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LINCOLN ROOM 
 
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 MEMORIAL 
 
 the Class of 1901 
 
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Lincoln and McClellan 
 
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Lincoln and McClellan 
 
 • • 
 
 By 
 M. L. Houser 
 
 • • 
 
 Prepared for 
 The Lincoln Group of Chicago 
 
 • • 
 
 COURIER PRINTING COMPANY 
 EAST PEORIA, ILLINOIS 
 
 1946 
 
Copyright 
 
 By M. L. Houser 
 
 1946 
 

 Lincoln and McClellan 
 
 Early in 1861, in what is now West Virginia, General George B. 
 McClellan, with 20,000 troops, gained several minor victories over 
 5,000 Confederates, took 1,000 prisoners, and issued some rhetorical 
 proclamations which appealed to the popular imagination. ( 1 ) With 
 the approval of the aged General Winfield Scott, McClellan was 
 called to Washington and given command of the Eastern army, which 
 only recently had been defeated at Bull Run.(2) 
 
 McClellan proved himself to be a splendid organizer and driller 
 of troops, he did a good job in fortifying the capital, and he made 
 himself exceedingly popular with his troops by his liberality in 
 granting furloughs.(3) 
 
 Unhappily, however, McClellan developed an exaggerated ego, 
 a martyr complex, and a timidity regarding opponents — always over- 
 estimating their number two or three times; all of which made him 
 practically a total loss as a fighter; and the war, if successfully con- 
 cluded, must be won through fighting. (4) During forty years of dis- 
 cussions and compromises, the situation had steadily grown worse. 
 
 McClellan affected to distrust those in authority, especially 
 Lincoln and Stanton; accused them of wishing him to fail; and, after 
 eight long months of preparation, refused, with 180,000 troops, to 
 attack General Johnston, who, with only 47,C00 Confederates, was 
 virtually besieging the capital.(5) 
 
 Strenuously opposing Mr. Lincoln's plan — later adopted by 
 Grant — of moving directly on Richmond, and thereby keeping his 
 army between the main Confederate army and Washington, McClellan 
 finally advanced by way of the Peninsula of the James ar.d York 
 Rivers, in southeast Virginia.(6) 
 
 Taking with him an army of 121,000 men — the largest active 
 army yet assembled on the American continent — and battery after 
 battery of superior artillery, he, upon landing from the transports, 
 permitted himself to be held up for a month by 11,000 Confederates 
 under General Magruder; consumed another two weeks in advanc- 
 ing fifty miles; was reinforced until the total troops that had been 
 placed under his command on the Peninsula numbered 160,000; 
 and when he still had something over 100,000 effectives, was attacked 
 by General Lee, who had succeeded Johnston, with at least 15,000, 
 probably 25,000 fewer soldiers.(7) He was driven back twenty-five 
 miles, with a loss of immense stores, fifty-two cannon, and 15,000 
 casualties; and he then huddled with his army at Harrison's Larding 
 on the James River, under the protection of Federal gunboats.(8) 
 
 Returning, under orders, with his army to Acquia Creek, near 
 
 3 
 
Washington, McClellan remained passive (or worse) while General 
 Pope, defending Washington with the Army of Virginia, was defeated 
 as disastrously as McClellan had been on the Peninsula. (9) Mc- 
 Clellan then got what few defeated and discredited generals receive 
 — a second chance. 
 
 Believing that McClellan was the best man available to re- 
 organize the disorganized and discouraged troops, and realizing how 
 popular McClellan had made himself with the army, including those 
 favorites whom he had appointed to high positions, Mr. Lincoln, 
 in disregard of the strenuous objections of his cabinet, restored Mc- 
 Clellan to command of the troops defending Washington; and also 
 permitted him to command the Army of the Potomac when it followed 
 Lee into Maryland. (10) 
 
 There, McClellan had fall into his lap a lost order in which 
 General Lee disclosed that he was contemptuously dividing his little 
 army, while almost within sight of the Federals, for the purpose of 
 capturing 12,000 Union soldiers at Harper's Ferry.(ll) McClellan, 
 with 87,000 troops, delayed attacking Lee's 40,0*00 until Lee had 
 time to complete his Harper's Ferry enterprise and reassemble his 
 forces at Antietam Creek. (12) 
 
 Tardily attacking approximately half the number of his own 
 troops "by driblets" and failing to make proper use of 12,500 soldiers 
 commanded by Fitz-John Porter, the best McClellan could, or did, 
 accomplish was a draw, with another 12,000 casualties. (13) Lee's 
 losses of about the same number had been cancelled in advance by 
 his capture of Union troops at Harper's Ferry. (14) 
 
 Lee waited a day for McClellan to attack again; then, knowing 
 that the Union army was receiving heavy reinforcements, deliber- 
 ately and peacefully crossed the Potomac into Virginia, found a good 
 camping ground, awaited reinforcements, and secured supplies for 
 his barefooted soldiers. (15 ) 
 
 Mr. Lincoln did everything he knew how, through appeals, 
 orders, and a personal visit, to induce McClellan to attack Lee, 
 and win a decisive victory, perhaps the war; and. incidentally, thereby 
 rehabilitate himself in the confidence of the country; but McClellan, 
 as usual, contented himself for weeks with making excuses and prom- 
 ises^ 16) Finally losing all hope, Lincoln appointed Burnside to the 
 command of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered McClellan to 
 retire to his home at Trenton.(17) 
 
 During this time, General Grant, with hastily trained troops, 
 had won victories in the West at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and 
 Pittsburgh Landing; Farragut had taken New Orleans; and Pope, 
 
with Footed assistance, had captured Island No. 10 and 6,000 
 prisoners. (18) But for these successes, the government probably 
 would have collapsed. Small wonder that Lincoln said of Grant: 
 "I can't spare this man; he fights." (19) 
 
 That McClellan's delusions of grandeur, martyr complex, and 
 petulance, reached such proportions as to approach "queerness," even 
 in a young man who had suddenly been shoved into a position beyond 
 his capacity, can be indicated by a few extracts, mostly from letters 
 written to his wife; and nowhere else, probably, does a man reveal 
 his real self so clearly as when he pours out his soul to the woman 
 who thinks that he is "wonderful." 
 
