OF THE U N I VER.S ITY Of ILLINOIS Received by bequest from Albert H. Lybyer Professor of History University of Illinois 1916-1949 COLLECTION OF BRITISH AUTHORS. VOL. 974. TIIE INVASION OF TH^ CRIMEA BY A. W. KINGLAIvE. VOL. Y. f - A EXPLANATION. A. The Mal/Tkoffi B. The B&cLotro. C. ThtFlagstouf Bastion, 3D. The CeiitraT Bastions. F. Fhe (iccrul) Quarmtirie Bastixiv. G-.G.Th-e Fngiish Camp . H. The Right o f ike Trench Caiwp. TL. The spot tram, which Bard Booglctn recoimoitredt Sebas- topol on the 25 T Septf 1. Fort Constantine & adjoin- ing Batteries.. 2. Telegraph Batten/. 3. Fort Michael. 9. The Severnaya or Star Fort 5. Batteries caTLe d Nwraher Four. 6, WhstBighfhoiose. 7 East Lighthouse^. 8. Bussicav Bhips. 9 Fort Fated. 1 0. The Farad) el Faicb burg. ll.iBasirbs and Boohs. 12. Hospital. 13. Brisons . 19. Man of War Fatih our. 15. Roadstead. 16&17. Fart St Nicholas. 18. Artillery Fort . 19. Fori Alexander. 2 0. ' Queer antin& SeouFort. 22. Cernuttry. 23. Fort cmdBulATrbqs of the Queer ouutirie. 29. Buoys shewing the Beefs. 25. Fixer Tckernaya . 26. Careenage Fcrrt. The line of svrdsen Ships, (which does not appear indhe drawing) sUetch- ed across the entraruoe of fhe Roadstead from tlzReef beneathFvrt Con. stwztine to the' one beneath FortAlexocndpi^. The Chains stretched. from the Beef "beneath Fort Mochooel to tie one "beneathBort Thckoloos. NOTE It must not beanderstood/ thoU? this drawing should be regarded/ as oo srricidy accurate repres entixtioro; buz it may aid the endear ours of those mho desire to have oo general cancer tiro tithe appearance 'Which Sebastopol might preserve latidber oo Birds eye Kcw * trortv the Wish Il ls based upon a Font published id Paris which purported to reproduce, oo ctrawmg prepared for 'the Emperor Ficiuolas,- b zot the. TepresmtajdoTo of lie Mdl/Tkoffs hows marks of 'co n cioFtirsobaic origin because die work, is made to look tike whose the Alois sump os edit to be i.e.oo round Tower, whereas it war in part off horse shoe form. ill THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS DOWN TO THE DEATH OF .LORD RAGLAN. BY ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE. COPYRIGHT EDITION. WITH ALL THE PLANS, MAPS AND EMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON EDITION. VOL. Y. LEIPZIG BERNHARD TAUCHNITZ 186 8 . The Bight of Translation is reserved. r : *.;• < M ■ V - . M j , '■ ■ ■ : , . * ' . • _ .. . . .ir:-* • ’ - . : ■ : . T . ■ ' • > : ’ : • ■ • . " r s? . / 77 v.S-1 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAPTER XLV. Disposition of the Allied armies after the battle of the Alma, Continued prevalence of cholera, ... State of the field after the battle, Bearing of the wounded men, .... ■^Effect of the scene on the soldiers, . ^Evil of keeping the soldiers on the site of the battle Feeling disclosed by those of the Light Division, 'The wounded Russians, ■Neglect to which they were for a time subjected, ■Mr. Romaine’s exertions for their relief, . TAld rendered by Major Sankey, ^ These wounded Russians left on the Alma, * Painful task imposed on Dr. Thompson, . ' Succour brought at last by Captain Lushington, The number embarked and sent to Odessa, i State in which they arrived, .... Tone taken by the Russian Governor on the subject, CHAPTER XL VI. Page 1 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 S 8 10 10 11 11 ■> .^Importance of prompt advance after the victory, .... - tLord Raglan in favour of an immediate advance, .... j*His reasoning, and that of Sir Edmund Lyons, .... *£Steps taken by him for giving it effect, ^Meeting between St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, ~"*Lord Raglan urges immediate advance with a view to attack the North Fort, 13 14 14 14 15 15 VI CONTENTS OP VOLUME V. Page St. Arnaud refuses, 15 Lord Raglan’s vexation, 16 Second interview, and advance again urged, ..... 16 St. Arnaud still refuses, ‘ . . . . 16 Lord Raglan’s dejection, 16 His determination to push on the enterprise, 17 As an alternative, he proposes to march to the south coast, . . 17 The Allies resolved, while still on the Alma, to prepare for this' eventuality, 18 Cause of the halt on the Alma, 18 How the project of the flank march tended to prolong it, . . 19 Its duration depended on the time needed for embarking the wounded, 20 Time required by the French, 20 And by the English, 20 Zeal and devotion of the navy in this service, 20 Part taken by our seamen in it, 21 Numbers of men stricken with cholera, 21 The halt lasted till the morning of the 23d, 22 Recapitulation of the circumstances which occasioned it, . . 22 St. Arnaud could say on the 22d that he was waiting for the English, 22 And accordingly he so writes 23 The fort which stood between the Allies and the North Side, . 23 Lord Raglan and SirE. Lyons in favour of immediately attacking it, 24 Soundness of their inferences, 24 This the first of the lost occasions 26 CHAPTER XL VII. Advance on the Katcha, 27 The village on its banks, 27 Its people, 27 The landing of the Scots Greys, 28 The British cavalry already pushed forward to the Belbec, . . .28 Sunday the 24th, 30 Hesitation at the French Headquarters , and its cause, ... 31 The advance delayed at the request of the French Commander, . 31 It is at length resumed, 32 Sebastopol in sight, 33 State of Marshal St. Arnaud, * 33 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. Vlt Page The direction of march discloses the bend in the resolve of the Allies, 33 Signs of the ruined condition of the Russian army, .... 34 Causes which prevented the Allies apprehending this, ... 34 They descend into the valley of the Belbec, 35 Reconnaissance by Lord Cardigan, 35 Serious nature of a resolve to abandon the old plan of the invasion, 35 CHAPTER XL VIII. The design of operating against Sebastopol from the north, . . 37 Reports in favour of such attack, 37 Accession of weight since given in favour of it, . . . . 38 The time come for a final decision, 38 The Severnaya or north side of Sebastopol, 39 Its value to the Allies, 39 The plateau overhanging the North Side, 40 The Star Fort, 41 Endeavours of the Russians to strengthen it, 42 Guns available for the defence, 44 The works might be attacked by the fleet, 44 Part which the fleets might have taken in the attack, ... 44 Forces available for the defence, 45 The force on the North Side commanded by Admiral Korniloff, . 45 Reasons for avoiding more detailed account of the preparations for its defence, 46 Opinion of Todleben on the defensibility of the Star Fort, . . 46 This corresponded with the views of Lord Raglan and Sir E. Lyons, 47 The objections urged against this plan, ...... 48 The grounds of Sir John Burgoyne’s conclusion, .... 52 Recapitulation of the French objections to it, 52 Reconnaissance by Sir E. Lyons, 53 He fails in persuading St. Arnaud to attack the Star Fort, . . 53 Lord Raglan’s power of lessening the evils of divided command, . 54 Dilemma in which the Allies were placed, 55 Information obtained respecting the land defences of Sebastopol, . 55 That supplied by Colonel Mackintosh, 56 And Mr. Oliphant, 37 His report on the state of these defences, 38 Effect it produced, 39 Lord Raglan’s leaning in favour of attack on the South Side, . . 69 VJII CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. Page This idea now recurred to him, 60 Movement necessary under this plan, 60 Hazardous character of it, 61 Its effect in wasting the moral strength gained by the victory, . 62 And in debarring the Allies from operations in the held, . . 62 It involves a task of unknown magnitude, 63 Little freedom of choice left to Lord Raglan, 64 Reasons justifying the flank march, ....... 65 How Lord Raglan regarded the alternative, 66 Sir John Burgoyne, 67 His opinion, 71 He is requested to put it in writing, 72 His memorandum, 72 He propounds the flank march to St. Arnaud, 73 How far the idea of it was entertained at the time of the halt on the Alma, 74 Lord Raglan’s conference with St. Arnaud, 75 The flank march determined on, 76 State of St. Arnaud, 77 Decision to which the chiefs came, 77 Difficulty of accounting for St. Arnaud’s unwillingness to attack the Star Fort 77 Lord Raglan’s feeling of uncertainty as to St. Arnaud’s motives, . 78 Probable origin of the French counsels, ...... 78 St. Arnaud’s bodily state, 78 The second of the lost occasions, . 80 CHAPTER XLIX. The Allies ignorant of the enemy’s movements, .... 81 Critical position of the Allies, 81 Cause which brought them into this, 82 Circumstances to which they owed their immunity, ... 83 False alarm in the night, 83 No sign of the enemy at dawn, 83 Virulence of cholera, 84 Demeanour of the sufferers, 84 CHAPTER L. I. Lord Raglan’s visit to St. Arnaud — State of the latter, • . . 85 Lord Raglan’s dispositions for the flank march, .... 85 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. IX Page Commencement of the march, The cavalry did not take the woodland road, 88 But marched like the infantry by compass, • 88 March of the infantry, • 88 Suffering of the infantry from thirst, 89 Their murmurs, 89 Reconnaissance by Lord Raglan in person, 89 Route taken by Lord Raglan, 91 He falls in with Maude’s horse-artillery, 92 Unguarded way in which Lord Raglan and the artillery moved on, 92 His proximity to the junction between the lane and the great road, 93 General Airey comes on a Russian force, 93 The surprise mutual, 94 Danger to the English, 94 Lord Raglan’s presence of mind, 94 How he deals with the emergency, 94 Interval before the coming of the cavalry, 95 The Russians lose their opportunity, 95 The English cavalry come up, 96 Dissatisfaction expressed by Lord Raglan to Lord Lucan, . . 96 Retreat of the Russians, 97 The Greys dismounted, and posted in the wood, .... 97 The pursuit stopped, 97 Prisoners and booty taken, 97 Lord Raglan’s dissatisfaction expressed to Lord Cardigan, . . 98 Mackenzie’s Farm, 99 Heavy bodies of Russians seen on the march, .... 99 Coincidence which brought on the mutual surprise, ... 99 Nature of the Russian movement not discerned by the English, . 100 The officer taken prisoner, *90 Lord Raglan pained and revolted by his state, .... 100 The nature of the enemy’s movement unknown, .... 100 Anxiety for recovery of the sea communication, .... 101 The march resumed, * 101 The Mackenzie Heights, 101 Arrival at the Tchernaya, *01 March of the French, 102 Cathcart’s duties pn the Belbec, 102 The communications with the Katcha now abandoned, . . . 102 Lord Raglan on tlje Tchernaya -r- Message to the Admirals, . . 102 X CONTENTS OF VOLUME V, Page Purport of it, 103 March resumed on the 26th, 103 Lord Raglan before Balaclava, 104 Fire opened from the old castle, 105 Lord Raglan’s measures, 105 Ships’ guns heard, 106 Surrender of Balaclava, 106 Reasons of the commandant for not surrendering at once, . . 106 Entrance of Lord Raglan into Balaclava, 107 Demeanour of the inhabitants, 107 Lord Raglan rides towards the water’s edge, 107 An English vessel comes in, 108 Lord Raglan’s words on recovering his sea communications, . . 108 Smallness and depth of the harbour, 109 Harbour and town quickly filled, 109 II. Remonstrance by the French — Its justice, 109 Impracticability of dividing the place, ...... 109 Grounds of the French claim to Balaclava, 109 Their forbearance, 110 The choice offered to Lord Raglan, 110 He determines to take the right in the line for the sake of retaining Balaclava, Ill The English take the right, and the French the left, . . . 112 This done by the choice of the former, 112 The Allies take up their ground, 112 Cathcart’s march, 112 Success of the flank march, 113 This afforded no test of its prudence, 113 The leadership, for the time, practically with Lord Raglan, . . 114 Good effect resulting from this, 114 III. Cessation of St. Arnaud’s command — Night of the 26th, . . 115 Policy of the Emperor regarding the command, .... 115 General Canrobert 115 Dormant commission entrusted to him, 115 This to be concealed from St. Arpaud, 115 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. XI Pago Interposition of Colonel Trochu, 116 The command resigned to Canrobert, 117 The Marshal’s state, 117 Lord Raglan’s last visit to him, 117 His feelings at the loss of St. Arnaud, 117 Troubles which the latter had occasioned to Lord Raglan, . . 118 Token of St. Arnaud’s goodwill towards General Bosquet, . . 119 St. Arnaud removed on shipboard, 120 His death, 120 CHAPTER LI. I. Absence of interdependence among the hostile armies, 121 Effect of this on the narrative, 121 The undertaking to defend Sebastopol, 122 Knowledge required to understand the conflict, 122 The roadstead of Sebastopol, ..... 122 The land defences on the North Side, 123 The Chersonese, 124 The Man-of-war Harbour, 125 Position of Sebastopol, ...... 125 The streets, 126 The Naval Library 126 Population of the place, 127 The sea defences, . 127 The fleet, . 128 Efficacy of the sea-forts and fleet for defence of the roadstead, 129 Extent to which its safety assured that of the town, 130 Nature of the ground on the land side,^ 130 II. Absence of land defences on the south in autumn 1853, Works commenced after the rupture, State of these in February 1854, And at the time of the landing, The armament of the works, HI. The Russian forces in the Crimea at the time of the landing, . . 135 Prince Mentschikofif’s double command, J37 332 132 133 133 134 XII CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. Page Facility with which the ships’ crews were brought into use on land, 137 The Admirals in command in Mentschikoff’s absence, . . . 137 Workmen available for the defences, 138 Force under Mentschikoff at the time of the landing, . . . 138 Abundance of warlike stores, 138 Materials and mechanical appliances available, .... 139 Ammunition, 139 Store of provisions, 140 The armada seen from Sebastopol, 140 Measures thereupon taken, 141 The landing known to be going on, 141 Coincidence of date observed by the Russians, .... 142 Intention of attacking the armada abandoned, 142 Withdrawal of sailors for land service, 142 Progress of the works, 142 Their state on the 20th September, 143 Distribution of authority after the 18th, 143 Telegraphic communication between Sebastopol and the army, . 143 Forces left in the city, 143 CHAPTER LII. I. Sebastopol on the day of the Alma, 145 Korniloff’s ride towards the field, 145 Meeting with Mentschikoff, 147 His orders for closing the roadstead, 147 Korniloff's reception of Ihese, 148 Mentschikoff’s idea of a stand on the Katcha 148 The state of his army not compatible with this, .... 149 His plan of taking up a flanking position, 149 Instructions given with that object, 149 The sounds of the battle at Sebastopol, 149 Bearing of the inhabitants, 150 Preparations for reception of the wounded, 150 Prince Mentschikoff’s return to the city, 150 Tidings of the defeat, 150 Wounded soldiery brought in, 150 Despatch of aide*de-camp to St. Petersburg, .... 150 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. XIII II. Council of admirals and naval captains, Korniioff's address, . . . . , His proposal to attack the Allied fleets, The latter part of his address, Reception of his proposal, The measure which seemed to be engaging the attention of the council, Could Korniioff’s measure be usefully proposed? . Reasons by which he supported it, Captain Zorin’s counter-proposal, Grief with which it was heard, Loud speaking, Feelings with which the measure was regarded, .... Korniloff dismisses the council, ....... His interview with Mentschikoff, . . . . Order of the latter to sink the ships, Korniloff refuses to obey it, Mentschikoff’s rejoinder, Korniloff withdraws his refusal, The order issued, Mentschikoff’s resolve, Removal of stores from the North Side, Todleben’s report of his survey, He communicates it to Mentschikoff, The Prince’s reception of it, The army passed over into Sebastopol, ...... Arrival of the defeated troops, Their bivouac near the town, The ships moved into their places, III. Impression made on the French fleet by the appearance of the ships, Abortive effort of Korniloff to save them, . . . . . Connection between the sinking of the ships and Mentschikoff’s plan of a flank march, Announcement of the determination to sink the ships, . Naval officers awaiting Korniloff at his house, .... Their endeavours to stay the sinking of the ships, . Korniioff’s answer, Page 151 151 152 153 153 154 154 154 155 155 155 155 156 156 157 157 157 157 157 157 158 158 158 159 159 159 159 159 160 160 160 161 161 161 161 XIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. Page His address to the seamen, 161 The doomed ships scuttled, 162 Morning of the 23d — Their ^tate, 162 Tenacity with which the Three Holy Fathers resisted sinking, . 162 Feelings excited by the spectacle, 162 The measure was ending the career of the Black Sea fleet, . . 163 Fall for the seamen by their transfer to land service, . . * 163 Mechanic state to which the Russian army had been brought, . . 163 Freedom of the naval forces from this evil, 165 Reason of the seaman to deprecate his transfer to land service, . 165 The policy of sinking the ships, 166 CHAPTER LIII. Power the Allies had of seizing the enemy’s communications, . 168 Mentschikoff’s grounds for dreading this, 168 Their not using it gives him opportunity of recovering them, . . 168 His plan, 168 Its advantages, 169 His justification for the abandonment of the garrison, . . . 169 The charge of defence from within to be left to the sailors, . . 169 Korniloff’s remonstrance against the plan, 169 Mentschikoff’s defence of it, 169 He orders the ships’ crews to be formed into battalions, . . . 170 Consideration which* justified the plan, 170 The operation entrusted to Kiriakoff, 170 The main army marches out of Sebastopol, 171 The march up to the encounter at Mackenzie’s Farm, . . . 171 Prince Mentschikoff at Otarkoi, 171 Opportunity which offered itself to him on the 25th, . . . 172 His Avant of acquaintance with the movements of the Allies, . . 175 Completion of his flank march, and his retreat to the Katcha, . 178 Seclusion in which he and his army remained, .... 179 CHAPTER LIV. I. Mentschikoff’s distribution of the command at Sebastopol, . . 180 The command of the land forces there, 180 General Moller, 180 The command of the seamen on the South Side, . ♦ . 180 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. XV Pago Admiral Nachimoflf, 180 The command of the forces on the North Side, .... 1S1 Admiral Korniloff, 1S2 Colonel de Todleben, ISO Accord between Korniloff and Todleben, 195 Force exerted by their conjoint powers, 196 II. Korniloff assumes the command of the North Side, .... 196 Duties undertaken by Todleben, 196 Additional forces moved to the North Side, 196 Strength there on the morning of the 25th, 196 Korniloflf’s despair of being able to defend it, 197 Spirit in which he prepared for the conflict, 197 The garrison left without a cavalry force for reconnoitring, . . 198 Sight observed from the Naval Library, 198 Import of the operation undertaken by the Allies, .... 199 Shifting of the danger from the North to the South Side, . . 199 III. Forces under Nachimoff for defence of the South Side, . . . 199 His anxiety regarding his ships, 199 His hopelessness, 200 His address to the seamen, 200 IV. Ground of Nachimoff’s despair, 201 Effect of Mentschikoff's splitting the command, .... 201 Korniloff equal to the occasion, 203 He withdraws from the North to the South Side, .... 203 Meeting at his lodgings, 203 Arrangements made for disposition of the forces, .... 201 He is requested to take charge of the arrangements for defence, . 204 He accepts the command thus offered, 204 Arrangements for insuring the obedience of the land forces to him, 204 V. Korniloff proceeds to use and even extend his power, . . . 204 Nachimoff issues final orders for the destruction of his ships, . . 205 Korniloff interposes and forbids it, , . , t 205 XVI CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. Korniloff and Todleben devote themselves to the defence of the South Side, 205 The movement of the Allies to the south a surprise to the garrison, 206 Changes in the works effected since the landing, .... 206 Weak state of the defences, 206 Numbers of foot available for the defence, 207 Composition of the force, 207 Hopelessness of defence with this force against a determined at- tack, 208 No signs on the 26th that the Allies would attack next day, . . 208 No tidings of Mentschikoff and the army, 208 VII. The garrison still without tidings of the army on the 27th, . . 208 Todleben’s view of the position of the garrison, .... 209 Solemnity enacted at the lines of defence, 209 Impression produced by the way in which Korniloff had been raised up, 210 Enthusiastic devotion to him, 210 Devotion to him on the part of the men of the land service, . . 210 Causes of the enthusiasm which his presence created, . . . 211 His harangue to the troops at the close of the religious ceremony, 212 Effect produced by it, 213 Emotion with which he was regarded, 214 VIII. Todleben’s view of the result of a determined attack, . . . 215 The hope that the sight of preparations for defence might shake the enemy, 215 Todleben saw what was to be done, 216 He kept steadfastly before him the element of time, . . . 216 The other condition with which he had to deal, .... 216 All the resources of the fleet at the disposal of the defenders, . 217 Todleben’s plan for strengthening the defences, .... 217 The object which he kept in view, 218 How his works were meant to produce their result, . . . 218 The word which, he says, expressed his whole purpose, . . 218 The other aspect of the conflict, 219 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. XVII Page Probability that the sight of the preparations might delay the attack, 219 In either aspect the work to be done was the same, . . . 220 Its nature, 220 The small calibre of the guns likely to mislead the Allies, . . 220 Todleben’s way of adjusting the labour, 221 To proximate as well as to more remote objects, . . , 221 IX. All resources brought to bear on the business of the defences, . 221 Alacrity with which the work was carried on, . . . . 222 The people called on to come voluntarily forward to the defence of their country, 223 Their devotion to the cause, 223 Todleben’s habit of bringing his personal presence to bear on business, 224 X. Korniloff personally not hopeful as to the issue, .... 225 Still no tidings of Mentschikoff and the army, 225 Korniloff’s secret reflections on the position of the garrison, . . 226 The 27th passes without any attack by the Allies, .... 226 XI. Still no attack on the 28th, 227 Communication at last from Mentschikoff, 227 The messenger sent on foot, and by night, 227 The tidings brought by him, 228 Partial communication of these to the troops by Korniloff, . . 228 He also gives out that Mentschikoff would attack the Allies, . . 229 Mentschikoff' s real determination as communicated to him, . . 229 The Prince thus excluded himself from all interference in the strife, 229 Korniloff understood this, 229 His private reflections, 230 XII. The Allies on the 29th still refraining from attack, .... 230 The defenders encouraged by seeing the works they had achieved, 230 Changes wrought up to this time on the defences, .... 231 The general result attained, 233 / XVIII CONTENTS OP VOLUME V. Xin Page True result of Todleben’s exertions to this time, .... 233 An army requisite for the defence of such an entrenched position, 233 This condition was wanting, 234 The Prince still clung to his design of withholding succour, . . 235 On the 29th nothing heard of the army till the evening, . . . 235 Purport of the communication then received, 235 Inference to be drawn from it, 235 XIV. Morning of the 30th — the Allies still abstaining from attack, . 236 Joy caused in the town by the appearance of the army on the North Side, 236 This joy ill founded at the time, 236 Mentschikoff comes down to the North Side, 236 His interview with Korniloff, 237 His treatment of the arrangements which had raised Korniloff to the command, 237 His intention of still keeping the army aloof, 237 Korniloff’s remonstrance 237 Mentschikoff undertakes to summon a council of war, . . . 238 XV. Todleben’s explanation of Mentschikoff's course of action, . . 239 Inquiry as to its validity, 239 Surmise tending to account for Mentschikoff’s conduct, . . . 242 XVI. Merit belonging to the defence down to this time, .... 244 CHAPTER LV. Inquiry suggested by the condition of the town at the end of Sep- tember, * 247 First reconnaissance by the Allies of the defences on the South Side, 247 This gave them the knowledge on which to found their resolve, . 248 The question which needed solution, 249 It did not present itself in this light at the time, .... 250 The chiefs hardly probed their own intentions as to time, , . 250 CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. XIX Page The counsel of Sir E. Lyons, 250 Lord Raglan’s first proposal for an assault, 252 Its rejection by the French, • 252 Determination to land the siege-trains, 253 Purpose for which they were to be landed, 253 Their landing commenced, 253 Opportunity of considering the decision towards which the Allies were driving, 253 Sir George Cathcart’s suggestion for stealing into the place, . . 253 His subsequent suggestion for storming it, 255 Sir E. Lyons again gives counsel, 256 Lord Raglan agrees with him in desiring to assault, . . . 256 Unanimity of opinion among the French, 257 Their opinion shared by Burgoyne, 257 What the general opinion was, 258 The argument against immediately assaulting, .... 258 That in favour of it, 261 Second proposal by Lord Raglan for assault, 277 Its definitive rejection by the French, 278 Lord Raglan negatives the proposal that the conferences should be recorded, 278 Partial obscurity as to their tenor thus caused, .... 278 XX CONTENTS OF VOLUME V. ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOLUME V. Frontispiece , Sebastopol from the Sea. Plate XIII. The Country from the Alma to Balaclava „ XIV. Sebastopol, 25th September 1854, ,, XV. Sebastopol, Facsimile of Russian Survey 1834, „ XVI. The Flank March, .... ,, XVII. Diagram illustrative of Descriptions, . „ XVIII. Sebastopol, 24th April 1853, , XIX. Sebastopol, 14th September 1854, to face page 16 „ 38 „ 58 „ 92 „ 124 „ 132 „ 134 % INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAPTER XLY. When the fighting; on the hanks of the Alma chap. 00 . XEV had ceased along the whole line, more than one of- — the English generals prayed hard that their troops might be suffered to come down and bivouac near the bank of the stream, for the labour already under- gone by the men had been so great, that it was painful to have them distressed by the toil of going a long way for water, and fetching it up to the heights. But not choosing to loose his hold ofp^posi- ground carried at no small cost of life, Lord Raglan Allied was steadfast in his resistance to all these entreaties, afterHio and ordered that his troops should bivouac upon the Alma, heights they had won. With the sanction of his chief, General Airey placed our infantry for the night in a line of columns on the heights, with the artillery in rear of each column; and the disposition of these two arms had been so contrived that, although the artillery was covered, yet at any moment, and without there being any need of moving the infantry, the guns could be rapidly brought to the front, and placed Invasion of the Crimea , 7, 1 2 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap, in battery between tlie columns. In this order, and having a portion of the cavalry covering the rear, with the rest of our horsemen on its left flank, the English army bivouacked for the night. When General Martimprey learnt that this plan had been adopted by the English, he was so well pleased with it that he resolved to advise a like dis- position of the French army. During the battle, the waggons which followed the English army had, of course , been kept far enough in the rear to be, for the most part, out of fire*, but when the fighting had ceased, they were brought down towards the bridge, and soon became so crowded as to breed much confusion. For hours, and even, I think, all night, men were eagerly seeking after others whom none could help them to find. Continued On the night which followed the battle, men were ence of the sickening and dying of cholera in numbers as great cholera p during the RS before. That which lay in the sight of the troops when the fight on the Alma had ceased was new to the bulk of the soldiery, and, in one feature, new to all. In general, the warring armies of Europe have state of been followed by a hateful swarm, who make it their the field J \ after the livelihood to hover upon the march of the regiments, alighting at last upon a field of battle, that they may rifle the dead and the wounded. And there comes, too, that other and yet fouler swarm which strips the dead of their clothing and accoutrements INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 3 with so strange a swiftness, that a field which was speckled and glittering, at the close of the battle,' with the uniforms of prostrate soldiers, is changed of a sudden to a ghastly shamble, with little except maimed or dead horses, and the buff, naked corpses of men, to show where the battle has raged. But the breadth of the lands and the seas which divided this simple Grim Tartary from the great seats of European vice, had hitherto defeated the baneful energy of those who come out to prey upon armies by selling strong drinks, and robbing the dead and the wounded. Armed and clothed as he stood when, receiving* his death-wound he heard the last of the din of battle, so now the soldier lay. Many had been struck in such a manner that their limbs were suddenly stiffened, and this so fixedly, that, although their bodies fell to the ground, their hands and arms remained held in the very posture they chanced to be in at the moment of death. * This was observed, for the most part, in instances of soldiers who had been on the point of firing at the moment when they were struck dead; for, where this had happened, the man’s hands being thrown forward and fixed in the attitude required for level- ling a firelock, they of course stretched upwards to- wards the heavens when the body fell back upon * Medical men knew, as might be expected, that this catalepsy-like stiffness might now and then result from a gunshot wound ; but I be- lieve they were somewhat surprised at the large proportion of instances in which it occurred. 1 * CHAP. XLV. 4 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, ( ^^ > * tlie ground. These upstretched arms of dead men were ghastly in the eyes of some: others thought they could envy the soldier released at last from his toil, and encountering no moment of interval between hard fighting and death. In general , the undisturbed clothing of the stricken soldiers hid their wounds from a common observer*, and it was only here and there — as where a man’s head had been partly shot away, or where the skull had been entered by a cannon-ball — that the ugliness of the havoc was obtruded upon The bear- the sight. For the most part, the wounded men lay wounded silent. Now and then a man would gently ask for water, or would seek to know when it was likely that he would be moved and cared for; but, in gen- eral , the wounded were so little inclined to be craving after help or sympathy, that for dignity and composure they were almost the equals of the dead. Effect of Still, although there was nothing in the field of uponThe the battle which could mar the dignity of war, the th^sob* sight was of a kind to press hurtfully upon the imagi- diers. nation of young soldiers. For such troops it was The evil ^ ^ x of keeping an ill thing to be kept a long time together in the dieraon contemplation of a field strewn with dead and the battief wounded; and this the more because the sight went to make a man question the cause of the slaughter in his own corps. None can wonder if the survivors of the Light Division men who had stormed the re- doubt were inclined to let their thoughts dwell upon the nature of the trial to which they had been ex- INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 5 posed, and even, in some regiments, to comment, ^lv** and say, “We were sacrificed. ” * In such question- Feeling . • -« disclosed mgs there is danger. bysoi- That priceless confidence which sustains the ac- fought complished soldier, and gives him the mastery in Dlvlslon - battle, is, after all, a sentiment of a tender and delicate kind, which may be easily weakened or destroyed, if he comes to believe that his regiment has been mishandled in a bloody encounter; and it could not but happen that regiments which had suffered great losses would be encouraged in the in- dulgence of a sinister criticism by keeping them long on the ground where their comrades lay maimed and slaughtered. ** On the day after the battle , the hundreds of The Russians who lay wounded on the English part of Russians, the field had been brought to a sheltered spot of ground near the river. *** There , they were laid down in even, parallel ranks, and in such manner that the surface they covered with their prostrate * I myself, in passing, heard this the day after the battle. The sen- tence was uttered in a group of private soldiers belonging to one of the regiments of the Light Division. ** Many will recognise the high authority which is my warrant for venturing this remark, and for insisting on the danger to which the morale of the Light Division was exposed by its experience on the day of the Alma. Over, and over, and over again, Lord Clyde used to say that no troops in the world could be subjected to such a trial without undergoing a ruinous loss of soldierly confidence. *** The number, I believe, was about 500 ; but it was estimated, and on some authority, at 750. 6 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. ^y P * bodies was a large symmetrical oblong. The ground where they lay was at some short distance from the Headquarters camp, and but little exposed to view, giectto" -^ rom this, an( l from other circumstances, it happened which, for that not only the wounded Russians, but also the they wore English soldiers mounting guard at the spot, were subjected. £ or g o ^ en ^ anc [ w ithout food for many hours. But happily there was a man at Headquarters whose sense of honour and duty was supported by a strong will, by resistless energy, and a soundness of judg- ment and command of temper rarely united with Mr. Ro- great activity. Romaine came to know that these Scertions poor wounded Russians were lying untended, and relief 611 he j n ^ged that, unless they were cared for, there would be a lasting blot upon the honour of the Eng- lish name. An officer of the common stamp who had got to be possessed with such a feeling would have cheaply discharged his conscience by making a communication to Lord Raglan, or some other “proper authority.” It was not so that the task was passed on, and got rid of. Knowing the weight of the cares pressing upon the chief, Romaine did not appeal to Lord Raglan, but began to act himself, giving no repose to any whose aid he needed, but disturbing nobody else. Under the power of his generous indignation and strong will all lethargy slowly gave way; and, having obtained four hun- dred pounds of biscuit, and the number of hands that were needed to aid him in the undertaking, he toiled at his good work until there was no one in all INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 7 those prostrate ranks of wounded men who had not ™ y P - been tended with the offer of food and water. It was from seven in the evening until half-past eleven at night that he thus laboured. At the time, his exceeding zeal made him seem to be acting for the honour of some great cause much more than from tender pity; but what he felt he has owned and re- corded: “It was the most painful act,” he says, “I “ever had to perform. Some of the faces were ter- rible and ghastly from wounds, and hardly had “mouths to eat or drink with. They were faces to “haunt one in sleep.” One young man in the centre of a rank of prostrate soldiers sat up, and succeeded in causing himself to be distinguished as an officer; and although there were few or none amongst the other sufferers who could speak any tongue but their own, there was a plaintive melody in the sound of the words they uttered which served to convey to a stranger an idea of their gentleness and gratitude. There were some who, in cheerful tones, declined to prolong life by eating, and asked instead for a light. Sankey, of the Quartermaster-General’s department, Aid ren- entered into Romaine’s feeling with great warmth, by Major and not only shared with him in the bodily labour Sanke ' * of tending the sufferers, but helped to overcome the difficulty that there is in wringing new kinds of ex- ertion from people who are over-much regulated. Of course, the English sentries, who had been left for a time without food, were at once supplied with biscuit; but it did not at all delight them to have 8 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. XLV. These wounded Russians left on the Alma. Painful task im- posed upon Dr. Thomp- son and his ser- vant M'Grath. the mere staff of life without any of what they re- garded as the more cheering part of their rations. There was no enemy’s force at hand to whom the care of these wounded Russians could be given up*, and, within the period of the halt on the Alma, it was not practicable for the English to do more than get their own wounded men on board ship. So when, on the morning of the 23d, the Allies re- sumed their advance, the wounded Russians were left where they lay on the banks of the Alma, in charge of a medical officer. As soon as might be, they were to be got on board ship and sent to some Russian port under a flag of truce. It fell to the lot of Dr. Thompson, assistant- surgeon of the 44th Regiment, to be left with the charge of these sufferers in a country abandoned to the enemy.* He kept with him his servant, a sol- dier named John M c Grath, but no other was left to take part with him in the performance of the forlorn duty that he had to fulfil. ** In the event of a Rus- * I have always understood that Dr. Thompson was ordered upon this painful duty, but the language of Captain Lushington rather leads to the inference that Dr. Thompson had volunteered the service. See the next note. ** Captain Lushington to Admiral Dundas, 27th September 1854. Captain Lushington speaks of Dr. Thompson, with his servant M‘Grath, as having “remained alone in an enemy’s country, without tent or ac- commodation of any sort, for the sole purpose of alleviating the suffer- ings of 500 of his fellow-creatures.” And Dundas, in reporting the matter to Lord Raglan, speaks of Dr. Thompson and his servant as hav- ing “remained by themselves in an open country, without food or “shelter.” — Dundas to Lord Raglan, official despatch, 30th September 1854. What they needed, however, was the help of their fellow-men, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 9 sian force coming upon this surgeon and his attend- ant whilst left alone with their charge, the best' fate' they could hope for was that of being prisoners of war; but unless their idea of the modern “Cossacks” was other than that which commonly obtained in the Allied armies, they must have believed them- selves to be in more or less danger of barbarous treatment. * The arrangement imposing such a service must have been made in the full assurance that there would be no cruel delay in the arrival of succour from the fleet; but (from causes to me unknown) it did actually happen that, between the time when the army marched off, and the time when succour came, there was an interval of three days and three nights.** Of the five hundred ghastly and prostrate forms which were left to this one surgeon and his one attendant for their only companions, all were so stricken as to be unable to help to lift a body; very many were shattered in limb ; very many, still tortured by strong not shelter; and with regard to Dundas’s idea of their jiaving been without food, Lord Raglan, I see, with his own hand, has written on the margin opposite to that passage the following words: “They had food. R.” * It was observed , I think , in a former volume , that the modern Cossacks were obedient regiments of regular cavalry, with nothing of the wild, lawless character which belonged to the Cossacks of 1812 ; but the fact that this change had occurred was not generally known in the Allied armies. ** From the morning of the 23d to the morning of the 26th. Lush- ington reached the anchorage late at night on the 25th, and the next morning early went up to the ground where the wounded Russians were lying. — Lushington to Dundas, 27th September 1854. CHAP. XLV. 10 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. < ^^ > * remains of life, were lying on their faces, with their ' vitals ploughed open by round-shot; but some were dying more quickly, and others already lay dead.* From time to time during those three days, and to the utmost of their bodily strength, Dr. Thompson and his servant laboured to part the dead from the living, to heave the corpses away, and get them more or less underground; but when, at last, suc- cour came, our seamen had to lift out as many as thirty-nine bodies — some, in part, decomposed — before they could get at the living.** Succour When at length, on the morning of the 26th, byclfptain Captain Lushington of the Albion came up from the tonaftM shore, and discovered his two fellow-countrymen at vai 1 of er " Iheir dismal post of duty, he was filled with admira- da^ s e fi° n of their fortitude, and with sympathy for what they had endured.*** The All that day, and for five or six hours more on Russians, the following morning, the seamen of the Albion and about fifty ^ ie Vesuvius, being well provided with stretchers, got on* 1 ’ laboured hard, and with cheerful alacrity,* at the ^ai^dsiiip business of carrying the sufferers on board ship; and to Odessa, there only remained about fifty of the wounded still lying on the ground, when the appearance of a Russian infantry force, which was judged to be three * Lushington to Dundas , 27th September 1854. ** Ibid. *** Ibid. Captain Lushington was despatched on this duty in his ship, the Albion, towed by the Vesuvius, and having the Avon transport in company. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 11 thousand strong, obliged Captain Lushington to give < 5^ p ' up the rest of his task * The wounded men carried on board ship were sent to Odessa under a flag of truce*,** and the number of those who lived to be thus delivered up to their fellow-countrymen was 342:*** but so utter The state . _in which a weakness had prostrated this suffering mass oitheyar- human beings, that the Governor of Odessa declared it impossible, for the time, to make out by question and answer how many of them were non-commis- sioned officers and how many private soldiers.^ In his letter to the Governor of Odessa, Dundas The tone had spoken of the surrender of these wounded mentheRus- as an act dictated by feelings of humanity. t' f The ernor^i answer of the Governor was so stern and cold as to hedging" make Dundas remark that it “might have been ^ e t ^ rival “more gracious iff but remembering what was the wounded. * Lushington to Dundas, 27th September 1854. The arrangements made by Captain Lushington for covering the working parties who car- ried the wounded, and for effecting the orderly retreat of his marines and small-arms men, seem to have been very able and neatly timed. ** Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 30th September 1854. *** Acknowledgment dated 17/29 September 1854, signed by General Annenkoff, the Governor of Odessa. f The Governor says, he does not distinguish the non-commissioned officers from the privates, “par Timpossibilite d’en questionner la plu- “part dans l’etat d’affaiblissement ou ils se trouvent.” tf Dundas to the Governor of Odessa: “ I trust your Excellency “ t will, in the same feeling of humanity, receive and consider them as “ non-combatants until regularly exchanged.” ftt Dundas to Lord Raglan , 30th September 1854. The answer of the Governor to Dundas, 17/29 September, refers coldly to the acknow- ledgment — the one above quoted— which he, the Governor, had given; 12 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. XLV. aspect of those wounded men on the morrow of the ‘battle, and inferring the state they were in at the time of their reaching the port, I can excuse the Governor of Odessa if he angered a little at the sight of the word “humanity,” and almost thought himself mocked when he was asked to agree that these poor remains of what once had been soldiers, might be considered as “non-combatants” until they should be exchanged. If Dundas had boarded the Avon, and looked on those ruins of human forms with which she was laden, his kindly heart would rather have inclined him to utter his sorrow for the havoc inflicted by war, than to speak as though he were indulging in any act of humanity.* With only, perhaps, too much truth he might have pal- liated any seeming neglect of those poor Russian prisoners by alleging the hardships and privations which he could not find means to avert from our own sick and wounded men. and adds, that he will communicate to the Emperor the arrival of the wounded, and the condition which Dundas annexed to the surrender of them. * To make the act an act of “humanity,” I suppose something like sacrifice was needed, but there was none. The poor wounded men were simply an encumbrance, which it was convenient to shift off upon the Russians. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 13 CHAPTER X L V I. We saw that, at the close of the tight on the chap. Alma, an unwillingness to lengthen the distance be- “ tween the French and their knapsacks, then lying in the valley below, was the reason avowed by St. Arnaud for withstanding Lord Raglan’s desire to ad- vance at once in pursuit*, but, unless there were import- some other and heavier shackle which still held back prompt a the Allies, there could hardly be room for question af t I?“he that, on the morrow of the battle at latest, it would vict01 7 7 won by be well for them to push forward and follow up the Allies, their victory. Yet they lingered on the ground they had won for the whole of two clear days. The rea- son why they thus remained halted must not be kept in concealment* It had hitherto been taken for granted that the inquiry Allies were to march upon the Severnaya, or north cause of side of Sebastopol; and — not at first harbouring ^acted" the thought that Marshal St. Arnaud would swerve halton * Both in his official and private correspondence with the Home Government , Lord Raglan is silent as to the causes of the halt on the Alma, and neither records his endeavours to bring Marshal St. Arnaud to march upon the position of the Star Fort, nor the Marshal’s refusal to do so. As to the cause of this reserve I shall hazard my surmise in a future chapter (see chap, lv.) It is fortunate that the silence of the English Commander has been in some measure compensated by other testimony. 14 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VI. the Alma. (See the Map ) Lord Rag- lan’s opin- ion in favour of an imme- diate ad- vance. The rea- soning of Lord Rag- lan and of Sir Edmund Lyons, Steps taken by Lord Rag- lan for giving ef- fect to his opinion. from tlie purpose with which the Allies had come 'out — Lord Raglan deemed it to he of great moment to press on, and at once attack the northern forts, without giving the enemy time to recover from the blow which had felled him. As expressed — not in language originating with Lord Raglan himself, but by his declared concurrence in the statement of opinion submitted to him by Sir Edmund Lyons, — Lord Raglan conceived “that the character of the “whole expedition was that of a surprise, that it “was undertaken without accurate knowledge of the “strength of the enemy or their resources, and that “in great measure they [the Allies] still remained “ignorant on these points; that all they knew posi- tively was, that the victory at Alma had been a “heavy blow to them, and that the best chance of “continued success was to follow it up rapidly, “and try and take the Northern Forts by a coup-de - “ main In order to give effect to his desire for an ad- vance on the morrow, and to concert the movement with the naval chiefs, the English Commander had, * MS. Memorandum of a conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons on the 10th of February 1856, by Mr. George Loch. The memorandum was placed in Sir Edmund’s hands on the same day, and after he had read it over, he returned it with a statement that it was correct, and, a note stating that approval having been forthwith made, the paper be- came , upon the death of Sir Edmund Lyons , a valuable and authentic record. Its value was increased by the corroboration which was given to it in writing by the late Duke of Newcastle. — See Appendix to vol. vi., where will be found all that portion of the memorandum which relates to affairs touched in yoIs. y— viii. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 15 on the day which followed the battle, sent a note to xlvi.* Sir Edmund Lyons, requesting him to come up to the English Headquarters at eight o’clock the next morning*,* but the peremptory orders of Admiral Dundas prevented Sir Edmund’s compliance with the request until after mid-day;** and before Lord Raglan and Lyons were destined to have their in- terview, counsels opposite to those they judged right had not only prevented that immediate resumption of the forward march which they both deemed to be of great moment, but had brought into question and seeming jeopardy the whole plan and fate of the expedition. Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan had met; Meeting ^ between and the purport of what passed between them, as Marshal conveyed by Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, and Lord was this: Convinced of the policy of an immediate LofdRag- advance, and an attack of the Northern Forts, Lord |Ssopin- es Raglan pressed his opinion upon the French Marshal, and u proposed to him at once to advance on the Marshal, “Belbec, cross that river, and then assault the poses an “forts.”*** "ad- vance on the Bel- bec, with * Lyons’s recollection seems to have placed these circumstances at a view to a time one day earlier than that which I assign to them ; but his notes to Lord Raglan, now lying before me, show that he must have been Forts. mistaken. < Marshal ** These were orders founded on the report — a false report — that gt. Arnaud seven Russian men-of-war had slipped out of Sebastopol and sailed refuses, (apparently) for Odessa. Lyons with the steam squadron was ordered to pursue. *** MS, memorandum mentioned in note, ante, p. 14. 1G INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VI. Lord Rag- lan’s vexa tion. Lord Rag- lan has a second interview with St. Arnaud, and again presses for an ad- vance across the Belbec. St. Ar- naud ’s refusal. Lord Rag- lan’s de- jection of spirits. In answer to this proposal for an immediate ad- vance and attack upon the Northern Forts, Marshal St. Arnaud said that “his troops were tired, and that “it could not be done.”* Lord Kaglan, as may be supposed, “was disap- “pointed by this answer,” and “could not,” he said, “understand it*, for he knew that the troops could “not be tired, and that there must be some other “reason for the Marshal’s answer.”** After this, Lord Eaglan had another interview with Marshal St. Arnaud, at which he exerted his power of persuasion in “again urging the French “General to advance across the Belbec;” but in reply the Marshal now said: “He had ascertained that the “Bussians had thrown up strong earthworks on the “banks of the river; and though he did not doubt “that the Allies could force them, as they had the “works on the Alma, they could not afford the loss “that would be entailed.”*** In his power of warding off or concealing every access of despondency which might be hurtful to the public service, Lord Raglan stood above other men; but even he could not hide — not, at least, from his friend Sir Edmund Lyons — the dejection of spirits which was brought upon him by Marshal St. Ar- naud’s refusal to go on with the campaign as hitherto The MS. Memorandum mentioned in note, ante, p. 14. Ibid. My surmise as to what the other reason was will be given in chap, xlviii. *** Ibid. Plate 13 THE COUNTRY FROM TIME JlEMUi ~to NOTE Thr tiitr offhp Fhmk XrrrJt executed, bt/ ike Jtitt’S tints ! Lord Ratjlcrns rcromtoissrntrr tints Fritter Hmkhticoffs Flunk March tints Versts- f f 4 l Jsno/Iis'k J/Bles $ 4 . $ S i 0 4 A C LA Y A ^ i >'pinskyaYri*'^?< n< ) ? INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 17 planned.* And, indeed, the conjuncture was a pain- xLva* ful one. I have never learnt that the Marshal pro- posed any alternative plan; and for a while the pause of the Allies was not a mere halt. The enterprise stopped. It might seem that now once more — and this, too , on the morrow of a victory — the expedition was in danger of coming to an end; but if Lord Raglan had undertaken a venturesome campaign in loyal obedience to the desire of the Queen’s Govern- ment rather than to his own judgment, for that very reason perhaps he was the more steadfast in his nu deter- resolve to overcome or elude all obstacles: and the moment he found himself encountered by this sudden th . e eu ‘ recusancy at the French Headquarters, he sought and perceived a way by which his continued per- As an ai- sistence in the enterprise against Sebastopol could be to which! made to consist with St. Arnaud’s refusal to go on were re - 8 and attack the Forth Forts. Lord Raglan, indeed, gt.^Ar- by had not yet abandoned the hope that this refusal might be withdrawn; but, for the time, he had to toattack . i.i i i - i tllG Aortk deal with it as a decision which was only too likely Forts, to be adhered to: and accordingly, but only on the lan P ro- ag supposition that St. Arnaud might really persist in march to refusing to attack the Forth Forts, Lord Raglan ^® g ^ util proposed for consideration a plan of campaign which * Sir Edmund says" he “ found "him (Lord Raglan) in low spirits. “On asking him the cause, he (Lord Raglan) said” [then follows the account of Lord Raglan’s second interview with St, Arnaud as above given.] Invasion of the Crimedl V, 2 18 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xlv? * wou ^ I'olieve the Allies from the duty of having to march against the northern defences, by transferring the theatre of war from the western to the southern coast. Of the counsels which ended in a resolve to adopt this new plan of campaign I shall have to speak by-and-by,* and it is only in the process of accounting for the halt on the Alma that I stay to glance at them here. The Ah Upon the question thus raised there was no need still’ on the for the Allies to come to their final and absolute werere- decision until they should be in the neighbourhood prepare* 0 ^ ie Belbec; but whilst they were still on the Alma eventual- they apparently determined that nothing but a return ity of their to the old plan of attacking the North Forts should ultimately x adopting prevent them from adopting Lord Raglan s con- sure. ditional proposal : and this determination carried them so far towards an actual adoption of the measure, that already their merely inchoate approval of it began to govern their movements. Cause of The way in which these changes of plan detained the halt ...... J 1 . _. on the the Allies on the Alma will now be perceived, feo a ' far as concerns the earlier period of the halt, it re- sulted of necessity from Marshal St. Arnaud’s refusal to go on and attack the North Forts; for between the time of the refusal and the conditional acceptance of Lord Raglan’s alternative proposal, the Allies were without any purpose sufficing to guide their steps; and when at length, by persisting in his refusal, the Marshal constrained the Allies to entertain a measure * Post, chap, xlviii, See the Map, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 19 involving tlie abandonment of the western coast, he ®hap. drove them to an alternative which still further lengthened the halt. It is easy to see how the idea of abandoning the The wa y . . -| . -| . ® . in which western coast carried with it a prolongation of the the pro- halt on the Alma. The number of the wounded was flank the so great, that the labour of getting them on board “^ded to could not but fill a good deal of time, and it was of j^jfhait necessity that this operation should be covered by the presence of a sufficient force. Now, if the Allies had been firmly persisting in their determination to march against the Severnaya or north side of Se- bastopol, the western coast would have necessarily continued to be the theatre of operations, and in that case it would have been easy for them to go on with their advance the very day after the battle, leaving only a detachment on the Alma to cover the em- barkation of the wounded. If, on the other hand, the Allies should determine to abandon the western coast, they could not well venture to leave there an isolated detachment; and the business of embarking the wounded must either go on without the presence of any land forces to cover the operation, or else the whole Allied army would have to be detained for the purpose; and since the abandonment of the wounded by the land forces was an alternative too painful in its possible consequences to be held worthy of adoption,* it followed that to harbour the idea of * With our present knowledge we may entertain no doubt that the seamen and marines of the Allied navies might have been well able to 2 * 20 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xlvi* U P the intended attack on the North Side, and quitting the western coast of the peninsula, was to bring upon the whole Allied army the necessity of a halt on the Alma, and a halt, too, for such a time as would suffice for getting the wounded on board ship. Although So, although it is true that the cause of the delay shars un- on the Alma was the unwillingness of the French TeslTo Marshal to go on with the advance against the north Severnaya side of Sebastopol, still, the halt having once been was the resolved upon, its duration was made to depend on cause of # x x the halt, the time it would take to have the sick and the tion de- wounded put on board ship. The French would have the time° n been able to get their sick and wounded on board in embark? r one full day. On the other hand, the number of the wounded wounded English being, as Lord Kaglan computed, Time just three times greater than that of the French, and by q the 0d the g roim( t whence they had to be moved being very French, much farther from the shore, it soon became certain Time that at least two days of ceaseless labour would have En^iFh & one through before the English would be able to bury their dead, and to get all their sick and wounded on board. Even within the two full days, the work could not have been done without bringing to bear upon and devo ^ surpassing exertions. Nothing short of the energy tion dis- and the tenderness of the sailors would have sufficed. secure the safe embarkation of the wounded without requiring the sup- port of the land forces; but, at the time, there was not information enough in the Allied camp to warrant such an assumption. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 21 Admiral Dundas devoted all his medical officers to ^lvi.* the care of the sick and wounded who lay on the played by' field; and in the duty of removing these sufferers, fleets and and bringing them on board ship, as well as in that™®^ 0 ^ 110 of landing stores, he employed all his boats, and no[®? d ®^“ g less than a thousand of his seamen. * Every soldier vice * prostrate with wounds or sickness was a difficult ^®P a b r t load, which had to be carried by the strength of men 0U1 ’ s ? a - 7 J ' ° men in for a distance of three or four miles; but the sailors removing toiled, and toiled with a generous, exuberant Zealand which left them no rest till the work was achieved. and get- Deep, indeed, as Lord Eaglan declared, was his on board* “feeling of gratitude” to the sailors for these kindly shl P* services; and he owned that he had been singularly touched by observing the devotion with which naval officers took part in the bodily labour of lifting and carrying the wounded soldiers.** Of the whole number of wounded English, amount- ing, as we saw, in number to more than sixteen hun- dred, a large proportion were so stricken as to be helpless; but besides, there were the sufferers who lay upon the ground cast down and disabled by mortal sickness, and of these there were very many; for — baffling the hopes which medical science had tried, one may say, to harbour — the cholera had™® num* proved to be a pestilence which was not to be warded men ^ stricken off by the stir and glory of battle.*** with cholera. * Admiral Dundas to Admiralty, 27th October 1854. ** Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle. *** Captain Dacres, the commander of theSanspareil, and his captain 22 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. XLVI. The halt on the Alma last- ed till the morning of the 23d. Recapitu- lation of the cir- cumstan- ces which occasion- ed it. Although Marshal St. Ar- naud’s re- fusal to at- tack the North Forts had occasion- ed the halt, he could still say with truth on the 22d that he was kept waiting by the English. Thus, then, the battle having ended before five o’clock on the afternoon of the 20th of September, the Allied armies remained halted on the Alma until the morning of the 23d; and when it is asked why, instead of thus tarrying, they did not resume their advance on the morrow of the battle, the answer, we see, must be like to that which showed why they did not press the enemy’s retreat on the afternoon of the fight. The hinderer was Marshal St. Arnaud. But the halt having once been resolved upon, it lasted two whole days instead of one, because, though the French could embark all their wounded men in one day, the number of those who lay stricken on the English part of the field was too great to allow of their being dealt with in the lesser time.* So, not- withstanding that the measure of halting on the Alma was chargeable upon Marshal St. Arnaud, still, on the 2 2d of September (having by that time got his own wounded on board), he could say, and could say with literal truth, that the French army was able to advance when the English army was not. Accord- ingly, on the 22d, whilst the English were still toil- of the forecastle , were but two out of the number of those seamen who generously busied themselves in the kindly duties which they felt to be imposed upon them by the painful scenes of the battle-field ; but they alone took out from the tents (and buried as well as they could) the corpses of twenty-eight men who had died of cholera during the night. — Letter from Admiral Dacres , 19th October 1863. * By some it has been thought that commissariat difficulties pre- vented the earlier advance of the Allies: but after considering the rounds on which that belief rested, I have not accepted it. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 23 ing hard at the painful task of getting their wounded xlvi* on board, the Marshal suffered himself to write: Accord- “The English are not yet ready, and I am kept“uffj; e d° “back, just as at Baltchick, just as at Old Fort. It write * 0 “is true they have more wounded than I have, and “that they are farther from the sea.* What slowness “in our movements! War can hardly be carried on “in this way. The weather is admirable, and I am “not profiting by it. I rage.”** It being now seen that St. Arnaud’s refusal to advance on the position of the Northern Forts was the cause of the halt on the Alma, there remains the task of determining how far this refusal was warranted. Of the strength of the works which were thus arrest- The Fort . * 0 . . in which mg the Allies on the morrow of their victory we shall stood be- have to speak more fully by-and-by. For the present, Ames and it is enough to say that the main obstacle was the^ e North Star Fort, an octagon earthwork, surrounded by a ditch and glacis, looking down upon the open sea towards the west and the Sebastopol bay on the south-, that the Fort was not a work designed against invaders coming from the Belbec, being commanded and looked into from the ground by which the Allies might approach it;*** that the fire of the French and English ships could be easily brought to bear upon * Letter to Ms brother, 22d September. ** Private journal under same date. *** Sir John Burgoyne questions this , but he had not an opportunity of effecting any sufficing reconnaissance of the ground ; and upon such a matter I can hardly refuse to treat General de Todleben’s statements as a safe guide. — “ Defense de Sebastopol,” p. 131, 230. 24 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VI. Opinion of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons as to the ex- pediency of imme- diately attacking it. Sound- ness of their in- ferences. it;* that, whatever accession of strength might be 'given to the adjacent ground by the hasty labours of the enemy, there were only twelve out of all the guns then arming the Fort itself which could be brought to bear upon the approaches by which the Allies might advance; that the new, and as yet un- armed, work which threatened the mouth of the Belbec was assailable from the ships as well as by the land forces;** and that, finally, in the judgment both of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Fort, with all its new adjuncts, was not an obstacle which ought to baffle a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men advancing along the coast, with the active and available support of the attend- ant fleets.*** Time, at last, has apparently proved that the in- ferences of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons were sound. More than that, it has shown that, at a period when the Allies might have been marching upon the Star Fort,+ Prince Mentschikoff had not only withdrawn to the south of Sebastopol, but had deliberately renounced the idea of venturing his army * “Defense de Sebastopol,” p. 222. ** Ibid. **'«• Mr. Loch’s MS. memorandum, quoted ante, p. 14. t Viz., the 22d or 23d of September. After the departure of Prince Mentschikoff in the night of the 24th , the Allies , though not liable to be encountered at the Star Fort by any “army,” would still have had to deal, as we shall afterwards see, with Korniloflf and his sailors; but on the 22d or the 23d, or even, as I consider, on the 24th, the invaders might have marched upon the position of the Star Fort without being met by either the army or the seamen. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 25 in any encounter on the north of the roadstead.* Therefore, if St. Arnaud had followed the counsels of Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, the Allies would have occupied the north side of Sebastopol without encountering resistance, and having done this, they could have proceeded at once to execute the main purpose of the invasion by destroying the Black Sea fleet and the naval establishments of Se- bastopol.** Nor was even this all; for there is reason to believe that, by adding to their operations the mere occupation of a point on the road to Baktchi Serai, the Allies would have secured the surrender of the south of Sebastopol, and have brought the campaign to an end.*** I said that the victory of the 20th of September gave Sebastopol to the Allies on condition that they would lay instant hands on the prize, f That condi- CHAP. XLVI. * After giving his reasons for regarding the position of the Star Fort as untenable by the Prince’s army against the Allies , General Todleben says: “ Having thus convinced himself that there was not, on this “ground, any position where our troops could await the enemy with “ some hope of success , and without being exposed to find themselves “in a most critical situation in case of failure, Prince Mentschikoff saw “himself obliged to renounce encountering the Allies on the north of “the roadstead. Recognising, at the same time, the necessity of re- organising his troops , of completing his supplies of ammunition and “food, of reinforcing the garrison of Sebastopol , and determining the “measures necessary for its defence, Prince Mentschikoff took the re- “ solve of transporting himself to the south of Sebastopol.” — “Defense “de Sebastopol,” p. 215. £** The authority for this conclusion will be given post , chap, xlviii. *** So also as to this, t Vol. iv. p. 256. 26 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVI. This the first of the lost occa- sions. tion Marshal St. Arnaud rejected, by refusing to go on against the northern defences of the place. We shall have to make a reckoning of the lost occasions which followed the battle of the Alma. This one stands as the first. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 27 CHAPTER XL VII. On the morning of the 23d of September the chap. o x XL VII Allies once more marched forward; and moving all Advance the way along ground thickly strewn with arms and accoutrements — the signs of the enemy’s haste to retreat — they descended at length into the valley of the Katcha. The English were quartered amid The vii- ° x lage on its the gardens and vineyards of a village all smiling banks, with signs of plenty; for although, in broken fur- niture and emptied chests , there were traces of Cossack spoilers, and although, in their terror, the villagers had fled, still the happy -looking cottages, with their trellis ed and welcoming porches, the cher- ished fruit-trees and especially the abounding clusters of the vine, all seemed to speak of content and re- warded industry. Though the villagers had fled, they had not gone The peo- far. A knot of Englishmen inclined to ramble into viii^gef 9 the country had chosen the road leading eastward as the one most likely to withdraw them from the familiar scenes of the camp. When they had gone some way in this direction , they saw that , at a distance of some hundred of yards in front of them, there was a crowd. At sight of the strangers the crowd began to fly, but after a while some of the 28 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVII. The land- ing of the Scots Greys. Lord Rag- lan had already people turned round, and, little by little, were brought to attend to the beckoning and the encouraging signs with which they were met. After a while, the fugitive villagers — for these were the people who formed the crowd — began to grow somewhat less fearful; and at length, though often halting in doubt, they came nearer, and then again nearer; but even when they had evidently made up their minds to accept the proffered intercourse, they yet stopped from time to time that they might make prostrations and gestures in token of submission. These poor people were lurking about the neigh- bourhood of the village in order to see or make out what was going to befall their homes. The English- men saw the importance of reassuring the villagers, and an interpreter was fetched. When the people came to understand that no harm would be done to them or their property they became very grateful, and some of them ventured back into their village. From them the English first came to hear of the panic which had seized the Russian army in the midi^ight after the battle; and it was here, too (as told in a former page), that the simple natives ex- cused their content by saying that for three gener- ations they had lived in peace under the Czars. The English at this time received a small ac- cession to the strength of their cavalry from the landing of the Scots Greys. But whilst the whole of the French, and the main body of the English army, were establishing their INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 20 quarters in the valley of the Katclyi, Lord liaglan xlvu’ — in the person of the General commanding his pushed cavalry — was already in sight of Sebastopol, and hi^avai- descending unmolested to the Belbec. He had ordered Bcu>ec! e Lord Lucan with the hulk of the cavalry and his troop of liorse-artillery to push forward, and take possession of the village of Duvankoi, a village lying close to the Belbec, but so far up the stream as to be upon the high road which connected Sebastopol with Baktchi Serai. Lord Lucan had to approach the village by passing through a long defile which might have been easily defended against cavalry*, but, although watched by Cossacks, he was not opposed. The village, when reached, was found to be in a nook shut in between the bank of the river on one side, and precipitous heights on the other. Finding the place unoccupied, Lord Lucan not only took possession of it — that might have been done by means of a picket — but kept his troops down in the nook for some hours. As far as was possible in such a situation, he strove to prepare against the event of an attack by placing three guns at each entrance to the village, and some scouts on the com- manding hills; but he did not conceal from himself that his cavalry thus cooped down must be powerless, and exposed to destruction if attacked by infantry or artillery.* The enemy did not seize the occasion, * Lord Lucan seems to have thought that the order to “take posses- “sion of” Duvankoi made it his duty to place his main body in the village, and to keep it there during some “few hours;” for he speaks 30 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VII. Sunday the 24th, and at dusk Lord Lucan withdrew his troops to the "high open ground above;* but certainly during some hours, our cavalry had been in peril. Lord Lucan had been apprised that the Russians had had 2000 horse in the village of Duvankoi just before its occupation by our cavalry; and when he rose from his bivouac on the morning of the 24th, he saw bodies of Russian troops both in the direction of Sebastopol and near Mackenzie’s Farm; but he was recalled into the general line of march before the enemy’s movements were yet so developed as to enable him to make out their scope and bearing. If his orders had suffered him to remain in the neigh- bourhood of Duvankoi, he might have found that the Russians in force were converging upon the very ground where he stood, and that in a village close by Prince Mentschikoff was to establish his Head- quarters.** Excepting the cavalry, which Lord Raglan had thus pushed on a day’s march in advance, the whole of the Allied army bivouacked, as we saw, on the Katcha. On the morning of Sunday the 24th of September, the Allies made ready to begin the march which was to bring them to the Belbec, and place them in pre- of the occupation of the village which he had effected and continued till dusk as an act which had “ sufficiently carried out his instructions.” * This last measure , as might well be expected , was fully approved by Lord Raglan, ** The village of Otarkbi. It was early on the following morning that Prince Mentschikoff in person reached the village. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 31 sence of the defences which guarded Sebastopol on xlvll its northern side. They were checked. The reported existence of a Avowed fresh covered battery commanding the mouth of the the^anx*!- Belbec had been already put forward by the French Commander as an obstacle which might force the’pghesita- Allies to swerve from their purpose;* and now that French the advancing armies were at last on the banks of quarters, the Katcha, the Marshal’s avowed anxiety on the subject of this new field-work still hung in the way of the enterprise. The French, as we know, were on the right; or, in other words, next to the sea. Theirs was the part of the Allied army which (if the advance should be continued in the direction hitherto followed) would be brought opposite to the newly-formed battery; and, not unnaturally, they deemed it to be within their peculiar and separate province to judge of the importance of an obstacle which lay, as they thought, in their path. Moreover, it had now become known at the French Head- quarters that the enemy had sunk men-of-war across the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead. At seven in the morning, Lord Raglan received The ad ;. ° 7 ° vance of a message from the French Marshal requesting that the Allies i delayed at the march might be postponed till ten o clock, not the re- only for the purpose of considering the aspect of theFrench affairs as altered by the sinking of the enemy’s ships, zander, but also in order to give time for a further reconnais- sance of the field-work at the mouth of the Belbec. * See ante , p. 16 , and post, chap, xlviii. 32 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVII. The ad- vance at The request was conveyed by Colonel Trochu, “'who brought a note signed by himself, which he left in the hands of Lord Raglan. In English, the note runs thus: “Last night news reached the French “camp that the Russians had yesterday destroyed “the entrance of the port of Sebastopol by sinking “five ships and two frigates. Thence there results “a new situation, on the subject of which the Mar- shal sends me to confer with his lordship Lord “Raglan. Besides, the Russians have constructed in “advance of Fort Constantine* a battery which “directly commands the mouth of the Belbec, where “the siege materials and the supplies have to be dis- embarked, and where the line of march is which “the French army would have to take. Pending the “expression of opinion on this subject by his lordship “Lord Raglan, the Marshal has adjourned the de- parture for some hours.” Lord Raglan, of course, could do no otherwise than yield to the request, more especially on the last ground assigned*, for the field-work to which it referred stood opposite — not to the English, but — to the Marshal’s, line of advance, and (unless it were shunned altogether) would have to be dealt with by the French. It seems to have been ultimately agreed that the * Colonel Trochu meant the “Star Fort.” It was common at the time in the Allied camps to call the “Star Fort” “Fort Constantine.” The real Fort Constantine, however, was a sea-fort at the mouth of the Sebastopol bay. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 33 Allies should continue their march upon the Belbec, ^hap. though without committing themselves to an attack' "length re- of the Severnaya, or encountering the new field- work; and accordingly, at about ten o’clock, the ad- an / a d t ?*® r ’ vance was resulted. Soon, crowning the ridge of the at g a ^ r hills which divide the Katcha from the Belbec, naya, or to and then, gazing eagerly southwards, the two armies the new looked down on Sebastopol. work. On this summit the Allies for a while remained Sebasto- halted. Marshal St. Arnaud quitted his saddle and lay upon the ground. According to the accounts Marshal of the French historians, he was within a few hours naud. 1 of the period when the physicians pronounced him His state, to be suffering from cholera; and although, at this time , his appearance and manner spoke more of downcast spirits than of mortal disease, it may well be imagined that nothing other than bodily illness had made him joyless at this the moment of his first looking down on Sebastopol. He was unspeakably sad. Contrasting the hard enterprise before him with the work of happier days in the country of the Arabs and the Kabyles, he sighed as men sigh when they have to endure without hope. Again the Allies marched forward; but by the The diroc- time that their line of march was developed, an ob-^arch server who knew the ground might have inferred, from the direction they took, that already they were ^ at b ^ e d rG swerving from their purpose. Shunning the imagined was the strength of the new field-work at the mouth of the the Allies, Belbec, they began to bend away from the shore, Invasion of the Crimea. V, 3 34 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xlvtt’ The g rolln( i this time traversed by the invad- Signao'f ing armies was so thickly strewn with the marks of conditioif the enemy’s hasty flight and confusion, as to show the W Rus- that defeat had been lapsing into ruin, and that that Sd re- my had entered Sebastopol was* a hurried and entered fugitive crowd. Amongst the things abandoned there poi. was even the cargo of kitchen implements which had supplied the table of the Russian Headquarters. The Allies failed to read these signs , or rather they failed to read them with that kind of under- standing which leads to clear inference and to ac- cordant action. Indeed, it would seem that they had hardly at all treasured up and applied the narrative of that Russian panic on the Katcha which the vil- lagers had been giving them on the foregoing night. Cause Strange to say, that stand, or that mere semblance hindered of a stand, which Kiriakotf had made at the close fromap- 3 of the battle on the Alma, had raised up a veil so lng l the d " effectual, that it still served to screen the Russians ofthe tl0n f rom the e 7 es their invaders. Ho fragments of Russian the wreck, no accounts of eyewitnesses, were enough army after 7 / the Alma, to countervail the effect which Kiriakoff had wrought upon the counsels of the Allies, by showing them a front for some minutes, and causing them to believe that the retreat which he was covering must be a re- treat in good order. * * The reason why the few minutes’ stand made by Kiriakoff imposed so effectually upon the Allies was this: it happened that his lino of re- treat was so far diagonal, that when he took up his second position, some two miles in rear of the Alma heights, he was no longer opposite INVASION OF THE CRIMEA; 35 The invading armies now descended into the xlvh beauteous valley of the Belbec. There was little'rhe m- that could yet be seen of the Russian troops. Lord Jcend^nto Cardigan, with a couple of squadrons, reconnoitred of e t h^ alley a pass towards Sebastopol in the direct front of the Belbec> English lines, and reported it impracticable, there nuance being, he said, a marsh in front, then a causeway, ^ r digan ; and then a battery of heavy guns supported by a strong force of infantry and some cavalry. To go hardily on with the old plan of the inva- The ses- sion , undertaking to carry at once whatever the of a re- Ure enemy might have prepared by way of defence for ^Jud^n his Star Fort, — this, however difficult, or however lbe o1 !* easy, was, at all events, an enterprise deliberately invasion, contemplated beforehand, and of such a kind as to be strictly consisting with the character of the ex- pedition-, for the attack was one in which (by aiding in the capture of the works at the mouth of the Bel- bec, and the entrenchments connecting them with the Star Fort) the naval forces of the Allies could take a great part. Besides, the condition of things was such that, if the Allies should determine to shun this encounter, their caution would be far from restoring them to the approved and recognised paths of scientific warfare. On the contrary, a tardy to the French line of battle (as he had been during the action), but to the English; and the consequence was, that his presence in order of battle, much aided by the nature of the ground, masked the confusion of that part of the Russian army which was retreating from its conflict with the English. 3 * 36 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVII. wariness in that direction could hardly now fail to be imprudent. The expedition had gone too far to leave open a choice between risk and safety. The choice was between two or more kinds of grave danger. This night, though the soldiery were glad- dened by the beauty of the vale, and the wealth of the gardens and the villas, it could not but happen that the chiefs would be busied with anxious coun- sels. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 37 CHAPTER XLVIII. At the time when the deliberations of the Allies chap. in Bulgaria resulted in their determining that the-7j ^ -- de , ’ western, and not the southern, coast of the Crimea si s n of should be looked to for the place of their landing, it against was not so much settled in words, but rather taken fences of for granted, that this resolve carried with it the ul- po if r om terior design of moving on southward along the same the north< western coast, and operating against the northern M a e p | he defences of Sebastopol. The assumption was a na- tural one; for, because of the Sebastopol bay, it was only from the north that an invader remaining es- tablished on the western coast could attempt an at- tack. Long before, and prior indeed to the actual com- Report of mencement of the war, Captain Drummond of the Drum- 11 Retribution had ventured to give firm counsel upon S^Retri- this subject; and the knowledge which he had ac-^ d ° n s ’ 0 quired by lying at anchor in the roadstead of Sebas- ^riy^.s topol enabled him to speak with great weight.* Bothi 854 , in^ * Since the now published statements and comments of General Todleben tend very strongly to show that the “ North Side” was the true point to attack , it cannot but be interesting to the friends of Captain (now Admiral Sir James) Drummond to see the words in which he re- 38 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XL\nif. Captain Drummond and Captain Willis (who was the attack acting with him at the time of the survey) con- North ceived themselves able to report decisively in favour of Captain an attack upon the Star Fort as a means of Willis, achieving the great object of the Allies-,* but if, even before the invasion, they were warranted in fixing upon the Severnaya or “North Side” as a true point of attack, much more was it now to be con- cluded in favour of such a choice, since the Allies, Th^iand- by their successful landing, followed up by the re- xhebat- suit of the battle on the Alma, had fastened already the Alma upon that very part of the coast from which they greafac- could conveniently assail the Star Fort; and more- over, it was fairly to be reckoned, that if the Allies son/for s ^ lon ^ 8° straight to their end, without at all turn- attacking ing aside , or interposing fresh marches between Side. themselves and their prey, the momentum they had gathered from their victory might carry them through the defences without being put to a siege. The time Bivouacking now on the Belbec, the Allies were come for at last within gunshot of the fortress they had decSon. come over sea to confront; and, the period in which it had been possible to keep the question open being close to its end, they were called upon to ported to the above effect: “I think that, on carrying the position of “the ( E’ Fort [the Star Fort is marked ‘E’ in Captain Drummond’s “plan] the place would fall immediately.” — Captain Drummond’s Re- port, 9th January 1854. * Captain Willis says, in his Report: “I think it is quite possible to “destroy the arsenal with time and 20,000 soldiers, artillery, &c. The “attack on the South Side should be a feint.” Plate 14 INVASION OF THE CHIME A. 39 determine whether they would at once prepare to deliver the attack, or give up their old plan of cam- paign. It is now therefore time to see what there was in front of the Allies which might be calculated to turn them from the execution of their original de- sign. On the northern side of the Sebastopol bay, and facing the sea-forts which cover the town and har- bour, there were not only other sea-forts of great size and power, but also some barracks, some maga- zines, and a factory worked by the Government. This aggregate of buildings, or the quarter in which they stood, was known amongst Russians by the name of the Severnaya; and the English have been accustomed to call it the “North side of Sebastopol,” or, in language more short, the “North Side.” If once the Allies could make themselves masters there, they would be able to deal so heavily with the town and arsenal of Sebastopol, and would have it so completely in their power to burn every ship in the harbour, that thenceforth the main object of the in- vasion might be regarded as an object attained. * But even these were not all the advantages which might be expected to flow from a resolve to attack the Star Fort. By reason of the proximity of that field of action to the roads which converge near Mac- r CHAP XLVirr. The Se- vernaya or north side of Se- bastopol. Its value to the Allies. * I rest this assertion upon the authority of General de Todleben. — “Defense de Sebastopol,” vol. i. p. 239. The General states his conclu- sion upon this point in decisive, unhesitating terms. 40 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIir. The pla- teau over- hanging the North Side. kenzie’s Farm, the plan of operating against the ’north side of Sebastopol was compatible with measures for seizing the enemy’s lines of communication. * And this was a priceless advantage; for although, in regard to material supplies, Sebastopol for the time might be sufficing to the needs of the Eussian army. Prince Mentschikoff was wholly dependent upon his lines of communication for the reinforcements which he believed to be of absolute necessity to him. General de Todleben has good means of knowing the degree of stress which must have been put upon the Kussians by the loss of their lines of communication; and it is his judgment that, at this time, the establishment of an Allied force on the road to Baktchi Serai must have brought the campaign to an end. ** The forts, barracks, storehouses, and factory, which thus came to be of great worth in the eyes of the striving nations, were at the foot of a high plateau surrounded on three sides by water. Along the northern boundary of the plateau there flowed the stream of the Belbec; on the west its base met the Black Sea; and on the south, where the buildings were placed, it fronted the great bay of Sebastopol. The sea-forts were not so constructed as to be the means of defence against an invader coming down upon them by land from the north; but on the high * Not only with the north , but with the south-east of the Crimea, where there were 10,000 men under Khomatoff. ** Expressed in his book, and — very positively indeed — in conver- sation with me. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* 41 ground above, though still at a distance of only a xlviTi. few hundred yards from the bay, there was a work”" ' — ill-contrived and dilapidated — which the English have called the Star Fort. The work had been con- The star structed in the year 1818, with a view to secure Fort * Fort Constantine, and the other great sea-forts which lined the north of the roadstead, from being taken in reverse by marines or other forces landing on the west coast-, but it stood in the path of any invader approaching Sebastopol from the Belbec, and could therefore be brought into use as a means of defence against him. It was an octagon, having sides of which each was from 190 to 230 yards long-, and, of its eight angles, every other one was supplied with a little bastion or caponiere, having an earthen parapet, whilst three out of the four remaining angles of the octagon were furnished with small bonnettes and barbettes, each taking three pieces. At the flanks of the bastions, the lines of what would other- wise have been the curtain were so interrupted as to provide means of obtaining a flanking fire from some small guns placed in casemates. The profiles of the bastions gave 14 feet of height with 10 of thickness, and the other parts of the fort had a height of from 4 to 7 feet, with a thickness of from 3 to 7 feet. The bastion which looked towards the roadstead was retrenched at its gorge by a work called a cavalier. The fort was surrounded by a ditch 12 feet deep and 18 feet broad, with revetment in masonry and a glacis. It was covered on its south and south- 42 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xi^viFi eastern sides by two lunettes, but both of these faced the water, and were of no important use against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. Of the 47 guns which armed the work, only 12 could be of service in the expected attack from the north. The fort was commanded, and even looked into, from the heights towards the north. * Endeav- In and near this work, from the day of the land- theRus- mg, on the 14th ot beptember, down to the evening th^iVut er of the 24th, the time of which we are speaking, the Strengthen Russians had toiled night and day, and with a force and f the °^> one time, some 1500 workmen. Their object plateau. wa s, no t only to repair and strengthen the Star Fort itself, but also to provide generally for the defence of the plateau against an enemy advancing from the Belbec. By those who know that these hurried works went on under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel de Todleben, it will be easily inferred that they were planned with a consummate skill; but what even he found means to achieve in ten days could not but fall very short of what was needed. * It may be right to say that in the above account of the Star Fort I have not implicitly followed the description contained in the text of General de Todleben’s work; but my words, I believe, will be found to agree with the plans which accompany his book. Those plans agree very well with the description contained in the admirable work which I have followed, the work of Gendre (“MateTiaux pour servir,” &c.), but not with the words of General de Todleben’s book. General de Tod- leben's book purports not to have been written, but edited by him; and I imagine he would be much more likely to allow mistakes to occur in the words of the narrative compiled under his auspices than to suffer any grave faults to appear in the elaborate maps and plans of fortifica- tions which form so valuable a portion of the work. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 43 However, he threw up works on each flank of the fort in order to strengthen and extend the line of defence, taking care that all the approaches (some of which had before been quite out of harm’s way from the fort) should now be liable to be swept by fire. Besides this, he erected two batteries on the crests towards the north-west, with the design of keeping off the enemy’s ships; and two, if not three, out of the nine guns which ultimately armed these batteries were so placed as to command that part of the coast which lay towards the mouth of the Belbec. The earthwork prepared for the reception of those two guns was the apparition described to Lord Rag- lan in the morning by Colonel Trochu, and threaten- ing, as we have already seen, to scare the Allies from their purpose. It does not appear that Tod- leben foresaw the effect which these two guns would have upon the counsels of the Allies. His general object was to take care that no ships should come within range without incurring fire; and he did not, it would seem, entertain any notion that, by refusing to the Allies the absolutely peaceful possession of the mouth of the Belbec, he might drive them to abandon their plan of campaign. He connected both of these north-western batteries with the Star Fort by means of trenches, which were to be lined by men using their musketry. In order to prevent the Star Fort from being looked into by the enemy, a great effort was made to increase the height of the parapet; but under the weight of the earth laid for this purpose CHAP. XLVIII. 44 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, XLviir. upon one of the old parapets the revetment of the ~~ scarp gave way, and a breach was thus made by the defenders themselves. One of Todleben’s objects was to throw up works which might prevent the enemy from turning the Star Fort on the eastern flank, but for the execution of this part of his plan there was no time. available By the morning of the 25th there were altogether for the twenty-nine guns in battery and available for the defence against the expected attack from the north. Amongst these were the nine pieces which now armed the two new north-western batteries, including the two 24-pounder carronades which commanded the The works coas t towards the mouth of the Belbec. These two might be attacked batteries, however, were liable to be destroyed by guns 1 of the guns of the Anglo-French fleet*,* and the trench the fleet. connec ^ n g one 0 f them with the fort could be T o^*ant" en ^^ a ^ ec ^ an( l f a ^ en in r ear by fire from the same part which quarter.** Indeed, the position of the ground and of have Veen the Russian works was such that in every stage of theTeets an attack undertaken against the Star Fort, the on sVar k seamen and the ships of the Allies would have been Fort * able to take a great part.*** In order to cover the retreat of the Russians, some of their ships were placed in such positions as to be able to sweep with their broadsides the slopes on the north of the roadstead. The form of the ravines descending from the Star * Todleben, “Defense de Sebastopol/’ vol. i. p. 233. ** Ibid. *** Ibid. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 45 Fort was such that upon two, if not three, of the xl vrn approaches from the side of the Belbec, the assailants might come up to the ditch without first incurring a cannonade of any great might or duration. * With regard to the forces available for the defence, Forces it may be said that if the Allies had advanced against for the the Star Fort on the morning of the 25th they would defence * have encountered there and on the ground adjoining a battalion of militiamen,** a company of sappers, and so large a body of sailors — withdrawn, for that purpose, from the ships and from the defence of the South Side — as would bring up the whole number of combatants to 11,000.