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THE PERMANENT COURT 
 OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 BY 
 
 Honorable Charles E. Hughes 
 
 SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 delivered before the 
 
 AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
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 WASHINGTON, D. C, APRIL 27, 1923 
 

 
 
 
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THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL 
 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 It is my purpose to discuss in the simplest manner the proposal 
 made by the President that the United States should participate, 
 upon stated conditions, in the support of the Permanent Court of In¬ 
 ternational Justice. In making this proposal, the President has 
 been animated by the desire to promote world peace and stabiliza¬ 
 tion; he has sought to give effect to a long cherished American as¬ 
 piration and to pursue in the projected course the clear line of our 
 traditional policy. With full appreciation of the intensity of feel¬ 
 ing aroused by the controversy of recent years we can not fail to 
 realize the importance of having the subject considered upon its 
 merits and the supreme need is an understanding of the facts which 
 should remove uncertainty and quiet apprehension. 
 
 Let it first be noted exactly what the proposal is and what it is 
 not. As the President has explicitly stated, it is proposed to sup¬ 
 port the Permanent Court of International Justice; it is not pro¬ 
 posed to enter the League of Nations. Those who desire that by this 
 method the United States shall become a member of the league are 
 indulging vain hopes, and those who are alarmed at such a possibility 
 are entertaining vain fears. The test is a clear one. If the Senate 
 should approve the President’s recommendation, the United States 
 would still be outside the league. Acceptance of the President’s 
 proposal as to the International Court will not obtain for the United 
 States a single right or subject it to a single obligation under the 
 covenant of the league. 
 
 These are the questions in which I assume the citizens of the 
 United States are interested: 
 
 Is it a good thing to have an international court? 
 
 Why should we have a permanent court instead of temporary 
 arbitral tribunals? 
 
 Is the Permanent Court of International Justice established on a 
 sound basis? 
 
 Is there any good reason why the United States should not sup¬ 
 port it? 
 
 First. Why should there be an international court? The mani¬ 
 fest answer is that there are controversies between nations which 
 should be decided by a court. There are controversies calling for 
 the examination of facts and the application of principles of law. 
 
 44777—23 1 
 
2 
 
 There are international contracts or treaties, now more numerous 
 than ever, to be interpreted. Recognizing the distinction between 
 questions of a legal nature and questions of policy, there has emerged 
 from the discussions of jurists an agreement defining justiciable dis¬ 
 putes as those which relate to the interpretation of a treaty, to any 
 question of international law, to the existence of facts which would 
 constitute a breach of an international obligation or to the repara¬ 
 tion to be made for such breaches. Other questions may be submitted 
 for decision, but questions of the sort above described are manifestly 
 of the same character as those which in all civilized countries are 
 recognized as matters for determination by judicial tribunals whose 
 impartial judgment affords the nearest human approach to absolute 
 justice. 
 
 It is to the direct interest of the United States, with respect to the 
 disposition of its own controversies, that the best practicable method 
 of judicial settlement should be provided. We have rights and duties 
 under international law. We are parties to treaties under which we 
 have rights and obligations. As we can not be the final judge in our 
 own cases, we need the best possible international tribunal to decide 
 them. This is to the interest of every American citizen. It is also to the 
 interest of the United States that controversies between other nations 
 to which the United States is not a party should be appropriately 
 determined. Suppose a citizen of New York should say that he was 
 interested only in haVing a judicial tribunal to determine controversies 
 between States to which New York was a party, but that it made no 
 difference to him what happened if the question was between Mis¬ 
 souri and Kansas. Every citizen knows that it is in the interest of 
 domestic peace that we should maintain a tribunal by which contro¬ 
 versies arising between any two States can be determined. It is 
 equally essential to world peace that controversies not our own 
 should be peacefully and impartially determined wherever that is 
 possible. As President McKinley said, “ It has been recognized as 
 the leading feature of our foreign policy throughout our entire 
 national history ” that there should be “ the adjustment of difficulties 
 by judicial methods rather than by force of arms.” 
 
 How are controversies between nations to be determined? If the 
 nations are able to agree, the question does not arise. But what 
 shall be done if they can not agree? Is their controversy to remain 
 a festering sore? Ultimately, the alternative to peaceful settlement 
 is the arbitrament of force. The only way to prevent war is to dis¬ 
 pose of the causes of war and the desire for peace must be supported 
 by the institutions of peace. 
 
 Because a court may not be able to deal with every sort of con¬ 
 troversy but only with • controversies that are appropriate for a 
 court to decide is no reason for dispensing with it. There is no 
 
immediate access to the millennium and a demand for the millennium 
 will not prevent war. If the plain path of progress in dealing with 
 those controversies which all countries recognize to be susceptible 
 of settlement through judicial tribunals is not to be followed, then 
 no progress is possible. 
 