 I find myself in a new and strange position here: Presi- 
 dent, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me. I seem 
 to have become the power of the lard. (20) 
 
 I am daily becoming more disgusted with this adminis- 
 tration — perfectly sick of it. (21) 
 
 I was oblidged to attend a meeting of the cabinet at 
 8 P. M., and was bored and annoyed. There are some of 
 the greatest geese in the cabinet that I have ever seen. 
 
 It is sickening in the extreme, and makes me feel heavy 
 at heart, when I see the weakness and unfitness of the poor 
 beings who control the destinies of this great country. (23) 
 
 I have not been at home for some three hours, but am 
 concealed at Stanton's to dodge all enemies in the shape of 
 browsing Presidents. (24) 
 
 I am tired of serving fools. (25) 
 
 (That was) * * * one of the first steps taken to tie my 
 hands in order to secure the failure of the approaching 
 campaign. (26) 
 
 Don't worry about the wretches; they have done their 
 *worst; and can't do much more. History will present a sad 
 record of those traitors who are willing to sacrifice the 
 country and its army for personal spite.(27) 
 
 The President very coolly telegraphed me yesterday 
 that he thought I had better break the enemy's line at once. 
 I was much tempted to reply that he had better come and 
 do it himself. (28) 
 
 I feel that the fate of the nation depends on me, and 
 
 5 
 
I feel that I have not one single friend at the seat of gov- 
 ernment. (29) 
 
 When I see such insane folly behind me, I feel that the 
 final salvation of the country demands the utmost prudence 
 on my part. (30) 
 
 Anyone who cares for more of that sort of thing should read 
 McClellaris Own Story. 
 
 So far as I know, the only alternative to believing that McClellan's 
 remarkable conduct was caused by a faulty temperament is to sup- 
 pose that, for political reasons, he did not wish the war to be won 
 until such time as the administration might be compelled to make 
 peace with slavery intact; and leave undecided, or settle in favor 
 of the South, other issues which had helped cause the war. According 
 to Williams, in his Lincoln and the Radicals, General Randolph B. 
 Marcy. McClellan's father-in-law ard chief-of-staff, was supposed by 
 the Radicals to be "in secret sympathy with the Rebellion."(31) He 
 certainly was politically sympathetic with Clement L. Vallandigham, 
 whom Milton classes with "The Disloyal Opposition"; and who, also, 
 as that author says, eventually became chief of the Copperhead 
 fifth column. (32) 
 
 Early in July, 1862, after the Union army had been decisively 
 defeated on the Peninsula, and while it was cooped up on the James 
 River under the protection of gunboats, Lincoln visited McClellan; 
 in whom, by that time, practically no one else in the administration 
 had any confidence. (33) The President hoped, probably, that he 
 couid by kind counsel induce his disappointing protege to do better. 
 
 Instead of trying to defend himself because of his abject fail- 
 ures, McClellan handed Lincoln a long letter in which he advised 
 the President just how the government shouM be conducted. (34) 
 The most interesting part of this document, which a recent Mc- 
 Clellan biographer terms "extraordinary" and "amazing," was the 
 advice that the forcible abolition of slavery should not be considered 
 for a minute; ard that the military should not be allowed to impair 
 the authority of masters over slaves; with a covert threat that a 
 failure to heed such advice might lead to the "disintegration" of 
 "our present armies." 
 
 In the Army of the Potomac was a Major John J. Key, whose 
 brother was a member of McClellan's staff. Shortly before McClellan 
 was dismissed, Mr. Lincoln was told that Major Key, when asked 
 why the Confederate army was not "bagged" immediately after the 
 battle at Antietam, replied: 
 
Peninsula Campaign 
 
That is not the game. The object is that neither army 
 shall get much advantage over the other till they are ex- 
 hausted, and we shall make a compromise and save 
 slavery. (35) 
 
 When called to account by the President, Key admitted that the 
 report was substantially correct; and he was dismissed from the 
 service.(36) 
 
 When the President issued his preliminary Emancipation Procla- 
 mation on September 1, 1862, field commanders were instructed to 
 issue copies of it to their troops. The one that McClellan sent out 
 was accompanied by an order which contained this significant sen- 
 tence : 
 
 The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, 
 is to be found only in the action of the people at the 
 polls. (37) 
 
 Without direct and conclusive evidence, one hesitates to accuse 
 McClellan, or anyone, of treacherously and deliberately sabotaging 
 efforts of the administration to secure a quick decision; but McClel- 
 lan's best friends, as it seems to me, must admit that the course he 
 pursued might well have been adopted by anyone who did have that 
 purpose. Such a person, too, would probably voice loudmouthed 
 charges against Lincoln and Stanton, on the theory that a vigorous 
 offensive is usually the best defense. The rule, as everyone knows 
 is: "When you haven't much defense yourself, viciously attack the 
 Prosecuting Attorney." 
 
 Whether McClellan's failures were caused by his constitutional 
 weakness of character, by political considerations, or by both, I 
 insist that those failures were his own; and I deprecate their being 
 charged, even by inference, to treasonable conduct on the part of 
 Lincoln. That thought is neither new nor original. In 1885, over sixty 
 years ago, Hon. William D. Kelley, a member of Congress from 1860 
 until 1890, and eventually known as "Father of the House," in a 
 brochure entitled Lincoln and Stanton, when referring to an article 
 by McClellan then recently published in the Century, said: 
 
 Abraham Lincoln and Edwin M. Stanton are dead. No 
 member of Mr. Lincoln's cabinet during the Peninsula Cam- 
 paign is now living. * * * Emboldened by the ravages 
 death has made during nearly a quarter of a century, George 
 B. McClellan avails himself of the Century to present his 
 explanation of the failure of the Army of the Potomac while 
 under his command. The initial article * * * is an unjusti- 
 
fiable assault upon the memories of Lincoln a^d Stanton, 
 and but for this fact would not deserve notice * * *. The 
 statements by which he attempts to make good his assaults 
 upon the memory of the illustrious dead are sustained solely 
 by his word, and would vanish before a freshman's applica- 
 tion of the primary cannons of criticism. * * * I submit this 
 (essay) * * * in justice to the illustrious dead, whose mem- 
 ory the writer of that article so wantonly aspersed. (38) 
 
 One would suppose that the campaign charges made against 
 Mr. Lincoln, and the excuses made for General McClellan, during 
 the election contest of 1864, would now be forgotten, or would be 
 remembered only with tolerant amusement; but some distinguished 
 historians who sympathize with McClellan continue to assert, or 
 assume, that McClellan was a military genius and a political martyr 
 who was thwarted by a politically-minded Lincoln, aided and abetted 
 by a villainous Stanton. 
 
