M mm: ill THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 1876 •■WW' REMOTE STORAGE fl Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below. A charge is made on all overdue books. TT , T T U. of I. Library Aug 4 1943 tyc 1 1 1943 pi I l Llbh^.RY P / I jHetittattons 32 AT/ OP Marcus aurelius Antoninus EMPEROR OF THE ROMANS TRANSLATED BY GEORGE LONG LEE AND SHEPARD CHARLES T. DILLINGHAM ] %1 b Cambridge : Presswork by John Wilson &> Son. 1. 4 REMOTE STORAGE To KALPH WALDO EMERSON, THIS EDITION OF TUB THOUGHTS OF THE EMPEHOR M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS, IS INSCRIBED BY THE PUBLISHERS. 5 \ \ \ / CONTENTS. PAGE Life of Marcus Aurelius ..... 7 Philosophy of Marcus Aurelius ... 36 Meditations of Marcus Aurelius . . 81 Index of Greek Terms, with corres- ponding English 307 The portrait of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus is from a bust in the British Museum. The medallion die is from a coin of the time of Aurelius. M. AURELIUS ANTONINUS. ANTONINUS was born at Rome A» m 121 ? on the 26th of April. His father Annius Verus died while he was praetor. His mother was Domitia Calvilla, also named Lu- cilla. The Emperor Antoninus Pius married Annia Galeria Faustina, the sister of Annius Verus, and was consequently Antoninus' uncle. When Hadrian adopted Antoninus Pius and de- clared him his successor in the empire, Antoninus Pius adopted both L. Ceionius Commodus, the son of Aelius Caesar, and M. Antoninus, whose original name was M. Annius Verus. Antoninus took the name of M. Aelius Aurelius Verus, to which was added the title of Caesar in a. d. 139 : the name Aelius belonged to Hadrian's family, and Aurelius was the name of Antoninus Pius. When M. Antoninus became Augustus, he dropped the name of Verus and took the name of Anto- ninus. Accordingly he is generally named M. Aurelius Antoninus, or simply M. Antoninus. The youth was most carefully brought up. He thanks the gods (i. 17) that he had good grand- fathers, good parents, a good sister, good teachers, 8 M. A URELIUS good associates, good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. He had the happ}^ fortune to witness the example of his uncle and adoptive father Antoninus Pius, and he has recorded in his work (i. 16 ; vi. 30) the virtues of this ex- cellent man and prudent ruler. Like many young Romans he tried his hand at poetry and studied rhetoric. Herodes Atticus and M. Cornelius Fronto were his teachers in eloquence. There are extant letters between Fronto and Marcus, which show the great affection of the pupil for the master, and the master's great hopes of his in- dustrious pupil. M. Antoninus mentions Fronto (i. 11) among those to whom he was indebted for his education. When he was eleven years old, he assumed the dress of philosophers, something plain and coarse, became a hard student, and lived a most labori- ous abstemious life, even so far as to injure his health. Finally, he abandoned poetry and rhet- oric for philosophy, and he attached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But he did not neglect the study of law, which was a useful preparation for the high place which he was designed to fill. His teacher was L. Volusianus Maecianus, a dis- tinguished jurist. We must suppose that he learned the Roman discipline of arms, which was a necessary part of the education of a man who afterwards led his troops to battle against a war- like race. Antoninus has recorded in his first book the names of his teachers and the obligations which It *y'Msg 4 ANTONINUS. 9 he owed to each of them. The way in which / he speaks of what he learned from them might seem to savor of vanity or self-praise, if we look carelessly at the way in which he has expressed himself ; but if any one draws this conclusion, he will be mistaken. Antoninus means to com- memorate the merits of his several teachers, what they taught and what a pupil might learn from them. Besides, this book like the eleven other books, was for his own use, and if we may trust the note at the end of the first book, it was writ- ten during one of M. Antoninus' campaigns against the Quadi, at a time when the commemoration of the virtues of his illustrious teachers might re- mind him of their lessons and the practical uses which he might derive from them. Among his teachers of philosophy was Sextus of Chaeroneia, a grandson of Plutarch. What he learned from this excellent man is told by him- self (i. 9). His favorite teacher was Q. Junius Rusticus (i. 7), a philosopher and also a man of practical good sense in public affairs. Rusticus was the adviser of Antoninus after he became emperor. Young men who are destined for high places are not often fortunate in those who are about them, their companions and teachers ; and I do not know any example of a young prince having had an education which can be compared with that of M. Antoninus. Such a body of teachers distinguished by their acquirements and their character will hardly be collected again ; and as to the pupil, we have not had one like him since. 20 M . AURELIUS Hadrian died in July a. d. 138, and was suc- ceeded by Antoninus Pius. M. Antoninus mar- ried Faustina, his cousin, the daughter of Pius, probably about a. d. 146, for he had a daughter born in 147. M. Antoninus received from his adoptive father the title of Caesar and was associ- ated with him in the administration of the state. The father and the adopted son lived together in perfect friendship and confidence. Antoninus was a dutiful son, and the emperor Pius loved and esteemed him. Antoninus Pius died in March 161. The Senate, it is said, urged M. Antoninus to take the solemn administration of the empire, but he associated with himself the other adopted son of Pius, L. Ceionius Commodus, who is generally called L. Verus. Thus Rome for the first time had two emperors. Verus was an indolent man of pleasure and unworthy of his station. Anto- ninus however bore with him, and it is said that Verus had sense enough to pay to his colleague the respect due to his character. A virtuous emperor and a loose partner lived together in peace, and their alliance was strengthened by Antoninus giving to Verus for wife his daughter Lucilla. The reign of Antoninus was first troubled by a Parthian war, in which Verus was sent to com- mand, but he did nothing, and the success that was obtained by the Romans in Armenia and on the Euphrates and Tigris was due to his generals. This Parthian war ended in 165. ANTONINUS. 11 The north of Italy was also threatened by the rude people beyond the Alps from the borders of Gallia to the eastern side of the Hadriatic. These barbarians attempted to break into Italy, as the Germanic nations had attempted near three hundred years before ; and the rest of the life of Antoninus with some intervals was em- ployed in driving back the invaders. In 169 Verus suddenly died, and Antoninus administered the state alone. In a. d. 175 Avidius Cassius, a brave and skil- ful Roman commander who was at the head of the troops in Asia, revolted and declared himself Augustus. But Cassius was assassinated by some of his officers, and so the rebellion came to an end. Antoninus showed his humanity by his treatment of the family and the partisans of Cassius, and his letter to the senate in which he recommends mercy is extant. (Vulcatius, Avid- ius Cassius, c. 12.) Antoninus set out for the east on hearing of Cassius' revolt. We know that in a. d. 174 he was engaged in a war against the Quadi, Marco- manni and other Germanic tribes, and it is prob- able that he went direct from the German war without returning to Rome. His wife Faustina who accompanied him into Asia died suddenly at the foot of the Taurus to the great grief of her husband. Capitolinus who has written the life of Antoninus, and also Dion Cassius accuse the empress of scandalous infidelity to her husband and of abominable lewdness. But Capitolinus 12 M. AURELIU S says that Antoninus either knew it not or pre- tended not to know it. Nothing is so common as such malicious reports in all ages, and the history of imperial Rome is full of them. Anto- ninus loved his wife and he says that she was "obedient, affectionate, and simple." The same scandal had been spread about Faustina's mother, the wife of Antoninus Pius, and yet he too was perfectly satisfied with his wife. Antoninus Pius says in a letter to Fronto that he would rather live in exile with his wife than in his palace at Rome without her. There are not many men who would give their wives a better character than these two emperors. Capitolinus wrote in the time of Diocletian. He may have intended to tell the truth, but he is a poor, feeble biog- rapher. Dion Cassius, the most malignant of historians, always reports and perhaps he believed any scandal against anybody. Antoninus continued his journey to Syria and Egypt, and on his return to Italy through Athens he was initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. It was the practice of the emperor to conform to the established rites of the age and to perform religious ceremonies with due solemnity. We cannot conclude from this that he was a supersti- tious man, though we might perhaps do so, if his book did not show that he was not. But this is only one among many instances that a ruler's public acts do not always prove his real opinions. A prudent governor will not roughly oppose even the superstitions of his people, and though he A NTONINUS. 13 may wish that they were wiser, he will know that he cannot make them so by offending their prej- udices. Antoninus and his son Commodus entered Rome in triumph on the 23rd of December a. d. 176. In the following year Commodus was asso- ciated with his father in the empire and took the name of Augustus. This year Aja,. 177 is memor- able in ecclesiastical history. Attalus and others were put to death at Lyon for their adherence to the Christian religion. The evidence of this persecution is a letter preserved by Eusebius (E. H. v. 1 ; printed in Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. i. with notes). The letter is from the Chris- tians of Vienna and Lugdunum in Gallia ( Vienne and Lyon) to their Christian brethren in Asia and Phrygia ; and it is preserved perhaps nearly entire. It contains a very particular description of the tortures inflicted on the Christians in Gallia, and it states that while the persecution was going on, Attalus a Christian and a Roman citizen was loudly demanded by the populace and brought into the amphitheatre, but the governor ordered him to be reserved with the rest who were in prison, until he had received instructions from the emperor. It is not clear who the " rest " were who are mentioned in the letter. Many had been tortured before the governor thought of ap- plying to the emperor. The imperial rescript, says the letter, was that the Christians should be punished, but if they would deny their faith, they must be released. On this the work began again. 14 M. A URELIUS. The Christians who were Roman citizens were beheaded: the rest were exposed to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre. Some modern writers on ecclesiastical history, when they use this letter, say nothing of the wonderful stories of the mar- tyrs' sufferings. Sanctus, as the letter says, was burnt with plates of hot iron till his body was one sore and had lost all human form, but on being put to the rack he recovered his former appear- ance under the torture, which was thus a cure instead of a punishment. He was afterwards torn by beasts, and placed on an iron chair and roasted. He died at last. The letter is one piece of evidence. The writer, whoever he was that wrote in the name of the Gallic Christians, is our evidence both for the ordinary and the extraordinary circumstances of the story, and we cannot accept his evidence for one fart and reject the other. We often re- ceive small evidence as proof of a thing which we believe to be within the limits of probability or possibility, and we reject exactly the same evi- dence, when the thing to which it refers, appears very improbable or impossible. But this is a false method of inquiry, though it is followed by some modern writers, who select what they like from a story and reject the rest of the evidence ; or if they do not reject it, they dishonestly suppress it. A man can only act consistently by accepting all this letter or rejecting it all, and we cannot blame him for either. But he who rejects it may still admit that such a letter may be founded on real A NT ONI N US. 15 facts ; and he would make this admission as the most probable way of accounting for the existence of the letter : but if, as he would suppose, the writer has stated some tilings falsely, he cannot tell what part of his. story is worthy of credit. The war on the northern frontier appears to have been uninterrupted during the visit of Anto- ninus to the East, and on his return the emperor again left Rome to oppose the barbarians. The Germanic people were defeated in a great battle a. d. 179. During this campaign the emperor was seized with some contagious malady, of which he died in the camp at Sirmium (Mitrovitz) on the Save in Lower Pannonia, but at Vindebona (Vienna) according to other authorities, on the 17th of March a. d. 180, in the fifty-ninth year of his age. His son Commodus was with him. His body, or the ashes probably, was carried to Rome, and he received the honor of deification. Those who could afford it had his statue or bust, and when Capitolinus wrote, many people still had statues of Antoninus among the Dei Penates or household deities. He was in a manner made a saint. His son Commodus erected to his mem- ory the Antonine column which is now in the Piazza Colonna at Rome. The bassi rilievi which are placed in a spiral line round the shaft commemorate his father's victories over the Marco- manni and the Quadi, and the miraculous shower of rain which refreshed the Roman soldiers and discomfited their enemies. The statue of Antoni- nus was placed on the column, but it was removed M. A URELIUS at some time unknown, and a bronze statue of St. Paul was put in its place by Pope Sixtus the fifth. The historical evidence for the times of Anto- ninus is very defective, and some of that which remains is not credible. The most curious is the story about the miracle which happened in A. d. 174 during the war with the Quadi. The Roman army was in danger of perishing by thirst, but a sudden storm drenched them with rain, while it discharged fire and hail on their enemies, and the Romans gained a great victory. All the authori- ties which speak of the battle speak also of the miracle. The Gentile writers assign it to their gods, and the Christians to the intercession of the Christian legion in the emperor's army. To con- firm the Christian statement it is added that the emperor gave the title of Thundering to this legion ; but Dacier and others who maintain the Christian report of the miracle, admit that this title of Thun- dering or Lightning was not given to this legion because the Quadi were struck with lightning, but because there was a figure of lightning on their shields, and that this title of the legion existed in he time of Augustus. Scaliger also had observed that the legion was called Thundering (KepavvofioXos, or Kepavvo$>6poi) before the reign of Antoninus. We learn this from Dion Cassius (Lib. 55, c. 23, and the note of Reimarus) who enumerates all the legions of Augustus' time. The name Thundering or Light- ning also occurs on an inscription of the reign of Trajan, which was found at Trieste. Eusebius ANTONINUS. If (v. 5) when he relates the miracle, quotes Apoli- narius, bishop of Hierapolis, as authority for this name being given to the legion Melitene by the emperor in consequence of the success which he obtained through their prayers ; from which we may estimate the value of Apolinarius' testimony. Eusebius does not say in what book of Apolina- rius the statement occurs. Dion says that the Thundering legion was stationed in Cappadocia in the time of Augustus. Valesius also observes that in the Notitia of the Imperium Romanum there is mentioned under the commander of Ar- menia the Praefectura of the twelfth legion named " Thundering Melitene ; " and this position in Armenia will agree with what Dion says of its position in Cappadocia. Accordingly Valesius concludes that Melitene was not the name of the legion, but of the town in which it was stationed. The legions did not, he says, take their name from the place where they were on duty, but from the country in which they were raised, and therefore, what Eusebius says about the Melitene does not seem probable to him. Yet Valesius on the au- thority of Apolinarius and Tertullian believed that the miracle was worked through the prayers of the Christian soldiers in the emperor's army. Rufinus does not give the name of Melitene to this legion, says Valesius, and probably he pur- posely omitted it, because he knew that Melitene was the name of a town in Armenia Minor, where the legion was stationed in his time. The emperor, it is said, made a report of his 2 18 M. A URELIUS victory to the Senate, which we may believe, for such was the practice ; but we do not know what he said in his letter, for it is not extant. Dacier assumes that the emperor's letter was purposely destroyed by the Senate or the enemies of Chris- tianity, that so honorable a testimony to the Christians and their religion might not be perpet- uated. The critic has however not seen that he contradicts himself when he tells us the purport of the letter, for he says that it was destroyed, and even Eusebius could not find it. But there does exist a letter in Greek addressed by Anto- ninus to the Roman Senate after this memorable victory. It is sometimes printed after Justin's second Apology, though it is totally unconnected with the apologies. This letter is one of the most stupid forgeries of the many which exist, and it cannot be possibly founded even on the genuine report of Antoninus to the Senate. If it were genuine, it would free the emperor from the charge of persecuting men because they were Christians, for he says in this false letter that if a man accuse another only of being a Christian and the accused confess and there is nothing else against him, he must be set free ; with this mon- strous addition made by a man inconceivably ig- norant, that the informer must be burnt alive. 1 1 Eusebius (v. 5) quotes Tertullian's Apology to the Roman Senate in confirmation of the story. Tertullian, he says, writes that letters of the emperor were extant, in which he declares that his army was saved by the prayers of the Christians ; and that he " threatened to punish with death those who ventured to accuse us." ANTONINUS. 19 During the time of Antoninus Pius and Mar- cus Antoninus there appeared the first Apology of Justinus, and under M. Antoninus the Oration of Tatian against the Greeks, which was a fierce attack on the established religions, the address of Athenagoras to M. Antoninus on behalf of the Christians, and the Apology of Melito, bishop of Sardes, also addressed to the emperor, and that of Apolinarius. The first Apology of Justinus is addressed to Antoninus Pius and his two adopted sons M. Antoninus and L. Verus ; but we do not know whether they read it. The second Apology of Justinus is addressed to the Roman Senate, but there is nothing in it which shows its date. In one passage where he is speaking of the perse- cution of the Christians, Justinus says that even men who followed the Stoic doctrines, when they ordered their lives according to ethical reason, were hated and murdered, such as Heraclitus, JMusonius in his own times and others ; for all those who in any way labored to live according to reason and avoided wickedness were always hated ; and this was the effect of the work of daemons. Justinus himself is said to have been put to death at Rome, because he refused to sacrifice to the gods ; but the circumstances of his death are doubtful, and the time is uncertain. It cannot It is possible that the forged letter which is now extant may be one of those which Tertullian had seen, for he uses the plural number " letters." A great deal has been written about this miracle of the Thundering Legion, and more than is worth reading. 20 M. AURELIUS have been in the reign of Hadrian, as one author- ity states ; nor in the time of Antoninus Pius, if the second Apology was written in the time of M. Antoninus. The persecution in which Polycarp suffered at Smyrna belongs to the time of M. Antoninus. The evidence for it is the letter of the church of Smyrna to the churches of Philomelium and the other Christian churches, and it is preserved by Eusebius (E. H. iv. 15). But the critics do not agree about the time of Poly carp's death, differing in the two extremes to the amount of twelve years. The circumstances of Polycarp's martyrdom were accompanied by miracles, one of which Eusebius (iv. 15) has omitted, but it ap- pears in the oldest Latin version of the letter, which Usher published, and it is supposed that this version was made not long after the time of Eusebius. The notice at the end of the letter states that it was transcribed by Caius from th© copy of Irenaeus, the disciple of Polycarp, then transcribed by Socrates at Corinth ; " after which I Pionius again wrote it out from the copy above mentioned, having searched it out by the revela- tion of Polycarp, who directed me to it," &c. The story of Polycarp's martyrdom is embellished with miraculous circumstances which some modern writers on ecclesiastical history take the liberty of omitting. 2 2 Conyers Middleton, An Inquiry into the Mirac- ulous Powers, &e. p. 126. Middleton says that Eusebius omitted to mention the dove, which flew out of Poly- ANTONINUS. 21 In order to form a proper notion of the con- dition of the Christians under M. Antoninus we must go back to Trajan's time. When the younger Pliny was governor of Bithynia, the Christians were numerous in those parts, and the worshippers of the old religion were falling off. The temples were deserted, the festivals neglected, and there were no purchasers of victims for sacri- fice. Those who were interested in the mainte- nance of the old religion thus found that their profits were in danger. Christians of both sexes and of all ages were brought before the governor, who did not know what to do with them. He could come to no other conclusion than this, that those who confessed to be Christians and per- severed in their religion ought to be punished ; if for nothing else, for their invincible obstinacy. He found no crimes proved against the Christians, and he could only characterize their religion as a depraved and extravagant superstition, which might be stopped, if the people were allowed the opportunity of recanting. Pliny wrote this in a letter to Trajan (Plinius, Ep. x. 97). He asked for the emperor's directions, because he did not know what to do : He remarks that he had never been engaged in judicial inquiries about carp's body, and Dodwell and Archbishop Wake have done the same. Wake says, " I am so little a friend to such miracles that I thought it better with Eusebius to omit that circumstance than to mention it from Bishop Usher's Manuscript," which manuscript however, says Middleton, he afterwards declares to be so well attested that we need not any further assurance of the truth of it. 22 M. A URELIUS the Christians, and that accordingly he did not know what or how far to inquire and punish. This proves that it was not a new thing to inquire into a man's profession of Christianity and to punish him for it. Trajan's Rescript is extant. He approved of the governor's judgment in the matter ; but he said that no search must be made after the Christians ; if a man was charged with the new religion and convicted, he must not be punished, if he affirmed that he was not a Chris- tian and confirmed his denial by showing his rev- erence to the heathen gods. He added that no notice must be taken of anonymous informations, for such things were of bad example. Trajan was a mild and sensible man, and both motives of mercy and policy probably also induced him to take as little notice of the Christians as he could ; to let them live in quiet, if it were possible. Trajan's Rescript is the first legislative act of the head of the Roman state with reference to Chris- tianity, which is known to us. It does not appear that the Christians were further disturbed under his reign. The martyrdom of Ignatius by the order of Trajan himself is not universally ad- mitted to be an historical fact. In the time of Hadrian it was no longer possi- ble for the Roman government to overlook the great increase of the Christians and the hostility of the. common sort to them. If the governors in the provinces wished to let them alone, they could not resist the fanaticism of the heathen community, who looked on the Christians as athe- ANTONINUS. 23 ists. The Jews too who were settled all over the Roman Empire were as hostile to the Christians as the Gentiles were. With the time of Hadrian begin the Christian Apologies, which show plainly what the popular feeling towards the Christians then was. A rescript of Hadrian to the Pro- consul of Asia, which stands at the end of Jus- tin's first apology, instructs the governor that innocent people must not be troubled and false accusers must not be allowed to extort money from them ; the charges against the Christians must be made in due form and no attention must be paid to popular clamors ; when Christians were regularly prosecuted and convicted of any illegal act, they must be punished according to their deserts ; and false accusers also must be pun- ished. Antoninus Pius is said to have published Rescripts to the same effect. The terms of Ha- drian's Rescript seem very favorable to the Christians, but if we understand it in this sense, that they were only to be punished like other people for illegal acts, it would have had no mean- ing, for that could have been done without asking the emperor's advice. The real purpose of the Rescript is that Christians must be punished if they persisted in their belief, and would not prove their renunciation of it by acknowledging the heathen religion. This was Trajan's rule, and we have no reason for supposing that Hadrian granted more to the Christians than Trajan did. There is printed at the end of Justin's Apology a Re- script of Antoninus Pius to the Commune of Asia 24 M. AURELIUS (to koivov tt]s * Aatas) , and it is also in Eusebius 3 (E. H. iy. 13). The Rescript declares that the Christians, for they are meant, though the name Christians does not occur in the Rescript, were not to be disturbed, unless they were attempt- ing something against the Roman rule, and no man was to be punished simply for being a Chris- tian. But this Rescript is spurious. Any man moderately acquainted with Roman history will see at once from the style and tenor that it is a clumsy forgery. In the time of M. Antoninus the opposition between the old and the new belief was still stronger, and the adherents of the heathen re- ligion urged those in authority to a more regular resistance to the invasions of the Christian faith. Melito in his apology to M. Antoninus represents the Christians of Asia as persecuted under new imperial orders. Shameless informers, he says, men who were greedy after the property of others, used these orders as a means of robbing those who 3 In Eusebius the name at the beginning of the Re- script is that of M. Antoninus ; and so we cannot tell to which of the two emperors the forger assigned the Re- script. There are also a few verbal differences. The author of the Alexandrine Chronicum says that Marcus being moved by the entreaties of Melito and other heads of the church wrote an Epistle to the Com- mune of Asia in which he forbade the Christians to be troubled on account of their religion. Valesius sup- poses this to be the letter which is contained in Eusebius (iv. 13), and to be the answer to the apology of Melito of which I shall soon give the substance. But Marcus certainly did not write this letter which is in Eusebius, and we know not what answer he made to Melito. ANTONINUS. 25 were doing no harm. He doubts if a just em- peror could have ordered anything so unjust ; and if the last order was really not from the emperor, the Christians entreat him not to give them up to their enemies. 4 We conclude from this that there * Eusebius, iv. 26 ; and Routh's Reliquiae Sacrae, vol. I. and the notes. The interpretation of this Fragment is not easy. Mosheim misunderstood one passage so far as to affirm that Marcus promised rewards to those who denounced the Christians ; an interpretation which is entirely false. Melito calls the Christian religion " our philosophy," which began among barbarians (the Jews), and flourished among the Roman subjects in the time of Augustus, to the great advantage of the empire, for from that time the power of the Romans grew great and glorious. He says that the emperor has and will have as the successor to Augustus' power the good wishes of men, if he will protect that philosophy which grew up with the empire and began with Augustus, which phi- losophy the predecessors of Antoninus honored in addi- tion to the other religions. He further says that the Christian religion had suffered no harm since the time of Augustus, but on the contrary had enjoyed all honor and respect that any man could desire. Nero and Domi- tian, he says, were alone- persuaded by some malicious men to calumniate the Christian religion, and this was the origin of the false charges against the Christians. But this was corrected by the emperors who immediately preceded Antoninus, who often by their Rescripts re- proved those who attempted to trouble the Christians. Hadrian, Antoninus' grandfather, wrote to many, and among them to the governor of Asia. Antoninus Pius when Marcus was associated with him in the empire wrote to the cities, that they must not trouble the Chris- tians ; among others to the people of Larissa, Thessa- lonica, the Athenians and all the Greeks. Melito con- cluded thus : We are persuaded that thou who hast about these things the same mind that they had, nay rather one much more humane and philosophical, wilt do all that we ask thee. — This Apology was written after a. d. 169, the year in which Verus died, for it speaks 26 M . A URELIUS were at least imperial Rescripts or Constitutions of M. Antoninus, which were made the founda- tion of these persecutions. The fact of being a Christian was now a crime and punished, unless the accused denied their religion. Then come the persecutions at Smyrna, which some modern critics place in a. d. 167, ten years before the persecution of Lyon. The governors of the prov- inces under M. Antoninus might have found enough even in Trajan's Rescript to warrant them in punishing Christians, and the fanaticism of the people would drive them to persecution, even if they were unwilling. But besides the fact of the Christians rejecting all the heathen ceremonies, we must not forget that they plainly maintained that all the heathen religions were false. The Christians thus declared war against the heathen rites, and it is hardly necessary to obseive that this was a declaration of hostility against the Roman government, which tolerated all the vari- ous forms of superstition that existed in the empire, and could not consistently tolerate another religion, which declared that all the rest were false, and all of Marcus only and his son Commodus. According to Melito's testimony, Christians had only been punished for their religion in the time of Nero and Domitian, and the persecutions began again in the time of M. Anto- ninus and were founded on his orders, which were abused as he seems to mean. He distinctly affirms '• that the race of the godly is now persecuted and harrassed by fresh imperial orders in Asia, a thing M'hich had never happened before." But we know that all this is not true, and that Christians had been punished in Trajan's time. ANTONINUS. 