ON THE CONSOLIDATION 
 
 OF THE 
 
 WORCESTER AND WESTERN RAILROADS. 
 
 By CHARLES BECK. 
 
 EXPLANATION. 
 
 A few words are required to explain the reasons which 
 induced the writer of these pages to make his views on the 
 subject of the Consolidation of the Worcester and Western 
 Railroads known. It will be remembered that this important 
 subject having been referred to the Committee on Canals and 
 Railroads, the majority of the Committee made, towards the 
 close of the session, an oral report adverse to consolidation, 
 while Mr. Hopkins, Chairman of the Committee on the part of 
 the House, made a very able and elaborate report in favor of 
 the measure. Some surprise, not to say indignation, was ex¬ 
 pressed in some quarters at the proceeding of the majority in 
 not preparing a written report. Whatever may be thought of 
 this omission, it was not owing to the fact that the Committee 
 had not spent sufficient time, and devoted sufficient attention, 
 to the investigation of the subject. 
 
 If I had not, during the closing weeks of the session, been 
 kept by sickness from my seat, when the report came before 
 
11 
 
 3 
 
 3 (eStJr 
 
 the House, I should have availed myself of an opportunity to 
 explain and justify my assent to the majority report. What I 
 could not say then, I wish to say now, — that I have conscien¬ 
 tiously endeavored to collect all the facts in the case, to listen 
 attentively to the able arguments for and against the measure, 
 and to form my own conclusions. Not being a business man, 
 and least of all a railroad man, I think it very probable that I 
 may have misapprehended facts, overlooked important circum¬ 
 stances, and drawn erroneous conclusions. All I claim is, that 
 I was earnest and zealous in my search after light, and brought 
 to the investigation that very moderate share of common-sense 
 with which Providence has endowed me. Possibly the very fact 
 of my practical inexperience in railroad matters may have saved 
 me from the danger of yielding to pre-conceived notions, and 
 enabled me to look at the subject free from any bias. My col¬ 
 leagues of the Legislature of ’64, to whom I think an account 
 of my share in the matter due, will form their own independent 
 opinion. 
 
\^ Fl & 15 UOCViKfc Vru,*&5* 
 
 THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE WORCESTER AND 
 WESTERN RAILROADS, 
 
 In considering the subject of the Consolidation of the Wor¬ 
 cester and Western Railroads, referred to the Committee on 
 Canals and Railroads, it should be borne in mind that the 
 question is the simple, practical one, whether the petition for 
 the consolidation of the two roads should or should not be 
 granted; and not the general question, whether Massachusetts 
 should or should not adopt the policy of consolidation. Mr. 
 Hopkins, in his able and interesting report, chose to travel 
 beyond the limits of the subject referred to the Committee, 
 and discuss the latter subject. The starting from an ingenious 
 theory, and deducing therefrom the principles which are to regu¬ 
 late action in single cases, has something very attractive; but 
 the safer method is to act wisely, justly, and circumspectedly 
 on the individual cases as they present themselves, and con¬ 
 struct, naturally and logically, from a sufficient number of in¬ 
 dividual cases, a policy. A definite policy should be a result-— 
 not a starting-point; it should grow — not be made. It is un¬ 
 doubtedly true that, to some extent, every one who wishes to 
 act satisfactorily in a particular case, must have formed some 
 general principles which are to govern the individual cases; 
 but great cure should be taken not to indulge in the building 
 up of a fair theory, and then, when a particular case is to be 
 acted upon, to be either obliged to abandon the theory in 
 order to do justice to the existing emergency, or to cling to 
 the pre-conceived theory to the injury of the interest imme¬ 
 diately to be attended to. 
 
 jo 35256 
 
4 
 
 I have no pre-conceived theory on the subject of consolida¬ 
 tion. I consider it as a practical question. A railroad must 
 be of a certain extent to be worked profitably. A railroad of 
 a few miles in length must have .as much rolling-stock and as 
 many men as another of twice or thrice its length. The 
 shorter road has employment for its rolling-stock and men a 
 portion only of each day, — both the rolling-stock and men being 
 idle the remainder of the day, — and, consequently, to this ex¬ 
 tent, a non-remunerating investment. Such a road will very soon 
 be bankrupt, unless it finds safety in consolidation with another 
 road. For if it attempts to retrench its expenses by reducing 
 its equipment, it will fail to satisfy the just expectations of the 
 community, as to regular and efficient accommodation; or if it 
 attempt to keep up a sufficient equipment without having full 
 employment for it, the outlay will soon exceed the income. I 
 have, however, no doubts whatever that consolidation must have 
 a limit, beyond which it works injuriously. The point where it 
 may or should cease, and independent action commence, is 
 evidently when a road is able to keep up and employ con¬ 
 stantly, and therefore with profit, an equipment which satisfies 
 all the just demands of the business community. This point 
 may be reached by one road of twenty-five, by another of 
 thirty, by another of forty miles. The length of a road is 
 not a decisive criterion; other elements come in to affect the 
 result. But when a railroad has reached the point of inde¬ 
 pendent and self-sustaining action— that is, when, in order to 
 live, it does not depend on union or consolidation with another 
 road —the policy of consolidation should cease, and that of 
 co-operation begin. Before this point of independent, self- 
 sustaining action is reached, consolidation is the proper policy. 
 