 Probably one of the finest traits in human nature is a disposition 
 to sympathize with the under dog; but I maintain that to defend him 
 by attributing his faults and mistakes to others is neither good 
 history nor good morals. 
 
 In all the insinuations and assumptions that Lincoln, with some 
 help from others, caused McClellan's failure on the Peninsula, the 
 only concrete and specific charge which I have found is that Presi- 
 dent Lincoln retained McDowell's corps and Blenker's division for 
 the defense of Washington when McClellan wanted them on the 
 Peninsula. The facts about this "FIRST GREAT CRIME OF THE 
 WAR," as Franklin first called it, are illuminating — and no little 
 astounding. (39) 
 
 When Lincoln finally consented that McClellan should move 
 on Richmond by way of the Peninsula, instead of keeping his army 
 between Washington and the Confederate capital, the President stipu- 
 lated that sufficient troops should be left at Washington to make 
 it secure. (40) Kelley says that Lincoln specifically conditioned that 
 McDowell's corps should be left. (41) After McClellan started on 
 his way with 121,000 troops to meet Johnson's 53,000, it was learned 
 that he had ordered McDowell to follow. Military men who were 
 called in reported that without McDowell's corps the forces left to 
 defend the capital would be dangerously inadequate; and McDowell 
 was instructed by the President to remain at Washington. (41) That 
 this action was justified, both by McClellan's previous and subse- 
 quent conduct, and by other considerations, is apparent to even a 
 superficial student. 
 
By that time, many people feared — with some, it amounted to a 
 conviction — that McClellan was disloyal; and that he wished to 
 uncover the capital in such a way as to invite its capture by the 
 enemy, thereby forcing a compromise settlement (42) The President 
 did not share in this suspicion of McClellan, but he knew of it; and 
 he would have been criminally negligent if he had not taken what- 
 ever measures might be necessary to prevent such a contingency. 
 One of Lee's biographers says Lee believed that the surest way 
 to induce the North to abandon the struggle was to sieze the Federal 
 capital; and that, even when defending Richmond, Lee always kept 
 an eye on Washington.(43) 
 
 Lincoln knew that a defeat in the field could be repaired; but 
 that, under conditions then existing, a loss of the capital would be 
 fatal. 
 
 As a matter of fact, after other troops had reached Washington, 
 Franklin and McCall's divisions of McDowell's corps were sent to the 
 Peninsula, leaving only about 18,000 soldiers that were finally re- 
 tained. (44) How little difference it would have made in the results 
 attained on the Penisula by McClellan whether or not any or all 
 of McDowell's corps (or an additional one of the same size) was 
 sent to him is indicated by other circumstances. 
 
 Milton recapitulates by saying that a total of 160,000 soldiers 
 were furnished McClellan for the Penisula campaign; that McClel- 
 lan's report of July 7 showed 86,000 present; that of the 73,500 
 missing, not over 23,000 were casualties: leaving 50,000 to be ac- 
 counted for largely by McClellan's over-generous granting of fur- 
 loughs.(45) That number is 30,000 more than all the men he failed 
 to receive. Small wonder that McClellan was popular with his 
 troops, or that Lincoln once said that sending reinforcements to 
 McClellan was like trying to move fleas across a floor with a shovel. 
 
 If, after all of McClellan's delays, and his prima donna tactics, 
 Lincoln had dismissed him when he refused to attack Magruder at 
 the opening of the Peninsular campaign, and had been fortunate 
 in the choice of a successor, the Union army probably would have 
 captured Richmond within ten days, ard have won the war. Freeman 
 believes that, taken in connection with other reverses, the Confed- 
 eracy could scarcely have survived the loss of its capital at that 
 time. (46) The loss of Richmond, and the defeat of their Eastern 
 army, simultaneously with the defeats which the Confederates suf- 
 fered in the West, should have been determinative. 
 
 Anyway, Lincoln seems to have learned a lesson; for, about a 
 year later, when General Hooker, while in close contact with the 
 enemy, displayed a McClellan temperament, Lincoln instantly ac- 
 
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 Maryland Campaign 
 
cepted his resignation, and appointed Meade to command. Meade 
 won the battle of Gettysburg, and the Confederacy waned from that 
 hour. (47) 
 
 After his defeat at Gaines' Mill, at the beginning of the Seven 
 Days Battle, on the Peninsula, McClellan said in a telegram to the 
 Secretary of War: 
 
 If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe 
 nothing to you or any other persons in Washington. You 
 have done your best to sacrifice this Army. (48) 
 
 "Any other persons," of course, include all the villains at Wash- 
 ington, particularly the President, who made all final decisions. 
 
 Among McClellan devotees, "THE FIRST GREAT CRIME OF 
 THE WAR" has been a favorite heading for chapters dealing with 
 Lincoln's detention of McDowell's corps. 
 
 The use by a recent biographer of "McCLELLAN'S DEMO- 
 TION ASSISTS LEE" as a chapter heading is a not-too-subtle sug- 
 gestion that, in demoting McClellan, Lincoln was giving aid to the 
 enemy, especially Lee. In the text, this writer says that there was 
 "obstruction" and "opposition" to McClellan from start to finish. (49) 
 
 Another writer says that the President and Stanton consented 
 to McClellan's plan of attack by way of the Peninsula with reluctance; 
 and immediately after it commenced, began to take those measures 
 which resulted in its failure. (50) 
 
 Abraham Lincoln, as President of the United States and Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the army, either wished McClellan to succeed, 
 and did all that he believed he safely could do to help McClellan 
 succeed, or he did not. If he did not, it must be admitted, I suppose, 
 that (1) he was ignorant and weakly allowed himself to be swayed 
 by others; or (2) he was a traitor to his country in deliberately aiding 
 its enemies; or (3) he was malicious: or (4) he was all of these 
 things. I hasten to say that I believe that there is not a scintilla of 
 evidence which indicates that he was any of them: and I doubt if 
 anything but an overwhelming desire to glorify McClellan could 
 induce anyone to make such charges, even by implication. I believe 
 further that Mr. Lincoln told the truth when he stated in his famous 
 letter to General Hooker that he had supported all previous com- 
 manders to the utmost of his ability. 
 
