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THE HISTORY 
 
 OF THE REIGN 
 
 PHILIP THE SECOND, 
 
 KING OF SPAIN. 
 

 
 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 with funding from 
 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates 
 
 https://archive.org/details/historyofreignofOOwats 
 
THE HISTORY 
 
 OF THE REIGN 
 
 OF 
 
 PHILIP THE SECOND, 
 
 KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 BY ROBERT WATSON, LL.D., 
 
 PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITED COLLEGE OF ST. SALVATOR AND ST. LEONARDS, IN THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS. 
 
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LONDON : 
 
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THE HISTORY 
 
 St 
 
 
 0 
 
 OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 PHILIP THE SECOND, 
 
 Btng of £>pam. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 Philip II., King of Spain, son of the Emperor Charles V. and 
 Birth and of Isabella, daughter of Emanuel the Great, King of 
 education Portugal, was born at Valladolid on the twenty-first of 
 of Philip. May^ one thousand five hundred and twenty-seven. He 
 was educated in Spain under Ecclesiastics, noted for their 
 bigotry, who were appointed by his father to instruct him ; and, 
 by this circumstance, several of those features in his character 
 were either formed, or greatly heightened, which w T ere after- 
 wards so conspicuous in his conduct. 
 
 Charles, who was born in the Netherlands, and passed his 
 early youth there, had, through his whole reign, entertained 
 such a manifest partiality for that country, as was the source of 
 much dissatisfaction to his Spanish subjects. But they were 
 soothed by the preference which they received from the young 
 prince, and flattered themselves with hopes, which were not 
 frustrated, of obtaining, under his administration, that share of 
 the royal favour, which the Flemings had enjoyed under the 
 Emperor a . 
 
 Philip early displayed sagacity, prudence, and application : 
 His cha- and discovered likewise a disposition wonderfully suited 
 racter. t Q the re ligious instructions which he received. His 
 mind, being naturally serious and thoughtful, gave a ready 
 admittance to all the sentiments of that illiberal superstition, 
 which formed, at that time, the distinguishing character of the 
 Spanish Ecclesiastics. 
 
 At the age of sixteen, he espoused Mary, a princess of 
 His first Portugal ; who died in less than two years after her 
 mamage. marriage, in child-bed ; when she was delivered of Don 
 Carlos, whose unhappy fate will be related in the sequel. 
 
 8 HaraeiiF, Annales Belgii, &e., p. 570. Cabrera, Vida del Filippe II., lib. i. c. 1 . 
 
2 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 Philip continued to reside in Spain, and was intrusted with 
 the administration of the kingdom, till the year one thousand 
 five hundred and forty-eight. At that time, he was called by 
 He jg his father into the Low Countries ; where he arrived, 
 culled by the beginning of the following year, with a numerous 
 his father to retinue of Spanish nobles. Upon his entrance into 
 knd? Cther Brussels, 88 was ever desirous to maintain the 
 appearance of extraordinary piety, he went first to the 
 cathedral church, to render thanks to the Almighty for his 
 preservation ; and then proceeded to the palace. After passing 
 some days there with the Emperor, who, in all his behaviour, 
 discovered that fond affection, which is natural to a person in 
 the decline of life towards an only son, he set out to visit the 
 principal cities in the Low Countries, accompanied by the 
 Regent, his aunt, the Queen Dowager of Hungary b . 
 
 Nothing could exceed the pomp with which he was every- 
 Hisrecep. where received. In presents, entertainments, illumina- 
 tion there. tions, and tournaments, immense sums were expended. 
 The cities vied with each other in displaying that magnificence 
 which their industry had enabled them to attain ; and the people 
 gave everywhere the strongest demonstrations of their attach- 
 ment 0 . 
 
 But Philip, in the midst of those scenes of festivity which 
 His unpo- were exhibited for his amusement, and which were so 
 polar man- well calculated to gratify a young ambitious mind, could 
 ners * not conceal the natural austerity of his temper. The 
 Flemings observed, with anxiety, that there was a striking 
 contrast between the father and the son. Charles was courteous 
 and affable ; but Philip, they perceived, was distant, haughty, 
 and severe. The former could speak with facility the principal 
 languages of Europe, and used to discourse familiarly with all 
 his subjects; the latter had declined learning to speak any other 
 but the Spanish tongue, conversed little with the inhabitants of 
 the Low Countries, and was almost inaccessible to all but the 
 Spanish nobles. He lived in every respect as he had been wont 
 to do in Spain, wore a Spanish dress, and refused to conform, in 
 anything, to the modes and customs of the Netherlands d . 
 
 This behaviour, equally ungracious and impolitic, made a deep 
 Their effect impression on the minds of the Flemings, and created 
 on the in them a jealousy of the Spaniards, which they did 
 
 Flemings. no t study to conceal. Charles having required the 
 States to swear allegiance to Philip, as they had formerly done 
 to himself, they rejected his request ; and refused to acknow- 
 ledge Philip’s right of succession, till he engaged to exclude all 
 foreigners from any share in the government of the provinces. 
 
 b Harsei Annales Duciirn Brabantiae, &c., tom. ii. p. 653. Antwerpiae, 1623. Ludj 
 Guicciardini, lib. ii. p. 127. * Meteren, p. 9. 
 
 d Bcntivoglio, Historia della Guerra de Fiandra, p. 5. In Parigi 1645. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1548.] 
 
 And even to this nothing would have made them agree, but 
 their respect for the Emperor, and the awe in which they stood 
 of his power; for, if the distemper, under which Charles laboured 
 at this time, had proved mortal, it was believed, they would 
 have excluded Philip from the sovereignty, and conferred it on 
 Maximilian, his cousin, son of Ferdinand, King of Hungary and 
 Bohemia e . 
 
 From the Low Countries the Emperor carried his son into 
 The Em- f* erman y> in order to facilitate the execution of a 
 peror’s scheme, which he had lately formed, of having him 
 scheme for elected King of the Romans. In the year one thou- 
 himtobe san( ^ ^ ve hundred and thirty, Charles had procured 
 elected that dignity for his brother Ferdinand ; but having 
 King of the now a son grown up to maturity, of whose talents 
 Romans. f or government he entertained the most favourable 
 opinion, lie repented of what he had done in behalf of his 
 brother; and resolved, in case he would not resign, to endeavour 
 to persuade the Electors to annul his election. 
 
 But Philip’s manners were not less disgusting in Germany, 
 Aversion of ^ an ^ ie y ^ ia( ^ b een i n the Netherlands; and served 
 the Ger- rather to alienate the affections of the Germans, than 
 mans to to conciliate their favour. His demeanour there was 
 scheme equally distant, reserved, and haughty. He suffered 
 even princes of the highest rank to remain uncovered 
 in his presence ; and in all his behaviour, affected a degree of 
 state and dignity which the Emperors themselves had never been 
 accustomed to assume. The Germans dreaded the dominion of 
 one whose behaviour, even when he was courting their favour, 
 was so cold and distant. They refused to listen to the Empe- 
 ror’s proposal ; and they were confirmed in their resolution of 
 rejecting it, partly by their remembrance of the calamities which 
 they had suffered from conferring the Imperial crown on Charles, 
 whose power had proved almost fatal to their liberty ; and partly 
 by their attachment to Ferdinand, joined with the affection which 
 they bore to Maximilian, whose character and manners were 
 entirely the reverse of those of Philip. 
 
 Charles was not of a temper to be easily diverted from his 
 designs ; and, being conscious of the great superiority which he 
 had lately acquired, from his triumph over the confederacy of 
 Smalkalde, he doubted not of being able to compel the Electors 
 to make choice of his son, provided he could prevail on Ferdinand 
 to resign. To effectuate this, he applied himself with all that 
 earnestness and ardour which he commonly discovered in the 
 prosecution of his schemes. Nothing but the intoxication of 
 prosperity could have inspired a prince of so great sagacity as 
 Charles, with the hopes of succeeding in so chimerical an 
 attempt. Ferdinand himself was in the full vigour of life ; and, 
 
 Memoires de Ribier, tom. ii. p. 219, a Paris, 166G. 
 B 2 
 
4 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book I. 
 
 considering the declining state of his brother's health, his prospect 
 of the imperial dignity was not distant : his son had been educa- 
 ted with the view of attaining the same exalted station after his 
 father's death ; and, from the great popularity of his character, 
 he had just ground to entertain the most sanguine expectations 
 of success. Charles might easily have perceived, that no argu- 
 ments which he could employ, would persuade either the father 
 or the son to forego a prospect so alluring. Accordingly, although 
 he had, on all former occasions, found his brother’s behaviour 
 towards him respectful and complying ; and, to give greater 
 weight to his present application, made use of the powerful inter- 
 cession of his sister the Queen Dowager of Hungary, to whom 
 his brother was indebted for the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia; 
 yet Ferdinand withstood all his sister’s entreaties, and rejected 
 all the offers of compensation which were made to him. Charles 
 had given his daughter in marriage to Maximilian, and entrusted 
 him with the government of Spain, during Philip’s absence, in 
 order to sooth him under the disappointment which he was pre- 
 paring for him, and to remove him to a distance from Germany, 
 when his fathers affection was about to be put to the trial. This 
 young prince was greatly alarmed when he heard of the design 
 which was carrying on against him ; and having left Spain, and 
 returned to Germany, he omitted nothing in his power, to confirm 
 his father's purpose, and to render it unalterable. Charles saw 
 at last the necessity of dropping, for the present, the prosecution 
 of his scheme : and Philip left Germany, much dissatisfied with 
 the Electors, and other German Princes, but with none more 
 than with his kinsmen f . 
 
 From Germany he returned to Spain, where he held the 
 Philip regency of the kingdom, and acquitted himself of his 
 returns to charge in such a manner as led his subjects to form a 
 Spain. favourable opinion of his prudence, his industry, and his 
 capacity for government. But the cotemporary historians have 
 mentioned no particulars of his conduct during this period that 
 deserve to be recorded. He remained in Spain till his marriage 
 with the Queen of England, in the year one thousand five hundred 
 and fifty-four. 
 
 No sooner was Mary, daughter of Henry VIII., seated on the 
 His mar throne, than Charles, whose ruling passion, towards the 
 riage with close of his reign, was to aggrandise his son, conceived 
 the queen the design of uniting England to his other dominions, 
 of England, ^he maiT iage of Philip with the queen. Had Philip 
 declined this match, it was believed, that Charles would have 
 offered himself to Mary, rather than have lost so inviting an 
 opportunity of augmenting his power. But the son was not less 
 
 f Lud. Guicciardin. lib. ii. p. 128. Pallavicini Istoria di Concilio di Trento, lib. xi. c. 15. 
 Thuanus, lib. vii. ab initio. Extrait des Lettres de Marillac au Rov de Franco en Ribier. 
 July 22, 1550. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 5 
 
 1548.] 
 
 governed by ambition than the father ; and readily consented, at 
 the age of twenty-six, to marry a princess of thirty-seven, dis- 
 agreeable in her temper and manners, homely in her person, and 
 entirely destitute of every female charm g . 
 
 When Charles found that Philip was not averse to the 
 marriage, he immediately dispatched a messenger to the court of 
 London to propose it ; and Mary hesitated not a moment in 
 declaring her consent. Philip’s bigotry, which rendered him 
 unamiable in the eyes of others, recommended him to her. 
 She was ever strongly attached to her mother’s family ; and 
 she considered how much so powerful an alliance would enable 
 her to execute her favourite scheme of extirpating heresy from 
 her dominions. 
 
 Mary’s subjects had not the same reasons with their sovereign 
 Objections ma ke them fond of this alliance. They had beheld, 
 of the for more than thirty years, that restless ambition with 
 English which the emperor was actuated ; and they now received 
 against it. a s t r iking proof of Philip’s inordinate thirst after power, 
 by his agreeing so readily to the intended marriage, to which 
 there was nothing but motives of ambition that could allure him. 
 They were all well acquainted with his private character, and 
 the prejudices which his haughty demeanour had, a few years 
 before, created against him in Germany and the Netherlands. 
 They dreaded the consequences of having their queen, whose 
 temper was naturally rigid and severe, united to a prince of so 
 imperious a character. They trembled at the thoughts of the 
 danger to which their liberty and independence would be ex- 
 posed ; and they were filled with the most disquieting appre- 
 hensions of falling under the dominion of the Spaniards ; a 
 nation noted for their violent use of power in the Netherlands 
 and Italy, infamous for the barbarities which they had exer- 
 cised over the natives of America, and distinguished, above 
 all other nations, for their bigoted attachment to the church 
 of Rome h . 
 
 To quiet these alarms, Charles had recourse to different 
 Charles expedients. He prevailed on Mary to suspend her 
 labours to persecution of the Protestants ; and to resume the title 
 remove of Supreme Head of the Church, which she had laid aside 
 
 them. gome months before. He sent over immense sums of 
 money to be distributed among the members of parliament ; and 
 he ordered the marriage -articles to be drawn in terms the most 
 honourable and advantageous to Mary and her subjects. 
 
 By these articles it was provided, that Philip should have 
 only the name of King, while the sovereign power should remain 
 entire in the hands of Mary; that no foreigner should be 
 admitted into any public employment ; no innovation made in 
 
 e Ribier, tom. ii. p. 457. 
 
 h Burnet's Ref. part ii. p. 428 ; and Carte, vol. ii. p. 297. 
 
6 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book I. 
 
 the laws and customs, and no violation offered to the rights 
 or privileges of the nation ; that England should not, in conse- 
 quence of the marriage, be involved in any war between France 
 and Spain; that the heirs of the marriage should not only 
 inherit the Netherlands and England, but, in the event of Don 
 Carlos’s dying without issue, should succeed to the crown of 
 Spain, and to the rest of Philip’s hereditary dominions; and 
 that if the queen should die without issue, Philip should have no 
 claim to any share in the government of England, but the crown 
 of that kingdom should devolve immediately to the lawful 
 heir 1 . 
 
 These concessions were not altogether without effect. They 
 His success n °f ^ nc ^ ee( ^ entirely dispel the apprehensions that 
 were entertained ; and many persons thought that the 
 more advantageous the conditions offered were, there was so 
 much the greater reason for suspecting that Charles and his son 
 had no serious intention to fulfil them. But they furnished the 
 courtiers, and other partizans of the Spanish match, with specious 
 arguments in its defence ; and deprived those who still remained 
 averse to it, of any plausible pretext under which they might have 
 procured an association against it. This was attempted by Sir 
 Thomas Wiat and others, who succeeded so far, as to persuade 
 several hundreds of the people to take up arms ; but this incon- 
 siderable and ill-concerted insurrection was quickly suppressed, 
 and served only to confirm that power of the Queen to dispose of 
 herself in marriage, which the malcontents intended to have 
 controlled k . 
 
 Every obstacle being removed, and the articles of marriage 
 ratified by parliament, Mary now employed herself in preparing 
 for the reception of her future husband ; for whom, although she 
 had never seen him, she had conceived so violent a passion, as 
 filled her mind with the most anxious impatience for liis arrival. 
 She was, at the same time, extremely mortified with his coldness 
 towards her ; and complained, that, although she had so readily 
 consented to bestow upon him both her kingdom and herself, he 
 had never vouchsafed to write her a letter on the subject, or to 
 satisfy her as to the causes of his delay in coming to England. 
 At length he sent the Marquis De las Navas to inform her, that 
 everything was in readiness for his leaving Spain. But before 
 his departure, the Spanish historians relate, that, having visited 
 the shrine of St. Jago in Galicia, he there heard mass with much 
 devotion ; kneeling on the ground, without allowing the monks 
 to furnish him with a cushion ; and recommending himself to the 
 protection of the patron saint 1 . 
 
 He set sail from Corunna, in the beginning of July, one thou- 
 
 * Burnet’s Hist, of the Ref., p. ii. b. ii. p. 260. Carte, b. xvii. 
 k Bnvnct, p. 262. Carte. 
 
 1 Carte, b. xvii. p. 312. Cabrera, lib. i. c. 4. 
 
1554.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 7 
 
 Philip’s sand five hundred and fifty-four, and arrived at South- 
 arrival in ampton, after a prosperous voyage, on the 1 9th or 20th 
 England. G f the same month. In a few days after his arrival, the 
 marriage ceremony was performed at Winchester ; where Philip 
 received, from the Emperor’s ambassador, the investiture of 
 Naples, Sicily, and Milan, together with the titular kingdom of 
 Jerusalem ; all which Charles resigned to him on this occasion, 
 as a testimony of the joy and satisfaction which the marriage 
 afforded him, and in order to render his son a husband more 
 worthy of his royal spouse m . 
 
 Having brought with him a numerous train of Spanish nobility, 
 His bcha- Philip studied to dazzle the eyes of the English by the 
 viour and pomp and splendour of his public appearances, and to 
 manners. g a j n their affections by his liberality. But he could not, 
 with all his endeavours, hide the blemishes of his character. His 
 natural reserve and haughtiness still appeared in all his demean- 
 our. He was too much a Spaniard to relish anything that was 
 not Spanish. He could, on no occasion, comply with the manners 
 of the English. He suffered even the chief nobility to remain in 
 his presence without taking any notice of them ; allowed no 
 person to approach him without having previously obtained per- 
 mission ; and thus made himself difficult of access, even to those 
 whose favour he wished to conciliate or secure 11 . 
 
 It soon appeared, how little he was satisfied with that article 
 He dis- marriage-treaty, by which he was excluded from 
 
 covers his the government. At his desire, and in order to gain 
 ambitious his affections, which Mary regarded more than either 
 views. the interest of her people, or even her own importance 
 in the kingdom, she requested of the parliament to declare him 
 the presumptive heir of the crown, and to commit the adminis- 
 tration of the state into his hands. 
 
 Both houses had hitherto shown themselves extremely obse- 
 quious to her will ; but they saw now the necessity of putting an 
 end to their compliances. They easily perceived the spirit and 
 tendency of her demands, and considered them as an indubitable 
 proof of her determined purpose to gratify her husband’s ambi- 
 tion, without regard to the fatal consequences that might follow. 
 They rejected both her requests. Although they had consented 
 to Philip’s bearing the title of King, they would not agree to 
 the ceremony of his coronation ; and they obstinately refused to 
 assist the Emperor in the war which he was carrying on against 
 France 0 . 
 
 m Burnet’s Ref., p. ii. b. 2. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313. Summonte, Hist, di Napoli, libro 
 ono, p. 263. 
 
 n Burnet’s Hist, of the Ref. v. ii. p. 288. Carte, b. xvii. p. 313. “ His carriage,” says 
 
 Bishop Burnet, “ was such, that the acting him and his Spaniards was one of the great diver- 
 sions of Queen Elizabeth’s court.” 
 
 0 Carte, p. 315. 
 
8 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book T. 
 
 To overcome the prejudices, which, from this conduct of the 
 His artifice. P arliamen t> Philip perceived were entertained against 
 him, he resolved to curb his natural disposition, and to 
 assume the appearance of moderation. With this design, he 
 obtained from Mary the release of several persons of distinction, 
 whom she had thrown into prison, on suspicion of their dissatis- 
 faction to her government. . But there was no part of his conduct 
 better calculated to conciliate the favour of the English, than 
 his protection of the lady Elizabeth ; against whom Mary had 
 given such proofs of jealousy and resentment, as rendered the 
 nation extremely anxious with regard to the life of that princess. 
 It was unfortunate, however, for Philip, that the favour which 
 he showed towards Elizabeth admitted of an interpretation very 
 different from what he expected would have been put upon it. 
 Men were not inclined to ascribe to generosity, in a prince of his 
 interested character, an action to which he must have been 
 prompted by his political consideration, that if Elizabeth were 
 cut off, and Mary to die without issue, England would be inhe-* 
 rited by the Queen of Scots ; by whose marriage with the dau- 
 phin, both the crowns of Scotland and of England would be 
 united to that of France p . 
 
 Mary had, in order to ingratiate herself with the people, and 
 Persecution to advance the views of her husband, suspended her 
 of the Pro- persecution of the Reformers. But her zeal and 
 testants, bigotry were too violent to be long restrained; and 
 Philip was not inclined, either from principle or temper, to 
 oppose those sanguinary measures which she was now deter- 
 mined to pursue. Courts no less arbitrary than the Spanish 
 Inquisition were instituted : and the same barbarous punish- 
 ments, which that tribunal denounces, w 7 ere inflicted on great 
 numbers of persons, without distinction of either age or sex. No 
 person doubted that Mary was of herself sufficiently prone to 
 employ those dreadful severities which were exercised ; but as all 
 men knew how implicitly she was devoted to her husband’s will, 
 they could not help considering them as the consequence of either 
 his advice or his approbation q . Philip was sensible of the odium to 
 which he was exposed ; and, in order to remove or lessen it, he 
 had recourse to the ridiculous expedient of making his confessor, 
 a Franciscan Friar, deliver before him a sermon in favour of 
 toleration 1 '. But notwithstanding this artifice, which was too 
 
 p Burnet, vol. ii. brii. p. 287 ; Carte, p. 316 ; Camden's Apparatus. 
 
 Philip's historian, Cabrera, ascribes the persecutions to Philip as matter of praise, p. 28, 
 lib. i. c. 7. 
 
 r This sermon was delivered on the 10th of February ; yet on the 24th of May follow- 
 ing, Philip joined with Mary, upon occasion of Bonner's declining to take all the odium of 
 the persecution upon himself, in writing to that brutal prelate, requiring him to proceed in 
 the execution of the laws against heretics ; so as that through his good furtherance both 
 God’s glory may be the better advanced, and the commonwealth the more quietly governed. 
 Burpet’s Collection of Records, No. 20. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 9 
 
 1554.] 
 
 gross to impose upon any person, and though Philip seldom 
 appeared openly to act a part in the administration, the prepos- 
 sessions against him still remained. All his conduct was beheld 
 with an eye of watchful jealousy and distrust ; nor was it pos- 
 sible for Mary to obtain any higher concession from the par- 
 liament in his favour, than this, that if she should die, and 
 leave issue behind her, Philip should be protector during the 
 minority. 
 
 For several months, this concession was not deemed so insig- 
 Phiiip nificant as it afterwards proved. A belief prevailed 
 leaves Eng- throughout the kingdom, that Mary was with child, 
 land. and Philip and even Mary herself believed it s . Philip 
 remained in England while there was any reason to entertain 
 hopes of so desirable an event ; which might have realized that 
 power at which he had aspired ever since his arrival in that king- 
 dom. But when those appearances, which gave rise to the 
 belief of Mary’s pregnancy, were found to be nothing but the 
 approach of a dropsy ; when all prospect of her ever having 
 children was annihilated, and her anxiety for offspring, joined 
 with her natural sourness and jealousy, had preyed upon her 
 health, and rendered her person, as well as her conversation, 
 disagreeable ; Philip left England, after having staid in it four- 
 teen months, and passed over to the Netherlands 1 . 
 
 There the Emperor was preparing to execute a resolution 
 The Em e he had formed of resigning his dominions, in 
 
 vor’s resig- order to pass the remainder of his life in retirement, 
 nation of his At the time of Philip’s marriage with the Queen of 
 dominions. England, he had ceded to him the kingdom of Naples, 
 and the duchy of Milan ; and had little reason to be satisfied 
 with his son’s behaviour towards him, after giving so strong a 
 proof of his paternal affection and munificence. Philip, besides 
 refusing to come over to Flanders, where Charles was desirous 
 of seeing him, unless he were invested with some authority in 
 that country, during his abode in it, insisted, that the grant of 
 the Italian states should be absolute and unconditional ; and no 
 sooner had he entered upon the possession of them, than he dis- 
 placed his father’s ministers, in order to make room for creatures 
 of his own. This undutiful behaviour did not deter the emperor 
 from resolving to resign to his son all the rest of his dominions. 
 On the contrary, it appears to have been his principal motive in 
 forming this resolution ; as it gave him a clear discovery of 
 Philip’s imperious temper, and showed that he had now reduced 
 
 8 On the 30th of April, a report was spread that she was actually delivered of a son. 
 All the bells in London were set a-ringing. Bonfires were lighted up in every corner of 
 the city. A Te Deum was sung in the cathedral of St. Paul ; and a priest indulged his 
 credulity to such a height as to describe, with great particularity, the proportions and features 
 of the young prince, whom he represented as the healthiest and most beautiful that had 
 ever been seen. Carte, p. 317. 
 
 * Ilaraeus, Carte, p. 317 ; Burnet, part ii. b. ii. p. 312. 
 
10 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book I. 
 
 himself to the disagreeable alternative, of either contending with 
 him, or of yielding to him u . 
 
 Had Charles enjoyed the same vigour, either of body or of 
 mind, which he possessed some years before, it is probable that 
 Philip’s behaviour would have operated upon him very differ- 
 ently, and have determined him to abridge, rather than to 
 augment, his son’s power. But finding himself worn out, partly 
 by the excruciating pain which he had long suffered from fre- 
 quent returns of the gout, and partly by his incessant activity, 
 and continual application to business, he perceived that he must, 
 for the future, either trust to his ministers, which he had hitherto 
 avoided, or sink ere long under the weight of the government of 
 so many states as were subject to his dominions. It was there- 
 fore become necessary for him to disengage himself from, at 
 least, a part of those cares which oppressed him. If Philip’s 
 ambition had been more moderate, or his temper of mind more 
 complying, Charles might have invested him with the chief 
 branches of administration, and have still retained the supreme 
 authority ; or, after resigning to him the sovereignty of a part 
 of his dominions, he might have reserved the remainder in his 
 own hands ; but he foresaw that Philip’s temper would, in either 
 of these cases, have proved the source of continual uneasiness to 
 him ; and this he could not with dignity avoid by any other 
 means than by retiring from the world, and making an absolute 
 cession of his whole dominions x . 
 
 Determined by these motives, he resigned the sovereignty of 
 the Low Countries in October, 1555, and that of Spain in the 
 month of January immediately following. But he retained pos- 
 session of his imperial crown for several months longer, till he 
 had made another fruitless attempt to persuade his brother to 
 relinquish his claim to the empire, in behalf of Philip. Charles 
 was retiring from the world under a conviction of the vanity of 
 human greatness ; yet he was as solicitous to secure an accession 
 of that greatness to his son, as if he had believed that it consti- 
 tuted the supreme felicity of man. His own experience had 
 furnished him with the strongest proof, that dominions so widely 
 extended conferred the appearance of power more than the sub- 
 stance or reality ; that they are the source of continual and 
 distracting anxiety ; that they engage the possessor in enter- 
 prises beyond his strength, and that the right government of 
 them is a task above the capacity of any individual : yet he 
 desired nothing so much as to load his son with that burden, 
 which he himself had found intolerable, and under which he had 
 sunk long before the period when old age obliges men to quit the 
 scenes of active life. Charles had long fostered that preposterous 
 ambition of princes, which prompts them to the pursuit of power, 
 
 u L’Evcsquc, p. 24, 25; Summontc, lib. ix. p. 26;3. x Ribicr, p. 485. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 11 
 
 1.555.] 
 
 without regard to the great end for which alone it is desirable — 
 the happiness of their subjects : and it was become impossible for 
 him entirely to divest himself of this passion, although he was 
 determined never more to indulge it. 
 
 It is much easier to enter into the motives from which he 
 The truce of acted, with respect to another part of his conduct at 
 Vsiuceiics. this time. Previously to his abdication, he had been 
 exceedingly desirous to have peace established with France, in 
 order to give his son leisure to recover his dominions from that 
 exhausted state to which his own continual wars, together with 
 the sums transmitted to England, had reduced them. In this, 
 however, all his attempts had hitherto failed. But having been 
 detained in the Low Countries by sickness and the severity of 
 the season, much longer than he intended, he had the satisfac- 
 tion, before his departure, to employ his endeavours successfully 
 in effectuating the truce of Vaucelles : and, before the expira- 
 tion of that truce, there was ground to hope that the several 
 points of difference between his son and the French monarch 
 would be amicably adjusted. Soon after this, he set out for his 
 retreat in Spain ; where, having buried in the solitude of a con- 
 vent all his schemes of glory and ambition, he seldom inquired, 
 or even suffered his domestics to inform him, concerning what 
 was passing in the world y . 
 
 y Gianone, tom. iv. p. 198, 
 
12 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 Notwithstanding Charles was disappointed in his scheme of 
 Philip’s transmitting the empire to his son, Philip was still the 
 power and most powerful monarch of the age. In Europe, besides 
 dominions, un [ted kingdoms of Castile, Arragon, and Navarre, 
 he possessed the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, the Duchy of 
 Milan, Franche-Compte, and the Netherlands ; in Africa, Tunis, 
 Oran, the Cape-Verd, and the Canary Islands; in Asia, the 
 Philippine and Sunda Islands, and a part of the Moluccas ; and 
 in America, the empires of Peru and Mexico, New Spain and 
 Chili, besides Hispaniola, Cuba, and many other of the American 
 islands. The mines of Mexico, Chili, and Potosi, were, at the 
 time of Philip's accession, a source of greater wealth than almost 
 all the other princes in Europe were possessed of a . His fleet 
 was much more numerous than that of any other European 
 power. His troops were better disciplined, and more accus- 
 tomed to war and victory ; and they were commanded by the 
 ablest and most experienced generals of the age. 
 
 Such extensive power, and such copious resources, could not 
 but appear extremely formidable to the other European states ; 
 especially when they reflected upon the dark, imperious cha- 
 racter of the prince to whom they belonged. For although 
 Philip had neither his father’s valour, nor his enterprising 
 activity, yet he was plodding, industrious, and penetrating. He 
 had already shown that his ambition was not less ardent than 
 that of the Emperor; and it was the more to be dreaded, as it 
 was concealed under the cloak of fervent zeal for the interests of 
 religion. 
 
 But how much soever Philip's power and character were fitted 
 State of to excite jealousy in the neighbouring states, there were 
 Europe. few of them, at that period, in a condition to counter- 
 act his designs. The English had, since Mary’s accession, lost much 
 
 of that importance in Europe which they had enjoyed 
 Of England. f or a ce ntury before. Commerce was either ne- 
 
 glected or oppressed ; their troops were undisciplined, and disused 
 to war ; and their navy was in the most languishing condition. 
 During Philip’s residence among them, they had given proof of 
 their native spirit of independence, by refusing to admit him to 
 any share of the administration ; but they had, in everything 
 else, shown themselves tamely submissive to the will of their 
 
 * They brought him 25,000,000 of guilders yearly. Metercn. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 13 
 
 1555.] I 
 
 weak bigoted Queen ; and there was ground to apprehend, that, 
 instead of opposing, they would be compelled by her to assist 
 him in the execution of any violent or hostile plan which his 
 ambition or bigotry might prompt him to pursue. 
 
 He had no greater reason to expect opposition from Germany 
 Of Ger- than from England. For whatever disgust his compe- 
 many. tition with Ferdinand for the imperial crown might have 
 created, there was no probability that it would ever occasion any 
 violent dissension, or open rupture between them. Ferdinand 
 was not yet fully settled in the possession of Hungary. He was 
 disquieted with apprehensions that the Sultan would ere long 
 renew hostilities against him in that kingdom ; and, in order to 
 provide against this event, and secure to himself that support, of 
 which, in case it should happen, he would stand in need, he 
 laboured assiduously to establish concord among the several 
 princes of the Germanic body, and to compose the animosities 
 which the differences in religion had produced. 
 
 Portugal had, at this time, reached the summit of its prospe- 
 OfPortu- rity and glory. Those discoveries and conquests in the 
 gal. most distant regions of the globe, which had advanced 
 that kingdom to a rank so much superior to what it held before, 
 were almost completed. But John the Third, under whose 
 government and auspices so great a number of discoveries and 
 conquests had been made, was now in the decline of life ; beloved 
 by his people ; respected by his neighbours ; and only solicitous 
 to maintain peace, and to render his subjects happy. 
 
 The thrones of Denmark and Sweden were filled by Christiern 
 Denmark the Third and Gustavus Yasa. Under the just and mild 
 and-Sweden. administration of the former monarch, Denmark was 
 beginning to recover from that exhausted state to which civil 
 dissensions, the calamities of foreign war, and the oppression of 
 an odious tyrant lately dethroned, had reduced it : while the 
 Swedes, who, under Gustavus, had thrown off the yoke of the 
 neighbouring kingdom, and bestowed their crown upon their 
 brave deliverer, were enjoying under him the sweets of liberty, 
 and laying the foundation of that greatness to which they after- 
 wards attained. Neither of these nations, however, was yet in 
 a condition to take a part in the affairs of the other European 
 powers ; and the patriotic princes who ruled over them, found 
 sufficient employment in establishing tranquillity within their 
 kingdoms. 
 
 In Italy, the dominions of the church, lately much diminished 
 Of the Pope’s by the grant which Paul the Third had made of the 
 dominions. Duchies of Parma and Placentia to Octavio Farnese, 
 his grandson, were shut up between the duchy of Milan on the 
 one hand, and the kingdom of Naples on the other. The sove- 
 reign pontiff, therefore, was more dependent on Philip than upon 
 any other prince, and was much more likely to find his interest 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 14 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 in courting that monarch's favour, than in promoting any scheme 
 of opposition to his designs. 
 
 Cosmo de Medici, duke of Tuscany, had been greatly indebted 
 Tuscany. to th e emperor for the sovereignty which he enjoyed; 
 
 and his dominions were ,by the Emperor's favour and his 
 own wise policy, become so considerable, that only the viceroy of 
 Naples, or the governor of Milan, could give him any just ground of 
 uneasiness. Both gratitude and interest seemed to call on that 
 political prince to attach himself to the king of Spain, and to 
 cultivate his friendship. 
 
 Octavio de Farnese, duke of Parma, had been deprived of the 
 Savoy, Par- duchy of Placentia by the emperor; and Philibert Ema- 
 ma, & Pia- nuel, duke of Savoy, had been stripped, in his father's 
 centia. lifetime, both of Savoy and Piedmont, by the French. 
 Without the favour of Philip, neither of these two princes had 
 any prospect of recovering his dominions. 
 
 The republic of V enice, formerly so powerful and ambitious, had, 
 
 . after the league of Cambray, discovered the folly of their 
 enlcc * ambition ; and they now adhered stedfastly to the cautious 
 maxim of maintaining a strict neutrality in all the quarrels of 
 the European powers ; whose friendship, and especially that of 
 Philip, they were solicitous to secure, as the only means by which 
 the invasions of their formidable enemy, the Turkish sultan, 
 could be repelled. 
 
 From this view of the European states at the time of Philip’s 
 Of France access * on » it is evident there was no other counterpoise 
 * in Christendom to his power, but France : which was not 
 indeed of so great extent as Philip's dominions, but possessed such 
 advantages in its situation, in its people, and in its government, 
 as made it at least the second kingdom in Europe, and qualified 
 it to serve as a bulwark of the general liberty against the power 
 of Spain. Although the frontier of this mighty monarchy did not 
 reach so far as it does at present, yet it extended from the 
 British channel to the Mediterranean and Italy, and from the 
 Pyrenees to Germany and the Netherlands ; and, through all that 
 space, was unmixed with the territories of any other state ; lying 
 between Philip’s dominions in Spain or Italy, and the Nether- 
 lands ; and in the time of war, rendering it difficult for his troops 
 in one of these countries, to co-operate with those in the other. 
 
 During the reigns of several princes, the French nation had 
 Character been accustomed almost perpetually to the use of arms, 
 of the and had never become sufficiently acquainted either with 
 French, the arts, or with the sweets of peace, to be averse to 
 war. The spirit of chivalry, the heroic valour, romantic love 
 of military fame, which, whilst the feudal government subsisted, 
 proved the source of so many calamities to the kingdom, still 
 animated in a high degree the French nobility; but having taken 
 a different direction, instead of engaging them in hostilities 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 15 
 
 1555 .] 
 
 against one another, it inflamed them with the laudable ambition 
 of courting toil and danger in support of the glory of the nation 
 and the crown. 
 
 Henry the Second, who governed this warlike people, had 
 H ^ H already shown himself possessed of no inconsiderable 
 eniy * share of that ardent and ambitious spirit by which his 
 father was so eminently distinguished. He had not indeed the bold 
 military genius of Francis ; but this defect in his character was 
 abundantly supplied by his generals : among whom were the 
 Mareschal de Brisac, the conqueror of Piedmont ; the Constable 
 Montmorency, so much celebrated for his heroic valour; and 
 Francis of Lorrain, duke of Guise, who had lately acquired 
 immortal honour by his defence of Metz against the Emperor. 
 
 Henry was formidable, from his connexions with foreign powers, 
 His allies as we ^ as on account of liis internal resources. The Queen 
 of Scots having been educated at his court, and betrothed 
 to his eldest son, her kingdom was likely to become a province of 
 France. And, in imitation of his father, he had courted assidu- 
 ously the friendship of the Swiss, and entered into a strict alliance 
 with the Sultan ; as from the former he might, in case of a rupture 
 with Spain, receive assistance by land, and from the latter by sea, 
 on the coasts of Spain and Italy. 
 
 It appeared, almost from the beginning of Henry’s reign, that 
 he had thoroughly imbibed his father’s passions, his ambition to 
 recover possession of those Italian dominions which had occa- 
 sioned so many bloody wars, and his jealousy of the Spanish or 
 Austrian power and greatness. 
 
 Prompted by these passions, he had, in the year one thousand 
 five hundred and fifty-one, taken Octavio Farnese, duke of 
 Parma, under his protection, in opposition both to the Pope 
 and to the Emperor. And he had entered into a league against 
 Charles, with the Protestant princes in Germany, than which, 
 he could not have given a stronger demonstration of his jealousy 
 of the Emperor ; since the principal end of this alliance was, to 
 save from ruin, in Germany, that religion, the professors of 
 which he had persecuted in France with unrelenting rigour. 
 The war, which was the consequence of this alliance, continued 
 with various success, till a stop was put to it for a few months 
 by the truce of Vaucelles above mentioned. By this truce the 
 contending parties were to retain possession of their conquests 
 for five years, unless their respective claims were adjusted before 
 the expiration of that term. This was the principal article ; 
 and, in virtue of it, not only Metz, and Toul, and Verdun, which 
 rendered France secure on the German frontier, but almost the 
 whole of Savoy and Piedmont (the restoration of which the 
 Emperor was in honour bound to procure to the duke of Savoy) 
 were to remain in the hands of the French. Charles would 
 never have consented to this condition, which he had rejected 
 
16 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 when it was proposed in the preceding year, had he not thought 
 it necessary that his son should enjoy some years of peace. 
 Henry, on the other hand, had the highest reason to be satis- 
 fied ; yet it was by him the truce was violated. Into this 
 measure, of which he had much reason afterwards to repent, 
 he was drawn, partly by that hereditary ambition, which had 
 impelled so many of his predecessors to attempt to gain a 
 footing in Italy, and partly by the interested counsels of the 
 family of Guise ; but chiefly by the solicitations and importunity 
 of the sovereign pontiff. 
 
 Paul the Fourth, one of the most singular characters of the 
 age, and whose conduct furnished, at this time, a striking 
 contrast to that of the Emperor, had been lately advanced to 
 the papacy ; after having passed the greatest part of his life 
 either in the study of the learned languages and scholastic 
 theology, or in the austerities of a cloister. Born of the family 
 of Caraffa in the kingdom of Naples, he had in his youth 
 enjoyed several rich preferments, and been employed as a 
 nuncio in Naples, in Spain, and in England. But having grown 
 tired of this public life, he had relinquished the paths of ambi- 
 tion ; resigned his benefices ; instituted an order of monks, and 
 lived, for several years, in strict conformity to the rigid rules 
 which he prescribed them. Paul the Third with difficulty 
 persuaded him to quit his retirement, and accept the dignity 
 of Cardinal: nor would he have been induced to comply with 
 the Pope’s request, by any other motive, but the hope of contri- 
 buting towards the extirpation of the Lutheran heresy; against 
 which he had ever shewn the most furious and bigoted zeal. 
 He was the oldest cardinal when Marcellus died ; and this 
 circumstance had served not a little to promote his election ; as 
 it flattered the other competitors with the prospect of seeing, ere 
 long, another vacancy in the papal chair. 
 
 But his advanced age had given him neither moderation nor 
 prudence, nor any useful acquaintance with the world. He 
 talked perpetually of the power belonging to the successor of 
 St. Peter, and of his superiority to princes, in terms that might 
 have been suffered in the dark ages of the church, but which, 
 from the revolution men’s sentiments had lately undergone, 
 appeared, even to his courtiers, ridiculous and extravagant. In 
 all his demeanour he discovered a degree of haughtiness, that 
 astonished those who observed it ; and he began his pontificate 
 at the age of seventy-nine, with an impetuosity and violence 
 seldom to be met with in the ardour of youth 
 
 He had long held a distinguished character for sanctity 
 His ne- of manners, and disinterested zeal for the honour of the 
 phews. Holy See ; but having now attained the highest dignity 
 
 b F. Paul, lib. v. Onuphrii Panvinni vita Pauli IV. Thuani, lib. xv. c. 12. Bur- 
 net’s Hist, of the Ref., part ii. b. ii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 17 
 
 1555.] 
 
 to which he could aspire, and having no longer any reason to 
 disguise his sentiments, he devoted himself, with a blind attach- 
 ment, to his nephews, and seemed to have no other aim, in tho 
 exercise of his pontifical power, than to advance their interests, 
 and assist them in the execution of their ambitious designs. 
 Unfortunately for the peace of Europe, their ambition could not 
 be satisfied with the dignities, which, as supreme pontiff, he 
 had the power of conferring ; although he bestowed on Count 
 Montorio, his eldest nephew, the dukedom of Palliano, of which 
 he had violently dispossessed Mark Antony Colonna ; on the 
 second the government of Rome, with the county of Bagno, and 
 the title of Marquis of Montebello ; and had made the youngest 
 a cardinal, and legate of Bologna. But these men aspired at 
 some sovereign or independent establishment, such as had been 
 procured by Leo and Clement, for the Medici ; and by Paul the 
 Third, for the family of Farnese. They saw no other means of 
 accomplishing their design, but by dispossessing the Emperor 
 and his son of their Italian dominions : and to attempt this, 
 both Paul and his nephews were incited by motives of resent- 
 ment, as well as interest. The younger Caraffa, formerly a 
 soldier, and one of the knights of Malta, though now a cardinal, 
 having, when he served in the Emperor's army in Germany, 
 challenged a Spanish officer to single combat, Charles had put 
 him under arrest ; and afterwards, w hen the Pope had conferred 
 on him the priory of St. Jerom in Naples, the Emperor's viceroy 
 had prevented him from entering on the possession of it c . 
 
 Paul himself, during his residence as nuncio in Spain, having 
 acquired the esteem of Ferdinand the Catholic, had been 
 admitted by him into the council of state, and had retained his 
 place there after the accession of Charles. But having on some 
 occasion spoken with too much freedom against the Emperor in 
 the consistory at Rome, Charles had testified his displeasure 
 with him, by ordering his name to be struck out of the list of 
 counsellors. Not satisfied with this, he had first opposed his 
 being admitted to the archbishopric of Naples, to which Paul 
 the Third had presented him ; and afterwards, though Charles 
 was persuaded by Julius the Third to consent to his investiture, 
 yet he had molested him in the exercise of his jurisdiction ; and 
 had exerted all his influence in the conclave to prevent his 
 advancement to the papal throne d . 
 
 These injuries made a deep impression on the proud and fiery 
 temper of the pontiff ; nor was he solicitous to conceal his indig- 
 nation. Even in the presence of the cardinals of the Imperial 
 party, he used to inveigh bitterly against the Emperor, and to 
 join menaces to his invectives ; and would sometimes add, that 
 
 c Pnllavieini, p. 60. Father Paul, lib. v. 
 
 J Smnmonte, lib. x. p. 260. Prllavieini, lib. xiii, c. xiv. 
 
 F. Paul, Hb. v. 
 
18 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 they might inform their master, if they pleased, of what he 
 said. 
 
 It is probable, however, that he would not have formed the 
 Their arti- resolution of having recourse to arms, had not his 
 fiees. nephews, and particularly the Cardinal, the most ambi- 
 tious and intriguing, employed various artifices to deceive him. 
 They gave him information of nocturnal assemblies held in 
 Rome, by the partisans of the Emperor, at which, measures 
 were concerted prejudicial to his authority ; they informed him 
 of a detection which they had made, of persons hired by the 
 Emperor, to poison, or assassinate both him and them ; and 
 they carried him intercepted letters writ in cypher, from which, 
 according to the Cardinal's interpretation, it appeared that some 
 secret machinations were in agitation against him among the 
 Imperial ministers. 
 
 By these and other means of the same nature, they at once 
 roused his fears, and inflamed his resentment ; and he at length 
 resolved, in conformity with their advice, to endeavour to engage 
 the French king, whose war with the Emperor still subsisted, to 
 enter into a treaty of alliance with him against the common 
 enemy. 
 
 Having, with this view, called such of his courtiers as he 
 Paul forms con fided i n » to a secret conference, at which he desired 
 an alliance the French ambassador, Avanson, to be present; he 
 with Henry informed them of the several plots against him and his 
 n * nephews, which had fortunately been detected, and 
 
 lamented that, notwithstanding it had pleased God to appoint 
 him to be the common father of Christians, yet his children, by 
 conspiring to accomplish his destruction, had reduced him to 
 the painful necessity of taking arms against them, in order to 
 maintain that sacred dignity with which he was invested. And 
 he concluded with saying, that his hopes of deliverance from 
 the dangers which threatened him and the church, were 
 founded principally on the power and zeal of his most Christian 
 Majesty. 
 
 Avanson replied to this discourse, by assuring him that the 
 king and kingdom of France would be ready to devote them- 
 selves to the defence of his sacred person, and the Apostolic 
 See ; and Paul dismissed the assembly, after observing that he 
 hoped ere long to see one of the king’s sons in possession of 
 Naples, and another, of the duchy of Milan. 
 
 Caraffa, the cardinal, impatient of delay, immediately set on 
 foot a treaty between his uncle and Avanson ; and having, with- 
 out much difficulty, brought it to a conclusion, he transmitted it 
 to the court of France e . 
 
 a From this treaty it is evident, that however solicitous Paul was to advance the ambi- 
 tious and interested views of his nephews, he was not entirely under their direction, nor 
 altogether regardless of the interest of the Holy See. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. xv. 
 
1555.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 19 
 
 The most important articles were these : That the King of 
 France should take upon himself the protection of the Pope, and 
 all the family of Caraffa : That the Pope should furnish an army 
 of ten thousand men ; and the King the same, or a greater 
 number, if necessary, to co-operate with the ecclesiastical forces, 
 in restoring liberty to Tuscany, and in expelling the Imperialists 
 and Spaniards from the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily; and 
 that, in case their arms should be attended with success, the 
 Pope should immediately grant the investiture of these kingdoms 
 to a younger son of the French monarch ; reserving for the 
 Ecclesiastical State, the city of Benevento, with its territory, 
 and an annual tribute of twenty thousand crowns ; besides an 
 independent establishment, in the kingdom of Naples, of twenty- 
 five thousand crowns, for the Count Montorio ; and another of 
 fifteen thousand for Antonio de Caraffa f . 
 
 This treaty met with such a reception at the court of France 
 as Avanson had given reason to expect. Henry was allured by 
 the prospect which it opened to him of acquiring those Italian 
 dominions, for which his predecessors had so often contended ; 
 and was of himself strongly inclined to comply w ith the Pope’s 
 proposals. The constable Montmorency, ever bold, and often rash 
 in action, but in counsel provident, circumspect, and cautious, 
 employed several cogent arguments to dissuade him ; and was 
 warmly seconded by the cardinal of Tournon. 
 
 They observed, that, as the Emperor was about to resign his 
 •dominions, it was highly probable, that either a peace, or a 
 truce with Spain, might soon be established ; they represented 
 how pernicious all those enterprises in Italy had been, which 
 Henry’s ancestors had undertaken, in circumstances much more 
 favourable than at the present period, when the nation was 
 exhausted by a long succession of expensive wars. And they 
 endeavoured to convince him of the imprudence of unnecessarily 
 prolonging war with a prince possessed of so many resources as 
 the Emperor, depending on the feeble aid of a pope, at the age 
 of eighty ; after whose death those very forces on which he now 
 relied, would probably be ranged on the side of the enemy. 
 
 Henry, who had been long accustomed to pay the highest 
 deference to the constable’s opinion, would have yielded to these 
 arguments, had they not been warmly opposed by the duke of 
 Guise, and his brother, the cardinal of Lorrain ; who flattered 
 the king’s ambition, and thereby obtained an easy victory on 
 this occasion over their rival. Whether there was ground for 
 the suspicions which w^ere entertained, that Guise had formed a 
 design on the kingdom of Naples, and the cardinal on the papal 
 throne, it is impossible to decide ; but, from the interested and 
 ambitious characters of these men, there is reason to believe. 
 
 lf Sunnuonte, lih. x. p. 278. 
 
 cS 
 
*0 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 that neither a regard to the welfare of France, nor the glory of 
 the King, determined them to offer the counsel which they gave. 
 They knew that the management of the war, and the conduct of 
 all the negotiations relative to it, would be put into their hands ; 
 and they hoped, if the event were prosperous, to enjoy, in Italy, 
 a more independent authority than they could expect to exer- 
 cise in France, where they must submit to perpetual control 
 from the presence of the King, or from their rivals in the 
 court. 
 
 “ So fair an opportunity said the cardinal, “ of recovering 
 those dominions in Italy, which the crown of Spain has usurped, 
 ought not to be neglected. It was from the sovereign pontiff, 
 that the French monarchs had originally received their title to 
 the Neapolitan kingdom ; and it would not be difficult for the 
 King to assert his claim, with the assistance of the present Pope, 
 whose family would, by their credit and influence, engage the 
 friends of France to stand forth in defence of a cause which 
 their ancestors had so strenuously supported. And with regard 
 to what had been said of peace with the Emperor, as the prospect 
 of it was extremely precarious, so it was not to be supposed, that 
 any benefit that would accrue from it, could be put in the balance 
 with that accession of glory, which the King and the French 
 nation would derive from the proposed alliance." 
 
 This specious but flimsy declamation produced the desired 
 effect on the improvident temper of the King. The cardinal of 
 Lorrain, agreeably to his expectations, was immediately ordered 
 to repair to Rome ; and the cardinal of Tournon, though ex- 
 tremely averse to the measure adopted, was required to accom- 
 pany him. Not long afterwards the treaty was concluded in 
 form, and both parties began secretly to prepare for putting it 
 in execution. 
 
 But Henry soon forgot the obligations which he had brought 
 Truce of himself under in this treaty ; and, in less than two 
 Vaucelies, months after it was signed, agreed to the truce of 
 Dec. 15, Vaucelies. The cardinal of Lorrain was at that time 
 in Italy ; and the Constable, taking advantage of his 
 absence, represented to the King in so strong a light the benefit 
 which would arise from the truce, as overcame the resolution of 
 that unsteady prince, and persuaded him to abandon those allur- 
 ing prospects with which he had been dazzled and deceived. 
 The Cardinal, after his last audience of the Pope, was about to 
 set out from Rome, in order to solicit the duke of Ferrara and 
 the republic of Venice to accede to the alliances ; when intelli- 
 gence was brought him from the court of France, that, in a 
 conference held at Vaucelies for an exchange of prisoners, a 
 truce, with the condition of leaving both parties in possession of 
 their conquests, had been proposed by the Imperialists. But 
 lie thought it so exceedingly improbable that either the Emperor, 
 
1555 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 *21 
 
 or Philip, would consent to this condition, that he still persisted 
 in his journey, and left his information with the cardinal of 
 Tournon, to be communicated to the Pope. It made no greater 
 impression on Paul, than on the cardinal of Lorrain. He endea- 
 voured to make Tournon believe, that such a truce would give 
 him pleasure ; but it was an event, he said, to be desired, rather 
 than to be hoped for, or expected. 
 
 Not many days after, he received certain intelligence from his 
 Conster- nuncio at the court of France, that this event, which 
 nation of he thought so exceedingly improbable, had taken place ; 
 Paul * that the truce was actually signed, and that Henry, as 
 well as the Emperor and his son, had sworn to observe it ; the 
 first at Blois, in the presence of the Count de Lalain, and the 
 two last before the Admiral de Coligni at Brussels. The news 
 of this transaction excited^in Paul and his nephews the most 
 alarming apprehensions. They were conscious of having given 
 the Emperor and Philip the justest ground of offence. They 
 could not suppose that their conduct had been entirely secret, 
 and they were now exposed to the resentment of enemies, by 
 whom they must be quickly overwhelmed g . 
 
 In order to elude that vengeance which they justly merited, 
 His dissi- Paul affected to rejoice, as became the father of the 
 m ulation. Christian church, at seeing an end put to the calamities 
 of war. Under this mask he concealed his intention for some 
 time ; and that he might conceal it still longer and more effectu- 
 ally, he sent two nuncios, a cardinal of the name of Rebiba, to 
 the Emperor and Philip ; and his nephew, cardinal Caraffa, to 
 the King of France. He gave the same public instructions to 
 both, and ordered them to make an offer to these princes of his 
 mediation for establishing a solid peace on the foundation of the 
 truce ; and to treat with them of the measures proper to be 
 taken for assembling a general council. But the real design of 
 Caraffa’s embassy was, to persuade Henry to fulfil the conditions 
 of that alliance with the Pope into which he had entered some 
 months before h . 
 
 Rebiba was purposely detained in Rome for several weeks ; 
 but Caraffa, having carried along with him mareschal Strozzi, a 
 kinsman of the Queen of France, proceeded in his journey to 
 Paris with the utmost expedition. He possessed, in an eminent 
 degree, the art and eloquence necessary for executing the diffi- 
 cult negotiation which he had undertaken. And it was not 
 without good reason that the Pontiff, when he reflected on his 
 nephew’s talents, still flattered himself with the hopes of success. 
 
 U pon his arrival at F ontainebleau, Caraffa found the courtiers 
 His ne- divided, as formerly, with regard to the subject of this 
 phew embassy. When Henry first entered into alliance with 
 
 * Pallavicini, lib. xiii. c. xvi. 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
22 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 persuades^.® P°P e > the Constable was suspected of having too 
 Henry to faintly opposed it ; not from any doubt which he enter- 
 thetruce tainecl . of its “expediency, but either from the faithless 
 e ruc0, complaisance of a courtier to the inclinations of the 
 King, or from a desire to have his rivals of the family of Guise 
 removed to a distance from the court. But whatever ground 
 there was for this suspicion, it is certain that Montmorency had 
 been the chief promoter of the truce of Yaucelles ; and that he 
 now showed himself extremely averse to that shameful violation 
 of it, which Caraffa had come to solicit. 
 
 The duke of Guise, on the other hand, and his brother, the 
 Cardinal, were still as much bent on the Italian war as ever ; 
 and made no more scruple to exhort their master to undertake 
 it, after he had sworn to observe the truce with the Emperor, 
 than they had done formerly, when he was at liberty, consistently 
 with his honour, either to embrace or reject it. 
 
 Between the opposite counsels which were given him, the 
 unstable mind of Henry remained for several days in suspense. 
 Elated with the success which had hitherto attended his arms, 
 and inflamed with . the ambition of acquiring the Neapolitan 
 kingdom, he was inclined to a renewal of the war, and withheld 
 his consent from it, only out of respect for his oath, and his 
 deference to the opinion of the Constable. At length Caraffa 
 having gained over the Queen, through the influence of Strozzi ; 
 and the Guises having employed the still more powerful inter- 
 cession of the duchess of Valentinois 1 , Henry began to yield to 
 the importunity of such powerful solicitors, and admitted Caraffa 
 to a private audience, which he had requested, in the hopes of 
 completing that victory over the Constable’s remonstrances, and 
 the King’s remaining scruples, which his associates had begun. 
 On this occasion, having, with the usual ceremony, presented to 
 the King a consecrated sword, he remonstrated to him, at great 
 length, on the breach of his engagements with the Pontiff ; and 
 when he found that Henry was not offended with this freedom, 
 he next addressed himself to his ambition, and represented, that 
 a more favourable juncture than the present could not be desired 
 for attempting to expel the Spaniards from Italy. That the 
 reins of government were now abandoned by the Emperor, and 
 committed to his son ; who, besides his inexperience, was ex- 
 tremely unacceptable to the Italian states and princes, and was 
 not yet firmly established on his throne. That his exchequer 
 was drained by those expensive wars in which the Emperor had 
 been almost continually engaged ; and his armies were neither 
 so numerous nor so flourishing as at any former period since the 
 commencement of his father’s reign. While, on the other hand, 
 the French army would have easy access to Naples, through the 
 
 1 The famous Diana of Poitiers, Henry’s mistress. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 23 
 
 1555 .] 
 
 territories of the Pope, and would thence likewise be furnished, 
 both with fresh troops, and with abundant supplies of ammunition 
 and provisions. 
 
 Henry found it difficult any longer to withhold his consent. 
 But there were two points on which he required still farther 
 satisfaction, than either Caraffa’s arguments or promises had 
 given him. He could not entirely divest himself of the scruples 
 which arose from his oath ; and nothing offered by Caraffa had 
 taken off the force of the Constable’s objection against entering 
 into engagements with a Pope in the extremity of old age, who, 
 it was likely, would die before the end of the proposed alliance 
 could be accomplished. Caraffa had foreseen both these diffi- 
 culties, and was prepared to remove them. He produced from 
 Paul a power to absolve Henry from the obligation of his oath ; 
 he engaged that such a number of cardinals, partisans of France, 
 and enemies to Spain, should be nominated at the next promo- 
 tion, as would secure to Henry the absolute disposal of the 
 papacy, in the event of the Pontiff’s death ; and, for his further 
 security, he promised, in all events, that Bologna, Ancona, 
 Paliano, Civita-Y ecchia, and even the castle of St. Angelo, should 
 be put into his possession. 
 
 The war was now resolved upon without further hesitation. 
 Caraffa immediately dispatched a messenger to Rebiba, who, 
 according to his instructions, was advancing by slow journeys 
 towards Brussels, to inform him of what had passed, and to 
 desire him to return to Rome. Henry received absolution in 
 form from the obligation of that sacred law of nature, which 
 enjoins the observance of an oath ; and, at the same time, he 
 received a dispensation from a law of nations, considered as no 
 less sacred, by which it was held to be unchristian and barbarous 
 to begin hostilities without a previous declaration of war k . 
 
 As he flattered himself that his transaction with Caraffa might 
 be for some time concealed, he was determined, if possible, to 
 attack the Ehiperor and Philip, while, trusting to the truce, they 
 were off their guard. And thus did this monarch, who was not 
 less virtuous than most of his cotemporary princes, deliberately 
 resolve to add treachery to the perjury and falsehood into which 
 he had been betrayed ; under a persuasion that his conduct was 
 not only justifiable, but even honourable, and meritorious in the 
 sight of God and man. Such is the fascinating power of false 
 religion ; and so pernicious to society that impious pretension 
 to the power of annulling the sacred obligations of morality, 
 which was claimed by the Roman pontiffs, and which, through 
 the ignorance of their votaries, they were permitted for many 
 ages to enjoy. 
 
 Caraffa had endeavoured to conceal his negotiation at the 
 
 k Thuanus, lib. xvii. c. vii. Father Paul, lib. v. Pallavicini, lib. xiii. e. x. j>. 71. 
 
24 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 court of France, under the pretext of treating with the King 
 about the establishment of peace, and the calling of a general 
 council. But the Emperor and Philip were too well acquainted 
 with his character, to be so easily deceived. They had pene- 
 trated into the real intention of the embassy, and had for some 
 time kept a watchful eye over all the motions both of Henry and 
 the Pope. 
 
 The conduct of Paul was extremely ill-calculated to elude the 
 The vio- penetration of the Spanish ministers. Besides excom- 
 lence of munieating the family of Colonna, and depriving them 
 Paiil. 0 f ^eir territories, he had treated with much severity 
 and injustice all those whom he suspected of being attached to 
 the Spanish interest ; and had received, in the most gracious 
 manner, some Neapolitan exiles, who had fled to Rome. Some 
 of his letters having been intercepted, he had put to the torture 
 Antonio de Tassis, postmaster at Rome, though a Spanish 
 subject ; and, in violation of a privilege long enjoyed by the 
 kings of Spain, had given his office to another. He had put 
 under arrest De la V ega, Philip’s ambassador at Rome ; and 
 with no small degree of vanity, set on foot a trial in the con- 
 sistory, against Philip himself, on pretence that, as his liege-lord, 
 he had a right to deprive him of the kingdom of Naples, on 
 account of his having failed in the payment of 700 ducats, which 
 he alleged was an annual tribute due from the possessor of that 
 kingdom to the Holy See l . 
 
 While Paul gave these impotent proofs of his resentment, hi® 
 nephews were making diligent preparation for the approaching 
 war. They were employed assiduously in repairing the forti- 
 fications of Rome, Paliano, and other places. And, having levied 
 a considerable number of troops, they engaged Camillo Orsini, 
 one of the ablest generals of the age, to command them. 
 
 The administration of Philip's affairs in Italy was at this 
 The duke time in the hands of Ferdinand de Toledo, duke of Alva; 
 «>f Alva. a singular and distinguished personage in Philip’s reign, 
 whom there will be frequent occasion to mention in the sequel. 
 He was arrogant, vain, and proud ; violent, inflexible, and relent- 
 less ; but patient, prudent, and sagacious ; inured from his 
 youth to arms, and possessed of consummate skill in the art of 
 war. He had been intrusted with the supreme command of the 
 Emperor s forces in Germany ; and, though unsuccessful in the 
 sieo^e of Metz, had discovered uncommon vigour and abilities. 
 He did not, however, enjoy the same degree of credit with the 
 father, which he afterwards attained under the son ; whom he 
 nearly resembled in his character, and whose favour he had 
 courted with great assiduity and success. Through the influ- 
 
 1 Gianone, lib. xxxiii. c. i. The duke of Alva’s letter in Summonte, tom. iv. p. 2<0. 
 Clement. VII. had renounced this claim. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1556.] 
 
 ence of Buy Gomez de Silva, Philip’s principal favourite, who 
 beheld with a jealous eye Alva’s growing favour with the King, 
 and was desirous, on that account, to have him removed to a 
 distance from the helm of government, he had, about a year 
 before, been appointed viceroy of Naples, as well as governor of 
 Milan, and commander in chief of all the Spanish forces in 
 Italy. 
 
 Philip had been fully informed, by Alva, of the Pope’s conduct 
 with regard to him ; and even before he knew of his alliance with 
 Henry, he could not entertain any doubt of his intentions. Had 
 he permitted Alva to act with vigour, and to improve the advan- 
 tage over Paul, which his defenceless situation afforded him, he 
 might have got possession of all his fortified places, have deterred 
 Henry from entering into any new connexion with him, and have 
 thereby prevented the renewal of the war. But being convinced 
 that Henry would never violate the truce of Vaucelles, by which 
 he was so great a gainer ; and knowing that the Pontiff could 
 do nothing without the assistance of the French, he gave orders 
 to Alva to use every art of persuasion, before he should have 
 recourse to arms. Alva, though naturally averse to all mild 
 expedients, complied with his instructions ; and, by letters and 
 messengers, complained, remonstrated, and even soothed and 
 flattered both Paul and his nephews. All his endeavours, how- 
 ever, were ineffectual. They still continued their preparations ; 
 and gave him sometimes haughty, and always unsatisfactory 
 replies. At length the duke of Alva sent Pirro de Loffredo, 
 with one letter to the college of cardinals, and another to 
 Paul m ; in which, after enumerating the various injuries which 
 his master had received, and renewing his former offers of peace 
 and friendship, he concluded with protesting, that if his offers 
 were again rejected, the Pope should be chargeable with all the 
 calamities that might follow. Before the arrival of Loffredo, 
 Paul had received intelligence from France of the success of the 
 Cardinal’s negotiation ; and the duke of Alva’s letter served only 
 to precipitate him into new extravagancies. He threw Loffredo 
 into prison, and would even have put him to death, had not the 
 college of cardinals interposed 11 . He then gave orders to Aldo- 
 brandin, the consistorial advocate, to finish the process which he 
 had begun against Philip, on account of his failure in the paying 
 tribute for Naples; and, after hearing the cause pleaded, he passed 
 sentence, depriving him of the sovereignty of that kingdom °. 
 
 This violent conduct of Paul gave great offence throughout 
 Europe ; and, in Italy, served rather to obstruct, than to pro- 
 mote his designs. The Venetians refused to accede to his 
 
 TO The original letters are preserved by Summonte, lib. x. and dated August 21, 1556. 
 
 " Summonte, lib. x. p. 277. Gianone, lib. xxxiii. c. 1. 
 
 0 Gianone adds, that he was dissuaded from publishing it by G'amerario of Bcnevento, 
 the great civilian, a Neapolitan exile. 
 
26 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 alliance ; and the Neapolitans, perceiving what the ambition of 
 his nephews aimed at, with respect to them, entered warmly into 
 all the prudent measures which the duke of Alva planned for 
 their defence. 
 
 But Paul’s extravagant behaviour did not excite in Philip 
 Philip’s that resentment and indignation which might have been 
 scruples, expected from a young, ambitious, powerful monarch, of 
 a temper of mind impatient of injuries and affronts. Notwith- 
 standing the contumelious treatment which he had received, he 
 still continued irresolute, and discovered an amazing reluctance 
 against proceeding to extremities. 
 
 Some historians affirm, that he had early imbibed from the 
 Spanish ecclesiastics, who had the care of his education, the 
 highest veneration for the holy see ; and entertained some 
 scruples as to the lawfulness of employing force against the 
 sovereign pontiff. Others assert, that these scruples were mere 
 grimace and affectation. He had already formed the plan of 
 subjecting Europe to his dominion; and zeal for the catholic 
 faith was both the pretext and the instrument which he had 
 resolved to employ for accomplishing his design. 
 
 Neither of these accounts ought to be entirely rejected ; and 
 neither of them ought to be admitted as satisfactory. On the 
 one hand, it is impossible to doubt that ambition, and not reli- 
 gion, was the ruling principle of Philip’s conduct ; and on the 
 other, when we reflect on the pains which were taken, from his 
 earliest infancy, to inspire him with an attachment to the popish 
 faith, and consider how serious and zealous he ever appeared in 
 the profession and support of it ; it will be impossible to sup- 
 pose that, in religious matters, he was entirely hypocritical. It 
 is improbable that any person could act so uniform a part as 
 Philip did, without feeling, in a considerable degree, the power 
 of that motive which he held forth to the world as the principle 
 of his conduct. Nor does it afford the smallest presumption 
 against this supposition, that his conduct was, on many occa- 
 sions, inconsistent with religious sincerity. His religion was not 
 surely pure and genuine. It was neither the religion of nature, 
 nor that of Christ, but was the barbarous superstition of the 
 church of Rome, which, in the age of Philip, instead of deterring 
 men from vice, tended to encourage them in the practice of it, 
 by inculcating upon them the highest reverence for an order of 
 priests supposed to be invested with the power of absolving from 
 the guilt and punishment of the most enormous crimes. To 
 Philip’s superstitious veneration for the holy see, therefore, may 
 be ascribed, in part, both his moderation in the present juncture, 
 and a resolution which he formed to consult the most distin- 
 guished divines with regard to the lawfulness of waging war 
 against an enemy whose person he deemed so sacred and 
 inviolable. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 27 
 
 1556.] 
 
 Those men knew well what counsel was suited to his present 
 circumstances ; and they declared, that although it behoved him 
 to begin with supplicating his Holiness, as the universal father of 
 the church, yet, if his entreaties were rejected, the law of nature 
 would permit him to defend his territories, and to vindicate his 
 right by force of arms p . 
 
 By this answer, Philip’s religious scruples were removed. Still, 
 Alva’s miii- however, he lamented the necessity he lay under of 
 tary opera- beginning his reign with hostilities against a power 
 turns. with w hich, more than with any other, he was desirous 
 of cultivating peace and friendship. But at last, after having 
 lost a great deal of time in negociating, he sent orders to the 
 Duke of Alva to take the field. 
 
 That general having, some time before, gone from the 
 duchy of Milan to the kingdom of Naples, and fixed his 
 head-quarters near the confines of the Ecclesiastical State, 
 began his march in the beginning of September, one thousand 
 five hundred and fifty-six, with a well-disciplined army ; which, 
 though small in number, was superior to that which the Pontiff 
 had provided to oppose it. In a few weeks, Alva reduced seve- 
 ral towns in the Campagna di Roma, and took possession of 
 them in the name of the sacred college, and of the future Pope. 
 The people of Rome were thrown into consternation by his 
 approach; and many families left the city, in order to avoid the 
 calamities of a siege. Paul still retained all his wonted haugh- 
 tiness, and poured out threats and anathemas against the 
 enemy. 
 
 But the Duke of Alva still continued to advance, till his 
 He grants troops could make incursions almost to the gates of 
 a truce. Rome. In this situation, Cardinal Caraffa found his 
 uncle's affairs upon his return from France. The army which 
 he had obtained from Henry had already reached Piedmont; 
 but, being detained there by the rigour of the winter, could not 
 arrive in time to save Rome from falling into the hands of the 
 Spaniards. In order to prevent this, Caraffa prevailed on Paul, 
 who, from pride, and ignorance of his danger, was extremely 
 reluctant, to apply for a cessation of arms; and Alva, at the 
 request of his uncle, the cardinal of St. James, consented to a 
 conference with Caraffa, in the Isle of Fiumicino. He could not 
 be ignorant that this crafty Italian’s intention was only to amuse 
 him till the French army should approach. But an interval of 
 repose was no less expedient for himself than for the enemy. 
 His army was greatly diminished by putting garrisons into the 
 conquered towns. His ships with provisions had been long 
 detained by contrary winds ; and his presence was necessary in 
 Naples, to hasten his levies, and put the kingdom into a posture 
 
 p Ferreras, vol. ix. p. 373. 
 
28 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 of defence before the arrival of the Duke of Guise. Influenced 
 by these considerations, Alva readily consented to a truce of 
 forty days ; and, immediately after concluding it, he set out for 
 Naples, where he exerted himself with great assiduity in com- 
 pleting his preparations for the next campaign. 
 
 The Duke of Guise had now passed the Alps with twelve 
 
 1557 thousand foot and near two thousand horse, and had 
 advanced as far as Rheggio. There he was met by 
 the Duke of Ferrara, who, having acceded to the alliance 
 between the Pope and Henry, had brought along with him near 
 seven thousand men. Guise deliberated for some time whether 
 he should begin his operations with laying siege to Cremona, 
 Milan, and other towns in the north of Italy ; or, leaving these 
 behind him in the hands of the enemy, should march directly 
 towards Naples. He had been earnestly exhorted by Mareschal 
 de Brissac, whom he saw in Piedmont, to embrace the former of 
 these measures, as being the safest and most practicable ; and in 
 this opinion the Duke of Ferrara concurred ; but Guise had 
 received positive orders from the King, to be directed in this 
 matter by the Pope, who insisted that he should advance with- 
 out delay towards Naples. In compliance, therefore, with his 
 instructions, he pursued his march southward till he reached the 
 frontiers of that part of the kingdom which is called the Abruzzo. 
 At his arrival in Rome, he was received in triumph, as if he had 
 been already crowned with victory. But he soon found that he 
 had been cruelly deceived by Caraffa, with regard to the assist- 
 ance which that prelate had so confidently promised him in the 
 name of the Pontiff ; who had not been able either to raise the 
 troops which he had stipulated, or to furnish his magazines with 
 an adequate quantity of military stores. Guise was extremely 
 mortified at his present disagreeable situation, and saw that he 
 was likely to meet with nothing but disgrace and shame, where 
 he had flattered himself with the hopes of adding to his former 
 He lavs glory. He laid siege, however, to Civitella, and car- 
 siege to ried on his operations against it, for more than three 
 Civitella. wee k s ^ w ith his wonted spirit and intrepidity. After 
 having made a breach in the wall, he attempted to take the place 
 by storm. But his troops were repulsed with great loss by the 
 garrison, who were bravely seconded by the inhabitants. Even 
 the women discovered, on this occasion, the most undaunted 
 resolution, and seemed determined to lay down their lives rather 
 than submit to the dominion of the French; whose insolent use 
 of victory, in former Italian expeditions, was not yet, after many 
 years, obliterated from their minds. 
 
 The Duke of Alva had resolved, with his usual caution, to act 
 on the defensive, and to fortify his camp on the south side of the 
 river Piscarra, which lay between him and the enemy. But 
 when he found that their enterprise against Civitella detained 
 
PHILIP It. KING OP SPAIN. 
 
 29 
 
 1557.] 
 
 them so long, he concluded that the accounts which he had 
 received of their strength must have been exaggerated ; and 
 therefore he crossed the river, and advanced towards them. 
 
 Guise was extremely unwilling to quit the siege ; but having 
 But is received certain intelligence that the Spanish army 
 obliged to was superior to his own, he listened to the advice 
 raise it. G f Mareschal Strozzi, and retired into the Ecclesias- 
 tical territories. Alva followed him ; but neither he nor Guise 
 seem to have wished for a general engagement. The former 
 could not have ventured on it with any probability of success ; 
 and the latter thought it absurd to risk a kingdom without 
 necessity on the chance of a battle q . 
 
 Whilst these things passed in the Abruzzo, Mark Anthony 
 Colonna made rapid progress in the neighbourhood of Rome, 
 where he reduced several forts and towns, and obtained a victory 
 over the Pope’s forces, commanded by Julio Orsini and the Mar- 
 quis of Montebello. . 
 
 By these disasters, Paul was overwhelmed with terror. And 
 when he was lamenting, in the consistory, the calamities in which 
 his dominions were involved, ho expressed his dread that ere 
 long the Vatican itself would be in the hands of the enemy. He 
 added, that he longed now to be with Christ ; and, as if he had 
 engaged in the present war from zeal for the faith, and not from 
 ambition and resentment, he concluded with saying that he would 
 wait for his crown of martyrdom without dismay. 
 
 Pie was willing, however, to preserve his earthly crown as long 
 as possible ; and had sent to the Duke of Guise, entreating him 
 to hasten towards Rome for his defence. This general was now 
 on his march thither, full of vexation and chagrin on account of 
 the inglorious part which he had acted. He called upon Cardi- 
 nal Caraffa to fulfil his promises ; and he employed all his 
 interest to procure supplies from the court of France. But the 
 Pope’s resources were already exhausted; and the French mo- 
 narch had more than sufficient employment at home for all the 
 troops which he had reserved, after providing for his Italian 
 expedition. 
 
 Philip had, for the reasons above-mentioned, entered into the 
 The war in war with reluctance ; but having, in the origin of it, 
 France. received the highest provocation from Henry, as well 
 as from the Pope, and knowing that, in the beginning of his 
 reign, the eyes of all Europe would be fixed upon his conduct, 
 he had resolved -to exert his utmost vigour, and to attack Henry 
 in that quarter where he could most successfully annoy him. 
 
 With extraordinary industry and dispatch, he assembled a 
 numerous army in the neighbourhood of Charlemont, under the 
 
 i Harceus says that Guise laboured to force Alva to engage ; but this does not appear 
 from the detail in Thuanus. 
 
30 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 command of Philibert Emanuel, duke of Savoy. And Emanuel 
 cheerfully undertook the charge committed to him, as it gave him 
 at once an opportunity of displaying his great abilities, and of 
 taking vengeance on the French king, by whom he had been ex- 
 pelled from his dominions. Of the army which was collected, only 
 a small part consisted of Spaniards ; the greatest part were either 
 Dutch and Flemings, or Germans. In levying them, Philip was 
 much indebted to the zeal and alacrity with which his subjects 
 in the Netherlands espoused his cause. For the States of these 
 provinces, notwithstanding the prejudice to their commerce, 
 which they foresaw must arise from the war, granted, with 
 unusual liberality, all the supplies which he demanded. But 
 while in this they gave proof of their loyalty, they discovered, 
 by another part of their conduct, their jealousy and discontent. 
 They reserved in their own hands the administration of the 
 money which they voted him ; and appointed commissioners to 
 apply it to the payment of the troops. This action, which pro- 
 ceeded from their jealousy of the Spaniards, made a deep im- 
 pression on the dark resentful mind of Philip ; it contributed to 
 alienate his affections from his Flemish subjects ; and gave him 
 an inveterate prejudice against that free constitution of their 
 government, by which they were thus enabled to limit his au- 
 thority. But he was sensible how improper it would have been, 
 in the present conjuncture, to discover his resentment, or to 
 dispute their privileges. He agreed to accept of their supplies, 
 with the condition annexed to the grant of them ; and proceeded 
 to complete his preparations. 
 
 Not satisfied with the army which he had drawn together 
 Philip en- fr° m Germany and the ^Netherlands, augmented by a 
 gages Eng- reinforcement sent from Spain ; he resolved, if possible, 
 land in the to persuade the English to enter into the war. With 
 this view he went over to England. He found the 
 privy-counsellors, the Queen herself, and the whole body of the 
 people, averse to his design. It has almost never happened, 
 either before or since that period, that war with the French 
 was not agreeable to the English. During many centuries they 
 had been accustomed to consider their French neighbours as 
 enemies and rivals, with whom they often showed an eagerness 
 to contend, when it was greatly their interest to remain at peace. 
 But their enmity towards the French yielded at this time to 
 their jealousy of the Spaniards ; and they entertained the most 
 irreconcileable aversion to the proposed alliance. Mary, as just 
 now hinted, was not of herself inclined to the war ; but not- 
 withstanding this, and the cold indifference with which Philip 
 had ever treated her, she was unable to resist his solicitation 1 '. 
 
 Her kinsman, cardinal Pole, and her other counsellors, repre- 
 
 Van Meteren. 
 
 Thuanus, lib. xix. c. vii. Camden’# Apparatus. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 31 
 
 1557 .] 
 
 sented, that it was a chief article of her marriage treaty, that 
 the alliance with France should be preserved inviolate ; that the 
 violation of it would excite a universal alarm with regard to the 
 observance of the other articles ; and that the present state of 
 her finances would render it impossible for her, if she should 
 enter into the war, to acquit herself with honour. But Philip 
 having said, that if he were not gratified in his request, he would 
 leave England, and never return to it ; Mary was deaf to every 
 argument that could be employed to dissuade her from her pur- 
 pose ; and, without further hesitation, ordered war to be declared 
 in the city of Rheims, with the usual ceremony ; on pretences 
 which were either entirely false, or extremely frivolous. As she 
 knew it would be in vain to apply to her parliament for assist- 
 ance in carrying on a war so disagreeable to the nation, she had 
 recourse to the oppressive expedient of extorting loans from 
 individuals and corporations. By this, and other means of tho 
 same nature, she equipped a considerable fleet, and raised an 
 army of eight thousand men ; of which she gave the command 
 to the earl of Pembroke. 
 
 When this reinforcement had joined the duke of Savoy, his 
 cavalry amounted to twelve thousand, and his infantry to between 
 forty and fifty thousand ; an army much superior to any which 
 Henry could muster to oppose it. This inconsiderate monarch 
 had not expected that Philip would have been able to make so 
 great an effort, and saw now the folly of his late engagements 
 with the Pope. He was not wanting, however, either in pru- 
 dence or activity, in repairing his fault, and providing for the 
 security of his kingdom. He committed the chief command of 
 the forces to the Constable, whom, notwithstanding his averse- 
 ness to the war, he chose to employ, as the ablest of all his 
 generals, to conduct it ; and a great number of the principal 
 nobility and gentry flocked to the camp, eager to display that 
 zeal and bravery, which the French nation hath often exhibited 
 in defence of their king and country. 
 
 The Constable could not for some time conjecture on which 
 The siege side the duke of Savoy intended to turn his arms, 
 and battle of His first movements were calculated to beget a per- 
 St. Quentin. suas i on5 that he designed to enter France by the way 
 of Champaign; but no sooner had he drawn the French army 
 to that quarter, than, changing his route, he marched into 
 Picardy, and laid siege to St. Quentin. 
 
 This town must ^quickly have surrendered to so great a force, 
 August, had it not been defended by the celebrated Jasper de 
 Admiral Coligni, admiral of France, who made on this occasion 
 Coligni. a conspicuous display of those extraordinary talents 
 which rendered him afterwards one of the most illustrious per- 
 sonages of the age. Being governor of the province in which 
 the place lay, he thought it his duty to exert himself to the 
 
32 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 utmost for its preservation ; and he forced his way into it, 
 through the surrounding army, with a body of troops, which he 
 animated to expose themselves to every hazard of war in its 
 defence. Immediately after his arrival, he expelled the Spaniards 
 from the suburbs, and set fire to the houses. But he soon per- 
 ceived, that, by reason of the neglected state of the fortifications, 
 the garrison was still too weak ; and that, without a reinforce- 
 ment, it would be impossible to hold out long against so nume- 
 rous an enemy. Of this he gave immediate intelligence to the 
 Constable his uncle, and at the same time informed him where 
 it would be easiest to introduce the succour which he requested. 
 The Constable, anxious for his nephew's safety, and sensible how 
 necessary it was for the preservation of the kingdom that the 
 duke of Savoy should be detained before St. Quentin, appointed 
 d’Andelot, the Admiral’s brother, to the command of a select 
 body of two thousand foot, destined for the relief of the besieged. 
 A person of the name of yalpergue, well acquainted with the 
 face of the country, had been sent by the Admiral to serve as a 
 guide to this reinforcement. But whether he mistook his way, 
 or the duke of Savoy had got intelligence of the design, is 
 uncertain. D’Andelot found the enemy prepared to receive him, 
 and was so vigorously attacked, that he escaped with difficulty, 
 after the greatest part of his troops had been cut to pieces. 
 
 By this disaster the besieged were extremely dejected, and the 
 Admiral had much occasion to exert all his address and eloquence, 
 to prevent them from abandoning themselves to despair. From 
 a high tower in the town he could view the country round, 
 and saw that the place was completely invested on every side 
 but one, where there was a marsh or lake, too deep in some 
 places to be passed on foot, and in others too shallow to admit 
 of boats. Through this marsh, however, he hoped that his 
 friends might introduce a reinforcement. Having concerted with 
 the Constable the time and manner of putting his design in 
 execution, he threw up the earth in a part of the marsh, and 
 reduced the water into a canal large enough to receive some 
 small boats which he had prepared. The Constable then ad- 
 vanced toward the lake with all his forces, and gave d’Andelot 
 an opportunity of entering the town, with between four and five 
 hundred men s . But, in making his approach, the Constable had 
 led his army through some narrow defiles, which he must repass 
 before he could put his troops in safety. His misconduct, in 
 thus exposing his army to so great a risk in sight of an enemy so 
 much superior, was quickly perceived by the duke of Savoy ; 
 and a council of war was immediately called to consider of the 
 measures proper to be pursued. Many of the officers thought 
 that the Constable should be suffered to retire ; but count 
 
 Laboureur, Additions, &o. p. 375. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 33 
 
 1557.] 
 
 Egmont, general of the horse, whom Philip afterwards used so 
 ungratefully, maintained with warmth 1 , that it was practicable to 
 attack him in his retreat with the highest probability of success. 
 The duke of Savoy approved of the plan of attack which the 
 Count proposed, and committed the execution of it to himself. 
 No time was lost. Egmont advanced instantly at the head of 
 the cavalry, while the Duke hastened forward with the infantry 
 to support him ; and finding the enemy unprepared for their 
 defence, he soon threw them into disorder. The Constable 
 exerted himself strenuously to retrieve his error; but count 
 Egmont, seconded by the infantry, with the general at their 
 head, advanced with such impetuosity, that the Constable found 
 it impossible to recover his troops from the confusion into which 
 they had been thrown. Perceiving that the fortune of the battle 
 was irretrievable, and stung with the consciousness of the im- 
 prudence of which he had been guilty, he rushed into the midst 
 of the enemy, and seemed determined not to survive the reproach 
 in which his rashness had involved him. He was dangerously 
 wounded, and would have fallen in the field, as he desired ; but, 
 being personally known to some Flemish officers, he was by them 
 The French rescued from the soldiers and taken prisoner. His army 
 defeated, was entirely broken. Three thousand men were killed on 
 the spot, and four thousand taken prisoners; among whom, besides 
 the Constable and his two sons, there were many persons of dis- 
 tinction, and several of the first nobility in France. On the side 
 of the victors only eighty men were killed ; a certain proof that 
 the attack had been conducted with no less prudence than in- 
 trepidity. 
 
 Philip, although a slave to the lust of power, yet unambitious 
 of military glory, remained at Cambray till intelligence was 
 brought him of the victory. He then entered the camp with 
 great pomp, and when the duke of Savoy and count Egmont 
 approached him, he received them in the most gracious manner, 
 and expressed his gratitude for the important service they had 
 performed, with a degree of sensibility and joy which he was 
 seldom accustomed to discover 11 . His conduct on this occasion 
 was in another respect more agreeable to his character. In 
 memory of the battle, he vowed to consecrate a palace, a church, 
 and a monastery, to St. Lawrence, because it was on the anni- 
 versary of that Saint that he had obtained the victory. He 
 afterwards religiously fulfilled his vow by building the Escurial ; 
 for which he reserved immense sums, notwithstanding the diffi- 
 culties in which, through his expensive wars, he was almost con- 
 tinually involved. 
 
 The battle of St. Quentin might have been attended with the 
 
 1 Auctore, consuasore, & proped cam, perfectore Egmondensi. L. Guicciardini, p. 150. 
 lib. iii. 
 
 • u Cabrera, lib. iv. c. 7. 
 
84 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 Surrender most important consequences, if Philip had complied 
 of St. Quen- with the advice of some of his general officers, who 
 exhorted him to lead his army without delay into the 
 heart of France. But this measure was too bold to be relished 
 by a prince like Philip, whose caution often bordered on timidity. 
 He gave orders to proceed in the siege of St. Quentin ; saying, 
 that it would be dangerous to leave so strong a place behind him 
 m the hands of the enemy, and that every army that ventured 
 to penetrate into a powerful kingdom like that of France, ought 
 first to secure their retreat. His officers were the more easily 
 reconciled to these orders, as they believed it impossible for the 
 besieged to hold out above a few days longer. But they were 
 disappointed in their expectations by the skill and intrepidity of 
 the Admiral ; who, in order to save his country, and retard the 
 progress of the Spanish arms, had resolved to bury himself in 
 the ruins of the place, rather than agree to a surrender. He 
 inspired the garrison with the same generous resolution ; and, 
 though the fortifications were weak and ruinous, he withstood all 
 the vigorous and skilful efforts of the duke of Savoy, till the 
 seventeenth day after the renewal of the siege, when the town 
 was assaulted in eleven different places at one time, and both 
 the Admiral and his brother, after a brave and obstinate defence, 
 were taken prisoners on the breach. During the assault, Philip 
 showed himself to his troops in complete armour ; and this was 
 the only time in his life in which he was ever seen in a military 
 dress. He allowed his army to plunder the town, as a reward 
 of their labours ; but gave strict orders to preserve the churches 
 and the relics of the tutelary saint. 
 
 In the mean time Henry’s ministers, who had been over- 
 whelmed with consternation, employed to the best advantage 
 the leisure which the Admiral’s heroic bravery afforded them. 
 They levied forces in every quarter of the kingdom, gathered 
 together the remains of the vanquished army, sent for the troops 
 which served in Piedmont under the mareschal de Brissac, and 
 recalled the duke of Guise. In a few weeks the whole eastern 
 frontier was in a posture of defence, and an army collected in 
 Picardy under the duke of Nevers, able to make head against 
 the enemy. Philip then perceived that he had suffered the only 
 opportunity to escape which he would probably ever have, of 
 penetrating into France, and seizing the capital unprepared. 
 He was now under a necessity of being satisfied with employing 
 his troops in enterprises of less splendour and importance ; and 
 the only fruit of his victory at St. Quentin was, the taking of 
 the inconsiderable towns of Catelet, Ham, and Noyon; after 
 which, he dismissed a great part of his army, sent home his 
 English forces, and retired himself to Brussels x . 
 
 x Thuanus says, that the English and Spaniards quarrelled after the battle, and that 
 this was the reason why Philip so hastily broke up his camp. Lib. xix. p. 660. 
 
1558.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 35 
 
 The recalling of the duke of Guise from Italy rendered it 
 necessary for the Pope, though exceedingly reluctant, 
 to apply for peace ; to which Philip readily consented 
 upon much more moderate terms than could have been 
 expected, considering that Paul was now entirely at 
 
 Peace con- 
 cluded be- 
 tween Phi- 
 lip and the 
 Pope. 
 
 his 
 
 mercy, 
 
 and 
 
 that no enemy remained in Italy able 
 to withstand his power. The same motives, whether religious 
 or political, that made him so averse to entering into this war 
 with the Pontiff, determined him to have it brought as soon as 
 possible to a conclusion. Almost the only condition which he 
 required was, that Paul should observe a strict neutrality between 
 France and Spain. All the ecclesiastical towns which had been 
 taken were restored ; and orders sent to the duke of Alva to go 
 to Rome, and supplicate the Pope’s forgiveness, both in his own 
 name and that of his master, for their crime of invading the 
 sacred possessions of the church. In these conditions, and in 
 the manner in which they were fulfilled, Paul appeared as if his 
 arms had been victorious ; and Philip, as if he had been humbled 
 and overcome. Such was the reverence which the latter either 
 felt in reality for the Holy See, or thought it necessary to affect, 
 in order to promote his ambitious designs y . 
 
 In this manner did Philip put a period to the war with the 
 The duke sovereign Pontiff ; but that with Henry still continued, 
 of Guise re- This prince, conscious of his incapacity, and sensible 
 turns from that an exertion of the highest abilities was necessary 
 in the present critical situation of his affairs, trans- 
 ferred almost his whole authority to the duke of Guise, and 
 created him viceroy of France, under the name of Lieutenant 
 General of the kingdom. The French nation knew how much 
 the ambition of this nobleman had contributed to involve them 
 in their present calamities ; nor were they ignorant how unsuc- 
 cessful his attempts in Italy had been against the sagacity and 
 skill of Alva ; yet so splendid were his accomplishments, and to 
 so great a height in the general esteem had his spirited defence 
 of Metz against the Emperor exalted him, that his arrival 
 diffused universal joy, and roused the nation from that despond- 
 1558 ency into which it had been cast by the late disaster 
 
 January. at St. Quentin. He quickly showed that his count ry- 
 
 Siege of men were not mistaken in the opinion which they 
 entertained of his abilities. The ordinary season for 
 action was over, and the enemy had gone into winter- quarters, 
 when he took the field at the head of an army which he had 
 collected with the utmost secrecy and despatch. The eyes of all 
 Europe were directed towards him, and Philip attended to his 
 motions with much anxiety ; never doubting that he intended to 
 fall either upon St. Quentin, or some of the frontier towns of the 
 
 7 Thuanus. Summonte, c. 1 0. 
 D 2 
 
36 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 Netherlands. It soon appeared that he meditated an attack, by 
 which the interests of Philip’s allies would be more affected than 
 his own, but in the success of which France was more deeply 
 interested than even in the recovery of St. Quentin. For more 
 than two hundred years the town of Calais had remained in the 
 hands of the English ; and as it served for a key by which they 
 could at all times open an entrance for their armies into France, 
 it had been ever deemed one of their most valuable possessions. 
 The French monarchs were fully sensible of the dishonour, as 
 well as of the danger, which attended the suffering a rival nation 
 to possess a place of so much importance in their dominions. 
 But in those days, when the art of attacking towns was little 
 known, Calais was regarded as impregnable. Nor had any of 
 the French kings, even in the height of prosperity, ever thought 
 of laying siege to it. They were ignorant of the means of taking 
 it by storm, and they could not reduce it by blockade ; while the 
 English could easily furnish it by sea with fresh troops, stores, 
 and provisions. But a plan of attack, which had never occurred 
 to any person, was discovered by the fruitful genius of the 
 Admiral de Coligni, and by him had been suggested to the duke 
 of Guise. 
 
 In order to carry this plan into execution, and thereby to 
 redeem the nation from what had ever been considered as re- 
 proachful and ignominious, Guise put his troops in motion long 
 before the usual season for action had arrived. He judged 
 wisely in making choice of the rigour of winter for beginning his 
 enterprise ; for besides that the enemy had no army in the field at 
 this time to disturb his operations, he knew that the Queen of 
 England and her ministers had, from a principle of ill-judged 
 economy, been accustomed to dismiss a great part of the garrison 
 in the end of autumn, and to trust for the security of the 
 place, to the marshy ground on. the land-side, by which they 
 believed, that in winter, all access to it would be rendered imprac- 
 ticable. 
 
 But the briskness of the duke of Guise’s approaches soon 
 convinced the governor, lord W entworth, how little reason there 
 was for this imprudent confidence. Wentworth represented to 
 the English ministry, the necessity of sending him an immediate 
 reinforcement. He acquainted them that he had not above one 
 fourth of the number requisite to defend the works ; and that, 
 with the present garrison, it was impossible to prevent the place 
 from falling quickly into the hands of the enemy. Had Mary’s 
 ministers been ever so desirous of complying with his request, it 
 would not have availed him. Guise was sensible that the suc- 
 cess of his enterprise depended on his conducting it with expe- 
 dition. He pushed forward all the operations of the siege with 
 extraordinary vigour, and although it is acknowledged that the 
 governor and garrison acquitted themselves with honour, yet he 
 
37 
 
 1558.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 reduced them to the necessity of capitulating on the eighth day 
 Jui 8th a ^ er arrival 2 . He then laid siege to Guisnes and 
 Ham, which he subdued with great facility ; and thus, 
 in less than four weeks, he expelled the English from all those 
 possessions on the continent which they had enjoyed since the 
 time of Edward the Third, and in the acquisition of which that 
 victorious prince had, after the battle of Cressy, employed a 
 numerous army for near a twelvemonth. 
 
 The remaining part of the winter was spent in preparing for 
 The red uc- the next campaign: and, on the part of the French, pre- 
 tionofThi- parations were carried on with the utmost diligence, 
 onvilie. no ^. on iy j n France Hut in Germany, where forces were 
 levied to the amount of four thousand horse and fourteen thousand 
 foot. These troops the duke of Guise received in Lorrain ; and 
 then he marched with his whole forces united, and invested 
 Thionville, a city of great importance in the province of Luxem- 
 burg. The garrison, which consisted of eighteen hundred men, 
 made a vigorous defence ; but, as the vigilance of Guise rendered 
 all attempts to introduce supplies impracticable, they were soon 
 obliged to capitulate. 
 
 While the duke of Guise was thus employed in Luxemburg, the 
 The battle mareschal de Thermes, an old experienced commander, 
 of Grave- who had been appointed governor of Calais, having col- 
 imes. lected an army of ten thousand foot and fifteen hundred 
 horse, invaded Flanders, took and destroyed Dunkirk, together 
 with some other places of smaller note, and penetrated as far 
 as Nieuport, laying waste the country with fire and sword. 
 Philip sent count Egmont, with an army superior in number, 
 to oppose him. On the Count’s approach, de Thermes retired 
 hastily towards Gravelines, intending to continue his march to 
 Calais, along the shore, without risking a battle. But the 
 impetuosity and ardour of count Egmont, who advanced towards 
 him with great rapidity, put it out of his power to execute this 
 design. His men too were loaded with the spoil of the ravaged 
 country, which, whilst it retarded their march, contributed 
 not a little to accelerate the progress of the enemy. He had 
 time, however, to repass the river A a ; but, finding it impossible 
 any longer to avoid an engagement, he drew up his army advan- 
 tageously on a plain, where the enemy could not attack him but 
 in front, nor avail themselves of the superiority of their number. 
 He placed his carriages with the baggage and plunder on the 
 south, and had the sea upon the north, and the mouth of the Aa 
 behind him. In this posture he waited for the enemy ; and, being 
 fully prepared for their reception, he made considerable havoc 
 among them with his artillery as they advanced. This served 
 only to quicken the approach of the Flemings, and to bring on 
 
 1 Thuanus, 1. 20. Van Meteren, p. 18. Carte’s Hist, of England; 
 
38 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 the sooner a close fight, in which almost every part of both armies 
 was engaged, troop with troop, and man with man. The French 
 were rendered desperate by their situation in an enemy’s country, 
 where they could not escape without conquering; and the Flemings 
 were animated, partly by revenge for the outrages that had been 
 committed by the enemy, and partly by the desire of recovering 
 the spoil which they had carried off. The battle was obstinate 
 and bloody, and the issue remained for some time doubtful. It 
 would probably have been sooner decided, if the Germans in count 
 Egmont’s army had shown an equal regard with the Flemings to 
 the exhortations and example of their general, who not only acted 
 the part of a prudent commander, but often mingled with the 
 foremost combatants, and gave conspicuous proofs of the most 
 heroic valour. The French, however, still maintained their ground, 
 and seemed resolved either on death or victory ; when, fortu- 
 nately for count Egmont, some English ships of war, which 
 happened to be cruising upon the coast, perceiving the smoke, and 
 conjecturing the occasion of it, entered the river, and began to 
 discharge their guns upon the French army. Although they did 
 not approach near enough to do much execution, yet so unexpected 
 an event in the time of battfe, could not fail to produce an alarm 
 even in the most resolute, and it threw the cavalry into confusion. 
 Count Egmont improved, w 7 ith great dexterity, the advantage 
 which was thus presented to him ; and, pushing forward with all 
 his force, he broke their ranks and dispersed them. The infantry, 
 intimidated, turned their backs and fled. Near two thousand 
 veteran troops were slain on the field of battle. Many were 
 drowned in the river ; and some were killed by the peasants, in 
 revenge for the devastation of their country. A small number 
 only made their escape. The mareschal De Thermes, who was 
 grievously wounded, and several other persons of distinction, 
 besides three thousand common soldiers, were taken prisoners. 
 All the artillery and baggage fell into the hands of the victors ; 
 whose loss did not exceed four hundred men a . 
 
 Philip was now at liberty to employ all his forces united against 
 the duke of Guise. Having almost exhausted his finances by the 
 extraordinary effort which he made in the first campaign, and 
 having found it impossible to draw any considerable supplies from 
 England, it was late in the season before he could assemble an 
 army of sufficient strength. But after the mareschal De Thermes 
 was defeated, and count Egmont’s victorious troops were com- 
 bined with those under the duke of Savoy, the armies of the two 
 monarchs were nearly a match for one another, and consisted, 
 each of them, of more than forty thousand men. 
 
 They came in sight of each other upon the borders of Picardy, 
 
 ■ Thuanus, lib. xx. Van Mctcren, p. 116. Harscus, tom. ii. p. 698. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 39 
 
 1558.] 
 
 where the duke of Savoy pitched his camp near Dourlens, and 
 Anlriety of the duke of Guise in the neighbourhood of Pierrepont. 
 Philip and Both kings discovered that anxiety which it was natural 
 Henry. f or ^hem to feel in their present critical situation ; and 
 though they placed entire confidence in their generals, they 
 could not be at ease while they remained at a distance from the 
 scene of action, and therefore they repaired, each of them, to 
 his respective camp. Many skirmishes happened with various 
 success. But it soon appeared that neither of the two monarchs 
 was inclined to risk a general engagement. The principal strength 
 of both armies consisted in their German forces, and it was 
 apprehended, that if either of the two armies were defeated, the 
 victors as well as the vanquished would be exposed to the injuries 
 and insults of the foreign troops' 3 . 
 
 Besides this consideration, by which both parties were alike 
 They wish affected, there were other motives peculiar to each, 
 for peace. Henry had, from his late misfortunes, learned a degree 
 of caution, which nature had not bestowed on him. He dreaded 
 the event of another battle, in which he must encounter the same 
 generals by whom his troops had been already twice conquered ; 
 and considered that, after his defeat at St. Quentin, it had been 
 owing to the remissness or misconduct of the enemy, more than 
 to his own strength, that his capital had not been taken, and his 
 kingdom overrun. Philip, on the other hand, was, in all military 
 affairs, cautious to excess ; and chose rather to accomplish his 
 designs by political negotiation, in which he judged for himself, 
 than by the operations of war, in which he depended on the 
 abilities of others. Far from being elated with the success which 
 had hitherto accompanied his arms, he was now as desirous of 
 peace, as he had been before averse to entering into the war. 
 This is not to be ascribed either to his moderation, or his freedom 
 from the ambition of extending his power and territories. No 
 prince ever gave more convincing proofs of his being actuated by 
 that ambition ; but having, as was just now hinted, found that his 
 most vigorous exertions had been necessary to assemble the forces 
 which he had brought into the field ; he dreaded, that, in case 
 his present army were defeated, the difficulty of- raising another 
 would be insurmountable 0 . His arms, indeed, had hitherto been 
 crowned with victory ; but none of his generals had entered the 
 lists on equal terms with the duke of Guise ; and he was justly 
 apprehensive with regard to the issue of a battle in which he 
 must contend with a general so highly celebrated for his military 
 genius, and whose enterprises had been so often accompanied 
 with success. 
 
 These considerations derived additional force from Philip’s 
 
 b Meteren ; L. Guicciardini, lib. iii. 
 
 0 Carte says, he received no less than three millions of gold during this war, from 
 
40 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 extreme impatience to return to Spain ; for which, in preference 
 to his other dominions, he discovered, through his whole reign, a 
 warm and partial affection. And his desire of going thither was 
 increased by accounts which he received at this time, that the 
 opinions of the Protestants had made their way into that king- 
 dom. He dreaded the propagation of these opinions, and resolved, 
 as soon as possible, to embrace this opportunity in his native 
 country, in testifying his zeal for the Catholic faith, by showing 
 that he would treat those who opposed it without mercy, in 
 whatever part of his dominions they should be found. 
 
 Such were the motives which made the contending monarchs 
 Negocia- so desirous to put a period to the war. A negociation 
 tions for had been begun for this purpose in the month of August, 
 peace. foy the constable Montmorenci, and William the first 
 prince of Orange. Montmorenci, who beheld with much anxiety 
 the exaltation of the family of Guise, had borne his captivity 
 with great impatience ; and, in order to obtain his liberty, had 
 exerted himself strenuously in removing every obstacle to the 
 establishment of peace. He was permitted to go to Paris on his 
 parole, to treat in person with the King. A marriage was con- 
 cluded about that time between his son and a grand-daughter 
 of the duchess of Valentinois. And by this event, joined to 
 the King’s habitual attachment to him, he recovered all his 
 wonted influence ; and easily persuaded Henry to consent to 
 such terms of accommodation as it was not likely that Philip 
 would reject. 
 
 Plenipotentiaries were soon afterwards named by both princes, 
 and a congress, for discussing their respective claims, appointed 
 to be held at the Abbey of Cercamps, not far from the place 
 where the armies were encamped. The duke of Alva, the prince 
 of Orange, Buy Gomez de Sylva, Granvelle bishop of Arras, and 
 Vigilius, president of the council of state at Brussels, were nomi- 
 nated by Philip; and by Henry, the Constable himself was named, 
 the cardinal of Lorrain, the mareschal of St. Andre, Morvilliers 
 bishop of Orange, and Aubespine the secretary of state. The 
 duchess of Lorrain, whom it highly imported, on account of the 
 vicinity of her dominions, that the two kings should put an end 
 to the war, acted with great assiduity the part of mediator 
 between them. 
 
 The conferences, which were opened in October, were soon 
 afterwards interrupted by the death of Mary Queen of England, 
 who ended her short inglorious reign on the seventeenth of 
 November following. But Elizabeth renewed the powers of the 
 English commissioners, and the congress was resumed in the 
 beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and fifty- 
 1559 ' nine, at Chateau Cambresis d . 
 
 d Forbes’s Full View, p. 1. 
 
1559.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 41 
 
 In removing so many grounds of difference a^ subsisted between 
 Philip and Henry, the plenipotentiaries encountered many diffi- 
 culties ; but the zeal and activity of the Constable, added to the 
 unlimited influence which he had acquired over his master, sur- 
 mounted every obstacle, and soon brought the treaty, so far as 
 Philip, Henry, and the duke of Savoy were concerned, to the 
 desired conclusion. Nothing retarded the signing of it, but the 
 determined obstinacy of the French commissioners in refusing to 
 restore Calais to the Queen of England ; who, on the other hand, 
 declared, that she would not lay down her arms unless that con- 
 quest were restored. Philip thought himself bound in honour to 
 support the claim of Elizabeth ; since it was entirely on his 
 account that the English nation had engaged in the war, and 
 incurred the loss of the place in question. In a political view, 
 likewise, he was desirous that Calais should be restored. He 
 considered that, in some future period, he might derive advantage, 
 as his father had sometimes done, from that facility which the 
 possession of Calais gave the English of invading France. 
 
 But the zeal which Philip discovered on this occasion in behalf 
 of Elizabeth, arose principally from a very different motive. By 
 Mary’s death, his connexion with England had lately been dis- 
 solved, and he had formed the scheme of renewing it, by marrying 
 Elizabeth. The duke of Feria, his ambassador at London, was 
 ordered to propose the marriage, and at the same time to acquaint 
 the Queen, that his master would procure a dispensation for it 
 from the Pope. 
 
 Elizabeth had many motives to deter her from listening to this 
 proposal. Philip’s imperious temper would alone have been a 
 sufficient reason for rejecting it. Besides this, she knew well 
 what apprehensions her sister’s marriage had occasioned among 
 the English, with regard to their liberty and independence ; and 
 that her own popularity was greatly owing to the universal joy 
 which their deliverance from these apprehensions had excited. 
 She considered that her marriage with Philip would be liable to 
 the same objection as that of her father with Catharine of Arra- 
 gon ; and that her accepting of the Pope’s dispensation would be 
 in effect to acknowledge that her mother’s marriage was unlaw- 
 ful, and she herself illegitimate. By doing this, she might secure 
 to herself the protection of Spain, and thereby hold a precarious 
 and dependent authority during Philip’s life ; but she would for- 
 feit for ever the favour of her Protestant subjects, who alone were 
 sincerely attached to her person and government ; while she would 
 throw herself on the mercy of the Catholics, who, considering her 
 as a usurper, would, on the first favourable opportunity of assert- 
 ing the title of the queen of Scotland, think it their duty to 
 deprive her of her crown. 
 
 While, for these reasons, Elizabeth was unalterably determined 
 not to accept of Philip for a husband, she thought it prudent for 
 
42 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF] [Book II. 
 
 some time to conceal her intention ; and she returned such an 
 ambiguous, but obliging answer to his ambassador, that Philip 
 flattered himself with the hopes of success, and actually took 
 some steps to procure a dispensation. As long as there remained 
 any foundation for these hopes, he appeared extremely zealous 
 for the restitution of Calais. But when Elizabeth, finding 
 herself firmly established on the throne, ventured to introduce 
 certain alterations in religion, which discovered her resolution to 
 abolish popery in her dominions, Philip considered this part of 
 her conduct as a sufficient indication of her intentions with 
 regard to him. That zeal with which he had at first espoused 
 her interest, began to abate ; and the English plenipotentiaries 
 dreaded that, without regard to the claim of their mistress, he 
 would not delay much longer to put the finishing hand to his 
 treaty with the King of France 6 . 
 
 Elizabeth at length perceived that it was in vain to hope for 
 recovering Calais by treaty ; and as the situation of her affairs 
 at home rendered it highly inexpedient to employ force, she 
 wisely resolved to give it up on the following conditions : that 
 Henry should restore it before the end of eight years, or pay 
 500,000 crowns ; that foreign merchants, not subjects of France, 
 should give security for the money ; that hostages should be 
 delivered till that security were procured; and that, whether 
 the money were paid or not, Elizabeth’s claim should remain 
 valid, unless, within the time specified, she should commit hostili- 
 ties against the subjects of the French king. 
 
 Towards his other allies, Philip’s conduct was perfectly con- 
 Peace con- formable to the dictates of the strictest honour. He 
 eluded. procured the restitution of Montserrat to the duke of 
 Mantua ; of Bouillon to the bishop of Liege ; of the Isle of 
 Corsica to the Genoese ; and of all the towns which the French 
 had seized in Savoy, Piedmont, and Bresse, to the duke of 
 Savoy. This peace was advantageous to himself, as well as to the 
 princes in alliance with him. He recovered Thionville, Marien- 
 burgh, Montmedi, and all the other places which had been taken 
 by the French generals during the war, and acquired the sove- 
 reignty of the county of Charolois f . 
 
 In return for the many concessions made by Henry, that 
 monarch received no other compensation but St. Quentin, and 
 the two unimportant towns of Ham and Catelet. While his 
 people, therefore, rejoiced at the conclusion of the war, which 
 
 e If it is likewise true, that he made an offer to Elizabeth, of continuing the war till she 
 should recover what she had lost, upon condition that she too would engage to carry it on 
 for a certain term of years ; it would then seem, that he gave little reason for accusing 
 him, as r some authors have done, of having acted ungenerously towards his English allies. 
 But as this circumstance is omitted by the principal historians, and contradicts what is said 
 of his coldness with regard to the interest of Elizabeth, I have not ventured to advance it 
 as an undoubted fact. Burnet, part ii. p. 383. 
 f Mcteren, p. 24. Guicciardini, lib. iii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 43 
 
 1559 .] 
 
 had sometimes excited in their minds the most dreadful appre- 
 hensions, they complained bitterly of the inequality of the terms 
 of peace, and were highly exasperated against the Constable ; 
 who, in order to accomplish his private views, had abused the 
 too easy temper of his master, and made a sacrifice of the 
 interests and the honour of France. Montmorenci durst not 
 have counselled Henry to consent to such disadvantageous terms, 
 had he not devised the expedient of giving Elizabeth, Henry’s 
 eldest daughter, in marriage to Philip, and Margaret, his sister, 
 to the duke of Savoy. These marriages served, in some mea- 
 sure, as an excuse for the ample concessions made to these two 
 princes ; since honourable settlements were thereby obtained for 
 the daughter and sister of the King. 
 
 Amidst that attention which Philip and Henry bestowed, in 
 this treaty, on their political and civil interests, religion was not 
 forgotten. They bound themselves mutually to maintain the 
 Catholic faith in their dominions ; and to procure g the convoca- 
 tion of a general council, for suppressing heresy, and restoring 
 tranquillity to the church. 
 
 It is not to be doubted, that Henry would have fulfilled this 
 Death of article of the treaty with the same exactness which he 
 Henr y- observed in executing the other articles ; but a sudden 
 period was put to his life, in a few months after the peace was 
 signed, by an accident which happened in the time of the rejoic- 
 ings celebrated on account of his sister’s marriage. Having 
 entered the lists at a tournament with the count of Montgomery, 
 captain of his guards, the count’s lance broke on Henry’s corslet, 
 and a splinter of it having pierced his right eye, inflicted a 
 wound of which he died in a few days, at the age of forty. 
 
 This melancholy event made no alteration with respect to 
 the treaty of peace. The duke of Alva had some time before 
 espoused Elizabeth, in his master’s name ; and Margaret’s mar- 
 riage with Emanuel was celebrated privately in a chapel of the 
 palace. 
 
 The courtiers and the people of France were affected variously 
 State of by Henry’s death. The Constable lost thereby all the 
 France, fruits of his late intrigues, and was soon afterwards 
 obliged to retire from court, and to resign that power, which he 
 had shown himself so solicitous to attain, into the hands of his 
 enemies. 
 
 The young king, Francis the Second, a prince equally weak in 
 Francis II body and in mind, was entirely governed by his wife, 
 
 ' the celebrated Mary Queen of Scots ; who was blindly 
 devoted to her uncles, the cardinal of Lorrain and the duke of 
 Guise. These two men engrossed almost the whole administra- 
 tion of the kingdom; admitting only the queen-mother to a 
 
 k Padre Paolo, Hist, lib, v. 
 
4 4 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book II. 
 
 share of it, from their knowledge of her ambitious, intriguing 
 spirit, and the dread which they entertained of her influence, as 
 a mother, over the feeble mind of Francis. They showed no 
 moderation in the exercise of the power which they had usurped ; 
 but seized on every advantage for themselves, and laid hold of 
 every opportunity to humble and mortify their adversaries. The 
 princes of the blood, with Lewis, prince of Conde, at their head, 
 bore with extreme impatience the insignificance to which they 
 were reduced; and resolved to embrace the first occasion that 
 should offer, to vindicate their right to that share in the manage- 
 ment of affairs, to which they thought themselves entitled by 
 their birth, and the ancient practice of the realm h . 
 
 While the great men in France were thus animated against 
 each other by considerations of a political nature, the people 
 were violently agitated, and their minds inflamed by religious 
 controversies. Under the reign of Henry, the Calvinists had 
 suffered the most cruel persecution ; yet they had multiplied 
 exceedingly during that period in every quarter of the kingdom. 
 The duke of Guise and the cardinal of Lorrain kept alive the 
 flames of persecution against them, and on all occasions appeared 
 intent on their destruction. This alone w T ould have determined 
 the prince of Conde and his adherents to espouse the Protestant 
 cause ; for even although we should not believe that the chiefs in 
 either party were sincere in their religious profession, yet it can- 
 not be supposed they would have failed to embrace so specious a 
 pretext as the differences in religion afforded them to palliate 
 their conduct. The prince of Conde would instantly have had 
 recourse to arms, if the Admiral, more prudent and sagacious, 
 had not prevailed on him to suspend his resolution till a more 
 favourable juncture ; but it was impossible that passions so vio- 
 lent as those by which both parties were impelled, could be kept 
 long under restraint ; and to every person capable of reflecting 
 on what he saw passing before him, it was apparent that the 
 nation was upon the eve of a civil war. 
 
 France has in no period produced a more remarkable assem- 
 blage of great men than in the present and the succeeding 
 reigns ; and had there been a prince upon the throne possessed 
 of abilities sufficient to control their inordinate ambition, the 
 French nation might have much sooner reached that degree of 
 greatness and prosperity, which it attained towards the conclu- 
 sion of the following century : but this mighty kingdom, pos- 
 sessed of every advantage which nature bestows, became a scene 
 of devastation and misery for almost forty years, through the 
 misapplication of those very talents, which, if they had been 
 properly employed, would have rendered it prosperous and happy. 
 
 Nothing could be more desirable to Philip than this confusion, 
 
 h Davila ; Castelnau, ab initio ; and Additions aux Memoircs dc Castelnau. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 45 
 
 1559 .] 
 
 and the debility consequent upon it, in that nation, from which 
 alone he had reason to expect opposition to his designs. It left 
 him at liberty to pursue whatever measures he should think pro- 
 per for the confirmation and increase of his power in Spain, 
 Italy, and the Netherlands ; and it gave no small reason to the 
 other European powers to apprehend that France itself would 
 fall under the Spanish yoke. 
 
 In Italy the state of affairs was no less favourable to Philip’s 
 State of views than in France. He was now the sole and undis- 
 Itiiiy. puted sovereign of the duchy of Milan, and the kingdom 
 of Naples and Sicily. His inveterate enemy, Paul the Fourth, 
 was lately dead ; and Pius the Fourth, who was no less devoted 
 to his interest than Paul had been adverse, was raised to the 
 papal throne. The republic of Genoa, the dukes of Savoy, 
 Mantua, Tuscany, and Parma, were his allies, whom he had 
 bound to his interest by the strongest ties ; the three first, by 
 procuring for them the restitution of their dominions from the 
 French king; the fourth, by granting him the investiture of 
 Sienna ; and the last, by ceding to him the city of Placentia 
 and its territory. 
 
 After the conclusion of the peace, nothing remained to render 
 Philip uneasy, either in his own dominions, or in the neighbouring 
 kingdoms, but the progress which the reformers had made, and 
 were still making, in almost every country in Europe. From 
 Germany and Switzerland, where the Reformation took its rise, 
 it had spread with the most astonishing rapidity. It had become 
 the established religion, not only in several of the considerable 
 provinces and free cities in Germany, and the cantons in Switzer- 
 land, but likewise in the kingdoms of England, Scotland, Sweden, 
 and Denmark ; and in some of those states where the ancient 
 religion still maintained its ground, the Protestants were grown 
 so numerous as to be extremely formidable to their opponents. 
 
 From the constant intercourse which subsists between Ger- 
 many and the Netherlands, it was impossible but the new 
 opinions must have been early propagated from the former to 
 the latter; and accordingly, in the month of May 1521, the 
 Emperor Charles had published an edict, in which all the 
 penalties of high treason were pronounced against those who 
 should be found guilty of holding any of Luther’s tenets ; or of 
 re-publishing, or vending, any books written by him or his 
 followers. In the execution of this edict, which Charles from 
 time to time renewed, all the fury of persecution was exercised ; 
 and it is affirmed by several cotemporary historians, that during 
 the reign of Charles fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the Low 
 Countries were put to death on account of their religious prin- 
 ciples. These principles, however, far from being extirpated, 
 were more and more diffused in the midst of those severities 
 which were employed to suppress them. 
 
40 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book II. 
 
 Philip was not ignorant of the progress which they had made ; 
 and it gave him the greater uneasiness, because, being exceed- 
 ingly desirous of setting out for Spain, he would be obliged to 
 commit the business of extirpating heresy from the Netherlands 
 to others, whom he could not suppose possessed of the same 
 fervent zeal against it of which he himself was conscious. In 
 order to prevent as much as possible the inconveniences which 
 might arise from his absence, he had gone from his camp at 
 Dourlens to Brussels, and had been employed during the winter 
 season in settling the government of the provinces. 
 
1559.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 47 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 The provinces, which, on account of their situation, are called 
 Ancient the Netherlands, were long governed by their respec- 
 state of the tive princes, under the titles of dukes, marquises, or 
 Netherlands. coun t s . These princes were for many years engaged 
 in perpetual wars with the neighbouring powers, or with one 
 another ; and as they had frequent occasions, during these wars, 
 to have recourse to the people for supplies, the cities, the nobles, 
 and ecclesiastics, acquired, in return, several rights and privileges, 
 by which the provinces partook more of the nature of republics 
 than of regal governments. The supreme authority was lodged 
 in the assembly of the States, which had the power of meeting 
 as often as the members thought expedient ; and without the 
 consent of that assembly, no war could be undertaken, no taxes 
 could be imposed, no new laws enacted, no change made in the 
 current coin, and no foreigners admitted into any branch of the 
 administration. The sovereignty descended according to the 
 ordinary laws of hereditary succession ; but no prince was allowed 
 to enter upon the exercise of it, till he had solemnly sworn to 
 observe and maintain the fundamental laws a . 
 
 In this situation these provinces remained for several ages ; 
 till, by the failure of the male line in some of the reigning 
 families, by intermarriages, and by conquests, they fell under the 
 dominion of the house of Burgundy. After this event they still 
 continued to enjoy their ancient privileges, and to be governed 
 according to their old laws ; with this difference only, that 
 whereas all criminal and civil causes had been formerly deter- 
 mined, in the last resort, by the councils of the several provinces, 
 it was established, that parties might appeal from these to the 
 tribunal of Mechlin, which was instituted in order to unite the 
 provinces more closely, and to give them more the appearance 
 of one state. 
 
 Under the administration of the Burgundian princes, and 
 Prosperity even long before their accession to the sovereignty, 
 of the pro- trade and manufactures flourished in the Netherlands 
 vmces. more than in any other European state. No city in 
 those days, except Venice, possessed such extensive commerce as 
 Antwerp. It was the staple, or great mart, of all the northern 
 nations. Bruges was little inferior. Arras was famous for 
 tapestries, which still retain the name of that place. In the 
 
 Grotius de Antiq. Repub. Batav. cap. 5. 
 
48 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 city of Ghent there were many thousand artificers employed in 
 the woollen manufacture, long before the art was known to the 
 English, from whom the wool was purchased by the industrious 
 Flemings. 
 
 For this prosperity the inhabitants of the Netherlands were. 
 Causes in a great measure, indebted to the nature and situation 
 of it- of their country ; which, as it lies in the centre of Europe, 
 commanding the entrance and navigation of several of the great 
 rivers of Germany, and is almost everywhere intersected by these 
 rivers, or by canals and branches of the sea, is admirably fitted 
 both for foreign and domestic or inland trade. This singular 
 advantage, however, could not have enabled the Flemings to 
 leave the other European nations so far behind them, if the form 
 of their civil government had not been peculiarly favourable to 
 their exertions. The greatest advantages which nature affords 
 for improvement in the arts of life, may be rendered useless to 
 the people who possess them, by an injudicious, or tyrannical and 
 oppressive exercise of the civil power ; and universal experience 
 proves how vain it is to expect that men will apply themselves 
 with vigour to commercial pursuits, where their persons are 
 insecure, or where the fruits of their industry may be seized by 
 the rapacious hand of a despotic prince. But, happily for the 
 inhabitants of the Low Countries, the sovereigns of the several 
 provinces (unable, perhaps, from the small extent of their 
 dominions, to execute any plan of tyranny against the people) were, 
 at a very early period, induced to give their consent and sanction 
 to the above-mentioned system of fundamental laws ; by which, 
 although their prerogative was abridged, yet their power and 
 resources were greatly augmented, through that prosperity which 
 their moderate government had enabled their subjects to attain. 
 
 The sovereignty of these flourishing provinces passed from 
 the family of Burgundy into that of Austria, by the marriage of 
 Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold, and sole heiress of his 
 dominions, with Maximilian, son of Frederic the Third, emperor 
 of Germany. This marriage was set on foot and concluded by 
 the Flemings themselves, who, agreeably to their free maxims of 
 government, assumed the direction of the conduct of their princes 
 in this matter, which so nearly concerned their prosperity and 
 safety. 
 
 Lewis the Eleventh of France had demanded her for his son 
 the dauphin ; whilst he most impolitically gave offence to the 
 States, by seizing upon Burgundy and Picardy as fiefs of the 
 kingdom of France. This imprudent step, and the death of the 
 bishop of Liege, uncle of Mary, and a partisan of Lewis, 
 determined the Flemings in their choice. They judged wisely, 
 that their liberty would be safer in the hands of Maximilian, 
 whose hereditary dominions were small, and lay at a distance 
 from them, than in those of a neighbouring prince so powerful as 
 
1559.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 49 
 
 Lewis, who, in all his conduct, had discovered so much injustice 
 and rapacity. 
 
 The Flemings showed the same laudable jealousy of their 
 privileges, after Maximilian’s marriage with their princess, which 
 had influenced them in their choice of him for her husband. 
 About four years after her marriage, Mary died of a bruise 
 which she received by a fall from horseback, when she was big 
 with child. Maximilian, under the name of tutor to his son 
 Philip, assumed the reins of government. The Flemings con- 
 sidered his conduct as an encroachment on their rights, and 
 refused to acknowledge his authority, till the States had ordained 
 that he should be admitted as governor only for a limited time, 
 and upon conditions which they required he should take an oath 
 to fulfil. 
 
 He did not observe these conditions so exactly as they 
 expected. They complained of his conferring offices upon 
 Burgundians and Germans. They were grievously offended 
 with him for introducing foreign troops into the provinces, and 
 apprehended that he had formed a design against their liberty. 
 After he was elected king of the Romans, their suspicions arose 
 to so great a height, that, upon his entering the city of Bruges 
 with a numerous train of attendants, the inhabitants ran to 
 arms, surrounded him in the market-place, seized his person, 
 and confined him in the castle, where they kept him prisoner for 
 several months. The Pope and Emperor interposed in his 
 behalf, but could not obtain his liberty, till he had given security 
 with regard to the several particulars on account of which they 
 had taken offence. 
 
 Of the same jealous attention to their liberty the Flemings 
 Chari s v £ ave P ro °f s during the administration of Maximilian’s 
 
 ar ts ' successors. Under that of his grandson, Charles V., 
 they had real ground of uneasiness. Charles might have easily 
 subdued them, if he had been inclined to use his power so 
 ungenerously, and his arbitrary temper had sufficiently appeared 
 in his government of Spain and Germany ; in both which 
 countries he had trampled on all those rights of the people 
 which had been long esteemed the most inviolable. On several 
 occasions he had introduced foreign troops into the Low 
 Countries ; and it has been asserted b , that he once deliberated 
 whether he should employ them in establishing in the provinces 
 the same sort of arbitrary government which subsisted in his 
 Spanish and Italian dominions. 
 
 But Charles was born in the Netherlands, and had passed there 
 His popu- the pleasantest of his younger days. He loved the 
 krity. people, and was fond of their manners; which resembled 
 his own, and were not so reserved and stately as those of the 
 
 b Grotius, p. 6. 
 
50 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book III. 
 
 Spaniards. From taste and early attachment he kept them 
 always about his person, and had bestowed on them the most 
 important offices in his dominions. To his preceptor, Adrian of 
 Utrecht, who, through his interest, was afterwards advanced to 
 the papacy, he committed the government of Spain ; and Charles 
 de Lanoy, whom he appointed viceroy of Naples, was intrusted 
 with the management of his affairs in Italy for several years, with 
 unlimited authority. In all the wars which he carried on in 
 Germany, and on the frontiers of France, he placed a particular 
 confidence in his Flemish troops ; used the people, when he 
 resided among them, with the most courteous familiarity, and 
 banished from his intercourse with them, that form and ceremony 
 which renders it so difficult for princes either to know that they 
 are beloved, or to show that they deserve it c . 
 
 The Flemings entertained a grateful sense of the kindness with 
 which he treated them. If we except the insurrection of the 
 people of Ghent, there happened almost no disturbance in the 
 Netherlands during his reign. The States assisted him liberally 
 in defraying the expense of those wars in which he was almost 
 continually engaged, and discovered, at all times, a warm attach- 
 ment to his person. 
 
 Charles would gladly have transmitted to his son the affection 
 which he bore towards his Flemish subjects ; and for this purpose 
 he had, as above related, brought him to Flanders in his youth, 
 in order to reconcile him to the manners and customs of the 
 people. And afterwards, when he himself had resolved to retire 
 from the world, and to leave the government of his dominions in 
 the hands of Philip, he exhorted him, with much earnestness, to 
 cultivate the affections of the Flemings, and to govern them 
 according to those laws to which they had been so long accus- 
 tomed, and were so strongly attached. 
 
 But Philip could not enter into his father’s views. He had 
 Of Philip never made any considerable stay in the Netherlands; 
 His unpo- and could not be fond of a people whose manners were so 
 puiar beha- different from his own. In Spain, where he received his 
 education, he had been taught the most superstitious 
 reverence for the Holy See, and had imbibed the most extrava- 
 gant ideas of the extent of regal authority. Charles was not, in 
 reality, less fond of power ; but in him ambition was, in some 
 measure, tempered and corrected by his acquaintance with the 
 world ; whereas in Philip, it was perverted and inflamed by the 
 sentiments of an illiberal, cruel, gloomy superstition. 
 
 The Flemings had long perceived and lamented the difference 
 The Fie- between the character of their late, and that of their 
 raings jea- present sovereign. Philip had taken the usual oath, by 
 lous of hitn. w p 1 | c p 1 j ie hound himself to maintain their privileges ; and 
 
 c Bcntivoglio, p. 4. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 51 
 
 I55y.] 
 
 had made them the strongest professions of regard and affection. 
 But they judged of his disposition towards them from his conduct, 
 rather than from his oath or his professions. They were not 
 admitted, whilst he lived amongst them, to any share of his trust 
 and confidence ; and, in violation of their fundamental laws, he 
 committed the administration of the most important branches of 
 government to the bishop of Arras, a Burgundian ; or to his 
 Spanish ministers, Buy Gomez de Sylva, prince of Eboli, and the 
 dukes of Feria and Alva, whom the Flemings considered as 
 enemies to their nation, and strenuous abettors of that despotic 
 pow T er, to which, from the beginning of Philip’s reign, they had 
 suspected that he aspired. 
 
 It was not long before he gave them convincing proof how well 
 The edicts grounded their fears were with regard to his intentions, 
 against the by the measures which he employed for extinguishing the 
 protest- new opinions in religion. These opinions had been of late 
 diffused through every corner of the Netherlands ; having 
 been imported thither, partly by foreign merchants who came to 
 reside there, and partly by the Swiss and German troops, whom 
 both Charles and Philip had employed in their wars against 
 France; but chiefly by’ the English, French, and German Pro- 
 testants, who had fled from the persecutions which were carried 
 on against them in their native countries. 
 
 Charles had, as mentioned in the preceding book, shown the 
 same inclination to extirpate the reformed religion in the Nether- 
 lands, which he had discovered in Germany ; and had, for this 
 purpose, published several edicts against the Protestants, many 
 of whom had suffered the most cruel death d . 
 
 Great numbers had begun to leave the provinces and to trans- 
 port their families and effects to the neighbouring states. Charles 
 was moved with the representation which he received of this 
 event, from the regent his sister, the queen dowager of Hungary. 
 He felt for the calamities of the people, and he dreaded the 
 consequences of depopulating a country from which he had often 
 received the most effectual assistance and support. 
 
 But these considerations had no degree of influence on Philip. 
 He republished the edicts, and ordered the governors and magis- 
 trates to carry them into rigorous execution. 
 
 In these edicts it was enacted, that all persons who held any 
 erroneous opinion should be deprived of their offices, and degraded 
 from their rank. It w r as ordained, that whoever should be con- 
 victed of having taught heretical doctrines, or of having been 
 present at the religious meetings of heretics, should, if they were 
 men, be put to death by the sword ; and if women, be buried 
 
 d It is almost incredible that the number of those who suffered could amount to 50,000, 
 yet this is affirmed by several historians. Meteren calls the number 50,000. Grotius, 
 p. 12, calls it 100,000. F. Paul, lib. v. calls it 50,000. 
 
 E 2 
 
 u. OF ILL. LIB. 
 
52 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 alive. Such were the punishments denounced even against those 
 who repented of their errors and forsook them ; while all who 
 persisted in them were condemned to the flames. And even those 
 who afforded shelter to heretics in their houses, or who omitted 
 to give information against them, were subjected to the same 
 penalties as heretics themselves. 
 
 Philip was not satisfied with publishing and executing these 
 The Inqui- cruel edicts. He likewise established a particular tri- 
 sition. bunal for the extirpation of heresy, which, although it 
 was not called by the name of Inquisition, had all the essentials 
 of that iniquitous institution. Persons were committed to prison 
 upon bare suspicion, and put to the torture on the slightest evi- 
 dence. The accused were not confronted with their accusers, or 
 made acquainted with the crimes for which they suffered. The 
 civil judges were not allowed to take any further concern in 
 prosecutions for heresy, than to execute the sentences which the 
 inquisitors had pronounced. The possessions of the sufferers 
 were confiscated ; and informers were encouraged, by an assur- 
 ance of impunity in case they themselves were guilty, and by the 
 promise of rewards 6 . 
 
 It is not surprising, that the establishment of this arbitrary 
 tribunal should have occasioned disquietude in the Netherlands. 
 It had created disturbance even in Spain and Italy, where the 
 people could not boast so much as the Flemings of their civil rights ; 
 and had been strenuously opposed by many who were sincerely 
 attached to the Catholic religion. In the Flemings it excited the 
 most frightful apprehensions. They considered it as utterly 
 subversive of their liberty. They dreaded the ruin of their 
 commerce, which could not subsist unless the foreign merchants, 
 many of whom were Protestants, could reside among them with 
 safety. The new opinions had been propagated throughout all 
 the provinces, and men knew not how far the inquisitors might 
 extend their power, or how great a number might be found liable 
 to punishments that were denounced, not only against heretics 
 themselves, but against all those who were suspected to befriend 
 them. 
 
 To these causes of discontent Philip added another, by increas- 
 New erec- in g the number of bishoprics from five to seventeen, the 
 tion of bi- number of the provinces. This measure, which would not 
 shopncs. an y other time have given much offence, was in the 
 present juncture universally disagreeable. Granvelle, bishop of 
 Arras, was the chief adviser of it ; nor did he and the king's other 
 counsellors scruple to acknowledge, that their intention in pro- 
 moting it, was to have at all times a sufficient number of persons 
 in the Netherlands, upon whose zeal the king could rely for a 
 vigorous execution of the edicts. 
 
 Grotius, Annales, lib. i. 
 
1559.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 53 
 
 The new bishops were therefore considered as so many new 
 inquisitors. Their creation was regarded as an encroachment on 
 the privileges of the provinces, and a violation, on the part of the 
 king, of the oath which he had taken at his accession, to preserve 
 the church in the condition in which he found it. The principal 
 nobility were particularly averse to this innovation, because the 
 number of the counsellors of state was thereby greatly aug- 
 mented, and consequently the influence of the ancient members of 
 the council was impaired, and the balance of power thrown into 
 the hands of the clergy ; who, they doubted not, would on all 
 occasions show themselves ready to support the arbitrary mea- 
 sures of the sovereign. But no sect of men exclaimed so loudly 
 as the monks and abbots, whose opposition was inflamed by 
 motives both of ambition and interest. For besides that they 
 would be obliged to yield the precedency to the bishops, and have 
 much less weight than hitherto in the assemblies of the States, it 
 was out of their revenues that the new bishoprics were to be 
 endowed. They were therefore highly incensed. They laboured 
 to connect their private interest with that of the public ; and 
 represented the new erection as no less pernicious to the country 
 in general, than it was to their order in particular 1 ". 
 
 Besides the grievances enumerated, the Flemings complained 
 Spanish bitterly, that in the midst of peace the provinces were 
 troops in filled with Spanish soldiers. They had ever esteemed 
 the Nether- it one of their most valuable privileges, that, according 
 to their fundamental laws, no foreign troops could be 
 brought into the Netherlands. Charles indeed had often intro- 
 duced them in the course of his wars with France, and with the 
 Protestants in Germany. But the Flemings had been dazzled 
 with the glory which generally attended that monarch’s arms, 
 and had not entertained the same jealousy of his intentions as 
 of those of Philip ; who, they could not help thinking, had 
 formed a design to reduce them under a despotic government ; 
 and had, with this view, deferred so long the dismission of his 
 Spanish troops. Their discontent was greatly increased by the 
 insolent and rapacious behaviour of these troops ; which in 
 Zealand was so intolerable, that the people actually refused to 
 work at their dykes, saying, that they chose rather to be swal- 
 lowed up by the ocean, than to remain a prey to the cruelty and 
 avarice of the Spanish soldiers g . 
 
 Such was the state of affairs, and such the temper of the 
 people, when Philip, intending to set out for Spain, was deli- 
 berating concerning a proper person to whom he might commit 
 the government of the Netherlands. 
 
 He hesitated for some time between Christina, the duchess of 
 
 f Bentivoglio, lib. i. 
 
 B . These soldiers were not removed till the year following, when Philip had occasion for 
 them elsewhere. Reidanus, p. 5. Meursii Auriacus, near the beginning. 
 
54 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 The Du- Lorrain, his cousin, and Margaret, duchess of Parma, 
 Par in ) a na ^ ura ^ daughter of the late Emperor. The former 
 pointed^ h a< l distinguished herself by her prudent conduct in the 
 regent. government of Lorrain after her husband’s death, and 
 had lately acquired considerable reputation by her nego- 
 tiations in the treaty of peace at Chateau-Cambresis. From 
 the vicinity of Lorrain to the Low Countries, the Flemings were 
 well acquainted with her character ; and, as they had groaned 
 under the burden of the French war, and had now begun to 
 taste, with gratitude, the fruits of that peace which Christina’s 
 wisdom had contributed to procure for them, they were exceed- 
 ingly desirous that the government of the provinces should be 
 left in her hands. But Philip had good reason for the prefer- 
 ence which he gave to the duchess of Parma. The dukes of 
 Lorrain were, from their situation, in some measure dependent 
 upon the crown of France; whereas the duchy of Parma was 
 surrounded with Philip’s Italian dominions ; and the duke and 
 duchess were willing to send their son, the celebrated Alexander 
 Farnese, prince of Parma, to the court of Spain ; on pretence 
 of being educated there, but, in truth, as a pledge of that 
 implicit obedience which the duchess engaged to yield to the 
 king’s injunctions in her government of the provinces 11 . 
 
 As Philip did not intend to return soon to the Netherlands, 
 he thought proper, before his departure, to summon a conven- 
 tion of the States ; which was accordingly held in Ghent. He 
 was present himself, accompanied by the new regent, at the first 
 opening of that assembly ; but as he could not speak the language 
 of the country, he employed the bishop of Arras to address the 
 deputies in his name. 
 
 The bishop began his speech with informing them of the 
 The bishop king’s resolution of going to Spain, and the reasons 
 of Arras’s which rendered his journey thither necessary. He 
 the^St t° ex P a ti a ^ e( l on Ike affection which Philip bore towards 
 e tates. |^ g jjq em j s b subjects ; to whom his family had been so 
 much indebted for that ascendant and influence, which had 
 given them possession of such extensive territories. His affairs 
 in Spain, he hoped, would not detain him long ; but, in case 
 they should, he promised to send his son to reside in the Nether- 
 lands. In the mean time, he earnestly exhorted the States to 
 study to preserve the public peace ; and to this end he thought 
 that nothing could conduce so mtich, as the extirpation of heresy, 
 which, whilst it set men at variance with God, put arms into 
 their hands against their civil sovereign. They ought therefore 
 zealously to maintain the purity of their ancient faith, and for 
 this purpose, to execute with vigour the several edicts published 
 for the suppression of heresy. In this, and every other measure, 
 
 h Bentivoglio. 
 
1559.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 55 
 
 he hoped that they would concur cheerfully with the duchess 
 of Parma, whom he had appointed regent in his absence. He 
 would leave the Netherlands, impressed with the deepest sense 
 of that fidelity and affection which his subjects there had ever 
 shown him ; and would, as soon as possible, remove the foreign 
 troops, and deliver the people from every other burden which the 
 exigency of his affairs had made it necessary to impose k . 
 
 The answer of the States to this speech contained the warmest 
 sentiments of affection and loyalty. But, before the convention 
 was dissolved, Philip perceived that the deputies were far from 
 being satisfied with every part of his administration. They had 
 expected that the troops would have been immediately trans- 
 ported to Spain, and could not discover any reason for keeping 
 them longer in the Low Countries, but such as filled their minds 
 with terror. Their suspicion that the Inquisition was about to 
 be established in the Netherlands, excited the most disquieting 
 apprehensions. There were some of the deputies, who scrupled 
 not openly to remonstrate, That the Low Countries had never 
 been accustomed to an institution of so much rigour and severity : 
 That the people trembled at the very name of the Inquisition, 
 and would fly to the remotest corners of the earth rather than 
 submit to it : That it was not by fire and sword, but by the 
 gentlest and softest remedies, that the evil complained of must 
 be cured : That as each individual had a habit or constitution 
 of body peculiar to himself, so every nation had a peculiar 
 temperament or character : That what might be suitable to 
 Spain or Italy, would be extremely unfit for the Netherlands ; 
 and that, in general, the nations in the southern parts of the 
 world could live happily under a degree of restraint which would 
 render the northern nations extremely miserable l . 
 
 These and such other representations were addressed to the 
 Philip re. King himself by some of the deputies, who endeavoured 
 fuses to gra- to persuade him to annul, or at least to moderate, the 
 tify them. €( ]i c t s . But on this head Philip was inexorable. And 
 when one of his ministers represented, that, by persisting in the 
 execution of these edicts, he might kindle the seeds of rebellion, 
 and thereby lose the sovereignty of the provinces ; he replied, 
 44 That he had much rather be no King at all, than have heretics 
 for his subjects™.” 
 
 His religion, which was of all superstitions the most into- 
 lerant ; his temper of mind, which was naturally haughty and 
 severe ; his pride, which would have been wounded by yielding 
 to what he had repeatedly declared he would never yield ; his 
 engagements with the Pope, and an oath which he had taken to 
 devote his reign to the defence of the Popish faith and the 
 
 Bentivoglio, p. 9. 1 Bentivoglio, lib. i. 
 
 in Ch’egli voleva piu tosto rcstar senza regni, chc possedei'gli con heresia. Bentivoglio, 
 p. 10. 
 
56 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 extirpation of heresy ; above all, his thirst for despotic power, 
 with which he considered the liberties claimed in religious 
 matters by the Protestants as utterly incompatible ; all these 
 causes united, rendered him deaf to the remonstrances which 
 were made to him, and fixed him unalterably in his resolution 
 to execute the edicts with the utmost rigour. He showed him- 
 self equally inflexible with regard to the new bishoprics ; nor 
 would he consent at this time to withdraw the Spanish soldiers. 
 In order, however, to lessen the odium arising from his refusal, 
 he offered the command of these troops to the prince of Orange 
 and count Egmont, the two ablest and most popular noblemen 
 in the Netherlands ; the former of whom he had appointed 
 governor of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht; and the latter of 
 Artois and Flanders. Both of them declined accepting of the 
 offer which was made to them ; and had the courage to declare, 
 that they considered the continuance of the troops in the Low 
 Countries, after peace had been established with France, as a 
 violation of the fundamental laws of the constitution. 
 
 Count Egmont, descended from the dukes of Guelderland, 
 Count and one of the most accomplished noblemen in the 
 Egmont. Netherlands, having lately gained immortal honour by 
 the victories of St. Quentin and Gravelines, had just ground to 
 expect the highest rewards in the power of Philip to bestow. 
 
 The prince of Orange, so well known in history by the name 
 William I. of William the First, was the representative of the 
 prince of ancient and illustrious family of Nassau, in Germany. 
 Orange. From liis ancestors, one of whom had been Emperor of 
 Germany, he inherited several rich possessions in the Nether- 
 lands ; and he had succeeded to the principality of Orange by 
 the will of Bene Nassau and Chalons, his cousin-german, in the 
 year 1544. From that time the late Emperor had kept him 
 perpetually about his person, and had early discovered in him 
 all those extraordinary talents which rendered him afterwards 
 one of the most illustrious personages of the age. Both he and 
 count Egmont had aspired to the regency ; and their declining 
 to accept of the command of the Spanish troops was, by some, 
 ascribed to the chagrin occasioned by their disappointment n . 
 The prince of Orange, after dropping his own pretensions, had 
 expressed his desire to have the regency bestowed on the duchess 
 of Lorrain ; and this discovery of William’s inclination is said 
 to have been a principal motive with Philip, and his Spanish 
 counsellors, for conferring it on the duchess of Parma. Nor 
 were they satisfied with thwarting him in this. He had begun 
 and made some progress in a treaty of marriage with one of the 
 princesses of Lorrain. In this measure likewise they opposed 
 him, from an apprehension, it was pretended, that so close a 
 
 Ferreras, tom. ix. Crolius, [>. 4 — 0. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 57 
 
 1559.] 
 
 connexion with a family of so great influence, and whose terri- 
 tories lay so near the Netherlands, would give him an accession 
 of power that might be dangerous in the hands of a person whose 
 loyalty there was reason to suspect. 
 
 It does not, however, appear, that before the assembly of the 
 Causes of States, Philip had any just ground for his suspicions of 
 Philip’s William’s conduct ; and there is only one circumstance 
 alienation recorded to which they can be ascribed. The prince, 
 from him. having been sent to France as an hostage for the execu- 
 tion of some articles of the peace of Chateau-Cambresis, had, 
 during his residence there, discovered a scheme formed by the 
 French and the Spanish monarchs for the extirpation of the 
 Protestants. This scheme he had communicated to such of 
 his friends in the Netherlands as had embraced the reformed 
 religion, and from that time the king ceased to treat him with 
 his wonted confidence 0 . 
 
 But we find a still more satisfactory account of Philip’s aliena- 
 tion from the Prince, in the jealousy of Granvelle and the 
 Spanish ministers. From his early youth, William had been 
 considered as a principal favourite of the late Emperor, who had 
 on all occasions distinguished him with peculiar marks of his 
 esteem. Charles used to communicate to him his most secret 
 counsels, and had been heard to declare, that the Prince, though 
 scarcely arrived at the years of manhood, had often suggested 
 expedients to him that were of great advantage to his affairs. 
 William was in the twenty- third year of his age when Charles 
 resigned his dominions, yet he had already received several public 
 proofs of the Emperor’s attachment. Not to mention his making 
 choice of him to support him in that august assembly in which 
 he resigned his dofninions, or his bestowing on him, in preference 
 to his other courtiers, the honour of carrying the Imperial crown 
 to his brother Ferdinand ; he had appointed him commander-in- 
 chief of his army, in the absence of the duke of Savoy, when the 
 Prince was only two-and-twenty years old. Against this mea- 
 sure all his counsellors had remonstrated, and had represented to 
 him the superior character of the French generals, the duke de 
 Nevers and the admiral de Coligni. But Charles adhered to his 
 choice, and had no reason afterwards to repent of it. William 
 not only saved the troops while they were under his command 
 from sustaining any misfortune or calamity, but fortified Charle- 
 mont and Philip ville, and thereby secured the frontier of the 
 Netherlands, in spite of the most vigorous efforts which the 
 enemy could make to prevent him. This uncommon degree of 
 attachment that was shown him by the father, was the real 
 cause of the coldness with which he was treated by the son. 
 Granvelle and the Spanish ministers were envious of his rising 
 
 Bentivoglio, p. 6. Thuanus, tom. i. lib. xxii. sect. 10. 
 
58 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 greatness, and took every opportunity to inspire Philip with sus- 
 picions of his designs, and an aversion to his character. Philip 
 was confirmed in his suspicions by William’s refusing to accept 
 of the command of the troops ; and saw that neither he, nor 
 count Egmont, who likewise declined accepting it, were persons 
 on whom he could depend for executing the plan which he had 
 formed for establishing despotism in the provinces. 
 
 He left them, however, in possession of the several govern- 
 ments to which they had been appointed, and still allowed them 
 to hold their places as formerly in the council of state. Their 
 merit, he was sensible, entitled them to all the honours and offices 
 which they enjoyed. He knew how extensive their influence was 
 among the people ; and he was conscious they had been guilty of 
 nothing that could justify him for removing them from their 
 employments ; since, even when their conduct had offended him 
 the most, they had only exercised those rights which, by the 
 fundamental laws of the country, belonged to every inhabitant of 
 the Netherlands. 
 
 But although Philip did not think proper to dismiss them 
 from his service, he resolved that they should not have power to 
 frustrate his intentions. And for this purpose he left, for prin- 
 cipal counsellor to the regent, the bishop of Arras, whose views 
 were entirely coincident with his own, and in whom, therefore, 
 the duchess of Parma was desired to repose unlimited con- 
 fidence. 
 
 Anthony Perenot, bishop of Arras, so well known in the 
 The bishop history of the Netherlands by the name of cardinal 
 of Arras. Granvelle, was son to the celebrated chancellor of that 
 name, whom the late emperor had for many years entrusted with 
 the management of his most important affairs. " 1 Anthony, having 
 been early initiated into business, had been employed by the 
 Emperor for several years in the nicest political negociations, 
 and in some of the highest departments of the state. He was a 
 person of extraordinary abilities, and particularly distinguished 
 for his eloquence, his activity, his industry, and address. Yet 
 he was extremely odious to the people whom he was left to 
 govern, who considered him as the principal author of all their 
 grievances. In the court of Charles, and afterwards in that of 
 Philip, he had acquired habits and principles not unsuitable, per- 
 haps, to the minister of a despotic prince, but which rendered 
 him exceedingly unfit for the government of the Low Countries, 
 where the power of the sovereign was so much limited by the 
 laws. He was naturally choleric and haughty, vain, and osten- 
 tatious of his credit with the king ; and, by an imperious and 
 interested behaviour, had disgusted many of his friends, and 
 inflamed the resentment of his enemies. He was particularly 
 obnoxious to the principal nobility ; and, in the course of his 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 59 
 
 1559.] 
 
 ministry, had been instrumental in disappointing many of them 
 in their most favourite views of ambition and interest?. 
 
 In the hands of a person so universally disliked, it could not 
 reasonably be expected that the government would proceed 
 smoothly. While Philip himself was present, the discontented 
 nobles were overawed. But no sooner was that restraint removed 
 which the king’s presence imposed upon them, than their ill- 
 humour broke out, with a degree of violence that drew after it 
 the most serious and important consequences. 
 
 p Bentivoglio, and Strada, and Dom l’Evesque, tom. i. 
 
no 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Eook IV. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 Philip set sail from the Netherlands with a fleet of near seventy 
 Philip’s ships, on the 20th of August, 1559, and arrived at Loredo, 
 
 arrival in in the province of Biscay, on the 29th. He reached the 
 port in safety, but no sooner had he landed, than a 
 
 Spain. 
 
 dreadful storm arose, in which a part of his fleet was shipwrecked; 
 above a thousand men perished, and a great number of capital 
 paintings, statues, and other curious works of art, were lost, 
 which Charles had been employed during forty years in collecting, 
 in Germany, Italy, and Flanders. 
 
 Philip, animated by a spirit similar to that which prompted 
 him, after the victory of St. Quentin, to consecrate a church to 
 St. Laurence, thought he could not, on this occasion, express his 
 gratitude for his preservation, in a manner more acceptable to 
 the Deity, than by declaring his resolution to dedicate his life 
 to the defence of the Catholic faith, and the extirpation of 
 heresy a . 
 
 As the Spaniards had not for many years enjoyed the presence 
 The * 0 ' of tlieir sovereign, his arrival diffused universal joy 
 the Spaniards throughout the kingdom. His administration before 
 on this his marriage with the queen of England had procured 
 occasion. him the general esteem, and he was now more respected 
 than ever, on account of the signal success with which his arms 
 had been attended in his wars with France, and the moderation 
 and equity which he had displayed in the peace of Chateau- 
 Cambresis. 
 
 The proofs of affection which he received at this time from his 
 Philip’s Spanish subjects, were the stronger, because, although 
 attachment Philip seldom suffered either joy or sorrow to appear in 
 to Spam. hjg i 00 k s ^ his discourse, or behaviour, it was well known 
 how much he was attached to his native country, more than to 
 any of his other dominions ; and it was generally believed, 
 that he intended to fix in it his perpetual residence. His 
 manners were suited only to those of his Spanish subjects ; he 
 could not, as has been already mentioned, speak with facility any 
 other language but theirs, and he possessed not that courage and 
 enterprise by which the late Emperor had been determined to 
 undertake so many voyages and journeys to the different states 
 which were subject to his dominion. The Low Countries had 
 
 Father Paul, lib. v. p. 417. 
 
1559.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN 61 
 
 not, in the eyes of Philip, those charms by which Charles had 
 been so powerfully attracted ; and were particularly disagreeable 
 to him, on account of the restrictions which their free constitu- 
 tion of government imposed on his authority. 
 
 In the beginning of the reign of Charles, Spain was one of the 
 freest states in Europe ; but as the nobles were humbled, and 
 their power abridged, during the arbitrary but vigorous admini- 
 stration of cardinal Ximenes ; so the ill-concerted and unsuc- 
 cessful attempt which the commons of Castile made some years 
 afterwards, to assert their rights, served only to exalt the royal 
 prerogative, which they intended to have circumscribed, and to 
 reduce the Cortes to an entire dependence on the crown. And 
 although in Arragon the people still enjoyed their ancient privi- 
 leges, yet there was little probability that they would ever venture 
 to dispute the will of their prince ; who possessed such inex- 
 haustible resources, and could, when he pleased, employ even 
 their own countrymen, the Castilians, to subdue them. But 
 there was no circumstance which served more to increase Philip’s 
 partiality for Spain, and to make him prefer it to any of his 
 other dominions for the place of his abode, than the full estab- 
 lishment which the court of inquisition had acquired in that 
 kingdom, and the security which this institution afforded him 
 against the propagation of heresy. 
 
 This tribunal, which, although it was not the parent, has been 
 
 Of the the nurse and guardian of ignorance and superstition, 
 inquisition. j n every kingdom into which it has been admitted, was 
 introduced into Spain near a century before the present period, 
 by Ferdinand and Isabella; and was principally intended to 
 prevent the relapse of the Jews and Moors, who had been con- 
 verted, or pretended to be converted, to the faith of the church 
 of Rome. Its jurisdiction was not confined to the Jews and 
 Moors, but extended to all those who, in their practice or 
 opinions, differed from the established church. In the united 
 kingdoms of Castile and Arragon, there were eighteen different 
 inquisitorial courts ; having each of them its counsellors, termed 
 Apostolic Inquisitors; its secretaries, serjeants, and other officers; 
 and besides these, there were twenty thousand familiars dispersed 
 throughout the kingdom, who acted as spies and informers, and 
 were employed to apprehend all suspected persons, and to commit 
 them for their trial, to the prisons which belonged to the inqui- 
 sition. By these familiars, persons were seized on bare suspicion ; 
 and, in contradiction to the common rules of law, they were 
 put to the torture, tried and condemned by the inquisitors, 
 without being confronted either with their accusers, or with the 
 witnesses on whose evidence they were condemned. The punish- 
 ments inflicted were more or less dreadful, according to the 
 caprice and humour of the judges. The unhappy victims were 
 either strangled, or committed to the flames, or loaded with 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 62 
 
 [Book IV. 
 
 chains and shut up in dungeons during life. Their effects were 
 confiscated, and their families stigmatized with infamy b . 
 
 This institution was, no doubt, well calculated to produce a 
 uniformity of religious profession ; but it had a tendency likewise 
 to destroy the sweets of social life ; to banish all freedom of 
 thought and speech ; to disturb men’s minds with the most dis- 
 quieting apprehensions, and to produce the most intolerable 
 slavery, by reducing persons of all ranks of life to a state of abject 
 dependence upon priests ; whose integrity, were it even greater 
 than that of other men, as in every false religion it is less, must 
 have been corrupted by the uncontrollable authority which they 
 were allowed to exercise. 
 
 Such nearly were the sentiments which even the Spaniards 
 entertained of this iniquitous tribunal, at the time when it was 
 erected 0 . But not having had experience then of its pernicious 
 effects, and considering it as intended for the chastisement of 
 Jews and infidels, they only murmured and complained ; till, the 
 yoke being wreathed about their necks, the most secret murmur- 
 ings became dangerous, and often fatal to those who uttered 
 them. 
 
 By this tribunal, a visible change was wrought in the temper 
 Effects of ^ ie P eo P^ e ’ an( ^ reserve, distrust, and jealousy, 
 this institu. became the distinguishing character of a Spaniard. It 
 tion on the perpetuated and confirmed the reign of ignorance and 
 thT^eTlcf su P ers tition. It inflamed the rage of religious bigotry; 
 ie pe°p e. an( ^ crue j spectacles to which, in the execution 
 
 of its decrees, it familiarised the people, it nourished in them 
 that ferocious spirit which, in the Netherlands and America, 
 they manifested by deeds that have fixed an everlasting reproach 
 on the Spanish name. 
 
 But these considerations could not be apprehended by Philip ; 
 nor if they had been suggested to him, would they have had any 
 influence upon his conduct. He had imbibed, in all its virulence, 
 that spirit of bigotry and persecution, which gave birth to the 
 inquisition. He regarded heretics as the most odious of criminals ; 
 and considered a departure in his subjects from the Roman 
 superstition, as the most dreadful calamity that could befal them. 
 He was therefore determined to support the inquisitors with all 
 his power, and he encouraged them to exert themselves in the 
 exercise of their office, with the utmost diligence. 
 
 The zeal and vigilance of these men fully corresponded to that 
 ardour with which their sovereign was inflamed ; yet so irresist- 
 ible in this age was the spirit of innovation, and so great the 
 force of truth, that the opinions of the Reformers had found 
 their way even into Spain, and were embraced openly by great 
 
 b Mariana., lib. xxiv. c. xvi. p. 137. 
 
 c Mariana. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 6?, 
 
 1559.] 
 
 numbers of both sexes, among whom were both priests and 
 nuns. 
 
 Even the archbishop of Toledo, Bartlemi di Caranza y Miranda, 
 Caranza, was, from certain propositions contained in a catechism 
 abp. of which he published, suspected to have espoused them. 
 
 Toledo. The inquisitors informed the King of the grounds of 
 
 their suspicion, and desired to receive his instructions for their 
 conduct. Caranza had been universally respected as one of the 
 most virtuous and learned prelates in Spain. Having, when 
 provincial of the order of St. Dominique, been carried by Philip 
 into England, as a person well qualified to promote the re-estab- 
 lishment of popery in that kingdom, he had laboured with so 
 much zeal for that end, and thereby recommended himself so 
 powerfully to the King, that in the year one thousand five hun- 
 dred and fifty-seven, Philip advanced him to the primacy. His 
 first employment, after attaining this high dignity, was to admi- 
 nister spiritual comfort to the late emperor, whom he attended 
 in his last distress. But the memory of his merit and services 
 was now obliterated. Philip wrote to the inquisitors from the 
 Netherlands, that they must, without hesitation, proceed against 
 the Archbishop as they would do against other delinquents ; and 
 that they should not spare even his own son if they found him 
 guilty of heresy. Caranza was accordingly thrown into prison, 
 and his revenues were sequestrated. The propositions in his 
 catechism, at which the inquisitors had taken offence, were held 
 to be of a disputable nature even among the Catholics themselves. 
 It is probable, however, that sentence would have been pro- 
 nounced against him, had not the Pope interposed, and claimed 
 an exclusive right .to decide the cause. Philip, anxious for the 
 honour of the holy office, to whose power he* was desirous that no 
 bounds should be prescribed, employed all his interest to prevail 
 on the Pontiff to drop his pretensions. But at last he himself 
 yielded ; and Caranza, after having languished in prison for six 
 years and seven months, was transported to Rome, where he 
 was released from confinement, but died in a few weeks after he 
 was set at liberty d . 
 
 Before Philip’s arrival in the city of Valladolid, an Auto-de-fe 
 An Auto- had been celebrated, in which a great number of Protest- 
 de-te at ants were committed to the flames. There were still in 
 Valladolid, th e p r i song G f the inquisition more than thirty persons, 
 against whom the same dreadful punishment had been denounced. 
 Philip, eager to give public proof as early as possible of his 
 witnessed abhorrence of these innovators, desired the inquisitors 
 i>y Philip. q x a f or their execution ; and he resolved to 
 witness it. The dreadful ceremony (more repugnant to humanity, 
 as well as to the spirit of the Christian religion, than the most 
 
 d Ferreras, annis J 559 et 1565. Campana, an. 1559. Mlniana, lib, v. c. xi. 
 
61 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IV. 
 
 abominable sacrifices recorded in the annals of the Pagan world) 
 was conducted with the greatest solemnity which the inquisitors 
 could devise ; and Philip, attended by his son Don Carlos, by his 
 sister, and by his courtiers and guards, sat within sight of the 
 unhappy victims. After hearing a sermon from the bishop of 
 Zamora, he rose from his seat, and having drawn his sword, as a 
 signal, that with it he would defend the holy faith, he took an 
 oath administered to him by the Inquisitor-General, to support 
 the inquisition and its ministers against all heretics and apostates, 
 and to compel his subjects everywhere to yield obedience to its 
 decrees. 
 
 Among the Protestants condemned, there was a nobleman of 
 the name of Don Carlos di Sessa, who, when the executioners 
 were conducting him to the stake, called out to the King for 
 mercy, saying, 44 And canst thou thus, O King ! witness the 
 torments of thy subjects ? save us from this cruel death ; we do 
 not deserve it .’ 1 44 No,” Philip sternly replied, 44 I would myself 
 carry wood to burn my own son, were he such a wretch as thou 6 .” 
 After which he beheld the horrid spectacle that followed, with a 
 composure and tranquillity that betokened the most unfeeling 
 heart. 
 
 This dreadful severity, joined with certain rigid laws, enacted 
 to prevent the importation of Lutheran books, soon produced the 
 desired effect. After the celebration of another Auto-de-fe f , in 
 which about fifty Protestants suffered, all the rest, if there were 
 any who still remained, either concealed their sentiments, or 
 made their escape into foreign parts g . 
 
 Philip proceeded next to settle the civil government of the 
 kingdom ; and according to the Spanish historians, he discovered 
 in the choice of his ministers, and of the governors of towns and 
 provinces, much prudence and circumspection ; of which last, an 
 historian gives the following instance, that, besides making dili- 
 gent inquiry concerning the characters of the several candidates 
 for office, he kept a register for his own use, in which he recorded 
 all the vices and defects, as well as the virtues and accomplish- 
 ments of each h . 
 
 He might have confined his attention to objects of this nature, 
 and have applied himself wholly to the internal administration of 
 his dominions, had he not found it necessary to provide against 
 the hostile intentions with which the Turkish emperor, and the 
 corsairs of Barbary, were animated against him. 
 
 The Ottoman empire was, in the present period, at the summit 
 Of the °f its glory, under the victorious Solyman ; the greatest 
 Turkish and the most enlightened of all the Sultans. In Persia, 
 Emperor. j n Hungary, and in Africa, this heroic prince had widely 
 
 e Io traen lenna para quemar a mi hijo, si fuere tan malo eomo vos. Cabrera, 
 lib. v. c. iii. Miniana, 1. v. c. xi. 
 
 * In Seville. * Miniana, lib. v. c.. xi. h Ibid. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 65 
 
 1559.] 
 
 extended the limits of his empire ; had expelled the knights of 
 St. John from Rhodes, which till then had been deemed impreg- 
 nable ; had stripped the Venetians of a great part of their terri- 
 tories ; laid waste the coasts of Italy and Spain ; and filled all 
 Europe with admiration of his exploits, and with the terror of 
 his name. From the time of his competition with Ferdinand in 
 Hungary, he had regarded the princes of the house of Austria as 
 his rivals. He had assisted Henry II. of France, first against 
 Charles, and afterwards against Philip ; as he had formerly 
 assisted Francis against the Emperor. And in the late war, 
 although by some accident his fleet did not arrive in time to act 
 in concert with that of France, yet it came afterwards under his 
 admiral Piali, who, having landed his troops in Italy, and in the 
 islands of Prochita and Minorca, put great numbers of the inha- 
 bitants to the sword, and carried off many hundred prisoners 
 into slavery 1 . 
 
 From an enemy so powerful and enterprising, Philip had much 
 to apprehend. But he believed it to be inconsistent with the 
 character of protector of the church, to which he aspired, to 
 enter into any alliance with a prince who was the declared and 
 irreconcilable enemy of Christianity ; and therefore, far from 
 proposing any terms of accommodation, he issued orders for 
 putting the coasts of Spain and Italy into a posture of defence, 
 lest Solyman should find leisure from his other occupations to 
 renew hostilities. 
 
 But the Spanish monarch had more immediate cause of in- 
 The corsairs quietude from the corsairs on the coast of Africa, an 
 of Barbary. enemy much more formidable than before, by the assist- 
 ance which Solyman had afforded them ever since' they acknow- 
 ledged him for their sovereign. They consisted of Turks, Arabs, 
 Negroes, and Moors ; the last of whom were partly natives, and 
 partly such as had been expelled from Spain in the time of Fer- 
 dinand and Isabella. They were all men of barbarous manners, 
 inflamed with the most bigoted zeal for the Mahometan religion, 
 open foes to almost every Christian power, and animated with a 
 peculiar hatred against the Spaniards, who had often attacked 
 them in their strongholds, and had long treated their brother 
 Mahometans, the Morescoes in Spain, with inhumanity. They 
 had often taken full revenge for these injuries under the cele- 
 brated brothers, Home and Hayradin Barbarossas. Their prin- 
 cipal fleet was now commanded by another corsair, of the name 
 of Dragut, the Barbarossa of his age, and not inferior to either 
 of the two brothers in those qualifications by which they were so 
 eminently distinguished. 
 
 Born in a little village in Natolia, opposite to the isle of Rhodes, 
 Dragut. and sprung, like the Barbarossas, from the meanest 
 
 * Ferreras, an. 1558. 
 F 
 
C6 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IV 
 
 parents, Dragut had, in his youth, enlisted himself on board a 
 Turkish galley, and had served there for some years as a common 
 sailor. In that station he gave conspicuous proofs of his capacity. 
 He seemed however to be governed by a passion extremely dif- 
 ferent from that ambition which is the ordinary attendant upon 
 genius, and to have no other end in view than to enrich himself. 
 But as soon as he had acquired a certain sum of money, he pur- 
 chased a galley of his own, and began the adventurous occupa- 
 tion of a corsair, in which he became remarkable for his skill in 
 navigation, his knowledge of the seas, his intrepidity and enter- 
 prise. His character did not remain long unknown to Hayradin 
 Barbarossa, who was at that time high admiral of the Turkish 
 fleet. Barbarossa gladly received Dragut into his service, and 
 having made him his lieutenant, he gave him the command of 
 twelve of his ships of war. With this fleet Dragut did infinite 
 mischief to all the European states who traded in the Mediter- 
 ranean, the French only excepted, whose monarchs were in alli- 
 ance with the Turkish emperor. He suffered no season to pass 
 unemployed. Scarcely a single Spanish or Italian ship escaped 
 him ; and when he failed in taking a sufficient number of prizes, 
 he commonly made some sudden descent on the coasts of Spain 
 or Italy, plundering the country and carrying off great numbers of 
 the inhabitants into captivity. In these descents he was generally 
 fortunate ; but in the year 1541, having landed his men in a creek 
 in Corsica, they were scattered along the coast, and employed in 
 collecting their booty, when J uanetin Doria, the brave nephew of 
 the illustrious Andrew Doria, came upon him with a superior force, 
 took nine of his ships, and compelled him to surrender. When 
 he was carried on board the admiral's galley, he could not 
 restrain his indignation, but exclaimed, “ And am I then doomed 
 to be thus loaded with fetters by a beardless youth 2” a saying 
 which occasioned his meeting with harder usage than he would 
 otherwise have received. Both Barbarossa and Solyman inte- 
 rested themselves in his behalf, and made tempting offers to the 
 Genoese for his ransom. Notwithstanding which they detained 
 him four years in captivity ; nor could they be persuaded to set 
 him at liberty, till Barbarossa, with a hundred galleys under his 
 command, appeared before their town, and threatened to lay it 
 in ashes, if he were not instantly released. The Genoese found 
 it necessary to comply with this request ; and Dragut, who was 
 immediately afterwards furnished with a strong squadron of ships 
 by Barbarossa, and was now inflamed with redoubled hatred 
 against all who bore the name of Christians, resumed his former 
 occupation, and sought after opportunities, with unceasing ardour, 
 to wreak his vengeance upon his enemies. Besides captures which 
 he made at sea, he sacked and pillaged, year after year, innu- 
 merable villages and towns in Italy and the adjacent isles. Hav- 
 ing been dispossessed by Doria of his strong seaport of Mohedia on 
 
1559 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 er 
 
 Expedition 
 against 
 Tripoli and 
 the isle of 
 Gerba. 
 
 the coast of Barbary, he had ample revenge afterwards on that 
 gallant seaman, in an engagement off Naples, in which he took 
 JO "‘ six of his ships, with a great number of troops on board, 
 and obliged Doria himself, and the rest of the fleet, to fly before 
 him. In the year immediately following, he subdued almost the 
 whole island of Corsica, and delivered it into the hands of the 
 French. After this, having made himself master of Tripoli, he 
 fortified that place in the strongest manner. From Tripoli he 
 issued forth as often as the season would permit ; and after 
 Philip’s accession, and even after peace was concluded between 
 France and Spain, he continued to practise as formerly his depre- 
 dations upon the coasts of Sicily, Naples, and other states which 
 belonged to the Spanish monarchy. 
 
 Of these hostilities Philip had received particular information 
 before he left the Netherlands ; and had been earnestly 
 exhorted by the sieur de la Valette, grand-master of 
 the knights of Malta, and the duke de Medina Coeli, 
 governor of Sicily, to think seriously of putting an end 
 to the innumerable mischiefs to which his subjects were 
 exposed from this active corsair, by sending such a force against 
 him as might compel him to abandon his retreat. Philip readily 
 consented to this request ; and as he was informed by la Yalette, 
 that Dragut himself was absent at that time from Tripoli, carry- 
 ing on an inland war against one of the kings of Barbary, he sent 
 immediate orders to the duke de Medina Coeli, Doria, and others, 
 to hasten forward the preparations necessary for the intended 
 enterprise. The Pope and most of the other princes in Italy 
 contributed their assistance, and a fleet was assembled, consisting 
 of more than a hundred ships, having fourteen thousand soldiers 
 on board. This armament, of which the duke de Medina Coeli 
 had the chief command, set sail for Messina in the end of October, 
 one thousand five hundred and fifty -nine, and passed over to 
 Syracuse. There it was detained by contrary winds for several 
 weeks, and during that time a disease, occasioned by unwhole- 
 some provisions, carried off between three mid four thousand of 
 the troops. Medina Coeli, however, proceeded on his voyage, 
 still hoping that he had force sufficient to ensure success ; and it 
 is probable that he would not have been disappointed had he 
 advanced directly and laid siege to Tripoli. But he thought 
 it would facilitate the reduction of that place to make him- 
 self master beforehand of the isle of Gerba, which lies a few 
 miles from Tripoli, and was held by a Moorish governor, 
 attached to the interest of Dragut. This island was subdued 
 with little difficulty ; and a castle which had been erected 
 upon it was, after a feeble resistance, abandoned by the Moors, 
 whose commander swore allegiance upon the Alcoran to the 
 king of Spain. 
 
 It was the opinion of some of the principal officers, that this 
 
 f 2 
 
68 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book TV 
 
 castle should be immediately destroyed, and that the fleet should 
 proceed to Tripoli without delay. But the duke was unfortu- 
 nately of a different opinion, and resolved not only to preserve 
 the castle, but to strengthen and enlarge it. In this preposterous 
 undertaking a great deal of time was lost. Dragut had returned 
 with his army from his inland expedition ; and he had leisure 
 not only to provide for the security of the town, but to send 
 notice to the grand Seignior of the operations of the Christian 
 fleet, which he represented might be attacked with great advan- 
 tage in its present situation, while the commander was off his 
 guard, and most of the forces were on shore. 
 
 Solyman embraced, without hesitation, the tempting oppor- 
 Destrue t un ity which was thus presented to him. He fitted 
 tion of the out, with the utmost expedition, a fleet of seventy-four 
 Spanish galleys, put a hundred janissaries, besides other soldiers, 
 Tu^ks 7 thC 011 board each of them, and gave the command to his 
 admiral Piali, with orders to proceed in his voyage as 
 fast as possible. The Spaniards were informed of his approach 
 by a Maltese frigate, and were thrown into great perplexity. A 
 council of war was immediately held. Some officers were for 
 waiting till the enemy should arrive, and advised Medina to give 
 them battle. Others, among whom was the younger Doria k , 
 whose courage was unquestionable, were of opinion, that, consi- 
 dering the sickly condition of the troops, and the great diminu- 
 tion which they had undergone, they could not contend with so 
 powerful an enemy without the utmost danger of a total over- 
 throw, and therefore that they ought immediately to retire, and 
 conduct the fleet to a place of safety. The duke de Medina 
 Coeli, a man of no experience in maritime affairs, and utterly 
 unqualified for the charge which he had undertaken, was at a 
 loss to determine to which of the two measures proposed he 
 should give the preference. There was a necessity for embracing 
 instantly either the one or the other. Y et he balanced between 
 them for some days, and still continued to make the troops work 
 in completing the fortifications of the castle, till intelligence was 
 brought him that the enemy were at hand, and steering directly 
 towards the island. 
 
 There was no time now to put the fleet into a posture of defence. 
 Both the mariners and soldiers were overwhelmed with terror ; 
 and each crew, without waiting for the word of command, made 
 haste, with oars and sails, to escape from the impending danger. 
 Several ships foundered among the flats and shallows. Others 
 were driven back by the wind, or by the enemy, and wrecked 
 upon the island. Some escaped, and particularly those which 
 belonged to the order of St. John, through their superior acquaint- 
 
 k The elder Daria was prevented from taking a part in this expedition, by the infirmities 
 of old age. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 69 
 
 1559.] 
 
 ance with the coast. Above thirty were taken by the Turks ; 
 about one thousand men were killed or drowned, and five thou- 
 sand taken prisoners. Medina Coeli, with Doria, and some other 
 principal officers, passed in the night through the middle of the 
 enemy’s fleet, and arrived safe at Malta ; having, before his 
 departure, committed the charge of the fort of Gerba to Don 
 Alvaro de Sande, to whom he gave the strongest assurances of 
 speedy assistance and relief. 
 
 This valiant Spaniard had very little reason to trust to these 
 The siege assurances, and could not expect to be able to hold out 
 of the fort long against so great a force as he knew would be 
 u e^T ^1 b * em P lo y e(i against him; especially as he was but indif- 
 ie ui s. f erent jy furnished with provisions, and was much more 
 likely to find enemies than friends in the natives of the island. 
 Notwithstanding these discouraging circumstances, he readily 
 undertook the arduous task assigned him ; and having got his 
 garrison augmented by the crews of those ships which, in attempt- 
 ing to make their escape, had been driven back upon the coast, 
 he prepared with great alacrity for a vigorous defence. 
 
 Piali lost no time after his victory, but immediately landed his 
 troops, and began the siege. He was furnished with artillery 
 by Dragut, who brought it himself, together with some fresh 
 forces, from Tripoli. About twelve thousand Turks, besides the 
 islanders and other Moors, were employed in the siege. In their 
 first approaches many of them were killed. But soon after their 
 battery had been unmasked, a great part of the wall of the fort 
 was laid in ruins. The besieged in the mean time began to suffer 
 greatly from the heat of the season, and from the scarcity and 
 unwholesomeness of the water and provisions. Great numbers 
 died, and many, grown impatient under the hardships to which 
 they were exposed, deserted to the enemy. By these men Piali 
 was informed of the distressed condition of the garrison ; and 
 he invited them to surrender, and promised to spare their lives. 
 Don Alvaro rejected this offer with disdain, and still persisted 
 in the defence. But at length, finding that his stock of provi- 
 End of sions was almost spent, and having despaired of the relief 
 J'lly, which had been promised by Medina, he called together 
 io 60 . the g arr j son? which amounted now only to one thousand 
 men, and having reminded them of the glory which they had 
 acquired, and informed them that they had neither bread to 
 support their bodies, nor numbers to defend the fort any longer, 
 he desired them to resolve, whether they would give themselves 
 up tamely to be the slaves of their barbarous enemy, or imitate 
 the example which he would set them, and die fighting bravely 
 for the honour of their religion and their country. The soldiers 
 called out with one voice, u that they chose death rather than 
 slavery ; and were ready to follow wheresoever he should lead 
 them.” He then desired they would refresh themselves with 
 
70 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IV. 
 
 such victuals as still remained, and hold themselves in readiness 
 to leave the fort about the middle of the night. 
 
 At that time they set out, by the gate which looked towards 
 the sea, and having passed a triple rampart, which had been 
 thrown up to prevent their sallies, they made dreadful havoc 
 among the Turks, and had almost reached the general’s tent, 
 when they were put to a stand by the janissaries. They fought 
 long and desperately ; but at last, the whole Turkish camp being- 
 up in arms, they were overpowered by numbers, and almost all 
 of them were slain. Alvaro, with two officers who had kept near 
 him, forced his way through the thickest part of the enemy, till 
 he reached the shore, and got on board a Spanish ship which had 
 been stranded. There he was standing at day-break, with his 
 target in one hand and his sword in the other, surrounded by 
 the Turkish soldiers, who would have quickly buried him under 
 their darts, if their officers, who highly respected his heroic 
 valour, had not restrained them. Having been urged by a 
 Genoese renegado to lay down his arms, and assured of receiving 
 a treatment suitable to his rank and merit, he at last consented 
 to surrender himself to Piali 1 . 
 
 Such was the conclusion of this unfortunate enterprise ; the 
 failure of which, and all the calamities which ensued, seem to 
 have been owing principally to the weakness, obstinacy, and 
 inexperience of the commander -in- chief ; yet we do not find that 
 Philip ever expressed any dissatisfaction with his conduct. He 
 either viewed it in a different light from that in which it has 
 been represented by the contemporary historians ; or he consi- 
 dered, that it would have been a tacit acknowledgment of his 
 own want of discernment, to accuse, of imprudence or incapacity, 
 a person whom he had judged deserving of so great a trust. 
 Instead of this, he applied himself to provide against the effects 
 which he had reason to dread from the success of the Turkish 
 arms. He could hardly doubt that Piali would pursue his vic- 
 tory, and make a descent on the coasts of Spain or Italy. 
 
 The inhabitants were every where agitated with the most 
 alarming apprehensions. Watch-towers were raised along the 
 coast; and the fleet, which had lately suffered so much, was 
 repaired with the utmost diligence. But these preparations, 
 although they were afterwards found useful, were not at present 
 necessary. Solyman, having other objects of ambition which 
 engrossed his attention, recalled his fleet to Constantinople, and 
 thus delivered the Italians and Spaniards from their present 
 fears™. 
 
 Philip soon afterwards received intelligence that Hascem, son 
 
 1 lie was cariied to Constantinople with the other prisoners, and was afterwards set at 
 liberty, by an article in a treaty of peace between the Sultan and the Emperor of Ger- 
 many. 
 
 m Cabrera, lib. v. c. v. viii. xii. xiii. Miniana, lib. v. c. xii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 71 
 
 1559.] 
 
 The siege of the celebrated Barbarossa, and viceroy of Algiers 
 of Oran under Solyman, had formed a design upon Oran and 
 and Masai- Masarquivir, two strong forts on the coast of Barbary, 
 quivir ‘ which had been in the possession of Spain since the year 
 one thousand five hundred and nine, when they were subdued by 
 cardinal Ximenes. In order to frustrate this design, a fleet of 
 twenty-four galleys had been ordered to sail to Oran, for the rein- 
 forcement of the garrison ; but this fleet had been overtaken in 
 the middle of its course by a dreadful storm, in which two- and 
 twenty of the ships were lost. 
 
 By this accident Hascem was encouraged to proceed in his 
 projected enterprise. Having persuaded several of the Mahome- 
 tan princes in Barbary to assist him with their troops, he arrived 
 in the neighbourhood of Oran early in the spring, with a fleet of 
 more than thirty ships, and an army of a hundred thousand 
 men. Of the two places which he intended to attack, only 
 Masarquivir is a sea-port, and Oran lies at the distance of near 
 a league from it. With so great an army he was enabled to block 
 up both places at once ; but he began his operations with the 
 siege of Masarquivir, which, though of greater importance by 
 reason of its situation, was not so strongly fortified. 
 
 The count de Alcaudete, the Spanish governor, who had fore- 
 seen the approaching storm, had provided to the utmost of his 
 power for the security of the places committed to his care ; and 
 both he and his brother, Don Martin de Cordova, to whom he 
 committed the chief command in Masarquivir, were determined 
 to hold out to the last extremity. Many bloody rencounters 
 passed between the contending parties, in the sallies which 
 Alcaudete made from Oran ; and in these the Spaniards had 
 generally the advantage. Don Martin, and the troops under 
 his command, gave, if possible, still stronger proofs of intrepidity 
 in their defence of Masarquivir. The walls were laid in ruins 
 by the enemy’s artillery. Hascem made eleven different assaults, 
 and his standard was raised again and again upon the ruins of 
 the walls ; yet he was finally repulsed, and obliged, notwithstand- 
 ing his numbers, to yield to the unconquerable obstinacy of the 
 Spaniards. These brave men, however, were now sensible, that, 
 from the want of provisions, they must ere long either throw away 
 their lives, or submit to that odious slavery to which they knew 
 that the implacable hatred of their ungenerous enemy had doomed 
 them. 
 
 Philip was not ignorant of the distress to which they were 
 reduced ; and he had exerted himself with great acti- 
 vity in making preparation^ for their relief. But as 
 Masarquivir was blocked up by sea as well as by land, it 
 was necessary that the supplies which he had provided 
 should be accompanied with a fleet superior to that of 
 the enemy. Such a fleet he at last collected from Italy and the 
 
 The siege 
 of Oran 
 raised by 
 the Spa- 
 niards. 
 
72 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IV, 
 
 sea-ports in Spain, and gave the command of it to Don Francis 
 de Mendoza, with instructions to sail for Masarquivir with the 
 utmost expedition. Mendoza happily arrived in time. Having 
 come unexpectedly upon Hascem’s fleet, he took nine ships, and 
 put the rest to flight ; and Hascem himself, who had been em- 
 ployed for some days in preparing for a new assault, perceiving 
 the danger to which he was exposed from the Spanish fleet on 
 the one hand, and the garrisons in Oran and Masarquivir on the 
 other, raised the siege precipitately, after it had lasted three 
 months, and marched off with all his forces to Algiers. The 
 Spaniards pursued for several miles ; but finding they were 
 unable to overtake him, they returned ; and the fleet, after rein- 
 forcing the garrisons of Oran and Masarquivir, set sail for Spain, 
 where they were received with great rejoicing. The count de 
 Alcaudete was soon after made viceroy of Navarre ; Don Martin 
 received distinguished marks of the royal favour ; and all the 
 officers, and even the private soldiers, were rewarded in propor- 
 tion to their rank and merit". 
 
 During the absence of the fleet, the trade of Spain had sus- 
 The reduc- tained considerable prejudice from the depredations of 
 Pennon de a ce ^ e ^ ra ^ e( l corsair, of the name of Cara Mustapha, who, 
 Veiez°by ° with a squadron of six or seven ships, traversed the 
 the Spa- Mediterranean with unwearied activity, and made innu - 
 maids. merable captures. His retreat was a fort on the African 
 coast, called Pennon de Velez, which, in those days, before the 
 invention of bombs, was reckoned almost impregnable. It is 
 situated on a steep and rugged rock, and is inaccessible, except 
 by a narrow path, cut out in the rock itself ; which is separated 
 from the continent by a channel, capable of containing about a 
 dozen of those ships which were usually employed in cruising. 
 This rock was fortified, both above and below, with a wall, 
 flanked with bastions, and mounted with cannon ; and afforded 
 a constant shelter and protection to the corsairs, when pursued. 
 From its situation near the Straits, these corsairs could annoy 
 the Christians, while they themselves were exposed to very little 
 danger ; and it was become an object of the most serious concern 
 to all the Christian powers who traded in the Mediterranean, to 
 wrest it from them. 
 
 In consequence of a report which gained credit, that Solyman 
 intended this year to make an attack either on Spain or Italy, 
 Philip had greatly augmented his naval force ; but when he 
 found that either there had been no ground for this report, or 
 that the Sultan had changed his design, he thought that he could 
 not employ his fleet more usefully than by attempting to reduce 
 Pennon de Velez, which had been long an object of much dread 
 to his subjects. 
 
 n Cabrera, lib. vi. Herrera, Hist. Gen. del Moudo, lib. v. c. iii. et iv. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 73 
 
 1559 .] 
 
 Not satisfied with his own numerous fleet, he solicited assist- 
 ance from Portugal, from the Knights of Malta, and from his 
 allies in Italy ; nor did he permit them to set sail from Malaga, 
 the place of rendezvous, till he had collected above ninety galleys, 
 besides sixty ships of a smaller size, with no less than thirteen 
 thousand soldiers on board. The providing of so great a force 
 was not merely an effect of that extraordinary caution with which 
 Philip commonly entered upon any military enterprise ; and such 
 a number of troops could not be employed in besieging a place 
 of such small extent as Pennon de Velez ; but as the Moors in 
 the country adjacent were deeply interested in the preservation 
 of the fort, on account of immense quantities of commodities of 
 all kinds, and the number of Christian slaves which were daily 
 sold to them by the corsairs, there was reason to apprehend that 
 they would consider the cause, of these pirates as their own, and 
 give all the opposition in their power to the Spaniards, in the 
 operations of the siege. 
 
