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A 
 
 REPLY 
 
 T O 
 
 HON. WILLIAM THOMAS’ 
 
 EXPOSITION AND DEFENSE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW; 
 
 BY WILLIAM CARTER. 
 
 
 WINCHESTER, ILLS: 
 
 Printed at Hie office of the “Western Unionist.” 
 
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REPLY. 
 
 
 Jn his Exposition and Defence of the Fu- 
 gitive Slave Law, Mr. Thomas has shown 
 himself to be a well read lawyer. Had lie 
 been as well versed in Moral science as in 
 legal statutes, he would not have published 
 the doctrine that a man is bound to obey an 
 immoral la-w or quit the country: that in 
 case of conflict between human and divine 
 law, the only alternative to obedience to the 
 former, is expatriation. Let us examine 
 this doctrine. 
 
 Mr. T. says “he does not contest the 
 proposition that man is not bound to obey 
 God rather than man.’’ Of course he could 
 not and believe the Bible, for the proposi- 
 tion is there affirmed in express terms. — 
 Ha finds difficulty, however, in seeing who 
 is to determine whether there is a conflict 
 of laws. Of course every man is to decide 
 for himself, on his responsibility to God on 
 the one hand, and under liability to civil 
 penally on the other. Acting between 
 these two forces, the principle never has 
 worked harm and never will. Indeed Mr. 
 T. shows the absurdity of there being any 
 other Earthly tribunal. The ultimate de- 
 cision must be in the court of Heaven to 
 which the appeal is taken. 
 
 But what authority has Mr. T. for his 
 posittion that a man must either submit to 
 an immoral law or expatriate himself? — 
 Blackstone lays down the doctrine that “if 
 any human law should allow or enjoin us 
 to commit it [what the divin^law forbids] 
 we are bound to transgress thatnuman law. ” 
 But he does not say we are also bound to 
 quit the country. 
 
 When Daniel violated the law forbidding 
 him to pray to his God, he did very wrong, 
 according to Mr, T., he ought either to 
 have obeyed or quit the country. But when 
 Jehovah shut the lions' mouths, it looks ve- 
 ry much as if he approved both of his dis- 
 obedience, and his staying in the country. 
 So, according to Mr. T., the three children 
 of Israel did very wrong to stay in the 
 country, and yet refuse to bow down to 
 Nebuchadnezzar’s golden image, But God 
 did not seem so to regard it when he saved 
 them from the fiery furnace. And equally 
 culpable, according to Mr. T.’s doctrine, 
 
 were the Apostles in staying in the country, 
 and yet refusiug to obey the command of 
 the Sanhedreim, not to preach in the name 
 of Jesus. But it so happens that we have 
 a formal decision in this case. After they 
 had been forbidden, and imprisoned for dis- 
 obedience, the angel of the Lord led them 
 out of the prison, and commanded them 
 both to stay in the country, and disobey 
 their rulers. Said he: “go and speak in 
 the temple, all the words of this life.”— 
 Acts 5: 20. Divine authority, then, is 
 against Mr. T.’s position. 
 
 Mr. T.’s doctrine makes Judas Iscariot, 
 the only true patriot and Christian. The 
 highest authority in the Jewish nation had 
 issued a command that if any man knew 
 where Jesus was, he should show it, that 
 they might arrest him. There were twelve 
 men to whom this command was especial- 
 ly applicable, for they knew where he was. 
 None of them, it would seem, thought of 
 quitting the country in the dilemma. Elev- 
 en of them were your hot headed, fanatical 
 rebels, who held the higher law doctrine and 
 followed that. But one of them had the 
 genuine patriotism of the modern type, and 
 obeyed the powers that be. True, it might 
 seem to mar his patriotism and his piety, 
 that he received a reward for the deed.— 
 But upon reflection it seemed to him enough 
 to have done such a deed without q reward 
 and he comes back and casts it at his em- 
 ployers’ feet. 
 