*** The sailors were, for the The force most part, ill armed, some of them having old flint- fhe e po d s\ ng and-steel muskets, and others, it seems, only pikes 24 th an ? 0 or cutlasses. This was the force which, extended 2oth Sept * along a front of a mile, was to defend the fort and the plateau against a victorious army of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, supported and actively aided by their fleets. The defenders, however, were com- manded by one whose name will be long illustrious in the annals of Russia. For the present, it suffices Admiral to say of Admiral Korniloff, that he was a chivalrous, resolute, and devoted seaman, who, with hardly a hope of any better success than that of an honourable * In the ‘‘Defense de Sebastopol,” General de Todleben undertakes to show elaborately, and in full detail, the power and duration of the fire to which the assailants would be exposed. ** I continue to use the term “militia” as a word for distinguishing what the Russians call their “reserve” battalions. *** 11,350, — Todleben, vqI. i. p. 227, 46 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XLviFf death, had determined to defend the plateau and the fort to the last extremity. Reasons Of the reception so prepared for the Allies, I am for avoid- inga more content to say only this much, because, after all, it account of so happened that the Star Fort was never assailed; iaSonTfor an d although there is use in inquiring what would fenccfof have been the probable result of an attack upon the the North “North Side” from the direction of the Belbec, it chances that this very question has already received an answer which comes with so much authority, and is, at the same time, so well supported by detailed statement and laborious demonstration, that it is well to give the conclusion without reproducing, in this place, the voluminous materials of proof on which it is rested. * We saw that the officer who planned and directed the works of defence was Colonel de Todleben. He it is who has now pronounced that the plateau and the fort could not have been successfully defended against the attack which the Allies had the means of Opinion of making.** The situation of the defenders, he says, on the bsn notwithstanding all they had done, and notwitlistand- whetuer dig their heroic resolves, * was nothing less than * The passages in which General de Todleben maintains his con- clusion will be found in p. 230-33, 238 and 239 of his work ; but I do not reproduce them, because they fail to deal with the really disputed question — i. e., the question whether the position could have been ad- vantageously defended by mi army. The argument in favour of that last view (i. e Sir John Burgoyne’s) will be found in the Appendix. ** Todleben, “Defense de Sebastopol,” vol. i. p. 230-33. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 47 desperate;* and lie declares that the complete success of the expected attack by the Allies would have been "the star inevitable.** lie adds — and there were reasons which f^NorUi gave great importance to that part of the question hate^eiu — that their success must have been speedy.*** These conclusions he of course founds on his own complete fended against knowledge of the defences as seen from within; and an attack it would not of necessity follow that the weakness of Allies, which he was cognisant would be visible to the Allies. But, then, General de Todleben goes further. Sup- posing the Allies to have made full use of even those restricted means of observation they had, he says they must needs have learnt that the attack was feasible, f And , lest it be said that this , after all was only The opin _ the conclusion of an Engineer officer standing on the General 011 sea-cliff, and thence undertaking; to say how far the?® Tod ' 7 # J lebcn says defences could be judged of from the ships, it must the Allies be repeated that the conclusion to which General de have been Todleben says the Allies ought to have come was form was the very same as that to which Lord Raglan and^fr^° by Sir Edmund Lyons did come in fact. Sir Edmund, ^‘ d i ^ ag ‘ as commanding the in-shore squadron, would have Sirjs. been called upon to take a great part in any attack carried on along the coast, and therefore his judgment was that of a man preparing to act upon it. He, no less than Lord Raglan, was convinced, as we saw, * Todleben, “ Defense de Sebastopol /’ vol. i. p. 30. ** Ibid. p. 233. *** Ibid. p. 232. t Ibid. p. 239. 48 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VIII. The ob- jections which were urged against going on with the plan of attacking the North Side. that after the Alma the true policy of the Allies re- ’quire d an immediate attack upon the Star Fort. The Allies were not ignorant that the possession of the “North Side” would at once enable them to can- nonade the enemy’s shipping* Nor again did they fall into the error of supposing the Star Fort to be of itself a formidable work.** Indeed it may be said that the hindrances v/hich stood in the way of the enterprise w T ere all of such a kind that they must have been as clearly apparent to the minds of general officers whilst planning at Varna as now they were to the eyes of men scanning the work with their field-glasses. It is true, as we saw, that towards the north-west of the Star Fort a field-work had lately appeared, which bent round the shoulder of the hill, and in such a direction that two if not three of its guns, at a range of two miles, might bring their fire to bear upon the waters at the mouth of the Belbec; but the use of the spade and the pickaxe has been so long known in the world, and the crust of the earth has been so frequently used by man as a means of sheltering him in his efforts to harm his assailants, that if the Allies were * See chap. Xi/vlit. p. 39. It is difficult for an Englishman to help thinking wistfully of the course things might have been likely to take if, the French claim to precedence being out of the way, the English had been on the right. In that case, Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons would have been operating, as it were, side by side, and the enterprise against the Star Fort would have given a good occasion for showing what can be done by the closely combined action of land and sea forces, ** See Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum, post, p, 72» INVASION OF THE CEIMEA. 49 to turn aside from a well-weighed plan of campaign at the sight of a newly-made battery, they would' not only disclose a flexibility scarce consistent with the pretensions of aggressive States, but would be conceding to the power of the Defence, as compared with the power of the Attack, an ascendant which does not belong to it. Certainly, it was possible that by a gun in the new battery, discharged at a range of two miles, a vessel might be struck whilst engaged in bringing stores into the mouth of the Belbec; but it was not with a notion of being baffled by a contingency of this kind that the venturesome enterprise of the invasion had been planned or be- gun; and the work which thus threatened the en- trance of the Belbec was not only open to attack by the land forces of the Allies, but was also so placed that the naval forces of the French and English ships could have taken their part in its capture. Again, it was said that the position which the Russians would have to defend on the North Side was only a mile in extent, and that therefore their main strength might be concentrated with powerful effect upon a comparatively small space of ground.* It was also argued that, from the moment of the landing, the Russians must have inferred that the invaders intended to attack the Severnaya or North Side, and that, therefore, there was no hope of sur- prising the enemy by an attack at that point.** So * Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum , post, p. 72. ** Ibid. Invasion of the Crimea . V. CHAP. XL VIII. 4 50 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIII. far as they went, these two arguments were sound, but, taken alone, they had not sufficient cogency to warrant the abandonment of a well-matured plan of campaign. Yet again, it was argued that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone, though involving the means of cannonading the Russian ships and their dockyards, would not of necessity carry with it the entire possession of Sebastopol.* To this ob- jection the answer is twofold: for, first, it is clear that the capture of the Severnaya or North Side alone would have enabled the Allies to attain at once the main object of the invasion; but, secondly, as we have already seen, the operations against the Severnaya might have been easily accompanied or followed by a measure which (unless General de Todleben errs) must have instantly given the Allies the whole of the prize they were seeking.** By far the gravest of the obstacles to the plan of assailing the North Side was the want of a safe harbour on that part of the neighbouring coast which was north of the Sebastopol bay. It was said that the attack might take time, and that, pending the operations, the fleets might be so driven from the coast by stress of weather as to put the Allies in peril for their supplies. Of course, this fear was one wRich applied to the idea of attempting any landing at all on the western shores of the Crimea; * Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum, post, p. 72, ** See ante, p. 40. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 51 and, since it liad been so far set at nought that, in ^viir despite of it, the Allies had both landed and established themselves in the country, it was hardly perhaps opportune to revive the objection at a time when the invaders had made good their footing in the peninsula by a decisive victory. The Allies did well to regard the want of a harbour as a grave evil; but apparently their most prudent mode of al- lowing this care to weigh upon their counsels would have been by treating it as a motive for shortening to the utmost the anxious interval, and determining — ay, even, if need be, at a painful cost of life — to carry the works of the Severnaya with a per- emptory despatch, whilst yet by title of victory they seemed to have might on their side. So inextricably were the Allies engaged in the expedition, and so deeply were they committed in the face of Europe to the duty of achieving their end, that, whatever may have been their wisdom originally in resolving to touch the Crimea, the driest prudence now seemed to command that they should follow up the victory with swiftness, and always in that venturesome temper which was the only one fitted to their enter- prise. For refuge as well as for glory they needed the port of Sebastopol. I do not understand that Sir John BurgoyneTiie would venture a negative answer to this question;* ^ sir ds * Although he has strongly argued that it would have been injudi- cious to attack the position of the Star Fort , he has done this on the Oppressed ground — ground now known to have been unfounded — that 4 * U, OF ILL LI3. 52 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XLvni an ^ ^ when this is acknowledged, it he asked once John Bur- again why he counselled the Allies to avoid the conciu- Star Fort, the explanation is this: — Instead of re- sion. garding the Fort as a work which (along with its adjuncts) would he only defended hy its mere gar- rison, he looked upon it as a part only of an ex- tended line of defence. He looked upon it as mark- ing the dominant feature of an entrenched position which, in his judgment, might be advantageously defended hy an army; but having formed that opinion, he went on to infer that a like opinion would govern the decisions of the enemy, and that hy a whole army accordingly the position would be defended. There, he erred. There was no inten- tion on the part of the Russians to attempt to de- fend the position hy means of an army; and it must he added that the mistake of believing the contrary was one that might have been cleared away by a careful reconnaissance. But if the relinquishment of the North Side was not to be justified upon military grounds, there was still this to say for the measure : — it was a way out Recapi- of trouble. We have seen that when, the day after statement the battle, Lord Raglan proposed to St. Arnaud “at Jectio^to a ° nce to advance to the Belbec, cross that river, and attack the ‘ ‘then assault the forts,” the Marshal answered that Severnaya 7 which was a his troops were tired, and that it could not be evinced by the position was defended by an “army." — 11 Military Opinions,” p,238. It is Sir John Burgoype himself who puts the yvord in italics. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 53 “done.”* We also learnt that on the following clay, the 2 2d, Lord Raglan was “ again urging on the theFrench “ French General to advance across the Belbec,” and, garters for once in his life, was cast into a state of u low^ h t ^ lst “spirits,” by hearing the Marshal reply, “that he had ^mber GP " “ascertained that the Russians had thrown up strong “earthworks on the banks of the river; and though “he (the Marshal) did not doubt that the Allies could “force them, as they had the works on the Alma, “they could not afford the loss that would be en- tailed;”** and, finally, we were enabled to perceive the way in which this refusal of the French to go on with the campaign as originally planned, was the cause which induced the Allies to halt — to halt with the whole of their forces — for two clear days on the Alma. *** It must now be added, that the further efforts of Sir Edmund Lyons to induce the Marshal to agree to an attack on the position of the Star Fort were attended with no success. Upon hearing from LordRecon- _ x -it i naissance Raglan that the Marshal had alleged the new earth- by Sir works overlooking the Belbec as an obstacle not to Lyons, be faced, Sir Edmund put himself on board a small steamer, and ran in so close as to be able to recon- noitre effectually. He then ascertained that the f ailure of J his endea- * Statement of Sir E. Lyons, ante, chap. xlvi. ** Ibid. *** Instead of leaving merely a division to cover the embarkation of the wounded , an expedient which would have consisted perfectly with the plan of advancing at once to the attack of the Star Fort. See ante, chap. xlvi. 54 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xLvnr newly appearing works were of the kind represented vour to by the Marshal, but that they had not yet been st. Arnaud armed. Sir Edmund hastened to report the result of thepiaTof survey to the French Commander, but could not theStar S P ersua( l e hi m to resume the idea of marching against Fort. the Star Fort. Lord Rag- At first — and this was the cause of Lord Kag- power of Ian’s dejection — the whole enterprise seemed to be the^eviis* threatened with ruin by the refusal of Marshal St. from^a Arnaud to go on in the execution of the plan of divided campaign with which the Allies had set sail. But the English General was by nature so constituted that no man could be better qualified than he was to lessen to the very utmost the acknowledged evil of a divided command-, for, besides that his devotion to the public service was so entire as to exclude all thought of self, he was free from the vanity (if vanity it be) which makes a man desire that a great event should be traceable to his own conception: and he was not accustomed to ponder over warlike devices in such a way as to be likely to conceive a violent predilection for one plan, or a violent dislike of another. He plainly believed that, for an army endued with the strength which a victory always gives, an inferior or even rash plan, carried through with good will by each of the commanders, would serve the cause better than any other plan (however good in itself) which failed to win the cordial ap- proval of both the chiefs. He was, therefore, well qualified to deal with the emergency in which the INVASION or THE CRIMEA. 55 Allies would find themselves placed if the French should persist in their unwillingness to assail the Star Fort. The evil was occasioned by the fact that, at a Nature of moment when (from causes which will be afterwards lemma spoken of*) the French army was temporarily dis-^^ 1 ^ qualified for enterprise, that same army chanced to ^ r c e ed be the one which (by reason of its position on the right of the Allied forces, and therefore opposite to the Star Fort and its outworks) was called upon to perform an arduous duty. This accident, if so one may call it, being the true root of the evil which threatened the fate of the invasion, it followed that a way of escape from it might be found, if the hitherto adopted plan of campaign could be replaced by one which, for the moment, would present the labouring oar to the English instead of the French. Blending a technical phrase with words of common parlance, a man might say that the condition of the Allied army was this : — If, as first intended, it were called upon to operate “by its right,” it would still be under the palsy which affected the French Head- quarters. If, on the other hand, the Allied army were to operate against the enemy “by its left,” it would instantly shake off all numbness deriving from Marshal St. Arnaud, and would practically come under the leadership of the English General. It was possible to imagine a plan of campaign Account which would work this change. Though custom and formation * At the close of this chapter. 56 INVASION OP THE CRIMEA-. CHAP. XLVIIT. obtained respecting the land defences of Sebas- topol. Informa- tion sup- plied by Colonei (now Gen- eral) Mac- intosh. foreseeing prudence have made it the practice of the 'great European Powers to obtain in peace-time full accounts and plans of the fortresses belonging to rival States, this (in common with many other of the warlike duties attaching upon her in peace-time) England had neglected; and it happened that, in the case of Sebastopol, there had been a like neglect on the part of the French War Office. Neither France nor England were authoritatively informed of the state of the land defences of Sebastopol. In the year 1835, Colonel Macintosh had given to the world an account of the then state of the land defences of the place; and he had brought to bear upon this task not only a sufficing care and labour, but also so much sagacity, and so sound a knowledge of the military art, that to this hour it is curious to see how the nature of the struggle which was one day to gather about the Malakoff is foreshadowed in a book almost twenty years old.* When the war began to impend, General Macintosh imparted further * On the 16th of December 1834, General (then Colonel) Macintosh, in a memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople, wrote: “It appears that the works intended to enclose the town on this “side (it is now quite open) are meant to consist in a strong enceinte of “revetted bastions. They are now laid out, and quarries opened to “carry them on. . . . The new works are to extend as nearly as “possible in the direction e, e, e, and will completely cover the town “and harbour. At present the inner harbour is commanded from the “height d .” By looking at the accompanying copy of the sketch which Colonel Macintosh sent with his memorandum of 1834, it will be seen that the ground there designated as “the height d v is the site of the Malakoff. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 57 expositions of tlie subject to the authorities at the Horse Guards; and it is now certain that the body of information and suggestive comment which he supplied would have been a wholesome study for the Allies; for although it would have been necessary for them to make wide allowance for the changes which the hand of man might have wrought in a period of twenty years, the great features of the ground must needs be the same, and the plan of the defences which (according to the showing of General Macintosh) the Russian engineers had traced out on paper was one so cogently dictated by the nature of the ground, that it might well be regarded as a use- ful indication of what the defences would be even after a lapse of years. It was natural, however, that, being impatient of their strange want of knowledge concerning the actual state of the land defences, and yearning after fresher information, the Allies should have given too little care to the result of old surveys and inquiries. Our army is not constituted upon a plan which entices its officers to the pursuit of warlike studies or warlike inquiries having only a contingent use- fulness; and the power which England may be able to exert in appealing to arms depends a good deal upon the readiness with which she may be able to break down mere professional barriers, and bring to bear upon the great business of war the abounding zeal, energy, and skill of her whole people. M ^ It was from the book of a young Scottish traveller phant. 58 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVHI. His report of tlio state of the land defences of Sebas- topol. that the Allies derived what knowledge they had of the state of the land defences at Sebastopol. Mr. Oliphant had been gifted with an almost in- stinctive power, which showed him from afar where fields of action were opening; and he was so prone to decide and dart forward whilst others were only pondering, that, however many there might have been with wishes and plans like his, yet commonly of late years he has been the first to alight upon the scene of coming events. So it happened that, before the home statesmen of the day had begun to take the alarm, this restless, sagacious traveller had half divined the war, and already was pacing those ridges and knolls and ravines upon which, a little while later, his country was to rivet her thoughts. For some time, it had been the policy of the Czar to withdraw Sebastopol from the eyes of Europe; and, in general, no traveller was suffered to enter the place. But an obstacle of this kind was sure to be overcome by the spirit of enterprise; and Mr. Oliphant not only found means to enter Sebastopol, but suc- ceeded in informing himself of the then state of the land defences on the south side of the harbour. Ke- turning to England, he quickly made known the re- sult of his observations, and caused to be published these words : — “But of one fact there is no doubt, that however “well fortified may be the approaches to Sebastopol “by sea, there is nothing whatever to prevent any “number of troops landing a few miles south of the ' invasion of this ciumba. 59 “town in one of tlie six convenient bays with which xlwkl “ the coast as far as Cape Kherson is indented, and, “marching down the main street (provided they were “strong enough to defeat any military force that “might be opposed to them in the open field), sack “the town, and burn the fleet.”* This report not only did much to evoke the The effect desire for an enterprise against Sebastopol, but also duced, caused men to see that, at all events, up to the period when the question of the Holy Shrines began to assume a grave aspect, little had been done to the land defences; and that whatever obstacles might have to be encountered by an army attacking the place from the south, those obstacles, at the time of Mr. Oliphant’s visit, were not of a kind to make a formal siege needful. Moreover, as there was no proof that works on a great scale had been going on during the last eighteen months, there seemed to be fair ground for hoping that, so far as concerned the existence of regular fortifications in masonry, the land approaches to Sebastopol might be nearly in the state they were in when Mr. Oliphant saw them. Before he left England, Lord Baglan did not fail to give himself the advantage of a personal inter- * Oliphant’s u Russian Shores of the Black Sea p. 260. Mr. Oli- phant’s report was accurate. With the exception of throwing up a work near the water’s edge, which was more properly an adjunct to one of the sea-forts than a part of the land defences , nothing had been done at the time of his visit towards fortifying the main tow r n of Sebastopol on its south side. Mr. Oliphant’s book was published on the 15th of No- vember 1853. 60 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XLviif. v * ew witli Mr. Oliphant, and afterwards witli Oli- pliant’s fellow-traveller, Mr. Oswald Smith. The result was, that the impression created by the passage in Mr. Oliphant’s book was strengthened. Thence- forth the probability of finding Sebastopol weakly fortified on the land side never ceased to be kept in remembrance; and it was only the supposed want of a convenient landing-ground on the southern coast of the Crimea which afterwards caused the Allies to discard for a time the plan of attacking the place from that side. Lord Rag- At the time of the earliest deliberations on the Ian’s lean- ing in subject, Lord Raglan had been disposed to think tho plan that Sebastopol ought to be attacked on the south tackin' side; and although he had ceased to dwell on the side S . 0Uth ^ ea f rom the time when the west coast was chosen The idea ^ or P^ ace landing, it recurred to him, as we (though h saw, on the morrow of the battle, when he found laid aside himself encountered at the French Headquarters by west coast a refusal to attack the Star Fort. He then con- hhnsen for eeived that if the French should persist to the last ing/now their refusal, he at least might avert that utter recurred cessation and collapse of the whole enterprise which mind. their determination threatened to produce by per- idea of a suading them (as a substitute for the old plan which bywhich they were thus abandoning) to join with him in sure™ Tat- marching across the country to the south coast, and the^south there establishing a new base of operations, from Seba°t< to attack Sebastopol on its south side, poi might The hazardous character of such an undertaking INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 61 as this lias been masked, as we shall hereafter see, ^vm, by a strange coincidence, and by the singularly be recon- liappy immunity which that coincidence brought t ho fact with it; but the plan now proposed was nothing less than that, in the presence of a Russian army under- Jith&rto 118 stood to be concentrated in Sebastopol, the Allies followed x had placed should break into a slender column, with a depth of Allies many miles , and in that state defile for two whole west coast days or more (through a forest unknown save by Crimea, maps) round the eastern side of Sebastopol. It would The ha _ seem at first sight that an army undertaking such & character task would lay itself open to the danger of being of a pro- cut into two or more pieces at the pleasure ot the defile „ . ^ round the Russian Commander. east of Sebasto- Some reckoned, indeed, that the defeat which the p o1 * enemy had suffered might be expected to render him so tolerant that he would suffer the flank march to go on under his eyes without daring to undertake the seemingly easy task of bringing it to ruin; but to hope this was to found a great deal upon the moral effect of a victory; for the condition of troops and waggon-trains defiling through forest and moun- tain roads is exactly such as to give to a defeated army on their flank an occasion to recover its bold- ness and self-respect by effecting successful though petty attacks upon the more helpless portions of the long, trailing column. Besides, it is obvious that if the enemy’s prostration was so complete as to make him capable of suffering the Allies to defile by their left and march round him, it was still more likely 62 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xlahh. in the event of a prompt attack* upon the Star “Fort, that same prostration of spirit would bring its effect about the fall of the work. Indeed, one strong reason in wasting n ... the moral tor discarding the plan was, that if the Allied army wMcf^iie should once turn aside to make a circuitous march, gained h by instead of going on straight with its purpose against tory'on 6 " ^ Star Fort, it would lose a great deal of that the Aima. priceless momentum which the victory of the Alma had given it. Its effect Again, the configuration of the ground in the ring the neighbourhood of the Mackenzie Heights was of such from un- a kind that if, as was proposed, the Allies should offensive” march round to Balaclava and the Chersonese with in the tl0ns ^ ie whole of their forces, they would so forfeit their open field, freedom of action that (except by undertaking a second invasion) it would become impracticable for them, however strong they might be, to press upon the enemy by offensive operations in the field.* Shut back in a narrow district, they would be liable to undergo the attacks of the Russian Commander when- ever he might find it convenient to assume the offen- sive, and yet would be debarred from exercising a corresponding power themselves. The invaders had no acquaintance with the country into which they were going, except what they got from their map;** * This, as we shall hereafter see, was effectually proved in the spring of 1855, when, in the hope of finding an escape from the almost intolerable predicament in which the Allies had placed themselves, the French Government was about to undertake a fresh invasion of the Crimea. ** A reprint, under the auspices of Major Jervis, of the map pre- pared by the Russian Government, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 63 and although, so far as it went, this guide was not xhvui. an unfaithful one, the language of the engraver, who represented with lines and shading the south- ward declivities of the Mackenzie range, did not have the effect of warning the Allies that there was there an impregnable position, and that, if they should leave it to the enemy, they would concede to him irrevocably an advantage of the greatest worth, by giving up their power to attack him in the open field, and compelling themselves to assail him, if ever they should assail him at all, in his lines of defence at Sebastopol. And last, it must be observed, that for the Allies it in- to avoid the attack of the Star Fort, which stood Abandon- 6 within gunshot before them, and to move away to dTfTnite, a the south coast, was to fly from a task measured out, ^le^ask understood, well defined, and go off to confront things unknown. The weakness of the Fort itself as an magni- aid to defence had been perceived by the Allies;* and although they did not know that it had been abandoned by the Russian army to the care of the seamen, they were aware that it would be defended, if defended at all, by a force suffering under the depression of a lost battle, and having to attempt a stand with an arm of the sea in its immediate rear. Yet to the task of seizing this fort, and so at once gaining the north side of Sebastopol, and the means of destroying the enemy’s fleet and dockyards, they were going to prefer the unexplored forest and the * See Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum, post, p. 72. 64 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIII. Little freedom of choice remained to Lord Raglan. mountain roads, with the necessity of having to 'debouch into a plain where the presence of a Russian army might be expected, and of afterwards being forced to conquer for themselves new means of com- munication with the sea. On that, of course, their very existence was to depend; and then, again, in the distance there would still lie before them the prospect of having to force the immensely strong position of the Sapoune ridge; and not until that should be carried would they be able to begin attack- ing the southern defences of Sebastopol — defences of which, at this time, they knew very little. They had learnt, indeed, that on its land side, some two years before, the place was open; but in knowledge of what might since have been done for its defence their minds were almost blank. The dangers and evils thus attaching to the plan of the “flank march” were of the gravest kind; but the truth is, that the unwillingness of the French Commander to persist in the plan of attacking the north side of the place had brought the affairs of the Allies to such a state that, supposing his reluctance to continue, very little freedom of choice could or would remain to Lord Raglan. He could not, of course, insult the French army by marching across its front to attack a work which was straight oppo- site to their lines, and away from those of the Eng- lish. And, although Lord Raglan judged it to be his duty to uphold, to the last, the expediency of going on with the old plan of campaign, and at- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 65 tacking tlie North Fort, lie also felt that there was a limit to the urgency which could be appropriately exerted in that direction; for it was evident that to be beyond measure persistent in pressing and pressing the French Marshal to undertake an attack against liis declared will and judgment was not only a course which held out small promise of good, but one which, if too far pursued, could hardly be otherwise than unbecoming, offensive, and impolitic. The thought of abandoning the expedition was not to be borne; and although it may be judged that the most politic mode of conquering the enemy’s stronghold was by means of field operations carried on upon his lines of communication, yet the impatience of the English at home was so great, was so closely pointed to one object, and was, moreover, so hotly shared by their Government, that a resort to any plan of campaign, however wisely conceived, which avoided a direct attack upon Sebastopol, would have been almost looked upon as an abandonment of duty. Well, but if, for this reason field operations could not well be proposed as a substitute for a direct at- tack upon Sebastopol, then what choice was left? The truth is, that the unwillingness of the French to attack the north side of Sebastopol had brought the Allies into straits so hard that, with all its rash- ness, the plan of defiling round the east of Sebas- topol might be regarded as the least of the evils from which a choice could be made. Rightly looked at, Reasons “the flank march” - — for so the movement is called justify Invasion of the Crimea , Y. 5 66 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xlvitt — was a perilous, a desperate expedient, by which the resorT— that he might avert a collapse of the whole under- hand taking — Lord Raglan sought to find an alternative march. f or ^ en terprise declined by the French. From causes which will be spoken of presently, the French army, without any fault of its own, was, for the mo- ment, paralysed*, and the English army, on the other hand, being ready for action, and under a General resolved to force on the enterprise, there was great temptation to clutch at a plan which would relieve the French army from all immediate demand on its energies, and cast the load on the English. The plan of the flank march fulfilled these conditions; for it spared the French from the task which had seemed to await them on their right front, and in- vested the English General with the leadership and the virtual control of the proposed operation. Light in But although it was as an escape from a dilemma Lord Rag- that the flank march is best to be justified, I do not gardod the represent that Lord Raglan himself thought ill of the Uv^of^the measure. Without ever wavering in his opinion that march f^ ie victory on the Alma should be followed up by pursuing the old plan and attacking the Severnaya or North Fort, he yet thought that he saw such good features in the alternative plan as to be able to fall back upon it with a cheerful contentment. Appar- ently he was not much impressed with the hazardous character of the flank march; and, on the other hand, he certainly thought that, if once the Allies should be established on the south coast, they would INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 67 there be on the best ground for attacking Sebas- xLvnr. topoh* For the purpose of informing himself upon any question of military engineering, Lord Raglan had at his side an accomplished and gifted adviser. Sir Sir John John Burgoyne was a general of engineers now serv- ing on the Staff of the army which Lord Raglan commanded. His experience of war went back to the great days. It began with the first year of this century at Malta. In 1806 he was serving in Sicily. He was commanding engineer with General Fraser’s expedition to Egypt, and was at the assault on the lines of Alexandria, and the siege of Rosetta. He was with Sir John Moore at Messina and in Sweden in 1808, and was with him the same year in the Peninsula. He was at Corunna. He blew up the bridge of Benevente in the presence of the enemy. He was with Sir Arthur Wellesley in 1809, and attached to the 3d (Picton’s) Division. He was at the passage of the Douro. He served in the lines of Torres Vedras. He blew up Fort Concep- tion in presence of the enemy. He was at Busaco, at the first siege of Badajoz, at Elboden, at Aldea del Ponte, and at the siege and capture of Ciudad * “ I have always been disposed to consider that Sebastopol should “be attacked on the south side, and Sir John Burgoyne leant strongly “to the same opinion.” — Private letter from Lord Raglan to the Duke of Newcastle, 28th September 1854. This must not be understood as im- plying — for that would be contrary to the fact — that Lord Raglan, when once landed on the western coast of the Crimea , did not anxiously de- sire and prefer that there should be an attack on the north side. 5 * 68 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIII. Eodrigo, where he was present at the assault. He 'was at the second siege and capture of Badajoz, and was present at the assault and escalade of the castle. He was commanding engineer at the siege and cap- ture of the forts of Salamanca, and at the battle. He was commanding engineer at the capture of Madrid, and the Eetiro, and also at the siege of Burgos, where he was wounded. At Vittoria he had a horse shot under him. He was wounded at the assault of St. Sebastian. He conducted the siege of the castle of St. Sebastian as commanding engineer. He was at the passage of the Bidassoa, the Nivelle, at the Nive, at the passage of the Adour, the blockade of Bayonne, and the repulse of the sortie. He was at New Orleans, and was with the force despatched to Portugal in 1827.* He had, therefore, a vast experience, con- necting his name with a glorious period of England’s history; and the value of this advantage was not, as so often happens, in the least counteracted by failure of energy. On the contrary, Sir John Burgoyne was gifted with a vigour of mind which made him in that respect the equal of those who were young. Fur- rowed by years, and the sheer labour of great wars, he still showed what mettle there was in the genera- tion of men with which England began the century; for neither Egypt, nor the retreat to Corunna, nor the cares of Torres Yedras, nor the business of all the great sieges — Ciudad Eodrigo, Badajoz, Burgos, St, Sebastian - — nor yet the discomfiture of New * Hart’s Army List. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 69 Orleans, had been able to imprint upon his features the marks of painful anxiety. To high intellectual' power he added the firmness of a reasoner who holds that there can be no sect in mathematics, and that opinions carefully formed must not be dominated by mere results. As might be expected, he was master of the science of the military engineer; but his mind, ranging freely beyond his own branch of the service, had become stored with the many kinds of know- ledge which concern the whole business of war. He wrote with clearness, with grace, and so persuasively that, having a pen in his hand, he was liable per- haps to be drawn into error by the cogency of his own arguments. He was daring and resolute; and since his mind had been formed at a time when Eng- land was not only in a robust and warlike condition, but also in some degree careless of the lives of com- mon soldiers ,and workmen, it is probable that he could have easily brought himself to make a great sacrifice of life for a great purpose; and the power to do this, where a strong place lias to be taken, is one of no little worth. Moreover, it is believed that Sir John Burgoyne was not without that wholesome ambition which, if the command of an army had chanced to fall to his lot,* might have impelled him to great achievements. It is possible that because he was the commanding engineer with Fraser’s ex- * He was at one time the senior general officer serving under Lord Raglan, and, under possible circumstances, might have succeeded to the command. CHAP. XLVIII. 70 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIIL pedition to Egypt, and at the siege of Burgos, and "because he was at New Orleans, and because he was advising in the business of trying to take Sebastopol at a time when the place did not fall, therefore some, in estimating his quality as a general, might condemn him, after the manner of the Athenians, for not being fortunate*, and supposing it to be insisted upon (as it would be by the more accurate Moderns) that a mere charge of lucklessness is no honest answer to a ques- tion concerning the capacity of a general, the objec- tor, when thus driven home, might venture perhaps a surmise that Sir John Burgoyne’s sureness of judg- ment was liable to be endangered by his too indis- criminate reliance upon the processes of close reason- ing; for a method like that is most apt to lead man into fallacies, whenever he applies it to questions of such a kind that they need to be solved by the instinctive, the divining power, or even by coarse sagacity. Still, the tenor of counsels, appearing at first sight to result from a too studious method of solving war- like problems, might be traceable, after all, to the nature of Sir J ohn Burgoyne’s position at the English Headquarters, rather than to the original bent of his mind; for he who, without holding a command, was called upon to give advice likely to be accepted at the French Headquarters, as well as by his own chief, was obliged to make proposals of such a kind that he could support them in argument; and that very necessity would be enough to prevent him from INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 71 striking upon one of tliose daring yet happy con- ceptiqns which can be originated and pushed to great issues by a sole commander, although they are wanting in those smooth, placid features which would best recommend them to a council of war. Of course, it was in the nature of things that the judgment of a man deeply versed in the business of sieges should be more or less warped by his science-, and that, advising on the conduct of an enterprise much dependent on swiftness of action and on prompt use of the blessing of victory, the skilled engineer might be too ready to enter upon a war of entrenchments; but Sir John Burgoyne had so much breadth of view, and so general a knowledge of the warlike art, that he was as little likely, perhaps, to err in this direction as any other officer of the same calling in the French or the English camp. Now, Sir John Burgoyne not only held that the His project of an attack upon the south side of Sebas- topol had many and great advantages over that of assailing the Star Fort, but even brought himself to believe that, for the sake of being able to exchange the one plan for the other, it would be wise to front all the hazard of marching the Allied armies to the east of the Sebastopol roadstead, and thence round to the south of the place. His opinion was known to his chief; and when Lord Kaglan perceived that the reluctance of the French to attack the Star Fort was strong, and firmly rooted, he hastened to obtain for the alternative plan which had occurred to him 72 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XL^n ^he san( dion and persuasive support of Sir John He is re- ~ Burgoyne. Accordingly, on the morrow of the battle put iMii 10 on the Alma, he requested Sir John to put his wntmg. 0 pi n icm in writing; and, in the course of the same day, the English Commander was furnished with this memorandum : — - Memorandum. “Camp on the Alma, 21st Sept. 1854. Sir John “I would submit that, unless some impeding circum- goyne’s “ stances occur which cannot now be foreseen, the com- Memoran- “bined armies should at once move round to the south side dum. “of Sebastopol, instead of attacking Fort Constantine;* “by which the following advantages may be anticipated: — “1. That instead of attacking a position naturally u strong and of limited extent, to which a powerful support “will be given by Fort Constantine,* which is a permanent “fortification, though by no means formidable, if insulated, “the enemy would have to defend a very extensive line, “divided by valleys, and, from every information, very “ imperfectly , if at all, entrenched, and which would pro- bably be forced rapidly. “2. As the advance is from the north, our attack will “ rather be expected on that side , and not on the south. “3. Even supposing the Fort Constantine* to be taken, “although it will open the shipping, dockyard, &c., to “•cannonading, it does not insure entire possession of the “important establishments until after a second operation, “ which may still require to move round to the south, while * Ity Fort Constantine Sir John Burgoyne means the Star Fort. Fort Constantine was one of the sea-forts, but at this period of the in- vasion the name was often applied by mistake to the Star Fort. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA 73 “ the enemy will retain to the last free and open communi- ^vin “ cation'* to the place. * - “4. There is every reason to believe, from the ap- pearance of the maps, and what may be expected to be “the formation of the ground, that there is a very strong “position between the sea at Balaclava and along the “valley of the T chernaya, that would most efficiently cover “the Allied armies during the operation, but is too exten- sive to be taken up by the garrison. “5. That the communication with the fleet, which is, “in fact, our base of operations, would be far more secure “ and commodious by the small harbour of Balaclava and “the bays near Chersonese, than on the open coast to the “north, and with the advantage of a good road from Bala- clava* to the attacks, and a very flat country to pass to “them from the bays near Chersonese. “6. Under ordinary circumstances such a movement “would have the effect of exposing the communication of “the army to be cut off; but in this case the idea is, to “abandon the communication from the north altogether, “ and establish a new one to the shipping in the south, which “would be moved round for that purpose. “ J. F. Burgoyne, Lieut. -General” Having completed this memorandum, Sir John Sir John Burgoyne was requested by Lord Eaglan to go tobyLoM^ the French Headquarters, and there propound the Slct?on, plan of the flank march. He obeyed. His interview propouilds * Possibly some words may have been here left out o,r miswritten, for , as actually worded , this last suggestion seems to be not only an error, but an inversion of the real state of the case. The attack of the North Side was the one which would have been compatible with plans for seizing the enemy’s lines of communication , whilst the flank march was on the contrary a final abdication of all power to operate in that way. 74 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XL VIII. the flank march to Marshal St. Ar- naud. Extent to which the idea of the flank march was enter- tained at the period of the halt on the Alma. with Marshal St. Arnaud took place in the presence 'of the Marshal’s Chief of the Staff and of General Bizot, the officers in command of the Engineers. Some other Staff officers were in the tent. When Sir John Burgoyne had explained the proposal re- corded by his memorandum, and had answered the few questionings which were addressed to him, the Marshal at once, and without at all seeking counsel from the officers about him, declared, as Sir John understood, that he approved the plan, and was willing to join with Lord Raglan in the determina- tion to carry it into , effect;* but it must not be understood that these words carried with them an unconditional decision. The Marshal apparently understood the proposal exactly in the same sense as that in which Lord Raglan had meant it to be submitted to him; and what his answer really im- ported was, that if he should persist in his objection to attack the North Fort, then, and in that event, he would consent to resort to the flank march. At all events, it is certain that the question of adopting the plan of the flank march remained open until a later period.** Yet, even as early as the time when the Allies still lay on the Alma, the plan had won so much * Letter from Sir John Burgoyne. ** See Marshal St. Arnaud’s journal , under date of the 23d and 24th September. Lord Raglan fixes the evening of the 24th, on the Belbec, as the time when the measure was adopted. — Despatch to Secretary of War, Sept. 28. See also, post, an extract from a private letter to the Puke of Newcastle, written on the night of the 24th. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 75 favour ; tliat already, as we saw, it acted upon the arrangements of the Commanders, preventing them" from leaving a detachment to cover the embarka- tion of the wounded, and, in that way, prolonging the halt. And now, in the evening of the 24th of Septem- ber, whilst the troops were establishing their quarters among the gardens and the villas on the Belbec, the Allies took their final resolve. Lord Kaglan, with some of his Staff, went to the camp of the French Headquarters. The interview was not a long one. Lord Eaglan, in few words, and for the last time, submitted that the Allies should go on with their original plan of campaign, and assault the works on the north of Sebastopol. Marshal St. Arnaud once more declined to agree to this. He said that the defences of the Star Fort had CHAP. XLvnr. Lord Rag- lan’s con- ference with Mar- shal St. Arnaud on the evening of the 24th. revetments in masonry, and that he would not under- take to attack such a work without laying formal siege to it.* This answer was treated as negativing all further idea of attacking Sebastopol from the north.** As regards the course which, in these cir- * Information from an officer present. In a private letter to the Duke of Newcastle, written just after this conference, and dated, “On “the Belbec, 24th Sept., night,” Lord Raglan says: “We crossed to the “Belbec this afternoon, and moved to the heights above it. I was “ anxious to have gone farther , but the French thought otherwise.” ** The mouth of the Belbec being commanded by the new battery thrown up near the Star Fort , it was conceived that no base of opera- tions could be constituted in that region without first carrying the Star Fort , and that , consequently, any attacks on the Fort must be of a sum- mary kind. 76 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIII. Determin- ation to attempt the flank march. cumstances, was to be resorted to, Lord Kaglan, as we saw, bad himself proposed the alternative plan; and Marshal St. Arnaud, it seems, though not with- out some hesitation, had already made up his mind to accept it.* On this subject, therefore, neither one nor the other of the two Commanders had need to use words of persuasion. They agreed to attempt the flank inarch,** * On the 24th the Marshal wrote in his private journal: “We start “at eleven o’clock. We shall turn the positions and the batteries by “ the left.” Lord Raglan’s view seems to have been that the Marshal’s assent to the flank march did not so much result from positive approval of the measure as from reluctance to go on with the original plan of at- tacking the Star Fort after hearing of the new works which commanded the mouth of the Belbec. In his private letter of the 28th of September to the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Raglan, after speaking of Sir John Burgoyne’s memorandum respecting the flank march, says: “The Mar- “shal did not very readily adopt the idea in the first instance ; but when “he found that the mouth of the Belbec was commanded, and that “ strong works were erecting in front of Fort Constantine [meaning the “Star Fort] which would impede the use of the river, he assented to the “proposition without hesitation.” I imagine that the hesitation which Lord Raglan here ascribes to St. Arnaud must have shown itself after Burgoyne’s interview with the Marshal , and before the discovery of the new field-work overlooking the mouth of the Belbec. ** Statement by an officer present. Writing that same night of the deliberations between the French and the English Headquarters , Lord Raglan says: “We shall move again to-morrow morning, and we have “nearly determined to attempt the-attack of Sebastopol from the south “side, abandoning our communication with the Kateha.” — Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, dated, “On the Belbec, 24tli Sept. 1854, “night.” In qualifying his language by the word “nearly,” Lord Raglan, as I understand him, was adapting his statement to the fact that the execution of the plan was to be subject to the result of the reconnais- sance he was going to undertake on the morrow. He did not, in any other sense , mean that the resolve was otherwise than final ; and as the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 77 During the conversation, Marshal St. Arnaud sat xLvni rigidly up in an armed chair, and to some who ob- state of served it his bearing conveyed an impression that ^Ar^ 1 he wished to give to the interview an appearance of naud * formality, but Lord Raglan perceived the truth. He had no sooner left the French camp than he said to one of his Staff, “Did you observe St. Arnaud? — “lie is dying.” This was the last time that the two chiefs con- ferred upon the business of the campaign. When Lord Raglan visited the French Headquarters on the following morning, he found that the Marshal was no longer in a condition to be able to take part in affairs. The decision the chiefs had come to was this : — The de- that unless the reconnaissance which Lord Raglan which the was to make on the morrow should disclose good^ame! reasons for changing the plan, the English army first (to be followed in due time by the French) should endeavour to push round the head of the Sebastopol roadstead by gaining the Mackenzie Heights, with intention to descend thence into the valley of the Tchernaya, and recover communication with the sea by seizing the harbour of Balaclava. At the time, it was hard to account for the Mar- Difficulty ' at the shahs unwillingness to go on with the task of as- time of sailing the Star Fort, as well as for his ready ing for the intended reconnaissance was to be in the course of the flank march, and, so to speak, apart of it, lean make, without qualification the statement in the text to which this note is appended. 78 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. XLVin acce P^ ance of an alternative plan which, for the mo- Marshafs - ment, would throw the leadership of the Allied army nesTtc) 11 ^* into the hands of his English colleague; and Lord star 5 Fort! ^ a &l an acknowledged to Sir Edmund Lyons that he Lord Rag- could not understand the Marshal’s recusancy. But ing of ml- time has since thrown some light on what was then certainty obscure: and to me it seems that the theory which Arnaud’s best explains the counsels of the French Headquarters motives. . . . . x - , , , at this time is the obvious , the simple , the shallow origin of one — the one which traces them to the bodily con- seis which dition of Marshal St. Arnaud.* Without any ac- theFrench curate knowledge of the successive maladies from Headquar- tp e Marshal was suffering, or of their singular intermissions, it is easy to see that, in the interval betiveen the battle of the Alma and his final deter- mination to consent to the flank march, he was grievously ill in health, and was, from time to time, prostrated by his sufferings. But just as, in his African campaigns, he had more than once bravely resolved to drag his suffering body out of hospital that he might be acting with his regiment in some approaching engagement, so now, exerting himself to hold on in spite of his bodily state, he persisted in keeping his command. In the condition in which he was it was physically impossible for him to per- * This was the solution which Sir Edmund Lyons afterwards adopted ; but he also intimated that , at the time of the Marshal’s refusal to go on against the North Forts, the state of his bodily health was not so far known to him (Sir Edmund) or to Lord Raglan as to enable them to see that that was the cause of the evil. St. Ar- naud’s bodily state. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 79 form the laborious duties of a general who lias to provide for the attack of such a place as the Star' Fort. If it be said that he might have resigned his command, the answer is, that that was exactly the end which he was striving to avoid. With his old spirit of resistance to bodily weakness, he clung to his command, and apparently with the more tenacity from the time when he suspected that measures had been secretly taken to provide for the event of his becoming unable to remain at the head of the army. So when, as a substitute for the attack of the Star Fort, there came the proposal to resort to the flank march, he could see that the measure was one which averted the immediate necessity of his resigning the command, by shifting the stress of duty in the Al- lied army from its right to its left, and thereby enabling him to do now again what he had so hap- pily done once before when he lay struck down by illness* — that is, to leave the virtual leadership of the whole expedition for the time in the hands of the English Commander. This way of explaining what passed is the more to be welcomed since it tends to disperse the seem- ing cloud that was thrown upon the French army by the counsels of its chief, and recognises that sin- gular power of fighting against bodily sickness which was one of the most interesting features in the character of Marshal St. Arnaud.** CHAP. XL VIII. * During the voyage. See ante , vol. hi. chap, xxxvii. ** Since I wrote the above, I have had an opportunity of seeing that 80 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. XLVIII. The avoidance of the Star Fort was the second of the lost occasions. If this final determination to turn aside from the Star Fort was in one sense a mere continuance of St. Arnaud’s former refusal to march on and attack the work, still it took place under different condi- tions, and in circumstances which gave it the char- acter of a distinct resolve. Thus regarded, it has to be ranged as the second of the lost occasions which followed the battle of the Alma. General deTodleben ascribes the avoidance of the Star Fort to the same cause — the maladies of the French Marshal. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 81 CHAPTER XL IX. The night they lay on the Belbec, the Allies chap. were still in blank ignorance of the enemy’s plans ^ heAuiel and although they supposed that the Russian army j 1 t ( jJ. 1 a nce ig " must be almost, as it were, in their presence, they of l , he eue * * . my s plans did not know where it was posted. Of course, this and move- incuts# still undispersed darkness in regard to the enemy’s counsels and movements was of itself a source of grave danger; and unless they were largely reckoning upon the despondency or the unskilfulness of the enemy, the Allies might well believe that the circum- The criti- stances in which they stood were critical even to tkm P of the jeopardy. Hitherto, each day’s march had ended by Alhes * relinking the (temporarily) abandoned communication between the land and the sea forces of the Allies; but now that the invaders had made up their minds to leave the mouth of the river on which they were bivouacked to the undisturbed control of the enemy, it resulted that, except by a retrograde march to the Katcha, or by an adventure across the country to the southern coast of the peninsula, they could no longer gain access to their shipping. On their right, there was the sea-shore, controlled by the enemy, and not approached by the succouring fleets. Before them, they had that Severnaya or north side of Invasion of the Crimea, V. 82 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. xotx* Sebastopol, which, since they had determined not to attack it, was as hampering to them as if it had been really impregnable. On their left, the Allies had a wooded and broken country, to them quite strange, though of course well known to the enemy, and the condition of things w^as such that it was competent to the Russian Commander, without hazard (and even without being seen till the work should be nearty done), to move his army at pleasure to any part of the Belbec which was far enough above the English lines to be clear of their outlying picket. * If it could have been taken for granted that the troops which retreated from the Alma were still a coherent army, there would have been no reason why the morrow’s dawn should not show Prince Mentschikoff coming down in force upon the left flank of the Allies, and threatening to roll up their line. In that case the Allies — first the English and then the French — would have had to change their front, and to range themselves as best they could, with the north side of Sebastopol on their right, and, at their backs, a sea and sea-shore no longer friendly The cause to them, but controlled by the enemy’s guns. The brought cause of their being in this plight was Marshal St. into^an 63 Arnaud’s refusal to attack the work at the mouth of sute. nlled th e Belbec; for if that had been taken or silenced, the attendant fleets would have approached, and the * The soundness of this observation is proved by the movement which was actually made by the Russian army in the night of the 24th and, the morning of the 25th. Seo post, chap, hh INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 83 Allies, as before, would have been in communication xljx’ 9 with the shipping. This not being done, the fate" with which the principles of the art of war seemed to threaten the Allies was — not mere discomfiture, but ruin. If two strategists for pastime, or for love of their art, were to wage a mimic war upon a map with pins and counters , the one who might find himself brought to the condition in which the Allies now lay would have to confess himself vanquished, and this notwithstanding that his counters might show him to be much the grosser in numbers. It was with better fortune that the Allies were destined to rise from their bivouac on the Belbec; for they had strength of a kind which the pins and the counters of the strategist could hardly symbolise ; The eir- they were still under the shelter of their Wednesday’s stances to victory, and were favoured beyond common measure theyowed by the unskilfulness of the Russian Commander. munity? About two hours after midnight, there was aF a i se good deal of musketry firing in a part of the Allied line; and when this came to be followed by the sustained roar of field-artillery, it was hard for young soldiers to avoid believing that a somewhat hot combat must be going on. Lord Raglan was not awakened. It was said that the false alarm which brought about all this firing arose in the Turkish lines. When morning dawned upon the invaders there At dawn was no sign that the enemy was hovering upon their no^Tgn as left flank; and although, as was afterwards known, that thQ 6 * 84 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. XLIX. enemy was on the left flank of the Allies. Virulence of the cho- lera on the night of the 24th. Demean- our of the sufferers. the army of the Allies and the Russian field army were drinking that morning of the same stream, there was between them a distance not hitherto pierced by the reports of scouts or deserters, and great enough to prevent their being seen the one by the other. During the hours of this bivouac on the Belbec, the cholera raged. In the morning, great numbers of the soldiers thus torn from the strength of the English regiments were laid in ranks parallel with the road. The sufferers all lay strangely silent. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 85 CHAPTER L. I. Before he moved forward on the morning of the chap. 25th, Lord Raglan saw Marshal St. Arnand, hut b — found him in a state of bodily suffering too acute to lan’s visit allow ot his taking part m business. st. Ar- The resolve of the foregoing night was to be^^Mar- executed in the following way: — Leaving General Cathcart with the 4th Division and the 4th Lighting- Dragoons on the Belbec, in order that, for a while, f j0i ; d & ’ 7 7 Ian’s dis- he might there maintain the communication with the positions ^ for tll8 Katcha, and be able to send the sick thither, Lord flank Raglan determined that the rest of his army, avoiding the marsh in front which Lord Cardigan had re- connoitred, and bending at once to its left, should move straight up to the ground overhanging the head of the Sebastopol bay, and try to keep such a direction as to be able to strike the highroad between Sebastopol and Baktclii Serai at a spot described in the maps by the name of “Mackenzie’s Farm.” In that direction, accordingly, Lord Lucan was to pro- ceed on reconnaissance with the cavalry division; and, the ground being woodland, he was to be sup- ported by a battalion of the Rifles, under Colonel Lawrence. Upon reaching Mackenzie’s Farm, Lord 86 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. L. Lucan was to abstain from moving troops into the "great road; but his instructions enjoined him to watch it both ways — that is, in the direction of Sebastopol on one side, and Baktchi Serai on the other. He was to report to Lord Eaglan the result of his observations. * According to an indication given by the maps, there was a narrow lane or woodland road which led to Mackenzie’s Farm; and in order to leave that route clear for the cavalry and artillery, our infantry were to make their way through the forest by follow- ing, as ships do at sea, the guidance of the mariner’s compass. The direction in which they were to move was south- south-east from the point where the com- pass would first be needed. Lord Kaglan in person proposed to move forward in the general line of march until he should find himself on the commanding heights which overhang the head of the Sebastopol roadstead; but then, tak- ing with him his escort — a troop of light-liorse — he intended to reconnoitre the ground, and to de- termine with his own eyes whether there was any- thing in the nature of the country, or in the visible preparations of the enemy, which might make it ex- pedient to withdraw from the undertaking of the flank march, or to alter the way of effecting it. If he should judge that there was nothing which ought to hinder his enterprise, the advance of his whole army to Mackenzie’s Farm, and thence to the * See the written instruction in the Appendix to vol. vi. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 87 Tchernaya and the south coast, was to go on. In CI ^ P * that case, and as soon as the English cavalry, artil- lery, and waggon-trains should have so far defiled through the forest as to leave the road clear for other troops, the French army was to follow in the same direction. Accordingly, it may be said that, during the first hours of the march, the advance was a “re- connaissance in force,” but a reconnaissance so ar- ranged that Lord Raglan, by a word, could convert it into a definitive movement of the whole Allied army, which would be carried on to the top of the Mackenzie Heights, thence down to the Tractir bridge on the Tchernaya, and at last to the port of Balaclava. * At about half-past eight on the morning of 25th of September, the flank march began. Frommentof the first, Lord Lucan’s reconnoitring column was but little in advance of the main body of the English army for which it had to feel the way.** Lord Lucan’s order of march was this: at the head of his column there moved a troop of hussars with which he was present in person. Half the companies of the Rifle battalion were placed in advance, and the other half in the rear of the main body of the cavalry, * See tlie Map , and the Plan of the country near Mackenzie’s Farm. ** Lord Lucan (whose squadrons had bivouacked on the left of the English line) marched at about the same time as Headquarters — t. e . , at about half-past eight. It seems that in the earlier part of the morning the Rifle battalion had not reached the ground from which Lord Lucan was to move , and that , from that cause , the march of the reconnoitring column began at a later hour than would have been otherwise chosen. 88 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap. eac p regiment of which was covered by flankers of ~ "its own. The cavai- After marching some miles in the right direction, (as had. 110 this reconnoitring column of Lord Lucan’s (though tended) its route had been chosen for it by an officer of the woodland Quartermaster- General’s department, who rode with road; the f orce f or the purpose) was led into a path which turned out to be a byroad diverging from the true line of march — a byroad degenerating, after a time, to a mere track, and at last disappearing altogether.* but The troops were able, however, to make some way as the in- through the forest in the manner that had been pre- b7com dldj scribed to the infantry, by taking the compass for pass. tlieir guide, and moving, as nearly as they could, in a south-south-easterly course. Since Lord Lucan had a battalion of Rifles joined to his cavalry, and under- stood that he ought to keep his whole force together, he was unable, of course, to allow to himself and his horsemen a greater degree of speed than the foot- soldiers with him could reach. Upon the whole, it resulted that, after a while, the reconnoitring column was not (as Lord Raglan had of course supposed it would be) at the head of the advancing army. March of By aid of the compass, and with great toil, our try. infantry divisions made their difficult way through the forest. The underwood was in some places so * The officer charged with this duty was Major Wethorall, a man so able that no one ever thought of blaming him for choosing what turned out to be the wrong path. See, in the Appendix to vol. yi. , Sir Edward Wetherall’s statement. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 89 thick as to leave but a very narrow choice of path, C ” AP * and in general it was found impracticable for the troops to preserve any kind of formation. The men of each battalion broke through as best they could, passing sometimes over ground where several could be working their way abreast of one another, but at other times compelled to break into Indian file. Still, the plan of marching by compass was successful; and, so far as I have learnt, no body of men fell out of the prescribed line of march in such a way as to become long divided from the rest of the army. It was a laborious task for troops which were Suffering not at the time in the enjoyment of great bodily of theTn- strength to have to tear their way through steep ^om y forest ground without a road or a path; and at one thirst * of the halts which took place with a portion of the Foot regiments already near the summit of the heights, some impatience broke out; for, there being no water, the men felt the torment of thirst. There arose a low, grave, momentous sound — the murmur of angered soldiery. Each man, whilst he sat or lay on the Their ground, hoarsely groaned out the same intense word. murmur3 * The one utterance heard travelling along the lines was , “ W ater ! water ! water ! 1 7 * When Lord Eaglan had gained the high ground ^^g- on the east of Sebastopol, he diverged from the line son effects of march which his army was taking; and having naissance with him his escort, rode on along the shoulder of rection d of the hill which there bulges out towards the west. of e t £| ad bay. * This was not in the hearing of Lord Raglan. 90 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. When he stopped, he was at no great distance from the eastermost of those two lighthouses which stand at the head of the bay.* Then the prize, for the winning of which the Allies had come over the seas, lay spread out before him. Of such defences as there might be on the land side of the place he indeed could discern very little; but the day being bright, and the ground so commanding as to give him full scope for his survey, he looked all the way down the great roadstead from the east to the west, and even could mark where the waves were lapping the booms at its entrance. He saw part of the fleet and the docks, the ap- proaches of the man-of-war harbour, and the long- nurtured malice of the casemated batteries couched down at the water’s edge. On the upland above the Severnaya or North side, he saw the Star Fort now left behind and avoided, and on the south the Karabel faubourg, with, beyond, the steep shining streets and the olive-green domes of Sebastopol. So glittered before him that “priceless jewel” — for so the Rus- sians declared it — now becoming the gage of a con- flict not destined to end in his time.** None foresaw, I believe, at the time, that the ground where Lord Raglan was standing would ere long acquire a strange worth in the eyes of the in- * Seo Plan. ** See the bird’s-eye Plan. In a letter to his sovereign which will be spoken of hereafter, Prince Mentschikoff gives to Sebastopol the ap- pellation of “priceless jewel.” INVASION OF THE CIIIMEA, 91 vading nations; yet before tlie next spring should C ^ AP * warm into summer, the dominion of those barren up- lands at the head of the Sebastopol bay was about to be accounted so precious that, in order by sheer might to win it, the great Powers of the West would be contemplating another armada, another descent on the coast, another and a greater invasion.* But at this time, all was quietness. The Russians showed no troops; and not only was there no sign of their undertaking to obstruct the flank march, but it even seemed as if hitherto they must either have been blind to the movement, or else so alive to its nature as to be willing to let it proceed, and determined to abide their time. The survey thus effected by Lord Raglan in person had disclosed nothing that could deter him from converting the reconnaissance into a definitive movement, but no report of the condition of things on the great road had yet come in from the cavalry. He turned his horse’s head, and made for the line of march which his troops were pursuing, but with the intention of striking it at a point some way in advance. Led by that instinctive knowledge of country Lord Rag- which was one of his natural gifts, and neither hav- In^he* es ing a guide, nor needing any fresh glance at the J^ e U p ead ' map, he at once chose his course like a rider who throu s h * This is an allusion to the plan which , as we shall see hereafter, was propounded with gre'it eagerness by the French Emperor in the spring of 1855. 92 • INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. the forest to Mac- kenzie’s Farm. There he finds Maude’s troop of horse- artillery. Cause of the un- guarded way in which Lord Rag- lan and the artil-' lery-train moved on along the lane. had been familiar with the ground all his days, and "soon struck into the lane or woodland road which bends up towards Mackenzie’s Farm. The cavalry, as we saw, was moving through another part of the forest; but Maude’s troop of horse-artillery, though in general commanded by Lord Lucan, did not now form a part of the reconnoitring column; and having avoided the mistake which led the cavalry into a by- path, it was now upon its assigned route, moving steadily along the woodland road. The road was just broad enough to allow the passage of a piece of artillery, with also one horseman alongside it ; and at the time of the interruption wdiich will be presently recorded, Lord Eaglan, followed by his Staff in single file, was riding abreast of the foremost gun, or per- haps a few paces ahead of it. Lord Eaglan supposed that the reconnoitring co- lumn of cavalry and riflemen was in front of him, and from moment to moment, no doubt, he was ex- pecting Lord Lucan’s report. If the cavalry had been leading the march through this lane, it would have been moving, of course, with the usual precautions, and an advanced-guard preced- ing the column* by a sufficing distance, and perceiv- ing a hostile force in its front, would have been quick to carry back warning to the main body. It chanced, however, as we saw, that our cavalry had missed the lane, and this is why it was that Lord Eaglan came to be riding with none of his troops in front of him. PLAN illustrative of the FLANK MARCH ai the time Token the Eiujhsh Head Qvartirs 'rince MenlsKikoffs Field Army Orta Earn ilartinoffka PP A? .Markvn zie'sTarin TrWfces Kcrme Scale of Mile: INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 93 At length Lord Raglan reached a point in the CI *A p - lane where the light some way on could be seen Lord Rag- breaking through — breaking through in such way l^l t y P to X as to show that, a few yards in front, there must be ^ereTiie an opening in the forest.* Observing this, General Airey asked permission to ride on a little way in ad- road, vance, in order to see whether the ground was clear : and he moved accordingly; but in a few seconds he general stopped; and without speaking held up his hand in amovesfor- way which instantly showed not only that Lord Raglan suddenly and the whole column should instantly halt, but that f e a if close* there was need to be very quiet. Airey had, all at ^ once, come in sight of the great road at the point where it crosses the lane almost close to Mackenzie’s of Russian Farm. There, and only a few paces off, there was a Russian waggon-train and a body of Russian in- fantry. The force, as we now know, was a battalion of foot-Cossacks escorting the waggon-train, but con- stituting also the rear-guard of Prince Mentschikoff s field army.** The men were halted — but not be- cause they yet stood on the alert; they had halted as troops halt for rest in the midst of a toilsome march, and some of them were strolling along the road. Almost at the moment when they first caught sight of General Airey surveying them from his saddle, they must have heard the rumble of Maude’s horse- * See Plan of tlie country near Mackenzie’s Farm. ** A battalion of the Black Sea Cossacks escorting an ammunition* train of the artillery, and the baggage of the “Saxe Weimar” hussar regiment. 94 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap. ar tillery, and learnt tliat an enemy’s force was close upon them. If two hostile forces thus came, as it were, by an accident to strike, one against the other in march- ing, the result was owing to two causes — to mere negligence on the part of the Russians, and, on the part of the English, to that mistake, already ex- plained, which had led our reconnoitring column into The sur- the wrong path. To each of the bodies thus brought prise was 01 0 mutual, almost into contact the sudden presence of the other but tlie • . 1 _ gravity ofwas a surprise; but the gravity ot the danger they not the respectively incurred was tar from being the same. each. t0 A train of artillery marching up through a woodland The kind lane, and the string of horsemen forming the Head- to which quarters Staff, must needs have been almost helpless Hsh^fght under the fire of a few foot-soldiers moving briskly have been i n (o the Wood, subjected. But between the Russian battalion and the head of the English column thus by strange chance com- ing together, there was the difference that the Rus- sian battalion, at the time, was apparently without the guidance of an officer having presence of mind, Lord Rag- whilst the English Commander-in-Chief, who hap- sence P of pened, as we have seen, to be present in person with mmd * this part of his army, was one whom Nature had gifted with the power to do at the moment just that His way ' which the moment requires. In a tranquil, low voice, of dealing x x pi* with the Lord Raglan gave orders to bring up some of his gency. cavalry;* and the officers whom he charged with * He despatched, I think, two officers, of whorti one, I suppose, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 95 this mission glided swiftly away, but lie liimself and CI R AP * the rest of his Staff slowly moved down the lane ’ a few paces, then halted, and remained very still.* Before the orders for bringing up the cavalry Tho inter . could produce their effect, some minutes must needs ^^ ) . re pass, and during this little interval the English Com- mander and his Staff, as well as Maude’s artillery, could not but be much at the mercy of the enemy. Yet those of the Russians who were so placed as to be able to descry Lord Raglan through the foliage would never have been able to infer from the sight that he or his Staff were people who supposed them- selves to be placed in any kind of jeopardy. Rather they would have been led to imagine, from what they saw, that the English General had just effected a surprise designed beforehand, and was inspecting the progress of an attack now about to be made on them- selves. Deceived by the tranquillity of the scene thus Tlie Rug _ presented to them by Lord Raglan, or simply, per- their op- 6 haps, bewildered by the suddenness of the adventure, portunity. the Russians did not stretch out a hand to seize the may have been ordered to fetch the troop under Captain Chetwode which were on duty as Lord Raglan’s escort, whilst the other was pro- bably directed to endeavour to find Lord Lucan and the main body of the cavalry. According to the impression I formed at the time — and I believe I heard his words — he sent for any cavalry that could be found. * I have seen it somewhere stated that Lord Raglan and his Staff came galloping back in haste. If they had done so, they would pro- bably have brought destruction upon themselves. Neither Lord Raglan nor any of l^s Staff (except the officers sent to fetch the cavalry) moved out of a walk. 96 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C r AP ’ which fortune was proffering. Minutes passed without bringing signs that the enemy’s soldiery were The Eng- moving into the wood; and at length Chetwode’s ry comes troop of hussars came galloping up the lane in single file, the officers of the Staff making room for them by moving into the copse. Nor was this the only cavalry force now at hand. It chanced that Lord Lucan, who' had been marching through the forest a little lower down on the right, had sent Captain Wetlierall to explore, and Wetherall coming back to him quickly with tidings of the emergency which had occurred, Lord Lucan hastened to bring his cavalry division into the lane, and some of his squadrons were there almost as soon as the escort. Lawrence’s Rifles, too, were up, and swiftly pushing forward. None of the horsemen stopped at all in the lane, but all as they came, and in single file, galloped on into the road where the enemy had been seen. Expres- Lord Lucan in person was with the horsemen dissatis- thus coming up. Naturally, Lord Raglan had been addressed angered by finding that the cavalry was not in ad- Ragian l to vance upon the main line of march; and when lie Lucan saw divisional General passing, he said to him, a Lord Lucan, you are late!” Lord Lucan galloped on without answering.* * The foregoing account shows the grounds which would have been available to Lord Lucan if he had afterwards thought fit to tender an ex- planation of the way in which the reconnoitring column lost its place. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 97 But already the Russian soldiery who had under- CI ^ AP * gone this surprise were in flight along the great road, Retreat of and in a direction which took them away from Sebas- sfan^at- topol, and towards the town of Baktchi Serai. Our tallon ' cavalry continued to come up, and by this time Maude’s troop of liorse-artillery had not only got out of the forest, but had unlimbered some, of their guns on the great road, and brought them to bear on a part of the enemy’s waggon-train in a way which stopped its retreat. In order to cover his flank, Lord Raglap dis- The Greys mounted some of the Greys, and caused them to take ed and or* possession of the wood by the road’s side. take d pos- Our cavalry pressed forward, and at length came J^wood up with a small rear-guard consisting of some twenty ^ ^® de of the enemy’s infantrymen. These faced about boldly, and delivered a volley at the faces of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan and their Staff, then riding in front of our horsemen; but the Russians fired too high, and were presently, of course, over- powered, some running aside into the forest, others standing their ground so long that they failed to escape the edge of the sabre. When our cavalry had reached the crest from The pur- which the road goes steep down into the plain beyond, ped. st ° P " Lord Raglan stopped the pursuit. In the result, there were taken a few prisoners, a few including an officer of artillery, and numbers ofaSTsome ammunition -waggons. But besides these captures, {J^en. there was found in the baggage-train of the Weimar Invasion of the Crimea . V. 7 98 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. Lord Rag- lan’s ex- pression of dissatis- faction ad- dressed to Lord Car- digan. hussars so great a quantity of things worth the trouble 'of carrying, that almost every soldier coming up at this time was made happy with some piece of booty. The baggage of the Russian hussar regiment in- cluded the possessions of the officers, and thence it was that our soldiers got trophies of a kind which would serve for memorials and for presents. Without some knowledge of the soldier, and the simplicity of his nature, it would be hard to understand the full measure of the animation and delight which the troops were able to derive from this little capture of booty. When Lord Cardigan had returned from the pur- suit, he presented himself to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Raglan was still in anger at the thought of the disaster which might have been occasioned by the want of any cavalry force advancing in front of his army, and after mentioning the way in which the Headquarters Staff and Maude’s artillery had been suffered to come, as it were, into contact with a hostile force, he said, “The cavalry were out of their “proper place. You took them much too low down.” It may be believed that Lord Cardigan bore with much fortitude the blame which he felt could be immediately transferred from his shoulders to those of Lord Lucan, and he readily answered, “My lord, “I am no longer in command of the cavalry.”* * The words “no longer” may seem hardly intelligible; but Lord Cardigan had cherished the idea that his authority over the cavalry which landed with the army — i. e., over the Light Brigade — was to be a separate command. See post, chap. lxv. vol, vn. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 99 Almost close to the point in the road where the CIPVP * Russians had thus been surprised, there was theTiacken- building marked in the maps as Mackenzie’s Farm. i4, rra . It seemed to have been used as a temporary barrack, or resting-place for troops in march. In its precincts there were two wells, which yielded a grateful, though too scanty, supply of water. From the crest just reached by our cavalry when they had to obey the recall, the eye commanded a far-reaching view of the plain beneath. Through this plain there passed the post-road which led to Baktchi Serai and Simpheropol, and thence north to the main- land of Russia. Retreating along it, there could be Heavy seen a division of infantry, some cavalry, and a bat- Hu^sian f tery of field-artillery: but beyond, and beyond again, tro °ps j j 7 j i j o 7 perceived there were thick clouds of dust, which indicated the tobe tp t marching track of more distant battalions and of squadrons on on Bak- ■ i t • *1 tchi Serai. the same line of march. This “incident of war” — so Lord Raglan called Nature of it at the time to one who rode near him — this “in- cidence “cident of war” was the result of a singular chance brought which brought into contact of time and place two mutual 110 movements, each of them cardinal — the one the sur P rise * dank march undertaken by the Allies, the other a flank march also, in which the Russians were busied. Of the extent and purpose of this Russian flank march we shall have to speak by-and-by; but, for the present, we are only observing so much of the then dim truth as was visible, at the time, to the English Headquarters. 7 * 100 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap. it might be thought that, from the sight of the The scope^enemy’s retiring columns, from the nature of the cap- and extent , j -i tp , i o x oftheRus- tured baggage, and from the answers of the tew menuiid prisoners taken (of whom one was an officer), a clue close itself w °ul^ be eas ^J seized, from which to infer with English some certainty the scope and extent of the operation going on under the eyes of our people. It was not so. The of The officer who had been taken prisoner proved prisoner, to be a captain of artillery. He was brought forward that he might be questioned, but it instantly appeared that he was in a condition which, for the moment, was of advantage to his country, for it baffled all endeavours to draw knowledge from him. He had brought himself to that stage and that kind of drun- kenness which causes the patient to reel in curves from side to side, declaring his good-will to his fellow-creatures, and incessantly proffering his friend- ship. Yet the time was mid-day, and the sun was Lord Rag- shining. Lord Eaglan’s anxious regard for the per- Ind P i^ med senal dignity of the officer and the gentleman had voited. nothing of the narrowness which would confine its scope to those of his own nation, and it seemed that the feeling with which he looked upon the reeling captain was hardly short of distress. At all events, he was so revolted that, yielding to impulse, he broke away from the sight, abandoning all endeavour to draw from the prisoner the knowledge he might Thena- happen to have. If other attempts were made to enemy’s get at the truth, they were followed by little result 5 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 101 for it is certain that, even long afterwards, the magnitude and the purpose of the movement which' brought the Russian force to Mackenzie’s Farm re- mained unknown at the English Headquarters. But whoever has formed any conception of the perilous character of this flank march will easily be- lieve that, at this time, almost the whole stress of the English General’s attention must have been brought to bear upon the object of recovering his communications with the sea. The army again moved forward, and, in a little while, it had reached the southern crest of those Mackenzie Heights upon which, during many long months, the Great Powers of the West were destined to be gazing with the eyes of baffled desire. Moving down from the summit of these heights to their base by a steep mountain-road, the English army de- scended into the valley of the Tchernaya. Still push- ing forward, but by a painful effort (for this day’s was a long and forced march), the bulk of the army at last descended upon the Tchernaya, at the point where its waters were crossed by the Tractir bridge; but darkness had long set in before the bulk of the troops gained their bivouac on the banks of the stream, and some did not reach it that night. Lord Raglan’s quarters were established in the little post- house which stood near the bridge. Whilst the main body of the English army thus lay on the Tchernaya, the road by which they had come was still crowded, miles back, by their trains; CHAP. L. movement remained unknown to the English Head- quarters. Para- mount anxiety in regard to the re- covery of the sea communi- cation. The march re- sumed. The Mac- kenzie Heights. The army reaches the Tcher- naya. 102 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CI ^ P * and the obstruction thus caused prevented the French March from pushing their march for that night beyond Mac- French, kenzie’s Farm; indeed, their rear-guard was not able to reach its bivouac there until three o’clock in the morning. The scanty supply of water remaining in the wells was exhausted by the first comers, and the troops suffered thirst. Cathcart’s Cathcart, meanwhile, with his Division, was still duties on 011 the Belbec, where he had been entrusted with the bee. duty of covering the march, and sending back the sick to the Katcha. His position would have been one of some peril if there had been in the field an enemy watchful and enterprising. From the Belbec to the Katcha, where lay the fleets, there was a tract Communi-of hill country unoccupied by the Allies, and the the trains sent thither with the sick were at the mercy nowaTthe ^ ie enemy. One of the trains came upon a strong the r ene°- f ^ uss i an picket, and Surgeon Inlong — himself a sick m j. man — was only able to save the convoy by causing the strongest of the patients to get out of the waggons and feign the appearance of a baggage escort. Lord Rag- Divided thus by what might almost be reckoned Tcher- L as a two-days’ march from Cathcart’ s Division, and naya. divided, too, from his shipping by a yet farther tract ance^of of country now left in the hands of the enemy, Lord tosenda 6 Raglan , from his bivouac at the Tractir bridge, was toThe^ 6 anx i° us > as ma y well supposed, to make known Admirals, to our Admirals the success of his march on the Tchernaya, and his now unconditional resolve to seize the port of Balaclava. This object was effected INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 103 twice over in the course of the night. Captain Hugh CI *^ P - Smith was ordered by Cathcart to endeavour to carry The ob- a despatch to Headquarters; and although the Captain passed a Russian battery, which opened upon him nigllt * and killed one of his orderlies, he was able to reach the Tchernaya, and thence bring back from Lord Raglan a message which Cathcart was to send on to the Katclia. Colonel Windham, entrusted by Cathcart with the duty of carrying on the message, succeeded in reaching the Katcha, and delivered it safely to the Admiral. Also, Lieutenant Maxse, despatched from the Agamemnon, was able to find our Head- quarters on the Tchernaya, and to bring back, during the night, Lord Raglan’s message for Lyons. Lord Purport of Raglan did not choose to risk a despatch, lest ltian’scom- should fall into the hands of the Russians; but the nous from message, repeated in duplicate, which he had thus nayl to Gr " been enabled to send, informed the Admirals of the^. e A d ' progress of his march, and of his now final determi- nation to move to the south coast, conveying, at the same time, his hope that a naval force would come round to Balaclava, and be there to meet him. Rightly looked at, the need that there was for resorting to ventures like these will help perhaps to disclose the hazardous character of the Flank March, and the weakness of the posture in which the Allied army lay on the night of the 25th of September.* On the morning of the next day, Lord Raglan The * march re - resumed his march, and crossing, after a time, the S umedon the 26th. * See the Plan. 104 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap. now f amous Woronzoff Road, was at length upon ground where, unless the maps were deceiving him, he must needs be very near to Balaclava. But the country which lay before him seemed closed up at every point by towering hills, and there was not the least sign of an opening in which to look for a sea- Lord Rag* port. Soon he came upon a village, but a smiling, Baia-° for ° and apparently inland village, having the porches of clava * its cottages richly laden with clustering grapes, and disclosing no sign of its being a place near the sea. This was Kadikoi. The villagers were questioned a little, and they said that Balaclava was undefended. They seemed to speak like people who had nothing they cared to withhold. The Rifles were already ascending the hills which lay towards the south, but, upon the road by which he was moving, Lord Raglan, at this time, had no advanced-guard before him. As at the Alma, when he gained the knoll looking down upon the enemy’s reserves, and as yesterday at Mackenzie’s Farm, when he all but struck in upon the rear-guard of a Russian army, so to-day, and for the third time in this singular campaign, it once again happened that of the whole Allied army he himself was the foremost explorer. A bend in the road brought him to the edge of what seemed to be only a small in- land pool with a rivulet trickling into it; for the rest of the sheet of water to which he had come lay hidden behind the fold of the hill. Beyond the pool, but still very close at hand, there rose a bar- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 105 rier of steep , lofty hills; and one of them was crowned, as it seemed, with an antique castle in' ruins.