 Agreeably to this persuasion, the allies no sooner arrived upon 
 the coast, than great numbers of these barbarians appeared among 
 the hills, by the foot of which the army were obliged to pass in 
 their way to the fort. But these tumultuary troops were not 
 able to prevent the Spaniards from landing ; nor, although they 
 gave them some annoyance on their march, could they obstruct 
 the operations of so formidable a body of regular forces. Still, 
 however, it was the opinion of several of the allies, that after all 
 that could be done to reduce a fort of so singular a construction, 
 they would in the issue find it necessary to abandon their attempt. 
 This would probably have happened, if Mustapha himself had 
 been present. But, in order to save his ships from falling a prey 
 to the enemy, he had left the place some time before, and given 
 the command of it to a renegado, of the name of Ferret, with 
 two hundred Turks under him, and ammunition and provision 
 sufficient to serve for a much longer time than the blockade was 
 likely to continue. 
 
 He believed that the Spaniards would soon perceive the folly 
 of their undertaking ; and was therefore employed in his usual 
 practice of cruising, with very little concern about the fate of his 
 retreat. But he had been deceived in his opinion of those to 
 whom he had committed a charge of so great importance. Both 
 the governor and garrison were intimidated by the sight of that 
 powerful fleet and army which now encompassed them. No 
 sooner were some of their guns dismounted by a Spanish battery, 
 and a part of the wall demolished, than they were struck with the 
 most violent panic, and the governor, and most of the garrison, 
 made their escape to the continent in the middle of the night, by 
 swimming. Such of them only remained as could not swim ; and 
 by these men the fort was delivered to the Spaniards. 
 
 There was much good fortune and little glory in this valuable 
 
74 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IY. 
 
 conquest ; but the joy which it excited over all the southern 
 coast of Spajn was inexpressible ; and it was the more complete, 
 as well as the more generally diffused, because only a very small 
 number had been killed or wounded in their recounters with the 
 Moors. Don Garcia de Toledo, the commander-in-chief, was, 
 soon after his return, rewarded by Philip with the vice-royalty of 
 Sicily °. 
 
 0 Cabrera, lib. vi. c. xvii. Ferreras, part xiv. Vertot’s History of the Knights of 
 Malta. 
 
1559.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 75 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 During the course of those military operations which have 
 been described, Philip beheld with much anxiety the rapid 
 progress of heresy in almost every state in Europe except Spain ; 
 and, in order to obstruct it, he employed all his influence to pro- 
 cure the convocation of a general council of the church. 
 
 In the first years of the reformation, the bigotry of those who 
 The perse adhered to the ancient superstition, suffered them not 
 cution of to think of any other means of extirpating the opinions 
 the Protest. G f the Protestants, but persecution ; which was exercised 
 against them with the same unrelenting severity, as if 
 they had been guilty of the most atrocious crimes. But it soon 
 appeared how inadequate this barbarous procedure was to the 
 purpose which the Romanists intended. Those bloody edicts 
 which were published, those fires which were lighted up, and 
 that variety of torments which priests and inquisitors invented 
 with ingenious cruelty, served in reality to propagate the doctrines 
 against which they were employed, and contributed to inflame, 
 rather than extinguish, that ardent zeal with which the Protest- 
 ants were animated. Being firmly persuaded, that the cause 
 which they maintained, was the cause of God and truth, and 
 that their perseverance would be rewarded with a happy im- 
 mortality, they courted their punishments instead of avoiding 
 them ; and in bearing them, they displayed a degree of fortitude 
 and patience, which, by exciting admiration in the beholders, 
 produced innumerable proselytes to the faith for which they 
 suffered. 
 
 Several princes had been converted to the faith. In some 
 Progress of states the Protestants had become more numerous and 
 the refor- powerful than their opponents ; and in others, their 
 mation. opinions so generally prevailed, that the Catholic princes 
 found it no longer possible to extirpate them, without depriving 
 themselves of great multitudes of their most industrious subjects, 
 on whom the wealth and importance of their states depended. 
 The time when persecution might have proved effectual was past, 
 and the princes came at length to perceive the necessity of having 
 recourse to some more gentle means than had been hitherto 
 employed. They were at the same time sensible, notwithstanding 
 their prejudices against the Reformers, that some reformation 
 was extremely necessary ; they had long borne with great im- 
 patience the numberless encroachments of the court of Rome ; 
 and were convinced, that if some abuses were removed, it would 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 76 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 not be impracticable to persuade the Protestants to return into 
 the bosom of the church. 
 
 A general council appeared to be the only expedient by which 
 a enerai this i m P or t an t en d could be obtained ; and the late 
 counciTde- emperor Charles had taken infinite pains to procure 
 si red by the the convocation of that assembly. In former times the 
 Catholic councils of the church had been convened by the em- 
 
 pimces. perors themselves ; but, in the time of Charles, the 
 
 power of calling them was, by all true Catholics, considered as 
 the peculiar prerogative of the Popes ; who dreaded, that such 
 assemblies might derogate from their usurped authority, and 
 were therefore inclined, if possible, to prevent them from being 
 held. With the timid Clement, Charles employed all his art 
 and influence to procure a council, but in vain. Paul the Third 
 was no less averse to this measure than Clement ; but the 
 Emperor being seconded by almost all the Catholic princes in 
 Europe, Paul yielded to their importunities, and summoned a 
 council to meet in Trent. From this place it was afterwards 
 translated to Bologna. After the death of Paul it was again 
 assembled in Trent in the year one thousand five hundred and 
 fifty-one, and continued to be held there till the year following ; 
 when it was prorogued for two years, upon war being declared 
 against the Emperor by the Elector of Saxony. 
 
 In the sessions which were held under Paul, that fundamental 
 tenet of the reformers, by which the writings of the evangelists 
 and apostles are held to be the only rule of the Christian faith, 
 was condemned ; and equal authority was ascribed to the books 
 termed Apocryphal, and to the oral traditions of the church. 
 
 From the manner in which the deliberations ol this assembly 
 were conducted, from the nature of its decisions, and from the 
 blind attachment of a great majority of its members to the court 
 of Rome, there was little ground to hope for the attainment of 
 those ends for which the calling of it had been so earnestly 
 desired. But no other expedient could be devised, which the 
 Catholics thought so likely to stop the progress of heresy ; and 
 therefore, as soon as the war between France and Spain was 
 concluded, the several Catholic princes began to think seriously 
 of the restoration of the council. 
 
 The state of Europe at that time seemed more than ever to 
 The state require the application of some immediate remedy. The 
 of Europe, power and number of the Protestants were every day 
 becoming more and more considerable. Both England and 
 Scotland had disclaimed allegiance to the see of Rome, and new- 
 modelled their religion. In the Netherlands the reformers had 
 greatly multiplied of late, notwithstanding the most dreadful 
 cruelties had been exercised against them ; and in France, where 
 every province was involved in the most terrible combustion, 
 there was ground to apprehend, that they would soon become 
 
1560.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 77 
 
 too powerful for the Catholics, and be able to wrest from them 
 the reins of government. The new opinions had penetrated even 
 into Italy, and had been embraced by a considerable number of 
 persons both in Naples and Savoy. From the former of these 
 states they were extirpated by the unrelenting severity of Philip ; 
 who issued orders to his viceroy to put all heretics to death 
 without mercy, and even to pursue with fire and sword a remnant 
 of them who had fled from Cosenza, and were living quietly 
 among the mountains a . 
 
 But the duke of Savoy, unwilling to deprive himself of so great 
 The Pope’s a number of useful subjects as had been converted to 
 dread of the Protestant faith, was inclined to attempt to enlighten 
 synodTin anc ^ convince them ; and with this view he desired the 
 Savoy and Pope’s permission to hold a colloquy of the principal 
 in France, ecclesiastics in his dominions, on the subject of religion. 
 Pius was about the same time informed, that in France a resolu- 
 tion had been embraced to have recourse to the same expedient. 
 He believed that no measure could be devised more likely to 
 prove fatal to that exclusive prerogative which he claimed, of 
 judging in matters of religion. He dreaded that the example of 
 France and Savoy would be quickly followed by other states, and 
 the decrees of provincial synods substituted in the place of those 
 of the Holy See. It highly concerned him, therefore, to prevent 
 this measure (so pernicious to his authority) from taking place. 
 Nor did he find much difficulty in dissuading the duke of Savoy 
 from adopting it. “ If the heretics,” said he to the Duke’s 
 ambassador, “ stand in need of instruction, I will send divines 
 and a legate, by whom they may be both instructed and absolved. 
 But your master will find, that they will lend a deaf ear to all 
 the instructions that can be given them, and will put no other 
 interpretation upon his conduct, but that he wants power to 
 compel them to submit. No good effect was ever produced by 
 that lenity which he inclines to exercise ; but from experience he 
 may learn, that the sooner he shall execute justice on these men, 
 and make use of force to reduce them, the more certain will be 
 his success ; and if he will comply with the counsel which I offer, 
 he shall receive from me such assistance as will enable him to 
 carry it into execution.” 
 
 The duke, who was sincerely attached to the Roman faith, 
 and closely connected with Philip, unfortunately complied with 
 this violent counsel, and engaged in a bloody war with his Pro- 
 testant subjects, of which he had afterwards the greatest reason 
 to repent b . 
 
 The Pope met with much more difficulty in preventing a 
 
 a Paul, lib. v. 
 
 /b He found it necessary at last to grant them the free exercise of their religion, after 
 having been worsted by them in several skirmishes among the mountains, and suffering a 
 total overthrow in a pitched battle, in which he lost 7000 of his troops. Paul, lib. v. 
 
78 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book Y. 
 
 national synod in France than in Savoy ; and was obliged to 
 His aver- promise, that he should call a general council without 
 sion to the delay. Pius had, before his promotion, taken an oath to 
 calling of a this purpose, as all the other cardinals had likewise done, 
 coimc.i . j3 e f ore they proceeded to his election. But no sooner 
 had he ascended the papal throne, than he adopted the sentiments 
 of his predecessors ; and showed that he entertained the same 
 aversion to this assembly which they had so uniformly mani- 
 fested. He remembered the motives which had determined 
 Paul the Third to dissolve it, under the colour of a translation 
 to Bologna. He reflected on the danger to which Julius had 
 been exposed, and from which his good fortune and the war of 
 Germany had delivered him ; and he considered, that as there 
 was now no prince so powerful as Charles, by whom the prelates 
 could be overawed, they would probably assume a bolder tone in 
 the council, and attempt to advance their own prerogatives on 
 the ruins of the papacy. 
 
 For these reasons he would gladly have eluded the performance 
 He finds it oath. But so great was his dread of the fatal 
 
 necessary consequences which might arise from a national synod in 
 to consent France, and so earnest the importunity of Philip, of the 
 Emperor, and other Catholic princes, that he at last 
 thought it necessary to comply with their request, resolving to 
 employ all his attention in providing against the dangers to which 
 his authority would be thereby exposed. 
 
 After many delays, which Pius knew well how to interpose, the 
 bull of convocation, summoning the council to meet in Trent at 
 Easter, was published in the consistory on the twenty-ninth of 
 September one thousand five hundred and sixty; and nuncios were 
 despatched to give intimation of it to all the Christian powers. 
 
 The Pope and cardinals were greatly at a loss to determine 
 The bull whether the council should be mentioned in the bull as a 
 cf convo- new one, or as a continuation of that which had been 
 cat.] on. under Paul and J ulius. The decision of this point, 
 
 seemingly of small importance, was rendered difficult by the 
 consequences which it involved. For if the continuation were 
 declared, then all those decrees of the former sessions, which were 
 levelled against the Protestants, would be held sacred, and receive 
 the sanction of the council that was about to be convened. The 
 Protestants would consider themselves as already condemned, and 
 pay no regard to the bull of convocation. Whereas, if in this 
 bull the assembly to be summoned were denominated a new coun- 
 cil, they might expect that all the points in controversy would be 
 discussed anew, and consequently might be persuaded to send 
 deputies to the council, and to acknowledge its authority. 
 
 Jn this the Emperor and the Queen-mother and ministers of 
 France were deeply interested ; and they urged with great ear- 
 nestness, that in the bull no mention should be made of the former 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1560 .] 
 
 79 
 
 sessions, and no occasion given the Protestants to suspect that 
 any restriction would be laid upon the proceedings of the coun- 
 cil. Philip was governed by views and sentiments of a very 
 different nature. His detestation of the Protestants prevented 
 him from relishing any other method of dealing with them, but 
 that of force. He was utterly averse to making any concessions 
 to reconcile them ; and he desired the celebration of the council, 
 not so much in order to recover those who had already revolted 
 from the church, as either to prevent others from following their 
 example, or, as Pius afterwards suspected, to increase the power 
 of the bishops and princes, by abridging the jurisdiction of the 
 Pope, to whose exorbitant pretensions Philip was in reality 
 adverse, notwithstanding that devoted attachment to the Holy 
 See which he affected, in order to promote his ambitious designs. 
 With these views and sentiments, Philip did not desire that the 
 Protestants should come to the council. He believed that their 
 Presence would serve only to perplex and retard its deliberations. 
 He apprehended, that to suffer the decrees of the former sessions 
 to be again discussed, would contribute to invalidate the authority 
 of the council itself : and for this reason he thought it necessary 
 that the intended meeting should be declared a continuation of 
 the council which had formerly been prorogued. 
 
 In this matter Philip’s sentiments were entirely conformable 
 to those of the Pope ; but Pius durst not, on this occasion, run 
 the risk of giving offence either to the Emperor, or to the court 
 of France; and therefore, after long deliberation, he couched 
 the bull of convocation in such ambiguous expressions, as might 
 be interpreted to signify either a new council, or a continuation 
 of the former. This expedient had, in some degree, the effect 
 intended. Although neither of the parties was entirely satisfied, 
 yet neither of them was so much disgusted as either the one or 
 the other would have been, if the terms had been explicit : and 
 the bull was at length received by the Emperor and the French 
 king, as well as by Philip, and the other catholic princes ; who 
 all gave orders to the Ecclesiastics in their dominions to repair 
 to Trent at the time appointed. 
 
 In the bull, only bishops, abbots, and others entitled to vote 
 The Protest- by the rules and ancient practice of the church, were 
 ants refuse summoned to attend. But an invitation was carried to 
 to attend the the several Protestant powers, by two nuncios, Marti- 
 councii. n engo and Commendone. 
 
 The Protestant princes in Germany were, on this occasion, 
 Their assembled at Naumburg, in Upper Saxony ; and to that 
 reasons. pl ace the Emperor sent three ambassadors, to second the 
 nuncios in their invitation. To the Imperial ambassadors, the 
 princes replied in terms expressive of their respect for Ferdi- 
 nand. They thanked him for the solicitude which he discovered 
 in their behalf ; and said, that nothing would be more agreeable 
 
80 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 to them than a general council, provided it were calculated to 
 heal the divisions of the church. But no such desirable effect, 
 they thought, could be expected from the council to which they 
 were now invited ; which was called by one whose authority they 
 could not acknowledge ; and in which (as appeared from the bull 
 of convocation) only those were to have decisive voices, who had 
 sworn allegiance to the Pope and the see of Rome. 
 
 The nuncios however were brought in, and briefs were delivered 
 by them from the Pope to each of the princes ; but these briefs 
 were on the next day returned unopened, with the following 
 declaration : “ That as they did not acknowledge any jurisdic- 
 tion in the bishop of Rome, there was no reason why they should 
 explain to him their sentiments of the council, which they had 
 already done to the Emperor c .” 
 
 From Naumburg the nuncios set out for England and Den- 
 mark ; but they were obliged to stop short, Martinengo in the 
 Low Countries, and Commendone at Lubec ; the latter having 
 been forbid to proceed by Frederic, and the former by Elizabeth, 
 both of whom had resolved to give no encouragement to the 
 intended council. 
 
 The opinion which the Protestants entertained of the sinister 
 The coun- intentions of the Pope was fully justified by the event, 
 cil meets at In the very first decree of the first session, when many 
 Trent, and p re i a ^ eg we re not yet arrived, his legates, who 
 
 js governed . . 11 * / ' ~ 1 . 
 
 by the Pope Presided in this assembly, procured it to be enacted, 
 and his that they only should propose the several questions to 
 
 legates. p e discussed ; and thus they made at once effectual 
 
 provision against all attempts to correct any of the numberless 
 abuses in the court of Rome, for remedying which the meeting 
 of the council had been desired. Against this decree Philip and 
 the other princes remonstrated in the most importunate manner, 
 and employed their interest, both with the Pope and in the 
 council, to procure the repeal of it. But all their endeavours 
 were ineffectual. Their solicitude on this head served only to 
 confirm Pius in his suspicions of their having formed a design to 
 encroach on his authority. He eluded their applications with 
 consummate artifice, and sent orders to the legates to make all 
 the opposition in their power to any proposal which might be 
 made for annulling the decree. 
 
 This did not prevent several of the prelates from endeavouring 
 
 the Pope power. The Pope, from whom the legates received 
 instructions on every difficult emergency, was kept in 
 perpetual anxiety ; and he sometimes thought of suddenly dis- 
 
 y. lin at _ to persuade the council to establish certain points, suen 
 tempts to as the divine institution and the residency of bishops, 
 abridge the w hich would have struck deep at the root of the papal 
 
 e Paul, lib. v, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 81 
 
 1560.] 
 
 solving an assembly which he found so difficult to keep within 
 the bounds that he prescribed. But, by unremitted vigilance 
 and attention, by threatening some prelates with his displeasure, 
 by flattering others, and heaping promises upon them of advance- 
 ment in the church ; and above all, by means of the great number 
 of Italian bishops d , who depended entirely on his favour, he 
 secured, in every question, a majority of voices; and not only 
 prevented any decision from being passed that might be detri- 
 mental to his authority, but procured the ratification of many of 
 these ecclesiastical usurpations which the princes, who had been 
 so solicitous for the convocation of the council, had expected 
 would have been abolished and condemned. These princes were 
 greatly disappointed and chagrined. Their ambassadors, as well 
 as the prelates, complained that the council, far from enjoying 
 freedom, were fettered in all their deliberations by the secret 
 orders which were daily sent from Home : and on this head, 
 remonstrances were made again and again to the Pope himself, 
 who sometimes vouchsafed a soft, evasive reply ; and at other 
 times, appearing to be greatly offended, asserted that the council 
 was at perfect liberty ; and insinuated, that the true source of 
 all the discontent on this head was, that the ambassadors of the 
 princes had not the power of dictating the decrees. 
 
 Whatever ground • there was for this insinuation, the deli- 
 berations of the council were conducted in the same manner as 
 before, till at length Pius, grown impatient under the perpetual 
 attention and expense which it required from him, sent orders 
 Conclusion ^is legates to bring it as soon as possible to a conclu- 
 of thecoun-sion. And it was concluded accordingly, with the most 
 cil * indecent precipitation, towards the end of the year one 
 ' thousand five hundred and sixty-three, without any con- 
 siderable opposition from the princes, who had long despaired 
 of deriving from it any of those salutary effects which had been 
 expected e . They perceived that the Pope’s influence over it 
 was not to be controlled ; and foresaw that the continuance of 
 it must serve only to augment and strengthen his authority. 
 The last which it had been their intention to circumscribe. Of 
 decrees, this they had the most convincing evidence in the con- 
 cluding session, in which two decrees were passed that had not 
 been mentioned before, and were manifestly designed as an 
 acknowledgment of the subordination of the council to the Holy 
 See. One of these was, That application should be made to 
 the Pope for his confirmation of the decrees; and the other, 
 That whatever expressions had been employed in any of the 
 
 d Many of them 'were so poor, that he was obliged to defray the expences of their 
 attendance. 
 
 e The acts were subscribed by the four legates, two cardinals, three patriarchs, 
 twenty-five archbishops, two hundred and sixty-eight bishops, seven abbots, seven generals 
 or regulars, and thirty-nine proxies. — Paul, lib. viii. 
 
 G 
 
82 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book V. 
 
 decrees, were to be understood without prejudice to the Pope’s 
 authority. 
 
 Pius rejoiced exceedingly when he wa9 informed of the disso- 
 
 1564. hition of the council, and still more when he received 
 The Pope’s intelligence of these its last decrees. He ordained, on 
 joy on this this occasion, a solemn thanksgiving ; and in the con- 
 occasion. g j g t or y declared, that he would confirm all the decrees, 
 and add many reformations to those which had been enacted 
 by the council. By these reformations, some of his courtiers 
 apprehended that the profits arising from their offices would be 
 diminished ; and they employed all their influence to dissuade 
 him from his purpose. Pius had no intention to introduce any 
 alterations of which they had reason to be afraid ; but he 
 considered, that his refusing to confirm the decrees would be 
 interpreted as a condemnation of the council ; that all its acts 
 would be therefore brought into disrepute ; and that occasion 
 might thence be taken, by the French and others, to hold 
 national assemblies. And he considered likewise, that it would 
 depend entirely upon himself to determine, how far any parti- 
 His bull of cular decree should be carried into execution. For 
 confirma- these reasons he disregarded the objections of his 
 non. courtiers, and published his bull of confirmation, with 
 the usual formalities ; requiring all prelates and princes to 
 receive and enforce the decrees of the holy council of Trent ; 
 prohibiting all persons, whether laymen or ecclesiastics, from 
 writing any explication of them under the form of notes or 
 commentaries ; and commanding the Catholics everywhere to 
 have recourse, in all dubious cases, to the Apostolic See. 
 
 This bull was addressed only to the Catholics ; for Pius did 
 Bad effects n °f ex P e °t that an y greater regard would be paid to it 
 of the de. by the Protestants than they had shown to his bull of 
 crees of the convocation. The whole conduct of the council had, 
 council. f rom the beginning, been calculated to widen, instead 
 of closing, that breach which subsisted between them and the 
 Roman church. The ancient religion was now more clearly 
 ascertained. Its doctrines, the offspring of subtle sophistry, 
 artifice, and presumption, were formally defined ; its rites, which 
 had crept into the church in the dark ages of ignorance and 
 superstition, were now made an essential part of worship ; and 
 anathemas were pronounced against all persons by whom either 
 the former or the latter were not embraced. By this impolitic 
 conduct the Protestants were more clearly instructed where to 
 direct their attack ; and in those absurdities, into which men 
 must fall who venture to dogmatise on subjects so mysterious as 
 many articles of ^le Christian faith, they often found abundant 
 matter of victory and triumph. No concessions of any kind had 
 been made by the council, in order to reconcile them ; but all 
 their doctrines had been indiscriminately condemned; and hence- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 8.5 
 
 1564.] 
 
 forth all ground of hope was cut off of ever inducing them to 
 return into the bosom of the church, by any other means but 
 open force and persecution. 
 
 Pius flattered himself that these means would sooner or later 
 The decrees prove effectual ; and was therefore little concerned at 
 rejected by the conduct of the Protestants with respect to the 
 the court of counc j] # He was much more deeply affected by the 
 
 • • it/ ^ ^ * 
 
 ill-humour which the Queen-mother and ministers of 
 Franco discovered on the present occasion. They had been 
 somewhat disgusted at the little regard that had been shown to 
 their desire, of having the council declared to be a new council. 
 They were displeased with the decrees of reformation, by some 
 of which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was extended beyond its 
 former bounds ; and they were highly dissatisfied with the tacit 
 acknowledgment contained in the concluding decrees, of the 
 superiority of the Pope above councils; an opinion which, in 
 France, had been always impugned and rejected. Influenced by 
 these considerations, and desirous at the same time of avoiding 
 to give any fresh occasion of discontent to the Calvinists, the 
 French court (although earnestly solicited by Pius) refused to 
 receive and publish the decrees f . 
 
 Pius had reason to apprehend that the example of so great a 
 They are monarchy would be imitated by the other Catholic 
 accepted by powers. But he had the pleasure of receiving inform- 
 Phiiip, and ation from his nuncios, that not only the republic of 
 lic pvinces 0 " Venice, and the several Italian princes, but most of 
 the Catholic princes in Germany, and the King of 
 Spain, had resolved to acknowledge the authority of the council. 
 
 In forming this resolution, Philip gave a striking proof of that 
 zeal which he so uniformly felt, or affected, for the Catholic reli- 
 gion and the Holy See. No prince was ever more jealous of his 
 power, or more tenacious of his rights ; upon some of which, 
 encroachments had been made in the decrees of reformation. 
 During the celebration of the council, he had complained loudly 
 of the dependence in which it was held by the Pope ; he had 
 again and again endeavoured, but in vain, to get that first 
 decree rescinded, by which the legates alone could propose the 
 questions to be discussed ; and he had likewise been highly 
 Dis ute of °ff en d e d with the Pope’s precipitate dissolution of the 
 precedence council, in which measure he had neither been con- 
 betweeuthe suited, nor had any delay been granted at his ambas- 
 rfPVml°" sudor’s request. To these causes of alienation, Pius 
 a'nd Spain, added another, which might have been attended with 
 decided in the most serious consequences, by determining a dispute 
 favour of f or p rece d ence between the Spanish and French am- 
 bassadors at Rome, in favour of the latter. To decide 
 
 * Father Paul, lib. v. vi. vii. viii. 
 G 2 
 
84 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 this point, which was of so delicate a nature, at so critical a 
 juncture, the Pontiff was induced, partly by the hopes of pre- 
 vailing on the court of France to receive the decrees of the 
 council, and partly by his dread, that, if the young King were 
 not gratified in this matter, his counsellors would advise him to 
 break off all connexion with Rome, and to commit the supreme 
 ecclesiastical authority in the kingdom to a patriarch of his own 
 election. 
 
 Pius ordered his nuncio to explain these motives to the Catho- 
 lic King, and spared no pains to convince him of the necessity of 
 the step which he had taken ; nor were his endeavours altogether 
 ineffectual. Philip did not, indeed, for some time, send any 
 ambassador to Rome in the place of Don Louis de Requesens, 
 who left it when the point of precedence was decided ; but being 
 determined, if possible, to live on. amicable terms with the Holy 
 See, he resolved to stifle his resentment. Nor did he suffer it to 
 influence his conduct with regard to the decrees of the council, 
 which, although they were not entirely conformable to his wishes, 
 yet would contribute, he believed, in some measure, to prevent 
 the progress of heresy ; and therefore he issued orders, without 
 . hesitation, to have them received and obeyed through- 
 u out all his dominions s . 
 
 * Cabreia, lib. vi. c. 16. Pallavicini, lib. xxiv. eap. 12. 
 
1565 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 85 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 Philip’s attention was, soon after this, called to objects of a 
 
 1565 . very different nature from those by which, during the 
 Hostile in- sitting of the council, it had been engrossed. The suc- 
 the^itan cess en ^ er P r ^ se a gainst Pennon de Velez having 
 
 against Phi- given great uneasiness to all the piratical states, they 
 lip and the had endeavoured to engage the Sultan to undertake 
 M fta tS ° f recovery of that fort ; and had entreated him to 
 employ such a fleet and army as might be sufficient to 
 expel the Spaniards from the coast of Africa. Solyman was at 
 the same time earnestly solicited by great numbers of his sub- 
 jects, to take vengeance on the knights of Malta, who, besides 
 co-operating with the Spaniards in all their African expeditions, 
 still continued to exercise their wonted hostilities against the 
 Turks at sea, and had of late made innumerable captures. 
 
 This prince was of himself as much incensed both against the 
 former and the latter of these his enemies, as any of his subjects 
 could desire ; and notwithstanding his great age, he was inflamed 
 as much as ever with the ambition of extending his dominions. 
 He therefore lent a willing ear to the solicitations which he now 
 received ; and having suspended all his other pursuits, he resolved 
 to turn his whole attention against the Maltese and Spaniards. 
 But he hesitated whether he should begin his operations with 
 invading Malta, or the dominions of the Catholic King ; and to 
 assist him in deciding this point, he held a council of his most 
 experienced commanders. 
 
 Mahomet, the oldest and wisest of all his Bashas, was of opi- 
 nion that it would be highly inexpedient to begin with invading 
 Malta ; in subduing which, he said, the Sultan would find infi- 
 nitely greater difficulty than he had encountered formerly in the 
 conquest of Rhodes. The latter of these islands, he observed, 
 lay at so great a distance from Europe, as had made it almost 
 impossible for the Christians to send assistance to the besieged ; 
 and was besides so large and fertile as to furnish subsistence to 
 the Turkish troops. Whereas the former was small and barren ; 
 so far from the Porte, and so near to Sicily and Italy, that the 
 knights could easily receive from thence perpetual succours and 
 supplies. The King of Spain was deeply concerned in their pre- 
 servation ; and he, and other Christian princes, would, from 
 religion as well as interest, think themselves bound to support an 
 order of men whom they had long regarded as the champions of 
 their faith. The knights would defend their island with the 
 
86 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VI. 
 
 utmost obstinacy. And even although the Sultan should at last 
 get possession of it, yet a new crusade would be formed by the 
 Christians for its recovery, and the Turkish fleet would be 
 destroyed in the harbours, before it could be put into a posture 
 of defence. Sicily, he thought, would be a much easier and 
 more certain conquest. The reduction of that island would con- 
 duce more to the Sultan’s glory, as well as to the interest of his 
 empire ; and it would be quickly followed by the reduction of 
 the knights of Malta, who could not subsist a single season 
 without those continual supplies of provision which that more 
 fertile region afforded them. 
 
 A prince of so great penetration as Solyman could not be 
 Solyman insensible of the weight of these considerations ; but 
 resolves to having been long accustomed to triumph over much 
 begin with more formidable enemies than the knights of Malta, 
 of^ialta an( t having formerly expelled the knights themselves 
 from Asia, when their power was more considerable 
 than at present, he believed that they could not long resist his 
 victorious arms. In this confidence of success he was confirmed 
 by most of the bashas, who chose rather to flatter his inclina- 
 tions at the expense of his interest, than to run the risk of 
 incurring his displeasure. His resentment against the knights 
 was greatly heightened at this time by the capture of a rich gal- 
 leon belonging to some of his greatest favourites in the seraglio. 
 These persons exerted all their influence to procure a speedy 
 vengeance, and contributed to determine the Sultan to open the 
 campaign with the siege of Malta ; after the conquest of which, 
 he resolved to turn his arms against the King of Spain. 
 
 Having thus fixed his purpose, he issued orders for equipping 
 His re a the S ^P S m his empire with the utmost expedition; 
 raUons! Pa * sen t a g rea t number of troops to the seaports in the 
 Morea, where he intended they should embark ; and 
 desired Hascem and Dragut, his viceroys in Algiers and Tripoli, 
 to hold their corsairs ready to join his fleet when it should arrive 
 at Malta. He gave the command of the fleet to Piali, and that 
 of the land forces to Mustapha, an experienced general, at the 
 age of sixty-five, who had acquired his esteem and confidence by 
 several victories which he had obtained in Asia. To these men 
 he recommended strongly the acting in concert with each other ; 
 and required them to consult, in every matter of importance, 
 with Dragut, whom he regarded as the ablest naval officer in his 
 dominions. 
 
 The news of his preparations soon reached the several Christian 
 La Valette P owors on the coast of the Mediterranean. But they 
 the grand- were for some time in doubt where the storm which was 
 master. of gathering would burst. At length John de la Valette 
 
 il ta> Parisot, the grand-master of Malta, received certain 
 information of Solyman's design, from spies whom he employed 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 87 
 
 1565.] 
 
 at Constantinople. He immediately communicated his intelli- 
 gence to the King of Spain, the Pope, and most of the other 
 Christian princes; and represented to them the necessity of 
 granting their assistance at the present crisis, if they would save 
 from ruin an order of men whose bravery had for ages past been 
 continually exerted in the protection of Christians of every nation 
 in Europe, against the implacable enemy of the Christian name. 
 
 But although the subjects of almost every Christian state had, 
 Philip’s re- on numberless occasions, been supported by their gene- 
 solution to rosity, and protected or rescued from slavery by their 
 support the intrepid valour, yet only such princes thought it incum- 
 n,glts * bent on them to interest themselves in their behalf, 
 whose territories lay exposed to immediate danger. Of these no 
 one had so much ground to dread the consequences of suffering 
 the knights to be overwhelmed, as the King of Spain. For 
 besides that his dominions were more exposed, he was much more 
 obnoxious to the Sultan than any other Christian monarch. He 
 had repeatedly committed hostilities against the African corsairs, 
 whom Solyman had taken under his protection ; and he could 
 not call in question the intelligence transmitted to him by the 
 grand-master, that as the Turkish armament was to be sent first 
 against the knights, it would be employed next against himself. 
 Philip had ever looked on Malta as his principal bulwark against 
 the invasions of the Turks; and he was sensible that he had now 
 more reason than ever to consider it in that view. Prompted 
 by these motives, he resolved to exert himself with vigour in its 
 defence ; and having written to his ministers and allies in Italy, 
 to form an army of twenty thousand men, which should be ready 
 to embark on the shortest notice, he assembled a numerous fleet 
 at Messina, and sent instructions to Don Garcia de Toledo, the 
 viceroy of Sicily, to watch over the preservation of Malta with 
 the same solicitude as if Sicily itself were to be attacked. 
 
 The zeal with which Philip espoused the cause of the knights, 
 The rand- delivered them from their anxiety with regard to the 
 master's final issue of the war, but did not prevent the grand- 
 activity master from exerting his activity and vigilance in pre 
 and vigi- p ar i n g for a vigorous defence. Besides sending a general 
 summons to the knights dispersed throughout the several 
 provinces in Europe, to repair instantly to Malta, he distributed 
 all the inhabitants of the island capable of bearing arms into 
 companies, and appointed the knights to train them in the 
 several branches of military discipline. He caused two thousand 
 troops to be levied by his agents in Italy, and kept all the ships 
 belonging to the order, perpetually employed in importing arms, 
 military stores, and provisions. 
 
 In obedience to his summons, all the knights hastened to his 
 assistance, except such as were prevented by age or infirmities ; 
 and these supplied their personal services, by sending him all the 
 
88 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 money which they could raise out of the effects belonging to their, 
 convents. Before the arrival of the enemy, he reviewed his 
 forces, and found that they amounted to seven hundred knights 
 and eight thousand five hundred soldiers, including two companies 
 of Spaniards which were sent to him from Sicily. These troops, 
 after a solemn religious procession, and partaking of the holy 
 sacrament, he distributed among the knights ; and assigned to 
 all of them their proper stations. In the midst of the multi- 
 plicity of affairs which demanded his attention, there was nothing 
 omitted which human prudence could provide. He was continu- 
 ally employed either in visiting the posts, or examining the stores, 
 or strengthening the fortifications, or instructing the officers as 
 to the conduct proper to be observed in case of an attack. The 
 wisdom displayed in his plan of defence, inspired his troops with 
 -confidence ; and his tranquillity and fortitude communicated to 
 them an elevation of mind, which rendered them superior to 
 every calamity that could befall them. 
 
 At length the Turkish fleet having left Constantinople in the 
 Arrival of end of March, arrived in sight of Malta about the 
 juries middle of May; consisting of more than two hundred 
 under Mus- sa ^> an( l having on board, besides a great number of 
 tapha and Christian slaves, designed to serve as pioneers, above 
 Piali. forty thousand land forces, composed chiefly of janis- 
 saries and spahis, the bravest soldiers of the Ottoman empire. 
 This formidable army landed at some distance from II Borgo% 
 and soon afterwards spread themselves over the country, setting 
 fire to the villages, putting the peasants to the sword, and 
 carrying off such of the cattle as, notwithstanding the orders of 
 the grand-master, had not been secured within the forts and 
 towns. 
 
 While the Turks were thus employed, La Valette sent out 
 De Copier, marshal of the order, with two hundred horse and 
 six hundred foot, to watch their motions. De Copier, an officer 
 of great experience, executed his commission with so much 
 prudence and vigour, that by falling unexpectedly on detached 
 parties, he cut off one thousand five hundred of the Turks, with 
 the loss of only about eighty men. But La Valette intended, 
 by permitting these skirmishes, only to make trial of his troops, 
 and to accustom them to the looks and shouts of the enemy. 
 He considered, that even so small a loss as was occasioned by 
 these rencounters, was more than he could easily support. He 
 therefore recalled De Copier, and sent the soldiers and knights 
 under his command to their respective posts. 
 
 The Turkish general held a council of war as soon as all his 
 The siege of troops were landed, to assist him in resolving where he 
 St Elmo, should begin his attack. Piali, agreeably to what he 
 
 a The town where the strength of the order was concentred. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 89 
 
 1565.] 
 
 understood to have been the Sultan’s instructions, was of opinion 
 that they ought not to enter upon action till Dragut should 
 arrive. But Mustapha, having received information of the King 
 of Spain’s preparations, thought that something must be done 
 instantly for the security of the fleet, which lay at present in a 
 creek, where it was exposed to the violence of the east wind, and 
 might be attacked with great advantage by the Spaniards. On 
 this account he was of opinion, that they should immediately lay 
 siege to a fort called St. Elmo, which stood on a neck of land 
 near II Borgo, having the principal harbour on one side of it, 
 and on the other, another harbour large enough to contain the 
 whole fleet in safety. This proposal was approved by a majority 
 of the council, and Mustapha proceeded without delay to carry 
 it into execution. He vainly expected that he would be able to 
 Difficulties reduce the fort in a few days. But besides the valour 
 attending with which it was defended, there were two circum- 
 the siege, stances which greatly augmented the difficulty of his 
 enterprise ; one of these was, that the garrison could easily 
 receive supplies from the town, across the great harbour, which 
 was secured by two forts, called St. Angelo and St. Michael, or 
 La Sangle ; and the other, that his approaches to the fort were 
 retarded by the nature of the road leading to it, which was either 
 a bare rock, or the rock thinly covered with a stony soil. This 
 last inconvenience he remedied, by substituting in the place of 
 trenches a parapet formed of planks and beams, covered on the 
 side towards the fort with earth, which they brought from a 
 distance, and mixed with straw and rushes. By this invention 
 he was enabled to open a battery mounted with his largest 
 cannon, on the sixth or seventh day after his arrival on the 
 island; and he quickly convinced the governor, the bailiff of 
 Negropont, that it would be impossible for him to hold out long. 
 St Elmo Of this the governor gave immediate information to the 
 thought un- grand-master, and made choice of "U knight of the name 
 tenable by of La Cerda for his messenger. This man, greatly 
 the garrison. di s t ur b ec i by fear, exaggerated the danger which he had 
 been sent to represent, and had the imprudence to tell the grand- 
 master, in the presence of many of the knights, that he must not 
 expect that the place would sustain the siege above a week longer. 
 u And what loss,” said La Yalette, “ have you received that 
 makes you so soon despair ?” “ The fort,” replied La Cerda, u is 
 to be considered as a sick person, greatly reduced, who must 
 receive continual remedies and supplies.” “ I myself,” answered 
 the grand-master, with great indignation, “ will be the physician; 
 and will bring others along with me, who, if they cannot cure 
 you of your fear, will at least preserve the fort from falling into 
 the hands of the Infidels.” 
 
 La Yalette did not expect that a place which was neither 
 strong, nor large enough to admit a numerous garrison, could 
 
90 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VI. 
 
 The grand- be defended long against so great a force as was em- 
 m aster’s ployed to reduce it; but lie thought it necessary that the 
 
 defend irf^it s * e £ e °f this fort should be prolonged as much as pos- 
 to the last, sible, in order to give the viceroy of Sicily time to come 
 to his relief. With this view he resolved to throwhimself 
 into St. Elmo with a select body of troops ; and he was preparing 
 to set out when the whole body of knights remonstrated with 
 such earnest importunity against his leaving the town, that he at 
 last consented to suffer the reinforcement which he had prepared, 
 to be conducted to the fort by a knight called De Medran, upon 
 whose conduct and intrepidity he could rely with the most 
 assured confidence. 
 
 Not long after De Medran’s arrival in the fort, the garrison 
 ^ made a vigorous sally, in which they drove the enemy 
 the* siege. 0 from their intrenchments, and put a number of them to 
 the sword. But the rest soon recovered from their 
 surprise ; and having returned to the charge, they compelled 
 the Christians to retire. In this rencounter, the vigorous efforts 
 of the janissaries were favoured by the wind, which blew the 
 smoke of the guns upon the fort, and covered the besieged with 
 a thick cloud, through which it was impossible to discern the 
 operations of the enemy. This incident the Turks had the pre- 
 sence of mind to improve to great advantage. They seized, 
 unperceived, upon the counterscarp, made a lodgment there with 
 beams, woolsacks, and gabions ; and raised a battery upon it 
 with incredible expedition. After the smoke was dispersed, the 
 besieged beheld what had been done with much astonishment ; 
 and they were the more disquieted, as the fortification which 
 the Turks had raised upon the counterscarp, overtopped a 
 ravelin which lay near it, in which the besieged could no longer 
 appear with safety. They resolved, however, to defend this 
 ravelin as long as possible, whatever it should cost them. 
 
 In the mean time Dragut and another noted corsair called 
 Uluchiali arrived with twenty galleys, having, besides 
 Dragut ° [ s l aves and seamen, two thousand five hundred troops 
 on board. This reinforcement and the presence of 
 Dragut added fresh vigour to the operations of the siege. This 
 gallant corsair exposed himself on all occasions with the utmost 
 intrepidity ; spent whole days in the trenches ; and as, besides his 
 other extraordinary talents, he was particularly skilful in the 
 management of artillery, he caused some new batteries to be 
 raised in more advantageous situations than had hitherto been 
 made choice of ; and kept up a continual fire both upon the 
 ravelin above mentioned, and a cavalier that covered the fort, 
 and was one of its principal defences. 
 
 This cavalier soon became the only defence which could pre- 
 Progrcss of vent the besiegers from coming up to the very foot of 
 the siege. ^} ie wa ]} Some Turkish engineers having approached 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 91 
 
 1565 .] 
 
 the ravelin at day-break, to examine the effects of their artil- 
 lery, they observed a gun-port so low, that one of them, when 
 mounted on the shoulders of another, looked into it, and saw the 
 Christian soldiers lying on the ground asleep. Of this they gave 
 immediate information to the troops ; who, advancing as quickly 
 and silently as possible, and clapping ladders to the gun-hole, got 
 up into the ravelin, and cut most of the Christians to pieces. 
 
 Between this ravelin and the cavalier lay the ditch, over which 
 the besieged had thrown a temporary bridge of planks, leading 
 up to the cavalier. The Turks perceiving this, leapt instantly 
 upon the bridge, and attempted to make themselves masters of 
 the cavalier, as they had already done of the ravelin. But the 
 garrison was now alarmed ; the bravest of the knights hastened 
 from different quarters to the post of danger ; and, after an 
 obstinate engagement, they compelled the Turks to retire into 
 the ravelin. There the janissaries observing another way of 
 reaching the cavalier, by a path from the bottom of the ditch, 
 they threw themselves down without dread or hesitation ; and 
 having ascended by this path to the other side, they renewed 
 their attack with greater fury than ever. The combat lasted 
 from sun-rise till noon, when the invincible bravery of the gar- 
 rison proved at last victorious. About twenty knights and a hun- 
 dred soldiers were killed, and near three thousand of the enemy. 
 
 As the ravelin was open on the side towards the fort, the 
 besieged pointed come cannon against it, and made great havoc 
 among the Infidels. But Mustapha, sensible of the value of the 
 acquisition which he had made, poured in fresh soldiers without 
 number ; and the pioneers coming forward with woolsacks, 
 planks, and gabions, put the troops at length in safety, and 
 made a lodgment in the ravelin, of which the garrison were 
 never able to dispossess them. 
 
 The grand-master’s concern on account of this disaster was 
 greatly augmented by considering that it could not have hap- 
 pened so soon, without some negligence on the part of the gar- 
 rison. He sent them however an immediate reinforcement ; but 
 both the siege and the defence were carried on with the same 
 vigour as before. 
 
 But the situation of the besieged was now become much more 
 The distress dangerous than formerly. The Turks applied them- 
 of the gar- selves, with unremitting diligence to heighten the rave- 
 nson. p n ft overtopped the wall of the fort ; and after this, 
 the garrison could no longer appear upon the parapet with safety. 
 Many were killed by the enemy’s artillery. Several breaches 
 were made in different parts of the wall, and the hearts of the 
 bravest knights began to fail within them. They apprehended, 
 that ere long the Turkish general would attempt to take the fort 
 by storm, and they dreaded that it would be impossible for so 
 small a number to resist so numerous an enemy. 
 
92 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 They agreed, therefore, though with much reluctance, to apply 
 They a ly g ran d-master for liberty to quit the fort ; and 
 
 for liberty they made choice of the chevalier De Medran for 
 to quit the their messenger. De Medran represented that the fort 
 fort ‘ was in reality no longer tenable, and that to continue in 
 it, though only a few days, would infallibly occasion the utter 
 destruction of the garrison. That nothing could be of greater 
 advantage to the Turks than sending the forces of the Order to 
 a place where there were no fortifications to defend them ; that 
 by so doing, the troops necessary for the defence of the other 
 fortresses would soon be consumed, and these fortresses become 
 an easy prey to the enemy. But he concluded with saying, that, 
 although this was the opinion of all the garrison, he was com- 
 missioned to declare to the grand-master, that whatever resolu- 
 tion he should form, they were determined to yield an implicit 
 obedience to his authority. 
 
 Most of the knights in council thought that this request of 
 Refused by the garrison ought to be immediately granted. But 
 the grand- La Valette was of a contrary opinion. The fort, he 
 master. acknowledged, would not probably hold out much 
 longer ; and he lamented the fate of those gallant knights and 
 soldiers who were stationed in so perilous a situation. But 
 there were cases, he said, in which it was necessary to sacrifice 
 some of the members for the preservation of the body ; and such 
 he knew to be the present critical state of their affairs. For he 
 was credibly informed that the Sicilian viceroy had declared, 
 that if the fort of St. Elmo were lost (as he could not then 
 attack the Turks with the same advantage as at present), he 
 would not expose his fleet to the risk of a defeat for the sake of 
 the rest of the island. And on this account La Valette sub- 
 joined, that the preservation of the Order depended almost 
 entirely on the length of the present siege. This he repre- 
 sented to the chevalier De Medran, and sent him back with 
 instructions to remind the knights of the vow which they took 
 at their entrance into the Order, of sacrificing their lives for its 
 defence. He likewise bade him assure them, in his name, that 
 he would not fail to send them such reinforcements as they 
 should stand in need of, and was determined, as soon as it should 
 be necessary, to come himself to their assistance, with a fixed, 
 unalterable purpose to lay down his life sooner than deliver the 
 fort into the hands of the Infidels. 
 
 This answer had the desired effect on several of the knights, 
 and particularly on those whose principles of honour and attach- 
 ment to the Order were confirmed by years. But the greater 
 part of them were much dissatisfied. They thought the grand- 
 master’s treatment of them harsh and cruel, and wrote him a 
 letter, subscribed by fifty-three, in which, after repeating their 
 former request, they informed him, that if he did not, on the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 93 
 
 1565. j 
 
 next night, send boats to carry them to the town, they were 
 determined to sally out into the Turkish camp, where they 
 might fall honourably by the sword, instead of suffering such an 
 ignominious death as they had reason to expect if the fort were 
 taken by storm. 
 
 To this letter La Valette replied, “ that they were much 
 mistaken, if they expected to satisfy their honour by throwing 
 away their lives ; singe it was no less their duty to submit to his 
 authority, than to sacrifice their lives in defence of the Order : 
 that the preservation of the whole depended on their present 
 obedience to his commands ; that no aid was to be expected from 
 Spain, if the fort were given up ; and that if he should yield to 
 their request, and bring them to the town, the town itself would 
 then be immediately invested, and they, as well as the rest, soon 
 afterwards reduced to a situation more desperate than that from 
 which they were so solicitous to escape, by deserting an important 
 station which they had undertaken to defend.’’ Besides this 
 letter, he sent three commissioners to examine the state of the 
 fortifications ; intending by this measure either to gain time, or 
 to prevent the garrison from sinking into despair. 
 
 These commissioners differed widely in the accounts which they 
 delivered at their return. Two of them thought it impossible to 
 defend the fort much longer. But the third, named Constantine 
 Castriot, a Greek prince, descended from the famous Albanian 
 hero Scanderbeg, whether from ignorance, or consciousness of 
 greater resources in his native courage than the other two pos- 
 sessed, maintained that the garrison was far from being reduced 
 to the last extremity ; and to give proof how firmly he was per- 
 suaded of the truth of what he said, he offered to enter the fort 
 himself, and to undertake the defence of it with such troops as 
 should be willing to accompany him. 
 
 The grand-master, strongly impressed with a sense of the 
 necessity of protracting the siege, immediately accepted this offer, 
 and bestowed the highest encomiums on Castriot’s zeal and reso- 
 lution. Nor did Castriot find any difficulty in persuading a 
 sufficient number to attend him, who were no less zealous and 
 resolute than himself. The soldiers crowded to his standard, and 
 were emulous to have their names enrolled for that dangerous 
 service in which he had engaged. 
 
 When La Valette saw the spirit by which these men were 
 animated, and had no longer any doubt of being able by their 
 means to prolong the siege of the fort, he sent a letter to the 
 knights, acquainting them that he was now willing to give them 
 their discharge ; and would immediately send another garrison, 
 into whose hands he desired they should be ready to deliver up 
 the fort, and come themselves to the town in the boats in which 
 their successors were to be transported. “ You, my brethren,” 
 continued he, u may be in greater safety here than in your pre- 
 
94 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 sent situation ; and I shall then feel less anxiety for the preserva- 
 tion of the fort, although I think it of so great importance, that 
 on the preservation of it, that of our Order seems entirely to 
 depend.” 
 
 The contents and style of this letter affected the knights in the 
 most sensible manner, and roused within them that delicate sense 
 of honour by which the order had been so long and so eminently 
 distinguished. They dreaded the reception which they were about 
 to meet with from the grand-master and the other knights : 
 “ And should this new garrison,” said they to each other, “ which 
 is appointed to succeed us, be fortunate enough to hold out till 
 the Spaniards arrive, in what corner of the earth shall we conceal 
 our infamy T’ They resolved without hesitation to remain in the 
 fort till every man should perish, rather than either deliver it to 
 the new garrison, or abandon it to the enemy. And they went 
 in a body to the governor, and entreated him to inform the grand- 
 master of their repentance, and to join with them in praying that 
 they might be suffered to wipe out the remembrance of their fault 
 by their future conduct. 
 
 The governor readily complied ; and, in order to prevent the 
 new garrison from setting out in the night, he despatched his letter 
 by a noted swimmer before it was dark. La Valette secretly 
 rejoiced at this application ; -but sent word to the governor, that 
 he must always prefer even a body of new troops, to the most 
 experienced warriors who had refused to submit to the control 
 of military discipline. When this answer was reported to the 
 knights, they were overwhelmed with anguish, and had recourse 
 to the most submissive entreaties of forgiveness. The grand- 
 master suffered himself at last to be overcome ; and henceforth 
 the garrison, dismissing all thoughts of their own safety, were 
 intent on nothing but how to prolong the defence. 
 
 The grand-master sent them every night fresh troops, to supply 
 the place of the killed and wounded ; and kept them well furnished 
 with provisions, ammunition, and fire- works. Of these last he 
 had invented a particular kind, which consisted of hoops of wood, 
 covered with wool, and steeped in boiling oil, and other inflam- 
 mable liquors, mixed with nitre and gunpowder. To these 
 machines they set fire, and threw them flaming in the midst of 
 the enemy, when they were crowded together at an assault. It 
 happened often that two or three of the Turks were hooked 
 together and scorched to death; and the utmost confusion was 
 produced wherever the hoops were thrown. 
 
 The besieged stood much in need of these, and every other 
 ,,,, . . instrument of mischief, that could be devised for their 
 cibic bra- defence. In spite of the most vigorous opposition, the 
 very of the Turks had cast a bridge over the ditch, and begun to sap 
 garrison. anc [ un( j erm j ne the wall. From the seventeenth of Juno 
 to the fourteenth of July, not a single day passed without some 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1565 .] 
 
 ys 
 
 rencounter ; and Mustapha had frequently attempted to scale the 
 wall of the fort, but had been as often repulsed with the loss of 
 some of the bravest of his troops. 
 
 Ashamed at having been detained so long before a place of such 
 inconsiderable strength, he resolved to make one great decisive 
 effort, and to bring to the assault as many of his forces as the 
 situation of the place would permit him to employ. He had 
 already made several breaches : but in order to secure the success 
 of the assault which he now intended, he kept his batteries play- 
 ing all the fifteenth without intermission, till the wall on that side 
 where he designed his attack was almost level with the rock. On 
 the sixteenth the fleet was drawn up before sunrise as near the 
 fort as the depth of the water would allow ; four thousand mus- 
 keteers and archers were stationed in the trenches ; and the rest 
 of the troops, upon a signal given, advanced to the breach. The 
 garrison was prepared to receive them. The breach was lined 
 with several ranks of soldiers, having the knights interspersed 
 among them at certain distances. The Turks attempted often to 
 break through this determined band, and to overpower them with 
 their numbers. But their numbers served only to augment the 
 loss which they sustained. Every shot from the fort did execu- 
 tion. The artillery made dreadful havoc among them, and the 
 burning hoops were employed with astonishing success. The 
 novelty of these machines, and the shrieks of those who were 
 caught in them, added greatly to the terror which they inspired, 
 and made it impossible for the Turkish officers to keep their men 
 firm and steady in pursuing the advantages which, had they 
 preserved their ranks, their numbers must have infallibly secured. 
 
 At length Mustapha, after having continued the assault for 
 more than six hours, without gaining a single inch of ground on 
 the besieged, gave orders for sounding a retreat. 
 
 In this attack the garrison lost about twenty knights and 
 three hundred soldiers ; but this loss was immediately supplied 
 by a reinforcement from the town : and Mustapha was at last 
 convinced, that, unless the communication between the fort and 
 the town were cut off, it would be impossible to bring the siege 
 of the former to a period, while any troops remained in any 
 other part of the island. By the advice of Dragut he resolved 
 to extend his trenches and batteries, on the side next to the 
 town, till they should reach to that part of the sea, or great 
 harbour, where those supplies were landed which the grand-master 
 daily sent to the garrison. This undertaking, he knew, must be 
 attended with the utmost difficulty, because all the space between 
 his intrenchments and the point to which it was necessary to 
 extend them, lay exposed to the artillery both of Fort 
 Idikd 4 St. Elmo and St. Angelo. In viewing the ground, a 
 Sangiac, in whom he put confidence, was killed by his 
 side ; and which was still a more irreparable loss, Dragut re- 
 
96 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 ceivecl a mortal wound, of which he died in a few days b . This 
 did not however discourage Mustapha from pursuing his design. 
 By employing his troops and pioneers at the work day and night 
 without intermission, he at length carried it into execution. 
 Then having planted batteries along the shore, and filled his 
 trenches with musketeers, it was impossible for any boat to pass 
 from the town to the fort, without the most imminent danger of 
 either being sunk or intercepted. 
 
 After this precaution, he resumed with fresh vigour his attempt 
 The garri- to take the fort by storm. On the twenty-first, he made 
 son reduced four different assaults ; all of which the garrison witli- 
 to the last gtood, and, in repulsing so many thousand brave and 
 extremity. we jj_ ( jj so ipi£ ne< j troops, displayed a degree of prowess 
 and fortitude which almost exceeds belief, and is beyond the 
 power of description. But this heroic garrison was now exceed- 
 ingly reduced in number ; and there was the strongest reason to 
 apprehend, that in one assault more, they must inevitably be 
 overpowered, unless a reinforcement were sent them from the 
 town. Of their desperate situation they gave intelligence to the 
 grand-master, by one who swam across the harbour in the night. 
 The boats were instantly filled with knights and other soldiers, 
 who generously resolved to devote themselves to certain destruc- 
 tion, for the general safety and the preservation of the fort. 
 They set off from the town with as much alacrity as if they had 
 entertained the most sanguine hopes of victory ; but they found 
 the Turks every where so much upon their guard, and the lines 
 so strongly defended, that, after several fruitless attempts to 
 land, they were at last obliged to return, depressed with sorrow 
 for the fate of their brave companions. 
 
 The garrison now despairing of relief, gave themselves up for 
 lost ; but instead of their capitulating, or attempting to escape, 
 they prepared for death, and passed the night in prayer, and in 
 receiving the sacrament ; after which, they embraced one another 
 tenderly, and then repaired to their respective posts ; while such of 
 the wounded as had been disabled from walking, were, at their 
 own earnest desire, carried to the side of the breach, where they 
 waited, without dismay, for the approach of the Turkish army. 
 
 Early in the morning of the twenty-third of July, the Turks 
 St. Elmo advanced to the assault, with loud shouts as to certain 
 taken by victory, which they believed so small a handful of men as * 
 assault. now remained in the fort would not dare to dispute with 
 them. In this expectation they were disappointed. The garri- 
 son being resolved on death, and despising danger, were more 
 than men, and exerted a degree of prowess and valour that filled 
 their enemies with amazement. The combat lasted upwards of 
 four hours, till not only every knight, but every soldier had fallen, 
 
 b lie was wounded in the head by the splinters of a stone, which was beat to pieces by 
 a cannon-shot from Fort St. Angelo. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 97 
 
 1565.] 
 
 except two or three who saved themselves by swimming. The 
 Turkish colours were then planted on the ramparts ; and the fleet 
 entered the harbour which the fort commanded in a kind of tri- 
 umph. When Mustapha took a view of the fort, and examined 
 its size and fortifications, he could not refrain from saying, 
 “ What will not the father cost us (meaning the town), when 
 the son, who is so small, has cost so many thousands 0 of our 
 bravest troops ?” But this reflection, far from exciting his 
 admiration of that heroic fortitude which he had found so diffi- 
 cult to overcome, served only to inspire him with a brutal fury. 
 He ordered all such of the garrison as were found lying on the 
 breach alive, to be ripped open, and their hearts torn out. And 
 as an insult on the knights and their religion, he caused their 
 dead bodies to be searched for, and large gashes to be made in 
 them, in the form of a cross, after which he tied them on planks, 
 and threw them into the sea, to be carried by the wind and tide 
 to the town, or Fort St. Angelo. 
 
 The grand-master was at first melted into tears at this shock- 
 ing spectacle ; but his grief was soon converted into indignation 
 and revenge ; and these passions betrayed him into an action 
 unworthy of the exalted character which he bore. In order to 
 teach the Basha, as he pretended, to make war with less bar- 
 barity, he caused all the Turks whom he had taken prisoners to 
 be massacred ; and then, putting their heads into his largest can- 
 non, he shot them into the Turkish camp. 
 
 In the siege which has been related, the Order lost about one 
 thousand five hundred men, including one hundred and thirty of 
 the bravest knights. The grand-master was deeply affected at 
 so great a loss ; but he wisely dissembled his concern, and wear- 
 ing still the same magnanimous and intrepid aspect as before, he 
 inspired all the troops that remained, with a fixed, unalterable 
 resolution, to defend the town and the other forts to the last 
 extremity. 
 
 Mustapha vainly imagined, that, being intimidated by the fate 
 of their companions, they would be now inclined to listen to terms 
 of capitulation ; and in this hope he sent an officer with a white 
 flag to one of the gates, attended by a Christian slave, designed 
 to serve for his interpreter. The Turk was not allowed to enter 
 within the town ; but the Christian was admitted, and was led 
 through several ranks of soldiers under arms by an officer, who, 
 after showing him all the fortifications of the place, desired him 
 to take particular notice of the depth and breadth of the ditch, 
 and said to him, “ See there, the only spot we can afford your 
 general ; and there we hope soon to bury him and all his janis- 
 saries.” 
 
 This insulting speech being reported by the slave, excited in 
 
 c Eight thousand. 
 H 
 
98 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VI. 
 
 the fiery mind of the Basha the highest degree of wrath and indig- 
 Siege of ii na ti 0I h an d made him resolve to exert himself to the 
 Borgo and utmost in the prosecution of the siege. His troops, 
 Fort St. though greatly diminished, were still sufficient to invest 
 Michael. once town and the fort of St. Michael d . 
 
 He kept a constant fire on both ; but he intended first to apply 
 himself chiefly to the reduction of the latter, which he proposed 
 to attack both by land and water, at the extremity of the 
 peninsula 6 on which it stands. In order to accomplish this 
 design, it was necessary he should have some shipping introduced 
 into the harbour, for transporting his forces. But the mouth of 
 the harbour having been rendered inaccessible by a great iron 
 chain, and the cannon of St. Angelo, his design must have been 
 relinquished, if Piali had not suggested an expedient against 
 which the grand-master had not provided. This was to make 
 the Christian slaves and the crews of the ships draw a number 
 of boats, by the strength of their arms, over the neck of land on 
 which stood Fort St. Elmo. Of this proposal, which Mustapha 
 immediately adopted, information was carried to the grand- 
 master by a Turkish officer, who, being by birth a Greek, was 
 touched suddenly with remorse, and deserted to the Christians. 
 In consequence of this intelligence, La Valette set a great 
 number of hands to work in framing a stacado along that part 
 of the promontory where the Turks intended their attack ; and 
 at another part, where the depth of the water or the hardness 
 of the bottom would not admit of the stacado, he ordered strong 
 intrenchments to be made upon the breach. Mustapha, in the 
 mean time, fired incessantly upon the fort, while the slaves and 
 crews were employed in transporting the boats over land into the 
 harbour. At length the Basha, judging that the number of 
 boats which he had transported would be sufficient, and that the 
 breaches which his artillery had made were practicable, resolved 
 without farther delay to make an attack both by sea and land. 
 He was the more confident of success, as, since the taking of 
 St. Elmo, he had received a considerable reinforcement, by the 
 Arrival of ari> i va l of Hascem, son of Barbarossa, with two thou- 
 Hascem, sand five hundred select soldiers, commonly called the 
 son of Bar- Bravoes of Algiers. Hascem, who possessed a con- 
 barossa. siderable share of his father’s fire, and was ambitious 
 to distinguish himself in the service of the Sultan, begged of 
 Mustapha to intrust him with the assault of Fort St. Michael ; 
 and vaunted, with his natural arrogance, that he would soon 
 make himself master of it sword in hand. The Basha, whether 
 from an opinion of his valour, or an intention to teach him at 
 
 d They arc situated on two promontories that run out into the great harbour, and are 
 separated from each other by a channel, where the galleys belonging to the Order lay, and 
 the mouth 'of which was strongly secured on each side by batteries. 
 e Called the Spur. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 99 
 
 15G5. ] 
 
 his own expense the folly of his presumption, readily complied 
 with his request ; and having added six thousand men to his 
 Algerines, he promised to support him with the rest of his army. 
 
 Hascem divided his forces with Candelissa, an old corsair, his 
 lieutenant, to whom he committed the attack by sea, whilst he 
 reserved that on the land side to himself. 
 
 Candelissa having put his troops on board the boats, set out 
 Candelissa with drums beating, and hautboys and other musical 
 repulsed instruments playing, preceded by a boat filled with 
 slaughter 1 Mahometan priests, some of whom were employed in 
 
 & ' offering prayers to Heaven for his success, or in singing 
 
 hymns ; while others had books in their hands out of which they 
 read imprecations against the Christians. Candelissa attempted 
 first to break down the stacado which had been formed to 
 obstruct his landing; but finding it much stronger than he 
 expected, and that, while he was employed in demolishing it, his 
 troops must suffer greatly from the enemy’s fire, he thought it 
 would be easier to make a descent on that part of the shore which 
 the grand-master had strengthened with intrenchments. At 
 this important post the Christian troops were commanded by an 
 ancient knight of the name of Guimaran. This experienced 
 officer reserved his fire till the Turks had advanced within a little 
 distance of the shore, when by a single discharge he killed about 
 four hundred men. This did not prevent the rest from approach- 
 ing. Candelissa pushed forwards while the Christians were 
 loading their cannon, and landed at the head of his Algerines. 
 But Guimaran, having reserved some cannon charged with grape- 
 shot, did dreadful execution among them after they had landed, 
 and many of them began to fly to their boats ; which Candelissa 
 observing, he commanded the boats to be put off to a little 
 distance from the shore. His troops, perceiving then that they 
 must either die or conquer, took courage from despair, and 
 advanced boldly to the intrenchment, with ladders for scaling it 
 in one hand, and their sabres in the other. The combatants on 
 both sides displayed the most intrepid valour. Great numbers 
 fell, and the ditch was choked with blood, and with the bodies 
 of the dead and wounded. The Turks at last, after an engage- 
 ment of five hours, reached the top of the intrenchment, and 
 there planted their ensigns. The knights, stung with shame on 
 account of their retreat, returned with redoubled ardour. But 
 they would probably have been overpowered by the superior 
 number of the enemy, had ' not the grand-master sent them a 
 seasonable reinforcement, under the admiral de Giou, and the 
 chevalier de Quiney; who fell upon the Algerines and Turks 
 with a degree of fury that struck terror into Candelissa himself, 
 who was noted for his intrepidity. Having ordered the boats to 
 be brought nearer the shore, he was among the first who fled. 
 His bravoes fought desperately for some time after he had left 
 
 h 2 
 
100 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 them ; but were at length thrown down from the intrenchments, 
 and compelled to fly to their boats with the utmost precipitation. 
 The Christians pursued them, and the batteries continued firing 
 on them without intermission. Many of the boats were sunk ; 
 the water was covered with dead bodies, mangled limbs, shields, 
 and helmets. Of the four thousand who had been sent on this 
 enterprise, scarcely five hundred remained, and many of these 
 were dangerously wounded. 
 
 Hascem was not more fortunate in his assault by land, than 
 TT , Candelissa was by sea. After bavins: been repulsed at 
 
 o , i p iCGiii and v c jl 
 
 one breach with great slaughter, he rallied his troops, 
 and led them on to another, where he fought long and desperately, 
 till most of the bravoes having fallen by his side, he was obliged, 
 with much reluctance and sorrow, to sound a retreat. 
 
 Mustapha, not unmindful of his promise to support him, no 
 Mustapha sooner perceived him beginning to retire, than he 
 repulsed. ordered the janissaries, whom he had kept under arms, 
 to advance. The garrison had maintained an engagement with 
 Hascem for five hours, in the middle of the day, and in the 
 hottest season of the year ; yet, as if they had not been subject 
 to the wants and weaknesses of humanity, they advanced beyond 
 the breach to meet the janissaries, and fought apparently with 
 as much vigour and fortitude as before. By the power of superior 
 numbers they were compelled to fall back within the breach. 
 But there they made the most desperate resistance ; and, being 
 reinforced by De Giou and De Quiney, with the troops which 
 had triumphed over Candelissa, they at last repulsed the janis- 
 saries with dreadful slaughter ; after having lost more than forty 
 knights, and two hundred of the bravest of the common men. 
 
 Mustapha, enraged by this invincible obstinacy which the 
 The siege of Christians displayed in their defence, and dreading 
 II Borgoaud that the Spanish succours, which had been already 
 St. Michael delayed muc h longer than he expected, might soon 
 the same arrive, resolved now to employ his whole force at once, 
 time. and, while he himself prosecuted the siege of Fort St. 
 Michael with one half of his troops, to employ the other, under 
 Piali, against the town. More batteries were raised. The 
 trenches were advanced still nearer than before. Bridges of 
 sail-yards and masts were thrown over the ditches. Mines, not- 
 withstanding the hard and rocky soil, were sprung. Assaults 
 were repeated without number, and the two bashas, emulous of 
 one another, and each of them agitated with continual anxiety 
 lest victory should declare first for his competitor, exhibited the 
 most shining proof of personal courage, and exhausted all the 
 art of war then known in the world. Yet, through the deter- 
 mined bravery of the knights, conducted by the grand-master 
 with consummate prudence and indefatigable vigilance, the Turks 
 were baffled in every attempt, and repulsed with slaughter. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 101 
 
 1505. j 
 
 Mustapha flattered himself once with the most sanguine hopes of 
 success on his part, made a machine, invented by his principal 
 engineer, in the form of a huge cask, bound strongly with iron 
 hoops, and filled with gunpowder, nails, chains, bullets, and such 
 other instruments of death. After setting fire to a train which 
 was fastened to this machine, it was thrown by the force of an 
 engine, upon a ravelin that was the principal defence of the fort. 
 But the garrison, undismayed, found means, before it caught fire, 
 to cast it out again into the midst of the assailants. In a moment 
 afterwards it burst with dreadful fury, and filled the Turks with 
 consternation. The. knights then sallied out upon them sword 
 in hand, and taking advantage of their confusion, killed many of 
 them, and put the rest to flight. 
 
 Piali had, on some occasions, still more reason than Mustapha 
 Success of to entertain the hopes of victory, although the town 
 Piali against was much stronger than the fort, and La Yalette 
 II Borgo. commanded there in person. By his batteries he had 
 demolished all the outworks of the place, and had made an 
 immense breach in the wall. While his troops were engaged in 
 a furious assault, that engrossed the whole attention of the 
 besieged from morning till night, he employed a great number of 
 pioneers in raising a cavalier or platform of earth and stones, 
 close by the breach, and so high as to overlook the parapet. 
 Night, in the mean time, came on, and prevented him from 
 carrying any farther this great advantage ; but he doubted not 
 that next day he should be able to make himself master of the 
 place. 
 
 As soon as he had drawn off his forces, a council of the Order 
 The wisdom was convened, and most of the knights were of opinion 
 and intrepi- that the town was no longer tenable ; that the forti- 
 ^'•and ma 6 ca ti° ns which still remained should be blown up, 
 ° “ iasu *and that the garrison and inhabitants should retire 
 into the castle of St. Angelo. But the grand-master received 
 this proposal with horror and indignation. “ This would be in 
 effect,” said he, “ to deliver the whole island into the hands of 
 the Infidels. Fort St. Michael, which has been so gallantly 
 defended, and which is preserved by its communication with the 
 town, would thus be soon reduced to the necessity of surrender- 
 ing. There is no room in the castle of St. Angelo for the 
 inhabitants and troops ; nor, if there were room, is there water 
 in that fort for so great a number. ,, It was then proposed that 
 at least the relics of the saints and the ornaments of the churches 
 should be carried into the castle ; and the knights earnestly 
 entreated the grand-master to retire into it himself, assuring him 
 that they would conduct the defence with the utmost vigour and 
 vigilance. “ No, my brethren,” he replied, “ what you propose 
 as to the sacred things, would serve only to intimidate the 
 soldiers. We must conceal our apprehensions. It is here we 
 
102 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VI. 
 
 must either die or conquer. And is it possible that I, at the 
 age of seventy-one, can end my life so honourably, as in fighting, 
 together with my friends and brethren, against the implacable 
 enemies of our holy faith ? ” He then told them what he thought 
 proper to be done, and proceeded instantly to put it in execution. 
 Having called all the soldiers from Fort St. Angelo, except a 
 few who were necessary for managing the artillery, he employed 
 them and the inhabitants all night, in throwing up intrenchments 
 within the breach ; after which he sent out some of the bravest 
 knights, with a select body of troops, to make an attempt on 
 the cavalier. These men stole softly along the foot of the wall 
 till they arrived at the place appointed, when they set up a loud 
 shout, and attacked the guards whom Piali had left there, with 
 so much fury, that the Turks, believing the whole garrison had 
 fallen upon them, abandoned their post, and fled precipitately to 
 their camp. 
 
 The cavalier was immediately fortified, a battery of cannon 
 planted on it, and a parapet raised on the side towards the 
 enemy. And thus the breach was rendered impracticable, the 
 town put in greater security than before ; and a work, which had 
 been devised for its destruction, converted into a bulwark for its 
 defence. 
 
 The grand-master had now greater confidence than ever of 
 Ungenerous being able to hold out till the Spaniards should come to 
 conduct of his relief. In consequence of the assurances given by 
 Au iliP 24 Philip, and the Sicilian viceroy, he had, long before this 
 
 ug ' ' time, entertained the hopes of their arrival, and had often 
 earnestly solicited the viceroy to hasten his departure from Mes- 
 sina. The conduct of this nobleman was long exceedingly mys- 
 terious. The patience of the knights was worn out by his delays ; 
 and they, and many others, suspected that the real motive of his 
 conduct was the dread of encountering with an admiral of so 
 great a reputation as Piali. But it afterwards appeared that 
 the viceroy had acted agreeably to his instructions from the court 
 of Spain. For although Philip was, for the reasons above men- 
 tioned, sincerely interested in the preservation of the knights, 
 and had amused them with the most flattering promises of assist- 
 ance, yet he seems from the first to have resolved not to expose 
 himself to danger on their account, and to avoid, if possible, a 
 general engagement. 
 
 A generous and grateful prince would have acted very differ- 
 ently towards an ally so deserving of his support ; and if either 
 generosity or gratitude had been the leading principle of Philip’s 
 conduct, it is probable he would, on this occasion, have regarded 
 the knights as his own subjects ; and have thought it no less 
 incumbent on him to exert himself in their defence, than if they 
 had acknowledged him for their sovereign. 
 
 But Philip was affected by the danger only so far as it threat- 
 
1565.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 103 
 
 ened the tranquillity of his own dominions. He had resolved to 
 interpose in their behalf, rather than to suffer them to be^over- 
 powered ; but he appears to have been very little touched with 
 their calamities ; and to have intended to leave them to them- 
 selves, as long as there was any prospect of their being able to 
 make resistance ; by doing which he considered, that he would 
 not only preserve his own strength entire, but might afterwards 
 engage with the Turks, when they were exhausted by the opera- 
 tions of the siege. 
 
 Philip adhered inflexibly to this plan, notwithstanding the 
 grand- master’s repeated importunities, much longer than was 
 consistent even with his own selfish views. For, without a degree 
 of fortitude and prowess on the part of the garrison, and a degree 
 of wisdom, vigilance, and magnanimity, on that of the grand- 
 master, infinitely higher than there could be reason to expect, it 
 must have been impossible for such a handful of men to have 
 withstood, for so long a time, so great a force, and such mighty 
 efforts as were employed to reduce them. Even the death of the 
 grand-master alone, whose person was exposed to perpetual dan- 
 ger, would have proved fatal to the knights, long before Philip 
 sent orders to his viceroy to give them any effectual support ; 
 and in this case, as his own dominions or his fleet would have 
 been immediately attacked, he would probably have had little 
 reason to be satisfied with the timid, ungenerous counsels which 
 he pursued. 
 
 Whatever judgment may be formed on this head, the viceroy 
 did not think himself at liberty to yield to the repeated applica- 
 tions of the grand-master, till the operations of the siege began 
 to relax, and the Turkish forces were reduced from forty-five 
 thousand to fifteen or sixteen thousand ; of whom many were 
 worn out with the fatigues which they had undergone, and others 
 rendered unfit for action by a bloody flux, which for several 
 weeks had raged amongst them. 
 
 In this situation of affairs, when it was probable that the 
 knights would, without assistance, have compelled the Turks to 
 raise the siege, the viceroy let the grand-master know that he 
 had now received such instructions from the King, as put it in 
 his power to show his attachment to the Order ; that he was not 
 indeed permitted to attack the Turkish fleet ; but that he would 
 immediately bring him a strong body of troops, whose commanders 
 (as he himself must return to Sicily) were to be entirely subject 
 to the grand -master’s authority, till the enemy should be expelled. 
 
 The viceroy, although still suspected of interposing unneces- 
 Arrival of sary delays, at length fulfilled his promise ; and on the 
 6000 Spa- seventh of September landed six thousand men, under 
 mards. D on Alvaro de Sande f and Ascanio della Corna, in that 
 
 i This is the same nobleman whose valiant defence of the fort of Gerba is described in 
 Book IV. p. 69. 
 
104 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VI. 
 
 part of the island which lay at the greatest distance from the 
 Turks ; after which he immediately carried back the fleet to 
 Sicily. 
 
 The Turkish bashas had been persuaded by their spies, that 
 the viceroy’s intention was to land his troops at the castle of St. 
 Angelo ; and to prevent this, Piali had lain several days at anchor 
 before the great port, after having blocked up the entrance into 
 it by a chain of sail- yards, piles, and boats. 
 
 In the mean time, intelligence being brought to Mustapha 
 . that the Spaniards were landed, and marching towards 
 raised, and him, he was thrown into the most dreadful consternation, 
 the depar- Sensible that his soldiers were much disheartened by 
 Turkf ^ ' C ^ ie * r success, he imagined that he was about to be 
 
 attacked by a superior army, consisting of the bravest 
 and best-disciplined troops in Spain. Without waiting for infor- 
 mation of their number, he forthwith raised the siege, drew his 
 garrison out of St. Elmo, and leaving all his heavy cannon behind 
 him, embarked his troops with as much precipitation as if the 
 Spaniards with superior forces had been in sight. He had 
 scarcely got on board when a deserter arrived from the Spanish 
 camp, and informed him that with fifteen or sixteen thousand 
 men, he had fled before an army that did not exceed six thou- 
 sand, having no general at their head, and commanded by officers 
 who were independent of one another. The Baslia was over- 
 whelmed with shame and vexation by this intelligence, and would 
 have immediately disembarked ; but this, he knew, he durst not 
 attempt without consulting Piali, Hascem, and his other prin- 
 cipal officers. 
 
 While he was deliberating upon it, the grand-master improved 
 to the best advantage the leisure that was afforded him. He 
 employed all the inhabitants, men, women, and children, as well 
 as the soldiers, in filling up the enemy’s trenches, and demolishing 
 their works ; and put a garrison without delay into Fort St. Elmo, 
 in which the Turks now beheld from their ships the standard of 
 St. John erected where that of Mahomet had lately stood. 
 
 This demonstrated to Mustapha how much new labour awaited 
 him in case he should return to the siege ; but being enraged 
 against himself on account of the precipitancy of his retreat, and 
 disquieted at the thoughts of the reception which he had reason 
 to expect from Solyman, he wished to atone for his imprudence, 
 and to wipe off the reproach in which it had involved him, by 
 victory or death. Piali, who from his jealousy of the Basha’s 
 credit with the Sultan, was not sorry for the failure of his enter- 
 prise, represented, in a council of war convened on this occasion, 
 that as the troops were much dispirited and worn out, it would 
 be exposing them to certain destruction, either to lead them 
 against the enemy, or to resume the operations of the siege. But 
 a majority of the council were of a different opinion ; and it was 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 105 
 
 1565 .] 
 
 resolved to land the forces again without delay, and to march 
 directly against the Spaniards. 
 
 The Turkish soldiers complained bitterly of this unexpected 
 The Turks resolution, and obeyed the orders to disembark with 
 again landed, much reluctance. Their officers were obliged to em- 
 ploy threats with some, and force with others. At length the 
 number intended was put on shore, and Mustapha set out at their 
 head in search of the enemy. 
 
 The grand-master had not neglected to give early notice of 
 and defeated their march to the Spanish commanders, who had 
 by the Spa intrenched their little army on a steep hill, which the 
 mards. Turks would have found almost inaccessible ; and it 
 was the opinion of some of the principal officers that they should 
 avail themselves of the advantage of their situation, and stand 
 in their defence. But this proposal was rejected with disdain 
 by the bold adventurous De Sande, and the greatest part of the 
 Spanish officers ; and the troops were led out of their encamp- 
 ment, to meet the enemy in the open field. This conduct, more 
 fortunate perhaps than prudent, contributed to increase the 
 dejection of the Turkish soldiers, and to facilitate their defeat. 
 Having been dragged against their inclination to the field of 
 battle, and being attacked by the Spaniards with great fury, both 
 in front and flank, they scarcely fought ; but, being struck with 
 a sudden panic, they fled wfith the utmost precipitation. 
 
 Mustapha, confounded and enraged by this pusillanimous 
 behaviour of his troops, was hurried along by the violent tide of 
 the fugitives. He fell twice from his horse, and w r ould have been 
 taken prisoner, if his officers had not rescued him. The Spaniards 
 pursued briskly till they came to the sea-shore. There Piali had 
 his boats ready to receive the Turks, and a number of shallops 
 filled with musketeers drawm up to favour their escape. Without 
 this precaution, they must all have perished ; and even, notwith- 
 standing the protection which it afforded them, the number of 
 their killed amounted to two thousand men, while the victors lost 
 only thirteen or fourteen at most. 
 
 Such, after four months’ continuance, was the conclusion of the 
 Conclusion s * e £ e ^ a lt a 5 which will be for ever memorable on ac- 
 count of that extraordinary display of the most generous 
 and heroic valour by which the knights, ^feo few in number, w r ere 
 enabled to baffle the most vigorous effort which could be made to 
 subdue them by the most powerful monarch in the world. The 
 new r s of their deliverance gave universal joy to the Christian 
 powers ; and the name of the grand-master excited every where 
 the highest admiration and applause. Congratulations w 7 ere sent 
 him from every quarter ; and in many states public rejoicings 
 were celebrated on account of his success. The King of Spain, 
 who derived greater advantage than any other from that glorious 
 
106 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VI. 
 
 defence to which La Valette had so highly contributed, sent an 
 ambassador to present him with a sword and dagger, of which 
 the hilts were solid gold, adorned with diamonds, as a testimony 
 of his respect ; and engaged to pay him annually a sum of money 
 to assist him in repairing his ruined fortifications g . 
 
 s Thuanus, lib. xxxviii. Herrera, historia general, lib. vii. Cabrera, lib. vi. Vertot. Hist, 
 des Cheval. de Malthe. 
 
1565.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 107 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 Philip, being now delivered from his apprehensions of a Turkish 
 The affairs invasion, applied himself with zeal to his favourite objects, 
 of the Ne- the extirpation of heresy, and the enforcing of obedience 
 therlands. the council of Trent. Nor in these points did he 
 meet with much opposition in any part of his dominions except 
 the Netherlands ; where the seeds of discord, which had been 
 sown in the beginning of his reign, were approaching fast towards 
 maturity. The duchess of Parma had, soon after his departure, 
 experienced what a difficult charge she had undertaken. The 
 regular clergy still continued to complain as loudly as ever of the 
 new erection of bishoprics ; and contributed to the utmost of 
 their power to foment the spirit of discontent among the people. 
 No change, they said, could be legally made in the constitution 
 of the church without the consent of the States. The new erec- 
 tions were therefore a violation of a fundamental law ; which was 
 the more intolerable, as the abbots, on whose ruins the bishop- 
 rics were raised, were natives of the country, and deeply inter- 
 ested in the public welfare ; whereas the bishops would be entirely 
 devoted to the courts of Rome and Spain. But the Regent was 
 obliged to pay a greater regard to the orders of the King, than 
 to the complaints or remonstrances of the people. Nor did she 
 yield to the importunities of any of the cities, into which it had 
 been resolved that the new bishops should be introduced, except 
 Antwerp ; the citizens whereof sent deputies to Madrid, and 
 found means to convince Philip, that his new institution, through 
 the dread with which it would inspire foreigners that the inquisi- 
 tion was about to be established, would prove destructive to their 
 commerce 3 . 
 
 While the Regent was employed in settling the new bishops, 
 she was not unmindful of the King’s injunctions with respect to 
 the execution of the edicts. They were executed with the utmost 
 rigour, against persons of all ages and of both sexes, without dis- 
 tinction ; and no greater regard was shown, on many occasions, 
 to the laws of nature and humanity, than to the constitution of 
 the provinces. The Regent was not of herself inclined to those 
 cruel measures that were pursued ; but she was directed in every 
 thing by Granvelle b , whose views, she knew, were perfectly con- 
 formable to those of the King ; and whose judgment, for that 
 reason, she often followed in contradiction to her own. 
 
 a Meteren, lib. ii. p. 37. Bcntivoglio, Grotius, &c. 
 b Now archbishop of Mechlin, ami advanced to the dignity of cardinal. 
 
108 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VII. 
 
 It was seldom that any matters relative to the edicts or the 
 Thenobi- new bishoprics were laid before the council, and when 
 lity disgust- they were brought thither, they were proposed as points 
 ed - already fixed, and not as subjects on which there was 
 
 room to deliberate. The Regent formed her resolutions privately, 
 with the assistance of Granvelle, and there was nothing left to 
 the council, but to give their sanction to the measures which had 
 been resolved upon before. 
 
 It is not surprising that a conduct so extremely partial should 
 have given umbrage to the other counsellors. The prince of 
 Orange and the counts Egmont and Horn c were more particularly 
 offended with it. Their high stations, their merit and services, 
 and the trust which had ever been reposed in them by the late 
 Emperor, entitled them to a principal share in the Regent’s 
 most secret councils ; and they were filled with indignation when 
 they saw that, on every occasion, a preference was given to the 
 cardinal. “ In this,” they said, “ consisted the recompense of 
 all their services, to be reduced by the King, to whose person and 
 interest they had ever shown the most inviolable attachment, 
 under the dominion of an arrogant and haughty ecclesiastic. 
 The duchess of Parma had the name of Regent, but the power 
 was lodged in the hands of Granvelle. The most important 
 affairs of the state were all determined in private by him, without 
 the consent, or even the knowledge, of the other counsellors. 
 Their seats in the council, and their government of the provinces, 
 were only high-sounding empty names, which gave them the 
 appearance of authority ; whilst they did not possess any real 
 power, but were equally subjected with others to the arbitrary 
 will of Granvelle.” 
 
 While the prince of Orange and the other discontented lords 
 had so much reason to be dissatisfied, it could not be expected 
 that they would be extremely active in executing the orders of 
 the court. Notwithstanding all that had been done to suppress 
 the new opinions in religion, these opinions were diffused wider 
 and wider every day throughout the provinces. This Granvelle 
 ascribed to the negligence of the magistrates in executing the 
 edicts. The prince of Orange, on the other hand, and Count 
 Egmont, threw the blafne of it on him ; and said, that by pursu- 
 ing measures to which the people of the Netherlands had never 
 been accustomed, he had soured their minds, and brought the 
 Regent’s government into hatred and contempt. Those com- 
 plaints were often made in the presence of the Regent herself ; 
 who, being pressed on the one hand by the positive orders of the 
 King, inculcated by Granvelle, and on the other, distressed by 
 her apprehension of the consequences to be dreaded from so much 
 ill humour and discontent, could only give soothing answers to 
 
 c Admirals of the Netherlands, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 109 
 
 1565.] 
 
 the complainers, and flatter them with some general hopes that 
 the grounds of their complaints would be removed. 
 
 She was still more embarrassed, when the prince of Orange 
 Their proposed in the council, that, in order to remedy the 
 
 animosity present evils she should summon a convention of the 
 
 against States. It could not be expected that Granvelle would 
 
 Gran veil e. re ^ s ^ this proposal. For he was not ignorant how ill 
 
 the people stood affected to his person, and his measures 
 of government ; nor how much superior the influence of the prince 
 of Orange would be to his, if the States were assembled. But 
 he did not neglect the present opportunity of ingratiating him- 
 self with the King. When the Regent gave Philip information 
 of the proposal which had been made to her, and desired to 
 receive his instructions on the subject, Granvelle took that occa- 
 sion to represent to him, “ that nothing could be more prejudicial 
 to his authority than the assembling of the States ; a measure 
 which ought at all times to be avoided, as it usually produced an 
 inclination in the people to encroach upon the prerogatives of the 
 crown ; but which there never was so much ground to dread as 
 at present, when persons of all conditions were so deeply infected 
 with a spirit of sedition and discontent. The abbots would come 
 to the convention, inflamed with indignation on account of the 
 late diminution of their revenues. The lower nobility and the 
 deputies of the towms would be gained over by the prince of 
 Orange, and the other discontented lords ; and the people, ever 
 fond of innovations, would be much more inclined to regard the 
 opinion of their deputies than that of the Regent, or the ministers 
 of the King. 
 
 This representation was perfectly agreeable to Philip’s views 
 and sentiments : nor did he hesitate in complying with the 
 counsel which was offered him. He immediately renewed his 
 orders to the Regent with respect to the rigorous execution of 
 the edicts ; and thereby let the prince of Orange and the other 
 nobles see that there was nothing farther from his intention 
 than to convene the States, in order to consider of more gentle 
 expedients for preventing the growth of heresy d . 
 
 The persecutions, therefore, were carried on as formerly. 
 They apply The compassion which all men felt for the unhappy 
 to Philip for sufferers excited a general odium against the govern- 
 his rerao- ment. The magistrates encountered insurmountable 
 difficulties in executing the orders of the court ; and 
 the number of Protestants increased daily, while the most 
 vigorous efforts were made to extirpate them by the Regent and 
 her ministers. Granvelle endeavoured to convince the King that 
 this was chiefly owing to the remissness of the governors of the 
 provinces. They were not ignorant of his accusation ; and 
 
 d Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 15. 
 
110 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 being now incensed against him more than ever, they resolved to 
 make him feel the effects of their resentment. Agreeably to 
 this resolution, the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont 
 and Horn, wrote a letter to the King, in which they laid the 
 blame of all the disturbances in the Netherlands upon the 
 cardinal ; who, they represented, had assumed the sole direc- 
 tion of affairs, and, by his imperious conduct, had rendered 
 himself the object of universal hatred. “ It was impossible for 
 them to serve either the King or the people, whilst a person so 
 exceedingly obnoxious possessed such unlimited influence. But 
 the government would proceed smoothly, if Granvelle were 
 removed ; and in case the King would grant their request, there 
 should be nothing wanting on their part, either to support his 
 authority, or to maintain the purity of the Catholic faith, to 
 which they were not less sincerely attached than Cardinal 
 Granvelle.” 
 
 To this letter Philip, after a delay of some months, made as 
 Philip’s mild a reply as could justly have been expected ; but 
 reluctance, he concluded with observing, “ that it was not his 
 practice to dismiss his ministers upon the complaints of their 
 enemies, till he had given them an opportunity of vindicating 
 their conduct. Justice, too, required that, from general accu- 
 sations, they should descend to mention particular crimes or 
 misdemeanors ; and if they did not incline to do this in writing, 
 one of them might come to Madrid, where he would be received 
 with every mark of distinction and respect .’ 1 
 
 With this answer the prince of Orange and the other lords 
 were much dissatisfied ; and they had the courage to reply, 
 “ that they were greatly disappointed to find so little regard 
 paid to their remonstrance. For they had not writ their former 
 letter, as Cardinal Granvelle’s accusers, but as the King’s coun- 
 sellors ; who, by virtue of their office, were bound to inform him 
 of whatever appeared to be of consequence to the welfare of his 
 dominions. They did not desire that the cardinal should suffer 
 harm ; and, in any place except the Netherlands, they should be 
 glad to hear of his prosperity ; but his continuance there, they 
 thought, was incompatible with the public peace.” They added, 
 “ that they did not esteem the cardinal so highly as to under- 
 take a journey to Spain on his account ; and that, since the 
 King was pleased to repose so little confidence in their opinion, 
 they hoped he would dispense with their further attendance in 
 the council; where, as they could not be present without a 
 diminution of their dignity, it was impossible for them, while the 
 cardinal retained his influence, to be of the smallest use.” 
 
 To this second letter Philip made no other answer, but that 
 ho would consider of what they had said, and that in the mean 
 time he expected they would continue to give their assist- 
 1 } ‘ ance as formerly in the council. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 Ill 
 
 1565 ] 
 
 They now saw that he had no intention to comply with their 
 Departure of request. Still, however, they obeyed his orders, and 
 Granveiie. a t times they went to the council ; but there, and 
 everywhere else, they treated the cardinal with so much ridicule 
 and contempt, that being at length disgusted with his situation, 
 he applied for liberty to retire. The King consented, but with 
 great reluctance ; and could never forgive the prince of Orange, 
 and the other lords, who had reduced him to this necessity e . 
 
 Granvelle’s departure was not attended with those advantages 
 His measures w ^ich his enemies expected to derive from it. They 
 adopted by had flattered themselves with the hopes of obtaining, 
 Viglius and after his removal, their just share in the administration ; 
 Barlaimont. ^ut Viglius f , and Count Barlaimont, two zealous 
 Catholics, who had concurred with Granveiie in all his arbitrary 
 measures, were soon received by the Regent into the same degree 
 of favour which he had possessed, and were allowed to exercise 
 the same unlimited influence in the government. 
 
 A little before this time the council of Trent had published its 
 Publication of d ecrees ? and Philip, as mentioned above, had resolved 
 the decrees of to have them obeyed throughout all his dominions, 
 the council of The disturbances which subsisted in the Low Countries 
 ought to have deterred him from adding fuel to a 
 flame which already burned with so much violence. But his - 
 bigotry, together with his arbitrary maxims of government, 
 rendered him averse to every mild expedient, and determined 
 him to enforce obedience to the decrees in the Netherlands, as 
 well as in Spain and Italy. When the Regent laid his instruc- 
 tions on this head before the council of state, she found the 
 counsellors much divided in their opinions. The prince of Orange 
 maintained, “ that the Regent could not require the people of 
 the Netherlands to receive the decrees, because several of them 
 were contrary to the fundamental laws of the constitution. He 
 represented that some Catholic princes had thought proper to 
 reject them ; and proposed that a remonstrance should be made 
 to the King on the ^necessity of recalling his instructions.” Several 
 other lords were of the same opinion. But Viglius, on the other 
 hand, urged with great earnestness the necessity of complying 
 immediately with the King’s commands. “ By general councils,” 
 he said, “ the church had in all ages secured the purity of its 
 discipline and doctrines. No remedies for the disorders in the 
 Netherlands could be devised more likely to prove effectual than 
 the decrees in question. If they should be found in any respect 
 incompatible with the laws or privileges of the Netherlands, the 
 inconveniences dreaded from thence might be prevented, by 
 executing them with prudence and moderation.” He subjoined, 
 
 e Bentivoglio. Grotius. 
 
 1 President of the privy council, and esteemed the greatest lawyer in the Netherlands. 
 
112 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 “ that it was the peculiar glory and happiness of their sovereign, 
 that either he did not entertain the same erroneous sentiments 
 or lie under the same disagreeable necessity as those other 
 Catholic princes who had rejected the decrees ; but held opinions, 
 and could follow measures, which, while they were conducive to 
 the welfare of the church, were necessary in order to secure the 
 peace and prosperity of his subjects g .” 
 
 This speech of Viglius had the desired effect upon the Regent ; 
 Progress of who immediately resolved, without regard to what had 
 the reforma- been offered by the prince of Orange, to publish the 
 tion. decrees. But, from different causes, both the number 
 and courage of the reformers were now greatly augmented. In 
 consequence of the civil wars in France, many Protestants of 
 that kingdom had retired into the southern provinces. And 
 through the constant intercourse which subsisted in the way of 
 trade between the more northern provinces and England and 
 Germany, these provinces were filled with Protestant ministers, 
 who, being prompted by that ardent zeal which the knowledge 
 of important truth lately discovered is calculated to inspire, 
 exerted themselves with unceasing industry in propagating their 
 religious tenets. The country abounded at the same time with 
 books written against the Popish rites and doctrines. Several 
 of the nobility, and many of the magistrates, had imbibed the 
 new opinions. The governors of the provinces were either not 
 inclined to execute those edicts, to which they had from the 
 beginning shown themselves averse ; or, as they often declared, 
 they found it impracticable to carry them into execution, without 
 laying the country waste, by forcing into exile great numbers of 
 its most industrious inhabitants. In many places the edicts were 
 not executed at all ; and in others, the Protestants were rescued 
 by the people from the hands of the inquisitors, and the inqui- 
 sitors themselves obliged to fly from the enraged multitude. 
 
 The Regent discovered at this time great perplexity and 
 Count Eg- hesitation. She was exceedingly desirous to have her 
 mont sent to administration approved by the King, and would have 
 Spam. gladly complied with his instructions ; but she could 
 not help being alarmed by the repeated representations which 
 were made to her of the consequences that might arise from 
 driving the people to despair. She therefore judged it expedient 
 to send one of the principal nobility to Spain, to inform the King, 
 more fully than she could do by writing, of the real state of the 
 provinces : and having made choice of Count Egmont for her 
 ambassador, as one who was equally acceptable to all parties, she 
 employed Viglius the president to give him her instructions, in 
 presence of the other counsellors. The prince of Orange was 
 highly dissatisfied with the terms in which these instructions 
 
 g Bentivoglio, b. ii. p. 22. 
 
1565.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 113 
 
 were expressed : “ This representation,” said he, “ of the state 
 of her affairs, is not calculated to inform the King, but to deceive 
 him. The relation which the president has given of our calamities 
 falls infinitely short of the truth. We must lay open from the 
 bottom those wounds under which the country bleeds, else the 
 King can never apply the proper cures. Let us not, by our 
 misrepresentations, make him believe the number of heretics to 
 be smaller than it is. Let us acquaint him, that every province, 
 every town, every village, is full of them. Let us not conceal from 
 him how much they despise the edicts, and how little they respect 
 the magistrates ; that he may see how impracticable it is to intro- 
 duce the inquisition, and be convinced that the remedy which 
 he would have us to apply, would be infinitely worse than the 
 disease.” He added, “ that although he was a true Catholic, and a 
 faithful subject to the King, yet he thought the calamities which 
 had been lately experienced in France and Germany, afforded a 
 sufficient proof that the consciences of men were not to be 
 compelled, and that heresy was not to be extirpated by fire and 
 sword, but by reasoning and persuasion ; to which it was in vain 
 to expect that men would be brought to listen, until the present 
 practice of butchering them like beasts was laid aside.” He 
 represented likewise the absurdity of publishing, on this occasion, 
 the decrees of the council of Trent, and proposed that Count 
 Egmont should be instructed to request the King to suspend the 
 publication of them till the present tumults were allayed. But 
 the Regent was either not inclined or not at liberty to follow the 
 opinion of the prince of Orange in preference to that of Yiglius. 
 She called Count Egmont apart from the council, and having given 
 him such instructions as she thought proper, she made him set' out 
 immediately for Spain ; after having flattered him with hopes that 
 his journey thither, if he improved the opportunity afforded him, 
 would secure him the full possession of his master's favour \ 
 
 The King received him at Madrid, and entertained him, during 
 His recep- his stay there, with every testimony of regard. When 
 tion there. he wa s about to return, he made him a present of fifty 
 thousand florins ; and as the count had several daughters, Philip 
 promised to dispose of them in marriages suitable to their father's 
 rank. The contemporary historians differ widely in their relations 
 
 His return w ^ ia ^ P asse d with respect to the subjects of his em- 
 is e urn. k ass y The mos ^. p ro bable account is, that although 
 Philip’s answer was not clear and explicit, yet that he expressed 
 himself with so much softness in speaking of the edicts, and 
 uttered so many strong professions of affection for the people of 
 the Netherlands, that the count, who was in the highest degree 
 candid and sincere, was induced to believe that the King did in 
 reality intend to alter his measures of government. It is certain * 1 , 
 
 b Bentivoglio, lib. ii. Grotius, lib. i. 
 
 I 
 
 1 Grotius, 
 
114 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 In conse- 
 quence of this 
 report, a con- 
 ference ap- 
 pointed. 
 
 that lie returned to the Low Countries highly satisfied with the 
 court of Spain ; and extolled the goodness of the King, and the 
 love which he bore to his Flemish subjects. The prince of Orange 
 was not so easily deceived. Count Egmont had been imposed 
 upon, he said, by Spanish artifice. His private interest had 
 blinded his penetration, and created in him an ill-grounded secu- 
 rity with regard to the public good k . 
 
 But although Count Egmont was not able to satisfy the prince 
 of Orange, it should seem that his report was credited 
 by most of the other counsellors, and even by the 
 Regent herself, who would not otherwise have agreed 
 to a measure which, immediately after the count’s 
 arrival, was suggested in the council. It was there 
 proposed that a certain number of divines and lawyers should 
 meet together in Brussels, to consider of the most effectual 
 methods of putting a stop to the growth of heresy ; and the 
 Regent readily consented to this proposal, without inquiring, as 
 she used to do on other occasions, whether it would be agreeable 
 to the King. To this conference she called the bishops of Arras, 
 Ipres, and Namur ; Ravenstenius and Jansenius, two eminent 
 divines ; the two presidents of the provincial councils of Flanders 
 and Utrecht, and two eminent lawyers from Mechlin and Brabant. 
 
 The result of their deliberations was, that schools for instructing 
 youth in the principles of the Catholic faith, should be erected in 
 all the provinces ; that particular attention should be given to 
 reform the lives of the clergy ; and that in punishing heretics 
 mild chastisements should be adopted, in the room of those severe 
 ones, which upon trial had been found so ineffectual 1 . 
 
 The Regent having transmitted to the King an account of these 
 July. determinations, was greatly surprised when she was 
 
 Philip offend- informed, that, far from approving them, he was 
 ed with it. extremely dissatisfied with her for allowing the confer- 
 ence to be held. The subjects which had been considered in it, 
 were points, he said, already fixed by his authority ; and which, 
 on that account, ought not to have been brought under deliberation. 
 The disorders which occasioned so much uneasiness to the Regent 
 had arisen from the connivance or negligence of her ministers. But 
 if any of them were found wanting, either in courage or in zeal for 
 the service which he required, she must immediately dismiss them, 
 and substitute others in their place ; for no service which she 
 could perform, would be either so acceptable to him, or so con- 
 ducive to his glory and interest, as the extinction of heresy in the 
 Netherlands. 
 
 The Regent had, from the beginning of her administration, 
 The persecu- been extremely solicitous to gratify the court of Spain, 
 tionsre- Nothing could have made her agree to the conference, 
 but her conviction, founded on Count Egmont’s report, 
 
 newed . 
 
 k Vid. William’s Apology, p. 405. 
 
 1 Bentivoglio, lib. ii. p. 25. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1565.] 
 
 1 15 
 
 that it would not be unacceptable to the King. As soon as she 
 discovered her mistake, she published an edict, confirming all the 
 former edicts, and requiring the governors and councils to pro- 
 ceed in the execution of them with the utmost diligence" 1 . 
 
 Even Viglius" hesitated as to the expediency of this measure 
 at the present juncture ; and it excited in the minds of the 
 people universal indignation and astonishment. Those hopes of 
 deliverance from their grievances, which they had conceived from 
 Count Egmont’s journey to Spain, had, by his report of the King’s 
 disposition towards them, been raised to the greatest height. 
 Their disappointment now was proportionably great. They did 
 not blame Count Egmont, for they were persuaded that he had 
 been deceived ; but they detested the duplicity and artifice of 
 Philip and his ministers. 
 
 The count had too much sensibility not to be deeply affected 
 on this occasion ; and he complained bitterly, that the King had 
 acted with no other design in the studied kindness which he had 
 shown him, but to expose him to the contempt or hatred of his 
 countrymen, and thereby to ruin his credit or influence 0 . 
 
 The prince of Orange was almost the only person in whom this 
 The prince of unexpected measure created no surprise. When the 
 Orange re- new edict was transmitted to him, he wrote to the 
 monstrates. Regent a letter ; in which he represented, “ that in 
 the present temper of the people it was impossible for the King’s 
 servants to execute the orders imposed upon them, without 
 involving the provinces in a civil war.” “ But if still,” he added, 
 44 your highness be determined to have the edicts carried into 
 immediate execution, then I must desire that some more proper 
 person may be appointed in my place, who, possessing greater 
 authority, may be better qualified to fulfil your intention. The 
 King is not ignorant, that, on other occasions, I have spared 
 neither my person nor my fortune in his service. My present 
 conduct proceeds not from the want of loyalty or zeal, but from 
 a persuasion that I cannot yield the obedience required from me, 
 without dishonour to myself, and infinite prejudice to the Nether- 
 lands p.” 
 
 Neither the prince of Orange, nor the counts Egmont and 
 Horn, expressed their dissatisfaction with the present measures 
 of government in any other way than by making remonstrances 
 and complaints. As it was greatly their interest, so it appears to 
 have been their sincere desire, to avoid incurring the King’s 
 displeasure. And they studied to give him every proof of fidelity 
 that could be reasonably expected from those who were members 
 of a free state, and had sworn to maintain the fundamental laws 
 of the constitution. 
 
 m Meursiiis Gul. Atiriac. p. 4, 5. 
 0 Strada, lib. iv. p. 118. 
 
 n Ibid. p. 4. 
 i’ Gen. Hist of the Netherlands. 
 
116 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 The conduct of many of the other nobles was not so scrupulous 
 The compro- and reserved. They set on foot, at this time, a con- 
 mise. federacy, by which they bound themselves to support 
 
 one another, in preventing the inquisition from being established 
 in the Netherlands. The prime mover of this expedient was 
 Philip de Marnix, lord of St. Aldegonde, a nobleman 
 t. egon e. distinguished for his eloquence, his address, and 
 
 his political abilities, who had the merit of contributing more than 
 any other person (the prince of Orange alone excepted) towards 
 accomplishing that happy revolution, by which the northern pro- 
 vinces were rescued from the Spanish yoke. By his advice, and 
 according to his direction, a writing was drawn up, termed the 
 Compromise, which is here inserted, as it marks strongly the spirit 
 by which the people of the Netherlands were animated. 
 
 “ Whereas certain malicious persons, under the cloak of zeal 
 for the Catholic religion, but in reality prompted by ambition, 
 pride, and avarice, have, by their misrepresentations, persuaded 
 our lord the King to introduce into these provinces that most 
 pernicious tribunal the inquisition ; which is not only contrary to 
 all human and divine laws, but exceeds in cruelty the most bar- 
 barous institutions of the most savage tyrants in the heathen 
 world ; which subjects all authority to that of the inquisitors, 
 reduces all men to a perpetual state of miserable slavery, and by 
 the visitations which it appoints, exposes the best men to conti- 
 nual apprehensions ; so that if a priest, a Spaniard, or wicked 
 minion of power, shall incline, he may, by means of this institution, 
 accuse any man, however innocent, and cause him to be impri- 
 soned, condemned, and put to death, without being confronted 
 with his accusers, and without being allowed to bring evidence of 
 his innocence, or to speak in his defence : for these reasons we 
 whose names are here subscribed have resolved to provide for the 
 security of our families, goods, and persons ; and for this purpose 
 we hereby enter into a sacred league with one another, promising 
 with a solemn oath, to oppose with all our power, the introduction 
 of the above-mentioned inquisition into these provinces ; whether 
 it shall be attempted openly or secretly, and by whatever name 
 it shall be called, whether that of Inquisition, Visitation, Com- 
 mission, or Edict : declaring at the same time, that we are far 
 from entertaining the design of attempting any thing prejudicial 
 to the interest of our sovereign the King ; but on the contrary, 
 that our fixed intention is, to support and defend his government, 
 to maintain peace, and to prevent, to the utmost of our power, all 
 seditions, tumults, and revolts. This agreement we have sworn, 
 and we hereby promise and swear to maintain it for ever sacred ; 
 and we call Almighty God to witness, that neither in word nor 
 deed shall we ever weaken or counteract it. 
 
 44 We likewise promise and swear mutually to defend one 
 another, in all places, and on all occasions, against every attack 
 
miLIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 17 
 
 15G5.] 
 
 that shall be made, or prosecution that shall be raised, against 
 any individual amongst us, on account of his concern in this con- 
 federacy. And we declare, that no pretence of the persecutors, 
 who may allege rebellion, insurrection, or any other plea, shall 
 exempt us from this our oath and promise. No action can deserve 
 the name of rebellion, that proceeds from opposition to the 
 iniquitous decrees of the inquisition ; and therefore, whether any 
 of us be attacked directly on account of opposing these decrees, 
 or under pretence pf punishing rebellion or insurrection, we hereby 
 swear to endeavour by all lawful means to procure his deliverance. 
 
 “ In this and every part of our conduct regarding the inqui- 
 sition, our meaning is, to submit to the general opinion of our 
 confederates, or to that of those who shall be appointed by the 
 rest to assist us with their counsel. 
 
 “ In witness of this our league, we invoke the holy name of 
 the living God, as the searcher of our hearts ; humbly beseeching 
 him to grant us the grace of his holy Spirit, that all our enter- 
 prises may be attended with success, may promote the honour of 
 his name, contribute to the welfare of our souls, and advance the 
 peace and. true interest of the Netherlands.” 
 
 Such were the terms of the compromise, which was quickly 
 circulated through the provinces, and subscribed by persons of all 
 ranks, whether Catholics or Protestants. Books were at the 
 same time multiplied, in which liberty of conscience was pleaded, 
 the absurdities in the popish doctrines and worship exposed, and 
 hideous pictures drawn of the inquisition. 
 
 The Regent felt great anxiety with regard to the consequences 
 with which so much ill-liumour and discontent were likely to be 
 attended. She had never fully credited the representations which 
 the prince of Orange and some of her other counsellors had often 
 made to her. And she now complained bitterly of the situation 
 to which she was reduced by the orders sent from Spain. “ For 
 to what purpose was it (she said) to publish edicts, when I 
 wanted power to enforce their execution? They have served 
 only to increase the people’s audacity, and to bring my authority 
 into contempt q .” 
 
 The prince of Orange, and the counts Horn and Egmont, had, 
 Speech of the ever s i nce t] he last republication of the edicts, ab- 
 prince of sented themselves from the council. The Regent now 
 Orange in the wrote to them in the most urgent manner, requiring 
 their attendance. They readily complied ; and the 
 Regent, after having informed them of her design in calling them 
 together, desired they would deliver their opinions without 
 reserve. The prince of Orange was among the last who rose, 
 and he spoke as follows r : 
 
 q Bentivoglio and Strada. 
 
 1 This speech is recorded by Nicholas Burgundius, who compiled his history from the 
 papers of the president Viglius. Vide Brandt’s History of the Kcformation in the Nether- 
 lands. 
 
118 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VII- 
 
 “ Would to Heaven I had been so fortunate as to gain belief, 
 when I ventured to foretell what has now happened. Desperate 
 remedies would not in that case have been first applied ; nor 
 persons who had fallen into error been confirmed in it, by the 
 means employed to reclaim them. We should not certainly 
 think favourably of a physician’s prudence, who, in the beginning 
 of a disease, when gentle remedies were likely to prove effectual, 
 should propose the burning or cutting off the part infected. 
 
 “ There are two species of inquisition. The one is exercised 
 in the name of the Pope, and the other has been long practised 
 by the bishops. To the latter, men are in some measure recon- 
 ciled by the power of custom ; and considering how well we are 
 now provided with bishops in all the provinces, it may be reason- 
 ably expected that this sort will alone be found sufficient. The 
 former has been, and will for ever be, an object of abhorrence, 
 and ought to be abolished without delay. 
 
 “ With respect to those edicts which have been so often pub- 
 lished against' the innovators in religion, hearken not to me, but 
 to your own experience, which will inform you, that the perse- 
 cutions to which they have given rise, have served only to increase 
 and propagate the errors against which they have been exercised. 
 The Netherlands have for several years been a school, in which, 
 if we have not been extremely inattentive, we may have learned 
 he folly of persecution. Men do not for nothing forego the 
 advantages of life ; much less do they expose themselves to torture 
 and death for nothing. The contempt of death and pain, exhi- 
 bited by heretics in suffering for their religion, is calculated to 
 produce the i^ost powerful effects on the minds of spectators. 
 It works on their compassion, it excites their admiration of the 
 sufferers, and creates in them a suspicion, that truth must cer- 
 tainly be found where they observe so much constancy and for- 
 titude. Heretics have been treated with the same severity in 
 France and England as in the Low Countries. But has it been 
 attended there with better success ? On the contrary, is there 
 not reason, there as well as here, to say what was said of the 
 Christians of old, that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the 
 church? The emperor Julian, the most formidable enemy whom 
 Christianity ever saw, was fully sensible of the truth of this. 
 Harassing and tormenting could only serve, he knew, to inflame 
 that ardent zeal which he wanted to extinguish. He had recourse 
 therefore to the expedient of ridicule and contempt ; and this he 
 found to be more effectual. The Grecian empire was at different 
 periods infected with heresies of various kinds. vEtius taught 
 errors in the reign of Constance ; Nestorius in that of Theo- 
 dosius ; Arius in that of Constantine. No such punishments 
 were inflicted, either on the heresiarchs themselves or on their 
 disciples, as are now practised in the Netherlands ; and yet where 
 are all those false opinions now, which the first broaclicrs were 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 119 
 
 1566.] 
 
 at so much pains to propagate ? Such is the nature of heresy, 
 if it rests it rusts ; but lie who rubs it, whets it. Let it be neg- 
 lected and overlooked, it will soon lose the charm of novelty ; 
 and with that it will lose the greatest part of its attractive power. 
 But they are not the examples only of heathen princes which I 
 would recommend to the Regent’s imitation. In complying with 
 my advice, she will tread in the steps of opr late glorious emperor, 
 her father ; who from experience was convinced, that gentle 
 measures were more likely to prove effectual than severe ones ; 
 and therefore adopted the former, in preference to the latter, 
 for several years before his resignation. 
 
 “ The King himself appeared, at a certain period, inclined to 
 make trial of mild experiments. But, through the influence of 
 the bishops and other ecclesiastics, he has changed liis views. 
 Let these men answer for their conduct if they can. For my own 
 part, I am entirely satisfied that it is impossible to root out the 
 present evils in the Netherlands by force, without shaking the 
 state from its foundation. I conclude with reminding you of 
 what we have all heard frequently, that the Protestants in the 
 Low Countries have opened a correspondence with those in 
 France. Let us beware of irritating them more than we have 
 already done, lest, by imitating the French Catholics in their 
 severity, we, like them, involve our country in the dreadful 
 miseries of a civil war.” 
 
 This speech was not entirely without effect. It convinced the 
 Regent, that she must either make some concessions to the con- 
 federates, or have recourse to arms. She was inclined to follow 
 the latter of these measures, because she knew it would be more 
 agreeable to the King ; and she desired Count Egmont to under- 
 take the command of some forces which he proposed to raise, in 
 order to carry her design into execution ; but the count declined 
 accepting of it, saying, that he could not fight with honour in 
 defence of the inquisition. The duchess found it necessary, 
 therefore, to embrace the other alternative, and to attempt to 
 soothe the malcontents, by making some abatement in the rigour 
 of the edicts s . 
 
 Meanwhile the number of those who had acceded to the com- 
 promise was become so considerable, that they thought it was 
 now time to take some step towards fulfilling their engagements. 
 With this view they set out for Brussels, where the court resided, 
 and sent some of their number to desire leave of the Regent, to 
 lay before her their sentiments concerning a subject in which the 
 interest of the King and their personal security were equally con- 
 cerned. The counsellors were divided in their opinions with 
 regard to the answer proper to be made to this request. Some 
 of them were for rejecting it utterly ; others advised to admit 
 
 s Brandt, vol. i. p. 165. 
 
120 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VII. 
 
 two or three of the confederates and no more ; but the opinion 
 of those prevailed who thought that, at present, it would be 
 imprudent to furnish them with any just ground of offence, by 
 denying them a privilege to which every inhabitant of the Nether- 
 lands was entitled ; especially as they were without arms, and no 
 danger could be apprehended from admitting them. 
 
 They entered Brussels in the beginning of April one thousand 
 five hundred and sixty-six, in number between three and four 
 hundred, on horseback. Besides Count Brederode, who was 
 descended from the ancient earls of Holland, there were the 
 counts Colemberg and Tresemberg, the marquis of Mons, the. 
 baron of Montigny, and Count Lewis of Nassau, brother to the 
 prince of Orange ; all of them persons of considerable influence 
 in the provinces. 
 
 They went in a body, walking two by two, from the house 
 of Count Colemberg to the palace, and were received there by 
 the Regent, attended by the council of state. 
 
 They began their petition with declaring, “that as hitherto 
 Petition of the they had never failed in loyalty to the King, so they 
 nobles. were still as much as ever determined to hold fast 
 their allegiance. They were sensible that their present conduct 
 might be misconstrued ; but they chose rather to expose them- 
 selves to this risk, than not inform the Regent of what they 
 were convinced was of the highest consequence to the interest 
 both of the King and the provinces. The solicitude which the 
 King had discovered to preserve religion pure in the Netherlands, 
 deserved the highest praise; but experience had shown, that the 
 remedies employed for this purpose contributed only to increase 
 the disease. They had long flattered themselves with hopes, 
 that the States would have been assembled, to devise means more 
 likely to prove successful ; but since this desirable event had not 
 taken place, they thought it their duty to inform her, that if the 
 measures of government respecting religion were not quickly 
 altered, they were persuaded it would be impossible to prevent 
 a general insurrection. It was therefore their earnest desire, 
 that she would send some persons to the King, to acquaint him 
 with the necessity of softening the rigour of the edicts ; and they 
 entreated her to suspend the execution of them till his pleasure 
 should be known. But if no regard, they added, should be paid 
 to this our humble and most earnest prayer, we call God and the 
 King, your highness, and these your illustrious counsellors, to 
 witness, that we have given warning of the impending danger, 
 and shall not be accountable for the calamities that may ensue 1 .” 
 
 To this petition the Regent gave the following answer in 
 Answer of^the writing : “ that she was not invested by the King with 
 Regent. power to suspend the execution of the edicts ; but that 
 
 1 Bentivoglio and Brandt. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OP SPAIN- 
 
 121 
 
 1566.] 
 
 she was not averse from sending some proper person to Spain, 
 where she would willingly employ her good offices to procure 
 them satisfaction. That, in the mean time, she would issue orders 
 to the inquisitors to proceed in the exercise of their office with 
 moderation ; and that, in return for her concessions, she ex- 
 pected that the petitioners would study carefully to avoid all 
 occasion of offence.” 
 
 The confederates, much dissatisfied with this answer, insisted 
 earnestly upon receiving one that was more explicit ; and the 
 Regent, dreading the consequences of sending them away in ill- 
 humour, ordered her secretary to communicate to them the 
 instructions which, after considering the matter more maturely, 
 she had resolved to transmit to the inquisitors. These were, 
 that henceforth they should proceed against offenders in the 
 article of religion with the utmost gentleness ; and should not 
 punish any of them with banishment, imprisonment, or confisca- 
 tion, unless they were found guilty of seditious practices. And 
 these instructions, it was added, were to remain in force till the 
 King’s pleasure should be known. The confederates, on the 
 other hand, engaged, not to attempt to make any innovation in 
 religious matters, but to wait patiently for the determination of 
 the assembly of the States ; which, they fondly flattered them- 
 selves, would be held soon, in order to put an end to all their 
 grievances. 
 
 Agreeably to her first declarations, the Regent immediately 
 rp, . despatched the marquis of Mons and the baron of 
 of M-ons and Montigny, to lay the petition before the King. And 
 the baron of these two noblemen gladly undertook the task assigned 
 to °s < a!n^ Sent them ; little suspecting either how fruitless their 
 journey was to prove, as to the intention of it, or how 
 fatal to themselves. For, as will appear in the sequel, Philip 
 did not consider them as the Regent’s ambassadors, but as per- 
 sons who had brought her under the disagreeable necessity of 
 clothing them with that character, and as the heads of a con- 
 federacy which had been formed against his government. 
 
 In thp mean time a report was propagated in the Netherlands, 
 The intempe- that the Regent had consented to the public profession 
 rate zeal of of the reformed religion. In the belief of this, the 
 the reformers. p eo pi e threw off the reserve which they had hitherto 
 maintained, and the Protestant ministers preached in many 
 places to numerous assemblies of persons, who came together in 
 arms, with a resolution to defend themselves, in case the inqui- 
 sitors should attempt to interrupt them. From these assemblies 
 they soon passed to open violence against the churches, and 
 despoiled them of all their costly ornaments. 
 
 These outrages were first committed in the province of Flan- 
 ders ; and the example of the Flemings was quickly diffused 
 throughout ail the provinces. In a little time afterwards the 
 
122 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VII. 
 
 same tumultuous spirit appeared in the great commercial towns ; 
 in which, from their frequent intercourse with foreign Protest- 
 ants, and from the spirit of liberty that naturally grows up in 
 large communities, almost the whole body of the people had 
 embraced the new opinions. 
 
 In Antwerp the reformers indulged themselves in the most 
 unjustifiable extravagances. They insulted the Catholics when 
 employed in the functions of their religion. They broke furiously 
 into the great church, which was one of the richest edifices in 
 Europe, overturned the altars, defaced the paintings, and de- 
 stroyed all the images of the saints. 
 
 From the cathedral they flew with the same ungovernable fury 
 to the monasteries and convents; and there, after forcing open the 
 gates, and obliging the monks and nuns to fly into the city for 
 shelter, it appeared that, under the cover of religious zeal, many 
 of the most abandoned of the people had joined with the reformers, 
 and embraced the present opportunity of gratifying their rapacity. 
 The same riotous spirit appeared in numberless other places. It 
 spread like a conflagration over all the provinces ; meeting every 
 where with the same combustible materials, and every where 
 producing the same pernicious effects. 
 
 In Brussels they were overawed by the presence of the court ; 
 yet even there, they had in some measure thrown off their wonted 
 reserve ; and the Regent, apprehensive that her person was in 
 danger, resolved to reside in Mons. This resolution gave much 
 uneasiness to the prince of Orange, and the counts Egmont and 
 Horn; who saw how much dishonour it would reflect on them, 
 to have it believed that the person of the princess was insecure, 
 where they were invested with such high command, and possessed 
 such extensive influence. They employed every argument that 
 could prevail upon her to alter her intention. They pledged 
 their lives and fortunes for her safety ; and promised to exert 
 their utmost power in quelling those disorders which were the 
 cause of her inquietude. At length she yielded to their entrea- 
 treaties, and consented still to remain at Brussels 11 . 
 
 The several governors soon after set out for their respective 
 The success provinces. The prince of Orange, besides being 
 and zeal of governor of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, and Burgundy, 
 Orana^in ° f was v i scoun t and governor of Antwerp. And even the 
 quelifng the popish historians acknowledge, that, having often gone 
 tumults. thither, he had exerted himself strenuously in quieting 
 the tumults occasioned by the intemperate zeal of the reformers. 
 August At this time he ordered three of the rioters to be 
 executed, and fined and banished several of the rest. 
 He again opened the great church, and restored the exercise of 
 the Catholic religion. 
 
 Bcntivoglio, Brandt, &c. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 123 
 
 1566.J 
 
 But finding it impossible to prevent the Protestants from 
 holding their religious meetings, he entered into an agreement 
 with the persons of the greatest influence among them, by which 
 they were allowed to exercise their religion in churches within 
 the city, provided that they should come together without arms ; 
 that they should give no annoyance to the Catholics ; and that 
 their preachers should refrain from all invectives against the 
 established church. And lie consented that this agreement 
 should remain in force till he should know the pleasure of the 
 King; to whom the Protestants engaged to submit, or imme- 
 diately to leave the Netherlands. 
 
 The Regent approved of every part of William’s conduct on 
 this occasion, except his allowing the reformers to hold their 
 meetings within the town. In order to satisfy her on this head, 
 he represented, that he had granted them this indulgence from 
 a conviction which experience had already confirmed, that by 
 means of it he could more easily prevent the pernicious effects 
 of their extravagance ; that when they were 1 under his own eye, 
 or that of the magistrates, their assemblies were not near so 
 numerous as formerly ; their preachers were not so apt to 
 indulge their enthusiasm, or to use indecent freedoms with the 
 government ; nor the people so apt to be inflamed, as when 
 they assembled without restraint in the open fields. This measure, 
 he added, was not only expedient, but necessary. There was no 
 room for authority or persuasion. The reformers had shown 
 themselves unalterably determined to set up their worship within 
 the city, whether he had permitted them or not. Their assem- 
 blies in the country had generally amounted to twenty-four or 
 twenty-five thousand. Even in the town there were seldom less 
 than ten thousand. He had no army to reduce so great a number 
 to obedience ; and not a single person among the Catholic in- 
 habitants could be persuaded to take up arms against them x . 
 
 After quieting the disturbances in Antwerp, the prince set out 
 for the provinces of Holland and Zealand, where his presence 
 was equally necessary. There too, as in Antwerp, he employed 
 all his power and influence ; and did more towards quelling the 
 tumultuous spirit of the reformers, than any other person could 
 have done, without an armed force to overawe them. He per- 
 suaded them to restore the churches which they had usurped ; 
 and, except in one or two places, they were satisfied with the 
 liberty which the Regent was willing to allow, of holding their 
 assemblies for religious worship in the suburbs of the towns, or in 
 the country. 
 
 Count Egmont was no less active in his department. From 
 Count natural temper, as well as from political principles, no 
 Egmont’s man was more averse to harshness and severity ; yet 
 being strongly prompted on this occasion by his desire 
 
 * Brandt. Van Meteren, lib. ii. 
 
124 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VII. 
 
 of gratifying the King, ho was at the utmost pains to discover 
 the rioters, and punished many of them with rigour. He restored 
 the priests to their functions, opened the churches which had 
 been shut, and reduced all the Protestants within his government 
 to the necessity of acquiescing in the conditions which the Regent 
 had prescribed. 
 
 Count Horn likewise acted with uncommon spirit and vigour 
 Count in the city of Tournay, where the disorders had risen 
 Horn’s sue- to a greater height than in other places. The inha- 
 cess ' bitants of that city, to the number of six thousand, 
 having taken arms, and laid siege to the garrison, they soon 
 reduced it to such extremity, as obliged the commander to inform 
 the Regent, that if she did not send him immediate relief, he 
 could not hold out longer than one day. She had not troops 
 sufficient to oppose so great a force ; nor was there any other 
 expedient in her power, by which she could preserve the garrison 
 from surrendering, but that of sending Count Horn, their 
 governors y brothef, to intercede with the inhabitants. The 
 count forced his way, at the hazard of his life, into the midst of 
 them ; and with great address persuaded them not only to 
 desist from the blockade, but to lay down their arms, to yield up 
 the churches which they had usurped, and to rest satisfied 
 with certain places of worship which he had assigned them with- 
 out the city 55 . 
 
 From this representation of the conduct of the prince of 
 Grounds of Orange and the counts Horn and Egmont, they had 
 Philip’s aver- very little reason, it should seem, to dread the King’s 
 sion to these displeasure. For they were not less active, nor less 
 noblemen. successful, than the other governors a , with whom P hilip 
 is said to have been entirely satisfied. But the disapprobation 
 which they had discovered of his measures of government some 
 years before ; the objections which they had urged against his 
 retaining the Spanish forces in the Low Countries ; the necessity 
 to which they had reduced him, of removing Granvelle ; their 
 frequent remonstrances in the council against the inquisition and 
 edicts ; and the attachment which they had ever shown to the 
 liberty and constitutional privileges of the provinces : all these 
 causes had alienated him entirely from them, and had begotten, 
 in his dark revengeful mind, a degree of hatred and resentment, 
 which neither time, repentance, nor faithful services, could erase. 
 
 These noblemen had been disappointed of the private as well 
 as public advantages which they expected to derive from the 
 removal of Granvelle. Viglius and Count Barlaimont were equally 
 their enemies as the cardinal, and equally disposed to put mali- 
 cious interpretations on their conduct. In these they were 
 
 y The baron do Mouligny, at this time in Spin. 4 Brandt, Metertn, &tc. 
 
 a The counts Arombcrg and Mcgon. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OP SPAIN. 
 
 125 
 
 1566 .] 
 
 powerfully seconded by Granvelle ; who, some time after his 
 leaving the Netherlands, had been called to Madrid, where he 
 enjoyed his wonted influence. This he did not fail to employ 
 against his enemies in the Netherlands ; and he found it easy to 
 persuade the King, that in secret they had been abettors of all 
 the disturbances which had arisen. Philip was therefore fired 
 with indignation against them, and resolved sooner or later to 
 make them feel the weight of his resentment. At present, how- 
 ever, he thought it necessary to conceal his sentiments ; and in 
 his answer to the account of the late transactions transmitted to 
 him by the Regent, he expressed his gratitude for the zeal that 
 had been discovered in his service, and exhorted her, and the 
 governors of the provinces, to continue their endeavours to allay 
 the tumults in the best manner which the present circumstances 
 would permit. 
 
 With this answer he sent money, and an order for raising a 
 Forces levied. body of Catholic troops, upon whose fidelity he could 
 depend for an absolute compliance with his will. 
 
 The Regent was not remiss in executing this order. She 
 immediately levied a body of cavalry, and five regiments of 
 infantry ; of which she gave the command to the counts Erbestian, 
 Charles of Mansfelt, Reuls, Baron Schomberg, and the sieur de 
 Hierges, son of Count Barlaimont. 
 
 The prince of Orange and the counts Horn and Egmont could 
 easily discern the design of this armament ; and they declared 
 their disapprobation of it in the council, as a measure calculated 
 to rekindle the flames of discord and sedition. 
 
 They were at the same time informed by letters from the 
 Discovery of marquis of Mons, and the baron of Montigny, 
 Philip’s de- that whatever public answer had been sent from the 
 signs. court of Spain to the duchess of Parma, it was known 
 to every person at Madrid, that the King was highly offended at 
 the concessions which they had made lately to the Protestants. 
 That they were considered as fomenters of the tumults, and 
 encouragers of heresy. That the King and his ministers talked 
 now more explicitly than they had hitherto done. The compro- 
 mise had no other name given it but that of a conspiracy ; and 
 the popular insurrections were never mentioned but as an open 
 rebellion. There was no longer any room to doubt that the 
 King, by the advice of Granvelle and Alva, was determined to 
 wreak his resentment on all concerned, and particularly on them 
 whom he considered as the most guilty. And although at first 
 domestic forces only were to be employed, yet their operations 
 would soon be seconded by those of Spain. 
 
 The prince of Orange had several times desired leave of the 
 Regent to resign his employments ; alleging, that it was impos- 
 sible for him at once to discharge his duty to his country, and to 
 satisfy the King. The Regent had as often refused to consent 
 
126 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book YIT. 
 
 to his request ; and had accompanied her refusal with expressions 
 of high regard, and with entreaties that ho would not forsake her 
 at a time when his assistance was more than ever necessary. On 
 the present occasion he made the same application to the King, 
 who gave him the same answer, and employed the same expres- 
 sions of regard and confidence . 
 
 But the prince had received intelligence of Philipps most secret 
 councils, and he knew that his real sentiments were entirely 
 different from those which he professed. Through a correspond- 
 ence which he held in France, he had procured a copy of a letter 
 to the Regent, from Alva the Spanish minister at Paris, which 
 confirmed the information that had been transmitted by the mar- 
 quis of Mons and the baron of Montigny. In this letter, Alva 
 particularly insisted on the present favourable opportunity of 
 establishing in the Low Countries that unlimited authority which 
 the King had long so earnestly desired. He advised the Regent, 
 as matters were not yet ripe for execution, to meet the smooth 
 faces of Orange, Horn, and Egmont, with the same artifice which 
 they had employed ; and concluded with informing her, that the 
 King, who knew them to be fomenters of all the disturbances 
 which had happened, would soon pay them the wages of their 
 iniquity ; and had sworn to punish them and the other inhabitants 
 of the Netherlands in the most exemplary manner 0 . 
 
 This letter the prince of Orange communicated to his brother, 
 Conference at Count Lewis, and to the counts Egmont, Horn, Hoog- 
 Dendre- straten, and several others of the nobility ; who met 
 monde. together at Dendremonde, to deliberate concerning 
 the measures which it would be proper to pursue. Count Lewis, 
 who was naturally bold and ardent, urged that they should imme- 
 diately incite the people to take up arms ; but his brother, the 
 prince of Orange, disapproved of this proposal, and observed, 
 that if they should begin to wage war in the present situation of 
 affairs, they would neither be able to carry it on with success, 
 nor to justify their conduct in undertaking it. That the inqui- 
 sition and edicts were in effect abolished ; and a reasonable 
 liberty allowed in matters of religion. That, considering the 
 tumults which had been excited, the Regent could not be greatly 
 blamed for raising forces ; especially since she had levied none 
 but such as were natives of the Netherlands. At present they 
 could not allege any good reason for having recourse to arms ; 
 but he believed that ere long the best and strongest reasons 
 would not be wanting. And in the mean time his advice was, 
 not only to be on their guard themselves, but likewise to awaken 
 in the people a sense of the danger with which they were tlircat- 
 
 b Bentivoglio. See the letter annexed to William’s Apology* 
 
 c The concluding words of the letter are , il in a manner that would make the ears of all 
 Christendom tingle, even though it should put in danger all the rost of his dominions." — 
 Brandt, 216. Uoidanus, p. 3. Mctcren, lib. ii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 127 
 
 1566.] 
 
 cned, that they might be prepared for entering upon action when 
 the proper season should arrive. 
 
 Had Count Egmont been of the same opinion with the prince 
 of Orange on this occasion, it is not to be doubted that all who 
 were present would have concurred in the measures which he 
 advised ; and considering the greatness of their power and 
 popularity, they might have induced the King to drop his plan, 
 by making him sensible of the difficulty of carrying it into 
 execution. 
 
 But they were all exceedingly disappointed when they heard 
 Count Egmont declare, “ that far from taking part in any 
 measure that might be offensive to the King, he looked upon 
 every such measure as equally imprudent and undutiful That 
 from the enormities which had been committed, the King had 
 some reason to entertain suspicions of their vigilance. That, for 
 his own part, he was resolved, if possible, to wipe out these 
 suspicions, by exerting himself strenuously to reduce the people 
 to a state of perfect tranquillity and obedience ; which if he and 
 the other governors could accomplish in their respective provinces, 
 he believed they should hear no more of the Spanish forces ; for, 
 after what the King had repeatedly told him when in Spain, he 
 could not regard what he had heard of his intention to rob the 
 Netherlands of their liberty. 1 ’ 
 
 The prince of Orange and the other discontented lords spent 
 several hours in attempting to bring him over to their opinion, 
 but in vain. Although, as above related, the count had received 
 sufficient proof of Philip’s insincerity in his discourse with him 
 at Madrid, yet the concern which he had appeared to take in 
 the interest of his family, joined to his professions of personal 
 attachment, had imposed upon him so far as to prevent him from 
 perceiving the danger to which he was exposed d . 
 
 Thus disappointed of the assistance of a person of so great 
 The nobility influence, that the other lords saw that nothing re- 
 eoncur with mained for them, but to conciliate Philip’s favour, by 
 the Regent. an ac ^ ve concurrence with the Regent in the measures 
 which she was about to employ for the perfect settlement of the 
 country. 
 
 A great deal had been already done for this end by the 
 Her success governors of the provinces ; but matters were not 
 in suppress, entirely upon the footing on which the Regent desired 
 ing the re- to have them placed. The zeal of the reformers burnt 
 onners. w ith too much violence to be restrained by the autho- 
 rity of the magistrates, and still continued to discover itself in 
 the most unjustifiable irregularities ; particularly in the city of 
 Valenciennes, where the common people had almost universally 
 embraced the reformation. The strength and populousness of 
 
 d Bentivoglio. 
 
128 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VII. 
 
 that city, its neighbourhood to France, and the correspondence 
 which the people held with the Protestants in that kingdom, 
 were powerful motives with the Regent for desiring to have a 
 garrison placed in it, composed of those troops which had been 
 lately raised. She wished to have had them admitted with the 
 consent of the inhabitants ; but finding that it could not be 
 / obtained, she declared them rebels to the King, and ordered 
 the lord of Noircharmes to besiege the town. The citizens 
 seemed at first resolved to defend themselves ; but when they 
 saw the batteries ready to play, their courage failed, and they 
 surrendered the city at discretion. Noircharmes no sooner 
 entered it, than he ordered the governor and his son, the Pro- 
 testant ministers, and several of the inhabitants who had been 
 the most active in the late disturbances, to be put to death ; 
 after which, having prohibited the public exercise of the reformed 
 religion, he left a strong garrison in the place, under the command 
 of a rigid Catholic. 
 
 The success of the Regent’s arms filled the Protestants with 
 terror, and inspired the Catholics with fresh courage and reso- 
 lution. She was not less successful in Tournay, Bois le Due, 
 and many other places. She even persuaded the city of Ant- 
 werp to receive a garrison, by means of which the Catholic party 
 acquired so great authority, and the reformers were so much 
 intimidated, that, without opposition, she banished all the Pro- 
 testant preachers, and abolished the exercise of their religion e . 
 
 Count Brederode, and some others of the confederated lords, 
 Count had recourse at this time to their first expedient of a 
 Brederode. petition or remonstrance. But neither the Regent nor 
 the confederates were now in the same situation as formerly. She 
 had no longer any reason to be afraid of them, since she was so 
 well provided with an armed force ; and many of them having 
 before this time become sensible of their weakness, had studied 
 to convince her that they were now entirely devoted to her 
 service. 
 
 Count Brederode desired to be admitted into her presence, 
 but this she refused ; and vouchsafed no other answer to his 
 petition, but “ that he, and those who concurred with him, had 
 wrested her concessions into a sense which she had never meant; 
 and, by encouraging riots and tumults, had broken their agree- 
 ment with her, and thereby forfeited their title to complain f . , ‘ > 
 
 From this answer Brederode perceived there was no other 
 resource left him but force of arms. Resolved to try his fortune 
 in this way, he went immediately into Holland, and having drawn 
 together a body of troops, he fortified himself in the town of 
 Vianen. But the counts Aremberg and Megen coming suddenly 
 upon him, he was soon reduced to the necessity of retiring 
 
 Bcntivoglio, p. 47. 
 
 1 Brandt and Bcntivoglio. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1567.] 
 
 129 
 
 into Germany. He returned to the Low Countries in the year 
 following, and died in the town of Harnhoff s . He was a person 
 much respected by the Protestants, but appears to have possessed 
 more zeal than capacity, and to have been in no respect qualified 
 to be the leader of a party. 
 
 After count Brederode was expelled, the reformers had no- 
 Tranquiiiity where courage to lift their heads. The storm which 
 established. had raged with so much fury was succeeded by a per- 
 fect calm. The churches were repaired, the altars restored, the 
 images replaced, and the magistrates respected and obeyed, in 
 the same manner as before the disturbances began ; while the 
 discontented lords seemed now to have no other ambition but to 
 surpass one another in giving proofs of their attachment to the 
 regent, and of their zeal in the service of the church and of the 
 king .' 1 
 
 g Brandt. 
 
 h Bentivoglio, p. 48. 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 130 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 While the duchess of Parma was thus successfully employed 
 Deliberations hi quieting the disturbances in the Netherlands, Philip 
 at the Court was only deliberating on the subject. The regent had 
 of Spam. joined with the confederated lords in representing, that 
 his presence would prove the most effectual remedy for the evils 
 which prevailed ; and this was the opinion too of some of his 
 Spanish ministers. He had long talked as if he intended to 
 comply with their counsel. He had even given orders for pre- 
 paring ships for his voyage, and all Europe was in expectations 
 of its taking place. But if he was ever serious in proposing it, 
 he was easily induced to alter his intention, by the dread of those 
 inconveniences or dangers with which he apprehended it might 
 be accompanied. These inconveniences and dangers would have 
 been disregarded by the late emperor, who undertook a journey 
 to the Netherlands, and put himself in the power of Francis, his 
 rival and antagonist, in order to quell an insurrection in the city 
 of Ghent. But Philip had neither the same personal courage 
 and activity as Charles, nor that degree of affection for his sub- 
 jects in the Low Countries which was necessary to make him 
 expose himself to danger on their account ; and through his 
 whole reign he chose rather to issue forth orders from his cabinet, 
 than to execute his schemes in person . 51 
 
 Having therefore resolved not to go to the Netherlands him- 
 Philip re- self, it remained for him to determine, whether ho 
 solves to send should send thither an army, to compel the people to 
 
 d “ k ®, of submit to his will, and to punish them for their disobc- 
 Netherlands, dience ; or should listen to their remonstrances and 
 
 1567. complaints. His counsellors differed widely in their 
 opinions from each other. The duke of Feria and the prince of 
 Evoli advised him to abolish the inquisition and edicts, and to 
 make trial of gentler and more indulgent methods of dealing with 
 the reformers ; since he had sufficiently experienced that severe 
 ones were not likely to be attended with success. But the duke 
 of Alva, on the other hand, and cardinal Granvellc, represented, 
 that nothing but too much lenity in the treatment of the heretics 
 in the Low Countries had been the cause of that insolence, and 
 those enormities, in which they had discovered an equal con- 
 tempt of the true religion and of the royal authority. This was 
 
 Bcntivoglio, ann. 1567. Herrera, lib. ix. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 131 
 
 1567.] 
 
 not the proper season, they alleged, for the exercise of clemency. 
 The king had too long received laws from the Netherlands, 
 instead of giving them. The people in these provinces had long 
 and loudly boasted of their privileges. If they were not speedily 
 chastised for their insolence and presumption, they would ere 
 long dispute the king’s having any right to command them, and 
 form themselves into an independent state, in opposition to him, 
 as the Swiss cantons had done formerly in opposition to his 
 German ancestors ; or, which was . still more likely, the prince 
 of Orange, and the counts Egmont and Horn, would, under the 
 pretence of defending the liberties of the people, reduce them 
 under their own power, and divide the several provinces as a prey 
 among themselves. Besides, what happier opportunity, said Alva, 
 can be wished for than the present, for introducing an army into 
 the Low Countries, in order to establish the royal authority 
 there on the same desirable footing as in Spain and in Italy b ? 
 
 No arguments could be better suited to the temper and incli- 
 nations of the King ; and accordingly, without further hesita- 
 tion, he resolved to send to the Netherlands a strong and well- 
 disciplined army, under the command of the duke of Alva, whom, 
 from long experience, he knew to be qualified in every respect for 
 executing the plan of tyranny and oppression which he was deter- 
 mined to pursue. 
 
 In the mean time the duchess of Parma had reduced the affairs 
 The regent of the Low Countries into the situation which is above 
 remonstrates described. She sent speedy information to the king 
 against it. G f the success with which her endeavours had been 
 accompanied ; and represented to him, that there was not now 
 the least occasion for the army which he had begun to prepare, 
 since the tumults were allayed, the rioters punished, the heretics 
 silenced, the church reinstated in its wonted authority, garrisons 
 put in suspected places, and the whole country settled in a state 
 of perfect order and tranquillity. 
 
 Had Philip been in reality influenced by the motives which 
 he pretended, he would, on receiving this intelligence, have coun- 
 termanded the orders which he had issued for the march of the 
 troops. But in issuing these orders it is impossible to believe 
 that he was prompted either by zeal for religion, or concern for 
 the welfare of his Flemish subjects ; but partly by the ambition 
 of establishing among them a despotic government on the ruins 
 of their ancient constitution, (a measure which the distance of 
 the Netherlands from his seat of empire must have rendered par- 
 ticularly desirable to a prince of so imperious a temper,) and 
 partly by an implacable resentment against the prince of Orange 
 and the other lords, who had discovered a jealousy of his designs. 
 
 Regardless, therefore, of the change which the affairs in the 
 
 b Bentivoglio. 
 K 2 
 
132 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII, 
 
 Netherlands had lately undergone, Philip persisted in his purpose. 
 The duke of Alva went by sea for Italy, and thence, after having 
 assembled the several bodies of troops which were cantoned there, 
 amounting to eight thousand foot and one thousand five hundred 
 horse, he directed his march towards the Low Countries, first 
 through the territories of the duke of Savoy, and then through 
 Burgundy and Lorrain. His army was augmented on its march 
 by the addition of three hundred Burgundian cavalry, and four 
 thousand German foot, and soon reached the province of Luxem- 
 burg, without meeting with any molestation by the way. After 
 putting garrisons in some of the frontier towns, he set out for 
 Brussels, where he arrived in the month of August one thousand 
 five hundred and sixty-seven c . 
 
 His arrival spread great consternation and astonishment over 
 The asto- all the provinces. Many thousand persons had before 
 dledT” the "this ti me left the Netherlands, among whom was the 
 arrival of ° P r i nce of Orange, who, having long foreseen the im- 
 Aiva and the pending storm, had withdrawn with his family and 
 Spaniards, friends to his country of Nassau in Germany. He knew 
 well how inveterate those prejudices were, which the King had 
 for several years entertained against him ; and could not account 
 for his sending to the Low Countries so formidable an army, 
 commanded by a man so tyrannical as Alva, without supposing 
 that he was determined to rule the people with a rod of iron ; 
 and, at the same time, to wreak his vengeance upon him, and all 
 such of the nobility as had ventured to dispute his will. 
 
 The prince would gladly have prevailed upon count Egmont to 
 The prince accompany him, and endeavoured to open his eyes to the 
 of Orange approaching danger. He repeated the evidence which 
 retires to he had formerly laid before him of the King’s inten- 
 ermany. ^i on g^ anc [ ] ie reminded him of the imperious character 
 of Alva, who, from being their enemy and rival, was become 
 their master, and would not fail to employ his power to accom- 
 plish their ruin. But Count Egmont was the father of a nume- 
 rous family, which he could not support with dignity in any other 
 country but the Netherlands. Conscious too of his fidelity, and 
 of the important services which he had performed to the King, 
 he could not be persuaded that Philip was insincere in the pro- 
 fessions of friendship which he had made to him in Spain ; nor 
 could he believe that he would indulge his resentment any far- 
 ther, than to punish those who had been concerned in tho late 
 disorders. 
 
 The prince of Orange finding the Count inflexible, left him, 
 with these words : a s You are the bridge, count Egmont, by which 
 the duke of Alva will pass into the Netherlands, and he will no 
 sooner pass it, than ho will break it down. You will repent of 
 
 * Herrera, lib. ix. c. 3. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 133 
 
 1507 .] 
 
 despising the warning which I have given you, but I dread that 
 your repentance will be too late.’ 1 
 
 In the interval between the departure of the prince of Orange, 
 in April one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven, and the 
 arrival of the duke of Alva in the month of August following, 
 count Egmont perceived his importance much diminished ; but 
 he resolved to submit to his present disagreeable situation, and 
 even humbled himself so far as to receive and welcome Alva in 
 the province of Luxemburg, where he made him a present of two 
 fine horses, as a mark of his desire to live with him on amicable 
 terms. Alva received this present with the haughtiness that was 
 natural to him ; but in all his behaviour towards the Count, 
 he dissembled his intention, till he was prepared to put it in 
 execution. 
 
 One of his first acts after his arrival at Brussels was to cast 
 imprison both count Egmont and count Horn into prison. As 
 ment of the the deed itself was tyrannical, so the manner of it was 
 counts Eg- insidious. Count Egmont having been first deceived 
 Horn and hi mse lf? was employed to draw count Horn into the 
 snare d . When Alva found that their apprehensions 
 were laid asleep, he desired one day that they would come to his 
 house, to give him their opinion with regard to a cita- 
 September. ^ which he proposed to build in Antwerp ; and after 
 the business for which they had been called was over, they were 
 carried on different pretences into separate apartments, count 
 Egmont by Alva himself, and count Horn by his son Frederic 
 de Toledo. “ Count Egmont,” said Alva, “ deliver your sword ; 
 it is the will of the King that you give it up, and go to prison.” 
 The Count, astonished at this unexpected declaration, would have 
 attempted to escape ; but observing himself immediately sur- 
 rounded by Alva’s guards, he delivered his sword, saying, “ By 
 this sword the cause of the King has been oftener than once 
 successfully defended”. 6 Both he and count Horn protested, that, 
 as Knights of the Golden Fleece, they could be judged only by 
 their peers, and imprisoned only by their authority. But no 
 regard was paid to this protestation. They were hurried away 
 to prison, in a place at a distance from Brussels, and out of the 
 confines of the province where they resided ; in violation of a 
 sacred privilege, which, by a fundamental law, belonged even to 
 the lowest of the people f. 
 
 Intelligence of this event (which was immediately followed by 
 The people the imprisonment of count Egmont’s secretary, the 
 fly into fo- lord of Bickerzel, and several other persons of distinc- 
 reign parts, ^ion) was soon conveyed to the remotest corners of the 
 Netherlands, and filled the minds of the Catholics as well as 
 Protestants with the most disquieting apprehensions. It was no 
 
 d Strada, p. 215. 
 
 * Strada, p. 215. 
 
 1 Grotius and Bentivoglio. 
 
i:m 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII 
 
 Nether- 
 
 lands. 
 
 security, they saw, against the King’s resentment, to have ad- 
 hered to the profession of the Catholic faith, nor even to have 
 been active in opposing the reformers. None were conscious of 
 so much merit of this kind, and none had distinguished them- 
 selves so highly in the service of the King, as those illustrious 
 persons who were now devoted to destruction. Men therefore of 
 all ranks were greatly alarmed, and began to abandon their 
 habitations ; and it was computed that, at this time, and a little 
 before Alva’s arrival, more than a hundred thousand persons fled 
 into foreign parts. Great numbers of these were the most indus- 
 trious of the people, who transferred their knowledge of arts and 
 manufactures into the countries which gave them refuge ; and 
 thereby enriched the dominions of Philip’s enemies whilst they 
 impoverished his own 5 . 
 
 The imprisonment of the counts Horn and Egmont was mat- 
 Th e duch- ^ er surprise to no person so much as to the Regent, 
 ess of Parma Philip had assured her, that although he had conferred 
 leaves the on Alva the command of the army, yet the authority 
 of the Regent was still to remain in her hands ; and 
 the royal commission, which Alva produced on his first 
 arrival, was agreeable to this declaration. But she could not 
 persuade herself that the duke would have presumed to make so 
 violent an encroachment on her prerogative, by the imprisonment 
 of two of the first persons in the state, unless he had been 
 invested with an authority much superior to that of which she 
 had been informed. The King had not been ingenuous, she sus- 
 pected, in his conduct towards her, and had conferred powers on 
 Alva by which her authority as Regent was impaired. This she 
 considered as a proof that Philip had listened to the calumnies 
 of her enemies, and did not repose in her that trust and confi- 
 dence which she was conscious her zeal to promote his interest 
 had deserved. She judged that it would be derogatory to her 
 honour, to remain any longer in the Netherlands ; and immedi- 
 ately applied for liberty to retire. After repeated solicitations 
 she at length obtained permission, and left Brussels in the begin- 
 ning of the year one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight, much 
 regretted by all the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and.par- 
 ticularly by the Protestants, to whom her administration appeared 
 mild and gentle, when they compared it with that which they had 
 reason to expect under their present government 11 . 
 
 After the departure of the duchess of Parma, the authority of 
 Alva’s regent remained entire in the hands of Alva ; and by 
 
 absolute the royal mandate which he published, it appeared, that 
 
 authority. Philip had vested him with higher powers than had ever 
 been bestowed on any former governor. They were much higher 
 than as sovereign of the Low Countries he had a right to bestow, 
 
 K Van Metcrcn, p. 80, 
 
 Bentivoglio ami Stnula. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 135 
 
 1567.] 
 
 and were utterly subversive of all the laws and privileges which 
 at his inauguration he had solemnly sworn to maintain. But 
 before this time he had had recourse to that method of justifying 
 iniquity, of which the votaries of the Romish church have so 
 often availed themselves ; he had obtained from the Pope a dis- 
 pensation from his oath, and no longer disguised his intention to 
 establish a despotic government in the Netherlands, on the ruins 
 of the ancient constitution. Besides the absolute command of 
 the army, Alva’s commission bore, that the King had conferred 
 upon him the presidency of the three councils, of state, of justice, 
 and the finances ; with full power to punish or to pardon crimes 
 of every sort, as he should judge to be expedient. 
 
 He began his administration with publishing a declaration, 
 that a month should be allowed to the reformers for preparing to 
 leave the country, without receiving during that space any trouble 
 or molestation ; and at the same time he issued secret orders to 
 the inquisitors to proceed immediately in the execution of their 
 edicts with the utmost rigour. 
 
 To assist and encourage these men in the exercise of their 
 The Council office, lie instituted a new council, to which he gave 
 of Tumults, the name of the Council of Tumults, which he appointed 
 to take cognisance of the late disorders, and to search after and 
 punish all those who had been concerned, directly or indirectly, 
 in promoting them. This council consisted of twelve persons, 
 the greatest part of whom were Spaniards. The duke was the 
 president himself, and in his absence, Vargas, a Spanish lawyer, 
 distinguished above all his countrymen by his avarice and 
 cruelty \ 
 
 One of the first deeds of this tribunal, which might well be 
 First deed of called, as the Flemings termed it, the Council of Blood, 
 the council. was to declare, That to have 'presented, or subscribed, 
 any petition against the late erection of bishoprics, or against 
 the edicts or inquisition, or to have permitted the exercise of the 
 new religion under any pretence whatever; or to insinuate by 
 word of mouth or writing, that the King has no right to abolish 
 those pretended privileges which have been the source of so 
 much impiety, is treason against the King, and justly merits the 
 severest punishment he shall be pleased to inflict k . 
 
 The governor had already stationed his army in such a manner 
 The perse- as he thought would most effectually secure the exe- 
 cution. cution of this cruel, undistinguishing resolution of the 
 council. In Antwerp he built a citadel, and compelled the inha- 
 bitants to defray the expense which this instrument of their own 
 slavery had cost him. He began to build citadels in other 
 places ; and, in the mean time, he spread his troops over the 
 
 5 Brandt, p. 260, 265, &c. Van Metercn, lib. iii. 
 k Van Metercn, lib. iii. p. 66. 
 
136 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII. 
 
 country in such formidable bodies, that the people, over whom 
 they exercised the most oppressive tyranny, either forsook their 
 habitations, or gave themselves up to despair. Above twenty 
 thousand persons escaped at this time into France, England, 
 and the Protestant provinces of Germany 1 . Great numbers 
 were prevented from Hying, and seized whilst they were medi- 
 tating flight by the cruel hand of the persecutor. The innocent 
 were overwhelmed with horror at the sight of the dreadful 
 punishments inflicted on the guilty ; and lamented that this once 
 flourishing country, so much distinguished for the mildness of its 
 government and the happiness of its people, should now present 
 no other object to view, but confiscations, imprisonments, and 
 blood m . 
 
 There was no distinction made of age, sex, or condition. 
 Persons in their earliest youth ; persons worn out, and ready to 
 sink under the infirmities of age ; persons of the highest 
 rank, as well as the lowest of the people, on the slightest 
 evidence, and sometimes even on bare suspicion, were alike 
 sacrificed to the rapacity and cruelty of the governor and his 
 associates. 
 
 Although in the space of a few months upwards of eighteen 
 Cruelty of Hundred persons suffered by the hand of the execu- 
 Aivaand tioner ; yet the duke of Alva’s thirst of blood was not 
 hie associ- satiated. Prisoners were not brought in so fast, nor 
 seized in such considerable numbers, as he desired. The 
 timo of Carnival was approaching, when he expected that he 
 should find the reformers off their guard. They would then 
 leave their skulking-placcs, he supposed, and visit their families, 
 while the Catholics were immersed in mirth and dissipation. On 
 this occasion his soldiers, accompanied by the inquisitors, like so 
 many wolves, were let loose among the Protestants ; who were 
 seized in the middle of the night in their beds, and from thence 
 dragged to prisons and dungeons. 
 
 Many who had been only once present at the Protestant 
 assemblies, even although they declared their faith in the Catholic 
 religion to be firm and unshaken, were hanged or drowned ; while 
 those who professed themselves to be Protestants, or refused to 
 abjure their religion, were put to the rack, in order to make 
 them discover their associates; they were then dragged by 
 horses to the place of execution, and their bodies being com- 
 mitted to the flames, their sufferings were prolonged with 
 ingenious cruelty. 
 
 To prevent them from bearing testimony, in the midst of 
 their torments, to the truth of their profession, their executioners 
 were not satisfied with barely confining their tongues ; they first 
 scorched them with a glowing iron, and then screwed them into 
 
 1 Brandt and Bontivoglio. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Bontivoglio, p. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 137 
 
 1567. 3 
 
 a machine, contrived on purpose to produce the most excru - 
 ciating pain n . 
 
 It is shocking to recount the numberless instances of inhuman 
 cruelty perpetrated by Alva and his associates, especially when 
 we consider that the unhappy victims were not those hardened 
 wretches, who, by daring and bloody deeds, are guilty of violating 
 the laws of nature and humanity, but were generally persons of 
 tho most inoffensive characters ; who, having imbibed the new 
 opinions in religion, had too much probity to disguise their sen- 
 timents ; or, at the worst, had been betrayed into indiscretions by 
 their zeal for propagating truths, which they believed to be of 
 the highest importance to the glory of God and the happiness 
 of men. 
 
 Alva communicated a great share of his savage spirit to the 
 inferior magistrates ; who knew that they could not recommend 
 themselves more effectually either to the King or to the governor, 
 than by the exercise of rigour and severity. Several of them, 
 however, whose humanity prevailed over the considerations of 
 safety and interest, were induced to give the Protestants timely 
 warning to withdraw. Even the members of the bloody council 
 began to feel their hearts revolt against the reiterated instances 
 of cruelty, to which their sanction was required. Some of them 
 applied for dismission ; others had the courage to absent them- 
 selves; and out of the twelve, of which the council was composed, 
 there were seldom above three or four present 0 . 
 
 About this time the magistrates of Antwerp, whose behaviour 
 Alva’s ty- from the beginning of Alva’s administration had been 
 ranny and extremely obsequious, thought they might venture to 
 arrogance, interpose in favour of certain citizens whom the inqui- 
 sitors had imprisoned. Their petition was conceived in the 
 humblest terms ; and they represented, that although the persons 
 for whom they pleaded had been present two or three times in 
 the Protestant assemblies, yet it was only curiosity that led them 
 thither ; they were still true sons of the church, and faithful 
 subjects to the King ; and they had remained in the country till 
 the time of their imprisonment, on the faith of the declaration 
 which the governor had made, that they should not receive any 
 disturbance on account of what had passed, till the expiration of 
 a month after his arrival in the Netherlands. 
 
 To this petition Alva haughtily replied, That he was amazed 
 at their folly in presuming to apply to him in behalf of heretics ; 
 and they should have reason, he added, to repent bitterly of their 
 
 n Brandt and Van Metercn, p. 69. 
 
 0 This appears from the sentences which they passed. Many of these were subscribed 
 only by two or three ; as that, for instance, against Anthony Van Stralen, which was 
 signed only by Vargas and two others. Except during the first two or three months, Alva 
 seldom attended, but all the sentences were dictated by him ; and his presence was ren- 
 dered unnecessary by the active and unrelenting cruelty of Vargas. Grimestone. 
 
138 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF * [Book VIII. 
 
 conduct, if they did not act more prudently in future ; for they 
 might rest assured, that he would hang them all, for an example 
 to deter others from the like presumption p. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, some of the Catholic nobility, and Vig- 
 lius, who had formerly concurred in all the arbitrary measures of 
 Granvelle, but whose heart melted at the present misery of his 
 countrymen, had the courage to remonstrate to the king against 
 the governor’s barbarity. Even the pope exhorted him to greater 
 moderation. Philip, however, refused to countermand the orders 
 which he had given, till he should hear from V argas ; who advised 
 him to persevere in the plan which he had adopted, assured him 
 of its success, and at the same time-flattered him with the hopes 
 of an inexhaustible fund of wealth that would arise from confis- 
 cation. Vargas being seconded by the inquisitors at Madrid, 
 Philip lent a deaf ear to the remonstrance which had been made 
 to him, and the persecutions were continued with the same unre- 
 lenting fury as before p . 
 
 The people of the Netherlands were confirmed in their despair 
 History of of obtaining mercy from Philip, by the accounts trans- 
 Don Carlos, mitted to them at this time from Spain, of his cruel 
 treatment of his son Don Carlos. Various relations are given 
 of that tragical and mysterious affair by the cotemporary 
 historians ; but the following appears the most consistent and 
 probable. This young prince had from his earliest youth been 
 noted for the impetuosity and violence of his temper ; and though 
 he never gave reason to think favourably of his understanding, 
 or his capacity for government, he had discovered the most 
 intemperate ambition to be admitted by his father to a share 
 in the administration of his dominions. Philip, whether from 
 jealousy, or a conviction of his son’s unfitness for any important 
 trust, refused to gratify his ambition, and behaved towards him 
 with distance and reserve ; while he gave all his confidence to 
 the duke of Alva, Puy Gomez de Sylva, and the president 
 Spinosa, against whom Don Carlos, partly on this account, and 
 partly because lie considered them as spies upon his conduct, 
 had conceived the most irreconcileable aversion. In this dis- 
 position he did not scruple, on different occasions, to censure the 
 measures of his father’s government, and particularly those which 
 had been adopted in the Netherlands. He had sometimes 
 expressed his compassion for the people there ; had threatened 
 the duke of Alva, and even made an attempt upon his life, for 
 accepting the government ; had been suspected of holding secret 
 interviews with the marquis of Mons and the baron de Montigny ; 
 and had afterwards formed the design of retiring into the 
 Netherlands, with an intention to put himself at the head of the 
 malcontents. 
 
 p Brandt, p. 265. 
 
 l i Brandt. Tbuanus, c. xliii. p. 9 . 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 139 
 
 1563 ] 
 
 Of this design intelligence was carried by some of the courtiers 
 to the king ; who, after having consulted with the inqui- 
 
 lljG8 ' sitors at Madrid, as he usually did on matters of great 
 importance and difficulty, resolved to prevent the prince from 
 putting his scheme in execution, by depriving him of his liberty. 
 For this purpose he went into his chamber in the middle of the 
 night, attended by some of his privy- counsellors and guards ; 
 and, after reproaching him with his undutiful behaviour, told 
 him that he had come to exercise his paternal correction and 
 chastisement. Then having dismissed all his attendants, he 
 commanded him to be clothed in a dark-coloured mourning 
 dress, and appointed guards to watch over him, and to confine 
 him to his chamber. The high-spirited young prince was ex- 
 tremely shocked at such unworthy treatment, and prayed his 
 father and his attendants to put an immediate end to his life. 
 He threw himself headlong into the fire, and would have put an 
 end to his life had he not been prevented by the guards. During 
 his confinement, his despair and anguish rose to a degree of 
 frenzy. He would fast sometimes for whole days together, 
 then eat voraciously, and endeavour to choke himself by swallow- 
 ing his victuals without chewing. Several princes interceded for 
 his release, as- did many of the principal Spanish nobles. But 
 the father was relentless and inexorable. After six months im- 
 prisonment, he caused the inquisition of Madrid to pass sentence 
 against his son, and, under the cover of that sentence, ordered 
 poison to be given him, which in a few hours put a period to his 
 miserable life at the age of twenty- three r . 
 
 Philip had, before this time, given a proof of the cruelty of his 
 February disposition ’ when, as above related, he chose to be 
 e ' present at the execution of his protestant subjects in 
 Spain. His singular conduct on that occasion, and the com- 
 posure with which he beheld the torments of the unhappy 
 sufferers, were ascribed by some to the power of superstition ; 
 while they were regarded by others as the most convincing 
 evidence of the sincerity of his zeal for the true religion. But his 
 severity towards his son did not admit of any such interpretation. 
 It was considered by all the world as a proof that his heart was 
 dead to the sentiments of natural affection and humanity ; and 
 his subjects were everywhere filled with astonishment. It struck 
 terror in a particular manner into the inhabitants of the Low 
 Countries ; who saw how vain it was to expect mercy from a 
 prince, who had so obstinately refused to exercise it towards his 
 own son ; whose only crime, they believed, was his attachment to 
 them, and his compassion for their calamities. 
 
 This unhappy people had no resource left but in the wisdom, 
 public spirit, and extensive influence of the prince of Orange. 
 
 r Compare Thuanus, lib. xliii. c. viii. with Strada, lib. vii. p. 225, & c. 
 
140 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII. 
 
 Soon after the duke of Alva’s arrival in the Netherlands, 
 The Prince William had been cited to appear before him ; and 
 of Orange a declaration had been published by Alva, in the name 
 cited to stand G f the king, that in case of his appearance, the utmost 
 ins trial. lenity would be shown him. But the prince was too 
 sagacious to be caught in this snare. He refused to obey the 
 citation, and assigned the following reasons for his refusal. 
 
 M The citation was of such a nature,” he said, “ that the duke 
 He refuses of Alva could not expect his compliance with it. It 
 to obey. was contrary in several respects to the fundamental 
 laws of the Netherlands ; the time allowed him to make his 
 appearance was not what the laws prescribed ; and was so short, 
 that, considering his distance from the place of trial, it was 
 utterly impossible for him to appear on the day appointed. The 
 duke of Alva was a judge, whose authority lie must on every 
 account decline ; since, as a Knight of the Golden Fleece, ho 
 could be judged only by his peers ; and, as an inhabitant of 
 Brabant, by his fellow citizens. It was a breach of his privileges 
 to commit the power of judging him to a person who was qualified 
 in neither of these respects ; and when injustice was done him 
 in the very nomination of his judge, he had little reason to hope 
 for justice in the decision of his cause ; especially when he con- 
 sidered, that the duke of Alva had long been his personal enemy, 
 and had lately, without hearing what he had to say in his defence, 
 proceeded on the supposition of his being guilty, and had seized 
 iiis son car- violently, and sent to Spain, his son the count of Buren, 
 lied to Spain. w ho was pursuing his studies in the university of Lou- 
 vain ; trusting for the security of his person, to his unquestionable 
 innocence, and the privileges of the place where he resided.” 
 
 At the same time with the prince of Orange, the earls of 
 His estates Hoogstraten and Culemberg, and several other noble- 
 confiscated. men, were cited to answer for their conduct ; and, as 
 soon as the short term allowed to them for making their appear- 
 ance was expired, Alva pronounced sentence against them, and 
 confiscated their effects. He ordered the house of count Culem- 
 berg in Brussels to be pulled down, because the confederates had 
 sometimes held their assemblies in it ; and he declared all the 
 estates of the prince of Orange, who (besides his principality in 
 the kingdom of France) possessed several in the Low Countries, 
 and some of great extent in Burgundy, to be forfeited to the 
 king ; a considerable share of the profits of which, if we may 
 credit some historians, he either applied to his own use, or 
 bestowed on the numerous informers whom he employed. 
 
 The prince of Orange was too well acquainted with Philip’s 
 Ho employs hiflcxiblo temper, to expect that any consideration or 
 tii c intcrccs- influence would prevail with him to redress his griov- 
 8>on of the ances ; yet, that he might more clearly evince to the 
 Emperor. wor i ( j the necessity which he lay under of having 
 
PHILIP IT. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 141 
 
 1 5G8.] 
 
 recourse to arms, lie sent to the Emperor Maximilian a particular 
 account of the treatment which lie himself had received, and of 
 the cruelty which the duke of Alva was exercising against the 
 people of the Netherlands; and intreated him to employ his 
 good offices in h is and their behalf. Maximilian, a prince entirely 
 opposite in character to Philip, readily complied with this request. 
 To give his intercession the greater weight, he made choice of 
 his brother Charles of Austria for his ambassador; and instructed 
 him to represent, that in his opinion, and that of all the princes 
 in Germany, the present conduct of the duke of Alva in the 
 Low Countries was no less impolitic than rigid and severe. 
 
 Philip’s answer to this remonstrance was such as from his well- 
 Phiiip’s reply known character there was reason to expect. The 
 to the Em- severities which had been employed, he said, had not 
 peror. y e t been found sufficient to repress the pride and 
 insolence of his Flemish subjects ; and he hoped the Emperor 
 would take care not to permit any troops to be raised against 
 him in Germany by the prince of Orange and his associates 5 . 
 
 So haughty an answer, given to a prince of the first rank in 
 Europe, who was Philip’s near relation, demonstrated that it 
 would be vain and ineffectual to make any farther attempt to 
 divert him from his purpose. It contributed likewise to alienate 
 Maximilian from his interest, and thereby facilitated the levies 
 which were soon afterwards made in Germany for carrying on 
 the war. 
 
 The prince of Orange, who for several months past had been 
 The rince of sorted- by the Flemish exiles to take up arms, would 
 Orange pre- willingly have deferred complying with their request, 
 pares for an in expectation of a more convenient season, when 
 Netherlands 1 ° might be involved in war with some of the 
 
 neighbouring nations, and have it less in his power to 
 bestow attention on the Netherlands. But the impatience of 
 the exiles to return home, the great additions which the perse- 
 cutions had made to their numbers, and his dread that Alva, 
 were he suffered to proceed, would establish his power on too 
 firm a foundation to be shaken by any force which could be 
 brought against it ; all these considerations concurred in deter- 
 mining him immediately to begin his preparations. 
 
 In order to raise money, he sold his jewels, plate, and furni- 
 ture. His brother, count John of Nassau, supplied him with a 
 considerable sum, and he received contributions from the Flemish 
 exiles in London, Embden, Cleves, and other places, where they 
 had taken shelter. 
 
 He was aware how unable the inhabitants of the Netherlands 
 His hopes of were, to resist the arms of Spain, unless supported by 
 assistance SO me foreign power. Philip was not, however, near so 
 
 s Ferrcras, 1568. 
 
142 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 formidable at this time as during the life of Mary Queen of 
 England, who knew no other law but her husband’s will, and 
 never scrupled to sacrifice the interests of her people to his 
 ambition. Had Mary been still alive, and Philip in possession 
 of his former influence over the English councils, the inhabitants 
 of the Netherlands would have . struggled for their liberties in 
 vain. It was fortunate for them, that the princess who sat now 
 from the upon the throne of England was led, both by inclina- 
 Queen of tion and interest, to adopt a system of politics entirely 
 
 England, contrary to that of Mary. For as Elizabeth had 
 
 established the Protestant religion in her own dominions, she 
 had before this time shown herself determined to support the 
 Protestants of the neighbouring kingdoms. She' had interested 
 herself deeply in the civil wars of France, in favour of the 
 Calvinists, whilst Philip gave assistance to the opposite party. 
 And the prince of Orange had reason to entertain the most 
 sanguine hopes, that she would not remain an idle spectator of 
 what was passing in the Netherlands. 
 
 He had conceived expectations likewise of obtaining succour 
 from the French Protestants ; and with this view had communi- 
 cated all his measures to their leaders, the prince of Conde and 
 the admiral de Coligny. But his chief dependence was upon 
 the Protestant princes of Germany, whom, ever since he left the 
 Netherlands, he had strenuously endeavoured to persuade, that 
 if they did not exert themselves with vigour, the liberties of the 
 Netherlands would soon be entirely suppressed ; and the trading 
 cities, with the prosperity of which the interest of the higher 
 provinces of Germany was inseparably connected, would be 
 changed into strong-holds, filled with Spanish troops, which the 
 duke of Alva, as soon as his purposes in the Low Countries wero 
 accomplished, would not fail to employ against the neighbouring 
 powers. 
 
 Prompted by these motives, and by zeal for their religion, the 
 and from the count palatine of the Rhine, the duke of Wirtemberg, 
 German the Landgrave of Hesse, and several other princes, 
 princes. resolved to support William in his intended armament; 
 and accordingly they furnished him with considerable supplies of 
 money, promised him more, and assisted him in levying troops 
 within their respective territories. 
 
 Whilst the prince was employed in making levies in Cleves, 
 Juliers, and other countries adjoining to Brabant and Guelder- 
 Count Lewis ^ anc ^ his brother, count Lewis, was no less active in 
 raising forces in the more northern parts of Germany, 
 and in gathering together the Flemish exiles. 
 
 Count Lewis was much sooner ready to take the field than his 
 arrives with brother, and he began his march in the end of April 
 an army in the or beginning of May. He resolved first to make an 
 Netherlands; attempt on Groningen; and for this purpose ho pitched 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 143 
 
 1568.] 
 
 his camp in such a situation, that whilst he cut off that city 
 from all correspondence with the neighbouring country, he kept 
 a communication open with his friends in Germany. 
 
 The duke of Alva sent count Aremberg, an officer of con- 
 gains a victory siderable reputation, to oppose him ; and ordered count 
 over the Megen, governor of Guelderland and Zutphen, to march 
 Spaniards. ag goon ag possible to count Aremberg’s assistance, 
 with a regiment of German infantry that was under his command. 
 Upon Aremberg’s approach, Lewis drew off his army to a still 
 more advantageous situation, and encamped on a rising ground 
 with a large morass in front. 
 
 The Spaniards gave at this time a striking proof of that 
 ferocity and insolence which they afterwards discovered on 
 numberless occasions, during the course of the present war. 
 Having conceived the most contemptible opinion of the enemy, 
 they were fired with impatience to engage, and as soon as they 
 came in sight demanded the signal of battle. Aremberg 
 endeavoured to restrain their ardour, by representing that the 
 enemy were so strongly posted, and so much superior in number, 
 that it would be impossible to attack them with success till 
 count Megen should arrive. But the Spaniards were not dis- 
 posed either to regard his opinion, or to respect his authority. 
 They reproached him with infidelity to the King, and accused 
 him of cowardice and ignorance of the art of war. Aremberg 
 had not sufficient strength of mind to despise their reproaches. 
 Inflamed with indignation at their unworthy treatment of him, 
 “ Let us march,” said he, “ not to conquer, but to be overcome; 
 and not by the arms of the enemy, but by the nature of the 
 place. We shall be buried in the mud and water before we can 
 reach the enemy ; but it will soon appear, whether I am wanting 
 either in courage or in fidelity to the King.” Saying this, he 
 gave orders to advance. The Spaniards were in the front, the 
 Germans in the rear, and the cavalry were distributed in different 
 places as the ground would permit. Lewis rejoiced when he saw 
 them approaching towards him. He had placed his cavalry, 
 under the command of his brother count Adolphus of Nassau, 
 on the right. On the left, his main army was covered by a hill, 
 on which he had planted a strong band of musketeers. Behind 
 him there was a little wood and the walls of a convent ; and in 
 his front, the morass above mentioned, which was almost im- 
 passable. Yet the Spaniards entered it without hesitation, and 
 continued to advance till they were within reach of the enemy's 
 fire. They came to be sensible of their folly when it was too 
 late. Those who had first entered were prevented from return- 
 ing by those who followed, and the farther they advanced, they 
 were the more exposed to the enemy’s shot, and the more 
 entangled in the mud. When they were in this situation, Lewis 
 attacked them vigorously in front, while his brother broke in 
 
144 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII. 
 
 upon their flank with the cavalry. They were cut to pieces 
 almost without resistance. Six hundred Spaniards were killed. 
 The Germans surrendered at discretion, and were dismissed, after 
 taking an oath that they would never more carry arms for the 
 duke of Alva. Count Aremberg, finding no room to act as 
 general, was obliged to content himself with performing the duty 
 of a common soldier; and he and count Adolphus rushing 
 furiously against one other, fell each of them by the other’s 
 sword. The Spaniards lost their artillery, baggage, and military 
 chest. The battle was scarcely ended, when count Megen 
 arrived with so strong a body of troops as would have been 
 sufficient, if they had advanced in time, to have changed the 
 fortune of the day. But they were not able alone to face the 
 enemy. And therefore Megen found it necessary to take shelter 
 in Groningen, where he collected the scattered remains of the 
 conquered army 1 . 
 
 The news of this defeat affected the duke of Alva in the most 
 sensible manner. He knew of how much consequence it was to any 
 cause that the first enterprise should be attended with 
 Alva’s in- success. He considered that Lewis had but just entered 
 tL^s occasion. ^he b>ow Countries when he had gained a signal victory, 
 and that the prince of Orange was ready to begin his 
 march with a still more formidable army than that of Lewis. 
 The neighbouring powers, he doubted not, would be animated 
 by what had happened, to grant the prince those supplies which 
 they had promised him ; and the Flemings would be less afraid 
 to declare in his favour. On these accounts he would have 
 marched immediately into Friesland with his whole army, in 
 order to cut off or scatter the troops under Lewis before his 
 The trial of brother should arrive. But he thought it necessary 
 the counts before he set out, to dispatch the trial of the counts 
 Egmont and Egmont and Horn, and some other lords, whom at 
 his first coming into the Netherlands he had thrown 
 into prison. Some of his friends endeavoured to divert him 
 from his purpose, by representing that the prisoners were so 
 many pledges in his hands for the peaceable behaviour of their 
 adherents ; and that putting them to death would only serve 
 to embitter the resentment of the people, and make them 
 receive the prince of Orange with open arms. He still, how- 
 ever, persisted in his resolution, prompted, if we may believe 
 some historians, by the apprehension that, during his absence, 
 the people might take up arms, and release the prisoners. 
 But, if we may credit others, he was influenced rather by revenge 
 than prudence, and could no longer restrain his fury, which was 
 inflamed at this time by the loss which his army had sustained 
 in the late engagement. 
 
 * Bcntivoglio, p. 67, &c. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1568 .] 
 
 145 
 
 In one day he ordered eighteen persons of rank, whom the 
 Council of Tumults had pronounced guilty of subscribing the 
 compromise, or of presenting remonstrances to the duchess of 
 Parma, to be put to death. Such of them as died Catholics 
 were beheaded, and the rest were committed to the flames. 
 Casembrot, the lord of Beckerzel, count Egmont’s secretary, 
 who had been condemned for signing the compromise, was tor- 
 tured in the most barbarous manner, to make him accuse his 
 friend and master ; and when it appeared that his exhausted 
 body was ready to sink under the torments which he suffered, 
 Alva, enraged that nothing had been extorted from him which 
 could justify the condemnation of the count, gave orders that he 
 should be drawn asunder by horses 4 . History scarcely furnishes 
 an instance of so cruel a punishment inflicted for so slight an offence. 
 
 Such was the prelude to the trial of the counts Horn and 
 Egmont, which followed immediately after what has been just 
 now related. 
 
 Although the conduct both of Philip and the duke of Alva, in 
 the Netherlands, and particularly their treatment of these two 
 noblemen, had been an open violation of the laws, yet it was 
 thought necessary to employ the farce of a formal trial before 
 the sentence of condemnation was pronounced. This was in- 
 tended to lessen the odium which might arise from putting to 
 death two such illustrious persons, who were so exceedingly 
 beloved by the people, and had distinguished themselves so 
 highly in the service of the King. But it was accompanied with 
 the contrary effect. It afforded the two counts an opportunity 
 of placing their innocence in the clearest light, and furnished 
 the world with the most convincing evidence of Philip’s lawless 
 tyranny and oppression. 
 
 The general charge against them was, that, in conjunction 
 The charge with the prince of Orange, they had formed a plan to 
 against them. a bolish the King’s authority in the Netherlands; and 
 the proofs of this charge were, first, That by their contumelious 
 treatment of cardinal Granvelle, they had obliged the King, con- 
 trary to his inclination, to remove that prelate from the Low 
 Countries. 
 
 2. That they were privy to the confederacy which had been 
 formed to oppose the introduction of the inquisition and edicts ; 
 and although count Egmont knew that the lord of Beckerzel had 
 subscribed the compromise, he had still retained him in his 
 service. 
 
 3. That they had met at Dendremonde, with the prince of 
 Orange, Count Lewis of Nassau, and several others, to deliberate 
 about opposing the entrance of the King’s army into the 
 Netherlands. And, 
 
 * Crimtstone and Bentivoglio. 
 
146 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 4. That, instead of punishing heretics with due severity, they 
 had in some places granted them liberty openly to celebrate their 
 religious assemblies. 
 
 In answer to these accusations, the two lords, after protesting 
 Their de- that, as knights of the Golden Fleece, they could not 
 fences. be tried by any other judges but the knights of their 
 order, began with declaring, that they had never entertained a 
 thought to the prejudice of the King’s authority ; and that when 
 they urged the King to remove cardinal Granvelle from the 
 Netherlands, they believed, and were still persuaded, that his 
 removal was equally calculated to promote the interest of the 
 King and of the provinces. Although they knew of the confe- 
 deracy, they had neither any concern in it, nor power sufficient 
 to prevent it ; and count Egmont had continued to employ the 
 lord of Bickerzel, after knowing that he had signed the com- 
 promise, from a conviction that he was still unshaken in his 
 fidelity to the church and to the King ; of which that nobleman 
 gave afterwards the strongest proof by exerting himself, with 
 great activity, in detecting and punishing the violators of the 
 churches. They had indeed been present at a conference in 
 Dendremonde, where count Lewis of Nassau had proposed that 
 they should unite their endeavours to prevent the entrance of 
 the Spanish troops ; but, instead of assenting to that proposal, 
 they had disapproved and opposed it. They had done every 
 thing in their power for the suppression of heresy; they had 
 made diligent search for the rioters, and punished many of them 
 with great severity; and although they had in some places 
 granted the Protestants liberty to hold their religious assemblies, 
 yet they had done so because they could not otherwise have pre- 
 vented the demolition of the churches, besides many other mis- 
 chievous effects, which there was the strongest reason to appre- 
 hend from the enthusiastic rage of the reformers. At the worst, 
 they had been guilty only of an error in judgment. They had 
 lived, and would die, in the belief and practice of the Catholic 
 religion. And as they had not been wanting in their duty to 
 the church ; so they had lately given incontestible evidence of 
 their devotion to the King, by taking cheerfully, at the duchess 
 of Parma’s desire, an oath to obey the King in everything, and 
 to regard, as enemies to the State, all those whom he should be 
 pleased to condemn. 
 
 While the prisoners offered these satisfactory defences of 
 intercessions their conduct, the most earnest solicitations were 
 in their behalf, employed in their behalf. 
 
 The Emperor Maximilian, agreeably to the humanity of his 
 character, interceded with Philip in their favour ; and flattered 
 himself so strongly with the hopes of success, that a few days 
 before their execution, he sent to inform the countess of Egmont, 
 that her fears for her husband’s life would, he now believed, be 
 happily disappoi n ted . 
 
15G8.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 147 
 
 The duchess of Parma too, who had never suspected that the 
 complaints which she had made against the prisoners during her 
 regency, would have been attended with such serious consequences, 
 Letter of the transmitted to the King, and seconded, a petition from 
 Countess of the countess of Egmont ; in which, after representing 
 Egmont. that j ier h us b anc i had distinguished himself above his 
 equals, first in the service of the late Emperor, and since in that 
 of the King ; and that he had often borne a principal share in their 
 wars and victories both in Europe and Africa ; she concluded 
 with intreating, that if, notwithstanding her husband’s defence 
 of his conduct, he should still be found obnoxious to justice ; yet, 
 on account of his former services, the King would remember him 
 with mercy, and take into consideration the deplorable situation 
 to which she, and her eleven helpless children, would be reduced 
 by the ignominious death of her husband. 
 
 But Philip, cursed with the most unfeeling heart, remained 
 relentless .and inflexible ; and, conformably to his orders, Alva 
 pronounced sentence of death both against count Egmont and 
 count Horn, in the beginning of June one thousand five hundred 
 and sixty-eight, after they had suffered near nine months 1 im- 
 prisonment. The sentence was intimated to them in the middle 
 of the night, when they were in bed, by the bishop of Ypres. 
 They received the intelligence with becoming fortitude and 
 resignation. “ I am not conscious , 11 said count Egmont, “ of 
 having deserved such hard usage from the King, whose glory 
 and interest I have sincerely studied to promote. But I will 
 submit to my fate with patience ; although my heart bleeds 
 when I think on my wife and children . 11 
 
 A few hours before his death he wrote to the King, “ That 
 Letter of although it had pleased him to order sentence of death 
 Count Eg- to be pronounced against him as a traitor, and an 
 mont to abettor of heretics ; yet in justice to himself he must 
 declare, that he had never failed, in word or in deed, 
 
 Philip. 
 
 in his duty either to him or to the church. I cannot therefore 
 doubt (continued he) that when you shall receive true information 
 of what has passed in the Low Countries, you will be sensible 
 how unjustly I have been used ; having been condemned for doing 
 what I never did or intended ; and for the truth of this, I call 
 Almighty God to witness, before whom I shall soon appear. My 
 last and only request is, that on account of my former services, 
 and the integrity of my intentions, you will take compassion on 
 June 5th, my unhappy wife and children ; in the hopes of which 
 1568. X will patiently submit to the execution of the sentence 
 which has been passed against me u . 11 
 
 Both prisoners had, a few days before, been brought from 
 The execu- Ghent to Brussels. Count Egmont was first conducted 
 tlon * to the place of execution, with Julio Romero, camp- 
 
 Ktradi, fee. 
 
