To be Argued, if permitted, by 
 LAURENCE ARNOLD TANZER. 
 
 Court of Appeals 
 
 OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. 
 
 STEPHEN R. CLEVELAND, individually and as 
 Commissioner of the Board of Water Works of 
 the City of Watertown, and others, 
 
 Respondents, 
 vs. 
 
 THE CITY OF WATERTOWN, and others, 
 Appellants. 
 
 BRIEF ON BEHALF OF THE MUNICI- 
 PAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION 
 OF NEW YORK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 WINFRED T. DENISON, 
 LAURENCE ARNOLD TANZER, 
 as amici curiae. 
 

 
 
 
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 LIST OF POINTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFOUUCTOrY StALEMENL 1... el ce eee eee 
 
 Point I.—Decision not only out of harmony 
 with the established principles of munici- 
 pal government in New York, but with 
 general policy of the other States ...... 
 
 Point I1.—Political Expediency of Act not for 
 Sete COCEIININE LION, oercci ied = ors o's eralere aie 
 
 Point I1I.—Not unconstitutional to allow lo- 
 cal control over administration of Assess- 
 ments, Public Safety, Health, Charity and 
 PieenSiie Gar MM DEr sani. seer. oy ss + o's 
 
 First. Former charter of Watertown, 
 and most charities in the State equal- 
 ly subject to this objection ........ 
 
 Second. Act does not affect city’s exist- 
 ing substantive powers but only 
 MeCTHOUVOU CXETCISG oes Skis oes 
 
 Third. Decision ignores character of 
 cities as governmental subdivisions 
 and agencies of the State .......... 
 
 Fourth. Decision inconsistent with 
 policy of fostering local home rule... 
 
 Fifth. The precise functions held not 
 subject to delegation to local govern- 
 ments have all been authoritatively 
 held subject to such delegation ...... 
 
 1. Functions of assessors ........- 
 2. Functions of public safety..... 
 B® [SRA heli NU) ee ei 
 
 Ot 
 
 14 
 
 19 
 
 23 
 
 ue 
 Or 
 
PAGE 
 
 ids 
 
 Or 
 
 - Kunctions of-charity -. 5. eee 
 
 5. Function of examining plumbers 57 
 6. Other similar functions ....... 58 
 
 Sixth. The extent to which local gov- 
 ernments shall be given control over 
 such functions is discretionary with 
 Legislature : .% 0) aS tres eee eee 59 
 
 Point IV.—Const. Art. III, Sec. 1, not vio- 
 lated by the provisions relative to repeal 68 
 Point V.—Barto vs. Himrod, inapplicable ... 82 
 
 Point VI.—Const. Art. III, Sec. 1, and Art. 
 XII, Sec. 1, not violated because of 
 city control over number and duties of 
 officers; Act not incomplete ............ 87 
 
 Point VII.—Const. Art. XII, Sec. 1, relative 
 
 to restriction of taxation not violated .. 109 
 Point VIII.—Const. Art. XII, Sec. 2, relative 
 to special city legislation not violated... 116 
 
 Point [X.— Federal constitutional guaranty 
 of republican form of government not 
 VIOlated ias din srei> sae ep nee ee - ne 
 Point X.—The act, being susceptible of con- 
 structions which will sustain it, cannot 
 be made invalid by construing it other- 
 WIS 7, dsc eatorecee vs ec etae > ni, at ar 119 
 Point XI.—The objections are to provisions 
 which ‘are separable .7) 7. -... seamen 122 
 
 Conclusion. 2 76s. sed, i > bn ares «| Je 
 
 ts 
 
Gmut of Appeals 
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK. 
 
 
 
 STEPHEN R. CLEVELAND, individu- 
 ally and as Commissioner of 
 the Board of Water Works of 
 the City of Watertown, and 
 others, 
 
 Respondents, 
 
 VS. 
 THE CITY OF WATERTOWN, and 
 
 others, 
 Appellants. 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the Ap- 
 pellate Division for the Fourth Department, af- 
 firming, by a vote of three to two and on the opin- 
 ion below, the Supreme Court of Jefferson County 
 which had adjudged the unconstitutionality of the 
 optional City Government Law (Laws 1914, c. 
 444), and restrained the City of Watertown from 
 proceeding to organize the form of City Govern- 
 ment it had elected to adopt thereunder. 
 
 As the decision annuls the entire act, it is neces- 
 sary to describe it before discussing the particular 
 points. 
 
 The purpose of the act, as declared in the title, 
 is to authorize cities of the second or third class 
 “to adopt a simplified form of government.” It 
 permits any city of the second or third class, by ref- 
 erendum vote, to adopt in place of its existing char- 
 
2 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 ter one of several forms of government set forth 
 in the act ($23). The act, in effect, provides seven 
 different optional forms of city charter, any one of 
 which a city may adopt for itself. The plans are 
 designated by different letters and may be briefly de- 
 scribed as: A—commission government, with each 
 city department in charge of a commissioner; B— 
 commission government, with the commission col- 
 lectively supervising the city departments; C—the 
 commission manager plan; D—the mayor and coun- 
 cil plan, with a council of five elected at large; 
 K—the same, with a council of nine elected at 
 large; F—the same, with a council elected by 
 wards; and G—the plan of the second class cities 
 law, made available for third class cities. 
 
 With respect to each of these plans the act pre- 
 scribes the composition and powers and duties of 
 the principal executive and legislative departments 
 of the city government and leaves to them the regu- 
 lation of details. 
 
 In case a third class city adopts the second class 
 cities law, it is governed by the provisions of that 
 law (§120); thus making applicable Sections 74 
 and 40 of the second class cities law, under which 
 the Board of Estimate and Apportionment and 
 the council respectively are empowered to fix and 
 determine the salaries or compensation and posi- 
 tions and numbers of all city officers and em- 
 ployees and to regulate their powers and duties. 
 With respect to the other plans of government, 
 the optional city government law confers upon the 
 governing body or officers of the city like power 
 to determine the number and positions and com- 
 pensation of the city officers and employees and 
 to regulate their powers and duties ($§74, 76, 82, 
 B3)2, 100 p- 
 
3 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 The Court held the act unconstitutional sub- 
 stantially on the grounds that it violates Article 
 III, Section 1, and Article XII, Section 1, of the 
 Constitution by delegating to cities power over 
 matters in which the state has an interest; that it 
 violates Article III, Section 1, and Article XII, 
 Section 1, of the Constitution by authorizing cities 
 to determine the number of their officers and 
 employees and their powers and duties; and so, 
 as the Court claims, allowing cities in effect 
 to frame their own charters; that it violates 
 Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution by dele- 
 gating too broad a power to repeal acts of the legis- 
 lature; that it violates Article III, Section 1, of 
 the Constitution by delegating to the council power 
 to complete an incomplete act of the legislature; 
 and that it violates Article XII, Section 1, of the 
 Constitution by failing sufficiently to limit the tax- 
 ing power of municipalities. The Court also in- 
 timated, without deciding, that the form of govern- 
 ment chosen by the people of Watertown—the com- 
 mission-manager plan—violates the requirement of 
 a republican form of government. 
 
 The Court held that the provisions of the act 
 which it holds to be unconstitutional are so inter- 
 woven with the whole scheme and purpose of the 
 act as to vitiate the whole statute and render it 
 void. 
 
 We contend that the act is not open to any of 
 the objections raised; that the powers delegated to 
 cities are only those powers of local self-govern- 
 ment which the Legislature has power to grant; 
 that the act does not permit cities to frame their 
 own charters, but establishes several forms of 
 charter and defines the powers of the governing of- 
 ficers and bodies under each form of charter and 
 
4. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 validly authorizes the people of any city to choose 
 which of these charters they will adopt, and that 
 the power granted to the city government to regu- 
 late matters of detail is a power which it was in 
 the discretion of the Legislature to grant; that 
 there is no unlawful delegation of power to repeal 
 acts of the Legislature but only the right on the 
 part of the city to exercise a lawfully delegated 
 power to pass ordinances which may have the effect, 
 by virtue of the act itself, of superseding provisions 
 of special and local statutes; that the act is a com- 
 plete act calling for no further action to make it 
 effective other than the vote of the electors of any 
 city accepting one of the charters for that city and 
 the exercise by the city government of the powers 
 lawfully delegated; and that the act does not vio- 
 late the command of the Constitution to place such 
 limits on the taxing powers of the city as the Legis- 
 lature may deem wise. An objection taken by 
 counsel for the plaintiffs below, but not sustained 
 by the Court, that the act should have been sub- 
 mitted to the local authorities for their assent as 
 a special city bill is also, we contend, without 
 foundation. We also contend that there is no 
 foundation for the intimation of the Court below 
 that the commission-manager plan violates the re- 
 quirements of a republican form of government. 
 We contend that if there is any doubt as to the 
 meaning of the act, it is to be construed so as to 
 be constitutional; and that even if the Court 
 should hold some portion or portions of the act 
 to be open to objection, the entire act is not there- 
 by made invalid. 
 
 The presiding Justice below filed a dissenting 
 memorandum, in which Justice de Angelis con- 
 curred. 
 
5 
 POINT I. 
 
 The decision below places this 
 State not only out of harmony with 
 its own established principles of local 
 government, but also out of harmony 
 with the widespread practice in the 
 other States of the Union. 
 
 Pervading the opinion below is the idea that this 
 is a novel and extraordinary and revolutionary 
 step in the method of legislative grants of munic- 
 ipal charters. Of course that would be no constitu- 
 tional objection, even if it were so, but the fact is 
 that the same essential principles have been recog- 
 nized for a long time both in this State and else- 
 where, and they are now widely accepted and in 
 force in all parts of the country. A progressive 
 ‘measure the Act doubtless is, dealing with the 
 problem in a broad way; but analysis will fail to 
 recall any feature of it that does not conform to 
 our established political practice and ideals. 
 
 Certainly there is nothing novel about the grant 
 of a new charter to a city. Nor is there anything 
 new about an optional provision, making it de- 
 pendent on the vote of the people whether the new 
 charter shall become operative. Optional laws, de- 
 pendent for their operation in any particular 
 locality on -a vote of the electors of that locality, 
 have been passed and approved from early days. 
 
 As recent instances of the growing practice of 
 making legislative charters depend upon a popular 
 vote (in addition to the constitutional submission 
 to the city officials) may be cited the charters 
 enacted by the legislature for Buffalo (Laws 1914, 
 ch. 217, §398), Batavia (Laws 1914, ch. 354, $217), 
 
6 
 
 Point I. 
 
 Olean (Laws 1914, ch. 436, §8413-422) and Me- 
 chanieville (Laws 1915, ch. 70, $119). 
 
 Such acts have always been held not to fall with- 
 in the doctrine of Barto vs. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 483, 
 which held a state-wide referendum on a legislative 
 question to be unconstitutional, and the Court be- 
 low does not criticise the present Act on any such 
 ground, deferring to the following conclusive auth- 
 
 orities: 
 
 Rome Bank vs. Rome, 18 N. Y., 38; 
 
 Starin vs. Genoa, 23 N. Y., 439; 
 
 Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 
 467, 472-4; 
 
 Corning vs. Greene, 23 Barb., 33; aff’d 26 
 Nas, Ai2n; 
 
 Clarke vs. Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605; 
 
 Village of Gloversville vs. Howell, 70 N. 
 Vira 
 
 Gilbert R. Co. vs. Kobbe, 70 N. Y., 361, 
 374; 
 
 People ex rel. Unger vs. Kennedy, 207 
 N. Y., 5838, 544. 
 
 Cooley’s Const. Limitations, 118; 
 
 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, Sec. 
 6311 ; 
 
 26 Cyc., pages 366, 367, 391; 
 
 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, Sec. 
 643 and note page 686, id.; 
 
 St. Johnsbury vs. Thompson, 59 Vt., 301. 
 
 The above authorities are all squarely in point, 
 and their theory is accurately represented by the 
 following passages from the opinions in the leading 
 two of them: 
 
7 
 
 Point I. 
 
 In Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 467, 
 472-4, the Court explained the distinction as 
 follows: 
 
 “The case of Barto vs. Himrod, decided that 
 the legislature does not possess the power to 
 submit to the people of the State the question 
 whether an act shall or shall not become a law; 
 * * * Tt is a material distinction, however, 
 between the cases, that the people of a par- 
 ticular mumeipality or local body are not the 
 constituents of the legislature. They are not 
 the people of the State of New York, who have 
 irrevocably committed their power of legisla- 
 tion to the legislature, by a delegation which 
 does not permit that legislature to remand any 
 legislative question to their constituency. A 
 city or town or a village is a separate recog- 
 nized local body, which, without exercising 
 legislative power, may signify, if permitted, 
 its assent or dissent to any grant or with- 
 drawal of powers or privileges. 
 
 And in People ex rel. Unger vs. Kennedy, 207 
 N. Y., 533, 545, the Court again stated it as follows: 
 
 “Starting with and fully accepting the ele- 
 mentary proposition involved in and decided 
 by the Barto case, we find that subsequent de- 
 cisions have declared that the doctrine of that 
 case should not be pushed beyond the question 
 there involved and that the legislature may 
 pass a statute which is a completed law affect- 
 ing or conferring rights upon a restricted 
 locality but to become operative only in the 
 
8 
 
 Pornt I. 
 
 event of an affirmative vote by the people of 
 such locality.” 
 
 A law by which the people of the locality are 
 given the option of choosing any one of several 
 charters provided by the legislature is not in prin- 
 ciple different from a law giving them the option of 
 choosing or rejecting a single charter; and so the 
 Court below does not criticize the law in this 
 respect. 
 
 Before the enactment of the present law, most of 
 the other states had optional charter laws. The 
 statutes of Ohio (Laws 1913, Page & Adams’ Ann. 
 Gen. Code, Supplement 1916, vol. 1, page 933 seq.), 
 Virginia (Laws 1914, ch. 94, Pollard’s Suppl, 1916, 
 page 914), Massachusetts (Laws 1915, ch. 267) and 
 North Carolina (Laws 1917, ch. 186), contain pro- 
 visions similar to the present act giving cities the 
 choice of any one of several forms of charter. 
 
 Many of the other states give cities the option 
 of adopting a commission or commission manager 
 charter. Among those are Arkansas (Laws 1914, 
 page 48, Kirby & Castle’s Digest, 1916, page 1612) ; 
 Idaho (Laws 1911, ch. 82, page 280; Laws 1917, 
 ch. 79); Illinois (Laws 1910, page 12, 1 Jones & 
 Addington’s Ann. Sts. 1913, page 1149, Laws 1915, 
 page 316, Callaghan’s Dlinois Sts. 1916, page 204) ; 
 Iowa (Laws 1917, Supp, Iowa Code, 362) ; Kansas 
 (Laws 1907, ch. 114, Kansas Gen. Sts. 1915, page 
 303, Laws 1909, ch. 82, ibid page 384, Laws 1913, 
 ch. 128, §27, ibid 426, Laws 1917, ch. 86) ; Kentucky 
 (Laws 1910, ch. 163, 2 Kentucky Statutes 1915, 
 page 1718, Laws 1914, ch. 477, ibid, page 1786) ; 
 Louisiana (Laws 1912, act 207; 2 Marr’s Ann. R. S. 
 1687) ; Mississippi (Laws 1908 ch. 108, Laws 1912, 
 
9 
 
 Pornt I. 
 
 ch. 120) ; Missouri (Laws 1913, page 420) ; Montana 
 (Laws 1911, ch. 57, Laws 1917, ch. 152) ; Nebraska 
 (Laws 1911, ch. 24, R. S. 1913, page 1501, Laws 
 1917, ch. 208) ; Nevada (Laws 1915, ch. 192) ; New 
 Mexico (Laws 1913, ch. 76, 2 N. M. Ann. Sts. 1915, 
 page 1105); North Dakota (Laws 1907, ch. 45, 
 Laws 1911, ch. 67); South Carolina (Laws 1910, 
 page 523, 1 Code 1912, page 841, Laws 1912, pages 
 793, 814); South Dakota (Laws 1907, ch. 86, 1 
 Compiled Laws 1908, page 322, Laws 1913, ch. 
 119) ; Tennessee (Laws 1913, ch. 49) ; Texas (Laws 
 1909, page 189, Revised Civ. Sts. 1911, page 255, 
 Laws 1918, ch. 21); Washington (Laws 1911, ch. 
 116, 3 Remington & Ballinger Ann. Code and Sts. 
 1914, page 740); Wisconsin (Laws 1909, ch. 387, 
 Wisconsin Sts. 1911, page 474); Wyoming (Laws 
 1911, ch. 84). 
 
 A great many cities have organized under the 
 provisions of these laws and their constitutionality 
 has been uniformly upheld. 
 
 Annotated Cases, 1912, C. page 1,000; 
 
 Eckerson vs. City of Des Moines, 137 
 Towa, 452; 
 
 Cole vs. Dorr, 80 Kan., 251; 
 
 Bryan vs. Voss, 143 Ky., 422; 
 
 State ex rel. Hunt vs. Tausick, 64 Wash., 
 69 ; 
 
 People ex rel. City of Springfield vs. 
 Edwards, 252 Il, 108; 
 
 Kessler vs. Fritchman, 21 Idaho, 30; 
 
 State ex rel. Baughn vs. Ure, 91 Nebraska, 
 BLS 
 
 Mayor vs. State, 102 Miss., 6638; 
 
 State ex rel..Simpson vs. City of Man- 
 kato, 117 Minn., 458; } 
 
10 
 
 Point I. 
 
 Mumn vs. Finger, 66 Fla., 577; 
 State ex rel. Bloomer vs. Canavan, 155 
 Wis., 398. 
 
 As we show infra, any limitation on the manner 
 in which or the extent to which the legislature may 
 grant to local legislative bodies the power to de- 
 termine the machinery of their own local govern- 
 ment would be in derogation of the plenary power 
 of the legislature over state and local government 
 as well as contrary to the principle of home rule, 
 which favors broad grants of power and local self- 
 government. It would also run counter to the long 
 continued practice in this state and in the country 
 generally, of granting local powers in broad and 
 general terms. 
 
 It is true that the Commission or City Manager 
 forms of City government are relatively new de- 
 velopments, but they do not involve any revolu- 
 tionary constitutional principles, and they have 
 been widely adopted throughout the country. The 
 opinion below does not attack their constitution- 
 ality as forms, but only a feature which generally 
 (though not necessarily) accompanies them in 
 practice, namely, broad rather than narrow local 
 powers. 
 
 There is nothing revolutionary or even novel 
 about that grant of power. The recognition of 
 its validity by the courts in the cases cited infra, 
 almost without discussion and as a matter of 
 course, is due to the fact that such grants have 
 been common and a well-recognized exercise of 
 legislative power from the earliest periods of our 
 history. 
 
 These City Manager or Commission forms have 
 been adopted in a large number of cities in all 
 
11 
 
 Pornt I. 
 
 parts of the country. According to statistics pub- 
 lished in “Equity” for October, 1916, at least the 
 folowing number of cities had come under this 
 plan: 
 
 Alabama, 12 cities 
 Arizona, pled 
 Arkansas, 7 th 
 California, Pay 
 Colorado, Res 
 Connecticut, Sars 
 Florida, ior ys 
 Georgia, oes 
 Idaho, yale 
 Illinois, 44. 
 Iowa, loa 
 Kansas, 46°" -“ 
 Kentucky, Gras 
 Lousiana, Pith 
 Maine, ape 
 Maryland, Vs od tae 
 Massachusetts, ot iedy 
 Michigan, a ea" Bs 
 Minnesota, ih 
 Mississippi, SF hhh 
 Missouri, Ons 
 Montana, Ane i 
 Nebraska, te 
 Nevada, ras 
 New Jersey, 8 ae aid: 
 New York, a 
 North Carolina, airs 
 North Dakota, diije & 
 Ohio, LO 
 Oklahoma, 2a87 
 
 Oregon, + 
 
12 : 
 
 Pornt I. 
 Pennsylvania, i ice 
 South Carolina, Ae 
 South Dakota, pe ees 
 Tennessee, gC 
 Texas, ta ee 
 Utah, Bidet? 
 Virginia, Desh 
 Washington, Ak 
 West Virginia, Rahs 
 Wisconsin, 14 “ 
 Wyoming, Paes 
 
 a total of 534 cities in 42 states; and the number 
 has increased since the foregoing statistics were 
 compiled. 
 
 Statutes providing for such methods of munic- 
 ipal government by commission, with or without a 
 city manager, and centering in the commission or 
 in the commission and manager the executive and 
 legislative powers of the city, to the same extent, 
 and sometimes to a greater extent than is pro- 
 vided by the present act, have uniformly been sus- 
 tained by the courts. 
 
 Brown vs. City of Galveston, 97 Tex. 1; 
 
 Eckerson vs. City of Des Moines, 137 Ia., 
 452, 461, 466; 
 
 Walker vs. Spokane, 62 Wash., 312; 
 
 Bryan vs. Voss, 143 Ky., 422; 
 
 People vs. Edwards, 252 Tll., 108; 
 
 State ex rel. Baughn vs. Ure, 91 Neb., 31; 
 
 State ex rel. Simpson vs. City of Mankato, 
 117 Minn., 458; 
 
 People vs. Prevost, 55 Colo., 199. 
 
 The cities in New York State which have come 
 under commission government are, in addition to 
 
13 
 
 PorntT I. 
 
 Watertown, the following: Beacon, Buffalo, 
 Mechanicville, Newburgh, Niagara Falls, Saratoga 
 Springs, Sherrill, and White Plains. 
 
 The present act substantially follows the pre- 
 cedents set by this long series of legislative acts 
 and court decisions. While broad in its terms, it 
 introduces no new principle, no substantial de- 
 parture from the former course of legislation. Its 
 enactment was, it is submitted, well within the 
 discretion vested in the legislature. 
 
 There is no force to the argument that the law 
 will lead to conflicts and uncertainties. On the 
 contrary, any conflicts that may arise will be no 
 greater or more difficult than those daily arising 
 between a municipal ordinance enacted under a 
 special charter and the provisions of that charter 
 or of the general laws of the state. The present 
 act has this great advantage, that, instead of call- 
 ing for the application in each city of different 
 special laws applicable to that city alone, the 
 source of authority will be found in a single 
 statute applying alike to all the cities of the state, 
 and giving each of them the power to adapt its 
 local ordinances to the local conditions. The act 
 affords a uniformity of authority, combined with 
 flexibility in its execution, which will avoid the 
 difficulties necessarily entering into any attempt 
 to enact uniform legislation for an entire class of 
 cities—difficulties which were pointed out in 
 People ex rel. Clancy vs. Supervisors, 139 N. Y., 
 524, 529, 530. 
 