* All at once, from a mortar in the ancient castle, fire was opened, and, in the next moment, a shell dropped plumping into the pool. This shot was fol- lowed by more, and one of the shells which came down sank into the earth — without bursting — at a spot very near the chief. Lord Raglan looked angry, imagining, I believe, for a moment, that the villagers of Kadikoi had meant to deceive him when they said that Balaclava was undefended. He ordered that the two flanking heights should be occupied by the Light Division, and by a part of Brandling’s troop of horse-artillery. The ground at a few paces distant afforded more or less shelter from the fire of the castle; but pending the operation entrusted to the Light Division, Lord Baglan had to await its result, and in the meantime submit to remain shut out from the haven on which he had marched. To an army engaged in the hazardous operation of marching across the enemy’s country in order to find and conquer for itself a new base of operations, any unlooked-for hindrance, even though it may seem likely to be of short duration, can hardly fail to be a subject of anxiety. * The castle was on the left of the two flanking heights ; but from the way in which the hills interfolded , the contrary seemed to be the case. Codrington with his brigade ascended the hill on our right and encountered no opposition , but had the happiness of reassuring some gentlewomen who had fled thither in terror from Balaclava. CHAP. L. Fire open- ed from one of the old castles. Lord Rag- lan’s mea- sures. 106 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. Ships’ guns heard. Surrender of Bala- clava. The com- mandant’s reason for not sur- rendering at once. Presently, and sounding as from beneath the old 'castle on its southern side, there roared out the thunder that peals from a gun of majestic calibre. Then again; then again. The whole landscape, being closed in abruptly towards the south by the form of the hills, bore a thoroughly inland aspect; but men knew, as it were, by his voice, the tried friend whom they could not yet see. They said, “There is Lyons!” The Admiral was keeping his tryst. The officer in charge of the castle which had opened fire on our Headquarters Staff was Colonel Monto. He had no force under his orders except a few Greeks of Balaclava, who had been formed into a kind of local militia; and before our light in- fantry had time to crown the two hills, he found means to show that he surrendered. Yfhen after- wards asked by Lord Raglan why he had taken upon himself to open fire without having means to attempt a real defence, Colonel Monto answered that he had never been summoned. He said that if he had been summoned he would have surrendered at once; but he thought that, until he should be either attacked or summoned, it was his duty to offer re- sistance* * The Russians ascribe to Colonel Monto one of those heroic speeches which people are accustomed to invent in time of war ; but I am sure that the above is the real purport of the Colonel’s answer , for Lord Raglan so represented it to me just after having received it. Lord Raglan, I remember, said there is often a good deal of practical diffi- culty in summoning. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 107 Upon learning tlie surrender of the castle, Lord CI * AP - Raglan once more rode forward, and presently en- Entrance tered the little street which formed the main part of RagiTn Balaclava. The people of the place were alarmed when they Demean- thought of the consequences which might he brought ?^ a ^ t the upon them by Colonel Monto’s show of resistance. ants - Their notion of what should be done may have been formed on the exigency of the moment, or else may have come down to them with their Greek or Asiatic traditions of conquering armies and suppliant towns. At all events, these poor people found a mute, touch- ing way of declaring their submission and praying for mercy. Leaving clear a lane in the centre for Lord Raglan and the horsemen who followed him, and the troops coming after, they went down upon their knees, and so remained, holding up, all the time, loaves of bread in their outstretched hands. They seemed to take heart when they lifted their faces and scanned the gracious looks of the English Commander-, but still he was what their imagina- tions represented as terrible — the capturer of a place which had greeted him with fire — and they could see — because of his arm — he was one who had knowm other wars. Riding forward to where, on his right, the way Lord Rag- opened down to the water, Lord Raglan approached Jo^ards 3 the pool or basin which lies parallel with the little thewa ' street-, but, shut in, as it was, by steep, lofty hills towards the south, the water still looked like a tarn, ter’s edge; 108 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. char or sma i] mountain lake; and whilst some who had ““"studied the maps were only now at length con- vincing themselves that what they saw must be in- deed the port of Balaclava, there occurred a con- juncture of the kind which a dramatist makes free to create, but one too signal and too aptly timed to be commonly met with in the confusions of the actual world.* Lord Kaglan had scarce stopped his and at horse, and was glancing across the small sheet of moment water before him, when from between the enfolding vessef of ^ hills a vessel came gliding in, and she carried the war comes English flag. One more, after a hazardous time of separation, the land and the sea forces met. Lord Rag- The words which Lord Baglan spoke at this words on moment disclosed that quality or ins nature winch ing the sea made him ever thoughtful of others. It was in con- caUon Um ' cert with Lyons that against every kind of obstacle he had forced on this bold invasion in obedience to the Government of the Queen; and now when, after the temporary severance occasioned by the flank march, he again touched the helping hand which the navy afforded, his first utterance was the expression of a wish that Lyons were enjoying the happiness of being there to greet him. “If Lyons were here,” * To an observer standing at Balaclava or approaching it from the north, the porfc^eems to be much more closely land-locked than could be easily supposed possible by one deriving his impression from maps and charts. Aim although it may be true that mensuration does not err, no one seemed to be prepared to find the port looking so exceedingly diminutive as it did. Its length is stated to be as much as 1400, and its breadth 230 yards. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 109 lie said, “this would be perfect.” The greeting soon CI l AP ‘ followed, for Lyons, in the Agamemnon, was close' outside. From on board the vessel which had run in, Smallness soundings were quickly taken, and, small as it was, of theha? the pool proved deep enough to float a ship of the bour ’ line. In a little while, the harbour was crowded Harbour^ with shipping, and the town with English soldiery, quickly II. The next day, when one of the French Divisions came up, there was an inclination to remonstrate, and not without reason, against the occupation of the whole of Balaclava by the English. The French said that, according to the understanding with wdiich the flank march was agreed to, Balaclava was to be for the Allies, and not for one of them only. How- ever accurate the maps and charts may have been, they had failed to convey to men’s minds before- hand the exceeding smallness of the place*, but now when the basin was thick crowded with masts, when the landing-place swarmed with busied men, and the little street overflowed with the red-coated sol- diery, it was evident that Balaclava was too diminu- tive to bear being divided between the French and the English. If the place was to be assigned to one of the two armies in exclusion of the other, the French were entitled to say, that in the Allied line they had hitherto taken the right, and that unless Remon- strance on the part of the . French. Its justice. Impracti- cability of dividing the place between theFrench and the English. Claim of theFrench to Bala- 110 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. __ clava on the ground of their hav- ing hither- to taken the right- hand side. Forbear- ance of the French. The choice of- fered to Lord Rag- lan. the precedence so conceded were to be withdrawn from them, Balaclava must needs be theirs, because it was the eastermost of all the possible landing- places on this part of the coast, and the Allies, when arrayed against Sebastopol, would have to face to- wards the north. The French acted, however, with great for- bearance; and nothing, indeed, could be fairer than the course which Canrobert took.* He justly repre- sented that the French had hitherto had the right side on the Allied line, and that, of necessity (on account of the position of the place), the army which was to be on the right must have Balaclava as the port of supply which would be in its immediate rear; but seeing the English already installed in the port and the town, and inferring that to call upon them to move out and make way for the French would be likely to create ill blood, he generously and wisely proposed to give Lord Raglan his choice. Either Lord Raglan might continue, as before, to take the left place in the Allied line, with an under- standing that, in that case, he would have to give up Balaclava to the French, or else he might keep Balaclava, but, as the consequence of doing so, must take his place on the right of the Allied line. To take the right was to add to the toils of the siege the duty of withstanding any enterprises which might be undertaken by the enemy’s field army; to * General Canrobert , as will be afterwards stated, bad at this time acceded to the command of the French army. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. Ill take the left was to be sheltered from molestation on all sides except that of the town. But, on the' other hand, the privilege of occupying Balaclava seemed, at the time, to be one of great value, be- cause the fitness and the ample advantages of the bays of Kamiesh and Kazatch had not been then recognised.* Before he made his choice Lord Kaglan con- sulted Lyons, and Lyons urged with a great earnest- ness that Balaclava should be retained by the Eng- lish. There, and there only, as he thought, could there be a sufficiently sure communication between the fleet and the land forces. As experience proved, he was wrong; but upon a naval question — and such this question was — his opinion , of course , had great weight. It prevailed. For the sake of re- taining Balaclava, Lord Itaglan elected to take the right in the Allied line, with all its burthens and perils. It seems probable that, if Lord Baglan had * Yet it might have been. In the memorandum addressed to our Ambassador at Constantinople in 1834 (see note and plan, ante., p. 56), General, then Colonel, Macintosh wrote: “Immediately after passing “ the lighthouse on the point , there is an extensive bay which branches “out in several directions — an excellent landing-place, but it is above “four miles from the town.” The inlets thus described are those of Kamiesh and Kazatch. In November 1853 General Macintosh called the attention of the Horse Guards to his memorandum of 1834, and wrote: “The large bay, marked D in the sketch [see copy of it, ante , “p. 56], at once suggests itself as the most suitable place to land a “battering-train and siege stores, but it is very probable that it is now “also fortified.” CHAP. L. Lord Rag- lan, after consulting Lyons, de- termined, for the sake of retaining Bala- clava, to take the right in the Allied line. 112 INVASION OF THE CHIMEA. CI j AP< chanced to prefer the other alternative, the subsequent " "“course of events would have borne but little re- semblance to that which in fact took place. Change in Pursuant to the understanding between the two the array, # 0 the Eng- chiefs, the French marched on to the westward; and taking the the forbearance they had shown was rewarded, for theFrench it proved that the bays of Kamiesli and Kazatch the left. yj e iq e( j excellent means of landing supplies for an army. it was Thus the French gained the vast advantage of from their . ® ® .. own having ample, convenient ports, together with all and not the comparative ease and immunity of being on the seiShness left of the Allied line, whilst the English, with one partof the diminutive harbour, were taking a post which seemed thatthe i nv °i ve them in the double duty of covering the English siege and taking part in its labours; but this allot- ted to ment resulted from the free (though mistaken) right. ° choice of the English, and not from any en- deavour to overreach them on the part of General Canrobert. 29th Sept. The -^Tdes, pushing forward, proceeded to esta- The Allies blish their besieging troops upon aline passing from take up east to west across the centre of that district of high ground in ground on the south of Sebastopol which goes by Sebasto- the name of the Chersonese; and the English, for poL the reason just given, accepted the east or right side, whilst the French, keeping more to the westward, consented to take the left. Oath cart’s Having, in the course of the 25tli, sent back all the convoys of sick to the Katcha, and having sent INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 113 forward what remained of the baggage-trains into CI Jy u> * the general line of march, Catlicart, on the following day, left the Belbec, moving up to Mackenzie’s Farm, and descending thence to the Tchernaya. For some thirty hours or more Catlicart had been left so far isolated as to make it seem likely that he would have occasion for showing his quality as a commander, and he contemplated the eventuality of being attacked in a way which would oblige him to burn his bag- gage and cut his way through; but the enemy for- bore, attempting nothing against him. After gaining the Tchernaya on the 26tli, Cath- cart did not, on the following day, pursue the track of the other divisions; but, pursuant to Lord Raglan’s orders, moved up by the Khantor Pass to the top of the plateau, and so at once came into line with the rest of the Anglo-French army, then ranging in front of Sebastopol. Thus ended a venturesome movement. Whether Success of the measure was really, as some have imagined, a march, wise one, or whether it was of so perilous a nature as only to be rendered warrantable by the exceeding stress of the predicament which caused its adoption, the Allies had at least the fortune to reach the goal they had sought, and even to reach it unhurt; but it must not be thought that, in any other sense, the why S the flank march bore the test of experience; for we shall themea^ see by-and-by that, though master of the country ^| e ^ f ‘ no around him, and having some 3000 horse, Prince sufficing tost of its Mentscliikoff suffered liimself to remain unacquainted prudence. Invasion of the Crimea. 7. 3 114 v INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. Circum- stances under which the sole lead- ership of the Allies during the flank march de- volved practical- ly on Lord Raglan. The good effect re- sulting from this temporary concen- with the march of the Allied army then proceeding in open day close to where he had brought his own troops; and that, even when his rear-guard was touched by Lord Raglan, and attacked by our horse and artillery, he ascribed the collision to a French or English patrol , and still preserved his clean ignorance of all that was going on. From this, the blindfolded state of Prince Mentschikoff, it resulted that the flank march did not undergo the perilous trial which seemed to await it; and therefore the success of the movement does not make it at all an example of what may be wisely dared in the pre- sence of an enemy accustomed to use common watch- fulness, and able to seize an advantage. But, even without the interposition of an enter- prising foe, a march of this kind might have been brought to ruin by any faltering or mismanagement on the part of the Allies. As it was, the march prospered. When once it had been agreed on the Belbec that this venturesome movement should be attempted, and that the English army should lead the way, it resulted from this arrangement, and from Marshal St. Arnaud’s increasing weakness, that Lord Raglan got for forty-eight hours the practical leader- ship of the whole Allied army; and the effect of the change soon showed itself in the speed and the firm- ness with which the flank march was executed. As at sea, after the 10th of September the illness of Marshal St. Arnaud gave a great momentum to the invasion , by placing the virtual guidance of the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 115 armada in tlie hands of Lord Raglan during several C1 ^ p * critical days, so now, when, from similar causes, the tration of virtual leadership of the Anglo-French army fell once p °^ C1, more, for a time, to Lord Raglan, it instantly felt the advantage which results from undivided com- mand. III. The night the French lay on the Tchernaya, Cessation Marshal St. Arnaud ceased to hold his command, st. Ar- Naturally, the policy of the French Emperor had in- command, dined him to put the army, as far as was possible, ^fenm'h under officers concerned in the slaughter which placed j^ t 27th him on his throne; and it must be acknowledged that Policy of in this respect General Canrobert was but too well ^ eFrench qualified by the part which he had had the mis- with re - ** # A spect to fortune to take in the massacre of the Boulevard; the com- but it is also true, as we have seen, that the brilliant the army, reputation which the General had established in Afri- General can warfare, gave him a more honourable, though rob ert. not more cogent, title to be trusted with high com- mand. To him the French Emperor had secretly The dor- confided a dormant commission which Avas to put mfssion m * him at the head of the French army, if any event ® 0 nt h ™* ed arising out of sickness or war should prevent the Marshal from keeping the command. This dormant The exist- . . 1 ° , ence of commission was to be kept hidden, it seems, from this was the Marshal.* Monsieur St. Arnaud seems to have ceaied C ° n from St. * It will be observed that in speaking of this dormant commission, Arnau( T and of the illnesses, resignation, and death of Marshal St. Arnaud, I 116 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. L. Interposi- tion of Colonel Trochu. had an instinctive suspicion that something of the “kind had been planned, but he was not made ac- quainted with the truth until the 13th of September, the day next before the landing. The Marshal had sent for General Morris, the officer next in seniority, and General Canrobert then thought it was time to disclose the existence of the commission. St. Arnaud had already requested the Government to appoint his successor as soon as Sebastopol should fall; but it would seem that his discovery of the dormant commission tended rather to increase than to lessen the singular tenacity with which — struggling al- ways against mortal sickness — he still clung to the command. However, on the 26th — the night the French lay on the Tchernaya — he became so weak that the attending physician thought fit to make his patient’s state known to Colonel Trochu, the officer understood to be entrusted by the Emperor with the function of advising at the French Headquarters. The Colonel then conceived it his duty to act. Entering the Marshal’s tent, he strove to break his purpose with all the tenderness and kindly feeling which words could express, but ended by telling the avoid the language of positive statement ; and I may say that for the means of making the statements I do on this particular subject I am mainly indebted to the work of M. Bazancourt. Through General Yusuf and M. Henry, who were constantly at the side of the Marshal in his last days, M. Bazancourt had peculiarly good means of knowing what passed , and his account bears internal evidence of being accurate. What I say, however, of Lord Raglan’s last visit to the Marshal, is drawn from Lord Raglan’s private correspondence. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 117 sick man that the time had come when, in order to CI *^ P - obtain the repose which he needed, he must have” his mind free from anxiety. For an instant the Marshal only fixed his eyes The com- upon the Colonel-, but then he said, “Yes, I under- signed™ “stand you; send for General Canrobert:” and in ^nd^of the next hour he resigned the command into the Q®“_ eral hands of his preordained successor. robert. It seems that on this night the Marshal had hal , s thrown off the cholera, but other ailments still caused state at this time. him from time to time cruel suffering alternating with periods of prostration. From the moment when he resigned, he longed with great intensity to be away from the Crimea, but before he embarked LordJ^° r ,g Raglan went to his bedside to bid him adieu. The™^® r _ Marshal, at that time, could only speak in a whisper, shai. and his mind, as Lord Raglan thought, was wander- ing. “I must say,” Lord Raglan wrote — “I must Lord Rag- “say I deeply regret him. Although he occasioned l/the" “me many difficulties from time to time, he never ^arshai “varied in his determination to be upon good terms st^Ar- “with me; and, personally, he was all kindness to “and consideration for me.”* It must be remembered, however, that when Lord Raglan thus wrote, he had not become acquainted with the contents of the despatch which Marshal St. Arnaud had thought fit to address to the Emperor * Private letter from Lord Raglan to tbe Duke of Newcastle, 8th October 1854. 118 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. Nature of the trou- bles which Marshal St. Arnaud had occa- sioned to Lord Rag- lan. on the morrow of the Alma.* After learning the contents of the despatch, Lord Raglan, in very warm terms, expressed his approval of the indignant re- monstrance on this subject which our Ambassador, as we shall see byand-by, had made to the French Government-,** and it will therefore, of course, be inferred that his perusal of the Marshal's narrative must have more or less changed his opinion of the writer. Among the troubles to which Lord Raglan re- ferred as having been brought upon him by Marshal St. Arnaud, there were some which had threatened to shake the Alliance, and others to mar the cam- paign; but, however much it might be owing to his own peculiar gifts that Lord Raglan, in the face of these dangers, was able to ward off all fatal dis- agreement from the camp of the Western Powers, and to prevent the invasion from collapsing, it was the generous quality of the Marshal’s temper which made it possible for the English General to achieve these results without leaving bitterness in the heart of his colleague. Whether the feeling with which St. Arnaud was regarded by the French army sprang from the cir- cumstance of his suffering himself to be interfered * See post, vol. vn. ** He speaks of the communication narrating the remonstrance and the grounds for resorting to it as “perfect;” and considering how choice Lord Raglan was accustomed to be in his language, this word coming from him was a strong one. — Private letter from Lord Raglan, 3d No- vember 1851. And see post, vol. vii. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 119 with by the Emperor, or whether it arose from the ci *ap. intrigues of rivals, or from honest distrust and re- probation, it is certain that the Marshal was without due ascendancy in his own camp. Under his com- mand, the French army was never the powerful instrument which the numbers and the prowess of its components seemed able to make it; for although, after the battle of the Alma, he suffered himself to imagine that victory had won him at last the full confidence of the troops, his bodily health from that time was hardly in such a state as to enable him to try the strength of his authority. It was only in the early days on the Bosphorus and in Bulgaria that the troubles St. Arnaud oc- casioned were of a kind resulting from his ambition or encroaching spirit. From the time when, during the voyage, the French officers sent in their protest against the intended descent on the Crimea, down to that when ,the whole Allied army was turned aside from its purpose by the bare apparition of an earth- work descried by the French on the Belbec, it was never, I think, mere ill-will or perverseness on the part of the Marshal, but always his want of author- ity, or else his failing health, which stood in the way of the enterprise. Almost the last of the Marshal’s acts whilst on t^Mai^ shore gave proof of that freedom from vindictiveness goodwill which was spoken of in an earlier page as one of towar J s the features of his character. Before he embarked, be regard- lie offered a present — his Russian carriage and enemy. 120 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. L. The Mar- shal car-, ried on board the Ber- thollet. Is attend- ed by a priest, and dies. horses — to General Bosquet, an officer, as we know, ‘ of great repute and station in the French army, who, even at that parting moment, was regarded by the Marshal as his enemy. Covered by a tricolor flag, the Marshal, on the 29th of September, was carried on board ship by the seamen of the Bertliollet, and placed in the cabin prepared for him. There, the Abbe Parat&re, who had been summoned to do the part of the Church to a dying Catholic, was left alone with the sufferer; but, “After some instants” — so runs the account — “the Abb^ came out, and said, ‘The Marshal is ready “‘to die a Christian.’” This was in the morning. The Berth ollet put to sea. Marshal St. Arnaud no longer suffered from acute pain, but between noon and sunset he died. In earlier volumes I recounted some of his actions. 121 INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. CHAPTEE LI. I. When two hostile armies are parted by only a chap. few miles of ground, the plans adopted in the one 1 — camp must commonly have close relation to what is there known of the other; and in such case, the narrative of operations conducted by either force must be more or less blended with accounts of what its adversary is doing or intending. But in this campaign it strangely happened that, even after their singular victory, the Allies could not scatter the mist which an S intev-° f had shrouded the enemy’s strength; and, except from ^end- vague rumours, and the marks of a hastened retreat the^pians which they tracked all the way to the Belbec, they menis of knew nothing of Prince Mentschikoffs army, till, by armies, sheer chance, our Headquarters touched it on the road by Mackenzie’s Farm. Even then, the sudden and incomplete knowledge thus flung upon the mind of Lord Eaglan did not bring him to change his designs; and therefore it is that we have been able to follow the march of the Allies from the Alma to Effect of the Belbec, and from the Belbec away to the south Jheatruc- round the head of the Sebastopol bay, without being ^rratiye 0 forced to break in upon that part of the story with accounts from Prince Mentschikoffs camp. 122 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LI. The un- dertaking to defend Sebasto- pol. The pre- liminary know- ledge re- quired for appre- hending the nature of the conflict. The road- stead of Sebasto- pol, Yet during those seven days which were passed by the Allies in caring for their wounded, and in marching to the southern coast of the peninsula, men faithful to their Czar and their country, and so endued with courage as to be able to exert their whole power of mind and body under a weight of disasters which seemed hardly short of mere ruin, were enter- ing upon a task of great moment, and destined to be famous in history. Expecting the attack of a victorious host, and abandoned by their own defeated army, an admiral with some thousands of sailors and workmen, all guided by the skilled engineer whose achievement has made him illustrious, were preparing the defence of Sebastopol. A fair apprehension of the nature of the conflict which those brave men undertook must be based upon some acquaintance with the features of the ground, and the resources available for defence. Towards the south-western extremity of the Crimea there is an arm of the sea, with a breadth of from a thousand to fifteen hundred yards, which stretches in from the west to a distance of three miles and a half. This deep, narrow bay is the roadstead of Sebastopol. * On the north the roadstead is bounded by the * The Allies were much in the custom of calling the bay or road- stead of Sebastopol “the great harbour,” or sometimes only “the harb- our;” but I follow the more accurate language of the Russians , who called the great bay “the roadstead,” and the man-of-war’s creek “the “harbour of Sebastopol.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 123 slopes and ledges on which 'stand the forts and buildings constituting the Severnaya or “North Side~state of “of Sebastopol; ” and it may be remembered that of defences the state of the land defences in that quarter we^th spoke in an earlier page. There was there shown Sid0 * ground for believing that, even so late as the 25th of September, though much had been done since the day of the landing, the Star Fort, the key of the North Side, could not have been successfully de- fended against a resolute attack by the Allies; and on the 14th — the day to which we are now going to revert — the Severnaya was still less capable of offering a formidable resistance. On the south and south-west of the bay there is The P la * •' teau on a high plateau or table-land, having much the shape the South of a heart or Saxon shield , with its top towards the e d the east and its pointed end towards the west. This ese? rS ° n ~ plateau is called the Chersonese.* It is much higher towards the east than towards the west. Along its eastern or landward side, it is abruptly divided from the plain by an acclivity rising to a height of from five to about seven hundred feet, and so extending from north to south, for a distance (in a straight line) of about eight miles, as to form a continuous buttress to the plateau. This acclivity, as well as the eastermost crest of the table-land or plateau at its top, is called Mount SapounA The only great break in the steepness thus dividing the table-land That is, according to General de Todleben’s nomenclature. 124 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LI. of the Chersonese from the plain is at the point some three miles from the southern coast, which was called the “Col de Balaclava.” Along a distance, in a straight line, of about four miles, beginning from its north-easterly angle near the Inkerman bridge, and going thence westerly, the plateau is washed, for the first half-mile, by the T chernaya, and lower down, by the waters of the Sebastopol bay*, but the rest of its water boundary is the open sea. The side of the Chersonese which lies towards the north is deeply jagged by creeks or bays through- out its whole length, from the Inkerman bridge on the east to Cape Chersonese on the west; but on the south and south-western side of the plateau its shore- line has a different character; for a seaman coasting along it from Cape Chersonese to the eastward would have on his larboard side a wall of rocks so un- broken, that although he might land a boat near the Monastery of St. George he would look in vain for a sheltering bay like those which abound on the other side of the Chersonese, and it could be only after passing the plateau that he would be able to find an inlet. The port he would then find is Bala- clava. The length of the plateau, from its easter- most side to Cape Chersonese, is about ten miles. Throughout its extent the plateau is scarred by ravines. Some of these are deep and precipitous. They run, for the most part, in a direction from the south-east to the north-west, and several of them are prolongations of the openings which form the many INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 125 creeks and bays indenting tlie north and north-west CI j^ p * of the plateau. Of these creeks there is one which, stretching The Man- deep in from the roadstead in a direction from north Harbour, to south, had become the port of Sebastopol, or, as the English used to call it, the “Man-of-war Har- “bour.” In this port mighty fleets could lie sheltered, and its waters were so deep even home to the shore, that the seamen of line-of-battle ships could pass from their decks to their barracks without taking to boat. It was in this harbour, and upon the ground on either side of it, that the Allies had to seek their prey. Including that eastern suburb which is called the Position “Karabel” faubourg, Sebastopol may be regarded astopoi. standing upon a semicircular tract of ground, sub- tended by the great bay or roadstead, and split into two segments by the Man-of-war Harbour, in such manner that the western segment included Sebastopol proper, with the Admiralty, the public buildings, the arsenal, and town; whilst the eastern segment — that is, the Karabel faubourg — contained, among other buildings, the docks, great Government storehouses, some barracks on a large scale, and a church. The separation of the town from its faubourg was ren- dered the more complete by the steepness and depth of the ravine which descended into the heart of the Man-of-war Harbour, for if a man, being in the town of Sebastopol, desired to go into the faubourg without passing over the water, he would not only 126 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C li P * ^ ave t° go down, and go round by tlie Pdressip at the head of the Man-of-war Harbour, but would be forced to ascend the eastern side of the ravine by a steep and difficult road. The configuration of land and water which thus split off the faubourg from the main town was a great source of embarrassment to the defenders, and was not the only obstacle in the way of their lateral communications, for there was another ravine which subdivided the town, and another again which cut the suburb in two. These ravines, as well as the ridges and knolls on which the place stood, sloped down with more or less ab- ruptness to the water’s edge. The long hill on which stood the main part of the town is 200 feet above the level of the sea, and it descends with some ab- ruptness towards the man-of-war harbour on the east, and on the west towards the deep ravine which divides the main town from its outskirts on the west of the Artillery Bay. The Of the streets in the town two were spacious, Btreets * and in these stood the principal buildings of the place. The rest of the streets were narrow and un- paved. The Naval The highest spot in the town was the one where Library. s j. ooc [ the ]^ ava l Library. On the top of the build- ing there was an observatory which (designed as it had been for recreation rather than for State purposes) men used to call the “belvedere.” This Naval Library was the place to which of- ficers were accustomed to go when they sought to INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 127 meet one another; and thence it was that one of the C ^ P ’ most momentous changes in the progress of the strife" - was destined to be first descried. In the times immediately preceding the invasion the numbers collected within the town and its suburbs had been in general about 42,000, but 35,000 of these belonged to the fleet or the army. P lace * When Count Pozzo di Borgo, in 1828, warned his Government against the eventuality of an attack upon Sebastopol by an English fleet,* his words, it would seem, were not written in vain; and during the years which followed, the w^orks judged to be needed for the seaward defence of Sebastopol were The sea carried on upon a vast scale. The result was, that at the time of the invasion, the portals, both north and south, of the great bay or roadstead, and both its shores within, to a distance of more than two miles, were studded with fortified works. Of these, some, indeed, were only great earthworks, but others, and those the chief ones, w r ere huge casemated forts, having stone-work revetments. These sea-forts and batteries, were: on the north side, Fort Constantine and Fort Michael, both stoneworks; the work called “Number Four,” the “Twelve Apostles,”** and “Paris;” and, on the south side, the Quarantine Sea-fort,*** Fort Alexander (a stone-work), the Ar- * See ante, vol. hi. p. 73. ** Not to be confounded with the man-of-war of the same nam04 The earthwork was named after the ship. *** Called by the Russians the “ Number Ten.” 128 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C 2f P * tillery Fort,* Fort Nicholas, and Fort Paul (both stone-works); and, lastly, the Sviatoslaw Battery. Three of these, the Twelve Apostles, the Paris, and the Sviatoslaw Battery, were constructed so late as the beginning of the year 1854. It was to cover Fort Constantine on its landward side, and to pre- vent the enemy’s ships from approaching the shore, that, after the breaking out of the war, the Volok- hoff Tower (surnamed by our people the “Wasp”), and the “Kartaschcwsky,” or “Telegraph” Battery, were erected on the high ground between the Star Fort and the open sea. In all these sea-forts and batteries, without including that Star Fort of which we heretofore spoke, there were mounted, at the time of the landing, 611 guns, for the most part of heavy calibre.** The Black Sea fleet, which lay in the harbour The fleet, or in the roadstead, consisted of 14 line-of-battle ships, 7 frigates, 1 corvette, 2 brigs, and 11 war- steamers, besides some smaller vessels. It carried 1908 guns, and was manned by 18,500 seamen. Of course, this naval force could be so placed as to be able to take part with the sea-forts and batteries in repelling from the first the incursion of a fleet, or else in preparing a reception for such of the enemy’s * The Fort thus called by the Allies included that front towards the roadstead which the Russians called the ‘‘Number Eight Battery” and also the Work for landward defence which the Russians called the “Number Seven Bastion.” ** “Materiaux pour servir,” &c. Todleben, I think, gives 610 as the number. For the details of the armament, see table in the Appendix to yol. vi. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 129 ships as might break into the mouth of the roadstead C j^ p * despite all the power of the forts. It was not the fate of the Black Sea fleet to prove its worth by engaging in any sea-fight with the ships of the Western Powers; but from the ceaseless pains which, since the last war, had been taken to make the fleet strong — from the love and reverence with which the seamen clung to the memory of the commander who had been foremost in labour- ing to this end* — from the sailor-like spirit and the evident love of the sea service which had been engendered — from the faith the sailors had in the power of their fleet — and, above all, from the courage with which Korniloff and his seamen, when forced to take to the land, stood fast to the defence of a place which Prince Mentschikoff and his army had aban- doned, — there is ground to infer that, whatever may still have been wanting to fit the Black Sea fleet for great encounters at sea, it would not have been wanting to itself in the less complex duty of fighting to extremity in the roadstead. Across the roadstead, at some distance from its Thepre . entrance, there was a boom. Before the day of the fi U c “cy of Alma (when alarm brought about the resort to a new ^tsand and mournful expedient), it was believed by the Rus- the fleet^ sians that these defences alone were fully enough to fence of make the roadstead secure against an attack from the stead, sea; and after the sinking of the ships at the mouth of the bay, the Allies acquiesced in this judgment, * Admiral Lazareff, Invasion of the Crimea, 7. 9 130 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C ia P abstaining throughout the war from any attempt to The ex- break in with their fleets. So it resulted that both which° the the north side of the place and the whole of Sebas- th^road- topol itself, including the Karabel suburb, were safe tended to ^ rom the a tt a cks of the Allies in every part front- assure the ing the roadstead or the man-of-war harbour. Kor safety of 0 _ the town, were even these all the advantages which the de- fenders of Sebastopol drew from their hold of the roadstead and its creeks*, for, on its eastern side, the Karabel suburb was so bounded by the Careen- ing Bay, and the deep ravine at its head, that, in that quarter also, the dominion of the water by the Russians was an obstacle to any attack. Thus re- lieved from apprehension of attack from the side of the water, the garrison would be enabled to bring almost their whole strength to bear upon the land defences. Of such of those land defences as covered the north of Sebastopol from attack on the side of the Belbec we have already spoken;* and what we now have to observe is the strength of the ground which hemmed in on the landward side not only the town of Sebastopol but also its Karabel faubourg. Nature On the western side of the town of Sebastopol ground there was a wide and deep ravine, running parallel °and h side with the boundary of the place, which could not but topoi. baS " he a g rave obstacle to besiegers; and, upon the whole, the configuration of the ground was of such a kind that works on a moderate scale might suffice to pre- * Ante, chap, xlviii. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 131 vent an enemy from choosing , in that direction, his jioint of attack. It was towards the south and' south-east that the defenders of the place were least helped by nature. Even in those quarters, however, the configuration of the ground -was in some respects favourable to the defence: for the ravines descended into the place in a way which laid them open to the fire of the garrison, especially to fire from the ships; and every one of the intervening ridges along which the assailants could best come to push their attacks was so formed by nature as to offer to the defenders of the place an advantageous position for the erection of a fortified Work. On the other hand, the place was commanded by the ground which would be under the dominion of besiegers established on the Chersonese. Then also the length of the semicircular line which had to be defended throughout was as much as •four miles; and finally, it must be understood that of the defensive posts which might be most advantageously established along this extended line, there were three, at the least, so circumstanced that the loss of any one of them would be likely to carry with it the fall of the place. * There existed other sources of embarrassment which however — though not in an equal degree — * The positions subsequently occupied by the Malakoff , the Redan, and the Flagstaff Bastion. Todleben even says that the loss of the “Central,’ 1 or of the “Land Quarantine” Bastion, called by the Rus- sians “Number Six,” would also have been fatal, 9 * CHAP. LI. 132 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LI. Absence of land defences on the SouthSide in the autumn of 1853. Works commenc- ed after were common to the attack and the defence. Be- ’sieged and besiegers alike were sure to be put to great stress by the depth of the ravines, which would more or less split their strength by hampering all lateral movements; and, in the event of the conflict taking a form which should make it depend much on earthworks, both the garrison and their assailants would have to encounter the difficulty of trying to gain cover from ground which was simply hard rock, coated over, where coated at all, with a very thin layer of clay. II. With the exception of an adjunct* to one of the sea-forts which faced in part along shore, the whole line of landward defences traced out in the year 1834 had been suffered to remain in the condition of a mere project down to the autumn of 1853, and certainly on its south side, at that time, the place lay quite open; but after the rupture of friendly re- lations with the Western Powers, which followed upon the action of Sinope, some works were begun upon a part of the projected line of defence. At first, * This was an adjunct to the work which the Allies called the Artil- lery Fort, and for the Russian names of which see the last footnote, p. 128, ante. The adjunct seems to have been intended to secure the Hank $f the sea-fort called by the Russians “Number Eight” with which it was connected ; but as the work has been counted amongst the land fortifications , I have thought it right to speak of the adjunct mentioi^ed in the text as an exception to the statement there made. pi *f J®igSp u JwSSP i iMffk.->>« wr W! / , P^S ?9 INt 8 -! ;c ^ gfeSH: ^>fe ill >K Elate 18. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 133 however, it was only against the eventuality of a C j^ p ' sudden landing in one of the neighbouring bays, andThe rup~ an incursion thence into the town, that the engineers lowingUie were apparently plying their task; for an enterprise |inop e ? f of that kind, undertaken as a measure merely auxi- liary to an attack from the sea, was the utmost in the way of a land attack that Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief, had hitherto believed to be at all probable.* So, although in the beginning off h t ^ of February 1854 the works planned for the defence of works on the west side of the town had been begun, the whole February of the Karabel suburb, and even the approach from the south leading into the heart of the place, re- mained untouched by the spade.** After that period, however, some works sprang up; and on the day when the Allies effected their landing, the state ofj^sede- the land defences was as follows : So much of the f e nc es at the time project of 1834 as had for its immediate object the of the defence of Sebastopol proper had been almost car- uth Sept, ried into effect; for at intervals along a curved line 1854 ’ beginning from the Artillery Fort and ending at the ground overhanging the head of the man-of-war har- bour, there now stood this chain of works: the Artil- lery Fort, the Land Quarantine Bastion,*** the Cen- * Todleben, vol. i. p. 121. ** The approach which was afterwards barred by the Flagstaff Bas- tion. *** The same work as that which the Russians called the u Number “Six” Bastion. I call the work the Land Quarantine Bastion from a fear that there might be a tendency to confound it with the. sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we have always been accustomed to call the Quarantine Fort. 134 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C ll P ’ Bastion, the Schwartz Bedoubt, and the Flag- staff Bastion. With the exception of the Central Bastion, which was still in course of construction, these works had reached their completion, and were connected with one another by a naked, loopholed wall, which passed with but little interruption along the whole of the curved line from the Artillery Fort to the head of the man-of-war harbour. Besides these works, the isolated sea-fort near Quarantine Bay, which we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, and also the Artillery Fort, had been so closed at their gorges by earthworks as to be turned into redoubts, now defended on the land side as well as on the side of the water. In the Karabel suburb, less had been done; but there also, along a curved line extending from the head of the man-of-war harbour to the mouth of the Careening Bay, there were already the Bedan, the Malakoff Tower, the Little Bedan, and, finally, a single faced battery for four guns in connection with the stone building, in the form of a cross, which stood near the mouth of the Careening Bay, and was made to serve as a cazern or defensible bar- rack. The works thus defending the Karabel fau- bourg were not as yet connected by any intermediate entrenchment; and the Malakoff, afterwards so formid- able, was only at this time a naked, liorseshoe-shaped tower, having five guns, on the top, but without the glacis and the outworks which were soon to rise fold- Thearma-ing around it. It seems that the tower was built at * invasion of tiie Crimea. 135 tlie expense of the Sebastopol traders. At this time, c ^£ p * the number of guns in battery for the defence of the ment of south side of Sebastopol on its land side amounted 1LU to 151. Of these, 128 pieces were applied to the defence of Sebastopol proper, and only 23 to that of the Karabel suburb. III. Supposing General de Todleben’s history to be free strength on this point from all error, the strength of the Czar portion in the Crimea, on the day when the great armada of the Allies was seen to be approaching the coast, may be taken to stand as follows : The land forces at the time then occupying the peninsula were 54,000 strong. * landing. Of this force, some small portions, consisting, it would seem, of about 1000 men, were local troops; and another portion, to the number of 2700, was a body of artillerymen permanently stationed at the batteries of the coast defences; but the rest, amount- ing in numbers to more than 50,500, were troops belonging to what the Russians call their “active “army,” and were available for operations in the field * 54,208, thus made up: — ■ Strength of the army (Todleben, p. 140), . . 51,500 Artillery appropriated to the coast defences (ib. p. 110), 2,708 54,208 I include the artillerymen appropriated to the coast defences, because, as a matter of fact, they were on the ground; but as they remained, it seems, constantly at their batteries, it may be considered that they were kept in check by the naval forces of the Allies. 136 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LI. wherever their services might be needed. Of these "Prince Mentschikoff had under his immediate per- sonal command a force of 38,500 men. * These lay posted partly in Sebastopol and partly at other places, but all were so nearly in hand as to be capable of being assembled in time for the battle. The rest of the regular land forces in the Crimea amounted in number to about 12,000,** and were stationed under the command of General Khomoutoff in the south- eastern part of the peninsula; but even these most distant troops were not so far beyond reach as to make it impossible to call them in to headquarters before the critical moment. *** Besides these bodies of men, which were all in strictness land forces , there were some bodies of marines, which at this time had been stationed in a permanent way, partly at the several sections into which the land defences had been divided, and partly in furnishing guards for the Admiralty and the hos- pital. These stationed marines were not men with- drawn from any of the ships in the roadstead. They amounted in number to 2600.T There were, besides, four “landing battalions,” amounting in number to 1800 men, which were posted along the lines of de- fence. These “landing battalions” were marines * 38,597. — Todleben, p. 140. ** Ibid. *** This was proved by the forced march of the Moscow Regiment, which, having been ordered up soon after the appearance of the Allies on the coast, was on the field of the Alma on the morning of the battle. t 2666. — Todleben, p, 141-43. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 137 withdrawn from the fleet, and efficiently organised for land service. Including these, it may be said that, independently of the army and of the local companies, and independently, also, of the men ap- propriated to the coast defences and without counting any of the naval forces remaining on board ship, there was a body of upwards of 4000 men * specially charged with the duty of holding the land defences, and guarding the Admiralty and the hospital. The seamen of the Black Sea fleet lying in the roadstead or in the harbour numbered, as we have seen, 18,500 men. Prince Mentschikoff, as High Prince \ ’ 11 Mentschi- Admiral, was in command of the fleet as well askoff’s the army ; and this , his double authority, may help command, to account for the exceeding ease and readiness with Causes of which, in the progress of the siege, the crews of the ity with ships, one after another, were turned into good bat- crews o? 6 talions; but it is also evident that some of the ar- ^ r f lips rangements peculiar to the Russian navy were con-P rou £ llt , . r . . into use ducing in the same direction. The Russian seaman for land (whose home is partly on shore and in barracks) has always been subjected to a good deal of the dis- cipline and instruction received by the land forces. In the absence of the Prince, Vice-Admiral Kor- The Ad- niloff, the chief of the staff of the Black Sea fleet, inborn- 6 * 1 was the first in authority over the naval forces inse^to- the roadstead and the harbour of Sebastopol. The absenc^of fleet was divided into two squadrons, of which one j/entschi- koff. * 4466 including tlie gunners , or 4048 without them. — Todleben, p. 143. • 138 CFIAP. LI. The num- bers of workmen available for the defences. Force which Prince Mentschi- koff had in the Crimea at the time of the landing. Abund- ance of warlike stores. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. was commanded by Korniloff, and the other by Vice- " Admiral Nacliimoff, the officer whose squadron had destroyed the Turkish ships at Sinope. From the time when Sebastopol was chosen as a military harbour, great works, such as docks and forts, had been almost constantly in course of con- struction*, and it seems that the numbers of workmen whose services could be obtained for the defence of the place amounted to 5000. Including these (and as they were obedient to military discipline, and were even of more worth than soldiers for the works which would have to be raised, it seems fitting to do so), the force which Prince Mentschikoff had in the Crimea at the time of the landing was 76,000 men.* Sebastopol, as might be expected, was rich in warlike stores. Thousands of guns of heavy calibre were contained in the arsenal*, but it is stated that, either because of the age and make of some of this ordnance, or else for want of the corresponding am- munition, a chief portion of these pieces were use- less; and there is no need to push inquiry on the subject, because, in the event which happened, the whole resources of the fleet became available for the * 76,375, thus made up: — The army, ....... 51,500 Local companies, 1,000 Stationed marines, 2,666 Seamen of the Black Sea fleet, . . . 18,501 Artillerymen appropriated to the coast defences, 2,7 08 76,375 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 139 land defences*, and not only all the ships’ guns — some 1900 in number — not only the ammunition, the iron, the timbers, the cordage, the spars, the tanks, the canvas — all, in short, that a great fleet could need, with vast quantities of stone already de- tached from the neighbouring rocks, — but also the cranes, the gins, the engines of all kinds by which man enforces his dominion over things of huge bulk and weight, and all the machinery, implements, and materials which had been in use either for the or- dinary business of the dockyards, or for quarrying and carrying on great works in the way of excava- tion, embankments, and masonry*, — all these things were not only at the disposal of the defenders, but close by, and most apt to the hands of the men, — some 26,000 in number,* — who had long been ac- customed to wield them. In the midst of all these vast resources, which General de Todleben speaks of as almost inex- haustible, there was a comparative scantiness in the supply of engineering tools*, but it does not appear that this want existed to a degree which prevented it from being effectually met by the measures which were taken for the purpose, or that, for want of the requisite implements, any work was even delayed. Indeed, the order to the Government factories for CHAP. LI. Vast amount of materials and me- chanical appliances which be- came available for the defence. Ammuni- tion. : Seamen Stationed marines, Workmen, 18,501 2,666 5,000 26,167 140 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LI. Store of provi- sions. 13th Sept. The arma- da seen from Se- bastopol. fresh and abundant supplies shows, in passing, the 'variety and the greatness of the mechanic resources to which the defenders could look. For all the early necessities of the defence there was a vast abundance of ammunition*,* and it being impossible for the Allies to invest the place, fresh supplies could be always poured in. We may there- fore evade that task of inquiring as to the quantity of ammunition in store which might be necessary for understanding the condition of a city which was really beleaguered, and the same reason dispenses with the necessity of any detailed statement with re- spect to the supply of food in Sebastopol; but it may be worth while to say that, in the matter of bread, the fleet was provisioned for seven months, and the army for four and a half. Between nine and ten o’clock on the morning of the 13th of September, men using their glasses at Sebastopol were able to see on the horizon two line- of-battle ships, and, behind them, a darkness of such a kind that it could hardly be anything else than the smoke of a great fleet of steamers. About noon, the telegraph from Loukoul announced that a fleet visible to the 1ST. W. was drawn up in three columns, and was standing E.N.E. By intelligence sent from * The almost reckless way in which the Russians used to squander their ammunition at the early period of the siege, is proof that at that time they could have had no apprehension of the possibility of finding it run short. In Todleben there will be found minute and ample details on the subject. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 141 tlie neighbourhood of Cape Tarkan, Prince Ment- c ^ p - schikoff also learnt that seventy vessels had there been seen, and it now appeared sure that the Allies had troops on board, and had come with intent to land. Prince Mentschikoff lost no time in giving the Measures thereupon orders which were to assemble his army on the taken, heights of the Alma. He stopped all the works at the port of Sebastopol which were unconnected with the strengthening of the place, giving orders that the men should be employed at the defences. He directed that the men should be mustered at the bat- teries, that they should be practised at the guns, and that all should be held ready for action. It was ordered that the fleet should prepare to make sail* but on this day it blew from 1ST. to N.E. in the bay, and apparently N.W. in the offing, and these winds were adverse to any project for sailing out to attack the armada. From time to time the increasing numbers of the approaching ships were announced; and at half-past eight in the evening the telegraph said, and said truly, “The enemy’s fleet is casting anchor.” The next day was calm; and Sebastopol knew uth Sept, that, without encountering hindrance, the Allies po? knew were landing their troops. The Russians were menj^.^ so constituted as to be able to derive a faint plea- waa s oill £ r on. sure from the mere date of the event, and even, it would seem, to found upon the coincidence a happy augury; for they ever had thought with pride of the 142 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LI. Coincid- ence of date ob- served by the Rus- sians. Abandon- ment of any inten- tion of at- tacking the ar- mada. Further with- drawal of men from the fleet for land service. Progress of tbe war which they are accustomed to call “the war of '“the twenty nations,” and the 14th of September was the anniversary of Napoleon’s entry into Moscow. In the roadstead of Sebastopol, and at the mouth of the Man-of-war Harbour, the two squadrons of the Black Sea were ranged in the order deemed best for sailing to meet the enemy. The adverse winds had been followed by calm; but it does not appear that there was any con- tinuance of that yearning to venture a naval attack which seems to have been felt the day before. The Russian fleet was so much weaker than that of the Allies in many respects, but especially in point of steam-power, that, unless it should chance to suc- ceed, any attempt of the kind would be liable to be condemned for its rashness. It is probable that upon this subject the orders of Prince Mentschikoff were peremptory. At all events, there was no thought, it would seem, on this day, of undertaking to disturb the busy scene in Kalamita Bay by breaking into the midst of the flotilla whilst the French and the English were landing. There was now withdrawn from some of the ships a number of men sufficing to add four more battalions to the strength of the mariners already turned into soldiers; and a day or two later, heavy guns, to the number of thirty, were taken out of the men-of-war, and brought into use for the land defences. All this time, the five thousand workmen at the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 143 North Side to Rear-Admiral Istomin, and the de- j^poi afte fence of the South Side to Rear-Admiral Panfiloff, J he 18th command of Prince Mentschikoff were busily em- c ^ p * ployed, and the works on the North Side especially work7fo7 were pushed on with ceaseless energy, but it was defend, not until after a week from the landing that these approached their completion. On the South Side, The state the defenders were busied with a field-work con- works necting the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions, but 20th h Sept. except in regard to the progress thus making at a single point, the land defences continued to be, for some time, in the state already described. When Prince Mentschikoff had established him- pistribu- self on the Alma, he entrusted the defence of the authority _ at Sebas- " topol after the 181' ’ S e P t# at the same time enjoining these seamen to apply to Lieutenant-General Moller, the Commander-in- Chief of the land forces at Sebastopol, for special instructions. Prince Mentschikoff also directed that, in the absence of Vice-Admiral Korniloff, the com- mand of the fleet, and any troops on board it, should be assumed by Vice-Admiral Nacliimoff, the senior officer in the roadstead. Means were taken for perfecting the telegraphic Perfecting communication between Sebastopol and the covering means of arn telegra- . phic.com- Wlien Prince Mentschikoff’ s orders for assembling; I ? uni 1 ca “ ® turn be- his troops on the Alma had been carried into effect, tween Se- bastopol the only portion ot the active Russian army then and the left at Sebastopol was a body of four militia battal- The Alma, ions. The rest of the combatants who helped to strength 144 .INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LI. of the forces left at Sebas- topol when Mentschi- koff had completed the with- drawal of all the troops ordered to join him on the Alma. form the garrison were the gunners attached to the batteries of the coast defences, the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, the 2600 stationed marines, and the 18,500 seamen. If, to all these forces, there be added the 5000 workmen, it would result that w r hen Prince Mentschikoff had advanced to the heights on the Alma with the whole of the forces which there afterwards encountered the enemy, the number of men still forming the garrison of Sebas- topol or aiding it in its labours, amounted to some 32,000.* Of these, however, there were none, ex- cept the gunners at the coast defences and the 3000 militiamen, who could be said to form part of the army. * Without reckoning the local companies belonging to Sebastopol, and which, appearing to be nine in number (see Todleben, p. 139), were probably 1000 strong, the exact number would be 31,875 — thus made up: — Four militia battalions, .... 3,000 Gunners at the coast batteries, . . . 2,708 Stationed marines, 2,666 Seamen of the fleet, 18,501 Workmen, 5,000 31,875 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 145 CHAPTER LIL I. Such was tlie condition of things at Sebastopol when, on the 20tli of September, the telegraph an- nounced to the garrison that the Allies were ad- vancing to assail Prince Mentschikoff in his position on the Alma heights. At half-past one, the can- nonade which marked the opening of the battle was heard in the town, and at two there came from the telegraph at Cape Loukoul a message, destined to be its last, — “The army is engaged with the enemy.” Already Korniloff was on horseback, and riding, with Colonel de Todleben, towards the sound of the guns.* We shall see by-and-by that, from a dis- tance of 3000 miles, the care and the sagacity of a news-dealing company on the banks of the Thames had enabled it to point out the day as well as the place of the expected encounter; and it might be thought that, since Korniloff was within cannon- sound of the Allied camp, and in hourly communi- * Without distinguishing from others those facts which I owe to per- sonal communications from General de Todleben, I wish to acknow- ledge generally the immeasurable advantage which I have derived from the repeated , lengthened , and most interesting conversations with which the General honoured me. Invasion of the Crimea. F. CHAP. LII. Sebasto- pol on the day of the Alma. Korniloff’s ride with Todleben towards the field of battle. 10 146 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LII. cation with Prince Mentschikoff, he would hardly ’need prophecy to prepare him for the 20th of September. Yet, in speaking of the reasons which made him believe that this 20th of September would prove to be the fated day, he gives the first place to the predictions of an authority — in his eyes ap- parently a kind of periodical apocalypse — which he calls the “Athenian Calendar.” Two days before, he had been at Prince MentschikofFs tent on the Kourganfe Hill, had seen the great strength of the position, and had not only observed the army to be in excellent spirits, but had found the Prince easy in his mind and cheerful. Yet now, as he rode to- wards the scene of action, he could not but be agitated, he says, by the thought that the fate of Europe “was to be decided on Cape Loukoul or on the Alma.” By degrees, he was forced to apprehend, and then to see only too plainly the result of the en- counter. “As I approached,” he says, “the firing “grew slacker, and I soon perceived that our army “was retreating, but retreating in order.* A sad “picture it certainly was, but the will of the Lord “is inscrutable to us.” Amongst the troops which Kornilofi’ and Todleben thus met retreating, there approached an officer on horseback, not marching on duty with any particular f * It was at a later period in the day that there occurred, along the road descending to the Katcha, the scene of confusion witnessed by Chodasiowicz , and described in a former volume of this work. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 147 regiment, nor yet having with him the staff which C lh P ' would denote the presence of a general. He was bowed forward, as though very weary. This horse- Their man was Prince Mentschikoff, the Commander-in- “j e t ^ ting Chief of the defeated army, and of all the military hi . and naval forces in the Crimea. Since the time koff - when he sat by his tent on the slope of the Kourgane Hill, indulging a happy belief in the strength of his ground on the Alma, some eight hours only were passed; but these had come heavy upon him. When Korniloff and Todleben had come up and spoken with him, they turned their horses’ heads, and the three, in company, rode down to the Katcha. It seems that the torment of mind which might well be supposed to be assailing the Prince was at all events masked, and even perhaps superseded, by the ex- treme of bodily weariness which he was suffering.* But if the Prince was thus bowed down by fatigue, and unwilling or hardly able to speak many words, he had formed a momentous resolve, and could still wield that strength of will which was needed for giving effect to it. He enjoined Korniloff to close PHnce^ the mouth of the Sebastopol roadstead (where the koff’s 4 I do not know whether Prince Mentschikoff, in the course of the foregoing night , had imposed upon himself any labours which would account for this excessive fatigue. Including all his hapless untimely rides from the east to the west , and from the west to the east , of the battle-field , he had not traversed much ground in the course of the day. Mentschikoff was not a young man; but I imagine that , in part at least, his prostration of strength must be ascribed to the stress which care and grief can put upon the bodily frame. 10 * 148 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lh P * Sea fleet lay at anchor); and it was under- orders to stood, if it was not expressed in words, that this was for Closing to be done by sinking some of the ships. The im- port of this order was, that the Czar’s famous navy of the Black Sea, — the result of patient energy con- tinued from generation to generation, the long-cherished instrument of conquest, the terror of the Moslems, the hope of the Christians in the East, — was to abdicate its warlike mission upon the approach of danger, and shut itself in for ever — a fleet foregoing the sea. And the officer instructed to execute this ruthless order was the virtual commander of this same fleet, the man who had toiled during years and years to Korniioff’s fit it for the business of war. The emotion with of the which Korniloff heard the words addressed to him may be inferred from their mere purport, as well as from the spirit of resistance which he made bold to show on the following day, but it seems that, at the time, he spoke little. He could not say he thought well of this measure of desperation, and lie did not, he could not, reply that he would obey the command; but, on the other hand, he respected the anguish of a defeated commander, and indulged his chiefs bodily weariness by refraining, for the time, from words of dispute and remonstrance. Prince When first Prince Mentschikoff found himself in koff’s idea full retreat from the Alma, he conceived the idea of ing a stand attempting a stand on the left bank of the Katcha; Katcka. but although it would be an error to suppose that the spirit of the Eussian soldiery was crushed by the the en- trance of the road- stead. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 149 defeat it had suffered, it is not the less certain that c ^ p * the loss of officers killed and wounded in the battle The state was greater than could be well borne, and that, from this and other causes, the army was for the moment ™ pat- in a disorganised and helpless state. theTexecu- Prince Mentschikoff therefore dismissed the ideation of that plan. of making a stand on the Katcha, and imagined a p h ce plan which (supposing that the ground should prove Mentschi-^ fit for the purpose) was well adapted to the object of of taking enabling the army, though defeated and inferior in hig^os?- numbers, to try to cover Sebastopol. The Russian country' of Commander proposed to take up such a position in^ Bel * the country of the Belbec as would enable him to menace the left flank of the Allied army whilst en- gaged (as he assumed that it presently would be) in attacking the Star Fort, and at the same time allow him to communicate freely by his rear with the great road through Baktclii Serai to the interior of Russia. With this view, he now entrusted to Colonel deThein- Todleben the task of surveying the country on the given with morrow , and trying to find a ground upon which ^Cokmei it would be prudent for the army to take up a position. At ten o’clock at night, Korniloff was once more in Sebastopol. As there heard, the sound of the The firing at half-past one had come from the left of the the battle position on the Alma, had gradually rolled to the^pofand eastward, at half-past four had slackened, and then n s t ubse " ceased altogether. From that time until night, the sus P ense * hours were blank, bringing nothing for men to learn ; but it does not appear that the booming of the guns 150 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, or the suspense which came after raised any of Bearing that kind of stir or emotion which signs of such im- ifabitants port might be likely to create in a city devoted to period of e the arts of peace. The people in the place were suspense. so l s * nce the garrison, split into two by the Man- ed attack, of- war Harbour, and the deep ravine at its head, would be unable to concentrate upon any one en- dangered quarter the little strength that it had. In the opinion of Todleben, it was impossible that the No signs on the 2 Gth that the Allies would attack the next day. On the other hand, no tidings of Prince Mentschi- koff and the army. attack of the Allies could be repelled by even the most valiant defence. The 26th, it is true, passed away without showing that the Allies (who had this day seized Balaclava) were preparing an attack for the morrow; but, on the other hand, it brought no tidings of the evading army. “Of the Prince,” writes Korniloff on this day, “nothing is to be heard.” VII. Morning On the morning of the 27th, the garrison was 27th, the still without tidings of Prince Mentschikoff and his garrison 0 still with- army. “Thus,” so Todleben writes, “the defenders INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 209 “of Sebastopol liad no help that they could reckon C j^y P * “on. It has been seen that it was absolutely im- out tiding* “possible for them to repel the enemy with only the army, “force the garrison consisted of. So there remained Todie- “to them no alternative but that of seeking to die of thVde- v “gloriously at the post committed to their bravery.” position m Supposing it useful and fitting for a people, in g a ^g 0 ^ he the time of their peril, to strive to approach the^ere x . placed. Almighty by help of bishops and priests, the solemn- SoleirilUy ity enacted by the Church on the 27th of Sep- enacted J . *1 r on tlie tember was indeed opportune. It was not upon the morning issue of a battle, nor indeed upon things material, sept, at 1 that the fate of Sebastopol was hanging that day. It of defence, was hanging upon the resolve of three or four men in the enemy’s camp, who would be trying to govepf events by dint of thought and hard reason. There- fore, even amongst those Russians who could hardly make bold to expect the corporeal intervention of Heaven in the conflicts of mortals, there well might be some who trusted that at the prayer of the Or- thodox Church, the Lord would so far vouchsafe to chastise a schismatic, an impious enemy, as to cloud liis mind with surmises and reasonings, give him cleverness instead of wisdom, incline his heart to delay, and in short make him weak of counsel. It was along the lines of defence that the ceremony had been ordained to take place. At an early hour, the troops stood ranged in 27th is opt. order of battle, some battalions being in extended order, and forming a chain along the line of the Invasion of the Crimea . V. H 210 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C Liy P * ramparts, whilst other battalions were drawn up in ' columns of companies, and others again in columns of attack. Then the priests, with images,* gonfalons, and crosses, walked in procession along the lines, and performed divine service at each of the bastions, and the troops were sprinkled with holy water. “Let “the troops first be reminded of the Word of God,” said Korniloff, “and then I will impart to them the “word of the Czar.” impres- To pious, obedient Muscovites, the way in which duced) 0 Heaven had raised up a man to meet the occasion upmipious was th- e nature of miracle. Without having law* minds, by f u ] authority, Korniloff had suddenly come to be the the way in J 1 ^ which unquestioned ruler whom all reioiced to obey — Korniloff _ 1 „ . .. J J . , had been whom all, wherever he rode, were pursuing with to’ 1 meet ip blessings and cheers. By the seamen of the fleet, as sion? CCa " we saw, Korniloff had long been known, had long Enthusias- been beloved and trusted; but at this time there was tionto° glowing, in the hearts of the whole people, a sen- him * timent of enthusiastic devotion to the elected phief. Devotion Kone caught this feeling more warmly than that to him on ° J the part of small body of land-service men which Prince Ment- themenof^.^ fi a d left in the place. Abandoned by the the land service. Prince and his evading army, these men, it would seem, had come to be proud of the fate which left them to fight under an admiral, and alongside of mariners, in a cause thought too desperate to allow * It is a Russian writer and a Russian translator who gives me the word “images;” but he must refer only to the flat, or basso-relievo, re- presentations of sacred beings which are used by the Greek Church. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 211 of its being upheld by the strength of Prince Ment- schikoff’s army. Of a certainty, the fire and the thorough devoted- ness of Korniloff’s nature were the main sources of the power which he was thus exerting over the minds of men never bred to the sea. But, also, it was given him to seem what he was. Unless the por- traits deceive, his face was of classic mould; for although, near the eyes, there were signs of a blood deriving from the North, the rest of his features had that kind of beauty which belonged to the great Bonaparte in the time of his first Italian campaign, whilst yet his face remained lean. According to those who knew Korniloff, it was not only in his features that the wearing, consuming energy of the man was expressed, but cdso in an eager bend forward, which his ardour had rendered habitual. It chanced that he had ail accomplishment which de- lighted the soldiery. Like the Bedouins seen in the ranges of the Atlas, he was accustomed to gallop at speed either up or down heights so steep, and over ground so rugged, as to make the feat seem a wonder; and it charmed the people and the garrison, but most, the men of the land service, to see the chief flitting thus from one post of defence to another.* But, * To one who has never seen such feats before , it is extremely in- teresting and surprising to see what a horseman can do in a rugged, mountainous country. Certainly I had not the least conception of what was possible in that way until I saw what the Bedouins could do in the ranges of the Atlas. CHAP. LIV. Causes of the enthu- siasm which his presence created. 14 * 212 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C liv P * a ^ ove had eloquence of that peculiar kind which touches the heart of the soldier. At the When the religious ceremony had ended, Korniloff, the reiigi- arrayed in the brilliant uniform of an Adjutant- mony? e General,* and followed by a numerous Staff, rode ^deaiong a l° n & the lines*, and to every separate body of men audhar 8 ’ addressed some words of harangue. As might be aagued expected, the words of these brief speeches were the troops. n . . . . t . . from time to time varied, but each of them, it is said, had words to this effect: “The Czar hopes that “we shall not give up Sebastopol. Besides, we have “nowhere to retreat to. We have the sea behind, the “enemy in front. Prince Mentschikoff has deceived “our enemies, and got round them*, and when they “attack us, our army will fall upon their rear. “Remember then — believe in no retreat. Let the “bands forget to play the retreat! Let him be a “traitor who sounds the retreat! And if I myself “give the order for retreating, kill me with the “bayonet!” In his addresses to the men of the land service, he added words to this effect: “Your business “will be at first to receive the enemy with a well- directed fire of musketry*, and if they should try “to mount the batteries, receive them in the Russian “style. You well know the work — at the point of “the bayonet!” To the battalion of Captain Yinck, which con- tained many sailors who had served under him when * As is well known, it is customary in Russia to give army rank to men of distinction who are not by profession soldiers. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 213 lie was Captain of the Twelve Apostles, Korniloff ^y 1 *' said that he had long known them as gallant fellows, and that to such there was no need of much talk. Indeed, he in general spoke less to the sailors than to the men of the land service. He was more sure, it seems, of the steadiness of the sailors. The harangues which seem to touch soldiers do not often embody a new and lofty conception;* but they utter some thought which all can partake; and by merging each man’s love of self in the aggregate feeling of the regiment, the brigade, or the army, they make opinion set in with all the volume and fweight which can be given to it by a multitude of human souls when they bend their whole forces one way. Therefore, speeches to soldiers are not to be wholly judged of by weighing the thoughts they con- tain, but rather by watching to see how they work on the hearts of the men. Tried simply by this latter test, the harangues Effect pro- of Korniloff must be held to have had a great worth; Korntioff’s for witnesses of different callings, and observing what haran s ues - passed from different points of view, are not only agreed in speaking of the enthusiasm which flew from battalion to battalion along the whole line of the works, but also in connecting this outburst of * The grand apostrophe of Bonaparte at the foot of the Pyramids, when he said to his soldiery, 11 Forty centuries look down upon you ! ” was addressed to a body of troops — all children as it were of the great Revolution — who, in point of intellectual and imaginative power, were not at all of the same quality as the ordinary armies of Europe. 214 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LIV. The emo- tion with which Korniloff was re- garded. national sentiment with the eloquence they ascribe ‘to the chief. His zeal spread like flame. The minds of men were exalted; and although it is certain enough that the garrison had been grieved, if not angered, by the untimely evasion of the army,* the sense of abandonment, the sense of being men offered up, and left, as it were, for a sacrifice, was so far from making them sullen with their cause, that rather it gave them just pride — not unlike the pride of the martyr — 7 and filled them with admiring love of the chief whom Providence, as it seemed, had given them for their ruler. There was rapture, the hearers declare, in the sound of the bursting “Hur- u rahs!” which tracked his career through the lines. And this rapture, it seems, was scarce short of worship. In the minds of a religious and unlettered people, the ascendant of a mortal exerting his power for purposes judged to be good is more commonly traced to the special interference of Deity than to the original of the Divine scheme; and it would seem that the emotion with which the garrison looked up to their chief was much of the kind which first led people to say that the king set up to rule over them was king u by the grace of God.” Amongst those entitled to boast that they were with Korniloff at this time there are able and gifted men who know and respect the true import of words: yet, speaking * My Russian accounts do not tell me, in terms, of any such grief; but they enable me to infer it by recording the joy with which, at a later time, the reappearance of the army was hailed. INVASION OF TIIJEJ CRIMEA, 215 and writing now in cold blood, these witnesses say ^y 1 that every one at the time looked up to the chief as to a man “inspired.” Nay, they still hand it down, and declare that in those last days of September — the glorious days of his life — he was not as other men. VIII. Colonel de Todleben was too deeply versed inTodieben things material, too familiar with the rigid cal- believe culations of his engineering science, to be liable to^rfsTf the error of ascribing undue force to all this ex- the %*■**}: altation of spirit. He did not believe that any efforts defend the of the garrison, however heroic, could, at this time, against a make good the defence against a determined attack. * e a attack. Nor, again, was he caught by the hope that any- thing he could do within a brief compass of time would enable the sailors and landsmen then left in the place to resist a determined attack without the But there aid of the army, but, on the other hand, he was of for the a strong sanguine nature*, and there was room for sight* the hope that those same works which were needed Jfon^for^ for the merely desperate purpose of enabling the garrison to sell their lives dear, might also do a more mi s ht _ 1 SHclKG til0 wholesome service, by shaking the enemy’s counsels, enemy’s counsels. * “Yet neither the exaltation of the troops, nor their resolve to fight “to the last extremity, could have saved Sebastopol, if the enemy had “ attacked it immediately after his passage of the Tchernaya,” — Tod- leben, vol. I. p. 257. 216 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C ^yf‘ In either aspect, the course to he taken was the Todieben same; and Todleben saw plain as day what had to saw plain what had be done. to be done. k e f ore providing for the defence of the steadfast- Star Fort, so also in this emergency, he looked stead- MmthQ 0 fastly to the condition of time; and, conceiving that of time? 11 ^ ie might make their attack at once, he took care that his endeavours to push forward the works towards that ulterior degree of perfection at which he was aiming should he always subordinated to the object of preparing them for the event of an assault taking place on the very morrow. Thus, for in- stance, he said it was better to be ready in time with the guns of a battery ill covered, or even not covered at all, than to have, at the moment of the assault, a work designed for great things, but marked by the fatal defect of not as yet being armed. The other In this necessity of looking to the question of condition # J ox with time there was nothing novel; but another of the had to conditions with which the garrison had to deal, was one which may be called unexampled, and of so startling a kind that no common man would have been likely even to perceive it, still less to found upon it a course of action. Korniloff and Todleben were not only able to see and understand this con- dition, but to accept it with all its consequences, ^cy^had They comprehended that, the fleet being prisoned piaced^at i n the roadstead, and Sebastopol — the sole hope and KorniiofFs shelter of that same fleet — being in the extreme of ail the 1 danger on the land side, there had come an emer- INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 217 gency in which, without lawful authority, hut for the C j®y P * good of their country, and even for the good of theTe^TceT fleet itself, they — an Admiral absent from his as- fleet. 8 signed station without leave, and a volunteer Colonel of Sappers — could take upon themselves to break up and dismantle the whole Black Sea fleet, and ap- ply its vast warlike treasures to the purpose of the land defences. As soon as they came to see this — they did not take in the whole truth quite at once, but they did by rapid degrees — they had upon them the full burthen of men to whom much is given. They had grace to see that because they could, there- fore they must. Todleben judged that especially he ought to labour towards making the greatest and most rapid use of this mighty resource; that he ought not to suffer the land defences to want for any one thing which could be supplied by stripping the fleet; and that, in particular, he must be sure to use to the utmost the great guns of the ships. Governed, as he says, by his perception of these two conditions — stress of time on the one hand, and, on the other, the command that he had of all the ships’ guns and munitions — he went on to frame his plan for streng- thening the lines of defence, and, with that view, re- Todie- solved “ to choose a position as little extended and foTstren^ “as near to the town as the nature of the ground J£| n d “ e “would allow, and to arm its principal points with fences * “a formidable artillery; to connect these points one “with the other by trenches to be defended by mus- ketry; to establish there separate batteries, each 218 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. Lit. The object which Todleben kept in view. The way in which his works were meant to produce their result. The one word which, Todleben used to say, ex- pressed his whole purpose. “ armed with some pieces of cannon, and in this way ’“to concentrate upon all the approaches of the town “a powerful front and flank fire of artillery and “musketry, endeavouring to sweep with as much fire “as possible all the bendings of the broken ground “by which the enemy might approach.”* The object of the works to be undertaken on this general plan was to provide against the event of an assault at whatever part of the line it might be at- tempted;** but the way in which they were to pro- duce their result was to be by enabling the garrison to meet every column of assault with a slaughtering fire. Whilst some thought much of the obstacles to assailants which the engineers’ art can contrive, and others, remembering Suwarroff, spoke rather in praise of the bayonet, Todleben was always steadfast in declaring that against an assault of the Allies the garrison had but one defence. According to him, that one defence lay in the volume of shot which the garrison might be able to pour into bodies of troops coming on within grape-shot range; and one single word, he used to say, at the time, was enough to describe his main purpose — “ Mitrail ! ” *** The round- * Todleben, vol. i. p. 259. ** Ibid. vol. i. p. 261. *** Originally, it seems, “mitrail,” or, a3 the French spell it, “mi- “ traille,” meant “canister” shot specially ; and even now, perhaps, in strictness, it describes only grape and canister; but in common parlance — and it was so that Todleben used it — the expression includes all the components of that hail which drives through the air when rifle or musket balls are flying along with grape and canister. It must be ac- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 219 sliot, the shell, the bayonet, and the rifleman’s far- c T ^y P * ranging bullet had each, he acknowledged, its use;" and now too, if ever in war, the spade and the pick- axe were needed; but still, in his mind, these things were chiefly of worth, because they either tended to avert the assault, or else, more or less, were auxiliary and conducing to his one cherished purpose — to his one cherished purpose of meeting the assaulting column, whatever the time, whatever the point of attack, with a pelting blast of mitrail. This was one of the aspects of the conflict in The other which the garrison were engaging; but, consistently thlTcon- witli full adherence to Colonel de Todleben’s plan fllct ‘ of defence, and even, indeed, resulting from it, there was open to the defenders of Sebastopol another and a more hopeful view of the future. That which can Pro t b h abil “ kill may also deter; and it was possible, as has been the sight part said already, that the very sight of preparations paragons for resistance might not only bring the enemy to an r ee 6S1St " adopt counter-measures for neutralising those same^ b ^ etllQ preparations, but might even perhaps for that purpose incline him to delay his attack. In other words, itattaek. was hoped that the enemy might be induced to re- frain from taking Sebastopol, with a view to besiege knowledged that the word thus chosen by Todleben, as sufficing to denote his main purpose, is one which (in French) has great power; for, besides that its mere sound helps somewhat to make it expressive of destructiveness , this word has the quality of indicating that the shot of which it speaks is in considerable volume , and is — not in the mere inert state of ammunition , but — cutting through the air , or actually striking. 220 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C liv P * ^ instead. The problem, as stated by one who toiled at Korniloffs side,* was, to maintain a line of four miles against powerful armies with only a small body of sailors and militiamen; whilst the way to attempt its solution was by making the defences so formid- able as to induce the enemy to forsake the idea of an immediate assault, and proceed to a regular siege, in either But whether men looked to the very end, and aspect, the ^ J 1 work to the actual crash of mitrail , or whether they rather was the drew hope from the pressure which might be put samc * upon the mind of an English or a French engineer by their visible means of slaughter, the work to be Se work ^ one was ^ ie same. Besides the task of connecting to be done, the still isolated works by intermediate entrench- ments, it was necessary to deepen the ditches, to thicken and raise the parapets, to erect traverses, and to strengthen the ground by a great number of new batteries. But also, as we saw — if only the enemy should give enough time — the armament of the works along the whole line of defence was to be changed, and the lighter artillery replaced by heavy guns brought from the ships. The preparations for effecting this change of armament could be carried on up to almost the last moment without being per- ceptible to the enemy; and, in the mean time — though it does not, I think, appear that such a result The small was designed — the modest calibre of the guns which the guns the garrison showed for the moment, was a snare wereWt which might cheat the Allies ; for perhaps they would * Gendre, “Mat^riaux pour scrvir,” chap. hi. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 221 argue and say, “If we were to storm tlie place to- ™y P * “day or to-morrow, our columns would be exposed for the “to heavy loss from the fire of artillery*, and yet that 6 “same artillery is so light that we should be able to ^mislead “silence it easily with the very much heavier metal the Allies * “which we have close at hand on board ship*, we “will therefore land our siege-trains.” Colonel de Todleben determined that the works Todie- should go on simultaneously along all the weak parts of adjust^ of the line*, and each day’s toil was to be so adjusted (a difficult problem this seems) that it would not only His way effect a due approach towards the perfecting, after a time, of the work which had to be executed, butP roxi “ ate 7 s 7 as well as would also bring the pending improvements to such to more a state every night, that, in the -event of an attack objects, the next morning, they would still subserve the de- fence*, so that, if the enemy should grant a long re- spite, or if, on the other hand, he should assault in three days, or in two, or on the very morrow, the works — whether grown to full strength, or assailed whilst yet frail and weak — might in each case do all the good which the limit of time would allow, IX. And now, by the ardour and consuming energy in of Korniloff and Todleben, all things and all people nien and 1 r things within the place or the roadstead were turned to the brought to business of the defences. Even in this time of ex- the bus P p n tremity, the men of the desk were surely astonished defences! 0 222 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LTV. The ex- ceeding alacrity with which the work was carried on. by the boldness with which Korniloff laid open to ‘the orders of Colonel de Todleben all the engines, stores, and materials to be found in the arsenal and the dockyards. Waggons, carts, phaetons, and carriages of all kinds, belonging to private citizens, were employed in drawing up loads to the batteries. In terms which would seem at first sight to be meant for our own English sailors, eye-witnesses speak of the merry, the ceaseless energy with which (in ways strange to landsmen) the crews of the ships dragged up great guns to the front. Of the citizens, some formed themselves into volunteer corps, undertaking to do duty as guards and patrols in relief of the soldiers. Others toiled at the works. The women, the children helped. Men just let loose from prison — they had been loosed, as I gather, on account of the desperate nature of the emergency — came and entreated that they might be suffered to take part in the common labour. The people toiled cheerily, and indeed, as it seems, with a most joyful animation, each labourer # working intent, as though he saw plainly the object which all were seeking in common, and also understood, without doubting, what he him- self had to do. There was no ceasing. The people worked by relays. From dawn to sunset, between five and six thousand men were busy along the lines of defence. By help of torches, other men, in less numbers, carried on the work through the night. Before this, of course, the people of the place and the garrison had shared with their fellow-country- INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 223 men the beliefs and the affections which are the c **y P * foundation of patriotism; and they had, most of them, obeyed some orders connected with the service of the State; but now, for the first time, they knew the The sacred emotion which kindles in the bosoms of men^wknew when, coming to toil or to fight for the land of their birth, they come of tlieir free accord.