'I B RAFLY OF THE ^ - UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS?.- From the library:- of Frank A. Jensen Presented in 1947 M NOTICE: Return or renew all Library Materials! The Minimum Fee for each Lost Book is $50.00. The person charging this material is responsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the Latest Date stamped below. Then, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for discipli- nary action and may result in dismissal from the University. To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN mi* oa-oz*, APR 1 UttlW L161 0-1096 _ '" " -_ BOHN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY. KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. CRITIQUE PURE EEASON, TKAXSIATKD FBOM THE GEBMAN OF IMMANUEL KANT. BY J. M. D. MEIKLEJOHN. LONDON : GEORGE BELL AND SONS, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN. 1890. BACO DE VERULAMIO, INSTAUEATIO MAGNA-PR^EFATIO. D NOBIS IPSIS SILEMUS: DE BE AUTEM, QU^l AGITUE, PETIMU8: UT HOMINES EAM NON OPINIONEM, BED OPUS ESSE COGITENT ; AC PBO CEBTO HABEANT, NON SflCT^l NOS ALICUJCS, AUT PLAC- ITI, SED UTILITATIS ET A.MPLITTJDINIS HUMANE FTJNDAMENTA MOLIBI. DEINDE UT suis COMMODIS ^QUI IN COMMUNE CON- SULANT ET IPSI IN PABTEM VENIANT. Pfi^TEBEA UT BENB 8PEBENT, NEQUE INSTAUBATIONEM NOSTBAM UT QUIDDAM INFI- NITUM ET ULTBA MOBTALE FINGANT, ET ANIMO CONCIPIANT ; QUUM BKVEBA SIT INFINITI BBBOKIS FINIS ET TEBM1NUS LE- OITIXUS. CONTENTS. ^ TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE xi PREFACE TO THE FIBST EDITION OF THE CBTTIQ,TTE xrli ''PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION XXi> INTRODUCTION. ^ I. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL KNOT- LEDGE \ II. THE HUMAN INTELLECT, EVEN IN AN ONPHLLOSOPHICAL STATE, IS IN POSSESSION OF CERTAIN COGNITIONS A PRIORI 2 III. PHILOSOPHY STANDS IN NEED OF A SCIENCE WHICH SHALL DETERMINE THE POSSIBILITY. PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI 4 IV. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETI- CAL JUDGMENTS 7 V. IN ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON, SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PRIORI ARE CONTAINED AS PRINCIPLES . . 9 VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON 12 VII. IDEA AND DITL X CONTENTS. Page CHAP. II. THE CANON OF PUKE REASON 482 SECT. I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason * 483 SECT. IL Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Deter- mining Ground of the ultimate End of Pure Reason 487 SECT. III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief. 496 CHAP. in. THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PURE REASON 503 CHAP. IV. THE HISTORY OF PUBE REASON . .515 TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. 1 1 HE following translation has been undertaken with the hope of rendering Kant's JLritik der reinen Vernunft intelligible to the English student. The difficulties which meet the reader and the translator of this celebrated work arise from various causes. Kant was a man of clear, vigorous, and trenchant thought, and, after nearly twelve years' meditation, could not be in doubt as to his own system. But the Horatian rule of Verba praevisam rem non invita sequentur, will not apply to him. He had never studied the art of ex- pression. He wearies by frequent repetitions, and employs a great number of words to express, in the clumsiest way, what could have been enounced more clearly and distinctly in a few. The main statement in his sentences is often over- laid with a multitude of qualifying and explanatory clauses ; and the reader is lost in a maze, from which he has great difficulty in extricating himself. There are some passages which have no main verb ; others, in which the author loses sight of the subject with which he set out, and concludes with a predicate regarding something else mentioned in the course of his argument. All this can be easily accounted for. Kant, as he mentions in a letter to Lambert, took nearly twelve Xii TRANSLATOR^ PREFACE. years to excogitate his work, and only five months to write it He was a German professor, a student of solitary habits, and had never, except on one occasion, been out of Kcinigs- berg. He had, besides, to propound a new system of philoso- phy, and to enounce ideas that were entirely to revolutionise European thought. On the other hand, there are many excellencies of style in this work. His expression is often as precise and forcible as his thought; and, in some of his notes especially, he sums up, in two or three apt and powerful words, thoughts which, at other times, he employs pages to develope. His terminology, which has been so violently denounced, is really of great use in clearly deter- mining his system, and in rendering its peculiarities more easy of comprehension. A previous translation of the Kritik exists, which, had it been satisfactory, would have dispensed with the present. But the translator had, evidently, no very extensive acquaint- ance with the German language, and still less with his subject. A translator ought to be an interpreting intellect between the author and the reader ; but, in the present case, the only interpreting medium has been the dictionary. Indeed, Kant's fate in this country has been a very hard one. Misunderstood by the ablest philosophers of the time, illustrated, explained, or translated by the most incompetent, it has been his lot to be either unappreciated, misappre- hended, or entirely neglected. Dugald Stewart did not understand his system of philosophy as he had no proper opportunity of making himself acquainted with it ; Nitsch * and Willichf undertook to introduce him to the English philosophical public; Richardson and Hay wood "traduced" * A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles By F. A. Nitsch. London, 1796. WilHch's Elements af Kant's Philosophy, 8vo. 1798. TBINSLATOB'S PBEFACE. XU . him. More recently, an Analysis of the Kritik, by Mr. Haywood, has been published, which consists almost entirely of a selection of sentences from his own translation : a mode of analysis which has not served to make the subject more intelligible. In short, it may be asserted that there is not a single English work upon Kant, which deserves to be read, or which can be read with any profit, excepting Semple's translation of the " Metaphysic of Ethics." All are written by men who either took no pains to understand Kant, or were incapable of understanding him.* The following translation was begun on the basis of a MS. translation, by a scholar of some repute, placed in my hands by Mr. Bohn, with a request that I should revise it, as he had perceived it to be incorrect. After having laboured through about eighty pages, I found, from the numerous errors and inaccuracies pervading it, that hardly one-fifth of the original MS. remained. I, therefore, laid it entirely aside, and com- menced de novo. These eighty pages I did not cancel, be- cause the careful examination which they had undergone, made them, as I believed, not an unworthy representation of the author. * It is curious to observe, in all the English works written spe- cially upon Kant, that not one of his commentators ever ventures, for a moment, to leave the words of Kant, and to explain the subject he may be considering, in his own words. Kitsch and Willich, who professed to write on Kant's philosophy, are merely translators ; Haywood, even in his notes, merely repeats Kant; and the translator of " Beck's Principles of the Critical Philosophy," while pretending to give, in his " Translator's Preface," his own views of the Critical Philosophy, has fabricated his Preface out of selections from the works of Kant. The same is the case with the translator of Kant's "Essays and Treatises," (2 vols. 8vo. London, 1798.) This person has written a preface to each of the volumes, and both are almost literal translations from different parts of Kant's works. He had the impudence to present the thoughts contained in there as bis own ; few being then able to detect the plagiarism. riv The second edition of the Kritik, from which all the sub- sequent ones have been reprinted without alteration, is followed in the present translation. Rosenkranz, a recent editor, main- tains that the author's first edition is far superior to the second ; and Schopenhauer asserts that the alterations in the second were dictated by unworthy motives. He thinks the second a Verschlimmbesserung of the first; and that the changes made by Kant, "in the weakness of old age," have rendered it a " self- contradictory and mutilated work." I am not insensible to the able arguments brought forward by Scho- penhauer ; while the authority of the elder Jacobi, Michelet, and others, adds weight to his opinion. But it may be doubted whether the motives imputed to Kant could have influenced him in the omission of certain passages in the second edition, whether fear could have induced a man of his character to retract the statements he had advanced. The opinions he expresses in many parts of the second edition, in pages 455 460, for example,* are not those of a philosopher who would surrender what he believed to be truth, at the outcry of preju- diced opponents. Nor are his attacks on the " sacred doctrines of the old dogmatic philosophy," as Schopenhauer maintains, less bold or vigorous in the second than in the first edition. And, finally, Kant's own testimony must be held to be of greater weight than that of any number of other philosophers, however learned and profound. No edition of the Kritik is very correct. Even those of Rosenkranz and Schubert, and Modes and Baumann, contain errors which reflect somewhat upon the care of the editors. But the common editions, as well those printed during, as after Kant's life-time, are exceedingly bad. One of these, the " third edition improved, Frankfort and Leipzig, 1791," swarms with errors, at once misleading and annoying. Rosenkranz haa * Of the present translation. TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE. Tt made a number of very happy conjectural emendations, the accuracy of which cannot be doubted. It may be necessary to mention that it has been found requisite to coin one or two new philosophical terms, to repre- sent those employed by Kant. It was, of course, almost im- possible to translate the Kritik with the aid of the philoso- phical vocabulary at present used in England. But these new expressions have been formed according to Horace's maxim pared detorta. Such is the verb intuit e for anschauen ; the manifold in intuition has also been employed for das Manniff- faltige der Anschauung, by which Kant designates the varied contents of a perception or intuition. Kant's own terminology has the merit of being precise and consistent. Whatever may be the opinion of the reader with regard to the possibility of metaphysics whatever his estimate of the utility of such discussions, the valua of Kant's work, as an instrument of mental discipline, cannot easily be overrated. If the present translation contribute in the least to the ad- vancement of scientific cultivation, if it aid in the formation of habits of severer and more profound thought, the translator will consider himself well compensated for his arduous and long-protracted labour. J. M. D. M. PREFACE TO THE FIRST ED1TION.-0 7 *1.) HUMAN reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, jis they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves ; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to dis- cover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysig. Time was, when she was the queen of all the sciences ; and, if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion of the time to heap con- tempt and scorn upon her ; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba, " Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens . . . Nunc trahor exul, inops."* At first, her government, under the administration of the * Ovid, Metamorphoses. XVU1 PKEFACE TO THE FTRST EDITIOTT. dogmatists, was an absolute despotism. But, as the legislative continued to show traces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and intestine wars introduced the reign of anarchy ; while the sceptics, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and settled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organised them- selves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small ; a-nd thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In recent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the legitimacy of her claims established by a kind of physiology of the human understanding that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found that, although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer her descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance which necessarily brought suspicion on her claims, as this genealogy was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims to sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell hnolc jntp the antiquated and rotten constitution of dogmatism, and again Became obnoxious to the contempt froinwhich efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all methods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there reigns nought but weariness and complete indifferentism the mother of chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of, or at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science, when it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill- directed effort. For it is in reality vain to profess indifference in regard to such inquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides, these pretended indifferentists, however much they may try to disguise themselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language of the schools, un avoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and propositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same time, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which relates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the last, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is plainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured judgment* of the We very often hear compluints of the shallowness of the present age, PEEFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. Xll age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge. It is, in fact, a call to reason, again tc undertake the most laborious of all tasks that of self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may secure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless assumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the Critical Investigation of Pure Reason. I do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry into the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it strives to attain without the aid of experience; in other words, the solution of the question re- garding the possibility or impossibility of Metaphysics, and the determination ot' the onginras well as of the extent and limits of Uns~"science. All this must be done on the basis of principles. This path the only one now remaining has been entered upon by me ; and I flatter myself that I have, in this way, dis- covered the cause of and consequently the mode of removing all the errors which have hitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical thought. I have not - returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by alleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the / mind ; I have, on the contrary, examined them completely in . the light of principles, and, after having discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason fell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these ques- tions have not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and of the decay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a secure foundation, such as Mathematics, Physical Science, &c., in the least deserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in the latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would he the case with the other kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In the absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe criticism are rather signs of a pro- found habit of thought. Our age is the age of criticism, to which every thing must be subjected. The sacredness of religion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of exemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted, they become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the 58t of a free and public examination. 6 2 XX METACE TO TILE MUST .EDITION. and desires^ had expected ; for it can only be satisfied by the fACicise of T^rg'T* 1 arts, and of these I hare no knowledge. Bat neither do these come within the compass of our mental and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the hick had their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued expectations may be ruined by its frpbnatioffui. My chief aim in this work has been thorough- ness ; and I make hold to say, that there is not a single meta- physical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to its solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity ; and therefore, if the principle presented by it prove to be in- sufficient for the solution of even a single one of those questions to which the TCTT nature of reason gives birth, we nrast reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its suffi- csency in the case of the others. While I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of dissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when be bears declarations which sound so boastful and extravagant ; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate than those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philo- sophical programme, in which the dogmatist professes to de- noniliaie the simple nature of the soul, or the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to extend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience ; while I humbly confess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I confine myself to the exami- nation of reason alone and its pure thought ; and I do not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its seat in my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason ; and it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented and the aid furnished by experience. So much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the present task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed upon us by the The above remarks relate to the matter of our critical in. oradry. Am regards the ./fast, there are two indispensable con- oittons, which any one who undertakes sc difficult a task ai PREFACE TO HUE ITS9T JEDITUHL XX! that of a critique of pure reason, is bound to fulfiL These this sphere of thought, ofuaom, k perfeedy iuadmkdWe, ant that everything which bears the least semblance of an hypo- thesis must be excluded, as of no value in such iliinsjMMisM For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that k to be established upon a priori grounds, that it shall be held to be absolutely necessary ; much more is this die ease with an at- tempt to determine all pure a priori cognition, and to furnish the standard and consequently an example of all apodektie (philosophical) certitude. Whether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to determine ; it is the author's business merely to adduce grounds and reasons, with- out determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of his judges. But, lest anything he may have said may be- come the innocent cause of doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might otherwise pro- duce, he may be allowed to point out those passages which may occasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not con- cern the main purpose of the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the mind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgment of the work as a whole, and in regard to its ultimate aim. I know no investigations more necessary for a full '** into the nature of the faculty which we call wmdentmmiuMj* and at the same time for the* determination of die rales and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the sfrnad chapter of the Transcendental Ajialvtic, under the title of Deduction f,1 the Pure Conceptions of tAe'Undenta&Mf ; and they have aha cost me by far the giealcai labour labour which, I hope, will not remain uncompensated. The view there taken, which somewhat deeply into the subject, has two i lates to the objects of the pure understanding, and is to demonstrate and to render comprrifi- validity of its a priori conceptions ; and it form Jfswom an fKumtial part of the the pure understanding itself, its _ cognition that is, from a subjective point of view; and, al- though this exposition is of great importance, it does not be- long essentially to the main purpose of the work, because the XX11 PBEFACE TO THE PIliST EDITION. grand question is, what and how much can reason and under- standing, apart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the faculty of thought itself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect, and has thus in it some sem- blance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall show on another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the present instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere opinion, and that the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a different opinion. But I beg to remind him, that, if my sub- jective deduction does not produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the objective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned, is in every respect satisfactory. As regards clearness, the reader has a right to demand, in the first place, discursive or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of conceptions, and, secondly, intuitive or aesthetic clear- ness, by means of intuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration in concreto. I have done what I could for the first kind of intelligibility. This was essential to my purpose ; and it thus became the accidental cause of my in- ability to do complete justice to the second requirement. I have been almost always at a loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this question. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in the first .sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But I very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems with which I should be engaged ; and, as I perceived that this critical investigation would, even if de- livered in the driest scholastic manner, be far from being brief, I found it uuadvisable to enlarge it still more with examples and explanations, which are necessary only from a popular point of view. I was induced to take this course from the consider- ation also, that the present work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbe Ter- rasson remarks with great justice, that if we estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that it would be much shorter, if it wrre not so short. On the other hand, as regards the com- PREFACE TO THE FIEST EDITION. XXlD prehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a single principle, we may say with equal justice many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been in- tended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and em- bellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its arti- culation or organization, which is the most important con- sideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability. The reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co- operate with the present author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a complete and solid edifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him. Meta- physics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of completion and with little labour, if it is united, in a short time ; so that nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating and applying it didactically. For this science is nothing more than the inventory of all that is given us by pure reason, systematically arranged. No- thing can escape our notice ; for what reason produces from itself cannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so soon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The perfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure conceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar intuition leading to determinate experience, renders this com- pleteness not only practicable, but also necessary. Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.* Such a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the title of Metaphysic of Nature.^ The content of this work, (which will not be half so long,) will be Tery much richer than that of the present Critique, which * Persius. t In contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work wu never published. See page 509. Tr. XXIV PEE FACE TO THE SECOND E1HTIO*. has to discover the sources of this cognition .nd expose thfc conditions of its possibility, and at the same time to clear ana level a fit foundation for. the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing and the impartiality of a judge ; in the other, for the good-will and assistance of a co- labourer. For, however complete the list of principles for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of the system requires that no deduced conceptions should be absent. These cannot be presented a priori, but must be gradually discovered ; and, while the synthesis of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the Critique, it is necessary that, in the pro- posed work, the same should be the case with their analysis But this will be rather an amusement than a labour. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. (1/87.) WHETHER the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the province of pure reason, advances with that undeviating certainty which characterises the progress of science, we shall be at no loss to determine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow ; if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invari- ably brought to a stand before the goal is reached, and com- pelled to retrace their steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress, and may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark. In these circum- stances we shall render an important service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order to arrive at any results, even if it should be found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its attainment. That Logic has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest times, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step, and thus to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXV discussions on the mental faculties, sucli as imagination and wit, metaphysical discussions on the origin of knowledge and the different kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the objects (Idealism, Scepticism, and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes and remedies : this at- tempt, on the part of these authors, only shews their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge, but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits, and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed within limits which admit of perfectly clear defini- tion ; it is a science which has for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the formal laws of all thought, whether it be a priori or empirical, whatever be its origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties natural or accidental which it encounters in the human mind. The early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of its field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be made of all the objects of cognition with their characteristic distinctions, and in which the understanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It is, obviously, a much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path of science, where it has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects external to itself. Hence, logic is properly only & propaedeutic forms, as it were, the vestibule ol the sciences ; and while it is necessary to enable us to form a correct judgment with regard to the various branches of know- ledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive knowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, ill the objective sciences. Now these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain elements of a priori cognition, and this cogni- tion may stand in a two-fold relation to its object. Either it may have to determine the conception of the object which must be supplied extraneously, or it may have to establish its reality. The former is theoretical, the latter practical, rational cognition. In both, the pure or a priori element must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished from that which is supplied from other sources. Any other method can only lead to irremediable confusion. Mathematics and Physics are the two theoretical sciences which have to determine their objects a priori. The former is purely a priori, the latter is partially so, but is also de pendent on other sources of cognition. XX Vi PEEJAC'E TO THE SECOND EDITION. In the earliest times of which history affords us any record, mathematics had already entered on the sure course of science, among that wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have remained long chiefly among the Egyptians in the stage of blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionised by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual revolution much more important in its results than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope and of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration ele- ments which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not even require to be proved makes it apparent that the change in- troduced by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age, and it has thus been secured against the chance of ob- livion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the know- ledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction ; and that, in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he had him- self, in accordance with his conception, placedf in the object. A much longer period elapsed before Physics entered on the highway of science. For it is only about a century and a- half since the wise BACON gave a new direction to physical studies, or rather as others were already on the right track imparted fresh vigour to the pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of mathematics, we find evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In the remarks which follow I shall confine myself to the empirical side of natural science. PREFACE TO THE SECOKD EDITION. XXV11 When GALILEI experimented with balls of a definite weight on the inclined plane, when TOREICELXI caused the air to sustain a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite column of water, or when STAHL, at a later period, converted metals into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and subtraction of certain elements ;* a light broke upon all natural philosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it pro- duces after its own design ; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgment according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply to its questions. For accidental observations, made ac- cording to no preconceived plan, cannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for and requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant phenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by these rational principles, that it can have any real utility. Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not, however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea must the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so many centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of certain progress. We come now to metaphysics, a purely speculative science, which occupies a completely isolated position, and is entirely independent of the teachings of experience. It deals with 'mere conceptions not, like mathematics, with conceptions applied to intuition and in it, reason is the pupil of itself alone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all- destroying barbarism. But it has not yet had the good for- tune to attain to the sure scientific method. This will be ap- parent, if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We find that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain a priori the perception even of those laws * I do not here follow with exactness the history of the experimental sn-thod, of which, Indeed, the first steps are involved in some obscurity. XXV111 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. which the most common experience confirms. We find ii compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances, and to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to the desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the contrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the display of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests a field in which no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which, at least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession. This leads us to enquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of science has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is impossible to discover it ? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless aspirations after it, as if it were one of our weightiest concerns ? Nay, more, how little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason, if it abandons us in a matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the truth and not only so, but even allures us to the pursuit of vain phantoms, only to betray us in the end ? Or, if the path has only hitherto been missed, what indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation, and to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our predecessors ? It appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy, which, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by a sudden revolution, are sutn- ciently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential circum- stances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to induce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy which, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has hitherto been as- sumed that our cognition must conform to the objects ; but all attempts to ascertain anything about these objects a priori^ by means of conceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered abortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not be more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform to our cognition. This appears, at all events, to ac- cord better with the possibility of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of arriving at the cognition of PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXU objects a priori, of determining something with respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to do just what COPEBNICTJS did in attempting to explain the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything of them a priori. If, on the other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but if they are to be- come cognitions must refer them, as representations, to some- thing, as object, and must determine the latter by means of the former, here again there are two courses open to me. Either, first, I may assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform to the object and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as before ; or secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience, in which alone as given objects, they are cog- nized, conform to my conceptions and then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires understanding. Before objects are given to me, that is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in conceptions a priori. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of experi- ence must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason thinks, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience, or, at least, cannot be given so as reason thinks them. The attempt to think these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method of thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we only cognize in things a priori that which we ourselves place in them.* * This method, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural ohilosopher, consists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that which admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. Now the propositions of pure reason, especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do not admit of our making any experiment with their objects, as in natural science. Hence, with regard to those conception* XXX PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. This attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and pro- mises to metaphysics, in its first part that is, where it is occupied with conceptions a priori, of which the correspond- ing objects may be given in experience the certain course of science. For by this new method we are enabled perfectly to explain the possibility of a priori cognition, and, what is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie a priori at the foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of ex- perience neither of which was possible according to the pro- cedure hitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of a priori cognition in the first part of Metaphysics, we derive a surprising result, and one which, to all appearance, militates against the great end of Metaphysics, as treated in the second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty of cognition is unable to transcend the limits of pos- sible experience ; and yet this is precisely the most essential object of this science. The estimate of our rational cognition a priori at which we arrive is that it has only to do with phae- nomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real existence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of this estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend the limits of experience and of all phaenomena, is the unconditioned, which reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order to com- plete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, on the one hand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in themselves, the unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction, and that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things as they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as phsenomena, conform to our mode of representation, the contradiction disappears : we and principles which we assume a priori, our only course will be to view them from two different sides. We must regard one and the same con- ception, on the one hand, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the understanding, on the other hand, in relation to reason, isolated and transcending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we find that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result is in harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them from a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the experiment will establish the correctness of this distinction PI1EFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. shall then be convinced of the truth of that which we begaa by assuming for the sake of experiment; we may look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in thing? as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition.* But, after we have thus denied the power of specuiative reason to make any progress in the sphere of the supersensi- ble, it still remains for our consideration whether data do not exist in practical cognition, which may enable us to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned, to rise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a practical point of view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphy- sics. Speculative reason has thus, at least, made room for such an extension of our knowledge ; and, if it must leave this space vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to fill it up, if we can, by means of practical data nay, it even challenges us to make the attempt. f This attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the pro- cedure of metaphysics, after the example of the Geometri- cians and Natural Philosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason. It is a treatise on the method to be .followed, not a system of the science itself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the * This experiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the Chemists, which they term the experiment of reduction, or, more usually, the synthetic process. The analysis of the metaphysician separates pure cognition a priori into two heterogeneous elements, viz., the cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in themselves. Dialectic combines these again into harmony with the necessary rational idea of the uncon- ditioned, and finds that this harmony never results except through the above distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just. f So the central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies es- tablished the truth of that which Copernicus, at first, assumed only as a hypothesis, and, at the same time, brought to light that invisible force (Newtonian attraction) which holds the universe together. The latter would have remained for ever undiscovered, if Copernicus had not ven- tured on the experiment contrary to the senses, but still jusjt of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spec- tator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical method as a hypothesis with the yifw of rendering apparent the first attempts at such a change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique itself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from the nature of our representations of space and time, and from the elementary concep- tions of the understanding. XXXll PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. external boundaries and the internal structure of this Science. For pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought, it is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a complete enu- meration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and thus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in cognition a priori, nothing must be at- tributed to the objects but what the thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in regard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity, in which, as in an organised body, every member exists for the sake of the others, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with safety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation to the total use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular advantage an advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which has to do with objects that, if once it is con- ducted into the sure path of science, by means of this criti- cism, it can then take in the whole sphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave it for the use of posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh acces- sions. For metaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its own employment as determined by these principles. To this perfection it is, therefore, bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim may justly be applied : Nil actura repulans, si quid superesset agendum. But, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose to bequeath to posterity ? What is the real value or this system of metaphysics, purified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent condition ? A cursory view of tbi present work will lead to the supposition that its use is merely negative, that it only serves to warn us against venturing, with speculative reason, beyond the limits of experience. This is, in fact, its primary use. But this, at once, assumes a positive value, when we observe that the principles with which specu- lative reason endeavours to transcend its limits, lead inevitably, not to the extension, but to the contraction of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend the limits of sen- sibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm of PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXUi thought, and thus to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. So far, then, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its proper bounds, it is only negative ; but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same time, removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use of practical reason, it possesses a positive and very important value. In order to admit this, we have only to be convinced that there is an absolutely necessary use of pure reason the moral use in which it inevitably transcends the limits of sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring only to be insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it in contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the service which this criticism renders us, would be as absurd as to maintain that the system of police is productive of no positive benefit, since its main business is to prevent the violence which citizen has to appre- hend from citizen, that so each may pursue his vocation in peace and security. That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as phaenomena ; that, moreover, we have no conceptions of the understanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition of things, except in so far as a cor- responding intuition can be given to these conceptions ; that, accordingly, we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as a phenomenon, all this is proved in the Analytical part of the Critique ; and from this the limitation of all possible specula- tive cognition to the mere objects of experience, follows as a necessary result. At the same time, it must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of cognizing, we still reserve the power of thinking objects, as things in them- selves.* For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the exist - * In order to cognize an object, I must be able to prove its possibility, either from its reality as attested by experience, or a priori, by means of reason. But I can think what I please, provided only I do not contradict myself ; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought, though I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in the sum of possibilities. But something more is required before I can attribute to such a conception objective validity, that is real possibility the other possibility being merely logical. We are not; however, confined to theoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this addi- tional requirement, but may derive them from practical source* c XXXIV PREFACE TO THR SECOND EDITION. ence of an appearance, without something that appears- which would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, that we had not undertaken this criticism, and, accordingly, had not drawn the necessary distinction between things, as objects of experience, and things, as they are in themselves. The principle of causality, and, by consequence, the mecha- nism of nature as determined by causality, would then have absolute validity in relation to all things as efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert, with regard to one and the same being, e. g., the human soul, that its will is free, and yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is, not free; without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both pro- positions I should take the soul in the same signification, as a thing in general, as a thing in itself as, without previous criticism, I could not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we have undertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object may be taken in two senses, first, as a pheno- menon, secondly, as a thing in itself ; and that, according to the deduction, of the conceptions of the understanding, the princi- ple of causality has reference only to things in the first sense. We then see how it does not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that the will, in the phenomenal sphere in visible action, is necessarily obedient to the law of nature, and, in so far not free; and, on the other hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that law, and, accordingly, isfree. Now, it is true that I cannot, by means of specula- tive reason, and still less by empirical observation, cognize my soul as a thing in itself, and consequently, cannot cognize liberty as the property of a being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense. For, to do so, I must cognize this being as existing, and yet not in time, which since I cannot sup- port my conception by any intuition is impossible. At the same time, while I cannot cognize, I can quite well think freedom, that is to say, my representation of it involves at least no contradiction, if we bear in mind the critical distinc- tion of the two modes of representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the consequent limitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding, and of the principles which flow from them. Suppose now that morality necessarily presup- posed liberty, in the strictest sense, aa a property of our will ; suppose that reason contained certain practical, original prin- PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. ciples a priori, which were absolutely impossible without this presupposition ; and suppose, at the same time, that specula- tive reason had proved that liberty was incapable of being thought at all. It would then follow that the moral presup- position must give way to the speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious contradiction, and that liberty and, with it, morality must yield to the mechanism of nature ; for the negation of morality involves no contradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality does not require the speculative cognition of liberty ; it is enough that I can think it, that its conception involves no contradic- tion, that it does not interfere with the mechanism of nature. But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we had not learnt the two-fold sense in which things may be taken ; and it is only in this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are confined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to a criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things _n themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical cognition to mere phenomena. The positive value of the critical principles of pure reason .n relation to the conception of God and of the simple nature of the soul, admits of a similar exemplification ; but on this point I shall not dwell. I cannot even make the assumption as the practical interests of morality require of God, Free- dom, and Immortality, if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phaenomena, and thus rendering the practical exten- sion of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief. The dogmatism of metaphysics, that is, the presumption that it is possible to ad- vance in metaphysics without previous criticism, is the true source of the unbelief (always dogmatic) which militates against morality. Thus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to posterity, in the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in accordance with the Critique of Pure Reason, itill the value of such a bequest is not to be depreciated. It XXXVI PUEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. will render an important service to reason, by substituting the certainty of scientific method for that random groping after results without the guidance of principles, which has hithertc characterised the pursuit of metaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the inquiring mind of youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of genuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which can never lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and opinions. But, above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and religion, by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced for ever by the Socratic method, that is to say, by proving the ignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt, never will be, without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the highest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm, by closing up the sources of error. This important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its fancied possessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not prove in any way detrimental to the general interests of humanity. The advantages which the world has derived from the teachings of pure reason, are not at all im- paired. The loss falls, in its whole extent, on the monopoly of the schools, but does not in the slightest degree touch the in- terests of mankind. I appeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued existence of the soul after death, derived from the simplicity of its substance ; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of nature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of sub- jective and objective practical necessity ; or of the existence of God, deduced from the conception of an ens realissimum, the contingency of the changeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass beyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise the slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted that this has not been the case, and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding for such subtle speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the contrary, it is plain that the hope of a future life arises from the feeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is inadeouate to meet and satisfy the demands of his rature. PEE! ACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXVli In like manner, it cannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the claims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of freedom, and that the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in nature, give rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe. Such is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they depend on rational grounds ; and this public property not only remains undisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine that the schools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a matter of general human concernment, than that to which the great mass of men, ever held by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and that the schools should therefore confine themselves to the elaboration of these universally comprehensible, and, from a moral point of view, amply satisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant pretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive possession, the key to the truths which they impart to the public. Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri. At the same time it does not deprive the speculative philoso- pher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without its knowledge I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason. This can never become popular, and, indeed, has no occasion to be so ; for fine-spun argu- ments in favour of useful truths, make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of specula- tive reason, and thus to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be saved from these controversiei and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines. Criti- cism alone can strike a blow at the root of Materialism, Fatal- ism, Atheism, Free-thinking, Fanaticism, and Superstition, which are universally injurious as well as of Idealism and Scepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely XXXvtii PREFACE TO THE SECOKD EDITION. pass over to the public. If governments think proper to in- terfere with the affairs of the learned, it would be more con- sistent with a wise regard for the interests of science, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind, by which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than to support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of danger to the public over the de- struction of cobwebs, of which the public has never taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel. This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic proce- dure of reason in pure cognition ; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles a priori but to dogmatism, that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any progress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions, according to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of employing without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason has come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the dogmatic procedure of pure reason without previous criticism of its own powers, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arro- gates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphy- sics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary pre- paration for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics, which must perform its task entirely a priori, to the com- plete satisfaction of speculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but scholastically. In carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes, that is, in the future sys- tem of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict method of the celebrated WOLF, the greatest of all dogmatic philoso- phers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed principles, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our demonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at conclusions. The example which he set, served to awaken that spirit of profound and thorough investigation which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have been peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific cha- racter to metaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to pre- pare the field by a criticism of the organum, that is, of pure TO THE SECOND EDITION. XXXIX reason itself. That he failed to perceive the necessity of such a procedure, must be ascribed to the dogmatic mode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers of his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each other with. Those who reject at once the method of WOLF, and of the Critique of Pure Reason, can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of science, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy. In this second edition, I have endeavoured, as far as pos- sible, to remove the difficulties and obscurity, which, without fault of mine perhaps, have given rise to many misconceptions even among acute thinkers. In the propositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by which they are supported, as well as in the form and the entire plan of the work, I have found nothing to alter ; which must be attributed partly to the long examination to which I had subjected the whole before offering it to the public, and partly to the nature of the case. For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there is nothing isolated or independent, but every single part is essential to all the rest ; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or positive error, could not fail to betray itself in use. I venture, further to hope, that this system will maintain the same unalterable character for the future. I am led to entertain this confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which the equality of the result affords, when we proceed, first, from the simplest elements up to the complete whole of pure reason, and then, backwards from the whole to each individual part. We find that the attempt to make the slightest alteration, in any part, leads inevitably to contradic- tions, not merely in this system, but in human reason itself. At the same time, there is still much room for improvement in the exposition of the doctrines contained in this work. In the present edition, I have endeavoured to remove misappre- hensions of the aesthetical part, especially with regard to the conception of Time ; to clear away the obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions of the under- standing ; to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the demonstration of the principles of the pure understand- ing ; and, lastly, to obviate the misunderstanding of the paralo- gisms which immediately precede the Rational Psychology. Xi PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. Beyond this point the end of the second Main Division of the Transcendental Dialectic I have not extended my altera- tions,* partly from want of tine, and partly because I am * The only addition, properly so called and that only in the method of proof which I have made in the present edition, consists of a new refutation of psychological Idealism, and a strict demonstration the only one possible, as I believe of the objective reality of external intuition However harmless Idealism may be considered although in reality it is not so in regard to the essential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and to the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere belief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we derive the whole material of cognition even for the internal sense), and not to be able to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As there is some obscurity of ex- pression in the demonstration as it stands in the text, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows : "But this permanent cannot be an in- tuition in me. For all the determining grounds of rny existence which can be found in me, are representations, and, as such, do themselves re- quire a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my existence in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein they change." It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof, that, after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that is, of ray representation of external things, and that, consequently, it must always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this repre- sentation, does or does not exist externally to me. But I am conscious, through internal experience, of my existence in time, (consequently, also, of the determinability of the former in the latter), and that is more than the simple consciousness of my representation. It is, in fact, the same as the empirical consciousness of my existence, which can only be determined in relation to something, which, while connected with my existence, is ex- ternal to me. This consciousness of my existence in time is, therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something external to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction, sense, not imagination, which inseparably connects the external with my internal sense. For the ex- ternal sense is, in itself, the relation of intuition to something real, ex- ternal to me ; and the reality of this something, as opposed to the mere imagination of it, rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal experience as the condition of its possibility. If with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the representation : / am, which accom- panies all ray judgments, and all the operations of my understanding, I could, at the same time, connect a determination of my existence by in- tellectual intuition, then the consciousness of a relation to something ex- ternal to me would not be necessary. But the internal intuition in which alone my existence can be determined, though preceded by that purely intellectual consciousness, is itself sensible and attached to the condition of time. Hence this determination of my existence, and consequently my internal experience itself, must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which can be, therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must look upon myself as being related. Thus the reality of PREFACE TO THE SECOSD EDITION. xli not aware that any portion of the remainder has giren rise to misconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not here mention with that praise which is their due, but who will find that their suggestions have been attended to in the work itself. In attempting to render the exposition of my views as intel- ligible as possible, I have been compelled to leave out 01 abridge various passages which were not essential to the com- pleteness of the work, but which many readers might consider useful in other respects, and might be unwilling to miss. This trifling loss, which could not be avoided without swelling the book beyond due limits, may be supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with the first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the greater clearness of the exposition as it now stands. I have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of various reviews and treatises, that the spirit of pro- found arid thorough investigation is not extinct in Germany, though it may have been overborne and silenced for a time by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking, which gives itself the airs of genius and that the difficulties which beset the paths of Criticism have not prevented energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters of the science of pure reason to which these paths conduct a science which the external sense is necessarily connected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of experience in general ; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things external to rae related to my sense, as I am that I myself exist, as determined in time. But in order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external to me, really correspond, in other words, what intuitions belong to the external sense and not to imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case, to those rules according to which experience in general (even internal experience) is distinguished from imagination, and which are always based on the pro- position that there really is an external experience. We may add the remark, that the representation of something permanent in existence, is not the same thing as the permanent representation ; for a representation may be very variable and changing as all our representations, even that of matter, are and yet refer to something permanent, which must, therefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me, the existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of ray own existence, and with it constitutes one experience an experience which would not even be possible internally, if it were not also at the same time, in partj external. To the question How ? we are no more able to reply, than we are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the co-existence oi which with the variable, produces the conception of change. d Xlii PBEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. w not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can hope for a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these deserving men, who so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid exposition a talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing I leave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the statement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger is not that of being refuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own part, I must henceforward abstain from controversy, although I shall carefully attend to all suggestions, whether from friends or adversaries, which may be of use in the future elaboration of the system of this Propaedeutic. As, during these labours, I have advanced pretty far in years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year it will be necessary for me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of elaborating the Metaphysics of Nature as well as of Morals, in confirmation if the correctness of the principles established in this Critique of Pure Reason, both Speculative and Practical ; and I must, therefore, leave the task of clearing up the- obscurities of the present work inevitable, perhaps, at the outset as well as the defence of the whole, to those deserving men who have made my system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward armed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite possible to take objection to parti- cular passages, while the organic structure of the system, con- sidered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few possess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive view of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking these out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy to pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with anj freedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light in the eyes of those who rely on the judg- ment of others, but are easily reconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole. If a theory possesses stabi- lity in itself, the action and reaction which seemed at first to threaten its existence, serve only, in the course of time, to smooth aown any superficial roughness or inequality, and if men of insight, impartiality, and truly popular gifts, turn their attention to it to secure to it, in a short time, the requi- ite elegance also. KONIGSBERG, April 1787. INTRODUCTION. I. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PURE A3H) SMPIHICA L KNOWLEDGE. THAT all our knowledge begins with experience there can he no doubt. For how is it possible that the faculty of cog- nition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of them- selves produce representations, partly rouse our powers o/ understanding into activity, to compare, to connect, or to se- parate these, and so to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called ex- perience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it. But, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows, that all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible that our empirical know- ledge is a compound of that which we receive through im- pressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplier from itself (sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot distinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has made us at- tentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a question which requires close investigation, and is not to be answered at first sight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience, and even of all sensuous impressions ? Knowledge of this kind is called a priori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources h posteriori, that is, in experience. But the expression, " a priori," is not as yet definite enough, adequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in speaking cf knowledge which 2 INTRODUCTION. has its sources in experience, we are wont to say, that this or that may be known a priori, because we do not derive this knowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however, we have itself borrowed from experi- ence. Thus, if a man undermined his house, we say, " he might know ti priori that it would have fallen ;" that is, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actu- ally fall. But still, a priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are heavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away, must have been known to him previously, by means of experience. By the term " knowledge & priori," therefore, we shall in the sequel understand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but such as is absolutely so of all ex- perience. Opposed to this is empirical knowledge, or that which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experi- ence. Knowledge a priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge a priori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the proposition, " Every change has a cause," is a proposition h priori, but impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from expe- rience. II. THE HUMAN INTELLECT, EVEN IN AN UNPHILOSOPHICAL STATE, IS IN POSSESSION OF CEETAIN COGNITIONS A PRIORI. THE question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely distinguish a pure from an empirical cognition. Ex- perience no doubt teaches us that this or that object is con- stituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not possibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have a proposition which contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judgment a priori ; if, moreover, it is not derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally involving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely a priori. Se- condly, an empirical judgment never exhibits strict and abso- lute, but only assumed and comparative universality (by in- duction) ; therefore, the most we can say is, so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or that rule. If, on the other hand, a judgment carries with it strict wad absolute universality, that is, admits of no possible excep- A PRIOEI COGNITIONS. 3 tion, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Empirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary ex- tension of validity, from that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that Trhich is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all ; as, for example, in the affirmation, " all bodies are heavy." When, on the contrary, strict universality characterizes a judgment, it necessarily indicates another peculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition h priori. Necessity and strict univer- sality, therefore, are infallible tests for distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected with each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation is sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgment, or the unlimited universality which we attach to a judgment is often a more convincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria separately, each being by itself infallible. Now, that in the sphere of human cognition, we have judgments which are necessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure a priori, it will be an easy matter to shew. If we desire an example from the sciences, we need only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the commonest operations of the un- derstanding, the proposition, " every change must have a cause," will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case, indeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the con- ception of a necessity of connexion with an effect, and of a strict universality of the law, that the very notion, of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to derive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that which precedes, and the habit thence originating of connecting re- presentations the necessity inherent in the judgment being~ therefore merely subjective. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles existing a priori in cognition, we might easily shew that such principles are the indispen- sable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and con- sequently prove their existence a priori. For whence could our experience itself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves empirical, and consequently for- ttutous 1 No one, therefore, can admit the validity of the UM B2 4 INTRODUCTION of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, wf may content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and exercise a faculty of pure a priori cog- nition ; and, secondly, with having pointed out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and necessity. Not' only in judgments, however, but even in conceptions, is an a priori origin manifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a body all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience colour, hardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability the body will then vanish ; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly impossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner, from our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all properties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we cannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering to substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that of an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the con- ception of substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our faculty of cognition a priori. III. PHILOSOPHY STANDS IN NEED OF A SCIENCE WHICH SHALL DETEKMINE THE POSSIBILITY, PRINCIPLES, AND EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE A PRIORI. OF far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration that certain of our cognitions rise com- pletely above the sphere of all possible experience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole ex- tent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our judgments beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible sphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the investi- gations of Reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider far preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the understanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phsenomena. So high a value do we set upon these investigations, that even at the risk of error, we persist in following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor indifference to restrain us from the pur- 9uit. These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are DO&MATTW. GOD, FREEDOM (of will) and IMMORTALITY. Tlie science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics, a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it con- fidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking. Now the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems nevertheless natural that we should hesitate to erect a building with the cognitions we possess, without knowing whence they come, and on the strength of principles, the origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a foundation, it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the question, how the under- standing can arrive at these a priori cognitions, and what is the extent, validity, and worth which they may possess ? We say, this is natural enough, meaning by the word natural, that which is consistent with a just and reasonable way of think- ing ; but if we understand by the term, that which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural and more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left; long uuattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of mathematics, has been long firmly estab- lished, and thus leads us to form flattering expectations with regard to others, though these may be of quite a different nature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of ex- perience, we are of course safe from opposition in that quarter ; and the charm of widening the range of our know- ledge is so great, that unless we are brought to a stand-still by some evident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however, may be avoided, if we are suffi- ciently cautious in the construction of our fictions, which are not the less fictions on that account. Mathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of all experience, we may carry our a priori knowledge. It is true that the mathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only, in so far as they can be represented by means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily overlooked, because the said intuition can itself be given a priori, and therefore is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived by such a proof of IffTBODFCTIOK. the power of reason, we can perceive no limiti to the ex- tension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin air, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far more free and rapid in air- less space. Just in the same way did Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts ; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is, indeed, the common fate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought as rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether the foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of excuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or rather indeed, to enable us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous an investigation. But what frees us during the process of building from all appre- hension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity, is this. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason consists in the analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of objects. By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really nothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a confused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in respect of their form, prized as new introspections ; whilst, so far as regards their matter or content, we have really made no addition to our con- ceptions, but only disinvolved them. But as this process does furnish real a priori knowledge,* which has a sure progress and useful results, reason, deceived by this, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite different kind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, a priori in- deed, but entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and, indeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at once proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge. * Not svnthetical. Tr. ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. 7 IV. OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS. TN all judgments wherein the relation of a subject to the pre- dicate is cogitated, (I mention affirmative judgments only here ; the application to negative will be very easy,) this rela- tion is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A ; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connexion with it. In the first instance, I term the judgment analytical, in the second, synthetical. Analytical judgments (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity ; those in which this connexion is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical judgments. The former may be called explicative, the latter augmentative* judgments ; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which were thought already in the subject, although in a con- fused manner ; the latter add to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when I say, " all bodies are extended," this is an analytical judgment. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it : it is therefore an ana- lytical judgment. On the other hand, when I say, " all bodies are heavy," the predicate is something totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a body. By the addition of such a predicate therefore, it becomes a synthetical judgment. Judgments of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would be absurd to think of grounding an analytical judgment on experience, because in forming such a judg- ment, I need riot go out of the sphere of my conceptions, * That is, judgments which realiy add to, and do not merely analy ee or explain the conceptions which make up the sum of our knowledge. TV. and therefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That "bodies are extended" is not x an em- pirical judgment, but a proposition which stands firm a priori. For before addressing myself to experience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for the judg- ment, and I have only to extract the predicate from the concep- tion, according to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time become conscious of the necessity of the judgment, a necessity which I could never learn from ex- perience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all include the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that conception still indicates an object of ex- perience, a part of the totality of experience, to which I can still add other parts ; and this I do when I recognize by ob- servation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize beforehand by analysis the conception of body through the character- istics of extension, impenetrability, shape, &c., all which are cogitated in this conception. But now I extend my know- ledge, and looking back on experience from which I had derived this conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the above characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this as a predicate, and say, "all bodies are heavy." Thus it is experience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the conception of body, because both con- ceptions, although the one is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only contingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is itself a synthesis of intuitions. But to synthetical judgments a priori, such aid is entirely wanting. If I go out of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as connected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the synthesis possible ? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want. Let us take, for example, the proposition, "everything that happens has a cause." In the conception of something that happens, I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical judgments. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above conception, and indicates something entirely different from " that which SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PBIOBI. 9 happens," and is consequently not contained in that con- ception". How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception "that which happens" something entirely dif- ferent from that conception, and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as belonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X, upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found, out of the conception A a foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it ? It cannot be experience, because the principle adduced annexes the two represent- ations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not only with universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the expression of necessity, therefore completely a priori and from pure conceptions. Upon such synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends the whole aim of our specu- lative knowledge a priori ; for although analytical judgments are indeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that clearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis, and this alone is a real acquisition. V. IN ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON, SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PRIORI ARE CONTAINED AS PRINCIPLES. 1 . MATHEMATICAL judgments are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact, though incontestibly true and very important in its consequences, seems to have escaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to all their conjtc- tures. For as it was found that mathematical conclusions all proceed according to the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every apodeictic certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental principles of the science also were recognised and admitted in the same way. But the notion is fallacious ; for although a synthetical pro- position can certainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this is possible only when another syntheti- cal proposition precedes, from which the latter is deduced, ~ but never of itself. Before all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propo- sitions are always judgments d priori, and not empirical, be- cause they carry along with them the conception of necessity, 1 INTRODUCTION. which cannot be given by experience. If this be demurred to, it matters not ; I will then limit my assertion to pure ma- thematics, the very conception of which implies, that it con sists of knowledge altogether non-empirical and a priori. We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5=12, is a merely analytical proposition, following (ac- cording to the principle of contradiction), from the concep- tion of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more narrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains nothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all be cogitated what this single number is which embraces both. The conception of twelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and five ; and we may analyze our conception of such a possible sum as long as we will, still we shall never dis- cover in it the notion of twelve. We must go beyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds to one of the two, our five fingers, for ex- ample, or like Segner in his " Arithmetic," five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five given in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number 7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as objects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up the number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the number 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7 should be added to 5, 1 have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum =7+ 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are therefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by trying large numbers. For it wiL thus become quite evident, that turn and twist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to intui- tion, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis of our conceptions. Just as little is any princi- ple of pure geometry analytical. " A straight line between two points is the shortest," is a synthetical proposition. For my conception of straight, contains no notion of quantity, but is merely qualitative. The conception of the shortest ia therefore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be ex- tracted from our conception of a straight line. Intuition SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS A PRIORI. 1] must therefore here lend its aid, by means of which and thus only, our synthesis is possible. Some few principles preposited by geometricians are, in- deed, really analytical, ana depend on the principle of con- tradiction. They serve, however, like identical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as principles, for ex- ample, a=a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a + b) 7 , the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles themselves, though they derive their validity from pure conceptions, are only admitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition. What causes us here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgments is already contained in our conception, and that the judgment is therefore analytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in thought a certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves already to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join in thought to the given conception, but what we really think therein, though only obscurely, and then it becomes manifest, that the predicate pertains to these conceptions, ne- cessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself, out by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the con- ception. 2. The science of Natural Philosophy (Physics) contains in itself synthetical judgments a priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For instance, the proposition, " in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged ;" or, that, " in all communication of motion, action and re-action must always be equal." In both of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin a priori clear, but also that they are synthetical propo- sitions. For in the conception of matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space, which it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of matter, in order to think on to it something a priori, which I did not think in it. The proposition is therefore not analyti- cal, but synthetical,, and nevertheless conceived a priori ; and BO it is with regard to the other propositions of the pure part of natural philosophy. 3. As to Metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science, yet, from the nature of human reason, an 12 INTRODUCTION. in dispeii saole one, we find that it must contain synthetical propositions a priori. It is not merely the duty of meta- physics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate th conceptions which we form a priori of things ; but we seek tc widen the range of our a priori knowledge. For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles as add something to the original conception something not identical with, nor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgments a priori, leave far behind us the limits of experience ; for example, in the proposition, " the world must have a begin- ning," and such like. Thus metaphysics, according to the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical pro- positions a priori. VI. THE UNIVERSAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON. IT is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations under the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only facilitate our own labour, inas- much as we define it clearly to ourselves, but also render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to our undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the question, " How are synthetical judgments cL priori possible ?" That metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so va- cillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact, that this great problem, and p'erhaps even the difference between analytical and synthetical judg- ments, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the solution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the im- possibility of synthetical knowledge d. priori., depends the V existence or downfall of the science of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest^ of all to this problem: yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient preci- sion, nor did he regard the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped short at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its cause, (principium causal- itatis), insisting that such proposition & priori was impos- sible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical science is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into that which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has given the appearance" THE GRANT) PROBLEM OF PURE REASON. 