’LIBRARY OF THE |?*'!V f -R^|TV or !j 1 , ?=50!<; Sales of Arms to French Agents, SPEECH HON. IATT. H. CARPENTER, OF \V ISCONSTN, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 29, 1ST2. WASHINGTON: F. & J. RIVES & GEO. A. BAILEY, REPORTERS AND PRINTERS OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS. 1872. t fS w* S| S» W> za> ■ l r«« K+m ***' - 3 A m ca : :f j e- ;'•-) «« -■ - «® r-* e|; * 4 » ,*• C2 : S3 ns CSSASAO €3 i Sales of Arms to French Agents. ! ei lal affair’s of ur i ation, but : v course with foreign nations. He was respond ii.g to the toast ' National glory; a gem above ail price, and worthy ovary hazard to sustain its splendor.” That toast must have called to the old com lore’s mind the achieve ■ ments of himself and his brave companions on the seas. lie must have thought of the old ship in which he had sailed, of the flag always waving over them; and speaking of the intercourse of our country with other nations, he says: “Our country; in her hiterccursa with foreign nations may she always be in the right ”— So for the Senator approves it, and hopes si. c al way a will be in the right— , “ but our country, id:, it or wrong.” The Senator sn; s Ls cannot; subscribe to that, be cause he cannot: Aivhbe > anything v; t ou' • l But dees not the de udeer pcvecivo that ih.wba an important question back of this, namely, who is to determine whether our country be right or wrong? Tho United States has about forty millions of people. Now, suppose our country, the forty millions of its people unan¬ imously—save that the Senator from Massa¬ chusetts dissents—determine that it is right to pursue a certain line of foreign policy, or sup¬ pose that this people, by its representative, the Congress of the United States, passes judg¬ ment u-pon a certain controversy between us and England, that we are right and England wrong, and declare war to enforce the right ? Now the question is, whether the Senator freftn Massachusetts, an individual citizen of the United States, may resolve hitnself into a court ot review, and reverse the determination of the nation in regard to the rights of the nation; and thereupon determine that he cannot support what is wrong, and proceed to oppose his own country. The Senator may reply, that in determining what is right and what is wrong every individual must exercise ! his judgment in obedience to his conscience. Undoubtedly, so far as his conduct as an indi¬ vidual in matters of faith and Christian con¬ duct is concerned. I am not discussing the relations of a man to his Maker from a stand¬ point of high ethics or religion. I am not saying that as an individual Christian he may not when smitten upon one cheek turn the other also. But I am speaking of the rela¬ tions of a citizen to the Government which affords him protection, and to which he owes allegiance. Tne doctrine of non-resistance, however sound as a principle of religious faith, and however it may be binding upon the indi¬ vidual conscience in matters affecting the individual only, has not been ingrafted upon the law of nations; and no nation can exist which recognizes the right of one of its citizens to be at peace when it is at war, or to take I sides with its enemy in time of war. They who I enjo 3 r the protection of civil government are [ bound to sustain that government when in i perii, and any man who cannot conscientiously | do tins must abjure and depart from civilized j moiety, dress in goat skins, and dwell in the j wilderness. It is manifest that if a citizen may overrule oral disregard the judgment ofthe community of which lie is a member; if he may interpose his individual private judgment against the deliberate and pronounced judgment of the nation; if in a particular instance, in which his native country is engaged in war to enforce what it has determined to be right, a citizen may dissent from that judgment and contend against his country, then he may carry that opposition to the extent of taking up arms j against his country. The doctrine ofthe Sena temns the Consti¬ tution. of his country, and all the well-settled maxims of every Christian country upon this subject. It is evident that D< catur entertained differ- ? i eatim^nts, and ol fi >. di stand-point. The sentiment, which the Sen¬ ator from Massachusetts has so bitterly cou- i doomed wsn uttered by a great naval com-, j mender in tka pres ence of a parly of friends I assembled to'honor him for his- glorious ex¬ ploits in foreign seas. And it may safely be left to the people to determine whether he expressed sentiments worthy of a great naval officer, worthy of every citizen of every Christian country, or a sentiment which proves him to have been a heathen. Mr. SUMNER. The Senator does not im¬ agine any such case is before us flow. 8 Mr. CARPENTER. No; I have tried to || show that there was not any particular case j before us that called for the criticism which | the Senator passed upon Commodore Decatur, j Commodore Decatur was not on trial by im- ! peachment. Mr. SUMNER. I made no allusion to j Commodore Decatur. Mr. CARPENTER. That is a species of argument that would a great deal better be¬ come some other men that 1 know of than the Senator from Massachusetts. Here is a phrase coined by Commodore Decatur which has passed with commendation from that time to this. The Senator quotes it, and in his re¬ ported speech puts it in quotation marks, and then pronounces it a heathen sentiment. Mr. SUMNER. Because it has become a common-place of vicious politics. I did not attribute it to Commodore Decatur. The Sen j ator arrays the history and shows the sur¬ roundings with which he originally uttered it. 1 took it as it is afloat everywhere, a vicious sentiment, to be denounced, not to be de¬ fended by any Senator. Mr. CARPENTER. That explanation of it makes the Senator’s remark entirely proper; ! for if there was any subject that ever was all j afloat it is the preamble of the Senator’s reso- | lution, [laughter;] and anything which is! afloat also properly belongs to it, and is en- ' tirely germane to it. [Laughter.] I will, j therefore, pass the Senator’s criticism upon j this sentiment., crediting the Senator with I having given the best apology for it that he j could give. The phrase is all afloat, and so is ! his preamble ; let them float together. Mr. President, the principal motive I had in addressing the Senate at all this morning was to call attention to the precise question of in¬ ternational law that is involved in the floating preamble of the Senator from Massachusetts. That preamble assumes, and the debate of Opposition Senators supporting it has pro¬ ceeded upon the assumption, that if the United States sold these arms to France, or to any agent of France, knowing him to be such, that was a violation of the law of nations. I repeat, the friends of the Administration did not choose at that point to raise the legal question, but preferred to concede that it was so, and to meet the resolution by showing that the facts alleged did not exist. That has been triumphantly done. It may, however, be im¬ portant that, before this debate closes, atten¬ tion should be directed to the principle of international law involved. Nothing can be called trivial which affects the international relations of a great people. The principles wc recognize here by concessions in debate may come back to trouble us in future years ; and I desire here to say, without intending to prejudice any Alabama claim, that since 1861 the passion, the agony of this nation has driven us into extreme grounds against the rights of neutral nations; and our later writers, the American authors who are, I believe, the only ones who give any support to the docrine of the Senator from Massachusetts, have been j impelled to the extreme verge of doctrine by the circumstances in which the nation has been placed. I never sympathized with that motive. I never thought it wise for us with a view to get a few million pounds sterling more or less from England to abandon the high ground which we ought to take as to the rights of neutral nations. In 1868, after the close of our war, when