>' 1 ^*^ ^ 4 . I# '^TN'S r • • • -r . , ■ / # .flafnur c t-,t’>r*’ "«'> *' ''^'^"‘”'•'*1 • r -i «fiii (i'iq«i»i‘'.i<^i»*i n _ :*■ i. ) *,■*• : W-lfMi*!*/^' ' ■''. ^ ''^•’^ r.^^Swr*(|^vBl®/>»- f>' ' A »;^!vi^).iw« , - /nt< A- ^ ' '■ ^•■•'‘*i‘i 'i;5i'#"*^, . .,. ■ .;rw»j|y..bM {^MM - ;j' ' ' •;ir-*v,fr '<*v4;i«i.“ .. *41^ ..•'.« •V: v4^ ■•’4i-'i»<^vrft3»*^p£" ' ^ tv - ’- t ,t»f ;>»!)*{i; ; ' rCo ^ ../uKOli, •t V. j’* 'a ' • •*, ; ^ L L . ■ < Jh J _ ( 1 YOUNG ITALY 137 TIio Liberal niovciMcnt of 1830 foan‘I its echoes in every .•tate of Italy. It proves how little M'azziuis republican cj'Gcd represented the feeling of the coiintiy, tlurt in four f)f tlic states the Liberals looked to the throne for leadcrsliip. Tbcre was no decided note about t]\e movements ; tliey bore the stamp of a transitional stage, wlien politics were still largely under the influence of the old provinci;il and middle- class ideals, though the bigger national and democratic hopes of Young Italy were beginning to make tliemsolvcs dimly felt This was conspicuously the case at Naples, where Ferdinand Ls death in 1825 had been followed by the five- years reign of his son Francis 1 . As Regent in Sicily in 1812, at Naples in 1820, he had been the pretended Liberal and accoraplico in his fal.her’s treachery. Ho was a vulgar, cruel profligate, who left the government to his favourites, and lived Avith his mistresses in tlio midst of guards in hourly dread of assassination. While in Sicily the Viceroy Della Favare cowed the island Avitli his vspies till theatres and cafes avere deserted, the mainland broke into revolt at Oil onto (Jime 1828). Delcarotto, an ofllcer who had served the revolution in 1820 hut like many onother had made his peace Avith the oppressor, stamped out the rising with fire and SAvord, hehcjiding the leaders, and hanging their lieads in front of tlieir own homos. Still, in spite of disillusion and the long tale of tyranny and ]''er- jury, the feeble people were ever ready to look to the throne for reform. And when Francis son, Ferdinand XL, came to the throne in 1830 and publicly censured his fathers rule, kopo Avaas bright as ten years before. Ferdinand Avas young, liandsoine, popular in address. He had d abided in patriotie balk ; his care for the army and love of military parade ^-'ndeared him to the soldiers; his free and vulgar manners >i>«de him the darling of the lazzaroni. His peop)le did not yet. knoAA^ that he vras a true Bourbon, “ cruel and craSvS and proud as they”; ill-educated, superstitions, a tyrant by in- 'diiict. IIo Avas no profligate like his father and grand- ^^^thor; priests iioaa’ ruled the palace instead of courtesans; k) spare tne public blush, the Venus of Pi'axitolcs vras k*‘apod, and the Kings royal pen prescribed the length of 1 Mi ■% 1 - ; ■■■V “uM • ^ -• v»y ^■' /ifjjw *! ■ fsit'’’''*'* ’'I* , _ t* ■^-r ' '/ T'f --via ' i ■ - '’*''/iii'i '- ' ri^h S' '•■ •' '.'’■■".rftsij :i»!U::» ,aJrj 4 '^ hi ’ or!'' ■■• >.'-i;1 ■.' jJ 'i^jf t'’ip .-!«t ?i f:> •'. iUiifiry 'P¥^mfn4 •.-l^iy; ft. !(; 'V'-ii ., 4 . , .1 ^.. tn !■'■' '■■.•' <<.<., -■•'i wi ^■yr^Se.V' '. ■ a ,. " i’J' .1 p',i’il-'4 n'*>l(j.'i »' ''i •!' '• .' '<;Jf -t^ *■“ i/'i'a '"'^J. ■-'i‘ ^ . ‘ ^ '■ i- A '- 'L . . r' • r . BSLUILh }i\ ‘ v*{‘ 5 i iJi f/- f‘\y •»,.■: ' A ;‘J. iHtftlhl r/li '•''■“’'I. -Ml ^ ’■-V, x.h f vi .'I l,i(A ’> /.■r.Ai;’43 •*■ '!» V ^ ■“ ■ i/^ '/• •iX ' ri'fjgfjSter - J* • ' — ‘ t^R «|lf||BBr~ ‘ > •"' ‘ 1 i^- r-- li »#* /w V 13 S A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY ballet-dancers’ skirts. But his boorish ■^'brutality killed wife, the gentle Cristina of Savoy, and to friends and ser vants he was faithless on principle. “ The world,’' he reported to have said, '' likes to bo made a fool of, and -i King should be the first adept at the business.’^ And yet in his early days, shamed perhaps by the crying corruption of his fatlier’s court, he made some essays towards good government. Most of his father’s ministers were dismissed- the favourites flitted from court ; the King’s popular brother' the Count of Syracuse, v/as sent to govern Sicily. Ferdinand . showed interest in railways ; the exchequer was reorganized 'i and trade improved as confidence grew up. The Liberals ’ hoped that these were the prelude to more drastic reform. [ Appeals came to the King from home and from Bologna to place himself at the head of the nationalist movement,^ and lor a moment he seems to have been tempted to respond. There were even hopes of a constitution, and the minister Intonti, wishing to make Ids peace with the new order, proposed a sort of representative Assembly. Louis Bhilippei it was said, advised it, but the twenty -ye.ars’-old King re- plied, that his “ people were not like the French, and ho did their thinking for them.” And though ho refused to concert measures with the Papal government against the secret societies, he proposed an alliance of the Italian gov - 1 einments to combat revolution. Had he done otherwise, ' had he thrown himself on his people and the French alliance and granted a constitution, he woidd have wajii for himself and his state the hegemony of Italy. But again, as in 1820, the Bourbons threw away their chance for good and evil. It is well, on the whole, for Italy that they did so; for though it would have saved the South from a generation of retrogression and all the long painful effort to recover ground, it would have put the destinies of Italy in the hands of a nerveless people, and made Italian Unity iriipmssible in this century. The Liberals were repaid for their folly in trusting a 1 Bourbon. Ferdinand in fact was the very antithesis of a ’ Nisco, Ferdinando //., 27 ; Setterubiiiii, Rlcordanze, I. 42-43; Leopardi op. cit., 27-28; Bianclii, op. ciL, III. 25 3 ; Poggi, op. cU., II. jji. irv;;/ .4 -.''_ji_ fr'; rT5iV^'''Ki!!ir^t i'j>-'>i3^ I-- . - •■•' iL.- ’ ff«' ■ vLr' , .h»- 'Ti 'V ■ ]^|>^ 1^1 • V »> \ ' feV ■/ ■ ■'■’ - ’:'‘ ' ■ •• :^'‘'‘f * P^IPI ' .;Wf!/eii> f' 0|»4 ,1,1* • ..1 (4 > - '‘* ■= *■* • "t ' "»' ’•'Ti , — •' i?HIl 7 'i s ',• ' i :7jivl3a«^W^•^ f’' ' a i(|ta|ij/.v-K>^’^ r-'iV ;r'Kti.i'-<» *#/ .;'ri-.'JM -I tla'ir,--'. uitJ'ei^... ; i.\ mv:!-':«y«^^ «»(»!« J»ii ■■\ke •• « t'.’ i ' ' ji*’'/ '''M' ton- a'Wt'.<(J((ii^'‘' ail) •>i-i%f^- J5^-'» R'; ' i**,. V. •••A. ?i*-' '‘ ' ;Mv ■ W* ■’ r^4f'A»T •, '’•■ - ",.. ' '* ■ , . r .■»"'•■ - ^ "'J! f 5 ■«, *-«••.. . ».?l 1& ■ .; l‘ j,a‘.. ' v= : • ..<3 ■ ; ;; »M., ,,„J M-ji»J;;;.»'“ -• '^'U .... ! 'n?j I7i ,'‘J\ ^i^ P (.-V-?- li.i.'.i-'I -t- ■■ t’ -* '^.‘ “('■M.fy/ V. ’v .i,i*t^ / •'■>»•)♦ • ■ ■( i.;.a«.u '.(i) 1'' «>''''’ ■.s 3 ^ V j. ; „,v^ r (/I"! '‘■f r *' • a-w5^\ 'iii . jv' ji;;^:n /ia : :^>lif*$j ‘i%^ * -.- ‘... . ^ -. r-. . . . .. .. Efk.l-'' ' -^-'a.'riMi'.Y t-<. VA- :.i>i ^ '. .'-■•-vj;-L c> , , " - . . . '-jp T-^ y, : ;v.,. i^ ..jin<^is n7-n»x r.;; ^-.v;,Wv ,.,; r •; ,pi^S^V a:'.; 7^ ' ['•[' . T s ^;7.1iJf-;> I ‘MfiM^- 4fli;'!ptl(i[|i .Mpr: --V^^ a j,s ., I V. .ca jiiisa '^wyi IK-’ ... •>>^\^lv v<*T -‘.wifi’ * .1%^* ., . .f . Ui ail #-il^ if E' ’ .' ' ^ ^'. ff ' * ' ^ ; ‘ ■ “ ■ vr~7 -. i ^liit MRSfe^ . . ■'N* „ '"■ • - .^;1 ""3 " ':.J ,.i;iwv ' ■ -.‘aU'V.Kt V>!*i^'»4'S)'«r/*^i, . '' ,_JK'-'^^ i,., -i^v- ■'BBl '- !'*ti*?'‘''' -■ '^.1 ,.u i-,ii! / ^*.,1 -ii O';.!-' - , .,-„. ^ ■ ' ..!t iv or*'-- ■'■ ";:i,!.’i/"‘...if:v4n? ii-n ■ i‘V\t 1 v««tV ■.■.<•■» ■• V^.•>t^^;■^■l^V^.•i!^t■J^rf^'Wti . '•■> »pil^ ^ -.Mr- ••..;■■ .5 •■«>.•<) i a - I .. j V i -i ' ■ ' ■ ' ’''A-?..-:';. .Ilv.. ■ •■"'■ - -i ^v B '' A- iidL> *.'1 T i;/ ' . ', ..i .;f.-. " ^'■-■yi • . J* ii'?*.- A '■’”“‘'^4 ^M;V'«’-<.-v., i^tU! hftirtt!* ‘"^jHjd’',.'’""' '^’fW ' r; ., : ■!' . if-.* ".''•W- . ■; ,' ■ -'f !^' ' « ' ' '"' 4 ' ’^Jia ‘ ai-. ' . ,i> jA ■'^ i ■■ Ar ■ ■ .'.•ii-itA^f'^'W.. •'’■ ■ YOUNG ITALY 141 nified person and manners, his gluttony, Ins timid, irascible temper destroyed respect. He made his throne a sinecure ; he had spent most of his life in a Carnal c'.olensian monastery, and he hated public business. “ I am too old to reform the state,” ho is reported to have said, and the world will get idong somehow ; ” and ho absorbed himself in ignoble inte- rests, while the country groaned under the misrule, and his ex-barber and favourite amassed a princely fortune.^ He was an obscurantist of the most trivial order. He set him- self against the Scientific Congresses ; ^ he allowed no railways in the state, partly, it was said, from belief that they would “w^ork harm to religion,” partly lest they might bring up deputations of provincial malcontents. Ho earned an ill name in Liberal Europe for his counsels of passive obedience to the Poles in 1833, though he partly atoned for them in later years by the one bravo action of his life, his denuncia- tion to his face of the Czar Nicholas. His reign began amid revolution. Austria won back the revolted provinces for him, but Bernetti was resolved to bo independent of foreign powers. He and his master viewed with suspicion the patronage of the erastian Empire, sup- posed still, though perhaps now with little reason, to have its eye on the fat plains of Romagna^. To escape its perilous support, it was necessary to have a native force sufficient to crush revolution. Bernetti increased the army, but he saw in the fanatical section of the population the material for a more effective weapon. He encouraged the formation of ii’regular volunteer bands under the name of Centurions (1832), and the new bodies soon counted their thousands. 1 ho Liberal movement of the previous year had been appa- rently so universally accepted, that it is difficult to conjec- bu’o where they recruited their ranks. Probably the revolution had never been heartily obeyed by the super- ^hticus, priest-ruled peasants and unskilled labourers; no ^ eubt, too, there was much latent conservatism in the towms, Salvngni, Corte Romana, IIT. 197-199. “Gaetanino” Moroni, tlie ojc- ei, wrote an Ecclesiastical Dictionary, and every commune was compelled 0 ouj a copy : Farini, Roman Sta'e, I. 141. See below, p. 150. Dualterio, cp. c/i., I. 134, 139. See Eianchi, op. ciL. III. 139, 394. |&s’’.^’’..;.w|,,i'‘#a .,' . • . ■ jr, */:!-.>■ c,. ■ ' ^ 4 ‘ef r-*rf ' *,V- V' ti'"’ i k( hl’^ '-'V 1 ^* -v ‘ • ' :i • VaI Vi'k 'iibfi- bi-.y/' rri{ii'.ik« id I’l’t''.!-’ *i>'£,v“' .', ' 1 jf*} »' - 1 , «d'' '-''dw>*'if^'r;' IV: ^<etjl^tt. iw ■■ ’••!/» o^d '- t ««<■■■ I'. ,: '^id-! ./■ li’i^si .ipini’-'’ vidfviiWWfe' ■b^'-''v^,’v'^^ '' 'jjjl .^.V„{(; ■j'.iv; ..Tj IK' I'lUMtttlll.' I’l'i .ff.’f t f '*‘'® rWjlinl'-f,*!! y.^TW ■s •’■''rf* Wv»" rt, 4 « ^ J . «««,•'.■ i*MV*:V /i.rf, Irt /l.daaf'rt,'.. *(«• »d^*’ 1^', ;- ,.^,V'V; I By.... ,.'’ 5 ? •vrf' ...f- U->vV-,v;»-i .Ik^r r4f^l0iM ^pd')t%Ux^' v;^...^ ■Vq -Q f "* feK.y 4 »;t«^.i;.M,* t».'H, , , ■■> ;i y«*fil.»if4«-' 'I O.'^J ..asiiAft.' . '•i;Wi.»^«l^P^ , '.J''^i.f'*t''iM • -1 •I'di’ !i|M.t-;V;."''i’y. <^fi. '-i^y ' Ji'f' iT.uiig. 'i" AiiVV'' r;,^... . •',. / ■ W '.VU,'.1> .-jp »i(t»|M/...ir.nl|-J ‘i" -‘ftliV ' .l.b,'i-(;v^* Aftfi! Ji .“I st(.» (<*.( > i-.'iVi ‘fc-^ '- ’_> I"-' (■ I,.' , Vi'^fl ■■ -i I .>•■•<■•■■»£() iTi'i' 'a 4 *,fe- M '•: .Mr.i.'ftnb' *? >tf .‘"-i>' ' 'f.flwjf • - Vi/iWiv :»■;■ Av|Aaw>!.'id:vrd#ii»'f'-'''f,^!' .^/a; «I ..ii./ i.io '.'B-.ir.u fwxi ••.1/^'- .rV" •■' V'P 3 a.v\-.v: T.; •]■' \W'‘''’''i ''S^XiSBI.'' ’ . lij'' ktii^K^ nil ^ f-' ’ ■ “ '''"^ '•n,,--... ,1. l^|J->f!. .. ->«■ ■■■ ^ -H'’- .*r ^ •»! if rmiTO ,,.)•. .>i.^>r:r. ’Ml '‘ (111111.^ .. ,>I,:.':''^«: : ,i>i,;- ^ ■ ■ ‘:fe' 'vj.'Tl.,^.. i •.ki<’ y. j(>ii Ufi.’i^'-'ii'tJ' J ^ ..'i,.:;^| , ;tJ“ ..'■y . ..Hi»in A •'•■ '»•. » V'*- **»■•, *^! PaM !.,. .6 48811 ^ * ■“ ■■ W?: A'.V^V, r-^' / La« 1 *.<1 .1 ' ' YO’'’ •43 has boon in prison,” wrote D'AzcpIio, " o ronlioc ■ r hardly a man or I should.’” Even thf Eo.i .sl.ill halting in thoir Liberalism, were growing wc”u’y I’f ”th misrule. “Compromise is impossible w'th nfiosts tho popular watchword. But for the S^Ls"' t,;op.r ho government could not Irave survived a montl. ; ' and when 1 10 I qm flaunted his sympathy with tho Sondorbund even hoy (for many were Protestants) wavered in their loya tT fc was moroasmgly clear that tliere was no liono lornau State, while the government remained L clerical S., i’ .8,r •I'” 1 • r 1 1^1-1 1 in 1 educing Koine to a inerelv ocolesias ical supremacy, with only tlio sliadow of ti c Iciuporal Power/’ hfveii Capponi, conservative tlLumh he was, and Galeott), .staunch defender of the Temporal Power or iS.nontTr®”*'’ 01- Naples ""il t ‘ r““ '« "r i'ialdiiii Mel! IT. ‘’lo D>u'andos and Bpin If !>: were figlning for the Liberals in Ifaliin soHl ' otI>er.s, like Garibaldi, sailed to the Brussf “ud V“ to Paris '!‘oircounl.ry Ef!" star would have enriched 1 scveial years .Italian politics showed few ^"■incl.i, o|,?cf, 7 a 40”' Ponf.fido, I. 4,-42, 60 , 70; f RM^I G.aIcotli, So^ranM, CWl'7es Cw,“.LT 7 '• /VZer, 144 \ ..f ® Rcmsr.cnccs, II. 1S2 ; J. W. Fuller I • C'anyies Fcm{ patent and potent reality-. Howe, , , j'^-+ '-/ttiivJe in conquered ; he has tiansfornicd liis '. '"C' ,i'r 'f ''*’^ •% jki^ritW'Pr'^' 'o** ' ■' f ■ ■ “'’ "'ll ; ■’ji3sr«iSW'- ■ ■^’- ■" ■' i\f' N » Wt:, - . .rr^ &-#-.'-r-’:r-i;:Sti& ^-%‘«l ^;;j,%i' AO m * “.v! ' '> ■ »-Jfc.....'ia%!; ■ ’ ' 5<< ’*' ' '5v)» '•''"i .: .1 fi-v'tiii I'aflW .'S .-*5.?*'*’^!'. 4;', :n’y; ! f£' A' !iV ' ' - .! a/'-- ■li-' ‘* 7^t ' ' . ..fy^J^lt 0 'A'' 4. S JA =^’A''i-' ' ,y,Ti»«*<" . . ; .!i> ■’- • fi ^r,S, ■ i, . wH *»TU< A‘ „.;;:j^* ''' ’, i i.i vtj/t - ^ •'"■* ■ ■ ' ..' !• K*' " f lU ^ I M4 A }I1ST0R'Z OF ITALTAN UNITV •si-ns of life. Thf Carl.onav:, thoiigh the, name still , hci-e _ mid there, ^ liad practically disappoai-cd for ever S' i\laj;:-;ini retired for a time from tlio direction of Voin.S, Stilly and its ori^anisation \va.s almost broken up. :hi at all events, many an ex-revoiuliouist teas ready ciiokh 0 Korve llie oan.so f>f despotism ; in Lombardy 'society' h--,! resioncil and coutentod on the surface, gildiiuj its materir’ enjoyment, rvith va,giio aspirations for a Liglicr and frr-o' lile. Cautious men, like l)a! Vor/.o, pileadcd that it woidd 1,* bott-cr to accept Austrian rule and inalco Mio best of y' KSomelhing of the spirit of Leopardi's misanthropy a-jd possimism seemed to liavo .settied on the country.' A,,d just as tlio Irish Faiiiino arrested the national movomwit there, so the cholera, wliioii scourged Italy in depressed the physique and industry of the nation' and everywhere, e.vcept in the Soutl,. turned men’s mind.s'from public to pnvato griefs. Italy might well seem to ti.e suporhe'i.al observer “ the land of the dead”; it needed the taitli ot a Lamoimaus to realise that it was “the peace of tlie ci'adlo and noi of tlio gravo/^ lint the revival soon camo, heralded in literature. Silvio 1 ellico’s le mie though intended to i,o a manual o quietism, burnt into its readers’ hearts with its desciijition ot the martyrdom of the Spielberg. Eerchet liad written ills fain o as clioras : Arise, Italia, arise in amis, thy day has come,” (jiiorrazzi’s novels spoke of uu Italian greatness wJiicli might return again, and his Mmlia di Mrenze ( i S 3 i) was “ writlm, because lie could not fight,” ^ iJ'Aiieglio’s JiUore Fieram,m<. stiuo ^ a ruanlj note, tiiat helped to woau Italian youth from ballet-aanccrs to patriotic thought. Collotta and Lotta publkslied thou- Idsf.ories of recent Italian .stnigglo.s. Gustavo Modena’s comedies tauglit Italian and ariti-ivqad ideas as bob 11}/ m.s t,lio censorship allowed. Kos.sini’s aij'l ' There v/crc a fev/ ]odgo.s ut homo and iu Unibiia as late aF .1S67 : Mazzim, Of.err. XV, Ii.':. - .Mazzini, DutC'^nto Jcttcre, 14-15. ‘‘‘ Guerrazzi, Memorie, 95. young ITALY •45 Vordi s operas Jiad tales of national cllbrt for their themes Niccohm’s tragedies drew from niodioval liislo]-y memories that I'ousod the people to rocollootions of their old'domocracv" ylrnaUo cU Brescia (,843) was a hymn to libe^y’ aorcoly satirising German and Pajialist. and teaching how liinporor and I'ope wore leagued to ojipress the land Ginsti’s satires circulated in hundreds of mamiscript copies 11835), labelling the princes, the police, the courtiers with Ktmging epigra,nis, that stuck in the public memory. He wro'G “ in ins blouse ” in nervous, vernacular Tuscan, with the sharp, rattling rhythm of popular songs, or sometimes with an epic dignity, that recalled the greater ages of Italian litoratiiro. Ho lashed t^lie |)rinces, who “shaved at second-hand,” the “conscience-jaundiced Idodmontese ” the feeble i.azzaroni-l'aladin ” of Naples, tlie “Tuscan Morpheus, rvith lettuce and with poppy crowned”: he lashed the police, " those locusts of the state,” the priests 10 pl eached resignation and a marrowless iiiinianitarianisni ihe M'oathcr-cook politicians, the official “ adepts in the art of iiot-dolug.” The Pope ho told to “tear the mask, first troo! 1.11s own face, tlien from the tyrants.’’ But he was t- 'g' Cf tif- of the demagoLpje as to the cant of tee ofiicial; lie sneered at the “devotees of King Log” at fo thin and .shadowy virtue ” of Florence, at the eile.s "I'oso “clock alw.ay.s stood at ’31.” His rvas a deep and ygis patriotism; ho laughed at tlie men who thouglit '•“•t a cosmopolitan idea makes the brain grow lar^mr ” • si'.'' I fiercely on the .seutimenta] foroigtiers,'’ who ■M'.'f'O of Itaty as the land of the dead : “ Oil, sucli a noble gi-ivcyaid migl.t make tlie living envy ! ” MciwwhHe kTazziui’s passionate i.amphlets, smuggled fesf.’ief'Tl leavening with a now ear- l)u-v!b ‘‘niong the ediicateil classes, and Modona’s rl)u ' on jj,.' I there the branches of Young Italy ivo-]- g^-’a.diially, .hi spite of the depression, tlie net- to was rewoven from Palermo and Naples vor hlorcncc and I^Iilan. From England and I I 146 A HISTORY OF ITALUN IJNITT France, from Spain and 0 ('rsica, from the Tieino and M ip. and the Ionian islands the e::iles were in close corrospom ■ deuce with their friends at home. Sicily was now die focim *' of insurrection. The stamina of the population, the hatred 1 of the government which showed itself in almost yearly ^ outbreaks, the distance from the Austrian garrison all ! pointed to the island as a fitting starting-point for revolu- 1 tion; even the Piedmontese government was biddino- for a foothold of influence there.^ The long struggle betw^een tiio advocates of complete centralization and tire party which tried to make the Lieutenancy the means to a modified homo rnlo had ended in the final discomfiture of the latter, when Fer- dinand s jealousy recalled the Count of Syracuse (i835).2 The intolerable misrule, whicli followed, extinguished tljo divisions among the Liberals; Pakn’mo and Messina were ostentatiously reconciled ; the old separatist party joined hands with the younger school, ndiich sought to memo the island in an Italian republic. In 1837 deputies from all the secret societies of the island rvere meeting at Palermo to concert rebellion. A. month or two later the poj)ular fury, which accompanied the cholera, precipitated the rising. The terrible visitation, which struck tire North with despair, in the South was the signal ioi' blind outbreaks of panic and frenzy. The epidemi3 was decimating the population; 22,000 died ar Naples, over 40,000 at Palermo. The maddened people gave a ready oar to the old superstition, that the plague was bon of ])oison, and so utterly dis- credited was the govermreiit, that even educated mc]i were ready to believe that its f gents had poisoned tlie bread and . contaminated the wells. Formidable disturbances broke out in the Abruzzi and in STxily. 'flte Liberals took advautagoj of the panic. They deliberately encouraged the belief in tk'3. poisoning,' and pi'eached rebellion to the frenzied popidation.i Palermo itself was crushetl by tlie awful plagvio, ])ut i\l cssiiiii, Catania, and Syracuse rose ; .1.11 the two latter cities the yellow flag of Sicilian indepemlenco flew ; at Syracuse the ^ liianciii, TUpUnnazia, 111. 279. - Jiracci, Menun-ie, 55-58, 108-170. ^ f^ansune, A ivcnivicnti, 103. YOIjXG ITALY ‘ crowd massacred police and suspectcl poisoners, and for three weeks the c,ty was nnder mob-rnle. The ^ictlL the populace owed their deaths to the cholera scare a Catania, whore the niovcracut had been more political, there was no bloodshed; but the murders gave the government'; ts excuse for vengeance. Delcarotto was sent 1 organize'' terronsm, and condemned to death over one hundred of his victims AYPe, Uie savagery came to an end, the last remnants of mdependenco were destroyed. The civil service was lused with the Neapolitan ; the vicoroyalty became a sine! cure; genaarmes on the Neapolitan model took the place of Je old local police. Alone of their ancient privileges the Sicilians preserved their exemption from oonscriptL for Ssr”””' 1 1 an isolated movement, but it rs^YminVlrT pair was pas.sing into exa.spcvation. As Young Italy raised its head again, the plans of insur- cction took a more organized and extensive form. In the - '^53 f;''°^olutionaryconuTiitteos projected a .Wiioial rising in Naples, Romagna, and 'I’usoany, but caci, provniee waited for the othe^-.s to give the sigmd, and the - bcl ion was still-born. The plot had lo.akod out, however, . Lo ogna ami R.avcima, and a few conspirators, to osca,pc t',,! revenge, were led by the brothers Muratori to I pcnnineH, w]io]-e tlioy kept up a desultory p m the mountains, while below Cardinal Spiuola sent accomplices to the piisoii or the scallold. Ill'll .yo'”'g Romagnuols. who thought r"i>s|>ir.,to‘rs V l'>o rriscr of the c di'T’k- -- frying to , p ''".'P'f -0x1 rcpuhlioans on a bare prograuune 1> t.s : J '*?'; ''--'I'niave preferred to wait for'-a time, ‘'1' Ihe ;I w ‘ llr-'t occurred the mo.st noted I oi A movcnieuts. Attilio and Emiho llandiora wore 148 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY young Vcnotiai'] nohles, oinoors in tlio Aiistria with ti,o !itora(an-e of^Yonnc/ltalT oi hiavo and vigorous iictiori. Tliis example the- woid i give by organixiiig a, guerilla in the Southern Aperniinos' • la^uu and others did what they could to dissuade them • hut deaf to his reasoning, deaf to tlieir father’s tl, rents an 1 ^ le prayers of Attilio’s young wife, they determined to mal;' a descent on (Jalabria, where rumour had swelled a nettv onthroak to an insurrection. Escaping from their ship-? hoy took re ugo at Corfu (May 1844), and thence sailed m mr-'V'** detailed their pro- he Vv with Mai^zini, relyiuo the well-known trustwortliincass of the Erjo-lic], loHors were opened in the Se! .i!i? W 7 "U oomlomMi u, t,; Alot. 1 altering for a moment, they tried to save their lives f^y representing the movement as monarchical, and appealing tc I e dmand to lead it , " a King of Naples,” tliey uh Kun, IS the only possible King of Italy/^' It v;as the onlv unworthy action, that stained their perfect honour. ' 'Vhly Ie.ith, thou- proclamations in the name of Italian Inde- ’ P- once pi Unity, made a deep sensation Oiobiti I ‘ destnl-, r"' to«-ential invective for sf ri let b ^ could die ”■ they flkc to e to Yomig plausible, Lvever also to eprosent Ma.zmi from his safe hiding-place egging n the Bandieras to their forlorn enterprise, .imd the olum ' U at fell on hm. gave a great impetus to tlie neiv .school, .r"« “““ “i bee Vol. IL, Appendix C. - Kicciardi e Lattari, Bandicra, i 6 o. £. J’{. */>iiSvt:i ,:,jv.-«jrt -■ S:'«u,,C.'.s>r;>!^),t^V“^^'^ *C^ „;iU~ fm U-fi^ ■ - ■ K.J, ■ i|Sir ^ % r.'ir’j "d'" ' , ....--..k/-^ ■..„ .wr«>a' --- 1 If ^ . ’ « m f ■ . if ^ .^?ir A%'5Wil'<- ' m IV ,-in«r I.-,'- •’■^, *''tT^' '\ ^ \y ■- •■-■■“• ■■»» .-»V U'':,;.- “ V 'lljj ■ i^siJi*}^ 'W’ ■>(«.?«?* o^y- ^:H^^r'u f' 1 T*. -5’ '■ ■■ ■ .. ! .A*- Vlt? V ’ij /io!^* >'• > ? ■ 1^4/. . Il v/'-" . ■ ' i'^.'i] ■ * ' *’*^1 ,. >• 'ft. /V is... > CHAPTER VJTI THE MODERATES 1843-1846 Tlie reaction against Young Italy. The social reformers ; Scientific Con- gresses ; railways. The Moderates : (i.) The New Gdflfs ; Gioberti’s Pnmaio ; (ii.)TflE Piedmontese School ; Hperan^e d’ Italia.; D’Azeglio ; his Ultimi Gasi di Romagna; the Albertists. Charles Albert’s Eeign : his reforms ; railway schemes ; the King and Austria ; growth of Liberalism ; tariff- war with Austria ; the King and the Moderates. Since the discredit of the Carbonari, the democratic and more or less republican movement, which centred round Young Italy, had inspired the active patriotism of the country. However fitfully, the democrats had for the past twelve years been almost alone in upholding the flag of Italian Independence. They had now to confront a great wave of nationalist conservatism that swept over the country. To a -certain extent, no doubt, the Moderate School Avas descended from the earlier Liberalism of the Carbonaro period, retaining and developing its nationalist policy, and reverting from fear of Young Italy’s democratic programme to tlic more conservative and cautious thought, that had inspired and spoilt the movements of ’21 and ’31. There was an angry revulsion from the little plots, Avith tbeir Avaste of life and the cruel retaliation they proAmkod. “ It is hard,” Avrote Gioborti after the Savoy Expedition, ‘"to be calm, A^dien one reflects that a band of inexperienced young men, hoAvever good their intentions, presume to risk the future of Italy.” And the Moderates bore the impress of the con- structive didactic school, Avhich sprang from the ConciUatore, and the Anlologia and Manzoni. There was a Aidde con« viction that any forAvard pohtical movement was out of U9 i ^ ■ -u liVf ' ,.v| ’ *^>y‘' ' -. 