13 of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure philosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes in its universality. For he would then have perceived that, according to his own argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which assuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions a priori, an absurdity from which his good understanding must have saved liiin. In the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the possibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all sciences which contain theoretical knowledge a priori of objects, that is to say, the answer to the following questions : How is pure mathematical science possible ? How is pure natural science possible ? Respecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be asked, how they are possible ? for that they must be possible, is shewn by the fact of their really existing.* But as to metaphysics, the miserable progress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought forward, as far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really exists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of its existence. Yet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must un- questionably be looked upon as given; in other words, meta- physics must be considered as really existing, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the human mind (metaphysica naturalis}. For human reason, without any instigations imputable to the mere vanity of great know- ledge, unceasingly progresses, urged on by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by any em- pirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom ; and so there has ever really existed in every man some system * As to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps many may still express doubts. But we have only to look at the different pro- positions which are commonly treated of at the commencement of proper (empirical) physical science those, for example, relating to the perma- nence of the same quantity of matter, the vis inertia, the equality of action and reaction. &c. to be soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics (jphysica pura, or rationalis), which well deserves to b* separately exposed as a special science, in its whole extent, whether thai be great or confined. 14 rNTBODTJCTION. of metaphysics. It will always exist, so soon as reason uw&kee to the exercise of its power of speculation. And now the question arises How is metaphysics, as a nataral disposition, possible ? In other words, how, from the nature of universal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to itself, and which it is impelled by its> own feeling of need to answer as well as it can ? But as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the ques- tions which reason is prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the world had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with unavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natu- ral disposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the faculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always arises ; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the question whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats. We must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on the ability or inability of reason to form any judgment respecting them ; and therefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to set strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last ques- tion, which arises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus : How is metaphysics possible as a science 1 Thus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to science ; and, on the other hand, the dogma- tical use of reason without criticism leads to groundless asser- tions, against which others equally specious can always be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism. Besides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity, because it has not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible, but merely with reason her- self and her problems ; problems which arise out of her own bosom, and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but by her own nature. And when once reason has previously become able completely to understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets with in experience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her attempted application to objects beyond the confines of experience. We may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto IDEA OF A CRITIQUE OF PURE SEASON. 14 made to establish metaphysical science dogmatically as non- existent. For what of analysis, that is, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in one or other, is not the aim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for its object the extension, by means of synthesis, of our a priori knowledge. And for this purpose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shews what is contained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, a priori, at them ; and this it is her duty to shew, in order to be able afterwards to determine their valid use in regard to all objects of expe- rience, to all knowledge in general. But little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing the undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, in- evitable contradictions of Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of every system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will require more firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition from without, from endeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those hitherto followed, to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science indispensable to human reason a science from which every branch it has borne may be cut away, but whose roots remain indestructible. \ 7 II. IDEA AND DIVISION OF A PARTICULAR SCIENCE, UNDER THE NAME OF A CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. FROM all that has been said, there results the idea of a par- ticular science, which may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori. Hence, pure reason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing any thing absolutely d, priori. An Organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those principles according to which alone all pure cognitions d, priori can be obtained. The completely extended application of such an organon would afford us a system of pure reason. As this, however, is de- manding a great deal, and it is yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or if so, in what cases ; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits, as the propaedeutic to a eystem of pure reason. Such a science must not be called a Doctrine, but only a Critic '-is of pure Reason; and its use, 16 INTRODUCTION in regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to eri- large the bounds of, but to purify our reason, and to shield it against error, which alone is no little gain. I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occu- pied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori. A system of such conceptions would be called Transcendental Philosophy. But this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such a science must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical a priori, but of our analytical a priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range for our present purpose, because we do not require to carry our analysis any farther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles of synthesis a priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation, which we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique, because it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance of our knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of all know- ledge a priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a critique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon ; and if this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure reason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be set forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay, that such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its ever being com- pleted, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of outward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of the nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its cognition a priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be sought without, but altogether within ourselves, cannot remain con- cealed, and in all probability is limited enough to be com- pletely surveyed and fairly estimated, according to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader here expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason ; our present object is exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we make this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for estimating the philosophical IDEA OF A UHlTKtUE OT PURE REA.SOF. 17 ralue of ancient and modern writings on this subject; and vithout this criterion, the incompetent historian or judge decides upon and corrects the groundless assertions of otherc with his own, which have themselves just as little foundation. Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of Pure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from principles, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the parts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of pure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of transcendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it ought to contain a full analysis of ail human knowledge a priori. Our critique must, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical concep- tions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete analysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation of those derived from them, it abstains with reason ; partly because it would be deviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this process is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the synthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it would be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the vindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which, after all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis of these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions a priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain, provided only that we are in pos- session of all these radical conceptions, which are to serve as principles uf the synthesis, and that in respect of this main purpose nothing is wanting. To the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes transcendental philosophy ; and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but still not the science itself ; because it only proceeds so far with the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our syn- thetical knowledge a priori. The principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of a science like this, is : that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught empirical ; in other words, that c 1 INTROPUCTION. die knowledge a priori must be completely pure. Hence, although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality are certainly cognitions a priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental philosophy ; because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain, pleasure, desires, inclinations, &c., (which are all of empirical origin) at the foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of duty, as an obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a motive, these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the construction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is con- sequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason. For all that is practical, so far as it contains mo- tives, relates to feelings, and these belong to empirical sources of cognition. If we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science in general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the Elements, and, secondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions will have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we cannot here particularise. Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction or premonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably spring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and under- standing. By the former, objecte are given to us ; by the latter, thought. So far as the faculty of sense may contain representations a priori, which form the conditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the first part of our science of elements, because the con- ditions under which alone the objects of human knowledge are given, must precede those under which they are thought. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. PART FIRST. TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC. 1. Introductory. \TS whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our know- ledge may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear, that the only manner in which it immediately relates to them, is by means of an intuition. To this as the indispensable ground- work, all thought points. But an intuition can take place >nly in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner. The capacity for receiving re- presentations (receptivity) through the mode in which we are affected by object*, is called sensibility. By means of sensi- bility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions ; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise conceptions. But all thought must directly, ' r indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to intuitions ; consequently, with us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given to us. The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates to an object by means of sensa- tion, is called an empirical intuition. The undetermined ob- ject of an empirical intuition, is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter ; but that which effects that the content of the phseno merion can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, can- not be itself sensation. It is then, the matter of all phaeno- mena that is given to us a posteriori ; the form must lie ready u priori for them in the mind and consequently can be re-*^ garded separately from all sensation. 22 TEANSCESDENTAL ESTHETIC. I call all representations pure, in the transcendental mean- ing of the word, wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we find existing in the mind priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general, in which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and viewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body, all that the under- standing thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, d' visi- bility, &c., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impe- netrability, hardness, colour, &c. ; yet there is still something left \is from this empirical intuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real object of the senses or any sensation. The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call Transcendental ^Esthetic.* There must, then, be such a science, forming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought, and which is called transcen- dental logic. In the science of transcendental aesthetic accordingly, we shall first isolate sensibility or the sensuous faculty, by sepa- rating from it all that is annexed to its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding, so that nothing be left but em- pirical intuition. In the next place we shall take away from this intuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure intuition, and the mere form of phse- * The Germans are the only people who at present use this word to indicate what others call the critique of taste. At the foundation of this term lies the disappointed hope, which the eminent analyst, Baum- garten, conceived, of subjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles of reason, and so of elevating its rules into a science. But his endeavours were vain. For the said rules or criteria are, in respect to their chief sources, merely empirical, consequently never can serve as determinate laws a priori, by which our judgment in matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgment which forms the proper test as to the correct- ness of the principles. On this account it is advisable to give up the use of the term as designating the critique of taste, and to apply it solely to that doctrine, which is true science, the science of the laws of sensibility and thus come nearer to the language and the sense of the ancients in their well-known division of the objects of cognition into nloOtjra Kai vnijrn , or to share it with speculative philosophy, and emjjloi 1 it partly in a tran- scendental, partly in a psychological signification. 21ETAPTT rSTOAL EXPOSITION OF SPACE. 23 nom?na, which is all that the sensibility can afford a priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge priori, namely, space and time. To the consideration of these we shall now proceed. SECTION I. OF SPACE. 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. BY means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent to ourselves objects as without us, and these all in space. Therein alone are their shape, dimensions, and rela- tions to each other determined or determinable. The internal seirse, by means of which the mind contemplates itself or its internal state, gives, indeed, no intuition of the soul as an object ; yet there is nevertheless a determinate form, under which alone the contemplation of our internal state is pos- sible, so that all which relates to the inward determinations of the mind is represented in relations of time. Of time we cannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal intuition of space. What then are time and space 1 Are they real existences 1 Or, are they merely relations or de- terminations of things, such however, as would equally belong to these things in themselves, though they should never become objects of intuition ; or, are they such as belong only to the form of intuition, and consequently to the subjective consti- tution of the mind, without which these predicates of time and space could riot be attached to any object 1 In order to become informed on these points, we shall first give an expo- sition of the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear, though not detailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception ; and an exposition is metaphysical, when it contains that which represents the conception as given a priori, 1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences. For, in order that certain sen- sations may relate to something without me, (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space from that ui which I am) ; in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without of and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of space must already 24 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phae- nomena through experience ; but, on the contrary, this ex- ternal experience is itself only possible through the said ante cedent representation. 2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves for the foundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a representation to ourselves of the non- existence of space, though we may easily enough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered as the condition of the possibility of phaenomena, and by no means as a determination dependent on them, and is a repre- sentation ct priori, which necessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena. 3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the relations of things, but a pure intuition. For in the first place, we can only represent to ourselves one space, and when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of one and the same space. Moreover these parts cannot antecede this one all-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be made up, but can be cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one, and multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or that space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an a priori intuition (which is not empirical), lies at the root of all our conceptions of space. Thus, moreover, the principles of geometry, for example, that "in a triangle, two sides together are greater than the third," are never deduced from general conceptions of line and triangle, but from in- tuition, and this a priori, with apodeictic certainty. 4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every conception must indeed be considered as a representa- tion which is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible representations, which, therefore, comprises these under itself; but no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless, space is so conceived of, for all parts of space ire equally capable of being produced to infinity. Conse- quently, the original representation of space is an intuition priori, and not a conception TBANRCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF SPACE. 25 3. Transcendental exposition of the conception of Space. By a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception, as a principle, whence can be discerned the possi- bility of other synthetical a priori cognitions. For this pur- pose, it is requisite, firstly, that such cognitions do really flo^ from the given conception ; and, secondly, that the said cog- nitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given mode of explaining this conception. Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be possible ? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception, no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception,* and yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical prin- ciples are always apodeictic, that is, united with the conscious- ness of their necessity, as, " Space has only three dimen- sions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical judgments, nor conclusions from them. (Introd. II.) Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects themselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined a priori, exist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its seat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject's being affected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that is, intuition ; con- sequently, only as the form of the external sense in general. Thus it is only by means of our explanation that the pos- sibility of geometry, as a synthetical science a priori, becomes comprehensible. Every mode of explanation which does not shew us this possibility, although in appearance it may be similar to ours, can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it by these marks. 4. Conclusions from the foregoing conceptions, (a) Space does not represent any property of objects as * That is, the analysis of a conception only gives you what is contained in it, and does not add to your knowledge of the objepf of which ) THANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC. things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their rela- tions to each other ; in other words, space does not represent to us any determination of objects such as attaches to the ob- jects themselves, and would remain, even though all subjective conditions of the intuition were abstracted. For neither abso- lute nor relative determinations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they belong, and therefore not a priori. (b) Space is nothing else than the form of all pbaenomena of the external sense, that is, the subjective condition of the sensi- bility, under which alone external intuition is possible. Now, , because the receptivity or capacity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these objects, it is easily understood how the form of all phaenomena can be given in the mind previous to all actual perceptions, there- fore priori, and how it, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can contain principles of the relations of these objects prior to all experience. It is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space, extended objects, &c. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which alone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which we are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning whatsoever. This predicate [of space] is only appli- cable to things in so far as they appear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all rela- tions in which objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when abstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the name of space. It is clear that we can- not make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the possibility of their existence as far as they are phaenomena. And so we may correctly say that space contains all which can appear to us externally, but not all things considered as things in them- selves, be they intuited or not, or by whatsoever subject one will. As co the intuitions of other thinking beings, we can- not judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition, and which for U8 are universally valid. If we join the limitation of a judgment to the conception of the subject, then the judgment will poa- OF SPACE. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOHEGOIIfO. 27 sess unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, "All objects are beside each other in space," is valid only undei the limitation that these things are taken as objects 'of oui sensuous intuition. But if I join the condition to the con- ception, and say, " all things, as external phsenomena, are be- side each other in space," then the rule is valid universally, and without any limitation. Our expositions, consequently/ teach the reality (i. e. the objective validity) of space in re- gard of all which can be presented to us externally as object, and at the same time also the ideality of space in regard 'to objects when they are considered by means cf reason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution of our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its transcendental ideality ; in other words that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends, and look upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves. But, with the exception of space, there is no representation, subjective and referring to something external to us, which couia be called objective d priori. For there are no other subjective representations from which we can deduce syn- thetical propositions a priori, as we can from the intuition of space. (See 3.) Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs to these, although they agree in this respect with the representation of space, that they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous perception ; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of hearing, and of feeling, by means of the sensations of colour, sound, and heat, but which, because they are only sensations, and not intuitions, do not of themselves give us the cognition of any object, least of all, an a priori cognition. My purpose, in the above remark, is merely this : to guard any one against illus- trating the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insuffi- cient, for example, by colour, taste, &c. ; for these must be con- templated not as properties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes which may be different in different men. For in such a case, that which is originally a mere phaenomenon, a rose, for example, is taken by the empirical understanding for a thing in itself, though to every different eye, in respect of its colour, it may appear different. On the contrary, the 28 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. transcendental conception of phenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which be- longs as a property to things ; but that objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward ob- jects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensi- bility, whose form is space, but whose real correlate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representa- tions, nor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made. SECTION II. or TIME. 5. Metaphysical exposition of this conception. 1. TIME is not an empirical conception. For neither co- existence nor succession would be perceived by us, if the re- presentation of time did not exist as a foundation a priori. Without this presupposition we could not represent to our- selves that things exist together at one and the same time, or at different times, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession. 2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the found- ation of all our intuitions. With regard to pliBenomena in general, we cannot think away time from them, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but we can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phaeno- mena. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is aL reality of phsenomena possible. These may all be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled. 3. On this necessity a priori, is also founded the possibility of apodeictic principles of the relations of time, or axioms of time in general, such as, " Time has only one dimension," " Different times are not co-existent but successive," (as dif- ferent spaces are not successive but co-existent). These principles cannot be derived from experience, for it would give neither strict universality, nor apodeictic certainty. We should Duly be able to say, " so common experience teaches us," but not it must be so. They are valid as rules, through which, n general, experience is possible ; and they instruct us respect- ing experience, and not by means of it. TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION OF TIME. 29 4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general con- ception, but a pure form of the sensuous intuition. Different times are merely parts of one and the same time. But the representation which can only be given by a single object is an intuition. Besides, the proposition that different times can- not be co-existent, could not be derived from a general con- ception. For this proposition is synthetical, and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone. It is therefore con- tained immediately in the intuition and representation of time. 5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every determined quantity of time is possible only through limitations of one time lying at the foundation. Consequently, the original representation, time, must be given as unlimited. But as the determinate representation of the parts of time and of every quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete representation of time must not be furnished by means of conceptions, for these contain only partial representations. Conceptions, on the contrary, must have immediate intuition for their basis. 6. Transcendental exposition of the conception of time. I may here refer to what is said above (5, 3), where, for the sake of brevity, I have placed under the head of metaphy- sical exposition, that which is properly transcendental. Here I shall add that the conception of change, and with it the conception of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time ; that if this re- presentation were not an intuition (internal) a priori, no con- ception, of whatever kind, could render comprehensible the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of contra- dictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for ex- ample, the presence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same thing in the same place. It is only in time, that it is possible to meet with two contradictorily opposed deter- minations in one thing, that is, after each other.* Thus our conception of time explains the possibility of so much syn- * Kant's meaning is : You cannot affirm and deny the same thing of a subject, except by means of the representation, time. No other idea intuition, or conception, or whatever other form of thought there bo. can mediate the connection of such predicates. Tr 30 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. thetioal knowledge a priori, as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is not a little fruitful. 7. Conclusions from the above conceptions. (a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective determination, and therefore remains, when abstraction is made of the subjective conditions of the intuition of things. For in the former case, it would be something real, yet without presenting to any power of perception any real object. In the latter case, as an order or determination inherent in things themselves, it could not be antecedent to things, as their condition, nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical propositions a priori. But all this is quite possible when we regard time as merely the subjective condition under which all our intuitions take place. For in that case, this form of the inward intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and consequently a priori. (b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time cannot be any determination of outward pheenomena. It has to do neither with shape nor position ; on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations in our internal state. And precisely because this internal intuition presents to us no shape or form, we endeavour to supply this want by analogies, and represent the course of time by a line pro- gressing to infinity, the content of which constitutes a series which is only of one dimension ; and we conclude from the properties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this single exception, that the parts of the line are co-existent, whilst those of time are successive. From this it is clear also that the representation of time is itself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed in an external in- tuition. (c) Time is the formal condition a priori of all phsenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition a priori to external phsenomena alone. On the other hand, because all representations, whether they have or have not external things for their ob- jects, still in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state ; and because this internal state is subject to the formal condition of the internal intuition, that is, Ob 1 TIMK. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE FOREOOINO. 31 to time, time is a condition a. priori of all phenomena what- soever the immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the mediate condition of all external phenomena. If I can say a priori, " all outward phenomena are in space, and de- termined a priori according to the relations of space," I can also, from the principle of the internal sense, affirm univer- sally, " all phenomena in general, that is, all objects of the senses, are in time, and stand necessarily in relations of time." If we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves, and all external intuitions, possible only by virtue of this internal intuition, and presented to us by our faculty of representation, and consequently take objects as they are in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to phsenomena, because these are things which we regard as ob- jects of our senses. It is no longer objective, if we make ab- straction of the sensuousness of our intuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is peculiar to us, and speak of things in general. Time is therefore merely a sub- Active condition of our (human) intuition, (which is always sensuous, that is, so far as we are affected by objects,) and in itself, independently of the mind or subject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of all things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say, "all things are in time," because in this conception of things in general, we abstract and make no mention of any sort of intuition of tilings. But this is the proper condition under which time belongs to our representation of objects. If we add the condition to the conception, and say, " all things, as phse- nomena, that is, objects of sensuous intuition, are in time," then the proposition has its sound objective validity and universality priori. What we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of time ; that is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be presented to our senses. And as our intuition is always sensuous, no object ever can be pre- sented to us in experience, which does not come under the conditions of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute reality : that is, we deny that it, without having regard to the form of our sensuous intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property. Such properties 32 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. as belong to objects as things in themselves, never can be presented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein consists, therefore, the transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the subjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be reckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves, independently of its relation to our intuition. This ideality, like that of space, is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with sensations, for this reason, that in such arguments or illustrations,we make the presupposition that the phsenomenon, in which such and such predicates inhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can only find such an objective reality as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere phaenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I. (p. 27). 8. Elucidation. Against this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies to it absolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from intelligent men an objection so unanimously urged, that I conclude that it must naturally present itself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel. It runs thus : " Changes are real ;" (this the continual change in our own representations demonstrates, even though the existence of ail external phaenomena, together with their changes, is denied). Now, changes are only possible in time, and therefore time must be something real. But there is no difficulty in answer- ing this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is something real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition. It therefore has subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that is, I have really the representation of time, and of my determinations therein. Time, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of repre- sentation of myself as an object. But if I could intuite my- self, or be intuited by another being, without this condition of sensibility, then those very determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would present to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and conse- quently of change, would not appear. The empirical reality of time, therefore, remains, as the condition of all our expe- rience. But absolute reality, according to what has been OT SPACE A1TD TIME. ELUCIDATORY REMARKS. 33 iaid above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our internal intuition.* If we take away from it the special condition of our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes ; and it inheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind) which intuites them. But the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against our doctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot start any intelligible arguments against the doc- trine of the ideality of space, is this, they have no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the absolute reality of space, be- cause the doctrine of idealism is against them, according to which the reality of external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other hand, the reality of the object of our internal sense (that is, myself and my internal state) is clear immediately through consciousness. The former exter- nal objects in space might be a mere delusion, but the latter the object of my internal perception is undeniably real. They do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their reality as representations, belong only to the genus phse- nomeiion, which has always two aspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to the mode of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason problematical, the other, the form of our intui- tion of the object, which must be sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which it appears, which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and neces- sarily to the phsenomenal object. Time and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which form the foundation of pure ma- thematics. They are the two pure forms of all intuition, and thereby make synthetical propositions a priori possible. But these sources of knowledge being merely conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly determine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present * I can indeed say " my representations follow one another, or are successive" ; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a succession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense. Time, therefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective determinatiou obtaining to, or inherent in things. D 34 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. objects ae things in themselves, but are applicable to them solely in so far as they are considered as sensuous pheeno- mena. The sphere of phsenomena is the only sphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further objective use can be made of them. For the rest, this formal reality of time and space leaves the validity of our empirical know- ledge unshaken ; for our certainty in that respect is equally firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere in the things themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the other hand, those who maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially subsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves at utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide for the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the side taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two self-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without there being any thing real) for the purpose of containing in themselves every thing that is real. If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is preferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time as relations (contiguity in space or suc- cession in time), abstracted from experience, though repre- sented confusedly in this state of separation, they find them- selves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathe- matical doctrines a priori in reference to real things (for example, in space), at all events their apodeictic cer- tainty. For such certainty cannot be found in an a posteriori proposition ; and the conceptions priori of space and time are, according to this opinion, mere creations of the ima- gination,* having their source really in experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from experience, imagination has made up something which contains, indeed, general statements of these relations, yet of which no application can be made without the restrictions attached thereto by nature. The former of these parties gains this advantage, that they keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical science. On the other hand, these very conditions (space and time) embarrass them greatly, when the understanding endeavours * This word is here used, and will be hereafter always used, in its prnm. tive sense. That meaning of it which denotes a poetical inventive power, i* a secondary one. Tr. GENERAL REMARKS ON TRANSCENDENTAL J5STKETTC. 35 to pass the limits of that sphere. The latter has, indeed, tins advantage, that the representations of space and time do not corne in their way when they wish to judge of ob- jects, not as phenomena, but merely in their relation to the understanding. Devoid, however, of a true and objectively valid a priori intuition, they can neither furnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions a priori, nor bring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with those of mathematics. In our theory of the true nature of these two original forms of the sensibility, both difficulties are surmounted. In conclusion, that transcendental .^Esthetic cannot con- tain any more than these two elements space and time, is sufficiently obvious from the fact that all other con- ceptions appertaining to sensibility, even that of motion, which unites in itself both elements, presuppose something empirical. Motion, for example, presupposes the perception of something moveable. But space considered in itself contains nothing moveable, consequently motion must be something which is found in space only through experience, in other words, is an empirical datum. In like manner, tran- scendental ^-Esthetic cannot number the conception of change among its data a priori ; for time itself does not change, but only something which is in time. To acquire the conception of change, therefore, the perception of some existing object and of the succession of its determinations, in one word, experience, is necessary. 9. General Remarks on Transcendental ^Esthetic. I. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first place, to recapitulate, as clearly as pos- sible, what our opinion is with respect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general. We have in- tended, then, to say, that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phaenomena; that the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us ; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear ; and D 2 36 TEAIfSCETTDENTAL .ESTHETIC that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this alone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof ; sensation the matter. The former alone can we cog- o nize a priori, that is, antecedent to all actual perception ; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition. The latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition a pos- teriori, that is, empirical intuition. The former appertain ab- solutely and necessarily to our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be ; the latter may be of very diversified character. Supposing that we should carry our empirical intuition even fo the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things in themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of intuition, that is, of our sensibility, and this always under the conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the conditions of space and time ; while the ques- tion " What are objects considered, as things in them- selves?" remains unanswerable even after the most thorough examination of the phsenomenal world. To say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the con- fused representation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to them as things in themselves, and this undei an accumulation of characteristic marks and partial representa- tions which we cannot distinguish in consciousness, is a falsifi- cation of the conception of sensibility and phsenomenization, which renders our whole doctrine thereof empty and useless. The difference between a confused and a clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do with content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound understand- ing, contains all that the most subtle investigation could unfold from it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word, we are not conscious of the manifold representations com- prised in the conception. But we cannot for this reason assert that the ordinary conception is a sensuous one. con- GESERAL HEMATITE OT* TRANS CETTDE-STAL J5STHETTC. 37 taining a mere phenomenon, for right cannot appear as a phenomenon ; but the conception of it lies in the understand- ing, and represents a property (the moral property) of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could belong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the phenomenon or appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that appearance ; and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called sensibility, and remains toto ccelo different from the cognition of an ob- ject in itself, even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the very bottom. It must be admitted that the Leibnitz- Wolfian philosophy has assigned an entirely erroneous point of view to all investi- gations into the nature and origin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards the distinction between the sensuous and the in- tellectual as merely logical, whereas it is plainly transcenden- tal, and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but the content and origin of both. For the faculty of sensibility not only does not present us with an indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in themselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On the contrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the object represented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous in- tuition, entirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that determined the form of the object as a phaeno- menon. In phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially belongs to the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human being, from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not for the sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organ- ization of this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accus- tomed to say that the former is a cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only a particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, how- ever, is only empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the empirical intuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing that can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental distinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in them- 38 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. elves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world! investigate the nature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but phenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere appearance or phsenornenon in a sunny shower, and the rain, the reality or thing in itself ; and this is right enough, if we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as that which in universal ex- perience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous percep- tion, is known in intuition to be so and so determined, and not otherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum gene- rally, and enquire, without reference to its accordance with all our senses, whether there can be discovered in it aught which represents an object as a thing in itself (the raindrops of course are not such, for they are, as phsenomena, empirical objects), the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental ; and not only are the raindrops mere phsenomena, but even their circular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in itself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our sensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly unknown. The second important concern of our ^Esthetic is, that it do not obtain favour merely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as undoubted a character of certainty as can be de- manded of any theory which is to serve for an organon. In order fully to convince the reader of this certainty, we shall select a case which will serve to make its validity apparent, and also to illustrate what has been said in 3. Suppose, then, that Space and Time are in themselves ob- jective, and conditions of the possibility of objects as things in themselves. In the first place, it is evident that both present us with very many apodeictic and synthetic propositions a priori, but especially space, and for this reason we shall prefer it for investigation at present. As the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically a priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I enquire, whence do you obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does the understanding rest, in order to arrive At such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths ? There is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as such ; and these are given either a priori or a posteriori. The latter, namely, empirical conceptions, together with the GTWEBA.L HEMARTTS f' TRA-NSCETTDEXTAL /ESTHETIC. 39 empirical intuition on which they are founded, cannot afford any synthetical proposition, except such as is itself also empi- rical, that is, a proposition of experience. But an empirical proposition cannot possess the qualities of necessity and abso- lute universality, which, nevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions. As to the first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere concep- tions or intuitions a priori, it is quite clear that from mere con- ceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be obtained. Take, for example, the proposition, " Two straight lines cannot enclose a space, and with these alone no figure is possible," and try to deduce it from the conception of a straight line, and the number two ; or take the proposition, " It is possible to construct a figure with three straight lines," and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the mere conception of a straight line and the number three. All your endeavours are in vain, and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition, as, in fact, geometry always does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition. But of what kind is this intuition ? Is it a pure a priori, or is it an em- pirical intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much less an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never can give us any such proposition. You must therefore give yourself an object a priori in intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical proposition. Now if there did not exist within you a faculty of intuition a priori , if this subjective condition were not in respect, to its form also the universal condition (i priori under which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible ; if the object (that is, the triangle,) were something in itself, without relation to you the subject ; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in your subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also necessarily belong to the triangle in itself? For to your conceptions of three lines, you could not add any thing new (that is, the figure) which, therefore, must necessarily be found in the object, because the object is given before your cognition, and not by means of it. If, therefore, Space (and Time also) were not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions d, priori, under which alone things can become external objects for you, and without which subjective conditions the objects are in them- 40 TRANSCENDENTAL .ESTHETIC. selves nothing, you could not construct any synthetical pro- position whatsoever regarding external objects. It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that Space and Time, as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal experience, are merely subjective conditions of all oar intuitions, in relation to which all objects are therefore mere phsenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us in this particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form of phsenomena, much may be said a priori, whilst of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phsenomena, it is impossible to say any thing. II. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as internal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as mere phsenomena, we may especially remark, that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains nothing more than mere relations. The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the will, which are not cognitions, are excepted. The re- lations, to wit, of place in an intuition (extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to which this change is determined (moving forces). That, however, which is pre- sent in this or that place, or any operation going on, or re- sult taking place in the things themselves, with the exception of change of place, is not given to us by intuition. Now by means of mere relations, a thing cannot be known in itself ; and it may therefore be fairly concluded, that, as through the external sense nothing but mere representations of relations are given us, the said external sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the object to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in itself. The same is the case with the internal intuition, not only, because, in the internal intuition, the representation of the external senses constitutes the material with which the mind is occupied ; but because time, in which we place, and which itself antecedes the consciousness of, these representations in experience, and which, as the formal condition of the mode according to which objects are placed in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains relations of the successive, the co-existent, and of that which always must be co-existent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as represent- ation, can antecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is intuition ; and when it contains nothing but relations, it is the ttESEBAL EEMABKS ON TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 41 form of the intuition, which, as it presents us with no lepre- sentation, except in so far as something is placed in the mind, can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity, to wit its presenting to itself represent- ations, consequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that is, it can be nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form. Everything that is represented through the medium of sense is so far phseiiomenal ; consequently, we must either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject, which is the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as phsenomenon, and not as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous activity, that is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the question How the subject can have an internal intuition of itself? but this difficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of self (apperception) is the simple represent- ation of the " Ego ;" and if by means of that representation alone, all the manifold representations in the subject were spontaneously given, then our internal intuition would be intellectual. This consciousness in man requires an internal perception of the manifold representations which are pre- viously given in the subject ; and the manner in which these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on account of this difference (the want of spontaneity), oe called sensibility. If the faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what lies in the mind, it must affect that, and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self. But the form of this intuition, which lies in the original constitution of the mind, determines, in the representation of time, the manner in which the manifold representations are to combine themselves in the mind ; since the subject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and spontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally affected, conse- quently, as it appears, and not as it is. III. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the self-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in space and time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear, this is by no means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory appearances. For when we speak of things as phsenomena, the objects, nay, even the properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really 42 TRJUfSCENDEtfTA-L AESTHETIC. given ; only that, in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of the subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as phsenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I do not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul seems merely to be given in my self-con- sciousness, although I maintain that the properties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the condition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the objects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should reckon as phaenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.* But this will not happen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On the contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation, it becomes impossible to avoid changing every thing into mere appearance. For if we regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as things in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence, and reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved, inasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things, which are nevertheless not substances, nor any thing really inhering in substances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the exist- ence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to exist, although all existing things were annihilated, we can- not blame the good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own existence, which * The predicates of the phaenomenon can be affixed to the object it- self in relation to our sensuous faculty ; for example, the red colour or the perfume to the rose. But (illusory) appearance never can he attributed as a predicate to an object, for this very reason, that it attributes to this object in itself that which belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the subject in general, e. g. the two handles which were formerly ascribed to Saturn. That which is never to be found in the ob- ject itself, but always in the relation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is inseparable from our representation of the object, we denominate phaenomenon. Thus the predicates of space and time are rightly attributed to objects of the senses as such, and in this there is no illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness to the rose as a thing in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external objects, con- sidered as things in themselves, without regarding the determinate relation of these objects to the subject, and without limiting my judgment to that relation, then, and then only, arises illusion. GENERAL REMARKS Off TBAWSCEITDENTAL .ESTHETIC. 43 would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of iuch a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere appearance an absurdity which no :ne ha as yet been guilty of. IV. In natural theology, where we think of an object God which never can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an object of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition the conditions 01 space and time and intuition all his cognition must be, and not thought, which always includes limitation. But with what right can we do this if we make them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such moreover, as would con- tinue to exist as a priori conditions of the existence of things, even though the things themselves were annihilated ? For as conditions of all existence in general, space and time must be conditions of the existence of the Supreme Being also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of all things, there is no other way left than to make them sub- jective forms of our mode of intuition external and internal ; which is called sensuous, because it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the existence of the object or the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as we can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is dependent on the ex- istence of the object, is possible, therefore, only on condition that the representative faculty of the subject is affected by the object. ft is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in space and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well be, that all finite thinking beings must neces- sarily in this respect agree with man, (though as to this we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this universality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a deduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an original (in- tuitus oriyinarius), consequently not' an intellectual intuition; and this intuition, as such, for reasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never to a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its existence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This latter remark, however, must be taken only as au illus- tration, and not as any proof of the truth of our aesthetics? theory. 44 TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC. 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental ^Esthetic. We have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand general problem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question How are synthetical propositions a priori possible ? That is to say, we have shown that we are in possession of pure a priori intuitions, namely, space and time, in which we find, when in a judgment a priori we pass out beyond the given conception, something which is not dis- coverable in that conception, but is certainly found a priori in the intuition which corresponds to the conception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the judgments which these pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of the senses, and are valid only for objects of possible experience. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. PART SECOND. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. INTRODUCTION. IDEA OF A TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. I. Of Logic in general. OUR knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, the first of which is the faculty or power of receiving repre- sentations (receptivity for impressions) ; the second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations (spon- taneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an^objectjs given ^o us ; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation (which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. ^.Intuition and conceptions constitute, there- fore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither con- ceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor intuition without conceptions, can afford us a cog- nition. 3 Both are either pure or empirical. They are empi- rical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained in them ; and pure, when no sen- sation is mixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous cognition. Pure intuition con- sequently contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought of an object. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are possible a priori; the empirical only a posteriori. We apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions, in so far as it is in some way affected , and, on the other hand, we call the faculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of cognition, understanding. Our nature is so constituted, that intuition with us never can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains 46 TBANSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. only the mode in which we are affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensuous in- tuition, is the understanding. Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void ; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence it is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to join to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible (that is, to bring them under concep- tions). Neither of these faculties can exchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous faculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both, can knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the difference of the elements contributed by each ; we have rather great reason carefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the science of the laws of sensibility, that is, ^Esthetic, from the science of the laws of the understanding, that is, Logic. Now, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold, namely, as logic of the general [universal],* or of the particular * Logic is nothing but the science of the laws of thought, as thought, It concerns itself only with the form of thought, and takes no cognizance of the matter that is, of the infinitude of the objects to which thought is applied. Now Kant is wrong, when he divides logic into logic of the general and of the particular use of the understanding. He says the logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of right thinking upon any particular set of objects. This sort Df logic he calls the organon of this or that science. It is difficult to dis- cover what he means by his logic of the particular use of the understand- ing. From his description, we are left in doubt whether he means by this logic induction, that is, the organon of science in general, or the laws which regulate the objects, a science of which he seeks to establish. In either case, the application of the term logic is inadmissible. To regard logic as the organon of science, is absurd, as indeed Kant himself afterwards shows (p. 51). It knows nothing of this or that object. The mutter em- ployed in syllogisms is used for the sake of example only ; all forms of syllogisms might be expressed in signs. Logicians have never been able clearly to see this. They have never been able clearly to define the ex- tent of their science, to know, in fact, what their science really treated of. They have never seen that it has to do only with the formal, and never with the material in thought. The science has broken down its proper barriers to let in contributions from metaphysics, psychology, &c. It is common enough, for example, to say that Bacon's Novum Organum entirely super- INTEODUCTION. OF LOGIC IS GENERAL 47 use of the understanding. The first contains the absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatever of the understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed. The logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct think- ing upon a particular class of objects. The former may be called elemental logic, the latter, the organon of this or that particular science. The latter is for the most part employed in the schools, as a propaedeutic to the sciences, although, in- deed, according to the course of human reason, it is the last thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs only the finishing touches towards its correction and completion ; for our knowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably extensive and complete before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these objects can be established. General logic is again either pure or applied. In the for- mer, we abstract all the empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised ; for example, the influence of the senses, the play of the phantasy or imagination, the laws of the memory, the force of habit, of inclination, &c., conse- quently also, the sources of prejudice, in a word, we abstract all causes from which particular cognitions arise, because these causes regard the understanding under certain circum- seded the Organon of Aristotle. But the one states the laws under which a knowledge of objects is possible ; the other the subjective laws, of thought. The spheres of the two are utterly distinct. Kant very properly states that pure logic is alone properly science. Strictly speaking, applied logic cannot be a division of general logic. It is more correctly applied psychology ; psychology treating in a practical manner of the conditions under which thought is employed. It may be noted here, that what Kant calls Transcendental Logic is properly not logic at all, but a division of metaphysics. For his Categories contain matter as regards thought at least. Take, for example, the cate- gory of Existence. These categories, no doubt, are the fonr3 of the matter given to us by experience. They are, according to Kant, not de- rived from experience, but purely a priori. But logic is concerned ex- clusively about the form of thought, and has nothing to do with this or that conception, whether a priori or a posteriori. See Sir William Hamilton's Edition of Reid's Works, passim. It is to Sir William Hamilton, one of the greatest logicians, perhaps the greatest, since Aristotle, and certainly one of the acutest thinkers of any time, that the Translator is indebted for the above view of the subject of logic 2> 48 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. stances of its application, and, to the knowledge of them ex- perience is required. Pur_general logic h'as to do, therefore, merely with pure a priori principles, and is a canon of un- derstanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use, be the content what it may, empirical or trans- cendental. General logic^ is called applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use oflthe understanding, under the sub- jective empirical conditions which psychology teaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although, at the same time, it is in so far general, that it applies to the exercise of the understanding, without regard to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is neither a canon of the un- derstanding in general, nor an organon of a particular science, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding. In general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic must be carefully distinguished from that which con- stitutes applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly science, although short and dry, as the methodical exposition of an elemental doctrine of the understanding ought to be. In this, therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules : 1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of the understanding, and of the difference of objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thought. 2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and con- sequently draws nothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology, which therefore has no influence on the canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated doctrine, and every thing in it must be certain completely & priori. What I call applied logic (contrary to the common accep- tation of this term, according to which it should contain cer- tain exercises for the scholar, for which pure logic gives the rules), is a representation of the understanding, and of the rules of its necessary employment in concrete, that is to say, under the accidental conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote this employment, and which are all given only empirically. Thus applied logic treats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the origin of error, of the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction, &c., and to it is related pure general loicie in the same way thai INTRODUCTION. OF TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 49 pure morality, which contains only the necessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical ethics, which considers these laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and passions to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish us with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as applied logic, requires empirical and psychological principles. II. Of Transcendental Logic. General logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, that is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and regards only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, the form of thought in gene- ral. But as we have both pure and empirical intuitions (as transcendental aesthetic proves), in like manner a distinction might be drawn between pure and empirical thought (of objects). In this case, there would exist a kind of logic, in which we should not make abstraction of all content of cog- nition ; for that logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure thought (of an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were of empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of our cognitions of ob- jects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the objects themselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has nothing to do with the origin of our cognitions, but contemplates our representations, be they given primitively a priori in ourselves, or be they only of empirical origin, solely according to the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the process of thought, in relation to each other. Conse- quently, general logic treats of the form of the understanding only, which can be applied to representations, from whatever source they may have arisen. And here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in mind in the course of the following consider- ations, to wit, that not every cognition a priori, but only those through which we cognize that and how certain repre- sentations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or are possible only a priori; that is to say, the a priori possibility of cognition and the a priori use of it are transcendental. Therefore neither is space, nor any a priori geometrical 50 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. determination of space, a transcendental representation, but only the knowledge that such a representation is not of empirical origin, and the possibility of its relating to objects of experience, although itself a priori, can be called transcen- dental. So also, the application of space to objects in general, would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense, it is empirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical belongs only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the relation of these to their object. Accordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which relate a priori to objects, not as pure or sen- suous intuitions, but merely as acts of pure thought, (which are therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical nor eestheti- cal origin), in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves, by anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational* cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should deter- mine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be called Transcendental Logic, because it has not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding and reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without distinction, but concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects. III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic. The old question with which people sought to push logi- cians into a corner, so that they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this," What is truth ?" The definition of the word truth, to wit, " the accordance of the cognition with its object," is presupposed in the ques- tion ; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal and secure criterion of the truth of every cognition. To know what questions we may reasonably propose, is in itself a strong evidence of sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and unsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger not to * Vernunfterkenntni**. The words reason, rational, will always be confined in this translation to the rendering of Vernunft and its deriva* terss Tr INTRODUCTION. OF ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC. 51 mention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it of seducing the unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with the ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) " milking the he-goat, and the other holding a sieve." If truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object must be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others ; for a cognition is false if it does not accord with the object to which it relates, although it contains something which may be affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of truth would be that which is valid for all cog- nitions, without distinction of their objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion, we make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation to its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be utterly absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition ; and that, accordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot possibly be found. As we have already termed the content of a cogni- tion its matter, we shall say : "Of the truth of our cog- nitions in respect of their matter, no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is self-contradictory/' On the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form (excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it exhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these very laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules is false, because thereby the understanding is made to contra- dict its own universal laws of thought ; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria, however, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and in so far they are per- fectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a cognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not self- contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand in agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of truth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws of understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qud non, or negative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the error which depends not on the form, but Oil the content of the cognition, it has no test to discover. E 2 52 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. General logic, then, resolves the whole formal business ide their application to objects of experience, HS DEDUCTION OF THE GATE GOBIES. 71 general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with it- self.* ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTIONS. CHAPTER II. OP THE DEDUCTION OF THE PUEE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDEESTANDING. SECT. I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general. 9- TEACHEES of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quidfacti), and while they demand proof of both, they give to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of Deduction. Now we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any one ; and consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal in- dulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the ques- tion, quid juris ? In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ them can be founded. * Kant's meaning in the foregoing chapter is this : These three con- ceptions of unity, truth, and goodness, applied as predicates to things, are the three categories of quantity under a different form. These three categories have an immediate relation to things, as phenomena ; without them we could form no conceptions of external objects. But in the above- mentioned proposition, they are changed into logical conditions of thought, and then unwittingly transformed into properties of things in themselves. These conceptions are properly logical or formal, and not metaphysical or material. The three categories are quantitative ; these conceptions, quali- tative. They are logical conditions employed as metaphysical con- ceptions, one of the very commonest error? in the sphere of mental whence. TV. 72 TRAXSOESDENTAL LOGIC. Among the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori, independent of all experience ; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs Irom experience are not sufficient ; but it is necessary to know how these concep- tions can apply to objects without being derived from expe- rience. I term, therefore, an explanation of the manner in which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, thejranscen- dental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which a conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon ; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in pos- session of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they both apply to objects completely h priori. These are the concep- tions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate- gories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcen- dental. Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for Bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dis- similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising ou of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres- sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such * Gelegenheitsursachen. DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 73 an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions, is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en- quiry. But a deduction of the pure a priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely inde- pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that ot a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a qu&stio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog- nition. It is therefore manifest that there can csly be a tran- scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de- duction, in regard to pure d. priori conceptions, are vain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the alto- gether peculiar nature of these cognitions. But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen- dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective validity a priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure a priori cogni- tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep- tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon a priori intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are given a priori (as regards their form) in intuition by and through the cognition itself.* With the pure concep- tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab- * Kant's meaning is : The objects of cognition in Geometry, angles, lines, figures, and the like, are not different from the act of cognition which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist but while we think it does not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of thinking and the object of thinking, are but one tiling regarded from two different points of view. r 'r. 74 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning objects not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen- sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in a priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe- rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition ; and for this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces- sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the 1111- * I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, have sie. . von Gegenstanden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the sie is the pronoun for die reine Verstan desbegrlffe ; and we ought, there- fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objects," I have altered "syn- thetischen Einsicht des Denkens" into " synthetischen Einheit" And in page 77, sentence beginning, " But it is evident" we find "die erste Bedingung liegen." Some such word as rmiss is plainly to be understood. Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust- worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the press. Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the best ; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done so hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the editions I could gain access to, that I have altered the common reading ; while conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that the reading of every edition was a misprint. Other errors, occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been. *nd others after them will be. corrected L. silence. Tr. DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES, 57 avoidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may riot afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path ; because we have a choice of only two things either at once to give up all pretensions to know- ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion. We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com- prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob- jects, and render a synthetical cognition of these possible, '.ndependently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that is, be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con- dition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an a priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity. On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not represent the conditions under which objects are given to us in intuition ; objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding on the under- standing to contain a priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that is to say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, in other words, can become con- ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects ; for phaenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions of the understanding. Let us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates a peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, B, is connected according to a law. It is not a priori manifest why phsenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated a priori), and it hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such a con- ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuoui 76 TBANSCENDEtfTAL LOGIC. intuition must correspond to the formal conditions of SCD eibility existing priori in the mind, is quite evident, from the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity or thought, is an assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered. For phsenomena might be so con- stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought; and all things might lie in such confusion, that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor- respond to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this conception would be quite void, null, and without significance. Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought. If we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in pheno- mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab- stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep- tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con- trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand- ing, or be rejected as a mere chimeera. For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac- cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phsenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn- thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the cause, but as posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in- duction only a comparative universality, tliLt is, an extended range of practical application. But the pure conceptions ol DEDUCTION OTf THE CATEGORIES. 77 the understanding would entirely lose all their pecoliar cha- racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex- perience. TRANSITION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 10. There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re- presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it were, meet together. Either the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the case with phaenomena, as regards that in them which is refer- able to mere sensation. In the latter case although repre- sentation alone (for of its causality, by means of the will, we do riot here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex- istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re- gard to the object, if it is only by means r>f the represent- ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means of which the object, though only as phaenomenon, is given ; secondly, Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes- thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, a priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi- bility, therefore, all phaenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phaenomena at all ; that is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is, whether there do not exist h priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative, it follows that all empirical cogni- tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, if they are noi presupposed, it is impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besides the intuitioD of the senses through which an object ia 78 TRJJTSCEKDENTAL LOGIC. given, a conception also of an object that is given in Intuition. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as o> priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition ; and con- sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re- gards the form of thought) is possible only hy their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of ex- perience be thought. The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all priori conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conception* which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to all pos- sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what- ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible. The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un- derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, tc render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object, and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi- ence in which its objects were presented to it, he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that is from a subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective, in one word, from "habit." But he proceeded with perfect con- tequence, and declared it to be impossible with such con- DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 79 reptions and the principles arising from them, to overstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep- tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we d o possess scientific a priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics. The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance (for if reason has once undoubted righ, on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism, a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be- tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity. I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela- tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol- lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible." But in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions belongs the function of subject, arid to which that of predi- cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body." But the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under it, determines that ; and its empirical intui- tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, and never aa mere predicate. And so with all the other cate- gories. 8C TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS o? THE UNDER- STANDING. SECTION II. TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING. 11. Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre- sentations given by Sense. The manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist a priori in our faculty of representation, without being any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty understanding; so all conjunction whether conscious or un- conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- sensuous, or of several conceptions is an act of the under- standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub- ject itself, because it is an act cf its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never- theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, because only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation. But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of it, that of tht TBJLFSCEITDEXTAL DEDUCTION OT TEE CATEGORIES. 81 unity of it also. Conjunction is the representation of ths synthetical unity of the manifold.* This idea of unity, there- fore, cannot arise out of that of conjunction ; much rather does that idea, by combining itself with the representation of the manifold, render the conception of conjunction pos- sible. This unity, which priori precedes all conceptions of conjunction, is not the category of unity ( 6); for all the categories are based upon logical functions of judgment, and in these functions we already have conjunction, and consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore evident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore look still higher for this unity (as quali- tative, 8), in that, namely, which contains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgments, the ground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the under- standing, even in regard to its logical use. Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception.^ 12. The I think must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought ; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to all thought, is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the I think, in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation, I think, is an act of spontaneity ; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in order to distin- * Whether the representations are in themselves identical, and conse- quently whether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other, is a question which we need not at present consider. Our con- sciousness of the one, when we speak of the manifold, is always distinguish- able from our consciousness of the other ; and it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that we here treat. f Apperception simply means consciousness But it has been considered better to employ this term, not only because Kant saw fit to have another word besides Bewusstseyn, but because the term consciousness denotes a ttate, apperception an act of the ego; and from this alone the superiority of the Latter is apparent. Zlr. O 82 TRANSCEJTDETTTAL LOGIC. guish it /rom empirical ; or primitive apperception, because it is a self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the re- presentation / think, must necessarily be capable of accom- panying all our representations. It is in all acts of conscious- ness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no repre- sentation can exist for me. The unity of this apperception 1 call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate the possibility of a priori cognition arising from it. For the manifold representations which are given in an intui- tion would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as such), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, be- cause otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many impor- tant results. For example, this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given in intuition, contains a synthesis of repre- sentations, and is possible only by means of the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness which accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and disunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. This relation, then does not exist because I accom- pany every representation with consciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a variety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I can represent to myself the identity of con- sciousness in these representations ; in other words, the ana- lytical unity of apperception is possible only under the pre- supposition of a synthetical unity.* The thought, "These repre- * All general conceptions as such depend, for their existence, on the analytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of red in general, I thereby think to myself a property which (as a characteristic mark) can be discovered somewhere, or can be united with other repre- sentations ; consequently, it is only by means of a forethought possible svnthetical unity that I can think to myself the analytical. A represen- tation which is cogitated as common to different representations, is re- garded as belonging to such as, besides this common representation, con- .ain something different; consequently it must be previously thought in synthetical unity with other although only possible representations, before DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOKIES. 83 aentations given in intuition, belong all of them to me," is accordingly just the same as, "I unite them in one self-con- sciousness, or can at least so unite them ;'' and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of re- presentations, it presupposes the possibility of it ; that is to say, for the reason alone, that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many- coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical unity of the manifold in intui- tions, as given a priori, is therefore the foundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes a priori all determinate thought. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining a priori, and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apper- ception. This principle is the highest in all human cog- nition. This fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apper- ception is indeed an identical, and therefore analytical propo- sition ; but it nevertheless explains the necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without which the identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the Ego, as a simple representation, presents us with no manifold content ; only in intuition, which is quite different from the representation Ego, can it be given us, and by means of con- junction, it is cogitated in one self-consciousness. An under- standing, in which all the manifold should be given by means of consciousness itsjelf, would be intuitive ; our understanding can only think, and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore, conscious of my identical self, in relation to all the variety of representations given to me in an intuition, because I call all of them my representations. In other I can think in it the analytical unity of consciousness which makes it a conceptas communis. And thus the synthetical unity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every operation of the under- standing, even the whole of logic, and after it our transcendental philo- sophy : indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself. O 'I 84 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. words, I am conscious myself of a necessary OL priori syn- thesis of my representations, which is called the original synthetical unity of apperception, under which rank all the representations presented to me, but that only by means of a synthesis. The principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest principle of all exercise of the Understanding. 13. The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was, according to our transcendental aesthetic, that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of Space and Time. The supreme prin- ciple of the possibility of it in relation to the Understanding is : that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally synthetical Unity of Apperception.* To the former of these two principles are subject all the various representa- tions of Intuition, in so far as they are given to us ; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness ; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception / think ; and there- fore could not be connected in one self-consciousness. Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of Cog- nitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representations to an object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and con- * Space and Time, and all portions thereof, are Intuitions ; conse- quently are, with a manifold for their content, single representations. (See the Transcendental ^Esthetic.) Consequently, they are not pure conceptions, by means of which the same consciousness is found in a great number of representations ; but, on the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the consciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness is nevertheless syn- thetical, and therefore primitive. From this peculiar character of con- $ciou:>ness follow many important consequences. (See 21.) DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBIE8. 85 sequeiitly, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself. The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensuous in- tuition, namely, space, affords us, per se, no cognition ; it merely contributes the manifold in a priori intuition to a pos- sible cognition. But, in order to cognize something in space, (for example, a line,) I must draw it, and thus produce syn- thetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of con- sciousness, (in the conception of a line,) and by this means alone is an object (a determinate space) cognized. The syn- thetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective con- dition of ah 1 cognition, which I do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must neces- sarily be subject, in order to become an object for me ; be- cause in any other way, and without this synthesis, the mani- fold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness. This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, al- though it constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought ; for it states nothing more than that all my repre- sentations in any given intuition, must be subject to the con- dition which alone enables me to connect them, as my repre- sentation with the identical self, and so to unite them syn- thetically in one apperception, by means of the general ex pression, I think. But this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible understanding, but only for that understanding by means of whose pure apperception in the thought / am, no manifold content is given. The understanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through the act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding by and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should at the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the manifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which the human understanding, which thinks only and can- not intuite, has absolute need. But this principle is the first 86 TBA^SOEKDENTAL IO(1TC. principle of all the operations of our understanding, o that we cannot form the least conception of any other possible un- derstanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or possess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of space and time. What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. 14. It is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the manifold given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On this account it is called ob- jective, and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal sense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to be so united. Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as co-existent or as successive, de- pends upon circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association of representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world, and is wholly contingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intui- tion in time, merely as an intuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of consciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the manifold in intuition to the / think, consequently by means of the pure synthesis of the understanding, which lies priori at the foundation of all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone objectively valid ; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and which is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in con- creto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion conveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing ; and the unity of consciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that which is given by experi- ence, not necessarily and universally valid. The Logical Form of all Judgments consists in the Objectii* Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. 15. I could never satisfy myself with the definition which lo- gicians give of a judgment. It is, according to them, the DEDUCTION OF TUK CATEGORIES. 87 representation of a relation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition, in that it suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunc- tive judgments, these latter containing a relation not of con- ceptions but of judgments themselves ; a blunder from which many evil results have followed.* It is more important for our present purpose to observe, that this definition does not determine in what the said relation consists. But if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation which is produced ac- cording to laws of the reproductive imagination, (which has only subjective validity), I find that a judgment is nothing but the mode of bringing gh&en cognitions under the objective unity of apperception. This is plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgments, in order to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective unity. For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the original apperception, and also their necessary unity, even al- though the judgment is empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgment, " All bodies are heavy." I do not mean by this, tha| these representations do necessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition, but that by means of the necessary unity of apperception they belong to each other in the syn- thesis of intuitions, that is to say, they belong to each other according to principles of the objective determination of all our representations, in so far as cognition can arise fnom them, these principles being all deduced from the main principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone can there arise from this relation a judgment, that is, a rela- tion which has objective validity, and is perfectly distinct from that relation of the very same representations which * The tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical syllogisms ; and although it is nothing more than an artifice by surreptitiously introducing immediate conclusions (consequently imme- diate} among the premises of a pure syllogism, to give rise to an appearance of more modes of drawing a conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have had much success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical judgments into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must he referred a doctrine, however, which, according to 5 , is utterly false. CJ8 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. ha* only subjective validity a relation, to wit, which is produced according to laws of association. According to these laws, I could only say : " When I hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel an impression of weight ;" but I could not say : " It, the body, is heavy ;" for this is tantamount to saying both these representations are conjoined in the ob- ject, that is, without distinction as to the condition of the subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however frequently the perceptive act may be repeated. All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness. 16. The manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily under the original synthetical unity of appercep- tion, because thereby alone is the unity of intuition possible ( 13). But that act of the understanding, by which the mani- fold content of given representations (whether intuitions or conceptions), is brought under one apperception, is the logical function of judgments ( 15). All the manifold therefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in relation to one of the logical functions of judgment, by means of which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now the categories are nothing else than these functions of judg- ment, so far as the manifold in a given intuition is deter- mined in relation to them( 9). Consequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the categories of the understanding. Observation. 17. The manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is repre- sented by means of the synthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness, and this takes place by means of the category.* The category * The proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by Jieans of which an object is given, and which always includes in itself a synthesis of the manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of tlus latter to unity of apperception. DEDUCTION 0* :HE CATEGORIES. indicates accordingly, that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a pure self-cou- sciousness a priori, in the same manner as an empirical in- tuition is subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also h priori. In the above proposition, then, lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of the understanding. Now, as the categories have their origin in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make abstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an em- pirical intuition is given, in order to fix my attention exclu- sively on the unity which is brought by the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what follows ( 22), it will be shown from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs to it is no other than that which the category (according to 16) imposes on the manifold in a given intui- tion, and thus its a priori validity in regard to all objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be fully attained. But there is one thing in the above demonstration, of which I could not make abstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously to the synthesis of the un- derstanding, and independently of it. How this takes place remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understand- ing which was itself intuitive (as, for example, a divine un- derstanding which should not represent given objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves should be given or produced) the categories would possess no signification in relation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an understanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of submitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition from a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception ; a faculty, therefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but only connects and arranges the material of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to it by means of the object. But to show reasons for this peculiar character of our understandings, that it produces unity of apperception priori only by means of categories, and a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible as to explain why we are endowed with precisely BO many functions of judgment and no more, or why time and space are the only forms of our intuition. 90 TBAIfSCENDENTAL LOGIC. 18. In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is t\* only legitimate use of the Category. To think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing. In cognition there are two elements : firstly, the conception, whereby an object is cogitated (the category) ; and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is given. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not be given, it would still be a thought as re- gards its form, but without any object, and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch as, so far as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought could be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous ; consequently, our thought of an object by means of a pure conception of the understanding, can become cogni- tion for us, only in so far as this conception is applied to objects of the senses. Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of that which is im- mediately represented in space and time by means of sensation as real. Through the determination of pure intuition we ob- tain d, priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only as regards their form as phaenomena ; whether there can exist things which must be intuited in this form is not thereby established. All mathematical conceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except in so far as we presuppose that there exist things, which can only be represented con- formably to the form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given, only in so far as they are percep- tions (representations accompanied with sensation), therefore only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure con- ceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions a priori (as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and therefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them,) can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even by means of pure intuition, afford us any cognition of things ; they can only do so in so far as they can be applied to empirical intui- tion. That is to say, the categories serve only to render em- pirical cognition possible. But this is what we call experience ; DEDUCTION OF THE CATE(K)EIE8. 91 Consequently, in cognition, their application to objects of ex- perience is the only legitimate use of the categories. 19. The foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it determines the limits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the understanding in regard to objects, just as transcen- dental aesthetic determined the limits of the exercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as conditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us, are valid no further than for objects of sense, con- sequently, only for experience. Beyond these limits they re- present to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and have no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are free from this limitation, and extend tc objects of intuition in general, be the intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only it be sensuous, and not intellectual. But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our in- tuition is of no advantage ; for they are then mere empty con- ceptions of objects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they furnish us with no means of dis- covery. They are mere forms of thought, without objective reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity of apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the purpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can alone give them significance and meaning. If, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given, we can in that case represent it by all those pre- dicates, which are implied in the presupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to it ; for example that it is not extended, or in space ; that its duration is not time that in it no change (the effect of the determinations in time) is to be met with, and so on. But it is no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what the intuition of the object is not, with- out being able to say what is contained in it, for I have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure con- ception of understanding could be applicable, because I have not been able to furnish any intuition corresponding to it, but am only able to say that our intuition is not valid for it. But the most important point is this, that to a something o/ 92 TRANSCENDENTAL LO&IC. this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for example, the conception of substance, that is something that can exist as subject, but never as mere predicate ; in regard to this conception I am quite ignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a determination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occa- sion for its application. But of this more in the sequel. 20. Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in general. The pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in general, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be our own or some other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere forms of thought, by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized. The synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we have said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground of the possibility of a priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is dependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, there- fore, not merely transcendental, but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of sensuous intuition exists in the mind a priori which rests on the receptivity of the representa- tive faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a spontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the di- versity of given representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception, and thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold of sensuous in- tuition a priori, as the condition to which must necessarily oe submitted all objects of human intuition. And in this nanner the categories as mere forms of thought receive ob- jective reality, that is application to objects which are given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it is only of phenomena that we are capable of a priori intuition. This synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), in contra-distinction to that which is co gitated in the mere category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and is called connexion or conjunction of the understanding (syntheses intellectualis}. Both are trana- DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBIES. 93 cendental, not merely because they themselves precede ct priori all experience, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other cognition a priori. But the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the originally synthetical unity of apperception, that is to the transcendental unity cogitated in the categories, must, to be distinguished from the purely intellectual conjunction, be en- titled the transcendental synthesis of imagination.* Imagina- tion is the faculty of representing an object even without its presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination, by reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to sensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of spontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable, and which is consequently able to determine sense a priori, according to its form, conformably to the unity of appercep- tion, in so far is the imagination a faculty of determining sen- sibility d priori, and its synthesis of intuitions according to the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the imagi- nation. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, and the first application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at the same time the basis for the exer- cise of the other functions of that faculty. As figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual synthesis, which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of imagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it also the productive imagination, and distin- guish it from the reproductive, the synthesis of which is sub- ject entirely to empirical laws, those of association, namely, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to transcendental philosophy, but to psychology. ***** We have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox, which must have struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense ( 6), namely, how this sense repre- sents us to our own consciousness, only as we appear to our- selves, not as we are in ourselves, because, to wit, we intuits * See note on p. 34 94 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. ourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be contradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive re- lation to ourselves ; and therefore in the systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held to be one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary, carefully distin guish them. That which determines the internal sense is the under- standing, and its original power of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under an apperception (upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself). Now, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is unable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold of its own intuition, the syn- thesis of understanding is, considered per se, nothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even apart from sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our internal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it according to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a transcendental synthesis of imagi- nation, the understanding exercises an activity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is ; and so we are right in saying that the internal sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its synthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The former, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the name of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all sensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains merely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical con- junction of the manifold therein, and consequently does not con- tain any determined intuition, which is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the manifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of the understanding on the internal sense), which I have named figurative synthesis. This we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We can- not cogitate a geometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without describing it, nor represent the three dimensions * of space without drawing three lines from the game point f perpendicular to one another. We cannot even cogitate time, unless, in drawing a straight line (which is to * Length, breadth, and thickness. TV. t I" different planes. TV DEDUCTION Of THE CATEQOBIES. 95 serve as the external figurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the synthesis of the manifold, whereby we determine successively the internal sense, and thus attend also to the succession of this determination, Motion as an act of the subject (not as a determination of an object),* consequently the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act by which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that which produces the conception of succession. The un- derstanding, therefore, does by no means find in the internal sense any such synthesis of the manifold, but produces it, in that it affects this sense. At the same time how [the] / who think is distinct from the I which intuites itself (other modes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the same with this latter as the same subject ; how, therefore, I am able to say : " I, as an intelligence and thinking subject, cognize myself as an object thought, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the understanding, but merely as I appear," is a question that has in it neither more nor less difficulty than the question, " How can I be an object to myself," or this, "How I can be an object of my own intuition and internal perceptions." But that such must be the fact, if we admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense, can be clearly proved by the consideration that we cannot represent time, which is not an object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image of a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of re- presentation without which we could not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated to take our determination of periods of time, or of points of tin.e, for all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in outward things. It follows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense, as phsenomena in time, exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the * Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science, con- sequently not to geometry ; because, that a thing is moveable cannot he known a priori, but only from experience. But motion, considered as thf. description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the mari fold in external intuition by means of productive imagination, and belong not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy. 96 TRANSCETTDENTAL LOGIC. external senses in space. And consequently, if we grant respecting this latter, that by means of them we know objects only in so far as we are affected externally, we must also con- fess, with regard to the internal sense, that by means of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by ourselves ; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize our own subject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.* 21. On the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold content of representations, consequently in the syn- thetical unity of apperception, I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that Jf am. This representation is a Thought, not an Intuition. Now, as in order to cognize ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking, which subjects the manifold of every possible intui- tion to the unity of apperception, there is necessary a deter- minate mode of intuition, whereby this manifold is given ; although my own existence is certainly not mere phaenomenon (much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence j* * I do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our internal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention exemplifies it. In such an act the understanding determines the internal sense by the synthetical conjunction which it cogitates, conformably to the internal intuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the understanding. How much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be able to perceive in himself. t The / think expresses the act of determining my own existence. My existence is thus already given by the act of consciousness ; but the mode in which I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in which I must place the manifold belonging to my existence, is not thereby given. For this purpose intuition of self is required, and this intuition possesses a form given a priori, namely, time, which is sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the determinable. Now, as I do not possess another in- tuition of self which gives the determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to the act of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable, it is clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of my determination, and my existence remains ever determinable in a purely sensuous manne?, that is to say, like the existence of a phaenomenon. But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself an intelliyenct. DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES. 97 can c nly take place conformably to the form of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the mani- fold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I have therefore no knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The consciousness of self is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do not use the categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the conjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require, in order to the cognition of an object distinct from myself, not only the thought of an object in general (in the category), but also an intuition by which to determine that general conception, in the same way do I require, in order to the cognition of myself, not only the con- sciousness of myself or the thought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in myself, by which to determine this thought. It is true that I exist as an intel- ligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or synthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence has to conjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense. My intelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible only accord- ing to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper sphere of the conceptions of the understanding, and conse- quently cognize itself in respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by the understanding), only as it appears to itself, and not as it would cognize itself, if its intuition were intellectual. 22. Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employ- ment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Under- standing. In the metaphysical deduction, the a priori origin of the categories was proved by their complete accordance with the general logical functions of thought ; in the transcendental deduction was exhibited the possibility of the categories as CL priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general (16 and 17). At present we are about to explain the possibility of cognizing, a priori, by means of the categories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our senses, not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according to the H TEA.NSCENDENTAL LOGIC. laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of rendering nature pos- sible. For if the categories were adequate to this task, it would not be evident to us why everything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those laws which have an & priori origin in the understanding itself. I premise, that by the term synthesis of apprehension, I understand the combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as phaenomenon), is possible. We have a priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition in the representations of space and time, and to these must the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold in a pheno- menon be always conformable, because the synthesis itself can only take place according to these forms. But space and time are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions them- selves (which contain a manifold), and therefore contain & priori the determination of the unity of this manifold.* (See the Trans. Esthetic.) Therefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or within us, consequently also a con- junction to which all that is to be represented as determined in space or time must correspond, given a priori along with (not in) these intuitisns, as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of them. But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction of the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a primitive act of consciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our sensuous intui- tion. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is even per- ception possible, is subject to the categories. And, as experience * Space represented as an object (as geometry really requires it tc be) contains more than the mere form of the intuition ; namely, a com- bination of the manifold given according to the form of sensibility into a representation that can be intuited ; so that the form of the intuition gives us merely the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the ^Esthetic I regarded this unity as belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpos ; of indicating that it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all our conceptions of space and time are possible. For as by means of this unity alone (the understanding deter- mining the sensibility) space and time are given as intuitions, it follows that the unity of this intuition a priori belongs to space and time, ind not to the conception of the understanding ( 20). DEDUCTION Of THE CATEGORIES. Oil is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are there- fore valid a priori for all objects of experience. ***** When, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house by apprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of this act, and I, as it were, draw the form of the house conformably to this synthetical unity of the manifold in space. But this very synthetical unity remains, even when I abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the understanding, and is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intui- tion ; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the aforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must be completely conformable.* To take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity), which as such, stand toward each other mutually in a relation of time. But in the time, which I place as an internal intuition, at the foundation of this phsenomenon, I represent to myself syn- thetical unity of the manifold, without which the aforesaid relation could not be given in an intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of time) . Now this synthetical unity, as the a priori condition under which I conjoin the manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the permanent form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the category of cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility, I determine everything that occurs according to relations of time. Consequently apprehension in such an event, and the event itself, as far as regards the possibility of its perception, stands under the conception of the relation of cause and effect : and so in all other cases. ***** Categories are conceptions which prescribe laws cL priori to * In this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apper- ception, which is intellectual, and contained a priori in the category. It is one and the same spontaneity which at one time, under the name of ima- gination, at another under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of intuition. H2 100 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. phenomena, consequently to nature as the complex of all phsenomena (natura materialiter spectata). And now the question arises inasmuch as these categories are not derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves according to her RS their model (for in that case they would be empirical) how it is conceivable that nature must regulate herself accord- ing to them, in other words, how the categories can determine a priori the synthesis of the manifold of nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is the solution of this enigma. It is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the phaenomena of nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its d, priori form that is, its fa- culty of conjoining the manifold than it is to understand how the phaenomena themselves must correspond with the a priori form of our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than the phaenomena exist as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by re- lation to the subject in which the phaenomena inhere, in so far as it possesses understanding, just as phaenomena have no existence except by relation to the same existing subject in so far as it has senses. To things as things in themselves, con- formability to law must necessarily belong independently of an understanding to cognize them. But phaenomena are only representations of things which are utterly unknown in re- spect to what they are in themselves. But as mere repre- sentations, they stand under no law of coi junction except that which the conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which conjoins the manifold of sensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding contributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of appre- hension. Now as all possible perception depends on the syn- thesis of apprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental, consequently on the categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions, and therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness, that is, all phaenomena of n-ature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the categories. And nature (considered merely as n-ature in general) is dependent on them as the original ground of her necessary conformability to law (as natura formaliter spectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of prescribing lava EESULT OF THE DEDUCTION. 101 a priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is not competent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a nature in general, as a conformability to law of phaenomena of space and time, depends. Particular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined phaenomena, cannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all stand under them. Experience must be superadded in order to know these particular laws ; but in regard to experience in (general, and everything that can be cognized as an object 1 hereof, these a priori laws are our only rule and guide. 23. Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Under- standing. We cannot think any object except by means of the catego- ries ; we cannot cognize any thought except by means of in- tuitions corresponding to these conceptions. Now all our in- tuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object of it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is expe- rience ; consequently no a priori cognition is possible for us, except of objects of possible experience. * But this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is not for that reason 'derived entirely from experience, but and this is asserted of the pure intuitions and the pure con ceptions of the understanding there are, unquestionably, elements of cognition, which exist in the mind a priori. Now there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of ex perience with the conceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former of these * Lest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the conclusions that may be too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them that the categories in the act of thought are by no means limited by the conditions of our sensuous intuition, but have an unbounded sphere of action. It is only the cognition of the object of thought, the determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the absence of intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful consequences hi regard to the exer- cise of reason by the subject. But as this exercise of reason is not alway* directed on the determination of the object, in other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the determination of the subject and its yolition, I do uoc intend to treat of it in this place. 102 TBANSCEtfDENTAL LOGIC. statements will not hold good with respect to the categoric* (nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori conceptions, and therefore independent of experience. The assertion of an empirical origin would attribute to them a sort of generatio cequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains but to adopt the second alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the Epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the understanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience. But with respect to the questions how they make experience possible, and what are the principles of the possibility thereof with which they pre- sent us in their application to phsenomena, the following sec- tion on the transcendental exercise of the faculty of judgment will inform the reader. It is quite possible that some one may propose a species of prceformation-system of pure reason a middle way between the two to wit, that the categories are neither innate and first d, priori principles of cognition, nor derived from expe- rience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and disposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws of nature which regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an hypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment of predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case entirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it. The conception of cause, for example, which expresses the necessity of an effect under a presupposed condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary subjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I could not then say " The effect is connected with its cause in the object (that is, necessarily)," but only, " I am so constituted that I can think this representa- tion as so connected, and not otherwise." Now this is just what the sceptic wants. For in this case, all our knowledge, depending on the supposed objective validity of our judg- ment, is nothing but mere illusion ; nor would there be want- ing people who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect to themselves, though they must feel it. At all events, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. 103 we could not dispute with any one on that which merely de- pends on the manner in which his subject is organized. Short view of the above Deduction. The foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure con- ceptions of the understanding (and with them of all theo- retical a priori cognition), as principles of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the determination of all phse- nomena in space and time in general of experience, finally, from the principle of the original synthetical unity of apper- ception, as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as original forms of sensibility. ***** I consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only i:p to this point, because we had to treat of the elementary conceptions. As we now proceed to the exposition of the em- ployment of these, I shall not designate the chapters in this manner any further. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. BOOK II. ANALYTIC OF PBKTCIPLES General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, Understanding, Judgment, and Reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of Conceptions, Judgments, and Conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding. As this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all con- tent of cognition, whether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere form of thought (discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason. For the form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consi- deration the particular nature of the cognition about which it is employed, can be discovered a priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its momenta. Transcendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate con- tent, that of pure a priori cognitions, tc wit, cannot imitate general logic in this division. For it is evident that the 104 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. transcendental employment of reason is not objectively valid, and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth (that is, to analytic), but as a logic of illusion, occupies a particular department in the scholastic system under the name of tran- scendental Dialectic. Understanding and judgment accordingly possess in tran- scendental logic a canon of objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are comprehended in the analytical depart- ment of that logic. But reason, in her endeavours to arrive by a priori means at some true statement concerning objects, and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible expe- rience, is altogether dialectic, and her illusory assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an analytic ought to contain. Accordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the faculty of judgment, for the instruction of this faculty in its application to phsenomena of the pure concep- tions of the understanding, which contain the necessary con- dition for the establishment of a priori laws. On this account, although the subject of the following chapters is the especial principles of understanding, I shall make use of the term "Doctrine of the faculty of judgment " in order to define more particularly my present purpose. INTRODUCTION. OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL FACULTY OF JUDGMENT IN GENERAL. If understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the faculty of judgment may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these rules ; that is, of dis- tinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand under a given rule (casus da fee leais). General logic contains no directions or precepts for the faculty of judgment, nor can it contain any such. For as it makes abstraction of all con- tent of cognition, no duty is left for it, except that of ex- posing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions, judgments and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal rules for all exercise of the understanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general direction how we should sub- Kurne under these rules, that is, how we should distinguish ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. 105 whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this again, could not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely because it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of judgment. Thus, it is evident, that the understanding is capable of being instructed by rules, but that the judgment is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore the specific quality of the so-called mother- wit, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compen- sate. For although education may furnish, and, as it were, ingraft upon a limited understanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of employing these rules cor- rectly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which we can prescribe to him with this purpose, is, in the absence or deficiency of this gift of nature, secure from misuse.* A physician therefore, a judge or a statesman, may have in his head many admirable pathological, juriclical, or political rules, in a degree that may enable him to be a profound teacher in his particular science, and yet in the application of these rules, he may very possibly blunder, either because he is wanting in natural judgment (though not in understand- ing), and whilst he can comprehend the general in abstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concrete ought to rank under the former ; or because his faculty of judgment has not been sufficiently exercised by examples and real practice. Indeed, the grand and only use of ex- amples, is to sharpen the judgment. For as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of the understand- ing, examples are commonly injurious rather than other- wise, because, as casus in terminis, they seldom adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken the power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their universality, independently of particular circum- stances of experience ; and hence, accustom us to employ * Deficiency in judgment is properly that which is called stupidity ; and for such a failing we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom nothing is wanting but a proper degree of understand- ing, may he improved by tuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons frequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgment, it is not uncommon to find men extremely learned, who in the application of their science betray to a lamentable degree thil ii remediable want. 106 TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC. them more as formulae than as principles. Examples arc thus the go-cart of the judgment, which he who is naturally deficient in that faculty, cannot afford to dispense with. But although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of judgment, the case is very different as regards trans- cendental logic, insomuch that it appears to be the especial duty of the latter to secure and direct, by means of determinate rules, the faculty of judgment in the employment of the pure understanding. For, as a doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the sphere of the understanding in regard to pure a priori cognitions, philosophy is worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made, little or no ground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to guard against the mistakes of the faculty of judgment (lapsus judicii) in the employment of the few pure conceptions of the understanding which we possess, although its use is in this case purely negative, philosophy is called upon to apply all its acuteness and penetration. But transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides indicating the rule, or rather the general condition for rules, which is given in the pure conception of the understand- ing, it can, at the same time, indicate CL priori the case to which the rule must be applied. The cause of the superiority which, in this respect, transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences except mathematics, lies in this : it treats of conceptions which must relate a priori to their objects, whose objective validity consequently cannot be demonstrated d. posteriori, and is, at the same time, under the obligation of presenting in general but sufficient tests, the conditions under which objects can be given in harmony with those con- ceptions ; otherwise they would be mere logical forms, without content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding. Our transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgment will contain two chapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under which alone pure conceptions of the under- standing can be employed, that is, of the schematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat of those synthetical judgments which are derived a priori from pure conceptions of the understanding under those conditions, and which lie ii priori at the foundation of all other cognitions, that is to say, it will treat of the principles of the pure understanding, OF THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES. 107 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGMENT, OB, ANALYTIC OF PEINCIPLES. CHAPTER I. Of the Schematism of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. IN all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of the object must be homogeneous with the conception ; in other words, the conception must contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it. For this is the meaning of the expression, An object is con- tained under a conception. Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous with the pure geometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the roundness which is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter. But pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical intuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are quite heterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How then is the subsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the application of the cate- gories to phsenomena, possible ? For it is impossible to say, for example, Causality can be intuited through the senses, and is contained in the phaenomenon. This natural and important question forms the real cause of the necessity of a transcen- dental doctrine of the faculty of judgment, with the purpose, to wit, of shewing how pure conceptions of the understand- ing can be applied to phsenomena. In all other sciences, where the conceptions by which the object is thought in the general are not so different and heterogeneous from those which represent the object in concreto as it is given, it is quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning the application of the former to the latter. Now it is quite clear, that there must be some third thing, which on the one side is homogeneous with the category, and with the phsenomenon on the other, and so makes the applica* tion of the fo rmer to the latter possible. This mediating reprc- 108 ANALYTIC OP PEIKCIPLES. eentation must be pure (without any empirical content), and yet must on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous* Such a representation is the transcendental schema. The conception of the understanding contains pure syn- thetical unity of the manifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all representations, contains a priori a manifold in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental deter- mination of time is so far homogeneous with the category r , which constitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal, and rests upon a rule a priori. On the other hand, it is so far ho- mogeneous with the phenomenon, inasmuch as time is con- tained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Thus an application of the category to phsenomena becomes possible, by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the conceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former. After what has been proved in our deduction of the catego- ries, no one, it is to be hoped, can hesitate as to the proper de- cision of the question, whether the employment of these pure conceptions of the understanding ought to be merely empirical or also transcendental ; in other words, whether the categories, as conditions of a possible experience, relate a priori solely to phsenomena, or whether, as conditions of the possibility of things in general, their application can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we have there seen that con- ceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without signification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they consist, an object be given ; and that, consequently, they cannot possibly apply to objects as things in themselves without re- gard to the question whether and how these may be given to us ; and further, that the only manner in which objects can be given to us, is by means of the modification of our sensibility ; and finally, that pure a priori conceptions, in addition to tlis function of the understanding in the category, must contain a. priori formal conditions of sensibility (of the internal sense, namely), which again contain the general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of the understanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name the schema of the conception of the understanding, and the OP THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES. J09 procedure of the understanding with these schemata, we shall call the Schematism of the pure understanding. The Schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the ima- gination.* But as the synthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity in the determination of sen- sibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from the image. Thus," if I place five points one after another, this is an image of the number five. On the other hand, if I only think a number in general, which ma^r be either five or a hun- dred, this thought is rather the representation of a method of representing in an image a sum (e. g. a thousand) in con- formity with a conception, than the image itself, an image which I should find some little difficulty in reviewing, and comparing with the conception. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present its image to a conception, I call the schema of this conception. In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, &c., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indi- cates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience, or an image of the object, ever adequate to the empirical concep- tion. On the contrary, the conception always relates imme- diately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the de- termination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain ge- neral conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in general, without being limited to any particular individual form which experience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent to myself in concrete. This schematism of our understanding in regard to phaenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human soul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and unveil. Thus much only can * See note at p. 34. Tr. 110 ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. we say : The image is a product of the empirical faculty of the productive imagination, the schema of sensuous conceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a monogram of the pure imagination d priori, whereby and according to which images first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the conception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are in themselves never fully adequate to it. On the other hand, the schema of a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced into any image, it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by the category, con- formably to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a transcendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the determination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its form (time) in respect to all representa- tions, in so far as these representations must be conjoined a priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apper- ception. Without entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential requisites of transcendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding, we shall rather proceed at once to give an explanation of them according to the order of the categories, and in connection therewith. For the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is space ; the pure image of all objects of sense in general, is time. But the pure schema of quantity (quantita- tis) as a conception of the understanding, is number, a re- presentation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one (homogeneous quantities). Thus, number is no- thing else than the unity of the synthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating time * it- self in my apprehension of the intuition. Reality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds to a sensation in general ; that, conse- quently, the conception of which indicates a being (in time). Negation is that the conception of which represents a not- being (in time). The opposition of these two consists there- fore in the difference of one and the same time, as a time filled or a time empty. Now as time is only the form of intuition, * I generate time because I generate succession, namely, in the sue- cessive addition of one to one- Tr. OF THE SCHEMATISM Of THE CATEGOEIE8. ill consequently of objects as phenomena, that which in object* corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (Sachheit, reality). Now every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill time, that is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation of an object, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (=0= negatio). Thus there is a relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a transition from the former to the latter, which makes every reality representable to us as a quantum ; and the schema of a reality as the quantity of something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this continuous and uniform generation of the reality in time, as we descend in time from the sensation which has a certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend from negation to the quantity thereof. The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time ; that is, the representation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time ; a substratum which there- fore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not, but in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is unchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it that the succession and co- existence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.) The schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which, when posited, is always followed by something else. It consists, therefore^ in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subjected to a rule. The schema of community (reciprocity of action and re- action), or the reciprocal causality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the co-existence of the determinations of the one with those of the other, according to a general rule. The schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of different representations with the conditions of time in ge- neral (as, for example, opposites cannot exist together at the same time in the same thing, but only after each other), and is therefore the determination of the representation of a thing at any time. The schema of reality* is existence in a determined time. * Wirklichkeit. In the table of categories it is called Existence (Daseyn). Tr. 112 OF ANALYTIC PRINCIPLES. The schema of necessity is the existence of an object m all time. It is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity contains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the successive apprehension of an object ; the schema of quality the synthesis of sensation with the repre- sentation of time, or the filling up of time ; the schema of relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time (that is, according to a rule of the determination of time) : and finally, the schema of modality and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the determination of an object whe- ther it does belong to time, and how. The schemata, there- fore, are nothing but & priori determinations of time according to rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following the arrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in time, the order in time, and finally, to the com- plex or totality in time. Hence it is apparent that the schematism of the under- standing, by means of the transcendental synthesis of the ima- gination, amounts to nothing else than the unity of the mani- fold of intuition in the internal sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as a function corresponding to the in- ternal sense (a receptivity). Thus, the schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding are the true and only condi- tions whereby our understanding receives an application to objects, and consequently significance. Finally, therefore, the categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they serve merely to subject phsenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by means of an a priori necessary unity (on account of the necessary union of all consciousness in one original ap- perception) ; and so to render them susceptible of a complete connection in one experience. But within this whole of pos- sible experience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal re- lation to this experience consists transcendental truth, which antecedes all empirical truth, and renders the latter possible. It is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata of sensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they do, nevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the categories by conditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding namely, in sensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sensuous SYSTEM OV ALL PRINCIPLES. 113 conception of an object in harmony with the category. (Nu- merus est quantitas phenomenon,* sensatio realitas phseno- menon ; constans et perdurabile rerum substsntia phenomenon aternitas, necessitas, phenomena, &c.) Now, if we re- move a restrictive condition, we thereby amplify, it appears, the formerly limited conception. In this way, the categories in their pure signification, free from all conditions of sensibi- lity, ought to be valid of things as they are, and not, as the schemata represent them, merely as they appear, and consequently the categories must have a significance far more extended, and wholly independent of all schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the pure conceptions of the under- standing, after abstracting eveiy sensuous condition, a value and significance, which is, however, merely logical. But in this case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no meaning sufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion of substance, for example, if we leave out the sensuous determination of permanence, would mean nothing more than a something which can be cogitated as subject, without the possibility of becoming a predicate to anything else. Of this representation I can make nothing, inasmuch as it does not indicate to me what determinations the thing possesses which must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently, the categories, without schemata, are merely functions of the un- derstanding for the production of conceptions, but do not represent any object. This significance they derive from sensibility, which at the same time realizes the understanding and restricts it. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENT, OE ANALYTIC or PRINCIPLES. CHAPTER II. SYSTEM OF ALL PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING. IN the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the ge- neral conditions under which alone the transcendental faculty of judgment is justified in using the pure conceptions of the understanding for synthetical judgments. Our duty at pre- * Phenomenon is heie an adjective. Tram. I 114 ANALYTIC OP PEINCIPLES. sent is tc exhibit in systematic connection those judgments which the understanding really produces a priori. For this purpose, our table of the categories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is precisely the categories whose application to possible experience must constitute all pure h priori cognition of the understanding ; and the rela- tion of which to sensibility will, on that very account, pre- sent us with a complete and systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the use of the understanding. Principles a priori are so called, not merely because they contain in themselves the grounds of other judgments, but also because they themselves are not grounded in higher and more general cognitions. This peculiarity, however, does not raise them altogether above the need of a proof. For although there could be found no higher cognition, and therefore no objective proof, and although such a principle rather serves as the foundation for all cognition of the object, this by no means hinders us from drawing a proof from the subjective sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object. Such a proof is necessary moreover, because without it the prin- ciple might be liable to the imputation of being a mere gratu- itous assertion. In the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those principles which relate to the categories. For as to the principles of transcendental aesthetic, according to which space and time are the conditions of the possibility of things as phaenomena, as also the restriction of these principles, namely, that they cannot be applied to objects as things in themselves ; these, of course, do riot fall within the scope of our present enquiry. In like manner, the principles of ma- thematical science form no part of this system, because they are all drawn from intuition, and not from the pure concep- tion of the understanding. The possibility of these principles, however, will necessarily be considered here, inasmuch as they are synthetical judgments a priori, not indeed for the purpose of proving their accuracy arid apodeictic certainty, which is unnecessary, but merely to render conceivable and deduce the possibility of such evident u priori cognitions. But we shall have also to speak of the principle of analy- tical judgments, in opposition to synthetical judgments, which is the proper subject of our enquiries, because this very oppo- SYSTEM OF TEINCIPLES. 115 gition will free the theory of the latter from all ambiguity, and place it clearly before our eyes in its true nature. SYSTEM or THE PBiNCiPLEa or THE PUEE UNDEB- STANDING. SECTION FIRST. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical Judgments. Whatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner our cognition may be related to its object, the universal, although only negative condition of all our judgments is that they do not contradict themselves ; other- wise these judgments are in themselves (even without respect to the object) nothing. But although there may exist no contradiction in our judgment, it may nevertheless connect conceptions in such a manner, that they do not correspond to the object, or without any grounds either a priori or a pos- teriori for arriving at such a judgment, and thus, without being self- contradictory, a judgment may nevertheless be either false or groundless. Now, the proposition, "No subject can have a predicate that contradicts it," is called the principle of contradiction, and is an universal but purely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs to logic alone, because it is valid of cognitions, merely as cognitions, and without respect to their content, and declares that the contradiction entirely nullifies them. We can also, however, make a positive use of this princi- ple, that is, not merely to banish falsehood and error (in so far as it rests upon contradiction), but also for the cog- nition of truth. For if the judgment is analytical^ be it affirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable by means of the principle of contradiction. For the contrary of that which lies and is cogitated as conception in the cogni- tion of the object will be always properly negatived, but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the object, inas- much as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to the object. We must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the universal and fully sufficient principle of all analytical cocnition. But as a sufficient criterion of truth, it has no furtW I 2 116 ANALYTIC OF PEINC1PLES. utility or authority. For the fact that no cognition can be at variance with this principle -without nullifying itself, consti- tutes this principle the sine qua non, but not the determining ground of the truth of our cognition. As our business at present is properly with the synthetical part of our knowledge only, we shall always be on our guard not to transgress this inviolable principle ; but at the same time not to expect from it any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth of any synthetical proposition. There exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle a principle merely formal and entirely without content which contains a synthesis that lias been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up with it. It is this : " It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time." Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition of the word impossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty, which ought to be self-evident from the proposition itself, the propo- sition is affected by the condition of time, and as it were says : " A thing=^, which is something=.B, cannot at the same time be non-B" But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well exist in succession. For example, a man who is young cannot at the same time be old ; but the same man can very well be at one time young, and at another not young, that is, old. Now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical propo- sition must not by any means limit its application merely to relations of time, and consequently a formula like the pre- ceding is quite foreign to its true purpose. The misunder- standing arises in this way. We first of all separate a predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and afterwards connect with this predicate its opposite, and hence do not establish any contradiction with the subject, but only with its predicate, which has been conjoined with the tubject synthetically, a contradiction, moreover, which ob- tains only when the first and second predicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say : " A man who is ignorant is not learned," the condition "at the same time" must be added, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at another be learned. But if I say : "No ignorant man is a learned man," the pro- position is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance is now a constituent part of the conception of the subject ; and in this case the negative proposition is evident immediately SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES. 117 from the proposition of contradiction, without the necessity of adding the condition "at the same time." This is the reason why I have altered the formula of this principle, an alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an analytical proposition. THE SYSTEM or THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDER- STANDING. SECTION SECOND. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical Judgments. THE explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgments is a task with which general Logic has nothing to do ; indeed she needs not even be acquainted with its name. But in trans- cendental Logic it is the most important matter to be dealt with, indeed the only one, if the question is of the possibility of synthetical judgments d priori^ the conditions and extent of their validity. For when this question is fully decided, it can reach its aim with perfect ease, the determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure understanding. In an analytical judgment I do not go beyond the given conception, in order to arrive at some decision respecting it. If the judgment is affirmative, I predicate of the conception only that which was already cogitated in it ; if negative, I merely exclude from the conception its contrary. But in syn- thetical judgments, I must go beyond the given conception, in order to cogitate, in relation with it, something quite dif- ferent from that which was cogitated in it, a relation which is consequently never one either of identity or contradiction, and. by means of which the truth or error of the judgment cannot be discerned merely from the judgment itself. Granted then, that we must go out beyond a given concep- tion, in order to compare it synthetically with another, a third thing is necessary, in which alone the synthesis of two con- ceptions can originate. Now what is this tertium quid, that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgments ? It is only a complex,* in which all our representations are contained, the internal sense to wit, and its form a priori, Time- The synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagi- nation ; their synthetical unity (which is requisite to a judg- ment), upon the unity of apperception. In this, therefore, it * inbcgriff. 118 ANALYTIC OP to be sought the possibility of synthetical judgments, and aa all three contain the sources of a priori representations, the possibility of pure synthetical judgments also ; nay, they are necessary upon these grounds, if we are to possess a know- ledge of objects, which rests solely upon the synthesis of re- presentations. If a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an object, and possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is necessary that the object be given in some way or ano- ther. Without this, our conceptions are empty, and we may indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking, we have not, in fact, cognized anything, we have merely played with representation. To give an object, if this expression be understood in the sense of to present the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means nothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience, be that experience real or only possible. Space and time themselves, pure as these conceptions are from all that is empirical, and certain as it is that they are represented fully a priori in the mind, would be completely without objective validity, and without sense and significance, if their necessary use in the objects of experi- ence were not shewn. Nay, the representation of them is a mere schema, that always relates to the reproductive imagina- tion, which calls up the objects of experience, without which they have no meaning. And so is it with all conceptions without distinction. The possibility of 'experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to all our a priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon the synthetical unity of phsenomena, that is, upon a synthesis according to conceptions of the object of phaeno- mena in general, a synthesis without which experience never could become knowledge, but would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting together into any connected text, according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible) conscious- ness, and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Experience has therefore for a foundation, a priori principles of its form, that is to say, general rules of unity in the synthesis of phsenomena, the objective reality of which rules, as necessary conditions even of the possibility of experience can always be shewn in experience. But apart from this relation, priori synthetical FTCBTEM OF PRINCIPLES. 119 propositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no third term, that is, no pure object, in which the synthetical unity can exhibit the objective reality of its conceptions. Although, then, respecting space, or the forms which pro- ductive imagination describes therein, we do cognize much a priori in synthetical judgments, and are really in no need of experience for this purpose, such knowledge would never- theless amount to nothing but a busy trifling with a mere chimera, were not space to be considered as the condition of the pheenomena which constitute the material of ex- ternal experience. Hence those pure synthetical judgments do relate, though but mediately, to possible experience, or rather to the possibility of experience, and upon that alone is founded the objective validity of their synthesis. While then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical syn- thesis, is the only possible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other synthesis ;* on the other hand, this latter synthesis, as cognition a priori, possesses truth, that is, ac- cordance with its object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than what is necessary to the synthetical unity of ex- perience. Accordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judg- ments is : Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience. A priori synthetical judgments are possible, when we ap- ply the formal conditions of the a priori intuition, the synthe- sis of the imagination, and the necessary unity of that syn- thesis in a transcendental apperception, to a possible cognition of experience, and say : The conditions of the possibility of ex- perience in general, are at the same time conditions of the pos- sibility of the objects of experience, and have, for that reason, objective validity in an a priori synthetical judgment. * Mental synthesis. Tr. 120 ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. SYSTEM or THE PRINCIPLES or THE PURE UNDER- STANDING. SECTION THIRD. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical Principles thereof. That principles exist at all is to be ascribed soleb understanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that which happens, but is even the source of principles ac- cording to which every thing that can be presented to us as an object is necessarily subject to rules, because without such rules we never could attain to cognition of an object. Even the laws of nature, if they are contemplated as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, possess also a charac- teristic of necessity, and we may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which are valid a priori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature, without distinction, are subject to higher principles of the under- standing, inasmuch as the former are merely applications of the latter to particular cases of experience. These higher principles alone therefore give the conception, which contains the necessary condition, and, as it were, the exponent of a rule ; experience, on the other hand, gives the case which comes under the rule. There is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical prin- ciples for principles of the pure understanding, or conversely ; for the character of necessity, according to conceptions which distinguishes the latter, and the absence of this in every em- pirical proposition, how extensively valid soever it may be, is a perfect safeguard against confounding them. There are, how- ever, pure principles a priori, which nevertheless I should not ascribe to the pure understanding for this reason, that they are not derived from pure conceptions, but (although by the mediation of the understanding) from pure intuitions. But understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles mathematical science possesses, but their application to ex- perience, consequently their objective validity, nay the possi- bility of such a priori synthetical cognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely upon the pure understanding. On this acco mt, I shall not reckon among my principles PRINCIPLES OF PUEE UNDERSTANDING. 121 chose of mathematics ; though I shall include those upon the possibility and objective validity a priori, of principles of the mathematical science, which, consequently, are to be looked upon as the principle of these, and which proceed from con- ceptions to intuition, and not from intuition to conceptions. In the application of the pure conceptions of the under- standing to possible experience, the employment of their syn- thesis is either mathematical or dynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition alone, partly on the existence of a pheno- menon. But the a priori conditions of intuition are in relation to a possible experience absolutely necessary, those of the ex- istence of objects of a possible empirical intuition are in them- selves contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a character of absolute necessity, that is, will be apodeictic ; those, on the other hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an a priori necessity indeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. Con- sequently they will not possess that immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former, although their application to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth and certitude. But ot this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion of this system of principles. The table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of principles, because these are nothing else than rules for the objective employment of the former. Accordingly, all principles of the pure understanding are 1. AXIOMS of Intuition. 2. 3. ANTICIPATIONS ANALOGIES of of Perception. Experience. 