the Government had a large supply of arms on hand, Congress passed the law which.has been frequently read : “ That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed ”— Thus leaving no discretion with him— “ to cause to be sold, after offer at public sale cn thirty days’ notice, in such manner and at such times and places at public or private sale as he may deem most advantageous to the public interest, the old cannon, arms, and other ordnance stores now in possession of the War Department, which are damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the United States military service.” &c. In the first place, it is evident from this aev that Congress was speaking of arms that could be sold. In other words, by styling them “unsuitable arms” it was not intended to advertise in advance that they were useless arms. These arms were not condemned by this act; the Secretary was not directed, as it was said yesterday, to sell these arms for old iron, nor to destroy them, or abandon them. He was directed to sell them. Therefore, by the word “unsuitable” it cannot be under¬ stood that Congress intended in advance to advertise them as useless, but, as was so well said by the Seuator from Iowa [Mr. Harlax] yesterday—who always goes into a discussion of a legal question by announcing that be is not a lawyer and then immediately proceeds to contradict himself by showing that he is ; for, of all the preachers of the Gospel I ever heard, he speaksmost like a lawyer thoroughly grounded and bottomed in legal principles and familiar with all the statutes ; I have never known him fire amiss on a legal question—he says that back as far as 1825 we had an act of Congress which directed the sale of arms. J was not aware of that; but it is all the better for the point I now wish to make. From 1825, then, down to the present time it has been the policy of our Government, as I believe it has been the policy of all Governments, to dispose of those arms which were unsuitable in the sense that more suitable weapons could be found. In 1868 this act was passed to enlarge the scope of the former law, as the Senator in¬ formed us yesterday, and to make it impera¬ tive on the Secretary of War to sell. In 1868, (starting with that statute, if there had been no other on the subject,) no war existed between France and Germany; none was apprehended. We all know that in 1870 when the war was declared it came like a thun¬ der-bolt from a clear sky upon the whole civil¬ ized world. Not thirty days before war broke out, did any man in the United States anticipate it? This statute was, therefore, passed, not with reference to any particular nation, or to 9 take advantage of the emergency of any par- j ticular nation created by a particular war. or j the market which a particular war would fur- ; nish; but the United States announced and j declared its policy to dispose of arms unsuit- j able in the sense before mentioned. In 1868, i after the passage of this act, during the entire j year 1869, and in the spring of 1870, it was j perfectly legitimate and lawful for the United States to sell those arms to Louis Napoleon directly and deliver them to him in the city of Washington, and the question now is whether after war was declared between France and i Germany in the summer of 1870 we as a nation j were precluded from carrying out our own pol- j icy in the disposition of our own property, | and that is the precise question. There are several principles here from which we may gain some light, applying their analo¬ gies to this case. It is well settled by the law of nations that if one nation be under obliga¬ tion by treaty with another, it will, in case that other shall be at war, furnish a certain number of ships of war, or such a supply of troops, of arms, or of ammunition, the sub¬ sequent, execution of that covenant by the nation after a war has broken out, does not violate her neutral obligations. Why? Be¬ cause she is performing a duty which she un¬ dertook at a time when there was no war, and when she could not have intended any harm to the particular opposing belligerent. Trea¬ ties of this kind are frequently made. The j first treaty. I believe, ever made by the United | States, the old treaty between us and France, secured to France exclusive privileges in our ports in case of a war between her and any other nation; and in Dana’s edition of'Whea¬ ton’s International Law, section four hun¬ dred and twenty-five, it is said: “Another case of qualified neutrality arises out of treaty stipulations antecedent to the commence¬ ment of hostilities, by which the neutral may be bound to admit the vessels of war of one of the bel¬ ligerent parties, with their prizes, into his ports, while those of the other may be entirely excluded, or only admitted under limitations and restrictions. Thus, by the treaty of amity and commerce of 1778, between the United States and France, the latter secured to herself two special privileges in the American ports: first, admission for her priva¬ teers with their prizes, to the exclusion of her ene¬ mies; second, admission for her public ships of war in case of urgent necessity to refresh, victual, re¬ pair, &c., but not exclusively of other nations at war with her. Under these stipulations, the United States not being expressly bound to exclude the public ships of the enemies of France, granted an asylum to Brit¬ ish vessels and those of other Powers at war with her. Great Britain and Holland still complained of the exclusive privileges allowed to France in respect to her privateers and prizes, while France herself was pot satisfied with the interpretation of the treaty by which the public ships of her enemies were admit¬ ted into the American ports. To the former, it was answered by the American Government that they enjoyed a perfect equality, qualified only by the exclusive admission of the privateers and prizes of France, whicu was the effect of a treaty made long before, for valuable considerations, not with a view to oircumstances, such as had occurred in the war of the French revolution, nor against any nation in particular, but against all nations in general, and which might, therefore, be observed without giving just offense to any.” That was the ground assumed by our Gov¬ ernment in the letter of Mr. Jefferson, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Hammond and others. This principle applies to the case in hand. A nation may furnish supplies to another nation and send them ships of war and troops if prior to the breaking out of the war she had bound herself by treaty to do so; and the philosophy of this is that in her subsequent performance of this contract she evinces no hostile purpose, no design to injure the nation against which they may be used. She made the treaty, not knowing what nation they would be used against. She cannot therefore be held to have had any hostile purpose. Now the philosophy of that rule is equally applicable to this statute. A statute made in 1868, when no human being anticipated a war between France and Germany, cannot beheld to evince any intention on the part of the United States to take part against Germany. It simply announces the purpose of the United States to dispose of these arms. Now the question is, whether the United States.had a right to do so after the war com¬ menced. In time of peace it is not denied; but the question is, whether, having com¬ menced the disposition of these arms in 1868, and continued it at intervals as often as pur¬ chasers came, the United States were com pelled to stop that traffic in 1870 when the war broke out between France and Germany. Mr. SHERMAN. May I interrupt my hon¬ orable friend, rather in aid of his argument, to read to him the law of 1825, under which, without respect to the statute now discussed, no doubt the President of the United States could sell these arms whenever in his judg¬ ment they were unsuitable for the public ser¬ vice ? That law is still the law. It is the aet of March 3, 1825: “That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to cause to be sold any ordnance, arms, ammunition, or other