 It would seem preposterous to attack, as novel 
 or unconstitutional, a form of municipal govern- 
 ment which has been adopted to such an extent in 
 all sections of the country, and which has uni- 
 formly been sustained by the courts. 
 
14 
 Point II. 
 
 POINT II. 
 
 The wisdom of substituting a smail 
 city council with full and conspicu- 
 ous responsibility in place of the cid 
 system of a large council with limit- 
 ed and obscure responsibility and 
 subject to complicated restraints, in- 
 cluding the Mayor’s veto, was en- 
 tirely a question of political policy 
 upon which the courts have no con- 
 stitutional power to reverse the Leg- 
 islature’s judgment. 
 
 We assume we need not enter upon any argu- 
 ment or elaboration of authorities to the proposi- 
 tion that a court has no right to set aside a stat- 
 ute or a vote of electors, because of a difference of 
 opinion regarding political expediency, but from 
 the multitude of decisions to this effect we may 
 invite the Court’s attention to the following as 
 especially pertinent to this present situation. 
 
 People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 582, 545-6; 
 
 People ex rel. City of Rochester vs. Briggs, 
 50 N. Y., 553, 558, 559, 568; 
 
 People ex rel. Bolton vs. Albertson, 55 N. 
 Y., 50, 54; 
 
 Matter of Application of Mayor, 99 N. Y., 
 569, 584-5 ; 
 
 People vs. Crane, 214 N. Y., 154, 172, 173. 
 
 Yet, notwithstanding this thoroughly established 
 principle, it seems to us that no one can read the 
 opinion of the Trial Court, now adopted by the 
 
15 
 
 Point IT. 
 
 Court below (two justices dissenting), without the 
 conviction that its conclusion was largely con- 
 trolled by precisely such a difference of opinion 
 ‘between the Courts on the one hand and the 
 Legislature and the people of Watertown on the 
 other. ; 
 
 The Court, for example, expressly criticized the 
 new charter on the ground that it eliminated re- 
 straints on the city council, which the Court con- 
 sidered to have been imposed “in the interest of 
 the residents and taxpayers of the city,” and gave 
 the new council “power to pass ordinances hay- 
 ing the force of law of whatever kind or nature it 
 pleases” “without any limitation or restraint what- 
 ever, Save as to” certain specified subjects. 
 
 Similarly the Court criticized the new charter 
 on the ground that it “takes away the qualified neg- 
 ative of the Mayor over” what the Court stated to 
 be the danger of “hasty and inconsiderate action by 
 the council.” 
 
 Amplifying these views and discussing the rela- 
 tive provisions of the old charter and the new one, 
 from what seems to us a point of: view only of 
 political expediency, the Court dwelt upon the fact 
 that the old charter provided for the municipal 
 government “with much detail” and “at great 
 length,’ and “places many restraints upon the 
 governing body,” and that “the method of city 
 government is set forth at length” that “the char- 
 ter sets forth at great length the subjects on which 
 it (the common council) is authorized to enact 
 ordinances,” and that it has no power to direct 
 any extraordinary expenditure except upon a two- 
 thirds vote of its members, nor until such an ex- 
 penditure has been authorized by the taxpayers at. 
 
16 
 Pornt Ii. 
 
 a special election held for that purpose,” and that 
 the appointive officers are “to be appointed by the 
 Mayor, with the consent of the common council;” 
 and against these assumed merits of the old char- 
 ter, the Court contrasts the provision of the new 
 one in which the responsibility is clearly central- 
 ized on a small council over which the Mayor, while 
 a member, has “no power of veto.” 
 
 All these matters, including the question wheth- 
 er “the interest of the residents and taxpayers of 
 the City” might not be rather sacrificed than con- 
 served by the old charter system of diluted and ob- 
 scure responsibility and including the question 
 whether the check by conspicuous responsibility to 
 the electorate itself was not a better remedy against 
 possible “hasty and inconsiderate action by the 
 council” than even the veto power of a Mayor, are 
 clearly of political, rather than judicial cognizance. 
 
 Here we have, not only the vote of the electors of 
 Watertown, but a statute of the Legislature of the 
 State deciding authoritatively the question whether 
 the City Council should possess large and clear-cut 
 responsibilities, centralized in a small number of 
 members and subject to account directly to the 
 electorate. 
 
 It is not the concern of the courts whether this 
 decision so made by the Legislature and the people 
 of Watertown was wise; but if it were a question 
 open for such discussion, the public history of the 
 enactment must suffice. 
 
 Long experience in the operation of our democe- 
 racy had demonstrated the wide-spread and disas- 
 trous failure of our machinery of municipal govern- 
 ment throughout the country. The fact had at- 
 tracted the attention of all observers of our institu: | 
 
17% 
 Point IT. 
 
 tions, and had been, for example, a point of severe 
 criticism by Bryce in his “American Common- 
 wealth,” as well as by other observers, both foreign 
 and American. A long struggle had occurred to 
 remedy these evils, and there had gradually evolved 
 a consensus of public opinion that the dissipation 
 of responsibility was a chief cause of the failure. 
 
 In our own state, after long agitation, the mat- 
 ter was taken up by the Municipal Government As- 
 sociation, a non-partisan state wide organization, 
 having an active membership in every county of 
 the state, and affiliations with numerous city organ- 
 izations. The President of this Association was 
 Hon. John K. Sague, formerly Mayor of Pough- 
 keepsie, and its Vice-Presidents were Hon. Henry 
 L. Stimson, late Secretary of War, Hon. Charles E. 
 Treman, of Ithaca, Dr. Albert Shaw (of the Re- 
 view of Reviews), Dr. John H. Finley, State Com- 
 missioner of Education, Prof. Jeremiah W. Jenks, 
 and Mr. Isaac N. Seligman. 
 
 This Association made the original suggestion 
 of the bill which has now become the Optional City 
 
 rovernment Law. 
 
 The bill was made a part of the programme of the 
 State Conference of Mayors and other City Offi- 
 cials, and after thorough consideration by all in- 
 terests, it was formally drafted and introduced at 
 the Session of 1912, in the Senate by Senator Frank- 
 lin D. Roosevelt, now Assistant Secretary of the 
 Navy, and in the Assembly by Assemblyman Minor 
 McDaniels. The regular Session of 1912, not hav- 
 ing acted on it, forty-two mayors of second and 
 third class cities in this state submitted a peti- 
 tion to the Governor, asking him to call an extra- 
 ordinary session of the Legislature for its consider- 
 
 a 
 
18 
 Point II. 
 
 ation. This the Governor did, and thereupon the 
 bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator John 
 FE. Murtaugh, then Chairman of the Judiciary Com- 
 mittee, and in the Assembly by Assemblyman Aar- 
 on J. Levy, the majority leader, It passed the Sen- 
 ate unanimously and the Assembly with but four 
 negative votes. 
 
 At this time when the bill so became a law of 
 this state, there remained only eight states in the 
 whole Union which had not provided some similar 
 means by which cities were allowed to adopt char- 
 ters of the simplified type, similar to that which 
 the court below has held to be void and unconsti- 
 tutional. 
 
 Especially under such circumstances, we submit 
 that the Court went far beyond its powers in oppos- 
 ing its judgment relative to the interests of the 
 residents and taxpayers,against that of the Legis- 
 lature and the electors themselves. 
 
19 
 POINT III. 
 
 The courts below erred in holding 
 the charter to have violated Article 
 III, Section 1 and Article XII, Section 
 1 of the Constitution by permitting 
 LOCAL control over the LOCAL ad- 
 ministration of Assessments, Public: 
 Safety, Health, Charity, and the Li- 
 censing of Plumbers. 
 
 Probably the principal one among the points 
 made by the trial Court, whose opinion was adopted 
 below, was that the Legislature could not allow 
 cities to control even the local operation of Assess- 
 ments, Public Safety, Health, Charity, and the 
 licensing of Plumbers; this for the alleged reason 
 that those matters “are not purely municipal but 
 involve the performance of State functions” and 
 duties “in which the people at large have an in- 
 terest.”” The trial justice analyzed the powers of 
 each of the existing Boards on the subjects men- 
 tioned and then stated what seems to us the nub 
 of the decision, as follows: 
 
 “Tt is clear, therefore, that all of the above 
 Boards perform functions of a State character 
 and the effect of the statute is to permit the 
 City Council to legislate for the State at large 
 with regard to the performance of their 
 duties. This, as we have seen, is beyond the 
 domain of legislative power.” 
 
 The Court does not, and cannot claim that the 
 statute gives the Cities any powers extending 
 geographically beyond their boundaries and out in- 
 to the State at large. The point relates only to 
 the nature of the functions which the City authori- 
 ties are to exercise within the City limits, and it is 
 
20 
 Point III. 
 
 asserted that they cannot include asssessments, 
 public safety, health, charity, and plumbers’ exam- 
 inations, because even local administration of these 
 subjects is of interest to the whole State and a 
 “State function.” 
 
 We shall discuss later the revolutionary charac- 
 ter of this proposition, its denial of the essential 
 character of Cities as governmental subdivisions 
 and agencies of the State erected for the very pur- 
 pose of administering such subjects locally, and its 
 ruinous effect (if sustained) on any maintenance 
 of the Home Rule principle which has been so often 
 asserted by this Court, but let us first point out the 
 absence of any support for it from either of the 
 two cases which alone are cited by the Trial Court 
 as establishing it. They are McGrath vs. Grout, 69 
 A. D., 814-320 and Stanton vs. Board of Supervisors, 
 191 N. Y., 435 (fols. 228-229). The McGrath case is 
 not in point. The question there was, whether 
 the bill making the office of Sheriff of Kings County 
 a Salaried office, was a bill “relating to the property, 
 affairs or government of cities,” within the meaning 
 of Article XII, Sec. 2 of the constitution, so as to 
 require submission to the local authorities. The 
 court held that it was not, because it dealt with a 
 county office, not with a city office. The court did 
 not limit the Legislature, but held the Legislature 
 free of a limitation which was claimed to restrict 
 it. 
 
 The Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment, 
 171 N. Y., 7, placed its decision squarely upon the 
 ground that the County had been maintained as an 
 organization distinct from the City, and that the 
 County remained entirely within the legislative 
 control. 
 
at 
 Point ITT. 
 
 That case is, therefore, no authority for the pro- 
 position for which it is cited by the Court below 
 that: ; 
 
 “If the powers sought to be exercised * * * 
 in fact concern the people at large, or if they 
 involve the performance of functions which 
 are of a State character, they cannot be de- 
 legated to the municipality” (fols. 229-230). 
 
 Nor does Stanton vs. Board of Supervisors, 191 
 N. Y., 429, 4385, lay down any such proposition. 
 On the contrary, that case held that the Legislature 
 might leave the location of a county seat to a vote 
 of the electors of the County, on the ground, quoted 
 from Clarke vs. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605, 
 that 
 
 “while general statutes must be enacted by 
 the legislature, it is plain the power to make 
 local regulations, having the force of law, in 
 limited localities, may be committed to the 
 other bodies representing the people in their 
 local divisions, or to the people of those dis- 
 tricts themselves.” 
 
 The Court then added: 
 
 “We thus have distinctly presented the 
 difference between enactments pertaining to 
 the whole State, and those pertaining to 
 localities, and such distinction is not left to 
 those which are local or general laws; for 
 general laws may be and in certain cases must 
 be exacted, which pertain to localities only. 
 And especially is this true with reference to 
 county seats; for the legislature is prohibited 
 from passing any private or local bill locating 
 or changing county seats.” 
 
 The distinction taken by the Court in the case 
 cited was thus the very opposite of the distinction 
 
yy 
 Point ITI. 
 
 expressed by the Court below. The Court below 
 distinguished between acts pertaining to a locality 
 according as the subject matter of the act does 
 or does not concern the State on a matter in which 
 the locality acts as agent for the State. This Court, 
 on the other hand, takes no such distinction, but 
 it relies on the clear distinction between an act 
 pertaining geographically to the whole State, and 
 an act pertaining to localities, and holds that Acts 
 pertaining to localities may delegate powers ir- 
 respective of the general or local character of the 
 subject matter. The case is thus an authority di- 
 rectly contrary to the position taken by the Court 
 below. 
 
 The dissenting memorandum of Mr. Justice 
 Kruse in the Court below meets the point we are 
 discussing as follows: 
 
 “But it is contended that there are certain 
 provisions in the Act itself which attempt to 
 confer upon, the local authorities legislative 
 power. But that may be done by the legislat- 
 ure if confined within the sphere of local self- 
 government (Stanton vs. Board of Supervisors, 
 191 N. Y., 428; Village of Saratoga vs. Sara- 
 toga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 191 N. 
 Y., 128, 151), because, as is said by Chief 
 Judge Cullen in the last case cited, 
 
 ‘It is in conformity with the general 
 ‘principle which prevails with us of foster- 
 ‘ing local self-government.’ 
 
 Even certain governmental and administrat- 
 ive functions which affect the people of the 
 state as a whole may be delegated to a muni- 
 cipal corporation as a state agency, to be ex- 
 ercised within its territorial limits, and the 
 
23 
 Pornt ITT. 
 
 municipality may be empowered to make 
 ordinances upon the subjects thus committed 
 to it, and such ordinances have the force of 
 law within the territorial limits over which 
 their jurisdiction extends; such as the care 
 and control of highways (People vs. Kerr, 27 
 N. Y., 188; Village of Carthage vs. Frederick, 
 122 N. Y., 288; People ex rel. Collins vs. 
 Ahearn, 198 N. Y., 441; City of Buffalo vs. 
 Stevenson, 207 N. Y., 285) ; Public safety and 
 public health; (Metropolitan Board of Health 
 vs. Heister, 37 N. Y., 661; Polinsky vs. People, 
 13 N. Y., 65; People ex rel. Liebermann vs. 
 Vandecarr, 175 N. Y., 440; City of Rochester 
 vs. Macauley-Fien Co., 199 N. Y., 207; People 
 vs. Kaye, 212 N. Y., 407).” 
 
 The authorities here cited by Mr. Justice Kruse 
 were cited to the Courts below and seem to us con- 
 clusive, but no effort was made to distinguish them 
 and we are in the dark as to how they were 
 avoided. 
 
 We venture to say that there is no shred of af- 
 firmative authority for the proposition which lies 
 at the basis of the decision below. 
 
 The proposition is also opposed to the following 
 principles and authorities. 
 
 FIRST.—If the local administration 
 of the functions stated cannot be en- 
 trusted to the local government, then 
 the former charter of Watertown 
 under which the present Commission- 
 ers, who are plaintifis herein, hold 
 office is unconstitutional for the same 
 reason—as well as practically all 
 other existing city charters. 
 
 These very functions, which the Court says can- 
 not be delegated to the local governments, are now 
 
24. 
 Point IIL. 
 
 being exercised by the local government of Water- 
 town under its former charter, just as they are 
 being exercised by every local government in the 
 State. 
 
 Under the former Watertown charter (lL. 1897 
 c. 760), the existing Commissioners (plaintiffs 
 herein) having jurisdiction over these very subjects 
 were appointed by the Mayor and common council 
 of Watertown ($10); their salaries are controlled 
 by the common council of Watertown (§ 386) ; 
 which has the power to try them for misfeasance 
 ($ 39); and also the power to pass ordinances to 
 control them (‘preservation of order, peace, health, 
 safety and welfare,” §43) ; and the power to regu- 
 late their duties (§49). 
 
 If, as the Court below says, the Legislature can- 
 not grant to the cities the local control of these 
 matters, it seems clear that this former charter 
 was equally unconstitutional, and, as stated above, 
 we doubt if there is a valid City Government in 
 the whole State. 
 
 SECOND.—The Act now before the 
 Court does not in any way extend or 
 affect the city’s existing powers, but 
 only places within the control of the 
 common council authority to replace 
 or rearrange the machinery or pro- 
 cedure for exercising those powers, 
 which authority itself is to be exer- 
 cised subject to the restrictions con- 
 tained in the Act or incorporated 
 therein by reference. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the law here under attack 
 does not change the subject matters entrusted to 
 
25 
 Pornt ITT. 
 
 the cities at all, but only the machinery of opera- 
 tion, and so is not open to the criticism below as 
 to its alleged encroachment on subject matters ex- 
 clusively belonging to the State. 
 
 This clearly appears from the title of the Act it- 
 self, “An Act to authorize a city of the second or 
 third class to adopt a simplified form of govern- 
 ment,” and runs all through its provisions. Sec- 
 tion 4 continues the legislative powers of the city, 
 and provides that they shall not be abridged or im- 
 paired, but shall be possessed and exercised by 
 “the legislative body of the city.” Section 5 pro- 
 vides, “The existing corporate powers of a city 
 shall not be construed to have been abridged or 
 impaired by the provisions of this Act, but the same 
 shall be exercised as herein provided.” Section 6 
 reads, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed to in 
 any way impair or affect any duty or liability now 
 imposed by law upon a city.” Section 7 continwes 
 all existing ordinances and regulations not incon- 
 sistent with this act; Section 8 continwes in force 
 the Charter of the city and all special or general 
 laws applicable thereto, not inconsistent with this 
 Act, “until and unless superseded by the passing of 
 ordinances regulating the matters therein provided 
 for”’—i. e., until the exercise of the regulatory 
 power granted by Section 37. 
 
 The powers granted by Section 37 are: 
 
 (1) To confer by ordinance upon any officer or 
 employee of the City any powers, or to impose upon 
 any such officer or employee any duties theretofore 
 conferred or imposed upon any officer or employee 
 by provision of law, i. e., to transfer from one offi- 
 cer or employee to another any powers or duties 
 
26 
 POINT ITI. 
 
 created by existing law, and subject to all provi- 
 sions of existing law; and upon transfer of all the 
 powers of any officer or employee, to abolish his 
 office. 
 
 (2) To regulate by ordigance the exercise of 
 any power and the performance of any duty by any 
 officer or employee of the city. 
 
 These powers are subject: 
 (1) To the provisions of this Act. 
 
 (2) To all general laws applicable to the city 
 and not inconsistent with this act ($8) and espe- 
 cially to the Civil Service Law (§46). 
 
 (3) To all provisions of general or special law 
 regulating the granting of franchises, the lease or 
 sale of city real estate, and the incurring of munici- 
 pal indebtedness ($37). | . 
 
 These provisions do largely increase the power of 
 the council to control the machinery of the city 
 government for exercising the existing powers and 
 performing the existing duties of the city created 
 by existing law but this enlarged control over the 
 machinery of the government is granted without 
 authorizing the council itself to enlarge or add to 
 the city’s powers or to avoid the performance of 
 any duty imposed on the city by law. That the act 
 does not repeal or authorize the repeal of any gen- 
 eral law of the State is further shown elsewhere 
 herein. 
 
 The proposition that authority to regulate the 
 exercise of a power is not equivalent to authority 
 to enlarge a power or add a new power, and the 
 the performance of a duty is not authority to re- 
 proposition that authority to transfer or regulate 
 
bey ¢ 
 Point ITT. 
 
 lieve from the performance of a duty, would 
 seem so plain as not to require the citation of au- 
 thority. The following cases may be of interest as 
 illustrating the rule of construction here contended 
 for: 
 
 People vs. Morris, 18 Wend., 325, held that power 
 granted by the charter of the village of Ogdens- 
 burgh to the village trustees to “regulate and li- 
 cense”’ grocers to Sell liquor to be consumed on the 
 premises was subject to the limitations contained 
 in a State law subsequently passed. 
 
 People ex rel. Presmeyer vs. Commissioners of 
 Police, 59 N. Y., 92, 95, 96, held that an act amend- 
 ing the charter of the City of Brooklyn, which 
 created a board of excise to have the powers and 
 perform the duties of boards of commissioners of 
 excise of the state, under the state law, operated to 
 transfer to other officers the powers and duties 
 created by the state law, but did not change the 
 powers or duties themselves. 
 
 In Matter of Zborowski, 68 N. Y., 88, 94, the 
 Court held that a provision of a special act re- 
 lating to the City of New York authorizing the 
 common council “to regulate * * * the build- 
 ing and repairing of sewers” did not authorize 
 the council to cause sewers to be constructed, but 
 only to regulate the manner of constructing them. 
 See also 
 
 Van Ingen vs. Hudson Realty Co., 106 
 App. Div., 444, 446; 
 
 Gibbs vs. Luther, 158 A. D., 951, affirming, 
 81 Misc., 611; 
 
 City of Geneva vs. Fenwick, 159 A. D., 
 621; — 
 
 Peace vs. McAdoo, 110 A. D., 18, 16. 
 
28 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 The object of the optional city government law 
 was to relieve cities, at their option, from the con- 
 stant necessity of applying to the legislature for 
 changes in the machinery of their local government 
 by empowering the local legislative body to deal 
 with all such matters directly. It substitutes for 
 the hasty and ill-informed action of the legislature 
 on such matters of purely local machinery the judg- 
 ment of the representatives of the people of the 
 city chosen by them for that purpose. The act 
 thus enlarges the control of the city over the de- 
 tails of its own government without changing the 
 substance of any of the powers and duties imposed 
 on the city by law. If there were any doubt as to 
 this interpretation of the statute it should be re- 
 solved in favor of such construction as will uphold 
 its constitutionality. See infra. 
 
 THIRD.—The theory of the courts 
 below that the local administration 
 of matters which are of State inter- 
 est, such as health, police, etc., can- 
 not be delegated to cities denies the 
 essential and established character 
 of cities as governmental subdivi- 
 sions and agencies of the State. 
 