 Did Mr. T. never read the history of the 
 Puritans? Is ho aware that Hume says, 
 “the precious spark of liberty had been 
 kindled by the Puritans alone?’’ that to 
 them “the English owe the whole freedom 
 of their Constitution?” that Lord Brough- 
 ham says of them, “they obtained for Eng- 
 land the free Constitution she enjoys?” — 
 And that the peculiarity of the Puritans 
 was that they would obey God rather than 
 man? and those of them who wrought out 
 for England her free Constitution, stayed in 
 that country? aod that a portion of them 
 came to America, and here plantod a lib- 
 erty tree whose branches now dip into the 
 Atlantic and Pacific? and that Mr. T. is 
 now sitting under its shade, and eating us 
 
 
4 
 
 fruit, and yet saying to all those who have 
 a spark of the Puritan spirit, you must quit 
 the country? 
 
 But what is Mr. T.’s strong argument 
 against peaceful non-conformity to a law 
 which a man cannot conscientiously obey, 
 vvhile he submits to its penalty? The con- 
 sequences! Revolution! “Is it not obvious,” 
 he asks, “that such a course would result 
 in revolution?” No, and it is marvellous 
 that Mr. T. does not see that it would re- 
 sult neither in revolution, nor any other 
 direful calamity. “Why,” says he, “sup- 
 pose three fourths of the inhabitants should 
 assume this position, who will execute the 
 penalties?” Nobody, 1 presume; the law 
 would become a dead letter, as it ought to 
 be, and be repealed in due time. Suppose 
 Congress should pass a law requiring ev- 
 ery person uot to read his Bible but to burn 
 it, on penalty of six months imprisonment. 
 
 I should hope more than three fourths 
 would disobey on conscientious grounds. — 
 Who then would execute the penalty? No- 
 body, it might be. But is not this revolu- 
 tion, overthrow of government, anarchy and 
 confusion dire? No, the law would be a 
 dead letter like our State law forbidding 
 the circulation of foreign bills less than five 
 dollars. And though this law is disregar- 
 ded for convenience and not for conscience 
 sake, 1 have never heard of a revolution or 
 a shock to government, in consequence. — 
 We have a case on record in point. King 
 Saul once commanded his people when iu 
 pursuit of the enemy, not to take food un- 
 til night. Jonathan not knowing the com- 
 mand, ate of a honey comb which he found 
 in the way, for which Saul ordered him to 
 be put to death. Nobody would execute 
 the penalty. What was the result? Rev- 
 olution? Not at all. Saul roigned as be- 
 fore, and was more careful what laws he 
 made next time. 
 
 But suppose a war, say3 Mr. T., in I 
 which the people should take the same | 
 ground. Very well, ^suppose our govern- ( 
 ment should declare war upon Canada! 
 for the avowed purpose ol making it a; 
 slave State, and three-fourths of our I 
 people should believe it to be morally j 
 wrong and refuse to have part or lot in] 
 
 | it? What would be the result? The 
 best possible. Tne war would fail, and 
 Congress would learn wisdom for the 
 future. But suppose Congress right and 
 the people wrong. Suppose three- 
 fourths ol the people were Mahometans, 
 and Congress should require every wit- 
 ness to swear by the Bible. What the 
 result? Not revolution, but wisdom on 
 the part of Congress not to enact laws 
 in conflict with people’s consciences. — 
 Does he not know how futile is aiaw a- 
 gainst the conscience of a people? ' 
 
 But says Mr. T., this doctrine “is no 
 more nor less than saying that a man 
 may rightfully violate the law by burn- 
 ing a house or stealing a horse, if when 
 detected, he does not resist punishment.” 
 Not rightfully, unless the act is right. 
 No one can rightfully refuse obedience 
 to the Fugitive Slave Law, unless it is 
 right in the sight of God so to do. But 
 what great harm to the community 
 would grow out of it, should a thief or 
 house-burner profess to be conscientious 
 in hi? vocation. The penalty would be 
 inflicted just the same. As a matter of 
 fact, no one would be likely to pursue 
 the vocation long from conscientious 
 motives. 
 