stores, or subsistence or medical supplies, which, upon proper inspection or survey, shall appear to bo damaged or otherwise unsuitable for the public service, when¬ ever, in his opinion, the sale of such unserviceable stores will be advantageous to the public service.” The only difference between the law com¬ mented upon now and the law of 1825 was that in this case the sale must be made at pub¬ lic sale, and also it must be after inspection by public officers. The law of 1868 simply repealed these two restrictions. Mr. CARPENTER. I thank my friend for the interruption and for the reference to the statute. I now repeat that this policy of the country, as shown by these statutes, to dispose of arms unsuitable, in the sense referred to, was a settled policy of this Government prior to the breaking out of the war between Germany and France ; and in that light we come to con¬ sider whether the breaking out of a war between these two nations suspended our right to do what we could have done prior to that time. The Senator from Massachusetts, in the first speech he made on the subject, referred to certain authorities which, in my judgment, do 10 not bear out the distinction which he makes. He quotes from Wheaton these words: “ To give no assistance where there is no previous stipulation to give it, nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or anything of direct use in war.” Vattel, as quoted then, says: ‘‘I do not say to give assistance equally, but to give no assistance, for it would be absurd that a State should assist at the same time two enemies.” Then he quotes from Halleck substantially the same language in two or three different places. Now, the distinction which is to be observed here is this: the nation here spoken of embarks in the enterprise of “sending” arms to another nation'for the purpose—that is, with the intention—of enabling it to use those arms against a nation then at war with it. That cannot be done, because that is tak¬ ing part in the war. But in all these quotations they speak of one nation “ sending” arms to another, not selling them, but “sending” them. Now, what are we to understand by a nation “ sending ” arms to another? Why, loaning them, furnishing them at our own expense. That is the sense in which I think all these authors upon the subject speak. After reading these quota¬ tions the Senator concludes: “ There is the true principle. In sending men or war materials he takes part in the war.” That is exactly the principle. If we send, if we furnish, if we give to France arms, ships, troops, munitions of war, for the purpose of enabling her to wage her contest against Prus¬ sia, we take part with her; we become a party to the war; we violate our neutral obligations. The Senator then quotes a case which, if it was a case, would be directly applicable; that is, the sale of ships by the Swedish Govern¬ ment, and the Spanish protest in 1825. The Senator read here the note of protest by the Spanish diplomat to the Government of Swe¬ den, protesting, in what the Senator called very energetic language, that the act was wrong. The Senator did not inform the Senate what reply the Swedish Government made or whether it made any, nor do I know. He did not state to the Senate whether the Swedish Govern¬ ment admitted the grounds assumed by the Spanish Government and made reparation. He does not say that Spain took up arms to enforce her theory, but he reads here an angry protest from the diplomatic agent of Spain against this act, as authority on the law of nations! Why, Mr. President, you might just as well read the brief of a lawyer on one side of an important litigation in the Supreme Court as determining what the law of the case is, as to read this protest of the Spanish min¬ ister, made in his own interest and under the excitement and pressure of war, to determine what the law of nations is ! We have a notable illustration of this in our history. During the rebellion in Hungary, our Government sent a private agent to examine into the true state of that rebellion, with a view, I suppose, of recognizing either their independence or their belligerent rights. That agent went there, performed his duty, returned, bringing back discouraging intelligence, upon which the Government became satisfied that no action could be based in favor of Hungary; and there the matter rested until at the next session of Congress the President seut his message, which informed Congress that he had sent such an agent there. Mr. Hulseman, the minister of Austria at that time in Washington, wrote to our Government a very strong note, protesting against that as a violation of our neutral duties and an act unfriendly to Aus¬ tria. Mr. Webster took up that letter and in that controversy he acquired one of those nice little “victories of peace” which our Govern¬ ment is justly proud of. He left nothing of Mr. Hulseman’s protest, and Austria made no further complaint. Now, suppose that in France or Germany or Italy some man wanting to know what the law of nations was on that subject should read Mr. Hulseman’s letter to our Secretary of State, and either not find or suppress Mr. Webster’s reply, would that protest settle the law of nations? Therefore, I say this sale of ships by Sweden is entirely aside. There is nothing of it except the protest made by Spain in angry mood against the act; no admission on the part of Sweden, that we know of, that she was wrong or that the protest was right. The Senator from Massachusetts concluded his first speech by saying: “Since the case of the Swedish ships, I know no instance where a nation has been called in question for selling arms to a belligerent. For the first time has the United States within my knowledge fallen under suspicion of violating the requirement of neu trality on this subject. Such seems to be our present position. We are under suspicion.” I would not charge the Senator from Massa¬ chusetts with being artful in any unparliament¬ ary sense, but I may say that that is one of the most artful dodges that rhetoric could possibly suggest. He commenced his speech by saying that somebody in France suspected that somebody in America had cheated France in this transaction—a mere suspicion of cheat¬ ing in dollars and cents in the purchase of certain arms. He concludes his speech, and having his fancy inflamed with the terrible con¬ dition of the nation being under suspicion of having some man in its whole forty million people who would cheat, he transfers that suspicion over to the subject of neutrality, and says : “ we are under suspicion of having vio¬ lated our neutral obligations.” Nobody sus¬ pects us of having done it that we know, ex¬ cept the Senators who support this preamble. There is no pretense here that France suspects it; no pretense that Prussia does ; no pretense that it is suspected by anybody except these Senators. Now, let us examine for a few moments the authorities upon this subject, and I shall do so as briefly as possible. In the first place, I will refer to Woolsey, who, I think, goes further than any other writer to sustain the view of tho Senator from Massachusetts. He*is an American writer, and the first edition of his 11 work was published, I think, in I860. Then I shall refer to Halleck, the first edition of whose works was published in 1861. Woolsey, at page 262, says: “A neutral State is one which sustains the rela¬ tions of amity to both the belligerent parties, or negatively is a non hostis, as Bynkershoek has it, one which sides with neither party in a war.” “There are degrees of neutrality I want to call the Senator from Massachu¬ setts to the distinction here made— “strict neutrality implies that a State stands en¬ tirely aloof from the operations of war, giving no assistance or countenance to either belligerent. Imperfect neutrality may be of two kinds: it may bo impartial, inasmuch as both belligerents have equal liberty to pursue the operations of war, or certain operations, such as transit of troops, pur¬ chase of military stores, enlistments of soldiers or seamen, within the neutral territory.” Again, on page 246, he says: “The principles from which we start seem to be clear enough; at the same time, for the reason that neutrality is a thing of degrees, and that the prac¬ tice of nations has been shifting, it is a little difficult to lay down with precision the law of nations in regard to it as it is at present understood. That law seems to be tending toward strict neutrality.” Here it is to be borne in mind that this author is speaking not with that precision which characterizes a writer on municipal law, stating affirmatively what the law is as settled by the adjudication of the courts. He cannot do that. There are no means of arriving with such certainty at what the law of nations is, and here is one of the difficulties that every man wishing to study this or any other topic under the law of nations has to encounter: that every book he takes up is more an essay on the ethics of the subject, than a statement of what has been universally recognized or agreed upon. Indeed, there are few things that have been universally agreed upon, very few things that are to-day unanimously assented to by the nations of the earth. The author proceeds: “A just war being undertaken to defend rights, each sovereignty must, as we have seem, decide for itself whether its war be just and expedient. It fol¬ lows that Powers not parties to the war must treat both belligerents alike as friends. Hence no priv¬ ilege can be granted or withheld from one and not equally from the other. Thus, if transit, or the en¬ trance into harbors of ships of war, for the purpose of refitting or of procuring military supplies, or the admission of captured prizes and their cargoes, is allowed to the one belligerent, the other may claim it also. Otherwise a State aids one of its friends in acts of violence against another, which is unjust, or aids a friend in fighting against another party, which is to be an ally and not a neutral.” And again : “ But the rule of impartiality is not enough. The notion of neutrality, to say nothing of the conven¬ ience of the neutral and his liability to be drawn into the war, demands something more. It is not an amicable act when I supply two of my friends with the means of doing injury, provided I do as much for one as for the other. Such a relation is not that of a medius inter hostes, but of an impartial enemy, of a jack on both sides. Moreover, it is impartiality in form only, when I give to two par¬ ties rights within my territories, which may be im- t ortant for the one and useless to the other. The nited States in a war between Great Britain and Prussia might allow both parties to enlist troops within its borders ; but what would such a privilege be worth to Russia? And, indeed, almost every privilege conceded by neutrals would be apt to inure more to the benefit of one than of the other of two hostile nations. A rule of greater fairness would be to allow nothing to the belligerents which either of them would object to as being adverse to his interests; but this rule would be subjective, fluctuating, and probably impracticable. A rule, again, expressive of strict neutrality, would pro¬ hibit the neutral from rendering any service spe¬ cially pertaining to war, or allowing his territory to be used for any military purpose by either belliger¬ ent. This, if we add the qualification, ‘unless en¬ gagements previous to the war concede some special assistance to one of the parties, which assistance is not of importance enough to convert a neutral into an ally,’ would nearly express what is the present law and usage of nations.” It is evident, I think, that this author is maintaining a theory which he thinks ought to be the law of nations ; rather predicting what it will be in the good time coming, than as¬ serting what is the law of nations to-day. Next, Martens’ Law of Nations. I have Cobbett’s edition, at page 820: "Of the Obligations of Neutrality—To observe an entire neutrality, a State must, first, abstain from all participation in warlike expeditions; second, it must grant or refuse nothing to one of the bel¬ ligerent Powers which may be useful or necessary to such Power in prosecuting the war without grant¬ ing or refusing it to the adverse pary: or, at least, it must not establish an inequality in order to favor one of the parties more than the other. “ The moment a neutral Power deviates from these rules its neutrality is no longer entire, but limited; and, indeed, though neutral States sometimes prom¬ ise more, and enter into a sort of conventional neu¬ trality, a limited neutrality is all that the laws of neutrality impose.” Now, take this author in connection with what Woolsey says: neutrality is a thing of degrees; he says strict neutrality would pre¬ vent your selling to either party ; aud limited neutrality, under the head of “impartiality,” which is one of his subdivisions of limited neutrality, will permit that, provided it is done to both nations alike. If your pretended sale is in bad faith, if you make it a mere cloak and pretext for taking sides in the war, selling at a particular juncture when your sale will ben¬ efit only one party, or if in any other way you intend—and it is all a question of intention— to give aid in the war, you become a party to it; but if.abstaining from such act, and having no such intention, you lawfully pursue your own business, as we were doing under these statutes, it . is preposterous to say we were taking part in the war against Germany. Again, section four: “ Every sovereign has a right, in time of peace, to grant or refuse to another Power the liberty of rais¬ ing troops in his territory, or of marching a body of troops into or through his territory; and may grant to one Power what he refuses to another. In time of war he may do the same. He has a right to grant or refuse to the belligerent Powers, and observe the same inequality toward them as he did in time of peace, without thereby deviating from the senti¬ ments of impartiality that ought to be entertained by every neutral Power.” What does he mean by this? He is refer¬ ring back to the exception made in the law of nations where a nation has entered into a treaty before the war to furnish another nation certain ships or supplies in case of a war, and that treaty it may make with any nation. We may make such a treaty, if we please, with Mexico, and refuse to make it with England. That is no cause of offense to England ; and if war cfomes between Mexico and England 12 we may do the same thing, because we are j exercising the same right we exercised before | the war, and not taking sides with either party | by doing what we have a right to do. This is going much further than is necessary to main¬ tain my proposition ; perhaps further than the other writers justify. Yattel, at page 340, says : “A neutral nation preserves, toward both the belligerent Powers, the several relations which nature has instituted between nations. She ought to show herself ready to render them every office of humanity reciprocally due from one nation to another; she ought in everything not directly relat¬ ing to war to give them all the assistance in her power, and of which they may stand in need. Such asssistancc, however, must be given with impar¬ tiality; that is to say, she must not refuse anything to one of the parties on account of his being at war with the other.” But you may refuse to enter into a treaty with one nation to furnish supplies in case she shall be engaged in war. You cannot, how¬ ever, after the war has been declared enter into such a treaty with one nation and deny it to the other, because that is taking sides with one nation against the other, and that is the distinction between the cases. The author proceeds: “But this is no reason why a neutral State, under particular connections of friendship and good neigh¬ borhood with one of the belligerent Powers, may not, in everything that is unconnected with war, grant him all those preferences which are due to friends; much less does she afford any grounds of exception to her conduct, if, in commerce, for in¬ stance, she continues to allow him such indulgences as have been stipulated in