4. POSTULATES of Empirical Thought in general. These appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might not lose sight of the distinctions in respect of tht 122 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. evidence and the employment of these principles. It will, however, soon appear that a fact which concerns bcth ths evidence of these principles, and the a priori determination of phaenomena according to the categories of Quantity and Quality (if we attend merely to the form of these), the prin- ciples of these categories are distinguishable from those of the two others, inasmuch as the former are possessed of an intui- tive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in both instances a complete certitude. I shall therefore call the former mathematical,* and the latter dynamical principles, f It must be observed, however, that by these terms I mean, just as little in the one case the principles of mathematics, as those of general (physical) dynamics, in the other. I have here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, in their application to the internal sense, (without distinction of the representations given therein), by means of which the sciences of mathematics and dynamics become possible. Ac- cordingly, I have named these principles rather with reference to their application, than their content ; and I shall now pro- ceed to consider them in the order in which they stand in the table. I. AXIOMS or INTUITION. The principle of these is, "All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities." * Mathematically, in the Kantian sense. Tr. f All combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compost do) or connection (nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold, the parts of which do not necessarily belong to each other. For example, the two triangles into which a square is divided by a diagonal, do not necessarily belong to each other, and of this kind is tbe synthesis of the homogeneous in every thing that can be mathematically considered. This synthesis can be divided into those of aggregation and coalition, the former of which is applied to extensive, the latter to intensive quantities. The second sort of combination (nexus} is the synthesis of a manifold, in so far as its parts do belong necessarily to each other ; for example, the accident to a sub- stance, or the effect to the cause. Consequently it is a synthesis of that which, though heterogeneous, is represented as connected, a priori. This combination not an arbitrary one 1 entitle dynamical, because it con- cerns the connection of the existence of the manifold. This, again, may be divided into the physical synthesis of the phaenomena among each other, and the mttaphysical synthesis, or the connection of phenomena a priori in the faculty of cognition. AXIOMS OF IXTUITIOK. 123 PIIOOF. All phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time, which lies a priori at the foundation of all with- oui exception. Phenomena, therefore, cannot be apprehended, that is, received into empirical consciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a manifold, through which the repre- sentations of a determinate space or time are generated ; that is to say, through the composition of the homogeneous, and the consciousness of the synthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of a homogeneous manifold in intuition, in so far as thereby the representation of an object is rendered possible, is the conception of a quan- tity (quanti). Consequently, even the perception of an object as phenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous mani- fold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated ; that is to say, all phaenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as intuitions in space or time, they must be repre- sented by means of the same synthesis, through which space and time themselves are determined. An extensive quantity I call that wherein the representa- tion of the parts renders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the representation of the whole. I cannot repre- sent to myself any line, however small, without drawing it in thought, that is, without generating from a point all its parts one after another, and in this way alone producing this intui- tion. Precisely the same is the case with every, even the smallest portion of time. I cogitate therein only the succes- sive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by means of the different portions of time and the addition of them, a determinate quantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in all phaenomena is either time or space, so is every phaenomenon in its character of intuition an extensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our appre- hension by successive synthesis (from part to part). All phaenomena are, accordingly, to be considered as aggregates, that is, as a collection of previously given parts ; which is not the case with every sort of quantities, but only with those which are represented and apprehended by us as extensive. 124 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. On this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the generation of figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or geometry, with its axioms, which express the conditions of sensuous intuition a priori, under which alone the schema of a pure conception of external intuition can exist ; for example, " between two points only one straight line is possible," " two straight lines cannot enclose a space," &c. These are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities (quanta) as such. But, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say, the answer to the question, How large is this or that object ? although, in respect to this question, we have vari- ous propositions synthetical and immediately certain (inde- monstrabilia) ; we have, in the proper sense of the term, no axioms. For example, the propositions, " If equals be added to equals, the wholes are equal ;" "If equals be taken from equals, the remainders are equal ;" are analytical, because I am immediately conscious of the identity of the produc- tion of the one quantity with the production of the other ; whereas axioms must be a priori synthetical propositions. On the other hand, the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers, are certainly synthetical, but not uni- versal, like those of geometry, and for this reason cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulae. That 7+5 = 12, is not an analytical proposition. For neither in the represen- tation of seven, nor of five, nor of the composition of the two numbers, do I cogitate the number twelve. (Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both, is not at present the ques- tion ; for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only point is, whether I really cogitate the predicate in the repre- sentation of the subject.) But although the proposition is synthetical, it is nevertheless only a singular proposition. In so far as regard is here had merely to the synthesis of the homogeneous (the units), it cannot take place except in one manner, although our use of these numbers is afterwards ge- neral. If I say, " A triangle can be constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together are greater than the third," I exercise merely the pure function of the productive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter, and construct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number seven is possible only in one manner, and so is like- ANTICIPATIONS OF PEECEPTIOTT. 125 wise the number twelve, which results from the synthesis of seven and five. Such propositions, then, cannot be termed axioms (for in that case we should have an infinity of these), but numerical formulae. This transcendental principle of the mathematics of phe- nomena greatly enlarges our d priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics is rendered appli- cable in all its precision to objects of experience, and without it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident ; on the contrary, contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very point. Phsenomena are not tilings in themselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space and time) ; consequently, what geometry affirms of the latter, is indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, such as the statement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of construction in space (for example, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if these objections hold good, we deny to space, and with it to all mathematics, objective validity, and no longer know wherefore, and how far, mathematics can be applied to phe- nomena. The synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of all intuition, is that which renders possible the appre- hension of a phsenomenon, and therefore every external expe- rience, consequently all cognition of the objects of experience ; and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must necessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the chicaneries of an ill -instructed reason, which errone- ously thinks to liberate the objects of sense from the formal conditions of our sensibility, and represents these, although mere phsenomena, as things in themselves, presented as such to our understandings. But in this case, no cL priori syn- thetical cognition of them could be possible, consequently not through pure conceptions of space, and the science which determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would itself be impossible. II. ANTICIPATIONS or PEECEPTION. The principle of these is, "In all phenomena the Real, that which is an object of sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that is, ha* a Degree." 126 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. PROOF. Perception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a con- sciousness, which contains an element of sensation. Phsenomena as objects of perception are not pure, that is, merely formal in- tuitions, like space and time, for they cannot be perceived in themselves.* They contain, then, over and above the intui- tion, the materials for an object (through which is represented something existing in space or time), that is to say, they con-, tain the real of sensation, as a representation merely subjec- tive, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject is affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now, a gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure con- sciousness is possible, inasmuch as the real in this conscious- ness entirely evanishes, and there remains a merely formal consciousness (a priori) of the manifold in time and space ; consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the production of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement, that is, from the pure intuition = onwards, up to a certain quantity of the sensation. Now as sensation in itself is not an objective representation, and in it is to be found neither the intuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any extensive quantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by means of its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within a certain time rise from nothing = up to its given amount), consequently an intensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive quantity, that is, a degree of influence on SCHSG to all objects of perception, in so far as this perception contains sensation. All cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an Anticipation ; and without doubt this is the sense in which Epicurus employed his expression ^oX^-xj//?. But as there is in phsenomena something which is never cog- nized h priori, which on this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical cognition, that is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it follows, that sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at * They can be perceived only as phaenomena, and some part of them roust always belong to the non-ego ; whereas pure intuitions are entirely the products of the mind itself, and as such are cognized in themselves. Tr. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 127 all anticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure determinations in space and time, as well in regard to figure as to Quantity, anticipations of phenomena, because they represent a priori that which may always be given a pos- teriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in general, without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed something which could be cognized a priori, this would deserve to be called anticipation in a special sense special, because it may seem surprising to fcrestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, and which we can only derive from itself. Yet such really ia the case here. Apprehension,* by means of sensation alone, fills only one moment, that is, if I do not take into consideration a succes- sion of many sensations. As that in the phsenomenon, the apprehension of which is not a successive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation, sensation has therefore no extensive quantity ; the want of sensation in a moment of time would represent it as empty, consequently = 0. That which in the empirical intuition corresponds to sensation is rea- lity (realitas phenomenon) ; that which corresponds to the absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation is capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually disappear. Therefore, between reality in a phaenomenon and negation, there exists a continuous concatenation of many pos- sible intermediate sensations, the difference of which from each other is always smaller than that between the given sen- sation and zero, or complete negation. That is to say, the real in a phaenomenon has always a quantity, which however is not discoverable in Apprehension, inasmuch as Apprehension takes place by means of mere sensation in one instant, and not by the successive synthesis of many sensations, and there- fore does not progress from parts to the whole. Consequently, it has a quantity, but not an extensive quantity. Now that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality can be represented only by approximation to negation = 0, I term intensive quantity. Consequently, rea- lity in a phaenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree, * Apprehension is the Kantian word for perception, in the largest sense in which we employ that term It is the genus which includes under U B8 species, perception proper and sensation proper. Tr. 128 TRANSCENDENTAL iJOCTEINE. If we consider this reality as cause (be it of sensation or of another reality in the phsenomenon, for example, a change) ; we call the degree of reality in its character of cause a momen- tum, for example, the momentum of weight ; and for thia reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the appre- hension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I touch upon only in passing, for with Causality I have at present nothing to do. Accordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phaenomeua, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity, which may always be lessened, and between reality and negation there exists a continuous connection of possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every colour for example, red has a degree, which, be it ever so small, is never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight, &c. This property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest possible (no part simple*), is called their continuity. Space and time are quanta continua, because no part of them can be given, without enclosing it within bound- aries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is itself a space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of times. Points and moments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or positions of their limi- tation. But places always presuppose intuitions which are to limit or determine them ; and we cannot conceive either space or time composed of constituent parts which are given before space or time. Such quantities may also be called flowing, because the synthesis (of the productive imagination) in the production of these Quantities is a progression in time, the continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate by the expression flowing. All phaenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to intuition and mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the former case they are extensive quanti- ties ; in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the manifold of a phaenom-enon is interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of several phaenomena, and not properly a phse- nomenon as a quantity, which is not produced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but * Simplex. TV. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 129 by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I call thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite correctly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in standard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous quantity, in which no part is the smallest, but every part might constitute a piece of money, which would contain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, by the words thirteen dollars I understand so many coins (be their value in silver what it may), it wauld be quite erroneous to use the expression a quantity of dollars ; on the contrary, I must call them aggregate, that is, a number of coins. An'd as in every number we must have unity as the foundation, so a phenomenon taken as unity is a quantity, and as such always a continuous quantity (quantum continuum). Now, seeing all phaenomena, whether considered as extensive or intensive, are continuous quantities, the proposition, " All change (transition of a thing from one state into another) is con- tinuous," might be proved here easily, and with mathematical evidence, were it not that the causality of a change lies entirely beyond the bounds of a transcendental philosophy, and presup- poses empirical principles. For of the possibility of a cause which changes the condition of things, that is, which de- termines them to the contrary of a certain given state, the under- standing gives us a priori no knowledge; not merely because it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight is ab- sent in several a priori cognitions), but because the notion of change concerns only certain determinations of phaenomena, which experience alone can acquaint us with, while their cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that we have nothing which we could here employ but the pure funda^ mental conceptions of all possible experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be admitted, we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate general physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental experiences. Nevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great in- fluence which the principle above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions, and even in supplying the want of them, so far as to shield us against the false conclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw. If all reality in perception has a degree, between which and K 130 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. negation there is an endless sequence of ever smaller degree*, and if nevertheless every sense must have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations ; no perception, and consequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately or mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phsenomenon ; in other words, it is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty space or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in a sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception ; secondly, such absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single phsenomenon, and the difference of the degrees in its reality ; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of any phsenomenon. For if even the complete intuition of a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no part thereof is empty, yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive quantity of the phsenomenon un- changed, can diminish through endless gradations down to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with which space or time is filled, and the intensive quantity in different phenomena maybe smaller or greater, although the ex- tensive quantity of the intuition remains equal and unaltered. We shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philo- sophers, remarking a great difference in the quantity of the matter * of different kinds in bodies with the same volume (partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight, partly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion), conclude unanimously, that this volume (extensive quantity of the phsenomenon) must be void in all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would sus- pect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into nature should ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical hypothesis a sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and avoid ? Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space (I must not here call it impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is always iden- tical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensive quantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, for which they can have no ground in experience, and which conse- quently is merely metaphysical, I oppose a transcendental de- * It should be remembered that Kant means by matter, that which in the object corresponds to sensation in the subject the real in a phseao- menon. 2V. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION. 131 monstration, which it is true will not explain the difference in the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does away with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned pre- supposition that we cannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty spaces. This demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the understanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if the explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that although two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether different, so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein matter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has its degree (of resistance or of weight), which, without diminution of the extensive quantity, can become less and less ad infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and disappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space for example, caloric, or any other reality in the phenomenal world can decrease in its degrees to infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty ; on the contrary, filling it with those lesser degrees, as completely as another phenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain that this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard to their specific gravity ; I wish only to prove, from a prin- ciple of the pure understanding, that the nature of our per- ceptions makes such a mode of explanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a phenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation and extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an a priori principle of the understanding. Nevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat startle an enquirer whom initiation into tran- scendental philosophy has rendered cautious. We may natu- rally entertain some doubt whether or not the understanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting the degree of all reality in phenomena, and consequently the possibility of the internal difference of sensation itself ab- straction being made of its empirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution : How the understanding can pronounce synthetically and a priori respecting pheno- mena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is pecu- liarly and merely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sen- sation itself? K 2 132 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. The quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and cannot be represented priori (for example, colours, taste, &c). But the real that which corresponds to sensation in opposition to negation=0, only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a being (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical con- sciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in the internal sense can be raised from to every higher degree, so that the very same extensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites as great a sen- sation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illumi- nated. We can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a phoenomenon, and represent to our- selves in the mere sensation in a certain momentum,* a syn- thesis of homogeneous ascension from up to the given empirical consciousness. All sensations therefore as such are given only & posteriori, but this property thereof, namely, that they have a degree, can be known a priori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we can cognize a priori only a single quality, namely, continuity ; but in respect to all quality (the real in phsenomena), we cannot cognize a priori any thing more than the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All else is left to experience. III. ANALOGIES Or EXPERIENCE. The principle of these is : Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of per- ceptions. PROOF. Experience is an empirical cognition ; that is to say, a cognition which determines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which contains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a consci- * The particular degree of " reality," that is, the particular power 01 Intensive quantity in the cause of a sensation, for example, redness, weight, &c., is called in the Kantian terminology, its moment. The term momentum which we employ, must not be confounded with the word coin >conly employed in ratural science. TV. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE. 133 ousness ; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cog- nition of objects of the senses, that is, of experience (not merely of intuition or sensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so that no character of necessity in their connexion appears, or can appear from the perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a placing together of the manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of a necessity in the connected existence of the phsenomena which apprehension hrings together, is to be discovered therein. But as experience is a cognition of objects by means of perceptions, it follows that the relation of the existence of the manifold must be represented in expe- rience not as it is put together in time, but as it is objectively in time. And as time itself cannot be perceived, the determina- tion of the existence of objects in time can only take place oy means of their connexion in time in general, consequently only by means of a priori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the character of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a representation of the necessary connexion of perception. The three modi of time are permanence, succession, and co- existence. Accordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena, according to which the existence of every phaenomenon is determined in respect of the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience, and render it possible. The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of apperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception) at every time, conse- quently, as this unity lies a priori at the foundation of all mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all phsenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception relates to our internal sense (the com- plex of all representations), and indeed relates ft priori to its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold empirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original apperception according to relations of time, a necessity imposed by the a priori transcendental unity of ap- perception, to which is subjected all that can belong to my (i. e. my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become an object for me. This synthetical and a priori determine^ 134 TBANSCEKDENTAL DOCTRINE. unity in relation of perceptions in time is therefore the rule : " All empirical determinations of time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time ;" and the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be rules of this nature. These principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, and the synthesis of the empirical in- tuition thereof, but merely the existence of phenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the mode in which we apprehend a thing in a phaenomenon can be determined a priori in such a manner, that the rule of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can produce this a priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence of phse- nomena cannot be known ap?-iori, and although we could arrive by this path at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that existence determinately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating in what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from that of others. The two principles above mentioned, which I called mathe- matical, in consideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic to phsenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and instruct us how phsenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in their perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical synthesis. Consequently, numerical quan- tities, and with them the determination of a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in the other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might compose, and give priori, that is con- struct, the degree of our sensations of the sun-light.* We may therefore entitle these two principles constitutive. The case is very different with those principles whose pro- vince it is to subject the existence of phaenomena to rules a priori. For as existence does not admit of being con- * Kant's meaning is : The two principles enunciated under the heads of "Axioms of Intuition," and "Anticipations of Perception," authorize the application to phenomena of determinations of size and number, that is, of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of the sun, and say, that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than that of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its dif- ferent effects on water, &c., and on mercury in a thermometer. TV. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE. 13f stvucted, it is clear that they must only concern the relations of existence, and be merely regulative principles. In this case, therefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Tims, if a perception is given us, in a certain relation or time to other (although undetermined) perceptions, we can- not then say a priori, what and how great (in quantity) the otuer perception necessarily connected with the for- mer is, but only how it is connected, quoad its existence, in this given modus of time. Analogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they represent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulae, which enounce the equality of two relations of quantity,* and are always constitutive, so that if two terms of the proportion are given, the third is also given, that is, can be constructed by the aid of these formulas. But in philosophy, analogy is not the equality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case, from three given terms, I can give a priori and cognize the relation to a fourth member,t but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly possess a rule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and a mark to assist me in discovering it- An analogy of experience is therefore only a rule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in respect to objects (phaeno- mena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a regulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical thought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which concerns the form of phaenomena), the synthesis of per- ception (which concerns the matter of phsenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the relation of these perceptions). For they are only regulative principles, and clearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are con- stitutive, not indeed in regard to the certainty which both * Known the two terras 3 and 6, and the relation of 3 to 6, not only the relation of 6 to some other number is given, but that number itself, 12, is given, that is, it is constructed. Therefore 3 : 6 = 6 : 12. 7V. f Given a known effect, a known cause, and another known effect, we reason, by analogy, to an unknown cause, which we do not cognize, but whose relation to the known effect we know from the comparison of the three given terms. Thus, our own known actions : our own known motives = the known actions of others : x, that is, the motives of othen which we cannot immediately cognize. TV. 136 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. possess & priori, but in the mode of evidence thereof, conse- quently also in the manner of demonstration. But what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be particularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess significance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as principles of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can therefore be proved only as such, and that consequently the phaenomena must not be subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in themselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught con- cerning them synthetically & priori. But they are nothing but pheenomena ; a complete knowledge of which a know- ledge to which all principles a priori must at last relate is the only possible experience. It follows that these principles can have nothing else for their aim, than the conditions of the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of phaenomena. But this synthesis is cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of whose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the function unre- stricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will therefore authorize us to connect phaenomena according to an analogy, with the logical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the categories in the principles them- selves ; but in the application of them to experience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper application, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting conditions, under the title of formulae of the former. A. FIRST ANALOGY. PRINCIPLE OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE. In all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in nature is neither increased nor dimi- nished. PROOF. All phaenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is, as the permanent form of the internal intuition, co- existence and succession can be represented. Consequently OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE. 137 time, in which all changes of phenomena must be cogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which suc- cession and co-existence can be represented only as determina- tions thereof. Now, time in itself cannot be ail object of per- ception. It follows that in objects of perception, that is, in phaenomena, there must be found a substratum which repre- sents time in general, and in which all change or co-existence can be perceived by means of the relation of phsenomena to it. But the substratum of all reality, that is, of all that per- tains to the existence of things, is substance ; all that per- tains to existence can be cogitated only as a determination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which alone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is substance in the world of phsenomena, that is, the real in phaenomena, that which, as the substratum of all change, re- mains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot change in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor diminished. Our apprehension of the manifold in a phsenomenon is always successive, is consequently always changing. By it alone we could, therefore, never determine whether this mani- fold, as an object of experience, is co-existent or successive, unless it had for a foundation something that exists always, that is, something fixed and permanent, of the existence of which all succession and co-existence are nothing but so many modes (modi of time). Only in the permanent, then, are re- lations of time possible (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) ; that is to say, the permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself, in which alone all determination of time is possible. Permanence is, in fact, just another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of phsenomena, and of all change, and of all co-existence. For change does not affect time itself, but only the phsenomena in time (just as co-existence cannot be regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are co-existent, but all successive).* If we were to attribute succession to time itself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession would be pos- sible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence * The latter part of this sentence seams to contradict the former. The sequel will explain. 7V, 138 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. in different parts of the successive series of time receives & quantity, which we entitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing and recommencing, and therefore never has even the least quantity. Without the permanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an object of perception ; consequently the permanent in phsenomena must be regarded as the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the con- dition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is, of experience ; and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as a mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all phsenomena, the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance (phaenomenon);* but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of the existence of this substance or sub- stances, consequently to its determinations. I find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common understanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all change in phsenomena ; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will always accept this as an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself in a more precise and definite manner, when he says : " In all changes in the world, the substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable." But of this decidedly synthetical pro- position, I nowhere meet with even an attempt at proof ; riay, it very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as it deserves to do, at the head of the pure and entirely a priori laws of na- ture. In truth, the statement that substance is permanent, is tautological. For this very permanence is the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the phsenome- non ; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phaenomena there is something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable is nothing but a determination. But because a proof of this nature cannot be dogmatical, that is, cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns a synthetical proposition a priori, and as philosophers never re- flected that such propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and therefore cannot be proved except by means of a deduction of the possibility of experience, it is no wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all ex- * Not subatantia noumenon. Tr. OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE. 139 perience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never been supported by proof. A philosopher was asked, " What is the weight of smoke?" He answered, " Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the remaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke." Thus he presumed it to be incon- trovertible that even in fire the matter (substance) does not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like manner was the saying, " From nothing comes nothing," only another inference from the principle of permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding existence of the true subject in pheno- mena. For if that in the phaenomenon which we call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time, it follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be determinate by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term substance to a phsenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a notion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to be referable to future time. However, the internal necessity per- petually to be, is inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the expression may stand as it is. " Gigni de nihilo nihil" " in nihilum nil posse reverti" are two propo- sitions which the ancients never parted, and which people now- a-days sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because they imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves, and that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even in respect of its substance also) of the world upon a su- preme cause. But this apprehension is entirely needless, for the question in this case is only of phsenomena in the sphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we admitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their substance) should arise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can represent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that through which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This permanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to ourselves the existence of things in the phe- nomenal world. The determinations of a substance, which are only par- ticular modes of its existence, are called accidents. They are always real, because they concern the existence of sub 140 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. stance (negations are only determinations, which express the non-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the substance we ascribe a particular existence (for example, to motion as an accident of matter), this ex- istence is called inherence, in contradistinction to the ex- istence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many misconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to designate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance is positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical exercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it were, that which in the existence of a sub- stance is subject to change, whilst the substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly permanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under the title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof, than because it contains in itself any relation. Now, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception change. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or becomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another mode of existence of the same object ; hence all that changes is permanent, and only the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only determinations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an expression which seems somewhat paradoxical, " Only the permanent (substance) is subject to change ; the mutable suffers no change, but rather alternation, that is, when certain deter- minations cease, others begin." Change, then, cannot be perceived by us except in sub- stances, and origin or extinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely a determination of the permanent, cannot be a possible perception, for it is this very notion of the permanent which renders possible the representation of a transition from one state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can be empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which is perma- nent. Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be ; we must then have a point of time in which it was not. But how and by what can we fix and determine this point of time, unless by tliat which already exists ? For a void time preceding OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 141 is not an object of perception ; but if we connect this begin- ning with objects which existed previously, and which con- tinue to exist till the object in question begins to be, then the latter can only be a determination of the former as the per- manent. The same holds good of the notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of a time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists. Substances (in the world of phaenomena) are the substratum of all determinations of time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances, would utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time ; and in that case phaenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side by side, existence would pass ; which is absurd. For there is only one time in which all different times must be placed, not as co-existent, but as successive. Accordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phsenomena, as things or objects, are deter- minable in a possible experience. But as regards the empi- rical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the substantiality of phsenomena, we shall find sufficient oppor- tunity to speak in the sequel. B. SECOND ANALOGY PRINCIPLE OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY. All changes take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect. PROOF. (That all phsenoroena in the succession of time are only changes, that is, a successive being and non-being of the de- terminations of substance, which is permanent; consequently that a being of substance itself which follows on the non- being thereof, or a non-being of substance which follows on the being thereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, is impossible all this has been fully es- tablished in treating of the foregoing principle. This prin- ciple might have been expressed as follows : "All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely change ;" for the changes 142 Tfi^NSCEJTDIHT^L DOCTHIHE. of substance are not origin or extinction, because the concep- tion cf change presupposes the same subject as existing with two opposite determinations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall proceed to the proof.) I perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of things exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In this case then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now connection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product of a synthetical faculty of imagination, which determines the in- ternal sense in respect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in two ways, so that either the one or the other may antecede in time ; for time in itself can- not be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only conscious then, that my imagination places one state before, and the other after; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other words, the objective relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may be cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary, which of them must be placed before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception ; and in this case it is the conception of the relation of cause and effect, the former of which determines the latter in time, as its necessary conse- quence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is only because we subject the sequence of phaenomena, and consequently all change to the law of caus- ality, that experience itself, that is, empirical cognition of phse.- nomena, becomes possible ; and consequently, that phaenomena themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only by virtue of this law. Our apprehension of the manifold of phaenomena is always successive. The representations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another in the object also, is a second point for reflection, which was not contained in the former. Or THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 143 Now we may certainly give the name of object to every thing, even to every representation, so far as we are conscious there- of ; but what this word may mean in the case of phaenomena, not merely in so far as they (as representations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is a question re- quiring deeper consideration. In so tar as they, regarded merely as representations, are at the same time objects of con- sciousness, they are not to be distinguished from apprehension, that is, reception into the synthesis of imagination, and we must therefore say : " The manifold of phsenomena is always produced successively in the mind." If phaenomena were things in themselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our representations how this manifold is con- nected in the object ; for we have to do only with our repre- sentations. How things may be in themselves, without regard to the representations through which they affect us, is utterly beyond the sphere of pur cognition. Now although phaenom- ena are not things in themselves, and are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phae- nomena themselves, while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always successive. For example, the apprehen- sion of the manifold in the phaenomenon of a house which stands before me, is successive. Now comes the question, whether the manifold of this house is in itself also successive ; which no one will be at all willing to grant. But, so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the transcendental signifi- cation thereof, I find that the house is not a thing in itself, but only a phsenomenon, that is, a representation, the trans- cendental object of which remains utterly unknown. What then am I to understand by the question, How can the manifold be connected in the phaenomenon itself not considered as a thing in itself, but merely as a phsenomenon ? Here that which lies in mysuccessive apprehension is regarded as representation, whilst the phaenomenon which is given me, notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these representations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception, drawn from the representations of apprehension, must har- monize. It is very soon seen that, as accordance of the cog- nition with its object constitutes truth, the question now before us can only relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth,- 144 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representations of apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if it is subject to a rule, which distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the pheno- menon which contains the condition of this necessary rule 01 apprehension, is the object. Let us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to say, that something or some state exists which be- fore was not, cannot be empirically perceived, unless a phe- nomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this state. For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other words, a beginning, which no state of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended as the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which fol- lows upon another perception. But as this is the case with all synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house, my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other apprehensions. But I remark also, that if in a phenomenon which contains an oc- currence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and the following state, B, the perception B can only follow A in apprehension, and the perception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship float down the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this phenomenon, the vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the order in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is deter- mined ; and by this order apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the apprehension of a house, might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or vice versd ; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition by going from left to right, and from right to left. Ac- cordingly, in the series of these perceptions, there was no de- termined order, which necessitated my beginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But this rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a phenomenon necessary. OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 145 I must therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjtc* five sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of phaenomena, for otherwise the former is quite undeter- mined, and one phaenomenon is not distinguishable from another. The former alone proves nothing as to the con- nection of the manifold in an object, for it is quite arbi- trary. The latter must consist in the order of the manifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehen- sion of one thing (that which happens) follows that of an- other thing (which precedes), in conformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the pheenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order or sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I cannot arrange my apprehension otherwise than in this order. In conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which antecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which this event follows always and ne- cessarily ; but I cannot reverse this and go back from the event, and determine (by apprehension) that which antecedes it. For no phaenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding point, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time ; from a given time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the deter- mined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something that follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which antecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is necessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a condition, and this condition determines the event. Let us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must follow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist only in apprehension, that is to eay, would be merely subjective, and it could not thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what ought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a play of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one phaenomenon from another, as regards relations of time ; because the suc- cession in the act of apprehension would always be of the same L 146 TBAKSCE1S'DENTA.L DOCTE1NE. ort, and therefore there would be nothing in the phseuomenoE to determine the succession, and to render a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot say that two states in a phsenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that one apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does not determine an object, and con- sequently cannot be held to be cognition of an object, not even in the phaenomenal world. Accordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always presuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a rule. For other- wise I could not say of the object, that it follows ; because the mere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in relation to something preceding, does not autho- rize succession in the object. Only therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phsenomeua are determined in their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state, can I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is only under this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible. No doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradic- tion to all the notions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the procedure of the human understanding. Ac- cording to these opinions, it is by means of the perception and comparison of similar consequences following upon certain antecedent pheenomena, that the understanding is led to the discovery of a rule, according to which certain events always follow certain phsenomena, and it is only by this process that we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a basis, it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule which it furnishes us with " Everything that happens must have a cause" would be just as contingent as expe- rience itself. The universality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious attributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as it would not in this case be a priori, but founded on deduction. But the same is the case with this law as with other pure priori representations (e. g. space and time), which we can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from experience, only because we had already placed them therein, and by that means, and by that alone, had rendered experience ptisMble. OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 147 Indeed, the logical clearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events, is possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the recogni- tion of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phsenomena in time, was the ground of experience itself, and consequently preceded it a priori. It is now our duty to show by an example, that we never, even in experience, attribute to an object the notion of suc- cession or effect (of an event that is, the happening of some- thing that did not exist before), and distinguish it from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when a rule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of perception in preference to any other, and that, indeed, it is this necessity which first renders possible the representation of a succession in the object. We have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But, however widely extended, however accurate and thorough-going this consciousness may be, these repre- sentations are still nothing more than representations, that is, internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now how happens it, that to these representations we should set an object, or that, in addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still further attribute to them a certain unknown objective reality ? It is clear that ob- jective significancy cannot consist in a relation to another re- presentation (of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again arises : " How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain objective signifi- cancy over and above the subjective, which is proper to it, as a determination of a state of mind ?" If we try to discover what sort of new property the relation to an object gives to our subjective representations, and what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation has no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connexion of our representations in a certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule ; arid that conversely, it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of time of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to them. In the synthesis of phaenomena, the manifold of our repre- sentations is always successive. Now hereby is not repre- sented an object, for by means of this succession, which is L2 148 TBANSCEKDEtfTAL DOCTEIITE. common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished from another. But so soon as I perceive or assume, that in this succession there is a relation to a state antecedent, from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule, so soon do T represent something as an event, or as a thing that happens ; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign a certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because of the preceding state in the object. When, there- fore, I perceive that something happens, there is contained in this representation, in the first place, the fact, that something antecedes ; because it is only in relation to this, that the phae- nomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists after an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can receive its determined place in time, only by the presupposition that something existed in the foregoing state, upon which it follows inevitably and lilways, that is, in conformity with a rule. From all this it is evident that, in the first place, I cannot reverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede that upon which it follows j and that, in the second place, if the antecedent state be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily follows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain order in our repre- sentations, whereby the present gives a sure indication of some previously existing state, as a correlate, though still undetermined, of the existing event which is given, a cor- relate which itself relates to the event as its consequence, conditions it, and connects it necessarily with itself in the series of time. If then it be admitted as a necessary A aw of sensibility, and consequently a formal condition of all perception, that the preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inas- much as I cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding), it must likewise be an indispensable law of empi- rical representation of the series of time, that the phenomena of the past determine all phsenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot take place, except ill so far as the former determine their existence in time, that is to say, establish it according to a rule. For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity ill the connection of times. For all experience and for the possibility of experience, un OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 149 derstanding is indispensable, and the first step which it takes in this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear,* but to render the representation of an object in general, pos- sible. It does this by applying the order of time to phaeno- mena, and their existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon, as a consequence, a place in relation to preceding phaenomena, determined d. priori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time itself, which deter- mines a place a priori to all its parts. This determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of phaenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception) ; but, on the contrary, phsenomena must reciprocally determine the places in time of one another, and render these necessary in the order of time. In other words, whatever follows or happens, must follow in conformity with an universal rule upon that which was contained in the foregoing state. Hence arises a series of phaenomena, which, by means of the under- standing, produces and renders necessary exactly the same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible perceptions, as is found a priori in the form of internal intui- tion (time), in which all our perceptions must have place. That something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a possible experience, which becomes real, only because I look upon the phenomenon as determined in regard to ita place in time, consequently as an object, which can always be found by means of a rule in the connected series of my per- ceptions. But this rule of the determination of a thing ac- cording to succession in time is as follows : " In what pre- cedes may be found the condition, under which an event always (that is, necessarily) follows." From all this it is obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible experience, that is, of objective cognition of phae- nomena, in regard to their relations in the succession of time. The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the following momenta of argument. To all empirical cog- nition belongs the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is always successive, that is, in which the representations therein always follow one another. But the order of succession in imagination is not determined, and the aeries of successive representations may be taken retrogret- This was the opinion of Wolf and Leibnitz. ZV, ]50 TBANSCEFDEITTAL DOCTHItfE. lively as well as progressively. But if this synthesis is a syu thesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given phae- nomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or, to speak more accurately, there is therein an order of succes- sive synthesis which determines an object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when this is po- sited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my per- ception is to contain the cognition of an event, that is, of something which really happens, it must be an empirical judgment, wherein we think that the succession is determined ; that is, it presupposes another pheenomenon, upon which this event follows necessarily, or in conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I posited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should be obliged to con- sider it merely as a subjective play of my imagination, and if In this I represented to myself anything as objective, I must look upon it as a mere dream. Thus, the relation of phaeno- mena (as possible perceptions), according to which that which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily determined in time by something which antecedes, in conformity with a rule, in other words, the relation of cause and effect is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments in regard to the sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. The principle of the re- lation of causality in the succession of phsenomena is there- fore valid for all objects of experience, because it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience. Here, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The principle of the connection of causality among phseno- mena is limited in our formula to the succession thereof, although in practice we find that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in the same time, and that cause and effect may be simultaneous. For example, there is heat in a room, which does not exist in the open air. I look about for the cause, and find it to be the fire. Now the fire as the cause, is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of the room. In this case, then, there is no succession as regards time, between cause and effect, but they are simul- taneous ; and still the law holds good. The greater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the succession in time of the latter is produced only be- OT THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 151 cause the cause cannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when the effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause, because if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect could not have arisen. Here it must be specially remem- bered, that we must consider the order of time, and not the lapse thereof. The relation remains, even though no time has elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always determiiiable according to time. If, for ex- ample, I consider a leaden ball, which lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause, then it is simultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two through the relation of time of the dynamical connection of both. For if I lay the ball upon the cushion, then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface ; but supposing the cushion has, from some cause or another, a hollow, there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball. Thus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause. The glass is the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface, although the two phae- nomena are contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some water with the glass from a larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely, the change of the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a concave, which it assumes in the glass. This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action ; that of action, to the conception of force ; and through it, to the conception of substance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition a priori, to be crowded with analyses which merely explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions, I reserve the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great particularity, may already be found in well-known works on this subject. But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks on the empirical criterion of a substance, in so far as it seems to be more evi- dent and more easily recognised through the conception of 152 TEANSCENDENTAJ, DOCTRIITE. action, than througri tnat of the permanence of a pheno- menon Where action (consequently activity and force) exists, sub- stance also must exist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of phsenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain what we mean by substance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is by no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately from the action to the permanence of that which acts, this being nevertheless an essential and peculiar criterion of sub- stance (phsenomenon) ? But after what has been said above, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the common mode of procedure merely analysing our conceptions it would be quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the subject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that which happens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject thereof is the permanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that is, substance. For according to the prin- ciple of causality, actions are always the first ground of all change in phsenomena, and consequently cannot be a pro- perty of a subject which itself changes, because if this were the case, other actions and another subject would be necessary to determine this change. From all this it results that action alone, as an empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the presence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to discover the permanence of substance by a comparison. Besides, by this mode of induction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and strict universality of the conception requires. For that the primary subject of the causality of all arising and passing away, all origin and extinction, cannot itself (in the sphere of phsenom- ena) arise and pass away, is a sound and safe conclusion, a con- clusion which leads us to the conception of empirical necessity and permanence in existence, and consequently to the concep- tion of a substance as pheenomenon. When something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that which occurs, is an object requiring in- vestigation. The transition from the non-being of a state into the existence of it, supposing that this state contains no quality which previously existed in the phsenomenon, is a fact of itself OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 153 demanding inquiry. Such an event, as has been shown in Nc. A, does not concern substance (for substance does not thus originate), but its condition or state. It is therefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If thi* origin be re- garded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which cannot be admitted as an event among pnaenomena, be- cause the very possibility of it would annihilate the unity of experience. If, however, I regard all things not as phenomena, but as things in themselves, and objects of understanding alone, they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of their existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different meaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phsenomena as objects of possible ex- perience. How a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state existing in one point of time, an opposite state should follow in another point of time of this we have nol the smallest conception a priori. There is requisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which can only be given empirically; for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, of certain successive phseaoraena (as movements) which in- dicate the presence of such forces. But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can take place as the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the change, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), and consequently the succession of the states themselves, can very well be considered a priori, in relation to the law of causality and the conditions of time.* When a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b, the point of time in which the latter exists is different from, and subsequent to that in which the former existed. In like manner, the second state, as reality (in the phaenomenon), differs from the first, in which the reality of the second did not exist, as b from zero. That is to say, if the state, 6, differs from the state, a, only in respect to quantity, the change is a coming into existence of b a, which in the former state did not exist, and in relation to which that state is = 0. * It must be remarked, that I do not speak of the change of certain relations, but of the change of the state. Thus, when a bod> moves in an uniform manner, it does not change its state (of motion) ; but only when its niDtion increases or decreases. 154 TKAUSCE.tf DENTAL UOCTEINE. W ow the question arises, how a thing passes from one state =a, into another state = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two states existing in these moments, there is always a difference having a certain quantity (for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quan- tities). Consequently, every transition from one state into another, is always effected in a time contained between two moments, of which the first determines the state which the thing leaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing passes. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the intermediate state be- tween both, and as such they belong to the total of the change. Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality in the whole time during which the change takes place. The cause, therefore, does not produce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the time gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at b, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (b a) is generated through the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All change is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality, which, in so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not consist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect. Such is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which is, that neither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the smallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state of a thing passes in the process of a change through all these parts, as elements, to its second state. There is no smallest degree of reality in a phsenomenon, just as there is no smallest degree in the quantity of time ; and so the new state of the reality grows up out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the differences of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the difference between and a. It is not our business to enquire here into the utility of this principle in the investigation of nature. But how such a pro- position, which appears so greatly to extend our knowledge of nature, is possible completely a priori, is indeed a question which deserves investigation, although the first view seems to de- monstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the iue- OF THE SUCCESSION OF TIME. 1 &5 don, how it is possible, may be considered superfluous. Foi there are so many groundless pretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason, that we must take it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a thorough-going and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the clearest dogmatical evidence. Every addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in the exercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of the determination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression in time, be objects themselves what they may, phaenomena, or pure intuitions. This progression in time determines everything, and is itself determined by nothing else. That is to say, the parts of the progression exist only in time, and by means of the synthesis thereof, and are not given antecedently to it. For this reason, every transition in perception to anything which follows upon an- other in time, is a determination of time by means of the pro- duction of this perception. And as this determination of time is, always and in all its parts, a quantity, the perception pro- duced is to be considered as a quantity which proceeds through all its degrees no one of which is the smallest possible from zero up to its determined degree. From this we perceive the possibility of cognizing a priori a law of changes a law, how- ever, which concerns their form merely. We merely antici- pate our own apprehension, the formal condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind antecedently to all given phaenomena, must certainly be capable of being cognized h priori. Thus, as time contains the sensuous condition a priori of the possibility of a continuous progression of that which exists to that which follows it, the understanding, by virtue of the unity of apperception, contains the condition a priori of the possibility of a continuous determination of the position in time of all phenomena, and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the former of which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render universally and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid the empirical cognition of the relations of time. 156 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE c. THIRD ANALOGY. PRINCIPLE OF CO- EXISTENCE, ACCORDING TO THE LAW Of RECIPROCITY OR COMMUNITY. All substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same time, exist in a state of complete reciprocity of action. PROOF. Things are co-existent, when in empirical intuition the per- ception of the one can follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versd which cannot occur in the succession of phsenomena, as we have shown in the explanation of the second principle. Thus I can perceive the moon and then the earth, or conversely, first the earth and then the moon ; and for the reason that my perception of these objects can reciprocally follow each other, I say, they exist contempo- raneously. Now co-existence is the existence of the manifold in the same time. But time itself is not an object of percep- tion ; and therefore we cannot conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the other fact, that the perceptions of these things can follow each other reciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only present to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the other is not present, and contrariwise ; but would not show that the objects are co-existent, that is to say, that, if the one exists, the other also exists in the same time, and that this is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions may be capable of following each other reciprocally. It follows that a conception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the determinations of phsenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each other, and yet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in saying that the reciprocal succession of per- ceptions has its foundation in the object, and to enable us to represent co-existence as objective. But that relation of sub- stances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in the other substance, is the relation of influence. And, when this influence is reciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the co-existence of lubstances in space cannot be cognized in experience other- PRINCIPLE OF CO-EXISTENCE. 157 wise than under the precondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore the condition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience. Things are co-existent, in so far as they exist in one and the same time. But how can we know that they exist in one and the same time ? Only by observing that the order in the syn- thesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from A, through B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A. For if they were successive in time (and in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite impossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards to A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time, and therefore cannot be an object of apprehension. Let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another. Then I say that the co- existence of these cannot be an object of possible perception, and that the existence of one cannot, by any mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the existence of another. For we imagine them in this case to be separated by a completely void space, and thus percep- tion, which proceeds from the one to the other in time, would indeed determine their existence by means of a following per- ception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phsenomenon follows objectively upon the first, or is co-existent with it. Besides the mere fact of existence then, there must be something by means of which A determines the position of B in time, and conversely, B the position of A ; because only under this condition can substances be empirically represented as existing contemporaneously. Now that alone determines the position of another thing in time, which is the cause of it or of its determinations. Consequently every substance (inas- much as it can have succession predicated of it only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain determinations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the causality of the other in itself. That is to say substances must stand (mediately or immediately) in dyna mical community with each other, if co-existence is to be cog- nized in any possible experience. But, in regard to objects of experience, that is absolutely necessary, without which the 158 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. experience of these objects would itself be impossible. Con- sequently it is absolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far as they are co-existent, stand iii a relation of complete community of reciprocal action to eacn other. The word community has in our language* two meanings, and contains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio^ SLiidcommercium. We employ it in this place in the latter sense that of a dynamical community, without which even the com- munity of place (communio spatii} could not be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to observe, that it is only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can conduct our senses from one object to another ; that the light which plays between our eyes and the heavenly bodies pro- duces a mediating community between them and us, and thereby evidences their co-existence with us ; that we cannot empirically change our position (perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout the whole of space ren- dered possible the perception of the positions we occupy ; and that this perception can prove the contemporaneous ex- istence of these places only through their reciprocal influence, and thereby also the co-existence of even the most remote ob- jects although in this case the proof is only mediate. With- out community, every perception (of a phaenomenon in space) is separated from every other and isolated, and the chain of empirical representations, thai is, of experience, must, with the appearance of a new object, begin entirely denovo, without the least connexion with preceding representations, and without standing towards these even in the relation of time. My intention here is by no means to combat the notion of empty space ; for it may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach thereto, and where, there- fore, no empirical perception of co-existence takes place. But in this case it is not an object of possible experience. The following remarks may be useful in the way of explana- tion. In the mind, all phaenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must exist in community (communio) of apper- ception or consciousness, and in so far as it is requisite that objects be represented as co-existent and connected, in so far must they reciprocally determine the position in time of each * German PRINCIPLE OF CO-EXISTESCE. 159 other, and thereby constitute a whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective basis, or to be applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one substance must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For otherwise succession, which is always found in percep- tions as apprehensions, would be predicated of external objects, and their representation of their co-existence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is to say, a real community (commercium) of substances, without which therefore the empirical relation of co-existence would be a notion beyond the reach of our minds. By virtue of this com- mercium, phaenomena, in so far as they are apart from, and nevertheless in connection with each other, constitute a com- positum reale. Such composita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical relations then, from which all others spring, are those of Inherence, Consequence, and Com- position. Ihese, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing more than principles of the determination of the existence of phaenomena in time, according to the three modi of this determination ; to wit, the relation to time itself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that is, duration), the re- lation in time as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as the complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination in regard to time is thoroughly dynamical ; that is to say, time is not considered as that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its position ; for this is impossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of perception, by means of which phsenomena can be connected with each other. On the contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence of phaenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time, determines for every phae- uornenon its position in time, and consequently a priori, and with validity for all and every time. By nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we under- stand the totality of phaenomena connected, in respect of their existence, according to necessary rules, that is, laws. There are therefore certain laws (which are moreover h priori) which 160 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE. make nature possible ; and all empirical laws can exist only by means of experience, and by virtue of those primitive laws through which experience itself becomes possible. The pur- pose of the analogies is therefore to represent to us the unity of nature in the connection of all phaenomena under certain ex- ponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of time (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity of apperception, which can exist in synthesis only ac- cording to rules. The combined expression of all is this : All phaenomena exist in one nature, and must so exist, inasmuch as without this a priori unity, no unity of experience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience, is pos- sible. As regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these transcendental laws of nature, and the pecu- liar character of it, we must make one remark, which will at the same time be important as a guide in every other attempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthe- tical propositions a priori. Had we endeavoured to prove these analogies dogmatically, that is, from conceptions ; that is to say, had we employed this method in attempting to show that every thing which exists, exists only in that which is per- manent, that every thingor event presupposes the existence ot something in a preceding state, upon which it follows in con- formity with a rule lastly, that in the manifold, which is co- existent, the states co-exist in connection with each other according to a rule, all our labour would have been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of things, analyse them as we may, cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the existence of another. What other course was left for us to pursue ? This only, to demonstrate the possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last all objects must be capable of being presented to us, if the representation of them is to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating term, the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity of the apperception of all phaenomena, we found d priori conditions of the universal and necessary de- termination as to time of all existences in the world of phae- aomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would itself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity a priori, by means of which we could THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT. 101 anticipate experience. For \Nant of this method, and from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof of the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the em- pirical employment of the understanding, has it happened, that a proof of the principle of sufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain. The other two analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have always been silently employed by the mind,* because the guiding thread famished by the categories was wanting, the guide which alone can enable us to discover every hiatus, both in the system of conceptions and of principles. IV. THE POSTULATES OP EMPIRICAL THOUGHT. 1 . That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of experience, is possible. 