 The history of the world shows the 
 danger is not that men will subject them • 
 selves to civj^ penalties from conscien- 
 tious motives, but the whole danger is 
 that they will obey wicked laws rather 
 than incur their penalty. Witness Dan- 
 iel and the three children of Israel. — 
 With the exception of these, the whole 
 nation bowed to the impious laws of 
 of their monarchs. 
 
 Is there any inherent reason in Mr. 
 T’s, position? if human government en- 
 acts a law contrary to the law of God, 
 he admits that we have no right to obey* 
 it. How then can that wrong act of 
 government work a forfeiture of my 
 right to remain in my native land? If 
 our government commands me to blas- 
 pheme my Maker, reason and common 
 
 % 
 
sense decide that I am neither bound to 
 obey nor quit the country, especially 
 when the government does not impose 
 exile. And the wonder is that Mr. T. 
 should have propounded the contrary 
 doctrine. 
 
 Mr. T. is pleased to say that if there 
 had been no political objects to attain 
 by agitation, it is not probable that any 
 occupants of pulpits would have been 
 made to believe that their rights of con- 
 science were in 'any wise interfered 
 with by any of the provisions of this 
 Fugitive Slave Law, Does he not see 
 how easy it would be to retort that but 
 for political objects, it is not probable he 
 would ever have been made to believe 
 the doctrine he has promuiged? I have 
 no doubt the latter is just as true as the 
 former, but 1 will not make it because 
 of its intrinsic impropriety which no 
 man is more likely on reflection to see 
 than Judge Thomas. 
 
 The Fugitive Slave Law commands all 
 good citizens to aid and assist in the prompt 
 and efficient execution of the law, whenever 
 their services may be required by the mar- 
 shal. Very many people believe they arG 
 thus commandeid to do what is contrary to 
 the Divine law; that it is a palpable viola- 
 tion of the Golden Rule; that if they or their 
 fathers had been kidnapped into slavery, 
 they couid not think it wrong for them to 
 runaway, nor right for others to force them 
 back, and that no law commanding thereto 
 aid and assist in forcing back the fugitive 
 from bondage, could make it right so to do. 
 Judge Thomas does not deny that this Fu- 
 gitive Slave Law commands us to do what 
 is contrary to the law of God. 
 
 I do not understand the Constitution to 
 require private citizens to aid and assist in 
 returning fugitive slaves; nor do I under- 
 stand that the law of ’93 required it. Nor 
 do I understand Judge T. to affirm it of 
 either. But l understand him to maintain 
 that there isa3 much reason why good citi- 
 zens should aid in executing the law in ref- 
 
 erence to fugitive slaves, as in reference to 
 fugitive apprentices or fugitives from jus- 
 tico. From the legal stand-point where 
 the Judge looks at them, it may seem the 
 same. But from the moral stand-point, the 
 difference is as wide as the poles. In the 
 one case we are called on to do what is right , 
 in the other what is wrong in the sight of 
 God. This fugitive slave bill, so far as l 
 know, is the first ever passed by Congress 
 commanding all good citizens to do what 
 the Divine law forbids. But if the law of 
 ’93 or even the Constitution enjoined what 
 conflicts with the law of God, we are bound 
 not to obey. 
 
 But Judge T. endeavors to show that 
 citizens in aiding to execute wicked laws, 
 do not participate in the wrong. He sup- 
 poses a case in which the judge or sheriffis 
 satisfied that a man is convicted of felony 
 upon false testimony. Does the Judge, he 
 asks, by pronouncing sentence, or the sher- 
 iff by conveying the man to the penitentia- 
 ry, become guilty of perjury or false im- 
 prisonment? There might be a difference 
 of opinion in that case. But some would 
 say, no. Why? Because, they would say, 
 whan a man is tried for felony, it belongs to 
 the jury and to nobody else, to decide upon 
 the testimony. But when the question is, 
 does a law conflict with the law of God, it 
 belongs to every body to decide for himself, 
 and to act in accordance with that decision. 
 If a law commands idolatry, every man is 
 bound to decide for himself whether or not 
 it is a violation of God's law. No decision 
 of courts or juries can exonerate him from 
 the obligation to judge for himself and act 
 for himself. And so every man’s conscience 
 decides. There is no difference of opinion 
 on this point. Cannot Mr. T. see that 
 there is a radical difference between a de- 
 fect in the operation of a righteous and bo- 
 