 This being my opinion of consolidation, instead of adopting 
 and advocating a general theory, favorable or hostile to con¬ 
 solidation, I prefer to examine, carefully and conscientiously, 
 any given case, with due regard to the interests of the commu¬ 
 nity at large, of the stockholders, and of particular interests. 
 In this spirit, without any pre-conceived theory, I propose to 
 
5 
 
 consider the present question, whether it is, or not, advisable 
 for the Committee to recommend to the Legislature the grant¬ 
 ing of the petition for the Consolidation of the Worcester and 
 Western Railroads. I will take it for granted, that a majority 
 of the stockholders of both corporations favored the object, 
 although it must be confessed that the evidence on this point 
 was, to say the least, extremely confused and unsatisfactory. 
 Certainly, the election of a Board of Directors in one of the 
 corporations, opposed to consolidation, leaves it extremely 
 doubtful how much weight is to be attached to the petition. 
 I may the more easily leave this matter out of consideration, 
 because, even if the stockholders of both corporations were 
 unanimous in their wish for consolidation, this unanimity would 
 undoubtedly be an important element with the Legislature in 
 forming their decision, yet it would not be a decisive reason 
 for granting the petition. For as the Legislature considered 
 other interests as well as those of the stockholders when they 
 originally granted their charters, so they are in duty bound to 
 consider those other interests when a very material modifica¬ 
 tion of the charters is asked for. 
 
 What are the reasons in favor of the consolidation of the 
 two railroads j or, in other words, what are the benefits antici¬ 
 pated from this consolidation ? 
 
 The benefits are of several kinds. Some look upon consoli¬ 
 dation as the only means of terminating the long-continued and 
 apparently irreconcilable disputes concerning the division of 
 profits. Others expect from it a more economical management, 
 and, consequently, either greater profits to the stockholders or 
 a reduction of prices for the benefit of the public. Still 
 another party, and unquestionably the most important as to 
 number, influence, and character, demand consolidation as the 
 only means for restoring the declining commercial prosperity 
 of Boston. 
 
 I. The controversy concerning the division op profits 
 between the two railroads has lasted so long, and has at times 
 been carried on with so much feeling, that it is undoubtedly for 
 
6 
 
 the interest of all to terminate it; and, if consolidation will 
 bring about this desirable end, it deserves, for this reason 
 alone, serious consideration. 
 
 Of the many witnesses who appeared before the Committee, 
 none treated of this branch of the subject with greater fullness 
 than Mr. Chapin and Mr. Mason. While Mr. Mason sketched 
 with great distinctness the outline of the history of the contro¬ 
 versy, Mr. Chapin furnished many most valuable details. Mr. 
 Mason, after stating that the controversy has lasted for twenty 
 years, and after giving a full and accurate account of the several 
 attempts to settle the difficulty by an award, just in its prin¬ 
 ciple and satisfactory to the parties, but which, after trial, 
 proved unsatisfactory, and was repudiated by one or the other 
 party, declares that, in his opinion, it is impossible to discover 
 a just principle by which the claims of the two parties may be 
 adjusted, and that everything but consolidation has been tried, 
 and failed. It is the conviction of Mr. Mason, a conviction in 
 which Mr. Chapin emphatically concurs,* that these differences 
 can never be settled till the companies are united and their 
 interests identical. Mr. Chapin, in one place of his statement, 
 expresses himself very briefly, but very strongly, concerning 
 the difficulties between the two roads : “When you come to the 
 relations of the Boston and Worcester Railroad and the West¬ 
 ern Railroad, you find that we are interested in everything that 
 passes Worcester, and they are interested in it, and so many 
 questions come that we can not settle. I have almost wondered 
 myself that we can not; but such is the fact. We can not and 
 do not.” 
 
 It will be seen that this opinion, that consolidation is the 
 only means to terminate the controversy between the two 
 roads, is certainly not based upon experience. All that can be 
 
 * The language of Mr. Chapin on this point is : “I think it for the public 
 interest — the interest of the people along the lines of the roads, and of the 
 people in the eastern part of the State, who do a large part of their trade with 
 the West by this route — that the two roads should be consolidated.” 
 
7 
 
 said in its favor is, that all other means having failed to bring 
 about a satisfactory arrangement, it is possible that consolida¬ 
 tion, which has not yet been tried, may do it — certainly a very 
 slender basis for so important a measure as the consolidation 
 of two great and powerful corporations. 
 