 Second. Why should there be a permanent court instead of tem¬ 
 porary arbitral tribunals? 
 
 The principle of judicial settlement of international disputes has 
 been applied from early times through arbitrators. It is a method 
 of great value and I have no desire to underestimate it. We have 
 been parties to more than 70 arbitrations and we have concluded 
 a score of general arbitration conventions. Throughout its history 
 the United States has consistently supported this sort of judicial 
 process, but w T e have long recognized that it leaves much to be 
 desired. 
 
 Arbitrators are selected to determine a particular controversy, and 
 after the controversy has arisen. When the decision has been made 
 the arbitral tribunal ceases to exist. There is unnecessary expense 
 in the creation of a separate tribunal for every case and there is a 
 regrettable loss in the experience of judges because of the lack of 
 continuity in service. For the same reason, the development of the 
 law suffers, as, instead of a series of decisions with appropriate rela¬ 
 tion to each other by a permanent bench of judges, thus gradually 
 establishing a body of law, there are sporadic utterances by tem¬ 
 porary bodies disconnected with each other, acting under different 
 conditions, and having a widely different capacity. 
 
 There is a still more serious defect in this process. The arbitral 
 tribunal is composed of those specially selected by the parties to 
 the dispute. In legal matters of minor consequence, where national 
 interest is relatively small, judicial standards are more readily 
 maintained. But where the controversy is a serious one and success 
 is highly important, the constitution of a tribunal after the con¬ 
 troversy has arisen is not favorable to the selection of those who 
 will act solely as impartial judges. And those members of the 
 tribunal who are the separate choice of each party tend to become 
 advocates rather than judges; if this is not always the case in fact, 
 it is generally so in public estimation. 
 
 There need be no illusion as to this matter. The question finally 
 comes to the selection of the umpire, or third or fifth arbitrator, as 
 the case may be, who is likely to have the deciding vote. The smaller 
 Powers have the less difficulty in making such a choice. They have 
 a range of selection that is generally satisfactory from the stand¬ 
 point of national interest and they often are able to agree upon a 
 tribunal composed of a single arbitrator. When there is a serious 
 controversy between great Powers, however, the choice of an umpire 
 
4 
 
 or third arbitrator is far from easy. National interests are far- 
 reaching, and a selection satisfactory to one Power is for the same 
 reason the subject of objection by the other. The difficulty has been 
 vastly increased by the feelings engendered and the alignment of 
 sympathies in the Great War. It has become the practice to pro¬ 
 vide that, in case of a failure of the parties, or of the arbitrators 
 respectively selected by them, to agree upon an umpire or third arbi¬ 
 trator, he shall be selected by some designated Power or Powers. 
 This is because some means of choice must be provided if the parties 
 can not agree, but this course places with the designated Power or 
 Powers the virtual control of the final constitution of the tribunal. 
 The alternative is to have the selection determined by lot, and cer¬ 
 tainly this is not a satisfactory method. 
 
 Even where the parties are able to agree upon the arbitrators, 
 there still remains the danger that considerations of political ex¬ 
 pediency will usurp the place of judicial standards. I would not 
 disparage the motives of arbitrators or the importance of their serv¬ 
 ice, but as Mr. Root has well said, they too often “ consider them¬ 
 selves as belonging to diplomacy rather than to jurisprudence; they 
 measure their responsibility and their duty by the traditions, the 
 sentiments, and the sense of honorable obligation which has grown 
 up in centuries of diplomatic intercourse, rather than by the tradi¬ 
 tions, the sentiments, and the sense of honorable obligation which 
 characterizes the judicial department of civilized nations.’' The 
 process tends to the intrusion of political interest and to a solution 
 by compromise instead of a proper judicial determination. Ques¬ 
 tions of right come to be determined as questions of policy. 
 
 The problem in the improvement of the judicial process in inter¬ 
 national relations is to secure immunity, so far as is humanly pos¬ 
 sible, from considerations of political interest and policy and to have 
 the rights and obligations of nations determined upon their merits. 
 The United States has taken the lead in the endeavor to secure this 
 result by the most appropriate method, that is, by the establishment 
 of a permanent international court. 
 
 Secretary Hay instructed the American delegates to the First 
 Hague Conference in 1899 to present a plan for an international 
 tribunal of a permanent character. While this project was not 
 adopted, the conference did make a decided improvement in existing 
 practice by providing a code of arbitral procedure and an eligible 
 list of arbitrators from which tribunals might be constituted for 
 the determination of such controversies as the parties concerned 
 might agree to submit to them. This was called a Permanent Court 
 of Arbitration but it was not in fact a permanent court; it was a 
 panel of arbiters. This Government still cherished its ideal and 
 hence, at the Second Hague Conference, our delegates were instructed 
 
by Secretary Root to bring about “ a development of the Hague 
 Tribunal into a permanent tribunal composed of judges who are 
 judicial officers and nothing else, who are paid adequate salaries, who 
 have no other occupation, and who will devote their entire time to 
 the trial and decision of international causes by judicial methods 
 and under a sense of judicial responsibility.” 
 