* Long held£°“®°^ n in subjection to a military system which had never free^wm ceased to be fiercely and cruelly obtruded upon them fence of until there came this time of danger, they now had to country, face by themselves a task thought too hard for the army. Therefore, if they could not claim the birthright be- longing to men in free States, at least they had now cast upon them the first and the proudest of the burthens which freedom imposes, for they stood de- fending their country against foreign invasion. They were worthy of their charge. He who guided their energies at the time, and afterwards recorded in history the things they had done, breaks loose from his engagement to adhere to dry soldierly language, and declares that their devotion to their country’s Their de- cause was sublime in its strength. Yet this zeal, all the 1 cause, the time, was under wise rule, and taking its direc- * Of course , the soldiers and sailors composing the garrison (and practically also, I imagine, the dockyard labourers) were acting under orders ; but the accounts make it evident that, taking the whole move- ment together — the movement of soldiers, sailors working on shore, other labourers, private citizens, women, and children — it was, in a sense, spontaneous ; and that the hand of authority, though used to give direction to the energies of the people , was not needed for the purpose of compulsion. 224 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. °liv P ‘ tion > some governed force in mechanics, from “the will and the mind of one man. Tod- Colonel deTodleben, it would seem, was instinc- leben’s . . 7 habit of tively conscious that the power he was wielding de- Msp^ pended very much upon his actual presence. He sence fo^ never wrote. He did not even read the communica- the trans^ ti° ns which poured in upon him; for, believing that business 1 saw his way clear without the help of others, and being, it would seem, accustomed as an engineer to let his thoughts take the form of estimates and reckonings, he made, as it were, a computation, by which he assured himself that the probability of there being superlatively important matters in the papers before him was not great enough to compen- sate the distraction and the expenditure of most precious time which must be occasioned by reading them, and that, therefore, if he were to leave them unheeded, he would avoid a waste of power.* It was with his own eyes, with his own voice, that he defended Sebastopol. At a later period, when the besiegers could rest their field-glasses on the gabions which covered their batteries, they grew to be fami- liar with the aspect of an officer on a black charger, who was constantly seen in the Russian lines of de- fence; and they more than once pointed their * When the conflict was over, the mass of unopened letters and papers which had accumulated was examined. It then appeared that there were three or four papers which, at the time they were sent, might have been read with advantage , but that the perusal of the rest would have done no good. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 225 ordnance with design to extinguish that untiring ac- ^iv! * tivity of one man, which (even from across the space which divided besieged and besiegers) they could perceive to be of value to the garrison. In that ceaselessly diligent horseman, as we now know, they saAv the great volunteer whose brain was defending Sebastopol * X. Although the spirit which Korniloff roused in Korniioff others was one which forbade dismal fears, he him- share, the self, it would seem, in secret was living almost ness without hope. The encouragement he had given hadkn- 6 the garrison, by speaking of aid from the army, was t0 not warranted by any tidings which had reached him. The whole of the previous day, the 26th, had passed away, as we saw, without bringing him a word of account concerning Prince Mentschikoff*, and on the 27th it was the same. “Of the Prince,” OV 116 he wrote on that night, “nothing is still to be heard.” on the day 4 before What rumour had told him before, and told him there were only too truly, was, that the Russian field army had “f Prince 8 retreated to Baktchi Serai, and the distance thus in- ko^r orhVs terposed was too great to allow of his believing that army * * It was during General de Todleben’s visit to England in 1864, and in the course of conversation which passed between him and some of his former adversaries, that he was ascertained to be the officer on the black charger, whose movements had often been watched from the trenches. One of the shots specially directed against him struck the ear of his horse. Invasion of ihe Crimea, 7 . • 15 226 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C liv P an y assau ^ on Sebastopol, which the Allies might at ~~once undertake, would be checked or embarrassed by a flank attack from Prince Mentschikoff. In his Korniioffs privacy Korniloff wrote: “The troops are longing flections “for adventurous deeds, but all this can only in- position^n U crease ^ ie carnage without preventing the enemy garriscm 6 U f rom gaining access.”* And again: “We strengthen placed U ° ur position as much as possible. What, however, “but defeat can be expected when we have only a “handful of troops, scattered on an immense extent; “and what are fortifications which we have thrown “up in the course of a fortnight? If I had foreseen “this, I would never have consented to sink the “ships, but would rather have stood out to sea and “fought the enemy, though they were double our “numbers. . . . The catastrophe may be enacted to- “ morrow. Even fighting to the last man will “hardly advance our cause. The ships and all the The day, “vessels are ready for sinking. Let the enemy have the 27 th/ “their wrecks. The evening passed in gloomy without “thoughts about the future of Russia.”** Still, how- taJkon ever, the Allies were giving respite. In the course theAmes f °f ^ ie ^ a 7 ^ e y were seen on Chersonese, but they undertook no attack. * Private Journal, 14th (26th) September.^' ** Private Journal, 15th (27th) September, written at the close of the day when the religious ceremony and the harangues to the troops took place. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 227 CHAP. LIV. XI. When the morning of the 28th had dawned, itOntho „ it i® .m. -it. 28th, there still appeared that the Allies were undertaking nowasstm instant attack. They were afterwards seen recon- by the noitring the defences of Sebastopol;* but for that Allies; day at least — had the prayers of the Church then been heard? — the place was to be spared from assault. And, on this 28th of September, the deserted and there 7 1 7 was a garrison of Sebastopol got tidings at last from the eommuni- army. Prince MentschikofF had suffered himself to last from remain so strangely unacquainted with the move- Mentschi- ments of the Allies , that he supposed them to be koff ‘ still in that mountain region to the east of Sebas- imagining ^ tli 0 Allies topol through which they had made their flank to be stm march, and the officer instructed to carry his mes- mountain- sages to the garrison made his way from Head- east^fse^ quarters at night, and on foot; thus passing, as if by koff had sent his * General de Todleben remarks that, in his judgment, this recon- messenger 7 on foot naissance of the Allies was not carried close enough to enable them to an( ^ by come to sound conclusions ; but the General is mistaken in supposing, night, as he apparently does , that the reconnaissance of the 28th was the one which led the Allies to delay their attack. The reconnaissance on which the Allies founded their decision had taken place the day before, the 27th, but it seems to have been completed without exciting the observation of the garrison. Of course , it was incumbent on the Allies to be every day striving to improve their knowledge of the Sebastopol defences; but the reconnaissances which they effected after the 27th were not the ones which supplied them with the basis of their main decision. 15 * 228 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIV. The tid- ings brought by Lieu- tenant Stetzenko the mes- senger. Korniloff conceals part of the intelli- gence brought by Lieu- tenant Stetzenko; but makes known to the troops the fact of his being once more in com- munica- tion with the army, and the fact that the army had been rein- forced. stealth, through a country which had long been quite free from the invaders. Lieutenant Stetzenko was the officer intrusted with this mission; and (meeting, of course, no ob- struction from the Allies, who lay far away from the scene of his night journey) he reached his de- stination the following morning. He had been ordered to u inquire about the state of Sebastopol;”* but he also brought news that Prince Mentschikoff had been reinforced by the arrival of 10,000 men under Khomoutoff,** and was hourly expecting from the north fresh accessions of strength. The messenger also imparted to Korniloff the way in which Prince Mentschikoff intended to em- ploy the army thus augmented in numbers. That last — the chilling part of the communication — Korniloff kept secret; but the fact that he was once more in communication with the army, and that the army was heavily reinforced, he did not fail to make known; and, to do this the more impressively, he took Lieutenant Stetzenko with him along the lines, presenting him to his people as the messenger who had come with the glad tidings from the army, and even, it seems, giving out (though tins, as will be presently seen, was the opposite of what had been really determined upon by the Commander-in-Chief) * u Materiaux pour servir,” chap. III. ** The force which was in the south-east of the Crimea at the time of the landing (see ante, chap, li.) with the exception of the Moscow regiment, which was marched to the Alma in time for the battle. INVASION OF TUB CRIMEA. 229 that, according to the intelligence thus brought from C I H l y P * Headquarters, the Prince would immediately attack ho also the Allies. Korniloff knew that this could not be the present contrary intention of the Prince: for he had learnt from Lieu- p.J ! 10 ia ' 7 ^ . telligenco tenant Stetzenko that what Prince Mentschikoff had ho had received) resolved to do was to take up a position on the that the Belbec*, and this was a resolve which, so long as it would should last, would establish a state of mere peace attack Uh between the Russian field army and the invaders 0 f tho Alhes * Prince the Crimea; for those invaders were now cut off by MentscIli _ long , difficult of the koff’s real marches from the country determill _ Belbec; and, consistently with the detention of the ation > as 7 J _ communi- Russian field army in so distant a region, it would cated by not be possible for Prince Mentschikoff to take any ant stetz- part in the impending strife at Sebastopol. to uke^p All this Korniloff understood but too well; and on the 1011 it seemed to him that, since the Russian army was Belbec * to establish itself in the now peaceful region of the^J^f as Belbec, it was fitting for the deserted garrison to j^Q d turn for succour to Heaven. On the evening of the last > ° Prince very day when he had cheered the troops by pre- Mentschi- senting Stetzenko, and holding out promise of abeexciud- diversion from Prince Mentschikoff, he set down in seff and" the gloomy account which he kept in secret, that the Prince “was to take up his position along the a11 illter ; “heights of the Belbec between Otarkia and School! ;” the strife, and then, as though writing in mournful irony, heK°rnii°ff immediately adds: “Meanwhile, the enemy is ad- stood this, “vancing on Sebastopol. . . . There are three or 230 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C ljv P ’ “four ways by which a passage may be easily His pri- “effected; for there are but few defenders — 10,000 flections, “sailors and 5000 reserve soldiers.* May the Lord “bless and fortify us!” XII. On the The next day, the 29th, the Allies were seen to Allies 1116 b e again reconnoitring, but again refraining from an refraining attack; and the people of Sebastopol as well as the attack 11 ga^ison were now beginning to draw encourage- Encour- mer d from a new and a wholesome source. They agement were cheered by the mere sight of the wonders by the which had been wrought by the work of their own garrison . n and people hands. Jb or a time, ot course, there had been a town from great deal of the labour — as, for instance, the mak- tacie P of" l n g platforms — which went on in workyards , in factories , on board ships, in numbers of places, not achieved, reached by the public gaze; but the immense con- tributions towards the general scheme, which had thus been going on separately, and, as it were, out of sight, were now fast added, and added to the lines of defence; and, upon the whole, the result was so vast as to be astonishing to most people, and, in the eyes of some, almost magical; for, except the engineers, who could reckon these things by arith- metic, there were few who imagined beforehand the greatness of the works which might be done in three * It may be remembered that the troops described by the Russians as “ reserve” soldiers are those which I have called “militia.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 231 days by several thousands of men working always C L*y P * by day and by night, and under guidance so skilful that no man’s toil was in vain. ► • Of the changes which were wrought in the de- Changes . . wrought fences during the interval between the evening of in the de- the 25th and the evening of the 29th September, a tween the rapid indication is all I am willing to give. Along the 25th ° f the line between the Artillery Bay and the Central Bastion nothing was done-, but from the Central Se P t - Bastion to the Flagstaff Battery, and thence down to the bottom of the great ravine, and thence up to the Redan, and from the Redan to the Malakoff, and from the Malakoff to the Little Redan, and thence home to the Battery of the Point, the defences re- ceived great accessions of strength. The works al- ready constructed were extended and improved; those remaining unfinished were completed; the long and hitherto empty spaces which divided them one from the other were studded, in some places, with power- ful batteries, in others, were seamed with entrench- ments intended for covering infantry; and already, the armament of almost the whole line of defence was beginning to undergo change; for the lighter artillery, which had been lying as a snare for the Allies (by making them imagine themselves the stronger in cannonading power), was now giving place to great guns brought up from the ships. It was at the Malakoff, and the ground which flanked it on either side, that the greatest wonders were wrought. Admiral Istomin, who there com- 232 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIV. manded, knew that the post was vital; but also he "had been frankly told by Korniloff that it was weak. He had toiled with a ceaseless care, looking close into things of detail with his own eyes, and guiding the labours of the multitude which had swarmed night and day round the work. That simple white tower, the MalakofF, now famous in history, was fast losing its height from the ground , for already the summit of the knoll where it stood had been so changed in shape by the industry of the last three days, that it now closed high up round the centre or waist of the building, and had not only begun to take the form of a glacis annexed to the original work, but was also the site of a new semicircular battery, which covered the front of the tower. This last battery was connected by entrenchments with the other new works thrown up on both flanks of the Maiakoff. Nor was it only along the line of the works that Korniloff and Todleben were expending their care. Ships of war were so placed in the creeks that their fire could search the ravines which descended into Sebastopol. To ease the passage between the town and the Karabel suburb a floating bridge was con- structed. Between all the chief posts along the line of defence there was arranged a perfected system of communicating by signal. Provision was made for the care of men wounded. So far as can be gathered from the narratives of those who took part in these labours, nothing was forgotten, nothing neglected. INVASION OF TIIF CRIMEA. 233 Hardly four days had passed since the sight of the Eng- ( ^y P ’ lisli on the Mackenzie Heights disclosed to men gazing from the windows of the Naval Library the peril then suddenly coming upon the south side of Sebastopol; but, The geno- as tar as was possible m so scant a time, the gar- which had rison had now been put in a condition for using to ^edf" the very utmost their means of slaughter; and, on the night of this 29th of September, the great En- gineer, who had yearned to be in readiness along the whole line with his pitiless storm of mitrail, might almost lie down to his rest with the contentment of one who has made his purpose sure. XIII. But, so far as concerned the power of the small Todie- • •a , -i ben’s exer- garnson then occupying Sebastopol to withstand ationshad, determined assault, Colonel Todleben’s exertions had, only pro- after all, only provided that the defenders should be ^the that enabled to sell their lives dear. The hasty labours Dassault bestowed on the lines of defence had not, of course, tllc s arri ' changed an open town into a “fortified place.” What beableto had been achieved was this : there had been formed lives dear, “an entrenched position,” — an entrenched position, He had x x covered extending four miles along the arc of a half-circle, Sebasto- and covering Sebastopol on its land side. entrench- 1 Now, although it is true that a fortified place tion.° S1 ~ may be defended for a time by a garrison vastly in- ferior in numbers to the besieging force, a merely 234 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. ( liv P ‘ en trenclied position, and especially an entrenched To defend position four miles in extent, has no such attribute; entrench- and if it is resolutely attacked by a powerful army, tion there nothing less than another army can defend it. Deriv- Smy bean * n £ support from its entrenchments, the defending force need not, of course, be equal in numbers to its assailants, but it must be really an army, and an army so strong as to be able to sustain a pitched battle with forces attacking it on its prepared ground. To the garrison of Sebastopol, at the time I am This con- speaking of, this, the main condition of a hopeful wanting, defence, was wanting; for their body of 16,000 foot, composed for the most part of sailors unused to the land service, could hardly in any sense be called an army, much less an army competent to join battle with the invaders upon a line four miles in extent. It is true that, within a day’s march, there was a Russian army, and one, too, which in point of num- bers could hardly be thought too weak for the ex- igency; but, nine days before, this army had under- gone a defeat, and its commander was persistently withholding it from the scene of the expected con- flict. In this point of view, the very success with which the garrison had busied itself was calculated to become an embarrassment to Prince Mentschikoff when apprised of what had been done; for now that Sebastopol was covered by an entrenched position, it might seem hardly tolerable that the troops required to defend it should be refused by a general who was INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 235 lying a few miles off with a disposable army of be- c T ^y P ‘ tween 30,000 and 40,000 men. The growing strength of the works made it less and less easy to urge that the task of concurring with the garrison in Yet the defending the place was one too desperate to be p J{f c c e lung undertaken by the field army. Be that as it may, to his de- the Prince still clung to his design of withholding withhoid- from Sebastopol the succours required for defend- iour. UC ing it. On this 29th of September, nothing was heard of ^hSept., the army until the evening. Then there came a de- nothi , n ^ , J o . was heard spatch from Headquarters to Korniloff, announcing of nie^ that the advanced-guard of the field army, under the the even- command of General Jabrokritsky, would be on the ing ’ North Side the next morning: but the rest of the£ ur P ortof note went to show that Prince Mentschikoff was per- munica- • • . -!• i iTii* -ipp i tion then sisting m his resolve to hold his army aloot from the received defence of Sebastopol; for it directed that the heavy i2fff ori11 baggage of the army (which had been left in the town when Prince Mentschikoff undertook his flank march) should now be transported to the North Side. The measure was one which could only be accounted The i f fe / , ‘ J ence to be for by supposing — a painful hypothesis for the gar- drawn rison to have to adopt — that the separation of the field army from Sebastopol was now meant to be lasting. 236 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LIV. Morning of the 30th. The Allies still ab- staining from the attack. The ad- vanced- guard of the Rus- sian army appearing on the North Side, spread great joy in Sebas- topol. But, at the time, this ioy was ill founded. Prince Mentschi- koff in per- XIV. When morning broke on the 30th of September, it showed that the Allies were still abstaining from any attack. This was the sixth of the days which had passed since Prince Mentschikoff s army had been withdrawn from Sebastopol. In the course of the day the advanced-guard of the Russian army, commanded by General Jabrok- ritsky, appeared on the North Side; and the sight of his troopers imparted great joy to the garrison and inhabitants of Sebastopol, by causing them to imagine that the field army was returning at last to share in the perils and the glory of striving to de- fend the place. But this joy at the time was ill founded; for although some of Mentschikoffs troops had thus come once more within sight of Sebastopol, and could freely communicate with the town by cross- ing the ferry, their presence on the north of the roadstead was still far from really meaning that Prince Mentschikoff had resumed active warfare. Un- less these newly-seen troops should be suffered to cross the water — and the prospect of such a move- ment seemed to be shut out by the order for trans- ferring the army’s heavy baggage from the South to the North Side — there would still be long, difficult marches to divide them from the enemy. In the course of the day, Prince Mentschikoff in person came down from the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, but did not pass over the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 237 water. Supposing liim still determined to withhold c I 1 j [y 1> * all succour from Sebastopol, it was natural for him son came to avoid the pain and embarrassment of going into the North the midst of a garrison which he meant to leave to ^ e ^ 0 b t ut its fate. He rested in the Severnaya at that North ^°^ b ° a ^? r Side Lodge which he had adjoining the “Number topoi. Four” Battery. There, he received the devoted Ad- His inter- • . , , , view with miral who , since the two men last saw each other, Korniiotr. had been forced by his love of country to usurp the command of Sebastopol. Impliedly, if not in positive or generous terms, His way Prince Mentschikoff gave assent to the arrangements thcTar^ 1 ^ which had created, in his absence, a kind of dictator- J^ents ship; for he treated it as quite natural that Korniloff should have been raised to the supreme authority. ^the*^ With respect to the question of succouring Sebas- supreme^ topoi by means of the field army, Prince Mentschikoff Hig disclosed the intentions he had formed. After com-tionof plaining of the weakness of his army, and declaring ing the his belief that the enemy was in great strength, he aloof, and intimated that he was about to make another move- g^sto- ment, and caused Korniloff to understand that he, ^ 1 n t ^ e 1 . ts the Prince, meant to leave Sebastopol to its own re- sources * sources. * Korniloff remonstrated, and said: “If that takes Korniloff ’ s ’ remon- strance. * “The Prince complains very much of the weakness of his troops, “and supposes the enemy to be very strong; he is about to make an- “ other movement, and to leave Sebastopol to its own resources.” — Korniloff’s Private Journal, written on the evening of the day when the interview with Mentschikoff took place. 238 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. LIV. Prince Mentschi- koff un- dertakes to sum- mon a council of war. “place, then farewell to Sebastopol! If the Allies “decide on some daring action, they will crush us.”* Prince Mentschikoff then said that he would summon a council of war. XY. As propounded by Prince Mentschikoff himself before he undertook it, his flank march was at least a well-promising measure-, for he announced it as an expedient for enabling him to act with advantage against the flank of the invaders; but the plan he professed to have formed bore little enough of resem- blance to the one which he really adopted; and the proposition which has to be demonstrated by him who would defend the Russian Commander is nothing less than that the Prince was not only warranted in abandoning Sebastopol, with all its brave garrison of sailors, but also in standing aloof from the war for days and days together without disturbing, without threatening, nay, even without seeing, the invaders, or learning where they were posted. With apparently a friendly desire to give all the shelter he could, General de Todleben has brought his great name to the aid of the Russian Commander. * He probably added (though this he does not expressly say) words equivalent to those which he inserted in his journal as words of private reflection: “To hold Sebastopol with troops is very possible; nay, it is “possible even to hold out long; but without troops — that alters the “case!” — Korniloff’s Private Journal. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 239 After speaking of the painful condition to which c *^. p - the army would be reduced by the loss of its com- rodie- munications with the interior of Russia, and showing piTnation that, even with the aid of the army, the endeavours M e P ^cht to defend Sebastopol at this time against an attack of by the Allies would be likely to fail, General de action. Todleben says: u Having well weighed all these cir- cumstances, Prince Mentschikoff, convinced that his “army had not it in its power to save Sebastopol if “the enemy should direct an attack against that “town, judged that it was better to take the most “effectual measures, and employ the most energetic “efforts, for the defence of the peninsula of the “Crimea.”* But surely, for the purposes of the war, inquiry as the whole worth of the Crimea lay centred in the Nudity, fact that it included the mighty fortress which sheltered the Black Sea fleet; and, for the General to let Sebastopol fall that he might husband his means for the defence of the peninsula, would have been, as it were, to stand by acquiescing whilst the heart was torn out, with a view to keep the strength needed for defending the rest of the body. And again, when the all but hopelessness of an * Todleben, vol. i. p. 242. The passage in the text is immediately followed by this one : “ Nevertheless he still preserved the hope that , if “ the irresolution of the Allies and the desperate courage of our sailors “should make it possible to keep the enemy in check before Sebastopol “for some time, the army, after receiving reinforcements, might be “able to stop the ulterior successes of the Allies.” General de Todle- ben’s apology for Prince MentschikotFs flank march will be found at length in the Appendix to vol. vi. 240 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIV. endeavour to defend Sebastopol is assigned as tlie ^justification for the withdrawal of the troops, it is hard to see why some 20,000 brave seamen, with- drawn from their natural element to do the work of land forces, should have been left to meet their fate in a conflict which was thought to be one too desper- ate to allow of its being undertaken or even shared in by the army under Prince Mentschikoff. Apparently, the soundest defence of Prince Men- tschik off’s plan of a flank march was the one which he himself offered when he assured Korniloff that the adoption of it would enable him to operate formid- ably upon the flank and rear of the enemy*, and the omission to execute that, the vital part of the undertaking, is the thing that has to be justified. When there is no hope of being able to defend a place for such a time as may allow of the siege being raised by forces coming to its relief, the custom of even the most warlike nations permits and favours surrender; but for a general, with a field army 30,000 strong, to leave in the fortress some 25,000 brave men, who understand that they are to defend the place to extremity — to assure them that they will have the active support of the field army, which will be assailing the besiegers in flank and in rear - — to go out by night from the south of the fortress when the enemy is approaching it by the north — to move away to a distance of some eighteen miles from the fortress and nearly as much from the enemy * — to remain in that state of seclusion for days and INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 241 days together, without even knowing or labouring to know where the enemy might be, and in this way - to break from the promise which engaged him to aid the defence by pressing upon the enemy in the open field , — this seems to be a course of action which, though it ma‘y be capable of explanation on grounds connected with the state of the army or its want of supplies,* is not to be excused in all its stages by saying that, in the belief of the general who adopted it, the aid of the army which he thus kept aloof would have failed to make good the de- fence against a determined attack. Where some 25.000 men stand to defend a place to extremity, the desperate character of the service entrusted to them is, even at first sight, an astonishing reason to give for depriving them of the aid of a field army 30.000 strong, and withdrawing it from the scene of danger to a place of peaceful seclusion; but a closer look makes the reason seem still more unfitting. Far from being one of those places in which a few brave defenders can do as well as many, Sebastopol was a fortress with miles of ground to be guarded, and the very thing needed for a hopeful defence of the place was the army which Prince Mentschikoff with- drew. It is true that from without, even better, per- haps, than from within, he might have brought the * Todleben , in the place where' he says that the main body of the army remained on the Katcha until the 28th, adds that it was there “awaiting the supplies which were to reach it from Simpheropol” (vol. I. p. 245). Invasion of the Crimea. V. CHAP. LIV. 16 242 INVASION OF TIIE CHIME A. CHAP. LIV. Surmise tending to account for Prince Mentschi- koff’s con- duct. power of that army to bear upon the defence, but “down to this time, he gave no aid to the garrison in either one way or the other. It would be difficult to excuse Prince Ment- schikofFs seclusion by alleging his want of sup- plies;* but although I am without the knowledge which would warrant me in speaking with certainty, I can hazard a surmise which would account, in some measure, for the Prince’s abstention. Prom the first, the Pussian army in the Crimea had been scantily provided with skilled officers in the higher grades;** and when it happened on the day of the Alma that out of the number who were competent a large proportion was killed or disabled, and that of the officers of rank not thus stricken down some at least were in great measure shorn of their due authority by the comments and the blame and the recriminations which too often follow defeat, it resulted that, for the time, the army was much out of gear*** — nay, was hardly, I think, in a state to be manoeuvred in sight of the enemy, still less to be brought into action; and although the full stress of this want of officers was perhaps so imperfectly * Because there was an accumulation of stores at Simpheropol as well as at Sebastopol (Todleben, p. 148); and there did not occur any incident of war or of weather which could have frustrated the arrange- ments necessary for supplying the army. *'* Amongst the other wants of this kind there was that of a sufficing Headquarters Staff. *** It may be observed that up to this point in the sentence I speak with certainty. I do so on good authority. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 243 felt by Prince Mentschikoff, whilst still lie remained in Sebastopol, that he thought lie could safely pro-" mise to operate with effect upon the flank and rear of the Allies, yet what seems probable is, that the discovery of the weakness of his army in point of officers was afterwards so cogently forced upon the Prince by the incidents of the march (as, for in- stance, by the failure of the manoeuvre entrusted to Kiriakoff, no less than by the sudden encounter with the English at Mackenzie’s Farm) as to make him think it a duty to withhold his army, for a time, from the sight of the enemy’s outposts. At all events, there is no sound reason for believing that the spirit of the soldiery drooped*, and unless my surmise be ill based, it was nothing but the want of commanders which hampered, for a time, the mechanism of the army, and made the Prince shrink from the hazard of bringing it again into conflict before its defects were repaired. * * I have already intimated that this explanation of Prince Mentsehi- kofFs conduct is not the one put forward in print by General Todleben {ante, p. 239); but it does not follow that the General would disapprove it , though reasons of a personal kind might naturally enough prevent him from assigning the want of competent officers as the cause of Prince Mentschikoff’s inaction. General Todleben, however, does not, I think , say anything which would contravene the explanation above suggested. CHAP. LTV. 16 * 244 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LTV. The merit belonging to that portion of the de- fence of Sebasto- pol which was com- prised in the last six days of Sept. 1854. XVI. It is time to be passing again to the camp of the French and the English; but I hardly could turn away yet from the lines of defence at Sebastopol unless I might trust that I have suffered full light to come in upon what was there ventured and done in the last six days of September. For although they all passed away without either the event of a battle, or any cannonade or assault on the part of the Allies, those, nevertheless, were the days when the heaviest stress was put upon the courage and the devotion of the defenders. From first to last, it is true, the place was defended with tenacity, with valour, and with a rare, pliant skill; but in the later period of the conflict, the strength of the garrison, for the most part, was proportioned, or more than pro- portioned, to its task. In the six days I speak of, it was otherwise. The army had stolen away in the night-time, and for days was not to be heard of. The fleet, so to speak, was aground. What remained attempting defence was a scant number of people — militiamen, sailors, and workmen — men unused, for the most part, to the duties of fighting on shore. But then all these men were parcel of one people, obeying one monarch, professing one faith, speaking all one tongue, and being all instinct with the life, the passion, the will, which belong to a mighty nation. Therefore it was that the default and retreat INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 245 of the mere army at the moment of the enemy’s ap- proach did not cause, as a natural result, the in-' stant fall of the place. That which remained at the post abandoned by the Commander-in-Chief and his army was a steadfast people. The showy facade had come down, but behind it, there stood walls of granite. Korniloff could not tell his people with truth that there was either an army which would stand by them in the hour of danger, or a fleet which would be suffered to go to sea*, but, with handfuls of men of various callings, yet having a common country, he could and did say, There shall be “a Eussian “ defence.”* Although the chiefs knew that a determined re- sistance to a determined assault must needs result in the slaughter of the garrison, they still prepared for a conflict which promised this dismal end with the spirit, the care, and the energy which men are ac- customed to evince when they are abounding in strength and full of hope. The men of the garrison might well enough think they had been shamelessly abandoned by the evading army, but it seems they observed a brave silence in regard to the hardship of their fate, and only made themselves heard when they greeted their chosen Commander, or echoed his solemn engagement to hold out the place to the last. * It is in Korniloff’s Private Journal that I find this expression ; but I infer that he had been using it in speaking to the garrison and in- habitants. CHAP. LIV. 246 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LTV. And that same love of country which filled the void left by the army was also sufficing to raise up a chief and ruler when the Czar’s vicegerent was want- ing. The emergency perhaps, in a sense, created the chief; but there was a generous, patriot spirit in that forbearance and suppression of selfish desires which inclined men high up in soldierly rank to submit themselves to Admiral KornilofT as their chosen dictator. Nor less was there wisdom and loyalty in bending to the counsels of a volunteer Colonel of Sappers, who owed the power he wielded to the sheer ascendant of genius. INVASION or THE CRIMEA. 247 CHAPTER LV. Whoever lias learnt tlie condition in which Se- bastopol was left during those last days of September,' will be ready to ask why it was that the invaders, uow able to gaze at their ease on the domes of the coveted town, still did not move forward to seize it. On the 27th of September — the day the French completed their flank march, and the second of the days during which the deserted garrison had been left without tidings of Prince MentschikofFs army — both the French and the English pushed forward some troops towards Sebastopol, and effected their first reconnaissance of its defences from the southern side of the place. They had little difficulty in finding spots of ground from which, in a general way, though not yet, of course, with minuteness, they could examine Sebastopol on its southern side*, and the impression they were able to gather of the nature and strength of the defences was, upon the whole, a sound one.* CITAP. lv. Tlie in- quiry sug- gested by observing the condi- tion in which Sebasto- pol was left at the end of Septem- ber. 27th Sept. First re- connais- sance by the Allies of the de- fences on the south side of Se- bastopol, * It may seem at first sight that this could not have been the case; for whereas the front of defence was in reality a semicircular arc of four miles, Sir John Burgoyne regarded the enemy ’3 general line as u virtually a straight one,” and only “about 2500 or 3000 yards in total “extent” (Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne of the 20th November 248 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C j T y P * Indeed, it may be said that when this day’s re- Upon the connaissance was complete, the Allies, though un- t km of G :his acquainted in detail with the condition and resources saneejnie ^ ie place, still knew the main facts which were th^kno^- n ^eded as a basis for their next resolve. The evasion le i d - g l°. n from the town of the force led out by Prince Ment- found schikoff they had seen with their own eyes: and their next J ^ resolve, although there was a surmise amongst the English that the column which our Headquarters had touched at Mackenzie’s Farm was no more than 16,000 strong, the concurring testimony of the Russian prisoners, together with the known fact that Prince Mentschi- koff was present in person with the evading force, went far to disclose the full truth. Upon this, it would seem, the French were in no state of doubt, for in their reasonings they justly assumed that the force which the Prince had with him on the road to Baktchi Serai was nothing less than an army. The Allies had good means of computing approximately the strength which must remain for the defence of Sebastopol after the withdrawal of Prince Mentschi- koff’s army, and their estimates were not wide of the truth.* Seeing the entrance of the roadstead blocked 1854). But his apparent misapprehension can bo explained. Sir John Burgoyne regarded both the flanks of the line of defence as virtually impregnable , and applied his words to that part of the line with which alone, in his judgment, the Allies could have any practical concern. He spoke, in short, only of that part of the arc which fronted towards the south and the south-east. * The error of those who supposed that no more than 16,000 men had been withdrawn from Sebastopol was counterbalanced by that of INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 249 up, they were not without means of inferring that c ^y P * the resources of the Black Sea fleet, both in men and material, must become, in a measure, available for the land defences; and they were themselves sure witnesses of the energy and haste which the garrison thought it needful to exert in trying to strengthen their lines; for upon the spots where their field- glasses had been pointing there were thousands of men and women at work. Of the motive, indeed, with which Prince Mentschikoff had withdrawn his army, and of the policy which was guiding the labours of the garrison, the Allies, as might be ex- pected, could only judge by inference; but, upon the whole, it may be said that what they knew of the truth was enough to have served them as the basis of a right conclusion; so that, if they deter- mined aright, it is to their own discernment that the merit seems due, and if they went wrong, their error was not that of men who have to move in the dark, but one which resulted from the default of their collective judgment. Whether the Allies should now follow up their The ques- hitherto victorious march , and endeavour to carry really Sebastopol by a prompt and determined attack, orgohuion. whether they should consent to give the enemy a underrating the numbers of the sailors; so that, upon the whole, the Allies did not exaggerate the number of armed men, including sailors, who were defending Sebastopol. Sir John Burgoyne did not reckon that number at more than from 25,000 to 30,000. — “ Military Opinions,” p. 197, 201, 240, in which last page the estimate is only 20,000 to 25,000. 250 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. It did not present itself in this light at the time of the first re- connais- sance. The chiefs hardly probed their own intentions in regard to expen- diture of time. The coun- sel of Sir Edmund Lyons. breathing-time, and begin upon a slow plan of war- fare resembling wliat men call a siege — this , in reality, was the cardinal question which had to be solved; but it did not present itself to the attention of the Allies as one they must needs determine at their first reconnaissance; and although the de- liberators all looked on Sebastopol with a concurring desire to attack the place sooner or later, there were few who so probed their own meaning as to know to what length they were willing to go in the perilous expenditure of time. But before the day closed, bold counsel was ten- dered; and it seemed, at first sight, to originate with the vehement sailor whose words had always found welcome at the English Headquarters. Few, how- ever, will believe that, upon the vital question of an immediate assault, the mind of Lord Raglan could have been a blank awaiting the impress which the first adviser might give it; or that Lyons would have urged his own opinion upon others, without first assuring himself that Lord Raglan approved it. On the other hand, it was of great moment that pro- posals liable to be overruled by the French should not be too closely identified with the name of the English General. There is, therefore, some ground for surmising that the germ of what Lyons pro- posed may have sprung from his intimate conver- sations with the Commander of our land forces, and that when he submitted this counsel lie was echoing the thought and fulfilling the wish of Lord Raglan. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 251 Co this as it may, the recorded fact is that, having made himself acquainted in a general way with the' state of the defences which covered the land front of Sebastopol, and concluding them to he imperfect and weak, Lyons urged at the English Headquarters the expediency of an immediate assault.* Lord Raglan was of the same mind; hut he found him- self met hy the counter-opinion of Sir John Bur- goyne, who remonstrated against the notion of an assault without first getting down the fire of the place hy means of heavy artillery.** It is the lot of mankind to he blind to the future; and, unless Lyons errs , Burgoyne supported his opinion hy arguing that an immediate assault would cost the Allies a loss of 500 men.*** Another of the argu- ments used was founded upon a suggestion that the * The MS. authentical as described ante, chap. xlvi. The time as- signed in the MS. as that at which this counsel was given by Lyons to the military authorities is, “immediately after their arrival at Bala- clava” — and this coincides very satisfactorily with the words, “the “day after our arrival here,” which are quoted in a note, post, p. 253, from a different source, both records tending to show that the 27th of September was the day. I am disposed, however, to assign the after- noon or evening as the time of the conversation ; because Lyons’s advice proceeds upon a knowledge of the state of the defences , which he could hardly, I think, have acquired until after the reconnaissance effected on that day. ** Ibid, It must not be necessarily understood that the discussion w T as carried on between Lyons and Burgoyne personally. What I rather imagine is, that, in eliciting Burgoyne’s opinion Lord Raglan did not say what he himself and Sir Edmund Lyons thought of the question. See Memorandum by Burgoyne, 20th November 1854, and his “ Military Opinions,” p. 199, 202. *** Ibid. CHAP. LV. 252 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. 27tli Sept. Lord Rag- lan’s first proposal for an assault. Its rejec- tion by the French. assaulting forces would be exposed to slaughter from the fire of the enemy’s men-of-war lying moored in the harbour beneath. To that Lyons replied by pro- posing to seize the position of the Malakoff — the knoll was then like an ant-hill, all creeping with busy labour — and there establishing a battery which must soon drive off all the ships.* Lord Baglan agreed with Lyons in approving the plan of an immediate assault; and, notwith- standing the objections of Sir John Burgoyne, he submitted it for consideration to the French.** General Canrobert, however, refused to adopt the measure. He said that his men could not be restrained or kept together, and that from that cause alone, in the event of there occurring a check or reverse, the safety of the whole army would be imperilled.*** * The MS. authenticated as described ante, chap. xlyi. The pro- posal was to seize the position of “The White Tower,” the then name of the Malakoff amongst the Allies. ** In allusion, as it would seem , to this proposal, the narrative of one of the French Generals of division says: — “On ^tait si loin d’at- “tendre aux difficultes que l’on allait rencontrer, qu’il fut question do “ne pas debarquer ce materiel , et qu’on parut dispose a tenter une at- “taque de vive force contre Sebastopol.” *** An officer who was present assures me (October 19, 1865) of the accuracy of this statement; but, as the impressions of all men are liable to be varied by lapse of time , it is satisfactory to know how his words were noted in writing at a time much more near to the delibera- tions of which he speaks. Writing in the Crimea on the 31st of August 1855, Romaine, after naming the same officer, says: “He told me that “the French refused to make an attempt upon Sebastopol the day “after our arrival hero. They said that their men could not be re- “ strained , and if any check or reverse followed they could not be got “together, and the safety of the whole army -would be compromised. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 253 So now tlie Allies took a measure, not in itself C Ly P * decisive, but tending to govern their fate, by with- 27th Sept, drawing their minds from the all -vital question ofnation^to time, and placing them, as it were, upon a path — si£g e - he smooth and easy enough at first sight — which yet trains> might lead into trouble. They requested the naval commanders to land the siege-trains. Their purpose was to open the way for an assault by first getting down the enemy’s fire.* The next day, the 28th, the seamen were busily The p ui '- .. . . i . . J pose for engaged m landing the siege-trains , but the process which the was not a short one *, and the men who gave counsel trains in the Allied camps had leisure to weigh the sound- llndecL bQ ness of the conclusion to which they had been 28th Sept. driVlllg. ing of the It was at this time that Sir George Cathcart began to urge — and that with some eagerness — that the commenc- attack upon Sebastopol should be one of a summary o pp0 rtu- kind. Upon completing the flank march he had been nit y .° 7 f 1 .... . consider- ordered, as we saw, to move his division straight up ing the decision from the I chernaya to the heights on the south of towards Sebastopol, without going down to Balaclava in the Allies track of the main English army, and he established ^l] e driVJ himself upon ground confronting the Great Bedan, septem- from which he looked down upon the head of the parenUy Man-of-war Harbour, seeing no small part of the George Cathcart’s suggestion “ This was whilst St. Ar'naud was alive.” The 27th of September 1854 for steal- would be the day designated by the words “the day after our arrival ^ace “here,” the English having occupied Ralaclava^dn the 26th. * See Burgoyne’s “Military Opinions,” p. 181. 254 INVASION OF THE CHIME A. CHAP. LV. % town and yet more of the Karabcl faubourg. Judg- ing that he had discovered a way by which it would be feasible for the Allies to steal at once into the place, he addressed to Lord Raglan a note, dated “1 V 2 , Height, mile from the head of the Man-of-war “Harbour,” in which he says: “I am in the strongest “and most perfect position I ever saw. Twenty “thousand Russians could not disturb me in it with “my division*, and if you and Sir John Burgoyne “would pay m‘e a visit*, you can see everything in “the way of defences, which is not much. They are “working at two or three redoubts, but the place is “only enclosed by a thing like a low park wall, not “in good repair. I am sure I could walk into it, “with scarcely the loss of a man, at night, or an hour “before daybreak, if all the rest of the force was up “between the sea and the hill I am upon. We could “leave our packs, and run into it even in open day, “only risking a few shots whilst we passed the re- “ doubt. We see the people walking about the streets “in great consternation. I send this by Lieutenant “Ravenshill, who will explain everything.”* *■ The note is not dated (except in a way showing the place and the hour), but I think that the 28th of September is the day on which it w*as most probably written. I have hit upon no trace of w 7 hat was done in consequence. Sir John Burgoyne was not invited by Lord Raglan to go up and test the supposed opportunity of “ walking into” the place. It may be that Sir George Cathcart’s change of opinion took place in time to enable him to countermand his request for a visit. I ought to say that I do not find the original note amongst Lord Raglan’s papers, but take the words from a draft in Sir George Cathcart’s writing* INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 255 The impression under which Sir George Catlicart C £ I ^ P * tlius wrote, was created by the survey he had been able to make from ground in front of his camp*, but when, as presently happened, his division was moved further east to the ground we now call “Cathcart’s “Hill,” he had means of examining the defences from a fresh point of view, and thenceforth, unless I mis- take, he ceased to insist that the Allies could slip through the defences in the easy and costless way which he at first supposed to be possible*, but, in lieu of his plan for “stealing into” Sebastopol, he now, itSirGeorge seems, counselled. Lord Raglan to undertake a deter- subset s mined assault.* He gave it as his judgment that the gesUoiT— - place might best be wrested from the enemy’s grasp ^tho ly by pouring in battalion after battalion, until the end 29 Ui Sept, should be accomplished.** storming x the place. * I know of no written record of this second suggestion of Cathcart’s ; but the memory of the officer who heard it made is fortified — diploma- tists are the people who best know the value of a clue of that kind — by the quaint and homely simile with which his proposal was met. The simile, however, is not one worth repeating. ** With a view to disprove the fact of Cathcart’s having advised an assault, or to show that, at all events, any such advice, if ever given, could not have been adhered to , the following extract of a letter from Cathcart has been printed (“Official Journal of the Royal Engineers,” p. 18), date assigned being the 8th of October: “To attempt an assault “without mounting our heavy guns, would not be certain of success, but “liable to a great loss of men.” It seems to me, however, that in that letter, Cathcart’s disapprobation of an immediate assault belongs to the time w r hen he was writing — i. e ., to the 8th of October — and does not at all prove that he may not have approved an assault at an earlier day. My view of his meaning is supported by a letter which he wrote to Lady Georgiana Cathcart six days before — i. e., on the 2d of October; for there, after describing the part he had taken in the flank march, he pro- 256 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. c **y P * And at this time once more Sir Edmund Lyons sir Ed- gave counsel.* He did not disguise from himself that Lyons the loss resulting from an assault must now be much counsef. Ve grater than that which might have been expected to follow from such an enterprise if ventured some two days earlier; for in the interval, both by day and by night, the garrison and the people of Sebastopol had been incessantly busied at the works; but, notwith- standing his perception of the now increased peril of the undertaking, he submitted to Lord Raglan the Lord expediency of an assault. Lord Raglan was willing; agreed and asked Lyons how he would proceed. Lyons an- Lyonsin swered to this effect: “The Russians must think by proceed to U this time that we are going to lay regular siege to an assault, “the place. Let them be encouraged in this belief. “Send numbers of men to the front with pickaxes, or “something that will look like pickaxes, and make a ceeds to say: “I then came on and secured an important post within “fire of Sebastopol , and have held it for three days , with my division “quite unsupported. If they had all been up we might have taken the “place. Now, we have given them time to prepare and land their ship- “guns, and we must have a long regular siege.’’ It seems that Cathcart’s proposals, whether for “ stealing into” the place or assaulting it, were never made known to Sir John Burgoyne. — “Military Opinions,” p. 199, 202. * The day when Sir Edmund Lyons tendered this advice for the second time , was on or before the 29th of September. It is stated by him to have been given “a day or two after” the time when he, Sir Edmund, first proposed the assault of the South Side. — MS. described ante , chap. xlvi. Those words would seem to point to the 29th as the day; and a note from Sir Edmund, which will be afterwards quoted, fixes the 29th as the day on which Lord Raglan was to submit the pro- posal to Canrobert. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 257 u feint of turning up the ground, and then when the C j^ p * “enemy, deceived by the sight, shall be least expect- ' “ing an attack, rush in.” Whether Lord Raglan approved the stratagem of feigning the commencement of siege-works, I am un- able to say. What has been recorded is, that he shared with Lyons in his desire to proceed by as- sault.* In the course of the conversation which elicited this agreement of opinion between Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons, Sir Edmund had expressed his conviction that, unless the place were at once as- saulted, it would not be taken at all except after grievous loss, and that the men then composing the army “would not live to do it.” In later days, when the strength of the English army had dwindled, and still was dwindling, and in yet later days when great reinforcements had more than supplied all the losses, Lord Raglan, in conversation with Lyons, used often to revert to that saying. But it seems that the opportunity for further de- Unanim- liberation failed to elicit any change of opinion in opinion the camp of the French. Apparently they were all^ ongst of one mind; and the opinion they entertained was French ' not only shared at the time by Sir John Burgoyne, opinion shared by * The testimony of Sir Edmund Lyons in regard to Lord Raglan’s Burgoyne. desire for an immediate assault , has been fully confirmed to me by one who enjoyed the close confidence of his chief — I speak of General Airey. See in the Appendix to vol. vi. extracts from letters of Lord Raglan , from which , as I there submit , an inference to the same effect may be drawn. Invasion of the Crimea, V, 17 258 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lv P * but ^ ias ever s ^ nce support which his authority What the gives. This opinion was, that it would be rash, that opinion it would be wanton, nay even, as one chief said, that it would be criminal, to attempt to carry the place without first endeavouring to get down the enemy’s fire by the use of the siege-guns; and the following, as I gather, is the tenor of the reasonings on which the conclusion stands based: “The works “which cover the place, though not at all strong in “themselves, are nevertheless well placed and power- The argu- “ fully armed. The line of these defences is unas- against “sailable at both flanks. The ravines descending without^ “into the town and the suburb are all of them open ting down a ra king hre, either from the land batteries, or the ene- “from the broadsides of the ships for that purpose my’s fire . r 1 r h^means “moored in the creeks; and it is along one or more siege- “of the intervening ridges that the assailant would trams. “p ave advance. Of the ridges available for such “an attempt there are three; but each of them is “powerfully defended — the first by the Flagstaff “Bastion, the second by the Bedan, and the third “by the White Tower.* Our troops, in approach- ing either of those three works, would have to “move under the fire of the enemy’s batteries for a “space of some 2000 yards. They would have to “traverse ground quite unknown to them. Any at- “tack upon the enemy’s defences must be made from “an extended, diverging circumference; and besides, “ our assailing forces would be so split by these deep, * Afterwards called the Malakoff. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 259 “ intersecting’ ravines, as to become divided into iso- lated bodies of men incapable of giving one an-“ “ other any mutual help.* “ Including the sailors now acting as a land force, “the garrison is probably from 25,000 to 30,000 “strong;** and, within a day’s march of us, Prince “Mentschikoff is in the field with an army which “might act formidably upon our flank and rear — “which might attack us whilst in the act of assault- ing the place.*** To storm an entrenched position “thus held by a force 25,000 strong, and to provide “at the same time against any enterprise on our “flank or rear which Prince Mentschikoff might “undertake, we have only some 50,000 men. In “case of failing, we should find ourselves in danger “of being driven into the sea.f If we were to storm “at once, we should have to do this with nothing “but field-pieces at our command, and our troops “would be exposed, for a distance of upwards of a “mile, to a galling fire of more than a hundred “pieces of artillery, besides the guns of the shipping. * The above arguments were in substance urged by Sir John Bur- goyne. ** See “ Military Opinions” of Sir John Burgoyne, p. 197, 201, 240, in which last page, however, the estimate is from 20,000 to 25,000; and also the Narrative of a French Divisional General, given in the Ap- pendix to vol. VI- *** This seems to have been the argument which most pressed upon the minds of the French ; and its effect in bending their counsels should certainly be remembered by those who undertake to criticise Prince Mentschikoff’s flank march. f Narrative of French Divisional General referred to above. 17 * CHAP. LV. 260 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “Remember that the force engaging in such an attack ““would be without any retreat in case of a reverse.* “The place appears to be in such a state, and the “garrison so busily, and with so much apparent con- fidence, engaged in improving it, that, with a fine “battering-train on board ship close at hand, we “ought not for a moment to contemplate so rash an “act as that of storming at once.** To do so would “be utterly unjustifiable;*** would indeed be almost “a crime.” i Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they have all passed away; and, except to the extent already shown, I have no acquaintance with the reasons by which any of them might have been pre- pared to enforce proposals for an immediate assault; but, partly by becoming acquainted with the events of the campaign which followed, and partly by help * The arguments contained in this and the preceding sentence I un- derstand to be Sir John Burgoyne’s. — “Official Journal of the English “Siege Operations,” p. 17. ** Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 20th November 1854. In this paper Sir John says: “On arriving before Sebastopol, after the “battle of the Alma and the taking possession of Balaclava, the place “ appeared to be in such a state, and the garrison so busily, and with so “much apparent confidence, engaged in improving it , that, with a fine “battering-train on board ship close at hand , no one for a moment con- “ templated the attempt of so rash an act as to storm it at once.” *** “ The place was in such a state when the army first appeared be- “fore it as rendered an attempt to storm it by a coup de main utterly un- justifiable.” — Memorandum by Sir John Burgoyne, dated 30th Decem- ber 1854. t This last, I believe, was one of the forms in which General Canro- bert expressed his opinion of the idea of storming without first using the siege-guns. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 261 of the criticisms which later years have produced, it c ^y P * is practicable to discern the nature of the argument which the united counsels of the French Head- quarters and of Sir John Burgoyne might well have provoked at the time: — “ Before engaging in the main argument, it is Argument “convenient to examine some of your lesser and col- of assauit- “ lateral reasons for objecting to a prompt assault, ^cef “And first, you are wrong in imagining that the “embarrassment created by the ravines, is one which “would only be felt by the assailants. These ravines “descend into Sebastopol, dividing the town from “the faubourg, and again subdividing into fractions “both town and faubourg. It is plain that the dif- “ficulty in the way of lateral communication created “by this configuration of the ground must be so “sure a source of weakness to the garrison as to be “equivalent to a great deduction from their actual “numbers. You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, “that you yourself perceived this clearly enough, “from the indications in Colonel Jervis’s map; and “when you advised the flank march, you were so “far from looking upon these ravines as an evil to “us, that you spoke of the embarrassment they must “necessarily put upon the garrison as one of the “reasons for bringing us round to this South Side.* “And your reason, so far as it went, was a sound “one; for a difficulty in the way of lateral com- * See ante, p. 72, Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum of the 21st Sept. 262 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “munication must of necessity be more embarrassing '“to the defenders than to the assailants, who can “choose the ground where the real conflict shall take “place. Besides, we hold the heads of the ravines, “and there, our lateral communications are free. “Look at the part of the harbour ravine which the “enemy occupies. It is of such a depth and steepness “that the defences which cover the Karabel suburb “are quite sundered from those which cover the “town; and apparently a body of troops engaged in “meeting an assault upon one of these two districts “could not be supported at need by forces withdrawn “from the other one.* “You speak of our want of good means of re- “ treat in the event of a discomfiture; but this is a “source of danger inherent in the enterprise to which, “whether wisely or not, we are now committed. We “encountered it at the landing, we encountered it “in our march from Old Fort, we encountered it on “the Alma; but on that last day we greatly reduced “its gravity by proving our ascendant in the field; “and now that, with our victorious armies, we ap- proach the goal of our enterprise, it can hardly “be wise to revive the old objection, and to refrain “from attacking Sebastopol on the theory that, if “we were to be repulsed, we should need to abandon “the Chersonese, and yet be unable to secure our * General Todleben insists , with great force , upon this as one of the greatest of the evils with which the besieged had to deal. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 263 “retreat. If tlie attack of the place we came out to “take is, in other respects, prudent, we must not' “forego the occasion on account of a danger which “belongs to the very nature of our enterprise, and “is not to be evaded by delay. If we are already “so circumstanced as to be unable to effect a good “retreat after undergoing discomfiture in an assault “on Sebastopol, how can we expect to be better “prepared for a like contingency when we have “taken upon ourselves the additional task of saving “and re-embarking our cumbersome siege-trains? “You acknowledge that a main portion of the “force now constituting the garrison consists of “sailors. We do well to take it for granted that “these men will work the guns perfectly well, and “line the entrenchments, where needed, with a “diligent fire of musketry; but it is a perverse use “of the imagination to picture these crews from the “ships as battalions of infantry coming out to “manoeuvre on the open plateau, and driving into the “sea a hitherto victorious army of 50,000 prime “troops. “In truth, it is certain that, however efficient “this sailor garrison may be in defending the ram- “parts, it cannot be capable of engaging in offen- sive operations against us on the open ground; and “if we bear this in mind, we hardly need shrink “from the necessity of having to operate upon an “arc more extended than that which the enemy “holds. Besides, what is there in this peril of what CHAP. LV. 264 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “you call an 4 extended circumference’ which time “will help to remove? “But now to come rather more close to the task “which lies before us. Sebastopol, on this, its land “side, is not a fortress.* The enemy is in an en- trenched position — a hastily entrenched position “ — four miles in extent. To defend, such ground “as that, the one thing needed is an army. Nothing “less than an army can be competent. Well, but “the only army the enemy has at liis present dis- posal is the one which has marched off to Baktchi “Serai, having with it Prince Mentschikoff in per- “son, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Czar’s forces “in the Crimea, both military and naval. We do “not accurately know the strength of the detach- “ments which Prince Mentschikoff may have left in “the place;** but whether they be great or small, it “is, of course, a huge advantage to us, in assailing “an entrenched position, to have to do with some “mere fractions of an army instead of with the “army itself. Prince Mentschikoff may have been “led to withdraw his army from a despair of being * Sir John Burgoyne says , “It was, in fact, not a fortress, but an “ army entrenched on a very strong position , along a line of moderate “extent, with its flanks perfectly secure” (“Military Opinions,” p. 197). In that sentence Sir John well describes the position, but misdescribes its defenders. The sailors, and the 5000 “reserve,” or “militiamen,” at that time left in Sebastopol, were not “an army.” ** We do now: five thousand militiamen, as I call them, and some companies of sappers. There was, besides, a battalion which lost its way in the course of the march towards the Belbec , and came back at night into the town. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 265 “able to save it alive by any less ugly expedient;* “or he may have been acting, in part, from a cogent “desire to insure the junction of expected reinforce- ments;** or, again, he was perhaps impelled by “the blended force of both motives; but every sup- position which seeks to explain his withdrawal, in- “vites us to be prompt and summary — invites us “to storm the defences whilst yet the field army is “absent. “It is surmised — and this especially in the “French camp — that the Prince may have with- drawn from Sebastopol with a determination to “attack us in flank.*** Well, certainly, if we en- tangle ourselves in a lengthened siege, there may “come a time when the Russian Commander will be “so largely reinforced as to be able to take the “offensive, and assail us up there on the plateau in “a way to imperil our armies. But, as yet, we hear “nothing of any such reinforcements; and, in the “mean time, an opportunity of encountering such an “attack would be the best thing that could happen “to us; for an army, greatly inferior to us in num- “bers, and defeated last week in a chosen and pre- pared position, could hardly yet come and assail “our forces in the open field without giving us a “fair occasion for inflicting upon it a great disaster * It was so. See ante, cliap. liv. ** This also was one of his motives for the step. See ibid. *"** Narrative by one of the French Generals of Division, given in the Appendix to vol. vi. CHAP. LV. 266 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “ — a disaster of sucli a kind as would be likely to "“bring about the immediate fall of the place. “But then you, our French friends, say that “Prince Mentschikoff may attack us whilst in the “act of storming Sebastopol.* Surely this appre- hension is a chimaera. We can choose our own “moment for the assault: we are not without cavalry: “the Prince is distant from us between twenty and “thirty miles*, and supposing him to be marching by “daylight, his advance during many, many hours, “would be under the eyes of our people. If we wish “to be superlatively wary, we may so far guard “ourselves against the apprehended contingency as “to avoid storming at the very moment of daybreak; “but that surely is the utmost extent to which we “ought to be deflected in our counsels by the ex- istence of a Russian field army established near “Baktchi Serai. “You, it seems, Sir John Burgoyne, are much “impressed by the energy with which the enemy is “labouring at his defences;** and you infer, from “this display of zeal, a resolute determination to “defend the place; but surely this inference of yours “is the very one the enemy must wish us to draw, “if that which he wants is time and respite. Besides, “the very haste with which we see these thousands “of people now toiling at the works shows plainly * Narrative by one of the French Generals of Division, given in the Appendix to vol. vi. ** Sir John Burgoyne insists strongly upon this in his writings, j INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 267 “enough what the garrison think of the existing “state of their defences. There would not be so" “much doing if it were not that there is much which “has hitherto been left undone. The evident anxiety “of the enemy to bring his works to completion “should incline us to shorten the respite of which “we see him making so eager a use. “Imperfect as are the enemy’s works, they still, “no doubt, will enable him to inflict cruel loss upon “our assaulting columns*, but this objection, grave “ — or rather painful — as it is, has a general ap- plication to all attacks upon prepared positions; “and unless there be something exceptionably for- “midable in the works before us, and some very “obvious advantage to be gained by delay, it cannot “be commonly prudent for us to hold back and give “time. Well, but the one great exceptional circum- stance which marks the existing condition of things “is the evasion of Prince Mentschikoff’s army; and “this is an event of such a kind as to be a cause of “despair to the garrison, unless they can get some “delay, and an encouragement to us, if only we act “at once. For, if it be true that to defend this en- “ trenched position of four miles, nothing less than “an army is needed, and that the only army which “could have been looked to for this duty has marched “out and departed, along with its Commander-in- “ Chief, then it follows that the sailors, and the rest “of the people thus left to their fate who may prove “so brave and resolute as to be willing to take upon CHAP. LV. 268 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “ themselves the work of a whole army, and resist ’“to extremity the attack of our victorious battalions, “will be acting in a spirit of desperation. You say “that, in defence, a spirit of mere desperation is “sometimes formidable. That may be in a street, or a “mountain defile; but it is hardly within the com- petence of the spirit of desperation or any other “emotional impulse to hold a line of four miles “against the resolute assaults of an army. “Nor, indeed, is it clear that the work we see going “on is undertaken with the single purpose of enabling “the garrison to give us a hot reception. The chiefs “at Sebastopol who are directing these labours may “rather be striving to prevent us from venturing the “assault at all until it shall be too late. Their main “object may be — and in that they would be wise “ — to deter us from assaulting at once by a show “of energy and resolution.* It is consistent with “all we see them doing, to believe that they are “preparing a solid defence against any attack we “may make three weeks hence, and are, all the while, “acting with a full conviction that resistance to an “immediate attack would be hopeless.** “You say you will land your battering- trains. “The primary use of such implements is to break a “way through physical obstacles; but what is it that “you want to knock down?*** Engineers are ac- * This was the case. See ante, chap. liii. ** This was the case. See ante, ibid. This is not an imaginary question. In the evening of, I believe, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 2G9 “customed to say that when a place is guarded by u nothing but earthworks, the lines of defence are" “one universal breach. It is not, therefore, for the “purpose of breaching any walls of defence that you “are landing your siege-guns. What is your object? “You answer that by means of your siege-guns you “can so get down the enemy’s fire as to facilitate “your assault. That being your plan, it follows “that, until you are ready to make use of your “siege-guns, you will delay the attack. Well, but “have you formed a clear conception of the time “that will pass away before you can put your siege- “guns in battery? If indeed you can now at once “use your siege-guns as means of getting down the “enemy’s fire, such a measure, it must be acknow- ledged, will be a good preparative for the assault*, “but is that what you will really do? When you “have landed your siege-guns, will you not want to “provide cover for the batteries in which you intend “to range them? You confess that you will. Your “confession simplifies the question. It is now at “last clear that you are really entering upon the “business of trenches, with the prospect at least be- “fore you of c approaches,’ and first, second, and “third parallels, and all the laborious processes “by which men attack a great fortress. Call the the 28th of September, Lord Raglan rode up to the 4th Division camp and told Sir George Cathcart that it had been determined to land the siege-trains ; whereupon Cathcart said , “ Land the siege-trains ! But, “my dear Lord Raglan, what the devil is there to knock down?” CHAP. LV. 270 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “task what you will, you are going to undertake a ‘“siege; and this, though you know that you must “omit what ought to he the besiegers’ first step. “Without the possibility of investing the place, you “are going to sit down before the South Side of “Sebastopol. It will not be in less than three weeks “from the day when we first came down here to “Balaclava that your batteries will open their fire. * “Three weeks! and from the day of the Alma “a month! You are startled, as though this were “an extravagant estimate. Beckon then for your- selves You have reckoned. Our figures “agree. Well, but now that you have computed “the length of the respite you are giving the enemy, “go farther, and try to make out whether all this “momentous delay is good for him or for you. “First, how will delay be likely to tell, for a time, “upon the relative numbers of the invaders and the “invaded? By sending us. upon this enterprise, far “away from the mainland of Europe, and in bold “disregard of the German Powers, our French and “English Governments have brought about the inser- tion of a neutral army betwixt the Danube and the “Pruth, thus releasing the Czar from all care in the * The Allies completed their flank march on the 27th of September, and their batteries did not open until the 17th of October. The time they took was not lengthened by stress of war, or by accidents of weather or of any other kind , and therefore it is legitimate to suppose that the number of days required for the merely mechanical operations preparatory to the opening of the fire might have been computed in the last days of September with a fair approach to accuracy. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 271 “direction of his Bessarabian frontier;* and we ought “to assume that a large portion, if not indeed the ’Miole' “strength, of Prince GortschakofTs army is at this “moment rapidly marching upon Simpheropol. Any “troops which may have been previously stationed in “the more distant parts of the Crimea will probably “have been called in with all speed; and Prince “MentscliikofF s march to Baktchi Serai seems to show “that anxiety to give the hand to his expected rein- forcements must be one of the motives which urged “him to the singular measure of abandoning Sebas- “topol. On the other hand, we must know that, for “some time at least, we cannot hope to receive acces- sions of strength at all proportioned to those which “the army of Bessarabia will afford to the Russian “Commander.** Therefore, so far as concerns the “relative strength of our armies in point of numbers, “lapse of time will be telling against us. “Even more will delay tell against us in reducing “our moral ascendant. It is almost certain that an “enemy who has undergone a great defeat — a defeat “which obviously dislocated his whole scheme of de- fence — must above all things need time and respite. “Are we to give him what most he wants? Your “victory on the Alma gave you a mighty power, but * The Austrian army was the one interposed in this way. ** The soundness of this view was soon afterwards proved by [the result; but there was nothing in the imaginary prediction which might not have been inferred from known facts so early as the closing days of September. CHAP. LV. 272 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “a power which was vastly greater last week than it '“is now — a power which will be less the day after “to-morrow than it is to-day — a power which will “dwindle to nothing if it is not to be exerted till the “middle of next month; for the Russians are a firm, “courageous people; and as soon as they shall have “filled up the chasms, and repaired the confusion “which the defeat inflicted upon them, they will be “vastly more formidable than it is possible for them “to be at this moment. “It is a common saying in war, that when, for “the defence of a stronghold, a pitched battle is “ventured and lost, the place falls; but this maxim “rests upon the assumption that the victor will be “prompt to lay hold of the prize which the fortune “of battle has offered him; and we shall be forfeiting “what we won at some cost on the heights of the “Alma if we not only allow the place three weeks “of respite, but suffer it, all this time, to be in free “communication with the roads by which troops and “supplies can be brought to its succour. “But if time is thus so well fitted to enable the “enemy to recover from his weakness in point of “numbers, and from the stress of a great defeat, “much more is it favourable to him in enabling him “to strengthen his works of defence. You say that “we too can work; but in labour of this kind how “can we compete with the enemy? We have at our “disposal the few weary and too often sickly men “whom we can tell off for fatigue duty from the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 273 “ already diminished strength of our regiments. The “ enemy has thousands of strong, healthy sailors, he' “has bands of dock-labourers, all well supplied with ‘food, clothing, and shelter. In point of tools, “engines, timber, and other materials, and even in “point of great guns, we must not compare our re- sources with those of an enemy who has close “under his hand all that can be furnished by an “arsenal, by a dockyard, by a town, by a whole “fleet renouncing the sea. The time we shall take “to put twenty pieces in battery will enable the “enemy to confront us with forty*, and with works “better fitted for covering both batteries and infantry “than any we can hope to construct in the same “time.* “Yet again, think of the policy of delay as “affected by the season of the year. We are nearly “at the end of September. These warm, sunny days * So early as tlie 8tli of October Lord Raglan bad perceived that the business of “subduing the enemy’s fire” by superior cannonading power was “ an almost hopeless task.” — Private letter (quoted more at length, post, vol. vi. p. 13) from Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle. In a letter addressed by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert at the close of the year, he had occasion to speak of the day when the besiegers opened fire, and he describes the cannonading power then exerted by theemmy as amounting to “at least double that of the Allies.’’ It may be said that nothing but actual observation and experience sufficed to teach tlie Allies their inferiority in cannonading power, and that, therefore, the argument in the text could not have been used. I reply that, from the time when the Allies knew of the sinking of the ships across the mouth of the roadstead , they had before them the data from which it was competent to them to infer the great amount of power which would or might be developed by the enemy’s batteries. Invasion of the Crimea. V. 18 CIIAP. LV. 274 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA * CHAP. LV. “that we have had ever since the 14th, will be “followed by the winds, the rains, the cold of “autumn. Nay, force yourselves to think of the “winter, for if once you come to the business of a “siege, no man can say how long it will last. In “means of providing against the rigour of the season, “there is no approach to equality between the enemy “and ourselves. The enemy will have at his back “a whole town, with hundreds of buildings of all “kinds, including barracks and hospitals, and sup- “plied with the stores that are needed for keeping “an army in health. Our troops, on the other hand, “with no other shelter than tents, will be lying on “this bleak ridge at the mercy of the rain, the snow, “the biting frost. If, therefore, the respite you are “giving to the Russians should carry you into a siege “not destined to end in two months, your decision “will put the winter upon the side of the enemy. “You will remember, Sir John Burgoyne, that “one of your reasons for advising the flank march “was founded upon the hope that by this unexpected “movement to the South Side we might surprise the “garrison.* Well, the hope, we now know, has “been realised. By our sudden march round to this “side of the place the garrison has been clearly sur- prised. But how will this avail us if we leave to “a garrison, surprised for the moment, an immunity “of two or three weeks? * See the paragraph No. 2 in Sir John Burgoyne’s Memorandum of 21st September, ante , p. 72, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 275 “When you resolve to forego the present oppor- tunity of carrying the place with a view to com-" “mence a siege, you act as though you supposed that you were relatively weak in the number and “ power of your troops, and relatively strong in your “means of cannonading. But of these two supposi- tions each is ill founded; for at present you have “a great superiority over the garrison in the number* “ and quality of your troops, and the ascendant which “victory gives; whilst, on the other hand, the enemy, “it can hardly be doubted, has ample means of “establishing greater batteries than you can com- “mand. Therefore, to forego the present use of your “victorious battalions, and engage in a war of “trenches, is to give up the ascendant you enjoy, “and enter upon that very kind of warfare in which “the enemy, for a long time to come, will be abler “and stronger than you. “Of course, it is a painful task to have to order “an attack upon a prepared position; for, whatever “may be the expectation of final success, some por- tions of the assailing troops must almost necessarily “be engaged in what, for them (though not for the “army generally, of which they form a part), is a “hard, unequal conflict; but, circumstanced as we * Sir John Burgoyne thinks that, including the sailors, the forces constituting the garrison at this time might be reckoned at 25,000 (see “Military Opinions”); and he is not very far wrong, though Todleben cuts down to 16,000 the forces available for the defence of the South Side. CHAP. LV. 18 * 276 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. “are, we must not abstain from this assault on the “mere ground that it is a great evil to have to un- dertake it. The question is, whether the evil which “we should bring upon ourselves by refraining from “an assault would not be still greater. We are under “the eyes of all Europe; and unless the war comes “to an end, we can never go home without having “executed our appointed task. “Here, on this barren shore, we stand fastened “ — inexorably fastened — to the duty of taking “Sebastopol; and for an army in such a predicament “as this, the adoption of even a very hardy measure “may not only be free from the charge of rashness, “but may be commanded by the strictest prudence. “Although the idea of this expedition to the “Crimea was one of exceeding boldness, it is perhaps “defensible (as events have hitherto tended to show), “upon the supposition that it was meant to be car- died through with despatch, and in a venturesome “spirit corresponding with the audacity of the original “conception; but it is only on that supposition that “our invasion of this province of Russia can be “justified; and we shall run into grievous danger if “we become too slow and too cautious in the execu- tion of a plan essentially hazardous in its nature. “The very safety of our forces has come to be so “dependent on our spirit of enterprise, that we shall “be guilty of a false prudence equivalent to actual “rashness, if, after our landing and our victory, and INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 277 “our daring flank march, we now give the enemy c ^ p * “respite, allowing him to recover from the blow he “has received, and to draw to himself all the strength “which the armies of the Czar may be able to afford “him in two or three weeks from this time. To give “the enemy so great an advantage is surely more “hazardous than to strive to end the campaign at “once by a timely assault. His position, no doubt, “is entrenched ; and defended by numerous seamen “as well as by a detachment of land-service troops; “but it is a position four miles in extent which has “no army to hold it.”* These, I say, are some of the arguments which might have been adduced on one side of the question; for they are, all of them, based upon knowledge which had reached the Allies on the 29th of Sep- tember; and that, it seems, is the day on which the proposal to assault Sebastopol was submitted by Lord Raglan to General Canrobert for the second time.** 29th Sept. Second proposal for tho assault of Sebasto- pol sub- mitted by Lord Raglan to the French. * In the following November, both the French and the English engineers felt the strength of the meshes in which the Allies had entangled themselves by undertaking a siege, and came back, after all, to “enterprise” and “audacity” as offering the best means of ex- trication. — See Extracts from Memoranda of Sir John Burgoyne in the Appendix to vol. vi. ** The date is fixed by the following words of a private letter, dated the 30th of September, and addressed by Lyons to Lord Raglan: “I “shall be anxious to know the effect produced upon Sir John Burgoyne’s “mind by his reconnaissance yesterday, and also the result of Can- “robert’s night reflection upon the proposition of yesterday; and I will “ wait on your Lordship after breakfast.” 278 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lv P * General Canrobert, it seems, reserved his decision 30th Sept, until the following day, but ultimately the French tiv/i-ejeV adhered to their former opinion.* They still judged the 1 by that there ought to be no assault without first getting French. d own the fire of the place by means of their batter- ing guns. Lord Raglan’s? negative to the pro- posal for having the tenor of the con- ferences with the French recorded in writing. The effect of this in casting some de- gree of obscurity over what passed. To prevent all constraint in the expression of men’s thoughts, but also, I imagine, in furtherance of his desire to ward off the semblance of antagonism between Canrobert and himself, Lord Raglan, soon after the completion of the flank march, had nega- tived a proposal made to him for recording in manu- script the purport of the conferences then about to take place between the French and the English.** Far from wishing to record, he sought to obliterate all trace of the differences elicited by interchange of opinion. Evidently, this determination was a whole- some one*, but it tended, of course, after even a small lapse of time, to throw some obscurity over what passed in conference between the French and the English Headquarters; and the information I have does not enable me to give — not to give even ever so slightly — the tenor of the few words in * “He” (Lord Raglan) “would have been very willing to do it by “assault, but be was not supported in the proposal by the French “General, nor by his own engineers.” — MS. Memorandum quoted ante, p. 260. I believe that Sir John Burgoyne was not present at the con- ference of which I am speaking. ** Information given me by the officer who made the proposal to him. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 279 which Lord Raglan elicited the opinion of his French colleague. * * My conjecture is that, both on this occasion and on the one which offered itself two days before, Lord Raglan avoided anything like a lengthened argument, and even perhaps avoided any declaration in set terms of his own opinion, but submitted the proposal as one com- mended to attention by Lyons. His probable reasons for desiring that on this subject there should be no visible difference of opinion between Canrobert and himself will be seen post, vol. vi. p. 4-5. END OF VOL. V. CHAP. LV. PRINTING OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER. COLLECTION OF BRITISH AUTHORS. VOL. 975. THE INVASION OE THE CRIMEA BY A. W. KINGLAKE. VOL. VI. THE INVASION OF THE CRIMEA ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS DOWtf TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN. BY ALEXANDER WILLIAM KINGLAKE. COPYRIGHT EDITION. WITH ALL THE PLANS, MAPS AND EMENDATIONS OF THE LONDON EDITION. VOL. VI. LEIPZIG BERNHARD T A U C H N I T Z 1868 . The Might of Translation is reserved. ' . CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. INVASION OF THE CHAPTER LV. (continued.) The speech of Canrobert, .... It left no opening for attempts at persuasion, It ended the question, .... Care required in submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault, 4 Lord Raglan’s way of submitting the question, .... 4 His success in warding off the appearance of differences between Canrobert and himself, 5 Canrobert’s opinion on the question of assaulting sure to prevail, . 6 Tendency of divided counsels to end in rejection of vigorous mea- sures, 7 Weight of authority by which Lord Raglan was opposed, . . 8 He frankly and earnestly adopted the alternative measure, . . 8 His reserve regarding the differences between the French and him- self, 9 Clue to the opinion he formed as to the effect of the decision taken, 10 Communication from General Airey to the Horse Guards at the time, 11 The decision did not result from careful weighing of the question, 12 Causes which averted full deliberation on it, 12 Error ascribed by Todleben to those of the Allies who opposed an assault, 14 Real purport of their determination, 14 Its accordance with the aim of the defenders, 15 The third of the lost occasions, 16 CHAPTER LVI. Help available to the besiegers from the presence of the fleet, . 1 7 Limits of th e dominion possessed by the fleet, , , , 20 CRIMEA. Page VI CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. The North Side now regarded as secure, Conditions under which the siege would have tto be carried on, The North Side open to the garrison without trenching on their resources, The place secure on the water side, No actual investment practicable, Effects of abandoning to the enemy the road to Baktchi Serai, Change in the character of the enterprise now brought about, Effects of the flank march in relation to the enemy’s field army, And as hindering the Allies from aggressive field operations, . Small space on which the Russians might concentrate their efforts, Impediment in the way of field operations and of an effective siege, Condition of things after the Alma favourable to the Allies, on the supposition of their pushing their advantage, But formidable as soon as they resolved on a siege, CHAPTER LVII. Disposition of the Allied armies, Its twofold purpose, The French forces charged with siege duty, And the English, Defensive arrangements of the Allies, Extent to which these were favoured by the ground, Works of circumvallation on the Sapounb Ridge, .... Disposition of the French force on the south-eastern side, Where the English were charged with the defence of the position, . The way in which this system of defence was meant to act, And in which it actually worked, The English could only hold the north-east angle with a strong picket, Effects of these arrangements in relation to the two armies, Strength of the Allied position except at one point, .... No defence provided there, Representations of Burgoyne on this point, Why his suggestions were not complied with, Separate system of defence required for Balaclava, .... How this object was favoured by the ground, The defensive works there, Lord Raglan’s disposition of the force for the defence of Balaclava, Appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command there, Page 21 21 21 22 22 23 23 24 25 25 26 26 27 28 28 28 28 29 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 33 33 33 33 34 34 35 35 35 36 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. VII Confidence in the safety of Balaclava which this appointment created, , Position of the French and English Headquarters, .... CHAPTER LV1II. The landing of the siege-trains, Progress of bringing up things needed for the siege, Difficulty of the task so far as concerned the English, Aid given by the Commanders of the Allied fleets, . Distinguishing characteristics of the English soldier and sailor, Change in the attitude of Mentschikoff’s field army, He resumes the dominion of the Mackenzie Heights, And pushes reconnoitring parties into the valley of the Tchernaya, Increasing boldness of the garrison, The front for attack, Plan of attack adopted by the Allies, The first step proposed is to “ draw the investment closer,” . With a view to this, Lord Raglan assembles his Divisional Generals, Their resistance to the measure, Change of plan thus imposed on Lord Raglan, Opinion of Burgoyne after this decision of the Generals, This opinion a surprise to Lord Raglan, He imparts to Canrobert the change of prospect occasioned by it, . Two long-range batteries commenced by the English, The French act on the proposal for closer investment, And push forward troops to ground under Mount Rodolph, The French break ground, Progress of the French works, The enemy’s sallies and cannonades, Continued progress of the French works, Difficulties encountered by the English, . r Plan with which they were obliged to content themselves, They open their trenches : probable efficiency of their batteries, Desolation caused by stripping the buildings of their roofs. CHAPTER LIX. Desire that the fleets should take part in the attack, Difficulty of indicating how this could be prudently done, The French Admiral was under Canrobert’s orders, Page 36 37 39 39 39 41 41 44 45 45 45 46 47 49 50 50 51 52 53 53 53 54 54 ' 54 55 56 56 56 56 57 57 59 60 64 VIII CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. Page Lord Raglan’s reluctance to press advice on Dundas, ... 