27 the splendid ceremonies of the empire only a wor- ship of devils. If we had a true ecclesiastical history, we should know how the Roman emperors attempted to check the new religion, how they enforced their princi- ple of finally punishing Christians, simply as Chris- tians, which Justin in his Apology affirms that they did, and I have no doubt that he tells the truth ; how far popular clamor and riots went in this matter, and how far many fanatical and ignorant Christians, for there were many such, contributed to excite the fanaticism on the other side and to em- bitter the quarrel between the Roman government and the new religion. Our extant ecclesiastical histories are manifestly falsified, and what truth they contain is grossly exaggerated ; but the fact is certain that in the time of M. Antoninus the hea- then populations were in open hostility to the Christians, and that under Antoninus' rule men were put to death because they were Christians. Eusebius in the preface to his fifth book remarks that in the seventeenth year of Antoninus' reign, in some parts of the world the persecution of the Christians became more violent, and that it pro- ceeded from the populace in the cities ; and he adds in his usual style of exaggeration, that we may infer from what took place in a single nation that myriads of martyrs were made in the habitable earth. The nation which he alludes to is Gallia ; and he then proceeds to give the letter of the churches of Viemia and Lugdunum. It is probable that he has assigned the true cause of 28 M . AURELIUS the persecutions, the fanaticism of the populace, and that both governors and emperor had a great deal of trouble with these disturbances. How far Marcus was cognizant of these cruel proceed- ings we do not know, for the historical records of his reign are very defective. He did not make the rule against the Christians, for Trajan did that ; and if we admit that he would have been willing to let the Christians alone, we cannot affirm that it was in his power, for it would be a great mistake to suppose that Antoninus had the unlimited authority, which some modern sovereigns have had. His power was limited by certain con- stitutional forms, by the Senate, and by the prece- dents of his predecessors. We cannot admit that such a man was an active persecutor, for there is no evidence that he was, though it is certain that he had no good opinion of the Christians, as ap- pears from his own words. 5 But he knew nothing 5 See xi. 3. The emperor probably speaks of such fanatics as Clemens (quoted by Gataker on this passage) mentions. The rational Christians admitted no fellow- ship with them. " Some of these heretics," says Clemens, " show their impiety and cowardice by loving their lives, saying that the knowledge of the really existing God is true testimony (martyrdom), but that a man is a self- murderer who bears witness by his death. We also blame those who rush to death, for there are some, not of us, but only bearing the same name who give themselves up. We say of them that they die without being martyrs, even if they are publicly punished ; and they give them- selves up to a death which avails nothing, as the Indian Gymnosophists give themselves up foolishly to fire.'" Cave in his Primitive Christianity (n. c. 7) says of the Christians : " They did flock to the place of torment ANTONINUS. 29 of them except their hostility to the Roman relig- ion, and he probably thought that they were dangerous to the state, notwithstanding the pro- fessions false or true of some of the Apologists. So much I have said, because it would be unfair not to state all that can be urged against a man whom his contemporaries and subsequent ages venerated as a model of virtue and benevolence. If I admitted the genuineness of some documents, he would be altogether clear from the charge of even allowing any persecutions ; but as I seek the truth and am sure that they are false, I leave him to bear whatever blame is his due. I add that it is quite certain that Antoninus did not derive any of his Ethical principles from a religion of which he knew nothing. 6 faster than droves of beasts that are driven to the sham- bles. They even longed to be in the arms of suffering. Ignatius, though then in his journey to Rome in order to his execution, yet by the way as he went could not but vent his passionate desire of it : O that I might come to those wild beasts, that are prepared for me ; I heartily wish that I may presently meet with them ; I would invite and encourage them speedily to devour me, and not be afraid to set upon me as they have been to others ; nay should they refuse it, I would even force them to it and more to the same purpose from Eusebius. Cave, an honest and good man, says all this in praise of the Christians ; but I think that he mistook the matter. We admire a man who holds to his principles even to death ; but these fanatical Christians are the Gymnoso- phists whom Clemens treats with disdain. 6 Dr F. C. Baur in his work entitled Das Christenthum und die Christliche Kirche der drei ersten Jahrhunderte; &c. has examined this question with great good sense and fairness, and I believe he has stated the truth as near as our authorities enable us to- reach it. so M. A URELIUS There is no doubt that the Emperor's Reflec- tions or his Meditations, as they are generally named, is a genuine work. In the first book he speaks of himself, his family, and his teachers ; and in other books he mentions himself. Suidas (v. MapKo^) notices a work of Antoninus in twelve books, which he names the " conduct of his own life ; " and he cites the book under several words in his Dictionary, giving the emperor's name, but not the title of the work. There are also passages cited by Suidas from Antoninus without mention of the emperor's name. The true title of the work is unknown. Xylander who published the first edition of this book (Zurich, 1558, 8vo., with a Latin version) used a manuscript, which contained the twelve books, but it is not known where the manuscript is now. The only other complete manuscript which is known to exist is in the Vati- can library, but it has no title and no inscriptions of the several books : the eleventh only has the inscription MdpKov avroKpdropo^ marked with an asterisk. The other Vatican manuscripts and the three Florentine contain only excerpts from the emperor's book. All the titles of the excerpts nearly agree with that which Xylander prefixed to his edition, NLdpKOV ' Avtiuvlvov AvroKpdrop^ tcov ets kavrov /3i/3A.ta i/?. This title has been used by all subsequent editors. We cannot tell whether Antoninus divided his work into books or some- body else did it. If the inscriptions at the end of the first and second books are genuine, he may have made the division himself. ANTONINUS. 31 It is plain that the emperor wrote down his thoughts or reflections as the occasions arose ; and since they were intended for his own use, it is no improbable conjecture that he left a complete copy behind him written with his own hand ; for it is not likely that so diligent a man would use the labor of a transcriber for such a purpose, and expose his most secret thoughts to any other eye. He may have also intended the book for his son Commodus, who however had no taste for his father's philosophy. Some careful hand preserved the precious volume ; and a work by Antoninus is mentioned by other late writers besides Suidas. Many critics have labored on the text of Anto- ninus. The most complete edition is that by Thomas Gataker, 1652, 4to. The second edition of Gataker was superintended by George Stan- hope, 1697, 4to. There is also an edition of 1704. Gataker made and suggested many good correc- tions, and he also made a new Latin version, which is not a very good specimen of Latin, but it generally expresses the sense of the original and often better than some of the more recent trans- lations. He added in the margin opposite to each paragraph references to the other parallel passages ; and he wrote a commentary, one of the most com- plete that has been written on any ancient author. This commentary contains the editor's exposition of the more difficult passages, and quotations from all the Greek and Roman writers for the illustra- tion of the text. It is a wonderful monument of learning and labor, and certainly no Englishman 32 M . A URELIUS has yet done anything like it. At the end of his preface the editor says that he wrote it at Rother- hithe near London in a severe winter, when he was in the seventy-eighth year of his age, 1651, a time when Milton, Selden and other great men of the Commonwealth time were living ; and the great French scholar Saumaise (Salmasius), with whom Gataker corresponded and received help from him for his edition of Antoninus. The Greek text has also been edited by J. M. Sclmltz, Leipzig, 1802, 8vo. ; and by the learned Greek Adamantius Coral's, Paris, 1816, 8vo. The text of Schultz was republished by Tauclmitz, 1821. There are English, French, Italian and Spanish translations of M. Antoninus, and there may be others. I have not seen all the English transla- tions. There is one by Jeremy Collier, 1702, 8vo. a most coarse and vulgar copy of the original. The latest French translation by Alexis Pierron in the collection of Charpentier is better than Dacier's, which has been honored with an Italian version (Udine, 1772). There is an Italian ver- sion (1 675) which I have not seen. It is by a cardinal. " A man illustrious in the church, the Cardinal Francis Barberini the elder, nephew of Pope Urban VIII, occupied the last years of his life in translating into his native language the thoughts of the Roman emperor, in order to diffuse among the faithful the fertilizing and vivi- fying seeds. He dedicated this translation to his soul, to make it, as he says in his energetic style, redder than his purple at the sight of the virtues ANTONINUS. 83 of this Gentile" (Pierron, Preface). I have made this translation at intervals after having used the book for many years. It is made from the Greek, but I have not always followed one text. I have occasionally compared other versions. I made this translation for my own use, because I found that it was worth the labor. It may be useful to others also and at last I have determined to print it, though, as the original is both very difficult to understand and still more difficult to translate, it is not possible that I have always avoided error. But I believe that I have not often missed the meaning, and those who will take the trouble to compare the translation with the original should not hastily conclude that I am wrong, if they do not agree with me. Some passages do give the meaning, though at first sight they may not appear to do so ; and when I differ from the translators, I think that in some places they are wrong, and in other places I am sure that they are. I have placed a f in some passages, which indicates cor- ruption in the text or great uncertainty in the meaning. I could have made the language more easy and flowing, but I have preferred a somewhat ruder style as being better suited to express the character of the original ; and sometimes the ob- scurity which may appear in the version is a fair copy of the obscurity of the Greek. If I should ever revise this version, I would gladly make use of any corrections which may be suggested. I have added an index of some of the Greek terms with the corresponding English. If I have not 3 34 M. A URELIUS given the best words for the Greek, I have done the best that I could ; and in the text I have always given the same translation of the same word. The last reflection of the Stoic philosophy that I have observed is in Simplicius' Commentary on the Enchiridion of Epictetus. Simplicius was not a Christian, and such a man was not likely to be converted at a time when Christianity was grossly corrupted. But he was a really religious man, and he concludes his commentary with a prayer to the Deity which no Christian could improve. From the time of Zeno to Simplicius, a period of about nine hundred years, the Stoic philosophy formed the characters of some of the best and greatest men. Finally it became extinct, and we hear no more of it till the revival of letters in Italy. Angelo Poliziano met with two very inac- curate and incomplete manuscripts of Epictetus' Enchiridion, which he translated into Latin and dedicated to his great patron Lorenzo de' Medici in whose collection he had found the book. Poli- ziano's version was printed in the first Bale edition of the Enchiridion, A. D. 1531 (apud And. Cra- tandrum). Poliziano recommends the Enchiridion to Lorenzo as a work well suited to his temper, and useful in the difficulties by which he was sur- rounded. Epictetus and Antoninus have had readers ever since they were first printed. The little book of Antoninus has been the companion of some great men. Machiavelli's Art of War and Marcus Antoninus were the two books winch were used ANTONINUS. 35 when he was a young man by Captain John Smith, and he could not have found two writers better fitted to form the character of a soldier and a man. Smith is almost unknown and for- gotten in England his native country, but not in America where he saved the young colony of Vir- ginia. He was great in his heroic mind and his deeds in arms, but greater still in the nobleness of his character. For a man's greatness lies not in wealth and station, as the vulgar believe, nor yet .in his intellectual capacity, which is often asso- ciated with the meanest moral character, the most abject servility to those in high places and arro- gance to the poor and lowly ; but a man's true greatness l ies i n the consciousness of an honest purpose in life, founded on a just estimate of him- self and everything else, on frequent self-exami- nation, and a steady obedience to the rule which he knows to be right, without troubling himself, as the emperor says he should not, about what others may think or say, or whether they do or do not do that which he thinks and says and does. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS. T has been said that the Stoic phi- losophy first showed its real value when it passed from Greece to Rome. The doctrines of Zeno and his suc- cessors were well suited to the gravity and practi- cal good sense of the Romans ; and even in the Republican period we have an example of a man, M. Cato Uticensis, who lived the life of a Stoic and died consistently with the opinions which he professed. He was a man, says Cicero, who em- braced the Stoic philosophy from conviction ; not for the purpose of vain discussion, as most did, but in order to make his life conformable to its pre- cepts. In the wretched times from the death of . Augustus to the murder of Domitian, there was nothing but the Stoic philosophy which could con- sole and support the followers of the old religion under imperial tyranny and amidst universal cor- ruption. There were even then noble minds that could dare and endure, sustained by a good con- science and an elevated idea of the purposes of man's existence. Such were Paetus Thrasea, PHILOSOPHY OF ANTONINUS* 3? Helvidius Priscus, Cornutus, C. Musonius Rufus,* and the poets Persius and Juvenal, whose ener- getic language and manly thoughts may be as in- structive to us now as they might have been to their contemporaries. Persius died under Nero's bloody reign, but Juvenal had the good fortune to survive the tyrant Domitian and to see the better times of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian. His best precepts are derived from the Stoic school, and they are enforced in his finest verses by the un- rivalled vigor of the Latin language. The two best expounders of the later Stoical philosophy were a Greek slave and a Roman em- peror. Epictetus, a Phrygian Greek, was brought to Rome, we know not how, but he was there the slave and afterwards the freedman of an unworthy master, Epaphroclitus by name, himself a freed- man and a favorite of Nero. Epictetus may have been a hearer of C. Musonius Rufus, while he was still a slave, but he can hardly have been a teacher before he was made free. He was one of the philosophers whom Domitian's order banished from Rome. He retired to Nicopolis in Epirus, and lie may have died there. Like other great teachers he wrote nothing, and we are indebted to his grateful pupil Axrian for what we have of 1 I have omitted Seneca, Nero's preceptor. He was in a sense a Stoic and he has said many good things in a very fine way. There is a judgment of Gellius (xn. 2) on Seneca, or rather a statement of what some peo- ple thought of his philosophy, and it is not favorable. His writings and his life must be taken together, and I have nothing more to say of him here. 88 THE PHILOSOPHY Epictetus' discourses. Arrian wrote eight books of the discourses of Epictetus, of which only four remain and some fragments. We have also from Arrian's hand the small Enchiridion or Manual of the chief precepts of Epictetus. There is a valuable commentary on the Enchiridion by Sim- plicius, who lived in the time of the emperor Jus- tinian. 2 Antoninus in his first book (i. 7), in which he gratefully commemorates his obligations to his teachers, says that he was made acquainted by Junius Rusticus with the discourses of Epictetus, whom he mentions also in other passages (iv. 41 ; xi. 33. 36). Indeed, the doctrines of Epictetus and Antoninus are the same, and Epictetus is the best authority for the explanation of the philo- sophical language of Antoninus and the exposi- tion of his opinions. But the method of the two philosophers is entirely different. T^pWgtiU^ addressed himself to his hearers in a continuous discourse and in a familiar and simple maimer. An tori j,nns wrote down his reflections for his own use only, in short unconnected paragraphs, which are often obscure. The Stoics made three divisions of philosophy, Physic (c£uo-iko3 ), Ethic (yOtKOj ), and Logic (A.oyt- kov). This division, we are told by Diogenes, was made by Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic 2 There is a complete edition of Arrian's Epictetus with the commentary of Simplicius by J. Schweighaeu- ser, 6 vols. 8vo. 1799, 1800. There is also an English translation of Epictetus by Mrs. Carter. OF ANTONINUS. 39 sect and by Chrysippus ; but these philosophers placed the three div isions in the following order, LoffiCjJP hysic, Ethic, ft appears however that this division was made before Zeno's time and acknowledged by Plato, as Cicero remarks (Acad. Post. i. 5). Logic is not synonymous with our term Logic in the narrower sense of that word. Cleanthes, a Stoic, subdivided the three divis- ions, and made six : Dialectic and Rhetoric, com- prised in Logic ; Ethic and Politic ; Physic and Theology. This division was merely for practi- cal use, for all Philosophy is one. Even among the earliest Stoics Logic or Dialectic does not oc- cupy the same place as in Plato : it is considered only as an instrument which is to be used for the other divisions of Philosophy. An exposition of the earlier Stoic doctrines and of their modifica- tions would require a volume. My object is to explain only the opinions of Antoninus, so far as they can be collected from his book. According to the subdivision of Cleanthes, Physic and Theology go together, or the study of the nature of Things, and the study of the / nature of *he Deity, so far as man can under- stand the Deity, and of his government of the universe. This division or subdivision is not formally adopted by Antoninus, for as already ob- served, there is no method in his book ; but it is ' virtually contained in it. Cleanthes also connects Ethic and Politic, or the study of the principles of morals and the study t>f the constitution of civil society ; and undoubt- 40 THE PHILOSOPHY edly he did well in subdividing Ethic into two parts, Ethic in the narrower sense and Politic, for though the two are ultimately connected, they are also very distinct, and many questions can only be properly discussed by carefully observing the dis- tinction. Antoninus does not treat of Politic. His subject is Ethic, and Ethic in its practical application to his own conduct in life as a man and as a governor. His Ethic is founded on his doctrines about man's nature, the Universal Na- ture, and the relation of every man to everything else. It is therefore intimately and inseparably connected with Physic or the nature of Tilings and with Theology or the nature of the Deity. He advises us to examine well all the impres- sions on our minds (^avrao-tai) and to form a right judgment of them, to make just conclusions, and to inquire into the meanings of words, and so far to apply Dialectic, but he has no attempt at any exposition of Dialectic, and his philosophy is in substance purely moral and practical. He says (viii. 13), " Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul, 3 3 The original is em ndo7]Q (pavraalac. We have no word which expresses davTaaia, for it is not only the sen- suous appearance which comes from an external object, which object is called to davraoruv, but it is also the thought or feeling or opinion which is produced even when there is no corresponding external object before us. Accordingly everything which moves the soul is (pavraa- tov and produces a fyavTaa'ia. In this extract Antoninus says dvcnoXoyelv. ira&o2.oyeiv, 6iaX.EKTLKeveod-aL. I have translated jradoloyelv by usir g the word Moral (Ethic), and that is the meaning here. OF ANTONINUS. 41 apply to it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dialectic : " which is only another way of tell- ing us to examine the impression in every possi- ble way. In another passage (in. 11) he says, " To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added : make for thyself a definition or description of the object (to ^avracrrov) which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it lias been compounded, and into which it will be resolved." Such an examination implies a use of Dialectic, which Antoninus accordingly em- ployed as a means towards establishing his Physi- cal, Theological and Ethical principles. There are several expositions of the Physical, Theological, and Ethical principles, which are contained in the work of Antoninus ; and more expositions than I have read. Bitter (Geschichte der Philosophic, iv. 241) after explaining the doctrines of Epictetus, treats very briefly and in- sufficiently those of Antoninus. But he refers to a short essay, in which the work is done better. 4 There is also an essay on the Philosophical Prin- ciples of M. Aurelius Antoninus by J. M. Schultz, placed at the end of his German translation of Antoninus (Schles wig, 1799). With the assistance of these two useful essays and his own diligent 4 De Marco Aurelio Antonino ... ex ipsius Commen- tariis. Scriptio Philologica. Instituit Nicolaus Bachius, Lipsiae, 1826. 42 THE PHILOSOPHY study a man may form a sufficient notion of the principles of Antoninus ; but he will find it more difficult to expound them to others. Besides the want of arrangement in the original and of con- nection among the numerous paragraphs, the cor- ruption of the text, the obscurity of the language and the style, and sometimes perhaps the confu- sion in the writer's own ideas, — besides all this there is occasionally an apparent contradiction in the emperor's thoughts, as if his principles . were sometimes unsettled, as if doubt sometimes clouded his mind. A man who leads a life of tranquillity and reflection, who is not disturbed at home and meddles not with the affairs of the world, may keep his mind at ease and his thoughts in one even course. But such a man has not been tried. All his Ethical philosophy and his passive virtue might turn out to be idle words, if he were once exposed to the rude realities of hu- man existence. Fine thoughts and moral disser- tations from men who have not worked and suf- fered may be read, but they will, be forgotten. No religion, no Ethical philosophy is worth any- thing, if the teacher has not lived the " life of an apostle," and been ready to die " the death of a martyr." " Not in passivity (the passive affects) but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity " (ix. 16). The emperor Antoninus was a practical moralist. From his youth he followed a laborious discipline, and though his high station placed him above all OF ANTONINUS. 43 want or the fear of it, he lived as frugally and temperately as the poorest philosopher. -'Epictetus wanted little, and it seems that he always had the little that he wanted ; and he was content with it, as he had been with his servile station. But Antoninus after his accession to the empire sat on an uneasy seat. He had the administration of an empire which extended from the Euphrates to the Atlantic, from the cold mountains of Scotland to the hot sands of Africa ; and we may imagine, though we cannot know it by experience, what must be the trials, the troubles, the anxiety and the sorrows of him who has the world's business on his hands with the wish to do the best that he can, and the certain knowledge that he can do very little of the good which he wishes. In the midst of war, pestilence, conspiracy, gen- eral corruption and with the weight of so un- wieldy an empire upon him, we may easily com- prehend that Antoninus often had need of all his fortitude to support him. The best and the bravest men have moments of doubt and of weakness, but if they are the best and the bravest, they rise again from their depression by recurring to first principles, as Antoninus does. The emperor says that life is smoke, a vapor, and St. James in his Epistle is of the same mind ; that the world is full of en- vious, jealous, malignant people, and a man might be well content to get out of it. He has doubts perhaps sometimes even about that to which he holds most firmly. There are only a few passages of this kind, but they are evidence of the struggles 44 THE P H1L0S0PHY which even the noblest of the sons of men had to maintain against the hard realities of his daily life. A poor remark it is which I have seen somewhere, and made in a disparaging way, that the emperor's reflections show that he had need of consolation and comfort in life, and even to prepare him to meet his death. True that he did need comfort and support, and we see how he found it. He "constantly recurs to his fundamental principle that the universe is wisely ordered, that every man is a part of it and must conform to that order which he cannot change, that whatever the Deity has done is good, that all mankind are a man's brethren, that he must love and cherish them and try to [make them better, even those who would do him harm. This is his conclusion (n. 17) : " What then is that which is able to conduct a man ? One thing and only one, Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the divinity within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose nor yet falsely and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's doing or not doing anything ; and besides, accepting all that happens and all that is allotted, as coming from thence, wherever it is, from whence he himself came ; and finally waiting for death with a cheerful mind as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements, of which every living being is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and OF ANTONINUS. 4.5 dissolution of all the elements [himself]? for it is according to nature; and nothing is evil that is according to nature." The Physic of Antoninus is the knowledge of the Nature of the Universe, of its government, and of the relation of man's nature to both. He names the universe (fj rw/ oAw ovoria, vi. I), 5 "the universal substance," and he adds that " reason," (Aoyos) governs the universe. He also (vi. 9) uses the terms " universal nature " or " nature of the universe." He (vi. 25) calls the universe " the one and all, winch we name Cosmus or Order " (koo-/x js) If he ever seems to use these general terms as significant of the All, of all that man can in any way conceive to exist, he still on other oc- casions plainly distinguishes between Matter, Ma- terial things (vky, vXlkov), and Cause, Origin, 5 As to the word ovala, the reader may see the Index. I add here a few examples of the use of the word ; Anto- ninus has (v. 24), 7] ovfinaoa ovala, "the universal sub- stance." He says (xn. 30), " there is one common" sub- stance (ovoia), distributed among countless bodies ; and (iv. 40). In Stobaeus (torn. i. lib. 1, tit. 14) there is this definition, ovaiav 6i aoiv tCjV ovtov citcuvtmv rrjv TtpuTTjv vhjv. (In viii. 11), Antoninus speaks of to ovaitidec not vTukov, "the substantial and the material ; " and (vn. 10) he says that " everything material" (evvTlov) disappears in the substance of the whole (rrj rwv okuv ovaia). The ovaia is the generic name of that existence, which we as- sume as the highest or ultimate, because we conceive no existence which can be coordinated with it and none above it. It is the philosopher's " substance : " it is the ultimate expression for that which we conceive or suppose to be the basis, the being of a thing. " From the Divine, which is substance in itself, or the only and sole substance, all and everything that is created exists." (Swedenborg.) 