 But a moment’s consideration will show that consolidation 
 does not furnish the desired relief; and this will become most 
 apparent when we consider the mode of bringing it about. It 
 is taken for granted that this important measure is not to be 
 carried out by an arbitrary, high-handed decision of the Legis¬ 
 lature, disregarding the rights and interests of the parties, but 
 by a voluntary arrangement of the two parties, based upon a 
 just appreciation of the rights of each. It will be apparent 
 that the same difficulty, which has so often rendered a tem¬ 
 porary arrangement between the two railroads impossible, or, 
 when tried, unsatisfactory to the one or the other party, re¬ 
 turns with redoubled force. It must be plain to any intelligent 
 and fair man, that a permanent union or consolidation, duly 
 respecting the rights of the parties, involves the same points 
 which have formed the elements of the several temporary 
 arrangements or awards. Are the shares of the two roads to 
 be considered of equal value, or are the shares of one road to 
 be considered of more value than those of the other; and, 
 if so, of how much more value ? The value which each party 
 attaches to its road (including the expense of land damages, 
 construction, depot and merchandise accommodation, etc.), and 
 to the service which the road performs, is, of course, an ele¬ 
 ment of the value of the stock, and will be as little, or even 
 less accepted by the other party in the case of a permanent 
 arrangement or consolidation, than in the case of the temporary 
 ones, all of which have, after trial, been rejected by one of the 
 parties, or sometimes by both, as altogether unequal and unfair 
 in their operation. But the difficulties which a scheme of con¬ 
 solidation has to encounter, in consequence of the different 
 values which the two parties attach to their property, are not 
 only the same in kind as those experienced in making a tern- 
 
8 
 
 porary arrangement, but they are greater in degree. If a 
 temporary arrangement proves unjugt to one of the parties, 
 the injustice may be borne from a consideration of the early 
 termination of the arrangement. But if a permanent arrange¬ 
 ment proves unjust, even the comfort of looking forward to 
 the time when it will cease, will be taken away, for the very 
 reason that the connection is permanent. It is not to be 
 expected, therefore, that a permanent arrangement, which, of 
 course, will labor under some of the imperfections, on account 
 of which the several temporary arrangements or awards 
 have, after trial, been repudiated by one or the other party, 
 will be entered upon by the parties who know that, if the 
 arrangement proves unjust, there will be no means of escaping 
 the result or remedying the injustice. Under these circum¬ 
 stances, seeing the improbability of an arrangement being hit 
 upon that will be just and satisfactory to both parties, I for 
 one am not prepared to advise the Legislature to authorize a 
 consolidation of the two corporations. 
 
 While Mr. Mason does not seem to be aware that, to say 
 the least, it would be as difficult to settle the terms of consoli¬ 
 dation as it has proved to agree upon those of a temporary 
 arrangement — (he certainly does not, in his argument, advert 
 to this phase of the subject) — Mr. Chapin does not overlook 
 it. He says: “I think we can fix upon terms of union, 
 although we cannot upon terms of division; because, in fixing 
 upon terms of union, we should fix upon facts as they exist. 
 When we attempt to fix upon a division of future business, we 
 are fixing it upon facts which have not yet come to light. In 
 fixing the terms of union, I should think the prospective value 
 of the two roads would be a fair element. If I were going to 
 fix upon the elements that should govern such a calculation, I 
 should want to sit down and examine subjects that might now 
 escape my mind. The value of the property, as property for 
 producing an income, would undoubtedly be one of the first 
 elements. Perhaps that covers the whole; but there are 
 minor things. The value of the roads, as sources of present 
 
9 
 
 and prospective income, would be the main thing. I do not 
 think there is so much danger of doing injustice to the stock¬ 
 holders, in determining the value of their property, as in deter¬ 
 mining upon a division of the profits; because we have got the 
 present condition of these roads, and the amount of money 
 which each has earned, from its first start down to the present, 
 is capable of being demonstrated, every dollar of it.” I should 
 be inclined to differ from Mr. Chapin, and say, that to fix upon 
 the terms of a union is not only not easier but more difficult 
 than to devise a scheme of dividing the earnings, because an 
 additional element enters into the account, which Mr. Chapin 
 himself admits to be a legitimate element, viz., the capability 
 of future development; or, as Mr. Chapin calls it, “ the prospec¬ 
 tive value of the two roads.” Mr. Chapin admits that he has 
 not examined this branch of the subject, and yet he ventures 
 to say that he can fix upon the terms of union. When he un¬ 
 dertakes an examination of the prospective value of the two 
 roads, he will find it a very thorny subject, and the result at 
 which he will arrive, and honestly, too, will prove to be merely 
 the opinion of an individual, from which another individual, 
 whose judgment is entitled to equal respect, will differ. Who 
 is bold enough to say what will be the prospective value of 
 the two roads, a thing subject to so many contingencies which, 
 by a shrewd man may be guessed at, but which it is impossible 
 to foretell with precision. And yet this prospective value of 
 the property is an element, and an element that cannot be 
 winked out of sight, in settling the relative value of the two 
 kinds of property. It seems to me that the more this matter 
 of the prospective value of the two roads is considered, the 
 more evident it will be to every one, that, so far from its being 
 easier to agree upon the terms of an union than upon the 
 terms of dividing the earnings, it is more difficult; because it 
 is a matter of opinion on which the most intelligent, expe¬ 
 rienced, and honest men may differ, and because it depends on 
 contingencies which may or may not happen. If it has been 
 so difficult to discover a principle or system of dividing fairly 
 2 
 
10 
 
 and satisfactorily the earnings of the two roads, a matter in 
 which nothing but facts and items capable of the most accurate 
 calculation are to be considered, how can it be expected that 
 an harmonious arrangement can be effected in a matter in 
 which, in addition to the difficulty of dividing the earnings, — 
 because these go to make up, in part, the value of each prop¬ 
 erty, — another element comes in which is merely a matter of 
 opinion, incapable of calculation or demonstration; namely, the 
 prospective value of the stock. 
 