64 His sense of the duty that weighed upon him, . . . . * 64 Want of personal intercourse between him and Dundas, ... 64 The absence of Dundas from Headquarters not supplied by Lyons, 65 The counsels of the latter conducing to the course Lord Raglan took, 66 Lord Raglan’s letter to Dundas, • . 67 Feeling which prevailed in the English fleet, 68 Feeling and attitude of Lyons towards Dundas, .... 69 Sanction which this spirit obtained from the Secretary of State, . 70 Difficulty of resisting Lord Raglan’s appeal, 71 Dundas’s consent, 72 Naval conference on board the Mogador, 72 Its first resolution, 72 Opinion of the English captains as to when the naval attack should commence 73 Lyons concurs in this opinion, 73 View entertained by the English captains as to the part to be borne by the navy, 73 The decision of the Admirals. Their second conference, . . 74 Decision of the Generals upon the choice offered them, . . . 74 Joint letter of Canrobert and Lord Raglan to the Admirals, . . 75 Plan of the naval attack as originally conceived, .... 75 To the navy it promised only failure, 75 CHAPTER LX. The fate of Sebastopol was for some hours in suspense, . . . 79 Mentschik, off’s endeavours to withhold the aid of his army, . . 79 Intention with which he undertook to summon a council of war, . 80 Circumstances which were making it hard for him to keep his re solve, 81 Remonstrance by Korniloff put into writing and signed, . . . 81 Mentschikoff gives way, 82 Reinforcements of infantry sent in by him, . . . * . . 82 Admiral Istomin’s stratagem to obtain further succours, ... S2 Its success, 83 Strength of the garrison on the 6th October, 83 The seamen restored to their old organisation, . . . , 84 Division of the lines of defence into four sections, .... 84 Increased hopefulness of the defence, 84 The place nojonger lying at the mercy of the AUies, , , . $(i CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. IX Pa go The field army shows signs of resuming the campaign, ... 86 The main basis of the hope entertained by the garrison, ... 8G Discovery that the French had broken ground, .... 87 Joy this occasioned in the town, 87 Appearance on the following mornings of the English works, . . 88 How the chiefs in the town regarded this determination of the Allies, 88 Todleben’s idea of the way the attack was to be met, ... 88 The measures he adopts, 89 Recovery of their morale by tj^e Russians, 91 Sortie undertaken by them, 92 Petty ventures against the assailants, 93 The use that could be made of these acts well understood, . * 93 Great progress of the works,* 94 The time needed for completing them corresponded with the respite given by the Allies, 94 Increase of strength given to the land defences, .... 95 Respects in which the defenders had been gaining strength, . . 95 How this aggrandisement of the resources of the garrison became possible, 96 They knew on the 16th that the bombardment was to begin on the morrow, , 96 CHAPTER LXI. I. Conditions favourable to the prospects cf the garrison, ... 97 Sources of the confidence felt by the Allies, 97 Their batteries, 98 Those of the Russians which bore upon them, 99 Superiority of the Russians in artillery 100 Apportionment of the batteries of defence to the respective “Attacks,” 301 Time fixed for opening the cannonade, 101 The dawn of the 17th October, 102 Opening of the fire, 102 Cannonading in salvoes, 102 The cause of this, 103 The seamen who manned the guns, 103 Nature of the duty in the batteries, , . , , . f , 105 X CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. Spirit with which this conflict was maintained by all, Frail nature of the Russian earthworks, Imaginary columns of attack with which the Russians were con- tending, • Conditions as to loss under which the cannonade would take place, The forces defending Sebastopol still under Korniloff, Why he judged that his personal presence at the batteries would be of service, The movements of Korniloff, His presence at the Flagstaff Bastion, His ride towards the P^ressip, His presence at the Central Bastion, His continued survey, and return to quarters, His letter and message to his wife, His determination to go up to the Malakoff, He first ascends the house-top to gather a general impression of the cannonade, His despondency, State of the conflict at this time, Temper of the troops at the gorges of the bastions, .... Symptoms of a commencing panic, Measures adopted in consequence, The effect that might possibly have been produced at this time by a naval attack, . Todleben’s dispositions beginning to tell, Great explosion in one of the French batteries, .... Its physical effects, Its effect upon the spirit of the French troops, Second explosion in the French lines, Canrobert’s determination, Cessation of fire from the French batteries, Communications from Canrobert to Lord Raglan through General Rose, * . No enterprise against Mount Rodolph attempted by the Russians, . The English alone now engaged with the enemy, .... Prince Mentschikoff, His presence for a time in the town, His conversation with Korniloff before departing, .... His reasons for quitting the town, ....... His departure, Page 105 105 106 108 108 109 110 no 111 113 114 114 115 115 115 115 118 118 118 119 119 120 121 121 122 122 122 122 123 124 124 124 124 125 126 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. XI Page KornilofTs movements, and the directions he gave, .... 126 His meeting with Todleben at the P6ressip, 128 His ascent to the lines of defence in the Karabel faubourg, . . 129 His presence in the Redan, 129 State of things there, 129 His departure for the Malakoff, 129 His presence there, 130 The wound he there received, 131 His death, 133 The heroic quality of his nature, 133 Would longer life have added to his fame? 133 The control of the garrison no longer centred in one man, . . 134 Embarrassment likely to result from this in the event of an assault, 135 Endeavour to conceal Korniloif’s death, 135 Grief of the sailors and of the soldiery, 135 Feelings with which his memory was regarded, .... 135 II. Importance of the naval attack beginning simultaneously with the land cannonade, 136 It was so determined, 136 The time for the attack postponed at the instance of the French Admiral, 137 New plan of attack suddenly insisted on by the French, . . . 138 Particulars of this new plan, 140 It is insisted on by them as an ultimatum, 140 Dilemma in which Dundas was placed, 140 His reluctant acceptance of the new T plan, 141 His reason for accepting it, 142 Effect of the course thus taken by Canrobert, 142 Dundas’s conference with his captains, 142 The French plan condemned and accepted by them, . . . 143 Yielding of the English to such constraints from the French, . . 143 Service which Dundas thus imposed on himself, .... 144 The place he chose for the Britannia, 144 The “main division,” 144 Arrangement separating a portion of the English fleet from the rest, 145 The in-shore squadron, 145 The English steam-ships to be kept under way, .... 145 The sea -forts, 145 Forts Constantine and Alexander, ....... 146 XII CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI, Page Fort Constantine 147 Fort Alexander, 147 The definite purpose of the Allies, 147 The Quarantine Sea-fort, 148 Determination of the French to attack it, 149 Perverse coincidence 150 The order of advance, 150 Steam-power of the Allies, 150 Mode of applying it to the sailing-ships, 151 Fire opened by the Russian forts, 151 Silence of the French ships, 151 Array and position of the French fleet, 152 Quality of officers and men in the French navy, .... 152 Their presumed dislike of false heroics, 152 Cause which may have led to Admiral Hamelin’s signal, . . . 152 The words of the signal, 152 Opening of fire by the French fleet, 153 The range of their fire, 153 The English steam-ships ordered to engage, 153 Guns with which the Russians replied, 153 Engagement of the French with the Quarantine Sea-fort, . . 153 Suspense in Sebastopol as to its fate, 154 The result of the attack, 154 Attack on Fort Alexander, and its result, 155 General result of the French attack, 155 Cause of its failure, . 155 Works to be assailed by the in-shore squadron 156 The Wasp Tower, 156 The Telegraph Battery, 157 Fort Constantine, 157 The weak angle of the fort, 158 The shoal which protected the fort, 158 Soundings taken the night before the action, 15S The form of the shoal, . . . 159 Point at which a ship of the line could approach within 800 yards, 159 Dundas resolves to detach ships to its edge, 160 Ships composing the in-shore squadron, 161 Difference between the lot assigned to these and to the main division, 162 Advance of the in-shore squadron, ,,,,,,, 162 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VL XXII Instructions issued by Dundas, Signal from the Britannia, Advance of the Agamemnon, Interchange of cheers with the Sanspareil, Exchange of fire with the cliff batteries, Mr. Ball moves ahead, taking soundings for the guidance of the Agamemnon, She comes under fire, Anchors and opens fire at 800 yards from Fort Constantine, . Advantages of Lyons’s position, Position taken up by the Sanspareil, By the London, Causes which narrowed the region of comparative impunity, . Position of the steam-ships kept under way, Explosion on Fort Constantine, . . . Havoc amongst the batteries at the top of the fort, . They are abandoned by the Russians, The whole fort for a time silenced, Limit of the power the assailing ships had over the fort, . The Arethusa and Albion assail the cliff batteries Line formed by the ships of the in-shore squadron, . The main division, Ships which composed it, Way in which it was brought into line, Array formed by the French and the main division of the English, Position of the in-shore squadron in reference to the main division, Of the steam-ships kept under way, Aspect of the Allied line of battle, Place of the Britannia in the line, Part taken by the main division, Almost the whole of the Allied fleet now engaged, . The cannonade now delivered by the Allied line, . Fire that could be opposed to it, Counterbalancing effect of hard masonry, Comparative harmlessness of the cannonade delivered by the ships, No further results obtained from its continuance, . . . . Dundas compelled to conform to the French position, Only part of the main division long kept in the distant line, . Continuation of the engagement undertaken by the in-shore squadron, . . » Page 162 164 165 165 165 165 166 167 167 168 168 168 169 169 169 169 170 170 170 170 171 171 171 172 173 173 173 174 175 176 176 177 177 177 177 177 178 ITS XIV CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. Page Ships engaged with the Telegraph Battery and the Wasp Tower, . 178 The power of the cliff guns against the English ships at once ap- u i parent, 179 Contest of the Arethusa with the cliff guns, 179 Of the Albion, . ; . 180 Disabled state of these two ships, 182 Havoc inflicted on the London by the cliff guns, .... 182 Engagement of that ship with the Telegraph Battery, . . . 183 Its result, 183 Losses sustained by her, 184 The Sanspareil, 184 Her losses, 186 Immunity enjoyed for a time by the Agamemnon, .... 186 Change in this respect which subsequently occurred, . . . 186 Persistence of Lyons, 187 His measures for obtaining reinforcements, 187 Effect of these, 188 Reinforcements from quarters not specially appealed to, . . 188 The Bellerophon. Lord George Paulet, 189 The Queen, 189 The Rodney 190 The Rodney aground, 192 Her position. Her engagement with Fort Constantine, . . . 193 Lyons in the Agamemnon now hauled off, . . . . \ 195 Her losses, 195 The Sanspareil and London also hauled off, 196 What had been effected by the in-shore squadron, . . . . 196 Power of the cliff batteries against ships, 196 The Rodney left alone on the reef, 197 Temper and spirit of the men, 197 Concentration of fire on her and the Spiteful, 198 Its effect, . 198 . The French, and afterwards the English, fleet hauled off, . . 199 The Rodney still aground, 199 Measures for getting her off, 200 She is at length got off, 200 Fire directed against the Spiteful, 201 Deliberation with which the crew of the Rodney acted, . . . 201 She at length hauled off, 201 Steadiness of her crew, ......... 201 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. XV Page Losses on board the Rodney and Spiteful, 202 Failure of this naval attack, 202 The attempt sprang from no sound warlike purpose, . . . 203 Cause which brought the Allies to engage in it, ... 204 Failure of the attack in all respects, 205 Perverseness of the coercion applied by the French, . . . 205 And of the arrangement which excluded the English from the ♦ deep-water side, 206 Small loss inflicted on the Russians, 208 Damage to ships , and losses of the Allies, 208 Their loss of moral strength, 209 The pretension of their fleet to assail the town thenceforth with- drawn, 209 Extension of the dominion exerted by the sea-forts, . . . 209 No further naval attack ever attempted, 210 Admiral Hamelin not responsible, 210 Degree of blame attachable to Dundas, 211 Sir Edmund Lyons, 218 Praises showered upon him at the time, 219 The position in which he placed the Agamemnon, .... 221 Light thrown by this attack on the mechanics of war, . . . 221 The five results worthy of mark, 222 III. Continuance of the bombardment by the English batteries, . . 223 Its effect, 223 Its effect upon the Malakoff, 225 Its effect upon the Redan and the defences in its rear, . . . 226 Great explosion in the Redan, . . . 228 Its effect, 228 Retreat of the Russians posted near the Redan, .... 230 Defenceless condition of that work, 230 Expectation of an immediate assault, 230 Opportunity there was for assaulting, 230 The state of the work a fulfilment of Burgoyne’s design, . . . 231 What prevented the Allies seizing the opportunity, . . . 232 General Rose’s disclosure, and its effect, 233 Russian reconnaissance to Mount Rodolpli, . . • . . . 235 Conclusion of the cannonade for the day, 235 Losses on both sides, 235 Projectiles expended, 236 xn CONTENTS OF VOLUME Vf. PaP The cannonade had brought the Allies no nearer their object, . 237 Rigidity which belongs to mixed counsels, 237 Embarrassment resulting from the duality of t’.ic Allied armies, . 239 Course to which Canrobert resorted, 240 Decision as to whether the place might have been assaulted, . . 241 By the English Engineers, 242 By General de Todleben, 242 The omission of the Allies to push home their advantage makes the fourth of the lost occasions, . 243 APPENDIX. No. I. — Extract from a Memorandum of a Conversation held with Sir Edmund Lyons, which was made by Mr. George Loch , February 10 , 1856 , and approved as accurate on the same day by Sir Edmund, . . 245 No. II. — Argument for avoiding the Attack of the North Side, 250 No. III. — Statement (dated 24th Nov. 1867 ) by Sir Edward Wetherall respecting the Flank March, . . . 251 No. IV. — The Flank March. The Order given to Lord Lucan, 252 No. V. — Letter printed in “ L’Expedition de Crimee” of a French Divisional General whose name is not given by M. de Bazancourt, 253 No. VI. — Extracts from Letters of Lord Raglan tending to show his opinion as to the policy of storming the place at first, ......... 254 No. VII. — Extracts showing that in November 1854, both the French and English Engineers came back, after all, to “ enterprise ” as offering the best means of ex- trication, 257 No. VIII. — Extract of Return to the Admiralty showing the number of men and the quantity of material landed from the English fleet to aid the land forces in the siege of Sebastopol doAvn to 28th of October, . . . 253 No. IX. — General deTodleben’s Explanations of Prince Mentschi- koff’s Reasons for his Flank March, . . . 250 No. X. — Protest of Vice-Admiral Korniloff against Prince Ment- schikoff’s plan of still keeping the army aloof from Sebastopol, 261 Nq. XI. — Grounds of Statement ns to Strength of the Garrison, 263 CONTENTS OF VOLUME VL XViX Page No. XII. — Note respecting the Strength of the Besiegers and the Garrison in October 1S54, 264 No. XIII. — The French Siege Batteries, 17th of October, . . 265 No. XIV. — The English Siege Batteries, 17th of October, . 266-267 No. XV. — Armament of those Russian Batteries which were op- posed to the Batteries of the Besiegers on the 17th of October, 268 No. XVI. — Strength and Armament of the three Russian Sea-fort Batteries which were engaged by the Allied Fleets, 269 XVIII CONTENTS OF VOLUME VI. Plate 11 ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOLUME VI. XX. Diagram illustrative of assailable points, XXI. Sebastopol, 17th October 1854, . XXII. Naval Engagemeut of 17th October 1854, XXIII. Do. do. XXIV. Do. do. . to face page 24 98 152 166 177 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAPTER LV. (continued.) But the language used by General Canrobert has chap. not been forgotten. His arguments were adduced so— — uninterruptedly, and were also so well put, that they speech of not only constituted what men call a “speech,” butbert. a speech of much ability. If the memory of one who was much impressed with the speech at the time can be safely trusted, it was somewhat to this effect:* First, Canrobert drew the attention of his hearers to the existence of a field army under Prince Mentschikoff which might seize any fit occasion for assailing the Allies in flank and rear-, and although he acknowledged that Prince Mentschikoff s strength could not be accurately es- timated by the Allies, he insisted upon the imprudence of regarding it as otherwise than formidable. He spoke of the sacrifice of life to which the Allies must submit if they were to storm the place at once, with- out first breaking down the strength of its defences; * Information from an officer present. Invasion of the Crimea. Yl . I 7 2 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LV. and he insisted that whilst entangled in such a 'struggle — nay , even at a later time, whilst pushing their way in the streets of the town — the Allies would be exposed to grave danger from the enter- prise of Prince Mentschikoffs field army. He asked his hearers to imagine that army establishing itself on the plateau, and the Allies beneath in a hole, so placed, so engaged, so out of the controlling power of their commanders, as to be all but helpless.* He showed the disasters, the ruin, which must follow upon such a condition of things. Then, and with the happy skill of an orator, he opportunely reversed the picture. The perils he had indicated need not be faced. Instead of the ruin he spoke of, there might be a glorious triumph obtained at but a small cost of life. Happily the forethought of the two Home Governments had provided the Allied armies with magnificent siege-trains. By the help of these the Allies could so break down the defences of Sebas- topol that their forces would be enabled to enter the place without incurring grave loss, and without even risking that sure dominion of the plateau above, on which their existence depended. For himself, he declared that, if he were to incur the appalling risks of which he had Spoken, when, as he maintained, this cruel necessity could be averted by putting in battery the magnificent siege-train which the G overn- * In speaking of the Allies as “ in a hole” ( dans mi trou ), he meant to indicate the low and straitened position of Sebastopol as compared with the plateau above, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 3 mcnt had placed at his disposal, he would be con- demned by the voice of his conscience, and the~ Emperor would never forgive him.* In listening to his colleague at a conference of this kind, Lord Raglan would of course try to see whether Canrobert, with a mind yet open to convic- tion, was feeling his way towards a right conclusion, or whether he was adducing arguments in support of a determination already formed. In the one case, it might be Lord Raglan’s duty to endeavour to persuade 5 in the other, to hold his peace. Evidently the tenor of Canrobert’s speech was not such as to leave room for doubt. He had made up his mind. Without the concurrence of Canrobert there could, of course, be no assault. He had refused to concur — had refused in such terms as to show the hopelessness of any endeavour to shake his decision. The question was ended.** CIIAP. LV. Canro- bert’s speech left no open- ing tor at- tempts at persua- sion. It ended the ques- tion. *■ The rapidity of this transition from “the voice of conscience” to the French Emperor will be apt to remind people of a celebrated refusal which amused wicked London and afterwards Paris some few years ago, — “ Jamais ! Dieu le defend, et mon mari ne le permet pas ! ” ** It is just that, before men cast blame upon General Canrobert per- sonally for a want of opportune daring at this conjuncture, they should know the tenor of the very peculiar general instructions under w T hich the French army was acting. The instructions are before me ; but con- sidering the circumstances under which they were imparted to Lord Raglan and the Queen’s Government, I am not sure that it would be right for me to publish them without the assent of the French Emperor. The instructions w r ere communicated to Lord Raglan at the Tuileries so early as the 13th of April, and almost immediately afterwards the English Government became apprised of their contents. Our statesmen were therefore forewarned. 4 INVASION OF THE CItiMEA. CHAP. LV. The care required in submit- ting for considera- tion the expedi- ency of an assault. Lord Rag- lan’s way of submit- ting the question. The duty of thus submitting for consideration the expediency of an assault, was one which had to he performed with exceeding care, and, if possible, in such a way as to guard against the evil that must result from an overt difference between the French and the English Commanders. Supposing, as the event happened, that the alternative of entering upon siege-work should be the one adopted, it would ob- viously be perilous to the good understanding, and even to the discipline of the two allied armies, if the English soldiers, when enduring the toils and the hardships of protracted siege duties, should be able to say: “Our Commander has brought this upon us “by letting the foreigners have their way. He him- “self was for assaulting the place; and because the “Frenchmen would not agree, here we are on the “clay and the snow.” But if this was a danger attending the crisis, no one living could be more competent to guard against it than Lord Raglan. Even in eliciting Burgoyne’s opinion he did not, it seems, disclose his own;* and although, as we have seen, he twice over submitted to Canrobert the expediency of an assault, he found means to do this without at all putting himself for- ward as a biassed partisan of the measure. He pro- bably did no more than utter the few syllables which were necessary for inducing the French Gen- * See the words, “No one,” &c., quoted ante, vol. V. p. 260, note, from Burgoyne’s Memorandum of 20th November 1854, and “Military Opinions,” p. 199, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 5 eral to declare Ills opinion. 51 ' If he had found the C Ly P * least sign of a doubt in the mind of Canrobert, or " any division of opinion in the French camp, then possibly he would have judged that the prospect of bringing round others to his own inclination was hopeful enough to warrant him in resorting to argu- ment, and incurring the certain evil of “discussion” for the sake of the possible good that might emerge from it. But no such occasion arose*, for, Canrobert and Burgoyne being the two men whom Lord Raglan must needs have desired to see in agreement with him upon this question, it presently appeared that each of them was resting his opinion upon grounds of such a kind as to leave no opening for persuasion. 55 '* Indeed it might be said that discus- sion was almost forbidden, when Canrobert had based one of his reasons for not assaulting upon ground appertaining to the conscience.*** The effect of Lord Raglan’s care was, that al- IIi3S . uc ' though he had caused the question to be considered, warding ill 1 * 1-11 , off the ap- and although it had been determined m the waypearance which he thought the wrong one, still the camp did e ncesbe- not see in him a general overruled by his colleague ; clm-obert and, on the other hand, the common cause of the Allies was sheltered from the dangers to which it^equos- 0 tion of assault. * See conjecture in note, ante, vol. V. p. 279. ** See Canrobert’s speech, ante, vol. V. p. 278. With regard to Bur- goyne, it may be said, in his own words, that he looked upon an as- sault at the time in question as “utterly unjustifiable.” — Memorandum by Burgoyne, 30th December 1854, *** See ante, p. 3, 6 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C ^ P - must have lain exposed if the soldiery could have said that it was Canrobert who prevented an assault by his resistance to English counsels. The attain- ment of this convenient result was perhaps, in some measure, helped by the publicity of Cathcart’s pro- posals*,* for, to meet the exigency of camp gossip, in its search after those who desired to assault, there was needed at least some one man with whom to connect such a project, and the account of Sir George’s advice came apt to the moment. Rumour fastened itself on his name, so content with a morsel of truth that it failed to catch what had been passing between Lord Raglan and Canrobert. The cer- When once General Canrobert had definitively that Can- declared his opinion to be against assaulting, it fol- opinion lowed that he would prevail. Many English, no assaulting doubt, at this time were entertaining a notion that, finrttiveiy * n war ^ e alliances no less than in common addi- deciared, tion, one and one when united must have all the must pre- vail. value of two-, and that, because the old rivals stood shoulder to shoulder fast linked in the bonds of a treaty, they were equal to what, in hard algebra, a man might call “England plus France*,” but the world in general knew that there were fallacies in such a computation, and that one of them was the fallacy of omitting to allow for the effect of divided counsels. Independently of all the other evil they * Of my own knowledge I can speak to the publicity of Cathcart’s proposals; and it is certainly curious, though not the less true, that Burgoyne did not hear of them INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 7 breed, divided counsels have a perilous tendency to result in the adoption of the Negative; for when each of two men is independent of the other, any joint undertaking by the two must be founded, we know, upon concert; whilst, in order for them both to remain in a state of inaction, or comparative in- action, no agreement at all may be needed. There- fore, when they differ, the stress of their mutual relations must tend to make them delay; and when at last they force themselves to come to some kind of agreement, and to choose between two or more courses of action, they will incline to prefer the one which most nearly approaches to nothing. In other words, the least vigorous of any proposed plans will be the one chosen, not because it is the best, but because, as compared with the others, it has so much more of the negative character that its adoption in- volves a less ample surrender of opinion. Thus, supposing that Lord Raglan and General Canrobert (whilst resolved, for the sake of the alliance, to ab- stain from all separate courses of action) were each of them to cling to his opinion with an equal tenacity, it could not but be that Lord Raglan’s de- sire to assault must be defeated by Canrobert’s desire to do no such thing. The mere words which express the tenor of such a negotiation serve to show its inevitable result. “I propose an assault.” U I “decline the proposal.” “I again propose an assault.” “I definitively refuse to concur.” Plainly the ques- tion ends; and as it ends with the non-adoption of CHAP. LV. Tendency of divided counsels to end in the rejec- tion of vigorous measures. 8 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LV. The great weight of authority by which Lord Rag- lan was opposed. Upon the rejection of his pro- posals for the as- sault, Lord the proposal, the objector prevails. He does not 'prevail because he is unduly obstinate, but because he has on his side that force which in any joint counsels must always belong to the Negative. But, independently of this consideration, it must be acknowledged that, in every proposal to assault the place at once, Lord Raglan was overborne by a great weight of what may be justly called legitimate authority. The French had always been more care- ful students of the arts of war than the English; and, for anything that transpired to the contrary, there was but one opinion in their camp. They con- demned the idea of storming the place -without first getting down its fire by means of the siege-guns; and we saw that General Canrobert, their Com- mander-in-Chief, placed his objection on grounds of so positive a kind as almost to forbid discussion. Besides, the question was one upon which the opinion of military engineers must needs be of great weight; and it happened, as we already know, that Sir John Burgoyne not only adhered to the same conclusion as the French, but went so far as to think that the opposite counsel was of too wild a sort to be, even for one moment, tenable.* Seeing that he could not hope to make his own inclination prevail against all this concurrence of opinion, Lord Raglan seems to have thought that the next best course for him was a frank and * See ante, vol. V. p. 260 and the second and third notes, where the words of Burgoyne are given. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 9 earnest adoption of tlie measure recommended by c ^ p * the French as well as by the head of his own en- Raglan gineers; but also he determined apparently to do all an d ear- lie truthfully could towards concealing the difference adoption 1 * of opinion which had arisen between General Can- robert and himself. Not only did he avoid all re- tivem9a - currence to his words, but he even so comported himself as to ward off from camp the idea of his having been overruled by the French.* Nor was this all. I include the whole period from the battle of the Alma to the time now reached by my narra- His re- tive, when I say that , with a refined and thoughtful the sub- loyalty, which was characteristic of his nature, Lord differ^ tL ° Raglan withheld from the Home Government all tweenUm such disclosures of opinion as might show him to be more enterprising and more in favour of summary s9 * f - methods than the men who ruled at the French Headquarters.** He could not but know that, what- ever he might write to the Secretary of State, whether in the form of “secret despatch” or private note, would necessarily, and indeed legitimately, be imparted to several others*, that the number of people * Those who were in the English camp at the time will remember, as is observed, see ante, p. 6, that in current conversation the pro- posals for an assault used always to be attributed to Cathcart, never to Lord Raglan. Cathcart’s name helped to mask the truth. ** The two lines written at night on the Belbec (ante, chap, xlviii.) were probably an unpremeditated and almost unintentional deviation. Notwithstanding the restraint which he thus imposed upon himself, Lord Raglan could not altogether disguise his perception of the evil which was resulting from the plan of giving the enemy a respite. Proof of this is given in the Appendix at the end of this volume. 10 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. Probable clue to the opinion which Lord Rag- lan had formed as to the etfect of the de- cision just taken. thus legitimately apprised was subject to be a little augmented by the exigencies of the marriage-tie ; and that round the large group thus entrusted there always hovered the newsman, eager to hear, de- termined to tell, his mere presence suggesting a mart where tons of newspaper eulogy could be had for three grains of State secret. So, upon the whole, Lord Raglan could not but deem it probable that if he were to disclose to the Home Government his desire for an immediate assault, with an intimation that his wishes had been frustrated by General Can- robert and the Engineers both English and French, he would become the object of a brief popular ap- plause in England, but applause of a kind which must be jeopardising to the Alliance and hurtful to the prospects of the war. To one constituted as Lord Raglan was, it would be quite easy and na- tural to apprehend all these probable consequences, and (as a mere common, evident duty) to avert them by observing silence. It is thus that I account for his reserve. But the opinions of a commander are sometimes inferred from the conduct and language of the men who most closely surround him; and as it happens that General Airey, in this campaign, was constant at the side of Lord Raglan, and so devoted as to be the last man who would put his mind into a state of — even argumentative — antagonism with that of his chief, it is possible that, in the absence of more direct indications, the act and the words of the sub- INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 11 ordinate will be regarded as enabling ns to con- C jJy P * jecture the opinion of Lord Raglan himself in regard to the consequences that must result from refusing at once to assault. Be that as it may, Airey ven- tured a step, at the time, which shows that he had caught the full import — nay, already had divined the consequences of refusing to assault Sebastopol. What he did, indeed, was only to write some two lines in a private letter-, but, considering the place and the time, the purport of his communication , the Communi- personage to whom he addressed it, the events off^m* 1 the closing autumn, the appalling time which fol- lowed, the complaints that soon rose in Whitehall of J£ e t £ ime the dearth of all warning information from the Eng- Com- ° ° mander- lish Headquarters, and, finally, the return of the in-Chief at spring, bringing with it accessions of strength — his Guards." words were, at the least, a singular forecast- and to any who know how unlikely it was that lie would be forming, and sending home, an opinion opposed to that of his chief, the letter will convey some idea of the light in which Lord Raglan may have re- garded the decision just taken. On the third day from that when the French definitively rejected the proposal for an assault, Airey wrote to Lord Hard- inge, the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards. He did not presume to question the wisdom of the counsels which the Allies had been following-, but he gave to the chief of the army at home what he judged to be the probable consequence of the deci- sion just taken. “My own opinion,” he wrote — 12 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LV. The deter- mination to forego the plan of assault- ing did not result from a careful weighing of the question. Causes which averted full delib- eration. “my own opinion is that we are here for the winter, '“maintaining only a strong position until we can be “reinforced.”* If the determination to reject all proposals for an assault was too easily formed, the causes which averted full deliberation can be well enough seen. In the first place, the insidious form under which the ques- tion presented itself gave a dangerous smoothness to the process of forming a resolve. “We have our “siege-trains, and shall we not use them to get down “the enemy’s fire before we deliver the assault?” This seems to have been the question which men thought they had to deal with-, and, supposing it to be un- derstood too narrowly, and without a perception of the ulterior consequences to which it might lead, the plan was dangerously easy of acceptance. All those, of course, could adopt it who approved the idea of entering upon engineer operations more or less re- sembling a siege*, and, on the other hand, those who would have recoiled from the imprudence of wilfully conceding to the enemy a respite of twenty days, might unwittingly assent to a measure which did not, in terms, do more than add some heavy artillery to the other resources of the Allies ; for at this time ap- parently no trustAvorthy estimate had been made of * Private letter from General Airey to Lord Hardinge, 3d October 1854. I never beard General Airey insist, or even, I think, mention, that he had been able to take this clear-sighted view at so earl} 7 a day ; but after the death of the late Lord Hardinge a quantity of papers which had been in his possession came into my hands, and amongst them I found the note above cited. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 13 the number of days it would take to land the siege- trains, to get them up to the front, and to provide" earthen cover for the projected batteries.* Another of the circumstances tending to avert discussion was one which has been already referred to for another purpose*, and that is, the exceeding confidence of the Engineers, whether English or French, and this, upon a subject which — partly, at least, if not altogether — lay within the range of their special science. They not only judged that the idea of an immediate assault was one of so rash a sort as to be actually unworthy of discussion,** but were also very sure, at the time, that their plan of getting down the enemy’s fire by means of their siege-guns would bring about the fall of the place.*** Add to this that the opinion of the Allied Engineers was supported, as we have already seen, by the author- ity of General Canrobert, and apparently by the * For the reasons showing that such an estimate might have been made see the footnote anie,jv ol. V. p. 270. ** This was Sir John Burgoyne’s opinion, see ante , vol. V. p. 260 and note. With respect to the opinion in the French camp, and the determina- tion of General Canrobert, see the quotation from the Narrative of the French General of Division, quoted ante, vol. V. p. 252, and given in Note to the “Expedition de la Crimee,” p. 300. *** In a private letter addressed by Lord Raglan to the Duke of New- castle he says: “Since I wrote to you this morning I have had a “serious conversation with Sir John Burgoyne. He was very sanguine “of success at first, and considered that we had no very great obstacles “to contend against, but he has gradually arrived at a different con- clusion; and he now apprehends that the force we can command is “wholly inadequate to the real attack of the front of the place to which “we are opposed.” — 8th October 1854. CHAP. LV. 14 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lv # unanimous, or all but unanimous, judgment of those ~~who bad weight in the counsels of the French army. And, again, it would seem that the judgment of the Allies was in some measure governed by a fore- gone conclusion. By some, unless I mistake, the ex- pediency of making use of the siege-guns, then in process of landing, was hardly in form decided, but rather taken for granted. The' error The error which criticism ascribes to those who by To die- condemned all proposals for the immediate assault, is tiiose L °of that of exchanging their power to seize the strong- who^op - 03 hold at once for an opportunity of merely besieging assault 118 h? that too with inadequate means.* Being men, they could hardly be blamed for not seeing into the future*, but the impeachment is, that they did not so read the facts lying plainly within reach of their knowledge as to be able to obtain a clear sight of the conditions in which they were placed. Thus, to take but one instance, they failed to see how they were bound by the vital condition of time. In adopting a measure which was only the first and the easiest of a long, arduous, and bloody un- dertaking, the men who got the sway of the question were blind, or half-blind, it would seem, not merely to the probable effect, but to the then present im- port of what they were doing. They conscientiously, The real no doubt, resolved that, before attempting an as- their°de- Cf sault, they would make a good use of their siege- tio^ ma guns; but then they were not really going to put * To&leben, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 15 all this ordnance in battery without first getting C lv P * some cover for it; so that what they in truth under- took was to open some trench-work in which to plant their great guns, and with those to cannonade the fortress. In other words, they were determining — they hardly knew what they did — to enter upon the siege of Sebastopol. * It was with a hope of inducing the Allies to w *s r o with the come to this very resolve that the defenders of Se- hope of bastopol had been toiling. theAiiies The great Engineer who directed the labours of resolve the garrison has declared, as we saw, that the place, defenders at this time, could not have been held against such S ^ b 1 as ' an attack as the Allies had the power to make;** and been toil- this is the judgment of one who, compared with all other men, had the fullest understanding and know- ledge of the question on which he was writing. Gen- eral de Todleben is fallible;*** but unless he has * In saying parenthetically that the opponents of the proposal for assaulting entered upon the siege without knowing it , I am warranted, I think, by the language of Burgoyne, and those who have followed his view. No “approaches” were at this time meditated, and, for that reason, there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of the engineers to acknowledge that the intended process was a “siege.” ** Todleben, “Defense de Sebastopol.” General de Todleben’s opinion applies to the state of the defences on the 29th of September, and even to their state at a much later time; but a great change had been wrought in the two days preceding the evening of the 29th (See, and compare the plans). An attempt to defend the place at the time when the Allies first appeared on the South Side would have been even more desperate than it was on the 29th. *** General de Todleben’s most interesting arguments upon all these questions are in some measure vitiated by his errors in attributing to 16 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* C lv P ’ underrated tlie defensive resources of Sebastopol, which he himself was preparing in the four last days of September, the determination of the Allies to give the garrison respite will have to be ranged as the T f h f, th i rd . third of the lost occasions which followed the battle or the lost occasions. 0 f the Alma. the Allies a greater numerical strength than they really had ; but it will probably be considered that his conclusion upon the particular question above referred to would not be displaced by a mere correction of the numbers he gives. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 17 CHAPTER LVI. Of the conditions which surrounded the Allies chap. in this their siege of Sebastopol, there were some of — so general a kind, and so constant in their applica- tion to each varying stage of the conflict, that it seems right to speak of them here. And especially The extent — for this condition held steadfast from the begin- th^was ning to the end of the siege — it will be useful to convey an idea of the kind of help that was to be besie s ers J ■ L from the got from the presence of the Anglo-French fleet, and presence to mark out beforehand the bounds which were des-Angio- tined to confine its dominion. fleet! 011 It cannot be said that the conclusion of those who judged Sebastopol safe against an attack from the sea was ever upset or shaken by the subsequent course of events. It is equally certain, however, that nothing occurred which could be used as proof by experiment that the place was impregnable against an attack from the sea, for no irruption into the roadstead was ever attempted by the Allies;* and the mere fact that an Anglo-French fleet lay hover- * Since the naval cannonade of the 17th of October was undertaken as a diversion , and not with any design of forcing the entrance of the roadstead, it forms no exception to the statement in the text. Invasion of the Crimea. VI. 2 18 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVI. in g over tlie prey for a year and a half without "breaking in to seize it, has hardly so close a bear- ing upon the question as it might seem to have at first sight; for, powerful as is the separate navy both of France and of England, there are causes from which it seems to result that the united fleets of the two Powers are of less account for attack than the fleet of one acting singly. It may be that the dif- ficulty of founding decisive action upon piebald councils of war is even more fatal to naval enter- prise than to the operations of land forces. But, whatever be the cause, the lessons of history have hitherto gone to show that one of the ways in which England may carry on war without gaining naval renown is by yoking herself with France. In the days when a base Stuart king was hired to engage his people in alliance with France, the English navy was strong, and so was the navy of France; yet the battles of Solebay and Schonveldt gave proof that, acting together, the French and the English fleets might be hardly a match for the Dutch. So, what- ever may be the reasons for believing Sebastopol to be impregnable by sea, they did not receive decisive confirmation from the fact that an Anglo-French fleet was lying outside for a year and a half with- out making any attempt to force its way into the roadstead. Seemingly, however, the reasonings of those who concluded that the place was impregnable by sea were as sound as reasonings of the kind could well INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 19 be; for if an artillery adept bends over a plan of the roadstead, and marks out with ruler and pencil - the scope of the fire from the forts as well as from the ships of the Russians, he finds his radii converg- ing so thickly upon the mouth of the roadstead, and upon the waters leading on towards the Man-of-war Harbour, that even though no obstruction be sup- posed like that of sunken ships, he sees pointed out upon paper the assurance of ruin to a fleet which might strive to break in. Still it is of necessity that calculations of this kind should leave unreckoned the effects which may be wrought by smoke, con- fusion, miracle; by panic, by genius, by even that blind strength of will which in war sometimes gains over fortune; and, rightly or wrongly, the always empirical English are accustomed to think that a forecast which needs must leave out all these per- turbing elements has no conclusive worth. They like that the boundary of what is possible should be sought for by actual trial — should be fixed, so to speak, by exploring, instead of by mere calculation; and it was hardly to be expected that their desire to have the experiment made would be brought to an end by their learning that the entrance to the road- stead had been closed by sunken ships; for the age was one in which physical obstacles had been much overcome by the art of the civil engineer; and many who might not underrate the power of the enemy when engaged in active defence, were still somewhat loath to believe that the heart’s desire of a people 2 * CHAP. LVI. 20 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVI. The limits of the do- minion possessed by the Anglo- French fleet. who had made smooth their ways through mountains and beds of rivers, could be baffled by the inert re- sistance of six or seven drowned ships. However, there stands the fact, that whatever might have been possible to a man such as Cochrane invested with the sole command, and untrammelled by the fetters of an alliance, the Commanders of the Anglo-French fleet agreed with the Russians in believing that Sebastopol was safe against an attack from the sea. Therefore, for the purpose of under- standing the limit — not of what might be possible in the abstract, but — of what could be done by in- vaders impressed with this belief, it may be taken for granted that, although the Anglo-French fleet ruled unchecked over all the high seas, its dominion stopped short at the mouth of the Sebastopol road- stead. For securing the undisturbed maritime trans- port of supplies and reinforcements, whether entering Balaclava, or Kamiesch , or Kazatch , the Anglo- French shipping was all-powerful, nay, indeed, so completely unchallenged, that from the beginning to the end the waters of the Euxine were peaceful-, and besides, we shall always be seeing that, so far as was consistent With the maintenance of a sure efficiency at sea, the generous zeal of the sailors, together with such of those things as could be supplied from ships 1 armaments or ships’ stores, was from time to time brought without stint to strengthen and comfort the land forces-, but it has to be said once for all, that, as means of breaking through that part of the enemy’s INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 21 line which consisted of seaward defences, the fleets were of no avail. In the roadstead and all its creeks the Russian was master. Nor of this was there ever much question, for in judging the limits to which the Allied fleets could push their dominion, the in- vaders and the invaded were of one mind. Two other conclusions may be mentioned in which the contending belligerents were able to agree. From the time when the Allies were established on the south coast, they did not at all hope, and the Russians, on the other hand, did not at all fear, that the North Side of Sebastopol would ever be carried by means of a descent from the ships*, and with fully equal certainty, and on much better grounds, the belligerents knew it to be out of the question for the Allies to attempt to reverse their famous flank march, by moving back any of their forces round the head of the bay to their old bivouac on the Belbec. Our recognition of these three con- clusions — not necessarily as sound in themselves, but — as conclusions in which the Allies and the Russians agreed, will help to put in full light some of the most trying of the conditions which embar- rassed the siege of Sebastopol. For, first, it resulted that, from the time of the flank march, the North Side remained always free of access to the garrison, assuring them their free communication with the interior of Russia, and this without ever absorbing any material portion of their defensive resources. From the moment when it was ciiap. LVI. After the establish- ment of the Allies on the south coast, the NorthSide was re- garded as secure against any de- scent from the ships ; and also against any at- tempt of the Allies to attack it by re- versing their flank march. The trying conditions under which the siege would have to be carried on. The North Side re- mained free of access to the garri- son, with- out at all absorbing 22 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lvt P ' k nown that the invading army had established itself their re- on the south coast, the Russians, discharged of all giving 8 01 care for the safety of the Star Fort and the whole them care * N’ortli Side of Sebastopol, were free to bring their full strength to the scene of the actual conflict, whole itS Next, it followed that along every yard of the front on line which defined both the town and its suburbs on side the the side of the water, the defenders were so ab- secu?e Was solutely secure as not to need there for defence the needing presence of a single battalion. defend" It b> u t, independently of that configuration of land and water immediately adjoining Sebastopol which served to aid the defence, there were features in the neighbouring country which could not but hamper an enemy who might advise himself, as the Allies were now doing, to sit down before the place on its No actual s.outh side. Since Sebastopol was upon the shore of mentof the bay which bears its name, and since also the was P prac- whole bay was left in the unchallenged dominion of ticabie. ;R uss i anS} it followed that, in order to the invest- ment of the place, the bay itself must be surrounded 5 and it being on the west, and there only, that the Allied navy was master, the task of surrounding the bay in all other directions was one which could only be performed by land forces. Now the bay, as we saw, stretched inland for a distance of three miles and a half*, and the number of troops required for encompassing such an arm of the sea on the north, on the east, and on the south, would have ranged far beyond the resources which England and France INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 23 could command. Therefore the actual investment of the place — and this, be it always remembered, is the first indispensable step in the process of a re- gular siege — was a thing which could not be at- tempted. It may be said, and on sound authority, that a The op- virtual investment of the place was at one time prac- there^Ld ticable*, for if, in the month of September, the Allies bating had established a force on the great road which con- nectea Sebastopol with the north, they would have { orfe 1 ited done much towards putting the fortress in a state domng to of isolation*, and we have already seen ground for the great 7 believing that from such a measure the immediate Baktchi fall of the place would have resulted*,* but this op- Serai * portunity was forfeited by adopting the plan of the flank march, and abandoning to the enemy, first the free enjoyment, and then the absolute and unchal- lenged dominion, of his great line of communication between Sebastopol and the interior of Eussia. From the moment when the enemy — much doubting at first, and slow to believe his good fortune — was suffered to make himself master on the Mackenzie Heights, the Allies were no longer able, except by a fresh invasion, to intercept the succour which thenceforth , at the convenience of the Eussians, could be freely poured into Sebastopol. Before The the dank march, the enterprise against Sebastopol the char” was a swoop at rich prey, forming part, it is true, th^enter- of a mighty empire, yet seated in an outlying pro- ^^hwas * Ante, chap, xlyiii. 24 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVI. brought about by abandon- ing to the enemy his great line of com- munica- tion, and entering- up on a slow plan of war- fare. The way in which the flank march re- sulted in giving security and free- dom of movement to the ene- my’s field army; vince, and liable to be torn off by force, if force "could be used with due swiftness; but, so soon as the Allies had abandoned to their foe his great line of communication, and had also made up their minds to engage in a plan of slow warfare, then, in the full sense of the phrase (and without having means for their task), they became the invaders of Russia. Till that time, they had had to do with a provincial governor, far away from the centre of power, in- credulous of the rumours which heralded their com- ing, surprised by their descent on his coast. Now — for so they had chosen — they were going to be confronted by the gathering strength of a nation. Now — and hardly before — they were brought face to face with the Czar. Nor were these the only embarrassments which resulted from the flank march. When, on the 25th of September, the Allies began to descend from the steep sides of the Mackenzie Heights into the valley of the Tchernaya, they little imagined that they were abdicating their power to operate aggressively against all Russian forces which might approach Sebastopol by the great road from Baktchi Serai. Yet so it ,was. From the head of the roadstead to the Mackenzie Heights, and thence on far to the eastward, beyond the reach of forces besieging Sebastopol, the ground was so strong that an army stationed or moving on any part of the range could look down and defy the attack of those who would assail from the south. The result was that, whilst Ground which hh.p, /Uh ps it' cede cl/ cts into sscrilahle/ lints Wider s which di&^dlties ir ceded as icnas scalable Urns Lute winch dies Russians had io defend Hi us 'Plate SO. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 25 tlie general in command of a relieving force would C J^ P * be in free and safe communication with Baktchi" Serai, Simpheropol, and the interior of Russia, would be able to march to and fro at his pleasure between Sebastopol and the great road to the north, and would have it in his power to engage the besiegers and in whenever he might wish to join battle, he himself the Allies all the time — supposing him to keep to his heights derukfng — would be quite secure from attack. If, even ^^ions whilst thus cooped down by the strength of the inth ® ground given up to the relieving army, the besiegers should be so reinforced as to become invested with a numerical superiority over the enemy, they would have to bear the torment of learning that, for the purpose of operating aggressively in the open field from the base they now had on the coast, their strength could avail them nbthing.* We just now perceived how it happened that the Allied armies got to be pitted — no longer against the Prince-governor Mentschikoff, but — against the whole State of Russia; and we now come to see that (by reason of the impregnability of the roadstead, and of the heights ranging eastward from the mouth of the Tchernaya) the line upon which this great The small empire had need to prepare for conflict, was the arc ground * This will be made evident enough when I come to speak of the efforts which the Allies were ready to make in the'-spring of the follow- ing year , with a view to recover their power of undertaking offensive operations in the field. 26 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. °lvi P ‘ of only four miles which compassed Sebastopol and its suburb on the land side. Nay, even from that Russians 8 narrow front a deduction would be practically war- aMeVto ra ntable, because, towards its flanks both east and tiSrSi'eir wes ^’ position of the garrison was so strong as efforts, to leave no more than a belt some 3000 yards long as the space really likely to be fought for. Of course, it is no more than the common lot of a be- sieger to find himself thus confined in his choice of The the ground he can attack*, but, in general, he com- doubleim- , . , , . . , pediment pensates this evil by subjecting the garrison to the stoocUn stress of an investment*, and what made the plight botiToT ^ ie such a hard one was, the double im- ration? 8 " P ec ^ men ^ which hindered them from operating ag- effective 11 S Tess ^ ve V °pen held, and also stood in the siege. way of an effective siege. It will be observed, however, that great as these obstacles were, and much as they would be sure to embarrass the invader in a lengthened siege, not one of them was of a kind to hinder the Allies, whilst still on the Belbec, from attacking the north dfffoff°of °f Sebastopol, or even to deter them from assaulting theCMmea^ e P^- ace 011 ihs south front as soon as they had after the ma de their flank march. In truth, the condition of Alma was favour- ^ things in the Crimea, after the battle of the Alma, Allies up- was such as might well have contented the Allies if posuSmofthey had looked upon the expedition as one to be pushing carried through swiftly in the first week after the vantage victory; and yet would be' likely to tell hard against swiftly; them from the moment when, setting themselves INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 27 against the judgment of Lord Raglan, and Lyons, and Cathcart, they reasoned away their first boldness, and for- and wilfully suffered the enterprise to degenerate Sem b from into a siege. wLaThey made up their minds to a siege. 28 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAPTER EVIL chap* In adapting the disposition of their troops to the bTsposi- — undertaking now about to begin, the Allies had two Allied the °bj ec ts before them: they had to provide for the armies at duties of the intended siege ; and also to secure all the com- # ° 7 mence- their forces, as well as they could, from interruption ment of , n , r the siege, on the part ot the enemy. its two- With this twofold purpose in view, General Can- posef U1 robert divided his army into two bodies, each con- sisting of two French divisions. Of these two corps, The one only — consisting of the 3d and 4th Divisions, forces h and placed under the orders of General Forey — with^siege was charged with siege duties. It encamped with its duty. front towards the town of Sebastopol, its left resting on the sea, by the gulf called Streleska Bay, and its right extending to the Harbour ravine. The French forces drew their supplies from the bays of Kamiesch and Kazatch. The Eng- Oii the other hand, Lord Raglan devoted every charged one of his infantry divisions to the business of the duty. Siege siege*,* but his troops, as will be seen, were so posted, that whilst they had thus cast upon them the duty * The infantry forces detached were only one battalion, the 93d, and some weakly men not in a condition for hard duty, together with one field-battery. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 29 of pursuing* the siege, they were also liable, as we shall presently see more exactly, to be summoned to the task of defending the Chersonese at its north- eastern angle. The English army had its left at the crest of the ravine which divided our lines from the French, and thence it extended eastward to ground not very far distant from the crest of the Sapoune Ridge.* The English army drew its supplies from Balaclava, and at first by two routes*, for, until the 25th of October, the Woronzoff road, as well as the way by the Col, was open to the besiegers. In the task of securing their armies against at- The de * tacks in flank and rear, the Allies were much favoured arrange - by the conformation of the ground*, for the besieging the Allies, forces were all upon the Chersonese, and the Cherso- The ex- nese was so bounded by the sea on the one hand, which and the Sapoune Heights on the other, as to offer favoured 6 good means of defence. Except at the pass by the mature Col de Balaclava, and at the north-eastern angle of 01 ' 111 ® 7 # ° ground, the Chersonese where accessible spurs are thrown out, jutting down into the Inkerman valley, the Sapoune Heights were by nature so strong as almost to form of themselves a sufficing rampart of defence*, but, in order yet further to assure their hold on that Works of part of the ridge which was committed to their vaiiation charge, the French not only threw up some works poun? to line the jaws of the pass, but also — with a care lYldge * hardly needed because of the strength of the ground — carried on their line of entrenchment several miles * Lord Raglan to Secretary of War, despatch, 3d October 1854, 30 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVII. Disposi- tion of the French force charged with the defence of the Cher- sonese on the south- eastern side. The part of the field in which the Eng- lish along the crest of the ridge.* At first, too, an effort “was made to strengthen the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese by throwing up works on the ac- clivity which descended into the Xnkerman valley, but the forces there in charge were the English, and they — with small, dwindling numbers, and being eagerly intent on the siege — did not much persist in applying their scanty strength to a purpose which was one of precaution*, so, after the first few weeks, this, the weakest ground that there was along the whole course of the Sapoune Ridge, no longer re- mained defended by any work armed with artillery.** The task of covering the siege, by defending the Col , and the greater part of the Sapoune Ridge , was assigned to that moiety of the French army which consisted of the 1st and 2d Divisions; and Canrobert entrusted this force to the command of General Bos- quet. The Turkish battalions under the orders of the French Commander took part in the same duty. General Bosquet, however, did not occupy the more northerly part of the Sapoune Heights; for there, the right wing of the English, though also engaged in the siege, stood charged to defend the position.*** This * The prodigal labour bestowed upon that part of the field resulted from the fact that the powerful force under Bosquet — the half of the French army, with, besides, the Turkish battalions — was there estab- lished as a corps of observation, not busied with any siege duties. ** The “Sandbag Battery” was very efficient as long as it remained armed ; but, for want of the infantry force needed for its support, it was judged liable to be cut off , and was therefore dismantled. It was after the dismantling of the work that its site became famous in history. *** The English army at first was posted in manner following: On INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 31 anomalous distribution of Lurtliens was so cogent in its effect that it ought to be understood and remem- bered. The Allied armies were to be covered by the sea on the north-west as well as the south*, and on the more southerly portion of the Sapoune Heights, they were to be defended by Bosquet’s corps; whilst against any sortie from Sebastopol directed upon the French or English trenches, the besieging forces of course would be their own defenders. Thus, excepit in one quarter, the defences of the Allies on the Chersonese were all to be soundly con- stituted. But against any Russian attack directed upon the north-east of the table-land, there was neither the obstacle of the sea, nor the barrier of in- terposed trenches, nor the defence that can be afforded by a corps of observation exclusively charged with such duty; and in these circumstances, there was heaped upon the English siege forces the ad- ditional and separate task of providing for the security of the Allied army in what would have been other- wise an undefended part of its narrow dominions. the extreme right, in a somewhat retired position, there was camped the 2d Division, supported by the 1st Division, or rather by five out of its six battalions (the 93d being at Balaclava) ; and on the left of the 1st Division, but divided from it by a ravine, there was the Light Division. These troops were destined to support that portion of our siege opera- tions which was called the “Light Attack.” The 4th and the 3d Divi- sions were encamped on the ground to the south-west of Cathcart’s Hill, and were to support “ our Left Attack.” — “Official Journal of the “English Siege Operations,” p. 23. Changes were afterwards made, as will be seen in future chapters. CHAP. LVII. (though also en- gaged in siege duty) were charged with the defence ot the posi- tion. 32 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVII. The Eng- lish could only spare a strong picket for the occu- pation of the north- eastern angle of the Cher- sonese. Besides answering for tlie three ridges on which they 'meant to establish siege batteries, our people had charge of the ground which formed the north-eastern angle of the Chersonese. This ground, if so one may speak, had been half chipped off from the rest of the table-land by the deep and almost impassable ravine which descended into the Careening Bay, and it was only by an isthmus or neck of high land that the triangular quoin thus formed was joined on to the main bulk of the plateau. It would be vain to claim respect for the geographical nomenclature which prevailed before the war*, for as long as there shall be any memory of the fight, that was fought on that wedge of high ground, the English at least, if not others, will give it the name of “Inkerman.”* At first, the English cleaved somewhat jealously to this Inkerman Mount; but their eager desire to press the siege with alacrity soon caused them to grudge all the strength that was spent on collateral objects. Thenceforth, a strong picket was all they could spare for asserting the dominion of the Allies on that half- severed angle of upland where, four or five weeks afterwards, a battle was destined to rage. The’ want of means sufficing for the occupation of this part of the ground was the more vexing, * According to the geographical nomenclature prevailing before the war, and still adopted by' the Russians, the “inkerman” Heights were on the other side of the Tchernaya, being those which descended from the region of the lighthouses and the adjoining highlands; but I have avoided in the text every such application of the word “Inkerman,” as tending to unsettle and confuse the impressions of Englishmen. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 33 since it appeared that the formation of the spurs descending into the Inkerman valley was so favour- able to defence as to allow of their being held by a few against many. From these dispositions it resulted that, whilst Th ese di*- A 7 positions Forey’s corps had only to do with the siege, and effected a ^ x J complete Bosquet s had nothing to do except to defend a part division of of the ridge, the English were so posted as to have m the cast upon them the double duty of carrying on the *™y C ; h siege and also defending the Chersonese at its most assailable point. English x # # the tvvo- IJpon the whole, the result was that the position fold duty of the Allies on the Chersonese was a position of mg on the exceeding strength at all points except one*, and that aiso'de^ there, though measures were taken for watching the f^pia? ground, no actual defence was provided. Sir John Burgoyne pressed earnestly for a change assailable of these arrangements, and urged that, by placing a gtrength powerful reserve in an advanced position upon this of the part of the ground, and thence pushing forward of the strong outposts to occupy the spurs which project theVher- into the Inkerman valley and the ground at the head except’at the Allies should take care to enforce one pomt * of the bay, their dominion in the north-eastern Chersonese. This he desired, not only for the sake Prided angle of the £3™ Sir John of securing the Allies in their position, but also be- Bur - . x goyne s cause he perceived that their power of pushing the represen- siege against the Karabel suburb would be grievously this sub- straitened by the presence of the enemy on that part^ ect * of the ridge which flanked the approaches to the Invasion of the Crimea. VI. 3 34 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, Malakoff. But he urged in vain. The French, it 'would seem, had resolved that the hulk of their corps of observation should remain concentrated along that part of the Sapoune Ridge which lay south of the Reasons Woronzoff road; whilst, so far as concerned the Eng- su^ges- 8 lisli, no force could be spared for the desired object not n com- re without taking troops from the immediate business plied with, 0 f |j ie s i e g e5 and that was a sacrifice which Lord Raglan would not make*, for he was impressed with the importance — the growing importance — of time, and conceived that the actual attack on the place which the Allies were preparing should be made with their full might. It is obvious that a single general, having charge of the whole Allied army, would not have been at all likely to commit the error of accum- ulating a needless amount of force along the stiffest part of the Sapoune Ridge, and leaving without de- fence its more accessible slopes. Still less would he have been willing to do so, when he remembered that, except towards the north, the Sapoune Ridge was well covered by the plain of Balaclava where the English Horse camped and patrolled. The fault was one of the many which resulted from a divided command. Separate^ Such, then, were the arrangements made for the defence 0 defence of the Chersonese*, but so long as the Eng- for Baia- Ush should continue to look for supplies to the port ciava. they had hitherto used, it was necessary, of course, that Balaclava should be also secured*, and this place, though close to the south-eastern angle of the Cher- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 35 sonese, and lying indeed at its foot, was on the out- Lvlf* side of the natural rampart which guarded the table- land. It therefore required a separate system of defence. For this, so far as concerned its eastern The wa y in which approaches, the steep lofty lulls — which soon came this object to be known as the “Marine Heights” — were so voured by well fitted as to be capable of being rendered for- of e the ature midable by even the slight works which could p e ground * quickly constructed for the purpose; and a redoubt, alvisedfor with a line of breastwork extending athwart the enfngthe entrance to the gorge by the village of Kadikoi, was ™ e e r line to complete the “inner line” of the Balaclava de- fe »ce; fences. It was afterwards determined that an “ outer forming “line” of defence should be constructed by throwing iine°of ei up a chain of small redoubts upon the low range of^e^ 06 heights which stretches across the plain at a distance ^nned of about a mile and a half from the gorge leading into Balaclava. With 1200 men commanded by Colonel Hurdle, Lord Rag- and belonging to the force which gave its name to position of the hills, Lord Baglan found means to garrison the works on the Marine Heights, providing at the same he time for the defence of the gorge of Balaclava by^ ar ^ e for placing at Kadikoi the 93d Highland Begiment, with fence of a field-battery withdrawn from the 3d Division; and he eked out the defence of the town by assigning for guard duty there some four or five score of men who were in too weakly a state to be competent to harder labours. The chain of redoubts which our engineers destined for the “the outer line” of defence 3 * 36 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVII. Appoint- ment of Sir Colin Campbell to the command at Bala- clava. The singu- lar confi- dence in the safety of Bala- clava which this appoint- ment created. was to be constructed and manned by some bodies 'of Turks newly placed under Lord Raglan’s orders. * Lord Lucan with his cavalry and horse-artillery was stationed in the plain to the north of Balaclava, with orders to patrol to the Tchernaya, and also in the direction of the gorges leading into the valley of Baidar. With the exception of this division of cavalry, the whole of the scant forces entrusted with the defence of Balaclava was placed under the orders of Sir Colin Campbell. ** The appointment elicited proof of the light in which his quality as a soldier was regarded. For several days, and not without some- what of reason, men at Headquarters — I speak not of Lord Raglan himself — had been surmising that Balaclava was far from secure; but as soon as the Chief made it known that the place was in charge of Sir Colin, people went to an extreme of con- fidence, and ceased to imagine that ground where * A portion of these two battalions — had been placed at Lord Raglan’s disposal by the courtesy of General Canrobert; and the re- mainder, amounting to about 3500, was & force which, at the instance of Lord Stratford deRedcliffe, the Sultan had consented to place under Lord Raglan’s orders. ** The various arrangements described in this chapter were not, of course, all made at the same time , and were not permanent, for they were altered after the battles of Balaclava and Inkerman. They were carried into effect between the 27th of September and the middle of the following month. The appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to the com- mand of Balaclava was made, I think, on the 13th or 14th of October. The 14th was probably the day; for that I see is the one assigned by Colonel Sterling. — MS. by Sir Anthony Sterling, p. 108, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 37 lie was commanding’ could now be the seat of danger.* And certainly it was from no mere friendliness to- wards Campbell that all this confidence sprang; for his energy — a disturbing, and not always popular quality — together with the singular enmity he used to bear towards the Guards, was enough to prevent him from being liked in proportion to the trust he inspired. But that trust was deep. The business of defending Balaclava with the slight means assigned for the purpose was no longer a problem nor a topic. Men knew the old soldier was there, and turned all their thoughts to the siege.** Both the French and the English Headquarters The posi- tion of the * The extent to which this extreme confidence was warranted will be better judged of when we come to the battle of Balaclava. It will probably be thought that some of the arrangements for maintaining the outer line of defence were faulty or incomplete. ** A day or two after the appointment of Sir Colin Campbell to this command , a conversation with Lord Raglan turned upon the strength that everybody supposed to be given to the Balaclava defences by the presence there of one man; and it was remarked that the sense of security which the appointment created enabled a reader of the Wel- lington despatches and letters to feel the force of those expressions of the Duke’s , in which he used to speak of himself as dependent for his repose upon the presence or absence of some one man — upon the pre- sence, for instance, of Murray as his Quartermaster-General, or upon the absence of Massena as his opponent. Lord Raglan seemed much gratified by hearing of the moral effect produced by the appointment, and then said that he had been greatly pleased at the way in which Campbell accepted the charge. He said that upon his asking Campbell to take charge of Balaclava, Campbell, though he supposed at the moment that he was to be subordinated to Lord Lucan, replied, without the least hesitation , “Certainly, sir; I will place myself at once under “Lord Lucan’s orders.” Lord Raglan said he immediately explained to Sir Colin that his was to be an independent command. 38 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVII. French and the English Head- quarters. were established on the Chersonese — the English in a farmhouse a little to the north of the pass which led up from Balaclava, and the French at a spot farther west. * Lord Raglan was advantageously placed; for whilst he could communicate quickly both with his besieging forces and with Balaclava, as also with General Canrobert, he was also so near to the crest of the Sapoun& Heights as to be able in a few minutes to obtain a commanding view of the plain of Balaclava, the valley of the Tchernaya, and those neighbouring heights towards the east and north- east, from which, if bent on an enterprise, a Russian field army might come. * It was on tlie 5th of October that the English Headquarters were moved up from Balaclava to the heights. INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 39 CHAP TEE LYIII. Now at once — wharves had to he made for the chap. purpose — the Allies went on in all haste with the q he lan( j-;- toil of landing their siege-trains. But also there pre- the sently met them the yet harder task of bringing up trains, from the shore to the front heavy guns, great stores J£ 0 ' of ammunition, and the loads and loads of material bringing 7 # up to the required for the business of siege work, besides all front the usual supplies which were needed for the support needed for of their armies. the siege * The French had spacious landing-ground in their Bay of Kamiesch, with an easy approach to the ground where their siege-corps was camped; and it does not appear that they encountered any great difficulty in bringing to the front their stores and their battering- trains. It was otherwise with the English ; for now The there came to be felt the first stress of that want so which was destined to be the cause of cruel suffer- far ^5™' cerned the ings to their army, and to wring the hearts of their English, brethren at home with a grief which soon turned in- to anger. Our forces, encamped on the Chersonese, were near, it is true, to their port of supply, but not in contact with it. There was a distance of six or seven miles which had to be conquered. And how? The means of land transport were so slight in pro- 40 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVIII. portion to the enormous need, that the mere counting of the carts that they had and of the beasts tit for draught might well have induced the Allies to go back once more into council, and ask themselves yet again whether it was commonly prudent for them to forego or postpone their assault of the place for the sake of undertaking a mighty siege business without sufficing resources. It would seem that the only means of transport available to our Engineers were some light bullock- carts of the country, amounting at first in number to forty-six, but reduced by the 12th of October to twenty-one; and that the way in which this scant command of draught-power had to be augmented was by pressing into the service every spare ammunition and baggage horse. * Having those poor means cf land transport, the English proposed to drag their stores to the front — a distance of six or seven miles — and there, sitting down as besiegers, to pit themselves against the garnered resources of Sebas- topol and the vast empire lying behind it. With means of land transport not more than enough for a raid, they were invading an empire and undertaking an inland siege. It is true that by dint of toil long continued it was possible for them to drag up to the front the material for a day’s cannonade; but then that consumption of time was the very sacrifice they could least afford — the very one which, in every * “ Official Journal of the Siege Operations,” p. 26. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 41 battery anti every church of Sebastopol, the devout Russian prayed they might make. Aid given From on board the Allied fleets large bodies ofm°e\iand men were landed; and they were ordered — or rather Sources permitted, for the men were burning with zeal — to ] ^ 0 ^ e take part in the active operations against Sebastopol. 1 0 n f a t ^ ers The brigade of English seamen thus placed at Lord Allied Raglan’s disposal was under the orders of Captain Lusliington, and Captain Peel undertook a battery with a number of his men from the Diamond. More- over, large quantities of the armament and other material resources of the fleets were freely devoted to the same purpose. Numbers of ships’ guns of heavy metal were taken from the decks of the men- of-war, and afterwards dragged up to camp by the bodily power of the sailors. * In the eyes of those who have witnessed the con- trast, as shown and developed by the business of war, it seems hardly short of a wonder that the same nation should be able to send out, to toil and fight for her cause, two bodies of men, each so devoted, Disun- each so excellent, yet parted the one from the other character- by a breadth so great as that which divides our sol- th^Eng- diers from our sailors. It is true that the soldier engaged in campaigning is too often in a lower state of health than that which the sailor enjoys; but, even after recognising that physical cause as account- ing for some portion of the difference between the * For details of the assistance in men and material which our Navy afforded, see Appendix. 42 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVIir. two men, the contrast still keeps its force. For the mind of the soldier is so weighted down by the ceaseless pressure of Method, that he has little enough of resource except what he finds in his val- our and discipline: he is patient, and, in some cir- cumstances, strangely uncomplaining: he is grave, and calm: he has made himself famous in Europe for his power of confronting an enemy’s column with what the French used to call his “terrible “silence.”* On the other hand, the sailor, thrown suddenly into the midst of new conditions, is full of resource as Crusoe in his island. He does not hold himself at all bound to suffer without complaining. He freely tells his sorrows to his officers. His courage is of the kind that enables him , in the midst of slaughter, to go on cheerfully swearing, and steadily serving his gun — whilst in boarding, or any kind of assault, he finds a maddening joy; but he would hardly enter into the spirit of an order which called upon him and his mates to stand still in straight lines under fire, keeping silence, and not rushing forward. With the performance of his duties he blends a wild mirth. As though in his infinite tenderness for all that he deems weak and helpless, he loves of all things to come ashore, with * If I rightly remember, it was General Foy who", in the spring of 1814, assigned this observance of silence — u ce terrible silence” — as the cause which, in his judgment, had given the ascendant to the English infantry. He said the French could not stand it. See General Trochu’s most interesting account of the demeanour of British infantry in the crisis of a fight — <( L’Armde Franijaise.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 43 liis exuberant health and strong will, to give a help to the landsmen. Sometimes in those early days of October, whilst our soldiery were lying upon the ground weary, languid and silent, there used to be heard a strange uproar of men coming nearer and nearer. Soon, the comers would prove to be Peel of the Diamond, with a number of his sailors, all busy in dragging up to the front one of the ship’s heavy guns. * Peel has died — has died young — in the service of his country, but such was his zeal, such his energy, such his power of moving other men, that upon the whole his share of the gift of life was full and rich. Apart from the mere beauty of his form and features, there was a fire in his nature which gave him in that time of war an all but preternatural radiance. But whilst he was guid- ing the labours of his people with eye and hand and joyous words of direction or encouragement, the sailors used always to find their own way of evolving their strength. This they would do by speaking to the gun as to a sentient, responsible being, over- whelming it with terms of abuse; and, since it com- monly happened that the stress of their pull at the ropes would get to be in some measure timed by the cadence of their words, it followed that at each exe- cration the gun used to groan and move forward, as though it were a grim sullen lion obeying the voice of his keepers. * Captain William Peel, a son of tlie late and brother of the present Sir Robert Peel. His guns were 32-pounders. CHAP. LVIII. 44 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. Lvm This process of landing battering-trains and bring- ing them up to the front y^as too difficult to be got through in the short space of time that was probably reckoned sufficing at the period when the Allies were resolving to enter upon a siege*, and before they had yet got in readiness to open their first trench, the enemy’s field army began to show signs of intending to change the attitude to which its chief had con- 7th Oct. demned it since the day of the Alma. Prince Ment- Signs of # J change in scliikoff must have been told by his own officers, so tude of early as the 28th or the 29th of September, that the MentscM- Mackenzie Height was clear of the invaders, but army. field his mind , it would seem , had been so put awry by disasters, as to become almost inaccessible to good tidings*,* and until several more days were past, he had confined the movements of his field army to those peaceful regions on the Beibec, in which it was im- possible for his troopers to find a single battalion or squadron, either French or English. Nay, unless General de Todleben errs, Prince MentschikofFs de- termination to move his army to the north of Sebas- topol was actually a consequence of his learning that the Allies had marched off to the south.** But, by * On the 28th of September Prince Mentscliikoff sent two squadrons of regular cavalry and two of Cossacks to the Mackenzie Heights. — Todleben, p. 267. ** “The information which they [the cavalry patrols] gathered in “their march proved it certain that the enemy had definitively passed to “the south side. In consequence of this report, Prince Mentscliikoff “began to concentrate his army on the north side of Sebastopol.” — Todleben , p. 263. To understand the full force of this statement, any INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 45 tlic 7th of October, the Russians had begun to ap- ™j*** predate the fact that, after all, they were once more Prince the masters — the undisturbed masters — of the Mac- jf 0 e ff re C - hl kenzie Range, including every road, every pathway dominion which connected it with the valley of the Tcher- naya. So now, at last* their Commander accepted zie range i .i . . ’ . of heights; the priceless dominion ot territory which had been given up to him by the Allies some ten days before, and not only resumed the full ownership of those Mackenzie Heights which secured his communications with Sebastopol and the interior of Russia , but andpushes pushed his reconnoitring forces down into the plain, noting 1 and home even to the banks of the stream where f^toUie the English horsemen patrolled. It was a patrol f^Tcher- under Cornet Fisher which first felt the presence of na F a x where the the enemy in the country of the Tchernaya. The English Cornet was surprised in the early morning by find- troiung. ing himself in contact with part of a powerful force which had come down into the valley, * and three of his men were made prisoners. At this time, moreover, it began to appear that The garri- tlie forces which constituted the garrison of Sebasto- samftime pol were daily becoming more bold*, for (supporting ^ecomfn^' them in some instances by field-guns) the enemy mo , rebold » now kept his outposts so firmly on ground far inpyiug p p A , . i r i«i i a n • • ground far front of his works, as to hinder the Allies m any at- in advance J of their defensive one not accurately carrying in his mind the features of the country v, ° 1 ~ S * should glance at the map. * A whole division of cavalry, supported by several jbattalions of infantry and three batteries. 46 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. LVIII. The front for attack. tempt to establish batteries at a moderate distance from the place, and prevent their engineers from obtaining that minute knowledge of the ground which they wanted for the planning of their works. We shall see that the repression of this encroaching hardihood on the part of the enemy was the first in that series of measures now devised by the invaders which constituted their plan of attack. The part of the enemy’s defences which offered to his assailants the obvious u front for attack” was that slightly curved belt, which included the Flag- staff Bastion, the Redan, and the Malakoff Tower. This last work, or rather the ground on which it stood, had been pronounced by Sir John Burgoyne upon first surveying the ground to be the key of Sebastopol*, and none indeed could well doubt that the capture of the Malakoff* would carry with it the conquest of the other defences; for it took in reverse all the works on the eastern side of the Man-of-war Harbour, and its position on a high, commanding knoll seemed to offer to him who might once be there lodged good means of repelling assailants. But the Malakoff was not “the key” in such sense as to im- port that it was the only key of Sebastopol; and it is the opinion of General de Todleben that — for reasons not altogether dependent upon the mere scope of fire from each site — the capture of any one of the three works — the Malakoff, the Redan , or the Flagstaff Bastion — must have carried with it the fall of the place. He likewise judged that the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 47 loss of either the “Central” or the “Land Quaran- lvih* “tine” Bastion must have proved fatal-, hut those two last were not works which the Allies could attack with advantage. Whatever extent of dominion the possession of The plan qj attack the Malakoff might be capable of affording, the Allies, adopted at this time, did not even attempt to include it iiiAUies. that road of havoc by which they proposed to break through the enemy’s line of defences. Their reason will be apparent to those who remember that, for want of the numerical strength that would have been needed for the purpose, the English were prevented from occupying in force the Inkerman Mount; for, without being able in that way to secure their right flank from aggression, they could not advance upon the Malakoff by the ridge which connected it with the plateau; and (except by the long-ranging fire of their Lancaster guns) all they could yet attempt against this work was to assail it with shot thrown across the intersecting ravine from the slopes of the adjoining ridge — that is, from the Woronzoff Height. * Straitened thus in their choice of the “front for “attack,” the Allies determined that they would devote their first efforts to the object of carrying the Flagstaff Bastion and the Bedan; for they saw that, if they could there break through the enemy’s line of defences, they would complete that severance of * Called by tbe English “Frenchman’s Hill,” the site of “Gordon’s,” or the “Right Attack.” 48 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CH \P. LVIIL tlie town from the faubourg which the very form "and position of the Man-of-war Harbour with the deep ravine at its head had alone gone far to effect; and they hoped that the mastery which might thus be attained would insure, with but little delay, the fall of the Malakoff itself, and all the other de- fences. It was by the eventual assault of the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan that the French and the Eng- lish expected to be able to carry them; and, to j3re- pare the way for the enterprise, they were not only intent to get down the fire of those two works, as well as of all the intermediate batteries, whether planted on shore or ships’ decks, which helped the defence of the place on its land front, but also- — for the enemy’s works were disposed upon the prin- ciple of what is called “mutual support,” each one giving strength to its neighbour — it was their ob- ject to do all they could towards silencing, on the one side, the Central Bastion, on the other, the Mala- koff Tower. But since, after all, it was mainly with earthen entrenchments that the Allies had to deal, and not with those stone-work defences which oppose to the assailant in addition to other means of resistance a steep, inert, physical barrier, they did not hold it necessary to consume precious time in working on to what against masonry would be the right breach- ing distance by laborious, patient approaches; and their plan — the plan of both the French and the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 49 English — was to provide cover for their siege ord- ^vm* nance in positions near enough to the place to allow" of a cannonade which should prove effective against the enemy’s (chiefly earthwork) defences, and yet so distant that each position might be seized and fast- ened upon at once (under shelter of darkness) with- out the necessity of having to creep down to it gradually by dint of pickaxe and spade. After that cannonade, if it should prove as destructive as they expected , the Allies did not mean (as is done in re- gular siege) to dig their way on to close quarters, and there establish new batteries, but at once to undertake an assault. The French were to establish their siege-guns in a single line or system of batteries upon the crest of the hill called Mount Kodolph*, whilst the English intended to plant their “Attacks” on two separate ridges, one upon “Green Hill,” and the other on the “Woronzoff Height.”* The first step towards the execution of this plan The first was, as the Allies at the time expressed it, to “ draw wa?ds°"the “the investment closer-,”** in other words, to push t e ^pi°an * Generally called by the English “Frenchman’s Hill.” It is in con- formity with the language of the English Engineers that each system of batteries constructed by them has been called an “Attack.” The expedient of the capital letter is resorted to as a means of indicating that the word is used in its technical, and not in its usual sense. ** Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, 8th October 1854. After all that I have said as to the impossibility of investing the place, it is barely necessary to observe that the “investment” here re- ferred to extends only to that partial “investment” which was effected by the position the Allies had taken up on the Chersonese. Invasion of the Crimea . VI. 4 50 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lvih forward some of the infantry battalions to ground was~t(7 more near to the place*, and this with a view to « fnvesi e obtain for the Engineers better means of recon- “ closer.” noitring, and also to support the working parties in their endeavour to open trenches at a moderate dis- tance from the enemy’s works. This measure seemed to be rendered the more necessary by that increased and increasing boldness with which, as we know already, the enemy was maintaining his outposts on ground far in front of the place. 