46 THE PHILOSOPHY Reason (atria, aiTiwSes, Aoyos). 6 This is conform- able to Zeno's doctrine that there are two original principles (ap^at) of all things, that which acts (to ttolov! ) and that which is acted upon (ro 7rdcrx')y). That which is acted on is the formless matter (uA^) : that which acts is the reason (\oyos) in it, God, for he is eternal and operates through all matter, and produces . all things. So Anto- ninus (v. 32) speaks of the reason (Aoyos) which pervades all substance (ovo-lol), and through all time by fixed periods (revolutions) administers the universe (to irav). God is eternal, and Mat- ter is eternal. It is God who gives to matter its 6 I remark, in order to anticipate any misapprehension, that all these general terms involve a contradiction. The " one and all," and the like, and " the whole," imply limitation. "One" is limited; "all" is limited; the " whole " is limited. We cannot help it. We cannot find words to express that which we cannot fully conceive. The addition of " absolute " or any other such word does not mend the matter. Even God is used by most people, often unconsciously, in such a way that limitation is im- plied, and yet at the same time words are added which are intended to deny limitation. A Christian martyr, when he was asked what God was, is said to have answered that God has no name like a man ; and Justin says the same (Apol. ii. 6). We can conceive the existence of a thing, or rather we may have the idea of an existence, without an adequate notion of it, " adequate " meaning coexten- sive and coequal with the thing. We have a notion of limited space derived from the dimensions of what we call a material thing, though of space absolute, if I may use the term, we have no notion at all ; and of infinite space the notion is the same, no notion at all; and yet we conceive it in a sense, though I know not how, and we believe that space is infinite, and we cannot conceive it to be finite. OF ANTONINUS. 47 form, but he is not said to have created matter. According to this view, which is as old as Anax- agoras, God and matter exist independently, but God governs matter. This doctrine is simply the expression of the fact of the existence both of matter and of God., The Stoics did not perplex themselves with the insoluble question of the origin and nature of matter. 7 Antoninus also assumes a beginning of things, as we now know them ; but his language is sometimes very obscure. I have endeavored to explain the meaning of one difficult passage, (vn. 75, and the note.) Matter consists of elemental parts ((jToiyeia) of which all material objects are made. But nothing is permanent in form. The nature of the universe, according to Antoninus' expression (iv. 36), "loves nothing so much as to change the things which are, and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the 7 The notions of matter and of space are inseparable. We derive the notion of space from matter and form. But we have no adequate conception either of matter or of space. Matter in its ultimate resolution is as unintelligible as what men call mind, spirit, or by whatever other name they may express the power which makes itself known by its acts. Anaxagoras laid down the distinction between intelligence (vovg) and matter, and he said that intelli- gence impressed motion on matter and so separated the elements of matter and gave them order ; but he probably only assumed a beginning, as Simplicius says, as a foundation of his philosophical teaching. The common Greek word which we translate "matter" ii vlrj. It is the stuff that things are made of. 48 THE PHILOSOPHY earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar notion." All things then are in a constant flux and change : some things are dissolved into the elements, others come in their places ; and so the " whole universe continues ever young and per- fect." (xn. 23.) Antoninus has some obscure expressions about what he calls " apming^ prf^'ph^ " (cnrepixaTiKol Xoyot) . He opposes them to the Epicurean atoms (vi. 24), and consequently his "seminal principles " are not material atoms which wander about at hazard, and combine nobody knows how. In one passage (iv. 21) he speaks of living principles, souls, (i/^x a ') a f ter the dissolution of their bodies being received into the " seminal principle of the universe." Schultz thinks that by " seminal prin- ciples Antoninus means the relations of the various elemental principles, which relations areoteteK mined by the Deity and by which alone the pro- duction of organized beings is possible." This may be the meaning, but if it is, nothing of any value can be derived from it. 8 Antoninus often uses the word "Nature" (^o-t;), and we must attempt to fix its meaning. The simple etymo- logical sense of s) per- 10 I have always translated the word vovg, " intelli- gence " or " intellect." It appears to be the word used by the oldest Greek philosophers to express the notion of " intelligence " as opposed to the notion of " matter." I have always translated the word Xoyo^ by "reason,'' and XoyiKog by the word "rational," or perhaps sometimes " reasonable," as I have translated voepog by the word "intellectual." Every man who has thought and has read any philosophical writings knows the difficulty of finding words to express certain notions, how imperfectly words express these notions, and how carelessly the words are often used. The various senses of the word "koyor are enough to perplex any man. Our translators of the New Testament (St. John, c. i.) have simply translated 6 Aoyog by "the word," as the Germans translated it by "das Wort ; " but in their theological writings they sometimes retain the original term Logos. The Germans have a term Vernunft, which seems to come nearest to our word Reason, or the necessary and absolute truths which we OF ANTONINUS. 57 yades man. (Compare Epictetus' Discourses, I. 14 ; and Voltaire a Mad e . Necker, vol. lxvii. p. 278.) God exists then, but what do we know of his Nature ? Antoninus says that the soul of man is an efflux from the divinity. We have bodies like animals, but we have reason, intelligence as the gods. Animals have life (^xtf)' an( ^ wna ^ we call instincts or natural principles of action : but the rational animal man alone has a rational, intelligent soul (^XV ^°y tKI 7> vjepd). Antoninus insists on this continually : God is in man, 11 and so we must constantly attend to the divinity within us, for it is only in this way that we can have any knowledge of the nature of God. The human soul is in a sense a portion of the divinity, and the soul alone has any communication with cannot conceive as being other than what they are. Such are what some people have called the laws of thought, the conceptions of space and of time, and axioms or first principles, which need no proof and cannot be proved or denied. Accordingly the Germans can say " Gott ist die hochste Vernunft," the Supreme Reason. The Germans have also a word Verstand, which seems to represent our word " understanding," " intelligence," " intellect," not as a thing absolute which exists by itself, but as a thing connected with an individual being, as a man. Accord- ingly it is the capacity of receiving impressions ( Vorstel- lungen, tyavTciGLai), and forming from them distinct ideas, (BegrifFe), and perceiving differences. I do not think that these remarks will help the reader to the understand- ing of Antoninus, or his use of the words vovg and Xoyog. The Kmperor's meaning must be got from his own words, and if it does not agree altogether with modern notions, it is not our business to force it into agreement, but sim- ply to find out what his meaning is, if we can. 11 Comp. Ep. to the Corinthians, i. 3. 17. 58 THE PHILOSOPHY the Deity, for as he says (xn. 2) : " With his intellectual part alone God touches the intelli- gence only which has flowed and been derived from himself into these bodies." In fact he says that which is hidden within a man is life, that is the man himself. All the rest is vesture, cover- ing, organs, instrument, which the living man, the real 12 man, uses for the purposes of his present existence. The air is universally diffused for him who is able to respire, and so for him who is will- 12 This is also Swedenborg's doctrine of the soul. " As to what concerns the soul, of which it is said that it shall live after death, it is nothing else but the man himself, who lives in the body, that is, the interior man, who by the body acts in the world and from whom the body itself lives " (quoted by Clissold, p. 456 of " The Practical Na- ture of the Theological Writings of Emanuel Swedenborg, in a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin," second edition, 1859 ; a book which theologians might read with profit). This is an old doctrine of the soul, which has been often proclaimed, but never better expressed than by the " Auctor de Mundo," c. 6, quoted by Gataker in his " Antoninus," p. 436. " The soul by which we live and have cities and houses is invisible, but it is seen by its works ; for the whole method of 'life has been devised by it and ordered, and by it is held together. In like manner we must think also about the Deity, who in power is most mighty, in beauty most comely, in life immortal, and in virtue supreme : wherefore though he is invisible to human nature, he is seen by his very works." Other passages to the same purpose are quoted by Gataker, (p. 382.) Bishop Butler has the same as to the soul: " Upon the whole then our organs of sense and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, our- selves, make use of to perceive and move with." If this is not plain enough, he also says : " It follows that our organized bodies are no more ourselves, or part of our- selves, than any other matter around us." (Compare Anton, x. 38.) OF ANTONINUS. 59 ing to partake of it' the intelligent power which holds within it all things is diffused as wide and free as the air. (vm. 54.) It is by living a divine life that man approaches to a knowledge of the divinity. 13 It is by following the divinity within, Sat/xtoj/ or #eos as Antoninus calls it, that man comes nearest to the Deity, the supreme good, for man can never attain to perfect agreement with his internal guide (to ^yeficvmoy)- "Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to him, and that it does all the daemon (Saifuav ) wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this daemon is every man's understanding and reason." (v. 27.) Th em is in man, llmt is in the reason, the in- telligence, a superior faculty which if it is exer- cised rules all the rest. This is th^ruhng faculty (to r]y c{xovlk6v), which Cicero (De ISTatura Deo- rum, ii. 11) renders by the Latin word Principatus, " to which nothing can or ought to be superior." 13 The reader may consult Discourse V. " Of the ex- istence and nature of God," in John Smith's " Select Discourses." He has prefixed as a text to this Discourse, the striking passage of Agapetus, Paraenes. § 3 : "He who knows himself will know God ; and he who knows God will be made like to God ; and he will be made like to God, who has become worthy of God ; and he becomes worthy of God, who does nothing unworthy of God, but thinks the things that are his, and speaks what he thinks, and does what he speaks." I suppose that the old say- ing, " Know thyself," which is attributed to Socrates and others, had a larger meaning than the narrow sense which is generally given to it. 80 THE PHILOSOPHY Antoninus often uses this term, and others which are equivalent. He names it (vn. 64) " the governing intelligence." The governing faculty is the master of the soul. (v. 26.) A man must reverence only his ruling faculty and the divinity within him. As we must reverence that which is supreme in the universe, so we must reverence that which is supreme in ourselves, and this is that which is of like kind with that which is supreme in the universe, (v. 21.) So, as Plotinus says, the soul of man can only know the divine, so far as it knows itself. In one passage (xi. 19) Antoninus speaks of a man's condemnation of himself, when the diviner part within him has been overpowered and yields to the less honorable and to the perishable part, the body, and its gross pleasures. In a word, the views of Antoninus on this matter, however his expressions may vary, are exactly what' Bishop Butler expresses, when he speaks of " the natural supremacy of reflection or conscience," of the faculty " which surveys, ap- proves or disapproves the several affections of our mind and actions of our lives." Much matter might be collected from Anto- ninus on the notion of the Universe being one animated Being. But all that he says amounts ' to no more, as Schultz remarks, than this : the soul of man is most intimately united to his body and together they make one animal, which we call man ; so the Deity is most intimately united to the world or the material universe, and together they form one whole. But Antoninus did not OF ANTONINUS. 61 view God and the material universe as the same, any more than he viewed the body and soul of man as one. Antoninus has no speculations on the absolute nature of the Deity. It was not his fashion to waste his time on what man cannot understand. He was satisfied that God exists, that he governs all things, that man can only have an imperfect knowledge of his nature, and he must attain this imperfect knowledge by reverencing the divinity which is within him, and keeping it pure. From all that has been said it follows that the universe is administered by the Providence of God (-n-povoLa), and that all things are wisely ordered. There are passages in which Antoninus expresses doubts, or states different possible theories of the constitution and government of the Universe, but he always recurs to his fundamental principle, that if we admit the existence of a Deity, we must also admit that he orders all things wisely and well. (iv. 27 ; vi. 1 ; ix. 28 ; xn. 5, and many other passages.) Epictetus says (i. 6) that we can discern the providence which rules the world, if we possess two things, the power of seeing all that happens with respect to each thing, and a grateful disposition. But if all things are wisely ordered, how is the world so full of what we call evil, physical and moral ? If instead of saying that there is evil in the world, we use the expression which I have used, " what we call evil," we have partly antici- pated the Emperor's answer. We see and feel C2 THE PHILOSOPHY and know imperfectly very few things in the few years that we live, and all the knowledge and all the experience of all the human race is positive ignorance of the whole, which is infinite. Now as our reason teaches us that everything is in some way related to and connected with every other thing, all notion of evil as being in the universe of things is a contradiction, for if the whole comes from and is governed by an intelligent being, it is impossible to conceive anything in it which tends to the evil or destruction of the whole, (vin. 55 ; X. 6.) Everything is in constant mutation, and yet the whole subsists. We might imagine the solar system resolved into its elemental parts, and yet the whole would still subsist " ever young and perfect." All things, all forms, are dissolved and new forms_..appear. All living tilings undergo the change which we call death. If we call death an evil, then all change is an evil. Living beings also suffer pain, and man suffers most of all, for he suffers both in and by his body and by his intelligent part. Men suffer also from one another, and perhaps the largest part of human suffering comes to man from those whom he calls his broth- ers. Antoninus says (vin. 55), " Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose." The first part of this is perfectly consistent with the doctrine that the OF ANTONINUS. 63 whole can sustain no evil or harm. The second part must be explained by the Stpi^ principle that there is no evil in anything which is not in our power. What wrong we suffer from another is his evil, not ours. BuTTXiTs is an admission that there is evil in a sort, for he who does wrong does evil, and if others can endure the wrong, still there is evil in the wrongdoer. Antoninus (xi. 18) gives many excellent precepts with respect to wrongs and injuries, and his precepts-are practical. He teaches us to. bear what we cannot avoids and his lessons may be just as useful to him who denies the being and the government of God as to him who believes in both. There is no direct answer in Antoninus to the objections which may be made to the existence and providence of God because of the moral -disorder and , siuTering which are in the world, except this answer which he makes in reply to the supposition that even the best men may be extinguished by death. He says if it is so, we may be sure that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have ordered it otherwise, (xn. 5.) His conviction of the wisdom which we may observe in the govern- ment of the world is too strong to be disturbed by any apparent irregularities in the order of things. That these disorders exist is a fact, and those who would conclude from them against the being and government of God conclude too hastily. We all admit that there is an order in the mate rial worl d, a Nature, in the sense in which that word has been explained, a constitution (Karao-KtvYj,) what 64 THE PHILOSOPHY we call a system, a relation of parts to one another and a fitness of the whole for something. So in the constitution of plants and of animals there is an order, a fitness for some end. Sometimes the order, as we conceive it, is interrupted and the end, as we conceive it, is not attained. The seed, the plant or the animal sometimes perishes before it has passed through all its- changes and done all its uses. It is according to Nature, that is a fixed order, for some to perish early and for others to do all their uses and leave successors to take their place. So man has a corporeal and intellectual and moral constitution fit for certain uses^and on the whole man performs these uses, dies and leaves other men in his place. So society exists, and a social state is manifestly the Natural State of man, the state for which his Nature fits him ; and society amidst innumerable irregularities and disorders still subsists ; and perhaps we may say that the history of the past and our present knowl- edge give us a reasonable hope that its disorders will diminish, and that order, its governing prin- ciple, may be more firmly established. As order then, a fixed order, we may say, subject to devia- tions real or apparent, must be admitted to exist in the whole Nature of things, that which we call disorder or evil as it seems to us, does not in any way alter the fact of the general constitution of things having a Nature or fixed order. Nobody will conclude from the existence of disorder that order "Is^not the rule, for the existence oi_or.der both physical and moral is proved by daily ex- OF ANTONINUS, 65 r perience and all past experience. We cannot conceive how the order of the universe is main- tained: we cannot even conceive how our own life from day to day is continued, nor how we , perform the simplest movements of the body, nor i how we grow and think and act, though we know many of the conditions which are necessary for all these functions. K nowing nothin g then o f the unseen jDower^ except bywEatTis done, we know nothing of the power which acts through what we call all time and all space ; but seeing that "there Is'a^TSTature or fixed order in all things known to us, it is conformable to the nature of our minds to believe that this universal Nature has a cause which operates con- tinually, and that we are totally unable to specu- late on the reason of any of those disorders or evils which we perceive. This I believe is the answer which may be collected from all that An- toninus has said. 14 The origin of evil is an old question. Achilles tells Priam (Iliad, 24, 527) that Zeus has two casks, one filled with good things, and the other with bad, and that he gives to men out of each accord- ing to his pleasure ; and so we must be content, for we cannot alter the will of Zeus. One of the Greek commentators asks how must we reconcile this doctrine with what we hud in the first book of the Odyssey, where the king of the gods says, 14 Cleanthes says in his Hymn : " For all things good and bad to One thou formest, So that One everlasting reason governs all/' 5 66 THE PHILOSOPHY Men say that evil comes to them from us, but they bring it on themselves through their own folly. The answer is plain enough even to the Greek commentator. The poets make both Achilles and Zeus speak appropriately to their several charac- ters. Indeed Zeus says plainly that men do attrib- ute their sufferings to the gods, but they do it falsely, for they are the cause of their own sorrows. Epictetus in his Enchiridion (c. 27) makes short work of the question of evil. Pie says, "As a markjs not set up for the. purpose of missing it, so neither does the nature of evil exist in the Universe." This will appear obscure enough to those who are not acquainted with Epictetus, but he always knows what he is talking about. We do not set up a mark in order to miss it, though we may miss it. God, whose existence Epictetus assumes, has not ordered all things so that his pur- pose shall fail. Whatever there may be of what we call evil, the Nature of evil, as he expresses it, does not exist ; that is, evil is not a part of the constitution or nature of Things. If there were a principle of evil (apx>?) m the constitution of things7 evil" would no longer be evil, as Simplicius argues, but evil would be good. Simplicius (c. 34, [27]) has a long and curious discourse on this text of Epictetus, and it is amusing and instructive. One passage more will conclude this matter. It contains all that the emperor could say (n. 11) : " To go from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not in- volve thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not OF A NTONINUS. 67 / / exist, or if tliey have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth they do exist, and they do care for human tilings, and they have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be al- together in a man's power not to fall into it. But that which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these things, is it possible that the nature of the Universe has overlooked them ; nqr— is— it possible that it has made so g reat_a mist ake, either" throu^^^ranl^fV power or want of skill, that goodand evil should hap|?en-4nd iscrim i ua.tp.ly tQc-.tLe>-good-an and with what men they live an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the praise which comes from such men, since they are not even satisfied with them- selves. 5. Labor not unwillingly, nor without regard to the common interest, nor without due consider- ation, nor with distraction ; nor let studied orna- ment set off thy- thoughts, and be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be the guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life, and ready to go, hav- ing need neither of oath nor of any man's tes- timony. Be cheerful also, and seek not exter- nal help nor the tranquillity which others give. 8 114 M.ANTONINUS. III. A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others. 6. If thou Jndest in human life anything bet- terjthan justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in ajsvord, anything better than thy own mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it enables thee to do according to right reason, and in the condition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; if, I_say, thou seest anything bet- ter than this, turn to it with all thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best. But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites, and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind ; if thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than this, give place to noth- ing else, for if thou dost once diverge and in- cline to it, thou wilt no longer without distrac- tion be able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy proper possession and thy own ; for it js_jiot right that an ything of an y other kind, such as praise from the many, or power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competition with that which is rationally M.ANTONINUS. III. 115 and politically good. All these things, even though they may seem to adapt themselves [to the better things] in a small degree, obtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the bet- ter, and hold to it — But that which is useful N is the better." — Well then, if it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and main- tain thy judgment without arrogance : only tak& care that thou makest the inquiry by a sure method. 7. Never value ^^yj^in^jis^prontable to thy- self which shall compel thee to breal^thy prom- \ iseTTttJo^j^^ to hate any: man, to suspect, to curse, to act the Iry^wrJle^to^desire anything which needs walls and curtains : for he who has preferred to everything else his own intelligence, and the daemon [within him] and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much company ; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either pursuing or flying from [life] ; but whether for a longer or a shorter time he shall have the soul inclosed in the body, he cares not at all: for even if he must depart immediately, he will go as readily as if he were 116 M.ANTONINUS. III. going to do anything else which can be done with decency and order ; taking care of this only all ■ through life, that his thoughts turn not away from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a member of a civil community. 8. In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou wilt find no corrupt matter, nor im- purity, nor any sore skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete when fate overtakes him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage be- fore ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to other things], nor yet de- tached [from other things], nothing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place. 9. Reverence the faculty which produces opin- ion. On this faculty it entirjd^~j&epends whether there shall exist in thy ruling^rjaji--any r opinion inconsistent with nature and the constitution of the rational a nimal. And this faculty promises freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men, and obedience to the gods. ^ I 10. Throwing away then all things, hold- -to- these only .which are few ; and besides bear in mind that every man lives only this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that all the rest of his life is either past or it is uncer- M. ANTONINUS. III. 117 tain. Short then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of the earth where he lives ; and short too the longest posthumous fame, and even this only continued by a suc- cession of poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know not even themselves, much less him who died long ago. 11. To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added : — Make^or_thySfilL a defi nition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in incomplete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the names of the things of which it has been compounded, and into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive of eleva- tion of mind as to be able to examine methodi- cally and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and always to look at things so as to see at the same time what kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything performs in it, and what value everything has with ref- erence to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citizen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like families ; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and how long it is the nature of this thing to endure 118 M. ANTONINUS. III. which now makes an impression on me, and whal virtue I have need of with respect to it, such a? gentleness, manliness, truth, fidelity, simplicity contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on ever) occasion a man should say : this comes from god , and this is according to the apportionment f and spinning of the thread of destiny, and such-like coincidence and chance ; and this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner, one who knows not however what is according to his nature. But I know ; for this reason I behave towards him according to the natural law of fellowship with benevolence and justice. At the same time however in things indifferent I attempt to ascertain the value of each. 1 2. If thou workest at that which is before thee, following right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part pure, as if thou shouldest be bound to give it back immediately ; if thou holdest to this, expecting nothing, fearing nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity ac- cording to nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man who is able to prevent this. 13. As physicians have always their instru- M. ANTONINUS. III. 119 ments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have pr incipl es ready for the u nderstanding o f _thin^MdUvija^jjiiL 1 human, and for doing everything, even the small- est, with a recollection of the bond which unites the diving and human to one another. For neither wiliPthou do anything well which per- tains to man without at the same time having a reference to things divine ; nor tli£ contrary. 14. No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read thy own memoirs, nor the acts of the ancient Romans and Hellenes, and the selections from books which thou wast reserv- ing for thy old age. Hasten then to the end which thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come to thy own aid, if thou I carest at all for thyself, while it is in thy power. J 15. They know not how many things are sig- nified by the words stealing, sowing, buying^ keeping quiet, seeing what ought to be done ; for this is not doneHBylne eyes, but by another kind of vision. 