 It is unnecessary to dwell longer on this point. Not one of 
 the advocates of consolidation, with the exception of Mr. 
 Chapin, has even alluded to the practical difficulties of arriving 
 at a fair and equitable adjustment of the terms of consolidation. 
 Mr. Chapin is evidently too much a man of practical good 
 sense to overlook this matter of the prospective value of the 
 two roads, as an element in settling the terms of the union; 
 but he has not examined it, and neither he nor any other 
 advocate of consolidation proposes a plan of consolidation 
 indicating what value, both present and prospective, he 
 attaches to each stock. Until such a plan is offered, showing 
 that there is a reasonable prospect of a satisfactory result, it 
 can not be expected of the Legislature to authorize the 
 preparatory steps of consolidation. 
 
 While I appreciate, to some extent, the difficulties which 
 have been experienced by the two corporations in dividiag 
 their earnings in a fair and satisfactory manner, I cannot 
 persuade myself that the common and sound principle of 
 letting business take care of itself should, in this case, be 
 inadequate and powerless. If co-operation, or an arrangement 
 embracing several roads, is for the interest of the several 
 roads, and, of course, of the public, such an arrangement will 
 be made. It may be difficult to ascertain precisely the amount 
 of labor done by each party, and the amount of profit to which 
 it is entitled for that labor, but I can not believe it to be 
 impossible. Mr. Chapin states: ‘‘that until 1854, there was 
 no system by which freight could be billed from Boston to any 
 
11 
 
 point west of Buffalo.” “ The first step towards remedying 
 this difficulty was taken in July, ’54, at a meeting held in 
 Albany, at which all the roads from this to Chicago were 
 represented,— that is, the Michigan Central, the Great Western, 
 the New-York Central, the Western, and the Boston and 
 Worcester roads, — and the Boston Board of Trade.” Mr. 
 Chapin says, later: “ These difficulties have been constantly 
 lessened and lessened as competition has increased.” This 
 is the tendency of a free business. It will be so, nay, it has 
 been so, in the co-operation between the Western and 
 Worcester roads, as it has in the arrangements with the 
 Western roads, so far as it is for the interest of all parties 
 concerned. To press beyond that point may benefit, for a 
 time, some one branch of business, some one interest, but the 
 law of compensation will soon make itself felt. 
 
 II. Economy op Management. Almost every one who has 
 appeared as a witness in favor of consolidation, has expressed 
 the opinion that a union of the two roads would be followed 
 by a more economical management, which would, of course, 
 result in greater profits to the stockholders and cheaper prices 
 to the public. Yet this testimony did not remain uncontro¬ 
 verted, inasmuch as many of the witnesses asserted that 
 consolidation would not result in a reduction of expenses. 
 
 On this branch of the subject, we have again the weighty 
 testimony of Mr. Chapin, which deserves careful consideration. 
 He says: “ In regard to the matter of consolidation, while I 
 believe the present arrangement has been carried out with a 
 good understanding, and perfectly pleasant and amicable 
 relations between the several companies (for although we have 
 differed a great many times, very considerably, in our views of 
 the way in which business should be done, we have generally 
 reconciled these differences one way or the other), yet if there 
 had been but one interest, I can not but believe that the 
 business, could have been done very much more efficiently. I 
 believe that if the surplus stock and help that are now upon 
 the roads between Albany and Boston were all under one 
 
12 
 
 direction, it would increase the amount of work which could 
 be done, very considerably, and no interest suffer from it.” 
 
 11 In operating the road, I have had occasion several times to 
 see how much work we could get from our engines and men. 
 In order to have men enough to run our engines and do our 
 work at all times, and do it promptly, we are obliged to have 
 more men than we can use all the time; for our work is not 
 like some other kinds of work, running uniformly every day, 
 but varies considerably. I have found that when we get 
 twenty days’ work a month out of an engine, we get a full 
 average, and many times four days’ work of that time (task?) 
 has been done between Sunday, at 3 o’clock, and the next 
 Tuesday, at 3 o’clock. For instance: at the Albany end, we 
 run a stock-train for the Harlem road, at 3 o’clock, Sunday; 
 and then the regular business on Monday morning takes all the 
 engines we have got. They get back to Albany about 3 o’clock, 
 and then it is time for the Brighton stock-train to start; and 
 by the time they get back, it is time for the regular trains on 
 Tuesday to start; and then, the stock-trains being over, the 
 rest of the week the work is lighter; and the less surplus 
 help we have, in order to meet such emergencies, the less time is 
 lost by the men lying over the time when the business is light.” 
 