2. That which coheres with the material conditions of ex- perience (sensation), is real. 3. That whose coherence with the real is determined ac- cording to universal conditions of experience is (exists) ne- cessary. Explanation. The categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not in the least determine the object, or enlarge the con- ception to which they are annexed as predicates, but only ex- press its relation to the faculty of cognition. Though my conception of a thing is in itself complete, I am still entitled to ask whether the object of it is merely possible, or whether it is also real, or, if the latter, whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself is not more definitely determined * The unity of the universe, in which all phenomena must be con- nected, is evidently a mere consequence of the tacitly admitted principle of the community of all substances which are co-existent. For were sub- stances isolated, they could not as parts constitute a whole, and were their connection (reciprocal action of the manifold) not necessary from the very fact of co-existence, we could riot conclude from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former as a real one. We have, however, shown in its place, that community is the proper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of co-existence, and that we may therefore pro- perly reason from the latter to the former as its condition. M 162 TRANSCENDENTAL J)OCTliINE. in thought, out the question is only in what relation it, in- cluding all its determinations, stands to the understanding and its employment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgment, and to the reason in its application to expe- rience. For this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing more than explanations of the conceptions of possi- bility, reality, and necessity, as employed hi experience, and at the same time, restrictions of all the categories to empirical use alone, not authorizing the transcendental employment of them. For if they are to have something more than a merely logical significance, and to be something more than a mere analytical expression of the form of thought, and to have a relation to things and their possibility, reality or necessity, they must concern possible experience and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given. The postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the conception of the things agree with the formal conditions of our experience in general. But this, that is to say, the ob- jective form of experience, contains all the kinds of synthesis which are requisite for the cognition of objects. A concep- tion which contains a synthesis must be regarded as empty and without reference to an object, if its synthesis does not belong to experience either as borrowed from it, and in this case it is called an empirical conception, or such as is the ground and a priori condition of experience (its form), and in this case it is a pure conception, a conception which neverthe- less belongs to experience, inasmuch as its object can be found in this alone. For where shall we find the criterion 01 character of the possibility of an object which is cogitated bjj means of an a priori synthetical conception, if not in the syn- thesis which constitutes the form of empirical cognition of ob- jects ? That in such a conception no contradiction exists is indeed a necessary logical condition, but very far from being sufficient to establish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the possibility of such an object as is thought in the conception. Thus, in the conception of a figure which is contained within two straight lines, there is no contradiction, for the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction contain no negation of a figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest upon the conception in itself, but upon the TJIE PO8TTJLA.TES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT. 163 construction of it in space, that is to say, upon the conditions of space and its determinations. But these have themselves objective reality, that is, they apply to possible things, because they contain a priori the form of experience in general. And now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and influence of this postulate of possibility. When I repre- sent to myself a thing that is permanent, so that everything in it which changes belongs merely to its state or condition, from such a conception alone I never can cognize that such a thing is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something which is so constituted that, when it is posited, something else follows always and infallibly, my thought contains no self- contradiction ; but whether such a property as causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone affords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different things (substances) which are so constituted, that the state or condition of one causes a change in the state of the other, and reciprocally ; but whether such a relation is a property of things cannot be perceived from these conceptions, which con- tain a merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, there- fore, that these conceptions express a priori the relations of perceptions in every experience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that is, transcendental truth ; and that inde- pendent of experience, though not independent of all relation to the form of an experience in general and its synthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized. But when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of sub- stances, forces, action and reaction, from the material pre- sented to us by perception, without following the example of experience in their connexion, we create mere chimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion, because we have not taken experience for our instructress, though we have borrowed the conceptions from her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of possibility not, like the categories, d priori, as conceptions on which all experience de- pends, but only, a posteriori, as conceptions given by means ol experience itself, and their possibility must either be cog- nized a posteriori and empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all. A substance, which is permanently present in space, yet without filling it (like that tertium quid between matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce M 2 164 TJIANSCEXDENTAL DOCTKITH?. metaphysics), or a peculiar fundamental power of the minJ of intuiting the future by anticipation (instead of merely infer- ring from past and present events), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of thought with other men, however distant they may he these are conceptions, the pos- sibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based upon experience and its known laws ; and with- out experience, they are a merely arbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal contradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the possibility of such an object as is thought in these concep- tions. As far as concerns reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility in concrete without the aid of experience ; because reality is concerned only with sensa- tion, as the matter of experience, and not with the form of thought, with which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies. But I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in experience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of things by means of a priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the possibility of things is not derived from such conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal and objective conditions of an experience in general. It seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the conception of it alone (which is certainly independent of experience) ; for we can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely a priori, that is to say, we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form of an object, it must remain a mere product of the ima- gination, and the possibility of the existence of an object cor- responding to it must remain doubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we know that the figure can be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of ex- perience rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition 3 priori of external experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we construct a triangle in imagination, is the very same -as chat we employ in the apprehension of a phsenemenon for the purpose of making an empirical conception of it, are what ;alone connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing with the conception of it. In the same manner, the possibility of continuous quantities, indeed of Quantities in general, for the THE POSTULATES OF EMPIKICAL THOUGHT. 16.') conceptions of them are without exception synthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but only when they are considered as the formal conditions of the determina- tion of objects in experience. And where, indeed, should we look for objects to correspond to our conceptions, if not in experience, by which alone objects are presented to us ? It is, however, true that without antecedent experience we can cognize and characterize the possibility of things, relatively to the formal conditions, under which something is determined in experience as an object, consequently completely a priori. But still this is possible only in relation to experience and within its limits. The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be cognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real perception, in accordance with the ana- logies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connec- tion in experience. From the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to con- clude its existence. For, let the conception be ever so com- plete, and containing a statement of all the determinations of the thing, the existence of it has nothing to do with all this, but only with the question whether such a thing is given, so that the perception of it can in every case precede the concep- tion. For the fact that the conception of it precedes the per- ception, merely indicates the possibility of its existence ; it is perception, which presents matter to the conception, that is the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing, however, and therefore comparatively a priori, we are able to cognize its existence, provided it stands in connection with some perceptions according to the principles of the em- pirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity with the analogies of perception. For, in this case, the existence of the supposed thing is connected with our perceptions in a possible experience, and we are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the series of possible perceptions from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we do not perceive. Thus, we cognize the existence of a magnetic mutter penetrating all bodies from the perception of the at- traction of the steel- filing* by the magnet, although the coo I tit) TllANSCENDESiAL DOCTJHNE. stitution of our organs renders an immediate perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the laws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in an experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter, if our senses were more acute, but this obtuseness has no influence upon and cannot alter the form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of the existence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred from them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from experience, or do not pro- ceed according to the laws of the empirical connection of phsenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do not immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward powerful objections to these rules for proving existence mediately. This is, therefore, the proper place for its refutation. BEFUTATION OF IDEALISM. Idealism I mean material* idealism is the theory which declares the existence of objects in space without us to be either (1) doubtful and indemonstrable, or (2) false and im- possible. The first is the problematical idealism of Des Cartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical as- sertion (assertio), to wit, I am. The second is the dogmatical idealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects of which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself impossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the imagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard space as a property of things in themselves ; for in that case it is, with all to which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind of idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental aesthetic. Problematical ideal- ism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our in- capacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evi- dencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule, not to form a decisive judgment before * In opposition to formal or critical idealism the theory of Kant which denies to us a knowledge of things as things in themse ves, and maintains that w e can know only phaenomena. Tr. BUfDTATJON OF IDEALISM. 107 sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Des Cartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external ex- perience. THEOEEM. The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space. PROOF. I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in regard to time presupposes the exist- ence of something permanent in perception. But this perma- nent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason that my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It follows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only through a thing without me, and not through the mere representation of a thing with- out me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of real things ex- ternal to me. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily con- nected with the consciousness of the possibility of this deter- mination in time. Hence it follows, that consciousness in time is necessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as the existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That is to say, the con- sciousness of my own existence is at the same time an im- mediate consciousness of the existence of other things with- out me. Remark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which idealism plays, is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed, that the only immediate experience is internal, and that from this we can only infer the existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from given effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste and uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations may lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But our proof shows that external experience is pro- i68 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. perly immediate,* that only by virtue of it not, indeed, th* consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the deter- mination of our existence in time, that is, internal experi- ence is possible. It is true, that the representation / am, which is the expression of the consciousness which can ac- company all my thoughts, is that which immediately includes the existence of a subject. But in this representation we cannot find any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical knowledge, that is, experience. For experience contains, in addition to the thought of something existing, intuition, and in this case it must be internal intuition, that is, time, in relation to which the subject must be determined. But the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose, so that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only mediately and through external experience. Remark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of cognition in the determination of time is in perfect accord- ance. Its truth is supported by the fact, that it is possible to perceive a determination of time only by means of a change in external relations (motion) to the permanent in space ; (for ex- ample, we become aware of the sun's motion, by observing the changes of his relation to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that we possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the conception of a substance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence is not itself derived from external experience, but is an a priori necessary condition of all determination of time, consequently also of the internal sense in reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external things. In the representation J, the consciousness of myself is not an intui- * The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is, in the preceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, he the possibility of this consciousness understood by us or not. The question as to the possibility of it would stand thus : Have we an internal sense, but no ex- ternal sense, and is our belief in external perception a mere delusion : But it is evident that, in order merely to fancy to ourselves anything a* external, that is, to present it to the sense in intuition, we must already possess an exlernal sense, and must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external intuition from the spontaneity which cha- racterises every act of imagination. For merely to imagine also an exter- nal sense, would annihilate the faculty of intuition itself which is to be determined by the imagination. KKFUTAIIOS OF IDEALISM. 169 lion, but a merely intellectual representation produced by tie spontaneous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this / has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its cha- racter of permanence, could serve as correlate to the deter- mination of time in the internal sense in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of matter as an empirical intuition. Remark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary condition of the possibility of a deter- mined consciousness of ourselves, it does not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves the exist- ence of these things, for their representations may very well be the mere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness) ; though, indeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external perceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of ex- ternal objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that internal experience in general is possible only through external experience in general. Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary, must be dis- covered from its particular determinations, and by comparing these with the criteria of all real'experience. Finally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in existence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of conceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely a priori the existence of any object of sense, though we can do so comparatively priori, that is, relatively to some other previously given existence, a cognition, however, which can only be of such an existence as must be contained in the complex of experience, of which the previously given perception is a part, the necessity of existence can never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on the contrary, from its connection with that which is an object of perception. But the only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phaenomena, as necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with the laws of causality. It is consequently not the necessity of the existence of things (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things Unit we cognise, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of other states given in perception, according to 170 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. empirical laws of causality. Hence it follows, that the crite- rion of necessity is to be found only in the law of a possible experience, that, every thing which happens is determined a priori in the phaenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognise only the necessity of effects in nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of necessity in exist- ence possesses no application beyond the field of possible ex- perience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as substances, because these can never be considered as empirical effects, or as something that happens and has a beginning. Necessity, therefore, regards only the relations of phaenornena according to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility grounded thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a cause) a priori to another existence (of an effect) , Every thing that happens is hypothetically necessary, is a principle which subjects the changes that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary existence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist Hence the proposition, Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur casus), is an priori law of nature. The case is the same with the proposition, Necessity in nature is not blind^ that is, it is conditioned, consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum). Both laws subject the play of change to a nature of things (as phaenomena), or, which is the same thing, to the unity of the understanding, and through the un- derstanding alone can changes belong to an experience, as the synthetical unity of phaenomena. Both belong to the class of dynamical principles. The former is properly a conse- quence of the principle of causality one of the analogies of experience. The latter belongs to the principles of modality, which to the determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which is itself, however, subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phaenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non datur saltus] ; and likewise, in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two phseno- mena (non dotv.r hiatus), for we can so express the principle, that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or which even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond of the field of possible experience REFUTATION Of IDEALISM. 1/i (the world), such a question cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal reason, which passes beyond the sphere of a pos- sible experience, and aims at forming a judgment of that which surrounds and circumscribes it, and the proper place for the consideration of it is the transcendental dialectic. These four propositions, In mundo non datur hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur ca$us, non datur fatum, as well as all principles of transcendental origin, we could very easily exhibit in their proper order, that is, in conformity with the order of the cate- gories, and assign to each its proper place. But the already practised reader will do this for himself, or discover the clue to such an arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this, to admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or be foreign to the under- standing and the continuous connection of all pheenomena, that is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. For in the understanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must have their assigned place, possible. Whether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and whether the field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are interesting enough questions, and quite capable of synthetical solution, questions, however, which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone. For they are tantamount to asking, whether all things as phaenomena do without exception belong to the complex and connected whole of a single experience, of which every given perception is a part, a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any other phaenomena or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one possible experience ? The understanding gives to experience, according to the subjective and formal condi- tions, of sensibility as well as of apperception, the rules which alone make this experience possible. Other forms of intui- tion, besides those of space and time, other forms of under- standing besides the discursive forms of thought, or of cog- nition by means of conceptions, we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves ; and even if we could, they would still not belong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by which objects are presented to us. Whethei i.72 TRANSCENDENTAL DuCTHINE. other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given. Moreover, the poverty of the usual argu- ments which go to prove the existence of a vast sphere of pos- sibility, of which all that is real (every object of experience) is but a small part, is very remarkable. " All real is possible ;" from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of conversion, the particular proposition, " Some possible is real." Now this seems to be equivalent to " Much is possible that is not real." No doubt it does seem as if we ought to consider the sum of the possible to be greater than that of the real, from the fact that something must be added to the former to constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to the possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum of the possible, and consequently requires to be added to it, is manifestly impossible. In addition to accordance with the formal conditions of experience, the understanding requires a connection with some perception ; but that which is connected with this perception, is real, even although it is not immediately perceived. But that another series of phsenomena, in com- plete coherence with that which is given in perception, con- sequently more than one all-embracing experience is possible, is an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given us by experience, and still less without any data at all. That which is possible only under conditions which are them- selves merely possible, is not possible in any respect. And yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base the dis- cussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that of experience. I have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the conception of the understanding, there might be no omission of anything that, in the common opinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the notion of absolute possibility (possibility which is valid in every respect) is not a mere con- ception of the understanding, which can be employed empi- rically, but belongs to reason alone, which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the understanding. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with a merely critical remark, leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel. REFUTATION OF IDEALISM. 173 Before concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system of all principles of the pure understanding, it seems'proper to mention the reasons which induced me to term the principles of modality postulates. This expression I do not here use in the sense which some more recent philoso- phers, contrary to its meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs, attach to it that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither deduction nor proof. For if, in the case of synthetical propositions, however evident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the strength of their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the understanding is entirely lost ; and, as there is no want of bold pretensions, which the common belief (though for the philosopher this is no credential) does not reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and conceit, without the power of refusing its assent to those as- sertions, which, though illegitimate, demand acceptance as veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the conception of a thing an a priori determination is synthetically added, such a proposition must obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy of its assertion. The principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical, for the predicates of possibility, reality, and ne- cessity do not in the least augment the conception of that of which they are affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute nothing to the representation of the object. But as they are, never- theless, always synthetical, they are so merely subjectively. That is to say, they have a reflective power, and apply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other respects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception originates and has its seat. So that if the conception merely agree with the formal conditions of experience, its object is called possible; if it is in connection with perception, and deter- mined thereby, the object is real ; if it is determined according to conceptions by means of the connection of perceptions, the object is called necessary. The principles of modality therefore predicate of a conception nothing more than the pro- cedure of the faculty of cognition which generated it. Now a postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition which con- tains nothing but the synthesis by which we present an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for example " With a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from 174 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. a given point ' and such a proposition does not admit ci proof, because the procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible to generate the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly, can we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not aug- ment* the conception of a thing, but merely indicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition. GENERAL EEMARK ON TIIE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES. It is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from the category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident the objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for ex- ample, the categories of relation. How (1) a thing can exist only as a subject, and not as a mere determination of other things, that is, can be substance ; or how (2), because something exists, some other thing must exist, consequently how a thing can be a cause ; or (3) how, when several things exist, from the fact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others follows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances can be possible are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere con- ceptions. The very same is the case with the other cate- gories; for example, how a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that is, can be a quantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we cannot know, whether we do really think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere be found to cohere with them, and thus the truth is established, that the categories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the construction of cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason is it true that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For example, " In every existence there is sub- stance," that is, something that can exist only as a subject and not as mere predicate ; or, " everything is a quantity," to construct propositions such as these, we require something * When I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than the possibility, but not in the thing ; for that can never contain more in rea- lity than was contained in its complete possibility. But while the notion of possibility is merely the notion of a position of a thing in relation to the understanding (its empirical use), reality is the conjunction of tht thing with perception. ON THE SYSTEM Of PHINCIPLE8. 175 to enable us to go out beyond the given conception and con. nect another with it. Fo~ the same rtnson the attempt to prove a synthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions for example, " Everything that exists contingently has a cauae,' has never succeeded. We could never get further than prov- ing that, without this relation to conceptions, we could not conceive the existence of the contingent, that is, could not a priori through the understanding cognize the existence of sucli a thing ; but it does not hence follow that this is also the condition of the possibility of the thing itself that is said to be, contingent. If, accordingly, we look back to our proof of the principle of causality, we shall find that we were able to prove it as valid only of objects of possible experience, and, indeed, only as itself the principle of the possibility of expe- rience, consequently of the cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and not from mere conceptions. That, however, the proposition, " Everything that is contingent must have a cause," is evident to every one merely from con- ceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of the contingent is cogitated as involving not the category of modality (as that the non-existence of which can be conceived), but that of relation (as that which can exist only as the con- sequence of something else), and so it is really an identical proposition, " That which can exist only as a consequence, has a cause." In fact, when we have to give examples of con tingent existence, we always refer to changes, and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the opposite.* But change is an event, which, as such, is possible only through a cause, and considered per se its non-existence is therefore possible, and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact * We can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but the ancients did not thence infer its contingency. But even the alternation of the existence and non-existence of a given state in a thing, in which all change consists, hy no means proves the contingency of that state the ground of proof being the reality of its opposite. For example, a hody is in a state of rest after motion, hut we cannot infer the contingency of the mo- tion from the fact that the former is the opposite of the latter. For this opposite is merely a logical and not a real opposite to the other. If we wish to demonstrate the contingency of the motion, what we ought to prove is, that, instead of the motion which took place in the preceding point of time, it was possible for the body to have been then in rest, not that it is qfteiivards in rest ; for, in this case, both opposites are perfectly consistent witt each other. 170 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTK1NE. that it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a thing is assumed to be contingent, it is an analytical proposi- tion to say, it has a cause. But it is still more remarkable that, to understand the pos- sibility of things according to the categories, and thus to de- monstrate the objective reality of the latter, we require not merely intuitions, but external intuitions. If, for example, we take the pure conceptions of relation, we find that (1) for the purpose of presenting to the conception of substance some- /hing permanent in intuition corresponding thereto, and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space alone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of con- tinual flow ; (2) in order to represent change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of causality, we require the representation of motion as change in space ; in fact, it is through it alone that changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding can perceive, are capable of being intuited. Change is the connection of determinations contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one and the same thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite opposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an example can not only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible without intuition ; and this intuition is the motion of a point in space ; the existence of which in different spaces (as a consequence of opposite determinations) alone makes the intuition of change possible. For, in order to make even internal change cogitable, we require to repre- sent time, as the form of the internal sense, figuratively by a line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line (motion), and consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able to represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states. The proper ground of this fact is, that all change to be perceived as change pre-supposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no permanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the objective possibility of the category of community cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its objective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that external in space. For how can we conceive the possibility of comma- ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES. 177 nity, that is, when several substances exist, that some effect on the existence of the one follows from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that, because something exists in the latter, something else must exist in the former, which could not be understood from its own existence alone ? For this is the very essence of community which is incon- ceivable as a property of things which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the substances of the world as cogitated by the understanding alone a community, re- quired the mediating aid of a divinity ; for, from their ex- istence, such a property seemed to him with justice incon- ceivable. But we can very easily conceive the possibility of community (of substances as phaenomena) if we represent them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intui- tion. For external intuition contains in itself priori formal external relations, as the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and reaction, and therefore of the pos- sibility of community. With the same ease can it be demon- strated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and conse- quently the objective reality of the category of quantity, can be grounded only in external intuition, and that by its means alone is the notion of quantity appropriated by the internal sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and leave the task of il- lustrating this by examples to the reader's own reflection. The above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the confirmation of our previous confutation of idealism, but still more, when the subject of self-cognition by mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own na- ture without the aid of external empirical intuitions is under discussion, for the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such a cognition. The result of the whole of this part of the Analytic of Principles is, therefore All principles of the pure understand- ing are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibi- lity of experience, and to experience alone do all a priori syn- thetical propositions apply and relate indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation. 1/8 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBIEUG. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY O* JUDGMENT, OE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES. CHAPTER III. OF THE GROUND OF THE DIVISION OF ALL OBJECTS INTO PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA. WE have now not only traversed the region of the pure un- derstanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but we have also measured it, and assigned to everything therein its proper place. But this land is an island, and enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth (an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the region of illusion, where many a fog-hank, many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his voyage of discovery, a new country, and while constantly deluding him with vain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which he never can desist, and which yet he never can bring to a ter- mination. But before venturing upon this sea, in order to explore it in its whole extent, and to arrive at a certainty whether anything is to be discovered there, it will not be with- out advantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly contented with what it con- tains, or whether we must not of necessity be contented with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build upon ; and, secondly, by what title we possess this land itself, and how we hold it secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course of our analytic, we have already given sufficient answers to these questions, yet a summary recapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our conviction, by uniting in one poi.it the momenta of the arguments. We have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without borrowing from experience, it never- theless possesses only for the behoof and use of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether cons':itu- live & priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regu- lative (as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema, as it were, of possible experience. For experience possesses OF PHENOMENA AIS'D NOUME^A. ] /5 .ts unity from the synthetical unity which the understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the synthesis of the ima- gination in relation to apperception, and in a priori relation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a pos- sible cognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding are not only a priori true, but the very source of all truth, that is, of the accordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain the basis of the possibility of experience, as the ensemble* of all cognition, it seems to us not enough to propound what is true we desire also to be told what we want to know. If, then, we learp nothing more by this critical examination, than what we shoulu, have practised in the merely empirical use of the understand- ing, without any such subtle enquiry, the presumption is, that the advantage we reap from it is not worth the labour be- stowed upon it. It may certainly be answered, that no rash curiosity is more prejudicial to the enlargement of our know- ledge than that which must know beforehand the utility of this or that piece of information which we seek, before we have entered on the needful investigations, and before one could form the least conception of its utility, even though it were placed before our eyes. But there is one advantage in such transcendental enquiries which can be made comprehen- sible to the dullest and most reluctant learner this, namely, that the understanding which is occupied merely with empiri- cal exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very suc- cessfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere. This purpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have instituted. But if it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within its horizon or not, it can never be sure either as to its claims or possessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating; corrections, when it transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and loses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions. * Inlegriff. The word continent, in the sense of ttat which contains the content (inhalt), if I might be allowed to use an old word in a nevr sense, would exactly hit the meaning. Tr. K 2 180 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE. That the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its d priori principles, or even of its conceptions other than an empirical use, is a proposition which leads to the most impor- tant results. A transcendental use is made of a conception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to things in general and considered as things in themselves ; an empirical use, when it is referred merely to ph&nomena, that is, to objects of a possible experience. That the latter use of a conception is the only admissible one, is evident from the reasons following. For every conception are requisite, firstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought) in general ; and, secondly, the possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply. Failing this latter, it has no sense, and js utterly void of content, although it may contain the logical function for constructing a conception from certain data. Now object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by in- tuition, and, even if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is a priori possible, this pure intuition can itself obtain objec- tive validity only from empirical intuition, of which it is itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and with them all principles, however high the degree of their a priori possibi- lity, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to data towards a possible experience. Without this they possess no objective validity, but are a mere play of imagination or of understand- ing with images or notions. Let us take, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure intuitions. " Space has three dimensions" " Between two points there can be only one straight line," &c. Although all these prin- ciples, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself are generated in the mind entirely a priori, they would nevertheless have no significance, if we were not always able to exhibit their significance in and by means of phaenomena (empirical objects) . Hence it is requi- site that an abstract conception be made sensuous, that is, that an object corresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception remains, as we say, without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics fulfils this require- ment by the construction of the figure, which is a phsenome- non evident to the senses. The same science finds support and significance in number ; this in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in counters, or in lines and points. The conception OF PHENOMENA. AND ITOOCEITA. 181 itself is always produced a priori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such conceptions ; hut the proper employment of them, and their application to objects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as regards its form, they contain a priori. That this is also the case with all of the categories and the principles based upon them, is evident from the fact, that we cannot render intelligible the possibility of an object corre- sponding to them, without having recourse to the conditions ot sensibility, consequently, to the form of phaenomena, to which, as their only proper objects, their use must therefore be con- fined, inasmuch as, if this condition is removed, all signifi- cance, that is, all relation to an object disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what sort of things we ought to think under such conceptions. The conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the determination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is placed in it. * But this " how many times " is based upon successive repetition, con- sequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous therein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be ex- plained only by cogitating a time which is either filled there- with or is void. If I leave out the notion of permanence (which is existence in all time), there remains in the concep- tion of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of which I endeavour to realise by representing to myself something that can exist only as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under which this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make no- thing out of the notion, and draw no inference from it, because no object to which to apply the conception is determined, and we consequently do not know whether it has any meaning at all. In like manner, if I leave out the notion of time, in which something follows upon some other thing in conformity with a rule, I can find nothing in the pure category, except that there is a something of such a sort that from it a con- clusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing. * Kant's meaning is, that we cannot have any conception of the size, quantity, &c., of a thing, without cogitating or constructing arbitrarily a unit, which shall he the standard of measurement. This is observable in weights, measures, &c. Number is the schema of quantity. TV. 182 TRANSCENDENTAL DOOTRINE. But in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause and an effect, but, as this power to draw con- clusions requires conditions of which I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode in which it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle, Everything that is contingent has a cause, comes with a gravity and self- assumed authority that seems to require no support from without. But, I ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is, that the non-existence of which is possible. But I should like very well to know, by what means this possibility of non-existence is to be cognized, if we do not represent to ourselves a succession in the series of phaenomena, and in this succession an existence which follows a non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change. For to say, that the non- existence of a thing is not self-contradictory, is a lame appeal to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition of the existence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient for the real objective possibility of non-existence. I can annihilate in thought every existing substance without self-contradiction, but I cannot infer from this their objective contingency in existence, that is to say, the possibility of their non-existence in itself. As regards the category of commu- nity, it may easily be inferred that, as the pure categories of substance and causality are incapable of a definition and ex- planation sufficient to determine their object without the aid of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the relation of substances to each other (commercium) is just as little sus- ceptible thereof. Possibility, Existence, and Necessity nobody has ever yet been able to explain without being guilty of mani- fest tautology, when the definition has been drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the logical possibility of the conception the condition of which is that it be not self-contradictory, for the transcendental pos- sibility of things the condition of which is, that there be an object corresponding to the conception, is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced.* * In one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding object, and consequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, if we take away sensuous intuition the only intuition which we possess, and there then remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact that the conception or thought is possible which, however, is not the question ; what we want to know being, whether it relates to an object ind thus possesses anv meaning OF PHJltfOMKNA AND NOUMENA. Ib3 It follows incontestably, that the purs conceptions of the understanding art incapable of transcendental, ai d must always oe of empirical use alone, and that the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general conditions of a pos- sible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them. Transcendental Analytic has accordingly this important re- sult, to wit, that the understanding is competent to effect nothing a priori, except the anticipation of the form of a pos- sible experience in general, and, that, as that which is not phae- nomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of phaenomena, and the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions a priori of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of analytic of the pure understanding. Thought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of this intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely transcendental, and the conception of the understanding is employed only transcendentally, that is, to produce unity in the thought of a manifold in general. Now a pure cate- gory, in which all conditions of sensuous intuition as the only intuition we possess are abstracted, does not determine an object, but merely expresses the thought of an object in general, according to different modes. Now, to employ a conception, the function of judgment is required, by which an object is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal condition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing this condition of judgment (schema), sub- sumptibn is impossible ; for there is in such a case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The merely transcendental use of the categories is therefore, in fact, no use at all, and has no determined, or even, as regards its form, determinable object. Hence it follows, that the pure category is incompetent to establish a synthetical a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure understanding are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and that beyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical a priori principles are possible. It may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The pure categories, apart from the formal conditions of sen- 184 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. eibility, have a merely transcendental meaning, but are never- theless not of transcendental use, because this is in itself im- possible, inasmuch as all the conditions of any employment or use of them (in judgments) are absent, to wit, the formal con- ditions of the subsumption of an object under these concep- tions. As, therefore, in the character of pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They are merely the pure form of the employment of the under- standing in respect of objects in general and of thought, with- out its being at the same time possible to think or to deter- mine any object by their means. But there lurks at the foundation of this subject an illusion which it is very difficult to avoid. The categories are not based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the/orm* of intuition, space and time ; they seem, therefore, to be capa- ble of an application beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this is not the case. They are nothing but mere forms of thought, which contain only the logical faculty of uniting a priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition. Apart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they have still less meaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an object is at least given, while a mode of connection of the manifold, when the intuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning at all. At the same time, when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the .jther hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible exist- ences (noumena). Now the question arises, whether the pure conceptions of our understanding do possess significance in respect of these latter, and may possibly be a mode of cog- nising them. But we are met at the very commencement with an am- Dignity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension. OF PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA 185 The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain rela- tion phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence be- lieves that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental concep- tions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intel- ligible existence, a something out of the sphere of our sen- sibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the under- standing. If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making ab- straction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion and this is a noumenon in the positive sense. The doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative sense, that is, of things which the under- standing is obliged to cogitate apart from any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phaenomena, but as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends that it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in themselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this unity by means of general a priori connecting conceptions only on account of the pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to be met with, as is the case with nou- mena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of the cate- gories is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to correspond to the categories, is in this case incomprehensible. On this point, I need only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement of the General Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a thing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it ia 186 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEI1TE. cot self-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition cor- responding to the conception. If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which cannot be regarded as pliaeno. mena, we must have an intuition different fom the sensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense of the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an in- tellectual intuition, is no part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the categories to possess any appli- cation beyond the limits of experience. It may be true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sen- suous intuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not extend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon, must be understood by us as such in a negative sense. If I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the categories), there remains no cognition of any object ; for by means of mere intuition nothing is cogitated, and from the existence of such or such an affection of sensi- bility in me, it does not follow that this affection or repre- sentation has any relation to an object without me. But if I takeaway all intuition, there still remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the categories do in some mea- sure really extend further than sensuous intuition, inasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode (of sensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason apply to and determine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that such can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the sen- RUOUS mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making. I call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction, and which is connected with other cogni- tions as a limitation of given conceptions, but whose ob- jective reality cannot be cognised in any manner. The con- ception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be co- gitated not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure understanding) is not self-contra- dictory, for we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this con- OI PH^INOMEXA AND yOTTMEyA. 18" iepticn is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of phenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition ; for things in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena, for the very purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its applica- tion to all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such noumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phaenomena, ail is for us a mere void ; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province does problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an intuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possi- ble intuition, by means of which objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in reference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically : The concep- tion of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere. The division of objects into phsenomena and noumena, and of the world into a mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is there- fore quite inadmissible in a positive sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division ; for the class of nou- mena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and cannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can it be made conceivable that the catego- ries (which are the only conceptions that could serve as concep- tions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all, inasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible intuition, is requisite for their application to an object. The conception of a noumenon, considered as merely problematical, is, however, not only admissible, but, as a limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in this case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our understanding ; on the contrary, the kind of under- standing to which it could belong is itself a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of the possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not discur- sively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuoiui intuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension. That is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits, sensibility, by giving the name of noumena to i88 TBANSCEUDENTAL DOCTEDTS. things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in them- selves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for it confesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence is compelled to cogitate them merely aa an unknown something. I find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an en- tirely different use of the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligi bills,* which quite departs from the meaning of the ancients an acceptation in which, indeed, there is to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal quibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of phenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, butin so far as the connection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus in- telligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere observation of the starry heaven, may represent the former ; a system of astronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting of words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by modifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure, understanding and reason are employed in the cognition of phaenomena ; but the question is, whether these can be ap- plied, when the object is not a phenomenon and in this sense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the under- standing alone, and not to the senses. The question therefore is, whether over and above the empirical use of the under- standing, a transcendental use is possible, which applies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the negative. When therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they appear, the understanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood in a transcendental, but only in an empirical signification, that is, as they must be represented in the complete connexion of phsenomena, and not according to what they may be, apart from their relation to possible expe- rience, consequently not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever remain unknown to us. Nay, it is also quite unknown to us, whether any such transcendental or extraordi- * We must not translate this expression by intellectual, as is com- monly done in German works ; for it is cognitions alone that are intel- ectual or sensuous. Objects of the one or the other mode of intuition ought o be called, however harshly it may sound, intelligible or sinsible. OF PH^^OMENA A!ffD NOUME^A. 189 nary cognition is possible under any circumstances, at leaat, whether it is possible by means of our categories. Under- standing and sensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate them, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without intuitions ; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any determinate object. If, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates to abandon the mere transcendental use of the cate- gories, let him attempt to construct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of course, be unnecessary for this pur- pose to construct an analytical proposition, for that does not extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned only about what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided whether the conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the unity of thought complete abstraction being made of the modi in which an object may be given : in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the under- standing to know what lies in the conception to what it ap- plies, is to it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and so-called transcendental principle, for example, Everything that exists, exists as substance, or, Every- thing that is contingent exists as an effect of some other thing, viz., of its cause. Now I ask, whence can the understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions contained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in themselves (noumena) 1 Where is to be found the third term, which is always requisite in a synthetical propo- sition, which may connect in the same proposition conceptions which have no logical (analytical) connection with each other ? The proposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility of any such pure assertion never can be shown, without making reference to the empirical use of the under- standing, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing pure and non-sensuous judgment. Thus the conception of pure and merely intelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its application, because we cannot imagine any mode in tfhich they might be given, and the problematical thought *hich leaves a place open for them serves enly, like a void space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without con- taming at the same time any other object of cognitior beyond tlieir sphere. 190 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. APPENDIX. OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OR AMPHIBOLY OF THE CON- CEPTIONS OF REFLECTION FROM THE CONFUSION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL WITH THE EMPIRICAL USE OF THE UNDER- STANDING, REFLECTION (reflexio) is not occupied about objects them- selves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in which we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we obtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to the different sources or faculties of cogni- tion, by which alone their relation to each other can be rightly determined. The first question which occurs in considering our representations is, to what faculty of cognition do they belong ? To the understanding or to the senses ? Many judgments are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclina- tion ; but, because reflection neither precedes nor follows, it is held to be a judgment that has its origin in the understand- ing. All judgments do not require examination, that is, investi- gation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are immediately certain (for example, Between two points there can be only one straight line), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be found than that which they themselves contain and express. But all judgment, nay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a distinction of the faculty of cog- nition to which the given conceptions belong. The act where- by I compare my representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them, and whereby I distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to the pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental re- flection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are those of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and external, finally, of the deter- minable and the determining (matter and form). The proper determination of these relations rests on the question, to what faculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensi- bility or understanding ? For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the manner in which we must cog'tate these relations. OF tHE EQUIVOCAL NATO BE OF THE CONCEPTIONS. 191 Before constructing any objective judgment, we compare the conceptions that are to be placed in the judgment, and observe whether there exists identity (of many representations in one conception), if a general judgment is to be constructed, or difference, if a particular ; whether there is agreement when affirmative, and opposition when negative judgments are to be constructed, ai;d so on. For this reason we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of comparison (conceptus com- parationis). But as, when the question is not as to the logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether the things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition, and so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition, to wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on this relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental reflection, that is, the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of cognition, can alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able to discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or opposi- tion, &c., from the mere conception of the things by means of comparison (comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they belong, in other words, by means of transcendental reflection. We may, therefore, with justice say, that logical reflection is mere comparison, for in it no ac- count is taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given conceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as re- gards their origin, to be treated as homogeneous ; while tran- scendental reflection (which applies to the objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective comparison of representations with each other, and is therefore very different from the former, because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are not even the same. Transcendenta* reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an a priori judgment upon things. We shall now proceed to fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light on the question as to the determination of the proper business of the understanding. 1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to UR several times, but always with the same internal determin ations (qualitas et quantitax), it, if an object of pure under- standing, is always the same, not sevc'ral things, but only one 192 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. tiling (numerica identitas) ; but if a phenomenon, we do not concern ourselves with comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of some other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same, the difference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the numerical difference of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two drops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference (quality and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time in different places, is suf- ficent to justify us in holding them to be numerically different. Leibnitz regarded phsenomena as things in themselves, conse- quently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure understand- ing, (although, on account of the confused nature of their representations, he gave them the name of phaenomena), and in this case his principle of the indiscernible (principium iden- tatis indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned. But, as phseno- menaare objects of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in re- spect of them, must be employed empirically and not purely or transcendentally, plurality and numerical difference are given by space itself as the condition of external phaenomena. For one part of space, although it may be perfectly similar and equal to another part, is still without it, and for this reason alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in order to make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold good of all things that are in the different parts of space at the same time, however similar and equal one may be to another. 2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure understanding (realitasnoumenon), opposition be- tween realities is incogitable such a relation, that is, that when these realities are connected in one subject, they anni- hilate the effects of each other, and may be represented in the formula 3 3=0. On the other hand, the real in a phaeno- menon (realitas phenomenon) may very well be in mutual oppo- sition, and, when united in the same subject, the one may completely or in part annihilate the effect or consequence oj the other ; as in the case of two moving forces in the same straight line drawing or impelling a point in opposite direc- tions, or in the case of a pleasure counterbalancing a certain unouut of pain. 3, The Internal and External. In an object of the pure OF THE EQUIVOCAL NATURE OF THE CONCEPTIONS. 193 understanding only that is internal which has no relation (as regards its existence) to anything different from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a substnntia phainowenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself nothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are cognisant of only through forces operative in it, either drawing others towards itself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion and impe- netrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception of substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand, as an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal determina- tions and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object can I think than those which my internal sense presents to me ? That, to wit, which is either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz, who looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external relation, and therefore also composition or combina- tion, declared that all substances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with powers of represen- tation, in one word, monads. 4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all other reflection, so inseparably are they con- nected with every mode of exercising the understanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its determination, both in a transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every difference in that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined. Logicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of this or that part of the universal, form. In a judgment one may call the given conceptions logical matter (for the judgment) the relation of these to each other (by means of the copula), the form of the judgment. In an object, the composite parts thereof (essentialid) are the matter ; the mode in which they are connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general, unlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation thereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing is distinguished from another according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that something be given (at least in die conception), in order to be able to determine it in a certain manner. Hence, in a con- o 194 TBA.NSCENDENTAL DOOTBINE. ception of the pure understanding, the matter precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first assumed the existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of representation in them, in order to found upon this their external relation and the community of their state (that is, of their representa- tions). Hence, with him, space and time were possible the former through the relation of substances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each other, as causes and effects. And so would it really be, if the pure un- derstanding were capable of an immediate application to ob- jects, and if space and time were determinations of things in themselves. But. being merely sensuous intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phsenomena, the form of intuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must ante- cede all matter (sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phsenomena and all data of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the intellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the things themselves, and determine their possibility ; an ob- jection perfectly correct, if we assume that we intuite things as they are, although with confused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective condition, which is a priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form of which is primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter (or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience (as we must conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of itself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space and time). ON THE AMPHIBOLY or THE CONCEPTIONS or REFLECTION. Let me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a conception either in the sensibility or in the pure under- standing, the transcendental place. In this manner, the ap- pointment of the position which must be taken by each concep- tion according to the difference in its use, and the directions for determining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be a transcendental topic, a doctrine which would tho- roughly shield us from the surreptitious devices of the pure un- derstanding and the delusions which thence arise, as it would always distinguish to what faculty cf cognition each concep- OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF BEFLECTIOW. 195 tioii properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many cognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the logical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail themselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would best suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable them- selves to quibble and talk with fluency and an appearance of profundity. Transcendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the above-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which differ from categories in this respect, that they do not represent the object according to that which constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set forth merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our conceptions of things. But this comparison requires a pre- vious reflection, that is, a determination of the place to which the representations of the things which are compared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding, or given by sensibility. Conceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what faculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as phaenomena to sensi- bility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in respect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is neces- sary. Without this reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and construct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot acknowledge, and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that is, upon a substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phaenomenon. For want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and con- sequently deceived by the amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz constructed an intellectual system of the world, or rather, believed himself competent to cognize the internal nature of things, by comparing all objects merely with the understanding and the abstract formal con- ceptions of thought. Our table of the conceptions of reflec- tion gives us the unexpected advantage of being able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its parts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this peo'iliar mode of thought, which rested upon nought but a 196 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE. misconception. He compared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and naturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding distin- guishes its pure conceptions one from another. The con- ditions of sensuous intuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did not look upon as pri- mitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode of representation, and not any particular source of representa- tions. A pheenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although distinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the logical form the former with its usual want of analysis containing, according to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its concep- tion of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate and distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectua- lised phsenomena, just as Locke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such expressions), sensuulised the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say, declared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract concep- tions of reflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two different sources of representations, which, however, can present us with objective judgments of things only in conjunction, each of these great men recognised but one of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied immediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of confusing or arranging the representations of the former. Accordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leib- nitz as things in general merely in the understanding. 1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or dif- ference as judged by the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of objects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be given, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these conceptions whether, that is, their object ought to be classed among phaenomena, or among things in themselves, it was to be expected that he should extend the application of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid solely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus phaenomenon), and that he should believe that he Had thereby contributed in no small degree .to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth, if I cognize in all its inner determinations a drop of water o& OF THE CONCEPTIONS OT REFLECTIOK. 19? ft 'thing in itself, I cannot look upon one drop as different Ticm another, if the conception of the one is completely iden- tical with that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in space, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but also in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical locale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of things, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and equal to another in a place, A, just as well as if the two things were in every respect different from each other. Difference of place without any other conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phsenomena, not only possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called law is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison of things by means of mere conceptions. 2nd. The principle, '* Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically contradict each other," is a proposition perfectly true respecting the relation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in themselves (of which we have not the slightest conception), is without any the least meaning. For real opposition, in which A B is = 0, exists everywhere, an opposition, that is, in which one reality united with another in the same subject annihilates the effects of the other a fact which is constantly brought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and operations in nature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called rea- litates ph&nomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical condition of this opposition in an a priori rule, as it directs its attention to the opposition in the direction of forces a condition of which the transcendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz did not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new principle, he yet employed it for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers introduced it into their Leib- nitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to this prin- ciple, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited nature of created beings, that is, negations, because these are the only opposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing in general this is really the case, but not in things as phenomena). In like manner, the upholders of this system deem it not only possible, but natural also, to connect and 198 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE. unite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge DO other sort of opposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a thing is annihilated), and find them- selves unable to conceive an opposition of reciprocal destruc- tion, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the effect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only in sensibility. 3rd. The Leibnitzian Monadology has really no better foun- dation than on this philosopher's mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal and external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general, must have some- thing inward, which is therefore free from external relations, consequently from that of composition also. The simple that which can be represented by a unit is therefore the foundation of that which is internal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot therefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are all external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby we internally determine our faculty of sense itself,' that is to say, the state of representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form the elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in repre- sentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to themselves. For the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not represent it but as a predetermined har- mony, and by no means as a physical influence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that is, with its own representations, the state of the representations of one sub- stance could not stand in active and living connection with that of another, but some third cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the different states corre- spond with one another. And this did not happen by means of assistance applied in each particular case (systema assis- tentice), but through the unity of the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all substances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian school, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal correspondence, according to universal laws. 4th. This philosopher's celebrated doctrine of space and time t in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, ori- OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 109 ginated in the same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere understanding, the external relations of things, I can do so only by employing the con- ception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state of the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the order of cause and effect. And thus Leib- nitz regarded space as a certain order in the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their states. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent of things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them, whereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a self-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and time were the intelligible form of the connection of things (sub- stances and their states) in themselves. But things were in- telligible substances (substantitE noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of phenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of intuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the under- standing, and left to sense nought but the despicable task of confusing and disarranging the representations of the former. But even if we could frame any synthetical proposition con- cerning things in themselves by means of the pure under- standing (which is impossible), it could not apply to phaeno- mena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a case I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions only under the conditions of sensi- bility, and so space and time would not be determinations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in themselves, I know not, and need not know, because a thing is never presented to me otherwise than as a phsenomenon. I must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of reflection. Matter is substantia phenomenon. That in it which is internal I seek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the functions and opera- tions it performs, and which are indeed never anything but phaenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find any thing that is absolutely, but only what is comparatively in- ternal, and which itself consists of external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be according to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an 200 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE. object for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the foundation of the phseuomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid, the nature of which we could not understand, even though some one were found able to tell us. For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in intuition corresponding to the expressions em- ployed. If by the complaint of being unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do not comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may be in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable com- plaint ; for those who talk thus, really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite things without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of cog- nition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but even as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be men, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much less their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By observation and analysis of phsenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature, and no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those transcendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never answer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the power of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our internal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our faculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental ground of this unity of subjective and objec- tive, lie too deeply concealed for us, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as phenomena, to be able to discover in our existence any thing but phseno- mena, the non-sensuous cause of which we at the same time earnestly desire to penetrate to. The great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the processes of mere reflection, consists in its clear demon- stration of the nullity of all conclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the understanding alone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly insisted on, namely, that,although phaenomena are not included as things in themselves among the objects of the pure under- standing, they are nevertheless the only things by which cm THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 201 cognition can possess objective reality, that is to say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions. When we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than compare conceptions in our understanding, to dis- cover whether both have the same content, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether anything is contained in either conception, which of the two is given, and which is merely a mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these con- ceptions to an object in general (in the transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is an object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations present themselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions, and render all empirical use of them impossible. And thus these limit- ations prove, that the representation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient, but, without sensuous de- termination and independently of empirical conditions, self- contradictory ; that we must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as in logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of sensuous intuition ; that, consequently, the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar intuition, which we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us nothing ; while, on the other hand, phenomena cannot be ob- jects in themselves. For, when I merely think things in general, the difference in their external relations cannot con- stitute a difference in the things themselves ; on the contrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of one of two things is not internally different from that of the other, I am merely thinking the same thing in different relations. Further, by the addition of one affirmation (reality) to the other, the positive therein is really augmented, and nothing is abstracted or withdrawn from it ; hence the real in things cannot be in contradiction with or opposition to itself and so on. The true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employ- ment of the understanding, has, as we have shown, been so mis- conceived by Leibnitz, one of the most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times, that he has been misled into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition, which professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the senses. For this reason, the exposition of the cause of the 202 DOCTEIXE OF ELEMENTS. amphiboly of these conceptions, as the origin of these falsi principles, is of great utility in determining with certainty the proper limits of the understanding. It is right to say, whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception can be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni et nullo) ; but it would be absurd so to alter this logical proposition, as to say, whatever is not contained in a general conception, is likewise not contained in the par- ticular conceptions which rank under it ; for the latter are particular conceptions, for the very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in the general concep- tion. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is based upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to the ground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the employment of the understanding which have thence originated. Leibnitz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles or indistinguishables is really based on the presupposition, that, if in the conception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is also not to be met with in things themselves ; that, consequently, all things are completely identical (numero eadem) which are not distinguishable from each other (as to quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in the mere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary conditions of intuition, that of which abstrac- tion has been made is rashly held to be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is contained in its conception. The conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it, is in itself completely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct from each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are numero diversd) ; and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein the object of this conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception, but to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception of a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an affirmative ; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce any negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example, motion) is given, we find conditions (opposite directions) of which abstraction has been made in the con- THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 203 ception of motion in general which render possible a contra- diction or opposition (not indeed of a logical kind) and which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore not justified in saying, that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony, because no contradiction is discoverable among its conceptions.