1 6. Body, soul, intelligence : to the body _be- long sensations, to the soul appetites , to the inte lligence princi ples. To receive the impres- sions of forms by means of appearances belongs even to animals ; to be pulled by the strings of 120 M. ANTONINUS. III. desire belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to have the intelli- gence that guides to the things which appear suitable belongs also to those who do not be- lieve in the gods, and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for him ; and not to de- file the divinity which is planted in his breast, / nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to pre- serve it tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying anything contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a simple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil, ready to de- part, and without any compulsion perfectly rec- onciled to his lot. IV. I HAT which rules within, when it is according to nature, is so affected with respect to the events which happen, that it always easily adapts itself to that which is possible and is presented to it. For it requires no definite material, but it moves towards its purpose, under certain con- ditions however ; and it makes a material for itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of what falls into it, by which a small light would have been extinguished : but when the fire is strong, it soon appropriates to itself the matter which is heaped on it, and consumes it, and rises higher by means of this very ma- terial. 2. Let no act be done without a pirrDOse, nor otherwise than according to the perfect principles of art. 3. Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in 122 M. ANTONINUS. IV. the country, sea-shores, and mountains ; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the most com- mon sort of men, for it is in thy power when- ever thou shalt choose to retire into thyself. For nowhere either with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immediately in perfect tranquillity : and I affirm that tranquillity is nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Constantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself; and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all discontent with the things to which thou returnest. For with what art thou discontented? With the badness of men ? Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that ^ ratio n_al a njm a als_..£xk t.ib^^ that to endure is a part of justice,. and that men do wrong involuntarily ; and consider how many already, after mutual enmity, suspicion; hatred, and fighting, have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes ; and be quiet at last. — But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which i s ass igned M. ANTONINUS. IV. 123 to thee out of the universe. — Recall to thy recol- lection this alternative ; either there is providence or atoms [fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or remember the arguments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of political com- munity [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. — Con- sider then fur tli er that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself apart and discov- ered its own power, and think also of all that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps the desire of the thing called fame will torment thee — See how soon^yerything is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on each side of [the present], and the emptiness of ap- plause, and the changeableness and want of judg- ment in those who pretend to give^ praise, and the narrowness of the space^jwithin^ whic h it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last]. For the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of people are they who will praise thee. This^ then remains : Remember to retire into I his little territory of thy own, and above all do 124 M. ANTONINUS. IV. not distract or strain thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the jthings readiest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these, which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul, for they are external and remain immovable ; but our perturbations come only from the opinion which is within. The other is that all these things which thou seest change immedi- ately and will no longer be ; and constantly bear in mind how many of these changes thou hast already witnessed. The universe is transforma- tion : life, is opinion. I 4. If ouT^rteH-Getual part is common, the rea- son also, in respect of which we are rational be- ings, is common : if this is so, common also is the eason which commands us what to do, and what ot to do ; if this is so, there is a common law lso ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we are members of some political' commu- nity ; if this is so, the world is in a maimer a state. For of what other common political community will any one say that the whole human race are members ? And from thence, from this common political community comes also our very intellec- tual faculty and reasoning faculty and our capacity for law ; or whence do they come ? For as my M. ANTONINUS. IV. 125 earthly part is a portion given to me from certain earth, and that which is watery from another ele- ment, and that which is hot and fiery from some peculiar source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non- existence), so also the intellectual part comes from some source. 5. Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature..; a composition out of the same elements, and a decomposition into the same ; and altogether not a tiling of which any man should be ashamed, for it is confor mable to [the nature of] a reason- able_animal, and not contrary to the reason of our constitution. 6. It is natural that these things should be done by such persons, it is a matter of neces- sity; and if a man will not have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But by all means bear this in mind, that within a very short time both thou and he will be dead; and soon not even your names will be left behind. 7. Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, " I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm is taken away. 8. That which does not make a man worse than he was, also does not make his life worse, 126 M. ANTONINUS. IV. nor does it harm him either from without or from within. 9. The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been compelled to do this. 10. Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou obs^rve^l^arefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with respect to the continuity- of the series of things, but with respect to what is just, and as if it were done by one who assigns to each thing its value. Observe then as thou hast begun ; and whatever thou doest, do it in conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to this in every action. 11. Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look at them as they are in truth. 12. A man should always have these two rules in readiness; the one, to do only what- ever t he reason of the ruling and legislating facu^niay suggest for the use of men ; the other,, to change thy opinion, if there is any one jU^Jiand_wh.a„s^ets^ thee right and moves thee Jrom any__opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain per- M. ANTONINUS. IV. suasion, as of what is just or of common advan- tage, and the like, not because it appears pleas-^ ant or brings reputation. 13. Hast thou reason ? I have. — Why then dost not thou use it? For if this does its own work, what else dost thou wish? 14. Thou existest as a part. Thou shalt dis- appear in that which produced thee ; but rather thou shalt be received back into its seminal principle by transmutation. 15. Many grains of frankincense on the same altar : one falls before, another falls after ; but it makes no difference. 16. Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return^to thy. principles and the wor- ship of reason. 17. Do not act as if thou wert L going to live ten thousand years. Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good. 18. How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see what . his neighbor says or does or thmks, but only to what lie does himself, that it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon f says, ^ook not round at the depraved morals of others, but run straight along the line without deviating from it. 1 28 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 1 9. He who has a vehement desire for posthu- mous fame does not consider that every one of those who remember him will himself also die very soon ; then again also they who have suc- ceeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly admire and perish. But suppose that those who will remember are even immortal, and that the remembrance will be immortal^, what then is this to %hee ? And I say not what is it to the dead, but what is it to the living. What is p raise, except f indeed so far as it has f a certain utility ? For thou now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, cling- ing to something else T~ . "". f. ~" 20. Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by being praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and works of art. Th at wh ich, ia_r£allY - - beautiful has no need of anything ; not more than law, not more than truth, not more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed ? Is such a thing as an emerald M. ANTONINUS. IV. 129 made worse than it was, if it is not praised ? ov gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a flower, a shrub ? 21. If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity ? — But how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote ? For as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain continu- ance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make room for other dead bodies; (so the souls which are removed into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted, and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there) And this is the answer which a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continu- ing to exist. But we must not only think of the number of '"bodies which are thus buried, but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed on them ? And never- theless this earth receives them by reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element. What is the investigation into the truth in this t30 M. ANTONI N U S IV. matter? The division into that which is material. and that which is the cause of form [the formal], (vn. 29.) 22. Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have respect to justice, and on the oc- casion of every impression maintain the faculty of comprehension [or understanding], 23. Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature : from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus ? 24. Occupy thyself with few things, says the (philosopher, if thou wouldst be tranquil. — But /consider if it would not be better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason of the animal which is naturally social requires, and as it requires. For this brings not only the tran- quillity which comes from doing well, but also that which comes from doing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do being un- necessary, if a man takes this away, he will have more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every occasion a man should ask himself. Is M. ANTONINUS. IV. 131 this one of the unnecessary things ? Now a man should take away not ojuly-u-nneeessary acts, but alsqjurmecessary thoughts, for thus superfluous acts will not follow after. 25. Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of him who is satisfied with his por- tion out of the whole, and satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition. 26. Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do not disturb thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any one do wrong ? It is to himself that he does the wrong. Has anything happened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe from the beginning everything which happens has been apportioned and spun out to thee. In a word, thy life is short. Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation. 27. Either it is a well arranged universe 1 or a chaos huddled together, but still a universe. But can a certain order subsist in thee, and disorder in the All ? And this too when all things are so separated and diffused and sympathetic. 28. A black character, a womanish character, 1 Antoninus here uses the word Koafiog both in the sense of the Universe and of Order ; and it is difficult to express his meaning. 132 M. ANTONIJSUS. IV. a stubborn character, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous, fraudulent, tyran- nical. 29. If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social reason ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding ; he is poor, who has need of an- other, and has not from himself all things which are useful for life. He is an abs cession the universe who withdraws and separates himself from the reason of our common nature through being_disj^ased with the things which., happen, for the same nature produces this, and has pro- duced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable animals, which is one. 30. The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other without a book : here is another half naked: Bread I have not, he says, and I abide by reason — And I do not get the means of living out of my learning,f and I abide [by my reason]. 31. Lo ve the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned, and be content with it.; and pass through the rest of life like one who has in- M.ANTONINUS. IV. 133 trusted to the gods with his whole soul all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the slave of any man. -82. Consider, for example, the times of Ves- pasian. Thou wilt see all these things, people marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, war- ring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, nattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot- ting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present, loving, heaping up treasure, desiring con- sulship, kingly power. Well then, that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again, re- move to the times of Trajan. Again, all is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view also the other epochs of time and of whole nations, and see how many after great efforts soon fell and were resolved into the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom thou hast thyself known distracting themselves about idle things, neglecting to do what was in accord- ance with their proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be content with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that the atten- tion given to everything has its proper value and proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou appliest thyself to smaller matters no further than is fit. 134 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 33. The words which were formerly familiar are now antiquated : so also the names of those who were famed of old, are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus, Leonnatus, and a little after also Scipio and Cato, then Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have shone in a won- drous way. For the rest, as soon as they have breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks of them. And, to conclude the mat- ter, wh at is even an e ternal remembrance ? A„ mere^jiotidag. What then is that about which we ought to employ our serious pains ? This one tiling, thoughts just, and acts social, and words which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a principle and source of the same kind. < iw 34. Willingly give thyself up to Clotho [one of the fates], allowing her to spin thy thread f into whatever things she pleases. f 35. Everything is only for a day, both that Vwhich remembers and that which is remembered. 36. Observe constantly that all things take place by change, and accustom thyself to consider M. ANTONINUS IV. 135 that the nature of the Universe loves nothing so much as to change the things which are and to make new things like them. For everything that exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar notion. 37. Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by external things, nor kindly disposed towards all ; nor-_do^l-4l^u~-^t^ plac£-_wis4otti_£nJy^^ 38. Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise, what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue. 39. What i s evil to Jhee, does not subsist in thej-ujynj^H^ ; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy corporeal covering. Where is it thg_n? It Js in that part of thee in t which__£uhsi aia thje-_power__of forming opinions ahmiLevils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body, is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, nevertheless let the part which forms opinions about these things be quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good which can happen equally to the bad 136 M. ANTONINUS. IV. man and the good. For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is neither according to nature nor contrary to nature. 40. Constantly regard the universe as one liv- ing being, having one substance and one soul; and observe how all things Jjiave reference to one perception, the perception of this one living being ; and how all things act with one movement ; and how all things are the co-operating causes of all things which exist ; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and the contexture of the web. 41. Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus used to say. 42. It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for things to subsist in consequence of change. <-, 43. Time is like a river made up of the events which happen, and a violent stream ; for as soon as a thing has been seen, it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this will be car- ried away too. 44. Everything which happens is as familiar and well known as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer ; for such is disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and whatever else delights fools or vexes them. M. ANTONINUS. IV. 137 45. I^Liiifi^ries^jybiii^s those which follow are always aptly fitted to those which have gone before j . for this series is not like a mere enumera- tion of disjointed things, which has only a neces- sary sequence, but it is a rational connection: and as all existing things are arranged together har- moniously, so the things which come into existence exhibit no mere succession, but a certain wonder- ful relationship, (vi. 38. vu. 9.) 46. Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death of earth is to become water, and the death of water is to become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and reversely. And think too of him who forgets whither the way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which they are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs the universe ; and the things which they daily meet with seem to them strange : and con- sider /that we ought not to act and speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to act and speak ; and that f we ought not, like children who learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we have been taught.f 47. If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow or certainly on the day after to-morrow, thou. wouldstaiQt care much whether it was on the third, day or on the morrow, unless thou wast in 138 M. ANTONINUS. IV. th§Jiighest_d^ — for how small is the difference ? — so think it no great thing to die after as many years as thou canst name rather than to-morrow. 48. Think continually how many physicians are dead after often contracting their eyebrows over the sick ; and how many astrologers after predict- ing with great pretensions the deaths of others ; and how many philosophers after endless dis- courses on death or immortality ; how many heroes after killing thousands ; and how many tyrants who have used their power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if they were immortal ; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to speak, Helice and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast known, one after another. One man after burying another has been laid out dead, and another buries him ; and all this in a short time. To conclu de, always observe how ephemeral anc\ worthless human things are, and what was yester day a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes. Pass then through this little space of time conformably to nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and thanking the tree on which it grew. M. A NTONINUS. IV. 139 49. Be like the promontory against which the waves continually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the water around it. Unhappy am J, because this has happened to me — Not so, but HajDjiv^jimJ^ though J^s_has__ happened to me, because_.J-- continue free from . ... pain, neither crushed by the present nor fearing, th e future. For such a thing as this might have happened to every man ; but every man would not have continued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune ? And dost thou in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is not a deviation from man's nature ? And does a thing seem to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not contrary to the will of man's nature ? Well, thou knowest the will of nature. Will then this which has happened prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and false- hood ; will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and everything else, by the presence of which man's nature obtains all that is its own? Remember too on every occasion which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle : that this is not a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune. 140 M. ANTONINUS. IV. 50. It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of death, to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to life. What more then have they gained than those who have died early ? Certainly they lie in their tombs somewhere at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any one else like them, who have carried out many to be buried and then were carried out them- selves. Altogether the interval is small [between birth and death] ; and consider with how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people and in what a feeble body this interval is labo- riously passed. Do not then consider life a thing of any value.f Forjook to the immensity of time-behind thee, and to the time which is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then what is the difference between him who lives three days and him who lives three genera- tions ? 2 51. Always run to the short way ; and the short 2 An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the war of Troy among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred and fifty two years, and some others in modern times who have beaten Parr by twenty or thirty years ; and yet they died at last. The word is TpiyepTjvtov in Antoninus. Nestor is named rptyepov by some writers ; but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's Tepqviot ImroTa Neorup. M. ANTONINUS. IV. 141 way is the natural : accordingly say and do every- thing in conformity with the soundest reason. For such a purpose frees a man from trouble,! and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious display. V. N the morning when thou risest un- willingly, let this thought be pres- ent — I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dis- satisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world?/ Or have I been made for this, to lie in the bedclothes and keep myself warm ? J— But this is more pleasant — Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure, and not at all for action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the lit tle plants, t he little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees working together to put in order their several parts of the universe ? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which is according to thy nature ? — But it is necessary to take rest also — It is necessary : however nature has fixed bounds to this too : she has fixed bounds both to eating and M. ANTONINUS. V. 143 drinking, and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is sufficient ; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in working at them, unwashed and without food ; but thou valuest thy own nature less than the turner values the turning art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money values his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing, choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the things which they care for. But are the acts which concern society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labor ? 2. How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression which is troublesome or unsuit- able, and immediately to be in all tranquillity. 3. Judge every word and deed which is accord- ing to nature to be fit for thee ; and be not diverted by the blame which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a thing is good tobe done or said, do not consider it unworthy of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading principle and follow their peculiar movement ; which things do not thou regard, but go straight on, following 144 M. ANTONINUS. V. thy own nature and the common nature ; and the way of both is one. 4. I go through the things which happen ac- cording to nature until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon that earth out of w r hich my father collected the seed, and my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; out of which during so many years I have been supplied with food and drink ; which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for so many pur- poses. 5. Thou say est, Men cannot admire the sharp- ness of thy wits — Be it so ; but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show those qualities then which are altogether in thy power, sincerity^ gravity, endurance of labor? aversion to. pleasure, contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevolence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from trifling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how ln^y^aTItres~"t!iou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no excuse of nat- ural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still remainest voluntarily below the mark ? or art thou compelled through being defectively furnished by nature to murmur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, M. ANTONINUS. V. 145 and to find fault with tliy poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great display, and to be so restless in thy mind ? No by the gods : but thou mightest have been delivered from thes'e things long ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being rather slow and dull of com- prehension, thou must exert thyself about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure in thy d ulness. 6. One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to his account as a favor conferred. Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but lie goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season — Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it ? — Yes — But this very thing is necessary, the ob- servation of what a man is doing : for, it may be 10 146 M. ANTONINUS. V. said, it is characteristic of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his.social partner also should perceive it — It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said : and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act. 7. A prayer of the Athenians : Rain, rain, 0 dear Zeus, down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the plains. — In truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to pray in this sim- ple and noble fashion. 8. Just as we must understand when it is said, That Aesculapius prescribed to this man horse- exercise, or bathing in cold water or going with- out shoes ; so we must understand it when it is said, That the nature of the universe prescribed to this man disease or mutilation or loss or any- thing else of the kind. For in the first case Pre- scribed means something like this : he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted to procure health ; and in the second case it means, That M. ANTONINUS. V. 147 which happens 1 to [or, suits] every man is fixed in a manner for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean when we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen say of squared stones in walls or the pyramids, that they are suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of connection. For there is altogether one fitness [or, harmony]. And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [des- tiny] is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who are completely ignorant under- stand what I mean, for they say, It [necessity, destiny] brought this to such a person. — This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let us then receive these things, as well as those which Aesculapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of the things which the common nature judges tc be good, be judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it 'eads to this, to the health of the universe and to 1 In this section there is a play on the meaning of wuBaiveiv. 