148 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 marshal, on one hand, and the bishop of Ypres on the other. 
 The scaffold was covered with black cloth, and surrounded by a 
 strong guard, consisting of nineteen companies of soldiers. The 
 count went up to the scaffold accompanied only by the bishop of 
 Ypres ; with whom, having discoursed some time (on what sub- 
 ject we are not told), he kneeled down and prayed ; then rose 
 again, and throwing off his robe, he wrapped his head and face 
 in a handkerchief, and again kneeling down, with his hands 
 joined, he in that posture received the stroke of the executioner. 
 
 The head and body, and the blood which flowed from them, 
 were covered with a black cloth, to hide them from the view of 
 count Horn, who was soon after brought thither, accompanied by 
 the same attendants. Having ascended the scaffold, he inquired 
 whether count Egmont was already beheaded ; and being told 
 that he was, “ We have not seen one another,” said he, u since 
 the day when we were cast into prison. But from our fate, my 
 friends,” addressing himself to the spectators, “ learn to know 
 the measure of obedience required by your superiors. If I have 
 ever offended any of you, I now ask forgiveness, and beseech you 
 to assist me with your prayers.” Then having disrobed himself, 
 he submitted to his fate with perfect composure and tranquillity. 
 
 The heads were set up opposite to each other, on two iron 
 poles, fastened to the sides of the scaffold, where they remained 
 till the afternoon, when they were taken down and delivered, 
 together with the bodies, to the friends of the deceased x . 
 
 The unmerited death of these two great men excited universal 
 grief and indignation. Nor could the spectators be deterred, by 
 the numerous troops which surrounded them, from testifying their 
 resentment. Many of them, forgetting the danger to which they 
 exposed themselves, rushed forward to the scaffold, dipped their 
 handkerchiefs in the blood, and vowed, in the hearing of the 
 Spaniards, that ere long the governor and his associates should 
 have reason to repent of the cruel murder that had been com- 
 mitted 3 ". 
 
 Count Egmont was forty- six years of age when he suffered. 
 Character of To most splendid bodily accomplishments, he joined 
 count Eg- great gentleness of manners, and the most engaging 
 mont. affability. From his youth he had accompanied the late 
 Emperor in his military expeditions, and had on all occasions 
 acquitted himself with the highest honour, while at the same 
 time he rendered himself universally beloved. Of the two victo- 
 ries which Philip’s armies gained over the French, at St. Quentin 
 and Gravelines, it is allowed that the one was owing in a great 
 measure, and the other entirely, to count Egmont. As all men 
 were acquainted with the advantages which Philip derived from 
 these victories, they were shocked at the ungrateful return which 
 
 * Strada. 
 
 y Bcntivoglio. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 149 
 
 1568.] 
 
 he now made to the person by whose valour and conduct they 
 had been obtained 2 . 
 
 After this dismal catastrophe, Alva having nothing to prevent 
 Alva marches him from turning his whole attention to the war with 
 against Count coun t Lewis of Nassau, ordered bridges to be thrown 
 Lewis, OV er the Maese, the Rhine, and the Issel, and marched 
 directly to the enemy. He reached Daventer, where he had 
 given orders for several bodies of troops to meet him about the 
 middle of J uly ; and in a few days after, he arrived with his whole 
 army, consisting of twelve thousand foot and three thousand horse, 
 in sight of the enemy’s camp. 
 
 The army of count Lewis being much inferior both in discip- 
 line and number, that general quickly perceived the necessity of 
 quitting his present situation. He retired, however, in good 
 order, and with very little loss, till he arrived at the town of 
 Gemmingen, where he pitched his camp in a place that appeared 
 almost impregnable. Behind him lay the village of Gemmingen ; 
 on his left the river Ems, by which he could be supplied with 
 provisions from Embden, and other places ; and on his right, a 
 plain which he fortified with trenches and redoubts ; but that 
 which formed the chief strength of his situation was, that the 
 enemy could not approach him but by marching in defile along 
 the dyke of the river. This dyke was ten miles in length, with 
 the river on the one side, and a morass on the other. Having 
 planted a battery of cannon upon it, Lewds intended to open the 
 dyke, and lay the morass under water. And in this encampment, 
 he hoped it would not be difficult for him to keep the enemy at 
 bay, till his brother should begin his operations ; when he did not 
 doubt that the duke of Alva would find it necessary to retire. 
 
 Alva was aware of Lewis’s intention, and of the danger with 
 and defeats which any considerable delay must be attended. With 
 Ilim * the utmost expedition he brought forward his best 
 veteran troops, and arrived at the very time when the Flemings 
 were beginning to break down the dyke. Count Lewis and the 
 other nobility were themselves employed at the work. When the 
 enemy appeared, they betook themselves hastily to arms, but 
 they were soon obliged to yield to the superior force of the Spa- 
 niards, and to retire behind the battery above-mentioned. Here 
 Lewis expected to maintain his ground by the help of his artil- 
 lery ; but the Germans in his army, to the number of seven 
 thousand, having been disappointed of their pay for some weeks, 
 and believing that Lewds had money in his possession which he 
 had delayed giving them from his dread of their desertion, 
 resolved to embrace the present opportunity to extort from him 
 
 z At the same time that what is above related was transacted at Brussels, orders were 
 given at Madrid for putting to death the baron of Montigny, brother to count Horu, who 
 had been sent by the duchess of Parma along with the marquis Mons (who died some months 
 before) to present the petition of the confederates. Bentivoglio. 
 
150 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII. 
 
 a compliance with their demands. They rose tumultuously, and 
 threatened that they would not fight unless he immediately paid 
 through a their arrears. Intelligence of this sedition was carried 
 mutiny of by spies or deserters to the duke of Alva, who perceived 
 the Ger- that now was the time to make an attempt upon the 
 battery. He ordered a part of his army to enter the 
 morass ; through which, as it was the summer season, and Lewis 
 had been disappointed in his design of laying the ground under 
 water, the Spaniards found their way easier than they expected. 
 They arrived in time to attack the enemy in flank, whilst the rest 
 of the army, without shrinking, marched up to the battery in 
 front, and made a furious assault upon it sword in hand. The 
 Flemish exiles, with count Lewis at their head, defended them- 
 selves for some time with great bravery ; but, being deserted by 
 the Germans, they were at length compelled to retreat. The 
 Spaniards entered the camp along with them. The Germans, 
 overwhelmed with terror, made little resistance ; and as a just 
 punishment of their sedition at so critical a period, great num- 
 bers of them were put to the sword. Almost as many were 
 swallowed up in attempting to swim across the river, as fell by 
 the hands of the enemy. On the side of the Spaniards only 
 eighty men were killed ; but of the Germans, and the Flemish 
 exiles, between six and seven thousand perished, including those 
 who were drowned. Count Lewis, after having attempted in vain 
 to rally his scattered troops, escaped in a small boat to the 
 opposite side of the river ; and soon afterwards set out with 
 the earl of Lloogstraten for Germany, to join the prince of Orange 3 . 
 
 The duke of Alva went from the field of battle to the city of 
 Groningen, and from thence to Utrecht and Amsterdam ; carry- 
 ing on inquiries in these places against the Protestants, and 
 punishing with rigour all who were suspected to have been con- 
 cerned in the late disorders. He would gladly have spent more 
 time in this employment, so agreeable to the native cruelty of his 
 disposition ; but he was informed that the prince of Orange had 
 begun to put his troops in motion, and was upon his march from 
 Treves to the province of Guelderland, or Brabant. 
 
 Before William left Germany, he published a manifesto, in 
 which he explained the motives which induced him to have 
 recourse to arms. “ There was no other expedient left, 1 ’ he said, 
 “ by which he could save his countrymen from slavery and ruin ; 
 and to attempt this, he thought, was the indispensable duty of 
 every citizen ; especially of one who, like him, had enjoyed the 
 highest dignities of the state. The King, he hoped, would ero 
 long be delivered from those Spanish counsellors by whom he had 
 been led astray; but, in the mean time, he did not think it 
 incumbent upon any inhabitant of the Low Countries to yield 
 
 Strada, Bentivoglio, and Grimestone’s General History of the Netherlands. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 151 
 
 1568.] 
 
 obedience to the King in contradiction to the laws. For Philip 
 did not hold the same unlimited authority in the Netherlands, as 
 in his other dominions. His right to obedience subsisted only 
 whilst he maintained the rights of the people ; and by the con- 
 stitutions of the provinces, it was expressly provided, that if the 
 sovereign should attempt to violate any of the fundamental laws, 
 the people should in that case be absolved from their allegiance. 1 '’ 
 
 In this manifesto the prince thought proper to make it known, 
 that he had changed his sentiments in religion ; and was now 
 convinced, that the opinions of the Protestants were more con- 
 formable, than those of the Romish church, to the great rule of 
 Christian faith, the sacred writings. 
 
 William’s army, including horse and foot, did not exceed 
 The prince’s twenty thousand ; and the duke of Alva’s, after being 
 army. joined by a reinforcement which he received at this 
 time from Spain, was equal in number, and much better furnished 
 with military stores and provisions. The prince was sensible of 
 the great disadvantage under which he laboured in this respect ; 
 but from the pressing invitations which he received from many of 
 the principal inhabitants in the Netherlands, and from the 
 repeated representations which were made to him of the universal 
 hatred with which the people were animated against the governor, 
 he hoped that, as soon as his army should appear, there would 
 be an insurrection in his favour, or that some of the principal 
 cities would open their gates to receive him. 
 
 He passed the Rhine without opposition in the end of August, 
 Alva in vain a l*tt] a b° ve Cologne ; and then turning to the left, he 
 opposes his advanced towards Aix-la-Chapelle. About this time 
 passage over the duke of Alva arrived at Maestricht. The prince 
 the Maese. directed his march first towards Liege ; but being 
 disappointed in the hopes which he had conceived, of that city 
 declaring in his favour, he turned his course northwards, with an 
 intention to pass the Maese wherever he should find it fordable. 
 Alva’s whole attention was employed to prevent him from putting 
 his design in execution, and with this view he planted strong 
 guards along the banks of the river, and kept his army as nearly 
 opposite as possible to the enemy. 
 
 At last, however, after several marches and countermarches, 
 William effected his passage in the night, opposite to a town 
 called Stochem, where the duke believed it to have been imprac- 
 ticable. But the season had been remarkably dry ; and the 
 prince on this occasion imitated the conduct of J ulius Caesar in 
 his passage of the Ligeris, by placing his cavalry a little above 
 the ford, to break the force of the stream. 
 
 When Alva was informed next morning of what had hap- 
 pened, he could not at first believe it, and scornfully asked the 
 officer who brought the intelligence, Whether he imagined that 
 the enemy had wings ? 
 
152 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 The prince of Orange endeavoured to persuade his troops, as 
 soon as they had crossed the river, to march directly against the 
 Spaniards ; who, if this request had been complied with, might 
 have been attacked with great advantage ; but the Germans, 
 who, unfortunately for themselves as well as for the cause in 
 which they were engaged, never yielded due obedience to their 
 commander, refused to advance till they should have a night’s 
 refreshment ; and thereby lost the only opportunity which the 
 duke of Alva ever gave them, of compelling him to fight. 
 
 On the next day, when they were led forward to the Spanish 
 Alva camp to offer battle, they found it so strongly fortified 
 declines with intrenchments and redoubts, that no attempt could 
 fighting. k e mac [ e U pon it with the smallest probability of success. 
 Chiappino Vitelli, an officer of high reputation, was of opinion, 
 that the duke ought not to have declined an engagement, as the 
 enemy were fatigued with their passage of the river, and had not 
 yet made choice of a proper place for their camp, to which they 
 could retire after battle ; besides, that it was of the highest 
 consequence, he imagined, to give an early check to their pre- 
 sumption, in order to prevent the fortified towns from declaring 
 in their favour. 
 
 But Alva had already formed his plan, to which he was un- 
 His alterably determined to adhere. He considered that he 
 motives, had a great deal more at stake than the prince of Orange ; 
 and that a defeat would be attended not only with the loss 
 of his army, but the greatest part of the provinces. He was 
 acquainted too with the narrowness of William’s finances, and 
 knew that he must encounter the most unsurmountable diffi- 
 culties in supporting so numerous an army for any considerable 
 time ; especially as the winter season was fast approaching, 
 when, unless he should get possession of some of the great 
 towns, it would be impossible for him to remain in the Nether- 
 lands. 
 
 With this view, as he suspected that the prince intended to 
 His prudent lead his army into Brabant, he strengthened the 
 conduct. garrisons of Tillemont, Louvain, and Brussels ; and 
 when William directed his march towards Tongres, the Duke 
 drew his troops so near that town, as made it impossible for the 
 enemy to approach. Whichever way the prince of Orange turned 
 his course, the duke of Alva accompanied him ; marching some- 
 times behind, and sometimes on his flank ; always straitening 
 his quarters, and rendering it difficult for him to furnish his 
 army with forage and provisions ; while he intrenched his own 
 forces with so much skill, that the prince sought in vain for an 
 opportunity of bringing on an engagement. 
 
 In this situation frequent skirmishes between the two armies 
 Skirmishes were unavoidable, and in these the advantage fell 
 ' 8 ‘ sometimes on the one side, and sometimes on the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 153 
 
 1568.] 
 
 other; but each commander made such judicious movements, 
 chose his ground with so much skill, and exerted such an equal 
 degree of vigilance and attention, as effectually prevented his 
 antagonist from obtaining any considerable advantage over 
 him. 
 
 The only success which the duke of Alva could boast of, was 
 at the river Geete ; where, having attacked the rear-guard of 
 the enemy’s army, he killed some, and put the rest to flight. 
 
 The prince of Orange had the same ground of triumph in an 
 action at Quesnoy ; where, having come up with a detachment, 
 consisting of ten companies of German catholics, eight of Spa- 
 niards, and three troops of light- armed infantry, he put them to 
 rout, and took ample vengeance for the loss he had sustained at 
 Geete b. 
 
 He was on his march at that time to meet the Sieur de 
 Genlis, who had been sent to him by the prince of Conde, with 
 a reinforcement of troops ; which fully compensated all his losses 
 in Brabant. 
 
 But the causes already mentioned began to operate. The 
 The prince had been cruelly disappointed of the greatest 
 
 is obliged to part of the money which had been promised him. 
 disband his r phe dread which the Flemings entertained of the 
 aimy * Spanish forces, and the prudent precautions which had 
 been taken by the duke of Alva, had prevented William’s friends 
 from making any effort in his behalf. His army had been often 
 pinched for provisions. They now despaired of getting posses- 
 sion of any of the great towns, and they trembled at the thoughts 
 of passing the winter in the open fields. The Germans began to 
 desert in great numbers, and had often, before this time, shown 
 themselves refractory and disobedient. For these reasons, the 
 prince found it necessary to disband them ; after having given 
 them all the satisfaction in his power, by paying a part of their 
 arrears, and giving security to their leaders for the rest on his 
 lordship of Montfort and the principality of Orange c . 
 
 After these disasters, the prince, accompanied by his brother, 
 count Lewis, went to France, and conducted thither between a 
 thousand and twelve hundred horse, to the assistance of the 
 Calvinists. 
 
 Such was the conclusion of the first attempt which the prince 
 of Orange and his brother made to deliver the Netherlands from 
 the Spanish yoke. It must occur to every reader, that if they 
 had begun their operations and entered the provinces at the 
 same time, the issue of their enterprise would probably have 
 been extremely different. The duke of Alva would, in that 
 case, have been obliged to divide his forces, and have probably 
 been overpowered by numbers. But unfortunately count Lewis, 
 
 b Thuanus. 
 
 c Thuanus, Meursius ; Albanus, p. 19; Meteren, p. 79. 
 
154 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book VIII. 
 
 who was more expeditious in making his levies than the prince 
 of Orange, did not possess a fund sufficient to maintain them 
 without employment, and was obliged to enter upon action before 
 his brother was prepared to support him. And to the same 
 cause may be ascribed, both the prince’s delay in putting his 
 troops in motion, and the necessity to which he was reduced of 
 breaking up his camp. 
 
1568.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 155 
 
 BOOK IX. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 While Philipps bigotry, joined to his despotic and arbitrary 
 The war iu conduct, had engaged him in war with his subjects in 
 Granada. the Netherlands, the same causes produced a similar 
 effect in the province of Granada ; where the Moors, who had 
 long yielded a tame submission to the crown of Spain, were 
 provoked, by the tyranny of the present government, to throw 
 History of off their allegiance, and have recourse to arms. This 
 the Mores- people, who, during several centuries, had maintained 
 c°es. possession of the greatest part of Spain, were at last 
 totally subdued by Ferdinand the Catholic, in the year one 
 thousand four hundred and ninety-two. But although their 
 government was abolished at that time, the people themselves 
 remained ; and were permitted to enjoy not only their posses- 
 sions, dress, and customs, but even their religion, as in the time 
 of their native kings. And the politic Ferdinand scrupled not 
 to swear solemnly, to observe this condition, in hopes of being 
 able afterwards to devise some efficacious means of reconciling 
 them to the Christian faith. 
 
 Being disappointed in his expectation, and finding, after a 
 trial of several years, that the instructions of his priests were 
 not likely to prove effectual ; he resolved, without regard to the 
 oath which he had sworn, to employ force in order to accomplish 
 his design. He pretended, that the citizens of Granada had 
 forfeited their title to his fulfilling the terms of peace, by an 
 insurrection, into which some of them had been betrayed through 
 the violent administration of cardinal Ximenes ; and, on this 
 pretence, he ordered sentence of death to be pronounced against 
 them, and declared, that unless they would renounce their reli- 
 gion, it should be instantly carried into execution. By this 
 expedient, he compelled fifty thousand of the inhabitants of the 
 city of Granada, most of whom had no concern in the insurrection, 
 to profess themselves converts to Christianity. The inhabitants 
 of the country, and of the smaller towns, being highly exasperated 
 by the violent treatment of their countrymen, and dreading that 
 they themselves would quickly experience the same injustice, 
 began to prepare for resistance. But before they had time to 
 put themselves in a posture of defence, Ferdinand, who was no 
 less provident and active than false and faithless, came upon 
 them with a numerous army, and after taking one of their towns, 
 of which he put all the inhabitants to the sword, he soon obliged 
 
156 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 the rest to lay down their arms. Upon their paying him a sum 
 of money, he permitted a certain number to transport themselves 
 to Africa. But the greater part were compelled to remain in 
 the kingdom, and to submit to be baptized. They were still 
 however strongly attached to the Mahometan superstition ; and 
 although they generally conformed to the rites of the Romish 
 church, they could not, on every occasion, conceal their attach- 
 ment. The inquisitors were perpetually prying into their 
 conduct ; great numbers of them were condemned and burned 
 as heretics ; and many thousands, dreading the like fate, fled 
 over to Barbary. 
 
 Representations were often transmitted to court of the deso- 
 lation that was thus produced ; but these representations either 
 did not reach the ear of Ferdinand, or they were disregarded. 
 No remedy was ever applied, and the inquisitors continued to 
 exercise without control their wonted cruelty and oppression. 
 
 During the latter part of the reign of Ferdinand, and the 
 whole of that of Charles, the Moors are seldom mentioned by the 
 Spanish historians ; nor do these writers give us any other inform- 
 ation concerning them for half a century, than that they still 
 retained their ancient aversion to the Christian faith. But the 
 ecclesiastics, soon after Philip’s arrival in Spain, taking encou- 
 ragement from that bigoted zeal with which they knew their 
 prince to be so strongly actuated, revived their old complaints 
 against that unhappy people, and made repeated representations 
 of their obstinate and incurable infidelity. 
 
 “ They are Christians,” said Guerrero, archbishop of Granada, 
 “ in name only, but Mahometans in their hearts. They come 
 to hear mass on festival days, only in order to avoid the penalties 
 which they would otherwise incur. They work on these days 
 with their doors shut, and feast and carouse on Fridays. They 
 present their children to be baptised ; but no sooner do they 
 reach their own houses, than they wash them with warm water, 
 circumcise them, and give them Moorish names. They consent 
 to be married in the churches, because the law requires it ; but 
 when they return home, they clothe themselves in a Moorish 
 dress, and celebrate their nuptials with dances, songs, and other 
 species of music which are in use only among the Moors.” 
 
 This representation was well calculated to make impression on 
 the superstitious spirit of the king. But the archbishop knew, 
 that political considerations were likely to have as much weight 
 with him as those of a religious nature ; and therefore he sub- 
 joined, “ That the Morescoes held a treasonable correspondence 
 with the Turks and Corsairs, and were in the practice of carrying 
 off the children of Christians, and either selling them for slaves, 
 or sending them to Barbary, where they were brought up in the 
 religion of Mahomet.” Whether there was any truth in the 
 latter part of this accusation, does not appear with convincing 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 157 
 
 1568 .] 
 
 evidence ; but, considering the near affinity between the Mores- 
 coes and the African Moors, in respect of religion, manners, 
 language, and descent, together with the alienation from the 
 Spanish government, which the cruelties exercised against them 
 by the inquisition, and their exclusion from all offices of trust, 
 must have carried to the greatest height, it is not surprising that 
 Philip’s apprehensions were alarmed, and that he thought it 
 necessary to make provision against the danger which seemed to 
 threaten him. 
 
 His first step was to strip the Morescoes of their arms ; and 
 Philip dis- for this purpose he sent, on different pretences, several 
 arms them, regiments of Castilians to quarter among them, by 
 whom a great quantity of arms of all kinds were seized ; but as 
 their suspicions were perpetually awake, they had penetrated his 
 design, and concealed a considerable quantity a . 
 
 This discovery of Philip’s disposition towards them served to 
 alienate their affections more than ever from his government, 
 and at the same time encouraged the inquisitors to multiply their 
 complaints, and to urge at court the necessity of employing more 
 efficacious measures than had hitherto been adopted. The king 
 himself was far from being averse to comply with the violent 
 counsels that were given him ; and when upon consulting a 
 theologian of the name of Oraduy, that ecclesiastic, in the true 
 spirit of a Spanish inquisitor, quoted to him the proverb, that 
 “ of enemies, the fewer the better,” Philip was highly pleased 
 with his reply. 
 
 Having therefore resolved, if possible, to extirpate from his 
 His edict dominions the private as well as the public exercise of 
 against them. Mahometanism, and to wash it out with the blood of 
 its votaries, rather than suffer it to remain, he appointed a select 
 number of ecclesiastics to consider of the proper means by which 
 his design might be accomplished ; and agreeably to the advice 
 of these men, he soon afterwards published an edict which con- 
 tained the following prohibitions, and denounced death in case 
 of disobedience : “ That henceforth the Morescoes shall lay aside 
 their native language, dress, and peculiar customs, and in future 
 adopt those of the inhabitants of Castile. That they shall no 
 longer take Moorish names or surnames, but such as are gene- 
 rally used in Spain. That they shall bear none of those symbols 
 about them by which the disciples of Mahomet are distinguished. 
 That they shall discontinue the use of their baths, which shall 
 be immediately destroyed. That their women shall not, as 
 hitherto, appear in veils ; that no person shall marry without a 
 dispensation from the ordinary ; that none shall remove from one 
 place to another without permission ; and that they shall on 
 no occasion wear arms, or keep them in their possession.” 
 
 a Ferreras, ann. 1562. 
 
158 HISTORY OP THE REIGN OP [Book IX. 
 
 The exercise of the Mahometan religion having been pro- 
 hibited under the severest penalties by former princes, no mention 
 was made of it in the edict ; but the Morescoes readily perceived 
 the design and tendency of the present regulations, and considered, 
 that as they must render the secret practice of their religion 
 infinitely more difficult than formerly, they must infallibly prove 
 ere long the cause of its extirpation. Even although they had 
 not been apprehensive of any such serious consequence, it could 
 not be expected they would tamely submit to those affronting 
 rules which were now prescribed them. Men are often more 
 powerfully attached to the external forms and modes of life, 
 than to things that are the most essential to their happiness. 
 With this attachment the zeal of the Morescoes for their religion 
 coincided.. Their resentment, on account of the innumerable 
 cruelties which had been so long exercised against them by the 
 inquisition, added force to these incentives, and prompted them 
 to resolve to expose themselves to the last extremities, rather 
 than yield obedience to the edict that was now promulgated. 
 But as they were conscious of their weakness, and could not 
 depend upon receiving assistance from any foreign power, they 
 agreed, before they should take up arms, to make trial, whether 
 they could, by solicitation and intreaty, persuade the king to 
 revoke his edict. 
 
 44 Their dress,” they represented, “ had surely no relation to 
 Their re- any religion, whether the Mahometan or the Christian, 
 monstrance, since the Mahometans in Morocco, Fez, Tunis, and 
 Turkey, dressed very differently from one another ; while the 
 dress of the Christians in Turkey was the same as that of the 
 Turks : and to require them all to purchase Castilian habits, 
 would subject great numbers of them to an expense which they 
 were unable to defray. It was from modesty alone their women 
 wore veils ; a practice which obtained in many places of Castile, 
 as well as in Granada. Their music and dances were used on 
 days of festivity, only as amusements ; they had not the most 
 remote connection with religion, and they had been regarded as 
 innocent by prelates the most distinguished for their sanctity 
 and zeal. 
 
 44 Their baths were used for the purpose of cleanliness only ; 
 those of the men were separate from those of the women ; and 
 it was not in the power of those Christians, to whom the care of 
 them was committed, to allege, that either the former or the 
 latter had been ever applied to any use repugnant either to 
 decency or the Catholic religion. And with regard to their 
 language, as it was difficult to conceive how the Arabic could 
 contain anything contrary to Christianity, so it was utterly 
 impossible for them at once to lay aside the use of it, since great 
 numbers among them were too far advanced in life to be able to 
 learn a new language ; and in several parts of the country there 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 159 
 
 1568 .] 
 
 was no other tongue spoken but the Arabic, nor any means 
 established by which the Castilian could be acquired.” They 
 concluded with professions of loyalty to the king, and with 
 reminding him, that in his foreign wars they had given him 
 many proofs of their attachment and fidelity. 
 
 The Morescoes had not access, it should seem, to deliver this 
 remonstrance to Philip himself ; but it was presented to him by 
 Deza the chancellor of Granada, who was seconded by Don John 
 Henriquez, Don Antonio de Toledo, the prior of Leon, and the 
 marquis of Mondejar, captain-general of the province. This last 
 mentioned nobleman spared no pains to divert Philip from his 
 purpose, by representing, that from his knowledge of the Mores- 
 coes he was convinced, that an open rebellion would be the con- 
 sequence of carrying the edict into execution. But the king 
 having formed his resolution after mature deliberation, and by 
 the advice of such counsellors as he most esteemed, lent a deaf 
 ear to all the representations that were made to him, and gave 
 orders to Mondejar immediately to set out for Granada, in order 
 to make preparations for employing force in case he should find 
 it necessary. 
 
 The Morescoes were no sooner informed of the ill success of 
 their petition, than they began to meditate a revolt ; and the 
 leading men among them having met privately in Cadair, a town 
 situated in the entrance of the mountains of Alpuxara, they 
 despatched ambassadors to Fez, Algiers, and Constantinople, to 
 solicit assistance ; and at the same time spread their emissaries 
 over the province, in order to prepare the minds of the inha- 
 bitants. 
 
 The people almost everywhere, except in those places where 
 Their in- they were overawed by the Spanish garrisons, obeyed 
 surrection. with alacrity the invitation which they received to 
 assert their liberty ; and in a little time the whole region of 
 Alpuxara, which contains a space of seventeen leagues in length 
 and ten in breadth, comprehending many villages and many 
 thousand inhabitants, was up in arms. A reinforcement of 
 several hundred Turks, besides a quantity of military stores, 
 arrived from Africa, and the Morescoes flattered themselves with 
 the hopes that much more powerful assistance would ere long be 
 sent them by the sultan. 
 
 Their leaders in the meantime held another assembly, in which 
 They elect they elected for their king Don Ferdinand de Valor, 
 a kin g- a young man of four or five and twenty, descended from 
 their ancient princes, and in some measure qualified, by his 
 intrepid courage and activity, for the dangerous pre-eminence to 
 which he was now exalted. Having assumed the name of A ben- 
 Humeya, which had been that of his progenitors, he was invested 
 with the ensigns of royalty, with all the forms and ceremonies 
 which were anciently practised at the election of the Moorish 
 
160 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 kings. He then entered upon the exercise of his new authority, 
 appointed his ministers and officers, and sent orders to all the 
 chiefs who were not present in the assembly, to hold themselves 
 ready to act on the shortest notice. 
 
 His first and principal object was to get possession of the city 
 Their at- of Granada, in which he doubted not of being able to 
 tempt on defend himself till the Turkish succours should arrive. 
 
 Granada. N or was without some reason that he entertained 
 hopes of succeeding in an attempt on this important city. His 
 party had hitherto concealed their machinations with the most 
 profound and faithful secrecy. Their several meetings had been 
 held on pretences which deceived the penetration of the Spaniards, 
 and their military preparations had been carried on chiefly among 
 the mountains of Alpuxara. The marquis of Mondejar, indeed, 
 notwithstanding these precautions, had conceived a suspicion of 
 their designs, and had represented to Philip the necessity of 
 sending him a much more powerful army than was at present 
 under his command. But there subsisted at this time a violent 
 jealousy between that nobleman and Deza the chancellor, which 
 arose from a competition concerning the rights of their respective 
 offices. Deza, prompted by his animosity against the marquis, 
 endeavoured to discredit his account of the hostile intentions of 
 the Moors, and to persuade the king that there was in reality 
 no danger of a revolt, and that the edict lately published might 
 be sufficiently enforced by a vigorous exercise of the civil power 
 alone ; but that Mon dejar was desirous that a war should be 
 kindled, because he expected that the whole administration of 
 it would be committed to himself, and the count of Tendilla 
 his son. 
 
 Philip, though naturally provident and suspicious, and more 
 inclined to fear than hope, was by his counsellors, who were 
 Deza’s friends, led to believe his representation of the matter, 
 rather than that of the marquis. And thus the march of the 
 troops for which Mondejar had applied was delayed, and the 
 garrison of Granada suffered to continue so weak, that had it 
 not been for an accident which could not be foreseen, that city 
 would have fallen into the hands of the Morescoes. Aben- 
 Humeya having held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants 
 of the town of Albaicin, which communicates with the city of 
 Granada, and may be considered as a part of it, gave orders 
 about the end of December to Aben-Farax, one of his principal 
 officers, to march thither with a body of between six and seven 
 thousand men. Had these troops reached Albaicin at the time 
 expected, the inhabitants would have joined them, and thereby 
 have made up an army by which the garrison must have been 
 overpowered ; but by a fall of snow upon a neighbouring mountain, 
 over which they were obliged to pass, they were all prevented 
 from advancing except about one hundred and fifty. With these 
 
1568.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPATN. 1G1 
 
 Aben-Farax himself entered Albaicin in the middle of the night ; 
 and if ho could have prevailed upon the inhabitants to take arms 
 and join him, he might still have made himself master of the 
 town ; but, though well affected to his cause, they were deterred 
 from declaring in his favour, by observing how small a number 
 of troops he had brought along with him ; so that, after having 
 continued in the place for some hours, he was obliged, before the 
 approach of day, to make his escape to the mountain where his 
 army had been stopped. Philip’s eyes were then opened with 
 regard to the contradictory informations which he had received, 
 and he immediately issued orders for the march of those troops 
 for which the marquis of Mondejar had applied. 
 
 Aben-Humeya in the mean time was employed in fortifying 
 Their the narrow passes which led into the country of Alpuxara ; 
 hostilities, after which he, with one body of troops, and Aben-Farax 
 with another, went from place to place, exhorting or compelling 
 the Morescoes to revolt ; destroying the altars and images in 
 the churches, which they converted into mosques ; and putting 
 to death, in the most barbarous manner, all the priests and other 
 Christians who refused to embrace the Mahometan religion. 
 
 In order to check their progress, the marquis of Mondejar set 
 They sub- ou ^ f rom Granada as soon as he had collected a suffi- 
 mit to the cient number of troops for his intended enterprise, 
 marquis of The Morescoes disputed with him for some time the 
 Mondejar. en t rance into the mountains ; but they were unable to 
 withstand long the bold intrepid efforts of the Spanish infantry. 
 Mondejar triumphed over them at every pass ; put many of them 
 to the sword ; took a great number of prisoners, and at last 
 obliged Aben-Humeya to fly with the shattered remains of his 
 army to the more inaccessible parts of the mountains. In a 
 few months almost the whole region of Alpuxara was subdued. 
 The people, being every where intimidated by the rapidity of 
 Mondejar’s progress, laid down their arms, and either came to 
 him in numerous bodies, or sent deputies, to sue for peace. This 
 he readily granted, on condition of their yielding obedience in 
 future to the King’s authority ; and he at the same time gave 
 them protection against (what they had but too much reason to 
 dread) the rapine and violence of the Spanish soldiers. The 
 marquis de los Velez, who commanded a body of troops in the 
 neighbourhood of Almeria, was no less successful in dislodging 
 the Morescoes from some strongdiolds near the sea-coasts, where 
 they had fortified themselves with a view to favour the descent 
 of the Moors and Turks. And now the marquis of Mondejar, 
 believing the war to be almost entirely extinguished, and that 
 Aben-Humeya must either soon surrender or make his escape 
 out of the kingdom, sent intelligence of his success to Philip, 
 and desired that a part of the troops might be recalled. He at 
 the same time recommended the treating gently both such of 
 
 M 
 
162 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IX 
 
 tho Moreseoes as had submitted, and such of them as had been 
 taken prisoners. But unfortunately this nobleman’s enemies at 
 court had much greater influence than his friends ; and Philip 
 was of himself much more inclined to harshness and severity 
 than to lenity and mercy. Without regard to Mondejar’s repre- 
 sentations, a royal mandate was immediately despatched, com- 
 manding all the prisoners above eleven years of age, without 
 distinction of sex or condition, to be sold for slaves b . 
 
 This barbarous treatment of their countrymen revived in the 
 minds of such of the Moreseoes as had submitted, all their 
 wonted abhorrence of the Spanish yoke ; and soon afterwards 
 they themselves were treated with equal inhumanity. 
 
 Whether Philip’s exchequer was in reality drained at this 
 time by his late expensive armaments in the Mediterranean, and 
 his war in the Netherlands, or whether his ministers only pre- 
 tended this to be the case, in order to gratify their malignity 
 against Mondejar, does not sufficiently appear ; but, whatever 
 was the cause, the arrears due to the troops were so great, that 
 the marquis of Mondejar was unable to discharge them. The 
 usual consequence of the ill payment of an army quickly followed. 
 The general lost his authority, and the soldiers, and several of 
 the officers, deserted their stations, and spread themselves over 
 the country, plundering, and even butchering and carrying off 
 into slavery, great numbers of those Moreseoes for whose security 
 he had pledged his faith. Mondejar seems to have exerted 
 himself strenuously to put a stop to these enormities, by sending 
 out such of his troops as he could trust, to restrain or chastise 
 the delinquents. But his endeavours were in a great measure 
 fruitless. The Spaniards still continued to embrace every oppor- 
 tunity of indulging their rapacity ; and afterwards left their 
 standards, and went off to the neighbouring provinces with their 
 prey. 
 
 The Moreseoes, highly exasperated by the multiplied oppres- 
 sions which they suffered, repented of their late submission; 
 and, being now convinced that there was no safety in trusting 
 to any treaty with an enemy so cruel and perfidious, they 
 resumed their arms, took ample vengeance on scattered parties 
 of the Spaniards, whom they surprised among the mountains, 
 and again arranged themselves under the banners of their King. 
 It happened, about this time, that Aben-Humeya received from 
 Africa a reinforcement of four hundred Turks ; who, it was 
 pretended, were soon to be followed by a powerful fleet and 
 army. And thus the Moreseoes were determined, partly by 
 hope, and partly by vengeance and despair, to make a second 
 trial of the fortune of war; the calamities attending which, they 
 
 b The effect of this barbarous treatment, says a Spanish historian (Fcrrcras), was, that 
 great numbers of the Morcsco women languished in slavery for a little timo, and then sank 
 under their calamities. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 163 
 
 1568.] 
 
 thought, could not exceed those which they had lately experi- 
 enced in the time of peace. 
 
 The causes of this second revolt were very differently inter- 
 preted by the marquis of Mondejar’s enemies and friends. By 
 the former it was said, “ that this nobleman had erred egre- 
 giously, both in his manner of conducting the war, and in his 
 treatment of the rebels, when they laid down their arms. For 
 it was absurd to expect that an enemy so treacherous as the 
 Morescoes would regard their engagements any longer than they 
 found it necessary ; and no less absurd to hope that such obsti- 
 nate infidels would ever be sincere converts to the Christian 
 faith. Their late sacrilege, and the barbarous cruelties which 
 they had exercised against the priests, and other Christians, had 
 called aloud for vengeance ; and justice, as well as sound policy, 
 had required that they should all have been put to the sword, 
 or sold for slaves.” 
 
 But the marquis, on the other hand, and his adherents, repre- 
 sented, that this deluded people had been chastised with suffi- 
 cient severity, for enormities into which their leaders had betrayed 
 them : that humanity, and a regard to the interest of the King, 
 had prevented him from sacrificing to revenge the lives of so many 
 thousand useful subjects, most of whom were innocent of the crimes 
 that had been committed, and by whose destruction so great a 
 part of the kingdom would have been rendered desolate : besides, 
 that there was no reason to believe that the Morescoes would 
 have violated their faith, if the troops could have been kept under 
 proper discipline ; which he had found it impossible to maintain, 
 partly through the negligence of some of the King’s ministers in 
 making remittances for their pay, and partly through the pains 
 which some persons in power had taken to ruin his authority. 
 
 Between these contradictory representations, Philip was at a 
 Don John l° ss determine what measures to pursue. But at 
 of Austria, last, either because he himself, and most of his conn- 
 commander- sellors, disapproved of Mondejar’s lenity in so easily 
 m-chicf. receiving the Morescoes into favour, or because he did 
 did not incline to subject that nobleman’s enemies to the mortifica- 
 tion of seeing him still continued in the supreme command, he re- 
 solved to bestow it upon his natural brother, Don J ohn of Austria. 
 
 This young prince, whose mother was a German, of the name 
 of Blomberg, a native of Ratisbon, had been educated privately 
 by Lewis Quixada, lord of Villagarcia, for whose son he had 
 passed, till Philip’s arrival in Spain in the year one thousand five 
 hundred and fifty-nine. Soon after this, Philip having, agreeably 
 to his father’s request, acknowledged Don J ohn for his brother, 
 had appointed him a household suitable to his rank, and bestowed 
 the same attention on his education as on that of his own son. 
 
 Resembling his father in the gracefulness of his person, and in 
 the courteousness of his manners, Don John discovered, from 
 
 m 2 
 
1G4 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book IX. 
 
 his youth, the love of arms, and gave many conspicuous proofs 
 of those accomplishments by which he became afterwards one of 
 the most illustrious personages of the age c . 
 
 But as at this time he was only about twenty-two years old, 
 and did not possess any military experience, Philip, although he 
 conferred upon him the title of commander-in-chief, forbade him 
 to take the command of the troops into his own hands, and 
 required that, in the whole management of the war, he should 
 conform to the opinion of certain counsellors whom he appointed 
 to assist him. These were, the archbishop of Granada, Deza the 
 president of the chancery, the duke de Sessa, the marquis of 
 Mondejar, and Don Lewis de Requesens, the grand commendator 
 of Castile, whom he named for Don John’s lieutenant. 
 
 The war was now prosecuted in different quarters at the same 
 time, and a greater number of troops employed than formerly. 
 But the success was not answerable to the expectations that had 
 been formed. The Morescoes discovered, on many occasions, 
 that they were not destitute of valour, and in some rencounters 
 they came off victorious. 
 
 Don John, in the mean time, grown extremely impatient 
 The Mores- un der the restraints which had been imposed on him, 
 coes are ea- endeavoured to persuade the King to permit him to 
 duel/ SUb * comraan d the forces in person ; and he at length 
 obtained his request. After which, having got his 
 army reinforced, he himself marched against the Morescoes on 
 one side, while Requesens and the marquis de los Velez attacked 
 them on another. But the Morescoes, undisciplined, incom- 
 pletely armed, and disheartened by the disappointment of their 
 hopes of assistance from the Turks and Moors, were not a match 
 for such numerous regular forces as were now employed to reduce 
 them ; and their ruin was hastened by the dissensions of some of 
 their leaders, and the treachery of others. Aben-Humeya was 
 privately murdered by the friends of his wife, whose father he 
 had put to death on account of his secret practices with the 
 Spaniards. Another chief, called Aben-Aboo, was elected King 
 in his stead ; and he too suffered the same fate from the hands 
 of some of his officers, who hoped, by this sacrifice, to atone for 
 their rebellion. With the death of this leader, the war, which 
 had lasted almost two years, was concluded d . 
 
 Neither Don John nor Requesens acquired any glory by their 
 conduct in this war ; nor did they preserve themselves free from 
 that imputation of inhumanity and implacable revenge which, in 
 this age, was generally cast upon the Spaniards. 
 
 c Strada, an. 1578. 
 
 d In describing this war, the Spanish historians have descended to the most minute 
 detail. But amidst the endless multiplicity of little events and incidents which they 
 relate, there is almost no variety, and no display either of courage or conduct that can 
 interest a reader in the perusal. This part of the Spanish history is besides rendered pecu- 
 liarly disgusting by the numerous scenes of barbarous cruelty which it presents. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 163 
 
 1568.] 
 
 No other apology can be offered for the dreadful severities 
 which they exercised, but that their conduct was conformable to 
 the instructions given them by the King. For Philip had disap- 
 proved of the lenity with which the Morescoes had been treated 
 by the marquis of Mondejar ; and, while he listened only to the 
 voice of superstition or resentment, forgot what every wise king 
 will regard as the most sacred maxim of his policy, that the 
 strength and glory of a prince depend on the number and 
 prosperity of his subjects. 
 
 But this bigotted monarch set no bounds to his abhorrence of 
 those who deviated, or whom he suspected of deviating, from 
 the Catholic faith. Agreeably to his instructions, great numbers 
 of the Morescoes, living peaceably in the plains of Granada, were, 
 upon suspicion of their corresponding with the insurgents, put to 
 death. All the inhabitants of some villages and districts, men, 
 women, and children, were extirpated. All the prisoners of both 
 sexes were either executed or deprived of their liberty. And of 
 those Morescoes who had refused to join in the rebellion, all but 
 a few, without whom certain manufactures could not be carried 
 on, were torn from their native homes, and transported into the 
 interior provinces, where they were exposed to the injuries and 
 insults of a haughty people, and many of them, by their poverty, 
 reduced to a state of dependence on the Castilians, which differed 
 little from the condition of such of their countrymen as had been 
 sold for slaves. 
 
 Such was the conclusion of this war ; during which, notwith- 
 standing tho great disparity between the contending parties, 
 Philip was exposed to greater danger than at any other period 
 of his reign. Had the Morescoes made themselves masters of 
 the city of Granada, in their attempt on which they failed, more 
 through chance and accident than misconduct or the want of 
 strength ; or had they prevailed with Selim the Turkish 
 emperor, to interest himself in their behalf ; several towns in 
 Andalusia, and almost the whole kingdom of Valentia, which was 
 mostly inhabited by Morescoes, would have joined in the revolt ; 
 and, in that case, so great an army might have been raised, as, 
 with the assistance of the Moors in Barbary, would have furnished 
 employment for many years to all the forces which the King, 
 who was at the same time engaged in war with his subjects in the 
 Netherlands, could have collected to oppose them. 
 
 But fortunately for Philip, and perhaps for Christendom, the 
 Sultan was at this time intent upon prosecuting the war of 
 Cyprus against the Venetians, and from that war he could not 
 be diverted, although Mahomet, his grand visier, and the wisest 
 of all his courtiers, advised him earnestly to suspend the prose- 
 cution of it, and not to neglect the present happy opportunity 
 of turning his arms against the king of Spain 6 . 
 
 e Thuanus, lib. xlviii. Fcrreras, an. 1568-9-70. Cabrera, lib. viii. 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 166 
 
 PART II. 
 
 It was not long before Selim had reason to be sorry that he 
 War with the had not listened to.tliis advice, as Philip had no sooner 
 Turks. completed the reduction of the Morescoes, than he en- 
 tered into an alliance against him with the republic of V enice, the 
 Pope, and several others of the Italian states and princes. The 
 papal throne was filled at this time by the celebrated Pius the 
 Fifth, who by his merit had raised himself from obscurity to the 
 popedom ; and, though strongly tinctured with some of the vices 
 which characterised the ecclesiastics of that age, was endued 
 with certain royal virtues which rendered him worthy of the 
 exalted station to which he had been advanced. Having been 
 solicited by the Venetians, to employ his influence to procure 
 assistance from the Christian princes against the Sultan, who, in 
 the time of peace, and in violation of a solemn treaty, invaded 
 the isle of Cyprus, Pius readily consented to their request, and, 
 with a zeal becoming the head of the church, espoused their 
 cause. 
 
 His application, however, to most of the European monarclis 
 was without effect. For, besides that the season of crusades 
 was now over, and that the most superstitious princes were, in 
 that age, governed more by political views than religious zeal, he 
 found almost all of them unable to grant the assistance which he 
 solicited. The emperor Maximilian had lately concluded a truce 
 with the Sultan, which it was greatly his interest to maintain. 
 The attention of the French king, who had been long in alliance 
 with the Porte, was engrossed by those inveterate factions into 
 which his kingdom was divided. Sebastian, king of Portugal, 
 was too young ; and Sigismund of Poland too much worn out 
 with the infirmities of age, to engage in any foreign enterprise. 
 Philip was the only great prince in Europe with whom Pius had 
 reason to expect success in his present application. That 
 monarch’s zeal, as well as his power, was greater than that of any 
 other European prince, and from the situation of his dominions, 
 and the enmity which had long subsisted between him and the 
 Turkish sultans, he had no less reason to dread the increase of 
 the Ottoman power, than either the Pope or the V enetians. 
 
 Without hesitation therefore he resolved to comply with the 
 Philip’s request that was now made to him, and readily 
 league with entered into an alliance, by which ho bound himself 
 thc^peand -[ 0 p a y onc half of the expense of that powerful arma- 
 u. cnt uns. m ent which it was judged necessary to employ, while the 
 republic of Venice engaged to defray three fourths of the other 
 half, and the Pope the remainder. 
 
 The preparations stipulated were carried on with the utmost 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 167 
 
 1571 .] 
 
 celerity and despatch, and about the middle of September a fleet 
 was ready to sail from Messina, consisting of upwards of two 
 hundred and fifty ships of war, besides ships of burden, and, if 
 we may believe the contemporary historians, carrying near fifty 
 thousand men ; fourteen thousand of whom were furnished by 
 the princes and states of Italy. 
 
 The chief command of this mighty armament was given to 
 Don John of Austria, for whom the title of Generalissimo was 
 invented on this occasion. The grand commendator Requesens 
 was appointed his lieutenant, and under him were the marquis 
 de Santa- Croce, Doria, M. Antony Colonna, commander of the 
 Pope’s galleys, and Sebastian V eniero, who commanded those of 
 the Venetians. 
 
 The aged Pontiff, overjoyed to observe that his negotiations 
 had been attended with so great success, indulged the most san- 
 guine hopes with regard to the issue of the war ; and, as if he 
 had received a revelation concerning it from Heaven, he exhorted 
 Don John to embrace the first opportunity of engaging with the 
 enemy, over whom he assured him he would obtain a complete 
 victory. He sent him at the same time a consecrated standard, 
 and a number of ecclesiastics to officiate in sacred things on 
 board the ships ; and ordered a fast and jubilee to be proclaimed, 
 with an absolution from their sins, to all who should acquit them- 
 selves with honour against the Infidels. 
 
 Selim, on the other hand, exerted himself strenuously in pro- 
 Selim’s prepa- viding against so great a danger as now threatened 
 rations. to overwhelm him ; and although a part of his troops 
 were still employed in reducing Cyprus, he was able, through 
 the great resources which he possessed, to equip a fleet still 
 more numerous than that of the Christian allies. Hali, to whom 
 the chief command of it was given, arrived on the western coast 
 of Greece about the time when Don John set sail from Sicily ; 
 and the two fleets came in sight of each other, with a resolution 
 not to decline fighting, on the 7th of October, near the gulf of 
 Lepanto. 
 
 The battle was begun by the two admirals, and their example 
 The battle of was followed by all the other commanders, as 
 Lepanto. fast as the wind, or the general orders which they 
 had received, would permit them to advance. Between Don 
 John and the Basha the engagement was bloody and obstinate. 
 After cannonading one another for some time, they came to close 
 fight, and grappled with each other. The Spanish soldiers thrice 
 boarded the enemy's ship, and were thrice repulsed with great 
 slaughter. But at last Don J ohn having received a reinforce- 
 ment of two hundred men from the marquis of Santa-Croce, the 
 Turks were overpowered. Hali himself was killed, and all on 
 board were either put to the sword or taken prisoners. The 
 crescent of Mahomet was then taken down, and the standard of 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 168 
 
 the cross erected in its stead; after which, Don John, in order 
 to intimidate the enemy, gave orders to have the head of the 
 Turkish admiral fixed upon a long pole, which was fastened to 
 the topmasts ; and shouts were sent from ship to ship of triumph 
 and victory. 
 
 The contending parties were in the mean time engaged in 
 every quarter in furious combat with each other, fighting hand 
 to hand, as on a field of battle, and employing not only guns and 
 muskets, but arrows, pikes, javelins, and all the other ancient as 
 well as modern weapons of war. Both Turks and Christians 
 gave the most striking displays of prowess and intrepidity. Great 
 numbers fell on both sides, and the sea for several miles was 
 tinged with blood, and covered with mangled limbs and carcases. 
 At last the Christians were almost every where victorious. The 
 Christian slaves, by whom the Turkish galleys were rowed, took 
 courage from the success with which the arms of the allies were 
 attended, broke loose from their chains, and contributed not a 
 little to fix the victory ; while great numbers of the Spanish and 
 Italian galley-slaves, prompted by the hopes of recovering their 
 liberty, having obtained permission from their officers, boarded 
 and attacked the enemy with irresistible fury, and displayed a 
 contempt of danger with which nothing but despair, or the 
 abhorrence of slavery, could have inspired them. The Turks 
 were at the same time greatly disheartened by the loss of their 
 admiral ; and being tempted by the hopes of making their escape 
 upon a coast inhabited by their fellow-subjects, many of them ran 
 their ships ashore, and left them an easy prey to the enemy. 
 
 The Christian fleet was much better manned than the Turkish, 
 Causes of and the soldiers, having been a shorter time at sea, 
 the victory. W ere more fresh and vigorous. They were infinitely 
 better furnished with mails and helmets, and made much more 
 use of fire-arms than the enemy, many of whom were armed only 
 with bows and arrows, the wounds inflicted by which were sel- 
 dom mortal. The prows of the Turkish galleys were likewise 
 more open and defenceless ; and the wind, which at first was 
 favourable, changed suddenly against them, and greatly facili- 
 tated the motions of the Christian fleet. From these causes, 
 added to the fortunate bravery of Don John, seconded by the 
 prudent and intrepid conduct of Requesens, Santa- Croce, Co- 
 lonna, and above all of Veniero, Barbarigo, and other noble 
 Venetians, the allies gained the most memorable victory of which 
 we read in the history of modern times. 
 
 It was not indeed obtained without considerable loss. Near 
 The loss on ten thousand of the Christians were killed in the engage- 
 both sides, ment, or died afterwards of their wounds. Among these 
 was the Venetian proveditor Barbarigo, a nobleman equally 
 celebrated for his wisdom, his valour, and his moderation, llis 
 death was deeply lamented by the allies, and proved an irrepar- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1G9 
 
 1571.] 
 
 able misfortune to the common cause. But, to compensate for 
 these losses, near fifteen thousand Christians were delivered from 
 captivity ; and of the Turks, above five-and-twenty thousand 
 were killed, and ten thousand taken prisoners. A hundred and 
 thirty of their ships fell into the enemy’s hands, and all the rest 
 were either sunk or battered to pieces, or burnt, except between 
 thirty and forty with which Ulucciali, the famous corsair, escaped 
 to Constantinople, through his superior skill in navigation, and 
 his knowledge of the seas. 
 
 This victory, gained over the implacable enemy of Christen- 
 dom, spread universal joy throughout all Europe ; and Don John, 
 to whom as commander-in-chief it w r as principally ascribed, was 
 celebrated every where as the greatest hero of the age. No 
 person had more reason to rejoice than Philip, yet he received 
 the messenger with a cold indifference ; which his contemporaries 
 were not inclined to attribute to his moderation so much 4s to 
 that jealousy of his brother’s fame, of which he gave afterwards 
 a more convincing proof. “ Don John,” said he, “has gained 
 the victory, but he hazarded too much ; he might have lost it.” 
 The Pope’s joy on this occasion was more sincere. When he 
 received the news, he cried out, in the words of sacred writ, 
 “ There was a man sent from God, whose name was John.” 
 
 But the fruits of this signal victory were not proportional to 
 The allies the joy which it excited. The several admirals differed 
 return home, widely from one another with regard to the measures 
 proper to be taken in the further prosecution of the war. Although 
 Don John had been honoured with the extraordinary title of 
 generalissimo, yet, according to the treaty of alliance, no matter 
 of importance could be determined without the consent of the 
 other commanders. He would have sailed immediately after the 
 battle for the Dardanelles, to intercept the remains of the Turkish 
 fleet, and to block up the communication between Constantinople 
 and the Mediterranean; but the Venetians and other members 
 of the council of war refused to agree to this proposal. Other 
 enterprises were afterwards proposed, and rejected ; nor could 
 they fix on any one common measure, but that of returning home, 
 to repair the damage which had been sustained, and to prepare 
 for resuming their operations in the spring. 
 
 Not long after Don J ohn’s arrival at Messina, the Christians 
 Embassy of hi Albania and Macedonia, filled with admiration of 
 the Greeks his character, and believing that it must be long before 
 t° Don J °hn. the Turks could recover from the blow which they had 
 received, sent an embassy to make him an offer of the sovereignty 
 over them, and to assure him, that, if he would come to their 
 assistance with a fleet and army, they would shake off the 
 Turkish yoke, and sacrifice their lives and fortunes in his service. 
 
 Don John, whose ruling passion was ambition, would gladly 
 have accepted this tempting offer, but was obliged to inform the 
 
170 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 ambassadors, that before he could comply with their request, the 
 King must be consulted, and his consent obtained. He accord- 
 ingly sent immediate notice to his brother of the proposal that 
 had been made to him. And Philip, whether prompted by jea- 
 lousy, as was generally believed, or by motives of prudence and 
 policy, as he gave out, put an end at once to any hopes which 
 Don John might have conceived, by telling him, that at present 
 all, thoughts of such an enterprise must be laid aside, lest the 
 Venetians should take the alarm, and abandon the confederacy. 
 This, it is not improbable, would have happened, since the V ene- 
 tians had no less reason to dread the neighbourhood of the Spa- 
 niards than of the Turks, and had besides a claim themselves to 
 a part of those territories to the sovereignty of which Don J ohn 
 aspired. 
 
 In the mean time, Ulucciali, whom Selim had made com- 
 Preparations mander-in- chief of all his naval forces, exerted himself 
 of the Turks, with extraordinary vigour and activity in fitting out a 
 new fleet, to supply the place of that which had been ruined in 
 the battle of Lepanto ; and such at this time were the resources 
 of the Turkish empire, that he was ready by the month of April 
 to leave Constantinople, with more than two hundred galleys, 
 besides a great number of other ships. 
 
 With this fleet he coasted along Negropont, the Morea, and 
 Epirus ; put the maritime towns into a posture of defence ; 
 chastised with great severity many of those Christians who had 
 been concerned in the invitation given to Don John ; and after- 
 wards took his station at Modon in the Morea, with an intention 
 to watch there the motions of the enemy. 
 
 He had full leisure to finish all the preparations which he 
 inactivity judged to be necessary. The allies disputed long with 
 of the one another concerning the plan of their future opera- 
 aihcs. tions ; and at last, when, through the inactivity which 
 their dissensions had occasioned, it was become necessary for 
 them to drop their scheme of conquest in Greece and Africa, 
 and to go a second time in quest of the Turkish fleet, Philip 
 having conceived a suspicion that the court of France had, in 
 order to gratify the Sultan, formed the design of attacking him 
 in Piedmont, or the Netherlands, sent instructions to Don John 
 to delay for some time longer his departure for Messina. At 
 this place the Spanish fleet remained till after the massacre of 
 St. Bartholomew ; when Philip, being delivered from his anxiety 
 August, with regard to the intentions of the French court, gave 
 1572. his brother permission to join the Venetians, and to act 
 in concert with them in prosecuting the war against the Turks. 
 
 But it was the last day of August before the allies could 
 They at last effectuate a junction of their forces ; and it was the 
 set sail for middle of September before they came in sight of the 
 Greece. enemy. Immediately after their arrival on the Grecian 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 71 
 
 157*2.] 
 
 coast, Ulucciali drew out his fleet, as if lie intended to offer 
 battle ; but no sooner had he made a single discharge of his 
 artillery, in the way of bravado or defiance, than he retired under 
 the fortifications of Modon. These he had strengthened in such 
 a manner, as to render it extremely dangerous for the allies to 
 approach ; and he resolved to lie in wait there for some favourable 
 opportunity of attacking them, or at least to keep his fleet in 
 readiness to harass and interrupt them, in case they should 
 attempt a descent. 
 
 Don J ohn called a council of his general officers, to consider of 
 Ulucciali the measures proper to be pursued in case the Turkish 
 declines admiral should persist in his resolution to decline fighting, 
 fighting wag thought impracticable to force their way into the 
 harbour of Modon ; and therefore it was resolved to put the 
 forces on shore, and to besiege the town by land. But from this 
 attempt they were soon deterred, by the information which they 
 received from some troops sent to reconnoitre the strength of the 
 place ; which was so completely fortified, that they could not 
 expect to reduce it before the approach of winter. 
 
 It was next agreed to attempt the reduction of Navarino, 
 Siege of which is another town on the western coast of the Morea, 
 Navarino. no t many miles from Modon. The conduct of this enter- 
 prise was committed to Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, 
 who some years afterwards filled all Europe with his renown, 
 and acquired the character of one of the greatest generals of this 
 or perhaps of any other age. But the present undertaking did not 
 afford him an opportunity of displaying those superior talents for 
 which he is so justly celebrated. The garrison was powerfully 
 reinforced by detachments sent from Modon ; and so numerous 
 an army was drawn together from the neighbouring towns, and 
 sent by Ulucciali to attack the besiegers, that Farnese, after 
 Is raised H ie ramparts for several days, was obliged to 
 
 ' raise the siege, and put his forces on board the fleet, which 
 soon afterwards set sail for Messina. 
 
 Some months before this time the league had suffered an 
 Death of irreparable loss, by the death of the Pope ; whose suc- 
 Piu8 - cessor Gregory the Xlllth had neither the same zeal nor 
 the same influence and authority. Gregory, however, entered 
 readily into his predecessor’s views, and showed himself willing to 
 pursue the plan which Pius had adopted. And Philip, who was 
 now entirely free from his apprehensions of a French invasion, 
 had resolved to exert himself more than ever in the prosecution 
 of the war. But the V enetians having been highly dissatisfied 
 The Vene- ^ ie inactivity of the Spanish fleet in the preceding 
 
 tians make summer ; and finding that after a trial of two years 
 P eac ® with they had, notwithstanding the victory of Lepanto, 
 t ic ui is., derived little advantage from the war, to compensate 
 for the great expense which it had cost them, they listened to 
 
172 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX- 
 
 proposals made them by the French ambassador, and through his 
 intercession concluded a separate peace with the Sultan. 
 
 The Pope and Don John expressed their indignation against 
 the Venetians, on this occasion, without reserve. But Philip 
 thought it beneath his dignity to discover either uneasiness or 
 resentment ; and when intelligence of the peace was brought 
 him, he answered coolly, that he had entered into the league at 
 the desire of the sovereign Pontiff ; and that, although the 
 Venetians had thought proper to abandon it, he would still 
 employ his fleet and army as before, for the attainment of those 
 important ends, the humbling of the Infidels, and the security of 
 Christendom, with a view to which the confederacy had been 
 formed. 
 
 Agreeably to this resolution, he sent orders to Don J ohn, to 
 Doria, and the marquis of Santa- Croce, to employ their utmost 
 diligence in repairing and augmenting the fleet, and to hold ifc 
 ready for entering upon action in the spring. These orders were 
 punctually executed. Ulucciali, with the Turkish fleet, advanced 
 as far as Prevesa in Epirus. But neither he nor the Spanish 
 commanders thought it expedient to try their force in a general 
 engagement. At length Ulucciali, after reinforcing the garrisons 
 of the maritime towns, dismissed the corsairs who had come to 
 his assistance, and about the end of the summer set sail for Con- 
 stantinople. After which Don J ohn, agreeably to his instruc- 
 tions from the King, passed over to Africa, with an intention to 
 undertake the reduction of Tunis ; carrying with him for this 
 purpose a fleet of two thousand sail, having twenty thousand foot 
 on board, besides four hundred light horse, seven hundred pioneers, 
 and a numerous train of heavy artillery. 
 
 Tunis was at this time in the hands of the Turks, commanded 
 by Heder Basha, whom Selim had lately sent to govern the town 
 and kingdom. Heder, seized with consternation at the approach 
 of the Spanish fleet, left Tunis with his troops and a great 
 number of the inhabitants, and Don J ohn took possession of the 
 place, without meeting with the smallest opposition. 
 
 Philip had instructed his brother, when he sent him on this 
 expedition, to destroy Tunis, and to strengthen the fortifications 
 of the isle and fortress of Goletta 6 . But instead of complying 
 with these instructions, Don J ohn resolved to fortify the town 
 more strongly than ever ; and having laid the foundations of a 
 new fort, or citadel, he treated all the inhabitants who remained 
 with lenity and indulgence ; and engaged many of those who had 
 fled, to return and submit to the Spanish government ; after 
 which he carried back his fleet to Sicily. 
 
 He soon discovered his intention in acting a part so contrary 
 to the orders of the King. His success in an enterprise in which 
 
 • The Goletta, which is situated at the entrance of the bay of Tunis, had been in the 
 hands of the Spaniards over since it was conquered by the emperor Charles. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 -173 
 
 1572.] 
 
 the late emperor had failed, though entirely owing to the 
 cowardice of the Turkish governor, had inflamed his ambition ; 
 and he had conceived the hopes that his brother would be per- 
 suaded to grant him the title and dignity of the king of Tunis, 
 in compensation for the sovereignty of Greece, which he had 
 prevented him from accepting. The Pope, it is said, had dis- 
 approved of Philip’s resolution to demolish Tunis ; and had 
 secretly encouraged Don John to venture upon disobeying him ; 
 from an opinion that the erecting a Christian kingdom in Barbary, 
 would prove the most effectual means of extirpating the piratical 
 states. It is certain that Gregory warmly solicited Philip to 
 confer upon his brother the sovereignty of his new conquest, and 
 represented that all Christendom, and especially Spain and Italy, 
 would from thence derive the most substantial advantages. 
 
 Philip was conscious that, notwithstanding his copious resources, 
 it was beyond his power, while the war in the Netherlands sub- 
 sisted, to effectuate the establishment of a new kingdom in 
 opposition to so potent an enemy as the Turkish sultan. And 
 he had desired the fortifications of Tunis to be dismantled, in 
 order to save the expense of a numerous garrison, which would be 
 necessary for its defence. He did not, however, express great 
 resentment against his brother for counteracting his instructions. 
 But when the Pope interceded with him to confer the sovereignty 
 on Don John, he replied, “that, although no person could be 
 more sincerely concerned than himself, for his brother’s honour 
 and interest, yet there was much ground to doubt, whether 
 either the one or the other would be advanced by his complying 
 with the Pope’s request ; and that he could not grant it, till he 
 should know whether he was able to maintain the acquisition 
 that had been made, against the formidable armament which the 
 Sultan was preparing for its recovery.” The prudence of this 
 reply, whether it did or did not proceed from some secret motive 
 of jealousy against his brother, was fully justified by the issue. 
 
 In the summer following, Selim sent Ulucciali against Tunis, 
 Tunis and a consisting of three hundred ships, having 
 
 the Goietta about forty thousand troops on board, under the com- 
 taken by mand of his son-in-law, Sinan Basha. The new fort 
 t e ur-s. w bi c h j) on John j m j begun to build, was not yet 
 complete. Nor was the garrison which he had left strong enough 
 to hold out long against so great a force. Don John laboured 
 with much zeal and anxiety in assembling the Spanish fleet, with 
 an intention to raise the siege, but he was detained for several 
 weeks, first in one harbour, and afterwards in another, by tem- 
 pestuous weather and contrary winds. The Turks in the mean 
 time being powerfully seconded by many thousand Moors, under 
 the governor of Tripoli and the viceroy of Algiers, pushed for- 
 ward their operations at the same time against Tunis and the 
 Goietta. The garrisons defended themselves long with the 
 
174 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book IX. 
 
 utmost bravery ; but at last they were overpowered by numbers, 
 and both the Goletta and the town were taken by assault. 
 
 Don John was affected in the most sensible manner by this 
 disaster ; which showed him the folly of his late presumption, 
 and extinguished those flattering hopes which he had long 
 indulged of attaining some regal or sovereign establishment. 
 His mortification on this occasion was the greater, because, after 
 his most vigorous efforts, the Spanish fleet was still too weak to 
 enable him to take vengeance on the enemy. Philip, for the 
 same reason, dreaded that the Turkish commanders would pursue 
 their conquests, and either attack his other possessions in Africa, 
 or attempt a descent in Naples or Sicily, and it is probable that 
 his apprehensions would have proved but too well founded, had 
 not Selim died about this time, and left his throne to his son 
 Amurath the Third ; who devoted the beginning of his reign to 
 the arts of peace f . 
 
 f Prince Cantemir's Hist, of the Ottoman empire. Antonio Herrera; and Ferrcras in 
 hoc anno. Miniana, lib. vii. 
 
1568 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 175 
 
 BOOK X. 
 
 During the course of the transactions related in the preceding 
 Affairs of book, a variety of important events happened in the 
 the Nether- Netherlands, which require a more circumstantial 
 lands. narration. 
 
 In opposing the prince of Orange and Count Lewis of Nassau, 
 it was confessed, even by the duke of Alva’s enemies, that he 
 acted with the most consummate prudence ; and if his conduct 
 afterwards had been equally prudent, he might, notwithstanding 
 the general odium which his tyranny had excited against him, 
 have preserved the Netherlands in obedience to his authority. 
 For if such of the people as were disaffected to his government 
 remained quiet while the prince of Orange was at hand to favour 
 their attempts, it cannot be supposed, that, after all their hopes 
 of assistance were extinguished, they would have ever dared to 
 dispute his will. And indeed the spirits of this unhappy people, 
 at the present period, seem to have been so entirely broken, and 
 their minds so deeply impressed with awe and terror, that nothing 
 could have inspired them with the courage which they afterwards 
 displayed, but insolence and oppression carried to the most 
 enormous height. 
 
 As soon as the army of the prince of Orange was disbanded, 
 Alva’s va- Alva dismissed his German cavalry, and having dis- 
 nity and ar- tributed the greatest part of his infantry into winter- 
 rogance. quarters, he set out himself with the remainder for 
 
 Brussels ; where, after a triumphant entry, he ordered his 
 victory to be celebrated with every species of rejoicing. He 
 then commanded a solemn thanksgiving for the success which 
 had attended his arms to be observed through all the provinces ; 
 and ordered a statue of himself to be formed in brass, and 
 medals to be struck, which, while they served to perpetuate the 
 memory of his exploits, gave proof of a degree of vanity and arro- 
 gance, which put his friends to the blush, and made the world 
 unwilling to yield him that praise which his vigour and abilities 
 would have procured him b . One of the first acts of his admini- 
 
 b In one of the medals he was represented riding in a triumphal chariot, with a Victory 
 behind him, putting a crown upon his head. In his right hand he held a s'word, to signify 
 that he had conquered Count Lewis by open force : and in the left, an -®gis, to express 
 that wisdom of which he had availed himself against the prince of Orange : and as a farther 
 emblem of his wisdom, the chariot was drawn by owls, which in the ancient heathen super- 
 stition were sacred to Minerva. 
 
 But his statue, which was made at this time, and afterwards placed in the citadel of 
 
176 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book X. 
 
 stration, after his return to Brussels, was to determine the fate 
 of the prisoners whom lie had taken during the campaign ; and 
 all such of them as were inhabitants of the Netherlands were 
 treated as rebels, and put to death. 
 
 A strict inquiry was set on foot, to discover those who had. 
 His tyran- either by word or deed, whilst the war subsisted, shown 
 n y- their inclinations favourable to the prince of Orange. 
 
 And as the issue of the war had remained long uncertain, and 
 fortune had sometimes favoured one side and sometimes another, 
 many persons had unwarily given vent both to their hopes and to 
 their fears ; little suspecting that they were to be called to so 
 rigorous an account for unguarded expressions, uttered among 
 their friends and neighbours, which were now imputed to them as 
 the most atrocious crimes. The people of the Low Countries 
 had long enjoyed the privilege of not being tried by any judges 
 but those of the city or district to which they belonged ; and no 
 citizen could be put to death who had not confessed his crime. 
 No regard was paid to either of these privileges. Persons of all 
 ranks were hurried from the places of their residence, and carried 
 to so great a distance as made it impossible for them to disprove 
 the accusations brought against them, however groundless. 
 Great numbers were seized on bare suspicion ; many suffered 
 death on the slightest evidence ; and others were harassed with 
 prosecutions, by which they were reduced to the utmost poverty 
 and distress c . 
 
 Antwerp, afforded a still more striking proof of Ins vanity and arrogance. It was the work- 
 manship of Jockeling, a German artist, the most celebrated sculptor of the age. The 
 governor was represented trampling under his feet the figure of a monster, having certain 
 emblematical signs in different parts, which denoted the petition which had been presented 
 to -the duchess of Parma, the compromise, and the insurrection and tumults which ensued. 
 The base of the work was a square pillar of marble, containing on one side the artist’s name, 
 and on the other three sides an encomium of the duke of Alva; who is there said to have 
 extinguished heresy and rebellion, to have saved the church from destruction, and restored 
 justice and tranquillity to the Netherlands. This monument of Alva’s vanity was far 
 from being acceptable to the King ; it was a subject of derision among his enemies at the 
 court of Spain ; and in the Flemings, it excited the highest resentment and indignation.* 
 It appears from Grotius, that about this time the duke made several useful regulations 
 with regard to trade, the coin, and the liberty of the press ; but they failed in promoting the 
 purposes for which they were intended, and even the memory of them was soon effaced by 
 the violence of the measures which he afterwards pursued. 
 
 c The negligence which the judges discovered in the sentences which they passed against 
 the unhappy victims delivex-ed over to them by the inquisitors, and in the warrants which 
 they signed for their execution, w’ould be incredible, if the many instances recorded by the 
 contemporary historians did not put it beyond all doubt. An order was issued at this timo 
 for executing several of the prisoners who had been condemned. In the list of their names, 
 the name of one man was inserted whose cause had not been tried, and he too was led to 
 execution. Some time after, the judges gave orders to have this man brought before them 
 for his trial. They were informed, that, in obedience to their former command, he had 
 already suffered death ; and proof was at the same time laid before them of his innoeency. 
 Most of the judges expressed on this occasion great uneasiness; but Vargas, the Spanish 
 lawyer, observed, that what had happened, if rightly considered, ought not to givo them 
 much concern, since it was happy for the man’s soul that he died innocent. 
 
 * Bontivoglio, p. 86. Van Loon, tom. i. p. 135. Strada, p. 250. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 177 
 
 1560.] 
 
 The iniquity and unrelenting cruelty exercised by the inqui- 
 The Ne- sitors diffused a universal terror over all the provinces, 
 theriands Not only the Protestants, but likewise all who had ever 
 ^reatnum^ s ^ own themselves attached to the liberty of their 
 bers of the country, saw that nothing less would satisfy the governor 
 people. than their utter ruin. It would not avail them, they 
 perceived, to conceal their sentiments, nor even to disclaim them ; 
 since many of those who had done so, had been punished with 
 death and confiscation ; and had received no other favour from 
 the judges, but that of having suffered by the sword or halter, 
 instead of being committed to the flames. Determined by these 
 considerations, great numbers of both sexes abandoned their 
 habitations, and withdrew into foreign parts. We ought not, 
 perhaps, to believe what some historians relate, that no less than 
 a hundred thousand houses were forsaken by the inhabitants. It 
 is however certain, that several of the principal cities were sen- 
 sibly thinner, and some whole villages and smaller towns were 
 rendered almost desolate. Many of those who left the Nether- 
 lands went over to England, where they were well received by 
 Elizabeth. And as in that country they enjoyed the free exercise 
 of their religion, they fixed their residence in it ; and amply 
 rewarded the English for the protection afforded them, by intro- 
 ducing among that people various branches of manufacture, with 
 which they had before been unacquainted. 
 
 The Low Countries suffered extremely from this emigration of 
 the inhabitants. But the duke of Alva, far from being deterred 
 by this consideration from the prosecution of his plan, was at 
 pains to prevent the return of the exiles, and even prohibited 
 from returning all such of their friends as had gone to visit them, 
 by publishing an edict, setting forth, that they should be con- 
 sidered as holding intercourse with rebels, and should be liable to 
 the punishment due to those who gave assistance to the enemies 
 of the King. 
 
 The governor’s vanity was flattered about this time, by an 
 embassy which came from the Pope, to present him a consecrated 
 hat and sword. This sort of present, which used to be bestowed 
 only upon princes, was conferred on the duke of Alva, as an 
 illustrious defender of the popish faith; and it contributed to 
 confirm him in the pursuit of those sanguinary measures, which 
 had procured him such a distinguished honour. 
 
 But there was now almost no occasion for employing measures 
 The rest en- of this kind in his government of the Netherlands, 
 tirely sub- All persons who had rendered themselves obnoxious to 
 dued - his displeasure, had either been put to death, or had 
 gone into a voluntary banishment ; while those who remained 
 had shown themselves ready to yield an implicit and entire 
 obedience to his will. The new bishops, the decrees of the 
 council of Trent, the rites and ceremonies of the Romish 
 
 N 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 178 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 church, were received and established throughout' all the 
 provinces. 
 
 This success of the duke of Alva’s arms and counsels gave 
 Anxiety of great uneasiness to some of the neighbouring princes, 
 the queen of and particularly to the queen of England. That wise 
 England. princess had, from the beginning of her reign, beheld 
 with anxiety the growing power of the Spanish monarchy. She 
 knew how much Philip was inclined to disturb her government, 
 and was sensible of the advantage which the vicinity of his 
 dominions in the Netherlands afforded him, for carrying any 
 scheme which he might form against her into execution, especially 
 at the present period, when, instead of the limited prerogative 
 which he had hitherto enjoyed in these provinces, he had acquired 
 an absolute or despotic power, and established a military force, 
 which was formidable to the neighbouring nations, as well as to 
 the people whom it had been employed to subdue. Prompted 
 by these considerations, Elizabeth had granted her protection to 
 the Flemish exiles ; and, if we may credit some historians, she 
 had given secret assistance in money to the prince of Orange. 
 The situation of her affairs at home, where she was disquieted by 
 the machinations of the partisans of the queen of Scots, rendered 
 it inexpedient for her to come to an open breach with the 
 Spanish monarch ; but notwithstanding this, she had resolved to 
 lay hold of the first proper opportunity that should occur of 
 counteracting his designs. 
 
 It was not long before an occasion of this kind offered, which 
 She seizes s ^ e Tidily embraced. Some merchants of Genoa, 
 money be- having engaged to transmit certain sums of money for 
 ^nging to Philip’s use into the Netherlands, had put four hundred 
 11 ip ‘ thousand crowns on board five small vessels, which, 
 being attacked on their way to Antwerp by privateers belonging 
 to the prince of Conde, were obliged to take shelter in the 
 harbours of Plymouth and Southampton. The Spanish am- 
 bassador at the court of London immediately applied for a safe- 
 conduct, that he might send the money by the nearest way to 
 the Low Countries; and at first Elizabeth seemed willing to 
 grant his request ; but afterwards she ordered the ambassador 
 to be told, that, as she understood the money was the property 
 of the Italian merchants, she had resolved to detain it for some 
 time in her own hands, and would take care that the owners 
 should not have any reason to complain. The ambassador 
 endeavoured to make it appear, that the money belonged to the 
 King his master ; and he was seconded in his applications for it 
 by letters addressed to the Queen from the duke of Alva. 
 Elizabeth lent a deaf ear to their remonstrances, and discovered 
 plainly, that she had resolved to keep the money. Alva was not 
 of a temper to bear patiently this insult. It was ever moro 
 agreeable to his nature to conquer difficulties, than to attempt, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 179 
 
 1569 .] 
 
 by negotiation, to elude them. Without regard to treaties 
 subsisting between the English and the Flemings, and without 
 consulting either the States or council of the Netherlands, he 
 ordered all the English merchants at Antwerp to be cast into 
 prison, and their effects to be confiscated. He did not consider, 
 or he was not moved by the consideration, that the Flemings had 
 at that time a much greater quantity of goods in England, than 
 the English possessed in Flanders. Elizabeth had no reason 
 therefore to be'sorry for what had happened. But she despatched 
 an ambassador to Philip, to complain of the injury done to her ; 
 and not receiving satisfaction, she proceeded to make reprisals, 
 and seized effects, belonging to Spanish and Flemish merchants, 
 by which her subjects were more than compensated for all the 
 losses which they had sustained in Flanders. Alva came at last 
 to perceive his error, and sent over Christopher Assonville to 
 England, to negotiate an agreement with the Queen. Elizabeth, 
 who took pleasure to mortify the pride of Alva, refused to admit 
 Assonville into her presence, because he had not credentials from 
 Philip. Alva, more enraged than ever by this affront, prohibited 
 the people in the Low Countries from holding any commercial 
 intercourse with the English ; but at last, after various negotia- 
 tions, the matter was adjusted by treaty, and the trade put upon 
 its former footing, in the year one thousand five hundred and 
 seventy-four d . 
 
 In the mean time Elizabeth gained her end, and did a most 
 material prejudice to Philip’s interest in the Netherlands. This 
 prejudice was indeed much greater than she intended, and was 
 accompanied with more important consequences than she could 
 possibly foresee. Great arrears were due to the Spanish troops, 
 and Alva had contracted a considerable debt by building citadels. 
 Philip’s treasury, although the richest in Europe, was exhausted 
 by the expensive wars in which he had been engaged against the 
 Turks and Moors ; nor could he at present afford the money 
 requisite for the maintenance of his forces in Flanders. In this 
 situation, the governor found it necessary to have recourse to the 
 Flemings, whom he believed to be so thoroughly subdued, that 
 they would not refuse to comply with any demand which he could 
 make upon them. 
 
 The absurdity and folly, added to the oppression and tyranny, 
 Taxes of the int< o which his arrogance, together with his ignorance 
 loth and 20th of the interests of a commercial people, betrayed him 
 pennies. on occas i on? ma y justly be regarded as the chief 
 cause of all the difficulties which he afterwards encountered, and 
 of all those astonishing exertions which the people made to free 
 themselves from the Spanish yoke. It may appear surprising, 
 that the imposing of taxes, however burdensome, should have 
 
 d Meteren, p. 80. Strada, p. 252. Bentivoglio, p. 80. 
 N 2 
 
180 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF- [Book X. 
 
 wrought more powerfully on their minds, than the cruel persecu- 
 tions which had been exercised with such unrelenting fury on 
 account of religion. But the reason is obvious. The persecu- 
 tions extended only to a certain number of individuals ; whereas 
 the taxes affected all men alike, and must have proved the source 
 of universal and perpetual oppression. 
 
 The people in the Low Countries had in no period been 
 accustomed to be taxed by their princes. The power of imposing 
 taxes belonged, by the constitution and constant practice, to the 
 assembly of the States. And when the prince had occasion for 
 money, he had been accustomed, from the earliest times, to 
 petition the States for a supply, which they either granted or 
 refused, as they were satisfied or displeased with the reasons for 
 demanding it. 
 
 At certain periods, and particularly in the beginning of the 
 present reign, they had carried their jealousy of this important 
 privilege so far, as to appoint commissioners of their own to 
 receive the money from the people, and to see it applied to the 
 purposes for which it had been granted. The duke of Alva paid 
 no greater regard to this than he had done to their other 
 privileges. He resolved by his own authority to establish taxes, 
 sufficient not only to supply his present necessity, but to serve 
 as a perpetual fund for defraying all the expenses of his govern- 
 ment. 
 
 The manner in which these taxes were imposed was not more 
 arbitrary, than the taxes themselves were oppressive. They 
 were three in number. The first was a tax of one per cent, on 
 all goods, whether movable or immovable. The second, of 
 twenty cent, to be paid annually, of all immovable goods, or 
 heritage. And the third, of ten per cent, of all movable goods, 
 to be paid on every sale. It was enacted, that the first of these 
 taxes should be paid only once ; but it was ordained, that the 
 other two should continue as long as the public exigencies should 
 require. 
 
 Intimation was made of these demands, in the name of the 
 Excite uni- King, to an assembly of the States, and it is impossible 
 versai discon- to describe the astonishment which they excited. The 
 tent - deputies knew not what answer to return ; and there- 
 
 fore desired time to consider of the governor’s requisitions, and 
 to transmit an account of them to their constituents. They were 
 received everywhere with grief and indignation ; and there was 
 nothing to be heard but the bitterest lamentations over all the 
 provinces. 
 
 “ It was not enough,” they complained, “for the King to have 
 stripped the country of infinite numbers of the people ; to have 
 filled the provinces with foreign soldiers, and to have wreathed 
 the yoke about the necks of the inhabitants, by garrisons and 
 citadels ; but they must likewise bear the charge of supporting 
 
PHILIP II. KINO OF SPAIN. 
 
 181 
 
 1569.] 
 
 those instruments of their oppression ; and for this purpose 
 instead of the voluntary and moderate contributions which they 
 had been wont to pay under former princes, be loaded for ever 
 with the most violent and oppressive taxes. Notwithstanding 
 the injustice with which they had been treated from the begin- 
 ning of the governor’s administration, yet, during his contest 
 with the princes of Nassau, they had remained unshaken in their 
 fidelity to the King, and even co-operated with his forces against 
 the enemy ; but it now appeared that ‘their most implacable 
 enemy was the King himself, who seemed to desire nothing so 
 much, as to reduce them to a state of the most wretched slavery; 
 and in order to accomplish an end so cruel and inglorious, had 
 sent among them the duke of Alva, whose conduct seemed rather 
 as if he had come to extirpate the inhabitants, than to govern 
 or protect them. But they had already borne too much. It was 
 time to show that they had not been insensible of the treatment 
 which they had received, and that they were not altogether 
 unworthy of their illustrious ancestors, to whose wisdom and 
 valour they were indebted for those invaluable privileges, of which 
 the King, and the odious instruments of his tyranny, now wanted 
 to deprive them®. 
 
 When the States found that the new taxes were so universally 
 Opposition of disagreeable to their constituents, they took courage, 
 the assembly and represented their own sentiments concerning them 
 of the States. £ 0 governor. They reminded him of the disturb- 
 ances which had arisen from an attempt to establish the tax of 
 the hundredth penny, in the year one thousand five hundred and 
 fifty-six ; when persons of all ranks discovered an irreconcilable 
 aversion to it, not only on account of the exorbitancy of the 
 tax itself, but because it reduced them to the disagreeable 
 necessity of laying open their private affairs. There was still 
 greater reason, they observed, for being dissatisfied with the 
 other taxes ; and especially that of the tenth part of movable 
 goods, to be paid at every sale. This was not only such a tax 
 as had been never known in the Low Countries, but would prove 
 a burden which it would be utterly impossible to support. It 
 would amount, in many cases, nearly to the value of the com- 
 modities themselves; since the same commodities were often 
 transferred from one person to another, and from him to a third, 
 a fourth, a fifth, a sixth, before they came into the hands of the 
 consumer. In woollen manufactures this was unavoidable ; the 
 wool was purchased by one set of manufacturers ; the yarn by 
 another ; the cloth, before it was' dyed, by a third ; then it was 
 sold to the merchant ; by him, to the retailer ; and by the 
 retailer to his customers for use; and thus the tax proposed 
 would amount to six or seven tenths of the full value of the 
 
 Bentivoglio, p. 82. 
 
1 82 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book X* 
 
 commodity. Several consequences, fatal to the prosperity of the 
 people, would ensue. Foreigners would no longer purchase their 
 manufactures, because they could not sell them at the usual 
 prices. The manufacturers and merchants would fly from a 
 country where they were so grievously oppressed ; and the 
 Flemings would be obliged to have recourse to foreign nations 
 for those commodities with which foreigners had hitherto been 
 supplied by them. Thus the sources of their wealth would in a 
 little time be dried up ; and, as they would not have any manu- 
 factures of their own, so they could not long possess the means 
 of purchasing them from others. To these reasons they added 
 another, taken from the great expense and difficulty with which 
 the collection of the tax proposed must be attended. A multi- 
 tude of tax-gatherers must be employed ; the people would still 
 find it practicable, in numberless cases, to elude the tax ; and 
 the tranquillity of the provinces would be continually disturbed 
 with altercations and disputes. 
 
 In answer to this remonstrance, Alva, with much ignorance 
 and haughtiness, replied, that nothing could convince him that 
 the taxes required would be so oppressive as had been repre- 
 sented ; since it was evident, that lie demanded only one part of 
 ten for the King, and left the remaining parts to the people. 
 That in his town of Alva in Spain, the tax of the tenth penny 
 was actually paid, and yielded him a yearly rent of between forty 
 and fifty thousand ducats. That if such a revenue as he expected 
 should arise from it in the Netherlands, he would deliver the peo- 
 ple from all their other taxes. That he had often heard the late 
 Emperor complain of the difficulty of procuring money from his 
 subjects in the Low Countries ; and that in order to obtain it, he 
 had been constrained to grant them privileges greatly prejudicial 
 to his authority. But at present there was no room for remon- 
 strances . Great arrears were due to his troops ; several new forts 
 must be built without delay for the security of the country ; 
 money for these purposes must be immediately procured, and he 
 could not devise any more effectual means of raising it, than the 
 taxes which were proposed *. 
 
 Such was the governor’s reply to the assembly of the States ; 
 but being sensible of the difficulties which attended his plan, he 
 laid it before the council, and desired the counsellors to consider 
 of the most effectual method of carrying it into execution. There 
 were some of them, who, in order to ingratiate themselves with 
 the duke, exhorted him to persist in his design. And these men 
 advised him to endeavour first to gain over such of the provinces 
 as had distinguished themselves by their loyalty ; saying, that 
 their example would soon be followed by the other provinces, who 
 would dread incurring the imputation of disaffection. 
 
 1 Metcren, p. 89. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 183 
 
 1569.] 
 
 But most of the counsellors were of a contrary opinion, and 
 particularly the president Yiglius ; a minister of long experience 
 in the Netherlands, and of undoubted fidelity to the King. “ The 
 objections,” said he, 44 which had been urged against the taxes 
 were unanswerable ; for there was the widest difference between 
 the kingdom of Spain, and the Low Country provinces. The 
 wealth of Spain consisted in the great extent of its territory and 
 the fertility of its soil. It was divided from other kingdoms, 
 either by inaccessible mountains, or by the ocean. It was com- 
 plete within itself, and independent of any connexion with other 
 countries. Whereas the Netherlands were of such small extent, as 
 to be utterly insufficient to support the inhabitants. They were 
 situated in the heart of Europe, and had so many different nations 
 bordering upon them, that, if trade were discouraged or oppressed, 
 the manufacturers and merchants could easily, and would certainly, 
 transplant themselves, together .with their arts, to the countries 
 which lay around them. This consequence was to be dreaded 
 from much less burdensome impositions than those that were pro- 
 posed ; which were such as had never taken place in any com- 
 mercial state, and to which, he was confident, the people of the 
 Low Countries would never be persuaded to submit. I speak 
 thus (continued he), prompted by a concern for the interest of 
 the King, as well as by a regard to the prosperity of the Nether- 
 lands ; for there is the greatest reason to apprehend, that if the 
 governor shall not depart from his resolution, trade will soon be 
 redue-ed so low, that the people will be disabled from furnishing 
 the supplies requisite for the purposes of government 8 .” 
 
 This speech of Yiglius served rather to incense the duke of 
 Alva than to convince him. Without regarding either the dig- 
 nity of the speaker, or the strength of his arguments, he voucK 
 safed to make no other answer, but that, long before this time he 
 had resolved upon the taxes in dispute, and had communicated 
 his resolution to the counts Barlaimont and Noircharmes, before 
 he came into the Low Countries. His purpose was unalterably 
 fixed, and those who were friends to the King must, without any 
 further altercation, exert their endeavours to bring the States to 
 a compliance with his will. 
 
 When the States found that the governor was equally deaf to 
 the remonstrances of the president as he had been to theirs, they 
 began to dread the effects of his displeasure ; and in order to 
 soothe his resentment, they gave their consent to the tax of the 
 hundredth penny; entreating him, at the same time, to pass from 
 the other taxes, and representing again, in the strongest terms, 
 the ruinous consequences which would attend them. But he was 
 still as inexorable as ever ; although he condescended on this 
 occasion to make a trial of some softer expedients, before he 
 
 * Meursii Albanus, p. 35. Bentivoglio, p. 83. 
 
184 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF (.Book X. 
 
 should have recourse to those of a more violent nature, which, in 
 case of necessity, he was determined to employ. 
 
 In the beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and 
 1570. sixty-eight, Philip, with the advice of the inquisitors at 
 Act of in- Madrid, had pronounced a general sentence against his 
 demmty. subjects in the Netherlands, finding them obnoxious to 
 justice, and depriving them of their fortunes, rights, and privi- 
 leges. By this extraordinary sentence, which, from the nature of 
 it, was incapable of being executed, he had kept this unhappy 
 people in perpetual anxiety ; but at last, believing their spirits to 
 be thoroughly subdued, and dreading the utter desolation of the 
 provinces, he had resolved to publish a general indemnity ; and 
 some months before the present period, had transmitted it to the 
 duke of Alva, together with a confirmation of it by the Pope. 
 The duke thought that he could not publish this indemnity at a 
 more seasonable juncture ; and he flattered himself that it would 
 serve to conciliate the favour of the people, and make it easier 
 for him to overcome their aversion to the taxes. It was first 
 made public in the city of Antwerp ; where the governor, seated 
 on a lofty throne, surrounded with a degree of pomp which no 
 former governor had assumed, ordered it to be read in the pre- 
 sence of a prodigious concourse of people, who had come from all 
 quarters to hear it, full of the most anxious expectation. It was 
 afterwards printed and dispersed over all the provinces. But it 
 was extremely ill calculated to promote the purpose designed ; 
 and was clogged with such a number of exceptions, as tended 
 rather to awaken the fears of the people, than to allay or remove 
 them. 
 
 From the benefit of it were excluded, not only all the preachers 
 of the reformed religion, but likewise all those who had ever lodged 
 or entertained them in their houses ; all who had been concerned 
 in breaking the images, or in violating the monasteries and 
 churches ; all who had subscribed the compromise, the petition 
 of the nobles, or any other such bond of association ; and, lastly, 
 all those who had given assistance, or shown favour, by word, 
 deed, or writing, to the enemies of the King. Such were the 
 exceptions that regarded individuals ; and with respect to cities 
 and communities, it was declared, that if any of them should be 
 found to have been accessory to the late disorders, on the pre- 
 tence of maintaining their privileges, the King reserved to him- 
 self the power of punishing or forgiving them, as he should judge 
 expedient. 
 
 It is not surprising that an act of indemnity such as this 
 should have failed to produce any salutary effect. Per- 
 cdvetT" sons ^iiks were highly offended with that open 
 
 declaration which it contained, that they had forfeited 
 their privileges. There were many who, although they them- 
 selves had ever been zealously attached to the Catholic religion, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 185 
 
 1570.] 
 
 were connected by the most endearing ties with those who had 
 forsaken it. Prompted by natural affection, gratitude, or hu- 
 manity, they had done offices of kindness to their friends and 
 neighbours, for which they were now made equally liable to 
 punishment, as if they had been guilty of the most enormous 
 crimes. Their minds therefore were thrown into a greater fer- 
 ment than ever ; and they were disposed to regard the pardon 
 which had been proclaimed, rather as an insult added to the 
 injuries which they had received, than as an act of clemency and 
 mercy h . 
 
 The duke of Alva considered it in a light extremely different, 
 and soon afterwards resolved to make trial, whether it had pro- 
 duced the desired effect. With this view he ordered the several 
 governors to inform the States of their respective provinces, that 
 the situation of his affairs required an immediate and large supply, 
 and that they must proceed to the raising of the tax of the tenth 
 penny, without any further remonstrance or delay. With the 
 different provinces, however, he thought proper to employ very 
 different means of persuasion. As the inhabitants of Namur, 
 Artois, and Hainault, had, from the beginning, been extremely 
 submissive to his will, he desired the counts Barlaimont and 
 Noircharmes, to acquaint them, that he wished to obtain their 
 consent to the tax, more for an example of obedience to the other 
 provinces, than from any intention to levy it upon them : who had 
 deserved so well of him by their fidelity. But he delivered his 
 orders in a much more peremptory tone to the other provinces. 
 He would take care, he said, in levying the tax, to prevent the 
 consequences which they apprehended might arise from it ; and 
 would abolish it, if he found it hurtful to their trade. In the 
 mean time it was the will of the King that it should be imposed. 
 The King had invested him with power to exact it ; and he was 
 unalterably determined to employ that power for the purpose for 
 which it had been conferred. He concluded with reminding them 
 of the guilt which they contracted during the late commotions ; 
 and bade them esteem it a happiness that they were now allowed 
 to atone for their folly, by giving a part of their substance, when 
 the King might in justice have seized the whole. 
 
 By these promises and threats an assent was at last extorted ; 
 The General but it was given upon two conditions, that all the 
 States inti- provinces, without exception, should agree to the taxes ; 
 midated. an d the governor should, according to his promise, 
 moderate them in such a manner, that no prejudice could arise 
 from them to the trade or manufactures of the Netherlands. 
 The only provinces which rejected these conditions were those 
 of Utrecht and Brabant. And the former of these discovered, 
 in the progress of this affair, a firmness and intrepidity that 
 deserve to be recorded. 
 
 h Meterin, p. 84. Bentivoglio, p. 85. 
 
186 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Boox X. 
 
 Soon after the governor’s orders were communicated to the 
 The resolute States of Utrecht, they sent ambassadors to represent, 
 conduct of that having taken his demand under their most serious 
 the States of consideration, they were unable to conceive how it 
 Utrecht. cou i f i possibly be granted. The territory of Utrecht, 
 they said, was small ; the inland parts of it were barren, and 
 the other parts were preserved from the fury of the waters at 
 an immense expense. Although they had but lately become 
 subject to the house of Austria, yet, in order to raise the 
 tributes imposed upon them by the late emperor and the present 
 King, they had been obliged to contract a very large debt, 
 which they had never been able to repay. During the late 
 disturbances, they had suffered more than the other provinces ; 
 their city had been forsaken by its most industrious inhabitants, 
 and their trade, which was never great, almost annihilated. But 
 as they knew the necessity of the governor’s affairs, and were 
 sensible how much they had been indebted to him for restoring 
 tranquillity to the Netherlands, they were willing to assist him 
 to the utmost extent of their ability, and would engage to pay 
 him yearly a hundred thousand florins for six years ; provided 
 they were freed from all other burdens during that time. 
 
 This offer the governor rejected with scorn and indignation. 
 The States then sent another embassy to inform him, that they 
 had considered fully of what they could afford ; they had flattered 
 themselves that their offer would have met with a favourable 
 acceptance ; they were conscious of having given the strongest 
 proof of an inclination to comply with his desire ; but, whatever 
 should be the consequence, they must now declare, that it was 
 beyond their power to offer more. And in this declaration, the 
 presidents of the five churches concurred ; protesting, that they 
 could not agree to the taxes proposed, without incurring the 
 censure of excommunication, which was denounced in the Pope’s 
 bull \ in ccena Domini , not only against those who imposed taxes 
 on the revenues of the church, but against those likewise who 
 submitted to them. But the governor paid no greater regard 
 to this protestation of the ecclesiastics, than to the remonstrances 
 of the States. It provoked him exceedingly, to meet with such 
 obstinate resistance from so inconsiderable a province as Utrecht. 
 He had threatened to employ force, and he now resolved to put 
 his threat in execution. 
 
 He began with sending to the city of U trecht a regiment of 
 infantry, consisting of two thousand four hundred men; who, 
 besides, exacting the same number of florins a week for their 
 pay, lived at free quarters in the houses of the inhabitants, and, 
 knowing the governor’s design in placing them there, indulged 
 themselves in every species of outrage. He summoned the magis- 
 
 ' Published by Pius V. anno 1568. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 187 
 
 1570.] 
 
 trates cf the city, and the states of the province, to appear before 
 the Council of Tumults, to answer for their conduct in the year 
 one thousand five hundred and fifty-six, when they ceded to the 
 Protestants one of the churches of the city for their religious 
 assemblies. It did not avail them to allege in their defence, 
 that only a few individuals were concerned in this deed; that 
 these few had acted with the best intention towards the King 
 and the Catholic religion, and had made that concession, of 
 which the whole city was now accused, in order to prevent the 
 most unhappy consequences, which would otherwise have arisen 
 from the intemperate zeal of the reformers. These defences 
 made no impression on the duke, or on the council. And 
 sentence was passed with very little hesitation, at the same 
 time, against the ecclesiastics, the nobles, and the several cities 
 of the province. The ecclesiastics were deprived of their right 
 of voting in the assembly of the States ; the nobles were stripped 
 of all their honours and immunities ; the cities of Utrecht, 
 Amersfort, Wyck, and Rhenen, were declared to have forfeited 
 their privileges; and, as Utrecht was supposed to have been 
 more particularly guilty, it was enacted, that all the territory 
 and revenues belonging to the city and corporations should be 
 confiscated. 
 
 The States were so far intimidated by this iniquitous sentence, 
 and their patience so much exhausted by the oppressive rapacity 
 of the soldiers, that they were induced to raise the offer which 
 they had made of one hundred thousand florins, to one hundred 
 and eighty thousand. But neither what they had already suffered, 
 nor what they dreaded from the governor’s resentment, could 
 induce them to yield their consent to the taxes of the tenth and 
 twentieth penny. 
 
 This resolute conduct of the people of Utrecht was attended 
 with the most important consequences. It annulled the obliga- 
 tion under which the other States had come, when they consented 
 to the taxes, on condition that all the provinces should concur ; 
 and it confirmed the people in their resolution strenuously to 
 oppose the levying of the taxes. 
 
 The governor was aware how difficult it would have been, in 
 their present temper, to carry his plan into immediate execution; 
 and although it does not appear that he ever entertained the 
 remotest thoughts of dropping it, yet, as his occasions for money 
 were extremely pressing, he called an assembly of the States to 
 Brussels, and demanded, that, besides the hundredth penny, to 
 which they had formerly consented k , they should, in place of the 
 other taxes, pay two millions of guilders yearly, for six years. 
 The States endeavoured to make him sensible of the exorbitancy 
 of his demand, but in vain. He gave them a month to consider 
 
 k This amounted to 4.000,000 guilders. 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 188 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 of it, and at last, from their dread of his tyranny, they agreed to 
 his request. 
 
 The prince of Orange was not an unconcerned spectator of 
 Conduct of these transactions. He had gone, as was mentioned 
 the prince of before, at the end of the year one thousand five hun- 
 Orangc. dred and sixty-eight, to join the Protestants in France. 
 He was present, and had a considerable share in the several 
 actions which passed between the Calvinists and Catholics, at 
 La Charite, Roch-la-ville, and Poictiers. But being too deeply 
 interested in the affairs of the Netherlands to remain long at so 
 great a distance from them, he had left his brother, Count Lewis, 
 to command the German forces in France ; and having returned 
 in September, one thousand five hundred and sixty-nine, to his 
 county of Nassau, in Germany, he had been employed for some 
 time in making preparations for trying his fortune once more 
 against the Spaniards. 
 
 In Germany, he received particular intelligence of everything 
 that had happened in the Low Countries since his departure. 
 He was informed how much the duke of Alva had increased the 
 hatred which the people entertained against his person and 
 government. He received the strongest assurances of their 
 disposition to revolt ; and was solicited by the Catholics, as well 
 as Protestants, by those who still remained in the country, as 
 well as those who had been forced to leave it, to take up arms 
 in their defence. But he had not forgotten the cause of the 
 failure of his first attempt ; and he resolved not to begin any 
 military operations, nor even to levy forces, till he should be 
 better provided than formerly with the means of their support. 
 
 Soon after Alva’s arrival in the Netherlands, many of those 
 Ti e exiles w ^° country on account of the persecutions, 
 
 at sea ac- had united together, and fitted out a great number of 
 knowledge armed vessels, with which they seized all the Spanish ships 
 could meet on the Flemish or English coast, 
 nturers had lately, through the violence of 
 Alva’s administration, received a great increase of number; and 
 had been joined by many persons of rank, who had acquired an 
 ascendant over them. They were all strongly attached to the 
 prince of Orange, from whose wisdom alone they had any hopes 
 of being restored to their native country ; and they desired 
 nothing so much as that he would undertake the direction of their 
 affairs. They agreed, therefore, as soon as it was proposed by 
 their leaders, to receive commissions from him, and to pay a fifth 
 part of the value of all their prizes to certain officers, to be 
 appointed by him to receive it. 
 
 As their fleet was greatly superior to any which the duko of 
 Alva possessed, they did incredible mischief to the Spanish, and 
 sometimes too to the Flemish merchants ; and if their prizes had 
 been sold to advantage, the proportion which thoy allowed 
 
 Ins autho- 
 rity. 
 
 which they 
 These adve 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 J89 
 
 1570.] 
 
 to the prince of Orange would have amounted to a considerable 
 sum. 
 
 William had recourse, at the same time, to another method of 
 intrigues of improving his finances. He empowered some of the 
 the prince inferior nobility to grant commissions, in his name, to 
 of Orange. ^he p ro testant preachers, who went throughout the 
 provinces in disguise, and procured contributions from all those 
 who were disaffected either to the Catholic religion or the Spa- 
 nish government. These men not only knew better to whom it 
 was proper to apply, but by their piety and eloquence, they had 
 greater influence over the people, than any other persons whom 
 the prince could have employed. By their means too he acquired 
 a thorough knowledge of the disposition of the people, and formed 
 a correspondence with many of the principal inhabitants, which 
 contributed not a little to advance his views. These transactions 
 were carried on chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the 
 reformed religion had made greater progress than in the southern 
 provinces ; and where, from the nature and situation of the 
 country, intersected by navigable rivers, canals, and branches of 
 the sea, the people dreaded less, and were in reality less exposed 
 to, the power of the Spaniards. It was in these provinces, 
 formed both by nature and art to be the seat of liberty, that the 
 prince of Orange had wisely resolved to make his first attempt to 
 gain a footing in the Netherlands. And, accordingly, intrigues 
 were formed, and plans concerted, between his agents and some 
 of the principal inhabitants, for delivering the maritime towns 
 into the hands of the Protestant exiles. Attempts were made to 
 get possession of Enchuysen, and other cities in North Holland ; 
 but, from different causes, they proved abortive at this time, and 
 were laid aside till fortune should be more propitious. The per- 
 sons concerned in them had little reason, it may be thought, to 
 flatter themselves with the hopes of secrecy ; yet so universally 
 odious was the Spanish government become to the Catholics as 
 well as the reformers, that none, even of those by whose means 
 the plots of the Orange party were defeated, could resolve to give 
 information of them to the governor. They were averse from 
 gratifying a man whom they had so much reason to detest ; and 
 abhorred the thoughts of that cruelty, which they knew would, 
 in case of a discovery, be exercised against the guilty. 
 
 The duke of Alva, therefore, remained entirely ignorant of all 
 Surprise of that passed ; nor does it appear that he entertained the 
 the fort of least suspicion of the machinations of his enemies, till 
 Louvestem. £] ie £ a ki n g 0 f the f or t 0 f Louvestein. This fort stands 
 in the island called Bommel, which is formed by the Maese and 
 the Waal; and, though weakly fortified, was of great importance 
 on account of its situation. It was taken by surprise at this time, 
 by Herman de Ryter, a native of Bois-le-Duc, who wished to 
 signalize himself by some gallant exploit in the service of the 
 
190 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 prince of Orange. He had carried with him no more than fifty ' 
 men, and with this small number he hoped to be able to defend 
 the fort till his associates should arrive, but unfortunately they 
 were prevented from advancing by some unforeseen accident ; 
 and in the mean time the fort was invested by a superior force, 
 which had been sent from Bois-le-Duc, by Roderigo de Toledo. 
 The besieged defended themselves long with the most obstinate 
 valour ; but they were at last overpowered by numbers, and De 
 It y ter himself was slain 1 . 
 
 The duke of Alva was greatly alarmed by this event. He 
 indignation considered the cause more than the effect, and appre- 
 of the duke hended that this first enterprise of his enemies, which 
 of Alva. had been so easily frustrated, would ere long be followed 
 by other attempts in different parts of the provinces. It excited 
 in his fiery temper a degree of rage and indignation equal to his 
 anxiety. And his resentment was inflamed by the opposition 
 which the people had made to his raising the tax of the hundredth 
 penny ; especially in the maritime provinces, where he had never 
 been able either to levy that tax, or their proportion of the two 
 millions of guilders, which the General States had consented to 
 pay him yearly. This opposition might have opened his eyes, 
 and shown him the necessity of embracing milder expedients than 
 he had hitherto employed ; but, instead of this, it served only to 
 fix him in his first purpose of having recourse to open force and 
 violence. And he was resolved, whatever should be the conse- 
 quences, to compel the people to submit, not only to the tax of 
 the hundredth penny, to which the States had given their con- 
 sent, but likewise to that of the tenth and twentieth, to which 
 they had refused it m . To give a colour to his conduct, he asserted 
 in the council, that the States had consented to the two latter 
 taxes as well as the former. Yiglius, and some others of the 
 counsellors, reminded him, that the consent obtained had been 
 granted upon a condition which did not yet subsist. But Alva 
 was not in a temper of mind, at this time, in which he could 
 either listen to the truth, or bear with contradiction. They were 
 no better than rebels, he said, who durst affirm, that the States 
 had not consented. The King’s honour, as well as his interest, 
 required, that the taxes should be levied without delay ; and he 
 would suffer himself to be cut in pieces rather than allow the 
 States to break the promise which they had given him. 
 
 He accordingly issued an edict, requiring all the inhabitants 
 His edict °f the Low Countries to make immediate payment of 
 requiring the tenth and twentieth, as well as of the hundredth 
 payment of penny, to the officers appointed to receive them. But 
 the taxes. ag j 10 p rom i sec [ to moderate the two former taxes 
 in such a manner as to prevent the pernicious consequences that 
 
 1 Metercn, p. 86. Bentivoglio, p. 87. 
 
 Bentivoglio, p. 87. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 191 
 
 1571.] 
 
 were apprehended, an immunity from the tenth penny was granted 
 to foreign merchants, on the first sale of goods imported ; and 
 they were permitted to export them again, without paying this 
 tax, provided the goods had not been transferred from one person 
 to another during their continuance in the country. The same 
 immunity was likewise granted on the first sale of cattle, corn, 
 and fruits, the produce of the Netherlands. 
 
 These immunities, which the governor considered as proofs on 
 The conse- his part of the greatest condescension, had no effect 
 quences of towards reconciling the people to the taxes, which they 
 this measure. Relieved would, notwithstanding these concessions, be 
 attended with the ruin of their commerce and manufactures. 
 Their aversion to them, and their resolution to oppose the levying 
 of them, were as strong as ever. In many towns the people 
 began, almost as soon as the edict was published, to feel a 
 scarcity of the common necessaries of life. Provisions were not 
 brought to market,, nor did the merchants expose their goods to 
 sale as formerly 11 . These inconveniences were felt in no place 
 more than in Brussels, where the governor resided. There was 
 an entire stagnation in that city of every species of commercial 
 intercourse. Neither food nor drink could be purchased in it. 
 The shops and workhouses were shut up. The lower sort of people 
 were reduced to despair ; and the whole city was overwhelmed 
 with grief and consternation. 
 
 In this situation, Alva formed the barbarous resolution of 
 His barba- putting to death, before their own houses, seventeen of 
 rit y- the principal inhabitants. His soldiers were under 
 arms ; the gibbets, the ropes, and the executioners, were prepared, 
 when happily, only a few hours before the time fixed for the 
 execution, a messenger arrived with information that the exiles 
 had made a descent on the island of V orn, and got possession of 
 the Brille. 
 
 Alva, thunderstruck with this intelligence, recalled his bloody 
 The Brille orders ; and resolved, though with much reluctance, to 
 taken by suspend for a time the levying of the taxes. He was 
 the exiles. d ee piy sensible of the advantages which the exiles might 
 derive from their acquisition of a place, which, on account of its 
 situation at the mouth of a great river, and in the neighbourhood 
 of many important cities, had always been considered as one of 
 the chief keys of the Netherlands. He knew likewise how 
 extremely disaffected the people in the maritime provinces were 
 to his person and government ; and he dreaded that other places 
 would follow the example of the Brille, and open their gates to 
 the enemy. 
 
 He had the greater reason to be uneasy at this event, as he 
 had not exerted himself with proper vigour to prevent it. He 
 had neglected to form a naval force sufficient to contend with the 
 
 r - Bentivoglio, p. 87. 
 
192 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 exiles ; and had thereby not only suffered the trade of the 
 Netherlands to be ruined, but had left his government almost 
 defenceless on that side, where, from the nature of the power 
 which the Protestant exiles possessed, it was in the greatest 
 danger of being attacked. He had not even put garrisons into 
 the cities that were most exposed ; but, at the very time when 
 the exiles were hovering on the coast, kept a numerous body of 
 troops quartered in Utrecht ; which, if they had been distributed 
 among the sea-coast towns, might have baffled all the attempts 
 of the enemy. Of this supine negligence, in a person of so great 
 vigour and abilities as Alva, no account can be given, but the 
 extreme contempt in which he held the Protestant exiles ; whom 
 he considered as fit only to exercise piracy upon merchant ships, 
 but utterly incapable of conducting any important enterprise. 
 
 But although he had not taken the necessary precaution to 
 secure himself against their attempts, he had not been altogether 
 inattentive to their motions. He had complained to the queen 
 of England, of her permitting them to sell openly, in her do- 
 minions, the goods of which they had robbed the subjects of the 
 king his master. This was in effect giving assistance, he said, to 
 the king’s rebellious subjects, and was a violation of the treaties 
 which subsisted between the Spanish and English crowns. Eliza- 
 beth was secretly a friend to the Flemish exiles ; and she had 
 little reason, and as little inclination, to gratify the desires of 
 Philip, or the duke of Alva. She knew that, for some time past, 
 they had maintained a correspondence with her Catholic subjects, 
 and had used their endeavours to disturb her government. But 
 she did not judge it proper at this time to come to an open 
 rupture with Philip. She therefore complied with Alva’s request ; 
 ordered all ships belonging to such of the inhabitants of the Low 
 Countries, as had withdrawn their allegiance from the king of 
 Spain, to leave her harbours ; and forbade her subjects to furnish 
 them with shelter or provisions. 
 
 This unlooked-for compliance of Elizabeth, which was matter 
 of great triumph to the duke of Alva, and of equal mortification 
 to the exiles, was attended, in the issue, with consequences very 
 different from those which were expected. It reduced the exiles 
 to despair ; and as they were now thrown off by the only foreign 
 power from which they had received protection, they resolved, if 
 possible, to acquire possession of some place of strength in their 
 native country. Having with this view assembled at Dover, 
 they set sail with twenty-five ships, under William de Lumey, 
 count de la Marck, who held the chief command among them, 
 by commission from the prince of Orange. In their voyage they 
 had the good fortune to meet with two Spanish vessels richly 
 laden, which was no small consolation to them in their present 
 forlorn situation. They intended to have made an attempt upon 
 Enchuysen, in North Holland ; but the wind being contrary, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 193 
 
 1572.] 
 
 they were obliged to put into the Maese, where they cast anchor 
 before the town of Bribe, on the first of April, one thousand five 
 hundred and seventy-two. The count de la Marck immediately 
 landed his troops, and sent a messenger to summon the inhabit- 
 ants, in the name of the prince of Orange, to surrender. But 
 as they hesitated for some time what answer they should return, 
 he began to suspect that they were preparing to make resistance, 
 and therefore ordered the gates on the north side to be burnt 
 down. This was done accordingly ; and he entered, and took 
 possession of the town without opposition, at the head of only 
 two hundred and fifty men. 
 
 So accidental and so easily accomplished was the first event of 
 that war, which rendered the Netherlands a scene of horror and 
 devastation for more than thirty years ; but which, whilst it 
 proved the source, on many occasions, of extreme distress to the 
 people, called forth an exertion of virtue, spirit, and intrepidity, 
 which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Never was there 
 a more unequal contest than this which was now begun between 
 the inhabitants of the Low Countries and the Spanish monarch ; 
 and never was the issue of any dispute more contrary to wKat 
 the parties had reason to expect. On the one side, a people, 
 consisting chiefly of manufacturers and merchants, inhabiting a 
 country of small extent, and already much exhausted by a long- 
 continued exercise of tyranny and oppression ; on the other, the 
 richest monarch of the age, who was master of the most numerous 
 and best-disciplined forces, commanded by generals distinguished 
 above their cotemporaries by their consummate skill in the art 
 of war. Nothing but despair could have made the people of the 
 Low Countries enter the lists with an adversary so much superior 
 to them. And it could hardly be supposed that they would not 
 be quickly overwhelmed. But from the sequel it will appear, 
 how rash it is to conclude with confidence, that because an event 
 is improbable, therefore it will not happen. 
 
 On the next day after the Protestants had made themselves 
 masters of the Bribe, they began to convey their booty on board 
 their ships, with the design of proceeding on their voyage to 
 West Friesland ; but one of their number, a native of the place 0 , 
 having represented that they could not reasonably expect to find 
 a more commodious settlement elsewhere, the count de la Marck, 
 and all the rest, entered readily into his opinion ; and they 
 resolved without delay to fortify the town with the cannon be- 
 longing to the fleet. 
 
 They had just time to put themselves into a posture of defence, 
 Fruitless when the count de Bossut p , to whom the duke of Alva 
 attempt to had given orders to attack them, arrived in the island 
 Briiie r the a bod y Spanish troops, collected from Utrecht 
 
 and other places in the neighbourhood. The count de 
 
 0 Treslong. 
 
 p Governor of Holland. 
 
194 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book X. 
 
 la Marck, whose forces were much inferior in number to the 
 enemy, remained within the town, with a resolution to defend it 
 to the last. The Spaniards advanced to the walls, and began to 
 batter them with their artillery ; when one of the townsmen 
 leaped into a canal, and swimming a little way till he came to a 
 sluice, which Bossut had neglected to secure, he broke it down, 
 and let in such a quantity of water, that, in a few hours, a great 
 part of the country was overflowed. This did not deter Bossut 
 from the prosecution of his enterprise ; although it obliged him 
 to remove his forces to the south side of the town, where the 
 ground which led to the principal gate was still uncovered by the 
 water. La Marck had planted there his heaviest cannon ; and 
 the Spaniards had little prospect of being able to carry their 
 point soon. In the mean time, two of the boldest leaders of the 
 exiles sallied out with a part of the soldiers from the opposite 
 gate, and marching along the dykes to the place where Bossut 
 had left his ships, they burnt some of them, sunk others, set the 
 rest adrift, and then returned safe to the city. When the 
 Spaniards were advertised of this disaster, and perceived the 
 water round them rising higher and higher, they were struck 
 with a sudden panic, and betook themselves with the utmost 
 precipitation to the shore. Most of them made their escape to 
 the opposite coast in some vessels, which the enemy had not 
 time either to let loose or destroy ; and others by swimming, till 
 they reached the ships that had been set adrift ; while a con- 
 siderable number was swallowed up in the mud and water. Had * 
 they been pursued by the enemy, they must all have perished. 
 But la Marck, who was doubtful of the affections of the citizens, 
 thought it dangerous to quit the town, lest they should shut the 
 gates, and turn his own artillery against him. 
 
 From this success, the Protestants derived an increase both of 
 strength and courage. The citizens declared openly in their 
 favour, and they were immediately joined by numbers who flocked 
 to them from all parts of the island. The names of the inha- 
 bitants were registered ; and they all swore allegiance to the 
 prince of Orange, as the only legal governor of Holland ; 
 engaging to defend the town and island in his name, and that of 
 the King, against the duke of Alva and the Spaniards' 1 . 
 
 Their example quickly diffused the spirit by which they were 
 actuated, and served as a signal of revolt to other places. Of 
 
 <1 This first victory of the Protestants was sullied by that savage ferocity, of which there 
 are many instances in the present war. The monks, knowing how obnoxious they were 
 to the conquerors, endeavoured to make their escape from the island ; but they were 
 seized in their flight, treated in the most cruel and contumelious manner, and afterwards 
 put to death. The exiles were too much inflamed by the barbarous treatment which they 
 themselves had received, to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, or to listen 
 either to the dictates of humanity, or of that religion, for which they professed such ardent 
 zeal. Having been treated as wild beasts by their enemies, they had now become such, 
 and tore in pieces everything that fell in their way. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 195 
 
 1572.] 
 
 this the count De Bossut soon received a convincing proof. 
 Having with great difficulty passed over from Vorn to Beyerland, 
 he led his troops towards Dort, where he intended to refresh 
 them after the fatigue which they had undergone. But the 
 inhabitants having heard of his repulse at Brille, and dreading 
 that he might compel them to pay the taxes, they resolved, what- 
 ever should be the consequence, to refuse him admittance into 
 the city. As he was not in a condition to employ force, he 
 marched directly to Rotterdam. 
 
 There too he found the people equally averse to the admission 
 Bossut’s the Spaniards ; but after assuring the magistrates 
 
 massacre of that he meant only to lead them through the town, 
 the people of anc [ no t to lodge them in it, he persuaded them to 
 Rotterdam. su ff er the several companies to pass through it, one by 
 one. The magistrates had reason quickly to repent of this con- 
 cession. No sooner had the first company entered the city, than 
 Bossut, without regard to his engagement, ordered them to keep 
 the gates open, till the other companies should arrive. The 
 citizens reproached him with his treachery, and attempted to shut 
 the gates by force. He had hitherto been held in esteem for his 
 moderation ; but being chagrined, on this occasion, by the mis- 
 carriage of his attempt against the Protestants at Brille, and 
 incensed by the affront which had been offered him, first by the 
 people of Dort, and since by those of Rotterdam, he resolved to 
 wreak his vengeance upon the latter, and showed his soldiers 
 what he wished them to do, by killing with his own hand one of 
 the citizens, who was endeavouring to shut the gate. His troops, 
 eager to follow his example, drew their swords, attacked the city- 
 guards, slew' some of them, and drove the rest out of the city ; 
 then giving a loose to their fury, they spread themselves over 
 the town, and butchered more than three hundred of the inha- 
 bitants 1 '. 
 
 This shocking deed was no less impolitic, than it was savage 
 and barbarous ; and added fuel to that flame which Bossut, as 
 governor of the province, ought to have been at the utmost pains 
 to extinguish. It required but little discernment to perceive 
 the necessity of employing the mildest expedients with the mari- 
 time provinces. There were no citadels or Spanish garrisons in 
 the towns of these provinces. The soldiers who had been quar- 
 tered in them, had been drawn off at different times, for the 
 punishment of the people of Utrecht. The situation of most of 
 the towns, surrounded by the sea, or by the rivers and canals, 
 rendered it extremely difficult to besiege them ; and the Pro- 
 testants, who could have easy access by water to every part of 
 the country, were greatly superior to the Spaniards in naval 
 force. The people were not ignorant of these advantages ; and 
 
 r Meursii Auriacus, p. 75. Bentivoglio, p. 91. 
 
196 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book X. 
 
 they resolved to avail themselves of them on the present occasion. 
 The massacre at Rotterdam made them regard Bossut and the 
 Spaniards with horror ; and even those who wished to maintain 
 their allegiance to the king of Spain, were determined to guard 
 against the entrance of his troops within their walls, with the 
 same vigilance which they would have employed against an 
 open foe. 
 
 This spirit appeared first at Flushing ; which, on account of 
 Revolt of its situation near the mouth of the Scheld, has long 
 Flushing, been reckoned one of the most important towns in the 
 Netherlands. Among the last instructions which the Emperor 
 delivered to his son, when he resigned his dominions, he advised 
 him to make this place an object of his particular care, and to 
 spare no expense to secure it against the attempts of his enemies. 
 Alva had not bestowed that attention on it, which a place of so 
 much consequence deserved. He had weakened the garrison, 
 by ordering all of them but eighty Walloon soldiers to take up 
 their quarters in Utrecht. The loss of the Brille, which was 
 owing to the same cause, had made him sensible of his error. He 
 now therefore resolved to finish a citadel at Flushing, of which 
 he had laid the foundation some time before ; and with this view 
 he ordered eight companies of Spaniards to go there, under the 
 command of an experienced officer. The citizens beheld the 
 chains which were thus forging for them, with deep concern. 
 They dreaded the consequences which might arise to their trade. 
 They were not entirely free from apprehensions of being treated 
 in the same manner as the people of Utrecht and Rotterdam. 
 They doubted not that, sooner or later, the garrison, which was 
 about to be stationed in the town, would be employed to compel 
 them to make payment of the taxes ; and they were emboldened 
 by the success of the Protestants in the isleofVorn. While 
 their minds were in this agitation, there arrived among them 
 some partisans of the prince of Orange, who had come on pur- 
 pose to exhort them to assert their liberty. Instigated by these 
 men, the populace ran to arm, sand obliged the feeble remains of 
 the garrison to quit the city. 
 
 On the next day, the Spanish forces arrived in the harbour. 
 The people were assembled in the streets, and upon the walls ; 
 and were still in some measure unresolved as to their future 
 conduct. The Protestants, and other friends of the prince of 
 Orange, remonstrated to them on the absurdity of hesitating, 
 after they had begun hostilities. “ By expelling the garrison, 1 ’ 
 cried one of them, “ you have already done what the Spaniards 
 will undoubtedly interpret to be high treason against the King. 
 Consider well to whose mercy you expose yourselves. Remember 
 the fate of the counts Horn and Egmont, and consider whether 
 either your merit or your innocence has equalled theirs.” The 
 Protestants employed another method to impress the minds of 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 197 
 
 1572.] 
 
 the vulgar. They caused proclamation to be made by sound of 
 trumpet, that the Spanish garrison was at hand, and that all the 
 citizens must hold their effects, their wives and daughters, in 
 readiness for their use s . 
 
 When men are balancing between contrary resolutions, the 
 smallest weight is sufficient sometimes to turn the scale. A man 
 in liquor, who had mingled with the crowd, offered for a small 
 reward to fire one of the great guns upon the Spaniards ; and he 
 did it accordingly, on receiving three guilders from one of the 
 Protestants who stood near him. From that instant the people 
 were fixed in their purpose. The Spaniards, astonished at their 
 reception, and utterly unprepared to employ force, let slip their 
 cables, and sailed for Middleburg. 
 
 In that city resided Anthony de Burgoine, lord of Wackene, 
 the governor of the province ; who, as soon as he was informed 
 of what had happened, set out for Flushing, and on his arrival 
 there, having called together all the inhabitants into the most 
 public part of the town, he employed every argument addressed 
 to their hopes and fears, to persuade them to return to their 
 allegiance. But they could not listen now to anything but the 
 passions by which they were inflamed. Their abhorrence of the 
 Spanish tyranny was now wrought up to the greatest height ; 
 and the governor, apprehensive of danger from their unbridled 
 fury, immediately left the town. 
 
 Soon after his departure, they pulled up the foundations of the 
 new citadel, and drove out the persons to whom the charge of 
 building it had been committed. In a few days afterwards they 
 gave a still stronger proof of their resolution never to return 
 under the Spanish government. Don Pedro Pacheco, who had 
 been appointed governor of Flushing, having been detained some 
 days behind the troops, was ignorant of what had passed, and 
 entered the harbour under a belief that his soldiers were in the 
 town to receive him. The people ran to arms, and having seized 
 and plundered his ship, they cast him and his attendants into 
 prison. Among papers which were found in his possession, it is 
 said that they met with evidence of his having come with a 
 design to exercise in Flushing the wonted tyranny of the Spa- 
 niards; and this discovery, added to the circumstance of his 
 being nearly related to the duke of Alva, prompted them to 
 form the barbarous resolution of putting him to death. He 
 offered to pay them a rich ransom for his life, and to remain 
 their prisoner ; but they rejected his proposal. He then 
 begged that they would respect the nobility of his birth, 
 and put him to death by the sword, rather than by the halter. 
 Even this request was denied him. Their minds were grown 
 savage, from the bloody scenes which had of late been so often 
 acted before them ; and they rejoiced in the opportunity which 
 
 Reidanus, p. 10. 
 
198 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book X. 
 
 they possessed of wreaking their vengeance on the duke of Alva, 
 by inflicting a disgraceful punishment on his kinsman. 
 
 They were aware of the consequences with which this conduct, 
 so violent and hostile, must be attended ; and, as they knew that 
 it would quickly draw upon them the whole weight of the 
 governor’s resentment, they omitted nothing in their power to 
 secure themselves against it. They laboured incessantly to 
 strengthen their fortifications. They imported privately from 
 Antwerp, ammunition and provisions, which they laid up in 
 store ; and they applied to the prince of Orange, and to the 
 Protestants in France and England, for assistance. Some troops 
 were immediately sent them from France, by Count Lewis of 
 Nassau ; and five hundred Flemish exiles came from England, 
 who were soon afterwards followed by two hundred Scotch and 
 English volunteers, under the command of two adventurers, 
 Morgan and Balfour. Their fleet received an augmentation 
 where they did not expect it. The duke of Alva having, some 
 months before, fitted out a number of vessels to cruise upon 
 the coast, the commanders of these vessels now declared in 
 favour of the party which they had hitherto opposed ; and, set- 
 ting sail for Flushing, enlisted under the banners of the count de 
 Tserart, to whom the prince of Orange had given the chief 
 command of all the forces in the province. 
 
 Tserart soon found himself possessed of sufficient strength, not 
 Revolt of only to defend Flushing, but likewise to attempt the 
 other towns reduction of the other towns in Zealand. With most 
 m Zealand. 0 f these towns, there was very little occasion for 
 employing force. The inhabitants of Campvere, Armuyden, and 
 some other places, were no less inclined to revolt than the people 
 of Flushing; and in a few days the whole province, except Mid- 
 dleburg and the castle of Rammekins, declared against the 
 Spanish government, and received garrisons from Tserart. 
 
 In Middleburg too, the greatest part of the inhabitants would 
 gladly have followed the example of the other towns ; but they 
 were overawed by the garrison. Tserart laid siege to this city, 
 and expected soon to have got possession of it. The garrison 
 was weak ; and as the exiles were masters at sea, he hoped, by 
 their means, to intercept any reinforcement which might be sent 
 from the continent. The duke of Alva was sensible of the great 
 importance of the place, and resolved, if possible, to relieve it. 
 For this purpose, he ordered Sancio I)’ Avila, one of his bravest 
 officers, to carry thither a thousand select soldiers, partly Wal- 
 loons and partly Spaniards, whom he mingled together, as he did 
 on many occasions afterwards, that he might the more effectually 
 excite their emulation ; and to these a great number of officers 
 and persons of rank joined as volunteers, that they might partake 
 of the glory of so dangerous an enterprise. 
 
 D’Avila left Bergen-op-Zoom in the end of April, and had a 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 199 
 
 1572.] 
 
 prosperous navigation down the Scheld. He was desirous to 
 land his troops on the nearest part of the island, as from thence 
 he would have had the shortest march to Middleburg. But the 
 enemy, having received intelligence of his design, had drawn 
 together a powerful fleet to oppose him. He was obliged there- 
 fore to keep out to sea on the north side of the island, and to 
 fetch a compass round, till he came to that part of it which is 
 washed by the ocean. The landing there was difficult by reason 
 of the flats and shallows, which made it necessary for him to 
 march a great way in the water ; but, as he met with no oppo- 
 sition from the enemy, he at last brought his men all safe on 
 shore. Then having immediately set out with a chosen band, to 
 examine the situation of the enemy, and having found that, 
 trusting to the fleet, they had taken no precaution for their defence, 
 he ordered all his forces to advance. They ran forward to the 
 attack with the utmost impetuosity. The besiegers were over- 
 Raised by whelmed with astonishment. The garrison at the same 
 D’ A vila. time sallied out upon them from the city. They aban- 
 
 doned their trenches almost without resistance ; and being 
 hemmed in on every side, all of them, except a few who escaped 
 to Flushing and Campvere, were put to the sword *. 
 
 In this manner was the siege of Middleburg raised. But as 
 the Protestants still retained their superiority at sea, they hoped, 
 that by surrounding the island with their ships, and intercepting 
 the supplies which might be sent to it, they should soon be able 
 to compel the garrison to surrender. Their fleet consisted of no 
 less than one hundred and fifty armed vessels, manned with 
 sailors who were much more expert than any whom the duke of 
 Alva could procure. Their maritime enterprises were for this 
 reason almost always attended with success, and they did incre- 
 dible mischief to the Spaniards at sea ; while at land, having 
 only raw troops to oppose to regular and well-disciplined forces, 
 they were seldom able to look them in the face. 
 
 At this time, when the sea was covered with their ships, and 
 Success of almost every entrance to the ports of the Low Coun- 
 the exiles tries blocked up, the duke of Medina-cceli arrived upon 
 j Pion coas ^* ^his n °bleman had been sent by Philip to 
 u y ‘ succeed the duke of Alva, who, on account of his health, 
 had applied for liberty to return to Spain. Medina-coeli had 
 brought with him fifty ships, having two thousand Spanish soldiers 
 on board ; but as he knew nothing of the late transactions in the 
 maritime provinces, and had no suspicion that the Protestants 
 possessed such a considerable naval force, he fell unawares into 
 the midst of their fleet. Twenty-five of the largest of his ships 
 were taken. Some of them escaped to Rammekins and Middle- 
 burg, and he himself got with difficulty into Sluys, in Flanders. 
 The exiles found on board the ships which they took, two hun- 
 
 1 Bentivoglio, p. 93. 
 
200 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book X. 
 
 dred thousand guilders in specie ; and the ships, with the effects 
 which they contained, were valued at five hundred thousand 11 . 
 
 Their next success was in an attack upon a fleet of twenty 
 ships, which the duke of Alva intended to send to Middleburg, 
 with troops, ordnance, pikes, and gunpowder, for the use of the 
 garrison. The exiles attacked these ships before they had left 
 the harbour, and having taken them all, they carried them, 
 together with the military stores, to Flushing. 
 
 Another fleet, fitted out for the same purpose at Sluys, was 
 equally unfortunate. The Zealanders being informed by their 
 partisans of the destination of this fleet, and of the time fixed 
 for its departure, took three ships in the short run betwixt Sluys 
 and the isle of Walchern, and had the courage to pursue the 
 rest into the harbour of Rammekins, where, notwithstanding the 
 fire of the garrison, they took some, and burnt the rest. 
 
 They were not so successful in their next adventure. It had 
 been the chief object of their desire, for some time, to make 
 themselves masters of Middleburg ; because, while that city 
 remained in the hands of the Spaniards, the whole island was 
 subject to perpetual alarms. They had, as we have just now 
 seen, defeated several attempts which the duke of Alva made to 
 introduce supplies, and now the town of Tergoes was the only 
 channel by which they could be conveyed. Tergoes is the 
 capital of South Beveland, and was defended at this time by a 
 garrison of eight hundred Walloons and Spaniards, under the 
 command of Isidore Pacheco, a Spanish officer. 
 
 To this town Tserart, general of the Zealanders, had, some 
 Siege of time after his repulse from Middleburg, laid siege ; 
 Tergoes. but upon a false report of the approach of the Spa- 
 niards, he had hastily raised the siege, and left the island. He 
 Towards the now returned to it, with an army of near eight tliou- 
 end of sum- sand men, most of whom were German, French, and 
 mer - English Protestants. 
 
 As the garrison was no match in the field for so great a force, 
 Tserart had landed in the island without opposition, and, having 
 immediately invested the town, he pressed forward the siege 
 with great vigour. The besieged made several brisk sallies to 
 retard his approach ; but notwithstanding their most vigorous 
 efforts, Tserart had opened his batteries, and made some breaches 
 in the wall. The siege had lasted for several weeks, and Pacheco 
 began to perceive that it would not be possible for him to hold 
 out much longer. 
 
 Of this he had given early notice to the duke of Alva; nor 
 was the duke less intent upon relieving him, than he had reason 
 to expect. The distinguished bravery of the garrison and their 
 commander ; the reproach which would accompany the suffering 
 them to fall a prey to the enemy ; above all, the great import- 
 
 Meui'oii Aumcus, p. 83. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 201 
 
 1572.] 
 
 ance of the place, the loss of which would draw after it that of 
 Middleburg, and the whole province of Zealand ; these consi- 
 derations excited all the governor’s attention, and determined 
 him to apply with ardour to prepare the succour which Pacheco 
 had solicited. He ordered several regiments of his best troops 
 to assemble from different quarters at Bergen-op-zoom, from 
 whence there is a short run down the Scheld to Beveland. He 
 likewise sent thither a sufficient number of transports with stores 
 of ammunition and provisions ; and appointed D’ Avila and Mon- 
 dragone x to conduct them to the garrison of Tergoes. 
 
 These men exerted themselves strenuously in the execution of 
 the trust that was committed to them, and attempted several 
 times to force their way through the enemy’s fleet. But the 
 Zealanders watched their motions so attentively, were so much 
 more expert in sailing, and possessed a naval force so much 
 superior to theirs, that all their attempts were baffled ; and, to 
 save their ships from being sunk, they were frequently obliged 
 to return, without being able to effectuate their purpose. D’Avila 
 once flattered himself that he had discovered an expedient that 
 would prove successful. He planted batteries of cannon along 
 the banks of the Scheld, hoping to keep the enemy at a distance 
 from the shore, and thus to give Mondragone, with the troops, 
 an opportunity of passing. But the event did not answer his 
 expectation. The banks were wet, and did not allow of his 
 coming near enough to annoy the enemy. 
 
 The Spanish generals began to despair of being able to execute 
 Plumart’s design, when Plumart, a native of the province, 
 
 proposal for but zealously attached to the Spanish interest, proposed 
 raising the another method of transporting the forces, which at 
 siege * first appeared impracticable, although it was after- 
 wards embraced. In order to form a clear conception of Plu- 
 mart’s proposal, it is necessary to attend to the situation of the 
 country, and the change which some years before it had under- 
 gone. The isle of South Beveland, to which the Spanish generals 
 found it so difficult to transport their troops, is only seven miles 
 distant from a tract of land, to which they could have had easy 
 access from Bergen-op-zoom. This tract of land, which is divided 
 from Brabant by the Easter Scheld, and from Flanders by the 
 Hondt, or Wester Scheld, was once a part of Beveland, and 
 was separated from it by a dreadful inundation in the year one 
 thousand five hundred and thirty-two ; when the sea broke down 
 the dykes, and burst violently across the island, cutting off from 
 it the corner which lay nearest to Brabant, and covering it from 
 north to south, that is, from the Easter to the Wester Scheld, 
 with water, which the inhabitants were never able to exclude. 
 The space overflowed was, at the narrowest, seven Italian miles 
 
 Two of his most experienced officers. 
 
202 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book X. 
 
 broad. It could not be crossed in boats even at high water, by 
 reason of the flats and shallows ; and at low water it was thought 
 unfordabfe, on account of the miry bottom, and the channel of 
 several rivulets, which many persons still remembered to have 
 seen in it, before it was overflowed. 
 
 It was there, however, that Plumart thought it practicable for 
 the troops to pass over on foot, to the relief of the garrison of 
 Tergoes ; and he offered to lead the way, and conduct them in 
 their passage. The character of the man, whose prudence and 
 fidelity were well known to the commanders, was the only circum- 
 stance that prevented them from regarding his proposal as 
 chimerical. No person had ever attempted to pass that way 
 before. They themselves were unacquainted with the face of 
 the country before the inundation. They only knew the length 
 of space over which the troops must pass ; and no troops, they 
 believed, would be able to support the fatigue of so long a march 
 in water, and perhaps too in mud and clay. Besides, that, by 
 accidents which could not be foreseen, they might be retarded in 
 their passage, till they were overtaken by the rising tide, and 
 buried in the waves ; and, even although this should not happen, 
 yet the enemy might be apprized of their design, and be ready 
 to fall upon them, as soon as they should reach the land. 
 
 Plumart was not discouraged by these objections. He desired 
 that no mention might be made of this proposal, till he should 
 know with certainty whether there was not in reality such a 
 ford as he imagined. He then went to make the trial, accom- 
 panied by two Spaniards, and a peasant who was well acquainted 
 with the face of the country before the inundation. He found 
 the ford which he sought for ; arrived safe on the other side, and 
 returned, without encountering any greater difficulties than he 
 expected. 
 
 D 1 Avila and Mondragone did not hesitate after this to comply 
 with his advice. They immediately prepared a number of small 
 bags, which they filled with biscuit, gunpowder, and matches ; 
 and transported three thousand of the best troops, Germans, 
 Walloons, and Spaniards, from Bergen-op-Zoom to Aggar, a 
 village which lies near the entrance of the ford. Mondragone 
 took upon himself the conducting of this extraordinary expedi- 
 tion. When the time proper for entering upon it was arrived, 
 he ordered the troops to advance towards the ford ; and having 
 distributed the bags among them, he then disclosed his intention ; 
 gave them an account of the discovery which had been made by 
 Plumart and his companions ; and represented the glory which 
 they would acquire by performing, in the service of the church 
 and of the King, such an exploit as had never been achieved by 
 any army in the world before. The soldiers, full of that intrepid 
 spirit by which the Spanish troops were so highly distinguished 
 in the present war, and proud c ^ being selected from their com- 
 
1572.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 203 
 
 panions for so dangerous an enterprise, received this unexpected 
 information with every symptom of joy, and called out to 
 Mondragone to lead them forward without delay. 
 
 That they might have the more time for their passage, they 
 began to enter the water when the sea was going back. The 
 Spaniards, with Plumart and Mondragone at their head, marched 
 first, the Germans next, and last of all the Walloons. They were 
 ordered to keep as close as possible to each other, that they 
 might the more easily succour one another, if any of them should 
 fall into deeper water, or be entangled in the mud. They were 
 not without apprehensions of the tide returning upon them, and 
 therefore they moved forward as fast as the surrounding element 
 and the slimy bottom would allow. Nine men only perished 
 through fatigue, or their neglect of the order which had been 
 given them to keep close to their companions. All the rest 
 arrived safe at the dyke of Yersichen, a village only four miles 
 distant from Tergoes. There Mondragone ordered them to 
 repose themselves during the night, and resolved to lead them, 
 at break of day, to the relief of the besieged. 
 
 But he had already done all that was necessary for this 
 purpose, and had no occasion to expose either himself or his 
 men to further danger. When the besiegers were informed of 
 his arrival, they were filled with consternation. Under that 
 amazement into which they were thrown by so unexpected an 
 event, they regarded the Spaniards as more than men. They 
 did not take time to inquire into their number ; but having 
 immediately raised the siege, they left their baggage and artillery 
 behind them, and betook themselves precipitately to the shore. 
 Eight hundred were killed in their flight by the garrison, and 
 many more perished in the water, in attempting to get on board 
 their ships. Mondragone then entered Tergoes, where he was 
 received by the garrison with every demonstration of gratitude 
 for their deliverance; and, having remained there till he had 
 given directions for strengthening the fortifications of the place, 
 he left a part of his troops with the governor, and returned with 
 the rest to Brabant, to join the duke of Alva y . 
 
 y Bcntivoglio, p. 110. Meursii Auriacus, p. 89. 
 
204 
 
 HISTORY OF THE- REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 BOOK XI. 
 
 While tho transactions that have been related passed in Zea- 
 The revolt land, the same spirit of revolt, by which the people of 
 of Holland, that province were actuated, made rapid progress in 
 some of the other provinces. The inhabitants of Enchuysen 
 were the first in North Holland who had the courage to plant 
 the standard of liberty upon their walls ; and those of Medin- 
 blinc, Edam, Purmerend, and other towns, quickly followed the 
 example. In some of these places, part of the people were averse 
 to this revolution ; but these were few, compared with their 
 opponents, and tvere obliged either to yield to the majority, or 
 to secure themselves by flight from their resentment. 
 
 The same measures were pursued, at the same time, in the 
 southern parts of the province. That flame which had been 
 kindled some time before, burst out at once in a thousand dif- 
 ferent places. And in a few months, Leyden, Gouda, Dort, 
 Haerlem, and all the other towns in Holland, Amsterdam 
 excepted, had openly declared against the Spaniards, and avowed 
 their resolution to acknowledge no other authority in future, but 
 that of the prince of Orange, and the States. The same reso- 
 lution was formed in several of the cities of Overyssel, Friesland, 
 and Utrecht. 
 
 This revolution, so favourable to WillianTs views, was not a 
 little promoted by intrigues, which, although he himself was 
 absent, were carried on in his name, and by his authority. In 
 letters to the principal inhabitants he had allured them to his 
 interest, by flattering them with the hopes of having all their 
 privileges secured; of enjoying full freedom to exercise their 
 religion, whether Protestant or Catholic ; and of being for ever 
 delivered from that oppressive load of taxes, with which they had 
 been overwhelmed. In order to enforce these exhortations, he 
 sent his agents throughout the provinces; and most of these 
 were persons either of great address, or of great authority and 
 influence among the people a . 
 
 William’s military preparations were at this time far advanced, 
 His military and he hoped soon to begin his march, with the pro- 
 preparations. bability of a more prosperous issue than had attended 
 
 a In Holland, the revolution was chiefly owing to the activity of Sonoy, whom tho 
 prince had sent thither as governor substitute, till he himself should arrive : and in 
 Gucldcrland, Utrecht, and Friesland, to the count of Berg, a nobleman of interest in 
 those parts, who was married to William’s sister, and acted in everything by his dircc- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 205 
 
 1572.] 
 
 bis former expedition. He had already collected a formidable 
 army of well-disciplined forces. Considerable sums had been 
 transmitted to him by the friends of his cause ; and the strongest 
 assurances had been given him, that some of the principal cities 
 in the southern provinces would open their gates to receive him. 
 But no circumstance contributed more to inspire him with a con- 
 fidence of success, than the new measures which, a little before 
 the present period, had been embraced by the court of France. 
 
 In the bloody contest which had subsisted for several years 
 The affairs between the Catholics and Protestants in that kingdom, 
 of France, the former had generally been victorious. But the 
 latter, roused by their leaders, aided by foreign powers, animated 
 by zeal for their religion, and inflamed with resentment on 
 account of the cruel persecutions which had been exercised against 
 them, continued to make such vigorous efforts, as created in their 
 enemies the most alarming apprehensions with regard to the 
 issue of the war. The court had, at different times, offered 
 them advantageous terms of accommodation ; and peace had 
 oftener than once been established between the contending par- 
 ties. But their pretensions, their interests, and their religious 
 principles, were incompatible ; and they remained quiet only till 
 they were in a condition to renew hostilities. The court never 
 had more reason to entertain hopes of being able to extirpate 
 their opponents, than towards the end of the year one thousand 
 five hundred and sixty-nine. Their brave and active leader, the 
 prince of Conde, had been killed in the battle of Jarnac ; they 
 had afterwards received a dreadful overthrow in the battle of 
 Moncontour ; and the admiral Coligni, with the young princes 
 of Bourbon, had been obliged to retire, with the feeble remains 
 of their shattered army, to the mountains of Gascony and Lan- 
 guedoc. There, however, they exerted themselves strenuously 
 in making preparations for trying once more the fortune of war ; 
 and in a few months, they drew together a force sufficient to 
 enable them to leave their retreat, and to enter the lists against 
 the royal army. 
 
 When intelligence of this was brought to the Queen-mother, 
 Queen-mo- w ^ 10 exercised at that time an unlimited authority in 
 ther’s plot the government, she was equally exasperated and 
 against the alarmed ; and she resolved to employ other means 
 Piotestants. ^an O p 0n f orce to be avenged upon her enemies. She 
 communicated her plan only to the King, the duke of Anjou, the 
 cardinal of Lorrain, the duke of Guise, and Alberto Gondi, 
 count of Retz ; who all engaged to maintain the most inviolable 
 secrecy. Time only brought to light their dark design. The 
 Protestants, they now believed, were not to be overcome by the 
 force of arms ; and it was resolved to have recourse to fraud and 
 circumvention. 
 
 In pursuance of this plan, a new treaty with the princes of 
 
206 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 Navarre and the admiral was set on foot, and soon afterwards 
 concluded at St. Germains. By this treaty, the Protestants 
 received a free pardon of all their past offences, with liberty to 
 make public profession of the reformed religion ; and the princes 
 and admiral were allowed, for their security, to retain possession 
 of Rochelle, Cognoc, La Charite, or Montauban, on condition, 
 that if the articles of the peace were observed, these places 
 should be delivered to the King within the space of two years 
 from the date of the present pacification. 
 
 The Protestant leaders entertained the same distrust of the 
 sincerity of the King and Queen-mother in this, as in all their 
 former negotiations. They were still afraid of putting themselves 
 in their power, and remained at a distance from court, in the 
 places of strength which had been assigned them. In order to 
 remove their suspicions, every species of artifice was employed. 
 All the articles of the peace were punctually fulfilled. Strict 
 orders were issued to allow the Protestants in all places to cele- 
 brate openly their religious assemblies ; and in all the disputes 
 which happened between the Catholics and them, the latter were 
 treated with indulgence, while the former had, on many occasions, 
 reason to complain of injustice or severity. Charles embraced 
 every opportunity to express the pleasure which he now enjoyed, 
 in having restored tranquillity to his kingdom ; and even when 
 none but zealous Catholics were present, he often declared how 
 unalterably fixed his purpose was, to perform with strict fidelity, 
 his engagements with the Protestants. He had sufficiently 
 experienced the folly of attempting to subdue men’s consciences 
 by force ; and no consideration would make him return to his 
 former unhappy measures ; which he had found to be no less 
 ineffectual for accomplishing the end intended, than they were 
 destructive of his own repose, and pernicious to his subjects. 
 All his counsellors, except those who were partners in the bloody 
 secret, believed him to be sincere ; and by the accounts which 
 they gave of his discourse, added to the displeasure which they 
 expressed at his change of conduct, they contributed to complete 
 the delusion of the Protestants. The admiral, however, still 
 retained his wonted diffidence ; and when urged by the king to 
 come to court, and receive in person every proof that could be 
 given him of sincere attachment, he declared that it was impos- 
 sible for him to think himself secure, where his mortal enemies 
 of the family of Guise were possessed of so much power. 
 
 To have gratified the admiral by so great a concession as the 
 immediate removal of the Guises, Charles knew would have had 
 a suspicious aspect ; and therefore he went no further at this 
 time, than to assure him that his fears were groundless, and that 
 his enemies were not masters as formerly. But soon after, the 
 duke of Guise and his brother left the court, seemingly much 
 disgusted with the measures which were there pursued. At the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 207 
 
 1572.] 
 
 same time, other means of delusion were employed more likely 
 to produce the desired effect. Charles offered his sister in 
 marriage to the king of Navarre ; and an ambassador was sent 
 to England to negotiate a match between the duke of Anjou and 
 queen Elizabeth. But of all the instruments of deceit which he 
 employed, there was none more efficacious than the declaration 
 which he made of his resolution to enter into war with the king 
 of Spain. Philip had refused, he said, to grant him reparation for 
 certain injuries which his subjects had received from the Spaniards 
 in America ; and he was determined to take vengeance on that 
 prince, by invading his dominions in the Netherlands. He offered 
 the command of the army, which he talked of sending thither, to 
 the admiral, and assured him that he would be entirely governed 
 by his counsels, and those of the Prince of Orange and Count 
 Lewis, in carrying on the war. 
 
 No proposal could be better calculated than this to blind the 
 admiral’s penetration. Conscious of superior military talents, 
 he was naturally fond of war ; sincere in his profession of the 
 reformed religion, he was zealous to propagate and defend it ; 
 and he was strongly attached, by sympathy of manners, as well 
 as religious principles, to the princes of Nassau. Count Lewis 
 was with him at Rochelle when the proposal was delivered, and 
 he contributed not a little to banish from his mind the remains 
 of those suspicions which he still retained of the King’s sincerity. 
 Soon afterwards they both set out for Paris, where they were 
 received and treated with so much esteem and confidence, as 
 gave the admiral a full conviction that the sentiments both of 
 the King and the Queen-mother were in reality what they 
 seemed. 
 
 Charles thought it necessary for his purpose to wear the mask 
 for some time longer ; and as he found that nothing had served 
 so effectually to lull the admiral’s suspicions as this last device, 
 he affected to be extremely solicitous about making preparations 
 for the war ; and in the mean time desired Count Lewis to repair 
 to the frontiers of the Netherlands, to communicate his design 
 to the malcontents, and to hold them in readiness for the 
 admiral’s arrival with the troops. There was nothing farther 
 from his intention than to begin hostilities. But no sooner were 
 the Huguenots informed of the design on which Count Lewis had 
 set out, than great numbers of them, prompted by their religious 
 zeal, and by the restless military spirit of the age, flocked after 
 him, and offered to assist him in any enterprise he should under- 
 take. 
 
 Lewis was himself of too active a temper to suffer them to 
 remain long without employment. It was of the utmost conse- 
 quence, he knew, towards the success of that expedition on which 
 his brother was about to enter, as well as of the French invasion 
 of the Netherlands, to acquire early possession of some fortified 
 
208 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 town in the frontier provinces. With this view he had maintained 
 a secret correspondence with some of the inhabitants of Mons ; 
 and he made himself master of that important city by the follow- 
 ing stratagem : — 
 
 Having left the confines of France, he arrived in the evening 
 with five hundred horse and a thousand musqueteers at a wood 
 in the neighbourhood of Mons, whence he sent forward ten or 
 twelve of his soldiers, whom he selected on account of their 
 superior address and resolution. They entered Mons in the 
 evening, and lodged together in the same inn. They gave out 
 that they were dealers in wine ; informed their host that their 
 servants were bringing a quantity of that liquor, and inquired at 
 what hour the gate of the city, by which it was to be brought 
 in, would be opened. They were told that, for a small reward, 
 the keeper would open it at any time ; and early next morning, 
 having bribed the keeper to open it, they seized upon the keys, 
 and dispersed the guards. Count Lewis, who was at hand with 
 a hundred horse, immediately rushed in, and having taken pos- 
 session of the gate with a part of his troops, he traversed the 
 principal streets of the city with the rest, and proclaimed to the 
 inhabitants, that he was not come as an enemy, but as a friend ; 
 and that the Prince of Orange was approaching with a powerful 
 army, to assert their liberty, and to deliver them from all those 
 oppressive taxes which had been imposed upon them by the Duke 
 of Alva. 
 
 All the citizens still remained within their houses, except a 
 few who were privy to his design ; but he began to grow uneasy 
 when he reflected on the small number of men that were with 
 him, and to wonder that the rest of his troops were not come 
 forward. It was to no purpose, he knew, to attempt keeping 
 possession of so great a town with so small a force. He rode out 
 therefore as fast as he could towards the place where he had left 
 his troops, who had lost their way, and were wandering in the 
 wood. He conducted them immediately to the city ; not without 
 anxiety, lest he should find the gate shut against him on his return. 
 But such was the consternation of the citizens, and their ignorance 
 of what had passed,, that none of them had ventured to stir 
 without their houses. The gate was still open, and everything 
 in the town as quiet and motionless as when he left it. He then 
 placed his guards at the several gates, and on the ramparts ; and 
 calling the magistrates together, explained to them his own, and 
 his brother’s designs ; giving them the strongest assurances that 
 no violence should be committed by his soldiers. After which ho 
 commanded such of the citizens as he could not trust, to deliver 
 up their arms ; and ordered all of them to proceed as formerly in 
 the pursuit of their customary occupations. His troops did 
 not amount to more than fifteen hundred men; but he soon 
 acquired a much greater force by the accession of many Pro- 
 
PHILIP IT. ICING OF SPAIN. 
 
 209 
 
 1572.] 
 
 testants, who hastened to his assistance from Picardy and 
 Champagne b . 
 
 The loss of Mons affected the duke of Alva in the most sensible 
 manner ; and it gave him the greater uneasiness and concern, as 
 it was altogether unexpected. Being no stranger to Count 
 Lewis’s enterprising genius, he had kept an anxious eye upon all 
 his motions, during his abode in France; especially after the 
 peace of St. Germains, and the kind reception he had met with 
 from the King. The latest account which he had received of him 
 from his spies at Paris was, that he was playing at tennis ; by 
 which piece of intelligence they meant to insinuate, that he was 
 more attentive to amusement than to any serious pursuit. When 
 the duke therefore was informed of his success at Mons, he dis- 
 covered the utmost impatience and chagrin. In the rage which 
 it excited in him, throwing down his hat, and trampling upon it, 
 Ct I have been deceived,” he cried, “ by a Tuscan woman, (mean- 
 ing Catherine of Medicis,) but ere long, instead of Tuscan lilies 
 she shall feel the smart of Spanish thorns.” 
 
 His vexation was much increased by his knowledge of the great 
 importance of the place which he had lost. He considered that 
 Mons was not only the capital of the province of Hainault, but 
 one of the largest and most populous cities in the Low Countries; 
 that, being situated in a marshy soil, it might easily be rendered 
 impregnable ; that although it was not in the line of the barrier 
 towns, yet it was removed at so small a distance from the frontier, 
 that the possession of it must greatly facilitate the entrance of 
 foreign troops into the provinces ; and that either the French king, 
 whose conduct had for some time past had so hostile an appear- 
 ance, or the prince of Orange, could easily furnish it with supplies. 
 
 These considerations made him resolve to attempt the recovery 
 of it without delay ; but while he was making the preparations 
 necessary for this purpose, he received intelligence of the revolu- 
 tion in Holland ; and at the same time was informed that the 
 prince of Orange, having already collected a numerous army, was 
 about to begin his march. Alva, far from shrinking at the view 
 of so many impending dangers, exerted himself with great acti- 
 vity and vigour to repel them. He carried on his levies with the 
 utmost diligence, and in a very short time found himself possessed 
 of between five and six thousand German horse, and eighteen 
 thousand foot of the same nation ; besides fifty companies of 
 Spaniards, and one hundred and fifty of Walloons, and other 
 natives of the Netherlands. He would gladly have sent a part 
 of these forces to recover the revolted cities in the maritime pro- 
 vinces, and the rest to the siege of Mons ; but when he reflected 
 on the difficulty which he must encounter in either of these two 
 enterprises, he apprehended that his army, numerous as it was, 
 
 b Bentivoglio, p. 95. Meursii A miaous, p. 79. Meteren, p. 95. 
 P 
 
210 HISTORY OF THE RtilGN OF [Book XI. 
 
 could not with safety be divided. He resolved therefore to 
 employ it, whole and entire, against his enemies on one hand of 
 him, before he should turn it to the other. 
 
 Still, however, he remained in great perplexity, finding it dif- 
 ficult to determine whether it was most expedient to begin with 
 the siege of Mons, or the rocovery of the maritime provinces. 
 And to assist him in deciding this important question, he called 
 a council of his principal officers; when the marquis of Vitelli, 
 one of the first in rank, as well as in military merit, advised him 
 earnestly to begin with the latter, and supported his opinion by 
 observing, “ that although the interior provinces were liable to 
 be invaded from the side of France or Germany, yet it would not 
 be difficult to recover whatever cities should be lost in those 
 provinces, as the inhabitants were in general more loyal than 
 those of Holland and Zealand, and much less infected with the 
 spirit of innovation in religion. That the Huguenots under 
 Count Lewis were destitute of means to support themselves, and 
 must soon be dispersed ; for he could not be persuaded that the 
 French King, who had hitherto shown so much zeal for the true 
 religion, would ever debase himself so far, as to favour the 
 attempts of his rebellious subjects to subvert it. The German 
 forces under the prince of Orange, undisciplined and tumultuary, 
 were actuated in their present warfare, by no other motives but 
 those of pay and plunder. And if they were disappointed in their 
 expectation of these, there was little ground to doubt that they 
 would choose rather to return home, after taking vengeance on 
 their leaders, than expose themselves to the fatigue and danger 
 of besieging towns and fortresses. “We may therefore, without 
 anxiety,” continued he, “ put off the siege of Mons, and the 
 defence of the inland frontier, till a more convenient season shall 
 arrive. But the state of the maritime provinces admits not of 
 the least delay. The people there are universally infected with 
 heresy. They have conceived a degree of frenzy, and indulged 
 themselves in the most extravagant excesses against the church 
 and the King. Their situation, strong by nature, will soon be 
 rendered impregnable. Every passage of a river and canal will 
 require an army to force it, and every siege a campaign to finish 
 it. By the sea, and by the rivers, they can be always richly 
 furnished with provisions ; they can every hour receive succour 
 from France, Germany, or England; and will be able, by their 
 naval force, to prevent the king’s army from receiving supplies 
 from Spain. It is there too, the prince of Orange, for many 
 years, was governor. There he possesses several large estates ; 
 and he has formed there numerous and close connexions with 
 persons of the greatest influence in the country. As it was in 
 these provinces he first erected the standard of rebellion, it is in 
 them he intends to fix the seat of that usurped dominion which 
 he is so ambitious to maintain. Let us attack our enemy first in 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 211 
 
 1572 .] 
 
 iiis stronghold ; and when’ we have driven him from thence, we 
 shall find it much easier to prevent him from establishing himself 
 in any other quarter.” 
 
 Such were the reasons which Vitelli gave for advising the duke 
 of Alva to postpone the siege of Mons ; and, if his advice had 
 been followed, it is probable that the republic of the United 
 Provinces would never have been formed. The people had not 
 yet had time to put the cities into a proper state of defence, and 
 they could not have long resisted so great a force as the duke 
 of Alva might have employed to subdue them. Amsterdam and 
 Middleburg were still unshaken in their allegiance. With the 
 ships belonging to these two wealthy cities, and those which he 
 would have received from Spain, a fleet might have been equipped 
 superior to that of the Protestants ; who must have been soon 
 reduced to the necessity of submitting to whatever terms Philip 
 might have thought fit to impose. 
 
 No such pernicious consequences as those which were foretold 
 by Vitelli, could have followed from allowing the enemy to remain 
 for some time in possession of Mons ; nor even from the conquest 
 which the prince of Orange might have made of other places. In 
 an open country, such as the interior provinces, the fate of towns 
 must depend entirely on the number and discipline of the armies 
 employed to attack or defend them ; and in both these respects, 
 the duke of Alva had reason to believe that he would be at 
 all times able to maintain his superiority, especially if, by first 
 reducing the maritime provinces, he could keep open his commu- 
 nication by sea with Spain. 
 
 But it is infinitely easier for men to judge concerning matters 
 of such nice deliberation, after the event has happened, than 
 when they are about to enter upon action. It ought to be 
 considered, that Alva had not yet experienced the difficulties 
 attending the siege of towns, situated in a country so much 
 intersected by the sea, by rivers and canals, as the maritime 
 provinces ; and could not foresee those amazing exertions which 
 the people made, first in their preparations for war, and after- 
 wards in the defence of their cities when attacked. He had 
 likewise reason to entertain suspicions of the hostile intentions 
 of the French King. He dreaded the havoc which would be 
 made by the army of the prince of Orange, in the richer and 
 more fertile provinces ; and thought it would bring an indelible 
 stain upon his honour, if he did not endeavour to prevent it. 
 Besides these motives, it is not improbable, considering the 
 natural violence of his temper, that he was in some degree 
 influenced, in the resolution which he formed, by his personal 
 jealousy of the prince of Orange, and his desire of disappointing 
 a second time the attempts of one who had formerly rivalled him 
 in the favour of his prince. 
 
 Whatever were his motives, he resolved to begin his opera- 
 
 r 2 
 
212 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XI. 
 
 tions with the siege of Mons ; and to delay the reduc- 
 Mons Siege ° f ti° n Holland till he should disengage himself from 
 
 his enemies on the southern frontier. In order to 
 increase the number of his forces, he commanded the garrisons 
 of Rotterdam and Delfshaven, the only towns in Holland in which 
 he had any garrisons left to join him ; and immediately sent off 
 his son, Frederic de Toledo, accompanied by Noircarmes and 
 Fitelli, with a part of the troops, to form the blockade of Mons. 
 
 The inhabitants of that city, though suspicious at first of Count 
 Lewis’s intentions, were now well satisfied with his government, - 
 and were solicitous to provide for their defence against the 
 Spaniards. They assisted him with great alacrity in completing 
 their fortifications. They were active in laying in military stores' 
 and provisions ; and having repeatedly sallied out for this purpose 
 after Toledo’s arrival in their neighbourhood, they had several 
 rencounters with his troops. 
 
 Lewis had, some time before, sent the Sieur de Jenlis to Paris, 
 to inform the king of his success, and to solicit the speedy march 
 of the troops which he had promised to send to his assistance. 
 Charles received Jenlis in the most gracious manner, affected to 
 be extremely happy with the accounts which he had brought him, 
 and gave him authority to levy forces ; hoping that before they 
 could take the field, he would be able to put an end to the scene- 
 of dissimulation which he had so long been acting. But the admiral, 
 who was allowed to exercise an unlimited power in the adminis- 
 tration, pushed forward the levies with greater vigour than the 
 king intended ; and in a few weeks, Jenlis was ready to set out 
 with between four and five thousand foot, and four hundred horse. 
 The admiral and count Lewis concurred in advising him to direct 
 his march by the way of Cambray, that he might avoid being 
 intercepted by the enemy, and join the army of the prince of 
 Orange. But Jenlis refused to comply with this wholesome 
 counsel. He vainly hoped to be able, with his own forces alone, 
 to oblige the Spaniards to quit the siege ; and he wished to secure 
 this honour to himself, rather than leave it to be reaped by the 
 prince of Orange. Notice was sent privately to Toledo, from the 
 court of France, of the route which he was to take, and of the 
 time of his departure. Toledo immediately drew off his forces 
 from the blockade, and advanced to meet him on the frontier ; 
 being desirous to engage at a distance from the town, lest Count 
 Lewis should sally out, and attack the Spaniards in the rear, 
 when they were engaged in battle with Jenlis. Toledo had 
 reached a village called St. Ghislain, at the distance of a few 
 miles from Mons, when he was informed that the enemy had 
 entered a neighbouring wood, and that upon their coming out 
 from it he might attack them with great advantage. He ordered 
 his cavalry to march first, and followed as fast as ho was able 
 with the infantry. The cavalry had almost reached the borders 
 
1572.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 213 
 
 of the wood, when they perceived a hundred of the enemy’s horse 
 that had been sent before to reconnoitre. These the Spaniards 
 instantly attacked, and drove back into the wood, pursuing them 
 closely till they reached the main army, which was thrown into 
 confusion by the precipitate flight of the fugitives. In a very 
 little time the whole Spanish army arrived, and began the attack 
 before Jenlis had time to draw up his men in order of battle. 
 The French made resistance, however, for two hours with great 
 bravery ; but at last they gave way, and endeavoured to save 
 themselves by flight. Upwards of twelve hundred fell on the field, 
 and many were killed in the pursuit, partly by the Spaniards, and 
 partly by the country people, who took cruel vengeance for the 
 injuries which they had received from them in their march. Jenlis 
 himself was taken prisoner, and conducted to the citadel of Antwerp, 
 where, having died suddenly, his death was ascribed to poison. 
 The loss sustained by the Spanish army was inconsiderable. 
 
 Toledo returned to Mons in a few days after this distinguished 
 • \ v ^^ or y ’ & n d soon after, the duke of Alva arrived. This 
 before Mons cau ti° us general having drawn a double trench and 
 rampart round his army, by which it was rendered 
 secure on one side against the sallies of the besieged, and on the 
 other, against any sudden attack that might be made upon it by 
 the prince of Orange, he immediately erected several batteries, 
 and began his fire in different quarters with great fury. The 
 besieged discovered no less vigour in their defence ; which was 
 conducted with great prudence, as well as the most indefatigable 
 activity, by Count Lewis, seconded in all his operations by the 
 celebrated La Noue, who had gained distinguished renown in the 
 civil wars of France. 
 
 But although the besieged displayed the utmost skill and intre- 
 Arrival of the pidity, they had no hopes of being able to raise the 
 prince of siege, without the assistance of the prince of Orange. 
 Orange in the William had already penetrated into the Low Coun- 
 Netherlands. an( j advanced as far as Ruremond. There he 
 
 stopped, and demanded a supply of provisions for his troops. 
 The government of the town was in the hands of zealous Catho- 
 lics, who not only rejected his request, but accompanied their 
 refusal with a degree of haughtiness and insolence by which the 
 prince and his army were highly exasperated. There were many 
 of the citizens, however, with whom he had formerly held intel- 
 ligence. Having at this time renewed his correspondence with 
 them, he made a brisk attack upon one of the gates. The Catho- 
 lics sustained it with spirit ; but while they were thus employed, 
 the Protestant inhabitants snatched the opportunity, and intro- 
 duced the assailants by another gate into the city. It was not 
 then in the power of the prince of Orange to restrain the fury of 
 his soldiers. They plundered many of the citizens, violated the 
 churches, and put to death, with great barbarity, several priests, 
 
214 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XI 
 
 and other religionists. By some popish historians, William him- 
 self has been blamed on account of these enormities. But these 
 writers seem neither to have known that he published an edict to 
 prevent them, nor to have considered, that as he could not but 
 perceive that violent measures were calculated to hurt his cause, 
 by alienating the affections of the people in other cities, so his 
 conduct, on innumerable other occasions, furnishes the strongest 
 proof of his utter aversion to all cruelty and outrage. 
 
 William’s acquisition of Ruremond was of great importance, as 
 it put him in possession of a commodious passage over the Maese ; 
 lie therefore left a garrison to defend it, and hastened afterwards 
 to Hainault. The citizens of Mechlin, having been gained over 
 to his interest by the sieur de Dorp, opened their gates to receive 
 him. There he likewise left a garrison. The citizens of Louvain 
 refused to admit him within their walls ; but, on his preparing to 
 employ force, they consented to grant him a contribution ; of 
 which he accepted, in order to save the time which the siege 
 would have cost him. Nivelle, Diest, Sichem, Tillemont, and 
 several other towns, surrendered to him ; some through fear, and 
 others through the affection which they bore to his cause or per- 
 son. Dendremond and Oudenarde were taken by surprise, and 
 great irregularities were committed by the soldiers in both these 
 places, especially in the latter, where, notwithstanding their 
 leader’s prohibition, they once more indulged that ungovernable 
 fury with which their bigotry inspired them against the ecclesias- 
 tics of the Romish communion. 
 
 William made his stay at each of these places as short as 
 possible. He did not, however, arrive in Hainault till the begin- 
 ning of September, when his army amounted to more than 
 twenty thousand men. 
 
 So great an army could not be supported long without more 
 ample funds than he possessed. The States of Holland had sent 
 him a considerable sum. The exiles had transmitted to him a 
 part of the money that arose from their captures. His other 
 friends had arised contributions proportioned to their abilities. 
 But so great had been the expense of levying, equipping, and 
 maintaining his troops, and such immense sums had been laid 
 out in purchasing artillery and military stores, that he had occa- 
 sion still for all the supplies which had been promised him by 
 the court of France. 
 
 But his hopes of relief from that quarter were now utterly 
 extinguished. The plan of treachery above mentioned, which 
 had been carried on for two years with a degree of perseverance, 
 as well as of dissimulation, that has not its parallel in history, 
 was at this time brought to a conclusion. The artifices employed 
 to delude the Protestant leaders had at length succeeded, and 
 they were almost all caught in the net which had boon prepared 
 for their destruction. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 215 
 
 1572 .] 
 
 The admiral had remained at court for several months, during 
 which time Charles gave him every day fresh marks of affection 
 and esteem. That deceitful monarch had shown likewise a parti- 
 cular attachment to the admiral’s friends, and was perpetually 
 surrounded with them at council, in his own apartments, and 
 when he went abroad. With his permission, the admiral had 
 left Paris, and gone to Chatillon, where he staid for some time 
 to settle his private affairs. This indulgence was calculated to 
 create in him the most assured confidence ; since it could hardly 
 be supposed that, if the King had intended him any harm, by 
 enticing him to court, he would have allowed him to depart from 
 it. To such a height was the admiral’s security now risen, that 
 when Charles expressed his desire of having all grounds of enmity 
 between him and the Guises removed, he readily consented that 
 they should come to Paris, and agreed to refer the several points 
 of difference between himself and them to the King’s decision. 
 In a few days after, the duke of Guise arrived, attended by a 
 numerous train of dependants ; and a formal reconciliation was 
 made in presence of the King. But it soon appeared how little 
 sincerity there was on one side, in the professions which were 
 uttered on that occasion. 
 
 As a prelude to the final catastrophe, the queen of Navarre, a 
 princess who, by her spirit and magnanimity, had long been 
 formidable to the Catholics, died, after a short illness, which was 
 generally ascribed to poison. And an attempt was made, by a 
 partisan of Guise, to assassinate the admiral. By this last event 
 the Protestants were greatly alarmed ; but the King and Queen - 
 mother, by redoubling their dissimulation, and assuming, with 
 consummate artifice, the appearance of deep concern for what 
 had happened, prevented the admiral from suspecting them to 
 have been privy to it, and diverted him and the other Protestant 
 leaders from forming any vigorous resolution of providing for 
 their safety. They were all found, therefore, defenceless and 
 unprepared. 
 
 In that horrid scene which passed on the night of the twenty- 
 fourth of August, the duke of Guise was the principal actor. 
 But his savage spirit quickly diffused itself into every breast ; 
 and no Catholic declined to assist him in the execution of his 
 bloody purpose. The admiral, to whom, not many days before, 
 he had pledged his friendship, was among the first who fell a 
 sacrifice to his fury. This great man died with a fortitude and 
 tranquillity suitable to his character. 44 Young man,” said he 
 to La Besme (who was sent into his apartment by the duke of 
 Guise, while Guise himself remained without till the deed was 
 perpetrated), 44 you ought to reverence grey hairs ; but proceed 
 in the execution of your design ; you can shorten my life but a 
 very little.” While he was saying this, the assassin plunged his 
 sword into his breast. At the same time all his domestics and 
 
216 HISTORY OF THE REIQN OF [Book XI 
 
 fri'ends were murdered ; among whom was the brave Guerchy, 
 his lieutenant, and his son-in-law, the amiable Teligny, who had 
 won even the savage heart of Charles, and whose engaging aspect 
 suspended for some time the lifted hands of his murderers. But 
 it does not belong to this history to enter more particularly into 
 the detail of this transaction. Upwards of ten thousand Pro- 
 testants were massacred in Paris alone ; and in the other cities 
 of the kingdom, between fifty and sixty thousand. 
 
 Of this horrid massacre, the first idea is said to have been 
 suggested to the Queen-mother by Philip, through the duke of 
 Alva, at conferences held at Bayonne in one thousand five hun- 
 dred and fifty-nine ; and it is certain that intelligence of it was 
 received at Madrid with the utmost joy. Philip offered public 
 thanksgiving to heaven for the destruction of his enemies, and 
 wrote to Charles a congratulatory letter on the subject. On the 
 other hand, it filled the Protestants in the Low Countries with 
 horror and consternation. Their hopes of obtaining deliverance 
 from the Spanish yoke, through the powerful aid of France, had 
 been raised to the greatest height, and their dejection now was 
 in proportion to their former expectations. 
 
 Nothing could be more galling to the prince of Orange than 
 the news of this disaster. Besides the cruel disappointment of 
 finding a powerful monarch his mortal enemy, whom he had so 
 much reason to believe to be his friend, he knew not what 
 dangerous effect this unexpected revolution might produce upon 
 his troops, especially as some of them were subjects of France, 
 and had entered into his service under a belief that their King 
 was to support them in their present enterprise. 
 
 Perceiving, therefore, the necessity of pushing forward his 
 Operations of operations with the utmost vigour, and being persuaded 
 the prince of that, without some signal instance of success, he could 
 Orange. not } on g SU pp 0r ^ hi s arm y 9 he advanced without delay 
 towards Mons ; being resolved to try every expedient, not only, 
 to raise the siege, but, if possible, to bring on a general engage- 
 ment. 
 
 The duke easily penetrated into his design, and omitted nothing 
 in his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. 
 After the arrival of several German auxiliaries in his camp, his 
 army was superior in number, as it had always been in discipline, 
 to that of the prince ; and he could not have much reason to 
 dread the event of a battle, in case he should find it unavoidable. 
 But, knowing that the fate of battles is decided sometimes by 
 accidents, against which no human prudence can provide, and 
 considering that the prince’s army, through the scantiness of his 
 funds, would probably soon fall to pieces of itself, he resumed the 
 principles on which he had acted in the time of William’s former 
 expedition, and resolved to avoid exposing his troops to any 
 unnecessary risk ; hoping that, by tiring out the enemy, he 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 217 
 
 1572.] 
 
 should be able to triumph over them without fighting. With 
 this view, while he invested the town on every side, and prevented 
 any supplies from being thrown into it, he entrenched his camp 
 so strongly, as to render it entirely impracticable for the prince 
 of Orange to force his lines. He fortified the several passes by 
 which the town might be approached in the strongest manner ; 
 watched over every operation himself with indefatigable atten- 
 tion ; and forbade his men to engage in the slightest skirmish 
 with the enemy, whatever provocation they might receive. 
 
 After having taken these precautions, he sent out five hundred 
 horse to reconnoitre. They were met by nearly the same number 
 of German horse, commanded by Count Henry, William’s youngest 
 brother, who being ambitious to distinguish himself in this his 
 first campaign, attacked the Spaniards with uncommon fury, 
 and, after killing many of them, broke their ranks, and drove 
 them back in great confusion. The prince himself followed soon 
 afterwards with all his army, and drew it up in battle array 
 before the duke of Alva’s camp. 
 
 But Alva, more determined than ever, since the repulse of the 
 cavalry, to adhere to his plan, kept all his men within their 
 entrenchments. The prince of Orange omitted nothing in his 
 power to induce him to change his purpose. He shifted his 
 ground, intercepted the convoys of provisions, attacked foragers, 
 and sent out parties on every side with a view to entice the 
 enemy to quit their lines. 
 
 There were persons in the Spanish camp who condemned their 
 general’s conduct on this occasion, and exhorted him to put to 
 proof that courage of which the enemy were so extremely osten- 
 tatious. Among these was the archbishop of Cologne c , whose 
 ardent spirit breathed nothing but war and battle, and who 
 could not relish those cautious maxims by which the duke of 
 Alva had resolved to regulate his conduct. Alva remained 
 equally firm against the importunities of his friends, and the 
 arts that were practised by the enemy. It was a maxim often 
 in his mouth, that, as all human events are precarious, the most 
 precarious of all is a battle ; to which he added, that it ought 
 not to be the aim of a general to fight, but to overcome ; and 
 that there were other means by which this aim might be accom- 
 plished more effectually than by fighting. 
 
 But although his conduct was not approved by the archbishop 
 of Cologne, he had the satisfaction to know that it gave the 
 greatest uneasiness to the prince of Orange, who perceived that, 
 if an opportunity did not offer soon of striking some important 
 blow, by which he might raise the siege, it would not be possible 
 for him to keep his army together. His finances did not enable 
 him to bring provisions from a distance, and all the country 
 
 * The count of Isenbcrg. 
 
218 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XI. 
 
 round had been plundered by the Spaniards. Being driven, 
 therefore, to despair, he made a bold effort to break through the 
 enemy’s entrenchments ; but this adventurous attempt, which 
 nothing could justify but the urgent motive that incited him, 
 was attended with such an issue as he had reason to expect. 
 His men were bravely repulsed, and a considerable loss sustained. 
 
 He now relinquished all hopes of either raising the siege, or 
 forcing an engagement ; and he resolved to leave Hainault, after 
 attempting to introduce such supplies into the town as might 
 enable the garrison to hold out till winter, when the duke of 
 Alva would be obliged to retire. For this purpose, he made 
 choice of two thousand horse and one thousand foot, the flower 
 of his army. There was only a single pass by which they could 
 have access to the town, and at that place Alva had built a 
 strong fort, of which he committed the defence to a select body 
 of Spanish troops, under the command of Sancio d’ Avila and 
 Julio Romero. Notwithstanding this precaution, which left 
 hardly a possibility of success, the troops destined for the relief 
 of Mons advanced towards the pass with the utmost intrepidity. 
 Romero and d’ Avila received them with equal intrepidity, and 
 were seconded by the guns of the fort. The combat was hot 
 and furious. There was a brisk cannonading during the time of 
 it from the two armies, and from the town ; but the fire from 
 the fort did the greatest execution ; and the Germans, after 
 several hundreds of their number had fallen, were at last obliged 
 to abandon their attempt. 
 
 The prince of Orange, now convinced of the impossibility of 
 The prince is relieving the besieged in opposition to so powerful an 
 obliged to army, immediately decamped. The duke of Alva 
 leave Hai- followed him next day with most of his forces, and in 
 every movement discovered the most consummate skill; 
 so that he at once prevented the prince from returning towards 
 Mons, and avoided being reduced himself to the necessity of 
 fighting. It was not long before he learned that there was not the 
 same good order in the prince’s army which had hitherto been 
 observed in it. William’s authority over his troops had suffered 
 greatly by the failure of his late attempts ; and he was unable 
 any longer to maintain that perfect discipline, without which no 
 army, however numerous, can be formidable. 
 
 Alva readily embraced the opportunity which this circumstance 
 afforded him. Having taken a view in person of tho enemy’s 
 quarters, he resolved to attack them in the night. He committed 
 the charge of this enterprise to Julio Romero, and gave him two 
 thousand chosen infantry, who were ordered to be ready to march 
 in the middle of the night, each with a shirt over his armour, to 
 enable them to distinguish one another. They fell with great 
 fury on the Germans, who were stationed to guard the camp ; 
 and as most of them were fast asleep, they made dreadful havoc 
 
1572.J PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 219 
 
 among them, till the alarm was communicated to the rest, who 
 were soon roused by the groans and shrieks of the wounded. At 
 first, believing that the whole Spanish army had attacked them, 
 they fled precipitately. The assailants had in the beginning set 
 fire to the tents, and many of the Germans perished in the 
 flames. But this circumstance, by which the horror of the scene 
 was augmented, saved the German army from destruction. It 
 discovered the number of the Spaniards, and made it easier for 
 the prince of Orange to draw up his men, and to know in what 
 quarter he might find the enemy. But the assailants, perceiving 
 that the whole camp was up in arms, made their retreat in time, 
 and eluded the vengeance which they saw approaching. By the 
 favour of the night, they escaped with little loss, after having 
 put to the sword near five hundred of the Germans. 
 
 The consequences of this disaster were more pernicious to the 
 prince of Orange than the disaster itself. It filled his troops 
 with consternation, and gave them a formidable idea of the 
 Spaniards, whom, on account of their having so often declined 
 fighting, they had been accustomed to despise. Without waiting 
 for orders, they hastily decamped with one consent, and left a 
 part of their baggage a prey to the enemy. They had not 
 candour to acknowledge, that the misfortune which had befallen 
 them on the preceding night was owing to their negligence in 
 obeying orders. They were disposed to throw the blame of it 
 upon their general, and began to complain that, instead of 
 enriching them with spoil, he had brought them into the Low 
 Countries, only to expose them to perpetual hardships and 
 distress. He found means, however, at this time to quiet their 
 minds, and in some measure to rectify their opinion of his 
 conduct. 
 
 The duke of Alva was on this occasion urged by his officers to 
 pursue the prince till he should drive him entirely out of the 
 Netherlands ; but he repeated the old maxim, that it is wiser to 
 make a bridge for a flying enemy, than to reduce them to 
 despair ; and returned to the siege. 
 
 The prince of Orange led his troops to Mechlin ; and having 
 He disbands remained there for some days to recruit them after 
 hi s army, their fatigue, he continued his march northwards, till 
 he had brought them as far as Orsoy in the duchy of Cleves. 
 At that place their ill-humour broke out afresh with greater 
 violence than ever, and they began to hold private meetings, in 
 which they deliberated, whether, in order to procure payment 
 of their arrears, they should not deliver him up to the duke of 
 Alva. The principal officers received this ungenerous proposal 
 with horror and indignation. They were convinced that the 
 prince had done everything that could have been done by a 
 general of the most consummate abilities. They knew that 
 he had begun his enterprise with the highest probability of 
 
220 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 success, and that his failure in it had been almost entirely 
 owing to the treacherous dealings of the French king ; by trust- 
 ing to whom, he had engaged in a very different plan of operations 
 from that which he would otherwise have adopted. By these 
 considerations the officers were entirely satisfied : and through 
 their influence, the common soldiers were persuaded to relinquish 
 their perfidious design. The army was immediately disbanded ; 
 and William set out for Holland, where the people longed for his 
 arrival. 
 
 His retreat from Mons gave his brother, Count Lewis, who 
 The sur- was naturally of a sanguine tempef, the deepest affliction, 
 render of And this, joined to the extreme fatigue which he had 
 M°ns. undergone for several months before, threw him into a 
 violent distemper, which prevented him for some time from 
 attending to the siege. But during his confinement La Noue 
 conducted the defence with so much skill and intrepidity, that 
 Alva, despairing of being able before winter to take the town by 
 force, was willing to agree to such terms of capitulation, as Count 
 Lewis thought it not dishonourable to accept. These were, that 
 the French, Count Lewis, the Flemish nobility, and all who were 
 not inhabitants of the place, should leave it with their arms and 
 baggage ; and that such of the inhabitants as had borne arms 
 might leave it with their effects, but not their arms. That such 
 of them as were Catholics might remain in the town unmolested ; 
 but that all the Protestants should not only depart from the 
 town, but from the Netherlands ; and that all persons, whether 
 citizens or foreigners, should take an oath, that they would not 
 carry arms for the space of a year, either against the king of 
 France or the king of Spain ; from which oath Count Lewis 
 alone was exempted. This capitulation was signed by the dukes 
 of Alva and Medina Coeli, by Frederic de Toledo, and the baron de 
 Noircarmes ; and all the conditions of it were punctually fulfilled. 
 
 In this manner was Mons recovered from the Protestants, 
 Enormities a ^ er ^ had been m °re than three months in their pos- 
 of the Spa- session. The duke of Alva felt no anxiety with regard 
 niards at to the recovery of the cities which had received the 
 Mechhn. prince 0 f Orange. They were neither strongly fortified, 
 nor sufficiently provided with garrisons to defend them. The 
 first against which he turned his arms was Mechlin ; and he 
 ordered his son to lead thither the Spanish troops, who having 
 received no pay for some time, advanced like so many famished 
 wolves, with a resolution to satiate their rapacity by plundering 
 the inhabitants. 
 