 In a recent work, Lincoln, the President, so good in many 
 
 12 
 
Tespects that a committee of distinguished experts pronouced it "The 
 Lincoln Book of the Year," Dr. J. G. Randall devoted fifty-seven 
 pages to a McClellan apologetic, and he thereby, as I believe, dis- 
 paraged Lincoln. 
 
 Dr. Randall closes his (to me) unconvincing argument by dra- 
 matically telling that a recent biographer informs us that General 
 Lee once said "emphatically" that McClellan was "by all odds" the 
 ablest Federal general whom he had opposed. 
 
 That was disconcerting; but not believing that General Lee ever 
 did, or would, make such a statement, I determined to run the 
 matter down. I found that Dr. Randall quoted Freeman; that Free- 
 man quoted R. E. Lee, Jr.; and that R. E. Lee, Jr., in a book published 
 in 1904, disclosed that Cazenove Lee, a second cousin of General 
 Lee's, thought he remembered that Lee made such a statement in a 
 private conversation — thirty-four years previously. 
 
 In an untactful moment, after Lee's death, General Grant said 
 that he rated General Joseph E. Johnston higher as a military man 
 than General Lee; and that, naturally, was not pleasing to the Lee 
 family. 
 
 By a study of Freemen's R. E. Lee, one can can gain a hint 
 as to how Lee did evaluate McClellan. That author tells how Lee 
 left but 30,000 troops to keep 85,000 of McClellan's out of Richmond 
 by bluffing, while the bulk of Lee's army defeated Fitz-John Porter's 
 25,000 soldiers then stationed north of the Chickahomony River; he 
 opines that during the Seven Days Battle, McClellan was not far 
 from panic; and he says that Lee could not have wished for an 
 opponent in a worse frame of mind, or one more likely to "be- 
 wilder" an administration that was depending on such a comman- 
 der. (51) He tells us, too, that when, just before the Battle of 
 Antietam, General John G. Walker could not conceal his astonish- 
 ment at the apparent recklessness of Lee's plans, Lee quietly asked 
 him if he was "acquainted with" McClellan. (52) He also says 
 that Lee regretted McClellan's final dismissal because Lee feared 
 that the administration at Washington might eventually select a 
 commander whom he could not "understand" as he did Mc- 
 Clellan. (53) 
 
 In his generally-splendid biography of McClellan, Macartney says 
 that, in Maryland, Lee seemed "almost rashly indifferent" to the 
 Union army, then led by McClellan, although it was twice the size 
 of his own. (54) Lee had known McClellan since they worked to- 
 gether in the Mexican War, and thoroughly understood McClellan's 
 idiocyncracies. 
 
 13 
 
Dr. Randall also assures us that never did the Union army under 
 McClellan suffer a major defeat. (55) 
 
 After the Battle of Gaines' Mill, McClellan said in a dispatch 
 to Washington. 
 
 I know that a few thousand more troops would have 
 changed this defeat into a victory. (56 ) 
 
 McClellan said he had been defeated; and he then continued 
 to retreat until he had reached the protection of the gunboats on the 
 James River, fighting rearguard actions all the way; and losing, alto- 
 gether, immense stores, a hospital, fifty-two cannon, 1,700 men killed, 
 8,000 wounded, and 6,000 as prisoners. (57) Immediately after they 
 reached the James, his chief-of-staff went to Washington and dis- 
 cussed the possibility that McClellan might have to surrender his 
 entire army to Lee; and McClellan reported to the President that 
 he considered the situation of his army as "critical". (58) 
 
 On his way up the Peninsula, and when he finally reached White 
 House, on the Panunkey River, McClellan established a supply 
 base; and the government unstintingly stocked it with supplies which 
 the army might need. After McClellan's defeat at Gaines' Mill, and 
 while he was hastily preparing to retreat to the James River — he 
 called it "a change of base" — the depot at White House must, of course, 
 be abandoned. General Jeb Stuart, who arrived there while the stores 
 were being destroyed, described what happened in a report to the 
 Confederate government. One short extract will suffice: 
 
 Nine large barges, laden with stores, were on fire as we 
 approached; immense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars in 
 long trains, loaded, and five locomotives; a number of forges; 
 quantities of every species of quartermaster's stores and 
 property, making a total of many millions of dollars — all 
 more or less destroyed. (59) 
 
 At the same time, up at the front, many soldiers, preparing for 
 the proposed retreat, were also destroying supplies. Rhodes says that 
 great heaps of quartermaster's stores were destroyed on the ground; 
 that trains of boxcars, loaded with ammunition, shells for big guns, 
 and other supplies of all kinds, were attached to locomotives; and 
 that these trains then, under a full head of steam, were run into the 
 river. (60) 
 
 To an amateur historian and student, all of that taken together 
 would seem to include every element of a major defeat. A panic on 
 Wall Street and current newspaper comments indicate such was the 
 general opinion over the country at that time. 
 