 Mr. Choate, as the first delegate of the United States, in presenting 
 to the conference the American plan for a permanent court quoted 
 the words of President Roosevelt that he hoped “ to see the Hague 
 court greatly increased in power and permanency, and the judges, 
 in particular, made permanent and given adequate salaries so as to 
 make it increasingly probable that in each case that may come before 
 them they will decide between the nations, great or small, exactly as 
 a judge within our own limits decides between the individuals, great 
 or small, who come before him.” 
 
 Mr. Choate observed that the work of the First Conference, noble 
 and far-reaching as it was, had not proved entirely adequate to meet 
 the progressive demands of the nations, and to draw to the Hague 
 Tribunal for decision any great part of the arbitrations that had 
 been agreed upon; and that in the eight years of its existence only 
 four cases had been submitted to it, and of the 60 judges, more or 
 less, who were named as members of the court at least two-thirds 
 had not as yet been called upon for any service. He found the rea¬ 
 sons to lie in undue expense; in the fact that there was “ nothing 
 permanent or continuous or connected in the sessions of the court;” 
 that it had “ thus far been a court only in name—a framework for 
 the selection of referees for each particular case, never consisting of 
 the same judges.” “ Let us then,” said he, “ seek to develop out of 
 it a permanent court, which shall hold regular and continuous ses¬ 
 sions, which shall consist of the same judges, which shall pay due 
 heed to its own decisions, which shall speak with the authority of 
 the united voice of the nations, and gradually build up a system 
 of international law, definite and precise, which shall command 
 the approval and regulate the conduct of the nations.” 
 
 Mr. Choate added that the plan proposed by the American dele¬ 
 gates did not “in the least depart from the voluntary character of 
 the court already established. No nation can be compelled or con¬ 
 strained to come before it, but it will be open for all who desire to 
 settle their differences by peaceful methods and to avoid the terrible 
 consequences and chances of war.” With solemn emphasis, dis¬ 
 claiming any pride of opinion as to any point or feature of the 
 American plan, he warned the great gathering of the representa¬ 
 tives of all the nations that it “ would be false to its trust and wmuld 
 deserve that the seal of condemnation should be set upon its work ” 
 
6 
 
 if it did not “strain every nerve to bring about the establishment of 
 some such great and permanent tribunal.” 
 
 While the Second Hague Conference discussed a project and recom¬ 
 mended a draft convention for the establishment of a Permanent 
 Court, it was unable to find a satisfactory method of selecting the 
 judges, and for this reason the project failed. Still the American 
 delegates reported to their Government that in the proposed project 
 the foundations of a permanent court had been broadly and firmly 
 laid, and added—“a little time, a little patience, and the great work 
 is accomplished.” Echoing the same sentiment, President Roosevelt 
 said in his next message to the Congress: “ Substantial progress was 
 also made toward the creation of a permanent judicial tribunal for 
 the determination of international causes.” He regarded the un¬ 
 settled question as to the method of selecting judges as “ plainly one 
 which time and good temper will solve.” 
 
 The establishment of a permanent court of international justice 
 continued to be a cardinal feature of American policy. 
 
 Third. Is the present Permanent Court of International Justice, 
 to which the President’s recommendation refers, published on a 
 sound basis ? 
 
 This question invites consideration of its orgaol^^pn; of-the 
 extent to which the court has the support of the nations; of the 
 jurisdiction and standards of the court; and of the qualifications, 
 tenure, method of selection, and independence of the judges com¬ 
 posing it. 
 
 The Permanent Court of International Justice has been established 
 under what is called a statute, or constitution, which defines its or¬ 
 ganization, jurisdiction, and procedure. In the preparation of this 
 statute the council of the league called to its aid an international 
 committee of the most distinguished jurists, among whom was Mr. 
 Root. This Advisory Committee of Jurists formulated a plan for a 
 permanent court. The plan was considered and amended in the 
 council and assembly of the league, but its main structure was re¬ 
 tained. While the amended plan was adopted by the assembly of 
 the league, it could not be put into effect by action of the league. 
 In view of the scope of the plan, it was necessary to have a special 
 international agreement on the part of the States which were willing 
 to accept it. Accordingly a special protocol or agreement, with the 
 statute of the court annexed, was drawn up and sent to the nations 
 for approval. I understand that about forty-six States have signed 
 this special agreement, and of these about thirty-four States have 
 already ratified it. 
 