 On their arrival, the garrison which had been left in the town 
 by the prince of Orange seemed determined to make resistance ; 
 but finding the citizens averse from co-operating with them, and 
 despairing of being able, without their assistance, to hold out 
 long, they deserted the place in the night ; and next morning 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 221 
 
 1572.] 
 
 all the priests and ecclesiastics went in solemn procession to 
 Toledo's tent, to deprecate his vengeance. When they were 
 pleading the cause of the unhappy anxious inhabitants, and repre- 
 senting that only a small number of them had been guilty, while 
 by far the greatest part had preserved their allegiance ; the 
 soldiers, apprehensive that Toledo might listen to this apology, 
 and disappoint them of their prey, rushed forward to the city, 
 and broke into it, some by the gates, and others, by the help of 
 scaling-ladders, over the walls. Then spreading themselves like 
 a deluge, they gave a loose to every species of violence ; butcher- 
 ing some, and plundering all without mercy. There was no 
 distinction made of age, sex, or condition. Virgins and matrons 
 were violated before the eyes of their parents and husbands. 
 The churches and convents were pillaged as well as private 
 houses ; and the nuns were not exempted from that brutal lust 
 and fury, which the Spaniards indulged without control. 
 
 The duke of Alva was sensible how great an odium must 
 Justified by attend such a barbarous treatment of a city which had 
 the duke of hitherto been distinguished for its fidelity ; yet he 
 Alva. chose to justify what had been done, and in a few days 
 afterwards published a manifesto, in which he declared, that the 
 citizens had suffered no more than their rebellion had deserved ; 
 that justice was not yet entirely satisfied ; that their crime 
 merited a still severer punishment, than barely to be deprived of 
 their effects ; and that other cities which had already imitated, 
 or should afterwards imitate, their example, might expect, 
 sooner or later, to meet with the same fate. Of the sacrilege 
 that had been committed on the churches and convents, and the 
 shocking treatment of the weaker sex, no mention w r as made in 
 the manifesto, and no excuse was ever offered for passing over 
 these enormities with impunity. Great arrears, said the apolo- 
 gists of Alva, were at that time due to the soldiers ; and, as he 
 could not satisfy them, he either thought it reasonable to allow 
 them to take a compensation for their pay ; or, being well 
 acquainted with their ferocious tempers, he was afraid to exercise 
 his authority. The Spanish soldiers themselves, though little 
 scrupulous with respect to crimes contrary to the laws of nature, 
 justice, and humanity, were afterwards, agreeably to the cha- 
 racter of their nation, touched with remorse on account of their 
 violation of the churches ; and in order to atone for their guilt, 
 they hearkened to the dictates of superstition, and laid out a portion 
 of their plunder in building a house for the Jesuits in Antwerp 6 . 
 
 Alva, having gone to Maestricht, where he dismissed his 
 Cruelty of German horse, went from thence to Brussels, while the 
 the Spani- Spaniards were permitted to remain at Mechlin for 
 aids at Zut- several days, which they employed in collecting their 
 plunder, and sending it off in boats to Antwerp, to be 
 
 e Meteren, p. 107. Campana, p. 97. Bentiv. p. 1 14. 
 
222 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XT. 
 
 exposed to sale. Toledo then led them against the other cities 
 which had received German garrisons. These garrisons fled on 
 his approach ; and the people agreed to pay exorbitant contribu- 
 tions to save their cities from being sacked : nor did he meet 
 with any opposition in his progress, till he came to Zutphen, 
 which was at that time a place of considerable strength. It was 
 defended with a wall flanked with bastions, and surrounded with 
 a deep ditch. The Issel washes the fortifications on one side, 
 the Berkel on another; and the ground on the other two sides 
 is so extremely wet and marshy as to render the place, for the 
 greatest part of the year, almost inaccessible. But unfortunately 
 for the Protestants in garrison, they could not avail themselves 
 of these advantages at this juncture ; the frost having set in with 
 uncommon severity several days before the arrival of Toledo. 
 He found no difficulty, therefore, in approaching the place with 
 his batteries, and he soon made a breach in the wall. He was 
 preparing for an assault, when he received intelligence, that the 
 garrison, and all such as had rendered themselves obnoxious, had 
 gone out of the town by the opposite gate ; and that the citizens 
 who remained were now, when left at liberty to act agreeably to 
 their inclination, willing immediately to surrender at discretion. 
 But Toledo, having, by the small resistance which the garrison 
 had made, got a pretext for plundering this unhappy people, 
 refused to listen to any terms of accommodation, and ordered his 
 troops to advance. They entered the town without opposition, 
 and repeated there the same shocking barbarities which they had 
 exercised in Mechlin, with this difference, that as there was 
 much less booty in Zutphen to satisfy their rapacity, they in- 
 dulged their cruelty so much the more. They put to the sword 
 all the citizens who fell in their way, men and women without 
 distinction ; and when they were tired with slaughtering, they 
 cast great numbers into the Issel, and indulged themselves in the 
 horrid joy of beholding the unhappy sufferers perish in the stream. 
 By the sword and water, above five hundred perished ; and the 
 rest were obliged to redeem their lives by the most oppressive 
 contributions, which were so cruelly exacted, that the living had 
 reason to envy the fate of those whom death had delivered from 
 such intolerable misery f . 
 
 * Meteren, p. 110. Bentivoglio, p. 115. Meursii Auriacus, p. 90. 
 
1572 .] 
 
 PyiUP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 223 
 
 BOOK XII. 
 
 While the Spanish army was employed in the siege of Mons, 
 Transactions and in subduing the other revolted towns in the southern 
 in Holland provinces, the people of Holland and Zealand improved 
 and Zealand, ^h e i e i sure which was afforded them, by taking every 
 precaution in their power to secure themselves from being again 
 reduced under the Spanish yoke. They increased the number 
 of their ships of war, completed their fortifications, and levied so 
 great a number of forces, as, with the great advantages of their 
 situation, they hoped would be sufficient for their defence. 
 
 Before the duke of Alva set out for Mons, he had, agreeably 
 Philip to orders transmitted to him from Spain, read, in 
 passes from presence of the States of Brabant, Artois, Hainault, 
 the iotha°nd and Flanders, a declaration, that he would pass from 
 20th penny the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, on con- 
 in June. dition that the states would devise some other means 
 by which the money necessary for the king’s service might be 
 raised. Intimation was made of this concession to the States of 
 Holland, by the count of Bossut ; who, in the name of the 
 governor, commanded them to assemble at the Hague, to con- 
 sider of what other taxes they would substitute in the room of 
 those which had been formerly imposed. 
 
 This concession, which, if it had been made sooner, might have 
 His conces- prevented the revolt of the maritime provinces, was not 
 sion disre- attended with the desired effect. It excited in the 
 garded by minds of the people the highest degree of joy and 
 the States. exu i£ a tion ; but they did not think themselves indebted 
 for it, either to the King or the duke of Alva. They ascribed it 
 wholly to the dread that was entertained of the prince of Orange, 
 to whom alone they thought themselves bound for this first 
 instance of attention that had been shown to their inclination or 
 interest since Philip’s accession to the throne. They could not 
 doubt, that if his apprehensions of the German army were 
 removed, Alva would be again permitted to resume the pursuit 
 of that plan of tyranny which he had been obliged to suspend. 
 They were well acquainted with the vindictive spirit which 
 animated Philip’s councils. They knew that, for much slighter 
 offences than those of which they had been guilty, many thou- 
 sands of their countrymen had suffered the most cruel death ; 
 and they believed, that whatever assurances might be given 
 them of pardon, the memory of their guilt would never be 
 
224 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XI. 
 
 extinguished but in their blood. By the unrelenting cruelty 
 which had been exercised against the Protestants, added to the 
 contempt which had been shown to their fundamental rights and 
 laws, the people were entirely alienated from Philip’s person and 
 government. They were convinced that he had resolved to treat 
 them henceforth, not as subjects but as slaves; and they had 
 long repined and murmured at their fate. 
 
 From the time of Alva’s arrival in the Netherlands, all the 
 Protestants who had escaped from the cruelty of the inquisitors, 
 had carefully concealed their sentiments, and conformed to the 
 established worship ; but having of late received a great increase 
 of number, by the return of many of the exiles, they had thrown 
 off the mask ; and it now appeared, that by far the greatest 
 part of the inhabitants, and even of the deputies of the States, 
 were strongly attached to the reformed religion. Their religious 
 zeal co-operated with their abhorrence of the Spanish tyranny ; 
 and both together inspired them with a fixed unalterable purpose 
 to defend their liberty to the last. 
 
 Prompted by these motives, the States paid no regard to the 
 They meet order for assembling at the Hague, transmitted to them 
 at Dort, by Bossut ; and that they might the more strongly 
 express their contempt of the governor’s authority, they appointed 
 an assembly to be held at Dort. Of this assembly they gave 
 early notice to the prince of Orange, and entreated him to send 
 one of his most faithful friends, properly instructed, to assist them 
 in their deliberations. The person whom the prince made choice 
 of for this purpose, was the sieur de St. Aldegonde, the author 
 of the compromise, who had long been well acquainted with 
 William’s most secret views and sentiments. 
 
 St. Aldegonde readily undertook the task imposed upon him ; 
 
 , t and at the first meeting of the States, gave them thanks, 
 into engage- in the name of the prince, for the intimation which they 
 ments with had sent him, of their resolution to vindicate their 
 o^Oran^ under his direction. “ The prince was conscious,” 
 
 iange ‘ he said, “ of being seriously interested in the welfare of 
 all the provinces, and of none more than those of Holland and 
 Zealand, which for several years had been the objects of his par- 
 ticular attention. From time to time he had heard with indig- 
 nation and grief, of the distress and misery to which they had 
 been reduced through the Spanish tyranny ; and there was 
 nothing which he desired more ardently, than to be instrumental 
 in recovering for them those invaluable rights, which for ages 
 past had proved the source of their prosperity. In order to 
 accomplish this end, he had spared neither expense nor labour. 
 He had failed in his former attempt for their deliverance, not 
 (he hoped, they would believe) through any negligence or mis- 
 conduct, but through the superior power and more copious 
 resources of the enemy. In his present armament, ho had 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 157*2.] 
 
 225 
 
 already expended .all that remained of his once ample fortune ; 
 and as, in levying his army, he had trusted in a great measure to 
 the assistance which they had promised him, now was the time 
 to fulfil that promise, and to enable him to begin his military 
 operations without delay.” 
 
 The States, who knew the truth of what St. Aldegonde had 
 represented, and were sensible how much the success of William’s 
 enterprise depended on his receiving an immediate supply, sent 
 him without delay a hundred thousand florins, which they 
 borrowed from the more wealthy citizens ; and promised to send 
 him more as soon as it could be raised, either from the ordinary 
 taxes, or from the revenues of the monasteries, which were at 
 that time converted into a fund for carrying on the war. After 
 this transaction, a solemn declaration in writing was delivered 
 to St. Aldegonde, in which they engaged to acknowledge the 
 prince of Orange as the only lawful governor or stadtholder of 
 the province ; appointed him commander-in-chief of all their 
 forces by sea and land ; and engaged, that without his consent, 
 they should not listen to any terms of peace which might be 
 offered ; St. Aldegonde, on the other hand, engaging in the 
 name of the prince, that he would not lay down his arms, nor 
 enter into any accommodation or treaty, without the knowledge 
 and approbation of the States 8 . 
 
 The States exerted themselves strenuously to perform their 
 Their dis- promises of supplies. They sent him two hundred 
 tress. thousand florins, which he received at Ruremonde, in 
 his way to Mons, and gave him security for three hundred 
 thousand. When the news was brought them of his retreat, 
 and the necessity under which he found himself of disbanding his 
 army, they were exceedingly dejected ; and were filled with the 
 most disquieting apprehensions, when they considered that the 
 duke of Alva, having no enemy in the field to oppose his progress, 
 was now at liberty to employ all his forces united in taking venge- 
 ance on them for their contempt of his authority. 
 
 Their distress was much increased by the inflexible obstinacy 
 Amsterdam the °ity Amsterdam, in adhering to the Spanish 
 adheres to interest ; which did not proceed so much from the 
 the Spa- general inclination of the citizens, as from the care 
 which the duke of Alva had taken to preserve the 
 government of that city in the hands of the most rigid Catho- 
 lics. By an order of the States, Lumey, count de la Marck, had 
 besieged it with a considerable body of troops ; but after making 
 some progress in his operations, he despaired of success, and 
 suddenly raised the siege. He ascribed the miscarriage of his 
 attempt to the negligence of the States, in supplying him with 
 provisions. The States, on the other hand, threw the blame 
 entirely upon the count. They had been for some time past 
 
 £ Meursii Aumcus, p. 84. 
 
226 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XII. 
 
 extremely dissatisfied with his conduct, on account of the cruelties 
 which he had allowed his troops to exercise against the Catho- 
 lics ; and they believed that they should never be able to persuade 
 the people of Amsterdam to unite with the other cities in the 
 province, while their army was under the command of a person 
 who had rendered himself so exceedingly obnoxious h . 
 
 Loud complaints of the outrages of the soldiers were heard 
 Outrages m evei 7 quarter, and many of the people began to 
 committed lament the revolution to which they had given their 
 by their consent. The States dreaded the consequences of so 
 
 troops. much ill-humour. But they were not possessed of 
 
 power sufficient to remedy the abuses complained of ; and La 
 Marck, who was naturally violent and ferocious, paid no regard 
 to their commands. In this distress, they had no resource, 
 but in the prudence and authority of the prince of Orange, who, 
 they hoped, would, notwithstanding his late misfortunes, be able 
 to repress the insolence of the soldiers and their general. They 
 sent him notice of the critical situation to which they were 
 reduced ; and they intreated him to come as soon as possible, to 
 take the government of the province, and the command of the 
 forces, into his own hand. 
 
 William could not, either with safety or honour, have left his 
 Arrival of arm y sooner than he did. From Orsoy, where it was 
 the prince of disbanded, he went, attended only by his own domes- 
 Orange in tics, and a company of horse, to Campen in Overyssel, 
 Holland. anc [ f rom thence he passed over the Zuider Sea, to 
 Enchuysen ; where he was joyfully received, and all his directions 
 for the greater security of the place were carried immediately 
 into execution. After staying there for some days, and visiting 
 the other towns in the province, he set out for Haerlem ; having 
 appointed a convention of the States to be held in that city, to 
 consider of the present situation of their affairs. 
 
 His arrival excited in persons of all ranks the most unfeigned 
 His magna- joy ; but this joy, he perceived, was greatly allayed 
 nimity. by their apprehensions of being unable to resist an 
 enemy, before whom he himself, at the head of a powerful army, 
 had been obliged to retire. The first object of his attention was 
 to raise their drooping spirits, by making them sensible of the 
 advantages which they possessed in the nature and situation of 
 their country ; which, while they retained their superiority at 
 sea, and acted in concert, would render abortive all the attempts 
 of the Spaniards to reduce them. The magnanimity which he 
 displayed diffused itself into every breast ; and the deputies 
 unanimously declared, that they would be entirely governed by 
 his counsels in all their conduct, and would lay down their lives 
 sooner than abandon that invaluable liberty, without which they 
 thought life itself was not desirable. 
 
 11 Meursii Auriacus, p. 95. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 227 
 
 1572 .] 
 
 In the present temper of their minds, William might have 
 Hig modc ruled the people of the maritime provinces with an 
 ration, an d absolute sway ; but he knew there was a much safer, 
 salutary re- as W ell as a more effectual, method of exercising power, 
 gulations. an( j wisely resolved to consult the States in every 
 matter of importance, and to take upon himself only the execu- 
 tion of their commands. For this purpose he frequently convened 
 them ; and in order to give greater weight to their decisions, he 
 persuaded them to admit into their number the deputies of twelve 
 other cities, besides those of whom their assembly had been 
 hitherto composed : a measure which was no less gracious and 
 popular, than it was wise and prudent. It flattered the vanity 
 of those towns on which the new privilege was bestowed ; engaged 
 them to contribute with greater alacrity their share of the public 
 expenses ; and drew the several districts of the province into a 
 state of more intimate union with one another. 
 
 With the States, thus increased in number, the prince applied 
 himself to rectify the disorders which had prevailed, and to put 
 the province into a posture of defence against the Spaniards. It 
 had been deserted, during the late commotions, by many of the 
 principal inhabitants, by several members of the courts of justice, 
 and by the officers of the revenue, and others who held public 
 employments ; which they had been induced to abandon, either 
 by their attachment to popery, or their diffidence in the duration 
 and stability of the present government. The numerous vacancies 
 which were thus occasioned, were supplied with Protestants ; and 
 no Catholic was admitted into any office, or allowed to take any 
 concern in the administration of public affairs. 
 
 The exercise of the Romish religion was prohibited in the 
 Establish- churches ; and the only worship permitted to be 
 ment of the exercised publicly, was the Protestant, as taught by 
 reformed Calvin, and practised in Geneva, and the Palatinate, 
 religion. Thus far the prince of Orange complied with the incli- 
 nation of the people, by a great majority of whom the principles 
 of the reformers had been embraced. But all persecution on 
 account of religion, he discouraged to the utmost of his power. 
 His reasonings for toleration were more successful now in favour 
 of the papists, than they had been formerly with the duchess of 
 Parma, in behalf of the reformers. The States, by his persuasion, 
 resolved that no person whatever should be molested on account 
 of his religion, provided that he lived quietly, kept no correspond- 
 ence with the Spaniards, and gave no disturbance to the estab- 
 lished mode of worship \ 
 
 William found greater difficulty in restraining the licentious- 
 ness of the army, than in settling either the courts of justice or 
 the church. When we reflect on those horrid scenes which were 
 exhibited in the Netherlands by the duke of Alva and his asso- 
 
 » Grotius. p. 4 1 . 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XII. 
 
 ciates, it will not appear surprising, that the Protestants should 
 have conceived the most violent animosity against their bloody 
 persecutors. They had seen their dearest relations and friends, 
 besides many persons whom they revered on account of the 
 innocence and sanctity of their lives, treated like the most flagi- 
 tious malefactors : and many of themselves had, in order to 
 avoid the same fate, beep obliged to abandon their habitations, 
 and to wander from place to place, forlorn and indigent. In the 
 bitterness of their distress, they had forgotten the spirit of that 
 religion for which they suffered ; and on many occasions, wreaked 
 their vengeance against their enemies with a brutal fury. To 
 the Spaniards who were taken prisoners at sea, the Protestants 
 on board the fleet gave no quarter ; while the ecclesiastics, and 
 many others whose only crime was their adherence to the religion 
 of their ancestors, were treated by the Protestant soldiers with 
 equal inhumanity. 
 
 The count of la Marck, commander-in-chief of the forces, was 
 Lumey de so far from opposing these enormities, that he encou- 
 la Marck. raged his soldiers in committing them. This noble- 
 man's principal virtue was intrepidity, and under the cloak of 
 zeal for liberty, and the reformed religion, he seems to have 
 intended nothing so much as the gratification of his avarice or 
 revenge. The prince of Orange, who, from his natural humanity, 
 and a prudent regard to future consequences, w r as utterly averse 
 to every species of violence, attempted to make him sensible of 
 the folly and iniquity of his conduct. But finding that he was 
 not likely to succeed, and that the soldiers still indulged them- 
 selves without controul in their wonted excesses, he referred the 
 matter to the cognizance of the States, and desired them to 
 consider coolly what was proper to be done. The States, who 
 were highly incensed against the count, for his contempt of their 
 authority, deprived him of his command, and ordered him to be 
 apprehended. William, unwilling to forget the services which 
 the count had performed in the beginning of the revolt, soon 
 after interposed in his behalf, and prevailed upon the States to 
 release him. But la Marck could not digest the affront which 
 had been offered him. He complained loudly of the States for 
 their ingratitude ; boasted of his authority in the fleet and 
 army, and attempted to excite a spirit of sedition among the 
 people. The States were meditating to seize him a second time, 
 in order to bring him to his trial. But the prince of Orange, 
 prompted by tenderness for his relations, and a sense of his 
 former services, dissuaded them from executing their design, 
 and advised them to suffer him to leave the province. The 
 States listened, though with some reluctance, to this advice, and 
 the count, having left the Netherlands, died soon afterwards in 
 the city of Liege. 
 
 The command of the forces was conferred on the count of 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 229 
 
 1572.] 
 
 Battenburg, by whom they were brought under proper disci- 
 pline ; and all such of the Catholics as chose to remain in the 
 country delivered from those alarms and apprehensions with 
 which. they had been hitherto disquieted. One cause of the 
 great irregularities which had been committed by the troops, 
 was the want of proper funds for their subsistence. The States 
 now supplied this defect, as well as the present circumstances of 
 the province would allow. To the payment of the army, and 
 other public purposes, they appropriated the demesnes which 
 the King had enjoyed as Count of Holland, the revenues of the 
 Romish priests and monasteries, and the estates of all such 
 Catholics as had gone over to the enemy, besides a certain pro- 
 portion of the captures made at sea k . 
 
 While the prince of Orange and the States were thus employed 
 Progress of in providing for the security of Holland, Frederic de 
 the Spanish Toledo had made rapid progress in reducing the towns 
 arms. which had revolted in the other provinces ; nor did he 
 find much difficulty in subduing them ; for so great was the terror 
 which they had conceived from his late success, that of all the 
 towns which had declared for the prince of Orange in Groningen, 
 Overyssel, Utrecht, and Friesland, there was none that did not 
 send ambassadors to Toledo, to deprecate his vengeance, and to 
 make profession of unreserved submission to his will. He placed 
 garrisons in the most considerable towns, and inflicted no other 
 punishment upon the people but pecuniary fines. Had he main- 
 tained the same moderation in his conduct afterwards, he would not 
 perhaps have encountered much greater difficulty in the recovery 
 of some of the towns of Holland and Zealand, than he had met with 
 in recovering those of the interior provinces ; but from natural 
 temper, he rejoiced infinitely more in rigour and severity, than in 
 lenity and moderation ; of the truth of which he gave a signal 
 proof in his barbarous treatment of the inhabitants of Naerden. 
 
 This town was then neither large nor strongly fortified, yet 
 Massacre of the citizens, prompted by some foreign Protestants who 
 the people of resided in it, were bold enough to refuse admittance to 
 Naerden. a company of horse, sent by Toledo before his main 
 army, to require their submission ; but, having quickly repented 
 of their rashness, they despatched a deputation of the most 
 respectable inhabitants, among whom was Lambertus Hortensius, 
 a man eminent for his learning, to Amersfort, where Toledo had 
 arrived in his way to Naerden. He declined hearing the 
 ambassadors himself, and desired them to apply to Julio Romero, 
 who had power, he said, to grant them such terms of reconcile- 
 ment as he should judge to be reasonable. By Romero it was 
 agreed, that the lives and fortunes of the citizens should be 
 spared on the following conditions : that the town should be 
 immediately delivered into the hands of Toledo ; that all the 
 
 Grotius, p. 40. Meursii Auriacus, p. 97. 
 
230 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 inhabitants should renew their oath of allegiance to the king ; 
 and that one hundred Spanish soldiers should be permitted to 
 seize as much booty as they could carry at one time out of the 
 city. In ratification of this agreement, Romero, having given 
 his right hand three several times to Hortensius, entered the 
 town, attended by so small a number of Spaniards as banished 
 from the minds of the citizens all apprehensions of fraud or 
 violence ; and when he summoned them to meet in one of the 
 churches to take the oath of allegiance, they ran thither unarmed, 
 and presented themselves a defenceless prey to their bloody 
 murderers. Whether Romero acted in concert with Toledo does 
 not appear from the cotemporary historians. This only is 
 certain, that while the former was employed in administering the 
 oath, the latter, who had brought forward his troops to the gates 
 of the town, led them directly to the church in which the citizens 
 were assembled, and ordering the doors, which till then had been 
 kept shut, to be thrown open, he rushed into it at the head of 
 his troops, and immediately killed with his own hand the principal 
 magistrate. The Spaniards were not backward to imitate the 
 example of their general. They fell with savage fury on the 
 astonished, defenceless citizens, and after butchering all that 
 were in the church, spread themselves over the city, and put 
 every person whom they met to the sword. They made no 
 distinction between the innocent and the guilty; the Catholics as 
 well as Protestants ; those who had preserved their allegiance, as 
 well as those who had thrown it off, were all involved in one 
 promiscuous ruin. The soldiers then entering into the houses, 
 where they found the wives and daughters of the slain over- 
 whelmed with anguish, instead of being softened by the sight of 
 so much unmerited distress in that tender sex, their savage 
 hearts only prompted them to indulge their avarice, their cruelty, 
 and their lust. Even virgins under age they violated, and others 
 they tortured in the most inhuman manner, either from a wanton 
 pleasure which they took in cruel deeds, or to extort from the 
 unhappy sufferers a discovery of the treasure which had belonged 
 to their murdered husbands or parents. They strangled some, 
 embrued their hands in the blood of others, turned all the rest 
 of the city into the open fields, and then throwing fire into the 
 houses, reduced the town to ashes. 
 
 The accounts transmitted to us by the Protestant writers of 
 the horrid cruelty which the Spaniards exercised on this occasion, 
 would be incredible, if they were not confirmed by the Catholic 
 historians. There was an hospital in the town for old men, and 
 at that time there were several in it above eighty years of age ; 
 even these were butchered ; nor did persons confined to the bed 
 of sickness and distress escape their fury. The life of Lambertus 
 Hortensius was saved by the interposition of the count de Bossut; 
 but the Spaniards made him suffer what was worse than death, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 231 
 
 1572.] 
 
 by murdering the son, and tearing his heart out of his body 
 before the father’s eyes. There is another instance of their 
 cruelty recorded, which is, if possible, still more inhuman. After 
 having tortured in the most shocking manner one of the citizens, 
 to make him discover where he had concealed his wealth, they 
 dishonoured his wife in his presence, and upon his reproaching 
 them with their barbarity, they put him to death ; then having 
 tied the woman’s hands behind her, they bound her by the feet 
 to a beam of the house, with her head downward, and left her 
 to die in that posture, with her little son, whom they likewise 
 bound and placed beside her, to aggravate the misery of that 
 dreadful death to which their cruelty had doomed her 1 . 
 
 From this horrid massacre, Toledo led his army to Amster- 
 dam, where he remained for some time in expectation that, from 
 the dread of his vengeance, the other towns of the province 
 would be induced to make a tender of their submission ; but the 
 cruelty and treachery which he had exercised at Naerden,were not 
 more contrary to the laws of religion and humanity, than incon- 
 sistent with the maxims of sound policy, and were calculated not 
 so much to excite terror as revenge and indignation. From the 
 fate of Naerden, the people were convinced, that there was at 
 least as much to be dreaded from submission as from resistance ; 
 and they thought it no less absurd than dangerous, to enter into 
 terms of agreement with men who had shown themselves so 
 cruelly perfidious. 
 
 Of this they soon gave a conspicuous proof in their vigorous 
 Siege of and obstinate defence of Haerlem. To gain over the 
 
 Haerlem. inhabitants of that city, Toledo had employed the 
 
 mediation of the Catholics of Amsterdam, and some of the 
 magistrates of Haerlem had sent privately three of their number 
 to Frederic to treat with him of a surrender. This was no 
 sooner known, than Riperda, a Friesland gentleman, to whom 
 the prince of Orange had committed the government of the 
 town, called together the principal inhabitants, and informed 
 Riperda’ s them of what had passed. “ By a solemn oath,” said 
 
 speech. he, “ the magistrates were lately bound not to listen, 
 
 without your permission, to any proposals, or to engage in any 
 design or enterprise by which the general interest of the city 
 might be affected, yet, not only without your permission, but 
 even without your knowledge, they have sent an embassy to 
 treat with Toledo about delivering the city to the Spaniards. 
 We are unable, they pretend, to withstand so great a force as 
 will be brought against us, and must be involved in all the miseries 
 of a cruel siege, unless we avert them by a timely application for 
 peace and pardon. But have the Spaniards treated with greater 
 lenity those who have trusted to their faith, than those who have 
 
 1 Meursii Auriacus, p. 98. Thuanus, lib. liv. Bentivoglio, p. 115. 
 
232 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII 
 
 opposed them 1 Have the people of Mechlin and Zutphen been 
 dealt with more mercifully than those of Mons 2 Does not the 
 melancholy fate of Naerden sufficiently instruct you how little 
 regard is due to the promises of those men, who have now shown 
 themselves no less devoid of faith than we have ever found them 
 of humanity 2 Are not the streets of that unhappy city still 
 reeking with the blood of those who confided in the faith and 
 mercy of the Spaniards ? By standing on our defence we may 
 elude their fury ; but if we receive them into the city, we rush 
 headlong upon destruction. They will either butcher us like 
 sheep, after they have stripped us of our arms, or reduce us to 
 a state of ignominious slavery and bondage. Do not flatter 
 yourselves with the hopes that they are willing to be reconciled 
 to you. They intend only to take advantage of your simplicity, 
 and to get you into their power, without exposing themselves to 
 danger. Have you not already sworn to act the part to which I 
 now exhort you, to defend your walls against the Spaniards, and 
 to preserve your allegiance to the prince of Orange, whom you 
 have acknowledged as the only lawful governor of the province 2 
 And in order to save ourselves from the hardships of a siege, 
 shall we imitate that vile example of treachery, which in our 
 enemies appears so odious ? Let us derive courage, my friends, 
 from the justness of our cause; and rather than submit to such 
 an enemy, let us resolve to die, fighting gloriously in defence of 
 our religion, our liberty, and laws.” 
 
 This speech was received with shouts of high applause by all 
 the audience. They cried out with one voice — u No peace with 
 the Spaniards ! we will shed the last drop of our blood, rather 
 than open our gates to so perfidious an enemy.” Itiperda then 
 sent information to the prince of Orange, who was at this time 
 in Delft, of the resolution which they had formed. And, in 
 return, William encouraged the citizens to persevere, by assuring 
 them that the other cities in the province would exert themselves 
 with vigour in their behalf. Immediately after which he rein- 
 forced the garrison with four companies of Germans ; and sent 
 St. Aklegonde with a commission to put the administration of 
 the town in the hands of such as were sincerely attached to the 
 reformed religion. Of the three ambassadors who had treated 
 with the Spaniards, one remained with Toledo, and the other two 
 were, upon their return to Haerlem, put under arrest, and sent 
 to Delft, where, after being tried, they were condemned as 
 traitors. One of them died in prison, and the other was executed 
 publicly: an instance of severity, with which the prince of Orange 
 was not displeased, as it tended to deter the Catholics in the 
 other cities from holding correspondence with the enemy. 
 
 The news of these unexpected events excited, in the fiery 
 tempers of Toledo and his father, the highest degree of wrath 
 and indignation. They immediately gave orders for the march 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 233 
 
 1572.] 
 
 of the toops to Haerlem, and exerted themslves strenuously in 
 making preparations for carrying on the siege with dispatch and 
 vigour. 
 
 Haerlem was, at the time of this memorable siege, the most 
 Description considerable town in Holland, next to Amsterdam, 
 of Haerlem. It was surrounded with a deep ditch and a strong wall, 
 but was of so great extent, that it required a numerous garrison 
 to defend it. It stands beautifully in the midst of an extensive 
 plain, having a wood on one side, and a branch of the river 
 Sparen on the other ; and the other branch of that river passes 
 through the town, and then falls into the lake, or as it is some- 
 times called, the sea of Haerlem. Amsterdam and Leyden are 
 nearly at the distance of between three and four leagues from it ; 
 the former lying towards the east, and the latter towards the 
 south. From Amsterdam and Utrecht, Toledo proposed to 
 furnish his army with provisions ; and the people of Haerlem 
 expected to derive the same advantage from the neighbourhood 
 of Leyden ; where, in order to assist them more effectually, the 
 prince of Orange now fixed his residence. 
 
 The nearest way by which the Spanish army could approach 
 to Haerlem, was by the fort of Sparendam, the rampart of which 
 stood on the dyke along which the troops must pass. In this 
 fort Riperda had placed a garrison of three hundred men, and 
 had begun to employ the country people in breaking down the 
 dyke, in order to lay the country under water. Rut the frost 
 having set in with uncommon severity, rendered all their labour 
 fruitless, and gave the Spaniards easy access to the fort. The 
 garrison made a vigorous resistance for some time ; but being 
 attacked on every side, and overpowered by superior numbers, 
 they were at length compelled to retire to Haerlem. 
 
 Toledo followed soon after with his army, which consisted of 
 Toledo begins between twelve and thirteen thousand men ; six 
 tke siege. thousand of whom were natives of Spain, and the 
 rest W alloons and Germans. He had just begun to assign them 
 their several stations, when he received intelligence that a body 
 of troops, amounting to near three thousand men, with cannon 
 and provisions, were upon their march from Leyden, with an 
 intention to enter Haerlem, before the blockade was formed. 
 He set out immediately to intercept them, and had the good 
 fortune, during a fall of snow, to come upon them unawares, near 
 the village of Rerkenrode. His troops, being greatly superior in 
 number to the enemy, broke their ranks at the first onset, and 
 having killed between six and seven hundred, put the rest to 
 flight. Their officers endeavoured to rally them, but in vain. 
 They fled precipitately, and left their cannon and provisions a 
 prey to the victorious army. 
 
 Flushed with this success, Toledo returned immediately to the 
 siege. Having stationed the Walloons and Germans on the 
 
234 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 Progress of great road which leads to Leyden, he himself, with the 
 the siege. Spaniards, took possession of an hospital, which lay 
 near the gate of the cross. At this place he resolved to begin 
 his operations, although the gate was covered by a strong ravelin, 
 and the wall on that side could be more easily defended than in 
 any other quarter. Into this blunder he was betrayed, not so 
 much by ignorance or inadvertence, as by the contempt which he 
 entertained for the besieged. After the success with which his arms 
 had everywhere been attended, he did not expect to meet with 
 the smallest difficulty in his present enterprise ; and flattered 
 himself that Haerlem, like the other revolted cities, would, as 
 soon as he should begin his attack, open her gates to receive him. 
 From the same presumption, he neglected all the precautions 
 which are usually taken in sieges ; and, without opening trenches 
 to cover his men from the enemy’s fire, he planted his battery, 
 and began to cannonade the gate and ravelin. He had no sooner 
 made a breach, than he resolved to storm it, and for this pur- 
 pose ordered one hundred and fifty men to cross the ditch, by 
 means of a portable bridge. This detachment was ordered to 
 return, in case the breach should be found impracticable. But 
 the rest of the soldiers, who were not less confident of success 
 than their general, and were impelled by their avidity for plunder, 
 without waiting for the word of command, ran forward to the 
 bridge, and passed over it in great numbers. They soon per- 
 ceived their error. The breach was not near so considerable as 
 they had imagined, and their scaling-ladders were too short. 
 The narrowness of the bridge, which permitted only three men 
 to march a-breast, threw them into confusion. They stood on 
 the brink of the ditch, crowded together, and exposed to the 
 musketry as well as cannon of the besieged. Still, however, the 
 foolish ardour with which they were inspired, made them unwilling 
 to retire, till Romero, an officer whom they highly respected, 
 advanced towards them, and reproached them with the madness 
 of their attempt. 44 Do you not perceive,” he cried, 44 that the 
 smallness of the breach renders your assault impracticable ? Is 
 this the discipline which you have learnt in the school of the duke 
 of Alva ? thus, without orders, to expose yourselves a defenceless 
 prey to these rebels, who insult and butcher you, while they 
 themselves are out of the reach of danger? You will soon find an 
 opportunity to take vengeance on them. At present it is not in 
 your power.” At length he persuaded them to retire, but not 
 till he himself was wounded, and near two hundred private men, 
 and a great number of officers, had fallen. 
 
 This disaster served to undeceive Toledo with regard to the 
 facility of his enterprise ; and he resolved not to expose his 
 troops to any further danger, till he should be fully provided 
 with everything necessary for conducting the siege, with loss 
 expense of blood, and a better prospect of success. For this end, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 235 
 
 1572.] 
 
 lie gave the proper instructions to his agents in Utrecht and 
 Amsterdam ; but all the roads which led to his camp, were so 
 much infested by the Hollanders, that a whole month elapsed 
 before he was in a condition to renew his operations against 
 the town. 
 
 The prince of Orange was more successful in his attempts to 
 Supplies sent secure it. He could not indeed collect a sufficient 
 to the town number of troops, either to raise the siege, or to 
 over the ice. f orce j-jjg wa y through the enemy’s entrenchments. 
 But the frost having continued for several weeks, not only men, 
 but even loaded carriages, could be conveyed over the lake with 
 greater facility than by land. The reader need not be told with 
 what agility the Hollanders transport themselves from one place 
 to another, over the ice, with skates. They exerted all their 
 dexterity on this occasion, and introduced into the city fifteen 
 companies of soldiers, together with a great number of sledges 
 loaded with provisions and ammunition. 
 
 In the mean time Toledo had prepared everything requisite 
 for resuming the operations of the siege ; and he now hastened 
 to repair the faults which he had committed in the beginning ; 
 proceeding with greater caution than before, but with the same 
 activity and vigour. Having by trenches secured his troops 
 against the fire of the besiegers, he began to batter the town 
 with his artillery ; and at the same time employed his miners, of 
 whom the duke of Alva had sent him three thousand from the 
 bishopric of Liege, in working mines, and sapping the foundation 
 of the walls. Neither labour nor danger was avoided. But the 
 boldness and vigilance of the citizens and garrison were in pro- 
 portion to the means employed to subdue them. By counter-mines, 
 they either prevented, or rendered ineffectual, the mines of the 
 besiegers ; and no sooner was a breach made in the fortifications, 
 than ditches were dug, or some sudden bulwark raised behind it, 
 by which all access was rendered as difficult as ever. Not 
 satisfied with acting on the defensive, they often sallied out upon 
 the besiegers, destroyed their works, and fell upon them sword in 
 hand, when they were the least prepared to repel their attacks. 
 
 While the Spaniards were thus kept in perpetual occupation 
 and anxiety, the prince of Orange laboured assiduously to 
 increase their difficulties, by sending out flying parties to inter- 
 cept their convoys of provisions. Some of these attempts proved 
 successful ; and as they made it necessary for Toledo to send 
 large detachments from his army to guard his convoys, they 
 facilitated the introduction of supplies into Haerlem, and retarded 
 the progress of the siege. 
 
 Useless cm- Almost all the supplies of the Spanish army came 
 city exer- from Amsterdam, and there was but one road by which 
 cised by they could be conveyed. In order to take possession 
 pai ties. 0 £ an j m p or t an t pass on that road, the prince had 
 
230 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 sent a detachment of troops under Anthony 1c Peintre, who 
 had a principal concern in the surprise of Mons. The Catholics 
 of Amsterdam, having received information of this design, dis- 
 patched a number of forces, sufficient not only to secure the pass, 
 but to engage with the enemy. The two parties came to blows ; 
 the Protestants were routed, and many of them slain ; among 
 whom was le Peintre their commander. In derision of the 
 besieged, the Spaniards having cut off the heads of le Peintre, 
 and of another officer killed in that rencounter, whose name was 
 Coning or King, they threw them over the walls into the city, 
 with an inscription tied to the head of Coning, which bore, besides 
 his name, upon which they jested awkwardly, that he was come 
 with two thousand auxiliaries to raise the siege. Of this insult the 
 Haerlemese showed their resentment, by an action equally bar- 
 barous. They beheaded twelve of their Spanish prisoners ; and 
 then put all their heads into a cask, which they rolled down into 
 the trenches, after writing upon it, “The tax of the tenth penny 
 to the duke of Alva, with the interest due to him on account of 
 the delay of payment. 1 '* In revenge for this barbarity, the Spa- 
 niards hung up by the feet and neck, a number of prisoners, in 
 sight of the besieged ; who, in return, put to death some more of 
 their prisoners, in the same ignominious manner, in the view of 
 the Spaniards. Such instances of barbarous and useless cruelty 
 were often practised in the beginning of the present war ; nor 
 were they discontinued, till the duke of Alva and his son, who, 
 by their example, contributed much to the spreading of this 
 savage spirit, had left the Netherlands. 
 
 The operations of the siege were in the mean time carried on 
 Toledo as. hy Toledo with as much celerity, as the difficulty under 
 saults the which he laboured in furnishing himself with provisions, 
 town. and num berless diseases which the severity of the 
 season occasioned among his troops, would allow. By under- 
 mining the ravelin which defended the gate of the cross, he 
 obliged the garrison to abandon it ; and after a cannonading, 
 which had lasted for many days, by which he laid a great part of 
 the wall in ruins, he at last resolved to storm the breach with all 
 his forces. For this purpose he drew them together from their 
 several stations in the night ; and that he might find the besieged 
 unprepared, he began the assault before daybreak. No pre- 
 caution was neglected to insure success. The orders were 
 explained to all the soldiers, particularly and distinctly. Each 
 man had his station and part assigned him. Some were appointed 
 to stand at a proper distance from the walls, to annoy the enemy 
 in case they should appear; and those who were destined for 
 the assault were enjoined to observe the most profound silence, 
 till they should make themselves masters of the breach. So well 
 was this last injunction observed, that several of the Spaniards 
 had mounted the breach, and even scaled the walls, before the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1572.] 
 
 237 
 
 besieged were apprised of their approach. But when they had 
 advanced thus far, they were perceived by the guards, who 
 immediately sounded the alarm, and tumbled them all headlong, 
 before they had time to put themselves into a posture of 
 defence. 
 
 This assault was made near the ravelin of which the Spaniards 
 is repulsed ^ ia( ^ P ossesp i° n some days before; and in order to 
 second the assailants, many Spanish officers and sol- 
 diers were standing upon the ravelin, and a great number round 
 it. The townsmen, having resolved to render this fortification 
 useless to the enemy, had wrought a mine under it, and lodged 
 there a quantity of gunpowder, and other combustible materials. 
 They saw with joy, and seized instantly, the opportunity pre- 
 sented to them, of executing their purpose with signal damage to 
 the enemy. A part of the ravelin, with the ground adjoining 
 to it, was blown up ; and many of the Spaniards perished. The 
 rest of the army stood aghast at this unforeseen disaster. The 
 citizens left them no leisure to recover from their astonishment, 
 but rushed out impetuously, attacked them with irresistible fury, 
 and compelled them to retire, with the loss of a great number of 
 officers, and upwards of three hundred private men. 
 
 The failure of this attempt, in which Toledo had exerted his 
 He medi- utmost force and skill, gave him great anxiety with 
 
 tates the regard to the issue of the siege ; and some of the prin- 
 ting of cipal officers advised him to raise it without delay. “ All 
 
 the siege, ^.j ie miseries of a siege,'’ they said, “ were felt more by 
 
 the royal army, than by the rebels who were besieged. Through 
 
 the difficult communication between the camp and Amsterdam, 
 the troops laboured under a perpetual scarcity of provisions ; 
 and suffered more from the severity of the season, than from the 
 sword of the enemy. They would either never be able to take 
 the place, or it would cost them infinitely more than it was worth. 
 In the end, the conquerors would find themselves in as deplorable 
 a condition as the conquered ; and no army would remain, suf- 
 ficient to subdue the other cities which had rebelled.” 
 
 This opinion was warmly opposed by other officers, who repre- 
 sented, that their success in the further prosecution of the war, 
 would depend on the issue of the present siege. “If we raise it,” 
 said they, “we shall confirm all the other cities in their obstinacy ; 
 if we persevere, we shall render easier every future enterprise. 
 The season cannot remain long in its present severity. One night 
 may dissolve the ice, of which our enemies have so often availed 
 themselves. Our loss of men will be speedily repaired by the 
 levies which are making in the Netherlands, and by the troops 
 which we expect from Spain. We shall soon be able to cut off 
 the town from all communication with the other revolted cities, 
 and when we have done this, can we doubt that the besieged will 
 open their gates, and throw themselves upon our mercy ? ” 
 
238 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 Between these opposite opinions Toledo would not take upon 
 Alva's letter himself to decide, but referred the matter to the duke, 
 to his son. whose answer, carrying in it the appearance of authority 
 more than of counsel, showed that he was not a little dissatisfied 
 with his son for deliberating on the subject. “ You must prosecute 
 the siege,” said Alva, in the letter which he wrote to him, u till 
 you bring it to the desired issue ; unless you would prove yourself 
 unworthy of the name you bear, of the blood from which you 
 are sprung, and of the command with which I have entrusted you. 
 The more difficult this enterprise, the greater glory may you derive 
 from it. In a siege of such importance as the present, you ought 
 not to consider the number of days which it detains yon, but the 
 consequences with which your success or failure will be attended. 
 You must now endeavour to effectuate by famine, what you have 
 been unable to accomplish by the sword. You must blockade 
 the town instead of storming it ; and you will be enabled to 
 render the blockade complete, by the reinforcement which will 
 soon be sent you. But if still you shall entertain thoughts of 
 abandoning your enterprise, I will either come myself to the 
 camp, sick as I am ; or if my increasing illness shall prevent me, 
 I will send for the duchess of Alva to command the army, rather 
 than suffer it to withdraw.” 
 
 Frederic was stung with this reproach, and resolved to prose- 
 cute the siege, regardless of all the difficulties and dangers which 
 had induced him to deliberate. He proceeded slowly, however, on 
 account of his want of a sufficient number of troops to form the 
 blockade ; when, about the middle of February, the frost went 
 off, and changed entirely the operations of the contending 
 parties. 
 
 The prince of Orange had not neglected to provide for this 
 Battle on event. A great number of vessels had been prepared, 
 the lake. and as soon as the ice was melted, and the wind favour- 
 able, they left Leyden with a large supply of provisions; and 
 sailing along the lake, entered into the Sparen, and got safe to 
 Haerlem. In this way the besieged were frequently supplied ; 
 nor could the Spaniards for some time procure a naval force 
 sufficient to prevent it. At last the count de Bossut, assisted by 
 the people of Amsterdam, collected a great number of armed 
 vessels, with which he made his appearance on the lake. And 
 thus the scene was almost entirely changed, and the operations 
 of the siege converted, for several weeks, into the various ren- 
 counters which passed between the fleets ; while the one party 
 laboured to introduce supplies into the city, and the other was 
 continually on the watch to intercept them. At first the actions 
 were slight and unimportant, but at length the number of ships 
 on both sides being greatly augmented, they came to a general 
 engagement ; in which, after much bloodshed, victory declared 
 against the Protestants. In this action the count de Bossut 
 
1573.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 239 
 
 acquired great honour, and reduced the enemy’s fleet to so low 
 a pitch, that henceforth they could not venture with safety to 
 come within his reach. He soon after made himself master of a 
 fort in the mouth of the Sparen, and having stationed a part of 
 the fleet there, he rendered all access to the town by water 
 utterly impracticable. 
 
 During these transactions on the lake, the townsmen and gar 7 
 The vigour r i son exerted the same activity and vigour as before, 
 and intrepi- They gave the besiegers no respite, but harassed them 
 dity of the continually, by sallying out in strong bodies, sometimes 
 besieged. j n Qne q Uar fc erj anc | sometimes in another. In one of 
 the sallies, they drove the German forces from their intrench- 
 ments, slew upwards of eight hundred of them, set on fire their 
 tents and baggage, and carrying off a great number of cannon 
 and military ensigns, returned to the town in triumph 01 . 
 
 But Toledo was soon afterwards in a condition to prevent 
 these eruptions, from which the besieged derived so much glory. 
 The reinforcement which his father had been preparing, at length 
 arrived ; and his trenches were thereby secured against any 
 attack that could be made upon them, either from within or from 
 without. 
 
 The besieged began to suffer greatly from a scarcity of provi- 
 Their dis- sions. There was no expedient for relief, however 
 tress * desperate, which they did not employ. They attempted 
 frequently, in the night, to force the enemy’s lines, and to open a 
 passage for the convoys, which, agreeably to concert, the prince 
 of Orange sent forward, to be ready to enter the town, in case 
 the garrison could dislodge the besiegers from their intrench- 
 ments. But they found the enemy everywhere prepared to 
 receive them, and were repulsed in ali their attempts. They had 
 then recourse to another no less desperate expedient. They broke 
 down the dyke of the Sparen, and laid ail the ground between 
 the lake and the city under water. The Spaniards being obliged, 
 in consequence of this device, to quit the part of their intrench- 
 ments to which the water reached, some flat-bottomed boats 
 passed into the town, with gunpowder and provisions. But the 
 relief which the besieged received in this way was inconsiderable. 
 Bossut being absolute master of the lake, the passage by which 
 the Hollanders had entered was soon blocked up, and all access 
 to the town rendered as difficult as ever. 
 
 The people of Haerlem had now no prospect of deliverance, 
 Count Bat- but from a body of troops which the prince of Orange 
 tenburg had for some months been employed in assembling, with 
 defeated. a v ] ew attempt the raising of the siege. He had 
 solicited aid from the queen of England, and from the French 
 and German Protestants. But the former was averse, at this 
 
 Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 218. 
 
240 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 time, to declaring herself openly against Philip ; and both the 
 latter were too much occupied at home, to have either leisure or 
 power to afford their brethren in Holland any effectual assistance. 
 In the mean time, the famine in Haerlem had risen to the most 
 dreadful height. Every species of ordinary food was already 
 consumed ; and the people subsisted on the roots of the coarsest 
 herbs, and on the flesh of horses, dogs, and other animals against 
 which men commonly entertain the most irreconcilable aversion. 
 William, having got information of the extremity to which they 
 were reduced, resolved to make an effort in their behalf, with the 
 forces which he had already collected. They consisted partly of 
 French, German, and English Protestants, but chiefly of raw 
 troops, which had been levied hastily for the present purpose in 
 the neighbouring cities ; amounting to four thousand foot and six 
 hundred horse. He intended to have conducted this little army 
 himself, but was prevailed on by the States to give the command 
 of it to the count of Battenburg. Notice was conveyed to the 
 besieged, of the time when this armament would approach Haer- 
 lem, by letters tied to pigeons, which had been brought from 
 Haerlem to Leyden, in order to be employed as messengers to 
 the besieged, in case all other communication between the cities 
 should be obstructed". 
 
 Battenburg set out from Leyden with his troops, several field- 
 pieces, and a large convoy of provisions, in the beginning of July. 
 His instructions were, to direct his attack against the quarters of 
 the Germans stationed towards the plain of Haerlem. The 
 besieged, it was expected, would sally out upon them at the same 
 time ; and while they were thus distracted by one enemy before, 
 and another behind them, it was hoped that the convoy of provi- 
 sions would find an opportunity of entering the town. But 
 Toledo, having received intelligence of their design, drew up a 
 part of his forces within their intrenchments, to repress the sally 
 intended by the besieged, and led out the rest to me6t Count 
 Battenberg. His troops, being greatly superior to the enemy 
 both in discipline and number, broke their ranks, and threw them 
 into confusion at the first onset. The general, and upwards of 
 two thousand men, were killed ; and almost the whole convoy of 
 provisions fell into the hands of the victors. 
 
 This disaster entirely broke the spirits of the besieged, and 
 The besieged made it necessary for them to propose a surrender 
 offer to without delay. They accordingly sent a deputation to 
 
 capitulate. Toledo, with an offer to deliver up the town, on condi- 
 
 tion that the inhabitants should not be pillaged, and that the 
 garrison should be allowed to march out of it with the honours 
 of war. Toledo refused to listen to these or any other 
 is answer. con ^j^j ong . an d informed them that they must leave it 
 
 n Tluutnus, lib. lv. c. v. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 241 
 
 1573 .] 
 
 to him to determine what treatment both the garrison and citi- 
 zens should receive. 
 
 The besieged were too well acquainted with his implacable 
 Their reso- spirit, not to shrink at the thoughts of exposing them- 
 lution. selves to his mercy. They had not forgotten the dismal 
 catastrophe of Naerden. They considered this answer as a decla- 
 ration, that he had devoted them to destruction. The people ran 
 in crowds from every quarter of the city, to the places of public 
 resort, in order to learn the particulars of that fatal answer 
 which the deputies had brought. The women, the aged, and all 
 the more un warlike part of the inhabitants, were overwhelmed 
 with terror. As if their houses had been already in flames, or as if 
 they had beheld the bloody sword of the Spaniard waving round 
 them, there was nothing to be seen or heard but tears, and shrieks, 
 and groans. Their despair was soon afterwards converted into 
 a degree of madness, by a resolution formed by the governor and 
 garrison, to leave all such as were unable to bear arms behind 
 them, and to force their way, sword in hand, through the enemy's 
 lines. To prevent them from executing their purpose, the women 
 hastened tumultuously (many of them with their children in 
 their arms) to the gate, where the garrison had appointed to ren- 
 dezvous before their departure. It was a scene truly piteous and 
 miserable; the women either rolling in the dust, or clinging 
 round the necks and knees of their husbands, fathers, sons, or 
 brothers ; dissolved in tears, and imploring that they might 
 be carried along with them, and suffered either to escape or 
 perish together. The men were melted at the sight of so much 
 anguish in persons so near and dear to them, and yielded at last 
 to their entreaties. It was then agreed, that one half of all the 
 military in the town should march in the front, the other half in 
 the rear ; and the women, children, and others unable to bear 
 arms, it the middle between them. Drawn up in this form, they 
 resolved to attempt a passage with their swords through the 
 enemy's entrenchments. They knew it to be impossible but that 
 most of them must perish. “ But if we open our gates to the 
 Spaniards," said Riperda, “ must we not likewise perish ? And if 
 we must die (though still it is possible we may escape), is it not 
 better to die fighting bravely in the field, — we who have exerted 
 ourselves so strenuously in defence of our religion and liberty, — 
 than, after being stripped of our arms, and bound like criminals, 
 to receive an ignominious death upon a scaffold, or in a dun- 
 geon, from the hands of an ungenerous and unrelenting enemy?" 
 
 They were upon the point of putting their design in execution, 
 Toledo offers when intelligence of it was carried to Toledo. He 
 more favour- considered, that if they were not diverted from it, 
 able terms. j ie i n consequence of his victory, instead of a 
 
 great and important city, acquire possession only of a desolated 
 ruin. He reflected too on the danger to which his troops 
 
 K 
 
242 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII. 
 
 might be exposed, from the fury of so many brave men, animated 
 by despair and vengeance ; and therefore, without delay, he sent 
 a trumpet to the besieged, to give them hopes of favour and 
 forgiveness. There was a violent struggle in their minds for 
 some time between their fears, and the hopes with which he thus 
 inspired them. But from their knowledge of his character, their 
 distrust and diffidence prevailed ; and they refused to hearken to 
 his proposal, till he engaged that, on condition of their paying 
 two hundred thousand livres, the army should be restrained from 
 plundering the inhabitants, and that. all of them, except fifty-seven 
 whom he named, should receive a full pardon of their offences. 
 
 This exception of so great a number of citizens, who were 
 the most considerable persons in the town, and had distinguished 
 themselves by their bravery in its defence, would have prevented 
 the accommodation from taking place, had not the German part 
 of the garrison urged in the most determined manner, that the 
 conditions offered should be accepted. The Walloons, on the 
 other hand, and the Dutch, were extremely reluctant and averse ; 
 because, as they were more obnoxious than the Germans, they 
 believed that no mercy would be shown them. The garrison 
 being thus divided in their sentiments, and many of them having, 
 with a view to make their escape, secretly withdrawn from their 
 stations on the walls, the inhabitants began to dread that the 
 Spaniards, observing them grown more remiss than formerly, 
 The sur. might take the town by storm ; and therefore, without 
 render, further delay, they sent a deputation of their number, 
 to make the surrender on the terms proposed. 
 
 A regiment of Spaniards was immediately sent to take posses- 
 Juiy 13 s ^ on the place. All persons, whether inhabitants or 
 foreign soldiers, were ordered to lay down their arms. 
 The citizens were commanded to retire into certain churches, 
 and the garrison to certain monasteries, where guards were 
 placed over them to prevent their escape. On the same day, 
 Toledo entered the town with the Spanish troops. In order to 
 induce the foreign soldiers, of whom the garrison chiefly consisted, 
 to concur with the inhabitants in the surrender, Toledo had given 
 them particular assurances of safety. And although they were 
 strictly guarded, and not suffered to depart, yet bread had been 
 distributed to them , as well as to the citizens ; and no violence 
 was offered them till the third day, when the duke of Alva, who 
 had recovered from his illness, came to Haerlem on pretence of 
 visiting the fortifications, but in reality to instruct his son with 
 regard to his treatment of the prisoners. 
 
 It was then, but too late, that this brave, though now defence- 
 The perfidi- ^ ess g arr i sol b repented of having so tamely delivered up 
 ous cruelty their arms ; and saw the folly of trusting in the mercy 
 of Alva and 0 f an ungenerous enemy, whose revenge and hatred were 
 his son. implacable. A massacre, which had been concerted in 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1573.] 
 
 243 
 
 the interview between the father and son, was begun by putting 
 to death three hundred W alloons. At the same time, the brave 
 Riperda and other persons of note were beheaded. But the 
 slaughter stopped not here. Several hundreds of French, Scotch, 
 and English soldiers, besides a considerable number of the citizens 
 who had been seized in attempting to make their escape, were 
 likewise butchered ; and when the executioners were tired with 
 slaughtering, they tied the unhappy victims two by two, and 
 plunged them into the river. Even the sick and wounded were 
 carried out into the court-yard of the hospital where they lay, 
 and put to the sword. 
 
 Historians differ as to the number of those who were involved 
 in this dismal catastrophe ; and it is remarkable that some of the 
 Spanish writers make it greater than the Dutch. By the lowest 
 account nine hundred brave men were executed like the vilest 
 malefactors, who, trusting to Toledo’s promise, had given up their 
 arms, and thrown themselves upon his mercy. 
 
 It would shock the reader’s humanity to offer any excuse 
 Conse- for such inhuman cruelty ; yet it must not be denied 
 thevTorous Alva had ample matter of chagrin, when he con- 
 defen?e°o°f US sidered how much the length of the siege, and the 
 Haeriem. obstinate valour of the besieged, had cost him. By 
 the inclemency of the season, by the scarcity of provisions, and 
 by the sword of the enemy, he had lost four thousand five hun- 
 dred men ; besides a great number whom their diseases or wounds 
 rendered unfit for service. Nor was the diminution of his forces 
 the only loss which he sustained from this siege. It was attended 
 with an expense, by which his treasury was exhausted. It sunk 
 considerably the reputation of his arms, and inspired the insur- 
 gents with hopes, that an enemy, who had found it so difficult to 
 conquer, might themselves be overcome. It afforded leisure to 
 the other revolted cities to settle their affairs, and furnished them 
 with the happiest opportunity of carrying on their conquests in 
 Zealand, where the city of Middleburg still remained in the hands 
 of the Spaniards 0 . 
 
 Of the several inconveniences which the duke of Alva suffered 
 Mutiny of from the length of the siege, the draining of his trea- 
 the Spanish sury was not the least considerable ; as it occasioned 
 troops. Bis falling behind in the payment of his troops, and 
 rendered abortive all the succeeding operations of the campaign. 
 He intended that they should have gone from Haeriem into North 
 Holland, to secure the town of Alcmaer. But when orders were 
 given for their march, they refused to obey. They had been 
 greatly exasperated by the conditions granted to the people of 
 Haeriem, because they were thereby disappointed in their hopes 
 of plunder ; and they resolved to make Toledo feel their resent- 
 
 ° Bentivoglio, p. 117. Meteren, p. 1 10. Meursii Annaeus, lib. viii. 
 
 R 2 
 
244 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XII- 
 
 ment, by insisting on the immediate payment of their arrears. 
 He represented to them the prejudice which the King’s interest 
 would suffer from their remaining inactive at the present crisis. 
 But the more they perceived their importance, the higher was 
 the gratification of their resentment. Without regard either to 
 Toledo’s remonstrances, or to the terms on which Haerlem had 
 been surrendered, they fixed their quarters in that city ; laid the 
 citizens, already exhausted by their sufferings, under contribution, 
 and exercised over them the same tyrannical oppression as if they 
 had taken the town by storm : thus demonstrating to the in- 
 habitants of the other cities, the absurdity of submitting to 
 the Spaniards, whatever conditions might be offered ; since, even 
 when their commanders were willing to observe these conditions, 
 they were violated by the soldiers, whose rapacity the general 
 was unable to restrain. 
 
 This incident affected the duke of Alva with the most sensible 
 concern. He was aware of the pernicious effects that must arise 
 from it. He had ever valued himself, and not without reason, 
 on the exact discipline which he had hitherto maintained. In- 
 clined, but at the same time afraid, to employ rigour and severity, 
 lest still more pernicious consequences might follow, he resolved 
 to make trial of persuasion ; and with this view he employed the 
 intercession of the marquis of Vitelli, who was the most beloved 
 as well as the most respected of all his officers. Vitelli exerted 
 his utmost art and influence ; and at last, with infinite difficulty, 
 he persuaded the mutineers to accept a part of their arrears, and 
 to submit to the authority of their commanders 1 *. 
 
 Much time having been employed in this negociation, the 
 The siege of season was far advanced before the army could be 
 Alcmaer. led to Alcmaer. This place (if they had attacked it 
 sooner) must unavoidably have fallen into their hands. It had 
 been the last of all the cities in North Holland in shaking off its 
 allegiance to Philip. The catholic inhabitants were numerous, 
 and had been able to keep possession of one of the principal gates 
 of the town. They had earnestly solicited Toledo to hasten to 
 their assistance. But the mutiny of his troops having prevented 
 him from complying with their request till it was too late, the 
 prince of Orange had improved the leisure which this incident 
 afforded him ; and having sent forces to the assistance of the pro- 
 testant inhabitants, he had wrested the gate out of the hands of 
 the Catholics ; furnished the Protestants with arms, and procured 
 for them, from the neighbouring cities, supplies of provisions and 
 military stores. 
 
 Toledo was aware of the disadvantages which must attend his 
 entering on the siege of a place, situated like Alcmaer, in a 
 marshy soil, so late in the year. But he hoped that, with so 
 
 p Bentivoglio, p. 131. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1573.] 
 
 245 
 
 great an army as he now possessed q , he would be able to reduce 
 it before the rainy season should begin ; and he knew that the 
 reduction of Alcmaer would greatly facilitate his conquest of the 
 other towns in the province. He left Haerlem, therefore, as 
 soon as Vitelli had quelled the mutiny of the troops, and marched 
 directly towards Alcmaer r . 
 
 Having planted a battery on each side of the town, he began 
 a brisk cannonading, and in a few days made such considerable 
 breaches, that he doubted not of being able to carry the town by 
 storm. In order to divide the garrison, he resolved to make an 
 assault on both sides at once. The inhabitants perceived his 
 The Spani- design, and prepared for their defence. The Spaniards 
 aids bravely having passed the ditch, by means of two portable 
 repulsed. bridges, advanced to the attack with loud shouts, and 
 full of confidence that there was no force in the place sufficient 
 to oppose them. But they soon found that courage, when 
 grounded on despair, can in some cases supply the want both of 
 discipline and numbers. The garrison, seconded by the towns- 
 men, made so intrepid a resistance, as filled the Spaniards with 
 astonishment. They renewed the attack several times ; but were 
 at last obliged to retire with the loss of six hundred killed, and 
 three hundred wounded. Toledo could not, either by promises 
 or threats, persuade them to return to the assault. Soon after- 
 wards the rains began to fall, and the Spaniards suffered greatly 
 from the humidity of the air and soil. The duke of Alva, too, had 
 received intelligence, that the Hollanders had formed the design 
 of opening their sluices, in order to lay the country round Alcmaer 
 under water. To save his army, therefore, from destruction, 
 he sent orders to his son to raise the siege ; which Frederick 
 The siege did accordingly, on the eleventh of October. He then 
 raised. marched to the southern parts of the province, and 
 put his troops, greatly fatigued and exhausted, into winter- 
 quarters 5 . 
 
 Alva was not more fortunate at this time by sea, than he had 
 Sea-fight been by land at Alcmaer. In revenge for the assist- 
 
 near Am. ance which the people of Amsterdam had lent the 
 sterdam. Spaniards in the siege of Haerlem, the inhabitants cf 
 Enchuysen, Horn, and other protestant cities, had fitted out 
 against them a numerous fleet, which they stationed in the 
 mouth of the river Ye. With this fleet they took or destroyed 
 every vessel that attempted to pass from Amsterdam into the 
 Z wider Sea, and thus put an entire stop to the trade of that 
 commercial city. To remedy this evil, which must soon have 
 proved fatal to a people who subsisted wholly by trade, the duke 
 of Alva had come himself to Amsterdam, where he had equipped, 
 
 i It amounted to sixteen thousand men. 
 r It lies at the distance of only one day’s journey from Haerlem. 
 s Meteren, p. 123. Thuanus, lib. lv. sect. 8. 
 
246 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XII. 
 
 with the utmost expedition, a fleet, consisting of twelve ships of 
 war, of a much larger size than usual, of which he gave the com- 
 mand to the count de Bossut. This fleet was much inferior in 
 number to that of the enemy ; but this disadvantage, Alva hoped, 
 would be compensated by the number of soldiers on board, added 
 to the superior size of the ships, and the skill and bravery of the 
 commander. 
 
 As soon as Bossut approached the mouth of the river, the 
 The Protest- Hollanders left their station, and retired towards 
 ants victo- Horn and Enchuysen. Here they received a consider- 
 able reinforcement ; and soon afterwards returned, 
 under the command of Theodore Sonoy, to watch an opportu- 
 nity to encounter the enemy on advantageous terms. The two 
 fleets for some time lay in sight of each other, and frequent 
 skirmishes passed between them. Bossut hesitated long, whether 
 he should venture to engage with a force so much superior ; and 
 for this reason he kept his fleet in the open sea, and in the 
 deepest water, where he could avail himself of the size of his 
 ships. But the people of Amsterdam, impatient under the 
 interruption of their trade, having transmitted a false repre- 
 sentation to the duke of Alva of the strength of the Hutch fleet, 
 persuaded him to send positive orders for a general engagement. 
 Bossut, though extremely diffident of success, immediately steered 
 towards the enemy, who lay in shallow water, prepared for his 
 attack. The combat was begun with great spirit and intrepidity, 
 but victory soon appeared on the side of the Hollanders ; who, 
 having a much greater number of ships than the enemy, 
 attacked them on every side ; and being much nimbler in all 
 their motions, did them a great deal of mischief, while their own 
 loss was inconsiderable. Of Bossut’s fleet, one ship, with all the 
 crew, was sunk ; three were stranded, and afterwards taken by 
 the Hollanders ; and all the rest, except the Admiral’s galley, 
 saved themselves by flight. Of this vessel, the cotemporary 
 historians speak in the strongest terms ; and represent her as 
 one of the largest, and the best equipped, that had been ever 
 seen. She was surrounded by a number of the enemy’s smaller 
 vessels, which battered her furiously on every side, and at length 
 drove her upon a bank. Bossut, still unwilling to suffer her 
 to fall into their hands, continued to make the most obstinate 
 resistance*, till, of three hundred soldiers on board, two hundred 
 and twenty were killed, and all the rest wounded but fifteen. In 
 this situation, one of the Spaniards, who remembered the scenes 
 of treachery and bloodshed in which he had been concerned in 
 Naerden and Haerlem, advised the Admiral to receive the enemy 
 into the ship, and then to blow her in the air. But Bossut, 
 conscious of having done everything that either his duty or his 
 
 This engagement lasted for twenty-eight hours. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 247 
 
 1573.] 
 
 honour could require, refused to listen to so desperate a pro- 
 Bossut is posal, and chose rather to confide in an offer which 
 taken pri- was made him by the Hollanders, that if he would 
 soner. surrender without any further resistance, they would 
 spare the lives of all that were on board. On this condition, 
 the ship was accordingly given up ; and Bossut, with such of the 
 crew and soldiers as survived, was conducted to prison in the 
 town of Horn u . 
 
 Sonoy sent immediate notice of this victory to the States of 
 Holland ; who, being sensible how much their safety depended 
 on maintaining their superiority at sea, had been extremely 
 anxious with regard to the issue of the contest ; and they now 
 appointed a solemn thanksgiving to be observed in all the churches 
 of the province. 
 
 Their joy on this occasion was not a little increased by the 
 The States acquisition of San Gertrudenberg ; which gave them 
 ^acquire San the command of the Maese, and a free entrance into 
 Gertruden- the province of Brabant. It was taken by a detach- 
 ment of their troops, under the command of the Sieur 
 de Payette, a French protestant, who entered it in the night by 
 scalade, and put the garrison, consisting of a cohort of W alloons, 
 under a Spanish governor, to the sword. 
 
 This loss was in some measure compensated to the duke of 
 St. Aide- Alva, by an advantage which a detachment of his 
 gonde taken army gained over the Sieur de St. Aldegonde, who 
 prisoner. h a d marc ] ie d with a body of troops to check the 
 excursions of the Spaniards in the southern parts of Holland. 
 St. Aldegonde’s forces were cut to pieces or dispersed, and he 
 himself was taken prisoner. Alva would not have spared the 
 life of a man, who, by his activity in rousing the spirit of liberty 
 among his countrymen, had rendered himself so exceedingly 
 obnoxious, had he not been restrained by his regard for the 
 preservation of the count de Bossut ; upon whom the prince of 
 Orange had declared he would retaliate for whatever severity 
 should be used against St. Aldegonde 34 . 
 
 Alva intended to have begun the next campaign with the 
 Alva leaves siege of Leyden ; and with this view he seized upon a 
 the Nether- number of stations in the neighbourhood of that city, 
 lands. But s i e g e? no ] ess memorable than that of Haerlem, 
 was reserved for his successor. Alva had, as mentioned above, 
 applied to Philip for liberty to leave the Low Countries, on 
 account of the bad state of his health, occasioned by the moisture 
 of the climate, and the fatigues which he had undergone. This 
 was believed by many to be only a pretence ; while his request 
 proceeded in reality from apprehensions that the King had 
 
 11 The admiral’s ship, called the Inquisition, carried only two-and-thirty guns. — Thu- 
 anus, lib. lv. sect. vii. Meteren, p. 125. Bentivoglio, p. 133. 
 
 x Meursii Albanus, p. 270. Meteren, p. 125. 
 
248 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XII. 
 
 listened to the representations of his enemies, and would soon 
 confer his office upon another. There is very little reason, how- 
 ever, to suppose that Philip was in the smallest degree dissatis- 
 fied with his conduct, since he appears, in all his tyranny and 
 violence, to have acted with strict conformity to his instructions. 
 But Philip having at last become diffident of the success of those 
 cruel measures which he had hitherto prescribed, had resolved, 
 not from choice, but from necessity, to make trial of some more 
 gentle expedients. He knew how unfit the duke of Alva was to 
 be employed in the execution of this new plan of government ; 
 and he believed that no concessions would prove acceptable to 
 the revolted provinces, that could be made by one who had 
 rendered himself so much the object of their abhorrence. He 
 had therefore readily consented that Alva should retire, and had, 
 more than a year before the present period, appointed the duke 
 de Medina Coeli governor of the Netherlands in his room. This 
 nobleman having found, upon his arrival, that the provinces were 
 in a very different state from what he had expected, and that the 
 charge which he had undertaken would probably be attended 
 with much greater difficulty than glory, declined entering upon 
 it, and afterwards obtained leave from Philip to return to Spain. 
 He remained however in the Low Countries, till towards the end 
 The new of the present year, when the new governor, Don 
 
 governor. Lewis de Zuniga, and Requesens, arrived. And soon 
 
 afterwards the duke of Alva, who had come to Brussels to receive 
 Requesens, having resigned the regency into his hands, set out 
 with his son, by the way of Germany and Italy, for Spain. 
 
 On this occasion, men were affected variously. Even all the 
 Protestants did not entertain the same sentiments with regard 
 to the effects which the Duke’s departure was likely to produce. 
 While some rejoiced at it, from the dread which they entertained 
 of his abilities ; others considered, that for several months past 
 his good fortune had forsaken him ; and they believed that the 
 abhorrence which his tyranny had excited towards his person 
 and government, would, by proving a powerful bond of union 
 among his enemies, effectually prevent them from listening to 
 any insidious terms of accommodation which the Spaniards might 
 propose. 
 
 He was regarded, both by the Catholics and Protestants, as 
 the chief source of all the calamities in which the 
 
 v.is oast. Netherlands had been involved. He had received his 
 government, from the duchess of Parma, in a state of perfect 
 tranquillity. By his tyranny he had thrown it into the most 
 terrible combustion, and kindled the flames of a destructive war, 
 which he was conscious of being unable to extinguish, and had 
 therefore applied for liberty to retire. He is said to liavo 
 boasted to count Koningstein y , at whose house he lodged in his 
 
 7 Uncle to the prince of Orange. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 2-19 
 
 1573.] 
 
 way to Italy, that during his government of five years and a 
 half, upwards of eighteen thousand heretics had suffered by the 
 hand of the public executioner ; besides a much greater number 
 whom he had put to the sword in the towns which he took, and 
 in the field of battle. 
 
 The situation of the Low Countries during Alva’s administra- 
 His govern- tion, was truly deplorable. His oppression was not 
 ment. confined to the Protestants ; but great numbers too 
 of the Catholics were put to death, and their effects forfeited, 
 on the pretence of their having given entertainment to heretics, 
 or of having held a correspondence with them in their exile. 
 Wives were punished with the utmost severity for affording 
 shelter to their husbands, whom the council of tumults had 
 condemned ; children for performing the like kind offices to 
 their parents ; and in Utrecht, a father was executed for allow- 
 ing his son, who had returned from banishment, to lodge under 
 his rcof for one night. By forcing so many thousands of the 
 most industrious inhabitants to leave the country, and by neglect- 
 ing to provide a naval force to oppose the exiles at sea, commerce 
 was almost entirely ruined ; notwithstanding which, he imposed 
 upon the people more oppressive taxes than they could have 
 borne, if they had been in the most flourishing condition. In 
 levying his taxes, the utmost rigour was employed. The people 
 were often wantonly provoked, and tumults purposely excited, 
 from which, occasion was taken to punish them with confiscation 
 of their goods, and sometimes both with death and confiscation. 
 From the confiscations and taxes large sums were raised; yet, 
 by maintaining so numerous an army, and by building citadels 
 to keep the principal towns in awe, as he received little assist- 
 ance from the King, who was engaged in other expensive 
 enterprises, he fell behind in the payment of his troops ; and in 
 order to keep them in good humour, he permitted them to live 
 at free quarters upon the inhabitants ; against whom they ex- 
 ercised, on many occasions, the most cruel and oppressive 
 rapacity. 
 
250 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 BOOK XIII. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Philip could not have made choice of a more proper successor 
 Character of to the duke of Alva than Requesens , who had acquired 
 Requesens. SO me military fame in the battle of Lepanto, and had 
 distinguished himself in the government of Milan, by his prudence 
 and moderation ; qualities from which Philip now hoped for 
 greater success in quelling the rebellious spirit of his subjects in 
 the Netherlands, than had attended the violent administration of 
 the duke of Alva. 
 
 To show as early as possible that a change of measures had 
 He applies been adopted by the court of Spain, Requesens began 
 raise the^ie e government with demolishing Alva's statue above 
 of Middle-^ mentioned, and with repressing the insolence of certain 
 burg, 1574. garrisons, at whose enormities his predecessor had 
 connived 51 . He then applied with great industry to make 
 the necessary preparations for the relief of Middleburg; 
 which, having been closely besieged by the Zealanders for more 
 than a year and a half, was now reduced to the last extremity. 
 Several vigorous attempts had been made, during the duke of 
 Alva’s administration, to raise the siege: but through the supe- 
 riority of the Dutch fleet, they had proved abortive ; and Mon- 
 dragon, the governor, had given notice, that if he was not relieved 
 in a few days, he would find it necessary to surrender. 
 
 Requesens knew that nothing but the most pressing necessity 
 would have drawn this declaration from an officer of so great 
 spirit and fortitude as Mondragon. And he was sensible, that, 
 upon the preservation of Middleburg, depended that of all the other 
 towns in Zealand which retained their allegiance. He therefore 
 postponed every other object of his attention ; and having gone 
 to Antwerp, he equipped there, and at Bergen-op-zoom, with the 
 utmost expedition, a fleet consisting of more than thirty ships, 
 besides transports, with provisions and military stores 6 . 
 
 This fleet he divided into two squadrons; one of which, com- 
 manded by the vice-admiral, the Sieur de Glimes and Julio 
 Romero, he ordered to sail from Bergen, down the Easter Scheld ; 
 and the other, under Sancio d' Avila, to fall down the Ilondt or 
 Wester Scheld, from Antwerp. By this measure, he intended 
 to distract the enemy’s attention, and to oblige them to divide 
 their forces ; and he hoped that at least one of the two squadrons 
 might effectuate its entrance into the canal of Middleburg. 
 
 B Strada, ab init. anno 1574. b Meteren, p. 131. 
 
1574 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 251 
 
 But the prince of Orange, whose adherents were numerous in 
 every corner of the maritime provinces, had received early infor- 
 mation of the governor’s design, and had likewise got intelligence 
 of his plan of operations. Having passed over from Holland to 
 the isle of Walcheren, and taken up his residence in Flushing, in 
 order to assist the Zealanders with his counsel, William stationed 
 a part of his fleet on the south coast of the island, to lie in wait 
 for d’ Avila; and sent all the rest, strongly manned, and well 
 equipped for fighting, up the Easter Scheld, with orders, as soon 
 as possible to attack the fleet under the command of de Glimes 
 and Romero. 
 
 This fleet, with the greatest part of the transports, had already 
 Battle of set sail from Bergen ; and Requesens, extremely anxious 
 Sacherio. f or its fate, had accompanied it as far as Sacherlo. There 
 it cast anchor, and was waiting for the rising tide, when the Zea- 
 landers, commanded by Boisot, admiral of Holland, arrived in sight. 
 De Glimes soon perceived the superiority of Boisot’s fleet, both in 
 the size and number of the ships, and was of opinion that he ought 
 not to proceed in the intended enterprise ; but he was over-ruled 
 by Romero, who, prompted by his innate courage, and by that 
 contempt which, like the rest of his countrymen, he entertained 
 for the Dutch insurgents, insisted that they should try the for- 
 tune of a battle. They accordingly weighed anchor, and advanced 
 to the enemy. In the beginning of the engagement, de Glimes’s 
 own ship ran foul of a sand-bank, from which she could not be 
 disengaged. The Zealanders perceiving her distress, attacked 
 her on every side, and at length set her on fire. Romero hastened 
 to her assistance ; but all his attempts to extinguish the flames 
 proved ineffectual. In a few minutes she sunk ; after having 
 communicated the flames to Romero’s ship, that had come to her 
 relief. Romero was obliged to jump overboard, and save his life 
 by swimming 0 . The Zealanders had the same fortunate success 
 against all the other ships of the enemy ; they sunk some, burnt 
 others, and took the rest. Besides De Glimes, and several other 
 officers, near a thousand Walloons and Spaniards perished. The 
 victory was decisive. And Requesens had the mortification, 
 from the dyke of Sacherlo, to be an eye-witness of this disaster, 
 which was great in itself; but was rendered still greater, and 
 more afflicting to him, by the fatal consequences with which he 
 foresaw it must be attended. 
 
 D’Avila in the mean time, with the squadron under his command, 
 had sailed from Antwerp, and advanced as far as Flushing. Had 
 he proceeded in his voyage without delay, he must have reached 
 Middleburg, in spite of* the Dutch fleet which had been stationed 
 to oppose him ; for it is not probable that he would have met 
 with great resistance from that fleet, as the flower of all the 
 
 1 * 22 . 
 
 e Meursii Axiriacus, p. 
 
232 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 forces belonging to it had been sent with Boisot. The prince of 
 Orange, who knew this, was extremely apprehensive of the issue, 
 and anxiously longed for Boisot’s return : but he was soon 
 delivered from his anxiety, by observing from a promontory near 
 Flushing, that, instead of hastening forward, d 1 Avila had cast 
 anchor, and seemed resolved to wait for the arrival of De Glimes 
 and Romero. In a few hours d’ Avila received intelligence of 
 their defeat ; after which, despairing of being able to relieve the 
 besieged, he immediately set sail for Antwerp. He was pursued 
 by the enemy ; but having betaken himself to flight in time, he 
 arrived with very little loss at his destined port. 
 
 The prince of Orange conveyed intelligence to Mondragon of 
 The surren- what had passed by a Spanish officer whom he had 
 der of Mid- taken prisoner; and at the same time threatened, 
 dieburg. that if he did not surrender the town in a few days, 
 the garrison should be put to the sword without mercy. Great 
 numbers of the besieged had already died of hunger, or of the 
 unwholesome food to which they had been obliged to have 
 recourse. Provisions of almost every kind, not excepting the 
 flesh of dogs and horses, were consumed ; nor had they any other 
 food, but bread made of flax-seed ; and even this was nearly 
 exhausted. Mondragon, perceiving that the destruction of the 
 garrison, as well as of the inhabitants, must be the certain conse- 
 quence of his refusing to capitulate, consented to give up both 
 the city of Middleburg and Armuyden, on condition that the 
 garrison should be allowed to depart with their arms and baggage, 
 and that the ecclesiastics, and all such of the catholic inhabi- 
 tants as inclined to withdraw, should have liberty to dispose of 
 their effects, and be transported to the continent. William 
 highly respected Mondragon on account of his gallant conduct 
 during the siege, and agreed to these conditions ; but required 
 that he should pledge his honour that he would procure the 
 release of St. Aldegonde, and two or three more of the protestant 
 leaders, to return into captivity. In the sequel, Mondragon 
 showed himself worthy of the confidence which was reposed in 
 him. By his intercession with Requesens, St. Aldegonde and 
 the other prisoners were set at liberty d . 
 
 Notwithstanding this signal triumph gained over Requesens 
 A pprehen- * n enterprise, the prince of Orange was not 
 
 sions of the without apprehensions that the difference between his 
 prince of character and that of his predecessor, added to the 
 
 Orange. difference of measures which he seemed determined to 
 
 pursue, might produce some alteration in the sentiments of the 
 people. The high military talents, the vigour and activity of 
 Alva, had been objects of dread and terror. They had overawed 
 most of the provinces, and rendered the efforts of others ineffec- 
 
 d Melcren, p. 120. Bentivoglio. 
 
1574 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 253 
 
 tual ; but as the oppressive violence of that tyrant had at first 
 given birth to the revolt, so it had contributed more than any 
 other cause to cherish and support it. Under a milder and 
 more artful governor, William dreaded not only that the inhabi- 
 tants of the interior provinces would acquiesce in the established 
 government, but that even the people of Holland and Zealand 
 would be enticed again to yield their necks to the Spanish yoke. 
 And to prevent this, he employed every consideration that could 
 work either on their hopes or fears. 
 
 The King had so far complied with their wishes, as to remove 
 He puts the the duke of Alva ; but how little reason they had to 
 people on flatter themselves that any greater regard would be 
 then- guard. now p a iq to their rights than formerly, was manifest 
 from his choice of the new governor, who had procured his 
 master’s favour by the exercise of cruelty over the Moors in 
 Granada ; and who, being a stranger and a Spaniard as well as 
 Alva, could not be greatly interested in the prosperity of the 
 provinces, nor have any other end in view, but to promote the 
 tyrannical designs of the court of Spain. Requesens indeed had 
 a more benign and placid countenance than Alva ; but the danger 
 to which the provinces were exposed, was for this reason the 
 more to be dreaded by every friend of his country. Amidst the 
 governor’s professions of concern for their prosperity, no mention 
 had been made of freeing them from that enormous load of taxes 
 under which they groaned ; or of delivering their consciences 
 from that restraint and violence, which the former governor had 
 imposed upon them ; or of restoring the laws which Alva had so 
 wantonly trampled under foot ; or, in short, of dismissing those 
 foreign troops, from whose rapacity they had suffered such 
 intolerable outrage. In order to accomplish these important 
 purposes, the provinces of Holland and Zealand had taken up 
 arms ; and although the fortune of the war had been various, 
 yet in spite of the most vigorous efforts of the duke of Alva, 
 with a numerous army, to reduce them, these provinces were 
 governed by their own inhabitants, and enjoyed the free and full 
 possession of their religious and civil rights. The other provinces 
 ought now to imitate the example of their countrymen, and they 
 might reasonably hope that their endeavours would be attended 
 with success ; the King having appointed a governor over them, 
 inexperienced in the art of war, and unacquainted with the 
 army under his command, which was at present strongly infected 
 with a spirit of sedition and discontent. It might perhaps 
 appear rash and daring for the inhabitants of so narrow a 
 territory as the Netherlands, to enter the lists with so potent an 
 enemy as the king of Spain ; but the power of that monarch 
 was not in reality so formidable as it seemed. The great extent 
 of his dominions served rather to embarrass and encumber him, 
 than to add to his strength : and considering the distance of his 
 
254 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIII. 
 
 place of residence, and the difficulty of transporting troops either 
 from Spain or Italy, there was little reason to apprehend that he 
 would ever be able to subdue the people of the Netherlands, if 
 they acted with that unanimity and spirit which became them, 
 in a cause, wherein not only their property and their existence 
 as a commercial state, but their religion and civil liberty, were 
 at stake. 
 
 By these and such other arguments, did the prince of Orange 
 The last attempt animate the people to co-operate with him in assert- 
 of Count Lewis ing their liberty, in opposition to the plan formed by 
 of Nassau. the court of Spain to enslave them. 
 
 Meanwhile, his brother, Count Lewis, who had resided in 
 Germany ever since the surrender of Mons, was employed in 
 attempting to persuade the protestant princes there to assist 
 him in his preparations for a new invasion of the interior pro- 
 vinces ; to which, notwithstanding the failure of his former 
 enterprises, Lewis was prompted, partly by his knowledge of the 
 mutinous spirit of the Spanish troops, but chiefly by the prospect 
 of that assistance which it was now in his brother’s power to 
 afford him. It was concerted between the two brothers, that as 
 soon as Count Lewis had finished his levies, the prince should 
 advance with a body of troops towards the interior provinces, 
 either to make a diversion in his brother’s favour, or to unite 
 their forces. 
 
 Lewis found it extremely difficult to procure money to defray 
 the expense of his intended expedition. His brothers fortune, 
 as well as his own, were almost ruined by their former military 
 enterprises. The States of Holland were involved in greater 
 expense than they were able to support. They had, in conjunc- 
 tion with the prince of Orange, made application to the queen 
 of England ; but this princess, being unwilling to embroil herself 
 with Philip, had refused to assist them. Lewis had begun his 
 preparations, in hopes of receiving supplies from some German 
 princes, who had promised their assistance, but who were either 
 not inclined, or unable, to fulfil their engagements. To save 
 himself from the affront of abandoning an undertaking, in which 
 a great number of French and German protestants had engaged 
 at his request, he opened a negociation with Schomberg, ambas- 
 sador of Charles the Ninth of France, who at this time courted 
 the favour of the protestant princes in Germany, with a view to 
 facilitate the election of his brother, the duke of Anjou, to the 
 crown of Poland. Between Lewis and Schomberg, who met at 
 Francfort on the Maine, it was agreed, that if Charles should, 
 in behalf of the inhabitants of the Low Countries, declare war 
 against the king of Spain, the provinces of Holland and Zealand 
 should be immediately delivered into the hands of the French 
 monarch, on his engaging to maintain all their rights, and in 
 particular, the free exercise of the reformed religion. But if 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 255 
 
 1574.] 
 
 Charles should not make open war, it was agreed, that Count 
 Lewis should have three hundred thousand livres to assist him in 
 his present enterprise; that the French king should have the 
 sovereignty of Holland and Zealand, and that some of the 
 German princes should be surety for the performance of this 
 condition. A part of the money was paid, and Lewis was 
 thereby enabled to complete his levies, which amounted to 
 between three and four thousand horse, and seven thousand 
 foot e . 
 
 He began his march, accompanied by his brother Henry, and 
 Christopher son of the elector Palatine, in the beginning of 
 February ; and despising the rigour of the season, he advanced 
 with great rapidity towards the Netherlands, in hopes of finding 
 the governor unprepared. Having crossed the Rhine and the 
 Moselle, he directed his course towards Guelderland, with an 
 intention to pass the Maese at Maestricht, and to pursue his 
 march through Brabant, till he should unite his forces with those 
 which his brother had engaged to bring to his assistance. 
 
 With so great despatch and secrecy had Lewis conducted his 
 The gorer- preparations, that Requesens remained ignorant of his 
 nor’s per- design, till he was informed that he had begun his 
 plexity, march. By this intelligence the governor was thrown 
 into great perplexity. His troops had been lately so much 
 reduced, that it was impossible for him to oppose both the 
 brothers at the same time ; and he considered that to unite his 
 forces, and employ them against Lewis, would expose the 
 maritime provinces an easy prey to the prince of Orange. His 
 anxiety was increased by the discovery of an intrigue, which had 
 been formed by William's adherents, for the surprise of Antwerp. 
 Nor was he entirely free from apprehensions that his troops 
 might refuse to quit the towns in which they were stationed, till 
 they should receive payment of their arrears. Having convened 
 a council of his principal officers, and heard their opinions of the 
 measures which they thought most proper to be pursued, he 
 resolved to remain, together with the marquis of Vitelli, in 
 Antwerp, to w^tch the secret machinations of the prince of 
 Orange ; and such troops as could be soonest drawn together, 
 were immediately sent off, under Sancio d' Avila, to oppose the 
 passage of Count Lewis over the Maese. The rest followed soon 
 after; having been persuaded to leave their quarters, by a 
 promise, that their arrears should be paid as soon as the provinces 
 were delivered from the impending danger. 
 
 Lewis in the meantime, advancing towards the frontier, had 
 arrived within a few miles of Maestricht, where he pitched his 
 camp, in expectation that his friends in the place would be able 
 to make themselves masters of one of the gates. But Requesens 
 
 e Tlmanus, lib. lv. Meteren, p. 133. — Charles died soon after, and the treaty had no 
 other consequences. 
 
256 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 LB.ok XIII. 
 
 having discovered his intention, had dispatched several companies 
 of light-armed troops before the main army, to secure the town. 
 These troops arrived in time to prevent the friends of Lewis 
 from executing their design ; and in a few days afterwards, they 
 were joined by d’Avila with the rest of the forces. 
 
 Lewis was not prepared for undertaking the siege of a place 
 so completely fortified as Maestricht ; and after some trials of 
 strength in two or three skirmishes with the Spaniards, he 
 decamped, and marched down the east side of the river, till he 
 came to Ruremonde ; but there too, as well as in Maestricht, 
 the Protestants were intimidated and overawed, and not a single 
 person ventured to declare in his favour. He continued his 
 march in the same direction, resolving to hasten forward till he 
 should join his brother, who was advancing to meet him in the 
 country which lies between the Maese and the Wadi. 
 
 D’Avila aimed at nothing for some time but to prevent Lewis 
 from transporting his army over the river, and with this view he 
 had marched as near him as possible, having the river between, 
 them ; but receiving a reinforcement of two thousand veteran 
 troops, and finding, by the information of his spies, that Lewis 
 had laid aside his first design of crossing the Maese, and was on 
 full march towards the prince of Orange, he considered that it 
 was of the highest importance to prevent their junction ; and 
 that for this purpose it was necessary to compel Lewis as soon as 
 possible to engage. With this intention he proceeded with the 
 utmost celerity down the river, and having crossed it by a bridge 
 of boats at the town of Grave, he thus got between Count Lewis 
 and his brother’s army. Lewis, anxious to prevent this, had 
 avoided every unnecessary delay; but his troops, chagrined at 
 being refused admittance first into Maestricht, and afterwards 
 into Ruremonde, had proceeded in their march with much less 
 alacrity than the Spaniards. He received the first intelligence 
 of d 1 A vila’s having crossed the Maese when he arrived at Mooch, 
 a village at the distance of only one league from the Spanish 
 army, and on the same side of the river. He soon perceived the 
 necessity to which he was reduced, either to give the enemy 
 battle, or to retire. To retire, he saw, must be extremely difficult 
 and dangerous, on account of the disorder and consternation 
 which commonly attend a retreat ; and therefore he did not 
 hesitate to try the fortune of a battle, although he knew how 
 much inferior his undisciplined forces were to the Spaniards, who 
 were select veteran troops, animated by the consciousness of 
 superior prowess, and commanded by d’Avila, a person of extra- 
 ordinary abilities, who, by merit alone, had raised himself from 
 the station of a common soldier, to the rank of general. 
 
 To enable him to resist so formidable an enemy, Lewis resolved 
 Battle of to remain in his present situation at Mooch, and to 
 Mooch. cover his infantry with a strong intrenchmcnt. His 
 
t& 74 .] Philip It. king of sPaiN. 2.57 
 
 cavalry, though reduced by desertion, was still superior to that 
 of the enemy; but from this superiority, the nature of the 
 ground, which rises into hills at a little distance from the river, 
 did not suffer him to derive any considerable advantage. He 
 drew them up, as well as the unequal face of the country would 
 permit, on the right of his camp ; and upon a hill behind his 
 main army, he placed a squadron of chosen troops, with which 
 he intended either to fix the victory, if it should appear doubt- 
 ful ; or, in case of a defeat, to open a passage through the enemy 
 to his brother, who had now advanced as far as Nimeguen to 
 meet him. He had just time to put his troops in order of battle, 
 when d’Avila arrived, having his infantry on the right, and on 
 the left his cavalry, flanked by a body of musqueteers, designed to 
 support them against the superior numbers of the German cavalry. 
 
 D’Avila began the engagement by sending three hundred men 
 to attack the enemy’s lines. The troops which had been 
 appointed to defend them, advanced briskly towards the Spa- 
 niards, and gave them a gallant and resolute reception ; but they 
 were soon compelled to retire. The Spaniards followed, and 
 attempted to enter the camp along with them. The action there 
 was bloody and obstinate, and fresh succours hastened from both 
 armies to the assistance of the combatants. But the co- 
 temporary historians differ so widely from each other in their 
 accounts of this engagement, that it is impossible to know the 
 truth. Some authors affirm, that the Germans acquitted them- 
 selves with honour, and made a bold and vigorous resistance. 
 Others say, that only the French troops in Count Lewis’s army 
 performed their duty ; while the Germans refused to advance 
 unless their arrears were paid, and remained obstinately in their 
 eamp till the Spaniards broke into it, and, after making pro- 
 digious havoc among them, put them to an ignominious flight. 
 Lewis de. In the beginning of the action, the German cavalry 
 feated and proved an overmatch for their antagonists, and having 
 slam. fallen with great fury on that part of the enemy’s horse 
 that was nearest them, they drove them to a distance from the 
 field of battle ; but when they were forming themselves again 
 for a new attack, some fresh squadrons of the Spanish cavalry 
 advanced, and threw them into disorder. The Spanish musque- 
 teers, who had been placed to support the horse, were then of 
 signal use. With their shot they galled the Germans in flank, 
 and greatly augmented their confusion. Count Lewis and the 
 Palatine attempted, but in vain, to rally them. These princes 
 did everything to restore the battle that could have been done 
 by the most expert commanders, while they endeavoured to 
 animate their troops by their example, and gave conspicuous 
 proofs of the most heroic valour. Their efforts might have been 
 crowned with success, if a body of Spanish lances had not arrived 
 when the German reiters had begun to give way. The reiters 
 
258 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 were overpowered ; above five hundred of them were killed, and 
 of the infantry between three and four thousand. The victory 
 was decisive, and the value of it to the conquerors was greatly 
 enhanced by the deaths of Count Lewis, his brother Henry, and 
 the Palatine ; all of whom the cotemporary historians describe as 
 having exerted the highest degree of vigour and intrepidity, 
 although none of these writers were able to procure information 
 of the manner in which they fell. Their death was matter of 
 great lamentation to the Protestant confederates, and especially 
 the death of Lewis, who had made so many great exertions in 
 their behalf. 
 
 As soon as the prince of Orange received the melancholy news 
 Mutiny of of this disaster, he began to return towards Holland, 
 the Spanish being convinced that now, when he was deprived of his 
 troops. brother’s aid, it would be in vain for him to attempt to 
 keep the field g . 
 
 William expected that they would have immediately followed 
 him, in order to improve their victory, whilst the terror which it 
 inspired was recent ; and they would probably have done so, had 
 not' the Spanish troops sullied the glory which they had acquired, 
 by rebelling against their officers on the next day after the battle. 
 D’Avila could not instantly fulfil his engagement to pay their 
 arrears. Almost three years’ pay was due to them. Even before 
 the present expedition, their patience had been worn out ; and it 
 appears to have been the hopes of plunder, or the dread of conse- 
 quences fatal to themselves, that induced them to march against 
 the Germans, more than their confidence in the promise which 
 d’ Avila had made them. Being now freed from their appre- 
 hensions of personal danger, and disappointed in their expectations 
 of being enriched by the spoils of the enemy, who were still poorer 
 than themselves, they demanded from their general the immediate 
 performance of his promise; and when they only received new 
 assurances of the same kind as those with which they had been 
 amused before, they threatened to take vengeance on him for his 
 falsehood and deceit. He and the other officers endeavoured to 
 appease them, but in vain. In order to avoid their fury, he was 
 obliged to make his escape secretly from the camp ; and imme- 
 diately after his departure, they ran to arms, expelled their 
 officers, and having from among themselves elected other officers 
 and a commander-in-chief, they quickly left Mooch, and directed 
 their march to Antwerp, with an intention to live at free quarters 
 upon the inhabitants of that wealthy city, till they should extort 
 payment of their arrears. 
 
 Requesens having received intelligence of their design, had 
 They take remained at Antwerp ; and, if he had complied with 
 possession of the counsel of Champigny, governor of the town, and 
 Antwerp, taken precautions for securing a part of the fortifications 
 
 h Bontivoglio, p. 143. Th nanus, lib. lix. sect. xv. Van Meteren, p. 132. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 259 
 
 1574.] 
 
 which was unfinished, he might have frustrated their attempt ; 
 but being extremely diffident of the Spanish part of the garrison, 
 which had the same ground of discontent with the mutineers, 
 and flattering himself with the hopes of being able to appease 
 them, he suffered them to enter the city without resistance, to 
 the number of three thousand men. They had no sooner entered, 
 than they formed themselves in order of battle. The citizens 
 were overwhelmed with terror, and many of them fled precipi- 
 tately out of the city. Requesens rode up to the mutineers, and 
 remonstrating to them on the pernicious tendency of their 
 conduct, he prayed, entreated, and threatened them ; but could 
 not, by addressing either their hopes or fears, draw any other 
 concession from them, but that they would abstain from plunder, 
 on condition that they should receive immediate payment of their 
 arrears, and that the Walloons and G'ermans under the command 
 of Champigny, should be ordered to quit the town. With this 
 last request, the governor thought it expedient to comply; 
 and thus the mutineers were left in full possession of the 
 place, without any force to control them. The first object 
 of their attention was to secure the gates, after which they 
 dispersed themselves over the city, and took up their quarters 
 in the houses of the principal inhabitants, where they stu- 
 died to create expense, and night and day to give disturbance 
 and uneasiness. They were perpetually calling on the governor 
 to fulfil his engagements ; and as they daily threatened to sack 
 and plunder the town, if he did not speedily comply with their 
 requests, the people were disquieted with continual apprehensions 
 and alarms. The mutineers required payment not only of their 
 own arrears, but of those too which had been due to such of their 
 companions as had died of diseases or fallen in battle. At 
 length, the sum of one hundred thousand florins was raised by the 
 inhabitants ; and the governor was obliged to pledge his jewels 
 and furniture for the remainder, and to grant a pardon, con- 
 firmed by a solemn oath, to all concerned in this sedition ; after 
 which the mutineers returned under their former officers, and 
 M 30 went to join the rest of the army which was now in 
 
 ay * Holland, and had already begun the siege of Leyden. 
 
 From this mutiny, Philip’s interest in the Netherlands suffered 
 Destruction greatly in several respects. In the time of d’A vila’s 
 of the king’s expedition against Count Lewis, Requesens, having 
 fleet * exerted his utmost vigour and activity, had equipped 
 a numerous fleet, which he intended to employ in the recovery of 
 Zealand. When the mutineers arrived at Antwerp, this fleet, 
 which was not yet of sufficient strength, lay under the walls of 
 the city. Adolphus Anstede, the commander, anxious for his 
 charge, and apprehensive that the seditious soldiers might, in 
 order to extort compliance with their demands, take possession 
 of the ships, had removed them to a place at some distance from 
 
 s 2 
 
260 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIII. 
 
 Antwerp, where they were out of the reach of the Spaniards. 
 But, in avoiding this danger, he fell into a greater. The Zea- 
 landers, whose partisans were continually on the watch, quickly 
 received intelligence of his change of station, and resolved to 
 improve the opportunity which was thus presented to them. 
 Having attacked him when he was utterly unprepared for defence, 
 they took forty of his ships, sunk and destroyed several others, 
 and rendered all the rest unfit for service. By this severe blow, 
 the plan which Requesens had projected for recovering the 
 maritime towns, was entirely disconcerted. The fleet, now 
 destroyed, was to have acted in conjunction with another, which 
 Philip had been preparing in the ports of Spain. But as the 
 Spanish fleet was deemed too weak to contend singly with the 
 enemy, the design was laid aside for the present ; and no future 
 governor of the Low Countries ever found it practicable to 
 revive it g . 
 
 Whilst the Zealanders availed themselves of the sedition in 
 in the Spanish army by sea, the prince of Orange had been 
 equally intent on deriving advantage from it by land. On 
 receiving information of the fate of his brothers, he had begun 
 his march towards Holland ; but when intelligence was brought 
 him that the Spaniards had mutinied, he resolved to improve the 
 opportunity which this afforded him, by making some new acqui- 
 sition. Passing over into the isle of Bommel, which is formed 
 by the confluence of the Maese and the Rhine, he engaged the 
 chief town in it to espouse his interest ; and having fixed his 
 head-quarters there for some time, he gave support to his friends 
 in the island, and reduced to great extremity such of the people 
 as still adhered to the Spanish government. The marquis of 
 Vitelli was despatched by Requesens to oppose his progress. 
 That able commander rendered abortive a design which the 
 prince had formed on Bois-le-Duc ; and the prince, on the other 
 hand, took measures which prevented the town of Bommel from 
 falling into the hands of Vitelli. But the attention of both was 
 soon after this ingrossed by a more important and interesting 
 object, the siege of Leyden, to the relation of which I shall 
 proceed, after mentioning an attempt of Requesens to put an end 
 to the war, by publishing a new act of indemnity in the name of 
 the King. 
 
 Although several persons were excluded from the benefit of 
 Act of in- this indemnity, yet it was much more comprehensive 
 demnity. than that which had been published some time before 
 by the duke of Alva. It did not, however, produce the desired 
 effect. The people were not conscious of that guilt which Phi- 
 lip’s pompous deed of clemency imputed to them ; they be- 
 lieved that they had suffered wrong, instead of having done it ; 
 
 8 Bcntivoglio, p. 149. Meteren, p. 137* 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 26 1 
 
 1974.] 
 
 and they could not be grateful to him for dispensing with a 
 punishment, which they thought it would have been in the 
 highest degree tyrannical to inflict. Besides this, the pardon 
 was clogged with a condition, by which almost all the inhabit- 
 ants of Holland and Zealand, amounting to many hundred thou- 
 sands, and great numbers too in the other provinces, were ex- 
 cluded. This was, that the Protestants should renounce their 
 religion, and return into the bosom of the church ; a condition 
 from which Philip’s bigotry would never suffer him to depart, 
 nor the zeal and sincerity of the reformers permit them to accept. 
 Requesens could not be ignorant of this, yet he entertained some 
 hopes at this time of bringing about an accommodation, by means 
 of St. Aldegonde, who had not as yet obtained his liberty. The 
 governor sent Champigny and Junius de Jong to treat with him ; 
 but when St. Aldegonde informed them that no peace would ever 
 be agreed to by the maritime provinces, unless the question con- 
 cerning religion were left to the decision of the States, Requesens, 
 who knew that Philip would never consent to that condition, 
 ordered the conference to be immediately dissolved 11 . 
 
 He now bent his whole attention to the siege of Leyden. He 
 The siege of had blockaded that city for several months in the winter 
 Leyden. season, and reduced the inhabitants to great distress ; 
 but he had been obliged to desist from his undertaking, and to 
 call off his troops to oppose the German army. They left their 
 stations in the neighbourhood of Leyden on the 21st of March, 
 and resumed them on the 26th of May. 
 
 In order to form a just conception of the operations of this 
 memorable siege, it is necessary to remember that Leyden lies in 
 a low situation, in the midst of a labyrinth of rivulets and canals. 
 The city was large and populous ; and at the time of the siege 
 was surrounded with a deep ditch, and a strong wall, flanked 
 with bastions. That branch of the Rhine which still retains its 
 ancient name, passes through the middle of it ; and from this 
 stream such an infinity of canals are derived, that it is difficult 
 to say whether the water or the land possesses the greater space. 
 By these canals, the ground on which the city stands is divided 
 into a great number of small islands, united together by near a 
 hundred and fifty stone bridges, that are equally subservient to 
 the beauty of the place, and the convenience of the inhabitants. 
 Leyden is at the distance of a few hours’ journey from the Hague, 
 Delft, and Gouda ; and only a little further from Rotterdam on 
 the one hand, and Haerlem on the other. On account of its 
 situation, as well as on its own account, it was deemed a place of 
 the first importance, and a prize worthy of all the ardour which 
 was displayed by the contending parties. 
 
 The prince of Orange, who had received notice of the gover- 
 nor’s intention to renew the siege, communicated his intelligence 
 
 h Bentivoglio, p. 150. 
 
262 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIII. 
 
 to the citizens ; and exhorted them to furnish themselves with 
 stores of provisions, and to send out of the town all such persons 
 as would be useless in defending it. They were not sufficiently 
 attentive to these injunctions. The prince complained of their 
 remissness, and informed them, that for three months at least it 
 would not be in the power of the States to raise the siege. 
 
 To retard the approach of the Spaniards, he ordered ten com- 
 panies of English adventurers, under the command of colonel 
 Edward Chester, to take possession of two forts, one at the 
 sluice of Gouda, and the other at the village of Alphen, by which 
 the enemy must pass in their way to the city. These troops did 
 not answer the expectation which William had conceived of their 
 behaviour. The five companies which were placed at the sluice 
 of Gouda, after a short resistance, betook themselves to flight ; 
 and the other five, after a skirmish in which no person fell on 
 either side, basely imitated the example of their countrymen, and 
 retired under the walls of Leyden. The citizens, who from their 
 ramparts had beheld their ignominious behaviour, and suspected 
 them of treachery, refused to admit them within the town. The 
 English ascribed their conduct to the insufficiency of the fortifi- 
 cations which they had been appointed to defend ; but not being 
 able to wipe out the suspicion entertained of their fidelity, they 
 all deserted to the enemy, but a few whom the people of Leyden 
 received with open arms*. 
 
 The prince of Orange having intended that the English forces, 
 after being obliged to quit their first stations, should have retired 
 into the town, had not provided any other troops to defend it. 
 The inhabitants were therefore reduced to the necessity of trust- 
 ing for their defence, to their own valour and conduct ; a circum- 
 stance which at first had a formidable aspect, but which in the 
 end proved the cause of their preservation ; since it was thereby 
 much longer before they were reduced by famine, than it would 
 have been if, besides themselves, they had had a numerous gar- 
 rison to support. 
 
 The government of Leyden was committed on this occasion to 
 Janus Dou- J anus Douza k , a person of noble birth; and well known 
 za, chief . in the literary world, by his poetical productions. By 
 magistrate hi s example, and his eloquence, this illustrious patriot 
 
 e) en * kindled in the minds of his fellow-citizens such a zeal 
 for liberty, and so great an abhorrence of the tyranny of Spain, 
 as rendered them superior to every distress, and in a great mea- 
 sure supplied their want of military skill. They must, however, 
 have been found inferior to the Spaniards; and if Valdez, the 
 Spanish commander to whom Requesens committed the conduct 
 of the siege, had pushed his operations with proper vigour, he 
 must certainly have made himself master of the town. But 
 whether he wanted to save his men, and to carry his end without 
 
 ' Meteren, p. 139. 
 
 k Or Jean Vander Does, lord of Noordwick, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 263 
 
 15 / 4 .] 
 
 bloodshed ; or despaired, with the skill and force which he pos- 
 sessed, to be able to reduce so strong a place by sack and storm, 
 he did not think of any other expedient for subduing it, but that 
 of blocking it up on all sides, so as to prevent the entrance of 
 The block- supplies. To this one point, all his operations were 
 ade is directed. By a circular chain of more than sixty forts, 
 formed. which communicated with each other, and ran quite 
 round the city, he invested it on every side, and not only ren- 
 dered it impossible to introduce supplies, but even cut off all intelli- 
 gence between the besieged and their friends in the other cities, 
 except what was conveyed by pigeons, in the manner to which 
 the Protestants had recourse during the blockade of Haerlem 1 * * * . 
 
 By one of the forts, called Lammen, the besieged having been 
 deprived of the benefit of pasturing their cattle in the neigh- 
 bouring meadows, they sallied out with great fury upon the 
 Spaniards, and almost got possession of the fort ; but after an 
 obstinate and bloody contest, they were at last obliged to retire. 
 The Spaniards fortified themselves in that station more strongly 
 than before ; and the besieged now despaired of being able, 
 either in that, or any other quarter, to remove them to a greater 
 distance from the city. Instead of this, they apprehended daily 
 their nearer approach to it ; and expected that they would soon 
 Conduct open their batteries, in order to prepare for taking it 
 and resolu- by storm. This belief served to quicken the inhabit- 
 
 fhY't an ^ S ’ an< ^ ^ le women as we ^ as men were employed 
 m a itants. ^ a y an( j without ceasing, in strengthening the 
 
 fortifications. An account was taken of the stock of provisions 
 within the town ; and in order to make it hold out as long as 
 possible, they began to husband it betimes. They were per- 
 petually exhorting and animating each other, and expatiating 
 upon the cruelty and perfidy of the Spaniards, and the unworthy 
 fate of the people of Zutphen, Haerlem, and other places, who 
 had trusted to their faith and mercy. When they were solicited 
 to turn to their allegiance by Lanoy, De Lique, and other 
 natives of the Low Countries ; they made answer in the words 
 of a Latin poet, 
 
 Fistula dulce canit volucrem dum decipit auceps. 
 
 To other letters, in which they were desired to reflect on the 
 misery to which they must ere long be reduced, they replied, 
 that they had, upon the most mature consideration, resolved 
 rather to die of hunger, or to perish with their wives and chil- 
 dren in the flames of the city, kindled by their own hands, than 
 submit to the tyranny of the Spaniards' 11 . 
 
 1 These pigeons were embalmed, and are still preserved in the town-house of Leyden. 
 
 Les Delices des Pays Bas. 
 
 m Another saying, still more ferocious, is recorded by some historians : that rather than 
 
 submit to so perfidious an enemy, they would feed on their left arms, and defend themselves 
 
 with their right. Van Meteren, ut supra. 
 
264 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 That misery which, during the first two months of the siege, 
 Their dis- existed only in idea, was at last realised. Their whole 
 ness. stock of ordinary provisions being consumed, they were 
 obliged to have recourse to the flesh of dogs and horses. Great 
 numbers died of want, and many by the use of this unnatural 
 food. The resolution of the people at length began to fail, and 
 they now believed their present calamities to be superior even 
 to those they should experience under the Spanish government. 
 Some of them conceived a design to deliver up the town, and 
 formed a secret association for this purpose ; but their plot 
 being detected, means were taken to prevent them from putting 
 it in execution. A great number of people having come one 
 day in a tumultuous manner to a magistrate whose name was 
 Adrian, exclaiming that he ought either to give them food, or 
 deliver the town into the hands of the enemy, “ I have solemnly 
 sworn,” he replied, “ that I will never surrender myself or my 
 fellow-citizens to the cruel and perfidious Spaniard ; and I will 
 sooner die than violate my oath. I have no food, else I would 
 give it you. But if my death can be of use to you, take, tear 
 me in pieces, and devour me ; I shall die with satisfaction, if 
 I know that by my death I shall for one moment relieve you 
 from your direful necessity.” 
 
 By this extraordinary answer, the people, struck with aston- 
 ishment, were silenced, and their fury was for some time appeased. 
 
 The prince of Orange, who was not ignorant of the extreme 
 The States misery to which the besieged were reduced, had done 
 resolved to every thing in his power to accomplish their relief. He 
 lay tlie had already collected large supplies of provisions ; but 
 der water cou ^ n °t, with all his activity and address, raise a suf- 
 ficient force to open a passage into the city. When he 
 found that the situation of the besieged would not admit of longer 
 delay, he convened an assembly of the states of the province. 
 And the deputies, after considering the strength of the enemy, 
 and the amount of their own forces, perceiving it to be imprac- 
 ticable to relieve the besieged, either by land, or by the river 
 and canals, agreed to have recourse to an expedient which was 
 dictated by despair, and was the only one at present in their 
 power to employ. They resolved to avail themselves, against the 
 Spaniards, of that furious element, from which their country 
 had often suffered the most dreadful devastation ; to open their 
 sluices, to break down the dykes of the Maese and the Issel, 
 and by thus laying all the country round Leyden under water, 
 to get access to the besieged with their fleet. Nothing could 
 be more repugnant to the ideas of this people than such a reso- 
 lution. To drain their lands, to exclude the water, and preserve 
 their dykes, were then, as they are still, objects to the Dutch 
 of almost continual attention, and which cost them annually an 
 immense expense, But they were at present animated by objects 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 265 
 
 1574.] 
 
 still more important and interesting; and their love of liberty, 
 joined to their dread of popery and the Spanish yoke, prevailed 
 over every other consideration. The damage which it was sup- 
 posed would arise from the measure adopted, was estimated at 
 six hundred thousand guilders. But they considered, that if 
 the Spaniards should succeed in their present enterprise, not 
 only the region to be overflowed, but all the rest of the pro- 
 vince, would fall under their subjection. This the states regarded 
 as infinitely worse than either poverty or death ; and in their 
 present disposition, they would have chosen to ruin the country 
 altogether, rather than leave it to be enjoyed by an enemy 
 whom they held in such abhorrence. They now applied them- 
 selves to the demolition of those mounds, upon which their 
 existence as a nation depends, with a degree of industry and 
 ardour, equal to that which they were accustomed to employ in 
 repairing them, after the ravages of an inundation. 
 
 The water, after its barriers were removed, diffused itself over 
 all the adjacent fields ; and in a few days, almost the whole 
 region which lies between Rotterdam, Gouda, Delft, and Leyden, 
 was overflowed. The Spaniards were thrown at first into the 
 utmost dread and terror ; but when they understood the cause of 
 this unexpected inundation, and observed that the water did not 
 rise above a certain height, they recovered from their astonish- 
 ment. They were obliged to abandon such of their forts as were 
 situated in the lower grounds, and to retire to those which stood 
 higher ; but of these last they hoped to be able to keep possession, 
 and to continue the blockade, till the famine, which they knew 
 raged in the town with dreadful fury, should conquer the obsti- 
 nacy of the citizens, and bring the siege to a conclusion. 
 
 The prince of Orange, in the mean time, was employed in 
 preparing every thing necessary to carry into execution the mea- 
 sure which the States had adopted. He ordered to be built, at 
 Rotterdam and other places, near two hundred flat-bottomed 
 vessels, having each of them, ten, twelve, fourteen, or sixteen 
 oars ; and these he mounted with guns, and manned with eight 
 hundred Zealanders ; a rude and savage, but a brave and deter- 
 mined band, animated at once by religious zeal, and the most 
 implacable hatred against the Spaniards ; and whose appearance 
 was rendered horrid by the scars of innumerable wounds, which 
 they had received in their late naval engagements. They were 
 brought from the fleet by Boissot, the admiral of Zealand, to 
 whom the conduct of the present enterprise was committed 11 . 
 
 With such of the vessels as were already equipped, Boissot 
 left Delft in the beginning of September, and directed his course 
 towards Leyden. But the water had not as yet risen to a suf- 
 
 n The spirit by which these men were actuated, may be conceived from their method of 
 distinguishing themselves; which w-as by wearing a half moon on their caps, with -this 
 inscription — Turks rather than papists. Metercn, p. 140. 
 
266 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 ficient height, and the banks of the rivers and canals, in which 
 only there was a proper depth of water, were so strongly fortified, 
 as to render his approach to the city impracticable. From some 
 of their forts he obliged the Spaniards to retire, but others were 
 of sufficient strength to withstand the most vigorous attacks. In 
 order to avoid these, he broke down more dykes as he advanced, 
 and in his progress had several bloody engagements with the 
 enemy. The blockade, however, remained still as close- as ever. 
 Boissot began to be apprehensive of the issue. Heaven seemed 
 not to favour his design. The north wind continued much longer 
 than had been ever known at the present season, and retarded 
 the water in its ascent. The prince of Orange, when Boissot 
 entered upon this expedition, had been confined to his chamber 
 by a dangerQus illness. He was now recovered, and came to visit 
 the admiral’s disposition of his ships, which he found to be exactly 
 conformable to the directions which the States had given him ; 
 but their design, the prince perceived, must prove abortive, and 
 all their labour and expense be lost, unless the wind should change 
 soon to another quarter, and the autumnal tides rise as usual. 
 
 With extreme impatience they now expected the approach of 
 The anxiety these tides, which are commonly the subject of their 
 and misery of dread and terror. The situation of the besieged was 
 the citizens. b ecome th e m0 st deplorable and desperate. During 
 seven weeks there had not been a morsel of bread within the city, 
 and the only food had been the roots of herbs and weeds, and 
 the flesh of dogs and horses. Even all these were at length 
 consumed ; and the people reduced to live on soup made of the 
 hides of animals which had been killed. A pestilence succeeded 
 to the famine, and carried off in a few weeks some thousands of 
 the inhabitants. Those who survived, overwhelmed with anguish 
 at the dismal scenes which they daily beheld, were scarcely able 
 to perform the mournful office of burying the dead. In this 
 dreadful situation, they saw from their walls, the sails and flags 
 of the vessels destined for their relief; but had the mortification 
 to perceive, that it was utterly impossible for them to approach. 
 It is not surprising that some of the people, finding their misery 
 greater than they were able to endure, should have entertained 
 the thoughts of surrendering the town to the enemy. Some 
 conspiracies were again formed for this purpose ; but they were 
 discovered and defeated by the vigilance of Douza, supported by 
 a great majority of the people, to whom neither the pestilence, 
 nor famine, nor death in its most hideous forms, appeared so 
 dreadful as the tyranny of the Spaniards. 
 
 But the time of their deliverance was at hand; and Heaven 
 interposed at last in a conspicuous manner in their behalf. 
 Their deliver- Towards the end of September, the wind changing 
 ance. from the north-east to the north-west, poured the 
 
 ocean into the mouths of the rivers with uncommon violence ; and 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 267 
 
 1574 .] 
 
 then veering about to the south, it pushed the water towards the 
 plains of Leyden, till they were converted into a spacious lake, 
 in which the Spanish forts were seen scattered up and down, and 
 many of them almost covered with the water. 
 
 Boissot seized with ardour the opportunity which was thus 
 presented to him. And though several of the enemy’s fortifica- 
 tions still lay in the way by which it was necessary for him to 
 advance, he soon obliged the Spaniards to abandon them. The 
 Zealanders pursued them, sometimes on foot along the dykes, 
 and sometimes in their boats ; and had several fierce rencounters 
 with them, in which, from the advantage which their boats 
 afforded them, they were every where victorious. The situation 
 of the Spanish troops at this time was truly deplorable. Some 
 were swallowed up in the mud and water ; and others, attempting 
 to march along the dykes, were either killed by the fire from the 
 boats, or dragged down with hooks fixed to the ends of long 
 poles, and put to the sword without mercy. Fifteen hundred 
 perished in their retreat. 
 
 All the forts were now forsaken, except the fort above men- 
 tioned, called Lammen, of which, if the Spaniards had kept 
 possession, they might have retarded the approach of the fleet 
 for several days. This fort was much stronger, and stood higher 
 than the rest. But when the garrison understood that their 
 general had fled, and that the Zealanders on the one hand, and 
 the besieged on the other, were preparing to begin an attack, 
 they abandoned their station, and by torch-light effectuated a 
 junction with the rest of the forces, in the middle of the night. 
 
 In this manner was the siege of Leyden raised, in the begin- 
 ning of the fifth month after the blockade was formed . Boissot 
 advanced without delay to the gates of the city. The people, 
 pale and meagre, ran, as their small remains of strength would 
 allow, to meet him ; and many of them so greedily devoured the 
 food which he distributed, that what was intended for their 
 relief proved the cause of their instant destruction; for pro- 
 visions of every kind in the city had been entirely exhausted, 
 and the besieged were so weakened, that if the blockade had con- 
 tinued two days longer, they must all have perished 0 . 
 
 When they were somewhat refreshed with the food which 
 Boissot had brought, they accompanied the magistrates to one 
 of the churches, to render thanks to the Almighty. Never was 
 any assembly more deeply agitated. By the consideration of 
 their signal and unexpected deliverance when they were upon 
 the brink of ruin, joined to the remembrance of the dismal scenes 
 
 ° They escaped still more narrowly from falling into the hands of the enemy. In the 
 night immediately preceding, and at the very time when the Spaniards were making their 
 retreat from the fort of Lammen, a great part of the wall of the city having fallen down, 
 the noise reached the ears of the Spaniards ; who, if they had known the cause, might have 
 entered the town without resistance. But their dread represented the noise to their imagi- 
 nations as the approach of the enemy, and served only to precipitate their flight. 
 
268 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 ,vhich they had witnessed, and of the many friends and fellow- 
 citizens whom the famine and pestilence had carried off, their 
 minds were overpowered at once with gratitude and sorrow. 
 They were dissolved in tears, and mingled together the voices of 
 praise and of lamentation. 
 
 The cotemporary historians have further recorded, that when 
 the Prince of Orange received information of the raising of the 
 siege, being engaged in public worship in one of the churches at 
 Delft, he stood up, and read to the audience the letters which 
 contained the intelligence ; after which, the States being con- 
 vened, a day of general thanksgiving was appointed. 
 
 The Spanish army took their route by the way of Amsterdam 
 and Utrecht, and attempted to get possession of the last of these 
 places by surprise ; but the gates being shut against them, and 
 a contribution of money offered, they were prevailed on to pursue 
 their march towards Maestricht, where they were put into winter 
 quarters p . 
 
 PART II. 
 
 The difficulties which the Spaniards encountered in the several 
 Negotiations enterprises that have been related, gave Philip a very 
 for peace. different idea of the spirit, vigour, and resources of the 
 malcontents from what he had hitherto entertained, and deter- 
 mined him to listen to an offer which his cousin, the Emperor 
 Maximilian, made at this time, of mediating a reconcilement. 
 Maximilian was prompted to interpose his influence, partly 
 perhaps by concern for the interest of his kinsman, but chiefly 
 by his apprehension, that through the close connection which 
 subsisted between the Dutch and German Protestants, the flame 
 which raged with so much fury in the Low Countries might at 
 last diffuse itself into Germany. Having therefore interceded 
 with Philip to grant the insurgents favourable terms, and obtained 
 powers to negociate an agreement, he transferred these powers 
 to Count Schwartzenburg, whom he sent into Holland in the 
 beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-five, 
 attended by several German nobles. On the Count’s arrival in 
 Dort, he had an interview with his kinsman, the prince of 
 Orange, with whom he employed all his own influence, and that 
 of the Emperor, from whom he brought a confidential letter to 
 the Prince. From the respect due to the Emperor, William 
 
 p Meteren, p. 139. Meursii Auriacus, p. 130. Bentivoglio, p. 151. 
 
 The Spaniards threw all the blame of the failure of their enterprise upon their general; 
 whom they accused of having been remiss in his operations against the town, on account of 
 a bribo of two hundred thousand florins, which they alleged he had accepted, either from 
 the States of Holland, or from the people of Leyden. Whether there was any ground for 
 this accusation, does not appear with sufficient evidence. But the soldiers flew to arms, 
 seized his person, and confined him, till he agreed to pay them the two hundred thousand 
 florins, which they said he had received from the Hollanders. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 269 
 
 1575.] 
 
 consented to a congress in the city of Breda. But, as he could 
 not be persuaded that Philip would be ever brought to offer 
 conditions which the States could accept with safety, he believed 
 that the treaty proposed would prove abortive, and therefore he 
 exhorted the States to keep themselves in a posture of defence, 
 and to prosecute with vigour their preparations for renewing the 
 war, when the congress should be dissolved. The Prince himself 
 was not of the number of the deputies ; nor did those who were 
 appointed, though less obnoxious to Philip’s resentment, think it 
 safe to trust themselves in the power of the Spaniards in Breda, 
 till Romero and Mondragon, and two other persons of distinc- 
 tion, were sent into Holland as hostages. 
 
 From the proceedings at this congress, and the mutual distrust 
 which the deputies discovered, the reader will easily perceive the 
 causes which rendered ineffectual, not only the present attempt, 
 but likewise all the endeavours which were afterwards employed, 
 during the space of forty years, to reconcile the contending 
 parties. 
 
 The demands of the States of Holland and Zealand consisted 
 March 14 ^ w0 ar ^^ c ^ es ’ the governor should immediately 
 
 a * dismiss the foreign troops ; and that a general assembly 
 of the States of all the provinces should be held to determine the 
 several points in controversy, whether civil or religious. 
 
 In answer to these requests, the Spanish deputies observed, 
 that it was unreasonable to call the Spaniards by the name of 
 foreigners, since they were equally the subjects of the King as the 
 people of the Netherlands, and had done him the most signal 
 service in that very country from which he was now requested 
 to expel them ; that the Germans, French, and English, in the 
 service of the States, might with much greater propriety be 
 denominated foreigners ; that the King did not intend, in case 
 peace were established, to retain the Spanish troops in the Low 
 Countries longer than necessity should require ; but that it 
 would be highly improper to urge him any further on this subject, 
 as he could not, consistently with honour, dismiss the forces in 
 the present posture of his affairs. They added, that after tran- 
 quillity was restored, the King would not be averse to the convo- 
 cation of the States, nor oppose their deliberating concerning 
 such affairs as properly belonged to them ; that he would be ever 
 ready to listen to their counsel, and would regulate his conduct 
 agreeably to it in everything that was just and reasonable. And 
 that, in the mean time, he was graciously pleased to make them 
 an offer of a full indemnity of their past offences, upon the 
 following conditions : — That all cities and forts, with their artil- 
 lery and stores, should be delivered into his hands ; that every 
 heretical form of worship should be proscribed ; and that all 
 such persons as were unwilling to forsake their errors, should 
 dispose of their effects, and leave the country. 
 
270 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 To these declarations and offers of the Spanish deputies, those 
 of the States replied, that notwithstanding what had been said, 
 they must still adhere to their first request, of having the pro- 
 vinces delivered from the oppression of the Spanish and other 
 foreign troops. These troops were indeed subjects of the King 
 of Spain, but they were not subjects of the duke of Brabant, or 
 the earl of Flanders, Holland, or any other of the provinces, in 
 which therefore they could not be suffered to remain, without a 
 violation of a fundamental law of the constitution. It was true 
 that the French and English troops were foreigners; but these 
 troops had come into the Low Countries at the desire of the 
 States ; they had never assumed to themselves any share in the 
 government, and were deemed necessary by the States for their 
 defence against the Spaniards ; whereas the Spaniards had, from 
 their first entrance into the Netherlands, treated the inhabitants 
 as enemies and slaves ; had arrogated to themselves every 
 important branch of the administration, and had, on many 
 occasions, exercised the most unrelenting cruelty, indulging, in 
 the most abandoned manner, their lawless lust and avarice, to 
 the utter ruin of great numbers of the innocent and faithful 
 subjects of the King. It would be impossible to restore tranquil- 
 lity to the provinces while these men were allowed to remain ; 
 nor were they friends to the King, or the peace proposed, who 
 advised him to retain them. If the service which the King had 
 received from his Spanish troops were compared with the mischief 
 of which they had been the authors, it would be found that they 
 had done infinitely greater harm than good ; and that, by the 
 lawless rapine which they had exercised, they had received much 
 more than a sufficient compensation for all their services. The 
 inhabitants of the Low Countries were conscious of having often 
 contributed to advance the glory of the Spanish crown. Nor 
 could even their late conduct, if justly considered, be interpreted 
 as a breach of their duty to the King, since they had never 
 opposed his exercising any rights which appertained to him as 
 sovereign of the provinces; and although they had taken up 
 arms, they had never employed them but in vindicating those 
 rights and privileges which the King himself had sworn to 
 maintain, or in defending their lives and fortunes, their wives 
 and children, against the violence and lawless tyranny of the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 It gave them much concern to find that the King would not 
 agree to summon an assembly of the States till peace should be 
 restored, as they were convinced that no other means so effectual 
 could be devised for establishing peace on a firm and permanent 
 foundation. It gave them still greater concern to hear the 
 deputies, in the name of the King, express themselves as if they 
 looked upon the States only as counsellors, whose advice he 
 would or would not follow, according as be should judge ex- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 271 
 
 1575.] 
 
 pedient. This they could not help considering as an intimation 
 that the States were to be limited in the exercise of their autho- 
 rity ; and if this was intended, no useful purpose could be served 
 by calling them together. With the conditions annexed to the 
 proffered indemnity it was impossible they could comply. They 
 could not deliver the cities and forts into the hands of the 
 Spaniards, without being apprehensive of the fraud exemplified 
 in the fable of the war between the wolves and the sheep, in 
 which the latter were persuaded to give up their auxiliaries, the 
 dogs, into the hands of their crafty foes. For they had not 
 forgotten the fate of the Counts Egmont and Horn, and many 
 others, who repented when it was too late of putting faith in 
 promises which their enemies could violate with impunity. And 
 with respect to the other condition, that all heretics should quit 
 the country, as they could not believe the religion now established 
 in Holland and Zealand to be heretical, so if all who had renounced 
 the popish faith were to be deemed heretics, and expelled from 
 the Netherlands, there would not be a sufficient number left to 
 keep the dykes in repair ; the country would be stripped of the 
 greatest part of its inhabitants, and ere long be buried in the 
 waves. They concluded with entreating the deputies to take 
 the representation they had made in good part, as proceeding 
 from their zeal for the interest of the King as well as of the 
 provinces ; and with praying Almighty God to inspire the King 
 and his ministers with milder sentiments than those which they 
 had hitherto embraced. 
 
 In the reply which was made to this remonstrance, the Spanish 
 deputies, after complaining of the spirit in which it was composed, 
 said, that the King would so far comply with the request relative 
 to the foreign troops, as to send them away immediately after the 
 terms of peace were settled ; provided the States would at the 
 same time dismiss the foreigners in their service, and deliver up 
 the cities and other fortified places. He would likewise summon 
 the assembly of the States, as soon as the present disturbances 
 had subsided ; but he could not, consistently with his dignity, 
 submit to their decision the conditions on which peace was to be 
 established ; since this would be to abandon what he regarded as 
 his peculiar prerogative, and to allow them to prescribe where it 
 was their duty to obey. In particular, he was determined never 
 to refer to their decision the important question concerning 
 religion. The States, as well as the King, had sworn to maintain 
 the Catholic faith ; and no consideration would ever prevail on 
 him to suffer them to depart from it in the smallest article. He 
 was not afraid of depopulating the maritime provinces by the 
 expulsion of heretics ; on the contrary, he believed that these 
 provinces would flourish more, for that tranquillity which unity 
 of faith would ensure ; and if the heretical ministers were removed, 
 he doubted not that the people would soon perceive the folly into 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 272 
 
 [Book^III. 
 
 which they had been betrayed, and return into the bosom of the 
 church. 
 
 The deputies of Holland and Zealand, after consulting their 
 May 31st. constituents, gave the following as their ultimate reply : 
 Final answer That they were willing to refer the several points of 
 of the States, difference, the dismission of the Spanish troops, the 
 delivering of the cities, forts, and military stores, the nature of 
 the security to be given for fulfilling the conditions of the peace, 
 and even the article of religion, to the general assembly of the 
 States of all the provinces : and they were willing, they said, to 
 make the last of these concessions, not from any intention of 
 giving up their religion, which no consideration would induce 
 them to forsake, but from the deep concern which they felt on 
 account of the long-continued calamities of their fellow-citizens ; 
 to put an end to which, they were ready to abandon their native 
 country, if the States should find it necessary to establish a 
 religion with which their consciences would not suffer them to 
 comply. 
 
 Count Schwartzenburg now perceived that no greater concession 
 The confe- could reasonably be expected. He represented to the 
 rences dis- governor, that considering how deep the Protestant 
 solved. religion had struck its roots in the maritime provinces, 
 the extirpation of it could not be speedily accomplished ; and he 
 urged him to grant a truce for six months, during which time 
 the exercise of that religion should be permitted, and every 
 lenient measure employed to sooth and conciliate the minds of 
 the people. But Requesens had not authority from the King to 
 agree to this request ; and he refused to grant even a truce of 
 two months, except on condition that the Protestants should 
 abstain from their mode of religious worship, and oblige their 
 ministers immediately to quit the country. With this condition 
 Count Schwartzenburg knew that the maritime provinces would 
 never be persuaded to comply. He therefore despaired of being 
 able to bring his negociation to the desired issue, and soon after 
 set out for Germany. The congress was dissolved. The hostages 
 were restored ; and the contending parties, having their resent- 
 ment more inflamed than ever, applied themselves to the pro- 
 secution of the war q . 
 
 The deputies had no sooner left Breda, than Requesens pub- 
 The war lished an edict, prohibiting all communication with the 
 renewed, malcontents ; and immediately afterwards sent his troops, 
 July 12th. unf j er the Count de Hierges, to lay siege to the town of 
 Buren, which they soon obliged to capitulate. From Buren they 
 marched to Oude-water, and, in spite of a brave and vigorous 
 defence, they took it by storm, exercising at this place their 
 wonted fury, and putting the garrison and all the inhabitants to 
 
 i Meteren, p. 146 — 152. Bentivog. lib. ix. ab initio. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1575.] 
 
 275 
 
 the sword, without distinction either of sex or age. Hierges 
 proceeded next to Schowen upon the Leek. The prince of Orange 
 made haste to send a reinforcement to the garrison ; but the 
 inhabitants, dreading the same fate as that of the people of Oude- 
 water, obliged the garrison to surrender. After which, Hierges 
 directed his march towards Crimpen. Vitelli, in the mean time, 
 with the forces under his command, reduced a number of places 
 which lie between the Leek and the V ahal ; and Mondragone 
 was no less successful in the quarter of Holland which borders 
 upon Brabant. 
 
 But Requesens did not incline that his troops should push 
 The governor ^ ie ^ r conquests in Holland any further at present, 
 undertakes In compliance with his instructions, he resolved to 
 the conquest bend his whole attention to the reduction of some of 
 of Zealand. ^ le p r i nc ip a x towns of Zealand, which Philip was 
 desirous of acquiring, for the reception of a fleet to be sent from 
 Spain. In order to accomplish this design, Requesens drew off 
 his troops from Holland, and had, some time before, prepared a 
 number of flat-bottomed vessels, proportioned to the depth of the 
 gulfs and canals. In these vessels he intended to have trans- 
 ported his troops to Zealand ; but the prince of Orange having 
 received intelligence of his design, and collected a naval force of 
 the same kind, much superior in number, he relinquished his first 
 plan, and adopted another that seemed equally difficult and 
 dangerous. This was to imitate what was done by Mondragone, 
 when he raised the siege of Tergoes, and to make the soldiers 
 wade through an arm of the sea which was five miles broad. 
 
 In the north-east parts of Zealand there are three islands 
 Bold and sin- muc ^ larger than the rest, Tolen, Duveland, and 
 gui a r enter- Schowen. Tolen, which lies nearest to Brabant, was 
 prise of the ] n the hands of the Spaniards ; and between this 
 pamards. j s i anc i anc ] Duveland lies the little isle of Philipsland, 
 which is separated from Duveland by the canal, or arm of the 
 sea, over which Requesens intended that his forces should pass 
 on foot. It was known, from some experiments which had been 
 made, that this canal was fordable ; nor was it quite so broad as 
 that which Mondragone 1 s troops had passed over to the relief of 
 Tergoes. But there was still much reason to suspect that the 
 attempt would be found impracticable. 
 
 Such of the officers as were of this opinion observed, that there 
 was a wide difference between the enterprise in question and 
 that of Mondragone, whose men had no other obstacles to 
 encounter but those of the passage, and needed only strength 
 and patience to ensure success ; whereas, in the present case, 
 the enemy having taken the alarm, were continually upon the 
 watch ; and the ford was in a manner besieged by their numerous 
 vessels, which were ready to attack the Spaniards, when they 
 would be unable to defend themselves. And even allowing that 
 
274 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 they should surmount these difficulties, and effectuate their 
 passage, yet what remained for them, on their approach to the 
 opposite shore, but to be attacked by a fresh and vigorous enemy, 
 advantageously posted, before they could disentangle themselves 
 from the mud and water ? 
 
 By these considerations, some of the principal officers were 
 induced to remonstrate against the intended enterprise, as too 
 hazardous and desperate ; and they were of opinion that no 
 attempt ought to be made on Zealand till the fleet from Spain 
 should arrive. But this prudent counsel was not suited to the 
 bold intrepid spirit which animated the greater part of the 
 Spanish officers. The remembrance of their former victories, 
 joined to their contempt of the malcontents, inspired them with 
 confidence of success ; and they w r ere unwilling to divide the 
 glory of their conquests with their countrymen, who were sup- 
 posed to be on their way from Spain. If this enterprise, said 
 they, be impracticable in the day, why may we not undertake it 
 in the night? when we shall either elude the vigilance of the 
 enemy ; or, if they get information of our design, yet we shall 
 have little reason to dread their efforts, as they will be obliged 
 to fire their guns at random, and spend their force in air. The 
 troops posted on the other side to oppose our landing will act as 
 their countrymen have often done on similar occasions ; the 
 boldness of our adventure, and the daring countenances of our 
 men, will overwhelm their dastardly spirits with dismay and 
 terror. 
 
 Bequesens was not naturally fond of rash or daring enter- 
 prises ; but being exceedingly desirous to carry his scheme of 
 subduing Zealand into speedy execution, he transported three 
 thousand select troops, composed of an equal number of Spaniards, 
 Walloons, and Germans, to the isle of Philipsland. Then having 
 ordered d’Avila to attend him with the fleet, on board which he 
 put one half of these forces, he gave the command of the other 
 half, destined to attempt the passage, to Osorio d’Ulloa, a Spanish 
 officer of distinguished courage, who had warmly exhorted him 
 to undertake this bold and singular expedition. 
 
 On the 28th of September, as soon as it was dark, and the 
 tide had begun to retire, Ulloa entered the water at the head of 
 his troops, with the guides before him. The troops were followed 
 by two hundred pioneers ; and the rear-guard was formed by a 
 company of Walloons, commanded by an officer of the name of 
 Peralta. They could march only three men abreast, on the top 
 of a ridge of earth or sand, and were often obliged to wade up 
 to the shoulders, and to bear their muskets on their heads, to 
 preserve them from the water. They had advanced but a little 
 way, when the Dutch and Zealanders approached, and began a 
 furious discharge of their small arms and artillery. And not 
 satisfied with this, many of them leaped into the water, and with 
 
1575.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 257 
 
 hooks fastened to the ends of long poles, laid hold of the soldiers, 
 oppressed with the weight of the element through which they 
 toiled ; massacring some, and plunging others in the waves. 
 Nothing but the darkness of the night, which prevented the two 
 squadrons of the enemy’s ships from acting in concert, could have 
 saved the royalists from destruction. But, notwithstanding the 
 difficulties under which they laboured, they persisted bold and 
 dauntless in their course, exhorting and assisting one another ; 
 and without quitting their ranks, repelling the enemy, and 
 defending themselves as well as their desperate circumstances 
 would allow. Their calamities increased as they approached to 
 the opposite shore. For besides that their vigour was impaired, 
 they had deeper water to pass, and the enemy’s ships could come 
 nearer to the ford. At last, however, they reached the land, in 
 time to save themselves from destruction. The banks were lined 
 with a numerous body of troops ; and if these troops had 
 behaved with an ordinary degree of resolution, it is impossible 
 that the Spaniards, drenched as they were with mud and water, 
 and exhausted with fatigue, could have stood before them. But 
 unfortunately, in the beginning of the attack, their commander 
 was killed by an accidental shot of one of his own men. 
 Consternation seized his troops, and they fled in the most 
 dastardly manner before an enemy unable to pursue. 
 
 This extraordinary adventure, though it succeeded beyond 
 what could justly have been expected, was not executed without 
 loss. The pioneers were all either overtaken by the tide, or 
 destroyed by the enemy. The rear-guard under Peralta saved 
 themselves by returning back. Of the troops under Ulloa, a 
 considerable number was killed or drowned, and others wounded. 
 But among the killed there was only one person of distinction, 
 named Pacheco ; concerning whom it is recorded, that being 
 wounded by a musket-shot, and unable to advance, and some of 
 his men urging him to suffer them to bear him on their shoulders, 
 he replied, “ That would serve only to retard your march. My 
 wound is mortal ; I die, and not without some honour, in so 
 glorious an enterprise.” Saying this, he sank down into the 
 water q . 
 
 When the Dutch and Zealanders saw that, in spite of their 
 opposition, the royalists had accomplished their design, they 
 quitted the canal, and went to give notice of w T hat had happened 
 to the inhabitants of the sea-port towns, which they supposed 
 the enemy intended to attack. Requesens immediately laid hold 
 of the opportunity which their departure afforded him, to trans- 
 
 q Bentivoglio, p. 168. This historian gives the same authority for the above-mentioned 
 particulars as for those of the passage at Tergoes; the testimony of Rivas, governor of 
 Cambray, who was an actor in both. 
 
 The Spaniards were not a little encouraged by an appearance then rare, but since familiar 
 and common, an Aurora Borealis, or northern light ; which shone all the time of their 
 passage, and which they interpreted as a sign wrought by Heaven in their behalf. 
 
 T 2 
 
276 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIII. 
 
 port the rest of his forces to Duveland ; where they joined their 
 companions, and soon compelled all the protestant troops on the 
 island to fly over to Ziricsee, the capital of Schowen. 
 
 The reduction of that city was the immediate and principal 
 object of the present expedition. For, besides that Requesens 
 hoped, by possessing Ziricsee, to be able to disturb the communi- 
 cation between Holland and Zealand, he considered it as the 
 fittest place for the reception of the reinforcement which he 
 expected from Spain ; and he intended to make it the seat of 
 his strength in that quarter, till he should collect a naval force 
 sufficient to ensure the conquest of Middleburg, Flushing, and 
 the other towns in Walcheren. Towards Ziricsee, the army, 
 now commanded by Mondragone, proceeded without delay. 
 Before they could reach it, they found it necessary to pass over 
 the canal which separates Duveland from Schowen, and on the 
 opposite side of which they saw the enemy preparing to dispute 
 their passage. This did not deter them from the prosecution of 
 their design. Animated by the example of their leaders, they 
 leaped without hesitation into the canal, which was near a league 
 over, having the bottom full of mud, and advanced forward with 
 such undaunted intrepidity, that the enemy, regarding them with 
 astonishment, abandoned their station, and left the passage free 
 and undisputed. 
 
 Mondragone would have immediately begun the siege of 
 The desperate Ziricsee, but thought it necessary, beforehand, to make 
 defence of himself master of certain posts, which the Zealanders 
 Bommene. had f or tified, in order to secure the communication 
 between the inhabitants of that town, and their friends in the 
 other islands and on the continent. These forts were three in 
 number ; one on the south near Borendam, and the other two 
 called Browershaven and Bommene, on the north and east. 
 Through the imprudent confidence of the Spaniards, who made 
 an assault on the first of these forts too soon, it cost the lives of 
 sixty of that nation, with Peralta their commander, besides a 
 considerable number of Germans and Walloons. The fort of 
 Browershaven submitted without resistance ; but that of Bom- 
 mene, which was better fortified, was likewise more valiantly 
 defended than the other two. Du Lis, a French officer, com- 
 manded the garrison, consisting of Germans, French, and English, 
 into whose breasts he had infused the same generous and daunt- 
 less spirit with which he himself was animated. The behaviour 
 and fate of this brave determined garrison deserves a place in 
 history. At the time of high water their fortification was 
 impregnable, as at that time the sea filled both the ditch which 
 surrounded it, and a canal which passed through it ; but at low 
 water, and for some hours before and after that time, the ditch 
 was fordable, and the enemy could advance to the very foot of 
 the wall. Both Requesens and Vitelli had come to direct the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 27 7 
 
 1575.] 
 
 operations of the siege. Agreeably to their ‘commands, the 
 royalists, after approaching as near as possible to the ditch, by 
 means of trenches, opened a large battery, which continued firing 
 upon the fort for two days incessantly, till a sufficient breach was 
 made. Then waiting till the water had retired, they made a 
 furious assault ; but the besieged withstood their most vigorous 
 efforts, and at last obliged them to retire, with the loss of a 
 hundred and fifty killed, and twice that number wounded. The 
 Spaniards, enraged on account of their repulse and loss, returned 
 to the assault next da} 7 , and began to storm the fort on different 
 sides at the same time. Both parties were highly agitated with 
 fury and despair, and both were alike determined either to die 
 or conquer. The prospect of the returning tide wrought equally 
 on the fears of the assailants, and the hopes of the besieged. 
 The former knew, that if they did not carry their point soon, 
 they must a second time suffer the shame and slaughter of a 
 repulse ; and the latter considered, that if they could hold out a 
 few hours longer, the water would deliver them for the present, 
 and the enemy be perhaps deterred from renewing the assault. 
 Incited by these reflections, the combatants on both sides exerted 
 all their vigour, and displayed a degree of fortitude and prowess, 
 which seldom occurs in the annals of history. Each person, 
 regardless of his safety, and intent only upon annoying the enemy, 
 the conflict was as bloody and desperate, as the time was critical 
 and important. It had lasted for near six hours, and many of 
 the bravest on both sides had fallen. At last, the assailants, 
 perceiving the quick approach of the tide, and collecting and 
 exerting at once their whole force, overpowered the besieged with 
 their numbers, and burst forward irresistibly within the walls of 
 the fort ; in which the garrison still continued to resist, till there 
 was not a single person left to enjoy the glory of so illustrious a 
 defence. The royalists paid dear for their victory; above two 
 hundred men, besides those who had fallen in the first assault, 
 were killed upon the spot, and a much greater number wounded r . 
 
 They now proceeded to the siege of Ziricsee ; and in this 
 The siege of undertaking their difficulties were greatly augmented, 
 Ziricsee. an d the siege prolonged, by a resolution of the inhabit- 
 ants, who had broken down the dykes of the canal, and laid the 
 adjacent country under water. This measure, of which the 
 states of Holland had lately set the example during the siege of 
 Leyden, showed how firmly determined the citizens were to make 
 a vigorous defence, and rendered impracticable all the ordinary 
 methods of conducting sieges, by trenches, batteries, and assaults. 
 Mondragone perceived that the reduction of Ziricsee must be a 
 work of considerable time, and that the only expedient which he 
 could employ, was to block it up on every side, so as to prevent 
 the entrance of supplies. These it could receive only by the 
 
 T Meursii Auriacus, p. 147. 
 
'278 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIII. 
 
 way of a small canal, dug from Ziricsee to the great one above 
 mentioned, which separates Schowen from the isle of Duveland. 
 
 In order to secure the communication between these canals, the 
 Zealanders had fortified the banks of the smaller, where it is joined 
 to the greater ; and while they retained possession of the batte- 
 ries which they had planted there, they secured a free entrance 
 to the ships which were sent from Holland and Walcheren with 
 supplies. To deprive them of this resource, and lock up the 
 mouth of the small canal, was the first and principal object of 
 Mondragone’s attention. For this purpose he stationed his ships 
 in those parts where the water was deepest ; and formed in the 
 most shallow parts an estacade, a work of a prodigious labour, 
 which employed his troops for several months, and was attended 
 with considerable bloodshed. By perseverance, however, he 
 brought it at last to a conclusion; and then having drawn another 
 stacado of the same kind, from an island which lay in the entrance 
 of the canal, he joined the two stacados together by strong iron 
 chains, and thus rendered all access impracticable. 
 
 During the progress of these operations, the Protestants em- 
 braced every opportunity of introducing supplies into the city ; 
 and they were greatly favoured by the season, which was so much 
 milder than usual, as to leave the rivers and canals navigable 
 through the whole of winter. But in the beginning of F ebruary, 
 the enemy’s works were completed, and from that time, all 
 attempts to relieve the besieged, by the way of the small canal, 
 proved ineffectual. Their friends were therefore obliged to turn 
 to another quarter. 
 
 In the beginning of the siege several cuts had been made in 
 the dyke of the great canal on the side of Schowen, in order, as 
 was mentioned above, to overflow the country. Through one of 
 these cuts, near the village of Dreischer, the prince of Orange 
 proposed to convey supplies to Ziricsee across the inundation ; 
 and he committed the execution of his design to Count Hohenloe, 
 a German nobleman of the most unquestionable spirit and reso- 
 lution ; but a storm arising, and the Spaniards having encamped 
 most of their forces, and planted batteries on the dyke, close 
 by the cut, they obliged Hohenloe to retire. The prince, not 
 discouraged by this check, prepared to make a second attempt 
 with a more powerful armament. And in order to animate his 
 troops, he resolved to conduct the enterprise himself. 
 
 He reached Dreischer, and approached the cut at the time of 
 The rince of high water. In the beginning of the attack he threw 
 Orange 'at- ° the enemy into confusion, made considerable slaughter 
 tempts in among them, and carried off some pieces of cannon from 
 vain to relieve their batteries. But the Spaniards, roused by the 
 danger which threatened them, quickly recovered their 
 stations, and made a bold and vigorous resistance, till the tide 
 began to retire ; when the prince perceiving it to be imprac- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 279 
 
 1575. J 
 
 ticable to advance, was obliged, in order to save his fleet from 
 destruction, to return into the great canal. Boissot, the admiral, 
 whose ship was much larger than the rest, did not retreat in time, 
 and his ship having stuck against the bottom, he himself, and 
 about three hundred of the crew, either perished in the waves, 
 or were killed by the enemy. This was the last attempt for the 
 relief of the besieged, who being at length overpowered with 
 their miseries, agreed to surrender the town into the hands of 
 Mondragone ; and that general, desirous to put a period to so 
 tedious an enterprise, granted them such favourable terms as they 
 were willing to accept s . 
 
 This siege had lasted near nine months, and during all that 
 time had occupied the greatest part of the Spanish army. 
 
 But before the surrender of Ziricsee, other events had hap- 
 Death of pened which rendered those that have been related of 
 Vndii. small importance to either party ; and which, while 
 they disappointed the hopes entertained by the Spaniards of 
 completing the conquest of Zealand, in a great measure delivered 
 the confederates from those disquieting apprehensions which the 
 late success of the Spanish arms was calculated to excite. The 
 first of these events was the death of Yitelli, who was, without 
 controversy, the ablest and most experienced general at that 
 time in the Netherlands. 
 
 Vitelli’s death was quickly followed by that of Requesens. In 
 Death of carrying on the siege of Ziricsee, much greater sums 
 Requesens. had been necessary than he was able to supply. From 
 Spain, he knew that, considering the exhausted condition of the 
 king’s finances * 1 , occasioned by his war with the Turks, no money 
 could be expected ; and the States of such of the provinces as 
 retained their allegiance, were either unwilling, or unable, to 
 comply with his demands. Thus, great arrears were due to his 
 troops, and they had already begun to mutiny, and to exercise 
 the most intolerable oppression on the people ; to whom he had 
 been obliged to grant the liberty of wearing arms for their 
 defence, from a well-grounded apprehension, that if he had not 
 permitted them to do this, they would have done it without his 
 authority". 
 
 Requesens had too much sensibility, and too little strength of 
 mind, either to endure patiently the mortifications, or to encounter 
 resolutely the difficulties, to which he was exposed. His vexa- 
 tion and chagrin preyed incessantly on his health and spirits, 
 and at length brought on a fever, of which he died in a few days ; 
 leaving behind him a much higher character for civil, than for 
 military accomplishments, in which he was confessedly much 
 inferior to his predecessor the duke of Alva w . 
 
 8 Meteren, p. 155. Bentivoglio, p. 170. 
 
 1 Meteren, p. 156. u This liberty had been taken from them by the duke of Alva. 
 
 w Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 464. Strada, tom. ii. p. 35. 
 
280 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 BOOK XIV. 
 
 After the death of Requesens, who had been prevented from 
 The govern- nominating his successor by the violence of his disease, 
 ment in the the council of state assumed the reins of government ; 
 hands of the an d as the King hesitated for some time in his choice 
 ST ° f a g° vernor ? he found it necessary to confirm their 
 authority. 
 
 This revolution afforded great satisfaction to the people of 
 Holland and Zealand ; who flattered themselves with hopes, 
 that now, when the administration was lodged in the hands of 
 their fellow-citizens, the war would not be carried on with the 
 same animosity and ardour as before. At first, however, the 
 council entered heartily into the late governor’s designs, and 
 prosecuted with vigour the plan of operations which he had left 
 unfinished. And they continued to do so till their attention was 
 called to objects of a still more interesting nature than the 
 reduction of the maritime provinces. 
 
 The Spanish cavalry had, as already mentioned, begun to 
 Mutiny of mutiny before the death of Requesens. During the 
 the Spanish siege of Ziricsee, the infantry remained obedient to 
 1 1 oops. -fcheir commanders, partly from being kept in perpetual 
 
 employment, and partly from the hopes of enriching themselves 
 by the plunder of that city ; but being disappointed in these 
 hopes by the articles of the capitulation, and large arrears being 
 due, to the payment of which even the contributions of the people 
 of Ziricsee were not applied 51 , they flew to arms, deposed their 
 officers, elected others, and a commander in chief from among 
 themselves ; and then having sworn mutual fidelity over the 
 sacred host, they abandoned all their conquests which had cost 
 them so much labour and blood, and passed over to Brabant ; 
 intending to take possession of some considerable fortified place, 
 from whence they might make excursions, and plunder the 
 neighbouring towns and villages. 
 
 The council of state sent Count Mansvelt to appease them ; 
 They seize but no offers or promises which the count was ein- 
 on Allost. powered to make, could divert them from their design. 
 They hoped, by the rapidity of their march, to have entered 
 Brussels by surprise ; but both the inhabitants and garrison were 
 prepared to oppose them. They failed likewise in an attempt on 
 Mechlin. Then leaving Brabant, they turned suddenly towards 
 
 * Meteren says, that the Walloons laid hold of the money, and "with great dexterity 
 excluded the Spaniards from the town. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 281 
 
 1576 .] 
 
 Allost in Flanders ; and made themselves masters of that town, 
 by climbing over the walls in the middle of the night, when the 
 citizens were off their guard. They could not have acquired 
 possession of a place more suitable to their design; as it was 
 situated in the midst of a rich and fertile country, and lay at 
 nearly an equal distance from Brussels, Ghent, and Antwerp. 
 They had no sooner displayed the standard of rebellion in Allost, 
 than they were joined by most of the other Spanish troops in 
 the Low Countries ; after which they began to exercise every 
 species of violence and outrage, both against the citizens and the 
 inhabitants of the country round. 
 
 The prince of Orange remained not idle or unconcerned in 
 this critical conjuncture. He had too much sagacity not to dis- 
 cern, and too much zeal and dexterity not to avail himself of so 
 favourable an opportunity of advancing his designs. By his 
 letters, and emissaries, he endeavoured to rouse the spirit of the 
 people, and to persuade the council, “ that now was the time 
 when they might deliver themselves for ever from the tyranny 
 of Spain. By the good providence of God, the government had 
 fallen into their own hands. It ought to be their unalterable 
 purpose, to hold fast the power which they, possessed, and to 
 employ it delivering their fellow-citizens from that intolerable 
 load of misery under which they had so long groaned. The 
 measure of the calamities of the people, and of the iniquities of 
 the Spaniards, was now full. There was nothing worse to be 
 dreaded than they had already suffered ; and nothing to deter 
 them from resolving either to expel their rapacious tyrants, or 
 to perish in the glorious attempt.” 
 
 These exhortations, enforced by accounts which were propa- 
 They are de- gated of the enormities committed by the Spa nish troops, 
 dared rebels found an easy admittance into the minds of persons of 
 } tleco ' jnci1 ' all ranks. The council of state were no less inflamed 
 than the people ; and resolved to publish an edict, declaring the 
 Spaniards to be rebels against the King. Barlaimont, Mansvelt, 
 Yiglius, even the Spanish officers of the highest rank, and Khoda, 
 president of the council of tumults, seemed at first inclined to 
 concur with the other counsellors ; but perceiving that their 
 resentment was not confined to the mutineers, but extended 
 likewise to all the friends of the Spanish government, they began 
 to alleviate the outrages of the soldiers, and openly opposed the 
 publication of the edict ; alleging, that troops which had mutinied 
 on account of not receiving their pay, could not justly be con- 
 sidered as rebels ; and that the edict would serve only to exas- 
 perate them still more against the people, while the council was 
 not provided with force sufficient to restrain their excesses. But 
 these reasons were held in great contempt by a majority of the 
 council ; who, having expelled the dissenting members, accused 
 them of holding correspondence with the mutineers, and threw 
 
282 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIV. 
 
 them into prison. Then having elected the duke d’Arschot for- 
 th eir president, in the room of Viglius, they published an edict 
 in terms strongly calculated to increase the odium against the 
 Spanish troops ; calling on the people to concur with them in 
 driving out that lawless and rapacious crew, who, under the pre- 
 text of procuring payment of their arrears, would, if they were 
 not speedily prevented, bring utter ruin upon the Netherlands. 
 
 Nothing could have been more consonant to the general spirit 
 Hostilities Flemings, than the sentiments contained in this 
 
 between the edict. It served as fuel to that flame which was already 
 Spaniards kindled, and which now burst out with redoubled vio- 
 andFie- i e nce. To give greater weight to the measures which 
 had been already taken, and to those which they in- 
 tended t° pursue, the council called an assembly of the States ; 
 and all the provinces, Luxemburg excepted, sent deputies to 
 attend. This assembly had no sooner met than hostilities were 
 begun. The citadels of Antwerp, Ghent, Valenciennes, and 
 Utrecht, were in the hands of the Spaniards. Romero com- 
 manded in Lieres; and Maestricht was garrisoned by some com- 
 panies of German infantry. To acquire possession of these 
 important fortresses, and to prevent the Spanish troops from 
 uniting themselves into one body, were the objects upon which 
 the States bestowed their first and principal attention. They 
 were successful in gaining over to their side the regiments of 
 Walloons in the Spanish service; and they raised so great a 
 number of militia of the country, as, when joined with the Wal- 
 loons, formed a considerable body of troops. 
 
 The Spaniards on the other hand, prompted by Rhoda, and 
 animated by the brave and active d 1 Avila, exerted themselves no 
 less strenuously in counteracting their designs. An officer of the 
 name of Vargas, having drawn together eight hundred horse in 
 the neighbourhood of Maestricht, had advanced as far as Vise- 
 nach, in his way to Allost, in hopes of prevailing on the muti- 
 neers to act in concert with him. At Visenach he was met by 
 two thousand foot and six hundred horse, which the States had 
 sent to oppose him. But the Spaniards were not so much in- 
 ferior in number, as they were superior in military discipline. 
 Vargas supplied his want of infantry by making a company of 
 Burgundians quit their horses. The Flemish troops, though 
 they began the attack with great impetuosity, fell soon into dis- 
 order ; and the Spaniards broke in upon their ranks, and put 
 them to flight, with considerable slaughter. 
 
 Vargas continued his route to Allost ; and was seconded in his 
 application to the mutineers, by d 1 Avila and Romero; but neither 
 the importunity of their officers, nor a regard to the honour of 
 their nation, or to their personal safety, could overcome their 
 obstinate resolution to remain in Allost, till they should receive 
 payment of their arrears. From Allost, Vargas led his troops, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 *283 
 
 1576.] 
 
 with the utmost expedition, to Maestricht, which, he was in- 
 formed, the Germans in garrison there had agreed to deliver to 
 the States. The execution of their design had been retarded by 
 some companies of Spaniards, a part of whom were in possession 
 of one of the gates, and the rest stationed in the town of Vich. 
 This town lies on the east side of the river, and is connected 
 with Maestricht by a bridge over the Maese. Vargas, having 
 transported his troops, and joined his countrymen at Vich, had 
 a sharp engagement with the townsmen upon the bridge ; but as 
 they were not supported by the Germans, he soon compelled 
 them to retire. They paid dear for this attempt to assert their 
 liberty. The Germans, instead of acting as their friends, united 
 with the Spaniards, and both together plundered the town with- 
 out mercy b . 
 
 But the memory of the calamities which the people of Maes- 
 The sack in o- experienced on this occasion, was effaced by those 
 
 and plunder which soon afterwards befell the citizens of Antwerp, 
 of Antwerp The States had laboured in vain to persuade the Spa- 
 niardT Spa " n * * s k § arr ^ son m citadel to deliver it into their hands. 
 
 They now resolved to compel them ; and, with this view, 
 they had brought into the city a numerous body of W alloons and 
 other troops. They had much reason for that solicitude with 
 which they desired to get possession of this important fortress ; 
 which, on the one side, communicated with the town by a spa- 
 cious esplanade, and on the other, with the adjacent country. 
 The States were not sufficiently aware of the danger to which, 
 from these two circumstances united, the city of Antwerp was 
 exposed. Champigny 0 the governor had endeavoured to rouse 
 their attention to this danger, and had earnestly exhorted them 
 to block up the esplanade by batteries and trenches ; and, at the 
 same time, to order all the troops that could be spared, to encamp 
 without the town, so as to prevent the Spaniards at Allost and 
 other places from entering the citadel. But they wholly neg- 
 lected the latter part of this advice, and they were too late in 
 beginning to put the former in execution. They believed that 
 the garrison would not venture to sally out upon the town, in 
 which there was so great a number of troops to oppose them ; 
 and they flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to 
 compel them to surrender, before they could receive assistance 
 from their countrymen. For this purpose, two strong batteries 
 were planted on the esplanade ; while the townsmen were em- 
 ployed, either in pushing forward the trenches, or in raising 
 mounds for the security of the town. 
 
 The siege of the castle of Ghent was carried on at the same 
 time, and the States had conceived the most sanguine expecta- 
 
 b Meteren, p. J 64. Bentivoglio, p. 178. 
 
 * He was brother to Cardinal Granvelle, and was as averse from the Spanish interest as 
 his brother was attached to it. 
 
284 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIV. 
 
 tions of success, when the noise of the artillery reached from 
 both places to the mutineers in Allost ; and, awakening in them 
 some sparks of their native warlike ferocity, produced a more 
 powerful effect upon their minds, than all the exhortations and 
 entreaties of their commanders. 
 
 Navarese, their leader, seized dexterously this opportunity 
 which their present disposition afforded him ; and, calling them 
 together, exhorted them to reflect upon the folly of suffering the 
 fortresses besieged to fall into the hands of the Flemings. “ That 
 artillery,” said he, “ which is now thundering in our ears, is 
 levelled against us, no less than against the garrisons of Ghent 
 and Antwerp. When the Flemings shall have subdued the rest 
 of our countrymen, can we doubt that they will next turn their 
 arms against us, who are the principal objects of their resent- 
 ment ? Can you imagine that the States will then lend a more 
 favourable ear, than at present, to your requests ? Believe me, 
 they will ere long extinguish the debt which they owe you, in 
 your blood. Let us march instantly to the relief of the citadel 
 of Antwerp. We shall soon oblige the enemy to raise the siege. 
 We shall, in spite of the townsmen, and the raw troops which 
 they have brought to their assistance, make ourselves masters of 
 the richest city in the world, and take ample revenge for the 
 unworthy treatment we have received.” 
 
 He would have proceeded ; but was prevented by shouts of 
 applause, and exclamations from every quarter, To arms ! to 
 arms ! They were now as impatient to leave Allost, as they had 
 formerly been reluctant. On the third day of November, and 
 only a few hours before sunset, they began their march ; hoping 
 to reach the citadel of Antwerp early next morning, unobserved 
 by the enemy. Having found greater difficulty in passing the 
 Scheld than they expected, they did not arrive till noon ; not- 
 withstanding which, being joined by four hundred horse, under 
 Vargas and Romero, who had acted in concert with Navarese, 
 they entered the citadel, without meeting with the least oppo- 
 sition. The citizens were no sooner informed of their arrival, 
 than they suspected their design, and were filled with the most 
 dreadful apprehensions. Champigny the governor, whose advice 
 had been so unfortunately disregarded, saw the approaching 
 storm, and did everything in his power to avert it. 
 
 But the impetuosity of the mutineers did not leave him time 
 for completing the arrangements which he intended. These men, 
 impelled at once by avarice and revenge, rejected with disdain 
 the invitation given by d"’ Avila to repose and refresh themselves 
 after their march. With rage and fury in their countenances, 
 they demanded the signal to advance ; calling out, that they 
 were determined, before night, either to perish in the conflict, or 
 to fix their quarters in the city. They were in number between 
 two and three thousand, and the garrison, together with the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 28.5 
 
 1576.] 
 
 troops brought by Vargas and Romero, amounted nearly to the 
 same number. Navarese led on the mutineers, and the remainder 
 were commanded by Romero. Nothing could exceed the intre- 
 pidity with which these two determined bands, vying with each 
 other, attacked the trenches. The citizens displayed, at the first 
 onset, great bravery and resolution ; but being unable long to 
 withstand the impetuous attack of the Spaniards, and being 
 galled at the same time by the artillery of the citadel, they at 
 length gave way, and fled with precipitation along the two streets 
 which lead from the parade into the centre of the city. The 
 Spaniards were seconded by their cavalry ; which bore down all 
 before them, and followed close upon the rear of the vanquished, 
 till they reached the great square, in the centre of which stands 
 the Guildhall or Palace. There the fugitives, being joined by 
 some fresh troops, made a halt, and rallied ; but they were 
 soon broken a second time, and would have been all cut to pieces, 
 if they had not taken shelter in the palace, and in houses 
 of the square. From the windows they kept, for some time, a 
 brisk fire upon the enemy, and did considerable execution ; but 
 the Spaniards, who were accompanied by the retainers of their 
 camp, set fire to the houses with hay, straw, and other com- 
 bustible materials, not sparing even the palace itself, which was 
 esteemed one of the richest and most magnificent in the world. 
 It was quickly reduced to ashes ; and of those who had taken 
 refuge in it, some perished in the flames, and some by the sword, 
 in attempting to escape; while others, frantic with despair, flung 
 themselves headlong from the windows d . 
 
 The Spaniards then dispersed themselves over the city, over- 
 powering all opposition with irresistible impetuosity. Had their 
 number been sufficient either to murder, or to overtake the mul- 
 titude that fled before them, the carnage of that memorable day 
 would have been still more dreadful. Of the citizens near seven 
 thousand perished ; while the loss of the Spaniards amounted 
 only to two hundred men ; so great is the superiority in battle 
 of regular discipline, and prompt obedience to command. For 
 though the citizens fought with extraordinary courage, like men 
 whose all was at stake, they acted not in concert ; and although 
 they had been marshalled by Champigny, as well as the time 
 would allow, yet, from want of practice, they were soon thrown 
 into confusion, and, from the same cause, they were unable to 
 recover their ranks, or return to the charge. 
 
 Justice would oblige us to bestow on the Spanish troops the 
 praise due to the most heroic valour, if, besides the rapacity which 
 impelled them, they had not disfigured the lustre of their victory 
 by exercising a degree of barbarous cruelty, of which, at that 
 period, the Spaniards alone, of all the nations in Europe, seem to 
 have been capable. Antwerp, at the time of this catastrophe, 
 
 d Tbuauus. 
 
286 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 was in the most flourishing condition. Companies of merchants 
 from almost every commercial nation resided in it, possessing 
 store-houses and factories filled with the most precious com- 
 modities.' Great numbers of the citizens, too, were the wealthiest 
 in Europe. Their magnificent houses were adorned with the 
 most costly furniture ; and their shops and warehouses stored 
 with gold and silver stuffs, and all other kinds of valuable effects, 
 collected from every corner of the globe. Upon these the Spa- 
 niards seized without any discrimination of the owners, and 
 without considering whether the persons, whom they pillaged, 
 were friends or enemies. The plunder that lay open and uncon- 
 cealed was immense ; but was far from being sufficient to satiate 
 the avarice of the Spaniards. They exercised the most unre- 
 lenting cruelty upon all whom they suspected to have concealed 
 their treasures ; and nothing was to be heard in the city, but 
 either the shrieks and groans of the sufferers, or the lamentations 
 of those whom they compelled to behold the torments of their 
 husbands, wives, or children. Contemporary historians have 
 described some of the several species of torture which they 
 inflicted ; but the reader’s modesty would be offended, and his 
 humanity shocked, by the recital e . 
 
 In this manner were these men, for three days and nights, 
 employed in plundering and butchering by turns, a people who 
 were subjects of the same prince as themselves, and from whom 
 (whatever ground of complaint they might pretend against the 
 council of state) they had never received the smallest injury or 
 provocation. Nor does it appear that their officers interposed to 
 moderate their excesses, till the soldiers, exhausted with fatigue, 
 were about to give over of themselves. 
 
 The money in specie which was extorted, amounted at least 
 to eight millions of guilders, besides an immense quantity of gold 
 and silver, in plate, stuffs, and furniture, which the owners were 
 not able to redeem. The loss which the people of Antwerp 
 sustained by the burning of so many buildings, was not less than 
 what they suffered by the rapacity of the soldiers. The most 
 beautiful part of the city was burnt to the ground ; and great 
 numbers of shops and warehouses, containing the richest goods, 
 were consumed to ashes f . 
 
 Whilst the barbarity exercised against the inhabitants of 
 The States Antwerp, excited sentiments of compassion towards the 
 receivers- 8 unhappy sufferers, it greatly augmented that abhorrence 
 sistance from which the Flemings already entertained towards the 
 the prince of Spaniards, and made them more solicitous than ever to 
 range. deliver themselves from a yoke which was now become 
 intolerable. But the great superiority which the Spanish troops 
 discovered on every occasion over the raw undisciplined forces of 
 
 ® Thuanus and Meteren. 
 
 f Meteren, p. 164. Thuanus, tom. iii. p. 471 . Bentivoglio, p. 178. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 287 
 
 1A7<5.] 
 
 the States, created much anxiety with regard to the success of 
 their endeavours. The council of state perceived the necessity 
 of having recourse to foreign aid ; and they willingly accepted an 
 offer which was made them at this juncture by the prince of 
 Orange, of some cannon, ammunition, and troops, with which 
 they pushed forward the siege of the citadel of Ghent, and soon 
 obliged the garrison to capitulate. 
 
 This seasonable assistance contributed not a little to advance 
 the princess views. Immediately after the death of Requesens, 
 he had projected a scheme of uniting all the provinces, and had 
 exerted himself with great activity and address, in carrying it 
 into execution. The States entered readily into his ideas. 
 The confe Deputies were appointed, and invested with proper 
 deracy of powers, by the several provinces ; and in the congress, 
 Ghent. which was held at Ghent, a treaty of confederacy was 
 Sh V ?756 concluded, under which all the provinces, except Luxem- 
 burg, were comprehended. 
 
 In this confederacy, so well known in the history of the Nether- 
 lands by the name of the Pacification of Ghent, it was agreed 
 between the Catholic provinces on the one hand, and those of 
 Holland and Zealand, with the prince of Orange, on the other, 
 that there should subsist between them an inviolable alliance, 
 peace, and friendship ; that all past injuries should be buried in 
 oblivion ; that all prisoners, and in particular the count de 
 Bossut, should be set at liberty without ransom ; that the con- 
 tracting parties should, to the utmost of their power, assist each 
 other in expelling the Spaniards from the Netherlands ; that as 
 soon as the provinces should be delivered from these bloody 
 oppressors, and tranquillity established, a general assembly should 
 be held of the States of all the provinces, for redressing grievances, 
 reforming abuses, and restoring the constitution of its primeval 
 state ; that the prince of Orange should remain high admiral 
 and governor of the maritime provinces ; amd that he, and all 
 others, whose property had been confiscated, should be rein- 
 stated in their possessions and dignities ; that all the decrees of 
 the duke of Alva, relative to the tumults and heresy, should be 
 abolished ; but that in the Catholic provinces, only the Roman 
 Catholic religion should be exercised ; while in those of Holland 
 and Zealand, all matters, whether civil or religious, should remain 
 on their present footing, till a general assembly of all the States 
 should be held f . 
 
 The deputies who were now convened, whom the historians 
 Arrival of call likewise by the' name of the States, entered imme- 
 Don John of diately upon the execution of the articles of this con- 
 Austna. federacy, by transporting to the frontier of France 
 such of the Spaniards as had been taken prisoners in the citadel 
 of Ghent : and they had begun to make preparations to dislodge 
 
 f Meteren, p. 169. Bentivoglio, 1. ix. sub fine. Thuanus, 1. lxii. sect. 13. 
 
288 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIY. 
 
 them from other places, when they were informed that Don John 
 of Austria, whom Philip had made choice of for governor, had 
 arrived in the province of Luxemburg. In some respects, Don 
 John was admirably qualified for this new station, to which his 
 brother had appointed him. His affable and insinuating manners 
 were fitted to conciliate the affections of the people whom he 
 had been sent to govern ; and his military accomplishments 
 qualified him to pursue the war with vigour, against the revolted 
 provinces. But in the critical situation into which the late 
 enormities of the Spaniards had brought the Netherlands, other 
 talents besides these were requisite ; such as prudence, patience, 
 and self-command, together with skill and dexterity in managing 
 the passions and the prejudices of men ; qualifications which Don 
 John possessed not in an eminent degree. 
 
 His conduct upon his first arrival was ill calculated to allay 
 His rudence those suspicions which the Flemings entertained or 
 the King’s design in sending him to the Netherlands. 
 Having stopped at Luxemburg, he wrote letters to the council and 
 the States, in which he informed them, that he would not come 
 to Brussels, the usual residence of their governors, unless hostages 
 were given him for their peaceable behaviour, a guard appointed 
 for the security of his person, and the same unlimited command 
 of the fleet and army conferred upon him which the preceding 
 governors had enjoyed. He lamented the outrages which had 
 been committed by the Spanish troops ; and promised, that, if 
 if the States and people should maintain their obedience to the 
 King, and their profession of the Catholic faith, the injuries 
 which they had sustained should not pass unpunished. But he 
 added, that if they failed in either of these respects, they should, 
 in that event, find him no less prepared for war, than he was 
 inclined to peace s. 
 
 The States and council were ignorant, till they received these 
 The States Otters, °f the light in which their late conduct was 
 apply for ad- considered by the court of Spain. They believed that, 
 vice to the as the steps which they had taken were necessary for 
 OruTe^ the P reserva ti° n °f the people, it was impossible they 
 could be offensive to the King ; and they were ex- 
 tremely surprised, thus to meet not only with distrust, but even 
 threats, and a defiance where they were conscious of having 
 merited approbation and applause. They trembled therefore at 
 the thoughts of putting themselves in the power of the new 
 governor, and were greatly at a loss to determine what answer 
 they should return to his demands. On this occasioh they had 
 recourse to the prince of Orange for advice. And William 
 readily embraced the opportunity, which was thus presented to 
 him, of confirming his countrymen in those suspicions to which 
 the governor’s conduct had given rise. 
 
 * Meteren, p. 174. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 289 
 
 in 76.] 
 
 “As it was but too manifest,” he said, “from the strain of 
 His advice, Don John’s letter, that he intended to tread in the 
 dated Nov. footsteps of his predecessors, the States and council 
 . 30 , 15/6. h ac [ muc h need to exert all their firmness, prudence, 
 and circumspection. They ought seriously to consider the im- 
 portant charge with which they were entrusted ; and to remember, 
 that upon their present conduct it depended, whether they, and 
 their wives, and children, and fellow-citizens, should for the future 
 enjoy those rights which belonged to them as natives of the Low 
 Countries, or should be again exposed to the lawless tyranny of 
 the Spaniards. They ought to exercise with vigour the power 
 which they possessed, and resolutely reject all terms of agree- 
 ment with the governor, by which the fundamental laws of the 
 State might be brought into danger, or their own authority 
 abridged. Enter not,” said he, “ into any accommodation with 
 him, till the Spaniards, and all other foreign troops, be actually 
 dismissed. Trust not to any soothing promises which he may 
 give you, of dismissing them at a more convenient season. 
 Remember how the King himself, when he went to Spain, assured 
 you, that the troops which he then left behind him, should, in 
 three months afterwards, be withdrawn, and yet they were suffered 
 to remain for more than a year and a half ; and would, notwith- 
 standing your solicitations, have still remained, if the calamity 
 which befel his army in Africa had not made it necessary for 
 him to remove them. Let no consideration persuade you to 
 listen to Don John’s request of the unlimited command of your 
 forces. By granting this, you will furnish him with weapons 
 against yourselves. Nothing can express his distrust more 
 strongly than his unprecedented requisitions of hostages, and a 
 guard for the security of his person. If you comply with these 
 demands, you will enable him to annihilate your authority, and 
 to trample under foot your most sacred rights and laws. It is 
 impossible to believe that one who discovers so much solicitude 
 to strip you of your power, can seriously intend your welfare. 
 Is it not more reasonable that the governor should trust the 
 States, than that the States should lay themselves at the mercy 
 of the governor ? Such demands were never made, even by your 
 princes themselves; whose practice always was, to come unarmed 
 to your assemblies, and to take an oath to maintain your privi- 
 leges, before they received from you any promise of obedience. 
 Consent not to put yourselves under the power of John of 
 Austria, upon easier terms than have been ever insisted upon 
 with your native princes. Require him, previously to his admis- 
 sion, to interpose his authority for the immediate departure of 
 the Spanish troops ; and solemnly to engage to govern the State 
 according to its fundamental laws h . To these conditions, your 
 
 k Here the prinee mentions the particular privileges to which he alludes, and the times 
 when they were obtained. Meteren, p. 175. 
 
 U 
 
290 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 late fatal experience will justify you, if you add, that you shall 
 have tho power of assembling yourselves twice, or even thrice a 
 year, if you shall judge it to be expedient ; that the citadels 
 shall be razed to the ground ; that the right of appointing the 
 governors and magistrates shall be vested in you ; and that, 
 without your consent, no military force shall be levied, and no 
 garrisons stationed in the towns or forts. At present, it little 
 imports you to consider whether or not this conduct will give 
 offence to the King, for it is mere delusion, if you flatter your- 
 selves that you have not already offended him. Promises, sooth- 
 ing speeches, and professions of affection on his part, will not be 
 wanting ; but you will discover the last degree of weakness, if, 
 after what you have experienced for several years past, you are 
 not sensible that nothing now remains for you, but either 
 miserably to bend under the yoke from which you have so 
 happily escaped, or to employ with vigour and fortitude the 
 means with which Providence has furnished you ; and which, I 
 doubt not, may yet prove effectual for your security, provided 
 you maintain harmony and concord among yourselves h” 
 
 This letter, in some measure, produced the desired effect. It 
 The States P u ^ s J ence all those who were for receiving Don 
 apply for aid John on his own terms; and the States, more sus- 
 to foreign picious than ever of his design, resolved to insist upon 
 powers. di sm i ss j on 0 f the troops, and the confirmation of 
 
 the pacification of Ghent, as conditions without which they 
 woidd never agree to acknowledge his authority. And that 
 they might not be found unprepared, in case of his refusal, they 
 gave orders for making new levies ; drew together an army at 
 Wavre, between Brussels and Namur ; and despatched am- 
 bassadors to solicit assistance from foreign courts. 
 
 In Germany, where they were powerfully seconded in then- 
 applications by the prince of Orange, they engaged in then- 
 interests John Casimire, count Palatine of the Rhine. In 
 France they did not confine their application to the Calvinists, 
 but likewise prevailed upon the duke of Anjou, the king’s 
 brother, to espouse their cause, by setting before him the 
 prospect of an establishment in the Low Countries, more 
 suitable to his rank than he could expect to obtain in his 
 brother's dominions. From the queen of England, their envoy 
 met with the most gracious reception. It was matter of the 
 highest satisfaction to this sagacious princess, to sec her in- 
 veterate enemy thus embroiled with his Flemish subjects ; but, 
 as she was still desirous to avoid an open rupture with Philip, 
 she chose to assist them with money rather than with troops, 
 and gave them forty thousand pounds, with a promise of con- 
 tinuing her favour, on condition (which she added in order to 
 save appearances) that they should adhere to tho pacification 
 
 5 Metercn, p. 175, 176. Bcntivoglio, lib. ix. ab vnitio. Thuanus, 1. lxii. sect. 15. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 291 
 
 1576.J 
 
 of Ghent, and not throw off their allegiance to their legal 
 sovereign. 
 
 While the States were making these preparations to vindicate 
 Their nego- their rights by force of arms, they sincerely desired to 
 tiation with attain their end by negotiation with the governor. 
 Don John. p or they had too long groaned under the calamities of 
 war, not to wish most earnestly for peace, provided that blessing 
 could be secured without making a sacrifice of their liberties. 
 Don J ohn, on the other hand, discovered an extreme reluctance 
 to comply with the conditions which they required of him ; but 
 he endeavoured to dissemble his sentiments, and attempted, by 
 fair speeches, to cajole and deceive them. Still, however, he 
 continued to shew his diffidence, by insisting upon having a 
 numerous guard for his person ; and by refusing his consent to 
 the departure of the Spaniards, unless the States should at the 
 same time dismiss the foreign troops in their service, and give 
 hostages, to remain in the hands of a neutral power, till their 
 engagements should be fulfilled. 
 
 The States, whose jealousy was kept alive by the repeated 
 warnings of the prince of Orange, easily penetrated into Don 
 J ohn’s designs ; and they resolved, if possible, to convince him, 
 by one decisive step, that it was in vain for him to expect that 
 they would ever depart from the terms proposed. In their 
 assembly at Brussels, on the fifth of January, one thousand five 
 1577 hundred and seventy- seven, they drew up a new deed of 
 union, in which they engaged in the most solemn manner 
 to maintain inviolably for ever the pacification of Ghent; to 
 spare neither their goods, their persons, nor their lives, in order 
 to fulfil it ; and to regard as perjured traitors all those who, 
 participating in the present union, should by word, deed, or 
 counsel, counteract it. A copy of this deed, subscribed by the 
 governor and deputies of all the towns and provinces ; by the 
 nobility, prelates, and other dignified ecclesiastics ; and by the 
 members of tribunals, councils, colleges, and chapters, together 
 with a solemn ratification of it by the council, was sent by the 
 States to Don J ohn, as their final answer to his demands k . 
 