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The Hon. William D. Kelley, heretofore mentioned, told of a 
 long and intimate conversation which he had with Mr. Lincoln early 
 in October, 1862. During this conversation, as Kelley tells us: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln deplored this failure (at Antietam) to 
 achieve the decisive results which he said he believed had 
 been clearly within McClellan's grasp * * *. He had, he said, 
 restored him (McClellan) to command to reorganize 
 a broken and demoralized army * * *. Mr. Lincoln 
 admitted that McClellan, by incessant, and frequently un- 
 founded complaints * * * had done much to destroy the 
 morale of his troops, and that he had wantonly sacrificed 
 Pope * * *. He said with much deliberation, that he be- 
 lieved the restoration to command of McClellan, Porter, and 
 other chiefs, in the face of treasonable misconduct of which 
 they had been so flagrantly guilty in the sacrifice of Pope's 
 army, was the greatest trial and most painful duty of his 
 official life. 'I am now,' he said, 'stronger with the Army of 
 the Potomac than McClellan. The troops know * * * that 
 neither Stanton nor I withheld anything from him at An- 
 tietam, and that it was not the administration, but their 
 own former idol, who surrendered the just results of their 
 terrible sacrifices, and closed the fight as a drawn battle, 
 when, had he thrown Porter's corps of fresh men, and other 
 available troops, upon Lee's army, he would inevitably have 
 driven it in disorder to the river and captured most of it 
 before sunset'. ( 60 ) 
 
 Which raises the question as to how much of Lincoln's delay 
 in dismissing McClellan was caused by a hope that McClellan would 
 redeem himself, and how much by a fear that the Eastern army 
 might follow McClellan in a revolt. That Lincoln, thereafter, con- 
 tinued to be stronger with the army than McClellan is indicated by 
 the soldiers vote in 1864, when three out of four of them voted for 
 Lincoln. 
 
 One of the most characteristic astounding, and illuminating 
 incidents in McClellan's career, as it seems to me, is told by a recent 
 biographer. On September 13, 1862, McClellan received a copy of 
 Lee's lost order which disclosed that much of Lees' army had gone 
 to Harper's Ferry. A part of what was left held two gaps of South 
 Mountain. Not starting until the 14th, McClellan, that day, cleared 
 the gaps. On the 15th, Lee took a position on Antietam Creek, only 
 seven miles from the gaps, with the 18,000 troops that had remained 
 with him. If McClellan, with his 87,000 troops, had attacked Lee's 
 small force on the 15th, he could easily have captured it, probably 
 
 16 
 
before night; and he then could have defeated in detail, and prob- 
 ably have captured, the other portions of Lee's army. Instead, he 
 did little on the 15th and practically nothing on the 16th, while 
 Lee's scattered forces returned and took position. McClellan had 
 decided to fight on the 17th. He completed all arrangements by 
 ten o'clock on the night of the 16th, then went to bed and slept 
 until eight o'clock the next morning. (62) 
 
 Immediately following this battle, McClellan received reinforce- 
 ments which more than replaced his losses. Lee's army was now 
 reduced to about 30,000 effectives. Even after McClellan had let 
 Lee escape across the river, Lincoln begged him, while he had nearly 
 three times Lee's forces, to follow Lee relentlessly, and win a final 
 decision; but all his pleadings were to no purpose. (63) 
 
 Lincoln appears to have believed confidently that immediately 
 after Antietam, McClellan, with his overwhelming force, could scarcely 
 have failed to have captured Lee and to have ended the conflict, if he 
 had but made an effort. Believing that he must have felt ever after- 
 ward that all the sacrifices and casualties of the next two years were 
 unuecessary. Not much wonder, perhaps, that Lincoln appeared to 
 age twenty years between 1860 and 1865. 
 
 Probably it was fortunate for McClellan, possibly for the country, 
 that with his exaggerated ego, martyr complex, and his propensity 
 for quarreling with his superiors, not to mention the political influences 
 which surrounded him, he lacked Benedict Arnold's decisiveness and 
 headlong courage. One of McClellan's biographers states that he 
 often received the suggestion that his popularity with the Eastern 
 army would make it easy for him to depose the administration, and 
 play the role of dictator. That he toyed with the idea is indicated 
 by two incidents. Riding with some officers on the Peninsula, he men- 
 tioned the ease with which he believed he could take over the govern- 
 ment; and he appeared offended when he was told that, while his 
 soldiers loved him, they would never follow him in such a treasonable 
 project. (64) At a dinner which he gave at his headquarters on 
 September 24, 1862, he asked a group of officers what they thought 
 about the practicability of his opposing the Emancipation Proclama- 
 tion, stating that he believed the army was so devoted to him that 
 it would enforce any decision that he might make. (65) Again he 
 received no encouragement; and when, a few weeks later, he was 
 dismissed, he quietly turned the command over to Burnside, and 
 went to his home without any untoward incident. 
 
 Whether McClellan's failures were the result of his own inherent 
 
 17 
 
weaknesses, or whether, taking counsel of his political ambitions, and 
 influenced by his associates, he deliberately avoided a victorious de- 
 cision, as claimed by Major Key, he, by the irony of fate, played right 
 into the hands of those Radicals who were unwilling that the war 
 should close without the abolition of slavery, its principal cause. Every 
 disappointment and defeat moved the Conservatives, including Lin- 
 coln, farther toward the position of the extreme Radicals. The effect 
 on foreign and domestic public opinion of McClellan's and Pope's 
 disasters forced Lincoln to play his 'last card" — Emancipation. 
 
 The tides which control the destinies of men are more powerful 
 than any man, party, or administration. Perhaps that was what Lincoln 
 meant when he wrote to Hodges: "I claim not to have controlled 
 events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." It is an 
 axiomatic truth that "Man proposes and Fate disposes." Mr. Lincoln 
 may have had something like that thought in mind when he said in 
 his Second Inaugural Address: 
 
 Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the 
 duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated 
 that the cause of the conflict itself would cease. Each looked 
 for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and 
 astounding. 
 
 McClellan, of course, had some good qualities. Otherwise, he 
 never would have been graduated from West Point second in his 
 class, nor have been sent to the Crimea as a military observer, nor 
 have attained the presidency of even a small railroad. While he had 
 limitations and weaknesses which probably precluded his ever be- 
 coming a great general or a successful politician, if he had been for- 
 tunate enough to have had with him such a steadying influence as 
 Grant found in General Rawlins, instead of a Copperhead father-in- 
 law, he might have been a useful soldier, and a credit to the country. 
 He was not the only general who failed, who used bad political judg- 
 ment, or who was dilatory; and if claims were not now made for him 
 which discredit those who really won the war, most of us — conscious 
 of our own limitations, weaknesses, and faults — would be glad to 
 concede to him any honors which may be due him, wrap in a mantle 
 of charity every unpleasant phase of his character, and forget all the 
 incidents in his life which we should not like to have remembered 
 in our own lives. 
 