5 i\ V- t'm ..ji title it' ife: It; iQf r t 1 jT- _ - .,, ^ ^ c, • ' --A^ix -13^ ^ ' *. 'I'M. *; t*" .^i; . ■*'*,* '^' j,„, . ail jv.'K>i-/'i J2»r' i* !>(*J.^ 7 rf>’ ifit^*< ' .ii. It/ ^Crvtt^ t ’r i". roifi J 'rtii-.L?« K^li t^ 'JI ^ 4 , , . I «! 5 rjf -idt tv'j l^rt j •■ f ii. !'S I 4 *• J • li/^ -; 1 »: ’r >J^ V*^' f f- .- y’f . u _ ^ rr ^ U xwruwii*'*^*"** r^i..' <» 9 :»v 1 — ^ r V, r- - ?<:* • T ^/jpj^Cij ^ ‘ 4 ^:^ tt » jdu’=jb jc ' 'ft. -6 infr*l( ♦r ,, -i; X/?i.V.. *. ) i.^ 1 ^^.-* Iv ’ br vri^Ttw^? ; —vff |«^ r:'. #c /iii ‘k’ 'ir^-f' »i&'>: ' -'’->fi| ?* r.*f unr'* %dfc^ ■ /'^n*; *^* 1 ?^ ' * '"•• ' • ia^i Sex - •• t '♦ ' '■iSv.f;!! Ttwr" uiii ^ • ft .aj V U/.-V : V i# **iP 0 ir, * 4 ; 4 liir mimM' ti ^r. 'L " |il >>.>...>, t") Jtatit- -’-* '-■■''-,^|3nfi ■>?’•'. >7 jx.n. ' ^ '41 ' 4 . < .«w »>■ 150 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY court at present, that the energies of the nation for the moment were best devoted to education and social reform. Men, like the Georgofils in Tuscany, or Cattaneo at Milan, / or the agricultural reformers of Piedmont, believed that the spread of schools, agricultural improvements, the introduction tof railways, the promotion of literary journuls and scientific societies must take precedence for their generation over any .political movement, though many of them looked to create an atmosphere where despotism could not live. They attacked the dialects, and brought classic Italian into more general uso; they started model farms; they established infant schools and savings-banks. They founded, under the lead of Carlo Bonaparte and Sir John Bowring, the Scientific Congresses, first held at Pisa and Turin in 1839 1840.^ The Congresses were at first colourless but very practical gatherings of naturalists and scientists, who met under government patronage; but it was impossible for Italians of different states to come together without giving something of a national complexion to their meetings. Economic questions suggested a customs -league, social problems led up to politics, geography to free-spoken talk of Italy. Tlie Scientific Congresses were among the forces that made the nesv nationalism ; and the Pope and Duke of Modena were wise in their generation, when they forbade their subjects to attend them, it was the same school that gave the first serious impulse to railways. Military necessities and royal conveniences, if no higher considerations, compelled even the governments, except in the Papal States, to favour them. A short line from Naples to Portici was the first to be opened in 1839; another line, equally for the comfort of a court, ran between Milan and Monza a year later. Those were the preludes to the great trunk lines. That from Milan to Venice was commenced in 1840, and the first section from Padua to Mestre was opened in 1842. A line from Leghorn to Pisa, tlie first instalment of a railway to Florence, was working in 1844. The Piedmontese trunk 1 The other Congresses were at Florence, 1841; Padua, 1842; Lucca, 1843; Milan, 1844; Naples, 1845; Genoa, 1846; Venice, 1847. ih ^1 i»}ii» W' ■ ^"- -•■'<»? -'i' '1 ' 4^>ii/' M oa04^M/tr> i<> la!, ,. Mdl hzi/iH K* ^i.";* " ,• 1 ‘i^i.f Mmrn^ Bx/l^ ^ fter’mfhi ?^^’/ ,* -• u nci ^ ■4^,l afiui’W' vi4^v^ Vk ofho^riOKi »ir 'i^n^f'ky X:4^vili^ aJJu i-u. 'i ; 3 i,''f . )Vo,.; li^r^“*-* v^i r * .^wii -. icsr 4' ftkOiiq^w^i' /i>)dqif>'Tp4^* fticU^ii»'j /ion,qif* 7 w iU* ^cnt oiai t»fc iii^ ^ffpilci«f ^ a ?',^'iWf* ci 4 l'«. »i^ -/; jV'X^'^ho -VO *r-di ** ’^.:yi;^/^ ^itT . *or.Si: ^ yi1% ^ i:i»- ., •■I'tli'f’Oj.il SVI 1 ' i.l-JI’-V r. j tiiofliai^'ii' j toi^j i'e6 •Atr..- ‘a.:n‘j<» -i--.^ '-i r' if»fjp»;>-s iaaiii.' i- ij-ia.-tii IK--’- :- ■ iaif' J Irt t:-;.’. 8 '> ‘t j{^..Ui.« 4 -.-. ^ _ 1 * '. •.’i:/ .' i:-'?' .^*‘' '-^W uowwK. |? 3 j,v irrjU^ . >’»tt4 ; 'jv i) fl'^'jU^f‘^cn'< Ji Tir.rtii-i' -A nr i ■ -■' < r'< m'^!^ a.i • I'y. Ml '. b«a*7^i^;1j ’ i..'UiSM|Bt''^ v ,'''1 S'AilffniS^.^- >,r. il’ ‘V't.l> !=’• •2 *< -j l<*i>iia: ■ ' >i 'i!^ 1 >llf& f i/ ; '#^ift^f 6 '.^■♦*iC*‘'• ..>/J ^uU a n ; lOr ■•'» * . - ,'M*'>UJR *' • *-'.4 -■’ t: .i^ 1 ?l llfh <''1 ; i'fc^Liun ‘i?‘j -7i(i‘ini'> ,.‘)nti ^l:\A: VuiU’i M -t .i ^^ . ^ ^ i >-«: oji .4 \KHtcimn!#\v; .w V ■«> ..'i » j.: i-;ii- . -♦ *kf{i } Kt ‘•■ it ‘ ' .#W->-ii.’i #rv^ .’vf^fea U>f 1 Jv‘ ? r ':f^t^]>4\ '1 M I. i.i THE MODERATES T5I system followed a little later/ and Cesare Balbo as early as i'st |was above all Catholic. The New Gruelfs, as they called 'themselves, were the direct descendants of the Romanticists of Manzoni's school. Sentimentalists, worshippers of the past, they gave their reverence to Catholicism and the Papacy as its central embodiment. Respect for the priest had to he reconciled with theR humanitarianism, their very real sympathy with the oppressed. And so they pictured the Church released from the bondage which Joseph II. and ! his imitators had laid on it, pictured the Pope independent and supreme as the arbiter of nations, the defender of the poor, the champion of Italy. The popular Catholicism of the Fro'tnessi Syosi was to be the great feat of modern Europe. And their deeply religious spirit, dainty and want- ^ ing in masculine fibre though it was, made them moralists, i Like Mazzini, they preached duty, perseverance, education, q domestic virtue; unlike him, they preached passivity and |resignation. Wanting in moral courage, fearful of the stony road of progress, tender to opponents, over-sensitive in their sympathies, they painted an Utopia of class recon- ciliation, Avhere Pope and priests and princes, converted to justice and mercy, were to lie down with a grateful and contented people. The tradition (which had its .French counterpart in Montalerabert’s and Lamennais’ earlier writings) had been nursed by the Paviese school of Romagnosi and Cantu, by Raffaello Lambruschinis suggestions of church reform, by Capponi’s and Carlo Troya s historical rehabilitation of the I Papacy. In 1836 Niccold Tommaseo, a poet and critic, I who had been exiled Ironi Tuscan^’’ for his writings in the ' Antologia, published at Paris ^ an appeal to priests and princes to co-operate in the work of national regeneration, and pointed to a reforming Pope as the pivot of the movement. But Tornmaseo’s book was little known, and the new school started into prominence with a work, per- haps in part base! on his, wliicli appeared seven years ^ I'dlc nuuat speranze Italia. ;.V iiTj Si Hi m m v- ifj i'’, f ‘ ■ ■■<:: . •"it*,, r, V^-rr -^' ' ,?'': ' ^ . • ,. ''\ ?’. ' ■ ■'^ ■^;ii’'rce?> 5 jri*iu| fe vet i ''^^l Vi 1 Jtinfvr 4*^-1 . ^ S' ‘4» I'i .t'.i1%-)/ .^'.ja 4'V^'' ':‘V ".I;;.-. • -1 ," ■ ' f^'' ■!i(\ 2 ^ •>■.}♦■' ?-w-. " ;. ,.. 2 ’' '' , ■' ‘./^ • jl‘^*.'^Sik*’ W '' 1 /;' n r " •.-' j , '1 „. U.,»i ;-;.« ^-.UU ■ ' il’'”' »;■> •■' '• »■' ’ •! V. ' ' »<»;ind!a-.' i.,U- -)) '1 •>lC!i-«: i’IW>. !■ ,, .'.,.,;„./'^j. • . vl ---.n-feT ...■'' >.)'5ten V 4 id ;, ,>i-i‘ •' ■■ V. ■./ ^v»U(i^. ■ '■■>•} ‘; '' i;-^- •'''i“fc«‘ 'i* ' "'v't-i» ^KA.iT'.' '■►vfii • I ^ HAq ijl wj ■i^'.*^ itf** .•>'l^.--- .,,' '■■'■'■■ ‘‘i, ‘ ' niy> if.' iav ',.. '^ 4 . . THE MODERATES ^53 iater (June 1843). Moral and Civil Primacy of the ItalianH was tlio work of Gioberfci, a Turin priest, who had been oxilod in the' early days of Charles Albert's reignj Eroin sympathies with Young Itnly his vei'vsatilo interests had passed to an Italian school of metaphysics, to church reform and Jansenism/ and now fixed themselves on Italian Independence. His transcendental philosophy created an Italy of the imagination, and some fragmentary history and a few ethnological conceits blinded him to the real Italy past and present. With reasoning more conspicuous for patriotism than logic, lie argued that, Italy, because it had been the fatherland of Dante and Vico and Mapoleon, must for ever be the country of the “ dynamic men, the home of creatiAT-e genius. Almost in Mazzini s words he declared that because the Romans had been the elect people to propagate the idea of justice, because Christian Rome had taught the peace and love Avliich created modern civilization, therefore Italy must always bo the redeeming nation, the eldest-born among the peoples, the moral and spiritual centre of the Avx-rld.^ Such dignity claimed as its corollary national inde- pendence, and independence alone was needed to make his country again the first of nations. But Gioberti did not believe in It.alian Unity. Italy, he thought, had been too long divided to permit a peaceful union, and. union by force would be a crime. He wished to see a federation of Italian states, under the supreme authority of the Pope, which Avould seciux the country against foreign invasion, and make room for a national navy, national colonies, a customs’- league, a common system of administration.'^ The federa- tive idea Avas a part of the conservatism, Avhich pervaded all his politic.al thought. Like Locke, he uses first jHn- ciplos to justify the system of his predilection; he often fails to get behind conventions, and makes philosophy the handmaid of tlie e.visting fact. The Italian genius, he announces, is essentially monarchical and aristocratic and ^ Eerti, Oioherti, 15, 23. He told Mazziui in iiS47 his Catholicism was elastic CTJough to include anybody. ^ Gioberti, Prinwto, 14, 19, 27-32. 48. ^ 57-58 ; ProUyjmnem, 50, 158. -rw::, .ga ’j/‘:l'- '^ukr/- iUi:>^ P ;>.wi . -• ^ / i4;il|.i<4.. . :%f f 5‘.^J3 y. ^ M,.. : ^T i.: . -'t Jtt .jW **'*'' ' H‘ ‘ ■ “*' ■ 'll ,.y ., ■'^^ xx , ‘^'. orV»!^rj‘t^^ r i^f{ 'vafr^ j^^wlW'V' ^ joi^-«?)^“1c / 1 .^, ■ ''L \ ..... .- P ^ *[ W£fl.,^ ■ ':] i4ps tf^ f:^V . :*>'' i;v; .;'\i-rL'iV/.*k’Ur£^ A*' -/isitA'-' Jl: lif*' . V. 1..: . / , . k.; ..1^- :* r:^'> mU : I » . .'f < • fjr. fwijfl^fi r.1, ■ - ■ . ' - • ■ i*%- • tti • i ■■ |::;vf ^'fr,;' , -o^-ot' •■O’' ''aoi^Vt.' . p , ' .' tH'.^rf.'f iiUb*ni 9, j(w'^ ■ .fW m»i «t. . 4 l;.‘' X .vljj^' 'j ' ^iCpT '.i'l ^ Mtrif i" Ky.t * \\ .*, Tt'i *: .i-fV/ * J '-'Ha -j. W ki^' t' •' ' ■ ti ■’'#« ■ :■;,£ )/d '^tC' • ■ '' f-*’ ■■ ’ ' * <■ . . •■ t .«» .|-»i ^ r» . V ‘ ' 9 • yMif , ■ ■ .^V''''§jfr‘^ir .. 'll. 154 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY fodcralLst. The Pope is to keep' his Temporal Power ; ^ the Church, as lieir of the Jevrish pricstliood, must preservo her ancient independence; all good Italians must love and reverence their princes. His conservatism, however, is of the best. Though there is to be no change in the social order, every class must subserve the great national idea. The times were propitious for reform, and the princes were to initiate consultative assemblies and a moclitied liberty of the press. The nobles must justify their title to lead, must re- nounce the works of feudalism, must respect the lower orders. Priests must study, must free themselves from suspicion of worldliness, be tolerant to other creeds, use the same frank- ness to princes as to people. Even the Jesuits are called to help, and the Avhole country bidden rouse itself to move the dead weight of mediocrity that held the nation down. The results of Gioberti’s book were great and manifold. In common with Mazzini, it had a manly strain of en- couragement and hope, a memory anti a prophecy of high destinies, sorely needed by a weary and disillusioned genera- tion. He taught, as Mazzini had done, that it was craven to despair of twenty millions of men. Like him, he made their hopes pivot on national independence, and federalist though he was, he helped to swell the stream that set for Unity. But Gioberti parted from Mazzini, wlien he taught Italians to look for salvation to the Pope and the King of Piedmont. The fate of Italy, he said, depended on the alliance of Rome and Turin. He had all the pride of a Piedmontese, and held that the subalpine kingdom was now the chief seat of Italian arms and culture. Rendering li])- service to Charles Albert,^ he told how the manly piety and tenacity of the House of Savoy had disciplined its state, and prophesied that it was reserved to the Carignano branch to turn its energy to laiger purposes. But much as he caressed Charles Albert, he reserved his highest honours for 1 He was already wavering as to tliis when he wrote the Prolegwacni, q. V. 89. ‘ So again in Prolegomeni, 157. In liis liinnovamento, 1 . 507, he says he did not mean what he said about Chaiie.s Albert. 80 too he disclaimed his eulogies of Komo, ih. I. 20, 11 . 144, and Eerti, op. cit, 151, 187; but the dis- claimer was probably introduced to square with his later policy. . ■» Jimz hr "' ■ '.Vr4^ ''^■#C^J!^p i’ti.: ':;yi ■.■«-t?.v- fa^U ■' ■ ^ • . •: - • ,,. ,, . ■■ ^ -V - , V; ^ * r i0v»‘^< i .ik/iii^i “*^n (I "‘ \ 'a f ;'r-vJ 1 I'wt' ,%»>/! Uj^ ^ ^ r i4»«? f ur, ■ ■/ i-'-a ' ';v ,^«K - i#, ... '‘A.iui .!-■ fosjlfl#^ f.^v- T-' j»l' ►i>5:;'''''«B0a|W' ■'»« ' ' ''A V-V o-f i r . f . .<;.i llx.'.l'«!l- "nr vl .^^> sdft/r’f* - » '*‘^ifJ ' Vc^ tuvint . ..v:. /'Ci -v/ . /.‘V. '' t<;, • • i^.] t ^ ^ » « ■}h n < i .« ’ '«^|i!||b ♦f. .^-''' iv; v'. - .f/n ****?i_ <, .V'JMilAjdUH 'i^» ‘r- r, >W^?.'u*,VW> a, .4.^ f*te •%f*^a^4iJ*?‘ ■ i '^’M susi'.’-. ■.•: ifi4..i J THE MODERATES 155 the Plope. The old medieval idea of a reforming Pontiff was revived. Gregory (for even Gioberti could not idealize him) was told not to expect the joyful day himself, but he mightl rejoice in the high destiny reserved for his successor. The Pope, as heir of Guelf traditions, was to free Italy from the barbarian ; as the true friend of princes and peopk^s, he would hold the balance between them. The mediating office of the Papacy would champion right and religion against “ Most Christian ” kings and Holy Alli- ances. And then again, almost in repetition of Mazzini’s words, Gioberti foretold that from Italy, the seat and court of the spiritual monarchy, from Rome, the eternal city independent of change and time, would go forth the word that would regenerate the modern world. The book met with a splendid popularity. It was a safe book ; the timid, the devotees, the priests found in it palatable doctrine, that reconciled patriotism and prejudice. The clergy were won by its Catholic tone ; ^ the nationalist statesmen by its praise of the Savoy princes. It was in vain that the sceptics and anti-Papalists pointed to the scandals of Gregorys court and the hideous misrule of Romagna; it was in vain that Niccolini retorted that to regenerate Italy the Pope must begin by unpoping himself ; it was in vain that on the other side the Jesuits refused to be won by Gioberti’s caresses, and savagely attacked his “ Liberal house with the Papal scutcheon.” The Franciscans and Dominicans defended his orthodoxy, and he became the champion of the Liberal clergy. And when, stung by the Jesuit attack, and angered by the Sonderbund^ and the execution of the Bandieras, he placed the Jesuits and Neapolitan Bourbons under ban in his Prolegomeni (1845), he only voiced the national indignation, and his fame rose higher still. But though Gioberti carried everything before him in the popular imagination, there were cooler heads, who could ^ e.g. Pecci (now Leo XIII.) : Berti, o'p. cit., 157. 2 The Sonderbund was the union of the seven Catholic cantons of Switzer- land, formed in 1843. When the Diet declared for the expulsion of the Jesuits, it refused to obey (September 1847). The eighteen-days’ civil war (November 1847) ended in its complete defeat. 156 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY not accept his version of the Papacy, and he himself almost abandoned it in his Frolegomeni} The fashionable Voltaireans of Florence and Milan, students of Dante like Gabriel Rossetti, the earnest democrats of Mazzini’s school, the Pope’s own wretched subjects found it impossible to believe that any good thing could come out of Rome. Above all, the Liberal statesmen of Piedmont, however much they might welcome Gioberti’s panegyric of their country and the reaction against the democracy and conspiracies of Young Italy, had small hope that a Pope would lead the cause of nationality and reform. It was Gioberti’s belief in the House of Savoy that appealed most^ strongly to them in his doctrine. This school of nationalist statesmen had already found a voice in a very able but little known pamphlet,^ published at Paris in 1841 by Mamiani, an exiled leader of the revolution of 1831. Mamiani believed that sooner or later Italy must win her independence by hard fighting under an Italian prince and without foreign help. But she must wait her opportunity in Austria’s embarrassment, and years of patriotic education were needed before the masses could take their part. His policy was personal reform, the winning of the clergy and the rich, national education, church reform, and a thoughtful pro- gramme of mildly socialistic measures to raise the people to a confidence and sense of dignity, that would fit them to co-operate in the work. But Mamiani’s book, statesmanlike as it was, failed to win notice, because it attached itself to no existing political fact.^ The statesmen found their real voice in the Pied- montese school, which represented to a certain extent the anti-Papal and Ghibelline tradition. The policy of the Turin bureaucracy had been to make the Church a branch of the civil government; it preferred a commonplace and docile clergy, kept in order under concordats. While Manzoni’s followers had linked patriotism to fhe cause of ^ Gioberti, Prolegomeni, 6o. ..... o 2 Nosiro parere intorno alle cose italiane, republished in his Scritti. bee Gori, Rivoluzione, 69. His social programme is interesting. See below, p. 274. 3 So too the Veri Italiani, for whom see Mazzini, Opere, VII. 143 5 Archivio Triennale, I. 44-45. THE MODERATES 157 the Church, and attacked the Austrian government as Jansenist and irreligious, the Piedmontese statesmen put small reliance in the Pope, and centred their hopes on the erastian House of Savoy. They were mostly Piedmontese nobles, proud of Piedmont’s past, believers in her destinies, inheritors of the traditional hatred of Austria. They had the bureaucrat’s love of good government, the bureaucrat’s horror of untried paths, his contempt for theories and policies of faith. Some had a tincture of Liberalism ; a few wished to copy O’Connell and agitate within the bounds of the law for more popular institutions.^ But none were democrats. They wished to see the Neapolitan and Papal States better governed ; they were willing to absorb Lombardy ; they favoured an Italian Federation for common defence and customs’ -union. But they were opposed to Unity; they shrank from the struggle, which an attempt to realize it might involve ; they feared that Turin might have to yield its metropolitan honours to Milan or Rome. Just as the New Guelfs took as their text-book Gioberti’s Primacy, so the Piedmontese school had its manifesto in Cesare Balbo’s Hopes of Italy. ^ He was the son of Victor Emmanuel’s reforming minister, with the record of a some- what weak and inconsistent career, but inheriting the ambi- tions of the subalpine school, and not untouched by the wider national ideal. His book, a wearisome, sententious treatise, was published at Paris in 1843, a few months after the appearance of the Primacy. Balbo was a professed ad- mirer and follower of Gioberti, but he planted his hopes not on Rome, but on Turin. The whole book is a veiled appeal to Charles Albert, cringingly tender to his illiberal prejudices, incentive to both the baser and purer sides of his patriotism, promising at once the liberator’s crown of glory and the ter- ritorial gain that would follow the expulsion of the Austrians.^ Not that he dangled the bigger ambition of the Italian crown : the Kingdom of Italy was to him a dream of fanatics, and 1 Balbo, Speranze, 153. 2 For the history of the title, see Bianchi, Santa Rosa, 30-31 ; Ricotti, Balbo, 156. ^ Balbo, Speranze, 131, 143-158. A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 158 the political future of the country lay in Federation. But Federation was neither possible nor desirable while the Austrian was in the land. “ Without national independence other good things are as nought ” ; and the possession of a single province by the foreigner was fatal to the dignity and prosperity of the others, fatal to Italian industry and litera- ture and art, degrading directly or indhectly the character of the whole nation. Independence, therefore, must be sought before all else — before unity, before constitutional hberty; but its attainment would come not by a war of princes, nor by a war of peoples, nor by the help of another nation, but — impotent conclusion, so it seemed to his contemporaries — from the approaching break-up of the Turkish Empire, which would entice Austria eastwards, and allow her “to make Italy a present of her independence.” ^ But there was another side to Balbo. Salvagnoli might sathize the statesman who looked for salvation to the Turks. Yet the preacher of quietism, the vacillating politician had a strenuous gospel. If Italy was to be independent, her character must earn it ; she must be no longer “ the land of the olive and the orange ” ; she must cast off her native vice of sloth ; and as Father Matthews had been O’Connell’s best helper," so in Italy character and independence must advance together. And all through his book there is a healthy optimism. He attacks the different schools of despair ; his theme is his country’s Hopes. “ A nation of twenty millions is invincible if it has union and character.” His conclusion, like Gioberti’s, is, “ Let every man do his duty at his post, and leave the rest to Providence.” His teaching was carried on by his friend Massimo D’Azeoflio, like him born of a Piedmontese noble stock. Destined to the usual mihtary career, he scandalized Turin society by preferring to gain his living by his brush. To an artist the air of Turin was mephitic ; and D’Azeglio had shared his life between Rome and Milan and Florence, “ the fii’st Piedmontese who made himself practically an Italian.” He had painted pictures, written novels, ^ Balbo, Speranze, 127-128. For the subsequent history of the idea, see below, Vol. IL, pp. 16, 196, 232, 234, 285-6. ^ 167. THE MODERATES 159 studied society, done nothing very well. He was a perfect gentleman, an elegant and accomplished man of the world, but indolent, wanting in strenuousness and seriousness, unwilling to do disagreeable work, the very dilettante of politicians. But though he was always an aristocrat at heart, and his democratic veneer came more of ostentation than conviction, his slender purse, his frank manners, his obtrusive if shallow profession of progressive sympathies won him the liking of the democrats, and his novels had made him a household word through Italy. But while Balbo shared Gioberti’s tenderness to the Papacy, D’Azeglio hardened his face against Rome. In the autumn of 1845 he received a summons to preach the Piedmontese gospel in Romagna; whether the call came from Piedmontese agents, who were al- ready at work there, or from natives, who feared that Gregory’s impending death might be followed by a risiug of Young Italy and an Austrian occupation, there is nothing certain to show. D’Azeglio went and preached open agitation and trust in Charles Albert ; and in spite of the evil memories that hung round the King of Piedmont, and the inclination of the younger Liberals to rely on their own republican energies, he won the adhesion of a large and influential group. He was not equally successful in destroying the traditions of local revolt. He had hardly left Romagna when the terrorism, which followed the Muratori rising, drove some Liberals of Ravenna to take arms at Rimini, where they pub- lished a manifesto “ to the Princes and Peoples of Europe,” before they were driven across the Tuscan frontier. The rising was in itself of little moment. But it was the first public manifestation of the new spirit. Though some of the men who took part in it belonged to Young Italy, it was a fragment of a bigger agitation prepared by men like Mamiani and Farini, who dissociated themselves from the revolutionary party, and the manifesto, drafted by Farini, bore their stamp. D’Azeglio could not prevent the movement, but his influence was seen in its language.^ The 1 Farini, Roman State, 1 . 115-128; D’Azeglio, TJltimi Casi, 76-98; Archivio Triennale, I. 48-52 ; Gaiani, Roman Exile, 270 ; Guerrazzi, Appendice, 88 ; Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, I. 220-221. i6o A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY object of the rising was to force the Papacy to save itself U reform. Terrible indictment as the manifesto was of Papa misrule, it professed reverence for the Pope and regard fo; the dignity of his See. Its specific demands were bareb amplified from the Memorandum of the Powers in 1831 It excused the rebellion as the product of necessity, anc made its appeal to public opinion. So threatening did th( new spirit appear, that the Roman Court paid a tribute t( its strength by publishing an elaborate reply. D’Azeglic seized the occasion for a declaration in favour of th( Piedmontese forward policy. He published clandestine!