 This measure contributed not a little to promote the end pro- 
 Their agree- posed. It gave Don J ohn a proof of firmness on the 
 ment with part of the States which he little expected, and showed 
 him * him the necessity of either agreeing to the conditions 
 which they so earnestly required, or of resolving instantly to have 
 recourse to arms. Inflamed by ambition and the love of war, he 
 would not have hesitated a moment what part to act, had not his 
 instructions from the King required that he should avoid coming 
 to an open rupture with the Catholic provinces. He considered 
 likewise that the States had got the start of him, and were already 
 well prepared to repel force by force. Nor was he ignorant of the 
 
 k Meteren, p. 179. 
 u 2 
 
292 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 encouragement which they had received to hope for succour from 
 the neighbouring powers ; or of the danger to which great 
 numbers of the Spanish troops, surrounded by their enemies, 
 were exposed, of being reduced by famine. Influenced by these 
 considerations, and trusting that, ere long, after quieting their 
 suspicions, opportunities would offer of depriving the States, by 
 degrees, of that power of which they were at present so tenacious, 
 he entered into a negotiation with their deputies at Marche en 
 March 12 Famine, a city in Luxemburg; and after many obstruc- 
 tions and difficulties, concluded a treaty with them, 
 which they fondly termed the perpetual edict. 
 
 In this treaty he engaged that all the foreign troops in the 
 service of Spain should leave the Netherlands, and never return 
 thither without the consent of the States ; that the Spaniards 
 and Italians should depart within the space of forty days, and 
 the Germans immediately after receiving satisfaction with regard 
 to their arrears ; and that all the cities and forts possessed by 
 these troops should, as soon as they were relinquished, be 
 delivered to the States, together with the stores of ammunition, 
 arms, and provisions. He ratified the pacification of Ghent. 
 He consented that all prisoners detained on account of the late 
 disturbances should immediately be set at liberty, except the 
 count of Buren l . And he promised that diligent inquiry should 
 be made concerning the outrages lately committed by the troops ; 
 that justice should be executed against the guilty, and a reason- 
 able compensation made to the sufferers, either in the Nether- 
 lands or in Spain, according as the King should be pleased to 
 determine. 
 
 The States, on the other hand, engaged to preserve inviolable 
 their allegiance to the King, to maintain the profession of the 
 Roman Catholic faith throughout all the provinces ; to receive 
 Don John as governor-general of the Netherlands; and imme- 
 diately to furnish him with six hundred thousand florins, for the 
 payment of the Italian and Spanish troops, in order to prevail 
 on them the more easily to depart for Spain or Italy. 
 
 As soon as this treaty was concluded, ambassadors were 
 The States of despatched by the Catholic States, who alone were 
 Holland re- concerned in it, to the prince of Orange, and the States 
 fuse to concur. H 0 p anc i an( l Zealand, to desire their concurrence. 
 It might easily have been foreseen that this application could not 
 be attended with success. For although the maritime provinces 
 had consented, in the pacification of Ghent, to submit the question 
 of religion to the decision of a general assembly, to be held after 
 the departure of the Spaniards ; yet in that assembly they knew 
 that they would have leisure to employ all their influence in 
 behalf of their religion, and to offer such reasons against proscrib- 
 ing it as they hoped would prove a sufficient counterpoise to the 
 
 Son of the prince of Orange. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 293 
 
 1577 .] 
 
 religious zeal of the Popish States. Without this expectation, 
 it can hardly be supposed that Protestants, whose sincerity in 
 their profession was so unquestionable, would ever have agreed 
 to leave to others the determination of a matter in which they 
 were so deeply interested ; and therefore it is not surprising that 
 they declined acceding to the treaty now presented to them, in 
 which this important point had, without obtaining their consent, 
 been so hastily decided. But, lest they should alarm the bigotry 
 of the Catholic provinces, they took no notice, in their answer, 
 of this, which was their principal objection. They began with 
 saying, that they could not enough praise that generous zeal 
 which the States had displayed in delivering their country from 
 the tyranny of the Spaniards ; and they rejoiced to find that 
 they still persisted in their resolution of adhering to the pacifi- 
 cation of Ghent. But, after considering attentively the treaty 
 which had been transmitted to them, they were sorry to observe 
 that it was extremely ill calculated to answer the laudable inten- 
 tions of the States. For, besides several other objections of 
 great weight, there was no proper provision made in this treaty 
 for the regular calling of assemblies ; in a convention held on 
 purpose to restore and secure their rights, an open infraction of 
 them was ratified, by their consenting to the unjust detention of 
 the count of Buren ; the States had failed in the respect and 
 gratitude which they owed to the Queen of England and the 
 duke of Anjou ; and certain articles of the treaty were derogatory 
 to the honour of the Netherlands ; particularly that article by 
 which, instead of insisting upon a restitution of those inva- 
 luable effects of which the Spaniards had plundered the inha- 
 bitants, they had promised money to those men, notwithstanding 
 their having been solemnly declared traitors and rebels by the 
 States themselves, and by the council of State, when clothed 
 with the authority of the King. 
 
 The Catholics could not but be sensible of the strength of 
 Departure of f^ese objections. Their impatience to be delivered 
 the Italian from the Spanish troops, and their eager desire of 
 and Spanish peace, had betrayed them into that precipitation of 
 hoop*. which they had been guilty. They could not avail 
 themselves now of the superior penetration of the prince of 
 Orange. The treaty was already concluded, and nothing re- 
 mained for them but to watch the governor’s motions with an 
 attentive eye, till the troops were removed to such a distance 
 that they could not easily be recalled. Don John was at great 
 pains to dispel their suspicions. For that purpose he employed 
 all his influence to persuade the Spaniards to depart ; and he at 
 length prevailed, though not till he had distributed among them 
 the money which he had received from the States. This brave, 
 but ferocious and savage band, then set out upon their march for 
 Italy, like an army in triumph, loaded with the spoils of their 
 
294 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 fellow-subjects, and without compunction for the rapacity and 
 violence which they had exercised m . 
 
 Their departure diffused universal joy throughout the Nether- 
 Dou John’s l an d s ; an d the people indulged the flattering hope 
 admission to that the King, having been at last touched with their 
 the govern- calamities, had resolved to treat them with greater 
 lenity and moderation than they had experienced since 
 the beginning of his reign. Their satisfaction was heightened 
 by the popular character of the governor, who was in the prime 
 of life ; elegant and graceful in his person and deportment ; 
 lively, facetious, and affable ; and who gained exceedingly from 
 the comparison which men naturally formed of his insinuating 
 manners, with the reserve and austerity of the King. He was re- 
 ceived in Brussels with such marks of respect as had never been 
 shown to any former governor ; and persons of all ranks flattered 
 themselves with the prospect of a just and mild administration. 
 
 They did not long enjoy this soothing prospect. Although 
 His impolitic Philip himself had ratified the perpetual edict, and 
 conduct. Don John had, before his admission to the regency, 
 sworn in the most solemn manner to observe it, it soon appeared 
 that nothing was farther from the intentions of either. The 
 limitations which that edict imposed upon the sovereign’s autho- 
 rity were utterly repugnant to Philip’s temper, as well as to the 
 plan which he had formed for the government of the Nether- 
 lands ; nor would he ever have empowered his brother to make 
 so many concessions to the States, as the perpetual edict or 
 pacification of Ghent contained, but in order more effectually to 
 strip them afterwards of that very power which he now consented 
 they should enjoy. But Don John was, from his natural impe- 
 tuosity, incapable of executing this scheme, which required a 
 much higher degree of circumspection and experience, as well 
 as patience and dissimulation, than he possessed. His court 
 was perpetually filled with Spaniards, and other foreigners, who 
 had rendered themselves obnoxious to the natives ; nor were any 
 of the Flemings admitted into his confidence but such as had 
 shown themselves devoted to the Spanish interest ; while those 
 who had discovered an attachment to the liberty of their country 
 were kept at a distance, and treated with indifference or contempt. 
 This circumstance contributed not a little to revive that jealousy 
 of his designs which he had been so solicitous to allay. But the 
 States were still more alarmed when he made them the following 
 proposals : that they should not any longer withhold from him 
 the authority which his predecessors had enjoyed, but allow him 
 to act as captain-general as well as governor of the provinces : 
 that they should empower him, without waiting for the deter- 
 mination of the general assembly of the States, to execute the 
 two articles of the late treaty, which related to the obedience 
 
 n > Thuanus, lib. Ixiv, scot. vi. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 295 
 
 1577 .] 
 
 due to the King, and the re-establishment of the Catholic reli- 
 gion ; and that, if the prince of Orange would not immediately 
 agree to accede to the perpetual edict, the States should break 
 off all correspondence with him, and reduce him and the maritime 
 provinces to obedience by force of arms. With these proposals 
 the States refused to comply, but expressed their refusal in the 
 softest terms ; and without taking notice of his demand, to be 
 allowed to act as captain-general, they represented to him that, 
 by the pacification of Ghent, both he and they were bound to 
 wait for the meeting of the general assembly of the States, to 
 whose decision the prince of Orange, and the States of Holland 
 and Zealand, had engaged to submit. 
 
 Don John, perceiving that he was not likely to persuade them, 
 grew more impatient than ever under his present restraints, and 
 resolved now to employ either force or fraud, as opportunities 
 H . d j. should offer. The States could not thoroughly pene- 
 is up iu y. ,|. ra £ e design p u £ they perceived how much he was 
 dissatisfied with his situation, and what difficulty they would find 
 to obtain the performance of his engagements in the perpetual 
 edict. This served to render them more than ever solicitous for 
 the departure of the German troops, which it had been agreed 
 should remain in the Netherlands till they received payment of 
 their arrears. These arrears amounted to a very great sum, 
 which the States were utterly unable to raise at the present 
 juncture. But, having raised a part of it, they made an offer of 
 that to the Germans, and desired they would accept of goods 
 and security for the rest. In order to make a further trial of 
 Don John's sincerity, they entreated him to employ his influence 
 to procure their consent. Don John readily agreed to this 
 request; and declared that, if tbe Germans should refuse to 
 comply, he would, at the hazard of his life, compel them. Having 
 summoned their commanders to meet him at Mechlin, he went 
 thither, as if on purpose to persuade them; but in reality to 
 inflame their minds against the States, and to exhort them to 
 remain in the Netherlands in the service of the King. Having 
 had the success which he desired with some of the principal 
 officers, and judging it necessary now to redouble his hypocrisy 
 with the States, he wrote to them, lamenting that a much 
 greater sum was necessary to satisfy the German troops than 
 could be procured in the Low Countries ; and offering to send 
 his secretary, Escovedo, to represent their situation to the King. 
 This artifice was not altogether without effect. The States could 
 not believe that Don John was capable of so great a deceit as 
 he was now practising against them. They agreed to his pro- 
 posal, and, as an expression of their gratitude, they settled a 
 pension of two thousand ducats on Escovedo, who set out imme- 
 diately for Spain, but with a design extremely different from 
 that which was pretended. 
 
296 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIV. 
 
 Don J ohn, in the mean time, carried on his intrigues with the 
 lie seizes on German officers, and hoped soon, by their means, to 
 the castle of get possession of the fortified towns in which they lay. 
 
 But, before any of the plans which he had formed 
 with this view were put in execution, he judged it necessary to 
 withdraw from Brussels, and, if possible, to make himself master 
 of some place of strength near the frontier, where he might 
 remain in safety till he should find himself in a condition to take 
 the field. Of all the frontier towns, Namur appeared the fittest 
 for his purpose, being conveniently situated for the reception of 
 the troops, to which he expected the King would soon give orders 
 to return from Italy. It happened that Margaret de Valois, 
 queen of Navarre, intended at this time to pass through Namur, 
 in her way to Spa. On pretence of paying his respects to 
 Margaret, he left Brussels, and arrived in Namur, with a great 
 number of the nobility and others, who were favourable to his 
 design. But, as the governor of the castle was a person of strict 
 fidelity, Don John was obliged, in m-der to accomplish his aim, 
 to have recourse to the following stratagem: — Feigning to set 
 out in the morning for the chase, he took his way by the castle, 
 where having stopped, and inquired for the governor, he pre- 
 tended a curiosity to see the fortifications of the place. The 
 governor, flattered with this visit, and suspecting nothing hostile 
 from men who seemed equipped only for hunting, readily admitted 
 not only Don John himself, but his attendants ; some of 
 July 24. w j lom ^ i iav i n g arms concealed under their apparel, imme- 
 diately seized upon the gate n . 
 
 John having thus secured possession of the castle, the town 
 was, by the assistance of Count Barlaimont, governor of the 
 province, soon subjected to his authority. He observed with 
 triumph, that the day on which this event happened was the 
 first day of his regency. It might with greater propriety have 
 been said, that it was the first of those calamities which pursued 
 him to the grave. 
 
 After such an open violation of his faith, there could be little 
 room for any future negociation with the States. Yet, in a let- 
 ter which he wrote to them on this occasion, he regretted that 
 the plots which had been laid to deprive him of his life or liberty, 
 had obliged him to have recourse to so hostile an expedient, and 
 he affirmed, that he was still ready to observe the conditions of 
 the perpetual edict ; but declared, that he would not quit his 
 present situation, till they should make provision for the security 
 of his person against the machinations of his enemies. 
 
 The States and council were greatly astonished, when they 
 The astonish- received intelligence of this event. They had wished 
 mc.it* of the for nothing so much as to preserve, the provinces from 
 States. being plunged afresh into the calamities of war. They 
 
 m Bentivoglio, lib. x p. 192, 195. Meteren, |>. I ha. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 297 
 
 1577 .] 
 
 considered that some of the principal cities in Brabant were in 
 the hands of the Germans. They knew not what part these 
 troops might act, if hostilities with the governor should take 
 place ; and they could not imagine that he would have ventured 
 on so manifest a breach of the perpetual edict, without the pro- 
 spect of some powerful support. They immediately despatched 
 ambassadors to remonstrate with him on the nature and conse- 
 quences of his conduct, and to request him to return to Brussels. 
 They promised to make the most serious inquiry into the machi- 
 nations of which he complained, desired that he would name the 
 persons guilty, and assured him, that nothing should be wanting 
 on their part to provide, in the most satisfactory manner, for the 
 security of his person. 
 
 Of the reality of these machinations he could produce no other 
 evidence, but some anonymous letters, which, he said, had been 
 transmitted to him. But as no person was named in these let- 
 ters, and the authors of them were utterly unknown, all men be- 
 lieved them to be a forgery of his own, or of his courtiers, designed 
 to serve as a pretext for his present treachery. 
 
 The answer which he made to the States showed clearly, that, 
 in the steps which he had taken, he had been influenced by a 
 motive very different from that which he pretended — that the 
 States should put him in full possession of the authority, which 
 the preceding governors had exercised ; that they should give 
 him the entire command of the army ; break off all communica- 
 tion with the prince of Orange, and the provinces of Holland and 
 Zealand, and compel them to accede to the perpetual edict ; these 
 were some of the conditions, to which if they did not agree, he 
 acquainted them, that he was unalterably determined not to 
 return. The States represented the inconsistency between the 
 former of these demands, and the perpetual edict ; and reminded 
 him of the utter impossibility under which they found them- 
 selves, of complying with the latter without violating their faith, 
 which, in the pacification of Ghent, they had pledged to the 
 maritime provinces. He still persisted in his resolution ; and the 
 States were equally inflexible. 
 
 They were confirmed in their purpose, by some letters wTit by 
 Discovery of Don J ohn and Escovedo to the King, and Antonio 
 his designs. Perez, his secretary, which were intercepted in Gas- 
 cony by the king of Navarre, and sent by him to the prince 
 of Orange, who transmitted them to the States. In these let- 
 ters, the, necessity of the speedy return of the Italian and Spa- 
 nish troops was urged with the utmost earnestness and impor- 
 tunity. The diseases of the Netherlands, said Don John, admit 
 of no other cure but lopping off the parts affected : and to the 
 same purpose, Escovedo observed, that fire, and the shedding of 
 blood, were the only means by which the disorders that prevailed 
 could be remedied. For no man here, said he, whether among 
 
298 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIV. 
 
 the nobility or people, performs the duty that he owes either to 
 God or the King. Opinions the most abominable universally 
 prevail ; and every man lives as he lists without law or rule. 
 To which he added, that if the King did not send the necessary 
 troops and money soon, he was afraid that Don John, who could 
 not endure his present situation, would quit the Netherlands, 
 and try his fortune elsewhere. 
 
 While these letters served to alienate the Flemings more than 
 The States ever from Don J ohn, they raised to the greatest 
 oftownsToto 1 their admiration of the penetration and saga- 
 
 their posses- city of the prince of Orange, who had given them 
 sion. early warning of the governor’s duplicity, and whose 
 
 predictions were now so remarkably fulfilled. They entered 
 with greater ardour than ever into his views, and in con- 
 formity with his advice, they resolved to lose no more time in 
 negotiating, but without delay to put the provinces into a pos- 
 ture of defence before the return of the Spanish forces. Whilst 
 their levies, and other military preparations, were going on, they 
 laboured with great solicitude to persuade the Germans to deliver 
 up the towns in their possession. Their success was in some mea- 
 sure retarded by the governor’s intrigues with the officers ; but 
 the States, having at this time greater facility than Don John 
 in employing either money or force, according as the one or the 
 other was most likely to prove effectual, had greater influence 
 with the soldiers ; who not only refused to listen to their officers, 
 but put some of them under arrest, and gave them up to the 
 States, together with the towns and citadels. In this manner 
 the States recovered Bergen-op-zoom, Tolen, Breda, Bois-le-duc, 
 and several other places ; and they had the good fortune likewise 
 to defeat a body of Germans, in the governor’s interest, who were 
 upon their march to surprise the citadel of Antwerp. After 
 which, prompted partly by the apprehensions which this attempt, 
 though unsuccessful, had excited, and partly by the remembrance 
 of the many calamities which the citadels, in other places as well 
 as Antwerp, had occasioned to the inhabitants, they resolved to 
 demolish these fortresses ; and gave orders for this purpose, which 
 were executed by the people with inexpressible alacrity 0 . 
 
 Don John, in the mean time, endeavoured to make himself 
 master of some places in the neighbourhood of Namur ; and he 
 succeeded in his attempts upon Marienburg and Charlemont. 
 But, being forsaken by the duke of Arschot, and almost all the 
 other nobility who had attended him to Namur ; and perceiving 
 that the States were much farther advanced than himself in their 
 military preparations, ho sent them word that he had solicited 
 the King for liberty to leave the Netherlands ; and would imme- 
 diately retire to Luxemburg, to wait the issue of his application, 
 provided the States would agree to desist from hostilities till the 
 
 0 Motcrcn, p. 187. Bcnlivoglio, tom. ii. p. 212. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 29y 
 
 1577 .] 
 
 King’s instructions should arrive. But the States, suspecting from 
 their former experience that he intended nothing by* this proposal 
 but to render them more remiss in their preparations, replied, 
 that before they could listen to any terms of accommodation, he 
 must deliver up the city and castle of Namur. To this Don 
 John refused to consent ; and thus the negociation was broken 
 off, and all hopes of terminating the dispute amicably were extin- 
 guished 15 . 
 
 The States, considering war now as unavoidable, resolved to 
 The States invite the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels ; and 
 invite the accordingly five of their number were appointed to 
 Oranteto carr y him an invitation, couched in terms so flattering 
 reside 0 at and respectful, and so expressive at the same time of 
 Brussels. their gratitude for his former services, that it was im- 
 possible he could hesitate to comply with their request. Having 
 obtained the consent of the States of Holland and Zealand, he 
 went first to Breda, and thence to Antwerp and Brussels. His 
 reception in the places through which he passed, was such as might 
 be expected from a people, by whom he was held in the highest 
 respect and veneration. Ardent to behold him, after an absence 
 of several years, during which he had undergone so many labours, 
 and been exposed to so many dangers in their service, they poured 
 out in multitudes, to the distance of several miles, to meet him. 
 
 In his passage from Antwerp to Brussels, one side of 
 is reception. canal was lined by the inhabitants of the former 
 of these places, and the other by those of the latter ; while the 
 banks resounded with the joyful shouts of a grateful people, who 
 saluted him with the glorious appellations of the Father of his 
 Country, and the Guardian of its liberty and laws. Nor were 
 these demonstrations of joy confined to the vulgar, who are 
 always sincere, but often precipitate and inconstant in their 
 applauses ; persons of all ranks vied with each other in testifying 
 their respect and gratitude ; and immediately after his arrival, 
 the States of Brabant and the States-general concurred in elect- 
 ing him governor of the province of Brabant q ; a dignity which 
 had been hitherto bestowed only on the viceroys, or governors- 
 general, of the Netherlands. 
 
 By his wisdom and moderation, as well as by his vigilance and 
 Thepromis- industry, William fulfilled the most sanguine expecta- 
 ing condition tions of his countrymen. But, notwithstanding his 
 land 6 Nether “ a ddress and prudence, and skill in managing the minds 
 of men, — qualifications which he possessed in the most 
 eminent degree, — he could not preserve that unanimity among the 
 Flemings, which it was of so much consequence for them in the 
 present juncture to maintain. At no period had they enjoyed so 
 fair a prospect of securing their liberty on a firm and permanent 
 foundation. Besides the advantage of having a person of so 
 
 p Bentivoglio, p. 198. 
 
 *i Vide Hist. Metallique, tom. i. p. 235. 
 
300 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIV. 
 
 great experience and abilities to guide their counsels, the Spa- 
 nish troops were entirely withdrawn ; the King's finances were 
 greatly exhausted with the wars in which he had been continually 
 engaged ; almost all the fortified places were in the hands of the 
 States ; and the people were animated universally with the most 
 violent abhorrence of the Spanish government. But the States 
 were prevented from improving the opportunity which this for- 
 tunate concurrence of circumstances afforded them, by a spirit of 
 division and animosity, which sprang up, partly from the jealou- 
 sies of the nobility, and partly from the intemperate religious 
 zeal and bigotry of the people. 
 
 Philip de Croy, duke of Arschot, the marquis of Havree his 
 Sources of brother, the count de Lalain, and several others of the 
 animosity^ Catholic nobility, had, since the death of Requesens, dis- 
 isco! . ^j n g U j[ s ] ie q themselves as strenuous asserters of the liber- 
 ties of their country. They had promoted with all their influence 
 the pacification of Ghent, and had concurred with their country- 
 men in the invitation given to the prince of Orange to reside at 
 Brussels. But when they reflected upon the extraordinary marks 
 of attachment which William had received, and saw him vested 
 with an authority and dignity in Brabant, which only the sove- 
 reign or his viceroys had hitherto enjoyed ; above all, when they 
 contemplated his great abilities and experience in the conduct of 
 affairs, they foresaw that they must content themselves with 
 acting a subordinate part in the government, and that the States 
 would, in every branch of administration, be directed by the prince 
 of Orange, who must therefore reap the glory of whatever should be 
 achieved, and, without the name of sovereign, exercise a supreme 
 and sovereign authority. Stung with envy, and desirous to con- 
 ceal the motive of their conduct, they began to affect an extreme 
 anxiety at the danger to which the Catholic faith was exposed, by 
 the States reposing such unreserved confidence in one who was 
 an avowed friend of the new religion. On this pretence, which 
 never received any colour from the prince’s conduct, they formed 
 themselves into a confederacy, with a design to counteract him. 
 And in order to give their party consistency, weight, and influ- 
 ence, they resolved to invite the archduke Matthias, brother of 
 the Emperor, to take upon him the government of the provinces. 
 
 This resolution they not only formed, but executed, without 
 The Flemish knowledge or authority of the States, and they 
 nobles give despatched a messenger to Matthias with the greatest 
 
 an invitation secrecy, to entreat him to leave Vienna without 
 to Matthias. de ] ay 
 
 Nothing could exceed the temerity of those who gave this 
 invitation, but the imprudence of Matthias in accepting it. For, 
 besides that he was called only by the least powerful of the two 
 parties into which the Flemings were divided, lie could not bo 
 ignorant how injurious and affronting his conduct must be thought 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 301 
 
 1577.] 
 
 by his kinsman the king of Spain. It is some alleviation of his 
 folly, that he was only twenty-two years of age ; and that, con- 
 sidering the numerous progeny which his father left behind him, 
 there was little probability of his obtaining any settlement in 
 Germany, suitable to his rank. At the time of the death of 
 Requesens, he had made an offer of his service to the States, and 
 he accepted greedily of the present invitation. His enterprise 
 being of such a nature that he durst not discover it to the Emperor, 
 he set out from Vienna in the middle of the night, with a small 
 number of attendants. No sooner was his brother apprised of his 
 design, than messengers were despatched to bring him back, and 
 letters sent to the princes whose states he must pass through, 
 intreating them to stop him ; but Matthias travelled faster than 
 His arrival. the messengers, and, in a few days, reached the town 
 of Lierres in Brabant. 
 
 The States, astonished at the news of his arrival, and highly 
 He is admit- incensed against those who had invited him, complained 
 ted governor loudly of the insult offered to their authority ; and 
 by the States. wou j ( j l iave instantly formed the resolution of rejecting 
 him, had they not been dissuaded from it by the prince of Orange. 
 William foresaw the advantages which might arise from that 
 rivalship, into which Matthias had entered with his kinsman 
 Don John, and from the seeds of enmity which were thereby 
 sown between the German and Spanish branches of the house of 
 Austria. He reckoned it rather fortunate, that Don John had 
 received so unpardonable an offence from the Catholic nobility ; 
 and he considered how fatal to the general interest of the pro- 
 vinces all division must necessarily prove in the present critical 
 conjuncture of their affairs. 
 
 Influenced by these considerations, he exhorted the States to 
 overlook the injurious treatment which they had received, and 
 persuaded them to agree, not only to receive Matthias with all 
 the respect due to his high rank, but even to elect him governor, 
 on such conditions as they should judge proper to require. This 
 conduct, the most prudent that could have been adopted in the 
 present circumstances, furnished no sort of triumph to the duke 
 d’Arschot, and the other Catholic nobility. On the contrary, it 
 mortified them exceedingly to observe that Matthias owed his 
 election not to them, but to the prince of Orange ; whose autho- 
 rity, which they intended to have controlled, was now considerably 
 augmented, and more firmly established than before. 
 
 Soon after this, they received a still more sensible mortifi- 
 Mortifications cation. The duke d’Arschot, having lately been 
 of the nobi- appointed governor of Flanders, had gone to the city 
 of Ghent, to take possession of his government. Not 
 long after his arrival, a deputation of the inhabitants having 
 urged him with much importunity to reinstate them in their 
 ancient privileges, of which they had been deprived in the time of 
 
302 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIY. 
 
 Charles V., ho was heard to declare, that that seditious multi- 
 tude, which made so much noise about their privileges, should 
 ere long be punished as they deserved, notwithstanding their 
 being supported by the prince of Orange. This saying being 
 repeated by some who heard it, and circulated all over the city, 
 inflamed the minds of the people with rage and indignation. 
 They ran to arms, surrounded the governor’s house, and threw him, 
 and his friends and attendants, into prison. The prince of Orange, 
 dreading the consequences of so violent a procedure, and believing 
 the duke to be now sufficiently humbled, interceded with the 
 Ghentese, and procured his liberty ; but no solicitations could 
 induce them to release his adherents. In this manner was the 
 duke d’Arschot’s importance in the Netherlands almost annihi- 
 lated. Matthias, perceiving this, saw it to be his interest to connect 
 himself with the party of which the prince of Orange was the 
 head ; and readily accepted the government, with a condition to 
 which the States required his consent, that the prince should be 
 his lieutenant-general in all the branches of administration. 
 
 Matthias made his joyful entry into Brussels in the beginning 
 of the year one thousand five hundred and seventy-eight, when 
 both he and the prince of Orange were admitted to their respec- 
 tive offices, after taking an oath to maintain the laws, and to 
 regulate their conduct according to the instructions which should 
 be given them by the States' - . 
 
 Don J ohn sent an ambassador to protest in his name against 
 Application these proceedings. But the States had some weeks 
 of the States before this time declared him an enemy to the Nether- 
 to Philip. lands, and paid no regard to his protestation. As they 
 were persuaded, however, that they had done nothing but what 
 was authorised by the fundamental laws of the constitution, they 
 wrote an account of their proceedings to the King, declaring that 
 they still held their allegiance to him inviolable ; and praying, 
 that he would confirm their election of his kinsman Matthias, as 
 the most likely means of restoring tranquillity to the provinces. 
 They had very little reason to expect that Philip would listen to 
 this request. He looked upon their conduct in a light extremely 
 different from that in which they themselves regarded it ; and 
 considered their presumption in rejecting the governor whom he 
 had appointed, and still more that of nominating another without 
 his consent, as an act of the most audacious rebellion. The 
 States were too well acquainted with his character, not to enter- 
 tain some apprehensions that such might be his sentiments ; and 
 therefore, while they omitted nothing in their power to assuage 
 his resentment, they endeavoured to secure themselves against 
 the effects of it, by interesting the neighbouring powers in their 
 behalf, and by establishing unanimity between the religious parties 
 into which the provinces were divided. 
 
 Mcteren, p. 19G, 202. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 303 
 
 1573.] 
 
 In order to accomplish this last and most important object, a 
 new treaty of union was concluded, in which, besides confirming 
 the pacification of Ghent, the Catholics and Protestants pro- 
 mised mutually to support each other ; and engaged, that they 
 would join together in opposing all persecution on account of 
 religion, from whatever quarter it should come 8 . 
 
 The neighbouring powers were not unconcerned spectators of 
 The Emperor. f^ ese transactions. The Emperor 4 saw with much 
 anxiety, that those flames which had burnt so long 
 in the Netherlands, were now likely to burst out with greater 
 violence than ever. But having been educated at the court of 
 Madrid under Philip, with whom he wished to live on amicable 
 terms, he had shown himself exceedingly displeased with the 
 conduct of Matthias ; had given Philip entire satisfaction with 
 regard to his own intentions ; and had resolved to take no other 
 part in the dissensions of the Netherlands, but that of employing 
 his intercession and advice. He did not however oppose the 
 levies which the count palatine was making for the service of 
 the States, either because he knew that his prohibition would 
 not have been regarded, or because he desired to preserve a strict 
 neutrality between the contending parties. 
 
 Henry III. of France was too much occupied in his own domi- 
 Henry III. nions, to have leisure to enter deeply into the affairs 
 of France. 0 f the Netherlands. For many ages, France had 
 seen no king of whose reign the people entertained more san- 
 guine expectations. Having, in his early youth, been appointed 
 commander -in-chief by his brother Charles, he had given signal 
 proof of uncommon abilities. The French had flattered them- 
 selves with the hopes of seeing their kingdom restored by him to 
 its ancient splendor ; his fame was universally diffused, and the 
 Polish nobility had, with general applause, conferred upon him 
 their elective crown. But when, upon his brother’s death, he 
 left Poland, and succeeded to the crown of France, it is incon- 
 ceivable how great a change he seemed to have undergone. 
 Irresolute, inconstant, indolent, and voluptuous, with a mixture 
 of the most ridiculous superstition, he lost the confidence of the 
 Catholics as well as Protestants, whom he favoured and betrayed 
 by turns. The unsteady and unskilful hand, with which he held 
 the reins of government, added daily new force to the virulence 
 of faction, till every member of the state, and almost every indi- 
 vidual in the kingdom, was infected. The Queen-mother em- 
 ployed all her art and influence to support his authority, but 
 could not restrain her younger son, the duke of Alenin, now 
 duke of Anjou, from putting himself at the head, sometimes of 
 one party, and sometimes of another, in opposition to the King. 
 To this prince, who was now the presumptive heir of the crown, 
 the Flemings addressed themselves, after having in vain applied 
 
 s Meteren, p. 197. 
 
 * Rodolpli II. 
 
304 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY 
 
 to the King himself for protection. Anjou listened with much 
 The States pleasure to their application ; and having conceived 
 apply for aid hopes of obtaining the sovereignty of the provinces, he 
 to the duke made them the most flattering promises of assistance, 
 o Anjou. ij e nry, far from opposing the duke’s designs, consi- 
 dered his leaving France as the most fortunate event that could 
 happen ; since he would be thereby delivered from a great num- 
 ber of restless intriguing spirits, by whom the tranquillity of his 
 kingdom had been disturbed. But as he declined on this occa- 
 sion to assist his brother in levying forces, partly from inability, 
 and partly from the dread of embroiling himself with Philip, 
 Anjou was not in a condition, till some time after the present 
 period, to fulfil his engagements. 
 
 The Flemings mean while received the most seasonable assist- 
 They receive ance f rom the flueen of England. Don John had, some 
 assistance months before, endeavoured to prepossess Elizabeth in 
 from Eliza- hi s favour ; by representing, that the disturbances in 
 beth ' the Netherlands were entirely owing to the prince of 
 Orange and his adherents, who had broken the pacification of 
 Ghent, and by their intrigues prevailed upon the States to violate 
 the perpetual edict. Elizabeth pretended to give credit to this 
 representation, and ordered her ambassador to reproach the 
 States with their infidelity, and even to threaten them with her 
 resentment, in case they should refuse to adhere to their engage- 
 ments. Thus far this artful princess went, in order to persuade 
 Philip, that she seriously desired his subjects in the Netherlands 
 to maintain their allegiance. But in reality she wished for 
 nothing less. In a political light (that light in which the con- 
 duct of Elizabeth ought almost always to be considered) nothing 
 could be more desirable to her, than that the troubles of the 
 Low Countries should continue ; and, if either of the two contend- 
 ing parties should finally prevail, that victory should fall rather 
 on the side of the people, than of the King. But when she con- 
 sidered the inequality of the dispute between him and the Flem- 
 ings, she dreaded that the latter, if left to themselves, must soon 
 be compelled, either to relinquish their pretensions, or to throw 
 themselves for protection into the arms of France. She had 
 therefore resolved to watch carefully over their conduct, and to 
 afford them, from time to time, such assistance as their circum- 
 stances should require. She lent a favourable ear to the defence 
 which was made by the prince of Orange and the States against 
 Don John’s accusations; and she admitted of their justification 
 the more willingly, as, in the representation given her of Don 
 J ohn’s conduct on this occasion, she found reason to believe that 
 his intentions were no less hostile with regard to herself, than 
 with respect to the States and the prince of Orange. For 
 William had taken particular care to inform her of some inter- 
 cepted letters of Don John’s, from which it appeared, that ho 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 305 
 
 1578.] 
 
 entertained a secret correspondence with the queen of Scots ; 
 that he had formed a plan, to which the Pope was privy, for set- 
 ting that princess at liberty ; and that he was incited to attempt 
 this, not only by the desire of distressing Elizabeth, but likewise 
 by the wild ambition of marrying the Scottish queen, and attain- 
 ing, through her, possession of the British crowns. 
 
 After this discovery, Elizabeth resolved no longer to keep any 
 measures with Don John, but to exert herself with vigour in 
 opposing his re- admission into the government of the Nether- 
 lands. With this intention she gave the most gracious recep- 
 tion to the marquis d’Havree, the ambassador of the States, and 
 entered readily into a treaty, by which she engaged to furnish 
 them with an immediate supply, both of money and troops ; upon 
 condition, that the commander of these troops should be admit- 
 ted into the council of state ; and that, during the continuance 
 of the war, no step should be taken, nor any alliance formed, 
 without her consent u . 
 
 Elizabeth had no sooner subscribed this treaty, than, being still 
 desirous to avoid an open breach with Philip, she despatched an 
 ambassador™ to Madrid, to represent to him, that in her late 
 transaction with the States, it was far from her intention to 
 encourage them to withdraw their allegiance ; that, on the con- 
 trary, she had employed the only means likely to prove effectual 
 to prevent them from casting themselves, in despair, into the 
 hands of some other power. She was deeply interested, she 
 acknowledged, in saving her neighbours from oppression ; espe- 
 cially the Flemings, with whom the commercial interests of her 
 subjects had long been, and still were, so closely connected. 
 This she hoped would plead her excuse for exhorting him to 
 substitute in the room of his brother, a governor in whom the 
 people could repose greater trust and confidence ; and with 
 whom she herself could maintain a more friendly intercourse 
 than she could ever hold with Don J ohn, after having discovered 
 his design to invade her dominions. She concluded with en- 
 treating him to redress the grievances of his Flemish subjects ; 
 offering to mediate between him and them, if her mediation 
 could be of use ; and declaring, that if they should refuse to 
 fulfil their late engagements, or attempt to make any innova- 
 tion contrary to the pacification of Ghent, she would assist him 
 in reducing them to obedience by force of arms x . 
 
 Elizabeth could not mean anything by this embassy, but the 
 fulfilling of an empty ceremonial, which was received by Philip, 
 and performed by her, with equal insincerity. She did not wait 
 for a return to her embassy, but proceeded instantly to carry 
 into execution her treaty with the States. Both the troops and 
 money which she engaged to furnish, were immediately sent over ; 
 
 u Meteren, p. 197. Bentivoglio, p. 202. Camden, anno 1577, &c. 
 w Thomas Wilkes, clerk of the council. x Carte, book xviii. Camden. 
 
306 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIV 
 
 and the latter was remitted by the States to Prince Casimire, to 
 enable him to complete his levies. 
 
 The States had collected a considerable body of forces, which 
 imprudent they stationed in the neighbourhood of Namur ; and if 
 delays of the they had followed the counsel of the prince of Orange, 
 who exhorted them to lay siege to that important for- 
 tress, they might have made themselves masters of it, and pre- 
 vented the return of the Spanish troops. But many among them 
 being still unshaken in their allegiance to the King, as well as in 
 their attachment to the popish faith, nothing but their remem- 
 brance of the cruelties of Alva, and the late enormities of the 
 Spaniards, could have induced them to concur in the measures 
 which the majority had adopted. These men fondly imagined, 
 that Philip would be moved with their calamities, and persuaded 
 to comply with their requests. Being, for this reason, unwilling 
 to begin hostilities, they urged strongly the expediency of a de- 
 fensive war : and thus the army was suffered, for several months, 
 to remain inactive, and time imprudently given for the arrival of 
 the Italian and Spanish troops y . 
 
 Although Philip did not entirely approve of his brother’s 
 The return of conduct, and desired to have obtained his ends by 
 the Spanish negotiation and artifice ; yet, having failed in this 
 troops. way, he resolved, without hesitation, to employ force ; 
 and he had accordingly sent orders to Alexander Farnese, the 
 prince of Parma, to lead back the troops from Italy, to the 
 Netherlands, without delay. On their arrival at Namur, being 
 joined by other troops, which Don John had levied in the 
 neighbouring provinces, they composed an army of fifteen 
 thousand foot and two thousand horse ; while that of the 
 States amounted only to ten thousand foot and one thousand 
 five hundred horse ; and was no less inferior to the enemy in 
 discipline than in number. The States now saw their folly in 
 having neglected to make themselves masters of Namur, as an 
 entrance had thereby been secured for the Spaniards into the 
 centre of the Netherlands. 
 
 The situation in which Don John found himself at this time, 
 was much more suitable to the talents which he possessed, than 
 those negociations and treaties in which he had been hitherto 
 engaged. He had longed with extreme impatience for the 
 arrival of the forces, and ardently desired to be revenged upon 
 the States for the injurious treatment which he imagined he had 
 received. Having got information that their army, commanded 
 by the sieur de Goignies, had left their camp in the neighbour- 
 hood of Namur, and were retiring towards Brussels, he resolved 
 to attack them on their march. With this intention he sent his 
 cavalry before, under the prince of Parma, and followed them 
 himself, as quickly as possible, with the foot. Farnese executed 
 
 y Metcron, book viii. ab initio. 
 
1578.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 307 
 
 the trust committed to him with great valour. At the head of 
 The battle of his battalion, he attacked the Flemish cavalry with 
 Gembioms. uncommon fury ; and though they gave him a spirited 
 reception, he soon compelled them to retire. In the mean time 
 Don John came forward with a chosen body of infantry, and 
 afforded him such a powerful support, as enabled him to drive 
 the enemy’s horse before him, till he entered along with them 
 into the ranks of their main army. The Flemings believing the 
 whole Spanish forces to be at hand, and being utterly unprepared 
 for so sudden an attack, were soon thrown into confusion and 
 dispersed. About three thousand were killed, and a great num- 
 jxn 31 ^er, ^ ie commander-in-chief, were taken prisoners. 
 
 The loss on the side of the conquerors was inconsiderable. 
 
 After this victory, Don John reduced Gemblours, Louvain, 
 Sichem, Nivelle, and several other places, both in Brabant and 
 Hainault. He desired likewise to have laid siege to Brussels ; 
 but his council of war were of opinion, that his strength was not 
 adequate to so great an enterprise, and thought it more ex- 
 pedient to aim at easier conquests, till his army should be 
 reinforced. 
 
 The States in the mean time received an abundant com- 
 Amsterdam pensation for their losses in the southern provinces, 
 accedes to the by the acquisition of Amsterdam. To this wealthy 
 confederacy. c ity, which even then was the greatest in the northern 
 e nuaiy 8. p rov i nce g 5 the duke of Alva had, as mentioned 
 above, given the most particular attention ; having expelled 
 the Protestants, and put the government entirely into the hands 
 of rigid Catholics. These men, supported by a numerous 
 garrison, had baffled all the attempts which had been made by 
 the States of Holland to reduce them. But being now hemmed 
 in by their countrymen both by sea and land, and their trade 
 almost ruined, they at last consented to accede to the pacification 
 of Ghent, and agreed to disband the popish garrison, to recal 
 the Protestant exiles, and to allow them to hold their religious 
 assemblies without the city. It was not long before they re- 
 pented of these concessions. The Protestants being inflamed 
 with zeal for their religion, impatient under the restraints which 
 in the late agreement had been laid upon them, fired with 
 resentment for former injuries, and suspicious that the Catholics 
 were again meditating schemes for their expulsion, flew to 
 arms ; and having suppressed the exercise of the popish faith, 
 they drove all the priests, and others whom they suspected of 
 malignant designs, out of the city 2 . 
 
 In the midst of these transactions, Johnde Noircarmes, Baron 
 Philip’s an- de Selles, arrived from Spain, with Philip’s answer to 
 swer to the the application which the States had made to him 
 some months before. It was such as they had reason 
 
 * Van Metercn, p. 207. 
 x2 
 
308 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIV. 
 
 to expect, and contained an absolute denial of their requests, 
 with regard to the removal of Don John, and the ratification of 
 the election of Matthias. 
 
 Convinced by this denial, of the folly of those hopes which 
 The States they had entertained, that the King would yield to 
 prosecute their intreaties, and sensible that they had suffered 
 the war. considerable loss, from that want of despatch and 
 secrecy which is incident to the procedure of a numerous assem- 
 bly ; they enlarged the powers of Matthias and the prince of 
 Orange, and invested them, and the council of state, with 
 authority to conduct the operations of the war, without having 
 recourse on every occasion to the assembly of the States. 
 
 No time after this was unnecessarily lost. The troops which 
 had been dispersed at Gemblours were collected, and of these, 
 and the new levies, an army was composed, amounting to eight 
 thousand foot and two thousand horse, partly Flemings, and 
 partly Scots and English. This army was stationed in the 
 neighbourhood of Lierres, in the centre of Brabant, under the 
 command of the count de Bossut. Don John’s army, after he 
 had put garrisons into the towns which he had taken, was still 
 superior in number ; and therefore he resolved to march towards 
 Bossut, before the auxiliaries, which the States expected from 
 France and Germany, should arrive. But he soon found that he 
 had now to contend both with troops and a general much su- 
 perior to those whom he had encountered at Gemblours. Bossut, 
 Battle of from a sense of the inferiority of his forces, had pitched 
 Rimenant. hi s camp near the village of Rimenant, in a situation 
 extremely advantageous for preventing the enemy from pene- 
 trating further into the provinces. On the one side it was 
 defended by the Demer, and on the other by a wood ; and was 
 fortified both before and behind with strong intrenchments. 
 Notwithstanding this, Don John resolved to attack it, unless he 
 could provoke the Count to quit his lines, and give him battle. 
 The prince of Parma, who from his early youth was no less wise 
 The prince than brave, remonstrated against this resolution as 
 of Parma, being dangerous and desperate. But Don J ohn, being 
 confirmed in his purpose by the other officers, gave orders for 
 his army to advance, after having sent before a select body of 
 troops to attack an important post without the camp, which was 
 guarded by some English and Scotch forces, under colonel Norris. 
 Among the assailants was Don Alphonso Martinez de Leyva, at 
 the head of a company of two hundred men, whom he maintained 
 at his own expense, and who were all either gentlemen, or soldiers 
 who had distinguished themselves in former wars. These men 
 attacked the British troops with uncommon fury. After a short 
 resistance, the latter began to retreat, but in good order, and 
 with their faces turned towards the enemy. The Spaniards (to 
 second whom Don John had sent several battalions of fresh 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 309 
 
 1578.] 
 
 troops) not suspecting any artifice, and believing the enemy to be 
 intimidated, followed them with much precipitation, till they had 
 passed a narrow defile within reach of the artillery of the Flemish 
 camp. Norris then returned to the charge, and the combat was 
 The Spaniards renewed with greater fury than ever. He was rein- 
 icpuised by forced with troops sent him from the camp, and both 
 the English. p ar |j es being nearly equal, seemed determined to die or 
 conquer. This gallant Englishman animated his army by his own 
 August 1st exam pl e > and had three horses killed under him. The 
 Scots, impatient of the heat, fought in their shirts, and 
 astonished the enemy with the singularity of their appearance. 
 In the mean time, a body of troops, which had been placed in 
 ambush, attacked the Spaniards in flank, and Bossut continued 
 to fire upon them incessantly with his artillery. They must all 
 have perished, had not the prince of Parma obtained liberty from 
 Don J olm to advance at the head of the cavalry to their relief. 
 By his superior prudence, he would have prevented this incon- 
 siderate enterprise; and now, by his prudence and bravery 
 united, he saved the troops from those fatal consequences, to 
 which, through their own and the general’s confidence, they had 
 been exposed. About nine hundred men, however, fell on the 
 field of battle, and a considerable number were taken prisoners a . 
 
 Don John, having thus failed in his attempt, and being sensible 
 that he could not, with his present army, keep the field against 
 the numerous forces that were ready to pour in upon him from 
 France and Germany, retreated, with the resolution of acting 
 for the future on the defensive only, and pitched his camp under 
 the fortifications of Namur. 
 
 The States concluded about this time their treaty with the 
 Treaty of the duke of Anjou, which consisted of the following 
 States with articles : — That, under the title of protector of the 
 
 Anjou. Netherlands, the Duke should furnish, at his own 
 expense, ten thousand foot and two thousand horse : that all the 
 conquests which he should make on the Flanders side of the 
 Maese should belong to the States, and those on the other side 
 to himself : that, for the accommodation of his troops, Landrecy, 
 and Quesnoy in Hainault, and Bapaume in Artois, should be put 
 in his possession : that the States should not enter into any 
 agreement with Don John without the Duke’s consent: and that, 
 in case they should hereafter think proper to elect another sove- 
 reign, they should make choice of the Duke ; but that, in the 
 mean time, the government should remain entire in the hands of 
 the States. 
 
 Agreeably to the first article of this treaty, Anjou had 
 Designs of assembled a considerable body of troops in the neigh- 
 the States, bourhood of Mons, to which place the States sent a 
 solemn embassy to entreat that he would quicken his march 
 
 3 Bentivoglio, book x. Strabo, 1. iii. Meteren, p. 225. Thuanus, lib. lxvi. see. xii. 
 
310 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIV. 
 
 into tlie interior provinces. They intended that their own army 
 should unite with his and that of Casimire, and that all the 
 three armies should act in concert with one another in expelling 
 Don John, before he should receive a reinforcement from Spain 
 or Italy. Nor was it without apparent reason that they enter- 
 tained the hopes of accomplishing this design. Prince Casimire 
 had passed the Rhine and the Maese, and advanced as far as the 
 Their nume- town of Diest, in Brabant. His army, when joined 
 rous army . with that of the States, amounted nearly to forty 
 thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, and was greatly 
 superior to any which Don J olm could muster to oppose it. 
 
 But a variety of causes concurred in rendering almost useless 
 its operations these mighty preparations ; and a spirit of division 
 rendered arose, by which the people in the more fertile pro- 
 ineffectual. winces lost for ever that liberty for which they had so 
 strenuously contended, at the very time when it was most in 
 their power to secure it on a firm and permanent foundation. 
 For although, according to the testimony of the Catholic, as 
 well as the Protestant historians, nothing could exceed the 
 prudence and moderation with which the prince of Orange 
 conducted the affairs of government, it soon appeared that no 
 human wisdom was sufficient to preserve harmony and concord, 
 where there were so many grounds of jealousy and discontent. 
 Of this discontent and jealousy, religious bigotry was the prin- 
 cipal, but not the only cause. Ambition and interest joined 
 their influence to that of religion, and not only divided the people 
 themselves into factions the most inveterate and hostile, but 
 created suspicion and discord between them and the foreign 
 powers which they had called to their assistance. 
 
 The Queen of England had heard with great uneasiness of the 
 late treaty between the States and the duke of Anjou. She 
 knew not, at this time, how far Henry was concerned in his 
 brother’s enterprise, nor what schemes of conquest these two 
 princes might have formed. She considered what great advan- 
 tages their neighbourhood afforded them for the execution of 
 these schemes ; and foresaw the prejudice which might accrue to 
 the English nation if the Netherlands were to fall under subjec- 
 tion to the crown of France. In order to prevent this, and 
 counterbalance the power and influence of Anjou, she had made 
 such ample remittances of money to Prince Casimire, as had 
 enabled him to augment the number of his army, which consisted 
 wholly of Protestants, considerably above what the States had 
 either expected or desired. This alarmed the jealousy of all the 
 Catholics in the Low Countries, who dreaded the approach of so 
 great an army of reformers, and suspected that Casimire, in 
 concert with Elizabeth, had conceived the design of extirpating 
 the Popish faith. They did not conceal their apprehensions. 
 Even the prince of Orange, and other moderate Protestants, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 311 
 
 1578.] 
 
 joined in remonstrating with Casimire on the necessity of his 
 dismissing a part of his forces. But this remonstrance served 
 only to alienate him from the prince of Orange and the council, 
 and to render him less attentive to their instructions with regard 
 to the conduct of the war. He was likewise highly offended 
 with the preference which the States had given to the count of 
 Bossut, by appointing him commander-in-chief of the army ; 
 and he made them feel his resentment, by the slowness of all 
 his military operations, and his continual demands of supplies 
 for the payment of his troops b . 
 
 But the intemperate zeal and ambition of the Protestants 
 intemperate were productive of still more pernicious effects. Not 
 zeal and am- satisfied with the security from persecution which 
 bition of the they had enjoyed since the pacification of Ghent, they 
 Protestants, took courage from the great number of Protestants in 
 the army, and petitioned IVJatthias and the States to be allowed 
 to hold their religious assemblies openly in churches, and to be 
 admitted, on the same footing with the Catholics, to the several 
 offices of government. They ought certainly to have remained 
 silent, as they had done hitherto, till the common enemy had 
 been expelled, and the public tranquillity established. Yet their 
 conduct admits of some apology : their party had greater in- 
 fluence now than it was likely to possess if the Catholics were 
 delivered from their dread of the Spaniards, and they could not 
 foresee those fatal consequences with which their application was 
 afterwards attended. 
 
 But, whatever judgment may be formed of their discretion, 
 the States thought it necessary, lest the army should have 
 proved refractory, to comply with their requests. The pacifi- 
 cation of Ghent required that religion should remain on the same 
 footing on which it stood at the time of that treaty, till the 
 States of all the provinces should be assembled ; yet the States, 
 now partially assembled, consented not only that the Protestants 
 should have access to all public offices, but likewise that they 
 should have churches allowed to them in every place where a 
 hundred families resided ; upon this condition, that in Holland 
 and Zealand the same indulgence should be granted to the 
 Catholic inhabitants. To this decree they gave the name of the 
 Peace of Religion ; and each of the provinces was left at liberty 
 to accept or reject it, as they should judge expedient. 
 
 In some cities it proved a salutary remedy for the disorders 
 The unhappy with which they were distracted ; but in many others 
 consequences, it added malignity to that poison which raged in the 
 minds of the more violent religionists, and was the source of the 
 most pernicious animosity and discord. It gave no contentment 
 to the zealots of either party, but contributed to inflame them 
 more than ever against each other, by adding fresh materials to 
 
 b Rcidamus, p. 25, 26. 
 
312 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIY. 
 
 that inveterate jealousy and rancour which their bigotry inspired, 
 but which had been laid asleep for some time past by their 
 apprehensions of the common danger. The Catholics every- 
 where, but in a few cities of Flanders and Brabant, opposed 
 the execution of this decree ; and the reformers derived little 
 advantage from it, except in those places where they over- 
 powered their antagonists by superior numbers. In the provinces 
 of Artois and Hainault, where the Reformation had never made 
 any considerable progress, the people rejected the decree with 
 the most determined obstinacy, and refused to allow the exercise 
 of any other religion but the Catholic within their territories ; 
 while the people of Ghent and other places, in which the majority 
 were Protestants, actuated by the same intolerant and bigoted 
 spirit, expelled the Popish ecclesiastics, seized their effects, and 
 spoiled the churches of their ornaments. 
 
 Between the people of Ghent and the W alloons c a particular 
 Discord be- ground of enmity had subsisted ever since the former 
 Walloons Kad cast the duke d’Arschot and his attendants into 
 and Fie- prison ; for most of these were persons of rank in the 
 
 mings. W alloon provinces ; and the Ghentese had not only 
 
 rejected every solicitation in their behalf, but had even treated 
 them with severity during their confinement. The Walloons 
 were, for this reason, the more readily incensed by the accounts 
 which they received of the late enormities committed against the 
 Catholics, which they justly regarded as a violation, on the part 
 of the Protestants, of their late engagements. Forgetful, there- 
 fore* of the danger which threatened them, and listening only to 
 the voice of indignation and resentment, they began to separate 
 themselves from the other provinces, and refused to contribute 
 their share of the money necessary for the payment of the troops. 
 “ We took arms,” said they, 44 to vindicate our liberty; but 
 what will it avail us to be delivered from the Spanish yoke, if 
 we must submit to a yoke no less galling and intolerable, imposed 
 upon us by our countrymen, who, under the pretext of zeal 
 against the tyranny of the Spaniards, show now that their only 
 design has been to tyrannize over us themselves ?” The other 
 provinces represented to them the mischievous consequences with 
 which their conduct must be attended, and accompanied their 
 representations with prayers and threats; but the Walloons 
 remained inflexible, and soon afterwards they gave a striking 
 proof of their hostile disposition, by refusing to deliver the 
 towns of Landrecy, Quesnois, and Bapaume, to the duke of 
 Anjou, in conformity to the treaty above recorded. Not satisfied 
 with this, they began to prepare openly for war, and employed the 
 contributions which had been raised for paying the army of the 
 States in levying forces against the Flemings. The Flemings 
 quickly armed themselves in their defence, and several rencounters 
 
 c The natives of Artois, Hainault, and the other southern provinces. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 313 
 
 1573 ] 
 
 happened between the W alloons and them that were equally 
 pernicious to both. 
 
 Prince Casimire’s troops and those of the States had been 
 The effects of for some time past united, and Don John was not 
 that discord, possessed of a force sufficient to oppose them ; but the 
 factious and refractory spirit of the Walloons and Flemings had 
 diffused itself into almost every part of the Netherlands except 
 the provinces of Holland and Zealand. Many cities withheld 
 their contributions, and the army was extremely ill provided 
 with everything necessary to render the operations of the cam- 
 paign effectual. Bossut’s principal object was to compel the 
 enemy to a general engagement ; and for this purpose, after 
 taking two or three towns of little consequence, he led his troops 
 within view of the camp in which Don John had entrenched 
 himself, under the fortifications of Namur. With an army so 
 much superior in number to the enemy, the Count might have 
 forced the entrenchments; but, being neither furnished with 
 pioneers, cannon, or a sufficient quantity of ammunition, and 
 finding Don John unalterably determined to keep within his 
 camp, he was obliged to retire. His troops, in the mean time, 
 were highly discontented on account of their want of pay ; his 
 discipline was unavoidably relaxed ; the country was oppressed 
 and plundered. Casimire accepted of an invitation from the 
 Ghentese to assist them with a part of his forces against the 
 Walloons. It became dangerous to keep the remainder of the 
 army any longer in the neighbourhood of the Spanish camp, and 
 it was soon afterwards found impracticable to support it. A 
 part of the troops, therefore, was disbanded, and the rest were 
 put into garrison in the fortified towns. 
 
 The duke of Anjou’s army was not better provided with the 
 means of subsistence than that of the States, and its operations 
 were equally insignificant. Conscious of his inability to fulfil his 
 engagement, Anjou grasped at those pretexts for eluding them 
 which the conduct of Casimire, and that of the Walloons, 
 afforded him. He complained bitterly of the treatment which 
 he received from the latter, who not only refused him admittance 
 into the towns which the States had promised for the accom- 
 modation of his troops, but showed themselves no less unwilling 
 to furnish him with provisions, than if he had come to invade, 
 and not to protect and defend them. He seems likewise to 
 have suspected, and not without some reason, that Casimire had 
 formed some private designs, inconsistent with that establishment 
 which he himself had in view in the southern provinces ; and 
 that he had carried his troops to the assistance of the people of 
 Ghent in order to pave the way for executing those designs. He 
 therefore refused to join his army with that of Bossut, unless 
 Casimire should return to it ; and when Matthias and the prince 
 of Orange failed in their endeavours to prevail on Casimire, (to 
 
314 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIV. 
 
 whom the Ghentese had advanced a considerable sum of money, 
 to induce him to remain with them,) Anjou broke up his camp, 
 and suffered a part of his army to go over to the baron de 
 Montigny, who was commander-in-chief at that time of the forces 
 of the Walloons d . 
 
 Such was the conclusion of this campaign, and such the issue 
 Conclusion of of all the mighty preparations which the States had 
 the campaign, made for a vigorous prosecution of the war. The 
 people themselves, instead of uniting their efforts against the 
 common enemy, wage war with one another, in violation of the 
 most solemn engagements into which they had entered only a 
 few months before ; and the princes, who had undertaken to 
 deliver the Flemings from the Spanish yoke, enlist themselves, 
 in opposition to each other, under the banners of those inveterate 
 factions which threaten this unhappy people with destruction. 
 
 Casimere went over to England to justify his conduct' to 
 Elizabeth, and Anjou sent an ambassador to the States to make 
 an apology for his, by representing that his troops had joined 
 those of Montigny without his consent ; but that the States had 
 no reason to dread the consequences of that step, since the 
 Ghentese would be thereby more easily restrained from their 
 excesses. The States, thinking it prudent to dissemble their 
 resentment, admitted of his apology ; and, that they might still 
 remain on friendly terms with him, they assured his ambassadors 
 that they had a just sense of gratitude for the efforts which the 
 Duke had made in their behalf ; that, as soon as possible, they 
 would refund his expenses ; and that, if they should ever find it 
 necessary to elect another prince, in the place of the King of 
 Spain, they would make him an offer of the sovereignty. 
 
 During the course of the transactions that have been related, 
 Death of Don John had kept his troops within their camp at 
 Don John Namur. They might now have left it without danger; 
 of Austria, p U £ j) on j 0 j in j ia( j been seized, some weeks before, 
 with a violent illness, which cut him off before he had reached 
 the thirtieth year of his age. His death was by some ascribed to 
 poison ; but, according to others, it was owing partly to disease, 
 and partly to that chagrin which he conceived from the negligence 
 with which his repeated applications for money and troops were 
 treated by the Spanish ministers. Fond to excess of military 
 glory, and conscious of talents which would probably have ensured 
 October success ’ h e lament^ ed bitterly the necessity which the weak- 
 ness of his army imposed upon him of remaining so long 
 inactive, and solicited his brother for a reinforcement with tho 
 most earnest importunity. Nor was it only because Philip was 
 averse to a vigorous prosecution of the war that he deferred com- 
 plying with his request. After that renown which Don John had 
 acquired in tho battle of Lepanto, his conduct, as above related, 
 
 ll Mctcrcn, p. 33. Grotius, p. GO. 
 
1579.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 315 
 
 contained so clear a discovery of his views, as could not but 
 alarm the suspicious temper of the King, who thenceforth kept 
 a watchful eye upon all his brother’s most secret motions ; and 
 when he sent him to the Netherlands, resolved never to intrust 
 him with such a numerous army as might enable him to execute 
 any ambitious design. Philip’s suspicions, during his brother’s 
 residence in the Low Countries, were kept perpetually awake by 
 reports of his having formed a design of marrying the Queen of 
 Scots. To these reports Philip gave credit, perhaps too easily. 
 By his orders, Don John’s secretary, Escovedo, who had fomented 
 his master’s ambition, was privately put to death. It was believed 
 by many that he issued the like orders with regard to his brother, 
 and that this young heroic prince died of poison given him by 
 certain popish ecclesiastics, instigated by the court of Spain. 
 But whatever ground there was for this persuasion, there is little 
 room to doubt that, from jealousy of his brother, more than any 
 other cause, Philip withheld the supplies necessary for carrying 
 on the war. And to this circumstance the troops of the States 
 were indebted for their preservation from that ruin to which 
 their divisions had exposed them d . 
 
 d Meteren, p. 234. Grotius, &c. 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XV. 
 
 316 
 
 BOOK XV. 
 
 The prince Don J° HN having on his death-bed appointed the prince^ 
 of Parma of Parma to succeed him, his choice was soon afterwards 
 governor, approved, and ratified by the King. 
 
 This young prince had, on many occasions since his arrival 
 His cha- in the Netherlands, given proof of consummate pru- 
 racter. dence, and the most intrepid valour. Temperate, vigi- 
 lant, and indefatigable, he could descend to the most minute 
 detail in all military operations, and was always the first to 
 expose himself to toil and danger, and the last to retire. Pliant 
 in his manners, and insinuating in his address ; he could speak 
 most of the European languages, and accommodate himself to 
 the soldiers of all the different nations of which the army was 
 composed. He possessed a vigour of bodily constitution equal to 
 that of his mind, joined with an elevated martial air and aspect, 
 which served, in time of battle, to fill the enemy with terror, and 
 to inspire his own troops with courage and confidence of success. 
 
 He had no sooner performed the last offices of his friend and 
 kinsman, than he applied himself assiduously to fulfil the duties 
 of that important station to which he was now advanced. While 
 the army of the States remained in the field, he was obliged, 
 through the smallness of his numbers, to follow the same plan 
 which his predecessor had pursued, and to keep his little army 
 strongly fortified within their camp ; but when, from the causes 
 above explained, not only the army of the States, but likewise 
 the Germans and French under Casimire and Anjou, were all 
 either disbanded, or put into winter-quarters, Farnese, con- 
 sidering this as the proper season for action, resolved to under- 
 take the siege of some important place, by the acquisition of 
 which he might increase his resources for carrying on the war. 
 
 He hesitated for some time, whether he should enter first upon 
 the siege of Maestricht, or that of Antwerp. The benefit which 
 he would have derived from the possession of the latter of these 
 places, was greater than any which could arise from that of the 
 former ; as Antwerp was the principal seat of wealth and com- 
 merce in the Netherlands, and was situated in the most ad- 
 vantageous manner for prosecuting the conquest of the maritime 
 provinces ; but having weighed attentively the difficulties to be 
 surmounted in the siege of a place of so great extent and strength 
 as Antwerp, he wisely resolved to begin with the siege of Maes- 
 tricht, in which he could engage with fewer forces, and a greater 
 probability of success a . 
 
 Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 17 
 
 1579.] 
 
 In order to conceal his design from the States, he directed his 
 march towards Antwerp, and had a sharp rencounter with a 
 body of French and British forces, which were sent out to 
 obstruct his approach. These he forced to retire under the 
 fortifications of the city ; immediately after which he turned 
 back suddenly, and invested Maestricht, before the States had 
 time to furnish that town with the necessary supplies of stores 
 and provisions. 
 
 The inhabitants were not numerous in proportion to the extent 
 He lays siege of the place b ; but it was strongly fortified, and the want 
 to Maestricht. 0 f numbers was abundantly supplied by the martial 
 spirit of the people, who, being exposed by their situation to fre- 
 quent invasions from foreign enemies, were well accustomed to the 
 use of arms. About fifteen hundred of them were enrolled ; and by 
 these, and a thousand regular troops, together with two thousand 
 of the country people, who served as pioneers, Maestricht was 
 defended for almost four months, against - an army of fifteen 
 thousand foot and four thousand horse, the best disciplined and 
 bravest troops in Europe, whose operations were directed by the 
 greatest military genius of the age. Amongst the besieged there 
 were two persons, Scwartzenbourg de Herle, a Fleming, and 
 Tappin, a Frenchman, who conducted the defence with a degree 
 of wisdom and intrepidity that excited universal admiration and 
 applause. 
 
 The prince of Parma, having arrived before the town in the 
 Conduct of beginning of March, sent Mondragone, with a part of 
 the siege, the army, to the east side of the river, to invest the 
 town of Vich ; whilst he himself remained on the other side, where 
 he intended to make his principal attack. His first object was 
 to prevent the States from introducing any supplies or rein- 
 forcements. With this view, he shut up the Maese with two 
 bridges of boats, one above and the other below the town, and 
 drew quite round his camp, on both sides of the river, strong 
 lines of circumvallation. Immediately after taking this pre- 
 caution, he began to make his approach to the walls by trenches. 
 The garrison had the courage to make several sallies, by which 
 his operations were retarded. At length, however, when by 
 perseverance, and the power of superior numbers, his trenches 
 were sufficiently advanced, he planted two batteries, one against 
 the gate of Tongres, and the other against the curtain, between 
 the gate of Hoxter and that of the Cross. While the batteries 
 were played off with great success, the Royalists pushed forward 
 the trenches, and were ready to enter into the ditch. The 
 breach at the gate of Tongres was the first made practicable, 
 and Farnese resolved to assault it with a select body of troops, 
 drawn from the several nations of which his army was composed. 
 By thus mingling them together, he inflamed their ardour and 
 
 b It is five Italian miles in circumference. 
 
318 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XV. 
 
 emulation ; but they met with equal ardour on the part of their 
 opponents, and, after an obstinate and bloody conflict, were 
 obliged to retire. 
 
 The Prince, believing that this first attempt had failed through 
 Brave defence the smallness of the breach, renewed the fire of his bat- 
 of Maestxicht. teries with redoubled fury, and prepared for a second 
 attack. In order to weaken the garrison by dividing it, he resolved 
 to make an assault at each of the two breaches at the same time. 
 His troops advanced, in the face of the enemy’s cannon, with 
 the most undaunted intrepidity. The besieged stood undismayed 
 till they approached, and nothing could exceed the fury with 
 which both parties began the combat. Their fire-arms soon 
 ceased to be of use to them ; for they came immediately to close 
 fight, in which they could employ only their pikes and swords. 
 In one of the breaches De Herle, and in the other Tappin, gave 
 the most splendid proofs of capacity and valour. The assailants, 
 enraged at meeting with such obstinate resistance from an 
 enemy so much inferior in number, exerted their utmost vigour 
 to overpower them. The action was furious and desperate. 
 The ruins of the wall, and the ground on both sides, were strewed 
 with the dead and dying. Stones hurled down from the bul- 
 warks, and artificial fires, which the besieged launched among 
 the assailants, increased the confusion. Those fires happened to 
 lay hold of the barrels of gunpowder, which stood near for the 
 use of the combatants. The explosion was terrible, and many 
 on both sides perished by this fatal accident. The air resounded 
 with cries, and shrieks, and groans. The earth was covered with 
 mangled carcases ; yet those who survived still maintained their 
 ground with the same unconquerable obstinacy as before, and 
 from the horrid scene which lay around them, seemed only to 
 derive fresh rage and fury. The prince of Parma gave orders at 
 last, with much reluctance, for sounding a retreat. The resolu- 
 tion and fortitude of the besieged, he perceived, were not to be 
 overcome. Even if he could have mounted the breach, and kept 
 possession of it, this would not have availed him, as other fortifi- 
 cations had been raised within, which rendered the town almost 
 as impregnable as before. 
 
 Upon reviewing his troops, the prince found that many of his 
 best officers had fallen, and that the regiments of Spanish vete- 
 rans were extremely diminished. He soon completed his numbers, 
 by making draughts from the garrisons of the towns in his posses- 
 sion. But when he reflected on the character of the besieged, 
 he perceived the necessity of laying aside all thoughts of taking 
 the town by storm, and resolved to content himself with the slower 
 method of undermining the fortifications ; employing for this pur- 
 pose a prodigious number of pioneers, and taking effectual care, 
 in the mean time, to render it impossible for the besieged to 
 receive any reinforcement or supplies. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 319 
 
 1579.] 
 
 The States were not neglectful of the preservation of a place, 
 The States w ^ iere both the garrison and inhabitants had shown 
 attempt in themselves so worthy of their attention. Having some 
 vain to re- time before received the celebrated La Noue into their 
 heve it. service, they had appointed him governor of Maestricht, 
 and given him the charge of conducting thither the reinforcements 
 which they intended for the relief of the besieged. Nothing was 
 omitted by La Noue to fulfil their expectations ; but so perni- 
 cious were the consequences of that spirit of discord, which still 
 raged as furiously as ever between the Protestants and Catho- 
 lics, that, although the council of state, seconded by the prince 
 of Orange, gave him all the assistance in their power, he was 
 never able to collect a force sufficient to execute his purpose. 
 The situation, therefore, of the besieged was become extremely 
 deplorable. The garrison, which in the beginning of the siege 
 consisted of a thousand men, was now reduced to four hundred, 
 and the citizens and country-people had suffered a proportionable 
 diminution. Their provisions began to fail, and their store of 
 gunpowder was nearly exhausted. 
 
 Their distresses were much augmented towards the middle of 
 June, by the loss of a ravelin, which had enabled them to give 
 great annoyance to the enemy. To acquire possession of this 
 ravelin had been the chief object of the prince of Parma’s opera- 
 tions for several weeks ; and, though he met with the most spirited 
 resistance, he at length accomplished his design, and could, with 
 a large cavalier which he constructed, overlook the walls, and 
 scour the town with his guns, almost from the one end to the 
 other. Still, however, the besieged, animated by the hopes of 
 relief, refused to capitulate. 
 
 But the siege was brought to a conclusion much sooner than 
 Maestricht either of the two contending parties had reason to 
 taken by expect. On the 29th of June, it was suspected by 
 
 surprise. SO me Spanish soldiers, that the wonted vigilance of 
 
 the garrison was relaxed. In order to know the truth with 
 certainty, these men crept silently to the top of the rampart, 
 and found that the defendants were not only few in number, but 
 overpowered with fatigue and heat, and buried in sleep. Of 
 this they carried information to the general ; who, without delay, 
 ordered such of his troops as were nearest, to ascend the rampart 
 with as little noise as possible. They were immediately followed 
 by all the rest of the army. The garrison were thus suddenly 
 overwhelmed, and almost all of them were put to the sword. 
 The inhabitants fought desperately ; but they sunk at last under 
 the superior force of the assailants, who spared neither sex nor 
 age ; and continued the slaughter, till, of eight thousand citizens, 
 only three hundred remained. De Herle escaped by disguising 
 himself in the habit of a menial servant ; and Farnese issued 
 strict orders to spare the life of the valiant Tapping 
 
 Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Meteren, lib. ix. 
 
320 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XV. 
 
 During the siege of Maestricht, various political negotiations 
 The prince were carried on by the opposite parties. The prince 
 ofO range G f Orange had at this time the chief direction of all the 
 quellThe 0 measures that were pursued by the States and council ; 
 tumults in Matthias having, from a consciousness of his own want 
 Ghent. G f experience, left the entire administration in his hands. 
 The dissensions between the Walloons and Flemings had, from 
 the beginning, given him deep concern, and he had omitted 
 nothing in his power to heal them. Among the Walloons he 
 had little influence, by reason of their abhorrence of his religion, 
 and the jealousy which they had conceived of his designs. On 
 the other hand, the Ghentese, who, in that age, were noted for 
 their turbulent and seditious spirit, had been wrought up by 
 certain factious leaders to a degree of madness, and were long 
 deaf to all the remonstrances which he could employ. St. Alde- 
 gonde, whom he sent to deal with them, exerted, but in vain, all 
 the address and eloquence for which he was so highly celebrated. 
 The interposition of Matthias and the States was equally inef- 
 fectual. Nor did they pay any greater regard to the representa- 
 tions and threats of Elizabeth, who sent over an ambassador d 
 on purpose to persuade them. At length, the prince of Orange 
 went himself to treat with them. They had lately inveighed 
 against him, with great severity, for his moderation towards the 
 Catholics ; and had suffered some of their preachers to arraign 
 him on this account, as insincere in his religious profession. 
 But, being flattered with that regard and confidence of which 
 his present visit was expressive, they resumed their wonted affec- 
 tion to his person ; and, after he had staid among them some 
 weeks, they complied with the several requests which they had 
 hitherto rejected. They consented to make restitution of the 
 goods of which they had plundered the popish ecclesiastics ; per- 
 mitted the re-establishment of the rites and ceremonies of the 
 Romish church, forbad all abusive language, whether in the 
 pulpit or in private assemblies, and engaged to yield a more 
 prompt obedience for the future to the authority of the States 6 . 
 
 It soon, however, appeared, that nothing but William’s per- 
 sonal influence had induced them to make these concessions. In 
 a few months afterwards, being incited by the same factious lead- 
 ers to whom they had formerly listened, they indulged themselves 
 in the most unjustifiable excesses ; they plundered the churches 
 and monasteries, expelled the ecclesiastics from the town, and 
 seized their effects, which they distributed among the Germans, 
 whom they had called to their assistance against the Walloons. 
 These and other enormities occasioned the prince of Orange to 
 visit the Ghentese a second time ; when they made him an offer 
 of the government of the province. He prudently declined ac- 
 cepting this offer ; but having again employed all his influence to 
 quash the present dissensions in the city, ho succeeded so far as 
 
 d Mr. Davidson. 
 
 e Thuanus, lib. lxvi. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 321 
 
 1579 .] 
 
 to be able to compel Imbise the chief magistrate, together with 
 his factious adherents, to leave the city. He likewise put the 
 magistracy into the hands of the more moderate reformers, set at 
 liberty such of the W alloon nobility as were still in prison, and 
 procured for the catholic inhabitants, liberty of private worship, 
 and security from molestation f . 
 
 William laboured with no less earnestness to assuage the 
 resentment of the Walloons, who, although they had not been 
 the first aggressors, persisted in their hostile disposition, with 
 the most unconquerable obstinacy. By the artifices of Matthew 
 de Moulard, bishop of Arras, the count de la Lain, the marquis 
 de Roubais, and others of the nobility, who beheld with deep 
 malignity William’s unrivalled credit and authority, the people 
 had conceived the most incurable suspicions, that, far from being 
 actuated by a disinterested attachment to the civil or religious 
 liberty of the provinces, he intended only his own exaltation, and 
 was preparing to establish it upon the ruins of the catholic faith. 
 They lent a deaf ear therefore to every plan of accommodation 
 that was proposed, either by the prince himself, or by Matthias 
 and the States ; who, they knew, were entirely directed by his 
 counsels 8 . 
 
 The prince of Parma was too sagacious not to discern the 
 The prince advantage which this disposition of the W alloons 
 of Parma afforded him, for drawing them back to their allegi- 
 the Wd^ ance. Soon after the death of Don John of Austria, 
 loons. he had, for this purpose, begun a negociation with 
 their leaders ; upon which he had bestowed particular attention, 
 in the midst of those military occupations in which the siege of 
 Maestricht had engaged him. In order to frustrate his endea- 
 vours, the prince of Orange and the States remonstrated to the 
 Walloons on the infidelity which would be justly imputed to them, 
 if they should enter into any separate terms of agreement ; and 
 represented to them the danger to which they would thereby 
 expose themselves , as well as the other provinces, of being again 
 enthralled by the Spaniards. The Walloons could not entirely 
 divest themselves of the scruples, which these remonstrances were 
 calculated to excite ; nor were they free from those apprehen- 
 sions of the Spanish tyranny, by which the other provinces were 
 so much disquieted. They had not forgot the scenes of treachery 
 and violence, of which they had been so often witnesses ; and 
 found it difficult to rely on the promises of those, whose insin- 
 cerity they had so frequently experienced. On the other hand, 
 their bigotry, joined with the inveterate jealousy which the nobility 
 entertained of the prince of Orange, formed an insurmountable 
 obstacle against any agreement with the Flemings. That hatred 
 with which they had been long actuated against the Spaniards, 
 began to yield to a more implacable aversion against the pro- 
 
 f Grotius, lib. iii. 
 
 k Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 29. 
 
322 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XY. 
 
 testants ; and in this they were confirmed by the address of the 
 bishop of Arras, and the other agents of the prince of Parma ; 
 whose proposals of accommodation they were now inclined to 
 embrace, provided it could be done consistently with those solemn 
 engagements, under which they had lately come to the other 
 provinces. To these engagements, according to the sense in 
 which they themselves understood them, they adhered with 
 inflexible fidelity ; and persisted to the last in requiring that all 
 foreign troops should be immediately dismissed ; that the pacifi- 
 cation of Ghent should be fully executed ; and that Philip should 
 recognise their right to form alliances either within or without 
 the Netherlands, in case of any infraction, on his part, of the 
 articles of this pacification. 
 
 Of their several demands, there was none which the prince of 
 The Spanish Parma found it so difficult to digest, as that of sending 
 and Italian awa y the f ore ip*n troops. Their place, he knew, could 
 out of the not be supplied by the undisciplined forces of the 
 Netherlands, country ; and he dreaded that he should be obliged to 
 abandon the plan which he had formed, for subduing the mari- 
 time provinces. The king, to whom he applied for precise 
 instructions, was no less averse to this concession. But Philip, 
 considering the recovery of the Walloons (the most warlike of 
 all the inhabitants of the Netherlands) as a matter of the last 
 importance ; especially in the present juncture, when his ex- 
 chequer was drained by the expense which he had incurred in 
 the conquest of Portugal ; and hoping, that by the indulgent 
 measures which he had resolved to espouse in his treatment of 
 the Walloons, he should be able ere long to obtain their consent 
 to whatever he should require of them, he sent orders to Farnese 
 to hasten the conclusion of the treaty ; and it was accordingly 
 Ma 1 7th conc lnded m the following terms : — That all foreign troops 
 ay / u in the service of the King, should leave the Netherlands 
 in six weeks, and never return thither without the consent of 
 the W alloon provinces : that an army of national troops should 
 be levied, to the payment of which the King might apply the 
 subsidies to be granted by the States : that all persons in public 
 offices should take an oath to maintain the catholic religion : 
 that all the privileges of the provinces should remain inviolate : 
 and that the government should be preserved in the same form 
 in which it had been left by the late emperor when he resigned 
 his dominions h . 
 
 This treaty was signed, on the part of the provinces, only by the 
 deputies of French Flanders, Artois, and Hainault. The other 
 provinces were not called, as Luxemburg had never concurred in 
 any of the late transactions ; and the greatest part of Limburg 
 and Namur had already submitted to the King’s authority. 
 
 The prince of Orange, no stranger to the secret motives of the 
 
 h Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i, 
 
1579 ] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 323 
 
 The union loading men among the Walloons, having foreseen that 
 of Utrecht, this agreement would certainly take place, had, in order 
 to provide a counterpoise against it, set on foot a new treaty of 
 alliance among the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, 
 Guelderland, Friesland, Brabant, and Flanders. This alliance 
 was called the Union of Utrecht, from the place where it was 
 brought to a conclusion. It may justly be considered as the first 
 foundation of the republic of the United Provinces. It is still 
 regarded as containing the fundamental laws of the constitution, 
 and proves its author, by the wisdom, moderation, and extensive 
 views which it discovers. It contains neither any avowal, nor 
 any express renunciation of their allegiance to Philip ; but the 
 provinces tacitly assume to themselves the sovereign authority, 
 and lodge it partly in the general assembly of the States, and 
 partly in the States of the several provinces. The principal 
 articles of this confederacy are those which follow^ : “ That the 
 
 several provinces contracting, unite themselves together in one 
 political body, renouncing for ever the power of separating from 
 each other ; but reserving each to itself all the rights which it 
 possessed before. 
 
 “ That the said provinces shall assist each other to repel the 
 attacks of any' foreign power ; and, in particular, to repel 
 whatever violence may be offered to any of the contracting 
 parties, in the name of the King of Spain, under the pretext of 
 establishing the catholic religion, or on account of any transaction 
 in the Netherlands since the year 1558 ; leaving it always to the 
 generality of the union to determine in what proportion each 
 province shall be obliged to furnish its supplies, either of money 
 or of troops. 
 
 “ That in Holland and Zealand, no religion but that which is 
 already established shall be openly professed ; and that the other 
 provinces shall be at liberty to allow either of the protestant 
 religion, or the catholic, or both, as they themselves shall judge 
 expedient : that restitution shall be made of the effects which 
 belonged to the convents and churches, in all the provinces, 
 except those of Holland and Zealand; and in these, that pensions 
 shall be appointed to the popish ecclesiastics, to be paid them 
 wheresoever they reside. 
 
 “ That all frontier and other towns, which the general and 
 provincial States shall think proper to fortify, shall be fortified 
 at the joint expense of the generality, and of the particular pro- 
 vince in which they lie ; but if the General States shall, on any 
 occasion, think proper to build new forts, without the consent of 
 the particular province in which they lie, the generality shall 
 furnish the whole expense. 
 
 “ That all fortified towns shall be obliged to receive such gar- 
 risons as the generality shall appoint, on condition that the 
 troops shall, besides their oath of allegiance to the General 
 
 y 2 
 
324 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XV. 
 
 States, take a particular oath to the province and town in which 
 they are stationed. 
 
 “ That the General States shall not conclude any peace or 
 truce, nor undertake any war, nor impose any taxes, without the 
 consent of the majority of all the provinces and towns of the 
 union ; and that, on the other hand, no town or province shall 
 enter into any alliance with any foreign prince or power, without 
 consent of the generality. 
 
 “ That in case any Prince or State shall incline to accede to 
 this alliance, he may be admitted, with the consent of all the 
 members of the confederacy. 
 
 “ That all the male inhabitants of the provinces, from the age 
 of eighteen to that of sixty, shall, in a month after the publica- 
 tion of the present treaty, inscribe their names in a register to 
 be laid before the General States at their first assembly, to assist 
 them in judging what forces each province is able to furnish. 
 
 “ That, in order to procure the money necessary for the sup- 
 port of the forces, all the taxes shall be farmed out publicly, to 
 those who shall make the highest offer ; and lastly, that the said 
 taxes shall be heightened or lowered, according as the General 
 States shall judge the exigencies of the confederacy to require.” 
 
 This confederacy was not immediately attended with those 
 advantages which it was designed and calculated to produce. 
 It behoved the religious parties to experience, for some time 
 longer, the mischievous effects of their intemperate zeal and 
 bigotry, before they could live at peace. In several places the 
 people were still agitated by the most violent animosity against one 
 another. In Bois-le-Duc, the protestants and papists took arms, 
 and coming to blows, had several hundreds of their number 
 killed. Soon after this, the protestants, being seized with a 
 sudden panic, abandoned the town to their enemies, who imme- 
 diately submitted to the Spaniards. 
 
 In Antwerp, where the Protestant party was the most power- 
 violence of the people insulted the Popish ecclesiastics, when 
 the Protest, employed in one of the solemn processions of their re- 
 ants. ligion ; and in spite of Matthias and the prince of 
 Orange, who interposed their authority to protect them, they 
 obliged them to leave the city. 
 
 These violences, which the reformers, impelled by their re- 
 count Eg- hgious zeal, exercised in Antwerp and other places, 
 mont’s at- served only more easily to reconcile the Catholics to the 
 tempt on Spanish government ; and contributed not a little to 
 Biusseis. ma k e several of the nobility forsake the party of the 
 States. Among these was count Egmont, son of the great un- 
 fortunate count Egmont. This young nobleman had hitherto 
 distinguished himself by his zeal against the Spaniards ; but 
 resolving now to make his peace with them, he attempted, with a 
 regiment of Walloons, to render himself master of Brussels, in 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 325 
 
 1579.] 
 
 order to deliver it to Farnese ; and he succeeded so far in his 
 design, as to get possession of one of the gates, and introduce his 
 troops into the city. The citizens ran instantly to arms ; and, 
 being joined by some regular forces in the service of the States, 
 they quickly recovered the gate by a singular stratagem. Having 
 driven violently towards it some waggons loaded with hay and 
 straw, they set fire to these combustible materials, and the wind 
 blowing the flame and smoke towards count Egmont’s soldiers, 
 they were obliged to betake themselves to flight. The whole 
 inhabitants had, in the mean time, got under arms, and Egmont, 
 with the rest of his men, was shut up in the market-place, hemmed 
 in on every side, and without any prospect of deliverance. There 
 they remained during that day and the night following ; neither 
 of the two parties being inclined to begin hostilities. The 
 citizens meanwhile indulged their resentment, by reproaching 
 the count with his treachery, in forsaking those who had taken 
 arms to revenge his father’s death ; calling out to him, that only 
 eleven years before, on the same day of the year, and in the very 
 place where he then stood, his father had died a martyr for that 
 cause, which lie now wanted so basely to betray. This bitter 
 remembrance drew tears from the young man’s eyes. The 
 people w r ere moved with that compassion for the son which they 
 owed to the memory of the father, and consented to suffer him 
 and his troops to leave the town \ 
 
 During the course of these transactions, conferences for recon- 
 Conferences ciling the Netherlands to Philip were held in the city 
 for peace at of Cologne, at the request and under the mediation of 
 Cologne. the em p eror? the pope, and the electors of Treves and 
 Cologne- The pope sent thither Castagna, archbishop of Ros- 
 sano, who afterwards attained the papal dignity, and assumed 
 the name of Urban VII. The chief of the emperor’s embassy 
 was count Schwartzenburg. Philip named the duke de Terra 
 Nuova for his ambassador, and the duke d’Arschot was at the 
 head of the deputies from the States. From this nomination of 
 persons of so great eminence and distinction, superficial observers 
 were apt to imagine, that the negotiation committed to them 
 could not fail to be brought to the desired conclusion. But this 
 w'as not the judgment of persons of greater penetration. They 
 considered, not only that the prince of Orange, and the other 
 popular leaders by whom the States w 7 ere governed, had already 
 gone too far to expect forgiveness from the unrelenting temper 
 of the king ; but that the opinions of the reformers were more 
 widely diffused, and their zeal, if possible, more ardent than ever. 
 And as there was no reason to believe that they would ever be 
 persuaded to abandon their religion, so there was little ground to 
 hope that Philip’s bigotry would suffer him to agree to any terms 
 of peace, whilst they adhered to it. It w^as in reality this cause 
 
 * Grotius, p. 64. Mcteren, book ix. p. 250. 
 
326 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XY. 
 
 chiefly, by which the present negotiation, as well as all preceding 
 ones, was frustrated. Philip acted on this occasion with his 
 usual duplicity, and gave private instructions to his ambassador, 
 of very different import from those which had been communicated 
 to the emperor k . At first he seemed willing to ratify the paci- 
 fication of Ghent ; and by one of the articles of that treaty, 
 religion was to remain on its present footing, till a general 
 assembly of the States should alter it. But in the course of the 
 conferences it appeared, that the re-establishment of popery was 
 a condition without which he would agree to no accommodation. 
 Neither would he consent to the convoking of the assembly of 
 the States, nor to the ratifying the election of Matthias ; and he 
 still insisted peremptorily, that all cities, forts, and military 
 stores, should be immediately delivered into the hands of the 
 prince of Parma. In a word, the terms offered on this occasion 
 were, in every material article, the same with those which had 
 been formerly rejected by the provinces of Holland and Zealand, 
 when they stood alone and unsupported by the other provinces ; 
 and therefore it is difficult to suppose that Philip could, from 
 the beginning, have intended any thing by the present negotia- 
 tion, but to gratify the pope and emperor, at whose desire it was 
 begun. 
 
 Before the dissolution of this congress, however, he humbled 
 
 Philip at- himself so far as to make private offers to the prince of 
 
 tempts to Q ran g 0 These were the payment of his debts, the re- 
 gain over . o. i j • o ii i 
 
 the prince stitution of his estates, a compensation lor the losses 
 of Orange, which he had sustained during the war, and the liberty 
 of his son the count of Buren, upon whom, if the prince himself 
 should incline to retire into Germany, the king promised to 
 bestow the government of Holland and Utrecht. These offers 
 were made in Philip’s name by count Schwartzenburg, who 
 pledged his faith for the strict performance of them. William 
 could not but be flattered with the testimony which was thus 
 given, by an enemy so great and powerful, of the dread that was 
 entertained of his abilities. But being superior to the allure- 
 ments of interest, he preferred the glory of saving from slavery 
 a people who confided in his integrity, to all the advantages 
 which he or his family could have derived from the favour of the 
 king. “ He would listen to no proposal,” he said, “ that related 
 to himself only. He was conscious, that in all his conduct, he 
 had been animated by a disinterested affection towards the 
 public good ; and no consideration would induce him to enter 
 into any agreement, from which the States and people were 
 excluded : but if their just claims were satisfied, he would not 
 reject any terms for himself, which his conscience and honour 
 would suffer him to accept V’ 
 
 Soon after this the congress was dissolved; and no other 
 
 k Strada, lib. v. 1 Reidanus, p. 21). Crotius, p. 66, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 327 
 
 1579.] 
 
 Dissolution of effect was produced by it, except that the duke 
 the congress. d’Arschot, and some other deputies of the States, 
 embraced the opportunity with which it furnished them, of 
 reconciling themselves to the King. 
 
 The negotiations for peace did not entirely interrupt the 
 operations of the war. By the assistance of the Catholic in- 
 habitants, the prince of Parma acquired possession of Mechlin ; 
 and some time afterwards of Villebrock. These losses were 
 compensated to the States, by some acquisitions which their 
 forces made under the count of Renneberg ; who, besides re- 
 ducing the province of Friesland, made himself master of 
 Deventer and Groningen. In the southern provinces, the 
 Flemings and Walloons were engaged in perpetual hostilities 
 against one another ; but no exploit was performed by either 
 party, sufficiently interesting and important to deserve to be 
 recorded. 
 
328 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVI. 
 
 BOOK XVI. 
 
 During the course of the preceding transactions in the Nether- 
 State of lands, Philip was assiduously employed in preparing to 
 Portugal, assert his claim to the kingdom of Portugal, an object 
 fitted to inflame a more moderate ambition than that of Philip, 
 and worthy of all the attention and expense which he bestowed 
 in order to acquire it. Under a succession of kings, who placed 
 their glory in promoting commerce among their subjects, and 
 in making discoveries in the remotest regions of the globe, the 
 Portuguese had attained a degree of consideration among the 
 European nations, from which the narrow limits of the kingdom, 
 and the neighbourhood of the Spanish monarchy, seemed for 
 ever to exclude them. Besides establishing settlements in Africa, 
 and the adjacent islands, they had doubled the Cape of Good 
 Hope, which no European mariners had ever attempted, and 
 had penetrated boldly into almost every corner of the great 
 Eastern Ocean, discovering lands till then unknown, and founding 
 cities, with a view to the advancement of their trade. And not 
 satisfied with their acquisitions in the East, they had 'turned 
 their arms towards America, and planted in Brazil that valuable 
 colony of which they still retain possession. 
 
 John the Third, the last of those great kings under whose 
 Don Sebas- government the Portuguese performed such mighty 
 tian - achievements, died several years before the present 
 
 period, leaving his throne to Sebastian, his grandson, who was 
 then only three years old. This young prince gave early indica- 
 tions of many splendid accomplishments, which excited in the 
 minds of the Portuguese the most sanguine hopes of a prosperous 
 and happy reign ; but unfortunately for himself, as well as for 
 his people, he was animated with the most chimerical ambition, 
 which led him not to imitate the example of his illustrious 
 ancestors, by studying to promote the true happiness of his 
 subjects, but prompted him to extend his dominions, in order 
 to propagate the Romish faith. 
 
 This passion was cherished in him by Don Alexis de Menezes, 
 His romantic his governor, and Lewis de Camarra, a J esuit, his 
 ambition. tutor or instructor ; the former of whom was perpe- 
 tually celebrating the praises of his predecessors, on account of 
 their victories over the Moors in Africa and the Indies ; while 
 the latter impressed his young mind with a persuasion, that it 
 was the first duty of a Christian king, and the most acceptable 
 service which he could perform to the Deity, to extend the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 329 
 
 1579.J 
 
 knowledge of the true religion. By these means his ambition 
 was inflamed to a degree of madness ; and, in order to accom- 
 plish that design which appeared so meritorious and honourable, 
 he once resolved to sail with a fleet and army to India ; nor 
 could his courtiers persuade him to relinquish that romantic 
 project, till they proposed that, in place of it, he should under- 
 take an expedition against the Mahometans in Africa. From 
 this enterprise likewise his wisest counsellors laboured with much 
 solicitude to divert him ; but their exhortations proved ineffec- 
 tual. Sebastian adhered to his purpose with inflexible obstinacy, 
 and exerted himself with great activity in making preparations 
 for carrying it into execution. 
 
 In the midst of these preparations an opportunity presented 
 State of itself, which he considered as a declaration of Heaven 
 Morocco. i n favour of his design. On the death of Abdalla, king 
 of Morocco, his son, Muley Mahomet, had seized upon the 
 crown, in contradiction to an established law of succession, that 
 the kingdom should devolve to the brother of the deceased king. 
 A civil war ensued ; and Mahomet, after having lost several 
 pitched battles, was compelled to leave his uncle, Muley-Moluc, 
 a prince of great abilities and virtues, in possession of the throne. 
 After attempting in vain to engage Philip to espouse his cause, 
 Mahomet applied to Sebastian, and offered, if he would reinstate 
 him in his dominions, to put certain towns into his hands, and 
 to become tributary to the crown of Portugal. 
 
 Sebastian re- Sebastian listened to these offers with the utmost 
 solves to in- pleasure, and readily engaged to pass over himself to 
 vade Morocco. Africa with a flee t and army. 
 
 To enable him to fulfil this engagement, he solicited assistance 
 in troops from his uncle, the king of Spain, from some Italian 
 powers, and (which shows how anxious he was to insure success) 
 from the prince of Orange. 
 
 In answer to the application which he made to Philip, that 
 monarch proposed an interview with him in the town of Guada- 
 loupe, in Castile. Sebastian agreed to this proposal ; and the 
 Spanish historians relate, that, in the interview which was held 
 soon afterwards, Philip endeavoured to dissuade him from his 
 intended enterprise ; but that, having found him inflexible, he 
 promised, before they parted, to assist him with fifty galleys and 
 five thousand men. They add, that not long after, Philip, 
 dreading that the great number of Turks in the service of Muley- 
 Moluc might reduce Morocco under the dominion of the Sultan, 
 made an offer of his friendship to that prince, who, being like- 
 wise under apprehensions of danger from the Turks, gladly 
 accepted of it, and entered into the proposed alliance. The 
 same historians inform us, that about this time Philip obtained, 
 through the intercession of the V enetians, a truce of three years 
 from the Sultan ; and that he was prompted to humble himself 
 
330 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVL~ 
 
 so far, as thus to treat with the inveterate enemies of Christianity 
 (which he had never vouchsafed to do before), by the anxiety 
 which he entertained with regard to the transactions in the 
 Netherlands a . 
 
 The prince of Orange was not less anxious concerning the 
 issue of these transactions, yet his conduct was extremely dif- 
 ferent from that of Philip ; whether it proceeded from his native 
 magnanimity, joined with a desire of giving proof, in the sight 
 of all Europe, of the strength of the confederate provinces, or 
 from the hopes of securing Sebastian’s friendship to the confe- 
 deracy in some future period ; by whichsoever of these motives 
 William was influenced on this occasion, he gave the kindest re- 
 ception to Da Costa, the Portuguese ambassador, and afterwards 
 sent three thousand Germans to the assistance of Sebastian 1 *. 
 
 These troops, with ten thousand Portuguese, and some Italians 
 His army. an d Spaniards that were sent him by Philip, notwith- 
 standing his late treaty with Muley-Moluc, made up an 
 army of fifteen thousand men. With this army, and a great 
 number of pioneers, Sebastian set sail from Portugal in the be- 
 He arrives ginning of summer 1578, and landed them all safe at 
 in Morocco. Arzile and Tangiers, where he was joined by Mahomet, 
 the exiled king, with a body of Moorish troops. 
 
 Muley-Moluc, having received early intelligence of his design, 
 Muley-Moluc ^ iac ^ endeavoured to divert him from it, by offering 
 him certain territories adjacent to those sea- coast 
 towns in Africa which belonged to the crown of Portugal. This 
 heroic prince had been the more solicitous to prevent Sebastian’s 
 invasion, because he laboured under an inveterate disease, which 
 he believed would soon prove mortal ; and he was desirous to 
 leave his dominions in peace to his brother, whom he considered 
 as his rightful heir. But when he found Sebastian deaf to his 
 proposal, he had exerted all his native vigour in preparing for 
 his defence, and had drawn together an army consisting of more 
 than sixty thousand horse and foot. 
 
 With this army he advanced towards the enemy, and when he 
 had arrived within a few miles of their camp, as he doubted the 
 fidelity of a part of his troops who had formerly been attached 
 to the interest of his nephew, he published a proclamation, giving 
 liberty to all, who should incline, to pass over to the Portuguese. 
 But few of them embraced this opportunity which was offered 
 them. His magnanimity, and other virtues, had overcome their 
 attachment to Mahomet, and determined them faithfully to sup- 
 port their present sovereign. 
 
 Sebastian was earnestly entreated by his most experienced 
 officers, and by Mahomet, who was greatly discouraged at seeing 
 Imprudence so small a desertion from his uncle’s army, to keep 
 of Sebastian, within his intrenchments, near the sea-coast, and not 
 
 a Ferreras, vol. x. p. 306, 312. 
 
 Tlmanus, 
 
PHILIP 11. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 331 
 
 1579.] 
 
 to expose liis troops to the risk of a battle ; but that obstinate, 
 imprudent prince, rejected with disdain this wholesome counsel, 
 because he thought that it savoured of timidity, and not only led 
 out his army from the camp which he had fortified, but marched 
 into the centre of the country to meet the enemy. 
 
 Moluc’s distemper, in the mean time, had made the most 
 rapid progress ; yet the strength of his mind was unabated. If 
 he had not dreaded the quick approach of death, he would have 
 been satisfied with cutting off Sebastian’s communication with 
 the ships, and as the Portuguese were badly furnished with pro- 
 visions, have brought the war to a conclusion without fighting ; 
 but he dreaded the effect which his death might produce upon 
 his troops, and therefore resolved to bring on as soon as possible 
 a general engagement. Sebastian’s rashness rendered it easy 
 for him to execute this resolution. Without regard to the great 
 superiority of Moluc’s forces, that infatuated prince ventured to 
 advance into an open country, where the whole Moorish army, 
 horse as well as foot, could be employed. Moluc improved with 
 great dexterity the advantage which was thus afforded him. 
 Having drawn up his army in the form of a half-moon, he went 
 in his litter through all the ranks, exhorting his troops to 
 remember that their religion and liberty were at stake ; and 
 assuring them, that by whatever pretext Sebastian had offered 
 to justify his present unprovoked invasion, his real design was to 
 reduce the Moors to slavery, and to extirpate their religion. 
 Then after he had given all the instructions which he thought 
 necessary to ensure success, finding his strength almost quite 
 spent, he committed the command of the army to his brother, 
 and retired to a little distance from the field. 
 
 The battle was begun with a furious discharge of the artillery ; 
 Battle of but the two armies came soon to close fight, and the 
 Alcazar. Portuguese infantry repulsed the Moors in different places 
 with great slaughter. In the meantime the Moorish cavalry, 
 amounting to thirty thousand, having wheeled round from both 
 wings, had inclosed the enemy on every quarter; immediately 
 after which, they attacked them on the flanks, and in the rear, 
 while they were pursuing the advantage which they had gained 
 over the Moorish infantry. By the Portuguese horse, a body of 
 the Moors was repulsed, and driven towards the place to which 
 Moluc had retired. Fired with indignation at the sight, he 
 threw himself out of his litter, and having got on horseback, by the 
 assistance of his attendants, he rallied his flying troops, and was 
 about to lead them back to the field of battle. But by this exer- 
 tion the small remains of his strength were entirely exhausted. 
 His officers seeing him unable to support himself on his horse, 
 carried him to his litter, where he fainted, and only recovered 
 Death of Mu- to desire that those about him would keep his death 
 ley-Moluc. secret till the battle should be decided ; immediately 
 
332 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XYI. 
 
 after which, putting his finger on his mouth, as a further injunc- 
 tion of secrecy, he expired. 
 
 A more striking display of strength of mind occurs not in the 
 TT . , annals of history. Moluc was besides endued with 
 
 liis character. *11 i , , , 1*1 , . 
 
 every amiable and respectable accomplishment, being 
 no less conspicuous for justice and generosity, and (which were 
 rare endowments in a native of Africa) integrity and candour, 
 than for prudence, vigour, magnanimity, and fortitude. By his 
 bravery and conduct he delivered his kingdom from the oppres- 
 sion of a tyrannical usurper ; and if he had lived, he would have 
 advanced it to a degree of prosperity and glory to which it has 
 never attained. 
 
 His troops remained under a persuasion, that he was still a 
 spectator of their behaviour. Great numbers of them fell. The 
 Portuguese, the Spaniards, and Germans, fought with the most 
 undaunted intrepidity ; but the horse being driven upon the foot, 
 broke their ranks, and threw them into confusion. The Moorish 
 cavalry then pressed forward in thousands on every side, and 
 made dreadful havoc among them, till almost all of them were 
 either slain or taken prisoners. 
 
 Sebastian himself, who still survived the fatal catastrophe, had, 
 in the arrangement of his troops and in the beginning of the engage- 
 ment, acted the part of an expert commander ; and he gave after- 
 wards many conspicuous proofs of the most heroic valour, flying 
 from rank to rank, encouraging and exhorting the troops ; exposing 
 himself to every danger ; and often mingling, sword in hand, with 
 the thickest of the enemy. Having had three horses killed under 
 him, and his standard-bearer slain, his soldiers, in the confusion 
 of battle, mistook another standard for his, which they flocked 
 round, and left their King almost alone. The Moors called out 
 to him, that if he would surrender, they would spare his life ; 
 “ but you cannot , 11 replied he, “ preserve my honour . 11 Then, 
 accompanied only by the count of Vimioso, Christopher Tavora, 
 and Nunno de Mascaregnas, he threw himself into the midst of 
 the enemy, and fought deperately, till Vimioso and Tavora fell 
 by his side, and he himself, breathless and exhausted, and unable 
 any longer to wield his sword, was seized and disarmed by tho 
 surrounding Moors. 
 
 These men quarrelled with one another concerning their royal 
 Death of Se- prisoner, and from words they had recourse to arms ; 
 bastian. when a Moorish officer coming up, put an end to the 
 dispute, by discharging a furious stroke of the sabre on the head 
 of the king 0 . 
 
 In this manner perished the brave, but rash Sebastian ; whose 
 fate affords a striking instance of the pernicious tendency of 
 
 c The account of Sebastian’s death rests entirely on the testimony of Don Nunno dc Mas- 
 caregnas, who was an eye-witness; nor did De Thou think there was any reason for calling 
 it in question ; though some authors insinuate, that Sebastian laid violent hands on himself. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 333 
 
 1579 .] 
 
 courage and ambition, when they are not tempered with prudence 
 and moderation. About eight thousand of his troops were killed, 
 and all. the rest, except a few who escaped to Arzile and Tan- 
 giers, were reduced to slavery. Of the nobility the greatest part 
 were slain ; and several of the most illustrious families in Portugal 
 became extinct d . 
 
 Don Henry, grand-uncle of Sebastian, a cardinal and a priest, 
 Don Henry, succeeded to the throne ; but being of a weak and 
 king of sickly constitution, and far advanced in years, there 
 Portugal. wag j^tle probability either that he would live long, or 
 that he would leave any issue behind him : and his short reign 
 served only to give the several pretenders to his kingdom an 
 opportunity of preparing to assert their claims to the succession. 
 
 The candidates were seven in number : the duchess of Bra- 
 Candidates ganza, the king of Spain, the duke of Savoy, Don 
 for the sue- Antonio, prior of Crato, the duke of Parma, Catherine 
 cession. 0 f ]VI e di C is, and the sovereign pontiff. 
 
 The four first were grand-children of Emanuel the Great, father 
 of Henry. The duchess of Braganza was daughter of Prince Ed- 
 ward, Emanuers second son ; Philip was the son of the Empress 
 Isabella, his eldest daughter ; the duke of Savoy, of Beatrix his 
 younger daughter ; and Don Antonio was a natural son of Lewis, 
 who was a younger son of Emanuel, and brother to the present 
 king. The duke of Parma was great-grandson of Emanuel, by a 
 daughter of the above-mentioned Prince Edward. The Queen - 
 mother of France founded her claim on her supposed descent 
 from Alphonso III., who died about three hundred years before 
 the present period ; and the Pope pretended that Portugal was 
 feudatory to the see of Rome, and belonged to him, since the 
 male-heirs in the direct line were extinct. Gregory had con- 
 ceived a violent desire to make his natural son a king, and lie 
 had once flattered himself with the hopes of making him king of 
 Ireland, through the assistance of Philip. But as it is incon- 
 ceivable how he could ever expect to persuade Philip to quit 
 his claim, so nothing but folly or dotage could have determined 
 him to prosecute his own, in opposition to so powerful an 
 antagonist. 
 
 The pretensions of Catherine of Medicis, and her hopes of 
 success, if she entertained any, were not less chimerical than 
 those of the Pope. It can hardly be believed, that this politic 
 princess' could, in her present competition, have any other end in 
 view, but to obstruct the ambitious designs of Philip, and to 
 furnish the court of France with pretence for opposing him. 
 
 From the dukes of Savoy and Parma, Philip knew that he 
 should not meet with opposition ; since, besides that his claim 
 was better founded than theirs, these princes were in close 
 
 d Mahomet, the exiled king, was drowned in attempting to make his escape ; and Hamet, 
 Muley-Moluc’s brother, succeeded to the throne of Fez and Morocco. 
 
334 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVI. 
 
 alliance with him, and depended much upon his support and 
 protection. Could Don Antonio have proved his mother’s mar- 
 riage, his right to the throne would have been unquestionable. 
 He attempted to prove it, but in vain. Still, however, he per- 
 sisted in his purpose, and, with some address and great activity, 
 he gained over a considerable party among the people. Most of 
 the nobility, on the other hand, and the king himself, who knew 
 the vanity of Antonio’s pretensions to legitimacy, were inclined 
 to support the claim of the duchess of Braganza e ; whose right, 
 they thought, was clearly preferable to that of Philip, not only 
 because she was descended from Emanuel by a male, and Philip, 
 by a female ; but because an ancient and fundamental law required 
 that the crown should not be inherited by a stranger. 
 
 Philip’s agents at the court of Lisbon allowed, that if the 
 Philip’s duchess of Braganza’s father had been alive, his title 
 title. would have been indisputable ; but they maintained, that 
 since he had died without attaining possession of the throne, 
 nothing but the degree of consanguinity to Emanuel ought to be 
 regarded ; and that as the duchess and he were equal in that 
 respect, the preference was due to a male before a female. And 
 they farther insisted, that the law which excludes strangers from 
 inheriting the crown, was not applicable to him, since Portugal 
 had formerly belonged to the kings of Castile. 
 
 Besides these considerations, which had very little weight, 
 except with those who were for other reasons inclined to espouse 
 Philip’s interest, the duke de Ossuna, his ambassador, endea- 
 voured to impress the scrupulous and timid mind of Henry with 
 a persuasion, that, in opposition to so powerful a competitor as 
 the King of Spain, it would be impossible for the duke of Bra- 
 ganza to maintain possession of the throne ; and that the fruits 
 of all the glorious discoveries and conquests which had been 
 made by his father and brother, would be lost, and the kingdom 
 itself involved in the calamities of war. 
 
 Henry’s desire to prevent these unhappy consequences, de- 
 Don Henry termined him to proceed with great deliberation in 
 discusses the examining the pleas of the contending parties. He 
 claims of the consulted civilians in different parts of Europe, and 
 competitors. ca p e( j a convention of the States of the kingdom, to 
 give him their opinion with respect to the measures proper to be 
 pursued. The members of the convention differed widely in 
 their sentiments from each other, and while some of them ad- 
 vised him, without delay, to nominate for his successor which- 
 soever of the competitors he thought fit, others exhorted him 
 deliberately to examine the several claims that had been offered. 
 In compliance with this last advice, the candidates were cited to 
 appear ; and they all sent commissioners, who pleaded the cause 
 
 c The duke of Braganza himself was sprung, though not in a direct line, from the royal 
 blood. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1579. ] 
 
 335 
 
 of the princes whom they represented, before Henry, as they 
 would have pleaded an ordinary point of right before a civil judge. 
 
 This extraordinary trial, in which so great attention seemed 
 Henry’s de- to be paid to justice, was suited to the feeble and 
 liberations, irresolute character, as well as to the habits of the 
 King, who had spent his life in listening to the idle disputes of 
 theologians. But his conduct was severely censured by all men 
 of prudence and understanding. They considered that the fate 
 of kingdoms can almost never be decided by the forms or prin- 
 ciples of law ; and they regarded this farcical trial, not only as 
 useless for the purpose which was intended, but as calculated to 
 divide the kingdom into factions, which must sooner or later 
 produce a civil war. 
 
 He ought in the beginning, it was said, to have declared 
 His impra- himself in favour of the duchess of Braganza, whose 
 dence. right, according to the most common and obvious law 
 of succession, was unquestionable ; and who, besides, was much 
 more acceptable to the nation than any other of the candidates. 
 He ought, after this, to have caused her right to be recognised 
 by the convention of the States, who would cheerfully have con- 
 sented to acknowledge it ; he ought to have required an oath of 
 allegiance to her, in the event of his own demise, from the army, 
 and all persons in public offices ; and then, instead of losing his 
 precious time in consulting and deliberating, he ought to have 
 employed it, in putting the kingdom into a posture of defence 
 against the King of Spain. 
 
 But Henry was incapable of forming any resolution that 
 required so much courage, vigour, and activity. He was no less 
 attached to the duchess of Braganza, and no less averse from 
 Philip, than his nobility and people; yet he still continued to 
 deliberate, as if he had expected to live for many years. 
 
 In order to extricate himself from this perplexity, Henry 
 began to think seriously of a proposal which had been made to 
 him by some of his counsellors, to marry ; and accordingly, 
 notwithstanding his great age, his infirmities, and his having 
 borne so long the character of a priest, he sent an ambassador to 
 solicit a dispensation from the pope. There was little pro- 
 bability of his living to fulfil his intentions, and much less of his 
 leaving any issue behind him ; yet Philip, being greatly alarmed 
 at his design, sent Ferdinand de Castello, a Dominican friar, to 
 dissuade him from it, by reminding him of the offence which his 
 marriage would give to all true Catholics, and the triumph it 
 would afford to the Lutherans and other sectaries of the age ; 
 and when Henry refused to admit Castello to an audience, a 
 circumstance that furnished Philip with a stronger proof of 
 Henry’s alienation from him than any which he had hitherto 
 received, he employed all his interest at Rome, to prevent the 
 pope from granting the dispensation. 
 
336 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVI. 
 
 In the mean time he spared no pains to conciliate the favour 
 Philip’s ma- of the principal nobility ; and having spread his emis- 
 nifesto. saries over the kingdom, he published a manifesto in 
 vindication of his title, calling upon the people to turn their eyes 
 towards him , as the only person who would have a right to the 
 throne after the decease of the present King. This manifesto, 
 while it incensed Henry more than ever against him,' served in no 
 degree the purpose for which it was designed. The Portuguese 
 entertained the thoughts of falling under the dominion of the 
 Castilians with an hereditary and violent aversion ; and there 
 was nothing in the character of Philip by which their prejudice 
 could be overcome. 
 
 If Henry had availed himself of this disposition of his subjects, 
 and acknowledged the duchess of Braganza for his successor, 
 almost the whole kingdom would have concurred to support her 
 claim ; and so great a force might have been prepared, as, with 
 the assistance of foreign powers, would have either determined 
 Philip to abandon his design, or have prevented him from carry- 
 ing it into execution. But as the duke and duchess of Braganza 
 were deterred from exerting themselves, by their dread of Philip, 
 and the weak irresolute conduct of the King; so Henry still 
 flattered himself with the vain conceit, that Philip as well as the 
 other competitors, would submit to his decision. 
 
 Towards his nephew, Henry acted with much less hesitation 
 Don Anto- and reserve, than towards the other candidates. Having 
 nio decinred obtained a bull from the Pope, empowering him to 
 illegitimate, judge of Antonio’s claim to legitimacy, he examined 
 the witnesses whom Antonio produced to prove his mother’s 
 marriage ; and, having extorted from two of them a confession 
 of their having been suborned, while the other two contradicted 
 each other in delivering their evidence, Henry, on this foundation, 
 joined with the circumstance of the prior’s being mentioned by 
 his father in his latter will as his natural son, passed sentence, 
 declaring him to be illegitimate. 
 
 Antonio had influence afterwards to persuade the pope to 
 recall his bull, on the pretence of the king’s having exceeded his 
 powers. By this treatment Henry was highly exasperated, both 
 against the pope and Don Antonio ; and he indulged his resent- 
 ment against the latter, by banishing him first from the court, 
 and afterwards from the kingdom. In obedience to this sen- 
 tence, Antonio retired for some time into Castile, but he soon 
 returned, and found that his uncle’s conduct towards him had 
 not produced that effect upon the people which Henry had ex- 
 pected. Their attachment to the prior remained as strong as 
 ever ; and, as no pains were taken to form a party in the interest 
 of the duchess of Braganza, great numbers of the people were 
 entirely devoted to him, and regarded him as their only resource 
 against the tyranny of Spain. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 337 
 
 1579.] 
 
 From this disposition of the people, together with the activity 
 Philip’s mi- which Antonio displayed in augmenting the number 
 litary pro- 0 f his partisans, Philip perceived that he must not 
 paragons. sa qi s fy himself with arguments, manifestoes and pri- 
 vate applications to individuals, but must resolve to support his 
 claim by force of arms. Agreeably to this resolution, he issued 
 orders for levying troops in Spain, Italy, and Germany ; and 
 gave instructions to the marquis de Santa Croce to hold the fleet 
 in readiness for action. He was aware how much reason he had 
 to expect opposition from several of the European powers; and 
 in order to prevent them from being alarmed, he caused a report 
 to be propagated, that having entered lately into an alliance with 
 the new king of Morocco, his present military preparations were 
 intended for an expedition which he had agreed to undertake, in 
 conjunction with that monarch, against Algiers. This pretext 
 served the purpose which he designed ; and neither the king of 
 France, nor the queen of England, nor any Italian or German 
 prince, seemed to attend to his operations. 
 
 In the mean time, Henry’s health declined daily, and all about 
 him perceived that his death was fast approaching. He appeared 
 now more desirous than ever to have his successor fixed ; and 
 having for this purpose summoned the States to meet at Almerin, 
 he seems to have resolved to declare himself either in favour of 
 the King of Spain, or the duchess of Braganza, according as he 
 should find the one or the other of these competitors most accept- 
 able to the States. But the members of this assembly could not 
 agree. Most of the nobility and ecclesiastics had, by different 
 means, been gained over to the interest of Philip, while the 
 deputies of the cities were animated with the most irreconcilable 
 aversion to his person and government. 
 
 In the midst of their deliberations and disputes the King 
 Death of died, leaving the nomination of his successor to five 
 Henry, Jan. persons, to whom he committed the regency of the 
 3ist, io80. ki n gd om . 
 
 The first act of the administration of the regents was to 
 send ambassadors to Philip, to dissuade him from having re- 
 course to arms, till, according to the will of the late king, they 
 should deliver their judgment concerning his right to the succes- 
 sion. But to this request, Philip, whose preparations were now 
 complete, gave the following reply : “ That his right was clear 
 and indisputable ; that he would not submit it either to the 
 regents, or to the States ; and that he did not desire to have 
 any judgment whatever passed in confirmation of it.” 
 
 By this answer the regents were thrown into great perplexity. 
 A majority of them stood well affected towards Philip, but they 
 were prevented from declaring in his favour by their dread of 
 the indignation of the people, and were obliged to issue orders for 
 equipping the fleet, and strengthening the fortifications and gar- 
 
338 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVI, 
 
 risons of the frontier towns. But the great exertion which had 
 been made lately by Sebastian, and the exhausted state to which 
 the kingdom had been reduced by the numberless expeditions to 
 India and America, from which no fruit had been yet derived 
 sufficient to compensate either for the expense which they had 
 cost, or the loss of men which they had occasioned, rendered it 
 impossible for the regents, if they had been ever so much inclined, 
 to secure the kingdom -against so great a force as the Spanish 
 monarch had prepared. 
 
 His army, including four thousand pioneers, amounted to 
 Philip’s thirty-five thousand men, and his fleet consisted of thirty 
 fleet and men of war, seventeen frigates, and seventy galleys and 
 army. ships of burden loaded with provisions and military stores. 
 It was not likely that so great a fleet and army would find em- 
 ployment in subduing a kingdom so ill prepared for defence, and 
 so much weakened by intestine divisions, as Portugal at the pre- 
 sent period. But, besides that Philip was, from natural temper, 
 generally cautious to excess in his military enterprises, it should 
 seem that, in the present case, he regarded the importance of 
 the prize more than the difficulty of attaining it ; unless it be 
 supposed, that he still had reason to apprehend that the French 
 and English would interpose. 
 
 He gave the command of the fleet to the marquis of Santa 
 command- Croce, who was reckoned the ablest naval officer in 
 ed by Santa Spain. But he hesitated for some time with regard 
 Croce ; to the person whom he should place at the head of his 
 land-forces. His hesitation, however, did not proceed from any 
 doubt which he entertained with regard to the merit and abilities 
 of his generals ; for the Duke of Alva was still alive ; whom 
 Philip knew to be possessed of every qualification requisite to 
 secure the success of his intended enterprise. 
 
 Alva, upon his return from the Netherlands, had been admitted 
 and the by Philip to the same degree of favour and confidence 
 duke of which he had formerly enjoyed. But his son, Don Garcia 
 Alva. ^e Toledo, having debauched one of the maids of honour, 
 under a promise of marriage, Philip had put him under arrest, 
 and given orders that he should not be released till he should 
 consent to fulfil his engagement : notwithstanding which, his 
 father had assisted him in making his escape ; and in order 
 effectually to disappoint the King’s intention, had concluded a 
 marriage between him and his cousin, a daughter of the marquis 
 of Villena. 
 
 Philip, highly provoked with this contempt of his authority, 
 had banished the Duke from court, and confined him to the castle 
 of U zeda. Alva bore this indignity with extreme impatience, and 
 persuaded the Pope, and some other foreign princes, to employ 
 their intercession in his behalf ; but all his applications for for- 
 giveness had hitherto been ineffectual, and he had remained almost 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 33.9 
 
 1580.] 
 
 two years in confinement. This severity, exercised for so small 
 an offence, towards an old friend and servant, in the decline of 
 life, was by some ascribed to Philip’s imperious temper, and his 
 implacable resentment ; whilst others said, that he had been long 
 disgusted with Alva’s arrogance ; and that the Duke’s conduct in 
 the affair of his son, was only a pretence which Philip made use 
 of, to justify himself for dismissing from his presence a man whose 
 temper and manners were become intolerable. 
 
 To whichsoever of these motives Philip’s treatment of Alva 
 could be ascribed, it was expected, that neither his pride, nor his 
 natural suspicion and distrust, would have suffered him to com- 
 mit the charge of an enterprise of so great importance as the pre- 
 sent, to one towards whom he had shown himself so inexorable ; 
 and it excited great surprise, when he sent two of his secretaries 
 to the Duke, to inquire whether his health would permit him to 
 undertake the command of the army which he had prepared for 
 the conquest of Portugal. To this inquiry, Alva, without hesita- 
 tion, replied, that he was ready to devote the little health and 
 strength that were left him to the service of the King ; and imme- 
 diately afterwards he set out for Barajas to receive his instruc- 
 tions. He desired liberty to pay his respects to Philip at Madrid ; 
 but so ungracious was this prince even towards such of his minis- 
 ters as he esteemed the most, and so incapable of entirely for- 
 giving any offence or injury, that he refused to grant him admit- 
 tance into his presence ; and, having transmitted his instructions 
 to him at Barajas, he ordered him to join the army as soon as 
 possible. Those who remembered the barbarous cruelty which 
 Alva had exercised in the Netherlands, were not sorry for the 
 mortification which he suffered on the present occasion ; but they 
 could not withhold the tribute of applause which was due to him, 
 on account of that inflexible fidelity, so becoming in a subject 
 towards the sovereign, which determined him, in the extremity 
 of old age, to expose himself to all the hazards and hardships of 
 war, in order to advance the interest of a prince by whom he had 
 been treated so ungratefully. 
 
 From Barajas Alva went, as soon as he had received his 
 March of instructions, to join the troops, which were assembled 
 the Spanish at Badajoz ; and soon afterwards he began his march 
 troops. towards Elvas and Oliven^a. These, and all the other 
 une 580. ^ owns w j 1 i c } 1 \[ e nor th from the Tagus, as far as Setubal 
 on the western coast, though extremely averse to the Spanish 
 government, yet being utterly unprepared for resistance, opened 
 their gates and proclaimed Philip for their sovereign. 
 
 The marquis de Santa Croce, who had set sail with the fleet 
 from Port St. Mary near Cadiz, found the same facility in reduc- 
 ing Faro, Lagos, and other towns on the coast of Algarva and 
 Antejo ; and he came in sight of Setubal, in a few days after the 
 arrival of the land-forces at that place. 
 
 z 2 
 
340 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVI, 
 
 Hitherto almost no blood had been shed, and neither the 
 Progress of fleet nor army had met with any opposition to retard 
 the Spanish their progress. The duke of Alva intended next to 
 arms. march without delay to the capital, but it was neces- 
 sary, he thought, to proceed now with greater circumspection 
 than before, as Don Antonio had drawn together a considerable 
 body of forces, had been admitted into Lisbon, where he was pro- 
 claimed king by the people, and had strengthened several of the 
 towns and forts by which the Spanish army must pass in their 
 approach to that city. 
 
 Three ways of reaching Lisbon were proposed in a council of 
 war that was held on this occasion. One of these was to cross 
 the Tagus, some miles above the city, at the towns of Almerin 
 and Santerem ; another, to send round the fleet to Almada, and 
 to put the troops on board at that place, which lies almost 
 directly opposite to Lisbon ; and the third, to carry the army 
 round by sea from Setubal to Cascaes. The two first of these 
 ways was thought preferable to the last by most of the officers, 
 because they were safer ; yet the last was embraced by the duke 
 of Alva. He acknowledged the justness of what his officers 
 advanced in support of their opinion ; but he observed, that as 
 the fleet was at hand, the army could be immediately put on 
 board : that the passage to Cascaes was not long; and that as 
 the enemy were ill prepared for their defence, his success would 
 be greatly facilitated by the celerity of his approach. 
 
 Alva was not disappointed in his expectation of the effect 
 which his sudden arrival was calculated to produce upon the 
 Portuguese. They were drawn up along the shore, as if they had 
 intended to dispute his landing ; but no sooner had the ships 
 begun to fire upon them, than they retired, and suffered him to 
 land, and put his men in order, without giving him the smallest 
 molestation. They might still have obstructed his approach to 
 Cascaes, as his road thither lay over a hill, defended with a 
 battery of cannon, and full -of rugged rocks and brambles, of 
 which Don Diego de Meneses, commander in chief of the 
 Portuguese under Don Antonio, had taken possession with 
 between three and four thousand men. Alva ordered the 
 Spaniards to attack them, without being deterred, either by the 
 strength of the ground or the number of the enemy. An old 
 experienced officer, of the name of Bariettos, an intimate friend 
 of Alva’s, asked him in a whisper, “ Whether his attempting, 
 with so little precaution, to dislodge an enemy so strongly 
 situated, did not resemble the action of an ardent young warrior, 
 rather than that of an experienced general V Alva smiled, and 
 replied, “ That a good general ought, on some occasions, to 
 employ the prudence and circumspection of old age, and in 
 others, the ardour and confidence of youth.” The event showed 
 that his conduct, though apparently rash, was well adapted to 
 
1380.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 341 
 
 the present circumstances. The Spaniards, inspired with their 
 general’s confidence, advanced boldly, and the Portuguese 
 (almost all of whom were raw and undisciplined) retreated 
 without waiting for their approach. 
 
 Alva laid siege, immediately afterwards, to the town and 
 castle of Cascaes, and by the briskness of his operations he soon 
 compelled the garrison to surrender. But on this occasion he 
 sullied that renown which his wisdom and vigour would have 
 procured him, by the cruelty which he exercised towards such 
 of the Portuguese as had thrown themselves upon his mercy. In 
 violation of his promise to Don Antonio de Castro, lord of 
 Cascaes, who had joined him upon his first arrival in the 
 kingdom, he gave up the town to be plundered by the Spaniards, 
 and having sent all the soldiers in the garrison to the galleys, he 
 put to death, without an}' form of trial, Don Diego de Meneses, 
 a nobleman of an illustrious family, and one who, on account of 
 his personal merit, was universally respected and beloved. To 
 this barbarity Alva was prompted by private resentment against 
 Meneses d ; although it may be presumed that he would not have 
 ventured to indulge it on the present occasion, had he not known 
 that his conduct was conformable to the sentiments of the King. 
 It was calculated to inspire the Portuguese with terror, but it 
 served likewise more than ever to alienate their affections ; and 
 considering how much superior the Spanish fleet and army were 
 to any force which had been prepared to oppose them, it could 
 not be coloured with the tyrant’s ordinary plea of necessity. 
 
 From the town of Cascaes, Alva led his army against the forts 
 of St. John and Belem, both which he soon reduced to the 
 necessity of surrendering ; and being seconded in his operations 
 by the fleet, the example of these places was quickly followed by 
 Almada, and almost all the other fortified towns on both sides of 
 the river. 
 
 During these transactions, Don Antonio, after having, from a 
 Don Antonio consc i° usness of the weakness of his party, essayed in 
 ’ vain to obtain advantageous terms from Philip, had 
 pitched his camp, with all the forces which he could collect, on 
 the east side of the river of Alcantara, on the road to Lisbon. 
 
 Alva amused him for several days with the hopes of an 
 accommodation, in order to afford time for the operation of a 
 spirit of despondency that prevailed in Antonio’s army. Mean- 
 while he omitted not to procure the most accurate information 
 concerning the situation and strength of his camp ; and, on the 
 25th of August, he resolved to attack it. Before he could 
 approach the intrenchments, it was necessary that he should 
 make himself master of the bridge of Alcantara, or lead his army 
 to a considerable distance up the river, the banks of which were 
 so steep and rugged, as rendered it impossible to transport either 
 
 u Thuanus, lib. lxx. c. x. 
 
342 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVI. 
 
 horse or foot in sight of the enemy. Having drawn up his main 
 army in order of battle, directly opposite to the Portuguese 
 camp, he sent the horse under his son Ferdinand de Toledo, and 
 two thousand select infantry, under Sancio d’ Avila, to cross the 
 river several miles higher, where the banks were practicable, 
 whilst he ordered Colonna, with the Italians, to make an assault 
 upon the bridge. 
 
 Colonna’s troops were twice repulsed ; but in the third onset, 
 being supported by a body of Germans, which the Duke sent to 
 their assistance, they drove the Portuguese, before them, and 
 secured possession of the bridge. 
 
 Soon afterwards Toledo and d’ Avila appeared. The Portu- 
 Defeat of guese, astonished at the sight of them, and dreading 
 the Portu- that their communication with the city might be inter- 
 guese under cepted, threw down their arms after a short resistance, 
 Antomo. anc [ k e £ 00 k themselves to flight. The Spaniards pur- 
 sued, and slew between two and three thousand before they 
 could reach the town. 
 
 Don Antonio, who displayed on this occasion neither fortitude 
 nor conduct, had fled with his troops to Lisbon. There he 
 knew that he could not remain long in safety, as, besides the 
 insufficiency of the fortifications, the magistrates and many of the 
 inhabitants were disaffected to his interest ; and therefore, 
 immediately after releasing all the prisoners in the city (a poor 
 expedient, to recruit his ruined army), he set out, attended by 
 the count de Vimioso, and the bishop of La Guarda, with a small 
 number of troops, for the town of Santaren. 
 
 The magistrates of Lisbon did not hesitate a moment in 
 resolving to submit to the conqueror, and the town was, im- 
 mediately after the battle, delivered into his hands. The Por- 
 tuguese fleet at the same time struck their colours to the 
 marquis de Santa Croce, and received such a number of his 
 Castilians on board as gave him the entire command. 
 
 It was now become Philip’s interest to provide for the 
 Cruel treat- security of Lisbon and its suburbs, as much as for that 
 ment of the 0 f a ny of his towns in Spain ; and Alva so far fulfilled 
 Portuguese. ^ engagement with the magistrates, as to prevent 
 any formidable number of his troops from entering the town ; 
 but he gave up the suburbs (which were at that time no less 
 considerable than the town itself 6 ) to be ransacked and plundered, 
 without making any distinction between the friends and enemies 
 of the King. He suffered them likewise to pillage the houses of 
 such of the inhabitants within the town, as had discovered any 
 attachment to Don Antonio, and he allowed parties to go out 
 and plunder all the country and villages in the neighbourhood. 
 A Spanish historian says, that the soldiers committed these 
 enormities without the Duke’s permission, yet no punishment was 
 
 • Thuanus, lib. lxx. c. x. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 343 
 
 1580 .] 
 
 ever inflicted on them, and no restitution was ever made to the 
 many thousand innocent persons, who were involved in the same 
 common ruin with the guilty. 
 
 After a conduct so barbarous and impolitic, there was little 
 reason to expect that the people of Lisbon would be able soon 
 to overcome their aversion to the Spanish government. From 
 their dread of Alva’s tyranny, they took the oath of allegiance 
 which was prescribed to them ; and, from the same motive, they 
 were present at those public rejoicings which he appointed to be 
 celebrated on account of his success ; but being unable to conceal 
 the anguish of their minds, the acclamations which they uttered 
 were feeble, and intermixed with sighs and groans. 
 
 The duke of Alva’s joy, soon after his entrance into Lisbon, 
 was interrupted by intelligence which he received from Spain, 
 that Philip had fallen sick, and that his physicians were extremely 
 apprehensive of the issue of his distemper. Alva knew that the 
 King’s death, at this crisis, would probably render all his labours 
 and success in Portugal abortive, and therefore he suspended for 
 a while the prosecution of the war. 
 
 In this interval, Don Antonio exerted himself with great 
 New prepara- activity, and employed every expedient which he or his 
 tions of Don partisans could devise to raise another army, flattering 
 himself with the hope of being able to maintain his 
 ground, till the French, or some other foreign power, should be 
 persuaded to espouse his cause. In the town of Santarem he had 
 lately been received by the people as their only rightful sovereign, 
 and every mark of affection and respect had been shown him ; 
 yet so great a change had his defeat and flight produced, that 
 they refused to admit him within the town till he engaged that 
 he should not remain in it beyond a limited time ; and, im- 
 mediately after his departure, they sent ambassadors to the duke 
 of Alva with an offer of submission. 
 
 From Santarem, Antonio directed his course northwards, and 
 in the province which lies between Minho and Douro, he pre- 
 vailed upon eight or nine thousand of the inhabitants to take up 
 arms. With these tumultuary troops he procured admittance, 
 partly by force and partly by persuasion, first into Aveiro, and 
 afterwards into the city of Oporto ; but in both these places he 
 exercised a degree of severity towards those whom he suspected 
 to be his enemies, that w^as extremely ill calculated to increase 
 the number of his friends. 
 
 He remained at Oporto till he was informed that the duke of 
 Alva, being delivered from his anxiety with regard to the King’s 
 health, had sent a part of his forces against him, under Sancio 
 d’Avila, who was advancing towards the banks of the Douro with 
 great rapidity. D’Avila had under his command only five or six 
 thousand horse and foot, and Antonio’s army consisted of about 
 nine thousand ; but from past experience, the latter was deeply 
 
344 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVI. 
 
 sensible of the difference between his undisciplined forces and 
 those of d'Avila, and he was well acquainted with the character 
 of that general ; who, in the Netherlands and other places, had 
 given the most conspicuous proofs of military skill and intrepidity. 
 His safety, he knew, depended on his preventing the Spaniards 
 from crossing the Douro, which, for many miles above Oporto, was 
 so deep and rapid, that without boats they could not attempt to 
 pass it. He exerted himself, therefore, with diligence in removing 
 the boats and barks from the south side of the river, and planted 
 his troops at different places on the north side, to watch the 
 motions of the enemy. 
 
 In the mean time d’ Avila advanced, and took possession of 
 Progress of Villanova, a little town which stands opposite to Oporto, 
 the Spani- From that place he sent a party of his troops in search of 
 ards under boats ; who returned without success : but d’ Avila being 
 d Avila. reso i vec i omit nothing in his power to accomplish his 
 design, sent them back with orders to pursue their march a great 
 way farther up the river, which they did accordingly, and col- 
 lected about twenty boats, from places at so great a distance 
 from Oporto, that Antonio had judged it unnecessary to remove 
 them. Still, however, most of the Spanish officers thought it 
 impracticable to effectuate their passage with so small a number ; 
 and it was impossible to bring them down the river, on account 
 of some armed vessels which Antonio kept ready to intercept 
 them. To remedy this inconvenience, d’ Avila ordered a part of 
 his troops to march up to the place where the boats lay, and 
 there he transported them, without opposition, to the other side. 
 These troops had time to intrench themselves, before the enemy 
 received intelligence of their landing ; and, under the shelter of 
 their intrenchments, the rest of the forces were immediately 
 carried over in the same way. 
 
 This unexpected success in the beginning of his enterprise 
 Defeat ofDon gave d’Avila the highest assurance of victory, and 
 Antonio. demonstrated how little reason he had to dread the 
 efforts of an enemy, who, on so critical an occasion, had shown 
 themselves so deficient both in courage and vigilance. Their 
 conduct afterwards was such as their negligence and cowardice, 
 in permitting the Spaniards to land in small bodies, one after 
 another, gave reason to expect. D’ Avila drove them before him, 
 till, with very little bloodshed, they were entirely routed and 
 dispersed. This active general lost no time in sending a 
 party of horse in pursuit of Don Antonio, who had fled, accom- 
 panied by a small number of his partisans, to Viana, a 
 town on the sea-coast near the northern frontier of the king- 
 dom. Upon the approach of the Spaniards to that place, he 
 attempted to make his escape by sea, but was driven back by a 
 violent storm, which overtook him soon after he had embarked. 
 He then dismissed his attendants, and disguising himself in the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 345 
 
 1580.] 
 
 dress of a common sailor, eluded the search of his pursuers. 
 Philip had recourse to his favourite weapon, a proscription, and 
 offered a reward of eighty thousand ducats to any person who 
 should deliver him into his hands. Notwithstanding this, so 
 great was the aversion of the Portuguese towards the Castilian 
 government, or such their attachment to Antonio, that no person 
 was tempted by the proffered reward, either to seize him, or to 
 give information of the place of his retreat. Antonio remained 
 in the country between the Minho and Douro from November 
 till May, living sometimes in the houses of the nobility, and some- 
 times in monasteries and convents, till he found an opportunity 
 of going by sea to France. 
 
 After the dispersion of the Prior’s army, all the towns between 
 Entire sub- the Minho and Douro opened their gates, and sub- 
 jection of mitted to the conqueror. The regents appointed by 
 01 llga ’ the late King had some time before declared themselves 
 for Philip ; and the duke of Braganza, who seemed to have 
 despaired from the beginning of being able to assert his wife’s 
 title to the throne against so potent an antagonist, had taken 
 the same oath of fidelity and allegiance that was required from 
 others. 
 
 The colonies in America, Africa, and the Indies, which be- 
 and of the longed to the crown of Portugal, quickly followed the 
 colonies, example of the mother country ; nor did Philip find 
 employment for his arms in any part of the Portuguese domi- 
 nions but the Azores, where Antonio’s agents had persuaded the 
 people to proclaim him king. Some troops which were sent 
 against them, under an officer of the name of Valdes, were 
 defeated by the governor of Angra. In the following year 
 Antonio obtained from the court of France a fleet of sixty ships, 
 with about six thousand troops, which he landed on one of the 
 isles called St. Michael ; but the marquis of Santa Croce coming 
 upon him with a fleet and army much superior to his, obtained a 
 decisive victory over the French both by sea and land, and after- 
 wards reduced all the inhabitants to a state of entire subjection 
 and obedience f . 
 
 The success of Philip’s arms, and the great accession of domi- 
 nion which he had thereby acquired, occasioned much anxiety to 
 the neighbouring powers ; and excited in the Dutch and Flemings 
 the most alarming apprehensions. They had with infinite diffi- 
 culty withstood his efforts, while he was employed in the pursuit 
 of that plan of conquest which he had now carried into execution ; 
 and they seemed, at this time, to have much greater reason than 
 ever to dread that they should soon be obliged to submit to 
 whatever terms of peace he should be pleased to prescribe. Yet, 
 
 f Antonio escaped, and once more returned to France ; and the marquis de Santa Croce 
 treated all his French prisoners as pirates, because war had not been declared between 
 France and Spain. 
 
346 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVI. 
 
 as will appear from the sequel, Philip’s acquisition of the Portu- 
 guese dominions in India served rather to expose him to the 
 assaults of his revolted subjects, than to furnish him with the 
 means of subduing them, and contributed more than any other 
 event to that wealth and greatness which they afterwards 
 attained 5 . 
 
 & Thuani Hist, sui temp. an. 1579-80. Cabrera, lib. xiii. Ferreras, part xv. &c. 
 
580.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 347 
 
 BOOK XVII. 
 
 While Philip’s arms were employed in subduing the Portu- 
 State of g uese > the prince of Parma had little room for the 
 affairs in exertion of that activity and enterprise, by which his 
 the Ne- character was so eminently distinguished. Having, 
 therknds. accor di n g hi s j a ^ e agreement with the southern pro- 
 vinces, dismissed his Spanish and Italian forces, he had thereby 
 weakened his army so much as to render it unable to keep the 
 field. The States of these provinces had laboured in vain to 
 fulfil their part of the agreement. Their finances were exhausted, 
 all their levies were carried on slowly, and their cavalry were so 
 few in number, that they had been obliged to consent that Far- 
 nese should retain some of the foreign horse for his body-guard. 
 
 It was fortunate for him, that at this juncture the confederates 
 were in a similar state of weakness. After the departure of their 
 auxiliaries, only a small number of troops remained ; and after 
 the revolt of so many of the nobility, and the death of the count 
 de Bossut, which happened about this time, there was scarcely 
 a single officer, a native of the Netherlands, whom they could 
 intrust with the chief command. Matthias, a young man of no 
 experience, bore the name, but was incapable of discharging the 
 duties of governor. The whole weight of the administration lay 
 upon the prince of Orange, who was involved in an endless maze 
 of the most intricate political negotiations ; and without his 
 continual presence, activity, and vigilance, the weak frame of the 
 confederacy would quickly have fallen to pieces. William was 
 therefore obliged to leave the direction of military affairs to the 
 count of Renneberg, La Noue, and Norris ; and although these 
 men were not deficient either in spirit and intrepidity, or in pru- 
 dence and good conduct, yet they neither had forces sufficient to 
 undertake any important enterprise, nor means to support such as 
 were under their command a . 
 
 The greatest part of Brabant and Flanders had acceded to 
 the union of Utrecht; but the strength of the confederacy was 
 not proportioned to its extent. The union of the several members 
 was not sufficiently compact, the administration was not properly 
 ascertained, and there was no common centre of power and 
 authority established. The troops were scattered in small bodies 
 throughout the provinces ; no adequate provision was made for 
 their pay; they lived at free quarters on the inhabitants ; and, as 
 
 a Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. 
 
348 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 luxury is the constant attendant of licentiousness, the country 
 was miserably oppressed and plundered, and the people reduced 
 to an incapacity of furnishing the necessary contributions and 
 supplies. In this situation many persons lamented that they 
 had not embraced the opportunity lately afforded them of making 
 their peace with the King ; and they began to accuse the prince 
 of Orange, who had advised them to reject the conditions that 
 had been offered, of having preferred his private interest to that 
 of the provinces. A spirit of discontent prevailed everywhere, 
 except in Holland and Zealand ; and it was generally believed, 
 that they must soon either maketheir peace with the king of 
 Spain, or elect some other sovereign able to deliver them from the 
 calamities with which they were overwhelmed. 
 
 The prince of Orange was at this time in Ghent, employed in 
 The causes quieting the disturbances above-mentioned. At the 
 of their dis- desire of the States he published a vindication of his 
 tress > conduct, together with his sentiments concerning the 
 causes of that distress in which the provinces were involved, and 
 the means of their deliverance. As what he said on this occa- 
 sion, and some weeks afterwards in the assembly of the States at 
 Antwerp, contains an interesting view of the situation of the 
 Netherlands at the present period, it will not be improper to 
 lay before the reader an abstract of the principal particulars. 
 
 He began with complaining of the injustice of those by whom 
 explained by he had been accused of having contributed to render 
 the prince ineffectual the late negotiation for peace at Cologne. 
 Orange. “ For no person in the Netherlands,” he said, “had 
 
 greater reason than himself to wish for peace, since, without it, he 
 could never hope to obtain either the liberty of his son, whom he 
 had not seen for many years, or the recovery of the many rich in- 
 heritances which he had lost, or the power of passing the remain- 
 der of his life, which now began to decline, free from labour and 
 anxiety. But while, for these reasons, joined with compassion 
 for the miseries of the people, no person could more ardently 
 desire to have an end put to the war, he could not help considering 
 war, with all its calamities, as infinitely preferable to the proffered 
 peace : by one article of which many hundred thousands of the 
 inhabitants would have been driven into exile ; and by another, 
 all who remained exposed to the cruelty of the Spaniards, without 
 any security either for their liberty or their lives, but the promises 
 of those by whom the most solemn oaths had been often violated. 
 These were not his sentiments only of the peace that had been 
 offered, but the sentiments likewise of the States, and of all the 
 sincere friends of their country ; nor could that detraction and 
 calumny in which many persons had of late indulged themselves, 
 be ascribed to any other cause but the secret machinations of 
 those who, from selfish views, were desirous of reducing the Ne- 
 therlands under the Spanish yoke. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 34 $ 
 
 1580 .] 
 
 “ There was much ground (he acknowledged) for complaining 
 of the irregularities of which the troops had been guilty in some 
 of the provinces ; but nothing could be more unjust than to throw 
 the blame on those who were intrusted with the reins of govern- 
 ment. The governors of States ought to be judged of sometimes 
 by the orders which they issued, and not by the success with 
 which their measures were accompanied ; for what could it avail 
 to interpose their authority, when they wanted power to enforce 
 obedience \ The disregard shown by many to the orders of the 
 States and council, was the principal source of the evils com- 
 plained of. In all the provinces, except Holland and Zealand, 
 there was scarcely a single town that would admit the garrison 
 appointed for its defence. To this was to be ascribed that faci- 
 lity with which the enemy had made themselves masters of Alost, 
 and other places ; and it was owing to the same cause, that the 
 troops were so much scattered throughout the provinces ; the 
 consequence of which was, that the inhabitants of the country 
 and of the open towns, suffering equally from the forces of the 
 States that lived at free quarters upon them, and from the incur - 
 sions of the enemy, were totally disabled from contributing their 
 share of the public expenses. Thus there was no fund sufficient 
 for the regular payment of the troops ; without which, it was in 
 vain to expect either that they could be kept under proper disci- 
 pline, or employed successfully in any important enterprise. 
 
 “ To remedy the abuses complained of, the most effectual 
 method was to place numerous garrisons in the frontier towns. 
 For if this were done, the great number of small garrisons would 
 become unnecessary ; and the interior parts of the provinces 
 being thereby delivered both from the oppressions of their friends 
 and the devastations of the enemy, the people would be more 
 able to furnish their proportion of the supplies, the troops would 
 be paid more regularly, and discipline more easily maintained. 
 
 “ The States ought not, however, to stop there, but to exert 
 themselves strenuously in drawing together such an army of 
 regular forces, as might face the enemy in the field, or at least 
 disturb and interrupt their operations. It was their want of 
 such an army that had occasioned the loss of Maestricht ; and, if 
 care were not taken to supply that want, there was ground to 
 apprehend, that the confederacy would soon be stripped of all the 
 towns in the inland provinces. But in order to carry this, or any 
 other expedient into execution, it was necessary that, instead of 
 suffering each town or province to dispose of its troops and con- 
 tributions as it thought fit, a senate or council should be esta- 
 blished, with authority to determine everything relative to the 
 application of the public funds and the conduct of the war. 
 
 “ He was far from intending that this council should be invested 
 with the power either of imposing taxes or of enacting laws. He 
 meant only that it should be empowered to levy such taxes as 
 
350 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 were imposed, and to execute such laws as were enacted by the 
 general States of the union. That it should not be subject to be 
 controlled by particular towns or provinces ; nor obliged, in apply- 
 ing the public money, distributing garrisons, and regulating the 
 motions of the troops, to have recourse, on every emergency, to 
 the States ; but should have such a degree of discretionary power 
 conferred upon it, as would enable it to seize the opportunities 
 of action when they offered, and to conduct the operations of the 
 war with secresy and despatch.” 
 
 Besides these and some other points of less importance, William 
 William ventured, both in the writing which he published, and 
 exhorts the afterwards in the assembly of the States, to explain his 
 rates to're- sentiments concerning another subject, which he had 
 nounce their long revolved, and concerning which he had sounded 
 allegiance. the inclinations of many of the deputies. Having, 
 before the present period, despaired that peace could ever be 
 restored between the King and the confederated provinces, he 
 exhorted the deputies to consider, whether they were not now in 
 a situation which required that, renouncing their allegiance to 
 Philip, they should transfer it to some other prince, who was 
 able and willing to defend them. 
 
 In the eyes of the greater part of Europe, this proposal ap- 
 peared in the highest degree audacious. Philip had, ever since 
 his accession, been considered as the most powerful prince of the 
 rT . age ; he had lately received an immense increase of 
 
 power by the acquisition of Portugal, and men could 
 not doubt that the revolted provinces must soon yield to his 
 superior arms, and bitterly repent of the offence which they had 
 given him. 
 
 Reasons however were not wanting to show, that the measure 
 proposed was the best which the people of the Netherlands could 
 embrace in their present circumstances. If they could have 
 entertained the prospect of obtaining peace on tolerable terms, 
 it might be difficult, perhaps, entirely to vindicate their conduct. 
 The evils which accompany a change of government are generally 
 so great, and the obligation to maintain the present so strong 
 and powerful, that nothing but the most urgent necessity can 
 ever justify a people for shaking off' their allegiance to their legal 
 prince. But, from the issue of the late negotiations at Cologne, 
 it was manifest, not only that Philip was unalterably fixed in his 
 purpose to govern the Netherlands with despotic authority, in 
 contradiction to their fundamental rights and laws ; but that the 
 utter extirpation of the Protestants, who were now become a 
 most considerable part of the people, was a condition, without 
 which he was determined never to be reconciled. Desolation 
 therefore, and slavery, must have been the certain consequences 
 of peace, and no greater evil could be apprehended from a con- 
 tinuance of the war. “ Even allowing,” said the prince of Orange, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 351 
 
 1580.] 
 
 in the assembly of the States, “ that the King should be persuaded, 
 by any mediating power, to grant us such conditions as our con- 
 sciences would suffer us to accept, yet what security can we obtain 
 for his fulfilling them l He has, before this time, been set at 
 liberty by the Pope from his most sacred obligations. It is an 
 established maxim of Philip and his counsellors, that with here- 
 tics, such as we are, no promises or oaths are binding. Although 
 he were of himself inclined to fulfil his engagements, yet the 
 Homan pontiff and the Spanish inquisitors would reclaim, and 
 soon persuade him to alter his intention. It has been said by 
 some (continued William), that he is a prince of a compassionate 
 disposition, and that we may safely rely upon his mercy. Of the 
 truth of this, we can best judge from what we have seen and 
 known. Do the deeds that have been perpetrated by his com- 
 mand in India, in Italy, or in Granada, authorise us to form this 
 favourable judgment of his character ? Has not every corner of 
 the Netherlands been overflowed with the blood of thousands of 
 our countrymen, barbarously butchered by his command ? Are 
 not all the neighbouring kingdoms filled with his subjects, who 
 have been driven from their native land, either to enrich the 
 countries that have afforded them protection, with our trade and 
 manufactures, or to drag out a miserable life in poverty and 
 exile \ W e know how grievously our late conduct has offended 
 him, and, from what we have seen on former occasions, we may 
 judge of the measure of his resentment. He may humble him- 
 self so far as to soothe us with the hopes of a more mild adminis- 
 tration ; but we should remember the discovery which we made 
 lately, when, by the letters that were intercepted, it appeared, 
 that, instead of the generous purposes that were pretended, 
 nothing was meant but to employ some of the provinces as instru- 
 ments of vengeance against the rest.” 
 
 Influenced by these considerations, which showed that Philip 
 Opposition had entirely lost the confidence as well as the affections 
 of the Ca- of his Flemish subjects, a great majority of the deputies 
 tliolxcs. were inclined to renounce his authority. Some of the 
 Catholic members, however, prompted partly by their political 
 principles, and partly by concern for the safety of their religion, 
 had the courage to remonstrate. They expatiated on the great- 
 ness of Philip’s power, and the danger to which the States would 
 expose themselves, by adding so great an affront to their former 
 provocations. And to their representations on this head they 
 subjoined, that they could not adopt the strong measure that 
 was proposed, consistently with their oath of allegiance ; since the 
 King was unquestionably their rightful sovereign, they had all 
 solemnly recognised his right ; and the provinces were his inherit- 
 ance, which he had derived from a long uninterrupted line of 
 illustrious ancestors b . 
 
 b Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. 
 
352 
 
 HISTORY OP THE REIGN OP 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 But this reasoning had no weight with the prince of Orange, 
 St. Aldegonde, and the other leaders of the Protestants. They 
 considered the breach between Philip and the confederated pro- 
 vinces as irreparable ; and knew that, long before the present 
 period, he was animated against them with the most implacable 
 resentment. “ It was too late,” they said, “to talk of keeping 
 measures with the King ; and no part remained to be espoused, 
 but to provide against the effects of his displeasure. Nor was 
 there the smallest reason for those scruples by which the Catho- 
 lic members were disturbed, either with regard to the lawfulness, 
 or the expediency of renouncing their allegiance. Kings were 
 invested with authority, not for their own sakes, but for the 
 interest of the people whom they were appointed to govern. If 
 the rights of princes were to be investigated, they would be found, 
 in most of the kingdoms in Europe, to have been derived from 
 the will of their subjects, who, grown impatient under the injuries 
 of former princes, had taken from them , and given to their suc- 
 cessors, what they had an undoubted right to bestow. A prince 
 was indeed superior to each individual in a State ; but neither 
 his interest nor his pleasure was to be put in the balance with the 
 security and happiness of the whole. On the contrary, he might 
 be judged, and even punished, for his abuse of power, by the 
 supreme council of the nation. If this truth were doubted of in 
 other places, it could not be controverted in the Netherlands ; 
 where, till lately, both the name of king, and the measure of 
 obedience which kings commonly require, were utterly unknown. 
 In the Netherlands the engagements between the prince and the 
 people were strictly mutual ; and in engagements of this sort, it 
 was a clear and universal maxim, that the infidelity of either of 
 the two contracting parties absolves the other from the sacred 
 obligation c .” t 
 
 The Protestant members, in comparison with whom the 
 Deliberations Catholics were few in number, being thus confirmed 
 about electing in their purpose of abjuring the dominion of Philip, 
 another sove- the assembly proceeded next to consider, whether 
 reign - they should substitute another sovereign in his place, 
 
 or establish a republican government, upon the plan of that 
 confederacy which was already formed. The latter of these 
 measures would have been embraced by all the deputies ; by 
 the Protestants, from the conformity between the principles of 
 a commonwealth and those of their religion ; and by the 
 Catholics, from their persuasion that such a government would 
 neither be so highly affronting to the King, nor so effectually 
 preclude the hopes of a future reconcilement. But the present 
 feeble state of the United Provinces obliged them to sacrifice their 
 inclination to their preservation and security. From the repre- 
 sentation which the prince of Orange made of the disorders that 
 
 c Mcteren, lib. x. and Grotius, p. 70. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1580.] 
 
 353 
 
 prevailed, together with the view which he exhibited of their 
 strength and resources, they were convinced, that however 
 strenuously they might exert themselves, they would be able to 
 wage only a tedious defensive war ; by which their strength 
 would be gradually wasted, till they were at last compelled to 
 accept of such terms of peace as the King should be pleased to 
 prescribe. To have recourse, therefore, to the assistance of 
 some foreign prince, seemed not only expedient, but necessary ; 
 and to engage the prince of whom they should make choice to 
 espouse their cause with greater zeal and sincerity than they had 
 hitherto experienced in their allies, they resolved to confer upon 
 him the sovereignty of the provinces, with all the prerogatives 
 which had been enjoyed by the princes of the house of Bur- 
 gundy. 
 
 Nothing now remained but to fix upon the person to whom 
 Motives for the offer of this high dignity should be made. The 
 choosing the prince of Orange, having beforehand sounded the incli- 
 ne of nations of the Emperor and other German princes, had 
 Anjou. found them utterly averse to taking any concern in the 
 affairs of the Netherlands. The queen of England and the duke 
 of Anjou, brother to the king of France, were the only princes 
 at that time in Europe between whom the States thought there 
 was ground to hesitate ; and they were determined to concur in 
 giving the preference to Anjou, by the prince of Orange ; who, 
 besides representing to them the necessity of electing a sovereign 
 who would reside in the country, informed them that their 
 making choice of the duke would be highly acceptable to the 
 queen. “ For she had writ to him on the subject, and given 
 him assurances of granting the States her assistance, in case the 
 sovereignty were conferred on one with whom she had so much 
 reason to expect to live on amicable terms d .” 
 
 From this it should seem, that William had offered to employ 
 his influence in favour of Elizabeth; and it may be presumed, 
 that unless he had found her averse to his proposal, neither he 
 nor the other Protestant leaders would have been inclined to give 
 the preference to Anjou. Very different motives indeed were 
 assigned for the prince’s conduct by his enemies. His princi- 
 pality of Orange, they observed, lay in the centre of France. 
 He had lately married Charlotte de Bourbon, of the blood-royal 
 of that kingdom e . For many years he had maintained an inti- 
 mate correspondence with the leaders of the Hugonots ; and he 
 flattered himself with the hopes of enjoying the entire direction 
 of the duke of Anjou, a weak prince, who would probably be 
 more attentive to his pleasures than to the affairs of government. 
 These interested considerations, it is likely, were not entirely 
 without their influence ; but the other circumstance above men- 
 tioned seems to afford a still more satisfactory account, since 
 
 d Meteren, lib. x. 
 
 e Daughter of the duke de Montpelier. 
 
354 HISTORY OF THE RfilGN OF [Book XVII, 
 
 there was in reality no room for hesitation between Elizabeth 
 and Anjou ; and Elizabeth, as will appear in the sequel, would 
 certainly have rejected the sovereignty, in case an offer of it had 
 been made to her. This politic princess expected to derive 
 advantage from that animosity which the election of Anjou was 
 likely to produce between the courts of France and Spain. And 
 the prince of Orange knew, that as it would be easier to reconcile 
 the Catholics in the U nited Provinces to the election of a prince 
 of the same religion with themselves, than to that of a Protestant, 
 so, without making such a choice, there was little probability 
 that he should ever prevail on the Walloons to accede to the con- 
 federacy. Whatever were William’s motives, a great majority 
 of the deputies entered readily into his opinion, and they would 
 have proceeded instantly to the election, had it not been deemed 
 a matter of too much consequence to be decided without con- 
 sul tin £ their constituents. 
 
 © 
 
 In the mean time the operations of the war were not wholly 
 La Noue discontinued, although neither of the two contending 
 taken parties was in a condition at this period to make any 
 prisoner. g Tea ^ or vigorous exertion. By means of a stratagem 
 conducted by Count Egmont, Farnese acquired possession of 
 Courtray in Flanders, as he did by the like means of some other 
 places. On the other hand, Count Egmont and his brother 
 were taken prisoners by La Noue, in the town of Ninove ; and 
 not long afterwards La Noue himself lost his liberty. This gal- 
 lant officer having been attacked unexpectedly by the marquis 
 de lioubais, commander-in-chief of the Walloon forces, was over- 
 powered by numbers, and obliged, through the disadvantage of 
 his ground, to surrender himself a prisoner of war. The States 
 were sensibly affected by the loss of a person of such uncommon 
 abilities, and they offered to give in exchange for him Count 
 Egmont and the baron de Selles, who had been taken prisoner 
 at Bouchain. But the prince of Parma refused to consent to 
 this exchange, saying, that he would never agree to give one lion 
 for two sheep. La Noue was conducted to the castle of Lim- 
 burg, where he remained long ; and, during his confinement, 
 employed himself in writing those military and political discourses 
 which were afterwards published, and much admired by his 
 contemporaries. Count Egmont’s relations, and those of de Selles, 
 solicited PJiilip with great importunity to consent to the exchange 
 proposed ; but this prince, who never hearkened to the voice of 
 gratitude or compassion where his interest interfered, declined 
 complying with their request ; and, rather than yield to the 
 enemy so great an advantage as the recovery of La Noue, he 
 chose to leave his friends to languish in prison for several years. 
 
 These two noblemen bore this indignity with extreme impa- 
 tience. De Selles, conscious of having exerted himself with the 
 most fervent zeal in detaching the Walloons from the revolted 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1.580.] 
 
 3.5.5 
 
 provinces, fell a sacrifice to the indignation and chagrin which 
 the King’s ingratitude and his own unfortunate situation were 
 calculated to inspire. The same causes produced a different but 
 no less melancholy effect on Count Egmont, whom they deprived 
 of the use of his understanding. Through the tender assiduous 
 care of his sister, whom the States permitted to attend him, he 
 recovered from this distress. But Philip still declined consent- 
 ing to the exchange till the year 1584, when La Noue engaged 
 in the strictest manner never to bear arms against him in the 
 Netherlands ; and the king of Navarre, the duke of Lorrain, 
 and others, became sureties for his fulfilling this engagement. 
 It is difficult to determine whether Philip’s conduct afforded on 
 this occasion a more striking proof of pusillanimity or ingrati- 
 tude, while no stronger testimony could have been given of the 
 extraordinary merit of La Noue, and the dread which his enemies 
 entertained of his abilities f . 
 
 About the time when La Noue was taken prisoner, the con- 
 JDefection of federacy sustained another loss by the defection of 
 Count Ren. Count Renneberg. This young nobleman having been 
 neberg. appointed governor of Friesland by the States, had 
 subdued the cities of Deventer and Groningen, besides several 
 other places of considerable consequence ; and his zeal and ser- 
 vices were the more highly valued, as all his relations adhered 
 to the Spanish interest, and he himself was of the Catholic per- 
 suasion. But these circumstances, which gave him so much 
 merit in the eyes of his countrymen, were the means by which 
 he was enticed to abandon the cause which he had hitherto so 
 illustriously supported. The prince of Parma readily perceived 
 the advantage which they afforded for gaining him over from 
 the confederates ; and, with this view, he employed the count’s 
 sister and her husband, the baron de Monceaux, to offer him the 
 following terms of accommodation : that he should be confirmed 
 in the government of Friesland, and have that of Overyssel 
 annexed to it ; that twenty thousand crowns should be immedi- 
 ately paid him, besides an annual pension of twenty thousand 
 florins ; that a town, of which he was feudal superior, should be 
 erected into a marquisate ; and that he should have two regi- 
 ments of troops to be distributed throughout his governments, in 
 whatever stations he should think fit. Besides these enticements, 
 another object was held forth to him, more tempting perhaps 
 than any of the rest ; he was flattered with the hopes of obtain- 
 ing in marriage the countess of Megen, of whom he was greatly 
 enamoured, and who possessed one of the richest fortunes in the 
 Netherlands. His religious principles conspired with these allure- 
 ments, and made him lend an open ear to his sister’s repeated 
 representations of the danger to which the Catholic faith was 
 exposed, and of the designs formed by the prince of Orange for 
 
 f Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. i. Reidanus, lib. ii. p. 3 9[; and Meteren. 
 A A 2 
 
356 * 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 its destruction. He hesitated, however, for some time, and 
 trembled at the thoughts of the infamy in which he was about 
 to be involved ; but at last he consented to accept of the terms 
 proposed, resolving to conceal his having done so, till he should 
 take proper measures for delivering the towns and forts into the 
 hands of the Spaniards. 
 
 His design could not entirely escape the penetrating eye of 
 the prince of Orange. Various circumstances concurred to alarm 
 William’s apprehensions, and make him resolve without delay 
 to prevent, if possible, the fatal effects of the count’s intended 
 treachery. He instantly went into Friesland, under the pretence 
 of quelling some disturbances in that country, and ordered some 
 officers to draw their troops together, and lead them against 
 Lewarden, Harlingen, and Staveren. These orders were exe- 
 cuted with secrecy and despatch, and all the three places were 
 wrested out of the hands of those to whom Count Renneberg 
 committed them. 
 
 The count, who resided at this time in Groningen, was thun- 
 derstruck when he received intelligence of this disaster, which at 
 once showed him that his perfidy was detected, and put it in a 
 great measure out of his power to fulfil his engagements to the 
 prince of Parma. Still, however, he was either not prepared, or 
 he had not courage, to throw off the mask. He complained 
 loudly of the affront that had been offered him, and of the ingra- 
 titude with which his services had been repaid. Among the 
 officers who beheld his confusion on this occasion, there were 
 two to whom, as he knew their fidelity to the States to be invio- 
 lable, he had not communicated his designs. These men, think- 
 ing it still practicable to preserve him in his duty, exhorted him 
 to go immediately to the prince of Orange, in order to clear 
 himself from the suspicions which were entertained against him. 
 “ This is the only expedient in your power , 11 said one of them, 
 “ if you are conscious of innocence ; nor can I doubt that you 
 are, when I consider that by persisting to act the part which 
 your duty and honour require, you must promote your interest 
 more effectually than by violating these sacred obligations, and 
 involving your name in perpetual infamy . 11 Renneberg listened 
 attentively to this discourse, changed colour frequently, and at 
 last burst into tears. He repeated his complaints of the treat- 
 ment which he had met with, but he would not explain his inten- 
 tions, nor follow the counsel that was given him. The two officers 
 then left him ; and after acquainting the chief magistrate of what 
 had passed, they withdrew privately from the city. 
 
 By a popular and insinuating behaviour, accompanied with 
 strong asseverations of the falsehood of the reports which had 
 been propagated, Renneberg laid asleep the suspicions both of 
 the magistrates and the people, till the plot which he had formed 
 was ripe for execution. Having brought in secretly a body of 
 
1580.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 357 
 
 troops, which ho concealed in the palace, and put arms into the 
 hands of his domestics ; with these, and the Catholic inhabitants 
 devoted to the Spanish interest, he overpowered the garrison ; 
 and having thus made himself master of the town, he proclaimed 
 himself governor, in the name of Philip, and then mounted the 
 fortifications with the troops which he had introduced. 
 
 But he did not long enjoy any of the advantages which he 
 Kenneberg’s expected to derive from his revolt, and some of them 
 remorse and he never attained. The money promised him was 
 deatfi. never paid, and the countess of Megen was given in 
 marriage to another. His health being impaired by the fatigues 
 which he had undergone in his military enterprises, the remem- 
 brance of his treachery filled his mind with anguish and remorse, 
 which preyed upon his sickly frame, and carried him off in the 
 prime of his age, lamented even by those whom he had betrayed, 
 who felt for his misfortunes, on account of his many amiable ac- 
 complishments g . 
 
 The losses which the confederacy suffered from La Noue’s 
 Election imprisonment, and the infidelity of Benneberg, served 
 of Anjou. on jy confirm them in their resolution of conferring the 
 sovereignty on some foreign prince ; and the reasons above 
 mentioned, joined to the influence of the prince of Orange, 
 determined the States of the several provinces and towns to give 
 the preference to the duke of Anjou. The election was made 
 accordingly in due form by the General States, and a solemn 
 embassy sent to give intimation of it to the duke, 'who readily 
 accepted the offer, and consented to all the conditions that were 
 required. They were contained in a treaty signed by him and 
 the ambassadors of the States at Plessis-les-Tours, on the 29th of 
 September ; and the principal articles were those which follow : 
 The condi- That the States of the United Provinces having elected 
 tious of it. Francis de Valois, duke of Alen^on and Anjou, for 
 their sovereign, did thereby confer upon him all the titles and 
 prerogatives which their former princes had enjoyed. That in 
 case the duke should die without issue, the States might elect 
 another sovereign, and that the Netherlands should in no event 
 be annexed to the crown of France. That in case the duke 
 should die leaving several sons behind him, the States should 
 have power to determine which of them should succeed him in 
 his sovereignty ; and that if the prince whom they should make 
 choice of were under age, they might assume the government 
 into their own hands till he should arrive at the age of twenty. 
 That the duke should maintain inviolate all the rights and 
 privileges of the people ; that he should summon the general 
 assembly of the States to meet at least once a year ; and that, if 
 he should fail to issue letters of convocation, they should them- 
 selves have power, agreeably to ancient form and custom, to meet 
 
 * Grotius and Metcrcn. 
 
35 a 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 together as often as they should judge expedient. That the duke 
 should fix his residence in the Low Countries ; but if his affairs 
 should, on any occasion, call him thence, he should nominate for 
 governor some nobleman, a native of the Netherlands, with the 
 consent and approbation of the States. That all his counsellors 
 should be natives of the provinces, except two or three of the 
 French nation, who might be admitted into the council, provided 
 the States should give their consent. That he should make no 
 innovation in religion, but afford his protection equally to the 
 Protestants and Catholics. That Holland and Zealand should, 
 both in respect of government and religion, remain in then- 
 present state, being obliged, however, to contribute their pro- 
 portion of the supplies requisite for the support of the con- 
 federacy. That the duke should spare no pains to engage 
 his brother the king of France to assist him in carrying on the 
 war ; that he should accede to all the treaties that subsist 
 between the States and foreign powers, and should not himself 
 form any new alliance without their consent. That all foreign 
 soldiers should be dismissed on the first requisition of the States: 
 And lastly, That if the duke should fail in performing any of the 
 foregoing conditions, his right to the sovereignty should cease, 
 and the Provinces be no longer bound to yield obedience to his 
 authority. 1 ’ 
 
 As this treaty was negotiated in France, Philip complained to 
 Henry of the breach of friendship in permitting it ; and Henry 
 affected to be much offended with his brother’s conduct, but in 
 reality did not feel the displeasure which he pretended. On the 
 contrary, he secretly rejoiced in the prospect of being delivered 
 from a brother, whose levity and caprice had given him much 
 inquietude ; and it is said, lie assured the States privately, that 
 lie would send them either troops or money, as soon as the 
 troubles of his kingdom were composed. 
 
 But whatever reason Philip had to be offended with the 
 Philip’s pro- French monarch, he was much more highly incensed 
 scription of the against the prince of Orange, whom he considered as 
 the prince of the contriver, as well as the chief promoter, of the 
 ° lallge ' revolution that had taken place. Having oftener than 
 once attempted, by negotiation and artifice, to free himself from an 
 enemy, who had furnished employment to his ablest generals and 
 best-disciplined forces for so many years, he had recourse, on 
 this occasion, to the ignoble expedient of exciting some wretch 
 or desperado to make an attempt upon his life. For this pur- 
 pose he published an edict of proscription against him, in which 
 he accused him of having excited and fomented that spirit of 
 discord, which had proved the source of so much misery to the 
 Netherlands; interdicted all the subjects of the crown of Spain 
 from holding communication with him, and from supplying him 
 with bread, or drink, or lire ; and offered to any person, who 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1580 .] 
 
 .359 
 
 should deliver him dead or alive, or take away his life, the sum 
 of twenty-five thousand crowns, besides making him and his 
 associates noble, if they were not already noble, and granting 
 them a full pardon of all crimes, however enormous, of which 
 they had been guilty. 
 
 This practice of commanding assassination, almost unheard of 
 since the days of the Roman triumvirate, was suitable to the dark, 
 revengeful, and ungenerous nature of Philip. The prince of 
 Orange could have retaliated the injury ; but he scorned so 
 ignoble a revenge, and chose rather to rest his defence on an 
 appeal to the world for his integrity. 
 
 His Vindication and Apology, addressed to the assembly of the 
 States, and of which he sent copies to the several courts in Europe, 
 is one of the most precious monuments in history. It contains 
 His A oio° an i n teresting elation of many particulars, which throw 
 1S poog} ‘ light, not only on William’s own character and that 
 of Philip, but likewise on the characters of several of the other 
 principal actors in the Netherlands. The author has, in some 
 parts of it, indulged himself in the language of keen resentment, 
 and ventured to assert boldly several facts, of which the contem- 
 porary historians have spoken with reserve. Some allowance 
 perhaps must be made for that just indignation with which he 
 was inflamed ; but when it is considered, that no person had 
 better access to information ; that no prince possessed a higher 
 character for sincerity and truth, having never, in a single 
 instance, been convicted by his numerous enemies of insincerity 
 and falsehood ; that the relation of the facts which he asserts 
 was published at the time when they are said to have happened, 
 and when it was easy for the persons accused, if accused unjustly, 
 to have confuted him ; that their interest and honour called 
 loudly for a confutation ; and yet, that no such confutation, nor 
 any vindication of their characters, which had been arraigned as 
 odious at the bar of the universe, was ever attempted ; when all 
 these circumstances are duly considered, there does not appear 
 any sufficient reason for calling in question the facts contained in 
 this Apology, although some of them are of such a nature as to 
 require the strongest evidence to justify the reader for yielding 
 his assent 11 . 
 
 The conduct of the confederated States on this occasion was 
 Adopted by such as William had reason to expect. After em- 
 the States, ploying several days in examining his Apology, they 
 voted him an affectionate address, in which they attested the 
 falsehood of those imputations on which Philip had founded his 
 proscription. They declared, that as the prince had been 
 regularly elected into the several offices which he held, so he had 
 never accepted of any office but in consequence of their most 
 earnest entreaties. They prayed him still to exercise the authority 
 
 ll An abstract of bis Apology is subjoined to the conclusion of this work. 
 
360 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVII. 
 
 with which they had invested him, expressed their gratitude for 
 his many eminent services to the commonwealth, and promised 
 to yield a ready and cheerful obedience to his commands. They 
 Dec ] 7 concluded with expressing their anxiety for his life, and 
 made him an offer of maintaining a company of horse- 
 guards, of which they entreated him to accept, being persuaded 
 that on his preservation their own security depended. 
 
 In a few days afterwards they gave, him another proof of that 
 Solemn renun- zea l an d sincerity with which they had espoused his 
 ciatj^n of their cause. Their election of the duke of Anjou was a 
 allegiance to virtual renunciation of their allegiance to their former 
 1 lulip ’ sovereign ; yet all public acts ran as before in the 
 name of Philip and that of the States ; the oath administered to 
 persons entering upon public offices had not been altered, and 
 the people in some of those cities in the confederacy, which had 
 consented to Anjou’s election, were extremely averse to alter it, 
 from that attachment which men often discover to exterior forms, 
 even after the institutions on w r hich they were originally founded 
 have been abolished ; but the States, sensible at last of the 
 incongruity between these forms and the steps which they had 
 lately taken, and apprehensive of danger from leaving it in any 
 respect ambiguous to whom the people owed their allegiance, 
 agreed now to remove all ground of ambiguity by a solemn 
 abjuration of Philip as their sovereign. 
 
 An act of abjuration was accordingly passed, with great 
 unanimity, in an assembly held on purpose at the Hague, con- 
 sisting of deputies from Brabant, Guelderland, Zutphen, Flan- 
 ders, Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, Overyssel, and Friesland. 
 In this act, after enumerating the principal grievances which 
 had prompted them to form their present resolution, they de- 
 . dared it to be a right inherent in every free people, to withdraw 
 their allegiance from a prince who obstinately refuses to fulfil the 
 duty whieh he owes them ; and much more from one who violates 
 the fundamental laws, and acts the part of a tyrant and oppres- 
 sor. They pronounced Philip to have forfeited for ever all 
 authority in the Netherlands. They forbade all judges and 
 others to use his name, arms, or seal; and they required the 
 magistrates of towns, and all other persons in public offices, to 
 bind themselves by an oath to oppose him and his adherents to 
 the utmost of their power. 
 
 These resolutions were carried into immediate execution. All 
 Philip’s seals were broken, all commissions and letters patent in 
 his name were cancelled, and the new oath was administered to 
 every person who possessed any civil or military employment. 
 It was not without difficulty that the magistrates in somo towns 
 were persuaded to take this oath. Some remaining scruples of 
 conscience, arising from a regard to their former oaths, gave un- 
 easiness to several ; and others doubted of the expediency of so 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1531.] 
 
 3G3 
 
 strong a measure at the present crisis, on account of the ships 
 and merchandise belonging to the people of the Netherlands, 
 which were in the ports of Spain. But no pains were spared to 
 remove these objections, and at last almost the whole inhabitants 
 of the above-mentioned provinces entered into the views of the 
 States, and took the oath that was prescribed them 1 . 
 
 About this time Matthias left the Netherlands, after having 
 Departure resided there between three and four years, without 
 of .Matthias. h av ing acquired either reputation to himself, or any 
 advantage to the people whom he had been called to govern. 
 He had employed all his influence to persuade the States to 
 make choice of him for their sovereign ; but the motives above 
 explained having determined them to give the preference to the 
 duke of Anjou, it should seem that the prince of Orange had 
 been able to satisfy Matthias as to the necessity of that measure, 
 since he remained in the country for a considerable time after- 
 wards, and accepted of an annual pension of fifty thousand guil- 
 ders from the States k . 
 
 During the course of these civil and political transactions, the 
 troops were not wholly unemployed. In Friesland, the king’s 
 forces were commanded by Schinch and V erdugo, between whom 
 and Colonel Norris and Count Hohenloe several sharp encounters 
 passed, with various success ; but the only important event which 
 happened at this time in the northern provinces, was the acquisi- 
 tion of Breda, into which the Spaniards were treacherously ad- 
 mitted in the night by some of the garrison, whom the agents of 
 the prince of Parma had found means to corrupt 1 . 
 
 The prince himself was, in the mean time, intent on the reduc- 
 tion of Cambray. But not having a sufficient number of troops to 
 carry on the siege with vigour, he was obliged to convert it into 
 a blockade. D’lnclii, the governor, had recourse for relief to the 
 duke of Anjou, and was warmly seconded in his application by 
 the States and the prince of Orange. Anjou perceiving how 
 deeply his honour was concerned to gratify this first desire of his 
 new subjects, published at the court of France his intention of 
 attempting to raise the siege. This was no sooner known, than 
 a great number of the nobility flocked from all parts of the king- 
 dom to his standard. With their assistance, he collected in a 
 'few days an army of near twelve thousand foot and four thousand 
 horse, and marched directly towards Cambray. The prince of 
 
 1 Upon a representation of the prince of Orange, the States formed at this time several 
 useful regulations relative to the administration of justice, to the finances, and the troops. 
 That Council of State likewise was established, of the necessity of which William had 
 laboured to convince them, which was instituted partly to remedy the inconveniences arising 
 from the slowness with which the deliberations of the States were unavoidably conducted, 
 and partly to serve as a check upon the future sovereign. Grotius An. lib. iii. Meteren, &c. 
 
 k Matthias had afterwards a better fortune. His brother resigned to him the kingdom 
 of Hungary in 1608, and that of Bohemia in 1611, and the year following he obtained the 
 imperial crown. Strada, lib. vii. Meteren, p. 317. 
 
 1 Meteren, p. 313. 
 
362 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVII. 
 
 Parma, too prudent to contend with an army, which, besides 
 being greatly superior to his own in number, was conducted by a 
 brave and warlike nobility, quitted his intrenehments and retired. 
 In this manner was Cambray delivered, after it had been block- 
 aded for several months, during which the inhabitants had been 
 reduced to great distress. Anjou having brought along with him 
 an ample supply of provisions, it was immediately introduced ; 
 and soon after, he made a magnificent entry into the city, 
 amidst the applauses of the people, who saluted him the Protec- 
 tor of their Liberty. He then laid siege to Chateau-Cambresis, 
 and quickly compelled the garrison to surrender 10 . 
 
 This success which attended Anjou's first enterprise, afforded 
 inexpressible pleasure to the confederate provinces, and served 
 to heighten their expectations of his future government. He 
 was earnestly entreated by the States to improve the present 
 opportunity, and to advance with his army towards Flanders. 
 But it was not in his power, he told them, to comply with their 
 request. All his troops but a few were volunteers, who had 
 engaged in his service only for a short time, and for the single 
 purpose of the relief of Cambray. He could not prevail upon 
 them to remain with him much longer ; and he had not yet pro- 
 vided money for their pay. But he hoped to return soon with a 
 powerful army ; and he would in the mean time employ his utmost 
 influence #to interest his brother and the queen of England in 
 their cause. 
 
 There were not wanting powerful motives to induce the French 
 Anjou soli- king to grant Anjou that assistance for which he now 
 cits aid from applied ; since, besides being delivered from the fickle 
 ins brother. reg ^i esg spirit of a brother, who had greatly increased 
 th’e troubles of his reign, he would have thereby avenged himself 
 of Philip, who had secretly undertaken the protection of the 
 Catholic league, which, as will be afterwards related, had been 
 lately formed by the duke of Guise, on pretence of providing for 
 the security of the Catholic religion, but in reality to control 
 the sovereign's authority. But Henry was not in a condition at 
 this time to make an open breach with Philip. By his indolence 
 and voluptuousness, added to the numberless calamities in which 
 his kingdom was involved, his finances were exceedingly reduced ; 
 and the king of Navarre on the one hand, and the duke of Guise 
 on the other, furnished more than sufficient employment to all 
 the policy and power which he possessed. Promises therefore of 
 future aid were all that Anjou could obtain from him, and his 
 disappointment determined the duke to set out immediately for 
 England, where it should seem he had better ground to hope for 
 assistance than in his native country. 
 
 Elizabeth had for some time past appeared to lend a favour- 
 able ear to a proposal of marriage which he had made to her ; 
 
 1,1 Meteren, p. 315. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. ii. 
 
1581.] PHILIP II. KING OP SPAIN. 3G.I 
 
 and his expectations were at present raised to the greatest height. 
 On his arrival in England, she gave him the most gracious recep- 
 tion. Soon afterwards, he ordered the ministers to prepare the 
 marriage contract ; and in the presence of many spectators, after 
 a long discourse with him apart, she took a ring from her own 
 finger, and put it upon his ; which both the spectators and the 
 duke interpreted as a declaration of her consent. It is impos- 
 sible to believe, with some historians, that Elizabeth meant only 
 to amuse Anjou, and thereby to advance some political design. 
 It is inconceivable how any design whatever could be promoted 
 by carrying her dissimulation to so great a length. This wise 
 princess, notwithstanding the many extraordinary accomplish- 
 ments which adorned her character, was not exempt from the 
 weaknesses that are peculiarly incident to her sex. Flattered 
 by the court which Anjou had long assiduously paid her, she 
 appears to have entertained the most partial sentiments of affec- 
 tion towards him, and seriously to have intended to listen to his 
 proposal. But at last her prudence, her ambition, and that love 
 of independence which she had cherished through her whole life, 
 prevailed over the temporary passion into which she had been 
 betrayed. She made an apology to Anjou for her change of 
 resolution, and gave him the strongest assurances of assistance 
 and support in his new dominions. The marriage was no more 
 mentioned, and the duke, after a stay of three months in Eng- 
 land, set sail for the Low Countries; escorted by a fleet, on 
 board which there was a great number of nobility and gentry, 
 whom the queen had desired to attend him, as a proof to his new 
 subjects, that although the intended marriage had not taken 
 place, yet she was deeply interested in his prosperity. 
 
364 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 BOOK XVIII. 
 
 After a passage of three days, the duke of Anjou landed on the 
 A nj ou’s ar- tenth of F ebruary at Flushing. F rom Flushing he went 
 rival in the to Middleburgh, and was conducted from thence 
 Netherlands. ^ a fl ee £ Q f fifty ships of war to Antwerp. The banks 
 of the Scheld, the entrance into the towrn, and the streets which led 
 to the palace, were lined by the citizens, to the number of twenty 
 thousand in arms ; and no expense was saved, which a wealthy 
 commercial city could afford, to express their attachment and 
 respect. After having taken the usual oath to maintain their 
 rights and privileges, he received from the States the oath of 
 allegiance ; and then entered upon the sovereignty, while all 
 around him wore the face of happiness and joy. 
 
 In Antwerp, the public exercise of the Catholic religion had for 
 158 . 2 some time past been prohibited. But now, in order to 
 gratify the new sovereign, it was permitted in one of the 
 churches ; and all Catholics were allowed to worship there, accord- 
 ing to the rites of their religion, upon condition that they should 
 abjure the king of Spain, and swear allegiance to the duke. A 
 few persons only accepted of this indulgence, while the greater 
 part chose rather to forego the privilege held forth to them, than 
 so solemnly renounce their former sovereign. On this occasion 
 the States, as well as the duke, were not a little alarmed : and 
 thought it necessary without delay to provide against the danger 
 that might arise from persons who gave so clear a discovery of 
 their disaffection to the present establishment. They first pub- 
 lished one edict, imposing a fine of two hundred guilders on those 
 who should decline taking the oaths ; and soon afterwards another, 
 by which the recusants were banished from the Netherlands 41 . 
 
 In the midst of these transactions, that joy which Anjou's 
 Attempt to arr i va l had diffused throughout the provinces was inter- 
 assassinate rupted, by an attempt which was made not many days 
 the prince after his inauguration, upon the life of the prince of 
 of Orange. Q ran g e> The design was first conceived in Spain, 
 by a man of the name of Isonca ; and it was suggested by him 
 to Gaspar Anastro, a Spanish banker in Antwerp, of ruined 
 circumstances, as an expedient for retrieving his affairs. To 
 induce Anastro to undertake the execution of the bloody purpose, 
 Isonca sent him a sign-manual of the king, in which Philip en- 
 gaged to pay him eighty thousand ducats as soon as the assassi- 
 
 a Meteren, p. 325. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1582.] 
 
 365 
 
 nation should be perpetrated. Anastro had not courage himself* 
 to execute so bold and desperate an enterprise, and therefore he 
 communicated Isonca’s proposal to John Jauregui, a menial 
 servant in his family, a young Biscayan, of a thoughtful melan- 
 choly disposition, whom he knew to be both trusty and audacious. 
 With this young man Anastro found there was little need for 
 persuasion. “ I am ready,” ^aid he, “ to perform instantly what 
 the King so earnestly desires. I despise equally the proffered 
 reward, and the danger to which I shall be exposed ; for I know 
 that I shall die. I only ask that you will assist me with your 
 prayers to God, and employ your interest with the King to provide 
 for my father in his old days.” J auregui was the better qualified 
 to succeed in his design, as he spoke the German language fluently,, 
 and was in no danger of being known to be a Spaniard. He was 
 confirmed in his purpose by a priest of the name of Timmerman ; 
 from whom he received absolution of his sins, and the strongest 
 assurances, that by putting to death so great a heretic as the 
 prince of Orange, he w ould infallibly secure the favour of God and 
 everlasting happiness. 
 