148 M. ANTONINUS. V. the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For he would not have brought on any man what lie has brought, if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is not suitable to that which is directed by it. For two ^ reasons then it is right to be content with that which happens to thee ; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed for thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and 9 the other, because even that which comes sever- ally to every man is to the power which adminis- ters the universe a cause of felicity and perfection, aay even of its very continuance. For the in- tegrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest off anything whatever from the conjunction and the continuity either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off, as far as it is in thy power, / when thou art dissatisfied, and in a manner triest to put anything out of the way. 9. Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dis- satisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing every- thing according to right principles ; but when thou hast failed, return back again, and be content if the greater part of what thou doest is consistent with man's nature, and love this to which thou re- M. ANTONINUS. V. 149 tunics t ; and do not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg, or as another applies a plaister, or drenching with water. For thus thou wilt not fail to f obey reason, and thou wilt repose in it. And remember that phi- losophy requires only the things which thy nature requires ; but thou wouldst have something else which is not according to nature — It may be ob- jected, Why what is more agreeable than this [which I am doing] ? — But is not this the very reason why pleasure deceives us ? And consider! if magnanimity, freedom, simplicity, aequanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For what is more* agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou thinkest of the security and the happy.course of all things which depend on the faculty of understanding and knowledge ? 10. Things are in such a kind of envelopement that they have seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common philosophers, altogether unin- telligible ; nay even to the Stoics themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all our assent is changeable ; for where is the man who never changes ? ' Carry thy thoughts then to the objects themselves, and consider how short-lived they are and worthless, and that they may be in the pos- 150 M. ANTONINUS. V. \ session of a filthy wretch or a whore or a robber Then turn to the morals of those who live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time, and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth being highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can- not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's duty to comfort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution and not to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only : the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not con- formable to the nature of the universe ; and the other, that it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and daemon : for there is no man who will compel me to this. 11. About what am I now employing my own soul ? On every occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire, what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling principle ? and- whose soul have I now? that of a child, or of a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a domestic animal, or of a wild beast ? 12. What kind of things those are which , ap- pear good to the many, we may learn from this. M. ANTONINUS. V. 15l For if any man should conceive certain things as being really good, such as prudence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after having first conceived these endure to listen to anything f which should not be in harmony with what is really good.f But if a man has first conceived as good the things which appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily receive as very applicable that which was said by the comic writer, f Thus even the many perceive the dif- ference.f For were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame, as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should value and think those things to be good, to which after their first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer might be aptly applied — that he who has them, through pure abundance has not a place to ease himself in. 13. I am composed of the formal and the ma- terial ; and neither of them will perish into non- existence, as neither of them came into existence out of non-existence. Every part of me then will be reduced by change into some part of the universe, and that again will change into another part of the universe and so on for ever. And by 152 M. ANTONINUS. V. consequence of jsuch a change I too exist, and those who begot me, and_so on for ever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from saying so, even if the universe is administered according to definite periods [of revolution]. 14. Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers which are sufficient for themselves and for their own works. They move then from a first principle which is their own, and they make their way to the end which is proposed to them ; and this is the reason why such acts are named Catorthoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed by the right road. 15. None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does man's nature promise them, nor are they the means of man's nature attaining its end. Neither then does the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them ; nor would a man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be M. ANTONINUS. V. 155 good, if indeed these things were good. But now the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man. 16. Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the character of thy mind ; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous series of such thoughts as these : for instance, that where a man can live, there he can also live well. But he must live in a palace ; — well then, he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried ; and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; and where the end is, there also is the advantage and the; good of each thing. Now the^good for the reasonable animal is society; for that we are made for society has been shown above. Is it not plain that the inferior exist fo^the sakejaf the superior ? but the things which ha ve life are superior to those which have not life, and of those which have life the superior are those which have reason. ~T7. To seek what is impossible is madness: 154 M. ANTONINUS. V. and it is impossible that the bad should not do something of this kind. 18. (Noth ing happens to any man which he is not formed by nature to bear, j The same things happen to another, and either because he does not see that they have happened or because he would show a great spirit he is firm and remains un- harmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit should be stronger than wisdom. 19. Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least degree ; nor have they admission to *the soul, nor can they turn or move the soul : but the soul turns and moves itself alone, and what- ever judgments it may think proper to make, such it makes for itself the things which present them- selves to it. 20. In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far as I must do good to men and endure them. But so far as some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no less than the sun or wind or a wild beast. Now it is true that these may impede my action, but they are no impediments to my affects and disposition, which have the power of acting conditionally and changing : for the mind converts and changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and sc M. ANTONINUS. V. 155 that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an act ; and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this road. 21. Reverence that which is best in the uni- verse ; and this is that which makes use of all things and directs all things. And in like manner also reverence that which is best in thyself; and this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and thy life is directed by this. 22. That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to the citizen. In the case of every ap- pearance of harm apply this rule: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am I harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his error is.f 23. Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and disappear, both the things which are and the things which are produced. For substance is like a river in a continual flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, and the causes work in infinite varieties ; and there is hardly anything which stands still. And consider this which is near to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the future in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool who 156 M. ANTONINUS. V. is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and makes himself miserable ? for they vex him only for a time, and a short time. 24. Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a very small portion ; and of universal time, of which a short and indivisible interval has been assigned to thee ; and of that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it thou art. 25. Does another do me wrong ? Let him look to it. He has his own disposition, his own ac- tivity. I now have what the universal nature wills me to have ; and I do what my nature now wills me to do. 26. Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh whether of pleasure or of pain ; and let it not unite with them, but let it circumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. But when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one, then thou must not strive to re- sist the sensation, for it is natural ; but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sensation the opinion that it is either good or bad. 27. Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with that which is assigned to M. ANTONINUS. V. 157 him, and that it does all that the daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is every man's understanding and reason. 28. Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits stink ? art thou angry with him whose mouth smells foul ? What good will this anger do thee ? He has such a mouth, he has such arm-pits : it_is npr>pggnTy jfofit cnMi nn PTriRp^fjmTrnnst come from su ch things — But the man has reason, it will be said, and he is able, if he takes pains, to discover trhmujj hr rfffrndr. T wish thee well of thy dis- covery. Well then, and thou hast reason : byjthy rat ion al .facult y siir up his rational faculty ; show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger, [f Neither tragic actor nor whore.f ] 2 29. As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out, . . so it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit thee, then get away out 2 This is imperfect or corrupt, or both. There is also something: wrong Or incomplete in the beginning of S. 29, where he says tog e^e/id-dv §j v diavoy, which Gataker translates " as if thou wast about to quit life ; " but we cannot translate etjeMdv in that way. Other translations are not much more satisfactory. I have translated it literally and left it imperfect. .158 M. ANTONINUS. V. of life, yet so as if thou wert suffering no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why dost thou think that this is any trouble ? But so long as nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose ; and I choose to do what is ac- cording to the nature of the rational and social animal. 30. The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the su- perior to one another. Thou seest how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every- thing its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best. 31. How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be said of thee : — Never has wronged a man in deed or word. And call to recollection both how many things thou hast passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to endure : and that the his- M. ANTONINUS. V. tor j of thy life is now complete and thy service 'Is " ended: and how many beautiful things thou hast seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou hast despise^; and how many things called honorable thou hast spurned ; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown a kind disposi- tion. 32. Why do unskil led and ignoranJLgouls dis- turb him who has skill and knowledge ? What soul then has skill and knowledge ? That which knows beginning and end, and knows the reason which pervades all substance and through all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the universe. 33. Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and either a name or not even a name ; but name is sound and echo. And the things which are much valued in life are empty and rot- ten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and justice and truth are fled Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth. What then is there which still detains thee here ? if the objects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and the organs of perception are / 160 M. ANTONINUS. V. dull and easily receive false impressions ; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tranquillity for t hy en d^ whether it is extinction or removal to another state ? And until that time comes, what is sufficient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and seL^ restraint ; 3 but as to everything which is beyond the limits of the poor flesh and breath, to remem- ber that this is neither thine nor in thy power. 34. Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two things are common both to the soul of god and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every rational being, not to be hindered by another ; and to hold good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination. 35. If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my own badness, and the common weal is 3 This is the Stoic precept avz%ov not anexov, TJie first part teaches us to be content with men and things as they are. The second part teaches us the virtue of self-restraint, or the government of our passions. M. ANTONINUS. V. 163 not injured, why am I troubled about it ? and what is the harm to the common weal ? 36. Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appearance of things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability and their fitness ; and if they should have sustained loss in matters which are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man when he went away asked back his foster-child's top, remembering that it was a top, so do thou in this case also. When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou forgotten, man, what these things are? — Yes ; but they are objects of great concern to these people — Wilt thou too then be made a fool for these things ? — I was once a fortunate man, but I lost it, I know not how. — But fortunate means that a man has assigned to himself a good fortune : — and a good fortune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good actions. 4 4 This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be corrupt, and the general purport of the section cannot be discovered. Perhaps several things have been improperly joined in one section. I have translated it nearly literally. Different translators give the section a different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they cannot understand. 11 VI. HE substance of the universe is obe- dient and compliant ; and the reason which governs it has in itself no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed by it. But all things are made and perfected according to this reason. 2. Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold or warm, if thou art doing thy duty ; and whether thou art drowsy or satisfied with sleep ; and whether ill-spoken of or praised ; and whether dying or doing something else. For it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die : it is sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in hand. 3. Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything nor its value escape thee. 4. All existing things soon change, and they will either be reduced to vapor, if indeed all sub- stance is one, or they will be dispersed. M. ANTONINUS. VI. 163 5. The reason which governs knows what its own disposition is, and what it does, and on what material it works. 6. The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong doer. 7. Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing, from one social act to another social act. thinking; of god. 8. The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself, and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills to be, it also makes every- thing which happens appear to itself to be such as it wills. 9. In conformity to the nature of the universe every single thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a nature which ex- ternally comprehends this, or a nature which is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and independent of this. (xt. 1, vi. 40, vin. 50.) 10. The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution of things, and a dispersion ; or it is unity and order and providence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry in a for- tuitous combination of things and such a disorder ? and why do I care about anything else than how I 164 M. ANTONINUS. VI. shall at last become earth ? and why am I dis- turbed, for the dispersion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the other supposi- tion is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I trust in him who governs, (iv. 27.) - 11. When thou hast been compelled by cir- cumstances to be disturbed in a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts ; for thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by continu- ally recurring to it. 12. If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still thou wouldst constantly re- turn to thy mother. Let the court and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother : return to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court. 13. When we have meat before us and such eatables, we receive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig ; and again, that this Faler- nian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe some sheeps' wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish : such then are these impressions, and M. ANTONINUS. VI. 165 they reach the things themselves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through life, and where there are things which appear most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful per- verter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it cheats thee most. Con- sider then what Crates says of Xenocrates himself. 14. Most of the things which the multitude admire are referred to objects of the most general kind, those which are held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as stones, wood, fig- trees, vines, olives. But those which are admired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are re- ferred to the things which are held together by a \Uving principle, as flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are still more instructed are the things which are held together by a ra- tional soul, not however a universal soul, but ra- tional so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some other way, or simply rational so far as the possessing of a number of slaves. But he who values a rational soul, a soul universal and 166 M. ANTONINUS. VI. fitted for political life, regards nothing else except this ; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same kind as himself. 15. Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are hurrying out of it ; and of that which is coming into existence part is already ex- tinguished. Motions and changes are continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted course of time is always renewing the infinite du- ration of ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which a man would set a high price ? It would be just as if a man should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but it has already past out of sight. Something of this kind is the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every moment, just the same is it with the whole respi- ratory power, which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day before, to give it back to the element from which thou didst first draw it. 16. Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued, nor respiration, as in domesti- M. ANTONINUS. VI. 167 cated animals and wild beasts, nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things, nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor assembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; for this is just like the act of separating and part- ing with the useless part of our food. What then is worth being valued ? To be received with clapping of hands ? No. Neither must we value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that thou hast given up this worth- less thing called fame, what remains that is worth valuing ? This in my opinion, to move thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper constitution, to which end all employments lead and all arts. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has been made should be adapted to the work for which it has been made ; and both the vine-planter who looks after the vine, and the horse-breaker, and he who trains the dog, seek this end. But the education and the teaching of youth aim at something. In this then is the value of the education and the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek anything else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things too ? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor suffi- cient for thy own happiness, nor without passion. 168 M.ANTONINUS. VI. For of necessity thou must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can take away those things, and plot against those who have that which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be altogether in a state of perturbation wdio wants any of these things : and besides, he must often find fault with the gods. But to reverence and honor thy own mind will make thee content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give and have ordered. 17. Above, below, all around are the movements of the elements. But the motion of virtue is in none of these : it is something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly observed it goes hap- pily on its road. 18. How strangely men act. They will not praise those who are living at the same time and living with themselves ; but to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they have never seen nor ever will see, this they set much value on. But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee. 19. If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not think that it is impossible for a man : but if anything is possible for a man and M. ANTONINUS. VI. 169 conformable to Ills nature, think that this can be attained by thyself too. 20. In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him afterwards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with suspicion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like this let thy behavior be in all the other parts of life ; let us overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred, 21. If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change ; for I seek the truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured who abides in his error and ignorance. 22. I do my duty : other things trouble me not ; for they are either things without life, or things without reason, or things that have rambled and know not the way. 23. As to the animals which have no reason and generally all things and objects do thou, since thou hast reason and they have none, make use 170 M. ANTONINUS. VI. of them with a generous and liberal spirit. But towards human beings, as they have reason, be- have in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods, and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which thou shalt do this ; for even three hours so spent are sufficient. 24. Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were brought to the same state ; for either they were received among the same semi- nal principles of the universe, or they were alike dispersed among the atoms. 25. Consider how many things in the same in- divisible time take place in each of us, things which concern the body and things which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder if many more things, or rather all things which come into existence in that which is the one and all, which we call Cosmos, exist in it at the same time. 26. If any man should propose to thee the question, how the name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining of the voice utter each letter ? What then if they grow angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with composure and number every letter? Just so then in this life also remember that every duty is made up of certain parts. These it is thy duty to observe, and without being disturbed or show- M. ANTONINUS. VI. 171 ing anger towards those who are angry with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set be- fore thee. 27. How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things which appear to them to be suit- able to their nature and profitable ! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them — But it is not so — Teach them then, and show them with- out being angry. 28. Death is a cessation of the impressions n through the senses, and of the pulling of the strings which move the appetites, and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the service to the flesh. 29. It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this life, when thy body does not give way. 30. Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye ; for such things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, affec- tionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to 172 M. ANTONINUS. VI. continue to be such as philosophy wished to make thee. (Reverence the gods, and help men. Short is life.) There is only one fruit of this terrene life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remem- ber his constancy in every act which was con- formable to reason, and his evenness in all things, and his piety, and the serenity of his countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty fame, and his efforts to understand things ; and how he would never let anything pass without having first most carefully examined it and clearly understood it ; and how he bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming them in re- turn ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he listened not to calumnies, and how exact an exam- iner of manners and actions he was ; and not given to reproach people, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist ; and with how little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, servants ; and how laborious and patient ; and how he was able on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except at the usual hour ; and his firmness and uniformity in his friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of speech hi those who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that M. ANTONINUS. VI. 173 he had when any man showed him anything bet- ter ; and how pious he was without superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest have as good a conscience, when thy last hour comes, as he had. (i. 16.) 31. Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back ; and when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou didst look at those [the dreams]. 32. I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body all things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differences. But to the understanding those things only are indifferent, which are not the works of its own activity. But whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these are in its power. And of these how- ever only those which are done with reference to the present ; for as to the future and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the present indifferent. 33. Neither the labor which the hand does nor that of the foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as a man is his labor contrary to nature, so long as it does the 174 M . ANTONINUS. VI. things of a man. But if the labor is not contrary^, to his nature, neither is it an evil to him. 34. How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. 35. Dost thou not sec how the handicraftsmen accommodate themselves up to a certain point to those who are not skilled in their craft, — never- theless they cling to the reason [the principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from it ? Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have more respect to the reason [the prin- ciples] of their own arts than man to his own reason, which is common to him and the gods. 36. Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : all the sea a drop in the universe ; Athos a little clod of the universe : all the present time is a point in eternity. All things are little, change- able, perishable. All things come from thence, from that universal ruling power either directly proceeding or by way of consequence. And ac- cordingly the lion's gaping jaws, and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and beau- tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of an- other kind from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion of the source of all. 37. He who has seen present things has seen M. ANTONINUS: VI. 175 all, both everything which has taken place fron? all eternity and everything which will be for time without end ; for all are of one kin and of one form. 38. Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner all things are impli- cated with one another, and all in this way are friendly to one another ; for one thing comes in order after another, and this is by virtue of thef active movement and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance. 39. Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast : and the men among whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly [sincerely]. 40. Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there. But in the things which are held together by nature there is within and there abides in them the power which made them ; wherefore the more it is fit to reverence this power, and to think, that, if thou dost live and act according to its will, everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence. And thus also in the universe, the things which belong to it are in conformity to intelligence. 176 M. ANTONINUS. VI. 41. Whatever of the things which are not within thy power thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men too, those who are the cause of the misfor- tune or the loss, or those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause ; and indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference be- tween these things [because we do not regard these things as indifferent]. But if we judge only those things which are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason either for finding fault with god or standing in a hostile attitude to man. 42. We are all working together to one end, some with knowledge and design, and others without knowing what they do ; as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus, I think, who says that they are laborers and co- operators in the things which take place in the universe. But men co-operate after different fashions : and even those co-operate abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe had need even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to understand among what kind of M. ANTONINUS. VI. 177 workmen thou placest thyself; for he who rules all things will certainly make a right use of thee, and he will receive thee among some part of the co-operators and of those whose labors conduce to one end. But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of. 43. Does the sun undertake to do the work of the rain, or Aesculapius the work of the Fruit- bearer [the earth] ? And how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not different and yet they work together to the same end? 44. If the gods have determined about me and about the things which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought ; and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire towards that ? for what advantage would result to them from this or to the whole, which is the special object of their providence ? But if they have not determined about me individually, they have cer- tainly determined about the whole at least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to be content with them. But if they determine about nothing — which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us neither 12 178 M. ANTONINUS. VI. sacrifice nor pray nor swear by them nor do any- thing else which we do as if the gods were present and lived with us — but if however the gods de- termine about none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful ; and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me. 45. Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest of the universal : this might be suf- ficient. But further thou wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe, that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the common sense as said of things of the mid- dle kind [neither good nor bad]. 46. As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places, that the continual sight of the same things and the uniformity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ; for all things above, below, are the same and from the same. How long then ? M. ANTONINUS. VI. 179 47. Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion. Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To that place then we must remove, where there are so many great orators, and so many noble philoso- phers, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Socrates ; so many heroes of former days, and so many generals after them, and tyrants ; besides these, Eudoxus, Hip- parchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute nat- ural talents, great minds, lovers of labor, versatile, confident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm then is this to them ; and what to those whose names are altogether unknown ? ^One thing here is worth a great deal, to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent disposition even to liars and unjust men. j 48. When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues of those who live with thee ; for instance, the activity of one, and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing de- lights so much as the examples of the virtues, 180 M. ANTONINUS. VI. when they are exhibited in the morals of those who live with us and present themselves in abun- dance, as far as is possible. Wherefore we must keep them before us. 49. Art thou dissatisfied because thou weighest only so many litrae and not three hundred ? Be not dissatisfied then that thou must live only so many years and not more ; for as thou art satisfied with the amount of substance which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the time. 50. Let us try to persuade them [men]. But act even against their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other virtue ; and remember that thy attempt was with a reservation [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossibilities. What then didst thou desire ? — Some such effort as this — But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which thou wast moved are [not] ac- complished.f 51. He who loves fame considers another man's activity to be his own good ; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensations ; but he who has M . ANTONINUS. VI. 181 understanding, considers his own acts to be his own good. 52. It is in our power to have no opinion' about a thing, and not to be disturbed in our soul ; for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgments. 53. Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by another, and as much as it is pos- sible, be in the speaker's mind. 54. That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee. 55. If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor, would they listen to anybody else ; or how could the helmsman secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the health of those whom he attends ? 56. How many together with whom I came into the world are already gone out of it. 57. To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by mad dogs water causes fear ; and to little children the ball is a fine thing. Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog ? 58. No man will hinder thee from living ac- cording to the reason of thy own nature : nothing 182 M. ANTONINUS. VI. will happen to thee contrary to the reason of the universal nature. 59. What kind of people are those whom men wish to please, and for what objects, and by what kind of acts ? How soon will time cover all things, and how many it has covered already. VIL HAT is badness? It is that which thou hast often seen. And on the occasion of everything which hap- pens keep this in mind, that it is that which thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down thou wilt find the same things, with which the old histories are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own day ; with which cities and houses ar$ filled now. There is noth- ing new : all things are both familiar and short- lived. 2. How can our principles become dead, unless the impressions [thoughts] which correspond to them are extinguished ? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about anything, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ? The things which are external to my mind have no relation at all to my mind. — Let this be the 184 M. ANTONINUS. VII. state of thy affects, and thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power. Look at things again as thou didst use to look at them ; for in this consists the recovery of thy life. 3. The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs, a bit of bread into fish- ponds, laborings of ants and burden-carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets pulled by strings — [all alike]. It is thy duty then in the midst of such things to show good humor and not a proud air ; to understand how- ever that every man is worth just so much as the things are worth about which he busies himself. 4. In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the one thou shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, but in the other watch carefully what is the thing signified. 5. Is my understanding sufficient for this or not ? If it is sufficient, 1 use it for the work as an instrument given by the universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do so ; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man who with the aid of my ruling M. ANTONINUS. VII. 185 principle can do what is now fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society. 6. How many after being celebrated by fame have been given up to oblivion ; and how many who have celebrated the fame of others have long been dead. 7. Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy ^ business to do thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then, if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battlements alone, but with the help of another it is possible ? 8. Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same reason which now thou usest for present things. 9. All things are implicated with one another, ^ and the bond is holy ; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is one universe made up of all things, and one god who pervades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one] common reason in all intelligent ani- mals, and one truth ; if indeed there is also one 186 M. ANTONINUS. VII. perfection for all animals which are of the same stock and participate in the same reason. 10. Everything material soon disappears in the substance of the whole ; and everything formal [causal] is very soon taken back into the universal reason ; and the memory of everything is very soon overwhelmed in time. 11. To the rational animal the same act is ac- cording to nature and according to reason. 12. Be thou erect, or be made erect, (in. 5.) 13. Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are united in one, so it is with ra- tional beings which exist separate, for they have been constituted for one co-ope atior. And the perception of this will be more apparent to thee, if thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [^e'Aos] of the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r] thou sayest that thou art a part [/xepos], thou dost not yet love men from thy heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for its own sake ; 1 thou still doest it barely as a thing of propriety, and not yet as doing good to thyself. 14. Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can feel the effects of this fall. For 1 I have used Gataker's conjecture Kara/irjicTiKcbc instead of the common reading KaTa?\,7]KTLKCjg : compare iv. 20 ; ix. 42. M. ANT ONINUS. VII. 187 those parts which have felt will complain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that what has hap- pened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in my power not to think so. 15. Whatever any one does or says, I must be good, just as if the gold, or the emerald or the purple were always saying this, Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald and keep my color. 16. The ruling faculty does not disturb itself, I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself pain.f But if any one else can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, and let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power of forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing, for it will never deviate! into such a judgment. The leading principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want for itself ; and therefore it is both free from perturbation and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself. 17. Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good thing. What then art thou doing here, O imagination ? go away, I intreat thee by the 188 M. ANTONINUS. VII. gods, as thou didst come, for I want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old fashion. I am not angry with thee : only go away. 18. Is any man afraid of change ? Why what can take place without change ? What then is more pleasing or more suitable to the universal nature ? And canst thou take a bath unless the wood undergoes a change? and canst thou be nourished, unless the food undergoes a change ? And can anything else that is useful be accom- plished without change ? Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature ? 19. Through the universal substance as through a furious torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united with and co-operating with the whole, as the parts of our body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already swal- lowed up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with reference to every man and thing. 20. One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the way which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now. 21. Near is thy forgetfulness of all things; and near the forgetfulness of thee by all. M.ANTONINUS. VII. 189 22. It is peculiar to man to love even those v who do wrong. And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will die ; and above all, that the wrong doer has done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling fac- ulty worse than it was before. 23. The universal nature out of the universal substance, as if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken this up, it uses the mate- rial for a tree, then for a man, then for something else ; and each of these things subsists for a very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened together. 24. A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; when it is often assumed, 2 the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at last is so completely extinguished that it cannot be again lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of doing wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any longer ? 25. Nature which governs the whole will soon change all things which thou seest, and out of their 2 This is corrupt. 190 M.ANTONINUS. VII. substance will make other things, and again other things from the substance of them, in order that the world may be ever new. 26. When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately consider with what opinion about good or evil he has done wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him, and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thyself thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to pardon him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is in error. 27. Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast : but of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care that thou dost not through being so pleased with them accustom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if ever thou shouldst not have them. 28. Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures tranquillity. 29. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pull- M.ANTONINUS. VII. 191 ing of the strings. Confine thyself to the pres- ent. Understand well what happens either to thee or to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal [formal] and the material. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a man stay there where the wrong was done. 30. Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understanding enter into the things that are doing and the things which do them. (vn. 4.) 31. Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with indifference towards the things which lie between virtue and vice. Love mankind. Follow god. The poet says that Law rules all — f And it is enough to remember that law rules all.t 3 — 32. About death : whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change. 33. About pain : the pain which is intolerable carries us off ; but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself, f and the ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts which are harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion about it. 8 The end of this section is unintelligible. 192 M. ANT ONINU S. VII. 34. About fame : look at the minds [of those who seek fame], observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid, and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former sands, so in life the events which go before are soon covered by those which come after. 35. From Plato : 4 the man who has an elevated mind and takes a view of all time and of all sub- stance, dost thou suppose it pos ible for him to think that human life is anything great ? it is not possible, he said. — Such a man then will think that death also is no evil — Certainly not. 36. From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good and to be abused. 37. It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for the mind not to be reg- ulated and composed by itself. 38. It is not right to vex ourselves at things, For they care nought about it. 5 39. To the immortal gods and us give joy. 40. Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn : One man is born ; another dies. 6 * Plato, Pol. vi. 486. 6 From the Bellerophon of Euripides. 6 From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. M. ANTONINUS. VII. 193 41. If gods care not for me and for my children, There is a reason for it. 42. For the good is with me, and the just. 7 43. No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion. 44. From Plato : 8 But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this : Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man, who is good for anything at all ought to compute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man. 45. 8 For thus it is, men of Athens, in truth . wherever a man has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has been placed by a com- mander, there in my opinion he ought to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the reckoning, either death or anything else, before the baseness [of deserting his post]. 46. But, my good friend, consider whether that ill. 25.) has translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are these two lines : — Reddenda terrae est terra : turn vita omnibus Metenda ut fruges : Sic jubet necessitas. 7 See Aristophanes, Acharnenses. 8 From the Apologia. 13 194 M. ANTONINUS. VII. which is noble and good is not something different from saving and being saved ; for f we must not allow that it consists in living such or such a time, at least for one who is really a man ; f and he should not be fond of life, but entrusting this to god and believing what the women say, that no man can escape his destiny, he should next in- quire how he may best live the time that he has to live. 9 47. Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou w r ert going along with them; and con- stantly consider the changes of the elements into one another; for such thoughts purge away the filth of the terrene life. 48. This is a fine saying of Plato : 10 That he who is discoursing about men should look also at earthly things as if he viewed them from some higher place ; should look at them in their as- semblies, armies, agricultural labors, marriages, treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert places, various nations of barba- 9 Plato, Gorgias, c. 68. In this passage the text of Antoninus has eareov, which is perhaps right ; but there seems to be something wrong in the text. It is certainly difficult to see the exact construction of parts of the section. The reading evicreov for eareov does not mend the matter. 10 It is not in the extant writings of Plato. M. ANTONINUS. Vll. 195 rians, feasts, lamentations, markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination of contraries. 49. Consider the past ; such great changes of political supremacies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be. For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible that they should deviate from the order of the things which take place now : accordingly to have contemplated human life for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten thousand years. For what more wilt thou see ? 50. That which has grown from the earth to the earth, But that which has sprung from heavenly seed, Back to the heavenly realms returns. 11 This is either a dissolution of the mutual in- volution of the atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. 51. With food and drinks and curming magic arts Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death. 12 The breeze which heaven has sent We must endure, and toil without complaining. 11 From the Chrysippus of Euripides. 12 The first two lines are from the Supp. of Eurip- ides, v. 1110. 196 M. ANTONINUS. VII. 52. Another may be more expert in casting hia opponent; but let him not be more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with respect to the faults of his neighbors. 53. Where any work can be done conformably to the reason which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to fear : for where we are able to get profit by means of the activity which is successful and proceeds according to our consti- tution, there no harm is to be suspected. 54. Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy present condi- tion, and to behave justly to those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them with- out being well examined. 55. Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee, both the universal nature through the things which happen to thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must be done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is according to its constitution ; and all other things have been made for the sake of rational beings, just as among irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but the rational for the sake of one another. M . ANTONINUS. VII. 197 The prime principle then in man's constitution is the social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelligent motion to cir- cumscribe itself, and never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the ap- petites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent motion claims superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational consti- tution is freedom from error and from deception. Let then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go straight on, and it has what is its own. 56. Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy life up to the present time ; and live according to nature the remainder which is allowed thee. 57. Love that only which happens to thee, and is spun with the thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable ? 58. In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those to whom the same things hap- pened, and how they were vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault with them : and now where are they ? Nowhere. Why then dost thou choose to act in the same 198 M. ANTONINUS. VII. way ? and why dost thou not leave these agita- tions which are foreign to nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved by them ? and why art thou not altogether intent upon the right way of making use of the things which hap- pen to thee ? for then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a material for thee [to work on]. Only attend to thyself, and resolve to be a good man in every act which thou doest : and remem- ber * * # * #13 59. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig. 60. The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregularity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind shows in the face by maintaining in it the expression of intelligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the whole body. But all these things shoul»d be observed without affectation. y 61. The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the dancer's, in respect of this that it should stand ready and firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected. 13 This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt that it is impossible to give any probable mean- ing to it. It is better to leave it as it is than to patch it up, as some critics and translators have done. M . ANTON! N US . VII. 100 62. Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess. For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involuntarily, not wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest to the sourcea of their opinions and appetites. 63. Every soul, the philosopher says, is invol- untarily deprived of truth ; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temper- ance and benevolence and everything of the kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind, for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all. 64. In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no dishonor in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either so far as the intel- ligence is rational 14 or so far as it is social. In- deed in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest nothing to it in imag- ination : and remember this too, that we do not 14 The text has vXlktj, which it has been proposed to alter to Aoyi/cr/, and this change is necessary. We shall then have in this section "koywrj and kolvovlkt] associated, as we have in s. 68 Iojlkt} and •koIltlkt], and in s. 72. 200 M. ANTONINUS. VII. perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When then thou art dis- contented about any of these things, say to thy- self, that thou art yielding to pain. 65. Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel towards men. 15 66. How do we know if Telauges was not supe- rior in character to Socrates ? for it is not enough that Socrates died a more noble death, and dis- puted more skilfully with the sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more endurance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis, he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked in a swaggering way in the streets — though as to this one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed, and if he was able to be content with being just towards men and pious towards the gods, neither idly vexed on account of men's villany, nor yet mak- ing himself a slave to any man's ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his 15 I have followed Gataker's conjecture ol uKavdpwro instead of the MSS. reading ol avSpomoi. I ill. ANTONINUS. VII. 201 share out of the universal nor enduring it as intolerable, nor allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of the miserable flesh 67. Nature has not so mingled f [the intelli- gence] with the composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under subjection to thyself all that is thy own ; for it is very possible to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one. Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, that very little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And because thou hast de- spaired of becoming a dialectician and skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason renounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and obedient to god. 68. It is in thy power to live free from all com- pulsion in the greatest tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out against thee as much as hey choose, and even if wild beasts tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity and in a just judgment of all sur- rounding things and in a ready use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judgment may say to the thing which falls under its obser- 202 M. ANTONINUS. VII. vation ; This thou art in substance [reality], though in men's opinion thou mayst appear to be of a different kind ; and the use shall say to that which falls? under the hand : Thou art the thing that I was seeking ; for to me that which pre- sents itself is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and in a word for the exer- cise of art which belongs to man or god. For everything which happens has a relationship either to god or man, and is neither new nor difficult to handle, but usual and apt matter to work on. 69. The perfection of moral character consists in this, in passing every day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor torpid nor playing the hypocrite. 70. The gods who are immortal are not vexed because during so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as they are and so many of them bad ; and besides this they also take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this too when thou art one of them ? 71. It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's badness, which is im- possible. M. ANTONINUS. VII. 203 72. Whatever the rational and political [sociall faculty finds to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be inferior to itself. 73. When thou hast done a good act and an- other has received it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good act or to obtain a return ? 74. No man is tired of receiving what is use- ful. But it is useful to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiving what is useful by doing it to others. 75. The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But now either everything that takes place comes by way of consequence [or continu- ity] ; or even the chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move- ment are governed by no rational principle. If this is remembered it will make thee more tran- quil in many things, (ix. 21, vi. 44.) 