} at Florence a pamphlet On the Recent Events in Romagna in which he drew a modest, temperate analysis of the causes and character of the unfortunate revolt. It was a scathing commentary on the dream of a regenerating Papacy, D’Azeglio professed veneration for the head of the Catholic church, and shrank from any schism that would destroy the one bond of formal unity in Italy. But he freely attacked the utter variance between the practices of the Papal government and the divine principles which it pro- fessed. The Pope could not be ignorant of the obstinate obscurantism under which the country groaned ; the denial of justice, the economic and financial mismanagement, the monopolies which strangled commerce, the Swiss mercenaries and the Sanfedist assassins, the opposition to everything that savoured of innovation, to education and railways, to banks and agricultural societies and scientific congresses. The responsibility, he insisted, must fall on the Papacy itself ; it must cease to pilot a ship, which would not answer to the helm ; it must attack the iniquitous proconsulships of the Legations, and give at least the civil justice that Austria allowed her subjects. The Papal government could not rest on coercion ; at the present day there was no basis for authority but public opinion and the consent of the governed, and to this final court the Pope himself must bow. Then D’Azeglio turned to the Liberals. While recog- nizing the provocation and admiring the courage, these petty local revolts, he protested, were not the road to inde- 1 D’Azeglio, Ultimi Cast, 46, 99-100, 104-119. THE MODEEATES i6i endence. No minority had a right to play pitch-and-toss With the fortunes of the people, and plunge the country ’into a contest which risked so much. It tended to dwarf the great national struggle down to provincial efforts, and lost all sense of the bigger aim. When Italians fought, all must fight ; but the time was not ripe for war, when the Austrians stood ready to crush any appeal to arms. Italy must first school herself by masculine patience, by sacrifice, by refusing to bow her spirit. Patience was difficult to men who were smarting_ under tyranny; but the true alternative to revolt was public protest, peaceful, but spirited and constant. It is D Azeglio s merit that he recognized the power of public opinion, and knew what it could extort from the most despotic of governments. He had the cool judgment of the statesman, the patience that laboriously lays foundations, but his theory made him the servant of events, and he had little of the faith that creates new forces and falsifies the accumulated evidences. book at once made a party. Though Charles Albert for the moment made no sign, and his partisans were discredited in Eomagna, when their boasts of Piedmontese help ended in nothing; though D’ Azeglio himself con- spicuously failed to practice in Piedmont his own of civil courage and agitation ; yet among the prudent men who had weighed the chances of a struggle with Austria, and the timid, who wanted Piedmont to do what they shrank from doing themselves, D’ Azeglio became the fuglernan of the “ Albertists,” who placed their hopes in the King of Piedmont. The republicans found it impossible to stand against the current. Young men, who in 1833 had been republicans, were passing fast to the other camp.^ How irresistible was the tide was shown by the fact that Mazzini, however much against the grain, found it necessary to compromise, and offer to drop, at all events for a time his republican propaganda, if on their part the Moderates would give up Federation and work for Unity.^ Thus the Castelh, R^coTd^, sub. in.; G. Torelli, Ricordi, xvi. ; Mazrini, Lettres I^ettere, 37, 39; contra Ricoiardi, Conforti. n ., r , 155 (April 1846) ; see also Gn Sioiliano, Senti- mento, 22, 35 ; Archivio Triennale, II. xix. VOL. I. L i 62 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY very numerous class, which cared greatly for Italian freedom, which was revolted by the misrule, but which, without leaders or settled plan of their own, rejected the programme of Young Italy, became Moderates and Albertists. At pre- sent they had little coherency. Some wished to associate the Pope in the movement ; others, like Giacomo Durando in his Italian Nationality, and Luigi Torelli, the author of the anonymous Thoughts on Italy, cared only to disarin him, and would have forced him to a practical surrender ot the Temporal Power.^ Some, like Balbo, were indifferent to civil liberties ; others set constitutional freedom as high as or higher than independence. Some were jealous of Piedmontese expansion, or at the best opposed any annexa- tion beyond the Po valley; others, like Gioberti, wished to see Charles Albert “moral lord of Italy,” or would have partitioned the peninsula between Piedmont and Naples and perhaps Tuscany ; and there was a section, especially among the half-converted republicans, who hoped that Charles Albert would be pushed despite himself into a policy, Avhich could not stop till the Kings of Piedmont were Kings of Italy. Meanwhile Charles Albert had been to some extent iustifying the hopes of his partisans. In the_ first years of his reign he had seemed to have lost his earlier and nobler ideals."’ Impressionable, timid, in a way feminine, he had allowed himself to fall at times into the hands of the clerica party. The Savoy Expedition had scared him, and its cruel repression deepened the gulf between him and the Liberals. He protested that he would never compromise with them ; his government helped Austria to coerce Switzerland into expelling the refugees; even as late as 1837 it risked the friendship of England and France by its violent espousal ot Don Carlos’ cause in Spain. The court, severe and hypo- critical, was given over to the cares of etiquette, and the 1 Compare Castelli, Saggi, 49 , 85, with Durando, Nazionahta, 102, Gioberti, Prolegomeni, 315. and Anonimo Lombardo, Pensieri, 59, 60. me germs of several of the main ideas of the next period are to be found in Durando’s very ingenious book. THE MODERATES 163 ministry was nearly wrecked, because the wife of an am- bassador wore a head-dress sacred to royal princesses. To young Camillo Cavour, returning home from London and Paris, Piedmont seemed ‘‘ a kind of intellectual hell.” The King’s health grew worse ; asceticism and a vegetable diet completed the wreck, which early excesses had begun ; he became the prey of quacks, who perpetuated his debility, and, incredible as the story seems, were paid, it is said, by Austria.^ The influence of religious charlatans, remorse for the atrocities of 1833, a knowledge of the plotting that went on steadily round him, increased his nervousness and want of fibre. But he never became the blind tool of the reactionaries. Old memories had their influence ; he had for better and for worse a strong theory of conscientious kingship, which made him jealous of encroachments from Rome, and impelled him to any step, which might make him master of more nume- rous or more prosperous subjects. Not that any big patient scheme of constitutional reform, such as was read into his life in later years, existed in fact. No doubt he would have done more but for the fear of the Austrian army marching on Turin, and for the daily insinuating pressure of the Catholic party. But his ideal did not reach beyond an enlightened and progressive autocracy ; a strong personal government was necessary, he believed, for the protection of Piedmontese nationality. And yet underneath his cold, reticent, antique port there lay a certain power of enthusiasm and sympathy, aUd a conscientiousness, which, however twisted, was genuine, and made him capable of higher things when the occasion came. However much his difficulties were aggravated by his cowardice, his position almost compelled him to a middle and dubious course. He stood (so the phrase was put into his mouth) “ between the dagger of the Carbonari and the poisoned chocolate of the Jesuits.” And this persistent opposition, which met him at every turn, increased his in- decision. Never naturally frank, he became more and more ^ Bersezio, Regno, II. i8 ; Predari, Primi vagiti, 82-83. He lived largely on potatoes and spinach. 1 64 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY tliG intriguer, playing off one minister against anotlier, less for miscliief^tlian statecraft. Slowly, almost shamefacedly, he liberahzed the government. For a time, indeed, the ministry was ruled by Della Margherita, a narrow, tenacious man, tender of the national independence, but anxious to keep on good terms with Austria, and di’eading any forward movement as dangerous to the narrow rehgious discipline, which made his pohtical ideal. But as a counterpoise, the Ivino- appointed Villamarina, a constitutional minister of 1821, who, though no Liberal, hated the clericahsts. The King,’ iiritated at the persistency of the Jesuit party, whose powerful organisation was used to nullify his reforms in the execution, gave his confidence to Yillamarina. Slowly, man by man, the more reactionary elements were weeded out of the cabinet, till Della Margherita stood alone. Charles Albert’s record of administrative reform was a remarkable one. “ I believe,” he said at a rather later date, “that we best please God by utilizing every discovery in science and art to serve the greatest good of the people. Govern- ment must set itself in the van of progress.” His legal commissions published the Albertine Codes (1837-47), on which, in after days, the body of Italian law was based. Except that they left Catholic marriages subject to Canon Law, and hardly touched ecclesiastical privileges, they were among the most enlightened laws of Europe. I eudal customs were abolished in Sardinia, where alone in Italy they still had legal sanction. Yillamarina reorganized the army on a territorial and short service system. Protectionist duties were slightly relaxed (1835)5 prosperity of Genoa revived by making it in part a free port (1842). Abroad Della Margherita concluded a series of fifteen com- mercial treaties. At home government made loans for the development of the silk industry, abohshed guilds, reformed the Post Ofiice. The King gave commissions to the best painters and sculptors of Italy ; new chairs were founded in Turin University ; historians were encouraged, though only 1 Sclopis, Sardegna, 50 et seq . ; Portalis, Code Civil ; Bianchi, Diplovuizia, III. 193- . ^ - Kubattino began to run his packets in 1841. THE MODERATES 165 to study the annals of the royal house ; copyright treaties were completed with every Italian state but Naples. In 1840 the second Scientific Congress was invited to Turin. Even towards the Church, devout son as he was, .the King showed a qualified independence. In spite of Della Marg- herita he supported the Galilean privileges of the bishops against Roman attacks, and refused to recognize the Trentine decrees in Savoy. The Waldenses were more or less pro- tected, and the government connived at evasion of the cruel laws, which still weighed on them. When the clergy opposed lay infant schools and charitable societies, the King “ looked at these questions from a standpoint diametrically opposed to theirs.” Though he supported the prelates against the Pope, he allowed no evasion of the law from them, and the Jesuits were forbidden to hold a service, in which Hildebrand was lauded for debasing the power of princes. Above all, perhaps, his thoughts were given to commercial development. For this, the country needed railways first of all, and the King proposed to devote to them the surplus that his economic Treasury had accumu- lated.^ As early as 1833 a line was projected from Genoa to Arona on Lago Maggiore. The government hoped to secure much of the English-Mediterranean trade by an arrangement with Switzerland to continue the line under the Lukmanier to Chur, where it would connect with a through route to Ostend.^ The scheme aroused Austria’s jealousy, for the command of the Northern trunk-line would give Piedmont a preponderating commercial influence in Central and Southern Italy. The capitalists of Vienna and Trieste championed a rival route from Leghorn through Florence and Bologna to Trieste, thus isolating Genoa ; and their government patronized a projected line across the Brenner. The railway controversy was the first sign to the world of the growing tension with Austria. Charles Albert had ^ On the question of state versus private capital, see Cavour, Lettere, I. 78 ; V. 1 16, 122. ^ Gualterio, writing in 1851, says that the King wanted to enter into closer relations with England, foreseeing the Western alliance against Russia ; Rivolgimenti, II. 149. i66 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY never forgiven Metternich. for his supposed efforts to exclude him from the throne ; he was very sensible of the historic jealousy between the two states; he remembered that more than once public opinion had marked him for the future King of North Italy. He knew that Metternich had in- trigued with his reactionary ministers, that perhaps he had prompted them to scheme for an Austrian occupation, that he had his spies on his correspondence, on every detail of his life.^ As early as 1835 Della Margherita had seen the drift of the King’s thoughts, and done his best to check it ; three years later, in some private reminiscences of 1821, Charles Albert wrote of “taking his musket on his shoulder for another war with Austria.” And yet, either because he was dissimu- lating or because he was overborne by his premier, he allowed the professed sympathies of his government to be with her, and married his son, the Duke of Savoy, to the daughter of the Archduke Rainerio. But even Deha Margherita was nettled by Austria’s persistent claim to dictate, and in 1843, on the occasion of a frontier squabble of patrols, the King threatened “ to ring every bell from the Ticino to Savoy and raise the cry of Lombard Independence. He distributed a medal with the device of the lion of Savoy standing over a prostrate eagle and the suggestive legend, “ I await my destiny.” The cause of nationality, whose sacredness he based on scriptural authority,^ the traditional policy of his family, hatred of the rival power, a plaintive longing to atone for 1821 and 1833 and become once more the hope of Italy, impelled him in his premature old age to strike one decisive blow. But that strange patience of his, which, though it flinched from facing obstacles, never lost sight of its end, found him still waiting for the great occasmn. ^ As his designs against Austria matured, he was inevitably impelled to lean upon his people. Thanks probably to his French education, he had never shared the exclusiveness of his aristocracy. He had from the early days of his reign set himself to break the barriers between the nobility 1 Gualterio, op. cit., I. 6i8, 625-629 ; III. 176-179 ; Bianchi, op. cit., IV. 88. 2 Bianchi, op. cit., IV. 363 ; Metternich, Mimoires, IV. 266-267. 3 Deut, XVIL 15 : Cibrario, Missione, 47. THE MODERATES 167 and the middle classes. He patronized the sincere philan- thropy which had enlisted the best of both, promoting savings banks, infant schools, refuges for the destitute. A certain amount of mild democratic opinion dared to show itself. Entails became rare in the face of public disapproval ; the Jesuits found their schoolrooms half empty ; Brolferio, a conspirator in 1 8 3 1 5 founded the Messctggero Torinese of a Liberal colour new to Piedmontese journalism. The King permitted (1842) the foundation of a national Agricultural Society, whose meetings furnished occasions where Pied- montese and Lombards could meet for public discussion, and which, despite the royal bridle, felt that it had something more to do than “talk about the cultivation of cabbages.” Gioberti’s PriTnacy was allowed to circulate, and the poet Prati was paid to write a marching song of daring allusion ; “ All we are of one country, One blood runs in our veins.” In the meantime the strain with Austria grew more threatening. Early in 1843 a dispute arose over the salt trade with the Canton of Ticino. By the terms of an old treaty Piedmont had renounced the trade, but when insuffi- cient quantities came from Lombardy, the Canton appealed to Piedmont to make good the deficiency. The salt, which was a state monopoly, was sent, and Austria denounced Piedmont for breaking faith. The quarrel became a question of prestige. Austria tried to exclude Piedmont from the signatories to the Treaty of Florence (October 1844). The treaty would in time have hemmed in Piedmont on its south-eastern frontier by Parmesan or Modenese territory,^ and Charles Albert re- taliated by sounding the Grand Duke touching a defensive alliance of Italian princes. Eighteen months later, when Austria placed a prohibitory tariff on Piedmontese wines (April 1846), the government, at Della Margheritas advice, stigmatised it as an act of reprisals. The attempt to cow Piedmont had failed, and public opinion passionately ap- plauded. Charles Albert, well pleased with the novel taste of popularity, told his reactionary councillors that “ if Pied- 1 See below, p. 189. i68 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY mont lost Austria she would gain Italy, and then Italy would be able to act for herself.” He showed no disapproval of H’Azeglio’s mission in Romagna, and bade him tell his friends there that “ when the opportunity came, his arms and his treasure would be spent for Italy.” ^ But when a great popular ovation, a new phenomenon in torpid Turin, was prepared, the King would not be persuaded to show himself until the crowds were already dispersing. Della Margherita formally protested against the new policy, and worked hard for a settlement of the commercial differences. The King shrank back from war, when its prospect became imminent, and proposed to refer the quarrel to the arbitration of the Czar. At home, too, he was still irresolute, querulous, though painfully struggling in the face of Jesuit influence and his own moral cowardice to act up to his position. It is impos- sible but that the Primacy had its influence on him ; and reform, so Gioberti taught, was consistent with the interests of throne and altar. The Kdng reformed elementary educa- tion,^ and encouraged his Education Minister, Cesare Alfieri, to make Turin University less a hotbed of clericalism. He had a bitter quarrel with Fransoni, the Archbishop of Turin, over the introduction of training colleges for lay teachers, and he turned his anger on Della Margherita. He even gave vague hints of leanings to a constitution.^ He was more or less in communication with the Moderate Liberals, who wanted social freedom, hut who were as much opposed as was the King to a democratic movement, and at this time were barely anxious for constitutional rights. Their leaders were D’Azeglio, Mamiani, Camillo Cavour; Balbo at the moment stood aloof from active work. Knowing the King’s defer- ence to foreign opinion, they inserted encouraging articles in the Dehats and the French reviews. In May Cavour published an article in the Nouvelle R^vue on the railway question ; though on the face of it a manifesto against the ^ D’Azeglio, Ricordi, 529; Brofferio, Parlamento, I. clxi.-clxvi. ; Archivio Triennale, I. 52 ; II. xix. ; Minghetti, Ricordi, I. 206. - See above, p. 47. ^ Brofferio, op. cit., I. Ixxxiv,, cliii. THE MODERATES 169 republicans, it angrily attacked Austria for her malign influence, and made a tolerably overt appeal to Charles Albert to take up the cause of Independence. The King was not displeased, though he resented the attempt to force his hand.^ On one point, however, he was proof against Liberal influence. The Jesuits had not lost their hold; he gave his sympathy and help to the Sonderbund, and in the midst of the excitement over the wine duties he promised that they should never be disturbed while he sat on the throne.^ It was still doubtful perhaps whether patriotism or clericalism would have the mastery, when the face of Italian politics was changed by the election of a new Pope. ^ Predari, op. cit., 94 ; Nigra, Cavour, 64. 2 Bresciani e Grossi, Documenti . . del padre Bresciani^ quoted in Tivaroni, Dominio austriaco. III. 626. CHAPTER IX PIO NONO JUNE 1846-DECEMBER 1847 Pius IX. ; the amnesty ; the cult of Pius. Charles Albert and Pius ; the Scientific Congress at Genoa. The Austro- Jesuit opposition. The Liberals in the Curia ; the Moderates in Eomagna ; the Kadicals. Tuscany : Pisa and the Jesuits ; the secret press ; the^ Plorentine Liberals and the censorship. The Eomans ; the Council of State ; the “ Great Conspiracy.” Metternich ; Occupation of Perrara ; Charles Albert promises to help the Pope. The Citizen Guard at Lucca, and Florence ; the Feasts of Federation. The three progressive states ; the Commercial League ; Charles Albert in October. The Lunigiana question. Gregory had died in the summer of 1846 (June i), ne- glected and unregretted, his end, it was rumoured, hastened by want of care and nourishment. The Conclave met to choose his successor on June 14. Its members were aware of the critical state of affairs; Romagna was known to be on the point of revolt, and petitions for reform, signed by thousands, came to warn or encourage them. The majority of the Sacred College hated Lambruschini and his Austrian friends, and, to exclude him from the Papacy, were wilhng to side with the small section of Liberal and nationalist cardinals.! Eager to anticipate the arrival of Gaysruck, the Archbishop of Milan, who was hearer of the Austrian veto,^ eager, too, to escape from the sultry Roman air, the coalition sank its personal differences, and elected Cardinal Mastai- 1 The facts given in Bianchi, Diplomazia, V. 9, support the view that Mastai owed his election more to the feeling against Lambruschini, than to any Liberalism in the Conclave. See also Chaillot, Souvenirs, 27. Cardinal Micara, is said to have observed to Lambruschini, “If God makes the election, Mastai will be chosen ; if the Devil gets his finger in, it will be you or 1 .” “ See above, p. 72. 70 PIO NONO 171 Ferretti (June 17). With utmost shrinking and reluctance he was proclaimed as Pius IX. The new Pope came of an old and decayed family of Sinigaglia, long famous down to their cats, so the proverb went, for nationalist sentiment. In early life he had been destined for the army ; an impres- sionable, delicate, disingenuous youth, ^ afterwards a fashion- able but pure man of the world. Epilepsy dashed his hopes of military life ; he took orders, and acquired the melo- dramatic fame of an Italian revivalist preacher. As bishop at Spoleto and Imola, he had dealt mercifully with the Liberals ; though a patron of the J esuits, and too much all things to all men, he won a name for graciousness and kind- ness and success in reconciling the opposing factions. He had read Gioberti and D’Azeglio ; he had marked with indignation the political persecutions, the stifling of trade, the foolish obscurantism of the government; he believed, with such enthusiasm as he was capable of, in the future of Italy. Cultured and liberal, kindly, sensible, with consider- able acuteness and a clear, forcible oratory, he might have succeeded in quieter times. An epileptic of delicate health, with more sensitiveness than depth of feeling or affection, absolutely devoid of genius, superstitious, unserious, little- minded,^ he was no hero to steer a revolution. He was too intelligent to be altogether weak ; in youth he had been known for his proud temper, and he still had an introspec- tive obstinacy, which, though he never met opponents man- fully, rarely let him yield. But he was a coward morally and intellectually ; he pined for applause, he shrank from responsibilities ; there was always in him something of the supple, cringing ecclesiastic. He loved a half-genuine, half- humorous self-depreciation ; “ My God,” he said, “ they want to make a Napoleon of me, who am only a poor country parson.” He never fronted the situation, so long as he could drift and throw the responsibility on Providence. Feebly optimistic, with no master-grasp or foresight or ^ Trollope, Pius, 8. He was said to be of Jewish descent : Chaillot, op. cit, 29 ; as to whether he had been a Freemason, see Arthur, The Pope, I. 13 n. 2 Liverani, II papato, 74-75 ; Salvagni, Corte romana. III. 245 ; Castelli, Ricordi, 240. 172 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY caution, he refused to look below the surface, and provided for the moment. Such was the man, who was called to decide the future destinies of the Papacy. He recognized at once that it must ally itself with Liberal Europe. He could not fail to contrast Russian persecution of Cathohc Poland and evangelical intolerance in autocratic Prussia with the free- dom of the Church in constitutional England and France and Belgium, or the fervid Catholicism of democratic Ireland. He inherited the traditional Roman jealousy of Austria, and the Galician massacres completed the aliena- tion. He had studied the Primacy, and though far from rising to the fulness of Gioberti’ s conception, he wished to see the Papacy leading in the path of moderate reform. But he did not in the least realize all that lay in the Liberal movement ; of the desire for political and intellectual freedom he had little comprehension; it seemed to him sufficient to abolish the crying grievances of the old order, and allow free play to trade.