 The permanent court is thus an establishment separate from the 
 league, having a distinct legal status created by an independent or¬ 
 ganic act. 
 
7 
 
 The jurisdiction of the court comprises all cases which the parties 
 refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and 
 conventions in force. 
 
 Careful provision has been made to secure the independence of 
 the court and to safeguard the appropriate discharge of its functions 
 as a judicial body in accordance with accepted judicial standards. 
 The statute of the court provides that it shall be composed “ of a 
 body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality 
 from amongst persons of high moral character, who possess the quali¬ 
 fications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
 highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence 
 in international law/’ The court consists of 15 members—11 
 ordinary judges and 4 deputy judges. The 11 judges constitute 
 the full court, but if they can not all be present, the deputy 
 judges may be called on. Nine constitute a quorum. The court is 
 thus large enough to be appropriately representative and at the same 
 time is not so large that it can not effectively transact its business. 
 
 The judges are elected for nine years and are eligible for reelec¬ 
 tion. Every judge before taking up his duties must make a solemn 
 declaration in open court that he will exercise his powers impartially 
 and conscientiously. The ordinary members of the court may not 
 exercise any political or administrative function. This provision 
 applies to the deputy judges during the time that they are perform¬ 
 ing their duties on the court. 
 
 No judge can be removed by the League of Nations. A judge 
 can not be dismissed unless, in the unanimous opinion of the other 
 members of the court, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions. 
 This gives the judges absolute security in the impartial performance 
 of their duties. 
 
 The statute provides that in deciding cases the court shall apply 
 international conventions establishing rules expressly recognized by 
 the contesting States; international custom, as evidence of a general 
 practice accepted as law; the general principles of law recognized 
 by civilized nations; and the judicial decisions and the teachings 
 of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
 subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. All ques¬ 
 tions are decided by a majority of the judges present, and in the 
 event of an equality of votes, the President or his deputy, who are 
 elected by the court itself, shall have a casting vote. 
 
 The judgment of the court is to be final and without appeal. It 
 is expressly provided, however, that the decision of the court shall 
 have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
 the particular case decided. 
 
 As already observed, the Hague project of 1907 for the establish¬ 
 ment of a permanent court failed because it was found to be im- 
 44777—23-2 
 
8 
 
 possible to agree upon the method of selecting the .judges. Mani¬ 
 festly, if the nations are to participate in maintaining an inter¬ 
 national court they must have suitable opportunity to participate in 
 the election of those who compose it. Still, to have every nation rep¬ 
 resented upon such a court, or to have a selection of a permanent 
 body of judges according to nationality, would be wholly impracti¬ 
 cable, and insistence upon such a course would make impossible the 
 establishment of a permanent court. The fundamental postulate of 
 international law is the equality of States, but if this principle alone 
 is observed and all States should join in the election of judges pre¬ 
 cisely upon the same footing, the small powers would have a great 
 majority and would control the election. Even though the juris¬ 
 diction of the court was not compulsory, a court thus constituted 
 would not be likely to enjoy the confidence of the great powers. 
 At least, the fear of such an arrangement has been until now an 
 insuperable obstacle in establishing an international court. 
 
 This difficulty has been surmounted by providing that the two 
 groups of Powers in the council and assembly of the league shall 
 act concurrently in the election of judges. The council is a small 
 body, of ten members, and the great Powers—Great Britain, France, 
 Italy, and Japan—are permanent members, the others being non¬ 
 permanent members. The assembly, on the other hand, embraces 
 all the members of the league, fifty-two in number. The statute 
 of the court provides that in electing the judges each of these bodies 
 shall proceed independently, and the successful candidate must have 
 a majority of the votes in each. The result is that the great Powers 
 are able to vote in a small group, of which they are permanent 
 members, while all the smaller Powers can vote in the other group. 
 In this way the great Powers and the smaller Powers have a check 
 upon each other, and it is as certain as anything human can be that 
 their concurrent action will result in the election of impartial judges. 
 
 It should be noted that the council and assembly, in electing 
 judges, do not act under the covenant of the League of Nations. 
 That covenant, which determines the rights and obligations of 
 members of the league, invests them with no authority whatever 
 for such action. The election is held under the provisions of the 
 statute of the court which rests, as I have said, upon a special inter¬ 
 national agreement. For this purpose, the council and assembly 
 are electoral bodies which are utilized because they are groups of 
 States and through provision for their concurrent action the diffi¬ 
 culty of finding a satisfactory basis of selection has been overcome. 
 