her treaties with him. She ought, therefore, as far as the public welfare will permit, equally to allow the subjects of both parties to visit her territories on business, and there to purchase provisions, horses, and in general every¬ thing they stand in need of—unless she has by a treaty of neutrality promised to refuse to both par¬ ties such articles as are used in war. Amid all the wars which disturb Europe, the Switzers preserve their territories in a state of neutrality. Every nation'indiscriminately is allowed free access for the purchase of provisions, if the country has a surplus, and for that of horses, ammunition, and arms.” But now I come, in Vattel, which I cite, page 234, section one hundred and ten, to the precise point which I have been endeavoring to estab¬ lish, drawing the distinction which 1 maintain exists between a nation pursuing the line of its own policy inaugurated during a peace, even past the time when war breaks out, and the creation of a new policy pending a war which is to have the effect to turn the scale between two contending nations: “First, no act on the part of a nation, which falls within the exercise of her rights, and is done solely with a view to her own good, without par- I tiality, without a design of favoring one Power to the prejudice of another—no act of that kind, I say, can in general be considered as contrary to neutrality ; nor does it become such, except on par¬ ticular occasions, when it cannot take place without injury to one of the parties, who has then a particu¬ lar right to oppose it. Thus, the besieger has aright to prohibit access to the place besieged, (see section one hundred and seventeen in the sequel.) Except in cases of this nature, shall the quarrels of others deprive me of the free exercise of my rights in the pursuit of measures which I judge advantageous to my people? Therefore, when it is the custom of a nation, for the purpose of employing and training her subjects, to permit levies of troops in favor of a particular Power to whom she thinks proper to in¬ trust them, the enemy of that Power cannot look upon such permissions as acts of hostility, unless they are given with a view to the invasion of his territories or the support of an odious and evidently unjust cause. He cannot even demand, as matter of right, that the like favor be granted to him, be¬ cause that nation may have reasons for refusing him which do not hold good with regard to his adversary; and it belongs to that nation alone to judge of what best suits her circumstances. The Switzers, as we have already observed, grant levies of troops to whom they please; and no Power has hitherto thought fit to quarrel Avith them on that head. It must, however, be owned”— Now he comes back to ethics and not to law, because no such case has ever arisen— “That if those levies were considerable and consti¬ tuted the principal strength of my enemy, Avhile, Avithout any substantial reason being alleged, I were absolutely refused all levies Avhatever, I should have just cause to consider that nation as leagued Avith my enemy; and in this case the care of my own safety would authorize me to treat her as such. "The case is the same Avith respect to money which a nation may have been accustomed to lend out at interest.” I wish to call special attention to the point made here by all these authorities. The whole subject seems to be one of good faith. If a nation has been accustomed to lend a fund of money; for instance, if we bad $100,000,000 set apart as an educational fund to lend to the States of the Union or to foreign nations in¬ differently, and had been accustomed to loan that money for years for interest, we might have lent it either to France or Germany dur¬ ing the war. Let me read that again : “ The case is the same with respect to money which a nation may have been accustomed to lend out at interest. If the sovereign, or-his subjects, lend money to my enemy on that footing, and refuse it to me because they have not the same confidence in me, this is no breach of neutrality.” In other words the point of loaning money to one nation and refusing to loan it to the other must rest on the ground that such dis¬ crimination is dictated only by the prudence of the nation making the loan ; it must be a case where the investment is made iu one case and denied in the other for prudential reasons touching our own interests, and not in bad faith, and from a desire and with a design to take part in the war. The intention settles the legality or illegality of the trans¬ action. If this country chooses to loan money, and loans it to a belligerent, because it wants to loan it, without any intention to prejudice the other party beyond what necessarily results from loaning money, it may do so. Vattel says: “They lodge their property where they think it safest. If such preference'ba not founded on good reasons’’— Here he comes back to the precise point— “I may impute it to ill-will against me, or to a pred¬ ilection for my enemy. Yet if I should make it a pretense for declaring war, both the true principles of the laAv of nations and the general custom hap¬ pily established in Europe would join in condemn¬ ing me. While it appears that this nation lends out her money purely for the sake of gaining an interest upon it, she is at liberty to dispose of it according to her own discretion; and I have no right to com¬ plain.” It will be seen that this author fully recog¬ nizes the right of any neutral nation to prose¬ cute the same measures of internal adminis¬ tration pending a war between other nations 13 that it was accustomed to before the war broke out. If we had a fund of money to lend, if we had ships and ammunition to sell long before this war commenced, and were loaning the money and were selling these'ships, then our continuing to do so in good faith, without any intention thereby to become a party to or to turn the scale between those two nations, violates no principle of the law of nations, as Vattel says, and gives no cause of complaint. Then he proceeds: “But if the loan were evidently granted for the purpose of enabling an enemy to attack me, this would be concurring in the war against me. “If the troops above alluded to were furnished to my enemy by the State herself, and at her own expense, or the money in like manner lent by the State, without interest, itwouldno longer be a doubt¬ ful question whethersuch assistance were incompati¬ ble with neutrality.” • Why? Because if she was accustomed to loan money upon interest, and in case of war should loan her money to one of the Powers without interest, she thereby changes her policy and shows her intention to influence the strife that is in progress between those Powers. Then the question of intention is settled by the circumstances of the case against the neutral. “ Further, it may bo affirmed on the same princi¬ ples, that if a nation trades in arms, timber for ship¬ building, vessels, and warlike stores, I cannot take it amiss that she sells such things to my enemy, pro¬ vided she does not refuse to sell them to me also at a reasonable price. She carries on her trade without any design to injure me; and by continuing in the same manner as if I were not engaged in war, she gives me no just cause of complaint.” Yattel then proceeds in section one hundred and eleven to the case of a neutral nation re¬ sorting to a belligerent country forcommercial purposes: “ In what I have said above, it is supposed that my enemy goes himself to a neutral country to make his purchases. Let us now discuss another case, that of neutral nations resorting to my enemy’s country for commercial purposes. It is certain, as they have no part in my quarrel, they are under no obligation to renounce their commerce for the sake of avoiding to supply my enemy with the means of carrying on the war against me. Should they affect to refuse selling me a single article, while at the same time they take pains to convey an abundant sup¬ ply to my enemy, with an evident intention to favor him, such partial conduct would exclude them from the neutrality they enjoyed. But if they only con¬ tinue their customary trade, they do not thereby declare themselves against any interest, they only exercise a right which they are under no obligation of sacrificing to me. “ On the other hand, whenever I am at war with a nation, both my safety and welfare prompt mo to deprive her, as far as possible, of everything which may enable her to resistor injure me. In this in¬ stance the law of necessity exerts its full force. If that law warrants me, on occasion, to seize what belongs to other people, will it not likewise warrant me to intercept everything belonging to war which neutral nations are carrying to my enemy? Even if I should, by taking such measures, render all those neutral nations my enemies, I had better run that hazard than suffer him who is actually at war with me thus freely to receive supplies, and collect additional strength to opposo me. It is therefore very proper, and perfectly conformable to the law of nations (which disapproves of multiplying tho causes of war) not to consider those seizures of tho goods of neutral nations as acts of hostility. “ When I have notified to them my declaration of war against such or such a nation, if they will afterward expose themselves to risk in supplying her with such things which serve to cany on war, they will have no reason to complain if their goods fall into my possession, and I, on the other hand, do not declare war against them for having attempted to convey such goods. They suffer, indeed, by a war in which they have no concern ; but they suffer accidentally. I do not oppose their right. I only exert my own; and if our rights clash with and re¬ ciprocally injure each other, that circumstance is the effect of inevitable necessity. Such collisions daily happen in war. When, in pursuance of my rights, I exhaust a country from which you derive your subsistence, when I besiege a city with which you carried on a profitable trade, I doubtless injure you ; I subject you to losses and inconveniences, but it is without any design of hurting you. I only make use of my rights, and consequently do you no inj ustice.” It i 3 evident, I think, that Yattel does not support the distinction made by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] between a sale of goods contraband of war, made by the sovereign, or one which is permitted by the sovereign to be made by his subjects. Sup¬ pose a nation to be engaged in the manufac¬ ture of arms, and to have been so engaged for a series of years, selling them to other nations. The question is whether, after a war breaks out between two other nations, to both of whom she has sold arms for years, she is for¬ bidden to continue such sale, taking of course the risk of such arms being intercepted and treated as contraband. The fact is, the writers on the law of nations—that is, the old stand¬ ard authors—recognize the right of neutrals to trade ia contraband with tho belligerent, but also recognize the right of one belligerent to prevent the advantage which would be enjoyed by its opponent from the purchase, by seizing and confiscating the contraband articles. Our modern writers have tried to eliminate this conflict of rights and criticise these rules by a principle which is sound in municipal law, that one cannot have a right to do what another has a right to prevent. Hence the conclusion that trade in articles contraband is illegal, and although it is admitted that the sovereign of a neutral nation may permit his subjects to carry on such trade, he cannot do so himself. But it is difficult to perceive how it can be innocent in a sovereign to permit his subjects to do what is in violation of the law of nations without incurring censure. A more satisfac¬ tory solution would seera to be that the prin¬ ciple of municipal law above mentioned has no place in a code which applies to parties— sovereign nations—which acknowledge no com¬ mon superior ; and that it necessarily results | that each may exercise its right; that is, the neutral sovereign may carry on his accustomed trade with a belligerent, subject to the same contingency that applies to such traffic when conducted by his subjects, that the prop¬ erty will be lost if it fall into the power of the opposing belligerent. And although I do not speak with confidence, not having examined as to this point particularly, because it is not involved in the case before us, yet my impres¬ sion is that no writer on the law of nations of fifty years standing recognizes any such dis¬ tinction against the sovereign of a neutral State. And no writer can be considered as an authority upon the law of nations whose work 14 has not stood the test of time and enjoyed the approving assent of the nations. Mr. President, I claim that these authorities establish the doctrine which I have attempted to maintain, that the Government of the Uni¬ ted States having, from 1825 to the present time, in peace and war, sold its unsuitable arms, and having in 1868 by this mandatory statute commanded the Secretary of War to sell them, long before any war was anticipated or existed, and subsequently the Secretary of War having merely obeyed this act iu the sale of these arms, I believe that if he had sold them in the city of Washington to Louis Napo¬ leon, and delivered them to him personally, it would have been no violation of our neutral obligations. I have desired to present this subject because of the importance it may have in the subsequent history of this country. Mr. President, we are a great nation ; we are advancing to the forefront among the Powers of the earth ; we cannot always be at peace, and we shall not always be at war ; but it is im¬ portant to us as a nation that in all these par¬ ticulars we should vindicate sound doctrine, that we should stand by the law of nations, and stand by all the principles and all the excep¬ tions as well as the rules, that hereafter we may be at liberty to take our proper ground under the laws of nations to protect our rights. There are special reasons why this country should maintain such a doctrine. Here we are with laws that permit the subjects of all foreign nations to become citizens of the Uni¬ ted States by our easy naturalization process. We have German citizens and English citi¬ zens, Irish citizens, French citizens, Italians, and will soon have from all the nations of the earth. Everybody now, I believe, can come here except the Chinese; the negroes from central Africa can come here and be natural¬ ized in five years. Now, see what will result if we do not stand by this doctrine. These mil¬ itary stores and arms, of course, will only be sold to be used in war; that everybody knows. They cannot be sold for any other purpose. When arms become unsuitable in the sense of this statute, they will not be bought by a pri¬ vate gentleman for sporting purpQses. That is not the object. They will be-sold when some great war creates a demand for them, and not otherwise ; and while they may be unsuitable for us in a time of peace and within the meaning of this statute, they may be very useful to a nation which must have them or fare worse. As was well said by the Senator from Iowa yesterday, a flint-lock mus¬ ket would be very unsuitable now for us; but if we had nothing better it would have to serve our purpose. So would a pitchfork, or a scythe, o-r a club, or a carving-knife, anything which will let blood is better than nothing in a con¬ test where blood must be let. Suppose a war breaks out to-morrow between France and England, another between Austria and Germany, another between Italy and Tur¬ key, here we have in our ranks subjects from every one of those nations; here we have men in full citizenship, and may have them from every one of those nations in the Senate of the United States. Is it to be tolerated by Americans that we, because we have these different classes of citizens, are to pursue another course than we otherwise would? Such a doctrine cannot be tolerated, because it would lead to great embarrassment. Men of these nationalities come here and are ad¬ mitted to citizenship upon the theory that they renounce in fact as well as form all