* According to mere conceptions, that which is internal is the substratum of all relations or external deter- minations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of in- tuition, and confine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make abstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a conception of that which in- dicates no relation, but merely internal determinations. Now it seems to follow, that in everything (substance) there is something which is absolutely internal, and which antecedes all external determinations, inasmuch as it renders them pos- sible ; and that therefore this substratum is something which does not contain any external relations, and is consequently simple (for corporeal things are never any thing but relations, at least of their parts external to each other) ; and inasmuch as we know of no other absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense, this substratum is not only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense, deter- mined through representations, that is to say, all things are properly monads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this would be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the only necessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It is, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phsenomenon in space (impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing that is absolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of all external perception. By mere concep- tions I cannot think any thing external, without, at the same * If any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and to say, that at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition to each other, it will be requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous reality, that it may be understood whether the notion re- presents something or nothing. But an example cannot be found except in experience, which never presents to us anything more than phcenomena , and thus the proposition means nothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives, does not contain anything negative k proposition nobody ever doubted. 204 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. time, thinking something internal, for the reason that con- ceptions of relations presuppose given things, and without these are impossible. But, as in intuition there is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains, consists of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in the mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the substratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I cannot say : because a thing cannot be represented by mere conceptions without something absolutely internal, there is also, in the things themselves which are contained under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to which something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when we have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly remains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general, through which alone the external is possible. But this necessity, which is grounded upon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the case of things themselves, in so far as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere relations, without having any thing internal as their foundation ; for they are not things in themselves, but only pheenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively internal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which a determined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made of these relations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the conception of a thing as phsenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does away with the possibility of an object that is determinable according to mere conceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a thing consists solely of relations ; but this thing is simply a phaenomenon, and cannot be cogitated by means of the mere categories : it does itself consist in the mere relation of some thing in general to the senses. In the same way, we cannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we commence with conceptions alone, in any other manner than that one is the cause of determinations in the other ; for that is itself the conception of the understanding or category of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction of all intuition, we lose altogether the mode in which the manifold determines to each of its parts its place, that is, the form of THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION. 205 tensibility (space) ; and yet this mode antecedes all empircal causality. If by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means of the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our conceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, whereby objects are given ; and, if we make abstraction of the latter, the former can have no relation to an object. And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is HO more than saying that our mode of intuition is not ap- plicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories a mode of in- tuition and a kind of conception neither of which is appli cable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incom- petent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification. For it must be con- fessed of the categories, that they are not of themselves suffi- cient for the cognition of things in themselves, and without the data of sensibility are mere subjective forms of the unity of the understanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed purely and with- out the intervention of sensibility, for it would then be with- out reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thougit ; for the representation thereof is 206 DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS. but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception insepar- ably connected with the limitation of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the answer to the question Are there objects quite unconnected with, and independent of, our intuition 1 a question to which only an indeterminate answer can be given. That answer is : Inasmuch as sensuous intuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there remains room for other and different objects. The existence of these problematical objects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate conception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither must they be ad- mitted as objects for our understanding. Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it for- bids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of phsenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental object, which is the cause of a phsenomenon (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object) an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our under- standing, the representation is for us quite void, and is avail- able only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intui- iton, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experi- ence, nor of the pure understanding. The Critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to create for ourselves a new field of objects be- yond those which are presented to us as phgenomena, and tc stray into intelligible worlds ; nay, it does not even allow us to THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF EEFLECTION. 20/ endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The spe- cious error which leads to this and which is a perfectly excusable one lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary to its proper purpose and destination, is made tran- scendental, and objects, that is, possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to conceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the intui- tions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason of this again is, that apperception, and with it, thought, antecedes all possible determinate arrrangement of representa- tions. Accordingly we think something in general, and de- termine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other, distinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this particular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of determining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical form without content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of the ob- ject in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is limited to our senses. Before ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which, although in itself of no particular import- ance, seems to be necessary to the completeness of the system. The highest conception, with which a transcendental philosophy commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. But as all division pre-supposes a divided conception, a still higher one must exist, and this is the conception of an object in general problematically understood, and without its being decided, whether it is something or nothing. As the categories are the only conceptions, which apply to objects in general, the distinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed according to the order and direction of the categories. 1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many, and one, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception of none is opposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be found to correspond, is=nothing. That is, it is a conception without an object (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the sphere of reality, though they must not there- fore be held to be impossible, or like certa'n new funda- 208 DOCTEINE OF ELEMENTS. mental forces in matter, the existence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from experience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible. 2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the absence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativwri). 3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but the merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and pure time. These are cer- tainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited (ens imaginarium). 4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because the conception is nothing is impossible, as a figure composed of two straight lines (nihil negativum). The table of this division of the conception of nothing (the corresponding division of the conception of something does not require special description,) must therefore be arranged as follows : NOTHING. As 1. Empty conception without object, ens rationis. 2. 3. Empty object of a conception, Empty intuition without object, nihil privativum. ens imaginarium. 4. Empty object without conception, nihil negativum. We see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure nothing by the consideration, that the for- mer must not be reckoned among possibilities, because it is a mere fiction though not self -contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility, inasmuch as the concep- tion annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty conceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are empty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot represent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not perceived, we cannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition can, with out something real, be an object. 209 TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. SECOND DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance. We termed Dialectic in general a logic of appearance.* Tills does not signify a doctrine of probability;^ for probability is truth, only cognised upon insufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it is not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from the analytical part of logic. Still less must phenomenon ^ and appearance be held to be identical. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgment upon the object, in so far as it is thought. It is there- fore quite correct to say that the senses do not err, not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all. Hence truth and error, consequently also, illu- sory appearance as the cause of error, are only to be found in a judgment, that is, in the relation of an object to our under- standing. In a cognition, which completely harmonises with the laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the senses as not containing any judgment there is also no error. But no power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the understanding per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses per se, would fall into error ; the former could not, because, if it acts only according to its own laws, the effect (the judg- ment) must necessarily accord with these laws. But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgment neither a true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of cognition besides these two, it follows, that error is caused solely by the unobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it happens that the subjective grounds of a judgment blend and are confounded with the objective, and cause them * Schem. f WahrscbeinlichKeit. J Erscheinung. If 210 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. to deviate from their proper determination,* just as a body in motion would always of itself proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a different direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion. To distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which mingles with it, it is necessary to consider an erroneous judg- ment as the diagonal between two forces, that determine the judgment in two different directions, which, as it were, form an angle, aud to resolve this composite operation into the simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility. In pure a priori judgments this must be done by means of transcen- dental reflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its place appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and consequently the influence of the one faculty upon the other is made apparent. It is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory appearance (for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of otherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgment is misled by the influence of imagination. Our purpose is to speak of trans- cendental illusory appearance, which influences principles that are not even applied to experience, for in this case we should possess a sure test of their correctness but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings of criticism, com- pletely beyond the empirical employment of the categories, and deludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure understanding. We shall term those principles, the application of which is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on the other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent principles. But by these latter I do not understand principles of the transcendental use or misuse of the categories, which is in reality a mere fault of the judgment when not under due restraint from criticism, and therefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which the pure under- standing is allowed to exercise its functions ; but real principles which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay * Sensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which the understanding employs its functions, is the source of real cognitions. But, in so far as it exercises an influence upon the action of the under- standing, and determines it to judgment, sensibility is itself the cause of error. INTRODUCTION. 211 claim to a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognises no line of demarcation. Thus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of the pure under- standing, which we have already propounded, ought to be of empirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not applicable to any object beyond the sphere of experience. A principle which removes these limits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them, is called transcendent. If our criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended principles, those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of experience, may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of the pure understanding. Logical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason (the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a want of due attention to logical rules. So soon as the attention is awakened to the case before us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the contrary, does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its nothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism. Take, for example, the illusion in the proposition, " The world must have a beginning in time." The cause of this is as follows. In our reason, subjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist fundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the appearance of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens, that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concep- tions, is regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we see the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which is a still stronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the moon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not deceived by this illusion. Transcendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the illusory appearance in transcendental judgments, and guarding us against it ; but to make it, as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and cease to be illu- sion, is utterly beyond its power. For w r e have here to do with a natural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes thece upon us as objective, p 2 212 TEANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. while logical dialectic, in the detection of sophisms, has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the pro- oositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the natural error. There is therefore a natural and unavoid- able dialectic of pure reason not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite knowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose of misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and which, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive, and continually to lead reason into momen- tary errors, which it becomes necessary continually to remove. II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of the Transcendental Illusory Appearance. A. OF KEASON IN GENERAL. All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind for elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity of thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in some difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of cognition ; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined by logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immedi- ate conclusions (consequently immediate) ; but the nature of the latter, which itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood from this definition. Now as a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary to seek for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions. In this we may expect, according to the analogy of the con- ceptions of the understanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the conceptions of reason. INTRODUCTION. OF KEASON IN GENEBAL. 213 In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to be the faculty of rules ; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the faculty of principles. The term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that may be employed as a principle ; although it is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even if derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the major in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms (for example, there can be only one straight line between two points,) are general d, priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from principles I cognize it only in pure intuition. Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in whichj I cognize the particular in the general by means of concep-j tions. Thus every syllogism is a form of the deduction of aj cognition from a principle. For the major always gives a* conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general cognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with such general ct priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in re- spect of their possible use. But if we consider these principles of the pure understand- ing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to be any thing rather than cognitions from conceptions. For they would not even be possible a priori, if we could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the conditions of a possible experience. That every thing that happens has a cause, cannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens ; on the contrary the prin- ciple of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a determinate empirical conception. Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be called prin- ciples. At the same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative principles. It has been a long-cherished wish that, (who knows how 214 TttANSCENDEXTAL DIALECTIC. late,) ncay one day be happily accomplished that the princi- ples of the endless variety of civil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone can we find the secret of sim- plifying legislation. But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in perfect harmony "with itself ; they consequently have for their object that which is completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves how the nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to answer. Be this however as it may for on this point our investigation is yet to be made it is at least manifest from what we have said, that cognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself in so far as it is synthetical is neither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone. The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phaenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sensuous object ; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a unity a priori by means of conceptions a unity which may be called rational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity produced by the understanding. The above is the* general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of examples. These will be given in the sequel. B. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF EEASON. A distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and that which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure which is bounded by three straight lines, there are three angles, is an immediate cognition ; but that these angles are together equal to two right angles, is an inference INTRODUCTION. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF BEASON. 215 or conclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought, and have thus become quite accustomed to it, we 110 longer remark the above distinction, and, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as immediately perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or syllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from it, and finally the conclusion, which con- nects the truth in the first with the truth in the second and that infallibly. If the judgment concluded is so contained in the first proposition, that it can be deduced from it without the mediation of a third notion, the conclusion is called imme- diate (consequentia immediata) :* I prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. But if, in addition to the fundamental cognition, a second judgment is necessary for the production of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason. In the proposition, All m?n are mortal, are contained the propo- sitions, Some men are mortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate conclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition, All the learned are mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the con- ception of a learned man does not occur in it), and it can be deduced from the main proposition only by means of a me- diating judgment. In every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the understanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of the rule (and this is the minor) by means o the judgment. And finally I determine my cog- nition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is the conclusio), consequently, I determine it a priori by means of the reason. The relations, therefore, which 'the major propo- sition, as the rule, represents between a cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of syllogisms. These are just threefoldanalogously with .ill judgments, in so far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a cog- nition in the understanding -namely, categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. * A conseguentia immediata if there really be such a thing, and if ft be not a contradiction in terms evidently does not belong to the sphere of logic proper, the object-matter of which is the syllogism, which always consists of three propositions, either in thought or expressed. This indeed is tantamount to declaring that there is uo such mode of reasoning. TV. 216 TSANSOENDENTAL DIALECTIC. When, as often happens, the conclusion is a judgment which may follow from other given judgments, through which a per- fectly different object is cogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion in this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a general rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the conclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion follows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. From this we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the cognitions of the understanding to the smallest, possible number erf principles {general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity. C. OP THE PURE USE OF KEASON. Can we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source of conceptions and judgments which spring from it alone, and through which it can be applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is to give a certain form to given cognitions a form which is called logical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subor- dinated to each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be done by comparison ? This is the question which we have at present to answer. Manifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of rea- son, for the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with itself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to conceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the possi- bility of cognizing, or of determining them as such, but is merely a subjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding. The purpose of this law is, by a comparison of the conceptions of the understanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although, at the same time, it does not justify us in demanding from objects them- selves such an uniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the sphere of the understanding, or in expecting that it will itself thus receive from them objective validity. In one word, the question is, does reason in itselC INTRODUCTION. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON. 217 that is, does pure reason contain a priori synthetical principles and rules, and what are those principles ? The formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient information in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of reason in its pure syn- thetical cognition will rest. 1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not appli- cable to intuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules for this is the province of the understanding with its categories- but to conceptions and judgments. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them, it does so not immediately, but mediately through the understanding and its judgments, which have a direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for the purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason is therefore not the unity of a possible experience, but is essenti- ally different from this unity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which happens has a cause, is not a principlft cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle makes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which, without a reference to possible experience, could never have produced by means of mere conceptions any such synthe- tical unity. 2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general condition of its judgment (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment by means of the subsumption of its condition under a general rule (the major). Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of reason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of a prosyllogism) as long as the process can be con- tinued, it is very manifest that the peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the conditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity of the former is completed. But this logical maxim cannot be a principle of purereason y unless we admit that, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions subordinated to one another a series which is consequently itself unconditioned is also given, that is, contained in the object and its connection. But this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical ; for analytically, the conditioned certainly relates to some con- dition, but not to the unconditioned. From this principle 218 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. also there must originate different synthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding is perfectly ignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience, the cognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The uncondi- tioned, if it does really exist, must be especially considered in regard to the determinations which distinguish it from what- ever is conditioned, and will thus afford us material for many d priori synthetical propositions. The principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will, however, be transcendent in relation to phsenomena, that is to say, it will be impossible to make any adequate empi- rical use of this principle. It is therefore completely different from all principles of the understanding, the use made of which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being merely the possibility of experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is as follows. To discover whether the principle, that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of phaenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the uncon- ditioned, is objectively true, or not ; what consequences re- sult therefrom affecting the empirical use of the understand- ing, or rather whether there exists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not, on the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend perpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series of them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of reason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason has not been regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in objects themselves. We must show, more- over, the misconceptions and illusions that intrude into syllo- gisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has sup- plied a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of &petitio than of&postulatum and that proceed from experi- ence upwards to its conditions. The solution of these pro- blems is our task in transcendental dialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in human reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which will treat of the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the necond of transcendent and dialectical syllogisms. 21!) TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC, BOOK I. OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF PTJRE EEA8ON. THE conceptions of pure reason we do not here speak of the possibility of them are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. The conceptions of understanding are also cogitated a priori antecedently to experience, and render it possible ; but they contain nothing but the unity of reflection upon pheenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the determination of an object possible. It is from them, accordingly, that we receive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we possess no a priori conceptions of objects from which they might be deduced. On the other hand, the sole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on them, as containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting their application and influence to the sphere of experience. But the term, conception of reason or rational conception, itself indicates that it does not confine itself within the limits of experience, because its object- matter is a cognition, of which every empirical cognition is but a part nay, the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of it, a cogni- tion to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although it does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions is the comprehension, as that of the conceptions of understand- ing is the understanding of perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which all experience is sub- ordinate, but which is never itself an object of experience, that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from ex- perience, and by the standard of which it estimates the degree of their empirical use, but which is never itself an element in an empirical synthesis. If, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess objective validity, they may be called conceptus ratio- cinati (conceptions legitimately concluded) ; in cases where they do not, they have been admitted on account of hay- ing the appearance of being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes (sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be sufficiently demonstrated in that part 220 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of reason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. As we called the pure conceptions of the understanding cate- gories, we shall also distinguish those of pure reason by a new name, and call them transcendental ideas. These terms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I. SECT. I. Of Ideas in General. SPITE of the great wealth of words which European lan- guages possess, the thinker finds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his conception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either to others or to nimself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful ; and, before recourse is taken to so desperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned languages, with the hope and the pro- bability that we may there meet with some adequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if the original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from carelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always better to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning even although it may be doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense than to make our labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves intelligible. For this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonyme for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very differ- ent import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it. Plato employed the expression Idea in a way that plainly OF IDEAS Ilf GENE11AL. 22! Jiowed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, (with which Aristotle occupied himself,) in- asmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experi- ences, like the categories. In his view they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recal by reminiscence which is called philosophy the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression. I shall content myself with remarking that it is nothing unusual, in common conversation as well as in written works, by comparing the thoughts which an author has de- livered upon a subject, to understand him better than he un- derstood himself, inasmuch as he may not have sufficiently determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay even thought, in opposition to his own opinions. Plato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a much higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phsenomena according to synthetical unity, for the purpose of being able to read them as experience, and that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to admit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to them cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of the brain. This philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is practical,* that is, which rests upon freedom, which in its turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of reason. He who would derive from experience the con- * He certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative cognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely a priori, nay, even to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere than in possible experience. I cannot follow him in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them ; although, in truth, the elevated and exag- gerated language which he employed in describing them is quite capable of an interpretation more subdued and more in accordance with fact and the nature of things. 222 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ceptious of virtue, who would make (as many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an imperfectly illustrative example, a model for the formation of a perfectly adequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity changeable according to time and circum- stance, and utterly incapable of being employed as a rule. On the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one is held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called model with the true original which he possesses in his own mind, and values him according to this standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which all possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as examples proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which, the conception of virtue demands but certainly not as arche- types. That the actions of man will never be in perfect ac- cordance with all the requirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to be chimerical. For only through this idea are all judgments as to moral merit or demerit pos- sible ; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to moral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human nature indeterminable as to degree may keep us. The Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an ex- ample and a striking one of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the idle thinker ; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a prince can never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But we should do better to follow up this thought, and, where this admirable thinker leaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light, rather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and pernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible human freedom according to laws, by which the liberty of every individual can consist with the liberty of every other t (not of the greatest possible happiness, for this follows neces- sarily from the former ;) is, to say the least, a necessary idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first plan of the constitution of a state, but of all its laws. And in this, it is not necessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our way obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character of human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in legislation. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 223 For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a philosopher, ;nan the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse experience, which indeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at the proper time and in accordance with ideas ; while instead of this, conceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from ex- perience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and in- tentions. The more legislation and government are in harmony with this idea, the more rare do punishments become, and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did, that in a perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although a perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just, which holds up this Maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in order to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest possible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its progress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between the idea and its realiza- tion, are problems which no one can or ought to determine, and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to overstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea. But not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where ideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in the region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear proofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, an animal, the regular order of nature probably also the disposition of the whole universe give manifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to ideas ; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its existence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its kind just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless he bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions ; that, notwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individu- ally, unchangeably and completely determined, and are the original causes of things ; and that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully adequate to that idea. Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the writings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from the ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic connection thereof according to ends, that ie, 224 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ideas, is an effort which deserves imitation and claims respect But as regards the principles of ethics, of legislation and o! religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience pos- sible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has vindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated only because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as principles is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us with rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws experience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree reprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do, from what is done. We must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the development of which is in reality the reculiar duty and dignity of philosophy, and confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful task of pre- paring a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of mora. science. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many subterranean passages which reason in its con- fident but vain search for treasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves perfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its principles and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its influence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a close, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart and their number is but small, if they shall find themselves convinced by the considerations follow- ing as well as by those above, to exert themselves to preserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care that it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of representations are loosely designated, that the interests of science may not thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which are proper to others. The following is a gradu- ated list of them. The genus is representation in general (represent atto). Under it stands representation with consci- ousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as a modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception (intuitus vel conceptus) OF IDEAS IN GENERAL. 225 The former has an immediate relation to the object and i& singular and individual ; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means of a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is either empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understand- ing alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image,* is called notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the possibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who has accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to hear the representation of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to be called a notion or conception of understanding. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I. SECT. II. Of Transcendental Ideas. TRANSCENDENTAL analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure con- ceptions a priori, conceptions which represent objects ante- cedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments converted into a conception of the synthesis of intuitions produced the categories, which direct the employment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure con- ceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of ex- perience according to principles. The function of reason in arguments consists in the uni- versality of a cognition according to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgment which is determined & priori in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition. "Caius is mortal," is one which may be obtained from experience by the aid of the understanding alone ; but my wish is to find a conception, which contains the condition under which tli * All mathematical figures, for example. 2V. 226 TEANSCEirDESTAL DIALECTIC predicate of this judgment is given in this case, the con- ception of man and after subsuming under this condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine according to it the cognition of the object thought, and say, "Caius is mortal." Hence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a pre- dicate to a certain object, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a certain condition. This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a condition is called universality (universalitas) . To this corresponds totality (universitas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental conception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the totality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned alone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of con- ditions is itself always unconditioned ; a pure rational conception in general can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the unconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned. To the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means of the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond. We must therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject ; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the mem- bers of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system. There are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of which proceeds through prosyllogisms to the uncon- ditioned one to the subject which cannot be employed as a predicate, another to the presupposition which supposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the mem- bers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the pure rational conceptions of totality in the synthesis of con- ditions have a necessary foundation in the nature of human reason at least as modes of elevating the unity of the under- standing to the unconditioned. They may have no valid application, corresponding to their transcendental employment, m concreto, and be thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how, while extending them as widely as possible, to maintain its exercise and application in perfect consistence and harmony. OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 227 But, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the common title of all conceptions of reason, we again light upon an expression, which we find it impossible to dispense with, and which nevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot employ with safety. The word absolute is one of the few words which, m its original signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was intended to convey a conception which no other word in the same language exactly suits, and the loss or, which is the same thing, the incautious and loose employment of which must be followed by the loss of the conception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the attention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all transcendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present frequently used to denote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and intrinsi- cally. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is possible in itself (interne) which is, in fact, the least that one can predicate of an object. On the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate that a thing is valid in ail respects for example, absolute sovereignty. Absolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all relations and in every respect ; and this is the most that can be predicated of the possibility of a thing. Now these significations do in truth frequently coincide. Thus, for example, that which is intrinsically impossible, is also impossible in all relations, that is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases they differ from each other toto ccelo, and I can by no means conclude tnat, because a thing is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations, and therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show, that absolute necessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that therefore it must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an opposite which is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that it is in all respects impossible, and that con- sequently the thing itself, of which this is the opposite, is absolutely necessary ; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the opposite of that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsi- cally impossible, that is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal' necessity. For this internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the least con- Q 2 228 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of a thing in all relations possesses /ery peculiar determinations. Now as the loss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter of indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and careful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will likewise be not indifferent to him. In this enlarged signification then shall I employ the word absolute, in opposition to that which is valid only in some par- ticular respect ; for the latter is restricted by conditions, the ^former is valid without any restriction whatever. Now the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else than absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and does not rest satisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all respects and relations, uncon- > ditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding every tEing that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to their synthesis in imagination. The former restricts itself to the absolute totality in the employment of the con- ceptions of the understanding, and aims at carrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to the unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity* of pheenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity of the understanding.* Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use of the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of possible experience (for the conception of the ab- solute totality of conditions is not a conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience is uncon- ditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain 'unity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the lim of which is to collect into an absolute whole all acts of the understanding. - Hence the objective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent, while that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to their nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible experience. I understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no corresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the pure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental ideas. They Vernunfteinheit, Verstandeseiuheit. OF TBANSCEKDENTAL IDEAS. 229 are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all cognition as determined by means of an absolute totality .of ) .conditional They are not mere fictions, but natural ana necessary products of reason, and have hence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the understand- ing. And finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of all experience, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that would be perfectly adequate to a tran- scendental idea. When we use the word idea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a great deal, but as regards its subject (that is, in respect of its reality under conditions of experience), exceedingly little, be- cause the idea, as the conception of a maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in concreto. Now, as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter is properly the sole aim, and as in this case the approxi- mation to a conception, which is never attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception were non-existent, it is commonly said of a conception of this kind, it is only an idea. So we might very well say, the absolute totality of all phsenomena is only an idea, for as we never can pre- sent an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a problem incapable of solution. On the other hand, as in the practical use of the understanding we have only to do with action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure reason can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, it is the indispensable condition of all practical employ- ment of reason. The practice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective, but nevertheless within indeter- minable boundaries, consequently always under the influence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical idea is always in the highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions indispensably necessary. In the idea, pure reason possesses even causality and the power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say of wisdom, in a disparaging way, it is only an idea. For, for the very reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, it must be for all practical exertions and en- deavours the primitive condition and rule a rule which, if not constitutive, is at least limitative. Now, although we must say of the transcendental coucep- 230 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ticms of reason, they are only ideas, we must not, on this account, look upon them as superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them, they can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the understanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent exercise a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an object than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which guides it more securely in ite cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps render possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to the practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so to speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The explication of all this must be looked for in the sequel. But setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the consideration of the practical ideas, we proceed to con- template reason in its speculative use alone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental use ; and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction of the categories. That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the cognition of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source of conceptions which enable us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically a priori, in relation to one or other of the func- tions of reason , Reason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is the faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate judgment by means of the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment. The given judgment is the general rule (major). The sub- sumption of the condition of another possible judgment under the condition of the rule is the minor. The actual judgment, which enounces the assertion of the rule in the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule predicates wmething generally under a certain condition. The con- dition of the rule is satisfied in some particular case. It follows, that what was valid in general under that condi- tion must also be considered as valid in the particular case which satisfies this condition. It is very plain that reason attains to a cognition, by means of acts of the un- derstanding which constitute a series of conditions. When 1 arrive at the proposition, "All bodies are changeable," by OF TKANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 2S1 beginning with the more remote cognition, (in which the conception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless contains the condition of that conception), " All [that is] com- pound is changeable," by proceeding from this to a less remote cognition, which stands under the condition of the former, " Bodies are compound," and hence to a third, which at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) with the one before me, " Consequently, bodies are change- able," I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a series of conditions (premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or hypothetical judgment) is given, can be continued ; consequently the same procedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is a series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the side of the conditions (per prosy llogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to an indefinite extent. But we very soon perceive that the chain or series of pro- syllogisms, that is, of deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of a given cognition, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms must have a very different relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series, that is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by means of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) is given only as con- ditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the pre-supposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (totality in the series of premisses), because only under this supposition is the judgment we may be considering possible & priori ; while on the side of the conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming, and not a pre-supposed or given series, consequently only a potential progression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition is contemplated as conditioned, reason is compelled to con- sider the series of conditions in an ascending line as completed and given in their totality. But if the very same cognition ia considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions, which together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a descending line, reason may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how far this progression may extend a parte posteriori, and whether the totality of this series is possible, because it stands in no need of such a series for the purpose of arriving at tl^e conclusion before it, inasmuch as this conclusion is 232 TKANSCENDESTAL DIALECTIC. sufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a part* priori, it may be the case, that upon the side of the con- ditions the series of premisses has & first or highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori unlimited ; but it must nevertheless contain totality of conditions, even admitting that we never could succeed in completely appre- hending it ; and the whole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is considered *s an inference resulting from it, is to be held as true. This is a requirement of reason, which announces its cognition as determined a priori and as necessary, either in itself and in this case it needs no grounds to rest upon or, if it is deduced, as a member of a series of grounds, which is itself unconditionally true. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK I. SECT. III. System of Transcendental Ideas. WE are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic whicli makes complete abstraction of the content of cognition, and aims only at unveiling the illusory appearance in the form of syllogisms. Our subject is transcendental dialectic, which must contain, completely d priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn from pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced con- ceptions, the object of which cannot be given empirically, and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of the faculty of under- standing. We have observed, from the natural relation which the transcendental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as well as in judgments, must have to the logical, that there are three kinds of dialectical arguments, corresponding to the three modes of conclusion, by which reason attains to cognitions on principles ; and that in all it is the business of reason, to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding never proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach. Now the most general relations which can exist in our representations are, 1st, the relation to the subject ; 2nd, the relation to objects, either as phaenomena, or as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with the main division, all the relations of our representations, of which we can form either a conception or an idea, are threefold* SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 233 I. The relation to the subject ; 2. The relation to the mani- fold of the object as a phenomenon ; 3. The relation to all things in general. Now all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of representations ; conceptions of pure reason, (transcendental ideas) on the other hand, with the uncondi- tional synthetical unity of all conditions. It follows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the 'first of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject, the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a phaenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of thought in general. The thinking subject is the object- matter of Psychology; the sum total of all phaenomena (the world) is the object-matter of Cosmology ; and the thing which contains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the being of all beings) is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason presents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul ( psy- chologia rationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis), and finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendent alis). Understanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even when connected with the highest logical use of reason, that is, all cogitable syllogisms for the purpose of proceeding from one object (phsenomenon) to all others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on the contrary, pure and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason. What modi of the pure conceptions of reason these trans- cendental ideas are, will be fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thread of the categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, out to the conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In like manner, it will be made manifest in the detailed explana- tion of these ideas, how reason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it employs in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of the absolute unity of the thinking subject, how the logical procedure in hypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of the ab- solutely unconditioned in a series of given conditions, and finally, how the mere form of the disjunctive syllogism in- volves the highest conception of a being of all beings : a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree paradoxical. 234 TBANSCEJTDENTAL DIALECTIC. An objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the case of the categories, is impossible as regards these trans- cendental ideas. For they have, in truth, no relation to any object, in experience, for the very reason that they are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our reason is possible, and has been given in the present chapter. It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is, the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the condi- tions, and that it does not concern itself with the absolute com- pleteness on the part of the conditioned. For of the former alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole series of conditions, and thus present them to the understand- ing a priori. But if we once have a completely (and uncon- ditionally) given condition, there is no further necessity, in pro- ceeding with the series, for a conception of reason ; for the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition to the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for ascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that is, principles. As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we find that there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the laws of the understanding, but that a transcendental use thereof is impossible ; and, that when we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis, for example, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this idea is a mere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not a neces- sary presupposition of reasen. For the possibility of the con- ditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this conception is not a trans- cendental idea and it is with these alone that we are at present occupied. Finally, it is obvious, that there exists among the trans- cendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to the cognition of the world, and through these to the supreme being, the progres- sion is so natural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the premisses to the conclusion.* Now whether *The science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries ooly three grand ideas : Goo, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and it aiics SYSTEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 235 there lies unobserved at the foundation of these ideas an analogy of tlie same kind as exists between the logical ana transcen- dental procedure of reason, is another of those questions, the answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage in our inquiries. In this cursory and prelimi- nary view, we have, meanwhile, reached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the transcen- dental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with other conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly distinguished from the conceptions of the under- standing ; we have exposed their origin, and thereby at the same time their determinate number, and presented them in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a definite sphere for pure reason. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II. OF THE DIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON. IT may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of which we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of reason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object that is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object must be capable of being presented and in- tuited in a possible experience. But we should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that, we can have no knowledge of an object, which at showing, that the second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a necessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are merely means, for the attainment and realiza- tion of these ideas. It does not require these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the contrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete insight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethics, and, through the conjunction of both, Religion, solely dependent on the speculative faculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the above-mentioned arrange- ment the synthetical one would be the most suitable ; but in the in- vestigation which must necessarily precede it, the analytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our purpose, as in it w* should proceed from that which experience immediately presents to psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology. 236 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. perfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical conception thereof. Now the. transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of reason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary procedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no empirical pre- misses, and by means of which we conclude from some- thing that we do know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which we, nevertheless, by an un- avoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such arguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than syllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well entitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental products of reason, but are neces- sitated by its very nature. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him. Of these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corre- sponding to the number of the ideas, which their conclusions present. In the argument or syllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of the subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of which I can not in this manner attain to a concep- tion. This dialectical argument I shall call the Transcendental Paralogism. The second class of sophistical arguments is occu- pied with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given phaenomenon, and I conclude, from the fact that I have always a self-contradictory conception of the unconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the opposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of reason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the Antinomy of pure reason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I conclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that is, from things which I do not know in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of ail beings which I know still less by means of a transcenden Or THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON. 237 tai conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity 1 can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument i shall call the Ideal of pure reason. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II. CHAP. I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. THE logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its form, be the content what it may. But 2 transcendental paralogism has a transcendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and unexcep- tionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation iii the nature of human reason, and is the parent of an unavoid- able, though not insoluble, mental illusion. We now come to a conception, which was not inserted in the general list of transcendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same time without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table. This is the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgment, 1 think. But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the vehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental conceptions also, and that it is therefore re- garded as a transcendental conception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as its only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness. At the same time, pure as this conception is from all empiri- cal content (impressions of the senses), it enables us to distin- guish two different kinds of objects. 7, as thinking, am an object of the internal sense, and am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, designates the object-matter of psychology, which may be called the rational doctrine of the soul, inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the soul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in concreto), may be concluded from this con- ception I, in so far as it appears in all thought. Now, the ratioval doctrine of the soul is really an 238 TBAXSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. taking of this kind. For if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any particular perception of my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of this science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the soul. We have thus before us a pretended science, raised upon the single proposition, I think, whose foundation or want of foundation we may very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition, which ex- presses the perception of one's self, an internal experience is asserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is founded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle. For this internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception, I think, which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions possible, in which we say, I think substance, cause, &c. For internal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general, and its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or determination thereof is empirically given, cannot be re- garded as empirical cognition, but as cognition of the empiri- cal, and belongs to the investigation of the possibility of every experience, which is certainly transcendental. The smallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should he included in the general representation of self-con- sciousness, would immediately change the rational into an empirical psychology. I think is therefore the oi:ly text of rational psychology, from which it must develope its whole system. It is* manifest that this thought, when applied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental predicates thereof; be- cause the least empirical predicate would destroy the purity of the science and its independence of all experience. But we shall have to follow here the guidance of the cate- gories, only, as in the present case a thing, I, as thinking being, is at first given, we shall not indeed change the order of the categories as it stands in the table, but begin at the category of substance, by which a thing in itself is represented, and proceed backwards through the series. The topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which every thing else it may contain must be deduced, is accordingly as follows : OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUBE BEASCN. 239 1. The soul 19 SUBSTANCE. 2. 3. As regards the different times in which it exists, A* regards its quality, it is numerically iden- it is SIMPLE. tical, that is UNITY, not Plurality. 4. It is in relation to possible objects in space.* From these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by combination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance, merely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of Immateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility ; its identity, as in- tellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality ; all these three together, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and as the ground of Animality ; and this, limited and determined by the conception of spirituality, gives us that of Immortality. Now to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a trans- cendental psychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the nature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this science nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly coutentless representation 7, which cannot even be called a conception, but merely a con- sciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this I, or He, or It, who or which thinks, nothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought x, which is cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of * The reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these expressions taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess why the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will find the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I have, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed, instead of their German synonymes, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But I judged it batter to sacrifice elegance ol language to perspicuity of exposition. 240 TBANSCEJTDENTAJi DIALECTIC!. which, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence we are obliged to go round this representation in a per- petual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order to frame any judgment respecting it. And this inconvenience we find it impossible to rid ourselves of, because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation distinguishing a par- ticular object, as a form of representation in general, in so far as it may be termed cognition ; for in and by cognition alone do I think anything. It must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the condition, under which I think, and which is consequently a property of my subject, should be held to be likewise valid for every existence which thinks, and that we can presume to base upon a seemingly empirical proposition a judgment which is apodeictic and universal, to wit, that every thing which thinks is constituted as the voice of my consciousness declares it to be, that is, as .a self-conscious being. The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact, that we necessarily attribute to things & priori all the properties which constitute conditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain the least representation of a thinking being by means of external experience, but solely through self-consciousness. Such ob- jects are consequently nothing more than the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can only thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, / think, is, in the present case, understood in a problematical sense, not in so far as it contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian Cogito, ergo sum), but in regard to its mere possibility-r-for the purpose of discovering, what properties may be inferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the subject of it. If at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of think- ing beings there lay more than the mere Cogito, if we could likewise call in aid observations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws of the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology which would be a kind of physiology of the internal sense, and might possibly be capable of explaining the phenomena of that sense. But it could never be available for discovering those properties which do not be- long to possible experience (such as the quality of simplicity), cor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on the nature OF THE PARALOGISMS Oi PURE REASON. 241 of thinking beings : it would therefore not be a rational psychology. Now, as the proposition I think (in the problematical sense) contains the form of every judgment in general, and is the constant accompaniment of all the categories ; it is manifest, that conclusions are drawn from it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of the under- standing excludes all empirical elements ; and we cannot, as has been shown above, have any favourable conception before- hand of its procedure. We shall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the predicaments of pure psychology ; but we shall, for brevity's sake, allow this exami- nation to proceed in an uninterrupted connection. Before entering on this task, however, the following general remark may help to quicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not merely through my thinking that I cognize an object, but only through my determining a given intuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking consists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as determined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of self-conscious- ness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (concep- tions of the understanding categories) ; they are mere logical functions, which do not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore present my Self a& an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but only that of the determinate self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so far as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably with the general condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object. 1 . In all judgments I am the determining subject of that rela- tion which constitutes a judgment. But that the I which thinks, must be considered as in thought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot be a predicate to thought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition. But this proposition does not sig- nify that I, as an object, am, for myself, a self -subsist ent being or substance. This latter statement an ambitious one re- quires to be supported by data which are not to be discovered in thought ; and are perhaps (in so far as I consider the think- ing self merely as such} not to be discovered in the thinking self at all. * 242 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. 2. That the 7 or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is singular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and therefore indicates a logically simple subject, this is self-evident from the very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition. But this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple substance for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of substance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than sensuous, and which conse- quently lie completely out of the sphere of the understanding and its thought : but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that the Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be sur- prising, if the conception of substance, which in other cases requires so much labour to distinguish from the other elements presented by intuition so much trouble too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts of matter), should be presented immediately to me, as if by reve- lation, in the poorest mental representation of all. 3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold representations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the conceptions themselves, and is conse- quently analytical. But this identity of the subject, of which I am conscious in all its representations, does not relate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an object. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the iden- tity of the person, by which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance as a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove this, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical judgments based upon a given intuition. 4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of other things external to me among which my body also is reckoned. This is also an analytical propo- sition, for other things are exactly those which I think as ditferent or distinguished from myself. But whether this consciousness of myself is possible without things external to me ; and whether therefore I can exist merely as a thinking being (without being man), cannot be known or inferred from this proposition. Thus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition ci myself as object, by the analysis of the consciousnec-a of OF THE PARALOGISMS OF PUKE REASON. 242 my Self in thought. The logical exposition of thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination f the object. Our Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there existed a possibility of proving a priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of per- sonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected with matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have pene- trated into the sphere of noumena ; and in this case the right could not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of establishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves possessions in it. For the proposition, " Every thinking being, as such, is simple sub- stance," is an a priori synthetical proposition ; because in the first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of it, and adds to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its existence, and in the second place annexes a predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter conception a pre- dicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere of experience. It would follow that a priori synthetical propo- sitions are possible and legitimate, not only, as we have maintained, in relation to objects of possible experience, and as principles of the possibility of this experience itself, but are applicable to things as things in themselves an inference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to fall back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure. But indeed the danger is not so great, if we look a little closer into the question. There lurks in the procedure of rational psychology a para- logism, which is represented in the following syllogism : That which cannot be cogitated otherwise than ovs subject, does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance. A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogi- tated otherwise than as subject. Therefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance. In the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated gene* rally and in every relation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor we speak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as subject, relatively to thought J44 TBJLNSCEKDE:NTAL DIALECTIC. and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to intui- tion, by which it is presented as an object to thought. Thus the conclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figures dictionu.* That this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any one who will consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of the principles of the pure under- standing, and the section on noumena. For it was there proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se only as a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality ; that is to say, we can never know, whether there exists any object to correspond to the conception ; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and from it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the term substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition ; we must have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the indispensable condition of its objective reality. For through intuition alone can an object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent, for the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If, then, we appeal merely to thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of the conception of substance that is, of a subject existing per se to the subject as a thinking being. And thus the con- ception of the simple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective reality of this conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more than the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought ; whilst we remain perfectly ignorant, whether the subject is composite or not. * Thought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. in the major it is considered as relating and applying to objects in general, consequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand it as relating merely to self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an object, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as the form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of things, but of thought, (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the subject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, " I cannot exist otherwise than as subject ;" but only " I can, in cogitating my existence, employ my Ego only as tli subject of the judg- ment." But this is an identical proposition, and throws no light on the mode of my existence. REFUTATION Of MENDELSSOHN'S ARGUMENT. 245 Refutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Sub- stantiality or Permanence* of the Soul. This acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common argument which attempts to prove that the soul it being granted that it is a simple being cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition ; he saw it is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance.^ He endea- voured to prove in his Phe concerned, following the analogy with hypothetical syllo- gisms, with the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in the phenomenon ; and, in this way, the theme of the third kind to be treated of in the following chapter, will be the un- conditioned unity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general. But it is worthy of remark, that the transcendental paralo- gism produced in the mind only a one-sided illusion, in re- gard to the idea of the subject of our thought ; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary proposition. The advantage is completely on the side of Pneu- matism ; although this theory itself passes into nought, in the crucible of pure reason. Very different is the case, when we apply reason to the 06- jective synthesis of phaenomena. Here, certainly, reason es- tablishes, with much plausibility, its principle of unconditioned unity ; but it very soon falls into such contradictions, that it is compelled) in relation to cosmology, to renounce its pretensions. For here a new phsenomenon of human reason meets us, a perfectly natural antithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry, but into which reason of it- self unavoidably falls. It is thereby preserved, to be sure, from the slumber of a fancied conviction which a merely one-sided illusion produces ; but it is at the same time com- pelled, either, on the one hand, to abandon itself to a despair* 256 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume a dogmatical confi- dence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions, without f ran ting a fair hearing to the other side of the question, ither is the death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps deserve the title of the Euthanasia of pure reason. Before entering this region of discord and confusion, which B conflict of the laws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall present the reader with some considerations, in ex- planation and justification of the method we intend to follow in our treatment of this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so far as they relate to the absolute totality in the / synthesis of phsenomena, cosmical conceptions ; partly on ac-J count of this unconditioned totality, on which the conception of the world- whole is based a conception which is itself an idea, partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of phsenomena the empirical synthesis ; while, on the other hand, the absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible tilings gives rise to an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct from the cosmical conception, although it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy of pure reason will present us with the transcendental princi- ples of a pretended pure (rational) cosmology, not, how- ever, to declare it valid and to appropriate it, but as the very term of a conflict of reason sufficiently indicates, to pre- sent it as an idea which cannot be reconciled with phsenomena and experience. THE ANTINOMY or PURE REASON. SECTION FIRST. System of Cosmological Ideas. That we may be able to enumerate with systematic preci- sion these ideas according to a principle, we must remark, in the first place, that it is from the understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions take their origin ;_ that the reason does not properly give birth to any couceptiojvbut only frees the conception of the understanding from the un- avoidable limitation of a possible experience, and thus endea- SYSTEil OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 2f- '/ vours to raise it above the empirical, though it must still 1m in connection with it. This happens from the fact, that for a given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality on the side of the conditions (to which the understanding submits all phsenomena), and thus makes of the category a transcendental idea. This it does that it may be able to give absolute complete- ness to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the uncon- ditioned (which is not to be found inexperience, but only in the idea). Reason requires this according to the principle, If the conditioned is given, the whole of the conditions, and consequent- ly the absolutely unconditioned, is also given, whereby alone the Jormer was possible. First, then, the transcendental ideas are properly nothing but categories elevated to the unconditioned ; and they may be arranged in a table according to the titles of the latter. But, secondly, all the categories are not available for this purpose, but only those in which the synthesis con- stitutes a series of conditions subordinated to, not co-ordi- nated with, each other. Absolute totality is required of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series of the conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the question relates to the descending series of consequences, or to the aggregate of the co-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For, in relation to a given conditioned, con- ditions are pre-supposed and considered to be given along with it. On the other hand, as the consequences do not render possible their conditions, but rather pre-suppose them, in the consideration of the procession of consequences (or in the descent from the given condition to the conditioned), we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not ; and their totality is not a necessary demand of reason. Thus we cogitate and necessarily _a^iven time ropiplptply elapsed up to a given moment, although that time is not determinable by us. But as regards time future, which is not the condition of arriving at the present, in order to con- ceive it ; it is quite indifferent whether we consider future time as ceasing at some point, or as prolonging itself to infinity. Take, for example, the series in, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the same time as the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards from the conditioned n to in (I, k, i, &c.), and also downwards from the condition n to the conditioned o (p, q, r, &c.), I must 258 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. pre-suppose the former series, to be able to consider n as given, and n is according to reason (the totality of conditions) possible only by means of that series. But its possibility does not rest on the following series o,p, q, r, which for this reason cannot be regarded as given, but only as capable of being ivefe (dabilis). I shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the conditions from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more remote regressive ; that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned, from the immediate consequence to the more remote, I shall call the progressive synthesis. The former proceeds in antecedentia^ the latter in consequential. The cosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive synthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not m consequential. When the latter takes place, it is an arbi- trary and not a necessary problem of pure reason ; for we re- quire, for the complete understanding of what is given in a phaenomenon, not the consequences which succeed, but the grounds or principles which precede. In order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the table of categories, we take first the two primitive quanta of all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series), and hence, in relation to a given present, we must distinguish & priori in it the antecedentia as conditions (time past) from the consequentia (time future). Consequently, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to all past time. According to the idea of reason, the whole past time, as the condition of the given moment, is necessarily cogitated as given. But as regards space, there exists in it no distinction between progressus and regressus ; for it is an aggregate and not a series its parts ex- isting together at the same time. I can consider a given point of time in relation to past time only as conditioned, because this given moment comes into existence only through the past time or rather through the passing of the preceding time. But as the parts of space are not subordinated, but co-ordi- nated to each other, one part cannot be the condition of the possibility of the other ; and space is not in itself, like time, a series. But the synthesis of the manifold parts of space (th syntheses whereby we apprehend space) is nevertheless succes- SYSTEM! OF COSMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 25* sive ; it takes place, therefore, in time,and contains a series. And as in this series of aggregated spaces (for example, the feet in a rood), beginning with a given portion of space, those which con- tinue to be annexed form the condition of the limits of the for- mer, the measurement of a space must also be regarded as a synthesis of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned. It differs, however, in this respect from that of time, that the side of the conditioned is not in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition ; and, consequently, regressus ana progressus in space seem to be identical. But, inasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by and through another, we must also consider every limited space as conditioned, in so far as it pre-supposes some other space as the condition of its limitation, and so on. As regards limita- tion, therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus, and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the syn- thesis in a series of conditions applies to space also ; and I am entitled to demand the absolute totality of the phsenomenal synthesis in space as well as in time. Whether my demand can be satisfied, is a question to be answered in the sequel. Secondly, the real in space that is, matter, is conditioned. Its internal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote conditions ; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the absolute totality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be obtained otherwise than by a complete division of parts, whereby the real in matter becomes either nothing or that which is not matter, that is to say, the simple.* Consequently we find here also a series of conditions and a progress to the unconditioned. Thirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between phaenomena, the category of substance and its accidents is not suitable for the formation of a transcendental idea ; that is to say, reason has no ground, in regard to it, to proceed re- gressively with conditions. For accidents (in so far as they inhere in a substance) are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a series. And, in relation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to it, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The conception of the sub- stcuitial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the trans- cendental reason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the conception of an object in general, which subsists in so far as * Das Einfache. (Thus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in which, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not detain ourselves with this question, for it has already been sufficiently answered in our discussion of the antinomies into which reason falls, when it attempts to reach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to be deceived by the illusion of transcen- dental idealism, we shall find that neither nature nor freedom exists. Now the question is : Whether, admitting the exist- ence of natural necessity in the world of phsenomena, it is possible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an effect of freedojn or, whether these two modes of causality are contradictory and incompatible ? No phsenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every action, in so far as it is productive of an event. is itself an event or occurrence, and presupposes another pre- ceding state, in which its cause existed. Thus everything that happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute be- ginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes are, accordingly, themselves effects, and pre- suppose causes preceding them in time. A primal action an action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal power of phenomena. Now, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are phenomena, the causality of the cause of these effects must also be a phenomenon, and belong to the empirical jyorid ? Is it not rather possible that, although every^effect in the phsenomenal world must be connected with an empiricai la.usej according to the universal law of nature, this empirical OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF FKEEDOM. 337 causality may be itself the effect of a non-empirical and intel- ligible causality its connection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact ? Such a causality would be considered, in reference to pheenomena, as the primal action of a cause, which is in so far, therefore, not phaenomenal, but, by reason of this faculty or power, intelligible ; although it must, at the same time, as a link in the chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world. A belief in the reciprocal causality of phaenomena is neces- sary, if we are required to look for and to present the natural conditions of natural events, that is to say, their causes. This being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the requirements of the understanding, which recognises nothing but nature in the region of phenomena, are satisfied, and our physical ex- planations of physical phaenomena may proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without opposition./ But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the idea to be a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes in the possession of a faculty whjcj^ is not empirical, but intelli- gible, inasmuch as it is not detertnined to action by empirical conditions, but purely and solely upon grounds brought for- ward by the understanding this action being still, when the cause is phsenomenizcd, in perfect accordance with the laws of empirical causality. ' Thus the acting subject, as a causal phenomenon, would continue to preserve a complete con- nection with nature and natural conditions ; and the phe- nomenon only of the subject (with all its phaenomenal causality) would contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the transcendental object, must necessarily be re- garded as intelligible. > For, if we attend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phsenomena, to the directions of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the rela- tion in which the transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to us, stands to these phaenomena and their connec- tion in nature. The intelligible ground of phaenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions. It has to do only with pure thought ; and, although the effects of this thought and action of the pure understanding are discoverable in phaeuomena, these phseuomena must nevertheless be capable cf a full and complete explanation, upon purely physical grounds, and in accordance with natural laws. And in thia 1 338 TBAWSCEKDENTAL DIALECTIC. case we attend solely to their empirical, nnd omit all consider- ation of their intelligible character, (which is the transcendental cause of the former,) as completely unknown, except in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its empirical symbol. Now let us apply this to experience. Man is a phsenomenon of the sensuous world, and at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the causality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must possess an empirical character, like all other natural phsenomena. We remark this empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain powers and faculties. If we consider inanimate, or merely animal nature, we can discover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is determined in a purely sensuous man- ner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself only through sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through pure apperception ; and this in actions and internal determi- nations, which he cannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand, a phaenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely in- telligible object intelligible, because its action cannot be as- cribed to sensuous receptivity. These faculties are under- standing and reason. The latter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all empirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in the consideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the understanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own conceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical. That reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are compelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in the sphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers. The words / ought express a species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which nature does not and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows nothing in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be absurd to say that any- thing in nature ought to be other than it is in the relations of time in which it stands ; indeed, the ought, when we consider merely the course of nature, has neither application nor mean- ing. The question, what ought to happen in the sphere of nature, is just as absurd as the question, what ought to be the properties of a circle ? All that we are entitled to ask is, what OF THE COSMOLOG1CAL IDEA OF FBEKDOM. 339 place in nature, or, in the latter case, what art the pro- perties of a circle ? But the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of which is a pure conception ; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on the contrary, always a phaenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under physical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but these physical or natural conditions do not con- cern the determination of the will itself, they relate to its effect alone, and the consequences of the effect in the world of phae- nomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present to my will, whatever sensuous impulses the moral ought it is beyond their power to produce. They may produce a volition, which, so far from being necessary, is always conditioned a volition to which the ought enunciated by reason, sets an and conditioned iu their existence, the series of de- 346 TEAtfSCEtfDENTAL DIALECTIC. pendent existences cannot embrace an unconditioned member, the existence of which would be absolutely necessary. It follows that, if phaenomena were things in themselves, and as an immediate consequence from this supposition condi- tion and conditioned belonged to the same series of phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the condition of the existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly im- possible. An important distinction, however, exists between the dy- namical and the mathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the combination of parts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts ; and therefore are the con- ditions of its series parts of the series, and to be consequently regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as consisting, without exception, of phsenomena. In the former regress, on the contrary, the aim of which is not to establish the pos- sibility of an unconditioned whole consisting of given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to demon- strate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from its cause, or of the contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily, it is not requisite that the con- dition should form part of an empirical series along with thft conditioned. In the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present dealing, there exists a way of escape from the diffi- culty ; for it is not impossible that both of the contradictory statements may be true in different relations. All sensuous phaenomena may be contingent, and consequently possess only an empirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also exist a non-empirical condition of the whole series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this necessary being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a member not even the highest member of the series ; the whole world of sense would be left in its empirically determined existence uninter- fered with and uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the modes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in the consider- ation of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself the cause (substantia phenomenon) was regarded as belonging to the series of conditions, and only its causality to the in- telligible world, we are obliged in the present case to cogi- 01 TKE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF DEPENDENCE. 347 tate this necessary being as purely intelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens extramun- danum) ; for otherwise it would be subject to the phaenomenal law of contingency and dependence. In relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle of reason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically conditioned existence, that no pro- perty of the sensuous world possesses unconditioned necessity, that we are bound to expect, and, so far as is possible, to seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of conditions, and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in deducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the empirical series, or in regarding any ex- istence as independent and self-subsistent ; although this should not prevent us from recognising the possibility of the whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible, and for this reason free from all empirical conditions. But it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove the existence of this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to evidence the possibility of a purely intelli- gible condition of the existence of all sensuous phenomena. As bounds were set to reason, to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of empirical conditions, and losing itself in transcendent theories which are incapable of concrete pre- sentation ; so, it was my purpose, on the other hand, to set bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding, and to protest against any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things, or declaring the existence of the in- telligible to be impossible, merely on the ground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition of phaenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the phsenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the arbitrary hypothesis of a neces- sary, although purely intelligible condition, that no real con^ tradiction exists between them, and that, consequently, both may be true. The existence of such an absolutely necessary being may be impossible ; but this can never be demon- strated from the universal contingency and dependence of sen- suous phsenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to discontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some sphere of existence beyond the world oi 548 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. nature. Reason goes its way in the empirical world, m follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of the transcend- ental. The sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere representations, and always sensuously con- ditioned ; things in themselves are not, and cannot be, ob- jects to us. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that we are not justified in leaping from some member of an empirical series beyond the world of sense, as if empirical representa- tions were things in themselves, existing apart from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the cause of whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would certainly be the case with contingent things ; but it cannot be with mere representations of things, the contin- gency of which is itself merely a phaenomenon, and can relate to no other regress than that which determines phenomena, that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an intelligible ground of phaenomena, as free, moreover, from the contingency ot the latter, conflicts neither with the unlimited nature of the empirical regress, nor with the complete contingency of phae- nomena. And the demonstration of this was the only thing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the coirdition of every conditioned as regards its existence is sensuous, and for this reason {?*part of the same series, it must be itself conditioned, as was shewn in the Antithesis of the fourth Antinomy. The embarrassments into which a reason, which postulates the unconditioned, necessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to exist ; or the unconditioned must be placed in the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its necessity does not require, nor does it even permit, the pre- sence of an empirical condition : and it is. consequently, un- conditionally necessary. The empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of a purely intelligible being ; it continues its operations on the principle of the contingency of all phae- nomena, proceeding from empirical conditions to still higher and higher conditions, themselves empirical. Just as little does this regulative principle exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause, when the question regards merely the pure employment of reason in relation to ends or aims. For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the transcen- CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE ANTINOMIES. 349 dental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensu- ous phenomena, and its existence necessary and independent of ail sensuous conditions, is not inconsistent with the con- tingency of phenomena, or with the unlimited possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical conditions. Concluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason. So long as the object of our rational conceptions is the to- tality of conditions in the world of phenomena, and the satis- faction, from this source, of the requirements of reason, so long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological. But when we set the unconditioned which is the aim of all our inquiries in a sphere which lies out of the world of sense and possible experience, our ideas become transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable towards the completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never executed, but always to be pursued) ; they detach themselves completely from experience, and construct for themselves objects, the material of which has not been presented by experience, and the objective reality of which is not based upon the comple- tion of the empirical series, but upon pure d priori conceptions. The intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may be conceded, as a transcendental object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing determinable by certain distinct predicates re- lating to its internal nature, for it has no connection with em- pirical conceptions ; nor are we justified in affirming the existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a mere product of the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas, however, it is that occasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this step. For the existence of phaenomena, always conditioned and never self-subsistent, requires us to look for an object different from phaenomena an intelligible object, with which all contingency must cease. But, as we have allowed ourselves to assume the ex- istence of a self-subsistent reality out of the field of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as merely a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by beings which are themselves intelligences, no other course remains for us than to follow analogy, and employ the same mode in forming some conception of intelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which 350 TRAWSCEISTDENTAL DIALECTIC. uatare taught us to use in the formation of empirical con- ceptions. Experience made us acquainted with the contingent. But we are at present engaged in the discussion of things which are not objects of experience ; and must, therefore, deduce our knowledge of them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that is from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the world of sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation of a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of it, all our conceptions of intelligible things. This we pro- pose to attempt in the following chapter. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. BOOK II. CHAP. III. THE IDEAL OP PURE REASON. SECTION FIRST. Of the Ideal in General. We have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind, except under sensuous conditions ; because the conditions of objective reality do not exist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact, nothing but the mere form of thought. They may, however, when applied to phsenomena, be presented in concrete ; for it is phaenomena that present to them the materials for the formation ot empirical conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms of the conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further removed from objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever present them to the human mind in concrete. They contain a certain perfection, attain- able by no possible empirical cognition ; and they give to reason a systematic unity, to which the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely attain. But still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the Ideal, by which term I understand the i r lea, not in concreto, but in individuo as an individual thing, deter- minable or determined by the idea alone. The idea of humanity in its complete perfection supposes not only the OF THE IDEAL IN GENEEAL. 351 advancement of all the powers and faculties, which constitute our conception of human nature, to a complete attainment of their final aims, but also every thing which is requisite for the complete determination of the idea ; for of all contradictory predicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What I have termed an ideal, was in Plato's philosophy an idea of the divine mind an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phaenomenal existences. Without rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess that human reason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess, not, like those of Plato, creative, but certainly practical power as regulative principles, and form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions. Moral con- ceptions are not perfectly pure conceptions of reason, because an empirical element of pleasure or pain lies at the foun- dation of them. In relation, however, to the principle, whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom which is in itself without law, and consequently when we attend merely to their form, they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a human being existing only in thought, and in com- plete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea pro- vides a rule, so the ideal serves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy. Thus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of action, with which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help us to reform ourselves, although the perfection it de- mands can never be attained by us. Although we cannot concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to be considered as chimseras ; on the contrary, they provide reason with a standard, which enables it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of incompleteness in the objects presented to it. But to aim at realising the ideal in an example in the world of experience to describe, for instance, the character of the perfectly wise man in a romance is impracticable. Nay more, there is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be little edifying, as the natural limitations which are continually breaking in upon the perfection and completeness of the idea, ^destroy the illusion in the story, and throw an aut 352 ITIJLNSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. of suspicion even on what is good in the idea, which heuce appears fictitious and unreal. Such is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which ia always based upon determinate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for imitation or for criticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of these it is impossible to present an intelligible conception ; they are a kind of monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague picture the production of many diverse experiences than a determinate image. Such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists [profess to have in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for production nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though improperly, sensuous ideals, as they are de- clared to be models of certain possible empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards for expla- nation or examination. In its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determi- nation according to a priori rules ; and hence it cogitates an object, which must be completely determinable in conformity with principles, although all empirical conditions are absent, and the conception of the object is on this account trans- cendent. CHAPTER THIRD. SECTION SECOND. Of the Transcendental Ideal. (Prototypon Transcendentale.} Every conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in it, undetermined and subject to the principle of determin- ability. This principle is, that of every two contradictorily op- posed predicates, only one can belong to a conception. It is a purely logical principle, itself based upon the principle of contradiction ; inasmuch as it makes complete abstraction of the content, and attends merely to the logical form of the cognition. But again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also sub- ject to the principle* of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible contradictory predicates of things must belong to it. This principle is not based merely * Princijiium determination^ omnimodae. Ir. me other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or o certain de- terminations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two conceptions, which have a certain object or content ; the word is, is no additional predicate it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to the subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same ; and there is no addition made to the conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my cogitating the object in the expression, it is as absolutely given or exist- ing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter indicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the content of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would not be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an inadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be more in a hundred real dollars, than in a hundred possible dollars that is, in the mere conception of them. For the real object the dollars is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a synthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my mental state), although this objective re?,itity this existence apart from my conception, does not ir. the least degree increase the aforesaid hundred dollars. By whatever and by whatever number of predicates even to the complete determination of it I may cogitate a thing Or THE ONTOLOGTCAL ARGUMENT. 369 I do not in the least augment the object of my conception by the addition of the statement, this thing exists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was cogi- tated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact object of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing all modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not added to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists ; on the contrary, the thing exists if it exist at all with the same defect as that cogitated in its conception ; other- wise not that which was cogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still remains whether this being exists or not? For although no element is wanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in its relation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of the object indicated by the conception is possible a posteriori. And here the cause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question re- garded an object of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the conception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me to cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience ; while the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as con- tained in the sphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world of experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible perception has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate existence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we should find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish it from mere possibility. Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of sensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical laws with some one of my perceptions ; but there is no means of cognizing the existence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized com- pletely a priori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it imme- diately by perception, or by inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the sphere of experienc* BB 37C TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. which is in perfect unity with itself; and although au exist- ence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to b impossible, it is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining. The notion of a supreme being is in many respects a highly useful idea ; but for the very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition with regard to the exist- ence of things, tt is not even sufficient to instruct us as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The analytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of contradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real properties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an a priori judgment cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us spe- cifically ; and even if this were to happen, a judgment would still be impossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions must be sought for in the world of ex- perience, to which the object of an idea cannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his attempt to establish upon a priori grounds the possibility of this sublime ideal being. The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme Being is therefore insufficient ; and we may as well hope to increase our stock of knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by the addition of noughts to his cash-account. CHAPTER THIRD. SECTION FIFTH. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Exist- ence of God. It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary, an invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt to draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the existence of a ueces- OF THE COSMOLOGICAL AEGUMENT. 371 ary being as a basis for the empirical regress, and that, an this necessity must be unconditioned and d priori, reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, this requirement, and enable us to attain to the d priori cog- nition of such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a better defined know ledge of a necessary being, of the existence of which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was ieduced from her natural course ; and, instead of concluding with the conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary existence, which it was in fact called in to complete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher. The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the connection between absolute necessity, and the highest reality ; but, instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary existence, like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural, and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while it contains, at the same time, the outlines of all the argu- ments employed in natural theology arguments which always have been, and still will be, in use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under whatever embellish- ments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical with the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, termed by Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentid mundi, I shall now lay before the reader, and subject to a strict exa- mination. It is framed in the following manner : If something exists, an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor contains an experience, the major reasons from a general experience to the existence of a B B 2 372 TKA-NSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. necessary jeing.* Thus this argument really begins at ex perience, and is not completely a priori, or ontological. The object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the cosmological proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which this world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds ; and in this respect it differs from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon the consideration of the peculiar consti- tution of our sensuous world. The proof proceeds thus : A necessary being can be de- termined only in one way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed predicates ; consequently, it must be completely determined in and by its conception. But there is only a single conception of a thing possible, which completely determines the thing a priori : that is, the con- ception of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception i)f the ens realissimum is the only conception, by and in which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a supreme being necessarily exists. In this cosmological argument are assembled so many so- phistical propositions, that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument for the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to the agree- ment of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism ; while, in fact, it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it may possess a secure foundation, it bases its conclu- sions upon experience, and thus appears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument, which places its con- * This inference is too well known to require more detailed discus- sion. It is based upon the spurious transcendental law of causality,f that everything which is contingent has a cause, which, if itself contin- gent, must also have a cause ; and so on, till the series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely necessary cause, without which it ould not possess completeness. \ See note on page 175. TV. OF T:.IE COSMOLOGICAL ABGUMENT. 373 fidence entirely in pure a priori conceptions. Bui this expe- rience merely aids reason in making one step to the exist- ence of a necessary being. What the properties of this being are, cannot be learned from experience ; and therefore reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conceptions, for the purpose of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, what among all possible things contain the conditions (reqiiisita) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that it has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens realis- simum and in it alone, and hence concludes : The ens realis- simum is an absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that reason has here presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the ex- istence of the latter, from that of the former a proposition, which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and which is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument, contrary to the wish and professions of its in- ventors. For the existence of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone. But if I say the conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of a necessary being, I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument which figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the latter ; while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than to conduct us to the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any deter- minate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of ex- perience, and rise to that of pure conceptions, which we exa- mine with the purpose of discovering whether any one con- tains the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely neces- sary being. But if the possibility of such a being is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved ; for we may then assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses the attribute of necessity in other words, this being possesses an absolutely necessary existence. All illusions it an argument are more easily detected, whea 374 TEANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. they are presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we now proceed to do. If the proposition, Every absolutely necessary being is like- wise an ens realissimum, is correct (and it is this which con- stitutes the nervus probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative judgments, be capable of conver- sion the conversio per accidens, at least. It follows, then, bhat some entia realissima are absolutely necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, and what is valid of some, is valid of all. In this present case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion,* and say, Every ens realissimum is a necessary being. But as this pro- position is determined a priori by the conceptions contained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument, and not recognised by the cosmological, although it formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning. Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating the existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory and inadequate, but possesses the addi- tional blemish of an ignoratio elenchi professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted at its call. I mentioned above, that this cosmological argument contains a perfect nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendents criticism does not find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely enumerate these, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be well practised in such matters, to inves- tigate the fallacies residing therein. The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this mode of proof: 1. The transcendental principle, Every thing that is contingent must have a cause a principle without sig- nificance, except in the sensuous world. For the purely in- tellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which is itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phaenomenal world. But in the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. From the im- possibility of an infinite ascending series of causes in thsi * Conversio pura seu simplex. Tr. OF THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. 376 world of sense a first cause is inferred ; a conclusion which the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in the sphere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3. Eeason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It removes all conditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place) ; and, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conception, it accepts this as a completion of the con- ception it wishes to form of the series. 4. The logical possi- bility of a conception of the total of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction) is con- founded with the transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of such a synthesis a principle which again refers us to the world of experience. And so on. The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the ne- cessity of proving the existence of a necessary being d. priori from mere conceptions a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an actual existence an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary condition of that ex- istence. It is in this case unnecessary to demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the ques- tion regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we wish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look out for some being the conception which would enable us to comprehend the necessity of its being for if we could do this, an empirical presupposition would be unnecessary ; no, we try to discover merely the negative con- dition (conditio sine qua non), without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its principle ; but in the present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be discovered in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently contain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this ab- solute necessity d, priori. That is, it must be possible to reason conversely, and say the thing, to which the concep- tion of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. But if I cannot reason thus and I cannot, unless I believe in 376 TBANSCENJOEWTAL DIALECTIC. the sufficiency of the ontoiogical argument I fijd insur- mountable obstacles in my new path, and am really no furthef than the point from which I set out. The conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding the internal determinations of a thing, and is for this reason an ideal without equal or parallel, the gerferal conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence which was the purpose of all our enquiries ; and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer the question What of all things in the world must be regarded as such ? It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all- sufficient being a cause of all possible effects, for the purpose of enabling reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists, is no longer the modest enun- ciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty ; for the cognition of that which is absolutely necessary, must itself possess that character. The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is, either to discover a conception which shall harmonise with the idea of absolute necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea. If the one is possible, so is the other ; for reason recognises that alone as absolutely necessary, which is necessary from its conception.* But both attempts are equally beyond our power we find it impossible to satisfy the under- standing upon this point, and as impossible to induce it to remain at rest in relation to this incapacity. Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of all existing things, is an indispensable require- ment of the mind, is an abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity, ter- rible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller, does not pro- duce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and terror ; for, although it measures the duration of things, it does not support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves of the thought, that a being, which we regard as the greatest of all possible existences, should say to himself' I am from * That is. which cannot be cogitate* as other than necessary. Tr, Or THE ILLUSION IN THE FOREC DING ARGUMENTS. 377 eternity to eternity ; beside me there is nothing, except that which exists by my will ; but whence then ami? Here all sinks away from under us ; and the greatest, as the smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other. Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by their effects, are perfectly inscrutable in their nature ; they elude all our powers of observation. The transcendental ob- ject which forms the basis of phsenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from our mental vision ; the fact is there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of its reality is the need of it felt by reason, for the purpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical unity. An ideal is not even given as a cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable ; on the contrary, it must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to give an account of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions upon objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds. Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a Necessary Being. Both of the above arguments are transcendental ; in other words, they do not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason in relation to an existence given by empirical consciousness ; utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its assertions entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the cause, in these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural, illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and lupreme reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anj 378 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. tiling but an idea ? What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary, while it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being as from an abyss ? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and re- luctant approbation always again withdrawn, arrive at a calm and settled insight into its cause ? It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something exists, I cannot avoid the inference, that some- thing exists necessarily. Upon this perfectly natural but not on that account reliable inference does the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me be the thing or being what it may from cogitating its non-existence. I may thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or indivi- dual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never com- plete the regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary being ; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this be- ing. If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the oasis of existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable in- ference is, that necessity and contingency are not properties of things themselves otherwise an internal contradiction would result ; that consequently neither of these principles are objective, but merely subjective principles of reason the one requiring us to seek for a necessary ground for every thing that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no other expla- nation than that which is complete a priori, the other forbid- ding us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that is, to regard no member of the empirical world as un- conditioned. In this mode of viewing them, both principles, in their purely heuristic and regulative character, and as con- cerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite con- sistent with each other. The one says you must philoso- phise upon nature, as if there existed a necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing OF THE ILLUSION Iff THE POBEGOING AEGUMEffTS. 379 systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an idea of this character a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate ; while the other warns you to consider no indi- vidual determination, concerning the existence of things, as such an ultimate foundation, that is, as absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in the deduction, and to treat every determination as determined by some other. But if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary, it is impossible that anything which is empirically given should be absolutely necessary. It follows from this, that you must accept the absolutely necessary as out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a principle of the highest possible unity in ex- perience, and, you cannot discover any such necessary existence in the world, the second rule requiring you to regard all em- pirical causes of unity as themselves deduced. The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent ; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with the judgment of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But if they had regarded matter, not relatively as the substratum of phenomena, but absolutely and in itself- as an independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For there is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence ; on the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, always and without self-contradiction. But in thought alone lay the idea of absolute necessity. A regulative principle must, therefore, have been at the foundation of this opinion. In fact, extension and impenetrability which together con- stitute our conception of matter form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phaenomena, and this principle, in so far as it is empirically unconditioned, possesses the property of a regulative principle. But, as every determination of matter which constitutes what is real in it and consequently impenetrability is an effect, which must have a cause, and is for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonise with the idea of a necessary being, in its character of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of ita real properties, being derived, must be only conditionally ne- cessary, and can therefore be annihilated in thought ; and thus the whole existence of matter can be so annihilated of 380 TBANSCEITDENTAL DIALECTIC. suppressed. If this were not the case, we sh UK! have fcund in the world of phaenomena the highest ground or condition of Hnity which is impossible, according to the second regu- lative principle. It follows, that matter, and, in general, all that farms part of the world of sense, cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of empirical unity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect con- fidence to deduce the phaenomena of the world and their ex- istence from other phaenomena, just as if there existed no ne- cessary being ; and we can at the same time, strive without ceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our de- duction, just as if such a being the supreme condition of all existences were presupposed by the mind. These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the' Supreme Being, far from being an enounce- ment of the existence of a being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between phsenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phaenomena. We cannot, at the same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle as constitutive, and hypostatising this unity. Pre- cisely similar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it ; arid thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing as an object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural that, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be esta- blished as a principle for the empirical employment of reason, unless it is based upon the idea of an ens realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character of supreme condition, as ab- solutely necessary, and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which, relatively to the worici, wa absolutely (unconditionally) ne- cessary, as a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this necessity in or by any conception, and it OF THE PHTSICO-THEOLOGICAL ABGUMEJTT. 381 exists merely in my own mind, as the formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic condition of existence. CHAPTER THIRD. SECTION SIXTH. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof. If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experi- ence of an existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other mode that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of the pheenomena of the pre- sent world, their constitution and disposition, and discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of the ex- istence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insuf- ficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any satis- factory proof of the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea. It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the E receding sections, that an answer to this question will be far *om being difficult or unconvincing. For how can any ex- perience be adequate with an idea ? The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be dis- covered congruent or adequate with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical, which is always con- ditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in vain seek the unconditioned among things that are condi- tioned, while examples, nay, even guidance, is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis. If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions, it must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower members which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the series. If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural causes how shah 1 reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former? AH laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all syn- 382 IRAffSCEXDElfTAL DIALECTIC. thetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from them, are without significance. The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or into its illimitable divisions on the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest or its least manifestations, even after we have attained to the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without the power of expression all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Every- where around us we observe a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth ; and, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we find it, we are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of contingencies, there exists something that is primal and self-subsistent something which, as the cause of this phenomenal world, secures its continuance and preservation. This highest cause what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is there to prevent us from attri- buting to it such a degree of perfection as to place it above the sphere of all that is possible ? This we can easily do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract conception, by representing this being to ourselves as contain- ing in itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfec- tion a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands parsimony in principles,* which is free from self-contradiction, which even contributes to the extension of * A reference to the metaphysical dogma : Entia practer necessitate non gunt multiplicanda, which may also be applied to logic, by the BUD- titution ofprincipia for entia. Tr. OF THE PHTS1CO-THEOLOGICAL AEQUMENT. 388 the employment of reason in experience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience. This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect It is the oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself derives its existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle of which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again re-acts upon this idea its cause ; and thus our belief in a divine author ol the universe rises to the power of an irresistible conviction. For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly elevated by these considerations, which, although empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation ; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned author of all. But although we have nothing to object to the reasonable- ness and utility of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a recep- tion upon its own merits, apart from favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the proper- ties of a belief that brings calm and content into the minu, without prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the ontological argument to which it serves merely as an introduction, and that, consequently, this argu- ment contains the only possible ground of proof (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this being. 384 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow : 1. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed with great wisdom, and existing in a whole of a content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing in the world it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute ; in other words, the nature of different things could not of itself, what- ever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain fundamental ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sub- lime and wise cause (or several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free arid intelli- gent cause of the world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice an inference which all our observation favours, and all principles o^* analogy support. In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a watch, that the same kind of causality namely, understanding and will resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and superhuman art, a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that it must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design these being the only products whose causes and modes of origination are completely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explana^ tion which she does not know. According to the physico-theological argument, the OH*- OF THE PHTSICO- THEOLOGICAL AEGTTMENT. 385 nection and harmony existing in the world evidence the con- tingency of the form merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world. To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony and order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art. This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are sub- ject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task before us a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid. We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the ex- istence of a cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in one word, all per- fection the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient being^. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and the observer, who compares it with himself and with his own power of comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by which the object is either magnified, or the observing subject depreciated in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the mag- nitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no determinate conception, except that which comprehends all possible perfection or completeness, and it is only the total \omnitudo] of reality which is completely determined in and through its conception alone. Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare that he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of the world he contemplates, bears (in its extent C c 386 TBAa-fSCESDENTAL DIALECTIC. as well as in its content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in the world to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being.* Physico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a deter- minate conception of a supreme cause of the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology a theology which is itself to be the basis of religion. The attainment of absolute totality is completely impos- sible on the path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the physico- theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the abyss ? After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power, wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we can advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary ; and, still advancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof the conception of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing in its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument ; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to have no connection with this faculty, and to base its entire procedure upon experience alone. The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they will find that., after following for some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass in to the region * Kant's meaning is, that no one will be bold enough to declare that he is certain that the world could not have existed without an omnipotent author; that none but the highest wisdom coiuld bave produced the har- mony and order we observe in it; and that its unitj is j -ssible only untiei the condition of an absolute unity. Tr. CRITIQUE OP ALL THEOLOGY. 3S7 of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of ideas, what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their determinate conception into the pos- session of which they have come, they know not how over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations drawn from experience though in a degree miserably unworthy of the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of experience. Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmo- logical, and this upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being ; and as besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all. CHAPTER THIRD. SECTION SEVENTH. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative Principles of Reason. IF by the term Theology I understand the cognition of a primal being, that cognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis) or upon revelation (theologia re- velata). The former cogitates its object either by means of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens originarium, rea- lissimum, ens entium, and is termed transcendental theology ; or, by means of a conception derived from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must then be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a transcen- dental theology alone, is termed a Deist ; he who acknow- ledges the possibility of a natural theology also, a Theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence of a supreme being, but at the same time main- tains that our conception of this being is purely transcen- dental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it more closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from C c 2 388 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. the analogy with nature, with a more definite conception ol thi^ being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will. The formei regards the Supreme Being as the cause of the world whether bv the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent, is left un- determined ; the latter considers this being as the author o/ the world. Transcendental theology aims either at inferring the exist- ence of a Supreme Being from a general experience without any closer reference to the world to which this experience belongs, and in this case it is called Cnsmotheoloyy ; or it en- deavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through mere conceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then termed Ontotheology. Natural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of the world, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable in, the world, in which two modes of causality must be admitted to exist those of nature and freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelli- gence, either as the principle of all natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the former case it is termed Phy- sico- theology, in the latter Ethical or Moral -theology.* As we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and as it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity, we might, in strict rigour, deny to the Deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being or thing the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct as it is less harsh to say, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God (summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to * Not theological ethics ; for this science contains ethical laws, which presuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world; while Moral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a conviction cf the existence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical laws. CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY. 38^ investigate the sources of all these attempts of reason to esta- blish the existence of a Supreme Being. It may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical know- ledge or cognition as knowledge of that which is, and prac- tical knowledge as knowledge of that which ought to be. In this view, the theoretical employment of reason is that by which I cognize d, priori (as necessary) that something is, while the practical is that by which I cognize a priori what ought to happen. Now, if it is an indubitably certain, though it the same time an entirely conditioned truth, that some- thing; is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate condition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a con- dition may be arbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition is postulated (per thesiri), in the latter supposed [per hypothesin). There are certain practical laws those of morality which are absolutely necessary. Now, if these laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as the condition of the possibility of their obligatory power, this being must \) postulated, because the conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, is itself cognized h priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some future time show that the moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme Being, but also, as themselves abso- lutely necessary in a different relation, demand or postulate it although only from a practical point of view. The dis- cussion of this argument we postpone for the present. When the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which ought to be, the conditioned which is presented in experience, is always cogitated as contingent. For this reason its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely necessary, but merely as relatively necessary, or rather as needful; the con- dition is in itself and a priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of the cognition, by reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a theoretical cognition of the absolute neces- sity of a thing, we cannot attain to this cognition otherwise than a priori by means of conceptions ; while it is impos- sible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any relation to an existence given in experience. Theoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain conceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be discovered by means of experience. It is oy 390 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. posed to the cognition of nature, which concerns only those objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience. The principle that everything which happens (the empi- rically contingent) must have a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of speculative cognition. For, if we change it into an abstract principle, and deprive it of its reference to experience and the empirical, we shall find that it cannot with justice be regarded any longer as a syn- thetical proposition, and that it is impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists to something en- tirely different termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a cause as likewise that of the contingent loses, in this speculative mode of employing it, all significance, for its objective reality and meaning are comprehensible from expe- rience alone. When from the existence of the universe and the things in it the existence of a cause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding not in the natural, but in the speculative method. For the principle of the former enounces, not that things themselves or substances, but only that which happens or their states as empirically contingent, have a cause : the assertion that the existence of substance itself is contin- gent is ^iot justified by experience, it is the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative manner. If, again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all things are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of a cause entirely distinct from the universe, this would again be a judgment of purely specula- tive reason ; because the object in this case the cause can never be an object of possible experience. In both these cases the principle of causality, which is valid only in the field of experience, useless and even meaningless beyond this region, would be diverted from its proper destination. Now I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology by the aid of speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of reason as applied to nature do not conduct us to any theological truths, and, consequently, that a rational theology can have no existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of morality. For all synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as imtnMient in experience i while CRITIQUE OP ALL THEOLOGY. 391 the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates their being em- ployed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is quite incapable. If the empirical law of causality is to con- duct us to a Supreme Being, this being must belong to the chain of empirical objects in which case it would be, like all phsenomena, itself conditioned. If the possibility of passing the limits of experience be admitted, by means of the dyna- mical law of the relation of an effect to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain by this procedure ? Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because experience never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and it is only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence of a corresponding cause. If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the requirements of Reason, we recognise her right to assert the existence of a perfect and absolutely neces- sary being, this can be admitted only from favour, and cannot be regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration. The physico-theological proof may add weight to others if other proofs there are by connecting speculation with experience ; but in itself it rather prepares the mind for theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural direction, than establishes a sure foundation for theology. It is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only of transcendental answers those presented a priori by pure conceptions without the least empirical admixture. But the question in the present case is evidently synthetical it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond the bounds of experience it requires an assurance respecting the exist- ence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which no experience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved that all a priori synthetical cognition is possible only as the expression of the formal conditions of a possible experience ; and that the validity of all principles lepends upon their immanence in the field of experience, that . s, their relation to objects of empirical cognition, or phaeno- nena. Thus all transcendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is without result. If any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofi of our Analytic to losing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time-honoured arguments, he at least cannot decline answering the question how he can pass the limits of all 392 TBANSCENDESTAL DIALECTIC. possible experience by the help cf mere ideas. If he talks of new arguments, or of improvements upon old arguments I request him to spare me. There is certainly no great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all speculative argu- ments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I have, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the dogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon myself as a remarkably com- bative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect the fallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of specu- lative theology. And yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to the dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the simple and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the nature of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of knowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely d priori, and to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and no means exist of guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the understanding may have attained to a conception, the existence of the object of the conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition of the existence of the object depends upon the object's being posited and given in itself apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go beyond our conception, without the aid of experience which presents to the mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere conceptions tc a conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or super- natural beings. But although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest utility in correcting our conception of this being on the supposition that we can attain to the cognition of it by some other means in making it consistent with itself and with al. other conceptions of intelligible objects, clearing it from aL that is incompatible with the conception of an ens summum, and eliminating from it all limitations or admixture of empi- rical elements. Transcendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its objective insufficiency, of importance in a negative respect ; it is useful as a test of the procedure of reason when engaged CRITIQUE OF ALL THEOLOGY. 393 with pure ideas, no other than a transcendental standard being in this case admissible. For if, from a practical point of view, the hypothesis of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to maintain its validity without opposition, it must be of the highest importance to define this conception in a correct and rigorous manner as the transcendental conception of a ne- cessary being, to eliminate all phaenomenal elements (anthro- pomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the same time to overthrow all contradictory assertions be they atheistic, deistic, or anthropomorphic. This is of course very easy ; as the same arguments which demonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a, Supreme Being, must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For it is impossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason demonstration that there exists no Supreme Being, as the ground of all that exists, or that this being possesses none of those properties which we regard as analogical with the dynamical qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the an- thropomorphists would have us believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility imposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of experience. A Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though a faultless one a conception which per- fects and crowns the system of human cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor disproved by pure reason. If this defect is ever supplied by a Moral Theology, the problematic Transcendental Theology which has preceded, will have been at least serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the conception, by the complete determination of it which it has furnished*, and the ceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often de- ceived by sense, and not always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity, infinitude, unity, exist- ence apart from the world (and not as a world-soul), eternity free from conditions of time, omnipresence free from conditions of space, omnipotence, and others, are pure trans- cendental predicates ; and thus the accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology require?, is furnished by transcendental theology alone. 394 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. APPENDIX TO TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason THE result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the truth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental Analytic, namely, that all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this im- portant lesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits, and that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as categories are of the understanding. There exists this difference, however, that while the categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in perfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the severest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies which they induce. Whatever is grounded in the nature of our powers, will be found to be in harmony with the final purpose and proper employment of these powers, when once we have discovered their true direction and aim. We are entitled to suppose, there- fore, that there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and immanent ; although, when we mis- take their meaning, and regard them as conceptions of actual tilings, their mode of application is transcendent and delusive. For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in relation to possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is employed transcendently, when it is applied to an object falsely believed to be adequate with and to correspond to it ; immanently, when it is applied solely to the employment of the understanding in the sphere of expe- rience. Thus all errors of subreptio of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of judgment, and not to understand- ing or reason. Reason never has an immediate relation to an object ; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely ananyes them and gives to them OF THE IDEAS 3F PUKE REASON. 395 that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely aa possible. Reason avails itself of the conceptions of the under- standing for the sole purpose of producing totality in the dif- ferent series. This totality the understanding does not con- cern itself with ; its only occupation is the connection of ex- periences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is there- fore the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by roeans of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas ; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which without this occupies itself with a distributive unity alone. I accordingly maintain, that transcendental ideas can never be employed as constitutive ideas, that they cannot be con- ceptions of objects, and that, when thus considered, they as- sume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on the other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary application to objects as regulative ideas, directing the understanding to a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in which they all meet in one point. This point though a mere idea (focus imaginarius), that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the under- standing do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible experience serves notwithstanding to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the great- est possible extension. Hence arises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines proceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition, just as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But this illusion which we may hinder from imposing upon us is necessary and unavoidable, if we desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us, but those which are at a great distance behind us ; that is to say, when, in the present case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every given experience, towards an extension as great as can possi- bly be attained. If we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that the peculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that is to say, to give them connection accord- 396 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. ing to a principle. This unity presupposes an idea the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition), preceding the de- terminate cognition of the parts, and containing the condi- tions which determine a priori to every part its place and relation to the other parts of the whole system. This idea accordingly demands complete unity in the cognition of the understanding not the unity of a contingent aggregate, but that of a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be affirmed with propriety that this idea is a concep- tion of an object ; it is merely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects, in so far as this unity is available to the understanding as a rule. Such concep- tions of reason are not derived from nature ; on the contrary, we employ them for the interrogation and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as defective so long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that su-ch a thing as pure earthy pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we require these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as regards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining the share which each of these natural causes has in every phsenomenon. Thus the different kinds of matter are all referred to earths as mere weight, to salts and inflammable bodies as pure force, and finally, to water and air as the vehicula of the former, or the machines employed by them in their opera- tions, for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and re-action of bodies in accordance with the idea of a me- chanism. For, although not actually so expressed, the in- fluence of such ideas of reason is very observable in the pro- cedure of natural philosophers. If reason is the faralty of deducing the particular from the general, and if the general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary that the judgment should subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus necessarily deter- mined. I shall term tfiis the demonstrative or apodeictic em- ployment of reason. If, however, the general is admitted as problematical only, and is a mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality of the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several particular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and examined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule ia Or THE IDEAS OF PU11E 11EASON. 397 applicable to them ; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be collected follow from the rule, its univer- sality is inferred, and tt the same time, all the causes which have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are con- cluded to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This I shall term the hypothetical employment of the reason. The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as problematical conceptions is properly not consti- tutive. That is to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has been employed as an hypo- thesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason. For how can we know all the possible cases that may arise ? some of which may, however, prove exceptions to the universality of the rule. This employment of reason is merely regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into the aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating of the rule to universality. The object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the systematic unity of cognitions ; and this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule. On the other hand, this systematic unity as a mere idea is in fact merely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given, but only in the light of a problem a problem which serves, however, as a principle for the various and particular exercise of the understanding in experience, directs it with regard to those cases which are not presented to our observation, and introduces harmony and consistency into all its operations. All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is, that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained. But the assertion that objects and the understanding by which they are cognized are so constituted as to be determined to system- atic unity, that this may be postulated a. priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that we are justified in declaring all possible cognitions empirical and others to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general principles from which, notwithstanding their various character, they are 398 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. all derivable, such an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle of reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and logically in its character of a method, but aojectively necessary. We shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the understanding make us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity, with that of the causality of a substance, which is termed power. The different phenomenal manifestations of the same substance appear at first view to be so very dis- similar, that we are inclined to assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are different effects as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling, consciousness, ima- gination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire, and so on. Now we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these dif- ferences to as small a number as possible, by comparing them, and discovering the hidden identity which exists. We must inquire, for example, whether or not imagination, (connected with consciousness), memory, wit, and analysis are not merely different forms of understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power, the existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem to be solved, for the system- atic representation of the existing variety of powers. The logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great a unity as is possible in the system of our cognitions ; and the more the phenomena of this and the other power are found to be identical, the more probable does it become, that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same power, which maybe called, relatively speaking, a. fundamental power. And so with other cases. These relatively fundamental powers must again be com- pared with each other, to discover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely fundamental power of which they are but the manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical. It is not maintained, that this unity does really exist, but that we must, in the interest of reason, that is, for the establishment of principles for the various rules presented by experience, try to discover and intpoduce it, so far as is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions. But the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to believe that this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but that it possesses objective reality, OF THE IDEAS OF PUEE RV{inT7. 399 and thus the systematic unity of the various powers or f&rcei in & substance is demanded by the understanding ?md erectec 1 into an apodeictic or necessary principle. For, without having attempted to discover the unity of the various powers existing in nature, nay, even after all our attempts have failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist, and may be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in the case above adduced, with regard to the unity of sub- stance, but where many substances, although all to a certain ex- tent homogeneous, are discoverable, as in the case of matter in general. Here also does reason presuppose the existence of the systematic unity of various powers inasmuch as particular laws of nature are subordinate to general laws ; and parsimony in principles is not merely an economical principle of reason, but an essential law of nature. We cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of right exist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which such a systematic unity as a property of objects themselves is regarded as necessary a priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical exercise, require us to regard the variety of forces which nature displays, as in effect a disguised unity, and to deduce them from one funda- mental force or power, when she is free to admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be different in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to the design of nature ? In this view of the case, reason would be proceed- ing in direct opposition to her own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely conflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert that reason has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of phsenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a necessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of reason, nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing the under- standing, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient criterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must suppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective validity and necessity. We find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in the principles of philosophers, although they have neither recognised it nor confessed to themselves its presence. 