 We believe we are quite within bounds in saying, 
 as we have said above, that the proposition of the 
 Courts below is “revolutionary.” The conception 
 that the functions of local police, fire, health, char- 
 ities and assessments cannot be awarded to local 
 governments is contrary to the whole foundation 
 and evolution of local governments in America. It 
 denies the essential quality of local governments as 
 being governmental in their very nature, and not 
 
29 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 mere private corporations. They are subdivisions 
 of the State, and not outside organizations dealing 
 with it at arms length. They are the State’s agents 
 for the local accomplishment of the State’s objects. 
 To say, as the Courts below have said that any 
 function which is a State object cannot be accom- 
 plished through their agency is to misconceive their 
 political quality altogether and set up a test under 
 which they will become entirely impotent; for what 
 local matter is not a State object? The State is 
 only the sum of the localities which it contains. 
 One of the most direct and forceful statements 
 of this quality of cities as governmental agencies 
 for local administration of matters of state interest 
 (charities, for example) occurs in Maxmilian vs. 
 Mayer, 62 N. Y., 160, 168, infra, as follows: 
 
 “The territorial boundaries of the defendant 
 are taken by the legislature acting as the 
 organ of the sovereign power, and within them 
 is created a department, and constituted a 
 board of chief officers which, within those 
 boundaries, is to have the power to use the 
 public moneys of this political division of the 
 State, for the due discharge of the duty of the 
 State in this locality to the poor, the crazed, 
 the wicked. It is a public duty laid upon the 
 defendant, as a convenient mode of exercising 
 a function of government, that it should, 
 through its chief executive officer, from time 
 to time appoint the chief officers of this de- 
 partment and from time to time supply it with 
 the means of performing its special public 
 duties. These chief officers, though in a sence 
 its officers, as having no power unless after 
 appointment by it, and as mainly confined 
 
30 
 Point ITI. 
 
 within its territorial boundaries, are yet offi- 
 cers of the State government, in the sense that 
 they perform its function within a designated 
 political division of the State. The defendant 
 may not control them, save in strict accord- 
 ance with the provisions of law.” 
 
 From the multitude of other declarations of this 
 Court, which have settled this governmental char- 
 acter of the cities, created as agents of the State, 
 for the very purpose of accomplishing locally these 
 things which are of “State interest,” we invite at- 
 tention to the following: 
 
 People vs. Kerr, 27 N. Y., 188, 214: 
 
 “The power which the municipal govern- 
 ment holds and exercises in controlling and 
 regulating the use of streets of New York has 
 been delegated to it by the state. It is a grant 
 
 ‘of governmental power for local purposes, 
 subject to the control of the supreme power in 
 the state. The legislature may at any time 
 resume the power delegated.” 
 
 Darlington vs. Mayor, 31 N. Y., 164-193 (dealing 
 with the liability of a city for injury done by a 
 mob) : 
 
 “City corporations are emanations of the 
 Supreme law-making power of the state, and 
 they are established for the more convenient 
 government of the people within their limits.” 
 
 People ex rel. City of Rochester vs. Briggs, 50 
 N. Y., 558, 559: 
 
31 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 “A municipal corporation is a part of the 
 governmental machinery of the State, organ- 
 ized not for the purpose of private gain, like 
 private corporations, but for the purpose of ex- 
 ercising certain functions of government, with- 
 in a specified locality; and it possesses such 
 powers, and such only, as are conferred upon 
 it by the legislature; and they are to be exer- 
 cised in such form, mode and manner, and by 
 such agencies as the legislature may from time 
 to time prescribe, within the limits of the con- 
 stitution” (cited with approval People ex rel. 
 Devery vs. Coler, 173 N. Y., 108, 110-1). 
 
 The Court referred, by way of example, to “An 
 Act to reorganize the government of the City of 
 New York, which would involve all its varied gov- 
 ernmental interests, executive, legislative and judi- 
 cial, embracing extensive powers over life, liberty 
 and property, as well as authorizing and regulating 
 public obligations, duties, rights and_ responsi- 
 bilities.” 
 
 In Wells vs. Town of Salina, 119 N. Y., 280-295, 
 the Court cites with approval from the opinion of 
 Bradley, J., in Mayor vs. Ray, 19 Wallace, 468, 
 475: 
 
 “A municipal corporation is a subordinate 
 branch of the domestic government of a state. 
 It is instituted for public purposes only.” 
 
 MacMullen vs. City of Middletown, 187 N. Y., 
 37, 42: 
 
 “These corporations are bodies politic; cre- 
 ated by laws of the state for the purpose of 
 
32 
 Point ILI. 
 
 administering the affairs of the incorporated 
 territory. They exercise powers of govern- 
 ment, which are delegated to them by the leg- 
 islature, and they are subjected to certain 
 duties. They are the auxiliaries, or the con- _ 
 venient instrumentalities, of the general goy- 
 ernment of the state for the purpose of munic- 
 ipalrule. * * * The whole interests are the 
 exclusive domain of the government itself and 
 the power of the legislature over them is su- 
 preme and transcendent; except as restricted 
 by the constitution of the state. Their char- 
 ters being granted for the better government 
 of the particular districts, the right to insert . 
 such provisions as seem to best subserve the 
 public interest would seem from the very na- 
 ture of such institutions, to be inherent.” 
 
 In People ex rel. Williams Engineering and Con- 
 tracting Oo. vs. Metz, 193 N. Y., 148, 162, uphold- 
 ing an eight-hour law for municipal contractors, 
 the Court cited with approval the following from 
 Atkin vs. Kansas, 191 U. 8., 207, 220: 
 
 “Such [municipal] corporations are the 
 creatures, mere political subdivisions of the 
 state for the purpose of exercising a part of 
 its powers. * * * What they lawfully do 
 of a public character is done under the sanc- 
 tion of the state. They are, in every essential 
 sense, only auxiliaries of the state for the pur- 
 poses of local government.” 
 
 Scott vs. Village of Saratoga Springs, 199 N. Y., 
 178, 181, 182, reiterates the holding in MacMullen 
 vs. Oity of Middletown, supra, that 
 
54 
 Point ITI. 
 
 “A municipal corporation is a political, or 
 governmental, agency of the state, which has 
 been constituted for the local government of 
 the territorial division described and which 
 exercises, by delegation, a portion of the sov- 
 ereign power for the public good.” 
 
 People ex rel. Hon Yost vs. Becker, 203 N. Y., 
 201, 205, 206, held that inasmuch as the Constitu- 
 tion constitutes the counties, cities, towns and vil- 
 lages of the State, the organs of government, the 
 Legislature was without power to create other po- 
 litical divisions. The Court, speaking of the at- 
 tributes of a municipal corporation such as was at- 
 tempted to be created, said: 
 
 “It was a body politic and corporate, and, 
 as such, the local recipient of administrative 
 and judicial functions to be used as a part of 
 the state government for the public good, by 
 the exercise of which it became a participant 
 in the government of the state.” 
 
 The Court cites Barnes vs. District of Columbia, ° 
 91 U. S., 540, 544, where the Court said: 
 
 “A municipal corporation, in the exercise of 
 all of its duties, including those most strictly 
 local or internal, is but a department of the 
 state. The legislature may give it all the 
 powers such a being is capable of receiving, 
 making it a miniature state within its local- 
 ity. Again, it may strip it of every power, 
 leaving it a corporation in name only; and it 
 may create and recreate these changes as often 
 as it chooses, or it may itself exercise directly 
 within the locality any or all the powers usu- 
 
34 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 ally committed to a municipality. We do not 
 regard its acts as sometimes those of an agency 
 of the state and at others those of @ munci- 
 pality; but that, its character and nature re- 
 maming at all times the same, it is great or 
 small according as the legislature shall ea- 
 tend. or contract the sphere of its action.” 
 
 Harris vs. ‘People, 59-N. Y., 599, 601, holding 
 that provisions creating a city court for Long 
 Island City were within the title of an act to revise 
 the charter of the city. 
 
 “We think it plain that an act creating a 
 municipality, and giving to~it the necessary 
 legislative, taxing, judicial and police powers, 
 embraces but one subject. Every municipality, 
 to be of benefit to its citizens and to be efficient 
 in its action, must have such powers to greater 
 or less extent. Any act which sets out to erect 
 a municipality must give to it these powers, 
 or it is passed in vain. It follows, then, that 
 the separate provisions of the act defining and 
 granting these powers are but parts of a whole, 
 and essential to make a whole.” 
 
 In Fowle vs. Common Council of Alexandria, 3 
 Pet., 398, 409, Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the 
 City of Alexandria as “a municipal corporation, 
 established for the general purposes of government, 
 with limited legislative powers,” and as “a legis- 
 lative corporation, established as a part of the gov- 
 ernment of the country.” 
 
 Of course it has long been thoroughly settled 
 that the grant to municipalities of power to con- 
 trol their own local affairs, falls entirely outside 
 
35 
 
 PoINntT ITI. 
 
 of the principle that the legislative power cannot 
 be delegated. 
 
 Clarke vs. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y., 
 605, 634; 
 
 Village of Saratoga Springs vs. Saratoga 
 pruaeoe leis da 2) Co. AgioaN wy... 123, 
 138; 
 
 Stanton vs. Board of Supervisors, 191 N. 
 Y., 428, 434, 435. 
 
 FOURTH.—The proposition of the 
 Court below is contrary to the estab- 
 lished principle of recognizing and 
 encouraging local home rule. 
 
 In the next branch of this Point, we collect 
 many authorities supporting Legislative grants of 
 local control over the very subject matters dis- 
 cussed by the Court below, but here we wish to 
 point out that the Court’s opinion holding that no 
 functions in which the State “has an interest,” 
 including even police and health, can be delegated 
 to the local governments, collides head-on with 
 the whole principle of local home rule, which has 
 been a characteristic feature of American munici- 
 pal government from the beginning. In effect the 
 Courts below have held that the Legislature is 
 forbidden by the Constitution even to permit home 
 rule. One would have thought this Court had ex- 
 pressed itself often enough and with sufficient 
 clearness on this point. 
 
 Indeed there is much more ground for holding 
 that the Legislature cannot refuse home rule. This 
 is the purpose of the express “home rule” provi- 
 sion of the Constitution (Article 10, Sec. 2) which 
 requires local selection of all local officers. 
 
36 
 Pornt ITT. 
 
 For example, an effort of the Legislature to take 
 away the local power of appointment of local 
 police officers was held unconstitutional in People 
 ex rel. Bolton vs. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 56, 57, 
 where the Court said: 
 
 “The purpose and object of Section 2 of 
 Article 10 of the Constitution, as is very ob- 
 vious, was to secure to the several recognized 
 civil and political divisions of the state the 
 right of local self-government, by requiring 
 that all county, city, town and village officers 
 * * * should be elected by the electors of the 
 respective municipalities, or appointed by such 
 authorities thereof as the Legislature should 
 designate ~*~ * * , 
 
 This right of self-government lies at the 
 foundation of our institutions, and cannot be 
 disturbed or interfered with, even in respect 
 to the smallest of the divisions into which the 
 State is divided for governmental purposes; 
 without weakening the entire foundation; and 
 hence it is a right not only to be carefully 
 guarded by every department of the govern- 
 ment, but every infraction or evasion of it to 
 be promptly met and condemmed; especially 
 by the Courts, when such acts become the sub- 
 ject of judicial investigation.” 
 
 In this case the Court adopted the reasoning of 
 the dissenting opinion of Brown, J., in People vs.: 
 Draper, 15 N. Y., 682, in which the historic prin- 
 ciple of home rule is expounded. 
 
 Rathbone vs. Wirth, 150 N. Y., 459, was another 
 case holding a Legislative act wnconstitutional be- 
 ‘cause it provided for appointment of police com- 
 
SE 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 missioners by other than local authority; and in 
 this case this Court pointed out the general princi- 
 ple of home rule as follows: 
 
 “Tt is, of course, evident that the provision 
 authorizes the Legislature to confer the power 
 of appointment upon any local authority; but 
 that the power, which is to be thus conferred, 
 may be qualified, or hampered in its exercise 
 by the Legislature, is not only not evident, 
 but such a proposition, in my _ opinion, 
 threatens what we are bound to regard as a 
 cardinal principle of our form of government. 
 I refer to the right of local self-government, a 
 right which inheres in a republican govern- 
 ment and with reference to which our con- 
 stitution was framed. 
 
 “The habit of local self government is some- 
 thing which we took over, or rather, continued 
 from the English system of government and, 
 as Judge Cooley has remarked with reference 
 to the constitutions of the states, “if not ex- 
 pressly recognized, it is still to be understood 
 that all these instruments are framed with its 
 present existence and undisputed continuance 
 in view.’ It means that in the local, or 
 political, subdivisions of the state, the people 
 of the locality shall administer their own local 
 affairs, to the extent that that right is not 
 restricted by some constitutional provision” 
 (opinion of Gray, J., page 467). 
 
 And at page 487, O’Brien, J., reaffirmed the 
 ruling in the Albertson case, supra, that the pro- 
 vision in question 
 
38 
 Pornt III. 
 
 “was designed to protect and give force and 
 effect to the principle of local self-government 
 which has always been regarded as funda- 
 mental in our political institutions, and to be. 
 the very essence of every republican form of 
 government. The local government, even in 
 the smallest division of the state, is the pre- 
 paratory school in which the citizen acquires 
 the rudiments of self-government, and hence 
 these institutions have been justly regarded as 
 the nurseries of civil liberty.” 
 
 In the opinion below (6 A. D., 277, 290-297) 
 which was also expressly approved by the opinion 
 of this Court (page 466, see also Scott vs. Saratoga 
 Springs, 199. N. Y., 178, 18), the general con- 
 stitutional policy of home rule was forcefully 
 stated as follows: 
 
 “The future success or failure of our present 
 form of government will depend largely upon 
 the capacity of the inhabitants of cities for self- 
 government. * * * Any departure from the 
 principles of local self-government for the pur- 
 pose of remedying temporarily, real or fancied 
 grievances or evils, is both a confession of in-- 
 capacity on the part of the people to govern - 
 themselves, and a means of creating such in- 
 capacity, and is sure, sooner or later, to cause 
 greater evils than those sought to be remedied 
 by such departure.” 
 
 And in the same case the Court below adopted 
 the following statement from Black’s Constitu- 
 tional Law: 
 
39 
 Point IIT. 
 
 “The continued and permanent existence of 
 local government is, therefore, assumed in all 
 the state constitutions, and is a matter of 
 constitutional right, even when not in terms 
 expressly provided for. It would not be com- 
 petent to dispense with it by statute.” 6 
 App. Div., 277, 290. 
 
 We submit that the decision below that the Legis- 
 lature, because of some supposed implied prohibi- 
 tion, cannot grant home rule on the subject of police 
 is directly in the teeth of these decisions of this 
 Court under Article X, section 2 of the Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 The spirit of the Constitution as supporting, 
 rather than controverting, home rule is further 
 illustrated by the express provisions which prohibit 
 legislative interference with the municipal proper- 
 ty, and the passage of special laws without the con- 
 sent of the Mayor of the City Council. 
 
 In the following cases, these express clauses have 
 been discussed by this Court in a way which seems 
 to us to throw light on the general question. 
 
 In People ex rel. R. R. Co. vs. Batchellor, 53 N. 
 Y., 128, the Court held void a mandatory act com- 
 pelling a town to subscribe for stock in a railroad, 
 on the ground that the legislature could no more 
 require the town to enter into a private contract 
 than it could an individual; and in Brownell vs. 
 Town of Greenwich, 114 N. Y., 518, 532, the rail- 
 road aid act of 1869, authorizing towns, upon a tax- 
 payers’ vote, to bond themselves in aid of railroads, 
 was upheld, distinguishing the Batchellor case, on 
 the ground that what the legislature could not 
 compel a municipal corporation to do, it could em- 
 power it to do at its discretion. 
 
40 
 Point ITI. 
 
 In People ex rel. Rodgers vs. Coler, 166 N. Y., 
 1, 12, 13, 19, 20, the court held invalid an act re- 
 quiring the city to withhold payments from con- 
 tractors unless the latter paid the prevailing rate 
 of wages, on the ground, among others, that it re- 
 quired the expenditure of city moneys for other 
 than a city purpose. The Court said: 
 
 “The city exists under its ancient charters 
 as modified or enlarged by modern enactments 
 for the purpose of local self government. 
 While the rights and powers so conferred upon 
 the city are subject to change or modification 
 by the supreme power of the state they cannot 
 be wholly destroyed. It is not true that the 
 internal affairs of cities in this state are abso- 
 lutely subject to the will of the legislature. 
 The constitution recognizes their existence as 
 political and corporate bodies and has im- 
 posed various restrictions upon the powers of 
 the legislature to interfere in matters of local 
 government. It is without power to appoint 
 city officers, though it may provide for their 
 election by the local electors, or their appoint- 
 ment by some local authority. It cannot dis- 
 pose of the property of the muncipality, nor 
 disburse its revenues, however acquired, for 
 any purpose not pertaining to local admin- 
 istration or local government. 
 
 “The recent amendment to the constitution, 
 which confers upon the mayor in the larger 
 cities and the mayor and governing body in 
 the others the right to interpose what may be 
 called a qualified veto upon acts of the state 
 legislature relating to their local affairs, plain- 
 ly implies that cities possess a certain kind of 
 
 ~ 
 
41 
 Point ITI. 
 
 political autonomy which, however limited, 
 the legislature may not invade or destroy at 
 pleasure. (1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., §$71-74.) 
 It may regulate but cannot destroy powers 
 recognized by the Constitution as inherent in 
 the cities of the state.” 
 
 “The compulsory authority of the legisla- 
 ture over municipal corporations in regard to 
 matters of general concern and duties which 
 the people of the several localities owe to the 
 state at large is not questioned. Legislative 
 control in matters political and governmental 
 is complete. But while such corporations are 
 made use of in state governments, and in that 
 character subject to state control, they have 
 other objects and purposes peculiarly local, in 
 which the state at large, except in conferring 
 the power and regulating its exercise, is legal- 
 ly no more concerned than it is in the indi- 
 vidual and private concerns of its several citi- 
 zens, and it is from the standpoint not of state 
 interest but of local interest that the necessity 
 of incorporating cities and villages most. dis- 
 stinctly appears. With respect to property 
 and contract rights of exclusively local con- 
 cern, the state has no right to mterfere and 
 control by compulsory legislation the action 
 of municipal corporations.” 
 
 The care with which these safeguards have been 
 imposed against legislative interference with home 
 rule is a most persuasive evidence that the Consti- 
 tution never intended to prohibit the legislature 
 from permitting home rule in other respects; and 
 so this Court itself explained the purpose of Article 
 X, section 2, as follows, in People ex rel. Metro- 
 
42 
 Point ITI. 
 
 politan Street Railway Co. vs. Tax Commissioners, 
 174 N. Y., 417, 484, 435: 
 
 “These and other commands of the different 
 constitutions, when read in the light of prior 
 and contemporaneous history, show that the 
 object of the people in enacting them was to 
 prevent centralization of power in the state 
 and to continue, preserve and expand local 
 self-government. * * * The legislature has 
 the power to regulate, increase or diminish 
 the duties of the local officer, but it has been 
 steadfastly held that this power is subject to 
 the limitation that no essential or exclusive 
 function belonging to the office can be trans- 
 ferred to an officer appointed by central au- 
 thority. * * * It is interference, whether di- 
 rect or indirect, with the vital, intrinsic and 
 inseparable functions of the office as thus de- 
 fined and understood that the constitution 
 prohibits.” 
 
 In this connection, we also invite the attention 
 of the Court to the following other cases in which 
 principle of home rule has been recognized, not as 
 hostile to the Constitution, as the court below has 
 held, but as in accord with it and a policy to be 
 encouraged. 
 
 People vs. Morris, 18 Wend., 324-334, adopting 
 the statement from Cuddon vs. Eastwick, 1 Salk. 
 193, ‘a public corporation is also defined to be ‘an 
 investment of the people of a place with the local 
 government thereof.’ This latter description is the 
 most appropriate, and is justified by the history 
 of these institutions, and the nature of the powers 
 with which they were and are invested.” 
 
43 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 In Mills vs. Sweeney, 219 N. Y., 213, Pound, J., 
 Says at page 221, “The legislative policy favors full 
 power to cities in their local affairs.” 
 
 In Barhite vs. Home Telephone Company, 50 
 A. D., 25, 28, 29, the court approved the grant of 
 legislative authority as found in the Charter of 
 the City of Rochester “because that delegation is 
 deemed wise and practical on the assumption that 
 the citizens of the municipality and its officers can 
 better legislate for its inhabitants than the State 
 Legislature. It is in furtherance of home rule, and 
 is a normal product of the principle of self- 
 government.” 
 
 People ex rel. Lavier vs. Hessler, 152 A. D., 
 839, 842 (Fourth Department) : 
 
 “The trend of modern legislation is toward 
 vesting in each municipality the management 
 of its local affairs. Responsibility can then 
 be brought home to the body charged with the 
 performance of any specific duty, and the mem- 
 bers will probably be known to the people of 
 the city.” 
 
 This right of local self-government does not rise 
 from or depend upon any express grant of power in 
 the constitution, analogous to the power granted 
 to confer upon boards of supervisors of counties 
 powers of local legislation and administration, but 
 antedates the constitution and is implied in its 
 terms. Bank of Chenango vs. Brown, 26 N. Y., 
 467, 469, 470. 
 
 This was well expressed in Village of Carthage 
 vs. Frederick, 122 N. Y., 268, 273, discussing this 
 general subject with especial reference to the police 
 power: 
 
44 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 “It is made the duty of the legislature by the 
 Constitution now in force, to provide for the 
 organization of cities and villages, but, as a 
 recent writer has said: “The right of the legis- 
 lature, in the entire absence of authorization 
 or prohibition, to create towns and other in- 
 ferior municipal organizations and to confer 
 upon them the powers of local government, and 
 especially of local taxation and police regula- 
 tion usual with such corporations, would al- 
 ways pass unchallenged.’ (Cooley on Const. 
 Lim. [5th ed.], 228). During the early history 
 of the state, when the constitution was silent 
 upon the subject, cities and villages were in- 
 corporated by the legislature, and extensive 
 powers of local legislation were conferred up- 
 on them, including the right to pass by-laws or 
 ordinances, to inflict fines and penalties for 
 their violation and to collect the same through 
 the courts. (Laws of 1785, chap. 83; Laws of 
 1790, chap. 49; Laws of 1794, chap. 36.) As 
 early as 1785, by the charter of the city of 
 Hudson, the right to legislate in regard to the 
 ‘police’ power was expressly conferred. (Laws 
 of 1785, chap. 83, Sec. 11.) This power was 
 then well known to the common law, and, 
 twenty years before, had been defined by Black- 
 stone as ‘the due regulation and domestic 
 order of the Kingdom, whereby the individuals 
 of the state, like members of a well-governed 
 family, are bound to conform their general 
 behavior to the rules of propriety, good neigh- 
 borhood and good manners and to be decent, 
 industrious and inoffensive in their respec- 
 tive stations’ (4 Black. Comm., 162). Munici- 
 pal corporations have exercised this power, eo 
 
45 
 Pornt ITT. 
 
 nomine, for time out of mind, by making 
 regulations to preserve order, to promote free- 
 dom of communication and to facilitate the 
 transaction of business in crowded communi- 
 ties. Compensation has never been a condition 
 of its exercise, even when attended with in- 
 convenience or pecuniary loss, as each member 
 of a community is presumed to be benefited by 
 that which promotes the general welfare. All 
 authorities agree that the Constitution. pre- 
 supposes the existence of the police power and 
 is to be construed with reference to that fact. 
 (2 Hare’s Am. Const. Law, 766; Anderson’s 
 .Law Dict. title ‘Police.’)” 
 