 Under a full conviction of the truth of what the priest had 
 declared, this deluded wretch set out for the castle, and having 
 taken his station near the door of the apartment in which tho 
 prince had dined, he watched the opportunity of his coming out ; 
 when stepping up to him, he discharged a pistol at his head, 
 loaded with a single ball. The ball entered a little beneath his 
 right ear, and passing under his palate, and upper teeth, came 
 out on the other side. William was deprived for a moment of 
 his senses ; which he no sooner recovered, than he desired his 
 attendants to save the life of the assassin. But the guards, 
 transported with sudden rage, had despatched him. The appear- 
 ance of the prince’s wound, from the effusion of blood, was ex- 
 tremely formidable, and as he was deprived of his speech by the 
 same cause, the spectators believed him to be at the point of 
 death. The news of this disaster spread quickly over the town, 
 and excited, in all ranks of men, inexpressible anguish and despair. 
 The citizens poured in crowds from every quarter to learn the 
 particulars of that calamity which had befallen them ; and, as if 
 each individual had lost his own proper parent, as well as the 
 common parent of the state, there was nothing to be heard but 
 the voice of sorrow and lamentation. 
 
 In the midst of this distress, a rumour was propagated, that 
 the French were the authors of the murder, and that it had been 
 perpetrated in order to deliver the duke of Anjou from the re- 
 straints which had been imposed on his authority. This report 
 gained easy credit from the people. Their grief was now converted 
 into fury, and they flew to the palace with an intention to execute 
 a speedy vengeance. 
 
 In the mean time it was known at the castle, that the assassin 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 3G6 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 was a Spaniard, from papers found in his pocket by Maurice the 
 prince’s son b . Of this discovery notice was immediately carried 
 to the prince, who had now recovered his speech ; and he was 
 informed, at the same time, of the danger *to which Anjou and 
 his countrymen were exposed. This intelligence affected William 
 in the most sensible manner ; and notwithstanding his present 
 critical situation, he wrote with his own hand a billet in excul- 
 pation of the French. By this, joined with the pains which were 
 taken by St. Aldegonde, the people were undeceived and paci- 
 fied. The assassin's body having been exposed to public view, it 
 was soon discovered that he had been a domestic of Anastro. 
 Anastro himself had fled ; but his secretary, whom he had left 
 behind to wait the issue of Jauregui’s attempt, and Timmerman 
 the priest, were seized, and, having confessed their guilt, they 
 were condemned to suffer death. At the desire of the prince of 
 Orange, who never neglected an opportunity of inculcating hu- 
 manity upon his countrymen, no tortures were inflicted on them. 
 They were first strangled and then quartered, and their heads and 
 limbs fixed over the gates of the city 0 . 
 
 William's recovery was dubious for some time, on account of 
 the difficulty which the physicians found in stopping the effusion 
 of blood ; but after all their applications had failed, they made a 
 number of persons succeed one another in pressing the mouth 
 of the wound with their thumbs, without intermission, for the 
 space of several days and nights ; and this expedient proved at 
 length successful d . 
 
 Anastro having gone from Antwerp to Tournay, where the 
 prince of Parma then resided, affirmed confidently that William 
 had died of his wound. Farnese too rashly believed him, and 
 wrote letters to the citizens of Antwerp, and other places, 
 exhorting them now to return to their duty, since that person 
 was removed by whom they had been led astray. These letters 
 would not have been calculated, in the present disposition of the 
 people, to promote the prince of Parma’s design, even if the 
 information on which he proceeded had been true ; but as they 
 did not arrive till after the people were delivered from their 
 apprehensions with regard to William’s life, they served only to 
 excite their ridicule and indignation®. 
 
 Meanwhile the operations of the war were not discontinued 
 Return of by either of the contending parties. The States 
 the Spanish acquired possession of the town of Alost, and the 
 u°°ps. prince of Parma made himself master of Steenwick 
 
 b Maurice was at this time only fifteen years of age, but was even then remarkable for 
 his attention and sagacity. 
 
 c They remained there till the city fell into the hands of the prince of Parma, when 
 they were taken down by the popish ecclesiastics, and buried with every mark of veneration 
 which their superstition could devise. 
 
 d While his life was in danger, a public supplication was offered up to Heaven for his 
 recovery ; and when it was accomplished, a solemn thanksgiving was celebrated. 
 
 e Bentivoglio, p. 263. Mcteren, p. 326. Thuanus, lib. lxxv. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1582.] 
 
 SC, 7 
 
 and Lierres. He was soon after enabled to act with greater 
 vigour than the weakness of his army had hitherto permitted 
 him to exert. Having consented, with great reluctance, to the 
 dismission of the Italian and Spanish troops, he had employed 
 all his address to convince the Walloons that it was in vain 
 •for them to expect, with their own forces alone, to bring the 
 war to a conclusion. He found it extremely difficult to overcome 
 their diffidence, and was obliged to observe the utmost caution, 
 in order to avoid awakening those suspicions which they had long 
 indulged against the Spaniards. At length, however, he accom- 
 plished his design through the marquis de Roubais, who, as was 
 mentioned above, had acted a principal part in promoting the 
 reconcilement of the southern provinces. With this nobleman 
 Farnese had formed an intimate connexion, and had laboured 
 assiduously to make him sensible how necessary it was that the 
 troops should be permitted to return. The marquis, flattered 
 with the familiarity to which he was admitted, and prompted by 
 the view of advancing his credit with the King, yielded at last 
 to the prince’s solicitations, and then employed his influence with 
 the States so effectually, that they not only consented to the 
 return of the forces, but even petitioned the King for it in the 
 most earnest terms 
 
 As nothing could be more acceptable to Philip than this appli- 
 cation, orders were immediately sent to Italy for the march of 
 four regiments of veterans, consisting of near ten thousand men ; 
 who, together with several thousand Burgundians and Germans, 
 arrived in the Netherlands towards the end of the summer one 
 thousand five hundred and eighty- two. After the arrival of this 
 reinforcement, the prince of Parma’s army amounted to sixty 
 thousand foot and four thousand horse ; but finding it necessary 
 to leave more than the half of that number in garrisons, he could 
 keep only about thirty thousand in the field ; and a part of these 
 was employed in Friesland under Verdugo, while the rest were 
 under his own immediate command in the southern provinces. 
 With these last he took Chateau-Cambresis, Ninove, Gaesbec, 
 and several other places ; he attacked the army of the States, 
 which he compelled to retire under the cannon of Ghent ; and 
 then he laid siege to Brussels, but the severity of the season, 
 and the difficulty of finding provisions in a country which had 
 been so long the seat of war, obliged him to desist from his 
 attempt, and to put his troops into winter-quarters g . 
 
 The United States, on the other hand, discovered great ala- 
 State of the crity and zeal in supporting their new-established 
 confederacy, government. They raised their yearly revenue from 
 two millions four hundred thousand, to four millions of guilders, 
 with which they maintained, besides their native troops, a con- 
 siderable number of British, French, and German forces. But 
 
 f Bentivoglio, p. 258. 
 
 8 Meteren, p. 334. 
 
368 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XYIII. 
 
 so great a proportion of these forces was necessary for defending 
 the forts and towns, that no army could be assembled sufficient 
 to contend with the enemy in the field, nor even to raise the 
 siege of any of those places which the prince of Parma attempted 
 to subdue. Thus the number of towns belonging to the confe- 
 derates was daily diminished, while their acquisitions were few 
 and inconsiderable. And as the enemy was now much more 
 formidable than before, they were filled with the most disquiet- 
 ing apprehensions when they looked forward to the opening of a 
 Anjou solicits new campaign. Anjou, who participated with them in 
 assistance the anxiety which so critical a situation was fitted to 
 
 from his excite, did every thing in his power to procure from 
 
 France the succours which he had given them reason 
 to expect. After many delays, the duke de Montpensier and 
 Mareschal Biron arrived in the Netherlands in the end of No- 
 vember, with between seven and eight thousand men, partly 
 Swiss and partly French. With this reinforcement, under so 
 able a general as Biron, Anjou perceived that he might retard 
 the progress of the prince of Parma’s arms, but that he could 
 not hope either to expel him from his new conquests, or to bring 
 the war to a conclusion ; he therefore renewed his solicitations 
 at the court of France, and endeavoured to engage his brother 
 more heartily to espouse his cause. 
 
 Henry’s counsellors were much divided in their opinions with 
 Henry’s de- regard to the measures proper to be pursued on this 
 liberations, occasion. By some of them, the present opportunity 
 was represented as the happiest that could offer for uniting the 
 Netherlands to the crown of France. But, as these men did not 
 intend to advance the interest of Anjou, they did not employ 
 any argument addressed to Henry’s friendship or generosity ; 
 and, instead of exhorting him to afford his brother aid sufficient 
 to establish himself securely in his new sovereignty, they advised 
 him only to give him such assistance as might enable him to stop 
 the progress of the Spanish arms. To this counsel they sub- 
 joined, that Henry ought to maintain a fleet in the Channel, and 
 an army on the frontier of Luxemburgh, in order to prevent the 
 prince of Parma from receiving supplies from Spain or Italy. 
 And in this posture, they said, he ought to wait, without exposing 
 his troops to the hazards of war, till the contending parties should 
 exhaust their strength, when it would be easy for him to drive 
 the Spaniards out of the Netherlands, and his brother and the 
 States, in order to obtain his protection, would gladly accept of 
 whatever terms he should think fit to impose. But such a plan, 
 which the great abilities of Farnese would have disconcerted, 
 was too refined, and required too much labour, patience, atten- 
 tion, and expense, to be relished by a prince so indolent and 
 voluptuous as Henry, who was so improvident of the future, and 
 whose affairs were so exceedingly involved. 
 
PHILTP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 3G9 
 
 1582.] 
 
 He listened with less reluctance to a proposal made him by 
 Heary refuses some others of his counsellors, who being well ac- 
 to grant his quaintcd with his character, perceived that his liesi- 
 request. tation proceeded in a great measure from the shame 
 of deserting his brother, and that in reality he wished for a 
 pretence to reject his application. These men, secret enemies to 
 the duke, and partisans of Philip, whose money it was believed 
 they had accepted, were afraid to declare openly against a mea- 
 sure in which the heir-apparent of the crown, supported by the 
 queen-mother, was so deeply interested. They affected to approve 
 highly of the granting Anjou's request, provided the King could 
 comply with it consistently with the interest of his kingdom. 
 But both the interest and honour of France, they thought, 
 required that the States should previously agree, that, in the 
 event of the duke’s death without issue, the King and his heirs 
 should succeed him in the sovereignty of the Netherlands. They 
 knew that the States would not consent to this condition. It 
 was, however, proposed to them, and having met with that 
 reception from them which there was reason to expect, notice 
 was soon afterwards sent to Anjou by the queen-mother, and his 
 other friends, of the unsuccessful issue of their endeavours to 
 serve him h . 
 
 This disappointment, which rendered it impossible for him to 
 Anjou’s at- fulfil the expectations of his new subjects, was calculated 
 tempt on g} ve ^p e mog ^ sensible concern. A candid and 
 and other grateful prince would have thought himself bound more 
 places. strongly than ever to exert himself in their behalf ; and, 
 by a careful attention to their interests, joined to a faithful dis- 
 charge of his other obligations, to atone for his failure in 
 that engagement which he was unable to perform. Widely 
 different were the sentiments which arose in the mind of the 
 faithless ungenerous Anjou. Apprehensive that the Flemings, 
 disgusted on account of their disappointment in those hopes of 
 assistance with which they had been deluded, might withdraw 
 their allegiance from him, and reconcile themselves to their 
 former sovereign, he resolved to prevent them from executing 
 this design, in case they should conceive it; and in violation of all 
 the baths which he had sworn so lately, he formed a plan of 
 depriving them of their liberty, by making himself master of all 
 the towns into which his troops had already found, or could by 
 force or stratagem find, admission. 
 
 This strange design, it is said, was first suggested to him 
 by his partisans in France, in order to induce Henry to grant 
 him the assistance which he solicited ; and it was strongly re- 
 commended by Fervaques, and other French nobility who had 
 accompanied him to the Netherlands. These men were all real or 
 pretended friends to Anjou, and affected to be deeply concerned 
 
 h Thuanus, iib. xxvii. c. ix. Meteren, lib. xi. 
 
 B B 
 
370 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII 
 
 for his honour, with which they persuaded him that such a 
 limited authority as he possessed was utterly incompatible. Had 
 they been his most inveterate enemies, they could not have 
 advised him to a measure more likely to prove fatal to his 
 interest. Yet this weak prince, without communicating his 
 intention to Biron or Montpensier, who would have refused their 
 consent, readily embraced the counsel that was given him, and 
 immediately proceeded to deliberate with his advisers concerning 
 the means of carrying it into execution \ 
 
 1583 It was agreed, that the French troops, in all the towns 
 ' where they were quartered, should, under the pretence of 
 a mutiny, take up arms, and expel the garrisons ; and in this 
 manner he got possession of Dunkirk, Dixmude, Dendre- 
 monde, and several other places ; but his principal object was 
 the city of Antwerp. It would have been in vain, he believed, 
 to attempt making himself master of so strong a place by open 
 force, with so small a number of his troops as were within the 
 city ; and therefore, in conjunction with his counsellors, he 
 exerted all his ingenuity in contriving how force and artifice 
 might be united. On this occasion, fortune seemed to favour 
 his design. Towards the middle of January, after the frost had 
 continued for some time, the States signified their intention to 
 have his troops employed in an expedition against some of the 
 enemy’s towns in Friesland, which, on account of their wet 
 situation, were accessible only in the time of frost. Anjou pre- 
 tended to enter with great alacrity into this design. He im- 
 mediately gave orders to have his troops conducted to the 
 villages in the neighbourhood of Antwerp, where he held them 
 ready to march upon the shortest notice ; and, under various pre- 
 tences, he brought to his court at Antwerp almost all the French 
 noblesse, who had been dispersed throughout the Netherlands. 
 
 Being thus prepared, his plan was to seize upon the gate of 
 Cronenburg, which lay next to the palace, with his body-guards, 
 and to introduce his army silently in the night ; but, on the day 
 immediately preceding, an obscure report of his intention was 
 circulated among the citizens, and a general alarm excited. The 
 prince of Orange and the magistrates thought it proper to inform 
 the duke of this report, and proposed to hang up lights in the 
 city, and to stretch chains across the streets and gates, in order 
 to quiet the apprehensions of the people. Anjou could not, 
 without confirming the suspicions entertained against him, refuse 
 his consent to this proposal ; but as he possessed a considerable 
 share of his mother’s duplicity and artifice, he assumed, with so 
 much seeming sincerity, an appearance of indignation against 
 the authors of the report, accompanied with such strong pro- 
 fessions of attachment to the Netherlands in general, and the 
 city of Antwerp in particular, that not only the magistrates, but 
 
 1 Thuauus lib. xxvii. c. 10. Meteren, p. 386. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 37 
 
 1583 .] 
 
 even the prince of Orange was almost persuaded of his innocence. 
 The streets however were barricaded, the whole town was illu- 
 minated, and many of the citizens were under arms. 
 
 These circumstances having made it necessary for Anjou to 
 change his plan, he went early next morning to the prince of 
 Orange’s apartment in the castle, and after informing him that 
 he had ordered his troops to be drawn out for a general review 
 before their departure for Friesland, he desired the prince to 
 accompany him to the field. Whether William had still any 
 suspicion of his design is uncertain ; but he declined complying 
 with his request, alleging the badness of the day, and the state 
 of his wound, as an excuse for his refusal ; and he advised the 
 duke to put off the review till some future day, when the people 
 would be entirely delivered from those apprehensions with which 
 they were at present disquieted. Anjou pretended that he 
 would comply with his advice, and left him ; but soon afterwards 
 he sent him notice, that, finding the day cleared up, he still 
 resolved to hold the review, as he had first intended. He then 
 gave orders to remove the barricades in the street which leads 
 to the gate of Ripdorff, and set out, attended with a retinue in 
 arms, amounting to between two and three hundred men. 
 
 He had no sooner passed the gate and the draw- bridge, than 
 his attendants fell, sword in hand, upon the guards, and having 
 butchered some of them, obliged the rest to take shelter in the 
 guard-house. The orders which he had sent to the camp had 
 been punctually executed. The whole army was in motion, and 
 seventeen companies of foot, six hundred lances, and four troops 
 of horse were at hand, and ready to enter the city. They rushed 
 in impetuously; and, having set fire to some houses near the 
 gate, as a signal for the rest of the troops to hasten forward, 
 they spread themselves over the town, crying out, “ May the mass 
 flourish ! the city is taken.” 
 
 The citizens had been in some measure freed from their 
 apprehensions by Anjou’s protestations on the evening before ; 
 but they had not been put entirely off their guard. They flew 
 instantly to arms, and quickly formed a close compacted body, of 
 sufficient strength to make head against the enemy. Their 
 number was soon augmented by others, who flocked to their 
 assistance from every quarter of the city. None declined exposing 
 themselves to danger, or trusted to others for their defence. 
 They remembered the devastations which had been committed 
 some years before by the mutinous Spaniards, and were per- 
 suaded, that they could not now avoid a repetition of the dis- 
 asters which they then suffered, by any other means but by 
 exerting their utmost vigour, and showing, each man for himself, 
 a contempt of danger. Animated therefore by the dread of that 
 ruin with which their fortunes, their friends, their wives and 
 children, were about to be overwhelmed, and fired with indig- 
 
 bb2 
 
372 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVIII. 
 
 nation against their ungrateful, perfidious enemy, they advanced 
 with a degree of fury which the French troops were unable to 
 withstand. Many of the French had entered the houses for the 
 sake of plunder. These men were quickly surrounded by the 
 citizens, and put to the sword : the rest were driven back towards 
 the gate. There they expected, either to be supported by their 
 friends from the camp, or to make their escape out of the city ; 
 but, having neglected to secure the portcullis, the soldiers, who 
 had sl^ut themselves up in the guard-house, had sallied out and 
 let it down. By this circumstance the French were thrown into 
 despair, and the resolution and spirit of the citizens augmented. 
 The situation of the former was now truly deplorable : dis- 
 appointed of that assistance from without on which they had 
 depended, and crowded together in a narrow space ; while the 
 citizens, who pursued, poured their shot upon them without a 
 moment’s intermission ; they fell in heaps above one another, 
 till the gate was choked with the dead and wounded. 
 
 The citizens made next a desperate attack on a body of 
 French troops who had mounted the rampart, and either put 
 them to the sword, or tumbled them headlong from the wall. 
 Of this scene, Anjou himself, and the Swiss troops, who had 
 attempted in vain to burst open the gate, were spectators. At 
 first he thought it was the citizens that were thrown down, and 
 believed it must have been by accident that the portcullis had 
 been shut. He could not suppose that the inhabitants, unac- 
 customed to the use of arms, could in the space of an hour have 
 discomfited so great a number of disciplined forces ; but he was 
 soon undeceived in his conjecture. The citizens, still inflamed 
 with indignation, on account of his unprovoked, atrocious at- 
 tempt, pointed their cannon towards the place where he stood, 
 and killed a considerable number of the Swiss. 
 
 The prince of Orange, who lodged in the castle, at the oppo- 
 site end of the city, remained ignorant for some time of what 
 had passed, and when intelligence of it was brought him, he at 
 first believed it to be some accidental scuffle between the inha- 
 bitants and soldiers ; but at last receiving more certain informa- 
 tion of the truth, he set out with a part of the garrison for the 
 scene of action. In his way thither, he met Fervaques advancing 
 towards him with a body of French troops, which had been left 
 behind in the palace. At the first onset, Fervaques himself was 
 taken prisoner, and his troops, disheartened by the loss of their 
 commander, and still more by the consciousness of their treachery, 
 were easily overcome. William then proceeded to the gate of 
 Ripdorff, where he arrived in time to prevent the citizens from 
 wreaking a useless, though merited, vengeance upon the prisoners. 
 
 Nothing could, be more affecting, says an historian' whose 
 information was derived from eye-witnesses, than the spectacle 
 
 » Van Meteren. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 373 
 
 1583.] 
 
 at the gate : the dead bodies piled one upon another to a con- 
 siderable height, and the wounded mingled with the dead, wel- 
 tering in blood, uttering the most doleful lamentations, and 
 struggling to disengage themselves from each other, or from 
 the bodies of their slaughtered friends. At the prince’s inter- 
 cession the lives of all the prisoners were spared, and many of 
 the wounded recovered, through the attention and tenderness of 
 those to whose care they were committed. 
 
 The number of the French found dead in different parts of the 
 city amounted to fifteen hundred, among whom were upwards of 
 three hundred persons of distinction. And the prisoners, includ- 
 ing those who surrendered to the prince of Orange, were com- 
 puted at two thousand. So great was the loss which Anjou 
 sustained from this ill- concerted enterprise ; while only one 
 hundred of the inhabitants were killed, and the same number 
 wounded. It would be impossible, notwithstanding the despe- 
 rate bravery of the citizens, to account for this extreme disparity 
 betwixt the loss on the one side, and that on the other, were it 
 not for a circumstance which one of the historians 14 has mentioned, 
 that the French, either from negligence, or their general’s con- 
 fidence of success, had brought very little ammunition with them, 
 and, during the greatest part of tho combat, stood exposed to 
 the enemy’s fire, without having any other weapon to defend them 
 but their swords. 
 
 It is easier to imagine than describe the confusion with which 
 Anjou must have been overwhelmed, when he reflected on the 
 egregious folly into which he had been betrayed. He passed 
 the night in a neighbouring fort called Berchem, where there 
 was neither furniture nor provisions. From that place he wrote 
 a letter to the senate of Antwerp, in which, after boasting 
 absurdly of the proofs which he had given of his attachment to 
 the Netherlands, he subjoined, that although the misfortune 
 which had happened, had arisen from the unworthy treatment 
 which he had met with, yet he was deeply penetrated with sorrow 
 and repentance on account of it ; that he still retained all his 
 wonted affection towards them, and had sent them this letter, 
 partly to inquire what were their intentions with respect to him, 
 and partly to desire that they would send him his papers, furni- 
 ture, and servants ; hoping that these last, who were entirely 
 innocent of what had been done, should not suffer any harm 1 . 
 
 To this letter the* senate made no return, but referred it to the 
 consideration of the prince of Orange and the States ; and in the 
 mean time A n jou, being utterly destitute of every thing neces- 
 sary for the support of his troops, left Berchem and directed his 
 march towards Dendremonde. He intended to have gone thither 
 by the shortest road, but the citizens of Antwerp having sent a 
 number of armed vessels to oppose his passage over the Scheld, he 
 
 k Reidan, 
 
 1 Metcrcn, p. 339» 
 
374 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XYIII. 
 
 was obliged to turn back, and to fetch a compass round by Duf- 
 fel, Mecldin, Rimenant, and Vilvorden. In this march, besides 
 suffering the greatest hardships in his own person, he lost a con- 
 siderable number of his troops by an inundation of the river 
 Nethe. From Duffel he wrote letters to the governors of Brus- 
 sels, and other places, in which he threw the whole blame of 
 what had happened on the inhabitants of Antwerp, and repre- 
 sented the affair as a tumult, in which his troops, when upon 
 their way to the camp, had interfered, but which had arisen in 
 consequence of the ill usage which he himself had received. 
 This disingenuous conduct served to exasperate the people of 
 Antwerp more than ever against him, and they published a vin- 
 dication of their conduct, setting forth u that they had in all 
 respects demeaned themselves towards him as became good and 
 faithful subjects. They had given him even more than their 
 proportion of the supplies, and had raised the sum of seventy 
 thousand guilders ; which, instead of applying it to pay the 
 arrears due to the army, he had distributed among his French 
 and Swiss troops to encourage them in their late atrocious 
 attempt. Nothing could be more palpably unjust than to im- 
 pute that attempt to the citizens of Antwerp, since, on the 
 same day, the French troops had offered the same violence in 
 other places. By the kind providence of Heaven, the plan con- 
 certed to enslave them had been frustrated, in such towns as 
 were of the greatest importance ; and it was their earnest prayer, 
 that the duke might become sensible of the iniquity of his con- 
 duct, and resolve for the future to govern the provinces conform- 
 ably to those fundamental laws of the constitution, which, at his 
 accession, he had solemnly sworn to observe.” 
 
 The news of what had happened, having been quickly diffused 
 throughout the provinces, excited universal astonishment and 
 indignation. The prince of Parma, desirous to improve the 
 opportunity which was presented to him, attempted to recon- 
 cile the people to their ancient government. But his endea- 
 vours were not more successful now than formerly. The con- 
 federates were deaf to his proposals ; and even refused to appoint 
 ambassadors to treat with him concerning peace. 
 
 The States in the mean time were deliberating concerning the 
 Delibera- letter which Anjou had written to the senate of Ant- 
 tions of the werp. Had they listened to that just resentment with 
 States. which they were inflamed, they would not have hesi- 
 tated to declare that he had forfeited the sovereignty. But 
 they considered how extremely critical their situation was become, 
 while Anjou was master of several of their fortified towns, and 
 the prince of Parma hovered round them with an army, against 
 which they were unable to contend. In this perplexity, they 
 entreated the prince of Orange, who had hitherto remained 
 silent, to assist them with his counsel. No person felt more 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 375 
 
 1583.] 
 
 sensibly for the distress into which Anjou’s temerity had plunged 
 the confederacy ; and no person had a juster ground of provoca- 
 tion. It was by his means chiefly that Anjou had obtained the 
 sovereignty ; and yet it could not be doubted, that in sending 
 Fervaques with troops to the castle, as above related, the inten- 
 tion was to deprive him either of his life or of his liberty. Not- 
 withstanding this, William had at first interposed to prevent the 
 citizens from using any violence againt the prisoners ; and he now 
 gave the following conciliatory advice to the States in writing, 
 as he generally did in matters which he deemed of high importance. 
 
 It was not, he said, without reluctance, that he had resolved 
 to deliver his opinion on the difficult question which was now 
 before them, as it had of late been the practice of many persons 
 to blame him for every misfortune that had befallen the con- 
 federacy. Even if he had been invested with absolute authority, 
 their censure would have been unjust, since the issues of things 
 belong to God only, and no man can answer for the success of 
 the best-concerted enterprise. Considering his age, and the 
 injustice with which he had been treated, it would be prudent 
 perhaps not to expose himself again to the obloquy of his detrac- 
 tors. But his concern for the prosperity of the Netherlands 
 would not suffer him to maintain that silence, which a regard to 
 his personal ease and security required ; especially as they assured 
 him that they would take in good part, and interpret favourably, 
 whatever counsel he should offer. 
 
 Nothing was farther from his intention than to attempt to 
 justify that atrocious violence which had been lately perpetrated : 
 on the contrary, he thought the conduct of the duke had been 
 such as proved, beyond a possibility of doubt, that he had for- 
 feited his title to the sovereignty. Notwithstanding this, no 
 person, he believed, who suffered himself to consider attentively 
 the course of events since their first connexion with the duke, 
 would deny that this connexion had been attended with advan- 
 tages. By his troops, not only the siege of Cambray, but that 
 of Lochem too, had been raised, and the whole province of 
 Guelderland thereby saved from the depredations of the enemy. 
 In consequence of his election, peace had been established be- 
 tween the Catholics and Protestants in France, and the latter 
 left at liberty to enter into the service of the States. Not to 
 mention what they ought perhaps to prize more than any thing 
 else, that, by electing the duke for their sovereign, not only the 
 authority but the name and arms of Spain had been abolished in 
 the Netherlands, and a foundation laid upon which their liberty 
 might be firmly established, provided they should exert them- 
 selves with their wonted zeal and vigour. When these things 
 were considered, there would not appear much ground for the 
 censures passed on those by whom the duke’s election had been 
 promoted. But whether they had judged wisely or unwisely, 
 
376 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 the States nmst now resolve either to make peace with the king 
 of Spain, or trust for the future to their own strength, or enter 
 into terms of accommodation with the duke. 
 
 With regard to the first of these, he observed, that besides 
 that all the same reasons still subsisted against returning under 
 the Spanish yoke, which had formerly determined them to shake 
 it off; it must appear preposterous to think of reconciling them- 
 selves as subjects to a prince whose name and ensigns were 
 obliterated, and whose authority they had so solemnly renounced. 
 There was truth in what some persons (friends of Spain more 
 than their native country) had suggested, that it was more de- 
 sirable for the people of the Low Countries to be subject to a 
 distant than to a neighbouring prince, as it must be more diffi- 
 cult for the former than for the latter to encroach upon their 
 liberty. But this maxim could not, in the present divided state 
 of the Netherlands, be urged in favour of the dominion of the 
 king of Spain ; who, besides possessing a powerful army ready 
 to overwhelm them, was absolute master of several of the pro- 
 vinces, and was therefore, in reality, much nearer to the confede- 
 racy than any other prince. 
 
 Prompted by this and other considerations, they had bestowed 
 the sovereignty on the duke of Anjou ; and Ae, it could not be 
 denied, had forfeited his title to it. This was acknowledged 
 even by the duke himself, who was now sensible of his folly. 
 But notwithstanding his repentance, there was much ground to 
 doubt of the expediency of entering into a second agreement 
 with one by whom the first had been so grossly violated. There 
 was ground to dread that the same evil counsellors, by whom the 
 duke had been once deluded, might again deceive him ; and there 
 was reason to suspect, that confidence could not be soon restored 
 between the French troops and the people of the Netherlands. 
 
 On the other hand, he thought it his duty to call their attention 
 to the consequences which must attend their refusing to be 
 pacified. The duke would deliver all the fortified towns which 
 he possessed, into the hands of the Spaniards. Both he and his 
 brother, the King of France, would from friends be converted into 
 the most bitter enemies ; from whom all that mischief might be 
 expected, that can be contrived and executed by those who are 
 stimulated by ambition, and inflamed with animosity and resent- 
 ment. An immediate stop would be put by the French King to 
 their commerce with his subjects ; and while he would shut his 
 harbours against their ships, he would open a passage through 
 his dominions for the troops of the King of Spain. Even the 
 Queen of England, though highly dissatisfied with the duke's 
 conduct, yet were she to be informed that the States had 
 obstinately refused to be reconciled, would be exceedingly 
 offended. And if they should lose her favour, as well as that of 
 France, to what other friend could they have recourse, either 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 377 
 
 1503.] 
 
 able or willing to support them ? They must for the future 
 trust for their preservation entirely to themselves. They must, 
 without delay, make a numerous augmentation of their forces ; 
 and yet he knew not where these forces could be raised, since 
 the devastation of the war had been so great in every province 
 of the confederacy, that scarcely a sufficient number of the 
 people remained to carry on their trade and manufactures. In 
 order to maintain such an army as was necessary, much larger 
 sums of money were requisite than had hitherto been collected. 
 What these were, would appear from the scheme which he now 
 delivered to them, containing a particular description of all the 
 ordinary and extraordinary expenses of the war. From the 
 difficulty which they had experienced in procuring money for 
 paying the garrisons alone, they might judge whether they were 
 possessed of funds adequate to the expense both of these and of 
 an army in the field ; without which, it was impossible that they 
 could for any considerable time resist the enemy. 
 
 He was far from censuring those who advised them to trust to 
 the Almighty for protection. The counsel of these persons was 
 pious and well-intended ; but he thought, that to engage in any 
 difficult enterprise without the means of carrying it into exe- 
 cution, was more properly to tempt the Divine Providence than 
 to trust in it ; and that those only could be said to exercise a 
 proper trust in God, who. after embracing the most favourable 
 opportunities of action, had recourse to Heaven by prayer, to 
 crown their undertakings with success. It behoved them there- 
 fore still attentively to consider their strength and their re- 
 sources ; and if, without foreign assistance, they should find them 
 sufficient for the purposes which they had in view, they would, in 
 his opinion, judge wisely in resolving to retain the sovereignty in 
 their own hands. 
 
 There was a time when the people of the Netherlands might 
 have established themselves in this happy state of freedom and 
 independence ; when, in spite of the King of Spain, they might 
 have expelled his brother John of Austria from the provinces. 
 But our present situation, continued William, is widely different 
 from what it was at the time of which I speak. A powerful 
 Spanish army, seconded by those who were then our friends, is 
 at our gates. The strength of the confederacy is impaired. 
 Even with the assistance of the French troops, we have been 
 unable to stop the progress of the enemy. If nevertheless you 
 shall, upon inquiry, find that you are able, by making greater 
 exertions, to do more alone, than when you were assisted by 
 others, banish for ever all thoughts of an accommodation with 
 the duke, and resolve henceforth, alone and unassisted, to oppose 
 both him and the Spaniards. Proceed instantly to the execu- 
 tion of your design. But I dread that before you can make the 
 preparations necessary for entering upon action, before you can 
 
378 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XVIII. 
 
 collect either the troops or the money requisite, and even 
 before you can appoint a general to command your forces, 
 many of your towns will be taken ; and many of them, despair- 
 ing of relief, will enter into terms of accommodation with the 
 Spaniards. For these reasons you will judge, perhaps, that 
 in your present circumstances the wisest resolution which you 
 can form, is to enter into a treaty of reconcilement with the 
 duke. And if this shall be the result of your deliberations, I 
 have only one other counsel to suggest, which is, to give par- 
 ticular attention in your new agreement to prevent the fortified 
 towns from being exposed on any future occasion to that danger 
 from which the city of Antwerp has so narrowly escaped ; and 
 for this purpose to require, that no officer or soldier shall be 
 admitted into garrisons without taking an oath of allegiance 
 and fidelity to the States °.” 
 
 This reasoning of the prince of Orange produced the desired 
 Reconcile- effect upon a great majority of the deputies, and a 
 States^vkh ne S°^ a ^ on was immediately begun, and soon after- 
 Anjou. wards a treaty of peace and reconciliation was con- 
 March 8th. eluded, on the following conditions : That all the French 
 prisoners in Antwerp should be set at liberty, the duke’s papers 
 and other effects restored, and ninety thousand guilders given 
 him for discharging the arrears due to his troops. That he 
 should deliver up all the towns which he had seized, retire to 
 Dunkirk with four hundred foot and three hundred horse, and 
 remain there till every point of difference should be entirely 
 settled ; that he should renew the oath which he took at his 
 inauguration, to govern the provinces according to the funda- 
 mental laws, and that all his troops should take an oath of 
 allegiance to the States, binding themselves to serve them faith- 
 fully against their enemies, and never to be concerned in any 
 attempt to the prejudice of their authority. 
 
 As in promoting this agreement the prince of Orange appears 
 Attempts on h ave acted under a conviction, that there was no 
 the life of the other expedient by which the confederacy could be 
 prince of saved from ruin ; so, in being able to persuade the 
 
 Change. States to adopt it, he gave the most convincing proof 
 
 of his unlimited influence over that assembly. The people in 
 general, especially in Flanders and Brabant, were extremely 
 averse to any accommodation. Their hereditary antipathy 
 against the French had, on this occasion, risen to the greatest 
 height. Many of the deputies too were animated with the same 
 aversion and resentment ; nor can it be doubted, that if they 
 had not been prevented by that deference which they had been 
 long accustomed to entertain for William’s opinion, they would 
 have proceeded against Anjou to the utmost extremities, and have 
 resolved never more to acknowledge his authority. The Spaniards 
 
 0 Van Mctcrcn and Tlmanus. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 379 
 
 1583. 1 
 
 were not ignorant by whom the States had been prevented from 
 forming this resolution ; and they were now convinced, that, till 
 the prince of Orange were removed, no event, however promis- 
 ing, would induce the confederates to return to their allegiance. 
 They had recourse therefore to the dishonourable means of 
 private assassination ; and to attempt it, different persons were 
 instigated about this time by Philip or his ministers ; one of 
 them by Philip himself, according to the declaration of the 
 criminal ; but more probably by his ministers at Madrid ; 
 another by his ambassador at the court of France ; and a third 
 by the marquis de Roubais and the prince of Parma. The 
 conspiracy of the two former was detected, and they suffered 
 death ; and the last, a French officer, whom Roubais had taken 
 prisoner, and who had pretended to agree to the proposal in 
 order to procure his liberty, gave information to William’s 
 friends of the arguments which had been employed to persuade 
 him, and showed, by his conduct afterwards in the service of the 
 States, the sincerity of his abhorrence of that unhallowed deed 
 which he had been solicited to perform?. 
 
 The danger to which the prince was so often exposed from the 
 Discontents inveterate resentment of the Spaniards, ought to have 
 of the people, endeared his person and counsels to his countrymen, 
 and they produced this effect in a high degree upon all those who 
 were able to comprehend the wisdom and moderation with which 
 he had conducted their affairs. But great numbers having 
 formed their judgment of Anjou’s election to the sovereignty, 
 from the late unhappy consequences with which it been accom- 
 panied, could not refrain from ascribing some sinister intention 
 to those who had been active in promoting it. They were in- 
 capable of discerning the strength of the motives by which 
 William had been prompted to advise the States to renew their 
 agreement, and they even fostered suspicions of his having 
 attached himself to the duke, with a view to the attaining of 
 some private advantage. This spirit of discontent was not 
 confined to the vulgar, but likewise infected several of the 
 deputies of the States, who became sullen and refractory ; and 
 by their contentious opposition to almost every measure that 
 was proposed, disturbed and retarded the deliberations of that 
 assembly. A great majority, however, of the members agreed to 
 employ the French and Swiss troops under Mareschal Biron, 
 whom the duke had appointed to command them. Biron having 
 not only had no concern in the attempt upon Antwerp, but 
 having been considered by Anjou as one by whom it would have 
 been opposed, was the most unexceptionable person to whom the 
 command could have been committed, and he had been long 
 distinguished for his military skill and experience. At first his 
 arms were attended with success. He compelled the fort of 
 
 i’ Metercn, p. 348. 
 
180 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 Wouda to surrender, and with inferior forces he repulsed the 
 prince of Parma, who had attacked his lines near the town of 
 Bosendal. But it was impossible for him with so small an army 
 to stop the progress of the Spaniards in other places, or to face 
 them in the open field. Farnese therefore pushed his conquests 
 with great rapidity, and made himself master of Endove, Diest, 
 and Westerlo, while he practised every art of negotiation and 
 intrigue against Bruges, Ghent, and other places. 
 
 During the course of these transactions the duke of Anjou fell 
 into a lingering illness at Dunkirk, which was generally supposed 
 to be the effect of those hardships which he suffered in his retreat 
 from Antwerp. Whether he believed himself insecure in his 
 present situation, while the prince of Parma was so briskly 
 carrying on his conquests in the neighbourhood, or found that his 
 health required a change of air, and a relaxation from the fatigues 
 of business, or whether he had conceived hopes at this time of 
 obtaining, by a personal interview with his brother, more powerful 
 assistance than he had hitherto received, does not appear with 
 sufficient evidence. But whatever was the motive which deter- 
 mined him, he left Dunkirk, and set out for France. 
 
 The prince of Parma was no sooner informed of his departure, 
 Progress of than he quitted Herentals, and led his troops to Dun- 
 the prince of kirk. The States, aware of the importance of that 
 Parma’s place, ordered Mareschal Biron to march with all his 
 forces to its relief. But such was the resentment which 
 the Ghentese and other Flemings had conceived against the 
 French, that no consideration could prevail upon them to suffer 
 Biron to pass through their territories. They had resolved, they 
 said, never to accede to the late agreement with the duke, whom 
 they could not trust, and they would not be indebted to his troops 
 for their defence. The consequence to be expected followed. 
 The garrison of Dunkirk, which consisted wholly of French, gave 
 up the town in a few days to the prince of Parma. He then laid 
 siege to Nieuport, and took it with so much facility as gave ground 
 for a suspicion of treachery on the part of the garrison. He in- 
 tended next to have invested Ostend, but having learnt that the 
 prince of Orange had taken particular pains to provide for its 
 security, he relinquished his design ; and having turned his arms 
 against Dixmude and Meningen, lie subdued these and several 
 other places with a degree of celerity with which the people of* 
 the Netherlands had never been accustomed to see any military 
 enterprises carried on. But his success served only to dazzle and 
 confound the confederates, instead of opening their eyes to the 
 fatal consequences of that discord which had exposed so great a 
 number of their associates an easy prey to the Spaniards. Except 
 augmenting the garrisons of two or three towns, in the preservation 
 of which some of the deputies were personally interested, no 
 vigorous resolution of any consequence was formed by the States, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 331 
 
 1583 .] 
 
 although they held their sessions daily, and were daily alarmed 
 with fresh accounts of some new loss which the confederacy had 
 sustained. 
 
 About this time an incident fell out at Antwerp, which strongly 
 . . marks the spirit by which the Flemings were actuated 
 suspicions on this occasion. The prince of Orange having given 
 against the orders for building on additional rampart for the 
 Oran^e° f g rea ter security of the castle, some secret partisans 
 
 ° ‘ of Spain took occasion thence to insinuate, that he 
 
 intended to deliver the fortress to the French, and was now pre- 
 paring it for their reception. The people ioo easily believed this 
 injurious suggestion ; and having taken up arms, they ran tumul- 
 tuously to the castle, with a resolution to expel the garrison. 
 William immediately presented himself before them. The sight 
 of a person whom they had been so long accustomed to revere, 
 joined to the evidence which they received on the spot of the utter 
 falsehood of that report which they had so rashly credited, 
 appeased the fury of the greater number, and quelled the tumult. 
 But there were some among them more audacious and malignant 
 than the rest, who called him by the contumelious names of de- 
 serter and traitor of his country. This treatment, so unmerited 
 from a people whom he had saved from ruin, affected him in 
 the most sensible manner. He admonished the magistrates to 
 take cognizance of the licentiousness of which they had been 
 He retires spectators. But finding that, on account of the great 
 to Zealand, number of the guilty, they were afraid to exercise 
 July 22. ^h e i r authority, he left Antwerp, and retired into Zea- 
 land, after having delivered directions to . the magistrates in 
 writing, for the government and defence of the city, and nomi- 
 nated the sieur de St. Aldegonde, chief magistrate, or governor, 
 for the ensuing year q . 
 
 William did not intend, by changing the place of his residence, 
 to withdraw his attention from the southern provinces. He 
 interested himself as much as ever in their affairs, and meant 
 only to provide for his own security, and to remove the assembly 
 of the States (which was summoned to meet at Middleburgh) to 
 a situation in which the deputies would not be so much influenced 
 by the emissaries of Spain, nor so much disturbed in their delibe- 
 rations by the tumultuous disposition of the people. He still 
 employed all his interest to reconcile the cities of Brabant and 
 Flanders to the continuance of the French troops in the Nether- 
 
 ** Of the affection of the maritime provinces towards the prince of Orange, and of the 
 trust and confidence which they reposed in him, he received about this time a conspicuous 
 proof, by a resolution into which all the cities entered, except two, of creating him earl of 
 Holland and Zealand, with all the powers and privileges which belonged to that ancient 
 dignity. How far the prince himself contributed to their forming this resolution, does not 
 appear from the contemporary historians. It did not contradict the treaty between thb 
 United States and the duke of Anjou ; as, by that treaty, the maritime provinces had only 
 bound themselves to contribute their share of the public expenses. Yet it was matter of 
 some obloquy against the prince, of whom it was said, that he had not been inattentive to 
 his private interest. 
 
382 ' HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XYIII. 
 
 lands. And his endeavours proved effectual with Brussels, and 
 some other towns which lay nearest to the enemy ; but Ghent, 
 and most of the other cities, remained as inflexible as ever, and 
 resolved never to admit the French within their territories, or to 
 be indebted to them for protection. The States therefore found 
 it necessary to give orders for the departure of these troops, at a 
 time when every friend of his country, who suffered himself to 
 reflect on the critical situation of the confederacy, thought that 
 the provinces ought rather to have made concessions to Anjou 
 and the French King, in order to induce the latter to augment 
 their number. Biron put them on board transports at Birvliet, 
 and thence conducted them by sea to France. 
 
 The Spaniards were now at liberty to pursue their conquests 
 Ano ust 27 a ^ mos t without opposition. Farnese immediately formed 
 
 ° ’ the blockade of Ypres. Alost was sold to him by an 
 
 English and Walloon garrison, for the payment of their arrears. 
 The country of Waes, and the town of Ruplemonde on the Scheld, 
 were subdued, and Zutphen too was taken by surprise ; the con- 
 sequence of which was, that the Veluwe, an extensive territory 
 between the Issel and the Rhine, was laid open to the incursions 
 of the enemy. 
 
 In the mean time the secret partisans of Spain were daily 
 increasing in Bruges, Ghent, and other places. Many persons 
 had declared themselves against Anjou with so much violence, 
 that they dreaded his return. Many were intimidated by the 
 rapidity of the prince of Parma’s conquests. Some having been 
 intrusted with the public money, were afraid of being called to 
 account for their management of it by the prince of Orange and 
 the States, and all of them were allured to their first allegiance 
 by the moderation with which Farnese treated such as had 
 already submitted to him, and the strict fidelity with which he 
 adhered to his engagements. 
 
 Among the persons who, prompted by these motives, were 
 desirous of again reducing their country under the Spanish 
 government, the prince of Orange had the mortification to find 
 his brother-in-law, Count Heremberg. This nobleman, weak, 
 inconstant, and governed by his wife, who was the prince’s sister, 
 but had for some time been at variance with her brother, had 
 formed the design of delivering the province of Guelderland, of 
 which he had been appointed governor, into the hands of the 
 Spaniards. His plot having been detected before it was ripe for 
 execution, he was seized and imprisoned by an order of the States. 
 But having been afterwards set at liberty upon his parole, he 
 gave irrefragable proof of his guilt by flying over to the enemy. 
 
 The prince of Chimai’s intrigues in Flanders were more 
 Treachery successful than those of Heremberg. He was eldest son 
 of the of the duke d’Arschot, and had been educated in the 
 prince of Catholic faith ; but some time before the present period, 
 
 imai * he had openly professed the reformed religion, and 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 383 
 
 1583.] 
 
 attached himself with much apparent zeal to the party of the 
 prince of Orange and the States. Conscious that both his 
 religion and patriotism were mere grimace, he had laboured with 
 consummate artifice to remove any suspicions that might be 
 entertained of his sincerity. He was perpetually surrounded 
 with the Protestant ministers, with whom he lived on the most 
 familiar terms ; and he published an apology for his conduct, in 
 which, with the highest encomiums on the Protestant faith, he 
 mingled the bitterest invectives against Philip, bestowing on him 
 every reproachful epithet which the most implacable hatred 
 could suggest. By these means he had insinuated himself into 
 the favour of great numbers of the Protestants, and particularly 
 those of Bruges, who conferred upon him the government of 
 their town. The prince of Orange having received information 
 of a secret correspondence which he held with the Catholics, had 
 at first attempted to persuade the people of Bruges from electing 
 him their governor, and he now gave secret instructions to the 
 magistrates, to employ Colonel Boyd, a Scotch officer, who com- 
 manded one of the regiments in garrison, to deprive Chimai of 
 his authority. Boyd affected to enter heartily into the plan 
 proposed, but he betrayed the magistrates, and gave immediate 
 information of their design to Chimai ; who, through an artful 
 misrepresentation of their conduct,, was enabled to expel them 
 from the city. He then put others into their place who were 
 devoted to his interest, and still pretended all his wonted zeal 
 for the reformed religion, till having obliged many of the principal 
 citizens to withdraw, he made himself master of the town, 
 and then delivered it to the prince of Parma, upon con- 
 dition that the prince should confer upon him the government of 
 the province. To the obtaining this request, which was granted 
 by Farnese, and confirmed by Philip, Chimai thought himself 
 the better entitled, as he had contributed in the same perfidious 
 manner to the reduction of Ypres, which after a blockade of nine 
 months, had lately been obliged to surrender. Not long after 
 this he threw off the mask of religion, and both he and one of 
 the Protestant ministers, w T ho had been a principal instrument of 
 his deceit, publicly abjured Calvinism, and declared themselves 
 converts to the Popish faith r . 
 
 An attempt of the same nature with that of Chimai on 
 Bruges was made by Imbise, and other agents of Farnese, to 
 reduce Ghent and Dendremonde under the Spanish power. In 
 order to second their endeavours, the prince of Parma had 
 pitched his camp between Ghent and Bruges ; but the plan 
 which had been formed for the surprise of Dendremonde was 
 discovered, and Imbise, the principal contriver, who was chief 
 magistrate of Ghent, a factious and turbulent old man, was 
 condemned and executed. 
 
 r Meteren, p. 357. Thuamis, lib. lxxix. c. xv. 
 
334 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII- 
 
 During these transactions, the prince of Orange was employed 
 Death of in establishing a thorough reconcilement between the 
 An j° u * States and the duke of Anjou, whose return with a nume- 
 rous army William considered as the only remedy for the in- 
 creasing calamities of the commonwealth. There was more 
 reason now than ever to expect that Anjou would soon be able 
 to fulfil his engagements. Through the queen-mother’s inter- 
 cession, Henry had openly declared his resolution to exert 
 himself with vigour in the support of his brother’s interest in the 
 Netherlands. An ambassador had been sent by the States to 
 congratulate with the duke on this desirable event, and to ac- 
 quaint him of their having consented to certain conditions which 
 he had proposed. His joy on this occasion was extreme, and he 
 now indulged the most flattering expectations ; but he did not 
 long survive these events, which gave him so much pleasure. 
 Having never enjoyed perfect health since the hardships which 
 Beginning he underwent in his retreat from Antwerp, he was seized 
 of June, about this time with an illness which might have been 
 easily accounted for, from the unsound state of his constitution ; 
 but which, agreeably to the practice of the age, was attributed 
 to poison s . Whatever was the cause, he died in great pain, 
 at Chateau-Thierry, on the 10th of June 1581, at the age of 
 thirty. 
 
 Such was the conclusion of the restless life of this prince, 
 His charac- whose weaknesses and vices were equally pernicious to 
 ter - himself, to the Netherlands, and to France. Impro- 
 vident of the future, and unable to judge for himself, he was a 
 slave to the selfish purposes of others, as well as to his own 
 humour and caprice. He seems, likewise, to have been in- 
 capable of discerning the merit or demerit of those who ap- 
 proached him, or the soundness or folly of the counsels which 
 they offered. He was not void of friendship or attachment, and 
 he was active and ambitious ; but he was entirely destitute of 
 that patience, steadiness, and resolution, which are necessary in 
 carrying on any important enterprise ; and his conduct towards 
 the United Provinces, above related, too clearly justifies what 
 was said of him by his sister Margaret, that if fraud and in- 
 fidelity were to be banished from the earth, there was in him a 
 stock sufficient from which it might be soon replenished t . 
 
 Yet his death, at the present crisis, 'was a real calamity to the 
 Assassina- P eo pl e of the United Provinces; but the memory of it 
 tion of the was soon effaced by a much greater calamity, which in a 
 prince of f ew weeks afterwards befell them, in the death of the 
 Orange- p r i nce 0 f Orange ; against whom one of those atrocious 
 attempts, to which Philip’s proscription gave birth, proved at 
 last successful. It was planned, and afterwards executed in 
 
 s It was supposed to have been given him by his physician, bribed by the court of Spain. 
 1 Bentivoglio, 275. Davila, lib. vi. &c. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1584 ] 
 
 385 
 
 Delft, by Balthazar Gerard, a native of Villefans in Burgundy. 
 This man, in order to facilitate his admission into the prince’s 
 presence, had called himself the son of a French Protestant, of 
 the name of Guion, who had suffered for the sake of his religion. 
 By this fictitious account of his extraction, joined to an artful 
 affectation of zeal for the reformed religion and the service of the 
 States, he became known to the prince ; and William was so far 
 deceived by this impostor, that he put him into the train of an 
 ambassador to the court of France. This mark of confidence 
 did not divert him from his ungenerous design ; on the contrary, 
 he had no sooner returned from France, than he resolved to 
 carry it into execution ; and he would have done so, as he after- 
 wards declared, on his first arrival, when he was admitted with 
 letters into the prince’s apartment, if he had not neglected to 
 furnish himself with arms. But in a few days after, having 
 returned to the palace, on the pretence of applying for a passport, 
 he placed himself at the door of that apartment, in which the 
 prince was at dinner with his wife Louisa de Cologni, and his 
 sister the countess of Schwartzenburgh, and waited there, with a 
 cloak cast round him, till they were retiring into another room. 
 The princess, observing him look confused and pale, w T as greatly 
 alarmed, and inquired what he wanted. “He comes for a pass- 
 port,” answered the prince ; when the assassin, stepping forward, 
 shot him in the body with a pistol loaded with three balls. 
 William had time only to say, “ God have mercy on me and 
 this afflicted people ! I am grievously wounded.” Immediately 
 Jul'ioth a ^ er which he fell down, and in a few moments after- 
 * U 3 u wards expired u ; the princess, overwhelmed with anguish, 
 looking on ; whose peculiar fate it was to see her second husband 
 murdered, as her illustrious father, and her first husband, the amia- 
 ble Teligni, had been, in the massacre of Paris, some years before. 
 
 The murderer in the mean time had made his escape out of 
 the palace, by a back-door, and had almost reached the ramparts. 
 He was preparing to throw himself into the ditch, which was full 
 of water, in the hopes of being able to swim over, when he was 
 overtaken by two of the prince’s guards. 
 
 Upon his first examination, he declared, that, six years before 
 the present period, he had formed the design of putting the prince 
 to death : that he had then been deterred from his purpose by 
 his friends ; that he had again resumed it, when the King pub- 
 lished his edict of proscription ; that, having been in the service 
 of Du Pre, secretary to count Mansveldt, he had procured from 
 him some blank subscriptions of the count’s, which, in order to 
 gain credit, he had delivered to the prince ; that he had com- 
 municated his design to four Jesuits in Treves and Tournay, who 
 assured him, that if he should die in the execution of it, he would 
 be deemed a martyr by the Church. 
 
 In the fifty-second year of his age. 
 
386 
 
 HISTORY OF THE ItEIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 To these circumstances, after the torture was applied, he sub- 
 joined, that the reward promised in the proscription had been 
 his principal motive ; that he had made known his purpose to 
 the prince of Parma, and had been desired by him to converse 
 with his secretary, Christopher Assonville ; that Assonville had 
 desired him to reflect on the difficulties which he must encounter ; 
 but had assured him, that he could not perform a more accept- 
 able service either to the King or the prince of Parma ; that he 
 might depend, with perfect security, upon receiving the money 
 promised in the King’s edict of proscription ; but exhorted him 
 repeatedly to deny, in case of his being seized, that the prince of 
 Parma had approved of his design ; although the prince, he said, 
 had in reality approved of it, and had consented to his using 
 the blank subscriptions. 
 
 When he was informed of the sentence pronounced against 
 him, in which it was ordained, that his right hand should be burnt 
 off, and the flesh of his body torn from the bones with burning 
 pincers, he was at first thrown into the most dreadful consterna- 
 tion, and lamented bitterly that he had suffered the thirst of 
 wealth to betray him into an action which had plunged him 
 into such intolerable misery ; but he soon recovered his natu- 
 ral fortitude, and said that, far from repenting of what he 
 had done, he was conscious of having merited the favour of God, 
 and was sure of being admitted into a state of eternal happiness. 
 And in this temper of mind he remained, both in the interval 
 before his execution and in the time of it, during which he 
 exhibited a degree of composure and tranquillity that filled the 
 spectators with astonishment. 
 
 The highest encomiums were bestowed on this deluded wretch 
 by the popish ecclesiastics in the southern provinces; and in 
 many cities they would have lighted up bonfires, and celebrated 
 public rejoicings, if the consent of the people could have been 
 obtained ; but even the prince of Parma’s troops refused to join 
 in these rejoicings, and openly declared their condemnation of 
 an act which they found repugnant to the dictates of their 
 hearts, whatever might be said in justification of it, on the prin- 
 ciples of crooked politics or the popish faith. 
 
 It will be unnecessary to inform the reader of the grief and 
 consternation which this melancholy event diffused throughout 
 the confederated provinces. Each person mourned as for his 
 parent, his guardian, and friend, and felt for the loss which the 
 state had sustained, as men are wont to feel for their private 
 and domestic calamities. Being now deprived of the person 
 whose wisdom had, for many years, been their principal support, 
 they considered themselves as destitute and forlorn, and were 
 overwhelmed with the most gloomy apprehensions of their future 
 fate w . 
 
 w Van Meteren, p. 363. Bentivoglio, lib. xii. 
 
 Thuanus, in hoc anno. 
 
HIL1P II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 387 
 
 1584 .] 
 
 Never was any person better fitted than the prince of Orange 
 Character of for the difficult situation in which he was placed, or 
 the prince, better qualified for the arduous task of delivering an 
 injured people from the yoke of their oppressor. Even his 
 bitterest enemies allow him to have been possessed of vigi- 
 lance, application, penetration, and sagacity, joined with a 
 peculiar dexterity in governing the inclinations of men, and in 
 conciliating and preserving their affections. To these accom- 
 plishments both the history of his life and the testimony of the 
 best-informed historians authorise us to add the virtues of 
 fortitude and magnanimity, of justice and equity, of patience, 
 equanimity, and moderation, which were never, perhaps, found 
 united in one person in so eminent a degree x . Amidst all the 
 variety of fortune which he experienced, he was never either 
 elated or depressed ; but, whether the events in which he was 
 interested were prosperous or adverse, he preserved on all occa- 
 sions the same composure and serenity of soul. 
 
 By a respectable popish historian y , he is accused of avarice and 
 rapacity ; yet that author has not been able to produce a single 
 fact to justify his charge. It appears not, from any historian, 
 that he was ever guilty of employing his power for the purpose 
 of advancing his private interest, to the prejudice either of indi- 
 viduals or the public. He always declined taking any concern 
 in administering the finances. He did not even exact payment 
 of the revenue which the States had appointed him ; and at his 
 death he left his private affairs so much encumbered, that the 
 States found it necessary to make provision for the support of 
 his widow and children 2 . 
 
 The same historian has loaded him with the imputation of 
 fraud and hypocrisy, of which, however, no proof was ever given, 
 but general invective, nor a single instance of deceit produced by 
 his most inveterate enemies. Before his rupture with Philip, he 
 testified on all occasions his disapprobation of the measures that 
 were pursued ; and, after it, he acted uniformly the part of an 
 open foe. He had no religion, say some Catholic writers, but 
 what his interest and ambition dictated. Yet he was decent 
 and irreproachable in his conduct, as well as punctual in dis- 
 charging the functions of that religion which he professed ; nor 
 do these authors pretend to offer any other evidence to justify 
 their surmise, but that he gave up the Catholic religion, in which 
 he had been educated at the court of the Emperor, and returned 
 to that with which his mind had been tinctured in his earliest 
 infancy. His religion was not, indeed, of the same spirit either 
 with that of those whom he forsook, or of many of those whose 
 cause he adopted. It suffered him notto regard either speculative 
 opinions or external rites, as sufficient ground for harassing and 
 butchering those from whom he differed in opinion. But in an age 
 
 Thuani Historia. 
 
 y Bentivoglio. 
 
 C C 2 
 
 1 Wickfort, lib. ii. 
 
388 
 
 HISTORY OB* THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XVIII. 
 
 of cruel gloomy superstition, with which almost all the compa- 
 nions of his youth were deeply infected, his religion, conformably 
 to the example and precepts of its author, was mild, moderate, 
 and humane. Nor was it to one sect of Christians only that his 
 moderation and humanity extended. As he did what he could, 
 while he adhered to the Catholic faith, to put a stop to the per- 
 secution of the Protestants; so, after he had embraced the 
 reformed religion, he exerted his most strenuous endeavours to 
 protect the Catholics from violence, and to procure liberty for 
 them to exercise their religion as far as was consistent with the 
 public peace. To infer from this conduct that he had no religion 
 of his own, is going a great deal farther than to assert the law- 
 fulness of persecution : it is equivalent to maintaining that no 
 Christian can be sincere who can live at peace with those who 
 differ from him in his religious persuasion. 
 
 It is not to the purpose which the popish historians intended 
 to serve by their portraits of William's character, to say of him 
 that he was ambitious ; in itself, ambition merits neither praise 
 nor blame, but is culpable or laudable according to the end at 
 which it aspires, and the means which it employs. But if we 
 judge concerning the character of the prince of Orange accord- 
 ing to this criterion, it must be impossible for persons so oppo- 
 site in their principles, as the Catholic and Protestant historians, 
 to agree. 
 
 If, with the former, we place the rights of all sovereigns on 
 the same foundation, without distinguishing between an abso- 
 lute prince and the sovereign of a free people, and believe that 
 every prince is, by an indefeasible and divine right, entitled to 
 exercise a despotic power over the religion and liberty of his sub- 
 jects ; if we believe, that, with the permission of the Pope, a 
 King may violate his most solemn oaths, and that the obligations 
 of his subjects to obedience remain in force, even after every con- 
 dition upon which they entered into them has been violated ; if, 
 with such principles as these, we judge of the character of the 
 prince of Orange, it will be difficult not to consider him as guilty 
 both of perjury and rebellion ; and in this case, the most favour- 
 able verdict that can be passed upon his conduct is to say, that 
 it proceeded from a criminal ambition. 
 
 But if, on the other hand, we regard the pontiff's pretensions 
 to the power of setting men at liberty from their oaths as absurd 
 and impious ; if we regard the rights of subjects as no less sacred 
 than those of Kings ; if we distinguish between a prince invested 
 with unlimited authority, and one whose power is circumscribed 
 by the fundamental laws of the state ; between a prince whose 
 right to his dominions is indefeasible, and one who obtained his 
 sovereignty only upon certain terms, which he swore to fulfil, 
 while his subjects engaged to yield their obedience on condition 
 of his fulfilling them ; in this case, our judgment of William's 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 389 
 
 1584.] 
 
 character will be extremely different from what it was on the 
 former supposition. We shall not be satisfied with barely assert- 
 ing his innocence of those crimes of which his enemies have 
 accused him, but shall confer upon him the glorious appellations 
 which his countrymen bestowed, of the father of his country, and 
 the guardian of its liberty and laws, who generously sacrificed 
 his interest, ease, and safety to the public good, and who, first 
 by counsel and persuasion, and afterwards by force of arms, did 
 more to rescue his fellow-citizens from oppression than was ever 
 done in such unfavourable circumstances by any patriot in the 
 world before*. 
 
 * William left issue, four sons and eight daughters. By his first wife, Anne of Egmont, 
 countess of Buren, he had Philip- William, who was detained for thirty years a prisoner in 
 Spain ; and Mary de Nassau, who was married to count Hohenloe. 
 
 By his second wife, Anne, daughter of Maurice, elector of Saxony, he had prince Maurice, 
 so much celebrated in the history of the Netherlands ; and a daughter, named Emilia, who 
 married Emanuel, son of Don Antonio, prior of Crato. 
 
 By his third wife, Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the duke de Montpensier, he had 
 six daughters, viz. 
 
 1st. Louisa Juliana, who was married to Frederic IV., Elector Palatine. 
 
 -2nd. Elizabeth, whom he gave in marriage to Henry de la Tour, duke of Bouillon; and 
 who, besides other children, bore her husband the celebrated viscount de Turenne. 
 
 3rd. Catharine, who married Lewis, count de Hanau. 
 
 4th. Charlotte Brabantina, married to Claude, duke de la Trimouille, to whom she bore 
 the celebrated countess of Derby, who distinguished herself during the civil wars in Eng- 
 land ; and from whom are descended the present noble families of Derby and Athol. 
 
 5th. Charlotte Flandrina de Nassau, who embraced the Catholic religion, and died abbess 
 of St. Croix in Poitiers. And, 
 
 6th. Emilia de Nassau, who was married to the duke of Lansberg. 
 
 By his fourth and last wife, Louisa de Coligni, daughter of the great admiral de Chatillon, 
 William had one son, Henry-Frederic, who succeeded his brother Maurice in the princi- 
 pality of Orange, and in his authority in the United Provinces. 
 
 Besides this numerous offspring, William left a natural son, Justin de Nassau, who was 
 highly respected for his bravery and conduct, was intrusted with several important com- 
 mands, and is often mentioned in the sequel. 
 
390 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 BOOK XIX. 
 
 The prince of Parma did not neglect the opportunity which 
 Temper and the distress, occasioned by the death of the prince of 
 disposition of Orange, afforded him, to persuade the confederated 
 the States. p rov j nce g to accept of peace. But their distrust of 
 Philip, their attachment to the Protestant faith, and the other 
 causes mentioned above, still retained their influence, and ren- 
 dered them averse to any reconcilement with a prince against 
 whom their indignation was more inflamed than ever by the 
 cruel injury which they had lately suffered. They could attend 
 to nothing, now, but how to prosecute the war with vigour, or to 
 testify their respect for the memory of the prince of Orange. 
 
 W illiam’s eldest son, the count of Buren, was still a prisoner 
 Prince in Spain ; and his second, prince Maurice a , was engaged 
 Maurice. i n the study of literature and science at the university of 
 Leyden. On this young man, who, at the time of his father’s 
 death, was only eighteen years old, of great hopes, and whose 
 actions afterwards exceeded the most sanguine expectations of 
 his countrymen, the States bestowed the greatest part of the 
 dignities which his father had enjoyed. Besides creating him 
 high-admiral of the Union, they conferred upon him the govern- 
 ment of Holland, Zealand, and Utrecht. And, in order to sup- 
 ply his want of experience, and secure his being early instructed 
 in the military art, they appointed Count Hohenloe, the most 
 accomplished officer in their service, to be his lieutenant or 
 deputy, till he should attain to greater maturity of years and 
 understanding. 
 
 From this conduct of the States, which proved that William’s 
 Reduction ascendant over them had not terminated with his life, 
 of Brussels, Farnese perceived that it would be impossible to bring 
 Ghent, &c. the war £ 0 a conclusion in any other way than by force 
 of arms. Dismissing, therefore, all thoughts of peace, he pro- 
 ceeded with great activity in the military operations which he 
 had begun in Brabant and Flanders ; and his success was in 
 proportion to the prudence and vigilance which he exerted. 
 Besides the towns above mentioned, he had lately acquired 
 Vilvorden and Dendremonde, but he had not yet reduced Ghent, 
 Brussels, or Antwerp. To have proceeded separately against 
 each of those places in the ordinary way of sieges, would have 
 protracted the war to an excessive length. Instead of that 
 method, he bethought himself of another, which was suggested 
 
 " Grandson, by the mother’s side, of the celebrated elector of Saxony, of the same name. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 391 
 
 1584.] 
 
 by the situation of the several towns, and the nature of their 
 resources. This was to make himself master of the banks of the 
 rivers and canals on which they stood, while he sent out flying 
 parties of horse to scour the adjacent country. And thus he 
 not only put a stop to their trade, without which they could not 
 subsist, but cut off all of them but Antwerp from every sort of 
 communication with other places. For several months, however, 
 the inhabitants declined entering into any terms of accommoda- 
 tion. But when they considered that, unless he were obliged to 
 draw off his troops by the approach of a superior army, they 
 must soon be reduced to -the last extremity, their resolution 
 failed, they began to listen more patiently to the exhortations 
 which the secret partisans of Spain were daily sounding in their 
 ears ; and at length, such of them as were situated in the more 
 interior parts, first Ghent, and afterwards Brussels, and some 
 other inland towns, resolved to return under the Spanish govern- 
 ment, upon conditions to which Farnese had, on different occa- 
 sions, shown himself willing to agree. 
 
 Of these conditions, the most important were the following : 
 “ That the people should engage to acknowledge no other sove- 
 reign but the king of Spain ; that no religion but the Roman 
 Catholic should be permitted, but that the Protestants should 
 be allowed to remain in the Netherlands for two years, in order 
 to dispose of their effects ; that a sum of money should be paid 
 for defraying the expenses of the war ; that all past offences 
 should be forgiven, and all the ancient rights and privileges of 
 the inhabitants restored and maintained inviolate.” 
 
 In fulfilling his part of these conditions, Farnese not only 
 acted with strict fidelity, but displayed a degree of lenity and 
 moderation that was admirably calculated to promote his views. 
 Of the fine of three hundred thousand crowns, to which the 
 people of Ghent consented in their treaty of surrender, he de- 
 manded only two hundred thousand. And although, in his act 
 of indemnity, six persons, more obnoxious than the rest, had been 
 excepted, he required from them only a pecuniary fine. He was 
 likewise at all times willing to listen to the complaints of the 
 Protestants, and to redress their grievances b . 
 
 All the considerable towns in Brabant were now subdued, 
 Siege of except Antwerp. The prince had early formed the reso- 
 Antwerp. fiition of laying siege to that important city ; and, some 
 time before his acquisition of Ghent and Brussels, he had taken 
 measures for beginning it. But in order to secure success, it 
 was necessary that his utmost skill and strength should be ex- 
 erted ; and he now applied himself to the prosecution of his design 
 with all the anxiety, zeal, and industry, which an object of the 
 highest consequence deserved. 
 
 Antwerp was at this time not only the richest and most 
 
 b Metercn, p. 368. 
 
392 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 splendid, but likewise the strongest, city in the Netherlands. As 
 it lies extended along the banks of the Scheld, and the confede- 
 rates still maintained their superiority at sea, it was thought to 
 be sufficiently secured on one side by a strong wall, which ran 
 parallel to the river ; and on the other sides it was fortified by 
 ramparts of extraordinary height, and a ditch filled with water, 
 of such depth and breadth as, in the opinion of those times, ren- 
 dered it almost impregnable. 
 
 Such was the judgment formed of it by the prince of Parma ; 
 and on this account he did not intend to attempt reducing it by 
 storm, but to have recourse to the slower method of blockade, 
 which he knew must, sooner or later, prove successful. 
 
 On the side towards the land, he found it extremely easy to 
 render the "blockade complete, as the States had no army able 
 to contend with him in the field, and all the neighbouring towns 
 were in his possession. But these circumstances he perceived 
 would be of little advantage, while the besieged remained masters 
 of the Scheld ; and therefore, to deprive them of this resource 
 was the great object to which all his operations, during this 
 celebrated siege, were directed. 
 
 The people of Antwerp had penetrated into his design, and 
 omitted nothing in their power to prevent him from carrying it 
 into execution. With this view they had constructed two forts, 
 one on each side of the river, about three miles below the town ; 
 to one of which they gave the name of Lieffkensoech, and to the 
 other that of Lillo. Farnese judged it necessary to begin his 
 operations with reducing these forts. He sent the marquis de 
 Koubais against Lieffkensoech, which stood on the Flanders side 
 of the Scheld, while Mondragon laid siege to Lillo. Boubais 
 found no great difficulty in fulfilling the general’s intention with 
 regard to Lieffkensoech : but Mondragons attempt on the fort 
 of Lillo was not attended with the same success. This fort was 
 valiantly defended by Colonel Balfour, a Scotch officer of distin- 
 guished merit, and Teligny, the worthy son of the brave La Noue. 
 After battering the ramparts for several days, Mondragon at- 
 tempted to take the fort by storm, but was repulsed ; and in his 
 repulse, and a sally which the garrison had made some days 
 before, he sustained the loss of no less than two thousand men. 
 
 Upon receiving intelligence of this disaster, the prince of 
 Parma, after settling the government of the towns which he had 
 lately conquered, came himself to view the scene of action. He 
 found that all the time and pains and blood which had been spent 
 in the siege of this fort had been misapplied ; and perceived that, as 
 it stood at some distance from the banks, it did not materially inter- 
 fere with his plan for putting a stop to the navigation of the river. 
 
 For this reason, instead of pushing the immediate reduction of 
 it, he was satisfied with blockading it on the land side, so as to 
 prevent the excursions of the garrison. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 393 
 
 1584. J 
 
 Having given instructions for this purpose, he called a council 
 The prince of his general officers, and laid before them his project 
 of Parma’s f or blocking up the Scheld, by building a bridge over 
 blocking up it? t < 0 intercept the communication between the besieged 
 the Scheld. city and the maritime provinces ; an enterprise which, 
 had it failed, would have exposed him to derision, but which 
 showed the boldness of his genius, and has contributed, more 
 than almost any other of his military achievements, to raise his 
 character to that exalted rank which it holds in the annals of 
 history. 
 
 By most of the officers his proposal was regarded as chimerical. 
 For where, said they, can materials be found for so great an 
 undertaking ? And even if they should be found, yet how is it 
 possible to transport them hither ? By land- carriage, it is utterly 
 impracticable ; nor would it seem to be much easier by water, 
 while the enemy possesses so great a superiority in naval force. 
 Besides that, no beams, they observed, were of sufficient length 
 to reach the bottom of the river. 
 
 To build a bridge of ships, they thought, would be equally 
 impracticable, because he did not possess so great a number as 
 was necessary, and it would be impossible to collect them from 
 different places, in the face of a vigilant enemy, of a superior 
 naval strength. And even allowing it were possible, either with 
 beams or ships, to construct such a bridge as was projected, yet it 
 would be quickly destroyed by the ice, or by the tides and storms, 
 or by the enemy. 
 
 But Farnese, conscious of resources in the fertility of his 
 genius, of which his officers could form no idea, was not dis- 
 couraged by these objections. He considered that the measure 
 on which he had resolved was the only one by which Antwerp 
 could be reduced, and that, till bo should reduce that city, and 
 thereby get possession of a naval force, the towns lately acquired 
 (which usually carried on their trade by the way of Antwerp) 
 must suffer the greatest inconveniences ; and it would be in vain 
 for him to attempt the conquest of the maritime provinces. 
 
 Determined by these considerations, he proceeded instantly to 
 make the preparations necessary for executing his design. Hav- 
 ing first sounded the river, and measured its breadth in different 
 places, he found that, between the village of Ordham in Brabant, 
 and Caloo in Flanders, it was neither so deep nor so broad as 
 above or below. At this place, therefore, he resolved to build a 
 bridge : and he began with raising two strong forts opposite to 
 each other on the different sides of the river, besides several 
 redoubts, on which, as well as on the forts, he planted a great 
 number of cannon, to defend the bridge when finished, and to 
 protect the workmen while engaged in building it . 
 
 In the mean time he ransacked all the country round for 
 materials, and had the good fortune to find at Dendremonde and 
 
394 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 Ghent great quantities of every thing requisite for the intended 
 work. If he could have conveyed his materials to Caloo down 
 the Scheld, a great expense of labour and time would have been 
 saved. This he repeatedly attempted ; but he soon found that 
 it was impossible to escape the vigilance of the citizens, who, being 
 directed in all their operations by St. Aldegonde, lay in wait for 
 his boats near Antwerp, and either took or destroyed them. 
 
 In order to avoid the repetition of this disaster, Farnese made, 
 on the Flanders side, near Borcht, which stands higher than 
 Antwerp, a large cut in the dyke of the Scheld, by which he laid 
 all the neck of land between Borcht and Caloo under water ; 
 opening an egress for the water by another cut near Caloo, and 
 transporting his apparatus for the bridge across the inundation. 
 This expedient rendered it unnecessary for his boats to pass by 
 Antwerp, and they likewise arrived sooner at their destined 
 port. 
 
 But St. Aldegonde, having built a redoubt on the Brabant 
 side, opposide to the cut at Borcht, and stationed some armed 
 vessels to cruise there, soon rendered the passage as difficult as 
 before. Farnese was therefore obliged to adopt another ex- 
 periment, much more laborious than the former, but which he 
 knew would certainly be attended with success. This was to dig 
 a canal, fifteen Italian miles in length, to join the inundation just 
 now mentioned with a little river which falls into the Scheld at 
 Ghent. That he might finish this arduous undertaking the more 
 speedily, he fixed his head-quarters at Beveren, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of the canal, and was perpetually present himself, 
 exhorting and encouraging the workmen ; and sometimes taking 
 the spade and pick-axe into his own hand. The work was 
 finished with wonderful expedition, and fully answered his ex- 
 pectation. As the enemy could have no access either to the 
 canal or the river with which it communicated, he conveyed all 
 necessary materials and engines from Ghent without opposition, 
 and immediately afterwards began the construction of the bridge. 
 
 The two extremities of this edifice were formed of huge beams, 
 Description driven into the bottom of the river by the force of 
 of the bridge, engines, and strongly bound together by other trans- 
 verse or cross beams. This part of the work, called the staccados 
 or estaccados, ran from each side of the river towards the middle 
 of it, as far as the depth of the water would allow ; which, on the 
 Flanders side, was two hundred feet, and on the other, nine 
 hundred. These staccados were only twelve feet broad, except 
 towards the two extremities, next the centre of the river, where 
 their breadth being increased to forty feet, two forts were erected 
 upon them, and furnished with artillery. The whole was covered 
 at top with strong planks, and a parapet, five feet high, of the 
 thickest planks, was raised upon it for the security of the soldiors. 
 A row of piles was then driven deep into the bottom of the river, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 395 
 
 1585.] 
 
 parallel to each of the staccados, at the distance of a few feet from 
 them, and strongly fastened to the beams of which they were 
 composed. Besides which, another row of long beams, pointed 
 with iron, was placed horizontally, a little above the surface of the 
 water ; stretching out to a considerable length from the bridge 
 on both sides, so as to make it dangerous for ships to approach. 
 
 By this part of the work the navigation of the river was 
 considerably straitened ; but, as there was an open space in the 
 middle, between the heads of the estaccados, of more than one 
 thousand two hundred and fifty feet, the enemy’s ships, taking 
 advantage sometimes of the night, and sometimes of the wind 
 and tide, continued, though not without loss, to pass and repass 
 as formerly ; and the city was still abundantly supplied with 
 provisions. Farnese having, from the beginning, intended to fill 
 up the intermediate space with ships, had with great difficulty 
 collected two-and-thirty, which he judged to be a sufficient 
 number. These vessels, after the masts had been taken out, 
 were placed with their sides parallel to each other, at the dis- 
 tance of about twenty feet. They were strongly fastened 
 together by chains, and were fixed in their places by anchors at 
 both ends, in such a manner that the sailors could shorten or 
 lengthen their cables, as the tide either rose or fell. Over the 
 intermediate spaces, strong beams went from one ship to another. 
 Above these were laid planks ; and the same sort of parapet was 
 erected as that which was raised on the staccados. Thirty 
 soldiers and four sailors were put on board each ship, and all the 
 ships were planted with artillery. 
 
 For the greater security of this part of the work, a flota, one 
 thousand two hundred feet long, was constructed of barks, bound 
 together in the same manner as the ships of which the bridge 
 was formed, with the same sort of beams pointed with iron, 
 resembling a file of pikes, stretching from that end of the barks 
 which lay next to the enemy. These barks were filled with 
 empty casks, to prevent them from being sunk, and were fixed 
 in their place by anchors. Of this kind of flota, two were con- 
 structed, consisting each of two-and-thirty barks, one above, and 
 the other below the bridge, at the distance of two hundred 
 yards. 
 
 This stupendous work c furnished employment to the prince of 
 15g5 Parma’s fleet and army for more than half-a-year With- 
 out a fleet of considerable strength it could not have been 
 executed, and the procuring of this fleet in such disadvantageous 
 circumstances was one of the many striking proofs which Far- 
 nese exhibited, on this occasion, of that extraordinary activity 
 and enterprise by which his character is so eminently dis- 
 tinguished. With infinite labour and difficulty he had equipped, 
 at Ghent and Dunkirk, forty armed vessels, and put them under 
 
 c It was finished February, 1585. 
 
396 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 the command of the marquis de Roubais ; who, being well sup- 
 ported by the forts and redoubts on the banks of the river, pro- 
 tected the workmen, in spite of the most vigorous efforts which 
 the besieged could make to interrupt them. 
 
 Farnese, however, would not probably have succeeded in his 
 enterprise, if the United States had exerted themselves with 
 vigour proportioned either to that of the enemy or to the 
 importance of the prize contested. It now appeared how great 
 was the loss which the confederacy had sustained in the death of 
 the prince of Orange. By William’s superior rank, wisdom, and 
 experience, some turbulent leaders had been restrained, who, 
 after his death, indulged their factious, interested spirit, without 
 regard to the pernicious consequences which might ensue. 
 Among these was Treslong, whom the States had appointed 
 commander of the fleet destined for the relief of Antwerp. This 
 man, whether from treachery or from private resentment, paid 
 no regard to his instructions ; but, on different pretences, at first 
 delayed putting the orders of the States in execution ; and at 
 last told them that he would not sail, unless some persons with 
 whom he had quarrelled were removed from the magistracy. On 
 this occassion, prince Maurice called an assembly of the States of 
 the province, dismissed Treslong from his employment, and put 
 him under arrest. The command of the fleet was then given to 
 count Hohenloe ; but the time, in which its operations might 
 have proved effectual, was past ; and the bridge, with all its 
 fortifications, as above described, was almost finished. 
 
 No words can express the astonishment which it excited in the 
 Consterna- minds of the besieged. At the commencement of the 
 tion of the work, they had regarded it rather as an object of derision 
 besieged. ^ ian ag g^ed excite any serious apprehension or alarm. 
 Their anxiety and terror now were in proportion to their former 
 confidence and security. They saw an entire stop put to their 
 trade in every quarter. They already felt many of the incon- 
 veniences of a siege. Their imaginations represented, in the 
 most dreadful light, the calamities which they were about to 
 suffer ; and persons of all ranks began to talk of the necessity of 
 preventing them in time, by making their peace with the enemy. 
 But they were diverted from forming any fixed resolution by St. 
 Aldegonde, who employed all his eloquence and address to rouse 
 their abhorrence of the Spanish yoke, and to inspire them with 
 the hopes of being able to raise the siege. 
 
 44 It is not surprising,” said he, in an assembly of those who held 
 Speech of St. public offices in the town, “that many of our fellow- 
 AidegonJe. citizens should tremble at the prospect of' those hardships 
 which usually attend a long continued siege. But while we cast 
 our eyes forward to these, let us reflect on the calamities which 
 we have reason to dread from a surrender. We have seen, within 
 these few years, two memorable sieges, the siege of Haerlem, and 
 
1585.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. ►" 397 
 
 that of Leyden. The people of Haerlem, rather than submit to 
 the last extremities, chose to throw themselves on the mercy of 
 the Spaniards. But how bitterly did they repent of their having 
 done so ! And how much better had it been to have fallen 
 in the field of battle, than to suffer, as so great a number of 
 the bravest did, that ignominious death, to which they were 
 doomed by the cruel Spaniard ! The inhabitants of Leyden, on 
 the other hand, resolved rather to die than to deliver themselves 
 up to such a perfidious enemy ; and the consequence of their 
 adhering to this resolution was, that the siege was raised, and a 
 period put to all their miseries. Can we hesitate in deciding 
 which of these examples we ought to follow ? Is not death more 
 eligible than submission to the dominion of an enemy, from 
 whom we have endured such intolerable outrage ? 
 
 “ If this city shall fall again under the yoke of these oppressors, 
 can we doubt that the citadel will be restored, and with it all the 
 tyranny which they were*wont to exercise ? Will not our religion 
 be proscribed, and the inquisition established ? This illustrious 
 city will then become a colony of Spaniards. Her commerce will 
 be ruined, and her inhabitants obliged /to wander in search of 
 places of abode, forlorn and indigent. But why should I thus 
 describe the disasters of a surrender f There is still no reason for 
 despair. It is impossible that this bridge can stand long against 
 the efforts which we shall make for its destruction. Let us not 
 therefore be wanting to ourselves; but, with a fixed unalterable pur- 
 pose, let us embrace the glorious alternative of liberty or death. 1 ’ 
 
 By these exhortations, joined to the respect in which his cha- 
 racter was held, St. Aldegonde gained over the citizens to a 
 perfect conformity with his sentiments ; and persuaded them to 
 renew the oath, which they had formerly taken, never to return 
 under the dominion of the king of Spain. An edict was then 
 published, prohibiting all persons, under the severest penalties, 
 from listening to any terms of accommodation that might be 
 offered : after which they proceeded with redoubled ardour to 
 put in practice such expedients as had been devised for the demo- 
 lition of the bridge. 
 
 In order to effectuate this, they had been for some time past 
 Preparations employed in preparing fire-ships, under the direction of 
 °ieo-ed for "de ^iambelli, a celebrated Italian engineer, who appears to 
 molishing the have been the author of this invention. They were formed 
 bridge. of the thickest planks, and had each of them a mine 
 or chamber in the middle. This mine was built in the strongest 
 manner, and filled with gunpowder, and with rugged stones, bullets, 
 and such other weighty materials, rammed hard and close, on pur- 
 pose to increase the resistance and augment the force of the 
 explosion. 
 
 The citizens laboured at the same time in constructing a flat- 
 bottomed vessel of extraordinary strength and size, with which they 
 
398 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 intended to attack the forts and redoubts on the bank of the river. 
 This enormous machine was more properly a floating castle than 
 a ship, and the townVpeople had, on account of the sanguine 
 expectations which they conceived from it, given it the name of 
 “ the End of the War . 11 
 
 While the people of Antwerp were thus employed, the confe- 
 derates who lay at Lillo, under count Hohenloe, made a vigorous 
 attack on the fort of Lieffkensoech, and compelled the garrison 
 to surrender. From Lieffkensoech, they proceeded against 
 another fort, of the name of St. Anthony, which they likewise 
 reduced with the same facility. When intelligence was brought 
 to the prince of Parma of their descent, he set out with a detach- 
 ment of his army to oppose their progress ; but both the forts 
 had surrendered before he could arrive. Being enraged against 
 the commanders of these forts, on account of their having made 
 too feeble a resistance, he ordered them both to be beheaded on 
 the dyke of the Scheld, in sight of the eflemy. He was the more 
 concerned for the loss of Lieffkensoech, as it gave the enemy free 
 possession of the navigation of the river below the bridge, and 
 thereby tended to facilitate the execution of any design which 
 they might form for its destruction. 
 
 At first he imagined that the solicitude which the confederates 
 had shown for the recovery of Lieffkensoech had proceeded from 
 their intending to make an attempt upon the lower side of the 
 bridge. But it soon appeared that their only view was to second the 
 operations of the besieged, and to complete that ruin which they 
 expected the explosion of the fire-ships would certainly produce. 
 
 These vessels were sent down the river, with a favourable wind 
 and tide, on the fourth of April. The Spaniards, who had got 
 some imperfect intelligence of their nature, were filled with the 
 most anxious expectations. They knew them to be the fire-ships, 
 from their unusual appearance, and were variously affected, 
 according to the various conjectures which they formed of the 
 effects that were about to be produced. But they were all alike 
 prompted by curiosity, to behold a spectacle which had never 
 been exhibited in any siege before : and the banks of the river, the 
 forts and redoubts, and even the bridge itself, were crowded 
 with spectators. 
 
 Of several vessels which Giambelli had prepared, only two 
 were constructed in the manner above mentioned ; the one of 
 which contained in its mine six thousand pounds of gunpowder, 
 and the other, seven thousand five hundred pounds. One of them 
 ran ashore before it reached the bridge. But the other, being 
 more fortunate in its direction, was driven towards that part of 
 the bridge where the staccado, on the Flanders side, was united to 
 the ships. A great number of the Spanish officers and soldiers 
 had the courage to jump on board, in order to extinguish the 
 train, which Giambelli had contrived in such a manner, as to re- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 399 
 
 1585.] 
 
 quire an hour before it could reach the mine. The prince of 
 Parma had advanced a little way on the staccado, to wait for the 
 event ; but was prevailed upon by his officers to retire. He had 
 scarcely entered the neighbouring fort, when the explosion hap- 
 pened, with a noise more dreadful than the loudest thunder. 
 A sudden darkness overspread the region round. The ground 
 shook as in an earthquake. The river, disturbed in its course, 
 was thrown over its dykes, and poured into the fort of Caloo with 
 inconceivable violence. Not only such of the Spaniards perished 
 as had ventured to go on board the fire-ship, but all those too 
 who were upon the bridge, and many of those who stood upon 
 the banks of the river. No language can describe the horror of 
 the scene which presented itself after the smoke was dispelled. 
 The bridge, and both the surface and the banks of the river, were 
 covered with the dead and wounded, whose bodies were dis- 
 figured in a thousand hideous ways by the smoke and flames, 
 and the various instruments of destruction with which the ship 
 was stored. Eight hundred men were killed, and a great number 
 maimed and dangerously wounded. Among the killed were 
 many officers of distinction ; but no person perished, so deeply 
 lamented by the prince of Parma, as the Marquis de Roubais, 
 the general of the horse ; a nobleman distinguished by many 
 shining accomplishments, brave, active, and expert, both in the 
 arts of peace and war ; once an enemy of Spain ; but who, 
 prompted by jealousy of the prince of Orange, had abandoned the 
 cause of liberty, and shown, for some years past, no less zeal in 
 reducing his countrymen under the Spanish yoke, than he had 
 discovered formerly in asserting their independence. It was not 
 only losses of this kind which the prince of Parma sustained on 
 this occasion. The bridge likewise suffered considerable damage. 
 Six of the ships which composed the middle part of it were burnt ; 
 some were forced from their stations, and others turned with 
 their keels uppermost, and dashed to pieces. 
 
 If the confederates had improved the opportunity which this 
 havoc afforded them, the whole work might have been demolished ; 
 and in that case, a prediction of the prince of Orange would have 
 been fulfilled ; that, if Farnese, with so small an army, should 
 undertake the siege of Antwerp, it would prove his ruin. But, 
 as was observed by the old experienced Mondragone, it ap- 
 peared, from many circumstances in the conduct of the confede- 
 rates in this siege, that the prince of Orange was dead. 
 
 By some strange fatality, or some unaccountable inadvertence, 
 or, as one historian insinuates, by a misunderstanding between 
 the magistrates of Antwerp and the admiral of the Antwerp fleet, 
 those fire-ships, which had cost so great an expense of money, 
 ingenuity, time and pains, were sent down the Scheld before any 
 concert had been formed with the confederates at Lillo, who 
 were therefore unprepared to second that mighty effort which 
 
400 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 had been made for opening the navigation of the river. Giam- 
 belli, though extremely solicitous to know the success of his in- 
 vention, remained entirely ignorant of it for two days. A large 
 reward was offered to those who should venture to go down the 
 river for intelligence. But none had courage to advance far 
 enough to make any certain discovery ; nor did the citizens know 
 anything of what had happened till the third night after, when 
 they received information of it by a messenger from count 
 Hohenloe. 
 
 The prince of Parma was in the mean time employed in repair- 
 ing the bridge ; and he exerted himself with so much activity and 
 vigour, that it was made as strong as ever before the besieged 
 were acquainted with the damage which it had sustained. His 
 late experience suggested to him an alteration in the work, which 
 was found afterwards of great importance : this was to remove 
 the flotas, and to form that part of the bridge which was com- 
 posed of the ships, in such a manner that, in case the enemy 
 should repeat their experiment, it might be opened at different 
 places, to let the fire-ships pass through and continue their course 
 down the river. 
 
 The spirits of the besieged were still supported by the san- 
 Other at- guine hopes which they had conceived from that enor- 
 tempts of mous vessel which they called “ the End of the War.” 
 the besieged, k U g e mac hi ne was entirely the work of the citizens, 
 
 and was not approved of either by Giambelli or St. Aldegonde. 
 It was found, on trial, too unwieldy to answer the purpose for 
 which it was intended. After planting the lower part of it with 
 cannon, and filling the higher part with musketeers, they made 
 an attack upon one of the Spanish redoubts ; but they failed in 
 their attempt, and the machine itself was so much shattered, as 
 to be rendered almost unfit for future use. 
 
 At Giambelirs desire, the senate of Antwerp had again recourse 
 to their first expedient of fire-ships ; but the enemy having learnt 
 the nature of these machines, employed different means to render 
 them ineffectual. They laid hold of them as soon as they appeared, 
 and sometimes extinguished the trains, and sometimes dragged 
 the vessels to the banks of the river, or through the openings in 
 the bridge. 
 
 Giambelli then bethought himself of another device, from which 
 he believed that some more certain effect might be expected. 
 Having bound together in one compacted body fifteen ships 
 armed with pointed beams, and with scythes or falchions, for 
 cutting the chains and cordage of the bridge, he sent them, 
 accompanied with fire-ships, down the river when the wind and 
 tide were combined and favourable. The shock which this con- 
 trivance produced was very great ; but, through the wise precau- 
 tion which Farnese had taken, by making the openings just now 
 mentioned, together with the unexampled boldness of his soldiers 
 
1585 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 401 
 
 in laying hold of the fire-ships, the bridge received no greater 
 damage than could be quickly repaired. Some other expedients 
 were proposed by Giambelli, but the senate was deterred from 
 adopting them, partly by the expense and time requisite to pre- 
 pare his machines, and partly by the difficulty of finding mariners 
 and soldiers willing to expose themselves to the danger with which 
 the putting his inventions in practice would have been attended. 
 
 There remained now for the besieged only one resource, to 
 The coun- which, if they had given proper attention in the begin- 
 terdyke of ning, all the anxiety, expense and labour, which they 
 Cou vestei n. beg^yed in attempting to demolish the bridge, might 
 have been saved. In order to form a clear conception of what 
 will be said on this interesting part of the present subject, it is 
 necessary to remember that the ground on the north side of the 
 Scheld, between Antwerp and Lillo, is much lower than the rest 
 of the country ; and were it not for the dyke of the river, would 
 every tide be overflowed. This ground is generally covered with 
 water in many places, but in other parts it furnishes pasture for 
 a great number of cattle with which the Antwerp market is sup- 
 plied. Through the middle of this plain there runs from the 
 village of Couvestein, where the country begins to rise, to the 
 great dyke of the Scheld, a smaller dyke, called the Counterdyke 
 of Couvestein, which had been formed to serve for a road or 
 causeway. The confederates at Lillo could, by opening the 
 dyke of the Scheld, lay all the ground under water between 
 Lillo and the counterdyke, while the besieged could, with the 
 same facility, introduce the river into that part of the plain which 
 lies between the counterdyke and Antwerp ; and thus, by break- 
 ing down the counterdyke, the inundations on each side of it 
 could be united, and a free navigation opened between Antwerp 
 and Lillo. 
 
 The reader will easily perceive, that while the bridge stood, 
 the fate of Antwerp depended entirely on the counterdyke ; and 
 that, in case the confederates could make themselves masters of 
 it, they might bid defiance to the prince of Parma, and without 
 anxiety suffer him to retain possession of the bridge. If, in the 
 beginning, they had believed it practicable for him to execute his 
 design of blocking up the river, they could have fortified them- 
 selves on the counterdyke in such a manner, that, with the assist- 
 ance of the inundation, they would have baffled his most vigorous 
 efforts to expel them. But they were deceived by the contempt 
 which they entertained of his intended enterprise, and did not 
 perceive their error in neglectingto occupy this important station 
 till it was too late. The prince of Parma had already seized 
 upon it, and taken every necessary precaution against the 
 attempts which he doubted not they would, sooner or later, 
 make to wrest it from him. He committed the charge of defend- 
 ing it to two of his most vigilant officers, Mondragone and Mans- 
 
 D D 
 
402 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 velt. He ordered it to be made broader and higher than it was 
 before. He strengthened it with piles of wood driven into it 
 transversely, and he created several forts npon it, besides planting 
 redoubts on the dyke of the Scheld, with which he intended to 
 take the enemy in flank, in case they should venture to approach. 
 
 The confederates, however, despairing of being able to demolish 
 the bridge, resolved, if possible, to dislodge him from the counter - 
 dyke. And their first attempt, after laying the ground on each 
 side of it under water, was made in the beginning of May, by 
 Count Hohenloe. That general had formed the plan of this 
 attack in concert with St. Aldegonde, who was to have co-operated 
 with him, and had agreed to set sail with the Antwerp fleet im- 
 mediately after lighting up, on a tower in the city, three fires, as 
 a signal of his departure. By a mistake of the person to whom 
 the charge of this signal was committed, it was exhibited before 
 the time, and through this untoward accident Count Hohenloe 
 was left alone in the execution of his enterprise. He conducted 
 it, however, with vigour, and laid one of the forts and a part of 
 the counterdyke in ruins ; after which he thought it prudent to 
 retire, and to reserve his forces unimpaired till the besieged 
 should be ready to second his operations. This unfortunate 
 attempt served only to rouse the prince of Parma to greater 
 vigilance and exertion. Agreeably to his conjectures, he saw that 
 the principal efforts of the enemy would henceforth be directed 
 against the counterdyke ; and, therefore, he not only applied 
 himself with diligence to repair the damage which it had sus- 
 tained in the late attack, but visited every day all the redoubts 
 and forts, and reinforced the garrisons with chosen troops taken 
 from the several nations of which his army was composed. 
 
 The confederates at Lillo, and the people of Antwerp, were in 
 the mean time indefatigable in making preparations for another 
 attack. St. Aldegonde stood almost single in his opinion on this 
 occasion, and endeavoured to convince his countrymen, that it 
 would be easier for them to destroy the bridge itself, than to 
 make themselves masters of the counterdyke, in opposition to an 
 enemy so much upon their guard, and so strongly fortified. But 
 having, since their disappointment with regard to the effect of 
 the fire-ships, been accustomed to consider the bridge as impreg- 
 nable, they were deaf to whatever he could advance upon the 
 subject, and he was obliged to concur (which he did with all his 
 wonted activity) in the execution of that design of which the 
 majority approved. 
 
 Towards the end of May everything was prepared, both at 
 Battle of the Antwerp and Lillo, that was thought necessary to 
 counterdyke, secure success ; and, on the 26th of that month, Count 
 Hohenloe, according to concert with St. Aldegonde, sailed from 
 Lillo early in the morning, with a squadron of more than a hun- 
 dred ships, having on board a numerous body of troops, under 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 403 
 
 1585 .] 
 
 the command of the most experienced officers in the United Pro- 
 vinces' 1 . He resolved to make his attack at the broadest part of 
 the counterdyke, between the*two middle forts, called the Fort 
 of the Palisades and Fort St. George, where there was room to 
 intrench his troops. In order to facilitate his landing, he sent 
 before him four vessels resembling fire-ships, with some trains of 
 gunpowder, to which the soldiers, who were concealed within, 
 set fire. This device produced the designed effect. The Spa- 
 niards, taking the smoke and flame for the forerunners of an 
 explosion, retired hastily from that part of the dyke to which 
 they saw the vessels approaching. The' confederates in the mean 
 time advanced, and landed between seven and eight hundred 
 men, who were quickly followed by all the rest of the forces. 
 The Spaniards then discovered the artifice by which they had 
 been deceived, and immediately returning, attempted to recover 
 the station which they had left. An obstinate and bloody action 
 ensued, while the contending parties were supported on the one 
 side by the cannon of the fleet, and on the other by those of the 
 forts on the counter dyke. 
 
 In the midst of this contest St. Aldegonde arrived with the 
 fleet from Antwerp, which was nearly as numerous as that from 
 Lillo. The confederates being thus powerfully reinforced, kept 
 possession of the ground which they had gained, and while some 
 of them fought, others were employed in cutting the count erdyke, 
 and in raising temporary defences of piles of wood, and sacks of 
 earth and wool, against the fire of the enemy. The combatants 
 being cooped up in a narrow space, every stroke and shot did 
 execution. But they received continual supplies of fresh men 
 from the ships and forts, and their courage was superior to every 
 danger. Both St. Aldegonde and Hohenloe mingled with the 
 combatants, and by their example and exhortations nourished 
 the desperate and intrepid ardour of the soldiers. “ This is the 
 last difficulty (cried St. Aldegonde) which remains to be sur- 
 mounted. Persist as you have begun, and Antwerp, that bul- 
 wark of our confederacy, will soon be delivered. Your liberty, 
 your future safety, and everything dear and sacred, depend on 
 the success of your present enterprise. We have now no choice 
 left but victory or death.” 
 
 The Spanish generals were at no less pains to animate their 
 troops. Both Mondragqne and Mansvelt, though worn out with 
 age and the fatigues of a long-continued warfare, displayed on 
 this occasion the highest degree of valour and intrepidity. But, 
 notwithstanding their most vigorous exertions, the confederates 
 still maintained their ground. They twice repulsed the Italians 
 and Spaniards. Of the materials which they had brought along 
 with them, they raised a considerable bulwark against the enemy’s 
 artillery. They made several openings in the counterdyke, and 
 
 d Justin de Nassau, Iselstein, Fremin, Morgan, and Balfour. 
 D D 2 
 
404 History of the reign of [Book xix. 
 
 were so confident of victory, that St. Aldegonde and Count 
 Hohenloe, after assigning to the several officers their respective 
 stations, set sail for Antwerp in a ship which had passed through 
 one of these openings, and entered the city in triumph. Their 
 design, it is said, was to consult with the magistrates concerning 
 some future measures which they thought necessary to be pur- 
 sued. But what the particular motives were, which determined 
 the commanders-in-chief to leave their troops at this crisis, is not 
 told by the cotemporary historians ; and we are left to suspect 
 two men of vanity and folly, whose general conduct furnishes 
 not the smallest ground for so unfavourable an imputation. They 
 were received at Antwerp with the highest transports of grati- 
 tude and joy, and the people flocked to the harbour, impatiently 
 expecting the arrival of the supplies of provisions which they 
 believed to be near at hand. 
 
 But this joy was of short duration : the prince of Parma was 
 for some time ignorant of what had passed. Having watched 
 all the preceding night, he had gone in the morning to his head- 
 quarters at Beveren, and retired to rest ; but being soon awaked 
 hy the noise of the guns, he selected a body of troops, and imme- 
 diately marched to the place of action. 
 
 On his arrival, he viewed with indignation the enemy in pos- 
 session of the counterdyke. He rushed forward at the head of 
 his battalion, and sighing, exclaimed, “ Where, my fellow- 
 soldiers, is now your wonted intrepidity ? Are you not ashamed 
 thus to yield to an enemy you have so often conquered, and in 
 one hour to lose the fruit of all your labours ? Let who will 
 follow me; I shall either die, or conquer.” Having spoken 
 these words, he advanced towards the enemy with a sword in 
 one hand, and a buckler in the other. The danger to which he 
 was exposed inflamed his troops to a degree of madness. They 
 returned to the charge with redoubled fury, and, in spite of the 
 most intrepid resistance, they drove the confederates along the 
 counterdyke, till they came to the place where their companions 
 were intrenched : there they stopped. The dispute was despe- 
 rate, and the confederates, being reinforced with fresh troops from 
 their ships, once more compelled the Spaniards to retire ; but 
 Farnese, whose ardour was unabated, still urging and impelling 
 them, the attack was instantly renewed, and the Spaniards proved 
 at last victorious. 
 
 It was now only within their intrenchment that the confederates 
 retained possession of the counterdyke. The prince of Parma 
 ;and his troops were aware of the difficulty which they must 
 encounter, in attacking an intrenchment defended by men who 
 from the beginning had displayed the most determined bravery ; 
 yet they boldly advanced amidst an incessant fire both from the 
 ships and the intrenchment. Great numbers fell : still, however, 
 they continued to advance ; and whilst those who were in the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 105 
 
 1585 .] 
 
 rear maintained a constant fire upon the enemy, the foremost 
 ranks were employed in demolishing the fortification. 
 
 This fortification was at the same time attacked, on the other 
 side, by two battalions sent against it by Count Mansvelt, the one 
 consisting of Spaniards and the other of Italians, who vied with 
 each other in giving the most conspicuous proofs of their con- 
 tempt of danger. The leaders of these battalions, Capisucchi 
 and Toralva, were the first who entered the intrenchments ; and 
 soon afterwards the troops under the prince of Parma entered 
 it on the other side. The confederates, though thus deprived of 
 all defence, still continued to fight desperately, till perceiving 
 that the tide was going back, and that their ships were beginning 
 to put off to a greater distance, while fresh Spaniards were pour- 
 ing in upon them from both ends of the counterdyke, their 
 coiirage failed, and they attempted to save themselves by getting 
 on board their boats and ships. 
 
 The Spaniards, not satisfied with this victory, flung themselves 
 The confede- from the counter dyke, and pursued the fugitives as 
 rates are de- far as the depth of the water would allow. No quarter 
 was given to those whom they overtook. The coun- 
 terdyke, and the water on both sides of it, were covered with the 
 slain, and many fell with dishonourable wounds, who for several 
 hours together had given incontestible evidence of the most heroic 
 valour. The number of the killed on the side of the confederates 
 amounted to two thousand five hundred, and that on the other 
 side, to one thousand. The recovery of the counterdyke was not 
 the only advantage which Farnese derived from his present 
 victory ; he likewise got possession of more than thirty of the 
 enemy’s ships, with all the artillery and engines that were on 
 board. Immediately after which he proceeded to fill up the 
 breaches in the counterdyke, and to repair the damage which 
 his fortifications had sustained. 
 
 The besieged, being thus cruelly disappointed in their hopes 
 of deliverance, were overwhelmed with consternation and despair. 
 By their late great exertions, their internal resources were 
 exhausted, and they had little prospect of any foreign aid that 
 could arrive in time to prevent the necessity of surrendering. 
 They had not indeed as yet experienced those intolerable miseries 
 which attend on famine in a place besieged ; but they foresaw 
 that ere long these miseries must certainly overtake them, and 
 they considered, that to delay making peace with the enemy, 
 could only serve to increase the difficulty of obtaining favourable 
 terms. Such were the sentiments of great numbers of every 
 condition, notwithstanding the solemn engagement under which 
 they had lately come, of never submitting to the Spanish govern- 
 ment. St. Aldegonde, and the other magistrates, laboured to 
 remove their apprehensions, by assuring them, that not only 
 their friends in the maritime provinces were preparing forces to 
 
406 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XIX. 
 
 relieve them, but that the queen of England intended to exert 
 herself in their behalf. St. Aldegonde himself appears to have 
 been animated with this hope, and for several weeks it had the 
 effect which he desired on the minds of the citizens ; but their 
 patience being at last worn out, they assembled in a tumultuous 
 manner, and peremptorily required that ambassadors should be 
 appointed to treat of a surrender. The magistrates, though 
 extremely reluctant, found it necessary to comply with their 
 request ; and accordingly St. Aldegonde, and several others of 
 the principal inhabitants, were sent to the Spanish camp. 
 
 They were received by the prince of Parma in the most 
 Capitulation gracious manner, and much more favourable terms of 
 of Antwerp, accommodation were offered than they had reason to 
 expect. Various motives concurred in determining this prudent 
 general to act on the present occasion with the utmost degree of 
 moderation which the King’s instructions would allow ; for, 
 besides that the granting of equitable conditions to the citizens 
 of Antwerp would contribute to facilitate his future conquests, 
 he considered that his troops had suffered great diminution since 
 the commencement of the siege ; that, by accidents which he 
 could not foresee, the bridge might be demolished ; that he had 
 with much difficulty resisted the efforts which the confederates 
 had already made ; that still greater exertions were to be appre- 
 hended from despair ; and that the besieged, if compelled by 
 severity to imitate the example of Haerlem or Leyden, might 
 resist his most strenuous endeavours to reduce them, till the 
 queen of England, who was deliberating on the subject, should 
 resolve to espouse their cause. 
 
 Moved by these considerations, Farnese showed himself not 
 only willing, but even desirous, to bring the treaty of surrender 
 speedily to a conclusion ; but the ambassadors of the besieged, 
 still flattering themselves with the hopes of assistance, studied to 
 put it off as long as possible ; nor was the capitulation signed 
 till within three days of the time when the whole stock of pro- 
 visions in the city would have been consumed. This circum- 
 stance had been carefully concealed from the citizens, as well as 
 from the prince of Parma, and was known only to the magis- 
 trates and masters of police. It had not therefore the smallest 
 influence on the terms of peace, which were as favourable now as 
 if the surrender had been made some months before. 
 
 In some respects they were more favourable than even those 
 which had been granted to Ghent and Bruges. Whereas the 
 Protestants of these places had been permitted to continue only 
 two years, in order to settle their affairs — in Antwerp they were 
 allowed to remain four ; and although Antwerp was much richer 
 than any of the other cities, and the expense of the siege in- 
 finitely greater, yet he demanded a fine of only four hundred 
 thousand guilders for the payment of his troops. All the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 407 
 
 1505.] 
 
 prisoners were set at liberty; all past offences were forgiven, 
 and no exception whatever was made in the general act of in- 
 demnity ; nor were any personal restrictions laid upon any of the 
 citizens, except St. Aldegonde, who was required to engage, that 
 he would not carry arms against the King of Spain for the space 
 of a year. This circumstance had the appearance of a punish- 
 ment inflicted on this distinguished patriot ; but it ought to be 
 considered rather as a mark of respect and honour, since it 
 implied an acknowledgement of his superior merit, and discovered 
 the dread which his enemies entertained of his abilities. 
 
 Notwithstanding this public testimony which St. Aldegonde 
 received from the Spaniards, he was accused of having delivered 
 up the town without necessity; and so rash and ill-informed 
 were the States of Holland and Zealand on this occasion, that 
 they forbade him to take up his residence within their territories. 
 Being conscious of having acted with perfect integrity, he paid 
 no regard to their interdiction, but soon after the surrender set 
 out for Zealand, where he required the States to produce his 
 accusers, and to try him openly s ; and as no accuser ever 
 ventured to appear, he published a vindication of his conduct, 
 calculated to put his enemies to silence, and to show that, instead 
 of censure, he had merited the highest praise * 11 . 
 
 The ill-humour which the maritime provinces discovered on 
 this occasion, in their injurious treatment of a person so beloved 
 and popular as St. Aldegonde, proves the error of those who 
 assert that these provinces were not displeased that the Spaniards 
 had got possession of Antwerp, and that their jealousy of that 
 commercial city was the cause why they did not exert themselves 
 with greater vigour to preserve it. As the circumstances above 
 explained seem to afford a full account of their inactivity in the 
 beginning of the siege, so, towards the close of it, it should seem 
 they did everything for the relief of the besieged, which they 
 could have done in their own defence. The only object of their 
 dread at this time was the power of Spain. They could not but 
 consider Antwerp as a bulwark against that power, and they 
 could not foresee those commercial advantages which they 
 derived afterwards from the reduction of that wealthy city under 
 the Spanish yoke. 
 
 They soon experienced these advantages by the removal of so 
 Brabant de- g rea, t a number of the inhabitants of Brabant and 
 serted by Flandprs to Amsterdam and Middleburg, that it be- 
 many ofits C ame necessary to extend the walls of those cities in 
 inhabitants. or( j er contain them. And thus the trade of the 
 confederated States was greatly augmented, while that of the 
 southern provinces received a wound, of which it never after- 
 
 s The account here given is taken from Meteren, the best informed of all the historians 
 in matters relative to Antwerp. It differs materially from that of Reidanus. 
 
 11 Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iii. Meteren, lib. .xii. Thnanus, lib. lxxxiii. Reidanus, lib. iv. 
 
408 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XIX. 
 
 wards recovered. The prince of Parma had provided carefully 
 against this event, so fatal to tlie prosperity of his late ac- 
 quisitions, by the length of time which he allowed to the Pro- 
 testants for disposing of their effects, and by the mildness of his 
 administration ; but, besides that their aversion to the Spanish 
 government was become unconquerable, and that for some years 
 past they had tasted the sweets of liberty, they were too sin- 
 cerely attached to the reformed religion, to bear the thoughts of 
 ever complying with the Catholic, or even to endure those re- 
 straints to which it behoved them, during their stay at Antwerp, 
 to submit. Philip’s bigotry had, in the time of the duke of Alva, 
 transplanted great numbers of his subjects, together with their 
 wealth and manufactures, into foreign states, and it now in- 
 creased the power of the revolted provinces, at the expense of 
 those which had returned to their allegiance. The Dutch began, 
 not long after this period, to push their commerce to a greater 
 extent than ever. They were more able than formerly to sup- 
 port the burden of the war ; and in a few years afterwards they 
 found themselves in a capacity, not only to defend their infant 
 state, but to attack their powerful adversary, with splendour 
 and success, in the most distant regions of the globe. 
 
1585 .] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN 
 
 409 
 
 BOOK XX. 
 
 Although the prosperity of the United Provinces was, in the 
 State of the issue, greatly augmented by that increase of inhabit- 
 United Pro- ants which they received from the conquered towns ; 
 
 yet, at the present period, their situation was more 
 alarming and critical than it had ever been since the commence- 
 ment of the war. The prince of Parma was an enemy more 
 formidable in every respect than the duke of Alva ; superior to 
 him in military, and still more in political abilities ; and the 
 more to be dreaded by the confederacy, on account of the mode- 
 ration and equity which he displayed in his treatment of the 
 people who had submitted to his arms. Almost the whole of 
 Brabant and Flanders, except Sluys and Ostend, was already 
 conquered ; and by his reduction of Antwerp, he had acquired a 
 numerous fleet, which he knew well how to make subservient to 
 the operations of his land-forces, in the further prosecution of 
 the war. 
 
 The States were more sensible than ever of their inability to 
 They offer defend themselves, without the assistance of some 
 the sove- foreign power. In their treaty with the duke of Anjou, 
 the King of they had discovered great solicitude in guarding against 
 France. the annexation of the provinces to the crown of France; 
 but soon after the death of the prince of Orange, they were 
 persuaded that with their most strenuous efforts it would be 
 impossible for them long to preserve their independence, and that 
 they must either submit to Philip, or become the subjects of 
 some other sovereign, possessed of power sufficient to defend 
 them. Having, towards the conclusion of the year one thousand 
 five hundred and eighty-four, deliberated maturely on the sub- 
 ject, they hesitated for some time between the King of France 
 and the Queen of England ; but they came at last to fix their 
 choice on the former, partly because they believed it would be 
 easier for Henry, than for Elizabeth, to afford them assistance 
 and support ; and partly because, at Henry’s death, his crown 
 would devolve on the King of Navarre, in whose hands they 
 believed that both their religion and liberty would be secure. 
 
 That the offer which they resolved to make to the French 
 monarch would be readily accepted, they could not doubt, when 
 they considered that the principal reason why he had formerly 
 declined to espouse their cause, was their refusing to consent to 
 his succession, in the event of his brother’s death. They could 
 
410 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [3ook XX. 
 
 not but suppose that his ambition would be highly flattered with 
 the opportunity of making so great an addition to his hereditary 
 dominions ; and they were not ignorant of the resentment which 
 he bore towards the King of Spain, who, under the mask of 
 friendship, had long fomented the troubles of his kingdom. 
 
 Henry was not insensible to the force of these incentives. He 
 gave the ambassadors whom the States had sent to him on this 
 occasion, the most gracious reception ; assured them of his grati- 
 tude for the trust and confidence which the States were pleased 
 to repose in him ; and bade them rely upon him for every mark 
 of friendship in his power to bestow. But as their proposal was 
 of too much importance to be hastily embraced, he desired they 
 would deliver it in writing, that it might be submitted to the 
 revisal of his counsellors. 
 
 Henry would not thus have delayed giving them a decisive 
 State of answer, if he had been at liberty either to pursue his own 
 parties in i nc ii na tions, or to consult the interest of France. Peace 
 France, indeed, had been established between the inveterate fac- 
 tions into which his kingdom was divided, and the| Catholic league 
 was apparently extinct. But the causes to which that pernicious 
 confederacy owed its birth still subsisted ; and it required a much 
 more dexterous and steady hand than that of Henry, to guide the 
 reins of government in such a manner as to prevent the passions 
 of the parties from breaking out again with as much violence as 
 before. Henry duke of Guise, son of the celebrated Francis, was 
 superior to his father in exterior accomplishments, and not inferior 
 to him either in military or political abilities. Like his father, 
 too, he was actuated with the most inordinate ambition ; and 
 could not* endure that insignificance to which the King’s aversion 
 to his bold aspiring character had reduced him. Enraged at 
 being excluded from the government of the state, while all the 
 power which he and his adherents had formerly enjoyed was en- 
 grossed by the minions of the King, he resolved either to compel 
 Henry to redress his grievances, or to deprive him of his crown. 
 With the most indefatigable industry he applied himself to the 
 prosecution of his design. His emissaries were spread everywhere ; 
 the kingdom swarmed with anonymous letters; and the pulpit 
 resounded with the Lmninent danger to which the church was 
 exposed. “ For the King (it was said) notwithstanding his pre- 
 tensions to sanctity, had either no religion at all, or was secretly 
 attached to that of the Hugonots ; for whom he had, in his late 
 treaty with them, discovered the most unjustifiable partiality. 
 This alone was sufficient to rouse the indignation of every faith- 
 ful son of the church ; but there was ground for the most alarm- 
 ing apprehensions, when it was considered, that the Duke of 
 Anjou being now dead, and the King without any hopes of 
 issue, the crown must (if the people did not exert them- 
 selves with vigour to prevent it) be inherited by the King of 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1585 .] 
 
 411 
 
 Navarre, a relapsed heretic, and a determined enemy of their 
 holy /aith a, \ 
 
 By these means the duke of Guise united more than one half 
 The Catho- of the kingdom in a fanatical but firm confederacy, 
 lie league, with which he hoped to controul, and in time to anni- 
 hilate, the authority of the King. In order to gain greater 
 respect to this confederacy, he placed at the head of it Charles, 
 cardinal 6 of Bourbon, a zealous catholic, far advanced in years, 
 and noted for the weakness of his understanding. Guise intended 
 this prelate for Henry's successor in the event of the death or 
 deposition of that prince ; and he expected under him to engross 
 the whole administration, and to pave the way for his own acces- 
 sion to the throne. 
 
 The king of Spain was not an unconcerned spectator of these 
 transactions, in a kingdom to the affairs of which he had, for 
 several years, given the most particular attention. For, besides 
 the deep concern which, agreeably to his general system of 
 politics, he had ever taken in all the contests between the Catho- 
 lics and Protestants in almost every European state, he was 
 greatly interested to prevent the King of Navarre (whose do- 
 minions he held unjustly) from ascending the throne of France ; 
 and there w r as no other means he knew, by which he could deter 
 the French monarch from lending assistance to the United Pro- 
 vinces, but to furnish him with employment at home. 
 
 Moved by this last consideration, he had given assistance 
 His views to the l ea g ue > when it was first formed by the same 
 factious leaders some years before. He was now more 
 determined than ever to support it ; prompted partly by the 
 motives that have been mentioned, and partly by this considera- 
 tion, that, by fomenting the disturbances in France, he would 
 exhaust the strength of that mighty monarchy, and thereby 
 either acquire possession of it himself, or be at least delivered 
 from all dread of that power, which he believed to be the only 
 one in Europe able to counteract his designs. 
 
 Having some time before the present period revived his nego- 
 His treaty biations with the duke of Guise and the other heads of 
 with the* the league, he gave orders to his commissioners, Moreo, 
 duke of and Baptista Tassi, to form an alliance with them, with- 
 TU,se ' out delay. And it was accordingly concluded between 
 the Spanish envoys on the one hand, and the dukes of Guise and 
 Mayenne, and the Sieur de Menneville, agent for the cardinal of 
 Bourbon, on the other, at Joinville, on the second of February 
 one thousand five hundred and eighty-five, upon the following 
 conditions : 
 
 “ That in case the present king of France should die without 
 male issue, the cardinal of Bourbon should, as first prince of the 
 blood, be declared King ; and all those persons excluded from 
 
 * Memoires de la Ligue, tom. iii. 
 
 b Uncle to the king of Navarre. 
 
412 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XX. 
 
 the succession, who were either heretics themselves, or favourers 
 of heretics. 
 
 44 That the cardinal of Bourbon should, in the event of his 
 succeeding to the crown, ratify the peace of Chateau-Cambresis, 
 between the courts of France and Spain. 
 
 44 That he should prohibit the exercise , of every religion but 
 the Catholic, within his dominions. 
 
 44 That he should restore to Philip all the places which had 
 been taken from him by the Hugonots, and assist him in subdu- 
 ing his rebellious subjects in the Netherlands. 
 
 44 That, on the other hand, Philip should contribute fifty thou- 
 sand crowns a month, for the support of the confederacy, besides 
 assisting it with a sufficient number of troops, till heresy should 
 be utterly extirpated. That he should take the cardinal of Bour- 
 bon, the lords of the house of Guise, and all others who should 
 accede to the league, under his protection ; and that neither of 
 the contracting parties should enter into any treaty with the 
 king of France, without mutual consent.” 
 
 Besides these conditions, which were committed to writing, 
 and subscribed, Philip engaged to pay annually the sum of two 
 hundred thousand crowns to the duke of Guise, to be disposed of 
 by him as he should judge most conducive to the interest of the 
 league. And it was agreed, that this whole transaction should 
 be concealed, till a more convenient season for divulging it. 
 
 Henry, however, received intelligence of the congress; and, 
 from former experience, it was easy for him to conjecture the 
 purpose for which it had been held. Soon after this, the em- 
 bassy from the States of Holland arrived, and was received in 
 the manner above mentioned. Mendoza, the Spanish resident, 
 could not be ignorant of what had passed at Joinville ; yet he 
 complained to Henry of his kind reception of the Dutch ambas- 
 sadors, as being inconsistent with the friendship which he owed 
 to the Catholic King. Henry replied to this complaint with a 
 degree of firmness and dignity, which it had been happy for him- 
 self and for his subjects if he could have maintained uniformly 
 in his conduct : 44 I do not,” said he, 44 consider the people of the 
 Netherlands as rebels, but as men whose patience has been worn 
 out by oppression. Humanity and justice incline me to take an 
 interest in the distress of a neighbouring nation, once subject to 
 the crown of France. I have not, however, as yet resolved to 
 concern myself in their affairs. I am unwilling to violate that 
 peace which subsists between your master and me ; although I 
 know, that, on his part, it has been violated. My resolution will 
 appear, when I think fit to disclose it. In the mean time I desiro 
 it may be remembered, that I shall not bo intimidated by the 
 threats of the king of Spain ; and that I am master of my con- 
 duct, and at liberty, without being answerable to any other 
 prince, to make either peace or war, as I incline.” 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 113 
 
 1585.] 
 
 Among Henry’s counsellors were some who exhorted him to 
 Henry hesi- embrace so tempting an opportunity as the present, of 
 tates as to advancing the glory of his crown. The perplexed 
 th^proffered situation of his affairs, they said, ought rather to de- 
 soveieignty. tennine him to enter into foreign war, than to deter 
 him from engaging in it. It would prove the most effectual 
 remedy for those noxious humours with which his kingdom was 
 distempered, by giving a new direction to that restless spirit witli 
 which his subjects had long been actuated ; and it would be found 
 the surest method of disappointing the designs of the duke of 
 Guise, by depriving him of the assistance of the Catholic King, 
 to whom it would furnish sufficient employment in defence of his 
 own dominions. 
 
 Such was the reasoning of those who advised Henry to accept 
 of the sovereignty of the United Provinces. It was plausible, 
 but not substantial or solid. “For where,” said others of his 
 counsellors, seconded by the queen-mother, “ can troops be found 
 in F ranee sufficient to carry on a war against an enemy so power- 
 ful as theking of Spain ? Upon such of the Catholics as are in 
 league with that monarch, the King can have no reliance. On 
 the contrary, they would unite with Philip against their native 
 sovereign. To compose an army of such Catholics as retain their 
 fidelity, and to send that army to the Netherlands, would be to 
 abandon the kingdom naked and defenceless to the duke of Guise. 
 And were the King to apply to the Protestants for assistance, 
 what purpose would that measure serve, but to excite a universal 
 alarm, and to determine all the Catholics in the kingdom ta 
 accede to the league ?” 
 
 Henry could not resist the force of these arguments. Finding 
 He declines himself, therefore, thus fettered by his factious subjects, 
 accepting it. h e resolved, though with much reluctance, to decline 
 the tempting offer which the States had made to him; and 
 having called their ambassadors, he informed them, that the 
 unhappy situation of his domestic affairs rendered it impossible 
 for him at present to accept of their offer, or to undertake their 
 protection ; but that he would not fail to recommend their cause 
 to the queen of England in the warmest 'manner c . 
 
 Elizabeth had formerly approved of their election of the duke 
 Anxiety of of Anjou, and bad even contributed her endeavours to 
 the queen promote it. But she dreaded the union of the pro- 
 of England. v i nces w ith France, as an event which would bave 
 raised the maritime power of that kingdom to a superiority 
 above her own, and therefore she had regarded with a jealous 
 eye the making a tender to Henry of their sovereignty. No 
 sooner was she informed of that monarch’s resolution to decline 
 accepting it, than, her anxiety taking another direction, she 
 dreaded that their despair would induce them to throw them- 
 
 c Reidan, lib. iv. Davila, lib. vii. Van Meteren, lib. xii. p. 7 G. 
 
414 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX 
 
 selves on the mercy of their former sovereign, whose severest 
 vengeance, she could not doubt, would be poured out upon her, 
 as soon as his affairs in the Netherlands were composed. 
 
 In order to prevent this effect of Henryks refusal, which was a 
 The States more immediate object of her dread than any conse- 
 make her an quence that could have arisen from his acceptance, she 
 offer of the se nt an ambassador to rouse their drooping spirits, and 
 soveieignty. gj ve them hopes of her protection. The States were 
 encouraged, by this mark of her attention, to form the resolution 
 of making the same offer of their sovereignty to her, which they 
 had made to the king of France ; and ambassadors were accord- 
 ingly appointed, and sent over to England in the month of July, 
 one thousand five hundred and eighty-five. 
 
 These ambassadors employed every argument which they could 
 devise, to prevail upon Elizabeth to yield to their desire. After 
 testifying in the strongest terms that gratitude with which the 
 States were penetrated, on account of the favour which she had 
 already afforded them, they represented, “ that they had now 
 more occasion than ever for her friendship, and must sink under 
 the power of Philip, who possessed such inexhaustible resources, 
 if she did not speedily interpose in their behalf. But although 
 the power of the confederacy was small, when compared with 
 those mighty efforts which were made by the king of Spain to 
 enslave it, it was not unworthy of the Queens attention and 
 regard. Besides possessing some important towns in Brabant, 
 Flanders, and Guelderland, they were still in possession of Hol- 
 land, Zealand, Utrecht, and Friesland, in which there were many 
 flourishing and well-fortified cities, capacious harbours, and navi- 
 gable rivers, from which the Queen's subjects would derive infi- 
 nite advantage in the way of commerce ; not to mention that, by 
 the accession of so numerous a fleet as that of the United Pro- 
 vinces, her navy would be able to give law to all the maritime 
 powers in Europe. They were far from supposing that interest 
 alone would determine the Queen to regard their present appli- 
 cation ; they had already experienced her generosity, and they 
 now addressed her as the sovereign of a powerful kingdom, who 
 had shown that she was touched with their calamities. It was 
 their earnest desire, at this time, that she would accept of the 
 sovereignty of the provinces, upon the same conditions on which 
 their native princes had enjoyed it, and that she would hence- 
 forth consider the people of the Netherlands as her faithful 
 subjects, who would vie with those of her native kingdom in 
 demonstrating their attachment to her person, and in advancing 
 the glory of her reign . 11 
 
 Elizabeth received this proposal with much complacency, and 
 assured the ambassadors, that they should not return without 
 carrying such an answer along with them as would entirely satisfy 
 the States ; but before she could be more particular in her reply, 
 
1585.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 415 
 
 she must consider the affair with that attention which it deserved, 
 and hear the opinions of her counsellors. 
 
 The same thing happened on this occasion, in the court of 
 She delibe- England, as in that of France some months before, 
 rates on the Elizabeth’s ministers were no less divided in their 
 subject. sentiments than those of Henry, and formed their 
 judgments as courtiers are wont to do in matters of doubtful 
 issue, conformably either to the natural temper of their mind, 
 or to the inclination of the prince. 
 
 There were some among them who thought that both justice 
 and prudence required that Elizabeth should reject the offer that 
 had been made to her ; “ for it was the common interest of 
 princes,” they said, “ that subjects should be retained in their 
 allegiance ; and to encourage them in the violation of it, was in 
 reality to undermine the foundations of their own authority. 
 The Queen had hitherto favoured the inhabitants of the Low 
 Countries, not as a free and independent nation, but as a people 
 who were cruelly oppressed ; and her intention had not been to 
 enable them to renounce their allegiance, but to induce their 
 King to treat them with greater equity and moderation. In 
 this purpose they thought she might still persist. But to 
 acknowledge the States for sovereigns, and to accept from their 
 hands that sovereignty which belonged to another, would not 
 only be a violation of that justice which princes owe to one 
 another, but might be attended with the most dangerous conse- 
 quences to her own repose. The king of Spain would not rest 
 satisfied till he had retaliated so great an injury. The state of 
 Ireland, and even that of England, where there was so great a 
 number of Catholics devoted to his service, w r ould furnish him 
 with means of executing his design. And from fomenting a 
 spirit of division among her subjects, he would soon pass to an 
 open invasion of her kingdom. With his arms the spiritual 
 thunders of the Homan pontiff would co-operate, and in that 
 case such a number of enemies might be excited against her as 
 would endanger the stability of her throne.” 
 
 But others of Elizabeth’s counsellors were of opinion, that so 
 inviting an opportunity as the present ought not to be neglected, 
 and that the Queen could not, with reason, be accused of injustice 
 for embracing it. The States, compelled by necessity, had, 
 several years before the present period, assumed the sovereignty 
 into their own hands, and since that time they had conferred it 
 upon the duke of Anjou, whom the Queen had virtually recognized 
 for their lawful sovereign. The king of Spain had clearly forfeited 
 his right to their obedience, by his violation of all the conditions 
 on which that right was founded. “ Notwithstanding this, he 
 will no doubt be highly offended,” continued they, “ if the Queen 
 shall think fit to listen to the present application. But can he 
 be more an enemy to the Queen than he has already shown 
 
416 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX. 
 
 himself? Has ho not long endeavoured to stir up her disaffected 
 subjects in Ireland? And in England does he not pursue the 
 same hostile and insidious designs ? Has he not warmly espoused 
 the cause of the queen of Scots ? Does he not on every occasion 
 show himself an implacable enemy to the English name ? And 
 what is it that has so long prevented him from declaring open 
 war, but that his revolted subjects in the Netherlands have 
 hitherto afforded full employment to all the forces which he 
 could spare from his ambitious enterprises ? When he shall 
 have disengaged himself from his embarrassments in the Low 
 Countries, can we doubt that he will turn his arms against the 
 Queen ? It is the part of prudence to provide against a distant 
 as well as against an immediate danger ; and prudence and a 
 regard to self-preservation require that the Queen should, to the 
 utmost of her power, support the people of the United Provinces, 
 because in their preservation the peace and security of her own 
 dominions are involved. If she reject the application of the 
 States, and either give them no assistance, or such only as has 
 hitherto been granted, they will soon be overpowered, and Philip 
 will then be not only at greater leisure, but much more able 
 than at present to execute his designs. But if the Queen accept 
 of the advantageous offer that is made to her, and exert herself 
 with vigour in defence of this people, who desire to become her 
 subjects, she will encounter her enemy at a distance from home, 
 she will be powerfully assisted by a brave and determined ally, 
 and with her fleet acting in concert with that of the States, she 
 will be able to maintain the tranquillity of her kingdom.” 
 
 Elizabeth readily perceived the force of this reasoning : she 
 Elizabeth un- believed that an open breach with Philip was unavoid - 
 dertakes the able, and she thought it more eligible to begin hostilities 
 protection of herself now, than to wait till her adversary should be 
 t ie tates. j n a con q^j on to execute his designs against her. She 
 resolved, however, to decline accepting the sovereignty which the 
 States had offered her ; either because she apprehended that it 
 would prove a greater burden than she was able to support, or 
 because she was afraid of exciting the jealousy of the neighbour- 
 ing powers. But while for these reasons she desired that the 
 supreme authority might still remain in the hands of the States, 
 she resolved to afford them her protection ; and with this view, 
 after having received particular information concerning their 
 strength, and the number of troops necessary for carrying on the 
 war, she concluded a treaty with them, of which the principal 
 articles were those which follow : — “ That the Queen should 
 furnish the States with five thousand foot and one thousand 
 horse, to be commanded by a Protestant general of her appoint- 
 ment, and to be paid by her during the continuance of the war. 
 That after the conclusion of the war the States should repay her 
 expenses, and that the towns of Brill and Flushing, and the fort 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 417 
 
 1586 .] 
 
 of Rammekins, should be immediately delivered to her, and should 
 remain in her possession till she were fully reimbursed. That the 
 commander of the forces, the governors of provinces and towns, 
 and all the officers and soldiers, should take an oath of fidelity to 
 the Queen and the States. That in case it should be found ex- 
 pedient to employ a fleet in the common cause, the States should 
 furnish the same number of ships as the Queen, to be com- 
 manded by an English admiral. That the commander-in-chief, 
 and two English ministers residing in the Netherlands, should be 
 admitted into the assembly of the States. That none of the 
 rights or privileges of the confederated provinces should be 
 violated, and no change introduced in the established religion or 
 government. And lastly, That neither of the two contracting 
 parties should, without mutual consent, make peace or enter into 
 an alliance with the King of Spain d .” 
 
 This treaty was no sooner ratified, than Elizabeth issued orders 
 Leicester f° r carrying ^ into execution. The earl of Leicester 
 appointed (to whom this wise princess had been long attached in 
 commander- a degree which far exceeded his merit and services) was 
 m- chief. appointed general of the forces, and went over with 
 
 them to Holland in the beginning of the year 1586, accompanied 
 by more than five hundred gentlemen, who intended to serve 
 under him as volunteers. Leicester had neither courage, ca- 
 pacity, moderation, nor integrity, to qualify him for the arduous 
 task that was assigned him, but his defects were concealed under 
 the glare of superficial accomplishments ; with which, as he had 
 long deceived the penetration of Elizabeth, he now imposed upon 
 the people of the Netherlands, and excited in them the most 
 flattering and delusive hopes. From his first arrival, they 
 regarded him as the restorer of their fallen state, and profusely 
 heaped upon him every mark of honour which their immoderate 
 fondness could devise. Not satisfied with receiving him rather 
 as a prince and a conqueror, who had already wrought their 
 deliverance, than as the subject of an ally by whom he had been 
 sent to their assistance, they conferred upon him the offices of 
 governor-general of the confederacy, and commander-in-chief of 
 all their forces by sea and land. 
 
 By this precipitate measure, of which they had afterwards the 
 greatest reason to repent, they intended to gratify the Queen, 
 and if possible, to induce her to take a deeper interest in their 
 affairs. But they were exceedingly disappointed in their ex- 
 pectations ; she was offended at their artifice, and immediately 
 despatched her vice-chancellor e to complain of their conduct, as 
 being Calculated to make the world believe her insincere in the 
 declaration which she had published, of intending only to assist 
 the provinces, and not to undertake the absolute charge of their 
 protection. She desired that the States would recall that au- 
 
 a Benfivoglio, part ii. lib. v. Camden, an. 1585. 
 
 E E 
 
 e Sir Thomas Heneage. 
 
418 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX. 
 
 thority which they had conferred on Leicester, and commanded 
 him to rest contented with the portion of power which she had 
 given him. But it is extremely doubtful whether Elizabeth was 
 in reality as much incensed on this occasion as she appeared to 
 be. She soon discovered an unwillingness to mortify her favourite’s 
 vanity and ambition ; lent a favourable ear to the apology that 
 was made to her by the States, and did not insist on a compliance 
 with her request. Whatever was her motive for this conduct, 
 Leicester was installed in the government, and invested with 
 as ample powers as were consistent with the fundamental laws of 
 the constitution ; after which he proceeded to make preparations 
 for putting a stop to the progress of the Spanish arms. 
 
 The prince of Parma, on the other hand, was no less active in 
 Operations preparing for the further prosecution of the war. After 
 of the prince the acquisition of so many important towns, he had 
 of Parma, conceived the most sanguine expectations of being able 
 soon to complete the reduction of the revolted provinces. But 
 by the interposition of Elizabeth he perceived his victory snatched 
 from him, when he thought himself upon the point of reaping it, 
 and was exceedingly disappointed and chagrined. Finding him- 
 self, however, still superior to his enemy in the field, he resolved 
 to improve this advantage, and, as soon as the season would 
 permit, to proceed with his wonted vigour. 
 
 The confederates had, notwithstanding their loss of Maestricht 
 The siege above related, been able to keep possession of two con- 
 of Grave, giderable towns on the Maese, Grave in Brabant, and 
 Venlo in Guelderland. Farnese was desirous to make himself 
 master of these two places before he should turn his arms against 
 the northern provinces ; and early in the spring he sent Count 
 Charles of Mansyeldt to form the blockade of Grave. Mansveldt 
 executed his commission with little opposition, by casting a bridge 
 over the Maese, and by building forts and redoubts not only on 
 the dykes of the river, but on the land side of the town, where 
 he pitched his camp, and cut off all communication between the 
 besieged and the country behind them. The town was defended 
 by an English garrison, under the command of a young noble- 
 man, Baron de Hemert, a native of Guelderland. Leicester, 
 sensible that the place was of the greatest importance for pre- 
 venting the enemy from advancing into the provinces of Guelder- 
 land and Utrecht, went himself as far as the city of Utrecht, and 
 from thence sent Count Hohenloe and colonel Norris with two 
 thousand five hundred foot, partly Dutch and partly English, to 
 the relief of the besieged. The Dutch arrived first, and having 
 taken one of the Spanish forts on the banks of the Maese, op- 
 posite to Grave, they had begun to fortify themselves upon the 
 dyke, when Mansveldt, having received intelligence of their 
 arrival, sent three thousand Spaniards over the bridge already 
 mentioned. By these troops the confederates were compelled to 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 419 
 
 158G.] 
 
 abandon their fortifications, and to retire along the dyke ; but 
 Norris and the English forces coming up to their assistance, a 
 bloody battle ensued. The English, though long inured to peace, 
 gave proof on this occasion of that strong military genius by 
 which they have so often distinguished themselves in their wars 
 upon the Continent. They drove the veteran Spaniards before 
 them with irresistible impetuosity ; killed several hundreds of 
 them, besides seven captains, and a great number of inferior 
 officers, and compelled them to continue their retreat till they 
 reached their fortifications on the bridge. There they were 
 supported by fresh troops sent by Mansveldt from the camp. 
 The battle was renewed, and both parties fought for some time 
 with the same fury as before, till they were separated by a violent 
 storm of wind and rain, which rendered all their efforts ineffectual. 
 Through this accident the Spaniards still retained possession of 
 the bridge, but the rain which fell furnished Count Hohenloe 
 with the means of relieving the besieged. The river being swelled 
 to an uncommon height, he broke down the dyke near Ravestein, 
 which stands on the same side with Grave, and having laid all 
 the country between Ravestein and Grate under water, he con- 
 veyed to the besieged ammunition, provisions, and a supply of 
 troops, across the inundation. 
 
 The prince of Parma, alarmed with this success of the confe- 
 derates, set out for Grave with his main army ; and in a few days 
 after his arrival before the place, two batteries were planted, 
 and a part of the wall was demolished. It might still, however, 
 have been defended for a considerable time ; and De Hemert, 
 the governor, gave the earl of Leicester the strongest assurances 
 that he would hold out to the last. But his courage failing, he 
 began to talk of the necessity of surrendering ; and although only 
 two or three of his officers approved of his design, while all the 
 rest remonstrated against it as cowardly and dishonourable, he 
 resolved to put it in execution ; and upon the seventh of J une, 
 before the breach was practicable, or the enemy had taken any 
 measures for an assault, he sent to the prince of Parma a proposal 
 to capitulate. The prince readily granted him the most favour- 
 able conditions, and suffered him and the garrison to march out 
 with their arms and baggage. But as De Hemert was unde- 
 serving of this honour, he soon had reason to repent of the 
 infamous part into which his cowardice had betrayed him. Both 
 he and the officers who had concurred with him were condemned 
 by a court-martial to be beheaded. The sentence was acknow- 
 ledged to be just, yet De Hemert’s fate excited great commise- 
 ration in his countrymen. He was too young for the important 
 trust which had been committed to him ; there was no reason to 
 suspect him of treachery or corruption, and he solicited in the 
 most earnest manner to have his life spared, and to be permitted 
 to engage in some perilous enterprise in which he might retrieve 
 
 e e *2 
 
420 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX. 
 
 his honour. But Leicester, thinking it necessary at this time, 
 for the establishment of military discipline, which had been 
 greatly relaxed, to give an example of severity, rejected all the 
 applications which were made in his behalf f . 
 
 Immediately after the surrender of Grave, Farnese led his 
 Siege of army, amounting to twenty thousand foot and three 
 Yenlo. thousand horse, to besiege Venlo; and he made the 
 greater haste in his expedition against that place, the only one 
 on the side of the Maese which remained in the hands of the con- 
 federates, as he understood that the garrison was weak, and that 
 the celebrated Martin Schench, who commonly resided in it, 
 had, by Leicester’s orders, marched with the greatest part of 
 his troops to secure the town of Guelders. This man, a native 
 of Guelderland, and a soldier of fortune, is celebrated by 
 all the cotemporary historians, on account of his extraordi- 
 nary valour, activity, and enterprise. Having first attached 
 himself to the Spanish party in the Netherlands, he per- 
 formed for that party several important services, but thinking 
 himself dishonoured by a preference which the general bestowed 
 on a Spanish officer, he had deserted to the States. Schench 
 no sooner heard that the Spanish army had begun the siege of 
 Venlo, than he set out with a body of horse in order to throw 
 himself into the place. Finding it completely invested on every 
 side, he attacked the besiegers in the middle of the night, and 
 having penetrated beyond the general’s tent, he continued to 
 advance till he had almost reached one of the gates of the town : 
 but he could not enter, by reason of certain barricades which 
 Farnese had raised to prevent the sallies of the garrison. Before 
 he had time to demolish these, the whole camp was up in arms, 
 and obliged him to abandon his attempt. He fought his way 
 back through the thickest of the enemy, and escaped with the 
 loss of between forty and fifty men. He made several other 
 vigorous efforts for the relief of the besieged, but they were all 
 rendered abortive by the foresight and vigilance of the prince of 
 Parma, who repelled his attacks ; and, in spite of the annoyance 
 which he gave him from without, kept up an incessant fire upon 
 the town till a great part of the wall was demolished. The dif- 
 ferent nations of which the army consisted were disputing with 
 each other for the honour of beginning the assault, when the 
 besieged, dreading the fatal consequences that might follow, 
 surrendered the town on nearly the same conditions with those 
 which had been granted to the citizens of Grave. The prince of 
 Parma found it necessary to employ all his authority to prevent 
 the soldiers, whom the capitulation disappointed of their prey, 
 from offering violence to the inhabitants ; and he gave a proof 
 of his respect for Schench, by treating his wife and sister in the 
 
 1 Metercn, p. 403. Bcntivoglio, part ii. lib. ii; ; and Strada, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 421 
 
 1586.] 
 
 most honourable manner, and furnishing them with his own coach 
 to carry them to whatever place they should incline 8 . 
 
 The sie<re and From V enlo, F arnese went without delay and in- 
 destriicUon of vested Nuys, which belongs to the bishopric of Cologne, 
 Nu P- but was at that time in the possession of the States. 
 
 Gebhert de Trusches, the archbishop and elector of Cologne, 
 having, about three years before the present period, abjured the 
 Catholic religion, and married, attempted still to retain his 
 bishopric and electorate ; but his canons, supported by the Pope 
 and Emperor, excommunicated him ; and having made war 
 against him, in which they were assisted by the prince of Parma, 
 they obliged him to take refuge in Holland, and elected in his 
 room Ernest, son of the duke of Bavaria. The count de Meurs, 
 one of his partisans, soon after recovered for him, by surprise, 
 the town of Nuys, and obtained from the States a garrison, with 
 which he had been able not only to defend that town against the 
 force of Ernest, but to overrun the country, and do infinite mis- 
 chief to the Catholic inhabitants. Ernest, unable to repress their 
 irruptions, had gone himself in disguise to the prince of Parma 
 to solicit his assistance, and it was in compliance with his request 
 that Farnese, postponing the prosecution of his designs against 
 the northern provinces, engaged in his present enterprise. He 
 knew that Philip regarded no undertaking as foreign to his 
 interest, in which the security of the Catholic religion was con- 
 cerned ; and he dreaded that if the garrison of Nuys was not 
 checked in time, they might gather strength, and persuade some 
 of the neighbouring Protestant princes to espouse their cause. 
 Some historians affirm, that he was likewise prompted by the 
 prospect of that glory which he would acquire, should he conquer, 
 in a few weeks, as he expected, a town which Charles the Bold, 
 duke of Burgundy, had in vain attempted to reduce with an 
 army of sixty thousand men in the space of a year. 
 
 In this expectation he was not disappointed. Through a mis- 
 fortune which befel the garrison in the person of Cloet the 
 governor, who, being dangerously wounded, was disabled from 
 attending to the operations of the defence, their resolution failed ; 
 and in less than three weeks after the prince’s arrival before the 
 town, they began to treat of a surrender. That he might save 
 time, and deliver the town as entire as possible to the Elector, 
 Farnese agreed without any difficulty to an armistice; and he 
 had begun to treat with the deputies of the besieged, concerning 
 the terms of capitulation, when the Italian and Spanish troops 
 (who had been highly incensed on account of his having prevented 
 them from plundering the inhabitants of Venlo), being trans- 
 ported with a sudden rage, ran forward in contempt of his 
 authority, and assaulted the town on different sides, while the 
 garrison, who trusted to the armistice, were off their guard. 
 Meeting with little resistance, they quickly scaled the walls, 
 
 Sf Metcien. Strada. 
 
422 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XX. 
 
 spread themselves over the town, and butchered all who fell in 
 their way, without distinction of age, sex, or condition. Nor 
 was their barbarous cruelty satiated with the horrid carnage 
 which they committed. Their fury being turned into madness, 
 they spurned the thoughts of plunder, and set fire to the town ; 
 and as the wind was high, and most of the houses were built of 
 wood, it was in a few hours consumed *to ashes. Two churches 
 only escaped, in which a number of women and children had 
 taken refuge ; and it was with difficulty that the marquis del 
 Guasto prevailed upon the savage soldiers to spare the lives of 
 those trembling, miserable remains of the inhabitants 11 . 
 
 From this disastrous scene, Farnese, now duke of Parma by his 
 Siege of father’s death, directed his march towards Rhineberg ; 
 Rhmeberg. another place in the electorate of Cologne, of which, on 
 account of its important situation, the States were extremely 
 solicitous to retain possession. 
 
 The earl of Leicester meanwhile had been employed in drawing 
 Operations together all the forces which could be spared from the 
 of the earl garrisons of the towns and forts, and seemed deter- 
 of Leicester. m i ne d not to suffer any more of the campaign to pass 
 without striking some important stroke, which might satisfy the 
 expectations of the confederates. But as his army, which con- 
 sisted only of seven thousand foot and one thousand four hundred 
 horse, was inferior in number to the enemy, he durst not hazard 
 an engagement ; but resolved to attack some place of importance 
 in the possession of the Spaniards, in order to induce the duke 
 of Parma to relinquish the siege of Rhineberg. He directed his 
 march towards Zutphen, and in order to facilitate his design 
 against that place, first attacked and made himself master of the 
 town of Doesberg ; after which he sat down with his whole 
 army before Zutphen and began the siege in form. 
 
 If he had followed the counsel that was given him, to secure 
 He lays siege certain passes which led to the town, it must un- 
 to Zutphen. avoidably have fallen into his hands ; as it was neither 
 furnished with provisions nor with military stores. Of this the 
 duke of Parma had been particularly informed by Baptisto Tassi 
 the governor ; and for this reason, although he had made progress 
 in his operations against Rhineberg, he immediately raised the 
 siege of that place, and hastened with all his forces to the relief 
 of Zutphen. As he was acquainted with the extremity to which 
 the besieged were reduced, he sent the Italian cavalry, under the 
 marquis del Guasto, before the rest of the army, with a temporary 
 supply ; and ordered a numerous body of Spanish infantry to 
 advance with the utmost expedition. Through Leicester’s neglect 
 to fortify the passes, a part of this supply was introduced into 
 the town without any difficulty, in the night ; and on the day 
 following, Del Guasto attempted to introduce the rest. On this 
 
 *' Bcntivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 423 
 
 1586. J 
 
 occasion a fierce rencounter happened between the Italian and 
 English cavalry. At the first onset, the Italians were compelled 
 to retire ; but they soon returned to the charge. The action 
 then became hot and obstinate, and the issue remained for some 
 time doubtful. Del Guasto, seconded by several officers of dis- 
 tinguished reputation, made every effort that could have been 
 expected from the most experienced commander. But the Eng- 
 lish, led on by colonel Norris and Sir Philip Sidney, proved a 
 second time victorious, and drove the Italians before them till 
 they reached the Spanish infantry ; when the English, being 
 ignorant whether the whole Spanish army was at hand, thought 
 it dangerous to advance. Of the Italians about one hundred and 
 fifty were killed and wounded, and of the English thirty. But 
 Death of the latter paid dear for their victory, by their irreparable 
 SirPhiiip loss of the brave and accomplished Sir Philip Sidney, who 
 Sidney. - g ce i e k ra q ec [ by his contemporaries as a person of the 
 most consummate worth ; and as he possessed the favour of Eli- 
 zabeth, must, if it had been the will of Heaven to prolong his life, 
 have soon attained to the highest dignities in her power to bestow. 
 Soon after this rencounter, the duke of Parma arrived with his 
 Leicester ob. w ^ole army in order of battle ; and Leicester, conscious 
 liged to raise of the inferiority of his forces, drew them off from the 
 Oct &1 J2th s * e g e > an d suffered him to enter Zutphen without oppo- 
 ’ sition. Here the duke remained till he had visited the 
 fortifications, and laid in a sufficient quantity of ammunition and 
 provisions ; after which he repassed the Rhine, and having put 
 garrisons into his new conquests, he set out for Brussels. 
 
 His troops were no sooner distributed into winter- quarters, 
 Leicester than Leicester returned with his army towards Zut- 
 takes some phen. He did not, however, intend to enter so late in 
 forts near the y ear U p on the siege of the town itself, but only to 
 utp ien ' make himself master of three'Torts on the opposite side 
 of the river, which put it in the power of the Spaniards to make 
 frequent incursions into the territory of V eluwe. In this attempt 
 he succeeded, and thereby deprived the Spaniards for a time of 
 what had been the principal advantage which they derived from 
 the possession of Zutphen. After which, having stationed a part 
 of his troops in these forts, he returned to the Hague, where the 
 States had been appointed to convene. 
 
 This assembly had no great reason to be satisfied with their 
 Leicester’s new governor’s management of the war ; and they 
 amlimpru- were highly discontented with his civil administration, 
 dent con- During the course of those military operations which 
 duct. have been related, he had treated them in many respects 
 rather as a conquered province, than a free state, to whose assist- 
 ance he had been sent by their friend and ally ; and had shown 
 no less contempt of their fundamental laws, to which he knew 
 they were unalterably attached, than to the conditions of their 
 
424 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 LBook XX. 
 
 treaty with Elizabeth. Instead of regulating his conduct by the 
 advice of the States or council, as gratitude and prudence 
 required, he appears to have conceived an early prejudice against 
 all those who had distinguished themselves in the service of their 
 country, while he bestowed his favour on a set of artful and de- 
 signing men, of suspected fidelity, who were obsequious to his 
 caprice. 
 
 By their counsel, he laid restrictions upon trade, which, if the 
 States had not interposed with vigour, would have proved fatal 
 to it ; and which obliged many of those Flemish merchants, who 
 had lately settled in Holland and Zealand, to remove into foreign 
 parts. By the same advice, he tampered with the coin, and made 
 such alterations in it as enriched his minions or himself, whilst 
 they impoverished the provinces. 
 
 Innovations were introduced without the consent of the States, 
 in the manner of collecting the public money ; and after it was 
 collected, instead of putting it, as the constitution required, into 
 the hands of the treasurer chosen by the States, Leicester ordered 
 it to be delivered to a treasurer of his own appointment, who re- 
 fused to satisfy the States as to the purposes to which it was 
 applied. Taxes were levied from the people, for paying not only 
 all the soldiers in the garrisons, and all the country troops, but 
 sufficient likewise for the payment of between six and seven 
 thousand Germans ; yet the soldiers in the garrisons were so ill 
 paid, that the officers found it difficult to prevent a mutiny ; and 
 two thousand Germans who had enlisted under the count de 
 Meurs, in hopes of receiving a certain sum on their arrival in the 
 Netherlands, being disappointed, through the governors negli- 
 gence, or the corruption of those in whom he confided, returned 
 to Germany without drawing their swords, at a time when their 
 assistance was absolutely necessary to the success of the campaign. 
 
 In the treaty between the States and Elizabeth, it had been 
 agreed, that when any vacancy should happen in the government 
 of a town, fort, or province, the commander-in-chief should fill it 
 up with one of three persons presented to him by the States. To 
 this agreement Leicester paid no regard, but appointed persons 
 to governments of great importance, not only without their being 
 named by the States, but even when the States remonstrated 
 against his appointing them. Roland York, a Londoner, who 
 had some years before been detected in treasonable practices, of 
 which they gave Leicester timely information, was, notwith- 
 standing this, intrusted with the charge of the principal fort 
 near Zutphen, which commanded the country of Veluwe ; and 
 William Stanley, an English Catholic, who had been in the ser- 
 vice of Spain, was made governor of Deventer, into which place 
 Leicester, in contradiction to the treaty with Elizabeth, had put 
 a garrison of twelve hundred foot and two hundred horse, con- 
 sisting mostly of Irish papists. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 425 
 
 158G.] 
 
 Besides these find other instances of imprudent and arbitrary 
 conduct, he disgusted the Dutch troops by appointing English 
 officers to command them. He compelled the people to furnish 
 him with carriages, and to serve in his army as pioneers ; and, in 
 violation of what had ever been esteemed a fundamental privilege 
 of the inhabitants of the Netherlands, he obliged persons, pro- 
 secuted by his tools, to leave the provinces in which they resided ; 
 and to submit to their trial in other provinces, where their pro- 
 secutors had greater influence to procure their condemnation 1 . 
 
 Such a complication of despotic measures in the government 
 of a people jealous of their liberty, appears repugnant, whatever 
 were the governors motives, to the very lowest degree of prudence 
 which we can suppose him to have possessed. It is not surpris- 
 ing that he was suspected of having formed a plan to suppress 
 the assembly of the States, and to assume an absolute authority ; 
 but if his presumption could impose upon him so far as to make 
 him believe, that so wise a princess as Elizabeth would, from her 
 partiality to him, and in open violation of her engagements, sup- 
 port his usurpation, yet his conduct was extremely ill calculated 
 to promote his perfidious design. It disgusted all the better sort 
 of those who had influence in the provinces, and served to diffuse 
 an universal alarm, before he had taken measures proper for 
 securing success in his attempt. 
 
 The States, however, sensible of their present dependence upon 
 The States Elizabeth, resolved to avoid an open rupture with her 
 remonstrate, favourite, and, notwithstanding what had passed, they 
 received him on his arrival at the Hague with every mark of 
 respect. They delivered to him a modest but firm remonstrance, 
 and intreated him with much earnestness to redress their griev- 
 ances. Leicester could not justify his conduct in any of the 
 particulars that have been mentioned. He attempted, however, 
 to make some apology for it, and assured the deputies, though 
 with little sincerity, that for the future he should be careful to 
 avoid giving them any just ground of offence. He added, that 
 at present he was under a necessity of passing over to England, 
 on account of certain disturbances in that kingdom, which required 
 his presence. The States were extremely surprised at this inti- 
 mation, as they expected that he would have proceeded imme- 
 diately to reform the abuses of which they had complained ; but 
 they were in some measure reconciled to his departure, by his 
 agreeing to a proposal which they made to him, that, till his 
 return to the Low Countries, his authority as governor should be 
 lodged in the council of state ; and he accordingly executed a 
 public deed to this effect on the twenty-fourth of November, 
 although it soon afterwards appeared that he had done it only 
 to avoid the trouble of any further solicitation upon the subject. 
 He executed privately on the same day another deed, in which 
 
 * Van Mcteren, lib. xiii. Grotius, lib. v- 
 
426 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book. XX. 
 
 he reserved to himself an exclusive authority over all the gover- 
 nors of provinces, towns, and forts, and even deprived the council 
 of state of their wonted authority. This conduct, at once so 
 cowardly and insincere, alienated from him more than ever the 
 affections of the States, and destroyed entirely the confidence 
 which they had reposed in him. It confirmed the opinion of 
 those who believed that he aspired at the sovereignty, and filled 
 the minds of persons of all ranks with the most alarming appre- 
 hensions. 
 
 The States had, as mentioned above, remonstrated against the 
 1587. trust committed to Roland York and William Stanley. 
 Treachery These men gave soon a fatal proof of the justness of the 
 York and suspicions which had been entertained of their fidelity. 
 William In a few weeks after Leicester’s departure for England, 
 Stanley, they entered into a treacherous correspondence with 
 Baptisto Tassi, governor of Zutphen, and began to prepare their 
 measures for delivering to him the important fortresses which had 
 been intrusted to their care. The council of state received intel- 
 ligence of their perfidious design ; but they had not power to 
 hinder them from putting it in execution. In the beginning of 
 February, both Deventer and the fort opposite to Zutphen were 
 given up to the Spaniards. York did not live long to enjoy the 
 wages of his iniquity, and died in misery, neglected and forgotten 
 by those to whom he had sacrificed his honour ; but Stanley, 
 having persuaded most of his troops to enter into the service of 
 Spain, and having uniformly professed the Catholic religion (which 
 Philip considered as an atonement for the most odious crimes), 
 was permitted to retain the government of Deventer, together 
 with the same rank in the Spanish, which he had enjoyed in the 
 English army. This man, sprung from a respectable family in 
 England, had been concerned in Babington’s conspiracy in favour 
 of the queen of Scots, and was probably betrayed, by the dread of 
 a discovery, into this unworthy conduct, which has involved his 
 name in perpetual infamy. 
 
 The news of these disasters spread grief and consternation over 
 the confederated provinces. They recalled the memory of the 
 duke of Anjou’s attempt on Antwerp, and excited great anxiety 
 and dread, lest the examples of York and Stanley should be 
 imitated by the governors of other forts and towns. 
 
 The States participated in the distress which the people felt 
 Prudence on ^ ie P resen t occasion. They still however maintained 
 and mode- their wonted fortitude, and without regard to Leicester’s 
 ration of the resentment, resolved to provide, as well as their circum- 
 Statcs * stances would allow, for the preservation of the common- 
 wealth. In an assembly held at the Hague on the sixth of Fe- 
 bruary, after asserting their own supreme authority, they enacted, 
 that during the absence of the earl of Leicester, prince Maurice 
 should exercise the authority of governor, and that all officers in 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 427 
 
 1587.] 
 
 their service should take an oath of obedience to him , and of 
 fidelity to the States. To this resolution, which was immediately 
 published and enforced, two declarations were subjoined ; the first, 
 that the States did not thereby mean to abridge the authority 
 which they had conferred on the earl of Leicester, but only to 
 restore to the inferior governors their legal rights and powers ; 
 and the second, that they highly disapproved of those general 
 reflections which had been thrown out against the English troops, 
 on account of the late treachery of a few individuals ; for there 
 were bad as well as good men in every nation, and nothing could 
 be more illiberal and unjust than such undistinguishing reflections. 
 
 But while their conduct at home contained this mixture of 
 They repre- fi rmness and moderation, they gave vent to their resent- 
 sent their ment, in letters, which they appointed some of their 
 grievances number to carry to Elizabeth and Leicester ; in which, 
 to Elizabeth. a ^ er making mention of the trust and confidence which 
 they had placed in him, they entered into a full detail of their 
 grievances. 
 
 Leicester was highly offended with these letters, and endea- 
 voured to persuade Elizabeth, that they had been written by a 
 party who were his enemies, while the generality were well 
 affected both to his person and government. There was indeed 
 a numerous faction in the Netherlands, under the direction of 
 the clergy, whom Leicester had attached to him by a punctilious 
 attendance on public worship and an affectation of zeal for the 
 reformed religion. These men not only concurred with his par- 
 tisans in England, in attempting to discredit the representation 
 of his conduct which the States had transmitted to Elizabeth, 
 but studied to control the authority of the States at home, and 
 endeavoured to inspire the queen with the most groundless pre- 
 judices against prince Maurice and other popular leaders, through 
 whose influence, they said, the States had conceived a disgust 
 against the English alliance, and were now no less alienated from 
 the queen than from the earl of Leicester. Elizabeth did not 
 hearken implicitly either to the States or their accusers, but sent 
 Lord Buck- over Holland lord Buckhurst, a nobleman esteemed 
 hurst sent to for his prudence and moderation, to inquire into the 
 the Nether- ground of that contradictory information which she had 
 received, but chiefly with an intention to extinguish, as 
 soon as possible, the spirit of animosity and division to which the 
 governor’s imprudence had given rise. Buckhurst soon discovered 
 the falsehood of those insinuations which Leicester’s partisans had 
 propagated with regard to the designs of prince Maurice, and 
 the disaffection of the States ; and he found no reason to call in 
 question any part of that remonstrance which had been sent to 
 Elizabeth. He wisely declined entering into any discussion of 
 the points of difference between the opposite parties, approved 
 in general of the conduct of the States since Leicester’s departure, 
 
428 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XX. 
 
 exhorted them to bury in oblivion what had passed, and reminded 
 them of the mischievous consequences with which the want of 
 harmony must be attended in the present critical situation of 
 their affairs. 
 
 These exhortations seemed to produce, in some measure, the 
 Elizabeth’s desired effect ; the States appeared satisfied that Lei- 
 partiality cester should still retain the office of governor; and 
 for Leices- lord Buckhurst carried back to Elizabeth such a report 
 of their disposition, as was calculated to preserve that 
 amity which had hitherto subsisted between her and them ; but 
 he scrupled not to condemn the conduct of her favourite, and 
 accused him of being the cause of all the disturbances which had 
 happened. If any other of Elizabeth's courtiers had been guilty 
 of the same indiscretions with the earl of Leicester, it is not to 
 be doubted that he would have felt the weight of her resentment. 
 He had far exceeded the powers which she had given him. By 
 his misconduct he had strengthened the hands of her mortal 
 enemy, the king of Spain ; and by his misconduct and arro- 
 gance together, he had almost involved her in dissensions with 
 an ally whom she had undertaken to defend, and with whom it 
 was of the highest consequence to her interest that she should 
 maintain a perfect understanding. Yet such was her partiality 
 for this unworthy favourite, and so great the influence which he 
 possessed, that he found means to turn her indignation from him- 
 self against his accuser. Lord Buckhurst incurred her displea- 
 sure, and was even put under arrest, as if he, and not Leicester, 
 had been guilty k . 
 
 Nothing could be more agreeable to the Duke of Parma than 
 Famine and fhese distractions in the confederated provinces ; but 
 pestilence in he was prevented from availing himself of them by the 
 the southern miserable condition to which the provinces under his 
 provinces. comman q W ere reduced by famine and pestilence. The 
 country, as well as the towns, in the southern provinces, had of 
 late suffered a prodigious diminution of inhabitants. Great 
 numbers had forsaken their habitations, partly on account of 
 their religion, and partly of the ravages which had been com- 
 mitted by the troops ; and only a few of those who remained 
 had either seed to sow, or horses and cattle to cultivate their 
 grounds. There had been almost no crop raised in the preceding 
 year within the provinces, and the crops in the neighbouring 
 countries had been worse than usual for several years. From 
 Holland and Zealand the Flemings might have been abundantly 
 supplied, but the confederated States, besides prohibiting all 
 communication with the southern provinces, had placed guard- 
 ships upon the coasts, and in the mouths of the rivers, to prevent 
 them from receiving supplies from foreign parts, in the hopes 
 of weakening the Spanish army, or of compelling the frontier 
 
 h Meteren, lib. xiv. Bcntivoglio, p. ii. lib. iv. Rcidanus, lib. vi. Camden, an. 1587. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 • 4211 
 
 1587.] 
 
 towns to return into the confederacy. This cruel policy was not 
 attended with either of these effects. The Duke of Parma 
 brought provisions for his army from France, Germany, and 
 England, at an immense expense, and he gave particular at- 
 tention to the supplying of those towns which lay nearest to the 
 United Provinces. 
 
 Those dreadful calamities which are the ordinary concomitants 
 of famine, were felt chiefly in the interior parts, where great 
 multitudes died of want, and of those pestilential diseases which 
 want and unwholesome nourishment produced. In Antwerp, 
 Brussels, and other places, many persons of the better ranks in 
 life, after selling their furniture and other effects to purchase 
 food, were reduced to beg openly in the streets. In Brabant 
 and Flanders several villages were entirely deserted : and the 
 cotemporary historians add, that from the solitude and desolation 
 of some parts of the country, wolves and other wild beasts were 
 so much multiplied, that besides many persons who perished in 
 other places, upwards of a hundred were devoured by those 
 furious animals, within two miles of Ghent, in a country formerly 
 one of the best cultivated and most populous in the Nether- 
 lands. 
 
 Such was the state of the southern provinces, which are by 
 Prosperity of nature the richest, though governed by the Duke of 
 the United Parma with superior abilities. On the other hand, the 
 Provinces, maritime provinces were torn by factions, and governed 
 by one who possessed neither moderation, prudence, nor capacity; 
 yet the inhabitants were not only entirely free from those cala- 
 mities with which their neighbours were oppressed, but were 
 richly furnished with all the necessaries of life, and daily increased 
 in numbers. Every house was occupied, new streets and new 
 towns were built, and individuals grew richer every day, not- 
 withstanding the perpetual burden of an expensive war. For 
 these advantages the Dutch were indebted chiefly to their com- 
 merce, which had long been considerable, but was of late greatly 
 augmented by the multitude. r of manufacturers and merchants who 
 flocked into Holland and Zealand, when Brabant and Flanders 
 were broken off from the confederacy. The calamities of the 
 latter provinces contributed still more to increase the migration 
 of people into the former, till they became the seat of the 
 greatest part of that wealth and industry, which for ages past 
 had distinguished the Netherlands above the rest of Europe l . 
 
 In this condition of the United Provinces, it may appear sur- 
 prising, that during the space of eight months no attempt was 
 made by the confederates to recover any of the towns which had 
 been taken from them; but division, here, and the want of 
 capacity and vigour in the person intrusted with the reins of 
 government, were attended with some of the same effects as were 
 
 1 Van Meteren, lib. iv. p. 434. Thaanus, lib. lxxxviii. p. 9. 
 
430 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX. 
 
 produced by the famine and pestilence in the other provinces. 
 Neither prince Maurice nor the States had power at this time to 
 enforce obedience to their commands, except in the provinces of 
 Holland and Zealand. In the rest, the partisans of Leicester 
 disputed and counteracted their authority ; and thus the Duke 
 of Parma, notwithstanding those unspeakable calamities in 
 which the provinces under his government were involved, was 
 sooner ready than the confederates to resume the operations of 
 the war. 
 
 Ostend and Sluys were the only towns of importance in 
 The siege of Flanders which had not submitted to his arms. He 
 Siiiys. now resolved to attack the latter of these places ; and, 
 in order to conceal his design, he sent Hautepeine and the 
 marquis del Guasto, with a body of troops, towards the Yeluwe, 
 as if he had intended to make his principal attack in that 
 quarter. This artifice had the effect which he desired. Prince 
 Maurice and Count Hohenloe were immediately sent to the 
 Y eluwe with the army of the States ; and in the mean time the 
 duke turned suddenly towards Sluys. This place, which lies at 
 Beginning of a little distance from the coast, communicates with the 
 June - sea by a spacious canal, capable of receiving the largest 
 ships. By this canal, which separates Sluys from the isle of 
 Cadsand, the town is rendered inaccessible by land on the west 
 and north ; and all the ground on the east is so broken and 
 intersected by an infinite number of smaller canals derived from 
 the larger, that it is impracticable to approach the place except 
 by a neck of land on the south, leading towards Damme and 
 Bruges. Sluys lies at the distance of nearly five miles from 
 Ostend on the south, and from Flushing on the north ; from the 
 former of which it might receive assistance by land, and from the 
 latter by sea. It was, therefore, the Duke of Parma’s first object 
 to intercept the communication of the besieged with these two 
 places, and for this purpose he began with attacking the fort of 
 Blackenberg, which stands half-way between Sluys and Ostend. 
 As the garrison were utterly unprepared for resistance against so 
 vigorous an attack, he soon compelled them to surrender ; im- 
 mediately after which, he proceeded with a part of his forces to 
 the isle of Cadsand. At that place, after erecting a fort on the 
 banks of the great canal, nearer the sea than Sluys, he had 
 recourse to the same expedient which he had employed so suc- 
 cessfully at Antwerp, and blocked up the canal by a bridgo of 
 ships strongly bound together, and well furnished with troops 
 and artillery. 
 
 Having thus cut off the only channels of communication by 
 which the friends of the besieged could relieve them, he began to 
 make his approaches to the place itself on that side which looks 
 towards Bruges, on which alone it was accessible. Even there 
 the ground was so wet, as to increase exceedingly the labour of 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 431 
 
 1587.] 
 
 working the trenches' ; and the besieged had, in order to keep 
 the enemy at a distance, raised a strong redoubt beyond the 
 ditch. The garrison consisted of about one thousand six 
 hundred men, partly English and partly Dutch, commanded by 
 colonel Groenvelt, one of the bravest officers in the service of the 
 States. In the beginning of the siege they made several vigorous 
 sallies, in which they gave the most shining proofs of intrepidity. 
 But finding that although in these sallies they did great execution 
 among the enemy, their own numbers suffered considerable dimi- 
 nution, Groenvelt resolved to restrain them for the future from 
 advancing beyond the redoubt. This redoubt they defended for 
 some time with great bravery, and frequently repulsed the assail- 
 ants ; but they were obliged at last to yield to superior numbers, 
 and to retire within the town. 
 
 In carrying forward the trenches, Farnese encountered diffi- 
 culties from the softness of the ground, and the incessant fire of 
 the besieged, that were almost insurmountable. Many of his 
 troops were killed, and the Marquis of Renti, La Motte, and 
 several others of his principal officers, dangerously wounded. 
 
 In the meantime Prince Maurice and Count Hohenloe had 
 Return of entered Brabant, and after destroying a great number of 
 Leicester little towns and villages, had directed their march towards 
 from Eng- Bois-le-Duc, hoping that, in order to save that place, the 
 Duke of Parma would quit the siege of Sluys. But be- 
 fore they had taken the fort of Engelem, which lay in their way 
 to Bois-le-Duc, they were informed that the Earl of Leicester, 
 who had long been impatiently expected, had at last arrived at 
 Flushing with a reinforcement of troops. Maurice set out in- 
 stantly, with some cohorts, to meet him, leaving Hohenloe with 
 the rest of the forces to prosecute the enterprise against Engelem 
 and Bois-le-Duc. When Maurice had joined Leicester, the 
 confederated army was nearly equal to that of the besiegers. 
 Leicester set sail from Flushing on the twenty-ninth of June, 
 His feeble anc l ’ m a ^ ew hours reached the canal of Sluys. But 
 attempts to after examining the bridge, redoubts, and forts, 
 raise the siege w ith which Farnese had blocked up the passage, he 
 of Sluys. judged it impracticable in that way to reach the town. 
 Between the desire of accomplishing his design, and the difficulty 
 which he must encounter in carrying it into execution, he 
 balanced for some days, and at length he steered his course for 
 Ostend, with the resolution to lead his troops from thence by 
 land to the relief of the besieged. In the prosecution of this 
 latter design, he showed no greater spirit than in that of the 
 former. To open his way from Ostend to Sluys, it was necessary 
 he should make himself master of the fort of Blackenberg. He 
 accordingly laid siege to that fort, and had begun to batter it 
 with his cannon ; but he was no sooner informed that the Duke 
 of Parma was upon his march to give him battle, than he drew 
 
432 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XN. 
 
 off his troops from Blackenberg, retired hastily in the night to 
 Ostend, and soon afterwards returned to Zealand. 
 
 The duke of Parma resumed with fresh ardour the operations 
 of the siege, and having at last, though with incredible labour, 
 pushed his trenches near enough for erecting a battery, he soon 
 laid a great part of the wall in ruins. He would then have 
 attempted an assault, had he not perceived that the besieged 
 had raised within the wall a half-moon, which they had fortified 
 in the strongest manner. Laying aside therefore all thoughts 
 of taking the town by storm, he resolved to employ the slower 
 method of filling up the ditch, and working mines ; and in these 
 operations, against which the besieged made the most vigorous 
 opposition, near three weeks were spent after the wall had been 
 Generous re- demolished. The besieged had received certain intelli- 
 soiution of gence that Leicester had given up all hopes of being 
 the besieged. a jji e re i[ eve them, and they had now no more gun- 
 powder left than was sufficient to serve them for ten or twelve 
 hours longer. Six days before this time Groenvelt, and the other 
 surviving officers, having assembled together, were of opinion, that 
 as they had no prospect of relief, it would not be dishonourable 
 to surrender the place upon certain conditions ; and they 
 resolved that, in case these conditions were rejected, they would 
 set fire to the town, and endeavour to force their way sword in 
 hand through the enemy’s intrenchments. This resolution, with 
 the articles of the surrender, which they committed to writing 
 and confirmed with an oath, was sent to the earl of Leicester, to 
 serve for a vindication of their conduct. But their messenger 
 was discovered in swimming across the canal, and the paper 
 seized and carried to the duke of Parma, whose prudence and 
 respect for valour, though in an enemy from whom he had 
 suffered greatly, made him resolve to grant them those terms on 
 which he had thus accidentally discovered they were so much 
 They capi. determined to insist. Accordingly when, their gun- 
 tulate. powder being almost spent, they offered to deliver the 
 town upon condition that they should march out with the honours 
 An ust 4 war ’ instantl y complied, with their request. 
 
 ugus ' Their number had been reduced, from sixteen or seven- 
 teen hundred, to seven hundred men. The loss of the besiegers 
 was likewise very great. The contemporary historians do- not 
 mention the particular number of the killed and wounded ; but 
 they concur in saying that Sluys cost the duke of Parma more 
 than Nuys, Grave, and Yenlo together m . 
 
 It afforded him great satisfaction under this calamity, that 
 Guelders be- during the siege of Sluys, he had, without any blood- 
 trayed to the shed, acquired the town of Guelders, which was betray- 
 Spamards. e( j £ 0 hi m by a Scots colonel of the name of Paton. 
 
 m Strada mentions the numbers killed on both sides ; but his whole relation of this 
 siege is so exceedingly romantic, that no credit can be given to if. 
 
 Metcren, lib. xiv. p. 439. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 435 
 
 1587 .] 
 
 To this man Leicester had committed* the government of Guel- 
 ders ; but having taken offence at some part of his conduct, 
 he had openly threatened to put another, of the name of Stuart, 
 in his room. In order to avoid this affront, Paton entered into 
 a correspondence with Hautpeine, whose troops were at that 
 time in the neighbourhood of G uelders, and with his assistance 
 he soon afterwards executed his perfidious design. 
 
 To compensate to the States for so many important places as 
 they had lost since their alliance with England, their forces had 
 gained no advantage but the reduction of Axel, which Prince 
 Maurice took by a stratagem ; and the fort of Engelem, which 
 was compelled to surrender by Count Hohenloe ; who at the same 
 time beat the Spanish troops under Hautpeine, in a rencounter, 
 in which the latter lost his life. 
 
 After Leicester’s unsuccessful attempt to raise the siege of 
 Sluys, he transported his troops to Brabant, and made another 
 equally inglorious attempt to reduce the town and district of 
 Hoogstraten. This was the last military enterprise which he 
 undertook in the Netherlands, immediately after which he set 
 out for Dort, whither the States had sent some of their number 
 to wait his arrival. 
 
 This assembly was now more disgusted than ever with his 
 Intrigues of conduct. They long had reason to suspect, and they 
 Leicester. had lately received certain intelligence, that he had 
 formed a design to deprive them of their authority. A letter of 
 his, writ from England to one of his secretaries, had been inter- 
 cepted, in which, after mentioning his intended return to the 
 Low Countries, he expressed, in strong terms, his discontent 
 with the limited power which he had hitherto enjoyed as governor; 
 sent instructions to be communicated to those who were privy to 
 his designs ; and insinuated, that if he could not obtain a more 
 extensive authority, it was the Queen’s resolution, and his own, 
 to abandon the provinces altogether, and to leave them to their 
 fate. 
 
 The States, alarmed with this intelligence, resolved to stand 
 The States upon their guard against his machinations. Being still 
 alarmed. however unwilling, from their dread of Elizabeth’s dis- 
 pleasure, to come to an open rupture with him, they took no 
 notice of this letter, but exhorted him to reject such malignant 
 counsels as might be offered by ill-designing men, who, in order 
 to promote their own selfish views, wished to sow the seeds of 
 animosity and dissension. From this exhortation, Leicester 
 easily perceived that the States had come to the knowledge of 
 his designs. With great disingenuity he accused them of having 
 violated their faith, by abridging that authority which they 
 had entreated him to accept ; and he threw the blame of all the 
 misfortunes which had befallen the confederacy, partly on the 
 States, and partly on Prince Maurice and Count Hohenloe. The 
 
 F F 
 
434 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XX. 
 
 States, he said, had neglected to furnish him with the necessary 
 supplies ; and Maurice and Hohenloe had, on different pretences, 
 refused to co-operate with him in his military enterprises. Of a 
 writing which contained these and some other groundless ac- 
 cusations, copies were sent by his partisans into different parts 
 of the provinces. The parties accused published a vindication 
 of their conduct ; and it is impossible, from what is preserved 
 of this altercation, to consider what Leicester advanced in any 
 other light but as the mean attempt of a person, equally weak 
 and disingenuous, to blacken the characters of others, in order 
 to conceal the cowardice and imprudence of which he himself 
 was conscious. Such was the judgment formed of it by the 
 impartial world, and by most of the inhabitants of the Nether- 
 lands. But there was still a numerous party who espoused 
 Leicester’s defence, and promoted the execution of his designs. 
 The clergy were still as much attached to him as ever, and 
 spared no pains to bring the people to a compliance with his 
 will. Having with this view called a synod or assembly, they 
 appointed four of their number to present an address to the 
 States, in which, besides exhorting them to attend to the true 
 interest of the country, and the advancement of religion, they 
 advised them to maintain concord with the queen of England, 
 and the earl of Leicester. 
 
 To this address the States made such a reply, as the officiousness 
 The officious- of those in whose name it was presented seems to have 
 ness of the deserved. “ They had not been inattentive,” they said, 
 clergy. u £ 0 ^ 10Se important objects which the synod had recom- 
 
 •mended to their attention ; and they could not be more solicitous 
 than they had always been, to preserve inviolate those engagements 
 into which they had entered with the queen of England and the 
 earl of Leicester; but, in their turn, they must exhort the ministers 
 to be on their guard against admitting among them persons, 
 who, under the cloak of religion, made it their business to 
 calumniate the civil magistrates. By persons such as these, 
 who affected great zeal for religion, the church had been ruined 
 in the southern provinces ; and its ruin in the United Provinces 
 would soon be accomplished, if an end were not speedily put to 
 the practices of such designing men. They concluded with 
 exhorting the ministers to take warning from the fate of their 
 brethren in Brabant and Flanders ; and to remember, that the 
 only way in which they ought to interfere in public affairs, was 
 to favour those to whom the administration was committed, with 
 the assistance of their prayers.” 
 
 Neither this wholesome counsel, nor any other measure which 
 Leicester’s the States employed to enlighten and alarm their 
 desigus are countrymen, produced for some time the desired effect, 
 frustrated. Leicester still continued to carry on his intrigues in 
 different places, and went from town to town, putting in practice 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 435 
 
 1587.] 
 
 every low art by which he might increase the number of his 
 partisans. In Friesland, North Holland, and even in Dort and 
 Leyden, there were many who espoused his cause, and showed 
 themselves desirous to invest him with authority to control the 
 assembly of the States, notwithstanding the many striking proofs 
 which he had given both of tyranny and folly. In Leyden a plot 
 was laid for putting him in possession of that important city ; 
 but the conspirators were detected, condemned, and executed ; 
 and by the vigilance of the States, seconded by Prince Maurice 
 and William de Nassau, governor of Friesland, his designs in 
 other places were rendered equally ineffectual. Having come at 
 last to perceive that he was not equal to the attempt upon which 
 he had entered, he grew tired of his situation, and in the month 
 of December passed over to England, where, not long after his 
 arrival, Elizabeth, either from a conviction of his incapacity, or 
 from the desire of keeping him for the future near her person, 
 He resigns required him to resign his government of the Provinces ; 
 the govern- which he accordingly did on the 27th of December, 
 ment. one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven 11 . 
 
 The flame which he had kindled was not so soon extinguished. 
 In some towns the garrisons, instigated by him or his emissaries, 
 openly despised the authority of the States. Against the 
 garrison of Medemblinc they were obliged to employ force ; and 
 in order to engage other garrisons to yield obedience to their 
 commands, they had recourse to the interposition of Elizabeth, 
 through whose good offices internal tranquillity was at length 
 restored. 
 
 n Meteren, p. 455. 
 
 F F 2 
 
436 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXL 
 
 BOOK XXI. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Elizabeth was the more solicitous to heal the divisions in the 
 Philip me- United Provinces, as she apprehended that she would 
 ditates the soon have occasion for all the assistance which her 
 conquest of allies could afford her. All Europe had resounded for 
 ng an ' some time with the noise of the preparations which 
 Philip was making, with a view to some important enterprise. 
 He had been employed for several months in building ships of 
 an extraordinary size, and in collecting stores for their equip- 
 ment ; while the duke of Parma had made such numerous levies 
 in Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, as showed that he 
 intended to take the field against the next campaign, with a 
 much more powerful army than any which he had hitherto 
 commanded. 
 
 Almost ever since the beginning of Philip's reign, a great 
 proportion of his troops had been occupied, either in 
 is motives. war w ^j 1 ^he Corsairs and Turks, in the reduction of 
 the Morescoes, or in the conquest of Portugal. Pie had never 
 fully exerted his strength against his revolted subjects in the 
 Netherlands. Nor had he found leisure to take vengeance upon 
 Elizabeth for the support which she had given them, and the 
 insults which he had received from her in America, where several 
 of his colonies had been plundered by her fleet a . To these 
 objects he now thought that his honour, as well as his interest, 
 required that he should apply his principal attention. As he 
 did not doubt that, with a much smaller force than he intended 
 to employ, he should be able to compel the people in the Nether- 
 lands to return to their allegiance, he had begun his preparations 
 chiefly with an intention to invade England, and he aspired to 
 the entire subjection of that kingdom. But he hesitated for 
 some time as to the manner in which he should proceed ; and 
 held frequent meetings of his council to assist him in deciding, 
 whether it was most expedient to begin with the invasion of 
 England, or with the conquest of the United Provinces. 
 Idiaquez, one of his principal officers of state, advised him to 
 abandon altogether the former of these designs. 
 
 “ The situation of England," said that prudent statesman, 
 Speech of “ which is surrounded on every side with a tempestuous 
 idiaquez. ocean, and has few harbours upon its coasts ; the 
 
 a By Sir Francis Drake, anno 1585. 
 
PHILIP IT. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1587.] 
 
 43 7 
 
 numerous forces which defend it ; the genius of the people, and 
 the nature of their government, concur in making me believe 
 that it will be found almost impossible to succeed in an attempt 
 to conquer it. 
 