^ He was indeed anxious to I prove himself no obsciu’antist ; he promised to support | Scientific Congresses, and appointed a commission on rail- ways; he marked his condemnation of Gregory’s reign by granting an amnesty for political offences (July 17). But though he had decided on this from the first, he delayed its publication for a month, and clogged it with an oath, which seemed a pledge to abstain from political action. But in spite of its defects, the amnesty was hailed I through Italy with wildest acclaim. There had been ! amnesties before, but never one that seemed so spontaneous or harbinger of so much besides. Public opinion, steeped in Gioberti’s dreams of a reforming Pope, had carefully watched the election ; it grew keener when it saw Gaysruck outwitted, and a Pope elected of Liberal family and creditable ante- cedents. When the new reign opened with the amnesty, and 700 exiles and prisoners returning home spread the fame of their deliverer, it saw in Pius the long-expected reformer, the creator of the new Italy, the mediator between Catholicism and democracy. To the religious, impulsive, ^ Gualterio, Hivolgimenti, III. 48. PIO NONO 173 ill-educated average Italian a Pope’s sympathy meant more than all the philosophy and idealism of Young Italy. Pius’ presence had a magnetism on the thousands that crowded to Kome. He had a fine person and magnificent voice ; in contrast with Gregory’s coarse and sordid appearance, he was a gentleman in bearing and manners. His simple informal habits, his interest in every social and educational scheme, his lavish and theatrical charity, the hundred stories of his wit and kindness, strung to fever-pitch the adoration of the people. Applauding thousands followed him through the streets ; festive demonstrations commemorated each day connected with his life ; torchlight processions would march to the Quirinal in the warm summer nights, and the Pope from his balcony would bless the kneeling multitude. Hymns were written to him; the men wore scarves, the women ribbons of his colours; Rossini wrote a cantata in his honour; tokens of esteem came from every nation of Europe and America; even the Sultan sent his presents. Pius,” wrote Gioberti in his Modern Jesuit, “ has reconciled men to religion by proving himself a friend of civilization,” his reign “ begins a new era for Italy and the world.” All men bowed before the conception of a reforming Pope ; and when the amnestied exiles crowded to receive the sacra- ments, it seemed a symbol of the dawning time, when liberty and social redemption would go hand in hand with religion and moral reform. There was a boyish enthusiasm that hoped and believed all things. The air was thick with schemes of charity and education, with projects of railways in which everybody should have shares,^ with universal fraternity and optimism. Bologna sent to Rome its symbols of reconciliation; old trade feuds disappeared; there were solemn peace-makings between police and people. The guilds of Romagna converted themselves into mutual benefit societies, and large subscriptions were collected to found schools. Even in slow Piedmont big schemes of social construction were in the air, and a “ grand Italian association” appeared on paper to reclaim the uncultivated lands of the peninsula. ^ Spada, Rivoluzione, I. 83, and Progetto nazionale . . Conti. 174 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY To Charles Albert a reforming Pope was the strongest of encouragements. His conscience was at rest, now that he was progressing on the same road as the Head of the Church, 1 and could set the Pope’s example against the warnings of confessor and Jesuits. He defied Archbishop Fransoni to do his worst. “ In spite of the tiny Austrian party,” he wrote, “ I am firmly determined not to stop on the road of progress.” Austria was threatening to occupy Romagna, and religion and patriotism made him hail the chance of championing Pius against her attacks. “ The moment that Austria or Naples interferes in the Papal States,” he said in October, “ I shall raise the cry of inde- pendence and religion.” Promises of support poured in from the richer and middle classes of Piedmont. Vercelli, followed by other cities, congratulated him on his spirited foreign policy, and hinted that the time was ripe for consti- tutional liberty. The Agricultural Society, smarting under the retaliatory Austrian tariff, and touched by the patriotic current, was absorbed by the topic at its annual meeting (September 7). A week later the Scientific Congress met at Genoa, and, encouraged by the King,^ speech was free and bold. As if in national parliament, the associates dis- cussed independence and liberty and the Italian revival. In December the government, giving itself head, allowed the Genoese to celebrate the centenary of their expulsion of the Austrians (December 5); and men’s thoughts turned to i the near future, when Milan and Venice in their turn might ! drive the foreigner out. The line of bonfires, which blazed I along the Apennines into Tuscany and Romagna, was a new gage of defiance to Austria. 1 But though for the moment the Jesuits and reactionaries had not attempted to stem the flood, though some of them had themselves barely escaped the contagion, they quickly rallied. In Naples and Modena and the Austrian provinces reform had not dared to show its head. In Piedmont and Tuscany and Rome they were still a powerful and dangerous party, filling the public offices, controlling a large section of ^ Della Margherita, Memorandum^ 542. 2 Promis, Memorie, 75, quoted in Gori, Rivoluzione. See i&., 159. * PIO NONO 175 the aristocracy and clergy, strong in their world-wide organi- zation and influences, secret or overt, in every Italian Govern- ment. At Rome Pius found himself opposed by the Jesuits, the majority of the Cardinals, the great mass of at least the higher clergy, and practically the whole civil service. In his anxiety to offend no party he had decorated notorious Centurions and confirmed Gregory’s most reactionary officials. It was a fatal error ; in vain Rossi, the French minister at Rome, urged that a purging of the civil service must precede all reform ; the Pope replied that nothing but the clearest evidence of guilt would induce him to dismiss an official. He paid the penalty of his ill-timed leniency. Orders from the Quirinal were disobeyed ; the Sanfedists talked of civil war, and libelled him in their secret press.^ The more saga- cious of them knew that Pius was “ straining his voice,” and waited till they could persuade him that reform was a sin against the Church, and make him throw himself into their arms. Fortunately there were more wholesome influences at the Quirinal. The Pope’s brother was an old rebel and a Liberal. Father Ventura, a brave, frank, puzzled man, who had scandalized Gregory’s court by his friendship for Lamennais, held up his ideal of the Church’s mission for liberty and social regeneration. Rossi, whose Italian blood and repute of philosophic Liberalism combined with Jesuit hatred to win him the respect of the reformers, was Pius’ trusted adviser. Corboli-Bussi, the Pope’s private secretary, had, like Ventura, vague socialist enthusiasms, and was fighting the worst corruptions of the government. In August the Pope had appointed Cardinal Gizzi to be Secretary of State. Gizzi was looked to as the leader of the Liberal churchmen, and had been the popular candidate for the Papacy. In fact there was more easy tolerance than principle in his LiberaSm: his years (he was nearly 90), his municipal ignorSm^2S^ timidity unfitted him for a statesman’s work. The demon ^atio ns frightened him; and in October he ^ Gualterio, op. cit, IV. 74, 102-107 ; Safii, Scritti, II. 36 n. ; Gioberti, Gesuita moderno, V. 102; Farini, Roman State, I, 184; II. 74; Gori, op. cit., 142, 152. 176 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY issued a secret circular against “the noisy rejoicings of the populace,” which was soon in everybody’s hands and finally undid his brief popularity. The puzzled Pope tried to “ reform without offending anybody.” He refused to allow Bologna to invite the next Scientific Congress. He gave a general authorization of railways, and promised legal and municipal reforms (November), but at the same time he anathematized secret societies and doctrines subversive of the Temporal Power, attacking “ modern progress ” with all the artillery of pontifical abuse. With a nonagenarian Secretary, a vacillating Pope, a demoralized administration, the inevitable result was anarchy. The Centurions were still on their old footing, and as autumn drew on, the Romagnuol Liberals felt the assassin’s knife in the unlit streets. For self-protection they demanded a citizen guard, and at Bologna and Ferrara they patrolled the streets without waiting for the government’s reply. Gizzi obstin- ately refused his sanction, and made his tenure of office conditional on non-surrender. The government was growing daily weaker, Gizzi more irritated, the Pope more puzzled. “ This winter,” said Rossi, “ the Roman government died of inertia. It had lost the authority of a settled government without gaining the vigour of a new one. It had brought none of the problems nearer solution. Had it frankly allied itself with the Moderate Liberals, it might have been irresistible.^ But this m^nt the purging of the civil service and the granting a citizen guard ; and the reactionaries, working on the Pope s scruples, were able to stave both off. The Moderates for their part seemed struck with ineffectiveness. Over-con- fidence from the seeming triumph of their programme, trust in the Pope and unwillingness to force his hands prevented them from driving their policy hom^®[hey had been frightened by the Radicals. They the rough vigour of the new demo||fcAjd^^ ^ ^ friar’s attacks on capital and VenturaSBWnciations of the wealthy alarmed them. Fearful oij^^obinism, they shrank from touching one stone of the social edifice. Iheii 1 Guizot, Mtmoires, VIII. 35° > Farini, op. cit., I. 217 - PIO MONO 177 programme was ludicrously insufficient for the present need : a reorganization of the police, the formation of a bank at Bologna, University reform, a Council of State. They gave banquets to Cobden and D’Azeglio ; founded clubs and newspapers. But papers and clubs alike passed into the hands of the Kadicals; and a projected movement on the lines of the Irish Kepeal agitation died still-born. While the governments gave no sign, and the Moderates played at programme-making, the more strenuous Liberals, seeing their hopes as far as ever from accomplishment, grew restless. Mazzini, angry as he was at the enthusiasm for the Pope and Charles Albert, recognized that his best policy was to join in the new movement and turn it to his ends. He was still prepared to sacrifice his republicanism if neces- sary, and accept any leader, be he Pope or King, who would declare for Unity. He instructed his friends to give the demonstrations a more definite nationalist colour ; ^ and though his own personal following was small, there were many Liberals who joined in the Pius cult from a hope that the Pope and princes would come freely or perforce into a democratic movement, with constitutional government and a war with Austria as its eventual goal. They were half sincere or less in their adulation, their judgment was almost overborne by the enthusiasm; but they were de- t(^rmined to force the pace, and use each concession to extqjt new ones. Perhaps they had never faced the possi- bility that they must soon choose between throwing over the princes or surrendering their own ideals. Tuscany was now the focus of discontent. But, in Giusti s phrase, though she had her feet out of bed, she still Had the government been true to its ions, it would have needed much to intry. ^ But Corsini was dead (November 1845), |k^^kemier, alone preserved the policy of Mere, 168-169, 175-177, 235, 240; Mario, Mazzini, 309, 31 1. The instructions published in Spada, Rivoluzione, I. 120-124, seem genuine, though their socialist colouring proves that they did not emanate from Mazzini himself. VOL. I. M 1/8 HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Fossombroni’s school. Renzi, the leader of the Rimim rising, was extradited (January 1846), and unwarned by the signs of rising storm, the reactionary cabinet decided to admit the Jesuits. Nothing could have touched Tuscan susceptibilities nearer the quick, and the traditional abhor- rence of the Society had been intensified by their aggressive attitude in Switzerland. Defeated in an attempt to intro- duce them into Florence, the court tried to prepare the way for them at Pisa by inviting -their inevitable forerunners, the Sisters of the Sacred Heart. But Montanelh, a professor . at the University, roused the students, and the si^terh , retreated before their threats X^ebmary 21, 1846). tanelli organised the secret press into a powerful political , force Though often juvenile and exaggerated, its verve, it' «klful appei to all sections of Liberals, its bold and defiant circulation made it a vast and insidious in u - ence The police tried in vain to track it down;_ and ts “bulletins” went through the post were thrown into the , Grand Duke’s carriage, and showered in the theatres. Then came the news of Pius’ accession and the Papal amnesty. Tuscany was traditionally suspicious of Rome, but the cult, - sedulously preached, seized on it, leaving Niccolmi to com- plain that 4 friends had been dipped in holy waten The demonstrations, that followed, found their mod m the ^ content, as much economic as political, which was spread .g r“,gi .k. B,.»l g." tk. — a pretext to intrigue for an Austrian occupation but Lec- pofd, tender of his independence, s®* ^s face against mei- vention The government tried to frighten the well-to d Ilasses by raising the cry of communism; but the cooler heads scoffed, afd the Liberal nobles of Florence, though not endorsing all the demands of the secret press, were as insistent as the Radicals for reform of local the civil service. But they failed to agree on the one hand stood the more cautious sectim^l^ ^ ^ poni and Ridolfi, the leaders of the Geor^^^ m the other, a small knot of men, who, though very crats, looked beyond administrative reform social liberty and constitutional government. Their chiet PIO NONO 179 was Bettino Ricasoli, an austere country noble, who knew his end and went straight for it. They were a manly patri- otic group, but too exclusive for a time, when compromise and discipline were all-necessary to fuse the Liberals into a solid and practical party. Both sections joined hands in demanding a relaxation of the censorship ; both wished to see the secret press superseded by public journalism. But while Capponi asked for the license of a single privileged paper, which should be almost non-political, Ricasoli knew that this would satisfy nobody, and urged the necessity of allowing full freedom of the press. Cempini slowly brought the ministry to the lore Liberal policy ; the secret press suspended its issues to give the government free play, and both Liberal parties seized the occasion of Cobden’s visit to Florence (May 1847), as the pretext of a great demonstration. The Georgofils naturally gathered to do honour to the great Free-trader, and even the ministry was forced to take a part. Four days later (May 6), the govern- ment published the new press-law, and in a few weeks it promised a Council of State and reforms in law and local government. But the hampering provisions of the press-law only proved how unequal the ministry was to its task. Con- cessions, grudgingly and tardily made, though welcomed with noisy insincerity, failed to win real gratitude, and encouraged further agitation. The middle classes were calling for power to organize a national guard that would protect property against bread riots and possible anarchist outbreaks. Bal- dasseroni, the Minister of Justice, a sincere, hard-working official, was masking himself behind the projects of reform, and probably intended to stultify them in the execution.^ The people grew more and more suspicious, and when a law appeared early in June to regulate public demonstrations, their contemptuous disregard made it a dead letter. Meanwhile the Pope’s subjects in their turn were grow- ing impatient. Dimly conscious of what was going on, they alternated between depression and fresh bursts of enthusiasm and hope. Their reverence for the Pope was indeed un- 1 Montanelli, Memorie, I. 282 ; Zobi, Storia, V. 106. 1 80 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY shaken. His reactionary Encyclicals passed hardly noticed ; | the old loyalty and new radicalism of the Romans, and the calculated praise of their leaders had raised him to a pedestal, from which it was impossible for him at once to displace himself. His cosmopolitan fame threw a reflected lustre on the city. The Sultan’s envoy, the English Queen s letter, the thanks of the famine-stricken Irish stirred its pride.’ But expectations were high, and reforms, which would have satisfied a year ago, were scorned as unequal to the times. There was keen disappointment at the rejection of the prayer for a citizen guard, at the delays in legal re- form and railway construction. In Romagna the old threats of secession were heard again. The Romans fixed the responsibility of the delay with accuracy enough on the Cardinals and Jesuits, and in the spring ommou 8 _ cheers were heard for “ Pius, but not the others.” The Jesuits, they believed, were plotting the Pope’s death; and when he visited their college, the crowd shouted, “ Holy Father, don t take their chocolate.” The demonstrations were changing their character. Though still with more or less sincerity made in honour of the Pope, they were becommg clamorous for reform and war. The leaders intended them to mtimi- date the government. The prime mover was a seh-confident, o-enial blacksmith, Angelo Brunetti, mcknamed Ciceruacchio, who posed as the Pope’s personal friend, and whose braivny, genuine personality marked him out for a popular leader. He preached unity and virtue in honest melodrama; and though the nobles flattered him, and Lord Minto compared him to Horatius, the pride of the Roman artisan saved him from being spoilt. There was need of such a man, for every day it was more difficult to prevent impatience from degen- erating into disorder. Pius was alarmed, and dearly as he loved his popularity, was disposed to draw back. He was irritated at the opposition of the court, but lacked courage to cow it down.i The work of reform dragged slowly along ; and new promises, procrastinated in their turn, only quick- ened hopes that were not intended to be realized, fetill some progress was made. In March (1847). a press law 1 Guizot, Mimoim, VIII. 357-358; Cibrario, -VoO'iic, 61. PIO NONO 8i abolished the preventive censorship, which had for some months past been practically in abeyance, but it limited criticism of contemporary politics, and, like its Tuscan coun- terpart, satisfied nobody and became a dead letter. In April the Pope promised a Council of State, to be nominated by the Provincial Councils and have a considerable voice in legislation and finance. In June a ministerial cabinet was appointed in place of the old irregular system, and though it was composed exclusively of ecclesiastics, it seemed an advance towards popular institutions. But the government wrecked any chance of recovering ground by coupling its ■reforms with irritating freaks of coercion. Gizzi protested officially against anti- Austrian theories, which forgot that the Pope was “ father of all Christians, to whatever part of the world they belonged.” Ventura was assailed for his funeral oration on 0 Connell (who had died at Genoa on his way to Rome), in which he condemned passive obedience, and held up for model the “ amorous and legal agitation ” of the great Irishman. Gavazzi, a Barnabite friar, who had been preaching somewhat incendiary sermons, was forbidden to mention the name of Italy. But the Moderates under D’Azeglio s leadership were at last agitating with some vigour ; and the ministry, following too late Rossi s advice, hoped to win them by a decree to form a citizen guard (June 30),^ though the resolution en- tailed Gizzi s resignation. They probably thought that an armed middle class was their best bulwark against popular pressure on the one hand, and Austrian or Sanfedist plots on the other. For the moment the latter seemed more imminent. Sanfedist intrigues had long been busy both at Rome and in the Legations. There had been apparently concerted attacks on the Liberals at Parma and Lucca and Siena; and some of the bolder partisans talked of a cou'p detat. Whether there was any substance in it may be doubted ; but real or pretended disclosures made even level- headed men believe in a “ great conspiracy,” ^ and Rome was ^ D Azeglio, L' Italic, 11-16; Coppi, Annali, IX. 104-107. Jarini, op. cit., I. 229, 235-241 ; Spada, op. cit., I. 256; Guizot, op. cit., 359; Saffi, op. cit., II. 84-88; D’Ideville, Rossi, 168; Gabussi, Mcmoric, 1 82 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY frenzied with terror and suspicion. Austria, it was thought not without ground, was behind the Sanfedists, and visions of massacre scared the citizens. Ciceruaochio and his men were masters of the city and issued hysterical versions ot the plot. The Pope, though sceptical, hurried on the organization of the citizen guard, ordered the disbanding of the Centurions, and arrested such of the Sanfedist sus- pects as did not liy. Cardinals and priests, infected with the enthusiasm or bowing to the storm, collected subscrip- tions for the patriotic cause. The ranks of the citizen guard filled rapidly, and Rome was too serious or frightened to laugh at their odd semi-civil equipment. Cardmal Ferretti, who had succeeded Gizzi, sealed their enthusiasm by appealing to them to “ show Europe that we can manage by ourselves.” Ferretti, who was the Pope’s cousm had been an Austrian spy, and his sincerity may be doubted. But his brother Pietro had played an honourable part in the Revolution of 1831, and now moulded his policy to Liberalism. For the moment the Cardinal’s popularity was unbounded, and the government’s decree to form a camp of observation at Forli seemed to show that for the moment it and the people were reconciled. A week before there had been a possibility that in the constitutional struggle the national question might be for- gotten. Now Austrian impatience once more brougnt government and people into line in defence of Italian Independence. Metternich bad watched the course ot events with disquietude. In his system “a Liberal Pope was an impossibility”; now fronted by one, _ he declared it “ the greatest misfortune of the age.” Austrian influences had failed to stem the Italian movement, and Metternich, at last realizing the strength of the ideal that faced him, I 75 ; La Farina, Storw., III. 43-44 ; De Boni, Congiura di Umia, 49 et alibi ; Gol Rivolu^ione, 2,2 ; Correspondence-Italy, I 6^6. ; N^colm, Pon^oa . i6 ; Gaiani, Roman Exile, 355 ; Campanella, My Life, 217 ; ^ Azegho 10 Saffl in his History of the Roman RepuUio (op. cit., II. 5»-59). asserts relations between Gizzi and the Sanfedist conspirator Alpi, but I know of no evidence to support it. 1 Archivio Triennale, I. 8 ; Safti, op. cit., II. 81-82. PIO NONO 183 confessed that it was “ a sorry task to fight with un- substantial things.” ^ In vain he had tried to frighten the Pope with the phantasm of Protestantism, and the Grand Duke by predictions that the national movement must end in a republic. After endeavouring equally in vain to attach Charles Albert by a promise of support against his own subjects, he set his agents at work to libel the King.^ When the promise of a citizen guard at Kome was followed by a renewed agitation in Tuscany, he wrote an angry note, threatening occupation if the guard were conceded, and sent a copy to the Turin court. At the time of the Conclave he had only been prevented by French threats from occupying Romagna, and now again he hinted at intervention, if the Liberal movement went further, pro- voking Palmerston into a threat to send the English fleet to Trieste, and even drawing from Guizot a warning that he would land French troops in the Papal States.