 People ex rel. Met. St. Rlwy. Co. vs. Board of 
 Tax. Commrs., 174 N. Y., 417, 431, 484—+treats of 
 the history of the principle, as do also 
 
 People ex rel. Hon Yost vs. Becker, 203 N. Y., 
 201, 205 ff., and 
 
 People ex rel. Town of Pelham vs. Village of 
 Pelham, 215 N. Y., 874, 380 ff. 
 
 FIFTH.—The specific, precise func- 
 tions held by the courts below to be 
 not susceptible of local control (i. e., 
 assessments, public safety, health, 
 charity, and plumbers’ licenses) 
 have been held by this Court to be 
 valid subjects for such local control. 
 
 In view of the above basic principles which 
 establish the error of the Courts below, and in 
 view of the uniform history of the State, it seems 
 hardly necessary to argue the precise proposition 
 that cities can constitutionally be allowed to con- 
 
46 
 Point IIL. 
 
 trol local assessments, police, health, charity and 
 plumbers, but this is what has been actually 
 held by the courts below, and we therefore, will col- 
 lect some of the cases dealing directly with pre- 
 cisely such delegations. 
 
 Of course, we do not contest the proposition, that 
 these subjects are matters of state interest. That 
 is perfectly clear and thoroughly settled. What 
 we do contest is the proposition that their local 
 administration cannot be left to the cities. We 
 should have thought the contrary so overwhelm- 
 ingly established that no one would have disputed 
 it. 
 
 As to the functions of the assessors. 
 
 The power to delegate these functions has been 
 upheld in the following cases: 
 
 Clarke vs. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605, 634, 
 upheld an act authorizing, subject to referendum, 
 the City of Rochester to subscribe for railroad 
 stock, to issue bonds therefor and to raise, by taxa- 
 tion, the money to pay the interest on the bonds. 
 The Court says that the section of the constitution 
 which makes it the duty of the legislature to pro- 
 vide for the organization of cities and to restrict 
 their power of taxation, etc., 
 
 “contains an irresistible implication that the 
 authority to lay local taxes and to borrow 
 money for local objects may be constitutionally 
 committed to local boards or councils within 
 the cities or villages. * * * I do not say 
 that it can be submitted to the electors of a 
 
47 
 Point ITI. 
 
 city or village to determine what powers its 
 local legislature shall possess, but only that 
 these bodies shall be made the depositories of 
 such powers of local government as the legis- 
 lature shall see fit to prescribe, and the ex- 
 ercise of which is not repugnant to any of the 
 general arrangements of the constitution.” 
 
 People vs. Raymond, 37 N. Y., 428, 480, holds 
 that the office of commissioner of taxes in the City 
 of New York is a local office, which cannot consti 
 tutionally be filled by appointment by the Governor, 
 notwithstanding their function was to assess prop- 
 erty for taxation for state as well as local purposes. 
 
 Matter of Zborowski, 68 N. Y., 88, 96, 97, in- 
 volved the question what officials in the City of 
 New York had authority to cause sewers to be con- 
 structed and the power of the legislature to delegate 
 that power, together with the concomitant power 
 to levy assessments, was challenged on the ground 
 that it involved a delegation of the power to tax. 
 The Court held: 
 
 “It is contended that the power to tax may 
 not lawfully be delegated by the legislature. 
 This we do not concede in that broad state- 
 ment. The legislature may delegate to a muni- 
 cipality the power to tax for the expenses of 
 the local government, and the power to assess 
 for the expenses of local improvements. All 
 the powers of local government are delegated. 
 In the case at hand, the power of assessment 
 is delegated to the corporate body, the mayor, 
 alderman and commonalty of the City of New 
 York, and it may lawfully be exercised through 
 the officers of the corporation, if the terms of 
 
48 
 PoInt ITI. 
 
 the legislature delegation so provides. The 
 whole system of government of the North 
 American States is upon this principle. All 
 through the political arrangement of counties, 
 cities, towns and villages, and even school dis- 
 tricts, local affairs, including the power of 
 taxation, are put into the hands of local 
 officers, some of whom, as a single officer, or as 
 boards of officers, determine upon and author- 
 ize that which in the end brings upon the own- 
 ers of property the burden of taxation; and 
 others of whom, singly or as boards, fix the 
 amount of that burden which will be laid up- 
 on each owner.” 
 
 Genet vs. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y., 296, 307, 
 upheld the power of the legislature to delegate 
 to the commissioners of Prospect Park, Brooklyn, 
 power to fix an area of assessment and to impose 
 the cost of widening certain streets within that 
 area. The Court said: 
 
 “The legislature may itself fix a district of 
 assessment, or the power may be delegated by 
 the supreme legislative body to the authorities 
 of subordinate political and municipal di- 
 visions, or other official agencies, as may also 
 the incidents of the power, such as the appor- 
 tionment and distribution of the tax, as be- 
 tween the persons and property upon which 
 it is laid. The learned counsel for the inter- 
 venors is compelled to admit that the legisla- 
 ture may distribute the burden of public im- 
 provements on its own notions of policy, its 
 own sense of justice, and.its own assumptions 
 of benefit.” 
 
49 
 Point ITI. 
 
 Terrell vs. Wheeler, 123 N. Y., 76, 82, 838, up- 
 held the power of the legislature to delegate to 
 the board of assessors of the City of Brooklyn dis- 
 cretionary power to reduce taxes or assessments 
 in arrears: 
 
 “Could the legislature devolve upon the 
 board of assessors the jurisdiction specified in 
 the section? Why not? It was a local board 
 —one of the departments of the city govern- 
 ment charged by the city charter with the gen- 
 eral duty of making assessments for the pur- 
 pose of taxation. Its members represented the 
 city and the people of the locality, and it was 
 the appropriate tribunal for the exercise of the 
 jurisdiction conferred. * * * 
 
 It was not necessary for the legislature to 
 fix the amount of the impositions. Such legis- 
 lation is not unusual in principle.” 
 
 Followed Lamb vs. Connolly, 122 N. Y:, 
 531, 535. 
 
 People ex rel. Town of Pelham vs. Village of 
 Pelham, 215 N. Y., 374, held invalid an act trans- 
 ferring the powers of village assessors to town 
 ASSESSOTS. 
 
 2. 
 As to the functions of Public Safety. 
 
 In People ex rel. Bolten vs. Albertson, 55 N. Y., 
 50 the Court went to the extent of holding the 
 Rensselaer police district act unconstitutional, be- 
 cause it attempted to deprive the people of Troy of 
 the control of their own police. 
 
50 
 
 Point ITI. 
 
 The earlier case of People vs. Draper had upheld 
 the Metropolitan Police District Act solely on the 
 ground that its operation extended beyond the ter- 
 ritorial limits of the city: 
 
 “All these officials were, I have no doubt, 
 public officers; and they were, moreover, city 
 officers within the meaning of the constitution. 
 The superintendent. of police, captains, ser- 
 geants and patrolmen, mentioned in the metro- 
 politan police bill, are officials of the same 
 character, possessing substantially the same 
 powers and authorized to exercise the same 
 functions as those heretofore existing under 
 somewhat different names; and if appointed 
 for the City of New York, unconnected with 
 the other territory annexed to-it by this act, 
 they should have been elected by the electors 
 of the city, or of some division of it, or ap- 
 pointed by some authority of the city. The 
 police commissioners, assuming that they were 
 themselves constitutionally appointed, cannot 
 be regarded as authorities of the city within 
 meaning of the constitution. Hence it follows 
 that if the provisions of the statute had been 
 limited territorially to the City of New York, 
 it would have been in conflict with the section 
 of the constitution so often referred to.” 
 
 People ex rel. Dunn vs. Ham, 166 N. Y., 477, 480, 
 481, sustained a city ordinance abolishing the 
 statutory position of station house keeper in the 
 police force of the City of Albany, under a statutory 
 delegation of power substantially as broad as the 
 one here involved. 
 
51 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 People ex rel. Devery vs. Coler, 173 N. Y., 103 
 107, held that the provisions for the reorganization 
 of the police force of the City of New York came 
 within the title of the Greater New York Charter 
 because coming under the “single subject, the gov- 
 ernment of the City of New York.” 
 
 People ex rel. Werner vs. Prendergast, 206 N. Y., 
 405, 409: 
 
 “The police department and the department 
 of education and health in any city are en- 
 gaged in the discharge of duties which very vi- 
 tally affect the general public, and yet it 
 would be opposed to widespread and well set- 
 tled opinion to hold that the members of such 
 departments are state officials in the sense of 
 being engaged in its service.” 
 
 oe 
 As to the Health Functions. 
 
 Though unquestionably a State function, dele- 
 gation of local powers to local officials is held with- 
 in the powers of the Legislature. 
 
 Metropolitan Board of Health vs. Heister, 37 N. 
 Y., 661, 666, 670, upheld the Metropolitan sanitary 
 district act on the authority of the Draper case: 
 
 “As early as 1796, and by repeated statutes, 
 from that time down to the adoption of the 
 Revised Statutes, in 1830, the duty of attend- 
 ing to the health of the city, to cases of infec- 
 tious diseases, to vessels from unhealthy ports, 
 to establishing and regulating slaughter- 
 houses, has been given to, and exercised by, the 
 
a 
 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 mayor of the City of New York, the mayor, 
 aldermen and commonalty thereof, commis- 
 Sioners of health, health wardens for the city, 
 or some other local officers of that city (3 
 Greenl. ed. Laws, ch. 38, page 305; 1 R. L, 
 1813; Laws 1850, ch. 275). 
 
 If the act of 1866 (ch. 74), which we are con- 
 sidering, was an act for the regulation of these 
 subjects, in the city and county of New York 
 alone, it would be difficult to sustain it, under 
 the decisions of this Court. 
 
 * * *% % % * *% * 
 
 Scarcely a year passes, or did pass prior to 
 1846, in which the legislature did not charter 
 some city or village, and give to the local 
 powers, full authority, by their own action and 
 in their own way, to regulate, abate or remove 
 all trades or manufactures that might be by 
 them deemed injurious to the public health. 
 I have examined the statutes from 1832 on- 
 ward, and find that scarcely a year passed by 
 in which these powers were not given to many 
 cities or villages by original authority or by 
 amendments to their charters.” 
 
 Followed Health Department vs. Knoll, 70 N. Y., 
 
 530, 536, upholding an ordinance of the Board of 
 Health of the City of New York under the city 
 charter of 1878, which transferred to it the powers 
 formerly vested in the Metropolitan Board of 
 Health. 
 
 Polinsky vs. People, 73 N. Y., 65, 69, 70, upheld 
 
 an ordinance prohibiting the sale of adulterated 
 milk: 
 
 “That the legislature in the exercise of its 
 constitutional authority may lawfully confer 
 
53 
 Pornt III. 
 
 on boards of health the power to enact sanitary 
 ordinances, having the force of law within the 
 districts over which their jurisdiction extends, 
 is not an open question. This power has been 
 repeatedly recognized and confirmed.” 
 
 Followed People ex rel. Lieberman vs. Vandecarr, 
 175 N. Y., 440, 444, upholding an ordinance for- 
 bidding the sale of milk without a permit. 
 
 People ex rel. Bush vs. Houghton, 182 N. Y., 301, 
 306, 307, holding unconstitutional an act author- 
 izing the county judge to fill vacancies in the Board 
 of Health of the City of Oswego: 
 
 “They are subserving the general public in- 
 terest in promoting and maintaining sanitary 
 conditions in the locality; but they, equally, 
 execute a corporate purpose of the municipal 
 government; which, if it is not to be implied, 
 is actually made a part of its charter by the 
 laws. They are to be appointed under the 
 statute, primarily, by the governing municipal 
 authorities and the performance of their duties 
 is confined territorially to the city. It seems 
 to me that the situation was such as the Peo- 
 ple intended to be met, when establishing in 
 the fundamental law of the state the principle 
 of ‘home rule’ for its political subdivisions. 
 The appointment of the complainants by the 
 county judge of the county was, of course, not 
 an appointment by a municipal authority and 
 it cannot be justified, unless the appointees 
 are to be regarded as public officers, whose 
 offices constitute no part of the city govern- 
 ment. That they can be so viewed and that 
 their appointment could validly be shifted 
 
54 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 from the mayor and common council of the 
 city, in the event of unfilled vacancies in. the 
 board, upon a county officer I do not believe. 
 Whatever doubt there might be with respect 
 to a member of the board of health of the city 
 being a city officer ought to disappear, when 
 we notice the provisions of the charter of the 
 city. 
 * * * 4 *% % *% % w 
 If a member of the board of health could not 
 be regarded elsewhere in the state as a city 
 officer, the legislature, which enacted the Pub- 
 lic Health Law, under which his office is ere- 
 ated, has, certainly, made him a city officer in 
 the city of Oswego.” 
 
 (And see People ex rel. Werner vs. Prendergast, 
 206 N. Y., 405, 409, supra. ) 
 
 Crayton vs. Larabee, 220 N. Y., 493, 502, sustain- 
 ing the acts of a health officer authorized by ordi- 
 nance adopted by the City of Syracuse under the 
 power delegated by the Second Class Cities Law: 
 
 “Among all the objects to be secured by goy- 
 ernmental Jaws none is more important than 
 the preservation of the public health. As a 
 potent aid to its achievement the state creates 
 or authorizes the creation of local boards of 
 health or health officers. * * * The powers 
 in fact conferred upon them by the legislature 
 or by virtue of legislative authority, in view of 
 the great public interest entrusted to them, 
 have always received from the courts a liberal 
 construction.” 
 
55 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 Matter of Board of Health, 43 App. Div., 236, 
 heid that a member of a village board of health is 
 a village officer, whose oath of office must be filed 
 with the village clerk: 
 
 “While a board of health enforces state 
 laws, it does so only within the political sub- 
 division of the state for which it is appointed.” 
 
 Followed Matter of Towne vs. Porter, 128 App. 
 Diy., 717, 721, holding unconstitutional an act em- 
 powering the state commissioner of health to ap- 
 point the health officer of a village on nomination 
 of the local board of health. 
 
 Hellyer vs. Prendergast, 176 App. Div., 383 up- 
 held a local ordinance prescribing qualifications 
 for employees under the board of health. 
 
 The foregoing authorities hold also that the reg- 
 wlation of health is a matter generally speaking of 
 state concern. On the relation between the state 
 power and the power delegated to municipalities, 
 the recent decision in People ex rel. Knoblauch vs. 
 Warden, 216 N. Y., 154, 157, 160, 161, is especially 
 pertinent. It holds that a delegation of power to 
 a city to regulate matters of state concern must be 
 considered as being subject and subordinate to the 
 general laws of the State on the subject so that a 
 regulation of the city board of health within its 
 statutory power takes precedence over a_ local 
 ordinance on the same subject. In other words, 
 the Court upholds the very rule of construction for 
 which we are here contending: 
 
 “A statement of the sections of the charter, 
 necessarily brief and epitomized, enforce two 
 conclusions; the one, that the legislature em- 
 
56 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 powered the board of health to enact and en- 
 force regulations and ordinances, in order that 
 the public health and comfort should be pro- 
 tected and promoted, in relation to very many 
 subjects and matters over which the board of 
 aldermen or other municipal body are given by 
 the charter regulative power and control; the 
 other, that the lawful regulations, ordinances 
 and orders of the board of health are superior 
 and paramount. 
 * * * % * * * 
 The legislature did not intend or contem- 
 plate a conflicting authority or administration. 
 Authority to the board of aldermen to con- 
 struct, maintain or regulate in a certain re- 
 spect or matter was not intended to and did 
 not bar the board of health from interfering 
 with or exercising its power as the authorized 
 conservator of the public health in regard to 
 i 
 
 4. 
 
 As to the function of charities: 
 
 Maamilian vs. Mayor, 62 N. Y., 160, 168, held 
 the City of New York not liable for the negligence 
 of an ambulance driver employed by the commis- 
 sioners of charities and corrections appointed by 
 the mayor, because, while being local-officers, they 
 were exercising government functions. The pas- 
 sage of the opinion in which the Court discusses 
 fully the power of the Legislature to entrust the 
 governmental interest of our local charities to the 
 local authorities is quoted in full swpra, at page 
 
 29. 
 
57 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 5. 
 
 As to the function of examining plumbers. 
 
 People ex rel. Nechamcus vs. Warden, 144 N. Y., 
 529, sustaining act establishing examining board of 
 plumbers in cities. 
 
 People ex rel. Lavier vs. Hessler, 152 App. Div., 
 839. 842 (Fourth Department), holding that a 
 plumber must be licensed by the local examining 
 board and that a certificate of the board of another 
 city is not sufficient. 
 
 “The trend of modern legislation is toward 
 vesting in each municipality the management 
 of its local affairs. Responsibility can then be 
 brought home to the body charged with the 
 performance of any specific duty, and the mem- 
 bers will probably be known to the people of 
 the city. The endowment of an examining 
 board of a city with the authority and duty to 
 determine as to the competency of one seeking 
 to act as employing or master plumber is an 
 advanced instance of this tendency of our Leg- 
 islature and the legality of the act has been 
 sustained.” 
 
 See, also, as to licensing other occupations: (City 
 of Brooklyn vs. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591; People ex 
 rel. Larrabee vs. Mulholland, 82 N. Y., 324, 326; 
 Village of Stamford vs. Fisher, 140 N. Y., 187. 
 
 The above cases are cited here because they up- 
 hold explicitly the power to delegate to local au- 
 thority to control the local administration of the 
 precise functions which have been held below not 
 capable of such delegation. 
 
58 
 PoInt ITI. 
 
 We refrain from burdening the Court with dis- 
 cussion of a great multitude of cases to the same 
 effect, but relating to other particular functions of 
 similar “State interest,” and content ourselves with 
 a mere reference to some of the decisions dealing 
 with the following subjects: 
 
 Elections—( People ex rel. Werner vs. Prender- 
 gast, 206 N. Y., 405, 408-11). 
 
 Streets— (Village of Carthage vs. Frederick, 122 
 N. Y., 268; People ex rel. Collins vs. Ahearn, 193 
 N. Y., 441; City of Buffalo vs. Stevenson, 207 N. Y., 
 258, 263; McCabe vs. City of New York, 213 N. Y., 
 468, 484; Appleton vs. City of New York, 219 N. Y., 
 150, 168). 
 
 Franchises— (Matter of Gilbert Elevated Rail- 
 way Co., 70 N. Y., 861, 374, 875; Kittinger vs. Buf- 
 falo Traction Co., 160 N. Y., 377, 392; Wilhs vs. 
 City of Rochester, 219 N. Y., 427, 483, 434). 
 
 Excise—( Village of Gloversville vs. Howell, 70 
 N. Y., 287, 290, 291; People ex rel. Haughton vs. 
 Andrews, 104 N. Y., 570. 
 
 Administration of Justice—(Devoy vs. Mayor, 
 36 N. Y., 449, 450; People ex rel. Fowler & Bull, 46 
 N. Y., 57; Harris vs. People, 59 N. Y., 599, 601; 
 People ex rel. Taylor vs. Dunlap, 66 N. Y., 162, 167, 
 168). 
 
 General Police Power—( Presbyterian Church vs. 
 Mayor, 5 Cow., 538, 540; Mayor vs. Williams, 15 
 N. Y., 502, 504, 505; People ex rel. Bolton vs. Al- 
 bertson, 55 N. Y., 50, 68; Village of Carthage vs. 
 Frederick, 122 N. Y., 268, 274; Oity of Rochester 
 vs. West, 164 N. Y., 510, 513, 514; Fifth Ave. Coach 
 Co. vs. City of New York, 194 N. Y., 19, 29; City of 
 Rochester vs. Macauley-Fien M .Co., 199 N. Y., 
 207, 210, 211; People vs. Kaye, 212 N. Y., 407, 
 416). 
 
 
 
 = 
 
59 
 Point ITI. 
 
 SIXTH.—To what extent control 
 over the exercise within their re- 
 spective localities of these important 
 State functions or of any other mat- 
 ter in which the city acts as agent 
 for the State shall be delegated to 
 cities, rests entirely in the discretion 
 of the Legislature, and that discre- 
 tion cannot be reviewed by the 
 courts. 
 
 As we state in Point II. of this brief, it seems 
 to us that the real issue between the Courts below 
 and the Legislature is on questions of political 
 expediency—how far is Home Rule expedient, and 
 how far should direct, clear responsibility be en- 
 couraged in municipal governments as against 
 complicated counter checks and obscure responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 We need not repeat here our argument that such 
 questions are not for the Courts, but there are 
 a number of cases decided by this Court which bear 
 directly on the Legislative power to determine for 
 itself to what extent the functions in which the 
 state is “interested” shall be administered by the 
 local governments and to what extent by the 
 central government. 
 
 In People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 545, supra, 
 the Court said that “it belongs to the legislature 
 to arrange and distribute the administrative func- 
 tions, committing such portions as it may deem 
 suitable, to local jurisdictions and retaining other 
 portions to be exercised by officers appointed by 
 the central power, and changing the arrangement 
 from time to time, as convenience, the efficiency 
 of administration and the public good may seem 
 
60 
 Pornt ITI. 
 
 to require. If a particular act of legislation does 
 not conflict with any of the limitations or re- 
 straints which have been referred to, it is not in 
 the power of the courts to arrest its execution, 
 however unwise its provisions may be, or whatever 
 the limitations may have been which led to its 
 enactment.” 
 
 Clarke vs. City of Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605, 634: 
 
 “T do not say that it can be submitted to 
 the electors of a city or village to determine 
 what powers its local legislature shall pos- 
 sess, but only that these bodies may be made 
 the depositories of such powers of local govern- 
 ment as the legislature may see fit to prescribe, 
 and the exercise of which is not repugnant to 
 any of the general arrangements of the con- 
 stitution.” 
 
 People vs. Pinckney, 32 N. Y., 877, 393: 
 
 “The power of the legislature of the state 
 is supreme over that of all local legislatures, 
 except when the constitution intervenes to 
 restrict it. * * * The legislature may re- 
 call to itself and exercise at its pleasure, so 
 much of the powers it has conferred upon the 
 city corporation as are not secured to it by 
 the constitution. This necessarily results 
 from the fact that all the legislative power of 
 the people is granted to the legislature, except 
 such as is expressly reserved.” 
 