 “ The English navy is alone equal to that of any other nation ; 
 and, when joined with the ships belonging to the revolted 
 provinces, must prove an overmatch for any fleet that can be 
 sent from Spain. And even allowing that the King’s forces 
 should effectuate a descent, yet what ground is there to hope 
 that they will be able either to subdue so great a nation, or to 
 maintain, for any considerable time, such conquests as may be 
 made ? In order to accomplish the most ordinary conquests, 
 some favourable disposition in the people towards the conquerors 
 is necessary ; and in order to preserve them, there is need for a 
 continual supply of troops. From no part of the English nation 
 has the King any reason to hope for assistance in the intended 
 enterprise. In the beginning of his reign he had experience of 
 the strong abhorrence which these islanders entertain of a 
 foreign yoke. And he knows how difficult it must be to keep 
 up a numerous army in England, besides all the other armies 
 which are necessary for the defence of his hereditary, and his 
 lately acquired dominions. If England should prove equally 
 pernicious to Spain as Flanders has done, would there not be 
 reason to dread the consequences l Even the consequence of 
 success may prove fatal ; how much more those which may arise 
 from a disappointment, by which Elizabeth, being delivered from 
 her apprehensions of danger at home, would be at greater leisure 
 than ever to support the provinces in their rebellion ; and by 
 joining her maritime force with theirs, do infinite mischief to 
 the Spanish dominions both in Europe and America. In my 
 opinion, therefore, it will be better to suspend the design of 
 invading England, and to employ both the fleet and army in the 
 reduction of the Netherlands. The rebels will not long resist 
 so great a force ; and when they are subdued, the King, having 
 fewer enemies to contend with, will be much more able than at 
 present to chastise the queen of England.” 
 
 The duke of Parma, whom Philip consulted on this occasion, 
 Duke of was of the same opinion as Idiaquez ; and added, that 
 Parma’s before the King could enter upon the English expedition 
 opinion ' with a probability of success, it was necessary to acquire 
 possession of some of the most considerable seaports in Zealand, 
 for the accommodation of his fleet. 
 
 Philip was not naturally either bold or rash ; yet he refused 
 Rejected to listen to these prudent counsels. Blinded by the 
 by Philip, splendid success of his arms in the conquest of Portugal, 
 he thought it impossible that Elizabeth could withstand the 
 powerful armament which he intended to employ against her. 
 And if England were subdued, the reduction of his revolted 
 
438 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 subjects would quickly follow, as they would then be deprived of 
 the only foreign aid by which they had been hitherto enabled to 
 persist in their rebellion. Nor would the conquest of the former, 
 he thought, be either so tedious or so difficult as that of the 
 latter ; because England was everywhere an open country, and 
 the English, trusting to their insular situation, had neglected to 
 provide any fortified towns to retard the progress of an enemy. 
 A single battle by sea, and another by land, would decide the 
 contest ; and as the fleet which he was preparing was greatly 
 superior to any which Elizabeth could equip, so he could not 
 suppose that her land-forces, undisciplined, and unaccustomed to 
 war, would be able to resist his veteran troops, which had been 
 long inured to victory, and were commanded by the greatest 
 general and the bravest officers in the world. 
 
 He was not ignorant how much reason the other European 
 State of powers had to be jealous of his design ; but he considered 
 Europe, that happily they were at present either not inclined, or 
 not in a capacity, to prevent him from carrying it into execution. 
 The emperor of Germany was his friend and ally. The attention 
 of the northern potentates was wholly engrossed with the internal 
 administration of their dominions. And the French monarch, 
 who was more deeply interested than any other in opposing 
 him, could with difficulty support himself upon the throne against 
 his rebellious subjects. 
 
 But there was nothing which contributed more to confirm 
 him in his purpose, than the approbation which it received from 
 the Pope b , who, although it has been asserted that no person 
 entertained a higher admiration of the character of Elizabeth, 
 considered her as the most formidable enemy that the church 
 had ever seen upon a throne. She had not indeed, on any 
 occasion, treated her Catholic subjects with that inhuman 
 cruelty of which Philip had set her an example in his treatment 
 of the Protestants, but she had shown herself intent on extir- 
 pating the Catholic religion from every country in Europe to 
 which her power and influence could reach. For almost thirty 
 years she had been the chief support of the Protestants in 
 Germany, the Netherlands, and France. She had entirely 
 abolished the Popish faith in Scotland, as well as in her own 
 dominions ; and, not satisfied of depriving the unfortunate 
 Mary of her liberty, she had lately, after the farce of a solemn 
 trial, ordered that princess to be condemned as a traitor, and to 
 suffer death. This action, for which Elizabeth was severely 
 censured by Protestants as well as Papists, excited in the violent 
 mind of the Pontiff the highest degree of rage and indignation. 
 With these passions his interest concurred ; and the hope of 
 seeing England, which had formerly been the most precious 
 jewel of the triple crown, brought back to its ancient obedience 
 
 b Sextus V. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 439 
 
 1587 .] 
 
 to the Holy See. He approved highly, therefore, of Philip’s 
 intended enterprise, exhorting him to persevere in his design, 
 and gave him assurances that he would befriend him in the 
 execution of it to the utmost of his power. Next to an insatiable 
 thirst after dominion, it had ever been Philip’s principal ambi- 
 tion to be considered as the guardian of the church ; and his 
 vanity was not a little flattered at this time with having the 
 sovereign Pontiff for his associate 0 . 
 
 He proceeded therefore with much alacrity in completing his 
 Artifice of preparations. But although he resolved to spare no 
 Philip to expense or pains to secure success, yet, that he might 
 deceive Eli- find Elizabeth unprepared, he concealed with care the 
 purpose for which his armament was intended. A part 
 of his fleet, he said, was to co-operate with his land forces in 
 the reduction of Holland, and the rest to be employed in the 
 defence of his dominions in America. 
 
 Elizabeth had too much penetration to be so easily deceived 
 by the artifices of a prince, with whose duplicity she was so 
 thoroughly acquainted ; and in the spring of the year one thou- 
 sand five hundred and eighty-seven, she sent Sir Francis Drake 
 with a fleet to the coast of Spain to interrupt his preparations. 
 By this gallant seaman, the Spanish ships of war, which had been 
 sent to oppose him, were dispersed, and near a hundred vessels 
 filled with naval stores and provisions, besides two large galleons, 
 were destroyed in the harbour of Cadiz. Drake then set sail for 
 the Azores, where he took a rich carrack in her way from the 
 East Indies, and afterwards returned to England loaded with 
 spoils, having, by this bold and fortunate adventure, rendered it 
 impossible for Philip to execute his, enterprise against England 
 till the following year. 
 
 Notwithstanding these hostilities, Philip still affected to desire 
 Fruitless that all the grounds of difference between him and 
 negotiation Elizabeth might be removed, and gave orders to the 
 for peace. fi u k e 0 f p a rma to propose a negotiation for peace. It 
 is not probable that the Queen was deceived by this any more 
 than by his former artifice. She resolved, however, to appear to 
 be caught in the snare ; she pretended to believe his declaration 
 with regard to the destination of his fleet, and to listen to his 
 proposal of negotiating an agreement. She readily accepted of 
 the mediation of the king of Denmark ; and that her conduct 
 might have the greater appearance of sincerity, she urged the 
 States to send ambassadors to Bourbourg, the place appointed 
 for the conferences, and ordered her envoy to represent to them 
 the expediency of putting a period to the war. 
 
 The States were much alarmed with her proposal, and sus- 
 pected that, in order to avert the storm which threatened her, 
 
 c Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. See a very different account in Gregorio Lcti’s Life of 
 Sixtus, lib. vii. 
 
4-10 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XNT. 
 
 she had resolved to sacrifice the confederacy, and to deliver up 
 to Philip the Dutch towns in her possession. She found it neces- 
 sary to remove their apprehensions on this head, by declaring, 
 that as she had not the remotest thoughts of forsaking them, so 
 she would never consent to any terms of peace inconsistent with 
 their security. 
 
 She could not, however, persuade them to send ambassadors 
 to the congress. “ They were deeply sensible,” they informed 
 her, “ of the weight of those considerations, which her ambassa- 
 dor had urged, to induce them to think of peace. They lamented 
 that spirit of discord which had seized on some towns of the 
 confederacy, and they heard with great anxiety of those mighty 
 fleets and armies which the king of Spain was preparing for their 
 destruction. But their situation, though bad in some respects, 
 was far from being desperate ; they were still in possession of 
 more than sixty towns and forts, each of which could make a 
 vigorous resistance against the enemy. In the two years during 
 which the earl of Leicester had governed them, eight millions of 
 guilders had been raised for the public service, and under a pru- 
 dent administration they would be able not only to continue to 
 afford the same expense, but even to augment it. But although 
 their situation were in reality as ill as some had represented, it 
 could not serve any good purpose to treat of peace with the king 
 of Spain, who was unalterably determined never to grant them 
 peace on such conditions as either their interest or their con- 
 sciences would permit them to accept. And from past experience 
 they were persuaded, that their sending ambassadors to the con- 
 gress would be attended with the most pernicious consequences. 
 It would create in many persons such despair with regard to the 
 stability of the present government, as would determine some to 
 change their religion, and others to leave the Netherlands. It 
 would raise the spirits of the Catholics, and induce both them 
 and the Protestants to withhold their share of the public ex- 
 penses ; the former, from the view of forwarding the peace, and 
 the latter, from that of retiring into foreign parts. Thus, both 
 the fleet and army, being ill paid, would become refractory, the 
 commanders of towns and ships would provide for their future 
 security, by entering into secret practices with the enemy ,* and 
 in the midst of that sedition, confusion, and treachery that would 
 ensue, it would not be in the power of the States, or of the 
 Queen, to prevent the people from accepting whatever terms of 
 peace the king of Spain should think fit to impose.” 
 
 In these reasons Elizabeth found it necessary to acquiesce ; 
 but she persisted in the resolution which she had formed with 
 regard to her own conduct, and ordered her ambassadors to 
 repair to Bourbourg. In the conferences held there, various 
 terms of accommodation were proposed, with no sincerity on the 
 part of Spain, and with little hope of success on the part of 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 441 
 
 1583.] 
 
 England. The Spanish ministers still continued to assure those 
 of England that no invasion of that kingdom was intended ; and, 
 considering how long this congress subsisted (for it was not dis- 
 solved till the arrival of the Spanish fleet in the channel), it 
 should seem that their asseverations were not wholly disregarded 
 by Elizabeth 01 . 
 
 This artifice, however, did not prevent her from putting her 
 Elizabeth’s kingdom into a posture of defence. An army was 
 preparations, raised, amounting to eighty thousand men, twenty 
 thousand of whom were stationed on the south coast of the 
 island, twenty-two thousand foot and a thousand horse were 
 posted at Tilbury in Essex, under the earl of Leicester, and the 
 remainder, commanded by Lord Hunsdown, were kept near the 
 Queen’s person, in readiness to march against the enemy where- 
 soever they should attempt to land. Elizabeth did not trust 
 implicitly at this juncture either to her own judgment, or that of 
 her counsellors of state ; Lord Gray of Wilton, Sir Francis 
 Knolles, Sir John Norris, Sir Richard Bingham, and Sir Roger 
 Williams, officers of distinguished reputation, were appointed to 
 consider of the measures proper to be pursued ; and by their 
 advice, all the seaports which lay most conveniently for a descent 
 were fortified ; the militia was raised, their arms and manner of 
 fighting ascertained, and a resolution formed that if, notwith- 
 standing the precautions taken, it should be found impossible to 
 prevent the enemy from landing, all the country round should 
 be laid waste, and a general engagement avoided till the several 
 armies were combined. 
 
 While these prudent measures were pursued at land, Elizabeth 
 exerted herself strenuously in the equipment of her fleet. When 
 she began her preparations, it did not amount to more than thirty 
 ships, and none of these were nearly equal in size to those of the 
 enemy. But this disadvantage was in some measure compensated 
 by the skill and dexterity of the English sailors ; and the num- 
 ber of her ships was soon augmented, through the alacrity and 
 zeal which her subjects displayed in her defence. By her wise 
 administration she had acquired their esteem and confidence. 
 The animosity against her person and government, which the 
 differences in religion had excited in the minds of some, was at 
 present swallowed up in that universal abhorrence which the 
 Catholics as well as the Protestants entertained of the tyranny 
 of Spain. Great pains were taken to keep alive and heighten 
 that abhorrence. Accounts were spread of the horrid barbarities 
 which the Spaniards had perpetrated in the Netherlands and 
 America : descriptions were drawn, in the blackest colours, of 
 the inhuman cruelties of the inquisition, and pictures were dis- 
 persed of the various instruments of torture employed by the 
 inquisitors, of which it was said there was abundant store on 
 
 d Mctcren, lib. xiv. p. 459. Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. iv. 
 
442 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 board the Spanish fleet. These, and such other considerations, 
 made a strong impression, not upon Elizabeth’s Protestant sub- 
 jects only, but likewise upon the Catholics e ; who, although the 
 Pope had published a bull of excommunication against her, yet 
 resolved not to yield to the Protestants either in loyalty to their 
 sovereign or in zeal for the independency of the state. The 
 whole kingdom was of one mind and spirit ; some Catholics 
 entered into the army as volunteers, and others joined with the 
 Protestants in equipping armed vessels. Every maritime town 
 fitted out one or more. The citizens of London furnished thirty, 
 although only fifteen were required of them ; and between forty 
 and fifty were equipped by the nobility and gentry throughout 
 the kingdom. But all these ships were of small size, in compa- 
 rison of those which composed the Spanish fleet ; and there was 
 still much ground for the most anxious apprehensions with regard 
 to the final issue of the war. 
 
 No person felt greater anxiety on this occasion than Elizabeth; 
 the principal object of whose prudent politics for thirty years, 
 had been to avoid the critical situation to which she was now 
 reduced. She did not, however, suffer any symptoms of uneasi- 
 ness to appear, but wore at all times a placid and animated 
 countenance, and in her whole behaviour displayed an undaunted 
 spirit, which commanded admiration and applause. 
 
 The States of Holland, in the mean time, were not inattentive 
 Preparations to the approaching danger, nor did they think them- 
 and conduct selves less interested to provide against it, than if 
 of the Dutch, pjjjjjp h ac [ intended to begin his operations with an 
 attack upon the Netherlands. From their fears of an immediate 
 attack, they were delivered by intelligence of the enormous size 
 of the Spanish ships, to which the coasts of Holland and Zealand 
 were inaccessible. They turned their principal attention there- 
 fore to the assistance of their ally ; and kept their fleet, consisting 
 of more than eighty ships, prepared for action. At Elizabeth’s 
 desire, they sent thirty of that number to cruise between Calais 
 and Dover ; and, afterwards, when the duke of Parma’s design 
 of transporting his army to England was certainly known, they 
 ordered Justin de Nassau, admiral of Zealand, to join Lord 
 Seymour, one of the English admirals, with five- and- thirty ships, 
 to block up those seaports in Flanders where the duke intended 
 to embark f . 
 
 The principal English fleet was stationed at Plymouth, and 
 the chief command of it was given to Charles Lord Howard of 
 Effingham, who had under him as vice-admirals. Sir Francis 
 Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher, three of the most expert and 
 bravest seamen in the world. 
 
 In the beginning of May one thousand five hundred and 
 The Spanish eighty-eight, Philip’s preparations, which had so long 
 Armada. kept all Europe in amazement and suspense, were 
 
 c Metcrcn, lib. xv 
 
 f Ibid. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 443 
 
 1588. J 
 
 brought to a conclusion. That Armada, to which the Spaniards, 
 in confidence of success, gave the name of Invincible, consisted 
 of one hundred and fifty ships, most of which were greatly 
 superior in strength and size to any that had been seen before. 
 It had on board near twenty thousand soldiers, and eight thou- 
 sand sailors, besides two thousand volunteers of the most distin- 
 guished families in Spain. It carried two thousand six hundred 
 and fifty great guns, was victualled for half a year, and contained 
 such a quantity of military stores, as only the Spanish monarch, 
 enriched by the treasures of the Indies and America, could 
 supply. 
 
 Philip’s preparations in the Netherlands were not less advanced 
 Duke of than those in Spain. Besides a flourishing army of 
 Parma’s pre- thirty thousand foot and four thousand horse, which 
 parations. the d u ke G f Parma had assembled in the neighbour- 
 hood of Nieuport and Dunkirk ; that active general had, with 
 incredible labour, provided a great number of flat-bottomed 
 vessels, fit for transporting both horse and foot, and had brought 
 sailors to navigate them from the towns in the Baltic. Most of 
 these vessels had been built at Antwerp, and as he durst not 
 venture to bring them from thence by sea to Nieuport, lest they 
 should have been intercepted by the Dutch, he was obliged to 
 send them along the Scheld to Ghent, from Ghent to Bruges, by 
 the canal which joins these towns, and from Bruges to Nieuport, 
 by a new canal which he dug on the present occasion. This 
 laborious undertaking, in which several thousand workmen had 
 been employed, was already finished, and the duke now waited 
 for the arrival of the Spanish fleet ; hoping, that as soon as it 
 should approach, the Dutch and English ships that cruised upon 
 the coast would retire into their harbours. 
 
 The Armada would have left Lisbon in the beginning of May, 
 Death of the but the marquis de Santa Croce, who had been appointed 
 Spanish ad- admiral, was, at the very time fixed for its departure, 
 seized with a violent fever, of which he died in a few 
 days ; and, by a singular fatality, the duke de Paliano, the vice- 
 admiral, died likewise at the same time. Santa Croce ‘being 
 reckoned the first naval officer in Spain, Philip had much reason 
 to lament his death, and it should seem that he found it extremely 
 difficult to fill his place, since he named for his successor the duke 
 de Medina Sidonia, a nobleman of considerable reputation, but 
 entirely unacquainted with maritime affairs. This defect in the 
 commander-in-chief Philip supplied in some measure, by giving 
 him Martinez de Becaldo, a seaman of great experience, for his 
 vice-admiral. 
 
 In these arrangements so much time was lost, that the fleet 
 The Armada could not leave Lisbon till the twenty-ninth of May. 
 sets sail from It had not advanced far in its voyage to Corunna, at 
 which place it was to receive some troops and stores, 
 when it was overtaken by a violent storm and dispersed. All 
 
444 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 the ships, however, reached Corunna, though considerably 
 damaged, except four g . They were repaired with the utmost 
 diligence, the King sending messengers every day to hasten their 
 departure, yet several weeks passed before they could be put in 
 a condition to resume the voyage. 
 
 In the mean time a report was brought to England, that the 
 Armada had suffered so much by the storm, as to be unfit for 
 proceeding in the intended enterprise ; and so well attested did 
 this intelligence appear to Queen Elizabeth, that, at her desire, 
 Secretary Walsingham wrote to the English admiral, requiring 
 him to lay up four of his largest ships, and to discharge the 
 seamen. Lord Howard was happily less credulous on this occa- 
 sion than either Elizabeth or Walsingham, and desired that he 
 might be allowed to retain these ships in the service, even though 
 it should be at his own expense, till more certain information 
 were received. In order to procure it, he set sail with a brisk 
 north wind for Corunna, intending, in case he should find the 
 Armada so much disabled as had been reported, to attempt to 
 complete its destruction. On the coast of Spain he received 
 intelligence of the truth : at the same time the wind having 
 changed from north to south, he began to dread that the Spa- 
 niards might have sailed for England, and therefore he returned 
 without delay to his former station at Plymouth. 
 
 Soon after his arrival, he was informed that the Armada was 
 Arrival of the sight* He immediately weighed anchor, and sailed 
 Ar mada in out of the harbour, still uncertain of the course which 
 
 the Channel, the enemy intended to pursue. On the next day he 
 July 30th. perceived them steering directly "towardsj'him, drawn 
 up in the form of a crescent, which extended seven miles from one 
 extremity to another. It was for some time believed that Ply- 
 mouth was the place of their destination ; and it was the opinion 
 of many persons of that age, that their enterprise would have been 
 more successful than it proved, had they landed there, and not 
 proceeded up the channel. By doing this, it was supposed, they 
 would have drawn Elizabeth’s whole force to the south-west 
 coast of the island, and have rendered it easier for the duke of 
 Parma to transport his troops. But in this expectation it is 
 probable they would have been extremely disappointed, as the 
 Dutch fleet alone would have been able to block up the seaports 
 in Flanders ; the English fleet might have destroyed the A rmada 
 had it once entered Plymouth harbour, and Elizabeth’s land- 
 forces would have been an over-match for all the Spanish troops 
 Plan of opc- w ^ich the Armada had on board. But if the duke de 
 rations pi e- Medina ever intended to make a descent at Plymouth, 
 sented by } ie soon changed his design, and adhered closely after- 
 rhllip ‘ wards to the execution of the plan prescribed to him 
 
 b In three of these, the galley-slaves, consisting of English, French, and Turks, taking 
 advantage of the confusion occasioned by the storm, overpowered the Spaniards, and carried 
 the ships into a harbour on the coast of Bayonne. Mcteren, p. 470. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 44.*> 
 
 1588.] 
 
 by the court of Spain. This was to steer quite through the 
 channel till he should reach the coast of Flanders, and after 
 driving away the Dutch and English ships, by which the har- 
 bours of Nieuport and Dunkirk were besieged, to escort the duke 
 of Parma’s army to England, and to land there the forces that 
 were on board the fleet. In compliance with these instructions, 
 he proceeded in his course, without turning aside to the English, 
 who were drawn up along the coast, and ready to receive him. 
 
 Lord Howard, considering that the Spaniards would probably 
 Prudent and muc ^ superior to him in close fight, by reason of the 
 gallant con- size of their ships, and the number of their troops, 
 duct of Lord wisely resolved to content himself with harassing them 
 Howard. j n p ie i r voyage, and with watching attentively all the 
 advantages which might be derived from storms, cross winds, and 
 such-like fortuitous accidents. It was not long before he dis- 
 cerned a favourable opportunity of attacking the vice-admiral 
 Recaldo. This he did in person, and on that occasion* displayed 
 so much dexterity in working his ship, and in loading and firing 
 his guns, as greatly alarmed the Spaniards for the fate of the 
 vice-admiral. From that time they kept much closer to one 
 another ; notwithstanding which, the English on the same day 
 attacked one of the largest galeasses. Other Spanish ships came 
 up in time to her relief, but in their hurry, one of the principal 
 galleons, which had a great part of the treasure on board, ran 
 foul of another ship, and had one of her masts broken. In con- 
 sequence of this misfortune she fell behind, and was taken by sir 
 Francis Drake ; who, on the same day, took another capital ship 
 which had been accidentally set on fire. 
 
 Several other rencounters happened, and in all of them the 
 Superiority English proved victorious, through the great advantage 
 of the Eng- which they derived from the lightness of their ships, 
 hsh sailors. an q ^h e dexterity of the sailors. The Spaniards in that 
 age did not sufficiently understand nautical mechanics, to be able 
 to avail themselves of the unusual magnitude of their ships. The 
 English sailed round them, approached or retired with a velocity 
 that filled them with amazement, and did infinitely greater exe- 
 cution with their cannon, for while every shot of theirs proved 
 effectual, their ships suffered very little damage from the enemy, 
 whose guns were planted too high, and generally spent their 
 force in air. 
 
 The Spaniards, however, still continued to advance till they 
 The Armada came opposite to Calais : there the duke de Medina 
 opposite to having ordered them to cast anchor, he sent informa- 
 Cakis. tion p ie q u k e 0 f p arma 0 f his arrival, and entreated 
 him to hasten the embarkation of his forces. Farnese set out 
 immediately from Bruges, where the messenger found him, for 
 Nieuport, and he began to put his troops on board. But at the 
 same time he informed Medina, that, agreeably to the King’s 
 
HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 446 
 
 instructions, the vessels which he had prepared, were proper only 
 for transporting the troops, but were utterly unfit for fighting ; 
 and for this reason, till the Armada were brought still nearer, 
 and the coast cleared of the Dutch ships which had blocked up 
 the harbours of Nieuport and Dunkirk, he could not stir from his 
 present station, without exposing his army to certain ruin, the 
 consequence of which would probably be the entire loss of the 
 Netherlands. 
 
 In compliance with this request, the Armada was ordered to 
 Is thrown advance, and it had arrived within sight of Dunkirk, 
 into con- between the English fleet on the one hand, and the Dutch 
 the°Eng- 011 the °ther, when a sudden calm put a stop to all its 
 lish fire- motions. In this situation the three fleets remained for 
 ships. one whole day. About the middle of the night a breeze 
 August 7. sprang up, and Lord Howard had recourse to an expedient 
 which had been happily devised on the day before. Having filled 
 eight ships with pitch, sulphur, and other combustible materials, 
 he set fire to them, and sent them before the wind against the 
 different divisions of the Spanish fleet. 
 
 When the Spaniards beheld these ships in flames approach- 
 ing towards them, it brought to their remembrance the havoc 
 which had been made by the fireships employed against the duke 
 of Parma^s bridge at the siege of Antwerp. The darkness of the 
 night increased the terror with which their imaginations were 
 overwhelmed, and the panic flew from one end of the fleet to the 
 other. Each crew, anxious only for their own preservation, 
 thought of nothing but how to escape from the present danger. 
 Some of them took time to weigh their anchors, but others cut 
 their cables, and suffered their ships to drive with blind precipi- 
 tation, without considering whether they did not thereby expose 
 themselves to a greater danger than that which they were so 
 solicitous to avoid. In this confusion the ships ran foul of one 
 another : the shock was dreadful, and several of them received 
 so much damage as to be rendered unfit for future use. 
 
 When day-light returned. Lord Howard had the satisfaction 
 Battle be- to perceive that his stratagem had fully produced the 
 tween the desired effect. The enemy were still in extreme disorder, 
 two fleets. anc [ their ships widely separated and dispersed. His 
 fleet had lately received a great augmentation by the ships fitted 
 out by the nobility and gentry, and by those under Lord Sey- 
 mour, who had left Justin de Nassau as alone sufficient to guard 
 the coast of Flanders. Being bravely seconded by Sir Francis 
 Drake, and all the other officers, he made haste to improve the 
 advantage which was now presented to him, and attacked the 
 enemy in different quarters at the same time with the utmost 
 impetuosity and ardour. The engagement began at four in the 
 August 8th m orning, and lasted till six at night. The Spaniards 
 displayed in every rencounter the most intrepid bravery ; 
 
HILIP 11. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 447 
 
 1588.] V 
 
 but, from the causes already mentioned, they did very little 
 execution against the English, while many of their own ships 
 were greatly damaged, and ten of the largest were either run 
 aground, or sunk, or compelled to surrender. 
 
 The principal galeass, commanded by Moncada, having Mauri- 
 Losses sus- quez, the inspector-general, on board, with three 
 tained by the hundred galley-slaves and four hundred soldiers, 
 Spaniards. was d r j ven ashore near Calais. She was quickly 
 followed by some English pinnaces, and these were supported 
 by the admiral’s long-boat, in which he had sent a body of select 
 soldiers to their assistance. Moncada himself, and almost all 
 the Spaniards, were either killed, or drowned in attempting to 
 reach the shore. The rowers were set at liberty. About fifty 
 thousand ducats were found on board. Mauri quez escaped, and 
 was the first who carried the news of the disaster of the fleet to 
 Spain. 
 
 One of the capital ships having been long battered by an 
 English captain of the name of Cross, was sunk in the time of the 
 engagement. A few only of the crew were saved, who related, 
 that one of the officers on board having proposed to surrender, 
 he was killed by another who was enraged at his proposal ; that 
 this other was killed by the brother of the first ; and that it was 
 in the midst of this bloody scene, which paints the ferocious 
 character of the Spaniards, that the ship had gone to the 
 bottom s . 
 
 The fate of two other of the Spanish galleons is particularly 
 mentioned by the contemporary historians. One of them was 
 called the St. Philip, and the other the St. Matthew, which had 
 on board, besides several other nobility, two general officers, Don 
 Francis Toledo, of the family of Orgas, and Don Diego Pimentel, 
 brother to the Marquis of Tomnarez. After an obstinate 
 engagement, in which the admiral’s ship fought along with them, 
 they were obliged to run ashore on the coast of Flanders, where 
 they were taken by the Dutch. Toledo was drowned, and 
 Pimentel, and all the rest who survived, were made prisoners. 
 
 The duke de Medina was much dejected at these misfortunes, 
 The duke anc ^ m ore when he reflected on the superior skill of 
 de Medina the enemy. For it is well attested, that in all the 
 despairs of engagements which had passed since the fir§t appearance 
 success, of the Armada in the channel, the English had lost only 
 one small ship, and about a hundred men. Animated by their 
 past success with sanguine hopes of final victory, they were now 
 more formidable than ever. Medina dreaded, from a con- 
 tinuance of the combat, the entire destruction of his fleet. He 
 could not without the greatest danger remain any longer in his 
 present situation, and much less could he venture to approach 
 nearer to the coast of Flanders. 
 
 k Meteren and Grotius. 
 
448 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXI. 
 
 It now appeared how great an error Philip had committed, 
 Cause of his in neglecting to secure some commodious harbours in 
 despair. Zealand. He had from the first supposed that the 
 enemy’s ships would fly to their respective ports, as soon as his 
 stupendous Armada should appear. But this Armada had been 
 made unfit for the purpose for which it was designed, by means 
 of that enormous expense which he bestowed in order to render 
 it invincible. In constructing it, no attention had been given to 
 the nature of those narrow seas in which it was to be employed ; 
 and the consequence of this important error was, that even if the 
 English fleet had been unable to contend with the Spaniards in 
 the deeper parts of the channel, yet they would have prevented 
 them from landing : and the Dutch fleet lying in shallow water, 
 to which the galleons durst not approach, would still have kept 
 their station, and have rendered it impossible for the Spanish 
 fleet and army to act in concert. 
 
 This the duke de Medina at length perceived, and he did not 
 He resolves hesitate in resolving to abandon the further prosecu- 
 to return to tion of his enterprise. The only subject of his delibera- 
 Spaiu ‘ tion now was, how he might, with the least difficulty 
 
 and danger, get back to Spain. Had he been ever so much 
 inclined to return through the channel, in which he must have 
 been continually harassed by the enemy, yet the wind, which blew 
 strong from the south, would have prevented him. He therefore 
 resolved to sail northwards, and to make the circuit of the 
 British isles. 
 
 This resolution was no sooner understood by the English 
 admiral, than having dispatched Lord Seymour with a part of 
 the fleet, to join the Dutch in watching the motions of the duke 
 of Parma, he set sail himself with the greater part of it, in 
 pursuit of the Spaniards. He followed close in the rear for three 
 days, without attacking them. This he declined, from the 
 apprehension of his not having a sufficient quantity of gun- 
 powder, with which he had been ill supplied by the public offices. 
 Had he not been deterred from renewing his attack by this 
 provoking circumstance, he might have forced the Spaniards to 
 an engagement off Flamborough-head ; and it is asserted by a 
 respectable contemporary historian 11 , that so great was the distress 
 of the Spanish fleet, and such the admiral’s dread of the long 
 and dangerous voyage before him, that he would have surren- 
 dered without resistance, in case he had been attacked. But 
 he was saved from the disgrace in which this action would have 
 involved his name, through the necessity under which the 
 English admiral found himself of returning to England, to supply 
 the deficiency of his stores. 
 
 Lord Howard had reason to be incensed against those, by 
 
 h Grotius. 
 
1588.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 449 
 
 Disasters whose negligence he was thus disabled from completing 
 which befell the glory which his gallant conduct had procured him. 
 the Armada. j n i ssue however, it would have been unfortunate if 
 he had delayed his return. The two fleets, which sailed in opposite 
 directions, were not far distant from each other, when a dreadful 
 storm arose. The English reached home, though not without 
 difficulty, yet without sustaining any considerable loss. But the 
 Spaniards were exposed to the storm in all its rage, and became 
 no less objects of pity to their enemies, than they had lately 
 been of dread and terror. Having hitherto kept near each 
 other, lest the English should have renewed the attack, this 
 circumstance proved the first cause of their disasters. The ships 
 were driven violently against each other, and thereby many of 
 them were rendered an easy prey to the fury of the waves. At 
 length they were dispersed. In order to enable them to ride out 
 the storm, the horses, mules, and baggage were thrown over- 
 board. This precaution was of advantage only to such of the 
 ships as were stronger, or more fortunate than the rest. Some 
 of them were dashed to pieces on the rocks of Norway, or sunk 
 in the middle of the ocean. Others were thrown upon the coasts 
 of Scotland, and the Western Isles. And more than thirty were 
 driven by another storm, which overtook them from the west, on 
 * different parts of the coast of Ireland. Of these, some after- 
 wards reached home in the most shattered condition, under the 
 vice-admiral Recaldo ; others were shipwrecked among the 
 rocks and shallows ; and of those which reached the shore, the 
 crews were barbarously murdered; from an apprehension, it 
 was pretended, that, in a country where there were so many 
 disaffected Catholics, it would have been dangerous to show 
 mercy to so great a number of the enemy. The duke de Medina 
 having kept out in the open seas, escaped shipwreck, and arrived 
 at Saint Andero in Biscay about the end of September. 
 
 The calamities of the Spaniards did not end with their arrival 
 in Spain. Two of the galleons which had withstood the storm, 
 were accidentally set on fire, and consumed to ashes in the 
 harbour. Great numbers, especially of the nobility and gentry, 
 accustomed to a life of ease and pleasure, had died at sea ; and 
 many more died afterwards of diseases occasioned by the hard- 
 ships they had undergone. 
 
 V ery different accounts are given by different historians, of the 
 total loss sustained. Some assert that it amounted to thirty-two 
 ships, and ten thousand men ; but others, without pretending to 
 ascertain the number of men, which could not, they say, be less 
 than fifteen thousand, affirm that eighty ships were taken, 
 destroyed, or lost 1 . This dreadful calamity was sensibly felt all 
 
 ‘ As the president De Thou, who lived at the time of this memorable event, pretends 
 not to determine to which of these relations the greatest regard is due, it would be in vain 
 at this time to attempt to decide betwixt them. 
 
 G G 
 
450 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 over Spain, and there was scarcely a single family of rank in the 
 kingdom that did not go into mourning for the death of some 
 near relation ; insomuch that Philip, dreading the effect which 
 this universal face of sorrow might produce upon the minds of the 
 people, imitated the conduct of the Roman senate, after the 
 battle of Cannae, and published an edict to abridge the time of 
 public mourning k . 
 
 While the people of Spain were thus overwhelmed with 
 Rejoicings' affliction, there was nothing to be heard in England 
 in England and the United Provinces but the voice of festivity and 
 and Hoi- j 0 y. In Holland medals were struck in commemoration 
 land * of the happy event ; and in both countries, days of 
 solemn thanksgiving to Heaven were appointed for their delive- 
 rance. Elizabeth went for this purpose to St. Paul’s cathedral, 
 seated in a triumphal chariot, and surrounded with her ministers 
 and nobles, amidst a great number of flags and colours which had 
 been taken from the enemy ; while the citizens were ranged in 
 arms on each side of the streets through which she passed. Nor 
 did the destruction of the Armada give joy only to the English 
 and Dutch. All Europe had trembled at the thoughts of its success. 
 For although it can hardly be supposed that Philip was so romantic 
 as to flatter himself with the hopes of attaining universal monarchy, 
 yet it is not to be imagined that he aspired only at the conquest 
 of England and Holland. He had before this time formed the 
 plan, which he afterwards pursued, of subduing France : nor can 
 it be believed that anything less would have satisfied his ambition, 
 than the subjection of every Protestant state in Europe, and the 
 utter extirpation of the reformed religion. 
 
 His ambition was on this occasion severely mortified. But 
 Philip’s mag- as he possessed in a high degree the art of concealing 
 nanimous be- his emotions, he received intelligence of the disaster that 
 haviour. had befallen him, with an appearance of magnanimity 
 and resignation to the will of Heaven, which, if it was not affected, 
 deserved the highest praise. He returned thanks to God, that 
 the calamity was not greater. He issued orders to have the ut- 
 most care taken of the sick and wounded, who had survived the 
 general catastrophe. And instead of forbidding the duke of 
 Medina Sidonia to come to court, as is alleged by some historians, 
 he wrote to him in the most obliging terms, expressing his grati- 
 tude for the zeal which he had discovered in his service ; and 
 observing, that no man could answer for the success of an enter- 
 prise, which, like that wherein the duke had been engaged, de- 
 pended on the winds and waves 1 . 
 
 Philip’s behaviour towards the duke of Parma on this difficult 
 occasion, contained the same display of justice that appeared in 
 his letter to Medina Sidonia. Notwithstanding the many proofs 
 
 k Meteren, lib. xiv. Grotii Historia, lib. i. Campana, dccad. vii. lib. i. Fcrieras 
 and Thuanus. 1 Ferreras, part xv. Strada, lib. v. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 451 
 
 1588 .] 
 
 which Farnese had exhibited in the sight of all Europe, of inde- 
 fatigable vigour and activity, as well as of heroic valour, yet the 
 failure of the expedition against England was by some ascribed 
 to his negligence in making the necessary preparations, and by 
 others to his excessive caution or timidity. But Philip refused to 
 listen to these groundless calumnies. He still continued to repose 
 in the duke his wonted confidence ; and testified towards him 
 all that attachment and esteem which his conduct in the Nether- 
 lands had deserved. The truth is, that as the principal error in 
 conducting the expedition had been committed, by neglecting the 
 duke of Parma’s advice, so no person was more deeply interested 
 in its success ; since, if the Armada had opened a passage for his 
 troops, the whole direction of the enterprise would have belonged 
 to him, and the noblest opportunity, to which his ambition could 
 aspire, have been given, of exerting those illustrious military 
 talents which have acquired him such distinguished renown. 
 
 The duke had the greater reason to entertain the hopes of 
 victory, in case his army could have been transported to England, 
 as Elizabeth had, from her partiality for the earl of Leicester, 
 bestowed the chief command of her land-forces on that nobleman, 
 who was so little entitled, either by his courage or his abilities, 
 to so great a trust. Her good fortune, or more properly the 
 kind providence of Heaven, so conspicuously exercised in her 
 behalf, saved her from the consequences with which this unjusti- 
 fiable step might have been attended. It was perhaps the only 
 imprudent measure of which, at this difficult crisis, she can be 
 justly accused ; and she fully atoned for it by the wisdom, vigour, 
 and fortitude which she displayed in every other part of her 
 conduct. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Elizabeth’s situation now was extremely different from what 
 Situation of it had ever been since her accession to the throne. 
 Elizabeth. Having been delivered some time before the present 
 period from the queen of Scots, who had long been a principal 
 cause of her inquietude, she had found the art of appeasing the 
 resentment, and even of conciliating the favour, of the son of that 
 unfortunate princess; She had united her Catholic and Pro- 
 testant subjects in her defence, and had triumphed over her 
 implacable enemy, the king of Spain. She had not the same 
 reason as formerly to dread the power of that monarch, which 
 he had exerted in vain for her destruction, and she had very 
 little reason to apprehend that he would soon renew his attempt 
 to invade her dominions. To prevent this, by furnishing him 
 with employment elsewhere, had been long her principal motive 
 for taking such deep concern in the affairs of the Netherlands. 
 
 G 6 2 
 
152 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 This motive did not subsist in the same degree of force as for- 
 merly, yet she resolved to adhere faithfully to her engagements 
 with the States, and still to assist and support them. After 
 Leicester’s resignation, she had conferred the command of her 
 Lord Wil- troops in the Netherlands upon Lord Willoughby, sub- 
 loughbv. jecting this nobleman, however, to the authority of the 
 States, and leaving the command in chief to Prince Maurice, to 
 whom the States themselves had lately committed it. 
 
 It was not gratitude alone, or a respect for the memory of the 
 Prince late prince of Orange, that determined the confederated 
 Maurice, provinces to repose so great a trust at this perilous con- 
 juncture in his son, who was at this time only in the twenty-first 
 year of his age. Maurice had, from his early youth, given proof 
 of superior prudence and capacity ; and his conduct afterwards 
 fulfilled the most sanguine expectations of his countrymen. 
 With much less moderation and self-command, and less too of 
 the art of governing the minds of men, which William possessed 
 in so eminent a degree, Maurice was superior to his father in 
 military accomplishments, and of these the confederacy stood 
 more in need at the present period, than of political abilities. 
 
 Maurice had no opportunity of exercising his talents for war, 
 from the time of Leicester’s departure till the fate of the Spanish 
 Armada was decided. A great number of his best troops had 
 been put on board the fleet commanded by Justin de Nassau ; all 
 the garrisons of the maritime towns had been augmented, lest 
 the Spaniards should have attempted to make a descent ; and 
 there was no body of forces left, sufficient to enable him to take 
 advantage of the duke of Parma’s inactivity, by undertaking any 
 military enterprise. 
 
 The first opportunity of action was afforded him by a resolu- 
 The duke of tion which the duke formed, as soon as he perceived 
 dftates tiT" ^ ere was no l° n g er any prospect of invading England, 
 siege^f Ber- besiege the town of Bergen-op-Zoom. This town, 
 gen-op- as its name imports, is situated on the river Zoom, at 
 
 Zoom. a little distance from the. place where that river falls 
 
 into the Scheld ; and by this last river the territory of Bergen is 
 separated from the isle of Tolen. Farnese thinking it necessary 
 towards the success of his intended enterprise, to be master of 
 this island, sent Count Charles of Mansveldt with a body of eight 
 hundred foot to take possession of it ; and in order to conceal his 
 design, he ordered them to make a feint of marching towards 
 Heusden. This artifice however had not the desired success. 
 Maurice had taken care to have both Bergen and Tolen properly 
 furnished with troops for their defence. 
 
 At low water it is practicable to pass over to Tolen upon foot, 
 and in this way Count Mansveldt endeavoured to approach it. 
 But the governor, Count Solmes, was so well prepared to receive 
 him, that Mansveldt was soon obliged to abandon his attempt, 
 
1588. J 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 453 
 
 and in his retreat he lost about four hundred men. In the mean 
 time the duke of Parma had advanced with his army, and invested 
 the town on the land side, without having met with any consider- 
 able opposition. But the besieged beheld his operations with 
 great indifference ; their communication with Holland and Zea- 
 land was still as free and open as before. In order to intercept 
 it, they knew that the enemy must first reduce two strong forts 
 October s t° 0( l between the town and the Scheld, and this 
 
 they trusted could not be accomplished before the approach 
 of winter. 
 
 The duke immediately began his operations with an attack 
 He is deceiv- u P on one °f these forts ; but before he had made any 
 ed by two considerable progress, he conceived hopes of acquiring 
 British possession of it in a way much more easy and expedi- 
 tious than by open force. Two soldiers belonging to 
 the garrison, whom some historians call Scots, and others English, 
 having gone over to Farnese, offered to deliver the fort to him, 
 on condition of his granting them a suitable reward for so great 
 a service. Farnese lent a willing ear to their proposal, and gave 
 them the most flattering promises ; but as he still suspected them 
 of insincerity, he made them confirm what they had told him by 
 an oath, and required that they should be carried bound in the 
 midst of the soldiers whom he intended to employ in executing 
 the plan which they had suggested. To this, as well as to the 
 oath required from them, they readily agreed. The duke could 
 no longer remain distrustful, and ordered De Levya, one of his 
 bravest officers, to be ready immediately after sun-set, with three 
 thousand infantry, to advance towards the fort. De Levya set 
 out at the time appointed, and arrived at the gate when it was 
 beginning to grow dark. Upon a signal given by the two British 
 soldiers the port was opened, but no sooner had about fifty Spa- 
 niards entered, than the portcullis was let down, and all the rest 
 excluded. Those who had entered perceived the treachery of 
 their guides, but being more solicitous to save their own lives 
 than to take vengeance on the traitors, they suffered them to 
 escape, and the Spaniards themselves were instantly surrounded 
 by the garrison, and either put to the sword or taken prisoners. 
 
 Of those who were without, only such as were near the gate 
 were acquainted with what had happened, while the rest who 
 were ignorant of it still pressing forward, made it impossible for 
 the foremost to retire. These men, rendered desperate by their 
 perilous situation, attempted to scale the ramparts, but they 
 were soon repulsed by the garrison, who were every where upon 
 their guard. The guns of the fort began to play upon them. 
 The darkness of the night increased their confusion, and they 
 fell into an ambush which the garrison had prepared. A great 
 number was killed, and many were swallowed up in the mud and 
 water with which the fort was surrounded. 
 
454 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXL 
 
 After this misfortune the duke of Parma despaired of succeed- 
 The duke m h* 8 enterprise. Heavy rains had lately fallen, 
 
 abandons his troops began to grow sickly, and all the country 
 his attempt round, which was naturally wet, was become almost 
 on eigen. i naccess ikle h[ s CO nvoys of provisions. Determined 
 by these considerations, he raised the siege before the middle of 
 November, after fortifying some passes in the neighbourhood of 
 the place, to restrain the excursions of the garrison 111 . 
 
 No sooner had he drawn off his troops from Bergen, than, hav- 
 ing put the Italians and Spaniards into winter-quarters, he sent 
 the Germans under Count Peter Ernest de Mansveldt to lay 
 siege to Wachtendonck, in Upper Guelderland, a small place, 
 but strongly fortified, and situated in the midst of a marshy soil. 
 Farnese was, notwithstanding these circumstances, determined 
 to employ his troops in reducing it, by loud complaints which 
 were made to him of the continual depredations of the garrison. 
 This garrison consisted of troops formed by the celebrated 
 Schenck, whose bravery would have baffled the utmost efforts of 
 Count Mansveldt, had it not been for a circumstance which entitles 
 the siege of this little town to a place in history. It was in this 
 The inven- siege that bombs, the late invention of an inhabitant 
 tion of in Venlo, were first employed. To save the town from 
 destruction, the citizens prevailed on the garrison to 
 consent to a surrender, but not till they had sallied out and killed 
 a great number of the enemy; many of whom likewise perished by 
 the inclemency of the season, and the humidity of the air and soil. 
 
 In consequence of the loss of men sustained at this siege and 
 Anxiety of that of Bergen, the duke of Parma found his army 
 the duke of exceedingly diminished. This consideration alone must 
 Parma. hstve b een a sensible mortification to a general of so 
 great activity and enterprise, but he was more deeply mortified 
 at the difficulty which he found in supporting the forces that 
 still remained under his command. They had begun to murmur 
 on account of the arrears which were due to them, and he dread- 
 ed the loss of that authority over them which he had hitherto 
 maintained. He had earnestly solicited remittances from the 
 court of Spain, and had represented the fatal consequences which 
 must attend the irregular payment of his troops. But his 
 requests had not for some time past been listened to as formerly, 
 and some of the bills which he drew had been returned unpaid. 
 This was owing partly to the low state of Philip’s finances, which, 
 great as his resources were, had been overburdened by the 
 enormous expense in which his late armament had involved him ; 
 and partly to the malignity and envy of the Spanish ministers. 
 The duke could not conceal his chagrin, which was augmented 
 by the decline of his health, and the symptoms of a dropsy, 
 which some years afterwards put a period to his life n . 
 
 m Grotius Hist. lib. i. Bentivoglio and Mctcren, anno 1 588. 
 
 Metercn, p. 503. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OP SPAIN. 
 
 455 
 
 1589 . 
 
 In this situation lie received great satisfaction from an event 
 Certrudcn- which was one of the consequences of the intrigues of 
 berg betray- the earl of Leicester. The garrisons of several towns 
 ed to the had, through the influence of that nobleman’s partisans, 
 Spaniards. or f rom the deficiencies in their pay occasioned by his 
 misconduct, shown great contempt for the authority of the States 
 and Prince Maurice ; but they had all been brought back to their 
 duty, except the garrison of St. Gertrudenberg, which consisted 
 of one thousand five hundred foot and three hundred horse, 
 partly Dutch and partly English. This garrison, having indulged 
 themselves in greater excesses than any other, were conscious of 
 such a degree of guilt as they thought could not easily be forgiven : 
 they were therefore still as refractory and seditious as ever, main- 
 taining openly, that they were accountable to none but the 
 queen of England ; and seizing upon ships, and carrying off 
 plunder from the friends as well as the enemies of the confede- 
 racy. The States, apprehensive of their delivering the town to 
 the enemy, applied every soothing expedient to prevent them. 
 They offered them a full pardon of their offences, got Lord 
 Willoughby to interpose his influence, and made immediate pay- 
 ment of a great proportion of their arrears ; but all endeavours 
 were ineffectual. In the mean time Lanzavecchia, the governor 
 of Breda, being well informed of their temper and disposition, 
 employed secret agents to confirm them in their seditious pur- 
 poses, holding forth to them the rewards which they might hope 
 for from the duke of Parma, while there was nothing to be 
 expected from the queen of England or the States, but either an 
 ignominious punishment, or perpetual diffidence and contempt. 
 They hesitated for some time ; but when an offer was made to 
 them in the name of the duke of Parma, of full payment of their 
 arrears, besides a sum of money equal to five years’ pay, they 
 were unable to resist the allurement ; they agreed to give up the 
 town on the terms proposed, and began to prepare for the 
 execution of their design, by disarming the inhabitants. Upon 
 receiving intelligence of this infamous transaction, Prince Maurice 
 set out by sea, with a body of troops, in order to reduce the 
 garrison by force of arms. But before he had time to make any 
 progress in the siege, having been informed that the duke of 
 Parma was upon his march to oppose him with a superior army, 
 he thought it prudent to retire. The duke soon afterwards 
 entered the town, and having fulfilled his engagements to the 
 garrison, he bestowed the government upon Lanzavecchia as a re- 
 ward for the service he had performed. Gertrudenberg was the 
 first town in Holland which the Spaniards had acquired since 
 their expulsion from that province about twelve years before ; and 
 it gave Farnese, on that account, the most sensible joy and satis- 
 faction. The States, on the other hand, expressed their indigna- 
 tion against the traitors, by proscribing them ; and it ought not to 
 
456 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXI 
 
 be forgotten, that through various accidents almost all of them 
 fell into the hands of the confederates, and had the sentence of 
 proscription executed upon them with the utmost rigour. 
 
 From Gertrudenberg the Spanish army was sent under Count 
 Charles of Mansveldt, to reduce the towns of Heusden and 
 Romersval, and the fort of Louvestein ; but all their attempts 
 on these places were baffled by the activity and vigour of Prince 
 Maurice and Count Hohenloe. 
 
 The duke of Parma returned to Brussels, and not long after- 
 The duke wards he set out for Germany, to drink the waters at 
 of Parma Spa, although it was believed he would not have gone 
 at Spa ' at this season, which was the most proper for all mili- 
 tary operations, if his army had been in a condition to enter 
 Mav upon any enterprise worthy of his former fame °. 
 
 During his absence, Prince Maurice was barely able to 
 prevent Count Mansveldt from making any new acquisition. 
 The forces of these two generals were nearly equal; neither 
 party was inclined to risk an engagement, and no rencounter 
 passed between them that deserves to be recorded. 
 
 Some important services were in the mean time performed by 
 Achieve- the indefatigable Schenck in the interior provinces, 
 mentsof Having some time before the present period, proposed 
 Schenck. g^ a ^ eg to bmld a fort upon the Rhine, at the place 
 
 where that river divides itself into two branches, and forms the 
 isle of Betuwe p , the States approved highly of his proposal, and 
 furnished him with everything necessary for carrying it into exe-^ 
 cution. He finished it with great despatch ; and having fixed 
 there his head- quarters, he overran all the country round, and 
 seized every favourable opportunity of annoying the enemy. He 
 took the city of Bonne, upon the Rhine, by surprise in the night. 
 Having been informed that a body of troops were upon their march 
 to reinforce Verdugo, the governor of Groningen, and were escort- 
 ing a sum of money to that place for the payment of the garrison, 
 he chose his ground with so much skill, and attacked them with 
 such impetuosity and ardour, that he routed them, and got 
 possession of the money without the loss of a single man. But 
 there was nothing on which he was so intent as the recovery of 
 Nimeguen, which some years before he himself had conquered 
 for the Spaniards. Nimeguen stands on the banks of the Waal, 
 at the distance of only a few hours, sail from the fort which 
 Shenck had constructed. Having embarked his troops, he set 
 out with an intention to reach the town about the middle of 
 the night. Through some accident or mistake he did not 
 arrive till the morning, when he happened unfortunately to land 
 at a house where a number of persons were assembled for the 
 celebration of a wedding. By these persons the alarm was 
 instantly given to the rest of the inhabitants, who were well 
 
 Gratius, p ] 32. 
 
 P Called anciently Batavia, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 457 
 
 1589.] 
 
 acquainted with the enmity with which Schenck had for some 
 time past been animated against them, and knew that an uni- 
 versal pillage would be the consequence of his success. They 
 ran to arms from every quarter, made a furious attack upon his 
 men, and, notwithstanding the most intrepid resistance, drove 
 them towards their boats in great confusion. Schenck endeavour- 
 ed to rally them, but in vain. The town’s people pursued, and 
 slew many of them while they were attempting to escape. 
 Death of Schenck himself was wounded, and immediately after- 
 Schenck. wards his boat was overset, and he, and all on board, 
 were drowned. Such was the fate of this brave man at the age 
 of forty, by whom, ever since his revolt, the Spaniards had been 
 subjected to perpetual apprehensions and alarms q . 
 
 No other material transaction occurred during this campaign 
 Battle of but the siege of Rhinb erg, which was undertaken at the 
 Rhinberg. earnest desire of the elector of Cologn, and the charge 
 of it committed by the duke of Parma to the marquis of V aram- 
 bon. Colonel Yere, an English officer of high reputation, was 
 sent by the States to the relief of the besieged, and between him 
 and V arambon a bloody battle was fought, in which the English 
 commander gained a complete victory. After this he entered 
 the town, and fortified it so strongly, as enabled the inhabitants 
 for some time longer to preserve their liberty and independence. 
 
 It was now the end of autumn, and the duke of Parma was 
 The duke of re ^ urne< ^ ^ rom Spa. Soon after his return, his appre- 
 Parma re- hensions with regard to the consequences of the irregular 
 turns from payment of his troops wereverified by the mutiny of a 
 Spa ' Spanish regiment which lay in garrison at Courtray. 
 
 From complaints the soldiers proceeded to threats, and at last 
 openly refused to obey his commands. With the utmost difficulty 
 he raised money sufficient to appease them. But as this was the 
 first sedition which had happened since the commencement of his 
 government, he was the more sensibly afflicted by it, and dreaded 
 that the example which it afforded would soon be followed by 
 the garrisons in other towns. 
 
 This event happened about the end of the year one thousand 
 The surprise five hundred and eighty-nine ; and in the month of 
 of Breda. February immediately following, another misfortune 
 
 L599. happened, which convinced the duke, that Prince Mau- 
 rice was an antagonist of a character extremely different from 
 that of any other with whom he had hitherto contended. This 
 was the loss of the important city of Breda, of which Maurice 
 got possession by a singular stratagem, suggested to him by 
 the master of a boat, called Adrian Vandenberg, who had some- 
 times supplied the town and garrison with turf for firing. When 
 Lanzavecchia, the governor, was at Breda, all vessels which came 
 there were carefully examined ; but the duke of Parma, having 
 
 ‘i Bentivoglio, p. .334. 
 
458 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXI. 
 
 rewarded this crafty Italian, for the part which he had acted in 
 corrupting the garrison of St. Gertrudenberg, with the govern- 
 ment of that town, still suffered him to retain that of Breda. 
 Lanzavecchia found it necessary to be often absent from the latter 
 of these places ; and, during his absence, usually committed the 
 charge of it to his son. Yandenberg having observed that on 
 these occasions there was commonly great negligence in searching 
 his boat, founded upon this circumstance his plan for taking the 
 citadel by surprise. It was communicated to Prince Maurice, 
 who readily embraced it, and immediately applied himself to put 
 it in execution. The boat was loaded in appearance with turf, as 
 usual ; but the turf was supported by a floor of planks fixed at 
 the distance of several feet from the bottom ; and under this floor 
 seventy select soldiers were placed, under the command of Charles 
 Harauguer r , an officer of distinguished valour and capacity. 
 They had but a few miles to sail ; yet through unexpected acci- 
 dents, several days passed before they could reach Breda. The 
 wind turned against them, the melting ice retarded their course, 
 and the boat, having struck upon a bank, was so much damaged that 
 the soldiers were for some time up to the knees in water. Their 
 provisions were almost spent, and one of their number was seized 
 with a violent cough, which, if it continued, they foresaw would 
 certainly occasion a discovery. This man had the generosity to 
 offer them his sword and to entreat them to kill him. They as 
 generously declined it ; and being resolved to run all risks, rather 
 than embrue their hands in the blood of their companion, they 
 still persisted in their design. Happily their virtue was rewarded : 
 the soldier’s cough left him, and even the leak in the vessel was 
 stopped by some accidental cause. 
 
 In order to secure the absence of Lanzavecchia, whose vigilance 
 there was much ground to dread, Prince Maurice had made a 
 feint of marching against Gertrudenberg, and this artifice pro- 
 duced the desired effect. Lanzavecchia was absent from Breda 
 when the boat arrived. It was admitted within the fortifications 
 of the castle, and the search was made in the most superficial 
 manner. 
 
 Notwithstanding this, there was still the utmost danger of a 
 discovery, and it would certainly have been made, had not Van- 
 denberg possessed an extraordinary share of address and art, 
 which he exerted on this occasion. There being a scarcity of 
 fuel in the castle, the turf was immediately purchased : the 
 soldiers of the garrison were set to work in carrying it ashore, 
 and so great a number of hands were employed, that they would 
 soon have uncovered the planks, and thereby have detected the 
 plot, had not V andenberg, pretending to be fatigued with labour 
 and watching, and unable to assist the soldiers any longer in un- 
 loading, first amused them with discourse, and then invited them 
 
 A native of Cambray. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 459 
 
 1590.] 
 
 to join him in drinking some wine which he had provided. His 
 offer was readily accepted. The night came on, and the Spanish 
 soldiers were all either asleep or drunk. Yandenberg then set 
 out, in order to give notice of his success to Prince Maurice and 
 Count Hohenloe, who, according to agreement, had in great silence 
 brought forward a body of forces within a little distance of the town. 
 
 About the middle of the night, Harauguer issued forth from 
 his retreat ; and having divided his band into two bodies, he 
 attacked at the same time, both the guards which were placed at 
 the gate towards the country, and those which were stationed at 
 another gate which led from the citadel to the town, and meeting 
 with little resistance, he secured possession of the gates. Young 
 Lanzavecchia rushed out against him with between thirty and 
 forty of the garrison ; but these men were not able to withstand 
 the determined and desperate valour of the assailants. They 
 were all either put to the sword or dispersed, and Lanzavecchia 
 himself was wounded and taken prisoner. 
 
 The alarm was soon communicated to the town, in which there 
 was a numerous garrison, consisting of five companies of Italian 
 foot, and one of horse. The citizens offered to co-operate with 
 the garrison in defending the fortifications, till the duke of Parma 
 should come to their relief ; but this cowardly garrison, being 
 struck with an universal panic, and having no commander in chief 
 to direct their operations, suddenly forsook the town. In the 
 mean time Prince Maurice arrived in the citadel, and the inhabit- 
 ants having now no garrison to support them, sent a trumpet 
 with an offer to surrender, on condition that they should not be 
 plundered. And to this Prince Maurice readily agreed ; but re- 
 quired that they should pay him ninety thousand florins to be 
 distributed among his troops. 
 
 Maurice received the greater satisfaction from this acquisition, 
 which had been attended with the loss of only one man, as Breda 
 had been for many years the hereditary property of his family ; 
 and for the same reasons the citizens were less reluctant in sub- 
 mitting to his authority. He appointed the brave Harauguer to 
 be governer of the town, and liberally rewarded Yandenberg and 
 all the other sailors and soldiers, in proportion to their merit. 
 
 The duke of Parma, on the other hand, was extremely mortified 
 with what had happened, and highly incensed against his country- 
 men, the Italians, who had so basely deserted the town committed 
 to their care. He ordered the officers to be arrested, and 
 afterwards commanded all of them to be executed, agreeably to 
 the sentence of a court-martial, except one, whom he pardoned in 
 consideration of his youth 1 . 
 
 Old Lanza veccliia’s imprudence in committing so important a 
 charge to so young a man as his son, was already severely 
 punished by his son’s imprisonment, and the loss of his govern- 
 ment of Breda. He punished himself still further, by resigning 
 
 1 Grotius. Bentivoglio, 
 
460 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXI. 
 
 liis government of Gertruden'berg. Such were the bitter fruits of 
 that corruption for which this man had been so lately rewarded. 
 According to the principles which warriors and politicians are 
 ready to adopt, his conduct deserved the reward which was be- 
 stowed upon it ; but to the friends of virtue it will give satisfac- 
 tion to observe, that, in the course of providence, punishment is 
 inflicted sometimes not upon the treacherous alone, but on those 
 too by whom they are prompted, or encouraged in their treachery. 
 
 Meanwhile Farnese resolving to recover the town, if possible, 
 before Prince Maurice should have time to secure it, sent Count 
 Mansveldt against it with a part of the army. But Maurice had 
 no sooner acquired possession of the place, than he furnished it 
 with provisions sufficient for many months, and stationed a 
 garrison in it consisting of one thousand two hundred foot and 
 four hundred horse. Mansveldt did not therefore think it 
 expedient to lay immediate siege to Breda ; but in order to cut 
 off the communication of the garrison with Holland, he attempted 
 to reduce a strong fort in the mouth of the river Mark, which 
 commanded the navigation of that river. From this attempt, 
 however, he was obliged to desist, after having lost between six 
 and seven hundred men. He then built another fort at the mouth 
 of the river, and began to make preparations for besieging the 
 town itself. In order to divert him from the prosecution of his 
 design Prince Maurice marched with a body of about five thousand 
 men towards Nimeguen, resolving to besiege that town in case 
 Mansveldt did not relinquish his present enterprise. 
 
 Farnese, sensible of the great importance of Nimeguen, sent 
 orders to Count Mansveldt to lead his army thither without delay. 
 Maurice perceived then that it was impracticable for him to 
 attempt the siege with any probability of success, and encamped 
 his troops in the Betuwe, on the north side of the Waal, opposite 
 to Nimeguen. Having fortified the banks of the river, to prevent 
 Count Mansveldt from transporting his forces, he built, in sight 
 of the enemy, a strong fort, afterwards called by the name of 
 Knotzenburg, directly opposite to the town ; by which he not 
 only deprived Nimeguen of all the advantages which it had 
 hitherto derived from its situation ; but, as the cannon of this 
 fort could reach the town, the inhabitants were exposed to con- 
 tinual danger. After having finished this important work, he 
 dug a navigable canal across the Betuwe, from the Rhine to 
 the Waal. This wise expedient rendered the navigation of the 
 confederates in those parts secure, by making it unnecessary for 
 their ships to pass by Nimeguen ; and it was of great advantage 
 to all the country round, by lessening the violence of the inunda- 
 tions to which that part of the Netherlands is sometimes liable. 
 The States of Guelderland and Overyssel had a just sense of the 
 benefits which they derived from his operations, and they testi- 
 fied their gratitude by electing him governor of these two 
 provinces. 
 
1590.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 4 G 1 
 
 BOOK XXII. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 From the capacity and vigour which Maurice had already dis- 
 Affairs of played, Philip might have perceived that he should 
 France. probably find full employment in the Netherlands for 
 all the forces which, in the present state of his finances, he was 
 able to support. And considering the unfortunate issue of his 
 enterprise against Elizabeth, and how much the reputation of 
 his arms and counsels had suffered from his long unsuccessful 
 struggle with the inhabitants of the United Provinces, it 
 might have been expected that he would have seen the 
 absurdity of that preposterous ambition which had led him to 
 undertake new conquests before he had reduced his own dominions 
 under obedience. It does not appear that he ever seriously 
 entertained the thoughts of renewing his attempt against England ; 
 but having never relinquished his designs on France, he had 
 maintained his connexions with the heads of the Catholic league ; 
 and notwithstanding the difficulty which he found in paying his 
 army in Flanders he had from time to time supplied them with 
 considerable sums of money. 
 
 These factious leaders had now more occasion than ever for 
 The Catholic his assistance. After the treaty mentioned above, which 
 league. Philip concluded with the duke of Guise at Joinville in 
 the year one thousand five hundred and eighty-five, the flames 
 of war between the Catholics and Protestants had been kindled 
 afresh from one end of the kingdom to the other. Henry, 
 well acquainted with the secret intentions of Guise and his 
 partisans, which were no less hostile to himself than to the 
 Calvinists, would gladly have employed all his power for their 
 destruction ; but he soon perceived that he was unable to contend 
 openly with so great a force as they had provided against him, and 
 therefore disguising his resentment for the affront offered to his 
 authority, he resolved to accede to the league, in hopes of 
 acquiring the direction of it, by declaring himself its head and 
 protector. In consequence of this resolution, great preparations 
 were made for prosecuting the war against the Calvinists, and 
 three different armies were raised. One of these Henry com- 
 manded in person ; another was sent under the duke de Joyeuse 
 against the king of Navarre ; and the third was led by the duke 
 of Guise to oppose a numerous army of Germans, who were upon 
 their march to the assistance of the Plugonots. Joyeuse lost 
 
462 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXII. 
 
 both his army and his life in the battle of Coutras ; but the duke 
 of Guise, who made up for the small number of his troops by 
 his superior conduct and intrepidity, proved victorious over the 
 Germans, and thereby acquired an increase of popularity and 
 fame, which gave him uncontrollable influence over almost all the 
 Catholics in the kingdom. Elated with his success, and conscious 
 of his power, this ambitious leader could no longer delay the 
 execution of his designs ; but resolved, after deposing the King, 
 and confining him to a cloister, to place the infirm and aged 
 cardinal of Bourbon upon the throne ; hoping to engross the 
 whole administration, and to secure the succession to himself 
 in the event of the cardinal’s demise. Henry beheld with much 
 dread the precipice on which he stood ; and, in order to avoid it, 
 had recourse to that detestable expedient, of which, in his youth, 
 he had shown his approbation, in the massacre of St. Bartholomew, 
 by commanding both the duke of Guise, and his brother the car- 
 dinal, to be assassinated. 
 
 This murder, which even Henry pretended to justify only by 
 the plea of necessity, did not produce the effect which he expected. 
 Instead of intimidating his enemies, it served to inflame their 
 minds with wrath and indignation. In Paris, where the spirit of 
 the league had long raged with the utmost fury, the people broke 
 his statues to pieces, the ecclesiastics declaimed against him in the 
 bitterest and most abusive terms, and the Sorbonne declared him 
 to have forfeited the crown. His subjects almost every where 
 rose up in arms against him and the duke of Mayenne, brother 
 of the Guises, a prince of extraordinary prudence and capacity, 
 was chosen commander in chief in his brother’s room. 
 
 In this situation Henry had no resource left but in the king 
 of Navarre, whom he had deceived and persecuted. But this 
 generous and heroic prince readily forgot the injuries he had 
 received from him, and made haste to march with a numerous 
 army to his assistance. Thus powerfully supported, Henry 
 became an overmatch for his enemies, and he would soon have 
 compelled the city of Paris to surrender, when a period was Tput 
 to his life by a fanatic monk, who, being seduced by his superiors, 
 burned with the desire of meriting heaven, by embruing his hands 
 in the blood of his lawful prince. Such was the unfortunate end 
 of Henry III. the last of the race of Valois, which had reigned 
 over France for almost three hundred years. 
 
 The king of Navarre, the undoubted heir of the crown, and 
 Accession of whom the deceased monarch had nominated his suc- 
 Henry IV . cessor, was immediately proclaimed king in the camp, 
 by the name of Henry IV., a name which will be for ever 
 respected, not by the French nation alone, but by every friend 
 of mankind and of virtue. Brought up in the hardest school 
 of adversity, patient, frugal, and laborious ; brave and wise ; 
 sincere, humane, and generous ; of the strictest integrity, and 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 4G3 
 
 1590.] 
 
 the most untainted honour ; he had long commanded the 
 admiration of his enemies, as well as of the impartial world. 
 Never did any prince succeed to a throne, adorned with more 
 splendid, more substantial, or more amiable accomplishments ; 
 yet so fierce was the spirit of religious bigotry with which his 
 subjects were inflamed ; so great their abhorrence of Calvinism ; 
 and such their dread, that Henry, who was himself a Calvinist, 
 although the most moderate of his sect, would, in imitation of 
 the queen of England, overturn the Popish religion, that many 
 of the Catholics instantly forsook his camp ; nor would any of 
 them have been persuaded to remain with him, had he not given 
 them ground to entertain hopes of his conversion. 
 
 In Paris he had a numerous party who would willingly have 
 recognised his right, in case he would have agreed to embrace the 
 Popish faith. There were others who, under the pretence of 
 religion, had no other ends in view but to secure and perpetuate 
 that unbounded license which they had long enjoyed, of perpe- 
 trating the most atrocious crimes ; and there were many who, 
 having been gained over by Spanish influence, had, in concert 
 with Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, and Cajetan, the Pope’s 
 legate, a partisan of Spain, formed the design of conferring the 
 crown, either on Philip himself, or his daughter Isabella a . 
 
 The duke of Mayenne, who had adopted his brother’s plan in 
 all its branches, hoped to make these parties subservient to his 
 own elevation to the throne. This design, however, he concealed 
 with care ; and that he might have leisure to prepare the means 
 of putting it in execution, he prevailed on a great majority to 
 concur in electing the cardinal of Bourbon king ; to which 
 measure likewise Philip, actuated by a similar intention, gave 
 his consent. 
 
 Henry in the mean time finding himself unable, from the great 
 desertion of his forces, to maintain his present situation before 
 Paris, retired into Normandy, to wait there, till succours, which 
 he expected from Elizabeth, should arrive. Mayenne, putting 
 himself at the head of an army much more numerous than that 
 of the King, pursued and attacked him in his fortifications near 
 the town of Arques ; but having been repulsed with great 
 slaughter, and having suffered afterwards a total overthrow in 
 the battle of Ivry, in which, as on many other occasions, Henry’s 
 superior bravery supplied his want of numbers, Mayenne was 
 obliged, with the shattered remains of his army, to take refuge 
 in the metropolis. There he stayed no longer than till he had 
 consulted with the duke of Nemours, the governor, with regard 
 to the proper measures of defence, in case the city should be 
 besieged by the victorious army ; after which he set out for 
 Picardy, to meet the duke of Parma, from whom he expected a 
 reinforcement of troops. The King arrived soon after in the 
 
 * Grand-daughter of Henry II. 
 
464 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF LBook XXII. 
 
 Siege of neighbourhood of Paris, and having made himself master 
 Paris. 0 f the course of the Seine and the Marne, and blocked 
 up every entry by which provisions might be conveyed into the 
 town, he invested it on every side, and soon reduced the in- 
 habitants to extreme necessity. 
 
 By the persuasion however of their leaders, seconded by the 
 Spanish minister and the Pope’s legate ; by the decrees of the 
 Sorbonne, and the harangues of the clergy ; they were confirmed 
 in the resolution which they had formed from the beginning to 
 endure every calamity, rather than receive an heretical king, 
 whose authority they were taught to believe they could not 
 acknowledge, without endangering their salvation. 
 
 In their present distressful situation they had no prospect of 
 Philip’s relief but from the arms of Spain ; nor was Philip less 
 views on inclined now to interpose in their behalf and that of the 
 France. j ea g Ue general, than formerly. The affairs of France 
 were at this time the principal object of his attention ; and he 
 would gladly have exerted himself against the king with his 
 utmost vigour, especially as the cardinal of Bourbon was lately 
 dead, if the present juncture had been favourable to his am- 
 bitious design, of seizing the monarchy for himself or his 
 daughter ; by which, more than by zeal for the Catholic faith, 
 he had long been actuated. But having penetrated into the 
 views of Mayenne, and found that from him and all his party he 
 had reason to expect the most strenuous opposition ; he con- 
 sidered, that if Henry were utterly subdued, the Catholics, 
 standing then no longer in need of his assistance, would 
 probably unite against him, and, without regard to the ob- 
 ligations which he had laid them under, render all his expense 
 and labour fruitless. He resolved, therefore, agreeably to the 
 advice of the duke of Parma, to protract the war, and to afford 
 the league only such assistance as might prevent the king from 
 acquiring an entire ascendant over them ; hoping thereby to 
 waste the strength of both the contending parties, and sooner or 
 later to oblige them to comply with whatever terms he should be 
 pleased to prescribe. 
 
 Conformably to this plan, the duke of Parma, with whom 
 Mayenne had an interview at Conde, gave him only two 
 thousand seven hundred foot and eight hundred horse. But 
 as this reinforcement was inadequate to the purpose for which it 
 had been solicited, Philip became apprehensive that the resolu- 
 tion of the besieged might fail ; and dreaded, that if Henry were 
 once master of the capital, a prince of so great ability and 
 address might soon compel the rest of the kingdom to submit to 
 his authority. To prevent this, he resolved to postpone every 
 consideration of prudence and interest to the raising of the 
 siege ; and sent positive orders to the duke of Parma, to 
 conduct his army to France for this purpose with the utmost 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1590. j 
 
 4G5 
 
 expedition. Farnese, though possessed of capacity and courage 
 equal to the most difficult and dangerous enterprise, would 
 gladly have diverted Philip from his design. He represented to 
 him the dangerous consequences with which the absence of his 
 troops from the Netherlands would be attended ; and he 
 attempted to make him sensible of the extreme uncertainty of 
 those advantages which he expected to derive from taking so 
 deep an interest in the affairs of France. But Philip, blinded 
 by his ambition, could not relinquish those delusive hopes which 
 lie had long fondly indulged, of adding France to his dominions. 
 He was deaf to the duke’s prudent remonstrances, and only 
 listened to his advice so far, as to consent that he might return 
 to the Low Countries, when the siege of Paris should be raised. 
 
 Finding the king thus obstinate and inflexible, Farnese com- 
 The Duke of the government, during his absence, to count 
 
 Parma’s first Peter Earnest of Mansveldt, and appointed his son 
 expedition count Charles to command the small number of troops, 
 into France, } ie designed to leave behind him for the defence 
 
 of the Netherlands. He then applied himself with great anxiety 
 to make the necessary preparations for his march : for he was 
 well aware of the difficulty which he must encounter in fiis 
 intended enterprise against a prince of so great abilities as the 
 King of France, in the midst of his dominions, and at the head 
 of a victorious army, commanded by a gallant and almost 
 invincible nobility. This consideration, however, far from in- 
 timidating him, served only to make him exert, with more than 
 ordinary vigour, those illustrious talents with which he was 
 endowed ; lest now, when he was about to enter the lists with 
 so great a rival for military fame, he should forfeit that high 
 renown which his former achievements had procured him. 
 
 Henry was at this time about forty years of age, and Farnese 
 Comparison a few years older. From their earliest youth they had 
 of him with been alike distinguished by the love of arms ; and had 
 IIenry * passed their lives either in learning, or in practising the 
 art of war. They possessed alike the talent of conciliating the 
 affections of their troops, without any relaxation of discipline, or 
 diminution of authority. They were equal too in personal 
 courage, in quick discernment, and in fertility of genius. But 
 the king was more prompt in his decisions ; the duke more 
 cautious and circumspect. The latter, always cool, and master 
 of himself, transgressed on no occasion the bounds of the 
 strictest prudence ; but the former was often betrayed by his 
 natural impetuosity and ardour, rather to act the part of a 
 common soldier, than of a general, and unnecessarily to expose 
 his person to danger. From the same impetuosity of temper, 
 the king was ever fond of striking a decisive blow, by a pitched 
 battle in the field ; whereas the duke chose rather to accomplish 
 his designs by stratagem and dexterity, without bloodshed. 
 
 H H 
 
46G 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXII. 
 
 Notwithstanding this diversity in their characters, they were 
 indisputably the greatest captains of the age in which they lived, 
 and may be compared, without suffering by the comparison, with the 
 most illustrious commanders either in ancient or in modern times. 
 
 Farnese was ready to set out from Brussels in the beginning 
 His wise pre- of August, with an army of fourteen thousand foot and 
 cautions. three thousand horse. On his arrival in France, having 
 convened his principal officers together, he explained to them the 
 conduct proper to be observed in the present expedition; and 
 represented the necessity of requiring a strict attention from 
 every individual in the army, to all the rules of military discipline. 
 They were about to enter into a kingdom where, the people 
 being naturally jealous of the Spaniards, suspicions would be 
 easily excited, that, instead of having come to their assistance, 
 he intended to reduce them under the government of Spain. 
 Against giving ground for these suspicions, which might defeat 
 the intentions of the king, they must be continually on their 
 guard, and take effectual care to restrain the troops from offering 
 any violence to the natives. They were ere long to pursue their 
 march in the face of a bold and enterprising enemy ; and for 
 this reason it would be necessary that the most perfect order 
 should be observed, that no tumult should be permitted in their 
 quarters, and no soldier allowed to leave his colours night or 
 day, upon any pretence whatever ; that the country should be 
 reconnoitred with the utmost care ; that they should take up 
 their quarters every evening a considerable time before sunset ; 
 that the troops should stand under their arms, till the intrench- 
 ments were completed : and that their intrenchments should be 
 as strongly fortified, as if the enemy were in sight. 
 
 The duke secured the execution of these orders, by the activity 
 and vigilance which he exerted. Although he had many officers 
 of high reputation under him, yet he resolved not to put implicit 
 trust in any of them. From charts or maps, joined to the infor- 
 mation which he received from the natives, he had acquired a 
 thorough knowledge of the country through which he was to 
 pass. He heard in person the reports of all the parties which 
 he sent to reconnoitre ; marked out the encampments with his 
 own hand, and bestowed such particular attention on everything 
 which he deemed of the least importance, that he left himself no 
 other time for repose, but the few hours between beating the 
 reveille, and the marching of the troops. 
 
 In order to preserve his men fresh and vigorous for the time of 
 action, he marched gently forwards ; and did not arrive at Meaux, 
 which is ten leagues distant from Paris, till the 23rd of August. 
 He was joined at Meaux, by the duke de Mayenne, with ten 
 thousand foot and one thousand five hundred horse ; and from 
 this place he sent intelligence to the besieged, that he hoped to 
 be able in a few days to relieve them. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 4<57 
 
 1590 .] 
 
 Their patience was almost exhausted. They had been for 
 Distress of many days reduced to the most deplorable condition, 
 the Parisians. Great numbers had died of want, or of diseases occa- 
 sioned by the unwholesome food to which they had been obliged 
 to have recourse ; and though their bigotry made them still enter- 
 tain the thoughts of a surrender with horror, it had required the 
 utmost vigilance on the part of the governor, to prevent it from 
 taking place. They believed it to be impossible for them to hold 
 out even for a few days, at the end of which the duke of Parma 
 had given them hopes of his arrival. Of this desperate situation, 
 their leaders did not fail to inform him, nor did he delay advanc- 
 ing towards them one moment longer than was necessary in order 
 to secure a fortunate issue to his enterprise. 
 
 Henry had for several weeks entertained the most sanguine 
 Henry raises hopes of being able to terminate the siege before the 
 the siege. duke could arrive b . He was now extremely chagrined 
 
 and mortified, and was at the same time thrown into great per- 
 plexity, with respect to the measures proper to be pursued. 
 Unwilling to quit his prize, when he was upon the point of seizing 
 it, he would gladly have divided his army, and leaving a part of 
 it to continue the blockade, have led the rest to meet the enemy. 
 But as it had lately suffered great diminution by sickness, he 
 apprehended that he would find sufficient employment for the 
 whole, in defending himself against the Spaniards. After much 
 hesitation, he raised the siege, and set out to oppose the duke of 
 Parma, before he should approach nearer the town c . 
 
 Having advanced as far as Chelles (which lies about four 
 leagues distant from Paris) he pitched his camp in a spacious 
 plain, which is terminated by two hills of a gentle ascent, sepa- 
 rated from each other by the road that leads to Meaux. The 
 duke of Parma’s army was encamped on the other side of these 
 hills, and was well secured by strong entrenchments. In this 
 situation the two armies remained for several days. The Duke 
 did not now lie under the same necessity as before, of precipitating 
 his approach to Paris, because the citizens having ventured, after 
 the King’s departure, to make excursions into the country, had 
 furnished themselves with some provisions from the places adja- 
 cent ; and the King durst not attack such strong intrenchments, 
 defended by an army superior in number to his own. But being 
 eager to engage, and dreading the daily diminution of his forces 
 from the sickness which prevailed among them, Henry sent a 
 defiance to the duke of Mayenne, calling upon him to quit his 
 den, in which he lay more like a fox than a lion, that the con- 
 test between them might be decided, and an end put to the cala- 
 mities of the kingdom. 
 
 b It had lasted four months. 
 
 c His army amounted to twenty thousand foot and five thousand horse. 
 
 H H 2 
 
468 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII 
 
 Mayenne sent the herald who brought this challenge to the 
 Stratagem duke of Parma, who answered, smiling, That his pre- 
 of the duke sent conduct, he perceived, was not agreeable to the 
 
 amia. King ; but that he had been accustomed to fight, only 
 when he himself thought proper, and not when it was convenient 
 for his enemies ; and he added, That far from declining battle, 
 he would offer it as soon as the interest of the cause which he 
 had come to support should render it expedient. Agreeably to 
 the spirit of this reply, Farnese kept his army within their lines 
 for two days longer ; during which time he was employed in 
 examining the situation of the country, and in considering how 
 he might accomplish the end of his expedition, without hazarding 
 an engagement. Having at length fixed his plan of operations, 
 without communicating it to the duke of Mayenne, or any other 
 of his officers, he gave out, that he now intended to offer battle. 
 Of the van, which consisted of two squadrons of lances, with all 
 the light horse in his army, he gave the command to the marquis 
 de Renti, with instructions, that as soon as he should reach the 
 top of the interjacent hill, he should spread out his troops, and 
 make as large a front as possible ; and then begin to descend 
 slowly towards the enemy, but not to engage without further 
 orders, whatever provocation he should receive. He committed 
 the charge of the main army to the duke de Mayenne, and that 
 of the rear to the sieur de la Mothe ; while he reserved liberty 
 to himself to ride from one part of the army to the other, as 
 occasion should require. 
 
 When the King was informed of this disposition and move- 
 ment of the Spanish army, he could not doubt that the Duke 
 had at length resolved to try the fortune of a battle. His eyes 
 sparkled with joy. He drew up his army in battle array, with 
 the utmost celerity and skill ; but resolved to wait till the enemy 
 should descend to the plain, where he might enter the lists with 
 them on equal terms. 
 
 When the van of the Spanish army had formed so large a front, 
 as totally obstructed the view of everything behind them, the Duke 
 commanded De Renti to stop, and to wait for the King, in case 
 he should think fit to ascend the hill. Then clapping spurs to 
 his horse, he galloped back to the duke de Mayenne, who was 
 advancing with the main army, and taking him by the hand, he 
 said, with a cheerful animated countenance, “ Paris will soon 
 be delivered now, my lord ; but for this purpose we must turn 
 back, and direct our march to another quarter . 11 He then de- 
 sired both Mayenne and La Mothe to march towards Lagny, a 
 town on the other side of the Marne, and instructed them to 
 take possession of the ground on this side, directly opposite to 
 the town, and to employ all their troops in drawing strong lines 
 of circumvallation round their camp. 
 
 These orders were executed with great expedition. A battery 
 
1590.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 469 
 
 of the largest cannon was planted over against the town ; and the 
 camp was fortified in such a manner with trenches, breast-works, 
 and redoubts, as to render it impregnable. 
 
 When this was done, the marquis de Renti, who for several 
 hours had amused the enemy with hopes that he intended to 
 come down from the hill, began to file off towards Lagny ; after 
 having planted a body of select troops, under an officer of the 
 name of Basta, in certain woody parts of the hill, to secure his 
 retreat. 
 
 The King in the mean time knew nothing of what had passed 
 on the other side of the hill ; and when he saw the marquis de 
 Renti depart, he sent a detachment after him to attack his rear, 
 and, if possible, to discover the duke’s design. But this detach- 
 ment fell unexpectedly among the Spanish troops under Basta ; 
 and a furious rencounter ensued, which continued with various 
 success till night, when both parties retired to their respective 
 camps. The King remained all night entirely ignorant of the 
 operations of the enemy. He could not suppose that Farnese, a 
 general so distinguished for his caution, would attempt to trans- 
 port his forces over the Marne, in order to advance to Paris, on 
 the other side of that river, while so strong a fortified pass as 
 Lagny lay behind him. And it was still more difficult to believe, 
 that in the face of such an army as lay ready to attack him, he 
 would undertake the siege of Lagny, especially as the river lay 
 between him and that place. It was the last of these measures, 
 however, on which the duke of Parma had resolved ; and all his 
 movements on the day before had been made in order to insure 
 success. Next morning the King received intelligence of his 
 design, but he had the mortification to perceive that it was 
 beyond his power to prevent him from carrying it into execution. 
 On each hand he was perplexed with insurmountable difficulties. 
 The fortifications of the Spanish army were already so complete, 
 that he could not attack them with the smallest hopes of success. 
 If he should remain where he was, Lagny would certainly be lost, 
 and thereby a passage to Paris opened on the other side of the 
 river ; and if he should transport his army, in order to save 
 Lagny, the duke would then be at liberty to march directly by 
 the road on this side to the relief of the besieged. 
 
 There was no other expedient in his power, but, while he re- 
 mained in his present situation, to send reinforcements from time 
 to time to the garrison of Lagny. 
 
 The duke of Parma meanwhile pushed forward the siege of 
 He takes that place with the utmost celerity and vigour ; having, as 
 La s n y* already mentioned, planted a battery on this side of the 
 river, he opened it next morning, and soon laid a great part of 
 the wall in ruins. The garrison, however, still believed them- 
 selves to be secure, as the river was between them and the 
 enemy ; but the duke had thrown a bridge of boats over it some 
 
470 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 miles above the town, and had already transported several thou- 
 sands of his bravest troops. These troops were ready to mount 
 the breach as soon as it was made practicable. In the first 
 assault they were repulsed with great bravery by the garrison, 
 but an error in military discipline, committed by La Fin, the 
 governor, quickly decided the fate of Lagny. Instead of reliev- 
 ing those who had sustained the first assault, by changing them 
 file by file, according to an established rule' in the defence of 
 places, he attempted to do it all at once, and thereby threw his 
 men into confusion. This blunder was perceived by the assail- 
 ants, who returned instantly to the charge with redoubled fury, 
 and after taking La Fin himself prisoner, put most of the garrison 
 to the sword, while the King stood a sorrowful spectator of the 
 loss of the place, and the slaughter of his troops. 
 
 After the taking of Lagny, no other obstacle remained to prevent 
 Relief of the Spaniards from approaching Paris on that side of the 
 Paris, river, but the garrisons at the bridges of St. Maur and 
 Charenton. These were easily overcome, and the convoys with 
 provisions advanced without molestation to the gates of the city. 
 The joy of the Parisians on this occasion may be more easily 
 imagined than described ; they poured forth in multitudes to 
 receive that food of which they stood so much in need, and every 
 tongue celebrated in the highest strains the praises of their 
 deliverer. 
 
 No person admired more that dexterity by which the duke of 
 Error of the ^ arma had accomplished his design, than the King 
 French mo- himself ; but his generous spirit was severely mortified, 
 narch. and he had the greater reason for the chagrin which 
 he felt on this occasion ; because if, instead of encamping his 
 army at Chelles, he had followed the counsel of the wise La 
 Noue, and advanced as far as Claye, Lagny might have been 
 saved, and the Spanish army so long retarded, that the Parisians 
 must have thrown themselves upon his mercy. 
 
 Henry’s uneasiness was greatly augmented when he considered, 
 that at present it was impossible for him, by any bold decisive 
 stroke, to retrieve his error. He knew it to be vain to entertain 
 the hopes of forcing the duke of Parma, now when the end of 
 his expedition was accomplished, to expose his troops to the risk 
 of a battle. His own army was greatly weakened by sickness, 
 and the fatigues of a long campaign. All the country round 
 being laid waste, he began to feel a scarcity of provisions ; his ex- 
 chequer was exhausted, and many of his nobility and gentry, who 
 served at their own expense, having no farther expectations this 
 season of either subduing Paris, or compelling the enemy to 
 engage, were impatient to depart. Determined by these motives, 
 He disbands he retired to St. Dennis, and having disbanded the 
 his army, greatest part of his forces, he sent the nobility to pro- 
 vide for the security of the several provinces in which their 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 471 
 
 151)0.] 
 
 interest lay, retaining only a flying army of his best troops, with 
 which he intended, during the winter, to check the progress of 
 the enemy. 
 
 This little army was not so formidable as to prevent the duke 
 Siege of of Parma from undertaking whatever enterprise he should 
 Corbeii. incline to. At the desire of Mayenne, and the other heads 
 of the league, he laid siege to Corbeii ; and, notwithstanding the 
 most obstinate resistance, he took it by assault, but not till he 
 had spent many days in the siege, and lost a great number of 
 men. 
 
 Being desirous to preserve in his own hands an acquisition 
 which had cost him so dear, he proposed to the leaders of the 
 league to put in Corbeii a garrison of his W alloon or Italian 
 forces. By this proposal, perhaps, he meant only to make trial 
 of their disposition towards the Catholic king ; or, considering 
 how averse he himself had ever been to his present expedition, 
 he intended to make Philip sensible of the difficulty of deriving 
 any substantial advantage from taking so deep an interest in the 
 affairs of France. 
 
 Whatever was his motive, Mayenne and the other leaders 
 declined consenting to his proposal, and in their refusal gave 
 him a clear discovery of their jealousy and suspicion. This dis- 
 covery confirmed him in his opinion, that matters were far from 
 being ripe for the execution of Philip’s designs, and that probably 
 he should never be able to accomplish them by any other means 
 than by protracting the war, till the strength and patience of 
 the contending parties were exhausted. This plan had, as men- 
 tioned above, been recommended to Philip by the duke himself ; 
 and conformably to it, he resolved, since neither party Was in 
 immediate danger of being overpowered, to return to the Nether- 
 lands. Other motives concurred in determining him to form 
 this resolution; the inclemency of the season, the sickliness of his 
 army, the want of money, and a scarcity of provisions ; which 
 last was so great, as made it necessary for him sometimes to 
 suffer his troops to plunder the inhabitants, although he foresaw 
 that his granting this permission must not only prove prejudicial 
 to his discipline, but contribute likewise to alienate the affections 
 of the people, and thereby to obstruct his master’s views. 
 
 The Catholic leaders, who had expected that he would have 
 remained in France till the King was totally subdued, laboured 
 with much importunity to divert him from liis purpose ; but all 
 their arguments were ineffectual. The state of affairs in the 
 Netherlands, he informed them, rendered his return indispensably 
 necessary, but he would send them money, and leave such a 
 number of troops as would enable them to prosecute the war. 
 Neither the money d nor the troops 6 which he promised, were 
 answerable to the sanguine expectations which they had formed. 
 
 d Thirty thousand ducats. 
 
 e Between five and six thousand- 
 
47*2 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXII. 
 
 They saw that Philip, notwithstanding the seeming zeal with 
 which he espoused their cause, was surely actuated by some pri- 
 vate motive of ambition ; that there was nothing farther from 
 his intention than to bring the war to a conclusion, and that he 
 would never contribute effectually to their gaining a victory over 
 their enemies, unless he himself were to reap the fruits of it. 
 They found it necessary, however, to conceal their suspicions, 
 and to accept of the scanty supply of money and troops which 
 the Duke had offered. Farnese in the mean time was preparing 
 for his march ; and, as he could not doubt that Henry would 
 give him all the annoyance in his power, he employed the same 
 precautions as he had done formerly when he left the Nether- 
 lands. Having drawn up his army in four divisions, he marched 
 always in the order of battle : the country through which he 
 passed was diligently reconnoitred by the light horse, and his 
 camp was every evening secured by strong intrenchments. 
 
 Notwithstanding these precautions, the King was determined 
 The duke re- not to suffer him to return unmolested. With this 
 turns to the intention he had brought a select body of troops to 
 Netherlands. c om pi e g nej near the borders of Picardy, and he set 
 out with them from that place, as soon as he got information of 
 the enemy’s route, inflamed with the desire of taking vengeance 
 for the injuries he had received. Henry had full scope in the 
 present scene of action for his wonted bravery and vigilance, 
 nor did he suffer any opportunity to escape of exerting these qua- 
 lities with signal damage to the enemy. Hovering perpetually 
 round them, he attacked them sometimes in the front, when 
 they least expected it, sometimes in the flank, and sometimes in 
 the rear, giving them no respite night or day, and filling their 
 minds with continual apprehensions and alarms. 
 
 No general could have made greater efforts with so small a 
 force ; and if the Spaniards had been commanded by a general 
 less distinguished than the duke of Parma for prudence and cir- 
 cumspection, it is impossible, considering the length of their 
 march, the badness of their roads, and the season of the year, 
 but they must have been often thrown into confusion, and the 
 greater part of them destroyed. But the Duke’s vigilance was 
 not inferior to the activity of the King ; while he was perpetually 
 on his guard, and ever ready to assist whatever part of his army 
 was attacked, he suffered no provocation to divert him from the 
 prosecution of his march; and at last he brought his troops, 
 though not without considerable loss, yet in good order, into the 
 province of Hainault f . 
 
 f P’Avila, lib. xi. Bcntivoglio, part ii. lift v. Tlmanus, lib xcix. sect. vi. and vii. 
 
1591.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 473 
 
 PART II. 
 
 The duke of Parma, on his return to the Netherlands, found 
 Affairs of that all the unhappy consequences which he foretold had 
 the Low arisen from his absence. Having drained his finances by 
 Countries. £j ie expedition, many of the troops left in the 
 
 Low Countries had mutinied on account of their want of pay. 
 The forces of the confederated states had over-run the fertile 
 provinces of Brabant and Flanders ; and prince Maurice, having 
 made himself master of a great number of the smaller towns upon 
 the frontier, had paved the way for future conquests. 
 
 These misfortunes gave the duke of Parma the greater 
 uneasiness, as he had little prospect of being able soon either to 
 retrieve his losses or to make reprisals on the enemy. Finding 
 by his instructions from the court of Spain, that Philip was as 
 much intoxicated as ever with his ambitious views on F ranee, he 
 was obliged to station the greatest part of his troops in the pro- 
 vinces of Artois and Hainault, where they might be ready to 
 march, if necessary, to the assistance of the league. And thus 
 several of the most important towns which lay next to the 
 revolted provinces, being badly furnished with garrisons to defend 
 them, were exposed an easy prey to the enemy. The confederates 
 were too sagacious not to discern the advantage which was thus 
 presented to them : and whereas they had, till lately, been satis- 
 fied with defending their frontier, which they had done with much 
 anxiety, and often without success ; they now took courage, from 
 the distractions in which Philip’s preposterous ambition had in- 
 volved him, and resolved to exert themselves with vigour in 
 carrying on an offensive war. 
 
 The year one thousand five hundred and ninety-one had just 
 begun, when colonel Norris led out the garrison of Ostend, 
 which had been reinforced by troops from England ; and having 
 taken the fort of Blackemberg, between Ostend and Sluys, 
 he laid a great part of Flanders open to his incursions. Soon 
 afterwards another party of the forces of the States surprised 
 the forts of Turnhout and Westerlo, in Brabant. But these 
 conquests were inconsiderable, when compared with those of 
 Prince P r i nce Maurice, who, having put his troops in motion as 
 Maurice early as the season would permit, opened the campaign 
 subdues with the siege of Zutphen, and soon compelled the gar- 
 
 Zutphen, r J SQn surrenc | er> 
 
 From this place he led his army against Deventer, a town 
 and De- of still greater importance than Zutphen. Deventer 
 venter. had been, as above related, betrayed to the Spaniards 
 by Sir William Stanley ; and Maurice was earnestly solicited to 
 undertake the siege of it, at this time, by colonel Vere, who was 
 
474 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 fired with the generous ambition of wiping out the reproach 
 which Stanley’s treachery had brought upon his countrymen. 
 Vere displayed in this siege all. that bravery and conduct, for 
 which he is so highly celebrated by the cotemporary historians ; 
 and next to Maurice, who conducted the attack with consummate 
 prudence, he principally contributed to the reduction of the place. 
 It was vigorously defended by the count de Berg, cousin-german to 
 the prince ; but the count being grievously wounded, and the wall on 
 Jane 10 ^at side where Vere commanded laid in ruins, the garri- 
 ’ son capitulated in a few days after opening the trenches, 
 and the inhabitants returned under obedience to the States g . 
 
 The duke of Parma in the mean time laid siege to the fort of 
 Knotzenberg, which Maurice had built in the end of the preced- 
 ing year. By this fort, the confederates commanded the naviga- 
 tion of the river, and gave such annoyance to Nimeguen, as made 
 the Duke extremely uneasy about the fate of that important city. 
 In order to conceal his design, he directed his march first 
 towards the fort of Schenck. But Maurice was not deceived by 
 this feint, and had taken care to strengthen the garrison of 
 Knotzenberg with an addition of some chosen troops. 
 
 The Duke therefore met with the most vigorous resistance, and 
 He defeats lost a great number of his men ; still, however, he 
 the Spanish persisted in the siege. Maurice, dreading his success, 
 horse. relinquished a scheme which he had formed for the 
 reduction of Groningen, and having passed the Waal, he pitched 
 his camp within sight of the enemy. As he did not possess 
 sufficient force to attack their lines, he intended only to encourage 
 the garrison by his presence, or to straiten the duke’s quarters, 
 and to intercept his convoys. Many skirmishes passed with 
 various success, till Maurice at length found an opportunity of 
 putting in practice the following stratagem : having planted an 
 ambush of his bravest troops, he marched up to the enemy’s 
 camp, attended by count Solmes and colonel Vere, at the head 
 of some companies of horse. The duke, less circumspect and 
 cautious on this occasion than usual, sent out ten companies of 
 Spanish and Italian horse to attack him. A fierce rencounter 
 ensued. Agreeably to orders, the prince’s troops soon turned 
 their backs and fled. The royalists pursued with ardour, till 
 they had passed & narrow defile and a bridge, when Maurice 
 returned suddenly to the charge, and the soldiers in ambush 
 pouring in upon them from both sides, their return to the camp 
 was intercepted, and almost all of them were put to the sword 
 or taken prisoners. 
 
 This disaster afflicted the duke of Parma in the most sensible 
 manner ; a great number of the officers who fell were his country- 
 men, many of whom were persons of rank, in whose fortune he 
 was particularly interested. He perceived that if he remained 
 
 K Vide Bcntivoglio, p. 350. Grotius, p. 145. Meteren, p. 530. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 475 
 
 1591 .] 
 
 in his present situation, he must find it extremely difficult, from 
 the diminution of his cavalry, to supply his army with provisions, 
 and he had not as yet made any considerable progress in the 
 siege. 
 
 He would still however have prosecuted his enterprise, if he 
 had not been obliged to desist from it by orders which he received 
 from Philip, to act only on the defensive in the Netherlands, and 
 to spare his troops as much as possible for another expedition 
 into France. Maurice hoped to have gained some advantage 
 over Farnese in his retreat from Knotzenberg ; but both in this, 
 and in his passage over the Waal, such wise precautions were 
 employed, as rendered it impossible for the prinde to annoy him ; 
 while they filled that young hero with the highest admiration of 
 the duke of Parma’s skill, and furnished . him with important 
 lessons in the military art, which he put in practice on many 
 occasions afterwards with signal glory and success. y 
 
 Having passed the river, and put his troops in safety, the Duke 
 The reduc- ordered new levies to be made in Germany, Burgundy, 
 tion of and the southern provinces of the Netherlands ; after 
 Holst, which, he went, on account of his indisposition, to drink 
 the waters at Spa. He had no sooner set out, than prince 
 Maurice, having embarked four thousand foot and six hundred 
 horse, made a sudden descent on that part of Flanders called the 
 county of Waes, and invested the town of Hulst. Mondragone, 
 the governor of Antwerp, lost no time in drawing together such 
 forces as were stationed in the neighbouring places, with an in- 
 tention to raise the siege. But Maurice having pierced the 
 dykes, had laid the country under water, and rendered it impos- 
 sible for Mondragone to approach. Agreeably to the intelligence 
 which had induced the prince to engage in his present enterprise, 
 the garrison of Hulst was weak, and they were badly furnished 
 both with provisions and military stores. Their defence there- 
 fore was spiritless and feeble, and they soon agreed to a sur- 
 render. 
 
 From Hulst, Maurice returned unexpectedly to Knotzenberg ; 
 and Nime- and as there was no Spanish army near, he threw' a 
 s uen - bridge over the Waal, and laid siege to Nimeguen. 
 The garrison, consisting of Germans and Walloons, made several 
 sallies to retard his approach : and, if they had been seconded 
 by the townsmen, the reduction of a place of so great extent and 
 strength as Nimeguen must have detained him long. But he 
 had for some time past held a secret correspondence with some 
 of the principal inhabitants, and the people in general were ex- 
 tremely disaffected to the Spanish government. They took 
 courage now, when Maurice was at hand to support them, and 
 having risen tumultuously, required the garrison, in the most 
 peremptory manner, to put an end to their calamities by a sur- 
 render of the town. The garrison, conscious of their inability 
 
476 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 to resist both the citizens and the enemy, complied with their 
 request ; and Maurice was received by them rather as their 
 deliverer from slavery, than as a conqueror, by whose arms they 
 had been subdued. They were admitted to the same privileges 
 as the other towns of the confederacy ; and although the 
 administration was put into the hands of the Protestants, yet 
 no punishment was inflicted on any of the Catholics, by whom 
 the city had been kept so long under the Spanish government. 
 
 After this important acquisition, Maurice set out for the 
 Hague, and received there the most flattering testimonies of 
 gratitude, attachment, and respect. The prudence with which 
 his enterprises liad been concerted, and the celerity and vigour 
 with which he had carried them into execution, filled all Europe 
 with his renown, and gave his countrymen the most sanguine 
 hopes of future prosperity and success. 
 
 Their condition was extremely different at this period from 
 State of the what it had ever been since the confederacy had been 
 confederacy, formed : till lately they had experienced an uninterrupt- 
 ed course of calamities ; they had been perpetually disturbed 
 with intestine broils, and had lived under continual anxiety, 
 occasioned partly by the neighbourhood of their active enter- 
 prising enemy, and partly by the perfidious designs of those 
 whom they had intrusted with the reins of government. But 
 their domestic dissensions were now composed ; the enemy was 
 removed to a greater distance, and their frontier was formed 
 either by towns strongly fortified, or by navigable rivers, in 
 which they could avail themselves of the superiority of their 
 naval force. They were no longer disquieted by suspicions of 
 the fidelity of their governors ; and the loss which they had 
 suffered by the death of the prince of Orange, was compensated 
 by the extraordinary merit of his son. 
 
 But there was nothing which contributed so much to inspire 
 French them with their present hopes, as their knowledge of 
 affairs. Philip’s attention being still as much engrossed as 
 ever with the affairs of France. In prosecution of his plan for 
 acquiring the sovereignty of that kingdom, by fomenting the 
 war, he had, after the duke of Parma raised the siege of 
 Paris, afforded the leaders of the league only such assistance as 
 was necessary to save them from being overwhelmed. Their 
 power was at this time exceedingly reduced, while that of the 
 King had received a proportional augmentation. By his 
 bravery and good conduct, joined to his clemency and modera- 
 tion, Henry had allured great numbers of his rebellious subjects 
 to their duty ; and had, at the same time, engaged the Protest- 
 ants in Germany, and the queen of England, to interest 
 themselves more deeply than ever in his cause. For several 
 months past he had been absolute master of the field, and he 
 had lately begun the siege of Rouen, with an army amount- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 47 7 
 
 1591.] 
 
 ing nearly to thirty thousand horse and foot. Both the town 
 and garrison were commanded by the Sieur de Villars, who dis- 
 played the highest degree of intrepidity, vigilance, and skill in 
 the defence. But there was little probability of his being able 
 to defend it long against so powerful an army, whose operations 
 were conducted by so great a master in the art of war. 
 
 The duke de Mayenne, and other Catholic leaders, dreaded 
 Siege of that the reduction of so important a place as Rouen would 
 Rouen, prove fatal to their party, and they had exerted themselves 
 strenuously to relieve it ; but having no army, with which they 
 could venture to enter the lists with the King, they had recourse 
 as formerly to Philip, and spared no pains to convince him that, 
 if he did not speedily interpose, Rouen, and all the other towns 
 in their possession, must ere long submit to the King’s victorious 
 arms. ' They were seconded in their application by the Spanish 
 ministers in France ; and in consequence of instructions sent 
 from Madrid to the duke of Parma, that general, after his 
 return from Spa, had been entirely occupied in preparing to 
 lead his army a second time to the assistance of the league. 
 
 His preparations were finished about the middle of December, 
 Duke of Par- an( ^ on the 21st mon th he began his march, 
 
 mu’s second taking the same precautions as in his former expedi- 
 expedition tion. He was joined by the duke de Mayenne in the 
 mto France. p rov j nce 0 f Pi ca rdy, an d his army, after the reinforce- 
 ment brought him by the duke, amounted to five-and-twenty 
 thousand foot and six thousand horse. 
 
 As, in order to preserve his troops fresh and vigorous, he 
 marched only a few miles each day, it was near the end of 
 January before he reached the province of Normandy. At that 
 time the siege of Rouen was far advanced, and the garrison was 
 reduced to the last extremity. When the king therefore heard 
 of the duke of Parma’s approach, he could not resolve to re- 
 linquish his enterprise ; but he left his infantry to prosecute the 
 siege, and advanced towards the duke with his cavalry, in hopes 
 that, by harassing and retarding him on his march, the garrison 
 would be obliged to capitulate before he could arrive. 
 
 By his vigilance, intrepidity, and quick discernment, Henry 
 Danger of was admirably fitted for the bold and dangerous enter- 
 Henry at prise in which he was now engaged ; but his impetuous 
 Aumaie. coura ge was not always under the government of pru- 
 dence, and betrayed him sometimes into rash and desperate 
 attempts, more becoming an officer of inferior rank, than a 
 general or a king. Of this he gave a striking proof in his 
 conduct on the present occasion. Having advanced before the 
 rest of the cavalry with three or four hundred horse, he met, 
 unexpectedly near the town of Aumaie, with the forerunners of 
 the duke of Parma’s army, and he repulsed them with little 
 difficulty ; but although the whole Spanish army was in sight, he 
 
470 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 would not retire till he had taken a view of the order of their 
 march, nor even after he saw the Duke's light horse advancing 
 towards him. With these, likewise, he encountered, and fought 
 long and desperately, till many of his troops had fallen by his 
 side, and he himself was wounded. Had not the duke of Parma 
 suspected an ambuscade, he might easily have cut off the king’s 
 retreat. He was urged by Mayenne to send forward more 
 troops for that purpose, but he refused to comply with the Duke’s 
 request ; and when he was afterwards reminded of the oppor- 
 tunity which he had lost, he replied, that he could not reproach 
 himself for his conduct, as he supposed, that, in the King of 
 Navarre, he had a great general to contend with, and not merely 
 the captain of a troop of horse. 
 
 Henry was no sooner able, after his wound, to get on horse- 
 back, than he resumed his first design of annoying the enemy on 
 their march ; and this he did with more circumspection than 
 before, but with such indefatigable vigour and activity, as kept 
 the duke of Parma in perpetual alarms. Several warm ren- 
 counters passed, in which the success was various. The Duke’s 
 vigilance, and the perfect discipline which he maintained, 
 preserved his army from sustaining any great calamity. His 
 march, however, was considerably retarded, and there was much 
 reason to apprehend, that the besieged would be compelled to 
 surrender before he could advance to their relief. 
 
 Nothing less than the intrepidity and skill of Villars could 
 Spirited have protracted the siege to so great a length. This 
 conduct of brave man, far from having any thoughts of capitulating, 
 Villars. ag pi re( j to the glory of raising the siege without the 
 assistance of the Spaniards. With this view he resolved to take 
 advantage of the absence of the king, and to exert at once his 
 whole force in an attack on the besiegers. Never was attack 
 conducted with more intrepidity and vigour. Great numbers of 
 the royalists were put to the sword ; the marshal de Biron, their 
 commander-in-chief, was wounded ; their trenches were filled up ; 
 many of their cannon were spiked, or buried in the ditch ; and 
 their stores of provision and ammunition were either carried into 
 the town or destroyed. Villars was at last repulsed, and obliged 
 to retire within the walls ; but not till the enemy had suffered so 
 much loss by the destruction of their works and stores, that he 
 expected to be able to defend the town for several months longer, 
 if his garrison were reinforced. 
 
 Of this happy change in his situation, Villars gave immediate 
 notice to the duke of Parma, and advised him to turn his ’arms 
 to some other quarter, where they might be employed with 
 greater advantage to the common cause. It was suspected, that 
 vanity had considerable influence in prompting Villars to give 
 this advice. The duke was within two days’ march of Rouen 
 when he received it, and he immediately called a council of war 
 to consider of what was proper to be done. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 4/9 
 
 1591 .] 
 
 He was himself of opinion, that he ought still to pursue his 
 march, in order to attack the enemy before they had recovered 
 from their confusion ; and he observed, that if he should only 
 send a reinforcement to the garrison, as the governor had desired, 
 the King of Navarre would instantly renew the operations of the 
 siege, and probably exert himself with greater vigour than before. 
 But the duke de Mayenne and the other French nobility, less 
 bold on this occasion than the duke of Parma, represented, that, 
 notwithstanding the disaster which had befallen the royalists, it 
 would be extremely dangerous to attack them in their intrench- 
 ments whilst their cavalry were so numerous ; that when the 
 nobility, who served without pay, and were already impatient 
 under the length of the siege and the rigour of the season, saw 
 that there was no prospect of a battle, they would leave the camp, 
 and retire to their respective homes ; that the Duke might then 
 attack the King with the highest probability of success.; and that 
 till then the troops might either be employed in some other 
 enterprise, or conducted to winter- quarters, whence they might 
 issue forth fresh and vigorous, when a more advantageous season 
 for action should arrive. Whether Mayenne spoke from con- 
 viction on this occasion, or from his dread of the duke of Parma’s 
 acquiring too great a superiority over the King, is doubtful. 
 Farnese was not entirely satisfied with his reasoning, and could 
 not approve of a resolution to neglect one favourable opportunity, 
 on account of the uncertain expectation of another. But as the 
 proposal was perfectly consistent with his plan of protracting the 
 war, he complied with it ; and, having sent eight hundred 
 select troops to reinforce the garrison of Rouen, he led his army 
 back to Picardy, and invested the town of St. Esprit- de- Rue. 
 
 He had no sooner set out, than the king applied himself with 
 the utmost diligence to the prosecution of the siege of Rouen ; 
 and as he received at this time a seasonable supply of cannon 
 and ammunition from the States of Holland, he was enabled to 
 carry on his operations with greater success than ever. 
 
 In a few weeks the garrison was again reduced to the most 
 The siege critical situation, and Villars, notwithstanding the con- 
 of Rouen fidence, of which he had lately given so strong a proof, 
 raised. wag 0 |qig ec i the duke of Parma know, that, if he 
 
 did not return to his relief before the twentieth of April, he 
 would find it necessary to give up the town. Mayenne was now 
 as solicitous to persuade the duke of Parma to lead his army 
 against the King, as he had been formerly reluctant and averse. 
 And the Duke more readily yielded to his desire, as certain intelli- 
 gence had been received, that, agreeably to Mayenne’s prediction, 
 the cavalry in the King’s army did not at this time amount to 
 more than the half of their former number. Having drawn off 
 his troops from St. Esprit-de-Rue, he set out without delay for 
 Rouen, and proceeded with so great expedition, that he per- 
 
480 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 formed the same march in six days, which had formerly cost 
 him twenty. 
 
 The King was equally disappointed and surprised when he 
 heard of his approach. He dreaded the danger to which his 
 army would be exposed, if he remained in his present situation, 
 between so brave a garrison on the one hand, and the Spanish 
 army on the other ; and he would have gone to meet the duke 
 of Parma at a distance from the town : but finding, upon an 
 accurate review of his troops, that they were greatly inferior in 
 April 20 num ^ er enemy, he raised the siege, after it had 
 
 lasted five months, and retired to Pont-de-T Arche, with a 
 resolution to wait there for a return of his nobility. The duke 
 of Parma in the meantime advanced in battle array, and entered 
 Rouen in a kind of triumph. From Rouen he led his army, by 
 the advice of Mayenne, and the other leaders of the league, 
 against Caudbec, which it was thought necessary to reduce, 
 before the deliverance of Rouen could be deemed complete. 
 
 In taking a review of the fortifications, and marking the 
 Duke of Par- ground for batteries, which he did, as on other occa- 
 ma wounded sions, with his own hand, he received a wound 
 at Caudbec. ^ a musket-ball, which entered his arm a little 
 below the elbow, and pierced downward till it lodged in his 
 wrist. Without any change in his voice or countenance, he 
 continued to give his orders as before, nor could his son and the 
 other by-standers persuade him to retire till he had instructed 
 them fully in his designs. In order to discover the course of the 
 ball, his surgeon found it necessary to make three different 
 incisions ; and the pain occasioned by these and the wound 
 brought on a fever, which confined him to his bed for several 
 days. This accident had almost proved fatal to his army and to 
 the league. The siege of Caudbec was conducted agreeably to 
 his direction, and was soon brought to a conclusion ; but in 
 undertaking this siege, the duke had committed the only con- 
 siderable blunder which we meet with in the history of his life. 
 Caudbec lies in the peninsula of Caux, which is formed by the 
 Seine on the west, and the sea and the river d’Eu, or Bresle, on 
 the north and east. As the King, by possessing the towns of 
 Eu, Arques, and Dieppe, commanded the entrance into Caux 
 from the east, it was impossible for the army of the league to get 
 out of it but either by crossing the Seine, or returning southward 
 the same road by which they had entered the peninsula. In 
 this way they might have escaped, if they had attempted it in 
 time ; and perhaps they would have done so, had it not been 
 judged necessary for the general’s recovery that he should remain 
 for several days at Caudbec. 
 
 The King quickly perceived the advantage which was presented 
 to him, and exerted himself with ardour to improve it. Having, 
 immediately after he had raised the siege of Rouen, despatched 
 
* 
 
 1592.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 481 
 
 messengers to summon his nobility to return to his camp, they 
 The Spanish had obeyed his summons with their wonted alacrity ; 
 army blocked and in the space of a few days, his army was augmented 
 up in Caux. seve nteen thousand foot, and between seven and 
 eight thousand horse. With this army he left Pont de Y Arche, 
 on the 30th of April, and arrived on the same day within sight 
 of the enemy, who had encamped at Yvetot, which lies at the 
 distance of three or four miles from Caudbec. 
 
 Henry’s first care was to fortify his camp in such a manner, 
 that it might not be in the power of the enemy to compel him 
 to engage ; and his next, to make himself master of all the 
 defiles through which they might attempt to force their passage. 
 Many hot rencounters happened, in which both parties gave 
 conspicuous proofs of prowess and intrepidity. The royalists 
 were frequently repulsed from their stations, and much blood 
 was spilt. But at last they accomplished their design, and 
 hemmed in the enemy so closely that it was no longer practicable 
 for them to approach to the outlet from the peninsula. In this 
 situation they remained a fortnight. Their stock of provisions 
 was almost spent, and Henry began to indulge the flattering 
 hope, that in a few days they would lay down their arms. 
 
 Nothing but the bold inventive genius of the duke of Parma 
 Their pas- cou ^ have saved them from this disgrace : he had 
 
 sage of the erred when he entered the peninsula, while so vigilant 
 Seine at an enemy as Henry was so near. Neither the impor- 
 Caudbec. £ un ^y 0 f the chiefs of the league, nor his ignorance of 
 the country, nor the hopes of finishing his enterprise before the 
 King could arrive, are entirely sufficient to justify his conduct. 
 But he now fully atoned for his imprudence in exposing his 
 troops to so great a risk, by the extraordinary capacity and 
 vigour which he exerted in their deliverance. 
 
 As soon as he had recovered from the distress occasioned by 
 his wound, and taken a view of the position and strength of the 
 enemy, he perceived that it would be in vain to attempt to force 
 their lines ; and consequently, that there was no other way by 
 which he could save his army from captivity or ruin, but by 
 transporting it over the river. To this expedient he resolved to 
 have recourse, and he communicated his design to the duke de 
 Mayenne, and some other of his most experienced officers, who 
 all pronounced it to be impracticable. They knew how difficult 
 it was to pass even the most inconsiderable river in sight of an 
 enemy, and they could not conceive it possible for an army so 
 much encumbered with artillery and baggage to pass so broad a 
 river as the Seine at Caudbec, when not only a powerful enemy, 
 so vigilant as the King, but the Dutch ships of war likewise, 
 were prepared to obstruct their passage. 
 
 The Duke was fully sensible of all the difficulties with which 
 his enterprise must be attended, but as the urgent necessity of 
 
 i i 
 
482 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 his situation would not suffer him to relinquish it, he persisted 
 in his resolution of attempting to carry it into execution. 
 
 Having first cleared the river of the Dutch ships, by planting 
 batteries along the banks, he ordered the sieur de Yillars to 
 hold all the boats and barks at Rouen in readiness, and to 
 prepare a number of rafts of strong beams fit for transporting 
 the artillery. After this, taking advantage of a thick mist, on 
 the 16th of May, he sent out his cavalry by day-break, as if he 
 intended an attack ; and while the enemy were thus amused, he 
 drew off his infantry from Yvetot to Caudbec. The cavalry fol- 
 lowed; and as soon as they had retired, the King advanced with 
 all his forces, having no suspicion of the duke’s design, and 
 wondering that he should have chosen to move his camp to a 
 situation in which it was more confined and straitened than 
 before. Henry still thought of nothing but blocking up the pas- 
 sages, and fortifying his camp so as not to be obliged to accept 
 of battle. 
 
 While the King was thus occupied, the duke employed a 
 great number of pioneers in raising two forts, one on each side 
 of the river, directly opposite to each other, which he planted 
 with cannon, and lined with musketeers. To prevent the King 
 from taking the alarm, he maintained all the same appearances 
 as formerly, of a design to enlarge his quarters, and frequent 
 skirmishes were fought. 
 
 At last, every thing necessary being prepared, the rafts and 
 the boats (of which there was a great number at Rouen em- 
 ployed in the river trade) fell down with the ebbing tide, in the 
 evening of the 20th of May ; and, on the same night, the greatest 
 part of the troops, artillery, and baggage was transported. The 
 King, perceiving early next morning a change in the appearance 
 of the enemy’s camp, sent the baron de Biron to reconnoitre it. 
 The baron returned immediately at full gallop, calling out, that 
 the Spaniards were passing the river. Henry set out without 
 delay at the head of his cavalry. When he came in sight, he 
 had the mortification to observe, that only two or three thousand 
 of the Spaniards remained on this side, and that they were so 
 skilfully defended by the fort, that he could not approach them 
 without sacrificing the lives of many of his troops. He then 
 planted his artillery on a hill which commanded the passage, 
 and the Dutch ships came up the river from Quillebeuf ; but 
 before the cannon were ready to fire, and before the Dutch were 
 near enough to do execution, the rear of the Spaniards, con- 
 ducted with much prudence by Prince Rannucio, the duke of 
 Parma's son, had landed safe on the other side, and set the boats 
 on fire. 
 
 Neither the King, nor any of the French nobility, had ever 
 suspected that such a retreat was possible ; and this circumstance, 
 joined to the nature of the ground near Caudbec, which concealed 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN, 
 
 433 
 
 1592 .] 
 
 the duke of Parma’s operations, contributed not a little to the 
 fortunate issue of his enterprise. Henry had for several days 
 entertained the most sanguine hopes of gaining a decisive victory, 
 which would probably have given him immediate possession of 
 his kingdom ; and his mortification now was in proportion to the 
 confidence of his former expectations ; it was the more sensible 
 and galling, as his infantry was so much exhausted by the hard- 
 ships of a tedious winter’s campaign, that it was impossible for 
 him at present either to pursue the enemy, or to renew the siege 
 of Rouen. The duke de Mayenne entered this city with a part 
 of the forces, and the duke of Parma directed his march towards 
 the Netherlands, where he arrived in a few weeks without receiv- 
 ing any molestation by the way h . 
 
 While Philip thus kept alive the flames of war in France, he 
 History of had the good fortune to preserve his Spanish dominions 
 Antonio in a state of undisturbed tranquillity ; and as a kingdom 
 Perez. j n situation furnishes few materials for history, 
 hardly any transaction passed in Spain during several years pre- 
 ceding the present period that deserves to be recorded ; but in 
 the course of this year an affair happened, which, while it marks 
 the character and shows the secret life of Philip, was attended 
 with the most serious consequences. 
 
 Having been engaged in a love intrigue wfith Anna Mendoza 
 princess of Eboli * 1 , he had committed the conduct of it to his 
 secretary Antonio Perez, who having frequent opportunities of 
 conversing with that princess, had become no less enamoured of 
 her than the King ; and it was generally believed that she had 
 made him a full return to the passion which her beauty had 
 inspired. At the time when Antonio’s correspondence with the 
 princess was much talked of, Escovedo, the friend and confidant 
 of Don John of Austria, had arrived from the Netherlands, to • 
 solicit the King for the return of the Italian and Spanish forces ; 
 and finding the secretary averse to Don John’s designs, he 
 resolved to take vengeance on him, by making a discovery to the 
 King of what was reported of Antonio’s familiarity with the 
 princess of Eboli. Philip readily believed this intelligence, and 
 conceived an implacable resentment against the secretary ; but 
 he was animated at the same time with hatred no less implacable 
 towards Escovedo; who, he believed, had fomented Don John’s 
 ambition, and would, sooner or later, engage that prince in some 
 desperate enterprise inconsistent with his allegiance. Philip 
 resolved to employ one of these men as the instrument of his 
 vengeance against the other, and gave a private order to Perez 
 to have Escovedo assassinated. This order was executed without 
 delay, and soon afterwards a prosecution was begun against the 
 murderer, with Philip’s permission, by the widow and children of 
 
 h D’Avila, lib. xiii ; Bentivoglio, part ii. lib. vi. ; and Thnanus, lib. ciii. 
 ‘ The wife of Ruy Gomez de Silva. 
 
 i i 2 
 
484 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXII. 
 
 Escovedo. Philip intended by this measure to remove all sus- 
 picions of being accessary to the murder. But dreading that 
 Perez might, for his own exculpation, make a full discovery, he 
 wrote him several letters with his own hand, requiring that he 
 would conceal the order which had been given him, and assuring 
 him, that a stop should soon be put to the prosecution. It was 
 stopped accordingly ; and although Perez was forbid to come to 
 court himself, he was allowed for some years to transact the 
 several branches of public business which had been intrusted to 
 him, by his deputies or clerks. But no time could assuage the 
 King’s resentment : after six years he commanded him to be tried 
 for malversation in the discharge of his office, and having ordered 
 a fine of thirty thousand ducats to be imposed on him, he threw 
 him into prison and loaded him with chains. Perez was offered 
 his liberty on condition that he should give up all the King’s 
 letters relative to the murder of Escovedo. He delivered some 
 of them, and was released ; but Philip was no sooner in posses- 
 sion of the letters, than a new process on account of the murder 
 was commenced. Perez was again thrown into prison, and put 
 to the torture ; and he now perceived, that nothing less than his 
 death was intended. With the assistance of his wife and friends 
 he escaped and fled to Arragon, his native country, where he 
 expected to avail himself of the rights and privileges of the 
 Arragonians. Philip no sooner heard of his escape, than he de- 
 spatched certain officers after him, who overtook him in the town 
 of Calataiude ; and having forced him from a monastery, where 
 he had taken refuge, conducted him to Saragossa. When he 
 arrived in that city, he appealed to the Justiza, to whom, 
 according to a fundamental law of the constitution, an appeal 
 was competent from every other judge whether civil or eccle- 
 siastical. 
 
 By the Justiza, Perez was lodged in the state- prison, called 
 the Manifestation, to remain there till his cause should be tried. 
 But although no person could legally enter this prison without 
 the special permission of the Justiza, the marquis of Almenar, 
 the King’s attorney for Arragon, broke into it with a body of 
 armed men, and carried off Perez to the prison of the Inquisition. 
 The people, who had ever been accustomed to hold the person 
 and authority of the Justiza in the highest veneration, were in- 
 flamed with rage at this indignity ; and having risen tumultuously, 
 they rescued Perez from the inquisitors, surrounded the marquis 
 of Almenar, and after reviling him as a traitor to the liberty of 
 his country, maltreated him in such a manner, that he died soon 
 afterwards of his wounds. 
 
 Perez was again lodged in the prison of state, and remained 
 there for several months, during which time the governor, or 
 viceroy, ordered thirteen of the principal lawyers of Saragossa 
 to examine whether the cause belonged more properly to the 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 485 
 
 1592 .] 
 
 Justiza, or to the court of inquisition. After long deliberation they 
 declared, that it would be a violation of the liberties of Arragon, if 
 Perez were tried by any other judge than the Justiza; but after- 
 wards, being either corrupted or intimidated, they reversed this 
 sentence, under the pretence of the prisoners having held a 
 secret correspondence with the king of France, a heretic, and 
 pronounced that it belonged to the inquisition to take cognizance 
 of his cause. 
 
 The Justiza paid no regard to this opinion of the lawyers, but 
 persisted in defending the privileges of his office, and in refusing 
 to deliver up the prisoner. The viceroy had recourse to force ; 
 and having drawn together a great number of the familiars of 
 the inquisition, he broke open the state prison, loaded Perez with 
 chains, and was carrying him off in a sort of triumph, when the 
 people arose a second time, and set him at liberty. He imme- 
 diately left the town, and made his escape into France, where he 
 gave useful information to the King with regard to the designs 
 and measures of the court of Spain. 
 
 Philip in the mean time resolved not to neglect the opportunity 
 which this sedition of the Arragonians afforded him, to show how 
 little he regarded those rights and privileges of which they had 
 shown themselves so tenacious. Having formed an army of the 
 troops which were quartered in different parts of Castile, he gave 
 the command of it to Alphonso Vargas, with instructions to 
 march to Saragossa with the utmost expedition ; and to prevent 
 the Arragonians from preparing for resistance, he gave out that 
 this army was intended to assist the Catholics in France. The 
 Arragonians, however, having received certain intelligence of his 
 design, began to prepare for their defence. Lanusa, the Justiza, 
 having convened the principal inhabitants, and read to them a 
 fundamental law of their constitution, by which it is declared, 
 that they have a right to oppose by force the entrance of foreign 
 troops into Arragon, even though the King himself should lead 
 them, it was decreed with unanimous consent, that conformably 
 to this law they should take up arms on the present occasion, to 
 prevent the entrance of the Castilians under Vargas. 
 
 Intimation of this decree was sent to the other cities of the 
 province, and the inhabitants of Saragossa repaired in great 
 numbers to the standard of liberty that was erected : but they 
 had no leader of sufficient capacity to conduct them, and there 
 was no time for the people in other places to come to their 
 assistance. Vargas having arrived much sooner than they ex- 
 pected, 'they were overwhelmed with terror, and threw down their 
 arms. 
 
 Vargas entered the city without opposition, and cast such of 
 The Justiza. their leaders as had not made their escape into prison, 
 of Arragou Among these were the duke de Villa Hermosa, the 
 put to death. coun t G f Aranda, and the J ustiza. The two first he 
 
486 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXII. 
 
 sent prisoners to Madrid, but he put the Justiza publicly to 
 death without either trial or sentence, and then confiscated his 
 effects, and levelled his houses with the ground ; ordering pro- 
 clamation to be made in the city, that such should be the punish- 
 ment of all those who, like Lanusa, should adventure to dispute 
 the authority of the King. 
 
 The people heard this insulting proclamation with unspeakable 
 grief and indignation ; but they were obliged to lament in secret 
 the ruin of those invaluable rights which they were unable to 
 defend. The palace of the inquisition was fortified, that it 
 might serve the purpose of a citadel ; and a strong body of Cas- 
 tilian troops were quartered there and in the town, where they 
 remained till the minds of the citizens were thoroughly subdued. 
 Philip thought it unnecessary to abolish formally their constitu- 
 tion of government, as he had given them sufficient proof how 
 insignificant they would find it, if they should ever trust to it as 
 a barrier against the encroachments of the regal power. 
 
 While this transaction passed in Spain, the duke of Parma 
 Sickness of had returned from France to the Netherlands, and 
 Uie duke of from thence the bad state of his health had made it 
 necessary for him to go once more to drink the waters 
 at Spa. In the time of his French expedition, many of the 
 troops which he had left behind him had mutinied ; and on his 
 return from Spa, he had the mortification to find, that Prince 
 Maurice had subdued the two important towns of Steen wich and 
 Coverden, although the former of these places had been fortified 
 in the strongest manner, and was defended by a brave and de- 
 termined garrison of one thousand six hundred men. 
 
 The duke’s chagrin at these events contributed to quicken the 
 progress of his disease, which having baffled the power of medicine, 
 had now reduced him so low, that finding himself unable to fulfil 
 the duties of his office, he had applied to the King for liberty 
 to retire. 
 
 But Philip believing that no other person was so able to bring 
 His death schemes in France to the desired issue, refused to 
 
 grant his request ; and when he signified his refusal, 
 sent him instructions to return as soon as possible to the assistance 
 of the League. The duke would not desert a station which he 
 had filled with so much honour, and resolved to struggle with 
 his distemper to the last. Having by new levies supplied 
 some of the vacancies in his army, he went, on the 29th of 
 October, to Arras, and there applied, with his wonted assiduity, 
 to hasten the necessary preparations for his expedition. The 
 strength of his mind counterbalanced for several weeks the weak- 
 ness of his body. From the vigour which he displayed, those 
 about him conceived hopes that his death was still at a consider- 
 able distance. But on the third of December, immediately after 
 signing some despatches which had been prepared for his sub- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 487 
 
 1592 .] 
 
 scription, lie expired in the forty-seventh year of his age, and the 
 fourteenth of his government of the Netherlands. 
 
 In this manner died Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma, who 
 
 and claims our admiration, no less for his political wisdom 
 character. an d sagacity, than on account of those more splendid 
 military talents which have procured him such distinguished 
 renown. It was by his prudence, moderation, and address, more 
 than by the force of arms, that he reunited so great a part of the 
 Netherlands to the . Spanish monarchy : and if Philip had paid 
 the same regard to his opinion on all occasions, which he did on 
 some, it is probable that the United Provinces would have been 
 compelled to return to their allegiance. England might in that 
 case have been subdued, and France might have been swallowed 
 up by the exorbitant power of Spain. Though it was happy for 
 Europe that Philip, blinded by flattery and ambition, refused to 
 listen to the counsels that were offered him, yet we must admire 
 that superior sagacity and penetration by which they were 
 suggested. 
 
 The duke of Parma in his youth gave no indications of those 
 extraordinary qualities with which nature had endowed him, and 
 men were even disposed to think unfavourably of his understand- 
 ing ; but in the war with the Turks, in which he served under 
 J ohn of Austria, the flame of his genius broke forth, and burnt 
 afterwards through the whole of his life with unabating splendour. 
 His person was graceful, his eyes lively and penetrating, his 
 manner courteous, his address insinuating, and his temper 
 generous and humane. 
 
 His vices, says a respectable Dutch writer k , were those of the 
 age in which he lived, or of the court in which he had been edu- 
 cated j but what these vices were, neither this nor any other 
 historian has informed us. He appears not to have possessed 
 that winning simplicity of manners, the perfect ingenuity and 
 candour, by which his great rival for military fame, the French 
 monarch, was so eminently distinguished; yet the Protestant 
 as well as Popish historians acknowledge, that as he was dutiful 
 and faithful to his prince, so he maintained the most inviolable 
 fidelity in all his engagements with the people of the Netherlands 
 who submitted to his arms. 
 
 k Gro tius. 
 
488 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXII. 
 
 BOOK XXIII. 
 
 After the death of the duke of Parma, Philip committed the 
 Count Mans- government of the Netherlands to Count Peter Ernest 
 veldt gover- of Mansveldt, whom he ordered to send an army without 
 delay, under the command of his son Count Charles, 
 to the assistance of the League. In obedience to this order, 
 Charles immediately began his march with six thousand foot and 
 one thousand horse, which was the greatest number of troops 
 that could be spared from the defence of the Netherlands. These 
 troops, when joined by those of the duke de Mayenne, composed 
 an army of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, of 
 which the duke was invested with the chief command. 
 
 He began his operations with the siege of Noyon, in which he 
 Siege of exerted himself with extraordinary vigour, and compelled 
 Noyon. the garrison to surrender, before the King could arrive 
 to their relief. From Noyon the troops were led in Lower 
 Picardy, where some inconsiderable places were reduced. But 
 soon after this success, Count Mansveldt with the Spanish army 
 returned to the Netherlands; and the operations of war were 
 interrupted by certain political negotiations, from which Philip 
 expected to derive greater advantage than from the progress of 
 his arms. 
 
 Having, during several years, wasted the blood and treasure 
 Convention of of his subjects, in fomenting the war in France, in 
 the States of expectation of some favourable opportunity of seizing 
 the League. U p 0n the crown? his patience had been for some time 
 past exhausted ; and he had resolved to make trial, whether it 
 was practicable to realise those alluring hopes by which he had 
 so long been actuated. With this view his ministers had repeat- 
 edly requested the duke of Mayenne to summon an assembly of 
 the States of the League, that it might be known what Catholic 
 prince they inclined to choose for their sovereign. Mayenne 
 still cherished the hopes of attaining the sovereignty himself, in 
 some future more favourable crisis ; and he abhorred the thoughts 
 of having the French nation subjected to the dominion of Spain. 
 Influenced by these motives, he had on different pretences declined 
 for several months complying with Philip’s request ; but finding 
 that he would not be diverted from his purpose, the duke had 
 yielded to his importunity, and as lieutenant-general of the king- 
 dom, had issued a summons for the States to meet at Paris on 
 the twenty-sixth of January one thousand five hundred and 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 489 
 
 1593 .] 
 
 ninety-three. Philip sent the duke of Feria, and Mendoza, an 
 eminent Spanish lawyer, to this assembly ; and he fondly ima- 
 gined, that, by their influence, and that of the cardinal Piacenza, 
 the Pope’s legate, a majority of the deputies might be persuaded 
 to abrogate the Salic law, and to place his daughter Isabella on 
 the throne. 
 
 But it soon appeared how much his ministers in France had 
 Discovery of deceived him, and been themselves deceived. Neither 
 Philip’s views, the money which he had secretly bestowed to increase 
 the number of his partisans, nor the armies which he had employed 
 at so great an expense in their behalf, had produced in any 
 considerable degree the effects which he expected. Some of the 
 greatest bigots in the party, and some of the lowest of the people, 
 had given credit to his professions of zeal for religion ; even the 
 eyes of these men were now opened, and they perceived how little 
 they had been indebted to the friendship of a prince, who now 
 discovered, that his principal design in assisting them against 
 their enemies, had been to take advantage of their distress, and 
 to reduce them to the unhappy condition of a province of Spain. 
 For it was in this light they considered his proposal; and were 
 no less alarmed at his demand of their crown for Isabella, than 
 if he had demanded it for himself. In these sentiments the 
 deputies were secretly confirmed by Mayenne. But as both he 
 and they were conscious that they were utterly unable to contend 
 with Henry, if Philip should forsake them, they studied to 
 conceal their aversion to his proposal. They neither agreed to 
 it, nor rejected it ; but expressed their solicitude with regard to 
 the person whom the Catholic King should make choice of for 
 his daughter’s husband ; and insisted, that in the event of her 
 election, she should not be married to any foreign prince. 
 
 The Spanish ministers informed them, that their master had 
 indeed designed to give her in mariage to Ernest archduke of 
 Austria; but since it was not agreeable to the States, he was willing 
 to bestow her upon the duke of Guise. The duke de Mayenne did 
 not expect this concession, and was greatly disconcerted when the 
 Spanish ministers produced instructions empowering them to 
 make it. He was stung with the preference which was given to 
 his nephew before his son ; and he now secretly resolved to 
 obstruct the election of Isabella to the utmost of his power. 
 Finding it necessary, however, to disguise his sentiments, he 
 affected to be highly pleased with the proposal ; but alleged, that 
 a regard to the honour of his Catholic majesty, as well as to the 
 safety of the duke of Guise, required that the election of Isabella 
 should be deferred till an army was assembled, sufficient to 
 overpower her enemies, and to fix her upon the throne. At 
 present there was no army in France able to contend with 
 the king of Navarre, and a considerable time must elapse 
 before so great a force as was necessary could be raised. 
 
490 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 The Spanish ministers were sensible of the strength of this 
 objection ; they likewise knew that, without the assistance 
 of Mayenne, they could not persuade the States to proceed 
 to the election ; and therefore, without great opposition, they 
 agreed to a delay. In this manner did the duke de Mayenne, 
 influenced partly by ambition, and partly by concern for the 
 freedom and independence of the kingdom, disappoint for the 
 present Philip’s plan to enslave it ; and other events afterwards 
 happened, which would have rendered it impossible, even for 
 Mayenne himself, had he been so inclined, to carry it into exe- 
 cution. 
 
 The king of France, who knew the purpose for which the 
 Henry iv. States had been convened, though he was in a great 
 embraces the measure ignorant of Mayenne’s vi^ws, dreaded violently 
 Catholic re- his concurring with the Spaniards ; and felt great 
 ligion. anxiety with respect to the consequences which might 
 follow. For Philip, he believed, would regard an election made 
 by the States of the League, though only a small part of the 
 kingdom, as a sufficient foundation for his daughter’s claim, 
 and would employ all his power to support it, whatever pre- 
 judice might thence arise to his affairs in the Netherlands. 
 On the first opening of the assembly, Henry published an edict 
 declaring it to be illegal. And he gave permission at the same 
 time to the Catholic lords of his party, to enter into a conference 
 with those of the League ; intending to prevent the States from 
 proceeding to extremities, by affording them the prospect of his 
 speedy conversion to the Popish faith. 
 
 This expedient was in some measure attended with the desired 
 effect. The nobility of the League, disquieted with the appre- 
 hensions of being reduced under the dominion of Spain, and con- 
 scious, that if Philip should abandon them, they must soon yield 
 to the King’s victorious arms, were thrown into extreme perplexity; 
 and many of them showed that nothing was wanting but Henry’s 
 conversion to determine them to acknowledge his authority. 
 This condition, however, was still as necessary as ever. From the 
 long continuance of the war, their religious prejudices were become 
 unconquerable ; with these their sense of honour and consistency 
 conspired, and their regard to an oath which they had sworn, 
 never to acknowledge an heretical prince for their sovereign. 
 They were confirmed in their resolution, by the Pope’s legate, 
 and by the archbishop of Lyons, and other partisans of Spain ; 
 and were still as much determined as ever to adhere to their 
 engagements, without regard to any inconveniences or dangers, to 
 which they might thereby be exposed. 
 
 While the delay of the King’s conversion proved an insurmount- 
 able objection against him with the members of the League, it 
 gave the most sensible uneasiness to such of the Catholics as had 
 espoused his cause. They had been induced to remain with him, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 491 
 
 1593.] 
 
 after the death of the late King, by his promise of embracing 
 their religion. They had often urged him to fulfil this promise. 
 Amidst the hurry of arms he found it easy to employ excuses, 
 with which they had hitherto been satisfied. But their patience 
 was now exhausted. They entertained suspicions that he had 
 dealt insincerely with them. Though brave and warlike, they 
 were sick of the hardships and fatigues of war ; and they began 
 to hold conferences together, on the subject of transferring their 
 allegiance to Henry’s cousin the cardinal of Bourbon. Henry 
 perceived that the critical period was now come, when he must 
 resolve either to change his religion, or to forego the crown, and 
 expose himself and his Protestant subjects to the fury and ven- 
 geance of all the Catholics in France, supported by his inveterate 
 enemy the king of Spain. Even some of the Protestant leaders 
 were so candid as to acknowledge that, without embracing the 
 Catholic faith, he would never be able to preserve possession of 
 the throne ; and they exhorted him to embrace it, if his con- 
 science would permit, as the only means by which they, as well as 
 his other subjects, could be saved from ruin. 
 
 Never was an ingenuous prince placed in a more distressful 
 situation, and never was a virtuous mind assailed by temp- 
 tations more alluring ; for he was not impelled only by ambition, 
 or the desire of securing a great and mighty monarchy to himself 
 and his posterity ; the desire of delivering his people from 
 calamities, which were become intolerable, co-operated with his 
 ambition, and both together put his integrity to the severest 
 trial. 
 
 Without any longer delay, he invited the Catholic divines 
 throughout his kingdom, to come and instruct him in the prin- 
 ciples of their religion ; and having heard them discourse con- 
 cerning several of the points in dispute between the Protestants 
 and them, he declared himself entirely satisfied with their argu- 
 ments, and soon afterwards went to mass in the church of St. 
 Dennis, where he read aloud his confession of the Catholic faith, 
 and promised to maintain and defend it against whatever attempts 
 might be made for its subversion. 
 
 Henry’s conduct on this occasion was very differently inter- 
 preted by his contemporaries, according as they stood well or ill 
 affected to his person, or to the religion which lie had embraced. 
 It was alleged by some, that he had given a convincing proof of 
 his indifference with regard to all religion, and that his conver- 
 sion could be considered in no other light but as hypocrisy and 
 grimace. But others more justly observed, that if Henry had 
 been capable of so great insincerity as his enemies ascribed to 
 him, he would have listened to his interest at a much earlier 
 period, and not have so long exposed himself to the danger of 
 being for ever excluded from the throne. That no other satis- 
 factory account could be given of his delay, but the scruples 
 
492 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 with which his regard to truth and his sense of honour had in- 
 spired him. That it was not surprising, that a prince who had 
 passed his life amidst the tumults of war, should have been but 
 very imperfectly ^acquainted with the niceties of theological dis- 
 putes ; or that his opinions in matters of such difficult decision, 
 should have been gradually bent to a compliance with so great 
 an interest as he had at stake. And considering how candid 
 and sincere he had ever shown himself in all his conduct, it 
 might justly be supposed that he had still preserved his integrity, 
 and that his religious sentiments had, in reality, undergone that 
 change which he now expressed with so much seeming seriousness 
 and solemnity. 
 
 Whatever were the real motives of Henry’s conduct, it dif- 
 Effects of fused a general joy and satisfaction among his subjects. 
 Henry’s Worn out with the miseries of so long a war, they 
 conversion. exu i te q ^ the prospect of peace, though still at some 
 distance ; and being now freed from the fascination of their reli- 
 gious prejudices, they could perceive and admire those illustrious 
 virtues in the character of their sovereign, by which he was so 
 highly qualified to make them happy. 
 
 The Spanish ministers, on the other hand, the cardinal legate, 
 and the duke de Mayenne, were greatly alarmed at this event, 
 and still more when they observed the reception which the news 
 of it met with among the people. They represented it as a poli- 
 tical device, intended to prevent the election of a Catholic prince. 
 They persuaded a great number of their adherents to swear that 
 they would not acknowledge Henry for king, unless his conver- 
 sion were ratified by the Pope ; and at the same time they em- 
 ployed all their influence at the court of Pome, to dissuade the 
 Pope from granting him an absolution. 
 
 Philip was not discouraged from the prosecution of his scheme, 
 Philip still either by the opposition which it had received from the 
 adheres to States of the League, or by the conversion of the King, 
 his plan. jj e became sensible, however, of his error in pitching on 
 the duke of Guise (a young nobleman, indeed, of great merit and 
 moderation, but possessed of little power or influence) for his 
 daughter’s partner in the throne. This error he corrected, and 
 ordered his ministers to acquaint the duke de Mayenne, that he 
 was now determined to give the preference to his son. In con- 
 sequence of this declaration, a negotiation which Mayenne had 
 begun for reconciling himself to the King, was broken off. That 
 powerful leader and the Spaniards were henceforth on more ami- 
 cable terms ; and there was no longer any reason to doubt, that 
 in future he would exert himself with vigour in promoting their 
 designs 51 . 
 
 But there was much less probability at the present than any 
 
 D’Avila, lib xiv. Thuanus, lib. cvi. cvii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 493 
 
 1593.] 
 
 former period, that these designs would ever be accomplished. 
 State of his Philip had no general after the duke of Parma’s 
 affairs. death, qualified to enter the lists with the king of 
 
 France. His treasury was exhausted, and even his credit was 
 reduced so low, that the Genoese, and other Italian merchants, 
 from whom he had already borrowed several millions of money, 
 refused to lend him any more. His commanders in the Nether- 
 lands had not been able to make the necessary levies. His 
 troops there were fewer in number than they had ever been 
 since the commencement of the war ; and yet so great arrears 
 were due to them, that the officers found it impracticable to 
 maintain their authority. The greatest part of the Spanish 
 soldiers in the Low Countries had, upon their return from 
 France, forsaken their standards’; and having elected officers, 
 and a commander-in-chief, from among themselves, they had 
 begun to exercise the most oppressive rapacity upon the inhabit- 
 ants of the southern provinces. 
 
 The example of the Spaniards was quickly followed by the 
 Italians and Walloons. The people in the open country were 
 plundered in the most unmerciful manner. Those dreadful 
 scenes of devastation were renewed, which had been acted after 
 the death of Requesens ; and the Flemings had never suffered so 
 much from the enemy, as they now suffered from troops engaged 
 to protect and defend them. 
 
 Prince Maurice in the mean time exerted all his wonted 
 Siege of activity to improve the advantage which these disorders 
 Gertrud- afforded him for extending the territories of the States, 
 enberg. There was no town which the confederates were more 
 
 desirous of acquiring than Gertrudenberg ; which, as it lies nearer 
 them than Breda, subjected them to perpetual anxiety for the 
 preservation of that important city ; besides giving annoyance to 
 their inland trade, and furnishing the Spaniards with an easy 
 entrance into Holland. 
 
 During the winter, Maurice had made diligent preparation 
 for the siege of this place ; and early in the spring, he was ready 
 to take the field with such an army as he judged sufficient to 
 ensure success. In order to prevent the enemy from suspecting 
 his design, he directed his march first towards Sluys and Dun- 
 kirk ; afterwards to Bois-le-Duc and Grave ; and when by these 
 feints he had induced Count Mansveldt to divide his forces, he 
 turned suddenly to Gertrudenberg. 
 
 Mansveldt, anxious to avoid the reproach to which the loss of 
 a place of so great consequence would expose him, drew together 
 all the forces which could be spared from the garrisons of the 
 other towns, with an intention to attempt to raise the siege. 
 Prince Maurice expected this, and conducted his operations with 
 the utmost celerity. Not only his pioneers, amounting to three 
 thousand, but a great number of his troops, were employed day 
 
494 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 and night in fortifying his camp, both on the side towards the 
 town, to prevent the eruptions of the garrison, and on the side 
 towards the country. And not satisfied with this, he broke down 
 the dyke of the river, and laid a great part of the adjacent coun- 
 try under water. After which, having approached the town as 
 usual by trenches, he opened batteries against it at different 
 places ; and kept up a continual fire upon it from his fleet, on 
 the side towards the river b . 
 
 The garrison, consisting of Burgundians and Walloons, made 
 a brave and vigorous resistance, and thereby gave Count 
 Mansveldt time to advance to their relief. The count’s army 
 amounted to more than double the number of the besiegers ; 
 and he attacked their intrenchments in different places, where 
 the inundation permitted his approach. But Maurice had con- 
 structed his works with so much art, and strengthened them in 
 such a manner with forts and redoubts, at proper distances, 
 that all Count Mansveldt’s attempts proved ineffectual. The 
 count’s quarters were at the same time greatly straitened by 
 the garrison of Breda, which sallied out upon him, and made 
 considerable slaughter among his troops. He found it necessary 
 to retire, and Gertrudenberg soon afterwards capitulated. In 
 the garrison there were several of those soldiers who some years 
 before had sold the town to the Spaniards. These men suffered 
 the punishment due to their treachery ; but all the rest, and 
 the inhabitants of the place, received the most advantageous 
 and honourable terms. 
 
 Count Mansveldt had, in order to retrieve his honour, by 
 making reprisals upon the enemy, led his army from Gertruden- 
 berg, to invest an important fort belonging to the confederates, 
 called Creveceur. But this attempt likewise was frustrated by 
 the celerity of Maurice, who arrived before the count’s lines 
 were finished ; got between him and the fort, and though greatly 
 inferior in number, obliged him quickly to raise the siege. 
 
 During the rest of the campaign, Mansveldt acted on the 
 defensive ; and no other event happened in the Netherlands this 
 year that deserves to be recorded c . 
 
 Although Philip had, after the death of the duke of Parma, 
 Ernest, arch- committed the government to Count Mansveldt, he had 
 tr^overnor ^ rom i n te n ded that the count should resign it 
 
 of the°Ne- n ° r into the hands of Ernest archduke of Austria. This 
 . theriands. prince arrived in the beginning of the year one thou- 
 sand five hundred and ninety- four at Brussels ; and was re- 
 ceived there with every mark of joy and satisfaction. He was 
 ] 594 a P r ^ nce a m °dest and gentle disposition ; but he 
 possessed not the capacity and vigour requisite in the 
 present critical situation of affairs. Conscious of his want of 
 
 b The Maese at Gertrudenberg is more properly a branch of the sea than a river, and 
 admits of the largest ships. k c Bentivoglio and Grotius, lib. iii. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 495 
 
 1594.] 
 
 military talents, he fondly flattered himself with the hopes of 
 prevailing on the revolted provinces to return to their allegiance 
 by argument and persuasion ; and with this view he sent an 
 invitation to the States to appoint ambassadors to treat with 
 him concerning peace. But the States rejected his invitation, 
 and accompanied their refusal with declaring, “ that, as from 
 experience they could not repose any confidence in the king of 
 Spain, so they would never enter into any treaty of reconcile- 
 ment with him ; but would maintain their liberty to the last, 
 and lay down their lives sooner than submit to that intolerable 
 yoke from which they had been so happily delivered. 1 ’ 
 
 If it is true, as the Dutch historians relate, that two murderers 
 were detected at this time, whom the Spanish ministers had em- 
 ployed to assassinate Prince Maurice, it will not appear surprising 
 that this declaration of the States should have contained 
 expressions of resentment ; especially as they were now in a much 
 more flourishing condition than before, and had much less reason 
 than at any former period to dread the power of Spain. For 
 Philip, they knew, was still more intent on acquiring the crown 
 of France, than on recovering his hereditary dominions ; and 
 was likely to waste his strength in that chimerical attempt, 
 before he could be made sensible of his folly. 
 
 The situation of affairs in that kingdom became daily more 
 Affairs of unfavourable to his views ; and the King’s conversion 
 France. soon produced the happy effects which • were expected 
 to arise from it. 
 
 The citizens of Meaux were the first who sent him a tender of 
 Wise and ge- ^ heir submission ; not long afterwards, the Parisians 
 nerons con- opened their gates to receive him ; and the example 
 duct of the 0 f the metropolis, which had ever been the chief 
 strength of the League, was quickly followed by Rouen, 
 Lyons, and almost all the other great towns in the kingdom. 
 Henry’s conduct was admirably calculated to promote that affec- 
 tionate zeal of his subjects, of which he received at this time so 
 many striking proofs. For several years he had suffered from 
 them the most cruel injuries and affronts ; but his generous 
 spirit, superior to resentment, abhorred the thought of punish- 
 ing those who were willing to lay down their arms ; and he 
 received the submission of his most inveterate enemies with 
 a degree of goodness and condescension, which, while he won 
 their hearts, determined many others to imitate their example. 
 
 He granted to all who submitted to him the most favourable 
 terms ; confirmed their privileges, as if they had done nothing 
 to forfeit them ; adhered with inviolable fidelity to his engage- 
 ments, and published an edict of general indemnity, in order to 
 set the minds of the people everywhere at ease, and to convince 
 them that it would be their fault, and not his, if the public 
 tranquillity were not speedily restored. 
 
496 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 By these measures, which were equally prudent and magnani- 
 mous, the strength of the League was reduced so low. that 
 Philip and the duke of Mayenne might have easily perceived the 
 vanity of their designs. 
 
 It can hardly be imagined, that either the one or the other 
 Philip’s mo- cou ^ an y longer seriously entertain the hopes of suc- 
 tives for pro- cess. But Mayenne was so deeply engaged with the 
 secuting Spaniards, that he knew not how to extricate himself 
 fhe wai. w ith honour ; especially as he had solemnly sworn, 
 with many others of his party, that he would never acknowledge 
 Henry for his sovereign, till he should receive absolution from 
 the Pope. And though Philip could not now be so chimerical 
 as to expect to procure the crown for Isabella, yet he could not 
 overcome that implacable hatred, with which he had long been 
 animated against the French monarch, in whom (judging of 
 Henry from himself) he expected to find an irreconcilable and 
 mortal foe. Besides, he was not ignorant of the justice of Henry’s 
 claim to the kingdom of Navarre, which Ferdinand the Catholic 
 had wrested from Henry’s ancestors by fraud and violence ; and 
 he could not doubt that this active, victorious prince would, as 
 soon as his affairs were settled in France, either attempt to 
 recover his hereditary kingdom, or endeavour to procure a 
 compensation for it by invading the Spanish dominions in the 
 Netherlands. 
 
 Moved by these considerations, Philip resolved to continue 
 his hostilities, and, by joining his forces with those of the duke 
 of Mayenne, to make himself master of as many towns as 
 possible on the eastern frontier of France. 
 
 This resolution he communicated to the archduke Ernest ; 
 Siege of La who, agreeably to his instructions, sent Count Charles 
 Capeiie. G f Mansveldt early in the spring to invade the province 
 of Picardy, with an army of between eleven and twelve thousand 
 
 M v men - The count laid siege to the town of La Capelle ; 
 ay * and, as he attacked it unexpectedly, he soon obliged 
 the garrison to capitulate. 
 
 The King had set out from Paris as soon as he received intel- 
 Siege of ligence of the siege, but could not arrive in time to 
 L°n. prevent the surrender. Having been joined on his march 
 by the Dukes De Nevers and Bouillon, and finding himself at the 
 head of a considerable army d , he resolved to undertake some 
 important enterprise, by which he might be compensated for the 
 loss of La Capelle. One of the most considerable towns in that 
 part of the kingdom was Laon, a place of great extent, strongly 
 fortified, and well provided with everything necessary to sustain 
 a siege. The garrison, which was numerous, was commanded by 
 De Bourg, one of the bravest officers of the League ; and there 
 was, at that time, in the town, besides a great number of other 
 
 d Twelve thousand foot, and two thousand horse. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1594.1 
 
 497 
 
 nobility, the Count of Somerive, the duke de Mayenne’s second 
 son. These considerations, far from discouraging the King from 
 besieging Laon, were the motives which determined him to 
 invest it, and he carried on his operations against it with his 
 usual activity and vigilance. 
 
 The besieged gave him all the annoyance and interruption in 
 their power ; and in some sallies which they made, before he had 
 time to cover his troops, he lost more than four hundred men. 
 But his anxiety with regard to the issue of this enterprise, arose 
 principally from the neighbourhood of the Spanish army, which 
 was joined at this time by the duke de Mayenne, whom Philip, 
 in order to prevent him from entering into an accommodation 
 with the King, had entrusted with the chief command. 
 
 Various motives concurred on this occasion to determine 
 Mayenne at- Mayenne to exert himself with vigour. There was 
 tempts in vain much need of some splendid instance of success, to 
 to raise the support the drooping spirits of his party. Laon was 
 
 the most considerable town which remained in his 
 possession ; and, besides his son, and many of his faithful 
 adherents, he had left his most valuable effects in it, as in a 
 place where there was little danger of their falling into the hands 
 of the enemy. He lost no time in marching to it's relief. His 
 army consisted of nearly the same number as that of the King ; 
 but being inferior in cavalry, he found it necessary to approach 
 the town on that side, on which there lay a wood or forest, where 
 the enemy’s horse could not be easily employed. Henry had 
 penetrated into his design, and taken possession of the wood with 
 a part of his troops. Mayenne at first obliged them to retire ; 
 but the royalists, having immediately received a reinforcement 
 from the camp, returned to the charge, and stood their ground 
 for some time with great bravery against the Spanish veterans. 
 They would have been compelled, however, to give way a second 
 time, if the royal cavalry, which had advanced to their relief, 
 under the baron e , now marshal de Biron, had not, conformably 
 to their valiant leader’s example and command, dismounted 
 from their horses, and thrown themselves into the front of the 
 battle. The King himself soon after came up with the greatest 
 part of his army ; and, if the ground had permitted it, a 
 general engagement would have ensued ; but it allowed only 
 of . skirmishes, which continued with various success till the 
 evening ; when Mayenne, dreading that the King might send 
 his cavalry to attack his rear, drew off his forces to a little dis- 
 tance from the wood. 
 
 Although the nature of the ground in this rencounter prevented 
 the King from availing himself of the superiority of his cavalry, 
 yet this superiority proved afterwards of the greatest use. 
 Mayenne being obliged to bring his provisions through an open 
 
 e His father had been lately killed at the siege of Epernay. 
 
 K K 
 
49a 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 country from places at the distance of several miles, the King 
 sent out his horse in numerous bodies to intercept his convoys ; 
 and, although the Duke attempted to bring them under a strong 
 guard in the night, sometimes from one place, and sometimes 
 from another ; yet such was the vigilance of the duke de Longue- 
 ville, and the marshal de Biron, to whom the King gave the 
 charge of intercepting them, that almost none of them were 
 suffered to escape. These bold adventurous leaders were con- 
 tinually in motion : no guards which Mayenne could spare were 
 able to withstand their vigorous attack ; and his army was at last 
 reduced to so great distress, as made it necessary for him to 
 decamp. He was sensible how difficult he must find it to retire 
 in the face of a superior army ; but if he remained any longer in 
 his present situation, his troops, he perceived, must either perish 
 for want, or lay down their arms. 
 
 The Duke had hitherto been unfortunate in his enterprises, 
 His masterly and his misfortunes had contributed to obscure his 
 retreat. fame ; but, on this occasion, he gave a conspicuous 
 proof of consummate military skill, as well as of the most 
 unquestionable personal courage and resolution. His troops, 
 drawn up in the most masterly manner, were everywhere 
 so well prepared to receive the enemy, that the King, who 
 attacked him with his cavalry, as soon as they began their march, 
 found it utterly impracticable to penetrate their ranks; whilst 
 Mayenne himself marched on foot in the rear, fought on some 
 occasions as a common soldier, and, by the gracefulness of his 
 person, added to the fortitude which he displayed, commanded 
 universal admiration. In this manner he advanced slowly, till he 
 reached a narrow defile, where he had planted some batteries of 
 cannon ; from the dread of which, the King ordered his troops to 
 halt, and suffered the Duke to pursue his march to La Fere 
 without any farther molestation. 
 
 Henry then resumed his operations before the town. The 
 Laon sur- besieged, though deprived of all hopes of relief, persisted 
 renders. for some time in their defence ; but at last, finding their 
 numbers greatly diminished, they offered to surrender, on con- 
 dition that the garrison and the count of Somerive should be 
 allowed to march out with the honours of war ; and to this 
 condition the King readily consented, from his desire of prevent- 
 ing bloodshed, and saving the fortifications of the town. The 
 capitulation was signed on the twenty-second of July. The 
 terms of it were religiously fulfilled ; and Henry, far from 
 discovering ill-humour or resentment for the opposition which he 
 had met with, embraced with pleasure the present opportunity of 
 testifying his esteem for the duke de Mayenne, by showing 
 particular marks of respect and kindness to his son. 
 
 So much goodness, united with so much heroism and magna- 
 nimity, had charms in the eyes of Henry's enemies that were 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1594.] 
 
 499 
 
 irresistible. The reduction of Laon, and his generous treatment 
 Submission of the inhabitants and garrison, were quickly fol- 
 of the duke lowed by the voluntary surrender of Chateau-Thierry, 
 of Guise. Amiens, and Cambray. The duke of Lorrain, who from 
 the beginning had given his assistance to the League, chose now 
 to be at peace with a prince, in whose favour fortune, and his 
 own merits, had produced so remarkable a revolution. And the 
 duke of Guise, whom the Spaniards had tantalised with a glimpse 
 of royalty, but had afterwards neglected, moved partly by this 
 consideration, and partly by his admiration of the King, entered 
 into a treaty of reconciliation with him ; and having delivered 
 to him the towns of Rheims, Vitry, Rocroi, and several other 
 places in Champagne, he was rewarded by Henry with the 
 government of Provence . 
 
 During the course of these events, so adverse to Philip’s views 
 Siege of * n France, prince Maurice was engaged in the most im- 
 Groningen portant enterprise which he had hitherto undertaken, 
 by prince the siege of Groningen. That city, though almost 
 Maunce. gurroun( j e( j with the territories of the States, had been 
 preserved till now in its allegiance to Philip, by Verdugo, a 
 Spanish officer of great abilities, with whose assistance the 
 Catholic part of the inhabitants had been able to keep the 
 Protestants under subjection. Jealous however of their liberty, 
 they had never consented to admit any Spanish garrison within 
 their walls, but three thousand of the citizens, trained to the use 
 of arms, had been enlisted in the King’s service for the defence of 
 the town, while nine hundred of his foreign troops were permitted 
 to take up their quarters in the suburbs. 
 
 Maurice had long meditated the reduction of Groningen, not 
 only because it would be of itself an acquisition of great value to 
 the confederacy, but because it was the only place of consequence 
 in those parts under the Spanish dominion, and furnished an 
 easy entrance to the Spaniards into the northern provinces. 
 Much pains had been taken, and great exertions made, by 
 Verdugo for its security. Many bloody rencounters had passed 
 between him and the forces of the States, in which, from the 
 smallness of his numbers, and not from the want either of 
 bravery or conduct, he was generally unsuccessful ; and Maurice, 
 powerfully seconded in all his operations by his cousin count 
 William of Nassau, had at length reduced Verdugo to the 
 necessity of quitting the province, and had made himself master 
 of almost every pass by which the citizens could receive assist- 
 ance or supplies. 
 
 They had not neglected to inform the Archduke of the im- 
 minent danger to which they were exposed. At their request, 
 the emperor of Germany had transmitted to Philip a repre- 
 
 1 D’ Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, lib. ci. Meteren, lib. xiii. Bentivoglio, ann. 1 594. 
 Sully’s Memoirs, lib. vi. 
 
 K K 2 
 
500 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 sentation, importing, that although they desired nothing so much 
 as to maintain their allegiance, and had preserved it long amidst 
 much greater hardships and difficulties than any of his other 
 subjects had endured, yet if the army were not immediately sent 
 to their assistance, they would soon find it necessary to open 
 their gates to the enemy. Philip, far from disregarding their 
 application, made them the most gracious and flattering reply ; 
 and sent orders to the Archduke to postpone every other object 
 in the Netherlands to the relief of Groningen. But the greatest 
 part of his forces were at this time engaged in the war in 
 Picardy ; and the remainder having mutinied against their 
 officers, on account of their want of pay, refused to obey the 
 governor’s commands. 
 
 Prince Maurice therefore applied to the prosecution of the 
 siege, with very little apprehension of meeting with any inter- 
 ruption from the Spaniards, although, agreeably to his usual 
 cautious maxims, he fortified not only his quarters, but, likewise, 
 the several passes which led to them from the southern provinces. 
 By beginning to open his trenches at a distance from the town, 
 the siege was somewhat retarded, but he thereby prevented the 
 loss of men which would otherwise have been sustained. On the 
 third of June his batteries were unmasked, and soon afterwards 
 all the outworks were laid in ruins. The besieged, alarmed with 
 the rapidity of his progress, called the foreign troops, which were 
 quartered in the suburbs, to their assistance. The defence was 
 conducted for several weeks with the highest spirit and intrepi- 
 dity, and much blood was spilt. But Maurice having blown up 
 a ravelin, which was one of the principal defences of the place, 
 the courage of the inhabitants began to fail, and there was 
 nothing to be heard but complaints of the ingratitude of the King, 
 in thus abandoning to their enterprising enemy a people so 
 distinguished for their attachment and fidelity. 
 
 Their chief magistrate, V an Balen, who had long been secretly 
 averse to the Spanish government, improved with great dexterity 
 the opportunity which their present temper afforded him. He 
 studied to confirm them in their sentiments of the King’s in- 
 gratitude : he represented to them the folly of flattering them- 
 selves with the hopes of relief from a prince, who was more intent 
 upon conquering the dominions of others, than providing for the 
 security of his own. He painted in strong colours the miseries 
 which they must suffer, if either the siege were to be prolonged, 
 or the town to be taken by assault ; and, by expatiating on the 
 advantages which would accrue to them from acceding to the 
 union of Utrecht, he endeavoured to make them sensible, that if 
 freedom from a foreign yoke was an object to be desired, it was 
 infinitely more for their interest to submit to the generous 
 enemy, who now besieged them, than even to be delivered from 
 the siege. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 501 
 
 1594. J 
 
 These exhortations made the desired impression even upon the 
 minds of those who were most attached to the Catholic religion. 
 That attachment had been long their only tie to the Spanish 
 government ; and it was overcome at this time by their indig- 
 nation on account of Philip’s negligence in providing for their 
 defence, joined to their desire of participating of that civil liberty, 
 which had proved the source of so much prosperity and happiness 
 to the confederated provinces. 
 
 A deputation of the principal inhabitants was sent to treat of 
 Groningen a surrender; and the Prince, without hesitation, granted 
 united to the them the most advantageous terms. The city of Gro- 
 confedeiacy. n j n g en was declared to be henceforth a member of the 
 union of Utrecht. All the exemptions and ancient privileges 
 of the inhabitants were confirmed ; the civil government of the 
 place was allowed to remain on the same footing as before, and 
 liberty of conscience was established, with this restriction, that 
 no other religion but the reformed should be publicly exercised. 
 The citizens, on the other hand, engaged to acknowledge the 
 supreme authority of the States ; to submit to the general laws 
 of the union ; to contribute their share of the public expenses ; 
 and to admit such a garrison into the town as the States should 
 judge necessary for its security. The foreign soldiers were per- 
 mitted to depart with their arms and baggage. The capitulation 
 was signed on the 23rd of J uly ; and on the same day prince 
 Maurice entered the town. He remained in it for some time, till 
 certain articles of the capitulation were executed, after which, 
 having committed the government to his kinsman, count William 
 of Nassau, he set out for the Hague g . 
 
 While Philip’s power suffered so great a diminution in the 
 Mutiny of northern provinces, his affairs in Brabant were daily 
 the Spanish more and more involved in disorder and confusion, 
 an^d Italian The Archduke had, with the utmost difficulty, raised 
 s° ieis. money to satisfy the Walloon and Spanish mutineers; 
 but no sooner had these men returned to their duty, than the 
 Italians, to whom the same arrears were due, resolved to employ 
 the same means to effectuate their payment. Many of the officers 
 concurred with the private men in forming this resolution, and 
 they put it instantly in execution, by seizing on the town of 
 Sichen, where a part of their number had been stationed. They 
 were joined by soldiers from all the garrisons in the neighbour- 
 hood, who continued flocking to them, till they amounted to two 
 thousand horse and foot. 
 
 Not satisfied with laying the country round the town under 
 The inuti- contribution, they spread themselves over the province, 
 neers pro- made excursions to the very gates of Brussels, where 
 tec ted by the governor resided, and plundered the people with as 
 auuce * much cruelty as if they had been engaged in open war. 
 
 8 Metcren, lib. xvii, Bcntivoglio, part iii, lib. i. Gfotius, lib. iir, 
 
402 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 The governor having tried the power of persuasion without effect, 
 resolved to employ force to reduce them ; and for this purpose he 
 sent the Spanish troops which he had lately pacified, under Lewis 
 de Velasco, to besiege Sichen. In the beginning of this sedition, 
 prince Maurice had made the mutineers an offer of shelter and 
 protection in the territories of the States, and they readily agreed 
 to accept this offer in case they should find it necessary; but 
 informed him, that they would defend themselves in Sichen as 
 long as they were able, against the Spaniards. They accordingly 
 did so, and made several desperate sallies, in which many on both 
 sides were slain. Finding, however, that the place was too weak 
 to be long defended against an enemy so much superior in num- 
 ber, they retired under the fortifications of Breda and San Ger- 
 trudenberg, where provisions were sold to them by the subjects 
 His motive °f tl he States. The intention of Maurice in this sin- 
 gular treatment of an enemy, was only to prolong the 
 term of their disobedience. He made no attempt to persuade 
 them to enter into the service of the confederacy, but gave per- 
 mission to the Archduke to send an ambassador to treat with 
 them ; and when, after a tedious negotiation, they had agreed to 
 take up their quarters in Tirlemont, and to remain there till their 
 demands were satisfied, without renewing their hostilities, Mau- 
 rice readily allowed them to depart. They required a Spanish 
 nobleman to be given as a hostage for the fulfilment of the gover- 
 nor’s promises ; and so great was the disorder of the King’s 
 finances at this period, that these troops were suffered to remain 
 inactive at Tirlemont for near a year before their arrears were 
 paid\ 
 
 Before the expiration of this term, the governor was seized 
 Death of with a hectic fever of which he died on the twentieth of 
 Earnest ; February, in the forty-second year of his age. He named 
 the count of Fuentes for his successor, and his choice was soon 
 Fuentcs after ratified by the King. This nobleman, having been 
 named go- S ent into the Netherlands a little before the death of the 
 vernor. ^uke 0 f p arm a, had, agreeably to Philip’s instructions, 
 during the government of count Mansveldt and the Archduke, 
 possessed a principal share in the administration. By his advice, 
 or more properly by his authority, count Mansveldt had published 
 a barbarous edict, commanding all prisoners to be put to death ; 
 and ordering the King’s troops, who, in their excursions into the 
 territories of the States, had been satisfied for several years past 
 with levying contributions, henceforth to lay waste the country 
 with fire and sword. 
 
 The States, in return, published a manifesto, in which they 
 expressed their abhorrence of this barbarity ; but at the same 
 time declared, that if the governor did not recal his edict against 
 
 h Grotius, lib. iii. Meteren, lib. xvii. p. 581. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. i. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1591 .] 
 
 503 
 
 a certain time, they would retaliate the cruelty which it prescribed 
 upon the troops and subjects of the King. This measure had 
 been urged by Fuentes, on the pretence of shortening the dura- 
 tion of the war, although the experience of his kinsman, the duke 
 of Alva, might have convinced him, that, considering the strength 
 to which the confederacy had attained, it would serve only to 
 increase the calamities of the war, and to render it perpetual. 
 Count Mansveldt came soon to be sensible, that these must be 
 the consequences, and either revoked his edict, or gave orders to 
 prevent it from being carried into execution. 
 
 Fuentes, however, still continued to exercise an unlimited influ- 
 Discontent ence in the government. The Flemish nobility com- 
 of the Fie- plained bitterly, as in the time of cardinal Granvelle, 
 mish nobles. th e ^significance to which they were reduced, and 
 before the death of the Archduke they had given some striking 
 proofs of their discontent. This discontent was greatly height- 
 ened when the Count was appointed governor ; they saw then 
 how little sincerity there had been in those soothing promises 
 which the King had made them some years before, when they 
 consented to the return of the foreign troops. They perceived 
 how little trust and confidence he reposed in them, and were 
 sensible at last of the truth of what the prince of Orange had so 
 often told them, that, by their agreement with the duke of Parma, 
 they would reduce their country to the miserable state of a pro- 
 vince of Spain. The duke d’Arshot and count Charles of Mans- 
 veldt, who had reason to expect to have been preferred before 
 Fuentes, would not submit to the indignity put upon them, but 
 resigned their employments, and left the Netherlands. The duke 
 d’Arshot died afterwards in Venice, and count Mansveldt in 
 Hungary, where he commanded the Emperor’s army against the 
 Turks. 
 
 Fuentes, in the meantime, entered upon the exercise of his 
 vigorous office, and, notwithstanding the prejudices which the 
 conduct of Flemings seem justly to have entertained against him, 
 Fuentes. j ie soon discovered that his abilities were not unequal 
 to the charge with which lie was invested. He applied with 
 great success to quell the mutinous spirit of the army, and in a 
 few months put it upon a much more respectable footing, both 
 as to discipline and numbers. 
 
 Philip had greater occasion now than ever for abilities and 
 Declaration vigour in the person to whom he committed the govern- 
 of war * be- ment of the Netherlands. The league in France was 
 
 tween France about to expire, notwithstanding his exertions to pre- 
 and Spam. vei ft ft . an fi the French monarch, being firmly seated 
 on his throne, declared war against him, prohibiting all commerce 
 with his subjects, and granting liberty to the French to invade 
 and plunder, and take possession of whatever dominions belonged 
 to the crown of Spain. 
 
504 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 This measure was condemned by many, as being highly inexpe- 
 Henry’s dient at the present juncture, on account of the exhausted 
 motives, (state to which his kingdom was reduced by the long con- 
 tinuance of the civil wars, and no person was more sensible of 
 the strength of this objection than the King Jhmself ; but he 
 believed that, in the present temper of the Catholic king, peace 
 could not be obtained from him upon honourable terms. He 
 was persuaded, that war with the Spaniards must of necessity 
 continue some time longer ; and he thought, that as nothing 
 would contribute more to extinguish the flames of civil discord 
 than a foreign war, it would be easier to interest his Catholic 
 subjects in the prosecution of it, if it were regarded as a war 
 between the crowns, to which political motives had given birth, 
 than if it were suffered to remain on its present footing, and 
 considered as carried on by Philip for the sake of religion. It 
 is not indeed improbable, that personal animosity added force to 
 these incitements. Philip had ever treated Henry in the most 
 contemptuous manner ; and, under the mask of religion, had 
 endeavoured first to exclude him, and afterwards to expel him, 
 from the throne. Henry detested that artifice and duplicity in 
 Philip’s character, of which, in his late attempt to procure the 
 abolition of the Salic law, he had given such incontestible evi- 
 dence ; and the terms in which his declaration of war was 
 expressed, demonstrate, that resentment had, on the present 
 occasion, a considerable influence on his conduct. 
 
 Philip’s answer to this declaration was perfectly conformable 
 to his character. All his interferences in the affairs of France 
 had proceeded, he said, from his concern for the prosperity of 
 the people, and the security of the Catholic faith ; and he 
 declared, that his intention now was not to enter into war with 
 the crown or nation of France, but only to persevere in protect- 
 ing the true Catholics of that kingdom from the oppression of 
 the prince of Bearn and his adherents 1 . 
 
 Both kings had been employed, before their declaration of 
 Prosecution war, in preparing for the recommencement of hostilities; 
 of the war. and Henry, besides his domestic preparations, had 
 entered into a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with the 
 United Provinces. Agreeably to ah article of this treaty, the 
 States sent a body of horse and foot, under Philip, count of 
 Nassau, to invade the province of Luxemburg. Their enterprises 
 were for some time attended with success ; but Fuentes, having 
 despatched the brave Verdugo with superior forces to oppose 
 them, they were obliged, after several rencounters, to quit the 
 province ; and were soon after recalled, and stationed near the 
 frontier of Brabant, where it was expected they would be of 
 equal service to the French monarch, by detaining the Spaniards 
 in the Netherlands. 
 
 * P’Avila, lib. xiv, 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 .505 
 
 1505 .] 
 
 The army of the States, however, even after it was joined by 
 siege of Ca- these troops, was not able to furnish full employment 
 telet. to those which the governor had prepared. He left 
 an army under Mondragone to. check . the progress of prince 
 Maurice, and set out himself for Picardy with the rest of his 
 forces. His first enterprise \tas the siege of Catelet, of which 
 he made himself master in a few weeks, though it was strongly 
 fortified, and bravely defended by the garrison. 
 
 During this siege, Fuentes had reason to flatter himself with 
 Affairs of Go- the hopes of acquiring possession of the castle and 
 meron and town of Ham without bloodshed. The castle was 
 d Oi v libers. j^ld ky an 0 ffi cer ca lled d’Orvilliers, and the town by 
 his half-brother, whose name was Gomeron. These two men had 
 been violent partisans of the league, and the latter resolved to 
 deliver the town to the Spaniards rather than to the king of 
 France; but he demanded from Fuentes a reward of twenty 
 thousand crowns for the town, and a still higher reward, if he 
 should prevail upon his brother (which he engaged to do) to 
 deliver up the castle. The Count readily agreed to these terms, 
 and paid him the twenty thousand crowns upon his admitting a 
 thousand Spanish troops into the town ; but required Gomeron 
 himself and his two younger brothers to remain with him as 
 hostages, till the castle likewise should be put into his possession. 
 To this Gomeron consented, from a fond persuasion that his 
 brother would imitate his example, rather than expose him and 
 his other brothers to the resentment of the Spaniards, especially 
 as their mother was in the castle, whose intreaties he expected 
 d’Orvilliers would be unable to resist. But d’Orvilliers chose 
 rather to abandon his brothers to their fate, than betray his 
 charge to the enemies of his country ; and he admitted the duke 
 de Bouillon into the castle, with a numerous body of the King’s 
 troops, who attacked the Spaniards in the town, and either put 
 them to the sword or took them prisoners. The mother of Go- 
 meron, now trembling with anxiety for her children’s preservation, 
 came to Fuentes, and represented that d’Orvilliers repented of 
 what he had done, and was willing to deliver the castle to him, 
 if he would come himself with his army to receive it. The 
 Count, believing her representation to be true, the more readily 
 as she herself seemed entirely convinced of the truth of it, 
 advanced with his forces towards Ham; but finding that the 
 mother had been deceived, and that, in order to avoid her impor- 
 tunity, d’Orvilliers had left the place, and resigned his govern- 
 ment to another, he was inflamed with rage, and put Gomeron 
 to death in presence of the army. The unhappy man did not 
 perhaps deserve so severe a punishment from the hands of 
 Fuentes; but it was due to the treachery and egregious folly 
 into which his avarice had betrayed him k . 
 
 k Bcntivoglio, part iii. lib. ii, 
 
50G 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 From Ham the Count conducted his troops, after they had 
 Siege of rested some days, to lay siege to Dourlens. This town, 
 Dourlens. being near the frontier of the Netherlands, was strongly 
 fortified and garrisoned by a considerable number of select troops. 
 Still, however, it was necessary, in order to prevent it from fall- 
 ing into the enemy’s hands, that the garrison should be aug- 
 mented : and no sooner had the marshals Bouillon and Villars, 
 whom the King had sent to watch the motions of the Spanish 
 army, heard that Dourlens was invested, than they assembled 
 all the troops in the neighbourhood, amounting to a thousand 
 foot and fifteen hundred horse, and advanced towards the town, 
 in hopes of being able to force their way through the enemy’s 
 entrenchments ; but Fuentes having received intelligence of their 
 design, left a part of his forces to guard his trenches, and 
 marched out with the rest, in order of battle, to an advantageous 
 situation at a little distance from the town. When the duke of 
 Bouillon observed Fuentes so well prepared for his defence, he 
 counselled marshal Villars to retire; but that intrepid general, 
 whose courage was ever too ardent and impetuous, refused to 
 comply, and still continued to advance, till his troops were almost 
 surrounded by the Spaniards. A desperate and bloody battle 
 ensued; in which, from their great inferiority in respect of 
 number, the French were almost entirely cut to pieces, Villars 
 himself was slain, and the cavalry, after great loss, were obliged 
 to retire. 
 
 During the combat, the garrison sallied out upon the troops 
 which had been left to defend the camp and trenches; but 
 through the wise precaution which had been taken, the Spaniards 
 proved victorious ; and Fuentes resumed, with fresh spirit and 
 vigour, the operations of the siege. Among the besieged there 
 were more than three hundred gentlemen, who inspired the gar- 
 rison with the same generous spirit by which they themselves 
 were actuated, and defended the town several days with extra- 
 ordinary courage and resolution. But their skill and conduct 
 were not equal to the bravery which they displayed. In an 
 assault on the thirty-first of July, they were overpowered by the 
 assailants, and almost the whole garrison, amounting to more than 
 a thousand men, with their governor the count of Dinan, were put 
 to the sword. 
 
 Fuentes, emboldened by his success, resolved next to lay siege 
 Siege of Cam- to Cambray ; the reduction of which was the principal 
 bra )'- object of his present expedition. 
 
 This important city had been wrested from the Spaniards, as 
 is above related, by the duke of Anjou ; and Anjou had be- 
 queathed it to his mother Catharine of Medicis, by whom a 
 French gentleman of the name of Balagny had been appointed 
 governor both of the town and citadel. Balagny, taking advan- 
 tage of the troubles in France, had for several years acknowledged 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 507 
 
 1595. J 
 
 no superior ^ and as he had studied to maintain some degree of 
 neutrality between the contending parties, he had been suffered 
 to act as sovereign both of the city and its territory. But ap- 
 prehending, after the discomfiture of the league, that it was ne- 
 cessary for him to make a choice either of the king of F ranee 
 or Spain for his protector, he agreed to acknowledge his depen- 
 dence on the French monarch, on condition that he should be 
 permitted to enjoy under him possession of the sovereignty, 
 with the title of the prince of Cambray ; and to these terms 
 Henry the more readily consented, as he dreaded that, if he 
 rejected them, they would be granted by the king of Spain. 
 
 Balagny, being thus confirmed in his possession, spared no 
 expense or pains in strengthening the fortifications of the place. 
 The garrison amounted to three thousand foot and six hundred 
 horse, the greatest part of which were French troops of the 
 most unquestionable bravery. The town was strong, and it was 
 well furnished with military stores and provisions. 
 
 Determined by these considerations, some of the principal 
 officers in the Spanish army endeavoured to persuade the count 
 de Fuentes to relinquish his design, by representing that, before 
 he could accomplish it, either the winter season would overtake 
 him, or the French monarch, being disengaged from his enemies 
 in other quarters, would arrive with a superior army and attack 
 him after his troops were diminishing in number, and exhausted 
 with the operations of the siege ; but Fuentes, ambitious to 
 distinguish his administration by so important an acquisition, 
 and elated by the success with which his enterprises had been 
 hitherto attended, refused to listen to these remonstrances ; 
 and, having received a great augmentation of forces from the 
 neighbouring provinces, he began his operations without delay. 
 They were carried on with a degree of skill and vigour which 
 would have reflected honour on the greatest generals of the age ; 
 and notwithstanding the most intrepid defence, conducted with 
 much prudence by the celebrated de Vic, whom Henry had 
 sent with a reinforcement of troops to the assistance of the 
 besieged, the Count opened his batteries in a few weeks so near 
 the town, that some of its principal defences were destroyed, and 
 a great part of the wall was laid in ruins. Still, however, his 
 success was doubtful. He encountered the most discouraging 
 difficulties in furnishing his troops with provisions ; and nothing 
 but the most unconquerable resolution, added to the dread of 
 tarnishing the glory which he had already acquired, could have 
 prevented him from abandoning his attempt. 
 
 But he was saved from that mortification, by the inhabitants 
 Cambray of the town, who having been long accustomed to the 
 given up by mild administration of their archbishops, had borne with 
 the citizens. ex t reme impatience the haughty imperious behaviour 
 of Balagny ; and had been almost reduced to despair by the 
 
508 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 extortion, rapine, and insolence of his wife, by whom he suffered 
 himself to be entirely governed. The citizens had secretly sent a 
 deputation of their number to the French monarch, intreating 
 him to deliver them from the yoke of their oppressor, and offering 
 on that condition to submit to his anthority, and to receive a 
 garrison of his troops. But through the influence of the famous 
 Gabrielle d’Estrees, whom Balagny had gained over to his interest, 
 Henry not only refused to comply with their request, but con- 
 firmed Balagny in his usurped authority. 
 