 Mr. Chapin does not carry out his illustration, but it is plain 
 what he is aiming at. He wants to show that the business at 
 the Albany end of the road, requiring surplus engines and men, 
 between Sunday, 3 o’clock, and Tuesday, 3 o’clock, to carry 
 the stock-trains, if there should be a similar pressure of 
 business some time between Tuesday, 3 o’clock, and the follow¬ 
 ing Sunday, 3 o’clock, somewhere on the Worcester road, the 
 surplus engines and men at the Albany end, if under the 
 control of one corporation, could be advantageously employed 
 on the Worcester road. This is unquestionably true; but in 
 order to make out his case, Mr. Chapin must prove two things, 
 viz.; first, that there exists such a pressure on the Worcester 
 road, and, secondly, that this pressure occurs just between 
 Tuesday and Sunday, when there is a lull near the western 
 
13 
 
 end at Albany. But Mr. Chapin does not adduce any facts to 
 prove this, and rests satisfied with the theoretical inference 
 which he does not even take the trouble of stating, that the 
 surplus engines and men at the Albany end of the road, if 
 under the same direction, might be profitably employed on 
 some part of the Worcester road. Any one will see at a glance 
 how much of the argument is merely hypothetical, unsupported 
 by facts. If the Legislature are expected to authorize so im¬ 
 portant a measure as consolidation, they ought certainly to 
 have a firmer basis for their act than a mere conjecture, 
 however probable, and however deserving of attention as 
 coming from a railroad man of large experience. 
 
 In another part of his statement, Mr. Chapin says: “ It 
 would reduce a great many of the expenses of the roads very 
 considerably; to what extent is a matter of conjecture, or 
 opinion, but I should have no hesitation in saying that it would 
 reduce the joint expenses more than five per cent. But the 
 great advantage would be gained, in my opinion, from the 
 greater efficiency that would be given to the road for doing 
 the business. If the rolling-stock of the present two companies 
 was under the direction of one, it would add to the ability to 
 do the business twenty per cent., perhaps more; because all 
 the surplus which each road now has would then be brought to 
 bear upon any point. Our business is not equal; it presses 
 sometimes at one point and sometimes at another. Like all 
 business, it has its ups and downs.” 
 
 Mr. Chapin, here, as in the extract above, confines himself 
 to a mere assertion — an assertion which, I confess, appears 
 extremely plausible, but which is not proved. If he had given 
 us facts, which must be in his possession, to show that in the 
 majority of cases, if not always, the pressure of business on 
 one part of the road occurs when there is a lull on another, 
 the argument would assume a very different aspect. As the 
 case stands, without further evidence (and here I must reiterate 
 the expression of my regret that, rich in facts as the statement 
 of Mr. Chapin is on many points, he has not furnished the facts 
 
14 
 
 which are needed to raise his assertion, or conjecture, on this 
 point, to a convincing argument), I must think it quite as 
 probable that the pressure of business may occur simul¬ 
 taneously on different parts of the road, so that the surplus of 
 rolling-stock and men may, at one and the same time, be needed 
 on several portions of the road, and the profit expected from 
 a more economical employment of the equipment will prove 
 illusory. 
 
 Considering, then, that Mr. Chapin is the only witness called 
 by the friends of consolidation who made an attempt at 
 explaining how the two roads, when consolidated, could be 
 managed more economically, it is, perhaps, unnecessary to 
 quote the testimony of some of the witnesses called by the 
 opponents of consolidation, tending to prove that the saving in 
 the management of the consolidated roads, if any, would be 
 trifling. Mr. Washburn stated “that both roads together 
 cannot be run with one man less, and that it is bad economy 
 to employ inferior menand again: “ the consolidated road 
 could not be managed more cheaply than the separate ones.” 
 Mr. B. W. Lincoln states: “ Consolidation would not save 
 expense between Boston and Worcester. I do not know 
 about the Western road. The only saving would be in clerks 
 who make the settlements; possibly one Treasurer might do, 
 but he would require an Assistant-Treasurer.” Mr. Homer 
 says: “ Consolidation would not reduce expenses. The only 
 saving might possibly be the Treasurer; but the one Treasurer 
 would have an higher salary.” 
 
 Considering, then, that with one exception (the employment 
 of the rolling-stock and men over the entire extent of the 
 two roads), Mr. Chapin does not point out where and wherein 
 the management of the two roads would be rendered more 
 economical by consolidation, that he contents himself, as all the 
 witnesses called by the friends of consolidation, with the 
 simple assertion that consolidation would result in greater 
 economy, which would, of course, accrue to the advantage of 
 either the stockholders, in the shape of larger dividends, or the 
 
15 
 
 public, in the shape of lower prices — an assertion which is 
 controverted by the testimony or opinion of the witnesses on 
 the other side, that consolidation would not result in greater 
 economy of management — would the Legislature be justified in 
 authorizing an act of consolidation which is, to say the least, 
 so very doubtful in its result ? I, for one, am not prepared to 
 take the responsibility of advising such action. 
 
 III. Benefit to the Commerce of Boston.— The third 
 consideration, which was urged with greater and more per¬ 
 sistent zeal than either of the two preceding considerations, is 
 that consolidation would resuscitate the declining commercial 
 prosperity of Boston. Mr. Jewett, the counsel for the Boston 
 merchants and the Board of Trade, pressed this point with 
 great vigor, asserting “that while the interests of the stock¬ 
 holders and the local communities had been looked to, the 
 interest of the public at large had been neglected. The roads 
 had failed to make Boston more an exporting port, and con¬ 
 solidation would do this; that it was the interest of the State 
 to compel the roads to consolidate.” Mr. Converse stated 
 u that the New-England tj*ade was inadequate to make Boston 
 what it ought to be, if we had the whole of it.” 
 