 People vs. Shepard, 36 N. Y., 285, 286: 
 
 “The legislature has authority to arrange 
 the distribution of these powers as the public 
 
61 
 Point ITT. 
 
 exigencies may require; apportioning them to 
 local jurisdictions, to such extent as the law- 
 making power deems appropriate, and com- 
 mitting the exercise of the residue to officers 
 appointed as it may see fit to ordain.” 
 
 Metropolitan Board of Health vs. Heister, 37 
 N-Y., 661, 672: 
 
 “That *the legislature possess the entire 
 control over the streets of the City of New 
 York, and that it can delegate such portions 
 of its authority to the local organizations, and 
 in such measure, form and under such restric- 
 tions as it thinks proper, has been frequently 
 decided.” 
 
 City of Brooklyn vs. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591, 596: 
 
 <* * * the wisdom and expediency of 
 granting such power (licensing) were within 
 the legislative power of the state government 
 to decide.” 
 
 People ex rel. Taylor vs. Dunlap, 66 N. Y., 162, 
 168: 
 
 “Tt is for the legislature to distribute the 
 powers of local governments, as it may deem 
 best, and this discretion, when not restrained 
 or excluded by some provision of the constitu- 
 tion, is absolute, and no such provision, ap- 
 plicable to the matter under consideration, 
 exists.” 
 
 Matter of Allison vs. Welde, 172 N. Y., 421, 428: 
 
 “We think * * * that the legislature 
 has the right to distribute the powers of local 
 
62 
 
 Point IIT. \ 
 
 government, as between the city and county 
 governments, as it may deem best; and that 
 there is no provision of the constitution which 
 limits the power of the legislature in this 
 regard.” 
 
 In MacMullen vs. City of Middletown, 187 N. 
 Y., 37-41, the Court cites with approval Meriwether 
 vs. Garrett, 102 U. S:, 472, 511, where Field, J., 
 said: 
 
 “Municipal corporations are mere instru- 
 mentalities of the state for the more conven- 
 ient administration of local government. 
 Their powers are such as the legislature may 
 confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged or 
 entirely withdrawn at its pleasure.” 
 
 Townsend vs. Mayor, 16 Hun, 362, 364; affirmed 
 TT N. Y., 542. 
 
 And see the passage cited above from the opin- 
 ion in Barnes vs. District of Columbia, 91 U. S., 
 440, approved as supra, People ex. rel. Hon Yost 
 vs. Becker, 203 N. Y., 201, 205. 
 
 A contrary rule would cripple the power of the 
 legislature rather than strengthen it, and would 
 tend to break down our entire existing and tradi- 
 tional system of government whereby the distribu- 
 tion of powers as between the state and the local- 
 ities rests entirely in the legislature subject only 
 to the limitations contained in the constitution 
 itself. 
 
 a a 
 
63 
 POINT IV. 
 
 The Court below also erred in hold- 
 ing that the Act violated Article III, 
 Section 1 of the Constitution by the 
 provisions relative to repeal. 
 
 The court below conceded, as follows, the power 
 of the Legislature to authorize the local govern- 
 ment to “supersede” or “repeal” even legislative 
 acts, so long as the subject matter is a local one: 
 
 “Tt is undoubtedly true that so far as local 
 matters are concerned, which only affect the 
 municipality, the Legislature may provide that, 
 upon the adoption of local ordinances, charter 
 provisions upon the subject shall be deemed 
 to be repealed. There have been several adju- 
 dications to that effect. 
 
 Matter of City of New York (Morris The- 
 atrical License), 131 App. Div., 767; 
 City of New York vs. Alhambra Theatre 
 
 Co., 156 App. Div., 509, affd. 202 N. Y., 
 528; 
 People vs. Kaye, 146 N. Y. Supp., 398. 
 
 This, however, is on the ground that the or- 
 dinances are entirely local and concern only 
 the city itself.” 
 
 The Court held, however, that this Act is not 
 within this principle but involves delegation of re- 
 pealing power over matters which are not “strictly 
 municipal but affect the State at large.” 
 
 So far as this particular feature of repeal is con- 
 cerned, no specifications are given how the Act is 
 supposed to go beyond the municipal domain into 
 
64 
 
 Point IV. eS 
 
 the exclusive State domain; but it is a fair infer- 
 ence that the Court meant to refer to the power 
 of abolishing the Boards of Assessors, Public 
 Safety, Health, Charity, etc., incidentally to creat- 
 ing other offices to perform their functions. 
 
 Manifestly, if this is the meaning of the Court, 
 the objection adds nothing to that discussed in the 
 last Point, because if the creation of offices for ad- 
 ministration of those subjects may validly be dele- 
 gated to the local government, the correlative re- 
 peals must necessarily also be subject to like dele- 
 gation. 
 
 Nevertheless, we may invite the attention of the 
 Court to certain authorities which have directly 
 upheld legislative delegation of this very power of 
 local repeal in reference to the same or analogous 
 subject matters. 
 
 In reference to the Public Safety function, for 
 example (which is one of those held by the Court 
 to be “a state function”), local repealing power 
 was upheld by this Court in People ex rel. Dunn vs. 
 Ham, 166 N. Y., 477-480, swpra, where a legista- 
 tive act was sustained as constitutional against 
 the objection that it authorized local authorities 
 to abolish the office of Police Station House Keeper 
 and so permitted local repeal of the legislative Act 
 which had established that office. The Court dis- 
 cussed the repealing aspect of the situation as 
 follows: 
 
 “The position of station house keeper was 
 abolished after the passage of the act for the 
 government of cities of the second class, which 
 must be considered in determining the power 
 of the common council to abolish the place. 
 The act of 1898 (Ch., 182) effected a repeal of 
 
65 
 Pornt IV. 
 
 all statutes and ordinances which were in- 
 consistent with its provisions [$482]. It con- 
 ferred all the legislative power of the city up- 
 on its common council, to which it gave au- 
 thority to enact ordinances, not inconsistent 
 with the laws of the State, for the government 
 of the City, the management of its business, 
 the preservation of good order, peace and 
 health, the safety and welfare of its inhabi- 
 tants, and the protection and security of their 
 property ($12) The evident purpose of that 
 section was to confer upon the common coun- 
 cil entire legislative authority as to matters 
 relating to the municipal government, except 
 as limited by the statute and others not in- 
 consistent with its provisions. This is clearly 
 indicated by the act itself, and was plainly 
 avowed by the commission which reported it 
 to the Legislature (Senate Documents, 1896, 
 vol. 5, No. 24). That the Legislature might 
 have passed an act abolishing the office of 
 station house keepers and otherwise regula- 
 ting and affecting the police government of the 
 city, cannot be questioned. Instead of passing 
 such an act, it conferred upon the common 
 councils of cities of the second class general 
 power to enact ordinances for the protection 
 and security of property, the preservation of 
 good order, and for the safety and welfare of 
 their inhabitants, which, plainly includes the 
 regulation of the police and police power of 
 such cities. The legislative power thus con- 
 ferred is unlimited except by the provisions of 
 existing laws. Hence, the common council 
 possessed the power to abolish any position 
 or office it deemed unnecessary which was con- 
 
66 
 
 Point IV. 
 
 nected with or incident to the police govern- 
 ment of the city, unless forbidden by that act 
 or some other statute then in force.” 
 
 Again, in People vs. Kaye, 212 N. Y., 407, 416, 
 affirming 160 A. D., 644, swpra, this Court upheld 
 the same repealing power within the same field of 
 Public Safety. This was a case in reference to fire 
 precautions and the pertinent portion of the de- 
 cision was in the language of the Appellate Divi- 
 sion as follows: 
 
 “Among the sections of the charter men- 
 tioned in said second schedule and thus 
 brought within the purview of the foregoing 
 section of the Act of 1901, was Section 762. 
 On Dee. 19, 1911, the board of aldermen adopt- 
 ed an ordinance * * * which regulated the 
 matters provided for in said Section 762 of 
 the charter. The said section thereupon be- 
 came automatically repealed and the ordinance 
 took its place and became the law so far as 
 concerns the matters therein dealt with.” 
 
 And again this repealing power within the Pub- 
 lic Safety function was affirmed in Chapman vs. 
 Selover, 172 A. D., 858, 861 (Fourth Dept.), which 
 upheld the provisions of Section 288 of the High- 
 way Law, authorizing a village to regulate the 
 speed of vehicles by ordinance and to fix the pun- 
 ishment for violation thereof, “which punishment 
 shall, during the existence of the ordinance, rule or 
 regulation, supersede those specified in subdivision 
 2 of Section 290 of this chapter, but, except in cities 
 of the first class, shall not exceed the same,” and 
 the Court said: 
 
67 
 Point IV. 
 
 “Tt will be seen that when a village adopts 
 an ordinance fixing a penalty or punishment, 
 then the punishment prescribed by subdivision 
 2 of Section 290 is no longer applicable in that 
 village.”’ 
 
 In reference to Health, as affected by tenements 
 and buildings and by the sewer systems, taxation as 
 affected by public works, safety and communica- 
 tions as affected by highways (all of which are 
 either recognized by the Court as matters of State 
 interest, or clearly are so in their proper degree), 
 the local repealing power was upheld in People vs. 
 Ahern, 193 N. Y., 441. 
 
 That case upheld the section of the New York 
 Charter by which it was provided that the commis- 
 Sioner at the head of the boroughs “may organize 
 such bureaus as he shall from time to time deem 
 necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of 
 his department.” This necessarily involved the 
 supersession of the offices theretofore existing by 
 legislative act for the administration of those func- 
 tions. 
 
 Health and public order are also involved in all 
 the local option laws, and yet the delegation of re- 
 pealing power under those is constitutional. 
 
 Village of Gloversville vs. Howell, 70 N. 
 Se Pree 
 
 The control of public morals, which surely is a 
 matter of State interest, was held subject to the 
 right of the Legislature to delegate local repealing 
 power in the Morris Theatrical License case (Mat- 
 ter of City of N. Y., 131 A. D., 767, supra), and the 
 Alhambra Theatre case (156 A. D., 509; affd. 202 
 N. Y., 528, supra). 
 
68 / 
 Point IV. 
 
 With reference to the judiciary the delegation of 
 repealing power was upheld in People vs. Cocks, 
 172 A. D., 737 (2nd D.), which sustained an act 
 authorizing a town board to change the compensa- 
 tion of justices of the peace, theretofore fixed by 
 statute. 
 
 Delegation of local repealing power has been up- 
 held even to the extent of authorizing villages in- 
 corporated by the Legislature to terminate their 
 own existence. 
 
 Blawelt vs. Nyack, 9 Hun, 1538. 
 
 Such illustrations might be multiplied indefinite- 
 ly, but the above should suffice; and, at any rate, 
 the cases are so fully collected in the proceeding 
 point as to require no further citation. Reference 
 may, however, be made to City of Jacksonville vs. 
 Bowden, 67 Fla., 181, a case directly in point, and 
 containing so well-reasoned a: discussion of the 
 questions involved here that we quote it at some 
 length. The legislature there had enacted: 
 
 “That the numbers, powers, duties, terms of 
 office and the time and manner of election or 
 appointment of any and all boards and offiers 
 of the City of Jacksonville, whether created by 
 or recognized in State legislation or City ordi- 
 nance, excepting only the legislative powers 
 and duties of the City Council, may be amended. 
 or changed, and any and all boards and officers 
 whether created by or recognized in State legis- 
 lation or City ordinance, may be abolished and 
 new boards and officers created, by ordinance 
 adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority 
 of all the members of the City Council, and ap- 
 
69 
 Point IV. 
 
 proved by the Mayor or passed over his veto, 
 and at special municipal election approved by 
 the affirmative vote of a majority of the quali- 
 fied electors of said City who shall vote there- 
 on in such special municipal election.” 
 
 The City Council, acting under the authority of 
 this statute, passed an ordinance transferring to 
 the City Council powers and duties vested in the 
 Board of Bond Trustees under legislative enact- 
 ment, and also defining the powers and duties of 
 the mayor with reference to the police force. The 
 action was brought to enjoin the submission of the 
 ordinance to referendum vote, on the ground that 
 the statute contained an unlawful delegation of 
 power, for the same reasons as are advanced in the 
 case at bar. The court reversed the action of the 
 lower court in granting an injunction, and upheld 
 the constitutionality of the statute and the action 
 of the council in all respects. In an illuminating 
 opinion, the court thus disposed of the objection 
 that the act illegally permitted the city council 
 to repeal acts of the legislature (pages 192-194) : 
 
 “Tf it is clear from its terms and purpose 
 that the intent of a statute is that it shall 
 .supersede another statute upon a stated con- 
 tingent event, the courts will give effect to such 
 intent, when organic law is not thereby plainly 
 violated, since the intent of the law is its vital 
 force, and the province of the courts is to as- 
 certain and effectuate the valid legislative pur- 
 pose. 
 “The statute expressly provides ‘that all 
 laws or parts of laws inconsistent herewith 
 are hereby repealed.’ This repeal of conflict- 
 
70 
 Point IV. 
 
 ing charter powers becomes operative upon the 
 taking of the specifically designated action by 
 ‘the municipality for municipal purposes under 
 the limited authority expressly given by the 
 statute. This is manifestly the legislative in- 
 tent, and such intent is the validity of the law. 
 Thus the statute amends the charter powers of 
 the city, but it does not repeal or suspend the 
 operation of particular features of the charter 
 acts except in the event that expressly author- 
 ized action is duly taken by the municipality 
 that is in accord with this statute, but it is in 
 conflict with the other charter acts. The au- 
 thority conferred by the statute is for a 
 municipal purpose and is within the powers 
 that the Legislature could lawfully confer upon 
 the municipality, viz.: the creation, change and 
 duty of municipal officers and boards, the legis- 
 lative powers and duties of the city council 
 being expressly excluded. 
 * * * * * * * 
 “The Constitution expressly provides the 
 manner in which statutes shall be enacted by 
 the Legislature itself; but in providing for 
 legislative control of the municipalities the 
 Constitution ordains in general terms that 
 the Legislature shall prescribe the ‘jurisdic- 
 tion and powers’ of the municipalities and 
 ‘provide for their government.’ While the 
 Legislature may itself enact all the laws re- 
 quired by a municipality it certainly may dele- 
 gate to the municipality power to enact ordi- 
 nances not in conflict with the Constitution 
 that have the force of law within their proper 
 sphere. In its discretion the Legislature may 
 by its own direct enactment or through the 
 
cE 
 PoIntT IV. 
 
 agency of municipal ordinances and regula- 
 tions prescribe and provide for the ‘numbers, 
 powers, duties, terms of office and the time 
 and manner of election or appointment of any 
 or all boards and officers of the City of Jack- 
 sonville;’ and the Legislature may itself pro- 
 vide how many and all boards and officers of 
 the city may be abolished and new boards and 
 officers created, or it may delegate this power 
 to the municipality or its electors without vio- 
 lating the organic law of the land. This be- 
 ing so, the fact that some of these regulations 
 may be already directly prescribed by statute 
 does not deprive the Legislature of the right to 
 alter or amend them; and it may do so through 
 the medium of the municipality by express au- 
 thority duly given where no provision of the 
 Constitution is thereby plainly violated. By 
 authorizing the municipality to adopt regula- 
 tions pertaining to the creation and abolish- 
 ment and powers and duties of municipal 
 officers and boards, that are in conflict with 
 existing statutes, the Legislature in effect ex- 
 pressly authorized municipal action within its 
 province; and when that authorized municipal 
 action is duly taken the existing statutory 
 regulations in conflict therewith are by force 
 of the statute giving the authority, suspended 
 or abrogated. This does not in reality amount 
 to the repeal of a statute by municipal action ; 
 but the operation of a statute upon a particular 
 subject may be suspended by the force and 
 effect of another statute authorizing conflicting 
 municipal action to be taken for a municipal 
 purpose in accordance with express legislative 
 authority given to that end.” 
 
72 
 Point IV. 
 
 In Gould vs. Baltimore, 120 Md., 534, 539, the 
 Court, sustaining an ordinance of the City of Bal- 
 timore providing for constables’ duties and com- 
 pensation different from those fixed by statute, 
 said: 
 
 “It would seem, therefore, to be perfectly 
 clear that as the Legislature had the right and 
 power to change at any time the duties and 
 compensation of constables, it could also dele- 
 gate and confer upon the city the power to 
 pass ordinances to accomplish the same pur- 
 pose. 
 
 “Tt is well settled that an ordinance passed 
 in pursuance of express legislative authority 
 is a law and has the same effect as a local law, 
 and it may prevail over a general law upon 
 the same subject. Balto. vs. Clunet, 23 Md., 
 449; Hammond vs. Haines, 25 Md., 541; Ross- 
 berg vs. State, 111 Md., 394; New Orleans Wa- 
 ter Works vs. New Orleans, 164 U. S., 471; 
 Walla Walla vs. Water Co., 172 U. S., 1; 2nd 
 Dillon on Mun. Cor., sec. 573; 2nd McQuillan 
 on Mun. Cor., 643, notes pages 149 and 1412.” 
 * * * * * * % * 
 
 “In the case at bar, the Legislature having 
 delegated and conferred upon the Mayor and 
 City Council of Baltimore the legislative 
 power, under a special provision of the char- 
 ter, to pass ordinances prescribing the duties 
 and compensation of constables in Baltimore 
 City, and the municipality, in pursuance of 
 this express legislative authority, having 
 passed Ordinance No. 202, here in dispute, it 
 follows that the ordinance so passed is as valid 
 
(65 
 PoInt IV. 
 
 a local law for Baltimore City as if it had 
 been passed. by the Legislature itself. 
 
 “This being so, and section 206 of the Char- 
 ter (Acts of 1898, Ch., 128) being enacted sub- 
 sequent to the provision of the Code of Public 
 General Laws, Code 1888, it is well settled by 
 authority that the ordinance passed in pur- 
 suance thereof, approved December 17, 1912, 
 would supersede the provisions of the General 
 Law (1888) relating to the duties and com- 
 pensation of constables. McCracken vs. State, 
 71 Md., 153; De Murguiondo vs. Frazier, 638 
 Md., 94; Leitch vs. Leitch, 114 Md. 336; Ross- 
 berg vs. State, 111 Md., 394; Balto. vs. Clunet, 
 23 Md. 449.” 
 
 In City of Woodland vs. Leech, 20 Cal. App., 15, 
 18, 19, a statute authorized the governing body of 
 a city to consolidate offices by making the city 
 treasurer license and tax collector. Held, that a 
 city ordinance to that effect operated to supersede 
 a State statute requiring the marshal to collect 
 license fees. The Court said: 
 
 “We find nothing in the constitution to pre- 
 clude the Legislature from delegating this au- 
 thority to the board of trustees. The condi- 
 tion simply amounts to a grant of power, to 
 be exercised in the discretion of the trustees, 
 to relieve one municipal officer of a ministe- 
 rial executive duty and transfer it to another. 
 Even if it be regarded as a legislative attempt 
 to confer authority upon the local law-making 
 body to create the office of city tax collector, 
 it does not seem to be obnoxious to any con- 
 stitutional provisions.” * * * 
 
74 
 PoIntT IV. 
 
 The above discussion, we believe, must dispose 
 of the point; but we may for a moment refer to 
 an argument which was made below, to the effect 
 that the statute, as construed, gives the local coun- 
 cil power to repeal general State laws. Even if 
 the Act had provided for repeal of some general 
 State law (which as we shall show it does not), 
 the cases above cited show it would still be valid 
 so long as the repeal is only of the local applica- 
 tion and merely a part of a transition from a cen- 
 tralized regulation of the subject to local. home 
 rule, and does not give a municipality any power 
 beyond its own geographical boundaries. Suppose, 
 for example, the Legislature, after having dealt 
 with charity matters by general law, fixing a uni- 
 form system applicable alike to all localities in the 
 State, should decide that the localities differed to 
 such an extent that the subject could be 
 better dealt with by local regulations conform- 
 ing to local conditions and the wishes of the local 
 inhabitants. Could not the Legislature grant home 
 rule on that subject, at the option of the several 
 localities, and still continue the general law until 
 such time as the localities adopted different regu- 
 lations pursuant to their home rule powers? The 
 position taken below leads to the result that when 
 the regulation of a subject matter has once been 
 centralized and prescribed by a uniform general 
 law, it can never be decentralized and made sub- 
 ject to local home rule; because the Legislature 
 cannot, as a practical matter, repeal the existing 
 general law in advance of the adoption of some sub- 
 stitute, and cannot, as a constitutional matter. (so 
 it is claimed) allow the existing general law to be 
 superseded piecemeal upon the adoption of con- 
 flicting regulations by the local authorities. The 
 
75 
 Point IV. 
 
 only other possible course is for the Legislature it- 
 Self to prescribe the varying local regulations, 
 which of course would equally nullify the home 
 rule idea. 
 
 But we do not have to maintain this proposition 
 here, because, as stated in the dissenting memor- 
 andum of Mr. Justice Kruse, the provisions for 
 repeal apply “only to such particular powers as 
 are committed by the Legislature to the local au- 
 thorities, and no further.” 
 
 The contrary argument was based on the follow- 
 ing passages from the Act, in which, however, the 
 words which we have printed in bold face seem to 
 us to demonstrate its unsoundness : 
 
 “8, Existing laws continued. Except in so 
 far as any of its provisions shall be inconsist- 
 ent with this act, the charter of the city, and all 
 special or general laws applicable thereto, 
 shall continue in full force and effect until 
 and unless superseded by the passing 
 of ordinances regulating the mat- 
 ters therein provided for; but to the 
 extent that any provisions thereof shall be in- 
 consistent with this act the same are 
 hereby superseded.” 
 
 “Sec. 37. Effect upon provisions of existing 
 law of adoption of ordinance regulating sub- 
 ject matter thereof. Until superseded as 
 herein provided, all provisions of law 
 regulating the exercise of the powers 
 and the performance of the duties 
 of officers and employees of any city 
 shall continue in full force and effect. The 
 council under any one of the plans of govern- 
 ment defined in this act as plan A, B, C, D, 
 
76 
 
 Point IV. 
 