6 
 
 nevolent law which punishes the felon, and 
 a wicked law which contravenes the law of 
 God. Suppose a man is to be burned at 
 the stake for refusing obedience to the law 
 commanding idolatry. Does not Mr. T. 
 think that every man who aids in executing 
 that law, even the man who binds the 
 chains, or piles the faggots, or applies the 
 torch, is guilty in the sight of God of the 
 iniquity of that law? Does not every man's 
 conscience decide that every one who aids 
 in sustaining and executing that impious 
 law, whether commanded or not, partakes 
 of its guilt? because it was a case in which 
 he was bound to know whether or not it was 
 contrary to the law of God. Dr. E. Beech- 
 er, former President of Illinois College has 
 some remarks on this subject, in a late ser- 
 mon, a few of which 1 beg to introduce: 
 
 “In all such cases the law of responsi- 
 bility is this; that those who in organic re- 
 lations perform such acts, are answerable 
 as individuals; that those whom they repre- 
 sent in such acts are also individually re- 
 sponsible to God for the organic sin if they 
 uphold and perpetuate such action; and that 
 they are responsible in a higher sense than 
 for any other kind of action. No matter 
 how long such laws exist, or for how many 
 generations they have been handed down; 
 every man and every generation who receives 
 and sustains them becomes individually re- 
 sponsible . 
 
 “That this is the real law of responsibili- 
 ty is clear; because no organic sin can be 
 committed but by tho voluntary action of 
 individuals; it cannot be charged upon fate 
 or any other responsible abst raction that 
 has no soul; and because the conseque nces 
 of the action of individuals are never so 
 great as when they act in organic relations; 
 and of course the obligations to act right 
 are never so high. The wide extent of 
 their consequences, the power of such ex- 
 
 ample, the perversion of the noblest parts of 
 our nature (the social powers) the evil edu- 
 cation established, the force of temptation 
 created, show this. These consequences do 
 not terminate with the actors. The malig- 
 nant power of a sinful law extends through 
 the social sphere, and becomes a fountain of 
 evil whose streams widen and deepen as they 
 flow on, until the imagination is overwhelm- 
 ed with their extent. The example of or- 
 ganic sin has greater influence in destroy- 
 ing tho energy of conscience. The makers 
 of laws and the directors of corporations, 
 are always the leading men of the commu- 
 nity.” “For what then should a man be 
 responsible, if not an agency in creating 
 such instruments of corruption? Sinful leg- 
 islation arrays interest and prejudice against 
 truth and tends to make men indifferent to 
 principle, and even to abandon the right, 
 through fear of dishonor or loss. Hence 
 the Word of God represents such a corrupt 
 organization under tho form of a terrific 
 beast, and asks, — “Who is like unto tho 
 beast? who is able to make war with him?” 
 And its power of temptation is represented 
 as being extended over all whose names 
 are not written in the book of life, by the 
 simple process of exacting from them some 
 token of submission, and by threatniug non- 
 intercourse in trade, and even death to those 
 who refuse to comply with the wicked law. 
 What a fearful responsibility rests on the 
 authors of such systems of temptation by 
 law ! But this is no excuse to those who 
 yield to the temptation, obeying man more 
 than God, for we read tt that not only the 
 beast and the false nrophet were cast alive 
 into a lake burning with fire and brimstone, 
 but all who should worship him or receive 
 his mark, shall share the same fearful desti- 
 ny.” 
 