^ But Metternich threw prudence to the winds. Had he had his own way, he would have made a strong military demon- stration on the Po, as a threat to Rome ; ^ defeated in this by his colleagues, he was driven back on a smaller move. On the very day for which the Sanfedist conspiracy was supposed to have been planned, the Austrians, with much offensive parade, poured a large reinforcement into the citadel of Ferrara, which they garrisoned by treaty rights. After a curt refusal from Rome to allow them to enter Romagna, the Ferrara garrison, acting on a forced interpre- tation of a treaty clause, patrolled the streets of the city itself (August 6), and a week later definitely occupied it. A thrill of indignation ran through Italy at the insult offered to the Pope, and the plain proof of Austria’s in- tention to veto the hopes of the nation. The Liberals closed up their ranks. Moderates like D’Azeglio and Balbo ^ He was still in August 1847 talking about Italy being a geographical expression. Correspondence — Italy,’ I. 34 ; Gualterio, op. cit., IV. 283 ; Bianchi, Diplomazia, V. 58. ^ Correspondence — Italy, I. 89, 157-158, 178, 240; Bianchi, op. cit., V. 61, 81 ; Metternich, M 6 moires, YII. 415-422. ^ Bianchi, op. cit, V. 399 ; Hiibner, Une annie, 18. 1 84 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY called for resolute measures. Far away in Montevideo, Garibaldi, whose legion’s heroism had rung through the world, wrote to the Pope, offering its services in his defence. Wrath, panic, the fear of invasion loosed the tide, and swept the princes more or less reluctantly with it. The Pope, whose fixed idea (save, perhaps, in rare moments of Liberal expansion^), was to preserve the integrity of his dominions, was indignant at the infringement on his in- dependence and hinted at excommunication. At the same time he sent a messenger to Charles Albert, to ask whether he could count on his protection. All through the spring and summer Charles Albert had been gravitating to the Liberal camp. He had steadily de- veloped his economic policy, preparing the ground for the Lukmanier railway, and negotiating for the Anglo-Indkn mail. Though inconsistent as ever, he was still subsidising the Sonderbund, the railway convention with republican Switzerland was hailed as an earnest of his growing Liberal- ism. Irritated by Austrian intrigues with the Cantons, angry and indignant at her note on the citizen guard, he drew nearer to the nationalists. Their books and^ papers were allowed to circulate ; the Torinese were permitted to subscribe to the sword of honour, which was to be presented to Garibaldi on his expected return ; the King himself had interviews with the conspirators of Milan." When the news came of the occupation of Ferrara, even Della Margherita bowed to the storm of indignation that swept in from the other states. The King could not be deaf to the national voice, which hailed him “ sword of Italy ; he more than responded to the outburst, and when the Pope’s message came, wrote back, that, come what might, he would never part his cause from that of Pius. When the Agricul- tural Society met at Casale on the anniversary of the Pope’s amnesty, he sent an open letter, proclaiming himself the champion of the Guelf cause, and declaring that “ if God permitted a war for the freedom of Italy, he would place himself at the head of his army.” ^ It was his first public 1 Rusconi, Memorie, 28 ; Leopardi, Narrazioni, 84. 2 See below, p. 194. Bianchi, Carlo Alberto, ; Ricasoli, Lettere, I. 277. PIO NONO 185 allusion to war ; and the associates, Piedmontese, Genoese, Lombards, Parmesans, Romans, replied with enthusiastic promises of help and pleadings for a citizen guard. The whole country was stirred to a fervour strange to Piedmont, and all classes vied in offering life and substance for the national cause. In Tuscany and Lucca the excitement tooj^ form in an ever angrier demand for a citizen guard. Probably every revolution since the Irish movement of 1779 has recognized, that when it has put arms in the people’s hands, it has triumphed more certainly than by winning representative institutions. The Italians knew well that the arming of a citizen guard made despotism henceforth impossible. To the piopertied classes, too, it was a guarantee against pos- sible anarchy and all the turbulence that was working below the surface. But at this moment it was neither as a weapon against despotism nor against socialism that the people called for it. They wanted arms to defend their country ; visions of an arrned people driving the Austrians before them came into men’s minds. Tuscany was as exposed as Romagna to an Austrian invasion, and the occupation of Ferrara gave point to Metternich s threats. W^hile Florence answered by a small but angry demonstration, Lucca took a stronger line. The Lucchese had been closely watching the course of events in Tuscany, but the whimsical, dissolute Duke had learnt nothing from the omens. Deaf to the warnings of Ward, who had learnt the ways of courts and proved himself a sagacious and cautious adviser, he met the outcry, that came from every class, with the boast that Bourbon princes sacrifice their thrones rather than their principles.” But the exasperation, which followed the arrest of some popular Liberals, frightened him into permitting the enrol- ment of a citizen guard (September i), and a few days later he fled from the Duchy. Early in October, rejecting the Duke of Modena’s advice to call in the Austrians, he sold his life-interest to Tuscany, and abdicated. The Tuscan government realized that when the guard was once permitted at Lucca, it was no longer safe to refuse it in Tuscany, and the Grand Duke, touched by the wave i86 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY of national enthusiasm and half-impatient of Austrian tute- lage, granted it on September 4, though a few days latei the feeble, puzzled man wrote to assure the Emperor of his unalterable attachment.^ But nothing was c^n o letter, and a flood of fervid patriotism swept over the country, bursting doivn the old local rivalries. Florence sent back to Pisa the harbour chains, which for over 200 years ha huno- before the Baptistery as the sign of victory over her ancient enemy. The tricolor ^ had floated at Lucca, and the people took it for a sign that they had reached some _pro- fnised land of reconciliation and freedom. The enthusiasm seized on all— old and young, priests and soldiers, nobles and people. Each city had its “ federal festival ; the country towns followed, and from the villages men and women and children trooped in with songs and flymg ban- ners then priests at their head, fervid agamst the sacii- legious invader of Ferrara. At Florence a monster poccssion defiled before the Pitti Palace, and cried for death to the Austrian and alliance with Rome. But behmd siasm for the Pope and the national cause lay a deep distrust of the government, which made the festivities easily lapse into disorder. Leghorn was, not for the first time, in no (September 22), and so impressed had its ^ yotmger Corsini, been by the temper of the city, that he urged in the cabinet, that nothing less than a constitution could lay the discontent. Corsini’s boldness cost nmi his seat in the ministry, but the Grand Duke saw that he must wm the Moderate Liberals ; and dismissing tLe most unpopular « the old ministers, he gave portfolios to Ridolfi and Seiristo . Thus the occupation of Ferrara had gone far to reheve the strain in the three progressive states. By the strange I am a little I La Varenne, Vltalk Centrale, 49 . quoting from Guerrazzi. '“?'“ThritL*nr“Laidtohave been derived from Masonic colours, and to have been adopted as early as 1796. “ II verde, la speme tant’ anni pasciuta ; II roseo, la gioia d’averla compiuta ; II bianco, la fede fraterna d’a.mov."—Berchet. See Mrs. Browning, Casa Guidi Tlindoit’s. PIO NONO 187 alchemy of circumstances the Liberal movement had come for the moment to appear as the champion of the Tem- poral Power ; the reform and nationalist causes were even more indissolubly blended, and both wore the halo of the Church’s blessing. To a cool observer indeed the situation must have appeared full of peril. Confidence and distrust still struggled for mastery. The friends of the old system filled the civil service, and threw a thousand obstacles in the working of the new laws. The popular demands were growing in ever increasing ratio, and the press, which had leapt into active life in Tuscany and the Papal States, was likely to force the pace still more ; while the riots at Leg- horn and Ciceruacchio s demonstrations at Rome pointed to forces, already dimly seen and feared, which might hurry reform into revolution. Already civil blood had been spilt in Calabria.^ • But on the surface Italy seemed as one against Austria. Everything pointed to an early war. The agitation had begun at Milan and Venice, and the only question was whether the governments or the revolution would lead the nation to the field. The shadow of the coming struggle impelled the Liberals to draw the three progressive states together in some form of alliance. A steady growth of belief in Free Trade ^ suggested a Commercial League after the precedent of the German Zollverein, and such a league, if not yeCoktensibly political, would be a warning to Metter- nich, and pledge the three governments yet further to a nationalist policy. Pius, still smarting at the occupation of Ferrara, eagerly took up a scheme which would relieve him of much of his responsibility, and assure him the protection of the Piedmontese army, should the Austrians again threaten to occupy Romagna. To propose its formation, he sent Corboli-Bussi to Turin, where he was enthusiastically welcomed, while the Grand Duke sent word that he would not be slow to ally himself with Rome and Piedmont in the defence of Italian nationality. Corboli-Bussi was ably seconded by Lord Minto, whom ^ See below, p. 203. 2 Mitfcermeier, Condizioni, 60 ; see Salis-Schwabe, Richard Cobden. 1 88 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Palmerston, strongly in sympathy with the Liberal move- ment, had sent on a roving commission to observe how matters were developing. Minto, while insisting t a England would sanction no territorial changes, encouraged the governments to persevere in a policy of reform and independence. He found Charles Albert once more para- lyzed by indecision. As was habitual with him after any decided step, he was exhausted and ill after t^ Casale letter. The government was not ready for war. ihe was still entangled in the Jesuit netJ Alarmed lest t e excitement and disorder of Tuscany should spread to Piedmont, he had allowed his police to charge a crow which had met to hear Rossini’s Hymn to Pius sung in public. A formal complaint against their conduct, thoug few dared to sign, marked the beginning of g.ibhc agitatwn Villamarina added his protest, and lost his office for it. Put the King still gave him his confidence, and Della Margherita,, after much disingenuous treatment from the Kmg, was forced to follow him into retirement (October 9)- The same uncer- tainty marked the King’s attitude to the Commercial League. To accede to it seemed the pendant of his message to the Pope in August, but, though he was still forward to chainpion Pius, he appeared indifferent to the League, except so far as it would promote the political lead of Piedmont, and he asked for terms to which neither Tuscany nor Rome could agree. In vain Minto urged the completion of a simple defensive alliance; it was not till November that even the principles of a commercial treaty were agreed upon, and meanwhile Charles Albert’s obstinacy had implanted in the Pope a prejudice which never left him. ^ . * i But the King was already veering again. A popu ar sonc^ on the Rd Tentenna (the Wobbling King) fell into his hands; he was roused and shamed, and returned to his old attitude. He saw that the temper of the people was too hi<^h to be trifled with ; he was anxious to forestall any forcing of his hands. And however fearful he may still have been of the ultimate outcome of the movement, he ha 1 Cantti, Cronistoria, II. 757* , , . r 2 Correspondence— Italy, I. 193 ; rtsorr jO A HISTOEY OF ITALIAN UNITY Parmesan Apennines, were to be divided between the tw. contiguous Duchies. The reluctance of their inhabitants t^ exchange the mild rule of Tuscany for despotism won th strong sympathy of Tuscans and Lucchese. ' The Florentin government delayed cession, till the young Duke Francis ^ of Modena, who had succeeded his father a year before, gre^ impatient, and occupied Fivizzano early in November (No^ ember 5). There was fatal fighting in the streets, and th excitement at Florence nearly drove Tuscany into war. Bu cooler counsels prevailed, and an arrangement was patche up, which saved Tuscan dignity. Austria was apparentl anxious to avoid the conflict,^ the Duke of Modena talked c joining the Commercial League, and after countless protocol and notes, Metternich yielded to the threatening signs an Palmerston’s strong pressure, and withdrew his troops froi the city of Ferrara (December 16). 1 Metternich, op.ycit., VII. 473”474'j Ricasoli, op. cit, I. 274. CHAPTER X THE CONSTITUTIONS 1847 MARCH 1848 Europe at the beginning of 1848. Schemes of war in Italy Lombard revival; the railway question; Lombardy m 1847; demonstration ; Nazari’s petition ; Manin at Venice ; Kadetzky ; the Tobacco Kiots. The constitutional question ; the economic question ; the bread riots ; revolt of Leghorn. The Constitutionalists ; m Tuscany ; in Piedmont ; Cavour. Naples and Sicily ; the rising m Calabria ; Moderates and Radicals at Naples ; Sicilian Revolution. The Constitution in Naples ; in Piedmont ; in Tuscany ; at Rome ; the “ Statutes ” ; theocracy and constitution at Rome. The year 1848 opened through all Europe with the pre- sentiment of coming change. The Home Eule agitations m Hungary and Bohemia and the feud between Magyars and Croatians threatened the Austrian Empire with disruption. The summoning of the Prussian Diet, its hot quarrel with the government and speedy dissolution had roused all Germany to a constitutional struggle. In France the fiasco of the Spanish marriages and the daily evidence of Orleamst corruption had discredited Louis Philippe and Guizot, and encouracred Liberals and Socialists to an attack, which was to prove° victorious sooner than they dreamt. England had iust seen the victory of the Anti-Corn-Law League, looked up to as a model by the Liberals of all Europe, and was still agitated to its depths by the Chartists. In ItMy, Austria was making treaties with the Duchies of the Po, which would reduce them to practical dependence. On the other hand Piedmont, Tuscany, and Eome were pledged to a policy that meant defiance to the Empire. No reform was safe till the Austrians were driven from Lombardy and Venetia ; and even Naples, occupied with its own special problems, and 191 192 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY feeling the Austrian influence comparatively slightly, had put its Liberals in line with those of the rest of Italy. Much had happened lately to drive home the conviction that Austria must be fought ; Metternich s notes to Tuscany and Piedmont, the events of Ferrara, the Duke of Modena’s boast that he had an army at call across the Po were so many precursors of battle. That war would come, and that the Austrians would be expelled, was a belief almost uni- versal, whether it came by the help of a foreign power, or by the armies of the Italian princes, or by a great uprising of the people. Of foreign help indeed there was small expectation at the moment. Louis Philippe had taken Metternich for his pedagogue, and warned Charles Albert not to count on \ French assistance; and though he would tolerate no Austrian intervention in the Papal States, he was indignant at Palmerston’s patronage of the nationalists.^ English sympathy was warm for Italy, but Palmerston, though he genuinely shared in it, would give no more than the vaguest hints of alliance, and was doing all he could to hold back Piedmont from war.^ There was indeed little inclination to look abroad for help. Young Italy and the Piedmontese statesmen were at one at least in this, and Charles Albert had voiced the feeling of the nation, when he endorsed the phrase that “ Italy would do her own work.” ^ In spite ' of English influence and Austrian intrigues, his better j instincts for national redemption and his poor cares for the safety of his crown made him face closer and closer the contingency of war. The Italians believed that the other princes, except in Modena and Parma, would join their ^ Guizot, Memoires, Ylll. 402-403 ; Id., Histoire parlementaire, IV. 555 ; V. 542, 552 ; D’Haussonville, Politique exterieure, II. 233-244 ; Bianchi, Diplo- ' mazia, V. 33, 404. I think that Poggi {Storia, II. 538-539) has shown reason to doubt the accuracy of the secret treaty between France and Austria (March 1847), referred to in Hillebrand Geschichte Frankreichs, II. 682-683. It is probable that there were pourparlers, but that nothing was concluded ; its principal provision was that France consented to the sole intervention of ■ Austria, if complications took place in Italy. See above, p. 183. 2 Ashley, Palmerston, I. 64 ; Martin, Prince Consort, I. 429 ; Bianchi, op. cit, V. 81, 92. 2 Italia fard da se ; see Leopardi, Narrazioni, 230. THE CONSTITUTIONS 193 armies to his. The belief was born of the unthinking ojptimism of the time. The Pope was declaring even now tjhat he would have no war on any terms. Ferdinand of isfaples was too remote, too jealous of Piedmont, too sym- pathetic with Austrian despotism, to be a willing partner in tliie struggle. Only the Grand Duke of Tuscany, who was at tlie mercy of the popular tide and had his small grievances against Austria, was likely to fight by the side of the King o|f Piedmont. But the enthusiasm took little count of the enemy’s strength or its own apparent weakness. Memories of the past, faith in the future of Italy, confidence that the I ’opes blessing would descend on the Italian hosts gave the fejirvour of a crusade to the coming struggle. 1 All eyes were fixed on Lombardy as the seat of the cbming war; and the Lombards themselves, impatient for kjbe fight, were already in a state of semi-revolt. For some yiears past the educated classes had been slowly weaning themselves from the unreal epicurean life, which had stifled tpeir political interests. Some of the younger nobles, i:|mitating the Georgofils, threw themselves into mild philan- thropic schemes, and their literary organ, the Eivista Europea, cjlared to speak of the brotherhood of Italians and the ijmpotence of coercion to crush the spirit of freedom. More cir less distinct from them, a more thoroughgoing and . jj>opular school gathered round Correnti and Cattaneo, the editor of the Politecnico. Correnti, in a clandestine pamphlet,^ \ challenged the government on the treatment of its Italian ^provinces, and proved to the satisfaction of his countrymen bhat they had unjust measure meted them in their share of Imperial taxation.^ Cattaneo was less advanced on the nationalist question than the Liberal nobles ; but in social , and industrial matters his review was bold and outspoken, fearlessly analyzing the industrial conditions of the country, knd giving voice to theories of reform and freedom, that 'were incompatible with Austrian despotism. But Cattaneo’s timidity on the point of independence could not satisfy the mass of young lawyers and doctors, who, though they had discarded the ritual of Young Italy, accepted Mazzini’s ^ U Austria e la Lombardia. ^ See above, p. 53. VOL. I. N A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 194 nationalist programme. Men like these did their best in j dark hour to keep alive the flame by clandestine publicjj) tions of liberal books, by organizing a polemic of wall writ ings, by quiet work among the artizans and peasants. j But it was the Piedmontese school that gave Lombaitt patriotism its bottom. Some of the Milanese nobles ownc^c properties in Piedmont, and divided their lives betwe^- * Turin and Milan. The tradition of a North Italian kingdo^^. under the House of Savoy had survived the discomfiture:, of 1814 and 1821, and it only needed Charles Albertj signal to give it life again. The tariff war of 1846 brougli: the occasion, and the nobles made cautious overtures to tl|i King, which at all events were not entirely rejecteQi Torelli wrote of the Kingdom of North Italy, and tried \t rouse Charles Albert with the tempting bait. Home quej; tions helped to stir the public. In 1837 the governme^ had sanctioned the laying of a railway between Milan anj Venice; and an angry controversy arose whether the Milaij; Brescia section should pass by Bergamo or Treviglio. Th majority of the Italian shareholders favoured the moi' direct route by Treviglio ; and the eloquence of a youn; Venetian barrister, Daniel Manin, brought the dispute intj, national prominence, and made it a battleground betweej: government and people. Manin, who, like Disraeli, canj. of a Venetian Jew stock, took as his motto that it is “ pelj haps never right for a nation to resign itself to misfortunei and found his political model in the legal agitations c: O’Connell and the Anti-Corn-Law League. It was impos sible, he believed, to fight Austria, except in the event 0. an European upheaval ; and meanwhile organized oppositio: would train the people and secure respect for Italy. Hi- opportunity had come, and he fearlessly bearded th« Imperial Commissioner. Encouraged by his novel boldness the Milanese and Venetian shareholders came into line, anc after years of controversy their united vote carried the day It was the beginning of revolution ; the government had itj first check, and Venice and Milan at last joined hands.“ 1 Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, I. 445-447 ; Bonfadini, Mezzosecolo, 227 ; Senior Journals, 1 . 297 ; Pinelli, Storia, III. 179. 2 Before 1848 the line was finished from Milan to Treviglio and fron Mestre to Vicenza. It was not open throughout till 1857. ! THE CONSTITUTIONS 195 It was now the summer of 1847* Lombardy and Vicnetia had been stirred to their depths. The fervour wliich Pius had called out, the outcry at the occupation of/ Ferrara, the call for Independence had their echoes in the down-trodden Austrian provinces. In the country the peasants Avere at last beginning to stir ; in the towns the Lbles and Radicals were drawing together. The priests dragged forward their differences with the government, the cc)mmunal councils stood up to the officials, the mountain pt^asantry defied the forest laws. The Austrians were boy- co\tted in high society, and not even an Archduke could find an Italian partner at a ball. At the Scientific Congress, wlaich met this year at Venice (September 1 847), nationalist sentiment cropped up from each discussion on railways or industry or literature. But something bigger and more ol|)vious was needed to take the public eye. Archbishop G,aysruck had died, and the government hoped to win p'bpularity by appointing an Italian to the vacant see. Their nominee, Romilli, had little to recommend him either af 4 patriot or prelate, but it sufficed that he Avas an Italian, a|nd Milan gave him a reception Avorthy of the Ambrosian see (September 5). Its enthusiasm and unanimity mad- dened the authorities, and when, three days later, the festivities Avere repeated, the police dreAV their SAvords on the peaceful holiday croAvd, and for days the troops patrolled the streets, hustling and provoking the citizens. The bloodshed, the insult to church and city finally won the masses of Milan to the cause; and even the magistrates, scandalized by the brutal effrontery, acquitted the men Avho "had been arrested at the demonstrations. The government realized that it was face to face with a serious movement, but it entirely miscalculated its strength ; and Metternich, though he Avas intending to make considerable reforms, thought that the main grievance against the government Avas that it “ had bored ” the Milanese. He found himself fronted by another and more em- barrassing phase of opposition. However comatose the Congregations might seem, they were still the one exist- ing fragment of representative institutions, the one hope of 196 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY those who, while deprecating separation from the Empir e wanted administrative reform and some measure of Home Ruled Nazari, the delegate of Bergamo, presented to the Central Congregation of Lombardy a petition which, takino the general discontent for its text, asked for the appointmern of a Commission to inquire into its causes and draft a memorial to the Emperor. The petitions which came m its wake from the Provincial Congregations were careful to disclaim disloyalty; nothing was said of constitutional changes ; they asked for only the most obvious and neces- sary reforms. Tommaseo at Venice claimed freedom of the press, in virtue of the unrepealed law of 1815 ; and though Manin, outstripping the Lombards, petitioned the Venetian Congregation to claim Home Rule and “ a genuine national representation,” the whole movement kept ’within the boun»■• rtsorg., II. 393 . > _ EpistoUrio, I. 4^2 ; Rivolgimenti, 35- See also La Farma, Slor.a, III. .26 , 2 P Correspondence — Naples, 49. THE CONSTITUTIONS 205 of the constitution of 1812; nobody trusted a Bourbon’s promises without guarantees, and however unsuited the old charter might be to present needs, it wore the halo of prestige, and made a war-cry round which all would rally. But the court would have no constitution ; Ferdinand replied to Louis Philippe’s warnings that he “would be a King, always a King,” and it was obvious that only force could decide the issue. The government probably did not know how weak its position at Palermo was, but De Sauzet, the commander, was short of food or frightened, and when his attempt to negotiate an armistice failed, he suddenly retreated (January 27), and retiring along the coast embarked for Naples. The other cities had risen, and by the end of January the Neapolitans had no footing left in all the island except the citadel of Messina and three other forts. The Sicilian rising was the overture to the revolutions, that ran through Europe in the spring of 1848. The temerity of the handful of men who attacked a powerful garrison, their dramatic triumph, the sudden fall of the Bourbon rule made a deep sensation in Italy and Europe. And while even the Moderates were obliged to hail Fer- dinand’s defeat, it was recognized on all hands that the bloodshed had quickened the pace, that there must be radical changes if the princes were to keep their thrones, that the struggle in the streets of Palermo was a prelude to barricades at Milan and Venice. Naples was the first to feel the effects. The Neapolitans had failed to keep their promise to Palermo, for Carlo Poerio, the leader of the more active conspirators, was in prison, and in his absence the Liberals seemed more paralyzed than ever. The sober, poverty-stricken peasants of Cilento rose, true to their revolutionary traditions; but it was not till the rising spread through the province of Salerno, and a report that the insurgents were advancing spread panic through the city, that its feeble Liberals showed signs of moving (January 25). The court was frightened by the exaggerated news; and though Delcarotto failed in a plot to extort a constitution^ and was banished, there were others who like him hastened 1 D’Ayala, Memorie, 98-101 ; Nisco, op. cit., iii ; Leopardi, op. cit., 69, 76, 86. 