 Some might, perhaps, object that this was legislating in favor 
 of a particular interest or class. I do not. I entertain no 
 doubt whatever, that, if the commerce of Boston should be 
 extended by consolidation, or any other measure, the benefit 
 would not be confined to the merchants of Boston, but would 
 be felt by every class in every part of the State. My difficulty 
 lies in another direction. The question which naturally pre¬ 
 sents itself to me, and to any unprejudiced mind, is: What 
 are the impediments in the way of a greater and more rapid 
 expansion of the trade of Boston, and how is the consolidation 
 of these two railroads to remove them ? 
 
 Considerable testimony was offered to show that the trans« 
 portation of merchandise, from and to the West, was subject 
 to expense, delay, loss, and other inconveniences. The testi¬ 
 mony on this point came from too respectable sources to admit 
 
16 
 
 of doubt as to its truth. Yet, upon a closer investigation, it 
 turns out that the cases complained of all occurred somewhere 
 west of Albany. Mr. Richardson, who has, on the whole, given 
 the most precise account of these inconveniences, to which the 
 transportation of merchandise from and to the West is 
 exposed, expressly states that they all occur west of Albany. 
 Mr. Chapin refers briefly to this subject: “I do not know 
 that any freight on the other side of the river at Albany has 
 been delayed, because we had not cars to bring it on. We 
 have been obliged to get cars from our neighbors, but we have 
 brought it on.” How can the consolidation of two railroads 
 in Massachusetts prevent irregularities on the railroads of 
 New York, Ohio, Illinois, etc. ? The consolidated road would, 
 of course, have no direct power over those roads. All that 
 could be expected would be that the consolidated road, being a 
 greater and more powerful corporation, might make its influence 
 upon other roads more effectually felt. I will not advert here 
 to the very serious consideration that the consolidated cor¬ 
 poration, being supposed strong enough to regulate and control 
 railroads beyond the borders of Massachusetts, might exercise 
 an equally irresistible influence over its competitors within the 
 State. But supposing a perfectly legitimate use, by the con¬ 
 solidated corporation, of its increased power and influence, it 
 would unquestionably have to meet the counter-influence of the 
 roads terminating at Portland, New York, Philadelphia, and 
 Baltimore. 
 
 It seems to me that the friends of consolidation, who expect 
 so great benefit from the measure for the commerce of Boston, 
 overlook one very important circumstance; namely, the greater 
 distance of Boston from the West, as compared to the other 
 ports. That distance is some sixty miles. That difference of 
 distance must be annihilated, both as to time and expense, 
 before Boston can successfully compete, in this particular 
 branch of business, with the other cities. Can merchandise 
 trains be run so much more rapidly as to annihilate the differ¬ 
 ence of distance ? They may, perhaps, but necessarily with 
 
17 
 
 increased expense. But this is not all. The expense for the 
 sixty odd miles must be defrayed by some one. Who is to 
 defray it? And if somebody were willing to bear this 
 additional expense, would not the roads to New York, Phila¬ 
 delphia, etc., be able to underbid the road to Boston, and go 
 on doing so until the consolidated road was financially ruined, 
 or must retire from the contest ? And in spite of this difficulty 
 and danger, we have the respectable testimony of Mr. Richard¬ 
 son, that, even now, the Western and Worcester Railroads 
 carry freight as low as the Pennsylvania and New York roads. 
 It is difficult to see what more consolidation can effect. 
 
 Much stress has, during the examination of the subject, been 
 laid upon the fact that Massachusetts has the advantage over 
 New York, because the river navigation being closed on an 
 average for four months, the West has no other outlet but the 
 Western Railroad. Mr. Chapin remarks on this point: “I 
 contend that for four months in a year, Boston is as near the 
 West as any other sea-board city, and can bring freight here 
 as cheaply as it can be carried to any other seaport.” This is 
 no doubt an advantage, and I am not inclined to undervalue it. 
 But I doubt whether a branch of business, which, after four 
 months, ceases for the remaining eight months, can, on the 
 whole, be very profitable, or considered firmly established. It 
 naturally requires an equipment of the railroads for the pur¬ 
 pose of doing the increased business of the four months, which 
 must necessarily lie idle during the remaining eight months. 
 I touch upon this point with diffidence, because I am too little 
 of a business man, and am too little acquainted with railroad 
 management, to claim the right of having or expressing an 
 opinion; but the necessity of an equipment, which can be 
 employed for one-third of the year only, seems to me indis¬ 
 putable. Granting, however, for the sake of the argument, 
 that this periodical increase of business during the four winter 
 months is profitable, is it dependent on consolidation ? Cer¬ 
 tainly not. 
 
 But while some of the business men of Boston are so 
 
 3 
 
18 
 
 urgent in their demands upon the two railroads to do all in 
 their power — possibly at the expense of some of their 
 legitimate duties to the community at large—to aid the com¬ 
 mercial interest of Boston, is it unfair to inquire whether the 
 business men of Boston have done all in their power in pursuit 
 of the same object ? Have they furnished shipping to transport 
 to Europe and other countries the produce which can be brought 
 to Boston ?* The statement of Mr. Chapin on. this point is 
 conclusive. He says: “ When you come to the 1 rolling 
 