7th Oct. In order to give effect to that part of the mea- vicwto sure which was to devolve upon the English army, operation, Lord Raglan, on the 7th of October, assembled the iln r as?em- Generals of his Infantry Divisions, and announced to them what he wished to have done*,* but they, some of them, spoke a good deal, and they were unanimous in opinion that, without cover, they could not maintain an advanced position but at a cost beyond what it would be right to risk. ** In de- claring against the idea of putting his Division in a more advanced position, Sir George Brown suffered himself to become vehement. I do not suppose — indeed I know it could not have been — that his bled his Infantry Generals of Divi- sion. Their re- sistance to the proposed measure. * These Divisional Generals, it may be remembered, were Sir George Brown, the Duke of Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, Sir Richard England, and Sir George Cathcart. Taken literally, Lord Raglan’s words would indicate that he had called together all his Generals of Division, but I do not imagine that he meant to include the Commander of his Cavalry Division. ** Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, private letter, marked “Most “confidential,” 8th October 1854. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 51 vehemence arose from any spirit of antagonism to ^vm* Lord Raglan; for he was a man of a good and warm heart, much attached to his chief, and intend- ing to walk loyally according to such lights as he had. The consulted Generals were, no doubt, aware that the desire to place our besieging forces on ground more close to Sebastopol had been submitted for adoption by Sir John Burgoyne; and it was rather, perhaps, in resistance to him, than with any notion of opposing Lord Raglan, that Sir George Brown spoke as he did. His mind was of the qua- lity of those which are liable to be much impressed by the distinctions which separate one branch of the service from another; and I believe that he probably disliked the sensation of being directed and propelled by an officer of Engineers. For appearance’ sake, Lord Raglan caused the it seemed assembled Generals to express (in terms void of spe- fh^this 16 cial significance) their willingness to aid in the siege on the™ 6 to the best of their means; but the practical con- elusion attained by the council was the rejection ofh nfantr ^ J J Generals Burgoyne s proposal for a closer investment of the of Divi- , sionwould place. * oblige After hearing the unanimous opinion which his ian r ?o^on- Generals of Division opposed to the idea of pressing operations closer upon the enemy by moving our infantry to Artillery t0 * I have not forgotten the passage (vol. hi.) in which I spoke of the exceeding willingness of every one serving under Lord Raglan to give effect to his wishes ; but that passage purports only to speak of things as they were whilst the army was in Bulgaria. 4* 52 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LVIII. a distant cannon- ade with guns of long range. Opinion entertain- ed by Sir John Bur- goyne on the 8th Oct. after this deci- sion of the Divisional Generals. positions more in advance, Lord Raglan apprehended that for the time, and until the moment for assault should he ripe, our army must confine itself to such an operation as would enable the Engineers to place in battery some guns of long range.* It seems probable, and even natural, that the course thus taken by our Infantry Generals of Di- vision may have so contravened and so vexed Sir John Burgoyne as to make him fear, for the time, that the English must be frustrated in their desire to take a great part in the siege; for although he had been “very sanguine of success at first,” yet now, on the day which followed the council, he astonished Lord Raglan by announcing that “he “saw insuperable difficulties in carrying on his En- gineer works within breaching distance under the “heavy fire which could be brought to bear upon “them, and that the English must make up their “minds to consider their position as principally one “of bombardment, and as contributing to divert the “enemy from the attack on the left” — the attack where the French were to act.** * Lord Raglan seems to ascribe to the decision of his Divisional Generals the necessity of thus confining the operations of the English army; for immediately after stating the opinion they gave him he writes, “It was ‘therefore- 1 resolved to confine ourselves,” &c. — Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, 8th October 1854. ** Private letter , Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle , 8th October 1854. It must not be understood that the word “bombardment,” when used by Lord Raglan and others who wrote at that time, meant only what in strictness it signified — that is , mere vertical fire. The ex- pression was used at the time as signifying a cannonade directed INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 53 This opinion of his chief Engineer came upon ^y^n’ Lord Raglan so suddenly that, until lie had actually Tins opin- lieard it from Burgoyne’s lips in the conclusive form joh^Bur- above stated, he liad no reason for imagining that^ n ®’ s it would become his duty to prepare the French *p r 0 ^ord Commander for any shortcomings in the way of Ra g lan ; siege work on the part of the English*, but he now buthenow at once imparted to Canrobert the change that had to General just taken place in the prospects of the English, so [i^change far as concerned the use of their siege-guns. The gpidToe- French General did not seem to be surprised by this £y S g“ r e _ d announcement, for he had previously learnt, it would goyne’s seem , that the ground in front of the English opinion, furnished no materials for entrenching. Lord Raglan did not fail to assure General Canrobert that lie should be ready to join him in any attack that might be determined upon, and to assist him in every way. In pursuance of their plan of attempting some- Two haif- thing against the shipping and the other defences iong- Gn by their long-range guns, the English, in the nights lotteries of the 7tli and the 8th of October, began the forma- tion of two half-sunken batteries upon spots very English, distant from the enemy’s line of works;* but meant to be armed with those guns of the “Lancaster” sort which might reach with their fire the ships at the head of the creeks, and the Malakoff, then called against a fortress and its defences; but an endeavour has since been made to restore to the word its original significance. * About 2800 yards from the nearest of the enemy’s works. 54 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lvih* White Tower. Those long-range Lancaster bat- teries, though intended, of course, to be auxiliary to the main purpose, stood apart in other respects from the general plan of siege labour in which the Allies were engaging. J ilQ , The ground that the French had before them acteduponwas favourable to the plan of u drawing closer the the nro- ... . x . _ posai for investment-, and, m their camp, the proposal to the hiveat- that effect did not meet with the hindrance which it closer • had encountered when Lord Raglan submitted the measure to his Infantry Generals of Division. The same day as that on which the English Generals of Division had delivered their opinions, but not till and push- after sunset, nine French battalions, commanded by nine 1 ba^ d General Lourmel, were pushed forward and estab- ground iy- wished in a sheltered position, beneath the com- the crest r man ^ n o cres ^ — the crest of Mount Rodolph — of Mount where the French meant to plant their batteries. Rodolph. r On the ^ It was on the night of the 9th of October that the 9th the French were to break ground. Advancing from French the ground where Lourmel had established himself, ground, their Engineers, with a large body of men told off for the work, were to fasten at once upon the crest of Mount Rodolph ; and this they proposed to do by throwing up a gabionade a few yards in advance of the ground they had selected as the site of their in- tended batteries. By this gabionade (to be thrown up as effectually as might be in one night) they in- tended to provide a fitting screen or cover for the INVASION OF TUN CRIMEA. subsequent operation of sinking the trenches in which their batteries were to be placed. The night was clear, but there blew a fresh wind from the north-east, which prevented the gar- rison from hearing the sound of the pickaxe; and relays of working parties, numbering altogether 1600, were enabled to toil all the night without being molested, so that, when morning dawned, they had thrown up a work some 1100 yards in length, and at a distance of about 1000 yards from the Central Bastion.* Men imagined that the spectacle of what they had been suffered to achieve without hindrance, must needs become a painful one to the enemy as soon as he should discover it. They little imagined — what yet we shall by-and-by see — they little imagined the feeling with which, on the morning of the 10th of October, the garrison would learn that their foe had indeed broken ground, and begun upon that kind of strife which is waged with pickaxe and spade. From this time, the French pushed on their The pro- works with great spirit; and, as marking the sin- fheFrench gular difference that there is between the ways of a works * French and the ways of an English commander, it seems worth while to repeat the order which was issued at this time by Forey. He gave orders for “zeal,” and “contempt of danger.” “It is neces- sary,” said he, in his general order, “that every “one, by his zeal, by his contempt of danger, * 1030 yards. 56 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. chap. LVIII. The ene- my’s sal- lies and cannon- ades. Progress of the French works. The diffi- culties en- countered by the English. The plan with which the English were ob- liged to content them- selves. u should aim at attaining as promptly as possible '“the glorious end wliicli we propose to ourselves.” And of the warlike virtues thus invoked there was no default. The enemy often busied himself with sallies at night, and the cannonades with which he assailed his besiegers and their works rarely ceased for any long time, and were sometimes of exceeding power. It is recorded that one day — the 14th of October — and in the space of a single hour, there were hurled against the works of the French no less than 800 cannon-shot; with a result which included a good deal of harm to the parapets, but killing only two men and wounding three.* The next day, for a time, a lire of the same kind was again opened; but notwithstanding all the hindrances offered, the French works on Mount Rodolpli grew fast towards completion, and were soon connected with one another, as also with the ground in their rear, by fitting lines of entrenchment. Whilst the French, in most places, had beneath them a fair enough depth of such earth as will yield to the pickaxe and spade, the ground in front of the English was almost bare rock — rock covered but thinly, where covered at all, with soil a few inches deep. Partly from that cause, partly from the con- figuration of the ground, and partly from the failure * Niel, p. 53; and Todloben, p. 300, wlio gives the number of shots at 9G0. The object of these cannonades of the 14th and 15th of October was to test the working of the Russian batteries , and prepare by actual experiment for the day of conflict. — Todleben, p. 299. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 57 of the above stated proposal for drawing the invest- ment more close, our Engineers were prevented from' fastening, as the French had been able to do, upon ground at all near to the fortress. The most that the English at this time could do was to endeavour to establish their siege-guns upon the Woronzoff Height and the Green Hill, at distances of from 1300 to 1400 yards from the place; and this they proposed to do by seizing at night time the best ground that could be chosen for the purpose on each of the two ridges, and there constructing the bat- teries with which they intended to prepare the way for assault. Accordingly, on the nights of the 10th and the 1 1th of October, the English succeeded in opening the trenches which they had designed to construct on Green Hill as well as on the Woronzoff Height; and it soon appeared that the fire they had means of preparing was likely to be much more effective than they had ventured to hope that it could be when first they prepared to break ground. By the evening of the 16th of October the Eng- lish had established their batteries, and stood ready, as did also the French, to open fire on the following morning. The English were to be held ready to storm the Redan as soon as the French operations should be ripe for a like effort against the Flagstaff Bastion. War by this time had set its desolating mark upon the ridges and the slopes of the Chersonese. CHAP. LVIH. In the nights of, the 10 th and 11th Oct. the English opened their trenches on Green Hill and the Wo- ronzoff Height ; and soon it was per- ceived that their batteries were likely to operate more effi- ciently than had been at first ex- pected. The ap- pearance 58 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LVIII. of desola- tion cre- ated at this time by the necessity of strip- ping the buildings of their roofs. When first the Allies seized the ground, there was to be seen here and there a farmhouse, a windmill, a cluster of cottages. But amongst the many wants of the Allies the want of timber was one; and the English more especially were put to great straits in this respect, because the platforms sent out with their siege-trains were of a new and ingenious structure, which, though promising to serve its end admirably when tried upon a perfect level at Wool- wich, turned out to be altogether unfitted for the rocky, and necessarily uneven ground where our bat- teries had to be placed. So, all at once, it appeared that platforms of the old-fashioned sort must be framed; and, to meet the emergency, most of the few buildings which stood on the Chersonese were quickly strip t of their roofs. It was only necessity which drove Lord Itaglan to this measure, for he well knew of course that, in many ways, the roofed buildings found on the Chersonese could not but be of great value to his army. Another house standing within reach of a sally which the enemy undertook for the purpose, was by him set on fire, and burnt down. Marked thus, with the ruins of men’s homes standing up here and there on the sky-line, the hills began to look ghastly. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 59 CHAPTER LIX. Although the Generals of the Allied armies ciiap. LIX trusted that, by the process already described, it was Desirc ~~~ feasible to break into the place against even the^atthe most steady resistance, they yet were not without should^ hope that the power of their artillery, when felt in in the at- the town of Sebastopol, and along the lines of de- Sebasto 00 fence, might beget such confusion and panic as poL would be likely to paralyse the defence, and ease the task of assaulting. Pursuing that thought, they desired that, in order still further to perturb the mind of the enemy, and distract it from quarters where the strife would be vital, the ^fleets should take part in the enterprise by attempting some kind of attack. It will presently be seen that, to obtain this con- currence of the navy, a good deal of urgency was used; and it is well to understand the grounds of that resistance — whether actual , or only anticipated — which had to be overcome by so strong an exer- tion of will.* The warlike thousands who manned the Allied * In a private letter to Lord Raglan, 20th October 1854^ Dundas says plainly that he consented to the operation undertaken by the fleets “ with reluctance.” 60 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. The diffi- culty of indicating a way in which it would be prudent for the fleets to take part in the at- tack. fleets had long been yearning for the liour of battle 'witli impassioned vehemence; but the mental state of such combatants as have only to fight under orders is not at all similar to that of a commander who must answer to his Government, to his country, and to himself, for the wisdom of what he undertakes; and it would seem that, at this conjuncture, the mind of an Admiral entrusted with power to grant or with- hold the aid of the English navy must have laboured with thoughts of this kind: “Any good opportunity “for taking part in the attack upon Sebastopol would “be singularly welcome; for the eagerness of our “people on board has grown to a height almost “dangerous to the maintenance of authority;* and “as the landsmen are confident in their hope of “carrying the place, we have every motive for shar- “ing in the achievement, if only we can do so with “credit. Perhaps our best mode of effecting a diver- sion in favour of the army would have been to “choose the moment appointed for the assault, and “then make a feint of landing towards the north, at “the same time cannonading the batteries on the “north shore with the fire of twenty steamers. Such “an operation would have been likely to make the “enemy withdraw troops from the scene of the real “conflict.** But a diversion of that kind is not, it * This was the case. ** This was Dundas’s opinion. — Letter of his to Lord Raglan, 25th October 1854. The reader of Todleben’s work will probably incline to believe that Dundas’s mind pointed in the right direction. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 61 “ seems, what the Generals desire. They wish that “the attack by the fleets should be one more closely' “in unison with that to be delivered by the land “forces. Let us see, then, what the fleets can do in “the way of direct attack upon Sebastopol. “We determined, some time ago, that in the face “of this barrier of sunken ships, and of the forts, “north and south, which arm the jaws of the road- stead, we would not attempt to break in. Is that “decision to be reconsidered? “No? Then it follows that, in the way of direct “attack upon Sebastopol, we can do nothing more “than cannonade the sea-forts. Well, but with what “result can we hope to engage our wooden ships “against casemated forts of stone, the work of a “quarter of a century? Amongst those who have “weighed the question of what ships can do against “masonry, some perhaps still imagine that, with “water enough to admit of close quarters, a fleet “having no other charge than to batter down a stone “fortress, or else be sunk in the attempt, might “possibly come off victorious. But whether that be “so or not we need hardly consider, for the soundings “do not offer us any such opportunity, and from our “Governments we have no such mission. We have “it in charge to defend the existence of the land “forces by maintaining the dominion of the sea. With “such a task weighing upon him, no naval com- “mander would be warranted in crippling his fleet for CHAP. nix. G2 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. “the 'sake of attempting mere mischief against the '“seaforts at a range of 800 yards. “If only for the sake of the land forces, and the “whole purpose of the invasion, our squadrons must “he always kept in a condition to maintain their “ascendant at sea. It is thought by some that this “ascendant lias been placed beyond the reach of all “challenge by the sacrifice the Russians have made. “True, the enemy has been dealing with some parts “of his Sebastopol fleet in a way which seemed to “show that he no longer meant it for sea; and, in- “deed, when we saw how he had sunk a number of “his ships across the mouth of the roadstead, we not “only said, ‘There ends the naval campaign!’ but “even ventured at once to give up to the land service “a large proportion of our strength in seamen and “marines, as well as in guns and materials; yet, for “all that, there is still one way — a way disastrous “for us — in which it would be possible for our “squadrons to bring about a renewal — or rather, “ one may say, a commencement — of the naval cam- paign. Only let us suffer our fleets to be disabled “by a ruinous encounter with the forts, and then the “Sebastopol fleet — for, after all, it is only a portion “of it which has been sunk — will be able at last to “come out and find us for once in a state ill-fitted “for a naval encounter. “Certainly we shall not choose to prepare such “a disaster for our fleets. Neither we nor any suc- cessor of ours will ever engage the batteries in a INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 63 “way that might be ventured by a commander who “is able to risk, and risk frankly, the actual destruC-" “tion of his squadron in an attack upon stone forts;* “and if we are persuaded to assail these sea-forts at “all, we shall not engage in the business with that “desperate purpose of running all hazards which “alone could open out to us any even faint prospect “of success. We know, in effect, beforehand, that “our attack of the sea-forts would be followed by no “result which could be worthily called a victory for “the naval forces. We know more. We know that, “after a while, mere exhaustion of shot will bring “our bombardment to a stop; and yet, if we thus “desist and sheer off without having first achieved “the ruin or surrender of the forts which we attack, “our failure will be signal — will, in short, be a “kind of defeat. Supposing that we give our aid in “the attack of Sebastopol, the part we take will be “this: For the purpose of effecting a diversion in “favour of the land forces, we shall attack the forts “in half earnest, yet at some cost of life and limb “and naval strength. If that were all, we might “willingly do as we are asked; but also — and there “lies the precious sacrifice — w T e shall be wilfully en- countering a discomfiture. Can this be agreed to * Dundas soon had a successor. No living man, I imagine, could desire more passionately than Lyons did to bring the power Of the Navy to bear upon the great enterprise , but from the moment when he at- tained the command of the fleet until the close of the war he never struck a blow at Sebastopol. I CHAP. LIX. 64 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lix P ’ one whose duty it is to maintain unimpaired the “renown of the navy?” The The French Admiral was under the orders of French Admiral General Canrobert; and although Lord Raglan had thef orders no actual authority over the English fleet, he could Canro- eral speak to its. Admiral in the form of request, and that, bert * too, with no little cogency. By character and tem- lmi’s pro^ perament, no man then living, I think, could have limtance" been ^ ess inclined than Lord Raglan to press with adviced ac ^ v * ce or exhortation upon a colleague of the sister d undas. service holding equal command with himself*, and the terms of his intercourse with Admiral Dundas were not of such a kind as to lessen his reluctance; ms sense put he felt all the weight of that charge to capture of the duty . ° . ° . 1 , which Sebastopol, which was given, as he expressed it, by upon^hfm. “the united voice of the Queen, the Government, “and the country;” and besides, he already per- ceived that an army nailed fast to the Chersonese by the strength of an unperformed vow, must soon be brought into trouble by time and the lapse of the seasons. Therefore it was that, with a degree of urgency to which he but seldom resorted, he resolved to press upon Admiral Dundas the importance of sup- porting the efforts of the land forces by the active cooperation of the fleet. The want It would have been well if the communication sonaiin- needed for this purpose had been oral; and indeed between. 6 it must be acknowledged that, at this conjuncture, lan and. ag the feelings which prevented a cordial and personal o undas. intercourse between Lord Raglan and Admiral Dun- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 65 das did harm to the public service. The differences P* 1 ^ 1 ** existing between them had been closed, it is true, in a measure, by the reconciliation effected in the previous month, and thenceforth the written corre- spondence of the two chiefs with each other was con- ducted in the way that is usual with men who are personally acquainted: but still Dundas never used to come to Headquarters*, and Lord Raglan, as might be supposed, did not quit his duties on shore to go on board the flag-ship. From this separation, so far as I know, no evil had hitherto resulted, for Lyons, as the commander of the in-shore squadron, was ever at hand — ever burning with zeal to bring to the aid of the land forces the resources of the fleet; but now that the duty of landing troops and supplies, and tending the march of the armies, was to be followed by that of determining whether the fleets should take part with the land forces in one great attack upon Sebastopol, much advantage would have been likely to result from a close and free in- tercourse between Lord Raglan and Dundas. Indeed no one, I think, well acquainted with the qualities of the two commanders, would easily believe that, after conversing freely upon such a question, they would have been likely to come to any other than a sound conclusion. This, however, was not to be; and I cannot Theab ' 7 7 7 sence of think that the absence of Dundas from the English t ^Y n j*. as at Headquarters was effectually supplied by Lyons, from the Invasion of the Crimea. VI. 5 66 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lix P Na y> it rather will be inferred tliat the counsels of English Lyons, at this time, were conducing to the course terswasT" which Lord Eaglan took, and to the naval operation dually sup- which resulted. plied by The ^ me j n0 w speak of is the second week in Lyons. x Rather it tke month of October. Lyons then, with the Agamem- non , was on duty at Balaclava. As might be ex- the conn- pected, lie was much with Lord Eaglan, and the in- Lyons tercourse between the two was most cordial. By his ducingto exceeding zeal for the cause, Lyons had wrought L 0 e rd°Rag e - himself into a high state of vehemence; and he had lan took. no £ y e t cleared his mind (as he did a day or two afterwards) by comparing his idea of what the navy could do against Sebastopol, with that entertained in the fleet. Now, considering the cordial terms on which Lord Eaglan was associated with Lyons, and the course which duty and common -sense would naturally enjoin, it may be regarded as certain that the appeal which Lord Eaglan was about to address to Dundas, must have been made after free consulta- tion with Lyons. It is not less certain that, if Lyons at this time had gained that greater clearness of view which he derived on the following Monday from liis intercourse with the ships’ captains, his counsels would have been of much greater worth to Lord Eaglan; and in that case also, it may, I think, be inferred that Lord Eaglan’s appeal to Dundas would either have been withheld altogether, or else would have been made in terms less cogent, and leaving- more room for the free deliberation of the naval INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 67 Commander.* Be that as it may, Lord Raglan’s appeal was in writing, and the letter which conveyed' it ran thus : — “Before Sevastopol, IZth October 1854. “ My dear Admiral Dundas, — This letter will be de- livered to you by Lieutenant-Colonel Steele. I have re- “ quested him to wait upon you with it , and if you will be “ so good as to allow him to impress upon you the great “ importance I attach to the active co-operation of the “ combined fleets , upon the day on which the French and “English armies open their fire, and commence their at- tack upon Sevastopol. “That day is fast approaching, and both General Can- “robert and myself feel that, if the enemy’s attention can “be occupied on the sea front as well as upon that of the “land, there will be a much greater chance of making a “serious impression upon their works of defence, and of “throwing the garrison into confusion. If the first efforts “ of a combined attack by sea and land should be great, “the most advantageous consequences may be anticipated “from it; and I know no way so likely to insure success “as the combined efforts of the Allied naval and military “forces. The royal navy has already done so much for “the army, that the latter has no claim upon its further “exertions perhaps; but then it must be recollected that “the former aspires to share in the renown which those of “the sister service hope to gain in bringing the present * See post , extract from letter of Lyons to Lord Raglan of tlie 16tli of October. I think it plain from the tenor of that letter that , until Lyons, after being recalled to the fleet, had brought his mind into con- tact with those of the ships’ captains, he had not perceived the most objectionable feature of the proposed naval attack. From the time when he thus corrected his view , I do not see that his opinion of the plan, in a naval point of view, differed from that of Dundas. CHAP. LIX. Lord Rag- lan’s letter to Dundas sent 14th, dated 13th, of October. 68 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. “enterprise to a happy conclusion, and their presence ■“would go far to make all feel that victory would be “nearly a matter of certainty. I can hardly find terms to “ express my sense of the aid afforded to me by Sir Ed- “mund Lyons since he came into Balaclava; but now that “most of what we chiefly required has been landed , and “active measures have been taken to put the place in a “state of defence, I should do an injustice to him if I were “to urge the further detention of the Agamemnon in the “harbour, and particularly when I see that there is a “chance of that noble ship distinguishing itself under his “able guidance. I entertain no doubt that it is his ambi- tion that it should be so employed. Our position here is “at least an extraordinary one. We are in the middle of “October. The fine weather which we have been so “fortunate as to enjoy, with one single day’s exception, “since we appeared on the south side of Sevastopol, can “hardly be expected to last much longer, and large rein- “ forcements are moving from the northward to the assist- ance of Prince Mentschikoff. Time, therefore, is most “precious, and we have not much left to capture the place “ which we have been called upon by the united voice of “the Queen, the Government, and the country, to take “possession of, and which our recent success on the Alma “will have led all to believe could and would be accom- plished. Not to disappoint these universal expectations, “the combined efforts of all branches of the naval and “military service are necessary, and none, I am sure, will “be withheld. “Excuse my pressing these considerations upon your “attention. (Signed) “Raglan. “His Excellency Vice-Admiral Dundas, C. B.” The feel- If must be acknowledged that the feeling which prevised P reva il e( I * n fl ie English fleet at this time was not at this a t all such as to support Dundas in any resistance INVASION OF THE CHIME A. 69 to Lord Raglan’s appeal. From the very souls of those thousands of warlike men, all bent upon hopes' of a fight long given and long deferred, there had been generated a force too mighty, and, if so one may say, too spiritual, in its nature, to be altogether controllable by mere authority. To resist it, a com- mander would need all the support that could be given him by an officer serving next under him. Lyons was the second in command. He, however, by this time, had certainly placed himself in a state of determined antagonism to his chief. Devoting his energies, with all that fiery zeal of which we have spoken, to the business of the invasion, he seems to have lost his power of appreciating the less stirring duties which devolved upon Dundas ; and (apparently) by contrasting his own ceaseless activity with the seeming quietude of the Vice-Admiral, he wrought himself into a state of mind and feeling which was hardly compatible with loyalty towards his chief. Lyons himself, I think, would not have said that he was loyal to Dundas; but rather would have insisted that, because of the lukewarmness and obstructive tendency which he imputed to his chief, disloyalty had become a duty, and, indeed, at the time we speak of, this spirit of resistance to the naval Com- mander-in-Chief had won a strange sanction from home.* * The sanction here spohen of was contained in a letter from the Secretary of State (see the next note) , which had been despatched on the 9th of October, though it had not yet reached its destination. CHAP. LIX. time in the English fleet. The feel- ing and attitude of Lyons towards Dundas. 70 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. The sanc- tion which this spirit of resist- ance ob- tained from the Secretary of State. The letters which reached London from the fleet and from the camp , were so charged with accounts of the supposed torpor or wilful obstructiveness of Dundas, and of the devoted energy of Lyons, that they failed not to work a deep impression upon the mind of the Duke of Newcastle; and the result was that, upon his sole and undivided responsibility, he ventured to give his conditional warrant to a mea- sure of singular boldness. Conceiving that to thwart or obstruct the zeal of Sir Edmund Lyons was to in- volve the expedition in imminent danger, yet fearing, apparently, that his design, if communicated to the Cabinet, would be baffled by the scruples of more timid men, the Duke went the length of intimating — and this without the knowledge of his colleagues — that he would support Lord Raglan and Sir Ed- mund Lyons, if Sir Edmund, in concert with Lord Raglan, should take upon himself to act indepen- dently of his chief. In other words, the Duke carried his burning eagerness for the public service to the extent of inviting Lyons to enter upon a course of mutinous resistance to the will of Dundas.* By those * It was in a letter to Lord Raglan, of the 9th of October 1854, that the Duke gave this bold, nay, as he himself would be the first to say, this lawless undertaking. Without ever disguising for a moment the lawlessness of the proceeding, the Duke often spoke of it to me as one of the acts of his life to which he looked back with pride and satisfac- tion. I have not at present before me the letter of the 9th of October, for it seems to have been handed by Lord Raglan to Sir E. Lyons , and the Duke’s copy of it (vrhich Mr. Gladstone, his executor, at no small cost of trouble to himself, has most kindly endeavoured to find) will not perhaps come to light in time for publication in this volume. I INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 71 means, such as they are, which enable me to cojne to a judgment, I am brought to believe that, in" suffering himself to take this attitude towards his chief, Lyons was at once honest and wrong ;* but, be that as it may, he made no secret of his opinions nor yet of his feelings*, and the known antagonism in which he stood towards Dundas, gave a head to the warlike impatience which stirred every ship in the squadrons. In this condition of things it would have been The ex- hard for the firmest of men to withstand a request dinfcuUy of resist- however have before me a written statement by the Duke of the pur- Raglan’s port of the letter (given in the Appendix), and also Lord Raglan’s reply appeal, to it. As may well he supposed, Lord Raglan, “educated in the strictest “ school of discipline,” was startled at the idea of his “ suggesting, to a “second in command, to set aside the authority of his Commander-in- “ Chief” (see the MS. Memorandum by Mr. Loch in the Appendix) ; and his reply to the Duke is as follows : — “Before Sebastopol, October 28, 1854. “ Confidential. “My dearDuke of Newcastle, — I thought it best to communicate “your letter, marked confidential, of the 9th inst., to Sir E. Lyons, who “has since had letters from Sir James Graham of a subsequent date, in “which he does not refer to what you tell me, but appears to wish that, “if possible, all scandal should be avoided. “I am quite satisfied that this is in the highest degree desirable, “and I do not think anything can occur to render it necessary to take “ any such extreme step as you authorise the adoption of. “It is, however, veiy gratifying to me , and I make no doubt it is “ equally so to Sir E. Lyons , that you should place such confidence “in us.” Those who knew Lord Raglan’s accustomed way of expressing him- self will perhaps detect a characteristic archness in his manner of saying that Sir James Grahaai — the most cautious of men — «had sent letters to Lyons containing ao reference to the subject of the Duke’s secret instruction. * The voluminous correspondence of both the Admirals with Lord Raglan, forms a part of the ground on which I rest my conclusion. 72 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lix P ‘ SUC ^ as had come from the English Head- Dundas’s" - quarters. Dundas at once yielded; and the officer consent. w jj 0 p ac i brought to the flag -ship Lord Raglan’s appeal, carried back the consent of the Admiral. Dundas’s short answer ran thus : — “Britannia, off Sevastopol, 14 th October 1854. “My dear Lord Raglan, — Colonel Steele has just ar- rived with your lordship’s letter of yesterday’s date, and “you may depend on my using every exertion with my “French colleagues to aid in your object. “Sir E. Lyons I have recalled from his present post, “where his services have been so valuable, and I have no “doubt, in his magnificent screw-ship, he will be of the “greatest use here. “I will consult with Admiral Hamelin as to our joint “operations, and will thank your lordship to let me know “the time when you intend to attack. “I do not wish to detain Colonel Steele, and therefore “leave it to him to explain what has passed between us. “Yours faithfully, “ Jno. D. Dundas.” 15 th Oct. In a conference held the next day on board the ference Mogador, the Allied Admirals resolved that, in order the Moga- to support the attack of Sebastopol by the Allied armies , all the ships of their squadrons should solution of execute, at the same time, a general attack upon the ference." sea-forts of the place, and the ships lying moored in its harbour.* The captains of the English ships * First resolution contained in the paper headed, “Resolutions prises par les Admiraux des trois escadres Alliees au sujet do l’attaque de Sevastopol.” This paper, dated the 15th of October, and signed by INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 73 judged that the co-operation of the fleets should be C I ^ P> simultaneous — not with the preliminary bombard-~o P inion of ment, but rather — with the intended assault ,* and li^h^hfp Lyons soon afterwards agreed with them, declaring inward that he could not see what advantage was to be t ? the , ° # stage of “gained by firing, and then retiring, without the^ccon- “ means of renewing the attack from day to day;” which and that such an operation could “hardly fail to shouM 7 “encourage the enemy,” because he would think — its^attack? and truly, too — that the fleets of great naval States, Lyons which desisted from an attack which they had de- thSr U opin- liberately commenced, must be desisting from a want d ’ of power to go on,** If the land forces should carry 16 5 h > p®J- Sebastopol — and they were confident, at the time, ^ice of the , r itt* 7 • i plan. that they would do so — it might be more or less gratifying to the lovers of the sister service to feel that the navy, though unable to do more, had, at all events, borne a part in the preparatory cannonade; but that humble share in a great triumph was not what the ship captains wanted. They desired that The view the part the squadrons were to take should be one elfbythe of such a kind as to be powerfully conducive to the^ 1 *^ great end; and it was all but evident that, if the taius ° 7 regard to the part proposed Dundas, Hamelin, Ahmet Pasha, Bruat, Lyons, Charner, and Bouet to be taken Willaumez, was received by Lord Raglan on the 16th. ^y the * Writing from the fleet, Lyons says that this was “the strong and “universal opinion amongst the captains here” (private fetter to Lord Raglan, 16th October 1854). I have no reason for supposing that the French or the Turkish captains differed from the English ; but it is not within my knowledge that they expressed an opinion on the question. ** Ibid. 74 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. The deci- sion of the Admirals in confer- ence. Their second re- solution. Decision of the Generals upon the choice of- fered them by the Admirals. fire of tlie ships on the sea -forts was to be simul- taneous with the land cannonade, it must not only lead to failure, but failure of such a kind as to wear in its public aspect the character of a naval discom- fiture. But the Admirals sitting in conference judged that they might appropriately leave it to the men of the armies to say in what stage of the impending conflict they would best like to have the help which the navy could give them;* and accordingly, after intimating that their ammunition was limited to 70 rounds for each gun, ** they submitted it to the Generals on shore to determine whether this, their supply of projectiles, should be all expended at the time of the land cannonade or at the time of the assault, or whether it should be divided into two, so as for one half of it to be used at the time of the land cannonade and the other half at the time of the assault.*** The Generals chose the last of the proffered alter- natives. Indulging, as we saw, a fond hope that the united power of the artillery might engender con- fusion in the place, they judged that the hour which * Lyons was present at the conference ; but, unfortunately, his per- ception of that true view of the question which the ship captains pre- sented to his mind was subsequent to the meeting of the naval con- ference , in w r hich the Admirals determined to leave the question to the decision of the Generals. ** That is, 140 rounds for each gun meant to be used ; the intention being that each ship should deliver fire from one only of her two broadsides. *** Second resolution, uli ante. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 75 they had fixed for commencing the land cannonade C lix P — that is, half-past six in the morning — would be ~ also the most fitting time for the ships to open their fire.* In the joint letter which conveyed this de- Joint let- . J J terofCan- cision, the Generals applauded the great resolve robertand to which the Admirals had come, and ventured an lan to the opinion that, by the common action of the fleets and Admirals * the armies conjoined, “moral and material effects” would be produced which must “insure the success of “the attack upon Sebastopol.” They also intimated The plan i X . tip . , of the that the attack would begin at halt-past six m the naval at- morning, and ended by announcing that an entire originally cessation of the fire from the trenches was to foe conceived * taken as a signal that the moment for the assault had come.** Regarded separately, and apart from any advan- To the tage which a naval diversion might confer upon thegarJed^ land forces, the Allied fleet, when thus invoked, had ®he pian ly no clear prospect thrown open to it except a prospect of failure. Lyons came to see this, we know, before but fai1 ' * J 1 1 ure. * Written communication from General Canrobert and Lord Raglan — date, the 16th October. ** The letter, 16th October 1854, was signed by Lord Raglan as well as by Canrobert , but it was drawn up by the French ; and I imagine that, if there had been time for mere literary changes, Lord Raglan would have liked to exclude the part about “ great resolye “moral “effects,” and certainty of success. The arrangement which the French expanded into the form of the joint letter was come to by Canrobert and Lord Raglan in the presence of General Rose and Colonel Trochu, and was recorded by a memorandum now lying before me in the hand- writing of Colonel Trochu. 76 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CIIAP. LIX. the day of the action;* and Dundas, more calm than 'his second in command, had perceived, from the first, that the operation was a “false” one.** The chiefs thought thus ill of the plan even before those sudden changes enforced by the French of which we shall afterwards hear; and the evil was, not that the Ad- mirals judged wrongly, but that their judgment was overborne by paramount forces. All, landsmen as well as sailors, desired that the part to be taken by the navy should be one of glory; and Lord Raglan, whose heart ever warmed with gratitude and admira- tion when he spoke of the seamen, was especially anxious that they should have their full share in what he believed to be the approaching triumph; but with this desire in common, there was still, as might be expected, a variety in the tendencies of the several minds which were brought to bear upon the naval counsels. The longing of the seamen for a naval engage- ment had been so effectually baffled by obdurate stone forts and the shoal newly formed of sunken ships, that a real attack upon Sebastopol and its sheltered fleet was deemed to be out of their power; but the frustrated ardour of officers and men (grow- ing fast, as some thought, to a grave discontent), and the probable eagerness of the people at home to see their fleets striking a blow, made it easy for the Generals to ask, and to ask with imperative cogency, * See his letter of the 16th October to Lord Raglan, quoted ante. ** Letter from Dundas to Lord Raglan, 20th October 1851. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 77 that the fleets should undertake a diversion in favour of the land forces; and thus it resulted that the Ad-“ mirals, though seeing aright, were moved in the wrong direction. Without being led astray by any ill- founded intelligence, without being caught by a fal- lacy, without being met and confounded by the darkness which shrouds the future, they still were so beset by circumstances that, knowingly and with open eyes, they prepared for themselves a discom- fiture. The Generals commanding the French and Eng- lish armies found themselves invested — the one by express commission, and the other by circumstance — with an all but complete power to enforce the concurrence of the fleets in their meditated under- taking, and having that power they thought fit to use it. Lord Raglan’s appeal to the navy was one of such irresistible urgency that virtually, as I think, he would have made himself answerable in an equal degree with Canrobert for summoning the fleets to take part in the attack, if it were not for this all- important difference — namely, that Canrobert, in ordering the French fleet to attack, was following apparently his own judgment , without accepting much light from the mind of the Admiral serving under him; whilst Lord Raglan, on the other hand, when he made his appeal to Dundas, was writing, so to speak, with Rear-Admiral Lyons at his side, — * was writing, in short, with all the sanction which CHAP. LIX. 78 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LIX. could be given by the opinion of a naval commander "deeply trusted by the Government at home.* It must also be remembered that if Lord Raglan thus ventured to invoke the aid of the navy, he, at all events, did nothing to render its action abortive. He took no part with General Canrobert nor with Admiral Hamelin in causing those changes which we shall by-and-by hear of as defacing the original plan. * Lyons, as we saw, was at Balaclava in the most friendly and con- stant communication with Lord Raglan. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 79 CHAPTEE LX. In tliat room by the “Number Four” Battery on C £ T £ P - the north of the roadstead where Prince Mentschikoff met his vicegerent, we heard the Prince flatly an- nouncing that he would not engage his field army in the conflict which awaited the garrison; we also heard Korniloff answer, that without the field army Sebastopol must surely fall; and, finally, we heard the Prince say he would summon a council of war. There, the conference ended; and during the Forsome ^ hours the hours which followed, the fate of the “jewel,” the fate of Se- “ treasure” — for so men called their loved fortress — wasinsus- was hanging upon the chance that a wrong-headed, pense ’ obstinate man might be driven, for once, from his purpose. That purpose, however, was of a sort to^fiehide- be almost revolting; for what it involved was — not character , 1 ° i i in .of Prince the surrender o± a beleaguered tortress to superior Mentschi- forces , but — the abandonment to the enemy of tinned en- many thousands of sailors and landsmen who, hav- fo with- 8 ing stood fast to their guns when the army marched ^garr? out in the night-time, were still defending the place ®°£ofhis with intent to hold out to extremity. And, Prince field army. Mentschikoff s communications with the interior of Bus si a being now in perfect security, the reason 80 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX. The pro- bable in- tention with which Mentschi- koff un- dertook to summon a council of war. which Lad excused liim when retreating out of "Sebastopol could no longer hold good as a warrant for standing aloof from the conflict. Upon the theory, I suppose, that the State must ever be ready for the defence of its honour and its interests, but especially for the defence of its terri- tory, tens of thousands of the youth of All the Russians had been every year torn from their homes at a cruel cost of life and happiness. Well, one of those very conjunctures which was to be provided for by the infliction of all these sufferings upon millions and millions of men had now at last come. A great Russian fortress more precious than many a kingdom, was assailed by the foreign invader. Brave sailors, with a handful of landsmen, were labouring to defend it; and already, as we know, to cover the town, there had been formed an entrenched position four miles in length. Without a reinforcement of several thousands of infantry to hold that entrenched position, the case of the garrison was hopeless. With it, the place might be formidably defended. That was the exigency. All ready to meet it, if only the Commander would give his assent, Prince Men- tschikoffs army was lying on the north of the road- stead in actual sight of the garrison — nay, almost within hailing distance. Yet, when he came into conference, Prince Mentschikoff had still thought it possible for him to deny the garrison all aid from his field army; and his promise to summon a coun- cil of war gave little or no room for thinking that INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 97 CHAPTER LXI. I. If it be acknowledged that tbe forces now charged crap. with the land defence of Sebastopol outnumbered the consider^ troops which besieged it-,* that, in command of^^i^ labour and material resources, the garrison had an pgcts r of enormous ascendancy-, that they were strongly en- the s arri * trenched-, that they had in their rear a harbour and a roadstead not only made good against hostile in- trusion by sea, but assuring them aid close at home from the broadsides of their own men-of-war; and, finally, if it be granted that the relieving army now gathered under Prince Mentschikoff had a greater numerical strength than the forces which covered the siege, men may ask how it came to be believed by both the French and the English, that the chances of war on the morrow would be brought to incline to their cause. The Allies trusted much to the power of their Sources of i -n n the confi- ordnance as well as to the quality of their troops ; deuce felt * I. e , Forey’s siege corps , and the English troops camped on the Chersonese. It will be remembered that Bosquet’s corps (having with it Canrobert’s Turkish battalions) and also the forces engaged in de- fending the town and plain of Balaclava were not in the number of the troops which carried on the siege. For the strength of the contending forces at this time see the Appendix, Invasion of the Crimea , VI. 7 98 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX I. by the Allies. The bat- teries with which the Allies were to under- take this cannon- ade. and, apart from tlie baneful delays wliicli their plan of attack had involved, it was not an ill-devised measure. The Allies, we saw, hoped to be able to get down the fire of the place to an extent which would enable their assaulting columns to gain the Redan and the Flagstaff Bastion , without, up to that time, undergoing an overwhelming loss from artillery; and they trusted that, when once they had thus pierced the enemy’s line, their troops would so over- master any soldiery that could be gathered to meet them in rear of the assaulted ramparts, as to be able to cut into two the whole structure of the Russian defences. This last liojie was even, perhaps, better founded than the Allies at the time understood it to be; for we now know that, notwithstanding the large reinforcements then lately brought into Sebastopol, the extent and conformation of the ground which the garrison had to defend put it almost out of their power to be prepared at each point against the ap- prehended assaults with what they judged competent forces. It was with batteries of 126 pieces, including 18 heavy mortars, that the Allies hoped to get down the fire of the enemy’s defences; and of these, 53 were French,* and 73 English.** Of the English guns, 29 were manned by our seamen, the rest by our Royal Artillery. *** The battery which the French * Nicl, “Journal des Operations du Genie,” p. 60. Auger gives the number of guns as 49, but T follow Niel. ** “Journal of the English Engineers,” p. 31. #** Ibid, See details of armament in Appendix. INVASION OF TIfE CRIMEA. 99 liad constructed by the sea-shore (near the site of c ^ r p - an old Genoese fort), and also the two English Lan- caster batteries, may be regarded as standing, in some measure, apart from the general plan of attack; and all the rest of the siege ordnance with which the Allies thus proposed to conquer the enemy’s fire were distributed into three systems. One of these was the system or string of batteries erected by the French on the crest of Mount Eodolpli, and armed with 49 pieces. Another was the bending line of English batteries on Green Hill, with an armament of 41 jneces, which our people called the “Left,” or “Chapman’s Attack.” The third, called the “Eight,” or “Gordon’s Attack,” was on the Woronzoff Height, and its two-faced array of batteries mounted 26 pieces. Without counting the batteries of the Jagoudil The P ieces — a ship lying moored across the head of the Man- Russians of- war Harbour * — or any other of the guns still on battery, deck which could be more or less brought into use, u^on the Russians , we saw, had in battery for the land defence of Sebastopol on its south side 341 pieces of^^' artillery; but of these, there stood opposed to the batteries established by the Allies only 118 pieces, including five heavy mortars. ** Amongst the 'rest of the 118 pieces there were some guns of great calibre; but, upon the whole, a salvo from the 126 * The J agoudil was an 84-gun ship which lay at the very head of the Man-of-war Creek with her larboard broadside towards the besiegers. ** Todleben, p. 344. 7 * 100 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. <*£• battering pieces now prepared for the siege was a good deal more weighty than one from the 118 pieces with which the Russians meant to engage them. * irrespec- ‘ It therefore appears that, as regards the weight the^Jus of ordnance brought into actual service for the artil- there were l er 7 conflict of the 17th of October, the garrison was counting inferior to its assailants; but it must be understood board 11 that, irrespectively of the 118 pieces thus awaiting ship) igo an encounter with the battering-guns of the besiegers, which the Allies, if proceeding to assault, might have to thTap- incur whilst advancing not only the shell and the an^ 63 eS ’ shot ships’ guns trained and pointed beforehand sides be " from the waters below, but also the fire of as many which as 150 p'nns established in land batteries which could take ° thebe- swept the approaches of the place; and that, even siegers in . , front or in alter traversing the approaches thus guarded , and th5r com- coming at last to close quarters, the still surviving close 0 assailants might be encountered in front or in flank quarters, py the blasts of yet 63 more pieces of cannon de- livering grape-shot and canister. ** Thepoten- It must also be borne in mind that potentially, ority of the ordnance arm of the Russians had a much greater skm^in ascendant than is indicated by giving the number artillery. an q ca pp re 0 f their guns already in battery. To an * 12 per cent greater, according to Todleben, 344. ** Guns opposed to the batteries of the Allies, . . 118 Guns sweeping the approaches, 160 Guns for taking the besiegers when at close quarters in front or flank, . . 63 Total (being the numbers given ante), . 341 INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA. 101 extent which, for a long time to come, must enable c ^x A i P ‘ them to outdo their assailants in artillery conflict, the garrison could not only command endless sup- plies of guns and ammunition, but (because of their strength in workmen as well as in material) could ceaselessly repair and re-arm, or shift or improve their batteries, and augment them in numbers and power. In distributing his batteries along the lines of The man- defence, Colonel Todleben had not apportioned them which the ratably to the strength of the respective systems of ‘o/the bat- “ Attack” which they were destined to encounter. Whilst he ventured to meet the 71 earns and mor- encounter ° those of tars of the English with so few as 54 pieces of ord- the be- ^ siegers nance, and those too, upon the whole, of a lighter was appor- calibre, he made ready to answer the 53 guns and the re- mortars which the French had in battery with a fire Attacks.” of G4 pieces.* At intervals throughout the night, the Russians, as it was their custom to do, fired some shots with the purpose of disturbing the working parties of the besiegers, but they elicited no reply. Notwithstanding that the intervention of the Allied J^timo * The calibres of the French and Russian guns being upon an average about equal, the superiority of the Russian armament was mea- sured by the difference in the number of the pieces, i. e., by the 'differ- ence between 64 and 53. Still, in the real conflict between the French and the Russians — i. e., the conflict between the batteries on Mount Rodolph and their opponents — the difference in the number of pieces was only 3. It was by the position of his batteries rather than by mere weight of metal that Todleben there prepared to take the ascendant. 102 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C inoT* nav y bad been suddenly postponed to a later hour, the open- the moment appointed for the opening of the land land can- cannonade remained unaltered. At half-past six in nonade. £j ie morn i n g 0 f the 17tli of October, three shells were to be discharged from one of the French batteries, and then forthwith the Allies were to open fire along the whole line of their works. The dawn The signal had not yet been given, when the of the 1 on ^caking grey of the morning enabled the Russians to see that the Allies, in the night-time, had cut their embrasures, and that seams of earth hitherto blank had all at once put on the look — significant of man and liis purpose — that is given by guns seen in battery. Here and there, as this change was o/the fire descried, a Russian battery opened fire. More fol- lowed. Some French guns began to make answer. There was more and more light. A body of French tirailleurs with a support pushed forward towards the enemy’s lines. Sebastopol beat to arms. The three appointed signal shells sprang out from the lines on Mount Rodolph. In a minute, some Eng- lish guns opened; and presently, along their whole line of batteries, and along all the enemy’s works, from the Central to the Flagstaff Bastion, and thence across to the Redan, and thence on again to the Malakoff, there pealed a sustained cannonade. Then, Cannon- an( J quickly again, and from time to time , this sustained admg in 1 J ° 7 salvoes, cannonade was out-thundered by salvoes of a kind INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 103 sounding strange to the land-service people. No ships were in action*, but at the first roar of the mightier outburst, the seamen who heard it grew radiant. They knew by what manner of men such a salvo as that was delivered. Whether serving the guns of the English, or The cause forming part of the garrison, the sailors engaged inf^/in fu " this conflict had brought with them many of their salvoes * familiar usages; and the Russian sailors especially, ^en who who were fighting at the land defences to the num-j“^ her of several thousands, clung fast, it seems, to their customs. Their naval system had been in a great measure copied — copied even, perhaps, with servility — from that of the English; and thus it re- sulted that, in each of the main fastnesses which constituted the line of defence, there was much of the warlike practice, and even, indeed, of the lesser routine, which obtains on board English vessels. The “ bastion’' stood for the ship. The parapets were bulwarks; the embrasures were port-holes. Every piece the men had to serve they tended and fondled and cursed in their natural, seamanlike way; and that too with the more affection when they knew it for one of their own familiar ship’s guns. As in our naval service , so also with the Russian seamen, the drum used to beat to quarters ; but to other of their du- ties the men, though onshore, were still called by the boatswain’s whistle. They were piped to their meals; they were piped to their u grog.” Night, for them, was a period divided into “watches;” and far from going by 104 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. clock, they measured and marked lapse of time just as though they were still on board ship; so that when, for example, it was noon, they reported it always “eight bells,” and as soon as they had the due sanction, were ready to make it “eight.” But, so well had these Russians been taught, that they could not be got to stop short in their old English lesson at the point their Commanders desired. To the exceeding vexation of Todleben, they could not at all be persuaded to train and point every gun with a separate attention to the object for which he designed it. Knowing well what nation it was that manned the works on Mount Rodolph, the men at the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions were too strongly bent on the end, aim, and purpose of what they had learnt from the English, to be able to forego all the rapture of “giving ‘the Frenchman a “broadside.” And, that being done to begin with, their rooted faith was that, with no greater pauses of time than were of absolute need for sponging and loading and firing, one broadside should follow an- other. * * There was a part of the height overlooking Sebastopol from the neighbourhood of the “Maison d’eau” which served as a very good post for observation; but the three men who witnessed from that point the opening of this great cannonade were disturbed in their appreciation of its grandeur by an incident strangely incongruous. From the direction of Sebastopol three setters came ranging up the hill-side , but making small progress , for at every salvo they dropped. At the thunder of the nations, as though it were the report of their master’s “double-barrel,” the well-bred and well-broken beasts took care to “ down-charge.” I never knew whence the dogs came, nor whither they went. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 105 To be serving the guns; to be swiftly repairing C ^ T P ‘ tlie havoc from time to time wrought in the parapets The na- (and especially in the revetments of the embrasures) duty in by the enemy’s round-shot and shell; to be quench- ing the fires which were constantly seizing u P on Russian gabions, fascines, and timber; to be replacing guns ; Frencji, to be tending or removing in litters the men newly wounded; and to be toiling thus, hour by hour, in the midst of a dim pile of smoke, with a mind al- ways equal to an instant encounter with death, — * this was alike the duty of the French, of the Eng- lish, and of the Russians, who worked the power of artillery in the conflicting batteries; and, until there For some occurred that disaster to the French of which we conflict of shall presently speak, the duty was performed with unflinching persistency by besieged and besiegers ^ t n h e< J n _ alike. flinching spirit by The works which covered the Russian batteries the ^ had been constructed in haste, with dry, gritty earth the Eng- laboriously brought to the spot; and, no rain having the kus- come in the interval to bind the loose heaps into sians * solid structures, they formed of course sorry ram- parts. The embrasures, too, were weak. Some of Thefl ^ a \ . state of them, for want of fascines and hurdles, had been re- the Rus-^ vetted with bags of earth, with planks, or with works, clay. There were other embrasures which had not been revetted at all. Of the revetments formed with clay, some were brought down in fragments by the mere blast of the guns firing out from between them; and those that had been made of earth-sacks and 106 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. EXT The ima- ginary columns of attack with which the Russians were com- bating. planks very often took fire, and fell. There was need of heroic stubbornness to be able to cling to the determination of sacrificing numbers of lives with the object of restoring defences so easily brought to ruin*, but the garrison had been taught that it was of great moment to them to have their embra- sures in the best state that might be possible, and at whatever cost of life to those who were charged with the toil, they repaired them again and again. But the Russians — and that every minute — had to hold themselves in readiness for a yet harder trial. Expecting an assault, they ever kept steadfastly in sight that last appeal to “mitrail” which their great Engineer had designed; and often, very often they imagined that the appointed moment had come. From the irrepressible tendency of the seamen to deliver their fire in broadsides, it resulted — for no breath of wind was stirring — that the men, by these rapid discharges, piled up above and around them huge, steadfast, opaque banks of smoke, which so narrowed the field of every man’s sight that he hardly could see the outline of a comrade’s figure at a dis- tance of two or three paces. Now a dim bank of smoke, admitting distorted and deadened rays, yet confining within straitened limits the scope of a man’s real vision — this, we know, is a lens which gives infinite favour to the creatures of an imagination already excited by battle. The grey, floating wreaths, though their movement INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 107 can scarce be descried , are all tlie while slowly changing in place, as well as in form; and from that cause, or that cause in part, it seems to result that, when once the thick cloud which obscures a man’s vision has been peopled and armed by his fancy, the shapes which appear before him do not long continue at rest. They grow larger; they move; and the unreal creature of the brain wfiicli at first seemed like infantry halted is presently a column ad- vancing. With the Russians — a firm, robust people — the imagination, though straying beyond the bounds of reality, was still guided in part by sound know- ledge; for the images men saw in the smoke were the images of what might well be. As in a quarter of the field at the Alma (where the onset of the English horse might fairly enough have been looked for), the mist had seemed to reveal a host of cavalry charging, so now when, as people believed, the Allies would storm the defences, men easily fancied they saw — that they saw indeed many times over — the enemy’s columns of infantry coming on to deliver the assault. The quality of the Russian sol- dier being what I have said, these pictures of his imagination did not drive him at all into panic, but still they much governed his actions. Again, and again, those who manned guns so planted as to be of no service except against assailing infantry, worked as hard at their loading and firing as though the as- sault had begun, and many a blast of mitrail was sent tearing through phantom battalions. CHAP. LXI. 108 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. Condi- tions under which the cannon- ade would necessari- ly take place so far as con- cerned the respective losses of the Allies and the Russians. The forces defending Sebasto- pol were still under the com- mand of Admiral K or nil off. So long as tlie conflict should be one between 'covered batteries on one side and covered batteries on tlie other, there could not well be any approach to equality in point of losses between the besiegers and the besieged; for the Russians were not only forced to keep manned the 223 guns which they had prepared against the expected assaults, but also to have close at hand near the gorges of their bastions the bodies of infantry with which they designed to meet the same contingencies; and, both the gunners and the foot soldiery being imperfectly sheltered against the batteries of the Allies, it could not but result that the troops thus kept in expectation would be, many of them, killed or wounded; whilst the be- siegers, on the other hand, could keep out of fire the troops with which they meant to assault till the moment for their onset should come. Though Prince Mentscliikoff had come from the country of the Upper Belbec to the Severnaya, or North Side, and although he indeed crossed the road- stead on the morning of this cannonade, and visited a part of the lines in the Karabel faubourg, he did not long stay, as we shall see, amid the scenes of the artillery conflict which raged on the south of Se- bastopol; and the virtual control of the whole force of soldiers and sailors engaged in defending the place still remained in the hands of the seaman whom INVASION OF THE CRIMEA 109 the popular voice had raised up to be chief and com- c ^ p ' mander of all. If Korniloff had been in command of a military Grounds garrison so organised, and so highly instructed in all he judged their duties, as to warrant him in relying upon their p^rso^ai exact performance of orders, he would probably have atliiTbat- thought it his duty to remain, for the most part, at the central and commanding spot which he had of service, chosen as his dwelling: for there, he would have been most readily found; there, better than at the ramparts, he would have been able to understand the general state of the conflict; there, with the greatest despatch, he might have pushed forward his reserves to the endangered post; there, most quickly he would have been able to learn where his presence was needed. But the forces defending Sebastopol were not of such a kind as to warrant Korniloff in taking this strictly military view of the position in which events had placed him. On the contrary — and that he knew — it was the collapse of the mili- tary structure which had put upon him this great charge; and a true instinct told him, that as the hope of defending Sebastopol against a determined attack had had little to rest on at first save that spirit of enthusiastic devotion with which he had inspired his people, both seamen and soldiers, so, although the defence of the place was no longer a task of such utterly overwhelming difficulty as to need being faced in a spirit of romantic desperation, it still must depend for success upon his power of 110 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lx\ P exalting and sustaining men’s minds. Therefore, overriding the numberless advisers who strove to move him from his decision, he judged it his duty to be visiting the lines of defence, to be sharing in the risks of the day with the gunners who stood at the ramparts, and, in short, to cause himself to be seen at all the chief posts of danger. The move- Men belonging to Korniioff’ s Staff have cornme- inents of -it Korniioff. morated the acts and the words of their hero, in this the last day of his life, with an almost pious exact- ness; and, although it be plain that, amongst our people at home, the uneventful ride of a Russian Admiral from bastion to bastion will -never evoke that kind of interest which it wrought in the minds of his own fellow-countrymen, I yet imagine that some portion of the material derived from those loving records may help to give true impressions of the nature of the business which engaged the chiefs in Sebastopol on the day of the first cannonade, and may even, in an incidental and passing way, afford better insight into the condition of things within the fortress than could well be imparted by formal words of siege narrative saying when, where, and how the men were struck down and replaced, when and where a gun was dis- mounted, or an embrasure spoilt and restored. The instant he heard the opening of the cannon- ade, Korniioff hastened to spring into his saddle; His pre- and then — at so eager a pace that his Staff could the Flag- hardly keep up with him — he galloped off to the tion, Bas " Flagstaff Bastion. By the time that he had gained INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. Ill tlie esplanade by the left face of the bastion, the C j^ p * firing had grown to its full height and power. Al- ” ready the smoke of the salvoes in which the sailors delighted had enwrapped the whole field of sight in a thick steadfast cloud. Seen through it, the sun in the east was a dull red and lustreless orb. Yet, by the darts of fire which, from moment to moment, were piercing the cloud, Korniloff and the officers with him could make out where the enemy’s guns were in battery, or where their own were replying. In their rear, too, they saw through the smoke a third belt of fire; for behind the gorge of the bastion, the skilled contriver of the defences had planted two batteries, which threw their shells over the heads of the men engaged at the ramparts in front. It was hot at this time in the Flagstaff* Bastion; for the batteries of the French on Mount Bodolph — unstricken, as yet, with the havoc which awaited them — were exerting their full might; but also — and this was more formidable , by reason of the greater calibre of the guns — the left face of the bastion was battered, and, at the same time, its right face enfiladed, by the fire from Chapman’s At- tack. Korniloff conversed with the gunners, and to some of them he gave directions in regard to the pointing of the guns; but it does not appear that he brought himself to put a check upon liis seamen by prevent- ng them from firing in broadsides. He passed from His ride gun to gun along the whole bastion, and then went boulevard 112 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX I. towards the Peres- sip. along the winding boulevard line to that new work ‘adjoining the Peressip, which, because of its sudden growth, men called the “Mushroom” Battery. Whe- ther it was that the minds of men were so kindled as to be capable of giving new colour and form to what their sight conveyed to them, or that Korni- loffs look and bearing were really in some degree altered by the opening of the long-promised conflict, it is certain that the language of those who rode with him along the line of the boulevard gives a kind of support to that old superstition of the Scots which assured the believing world that approaching death was foreshown by a sign, and that when his end drew near the doomed man was clothed with a preternatural brightness. “Calm and stern,” says one of the Staff who rode with Korniloff — “calm “and stern was the expression of his face, yet a “slight smile played on his lips. His eyes — those “wonderful, intelligent, and piercing eyes — shone “brighter than was their wont. His cheeks were “flushed. He carried his head loftily. His thin “and slightly bent form had become erect. He “seemed to grow in size.”* Korniloff returned the same way back to the right wing of the Flagstaff Bastion ; and, after speak- ing with Vice-Admiral Novolsilsky, he remounted his horse and descended into the ravine, going on through that part of the defences which connected * Admiral LikhatcliefF, one of Kornil off’s Staff, quoted in the “Ma- “t&daux pour servir.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 113 the Flagstaff and the Central Bastions. The road c ^. p - lay along a steep slope , and the blaze from the French batteries was so constant, and their tire so heavy, that for a moment the affrighted chargers of Korniloff and his Staff refused to confront the storm; but Korniloff soon conquered the will of his horse; and when he had done so he said, with a smile, “I cannot bear to be disobeyed.” In the valley he passed near the Taroutine battalion, and the soldiers were overheard saying, “This is indeed a brave fel- low.” Gaining at length the Central Bastion, Korniloff His pre- u ° scncc at there found Admiral Nachimoff toiling hard at histheCen- duty, and seeming to be as much at home in the tion. batteries as though he were on board his own ship. Nachimoff s appearance at this time might be regarded, perhaps, as somewhat characteristic of that tendency to self-immolation which we have attributed to him; for, as though he would be decked out for sacrifice, he distinguished himself from others by choosing to wear his full uniform, with all the heavy splendour of an admiral’s epaulets; and already, from a slight wound then lately received, the blood was coursing down his face. While conversing with Nacliimoff, Korniloff mounted the banquette at the projecting angle of the bastion, and there for some time the two Admirals stood; for they were trying to ascertain the effect of the Russian fire upon the enemy’s batteries. Driving- in from moment to moment, the round shots so struck Invasion of the Crimea . VI. 8 114 INVASION or THE CRIMEA. chap. the parapet and its defenders as to cover the Ad- mirals and the officers at their side with the pelting of loose, gritty earth, and even sometimes to sprinkle them with the blood of men wounded. Shells also were bursting on all sides, and slaughtering the people at the batteries. Seeing the danger to which Korniloff exposed himself, Captain Xlynsky approached the Admiral, and entreated him to leave the bastion. By that time Korniloff had descended from the banquette, and was looking to see how the men at the batteries were pointing their guns. Ilynsky tried to carry his purpose by saying to Korniloff that his presence at the bastion denoted want of trust in his subordinates; and added that he would so take care to fulfil his duty as to render unnecessary the presence of the Admiral. Korniloff answered, “And if you are to “do your duty, why do you wish to prevent me Komi- “from doing mine? My duty is to see all.” Korni- timied loff visited the battery at the gorge of the Central and his Bastion, and then went on to the work which we hls U quai°- call the Land Quarantine. Seeing that the men were suffering from thirst, he gave orders for haul- ing up casks of water to the batteries. Then, need- His letter i n cv food, he rode home to his quarters. Before he sage to his yet broke his fast, Korniloff found time to finish a letter which he had been writing to his wife. This, along with a watch which he regarded as a kind of heirloom, Korniloff entrusted to the courier who was about to be despatched to Nicolayeff. “Pray,” said INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* 115 he, “give this watch to my wife — it must belong “to my eldest son;” and then, in words half playful,' but susceptible of an interpretation which would give them a mournful significance, he went on to say, “I am afraid that here it will get broken.” It was soon after this that Baron Kriidener came in with messages from Admiral Istomin, the officer in command at the Malakoff. Istomin’s words pur- ported to convey an assurance that all was going on well at the Tower; but the words were accompanied by an entreaty. The entreaty was, that Korniloff would not needlessly imperil a life so precious as his by coming up to the Malakoff Hill. He persisted in his determination to go thither; but a little delay was obtained by inducing him to ascend to the ter- race on the house-top in order to form a more general and extended idea of the scope and power of the cannonade than he had yet been able to gather. It would seem that he was painfully impressed by what he saw; for, after first giving some practical direc- tions for insuring an unfailing supply of ammunition to all the batteries, he once more disclosed in private that want of hopefulness which we have already re- marked upon as forming an anomalous characteristic in one who could kindle and sustain the heroism of other men. “I fear,” he said, “that no means will “suffice against such a cannonade.” It may be said that, at the time, there was some ground, not, indeed, for so great a despondency as that which weighed upon Korniloff, but, at all events, 8 * CHAP. LXI. He per- sists in his determin- ation to go up to the Malakoff Hill ; but before doing so ascends the house- top in or- der to ga- ther a general impres- sion of the cannon- ade. His de- spond- ency. The state of the con- flict at this time. 116 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX I. for grave forebodings. The artillery conflict then 'raging between the French and the Russians had hitherto seemed so equal as to disappoint the reckon- ing of the great Russian Engineer; for Todleben’s idea of overwhelming the batteries on Mount Rodolph by a mightier and more embracing array of ord- nance-power had been baffled, as yet, by the prowess of the French artillerymen, and also, it would seem, by the obstinacy with which the Russian seamen still clung to their favourite notion of constantly fir- ing in broadsides. The fronting walls of the cazern at the gorge of the Central, and the one at the gorge of the Land Quarantine Bastions, were in some places destroyed, in others, grievously injured; and the parapet of that last cazern being also de- stroyed, the five guns ranged behind it were soon reduced to silence. Also, the lower part of the town wall was a good deal damaged, and in some places broken through, by the French shot. Moreover, there were some of the Russian batteries opposed to the French, in which a large proportion of the gunners originally serving the guns had already been killed or wounded, and replaced by fresh combatants. But if the strife of great guns between the French and the Russians was thus for a while al- most equal, it was otherwise with the conflict of artillery-power going on in the Karabel faubourg; for there, the besiegers were obtaining the ascendant. With all his skill and all the resources at his com- mand, Todleben, as we saw, had failed to provide INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 117 sufficing means to counteract the two English Attacks. Before the first hour of the cannonade had' passed, it began to appear that our batteries were proving to be of greater power than those opposed to them. This superiority resulted in part from the greater calibre of the English guns, but in part also from the skill with which they had been planted on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Already a good deal of havoc had been wrought in the Redan, as well as in the fronting walls of the cazern near it. Some of the guns on the summit of the Malakoff Tower had been dismounted, and the rest were now silent; for the English shot had not only ruined the parapet, but had flung its stone fragments upon the gunners with an effect so destructive as to compel an abandonment of all further attempt to w^ork the two or three guns still remaining in battery. For the rest of the day it was no longer from the tower itself, but only from some guns covered by the glacis and its flanking entrenchments, that the famous position of the Malakoff still asserted its power. And although at the Russian batteries the men were still firm, yet elsewhere, it would seem, there was need of that exaltation of spirit which Korniloff knew how to create by his presence among the com- batants. Indeed, one of the very officers who strove to dissuade him from hazarding his life at the ram- parts has acknowledged that the forces composing the garrison were in a state to require encourage- CHAP. LXI. 118 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. State and temper of the troops posted near the gorges of the bas- tions. Symptoms of a com- mencing panic. Measures adopted in conse- quence. ment. * Whilst the seamen, with such work in hand 'as was more than enough for the utmost of human energy, still persisted and stood to their guns, the bodies of infantry drawn up in rear of the bastions to meet the expected assault had been subjected to a different, nay, almost an opposite, kind of trial. They had had to remain still and passive under a fire of heavy artillery — for the most part a ricochet fire — which, for some time, had been more or less working havoc in their ranks. There were symptoms of a commencing panic. Some combatants of the inferior sort — including, it seems, a body of con- victs — began to move off in disorder from the com- paratively unimportant positions in which they had been placed; and although the troops posted by the gorges of the assailed bastions did not thus give way, their firmness was plainly undergoing too heavy a trial. The chief judged it necessary to re- duce to a very small number the force of infantry thus detained under fire, and to endeavour to com- pensate for the effect of the change by providing that at several chosen points there should be posted an aide-de-camp, having orderlies and horses in readiness, who was to hurry up reinforcements of infantry to any point threatened with immediate assault. * Captain Gendre. The Captain says: “ We all knew what influence “his [Korniloff’s] appearance exercised over the soldiers in these last “days, and he found it indispensable to animate the men, who were “not accustomed to the heavy naval shot. I did not dare to speak “more,” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 119 Upon tlie whole, therefore, it must he acknow- c *^ > - ledged that there was some approach to a fulfilment The effect of the hope which the Allies had suffered themselves possibly 1 " 1 to entertain when they looked to a panic in Se-p^ u ^^ n bastopol as the not unlikely result of their mere a cannonade*, and it would not be travelling beyond naval at- the range of things probable to imagine that, if the Allied navies at this time, and in accordance with the original plan, had been thundering at the mouth of the roadstead, the failing heart of those comba- tants who were less resolute than the rest might have led to confusion and flight. But whatever may be imagined in regard to the probable effect of putting that further stress upon the composure of the garri- son at a time when the land cannonade was most disturbing its courage, the Russians were secured from any such superadded trial of their fortitude by Admiral Hamelin’s determination to postpone the naval attack ; * and the moment was now close at hand when the evil, nay, the danger, that there is in the grievous discouragement of troops would be shifted away from Sebastopol by the turning fortune of war, and made all at once to pass over into the midst of the French batteries. As matched against the opposing Works, that The skn- string of French batteries on the crest of Mount Todie- ° f Rodolph had so narrow, so protruding a front, that prions' it has been likened to a solitary and isolated bastion * See post, p. 137. totell; 120 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C ^ I P * dispending its strength from a centre against the concave of an arc; whilst the long, bending line of great guns with which Todleben sought to embrace it threw back a converging fire; and although the great engineer had been baffled for a time by “the eagerness or the obstinacy of the sailors who manned his batteries, the higher skill of his dispositions was already beginning to give him the mastery, when the gradual and rightful solution of the problem he so longed to work out was all at once intercepted by what, in a sense, may be called an accident. The earth shook. A volume of flame sprang up from the when a ground. There was a roll of sound , not harsh nor plosion^" deafening, yet such as to out-thunder great guns; occurred anc [ f rom the spot whence the flame had issued there the French W as reared up on high a black, steadfast column of smoke. A shell from one of the Russian batteries had blown up a French magazine. The explosion, although so great a one as to be seen and heard from afar by the English as well as the French, was less widely apparent to the Russians, who were wrapped in a dense cloud of smoke. Some indeed of the garrison perceived what had happened, and they greeted the sight with exulting “Hurrahs!” but it was only by slow and imperfect process that even the chiefs in Sebastopol attained to learn much of the truth; and down to the last, it would seem, they regarded the explosion as merely an incident of siege-warfare, when, in truth, it almost had propor- tions great enough to decide the campaign. INVASION OP THE CRIMEA. 121 By this explosion no utterly ruinous harm was c ^j P * done to the works or the armament of the battery Physical^ in which the disaster occurred, and the number of t^expio- men whom it stretched on the ground killed or slon * wounded is confined by French records to fifty, but for those who had to witness the scene of the havoc, whilst yet the disaster was new, it may well have been appalling to see half a hundred of human beings, who had all been alive and busy the instant before, now changed by one blast of fire into mere blackened corpses or maimed and helpless sufferers. Therefore mere horror may have partly conduced to what followed; and the sensitive, anxious, humane disposition of General Canrobert laid him painfully its effect open to the impressions which such a calamity was^rVof 0 but too well fitted to create; but French troops know ^oer a ^ a * r °PP ortun ity ruining the work which mitted to we call the Quarantine Sea-fort, yet so far as con- of plan ° cerned the rest of the French, and the whole of the ha^been English Navy, the proposed operation was calculated, upon^im. as ^ seemed, to be in some degree hazardous, and at the same time thoroughly impotent. Under such conditions, the task imposed on our seamen was sacrificial rather than warlike; and apparently it was in the spirit of devotion to a forlorn duty that Dun- The place das chose the place in which to put his own flag- forthe ship; for when, in the course of this conference, an Biitanma. 0 f£ cer ^ w p ose opinion was weighty, pointed out that the ship which should be on the extreme right of the English line must of necessity be sunk in one hour, Dundas quietly answered that that post was the one The main lie had reserved for the Britannia.* That portion of the English fleet which was to anchor in the array * General Brereton , p. 26. Upon the supposition that the French line would commence at the eastern part of the Chersonese Bay, the centre of the whole array would be brought very near to the mouth of the roadstead; and in that case, there was good reason for believing that, if the fleets should be ranged at any moderate distance from Sebastopol, the enemy’s batteries would cross their fire with destructive effect upon any ship occupying the central post reserved for the Bri- tannia. With regard to General Brereton, it may be right to say that he was the guest of Admii*al Dundas on board the Britannia, was in the entire confidence of the Vice-Admiral, and with him in fact all day. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 145 enforced upon Dundas, and prolong tlie French line of battle, will be called the “main division.” In the course of the discussion, it w T as determined (as we shall afterwards see more particularly) that some portion at least of the fleet should be exempted from the necessity of taking part with the French in their vain line of battle-, and as the ships thus ex- cepted were despatched on a separate service, which brought them to closer quarters with the forts, they will be called the u in-shore squadron.” The ships of both the main division and the de- tached squadron were to be at anchor whilst deliver- ing their attack; but Dundas had, besides, four steam-frigates, the Sampson, the Tribune, the Terrible, and the Sphinx; a steam-sloop called the Spitfire, and a steam-gunboat called the Lynx. These steamers were left free to move as might be advisable, with- out casting anchor; but the Sphinx, having a freight of ammunition on board, was ordered to keep out of range. In his instructions to the captain of the Tribune, the duty of helping disabled ships was the one upon which Dundas most carefully insisted. CHAP. lxi. Arrange- ment sepa- rating a portion of the Eng- lish fleet from the main divi- sion. The in- shore squadron. The Eng- lish steam- ships which were to be keptunder way. From the time when, on the eve of the war, great' sea- Captain Drummond, of the Retribution , had come^ich back from Sebastopol with the result of the survey p^edas which he then found means to effect, the state of its t0 be able sea and harbour defences had been very well known the fleets. Invasion of the Crimea . VI, 10 146 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. IiXI. Forts Con- stantino and Alex- ander. to the Allies.* The main objects of these works 'were, — to prevent an enemy’s ships from entering the roadstead; to destroy them very speedily if they should ever succeed in doing so; and, failing even that, to sink them in any endeavour to approach or to penetrate the Man-of-war Harbour. So large a proportion of the defensive works had been designed for these purposes, that (not counting those two small works, the Wasp Tower and the Telegraph Battery, of which we shall hear by-and-by) three only of all the water-side forts were so placed as to be able to take part in an engagement with ships keeping clear of the entrance. These three forts were Fort Con- stantine, Fort Alexander, and the Quarantine Sea- fort. Fort Constantine on the north, and Fort Alex- ander on the south, of the entrance, were, both of them, works of prime importance, not only from their size, strength, and power, but also because it was evident, from the position of these two great fast- nesses, that the capture or destruction of either would be an event that might govern the fate of Sebastopol. * It was in January 1854, I think, that Captain Drummond, upon some specious pretext , took leave to enter the roadstead of Sebastopol. Whilst he lay in the roadstead, at some little distance from the inner or Man-of-war Harbour, the number of guns bearing on the Retribution was no less than 350. I imagine that any one acquainted (from Russian sources) with the sea-forts of Sebastopol, and examining Captain Drum- mond’s report , as well as the plan which accompanies it , would be struck with the exceeding accuracy of the survey which the Retribution effected. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 147 Like the rest of the great stone forts which de- C lxi P * fended the coast and harbour, Fort Constantine and the casemated portion of Fort Alexander were built of a very strong limestone called the “stone of the steppes.”* The average height above the level of the sea of the guns ranged in all these great sea-forts was, for the casemated tiers, about 26 feet, and for the open-air batteries on the top, from 30 to 40 feet.** The fronting stone walls of these two forts were from bl/g to 6 feet thick; and the vault-roofs which protected the storeys below from the effects of vertical tire had a thickness, including all their fillings and the layer of earth on the top, of from 6 to 12 feet.*** Fort Constantine had an armament of 97 pieces, ^antine?*' disposed in the manner which will be indicated in a later page. Fort Alexander mounted, in all, 56 guns, of^‘ r Alex ’ which 27 were in casemates.!* Of these 56 gun? there were 51 which, in the course of the engagement (though only at long range) could be brought to bear upon the French or the English ships, di* The third and last of the three Great works which Th * waters beneath.* The Telegraph Battery was an earthwork on the The Tele- cliff, which gave it an elevation of 100 feet above Battery, the level of the water. It was armed with 5 guns, all having command towards the sea.