2 o 6 a history of ITALIAN UNITY to make tkeir peace with the revolution.' Poerio was released, and his followers, at last bestirring themselves, organized a demonstration to alarm the King (January 27). Ferdinand found that his troops were wavering, and before nightfall took his generals’ advice a,nd gra,nted a constitution. It is said he showed a malign delight at outbidding the reforming princes; “they have driven me to this I will push them down.” It is more probable that pure fear dictated his surrender. The old ministers and the Jesuit confessor left the palace; Bozzelli was entrusted with, a draft of a constitution ; and though it bore all the marks of his timid and pedant mind, the people recked little of the defects and dangers, with which his proposals bristled. When the King rode through the city, and swore fidelity to the statute, he seemed once more the darling of his people. The news of the Neapolitan constitution unlocked all the unsatisfied aspirations of advanced Libera,ls throughout the peninsula. Everywhere it was hailed with the joy of men who had been holding themselves back and now felt free to march. A constitution suddenly became the uni- versal prayer. Piedmont was the first to feel the wave. The Radicals took up the cry, and D’Azeglio, on sppor- tunist grounds, urged the Moderates to accept it. So strong did the pressure suddenly become, that on the morrow of the news from Naples (February 2) the ministers recom- mended the King to give way. Charles Albert’s preposses- sions were all against a constitution; he thought himself bound by his old oath,' of which Mettermch had not failed to remind him; he distrusted parliamentary government, hated its publicity, its roughness, its party struggles, its possible corruption. Quite recently he had protested that he would never have it.'’ But he saw that it was dangerous to resist, that at all events it would win English sympathy and spell defiance to Austria. He allowed his ministers to privately draft a constitution, and thought of solving his ^ V. 63, 70; M. Carlo Aaerto,.o-, Predan. vanili 260 ; Costa de Beauregard, Derniera annces, 82 ; Cibrario, JVotiM, 75 , ZXticelclo, 22s ■, Cavour, LcUcre, I. cxx. 70; eonlra Saraceno, op. crb, 167. THE CONSTITUTIONS 207 personal dilemma by abdicating, as his predecessor had done in 1821. But while he delayed, the impatience grew. At the King s own prompting, resolutions asking for a statute were voted in the Municipal Councils of Turin and Genoa (February 7). Even many of the reactionaries, frightened by the storm and hoping to get the majority in an Upper House, swelled the cry. The Council advised the King that there was no alternative but a violent civil struggle, which might end in revolution. His conscience was set at ease by a patriot bishop, and he contented himself by stipulating that the first article of the charter should con- firm Catholicism as the religion of the state. On February 8 he promised that a constitution should be granted. The torch was passed on to Tuscany, where the govern- ment had lost all power to stand against popular pressure. The sbirri had been hunted into hiding (October 25, 1847), and the ministers had no force behind them except the citizen guard, themselves the foremost to demand reform. The cabinet itself was fussy and irresolute, and the victory of the constitutionalists in Piedmont broke down its guard. On February 1 1 the Grand Duke proclaimed a constitution. Capponi and Bidolfi still hoped to stop short at a consulta- tive assembly ; the Eadicals at the other extreme called for a single chamber. The majority of the cabinet decided for a middle course, and pronounced for the proposals of Ricasoli and the Florence municipality, who advocated a modification of the French statute of 1830. After the Liberal triumph in Piedmont and Tuscany it was no longer possible to refuse a constitution at Rome. The Pope had long since ceased to guide events. By fits he looked not unkindly on the Liberal movement. Bruited conspiracies of “ Gregorians ” still alarmed him ; he could not forget the insult of Ferrara, and was irritated anew, when in January the Austrian government, eager to stamp out Liberalism at Naples, asked leave to send troops through Papal territory. With all the milder side of the new move- ment Pius was in full sympathy. He assisted education, patronized schemes for the reclamation of the Agro Romano, ^ave concessions, that proved almost still-born, to railway 208 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY companies. He disclaimed sympathy with obscurantism, hopeful that his reforming fame would bring Protestants to the fold ; but he was painfully sensitive to the charge that he was siding with revolution, and was beginning to realize what combustible materials he was handling.^ He resented keenly the agitation against the Jesuits, the jubilations at the defeat of the Sonderbund, the newspaper attacks on the Belgian Catholics. He was growing very uneasy lest he should be forced to do things contrary to his conscience ; he was apt to get violently excited about the fancied growth of scepticism, and suffered terribly from alternations of hope and disappointment. Mazzini had written him an open letter (September 1847), urging him in too transparent flattery “ to be a believer and unite Italy.” The letter was far from expressing Mazzini’s permanent feelings, and its only effect on Pius was to thoroughly alarm him.^ He regarded the Temporal Power in all its plenitude as a sacred trust, which it Avas sin to surrender ; and at the opening of the new Council of State, he had hinted that they would at their cost inter- fere with his prerogative. He began to see hoAV irreconcilable Avere the claims of Italian prince and Catholic pontiff, and as the father of foreign princes ” he Avould not hear of Avar. So after his Avont he refused to face the situation. His fussy expectations of gratitude blinded him to the real temper of the people. So far as appearances went indeed, he Avas at times their idol. The Liberal leaders set to his credit each unwilling concession ; his reactionary pronounce- ments Avere not reported in the papers, and the inconsis- tencies and procrastinations of the government Avere charged to the Cardinals. But he had lost his spell. The Pius cult had groAvn artificial, and his popularity hung on his readi- ness to satisfy the people’s ever Avidening demands. In the autumn the Council of State had been opened, and Rome Avas given a municipal charter.^ Municipality and Council 1 Leopardi, op. cit . , 84 ; Guizot, Memoires, VIII. 392. 2 Mazzini, Oper€,Yl. 156-163; Aventura, Pei ?nor^^, xxxiv. For the inten- tion of the letter, see Mazzini, Opere, VII. 159, IX. 244; Id., Duecento lettcre, 250-252. 3 One of the first acts of the new municipality was to vote a considerable sum for the erection of labourers’ houses. THE CONSTITUTIONS 209 were hailed with the usual rejoicings, but they were regarded as steps to fresh victories. Rossi had urged the Pope to secure the support of the Moderates and isolate the Radicals by conceding a lay ministry and some form of representa- tive institutions. So far from this, however, the Moderates who formed the majority of the Council, found themselves' thwarted by the government at every turn. Their thouo-ht- ful and laborious endeavours in educational and civil service and army reform were sterilized, and after a bitter strugo-Ie with the Pope, they gave up the attempt in disgust, and left the field to the Radicals. In parts of Romagna things were little removed from anarchy. The old bitter feuds, the fear of invasion, perhaps the work of Sanfedist agents, led to in- evitable excesses; and at Imola and Forli, and to a slight extent elsewhere, political assassination was rife under plea of exterminating the Centurions. Rome was free from poli- tical crime, but seething with agitation. The Democrats had organised themselves into a “People’s Club”; there was a revolutionary committee, and Mazzini, despite his dis- ingenuous letter, was urging his friends to discredit the Pope.' But the Democrats were not alone in their dissatisfaction, and when the Council found itself paralyzed, all sections of Liberals were agreed that both reform at home and prepara- tion for war hinged on the appointment of a lay ministry. I he Conservative nationalists were ready to join the Radicals in forcing the Pope’s hands, and for the sake of the national iefence they determined once for all to be rid of the in- lompetence of an executive of ecclesiastics. The pressure lecame too strong for the Pope, and after an attempted Jompromise, he appointed a new cabinet with a majority of aymen under Cardinal Antonelli (March ii). But it was ilready too late to content the country with lay ministers • ■rom Romagna, from Umbria, from Rome, from Democrats ind^ Moderates, petitions were coming in for representative nstitutions. Pius and the government parried the demand ill the news of the French Revolution made the excitement 00 intense to allow of more delay. Pius, perhaps for the ' The letters in Bianchi, Mazzinianismo, 137, and Correspondence— Italy . 223, seem genuine. VOL. I. O 2 10 A HISTOKY OF ITALIAN UNITY moment, had visions of democracy reconciled to Catholicism, and new converts won for the Church.' The Cardinals re- . iected a constitution drafted by Rossi, but they adopted ; another of their own, and took the tricolor for the national 1 flag (Marcli 15). Apart from that of Piedmont, the “Statutes” of 1848 ^ were too short-lived to test effectually their value and . capacity of development. They were all more or less | modelled on the French constitution of 1830, which, with , evil omen for their success, was at this very moment ; tumbling into ruin. It was impossible in a country where ! there had been no free political life, that they should grow out of the practical experience of generations. They were necessarily mere bundles of constitutional maxims, based more or less on untested theories. And drafted as they were by men whose knowledge of constitutional working came from books, put out in the hurry of the moment: to satisfy an imperious popular cry, it was perhaps un- avoidable that they should retain many of the defects, ot their French original, and of the American precedents trom which it in turn was drawn; that they bore the impress of official and middle class timidity, that they attempted a divorce of executive and legislature, a balance of power, which threatened to clog the wheels of administration and make strong government difficult. They^ contained the elementary guarantees of liberty:— security of person and property, equality before the law, ministerial responsibility, a fL press, a citizen guard, the right of petition, parha^ mentary control of taxation. To these Tuscany adde freedom of commerce and industry, and Piedmont a modn fied right of public meeting. But the power of the Churo was shown in the provisions, which in every Statute sub jected religious publications to a preventive censorship, whict 1 Minghetti, Rimrdi, I. 3^9 : Leopardi, op. cit., 84 : Gori, op. ct(., 471 quotingfromGavazri, 45 - 2 Texts with translations in Correspondence Italy, . 5 » 5 ; . Correspondence-Naples, 131. The electoral laws of Naples and Correspondence-Italy, II. 165, 237 1 those for Tuscany and the Papal Stat in La Farina, Storia, V. 244; "VI. 1367 268. THE CONSTITUTIONS 21 1 declared Catholicism to be the religion of the State, which at Rome implicitly and at Naples explicitly, excluded tolera- tion of other creeds. Each parliament had an Upper Cham- ber, nominated by the sovereign, it being recognized on all hands that a hereditary house was out of the question.^ Th^e was no payment of members, except in special cases m luscany; and in Naples and Rome there was a rather high property qualification for deputies. The franchise everywhere excluded the bulk of wage-earners ; “ we want,” said Cavour, “ to bring the suffrage down to the shopkeeper, who has a little competency of his own and a good mt-au-fm every day. But it included the great mass of occupiers of land; and this, in the wide diffusion of farms prevalent in: Italy, meant the majority of rural householders. Illiterates' were excluded in Piedmont but not elsewhere. In every case there were fancy franchises for officials or men of educa- tional status. Voting in more than one constituency was illegal everywhere. Constitutions drawn on these lines were intended as Cavour speaking for the Moderates avowed, to checkmate the Democrats. A large number of the working men in the towns, who had helped to fight the constitutional battle found themselves, like their French and English brothers in 1830-31, left outside. Still in Piedmont and Tuscany and Naples the constitutions, assuming loyalty both in crown and people, might have quietly developed on to broader lines. ne Papal Statute, on the other hand, had from the first tatal seeds of decay. Some of the Liberal churchmen con- scious of Its inherent diificulties, had wished to have very wide local liberties as the substitute for a parliament.^ But their policy was impossible in the cry for parliamentary institutions, and an alternative was chosen, which, as Kossi ivas reported to have said, “ legitimized war between sovereign md subject.” It was, as events proved, impossible to graft •epresentative government on a theocracy; it was not practicable to put a Foreign Office, whose business related ^ E.g. Cavour, Lettere, V. 169 ; Eosmini, Costituzione, 2 iie tune opposed to any Second Chamber. Cavour was at 2 I 2 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY chiefly to the sphitual relations of the Holy See with foreign powers, into the hands of a layman, or to make it m®ponsib e to a lay and possibly hostile Chamber. The Papal Statute tried to provide for the dilemma by laying vague disabihtie on parliament; and above the two Chambers sat the College of Cardinals as a kind of third House. But a deadlock ^\a sooner or later inevitable, and it took only a few weeks to prove that, while the Pope’s Temporal Power lasted, a constitution could never march at Rome. CHAPTEE XI THE NATIONAL RISING FEBRUARY MARCH I 848 The French Revolution of 1848. The Jesuits. Military rule in Lombardy. Preparations for war in Piedmont. The Five Days of Milan. The National Rising at Venice ; in the Lombard cities ; in the Duchies, Tuscany, Papal States, Naples 5 character of the rising. Piedmont and the rising ; Charles Albert declares war. The constitutional question was settled for a time, and the country could give all its thoughts to war. The French Revolution (February 24) had changed the face of European politics, and the prestige of success had passed to the side of progress. To Austria the Revolution was a direct blow, for the Republic was certain to give its sympathies to a war for free- dom in Italy, and might not improbably lend its arms. Palmer- ston hinted that Austria might find herself at war both with France and England, if she invaded the free Italian states.^ The Milan massacres had sent a thrill of rage through Italy, and there was an earnest looking for the coming fight! Outside Sicily, absorbed in its own problems, every week added to the impatience for war. But it was recognized that the signal must come from Lombardy or Piedmont. All that the eager patriots could do meanwhile was to secure their rear, and for this they turned on the Austrians’ best friends, the Jesuits. It was an irony that the Society had been brought to range itself with the Power that had been so untender to Ultramontanism. But the struggle now was between despotism and democracy, and the Jesuits natur- ally found themselves in the Austrian camp. Gioberti, in his Prolegomeni and Modern Jesuit, had signalled out the ^ Ashley, Palmerston, I. 64. 2 14 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY • Austro-Jesuit league as the great obstacle to reform, and had lashed the Society with his ponderous dialectics as “ the great enemy of Italy.” And however unfair it may have been to set the whole clerical opposition to their charge, they had frankly acknowledged their alliance with Austria,^ and were the strength of the reaction at Rome, if not else- where. Slowly and steadily they had been winning back the ground they had lost in the eighteenth century ; and in proportion as they won it, the jealousy and suspicion of the people had turned to hate. Tuscany had successfully re- sisted their introduction ; Gregory, not long before his death, had consented to their suppression in France ; the defeat of - the Sonderbund at the end of 1847 had been hailed with public rejoicings even at Rome. Now the popular rage could no longer be restrained, and the governments threw the Society as a prey to the public hue and cry. The hos- tility had been perhaps strongest in Genoa, and before the end of the past year, the agitation had grown so dangerous that the Fathers left the city for a time. The news of the constitution gave the signal for the final attack. The Sar- dinians drove them from their island ; they fled again from Genoa ; Turin, and Alessandria, and Spezia expelled them a few days later. In the capital feeling was so intense, and the threats against the Jesuitesses of the Sacred Heart so loud, that the government at last gave way over the citizen guard, and sanctioned its formation to save the trembling Sisters from outrage. Early next month the Fathers fled from Naples, to return in a few days in disguise. Three weeks later (March 21), when the news of the Viennese revolution reached Rome, the first impulse of the crowd was to demand their expulsion. It was in vain that they hoisted the tricolor, that Pius threw his shield over them ; the government had to bow to the storm, and consent to close their College. Even in Sicily, where the Society had shown enlightenment and patriotism, a mild law of semi- suppression was carried a few months later. Lombardy meanwhile was preparing for the greater ^ Gioberti, Gesuita moderno, IV. 515- THE NATIONAL RISING 215 struggle. 1 There was no pause in the demonstrations ; the January massacres had only stirred the people’s blood, though Lombard mildness showed itself still in a hundred good-humoured fancies to outwit the police. As the word was passed round, crowds appeared and vanished at fixed points; thousands packed the Cathedral to give silent thanks for the Neapolitan Constitution ; at Venice the Carnival was abandoned, and the money saved for the wounded of the Tobacco Riots. Elsewhere the people were less in hand, and at Padua and Pavia the friction between University and garrison led to fatal fighting in the streets. In the government the party of no concession kept the upper hand. Rainerio tried by double play to keep the favour of both army and people, but the “ old women ” of the civilian party had thrown up the game. At Venice Tommaseo and Manin were arrested and charged with high treason, acquitted after a brilliant defence, but kept in prison. At Milan the police paraded all the fussiness of a government that felt itself ridiculous or impotent. But though they proclaimed the gmdizio statario ^ (February 1 1 ), no mere police measures would satisfy Radetzky. He saw insurrec- tion and war with Piedmont looming in the near future, and though he had over 70,000 troops, more than half of them were Italians of doubtful loyalty. He sent pressing messages for reinforcements to Vienna ; troops were already beginning to collect at Goritz, and Rainerio and Spaur left Milan. The army had more than ever got the government into its hands. On their side the Milanese leaders suspended the demonstrations, knowing that they had done their work. Business was almost at a standstill ; foreigners began to leave the city. The French Revolution, though it scared a faint- hearted section, only made the mass of the people more impatient ; ‘‘ cross the Ticino,” they sent word to Charles Albert, “ or we proclaim the Republic.” It was clear that the revolution might be precipitated at any moment, and the leaders decided to wait no longer for the King. Before March 16 it had been decided to rise in a few days.^ Piedmont for its part was watching with ever-increasing ^ See above, p. 58. 2 Archivio Triennale, I. 510. 2i6 a history of ITALIAN UNITY intensity of interest. The Tobacco Riots, the massacre of students at Pavia on its very frontier, the iniquities of the giiidizio statario piled fuel for their indignation. D Azeglio published a pamphlet on “ The Sorrows of Lombardy,” in A which the Moderate rivalled the angriest of Radicals in his denunciation of Austria. A new ministry had come into power under Balbo and Pareto, the leader of the Genoese Liberals, but though the Austrians thought that theh taking office meant “ almost a declaration of war,” the government showed the irresolution of a time of transition, when old timidity and the newer nationalism were still contending for mastery. Balbo meant to fight, if it proved absolutely necessary ; but more than he feared Austria, he dreaded French designs on Savoy and an inrush of revolutionary propagandists across the Alps ; and instead of concentrating troops on the Lombard frontier, he had left them scattered through the kingdom.