 freight/ the copper from Lake Superior, the cotton from 
 Memphis, the flour from St. Louis, the provisions from Chicago 
 and Cincinnati, the Western roads will all of them pro rata 
 (a new verb, but perfectly intelligible) with us from the place 
 it starts from to this point; and therefore the difference in cost, 
 in consequence of the increased distance, does not fall wholly 
 upon this line of road, but is divided over the whole length of 
 the route, and enables us to fill up our line with business, and 
 bring the freight forward to Boston, if we can only get you to 
 take it away. That is the only difficulty. We might have 
 brought to Boston, last winter, any quantity of freight — far 
 beyond what we have any ability to bring here — if there had 
 been any outlet for it. There is not so much communication 
 here with Europe as there is from New York. There are no 
 steam-freight lines from here, not so much shipping, and the 
 communication is not so frequent.” And in another place: 
 “We have brought freight from the West to the extent of our 
 (Western Road) rolling-stock. If there had been a better 
 outlet, we could have brought more, because the Boston and 
 •Worcester Railroad have had rolling-stock lying still all 
 winter.” This statement is corroborated by the very respect- 
 
 * A similar case is discussed in the Boston Daily Advertiser of Dec. 14 and 
 15 ; namely, the want of immediate steamboat communication between Boston 
 and New Orleans. An instance is mentioned of a Boston merchant haying 
 4000 barrels of flour waiting at New Orleans for shipment to Boston, and not 
 knowing how to bring it to Boston, except by way of New York. 
 
19 
 
 able testimony of Mr. Richardson, who declares that freight 
 from Boston to Liverpool is higher than from New York to 
 Liverpool,— a testimony confirmed by Mr. Tobey. 
 
 The expressions, “if we can only get you to take it away,” 
 and “if there had been any outlet for it,” are pregnant with 
 meaning. The men of business of Boston do not, of course, 
 demand that the railroads are to furnish this “outlet,” and do 
 for them what they ought to do themselves. And yet they 
 advocate the consolidation of the two roads, on the ground that 
 consolidation will aid and increase the transportation of freight 
 from the West to Boston, when confessedly they do not provide 
 the means of “taking away” that quantity which the two 
 roads, in their present condition, might deliver in Boston. 
 The demand of the men of business of Boston would be made 
 with better grace after they had done what they, and they 
 alone, can do; namely, furnish the means of transportation, 
 and at prices as low as at New York. 
 
 I ask again, would it be wise and just for the Legislature to 
 authorize a measure highly doubtful in its result, and which 
 would probably seriously affect the rights and interests of the 
 stockholders, for the benefit of parties who have confessedly 
 not yet done what is absolutely necessary to render the 
 expected benefit possible. 
 
 A misapprehension appears to me to lie at the bottom of 
 this idea that the commercial interest of Boston requires the 
 consolidation of these roads. The misapprehension to which 
 I refer is the belief that Boston can be made a second New 
 York, competing with the latter precisely in the same branches 
 of business to which New York*owes so great a portion of its 
 prosperity. Nature is against this. The geographical position 
 and conformation of Massachusetts render such an attempt 
 abortive. But while Boston can not do precisely what New 
 York does, it can do a great many things as well as New York, 
 and a great many other things which New York can not do. I 
 entertain no doubt whatever that Boston can be a growing and 
 prosperous community, as indeed it is and has been, but not 
 
y 
 
 20 
 
 precisely after the model of New York. Boston has already 
 branches of commerce and industry of its own with which no 
 other city of the Union can compete; the capital, intelligence, 
 and energy of Boston, if rightly directed, will develop these 
 more fully, and open new ones, and Boston will reach and 
 maintain an eminent position of its own. 
 
 The gradual improvement in the mode of doing the trans¬ 
 portation business between the West and Boston, to which 
 Mr. Chapin refers in several places of his statement, points 
 out the true policy. This policy is to act in concert with other 
 roads, by means of agreements, or arrangements, or contracts, 
 or whatever other term may be chosen,— in one word, by 
 co-operation. This co-operation of independent roads should 
 be secured by fair, mutually-beneficial agreement. Interest, 
 not springing from narrow-minded and blind selfishness, but 
 guided by a liberal, far-seeing desire of gaining the greatest 
 advantages with the least sacrifices, is here, as in all branches 
 of business, the surest basis. 
 
 The testimony of Mr. Chapin shows, that this policy has 
 been pursued by the two Massachusetts roads, and, apparently, 
 with success. In one place he says: “We have arrangements 
 now by which we bill freight and ticket passengers over the 
 roads generally. There is not a town in Ohio, with two 
 thousand inhabitants, that can not to-day take a bill of lading 
 in Boston and send it south of the Ohio River, north to the 
 lakes, or west to the next largest railroad; so that, in point of 
 fact, for a large portion of this business, we are already con¬ 
 solidated. The arrangements are many of them imperfect, 
 but they are being perfected; *we did not begin them until ten 
 years ago.” 
 
 In the preceding pages I have endeavored to show, after a 
 careful examination of the testimony brought before the Com¬ 
 mittee, that the objects which the friends of consolidation 
 expect to gain by that measure are not likely to be gained, 
 and that, consequently, it would not be wise or judicious for 
 the Legislature to recommend or allow the adoption of that 
 
21 
 
 measure. But there are also some positive objections to the 
 proposed measure. 
 