 I have now shown, I think, that men are 
 not bound to quit the country or obey a law’ 
 which is in conflict with the Divine law; 
 that disobedience does not necessarily lead 
 to revolution; that tho Fugitive Slave Law 
 commands all good citizens to do what is 
 contrary to the Divine law; aud that in aid- 
 ing in its execution they incur the guilt of 
 disobeying God. If Judge Thomas thinks 
 my reasoning unsound, 1 hope he will point 
 
 • » 
 
7 
 
 it out and establish his own positions if he 
 can. 
 
 As his constitutional argument doe9 not 
 affect the duty of obedience to law, I might 
 here stop; but inasmuch as it is as baseless 
 as his moral argument, 1 suppose it, is prop* 
 per to expose it. 
 
 The peculiarity of Judge Thomas’ defense 
 of the Fugitive Slave Law, is, that he lays 
 the Constitution by the side of the law, and 
 attempts to supply the defects in the law, 
 from the Constitution. The article which 
 he uses for this purpose, is the following : 
 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
 shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
 trial b> an impartial jury of the state and 
 district wherein the crime shall have been 
 committed, which district shall have been 
 previously ascertained by law, and to be in- 
 formed of the nature and cause of the ac- 
 cusation; to be confronted withjjthe witness- 
 es against him; to have compulsory process 
 for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to 
 have the assistance of counsel for his de- 
 fence.” From this he infers that “when 
 the fugitive is arrested, he is entitled under 
 the Constitution to have compulsory process 
 for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to 
 have the assistance of counsel for his de- 
 fence; and the right to make affidavit sta- 
 ting the names and residences of witnesses 
 and showing their materiality, results from 
 the right to have compulsory process.” As 
 to the right of trial by jury, he infers that 
 all the right the alleged fugitive has, is de- 
 rived from this article of the Constitution, 
 and this expressly locates the trial in the 
 state from which he escaped, and therefore 
 excludes it from the state where he is ar- 
 rested. Now all this is very plausible, and 
 would be very conclusive, but for one de- 
 fect. The articleof the Constititution which 
 he thus U3es, has no more applicability, to 
 the alleged fugitivejslave, than to the man in 
 the moon. That article begins by saying, 
 “In all criminal prosecutions” &c. The 
 prosecution of a person escaping from ser- 
 vice is not a criminal prosecution; the ques- 
 tion, which is raised and tried is not one of 
 crime, but of property \ the question is, 
 does the man own himself or is he own- 
 ed by the claimant? The language ot 
 
 the Constitution shows this: “he shall 
 be delivered up on claim of the party to 
 whom such service or labor may be 
 due.” The question of service or labor 
 due, is one of property, not of crime. — 
 And when the claimant takes him back 
 to the state whence he escaped, it is 
 not to afford him a jury trial, but to en- 
 joy the right of property in him, which 
 has been decided without a jury. 
 
 Many intelligent persons suppose 
 that the alleged fugitive from service, 
 has the right of trial by jury secured to 
 him by the following article of the Con- 
 stitution: u In suits at common law, 
 where the value in controversy shall ex- 
 ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
 by jury shall be preserved.” As we 
 have seen, the question in respect to an 
 alleged fugitive from service, is one of 
 property. “The value in controversy 
 exceeds twenty dollars,” usually. And 
 the right of trial by jury secured by this 
 article, is in the place where the properly 
 is found. If this article applies to the 
 question of property in the alleged fu- 
 gitive, then the fugitive slave law is un- 
 constitutional, for it deprives him of this 
 right. 
 
 The conclusion then to which we 
 come, is that neither this law nor the 
 article of the Constitution which Judge 
 T. quotes, gives to the alleged fugitive 
 slave, the light to have compulsory pro 
 cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
 nor to have the assistance of counsel, 
 nor the right to make affidavit for pur- 
 poses of continuance, or securing the at- 
 tendance of witnesses, nor the right of 
 trial by jury either where he is arrested 
 or any where else. The bill reported 
 by Mr. Clay, as chairman of the com- 
 mittee of thirteen (a part of the omni- 
 bus) did provide for a jury trial in £case 
 the alleged fugitive declared himself 
 free in the presence of the Court or 
 Commissioner and was delivered up. — 
 The claimant was put under a bond of 
 one thousand dollars, to take the alleged 
 
* 
 
 fugitive before a court of cmpetent ju- 
 risdiction in the county whence he fled, 
 at its first term, and then and there per- 
 mit a trial by jury for his freedom, and 
 “afford the facilities necessary for a *fair 
 trial.” But the present law scouts 
 such a provision. 
 