 This suggestion was brought forward by Mr. Boot in the Ad¬ 
 visory Committee of Jurists. Analogy was found in the plan which 
 made possible our organic Union, by providing for the representa- 
 
9 
 
 tion of sovereign States in the Senate and of the people in the House 
 of Kepresentatives and requiring in the enactment of laws the ac¬ 
 tion of both groups. The method of electing judges for the per¬ 
 manent court is thus a practical solution, and I think it may be 
 said that without a solution of this sort which will enable great 
 Powers to have a check upon the smaller Powers, and the latter to 
 have a check upon the former, a permanent court can not be estab¬ 
 lished. We are generally in danger, in all efforts at progress, of 
 being balked by an impractical idealism; in this case it is fortunate 
 that a w T ise practicality has enabled the nations to attain the ideal 
 of an impartial court. 
 
 It should be added that candidates for election are nominated by 
 national groups of arbitrators who are on the panel established by 
 The Hague Convention and the election is made from the candidates 
 presented by these groups, except that, in case of inability otherwise 
 to agree, a joint conference of representatives of the council and 
 assembly may unanimously present another name to each body. 
 These national groups who thus have the privilege of nominating 
 candidates for the Permanent Court of International Justice are 
 selected by the Governments, respectively, under the Hague Conven¬ 
 tion as men of known competency in questions of international law 
 and of the highest moral reputation. Before making these nomina¬ 
 tions, each national group is recommended by the statute of the court 
 to consult its highest court of justice, its legal faculties and schools 
 of law, and its national academies and national sections of interna¬ 
 tional academies devoted to the study of law. Thus the participat¬ 
 ing nations have the opportunity to submit the names of their leading 
 jurists. 
 
 The plan gives every assurance against a successful attempt by 
 any bloc to manipulate or control the elections. Any such attempt 
 in the assembly would meet with the greatest difficulty in view of its 
 52 members and their diverse interests, while any effort on the part 
 of the council to elect a judge partial to particular interests would be 
 wrecked in the assembly. It is wholly improbable that acting in this 
 way the participating nations would be able to agree upon judges 
 unless they were men of acknowledged merit with a public reputation 
 affording the best possible guaranty of competence and impartiality. 
 
 The judges chosen through the concurrent action of these groups 
 will be in all probability, as in the case of those already elected, men 
 of mature years, who have won high distinction. They are elected 
 for nine years and will most probably be reelected if they give faith¬ 
 ful service. This means that men of exceptional experience and 
 recognized fitness for these most important posts are chosen at a 
 time of life, and for a term of service, which leaves them no motive 
 but to devote the rest of their career to making efficient the adminis- 
 
10 
 
 tration of international justice to the full extent of their ability. 
 If there is any practicable plan better safeguarding the essentials 
 of an international court it has never been suggested. 
 
 In considering the question of the relation of the court to the 
 league, it must be remembered that if there were no league, you 
 would still have to deal with the States composing the league. If 
 you are to have a permanent court these States should participate 
 in establishing it and maintaining it and in electing its judges. The 
 question would still remain—whether all these States in choosing 
 judges should act in one body or group, whatever you might call it, 
 or not. If it were insisted that they should act in one body upon 
 precisely the same footing, we should return to the old difficulty and 
 get no court at all. If, on the other hand, you say that the par¬ 
 ticipating States should act in two bodies or groups, so that the 
 great powers may have a check upon smaller powers and the latter 
 upon the former, then the question is, What should the second body 
 or group be? Whatever you call it, it would be a body or group 
 in which the great powers would presumably be permanent members. 
 
 The fundamental question is whether the League of Nations con¬ 
 trols the court. To this there is a ready answer. The league does 
 not control the court; that is an independent judicial body. The 
 league is composed of States; they, of course, continue to exist as 
 States. When the league acts, it acts under the covenant which 
 creates the rights and obligations pertaining to the league. But 
 when these 52 members act in separate groups to elect judges, they 
 are, as I have said, not acting under the covenant, but are following 
 a course of procedure denned by a special international agreement in 
 order to secure the independent and impartial judicial body for 
 which the world has been waiting. 
 
 There are certain other provisions of the statute of the court which 
 have been adopted to meet obvious practical exigencies. Only one 
 national of a participant in the election can be chosen as a judge. 
 Judges of the nationality of each contesting party retain their right 
 to sit in the case before the court. If the court includes upon the 
 bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties only, the other 
 party may select from among the deputy judges a judge of its na¬ 
 tionality if there be one, or, if not, the party may choose a judge. 
 If the court includes upon the bench no judge of the nationality of 
 the contesting parties, each may choose a judge. If there are several 
 parties in the same interest they are to be reckoned, for the purpose 
 of these provisions, as one party only. 
 