 The principal objection is, that great corporations are not 
 desirable. I am not disposed to join in the crusade against 
 all corporations. Owing to the condition of our country, the 
 greater distribution of property and the consequent rarity of 
 very large fortunes, owing to our political institutions, which 
 leave to the enterprise of the citizens what under other forms 
 of government is done by the State, many useful enterprises 
 must be undertaken and carried on by the instrumentality of 
 corporations, or not undertaken at all. Personal responsibility 
 is so apt, in corporations, to vanish out of sight, that there is 
 a constant danger of things being done by corporations which 
 would not be attempted by individuals directly and personally 
 responsible. This danger of abuse increases with the extent 
 of the corporation. I readily grant, that frequently emergencies 
 occur when a desirable object would be gained more easily 
 and quickly if the power of two or more bodies were 
 concentrated into one guided by one mind. Just so in our polit¬ 
 ical condition. It frequently happens that the accomplishment 
 of a desirable object is delayed by the complicated machinery 
 of our responsible government, when it might be secured at 
 once through the action of the one-man power. Every one 
 knows this and understands it; yet few will be found willing 
 to give up the security which our institutions afford to every 
 citizen, and every interest, for the purpose of gaining, in some 
 isolated instances, a greater efficiency. I must confess, I was 
 somewhat surprised at the readiness with which witnesses and 
 counsel, favoring the consolidation scheme, advocated what 
 they called the one-man power. One of the counsel went so 
 far as to declare that the corporation should be compelled to 
 carry out the policy favored by him. I am inclined to think 
 that the able and energetic counsel would, after some reflection, 
 modify his view, especially if he should happen to be employed 
 by the opposite party. 
 
 That the power of the consolidated corporations would be 
 
22 
 
 great, and might be dangerous to other interests, and to the 
 independence of the State itself, admits of no doubt, although 
 the mere mention of such danger was received by some of the 
 parties with scornful ridicule. The example of other States 
 proves this conclusively. The baneful, selfish influence exer¬ 
 cised by the New-Jersey Railroad, not only over the internal- 
 improvement policy, but over the politics of that State, is 
 generally acknowledged. It would not be gratifying to the 
 self-respect of a Massachusetts citizen if some future President 
 of the consolidated Western and Worcester Railroads should 
 boast of carrying the State of Massachusetts in his breeches 
 pocket. The admissions of the able President of the Michigan 
 Central Railroad, as to the political and legislative abuses 
 connected with the affairs of the New-York Central Railroad, 
 are full of warning. The declaration of ^fr. Twitchell, that 
 he should deem it his duty to use his power and influence for 
 the purpose of controlling or destroying a competing road, 
 struck me as very significant. The case of the Hoosac-tunnel 
 enterprise shows, to the satisfaction of any disinterested, fair- 
 minded man, how much a feeble and local enterprise, in the 
 hands of determined and persevering men, can accomplish in 
 our Legislature, by the well-known legislative machinery of log¬ 
 rolling. All this should deter us from placing excessive, 
 irresponsible, and uncontrollable power in the hands of one 
 large corporation, essentially governed and directed by one 
 mind. The president of the consolidated road would govern and 
 direct over two thousand men, who owe their bread to him. 
 Will he, or will he not, have the means of deciding a closely- 
 contested election ? especially, if the principle enunciated and 
 justified, some years ago, by the agent of a manufacturing 
 corporation in our own State, be adopted, that a corporation 
 has a right to regulate the voting of its dependents. 
 
 The possibly, nay probably, injurious influence of the consoli¬ 
 dated corporation upon the full development and exercise 
 of the principle of competition, — a principle which may 
 undoubtedly bo carried to an unwise extent, but is, after all, 
 
23 
 
 the very life of a free and satisfactory condition of business,— 
 is another evident danger on which I need not dwell, after the 
 significant testimony of Messrs. Brooks and Twitchell. The 
 former says: “ If the consolidation takes place, rival lines will 
 much less be built.” The latter says: u Consolidation would 
 be injurious to the Norwich and Nashua roads, and prevent the 
 building of the Gardner road. The Western road would use 
 their influence and money to prevent the building of the 
 Gardner road, even if it were for the interest of the State.” 
 It is true that Mr. Chapin says on this point, “1 don’t think 
 consolidation would injure the Norwich and Worcester Railroad. 
 I think it would not be for the interest of any road to force 
 business out of its natural channel. I don’t think there would 
 be any profits made in doing that. Interest would be one 
 of the controlling elements in the government of the road. I 
 don’t think the consolidated road would be in favor of crushing 
 out the Norwich road. It is not my opinion that it would be 
 the policy of any body to break down the Norwich road. 
 Such a thing may have been done, and may be done again, but 
 if my opinion is asked, as a railroad man, — a man interested 
 in transportation, which has been my business all my life,— 
 I would say, meet fair competition everywhere, but introduce 
 no competition for the purpose of breaking down any body.” 
 This is, indeed, the opinion of a man of large experience, and, 
 as such, of great value, but it is an opinion only. Mr. Chapin’s 
 character would be a guaranty, if the management of the 
 consolidated roads were entrusted to him, that his administra¬ 
 tion would be fair and liberal; but what assurance is there 
 that he, or one like him, would be the manager ? 
 
 This is a brief, but I trust, intelligible statement of the 
 considerations which led me to vote with the majority of the 
 Committee, that the petitioners have leave to withdraw. 
 
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