^ Attacks on Austria in the press were rigorously put down, but at the same time the papers were permitted to talk of the coming war, and three classes of array contingents were called out. It was probably to keep their hands free for an offensive movement, that the ministry blew cold on fresh proposals from Tuscany and Rome for a defensive political alliance. Charles Albert, despite the alarm he felt at the French Revolution and the attacks on the Jesuits, was intervieving agents from Milan, and assuring them, that if the city “ rose in earnest, he and his people would rush arms in hand to its help.” ^ On March 1 7 startling news reached Milan. The Hungarian agitation had come to a head, and found its echo in the German provinces of the Empire. Vienna had risen in insurrection — Vienna, which to Italians had been the very seat and strength of Austrian tyranny. Metternich had been compelled to resign, and the Emperor had pro- mised to all his subjects liberty of the press, a national 1 Ricotti, BaJho, 263 ; Costa de Beauregard, Dernieres annees, 114-115. ^ Archivio Triennalc, I. 4S3, 508, 510 ; Torelli, Rirordi, 108 ; Casati. Milano, 153 ; Cavour, Lettere, L cxxxix.; Bonfadini, Mezzosecolo, 265 ; Costa de Beaure- gard, loc, cit.; contra, Archivio Triennale, I. 480. THE NATIONAL RISING 217 I guard, an early convocation of the Estates of the Empire I On the following morning the Milanese found the Emperor’s edict (omitting, however, mention of the national guard) : posted on all the walls. But the news had leaked out on the previous evening, and the leaders had been busy through • t e night, giving orders for a demonstration and preparing ) proclamations. The people needed little urging- thev recognized that their chance had come, and over the’ copies of the edict pasted the words “Too late.” A great crowd wi h Casati, the reluctant and timorous Podesta,' at their head, marched to the office of the Vice-governor, O’Donnell. , e sentineR were killed, the house invaded, and, in a wild scene of disorder O’Donnell, threatened of his life and unnerved, signed the decrees which Casati presented to him disbanding the police and authorizing the municipality to . enrol a citizen guard. So far the movement had worn an ostensibly legal colour, and O’Donnell’s decrees were only : the corollary of the Imperial Edict. But the soul of the movement was in the Radicals; and while Casati wished to come to terms with Radetzky, or at least wait till Charles - Albert moved, the popular leaders refused any compromise ! short of instant and absolute independence. It seemed a esperate resolve to pit an unarmed populace against a disciplined army of 13,000 men. But there was no hesita- i 1^°’ if li, soldiers, as they marched ' rough the streets, were attacked with tiles or stones, with I croc ery an boiling water or oil ; a battalion was driven back by showers of empty wine bottles; the few guns that ad been collected were brought out, the armourers’ shops were ransacked; here and there barricades were thrown up It took the troops six hours of desperate struggle to cut •their way to the Municipal Palace of the Broletto and capture its scantily- armed defenders. All through the : mght the young Radicals, who had directed the crowd in ' - the day, were throwing up hundreds of barricades, and nex morning (March 19) m the bright spring sunshine the hghtmg was renewed with double vigour. The intoxication Cas'atf ""tw I- 483, 485 ; II. 16, 183 ; Mario, I. 74 7, . Ca.,at., Jt^vela^^on^, II. 100; contra, lb. II. 124; Vimercati, 2 i 8 a history of ITALIAN UNITY of the struggle had fastened on the city. There was a stratum of brag and cowardice, but the mass fought with reckless and triumphant bravery. All that came to hand was given to make the barricades; furniture, carriages, pulpits, school benches, pianofortes, scenery from the theatres were heaped pell-mell. Behind them the few hundred who ^ had guns kept at bay the best troops of Austria ; at one barricade two youths held back a company for all a day ; women and young boys fought and were killed. Above the roar and rattle of cannon and musketry the bells clanged out from every steeple, heartening the citizens, maddening the Austrians.! all through the fight the Lombard good-temper and mildness showed bright. The rich opened Their palaces to the poor whose homes had been wrecked. There was no crime in the confusion beyond a few tntiing thefts, and the poor brought in the gold found in the “ King had only intervened to avoid a republican rnovemem in Lombardy and Piedmont.^ If Charles Albert knew the diplomatic trick, it augured_ ill for the future that he wen to the war with a lie upon his lips. 1 Bia.nc\xi, Di'plomazia,^. 172; Correspondence- Bastide, RepuUique francaise, 38. -Ttaly, II. i85s 292, CHAPTER XII the war march MAY 1848 Radetzky’s retreat; tlie Milanese after the Five Days; Piedmontese advance ; the two armies ; the Volunteers ; Santa Lucia. Beginnings of dmsion ; Albeetism ; Piedmont and the League. The Pope and BozJir ’ T® 29- Napfes: Ferdinand and Bozzelh; Troya ministry; the Counter-Revolution Charles L near'd “* 7 “ I^o“bardy : question Fusion plebiscite! “ the Provisional Government; the While Charles Albert was making up his mind, Radetzky was dragging his slow retreat along the Lombard roads He was following the recognized rules of strategy, which bade Him retreat to the Quadrilateral. But with an alerter enemy the march would have been full of danger His retreating column was fifteen miles long, his soldiers ex- hausted and demoralized ; between the Po and lower Adige stretched “the net” of irrigated country, with its intricacies ot canals and rice-marshes and plantations. Had a few well-generalled guerilla-bands cut the roads and harassed ihe enemy s long trail with sharpshooters, Radetzky’s march would have been sufficiently delayed for the Piedmontese to get between him and Verona and gain an easy victory over his weary and dispirited troops. But the Milanese were Uruck with a strange paralysis. Exhausted after the five days strain, they and their leaders thought that the war was at an end, or that at least the responsibility might be safely shifted to the Piedmontese. The Provisional Govern- ment, which had been formed at the end of the Five Days f vf property, which was in no danger,’ I hd dreaded the Volunteers as a possibly republican force. 22 8 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Only a few hundreds started for the field and the men, who Ld^een heroes in the Five Days, now preferred to caricature Sdetzky rather than pursue him. The Austrian rule was bearing L fruit; incapacity in the leaders, want of sacrifice in the^masses were the inevitable results of a tyranny that sucked out the virility of the people. Charles The Piedmontese in their turn lost their chance. Charles Albert with all his superb courage m the field, carried h 3 fViP rmmcils of War, and was obsessed by «.v™. iu hi. ..^1 H«1 tta Pi&Jmontese possw,..! a commander of genius, e ^ hurried a f«reo down ik* f before reinforcements reached it (March 3 )• sion of Mantua would have carried with it the fall o Leona^ro and Ferrara, and Radetzky, driven back on Verona and Peschiera, with the Tyrol held by the Volunteei-s and nerhaps in full revolt, would have been surrounded and starved into surrender. But the splendid ^ ^ missed The main army, 23,000 strong, crossed the Iicino at Pavia on the 25 th, hut it was nine days before h re^aj^ed Cremona five more before it was on t i n j was easily taken (April 8), and most of the force had crossed the river^ by the i ith. Radetzky, well-nigh despairmg of succ^sr and expecting to be recalled to defend the Emperor s pers^’ withdrew wLin Verona, after inflicting severe Leeks’ on the Volunteers both to east and west. As t _ g«i.o.. cm. in, k. >“^T'‘^"°C°urP.‘s° the great Quadrilateral fortresses of Verona, Mantua, ‘'^'®His“iRioT*ough far from one vLna and Mantua were fortresses of the first order and the road to the Tyrol was still open. With a perversio of national enthusiasm all Austoian parties “ keepina their heel on the Italian provinces and the ve y VieLe°se students, who had overthrown volunteered to fight against the cause of liberty m Italy. 1 Ufficiale Piemontese, Memorie, 451. 2 Ib. 454 ; Bava, ReLazione, 10 ; Pepe, Events, I. 301- 3 Sordello’s birthplace. THE WAR 229 The Austrian army, strange compound as it was of half-a- dozen nationalities, had its strong cementing esprit-de-corps. Even most of the Italian troops that still remained with their colours proved their loyalty of the staunchest; and while the ill-pieced Empire seemed falling into ruin, the clash of nationalities was unknown here, where Czech and German, Magyar and Slav and Italian, stood shoulder to shoulder, a mighty testimony to the power of discipline to weld discordant elements into one. The Piedmontese army had now 45?ooo men encamped on both banks of the Mincio. On their extreme right, in front of Mantua, were 12,000 more, Tuscans and Neapolitans and Modenese. Four thousand volunteers were in the Tyrol, and in Venetia, or about to enter it, were some 30,000, Romans, Venetians, and deserters from the Austrian army. The Piedmontese troops were of fine calibre, their artillery and cavalry superior to the Austrian, the men throughout more than a match for the enemy in courage, its inferior in train- ing and equipment; the officers as brave as their men, though often moved only by their loyalty to the King to fight for a cause they suspected or disliked. The generals, except perhaps Bava and the King s second son, the Duke of Genoa, had small experience or talent ; least capable of all was the unhappy King, who, tortured by scruples, ill at ease even in fulfilling his ambitions, planned his campaign m the inspiration of prayer or the counsels of a visionary nun, and made his troops march late to battle rather than let them miss Mass. He had the weak man’s fault of neither asserting nor suppressing himself, and confusion reigned in the Councils of War. The commissariat and ambulance services were unorganized, and food accumulated in magazines while the troops were sometimes starving. While Charles Albert kept his army for a fortnight in gloomy inaction in front of Verona, the Volunteers were pushmg vigorously forward. They were a strangely mixed collection of every age and rank and province ; young men of education and sometimes of high birth, students and artizans, veterans who had fought at the Borodino or at Waterloo, middle-aged gold-spectacled professors, peasants. 2 30 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY Austrian deserters, smugglers, the flower and the dregs of society; some moved by patriotism, some by love of excite- ment and action, a few by hope of license and plunder. They were brave, though liable to panics, the best with plenty of dash; on the whole a rough, impatient crew, who would swim a river under the enemy’s guns to pick wild flowers for their captain, but would as readily mutiny, it crossed. Men of rough life were among them and some- times lawless deeds disgraced them. Often the first en- thusiasm vanished in the face of hunger and exposure. But there were many who, at Curtatone and on the btelvio, at Vicenza and Venice, showed, in despite of discourap- ment and disillusion, that enthusiasm could be a match for the discipline of veterans. The bulk of tpm ^eje m Venetia. The 4000 who composed the “Army of the Alps” the volunteers from Milan and Genoa and Parma, had they had a few regulars to support them, might have kept the insurrection alive in the Tyrol, and harassed or cut off Radetzky’s communications. They had “amp straight to the Lago di Garda, where Manara cptured the Austrian steamers at Said (April 3); and severely punished at Castelnuovo, they converged on the Tyrol pushing on as far as the Val di Non. But Welden, hastily collectmg a small force in the German Tyrol, crushed an mcipient replt at Trent, and drove back their whole line to the Tonale Pass and the lower Chiese (April 20). A wise policy would hap linked a few regulars to give them steadiness , pt Ghar e Albert, ostensibly afraid to weaken his mam force, more really because he feared the diplomatic complications which might follow an invasion of the Tyrol, and not unwillmg to see the Volunteers discredited, ordered them to retire to Brescia and Bergamo to be incorporated m the newl^formed Lombard regiments. A few only were left under Giacomo Durando to hold tliG Tonale. Meanwhile the army had been wasting its chancp m use- less manoeuvres and empty demonstrations against pppera and Mantua. At the end of April its lines exten^d from the south-east bank of Garda to Villafranca, spthof Verona with the heights of Sommacampagna for their key, thus 231 THE WAR isolating Pesohiera, siege-guns to attack which were coming up. To the south the Tuscans and Neapolitans were watch- Plan to Illustrate Campaigns of 1848, 1859, 1866. " Railways in working in June 1859. Scale in English Miles. ing Mantua at Curtatone and Montanara. Radetzky’s only outlet was through the Tyrol, and after a victory at Pas- 232 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY trengo (April 30), the Piedmontese might have occupied the historic position of Rivoli, and ringed him in till want of supplies drove him to offer battle. But the political situa- tion made it almost imperative to gain a speedy and decisive victory. The Veronese sent word to the King that an assault on the suburbs would be followed by a rising in the city itself; and he attacked the low chain of hills, which lay between his lines and the city, covered by the gardens and mulberry plantations of Santa Lucia and other villages (May 6). In spite of the difficult ground, the plan might have succeeded but for the accustomed faults of tactics. The Piedmontese artillery was as usual well served; and though their left was badly checked, the splendid rush of the centre carried Santa Lucia, and cut the enemy’s line in two. The object of the battle had been gained, when the King, with his fatal timidity of judgment, decided to evacuate the village and retire to his hnes. It was an almost irreparable blunder. It lost the Italians their last chance of capturing Verona before Radetzkys reinforce- ments arrived ; worse than that, it destroyed the prestige of victory, which had hitherto been theirs. Splendid as had been the courage of the great majority of the troops, the patent incapacity of the generals, the cowardice of a few regiments, the sense of virtual defeat robbed the army of its confidence ; and though the Piedmontese soldier was made of stuff too tenacious to be soon demorahzed, the diffi- culties of the situation, alike military and political, rapidly thickened. What Mazzini had always foreseen was coming to pass. It was impossible for one prince to become the leader of the national movement without exciting the jealousy of the others. Every Italian throne had its petty territorial ambi- tions ; Rome had claims on Parma and Rovigo, Naples on An- cona ; 1 Tuscany and Piedmont had rival designs to annex the Lunigiana and Massa-Carrara. Perhaps already both Charles Albert and Leopold were dreaming of bringing the Sicilian 1 Minghetti, Ricordi, II. 212; Gualterio, Rivolgimenti, II. 226 n. THE WAR 233 crown into their families.^ Nor were these provincial jeal- ousies confined to the courts. Alike in Tuscany and Rome and Naples there were important sections who dreaded above all things annexation to Piedmont. Their fears were not un- grounded ; there were Unitarians, who would have liked to see Charles Albert King of all Italy, just as there were a few who would have egged on Leopold or Ferdinand to bid for the Italian crown ; in some of the cities there were Maz- zinians, who still aspired to a republic of united Italy And though the avowed friends of Unity of whatever shade were weak at present, a powerful constitutional kingdom in North Italy would form a magnet to which at all events Bologna and Florence would gravitate. The Albertists had been aggressively imprudent, and there was a wide-spread sus- picion that Piedmontese agents were at work throuo-hout the peninsula. No doubt since D’Azeglio’s mission to Romagna there had been a group of men, who had preached salvation through Charles Albert. Agents, authorized or un- authorized, had been fixing the ideas that Balbo and D’Azeglio had suggested, 3 and since the war broke out they had been especially busy in the Lunigiana and at Modena and Parma, balvagnoli and Berchet at Florence, Spaventa at Naples, to a certain extent Mamiani at Rome, favoured a strong Italian kingdom under the House of Savoy.^ How far the Albertists were aiming at annexation it is hard to say.^ No doubt some, at all events in the Legations and at Leghorn, would have liked to force Charles Albert’s hand by a plebiscite for union to Piedmont;'’ but though the Statute spoke of the Kings “ Italian crown,” there is little evidence to show how nn "I'’ II- 543-546 ; D’ADCona, Amari, I. 255 ; see below, PP. 250, 314. J Tivaroni, Dominio amtriaeo, II. 32, 40; Nisco, Ferdinands //., 88 : Farini Lettere 75 ; Orsim etc., Lettere, 77, 82, 186, 191 ; Gori, Rivoluzione, 92, 95. ’ Archzvw Trier^, I. 56-60, 109 ; Ricasoli, Lettere, I. 231-232, 235 ; Saffl Scritti,!. 125; Indirizzo degli Italiani. ^ 07>ereS“l!°7i°^’ '^48, 25-28, 37; Gioberti, eit f ^rnarei; Id., Operette, I. 85-89; Ricasoli, op. TinH 5 > Gremelli, Sicilia, 8; Bosio, ViZlamarina, 80-81 ; with (ii) .nclS’t!! «9 ; Ventura, Essal, 608 (r;hich I am inclined to disbelieve). See below, p. 2<;c. ® See below, p. 240. 2 34 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY far lie knew or approved their plans.i There can be no doubt however that visions of expansion had floated before the eyes of his statesmen, and prompted their mysterious attitude towards the League. After the French Revolution they had aaain thrown every difficulty in its way, on the pretence that a°lea<^ue without Naples in it was valueless ; and when Naples announced its adhesion (March 1 5), Tuscany had m its turn grown suspicious of Piedmont. As soon as war was declared, the Pope, anxious for anything to which he could shift his responsibility, again picked up the threads of the negotia- tions, and found Tuscany and Naples willmg to fall m ; but Pareto brusquely replied that the war was all-important, and put in a counter-scheme of an offensive alliance, io this Naples at all events was willing to adhere ; hut the Pope s reluctance gave Pareto his opportunity to break out ot any arrangement which might tie his hands. He sent his flnal refusal to join the league on April i8, and the Popes disap- pointment at missing a peaceful solution, his anger at the loss of Parma, his suspicions that Piedmont was aiming a,t Romagna and Naples at the Marches, fell in only too well with other tendencies to turn him from the cause. The war was supremely distasteful to him. In the moment of enthusiasm indeed he had attributed the events of March to Providence. He was patriot enough to wish to see Italy victorious, provided he escaped responsibility m the eyes of Germany. But he was less patriot than Pope ; he cared perhaps less for national independence than tor the recovery of those Italian territories, to which the Papacy treasured shadowy titles. He feared that the war might prove a crucible, from which Italy would emerge in trans- muted form, perhaps with little room for even a reformed Papal government. And so he blessed the flags when the troops started for the war, but he ordered Giovanni Durando, their general, not to cross the frontier, except to ^ I. ; Bianchi, 177-180 472-477; D'Azeglio e Gualteno, Carteggw, 25, Farmi, Homan state n 96-98 ; Costa de Beauregard, Derniires armies, 181 ; Gioberti, RmM- 22S; Massari. Casi di Napoli. ..9, 133 5 Leopardi, Narrazroru. 167, 170. See above, pp. i88, 216. THE WAR 235 Mcupy Rovigo, at which his claims of possession aimed. He was troubled too by the temper of Rome. When the Jesuits were attacked, he paraded his sympathy for his “unwearied fellow-workers in the vineyard of the Lord” and threatened to leave the city if the disturbances con- tinued. Fretful, ill at ease, clinging to his popularity, but ever less in sympathy with the new democratic and nation- alist developments, he had already lent his ears to sinister counsels. Always oblique in his methods, he had learnt to-^ hght his ministers by ruse or inaction; or sometimes he would fortify himself in the obstinacy of his narrow con- science, and startle them with some sudden and perverse re- solution. The condition of Rome grew worse. The needs of the war had driven the government to issue a forced cur- rency. The pauper classes rioted for bread, and Ciceruacchio threatened to levy toll on the rich unless they contributed to the war fund. The limitations of the franchise dissatisfied even some of the Moderates, and a vigorous section was agi- tetmg for a wider suffrage and the convocation of an Italian Hiet at Rome. The provinces, more intent on the war, cared less for political refoms, but were resolute that the state should take its part in the struggle on the Mincio. The ministry tried in vain to extract an explicit pronouncement from the Pope. He angrily repudiated an order of the day in which Durando had told his soldiers that the Pope blessed their swords ; but a few days later he spoke of “ obeying cir- cumstances,” and gave his implied consent that the troops ^ould cross the Po. Acting on this, the ministry ordered Durando to advance (April i8).i But the Pope would not see his name Imked with Charles Albert’s in the battle-cry of the new crusade. Threats of schism came from the Cerman bishops, and he was prepared to sacrifice anything rather than be the cause of such scandal to the Church When his ministers defended Durando, he took refuge in seclusion. Suddenly, with the spasmodic energy of a weak man who feels his hands being forced, he broke silence with 62 , ‘’P- I- 366, 421 ; Pasolini, op. cit., 60; Farini, op. cit., II respond:nc;-14l“^ “ '' A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY 236 an Allocution,^ which marked his final secession from the nationalist camp (April 29). The Allocution was an apology to the German Catholics. War with Austria, it declared, was “wholly abhorrent from the counsels ” of a Pope, who “ regarded and loved with equal affection all peoples, races, and nations.” It was the logical statement of his position as Catholic pontiff; it marked none the less his impotence, as an Italian prince, to take a side in the bigger problems which distracted Europe. At Rome it exploded his dwindling popularity; for two or three days the state was practically without a government, and a considerable party called for his deposition and the appoint- ment of a Provisional Government. Pius was frightened ; he had not realized how completely the Encyclical would sunder him from the Liberals ; he had even thought that its implicit sanction of the Volunteers would please them. He was grieved that it should be interpreted as an anti- nationalist manifesto ; he was willing even to promise to take part in the war in the capacity of an Italian prince. But Antonelli, despite the irritation he professed against the Pope, suppressed his intended eirenicon, and substituted a memorial confirming the worst interpretations of the Encyclical.^ The Pope tried in his good feeble way to repair the mischief. He wrote to the Emperor, asking him to surrender his Italian provinces, and promised Charles Albert to allow the Papal troops to march, if Austria refused the olive- branch.^ But this was not known to the public, and he was forced to see that the appointment of a popular ministry was the only means of laying the storm. He dismissed Antonelli, and commissioned Mamiani to form a cabinet. The Encyclical was followed by the defection of Naples. Between a disloyal king and a nerveless people the country had sat ill in its constitutional dress. Bozzelli paralyzed the cabinet — already the second since the granting of the Con- ^ According to Finali, Conteraporanei, 265, the Pope professed that a celestial visitor dictated it. It is generally called an Encyclical. 