 The actual state of things is this. If 
 a man from Texas claims my horse, I 
 have the right of trial by jury here. — 
 But if he claims me (and the law makes 
 no distinction of color,) this law debars 
 me the right of trial by jury here, and it 
 gives me the right nowhere, unless it 
 does here where this law excludes it.— 
 The false testimony of three men (es- 
 pecially if I were away from home a- 
 mong strangers)* might procure tfr 
 summary decision of the Commissions 
 in entire conformity to the law, which* 
 would send me to Texan bondage.— 
 Judge T. says 1 would be no worse oft 
 than if I were sent to Texas as an alleges 
 fugitive from justice, on false testimony,— 
 That is not so. In case of an alleged fugi- 
 tive from justice, the constitution expressly 
 provides fora speedy trial by an impartial 
 jury in the state whence he fled. But it 
 makes no such provision for an alleged fugi- 
 tive from service, nor will Mr.T. again affirm 
 it. Here is where the law leaves me. What 
 now can Mr. T. say in defence of this law? 
 Nothing! He can only say that if I am 
 taken to Texas (and not sold half adoz 
 en times by the way) and if Texas has 
 provided a law for a jury trial in such 
 cases, I may avail myself of that, i£ I 
 can; and if she has not, I may try and 
 get up an action for assault, and battery, 
 or false imprisonment, or something of 
 that kind. And that is all he can say; 
 unless he should add, as he seems to in- 
 timate, that if the Constitution does not 
 grant me the right of trial by jury, 1 
 have none; that the Constitution is the 
 only source of such right; that I can 
 claim nothing from natural justice any 
 more than the slaveholder for the deliv- 
 ery of his slave! And now with the 
 utmost respect for Judge Thomas, I beg 
 
 leave to say that this law, which he has un- 
 dertaken to defend, is a most abominable law, 
 and that he will have to try again before he 
 makes it appear otherwise. It allows mono 
 right of trial by jury on the question 
 whether! own myself or am owned by 
 a southern slaveholder; from the decis* 
 ion of an irresponsible, it may be an un- 
 principled Commissioner under this law, 
 there is no appeal; that decision puts 
 me where no writ of habeas corpus can 
 help me. I repeat.it is an abominable law. 
 
 It may me proper to say that 1 have 
 the utmost confidence in the honesty 
 and-christian character of Judge Thom- 
 as; but I will not say of him that I 
 think he has been misled or imposed 
 upon by wicked or designing men whose 
 object if not vocation is to deceive, and 
 that he has thus been led to make those 
 not correctly advised, believe lies, as he 
 says of an acquaintance; for it does not 
 seem to me it would be decorous. But 
 
 I may say with truth and propriety that 
 both his Constitutional and moral argu- 
 ments are entirely without foundation, 
 whether any body is misled by them or 
 not. And I hope he[will so see them. If 
 not, I hope he will show us their foundatior. 
 
 P. S. It has been suggested that my 
 reply to his constitutional argument is 
 not consistent with my first remark, 
 that Judge T’s defence shows him to be 
 a well read lawyer. I should not only 
 admit, but contend that he is such, 
 whether it is shown by his Defence or 
 not. But I confess that when I made 
 that remark I was not aware that he 
 had fallen into such an error, nor did I 
 suppose it possible he should. Such 
 was my confidence in his accuracy, 
 that I did not at first read his legal ar- 
 gument with a critical eye, nor did I 
 think of replying to it. Yet it lies on 
 the surface, and it is strange that any 
 body with an eye half open should not 
 see that he has applied an article of the 
 Constitution relating to criminal prose- 
 cutions, to the case of a fugitive from 
 service which is a question ol property*