 E or F shall have power, subject to the pro: 
 visions of this act, to confer by ordinance upon 
 any officer or employee of the city any powers, 
 or to impose upon any such officer or employee 
 any duties, theretofore conferred or imposed 
 upon any officer or employee by provision of 
 law, and such powers or duties shall there- 
 upon devolve upon or be discharged by such 
 officer or employee upon whom the same shall 
 have been so conferred or imposed; but the 
 provisions of law regulating the 
 exercise of such powers or the 
 performance of such duties shall, 
 subject to being superseded as 
 herein provided, continue in force and 
 apply to the exercise or perform- 
 amce thereof by the officer or employee 
 upon whom such powers or duties are 
 conferred or imposed, and whenever by any 
 such ordinance all the powers and duties of 
 any appointive officer or employee of the city 
 are conferred or imposed upon one or more 
 other officers or employees, such ordinance may 
 abolish the office or employment held 
 by the officer or employee whose powers and 
 duties shall have ceased, and thereupon the 
 term of office or employment of such officer 
 or employee shall expire. The council under 
 any one of the plans of government defined in 
 this act as plan A, B, C, D, E or F shall, sub- 
 ject to the provisions of this act, have power 
 to regulate by ordinance the exercise of 
 any power and the performance of any 
 duty by any officer or employee of the city; 
 and upon the passing of any such ordinance 
 
Ta 
 Point IV. 
 
 every provision of the charter or 
 of the second class cities law [n. b., 
 but not general laws], applicable to such 
 city, regulating the matters, or any of 
 them, provided for in such ordinance, 
 [i, e., ordinance regulating “the exercise of 
 any power and the performance of any duty] 
 shall cease to have any force or effect in such 
 city. But nothing herein contained shall be 
 deemed to authorize the repeal or superseding 
 of any provisions of law regulating the manner 
 in which, or the conditions subject to which, 
 franchises may be granted, or city real estate 
 leased or sold, or municipal indebtedness in- 
 curred in any city, except to the extent of 
 transferring powers or duties relating thereto 
 to officers or employees of the city; and noth- 
 ing herein contained shall be deemed to author- 
 ize the repeal or superseding of any provision 
 of law requiring any matter to be submitted 
 to the vote of the electors or taxpayers.” 
 
 Even the exact letter of these clauses demon- 
 strates that they do not affect or seek to affect in 
 any way the scope of the city’s powers, nor to re- 
 peal every act of the legislature on the subject 
 of an ordinance, but only to supersede provisions 
 regulating the matters * * * provided for in such 
 ordinances i. e., those dealing only with the “regu- 
 lation” of the “exercise” and “performance” of 
 powers and with the “offices and employments” 
 by which they are administered; and this is the 
 whole spirit of the act, as we have shown more 
 fully above. 
 
 Surely, no Legislative Act ought to be dealt with 
 so meticulously, especially on a constitutional issue, 
 
78 
 Point IV. 
 
 as the argument we have discussed deals with this 
 one. The problem confronting the Legislature called 
 for practical and sensible statemanship and its 
 solution should be dealt with in the same spirit. 
 
 Of course, it was theoretically possible for the 
 Legislature to dictate to the city precisely the offices 
 and machinery and even ordinances by which it 
 should “regulate” the “exercise” and “performance”’ 
 of its charter powers, but that would be only to 
 violate the fundamental principles of Home Rule 
 and local right in the utmost detail and throw 
 upon the Legislature the totally impracticable 
 burden of all local legislation and administration. 
 
 In this particular situation the plain purpose of 
 the legislature was to recognize the rights of the 
 people of a locality on the subject of the form and 
 administration of their own government, and to 
 provide for the transition from the old form to 
 such new one as they might select from among 
 those authorized by the Legislature. 
 
 Obviously, it was impossible to chop off the old 
 form of government at any one instant and put on 
 the new form in full working order at the same in- 
 stant. A gradual transition was necessary. It 
 would have been absurd for the Legislature to make 
 separate legislative acts for each stage of this 
 transition. The sensible course, and the only 
 practical course, was the one it took, by which the. 
 old machinery was superseded step by step as the 
 new machinery authorized by the Legislature was 
 established by the local authorities. 
 
 This, the only really practical course necessarily 
 involved delegation of local power to determine 
 when the old administrative arrangements should 
 become repealed, but that has no true legal relation 
 with the extent of the city powers, or with general 
 
79 
 Point IV. 
 
 provisions of law defining or restricting those 
 powers or dealing with them in any way. 
 
 The repealing power is not only limited, as shown 
 above, to regulatory acts, but even as to those is 
 confined to provisions “of the charter or of the 
 second class cities law, applicable to such city.” 
 There is not, as was argued below, any grant of 
 power to repeal or supersede any general law of the 
 state. Section 8, which continues existing general 
 and special laws “until and unless superseded by 
 the passing of ordinances regulating the matters 
 therein provided for” grants no power to pass such 
 Superseding ordinances, but refers to Section 37, 
 where is found the only grant of that power; and 
 the power is there expressly limited to provisions . 
 of the charter or of the second class cities law affect- 
 ing the city. 
 
 In the absence of an express grant of power to 
 repeal general laws of the state, the existence of 
 such a power is not to be implied, but the regulatory 
 power granted to the city must be exercised subject 
 to and in harmony with the general laws of the 
 state. 
 
 In Mills vs. Sweeney, 219 N. Y., 2138, 219, the 
 Court, holding that the common council of Buffalo 
 had no implied power to provide by ordinance for 
 a referendum on all public questions, said: 
 
 “A municipal corporation, says Judge Dillon 
 ‘cannot in virtue of its incidental power to 
 pass by-laws, or under any general grant of 
 that authority, adopt by-laws which infringe 
 the spirit or are repugnant to the policy of the 
 state as declared in its general legislation.’ ” 
 
 People ex rel. Presmeyer vs. Commissioners of 
 Police, 59 N. Y., 92, 95, 96, supra, held that an 
 
80 
 
 Point IV. 
 
 amendment to the Brooklyn charter transferring 
 to a local board of excise the powers and duties 
 of boards of commissioners of excise under the 
 state law, left the new board subject to the provis- 
 ions of the existing state laws on the subject. 
 
 People vs. Morris, 138 Wend., 325, supra, held that 
 a provision of the Ogdensburg charter empowering 
 the village trustees to regulate and license grocers 
 to sell liquor to be consumed on the premises, was 
 subject to a general law of the state subsequently 
 enacted, prescribing the conditions on which such 
 licenses might be issued. 
 
 People ex rel. Knoblauch vs. Warden, 216 N. Y., 
 154, 157, 160, 161, held that the general ordinance 
 making power granted to the New York Board of 
 Aldermen by the Greater New York Charter was 
 subject to health regulations adopted by the city 
 board of health pursuant to the general health law 
 of the state. 
 
 Even in other states whose constitutions express- 
 ly confer upon cities the right to make their own 
 charters, it has been held that the exercise of this 
 power is subject to the general laws of the state. 
 
 Ewing vs. Hoblitzell, 85 Mo., 64, 76-78; 
 
 State ex rel. Goodman vs. Police Commis- 
 sioners of Kansas City, 184 Mo., 109; 
 133, 134; 
 
 City of St. Lows vs. Meyer, 185 Mo., 583, 
 597, 598; 
 
 Paterson vs. Chicago & Alton Ry Co., 265 
 Mo., 462, 467 et seq; 
 
 Staude vs. Election Commissioners, 61 
 Cal., 313, 320, 321; 
 
 Thomason vs. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 
 76-79 ; 
 
81 
 Point IV. 
 
 Kennedy vs. Miller, 97 Cal., 429, 433: 
 
 Hancock vs. Board of Education, 140 Cal., 
 554, 561; 
 
 Coleman vs. City of La Grande, 73 Or., 
 521, 525; 
 
 West Linn vs. Tufts, 75 Or., 304; 
 
 Cole vs.,Seaside, 80 Or., 73, 86. 
 
 It is submitted that the following propositions 
 bearing on the present point are clearly estab- 
 lished : 
 
 (1) The Act is not unconstitutional because the 
 exercise by the city of the ordinance-making power 
 granted by the Act may operate to repeal laws of 
 the State. 
 
 (2) While power to repeal by ordinance general 
 laws of the State may be constitutionally granted, 
 if limited to the operation of those laws within the 
 locality, the present act does not contain any such 
 grant, but, on the contrary, excludes such power 
 by expressly limiting the grant of repealing power 
 to provisions of the charter or of the second class 
 cities law applicable to the city. 
 
 From these propositions it follows that there is 
 no constitutional prohibition preventing the dele- 
 gation by the present act of power to enact ordi- 
 nances transferring or regulating the exercise of 
 powers, with the effect of superseding provisions of 
 the charter or of the second class cities law appli- 
 cable to the city regulating the exercise of the pow- 
 ers dealt with by such ordinance, 
 
82 
 POINT V. 
 
 The Court below erred in applying 
 the doctrine of Barto vs. Himrod to 
 the present situation, notwithstand- 
 ing all the subsequent cases which 
 have denied its application to such 
 situations, 
 
 This case of Barto vs. Himrod, 8 N. Y., 488, dealt 
 with an Act of the Legislature which provided for 
 a general state-wide referendum on the establish- 
 ment of a general State free school system. The 
 Court held that this referendum was unconstitu- 
 tional because it attempted to place upon the citi- 
 zens of the State the exercise of the legislative 
 power with which the Legislature itself had been 
 charged by Article III, Section 1, of the Constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 We believe that the numerous subsequent deci- 
 sions of this Court overwhelmingly establish the 
 inapplicability of Barto vs. Himrod to such a stat- 
 ute as this, but the Court below was of opinion 
 that the present act was not a “completed law,” as 
 it left the Legislature, but attempted to give un- 
 constitutional legislative power to the local author- 
 ities to complete it. 
 
 It was not the optional feature of the law which 
 was criticized; the validity of that must be con- 
 ceded on the authorities cited above (Point I), and 
 is in fact conceded here. The point of the Court’s 
 objection is fully stated in the following passage 
 of the opinion below: 
 
 “The rule above laid down [i. e., the rule by 
 which Barto vs. Hiumrod has been held inap- 
 plicable to the passage of completed laws not 
 
83 
 POINT V. 
 
 to take effect until approved hy a popular 
 vote] exists only when the statute is a com- 
 pleted law when it leaves the hands of the 
 legislature. If the enactment itself is incom- 
 plete until further action is had the principles 
 above stated have no application. Barto vs. 
 Himrod, 8 N. Y., 488, 490; People vs. Kennedy, 
 207 N. Y., 548. The purpose of this statute 
 was to furnish a complete plan of city govern- 
 ment and the difficulty with the proposition 
 thus advanced is that the legislature has not 
 enacted in this case any completed law upon 
 the subject. It has not defined what the ordi- 
 nances shall be which are to displace the pres- 
 ent city government, and it leaves that matter 
 to be determined solely by the city council to 
 be selected under the act. It is the discretion 
 of the city council, therefore, and not the ac- 
 tion of the legislature, which makes the stat- 
 ute complete.” 
 
 The argument of the Court on this proposition 
 is in effect a denial of the principal of home rule, 
 and so we have explained above. 
 
 Furthermore, to say that an Act which grants 
 a City Council power to make ordinances “regu- 
 lating the exercise of the powers and the perfor- 
 mance of the duties of officers and employees of” 
 the city (Act §8) is unconstitutional because it 
 fails to prescribe “what the ordinances shall be” 
 seems to us a palpable absurdity. It is either a 
 decision that the legislature can legislate only in 
 specific detail and not in general terms or it is an 
 assertion that the local ordinance making power 
 cannot be delegated without such a prescription 
 in advance of the ordinances as would deprive the 
 
84 
 
 POINT V. 
 
 council of any discretion as to “what they shall 
 be”; and it might as well have been said that the 
 statutes upheld in the Rome Bank, Clarke, Starin, 
 and Gould cases* were all unconstitutional, be- 
 cause they failed to prescribe what bonds the cities 
 should issue, or that the statute upheld in the Corn- 
 ing case* was unconstitutional because it failed to 
 provide in detail what basin the city of Albany 
 might erect; or that the statute upheld in the 
 Gloversville case* was unconstitutional because it 
 failed to prescribe the local liquor option which 
 should be exercised; or that the statute up- 
 held in the Gilbert Elevated Ry. case* was 
 unconstitutional because it failed to prescribe 
 what the manner of exercise of street railway 
 franchises should be, which the city was autho- 
 rized to prescribe; or that the statute upheld in 
 the Ahern case, supra (193 N. Y., 431), was un- 
 constitutional because it failed to prescribe what 
 bureaus the borough presidents should create, or 
 that the statutes upheld in Soloman vs. The Mayor, 
 538 N. Y., 62, Costello vs. The Mayor, 63 N. Y., 48, 
 and People vs. Ham, 166 N. Y., 477, 480, 481, supra, 
 were unconstitutional because they failed to pre- 
 scribe what offices the local authorities might ecre- 
 ate. 
 
 In short, most cases cited on this brief are sub- 
 ject to the same criticism which the court has made 
 of this act, in this respect, and we do not consider 
 further discussion necessary except to quote the Ian- 
 guage of People vs. Morris, 13 Wend., 325, 330, 
 334, which is typical of the principles established 
 by the cases: 
 
 *All cited under Point I, supra. 
 
S 
 PoINT V. 
 
 ce 
 
 “Instead of prescribing at their discretion 
 every duty to be performed, and forbidding 
 every act to be avoided—in a word, directing 
 the whole system of government to be observed 
 and executed—the legislature have merely de- 
 fined the outlines and leading principles, and 
 conferred upon the inhabitants, within the 
 bounds of the corporation, the power at dis- 
 cretion to fill up and carry them into opera- 
 tion.” 
 
 Upon this point, see also 
 
 Hanover Bank vs. Moyses, 186 U. S., 181; 
 Clark Distilling Co. vs. Western Mary- 
 land R’way Co., 242 U. S., 311. 
 
 The act is complete in itself. It prescribes a com- 
 plete form of charter which becomes effective as 
 soon as the people of the city vote to adopt it. It 
 declares the powers of the council. Among them is 
 the power to pass ordinances regulating certain 
 matters. The fact that the ordinances remain to 
 be passed does not render the grant of power to 
 pass them incomplete. The holding below to the 
 contrary would lead to the absurd result that every 
 grant of power, to legislate, or do anything else, 
 is incomplete because the power granted remains 
 to be exercised. 
 
 The decision also goes counter to the well settled 
 principle that ordinances passed under a power 
 delegated by the legislature have the same force as 
 acts of the legislature. This was expressed so long 
 ago as 1826 by Savage, J., speaking for the Supreme 
 Court in Presbyterian Church vs. Mayor, 5 Cow., 
 538, 541, upholding an ordinance of the city of New 
 York prohibiting the use of certain lands for ceme- 
 tery purposes: 
 
86 
 
 PoInT VY. 
 
 “* * * the effect of the by-law is the same 
 as if that by-law had been an act of the state 
 legislature. It is expressly authorized by the 
 legislature; and whether it be their act or an 
 act of the local city legislature, makes no dif- 
 ference.” 
 
 It was again expressed so recently as May, 1917, 
 by Collin, J., speaking for this Court in Crayton 
 vs. Larabee, 220 N. Y., 498, 501, upholding a local 
 health ordinance of the city of Syracuse, with 
 citation of a few of the many intervening decisions 
 to the same effect: 
 
 “Valid ordinances have, within the proper 
 territory, the character and effect of a statute 
 and may correctly be said to be in force by 
 the authority of the state.” 
 
 The argument that although an _ ordinance 
 adopted under a delegated power has the force of 
 law, nevertheless an act of the legislature delega- 
 ting the ordinance-making power must provide in 
 advance what the ordinances adopted shall be, or 
 else it will be incomplete and unconstitutional, in- 
 volves a manifest contradiction in terms. 
 
 If, then, we are right in contending that the 
 grant of power is valid, it necessarily follows that 
 it cannot be successfully attacked as incomplete. 
 
87 
 POINT VI. 
 
 The Court below erred in holding 
 that the Legislature violated Article 
 III, Section 1,and Article XII, Section 
 1, of the Constitution by allowing: the 
 city to determine the number of its 
 officers and employees and their 
 powers and duties. 
 
 On this the position of the Court below is thus 
 stated by the adopted opinion : 
 
 “These corporations [i. e. municipal cor- 
 porations| the legislature is authorized to 
 create and for that purpose it must furnish 
 them with a charter which is the franchise for 
 their existence and provide for them the method 
 of their self-government. All of these func- 
 tions are strictly legislative and can not be 
 delegated by the legislature.” 
 
 The surrounding discussion by the trial court 
 indicates its opinion that the cities cannot consti- 
 tutionally be allowed to determine for themselves 
 by what officials and machinery they shall exercise 
 the powers they acquire from the state—i. e. “the 
 method of their self-government.” 
 
 Here again the opinion is in direct conflict with 
 the principle of fostering home rule. It also in- 
 volves an’ unauthorized construction of Article 
 XII, Section 1, of the Constitution. 
 
 That section requires the legislature to provide 
 for the organization of cities and villages; it does 
 not require the legislature itself to organize the 
 government of each city and each village in detail. 
 The duty of the Legislature is discharged when it 
 
88 
 Point VI. 
 
 grants a charter delimiting the powers granted to 
 the city and to its governing body. - The extent of 
 the powers, how far they shall be prescribed in de- 
 tail, and how far left to the local authorities, rest 
 in the discretion of the Legislature; this, too, has 
 been demonstrated by the authorities cited under 
 Point III, supra. 
 
 Grants of power in city charters authorizing city 
 authorities to fill in details and regulate the ma- 
 chinery of the local government are a common- 
 place of charter legislation. 
 
 Governor Nicolls Charter, granted to the City 
 of New York in 1665, empowered it “to appoint 
 such under officers as they shall judge necessary 
 for the ordinary execution of justice.” (Printed 
 in Ash’s Greater New York Charter, 1906 Ed., 
 page 1161). . 
 
 The Dongan Charter of 1686, Section 7, granted. 
 to the city power. 
 
 “To make laws, orders, ordinances and con- 
 stitutions in writing, and to add, alter, dimin- 
 ish or reform them, from time to time, as to 
 them shall seem necessary and convenient 
 (not repugnant to the prerogative of his most 
 sacred majesty aforesaid, his heirs and suc- 
 cessors, or to any of the laws of the Kingdom 
 of England, or the laws of the general 
 assembly of the province of New York), for 
 the good rule, oversight, correction and gov- 
 ernment of the said city and liberties of the 
 same, and of all the officers thereof and for the 
 several tradesmen, victualers, artificers and of 
 all other the people and inhabitants of the 
 said city.” 
 
89 
 
 Point VI. 
 
 The Montgomerie Charter of 1730, Section 14, 
 provided: 
 
 “That the said common council of said city, 
 for the time being, or the major part of them, 
 have and may, and shall have full power, au- 
 thority and license to frame, constitute, or- 
 dain, make and establish, from time to time, 
 all such laws, statutes, rights, ordinances and 
 constitutions, which to them, or the greater 
 part of them, shall seem to be good, useful or 
 necessary for the good rule and government of 
 the body corporate aforesaid; and of all offi- 
 cers, ministers, artificers, citizens, inhabitants 
 and residents of the said city, within the lim- 
 its thereof, and for declaring how and after 
 what manner and order the mayor, re- 
 corder, aldermen and assistants of the said 
 city, for the time being, and all and every of 
 their officers and ministers, and all officers and 
 ministers and all artificers, inhabitants and 
 residents of the same city, and their factors, 
 servants and apprentices, in their offices, func- 
 tions and business, within the said city and 
 liberties thereof for the time being, and 
 from time to time, shall use, carry and 
 behave themselves; and for the _ farther 
 public good, common profit, trade and better 
 government and rule of the said city.” 
 
 These charters were confirmed, as stated by 
 Chancellor Kent in his treatise on the charter of 
 the City of New York, Edition of 1854, page 287: 
 
 “The charter was explicitly confirmed in all 
 its parts and bearings by an act of the colonial 
 
90 
 
 POINT VI. 
 
 legislature of the 14th of October, 1732; and 
 it was along with other charters saved and 
 confirmed by the constitution of 1777, and 
 again by the constitution of 1821.” 
 
 The charter granted to the city of New York by 
 the legislature of 1849 (Laws of 1849, chapter 187) 
 provided as follows: 
 
 819. “It shall be lawful for the common 
 council of said city to establish such other de- 
 partments and bureaus as they may deem the 
 public interest may require, and to assign to 
 them and those herein created, such duties as 
 they may direct, not inconsistent with this 
 act.” 
 
 §20. “The number of officers or clerks in the 
 several departments shall be prescribed by the 
 common council. The terms of all the charter 
 officers, not prescribed by the law of the state, 
 shall be fixed by the common council. All 
 officers whose appointments are not otherwise 
 provided for, shall be elected or appointed in 
 such manner as the common council shall by 
 law prescribe.” 
 
 These broad provisions have been continued to 
 this day. They are now embodied in Section 1543 
 of the Greater New York Charter (Laws of 1897, 
 ch. 378, as re-enacted Laws of 1901, ch. 461), which 
 provides : 
 
 “The number of all officers, clerks, em- 
 ployees, laborers and subordinates in every de- 
 partment shall be such as the heads of the re- 
 
91 
 PoInt VI. 
 
 spective departments and borough presidents 
 shall designate and approve, not exceeding the 
 number limited by any ordinance of the board 
 of aldermen. The duties of all such officers, 
 clerks, employees, laborers and subordinates 
 shall be such as the heads of the respective de- 
 partments and borough presidents shall desig- 
 nate and approve, subject to the provisions of 
 law and to the ordinances of the board of 
 aldermen. The salaries or wages of all such 
 officers, clerks, employees, laborers and_ sub- 
 ordinates in every department shall be such as 
 shall be fixed by the board of aldermen upon 
 the recommendation of the board of estimate 
 and apportionment in the manner provided in 
 this act. Any head of department or borough 
 president, may, with the consent of the board 
 of estimate and apportionment, consolidate 
 any two or more bureaus established by law, 
 and may change the duties of any bureau.” 
 
 The charter of the City of Watertown (Laws of 
 1897, ch. 760) enacted the same year as the Greater 
 New York Charter, contains grants of power in 
 very much the same broad language: 
 
 §36. “Excepting as herein otherwise pro- 
 vided, the common council shall have power 
 to fix and change the salaries of all officers of 
 
 the city.” 
 