2 Pasolini, op. cit, 69-71 ; Minghetti, op. cit., I. 372, 380. ^ Costa de Beauregard, op. cit., 206. THE WAR 237 i stitution — and Saliceti, the one strong man in it, resigned. The King had taken Bozzelli’s measure, and knew that he could fascinate and mould to his liking the pedant, whose theoretic belief in firm government was only the cover of an unstable courtier spirit. Even a stronger ministry would ^ have found its path strewn with difficulties. The press gave no light, and lent itself to violent and undignified I abuse. The country tossed with chronic unrest, and the I masses were finding that liberty did not necessarily mean bread. The old police had vanished without any force to take their place, and some of the provinces were in a state of mild anarchy. The peasants, who cared little or nothing for a constitution, divided up the commo-ns, or appropriated land to which they had old claims. The Radicals were dis- contented with the Statute, its narrow franchise and its “House of Peers”; and Saliceti voiced their demands by calling tor an extension of the suffrage, an elective Second Chamber and immediate hostilities with Austria. The agitation forced' the ministry to resign, and for the moment the King was inclmed to bow to the storm and commission Pepe to form a ministry. But Pepe asked for as much as Saliceti (April i ), and the King, quickly recovering, determined to fight his ground inch by inch. Carlo Troya, the historian, was made premier (April 4), a gentle, honourable man, but more at home m literature than politics, a poor pilot in such stormy times. His ministry, whether willingly or not was obliged to compromise with the Radicals, and extend the franchise slightly, leaving the question of the Upper House with other modifications of the constitution for Parliament to settk And, however halting on matters of domestic reform, Troya declared frankly for war and adhesion to the Italian League. A regiment was despatched at once to Lom- ba,rdy to fight for “ the common country,” and Pepe was to follow with the main army. But the cabinet had no courage to bear down the difiiculties that thickened on it, from King and officials on one hand, from republicans and socialists on the other. The reactionaries were probably fomenting agra- rian troubles, and a priest near Salerno preached communism from the pulpit. Official circulars encouraged the peasants 2 38 A HISTOBY OF ITALIAN UNITY to hope for partitions of demesne land, and spoke of “ the intolerable obligation on agriculturists to work for a master.” The King saw his opportunity. After the French Bevolu- tion he had lost heart and drifted, schemed perhaps to use the Liberals to win back Sicily and partition Italy between Charles Albert and himself.' But he had no scruples about , playing the traitor, and he now saw with glee that the dread I of socialism and the weakness of the government were givmg 7 the reactionaries their chance of recovery. The Encychoal i| had rallied the clergy to their cause ; threatened with attack from the civil power, the priests spread the cry that religion was in danger, and the sacristies of Naples were so many nests of treason. San Gennaro’s blood refused to liquefy, till the national guard frightened the archbishop and made the miracle work. An active camarilla of courtiers and officers was preparing for a blow. Believing, with reason, that the ^ Liberals wanted to send the army to the north to have a free hand at home, they agitated against the war and raised the spectre of Albertism. The King himself probably took no active part in the plot, but was careful that it had free play. Meanwhile the elections had taken place, but so indif- ferent was the mass of the people, that only one-fifth of the electors went to the poll. Moderate Liberals were returned almost everywhere, and save for a handful of reactionaries and a score of Kadicals, the deputies were of the same featureless, compromising cast as the ministers. Parlia- ment was to meet on May i 5 ; two days previously most of the deputies were in Naples, holding a semi-official con- ference in the ward of Monteoliveto. They came ready to suspect, and a seemingly inoffensive incident fed then- humour. From the official programme for the coming ceremony it transpired that they would be asked to ti^e an oath to maintain the existing constitution. Probably it originated in Bozzelli’s pedantry, and no subterfuge was intended ; but the deputies regarded it as a ruse to pledge them against the democratic reforms, which the go^^n- ment had promised that they should consider. The 1 Leopardi, op. cit., 96, 115, 122; « documenti, 141-144; Tivaroni, op. cit., III. 198. THE WAR 239 ministers and, with some hesitation, the King offered to waive the formula, and even make specific allusion to reform ^ But there were forces at work on both sides to make com- promise impossible. Extremists from Calabria and Salerno, together with some national guards, were preparing for civil war, and in the tension and uncertainty, before the King gave way, some barricades had been thrown up. It was a fatal error, so palpable in the retrospect, that after-efforts were made to charge it to the plottings of the Camarilla But though Its agents may have been at work, there can be little doubt that it was the republicans who raised the barricades, apparently with some strange encouragement from the French fleet in the bay.s The shrewder of the Liberals endeavoured to repair the mischief, but part of the national guard was out of hand, and the barricades were left The King was frightened,^ and the Camarilla saw how the mad manoeuvre played into its hands. Twelve thousand troops were massed in front of the royal palace (May 15) and nothing remained to the Liberals but to fight and con- quer. The national guard of Salerno was advancing on the capital, and had the deputies thrown themselves into the smuggle, the great mass of the national guard and Liberal citizens would have followed, and not impossibly might have repeated the victories of Palermo and Milan. None knew who fired the first shot; from morn to nightfall a fierce hand-to-hand struggle raged down the Toledo, but the few hundred defenders had no chance against such odds. The troops, both native and Swiss, gave no mercy, massacred and pillaged and burnt, while Ferdinand egged them on from his palace balcony, and the deputies passed resolutions at Monte- ohveto, till the troops drove them out. The next morning dawned on a scene of desolation. Dead bodies and wrecked ' Leopardi, op. cit, 450-457, 467 ; Santoro, Rivolgimenti, 177 - 188 - Atti e crx kpo«.’.5 "it: ^ See '5th. 240 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY houses, outrage and rapine, marked the progress of the troops. The lazzaroni and their priests filed before the palace, and shouted “ death to the nation.” Their cries meant that the South of Italy was lost to the national cause. An express was sent to recall Pepe and his troops. The message found him at Bologna, where, contrary to his instructions, he was preparing to cross the Po. Had he promptly pushed on he might have taken his men with him ; but he hesitated long enough for intrigue to work, and when the old veteran at last decided to press on, he found only 2000 willmg to follow him. It lay with Charles Albert to say whether the defection of the Pope and King of Naples should weaken the national cause. Though it lost him soldiers, it simplified his position. For the few who desired an united Italy, for the many w o stopped short of unity but wished to see the whole strenph of the nation put into the war, there were now hut two possible alternatives— Albertism, or the republic. And the republicans were a minority-little knots of students and a few thoughtful artizans in the larger chies,— and many ot them led by Mazzini himself, were willing to drop their propaganda, if only Charles Albert would frankly adopt the Lmocratic and nationalist programme. A strong man would have taken it and won by it. Sicily was offering her crown to his son.^ In Romagna there was a powerful sepa- ratist party, which only waited his signal to throw itself into his arms.^ Everywhere outside Italy the popular forces held the field. The Republic was strong in France ; the Viennese students were driving out the Imperial court (May 17), Hungary and Bohemia had won their short-lived m epen - ence the German National Assembly was meeting (May 1 8). At no time, not even in 1830, had democracy been so triumphant. There was a moment when Charles Albert mi-ht have anticipated 1 860. But the King was no genius to "seize the great occasion. He was fighting a military » Torre! ; BegheWi, Xepubblka, I. 136; 129; Gabussi, Memorie, II. I 5 - THE WAR 241 campaign with all respect to the conventionalities of regular warfare. His treatment of the volunteers had shown his distrust and dislike of the popular forces. He would coun- tenance no designs on the Temporal Dominions of the Pope and sent Gioberti to Rome to win back Pius’ favour. He had ever the fear of European diplomatists before his eyes ; anxiety to humour Palmerston and conciliate the German Confederation made him shy of aggression in the Tyrol, and restrained him from hostilities at sea, where his fleet might have made an easy prey of Trieste and paralyzed Austrian commerce. He refused the aid of the Swiss volunteers; he broke off the friendly relations with the Hungarians, which the Milanese had initiated. He belittled the great Italian movement down to a struggle for North Italy; he did enough to alienate the other princes and excite the jealousies of France, and stopped short of what would have drawn the patriots of all Italy to his side. In North Italy itself he showed the same lack of con- sistency and masterfulness. The national rising had been followed m Lombardy by a period of quietude. Within a week the whole fabric of Austrian rule had fallen, and the energies of the country were absorbed in filling the void of governrnent and in feebler efforts to raise a Lombard army. The political question had been postponed by general con- sent. Every^ one expected that the war would be short, and in the meantime the burning questions of monarchy or re- public, of union or federation were best left unstirred “ When the cause has won, the nation will decide,” was the oft-repeated formula of compromise. Ostensibly at least, even those who wanted to see Charles Albert king at once- subscribed to the sla^us quo^ and he for his part had dis- couraged his extremer partisans. Anxious as he was to g.ve the republicans no chance and unite Lombardy to Piedmont, he had urged that, if the question could not be left alone, it should be decided at once by a plebiscite on the broadest possible sufirage. The republicans on their side ^ Casati, Rivelaztoni, II. 185 ; Casati, Milano, 415 ; Archivio Triennale, III. ' 33 ; Casati, VOL. I. Q 242 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY were equally Avilling to defer the question. Though at Milan they included at this time the active if not the numerical majority of the middle and working classes, they were weak outside. Mazzini, who had arrived there early in April, promised to support Charles Albert, so long as his ambitions made for Unity. He scorned the miserable in- trigues of Cattaneo’s small anti-Piedmontese faction ; the one thing needful was to drive the Austrians out, and till that was done, domestic questions must wait. On these terms he promised to give loyal support to the Provisional Government. But it was impossible to keep the political question in the background. The fraternal embracings of Lombards and Piedmontese soon broke down under the strain of ill- success and disappointment. As the army halted feeble and irresolute before Radetzky s lines, suspicion, only suspended for the moment by the victory of Pastrengo, steadily grew ; and when Nugent overran Venetia,^ the Lombards, solicitous for the sister-province, hinted angrily at treachery and a new Campoformio. And in every class there were fainthearts, whose lukewarm patriotism ill bore the difficulties and dangers of the war, and looked askance at the Piedmontese, as little better than Croats, preying on the country. The army for its part, writhing under the insults of the bitter, restless Milanese press, daily witnesses of the apathy of the rural population round the Mincio, were little disposed to fight without compensation, and angry words passed to and fro between Turin and Milan. The Provisional Government, too, was losing public con- fidence. The Republicans on it had been pliable to a fault, and the Moderates, who came to control it, possessed in a supreme degree the timidity and incapacity of their party. The finances were in complete disorder. The war was costing the province heavily ; the government had abolished many of the most unpopular burdens, it was difficult in the gene- ral unsettlement to collect the indirect taxes, and neither the heavy land-tax nor the patriotic offerings, considerable though they were, filled the void. The financial mismanage- 1 See below, p. 249. 243 THE WAE ment However would have been forgiven, had the govern- ment made better provision for the war. It is probable indeed that the Piedmontese commissariat was responsible for the army’s short supplies of food ; for more than sufficient was sent to the front, and the magazines were gorged.^ But for the slackness in forming a Lombard contingent the blame must go to the government at Milan. In spite of fair words it discouraged and mismanaged the Volunteers, cooling their enthusiasm with unsympathetic generals and orders that breathed distrust. It was impossible of course to improvise an army of trained soldiers, but there were 60,000 in the country , who had passed through the Austrian ranks, and no serious attempt was made to enlist them. It was July before some 10,000 raw conscripts were able to take the eld. It weighed little against such sins of omission, that the government showed a little reforming activity; the war overshadowed all else, and its laxity in this wrecked its popularity. Everything tended to bring to the front the question of “fusion” with Piedmont; and small blame can attach to the fusionists that they forced the government to find an issue from a position that contented nobody. The Pied- montese had to be satisfied by some tangible mark of grati- tude ; above all more vigour must be thrown into Lombardy’s ^are of the war. The formation of a powerful North Italian Kingdom, whatever its drawbacks, would at least shield Italy from Austrian aggression. Less worthy motives had their influence; the dread of a socialist republic, sycophancy to f to see Milan once more the seat of a brilliant court. The honester patriots of the opposition, though republicans in principle, were willing to sacrifice their theories to so big a step towards Unity, provided that a democratic constitution preserved the republic in its sub- stance ; and pressing appeals came from the republicans of Uenoa to form one family, in which democratic Genoa and Milan would be more than sufficient counterweight to Turin. The conservative fusionists organised an active and unscrupu- ’’V : Kestelli e Miestri, Fatti di Mtlano, 7, 13 , Corsi, 1844-1879, 131. See Della Eocca, Autobiografia, I. 1S5. 244 ^ HISTOEY OF ITALIAN UNITY lous ao-itation. Overtures were made to Mazzini and Cattaneo ; others" were won by promise of office or promotion. For a time the Provisional Government stood by its first promise of neutraUty; it even, it seems, in curious content to its general policy, intrigued at Venice agamst fusion. But soon forgetting its pledges, blind to the complications that loomed in ie ffiture, E thought only of the^ present necessity and gave way to the growing pressure without Early m May- it announced a plebiscite on the issue whether ^ould take place at once, or the question be postponed to the end of the war. Mazzini bitterly taunted it with breakmg faith and the excitement at Milan compelled it to promise, that whatever the issue of the plebiscite, the rig ° meeting, freedom of the press, and a citizen guard should be of the month. _ Later experience has shown how untrustworthy a plebiscite may be how with a people untrained in political life a vote on a single issue, taken hurriedly without free and full discussion, may be far from representing the real feelings of a peop . Royalist agents had been at work, and the idea abroad, that if the vote went against Charles Albert, he would with- draw from the war. Gioberti was brought to Milan to act as a counterpoise to Mazzini, and his theme of Char es Albert or Austria” was sung in every key. The republicans divided and irresolute, many of their leaders away at th war, ill-at-ease in opposing a movement that told umtj’ for the most part abstained. Villagers voted under the eyes of the priest, soldiers at their officers biddmg; forgery pressure, coercion were freely used. Still the result mus Lve surprised all parties. Five hundred and sixty or 84 per cent, of the electorate, gave them votes, and baie y seven hundred were recorded for postponing the questiom Makino' every allowance for the unworthy arts of one party and the disorganization of the other it whelming preponderance in favour of fusion. At Baim. and Piafenzaand Modena the plebiscites showed majorities proportionately as great. CHAPTEE XIII THE WAR (Continued) MAY AUGUST I 848 Fusion in Venetia, and at Venice; Piedmont and fusion; results of fusion The war in Venetia; NugenPs advance; Cornuda; Thurn’s attacks on Vicenza. Piedmontese inaction ; Curtatone ; second battle of Goito • loss of Vicenza, and Venetia. Palmerston’s negotiations. Piedmont and the war. Sommacampagna ; Custozza ; Volta; the retreat • the defence of Milan ; the Sukkender op Milan. In Venetia the question of fusion, was complicated by Manin’s proclamation of the republic. His political faith was republican, he had no liking for “ a half-revolution, that needed another to complete it.” He feared that an over- preponderancy of Piedmont would wreck any scheme of federation. But he had no wish to prejudice the future settlement of the nation; he repudiated any municipal sentiment, looking forward, as he did, to the federation, perhaps to the complete unity of Italy, and wishing to leave her final destiny to be decided by a Diet at Kome.^ It is probable that, despite his natural leanings, he would not have proclaimed the republic, had he not thought that Venice could be best won to the national cause by reviving the name of her great past, whose sins had been forgotten, and whose memories were so dear. Whether he was wise may be doubted. It is impossible not to think that his own prestige would have been enough to win the populace ; It IS certain that his action created difficulties. It offended the Lombards and Genoese by seeming to run counter to the general understanding not to consider the form of government till after the war ; it gave France an excuse to 1 Planat de la Faye, Documents, I. 145, 189, 264, 316, 391-392, 422; Kestelli’s reports in Casati, Milano. 245 246 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY set up the sister repubUc against the monarchical patriotism of Piedmont. On the Venetian mainland, ^here Manms government had but a nominal authority, the old jealousy of Venice blazed up afresh ; Padua and Vicenza and Treviso had no grateful memories of the republic that had only been a tyrant to them. Towards the middle of April the news of Nu See below, p. 249- ' Biaachi, Diplomazia, V. 270 . THE WAR , 247 her from another Campoformio. The government still ^^hised to hold, a plebiscite, but it was forced to order the election of an Assembly to decide on the political future of the city (June 3). The small polls showed the indifference of the masses, and the fusionists carried all before them. When the Assembly opened (July 3), the adroit manoeuvring of the Piedmontese agent secured an easy victory, and Manin, seeing that the cause was lost, was anxious only to avoid division ; let us forget parties to-day,’’ he said, “ and be neither republicans nor royalists but Italians.” By an almost unanimous vote the Assembly decided for immediate annexation to Piedmont. Manin and Tommaseo resigned, and a month later the Piedmontese flag floated in the Piazza. The question passed to Piedmont. Parma and Modena had dedicated themselves without reserves, but elsewhere the question was complicated by the conditions, which had been stipulated for in the plebiscites, and both Lombardy and Venetia had already taken steps for the election of a National Assembly. Thus the fusion bristled sufiiciently with difficulties, and above them there was hot debate whether Milan or Turin should be the future capital. The Piedmontese ministry was divided on the acceptance of the conditions. The conservative section swerved at their democratic colour, especially as they implied universal suffrage in Piedmont too. A national assembly might even wreck the throne, and the transfer of the capital to Milan meant the downfall of Piedmontese hegemony. Pareto and Ricci, Liberals and Genoese, welcomed the opportunity of destroying the supremacy of Turin and merging Piedmont in a wider Italian power. Balbo, a man of generous loyal nature, but angular and hot-tempered, made a bad premier of a discordant ministry. The quarrel was transferred from the Cabinet to the Chamber. The majority of the Deputies were Moderate Liberals of the middle and noble classes lawyers, landowners, civil servants— men of high character, but necessarily lacking in experience. Reflecting the gener- ous patriotism of the country, they were ready to meet the Lombards more than half-way, and though the vested interests 248 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY at Turin fought hard to pledge the government not to move i the capital, many even of the stricter Piedmontese school | felt that it was too dangerous play to alienate the Lombards, and perhaps throw them into the arms of the French Republic. Pareto, backed by Rattazzi, defeated the con- servative section, and saving a condition that the monarchy should not be left an open question. Parliament agreed to the Lombard terms and carried the Law of Union by a very large majority. It is not easy to balance the wisdom and unwisdom of the fusion. Had Charles Albert been a great general, and the forces of North Italy, as seemed probable at the time, sufficient to defeat Radetzky ; or had the King thrown him- self on the nation, and drawn round him the patriots of all Italy, the fusion would have been a big step to Unity, and the work of i860 might have been anticipated in part by twelve years. As it was, the fusion proved a great political blunder. The Piedmontese army was not sufficient of itself ; the one hope of victory lay in keeping old allies or winning new ones. But fusion angered France and Switzerland, both jealous of a strong monarchy in North Italy; it com- pleted the alienation of the Pope and King of Naples, and increased the suspicions of the Tuscan government. And the haste and indecorum of the plebiscite, which appeared to place the dynastic interests of Savoy above the hopes of Italy, damped what enthusiasm was left to the Democrats, and robbed the national struggle of half its moral force. “While Charles Albert was collecting votes, Radetzky was collecting men,” and Nugent was hurrying to his help with a force 14,000 strong. In the early days of^ the revolution the whole of the Venetian mainland had risen; corps of students and volunteers had hurried from its towns towards the Quadrilateral, till a severe defeat at Montebello^ sent them discouraged back. At first the Venetians had looked more to Rome than Piedmont for help, and the Papal troops were hurrying up. But the 1 Not to be confused with Montebello, where the battle of 1859 took place. THE WAR 249 necessary organizing power and nucleus of reliable troops could only come from Piedmont, and with strange careless- ness Charles Albert and his generals had done nothing for Venetia beyond sending a few artillerymen to Zucchi at Palmanuova, indifferent that the provinces lay directly exposed to attack from Austria, fancying perhaps that she was too exhausted to make another effort. The brief period of security soon passed. The loyalty of the Croatian Ban, Jellalich, allowed Nugent to muster a respectable force of Croat regiments, and with these he crossed the Isonzo on April 16. Palmanuova was masked, and Udine captured after a brave resistance. A few thousand men might have easily defended the Tagliamento ; the country people, un- assisted, destroyed the bridges, and the mountaineers drove back^ Welden, who tried to cross the Alpine passes from Carniola. But there were no regulars to help them ; Nugent crossed the Tagliamento on pontoons (April 27), and finding the bridges again broken on the Piave turned northwards to Belluno. Meanwhile the Venetians, realising their danger, had sent pressing messages to Charles Albert to allow the Roman forces, now placed under his command, to advance. ^ Bitter charges were brought against him that he was deliberately sacrificing Venetia. But there was no treachery the King was probably overruled by his generals, and their inaction, wise or unwise, was due to military con- siderations.^ At last (April 24) unable longer to resist the appeals, he allowed the Roman generals to march forward. While Giovanni Durando with the regulars, strangely dila- tory, refused to advance beyond Bassano, Ferrari’s volunteers, impatient and tumultuous, followed by peasants with forks and scythes, their priests with pistols at their head, pushed up the right bank of the Piave to the northern border of the plain at Cornuda. Here Ferrari was attacked in a disadvantageous position (May 8) ; his volunteers fought bravely for two days against superior numbers, while Durando, who might easily have relieved them and crushed the outnumbered Austrians, sent only a few troops. His ^ Revel, 1847, 22; Planat de la Faye, op. cit., 1 . 205; Ufficiale Pie- naontese, Memorie^ 136 > Riv. stor. del risorg., I. 271. 2 50 A HISTORY OF ITALIAN UNITY strange manoeuvre became afterwards the subject of a fierce polemic ; and it is so difficult to excuse it by any plea of error, that it seems probable that suspicious of the republicanism of Ferrari and his troops, prompted by Piedmontese intrigues or anxious to please the Pope by , keeping his Swiss troops intact, he sacrificed the Roman volunteers to the miserable partisanship of his chiefs.^ Ferrari’s men retreated tow'ards Treviso, and the retreat became a rout. The news of the Encyclical reached the camp, and the volunteers feared that, as their government had not formally declared war, they were liable, if captured, to be shot as filibusters. But Thurn, who had succeeded to the invalided Nugent, received orders to leave Treviso, and hurry on towards Verona. After an ineffectual attempt on Vicenza he marched on, but, before he reached Verona, Radetzky, angry at the repulse and realising aU the import- ance of Vicenza, ordered the footsore troops to return and attack it again. But Durando had brought up the bulk of his force ; and Thurn’s troops, driven back from the Benoi Hills and caught among the flooded ditches round the city, were forced to retreat once more with heavy loss. It was May 25 when he reached Verona. ^ During the fortnight, which had passed since Santa Lucia, the Pied- montese army had relapsed once more mto ^ maction. Reactionary and timid men surrounded the King, an confidence in eventual victory combined with the torren- tial rains to discourage any decisive step. Had a htt e more energy been shown, Nugent’s advance might have been stopped, the passes of Rivoli and Schio seized, and Radetzky hemmed in to Verona and its barren neighbour- hood. He on his side was only waiting for Nugent’s tiwps to take the field. He determined to make a final effort to save Peschiera, but apparently despairing of breaking throu