** The great casemated fastness called Fort Constan- Fort Con- tine stood at the water’s edge, and along with Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort contributed largely to the cross fire which defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. As we have already seen, it was a work built of stone, with a front wall of from five and a half to six feet thick, and vaulted roofing from six to twelve feet thick. The work had the form of a liorse-slioe, so placed upon a narrow spit of land that its right face was towards the sea, whilst its left looked up to the east, along the Sebastopol roadstead; and the rounded part of the work, which joined the right face to the left, defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. The fort contained two storeys of case- mates, and had besides, on its summit, a tier of open-air batteries. At its gorge, the work was closed by a strong cazern with a crenelled wall for muskets, and casemates on the storey above for 11 with one gun that the tower from the beginning to the end of the war kept alive the attention of our seamen. * Todleben, p. 333. ** Ibid. p. 117. This was the work which the Russians called the Kartacheffsky Battery. 158 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. The weak angle of the fort. The shoal which pro- tected Fort Con- stantine. Soundings taken the night be- fore the action. guns. Altogether, the fort mounted 97 guns, of "which more than 60 were in casemates, and 27 in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. Of these 97 guns there were 43, according to General de Todleben, that could be brought to bear upon some portion or other of the Allied fleet — that is to say, 23 (at a very long range) upon the French fleet, 18 upon the main division of the English fleet, and 2 only in the direction of a vessel approaching from the north along the five-fatliom edge of the shoal. * But nature had done a good deal to defend Fort Constantine from the guns of an enemy’s shipping, for the spit on which the work stood was prolonged towards the sea by a shoal of such form and size, that it forced line-of-battle ships attempting an attack from the west to stand off to a distance of eleven or twelve hundred yards. Towards the north-west, however, there was a bend in the form of the shoal of which we shall presently speak. The Allies had discovered the weak point which tended to mar the defensive powers of Fort Constan- tine*, and with a view, if possible, to take advantage of the defect, it became important to know the boundary of the shoal with a greater exactness than * According to Todleben, those two gabs were in the open-air bat- teries at the top of the fort. It must be stated, however, that the actual experience of our in-shore squadron does not perfectly accord with Todleben’s impressions. For the exact armament of Fort Constantine, gee Appendix. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* 159 tliat attained by the Admiralty charts. The ex- C ^ V I P * igency was no sooner felt than men came forward to meet it. On the night before the action, Mr. Main- prise the master of the Britannia, Mr. Noddall the master of the London, and Mr. Forbes the master of the Sampson, volunteered to go in under cover of darkness and endeavour to take soundings. And this they did. Approaching the shore in boats with muffled oars, they boldly penetrated within the line of the enemy’s look-out boats*, and although they were repeatedly hailed by the enemy, they yet, by their skill and coolness, succeeded in achieving their purpose. The result of this night’s survey proved to be one of high interest to those who desired an attack on Fort Constantine. It turned out that, from a point opposite the Wasp Tower, and distant from it some six hundred yards, the five-fathom line ran The form parallel with the coast till it came to a spot within shoal eight hundred yards of Fort Constantine*,* but then, we^tof with a sudden bend, this five-fathom line passed trending away to the west and south-west, running parallel in that last direction with the seaward bat- teries of the fort, and at a distance from them of eleven or twelve hundred yards. From this con- figuration of the shoal it resulted that, although a Point at line-of-battle ship attempting to attack from the west ship of the * The five-Tathom line sufficiently represents the boundary which kept off line-ofdbattle ships; and there was no question of attacking with gunboats or other small vessels* 160 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lx\ P ’ cou ^ n °t come at all near to Fort Constantine, she line could still would find water enough at that sudden bend fo within just now mentioned, where the edge of the shoal of tSort. was within eight hundred yards of the fort. What made this formation of the shoal the more interesting was, the now apparent fact that the point where a great ship could float within eight hundred yards of the fort, was on that very line of impunity, or comparative impunity, where a vessel might act against the fort — nay, might rake it obliquely from its gorge to its eastern face — without incurring a fire from any great number of guns. Dundas’s Before parting with Lyons on the morning of the aStmTo 11 " ac tion, Dundas (who had hitherto limited his designs some ships t° a mere prolongation of the French line) was moved to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered;* and having, as we saw, two powerful ships which were propelled by their own steam-power, and could therefore be wielded with an ease and exact- ness unattainable by any towed vessel, he at once perceived these to be the two ships which could best be charged with the duty of feeling their way to the edge of the shoal, and thence engaging Fort Con- stantine. Accordingly, he resolved to despatch Sir Edmund Lyons upon this service with the Agamem- to the edge of the shoal off Fort Constan- tine. * He was so moved, as I understand, by Lyons. I imagine that the merit of discovering the weak or u dead angle 11 of the fort belonged in great part to the French, and that Lyons, in inviting attention to this subject, was in some degree conveying their suggestion. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 161 non and the Sanspareil.* The Agamemnon, as be- fore, carried the flag of Lyons, and Dacres com- manded the Sanspareil. Subsequently the London, commanded by Captain Eden, was added to the force thus placed under Lyons.** At a later hour, the Albion and the Arethusa were detached from the main division, with orders to attack the Wasp, and the Telegraph Battery, and although these two ships at first had not been placed under Lyons, yet, as they acted in proximity to the ships which he commanded, and indeed were sent off from the main division before it got into action, they came to be included with the Agamemnon, the Sanspareil, and the London, as a part of the force which we have called the in-shore squadron.*** * Agamemnon, 91 guns: Sanspareil, 67. The current belief at the time was, that Lyons’s attack on Fort Constantine was an act of his own free will, not deriving at all from the authority of liis chief; but that was an error. Lyons , I believe , conveyed to his chief the suggestion spoken of in the last note; but Dundas having seen the merit of it, and having also now learnt the exact form of the shoal , was able to define the places which the Agamemnon and Sanspareil were to take, and this he says that he did at the morning's conference. In a private note to Sir James Graham, Dundas, after advertiug to a statement which seemed to give sanction to the current belief above-mentioned, says: “The position taken by every ship during the action was as defined by “me in my conference with the captains previously; but during the “action I was desirous of strengthening the position of the Agamemnon, “Sanspareil, and London, and I sent,” &c. — 27th November 1854. ** London, 90 guns. It was at the earnest instance of Captain Eden himself that Lyons sought and obtained from Dundas permission to take the London. *** Albion, 90 guns; Arethusa, 50. In the authentic record of the fleet called the Admiral’s “Journal,” these ships are treated as being Invasion of the Crimea, VI, 11 CHAP. LXI. The five ships com- posing the in-shore squadron. 162 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lxi P ’ I * 1 ^ ie na ^ ure °f the l°t which was assigned to Essential the main division, and of that which fell to the between 06 share of the detached or in-shore squadron, there assigned was this &U-governing difference: The main division tot . h ®. . had a place assigned to it beforehand by the force main divi- 1 . J sion and of the lever which subjected our Admiral to the assigned direction of the French; whilst, so far as concerns inshore the ships in the in-shore squadron, Dundas was left squadron. f ree p] ace them in those positions which he judged to be the best for the purposes of attack. Advance At half-past twelve, the Agamemnon, the Sans- in-shore pareil, and the London, moved slowly on towards squadron. pj ie ; but if Lyons and Dacres and Eden w^ere now at last standing in for the long-studied forts of Sebastopol, they needed some patience, or else some half-mutinous resolve, to sustain them under the weight of the distressing instructions which Dundas, on the eve of the action, had issued to some of his captains.* Until the very words shall come to light, it may be surmised that Dundas was misconstrued; The paper but by this paper the English Admiral was really tionTissu- understood to ordain that each captain to whom he edby addressed it must keep his ship out of danger. Yet formally as well as substantially under the orders of Lyons ; but since it happened that they moved at first with the bulk of the fleet, and had their towing steamers on the port side, it was very generally believed that they formed part of the main division. * It was understood to have been a circular addressed to all the captains ; but I have reason to doubt whether all received copies , for there are some who have no recollection of the circumstance. I have not myself seen a copy. One captain assures me that, purposely and in anger, he destroyed his copy before the action. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 163 the men to whom Dundas addressed these instructions C ^ I P< were told by him that the object of the attack was Dundas “the destruction of the enemy’s batteries.” They of the 6 e ' were to seek a great victory, but only by a path 0 f actlon * safety. So far as concerned the captains of ships in the main division of the fleet, the cramping force of this paper might not be intolerable*, for their duty was to be one of a fixed kind, leaving only slight room for the exercise of discretion*, but to men com- manding ships in the in-shore squadron these orders might be much more embarrassing. I do not under- stand that at the conference any remonstrance was made by the captains who had received this paper*, but some of them determined from the first to treat the instructions as null. Supposing that the instructions had really the import ascribed to them, it would be quite just to say, in condemnation of Dundas, that either he should have refused to attack at all, or else should have given due power to his captains; but we have seen how far out of his reach the first alternative was; and in regard to the second, it may be well to re- member that few people having authority are so con- stituted as to be able to carry out with great vigour the measures which they wholly condemn. In general, when men are forced to do what they dis- approve, they render a sort of homage to the opinion they have been forced to desert, by doing as little as may be in the opposite direction. As our states- men at home had sought rest for the soles of their 11 * 164 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI . Signal from the Britannia. feet in that shadowy land which they thought must lie somewhere between peace and war,* so apparently, Dundas in his pain had tried to find some middle term between doing and not doing — between the evil of undertaking a determined yet hopeless attack, and the all but impossible alternative of not attack- ing at all. Disapproving altogether the idea of as- sailing the forts with ships, he seems to have inferred that in proportion as he could attenuate the attack by confining it within cautious limits, he would be lessening its evil effect. But whatever was the origin of the instructions, they were scattered to the winds when the naval en- gagement began. The men of the in-shore squadron had just been aroused by the opening of the fire against the French fleet,** when there flew out a signal from the Britannia.*** As they gazed at the fast-shifting flags, Lyons, Dacres, and Eden may have, all of them, expected with pain more warn- ing, more caution, more hampering orders from the Commander-in-Chief; but perhaps Dundas now remembered his chilling instructions, and perceived that they were unfit for the guidance of a squadron standing in for the forts, or again it may be that his Scots blood at last had got heated , as the Scots blood commonly does when the din of fighting begins. At all events, his signal bore no * After the disaster of Sinope. See vol. n. chap. xix. ** At 1.5, according to the log of the Agamemnon. *** This was at 1.7, according to the log of the Agamemnon. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 165 such import as to make it unwelcome to even the c ^ p * most ardent of captains. The signal was this: — ~ “Proceed and attack batteries.” Already the Agamemnon had cleared, or was Acceierat- clearing, for action; and upon the appearance of the yaime of signal her speed was increased.* Presently, that she ^emnon might take her place in the van, the Agamemnon had to pass the Sanspareil. There was friendship between Lyons and Dacres, and the people of the Agamemnon, too, were united to those of the Sans- pareil by the bonds of a long-standing affection. Therefore, whilst the two ships were abreast, the He rinter- x _ change of crew oi each welcomed the other, and welcomed, cheers with the same roar of cheers, the long-desired fight Sanspar- then beginning. Cl1 ' When the ships passed under the guns of the Fire de- cliff batteries, some shots were exchanged, but at and re- first with little effect. The main purpose of the fire the^hipf from the ships whilst thus moving along the coast ^deT the* was to raise up around them a shroud of smoke, cliff which might more or less baffle the gunners at the batteries. Wasp and the Telegraph Battery. A bold offer had just now been made, which The ser- was destined to exert a great influence upon the Mr. e Ban cl1 tenor of the approaching combat. Mr. Edward by n goSg Charles Ball, acting master, who had the command ^ndtaking of a little steam-tender called the Circassia, proposed soundings ’ r r for the to be allowed to move on with his small craft ahead guidance of the Agamemnon, in order to feel the way for the Agamem- non. * To 40 revolutions. 166 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C 5a P ’ g reafc S ^P by taking soundings for her, and leading her on as close to the shoal as prudence would allow. Lyons felt the value of such an offer, but thought it fair to warn Mr. Ball that his vessel would probably be sunk, telling him, however, at the same time, that, to meet that contingency, and to pick up the commander and his crew, the Agamemnon’s boats should be kept ready and manned. Mr. Ball did not hesitate an instant. Upon the suggestion of Lyons, he placed his little vessel upon the off-shore side of the Agamemnon, and, as soon as the precon- certed signal was given, moved forward ahead of the great ship, and proceeded to find a path for her. In his first attempt to sound, the lead-line was struck out of the leadsman’s hands by a shot 5 but this only caused Ball to search for another sounding-line; and although his small craft received nine shot in her hull, and his leadsman got wounded, he did not re- mit his task till he had guided the Agamemnon to the very verge of the point to which she could move without grounding.* The Aga- Whilst the Agamemnon was slowly creeping on comes to the spot thus found for her, she received her first from^eve- shot; and a few moments afterwards she was hulled, terV? Uar " an( l muc h harmed in her rigging, by shot coming from several quarters. At five minutes before two she let go her stream anchor by the stern in five fathoms and a half of water, and presently she dropped her small bower-anchor under foot in five * Lyons to Dundas, despatch, 18th October 1854. ) >• INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 167 fathoms. Then, by so moving the ship as to bring the stream-cable to her starboard quarter, her port broadside was laid on Fort Constantine with all the advantage that the position allowed. She opened her fire. The centre of the fort then bore nearly south-east of the ship, and at a distance from her of 800 yards* In such a position as this, after all his im- patience for action, Lyons well might see room for contentment. He was so placed as to be assailing Fort Constantine almost in reverse, with power to rake its top batteries at a range of but 800 yards; and, although he was within 750 yards of the Tele- graph Battery, within 1200 yards of the Wasp, and also under the fire of some thirteen guns which (at very long range) could be brought to bear upon him from the opposite side of the roadstead, yet, as con- cerns Fort Constantine itself, he had so happily struck upon its weak point as to be secure from most of its batteries. General de Todleben, indeed, has erred in supposing that there were only two guns, and those on the top platform of the fort, which could be brought to bear upon the Agamem- non; for it is certain that she received shot and shell from some few, at least, if not more, of the guns in the casemated tiers; but it is not the less true that the ship took Fort Constantine at a great advantage, CHAP. L XI. and, an- choring at 800 yards from the gorge of Fort Con- stantine, opens fire. Advan- tage of Lyons’s position. * The exact bearing of the fort was S.E. J / 2 S. 168 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lx\ P ‘ an( l thai;, 80 ^ ar as concerned the fire from that work, she enjoyed a comparative impunity. Position Dacres, in the Sanspareil, came up close astern bythe llp of the Agamemnon; and laying his port broadside Sanspar- ^ owar( j s £l ie opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 900 yards. For the purpose of the attack, the position of the Sanspareil (if only she should be able to hold it) was regarded as admir- able; but the ship was much more exposed than the Agamemnon to the fire of guns on the cliff, more especially those of the Telegraph Battery. By the Eden, in the London, came up in the wake of London. ^ g anS p are ip Anchoring close astern of her, he laid his port broadside towards the shore, and opened fire on Fort Constantine at a range of 1500 yards. So large a proportion of his crew was en- gaged in the land operations that, with only the numbers remaining on board his own ship, he could hardly have brought into play more than one-third part of her batteries; but having reinforced himself by taking a body of men from the Niger (his towing steam-ship) to work his upper-deck guns, he was able to put forth the whole strength of his port broadside. He was, however, exposed to a destruc- tive fire from the guns on the cliff; for he lay right under the Telegraph Battery, at a distance from it Causea of less than seven hundred yards. The simple truth narrowed is that, by the destructive power of the cliff batteries the one hand, and the form of the shoal on the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 169 other, the region of comparative impunity was so narrowed as to offer no more than one berth to a great ship of war, and that berth was the one which the fortunate Agamemnon had taken. At this time, the steam-ships kept under way were all, it seems, hovering upon the off-shore side of the detached squadron. Some of them tried their range at Fort Constantine; and, almost at the time when the Agamemnon opened her fire, a shell which was believed to have been thrown from Carnegie’s steam-frigate, the Tribune, caused a great explosion of ammunition amongst the batteries at the top of the Fort.* This disaster alone must have done much to breed confusion; but it was mainly by the fire of the three great ships — the Agamemnon, the Sans- pareil, and the London — that the result was ob- tained. The upper-tier batteries of Fort Constantine were brought to ruin. Of the 27 guns there planted, 22 were speedily silenced; and the gunners found themselves so overwhelmed with shot and splinters of stone that, chiefly it seems by that last stress, they were driven to go down and take refuge in the casemates below.** Though no statement to such an effect has been made in Russian narratives, there is some ground for inferring that the gunners thus CHAP. LXI. compara- tive im- punity enjoyed by the Agamem- non. Position of the steam- ships kept under way. Explosion on Fort Constan- tine. Havoc wrought amongst the bat- teries at the top of Fort Con- stantine. They are abandon- ed by the Russians. * Brereton, p. 33, confirmed by inquiry from Admiral Carnegie. The shell from his ship , the Tribune , was thrown at a range of 1600 yards. The Lynx, also, at this time was firing on Fort Constantine. — Admiral’s Journal. As to the effect of the explosion, see Todleben, p. 336. ** Todleben, p, 336. 170 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lxi‘ driven from the top of the Work must have carried The whole down with them to the lower batteries a consterna- short time lion approaching to panic*, tor during a space ot ten lenced. minutes the whole fort was silent.* The limit But with that extermination of the top batteries, power and with that ten minutes of silence, the power of assailing 6 ships over the fort may be said to have ended; ships had f 0 r in the lower or casemated tiers, though ten of over Fort ° Constan- the embrasures were more or less damaged at the cheeks, and though four out of five of the shot- heating furnaces were destroyed, the stone wall of the fort held good, and the guns all remained un- touched.** So decisive was the line which defined the power of the assailing ships over Fort Constan- tine, that what they could inflict upon the open-air batteries proved to be sheer ruin, and what they could do against the casemates turned out to be al- most nothing. The Are- At about half-past two, the Arethusa towed by Albion, nd the Triton, and the Albion towed by the Firebrand, fntTiine came in from the south-west. They soon afterwards resfo^the t°°k up positions astern of the London, and opened detached upon the cliff defences, the Arethusa being then squadron, x ° assail the about 700 yards from the Telegraph Battery, and teries. the Albion, as her Commander reckoned it, within 600 yards of the Wasp. The line^ When this had been done, the whole number of ed by the those ships which I have spoken of as composing the P in- the in-shore squadron, were ranging in a single line shore squadron. * Brereton, p. 33. ** Todloben, ubi ante. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 171 which ran nearly parallel with the shore, and at dis- tances from it of from 600 to 800 yards. Meanwhile the main division had been coming The main into line; and indeed the Queen, which was the dlvlslon ’ leading ship, had moved on, and had even anchored so far towards the south as to be in the array of the French fleet;* but the Britannia was in her designed position at the extreme right of the English line; and although, at a quarter before three o’clock, there were still some of the vessels following her which had not yet come to an anchor, they were, all of them, very near to their assigned places; and it may be said that about this time the array of the main division had attained so much of perfection as it was destined to achieve. Besides the Britannia, 120, the flag-ship (which The ships was towed by the Furious), there were appropriated composed to this dismal service the Queen, 116 (towed by the 11, Vesuvius), the Trafalgar, 120 (towed by the Retribu- tion), the Vengeance, 84 (towed by the Highflyer), the Bellerophon, 78 (towed by the Cyclops), and the Rodney, 90 (towed by the Spiteful). These ships, all destined to be anchored in a continuous file, and in prolongation of the French line of battle, formed the right of the English fleet, and main division. The several steamers which propelled them were The way . x x . . . in which lashed to each sailing-ship on her port side, it being the main * She had the Henri IV. on her bow. — Log of the Queen. 172 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. division was brought into line. The com- bined array formed by the French fleet and the main division of the English. intended that the ships in this main division of the 'fleet should pour their fire from the starboard broad- sides. During the progress of the main division from the roads off the Katcha, the propelling steamers (being already lashed on in the way described) were, by consequence, on the landward side of the vessels propelled; but, before taking up her assigned position in front of the entrance to the Sebastopol roadstead, each ship was to make a sweep round, and present towards the forts her starboard, or fight- ing broadside. Even in the dead calm that there was on that day, the moving of great ships by means of steamers lashed to their sides turned out to be a slow process;* and it was not until half-past two o’clock that the Britannia and the vessels which followed her began to range in line of battle, and successively to open their fire.** At this time, then, the French fleet and Dundas’s main division were for the most part in their places, and if they had ranged in perfectly straight lines they would have formed an obtuse angle, at the point where the French left was touched by the English right.*** There being, however, a slight bend in both the * There was great difficulty in steering ships propelled in this manner; and even the single process of getting the ship’s head into the right direction after weighing anchor proved to be a tedious one. ** It was at half-past two o’clock that the Britannia herself cast anchor (log of Britannia) ; but the Queen was in advance , and had anchored , some minutes before , amongst the French ships. The Tra- falgar, the Vengeance, the Bellerophon, and the Rodney were clos8 fol- lowing, and preparing to range in prolongation of the line. *** The French line being N.N.E., and the English N.E. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 173 French and the English lines, the two formed to- gether a great arc or crescent, which enclosed the approach to Sebastopol, with a span nearly two miles in length; but at a distance of more than 2000 yards from the entrance of the roadstead, and at a distance, also, of from 1600 to 1800 yards from the nearest of the enemy’s forts. On the left front of Position this array, and placed, as it were, in echelon to it, at distances of only from 600 to 800 yards from the squadron nearest of the batteries which they assailed, there ence to were the ships which constituted the in-shore squa- main dron of the English fleet. The four frigates , the dlv 1 * 10n ' sloop, and the gunboat which remained under way steam- moved, hovering, as we have already seen, near the under kcpt ships of the in-shore squadron, and either supported way * by their fire the attack on Fort Constantine and the cliff defences, or else from time to time rendered such services as their facility of movement enabled them to afford.* Great as was the amount of naval strength thus spread out to sight by the Allied fleets, it can hardly, The aspect I think, be acknowledged that their battle array Allied line wore an aspect portentous of conquest. Whilst their of battle * power was a power impending, and not least uring that mid-day time when, in the majesty of their * The Tribune, the Terrible, and the Sampson were the three steam-frigates which had specially been ordered to engage by signal from the Britannia. — Log of Britannia. But I do not except the Sphinx from the statement in the text; for it seems that, though ordered to keep out of range, she occasionally fired. — Admiral’s Journal. 174 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, C lxi P * unex ^rted might, they were gliding down, ship after ship, to take their assigned positions, both the imagination of the unskilled people of Sebastopol, and the fairly-drawn inferences of minds informed on such things, were conducing to a rational dread of what might be achieved against a port, town, and arsenal by forces which ruled the high seas ; for none, at that time, knew where they could point to a limit which bounded the power of great navies over places in range of their guns. “There was something solemn,” says Todleben, “in those minutes of ex- pectation; all bending their anxious attention to “the manoeuvres of the enemy’s fleet, but at the “same time full of firmness, prepared to undergo a “maritime bombardment terrible, unknown till then “in the annals of war.”* But no sooner had the fleets taken up their array than the spell seemed to break. The practised seaman, who saw, through the barrier of smoke, how the line of fire from the French ships began at more than a mile from the nearest of the enemy’s works, and then went away N.N.E. as though avoiding Sebastopol, would soon be able to say: “This is not so much as a threat, “still less an attack in great earnest.” Place of The English Admiral did not forget the place tanni^m which he had chosen to reserve for his flag-ship when iine^>f^ ied told that any vessel must needs be sunk in one hour battle, * Todleben, p. 326. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 175 if she should be posted in the centre of the Allied C I 1 ^ P ‘ line of battle. It was exactly there that, in fulfil- rnent of his words, Dundas now placed the Britannia. It will presently be seen that of the vessels which ^^ ken followed the Britannia when she was thus brought main into line by the English Admiral, three were after- wards moved farther in, to take part in the closer engagement which Lyons had begun with Fort Con- stantine; but such of the ships as continued to act with the main division delivered, and continued to deliver, their fire all the rest of the day at ranges of from 1600 to some 1800 yards from the nearest forts. With what effect can scarcely be known; for Fort Constantine, the work they chiefly attacked, was engaged at the time with other English ships at comparatively short ranges; and it would be hard to say that there was any part of the havoc and loss sustained by the fort which may not have come from its closer assailants. These ships, it appears, were answered by 18 guns in Fort Constantine, and were also under a fire at long range from 36 pieces in Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort.* In a contest between ships and forts, long range gives immunity to the forts, but not to the ships. The Britannia was set on fire by a red-hot shot, which buried itself in some of the hammocks. She received 42 shots in her hull; and she suffered great damage in her masts, yards, shrouds, and rigging. * Todleben. 176 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. 2-45. Al- most the whole of the Allied fleet was now en- gaged. The great cannon- ade now delivered by the Allied line of battle. Lieutenant Vaughan and eight of the Britannia’s 'men, besides six of the men of the Furious, her towing steam-ship, were wounded. The main-mast of the Retribution, the steam-ship which towed the Trafalgar, was struck by a shot, and went by the board. Thereupon, the Trafalgar was ordered to haul out. We have before seen that not only the French fleet, but also those English steam-ships which were kept under way, and likewise the in-shore squadron acting with Lyons, had successively begun to take part; so that now, when, for the most part, Dundas’s main division had also come into line, it might be said that nearly the whole of the Allied fleet was at length engaged with the forts; and although each ship was firing from one only of its broadsides, it is declared that the cannonade which now pealed from the whole Allied line was the heaviest that had ever been delivered from shipboard.* The fire was delivered from more than 1100 pieces of heavy artillery,** whilst, to meet this great * “From the experience of fifty years, I can assert that so powerful “a cannonade as that of the 17th inst. has never taken place on the “ocean.” — Admiral Dundas to Lord Raglan, private letter, 17thOctober 1854. ** 1119 guns, as I make it (621 of the French fleet and 498 of the English), fired from the line of battle, without counting the guns of the steam-ships kept under way. Todleben gives 'a greater number, but he includes the guns of some French ships which were not in action. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 177 cannonade, tlie Russians could only bring' to bear c ^. p * on the fleets 152 guns; and of those there were as The tire many as 105 that were in open-air batteries firing be a oppos- d over the parapet, so that there were only 47 case- edt01t ' mated guns to meet all the broadsides of the Allied fleets.* But with all these elements of superiority on one Counter- side, the strength of hard masonry on the other did effect oT 5 more than redress the balance; and if this was the a ' heaviest sea cannonade that, up to that time, had compara- by the Allied fleets.** been known, it was also, in proportion to its great- ielsness m " ness, the most harmless one ever delivered. nonade an * The continuance of the fire from these 1100 guns delivered ~ by the added nothing to the advantages already obtained ships. No farther Such a result could not but be mortifying; and tamed some may judge that, in yielding to the dictation continu- which caused this impuissant display, Dundas was fire from 10 so abandoning his freedom of action as to be guilty the fleets * of making an extravagant sacrifice to the exigencies having 8 ’ of the French alliance; but, at all events, it is only ° ed to by argument in that direction that the fitness of the ^£ robert position taken up by the English Admiral and the Hameiin, ships which followed him can be rightfully challenged; now do for when once Dundas had submitted to act upon the thanmake plan which the French forced upon him that morn- conform ing, he had nothing to do but to place one of his p°g? t ® on taken up * Todleben, p. 334, 335. tZmh, ** For tbe results which had been obtained by the French fleet and the English fleet respectively, see ante, p.155 , and p. 169. Invasion of the Crimea . YJ, 12 178 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C Lxif # ships near the Jupiter or the Napoleon, and thence prolong the array in a north-easterly direction. And, after And, after all, it was only in part that the only of strength of the main division ran to waste in this division 1 impuissant array, for out of the six fighting ships ^optin 8 which constituted that part of our fleet at the open- mechanics over again, and in categoric form, five results evolved of war. by the conflict : — 1. At ranges of from 1600 to 1800 yards, a whole French fleet failed to make any useful im- pression upon a fort at the water’s edge, though its * Plagiarised from the title of a book on a very different subject, namely, that of legislation — the book by which Mr. Arthur Symonds delivered his patient country from the oppression of the wordy, diffuse, obscure Acts of Parliament which loaded the statute-book in the times before his attack. Treating language as the machinery by which the Legislature seeks to enforce its will, he called his book the “Mechanics “ of Law-making.” 222 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. The five results which, in that point of view, seem worthy of mark. guns were all ranged in open-air batteries and firing “from over tlie parapet. 2. An earthen battery mounting only five guns, but placed on the cliff at an elevation of 100 fleet, inflicted grievous losses and injury on four powerful English ships of war, and actually disabled two of them, without itself having a gun dismounted, and without losing even one man. 3. At renges of from 800 to 1200 yards, and with the aid of steam-frigates throwing shells at a range of 1600 yards, three English ships in ten minutes brought to ruin and cleared of their gunners the whole of the open-air batteries (containing 27 guns) which were on the top of a great stone fort at the water’s edge. 4. The whole Allied fleet, operating in one part of it at a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards, and in another part of it at ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, failed to make any useful impression upon casemated batteries protected by a good stone wall from five to six feet thick. 5. Under the guns of a great fort by the water’s edge, which, although it had lost the use of its top- most pieces of artillery, still had all its casemates entire, and the batteries within them uninjured, a great English ship, at a distance of only 800 yards, lay at anchor and fighting for hours without sustain- ing any ruinous harm.* * Of course , the value of the experience thus acquired by the Aga- memnon must depend upon a question still somewhat obscure, i. e., the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 223 CHAP. III. LXI. Whilst the fleets plied their thunder in vain, and the still silent guns on Mount Rodolph confessed the ill plight of the French, there yet was one part of the field where the cause of the Allies seemed to prosper. This was in the English batteries. There, continu- from break of day to that critical afternoon-time thebom- which we are now approaching, our cannoneers — carried on sailors and landsmen — had been well fulfilling their b y thc 0 English part. Not only had they sustained with advantage batteries, their now single-handed conflict with the Flagstaff Its effect. Bastion and the “Garden Batteries” — works which for the first three or four hours of the bombardment had been under fire from Mount Rodolph as well as from Chapman’s Attack — but they were fast achiev- ing almost all that could have been hoped from their efforts against that part of the enemy’s lines — his lines in the Karabel faubourg — which they more especially undertook to assail. The batteries in both Gordon’s and Chapman’s Attacks were so placed, and were armed with guns of a calibre which com- pensated so aptly for the length of the range, that, after some nine hours of firing, they had established a clear ascendant over the enemy’s ordnance. In- deed, the ascendant obtained was decisive enough to give ground for believing that Todleben, in his ex- number of guns in the casemates of Fort Constantine which could really be brought to bear upon her. The impunity of the Rodney would be even more instructive than the experience of the Agamemnon, if it were not for the surmise referred to, ante , p. 199. 224 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXI. ceeding eagerness to overwhelm the French works on Mount Rodolph, had devoted too little of his care to those blank-looking mounds on Green Hill and the Woronzoff Heights, which, at distances of 1300 or 1400 yards, marked the seat of the English Attacks. But after the opening of the tire, the great En- gineer had been quick to learn that the English bat- teries were operating with destructive power against a vital part of the Russian defences; and he seems to have felt to the quick (though seeing it all the time with a genuine, scientific approval) the telling effect of Attacks so disposed that, both as respecved the Flagstaff Bastion and the Redan, the same guns which battered in front the left face of the work could also enfilade the right face.* * This diagram — it is only a diagram and not a plan — may help to elucidate the text : — The Redan. (Chapman’s). of the Right Attack (Gor- don’s). INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 225 Though with somewhat less advantage, in that cp ^ r p ' respect, than the French, the English were still upon~~ heights which commanded the Russian defences, and looked over into their rear. From this cause, as well as from the effect, in some places, of shot bounding in by ricochet, our siege-guns, from the first, had begun to work a great havoc in those parts of the Kussian batteriesj which lay towards the gorges of their bastions, as well as amongst the bodies of troops which were posted hard by to await the expected assault. But this was not all; for, little by little, the whole front of the assailed defences in the Karabel faubourg began to give way under the power of the English artillery. Even from the Allied lines it was easy to see that, independently of the effect produced by explosions, the shell or the round-shot alighting upon a parapet which was no more, after all, than a heap of loose particles without coherence, wrought changes in its bulk and its form, whirling up into the air at every blow a dark column of dust and small earth. Before the day was half spent, the frail ramparts most battered by our artillery had de- generated into shapeless mounds; and after the first nine hours of the cannonade, there was more than one spot where they seemed to be nearly effaced. In the midst of the earthworks thus almost dis- It8effect solving into dust under blows of round-shot and shell, Miiakoff. the stone-built tower of the Malakoff remained yet upstanding; but the work had undergone a fire so powerful that it no longer carried an effective arma- Invasion of the Crimea , 7 7, 15 226 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LXI. Its effect upon the Redan and the defences in its rear. ment. Of its few guns — all ranged, as we know, in open-air battery, at the top of the work — some had been, not merely dismounted, but even hurled over the parapet; and there was one — the English remember it — which had been so tilted round by the blow of a shot as to be made to stand up on end, a staring sample of havoc which people could see from afar. But also the stone parapet of the tower was so shattered, and its splinters flew so de- structively, that, without incurring an unwarrantable sacrifice, the men at the top of the work could no longer be kept to their guns. They were withdrawn. There still poured a well-sustained fire from the guns on the glacis of the work, but the tower itself was now silent. It was at the Redan, however, as we have seen, that the English siege- guns were to drive a pathway for our columns of assault by first getting down the power of the Russian artillery. To assail the defences' at this chosen part of them, a large proportion of the guns which armed Gordon’s works had been made to cross their fire with that issuing from some of the batteries in Chapman’s Attack; and thus it resulted that each face of the Redan was both battered in front and enfiladed.* Meanwhile, also, other pro- jectiles of great weight discharged from the English batteries, and taking effect by ricochet, so swept the space between the Marine Hospital and the Dockyard See again the diagram appended to the foregoing note. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 227 ravine as to make all going and coming in that direc- tion a service of exceeding danger. We saw that so early as that hour of the forenoon when Todleben surveyed the Redan, its defences had fallen into a critical state. Even then several pieces had been dismounted, and numbers of the embrasures blocked up with ruins. True, we also learnt that the zeal of the Russian engineers and seamen was sup- porting them in their ceaseless effort to encounter the work of destruction with the work of repair, and giving them heart to toil thus under a fire of great power. But hours and hours elapsed. The cannon- ade did not relent*, and, despite all that man could do, the power of the English ordnance so continued to tell upon the Redan as to be gradually annulling its batteries. By about three o’clock in the after- noon, one-third of the pieces which armed the work had been dismounted; and even where guns were yet in battery, the cheeks of the embrasures lay in ruins. The loss in men had been heavy. Twice over, the gunners of several pieces had had to be replaced by fresh hands. Of 75 men sent to the Redan from on board one of the ships, so many as 50 were killed or wounded. And against the artillery which was inflicting these losses upon them the Russians could do but little; for their batteries were here over- matched by the more commanding position and the greater weight and numbers of the guns which assailed them from the Green Hill and the Woronzoff Height. Yet under stress of the decisive and increasing as- 15* CHAP. LXI. 228 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP LXI. Great explosion in the Redan. Its effect. Cendant thus established against them by the English, 'the gunners in the Eedan stood firm. They had been exalted, it seems, into so high a state of devo- tion by the example of their chiefs, Captain Ergomini- scheff, Captain Leslie, and Captain Katchinsky, that, however appalling the slaughter, the men yet remain- ing alive and unstricken worked on and worked on at the defence with a courage which did not droop. They strove hard to do what was needed for main- taining a fire in spite of all the havoc that had been wrought in the batteries; and, to that end, they kept on banking up the embrasures which were continually falling to pieces. The officers did not hesitate to give the example of this kind of devotion. They mounted the parapets, and toiled at the repairs of the embrasures with their own hands. But even by all these efforts the English artillery was not to be prevented from overmastering the Eedan;* and soon after three o’clock in the afternoon there occurred a disaster which completed the ruin of the work. A shell blew up the powder-magazine established in the salient. When the smoke lifted, it disclosed a dire spectacle of ruin. What a man could see of the world where transformed by the ex- plosion, bore scarce any likeness to what he had been looking upon the minute before. At the fore part of the work the parapet had been heaved over into the ditch, and so filled it in. The ground was * “These efforts were impotent to prevent the English artillery from “getting the dominion of ours.” — Todleben, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 229 laden with fragments of platforms, with guns dis- mounted, with gun-carriages overthrown and shat-' tered. On all sides there were the blackened bodies of men scathed by fire, and it was afterwards known that more than 100 men had been thus killed. There were many of the dead — and among them the brave Captain Leslie — whose bodies could never be recognised. The calmest of the survivors who gazed on this scene of havoc might well enough judge that the last hour of their cherished Sebas- topol must indeed be come; for not only could they see that the ruthless energy of their own war-muni- tions had laid open the road for a conqueror, but also, through the roar of the artillery, they heard the “hurrah” of the English; and the cheering was taken for proof that the besiegers had comprehended the gift which the fortune of war had brought them, and were coming to lay hands on their prize. The cheering died out; but narrators have said that, notwithstanding the thunder of the artillery war still waging elsewhere between Sebastopol and its assailants both by sea and by land, the failure of sound issuing from the Redan added strangely to the sense of desolation which the sight of its ruins occasioned. From a work where, for hours, great batteries had been pealing, where words of command and the shouts of men toiling under fire had been all day resounding, there was nothing now to be heard except the discharge, at long intervals, of a single cannon, and the groans and entreaties of CHAP. LXI. 230 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. C lx\ P * woun ment. Circumstance Yet on this occasion — as indeed happened which all at once allayed many times afterwards — it was the fate of the tion of the Emperor to be shielded by fortune from the peril- English. . . ous consequences of his mistake. At the very time when the indignation of diplomatists and of the English in Paris was upon the point of ex- tending over England, and putting the Alliance in the gravest peril, there came tidings of almost the only imaginable event (except, perhaps, a fresh battle or the capture of Sebastopol) which INVASION OP THE CRIMEA. 45 would have been calculated to hush the storm. Lxm* France and England learnt that Marshal St. Ar- Tidings of Marshal naud was dead. The intelligence acted upon the st. Arnaud’s . . . death. wrath of the English with immediate and decisive its effect, effect. Although their complaint was, in form, against the French Government for publishing papers which our statesmen regarded as a offen- sive,” yet, practically, any Englishman who might otherwise have been founding his expressed indignation upon the contents of the Marshal’s de- spatches, was silenced as soon as he knew that the hand of the writer was cold. During several months Marshal St. Arnaud Circum- t.tp. . # stances tend- liad been subjected to a kind of inspection which ing to prevent the death of our countrymen in general would judge to be cruel st. Arnaud being re- and unfair. He had vanity, he had a perilous gretted by the fondness for the use of his pen, and he trusted the eminent. French post-office. It resulted that his foibles p^teiet^ 8 were laid bare to the world without mercy. The of other® private letters which he had addressed in all con- f e 7 s nc 0 pened fidence to personal friends and relatives were post- opened and copied before they reached their des- tinations*, and as the letters of his enemies in the French camp were subjected to the same process, any minister or other public man who had these transcripts before him, was furnished with just those materials which were the best fitted to pro- duce an ill impression of the man to whom the 46 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. Lxrrx’ French army had been trusted. All those little ill effect of accounts of himself and his actions which were this upon the military re- likely to be read with delight and even approval putation of # A * the Marshal, by the close friends and relatives to whom the letters had been addressed, were exposed to the scornful eyes of strangers, and enemies, but also to the criticism of cold-blooded men sincerely de- siring to make out, as a mere matter of business, whether the French army in the East was in the hands of a capable chief*, and, the reputation of the Marshal being subjected to a trial of this severe kind, there is no room for wondering that it should have become more and more difficult to sustain him against the current of Opinion. If the death of the Marshal was a relief to the French Government, it was not the less, for that reason, The condo- a subject of international condolence. Our Gov- lence of the i-ii . ~ English Gov- ernment condoled*, and it they had desired to eminent. show that their words were not without warrant, they might have said, as we know, that by Lord Raglan himself — and who else of our country- men could be so competent to speak? — the loss had been deeply regretted. * High opinion From the arrangements of the French post- of the English ° A * Ante, vol. v. p. 117. Lord Raglan’s expression of regret was contained in a private letter, and could not, therefore, be regarded as merely formal. It is true, however, that Lord Raglan at that time had not seen the despatch which our authorities regarded as “offensive.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 47 office, there resulted at least one advantage to tlie lxhi * cause of truth. In communications to their friends army found to be expressed and relatives, which they meant to be private, in the inter- eepted letters French officers testified their admiration of the of French officers. English soldiery in action; and, along with the other contents of the letters, these statements were disclosed. They conveyed what was evidently at that time the genuine feeling of the French army. So far as I have learnt, no men in all France were so free from the tendency to undue boastful- ness and depreciation of others as the men com- posing her army in the field. The French Emperor had hardly been extricated The ^ m_ 1 J peror’s nn- by fortune from the consequences which were re- P^ent letter suiting from his rash publication of the “offensive” St. Arnaud. despatch, when he all at once stumbled again, and, without apparently having had the least notion of the construction which would be put upon his words, roused the indignation of the English Gov- its immediate ernment. Having to address a letter of condo- ° n t 11 lu ° lence to the widow of Marshal St. Arnaud, he thought fit to make this communication a vehicle for imputing to some persons unnamed an endeav- our to obstruct the expedition against Sebastopol by their timid counsels. Now, as France knew nothing of the paper which I have called the “unsigned remonstrance,”* and as it might well * Ante, vol. hi. p. 162. 48 INVASION OP THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXIII. Declaration in the “Moni- teur.” be judged highly improbable — though it after- wards turned out to be the fact — that the French Emperor, in a letter of condolence to a gentlewo- man, should have meant to assail his own officers in the form of innuendo, there seemed to be little room for doubting that the English must have been the delinquents to whom he ascribed timid counsels. Our Government took fire at the supposed charge, and an indignant remonstrance was ad- dressed to the Government of the Emperor. This time, however, the cure for the mischief was easily found. The Emperor consented to insert in the “Moniteur” a distinct assurance, declaring that the allusion had no reference to the English. This accordingly was done, and in very plain terms: “The following words of the letter of the Emperor “to the Marfichale de St. Arnaud, viz., ‘resisting “timid counsels,’ have been made the subject of “false interpretations. The only object of the “words was to make specially conspicuous the “energy of Marshal de St. Arnaud in opposing “the very natural differences of opinion which, “on the eve of so grave a resolution, were mani- fested in the counsels of the French army and “fleet.”* This declaration, of course, put an im- mediate end to the misunderstanding between the * t( Moniteur ” announcement, dated Paris, le RO Octobre, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 49 two Governments which the Emperor’s words had lxiii* occasioned. It was apparently surmised at the time that Question as to the real mean- tile Emperor’s disclaimer of all intention to allude mg of the Emperor’s to the English was a sacrifice of truth to policy; allusion, but a full knowledge of what had occurred on the 8th of September strongly tends to dispel that idea. It seems plain that the French officers who submitted for consideration the unsigned remon- strance of the 8th of September were the men to whom the Emperor alluded. The remonstrants were officers of great weight and authority, who put forward what may be called orthodox military considerations — considerations of such a kind as would have been probably approved by the French War Office, though opposed to the personal wishes of the Emperor. For that reason alone the Em- peror might naturally have been willing to level a blow at them; but another and yet more cogent motive was apparently conducing to his somewhat infelicitous taunt. After the victory of the Alma, and the successful establishment of the Allied armies in the invaded country, he might well seek to make it appear that he had sanctioned, and promoted the enterprise. The Emperor at this time had not, perhaps, learnt all that passed on the 8th of September and the days which followed. If he had known Invasion of the Crimea . VII. 4 50 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXXII. No despatch recounting the battle of the Alma from Prince Mentschikoff. The Czar’s state of ex- pectancy. the entire truth, and had been willing to disclose it, he would have said that Marshal St. Arnaud was so grievously ill at the time as to be physi- cally incapable of himself reconsidering the question of the invasion at the instance of the remonstrants — that in these circumstances he placed the de- cision in the hands of the English Commander — and that Lord Raglan, then eluding discussion, and gliding, as it were, into action, found means to overrule the remonstrance without even at- tempting to refute it, and drew forward the whole Armada, whether French or English or Turkish, to the rendezvous off Cape Tarkan.* III. Prince Mentschikoff wrote no despatch recount- ing the disaster he had undergone on the Alma,** but he sent an aide-de-camp to St. Petersburg. For several days towards the close of the month of September, the Czar had been growing more and more impatient for tidings. His impatience, it seems, was rather the longing for the good news he ex- pected than the result of evil foreboding. It is said * See chap, xxxvn. vol. in. ** An official narrative of the battle was afterwards prepared at the Russian Headquarters ; but was in the form of a journal. The aide-de-camp despatched to St. Petersburg carried, it is believed, no word of writing from the Prince. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 51 that he looked upon what he deemed to be the ^xm* unwarlike rashness of the invasion with a feeling akin to pity; and assuring himself that the Allies would soon be his prisoners, he ordered, they say, that in that event the captive armies of the West, but more especially the English, should be treated with kindness. At length the moment came when it was an- His reception nounced to the Czar that an aide-de-camp fresh of the Alma, come from the Crimea was in the ante -room.* He was instantly brought into the Czar’s presence. By brief word or eager gesture he was ordered to speak. He spoke — “Sire, your army has covered “itself with glory, but ” Then instantly the Czar knew that the tale to be told was one of disaster. With violent imprecations he drove the aide-de-camp from his presence. The aide-de-camp, however, understood that he was liable to be again called in; and after a time — a quarter of an hour I think I have heard — he was once more in the Czar’s presence. The Czar was changed in look. He seemed to be more composed than he had been, but was pale. When the aide-de-camp approached, the Czar thrust forward his hand as though to snatch at something, and imperatively cried, “The despatch!” The aide-de-camp an- * This aide de camp, I have heard, was Major Gregg. 4 * 52 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXIII, swered, “Sire, I bring no despatch.” “No des- patch?” the Czar asked, his fury beginning to rekindle as he spoke. “Sire, Prince Mentschikoff “was much hurried, and ” “Hurried!” inter- rupted the Czar; “What! what do you mean? Do “you mean to say he was running?”* Again his fury became uncontrollable; and it seems that it was some time before he was able to hear the cruel sound of the truth. When at length the Czar came to know what had befallen his army, he gave way to sheer despair; for he deemed Sebastopol lost, and had no longer any belief that the Cher- sonese was still a field on which he might use his energies. I have said that this man, gathering into his own person all the power, all the will, all the cares of the empire, was verily and indeed that which he had dared to call himself when he said that he was “the State.” I have said, too, that because the religion and the national passions of his obe- dient millions were his religion and his passions, therefore, in his superb and stately form vast Russia was truly incarnate. But never was this incarnation more manifest than in the time of the nation’s trouble. Because a disaster had come upon Russia, her Czar was first raging, then prostrate. * “Est ce qu’il courrait? INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 53 He obeyed tlie instinct which brings a man in his grief to sink down and lie parallel with the earth, and to seek to be hidden from all eyes. He took to his bed. Knowing the danger of approaching him, everybody was scared from the door of the chamber. By the side of the low pallet-bed that he lay on there was a pitcher of barley-water, or some such liquid, and of that, it is supposed, from time to time he drank; but, except the nourish- ment thus obtained, it is believed that for many days he took no food. This period of blank despair was indeed so prolonged that, when other and better tidings were beginning to come in from the Crimea, the Czar, it is said, still lay in the same condition. People feared to approach him so long as there was nothing to set against the thought of the defeat on the Alma; but when the more hopeful accounts came in, some thought they might approach him once more. Going to his bedside, they told him of these new tidings, and spoke of it as possible, if not even likely, that Sebastopol might still be saved. But the Czar would put no faith now in any words of hope. Nay, he raged, as they say, against those who sought to comfort him, saying: “You are the men, you are the very men, who “brought me to this — who brought me into this 54 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXIII. “war by talking to me of the power of the English “‘ peace party.’ Yes; you are the men, the very “men, who persuaded me that the English would “trade and not fight. Leave me! leave me!” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 55 CHAPTEK LXIV. After the failure of the 17th of October, the chap. Allies had determined to undertake a new plan of change of attack. The French were now to proceed against the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches. The Allies * English, it was known, with difficult ground in their front, and having but scant means of carry- ing on extensive siege works, would be able to do but little towards attaining the Be dan by regular approaches; but it was agreed that, whenever the Determin- ation to pro- French should be ready for the assault of the ceed by re- gular ap- Flagstaff Bastion, the English, at one point or proaciies, but . 07 x at the same other, should also storm the defences. In the night time to go on with the can- of the 17th of October, the French so prolonged nonade. their first parallel as to disclose their new plan of proceeding against the Flagstaff Bastion. It was determined, however, that, pending the time which would be occupied in proceeding by regular approaches, the cannonade should go on; and it was in pursuance of that part of the design that the English, on the 18tli of October, had maintained the fire of their batteries. Since the silencing of their fire on the 17 th of ^o n i n 9 °th a oct° f October, the French had been not only repairing 56 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP, LXIV. the havoc made in their works, hut establishing new, powerful batteries ; and as it was known that, on the morning of the 19th, they would be in a condition to reopen their fire with largely in- creased means, the hour of trial was looked for- ward to with great interest by the Allies. Indeed it may be said that, notwithstanding the adoption and continual prosecution of the plan for carrying forward regular approaches, there was a revival of the hope which had animated the Allies at the opening of the first cannonade. Men trusted that, under the more powerful fire which the French were now about to direct against it, the Flagstaff Bastion might be brought to such a condition as to warrant an assault; and, the English being ready at any time to storm the Redan, there was a prospect that, after all, the more summary of the two methods might be successful. In that aspect, the cannonade of the 19th of October would be a repetition of the attack which the Allies had commenced just two days before, though about to be attempted, this time, with more numerous and more powerful batteries. But the preparations of the French were under the eyes of Colonel de Todleben; and he assured himself that, so long as they might continue to assail him from a narrow front of fire, he would be able to keep his ascendant, by meeting their INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 57 increase of armament with, an increase yet greater ^xiv* than theirs. And Todleben got the dominion. Two of the French batteries were visited by the calamity of explosions; a third was silenced by fire at about ten o’clock in the morning; and at three in the afternoon there was no longer any French battery which continued the strife. The English fire was maintained with great energy the whole of the day , and directed, for the most part, against the Redan. At evening the cannonade ceased. No mate- rial injury had been done to the works of defence; but in killed and wounded this day the Russians lost 516 men. Every day from this time until the evening of The six suc- cessive days the 25th of October the fire of the Allies was of cannonade which fol- continued, but every day also it was encountered lowed the ^ J 19th Oct. by Todleben with a ceaseless energy. His defence of the place would be weakly, nay, almost wrongly, described by calling it “obstinate;” for, united to all the gifts which the defender of a beleaguered fortress should possess, he had a rare flexibility of mind, which enabled him to bend his vast powers to every changing phase of the conflict. Far from offering to the foe a resistance of the kind which the English call “dogged,” he was enterprising, disturbing, aggressive. If there could 58 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXIV. be little rest for a garrison living within the range of such energies, there was now even less on Mount Rodolph, where the French, with their magazines too often exploding, and their batteries too often enfiladed by new works thrown up for the purpose, were undergoing a trial of such a kind as might tend to make them distrustful of their own engineers. They hardly at the time understood the true root of the evils which beset them, but that which really stood in their path was warlike genius. Under the direction of this great volunteer, the Russians, though suffering carnage, could stead- fastly hold their ground. By fighting their bat- teries in the day-time with unsparing valour, and achieving at night immense labours, they were able to present to the besiegers every morning a line of defence which was not only strong and unbroken, but even augmented in strength; and they also found means to provide themselves, as the struggle continued, with a more and more efficient protection against the missiles of war. The comparative immunity enjoyed by the garri- son after the 19th of October they owed mainly to the traverses and other defensive works which were growing up round them each night, but in part also to the skill which they were acquiring from -practice in the art of descrying and eluding INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 59 the heavier missiles of war. On the 18th, as we ^xiv. saw (when only the English were firing), the Russians in killed and wounded lost no less than 543 men; hut although, during the six days which followed the 19th of October, a cannonade equally vigorous was maintained by both the French and the English, yet during that period the average daily loss of the Russians in killed and wounded was reduced to 254. The whole loss in killed and wounded which the Russians sustained from the siege down to the evening of the 25tli of October was officially stated to be 3834. But whilst Todleben thus met all the exigencies Measures for counteracting of the daily cannonade, he devoted yet more the French in J J their plan of of liis skill and energy to the object of counter- proceeding J # against the acting what he now perceived to be the main Flagstaff Bastion by design of the Allies. From the moment when, regular ap- proaches. on the morning of the 18th of October, he saw how the French on Mount Rodolph had newly opened the ground along a distance of four or five hundred yards, he assured himself that they had determined to assail the Flagstaff Bastion by regular approaches. As an engineer, he entirely approved their decision; for there were many cir- cumstances which concurred to make the Flagstaff Bastion a weak point in the line of defence; but so much the more for that reason he laboured to frustrate the assailants. By means of a change 60 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXIV. effected in the organisation of the night outposts, he found it possible to inflict much heavier losses than before upon the French working parties, and, indeed, to carry the interruption to such a length as to render the progress of the approaches ex- ceedingly slow, but also he constructed fresh bat- teries for the purpose of counteracting the new design of the French in all its successive stages, so ordering his measures that the nearer they might draw their approaches the more he would be enabled to ply them with fire; and adhering to his favourite principle, he never ceased to take care that, whenever the moment might come for assaulting the work, any troops employed in the enterprise should be under a storm of mitrail. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 61 CHAPTER LXV. Before entering upon the narrative of a battle chap. in which the English division of horse took a The t askoF“ principal part, it seems right to speak of the selec- generals 8 of tions that were made by our governing authorities service nuhe when they undertook to name the general officers field * who were to be entrusted with cavalry commands in the army despatched to the East. If a minister were unhappily forced to cast his eyes over a crowd of officers who had none of them rendered war service, and to try to draw out from among them the three or four gifted men who could best be entrusted to act in the field as generals of cavalry, it would be senseless to blame him for failing in so hard a task ; but when it so happens The great test that within recent years the State has carried on which is war, there surely is one test of fitness which has state such paramount value, that the neglect to apply o^war^vith- it can hardly be deserving of pardon, or even, we yeanT^ would say, of indulgence: Has the officer whose name is submitted done recent service in the field? Has his service been brilliant? Has he shown his prowess in action as a cavalry officer? Has 62 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lxv P ‘ ^e * n an y ran k } however humble, taken part in ~~ cavalry tights? Is he of the age for a cavalry man? Is he either under thirty-five, or else a man so fresh come from the performance of cavalry feats that the question of age may be waived? If the minister finds that all these questions must be answered in the negative by a portion of the can- didates, whilst others can answer affirmatively, it would surely appear to follow that he has already effected some progress towards a selection of the right names, because he can thenceforth confine his investigation to the merits of those officers who have served in the field, and eliminate those Great advan- who have not. To our own countrymen, more tage enjoyed by Engiand in especially, the principle might be expected to re- commend itself, because it so happened that, not- withstanding the long duration of the peace which had been existing between the great Powers of UsTof^fficers Europe, England had a superb list of cavalry of- who had done £[ cers pp e ear ]y prime of life who had done service in the J * hern. brilliant service in the field. The deter- Well, elimination proceeded — a choice was mination of . . ourauthori- made; but it was with an actually inverting enect ties to take . our cavalry that these operations took place, incredible as it generals ex- _ ciusiveiyfrom may seem , it is nevertheless true that, in nomina- the list of . those who ting general officers for cavalry commands in the had never , rendered East, the names oi the men who had done service war service. _ . n . n , in the field were all set aside, and that trom the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* 83 peace-service residue exclusively the appointments in question were made. The officer entrusted with the charge of our Lord Lucan, cavalry division was Lord Lucan. To his want of experience in the field there was added the drawback of age; for he had attained to a period of life at which no man altogether unused to war service could be expected to burst into fame as a successful cavalry general; but by nature Lord Lucan was gifted with some at least of the qual- ities essential for high command; and his fifty-four years , after all , however surely they may have extinguished the happy impulsiveness which is needed for a wielder of the cavalry arm, can hardly be said to have impaired his efficiency in the general business of a commander. He en- joyed perfect health; he saw like a hawk; and he retained such extraordinary activity of both body and mind, that perhaps the mention of his actual age makes it really more difficult than it might otherwise be to convey an idea of the tall, lithe, slender, and young-looking officer, pursuing his task of commander with a kind of fierce, tearing energy, and expressing by a movement of feature somewhat rare amongst Englishmen the intensity with which his mind worked. At every fresh access of strenuousness , and especially at the moments preceding strenuous speech, his face all 64 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. at once used to light up with a glittering, panther- like aspect, resulting from the sudden fire of the eye , and the sudden disclosure of the teeth, white, even, and clenched. At an early period of his life, and whilst still almost a boy, he had the honour to be encouraged in his career by the Duke of Wellington, and even to receive words of counsel and guidance from the lips of the great captain. In later years, he had had the spirit and enterprise to join the Rus- sian army whilst engaged in military operations, thus giving himself the advantage of seeing a campaign; * and I cannot but believe that the time thus spent was more conducing to warlike efficiency than many a diligent year employed in peace service at home. Independently of the general advantage derived from a glimpse of reality, Lord Lucan gathered from his experience of that cam- paign on the Danube some knowledge of a more special kind in regard to Russian troops; and there is reason for inferring that his mode of han- dling the English cavalry in the Crimea was in some measure influenced by the impressions of his earlier days. A quarter of a century before, he * In the war of 1828-9 against the Sultan, Lord Lucan was at- tached to the Staff of Prince Woronzoflf; and I have heard that he was graciously chided by the Emperor Nicholas for too freely ex- posing his life. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 65 had come back from the Danube campaign with a low opinion of the Russian cavalry, but with a high respect for the infantry — more especially, it seems , for the infantry when gathered in heavy column; and he not only carried those opinions with him to the Crimea, but continued, when there, to hold them unchanged, and even, perhaps — though unconsciously — to make them the basis of his resolves. Lord Lucan’s intellectual abilities were of a very high order, and combined as they were with the extraordinary energy of which I have spoken, they might seem to constitute power. Experience, too, had shown that he could apply these qualities effectively to at least one grade of military duty, for at the time when he exercised a Lieutenant- Colonel’s command his regiment was in excellent order. No military duties in peace-time could suffice to absorb such energies as those which Lord Lucan possessed; and during a period of many years immediately preceding the Russian war, he had engaged himself in the conduct of large agri- cultural operations, carried on upon his own estates both in England and Ireland. With him, the improvement and culture of land had not been a mere quiet resource for dawdling away Invasion of the Ciimea . VII , 5 CHAP. LXV, 66 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. tlie slow hours, but a serious and engrossing busi- ness, eliciting sustained energy. In executing his designs for the improvement of his Irish estates, he pressed on, it appears, with a great strength of purpose which overthrew all interposed ob- stacles-, and that ruthlessness perhaps was a cir- cumstance which might be numbered amongst the reasons for giving him a command, because the innovating force of will which he evidenced was a quality which had at the time a special and peculiar value. At the commencement of opera- tions in the field, it is difficult for any man who is not of an almost violent nature to prepare troops long used to peace service for the exigencies of actual war, by tearing them out of the grooves in which they have long been moving. Of course, the grave task of choosing our cavalry generals was converted, as it were, into guess-work by the determination to take them exclusively from the list of those officers who had never served their country in the field-, but apart from that grave objection, and the objection founded on age, Lord Lucan was an officer from whom much might be reasonably hoped, if the soundness of his judgment could be inferred from the general force of his intellect, and if also it could be taken for granted that he would prove willing and able, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 67 after having long had his own way, to accept the yoke of military subordination in the field, and to bear it with loyalty and temper. Lord Lucan had one quality which is of great worth to a commander, though likely to be more serviceable to a commander-in-chief than to one filling a subordinate post. He had decision, and decision apparently so complete that his mind never hankered after the rejected alternative. His convictions once formed were so strong, and his impressions of facts or supposed facts so intensely vivid, that he was capable of being positive to a degree rarely equalled. When he determined that he was right and others wrong, he did not fail also to determine that the right and the wrong were right and wrong with a vengeance. In summing up before the House of Lords an ar- gument attempting the refutation of a despatch sent home by Lord Raglan, he spoke in a way which was curiously characteristic. He did not dilute his assurances with the language of modera- tion. u My Lords,” he said, “I believe I have a now answered every charge contained in Lord “Raglan’s letter. I pledged myself to refute “every accusation; I said that I would not leave “a word unanswered. I believe I have fully ful- “ filled the undertaking I gave — have not left “two words together, but have torn the letter to 5 * CHAP. LXV. 68 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. “rags and tatters.” Coming from Lord Lucan, this language was no vulgar brazenry: it repre- sented the irrepressible strength of his real though mistaken conviction. From the qualities observed in this general officer at the time of his appointment, it might have been difficult perhaps for a minister to infer the peculiar tendency which developed itself in the field; but what happened was — that, partly from the exceeding vigour of his intellect, partly from a naturally combative, antagonistic temper, and partly, perhaps, from the circumstance of his having been long accustomed to rural and pro- vincial sway, Lord Lucan in the Crimea disclosed a habit of mind which was calculated to endanger his efficiency as a subordinate commander. He suffered himself to become an inveterate critic — - an inveterate critic of the orders he received from Headquarters; and since it happened that his criticism almost always ended in his coming to a strong disapproval of his chiefs directions, he of course lost that comfort of mind which is enjoyed by an officer who takes it for granted that his chief must be right, and had to be constantly executing orders with the full persuasion that they were wrongly conceived. Plainly, that was a state of mind which might grievously impair a man’s powers of action in the field, not only by INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 69 chilling him with the wretched sensation of dis- approving what he had to do, but also by con- fusing him in his endeavours to put right inter- pretations upon the orders he received. It was never from dulness or sloth, but rather through a misaiming cleverness, that Lord Lucan used to fall into error. With a mind almost al- ways apparently in a confident and positive state, he brought it to bear in a way which so often proved infelicitous, that his command in the Crimea was made on the whole to appear like that of a wrong-headed man*, but I imagine that this result was in no small measure produced by the circumstance of his being almost always in an attitude of oppugnancy*, and there is room for be- lieving that under other conditions, and especially if detached, and acting for the time independently, he might have evinced a much higher capacity for the business of war than he found means to show in the Crimea. There, at all events, he was not at all happily circumstanced; for besides being wholly unarmed with the authority which is conferred by former services in the field, he had so yielded to his unfortunate habit of adverse criticism as to be more often fretted than animated by the orders which came down from Head- quarters; and, on the other hand, he had under him a general officer commanding one of his CHAP. LXV. 70 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. brigades, wlio was rather a busy antagonist than a zealous and devoted lieutenant. It must be remembered, moreover, that the control of a large body of cavalry in action car- ries with it one peculiar source of embarrassment. If the general commanding leads a charge in person (as Murat was accustomed to do), he loses, of course, for a time his power of personally directing the troops not included in his first line, and so abdicates during the interval one of his principal functions as a general. If, on the other hand, he clings to his power as a general, and declines to narrow his authority during several critical minutes by taking the part of a leader, he must be content to forego a large share of the glory which attaches to cavalry achievements. He may deserve and attain the high credit of seizing the happiest moments for successively launching his squadrons; but in combats of horse, the task of actually leading an attack is plainly so momentous a business that it would be difficult for any man coming new to field service to build up any lofty repute as a general of cavalry, by ordering other people to charge. Therefore, for general as well as for special reasons, Lord Lucan’s command was one of an embarrassing kind; but despite the inherent dif- ficulties of his position — despite all the hindrances INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 71 created by himself, and the hindrances created by others — he was a diligent, indefatigable com- mander, — always in health , always at his post, always toiling to the best of his ability, and maintaining a high, undaunted, and even buoyant spirit, under trials the most depressing. He ex- pended a prodigious industry upon his duties. It may be that he was not perfectly consequent, or that his measures were wrong or ill-timed, or, again, that he was unduly thwarted; for certainly the result seems to have been that, in proportion to the energy exerted, his mind left no great trace of its action; but if a man’s power of com- manding could be safely inferred from mere words, the collection which has been made of Lord Lucan’s divisional orders would be a strik- ing example of vigour applied to the management of cavalry in a time of the heaviest trials. Dis- liking apparently every sacrifice, however tem- porary, of the controlling power, he did not take upon himself to lead in person any cavalry charge; and therefore the degree in which he may have been qualified for that very peculiar kind of duty must of course be a subject of conjecture rather than proof; but his composure under heavy fire was so perfect that, even in an army where prowess evinced in that way was exceedingly general, it did not escape observation. “Yes, CHAP. LXV. 72 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LXV. Lord Car- digan. ^damn him, he’s brave,” was the comment pro- nounced on Lord Lucan by one of his most steady haters. This is not the place for giving the general tenor of Lord Lucan’s services as commander of our cavalry in the Crimea;* but I have sought to prepare for my account of the action in the plain of Balaclava, by conveying beforehand some im- pression of the officer who there commanded our cavalry. Some such glance was the more to be desired because Lord Lucan’s abilities were evidently of a higher order than those he found means to disclose by the part he took in the battle. It should be understood that Lord Lucan did not thrust himself into the command of our divi- sion of horse. All he had asked for was to have charge of a single infantry brigade. The English division of horse numbered two brigades, one of which comprised the Light Cavalry, the other our Heavy Dragoons. The Light Brigade, as we know, was commanded by the Earl of Car- digan. Lord Cardigan, when appointed to this com- mand, was about fifty-seven years old, and had never seen war service. From his early days he * The place for that will be the chapter in which I deal with the period of Lord Lucan’s recall. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 73 had eagerly longed for the profession of arms, and although prevented by his father’s objections from entering the army at the usual period of life, he afterwards — that is, at about twenty-seven years of age — was made a cornet in a cavalry regi- ment. He pursued his profession with diligence, absenting himself much from the House of Com- mons (of which he was at that time a member) for the purpose of doing orderly duty as a sub- altern in the 8tli Hussars. Aided partly by for- tune, but partly by the favour of the Duke of York and the operation of the purchase system, he rose very quickly in the sendee, and at the end of about seven years from the period of his entering the army, lie was a lieutenant-colonel. He had a passionate love for the service — a fair knowledge, it is believed, of so much cavalry business as is taught by practice in England — a strong sense of military duty — a burning de- sire for the fame which awaits heroic actions — and, finally, the gift of high courage. Lord Car- digan’s valour was not at all of the wild, heedless kind, but the result of strong determination. Even from his way of riding to hounds, it was visible, they say, that the boldness he evinced was that of a resolute man with a set purpose, and not a dare-devil impulse. He bore himself firmly in both the duels he fought*, and upon the occasion CHAP. LXV. 74 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. which opposed him to an officer against whom he was bitterly angered, he shot his foe through the body.* His mind, although singularly barren, and wanting in dimensions, was not without force; and he had the valuable quality of persistency. He had been so constituted by nature, or so formed by the watchful care which is sometimes bestowed upon an only son, as to have a habit of attending to the desires and the interests of self with a curious exactitude. The tendency, of course, was one which he shared with nearly all living creatures ; and it was only from the extraordinary proportions in which the attribute existed, and from the ab- sence of any attempt to mask the propensity, that it formed a distinctive peculiarity. When engaged in the task of self-assertion or self-advocacy, he adhered to his subject with the most curious rig- our, never going the least bit astray from it, and separating from it all that concerned the rest of creation as matter altogether irrelevant and un- interesting. Others before him may have secretly concentrated upon self an equal amount of atten- tion; but in Lord Cardigan there was such an entire absence of guile, that exactly as he was so he showed himself to the world. Of all false pre- tences contrived for the purpose of feigning an interest in others he was as innocent as a horse. * Without, I think, killing him. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 75 Amongst his good qualities was love of order; but this with him was in such morbid excess, that it constituted a really dangerous foible, involving him from time to time in mischief. One of his quarrels was founded upon the colour of a bottle; another upon the size of a tea-cup. In each case the grievance was want of uniformity. To his formulated mind the distinction between lawful and right was imperceptible. A thousand times over it might be suggested to him that he ought not to have been sleeping on board his yacht — a yacht with a French cook on board — when not only all the officers and men under him, but also his divisional chief, were cheerfully bearing the hardships and privations of camp life; but a thou- sand times over he would answer that he indulged himself thus with the permission of Lord llaglan; and the lawfulness of the practice being thus es- tablished, he never seemed to understand that there could remain any question of propriety, or taste, or right feeling. With attributes of this kind, he was plainly more fitted to obey than to command. Having no personal ascendancy, and no habitual consider- ation for the feelings of others, he was not, of course, at all qualified to exert easy rule over English gentlemen, and his idea of the way to command was to keep on commanding. There CHAP. LXV. 76 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. surely was cruelty in the idea of placing human beings under the military control of an officer at once so arbitrary and so narrow; but the notion of such a man having been able to purchase for himself a right to hold Englishmen in military subjection is, to my mind, revolting. Lord Car- digan incurred a series of quarrels, and was re- moved from the command of his regiment; but afterwards, by the special desire of the Duke of Wellington, he was restored to active service. There can hardly have been any well-founded expectation that Lord Cardigan would be able to go through a campaign without engaging in quarrels; and never, surely, by action or speech, did he convince the dispensers of military authority that he was a man who would be competent to meet the emergencies of war with the resources of a fruitful mind. I imagine that the first active Bishop or Doctor of Divinity whom the Commander- in- Chief at the Horse Guards might chance to have met on horseback would probably have been much more competent than Lord Cardigan (whose mind worked always in grooves) to discover and seize the right moment for undertaking a cavalry charge. Yet without the attributes of a commander, a man may be a resolute, faithful, heroic soldier; and that surely is the kind of glory — it is glory of no mean kind — which can best be claimed for INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 77 Lord Cardigan. In despite of all tlie faults which he had manifested to the world when appointed ~~ to the command of the Light Brigade, there still remained good grounds for trusting that, as long as he should he acting in the performance of what, he might clearly understand to he his duty, he would perform it with precision, with valour, and, if need be, with unsparing devotion. If between Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan Lord Lucan there could be discovered any points of resemblance, digan regard- these were not of such a kind as to be conducive to harmony. They were, both of them, conten- tious; and whether from natural gifts, or from long habits of disputation, they had both of them powers of a kind which are commonly developed in lawyers, though not certainly in lawyers of the same quality. Lord Lucan was the able, the cogent, the strenuous, the daring advocate, whose opponents (especially if they happened to be in the right) were to be not merely answered but crushed. Lord Cardigan, in his forensic aspect, was of the species which repeats a hundred times over in the same words the same version of the same facts, persistently ignores the whole strength of the adversary’s argument, and which also relies a good deal upon what in the courts are called “ points” and “ objections.” Yet it would seem that he must have been capable of attaining to a 78 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LXV. higher level; for upon one occasion, when under- taking to defend himself in the House of Com- mons, he made what the House regarded as a very good speech. Lord Lucan and Lord Car- digan were both of them men possessed with ex- ceeding self-confidence, but a self-confidence re- sulting from very different springs of thought. Lord Lucan’s trustfulness in himself was based upon the consciousness of great ability, and upon that rare vividness of impression as well as that strength of conviction of which we were just now speaking. He was confident because he was posi- tive. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan’s as- surance was not, I think, founded upon any quality which could be rightly called self-conceit, but rather upon the corollary which he drew from the fact of his having a given command. He was so extravagantly military in his notions, so orderly, so strait-minded, so given to narrow and literal interpretations, that from the mere fact of his hav- ing been entrusted with the charge of a brigade, he inferred his perfect fitness for the task. By the act of appointing him his Sovereign had de- clared him fit, and he took the Queen at her word. When we see him, by-and-by, side by side with a cavalry officer of warlike experience, at a critical moment, we shall learn to how great an absurdity a man may be brought by this army- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 79 list process of reasoning. So far did Lord Car- digan carry the inference, that once, I see — even in writing — when maintaining his view as to the extent of undisturbed authority which should be possessed by the commander of a brigade, he made bold to bracket himself, as it were, for the purpose of the discussion, with no less a man than Sir Colin Campbell, basing one of his arguments upon the tacit assumption, that because Sir Colin and he both commanded brigades, they were both of them, therefore, entitled to the same degree of latitude. It was hardly to be expected with confidence that officers appointed to high cavalry commands without having earned them by serving their country in the field would all at once show them- selves able to put sound constructions upon the orders which were to guide them in the presence of the enemy, and the personal qualities of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan were not of such a kind as to supply in this point the absence of warlike experience. With Lord Lucan the danger was, that his fertile and vigorous mind might bring him into some elaborate and subversive process of reasoning. If, for instance, we should hear him in- formed that he is to be supported by infantry, we must be prepared to find him convinced that the infantry is to be supported by him. On the other CHAP. LXV. 80 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. hand, Lord Cardigan’s endeavours at construing orders were sure to be characterised by an ex- ceeding rigidity, which might be preposterous in one instance, in another superb. If ordered to hold a position, he might think himself planted as fast as a sentry at the gate of a palace. If ordered to advance down a valley without being told where to halt, he might proudly abstain from supplying the omission, and lead his brigade to destruction. Lord Lucan was the brother-in-law of Lord Cardigan*, but so little beloved by him that in the eyes of cynical London, an arrangement for cou- pling the one man to the other seemed almost a fell stroke of humour. It might have been thought that, in a free country, the notion of carrying of- ficial perverseness to any such extreme length as this must have been nipped in the bud. It was not so. If England was free, she was also very patient of evil institutions, as well as of official misfeasance. She trusted too much to the fitful anger of Parliament, and the chances of remon- strance in print. In justice to Lord Cardigan — because tend- ing to account for, and in some measure palliate, the act which will be presently mentioned - — it should be stated that, some short time before the embarkation, he had had to endure a bitter dis- appointment, under which he continued to smart INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 81 during the first two weeks of the invasion. Lord ( j I ^ r r * Lucan was to have been left in Bulgaria, and, ~ under that arrangement, Lord Cardigan in the Crimea would have been commander of our cavalry during several momentous days, without being liable to any interference except from Lord Rag- lan himself; but Lord Lucan successfully insisted upon his claim to be present with the portion of the division which was likely to come first into the presence of the enemy; and accordingly Lord Cardigan, though commanding the Light Brigade, had over him his divisional general, and was there- fore in a measure annulled. Lord Cardigan was not a man who would have Lord Cardi- consciously suffered himself to become at all in- ^protected 0 subordinate; but, whilst writhing under the torture he^egL-dcT inflicted by the annulling presence of his divisional fntorfer "nce° general, he brought himself to imagine that the Lucan? custom of the service set something like bounds to the overruling authority which should be exer- cised by a divisional general over his brigadier, and that in some matters at least — as, for in- stance, in the arrangements of his camp — the brigadier had a right to expect that he would be left to his own discretion. Accordingly, and at a period of the campaign when it might be imagined that the eternal claims of self would, for a time, be superseded by the Invasion of the Crimea. VII . 