 The court recognizes that it may be called upon by the council or 
 assembly of the league for advisory opinions. This is a practice 
 similar to that which has obtained in most of the States of New 
 England from colonial days. It now obtains in Massachusetts, 
 
11 
 
 New Hampshire, Maine, Rhode Island, Florida, Colorado, and 
 South Dakota. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
 has adopted rules upon this subject so as to assimilate the 
 process so far as possible to a judicial proceeding and especially so 
 as to exclude any supposition that advisory opinions may be rendered 
 in a diplomatic sense and without publicity. (See article by Judge 
 John Bassett Moore on the Organization of the Permanent Court of 
 International Justice, Columbia Law Review, Vol. XXII, No. 6, 
 June, 1922, pages 11 and 12.) 
 
 The conclusion is that while the United States should have the 
 right to participate in the election of judges if it is to support the 
 Permanent Court, that court is established on a sound basis. It is 
 already functioning. The judges have been elected—a most dis¬ 
 tinguished American jurist being one of them—and they are as rep¬ 
 resentative a body of independent and qualified jurists as could be 
 chosen. 
 
 Fourth . I come then to the final question: Is there any good 
 reason why the United States should not support the Permanent 
 Court ? This support has been proposed by the President upon four 
 explicit conditions. These conditions are: 
 
 I. That such adhesion .shall not be taken to involve any 
 legal relation on the part of the United States to the League 
 of Nations or the assumption of any obligations by the 
 United States under the covenant of the League of Nations 
 constituting Part I of the treaty of Versailles. 
 
 II. That the United States shall be permitted to partici¬ 
 pate through representatives designated for the purpose and 
 upon an equality with the other States’ members, respectively, 
 of the council and assembly of the League of Nations in any 
 and all proceedings of either the council or the assembly for 
 the election of judges or deputy judges of the Permanent 
 Court of International Justice, or for the filling of vacancies. 
 
 III. That the United States will pay a fair share of the 
 expenses of the court as determined and appropriated from 
 time to time by the Congress of the United States. 
 
 IV. That the statute for the Permanent Court of Inter¬ 
 national Justice adjoined to the protocol shall not be amended 
 without the consent of the United States. 
 
 The acceptance of these conditions will establish that the support 
 of the court will not involve entry by the United States into the 
 League of Nations; the participation of the United States in the 
 election of judges; the bearing by the United States of its proper 
 share of the expenses of the court; and, finally, a safeguard against 
 any change in the statute of the court without the assent of the 
 United States. 
 
 What, then, are the objections to support of the court upon this 
 basis? 
 
12 
 
 (1) It is objected that it is not a world court. But in what sense is 
 it not a world court? Is reference made to the number of nations 
 which support it? The answer is, as I have already said, that 
 about 46 nations have already signed the protocol, and if the United 
 States adheres, there is every reason to suppose that participation 
 by the other nations will be brought about. This should be our 
 aim. It is not too much to say that there will be no world court 
 if this court can not be made one, and whether or not it is to be in 
 the fullest sense a world court depends upon our own action. 
 
 Suppose we should now undertake to establish another world 
 court? What should we do? We could not establish it by our¬ 
 selves; we should have to prepare a plan and submit it to the other 
 nations. We should need the approval of the nations who have 
 already approved the present plan. 
 
 What differences should we propose, so far as the structure of the 
 court is concerned? With respect to the choice of judges, would we 
 endeavor to have a practicable plan or one that had been demon¬ 
 strated to be impracticable? Should we insist that all nations be 
 represented on the court by their nationals, or that all nations, great 
 and small, should act together in the choice of judges upon pre¬ 
 cisely the same footing and without any division into groups which 
 could form a check upon each other? If so, we should have a plan 
 which would most probably fail of acceptance, and at the same time 
 would not safeguard the interests of the United States nearly as well 
 as the existing plan. Should we recommend concurrent action by 
 groups of nations, in order to have a practical arrangement for 
 selecting judges? If so, what groups should we propose, and how 
 would they differ essentially from the present electoral bodies? The 
 more the matter is examined, the more clearly I think it will appear 
 that the suggested changes would be purely formal, and not at all 
 vital to our interests, or of a character which would disclose any just 
 reason for refusing support to the existing court and for entering 
 upon the difficult, if not vain, endeavor of establishing another 
 judicial institution. 
 
 (2) Another objection is that the court has been established 
 through the action of the League of Nations. This is not an entirely 
 accurate statement, for the action of the league could not have 
 established the court. It was necessary to have a special agreement 
 signed or adhered to by the nations which support the court, and 
 the court rests upon that agreement. The substantial point, however, 
 is not the source of the plan but its character. Any nation, or any 
 group of nations, might have suggested the plan and it might be 
 none the worse or none the better for that. The question still re¬ 
 mains—What is the court that has thus been established, and is it in 
 its essential attributes worthy of support ? 
 