16 16 It is not easy to understand this section. It has been suggested that there is some error in rj aMyiara, &c. Some of the translators have made nothing of the pas- sage, and they have somewhat perverted the words. The first proposition is, that the universe was made by some sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power which framed an order. The 204 M. ANT ON1NUS. VII, next question is, How are things produced now ; or in other words, by what power do forms appear in continu- ous succession % The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this : It is by virtue of the original constitution of things that all change and succession have been effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and the same, a continuity of identity ; as much one and the same as man is one and the same, which he believes himself to be, though he also believes and cannot help believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there is :hange and succession. There is no real discontinu- ity then in the universe ; and if we say that there was an order framed in the beginning and that the things which are now produced are a consequence of a pre- vious arrangement, we speak of things as we are com- pelled to view them, as forming a series or succession ; just as we speak of the changes in our own bodies and the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between any two supposed states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even infinitely small, between what we call one thing and any other thing which we speak of as immediately preceding or following it. What we call time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession of things or events, an idea which is a part of our con- stitution, but not an idea which we can suppose to be- long to an infinite intelligence and power. The conclu- sion then is certain that the present and the past, the production of present things and the supposed original order, out of which we say that present things now come, are one : and the present productive power and M. ANTONINUS. VII. 205 the so-called past arrangement are only different names for one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus wrote here as people sometimes talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed hy his words. There are certainly other passages from which, I think, that we may collect that he had notions of production some- thing like what I have expressed. We now come to the alternative: "or even the chief things principle." I do not exactly know what he means by ra Kvpiurara, " the chief," or, " the most excellent," or whatever it is. But as he speaks else- where of inferior and superior things, and of the infe- rior being for the use of the superior, and of rational beings being the highest, he may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative assumes a governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing its power towards these chief objects, or making its special, proper, motion towards them. And here he uses the noun {opfirj) " movement," which contains the same notion as the verb (upfi^ae) "moved," which he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking of the making of the universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis, he says, we must take the conclusion of the second, that the " chief things towards which the ruling power of the universe makes a movement are directed by no rational principle." The meaning then is, if there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing power, which strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude that there is no rational direc- tion of anything, if the power which first made the uni- verse does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that anything is now produced or now exists 206 M. ANTONINUS. VII. without the action of the supreme intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to act, we obtain a conclusion which cannot be reconciled with the nature of a supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always assumes. The tranquillity that a man may gain from these reflections must result from his rejecting the sec- ond hypothesis, and accepting the first ; whatever may be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he says elsewhere, if there is no provi- dence which governs the world, man has at least the power of governing himself according to the constitu- tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does the best that he can. If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labor to discover the writer's exact meaning ; for I think that he had a meaning, though people may not agree what it was. (Compare ix. 28.) If I have rightly ex- plained the emperor's meaning in this and other pas sages, he has touched the solution of a great question. VIII. HIS reflection also tends to the re- moval of the desire of empty fame, > that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy yonth upwards, like a philosopher ; but both to many others and to thy- self it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher ; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem [to others], and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee ; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happi- ness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature 208 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he has principles from which come his affects and his acts. What principles ? Those which relate to good and bad : the belief that there is nothing good for man, which does not make him just, temperate, manly, free ; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned. 2. On the occasion of every act ask thyself, How is this with respect to me ? Shall I repent of it ? A little time and I am dead, and all is gone. What more do I seek, if what I am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, and a social being, and one who is under the same law with god ? 3. Alexander and Caius and Pompeius, what are they in comparison with Diogenes and Hera- clitus and Socrates ? For they were acquainted with things, and their causes [forms], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these men were the same [or conformable to their pursuits]. But as to the others, how many things had they to care for, and to how many things were they slaves. 4. [Consider] that men will do the same things nevertheless, even though thou shouldst burst. 5. This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 209 for all things are according to the nature of the universal ; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and Augustus. It the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's nature demands, do it with- out turning aside ; and speak as it seems to thee most just, only let it be with good temper and with modesty and without hypocrisy. 6. The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove to that place the things which are in this, to change them, to take them away here and to carry them there. All things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All things are familiar [to us] ; but the distribution of them also remains the same. 7. Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its way well ; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, and when it directs its movements to social acts only, and when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which are in its power, and when it is sat- isfied with everything that is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this common nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature 14 210 M . ANTONINUS. VIII. of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant ; except that in the plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded ; but the nature of man is part of a nature which is not subject to impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to everything in equal portions and according to its worth times, substance, cause [form], activity, and incident. But examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking all the parts together of one thing and comparing them with all the parts together of another. 8. Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast leisure [or ability] to check arro- gance : thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be superior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and un- grateful people, nay even to care for them. 9. Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the court life or with thy own. (v. 16.) 10. Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something useful ; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect good man should look after it. But no such man would ever repent of having refused M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 211 any sensual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful. 11. This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution ? What is its substance and mate- rial ? And what its causal nature [or form] ? And what is it doing in the world ? And how long does it subsist ? 12. When thou risest from sleep with reluc- tance, remember that it is according to thy con- stitution and according to human nature to per- form social acts, but sleeping is common also to irrational animals. But that which is according to each individual's nature, is also more peculiarly its own, and more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable. 13. Constantly, and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physic, of Moral and of Dia- lectic. 14. Whatever man thou meetest with, imme- diately say to thyself : What opinions has this man about good and bad ? For if with respect to pleasure and pain and the causes of each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and life he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing wonderful or strange to me. if he does such and such things; and I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so. 212 M. ANTONINUS, VIII. 15. Remember that as it is a shame to be sur- mised if the fig-tree produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world produces such and such things of which it is productive ; and for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be surprised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavorable. 16. Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him who corrects thy error is as consist- ent with freedom as it is to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity which is exerted according to thy own movement and judgment, and indeed according to thy own understanding too. 17. If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? but if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame ? the atoms [chance] or the gods ? Both are foolish. Thou must blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct [that which is the cause] ; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing itself ; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it to thee to find fault ? for nothing should be done without a purpose. 18. That which has died falls not out of the universe. If it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its proper parts, which are elements of the universe and of thyself. And these too change, and they murmur not. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 213 19. Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why dost thou wonder ? Even the sun will say, I am for some purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For what purpose then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if com mon sense allows this. 20. Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end than to the beginning and the con- tinuance, just like the man who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have fallen ? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds together, or what harm when it is burst? The same may be said of a light also. 21. Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of thing it is ; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it becomes, and when it is diseased. Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the rememberer and the remem- bered : and all this in a nook of this part of the world ; and not even here do all agree, no not any one with himself : and the whole earth too is a point. 22. Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is an opinion or an act or a word. Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest 214 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. rather to become good to-morrow than to be good to-day. 23. Am I doing anything ? I do it with refer- ence to the good of mankind. Does anything happen to me ? I receive it and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from which all that happens is derived. 24. Such as bathing appears to thee — oil, sweat, dirt, filthy water, all things disgusting, — so is every part of life and everything. 25. Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda saw Maximus die, and then Se- cunda died. Epitynchanus saw Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is everything. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with pride, where are they ? for instance the sharp-witted men, Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, and others have become the heroes of fables, and again others have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then, that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and placed elsewhere. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 215 26. It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to form a just judg- ment of plausible appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of the universe and of the things which happen in it. 27. There are three relations [between thee and other things] : the one to the body 1 which surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee. 28. Pain is either an evil to the body — then let the body say what it thinks of it — or to the soul ; but it is in the power of the soul to main- tain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgment and movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil ascends so high. 29. Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself : now it is in my power to let no bad- ness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturba- tion at all ; but looking at all things I see what is 1 The text has alnov which in Antoninus means "form," " formal." Accordingly Schulze recommends either Valkenaer's emendation uyyelov, " body," or Corae's ifufiunov. Compare xu. 13, x. 38. 216 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. their nature, and I use each according to its value. — Remember this power which thou hast from nature. 30. Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he may be, appropriately, not with any affectation : use plain discourse. 31. Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descend- ants, ancestors, sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, inti- mates, friends, Arius, Maecenas, physicians and sacrificing priests — the whole court is dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a single man, [but of a whole race,] as of the Pompeii ; and that which is inscribed on the tombs, The last of his race. Consider what trouble those before them have had that they might leave a successor ; and then, that of necessity some one must be the last. Again here consider the death of a whole race. 32. It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act ; and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be content ; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty — But something external will stand in the way — Nothing will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and considerately — But perhaps some other active power will be hindered — Well, but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by being content M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 217 to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed, another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt itself to this order of which we are speaking. 33. Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance ; and be ready to let it go. 34. If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head, lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content with what happens, and separates himself from others, or does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached thyself from the natural unity — for thou wast made by nature a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off — yet here there is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together again. But consider the benev- olence with which he has distinguished man, for he has put it in his power not to be separated at all from the universal ; and when he has been separated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to resume his place as a part. 35. As the nature of the universal has given to every rational being all the other powers that 218 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. it has,f so we have received from it this power also. For as the universal nature converts and fixes in its predestined place everything which stands in its way and opposes it, and makes such things a part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to make every hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purpose as it may have designed. 2 36. Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various troubles which thou mayst expect to befall thee : but on every occasion ask thyself, What is there in this which is intolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to confess. In the next place remember that neither the future nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is reduced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this. 37. Does Panthea or Pergamus now sit by the tomb of Verus ? 3 Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit 2 The text is corrupt at the beginning of the para- graph, but the meaning will appear if the second Iojlkuv is changed into 6Awv : though this change alone will not establish the grammatical completeness of the text. 3 " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true reading. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 219 by the tomb of Hadrianus ? That would be ridic- ulous. Well, suppose they did sit there, would the dead be conscious of it? and if the dead were conscious, would they be pleased? and if they were pleased, would that make them immortal ? Was it not in the order of destiny that these per- sons too should become old women and old men and then die ? What then would those do after these were dead ? All this is foul smell and blood in a bag. 38. If thou canst see sharp, look and judge wisely,f savs the philosopher. 39. In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice ; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance. 40. If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security — Who is this ? self — The reason — But I am not reason — Be it so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any other part of thee suffers, let it have its own opinion about itself, (vn. 16.) 41. Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature Hindrance to the movements [desires] is equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else also is equally 220 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. an impediment and an evil to the constitution of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelligence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these things then to thyself. Does pain or fensuous pleasure affect thee ? The senses will look to that. — Has any obstacle opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object ? if indeed thou wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or, without any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest [into consideration] the usual course of things, thou hast not yet been injured nor even impeded. The things however which are proper to the understanding no one is used to impede, for neither fire nor iron nor tyrant nor abuse touches it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues a sphere, (xi. 12.) 42. It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have never intentionally given pain even to another. 43. Different things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome eyes and using everything according to its value. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 221 44. See that thou secure this present time to thyself : for those who rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the men of after time will be exactly such as these whom they cannot bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it in any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that sound or have this or that opinion about thee ? 45. Take me and cast me where thou wilt ; for there I shall keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this [change of place] sufficient reason why my soul should be unhappy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrinking, affrighted? and what wilt thou find which is sufficient reason for this ? 4 46. Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If then there happens to each thing both what is usual and natural, why shouldst thou complain ? For 4 6pryo(j.iv7i in this passage seems to have a passive sense. It is difficult to find an apt expression for it and some of the other words. A comparison with xi. 12. will help to explain the meaning. 222 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. the common nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee. 47. Jf thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion ? And even if thou art pained because thou art not doing some partic- ular thing which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather act than complain ? — But some insuperable obstacle is in the way ? — Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being done depends not on thee — But it is not worth while to live, if this cannot be done — Take thy departure then from life contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well-pleased too with the things which are obstacles. 48. Remember that the ruling faculty is invin- cible, when self-collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy. What then will it be when it forms a judgment about anything aided by reason and deliberately? therefore the mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for the future be inexpugnable. M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 223 He then who has not seen this is an ignorant man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly to this refuge is unhappy. 49. Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appearances report. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ; but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported. I see that my child is sick. I do see ; but that he is in danger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first appearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a man who knows everything that happens in the world. 50. A cucumber is bitter — Throw it away. — There are briers in the road — Turn aside from them. — This is enough. Do not add, And why were such things made in the world ? For thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with nature, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoemaker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they make. And yet they have places into which they can throw these shavings and cuttings; but the universal nature has no external space ; now the wondrous part of her art is that though she has circumscribed her- 224 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. self, everything within her which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she changes into herself, and again makes other new things from these very same, so that she requires neither sub- stance from without nor wants a place into which she may cast that which decays. She is content then with her own space, and her own matter and her own art. 51. Neither in thy actions be sluggish nor in thy conversation without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor let there be in thy soul in- ward contention nor external effusion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure. ]/ Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee. What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure, wise, sober, just ? For instance, if a man should stand by a limpid pure spring, and curse it, the spring never ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should cast clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt thou possess a per- petual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By forming thyself hourly to freedom conjoined with benevolence, simplicity, and modesty. 52. He who does not know what the world is, does not know where he is. And he who does M. ANTONINUS. VIII. 225 not know for what purpose the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the world is. But he who has failed in any one of these things could not even say for what purpose he exists himself. What then dost thou think of him who [avoids or] seeks the praise of those who applaud, of men who know not either where they are or who they are. 53. Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses himself thrice every hour ? wouldst thou wish to please a man who does not please himself? Does a man please himself who repents of nearly everything that he does ? 54. No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to respire it. 55. Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the universe ; and particularly, the wickedness [of one man] does no harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in his power to be re- Leased from it, as soon as he shall choose. 56. To my own free will the free will of my neighbor is just as indifferent as his breath and 15 226 M. ANTONINUS. VIII. his flesh. For though we are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ruling power of each of us has its own office, for otherwise my neighbor's wickedness would be my harm, which god lias not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on another. 57. The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions indeed it is diffused, yet it is not ef- fused. For this diffusion is extension : Accord- ingly its rays are called Extensions [axru/esj be- cause they are extended [0.77-6 ttov iKruvecrOai]. 5 But one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a darkened room, for it is ex- tended in a right line, and as it were is divided when it meets with a solid body which stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond ; but there the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such then ought to be the outpouring and diffusion of the understanding, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an extension, and it should make no violent or impetuous collision with the obstacles which are in its way ; nor yet fall down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not admit it. 6 A piece of bad etymology. M . ANTONINUS. VIII. 227 58. He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sensation, neither wilt thou feel any harm ; and if thou shalt acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live. 59. Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then or bear with them. 60. In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind. The mind indeed, both when it exer- cises caution and when it is employed about in- quiry, moves straight onward not the less, and to its object. 61. Enter into every man's ruling faculty; and also let every other man enter into thine. IX. E who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity ; for the universal nature is the nature of all things that are ; and all things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving ; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world ; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, M. ANTONINUS. IX. 229 for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good con- trary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursu§£_4>leasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected, — for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both, — towards these they who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain then and pleasure or death and life or honor and dis- honor, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they 230 M. ANTONINUS. IX. happen alike to those who are produced in con tinuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a certain original movement of provi- dence, according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, having con- ceived certain reasons of the things which were to be, and having determined generative powers of substances and changes and such like succes- sions. 2. It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and luxury and pride. How- ever to breathe out one's life when a man has had enough of these things is the next best voyage, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this pestilence ? For the de- struction of the understanding is a pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this corruption is a pestilence of animals in so far as they are animals ; but the other is a pestilence of men in so far as they are men. 3. Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to reach maturity, M. ANTONINUS. IX. 231 and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs, and to beget and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life bring, such also is dissolution. This then is consistent with the character of a reflecting man to be neither careless nor impa- tient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest also a vulgar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt be made best reconciled to death by observ- ing the objects from which thou art going to be removed and the morals of those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty to care for them and to bear with them gently ; and yet to remember that thy departure will be not from men who have the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing, if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those who live 232 M. ANTONINUS. IX. together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, 0 death, lest perchance I too should forget myself. 4. He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes himself bad. 5. He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing ; not only he who does a certain thing. 6. Thy present opinion founded on understand- ing, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment with everything which happens f — that is enough. 