 The inhabitants, inflamed now with resentment against the King 
 as well as against Balagny, resolved to embrace the first oppor- 
 tunity of putting themselves under the dominion of their former 
 master, the king of Spain ; and they were confirmed in their 
 resolution by the numerous ecclesiastics in the town, who hoped 
 by this measure to effectuate the re-establishment of the arch- 
 bishop, whom Balagny had expelled. Having formed their plan, 
 they delayed the execution of it, till Balagny and de Yic were 
 wholly occupied in taking measures against an assault, which 
 they believed to be intended by the Spaniards. At that time 
 they ran to arms, and made themselves masters of one of the 
 gates of the city. De Yic, Balagny, and his wife, spared no 
 pains to divert them from their purpose, but all their endeavours 
 proved ineffectual. Two of the principal citizens were immedi- 
 ately sent to F uentes, with an offer to surrender the town on the 
 following conditions, to which he readily agreed : — That the 
 soldiers should be restrained from plunder ; that all past offences 
 should be forgiven ; that the citizens should enjoy their wonted 
 privileges, and the Archbishop be restored to his ancient jurisdic- 
 tion and authority. 
 
 The garrison immediately retired into the citadel, where they 
 expected to have been able to defend themselves for a consider- 
 able time. But having found, upon searching the magazines, 
 that there was hardly provisions enough to support them for 
 three days, they agreed on the first summons to capitulate. The 
 wife of Balagny had reduced them to this necessity, by selling, 
 at an exorbitant price, without her husband's knowledge, the 
 provisions which had been laid up in store. 
 
 During the siege, this woman had discovered a degree of 
 spirit, capacity, and courage, above her sex ; but being unable 
 to bear the consciousness of that egregious folly into which her 
 avarice had betrayed her, and which was now attended with 
 consequences so fatal to her ambition, she was overwhelmed with 
 anguish and despair ; and refusing to take either medicine or 
 food, she died miserably, before the citadel was delivered to the 
 Spaniards. 
 
 The capitulation was signed on the seventh of October, and 
 the garrison marched out with all the honours of war upon the 
 ninth ; immediately after which, Fuentcs having stationed fivo 
 
1595.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 509 
 
 hundred Spaniards in the citadel, and two thousand Germans in 
 the town, set out for the Netherlands with the rest of his forces, 
 and put them into winter-quarters in Flanders, Artois, and 
 Hainault l . 
 
 The reader will not suppose that the active spirit of the French 
 Affairs in monarch could be unemployed during the course of these 
 Burgundy, disastrous events. He was deeply affected by the loss 
 of the important towns which had been conquered by Fuentes, and 
 would have marched in person to their relief, had he not believed 
 that his presence was still more necessary in another part of his 
 dominions. For Philip having resolved to prosecute the war with 
 vigour in different quarters at the same time, had ordered 
 Velasco, the constable of Castile and governor of Milan, to lead 
 an army of ten thousand men into Burgundy ; and these 
 troops were upon their arrival in Franche-Comte joined by the 
 duke de Mayenne with a thousand foot and four hundred horse. 
 This army was greatly superior to any which marshal Biron, 
 who commanded in these parts, could assemble to oppose it ; 
 and Henry dreaded that the province of Burgundy would be 
 speedily over-run. Having therefore sent orders to his troops 
 in different parts to follow him, he set out himself at the head 
 of one thousand eight hundred horse and foot, with an intention 
 to harass the enemy, till the rest of his army should arrive. 
 
 The Spaniards had passed the Saone and advanced as far as 
 Battle of Fontaine-Franqoise, when Henry attacked them on 
 Fontaine- their march, with a degree of impetuosity and ardour 
 Fran^oise. that filled Velasco with astonishment. The King was 
 bravely supported on this occasion by the marquis de Mirabeau, 
 the count de Grammont, and several others of his nobility ; but 
 above all, by the intrepid Biron, who fought long after he was 
 covered with the blood that flowed from a wound which he had 
 received in the beginning of the engagement. The King, by his 
 exhortations and still more by his example, inflamed his troops 
 to a degree of madness. At the head of his squadrons, he 
 plunged sword in hand into the midst of the enemy, broke 
 through their ranks, and threw their van into confusion. 
 
 Had Velasco ordered his whole army to advance, it is impos- 
 sible but Henry must have been surrounded and overpowered. 
 But his courage on this occasion supplied the want both of 
 caution and of numbers. Velasco, intimidated by the unex- 
 ampled boldness which he had seen displayed, gave orders for a 
 retreat, and left the King in possession of the field of battle. 
 Early next morning he repassed the Saone, notwithstanding the 
 earnest remonstrances of the duke de Mayenne, who had pro- 
 cured certain intelligence of the strength of the enemy. Mayenne 
 then intreated Velasco to leave him a part of the forces to raise 
 the siege of Dijon, .which had been invested by a party of the 
 
 1 D’Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii. 
 
510 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIII. 
 
 royalists, and to enable him to defend such other towns on this 
 side of the river as were still in his possession. But this like- 
 wise the Spanish general refused, and continued to retire till he 
 reached the town of Gray ; where he fortified his camp in the 
 strongest manner, with a resolution to act only on the defensive, 
 in case the royal army should advance. 
 
 Velasco, who was utterly unpractised in the military art, 
 Reconcile- appears to have been strongly actuated with a dread 
 ment of ^he gU p er i or skill and bravery of the King. But 
 with the the duke de Mayenne likewise perceived, in his conduct 
 King. towards him on this occasion, manifest symptoms of 
 diffidence and distrust. This the Duke could not help at- 
 tributing to Velasco’s instructions from the court of Spain; 
 and he could not doubt, that through the ill-offices of the Spa- 
 nish ministers in France, Philip had conceived some fresh 
 jealousy of his designs. He was therefore thrown into great 
 perplexity, while he believed that he should ere long be aban- 
 doned by the Spaniards, as he had already been by most of his 
 adherents in France ; and could hardly suppose that now, when 
 his power was reduced so low, he would be able to obtain advan- 
 tageous conditions from the King. After long deliberation, he 
 formed the resolution of going to Madrid to justify his conduct 
 to Philip, against the misrepresentations of his ministers. But he 
 was saved from that fatal step by the invincible goodness of the 
 French monarch, who, having been informed of his distress, sent 
 Lignerac, a friend and confidant of the Duke, to assure him of 
 his esteem, and to inform him that he was still ready to receive 
 him into favour, and to grant him the most honourable terms. 
 Henry did not require an immediate submission from him, 
 because the Duke had often declared, that he would never 
 acknowledge his authority till the Pope should grant him abso- 
 lution ; but he desired that he should return to Chalons, one of 
 his own towns, and wait there for that event, in full confidence 
 that no advantage should be taken, in the meantime, either 
 of himself or his adherents. 
 
 Mayenne, who knew with how much safety he might rely on 
 Henry’s promise, and was deeply penetrated with a sense of the 
 generous offer which had been made to him, accepted it without 
 hesitation, and left the Spanish camp. 
 
 Soon after this agreement, Henry advanced to the banks of the 
 Saone, with a resolution to transport his forces, consisting of seven 
 thousand foot and two thousand horse, into Franche-Comte, 
 where Velasco lay intrenched. In spiteof the troops which had been 
 planted to dispute his passage, he forded the river about three 
 miles below the town of Gray, and then led his army towards 
 the enemy ; but finding their intrenchments too strongly fortified 
 to be attacked with any probability of success, he turned aside, 
 and began to lay waste the country, or to levy contributions from 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 511 
 
 1595.] 
 
 the inhabitants. Velasco remained still within his camp. At 
 length the Swiss Cantons, as friends and protectors of the 
 people of Franche-Comte, interposed their influence. At their 
 desire, the King readily desisted from his depredations ; and 
 having led back his troops into his own dominions, he resolved to 
 march, as soon as possible, to the frontiers of the .Netherlands. 
 
 He was in daily expectation, at this time, of receiving 
 The pope the Pope's absolution, which had been much longer 
 grants delayed than he expected, through the violent opposition 
 Henry ab- 0 f the Spanish ministers at Rome ; but Clement, 
 so ution. now perceiving that Henry was firmly established on 
 the throne, and dreading that by a longer delay he might exhaust 
 his patience, and provoke him to throw off his allegiance to the 
 Holy See, resolved to run the risk of giving offence to Philip, and 
 on the 16 *th of September pronounced the sentence of absolution. 
 This event gave inexpressible joy to all the true Catholics of 
 France ; and the treaty 'of agreement, which had been begun 
 with the duke de Mayenne, was soon after brought to the desired 
 conclusion. Such other members of the league as had not 
 already submitted, imitated the example of their leader. In- 
 ternal peace was everywhere established, and Henry had leisure 
 to apply his whole attention to the Spanish war™. 
 
 The transactions in the Netherlands this year were less 
 Affairs of the important and interesting than in any former campaign 
 Netherlands. since the commencement of the war, which was princi- 
 pally owing to the governor’s prudent choice of the vigilant, 
 experienced Mondragone, as commander-in-chief of the forces 
 during his absence. About the middle of July, prince Maurice 
 besieged the town of Groll ; but Mondragone, having augmented 
 his army, by making draughts from the garrisons of the neigh- 
 bouring towns, advanced towards him with so much celerity, that 
 not having had time to complete his intrenchments, Maurice 
 was obliged to raise the siege. The two armies lay long in sight 
 of each other ; and as they were nearly equal in strength, and 
 both generals exerted an equal degree of vigilance and circum- 
 spection, they effectually prevented one another from undertaking 
 any important enterprise. 
 
 There were frequent skirmishes with various success ; but the 
 only one which deserves to be mentioned was a rencounter near 
 the river Lippe, where Maurice ordered count Philip de Nassau, 
 with five hundred horse, to lie in ambush in a wood, to intercept 
 a party of the enemy which had been sent out for provisions. 
 Of this Mondragone had received intelligence, and with great 
 secrecy stationed a body of horse still more numerous in another 
 wood, at a little distance from the first. When the Spanish 
 foragers arrived at the ambuscade, they were attacked on every 
 side, and repulsed with considerable slaughter; but being speedily 
 
 m i>’Avila, lib. xiv. Thuanus, anno 1595. Perefixe Elzevir, p. 230, &c. 
 
512 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIII. 
 
 reinforced by their friends in the neighbouring woods, they 
 returned to the charge. The Dutch troops, astonished to find 
 themselves caught in their own snare, were at last overpowered 
 by numbers ; three hundred of them, with their commander, 
 were killed, and the rest obliged to save themselves by flight. 
 
 This was the last memorable event of the campaign, although 
 Death of the two generals remained in sight of each other till the 
 Mondra. end of October, when they broke up their camps, and put 
 gone. their troops into win ter- quarters ; and Mondragone died 
 not long after, at the age of ninety-two, having to the last pre- 
 served sufficient vigour to fulfil, with distinguished reputation, all 
 the duties of a commander. He had served in the Netherlands 
 near fifty years, and had a principal share in almost every 
 military enterprise, yet he had the singular fortune to escape 
 without a wound n . 
 
 n Grotius, lib. iv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. ii. 
 
 During the course of the transactions recorded in this book, the Dutch performed their 
 first expedition to India ; but as their acquisitions at this time were inconsiderable, and 
 their most important conquests over Philip’s subjects in that distant region were not 
 achieved till several years after the present period, 1 have reserved the relation of the whole 
 for the history of the subsequent reign. 
 
1596.] 
 
 PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 513 
 
 BOOK XXIV. 
 
 From the capacity and vigour of which the count de Fuentes 
 The archduke h a d gi yen so many proofs since his accession to the 
 Albert gover- government, there was reason to expect that he would 
 nor of the have been suffered long to retain possession of it ; but 
 
 ether ands. having from the beginning intended that he 
 
 should continue governor only for one year, had immediately 
 after the death of Ernest fixed upon the cardinal, archduke Albert, 
 for his successor. 
 
 This prince, nephew to Philip, and youngest brother to the 
 Emperor, had been intrusted with the regency of Portugal. By 
 his prudent administration he had acquired universal esteem ; 
 and Philip, who entertained the highest opinion of his abilities, 
 believed that no person was better qualified either to prosecute 
 the war with vigour, or by an accommodation to bring it to the 
 desired conclusion. 
 
 He arrived at Brussels about the middle of February, one 
 thousand five hundred and ninety-six, having brought with him a 
 reinforcement of Italian and Spanish troops, and, which was of 
 still greater utility, a sum of money, amounting to fifteen hundred 
 thousand crowns a . 
 
 The count de Fuentes, unwilling to act in a subordinate 
 station, in a country where he had enjoyed the chief command, 
 resigned the government to the archduke, and set out for Spain. 
 
 Albert immediately applied himself to make the preparations 
 Siege of La necessary for a new campaign ; and conformably to his 
 Fere. instructions from Philip, he turned his principal at- 
 
 a Albert likewise brought with him, at this time, Philip, eldest son of the late prince of 
 Orange, who, as above related, had been seized by the duke of Alva, and sent to Spain, 
 where he had been educated in the Catholic religion, and detained for almost thirty years. 
 By setting him at liberty on this occasion, it is not improbable that the court of Spain ex- 
 pected to have created some division between the prince and his brother Maurice, that 
 might have proved prejudicial to the United Provinces. But Maurice readily yielded to 
 him all that he possessed of their father’s fortune ; and the States, perceiving that the arch- 
 duke, besides restoring to him his lands in Brabant and Burgundy, treated him with much 
 esteem and confidence, refused to grant him permission to fix his residence within their 
 territories, or even to visit his kinsmen there, till the year 1608, a short time before the 
 conclusion of the truce with Spain. 
 
 He married Eleanor of Bourbon, a daughter of the prince of Conde ; by the interest of 
 whose friends, he recovered possession of the principality of Orange, in the kingdom of 
 France. He lived on amicable terms .with his relations in the Netherlands; but, being 
 sincere in his profession of the Catholic religion, he seems not to have entertained any re- 
 sentment for the injurious treatment he had received from the king of Spain ; nor does he 
 appear to have possessed any share of that bold and enterprising genius, by which his brothers 
 were so eminently distinguished. He died without issue at Brussels, in the year 1618. 
 Du Maurier. 
 
 L L 
 
514 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV- 
 
 tention to the war with France. His first object was the relief 
 of La Fere in Picardy, which had remained in the hands of the 
 Spanish ever since it was delivered by the League to the duke of 
 Parma. 
 
 Towards the end of the preceding year, it had been invested 
 by the French monarch ; but as it was strongly fortified, and the 
 garrison consisted of chosen troops, commanded by Alvaro 
 Osorio, a Spanish officer of distinguished reputation, Henry was 
 satisfied with blocking it up so as to prevent the entrance of 
 supplies. This he accomplished with little difficulty. The 
 blockade had lasted for several weeks, and Osorio had conveyed 
 intelligence to the archduke, that if he was not speedily relieved, 
 the want of provisions would render it impossible for him to hold 
 out for any considerable time. The Spanish army was assembled 
 at Valenciennes, and almost ready to begin its march ; but the 
 more the governor and his council of war reflected on the diffi- 
 culties which must attend the attempting to raise the siege, by 
 marching directly to La Fere, the more insurmountable they 
 appeared. For they could not, it was observed, approach to 
 that town, without leaving behind them St. Quintin, Ham, 
 Guise, Peronne, and several other fortified places, the garrisons of 
 which would harass them on their march, break up the roads, 
 and intercept their convoys of provisions. An impassable marsh 
 rendered the town inaccessible on every side, except where the 
 French monarch had strongly fortified his intrenchments. Even 
 if they should come in sight of the town, yet, before they could 
 enter it, they must either attack the enemy within their camp, or 
 engage with their whole army in the open field. They could 
 not attack them in their camp, without exposing themselves to 
 almost certain ruin ; Henry would not give them an opportunity 
 of fighting in the field, unless his army, which was increasing 
 daily, were superior to theirs, and the consequences of a defeat 
 would prove fatal not only to the army, but to all the Spanish 
 conquests in France, and perhaps too to the King’s authority in 
 the Netherlands. 
 
 Determined by these considerations, the archduke formed the 
 resolution of besieging some other frontier town of sufficient im- 
 portance to induce Henry either to raise the siege of La Fere, 
 or compensate for the loss of that place, in case it should be 
 obliged to capitulate. 
 
 He hesitated for some time whether he should lead his army 
 Siege of against St. Quintin or Peronne ; but he soon laid aside 
 Calais, the thoughts of attacking either of these places, and 
 resolved to undertake the reduction of Calais, which he believed 
 would be an easier, as well as a much more important acquisition. 
 
 This enterprise was suggested to the governor by the Sieur de 
 The sieur Rone, a native of France, and formerly a violent par- 
 de Rdnc. tisan of the League, who had entered into the service 
 
1596. j PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 515 
 
 of Spain against his King and country. He was a man of a dark 
 intriguing spirit/ whom no tie could bind but interest ; but he was 
 bold and active, sagacious and penetrating, and eminently dis- 
 tinguished for his skill in the art of war. He had received intel- 
 ligence that Calais, like many other towns in the kingdom, had 
 been much neglected during the civil war ; that although the King 
 had ordered the fortifications of it to be examined, yet his other 
 occupations had not allowed him to bestow that attention on it 
 which its importance deserved ; and that, as some of the works 
 were ruinous, so the garrison was too small to defend a place or 
 so great extent. For these reasons, the governor approved 
 highly of De Rone’s proposal, and he committed the execution 
 of it to himself. 
 
 In order to prevent the enemy from suspecting what was 
 intended, it was communicated only to two or three of the prin- 
 cipal officers ; and the archduke gave out that his design was to 
 relieve La Fere. He accordingly began his march towards that 
 place, while De Rone turned suddenly to Calais with a body of 
 select troops, and attacked the fort and bridge of Nieulai, which 
 commands the entrance to the town by land. He made himself 
 master of it with very little difficulty, and then proceeded to 
 attack the fort of Risbane, which stands at the mouth of the 
 harbour, and was of the greatest importance for the preservation 
 of the place. The garrison of this fort made a more vigorous 
 resistance than that of Nieulai ; but no sooner had De Rone 
 opened a battery against them, by which only a few were killed, 
 than they were seized with a sudden panic, and offered to capitu- 
 late. This rapid progress exceeded De Rone’s most sanguine ex- 
 pectations, and it gave him the greater joy, as not long after the 
 Risbane had surrendered, some ships with troops for the reinforce- 
 ment of the garrison, which had arrived from Boulogne, finding the 
 entrance to the harbour in his possession, were obliged to return. 
 
 The archduke, who was in the neighbourhood of Valenciennes, 
 when he received intelligence of this fortunate commencement of 
 his enterprise, set out immediately with his whole army for Calais, 
 and pitched his camp in such a situation as he hoped would pre- 
 vent the approach of the enemy. 
 
 He first attacked the suburbs, and took them by assault ; nor 
 did he encounter greater difficulty in making himself master of 
 the town. His cannon had hardly begun to play upon it, when 
 Vidossan, the governor, retired with the garrison into the castle ; 
 and quickly despairing of being able to defend himself in it, any 
 better than he had done in the town, he offered to give it up in 
 six days, if he was not relieved before the expiration of that time. 
 The archduke, in order to save his troops and the fortifications 
 of the place, readily agreed to this proposal, never doubting that 
 he was fully able to prevent the entrance of any reinforcement 
 * either by sea or land. 
 
516 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIV. 
 
 The King, in the mean time, heard with much anxiety of the 
 progress of the Spanish arms. But the blockade of La Fere 
 having continued for several months, he expected that the gar- 
 rison must be reduced in a few days to the necessity of capitulat- 
 ing ; and he thought it probable that, after finishing his present 
 enterprise, (which he could not abandon without losing all the 
 expense and labour which he had bestowed upon it,) he would 
 arrive in time to raise the siege of Calais. He went himself, 
 however, with a part of his cavalry to Boulogne, that he might be 
 ready to administer such assistance to the garrison of Calais, as 
 might enable them to hold out till his whole army should be at 
 liberty to advance to their relief. 
 
 Upon his arrival in Boulogne, he was informed of the capitula- 
 Hcnry at- ti° n a ^ove mentioned. He lamented bitterly that he 
 tempts in had not brought with him a greater proportion of his 
 vain to raise troops ; but finding it necessary to make some exertion 
 the siege. without delay, he prevailed on Campagnol, the governor 
 of Boulogne, with three hundred chosen men, to attempt to force 
 his way in the night through the Spanish lines. 
 
 This arduous undertaking was executed without the loss of a 
 single man ; and Campagnol had no sooner arrived in the 
 castle, than having read the King’s orders to the garrison, he 
 required them all to swear that they would defend the fortress 
 to the last. 
 
 In the evening of the sixth day of the truce, they were sum- 
 moned to fulfil their engagement ; when they replied that they 
 had received the reinforcement which they expected. But it 
 soon appeared how unequal they were to the defence of so weak 
 a place, against so numerous an enemy. 
 
 Early next morning De Rone began to play off his batteries, 
 and in a few hours a great part of the wall was laid in ruins. 
 
 An Italian regiment, through whose negligence Campagnol had 
 Calais taken got into the fort, was ordered to advance to the assault, 
 by storm. and was followed by the Walloons and Spaniards. The 
 garrison received them in the breach with undaunted courage, 
 and, after an obstinate engagement, in which great numbers fell on 
 both sides, compelled them to retire. But the Italians returned 
 immediately to the charge; and at last, through the great 
 superiority of their numbers, they overpowered the garrison, en- 
 tered along with them into the fort, and put all of them to the 
 sword, except Campagnol, and a few others, who took refuge in 
 the church, and afterwards surrendered at discretion. In this 
 manner did Calais fall into the hands of the Spaniards in less than 
 three weeks after De Rone had begun the siege. The King left 
 Boulogne, after having taken precautions for the preservation of 
 that place, and returned to La Fere. And the archduke, after 
 staying eight or ten days in Calais to repair the fortifications, led 
 his troops against the town of Ardres. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 517 
 
 1596.] 
 
 The garrison of Ardres consisted of two thousand five hundred 
 Siege of men, commanded by the marquis of Belin, the lieutcnant- 
 Ardres. governor of the province, and by the Sieur de Annebourg, 
 governor of the town, an officer of distinguished courage and 
 capacity. By frequent vigorous sallies, the operations of the 
 besiegers were greatly retarded. At length, however, they took 
 the suburbs by assault, and De Rone began tojbatter the walls of 
 the town. But considering the strength of the place, and the 
 number and bravely of the garrison, he had little reason to hope 
 for success before the conclusion of the siege of La Fere; when 
 there was no room to doubt that the king would advance without 
 loss of time to the relief of Ardres. 
 
 Notwithstanding this encouraging circumstance, the marquis 
 de Belin called a council of war, and urged with great earnest- 
 ness the necessity of capitulating ; alleging that it was impos- 
 sible to hold out till the king’s arrival, and that the sooner they 
 submitted, they would the more easily obtain advantageous terms. 
 This proposal was rejected with great disdain by the Sieur de 
 Annebourg, and all the officers in the council. But the cowardly 
 Belin, availing himself of that superior authority with which he 
 was invested as lieutenant-governor of the province, capitulated, 
 notwithstanding their remonstrances, on a condition to which the 
 archduke readily agreed, that the garrison should march out with 
 the honours of war. La Fere having surrendered on the day 
 immediately preceding, the king had already set out for Ardres, 
 and as his army had of late received a considerable augmentation, 
 he entertained the most sanguine hopes of being able to raise the 
 siege. When a messenger informed him of the surrender, he was 
 inflamed with indignation, and ordered Belin to be tried for his 
 life. At the importunity of his friends, he afterwards stopped 
 the prosecution ; but he banished him from court, and deprived 
 him of his office of lieutenant-governor of the province b . 
 
 Henry was now in some perplexity with respect to his future 
 Albert re- conduct. He was extremely solicitous to recover as 
 turns to the soon as possible the towns which he had lost ; but as 
 Netherlands, fi nances we re in great disorder at that time, and 
 Picardy, having been long the seat of war, was reduced to the 
 most exhausted condition, he perceived that any enterprise so 
 tedious as the siege of a fortified town, must be attended with 
 insurmountable difficulties. He resolved, therefore, in conformity 
 to the opinion of his nobility, to advance towards the enemy, and 
 to compel them, if possible, to give him battle. But the arch- 
 duke, whose army was greatly diminished by putting garrisons into 
 the conquered towns, had penetrated into his design ; and being 
 no less averse to an engagement than Henry was desirous of it, 
 he left France without delay, and put his troops into quarters of 
 cantonment in the province of Artois. The king being thus 
 
 b D’ Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, &c. Thuanus, p. 1 16, lib. viii. 
 
5J 8 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIV. 
 
 disappointed in his hopes of a decisive action, dismissed the 
 greater part of his army, and leaving the marshal Biron with only 
 five or six thousand men to check the excursions of the Spanish 
 garrisons, he returned to Paris, where a great number of impor- 
 tant affairs of state required his attention. 
 
 While the Spanish army was employed in prosecuting the war 
 He besieges in France, no memorable event had happened in the 
 Huist in Netherlands. This was not owing to any want of 
 
 Flanders, activity and vigour on the part of Prince Maurice, 
 
 but to the extreme weakness of his army, which the States, from 
 a desire of saving their strength when they were not exposed 
 to immediate danger, had reduced so low, that when all the 
 garrisons were full, he could not lead into the field more than 
 three thousand men. With the assistance of this little army, 
 the garrisons of some of the frontier towns had made several bold 
 incursions into Flanders and Brabant, and either plundered the 
 country, or laid the inhabitants under contributions. The states 
 of these provinces had ardently wished for the return of the 
 archduke ; and they now intreated him to employ his arms in 
 reducing some of the places in their neighbourhood, from which 
 they received so great annoyance. Albert, who did not intend, 
 by returning so early to the Netherlands, to pass the remainder 
 of the season without action, readily complied with their request ; 
 and, after deliberating with his council of war, undertook the 
 siege of Huist in Flanders. 
 
 Maurice had, since his conquest of that place about five years 
 before, made great additions to its fortifications. He had like- 
 wise formed the territory on which it stands into an island, by 
 means of two large canals which were drawn around it ; and, by 
 building forts on these canals, and laying a part of the adjacent 
 country under water, he had rendered the town almost inac- 
 cessible. 
 
 This at least was the opinion of some officers whom Albert 
 had sent to reconnoitre it ; but being ambitious to distinguish 
 the first year of his administration, by performing some important 
 service to the people committed to his care, and being excited at 
 the same time by De Rone and other adventurous spirits, whom 
 no difficulties could deter from any enterprise, he persisted in his 
 design, and proceeded immediately to put it in execution. In 
 order to conceal it as long as possible from the enemy, he made 
 a feint of attacking some of the towns in Brabant, and this mea- 
 sure was attended with the desired effect. Of five thousand men 
 who were in garrison at Huist, prince Maurice ordered two thou- 
 sand to reinforce the garrisons of Gertrudenberg and Breda. 
 
 Albert immediately after turned suddenly towards Huist, and 
 having prepared a great number of small boats, he ordered two 
 of his principal officers, de la Biche and la Barlotta, to transport 
 a part of his forces across the inundation and canals. These 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1596.] 
 
 519 
 
 men executed their commission with great secrecy and silence in 
 the dead of the night, and encountered difficulties which required 
 the most determined resolution to surmount. The tide did not 
 rise so high as they expected, and they were often obliged to 
 leave their boats, and push them forwards, while they stood up 
 _ to their knees in mud. When, after much labour and difficulty, 
 they had brought them to the side of the canal, they were dis- 
 covered by the garrisons of some forts which had been built to 
 obstruct their approach ; but, notwithstanding the incessant fire 
 of these forts, they still continued to advance ; and having launched 
 their boats in the canal, they at last arrived on the other side, 
 with the loss of only a small number of men. Early next morn- 
 ing, count Solmes, the governor of Hulst, attacked them before 
 they had time to entrench themselves. A bloody combat ensued, 
 in which one regiment of the assailants was routed, and their 
 commander killed. But the rest, reflecting on their desperate 
 situation, from which it was impossible *to escape, advanced with 
 irresistible impetuosity, and, after much bloodshed, compelled the 
 garrison to take shelter in the town. 
 
 Prince Maurice no sooner heard of w hat had happened, than 
 he set out with all the forces which he could collect, hoping to 
 be able to drive the Spaniards from the island, before their num- 
 ber was increased. But the archduke advanced with greater 
 expedition, and prevented his approach. It was still practicable 
 for Maurice to transport his forces to Hulst, by the canal which 
 falls \nto the Hondt or Wester Scheld. But before he could 
 reach the island in that way, Albert had transported his whole 
 army, and begun the operations of the siege. The only expedient 
 which Maurice could now employ, was to introduce supplies into 
 the town by the canal, the mouth of which was commanded by a 
 strong fort, which he hoped the enemy would find impregnable. 
 For this purpose he fixed his residence at Cruning in Zealand; 
 and from that place, troops were frequently conveyed to the 
 assistance of the besieged, notwithstanding the most strenuous 
 endeavours of the Spanish army to intercept them. 
 
 The siege and the defence were conducted with equal vigour, 
 and the combatants on both sides gave innumerable proofs of the 
 most heroic courage. The garrison sallied out almost every day, 
 and made dreadful havoc among the Spaniards. De Rone, to 
 whom the chief conduct of the siege had been committed, was 
 killed ; and by this irreparable loss the assailants were greatly 
 dismayed. The archduke, however, persisted in this enterprise ; 
 and although he had lost a much greater number of his troops 
 than in both the sieges of Calais and Ardres, he continued his 
 operations with unremitted ardour, till, besides demolishing all 
 the outworks of the place, he had made a breach in the wall suf- 
 ficient to admit of an assault. 
 
 The garrison had thrown up a deep entrenchment within the 
 
520 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 Huist given breach, and as they were still as numerous as ever, 
 up to the through the seasonable supplies which prince Maurice 
 . pamar s. f rom time to time had sent them, they had little reason 
 for despair. But being seized with a sudden panic, they urged 
 count Solmes, the governor, with the most earnest importunity, 
 to capitulate ; and the count, dreading that, in the present temper 
 1 8th An °f their minds, they would probably deliver the town 
 1 ,lg * without his consent, complied with their request. 
 
 Albert staid no longer in Huist than was necessary to give 
 Vietory of orders for repairing the fortifications ; after which he 
 M. Biron in returned to Brussels, amidst the joyful acclamations of 
 the people ; who flattered themselves with hopes, that, 
 under the government of a prince so successful in all his enter- 
 prises, an entire stop would soon be put to the incursions of the 
 enemy, and internal security restored. But their joy on this 
 account was of short duration. Marshal Biron, whom the French 
 monarch had left behind him in Picardy, with a body of select 
 troops, had hitherto been satisfied with acting on the defensive ; 
 but soon after the surrender of Huist, he began to make incur- 
 sions into the province of Artois, and kept all the southern fron- 
 tier of the Netherlands under perpetual alarms. The archduke 
 sent the marquis of V arambon to oppose him ; and V arambon 
 for some time obliged him to act with greater caution and cir- 
 cumspection than he had hitherto observed. But Biron having 
 received intelligence that the marquis was on his march to offer 
 battle, he advanced rapidly to meet him ; and, having placed the 
 greater part of his troops in an ambush, he proceeded with the 
 rest till he had reached the enemy. A fierce rencounter ensued ; 
 and Biron continued fighting and retreating, till he arrived at 
 the place where his troops were posted. He then returned to 
 the charge with his whole forces united ; and having taken V a- 
 rambon prisoner, he put many of his troops to the sword, and 
 compelled the rest to save themselves by flight 0 . 
 
 The prince of Chimai, now duke D’Arschot, was appointed to 
 succeed V arambon ; and his endeavours to repress the incursions 
 of the enemy were attended with no better success than those of 
 his predecessor. Biron triumphed over him through the supe- 
 riority of his cavalry, and continued to exercise his depredations 
 in the open parts of the country, till the approach of winter 
 obliged him to retire. 
 
 During the course of these transactions in the Netherlands 
 Expedition an( l France, Philip sustained a calamity in Spain, which 
 of the English more than counterbalanced any advantage that could 
 against Spain, kg eX pected from his late acquisitions. Almost every 
 season since the discomfiture of his Armada in one thousand five 
 hundred and eighty-eight, the English had undertaken some 
 naval enterprise against his dominions in Europe or in America. 
 
 c Bentivoglio, lib. iii. Giotius* 
 
1596.] rHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 4 521 
 
 The affairs of the Netherlands and France had not hitherto left 
 him leisure to take revenge for these insults ; nor was his leisure 
 greater at the present period than it had been for some years 
 past, but his patience was exhausted ; and his acquisition of a 
 sea-port, so commodiously situated as Calais, gave him a facility 
 of annoying his enemy, which he had not possessed before. He 
 resolved, notwithstanding his present embarrassments, to improve 
 the advantage which this circumstance presented, and having 
 begun to prepare a naval and military force, he intended to make 
 a descent in Ireland, where he had long fomented the rebellious 
 spirit of the Catholic inhabitants, and had reason to believe that 
 they would join his troops as soon as they should land. 
 
 Elizabeth was aware of the impending danger, and determined, 
 Earl of Essex if possible, to dissipate the storm before it should ap- 
 commaiider proach. For this purpose she fitted out a fleet of more 
 in chief. than a hundred and fifty ships, having about eight 
 thousand soldiers and seven thousand mariners on board, and 
 gave the command of the land forces to the earl of Essex, and 
 that of the navy to lord Howard of Effingham. To this fleet 
 the Dutch added twenty-four ships, with a proportional number 
 of troops, under the command of Wardmont, vice-admiral of 
 Holland, and Count Lewis of Nassau, cousin to Prince Maurice. 
 
 With this powerful armament, Elizabeth intended to make an 
 attack on Cadiz, where Philip’s naval preparations were princi- 
 pally carried on. But its destination was carefully concealed. 
 Sealed instructions were delivered to the several commanders, 
 not to be opened till they should arrive at Cape St. Vincent ; 
 and they were ordered, in their way thither, to keep at a distance 
 from the coasts of Spain and Portugal, in order to prevent a 
 discovery of their design. 
 
 These precautions served effectually the purpose which was 
 intended. The whole fleet arrived on the twentieth of June 
 within sight of Cadiz, and found the Spaniards entirely unpre- 
 pared for their defence. There was in the bay and harbour, 
 besides thirty-six merchant ships richly laden, and ready to sail 
 for America and the Indies, a fleet of about thirty ships of war, 
 and a great number of transports loaded with naval stores, 
 designed for the equipment of another fleet, which Philip was 
 then fitting out at Lisbon. But there was no person in the place 
 invested with the chief command, and no garrison in it sufficient 
 for its defence. 
 
 The Spanish men-of-war, however, were quickly drawn up in 
 Cadiz sacked the mou th of the bay, and they sustained the attack of 
 and plunder- an enemy so much superior to them, for several hours, 
 ed by tbe till some of their largest ships were taken, others burnt, 
 and the rest driven aground on the flats and shallows. 
 
 Immediately after this success, the earl of Essex landed his 
 troops, and led them towards the town. A body of Spanish 
 
i>22 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 forces marched out to meet him ; but being unable to withstand 
 the impetuosity of the English, they soon turned their backs and 
 fled. The English pursued, and entered the town along with 
 them. The inhabitants, who were thrown into the most dread- 
 ful consternation, made a feeble resistance, and the castle sur- 
 rendered before the English artillery had begun to fire. Essex 
 discovered no less humanity after his victory, than bravery in 
 acquiring it. The town indeed was given up to be plundered by 
 the soldiers, but no cruelty or outrage, such as occurs so often in 
 the history of the Netherlands, was permitted to be exercised. 
 The booty was immense, and would have been much greater, if, 
 while the commanders were treating with some of the principal 
 merchants about a ransom for the merchant-ships, the duke de 
 Medina, who lay with some troops near the town, had not given 
 orders for setting them on fire. It was computed that, in mili- 
 tary and naval stores, merchant goods, and ships, the loss which 
 Philip and his subjects sustained on this occasion, could not 
 amount to less than twenty millions of ducats. Had the advice 
 of the earl of Essex been followed, the English would have 
 attempted to retain possession of the town, but Lord Howard 
 and the other commanders regarded his proposal as chimerical. 
 They believed that they had already fulfilled the queen’s inten- 
 tions ; they dreaded the approach of a Spanish army, and there- 
 fore they made haste to put their plunder on board their ships, 
 and immediately set sail for England. 
 
 The affront which Philip received on this occasion, in having 
 Destruction one °** capital towns sacked and plundered, con- 
 of the Spanish stituted a considerable part of his calamity, as it 
 fleet designed lessened exceedingly the opinion entertained of his 
 or ie an . p ru d ence , as well as of his internal strength. This 
 consideration, joined to an impatient desire of taking vengeance 
 on Elizabeth, determined him, without regard to the approach 
 of winter, to carry his plan of invading Ireland into immediate 
 execution. By the arrival of his Plate fleet from America, he 
 was enabled to equip; in Lisbon and other places, a hundred and 
 twenty-eight ships of war and transports, with fourteen thousand 
 troops on board, besides a great number of Irish Catholics, and 
 a prodigious quantity of military stores, and materials and instru- 
 ments for building forts. This fleet, under the command of Don 
 Martin de Padilla, set sail from Ferrol in the month of Novem- 
 ber ; and if it had reached the destined port, the Spaniards, with 
 the assistance of the Popish inhabitants, must have acquired so 
 firm an establishment in Ireland, as would have cost the English 
 many years, and much expense of labour and blood, to dispossess 
 them. 
 
 Elizabeth and her subjects, flushed with their success at Cadiz, 
 were as secure as if the wound which they had lately inflicted 
 on Philip’s naval power had been mortal. They had no suspicion 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 523 
 
 1597.] 
 
 of his design, and were entirely ignorant of his preparations ; 
 but the good providence of Heaven interposed remarkably on 
 this occasion, as it had done formerly, in their behalf. The 
 Spanish fleet was overtaken by a storm off Cape Finisterre, and 
 about forty ships, with their crews and stores, were lost. Padilla 
 got back with difficulty to Ferrol ; and henceforth all thoughts 
 of the intended enterprise were laid aside d . 
 
 These calamities were succeeded by another no less disastrous 
 The battle of event, which happened in the Netherlands in the 
 Tumhout. beginning of the year one thousand five hundred and 
 ninety-seven. The fertile provinces of Brabant still lay exposed 
 to the incursions of the confederates ; and the inhabitants, in 
 order to save the country and villages from being sacked and 
 plundered, had been obliged to submit to contributions, with 
 which the United States were enabled to maintain the garrisons 
 of Breda, Gertrudenberg, and other places. The Archduke, so- 
 licitous to deliver the people from these oppressions, had cantoned 
 between four and five thousand horse and foot in the open town 
 of Turnhout, which, on account of its neighbourhood to Breda, 
 he judged to be the fittest situation for watching the motions of 
 the enemy ; and he had given the command of these forces to the 
 count de Varas, brother to the marquis of Varambon. 
 
 Prince Maurice having received intelligence that Varas had 
 been intrusted with this command more on account of his rank 
 and family 6 , than his military skill, resolved to avail himself of 
 this imprudence into which the Archduke had been betrayed. 
 With great secrecy and expedition he drew together an army of 
 five thousand foot and eight hundred horse, and set out from 
 Gertrudenberg with a design to attack the Spaniards in their 
 quarters of cantonment. Varas was informed of his intention 
 only on the evening before, and was determined, in contradiction 
 to the remonstrances of some of his officers, to retire to the 
 town of Herentals. He accordingly sent off the baggage in the 
 night, and began his march by day-break, without the sound 
 either of drum or trumpet. His troops, almost all of whom were 
 experienced veterans, were at first indignant at the thoughts of 
 flying frofh an enemy whom they had often conquered ; but the 
 dread with which their general was actuated, soon diffused itself 
 into every breast, and begot a conviction, that their preservation 
 depended on the celerity of their retreat. 
 
 Maurice was only a few miles from Turnhout when his scouts 
 informed him of the Count’s departure. He immediately sent Sir 
 Francis Vere w T ith a party of horse to scour the woods and 
 hedges, and despatched another party under count Hohenloe, 
 to retard the Spaniards on their march till the infantry should 
 arrive. Besides count Hohenloe and Sir Francis V ere, the Prince 
 
 d Grotius, lib. v. p. 269. Camden, p. 730. Carte, lib. six. 
 e Of the name of De Rie in Franche Compte. 
 
524 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 had brought with him count Solmes, Sir Robert Sidney, governor 
 of Flushing, and several others of his bravest and most expe- 
 rienced officers, by whom all his orders were executed with equal 
 prudence and intrepidity. Count Hohenloe, at the head of four 
 hundred horse, began the attack, and quickly routed the Spanish 
 cavalry, who* being driven back upon the foot, threw them into 
 disorder. At this crisis, Maurice himself and Sir Francis Yere 
 came up, and having broken through the enemy’s ranks, com- 
 pleted their confusion, and made dreadful havoc among them, 
 till the greatest part of them were either put to the sword or 
 taken prisoners. Varas himself was killed, after having given 
 proofs, that his misconduct had not proceeded from the want of 
 personal bravery, but from the consciousness of his inexperience, 
 and his solicitude for the preservation of his troops. Above two 
 thousand were slain, and five hundred taken prisoners, while the 
 victors lost only nine or ten. 
 
 It was in this engagement that a practice invented by Maurice 
 was first introduced, of arming the cavalry with carabines instead 
 of lances ; and to this invention, which filled the enemy with 
 amazement, Grotius ascribes the great facility with which they 
 were overpowered ; for the victory was gained entirely by the 
 horse, and the infantry arrived only in time to divide the spoil. 
 
 The battle of Turnhout, through the great disparity between 
 the numbers of the slain on the opposite sides, contributed more 
 to exalt the character of Maurice, than any of his former achieve- 
 ments. Nor was it military renown only which he acquired ; he 
 gave a striking proof likewise of his humanity in his treatment of 
 the prisoners, whom he protected from all injury and violence 
 with the utmost care, and many of whom recovered through th 
 tender attention which he bestowed. He sent the body of count 
 V aras to the archduke ; and Albert on that occasion assured 
 him, that he would follow his generous example, and take 
 effectual pains to prevent all cruelty and outrage in the further 
 prosecution of the war. f . 
 
 The loss which Albert sustained in the battle of Turnhout was 
 The surprise soon afterwards compensated by his acquisition of 
 of Amiens. Amiens, the capital of Picardy, and one of the strongest 
 and most important towns in France. The citizens, who had 
 been zealous partisans of the league, had lately submitted to the 
 King, upon condition that all their ancient privileges should be 
 preserved, and in particular, that they should be allowed to 
 guard the town themselves, and not be obliged to admit a 
 garrison of mercenary troops. 
 
 The number of those who were enrolled for bearing arms was 
 between fourteen and fifteen thousand ; but neither their dis- 
 cipline nor their vigilance corresponded to the danger to which 
 they were exposed from the neighbourhood of the Spaniards. 
 
 f Grotius, lib. vi., ab initio. Thuanus, lib. cxviii. c. v. Bcntivoglio, purtiii. lib. Hi. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 525 
 
 1597 .] 
 
 They gave the same attention to their ordinary occupations as in 
 the time of peace ; only a few were employed as sentinels and 
 guards, and even these performed their duty in the most neg- 
 ligent manner. 
 
 Of this negligence, Portocarrero, governor of Dourlens, a 
 brave and enterprising officer, had received intelligence from one 
 of the citizens g , and he founded upon it a plan for taking the 
 the city by surprise. Having communicated this plan to the 
 archduke, and obtained his approbation, he collected from the 
 neighbouring garrisons about three thousand horse and foot, 
 which he judged to be sufficient to carry it into execution 11 . On 
 the eleventh of March, he set out from Dourlens in the begin- 
 ning of the night, and before sun-rise arrived at an hermitage 
 about a quarter of a mile from Amiens. As soon as he perceived 
 that the gate which lay next him was opened, he sent forward 
 ten or twelve of the most resolute of his soldiers, with three 
 officers, called d’Ognano, La Croix, and Del Aero, disguised like 
 the peasants of that country with long frocks, under which each 
 of them had a brace of pistols and a sword concealed. Three of 
 this party carried bags filled with nuts and apples. One of them 
 drove a waggon loaded with large beams, and the rest followed 
 slowly at a little distance. When the three first had passed the 
 pallisades and approached the gate, one of them fell down, as by 
 accident, and scattered the nuts and apples ; and while the 
 guards, making game of the supposed peasant, were scrambling 
 for the fruit, the waggon was driven under the gate. There it 
 stopped, and Del Aero, by pulling an iron pin, quickly disen- 
 gaged the horses. He then fired a pistol, which was the sign 
 agreed upon, and he, and those who were with him, falling with 
 great fury upon the guard, killed most of them, and made them- 
 selves masters of the gate. The sentinel upon the top of the 
 gate-way, perceiving what had passed, attempted to let down the 
 portcullis ; but it was suspended by the beams and the waggon ; 
 and Portocarrero in the mean time brought forward his troops, 
 and rushed into the town. The citizens, entirely unprepared for 
 this sudden attack, were overwhelmed with astonishment and 
 consternation. Their resistance was feeble and ill-conducted ; 
 and, after about a hundred of their number had fallen, they laid 
 down their arms, and suffered the enemy to take possession of 
 the town. 
 
 The news of this disaster affected the French monarch in the 
 Henry’s dis mos t sensible manner, and greatly allayed the joy which 
 tress on his late triumph over the League was calculated to 
 that occa- excite. He considered, that the Spaniards were, before 
 this time, in possession of Calais, one of the principal 
 
 g He had been banished on account of some crime. 
 
 h They consisted of eleven hundred Spaniards, five hundred Burgundians and Germans, 
 four hundred Irish, two hundred Walloons, and nine hundred horse. 
 
526 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 sea-ports in his dominions ; and that by their present conquest 
 they had opened a passage from the Netherlands, by which they 
 could make incursions to the gates of the capital. He was mor- 
 tified by reflecting on the judgment which foreign nations must 
 form of a prince, whose glory consisted chiefly in victories 
 obtained over his own subjects ; and he dreaded, that the mal- 
 contents in his kingdom might take advantage of the present 
 calamity, and rekindle the flames of civil war. He had laboured 
 for some time under bad health ; notwithstanding which, he 
 broke off a course of medicine which had been prescribed to him, 
 and set out immediately for Corbie on the Somme 11 , where, after 
 consulting with the marshal Biron and some other principal 
 officers, he resolved to postpone every other object of his atten- 
 tion to the recovery of Amiens. He then ordered Biron to 
 invest the town with such forces as he could draw' from the neigh- 
 bouring garrisons, and returned to Paris to hasten the prepara- 
 tions necessary to insure success. 
 
 Henry knew that the most vigorous exertion of his activity 
 The siege of was requisite on this occasion, and he laboured with 
 Amiens. unceasing ardour, till, besides raising a numerous army, 
 he had collected, from every quarter of his dominions, provisions 
 and military stores proportioned to the difficulty of his intended 
 enterprise. He concluded at this time a new alliance with the 
 Queen of Erigland and the States of Holland, in consequence of 
 which the former sent him four thousand troops, and the latter 
 furnished him with a considerable sum of money, besides engag- 
 ing to make a powerful diversion of the Spanish forces in the 
 Netherlands. Having sent off his troops to Amiens before him, 
 as fast as they were raised, he found, on his return thither in the 
 beginning of June, that the siege was already far advanced. 
 Biron, prompted by his natural ardour, and piqued by a saying 
 which had dropped from the King, that his affairs almost never 
 prospered wdiere he was not present, had exerted the most inde- 
 fatigable vigilance and industry. He had rendered the blockade 
 complete, by drawdng strong lines of circumvallation round the 
 town, and had begun to make his approaches to the walls. Henry 
 approved highly of everything that he had done, and in order 
 to pacify his resentment, suffered him still to retain the chief 
 command. 
 
 As the number of the troops was considerably augmented by 
 those which the King had brought with him, and by the 
 arrival of the English forces, the operations of the siege 
 were carried on with redoubled ardour and alacrity ; but the 
 progress of the assailants was retarded greatly beyond what 
 had been expected, by the invincible bravery and unremitted 
 vigilance of the governor and garrison, who disputed every 
 inch of ground with matchless intrepidity, and in the numberless 
 
 * About three longues higher than Amiens. 
 
1597.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 527 
 
 sallies which they made, put some thousands of the besiegers to 
 the sword. 
 
 By these sallies their own number was considerably diminished, 
 and in one of them Portocarrero was killed. The defence, how- 
 ever, was still conducted with the same skill and spirit as before, 
 by the marquis de Montenegro, a Neapolitan of the family of 
 Caraffa, and the King had reason to despair of being able to 
 finish his enterprise before the arrival of the Spanish army from 
 the Netherlands. 
 
 The archduke was sensible that it was of great importance 
 Albert at- to Philip’s interest to preserve possession of Amiens, 
 tempts in whether he should enter into a treaty of peace with 
 vain to raise the French monarch, or prosecute the war; and he 
 t ie siege, no t have exerted himself with greater activity in 
 
 making the preparations necessary to raise the siege. But his 
 levies, as well as all his other preparations, had been carried on 
 slowly, through the extreme difficulty which he found in procur- 
 ing money. The destruction of the fleet and stores at Cadiz 
 had contributed not a little to increase that disorder which had 
 so long prevailed in the King’s finances. For several years 
 Philip had been in the practice of borrowing large sums from 
 the Italian and Flemish merchants, for which he had agreed to 
 pay them an exorbitant interest, and had mortgaged certain 
 branches of his revenue. The inconveniences arising from 
 thence had become intolerable, and he was determined to 
 deliver himself from them at once, whatever should be the con- 
 sequence. He had accordingly published an edict in the month 
 of November of the preceding year, declaring all the contracts 
 by which he had sequestered his revenue to be null and void ; 
 and alleging, as an excuse for this step, that through the unfair 
 advantages which had been taken of his distress, he had reason 
 to dread, that, unless some remedy were immediately applied, all 
 his labours in behalf of Christendom and the true religion would 
 be lost k . 
 
 Philip had as little reason to be satisfied with the prudence, as 
 with the justice, of this expedient. His annual revenue, though 
 now freed from all incumbrances, was insufficient to defray the 
 enormous expense of the present war. It was still necessary for 
 him, while the war continued, to borrow money ; but no mer- 
 chants, either in Genoa or Antwerp, where it had been usually 
 found, could be persuaded to advance it ; and it was this cause 
 chiefly which had so long retarded the archduke’s preparations 
 for the relief of Amiens. 
 
 The blockade of that city had been formed in April, and it 
 Surrender of was the end of August before he could begin his march. 
 Amiens. At that time he set out with an army of more than 
 five-and- twenty thousand men, and arrived within sight of the 
 
 k Crotius, lib. v. 
 
528 ■ HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 French camp about the middle of September. As his infantry 
 was greatly superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to offer 
 battle ; and from the well-known temper of the French monarch, 
 he doubted not that his challenge would be accepted. But 
 Henry, being distrustful of his infantry, the greatest part of 
 which consisted of raw troops, readily complied with the advice 
 of the duke de Mayenne, whom he had brought with him to the 
 siege ; and resolved to remain within his lines. The archduke 
 advanced towards him, with his army drawn up in order of battle ; 
 but when he perceived that the king’s resolution was unalterably 
 fixed, that he was well prepared for his defence, and that his 
 intrenchments were everywhere strongly fortified, he despaired 
 of being able to effectuate his purpose, and returned to the 
 Netherlands. In a few days after his retreat, the marquis de 
 Montenegro, with the approbation of the archduke, consented to 
 capitulate, and received from Henry the most honourable terms 1 . 
 
 During the greatest part of the siege of Amiens, nothing 
 Progress of memorable was transacted in the Netherlands; but 
 the war in the as the archduke had, in order to fill up his army, 
 Netherlands. a i most drained the provinces of troops, he had no 
 sooner begun his march, than prince Maurice, having assembled 
 between twelve and thirteen thousand horse and foot, laid siege 
 End of Au Fhinberg, and in a few days obliged it to capitulate, 
 though the garrison amounted to a thousand men. He 
 next reduced the town of Meurs with the same facility. After 
 which, having passed the Rhine, he made himself master of Grol, 
 Brevort, and several other places, and then directed his march 
 26th Sep- towards Lingen, the only fortified town which remained 
 tember. [ n possession of the Spaniards on the north of the 
 Rhine. Both the town and castle of Lingen were commanded 
 by Count Frederic of Heremberg, with a garrison of six or seven 
 hundred men ; and the count made, for some time, a vigorous and 
 spirited defence. But the prince, after his batteries were ready 
 to begin to play, having sent him a summons to surrender on 
 honourable terms, with an intimation, that as this was the first 
 summons, so he might be assured that it would be the last ; 
 Heremberg considered, that his perseverance must be attended 
 with the destruction of the garrison, and therefore agreed to the 
 terms proposed. 
 
 All these conquests were achieved in less than three months. 
 In those of Grol and Brevort, places situated in a marshy soil, 
 Maurice encountered difficulties which required a vigorous exer- 
 tion of his superior talents to surmount ; but as no peculiar or 
 striking circumstances are recorded by the contemporary histo- 
 rians, I have not thought it necessary to descend to a particular 
 detail. The acquisition of so many frontier towns was of great 
 importance to the United Provinces, as they were thereby 
 
 1 D’Avila, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iv. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 1598 .] 
 
 529 
 
 delivered from the incursions of the Spanish garrisons, by which 
 the inhabitants of the adjacent country had been kept under per- 
 petual alarms ; and the States, deeply sensible of this advantage, 
 testified their gratitude to Prince Maurice, by conferring on him 
 and on his posterity the rich seignory of Lingen and its depen- 
 dencies. 
 
 These transactions happened towards the end of the year one 
 1598 . thousand five hundred and ninety-seven ; and the following 
 Negoti. was distinguished by a negotiation which was set on foot 
 ations for f or the establishment of peace between France and Spain, 
 peace. Neither Philip nor Henry had derived from the war those 
 advantages, by the prospect of which they had been allfired, and 
 both of them had powerful motives for desiring that it might be 
 speedily brought to a conclusion. Philip’s eyes were now opened 
 to the vanity of those flattering dreams of conquest by which he 
 had been so long deluded. His acquisitions in France had cost 
 him more than they were worth ; and, besides the expense of 
 making them, they were much more than counterbalanced by the 
 losses which year after year he had suffered in the Netherlands. 
 His finances, as has been already mentioned, were in extreme 
 disorder ; his credit was ruined by the late violation of his faith ; 
 his troops in many places of the Low Countries had mutinied 
 again, on account of their want of pay ; and if the war should 
 continue for another campaign, he thought it not improbable 
 that the greater part of them would refuse to march against the 
 enemy. From his advanced age, and broken health, he had rea- 
 son to believe that his death was not far distant, and he dreaded 
 the fatal consequences which might arise from leaving his son, 
 who was hardly arrived at the age of manhood, involved in war 
 with a prince so powerful and enterprising as the king of France. 
 
 Peace was no less desirable to Henry than to Philip ; those 
 wounds under which his kingdom had bled for so many years, 
 were still unclosed, and numberless distempers prevailed in 
 almost every quarter, to which no effectual remedy could be 
 applied during the continuance of the war. 
 
 While, for these reasons, both princes were alike desirous of 
 The Pope peace, neither of them would yield so far to his anta- 
 ™etween S the as to be the first to propose it. But the sove- 
 
 contending reign Pontiff, as the father of all Catholic princes, and 
 monarchs. the common friend of the two contending monarchs, 
 acted the part of mediator between them;, and Clement dis- 
 covered, on this occasion, a degree of zeal and prudence, which 
 justly entitled him to that high respect in which his character 
 was held by his contemporaries. At his request, it was agreed 
 by the two kings, that a congress should be held at V ervins, a 
 town in Picardy, near the confines of Hainault. The presidents 
 de Believere and Sillery, were appointed plenipotentiaries by 
 Henry; and Ricardotto and Baptista Tassis, by Philip. Alex- 
 
 M M 
 
530 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF [Book XXIV. 
 
 ander de Medici, the cardinal legate, likewise repaired thither, 
 and in the month of February the conferences were begun. 
 
 These conferences were matter of great anxiety to the States 
 Opposition of Holland, as they could not doubt that a principal 
 Elizabeth 7 m °ti ve which had determined Philip to disengage him- 
 and the self from the war with France, was, that he might be 
 States. at liberty to employ his whole strength against the con- 
 federated provinces. They were not without suspicions likewise, 
 that the queen of England would embrace the present opportunity 
 of delivering herself from the Spanish war, and were therefore 
 much disquieted at the apprehensions of being left without an 
 ally to support them. But they were soon delivered from their 
 fears with regard to the conduct of Elizabeth, who being entirely 
 convinced that the interest and safety of their infant republic 
 were inseparable from her own, gave them fresh assurances of 
 the continuance of her friendship. 
 
 The French monarch no sooner agreed to the Pope’s proposal 
 of a congress, than he sent an intimation of it to his allies, and 
 expressed his desire, that, if possible, a general peace might be 
 established, in which they, as well as himself, might be compre- 
 hended. But neither Elizabeth nor the States were disposed to 
 listen to his advice. The latter were well assured that no con- 
 sideration would persuade Philip to treat with them as a free 
 state, and they were unalterably determined never to acknow- 
 ledge him for their sovereign. Elizabeth, who had on different 
 occasions experienced the great advantage which she derived from 
 her alliance with them, was no less solicitous than themselves 
 that they should maintain their independence ; and she believed, 
 that while they maintained it, she should have no great reason 
 to dread the power of Philip. She was concerned, however, at 
 the prospect of losing so useful an ally as the king of France, 
 and sent Sir Robert Cecil and Mr. Herbert, who were accom- 
 panied by Justin de Nassau and the celebrated Barnevelt, from 
 the States, to remonstrate with Henry against the peace. 
 
 These able negotiators left no argument untouched that could 
 dissuade him from his purpose : they reminded him of the alli- 
 ance into which he had lately entered with the Queen and the 
 States, and of the assistance which on different occasions they 
 had afforded him. They represented the danger to which he 
 exposed himself by treating with a prince who had given so many 
 striking proofs of insincerity ; and they offered to furnish him 
 with a large supply of forces, besides money, and a numerous 
 fleet, for the recovery of Calais, and the farther prosecution of 
 the war. 
 
 Henry replied that no alliance which he had formed with the 
 Queen or the States, could be reasonably interpreted as an obli- 
 gation on him unnecessarily to prolong the war, which ho was 
 persuaded would soon prove the utter ruin of his kingdom. He 
 
1598.] PHILIP IL KING OF SPAIN. 531 
 
 expressed in strong terms his gratitude for the friendship which 
 they had shown him, and assured them, that no peace which he 
 should conclude with Spain, would prevent him from making a 
 suitable return. From the manner of life to which he had been 
 so long inured, joined to the provocations which he had received 
 from Philip, they might believe, that it was not an aversion to 
 the war, but the necessity of peace, that had determined him to 
 embrace a measure so repugnant to the inclination of his friends. 
 The disorders which prevailed in his dominions were such, that if 
 the proper remedies were not applied, they would soon become 
 incurable, and these remedies could not be applied in the time of 
 war ; but peace, he hoped, would quickly restore his kingdom to 
 its native strength and vigour ; when, instead of being a burden 
 upon his allies, as he had hitherto been, he would be able, and 
 they should find him willing, not only to repay with interest the 
 obligations which they had laid him under, but to defend and 
 protect them, and the rest of Europe, against the exorbitant 
 ambition of the king of Spain. 
 
 This apology, delivered with that irresistible force of natural 
 eloquence by which Henry was eminently distinguished, made a 
 strong impression upon the minds of the English and Dutch 
 ambassadors ; they could not doubt of the truth of what they 
 had heard ; and before their departure, they had the candour to 
 acknowledge, that as the peace which he was about to conclude 
 was necessary for France, so it might be found in the issue highly 
 beneficial to the other European powers. Henry sent ambas- 
 sadors to England and Holland to enforce what he had said on 
 this occasion, and still continued as formerly on terms of cordial 
 friendship both with Elizabeth and the States. 
 
 The- treaty of peace was soon after brought to the desired 
 Conclusion of conclusion 1 . Several difficulties occurred during the 
 peace on the course of the conferences, which were removed through 
 2nd of May. ^] ie disinterested zeal and great authority of the Pope 
 and the cardinal legate ; and at length, upon Henry’s resigning 
 his claim to Cambray, Philip consented, though with great reluc- 
 tance, to give up Calais, Andres, Dourlens, and all the other towns 
 in France, which he had acquired at the expense of so much 
 blood and treasure 111 . 
 
 Philip had been the more solicitous to put an end to the war, 
 Philip trans- on account of a scheme which he had conceived, after 
 tWandslo ^ ie disappointment of his views in France, of trans- 
 Isabella and ferring the sovereignty of the Netherlands to his eldest 
 Albert. daughter Isabella, whom he intended to give in mar- 
 riage to the archduke. And to embrace this measure, he was 
 prompted, partly by his affection for the infanta, one of the 
 
 * At Vervins. 
 
 m Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. iv. p. 464. Sully, lib. ix. D’ Avila, towards the conclusion. 
 Thuanus, lib. cxx. sect. i. & v. ; and Cavnbden, p. 760, &c. Miniana, lib. x. cap, xii. 
 
 M M 2 
 
532 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIV, 
 
 most accomplished women of the age, and partly by his esteem 
 for Albert, whom, of all the princes in Europe, he deemed the 
 most worthy of so illustrious an alliance. 
 
 But while his attachment to his daughter and her future husr 
 His delibera- band made him desirous of procuring for them some 
 tions on this sovereign establishment, he could not, without reluc- 
 subject. tance, resolve to separate from the body of his empire 
 so rich a portion of his hereditary dominions. To the troops 
 and money of the Netherlands, the late Emperor and himself had 
 been greatly indebted for most of their victories over their ene- 
 mies in France and Germany; and it had been the Netherlands 
 chiefly, which, by their situation in the heart of Europe, had 
 rendered them formidable to the several European powers, and 
 enabled them so long to maintain the tranquillity of their other 
 dominions. The preservation indeed of these provinces had, for 
 many years, proved a perpetual drain for the wealth of the Spa- 
 nish monarchy ; but it was doubtful whether, if they were dis- 
 jointed from it, they would not be found as great a burden as 
 ever, since it would still be incumbent on the King to support 
 the archduke in his new sovereignty, against the attempts of his 
 enemies in the revolted provinces. 
 
 These considerations were urged with great warmth by the 
 count de Fuentes, in order to dissuade Philip from the prosecu- 
 tion of his design. But some others of his counsellors, and par- 
 ticularly the count de Cast el- Rodrigo, in whom he reposed the 
 greatest confidence, were at no less pains to confirm him in it, 
 by representing, that the separation proposed, instead of lessen- 
 ing, would serve to augment the strength and vigour of the Spa- 
 nish monarchy. 
 
 44 The Netherlands lay so remote from the seat of government, 
 and the laws of that country, and the language, character, and 
 manners of the people, were so extremely different from those of 
 Spain, that it would be for ever found impracticable to preserve 
 them in obedience. Their aversion to a foreign dominion, and 
 especially that of Spain, was insurmountable ; the absence and 
 distance of the King had been the cause of that inveterate rebel- 
 lion which had furnished employment to his armies for almost 
 forty years, and no other effectual means could be devised either 
 to reconcile the provinces which had already revolted, or to 
 prevent the rest from imitating their example, but to give them 
 a sovereign of their own, who, by residing among them, might 
 conciliate and secure their affections. It was true, that, without 
 the assistance of the queen of England, the rebels must long ere 
 now have laid down their arms ; but if with the feeble aid which 
 they had received from a Queen engrossed with domestic cares, 
 and tottering on her throne, they had been able for so many 
 years not only to defend themselves, but to carry on an offensive 
 successful war, how much reason was there to dread the conse- 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 533 
 
 1598.] 
 
 quences that must follow, if the British crowns were united, as 
 they would soon be, on the head of a prince in the vigour of life, 
 who, being free from the embarrassments of a disputed title, 
 would have full leisure to give attention to foreign affairs ? From 
 jealousy of the King, the neighbouring princes would never cease 
 to support the rebellion, and foment the discontents of his Flemish 
 subjects ; but if the Netherlands were disunited from the Spanish 
 monarchy, and erected into a separate and independent state, 
 the cause of that jealousy would be removed ; it would become 
 the interest of France and Britain, and the other neighbouring 
 powers, to lend their assistance to extinguish the war ; and even 
 the revolted states would, in order to secure internal tranquil- 
 lity, choose to return to their ancient union with the southern 
 provinces.” 
 
 By these arguments, which coincided with Philip’s inclination, 
 His deed of he was confirmed in his design ; and, on the sixth of 
 abdication. May, he signed the deed of abdication ; in which, after 
 declaring his resolution to give the infanta in marriage to the 
 archduke, he resigned the sovereignty of the Netherlands, and of 
 the county of Burgundy, to that princess, to be enjoyed conjunctly 
 by her and her future husband ; and after their decease, by the 
 heirs of the marriage, whether male or female, according to the 
 established rules of hereditary succession. 
 
 But it was provided, that in case this sovereignty should 
 devolve to a female, she should marry either the king or the 
 prince of Spain : That neither any prince or princess descended 
 from the infanta, should marry without the consent of the king 
 of Spain ; and that in default of issue, the Netherlands should be 
 reunited to the Spanish monarchy. By other articles it was 
 stipulated that the new sovereigns should prevent their subjects 
 from trading to the Indies ; that they should, before their ad- 
 mission, take an oath to permit the exercise of no other religion 
 but the Catholic, within their dominions ; and in case they should 
 fail in the execution of this, or any other article, it was declared 
 that the sovereignty transferred should immediately return to the 
 crown of Spain. 
 
 This deed was immediately transmitted to the archduke ; and 
 How re- soon afterwards the States of the southern provinces 
 ceived in agreed to accept of the archduke and the infanta for 
 the Nether- their sovereigns, with the conditions which the deed 
 contained ; being well pleased to be delivered, as they 
 expected to be, from the yoke of Spain, which they had found so 
 grievous and intolerable. 
 
 But although this event gave great satisfaction to the people 
 subject to the Spanish government, it was not likely to produce 
 any change in the sentiments or conduct of their neighbours in 
 the United Provinces. The new sovereigns, said the confederates, 
 whom Philip has appointed, will be sovereigns in name only 
 
534 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIV. 
 
 and appearance, but not in reality. They will be utterly unable 
 to support themselves without the assistance of the Spanish arms. 
 They will depend on Spain, as much as any Spanish governor or 
 regent ; and the Spaniards will still continue to exercise, as 
 formerly, an unlimited influence in the government. In the deed 
 of abdication, the Netherlands are treated, not as a free and inde- 
 pendent state, but as a fief of the Spanish monarchy ; and from 
 the advanced age of the infanta m , together with the conditions of 
 the deed of abdication, it was evident that the present measure 
 could be meant only as a temporary expedient, intended to amuse 
 the people of the southern provinces, and not as a fixed and per- 
 manent establishment. But whatever was the King’s intention in 
 this measure, and whether the sovereignty now transferred should 
 or should not return to the crown of Spain, it was the unalterable 
 resolution of the United Provinces to maintain their liberty, in 
 opposition to whatever attempts might be made to deprive them 
 of it by the king of Spain, or the archduke of Austria". 
 
 Albert was in the mean time employed in preparing to set out 
 for Madrid ; but having been detained in the Low Countries 
 much longer than he expected, by a new mutiny of his troops, he 
 had just begun his journey when he received intelligence of the 
 death of the King. 
 
 For more than two years this prince had been extremely 
 Illness and afflicted with the gout ; to which had been lately added, 
 death of a hectic fever, and a dropsy. Finding his strength so 
 Flullp ‘ much decayed, that he could not expect to live above a 
 
 few weeks, he ordered his attendants to transport him from 
 Madrid to the Escurial ; and when his physicians signified to 
 him their apprehensions that he would not be able to endure 
 the fatigue, But I am resolved,” he answered, “ to accompany 
 my funeral to my tomb.” Upon his arrival at the Escurial, the 
 gout returned with double violence both in his feet and hands ; 
 and soon afterwards, several imposthumes gathered in his knees 
 and breast, which occasioned the most excruciating pain. He 
 was in some measure relieved by laying the imposthumes open. 
 But another more intolerable distress succeeded. The matter 
 of his sores was of the most purulent and nauseous nature, and 
 swarms of lice were engendered in it, from which no application, 
 and no care or pains, could deliver him. In this dreadful con- 
 dition, he lay in a supine posture for more than fifty days, during 
 which time he exhibited a striking display of patience, firmness 
 of mind, and resignation to his fate. He gave proof of the sin- 
 cerity of his religious profession, by practising, with great zeal 
 and assiduity, those superstitious observances which the church 
 of Rome prescribes, as the means of procuring acceptance with 
 the Deity. He seemed inclined likewise to make atonement for 
 
 m 
 
 Thirty-two. 
 
 Van Melcrcn, Grotius, &e. 
 
PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 
 
 535 
 
 1598.] 
 
 some severities which he had exercised, and ordered several 
 prisoners to be released, and their effects restored °. 
 
 About two days before his death, having sent for his son, and 
 his daughter Isabella, he discoursed to them of the vanity of 
 human greatness, delivered many salutary counsels for the admi- 
 nistration of their dominions, and exhorted them, with much 
 earnestness, to cultivate and maintain the Catholic faith. When 
 they had left him, he gave directions for his funeral, and ordered 
 his coffin to be brought into his chamber, and placed within his 
 view ; soon after which his speech failed, and he expired on the 
 thirteenth of September, in the seventy-second year of his age, 
 and the forty-third of his reign p. 
 
 No character was ever drawn by different historians in more 
 TT . . 4 opposite colours than that of Philip : and yet, con- 
 
 iriis character. • 1 7 # 7 
 
 ’ sidering the length and activity of his reign, there is 
 none which it should seem would be more easy to ascertain. 
 From the facts recorded in the preceding history, we cannot 
 doubt that he possessed, in an eminent degree, penetration, 
 vigilance, and a capacity for government. His eyes were con- 
 tinually open upon every part of his extensive dominions. He 
 entered into every branch of administration, watched over the 
 conduct of his ministers with unwearied attention, and in his 
 choice, both of them and of his generals, discovered a consider- 
 able share of sagacity. He had at all times a composed and 
 settled countenance, and never appeared to be either elated or 
 depressed. His temper was the most imperious, and his looks 
 and demeanour were haughty and severe ; yet among his Spanish 
 subjects he was of easy access, listened patiently to their repre- 
 sentations and complaints, and, where his ambition and bigotry 
 did not interfere, was generally willing to redress their grievances. 
 When we have said thus much in his praise, we have said all 
 that justice requires, or truth permits. It is indeed impossible 
 to suppose that he was insincere in his zeal for religion. But as 
 his religion was of the most corrupt kind, it served to increase 
 the natural depravity of his disposition ; and not only allowed, 
 but even prompted him to commit the most odious and shocking 
 crimes. Although a prince in the bigoted age of Philip might 
 be persuaded that the interest of religion would be advanced by 
 falsehood and persecution, yet it might be expected that, in a 
 virtuous prince, the sentiments of honour and humanity would, 
 on some occasions, triumph over the dictates of superstition ; 
 but of this triumph there occurs not a single instance in the 
 reign of Philip, who, without hesitation, violated his most sacred 
 obligations as often as religion afforded him a pretence; and 
 under that pretence exercised for many years the most unrelent- 
 ing cruelty, without reluctance or remorse. His ambition, which 
 
 0 Am ng these was the wife of Antonio Perez. 
 p Miniana, ib. x. cap. xiv. Thuanus, lib. cxx. sect. xiv. 
 
536 
 
 HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF 
 
 [Book XXIV. 
 
 was exorbitant; his resentment, which was implacable; his arbi- 
 trary temper, which would submit to no control ; concurred with 
 his bigoted zeal for the Catholic religion, and carried the sangui- 
 nary spirit which that religion was calculated to inspire to a 
 greater height in Philip, than it ever attained in any other prince 
 of that or of any former or succeeding age. 
 
 Some historians have distinguished this prince by the title of 
 Philip the Prudent q , and have represented him as the wisest as 
 well as the most religious prince that ever filled the Spanish 
 throne. But it is questionable, whether he be entitled to praise 
 on account of his prudence, any more than on account of his 
 religion. In the beginning of his reign he discovered great 
 caution in his military enterprises ; and, on some occasions, made 
 even greater preparations than were necessary to ensure success. 
 But his ambition, his resentment, and his abhorrence of the 
 Protestants, were too violent to suffer him to act conformably to 
 the dictates of sound policy and prudence. He might have pre- 
 vented the revolt of his Dutch and Flemish subjects, if, after the 
 reformation in the Netherlands was suppressed by the duchess of 
 Parma, he had left the reins of government in the hands of that 
 wise princess, and had not sent so odious a tyrant as the duke of 
 Alva to enslave them. He might, after the defeat of the prince 
 of Orange, have ri vetted the chains of slavery about their necks, 
 and gradually accustomed them to the yoke, if, by engaging in 
 too many expensive enterprises, he had not exhausted his ex- 
 chequer, and made it in some measure necessary for Alva to 
 impose the taxes of the tenth and twentieth pennies, for the 
 maintenance of his troops. He might, through the great abilities 
 of the duke of Parma, have again reduced the revolted provinces 
 to obedience, if he had not conceived the wild ambition of sub- 
 duing England and acquiring the sovereignty of France. His 
 armies, in the latter part of his reign, were never sufficiently 
 numerous to execute the various enterprises which he undertook ; 
 yet they were much more numerous than he was able to support. 
 Few years passed in which they did not mutiny for want of pay. 
 And Philip suffered greater prejudice from the disorders and 
 devastation which his own troops committed, than he received 
 from the arms of his enemies. Against his attempts on England 
 and France, his wisest counsellors remonstrated in the strongest 
 terms. And prudence certainly required that, previously to any 
 attack upon the dominions of others, he should have secured 
 possession of his own. Yet so great was his illusion, that rather 
 than delay the execution of those schemes which his resentment 
 and ambition had suggested, he chose to run the risk of losing 
 the fruits of all the victories which the duke of Parma had ob- 
 tained; and, having left defenceless the provinces which had 
 
 'i Eldiscreto. 
 
1598.] PHILIP II. KING OF SPAIN. 537 
 
 submitted to his authority, he thereby afforded an opportunity 
 to the revolted provinces of establishing their power on so firm a 
 foundation, as could not be shaken by the whole strength of the 
 Spanish monarchy exerted against it for more than fifty years s . 
 
 * By his first wife, Mary of Portugal, Philip had no other issue but Don Carlos ; and 
 by his second, Mary of England, he had none. Isabella, daughter of Henry II. of France, 
 bore him two daughters, Isabella Clara-Eugenia, and Catherine : the former of whom was 
 married to the archduke Albert, and the latter to Emanuel Philibert, duke of Savoy. His 
 fourth •wife, Anne of Austria, daughter of the emperor Ferdinand, and of Philip's own 
 sister Mary, brought him three sons and one daughter, who all died young, except Philip, 
 who succeeded him. 
 
 If the reader incline to enter more particularly into the private life and character of 
 Philip, than has been thought proper in the general history of his reign, he will meet with 
 several interesting anecdotes in the prince of Orange’s Apology, of which an abstract is 
 subjoined. 
 
APPENDIX; 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 AN ABSTRACT OF THE APOLOGY OR VINDICATION OF THE PRINCE 
 OF ORANGE, AGAINST PHILIP’S PROSCRIPTION. 
 
 The Prince of Orange begins his Apology, which is addressed 
 to the confederated States, with observing, that being conscious 
 of having devoted his life and fortune to the service of the 
 Netherlands, it afforded him great joy to reflect upon the testi- 
 mony given to his fidelity and zeal, in that barbarous Proscription 
 which had been published against him by the King of Spain. “ I 
 have reason likewise,” continued he, “ to rejoice at the oppor- 
 tunity which is thus presented to me, to vindicate my conduct 
 from those malignant imputations which have been cast upon it 
 by certain ignoble hirelings ; and which are repeated and set 
 forth in the blackest colours in this proscription. For I am not 
 accused at this time by any of those obscure libellers, to whom 
 I have ever thought it beneath my dignity to reply ; but by a 
 great and powerful prince, who intends, through my sides, to 
 wound, and if possible to destroy, the confederacy. I can 
 with confidence appeal to you, who are well acquainted with my 
 past life, whether it has ever been my practice, either to praise 
 myself or to censure others. And I must likewise appeal to 
 you and to the world, whether now, when I am accused of 
 ingratitude, infidelity, and hypocrisy, compared to a J udas and 
 a Cain, called a rebel, a traitor, a disturber of the public peace, 
 and an enemy to mankind ; and when both pecuniary and honorary 
 rewards are promised to those who shall slay or murder me ; 
 whether, after this, the duty which I owe to myself, and to you who 
 have reposed in me such unlimited confidence, does not call upon 
 me to say what I can consistently with truth, to prove the malice 
 and falsehood of my accuser. If you know his representation of 
 my conduct to be just, you will shut your ears against the defence 
 which I am about to offer ; but if you have known me from my 
 youth to be more faithful, and chaste, and virtuous, than the 
 author of this infamous proscription, I shall expect that you will 
 attend favourably to what I shall advance, and deliver judgment 
 in vindication of my integrity and innocence. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 539 
 
 w The first crime of which I am accused in this proscription, is 
 ingratitude ; and a recital is made of favours bestowed on me by 
 the king himself, and the emperor his father; to the latter of 
 whom, it is said, I owed my succession to the late prince of 
 Orange ; and to the former my having been admitted into the 
 order of the Golden Fleece, and appointed a counsellor of state, 
 and governor of the provinces of Holland, Zealand, Utrecht, 
 and Burgundy. 
 
 “ No man respects more than I do the memory of the emperor, 
 and I reflect with much satisfaction on the many proofs of attach- 
 ment which I have received from him. But the necessity which 
 I am laid under to vindicate my character, obliges me to observe, 
 that of the sort of favours which are objected to me, I never re- 
 ceived any from the emperor, but on the contrary suffered great 
 loss and prejudice in his service. With respect to my succession 
 to the inheritance bequeathed to me by my cousin, the late 
 prince of Orange, it is impossible to conceive any ground for 
 alleging that I was at all indebted for it to the emperor. My 
 right to that inheritance was indisputable ; nor was there ever 
 any prince or private person who pretended to call in question 
 its validity. Would not the emperor have been justly accused 
 of tyranny and injustice, if he had prevented me from enjoying 
 it ? And does my accuser reckon it an instance of goodness in 
 a prince, merely not to defraud and oppress his faithful subjects ? 
 
 “ All Europe knows what important services the emperor 
 received from the prince, my kinsman ; who commanded his 
 armies, extended his dominions, and died at his feet. Had the 
 emperor employed his power to disappoint the last will of one 
 who had served him with so much fidelity and success, would he 
 not have involved his name in perpetual infamy ! Besides, that 
 even although he had inclined to act a part so unworthy of his 
 character, yet of the most valuable part of that inheritance he 
 could not have deprived me, as it lies within the territory of the 
 king of France, on whom alone I depend for the secure possession 
 of it. But even allowing that what is said of my obligations to the 
 emperor were true, yet the king of Spain is surely not entitled 
 to reproach me with it ; who, in contempt of all law and jus- 
 tice, has, to the utmost of his power, endeavoured to deprive me 
 of the inheritance in question, and rendered ineffectual that 
 kindness of the emperor, for my unmindfulness of which he 
 accuses me of ingratitude. 
 
 “ Gratitude, in the opinion of this prince, ought not to be 
 confined tothe person by whom favours have been bestowed, 
 but ought to extend likewise to his descendants : and it is 
 because I have opposed the son, whose father was my benefactor, 
 that I am deemed ungrateful. Let him apply this golden rule 
 to his own conduct, as he has applied it to mine ; and he will 
 then perceive which of us is guilty of ingratitude. Maximilian 
 
540 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 was the first of the family of Austria who came into the Nether- 
 lands. And no person acquainted with history is ignorant of 
 the important obligations which that emperor received from my 
 kinsman, Count Egelbert of Nassau ; by whom he was powerfully 
 supported against Lewis the Eleventh of France ; by whom the 
 people who had rebelled against him were subdued ; and by 
 whom likewise he recovered his liberty, of which the jealousy of 
 the Flemings had deprived him. Need I mention what every- 
 body knows, of the service performed to the late emperor Charles, 
 by Count Henry Nassau my uncle, who was in reality the person 
 that prevailed with the electors to confer upon him the Imperial 
 crown \ Was it not by the bravery of Rene, prince of Orange, 
 that the emperor subdued the duchy of Guelderland ; and by 
 that of Philibert, that he gained possession of Lombardy and 
 Naples, and the person of the Pope, and the city and state of 
 Rome l And will his son pretend to reproach the memory of 
 these great men, by boasting of his father's kindness, in suffering 
 justice to be done to their kinsman \ Am I not authorised, 
 from the few facts which I have mentioned, to assert, that had 
 it not been for the houses of Orange and Nassau, which I have 
 the honour to represent, my defamer could not have put so 
 many pompous titles, as are inserted in the beginning of his 
 proscription ? 
 
 “ By what I have said, I would not be understood to disclaim 
 every kind of obligation to the emperor. I shall for ever retain 
 a grateful remembrance of the honour which he did me, when, 
 after having taken upon himself the inspection of my education, 
 and kept me nine years about his person, he gave me the import- 
 ant charge of all his ordnance in the Netherlands : and in my 
 absence, without any application made in my behalf, in contra- 
 diction to the representations of his courtiers, and in prefer- 
 ence to many officers of great experience, appointed me com- 
 niander-in-chief of his army, at the age of twenty-one. I reflect 
 with gratitude on that testimony of regard with which he 
 honoured me at the time of his resignation, when, having sent 
 for me from the camp, he gave me a public proof of his affection, 
 by placing me next him, and leaning upon me, to support him 
 under the fatigue of that solemnity. I know likewise, that he 
 meant to give me further proof of his regard, when he imposed 
 upon me the irksome task of carrying the Imperial crown to his 
 brother Ferdinand. But will my enemies pretend to assert, 
 either that I showed myself unworthy of these honours, or that 
 my interest and fortune were promoted by them ? Did the 
 troops, when I commanded them, suffer any repulse or damage \ 
 On the contrary, although the plague raged among them, and I 
 had two of the ablest generals of the age, the duke de Ncvers 
 and the admiral Coligny, for my opponents, 1 kept them at bay, 
 and fortified the towns of Charlomont and Philipville, in spite of 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 541 
 
 their most vigorous endeavours to prevent me. While the 
 services which I performed corresponded to the tr^st reposed in 
 me, I can affirm with truth, that honour was the only acquisition 
 which I derived from the favour that was shown me. From the 
 chamber of accounts it will appear, that I never received any 
 pecuniary recompense for my services. I am able to prove by 
 the most incontestable evidence, that my unavoidable expense as 
 general, added to the expense of my embassy into Germany, and 
 that which I incurred when the King required me to receive 
 and entertain the numerous foreign nobility who crowded to 
 congratulate him on his accession, amounted to no less than one 
 million five hundred thousand florins. And to indemnify me for 
 this expense, what return did I receive from the King, who now 
 accuses me of ingratitude ? Having, with the emperor’s consent 
 begun to assert my claim to the lordship of Chat el Beilin, before 
 the supreme court of justice at Mechlin ; when the counsellors 
 had registered their opinion, and on the day when they were to 
 have pronounced sentence in my favour, this King, who had just 
 sworn to govern us according to the laws, did, in violation of 
 these laws, interpose his arbitrary power, and forbid the judges to 
 proceed ; nor since that time have they been ever permitted to 
 do me justice. 
 
 “ When what I have said shall be considered, the governments 
 which were bestowed on me will not appear to be more than was 
 due for the services which I have performed ; nor more than an 
 adequate compensation for that extraordinary expense which 
 these services had cost me. Had the King allowed me to remain 
 in possession of these governments, he might have had some rea- 
 son for reproaching me ; although it was not in reality to him I 
 was indebted for them, but to the emperor, by whom it was de- 
 termined they should be conferred upon me, before his departure 
 from the Netherlands. But since my accuser has laboured to 
 expel me from them ; since he has, to the utmost of his power, 
 deprived me of my possessions, besides carrying off my son to 
 Spain, in contempt of the privileges of this country, which he 
 had sworn to preserve inviolate, because I would not lend myself 
 a willing instrument of his oppression ; after this, I say, is he 
 entitled to accuse me of ingratitude ! 
 
 “Nor is there any better ground for his accusation, that I 
 have violated the allegiance which I owed him as my sovereign. 
 Though I have rejected his authority, yet I have done nothing 
 more than was done by his ancestor, Albert duke of Austria, the 
 founder of his family, against my ancestor, the emperor Adol- 
 phus of Nassau. And besides this, I should gladly know by what 
 title my accuser possesses his Castilian dominions. Did not his 
 predecessor, Henry of Castile, a bastard, rise in rebellion against 
 his brother Pedro, his lawful sovereign, whom he killed with his 
 own hand ? And is not Philip the lineal heir of that usurper ? 
 
542 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 It may be said, that Pedro was a tyrant, and therefore justly 
 dethroned and slain. And may not the same plea be offered in 
 excuse for the part which I have acted ? May it not be said 
 with truth of Philip, that his conduct has been that of a cruel 
 tyrant ; and that the cruelties exercised by Pedro, were much 
 less shocking and horrible than those which have been perpe- 
 trated by the duke of Alva and his associates ? I must farther 
 observe, that as king of Spain, I owe him no submission, but only 
 as duke of Brabant. And as he is duke of that province, I, by 
 reason of the baronies which I hold there, am one of the principal 
 members of it. But he has forgotten the conditions on which he 
 received this dukedom. He has forgotten the solemn oath which 
 he took to preserve our privileges ; and that it is an express 
 article of the compact betwixt us, that if he fail in his engage- 
 ments, our obligation to obey him as our sovereign shall cease. 
 All Europe has witnessed his open contempt of .these engage- 
 ments. All Europe will bear me witness, when I say, that not 
 a single privilege only, but every privilege of which we boasted, 
 and which he had sworn to maintain, has been violated ; and not 
 in a single instance only, but in a thousand instances. In my 
 own person, as I have already hinted, I have had ample experi- 
 ence of his lawless tyranny : my son, at an age when he was 
 incapable of offending him, has been torn from me. All my 
 estates and goods have been confiscated ; and I myself declared 
 a traitor and rebel, without any of those forms of trial which the 
 laws require ; and by whom ? By men of the lowest class vested 
 with his authority, by pettifoggers, and others too mean to be 
 employed as pages, by one who holds the rank which I have long 
 held in the Netherlands. I do not deny, that at his accession I 
 took the customary oath of allegiance ; but the tie on me to yield 
 obedience, and that on him to afford protection, were mutual ; 
 and it is a dictate of common sense, that in obligations of this 
 sort, the failure of either party sets the other free from his 
 engagements. 
 
 “ But even if I had not received any personal injury, I should 
 have thought myself indispensably obliged to oppose the tyran- 
 nical measures which were pursued. For it is not the prince 
 only who swears to maintain the fundamental laws. The same 
 oath is required of the nobles, and of all who are admitted into 
 public employments. By this oath I was strictly bound to do 
 everything in my power to rescue my fellow-citizens from the 
 oppressions under which they groaned, and, had I not done what 
 my enemy complains of, I should have been justly chargeable 
 with the crime, of which all the world knows that he has been 
 guilty, a breach of the most sacred and solemn obligation. 
 
 “ To this imputation, I know that his partisans are ready to 
 reply, that although he swore at his accession to maintain our 
 privileges, yet the Pope had granted him a dispensation from his 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 543 
 
 oath. I leave it to divines and others, better acquainted than I 
 am with religious controversies, to determine, whether this arro- 
 gance of the Pope, in assuming power to set men free from the obli- 
 gation of an oath, be not an impious encroachment on the preroga- 
 tive of Heaven, and I leave it to them to determine, whether this 
 pretension is not destructive of faith among men, and subversive 
 of society. I speak not therefore of the lawfulness of Philip’s 
 conduct, after having obtained this boasted dispensation, but of 
 his folly in applying for it. The tie between him and his subjects 
 was strictly mutual ; and by procuring a dispensation for himself, 
 he at the same time set me, and all his other subjects, free from 
 the engagements which we came under to yield him obedience. 
 It is childish and trifling to say, that by means of the dispensa- 
 tion he is free, but that we who have not been dispensed with, 
 are still as much bound as ever. For from the moment that he 
 considers himself as disengaged (by what means soever his obli- 
 gation was dissolved), the condition on which we promised obedi- 
 ence being removed, it must be absurd to reproach us with 
 infidelity. 
 
 “ I come now to that part of the Proscription, in which I am 
 accused of having been the author of all the disturbances that 
 have happened. With such of you as are old enough to remem- 
 ber the rise of these disturbances, there will be no need to defend 
 myself against so groundless an imputation ; but for the sake of 
 those who were too young at that time to form a judgment of 
 what they saw, it is necessary I should give some account of those 
 transactions, which are so grossly misrepresented in this infamous 
 proscription. 
 
 “ No person acquainted with the conduct of my accuser in his 
 other dominions, or with the cruelties exercised in Granada, 
 Mexico, and Peru, will be at a loss to account for the calamities 
 with which the people of the Low Countries have been over- 
 whelmed. In the very beginning of his reign, his despotic tem- 
 per was conspicuous. The emperor his father saw it with deep 
 concern, and when the count de Bossut, and I, and several 
 others were present, he exhorted him to treat his Flemish sub- 
 jects with greater moderation ; and foretold, that if the pride and 
 arrogance of his Spanish counsellors were not restrained, the 
 people of the Netherlands would ere long be excited to revolt. 
 But this wholesome counsel had not the effect which the empe- 
 ror intended. His son still consulted only with Spaniards ; he 
 still fostered as much as ever his passion for arbitrary power : and 
 resolved, in contradiction to his interest, if rightly understood, as 
 well as to his oath, to overturn our constitution. The condition 
 annexed to your grant of the nine years’ supply, that the money 
 should be disposed of by your own commissioners, excited in him, 
 and in his counsellors, the most inveterate resentment. I have 
 been present when these counsellors, who knew well their master’s 
 
544 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 sentiments, advised him to the pursuit of measures, by which you 
 were all to have been adjudged to death. But it was by accident 
 I came to know that these bloody counsels had been adopted. 
 From the French king’s own mouth, when I resided at his court 
 as a hostage, I learnt that a plan had been concerted with the 
 duke of Alva, to extirpate from France and the Netherlands all 
 who were suspected of being favourably inclined to the reformed 
 religion. I concealed from the French monarch my ignorance 
 of the design ; and the indignation which it excited in me. By 
 the intercession of the duchess of Savoy, I obtained leave to 
 return into the Netherlands, where (I deny it not, on the con- 
 trary, I glory in it) I promoted with all my influence that earnest 
 request, which the States preferred to the king for the removal 
 of the Spanish troops. 
 
 u I acknowledge, that amidst the numberless falsehoods with 
 which this proscription is filled, there is truth in another part of 
 the charge which is laid against me. I acknowledge, that after 
 having remonstrated in vain to the duchess of Parma against the 
 cruel and arbitrary measures that were pursued ; being prompted 
 by my dread of a civil war, by my concern for the calamities of 
 the people, and by a sense of duty arising from the oath which 
 I had sworn to maintain their rights, I called together the prin- 
 cipal nobility, and attempted to open their eyes to the impending 
 danger. 
 
 “ I acknowledge likewise, that I approved of the supplication, 
 which was presented by the nobility, against the placards and 
 executions. I am far from being either ashamed, or sorry, for 
 the counsel which I gave. That supplication was not only the 
 most moderate measure that could have been devised, but was 
 strictly conformable to the constitution and practice of the 
 Netherlands ; and happy had it been for the king, as well as 
 for the people, had he complied with the request which it con- 
 tained. 
 
 “ With respect to that part of the proscription in which my 
 accuser reproaches me on account of the favours which I have 
 shown to the Protestants, I confess that, before I embraced the 
 reformed religion, I never hated those who possessed it. Nor 
 will this appear surprising, when it is considered that my mind 
 had been early tinctured with its principles, and that my father, 
 who had established it in his dominions, lived and died in the 
 profession of it. I confess, that even while, in consequence of 
 my education at the emperor’s court I held the Catholic persua- 
 sion, I always abhorred the barbarities which were exercised by 
 the Popish inquisitors. I confess, that at the time of the King’s 
 departure from Zealand, when he commanded me to put to death 
 certain persons attached to the Protestant faith, I refused to 
 obey, and gave these persons private warning of the danger to 
 which they were exposed. T confess, that in the council of state, 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 545 
 
 I made all the opposition in my power to the persecutions that 
 were proposed ; partly from motives of compassion or humanity, 
 partly from my conviction of the absurdity of punishing men for 
 opinions which they could not change, when they did not disturb 
 the public tranquillity ; and partly from a persuasion, that the 
 violent remedies employed were calculated to disappoint the end 
 in view. But while, for these reasons, I was from the beginning 
 averse to persecution, you all know that I had no concern, either 
 in the introduction of the reformed religion into the Netherlands, 
 or in the rapid progress which it made during the government of 
 the duchess of Parma. You know that at that time I possessed 
 not the smallest influence with those by whom it was introduced 
 and propagated ; and you likewise know that, with regard to 
 those disorders into which the Protestants suffered their zeal to 
 betray them, so far from giving them my countenance or appro- 
 bation, I exerted my authority to restrain them ; I punished the 
 perpetrators with severity, and have been, on account of the 
 rigour which I exercised, by many among the Protestants most 
 cruelly calumniated and defamed. 
 
 “ I hope to be excused, on this occasion, for observing that 
 there is one circumstance in the proscription that gives me plea- 
 sure. Notwithstanding the malice and rancour, and contempt 
 of truth which my accuser has discovered, there is one crime, 
 often laid to the charge of the governors of provinces, of which 
 he has not ventured to accuse me ; I mean that of avarice, or 
 the embezzlement of the public money. Of this despicable crime, 
 indeed, I have been accused by some unknown persons, in certain 
 defamatory writings that have been circulated. But from the 
 silence observed on this head by my inveterate enemy, these 
 libellers may see the folly, as well as falsehood, of their insinua- 
 tions. To you there can be no occasion to vindicate my conduct. 
 I give thanks to God, that I learnt, at an early period, of how 
 much consequence it was for one who governs a free people, not 
 only to preserve himself untainted, but even to keep himself free 
 from the suspicion of corruption. And you know, that on this 
 account I have constantly declined taking any charge of the 
 public money ; and, from the beginning of my administration, 
 have transferred both the collection and distribution of it to 
 others. 
 
 “ I am accused, in the proscription, of having practised to 
 return into Holland, by undertaking to defend the people from the 
 tax of the tenth penny, which, it is said, was imposed upon them 
 by the duke of Alva, without the King’s consent ; and I am 
 accused likewise of having persecuted and expelled the Catholics, 
 If, by practising, my accuser means that I solicited, for liberty to 
 return, there is as little truth in this as in his other assertions. 
 I myself was most earnestly solicited ; and I am ready to show 
 letters which I received, not only from the governors of towns, 
 
 N N 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 546 
 
 but from the citizens, entreating me to come and deliver them 
 from the tyranny of the Spaniards. And, in complying with 
 these entreaties, what did 1 do that my duty did not require 
 from me ? I attempted to deliver from slavery the provinces which 
 had been committed to my care ; whose liberties I had sworn to 
 maintain ; and of the right to govern which the King had no 
 power, without the consent of the States, to deprive me. 
 
 “No part of this proscription gives me greater surprise, than 
 that in which I am accused of persecution. It is impossible but 
 even the Romanists themselves must bear witness to the falsehood 
 of so injurious an imputation. No person in the Netherlands 
 can be ignorant, that far from employing rigour, I have often 
 argued and remonstrated against it, and have promoted lenity 
 in the treatment of the Catholics to the utmost of my power. 
 Of this, even my accuser himself seems to make an indirect 
 acknowledgment. I feigned, he says, that the persecution of 
 the Catholics displeased me. But how does he know that 
 I feigned? Have not my actions been at all times open? 
 Why does he not judge, from them, of my intention ? Never 
 had one person less ground for accusing another of any 
 crime, than my accuser has to cast on me the imputation of 
 hypocrisy. Did I, either before, or at the time when he con- 
 ferred these obligations upon me, for which he has reproached 
 me with ingratitude ; did I ever offer the incense of flattery, 
 either to himself or to the duchess of Parma, or his tools and 
 confidants in the council ? On the contrary, did I not openly, 
 and without disguise, condemn the measures which he had dic- 
 tated, and which they pursued ? Was it possible for me to speak 
 more plainly than I did, or to give a clearer testimony of my 
 aversion to his designs, than by desiring him, as I did frequently, 
 to suffer me to resign my governments, because it was not in my 
 power to yield him the obedience which he required ? Such was 
 my conduct before my departure into Germany ; and since that 
 time, is there a single step of my conduct that will admit of the 
 interpretation of hypocrisy ? Did I not openly solicit aid from 
 the German princes to oppose him? Have I not raised armies 
 against him ; taken towns which he possessed ; repulsed his 
 forces ; and expelled him utterly from at least two of the pro- 
 vinces over which he tyrannised ? Is there any thing in this that 
 can be termed hypocrisy ! 
 
 “ But my accuser will not find it so easy to vindicate his own 
 conduct from this odious imputation. Read my defence which 
 I published some years ago, and you will perceive to which of us 
 belongs the appellation of hypocrite and deceiver. In that 
 defence there are copies of letters which I received from him, 
 filled with professions of friendship and regard, at the very time 
 when, as appears from the sequel, he had doomed me to destruction. 
 
 “ But why should I expect to be dealt with equitably, by one 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 f» 4/ 
 
 whose conscience allows him to affirm, that his minister the duke 
 of Alva imposed the tax of the tenth penny, and urged the levy- 
 . ing of it with such inflexible obstinacy, without his authority or 
 consent ? Is it credible that one who knew this King’s temper so 
 well as Alva, and who had ever shown the greatest solicitude to 
 please him, would have presumed, by a measure so tyrannical 
 and unprecedented, to run the risk of kindling a civil war ? Or, 
 if this wary Spaniard was in reality so rash and presumptuous, 
 can it be believed by any person who considers the important 
 consequences with which his rashness and presumption were 
 attended, that the King would not, long ere this time, have dis- 
 avowed him, and made him feel the weight of his displeasure ? 
 Was not Alva punished for ordering his son to marry his cousin, 
 rather than another woman, whom he had debauched under a 
 promise of marriage ? Was not this old servant banished for 
 this venial transgression, from his master’s presence, and thrown 
 into prison, from which he would never have been delivered, if 
 one better qualified to tyrannise over the Portuguese could 
 have been found in Spain ? And what opinion must we form of a 
 King, who, for this private offence, could punish an ancient friend 
 and servant with so much severity ; while, notwithstanding the 
 crime of treason, the most public and notorious, and productive 
 of the most dreadful calamities to his faithful subjects, he not 
 only suffered him to pass unpunished, but received him with open 
 arms, and loaded him with honours ? After this, will he still 
 employ the language of a good King, and boast of his affection 
 for his people ?” 
 
 In a great part of what remains of this Apology, the prince of 
 Orange enters into a detail of the transactions recorded in the 
 preceding history. I shall therefore pass over this, and set before 
 the reader what relates to the reproach which Philip casts on 
 William’s marriage with the daughter of the duke de Montpen- 
 sier, who was the princess of Orange at the time of publishing the 
 proscription. 
 
 “ My accuser,” continues he, 44 is not satisfied with saying 
 everything that can blacken my character, and render it odious 
 to the world, but he has likewise attempted to taint the honour 
 of my wife. He says, 4 that I have infamously married a reli- 
 gious woman, solemnly blessed by the hands of the bishop, in 
 contradiction to the laws of Christianity, and of the Romish 
 church, and that I did so whilst my marriage subsisted with 
 another woman.’ Though this assertion were strictly true, it 
 would ill become this incestuous and adulterous King to accuse 
 me. But you know that it is entirely without foundation. My 
 marriage with my former wife, now dead, did not subsist, and 
 the ground of her divorce was approved even by the doctors of 
 the Roman church ; and by those illustrious princes to whom she 
 was allied. My present wife was not, even by the rules of the 
 
 N N 2 
 
548 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 popish church, a religious woman, in the sense made by my 
 accuser. The duke of Montpensier, my father-in-law, who is 
 sincerely attached to the Catholic communion (not as cardinal 
 Granvelle, and other Spanish ministers, from interest, but from 
 principle and conviction), spared no pains to put the lawfulness 
 of his daughter’s marriage beyond doubt or controversy. He 
 found it the clear opinion, not only of the principal persons in 
 the Parliament of Paris, but of several bishops and doctors whom 
 he consulted, that even if a promise of celibacy had been given 
 by my wife, yet, in consideration of her youth, it would not have 
 been binding, as it would have been contrary to the rules of 
 the Gallican church, to the decrees of the high court of justice in 
 France, and even to the ordinances of the councils of Trent, to 
 which my adversary pays such unlimited submission. He likewise 
 found, that in reality no such promise was ever made ; that 
 sundry protestations had been taken, to prevent any person from 
 imagining that his daughter ever intended to take the vow ; and 
 that, even in her absence, the most undeniable evidence of this 
 had been produced. 
 
 “ I said before, that although my marriage were not so unex- 
 ceptionable as you see it is, even by the principles of the church 
 of Rome, it would ill become my accuser to reproach me on 
 account of it. He seems not to have remembered the common 
 maxim, that whoever ventures to accuse another ought to be well 
 assured that he himself is innocent. And yet is not this king, 
 who has endeavoured to stigmatise my lawful marriage with 
 infamy, the husband of his own niece? It will be said by his 
 partisans, that he previously obtained a dispensation from the 
 pope. But does not the voice of nature cry aloud against such 
 an incestuous conjunction ? And in order to make room for this 
 marriage, is it not true that he put to death his former wife, the 
 mother of his children, the daughter and sister of the kings of 
 France? I say not this, prompted by my resentment, rashly, 
 and at random : I assert, that in France there is evidence of the 
 horrid deed of which I now accuse him. 
 
 “It was not a single murder that was perpetrated for the sake 
 of this extraordinary marriage. His son too, his only son, was 
 sacrificed, in order to furnish the pope with a pretext for so 
 unusual a dispensation, which was granted in order to prevent 
 the Spanish monarchy from being left without a male heir. This 
 was the true cause of the death of Don Carlos, against whom 
 some misdemeanours were alleged ; but not a single crime suffi- 
 cient to justify his condemnation, much less to vindicate a father 
 for imbruing his hands in the blood of his son. And if Don 
 Carlos was in reality guilty of crimes deserving death, ought not 
 an appeal to have been made to us, his future subjects ? Did 
 the right of judging, and pronouncing sentence of death, against 
 the heir of such extensive dominions, belong to Spanish friars 
 and inquisitors, the obsequious slaves of the father’s tyranny ? 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 54!) 
 
 41 But perhaps this good king made conscience of leaving for 
 his heir a prince whom he knew to be born in unlawful wedlock. 
 For Philip's marriage with the mother of Don Carlos was not 
 less contrary to the laws of God and man, than that other of 
 which I have already spoken. At the very time when he espoused 
 the princess of Portugal, the mother of Carlos, his marriage sub- 
 sisted with Isabella Osorio, by whom he had two sons, Pedro 
 and Bernardino ; a marriage brought about by Ruo Gomez de 
 Silva, prince of Evoli, to which that nobleman was indebted for 
 his power and greatness. And besides, is it not well known that 
 this king lived in habitual adultery with another woman, the lady 
 Euphrasia ? Did he not compel the prince of Aseoli to take that 
 lady for his wife, when she was big with child by himself? And 
 while it has been affirmed with certainty, that that unhappy man 
 was taken off by poison, do not even the Spanish courtiers 
 ascribe his death to the grief which he conceived from the affront 
 to which he was obliged to submit, and the cruel necessity 
 imposed on him, of acknowledging for his heir the adulterous 
 bastard of another ? Such, and so chaste has been the conduct 
 of this king, who has the assurance to calumniate my lawful 
 marriage as a violation of the sacred laws of chastity. 
 
 44 But I shall hasten to conclude this Apology, after offering 
 some remarks concerning the nature of the sentence that has 
 been pronounced against me. It is in this part of the edict of 
 proscription, that the compiler, whether the king himself or some 
 ignoble instrument of his tyranny, has employed all the thunder 
 and lightning of his eloquence. But I thank God, it intimidates 
 me no more than the anathemas of Clement VII. intimidated 
 my kinsman, Prince Philibert, when he besieged and took the 
 pontiff prisoner in his castle of St. Angelo, after the proofs which 
 I have given, that I fear not all the power which my adversary 
 is possessed of ; and after contending for so many years against 
 his best generals, with numerous armies under their command, 
 it was weak in him to expect to frighten me with the high- 
 sounding terms of this proscription. I have less reason now than 
 formerly to dread the attempts of those abandoned wretches 
 whom he has endeavoured to instigate against me. For I am 
 not ignorant, that before this time he has bargained with poison- 
 ers and other murderers to deprive me of my life. He has now 
 given me a public warning of his bloody design. And with the 
 divine assistance, and the vigilance of my friends, I trust that, 
 notwithstanding his diabolical machinations, my life shall be 
 preserved so long as the prosperity and interest of this people, 
 to whose service I have devoted it, shall require. 
 
 44 My confidence on this head is greatly augmented by reflect- 
 ing upon the indignation, which I cannot doubt will be generally 
 excited by that extraordinary method of proceeding against me, 
 which my adversary has adopted. For there is not, I am per- 
 
550 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 suaded, a nation or prince in Europe, by whom it will not be 
 thought dishonourable and barbarous, thus publicly to authorise 
 and encourage murder ; except the Spaniards, and their King, 
 who have been long estranged from every sentiment of honour 
 and humanity. In having recourse to private assassinations 
 against a declared and open enemy, does not this mighty 
 monarch confess his despair of being able to subdue me by 
 force of arms ? Does he not give a testimony in my behalf, 
 and discover that he dreads the efforts which I may make 
 against him? Is it not weak and mean, to make publicly so 
 pusillanimous an acknowledgement ? But the weakness and 
 meanness of his conduct is not greater than the absurdity of 
 his choice of the rewards, which he holds forth o those who 
 shall execute his bloody purpose. For it is not money only that 
 he offers them, but nobility and honour ; as if a regard to honour 
 could influence a man capable of perpetrating a deed held in 
 universal detestation ! And if any personal ready possessed of 
 nobility were to pollute himself by so foul an action, would not 
 his nobility from that moment be annihilated ? W ould not all 
 society and connection with him be held dishonourable ? 
 
 u Even my adversary himself seems to have been in some mea- 
 sure sensible of the truth of this, and therefore he addresses him- 
 self more particularly to criminals and malefactors, as those who 
 are most likely to comply with his request. 4 And in order/ 
 says he, 4 that his destruction may be the more effectually and 
 speedily accomplished, we, desirous of punishing vice and reward- 
 ing virtue, promise on the word of a king, and as the minister of 
 God, that if any person shall be found possessed of courage and 
 public spirit sufficient to animate him to the execution of this 
 decree, and to free us from the aforesaid pest of society, we shall 
 order to be delivered to him, either in land or money as he shall 
 incline, the sum of twenty-five thousand crowns ; and if he shall 
 have committed any crime, however enormous, we promise to 
 grant him our royal pardon; and if he be not already noble, we 
 hereby confer nobility upon him, and likewise on all those who 
 shall aid and assist him . 1 Is not this, in plain terms, calling on 
 every desperate wretch, every outcast from society, to assist him 
 in the execution of his design ? No crime, however enormous, but 
 shall be pardoned ; no criminal, however detestable, but shall be 
 crowned with honour. Does this king deserve the title which he 
 assumes, of a minister of God, who thus confounds the distinction 
 between vice and virtue ; and thus publicly avows his willingness 
 to bestow the highest rewards and honours upon men defiled 
 with the most abominable crimes ? Have I not ground to rejoice 
 in being persecuted by one whose conscience allows him to have 
 recourse to such unhallowed means? And is not such depravity 
 of sentiment in my accuser, a testimony in behalf of my integrity ? 
 u I have now said all that seems necessary to vindicate my 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 551 
 
 character from those false aspersions which are thrown upon it in 
 this proscription. Many tilings which I might have said, I have 
 purposely omitted. Had I descended to a particular account of 
 the cruelty, accompanied with a contempt of the most sacred 
 obligations, which has been exercised by my accuser over this 
 unhappy people, I should never have come to a conclusion. But 
 with you there can be no occasion for giving a more particular 
 detail. You have been spectators of the horrid scene ; and have 
 borne your share of those oppressions which would fall to be 
 described. 
 
 “ But before I conclude, I must intreat you to reflect seriously 
 upon the means to which our enemy finds it necessary to have 
 recourse, in order to accomplish his designs. This infamous 
 proscription, joined to the pains which he and his ministers con- 
 tinually employ to create divisions among the provinces, shows 
 clearly that he now despairs of enslaving us by force of arms, 
 while we remain united. 
 
 “ It is indeed against me chiefly, at this time, that his designs 
 are directed. 4 Were I removed, 1 he says, ‘ either by death or 
 banishment, tranquillity would be restored. 1 You will easily 
 conceive what tranquillity he means, if you call to mind your con- 
 dition, before I returned into the Netherlands, when you groaned 
 under the tyranny of the duke of Alva. Would to heaven that 
 by my banishment or death you could be delivered from your 
 calamities ! My enemy should not, in that case, find it necessary 
 to employ poisoners and assassins to destroy me. You all know 
 how often I have exposed myself to danger in your defence. I 
 leave it to you, to whom alone it belongs, to determine, whether 
 my life and presence be repugnant or conducive to the interest of 
 the provinces. To 'you only, and not to the King of Spain, I 
 am accountable for my conduct. You diave full authority (and 
 I pledge myself to submit to it) to dispose, as you shall incline, 
 either of my . person, or of my life. Interpose that authority 
 with which I acknowledge you to be invested, and give orders 
 either for my departure from among you, or for my death ; if 
 you judge either the one or the other for the general good. But 
 if, on the contrary, my past conduct has convinced you, as I trust 
 it has, of the sincerity of my zeal and attachment ; or if my long 
 experience gives you confidence in my ability for conducting your 
 affairs, I shall still continue to employ in your service the talents 
 which I possess, hoping that you will listen to the earnest exhor- 
 tations which I have given you, to maintain harmony and concord 
 in the state ; and exert yourselves strenuously for the defence of 
 this people, whom you have undertaken to protect ; depending 
 on the favour of the Almighty, that your endeavours for this end 
 shall be attended with success. 1 ' 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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I N D E X. 
 
 Abkn Homey a is elected king of the Moresco inhabitants of Granada, 159. Attempts 
 to possess himself of the city of Granada, 160. Commences hostilities against the 
 Spaniards, but is forced to fly to the mountains, 161. His scattered followers return 
 to his standard, 162. Is murdered, 164. 
 
 Albert, cardinal and archduke, is appointed governor of the Netherlands, 513. Under- 
 takes the siege of Calais, 514. Takes the town by storm, 516. Takes Ardres, 517. 
 Leaves France, ib. Lays siege to Hulst, 518. The garrison surrenders, 520. Sur- 
 prises the town of Amiens, 524. Marries the Infanta, and receives the sovereignty of 
 the Netherlands, 533. 
 
 Alcazar, battle of, between Sebastian king of Portugal, and Muley Moluc emperor of 
 Morocco, 331 . 
 
 Alcmaer besieged by Don Frederic de Toledo, 244. 
 
 Aldegonde, St. Philip de Marnix, lord of, promotes the agreement called the Compromise, 
 against the establishment of the inquisition in the Netherlands. 116. Is sent by the 
 prince of Orange to the assembly of the States at Dort, 224. Is defeated and taken 
 prisoner by the duke of Alva, 247. Defends the city of Antwerp against the prince of 
 Parma, 394. His speech to dissuade the garrison from a surrender, 397. Assists 
 Count Hohenloe in the attack of the counterdyke of Couvestein, 403. Is tied up by 
 the capitulation from bearing arms for a year, 407. 
 
 Alost , is seized by the mutinous Spanish troops, 280. Is recovered by the States, 366. 
 
 Alva, Ferdinand de Toledo, duke of, his character, 24. His instructions on the violation 
 of the truce of Yaucelles, 25. Leads an army into the Ecclesiastical State, 27. His 
 motives to granting the Pope a truce, 28. Advises Philip to awe the Netherlands by 
 
 • an army, 130. Leads an army thither, 132. Imprisons the counts Horn and Eg- 
 mont, 133. The extraordinary powers he was invested with by Philip, 134. Insti- 
 tutes a council called the Council of Tumults, 135. His violent proceedings, ib. His 
 insolent reply to the magistrates of Antwerp, 137. Cites the prince of Orange to stand 
 a trial, 140. Confiscates the prince’s estates, ib. His brutal proscriptions, 145. 
 Passes sentence on the counts Egmont and Horn, 147. Defeats count Lewis of Nas- 
 sau, 150. Declines engaging the prince of Orange, 152. His vanity and arrogance 
 on the prince disbanding his army, 175. His tyrannical prosecutions, 176. Impri- 
 sons, and confiscates the effects of, the English merchants at Antwerp, 179. Inflames 
 the Flemings by taxation, 180. His reply to the representations of the States, 182. 
 Publishes an act of indemnity, 184. Inforces the tax of the tenth penny, 185. Fills 
 the city of Utrecht with soldiers, to live at free quarters upon the inhabitants, 186. 
 His sentence against that city, 187. His demands on the city of Brussels, ib. His 
 indignation at the surprise of the fort of Louvestein, 190. Publishes an edict for the 
 immediate payment of taxes, ib. His barbarous purpose against the inhabitants of 
 Brussels, how prevented, 191. Complains of the queen of England protecting the 
 Flemish exiles, 192. The citizens of Flushing revolt on his attempt to fortify the 
 citadel, 196. His succours to Middleburg intercepted, 200. Besieges Mons, 212. 
 Cautiously avoids being forced to an engagement by the prince of Orange, 216. 
 Attacks and worsts him in his retreat, 218. Takes Mons, 220. His army plunders 
 Mechlin, ib. Orders his son Toledo to persevere in the siege of Haerlem, 238. His 
 barbarity there, 242. Obtains his dismission from the government of the Netherlands, 
 248. Review of his administration, 249. Incurs the king’s displeasure in the mar- 
 riage of his son, 338. Is appointed to command the forces employed against Portugal, 
 339. Commences his operations, ib. His barbarity on taking the town and castle of 
 Cascaes, 341. Defeats Don Antonio, 342. Takes Lisbon, ib. His cruelty there, ib. 
 
 Alvaro de Sande, his gallant defence of the fort Gerba against the Turks, 69. Is sent 
 with reinforcements to Malta, 103. Defeats the Turks, 105. 
 
554 INDEX. 
 
 Amiens , the town of, surprised by the Archduke Albert, 524. Is besieged by Marshal 
 Biron, 526. Is retaken, 528. 
 
 Amsterdam , is ineffectually besieged by the Count de la Marc, for its adherence to the 
 Spanisli interest, 225. The city accedes to the Pacification of Ghent, 307. 
 
 Anastro, Gaspar, a Spanish banker at Antwerp, engages a man to assassinate the prince of 
 Orange, 364. 
 
 Anjou, Duke of, receives application for assistance from the Flemings, 303. Concludes 
 a treaty with the States, 309. The intention of this treaty, how frustrated, 313. 
 Apologizes for his conduct to the States, 314. The sovereignty of the States confer- 
 red on him, 357. Raises the siege of Cambray, 361. Goes ovey to England on a 
 prospect of being married to queen Elizabeth, 362. His arrival iu tho Netherlands, 
 364. Solicits assistance from his brother the king of France, 368. Is refused, 369. 
 Resolves to subvert the liberty of the Flemings, ib. Seizes several towns, and 
 attempts Antwerp, 370. Reconcilement between him and the States, 378. Goes to 
 France, 380. Dies, 384. His character, ib. 
 
 Antonio, Don, his pretensions to the crown of Portugal, 333. Is declared illegitimate, 
 336. Is proclaimed king, 340. Is defeated by the duke of Alva, 342. Is again 
 defeated by D’Avila, 344. Escapes, ib. 
 
 Antwerp, outrages committed by the reformers there, 122. Is garrisoned, and the Pro- 
 testant preachers banished, 128. Unsuccessful petition of the magistrates to Alva, 
 137. Is seized by the mutinous Spanish troops, 258. Is sacked by the Spaniards, 285. 
 Outrages committed by the Protestants against the Catholics thei’e, 324. The duke 
 of Anjou attempts to seize the city, 370. Is besieged by the prince of Parma, 391. 
 A fortified bridge extended over the Scheld, 394. A fruitless attempt to destroy the 
 bridge, 398. Attack of the counterdyke of Couvestein, 402. Capitulates, 406. 
 
 Ardres is taken by the Archduke Albert, 517. 
 
 Aremberg , Count, is sent by the duke of Alva to oppose Count Lewis of Nassau, 143. Is 
 defeated by him, 144. 
 
 Armada , Invincible, of the Spaniards, its force, 442. Is dispersed by a Storm, 443. Is 
 harassed by the English fire-ships, 446. Is worsted in an engagement with Lord 
 Howard, ib. Causes of its failure, 448. Is finally ruined by storms, 449. 
 
 Arragon , the people of, displease Philip II. by protecting Antonio Perez, 484. Their 
 constitution of government abolished, 486. 
 
 Arras, Anthony Perenot, bishop of, his speech to the convention of States of Ghent, 54. 
 Is left principal counsellor of the duchess of Parma, regent of the Netherlands, 58. 
 His character, ib. 
 
 Arschot , duke of,' invites the archduke Matthias to be governor of the Netherlands, out of 
 envy to the prince of Orange, 300. Is imprisoned, but released by the mediation of 
 the prince of Orange, 302. 
 
 Austria, house of, how it acquired the sovereignty of the Netherlands, 48. 
 
 , Don John of, is appointed commander-in-chief against the Moresco revolters in 
 
 Granada, 163. His character, ib. Counsellors appointed to assist him, 164. Totally 
 subdues the revolters, ib. Is made generalissimo of the fleet sent against the Turks, 
 167. Gains the victory at Lepanto, ib. The prosecution of this victory obstructed 
 by his Venetian associates, 169. Is offered the sovereignty of Greece, ib. Undertakes 
 the reduction of Tunis, 172. Fortifies Tunis contrary to orders, ib. Tunis retaken, 
 173. Arrives at Luxemburg as governor of the Netherlands, 287. His treaty with 
 the States, 291. His admission to the government, 294. His impolitical conduct, ib. 
 His duplicity, 295. Seizes on the castle of Namur, 296. His designs discovered, 297. 
 Battle of Gemblours, 307. Is defeated by count de Bossut at Rimenant, 308. His 
 death, 314. 
 
 , Ernest, archduke of, succeeds Count Mansveldt in the government of the 
 
 Netherlands, 494. Invites the States to treat of peace, which they reject, 495. His 
 troops mutiny, 501. Dies, 502. 
 
 Avanson, the French ambassador at Rome, negotiates a treaty between Pope Paul IV. and 
 the court of France, 18. 
 
 B. 
 
 Balagny establishes himself in the sovereignty of Cambray, 506. The town delivered up 
 to the count de Fuentes by the citizens, 507. The garrison capitulates, 508. 
 
 Battenburg, count of, succeeds the count de la Marc in the command of the forces of the 
 States of Holland, 228. Is defeated and killed in an attempt to relievo II aerie in, 240. 
 
 Belin, marquis of, is disgraced by Henry IV. for surrendering Ardres to tho Archduke 
 Albert, 517. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 555 
 
 Bergen- op- Zoom, dispositions of the duke of Parma for besieging it, 452. 
 
 Biron , nnmeschal, his operations against the prince of Parma, 379. Is forced to leave the 
 Netherlands, 382. Defeats the marquis of Varambon in Artois, 520. Invests 
 Amiens, 526. Reduces it, 527. 
 
 Boisot, admiral of Holland, defeats and kills de Glimes at Sacherlo, 251. Conducts a 
 llect of flat-bottomed vessels, destined for the relief of Leyden, 265. His arrival* 26 7 . 
 Polishes in an attempt to relieve Ziricsee, 279. 
 
 Bombs, the first invention of, 454. 
 
 Bornmel, the town of, seized by the prince of Orange, 260. 
 
 Bommene , desperate defence of the garrison of, against the Spaniards, 276. 
 
 Bonne, the city of, taken by Martin Schenck, 456. 
 
 Bossut , count of, his fruitless attempt to recover the Brill, 193. Massacres the towns- 
 men of Rotterdam, 195. His orders for assembling the States of Holland disregarded, 
 223. Co-operates with Toledo at the siege of Haerlem, 238. Is defeated and taken 
 prisoner by the Hollanders, 246. Defeats Don John of Austria at Rimenant, 308. 
 Dies, 347. 
 
 Breda, a congress held there by Spanish and Dutch deputies to negotiate peace, 269. Is 
 taken by the Spaniards, 361. Is seized by Prince Maurice by stratagem, 457. 
 
 Brederod, Count, his application to the duchess of Parma, 128. His insurrection and 
 death, ib. 
 
 Brill taken by the Flemish exiles, 191. Is attacked by Count Bossut, 193. The inha- 
 bitants swear allegiance to the prince of Orange, 194. The monks cruelly treated by 
 the Protestants, ib. note. 
 
 Bruges is delivered up to the prince of Parma, by the prince of Chimai the governor, 383. 
 
 Brussels , the duke of Alva’s barbarous resentment for the opposition to his taxes there, 
 how disappointed, 191. 
 
 C. 
 
 Cadiz , expedition against, by the English, 521. Is plundered, ib. 
 
 Calais , the attack of, concerted by the duke of Guise, 35. Is taken, 37. Is besieged by 
 the Archduke Albert, 514. Is taken by storm, 516. 
 
 Cambray is besieged by the count de Fuentes, 506. Is delivered up by the citizens, 507. 
 The garrison capitulates, 508. 
 
 Caraffa , cardinal, cause of his personal resentment against the Emperor Charles V. , 17. 
 Concludes a treaty between his uncle pope Paul IV. and the court of France, 18. 
 His embassy to the court of France, 21. Solicits a violation of the truce of Vaucelles, 
 ib. Obtains a suspension of arms for the Pope, from the duke of Alva, 27. 
 
 Caranza, see Toledo, abp. of. 
 
 Carlos , Don, his history, 138. The turbulent designs formed by him, ib. Is poisoned 
 by his father’s order, 139. 
 
 Casimire , John , count palatine of the Rhine, engages to assist the States of the Nether- 
 lands against the Spaniards, 290. Is assisted with money by queen Elizabeth of Eng- 
 land, 305. Joins the army of the States, 310. Is obstructed by the jealousy of the 
 Catholics, ib. Assists the people of Ghent against the Walloons, 313. Goes over to 
 England to justify his conduct to Elizabeth, 314. 
 
 Castel Roderigo, count de, his arguments to persuade Philip II. to part with the sove- 
 reignty of the Netherlands, 532. 
 
 Catelet, besieged by the count de Fuentes, 505. Gomeron’s treachery and death, ib. 
 
 Caudebec is besieged by the duke of Parma, 480. 
 
 Charles V., Emperor, bad consequences of his partial attachment to the Netherlands, 1. 
 Calls his son Philip into the Low Countries, 2. Endeavours to have him elected king 
 of the Romans, 3. Solicits his brother Ferdinand to resign that dignity, ib. His 
 scheme in marrying Philip to Mary queen of England, 4. Labours to reconcile tbe 
 English to his marriage, 5. Philip’s undutiful behaviour to him, 9. Resigns his 
 dominions, 10. Procures the truce of Vaucelles, 11. Computation of the number 
 of persons destroyed during his reign for their religious principles, 45. 
 
 Charles IX. of France, deludes the Protestants by the treaty of St. Germains, 205. 
 Massacres the Protestants, 215. His treaty with Count Lewis of Nassau, 254. 
 
 Chateau Cambresis, negotiations for peace between France, Spain, and England, there, 
 40. Peace concluded, 42. 
 
 Chester , colonel Edward, is sent by the prince of Orange with ten companies of English to 
 protect Leyden against the Spaniards, 262. His men desert to the enemy, ib. 
 
 Chimai , prince of, his deceitful conduct, 382. Is made governor of Bruges, 383. Deli- 
 vers the town up to the prince of Parma, ib. 
 
556 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Civitelld is besieged by the duke of Guise, 28. 
 
 Coligni, admiral de, defends St. Quentin against the duke of Savoy, 31. Is^taken pri- 
 soner, 34. Is defeated at Montcontour, 205. Is killed in the massacre of Paris, 215. 
 
 Cologn, conferences entered into there for peace, between Philip and the States of the 
 Netherlands, 325. 
 
 Colonna , his military operations against the Pope, 29. 
 
 Compromise , a copy of the agreement so termed, 116. 
 
 Conde , prince of, his dissatisfaction at the inordinate power of the Guises, 44. Is killed at 
 the battle of Jarnac, 205. 
 
 Corbeil is taken by the duke of Parma, 471 . 
 
 Corsairs of Barbary, some account of, 65. 
 
 Council of State expel their dissenting members, and declare their mutinous Spanish 
 troops rebels, 281. Accept succours from the prince of Orange to prosecute the siege 
 of Ghent, 287. 
 
 of Tumults, established by Alva in the Netherlands, 135. Arbitrary decree of, 
 
 ib. The majority of the members decline acting, 137. 
 
 Coutras , battle of,, between the Duke de Joyeuse and the Germans, 461. 
 
 Cyprus is invaded by Sultan Selim, 166. 
 
 D. 
 
 D'Andelot is intercepted and routed in carrying a reinforcement to St. Quentin, 32. Is 
 taken prisoner, 34. 
 
 D' Avila raises the siege of Middleburg, 199. Commands a fleet at the siege of Middle- 
 burg, 251. Defeats and kills Count Lewis of Nassau, 257. His troops mutiny, 258. 
 He escapes from them, ib. Defeats Don Antonio, king of Portugal, 344. 
 
 De Glimes , the Spanish admiral, defeated and killed by Boisot, admiral of Holland, 251. 
 
 De Thermes , Mareschal, is defeated at the battle of Gravelines, 37. Is taken prisoner, 38. 
 
 Denmark and Sweden, state of, at the time of Charles V. resigning his dominions, 13. 
 
 Deventer is taken by prince Maurice, 473. 
 
 Doria, Juanetin, takes Dragut, the corsair, prisoner, 66. 
 
 Dort, assembly of the States of Holland held there, 224. Send a supply of money to the 
 prince of Orange, 225. 
 
 Dourlens besieged and taken by the count de Fuentes, 506. 
 
 Douza, Janus, defends Leyden against the Spaniards, 262. 
 
 Dragut , the corsair, some account of, 65. Makes himself master of Tripoli, 67. Carries 
 a reinforcement to the Turks at Malta, 90. Is killed at the siege of St. Elmo, 95. 
 
 Drake , Sir Francis, by his successes obliges Philip II. of Spain to postpone his invasion 
 of England, 439. 
 
 Du Lis, his gallant defence of Bommene against the Spaniards, 276. 
 
 Dunkirk is taken by the prince of Parma, 380. 
 
 E. 
 
 Egmont, Count, advises the battle, and gains the victory, of St. Quentin, 33. Defeats 
 mareschal de Thermes at the battle of Gravelines, 37. Is sent by the duchess of 
 Parma to represent the state of the Netherlands to Philip in Spain, 112. Complains 
 of being deceived by Philip, 115. Refuses to command the regent’s troops, 119. 
 Pacifies the tumults of the reformers, 123. Justifies and declares his readiness to 
 support Philip’s measures, 127. The prince of Orange’s warning to him, 132. Is 
 imprisoned by the duke of Alva, 133. His trial, 145. Petition of his countess to 
 Philip, 147. Is executed, ib. His character, 148. 
 
 , the young count of, endeavours to seize the city of Brussels for the prince of 
 
 Parma, 324. Is taken prisoner by La Noue, 354. 
 
 Elizabeth, queen of England, her motives for rejecting the proposed marriage with Philip 
 II. of Spain, 41. Her stipulations respecting Calais, 42. Affords protection to the 
 Flemish refugees, 177. Seizes money intended for Philip, in her ports, 178. Confis- 
 cates the effects of the Spanish and Flemish merchants, 179. Is induced to discoun- 
 tenance the Flemish exiles, 192. Assists the revolted Flemings with money, 290. 
 Her policy with regard to the disturbances of the Netherlands, 304. Engages to supply 
 the States with money and troops, 305. Apologises to Philip, ib. Her conduct on 
 the treaty between the States and the Duke of Anjou, 310. Measures taken toward 
 a marriage between her and the duke, 362. Her anxiety concerning the affairs of the 
 Netherlands, 413. The sovereignty of the United States offered to her, 414. Declines 
 
INDEX. 
 
 557. 
 
 the offer, but enters into a treaty for their protection, 416. Sends Leicester with an 
 army to their assistance, 417. Her partiality to him, 428. Review of her conduct, 
 437. Negotiates with Philip, 439. Prepares to defeat his intended invasion of Eng- 
 land, 441. The Invincible Armada totally ruined, 449. Her situation at this time, 
 451. Her expedition against Cadiz, 521. Opposes the peace between France .and 
 Spain, 530. Remonstrates to the king of France against it, ib. 
 
 Elmo , St., fort, on the island of Malta, siege of, by the Turks, 88. Is taken by assault, 96. 
 
 England , objections of the English to the marriage of their queen, Mary, with Philip II. 
 of Spain, 5. Measures taken by the Emperor Charles to reconcile them to it, ib. The 
 parliament refuses Philip the ceremony of coronation, 7. Philip returns to Spain, 9. 
 State of, at the time of the Emperor Charles’s resignation, 12. The conquest of, pro- 
 jected by Philip II. of Spain, 436. See Armada. 
 
 Ernest , archduke of Austria. See Austria. 
 
 Escurial, the palace of, built in consequence of Philip’s vow on gaining the battle of St. 
 Quentin, 33. 
 
 Europe , state of, at the time of the Emperor Charles’s resignation, 12. 
 
 Essex, earl of, is appointed to command the English armament against Cadiz, 521. Takes 
 and plunders the town, ib. 
 
 F. 
 
 Ferdinand , brother of the Emperor Charles V., is solicited hy him to resign his dignity- 
 as king of the Romans, 3. 
 
 , the Catholic, subdues the Morescoes in Spain, 155. Compels those of Granada 
 
 to profess Christianity, ib. Reduces the inhabitants of the country, ib. 
 
 Flemings refuse to swear allegiance to Philip II. of Spain, 2. Their jealous caution in 
 grants of money to him, 30. Their ancient commercial prosperity, 47. See Nether- 
 lands. 
 
 Flushing, revolt of, against the Spaniards, 1 96. Don Pedro Pacheco, the Spanish governor, 
 put to death there, 197. 
 
 Fontaine , Franfoise, battle of, between Henry IV. of France, and Velasco, constable of 
 Castile, 509. 
 
 France, its political state in reference to Philip II. of Spain, 14. Character of the French 
 at that time, ib. The dissatisfaction of the nation at the peace of Chateau Cambresis, 
 43. State of, on the death of Henry II., ib. The decrees of the council of Trent 
 rejected by the court of, 83. Battles of Jarnac and Montcontour, 205. The Protest- 
 ants deceived by a treaty, 206. Massacre of the Protestants, 216. State of parties 
 in, under Henry III., 410. The Catholic league, 411. 461. The duke of Guise 
 assassinated, 462. The king assassinated, ib. Accession of Henry IV., ib. He 
 embraces the Catholic religion, 491. Calais taken by the Archduke Albert, 516. 
 
 Francis II. of France, his accession, character, and administration, 43. 
 
 Fuentes, count of, succeeds the Archduke Ernest as governor of the Netherlands, 402. 
 Enters vigorously into the exercise of his office, 503. Besieges Catelet, 505. Puts 
 Gomeron to death, ib. Takes Dourlens, 506. Lays siege to Cambray, ib. The town 
 and castle delivered up, 508. Resigns the government to Albert, 513. 
 
 G. 
 
 Gemblours, battle of, 307. 
 
 Gerard, Balthazar, assassinates the prince of Orange, 384. His examination, 385. His 
 sentence, 386. 
 
 Germany, disgust conceived there at the behaviour of Philip II. of Spain, 3. State of, at 
 the time of the Emperor Charles’s resignation, 13. 
 
 Gertrudenberg is taken from the Spaniards by the Sieur de Payette, 247. Is betrayed 
 to the Spaniards by the garrison, 455. Is retaken by Prince Maurice, 493. 
 
 Ghent , a woollen manufacture carried on in that city before the art was known in Eng- 
 land, 48. The confederacy called the Pacification of, 287. The duke of Arschot 
 seized and imprisoned there, 302. Discord between the inhabitants of, and the 
 Walloons, 3 12. 
 
 Giambelli, his contrivances at Antwerp to destroy the prince of Parma’s bridge, 397. 400. 
 
 Gomeron, his private treaty with the count de Fuentes, for the delivery of Chatelet, 505. 
 Is put to death by Fuentes, ib. 
 
 Granada , the Moorish inhabitants of, forced by Ferdinand the Catholic to profess Chris- 
 tianity, 155. Are oppressed by the inquisition, 156. Are disarmed by Philip II., 
 
558 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 157. Philip’s oppressive edict against them, ib. Remonstrate against it, 158. Revolt 
 of the province, 159. Aben Huineya, their newly elected king, attempts to possess 
 himself of the city of Granada, 160. The Morescoes reduced by the marquis de 
 Mondejar. 161. The province plundered by the troops, 162. The inhabitants take 
 arms again, ib. Are totally subdued by Don John of Austria, 164. Dreadful severities 
 exercised against them, 165. 
 
 Granvelle , cardinal, rigorously enforces Philip’s edicts against heretics in the Netherlands, 
 107. His removal applied for, 109. Is removed by his own desire, 1 1 1 . Continues 
 to exert his influence over the king against his enemies in the Low Countries, 125. 130. 
 
 Grave , besieged by Count Mansvcldt, 418. Is taken by the prince of Parma, 419. 
 
 Gravelines , battle of, between Count Egmont and mareschal de Thermes, 37. 
 
 Gregory XIII., Pope, persuades Philip II. to confer the sovereignty of Tunis on Don John 
 of Austria, 173. 
 
 Groningen is besieged by prince Maurice, 499. Submits and accedes to the union of 
 Utrecht, 501. 
 
 Gueldres is betrayed to the duke of Parma, 432. 
 
 Guerrero , archbishop of Grenada, inflames Philip II. against the Moors, 156. 
 
 Guise, Francis duke of, leads an army into Italy to support the Pope against the duke of 
 Alva, 28. Besieges Civitella ib. Is recalled, 34. Takes Calais from the English, 
 36. Takes Thionville, 37. He and his brother engross the administration under 
 Francis II., 43. 
 
 • , Henry duke of, his political intrigues, 410. Forms the Catholic league, 411. 
 
 Enters into a treaty with Philip II. of Spain, ib. Gains a victory over the Germans, 
 462. Is assassinated by the king’s order, ib. 
 
 IT. 
 
 Haerlem is besieged by Don Frederic de Toledo, 231 . Speech of Riperda to the principal 
 inhabitants, ib. The town described, 233. Surrenders, 242. Cruel treatment of 
 the inhabitants, ib. Is seized and plundered by the mutinous Spanish troops, 244. 
 
 Hali, the Turkish admiral, defeated and killed at Le^anto, 167. 
 
 Hanstede, Adolphus, his fleet destroyed by the Zealanders, 259. 
 
 Hascem , the corsair, besieges Oran and Masarquivir, 70. Is forced to a precipitate retreat 
 by the Spaniards, 71. Brings a reinforcement to the Turks at Malta, 98. 
 
 Harauguer, Charles, carries a party of men secretly into Breda, and seizes the town for 
 Prince Maurice, 458. Is made governor, 459. 
 
 Henry II. of France, his character and political conduct, 15. Concludes an alliance with 
 Paul IV. against the Emperor Charles V., 18. Agrees to the truce of Vaucelles, 20. 
 Is persuaded to violate the truce, and renew the war, 23. His forces defeated before 
 St. Quentin, 33. His motives to wish for a peace with Philip, 39. Peace of Cha- 
 teau Cambresis, 42. His death, 43. 
 
 Henry III. of France, his character, 303. Refuses to assist his brother the duke of 
 Anjou, 369. Is offered the sovereignty of the United States of the Netherlands, 409. 
 State of parties in France, 410. His firm reply to the representations of the Spanish 
 ambassador, 412. Declines the offer of the States, 413. Declares himself the head 
 and protector of the Catholic league, 461. Procures the assassination of the duke of 
 Guise, and of his brother the cardinal, 462. Is assassinated himself, ib. 
 
 Henry IV. of France, his accession, 462. Defeats the duke of Mayenne, 403. Invests 
 Paris, 464. Comparison between him and the duke of Parma, 465. Raises the siege 
 on the arrival of the duke of Parma, 467. Sends a defiance to the duke of Mayenne, 
 ib. The duke of Parma deceives him by a stratagem, 468. Disbands his army, 470. 
 Collects troops, and harasses the duke in his return to the Netherlands, 472. Besieges 
 Rouen, 477. Abandons the siege, 480. Blocks up the Spanish army at Caux, 481. 
 Embraces the Catholic religion, 491. The principal cities submit to him, 495. Pub- 
 lishes a general indemnity, ib. Besieges Laon, 496. Repels the attempts of the duke 
 de Mayenne to raise the siege, 497. Laon capitulates, 498. The dukes of Lorrain 
 and Guise submit to him, 499. Declares war against Philip of Spain, 503. Makes 
 an alliance with the United Provinces, 504. Defeats Velasco, constable of Castile, 
 509. Gains over the duke de Mayenne, 510. Obtains the expected absolution from 
 Pope Clement, 511. Disgraces the marquis of Belin for the surrender of Ardrcs, 517. 
 Besieges Amiens, 526. Listens to overtures for peace, 530. His reply to Queen Eli- 
 zabeth’s remonstrances against it, 530. Concludes a peace at Vervins, 531. 
 
 Henry , Don, succeeds to the crown of Portugal, 333. Discusses the claims of the several 
 competitors for the succession after him, 334. Resolves to marry, 335. 1 lis death, 337 . 
 
INDEX. 559 
 
 Harenberg , Count, deserts the interest of the United Provinces, and goes over to the 
 Spaniards, 382. 
 
 Merges, count de, reduces several towns in the Netherlands, 272. 
 
 Hohenloe , Count, is appointed to the command of the fleet of the United States, 396. 
 Attacks the counterdyke of Couvestein, 403. Relieves Grave, 419. Reduces Axel, 
 and defeats Hautpeine, 433. 
 
 Holland, revolt of the provinces of, 204. Precautions taken there to withstand the Spa- 
 nish power, 223. The States of, assemble at Dort, 224. Establishment of the re- 
 formed religion, 227. Spanish fleet under Count Bossut defeated by, 246. The 
 States of, refuse to concur in the treaty with Don John of Austria, 292. See United 
 Provinces. 
 
 Horn, Count, pacifies the tumultuous inhabitants of Tournay, 124. Is imprisoned by the 
 duke of Alva, 133. His trial, 145. Is executed, 148. 
 
 Hortensius , Lambertus, cruel perfidy of the Spaniards to, 229. 
 
 Howard , Lord, the English admiral, his prudent management on thc^arrival of thejSpanish 
 Invincible Armada, 445. Harasses it with fire-ships, 446. Attacks the Spaniards 
 successfully, ib. 
 
 Hulst, is reduced by Prince Maurice, 475. Is fortified by him, and besieged by the arch- 
 duke Albert, 518. Surrenders, 520. 
 
 I. 
 
 Jarnac, battle of, 205. 
 
 Idiaque, endeavours to dissuade Philip II. from his projected invasion of England, 436. 
 
 Jenlis , sieur de, is defeated by Frederic de Toledo, and his suspicious death, 213. 
 
 Iquisition, in Spain, its history, and mode of proceeding, 61. Effects of this institution 
 on the characters of the Spaniards, 62. An Autb-de-fe celebrated in the presence of 
 Philip II., 63. The Moors driven out of Spain by the severities of, 156. 
 
 Joyeuse, duke de, is defeated and killed at the battle of Coutras, 462. 
 
 Italy , the states of, their dependence on Philip II. of Spain, 13. Its condition by the 
 peace of Chateau Cambresis, 45. 
 
 L. 
 
 La Capelle is taken by Count Mansveldt, 496. 
 
 La Marc, the count de, commands a fleet of Flemish exiles by commission from the 
 prince of Orange, 192. Takes the Brill, 193. Besieges Amsterdam, 225. Cause 
 of his miscarriage, ib. His character, 228. Is deprived of his command, and 
 dies, ib. 
 
 La None assists Count Lewis in the defence of Mons against the duke of Alva, 213. 
 Mons capitulates, 220. Undertakes the defence of Maestricht against the prince of 
 Parma, 319. Is taken prisoner by the Walloons, 354. On what terms released, 
 355. 
 
 La V alette, grand master of Malta, his vigorous preparations to defend the island against 
 the Turks, 87. His motives for defending St. Elmo, 90. Retaliates the barbarity of 
 the Turks, 97. 
 
 Lagny is taken by the duke of Parma, 469. 
 
 Lanzavecchia , governor of Breda, corrupts the garrison of Gertrudenberg to give it up to 
 the duke of Parma, 455. Loses Breda to prince Maurice by negligence, 458. 
 
 Laon is besieged by Henry IV. of France, 496. The duke of Mayenne endeavours in 
 vain to raise the siege, 497. Surrenders, 498. 
 
 League , Catholic, formed in France, by the duke of Guise, 411. Is joined by Philip II. 
 of Spain, ib. Henry III. declares himself its head and protector, 461. The duke of 
 Guise and the cardinal, his brother, assassinated, 467. The duke de Mayenne is 
 chosen commander in chief, ib. Mayenne defeated by Henry IV., 463. Paris 
 relieved by the duke of Parma, 467. Convention of the States of, 488. The dukes 
 of Lorrain and Guise submit to Henry, 499. Is deserted by the duke de Mayenne, 510. 
 
 Leicester, earl of, is sent with English troops to the assistance of the Dutch States, 417. 
 Is made governor and commander-in-chief of all the forces, 418. Besieges Zutphen, 
 422. His arbitrary and imprudent conduct, 423. His feeble attempts to raise the 
 siege of Sluys, 431. His intrigues discovered, 433. Differs with the States, ib. 
 Resigns his government, and returns to England, 435. Is appointed commander in 
 chief of the English forces to oppose the Spanish Armada, 451. 
 
 Lcpanto , battle of, between Don John of Austria and Hali, the Turkish admiral, 167. 
 
 Lewis XI. of France, how he lost the opportunity of bringing the sovereignty of the 
 Netherlands into his family, 48. 
 
560 INDEX. 
 
 Lewis of Nassau, Count, collects an army for the relief of the Netherlands, 142. De- 
 feats count Aremberg, 143. Is defeated by the duke of Alva, 149. Is deceived by 
 the offers of Charles IX. of France, 207. Seizes Mons, 208. Is besieged there by 
 the duke of Alva, 211. Mons capitulates, 220. His treaty with Schomberg, the 
 French ambassador, 254. Is defeated and killed at Mooch by D’Avila, 257. 
 
 Leyden is besieged by Requesens, 261. Its situation described, ib. Is defended by 
 Janus Douza, 262. Is blockaded, 263. Resolution and distress of the inhabitants, 
 ib. The country laid under water, 264. Is relieved by Boisot, and the siege 
 raised, 267. 
 
 Lisbon , the city of, submits to the duke of Alva, 342. • 
 
 Lorrain , cardinal of, his arguments for an alliance between France and the Pope, against 
 the Emperor Charles V., 20. He and his brother engross the administration under 
 Francis II., 43. 
 
 Louvestein, the fort of, surprised by Herman de Ruyter, 189. Is retaken, 190. 
 
 M. 
 
 Maestricht is besieged by the prince of Parma, 317. Is taken by surprise, 319. 
 
 Malta , the island of, invaded by the Turks, 88. Siege of St. Elmo, ib. St. Elmo 
 taken by assault, 96. Attack of fort St. Michael, 98. Arrival of Spanish succours, 
 103. The Turks retire, 104. Re-land, and are defeated by the Spanish reinforce- 
 ment, 105. 
 
 Mansveldt , Count, besieges Grave in Brabant, 418. Besieges and takes Watchendonck, 
 454. Is appointed governor of the Netherlands on the death of the duke of Parma, 
 488. Lays siege to Noyon, ib. Fails of relieving Gertrudenberg, 494. Is pre- 
 vented from taking Creveceur by Prince Maurice, ib. Is superseded in the govern- 
 ment of the Netherlands, by the appointment of the archduke Ernest, ib. Invades 
 Picardy, and takes the town of La Capelle, 496. Resigns his employment on the 
 appointment of the count de Fucntes to be governor, 503. 
 
 Mary, queen of England, her character, and motives for marrying Philip II. of Spain, 5. 
 Summary of the marriage articles, ib. Joins her husband in a persecution of the Pro- 
 testants, 8. Is left by her husband, 9. Is prevailed on by him to engage in the war 
 against France, 30. Her death, 40. 
 
 — princess of Portugal, married to Philip II. of Spain, 1. 
 
 daughter of Charles the Bold, married to Maximilian, son of the Emperor Frederic 
 
 III., 48. Her death, 49. 
 
 Matthias, Archduke, is invited by the duke of Arschot and others, to take upon him the 
 government of the Netherlands, 300. Is admitted by the States, 301. Leaves the 
 Netherlands, 361. 
 
 Maurice, Prince, succeeds to the offices of his father, 390. His character, 453. Gains 
 possession of Breda by a stratagem, 457. Provides for its security, 460. Is made 
 governor of Guelderland and Overyssel, ib. Takes Zutphen, 473 ; and Deventer, ib. 
 Defeats the duke of Parma’s cavalry by stratagem, 474. Reduces Hulst and Nime- 
 guen, ib. Subdues Steenwich and Coverden, 486. Takes Gertrudenberg, 493. 
 Murderers employed to assassinate him, by the Court of Spain, 495. Undertakes 
 the siege of Groningen, 499. Reduces it, 501. Affords protection to the Spanish 
 mutinous troops, ib. His operations obstructed by Mondragone, 511. Fortifies Hulst, 
 518. Defeats and kills-the count de Yaras, 524. Progress of his operations, 528. 
 
 Maximilian, son of the Emperor Frederic III., marries Mary, daughter and heiress of 
 Charles the Bold, 48. Is seized and imprisoned at Bruges, 49. 
 
 — II., emperor of Germany, remonstrates to Philip II. of Spain against the 
 
 cruel administration of the duke of Alva in the Netherlands, 141. Mediates between 
 Philip and the Dutch States, 268. 
 
 Mayenne, duke of, is appointed commander-in-chief of the forces of the League, 462. Is 
 routed by Henry IV., 463. Summons a convention of the States of the League, at 
 Philip’s desire, 488. Marriage treaty for his son and Philip’s daughter Isabella, 492. 
 Endeavours in vain to raise the siege of Laon, 497. His masterly retreat, 498. Is 
 reconciled to Henry, 510. 
 
 Mechlin is garrisoned by the prince of Orange, 214. Is plundered by the duke of 
 Alva’s troops, 220. 
 
 Medina Coeli, duke of, his expedition to Tripoli, 67. His fleet destroyed by the Turks, 
 68. The Flemish exiles take great part of the fleet he conducted to the relief of 
 Alva, 199. Is appointed to succeed the duke of Alva in the government of the 
 Netherlands, but declines the charge, 248. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 561 
 
 Medina , Sidonia, duke de, is appointed commander of the Spanish Invincible Armada, 
 443. Despairs of success, 447. Resolves to return to Spain, 448. His fleet ruined 
 by a storm, 449. Arrives in Spain, ib. 
 
 Mendoza , don Francis de, delivers Oran and Masarquivir from the corsair Ilascem, 72. 
 
 Michael , St., fort of, at Malta, siege of, by the Turks, 98. 
 
 Middleburg is besieged by Count Tserart, 198. The siege raised by D’Avila, 199. Is 
 besieged by the Zealanders, 250. Surrenders to the prince of Orange, 252. 
 
 Moncontour, battle of, 205. 
 
 Mondejar , marquis of, reduces the Moresco revolters in Granada, 161. His troops 
 plunder the country, 162. Is removed from his command, 163. 
 
 Mondragone , leads a detachment of Spanish troops through a channel of the sea to the 
 relief of Tergoes, 203. Defends Middleburg against the Zealanders, 250. Surrenders 
 by capitulation, 252. His vigorous preparations for the siege of Ziricsee, 278. Checks 
 the operations of Prince Maurice, 511. His death, 512. 
 
 MonSf the city of, seized by Count Lewis of Nassau, 208. Is besieged by the duke of 
 Alva, 212. Capitulates, 220. 
 
 Montmorency , constable of France, his reasons against an alliance with the Pope, against 
 the Emperor Charles V., 19. Persuades Henry to conclude the truce of Vaucelles, 20. 
 Is defeated before St. Quentin, 33. Returns to France to negotiate a peace, 40. 
 
 Mooch, battle of, between D’Avila the Spanish general, and Count Lewis of Nassau, 256. 
 
 Morescoes in Spain, the history of the, 155. 
 
 Morocco , state of that kingdom, 329. Is invaded by Sebastian, king of Portugal, ib. 
 Battle of Alcazar, 331. Death of Muley Moluc, ib. 
 
 Muley Moluc establishes himself in the sovereignty of Morocco, 329. Enters into an 
 alliance with Philip II. of Spain, ib. Dies during the battle of Alcazar, 331. His 
 character, 332. 
 
 Mustapha , commands the Turkish troops sent to reduce the island of Malta, 88. Be- 
 sieges St. Elmo, ib. Takes it by assault, 96. Retires from the island, 104. Lands 
 again, and is defeated, 105. 
 
 - Cara, a celebrated corsair, fortifies himself at Pennon de Yelez, 72. His fort 
 
 reduced by the Spaniards, 73. 
 
 N. 
 
 Naerden, cruel massacre of the townsmen of, by Don Frederic de Toledo, 229. 
 
 Namur , the castle of, seized by Don John of Austria, 296. 
 
 Navarese , the leader of the mutinous Spanish troops, conducts them from Alost to the 
 relief of the Spaniards at Antwerp, 285. Sacks the town, ib. 
 
 Netherlands , inquiry into the ancient state of, 47. Fall under the dominion of the house 
 of Burgundy, ib. The situation of the country favourable for commerce, 48. The 
 sovereignty transferred to the house of Austria, 49. Instances of the attachment of 
 the Emperor Charles V. to this country and its inhabitants, ib. Aversion of his son, 
 Philip II., to them, 50. Edicts published against the Protestants, 51. Rigorous tri- 
 bunals erected, 52. New bishoprics established, ib. The country filled with Spanish 
 troops, 53. The duchess of Parma appointed regent, 54. Speech of the bishop of 
 Arras to the convention of States at Ghent, ib. Apprehensions of the people, 55. 
 Arbitrary conduct of cardinal Granvelle, 107. The number of Protestants increase by 
 persecution, 109. Count Egmont’s embassy to Spain, 112. Result of deliberations to 
 stop the growth of heresy, 114. The enforcement of the edicts against Protestants 
 revived, 115. A confederacy against the establishment of the inquisition entered 
 
 1 into, 116. Speech of the prince of Orange in council, 117. The subscribers of the 
 compromise petition the regent, 120. Intemperate zeal of the reformers, 121. The 
 regent raises forces, 125. Valenciennes and Antwerp garrisoned, 128. Quiet re- 
 stored, 129. The duke of Alva sent thither with an army, 132. The prince of 
 Orange retires to Germany, ib. The Counts Horn and Egmont imprisoned, 133. 
 The inhabitants desert to foreign parts, ib. The duchess of Parma retires, 134. The 
 extraordinary powers Alva was invested with, ib. The Council of Tumults established, 
 135. The violent proceedings of Alva, ib. Count Lewis of Nassau raises an 
 army, 142. Defeats Count Aremberg, 143. Deaths of the Counts Egmont and 
 Horn, 147. Count Lev'is defeated by the duke of Alva, 149. The prince of Orange 
 raises an army and publishes a manifesto, 150. Is obliged to disband his forces, 153. 
 Tyrannical prosecutions of the duke of Alva, 176. Great desertion of the inhabitants, 
 177. The people inflamed by taxation, 180. Opposition of the assembly of the 
 States, 181. Act of indemnity published, 184. Its reception, ib. Resolute con- 
 duct of the States of Utrecht, 186. The city of Utrecht filled with soldiers, ib. 
 
 O O 
 
562 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Intrigues of the prince of Orange, 189. The fort of Louvestein surprised by Herman 
 de liuyter, ib. The duke of Alva publishes an edict for the immediate payment of 
 his taxes, 190. Violent commotions, especially at Brussels, 191. The Brill taken 
 by the exiles, ib. Count de Bossut massacres the townsmen of Rotterdam, 195. 
 Revolt of Flushing, 196. Revolt of the other towns of Zealand, 198. Siege of 
 Middleburg, ib. The duke de Medina Ceeli’s fleet destroyed, 199. Other captures 
 at sea, 200. Siege of Tergoes, ib. Extraordinary relief of, 203* Revolt of the 
 province of Holland, 204. Mons seized by Count Lewis of Nassau, 208. Ruremond 
 and other towns taken by the prince of Orange, 213. Mons taken by Alva, 220. 
 Mechlin plundered by Alva’s troops, ib. Barbarities exercised at Zutphen, 221. 
 Assembly of the States of Holland at Dort, 224. Massacre at Naerden, 229. Alva 
 removed, and the duke de Medina Coeli appointed governor, 248. Who, declining the 
 charge, is succeeded by Requesens, ib. ineffectual negotiations for peace at Breda, 
 269. Reduction of Ziricsee by the Spaniards, 277. Death of Requesens, 279. 
 Mutiny of the Spanish troops, 280. They sack the city of Antwerp, 285. Pacifica- 
 tion of Ghent, 287. The prince of Orange’s advice to the States, 289. They apply 
 to foreign powers for aid, 290. Form a new deed of union at Brussels, 291. Their 
 treaty with Don John of Austria, ib. The departure of the Spanish troops, 293. The 
 castle of Namur seized by Don John of Austria, 296. The States get a number of 
 towns into their possession, 298. Invite the prince of Orange to reside at Brussels, 
 299. The prince is counteracted by the duke of Arschot, 300. The archduke 
 Matthias chosen governor, 301. A new treaty of union, 303. The duke of Anjou 
 applied to for assistance, 304. Return of the Spanish troops, 306. Battle of Gem- 
 blours, 307. The powers of the prince of Orange and the archduke Matthias en- 
 larged, 308. The States conclude a treaty with the duke of Anjou, 309. The 
 operations of their numerous forces obstructed by dissensions, 310. The decree called 
 the Peace of Religion, 311, Discord between the Flemings and the Walloons, 312. 
 Their forces dispersed, 313. The death of Don John of Austria, 314. The prince of 
 Parma appointed governor, 316. He lays siege to Maestricht, 317. Maestricht taken 
 by surprise, 319. The Walloons gained over by the prince of Parma, 321. The 
 treaty called the union of Utrecht, 323. Conferences for peace at Cologne, 325. 
 The States resolve to transfer their allegiance from Philip to the duke of Anjou, 353. 
 The sovereignty conferred on him, 357. All allegiance to Philip of Spain solemnly 
 abjured by the United States, 360. Return of the Spanish troops, 366. Attempt of 
 the duke of Anjou on the city of Antwerp, 370. Reconcilement of the States with 
 the duke, 378. Discontents of the people, 379. Death of the duke of Anjou, 384. 
 The prince of Orange assassinated, ib. Is succeeded in his offices by his son, Prince 
 Maurice, 390. Great progress of the prince of Parma, ib. Siege of Antwerp, 391. 
 The city capitulates, 406. Brabant deserted by many of its inhabitants, 407. Their 
 critical situation on the death of the prince of Orange, 409. Offer the sovereignty to 
 the king of France, ib. To the queen of England, 414. Treaty with Elizabeth, 416. 
 The earl of Leicester sent to their assistance, 417. Great famine and pestilence, 128. 
 Ill consequences of the duke of Parma’s expedition to France to the Spanish cause, 473. 
 Death of the duke of Parma, 486. Count Mansveldt appointed governor, 488. 
 Ernest, archduke of Austria, appointed governor, 494. Who is succeeded by the count 
 de Fuentes, 502. Cambray delivered up to Fuentes by the citizens, 507. The Arch- 
 duke Albert appointed governor, 513. The sovereignty of, transferred to him, 533. 
 This deed, how received there, ib. See United Provinces. 
 
 Nimeguen is taken by prince Maurice, 475. 
 
 Norris , colonel, distinguishes himself at the head of a body of English, at tho battle of 
 Rimenant, 308. 
 
 Noyon is besieged by Count Mansveldt, 488. 
 
 Nuys, the destruction of, by the Spanish troops, 421. 
 
 O. 
 
 Oran, besieged by the corsair Hasccm, 71. The siege raised by the Spaniards, ib. 
 
 Orange, William I., prince of, his family and character, 56. Origin of the disgust between 
 him and Philip II. of Spain, 57. Applies for the removal of cardinal Granvelle, 1 10. 
 Opposes the admission of the decrees of the council of Trent, 111. Opposes the 
 instructions given to Count Egmont, 113. Declines enforcing the edicts against the 
 Protestants, 115. His speech in the council, 117. Punishes the rioters at Antwerp, 
 122. Tolerates the reformers, 123. His reasons for this indulgence, ib. Desires 
 leave to resign his employments, 125. Is informed of the king’s secret intentions 
 
INDEX. 
 
 563 
 
 against liim, 126. Retires to Germany, 132. Refuses to obey the duke of Alva s 
 citation, with his reasons, 140. His estates confiscated, ib. Applies to the Emperor 
 Maximilian for his interposition, ib. llis inducements to take up arms, 141. Pub- 
 lishes a manifesto, 150. Professes the reformed religion, 151 . Passes the Maese, ib. 
 Offers Alva battle, 152. Is obliged to disband his army, 153. Prepares to resume 
 his operations for the relief of the Netherlands', 188. Grants a commission to the 
 Count de la Marck, 192. Gives the command of all the forces in Zealand to the 
 Count Tserart, 198. The province of Holland induced to revolt by his negotiations, 
 204. His military preparations, ib. Takes Ruremond, 213. Is received at Mechlin, 
 214. Takes several other towns, ib. Endeavours in vain to provoke Alva to an 
 engagement, 217. Is attacked and worsted, 218. Disbands his army, and returns to 
 Holland, 219. Receives a supply of money from the assembly of the States at Doi t, 
 225. Is appointed commander-in-chief of all their forces, ib. His moderation and 
 prudent regulations, 227. Establishes the reformed religion, ib. Equips a fleet 
 against the Spanish at Middleburg, 251 . Reduces Middleburg, 252. Seizes the town 
 of Bommel, 260. His measures for the relief of Leyden, 264. His attempts to relieve 
 Ziricsee, 278. Projects the union of the provinces, in the pacification of Ghent, 287. 
 His advice to the States on the arrival of Don John of Austria, 289. Goes, by invi- 
 tation, to reside at Brussels, 299. Is counteracted by the duke of Arschot, 300. 
 Pacifies the people of Ghent, 320. Accomplishes the association called the Union of 
 Utrecht, 323. His reply to Philip’s private offers, 326. Sends assistance to Sebastian, 
 king of Portugal, against the emperor -of Morocco, 330. Justifies his conduct against 
 the popular clamours, 348. Advises the States to renounce their allegiance to Philip, 
 350. Is proscribed by Philip, 358. His apology addressed to the States, 359. An 
 attempt made to assassinate him, 364. His advice to the States on the duke of Anjou’s 
 treachery, 375. Other attempts made to get him assassinated, 378. Leaves Antwerp 
 on account of injurious suspicions entertained against him, 381. Is killed by Balthazar 
 Gerard, 384. His character, 387. Abstract of his famous apology, 538. See 
 Maurice. 
 
 P. 
 
 Pacheco, Don Pedro de, put to death by the inhabitants of Flushing, 197. 
 
 Paris , massacre of the Protestants there, 215. Is invested by Henry IY. of France, 
 464. Great distress of the Parisians, 467. The siege raised by the arrival of the 
 duke of Parma, ib. Submits to Henry IV. after his conversion, 495. 
 
 Parma, Margaret, duchess of, made regent of the Netherlands, 54. Persecutes the Pro- 
 testants in concert with cardinal Granvelle, 107. Publishes the decrees of the council 
 of Trent, 112. Sends Count Egmont to Spain, ib. Appoints a conference, to consider 
 of means to stop the growth of heresy, 114; which offends Philip, ib. Revives the 
 persecution of the Protestants, ib. Her answer to the petition of the nobles, 120. 
 Transmits the petition to Spain, 121. Raises forces by Philip’s command, 125. Her 
 success in suppressing the reformers, 1 27. Dissuades Philip from sending an army 
 into the Low Countries, 131. Obtains leave to retire from the Netherlands, 184. 
 
 , Alexander Farnese, prince of, lays siege to Navarino, 171. Is ordered by Philip 
 
 to lead the Spanish troops back to the Netherlands, 306. Battle of Gemblours, 307. 
 Is appointed to succeed Don John of Austria as governor of the Netherlands, 316. 
 His character, ib. Besieges Maestricht, 317. Takes the town by surprise, 319. 
 
 . Gains over the Walloons, 321. Possesses himself of Courtray, 354. Is forced to 
 abandon the seige of Cambray by the duke of Anjou, 362. Obtains a return of the 
 Spanish troops, 366. Takes Dunkirk, 380. With several other towns, ib. 382, 
 Bruges, delivered up to him by the prince of Chimai the governor, 383. Reduces 
 several principal towns, 390. His lenity towards the inhabitants, 391. Besieges 
 Antwerp, ib. Blockades the Scheld by a bridge, 393. Description of this bridge, 394. 
 Repairs the bridge after an attempt made to destroy it, 400. Fortifies the counter- 
 dyke of Couvestein, 401. Recovers the possession of it, 404. The city of Antwerp 
 submits to him, 406. His great power in the Netherlands, 409. Takes Grave in 
 Brabant, 419. Besieges Yenlo, 420. Takes the town by capitulation, ib. His 
 motives to attack Nuys, 421. Lays seige to Rhineberg, 422. Besieges Sluys, 430. 
 Dissuades Philip from invading England, 437. His preparations to co-operate with 
 the Invincible Armada, 443. Meditates the seige of Bergen-op-Zoom, 452. Is de- 
 . ceived by two English soldiers, 453. Abandons the attempt, 454. His difficulties 
 and anxiety, ib. Mutiny among his Spanish troops, 457. Sends a reinforcement to 
 the duke of Mayenne, 464. His first expedition into France, 465. Comparison be- 
 tween him and Henry IV., ib. His wise precautions on entering France, 466. Raises 
 
564 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 the siege of Palis, 467. Deceives Henry by a stratagem, 468. Takes Lagnv, 469. 
 Possesses himself of Corbeil, 471. Returns to the Netherlands, ib. His cavalry de- 
 feated by Prince Maurice, 474. Marches again into France, 477, Invests the town 
 of St. Esprit de Rue, 479. Raises the siege of Rouen, ih. Is wounded at Caudbee, 
 480. His army blocked up by Henry IV. at Caux, 481. Escapes by passing the 
 Seine, 482. Returns to the Netherlands again, 483. Is ordered back to France, and 
 dies, 486. His character, 487. 
 
 Paxil IV., Pope, his character and conduct, 16. The ambition of his nephews, 17. Cause 
 of his animosity to the Emperor Charles V., ib. Concludes an alliance with France 
 against the emperor, 18. Induces Henry to break the truce of Vaucelles, 23. His 
 violent conduct, 24. Passes a sentence to deprive Philip II. of the sovereignty of 
 Naples, 25. His dominions invaded by the duke of Alva, 27. Obtains a truce, 28. 
 His forces defeated by Colonna, 29. Obtains peace from Philip, 35. Dies, 45. 
 
 Payette , sieur de, takes San Gertrudenberg from the Spaniards. 247. 
 
 Pembroke , earl of, joins the duke of Savoy with a body of English forces, 31. Is sent 
 home, 34. 
 
 Pennon de Velez , the fort of, reduced by Don Garcia de Toledo, 7*2. 
 
 Perez, Antonio, his base treatment by Philip II. of Spain, 483. 
 
 Philip II. king of Spain, his birth and education, 1. His character, ib. His first 
 marriage, ib. Is called by his father into the Low Countries, 2. Unpopularity of his 
 manners, ib. Disgusts the Germans, 3. Returns to Spain, 4. Marries Mary, queen 
 of England, ib. Summary of the marriage articles, 5. Arrives in England, 7. His 
 behaviour and manners, ib. Is refused the ceremony of coronation, ib. His en- 
 deavours to remove the prejudices entertained against him, 8. Instigates a persecution 
 of the English Protestants, ib. Leaves England, 9. His undutiful behaviour to his 
 father, ib. Review of his dominions, and the extent of his power, 12. Dependence 
 of the Pope on him, 13. His conduct on Henry II. of France breaking the truce of 
 Vaucelles, 25. Is deprived of the sovereignty of Naples by the sentence of Pope Paul 
 IV., ib. His scruples as to opposing the Pope by violence, explained, 26. Orders 
 Alva to invade the Pope’s dominions, 27. Levies forces in the Low Countries against 
 France, 30. Engages England in the war, ib. His behaviour on the victory at St. 
 Quentin, 33. Takes the town, 34. Neglects the improvement of his advantages, ib. 
 Concludes a peace with the Pope, 35. His motives to desire a peace with France, 39. 
 Projects a marriage with Queen Elizabeth, 41. His conduct with respect to his allies, 
 42. State of his affairs in Italy on the peace of Chateau Cambresis, and death of 
 Henry II. of France, 45. His aversion to the Flemings, 50. His edicts against the 
 Protestants, 51. His rigorous tribunals for the extirpation of heresy, 52. Fills the 
 Netherlands with Spanish soldiers, 53. Appoints the duchess of Parma regent, 54. 
 Meets a convention of the States at Ghent, ib. His inflexibility in religion, 55. 
 Origin of the disgust between him and the prince of Orange, 57. Returns to Spain, 
 60. His partiality to Spain, ib. Orders Caranza, archbishop of Toledo, to be pro- 
 secuted by the Inquisition, 63. Enjoys the spectacle of an Auto-da-fe, ib. The 
 prudence of his civil government, 64. His unsuccessful armament against Tripoli, 67. 
 His great preparations to reduce Pennon de Velez, 72. Wishes to exclude all Protest- 
 ants from attending the council of Trent, 79. Acknowledges the authority of the 
 council, and orders obedience to its decrees, 84. His vigorous measures to assist 
 the knights of Malta against the Turkish invasion, 87. But ungenerously neglects 
 assisting them, 102. Sends troops at length who defeat the Turks, 103. Evades the 
 prince of Orange’s application for the removal of cardinal Granvelle, 110. His recep- 
 tion of Count Egmont, 1 13. Is offended at the consultation about means to stop the 
 growth of heresy in the Netherlands, 114. The grounds of his aversion to the prince 
 of Orange, and the Counts Horn and Egmont, 124. Resolves to awe the Netherlands 
 by an army, 131. Sends Alva thither, 132. The extraordinary powers ho invested 
 Alva with, 134. History of his son Don Carlos, 138. Orders him to be poisoned, 
 139. His reply to Maximilian’s remonstrance on the duke of Alva’s conduct, 141. 
 Is instigated against his Moresco subjects, 156. Disarms them, 157. His oppressive 
 edict against them, ib. The province of Granada revolts, 159. Makes slaves of the 
 prisoners, 162. His dreadful severities against the revolters when subdued, 165. 
 Enters into a league with the Pope and Venetians against the Turks, 166. His be- 
 haviour on the victory of Lepanto, 169. Recedes from his demand of the tenth and 
 twentieth pennies from the Netherlands, 223. Is persuaded by the Emperor Maxi- 
 milian to negotiate with the prince of Orange, 269. Appoints Don John of Austria 
 governor of the Netherlands, 287. Absolutely refuses to remove him, and ratify tho 
 election of Matthias, 307. Motives of his neglect in supporting Don John of Austria, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 565 
 
 314. Is suspected of poisoning him, 315. Consents to the treaty between the prince 
 of Parma and the Walloons, 322. His conduct in the conferences at Cologne, 325. 
 His private offers to the prince of Orange, 326. His interview with Sebastian king of 
 Portugal, 329. His negotiations with Muley Moluc and the Turkish sultan, ib. His 
 pretensions to the kingdom of Portugal, 333. His manifesto, 336. Invades Portugal, 
 839. Conquers it, 345. Offers a reward for the life of the prince of Orange, 358. 
 All allegiance to him solemnly abjured by the States of the United Provinces, 360. 
 His attention fo the affairs of France, 411. Enters into a treaty with the Duke of 
 Guise, ib. Meditates the conquest of England, 436. His Invincible Armada, 442. 
 This fleet totally ruined, 449. His magnanimity on this disaster, 450. His views on 
 France, 464. Sends the duke of Parma to France to oppose Henry IV., 465. Orders 
 the duke of Parma to march again to the assistance of the League in France, 477. His 
 base treatment of Escovedo, and Antonio Perez, 483. Sends troops to. chastise 
 the people of Arragon, 485. Abolishes the constitution of the Arragonian government, 
 486. Appoints Count Mansveldt governor of the Netherlands, 488. Procures a con- 
 vention of the States of the Catholic League in France, ib. His interested views dis- 
 covered by the French, 489. State of his affairs, 493. Appoints the Archduke Ernest 
 governor of the Netherlands, 494. His motives for continuing hostilities against Henry 
 IV. of France, 496. His reply to Henry’s declaration of war, 504. Invades Bur- 
 gundy, 509. Undertakes a descent upon Ireland, 521. Cadiz plundered by the 
 English, ib. His fleet against Ireland destroyed by a storm, 522. His expedient to 
 free himself from his pecuniary embarrassments, 527. His motives to a peace with 
 France, 529. Concludes a peace at Vervins, 531. Resigns the sovereignty of the 
 Netherlands to his son-in-law the Archduke Albert, 533. His illness and death, 534. 
 His character, 535. 
 
 Piali, the Turkish admiral, destroys the Spanish fleet under the duke of Medina Coeli, 68. 
 Commands the Turkish fleet sent against Malta, 86. 88. 
 
 Pius IV., Pope, dissuades the duke of Savoy from calling a provincial synod, 77. Is 
 forced to agree to the re-assembling of the council of Trent, 78. Governs the pro- 
 ceedings of the council, 80. Dissolves the council abruptly, 81. Confirms its decrees 
 by a bull, 82. 
 
 V., Pope, his character, 166. Applies to the princes of Europe to unite against the 
 
 Turks, ib. His death, 171. 
 
 Plumart, his expedient for raising the siege of Tergoes, 201. 
 
 Portocarre.ro , governor of Dourlens, his stratagem for the surprise of Amiens, 525, Is 
 besieged and killed there, 527. 
 
 Portugal , state of, at the time of the resignation of the Emperor Charles V., 13. State 
 of the disputed succession to the crown, 328. Death of king Sebastian, 332. Acces- 
 sion of Don Henry, 333. State of the pretensions of several candidates for the succes- 
 sion, ib. Don Antonio declared illegitimate, 336. Death of Don Henry, 337. Don 
 Antonio proclaimed king, 340. Is invaded by the Spaniards, ib. Lisbon submits to 
 Alva, 342. Is entirely subjected, 345. 
 
 Protestants , cruel edicts published against, in the Netherlands, by the Emperor Charles V. 
 and Philip II. of Spain, 51. Inquisitorial proceedings against them, 52. Refuse to 
 attend the council of Trent, and why, 79. Valenciennes reduced and garrisoned, 128. 
 Massacre of, at Paris, 216. 
 
 Q- 
 
 Quentin , St., is besieged by the duke of Savoy, 31. The French army under Montmo- 
 rency, defeated there, 33. The town taken, 34. 
 
 R. 
 
 Reformation , the rapid progress of, 45. Penetrates even into Spain, 62. Progress of, 
 75, 112. See Protestants. 
 
 Reneberg, count of, is enticed over to the Spanish interest, 355. His death, 357. 
 
 Requesens , grand commendator, acts as lieutenant to Don John of Austria, at the battle of 
 Lepanto, 167. Succeeds the duke of Alva in the government of the Netherlands, 248. 
 His character, and first transactions, 250. Imprudently suffers the mutinous Spanish 
 troops to take possession of Antwerp, 258. Publishes an act of indemnity, 260. Be- 
 sieges Leyden, 261. Undei'takes the conquest of Zealand, 273. Transports a body 
 of forces through an arm of the sea to Duveland, ib. Besieges Bommene, 276. And 
 Ziricsee, 27 7. His death, 279. 
 
 Rimenant , battle of, 308. 
 
566 INDEX. 
 
 Riperda , his speech to the principal inhabitants of Haerlem, 231. Is beheaded by the 
 Spaniards, 243. 
 
 Rome , its dependence on Philip II. of Spain, 13. 
 
 Rone , the sieur de, persuades the Archduke Albert to undertake the siege of Calais, 514. 
 
 Is intrusted with the conduct of it, 515. Takes the town by stoi’m, 516. Is killed 
 at the siege of Hulst, 519. 
 
 Rotterdam , the townsmen of, massacred by count de Bossut, 195. 
 
 Rouen, is besieged by Henry IV. of France, 477. The siege raised by the duke of 
 Parma, 479. 
 
 Ruremond is seized by the prince of Orange, 213. 
 
 S. 
 
 Sacherlo, naval engagement of, between the Dutch and the Spaniards, 251. 
 
 Santa Croce , marquis of, commands the Spanish fleet employed against Portugal, 338. Is 
 appointed commander of the Invincible Armada, but dies, 443. 
 
 Savoy, Philibert Emanuel, duke of, commands an army in the Netherlands to act against 
 France, 30. Is joined by the earl of Pembroke, 31. Lays 6iege to St. Quentin, ib. 
 Defeats Montmorency there, 33. His ineffectual persecution of his reformed sub- 
 jects, 77. 
 
 Scheld, description of the prince of Parma’s fortified bridge over, for the blockade of 
 Antwerp, 394. 
 
 Schenk, Martin, his brave attempt for the relief of Yenlo, 420. Builds a fort on the 
 Rhine, and over-runs the country round, 456. Is killed in an attack on Nime- 
 guen, 457. 
 
 Schwartzenberg, Count, is sent by the emperor Maximilian to treat with the prince of 
 Orange, 268. 
 
 Sebastian, king of Portugal, his character, 328. Undertakes the invasion of Morocco, 
 329. His interview with Philip of Spain, ib. Lands in Africa, 330. Battle of Alca- 
 zar, 331. Is killed, 332. 
 
 Selim, Sultan, invades the island of Cyprus, 166. A league formed against him by pope 
 Pius V., Philip II. of Spain, and the Venetians, ib. His fleet'defeated at Lepanto, 167. 
 Concludes a separate peace with the Venetians, 171. Dies, 174. 
 
 Sessa, Don Carlos di, burned at an Auto-da-fe, in the presence of Philip II., 64. 
 
 Sidney , Sir Philip, death of, 423. 
 
 Sixtus V., Pope, encourages Philip II. of Spain to the invasion of England, 438. 
 
 Slays, besieged by the duke of Parma, 430. Capitulates, 432. 
 
 Solyman, emperor of the Turks, his conquests, 64. Destroys the Spanish fleet sent 
 against Tripoli, 68. His preparations to reduce the island of Malta, 86. His troops 
 driven from the island, 105. 
 
 Sonoy, Theodore, commander of the Dutch fleet, defeats Count Bossut the Spanish 
 admiral, 246. 
 
 Spain , the history of the Moors in, 155. The country desolated by the severities exer- 
 cised against them, 156. Revolt of the province of Granada, 159. 
 
 Spanish troops, those under D’Avila in the Netherlands, mutiny for "want of pay, 258. 
 Another mutiny of, 280. Seize Alost, ib. Are declared rebels by the council of 
 State, 281. See Navarese. 
 
 T. 
 
 Ter goes, siege of, 200. Its situation, 201. Extraordinary relief of, 203. * 
 
 Thionville is taken by the duke of Guise, 37. 
 
 Toledo , Caranza, archbishop of, is suspected of inclining to the reformed opinions, 63. Is 
 prosecuted in the inquisition by order of Philip II., ib. 
 
 , Frederic de, son of the duke of Alva, blockades Mons, 212. Lays divers towns 
 
 under contribution, 224. His barbarous treatment of Zutphen, ib. His great pro- 
 gress in reducing the revolted towns, 229. His cruel massacre at Naerden, ib. Be- 
 sieges Haerlem, 233. Is ordered by his father to persevere in the siege, 238. His 
 perfidious barbarity to the garrison and inhabitants, 242. His troops mutiny, 243. 
 Besieges Alcmer, 244. 
 
 , Don Garcia de, reduces the fort of Pennon de Velez, 73. Is made viceroy of 
 
 Sicily, 74. 
 
 Tournay, the tumults of the reformers there quieted by Count Horn, 124. 
 
 Tournhout, battle of, between Prince Maurice and the count de Varras, 523. 
 
 Trent , summary account of the council of, 76. State of Europe at that time, ib. The 
 
INDEX. 
 
 567 
 
 meeting of, revived by Pope Pius IV., 78. Reasons why the Protestants refused to 
 attend it, 79. Is governed by the Pope and his legates, 80. Is abruptly concluded, 81. 
 Its decrees confirmed by a papal bull, 82. Its decrees rejected by the court of 
 France, 83. 
 
 Tripoli taken and fortified by the corsair Dragut, 67. Unsuccessful expedition of the 
 Spaniards against, ib. 
 
 Tserart, count de, defends the province of Zealand for the prince of Orange, 198. Be- 
 sieges Middleburg, ib. Besieges Tergocs, 200. 
 
 Tunis is taken by Don John of Austria, 172. Is retaken by the Turks, 173. 
 
 V. 
 
 Valdez is intrusted by Requesens with the reduction of Leyden, 262. Confines his 
 operations to a blockade, 263. Is forced to raise the siege, 267. Is accused by his 
 soldiers of being bribed, and is ill treated, 268, note. 
 
 Valenciennes , the city of, reduced and garrisoned by the regent, 1 28. 
 
 Valor , Don Ferdinand de, is elected king by the Moresco inhabitants of Grenada, 159. Sec 
 A ben Humeya. 
 
 Varambon, marquis of, is defeated by colonel Vere, 457. Is defeated and taken prisoner 
 by marshal Biron, 520. 
 
 Varas, count de, is defeated and killed by Prince Maurice, 524. 
 
 Vargas , a Spanish officer, plunders Maestricht, 283. 
 
 Vaucelles, truce of, procured by the emperor Charles V. previous to his resignation, 11. 
 Is broken hy Henry II. of France, 23. 
 
 Velasco , constable of Castile, invades Burgundy, 509. Is worsted by Henry IV., and 
 retires, ib. 
 
 Venice , political situation of, at the time of Charles V. resigning his dominions, 14. 
 
 Venlo, is besieged by the prince of Parma, 420. Capitulates, ib. 
 
 Verdugo defends Groningen for the Spaniards against Prince Maurice, 499. 
 
 Vere, colonel, defeats the marquis of Verambon, and relieves Rhinberg, 457. Distin- 
 guishes himself at the siege of Deventer, 474. 
 
 Vervins, conferences held there for a peace between France and Spain, 529. The peace 
 concluded, 531. 
 
 Viglius, president of the council to the duchess of Parma regent of the Netherlands, his 
 arguments for receiving the decrees of the council of Trent, 111. Offers a remon- 
 strance to Philip, against the barbarity of Alva’s administration, 133. His objections 
 to Alva’s taxations, 183. 
 
 Villars, sieur de, defends Rouen against Henry IV. of France, 477. His vigorous sally 
 to raise the siege, 478. Is defeated and killed before Dourlens, 506. 
 
 Vitelli, marquis of, his advice to the duke of Alva, 210. His death, 279. 
 
 Ulloa, Osorio de, conducts a body of Spanish troops through an arm of the sea, to Duve- 
 land, 274. 
 
 Uluccialli, the corsair, saves a part of the Turkish fleet from destruction at the battle of 
 Lepanto, 169. Is made commander-in-chief by sultan Selim, 170. Retakes Tunis 
 from Don John of Austria, 173. 
 
 United Provinces of the Netherlands, the first foundation of that republic laid by the 
 treaty called the Union of Utrecht, 323. The sovereignty of them conferred on the 
 duke of Anjou, 357. All allegiance to Philip of Spain solemnly abjured, 360. The 
 prince of Orange assassinated, 385. Their critical situation on this event, 409. Offer 
 the sovereignty to Henry III. of France, ib. To Queen Elizabeth of England, 414. 
 Treaty with Elizabeth, 416. Leicester made governor and commander-in-chief, 417. 
 They remonstrate to him on his arbitrary conduct, 425. Represent their grievances 
 to Queen Elizabeth, 427. Prosperity of, 429. Assist Elizabeth with ships to oppose 
 Philip’s projected invasion of England, 442- Prince Maurice made governor of Guel- 
 derland and Overyssel, 460. Reject the Archduke Ernest’s offer of treating for peace, 
 495. Groningen united to the confederacy, 501. Enter into an alliance with Heury 
 IV. of France, 504. Undertake their first expedition into India, 512, note. See 
 Netherlands. 
 
 Utrecht , the States of, oppose the imposition of the tenth penny, 185. Is filled with 
 Spanish soldiers at free quarters, 186. The treaty called the union of, 323. 
 
 W. 
 
 Walloons , source of the quarrel between them and the Flemings, 312. Commence hos- 
 tilities against them, 313. Are gained over by the prince of Parma, 321. 
 
568 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 JVial , Sir Thomas, his insurrection in opposition to Queen Mary’s marriage, 6. 
 
 Willoughby, Lord, succeeds the earl of Leicester in the command of the English troops in 
 the Netherlands, 452. 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zealand , the province of, revolts against the Spaniards, 198. Measures taken there to 
 withstand the Spanish power, 223. The Zealanders, destroy the Spanish fleet under 
 Adolphus Hanstede at Antwerp, 259. The conquest of that province undertaken by 
 Requesens, 273. Siege of Bommene, 27G. Siege of Ziricsee, 277. 
 
 Ziricsee besieged by the Spaniards under ltequesens, 277. Surrenders, 279. 
 
 Zutphen , its situation, 222. The cruelties practised^there by Don Frederic de Toledo, ib. 
 Is besieged by the earl of Leicester, 422. Is taken by Prince Maurice, 473. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON I 
 
 HKADItURY AND EVANS, J'MNtEK.s, WHITEFJUARS.