1 
 
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 t> 
 
 This question I have examined, and I think it is demonstrable 
 that the court is an independent judicial body with appropriate 
 judicial functions and abundant safeguards for their proper dis¬ 
 charge. It is not a servant of the league; and its decisions are not 
 supervised or controlled by the league. 
 
 It is said that the salaries and expenses, or budget of the court, 
 are fixed by the assembly of the league upon the proposal of the 
 council. But the action of the assembly is the action of the 52 mem¬ 
 bers composing the assembly and the recommendation of the coun¬ 
 cil is the recommendation of the States composing the council, 
 in each case the action being taken under the statute of the court. 
 If the nations are to support a court, they must of course have some 
 practical means of dealing with the budget. Under the present plan, 
 by which both these groups act, there is abundant protection against 
 extravagance. We properly reserve the right of Congress to deter¬ 
 mine by its appropriation the amount wdiich the United States shall 
 pay as its share. I find nothing which can be regarded as inimical 
 to the interests of the United States in the provisions as to procedure. 
 
 (3) But it is said that support of the court, although it mani¬ 
 festly does not involve entrance into the league, or the assumption 
 of any obligation under the covenant of the league, constitutes an 
 entanglement. But in what do we become entangled? Are we to 
 abandon the effort to dispose of international controversies by judi¬ 
 cial settlement, which has been a feature of American policy since 
 the foundation of the Government? We can not have an ordinary 
 arbitration unless we have an international agreement and an inter¬ 
 national tribunal for the purpose of the arbitration. We have never 
 considered this to be an entanglement. We have manifested our 
 desire for such judicial settlements by numerous treaties and special 
 conventions. 
 
 Certainly we do not object that the disputes of others should be 
 settled peacefully by similar methods. Then, as I have shown, the 
 establishment of a permanent court has been an American policy 
 because we have desired this essential improvement in judicial proc¬ 
 ess in international relations. Political platforms have treated 
 this as an American policy and not as a forbidden entanglement. 
 If you are to treat participation in a permanent court of international 
 justice as an entanglement foreign to our institutions, you must re¬ 
 write American history. If you are not, then the question is as to 
 this particular permanent court and we return to the consideration 
 of its organization and functions, and these justify the conclusion 
 that it is an independent judicial body of the highest character and 
 deserves our confidence. 
 
 (4) Again it is objected that a world court should have compulsory 
 jurisdiction and that the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of 
 
 
14 
 
 International Justice is not compulsory. It may be noted that pro¬ 
 vision is made in the statute of the court for the acceptance by States, 
 through a special agreement, of compulsory jurisdiction of legal 
 disputes as defined in the statute. I understand that of the 46 States 
 that have signed the protocol about 15 have ratified this optional 
 clause for compulsory jurisdiction, but among the majority of the 
 States which have not assented to the optional clause are Great 
 Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. It is apparent that the greater 
 nations are not yet ready to accept compulsory jurisdiction even of 
 the limited class of questions above described. Certainly, it does not 
 appear that the United States is ready to accept it. 
 
 The American plan for a permanent court, which was submitted to 
 the Second Hague Conference, was, as Mr. Choate pointed out, for a 
 jurisdiction of a voluntary character. The Senate repeatedly, from 
 the days of President Cleveland, has refused to sanction an arbitra¬ 
 tion treaty providing for compulsory arbitration. It has been re¬ 
 quired that, even under our general arbitration treaties relating to 
 legal disputes, there should be a limitation relating to questions 
 which affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the 
 two contracting States, and the Senate has insisted that a special 
 agreement for each particular arbitration should be submitted for 
 its assent. 
 
 Shall we postpone the plan for a world court because we can not 
 have compulsory jurisdiction? Can we not make substantial progress 
 in the judicial process by the creating of a tribunal which in the 
 highest degree will command confidence and to which the nations 
 may present their cases for the most impartial and expert considera¬ 
 tion that is obtainable? Why should impossibilities be demanded 
 if we are really interested in judicial settlement? It is said that 
 the court is substantially an arbitral tribunal because of the absence 
 of compulsory jurisdiction. But this is not an effective argument, 
 for even if the court could be so described, the question would re¬ 
 main ; why should we not have the great advantage of this improve¬ 
 ment in the judicial mechanism? This brings us back to the ques¬ 
 tion whether or not we desire a permanent court with the continuous 
 service of judges with appropriate judicial standards instead of 
 temporary arbitral tribunals—a question to the affirmative answer of 
 which we have long been committed. 
 
 (5) Further, it is objected that no provision is made for the en¬ 
 forcement of the decisions of the court. There are those who desire 
 to see an international armed force to compel the carrying out of de¬ 
 cisions. Those who make this demand generally assume that there 
 will be substantial unity among those furnishing the armed force so 
 that it can be used. But when there is such international unity the 
 power of public opinion is at its maximum and there is the least 
 
15 
 
 i i 
 
 need for force, while in the absence of such unity the armed force is 
 likely to remain unused. 
 