 $43. “The common council shall have power 
 to provide by ordinance or resolution for the 
 enforcement of the powers hereby expressly 
 granted to it or to any of the boards or officers 
 of the city, where the method of the execution 
 
92 
 
 Point VI. 
 
 of the powers is not herein expressly pre- 
 scribed, and shall have power to pass any 
 ordinance or resolution not repugnant to the 
 constitution of the laws of this state, not pre- 
 scribed herein or inconsistent herewith, for any 
 local purpose pertaining to the government of 
 the city, the management of its business, the 
 preservation of order, peace, health, safety 
 and welfare of the city and the inhabitants 
 thereof, * * * and * * * particularly to en- 
 act ordinances for the following purposes: * * * 
 
 16. To enact all such ordinances as may be 
 necessary to carry into effect any general 
 power or discharge any duty conferred or pro- 
 posed by this act.” 
 
 §48. “Whenever any executive or adminis- 
 trative function shall be required to be per- 
 formed by any ordinance or resolution of the 
 common council, the same shall be performed 
 by the proper executive or administrative 
 officer or board designated in the order or reso- 
 lution, and in case no such designation be 
 made, the mayor shall make the same.” 
 
 §49. “The common council may, by ordi- 
 nances not inconsistent with the provisions of 
 this act, or the laws of the state, regulate the 
 powers and duties of any city officer * * *, 
 The common council shall also have power to 
 provide for the enforcement by ordinance of 
 any regulation of any administrative board for 
 the conduct of the affairs committed to said 
 board.” 
 
 - 
 
93 
 Point VI. 
 
 The Watertown charter also gives board powers 
 to the various governing boards and particularly 
 to the board of public safety: 
 
 §142. “The board shall have power to make 
 such rules and regulations consistent with the 
 provisions of this act as it may deem best for 
 the government of itself and for the govern- 
 ment and organization of the fire and police de- 
 partments.” 
 
 8144. “The board * * * ghall recommend 
 * * * to the common council plans for the 
 organization of the police and fire department ; 
 upon the approval of such recommendations 
 by the common council, the board of public 
 safety shall be authorized to employ such 
 number of policemen and firemen and organize 
 the police and fire departments for the city.” 
 
 In the next year, 1898, was enacted the second 
 class cities law (Laws of 1898, ch. 182, originally 
 known as the White charter), which conferred 
 broad powers on all second class cities. (The sec- 
 tion numbers are those contained in the Con- 
 solidated laws) : 
 
 §16. “The salary of every city officer and the 
 salary or compensation of every person paid 
 out of the funds appropriated by the city, 
 where not specifically fixed by statute, shall be 
 fixed and determined by the board of estimate 
 and apportionment * * *. All such salaries 
 and compensation shall be payable in such in- 
 stalments and at such times as such board shall 
 
 determine.” | 
 
94 
 Point VIL. 
 
 §30. “The legislative power of the city is 
 vested in the common council thereof, and it 
 has authority to enact ordinances, not incon- 
 sistent with law, for the government of the 
 city and the management of its business, for 
 the preservation of good order, peace and 
 health, for the safety and welfare of its in- 
 habitants and the protection and security of 
 their property.” 
 
 $40. “The common council may, by ordi- 
 nance passed by three-fourths of all its mem- 
 bers, not inconsistent with this chapter, or 
 other laws of the state, regulate the powers and 
 duties of any city officer or department * * *.” 
 
 §41. “Whenever an executive or administrat- 
 ive function is by law or ordinance of the com- 
 mon council required to be performed, the same 
 shall be performed by the proper executive or 
 administrative officer or department, design- 
 ated in the law or ordinance, and in case no 
 such designation be thus made, the mayor shall 
 make the same, but no ordinance shall be pass- 
 ed interfering with the exercise of the executive 
 functions of the officers, departments and 
 boards of the city, as provided in this chapter 
 or otherwise by law.” 
 
 $74. “The board of estimate and apportion- 
 ment, except as otherwise provided by law, 
 shall have authority to fix the salaries or com- 
 pensation, and determine the positions and 
 numbers of all city officers and employees, of 
 each office, board and department. * * * ” 
 
95 
 
 Point VI. 
 
 8133. “The commissioner of public safety 
 shall make, adopt and enforce such reasonable 
 rules, orders and regulations, not inconsistent 
 with law, as may be reasonably necessary to 
 effect a prompt and efficient exercise of all the 
 powers conferred and the performance of all 
 duties imposed by law upon him or the depart- 
 ment under his jurisdiction. He is authorized 
 and empowered to make, adopt, promulgate 
 and enforce reasonable rules, orders and reg- 
 ulations for the government, discipline, ad- 
 ministration and disposition of the officers and 
 members of the police and fire depart- 
 Peet ee Gigs a 
 
 §134. “The police and fire department shall, 
 as to their membership and component parts, 
 remain as now constituted until the same shall 
 be changed by action of the common council. 
 The common council has power at all times by 
 ordinance to determine the number of officers 
 and members of each of said departments and 
 the classes and grades into which they shall be 
 divided, except that it shall not have the power 
 to diminish the number of the members of 
 either of said departments as now fixed. The 
 number of officers or members of either of said 
 departments shall not be increased without the 
 approval of the board of estimate and appor- 
 tionment. The common council may pass or- 
 dinances not inconsistent with law for the 
 government of the police and fire departments, 
 and regulating the powers and duties of their 
 officers and members.” 
 
 The broad provisions of this act were upheld and 
 enforced in People ex rel. Dunn vs. Ham, 166 N. Y., 
 
96 
 Point VI. 
 
 477, 480, 481, supra, and in City of Rochester vs. 
 Macauley-Fien Manufacturing Co., 199 N. Y., 207, 
 210, 211, supra. 
 
 A later act, granting powers to all cities in 
 Similar broad and general terms is the Municipal 
 Empowering Act referred to above,—Laws of 1913, 
 ch. 247, adding article Il-a, “Powers of Cities” to 
 the general city law. Section 19 contains a general 
 grant of powers in the following terms: 
 
 \ 
 
 “Every city is granted power to regulate, 
 manage and control its property and local 
 affairs and is granted all the rights, privileges 
 and jurisdiction necessary and proper for 
 carrying such power into execution. No enum- 
 eration of powers in this or any other law shall 
 operate to restrict the meaning of this general 
 grant of power, or to exclude other powers 
 comprehended within the general grant.” 
 
 Section 20 adds to this grant of powers a grant 
 of powers more specifically enumerated, including 
 the following: 
 
 13. “To maintain order, enforce the laws 
 protect property and preserve and care for the 
 safety, health, comfort and general welfare of 
 the inhabitants of the city and visitors there- 
 to; and for any of said purposes to regulate 
 and license occupations and businesses.”’ 
 
 17. “To determine and regulate the number, 
 mode of selection, terms of employment, 
 qualifications, powers and duties and com- 
 pensation of all employees of the city and the 
 relations of all officers and employees of the 
 
97 
 Point VI. 
 
 city to each other, to the city and to the in- 
 habitants.” 
 
 19. “To regulate the manner of transacting 
 the city’s business and affairs and the report- 
 ing of and accounting for all transactions of 
 or concerning the city.” 
 
 22. “To regulate by ordinance any matter 
 within the powers of the city, and to provide 
 for the enforcement of ordinances by legal 
 proceedings, to compel compliance therewith, 
 and by penalties, forfeitures and imprisonment 
 to punish violations thereof.” 
 
 Section 21 provides: 
 
 “The terms ‘public or municipal purpose,’ 
 and ‘general welfare,’ as used in this article, 
 shall each include the promotion of education, 
 art, beauty, charity, amusement, recreation, 
 health, safety, comfort and convenience, and 
 all of the purposes enumerated in the last pre- 
 ceding section.” 
 
 Section 22 provides: 
 
 §22. “This grant in addition to existing 
 powers. The powers granted by this article 
 shall be in addition to and not in substitution 
 for, all the powers, rights, privileges and func- 
 tions existing in any city pursuant to any 
 other provision of law.” 
 
 Section 24 provides: 
 
 “This article shall be construed, not as an 
 act in derogation of the powers of the state, 
 
98 
 Point VI. 
 
 but as one intended to aid the state in the ex- 
 ecution of its duties, by providing adequate 
 power of local government for the cities of the 
 state.” 
 
 This act has been approved in a number of deci- 
 sions, notably by Pound, J., in Mills vs. Sweeney, 
 219 N. Y., 218, 221, and has been applied and en- 
 forced in Hellyer vs. Prendergast, 176 App. Div., 
 383. 
 
 This series of enactments and many others like 
 them are in all essential particulars the precedents 
 and models upon which the present act is based. 
 
 The weight to be given to this long series of 
 legislative enactments as constituting a prior, con- 
 temporaneous and subsequent demonstration of the 
 extent of power understood to be vested in the 
 Legislature by the constitution is thus stated in 
 People ex rel. Hinsfeld vs. Murray, 149 N. Y., 367, 
 376: 
 
 “This legislative policy which has prevailed 
 for so long a period, sanctioned by numerous 
 statutes, never questioned in the courts and 
 acquiesced in by all departments of the state 
 government, it is a practical construction of 
 the constitutional provision now in question 
 * * * and this construction ought not now 
 to be disturbed.” 
 
 See also 
 
 Matter of City of New York (Tibbett 
 Av;),(22U5N. Yi, lain: 
 
 There are also a large number of direct Court 
 constructions of the Constitution on this subject 
 
99 | 
 Point VI. 
 
 and they are uniformily contrary to the decision 
 below. Z 
 
 The practice represented by the above charters 
 was common so long ago as to be referred to as a 
 well known mode of legislation in People vs. 
 Morris, 13 Wend., 325, 330, as follows: “Instead of 
 prescribing at their discretion every duty to be per- 
 formed, and forbidding every act to be avoided—in 
 a word directing the whole system of government 
 to be observed and executed—the legislature has 
 merely defined the outlines and leading principles, 
 and conferred upon the inhabitants within the 
 bounds of the corporation, the power at their 
 discretion to fill up and carry them into opera- 
 tion.” 
 
 In People ex rel. City of Rochester vs. Briggs, 
 50 N. Y., 553, 558, 559, the Court, discussing the 
 contents of a city charter, which it held properly 
 to embrace all the “laws relating to any specified 
 municipal corporation * * * those which create 
 the body, or define and regulate its powers and 
 prescribe the mode of their exercise,” said: “A 
 municipal corporation * * * possesses such 
 powers, and such only, as are conferred upon it 
 by the legislature; and they are to be exercised 
 in such form, mode and manner, and by such 
 agencies as the legislature may from time to time 
 prescribe within the limits of the constitution.” 
 
 See, also, Townsend vs. Mayor, 16 Hun, 362, 364; 
 midair N. Y., 362: 
 
 The grant of power which is here made the prin- 
 cipal subject of attack, viz.: the grant of power to 
 the local authorities to control the creation, ad- 
 ministration and duties of local offices and em- 
 ployments has been many times specifically sus- 
 tained by the courts of this State. 
 
100 
 Point VI. 
 
 People vs. Conover, 17 N. Y., 64, 66. 
 Sullivan vs. Mayor, 53 N. Y., 652. 
 Costello vs. Mayor, 63 N. Y., 48. 
 
 People vs. Ham, 166 N. Y., 477, 480, 481. 
 People vs. Sing Sing, 180 N. Y., 527, af- 
 firming 54 A. D., 555 (A. D., 1 D.). 
 
 People vs. Ahearn, 193 N. Y., 441. 
 
 Healey vs. Dudley, 5 Lans., 115 (4 D.). 
 
 Miller vs. Warner, 42 A. D., 208, 209 (4 
 D.). 
 
 Meyers vs. Mayor, 69 Hun, 291 (1 D.). 
 
 Eckerson vs. City, 80 A. D., 12 (1 D.), 
 ail 176° N. ¥., 609. 
 
 People vs. Cocks, 172 A. D., 787 (2 D.). 
 
 City vs. Sailors’ Sung Harbor, 85 A. D., 
 355, affirmed on Op. below, 180 N. Y., 
 527. 
 
 Hellyer vs. Prendergast, 176 A. D., 383. 
 
 Norris vs. City of Brooklyn, 19 Hun, 296. 
 
 In People vs. Conover, 17 N. Y., 64, 66 (supra), 
 in holding that the Governor had no power to ap- 
 point a street commissioner in the City of New 
 York, after the passage of Chapter 28, Laws 1849, 
 and Chapter 278, Laws 1849, the Court, at pages 
 66-67, expounded the city’s complete control in 
 all respects over offices created by it. 
 
 In Sullwan vs. Mayor, 53 N. Y., 652 (supra), 
 the Court upheld the power of the New York City 
 authorities to create the position of janitor in the 
 police force, notwithstanding the tax levy act of 
 1869 expressly prohibited the creation of new of: 
 fices or departments. The Court ruled that the 
 position in question was not an office within this 
 prohibition, but an employment, and so fell with- 
 in the general power of the local authorities. 
 
101 
 Point VI. 
 
 In Costello vs. Mayor, 63 N. Y., 48 (supra), the 
 Court went still farther than the case of Sullivan 
 vs. Mayor, swpra, and sustained the validity of a 
 city ordinance providing for an additional clerk 
 to the Board of Aldermen and held that this, 
 though the creation of an office, was still not pro- 
 hibited by a tax levy act of 1869, discussed in the 
 Sulliwan case. 
 
 In People vs. Ham, 166 N. Y., 477, 480, 481 
 (supra), the Court held, under the second class 
 cities law continuing the police department until 
 changed by the city council, that the City Council 
 of Albany had power to abolish the office of sta- 
 tionhouse keeper, which was provided for by its 
 charter. 
 
 In People vs. Sing Sing, 54 A. D., 555 (1 D.), 
 supra, Section 7 of the Sing Sing Charter (Chap- 
 ter 83, Laws 1896), was upheld. This section pro- 
 vided that 
 
 “all other officers shall be appointed for the 
 terms and in the manner hereinafter pro- 
 vided, or as may be hereafter fixed and de- 
 termined by” the Village Trustees. 
 
 Under this section, the Trustees had provided 
 that the term of office of policeman should expire 
 on each first of May, and this action was attacked 
 on the ground that it was made pursuant to an 
 unconstitutional delegation of power. This con- 
 tention was urged on the authority of People vs. 
 Cram, 165 N. Y., 166, but the Court distinguished 
 that case on the ground that it involved an at- 
 tempted delegation of power to fix terms of office 
 to the Civil Service Commission, and that its prin- 
 ciple did “not extend to a delegation of power to 
 
102 
 Point VI. 
 
 a board of village trustees which clearly may be 
 invested with other powers, as for instance, to 
 make ordinances which have the same force with- 
 in the corporate limits as the statute passed by the 
 Legislature itself” (page 557). 
 
 In People vs. Ahearn, 193 N. Y., 441 (supra), 
 the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 
 388, Chapter 466, Laws 1901 (The New York City 
 Charter), which gave to the Borough President 
 the power “to organize such bureaus as he shall 
 from time to time deem necessary to the proper 
 discharge of the duties of his department.” The 
 courts below had held this provision unconstitu- 
 tional upon grounds similar to those asserted by 
 the plaintiffs here, and in its opinion of reversal 
 the Court of Appeals overruled those contentions, 
 with a valuable discussion, holding: 
 
 “the power clearly belongs to that class which 
 ‘can be delegated to administrative officers of 
 the municipality for exercise within the mu- 
 nicipality,’ of which many notable examples 
 are given by the Chief Judge of this Court in 
 Village of Saratoga Springs vs. Saratoga Gas, 
 etc., Co. (191 N. Y., 123),” page 445. 
 
 In Healey vs. Dudley, 5 Lans., 115 (supra), the 
 General Term, in holding unconstitutional an act 
 which authorized the county supervisors to fix the 
 salaries of county judges, expressly based its deci-. 
 sion upon the fact that county judges were not local 
 officers (page 120). 
 
 In Miller vs. Warner, 42 A. D., 208, 209 (supra), 
 the Court, in holding that an electrical operator 
 of the police telegraph system in Rochester was 
 not a public officer who could maintain a bill to re- 
 
103 
 Point VI. 
 
 strain his discharge, made the following dictum 
 upon the subject here at issue: 
 
 “A public officer is not a natural growth of 
 the soil, and can be created only by the Leg- 
 islature or by some municipal board or body 
 authorized by the Legislature to create a pub- 
 lic office.” 
 
 Meyers vs. Mayor, 69 Hun, 291, supra, and Eck- 
 erson vs. City, 80 A. D., 12, supra, affirmed 176 
 N. Y., 609, on opinion below, held the same propo- 
 sition with the same dictum. 
 
 In People vs. Cocks, 172 A. D., 858 (2nd D.), 
 supra, the converse of the situation presented in 
 Healey vs. Dudley, supra, directly came up and 
 held in accordance with the dictum in that case. 
 It involved the validity of Chapter 11, Laws 1915, 
 which gave to town boards the power to fix by 
 resolution the salaries not exceeding $1,500 of Jus- 
 tices of the Peace. It was claimed that this was 
 in violation of Article III, Section 1, of the Con- 
 stitution, but the Court held not, saying that: 
 
 “The fixation of salaries of municipal of- 
 ficers is largely a municipal matter, though 
 the Legislature may, and in many cases does, 
 exercise that power itself. There is no prec- 
 edent cited that a statute giving a locality, 
 through its authorized agents, a power to fix 
 the salaries of its officers or employees is an 
 unlawful delegation of legislative powers” 
 (page 739). 
 
 In this case the decision of People vs. Klinck 
 Packing Co., 214 N. Y., 121, which was relied on 
 
104 
 
 PoInT VL 
 
 by the plaintiffs below, was distinguished upon the 
 same grounds on the which the Cram case was dis- 
 tinguished in People vs. Sing Sing, supra. 
 
 In City vs. Trustees of Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 180 
 N. Y., 527 (supra), this Court affirmed on the 
 opinion below the decision of the Appellate Divi- 
 sion for the First Department reported in 85 A. D., 
 355. This case held that the Superintendent of 
 Buildings in the City of New York continued to 
 have exclusive jurisdiction over the erection of 
 fire escapes in the Borough of Manhattan, notwith- 
 standing the subsequent passage of the General 
 Labor Law of the State, which was claimed to have 
 transferred such jurisdiction to the State Factory 
 Inspector. The Appellate Division, whose opin- 
 ion was adopted by this Court as aforesaid, stated 
 that the local act was not to be taken as destroyed 
 by the general act “in the absence of an express 
 repeal” (page 359). 
 
 Hellyer vs. Prendergast, 176 A. D., 383 (supra), 
 decided by the Second Department on January 5, 
 1917, is the latest case we have observed on the 
 subject. It upheld an ordinance of the City of 
 New York which prohibited the appointment or 
 employment in the city service of any persons who 
 were not citizens or residents in good faith of the 
 State. 
 
 In Norris vs. City of Brooklyn, 19 Hun, 296, 
 supra, the Brooklyn Charter of 1875 had author- 
 ized the heads of departments to employ the neces- 
 sary clerks and fix their salaries. An Act of 1877 
 authorized the common council to fix and regulate 
 salaries. Held, that the Act of 1877 did not re- 
 peal the provisions of the Act of 1873, but until 
 the Common Council acted, the heads of depart- 
 ments could continue to fix salaries. 
 
105 
 Point VI. 
 
 - The discretion vested in a Legislature by the 
 broad provision of the constitution empowering 
 it “to provide for the organization of cities” was 
 67 Fla., 181, 190, supra, discussing similar provi- 
 sions of the Florida Constitution and upholding 
 a delegation of power fully as broad ag the one now 
 before the court (pages 190, 191, 193; for facts see 
 supra). z 
 
 “The section of the Constitution empower- 
 ing the Legislature ‘to establish and to 
 abolish municipalities, to provide for their 
 government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and 
 powers, and to alter or amend the same at any 
 time,’ does not prescribe the manner by which 
 or the instrumentalities through which the 
 Legislature in dealing with municipalities 
 shall ‘provide for their government’ or ‘pre- 
 scribe their jurisdiction and powers.’ In the 
 absence of organic direction or limitation, the 
 Legislature may adopt any appropriate in- 
 strumentalities in discharging its duty ‘to pro- 
 vide for the government’ of a municipality. 
 Purely local regulations may as legally and 
 more conveniently be provided through muni- 
 cipal governments, and liberal use of muni- 
 cipalities for local governmental purposes is 
 clearly contemplated by the quoted provisions 
 of the Constitution. 
 
 The express authority given to the Legis- 
 lature by the constitution to ‘prescribe’ the 
 ‘powers’ of municipalities, and ‘to provide for 
 their government,’ is not subject to implied 
 limitations that would curtail the real intent 
 and purpose of the authority expressly con- 
 ferred as disclosed by a consideration of the 
 
166 
 Point VI. 
 
 language used and the subject matter upon 
 which it operates. 
 
 While under the express authority ‘to pro- 
 vide for the government’ of municipalities and 
 ‘prescribe their jurisdiction and powers and 
 to alter or amend the same at any time,’ the 
 Legislature cannot delegate to a municipality 
 its general lawmaking power for the State, 
 nor confer a power that violates any other 
 express provision of organic law, nor confer 
 ‘powers’ other than for municipal purposes, 
 yet the Legislature has a wide discretion in 
 the government it may provide and in the 
 powers it may prescribe for a municipality, 
 and also in the means and instrumentalities 
 it may use in providing the government and 
 prescribing the powers, when organic law is 
 not plainly violated. See Erickson vs. City 
 of Des Moines, 137 Iowa 452, 115 N. W. Rep., 
 Lites 
 
 “Neither the Constitution nor the common 
 law defines the line of separation between the 
 powers that shall be exercised directly by the 
 Legislature, and those that may be indirectly 
 exercised through delegated authority con- 
 ferred upon municipal governmental agencies. 
 Where the Legislature has authority to pro- 
 vide a governmental regulation, and the or- 
 ganic law does not prescribe the manner of 
 adopting or providing it, and the nature of 
 the regulation does not require that it be af- 
 forded by direct legislative act, such regula- 
 tion may be provided either directly by the 
 legislative, or indirectly by the legislative use 
 of any appropriate instrumentality, where no 
 provision or principle of organic law is there- 
 
107 
 
 Point VI. 
 
 by violated. If this rule is not recognized, 
 many useful governmental regulations may be 
 practically unattainable to the detriment of 
 the public, when in the language of the Con- 
 stitution the ‘government is instituted for the 
 protection, security and benefit of the citizens.’ 
 This salutary principle is observed with 
 reference to administrative boards and officers, 
 and it is specifically applicable to powers that 
 may be conferred upon municipalities for local] 
 governmental purposes. Such a principle is 
 particularly useful in our system where the 
 Constitution in fixing the status and powers 
 of municipalities expressly authorizes the 
 Legislature ‘to provide for their government’ 
 and ‘to prescribe their jurisdiction and powers, 
 and to alter or amend the same at any time,’ 
 by local or special laws’ to meet the inherently 
 varied local conditions and requirements that 
 are particular to this State, in the interest of 
 the public welfare.” 
 