 18 
 
NUMBER OF OPPOSING TROOPS 
 
 McClellan Johnson 
 Washington, 
 
 July 27, 1861 (Rhodes, Hi, 492-97) . . . 52,000 34,000 
 
 December 1, 1861 (Rhodes, Hi, 497) . . 169,000 47,000 
 
 (YORKTOWN) 
 
 McClellan Magruder 
 Peninsula, 
 
 May 10, 1862 (Rhodes, Hi, 615; iv. 2-3) 100,000 11,000 
 
 (FAIR OAKS) 
 
 McClellan Johnson 
 May 31, 1862 (Rhodes, iv, 24) 100,000 63,000 
 
 (SEVEN DAYS BATTLE) 
 
 McClellan Lee 
 June 26, 1862 
 
 (Rhodes, iv, 24-44, note) 100,000* 85,000 
 
 (ANTIETAM) 
 Maryland, 
 
 September 17, 1862 
 
 (Freeman, 358, 383) 87,000 40,000# 
 
 Compare: Rhodes, iv, 153; Johnson, 81-84, 109, 383; McClellan 
 (a), 237-38; (b), 9; Webb, 5, 7, 26, 49, 97, 119-20; Milton, 206- 
 10; Committee Report, 4; Palfrey, 68-69; Freeman, ii, 116; Ropes, 
 159, 336. 
 
 * McClellan's Report, June 20, 1862: 
 
 Present for duty 115,102 
 
 Sick, Under Arrest, Etc 12,225 
 
 Absent 29,511 
 
 156,838 
 
 § Rhodes generously estimates Lee's forces at Antietam at 55,000; 
 Livermore, 52,000. But Ropes says that Lee started north with 
 "not over" 55,000. Several authorities estimate that battle losses 
 and unusually heavy straggling had reduced Lee's forces before 
 Antietam to between 35,000 and 40,000 soldiers. Freeman states 
 that an Antietam Lee had 36,000 infantry, and a total of less than 
 40,000. In his official report, Lee says he had less than 40,000. 
 
 19 
 
The Substance 
 
 of 
 
 OPINIONS 
 
 held by 
 
 SOME LEADING HISTORIANS 
 
 McClure: 
 
 McClellan was the greatest organizer and defensive officer 
 of the age, but the Union cause demanded swift and terrible 
 blows. Grant met this want. (219) 
 
 Webb: 
 
 As usual, McClellan was grossly and persistently deceived 
 regarding the number of troops opposed to him on the Peninsula. 
 (187-88) 
 
 Blaine: 
 
 The Peninsula Campaign was a succession of deferred 
 hopes, disappointments, and sacrifices of hopes and treasures; it 
 ended in positive disaster, and a humiliating defeat. The opinion 
 of a majority of intelligent observers, both civil and military, is 
 that McClellan was a man of high professional training, admir- 
 ably skilled in the science of war, capable of commanding a large 
 army with success, but at the same time, not original in plan, not 
 fertile in resource, and lacking the energy, the alertness, the 
 daring and the readiness to take great risks for great ends, which 
 distinguish the military leaders of the world, (i, 451) 
 
 Palfrey: 
 
 At Antietam, McClellan was not equal to the occasion. It 
 may be said that he did better than Pope, but such faint praise 
 is the best that can be said for him on this important occasion. 
 (41) 
 
 Milton: 
 
 McClellan's failures were chiefly caused by his own inner 
 infirmaties. (a, 113) 
 
 Macartney: 
 
 McClellan had many remarkable military talents; and if he 
 had possessed courage and dash, he might have won a great vic- 
 tory and an early peace. As Greeley has reminded us, a higher 
 wisdom than that of either McClellan or the Radical Republicans 
 was at work, and Lincoln providentially both saved the Union 
 and freed it from the blight of slavery, (viii, 213-14) 
 
 20 
 
REFERENCES AND NOTES 
 
 1. Macartney, 59-63; Rhodes, iii, 436-42. 
 
 2. Milton (a), 102-4; Macartney, 100-2; Webb, 2-5. 
 
 3. Rhodes, iii, 490-501; Webb, 5-8; Macartney, 87-93; McClure, 216- 
 
 21; Milton (a), 102, 237; Battles & Leaders, ii, 112-13. 
 
 4. Milton (a), 100-20; Macartney, 97, 129-45; Rhodes, iv, 50-51. 
 
 Organization and drill, the things in which McClellan ex- 
 celled, may have been as important as we have been led to 
 believe; but when one considers that the Army of the Potomac 
 was four years in reaching and taking Richmond, at a distance of 
 about one-hundred miles; and that in less than a year, Sherman's 
 roughnecks fought and marched between six-hundred and seven- 
 hundred miles, taking Atlanta, Savannah, Columbia, and other 
 towns on the way, while going to the assistance of the Eastern 
 army, one wonders. 
 
 5. McClellan (a), 225; Rhodes, iii, 498-99; Macartney, 132-45. 
 
 Of all his father's family, McClellan appears to have loved 
 himself the best. Near the last of October, 1861 (Battles & 
 Leaders, ii, 435), when he already had over 76,000 effectives, he 
 recommended that operations in all other quarters be confined 
 to the defensive, and that all surplus troops be sent to him; but 
 when Rosecrans asked for reinforcements (Nicolay & Hay, v, 
 154) McClellan was "shocked" at such an unreasonable request. 
 
 6. Macartney, 133-34, 149; Webb, 17-33; Milton (a), 119-20; Nico- 
 
 lay & Hay, v, 148-49, 160-72, 181-84. 
 
 7. McClellan (a), 237-38; Milton (a), 194-210; Rhodes, iii, 615-17; 
 
 iv, 2-43; Freeman, ii, 230; Nicolay & Hay, v, 181-84, 358-91. 
 
 Freeman tells (ii, 18) about one method which Magruder 
 with only 11,000 men, employed to enable him to hold McClel- 
 lan's whole army for nearly a month in front of Yorktown. A 
 body of soldiers marched across a road in plain view of the 
 Federals, disappeared into the woods, circled around, and crossed 
 the road again, time after time. That gave McClellan the im- 
 pression that a host of Confederate troops were marching into 
 position; and he made the welkin ring with cries for reinforce- 
 ments. 
 