 The truth is that the decisions of the court will have the most solemn 
 sanction that it is practicable to obtain. When nations agree to sub¬ 
 mit a dispute to a tribunal and to abide by the decision, its observance 
 is a point of international honor of the highest sort. You can 
 really have no better sanction than this and the obligation is one 
 which will be all the more keenly felt when the decision is not simply 
 that of a temporary arbitral tribunal but of a permanent court 
 supported by practically all the nations of the world. If you desire 
 to improve the authority of judicial determinations of international 
 disputes, you can best effect this object by improving the reputation 
 for impartiality, and for disinterested judicial consideration, of 
 the tribunal that decides them. 
 
 (6) An objection of a different character is that the United States 
 should unconditionally support the court, and therefore, apparently, 
 that the suggested conditions should be withdrawn. This objection 
 simply means that the United States should enter the League of 
 Nations, as the objection assumes, in accordance with the fact, that 
 the proposed support of the court does not involve entry into the 
 league. But why, in supporting an institution which embodies a 
 cherished ideal of the American people, should we revive the con¬ 
 troversy over the league? Why should we not support the court as 
 a judicial body? In giving this support, however, it is important 
 that we should reserve the right to participate in the election of 
 judges, that we should protect ourselves against amendment of the 
 statute without our consent, and that we should provide for the de¬ 
 termination by Congress of the amount to be paid as our share of 
 the expenses. The stipulated conditions are appropriate to the 
 purpose. 
 
 (7) Another objection is that the British Empire has six votes 
 in the assembly of the league in the election of judges, because the 
 Dominions and other constituent parts of the Empire are members 
 of the assembly. It must be remembered, however, that there are 
 52 votes in the assembly. The admission to membership of these 
 parts of the British Empire has been a recognition of the aspiration 
 of the peoples composing them, and this has not been found an in¬ 
 superable obstacle to the support of the court by other Powers. And 
 it would be difficult to find a sound reason for objection on the part 
 of the United States to this increase on natural grounds in the voting 
 strength of the peoples who have been developed under the influence 
 of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. 
 
 Moreover, under the proposed condition the United States will 
 not only participate in the election by the assembly, but also in the 
 
16 
 
 election by the council, and in the council the British Empire has 
 but one vote. We are far better protected by this arrangement than 
 by one which would have all States vote together on exactly the same 
 footing and where the smallest nation would cast the same vote 
 as the United States. The arrangement for our participation in 
 the voting for the judges by the council is really a stronger protec¬ 
 tion to the interests of the United States than has hitherto been 
 suggested in any plan for a permanent court. The question should 
 also be considered in the light of the nature of the action that is 
 involved. It is practically impossible, under the scheme that has 
 been adopted, for the British Empire, or for any combination, to 
 secure an election of judges in aid of a particular political interest. 
 Such an effort would die stillborn, because of the necessity for a 
 concurrent choice by both groups of nations in the manner that has 
 been devised. 
 
 Finally, it is hardly necessary to say that I am in entire sympathy 
 with efforts to codify international law and to provide conventions 
 for its improvement. I believe in conferences for that purpose. We 
 have already made some progress in this direction through the recent 
 Commission of Jurists which sat at The Hague to suggest modifica¬ 
 tions in the laws of war which are made necessary by new agencies 
 of warfare—a commission established under a resolution adopted at 
 the Conference on Limitation of Armament. However, the process 
 of codifying, clarifying, and improving international law is neces¬ 
 sarily a slow one, and if we wait for a satisfactory body of law before 
 we have a permanent court a generation will pass before it is estab¬ 
 lished. Meanwhile let us supply appropriate means for the applica¬ 
 tion of the law we have. The two projects are not inconsistent; the 
 one can exist along with the other. 
 
 But we have an acute world need. We shall make no progress 
 toward the prevention of war if we adopt a perfectionist policy. 
 Whatever else we should have, we need at once a permanent court 
 of international justice. No plan to promote peace can dispense with 
 it. Why should we wait for the solution of difficult problems of 
 policy and the settlement of the most acute international controver¬ 
 sies of a political nature before we meet the obvious necessity of pro¬ 
 viding for the appropriate disposition of those controversies with 
 which an international court is competent to deal? 
 
 Any successful effort to settle controversies aids in the cultiva¬ 
 tion of good will and the desire for the adjustments of amity. The 
 support of a permanent court as an institution of peace will be a 
 powerful influence in the development of the will to peace. I hope 
 that the United States, in deference to its own interests and in 
 justice to its ideals, will do its part. 
 
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