allegiance to their own country, and cast their lot with us ; their interests the same with ours, their rights the same under our Constitution. The national policy which is good for the American is good for the German citizen ; and here he is an American, no longer a German. Whatever policy America should adopt to¬ ward Germany is g,s much for the interest of the German-American citizen as for any other American citizen. As an American citizen, whatever touches our interests as against Ger¬ many, concerns the German as well as the American citizen. In this connection let me say that I am not considering the Alabama claims, nor have I considered, nor do I care what might be the effect upon those claims of the doctrine for which I contend. And speaking here for one American citizen, binding nobody else, and, I trust, prejudicing no one else, let me say that I take no stock in those claims, cor in the case which we have made against England to be pre¬ sented to the board of arbitration in Geneva. If I could have had my way, the United States should have ascertained and paid all those claims and charged the amount over against Great Britain. It would have been a bond against that nation to keep the peace, worth ten times the amount of those claims. If England could abide by the principle of neu¬ tral obligations as illustrated by her conduct, I am certain we could. And if England to-day would, as there has been some apprehension, repudiate that treaty, I would tender her my personal thanks. I feel that, with a view to the prosecution of those claims, we have shackled our country. Our legal writers have contended for restrictions upon the rights of neutral nations which we cannot afford to have ingrafted into the law of nations, anu for which ten or twenty or fifty million dollars would be poor compensation. Situated as our country is, the English doctrine of neutrality is far more beneficial to us than our own, and I deeply regret the treaty which attempts to ingraft upon the law of nations principles which I believe to be most detrimental to us. Mr. President, I leave here the discussion of the principle of international law involved in the preamble and resolution before the Senate. But, sir, I cannot refrain from expressing the regret inspired by the debate which has occupied the Senate these many days. There are circumstances connected with it which I fear will exert a baleful influence. I shall not imitate the example which has been set by other Senators. I shall not say to the Senator from Missouri, as he said to the Senator from 15 New York, [Mr. Conkling,] that I pity him for the course he has taken. That Senator saw fit to indulge in a strain of debate never before witnessed on this floor. Years ago Mr. Webster resented as unparliamentary the words “ match, and over-match;” but, sir, the Senator from Missouri, assuming to descend from a superior plane of intelligence, ex¬ pressed his pity for the Senator from New York, that he had so grievously erred in offer¬ ing his amendment to this resolution. “How oft would I have gathered you into the fold of wisdom ; but ye would not. Senator from New York, I pity you.” This is the language held among equal Senators. I refer to the law when Isay “ equal Senators.” I know there may be great distinctions as regards learning, intellect, and influence; but as regards the courtesy due from one Senator to another, there is no dis¬ tinction among the members of this body, and such arrogance of language is as reprehensible as it is discourteous. But, sir, I regret this debate on account of the evil influence it can hardly fail to exert upon the American people. I have already acquitted the Senator from Mis¬ souri of a want ol patriotism in promoting this preamble and resolution upon the ground that he believes they rest upon no foundation of fact, and that he is simply attempting to pro¬ duce political effect by debate in advance of investigation. But all men may not be as charitable as I am. The mass of our citizens do not know that Senator as well as I do, and may not reason as technically as I have done. The theory of our naturalization laws' is that the German immigrant, landing upon our shores, and being admitted to citizenship under the United States, renounces in fact as in form all allegiance to and partiality for his native land, and becomes to all intents and purpose an American ; an American in inter¬ est, in principle, and in feeling. If this theory be found not to be vindicated by the fact, then our naturalization laws will go to the wall. If a German, landing upon our shores, seek¬ ing and obtaining admission to our nationality, and elected by our people to this Senate; a man of experience and cultivation, is not able to cast off hi s allegiance to his native land, and himself from affection toward his own country as to consult the interests of America even as against Germany; if he, in the American Senate, he a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and as such having access to the archives of the State De¬ partment and to all the secrets of our foreign policy; if he cannot rise above the feelings of partial love which, it may be charged, must bind every man to his native land, then it would follow that the theory upon which our naturalization laws rest is not supported by facts, and it would merit serious consideration whether those laws should not be changed. Mr. SCHURZ. If the Senator will permit me, I just came into the Chamber when he commenced that passage, and I did not hear what preceded it. Did I understand the Sen¬ ator to charge that I have not cast off my allegiance to any foreign country ? Mr. CARPENTER. When I want to charge that, I will say so. Mr. SCHURZ. I merely asked you whether that was what preceded the last sentence ? Mr. CARPENTER. Let me ask the Sen¬ ator another question just as pertinent as that: Does he mean to charge me with committing murder? Mr. SCHURZ. I heard the Senator say, “ if he cannot cast off his allegiance to another country,” and I asked the Senator simply whether he had in any previous sentence charged me with any such thing. Mr. CARPENTER. The Senator heard all that is material. I acquitted him in the out¬ set of what would be the serious charge that he was actuated by partiality for his native country by the charitable presumption that he did not believe that the United States had vio¬ lated its neutral duties. But I said, as near as I can recollect, that I regretted this debate on account of the influence it would exert upon the people. I then referred to our naturaliza¬ tion laws, and stated the theory upon which they rest—that the foreigner naturalized here could, and did, so far lay aside his affection for his native land as to take part with America even against that native land. And, speaking of the manner in which the people would reason upon the subject, I intended to say, what I now repeat, that the fact that a native of Prussia, a naturalized citizen and a Senator of the United States, taking part in promoting this preamble and resolution might be considered by the people, who do not understand as well as I do that the object of this proceeding is to make political capital in our own country by unfounded accusation, without expectation that the investigation will show that our nation hasbeen in fault in regard to its neutral duties, would be considered, un¬ justly in fact, but still considered, as evidence that a naturalized citizen would take the part of his native country against our own ; and thereupon the people would question the wis¬ dom of our naturalization laws. Having repeatedly disclaimed the intention of fixing upon the Senator from Missouri the charge that he has been unfaithful to his oath of allegiance to this country, I shall be under¬ stood when I say that I fear the people will not reason as charitably as I do, and that for this reason our American citizens may be led to question the policy of our naturaliza¬ tion laws, as they would not be if they knew that the Senator from Missouri was laboring in the capacity of an American politician to produce an immediate effect injurious