6 82 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. Lord Cardi- gan’s com- plaint in writing. Lord Raglan’s severe an- swer. warlike ardour of a cavalry leader, Lord Cardigan applied his mind to the object of protecting him- self from the interference of his commanding of- ficer. He drew up in writing a lengthy string of complaints on this subject, and submitted them to Lord Eaglan. Lord Eaglan judged it his duty to answer this appeal with some severity. In a paper which was addressed, it seems, to Lord Cardigan, but meant to be communicated also to Lord Lucan, the Com- mander of the Forces thus wrote : — “Balaclava, Sept. 28, 1854. “I have perused this correspondence with the “deepest regret, and I am bound to express my “conviction that the Earl of Cardigan would have “done better if he had abstained from making the “representation which he has thought fit to submit “to my decision. “I consider him wrong in every one of the “instances cited. A general of division may in- terfere little or much with the duties of a general “of brigade, as he may think proper or see fit. “His judgments may be right or wrong, but the “general of brigade should bear this in mind, that “the lieutenant-general is the senior officer, and “ that all his orders and suggestions claim obedience “and attention.’’ INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 83 Lord Eaglan, however, determined to try whether it were possible that words of entreaty from himself, addressed alike to Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, might either allay the animosity existing between them, or render it less embar- rassing to the public service; and accordingly, in the same paper, he addressed to both these Generals the following appeal: “The Earl of Lucan and “the Earl of Cardigan are nearly connected. They “are both gentlemen of high honour and of ele- vated position in the country, independently of “their military rank. They must permit me, as “the Commander of the Forces, and, I may say, “the friend of both, earnestly to recommend to “them to communicate frankly with each other, “and to come to such an understanding as that “there should be no suspicion of the contempt of “authority on the one side, and no apprehension “of undue interference on the other.” (Signed) “Eaglan.” It must not be supposed, however, that the re- lations between these two officers involved them in unseemly personal altercations. Lord Lucan with great wisdom and tact took care that the more unwelcome communications which he from time to time made to his brigadier should be either in writing, or else conveyed by the mouth of an- G * chap. lxv. Lord Raglan’s appeal to the good feelings of Lord Lucan and Lord Car- digan. 84 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. Inquiry as to the cause which render- ed it possible to confide our cavalry to those generals exclusively who had not rendered ser- vice in the field. other; and Lord Cardigan on the other hand had a sense of propriety in such matters, and was not without power of self-restraint. But now, why did it happen that England, having under her eyes a brilliant list of cavalry officers from whom she might make her choice, determined to exclude all those who had served in the field, and to place in the respective com- mands of which we have been speaking two peers between fifty and sixty years old who had neither of them rendered war-service? One answer is this: There was a divided responsibility. We heard what happened to London when the War Office and the Horse Guards — the clerk and the counter- clerk — differed; but this selection of cavalry of- ficers was the result of agreement, or rather, one may say, of a process which goes by the name of “compounding.” From ancient treaties of peace between the two sides of Whitehall it resulted that the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards was the authority for advising the appointment and taking the Queen’s pleasure upon it; but that the authorities responsible to Parliament, or, in other words, the Ministry, might take upon themselves to interpose; and that if they should do so, and do so persistently, then, painful as the surrender would be, their objection should be allowed to prevail. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 85 From this division of power there followed, of course, a corresponding alleviation of responsibility. Lord Hardinge could say that the proposed nomi- nations had been brought to the cognisance of the Ministry, without causing them to interpose their authority as a positive bar to the proceeding. The Ministry, on the other hand, could declare — as, indeed, the Duke of Newcastle very constantly did — that they strongly disapproved the appoint- ments, and never would have made them if they had the full power in their hands; but that, still, they did not feel it absolutely incumbent upon them to take the somewhat strong measure of in- terposing. In the present condition of our State arrange- The value of ments, one of the best and most graceful uses of (hAhe ab- a ° y sence of other an aristocracy N is to supply the country in time of sufficing ar- war with commanders who have attained to dis- as^inean^of tinction in presence of the enemy, and yet are Stewitii the sufficiently youthful. For a nation to build its manors C hav- hopes upon so narrow a basis, instead ot fairly experience, searching out from among the whole community also of the those men who may seem the best qualified { 0 rightage * lead its forces, this, no doubt, must be looked upon as a rude, quaint practice, which is only saved from being preposterous by the fact that no more rational method has hitherto found accept- ance; but in the mean time, the practice, as thus 86 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. The appoint- ments rested upon no such basis. understood, has its value. The adventitious cir- cumstances combine with personal merit, and lift a man into command at the age best adapted for the purpose; so that the qualities of a Wellesley, for instance, may come to be recognised at thirty instead of at sixty — a difference material to the individual, but unspeakably important to the coun- try; and in that way (until a better method can be discovered) the legitimate ambition of powerful or wealthy families may subserve the true interests of the State. If Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan had been two nobles of the age of some thirty- three years, who had fought side by side on the banks of the Sutlej, who had inspired their com- manders with a high idea of their warlike qualities, and who, by aid of these circumstances combining with their family pretensions, had attained to such military rank and distinction as to be recognised, and deserving candidates for high commands, then, indeed, a country which had not yet hit upon any better mode of attaining the object would have had reason to be grateful for the existence of a system which supplied and raised into eminence, at the right time of life, men capable of wielding authority in the field. Far from resting upon any such basis, these appointments deprived the country of the inestimable advantage of seeing her squa- drons entrusted to men in the prime of cavalry life INVASION OF TIIF CRIMEA. 87 who had gloriously served in the field, and com- ^ I xy P * mitted a superbly great stake to two peers of the ages of fifty-four, and fifty-seven, who, so far as concerns that teaching which is imparted by re- sponsible war-services, were now to begin their education, and begin it in the enemy’s presence. However, these two general officers were both The effects that were to of them brave men , and in that , at all events, be anticipated from these ap- there was a basis for hoping that, in spite of any pointments. misfortunes resulting from the appointments in question, the honour of the service would be sus- tained. It may be that, in professing to judge of the seed which was sown in the spring, one is governed too much by observing the harvest that was reaped in the autumn*, but certainly this double selection of generals does seem as though it were fitted — and that without much help from fortune — to involve the English Light Cavalry in some ruinous, yet brilliant disaster. There is a circumstance which tends in some Circumstance . n i tending to ac- measure to account tor dereliction ot duty on the count for de- reliction of part ot those who were preparing our army for duty on tho n . . ii P art of those toreign service. Men who might be supposed the who were re- . . sponsible for most competent to torm an opinion, were persuaded the appoint- i , iii i ments. that the torce would be used as a support to negotiations, and not for actual warfare.* * I do not include the Duke of Newcastle amongst those who entertained the impression, but certainly the communications made 88 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. General Scarlett. The officer appointed to the command of the Heavy Dragoons was Brigadier-General the Hon- ourable James Scarlett. He was fifty-five years of age, and he too, like Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, had never done service in the field; but besides those soldierly qualities of which we shall be able to judge when we see him engaging the enemy, he was gifted with two quiet attributes, which enabled him to appreciate the deficiency, and do all that man could to supply it. He had modesty as well as good sense; and knowing that experience, valuable in almost all undertakings, is especially valuable in the great business of war, he did not for a moment assume that, by the magic virtue of his mere appointment to a command, he became all at once invested with the knowledge or the practical skill which men acquire in the field; and he therefore deter- mined, if he could, to have men at his side who knew of their own knowledge what fighting was, and had even won high distinction. The officer whom Scarlett chose as his aide- de-camp, was Lieutenant Alexander Elliot. Be- fore the period of his entering the Boyal Army Elliot had served five years in India. He was in to Lord Raglan — communications extending down to the eye of his departure for Paris — compelled him almost to believe that the period of foreign service would be extremely brief. INVASION. OF THE CRIMEA. 89 the Gwalior campaign, and at the battle of Pun- niar commanded a troop of the 8th Bengal Light Cavalry. With the same regiment he went through the whole of the eventful and momentous struggle which we call the first Sutlej campaign. He com- manded a squadron at the great battle of Feroze- shah; and at a time when the 6 2d had been driven back and almost annihilated, he executed a des- perate charge, and with his standard-bearer and five troopers penetrated into the Sikh entrench- ments. In recognition of his brilliant cavalry service in that war, Lord Hardinge appointed him to a command in his body-guard, and made him honorary aide-de-camp. Being afterwards con- strained to leave India by the state of his health, he entered the Poyal Army, and it was owing to this necessitated change that he bore no higher rank than that of lieutenant. With all the special knowledge and instincts of a brilliant cavalry officer, he had qualifications of a more general kind; and if there had been at the time of the invasion a minister so strong and so resolute as to be able to do the thing which is right, a man such as Elliot would have been eagerly laid hold of and entrusted with high cavalry command. But this was not all that Scarlett was able to do towards arming himself with the experience of men who had done good service in war. Colonel CHAP. LXV. 90 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXV. Beatson liad fought under Evans in Spain, and had afterwards risen to high distinction in India. Being for the time in Europe, and yielding to the warlike impulses of his nature, he had laid aside those considerations of military rank which might have governed a lower order of mind, and con- sented to he attached to General Scarlett’s Staff as his extra aide-de-camp. Lord Lucan, with that unhappy perversity which was so constantly mar- ring his cleverness, opposed himself to this last arrangement of Scarlett’s, and declared, it seems, that Colonel Beatson must not be considered as having any recognised position in the army. I have said that if General Scarlett enjoyed the immense advantage of having two such aides- de-camp as these, he owed the happy idea of thus strengthening himself to his own wisdom and modesty, but it is worth while to say that that last quality of his had a tendency to withdraw our brigade of Heavy Dragoons from its due share of public attention. Concurring with other known causes, General Scarlett’s quiet unobtrusiveness did much to prevent his fellow-countrymen from acquainting themselves so fully as they might otherwise have been eager to do with the fight between his brigade and the main body of the Kussian cavalry. On the day of the battle of Balaclava it was INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 91 not the destiny of General Scarlett to have to act under any great complexity of circumstances, nor to give rise to any kind of public controversy, and it will therefore be easy to see and to understand him in action without having a preliminary know- ledge of the man; but in truth his achievement corresponded so closely with the noble and heroic simplicity of his character, that the account of what he did will not fail to carry along with it a true indication of his quality. We shall see him lead his great charge. CHAP. lxv. 92 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAPTER LXVI. I. ™ap. The strength and compactness of the position The iTolated” taken up by the Allies on the Chersonese upland position of the 1 forces defend- was not at all shared , as we know, by the scanty detachment of infantry which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the defence of Balaclava. Stationed apart in the plain below, this small force was in such local relation to the Allied army on the Chersonese as to be lying outside, and at the foot of the natural castle from which the main body looked down.* Yet Balaclava was the storehouse, the arsenal, the port, whence the English drew all their sup- plies; and such was the anomalous character of the arrangements which Lord Raglan had been forced to adopt, that, instead of being safely ensconced in the rear of the main Allied camp, the material sources of the English strength lay inviting the enterprise of Prince MentschikofFs field army, and in charge, so to speak, of an outpost. It, however, seemed feasible to construct a * See vol. yi. cheap, lvii. p. 34, et seq. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 93 system of field-works wliicli would enable the lxvi troops left out in the plain below to withstand an increasing strength and attack for such time as to allow of the needed rein- boldness of the Russian forcements coming down to their aid from the forces es- tablished in upland: and the English were quickened in their the direction ofTchorgoun. sense of the importance belonging to this part of their task, by the always increasing strength and boldness of the Russian force which had begun to show itself in the direction of Tchorgoun so early as the 7th of October. Before hearing of the battle of the 25th of Natur ® of the ° ground and of October, it is well to have an idea of the ground the d ff e ? c ® 8 upon which the security of Balaclava depended, and the arrangements which had been made for depended, its defence. The string of houses constituting Balaclava ex- Position of ' ITT! the Balaclava tended along a narrow ledge between the eastern town, side of the little harbour and the western acclivities of Mount Hiblak. Except at the gorge of Kadi- koi towards the north, and the narrow strait to- wards the south leading crookedly into the Euxine, both the town and the harbour were surrounded in all directions by steep lofty hills*, and the hills towards the west being a continuation of that Chersonese upland where the main Allied armies lay camped, were within the unquestioned domin- ion of the invaders. Partly from this cause, and partly from their 94 invasion of the Crimea. chap. LXVI. The inner line of de- fence. The part of it from the sea-coast to the Church of St. Elias. command of the sea — including the small hut deep harbour, which brought ships of the line close up to the town — the English, at Balaclava, were secure against any attack coming either from the west or the south; and again, towards the east, the ground was not only steep and commanding, but otherwise favourable for defence. Accordingly, from a part of the sea-cliff which is one mile east of Balaclava, and thence north and north-west to the Church of St. Elias, in the neighbourhood of Kadikoi, a curve could be drawn, extending along a distance of between two and three miles, in which nature had done so much for the defence that, by expending upon it a moderate amount of labour, and arming the works there constructed with a few naval guns of position, our Engineers were enabled to place all this portion of the inner line in a fair state of security, without diverting from the duties of the siege any very large body of men. * A few of the guns in position near the church were manned, it seems, by the Royal Ar- tillery, but all the rest of them by our Marine Ar- * Tlie number of guns in battery along this inner line of de- fence was, I think, 26. The Engineers were confident in the security of the “inner line,” and at times certainly Sir Colin Campbell shared their belief; but I gather that he was brought into an anxious state of mind by the peculiar responsibility which weighed upon him , and his language in regard to the security of the position waa not always the same. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 95 tillery ; and the only bodies of infantry which this lxvT line of more than two miles absorbed, were the 1200 marines from our fleet, under the command of Colonel Hurdle, with two companies of the 93d Regiment. * Towards the north, the hills opened, and the The part of i ii . iii i the inner line place could be approached by the gorge ot Kadi- of defence . . which crossed koi ; but even there , at intervals there were spurs the gorge of thrown out from the neighbouring acclivities which offered good sites for several small field-works, and by taking advantage of these, our Engineers completed their inner line of defence. The troops Sir Colin on which Sir Colin Campbell relied for the defence for?e P at°the gorge. of the gorge were the main body of the 93d High- landers, with a battalion of Turks and a battery of field-artillery. There was a frigate in the harbour, and (be- The other re- sources con- sides a score or two of English soldiers, having duties tributing to of some kind which brought them to Balaclava on the inner line, the day of the battle) there lay in the town some eighty or a hundred English soldiers, who, al- though invalided, were not so prostrate as to be unable to handle a musket. So great was the confidence which most of Circumstance curiously our people reposed in the strength of this inner illustrating * r r ° the quiet effi- ciency with * Our Engineers put the length of the line , taken altogether , at u about three miles.” — Official Journal, p. 41. 96 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX VI- which the inner line of defence was made good. The plain of Balaclava. line of defence, in the quality of all the troops which manned it, and in the prowess of the veteran soldier who commanded the garrison , that the safety of the ground thus covered cost them little or no uneasiness; and, as a not inexpressive sign of the quiet efficiency with which this part of the defence was made good, I may mention that an officer holding a very high and responsible com- mand, and one, too, which did not at all tend to divert him from this part of the Allied position, was long able to remain unacquainted with the very existence of the inner line of defence, and to hear of it for the first time some ten years after the peace. To him in the Crimea this inner line of defence was what oxygen is to a peasant — a blessing unperceived and unheard of, on which his existence depended. The gorge of Kadikoi opens out into a large tract of ground which, though marked in some places by strong undulations, by numberless hil- locks, and even by features deserving the name of “heights,” is yet, upon the whole, so much lower, and so much more even than the surrounding country, as to be called “the plain of Balaclava.” This tract of comparatively low ground is the field of the engagement, which we are accustomed to call the battle of Balaclava, but it lies a mile INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 97 north of the town.* It has an average length of ^xvi" about three miles, with a breadth of about two, and is hemmed in on almost all sides by ground of from some 300 to 1000 feet high; for, on the north of the plain, there are the Fedioukine * See the map ; but a glance at this diagram may aid towards an apprehension of the general features of the field. Invasion of the Crimea. VII, 7 98 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVI. Hills; on the east, Mount Hasfort; on the south, the Kamara Hills and Mount Hiblak; on the west, the steep buttresses of the Chersonese upland. The distinctive feature of the basin thus formed is a low ridge of ground, which, crossing the so- called “plain” in the direction of its length — or, in other terms, from east to west — divides it into two narrow valleys. So completely has this range of heights bridged over the plain, that it served as a natural viaduct, enabling the designer of the Woronzoff road to carry his trace-line across from the Kamara Hills on the east to the Chersonese uplands on the west without letting it ever de- scend to the general level of the ground which had to be traversed; and therefore it is that the features which constitute this ridge are distinguished as the “Causeway Heights.” From the foot of the Chersonese the North Valley sloped down in an eastern direction till it reached the embankment of the aqueduct, there crossed, it appears, by three bridges. A yet farther descent of only a few yards down the valley brought a rider to the left bank of the river Tclier- naya, and to fords by which he might cross it. On the other side of the river, and at a distance of less than a mile, there stood the village of Tclior- goun, where Liprandi, as we know, had estab- lished his Headquarters, and gathered his main INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 90 strength. This North Valley is ground on which lxvi* the memory of our countrymen has brooded. It was the scene of the Light Cavalry charge. The South Valley is on the Balaclava side of the “Causeway Heights.” At its eastern extremity there is a knoll between 500 and 600 feet high, which, being joined to the Kamara Hills by a neck of high ground, juts out over the valley as a pro- montory does over the sea, and for a feature thus conspicuous men soon found a name. They called it “Canrobert’s Hill.” At the opposite or western extremity of this valley, the road connecting Bala- clava with the Chersonese passed up by way of the “Col.” It is with the slope of a hill-side de- scending into this South Valley, and with the glory of Scarlett’s Dragoons, that England will have to associate her memory of the one great fight between cavalry and cavalry which took place in the course of the war. It was of so much moment to secure Balaclava Conception of from disaster, that there could not but be a desire of defence, to prevent the enemy from coming within the limits of the South Valley, and considering, on the one hand, the inconvenience of diverting troops from the siege for merely defensive purposes, and, on the other, the configuration of the ground in the plain of Balaclava, men thought that what was wanting in bayonets might possibly be eked 100 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP, LXVL out with the spade; and this idea was the more readily pursued because it happened that, in part from the confidence of the Sultan, and in part from the graciousness of the French Commander, Lord Raglan had obtained the services of some 3000 Turkish soldiers, who might first be em- ployed in constructing the requisite earthworks, and then in manning them. Our Engineers saw that by throwing up a slight work on Canrobert’s Hill, and a chain of little redoubts on the bosses or hillocks which mark at short intervals the range of the Causeway Heights, there might be formed an entrenched position which would enable a force of moderate strength to hold the ground against one much more numerous; and it is evident that the design would have had a great value if the position of Balaclava, when expecting an attack from 20,000 or 25,000 men, had had a small army of 10,000 or 12,000 men to defend it. But this was not the real exigency; for, on the one hand, the Allies, if they could have time to come down, were in no danger at this period of being outnumbered in the plain; and, on the other hand, there was not only no army at Balaclava of such strength as to be able to de- fend an entrenched position like that which might be formed on the line of the Causeway Heights, but actually no army at all, and no force of any INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. loi kind tliat could be charged to support the men placed in the intended works, save only a division of cavalry, with a single troop of horse-artillery. Our Engineers formed an entrenched position which could only have strength upon the supposition that several thousands of the Allied infantry would have time to come down and defend it. Yet unless there should be a more than English vigilance in the plain of Balaclava, and unless, too, our Divi- sion of Cavalry should be so brilliantly wielded as to be able to check and disconcert for some hours the marches of the enemy’s columns, there was no good ground for imagining that the strength of this “outer line,” or the prowess of the brave Osmanlis who were to be placed in its earthworks, could fairly be brought into use. It would seem, therefore, at first sight, that General de Todleben’s severe criticism of the outer line of defence must have been well enough justi- fied; but the truth is, that the scheme was never recommended by our Engineers as a really trust- worthy expedient. They chose it apparently as a makeshift which might more or less baffle a hither- to unenterprising enemy; and, at least, their plan had the merit — the then truly enticing merit — of diverting no English forces from the great busi- ness of the siege; for if the outer line of defence had not been adopted, our cavalry, with its at- CTIAP. LXVI. 102 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, lxve tendant troop of horse-artillery, would still have been camped in the plain. The works On Canrobert’s Hill there was thrown up a constituting # 1 the outer line slight breastwork , with its salient towards the of defence. D north-east; and along the whole line of the Cause- way Heights there were formed as many as five other earthworks, each smaller and weaker than the one on Canrobert’s Hill. Of these six works some were open at the gorge, and some closed, but they used to be all called “redoubts.”* The work on Canrobert’s Hill was known as the Redoubt Number One, and the five other works were distinguished by successive numbers;** but the one which, in this way, received the name of * Practically — I am not speaking of wliat might be found in books or in the impressions of formulated people — the word re- doubt has t*o meanings. In its most confined sense it means a work which is not open at the gorge ; but in the everyday language of those military men who are not professing to describe in a special and distinctive way, any kind of field-work , whether open or not at the gorge, is commonly called a ‘‘redoubt. 1 ’ Like, for instance, the word ship (which maj^ either be used in a very general sense, or else may be taken to designate a three-masted vessel of a particular rig), the word ‘‘redoubt” has practically two meanings, one general, the other distinctive. Lord Raglan — the most accurate of men in his language — constantly used the word “redoubt” in its general sense, applying it indiscriminately to works which were open at the gorge as well as to those which were not. ** I adopt the nomenclature which obtained so generally as to render any other inconvenient; but I may usefully mention that some — and amongst them Lord Raglan — did not include the work on Canrobert’s Hill in the numerical designation. With them the work commonly called Number Two would be Number One, and so on. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 103 Number Three was sometimes also called “Arab- lxvt’ tabia.” The works were executed by Turkish labour Slight nature of the works. under the direction of an English Engineer of- ficer. * They were of very weak profile, and a horseman, as w~as proved by the Cossacks, could well enough ride through and through them. In- deed, one of the works was begun, completed, and armed in a single day. The work on Canrobert’s Hill was armed with Armament of the works. three 12-pounder iron guns, supplied by Dundas from our fleet; and the three redoubts next ad- joining it — that is, the Redoubt Number Two, the Arabtabia or Redoubt Number Three, and the Redoubt Number Four — were each of them armed with two guns of the same sort and calibre/ 14 * The two other works — namely, the Redoubt Number Five and the Redoubt Number Six — were un- armed on the day of the battle. The works were manned by Turkish troops, How manned, one battalion of these being posted on Canrobert’s * Lieutenant Wagman , I believe ; but I hear Captain Stanton also took some part. The work completed in a single day was the “ Number Two.” *'* There is a difference between the various authorities which record the number and place of these guns, Lord Raglan putting them at seven, Todleben at eleven, and others at intermediate num- bers. I put them, as may be seen, at nine. — “Journal of Opera- tions.” The difference is an immaterial one. 104 INVASION OF THE CKIMEA. CHAP. LXVf. The Kamara Height, which commanded Canrobert's Hill, left in possession of the enemy. Space over which this outer line of earthworks extended. Distance of the farthest work from the English camp before Sebas- topol. The force im- mediately available for supporting the Turks. Hill, and a half battalion or wing in each of the Causeway redoubts. The work on Canrobert’s Hill was perilously exposed to any artillery which might be placed in battery on the neighbouring ridge of Kamara; and no arrangements were made for preventing the enemy from seizing this vantage-ground, for the ridge of Kamara was itself overtopped by crests ranging higher and higher in the direction of Baidar; and it was judged that to attempt to hold more ground would be to add to the weakness of this outer line. As it was, the line of these six earthworks extended over a space of more than two miles; and Canrobert’s Hill was so distant from the ground whence supporting forces might be expected to come, as to offer the enemy a licence of some hours’ duration for any enter- prise in the plain of Balaclava upon which he might think fit to venture.* The only force immediately available for at- tempting to give any support to the Turks was the division of English cavalry, which, along with its attendant troop of horse-artillery (commanded by Captain Maude) , was under the orders of Lord * The distance from Canrobert’s Hill to the camp of the nearest English division of infantry was only about four miles going straight; but we shall see that, from the moment of first giving the alarm to that when an English division could be got down to even the more western part of the plain, some hours elapsed. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 105 Lucan. This division of cavalry comprised some 1500 sabres, and was in liigli order. It lay camped on the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights, at a distance of not much less than two miles from Canrobert’s Hill, but it kept an out- lying picket at a spot near the heights of Kamara. Such, then, was the outer line of defence; and this — only this — was the force which , except after the lapse of some hours, could be expected to come and support it. It is strange, but still true, that for some time before the 25th of October, Sir Colin Campbell had been every day growing more and more con- fident in the strength of the position. There were moments, no doubt, when he spoke more distrust- fully, but in his report of the 20tli of October, sent up to Headquarters, he wrote: “I think we “ can hold our own against anything that may “come against us in daylight. I am, however, a “little apprehensive about the redoubts if seriously “attacked during the night;’ 1 and, in a later report, he said, “I fancy we are now very strong as well “as secure.” It could not but be that, when so wary and anxious a soldier as Sir Colin reported the position secure, he would more or less impart his own trustfulness to Headquarters; and it is not to be wondered at that, when thus assured, Lord Eaglan CHAP. LX VI. Sir Colin Campbell’s confidence in the mainten- ance of the position. This neces- sarily com- municated to Lord Raglan. 106 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVI. Uncertainty as to the sources of Campbell’s confidence. abstained from weakening bis scant resources by sending down any further detachments of infantry. The Turkish redoubts, though capable of sup- plying useful aid to an army, had no such means of independent self-defence as to warrant the notion of their holding out without support; and it is evident that, in the absence of infantry, nothing short of a vigilant and brilliant use of the cavalry arm would enable the Turks to with- stand a determined attack. I cannot say whether Sir Colin Campbell’s sense of security was in any high degree founded upon the cavalry, or whether, for once, he went along with the herd in his estimate of what could be insured by a little up- turn of the soil with a few Turks standing be- hind it. A main defect in the arrangements of the Allies was the one under which it resulted that those divisions of infantry on the Chersonese which lay the nearest to the plain below were not the troops of the nation which undertook to defend Balaclava. Bosquet, with two divisions, was so posted on the edge of the Chersonese upland, that, judging from their position alone, his troops might have been naturally looked to as the first to descend into the plain for the defence of Bala- clava; and, besides that General Bosquet was an ardent soldier, and a man most loyal in action, INVASION OF TIIE CRIMEA* 107 there is no reason for supposing that mere dif- lxvT* ference of nationality alone would have made the French slow to come down to the aid of Sir Colin Campbell; but the fact of the interposed force being under the orders of a commander other than Lord Raglan, made a dangerous break in the chain by which the Allies held together. It was only by persuading General Canrobert to allow it, that the nearest of the battalions on the Chersonese could be made to partake in a battle upon the plain of Balaclava; and the exceeding scantiness of the infantry force which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the immediate defence of the place made it a thing of great moment that the promptest possible despatch of reinforcements should not be left dependent upon the result of persuasions addressed to an independent com- mander, more especially where the commander whose assent thus had to be gained was a man of a hesitating and anxious temperament. Independently of the inherent fault that there inherent Voakness o£ was in this outer line of defence, the collateral the outer line, arrangements were far from being calculated to Collateral ° ° arrangements avert a disaster. which tended to increase One important omission was this: In all the works constituting this outer line , the Turkish disaster * soldiery were left without that strengthening help which might have been afforded them by the pre- 108 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX VI. sence in each redoubt of one or two Englishmen accustomed to rule Orientals; and the want was in no way supplied by sending, instead, a non- commissioned officer of artillery.* Then, again, since the cavalry was much looked to as an arm to ward off for some time any Russian attack, it would have been well to avoid a severance of authority by placing under one commander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or foot, or artillery, which were charged with the defence of Balaclava; for excellent as was the understanding between Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, their concord was no equivalent for the advan- tage which belongs to absolute unity of command. Above all, if the plan of defence were to rest at all on our cavalry, there was cogent need of an effort to neutralise in some measure the vice of Lord Hardinge’s peace-service appointments, and to make arrangements for giving more or less of initiative power in the field to men such as Morris * In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an English artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a resolute man or boy of a higher station in life, who will undertake to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted over a Turkish force by a fearless English gentleman is spoken of, ante, vol. hi. chap. xxx. Not- withstanding all that had been achieved in the defence of Silistria and on the field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means which there produced such brilliant results. INVASION OF TPIE CRIMEA. 109 CHAP. LX VI. and Elliot, who were practised in war, and knew by their own experience what it was to lead squadrons in battle. No such effort was made. It was against these defences of Balaclava that Mentsciii- kofFs purpose Prince Mentschikoff now resolved to direct an of assailing the defences attack. So early as the night of the 13th of the of Balaclava, month, Colonel Bakovitch, with three battalions, T1 }® f ° rc . e * four guns, and a couple of hundred Cossacks had Renter- ventured down from the Mackenzie Heights; and having been suffered at break of day on the fol- lowing morning to take possession of the village of Tchorgoun, he there established the nucleus of a force complete in all arms, which thenceforth began to gather in the valley of the Tchernaya. On the 23d, this force had been definitively con- stituted as the “Detachment of Tchorgoun,” and placed under the command of General Biprandi. The force comprised 17 battalions of foot, 30 squa- drons of horse,* and 64 guns. But besides the troops under the orders of Liprandi, there was a distinct force, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, and comprising some 8 battalions,** 4 squadrons * 20 squadrons of regular cavalry, and 10 “sotnias” (or, as I call them, /‘squadrons”) of Cossacks. A “sotnia” imported about tlio same number of horsemen as a “squadron.” General de Todleben is careful to make all possible “deductions from strength,” but he acknowledges that each squadron and each sotnia had a strength in effectives of 100 horsemen, p. 387. ** Literally, 7 and ^ths. 110 INVASION OF THE CHIME A. lxvt. horse, and 14 guns, which had orders to co- operate with the Detachment of Tchorgoun. Alto- gether, therefore, the force set apart for the attack upon the defences of Balaclava comprised 25 bat- talions, 34 squadrons of horse, and 78 guns. The numerical strength of the force is not to be learned with strict accuracy-,* but it seems to have amounted to about 25,000 men.** thef contempt Bor a sound appreciation of the battle of Ba- Lated attack. } a( q ava ^ ft WO uld be well to know what was the object contemplated by the assailant. His primary design was to seize the outer line of defence and the camp of the 93d Highlanders, as well as the camp of the Turks established near Kadikoi.*** It is plain, however, that the enterprise of an as- * Because, at the period in question , the “ morning states” of the infantry had been left uncorrected since the beginning of the month, and the “states” of the cavalry were wanting altogether. — Todleben, p. 3S8. ** On the 25th of October 1854 the most recent “states” of the infantry strength were those which had been furnished at the be- ginning of the month; and these, together with the estimated reckoning of the cavalry (of which no “states” had been prepared), give a total of 23,425, without counting the artillerymen, who (at 30 men for each gun) would number 2340, making, altogether, 25,725; but it is right to say that General de Todleben (by making a guess at the deductions from strength which may have occurred since the beginning of the month, and by reducing the estimate of the cavalry strength) cuts down the total elective to 20,500 (p. 388-90). In that estimate, however, he does not, I believe, include the 2340 artillery- men. *** Todleben, p. 384, 387, 388. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* 111 sailant who might attain to so much as that lxvi*’ would be strangely collapsing if he were to stay his victorious advance without doing all he could to bring ruin upon the English in the small crowded port from which they drew their sup- plies; and the possession of a spot from which it would have been practicable to shell Balaclava must needs have been coveted. The destruction of the root which the English had taken in Bala- clava may therefore, perhaps, be regarded as the real, though ulterior object of the intended attack. The force destined for the attack upon the Distribution of the Russian Turkish redoubts was divided into three columns* force into three distinct The left column was commanded by General bodies, and . . the duties Gribbb, the centre column by General Semiakine, assigned to each. the right column by Colonel Scudery; and, with that last force, General Jabrokritsky’s detachment was in close co-operation. Gribbb was to issue from the direction of the Baidar valley, seize the heights of Kamara, and thence take part in the attack directed against Canrobert’s Hill. General Semiakine, at the same time, was to advance against Canrobert’s Hill, and the Bedoubt Num- ber Two, by the road which leads from Tchorgoun to Kadikoi. Colonel Scudery’s column was to issue from the Tractir road, cross the North Valley, and ad- 112 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lxvT* van ce upon the Arabtabia or Eedoubt u Number Three.” The main body of the cavalry with its atten- dant batteries was to enter the North Valley, and there form in columns of attack to await Liprandi’s next orders. A battalion of the Ukraine regiment, with a company of riflemen and a battery of field-artil- lery, was to constitute the reserve. Finally, General Jabrokritsky, though not under the orders of Liprandi, was to cover the intended attack, by descending from the region of Mackenzie’s Farm and taking post on the Fedi- oukine Hills. Notwithstanding the trust they repose in the direct intervention of Heaven, the Turks know how to eke out their faith by means sufficiently human; and being too warlike a people to be careless of the value of foreknowledge in regard to the designs of the enemy, they see the use of a scout. The officer who had the merit of ob- taining, at this time, good, decisive intelligence, was Eustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier-General. 24th Oct. On the 24th of October, a spy employed by him of the enemy’s brought back an account which disclosed Liprandi’s t a hied by the designs for the morrow. The man announced before the ^ 7 that troops to the number of 25,000, and of all arms, were to march upon the plain of Balaclava, INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 113 and lie even prepared his hearers to expect an lav?’ advance from the direction of Baidar. He was The way in which the in- carefully examined by Lord Lucan, as well as by formation was ^ J m dealt with. Sir Colin Campbell-, and, both Generals coming to the conclusion that this report Avas well worthy of attention, Lord Bingham (his fathers aide-de- camp), was sent by Lord Lucan to Headquarters Avitli a letter from Sir Colin Campbell conveying the intelligence. Lord Bingham delivered the letter and the tidings it conveyed to the Quarter- master-General, but did not succeed in obtaining an interview with Lord Raglan, who Avas then engaged with Canrobert. General Airey, it is true, interrupted the conference of the tAvo Com- manders, and showed Lord Raglan the letter; but the answer first elicited was only a message of acknowledgment sent back in the words, “Very “well!” Afterwards, Lord Raglan requested that The morning ° . 1 of the 25th Oct. any new occurrence which might take place Tidino , s of the should be reported to him: but no fresh orders jmpending-at- J- 7 tack upon the resulted from the information thus furnished. The Turkish rc ' doubts. truth is that only a few days before, Lord Raglan had been induced by a similar report to send down 1000 men of the 4th Division, who had to be marched back Avhen it proved that the enemy was not advancing.* He could ill afford to ex- haust the time and strength of his men in these * This was on the 21st of October. Invasion of the Crimea . VII. 8 114 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. LXVI. 25th Oct. The hour before daybreak. Advance of Lord Lucan and his Staff in the direc- tion of Can- robert’s Hill. Break of day. Two flags seen flying from the fort on Canro- bert’s Hill. The import of this. marches and countermarches, and he seems to have come to the conclusion that it would be in- expedient for him to be again despatching rein- forcements to the outer line of defence in the plain of Balaclava, unless he should learn that the enemy was actually advancing against it. II. In accordance with its daily custom, the Eng- lish cavalry on the morning of the 25th of Octo- ber had turned out an hour before daybreak*, and the men were standing to their horses when Lord Lucan, already in the saddle and followed by his Staff, moved off at a walk towards Canrobert’s Hill. Two of the Divisional Staff — Lord William Paulet, I think, and Major M c Mahon, who had now, it seems, been joined by Lord George Paget — were riding some distance in rear of their chief, and had come within about 300 paces of Canrobert’s Hill, when a streak of pale light in the horizon before them began to disclose the morning. Presently, there was grey enough to show through the dusk that Canrobert’s Hill was not without its standard; but soon it became al- most clear, and presently afterwards certain, that from the flag-staff of the work two ensigns were flying. “Holloa!” said one, “there are two flags INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 115 “flying! Wliat does that mean?” “Why, that lxvT* “surely,” said another, — “that surely is the ar- ~~ “ranged signal — the “signal that the enemy is “advancing. Are you quite sure?” The ques- tioner was soon answered; for scarcely had he spoken when the fort opened fire from one of its 12-pounder guns. The Staff-officers hurried for- ward to overtake their chief; and Lord George Lord George Paget, in the Paget galloped hack at speed to the cavalry absence of , ^ /. ! i p T i ~ ^ Lord Cardi- camp, where (m the absence ot Lord Cardigan, gan, takes _ ill . n i . u P on himself who had the practice ot sleeping on board Ins to mount the _ _ / „ _ _ v Light Bri- yacht, and had not yet come up from Balaclava) gade. he took upon himself to mount the Light Brigade. He had hardly done this when a messenger came Orders from in from the front with an order despatched by for the im- Lord Lucan (then reconnoitring with Sir Colin vance of the Campbell in the direction of our advanced post) cavaliy * which directed the immediate advance of the cavalry. Thus it seems tained the earliest attack, but were al vance of the enemy/ The elevation of Canrobert’s Hill may have aided their surveys; but, without being watchful and sagacious, they could hardly have succeeded in being beforehand with so keen a soldier as Sir Colin Campbell. We watched the sweet slumbers of a Cabinet 8 * that the Turks not only ob- vigilance . . ii • /» . , • -i • evinced on intelligence ot the impending this occasion o the first to perceive the ad- bythe llukb ' 116 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LNVf. The English soldier’s want of vigilance. whilst assenting to the cogent despatch which en- forced this invasion; hut now, in the midst of the campaign, and at a moment when ac- counts have come in, which announce an attack for the morrow in the direction of the Baidar valley, we may steal before break of day to the ground where the enemy is expected, and there, seek our ideal of vigilance in the outlying cavalry picket. We shall seek in vain. The English soldier’s want of vigilance is so closely allied to some of his greatest qualities (as, for instance, to his pride, and his sullen unwillingness to be put out of his way by mere danger), that our countrymen in- cline to think of it with indulgence, nay, perhaps, with an unconfessed liking; but if the fault is in some measure natural and characteristic , it has been aggravated apparently by the empty ceremo- nies of military duty in peace-time; for to go on rehearsing men day after day, and year after year, in the art of giving and taking pretended alarms about nothing, and to carry on these re- hearsals by means of formulated sentences, is to do all that perverted industry can towards pre- venting, instead of securing, the “bright look-out” of the seaman. The relation that there is between standing armies and war bears analogy to that which con- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 117 nects endowed cliurches with religion; and, in particular, the Anglican arrangements for securing the infant mind against heresy show a curious re- semblance to those which are made during peace for preventing surprises in war-time. Whether aiming at the one or the other of these objects, man tries to secure it by formula. Just as through the means of set questions and answers, the anxious theologian arms children against “false “doctrine,” in the trust that, when they come to riper years, they may know how to treat his op- ponents, so also with him who makes rules for the governance of soldiers in peace-time, the hope, it seems, is that they may learn to be vigilant against night surprises by repeatedly saying their catechism. The common “challenge” is brief; but, it being foreseen that he who is appointed to watch may himself require watching, the func- tionaries called “visiting rounds” have been in- vented, whose duty it is to see that the sentries are at their posts and awake; but as this task of supervision has itself also lapsed into form, the result is, that at a military post requiring great vigilance, there goes on, all night, a reiteration of set questions and answers, which tends to avert real watchfulness by suggesting that a mere formal sign of not being absolutely asleep will sufficiently answer the purpose. Men trained to “look out” CHAP. LX VI. 118 INVASION OF THE ClilMEA. CHAP. LXVL Our outlying picket did not detect the enemy’s ad- vance, and was only saved from capture by the field officer of the day. Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell at the advanced post. They perceive the enemy’s as do sailors, are more likely to pierce to the ut- most of what eye and ear can reach, than those who are repeating to one another, and repeating and repeating all night, set lessons, of which this is one: “Halt! who goes there?” “Rounds!” “What rounds?” “Visiting rounds!” “Visiting “rounds advance! All’s well!” When these words have been reiterated by the same men a few thou- sand times, they are as lulling as the monotone waves that beat and still beat on the shore. The truth is, that the object of securing a really keen watchfulness is one which lies out of the true scope of mechanical arrangements. A man’s wits may be easily deadened, they can hardly be sharpened, by formula. Far from detecting the earliest signs of an advance in force, and being at once driven in, our outlying picket enjoyed its tranquillity to the last, and was only, indeed, saved from capture by the “field officer of the day,” who learnt, as he rode, what was passing, and conveyed to the men of the watch — just in time to secure their escape — that warning of the enemy’s approach which they themselves should have given. Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell were to- gether a good way in advance*, and, as day broke, they saw the enemy’s columns of infantry in march — saw them converging upon the easterly ap- INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 119 proaclies of the Causeway Heights from the direc- lxvi.* tions of Tchorgoun and Baidar. It soon became columns ad- ° . vancing upon apparent that, whatever might be his ulterior the Causeway design, Liprandi’s first object was the seizure Intelligence of the Turkish defences, beginning with Can- L^d°Ragian. robert’s Hill; and Lord Lucan did not fail to despatch an aide-de-camp to Headquarters with intelligence of the impending attack. * Our cavalry was brought forward; and the Lord Lucan’s guns of Maude’s troop of horse-artillery were got the P cavai°ry o1 into battery on the right of the Arabtabia or artillery. Number Three Redoubt. The Light Cavalry re- Determina- giments were placed in reserve under the southern Lucan (in slopes of the Causeway Heights; and Lord Lucan, si^c^Un lth then acting in person with his Heavy Brigade, t^the use that sought to check the advance of the enemy bymade d ofthe “demonstrations;”** but — with the full approval ca>alry * of Sir Colin Campbell, who indeed seems to have counselled this policy — he determined to confine himself to threats. His threats failed to deter; Failure of the # _ attempt to for the Russians pursued their design like men check the enemy by who had yet found no hindrance; and indeed it threatening movements. seems probable that the firmness of purpose they soon after disclosed was in some measure occa- sioned by the circumstance of their having de- * Captain Charteris was the officer sent. ** “Lord Lucan with the Heavy Cavalry moved about, making “ demonstrations and threatening the enemy.” 120 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX VI. The high de- gree of war- like skill that is required for enabling a cavalry officer to check the advance of infantry and artillery with- out gravely risking his squadrons. The impro- bability of ail officer being competent to such a task unless he is a man practised in war. tected our cavalry leader in a determination to threaten without striking. Since the ground, in most places, was favourable for the manoeuvring of horsemen, with no such obstructions as would prevent them from attempting flank attacks on the enemy’s infantry and artillery, it may be that a cavalry officer fresh from war-service would have been able to check Liprandi, and to check him, again and again, without sustaining grave loss •, but if a man can so wield a body of cavalry as to make it the means of thus arresting for a time an attack of infantry and artillery without much committing his squadrons, he has attained u to high art” in his calling; and to expect a peace-service general to achieve such a task, is much as though one should take a house-painter at hazard and bid him portray a Madonna. There were riding amongst our squadrons men well tried in war — men famed alike for their valour and their skill as cavalry officers; and although the perversity of our State authorities laboured, as it were, to neutralise the unspeakable value of such experience by putting the men who possessed it under peace-service generals, yet if Campbell’s command had included that cavalry arm which formed so large a proportion of the scanty re- sources, available, at flrst for defence, it is imagin- able that he would have been able to say a few INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 121 words to some such a man as Morris, which would have had the effect of checking the enemy without bringing grave loss on our squadrons. * Such a result would appear to be the more within reach, when it is remembered that Liprandi’s ad- vance was in three columns moving upon “ex- ternal lines” without speedy means of intercom- munication, and that Gribbd’s column — the one upon which the whole enterprise much depended — comprised only three battalions of infantry. ** The Russians had begun their advance at five o’clock in the morning. Without encountering the least opposition, General Gribbe, moving for- ward from the direction of the Baidar valley with three battalions, a squadron of horse, and ten pieces of cannon, had been suffered to take pos- session of the village of Kamara; and when there, he was not only enabled to cover the advance of the assailing forces on their left flank, but also on the high* ground above — ground commanding the object of attack — to establish his ten guns in battery, with the purpose of directing their fire, CHAP. LXVI. The advance of General Gribbe from the direction of Baidar. He seizes Kamara, and establishes a battery, which opens fire at close range on the Redoubt No. 1. * I refer to Captain Morris (commanding the 17tli Lancers) and Lieutenant Alexander Elliot (aide-de-camp to General Scarlett) merely as the two war-service officers of cavalry then in the Crimea whose names first occur to me. They were both of them men who had earned faine in honest war. ** See, in the Appendix, at the end of vol. vm., Lord Lucan’s view as to thi3. 122 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LX VI. Advance of the central column under General Semiakine. Its position on the northeast of Canrobert’s Hill. Advance of Levoutsky’s force. Its position on the left of the forces with Semiakine. Advance of Colonel Scudery’s column. Its position on the left of Levoutsky. at close range, upon the work crowning Can- robert’s Hill.* Nearly at the same time, Semiakine’s forces having advanced from Tchorgoun gained the slopes of the ridge on the north-east and north of Canrobert’s Hill. With five battalions (besides a separate body of riflemen) and ten guns, General Semiakine in person prepared to operate against the work on Canrobert’s Hill; ** whilst, on his right, General Levoutsky took up a like position with three more battalions and ten guns.*** His goal was the Kedoubt Number Two. At the same time Colonel Scudery, who with the four Odessa battalions, a company of riflemen, three squadrons of Cossacks, and a field-battery, had advanced from the Tractir bridge, was now moving upon the Arabtabia. i * This battery included, besides six light field-pieces of the No. 6 Light Battery, four guns of heavier calibre belonging to the Position Battery No. 4 (Liprandi’s despatch, October 26, 1854). The three bat- talions were the 1st, 2d, and 3d battalions of the Dnieper regiment. The squadron was one belonging to Jeropkine’s Lancers. ** With four battalions of the Azoff regiment, one — viz., the 4th — of the Dnieper battalions , the 2d company of the Rifle battalion, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4 , and six pieces of the Light Battery No. 6. *** The three Ukraine battalions, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4, and six guns of the Light Battery No. 7. f On Redoubt ‘‘Number Three.” The riflemen forming part of Scudery’s column were of the 4th Rifle battalion, the Cossacks of the 53d Cossack Regiment, and the battery was No. 7 of the 12th brigade. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 123 The main body of the cavalry under General lxvl’ Ryjoff, with its attendant troops of horse-artillery, Advance of the Russian was already in the North Valley, and supporting cavalry, and th.6 batteries the advance of the columns. which it escorted. Whilst the Russians were marching upon the The circum . heights which they now occupied, and whilst they ^ichilord^ were there establishing their thirty guns in bat-^ t ^^ t0 tery, Lord Lucan, as we see, was present with a ghoui S dbe at superb division of cavalry, and this upon fine ™^i r y f our ground, which, though hilly, was very free from obstructions; but except his six light pieces of liorse-artillery, he was wanting in the ordnance arm , and of infantry forces he had none. Thus, The emer* . gency forced then, by a somewhat rare concurrence of circum- a decision upon a ques- stances, there was brought about an emergency tion involving more or less which enforced, and enforced most cogently, the the general . . . usefulness of decision of a question involving more or less the the cavalry general usefulness of the cavalry arm. Some are chary, it seems, of acknowledging a condition of things in which cavalry can be used for the repression of the ordnance arm. Others fully agreeing that a body of horse, with its great extent of vulnerable surface, must beware of com- ing, or at all events of remaining, under the fire of artillery, are yet of opinion that cavalry, after all, is the very arm which, in many contingencies, can best be exerted against the power of ordnance. They say that artillery in march, or engaged in 124 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, CHAP. LXVI. Without hindrance offered by our cavalry, the Russians were suffered to establish their batteries against Can- robert’s Hill and the No. 2 Redoubt. unlimbering, is good prey for horsemen; that ar- tillery established in battery is assailable by horse- men at its flanks; and that, in general, where the country is at all open, a powerful and well-handled cavalry ought to be able to challenge the dominion of artillery by harassing it incessantly, by prevent- ing it from getting into battery, and, failing that by disquieting its batteries when formed. The decision of Lord Lucan was much governed by a sense of the great need there would be for the aid of our cavalry if the enemy, after carrying all the outer defences, should come on and attack Balaclava;* but it would also seem that his de- termination — a determination entirely approved, and even, I hear, originated by Sir Colin Camp- bell — involved a leaning to the first of the two opinions above indicated. Be this as it may, the result was that, without being met by any hindrance on the part of our cavalry, the Russians were suffered to advance from three points of the compass and converge upon the chain of little redoubts which extended from Canrobert’s Hill to the Arabtabia. The thou- sand or twelve hundred Turks who manned the three works thus assailed saw converging upon them some eleven thousand infantry and tliirty- * See Lord Lucan’s statement in the Appendix, at the end of vol. vm. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 125 eight guns. Upon the heights of Kamara, which overlooked Canrobert’s Hill from the east, and upon the part of the Causeway Heights which overlooked the same work from the north, the enemy placed thirty guns in battery*, and he now opened lire upon the work crowning Canrobert’s Hill, as also upon the Fort Humber Two. He was answered by the Turks with their five 12- pounders ; * and, for a while, by our troop of horse- artillery, but apparently with little effect. Captain Maude, the officer commanding the troop, was horribly wounded by a shell which entered the body of his horse and there burst. Maude’s troop had come into action without a due following of waggons*, and, before long, its ammunition was already so nearly exhausted as to leave but a small supply for even one gun. As soon as Lord Lucan heard this, he ordered that the troop should be withdrawn and kept out of fire until the want could be supplied.** It was hardly to be expected that under the fire of thirty guns, including eight pieces of heavy calibre, the three 12-pounders which formed the armament of Canrobert’s Hill would long remain CHAP. LXVI. Fire an- swered to by the Turks, and (without much effect) by our troop of horse- artillery. Captain Maude wounded. The troop of horse- artillery sent out by fire by Lord Lucan. * Three on Canrobert’s Hill , and a couple on the Number Two Redoubt. ** See Lord Lucan's statement. Maude’s severe wound was the reason why Lord Lucan instituted no inquiry as to the cause which led to this want of ammunition. 126 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lxvl undisabled. The fort became silent, and already The fort on the hapless battalion which manned it must have Canrobert’s by 1 over Gnced un d er g one heavy slaughter; but notwithstanding whelming this, and although it became now apparent that the hill was to be attacked by largely outnumber- Continued re- ing bodies of infantry, the brave Turks were still sistance of J the Turks, unconquered. They moved, indeed, from the un- sheltered part of the work to the side where more cover was offered; but there they stood fast and awaited the attack of the infantry.* Dispositions It was with the five battalions acting under made by % General Se- his personal direction that General Semiakine de- miakine for x rob^rt’s^inil 1 " * This s ^ etc ^ ma ^ kelp to i^ us ^’ate the attack of the eleven bat- talions, with thirty guns , upon the two little works, No. 1 and No. 2, which were defended by about 1000 or 1200 Turks with five guns. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 127 termined to storm Canrobert’s Hill. Covered by lxvl* the fire of the artillery, and by two companies of riflemen, pushed forward in skirmishing order, he advanced rapidly with three battalions of the Azoff regiment, disposed in columns of company, and so ranged in two lines of columns as that the first line was only about 100 paces in advance of the second. In a third line, General Semiakine brought up the 1st battalion of the Azoff regiment and the 4tli of the Dnieper battalions, each formed in a “column of attack.” Advancing in this order, he approached to within about 100 paces of the hill- The work stormed. top, and at once gave the signal for the assault. Then the two foremost lines of columns, led by Colonel Krudener, the commander of the Azoff regiment, and supported by the two columns of attack, moved rapidly forward. Encountering no fire of cannon to check them, the foremost of these troops converged from their extended front upon the small object of their attack, swarmed in across the ditch, swarmed over the feeble parapet, and, standing at length within the fort, closed at once with the remnant of the single battalion there bravely awaiting the onslaught. The force which thus stormed the work, and which threw itself °. fthe . Kus '. upon the remnant of the one Turkish battalion, ofnumbers * consisted, as we see, of five battalions; but on the side of Kamara, the three other Dnieper battalions 128 INVASION OF TIIE ERXMEA. CHAP. LXVI. Comparative rarity in mo- dern warfare of bodily col- lision be- tween masses of combat- ants. Here, the firmness of both Russians and Turks re- sulted in close fighting. were so operating that Sir Colin Campbell re- garded tliem as actual partakers in the attack*, and, moreover, Levoutsky’s three Ukraine battal- ions, though not engaged in the storming, were still so placed at the time as to be aiding the as- sault by tlieir presence. Upon the whole, there- fore, it may be said that, after having undergone an overwhelming cross-fire from the thirty pieces of artillery, which hurled destruction upon them at close range from commanding heights, the one battalion of Turks which defended this feeble breastwork, was now pressed by a number of bat- talions amounting to no less than eleven, and en- gaged in close conflict with five. It commonly happens in modern warfare that the dominion of one body of infantry over another is not found to depend, at the last, upon the phy- sical strength of man, or the quality of his weapons, but rather upon faith, or, in other words, upon sense of power. In this instance, however, the assailants and the assailed were both so resolute that, for once, the actual clash of arms was not to be averted by opinion. The many flooded in upon the few, overwhelming, surrounding, destroy- ing, yet still confronted with heroic desperation, and owing all the way they could make to the sheer fighting of the men, who thus closed with their Mussulman foe, and to the weight of the INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 129 numbers behind them. With much slaughter of lxvt* the devoted Turks — who lost , in killed only, no The fort at length ear- less than 170 out of perhaps about five or sixried, the Turks losing, hundred men — the work was carried at half-past in killed only, ^ # 170 men out seven o'clock, with its standard and its guns: but of a single battalion. it seems that, before moving out, the English artilleryman who had been placed in the redoubt to assist the Turks took care to spike the guns which had armed it. The colour of the Azoff regiment now floated from the summit of Can- robert’s Hill. When the Turks in the three next redoubts Abandon- saw how it had fared with their brethren on Can- Turks of the three next robert’s Hill, and perceived that, under the eyes redoubts, of some 1500 English horse, the work was left to fall into the enemy’s hands without a squadron being launched to support it by any attack on the foe, they had what to them would seem reason for thinking ill things of the Christians, and were not without warrant for judging that the English would fail to support them in any endeavour they might make to defend the remaining forts. But whether these Osmanlis reasoned, or whether they simply caught fear, as people catch plague, by contagion, they at all events loosed their hold.* Without waiting for a conflict with the three * In those redoubts, as in the Number One, the English artillery- man present in each is said to have spiked the guns. Invasion of the Crimea. VII . 9 130 INVASION or THE CRIMEA. lxvj Ukraine battalions, then already advancing to the “assault, or the four Odessa battalions, then also advancing, they at once began to make off, taking with them their quilts and the rest of their simple Their flight camp treasures. Coming west with these burthens under fire of artillery, and upon them, they looked more like a tribe m a pursued in some places state of migration than troops engaged in retreat. by Cossacks. f 1 ® ® In their night they were followed for a while by the fire of the Russian artillery*, and although Lord Lucan sought to cover their retreat with his cavalry, the Cossacks, at some points, pursued, and were able to spear many of the fugitives. Rustem Pasha had a horse shot under him. The enemy The enemy not only established a portion of himself on his forces on Canrobert’s Hill, but likewise in the Canrobert’s . . Hill, in the Number Two Redoubt, as well as m the Arab- Redoubt No. .. , , 2, and in the tabia or Number I hree ; and he took possession taking posses- of the seven iron 12-pounder guns with which the seven guns three works had been armed. He also, with the Odessa battalions, marched into the Redoubt He also marches the Redoubt marches into Number Four*, but instead of undertaking to hold No. 4, and the W ork , he did what he could to raze and dis- overturns its 7 two guns ; but man tle it. He then withdrew, because he deemed having farst done what he the position too far in advance to allow of his could to raze x h, he aban- undertaking to hold it. dons the work. Our cavalry now became exposed to some musketry shots which were successfully directed against it from the positions of the lost redoubts; INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 131 and, as it was also apparent that our horsemen lxvi’ were in the line of the fire which the gunners along our inner line of defence might soon have occasion to open, Lord Lucan, in accordance with *X esl1 d j s P°* an arrangement to that effect which had been pre- cavalry now ° A effected by concerted with Sir Colin Campbell, withdrew his L ? rd ^ ucan division to a part of the South Valley which was si r rr co ,( in 0f between the Number Four and the Number Five Campbell. Redoubts. The position he then took up was across the valley, his squadrons facing eastward. He was so placed as to be able to take in flank any enemy’s force which might bend away from the valley and endeavour to pass to the south, with intent to assail Balaclava. Such, then, was the first period of the battle Observations L upon the first of Balaclava; and it must be acknowledged that period of the the engagement, if it had closed at this time, would have furnished a distressing page for the military history of England. War often demands bitter sacrifices, and may sometimes force men to repress — not only their generous impulses, but — even those appeals of the conscience which a too fiery soldier might treat as the absolute dictates of honour. It may therefore well be that Lord Lucan performed a stern duty, when (with the sanction of Sir Colin Campbell) he determined 9 * 132 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* CHAP. LX VI. that our cavalry must be patient of the attack directed against Canrobert’s Hill, must endure to see English guns captured, must suffer our allies to be slaughtered without striking a blow to defend them; and the soundness of his conclusion can hardly be determined by the casuists, but rather by those who know something of the conditions in which the power of the cavalry arm (when cavalry chances to be the only available force) can be wisely, and therefore rightly, exerted.* If our people in general had known the truth, they would have been guilty of unspeakable mean- ness when they cast off all blame from themselves, and laid it upon the Turkish soldiery — upon men who had been not only entrusted to the honour and friendship of our army, but were actually en- gaged at a post of danger in defending the first approaches to the English port of supply.** The truth is, however, that the great bulk of our army (including Lord Raglan himself) had regarded the work on Canrobert’s Hill as a fast- * The opinion of onr cavalry, so far as I have been able to ob- serve it, tends to sanction Lord Lucan’s decision. ** Lord Lucan was never one of those who thus spoke. He could gee the nature of the conflict on Canrobert’s Hill, and I believe he has always spoken generously of the firmness with which the Turks awaited the onslaught of overpowering numbers. Sir Colin Camp- bell was also a spectator; and he says in his despatch, — “The “ Turkish troops in No. 1 persisted as long as they could , and then “ retired.” INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 133 ness susceptible of a protracted defence; and — strange as the statement may seem — were, for a long time, unacquainted with the nature of the conflict there sustained by the brave Turkish sol- diery. Several causes contributed to obscure the truth. In the first place, the defence of the work, though carried to extremity, was still of necessity brief; for when once the men, numbered by thou- sands, had swarmed in over a feeble parapet on the top of an isolated hillock which was held by only some 500 or 600 men, the end, of course, could not be distant; and although there were numbers of our cavalry-men who had been so posted as to be able to see that the Turks stood their ground with desperation, and were in close bodily strife with the enemy before they gave way under his overwhelming numbers, yet to the great bulk of the spectators, whether English or French, who gazed from the steeps of the Chersonese, no such spectacle was presented. They looked from the west; and, the attack being made upon the north-eastern acclivity of Canrobert’s Hill, they saw nothing of the actual clash that occurred be- tween the brave few and the resolute many. They descried the enemy on the heights of Ivamara and on the line of the Woronzoff road, but lost sight of him when from that last position he had de- scended into the hollow to make his final assault; CHAP. LX VI. 134 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVI. and soon afterwards, without having been able to make out what had passed in the interval, they saw the Turkish soldiery beginning to stream down from the gorge of the work. Then almost immediately they saw the red fezzes pouring out from the other redoubts, so that what they ob- served on the whole was a general flight of the Turks. They saw nothing of the fierce though short strife which ended in the slaughter of 170 out of the 500 or 600 men on Canrobert’s Hill; and I believe it may be said that the loss sustained by the devoted garrison of this little field-work long remained unknown to the English. Con- sidering that the Turkish soldiery died fighting in defence of the English lines, this may seem very strange and unnatural; but the truth is, that be- tween the soldiers of the Prophet and the men of our Army List there was so great a gulf that it proved much more than broad enough to obstruct the transmission of military statistics. The man temporal who would ask for a “Morning State,” with its column after column of figures, is baffled of course, by the man spiritual, who replies, that by the blessing of the Almighty his servants are as the leaves of the forest; and soon ceases to apply for a list of “casualties” if he only elicits an answer asserting the goodness of God and an indefinite accession of believers to the promised INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 135 gardens of Paradise. * Certainly, Lord Eaglan remained long unacquainted with the nature of the defence which the Turks had opposed to the enemy on Canrobert’s Hill.** It was from ignor- ance of the bare facts, and not from dishonest or ungenerous motives, that our people threw blame on the Turkish soldiery. III. All this while, the French and the English Commanders on the Chersonese had been too dis- tant from the scene of the attack against the Turkish redoubts to be able to sway the result; but they, each of them, proceeded to make ar- rangements for ulterior operations. Upon being apprised of the impending attack, The spot on Lord Eaglan had at once ridden up to that part Ragianpiaced himself upon of the ridge which best overlooked the scene of being ap- prised of the attack. * I find in the correspondence between the French and English Headquarters some trace of an attempt on the part of one of the hapless Turkish commanders to have justice done to his people; but probably the remonstrant did not know how to state a fact in such way as to obtain for it any real access to the European mind , for it does not appear that he succeeded in conveying any clear idea to the mind of General Canrobert. ** This is shown very clearly by the tenor of his correspondence. Any one who ever had means of judging of Lord Raglan’s nature must be able to imagine the eagerness with which, upon learning the truth, he would have hastened to redress the wrong done. 136 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. lxvI* the then commencing engagement;* and as soon as his sure, rapid glance had enabled him to ap- prehend the probable scope and purport of his assailant’s design, he determined to move down two out of his five infantry divisions for the de- His disposi- fence of Balaclava. The 1st Division, under the tions for the succour of Duke of Cambridge , and the 4th Division , under Balaclava, ° . and for secur- General Cat-heart , were accordingly despatched ing the forces on the Cher- upon this service. Lord Raglan, however, was sonese against a surprise. not without suspicion that the operations in the plain of Balaclava might be a feint, and that the real attack might be made from Sebastopol upon the besieging forces. He took care to make pro- vision for such a contingency; and his oral direc- tions for the purpose were conveyed by Captain Caltliorpe, one of his aides-de-camp, to Sir Richard England, the Commander of the 3d Division. General Can- General Canrobert, also, upon hearing of the robert also on . the ridge. attack galloped up to the ridge overlooking the Balaclava plain; and ultimately, though not all at His disposi- once the French Commander moved down to the tions. foot of the heights both Vinoy’s and Espinasse’s brigades of infantry, and also the two cavalry regiments of the Chasseurs d’Afrique, regiments comprising eight squadrons, and commanded by General d’Allonville. * Lord Raglan was on the ground before the capture of Can- robert’s Hill. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 137 There was, however, an evident difference lxyl* between the opinion which governed the English Apparent f dif- Commander and the one entertained by Canrobert. opinion be- J tween the Keenly alive, as was natural, to a danger which ^neh and threatened his only seaport, and hoping besides, Commanders. I imagine, that the somewhat dimmed prospects of the siege might be cleared by a fight in the plain, Lord Raglan, at this time, had not enter- tained the idea of surrendering ground to the enemy, and was preparing to recover the heights. General Canrobert, on the other hand, was of course less directly concerned in keeping watch over Balaclava*, and having become impressed with a belief that it was the object of the Russians to draw him down from his vantage-ground on the Chersonese, he seems to have resolved that he would baffle the enemy’s supposed policy by cling- ing fast to the upland. Accordingly, it will be seen (if we chance to speak further of these French infantry reinforcements), that though Vinoy’s brigade pushed forward, at one time, to ground near the gorge of Kadikoi, it was afterwards with- drawn from its advanced position, and ordered to rejoin the other brigade of the 1st Division close under the steeps of the Chersonese. As a means of covering Balaclava, the position taken up by Lord Lucan near the gorge of Kadi- kSi is believed to have been very well chosen; but 138 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVI. The new dis- position which Lord Raglan made of our cavalry division. His probable reasons for making the change. The position to which Lord Raglan with- drew the cavalry. Approaching concentration on the west of the Causeway Heights of forces with which the Allies propos- ed to engage Liprandi. the Commander-in-Chief, at this time, was indulg- ing the expectation of something like a battle to be fought with all arms; and he apparently desired that his cavalry should not be entangled in com- bat until the arrival of the two divisions of foot, then already despatched, should give Lord Lucan an opportunity of acting in co-operation with our infantry forces. He accordingly sent down an order which compelled Lord Lucan, though not without reluctance, nor even, indeed, without anger, to withdraw his horsemen to ground on the left of the Redoubt Number Six at the foot of the Chersonese upland. * When this retrograde movement of our cavalry had been completed, the whole of the forces of all arms with which Canrobert and Lord Raglan pro- posed to engage Liprandi might be regarded as approaching to a state of concentration near the westernmost limits of the plain. The ground, however, upon which the Allies were thus gather- ing lay at distances of not less than a mile from the gorge of Kadikoi; and it not only resulted, from the last disposition of the cavalry, that the small body under Sir Colin Campbell which de- * Captain Wetherall was the bearer of the order, which ran thus: “Cavalry to take ground to the left of second line of redoubts “occupied by Turks;” and the Captain, at Lord Lucan’s request, waited to see the order executed in the way which he judged to be accordant with Lord Raglan’s meaning. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 139 fended the approach to Balaclava was left for the lxvl moment uncovered, hut that (by reason of the period required for the transmission of a fresh order, and for countermarching our squadrons) this state of isolation might continue some time, in isolation of despite of all Lord Raglan could do. On the other hand, the position of Liprandi Brandi's* was this : With his victorious infantry and artillery disposed near the captured redoubts, he occupied a slightly curved line, which began at Kamara, and extended thence westward by Canrobert’s Hill and the Causeway Heights, till it reached a point somewhat in advance of the Arabtabia. The four Odessa battalions, posted near this The Odessa A regiment be- Arabtabia or Number Three Redoubt, marked the came the index of the limit of the venture which the Russian Commander enemy’s changing re- was assigning to his infantry in the direction of solves, the Allied camps. Indeed we shall see that this Odessa regiment, for the rest of the day, was a faithful and sensitive index of the enemy’s intent, mounting guard over the site of the Arabtabia, so long as the Allies were yet distant, falling back when our cavalry seemed going to attack it, and countermarching at once to the old ground when Liprandi saw that the French and the English Commanders were inclined to acquiesce in his conquest. The Russian cavalry, supported by its at- Position of 140 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVf. the Russian cavalry. Jabrokrit- sky’s force now ap- proaching, and preparing to occupy the Fedioukine Hills. These troops, though liable after a while to be over- matched by the Allies, were for the time secure against the attack of in- fantry. The period of licence thus enjoyed by Liprandi. tendant batteries, was drawn up across the North Valley, with its left resting on the lowest slopes of the Causeway Heights, and its right on the Fedioukine Hills. Nor was Liprandi’ s little army the only force with which the Allies would now have to cope, for Jabrokritsky, having descended from the Mackenzie Heights, was debouching from the Tractir road, and preparing to take up a position on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills. These Bussian forces had no pretension to match themselves against the troops which the Allies on the Chersonese could, sooner or later, send down for the relief of Balaclava*, but, on the other hand, it was certain that a long time must elapse before the infantry despatched from the upland could be brought into action against the assailants of Balaclava; and the configuration of the ground was such, that every French or Eng- lish battalion engaged in its descent from the Chersonese could be, all the while, seen by the enemy. Liprandi, therefore, could act at his ease; and it was for no trifling space of time that this privileged security lasted. He perhaps under- reckoned the probable duration of the licence which he thus might enjoy; but the actual result was, that from the seizure of Canrobert’s Hill to the moment when the Allies were ready to come INVASION OF THE CRIMEA, 141 into action, there elapsed a period of some three lxvi* hours. * So, although the moment might come when, by the nearer approach of the Allies marching down from the upland, Liprandi would be reduced to the defensive, or else compelled to retire, yet, for the time, the Russian General was not only secure against the contingency of being attacked by infantry, but also had such prey within reach as might tempt him to become the assailant. The arrival of Jabrokritsky, now debouching The forces from Tractir, entitled Liprandi to consider that ing Balaclava, troops which had come thus near were a present accession of strength*, and, taken altogether, the Russian troops actually under Liprandi, or near enough now to co-operate with him, were a force complete in all arms, and numbering, as we saw, Their some 25,000 men with 78 guns. Yet (now that sUcnbtl1, our cavalry had been withdrawn to the foot of the Chersonese), the only field force with which Sir Colin Campbell stood ready to oppose all these The forces • . • p if* ttt* i #i • • "| that could be Kussian troops m tront ot Kadikoi was a single opposed to battery of field-pieces, 400 men of the 93d High- the^mVa^of landers, commanded by Colonel Ainslie,** 100 in- bUCC0Uls * i * Canrobert’s Hill is stated to have been taken at 7.30, and it was half-past ten before the Allies had any of their infantry rein- forcements so far in advance as to be ready to undertake an attack. ** Only six companies of the regiment were at first available for this sorvice in front of Kadikoi ; the two remaining companies of the 142 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. CHAP. LXVI. Liprandi’sde' termination to abstain from seizing the occasion. His plan of trying a ven- ture with his cavalry. The design with which this was re- sorted to. valids under Colonel Daveney, who had been sent down to Balaclava for embarkation*, and, besides, two battalions of Turks, not hitherto carried away by the ebb of the Mussulman people. Liprandi did not seize the occasion. He, per- haps, had failed to divine the extreme weakness of the little gathering which undertook to defend the gorge of Kadikoi; but, be that as it may, he attempted no attack with his infantry upon the approaches of Balaclava. For a long time, he re- mained in a state of inaction; but at length when his period of licence was approaching its close, he resorted to that singular venture with his cavalry of which we shall now have to speak. IV. Some of our countrymen have imagined that this enterprise of Liprandi’s cavalry was a real attempt on the part of the enemy to possess him- self of Balaclava; but the Russians declare that the object really contemplated was only that of ruining a park of artillery believed to be near Kadikoi;* and, judging from the apparently hesi- battalion being on duty, under the command of Major Gordon, in the inner line of defence. Major Gordon, however, with the force under his orders, rejoined the main body of the battalion before the moment of its encounter with the Russian cavalry. * Todleben. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 143 tating nature of the movement, as well as from j^yT’ the fact of its having had no support from the in- % fantry, there would seem to be ground for believ- ing that some minor purpose of the kind indicated by the Eussians was the one really entertained. The Kussian cavalry had been brought into dis- credit by submitting to be null at the battle of the Alma; and it seems not unlikely that expiation of former shortcomings may have been one of the objects in view. Be this as it may, General Ryioff with the The advance main body of the Russian cavalry, and supported cavalry, by field-batteries, began to move up the North Valley.* The 93d Highlanders, now augmented to a Campbell’s arrangements strength of about 550 by the accession of the two for defending the approach companies under Gordon, were drawn up in line, by Kadikoi. two deep, upon that rising ground in front of the village of Kadikoi which was afterwards called the “Dunrobin” or “Sutherland” Hillock. Tower of the Coldstream, and Verschoyle, another young officer of the Guards, chancing to be in Balaclava this morning with some thirty or forty men, had seized the occasion for showing the warlike quali- ties of energy, high spirit, and prompt judgment; * With respect to the numerical strength of this great body of cavalry, see post, p. 145. According to General Todleben, it com- prised 2300 horsemen, being fourteen squadrons of hussars and nine sotnias of Cossack, p. 387, 393-94. 144 INVASION OF THE CRIMEA* lxvi’ f° r they gathered tlieir people together, brought them up to the front, ranged them quickly along with the Highlanders, and in this way brought Campbell a small accession of strength to eke out his scant means of defence.* The hundred in- valids, under Colonel Daveney, were drawn up on the left of the 93d.** On either flank of the scanty body of British infantry thus posted, there stood a battalion of Turks.*** Campbell’s means of defence were materially aided by Barker’s field- pieces, already in battery upon convenient ground near the hillock, as well as by a portion of the batteries constituting the inner line of defence, and especially, it seems, by a battery of two heavy guns under the command of Lieutenant Wolf of the Royal Artillery. Campbell The advance of the Russians soon brought withdrew liis . . ^ men to the their artillery to a ground within range ol Camp* hillock, and bell’s small force*, and, two of the Highlanders, caused them . to lie down, besides some of the Turks, being wounded by the * I am indebted solely to Colonel (now Sir Anthony) Sterling 1 ® very valuable MS. letters for the knowledge of the service thus rendered. ** Campbell’s despatch says the invalids were drawn up “in sup- “ port ; ” but I have reason for thinking that the statement in the text is accurate. *** This account of the disposition made by Sir Colin Campbell may seem to differ in some minute particulars from his published despatch; but there are matters on which the testimony of a sub- ordinate officer is more conclusive than the report of his chief. INVASION OF THE CRIMEA. 145 fire then opened, Campbell sought to give his men chap. shelter. He therefore moved them back to the ~~ ~~ foot of the hillock which their ranks had hitherto crowned, and caused them there to lie down. Preparing for such an eventuality as that of the gorge being forced, he despatched Colonel Sterling to Balaclava with orders to apprise the commander of the frigate which lay in the harbour of the pending attack. Meanwhile the Russian cavalry continued to Body of horse advance up the North Valley, but four squadrons the main body detached themselves from the mass, and came shap- cavalry, and ing their way for the gorge of Kadikoi — the now advanc- ground Campbell stood to defend.* When these tile gorge of horsemen were within about a thousand yards 0 f Kadlk01 - him, Campbell gave a brisk order to his little Campbell 1 * body of foot, directing them at once to advance, crowiuh^ 111 and again crown the top of the hillock. This was hlllock * done at the instant by the Highland battalion and the few score of English soldiers who had come up to range alongside it. The troops did not throw themselves into a hollow square (as is usual in preparing for cavalry), but simply formed line two deep. On this slender array all was destined * According to Todleben, tlie force must have been vastly more than 400 strong — consisting, he says, of nine squadrons, partly be- longing to the regiment called the “ Saxe- Weimar ” Hussars, and partly made up of Cossacks; but I accept Campbell’s estimate of the force, and he puts it at 400. Invasion of the Crimea. VII. 10 146 INVASION OF THE CHIME A. CHAP. LXVI. Flight of the Turks. Position of Campbell after the flight of the Turks. His percep- tion of the critical cir- cumstances in which he was placed. to rest; for the two battalions of Turks which had hitherto flanked the Queen’s troops were by this time without cohesion. It would seem that the disintegration of the Mussulman force had begun at the moment when Campbell withdrew his line to the foot of the hillock, and was completed, some few instants later, upon the evident approach of the Bussian cavalry. At all events, these two battalions of Turks w r ere now dissolved or dis- solving. Tor the most part, both officers and men turned and fled, making straight as they could for the port, and they cried, as they went, Ship ! ship ! ship ! By this defection in presence of the enemy’s advancing cavalry, Campbell was suddenly shorn of two-thirds of the numerical strength engaged in defending the gorge; and the few hundred British soldiers who had hitherto constituted but a fraction of his force were now almost all that remained to him upon the hillock in front of Kadikoi.* Whilst he waited the movements of an enemy who was altogether some 25,000 strong, he could not help seeing how much was now made to depend upon the steadfastness of the few hundred men * I say almost, because there were men among the Turks who manfully stood their ground. It would be a great error to question the courage of the fugitives. The one bane of the Turkish forces is the want of officers to whom the men can look up. Without that in- gredient cohesion is apt to fail, however bravo men may be. Cronoral I’lan of Iho BATTLE OF BALACLAVA Advance of the Russian Cavalry. EXPLANATION OF SIGNS. rie site of the English Light Cavalry (map thus The sitr of (hr Eng fish Ream/ (crvamf Camp tb/s B. Orders had ban given tv strike these Ca»/ps in the cirrli/vuimtng . bmi at ike time here indicated i. e. about 10 a.mt cvnsit/rral/e traces of them remained . Jr lb hue here, imbrated the Russia ns had caj/tured the /redoubts 1.2.3 C '( end estvcti shed themsehes in thetkree first . tearing the R” 4-Redoubt unoccupied Jhbrokritsky nnth between i rid Battalions . '/ Sgnadrons and 14 fan’s is -i-jrcsent, (as established on (he Fediovhine Sills; hut he had. barely taken up his position at the bme here indicated. Tie jour Sgiioetrons des/iatrbrd againsl Sir Cohn Oanpbrll m e in the midst of their encounter with the 93 T,! High landers whilst the Turkish Jroops tn-e. retreating m ronptsion upon Rnlnclana . f ~c.hr the command of deuerot By j off. the mam both/ of the Russian Canntnj having utrioeh/ advanced- Some may up the Tkl/ty is inclining to its lef t and, passing :