 In State ex rel. Gentry vs. Mayor, etc., of Village 
 of Dodson, 123 La., 903, the Court upheld the con- 
 stitutionality of an act providing as follows: 
 
 “The mayor and board of alderman of every 
 city, town and village shall have the care, 
 management and control of the city, town or 
 village and its property and finances, and shall 
 have power to enact ordinances for the pur- 
 poses hereinafter named and such as are not 
 repugnant to the laws of the state and such 
 ordinances to alter, modify and repeal and 
 they shall have power to provide for the elec- 
 tion of such municipal officers other than those 
 
108 
 Point VI. 
 
 required by this act as may be fotind neces- 
 sary, to prescribe the duties and to fix the 
 compensation of all officers and employees, 
 and to require bonds with sureties for the per- 
 formance of duties from all officers and em- 
 ployes;’ and sustained the action of a village 
 council in fixing the compensation of the Mar- 
 shal. 
 
 In City of Woodward vs. Leech, 20 Cal. App., 15, 
 18, 19, supra, the Court said, in upholding the con- 
 stitutionality of an act which authorized the City 
 Government to consolidate certain offices by ordi- 
 nance: 
 
 “Tt is not, of course, necessary for the Leg- 
 islature to prescribe the duties of all city offi- 
 cers. This power may be conferred upon the 
 city and it is certainly competent for the Leg- 
 islature to authorize the city to make changes 
 in the duties of the various officers when it is 
 deemed for the best interests of the commu- 
 nity to do so.” 
 
109 
 POINT VII. 
 
 The Court below erred in holding 
 that the Act violates Article XII, Sec- 
 tion 1 of the Constitution by authoriz- 
 ing (as the Court assumed) the re- 
 moval of the existing tax limit. 
 
 The reasoning of the Court below is that the ex- 
 isting charter limits the rate of municipal tax- 
 ation; that the present act permits the City Coun- 
 cil to do away with that restriction; -and that 
 thereby the act violates the command of the consti- 
 tution requiring the Legislature to restrict the 
 power of taxation in municipalities. 
 
 The Municipal Empowering Act, which dealt 
 with the question of powers as distinguished from 
 the question of machinery covered by the present 
 act, would have been even more subject to this at- 
 tack if there had been any basis for it, but never- 
 theless, it has been approved by the courts: 
 
 Mills vs. Sweeney, 219 N. Y., 213, 221-2: 
 
 Hammitt vs. Gaynor, 82 Misc., 196-199; 
 affirmed without opinion, 165 A. D., 
 909 ; 
 
 Hellyer vs. Prendergast, 176 A. D., 388, 
 supra; 
 
 Gibbs vs. Luther, 81 Misc., 611-616; af- 
 firmed without opinion, 158 A. D., 951. 
 
 We submit, first, that the act does not even at- 
 tempt to authorize the abolition of the tax limit, 
 and second, that whether the tax limit should or 
 should not remain in force was a matter entirely 
 within the discretion of the Legislature, third, That 
 if restrictions are essential they exist in other acts 
 
110 
 Port VII. 
 
 which are binding on the new city council; and 
 fourth, that even if it were otherwise, the effect 
 would be merely that the prior restriction- was 
 not validly repealed and still remains effective. 
 
 FIRST.—The Council is not author- 
 ized by the act to do away with the 
 tax limit. 
 
 The restriction in question is contained in Sec- 
 tion 176 of the City Charter (Laws of 1897, Ch. 
 760), which authorizes the council to raise moneys 
 by tax annually, and is as follows: 
 
 “Provided, that the amount of the tax 
 raised in any year for the aforesaid city ex- 
 penses (excluding the amount to be raised for 
 State and county purposes) shall not exceed 
 one dollar and seventy cents upon every one 
 hundred dollars of the assessed valuation of 
 taxable property in said city.” 
 
 This is very plainly a limitation on the extent of 
 the taxing power, as distinguished from a regula- 
 tion of its exercise. It does not tell the council in 
 what manner it must proceed, but fixes a limit on 
 its power. If we are right in our contention above 
 that the act delegates to the council only the regu- 
 lation of the exercise of existing powers without 
 enlarging or affecting the extent of those powers, 
 it follows that the tax limit provision remains in 
 force and the council is not even sought to be au- 
 thorized to do away with it. The present act no- 
 where in terms confers any power to tax; it deals 
 only with the exercise of the existing power. Any 
 doubt on this point should be resolved in favor of a 
 
111 
 Point VII. 
 
 construction, which will make the act, in the opin- 
 ion of the Court, reasonable and constitutional 
 (see discussion on that subject, infra). 
 
 SECOND.—Even if the act had au- 
 thorized the removal of the tax limit, 
 it would have been within the power 
 of the Legisiature. 
 
 The provision of Article XII, Section 1, is that 
 
 “It shall be the duty of the Legislature to 
 provide for the organization of cities and in- 
 corporated villages, and to restrict their power 
 of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, 
 contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so 
 as to prevent abuses in assessments and in 
 contracting debt by such municipal corpora- 
 tions.” 
 
 This is a command to the Legislature to impose 
 such restrictions as it deems wise for the purposes 
 mentioned. It does not require the Legislature to 
 impose any particular restrictions and furnishes 
 no test by which a court could judge whether the 
 command of the Constitution has been complied 
 with. Consequently, it is a mere general direction 
 for the exercise of a political power of a discre- 
 tionary nature; the Legislature is the sole judge 
 of when and how far it will proceed in pursuance 
 thereof; and its action or failure to act cannot be 
 reviewed by the courts, who would otherwise be 
 substituting their judgment for that of the Legis- 
 lature. This is well settled. 
 
 Bank of Rome vs. Village of Rome, 18 N. Y., 38, 
 42, 43, sustained an act authorizing the village of 
 
Lig 
 Point VII. 
 
 Rome to subscribe to railroad stock against the ob- 
 jection that the power granted had not been re- 
 stricted, in compliance with the constitutional pro- 
 vision in question. 
 
 “Indefinite as is the rule of restriction pre- 
 scribed by this provision, and ill-suited in its 
 terms to be judicially applied, it is still both 
 salutory and well suited to be the guide of leg- 
 islative discretion. It presents to the Legisla- 
 ture the general object to be attained, the pre- 
 vention of abuses in assessments and contract- 
 ing debts, and the general means of attaining 
 that object, by restrictions on the powers to be 
 conferred on municipal corporations; but it 
 leaves to the discretionary power of that body 
 the determination of what are abuses, and 
 what extent of restriction, on the powers to 
 tax, to lay assessments, to borrow, to contract 
 debts, to loan credit, will prevent such abuses. 
 
 * * * *% * = * % 
 
 If their judgment has been in any particu- 
 lar case erroneous, if the limit which they 
 deemed sufficient has proved not narrow 
 enough to exclude abuses, surely their judg- 
 ment is not to be reviewed and reversed in a 
 court of law. The rule is general that a dis- 
 cretion committed to one authority is not to be 
 reviewed by another. It holds, in regard to 
 tribunals, even of the most limited power, and 
 it applies at least with equal force when the 
 depositary of the discretion is also the deposi- 
 tary of the legislative power of the State. 
 
 T conclude, therefore, that the provision in 
 question does not set forth any rule by which 
 
113 
 Pornt VII. 
 
 a court can adjudge an act of the Legislature 
 to be void. The rule was intended to operate 
 upon the conscience and judgment of the Leg- 
 islature in passing laws, and we must assume 
 that the law in question was enacted by them 
 in view of it, and of all the responsibility which 
 it imposed, and that in the legislative judg- 
 ment this act did so restrict the powers in 
 question as to prevent abuses.” 
 
 Followed in 
 Matter of Livingston Street, 82. N. Y., 621. 
 
 Townsend vs. Mayor, 16 Hun, 362, 364, affirmed 
 77 N. Y., 542, upheld the provision of an act cre- 
 ating a board of estimate and apportionment in the 
 City of New York, and authorizing it annually to 
 determine “such amount as shall be necessary to 
 be raised by taxation in the City and County of 
 New York for county purposes,” without limit of 
 amount, 
 
 “The language of this section clearly recog- 
 nizes the right of the Legislature to confer 
 upon any city the right to determine what 
 moneys should be raised for municipal pur- 
 poses under such restrictions as the Legisla- 
 ture may see fit to impose. 
 
 There is no limitation in the Constitution 
 which at all affects the right of the Legislature 
 to place the power of determining the amounts 
 to be raised for municipal purposes in the 
 hands of such municipal officers as they may 
 see fit, and their power, unless so limited, has 
 
Be 
 Point VII. 
 
 been held to be in the case above cited, in all 
 respects relating to taxation, supreme. The 
 only limitation of this power contained in the 
 Constitution is that providing that the Legis- 
 lature shall restrict the power of taxation of 
 cities and villages. That the Legislature is the 
 sole judge of what restrictions shall be im- 
 posed upon taxation by municipal corpora- 
 tions, in pursuance of this requirement of the 
 Constitution, has been frequently held by the 
 courts of this State (People ex rel. Griffin vs. 
 The Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 489; The 
 Bank of Rome vs. The Village of Rome, 18 id., 
 38). And the courts have no power to review 
 the action of the Legislature.” 
 
 Under these authorities the Legislature was un- 
 der no duty to establish any limit on the amount 
 to be raised by tax. It was within its discretion 
 to establish such a limit and to repeal it at any 
 time; and if the legislature could itself repeal the 
 limitation, it could provide for its repeal conse- 
 quently upon the taking of lawful action by the 
 city council under the power delegated to it (see 
 supra). 
 
 THIRD.—Ifi restrictions are essen- 
 tial, they exist in other laws which 
 are binding on the new City Council. 
 
 Restrictions imposed by the legislature, in the 
 exercise of its discretionary power, on the taxing 
 power and on the debt-incurring power, are to be 
 found throughout the Tax Law, in sections 5 to 20 
 inclusive and section 84 of the General Municipal 
 
Lis 
 Point VII. 
 
 Law, and in section 23, subdivision 2-a of the Gen- 
 eral City Law (the Municipal Empowering Act), 
 all of which are general laws of the state applicable 
 to all cities, and are continued in force by the 
 present act, as shown above; also in various other 
 provisions of the Watertown Charter (Laws of 
 1897, chapter 760, sections 173 to 226, 295); and 
 See also sections 92 (as amended Laws of 1914, 
 chapter 4), 205 and 300 of the charter, requiring 
 taxpayers’ votes for certain purposes, all of which 
 provisions are expressly continued in force by sec- 
 tions 8, 10 and 37, last clause, of the present act. 
 
 FOURTH.—Even if the Act did at- 
 tempt to authorize an abolition of the 
 tax limit, and even if such authoriza- 
 tion would have been beyond the lez- 
 islative discretion, the only effect 
 would be that the old restriction has 
 never been repealed and still re- 
 mains effective. 
 
 The preceding answers which we have given to 
 this objection are, we submit, clearly sound, but it 
 seems clear also that the whole objection is imma- 
 terial. If the Legislature had no power to repeal 
 the old existing restrictions, its effort to do so was 
 necessarily unsuccessful and the restriction still 
 remains and limits the power of the City Council, 
 and so, even on the theory of the Court below, the 
 provisions of Article XII, Section 1, remain satis- 
 fied. 
 
116 
 POINT VIII. 
 
 The Act does not violate Article 
 XII, Section 2, requiring submission 
 of special city bills to the local au- 
 thorities. 
 
 This objection was not sustained by the Court 
 below, but as it was presented by counsel, we shall 
 briefly discuss it. 
 
 The claim of counsel was that the bill ought to 
 have been submitted to the Mayor or the Mayor 
 and Council before it could become effective,—this 
 because of the provisions of Article XII, Section 2 
 of the Constitution. 
 
 The terms of the Constitution, however, explicit 
 ly limit this requirement to special city laws and 
 certainly this act is not such a special law. 
 
 The argument of counsel to the effect that even a 
 general acts which repeal special laws must be sub- 
 mitted to the local authorities leads to the prepos- 
 terous result that the Legislature is to be regarded 
 as abdicating all power of general city legislation 
 the moment it passes any special city law. 
 
 Counsel’s further argument that this is to be in- 
 terpreted as a special city law because it may oper- 
 ate, and is intended to operate, differently in differ- 
 ent cities to the extent of superseding provisions 
 of their special charters, was equally unsound, for 
 the same reason that it would preclude the Legisla- 
 ture from exercising its constitutional power of 
 dealing with cities by general act. This very point, 
 was made and overruled in Hammitt vs. Gaynor, 82 
 Misc., 196, 199, affirmed without opinion in 165 A. 
 D., 909, supra. 
 
 The whole question has been closed, however, by 
 the decision of this Court in Koster vs. Coyne, 
 
117 
 Pornt VIII. 
 
 184 N. Y., 494, sustaining the Second Class 
 Cities Law (Laws of 1898, ¢. 182, as amended by 
 c. 501 L. 1905) against this precise objection. If 
 it is urged that the case particularly involved there, 
 was of a city not certainly to be affected by the act, 
 the same is true under this law because at the time 
 of its passage its effect in superseding the charter 
 of any city at all was doubtful because it depended 
 upon subsequent action to be taken in the several 
 cities. 
 
 Attention may also be directed not only to Ham- 
 mitt vs. Gaynor, supra, but also to the general rule 
 laid down in St. John. vs. Andrews Institute, 191 
 N. Y., 254, 270, and reiterated in People ex ret. 
 Central Trust Co. vs. Prendergast, 202 N. Y., 188, 
 195, with reference to this section of the Constitu- 
 tion that 
 
 “Tf the act relates to persons, places and 
 things as a class and is neither local nor tem- 
 porary, the mere fact that its practical effect 
 is special and private does not necessarily 
 prove that it violates constitutional provisions 
 against special legislations.” 
 
 As was said in Gubner vs. McClellan, 130 A. D., 
 val hey @4— am 
 
 “The argument that a provision, special in 
 
 locality, making an act pro tento local, has 
 
 been rejected repeatedly by the courts. Such 
 
 a rule would make it impossible for the Leg- 
 
 islature in many cases to- pass a law adapted 
 
 to the diversified conditions and means of the 
 different localities of the State.” 
 
 And see 
 
 Paul vs. Gloucester County, 50 N. J. L, 
 585, 609. 
 
118 
 POINT IX. 
 
 The Court below erred in its intima- 
 tion that the powers conferred on 
 the City Council by this Act did not 
 comply with the guaranties of the 
 Federal Constitution requiring a re- 
 publican form of government, 
 
 It is evident from the Court’s opinion that this 
 was regarded rather as “an interesting question” 
 than a constitutional objection for serious consid- 
 eration (fol. 223). 
 
 Of course the attribution to a representative and 
 elective council of the sort of powers granted un- 
 der this act cannot be a violation of the right to a 
 republican form of government, and in any event 
 the United States Supreme Court has directly held 
 that no Court has constitutional power to decide 
 such a question. 
 
 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. vs. 
 Oregon, 223 U. S., 118, dismissing writ 
 of error to review, 53 Ore., 162. 
 
 Kiernan vs. Portland, 223 U. S8., 151, dis- 
 missing writ of error to review, 57 Ore., 
 454, 
 
 Denver vs. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S., 
 128, 141. 
 
119 
 POINT X. 
 
 An Act of the Legislature will not 
 be declared unconstitutional unless 
 it clearly violates some provision of 
 the Constitution; and every presump- 
 tion must be indulged against such a 
 eonstruction of the Act as would in- 
 validate it. This is especially true 
 where the results of invalidation 
 would be so serious as in this case. 
 
 The questions raised in this case should be con- 
 sidered in the light of the established rule that a 
 law will not be declared unconstitutional unless it 
 clearly appears to violate some express or implied 
 restraint on legislative power, and that the burden 
 of showing its invalidity rests on those who attack 
 it. 
 
 People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532, 543; 
 
 Metropolitan Board of Excise vs. Barrie, 
 34 N. Y., 657, 668, 669; 
 
 Waterloo Woolen Manufacturing Co. vs. 
 Shanahan, 128 N. Y., 345, 357; 
 
 - Koch vs. Mayor, 152 N. Y., 72, 75; 
 
 People ex rel. Simon vs. Bradley, 207 
 N.Y., 592; 610; 
 
 Willis vs. City of Rochester, 219 N. Y., 
 427, 432. 
 
 All the main points of the objections raised by 
 the court below depend upon constructions of the 
 act which we have shown to be not only unfounded 
 but excessively strained. None of them consist 
 with the plain spirit and purpose of the act. 
 
 But even if they were doubtful they cannot pre- 
 vail, on a constitutional question, against the other 
 constructions which would sustain the act. 
 
120 
 
 POINT X. 
 
 The Court will hardly need citation of authori- 
 ties on this proposition, but the following are 
 among the multitude of cases on the point: 
 
 Clarke vs. Rochester, 28 N. Y., 605, 637. 
 
 People e rel. Simon vs. Bradley, 207 N. Y., 
 592, 610, 611, collecting the authorities. 
 
 Tauza-vs. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 
 N. ¥., 259, 267. 
 
 Dollar Co. vs. Canadian Car & Foundry 
 Co., 220 N. Y., 270, 275. 
 
 The situation is especially serious here, the City 
 of Watertown having by formal vote of its citizens 
 adopted this charter and being under the necessity 
 for making some provision for its government 
 thereunder. 
 
 The city governments of Niagara Falls and New- 
 burgh would also be thrown into chaotic conditions 
 if this act is held unconstitutional. 
 
 Both of these cities, like the city of Watertown, 
 adopted the commission manager plan (Plan C) 
 under the optional City Government Law. It is 
 true that in view of the questions raised as to the 
 validity of the law, each of these cities procured 
 the enactment of a special legislative charter; but 
 these charters were mainly confirmatory in their 
 nature, and were by their express terms supple- 
 mentary to the provisions of the Optional City 
 Government Law (Laws 1916, ch. 530, page 6, 
 Subd. 3; pages 56, 326, 330; Laws 1916, ch. 575, 
 §§8, 59). <A holding that the present act is un- 
 constitutional would involve in doubt the whole 
 government of these two cities, as well as that of 
 Watertown. In fact, since the decision in the case 
 at bar, the court below has held that the necessary 
 
121 
 POINT X. 
 
 effect of that decision is to render null and void 
 the existing city government of Niagara Falls 
 (People ex rel. Ferguson vs. Vroman, App. Div., 
 Fourth Department, October 19, 1917, now pending 
 in this Court, return filed October 29, 1917.) 
 Other cities, too, are awaiting the clearing up of 
 their rights by the determination to be made by 
 this Court in the case at bar. 
 
 The serious results which would follow from 
 holding the statute invalid should have some weight 
 with the Court in considering the construction to 
 be put upon it. 
 
 Ramsey vs. People, 19 N. Y., 41, 52, 53. 
 People ex rel. Carter vs. Rice, 1385 N. Y., 
 473, 506, 507. 
 
122 
 POINT XI. 
 
 The objections chiefly relied on by 
 the Court below are against provi- 
 sions of the Act which are not essen- 
 tial to its main operation but are sep- 
 arable. 
 
 Under the principle that unconstitutional 
 clauses do not invalidate an entire statute if they 
 are separable (Village of Saratoga Springs vs. 
 Saratoga Gas Company, 199 N. Y., 1238, at page 
 131; People vs. Klinck Packing Co., 214 N. Y., 
 121; Dollar Co. vs. Canadian Car & Foundry Co., 
 220 N. Y., 270, 278, 289), we propose to recapitu- 
 late here each of the objections above discussed on 
 the merits, and discuss their separability. 
 
 The objection relative to control of the so-called 
 matters of state interest such as taxation, public 
 safety, health and charity, relate plainly to separa- 
 ble features because the existing boards on those 
 subjects can be continued without essential inter- 
 ference with the new charter as a whole. They 
 affect only details of the machinery. 
 
 The objection relative to repealing power in 
 these fields involves precisely the same situation. 
 
 The objection founded on Barto vs. Himrod to the 
 effect that the local ordinance power is not defined 
 with sufficient completeness is also separable, be- 
 cause if this local ordinance power fails as un- 
 constitutional, the old power would still remain to 
 be exercised by the new City Council. 
 
 The objection on the ground that the act elimi- 
 nates necessary restrictions to the taxing power is 
 clearly separable for the reason we have stated 
 above in Point VII—namely, if the restriction could 
 not validly have been repealed then the effort to 
 repeal it was ineffective and it still remains. 
 
ted 
 
 i) 
 
 123 
 Point XI. 
 
 The objection that the act is one of those special 
 city laws which is subject to the veto of the Mayor, 
 is, of course, radical if sound. 
 
 The objection that the act violates the guaranties 
 of republican form of government would also be 
 radical if sound. 
 
 The main object of the act, to allow the people 
 of the city to adopt a simplified form of govern- 
 ment, can still be accomplished, the people of the 
 City of Watertown can still effectuate their desire 
 of substituting for the existing Mayor and council 
 government a commission-manager form of govern- 
 ment, even if the entire grant of power to reorganize 
 the city government were denied it and the new 
 council left entirely subject to the same charter 
 restrictions now restraining the present council. 
 
 The secondary object of the Act, to enable the 
 city to attain a greater degree of efficiency in local 
 self-government by empowering the council to 
 regulate and control the details of the city admin- 
 istration, can still be given effect, if it should be 
 held that some one or more of the subjects over 
 which that control extends could not constitution- 
 ally be committed to local control. 
 
 We submit that, even if the Court should sustain 
 one or more of the objections which are thus 
 separable, and all of which we contend are un- 
 founded, it does not follow by any. means that the 
 entire Act should be declared null and void, but 
 the valid portions should at all events be saved 
 and the will of the legislature and of the people 
 of Watertown effectuated so far as the Court may 
 deem constitutionally possible. 
 
124 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 The judgments should be reversed 
 and judgment directed for the de- 
 fendants. 
 
 LAURENCE ARNOLD TANZER, 
 Counsel for the Municipal Government 
 Association of New York State, 
 233 Broadway, 
 New York City. 
 
 WINFRED T. DENISON, 
 of Counsel, 
 15 Broad Street, 
 New York City. 
 
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