 8. Webb, 118-90; Macartney, 178-97; Milton (a), 206-17; Rhodes, 
 
 iv, 40-49; Nicolay & Hay, v, 413-40. 
 
 A number of historians, including Rhodes (iv, 48, note), 
 
 21 
 
perhaps to illustrate McClelland naive carelessness in making 
 statements, tell that immediately after his retreat to Harrison's 
 Landing, he reported to both Lincoln and Stanton that he had 
 lost but one gun, a slight error of fifty-one guns. Later, he raised 
 the ante to twenty-five. 
 
 On pages 237 and 238 of McClellaris Own Story, under 
 date of April 5, 1862, is the report of John Tucker, Assistant Sec- 
 retary of War, showing that he had just completed delivering 
 to the Peninsula for McClellan 121,500 soldiers. McClellan re- 
 ported that he had 108,000 effectives. This was followed closely 
 by another report which indicated that he had only 85,000. In 
 regard to a letter from Mr. Lincoln, dated April 9, 1862, asking 
 what had become of the apparently-missing 23,000, McClellan 
 says (Own Story, 278) that it is "sufficient to say" that the latter 
 estimate was made from his "latest returns" of those "present 
 for duty." 
 
 9. Rhodes, iv, 111-36; Milton (a), 238-42; Nicolay & Hay, vi, 1-29. 
 
 10. Wells, 192-98; Rhodes, iv, 135-37; Milton (a), 242-43; Battles & 
 
 Leaders, ii, 551. 
 
 11. Macartney, 236-37; Palfrey, 19-29; Rhodes, iv, 143-45. 
 
 12. Rhodes, iv, 146-53; Macartney, 251-71; Palfrey, 30-81; Davis, 338. 
 
 13. Macartney, 251-71; Rhodes, iv, 149-53; Palfrey, 127-28. 
 
 14. Rhodes, iv, 147; Palfrey, 26; Macartney, 249. 
 
 15. Freeman, ii, 415-19; Maurice, 158-65. 
 
 16. Rhodes, iv, 184-87; Nicolay & Hay, vi, 173-96; Browning, i, 590. 
 
 Alexander K. McClure, whom Mr. Lincoln once said had 
 "more brain power" than any other man he had ever known, was 
 one of Lincoln's most intimate friends at Washington. In his 
 Lincoln and Men of War Times (pp. 203-22), McClure claims 
 that he felt very friendly toward McClellan, and believed that 
 later commanders had some advantage because of McClellan's 
 experiences. He also believed, however, that McClellan's insinu- 
 ation that Lincoln was unfriendly were "unjust," a "fatal error," 
 and "monstrous." McClure says that Lincoln longed for the 
 earliest possible victory, and that he earnestly hoped that Mc- 
 Clellan would win laurels for himself by succeeding. 
 
 17. Macartney, 290-92; Rhodes, iv, 188; Wells, 198. 
 
 Writing from Warsaw, Illinois, under date of October 28, 
 1862, John Hay said (Dennett 51-52) that McClellan's reten- 
 
 22 
 
tion in command of the Eastern army had begun to "shake the 
 confidence" of the West in the government, and that he had not 
 heard a single man defend McClellan. 
 
 18. Milton (a), 160-82; Rhodes, iii, 581-93, 629. 
 
 19. McClure, 196; Rhodes, iii, 628; Milton (a), 299. 
 
 20. McClellan (a), 82. 
 
 21. Ibid. 168. 
 
 22. Ibid. 169, 
 
 23. Ibid. 175, 
 
 24. Ibid. 176, 
 
 25. Ibid. 453, 
 
 26. Ibid. 225. 
 
 27. Ibid. 310, 
 
 28. Ibid. 308, 
 
 29. Ibid. 317, 
 
 30. Ibid. 407. 
 
 Don Piatt opines (pp. 280-81) that McClellan 's Own Story 
 is its author's undoing, and depressive to the reader, because it 
 destroys all conclusions in the author's favor, and reveals him 
 as a singularly weak character; that one shudders who remem- 
 bers that a hundred thousand men, perhaps a government, were 
 subject to peril at the hands of such a man. 
 
 31. Williams, 78; Bates, 106-7; Julian, 251. 
 
 While Thomas Eckert was temporarily in charge of the 
 telegraph office at Fort Monroe, as Bates (p. 103-5) tells us, the 
 Chairman of the Democratic National Committee sent McClellan, 
 then at White House, several long messages advising him to 
 ignore the Administration and act on his own judgment. Eckert 
 refused to forward such messages over the wires, but delivered 
 them in person. McClellan was appreciative for the consideration 
 shown him by Eckert, and claimed that he had not received any 
 other messages of such a treasonable character. 
 
 Donn Piatt (pp. 291-95) believed that Colonel Thomas M. 
 Key, brother of the Major John J. Key who was dismissed from 
 the service for treasonable utterances, was another "evil genius" 
 on McClellan's staff. Colonel Key, whom Piatt knew personally, 
 
 23 
 
had, Piatt says, a deep-seated contempt for the administration; 
 possessed and controlled McClellan without the latter realizing 
 it; and, while honestly trying to make McClellan a great political 
 oracle, only succeeded in making him a military failure. Piatt 
 believed, however, that the very weaknesses which prevented 
 McClellan from becoming a successful military man precluded 
 his ever becoming an active traitor; and that this fact was realized 
 by both Lincoln and Seward. 
 
 32. Milton (b), 117, 216, 245. 
 
 33. Macartney, 198-200; Official Records, I, II, pt. 1, p. 48; Julian, 
 
 193-98. 
 
 34. McClellan (a), 487-89; Macartney, 198-200. 
 
 35. Dennett, 50-51; Macartney, 295; Nicolay & Hay, vi, 186-87. 
 
 36. Macartney, 295-96; Kelley, 68; Nicolay & Hay, vi, 188. 
 
 37. Kelley, 62; Macartney, 305. 
 
 38. Kelley, 6. 
 
 39. An article entitled "The First Great Crime of the War," by Gen- 
 
 eral W. B. Franklin, in The Annals of the War, Philadelphia, 
 1879. 
 
 40. Committee Report, 7; Rhodes, iii, 615; Kelley, 34; Milton (a), 
 
 120. 
 