to Gen¬ eral Grant, without the slightest expectation that the investigation would establish any just ground for Prussia to complain against us. Mr. President, let no man infer from this, and, most of all, let no man charge me with being a Know-Nothing. I have vindicated my friendship for the naturalization laws every¬ where and always. I have always voted in this Chamber to enlarge and never to restrict the scope of our laws upon naturalization. I have always voted with the Senator from Mas- 16 sacbusetts [Mr. Sumner] against excluding John Chinaman from the privileges of ctizen- ship, though I believe the Senator from Mis¬ souri (but I am not sui-e of this) has voted against me upon this subject. I have always voted to open our doors to all nations and to all men,because I have ever believed that the great mass of naturalized citizens were as hon¬ estly devoted to the interests of our country as the native-born citizens. And I do not believe that the mass of German-American citizens will follow any leader in a crusade against our own country or its Administration upon the ground of partiality for the father- land. Why, sir, what is meant by allegiance ? Al¬ legiance is an old term of the law. Fealty was sworn in a certain solemn, prescribed manner by the tenant to his immediate lord, but when his oath of fealty had to be taken to the superior lord, the king, then it was called the oath of allegiance, and that oath, as admin¬ istered in England for six hundred years, con¬ tained this promise : “To be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear of life and limb and ter¬ rene honor, and not to know or hear of any ill or damasre intended him without defending him there¬ from.” Our statute in regard to naturalization was intended to secure this fidelity on the part of the naturalized citizen toward our country. It is provided: “First. He shall have declared on oath or affirma¬ tion before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some one of the States or of the Territories north, west, or south of the river Ohio, or a circuit or district court o-f the United States, three years at least before his admission, that it was. bona fide, his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate. State, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate. State, or sovereignty whereof such alien m|iy at the time be a citizen or subject. ‘ Secondly. He shall, at the time of his application to bo admitted, declare on oath or affirmation, be¬ fore some one of the courts aforesaid, that he has resided within the United States, five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held, one year at least: that he will support the Constitution of the United States; and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, State, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate. State, or sovereignty whereof he was before a citi¬ zen or subject, which proceeding shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, “ Thirdly. The court admitting such alien shall be satisfied that he has resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States five years; and it shall further appear, to their satisfac¬ tion, that during that tkne he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. “ Fourthly. In case the alien applying to be ad¬ mitted to citizenship shall have borne any hereditary title, or been of any of the orders of nobility, in the kingdom or State from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his application shall be made; which renunciation shall be recorded in the said court.” The Senator from Missouri, in common yvith pvery < thor Senator on this floor, and in com- »i*.3i Wi y American Senator, if he learn of any »e intended to our country by Prussia, is ,and to defend us against it. He is placed by his oath of allegiance under as solemn a duty as was imposed upon Macbeth while Duncan slumbered beneath his roof. It is his duty as to all accusers of our nation to shut the door against our accusers, and not to bear accusation himself.” And I trust, sir, that the great body of our German-American citizens will see their true interests too plainly to be led away from the Administration upon any such grounds as have been suggested, even if those grounds were well founded in fact; and especially do I hope and trust that they will not allow themselves to be led away from the Administration by a totally unfounded complaint that our Govern¬ ment has dealt unfairly toward their native land. My trust is that the German,- Armericans are too intelligent not to see that in this mat¬ ter they owe their duty to America, and not to Prussia. . dt when his oath of fealty had to be taken to the superior lord, the king, then it was called the oath of allegiance, and that oath, as admin¬ istered in England for six hundred years, con¬ tained this promise: “To be true and faithful to the king and his heirs, and truth and faith to bear of life and limb and ter¬ rene honor, and not to know or hear of any ill or damage intended him without defending him there¬ from.” Our statute in regard to naturalization was intended to secure this fidelity on the part of the naturalized citizen toward our country. It is provided: "First. He shall have declared on oath or affirma¬ tion before the supreme, superior, district, or circuit court of some one of the States or of the Territories north, west, or south of the river Ohio, or a circuit or district court of the United States, three years at least before his admission, that it was. bona fide, his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate. State, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, State, or sovereignty whereof sucn alien m|iy at the time be a citizen or subject. ‘ Secondly. He shall, at the time of his application to be admitted, declare on oath or affirmation, be¬ fore some one of the courts aforesaid, that he has resided withia the United States, five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held, one year at least; that he will support the Constitution of the United States; and that he doth absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign prince, potentate, State, or sovereignty whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, State, or sovereignty whereof he was before a citi¬ zen or subject, which proceeding shall be recorded by the clerk of the court, “ Thirdly. The court admitting such alien shall be satisfied that he has resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States five years; and it shall further appear, to their satisfac¬ tion, that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. “ Fourthly. In case the alien applying to be ad¬ mitted to citizenship shall have borne any hereditary title, or been of any of the orders of nobility, in the kingdom or State from which he came, he shall, in addition to the above requisites make an express renunciation of his title or order of nobility in the court to which his application shall be made; which renunciation shall be recorded in the said court.” The Senator from Missouri, in common with every other Senator on this floor, and in com¬ mon with every American Senator if he learn of any damage intended to our country by Prussia, is bound to defend us againstit. _He is placed by bis oath of allegiance under as solemn^ duty as was imposed upon Macbeth while Duncan slumbered beneath his roof.' It is his duty as to all accusers of our nation V to shut the door against our accusers, and not to bear accusation himself.” And I trust, sir, that the great body of our German-American citizens will see their true interests .too plainly to be led away from the Administration upon any such grounds as have been suggested, even if those grounds were well founded in fact; and especially do I'hope and trust that they will not allow themselves to be led away from the Administration by a totally unfounded complaint that o.ur Govern¬ ment has dealt unfairly toward their native land. My trust is that the German.-Americans are too intelligent not to see that in this mat¬ ter they owe their duty to America, and n<^ to Prussia.