7. Wipe out imagination : check desire : ex- tinguish appetite : keep the ruling faculty in its own power. " " - - 8. Among the animals which have not reason one life is distributed ; but among reasonable ani- mals one intelligent soul is distributed : just as there is one earth of all things which are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that have life. 9. All things which participate in anything which is common to them all move towards that which is of the same kind with themselves. Ev- erything which is earthy turns towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together, and M. ANTONINUS. IX. 233 everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so that they require something to keep them asunder and the application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together with all the fire which is here, that even every sub- stance which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited, because there is less mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition. Accordingly then everything also which participates in the common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it. Accord- ingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds, and in a manner, loves ; for even in animals there are souls, and that power which brings them together is seen to exert itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in rational animals there are political communities and friendships, and families and meetings of people ; and in wars treaties and armistices. But in the things which 234 M. ANTONINUS. IX. are still superior, even though they are separated from one another, unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in things which are separated. See then what now takes place. For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone the property of flowing to- gether is not seen. But still though men strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and thou wilt see what I say, if thou only observest. Sooner then will one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no earthy thing than a man altogether separated from other men. 10. Both man and god and the universe pro- duce fruit ; at the proper seasons each produces it. But if usage has especially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this is nothing. Rea- son produces fruit both for all and for itself, and there are produced from it other things of the same kind as reason itself. 11. If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong ; but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to thee for this purpose. And the gods too are indulgent to such persons ; and for some purposes they even help them to get M. ANT ONINUS. IX. 235 health, wealth, reputation ; so kind they are. And it is in thy power also ; or say, who hinders thee ? 12. Labor not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who would be pitied or admired : but direct thy will to one thing only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the social reason requires. 13. To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my opinions. 14. All things are the same, familiar in ex- perience, and ephemeral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have buried. 15. Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves, neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any judgment. What is it then which does judge about them ? The ruling fac- ulty. 1 6. Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice lie not in passivity, but in activity. 17. For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up. (vni. 20.) 236 M. ANTONINUS. IX. 18. Penetrate inwards into men's leading prin- ciples, and thou wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of judges they are of themselves. 19. All things are changing: and thou thyself art in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the universe too. 20. It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there where it is. (vn. 29, ix. 38.) 21. Termination of activity, cessation from movement and opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy thoughts now to the con- sideration of thy life, thy life as a child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also every change was a death. Is this anything to fear ? Turn thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father ; and as thou findest many other differences and changes and terminations, ask thyself, Is this anything to fear ? In like manner then neither are the ter- mination and cessation and change of thy whole life a thing to be afraid of? 22. Hasten [to examine] thy own ruling fac- ulty and that of the universe and that of thy neighbor : thy own that thou mayst make it just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst 71/. ANTONINUS. IX. 237 remember of what thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbor, that thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly or with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that his ruling faculty is akin to thine. 23. As thou thyself art a component part of a social system, so let every act of thine be a com- ponent part of social life. Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immediately or re- motely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by himself stands apart from the general agreement. 24. Quarrels of little children and their sports,' and poor spirits carrying about dead bodies [such is everything] ; and so what is exhibited in the representation of the mansions of the dead 1 strikes our eye# more clearly. 25. Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and detach it altogether from its mate- rial part and then contemplate it ; then determine the time, the longest which a thing of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure. 1 to ttjq NeKvtag may be, as Gataker conjectures, a dramatic representation of the state of the dead. Schulze supposes that it may be also a reference to the Neavia of the Odyssey Uib. xi.) 238 M. ANTONINUS, IX. 26. Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does t he things which it is constituted by nature to do. But enough [of this]. 27. When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say about thee anything injurious, approach their souls, penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that these men may have this or that opinion about thee. However thou must be well disposed tow- ards them, for by nature they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on which they set a value. 28. The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up and down from age to age. And either the universal intelligence puts itself in motion for every separate effect, and if tkis is so, be thou content with that which is the result of its activity ; or it put itself in motion once, and everything else comes by way of sequence 2 in a manner : or indivisible elements are the origin of all things. — In a word, if there is a god, 2 The words which immediately follow /car' kitanokov- drjoiv are corrupt. But the meaning is hardly doubtful. (Compare vn. 75.) M.ANTONINUS. IX. 239 all is well ; and if chance rules, do not thou also be governed by it. Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth too will change, and the things also which result from change will continue to change forever, and these again forever. For if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which follow one another like wave after wave and their rapidity, he will despise everything which is perishable. 29. The universal cause is like a winter torrent : it carries everything along with it. But how worthless are all these poor people who are en- gaged in matters political, and, as they suppose, are playing the philosopher ! All drivellers. Well then, man : do what nature now requires. Set thyself in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee to see if any one will observe it ; nor yet expect Plato's Republic : but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can change mens principles ? and with- out a change of principles what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while they pretend to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexan- der and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They themselves shall judge whether they dis- covered what the universal nature required and 240 M. ANTONINUS. IX. (rained themselves accordingly. But if they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to imitate them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy. Draw me not aside to insolence and pride. 30. Look down from above on the countless herds of men and their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyagings in storms and calms, and the differences among those who are born, who live together, and die. And consider too the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name, and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that neither a posthumous name is of any value, nor reputation, nor anything else. 31. Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause ; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause, that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this, in social acts, for this is according to thy nature. 32. Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things among those which disturb thee, M.ANTONINUS. IX. 241 for they lie entirely in thy opinion ; and thou wilt then gain for thyself ample space by com- prehending the whole universe in thy mind and by contemplating the eternity of time and observ- ing the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from its birth to its dissolution, and the illimitable time before its birth as well as the equally boundless time after its dissolution. 33. All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who have been spectators of its disso- lution will very soon perish too. And he who dies at the extremest old age will be brought into the same condition with him who died pre- maturely. v 34. What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honor Imagine that thou seest their poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea ! 35. Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal nature delights in change, and in obedience to her all things are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like form, and will be such to time without end. What then dost thou say ? That all things have been and all things always will be bad, and that no power has 16 242 M. ANTONINUS. IX. ever been found in so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been condemned to be bound in never ceasing evil ? 36. The rottenness of the matter which is the substance of everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : or again, marble rocks, the callosities of the earth ; and gold and silver, the sediments ; and garments, only bits of hair ; and purple dye, blood ; and everything else is of the same kind. And that which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the same kind, changing from this to that. * 37. Enough of this wretched life and murmur- ing and apish tricks. Why art thou disturbed ? What is there new in this ? What unsettles thee ? Is it the form of the thing ? Look at it. Or is it the matter ? Look at it. But besides these there is nothing. Towards the gods then now become at last more simple and better. It is the same whether we look at these things for a hundred years or three. 38. If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But perhaps he has not done wrong. 39. Either all things proceed from one intelli- gent source and come together as in one body, and the part ought not to find fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole : or there are only M. ANTONINUS. IX. 243 atoms and nothing else than mixture and disper- sion. Why then art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and feed with the rest ? 3 y 40. Either the gods have no power or they have power. If then they have no power, why dost thou pray to them ? But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to give thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou desirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray that any of these things should not happen or happen ? for certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co- operate for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods have placed them in thy power. Well then, is it not better to use what is in thy power like a free man, than to desire in a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the things which are in our power ? Begin 3 There is some corruption at the end of this section. I believe that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. Whether intelligence rules all things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He must use the power that he has, and be tranquil. 244 M. ANTONINUS. IX. then to pray for such things and thou wilt see. One man prays thus : How shall I be able to lie with that woman ? Do thou pray thus : How shall I not desire to lie with her ? Another prays thus, How shall I be released from this ? Another prays : How shall I not desire to be released ? Another thus, How shall I not lose my little son ? Thou thus, How shall I not be afraid to lose him. In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and see what comes. 41. Epicurus says, Tn my sickness my conver- sation was not about my bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did T talk on such subjects to those who visited me ; but I continued to discourse on the nature of things as before, keeping to this main point, how the mind while participating in such movements as go on in the poor flesh shall be free from per- turbations and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says, give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life went on well and happily. Do then the same that he did both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum- stances ; for never to desert philosophy in any events that may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an ignorant man or with one unac- quainted with nature, is a principle of all schools M. ANTONINUS. IX. 245 of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which thou doest it. 42. When thou art offended with any man's shameless conduct, immediately ask thyself. Is it possible then that shameless men should not be in the world ? It is not possible. Do not then require what is impossible. For this man also is one of those shameless men, who must of necessity be in the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become better disposed towards every one individually. It is use- ful to perceive this too immediately when the occa- sion arises, what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every wrongful act. For she has given to man as an antidote, against the stupid man mildness, and against another kind of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray ; for every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray. Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has 246 M . ANTONINUS. IX. done anything by which thy mind could be made worse ; but that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the acts of an uninstructed man ? Consider whether thou shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not expect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blamest a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise, or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it absolutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service ? art thou not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for it ? just as if the eye demanded a 'recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by working according to their several constitutions obtain what is their own ; so also as man is formed M. ANTONINUS. IX. 247 by nature to acts of benevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted conformably to his constitution and he gets what is his own. X. TLT thou then, my soul, never be good and simple and one and naked, more manifest than the body which surrounds thee ? Wilt thou never enjoy an affectionate and contented disposition? Wilt thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing for nothing more, nor desiring any- thing either animate or inanimate for the enjoy- ment of pleasures ? nor yet desiring time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt thou convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee and will be well whatever shall please them, and whatever they shall give for the conservation of the perfect living being, the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds together all M. ANTONINUS. X. 249 things, and contains and embraces all things which are dissolved for the production of other like things ? Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in community with gods and men as neither to find fault with them at all nor to be condemned by them? 2. Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art governed by nature only : then do it and accept it, if thy nature, so far as thou art a living being shall not be made worse by it. And next thou must observe what thy nature requires so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayst allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational animal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these rules then and trouble thyself about nothing else. 3. Everything which happens either happens in such wise that thou art formed by nature to bear V it, or that thou art not formed by nature to bear it. If then it happens to thee in such way that thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not com- plain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise that thou art not able to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember however that thou art formed by nature to bear 250 M. .ANTONINUS. X. everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own opinion to make it endurable and toler- able, by thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty (o do this. 4. If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame not even thyself. 5. Whatever may happen to thee, it was pre- pared for thee from all eternity ; and the impli- cation of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being and of that which is incident to it. (in. 11 ; iv. 26.) 6. Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or nature [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a part of the whole which is governed by nature ; next, I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things which are assigned to rae out of the whole ; for nothing is injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole. For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advantage ; and all natures indeed have this com- mon principle, but the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it cannot be compelled even by any external cause" to generate anything M . ANTONINUS. X. 251 harmful to itself. By remembering then that 1 am a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the same kind with myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself, and I shall turn all my efforts to the com- mon interest, and divert them from the contrary. Now if these things are done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is content with whatever the state may assign to him. 7. The parts of the whole, everything I mean which is naturally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity perish ; but let this be understood in this sense, that they must undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For whether did nature herself design to do evil to the things which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil and of necessity fall into evil, or have such results happened with- M. ANTONINUS. X. out her knowing it ? Both these suppositions in- deed are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term Nature [as an efficient power] and should speak of these things [change] as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their nature subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised or vexed as if something were hap- pening contrary to nature, particularly as the dis- solution of things is into those things of which each thing is composed. For there is either a disper- sion of the elements out of which everything has been compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back into the universal rea- son, whether this at certain periods is consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee from the time of generation. For all this received its accretion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from the food and the air which is inspired. This then, which has received [the accretion], changes, not that which thy moth- er brought forth. But suppose that this [which thy mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that other part, which has the peculiar M. ANTONINUS. X. 253 quality [of change], this is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said. 1 8. When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true, rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, lake care that thou dost not change these names ; and if thou shouldst lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the > term Rational was intended to signify a discrimi- nating attention to every several thing and freedom from negligence ; and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the things which are as- signed to thee by the common nature ; and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelligent part above the pleasurable or. painful sensations of the flesh and above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such things. If then thou main- tainest thyself in the possession of these names, without desiring to be called by these names by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on another life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the** character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life, and like those- half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who 1 The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is very obscure. I have given that meaning which appears to be consistent with the whole argument. 254 M. ANTONINUS. X. though covered with wounds and gore, still intreat to be kept to the following day, though they will be exposed in the same state to the same claws and bites. Therefore fix thyself in the possession of these few names : and if thou art able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to certain islands of the Happy. 2 But if thou shalt perceive that thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go courageously into some nook where 2 The islands of the Happy or the Portunatae Insulae are spoken of by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode of Heroes, like Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors who had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest from his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus told Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at the boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt: (Odyssey, iv. 565.) For there in sooth man's life is easiest . Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there, But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr Oceanus sends up to gladden man. It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some old legend without having any knowledge of any place which corresponds to his description. The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be Madeira and the adjacent island. M. ANTONINUS. X. 255 thou shalt maintain them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing this one [laud- able] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of it thu-. In order however to the remembrance of these names, it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the gods and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all reasonable beings to be made like themselves ; and if thou rememberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree, and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work of a man is a man. 9. Mimi, 3 war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily wipe out those holy principles of thine, f How many things without studying nature dost thou imagine and how many dost thou neglect ? 4 But it is thy duty so to look on and so to do everything, that at the same time the power of dealing with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative faculty is exercised, and the con- fidence which comes from the knowledge of each several thing is maintained without showing it, 3 Corae conjectured fitaoq " hatred " in place of Mimi, Roman plays in which action and gesticulation were all or nearly all. 4 This is corrupt. 256 M. ANTONINUS. X. but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge of every several thing, both what it is in substance, and what place it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist and of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong, and who are able both to give it and take it away ? 10. A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken wild boars, and another when he has taken bears, and another when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these robbers, if thou examinest their principles ? 5 11. Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things change into one another, and con- stantly attend to it, and exercise thyself about this part [of philosophy]. For nothing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a man has put off the body, and as he sees that he must, no one knows how soon, go away from among men and leave everything here, he gives himself up entirely . to just doing in all his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns himself 5 Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself warred against Sarmatians, and was a rob» ber, as he says, like the rest. M. ANTONINUS. X. 257 to the universal nature. But as to what any man shall say or think about him or do against him, he never even thinks of it, being himself con- tented with these two things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being satisfied with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside all dis- tracting and busy pursuits and desires nothing else than to accomplish the straight course through the law, 6 and by accomplishing the straight course to follow god. 12. What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy power to inquire what ought to be done ? And if thou seest clear, go by this way content, without turning back : but if thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. But if any other things oppose thee, go on accord- ing to thy powers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears to be just. For it is best £o reach this object, and if thou dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the same time, and also cheerful and collected. 13. Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep, whether it will make any difference to * By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will of God. 17 258 M. ANTONINUS. X. thee, if another does what is just and right* It will make no difference. Hast thou forgotten that those who assume arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others, are such as they are at bed and at board, and hast thou forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, modesty, truth, law, a good daemon [happiness] ? (vn. 17.) 14. To her who gives and takes back all, to nature, the man who is instructed and modest says : Give what thou wilt ; take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly, but obediently and well pleased with her. 15. Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in a state [polit- ical community]. Let men see, let them know a real man who lives according to nature. If they cannot endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to live thus [as men do]. 16. No longer talk about the kind of man that a good man ought to be, but be such. M. ANTONINUS. X. 259 1 7. Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole of substance, and consider that all individual things as to substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, the turning of a gimlet. 18. Look at everything that exists and observe that it is already in dissolution and in change and as it were putrefaction or dispersion, or that every- thing is so constituted by nature as to die. 19. Consider what men are when they are eat- ing, sleeping, generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then what kind of men they are when they are imperious f and arrogant, or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what things ; and after a little time consider in what a condition they will be. 20. That is for the good of each thing, which the universal nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time when nature brings it. 21. "The earth loves the shower;" and "the solemn aether loves : " and the universe loves to make whatever is about to be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. And is not this too said, that " this or that loves [is wont] to be produced ? " 7 7 These words are from Euripides. They are cited by Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom. viii. 1. Athenaeus (xiii. 260 M. ANTONINUS. X. 22. Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thyself to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own will ; or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty. But besides these things there is nothing. Be of good cheer then. 23. Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land is like any other ; and that all things here are the same with things on the top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what Plato says, Making the walls of the city like a shepherd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are omitted. They are unintelligible.] 8 24. What is my ruling faculty now to me ? and of what nature am I now making it ? and for what purpose am I now using it? is it void of under- 296.) and Stobaeus quote seven complete lines beginning hpot fiev 5{j.j3pov yala. There is a similar fragment of Aeschylus. It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the mean- ings of words. So Antoninus here takes the verb