 41. Kelley, 34; Rhodes, iii, 615; Committee Report, 8-9; Nicolay & 
 
 Hay, v, 184. 
 
 42. Macartney, 144-45; McClellan (a), 195-96; Nicolay & Hay, v, 
 
 169; Browning, i, 537-39. 
 
 43. Maurice, 83. 
 
 44. Rhodes, iv, 4, 32; Committee Report, 14; Webb, 61, 119-21. 
 
 On page 89, vol. 2, text and note, of his Lincoln, the Presi- 
 dent, Dr. Randall says that, on April 7, 1862, McClellan "stated" 
 that he had 85,000 troops "for duty"; that McClellan then moved 
 up the Peninsula to meet Lee with 85,000 troops. Dr. Randall, 
 however, does not mention that McClellan had already received 
 36,000 more troops than he "stated" he had "for duty," and that 
 40,000 additional troops were sent to him. 
 
 According to the Committee Report, (p. 12), on June 20, 
 immediately before McClellan met Lee in the Seven Days Battle, 
 McClellan's own returns to the Adjutant-General's office gave 
 the strength of his army as: Present for duty, 115,102; special 
 
 24 
 
duty, sick and in arrest, 12,225; absent 29,000 — total 156,838. 
 
 45. Milton (a), 237; Nicolay & Hay, v, 453-54. 
 
 In a letter to President Lincoln, written soon after the Seven 
 Days Battle, McClellan said that 34,472 soldiers belonging to 
 his army were absent "with authority." (O. R., I, III, pt 3, p. 319) 
 
 46. Freeman, ii, 22; iv, 169. 
 
 47. Rhodes, iv, 280; Milton (a), 266-67. 
 
 48. McClellan (b), 131; Rhodes, iv. 43-44; Official Records, I, XI, 
 
 pt. 1, p. 61. 
 
 49. Dr. J. G. Randall in Lincoln, the President (ii, 87). 
 
 50. Macartney, 143. 
 
 Rhodes says (Hi, 616) that Lincoln's letter of April 9, 1862 
 to McClellan is "pathetic" in its revelation of how much Lincoln 
 wished the general to succeed, and the length he was willing to 
 go to promote that success. Rhodes further opines (iv, 50) that 
 it is no longer necessary to prove, hardly to state, that both 
 Lincoln and Stanton ardently and sincerely desired that McClel- 
 lan should succeed. 
 
 51. Freeman, ii, 242-431. See, also: Webb, 134-35; Maurice, 115; 
 
 Rhodes, iv, 40; Milton (a), 206; Jones, i, 138. 
 
 52. Freeman, ii, 362. 
 
 53. Ibid., 428. 
 
 54. Macartney, 237. 
 
 55. Lincoln, the President, ii, 69. 
 
 56. McClellan (a), 424-25; Macartney, 186. 
 
 57. Webb, 136-66; Milton (a), 212-20; Rhodes, iv, 44-53. 
 
 58. Macartney, 198-200; McClellan (a), 487-89; Nicolay & Hay, v, 
 
 443; Browning, i, 559. 
 
 59. Davis, ii, 150-51. 
 
 60. Rhodes, iv, 39-46; Webb, 136-37. 
 
 61. Kelley, 72. 
 
 62. Macartney, 265; Palfrey, 20-72; Battles & Leaders, ii, 559-81, 603, 
 
 630-82. 
 
 63. Rhodes, iv, 184-88; Webb, 130; Macartney, 280-92. 
 
 64. Macartney, 298; Piatt, 293-94. 
 
 25 
 
65, Macartney, 304-3. 
 
 That those who opposed the administration and supported 
 McClellan in the 1864 campaign did so from widely different 
 motives is indicated in the Official Proceedings of the Democratic 
 National Convention (1864) in extracts made from speeches 
 delivered by Long of Ohio and Powell of Kentucky: 
 
 "Although I am opposed to McClellan — although I think he 
 is the worst man you could put on the ticket * * * I expect to 
 * * * cast my vote with my friends." 
 
 "* * # anc ^ s i r? as a peace man who has opposed this war 
 from the beginning, never having voted a man or a dollar to carry 
 it on, * * * I believe that General McClellan * * * should receive 
 my warm, hearty, zealous support." 
 
 Palfrey (p. 47) says it is impossible to believe that Mc- 
 Clellan really supposed that on the Peninsula or in Maryland 
 the Confederates had the forces which he attributed to them. 
 Nicolay 8s Hay (yi, 188) say that before the end of October 1862, 
 Lincoln began to believe that McClellan had no real desire to 
 beat the enemy. 
 
 If over-estimating the enemy, under-stating his own forces, 
 furloughing wastefully, demanding impossible reinforcements, 
 preparing advance alibis, blaming the administration for his fail- 
 ures, and failing to grasp easy victories, were all parts of a political 
 comedy, the 25,000 casualties on the Peninsula and at Antietam, 
 could they know it, probably would not consider the drama too 
 amusing. 
 
 Some of us would like to believe that but very little praise 
 or condemnation is due any of those connected with the Civil 
 War drama, because the opinions and sympathies which gov- 
 erned the actions of each participant, from the rabid Abolitionists 
 of New England to the Fire-eater of the Deep South, were the 
 inevitable consequence of the innate qualties which he had in- 
 herited from his ancestors, as modified or supplemented by his 
 invironment and his teachings; that, as Lincoln seemed to feel, 
 Providence, Fate, the Logic of Events — whatever it is that deter- 
 mines the final destinies of men and nations — used all of these 
 participants to secure eventually the right solution of their 
 common problem. 
 
 26 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
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 Davis, Jefferson 
 
 Dennett, Tyler 
 
 Freeman, Douglas S. 
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 Jones, J. B. 
 
 Julian, George W. 
 Kelley, William D. 
 Macartney, Clarence E. 
 
 Maurice, Sir Frederick 
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 McClellan, George B. (b) 
 
 McClure, Alexander K. 
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 Lincoln in the Telegraph Office. New 
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 Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 
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 The Diary Of Orville Hickman Browning. 
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 27 
 
Nicolay & Hay 
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 The Antietam and Fredericksburg. (Cam- 
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 28 
 
A * 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 
 
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 LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN EAST PEORIA 
 
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