400 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. That the diversities of individual things do not exclude identity of species, that the various species must be considered ast Jierely different determinations of a few genera, and these again as divisions of still higher races, and so on, that, ac- cordingly, a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can be deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a scholastic maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not be employed by us. For we can infer the particular from the general, only in so far as general properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the particular rest. That the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in the well-known scholastic maxim, which for- bids us unnecessarily to augment the number of entities or principles (entia prceter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda). This maxim asserts that nature herself assists in the establish- ment of this unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite diversity of phenomena should not deter us from the ex- pectation of discovering beneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the aforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although a mere idea, has been always pursued with so much zeal, that thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the desire than to encourage it. It was considered a great step when chemists were able to reduce all salts to two main genera acids and alkalis ; and they regard this difference as itself a mere variety, or different manifestation of one and the same funda- mental material. The different kinds of earths (stones and even metals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two ; but still, not content with this ad- vance, they cannot but think that behind these diversities there lurks but one genus, nay, that even salts and earths have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely an economical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself trouble, and an attempt of a purely hypothetical character, which, when successful, gives an appearance of probability to the principle of explanation employed by the reason. But a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be dis- tinguished from the idea, according to which every one pre- supposes that this unity is in accordant with the laws of nature, and that reason does not in this case request, but re* Or THE IDEAS OF PURE BEASON. 401 quires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper limits of this unity. If the diversity existing in phsenomena a diversity not of form (for in this they may be similar) but of content were so great that the subtlest human reason could never by com- parison discover in them the least similarity, (which is not impossible), in this case the logical law of genera would oe without foundation, the conception of a genus, nay, all general conceptions would be impossible, and the faculty of the understanding, the exercise of which is restricted to the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical principle of genera, accordingly, if it k to be applied to nature, (by which I mean objects presented to our senses,) presupposes a transcendental principle. In accordance with this principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the variety of phae- nomena, (although we are unable to determine a priori the degree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical conceptions, and consequently no experience, would be pos- sible. The logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena, is balanced by another principle that of species, which requires variety and diversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus, and directs the under- standing to attend to the one no less than to the other. This principle (of the faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the levity of the former (the faculty of wit*) ; and reason ex- hibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest, on the one hand the interest in the extent (the interest of gene- rality) in relation to genera, on the other that of the content (the interest of individuality) in relation to the variety of species. In the former case, the understanding cogitates more under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more in them. This distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to natural philosophers, some of whom the remark- ably speculative heads may be said to be hostile to hetero- geneity in phaenomena, and have their eyes always fixed on the unity of genera, while others with a strong empirical tendency aim unceasingly at the analysis of phsenomena, and * Wit is defined by Kant as the faculty which discovers the general In the particular. Vid, Anthropologie, p. 123 Tr. D JU 402 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character of these according to general principles. The latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle, the aim of which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions. This principle authorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the various and diverse contained under it ; and in this way extension, as in the former case unity, is assured to the system. For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception which indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to proceed in the division of that sphere ; just as it is impossible, from the consideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how far we can proceed in the division of it. Hence every genus must contain different species, and these again different sub-species ; and as each of the latter must itself contain a sphere, (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus communis), reason demands that no species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest pos- sible. For a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which contains only what is common to a number of different things, does not completely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to it, and must consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other sub-species under it. This law of specification may be thus expressed : Entium varietates non temere sunt minuends. But it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without sense or application, were it not based upon a trans- cendental law of specification, which certainly does not require that the differences existing in phsenomena should be infinite in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the indeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation to its possible division, does not authorize this state- ment ; while it does impose upon the understanding the duty of searching for sub-epecies to every species, and minor differ- ences in every difference. For, were there no lower concep- tions, neither could there be any higher. Now the under- standing cognizes only by means of conceptions ; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in division, never by mere in- tuition, but always by lower and lower conceptions. The cog- nition of phaenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only by means of the understanding) requires au unceasingly continued specification of conceptions, and a pro- OF THE IDEAS OF PUKE UEASOX. 403 gression to ever smaller differences, of which abstraction had been made in the conception of the species, and still more ill that of the genus. This law of specification cannot be deduced from experi- ence ; it can never present us with a principle of so universal an application. Empirical specification very soon stops in its distinction of diversities, and requires the guidance of the transcendental law, as a principle of the reason a law which imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for differences, even although these may not present themselves to the senses. That absorbent earths are of different kinds, could only be discovered by obeying the anticipatory law of reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of discovering the differences existing between these earths, and supposes that nature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of the understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of differences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that these objects are homogeneous, because we could not possess conceptions, nor make any use of our understanding, were not the phseno- mena included under these conceptions in some respects dis- similar, as well as similar, in their character. Reason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations of this faculty, 1. by the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse in higher genera ; 2. by the prin- ciple of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species ; and, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, ?. a law of the affinity of all conceptions, which prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every other by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles of the homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms. The latter results from the union of the two former, in- asmuch as we regard the systematic connection as complete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as well as in the descent to lower species. For all diversities must be related to each other, as they all spring from one highest genus, descending through the different gradations of a more and more extended determination. We may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical principles in the following manner. Every con- ception may be regarded as a point, which, as the stand-poiu< 404 TBAJTSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. of a spectator, has a certain horizon, which may be said to enclose a number of things, that may be viewed, so to speak, from that centre. Within this horizon there must be an infinite number of other points, each of which has its own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed ; in other words, every species contains sub-species, according to the principle of specification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons (sub-species), but not of points (individuals), which possess no extent. But different horizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may have one com- mon horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be surveyed ; and we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and true horizon, which is deter- mined by the highest conception, and which contains under itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and sub- species. To this highest stand-point I am conducted by the law of homogeneity, as to all lower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law of specification. Now as in this way there exists no void in the whole extent of all possible con- ceptions, and as out of the sphere of these the mind can discover nothing, there arises from the presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned, and its complete division, the prin- ciple : Non datur vacuum formarum. This principle asserts that there are not different primitive and highest genera, which stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all the vari- ous genera are mere divisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus ; and hence follows immediately the principle : Datur continuum formarum. This principle indi- cates that all differences of species limit each other, and do not admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through smaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In one word, there are no species 01 sub-species which (in the view of reason) are the nearest possible to each other ; intermediate species or sub-species being always possible, the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these. The first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there exist different primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect homogeneity ; the second imposes a check upon this OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON. 405 tendency to unity and prescribes the distinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply our general conceptions to indi- viduals. The third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of homogeneity as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the gradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a relationship between the different branches or species, in so far as they all spring from the same stem. But this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum lofficarum) presupposes a transcendental principle (lex con- tinui in natura), without which the understanding might be led into error, by following the guidance of the former, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to that prescribed by nature. This law must consequently be based upon pure transcendental, and not upon empirical considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than the system ; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is systematic in our cognition of nature. These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for the purpose of experimenting upon nature ; although when any such connection is discovered, it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as valid in the sphere of nature, and thus they are in this respect not without their use. But we go farther, and main- tain that it is manifest that these principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and affinity in phae- nomena, are in accordance both with reason and nature, and that they are not mere methods or plans devised for the pur- pose of assisting us in our observation of the external world. But it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two reasons. First, because the species in nature are really divided, arid hence form quanta discreta ;* and, if the gradual progression through their affinity were continuous, the intermediate members lying between two given species must be infinite in number, which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any determinate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present us with any criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining how far we ought to pursue the graduation of differences : it merely contains a * Not quanta continua, like space or a line. See page 128, et teyg Tr. 406 TRANSCEND KNTAL DIALECTU. general indication that it is our duty to seek for and, if possi- ble, to discover them. "When we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order conformable to their employment in experience, they will stand thus : Variety, Affinity, Unity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the highest degree of their completeness. Reason pre-supposes the existence of cognitions of the under- standing, which have a direct relation to experience, and aims at the ideal unity of these cognitions a unity which far tran- scends all experience or empirical notions. The affinity of the diverse, notwithstanding the differences existing between its parts, has a relation to things, but a still closer one to the mere properties and powers of things. For example, imperfect experience may represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But we discover variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the planets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very similar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do not form a circle, will approximate more or less to the properties of a circle, and probably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still greater variations, for, so far as our observation extends, they do not return upon their own course in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets describe a parabola,, a figure which is closely allied to the ellipse. In fact, a para- bola is merely an ellipse, with its longer axis produced to an indefinite extent. Thus these principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms of these orbits, and, proceeding further, to a unity as regards the cause of the motions of the neavenly bodies that is, gravitation. But we go on extending our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seem- ing deviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system which no experience can ever substantiate for example, the theory, in affinity with that of ellipses, of hyper- bolic paths of comets, pursuing which, these bodies leave our solar system, and, passing from sun to sun, unite the most distant parts of the infinite universe, which is held together by the same moving power. The most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is, that they seem to be transcendental, and, although only containing ideas for the guidance of the empirical exer- cise of reason, and although this empirical employment stands OF THE IDEAS OF PT7BE EEASOK. 407 to taese ideas in an asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathe- matical term), that is, continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to them, they possess, notwithstanding, as priori synthetical propositions, objective though undeter- mined validity, and are available as rules for possible expe- rience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also be employed with great advantage, as heuristic * principles. A transcendental deduction of them cannot be made ; such a deduction being always impossible in the case of ideas, as haa been already shown. We distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dyna- mical principles of the understanding, which are regulative principles of intuition, from the mathematical, which are con- stitutive principles of intuition. These dynamical laws are, however, constitutive in relation to experience, inasmuch as they render the conceptions without which experience could not exist, possible d, priori. But the principles of pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard to empirical conceptions^ because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can be discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in con- creto. Now, if I grant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as constitutive principles, how shall I se- cure for them employment and objective validity as regulative principles, and in what way can they be so employed 1 The understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object of the understanding. The production of syste- matic unity in all the empirical operations of the understand- ing is the proper occupation of reason ; just as it is the business of the understanding to connect the various content of phsenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them to empirical laws. But the operations of the understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility, undetermined ; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is perfectly undetermined as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which, the understanding ought to carry the systematic connection of its conceptions. But, although it is impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the complete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there must be some analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum of the division and the connection of our cognition * From the Greek 408 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. in one principle. For we may have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect, all the restrictive condi- tions which are connected with an indeterminate and various content, having been abstracted. Thus the idea of reason ia analogous with a sensuous schema, with this difference, that the application of the categories to the schema of reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the case with the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely provides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the exercise of the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes upon the exercise of the understanding a priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity, also relates, although only in an indirect manner, to an object of experience, the principles of pure reason will also possess objective reality and validity in relation to experience. But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in regard to any empirical object ; they will merely indicate the procedure, following which, the empirical and determinate exercise of the under- standing may be in complete harmony and connection with itself a result which is produced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of systematic unity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it. I term all subjective principles, which are not derived from observation of the constitution of an object, but from the interest which Reason has in producing a certain completeness in her cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus there are maxims of speculative reason, which are based solely upon its speculative interest, although they appear to be objective principles. When principles which are really regulative are regarded as constitutive, and employed as objective principles, contradic- tions must arise ; but if they are considered as mere maxims, there is no room for contradictions of any kind, as they then merely indicate the different interests of reason, which occa- sion differences in the mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single interest, and the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely indicates a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which this interest is satisfied. This reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity in Hccordance with the principle of specification ; a lother, th OF THE IDEAS OF PUITE REASON. 409 interest of unity in accordance with the principle of aggre- gation. Each believes that his judgment rests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is examining, and yet it has been influenced solely by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of the two principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely from the interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims rather than principles. When I observe intelligent men disputing about the distinctive cha- racteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the one side assuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certain well-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the other side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same faculties and dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of external and accidental circumstances, I have only to consider for a moment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at the conclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and that there is little probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect insight into and understanding of the nature of the subject itself. Both have, in reality, been struggling for the two-fold interest of reason ; the one maintaining the one interest, the other the other. But this difference between the maxims of diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted ; although, so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must occasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hindrances in the way of the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of reconciling these conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union and harmony with itself. The same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz,* and supported with remarkable ability by Bonnetf the law of the continuous gradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference from the principle of affinity ; for observation and study of the order of nature could never present it to the mind as an objective truth. The steps of this ladder, as they appear in experience, are too far apart from each other, and the so-called petty differences between different kinds of animals are in nature commonly BO * Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. iii. ch. 6. f Bonnet, Betrachtungen iiber die Natur, pp. 29 85. 410 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. wide separations, that no confidence can be placed in such views (particularly when we reflect on the great variety of things, and the ease with which we can discover resern blauces), and no faith in the laws which are said to express the aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of investigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim which requires us to regard this order it being still undetermined how far it extends as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate and excellent principle of reason a principle which extends further than any experience or observation of ours, and which, without giving us any positive knowledge of anything in the region of experience, guides us to the goal of systematic unity. Of the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason. The ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own nature, dialectical ; it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise. For they originate in the nature of reason itself, and it is impossible that this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation should be itself undeserving of confidence and promotive of error. It is to be expected, therefore, that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is true, the mob of so- phists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and con- tradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty, because they cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its beneficial influences alone that they owe the position and the intelligence which enable them to criticise and to blame its procedure. We cannot employ an a priori conception with certainty, until we have made a transcendental deduction thereof. The ideas of pure reason do not admit of the same kind of deduc* tion as the categories. But if they are to possess the least objective validity, and to represent anything but mere crea- tions of thought (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible. This deduction will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason ; and it is to this part of our labours that we now proceed. There is a great difference between a thing's being presented OF THE NA1UBAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN SEASON. 411 to the mind as an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal object. In the former case I employ my conceptions to determine the object ; in the latter case nothing is present to the mind but a mere schema, which does not relate directly to an object, not even in a hypothetical sense, but which is useful only for the purpose of representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate and indirect manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect. Thus I say, the concep- tion of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea ; that is to say, its objective reality does not consist in the fact that it has an immediate relation to an object (for in this sense we have no means of establishing its objective validity), it is merely a schema constructed according to the necessary conditions of the unity of reason the schema of a thing in general, which is useful towards the production of the highest degree of sys- tematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we deduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of this idea, as the ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the idea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive conception ; it does not give us any information respecting the constitution of an object, it merely indicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we ought to investigate the constitution and the relations of objects in the world of experience. Now, if it can be shown that the three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological, cosmological, and theological), although not relating directly to any object nor determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the exist- ence of an ideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical employment of the reason, and extend our empirical cognition, without ever being inconsistent or in opposition with it, it must be a necessary maxim of reason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And this forms the transcendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive principles of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our experience, but as regulative princi- ples of the systematic unity of empirical cognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended within its own proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the operation of the principles of the understanding alone. I shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in these ideas, we must, in the first place, so connect all th 412 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. phsenomena, actions and feelings of the mind, as if it were a simple substance, which, endowed with personal identity, possesses a permanent existence (in this life at least), while its states, among which those of the body are to be included as external conditions, are in coatinual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must investigate the conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as external, as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or supreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence of intelli- gible grounds of these phsenomena, although we never employ them to explain phsenomena, for the simple reason that they are not objects of our cognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we must regard the whole system of possible experi- ence as forming an absolute, but dependent and sensuously- conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a sole, supreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself a ground which is a self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to which we so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects drew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words, we ought not to deduce the internal phsenomena of the mind from a simple thinking substance, but deduce them from each other under the guidance of the regulative idea of a simple being ; we ought not to deduce the phsenomena, order, and unity of the universe from a supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of a supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of causes and effects. New there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess an objective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological ideas, which lead reason into an antinomy : the psychological and theological ideas are not antinomial. They contain no contradiction ; and how then can any one dispute their objective reality, since he who denies it knows as little about their possibility, as we who affirm ? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a thing, it is not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive obstacle in the way ; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of thought, which transcend, though they do not contradict, all our conceptions, as real and determinate objects, solely upon the authority of a speculative reason striving to compass its ow OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF 3UMAN BEASON. 413 aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to be real in them- selves ; they can only possess a comparative reality that of a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all cognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in some measure analogous to them. We abstract from the object of the idea all the conditions which limit the exer- cise of our understanding, but which, on the other hand, are the sole conditions of our possessing a determinate conception of any given thing. And thus we cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have not the least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a relation to the whole system of phsenomena, analogous to that in which phenomena stand to each other. By admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions beyond the objects of possible experience ; we extend merely the empirical unity of our experience, by the aid of systematic unity, the schema of which is furnished by the idea, which is therefore valid not as a constitutive, but as a regulative principle. For although we posit a thing cor- responding to the idea a something, an actual existence, we do not on that account aim at the extension of our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This existence is purely ideal, and not objective ; it is the mere expression of the systematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of experience. There are no attempts made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be, or what the real nature of this imaginary being. Thus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God, which is presented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest sense deiatic. In other words, reason does not assure us of the objective validity of the conception ; it merely gives us the idea of something, on which the supreme and necessary unity of all experience is based. This something we cannot, following the analogy of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all things operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it as an individual object ; although we should rest contented with the idea alone as a regulative principle of reason, and make no attempt at completing the sum of the conditions imposed by thought. This attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with the grand aim of complete syste- 414 TBANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. matic unity in the sphere of cognition a unity to which no bounds are set by reason. Hence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no conception of the internal possibility of its perfection, or of the necessity of its existence. The only advantage of this ad- mission is, that it enables me to answer all other questions re- lating to the contingent, and to give reason the most complete satisfaction as regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the world of experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis itself ; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight into the subject, but its speculative interest alone which induces it to proceed from a point lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition, for the purpose of being able to consider all objects as parts of a systematic whole. Here a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we may cogitate a presupposition a distinction which is somewhat subtle, but of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient grounds to admit something, or the existence of something, in a relative point of view (suppositio relativa), without being justified in admitting it in an absolute sense (suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in the case of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we recognise, though we are ignorant of the source and cause of that necessity, and which we issume to be based upon some ultimate ground, for the pur- pose of being able to cogitate the universality of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I cogitate the ex- istence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental idea. But I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in itself, because all of the conceptions, by which I can cogitate an object in a determinate manner, fall short of assuring me of its existence ; nay, the conditions of the objective validity of my conceptions are excluded by the idea by the very fact of its being an idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, eausality, nay, even that of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the sphere of empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any object. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but they are utterly inadequate to explain the possibility of the universe itself considered at OF THE FATUEAL DIALECTIC OF HTJMAtf SEASON. 415 ft whole ; because in this case the ground of explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot, therefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the existence of an incomprehensible being of this nature the object of a mere idea, relatively to the world of sense ; although I have no ground to admit its existence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea (that of a systematic and complete unity, of which I shall presently speak more particularly) lies at the founda- tion of the most extended empirical employment of reason, and if this idea cannot be adequately represented in conci-eto, although it is indispensably necessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest possible degree, I am not only authorised, but compelled to realise this idea, that is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto. But I cannot profess to know this object ; it is to me merely a something, to which, as the ground of systematic unity in cognition, I attribute such properties as are analogous to the conceptions employed by the understanding in the sphere of experience. Following the analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and necessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attri- butes in the highest degree ; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone, I cogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the cause of the universe operating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony and unity. Thus I abstract all conditions that would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of rendering systematic unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and thus securing the widest possible exten- sion for the exercise of reason in that sphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections and relations in the world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a su- preme reason, of which our reason is but a faint image. I then proceed to cogitate this Supreme Being by conceptions which have, properly, no meaning or application, except in the world of sense. But as I am authorised to employ the transcendental hypothesis of such a being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the substratum of the greatest possible unity in experience, I may attribute to a being which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong solely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and am not justified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it exists in itself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for 416 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. this task, those of reality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in existence, losing all significance, and be- coming merely the signs of conceptions, without content and without applicability, when I attempt to carry them beyond the limits of the world of sense. I cogitate merely the re- lation of a perfectly unknown being to the greatest possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose of em- ploying it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs reason in its empirical exercise. It is evident, at the first view, that we cannot pre-suppose the reality of this transcendental object, by means of the con- ceptions of reality, substance, causality, and so on ; because these conceptions cannot be applied to anything that is dis- tinct from the world of sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme Being or cause is purely relative ; it is cogitated only in behalf of the systematic unity of experience ; such a being .B but a something, of whose existence in itself we have not the east conception. Thus, too, it becomes sufficiently manifest, why we required the idea of a necessary being in relation to objects given by sense, although we can never have the least conception of this being, or of its absolute necessity. And now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcen- dental dialectic, and the proper aim of the ideas of pure reason, which become dialectical solely from misunderstand- ing and inconsiderateness. Pure reason is, in fact, occupied with itself, and not with any object. Objects are not presented to it to be embraced in the unity of an empirical conception ; it is only the cognitions of the understanding that are pre- sented to it, for the purpose of receiving the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected according to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system ; and this systematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion over objects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over the empirical cognition of objects. The systematic connection which reason gives to the empirical employment of the understanding, not only advances the extension of that employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of a systematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only in an indefinite respect (principmm vac/urn). It is not, however, a constitutive principle, deter- mining an object to which it directly relates ; it is merely a OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN JttEASON. 417 regulative principle or maxim, advancing and strengthening the empirical exercise of reason, by the opening up of new paths of which the understanding is ignorant, while it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the sphere of experience. But reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the same time cogitating an object of the idea an object that cannot be presented in any experience, which contains no concrete example of a complete systematic unity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinate) is therefore a mere idea, and is not assumed to be a thing which is real absolutely and in itself. On the contrary, it forms merely the problematical foundation of the connection which the mind introduces among the phse- nomena of the sensuous world. We look upon this con- nection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew its origin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea. And yet all we aim at is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for the systematic unity of experience a unity indispensable to reason, advantageous to the under- standing, and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition. We mistake the true meaning of this idea, when we regard it as an enouncement, or even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of a real thing, which we are to regard as the origin or ground of a systematic constitution of the universe. On the contrary, it is left completely undetermined what the nature or properties of this so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted as a point of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so beneficial to the under- standing, may 'be regarded as radiating. In one word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle, by means of which Reason, so far as in her lies, extends the dominion of systematic unity over the whole sphere of experience. The first object of an idea of this kind is the Ego, con- sidered merely as a thinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the properties of a thinking being, I must in- terrogate experience. But I find that I can apply none of the categories to this object, the schema of these cate- gories, which is the condition of their application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I cannot thus attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phaenomena of the internal sense. Instead, therefore of an empirical E 418 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. conception of what the soul really is, reason takes the conception of tiie empirical unity of all thought, and, by cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive, con- structs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which is in itself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, and in connection with other real things external to it ; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple self-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this procedure is the attainment of principles of systematic unity for the ex- planation of the phsenomena of the soul. That is, reason desires to be able to represent all the determinations of the internal sense, as existing in one subject, all powers as deduced from one fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the condition of a being which is permanent and always the same, and all phcenomena in space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of thought. Essential simpli- city (with the other attributes predicated of the Ego) is re- garded as the mere schema of this regulative principle ; it is not assumed that it is the actual ground of the properties of the soul. For these properties may rest upon quite different grounds, of which we are completely ignorant; just as the above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the soul as it is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it, inasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented in concrete. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea of this kind, if we only take proper care not to consider it as more than an idea ; that is, if we regard it as valid merely in relation to the employment of reason, in the sphere of the phaenomena of the soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or principle, no empirical laws of cor- poreal phsenomena are called in to explain that which is a pheenomenon of the internal sense alone ; no windy hypo- theses of the generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus the consideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure, and unmixed with heteroge- neous elements ; while the investigation of reason aims at reducing all the grounds of explanation employed in this sphere of knowledge to a single principle. All this is best effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by means of such a schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thins: as an actual existence. The psychological idea is therefore meaningless and inapplicable, except as the schema of a reeu- Of THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON. 419 lative conception. For, if I ask whether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature, it is a question which has no meaning. From such a conception has been abstracted, not merely all corporeal nature, but all nature, that is, all the predicates of a possible experience ; and consequently, all the conditions which enable us to cogitate an object to this conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are absent, it is evident that the conception is meaningless. The second regulative idea of speculative reason is the con- ception of the universe. For nature is properly the only object presented to us, in regard to which reason requires regulative principles. Nature is twofold thinking and cor- poreal nature. To cogitate the latter in regard to its internal possibility, that is, to determine the application of the cate- gories to it, no idea is required no representation which transcends experience. In this sphere, therefore, an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only guide ; while, in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I), which contains a priori a certain form of thought, namely, the unity of the Ego. Pure reason has therefore nothing left bat nature in general, and the completeness of conditions in na- ture in accordance with some principle. The absolute totality of the series of these conditions is an idea, which can never be fully realized in the empirical exercise of reason, while it is service- able as a rule for the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires us, in the explanation of given phaeno- mena (in the regress or ascent in the series), to proceed, as il the series were infinite in itself, that is, were prolonged in indefnitum ; while, on the other hand, where reason is regarded as itself the determining cause (in the region of free- dom), we are required to proceed as if we had not before us an object of sense, but of the pure understanding. In this latter case, the conditions do not exist in the series of phseno- mena, but may be placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of conditions may be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an intelligible cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and not constitutive ; and that their aim is not to realize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion of this subject will be found in its proper place in the chapter on the anti nomy of pure reason. E E 2 420 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. The third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothevsis of a oeing which is valid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the one and all-sufficient cause of ail cosmological series, in other words, the idea of God. We have not the slightest ground absolutely to admit the existence of an object corre- sponding to this idea ; for what can empower or authorize us to affirm the existence of a being of the highest perfection a being whose existence is absolutely necessary, merely be- cause we possess the conception of such a being? The answer is, it is the existence of the world which renders this hypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident, that the idea of this being, like all other speculative ideas, is essentially nothing more than a demand upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and its subor- dinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by principles of systematic unity, and consequently, that it shall regard all phaenomena as originating from one all-em- bracing being, as the supreme and all-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of reason in this procedure is the establishment of its own formal rule for the extension of its dominion in the world of experience ; that it does not aim at an extension of its cognition beyond the limits of experi- ence ; and that, consequently, this idea does not contain any constitutive principle. The highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the unity of all things a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose ; and the speculative interest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order in the world, as if it originated from the intention and design of a supreme reason. This principle unfolds to the view of reason in the sphere of expe- rience new and enlarged prospects, and invites it to connect the phsenomena of the world according to teleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of sys- tematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause of the universe an intelligence which nas for us no more than an ideal existence, is accordingly always oi the greatest service to reason. Thus, if we presuppose, in relation to the figure of the earth (which is round, but some- what flattened at the poles),* or that of mountains or seas, " The advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has over every other, are well known. But few are aware that the slight OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN BEASOK. 41! 1 wise designs on the part of an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by the light of this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If we keep to this hypo- thesis, as a principle which is purely regulative, even erro cannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can have no more serious consequences than that, where we expected to discover a teleological connection (nexus finalis), only a me- chanical or physical connection appears. In such a case, we merely fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we do not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in experience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the law in its general and teleological rela- tions. For although we may convict an anatomist of an error, when he connects the limb of some animal with a certain purpose ; it is quite impossible to prove in a single case, that any arrangement of nature, be it what it may, is entirely with- out aim or design. And thus medical physiology, by the aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends its very limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts of an organized body so far, that it may be asserted with the utmost confidence, and with the approbation of all reflect- ing men, that every organ or bodily part of an animal has its use and answers a certain design. Now, this is a supposition, which, if regarded as of a constitutive character, goes much farther timn any experience or observation of ours can justify. Hence it is gvident that it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which aims at the highest degree of syste- matic unity, by the aid of the idea of a causality according to design in a supreme cause a cause which it regards as the highest intelligence. If, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely regulative influence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For it has then left the ground of experience, in which flattening at the poles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is the only cause which prevents the elevations of continents or even of moun- tains, perhaps thrown up by some internal convulsion, from continually altering the position of the axis of the earth and that to some consider- able degree in a short time. The great protuberance of the earth under the equator serves to overbalance the impetus of all other masses oi earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the earth, so far as we can ob- serve, in its present position. And yet this wise arrangement has beec unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of the formerly fluid mass 422 fliANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. alone are to be found the criteria of truth, and has ventured into die region of the incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the heights of which it loses its power and collectedness, because it has completely severed its connection with experience. The first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme Being as a constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of an idea), and not as a regulative principle, is the error of inactive reason (ignava ratio*). We may so term every principle which requires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete, and allows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task. Thus the psycho- logical idea of the Ego, when employed as a constitutive principle for the explanation of the phsenomena of the soul and for the extension of our knowledge regarding this sub- ject oejond the limits of experience even to the condition of the soul after death, is convenient enough for the purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even ruinous to its in- terests in the sphere of nature and experience. The dogma- tising spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our per- sonality through all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking substance, the interest which we take in things and events that can happen only after our death, from a con- sciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject, and so on. Thus he dispenses with all empirical investiga- tions into the cause of these internal phaenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon purely natura^ grounds ; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, he passes by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, greatly to his own ease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of all genuine insight and intelligence. These prejudicial consequences become still more evident, in the case of the dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, and the theological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it. For, in this case, the aims which * This was the terra applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical argument, which ran thus : If it is your fate to die of this disease, you will die, whether you employ a physician or not. Cicero says that this mode of reasoning has received this appellation, because, if followed, it puts an end to the employment of reason in the affairs of life. For a similar reason I have applied this designation to the sophistical argument of pure reason. OF THE NATL-KAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN SEASON. 423 we observe in nature, and often those which we merely fancy to exist, make the investigation of causes a very easy task, by directing us to refer such and such phenomena imme- diately to the unsearchable will and counsel of the Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their causes in the ge- neral laws of the mechanism of matter. We are thus re- commended to consider the labour of reason as ended, whei we have merely dispensed with its employment, which is guided surely and safely, only by the order of nature and the series of changes in the world which are arranged according to immanent and general laws. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely consider from the view-point of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the division and struc- ture of a continent, the constitution and direction of certain mountain- chains, or even the organisation existing in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, but look upon this system- atic unity of nature in a perfectly general way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme Intelligence. If we pursue this advice, we lay as a foundation for all invetigation the conformity to aims of all phsenomena of nature in accordance with universal laws, for which no particular arrangement of nature is exempt, but only cognised by us with more or less difficulty ; and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a ideological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate or predetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to follow out the physico-mechanical connection in nature ac- cording to general laws, with the hope of discovering, sooner or later, the teleological connection also. Thus, and thus only, can the principle of final unity aid in the extension of the employment of reason in the sphere of experience, with- out being in any case detrimental to its interests. The second error which arises from the misconception of the principle of systematic unity is that of perverted reason (jperversa ?'atio, ixfrspov frportpov rationis). The idea of systematic unity is available as a regulative principle in the connection of phsenomena according to general natural laws ; and, how far soever we have to travel upon the path of expe- rience to discover some fact or event, this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the more nearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature, although thai completion can never be attained. But this error reverses th 424 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. procedure of reason. We begin by hypostatising the ciple of systematic unity, and by giving an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a Supreme Intelligence, and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus not only does teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of unity in accordance with general laws, operate to the de- struction of its influence, but it hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon natural grounds, of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause. For, if we can- not presuppose supreme finality in nature a priori, that is, as essentially belonging to nature, how can we be directed to endeavour to discover this unity, and, rising gradually through its different degrees, to approach the supreme per- fection of an author of all a perfection which is absolutely necessary, and therefore cognizable a priori ? The regulative principle directs us to presuppose systematic unity absolutely, and, consequently, as following from the essential nature of things but only as a unity of nature, not merely cognized empirically, but presupposed a priori, although only in an in- determinate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon the foundation of a supreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature is in effect lost. For, in this case, it is quite foreign and un- essential to the nature of things, and cannot be cognized from the general laws of nature. And thus arises a vicious cir- cular argument, what ought to have been proved having been presupposed. To take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a constitutive principle, and to hypostatise and make a cause out of that which is properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious exercise of reason, involves reason in inextricable embarrassments. The investigation of nature pursues its own path under the guidance of the chain of natural causes, in accordance with the general laws of nature, and ever follows the light of the idea of an author of the universe not for the purpose of deducing the finality, which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but to attain to the cognition of his existence from the finality which it seeks in the existence of the phsenomena of nature, and, if possible, in that of all things to cognize this being, consequently, as absolutely necessary. Whether this latter purpose succeed or not, the idea is and must always be a true OI THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON. 425 one, and its employment, when merely regulative, must always be accompanied by truthful and beneficial results. Complete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes abso- lute perfection. But if we do not find this unity in the nature of the things which go to constitute the world of ex- perience, that is, of objective cognition, consequently in the universal and necessary laws of nature, how can we infer from this unity the idea of the supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being, which is the origin of all cau- sality ? The greatest systematic unity, and consequently teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of the pos- sibility of the most extended employment of human reason. The idea of unity is therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our reason. This idea is a legislative one ; and hence it is very natural that we should assume the existence of a legislative reason corresponding to it, from which the systematic unity of nature the object of the operations of reason must be derived. In the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is always possible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise ; and that the plea of the limited na- ture of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in many questions regarding natural phsenomena, cannot in thia case be admitted, because the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are necessarily originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own internal constitu- tion. We can now establish this assertion, which at first sight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in which reason takes the greatest interest, and thus complete our dis- cussion of the dialectic of pure reason. If, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental theology ;* first, whether there is anything distinct from the world, which contains the ground of cosmical order and con- nection according to general laws ? The answer is, Cer- * After what has been said of the psychological idea of the Ego and its proper employment as a regulative principle of the operations of reason, I need not enter into details regarding the transcendental illu- sion by which the systematic unity of all the various phenomena of the internal sense is hypostatised. The procedure is in this case very simi- lar to that which has been discussed in our remarks on the theologicaJ ideal 426 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. tainly. For the world is a sum of phenomena ; there must therefore be some transcendental basis of these ph&nomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone. If, secondly, the question is asked, whether this being is sub- stance, whether it is of the greatest reality, whether it is ne- cessary, and so forth ? I answer that this question is utterly without meaning. For all the categories whicli aid me in forming a conception of an object, cannot be employed except in the world of sense, and are without meaning, when not ap- plied to objects of actual or possible experience. Out of this sphere, they are not properly conceptions, but the mere marks or indices of conceptions, which we may admit, although they cannot, without the help of experience, help us to un- derstand any subject or thing. If, thirdly, the question is, whether we may not cogitate this being, whicli is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience ? The answer is, undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a real object. That is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum of the systematic unity, order, and finality of the world a unity which reason must employ as the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may admit into the idea certain anthromorphic elements, which are promotive of the interests of this regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea, which does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the regulative prin- ciple of the systematic unity of the world, by means, however, of a schema of this unity the schema of a Supreme Intel- ligence, who is the wisely- designing author of the universe. What this basis of cosmical unity may be in itself, we know not we cannot discover from the idea ; we merely know how we ought to employ the idea of this unity, in relation to the systematic operation of reason in the sphere of experience. But, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the existence of a wise and omnipotent author of the world ? Without doubt ; and not only so, but we must assume the ex- istence of such a being. But do we thus extend the limits of our knowledge beyond the field of possible experience ? By no means. For we have merely presupposed a something, of which we have no conception, which we do not know as it is in itself ; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the universe, which we must presuppose in all our observation of OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON. 427 nature, we have cogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent existence (an empirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed it with those attributes, which, judging from the nature of our own reason, may contain the ground of such a systematic unity. This idea is therefore valid only relatively to the employment in experience of bur reason. But if we attribute to it absolute and objective vali- dity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an ideal being that we cogitate ; and, by setting out from a basis which is not determinable by considerations drawn from experience, we place ourselves in a position which incapacitates us from ap- plying this principle to the empirical employment of reason. But, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception and hypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature ? Yes, for this very purpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental basis. But may I re- gard certain arrangements, which seemed to have been made in conformity with some fixed aim, as the arrangements of design, and look upon them as proceeding from the divine will, with the intervention, however, of certain other particular arrange- ments disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so ; but at the same time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it is asserted that divine wisdom has disposed all things in confor- mity with his highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of nature according to general laws, even in those cases where we are unable to discover that unity. In other words, it must be perfectly indifferent to you, whether you say, when you have discovered this unity God has wisely willed it so, or, nature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but the systematic unity, which reason requires as a basis for the in- vestigation of nature, that justified you in accepting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a regulative princi- ple ; and, the farther you advance in the discovery of design and finality, the more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim of this regulative principle was the dis- covery of a necessary and systematic unity in nature, we nave, in so far as we attain this, to attribute our success to the idea of a Supreme Being ; while, at the same time, we cannot, without involving ourselves in contradictions, overlook the 428 TRANSCEKDESTAL DIALECTIC. general laws of nature, as it was in reference to them alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I say, overlook the general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims observable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in Its origin ; inasmuch as there is no ground which can justify as in the admission of a being with such properties distinct from and above nature. All that we are authorized to assert is, that this idea may be employed as a principle, and that the properties of the being which is assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as systematically connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena. For the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of the supreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these we could not predicate anything of it) ; we may regard it as allowable to cogitate this cause ai a being with understanding, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and faculties of desire and will corresponding to these. At the same time, we may attribute to this being infinite perfection a perfection which necessarily transcends that which our knowledge of the order and design in the world would authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of systematic unity requires us to study nature on the suppo- sition that systematic and final unity in infinitum is every- where discoverable, even in the highest diversity. For, although we may discover little of this cosmical perfection, it belongs to the legislative prerogative of reason, to require us always to seek for and to expect it ; while it must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into nature in accord- ance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea of a supreme author of all, which I place as the founda- tion of all inquiries into nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a being, or that I have any knowledge of its existence ; and, consequently, I do not really deduce any- thing from the existence of this being, but merely from its idea, that is to say, from the nature of things in this world, in accordance witli this idea. A certain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have dictated to the philo- sophers of all times the moderate language used by them regarding the cause of the world. We find them employ- ing the expressions, wisdom and care of nature, and divine wisdom, as synonymous, nay, in purely speculative discus- OF THE NATURAL DIALECTIC OF HUMAN REASON. 429 sions, preferring the former, because it does not carry the ap- pearance of greater pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time directs reason to its proper field of action nature and her phaenomena. Thus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing less than the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is found, when thoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative principles, the virtue and function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher degree of unity than the understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the goal of all our struggles at so great a distance, realise for us the most thorough connection between the different parts of our cognition, and the highest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunder- stood and employed as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition, they become the parents of illusions and contradic- tions, while pretending to introduce us to new regions of knowledge. Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to conceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses in relation to all three elements, a priori sources of cognition, which seemed to transcend the limits of all experience, a thorough- going criticism demonstrates, that speculative reason can never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of possible experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of cognition, is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these methods, for the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, by the aid of the principles of unity, (among all kinds of which teleological unity is the highest), while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of experience, beyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane. The criti- cal examination, in our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which professed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely demonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience. If we were not distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems, if we were not allured by specious and inviting prospects to escape from the constraining power of their evidence, we might 430 TBANSCENDENTAI. DIALECTIC. spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the dia lectical arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its pretensions ; for we should know with the most complete certainty that, however honest such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they relate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility attain. But, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover the true cause of the illusions by which even the wisest are deceived, and as the analysis of all our transcendent cognition into its elements is of itself of no slight value as a psychological study, while it is a duty incumbent on every philosopher, it was found necessary to investigate the dialec- tical procedure of reason in its primary sources. And as the inferences of which this dialectic is the parent, are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a profound interest for hu- manity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a full ac- count of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to deposit it in the archives of human reason, as a warning to all future metaphysicians to avoid these causes of speculative error. n. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE 01' METHOD. IF we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an edifice, the idea of which, at least, exists in the human mind, it may be said that we have in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements examined the materials and determined to what edifice these belong, and what its height and stability. We have found, indeed, that, although we had purposeu to build for ourselves a tower which should reach to Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for a habitation, which was spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high enough to enable us to survey the level plain of experience, but that the bold undertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials, not to mention the confusion of tongues, which gave rise to endless disputes among the labourers on the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the world, each to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own plans and his own inclinations. Our present task relates not to the materials, but to the plan of an edifice ; and, as we have had sufficient warning not to venture blindly upon a design which may be found to transcend our natural powers, while, at the same time, we cannot give up the in- tention of erecting a secure abode for the mind, we must pro- portion our design to the material which is presented to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our wants. I understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of me- thod, the determination of the formal conditions of a com- plete system of pure reason. We shall accordingly have to treat of the Discipline, the Canon, the Architectonic, and, finally, the History of pure reason. This part of our Critique will accomplish, from the transcendental point of view, what has been usually attempted, but miserably executed, under the name of practical logic. It has been badly executed, I 432 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. say, because general logic, not being limited to any particulai kind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the un- derstanding) nor to any particular objects, it cannot, without borrowing from other sciences, do more than present merely the titles or signs of possible methods and the technical expressions, which are employed in the systematic parts of all sciences ; and thus the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and application of which he is to learn only at some future time. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER FIRST. THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. NEGATIVE judgments those which are so not merely as re- gards their logical form, but in respect of their content are not commonly held in especial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous enemies of our insatiable desire for knowledge ; and it almost requires an apology to induce us to tolerate, much less to prize and to respect them. All propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative form ; but, in relation to the content of our cogni- tion, the peculiar province of negative judgments is solely to prevent error. For this reason, too, negative propositions, which are framed for the purpose of correcting false cognitions where error is absolutely impossible, are undoubtedly true, but inane and senseless ; that is, they are in reality purposeless, and for this reason often very ridiculous. Such is the pro- position of the schoolman, that Alexander could not have subdued any countries without an army. But where the limits of our possible cognition are very much contracted, the attraction to new fields of knowledge great, the illusions to which the mind is subject of the most deceptive character, and the evil consequences of error of no inconsiderable magnitude, the negative element in knowledge, which is useful only to guard us against error, is of far more importance than much of that positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our knowledge. The restraint which is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the con- THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 43S stant inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed Disci* pline. It is distinguished from culture, which aims at tb formation of a certain degree of skill, without attempting to repress or to destroy any other mental power, already exist- ing. In the cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence of an impulse towards self-development, discipline takes a negative,* culture and doctrine, a positive part. That natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit), which ask a free and unlimited development, require in many respects the corrective influence of discipline, every one will readily grant. But it may well appear strange, that reason, whose proper duty it is to prescribe rules of discipline to all the other powers of the mind, should itself require this corrective. It has, in fact, hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of its magnificent pretensions and high position, no one could readily suspect it to be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things. Reason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand in need of criticism, because its principles are subjected to the continual test of empirical observations. Nor is criti- cism requisite in the sphere of mathematics, where the con- ceptions of reason must always be presented in concrete in pure intuition, and baseless or arbitrary assertions are discovered without difficulty. But where reason is not held in a plain track by the influence of empirical or of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in the transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in great need of discipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of possible experience, and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the utility of the philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character. Particular errors may be corrected by particular animadversions, and the causes of these errors may be eradicated by criticism. But where we find, as in the case of pure reason, a complete system of illusions and fallacies, * I am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the terra disci- pline is usually employed as synonymous with instruction. But there are go many cases in which it is necessary to distinguish the notion of the former, as a course of corrective training, from that of the latter, as the communication of knowledge, and the nature of things itself demands th appropriation of the most suitable expressions for this distinction, that it is ray desire that the former term should never be emploved in any othca than" a negative signification. 434 TBAN8CENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. closely connected with each other and depending upon grand general principles, there seems to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation, which, under the de- nomination of a discipline, and founded upon the nature of reason and the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a system of thorough examination and testing, which no fallacy will be able to withstand or escape from, under whatever disguise or concealment it may lurk. But the reader must remark that, in this the second division of our Transcendental Critique, the discipline of pure reason is not directed to the content, but to the method of the cog- nition of pure reason. The former task has been com- pleted in the Doctrine of Elements. But there is so much similarity in the mode of employing the faculty of reason, whatever be the object to which it is applied, while, at the same time, its employment in the transcendental sphere is so essentially different in kind from every other, that, without the warning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to that end, the errors are unavoidable which spring from the unskilful employment of the methods which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this sphere. CHAPTER FIRST. SECTION FIBST. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the sphere of Dogmatism. The science of Mathematics presents the most brilliant ex- ample of the extension of the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience. Examples are always contagious ; and they exert an especial influence on the same faculty, which na- turally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in other cases, as fell to its lot in one fortunate instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be able to extend its empire in the trans- cendental sphere with equal success and security, especially when it applies the same method which was attended with such brilliant results in the science of Mathematics. It is, there- fore, of the highest importance for us to know, whether the method of arriving at demonstrative certainty, which is termed mathematical, be identical with that by which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty in philosophy, and which is termed in that science dogmatical* THE DISCIPLINE OF PUKE EEASOK. 435 Philosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by meana of conceptions ; mathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of conceptions. The construction of a conception is the presentation a priori of the intuition which corresponds to the conception. For this purpose a non-empirical intuition is requisite, which, as an intuition, is an individual object ; while, as the construction of a concep- tion (a general representation), it must be seen to be univer- sally valid for all the possible intuitions which rank under that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presenta- tion of the object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere imagination in pure intuition, or upon paper in empirical intuition, in both cases completely a priori, without borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The individual figure drawn upon paper is empirical ; but it serves, notwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its univer- sality, because in this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the act of the construction of the conception, and pay no attention to the various modes of determining it, for example, its size, the length of its sides, the size of its angles, these not in the least affecting the essential character of the conception. Philosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in the general ; mathematical the general in the particu - lar, nay, in the individual. This is done, however, entirely a priori and by means of pure reason, so that, as this indi- vidual figure is determined under certain universal condi- tions of construction, the object of the conception, to which this individual figure corresponds as its schema, must be cogitated as universally determined. The essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists, therefore, in this formal quality ; it does not regard the difference of the matter or objects of both. Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing philosophy from mathematics by asserting that the former has to do with quality merely, and the latter with quantity, have mistaken the effect for the cause. The reason why mathematical cognition can relate only to quantity, is to be found in its form alone. For it is the con- ception of quantities only that is capable of being constructed, that is, presented a priori in intuition ; while qualities cannot be given in any other than an empirical intuition. Hence the * v 2 436 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD. cognition of qualities by reason is possible only through con- ceptions. No one can find an intuition which shall correspond to the conception of reality, except in experience ; it cannot be presented to the mind a priori, and antecedently to the empirical consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by means of the mere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of ex- perience ; but the colour of the cone we cannot know except from experience. I cannot present an intuition of a cause, except in an example, which experience offers to me. Besides, philosophy, as well as mathematics, treats of quantities ; as, for example, of totality, infinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the difference of lines and surfaces as spaces of different quality, of the continuity of extension as a quality thereof. But, although in such cases they have a common object, the mode in which reason considers that object is very different in philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The former confines itself to the general conceptions ; the latter can do nothing with a mere conception, it hastens to intuition. In this intuition it regards the conception in concrete, not empirically, but in an a priori intuition, which it has con- structed ; and in which, all the results which follow from the general conditions of the construction of the conception, are in all cases valid for the object of the constructed conception. Suppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a phi- losopher, and that he is required to discover, by the philoso- phical method, what relation the sum of its angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing before him but the concep- tion of a figure enclosed within three right lines, and, conse- quently, with the same number of angles. He may analyze the conception of a right line, of an angle, or of the number three as long as he pleases, but he will not discover any pro- perties not contained in these conceptions. But, if this ques- tion is proposed to a geometrician, he at once begins by con- structing a triangle.* He knows that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles which proceed from one point in a straight line ; and he goes on to produce one side of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which are together equal to two right angles. He then divides the exterior of these angles, by drawing a line parallel with the * Either in his own mind in pure intuition, or upon paper in em- pirical intuition. Tr THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE REASON. 437 opposite side of the triangle, and immediately perceives that he has thus got an exterior adjacent angle which is equal to the in- terior. Proceeding in this way, through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground of intuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the question. But mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of quantities (quanta), as in the case of geometry ; it occupies itself with pure quantity also (quantitas), as in the case of algebra, where complete abstraction is made of the properties of the object indicated by the conception of quantity. In algebra, a certain method of notation by signs is adopted, and these indicate the different possible constructions of quantities, the extraction of roots, and so on. After having thus denoted the general conception of quantities, according to their different relations, the different operations by which quantity or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in accord- ance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be divided by another, the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar to the operation of division ; and thus alge- bra, by means of a symbolical construction of quantity, just as geometry, with its ostensive or geometrical construction (a construction of the objects themselves), arrives at results which discursive cognition cannot hope to reach by the aid of mere conceptions. Now, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the philosopher and the mathematician, the former of whom follows the path of conceptions, while the latter pursues that of intuitions, which he represents, a priori, in correspondence with his conceptions. The cause is evident, from what has been already demonstrated in the introduction to this Critique. We do not, in the present case, want to discover analytical propositions, which may be produced merely by analysing our conceptions for in this the philosopher would have the ad- vantage over his rival ; we aim at the discovery of synthetics propositions such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized a priori. I must not confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my conception of a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere definition ; I must try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not contained in, although they belong to, the conception. Now, this is impossible, unless I determine the object present to 438 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. my mind according to the conditions, either of empirical, or of pure intuition. In the former case, I should have an empirical proposition (arrived at by actual measurement of the angles of the triangle), which would possess neither universality nor necessity ; but that would be of no value. In the latter, I pro- ceed by geometrical construction, by means of which I collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical intuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of a tri- angle in general, and consequently to ita conception, and thus construct synthetical propositions which possess the attribute of universality. It would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to reflect on it discursively ; I should get no further than the definition with which I had been obliged to set out. There are certainly transcendental synthetical propositions which are framed by means of pure conceptions, and which form the peculiar distinction of philosophy ; but these do not relate to any particular thing, but to a thing in general, and enounce the conditions under which the perception of it may become a part of possible experience. But the science of mathematics has nothing to do with such questions, nor with the question of existence in any fashion ; it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves, only in so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects. In the above example, we have merely attempted to show the great difference which exists between the discursive em- ployment of reason in the sphere of conceptions, and its intui- tive exercise by means of the construction of conceptions. The question naturally arises what is the cause which neces- sitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to discover whether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason is pursuing in an argument ? All our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is these alone that present objects to the mind. An a priori or non-empirical conception contains either a pure intuition and in this case it can be constructed ; or it con- tains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are not given a priori. In this latter case, it may help us to form synthetical a priori judgments, but only in the discur- sive method, by conceptions, not in the intuitive, by means of the construction of conceptions. THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE SEASON. 439 The only a priori intuition is that of the pure form of phaenouiena space and time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented a priori in intuition, that is, constructed, either along with their quality (figure), or as pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous), by means of number. But the matter of phsenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can be presented only in perception, a posteriori. The only conception which repre- sents a priori this empirical content of phaenomena, is the conception of a thing in general ; and the a priori synthetical cognition of this conception can give us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be contained in the corresponding a posteriori perception ; it is utterly inade- quate to present an a priori intuition of the real object, which must necessarily be empirical. Synthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an a priori intuition of which is impossible, are transcen- dental. For this reason transcendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the construction of conceptions ; they are a priori, and based entirely on conceptions themselves. They contain merely the rule, by which we are to seek in the world of perception or experience the synthetical unity of that which cannot be intuited a priori. But they are incom- petent to present any of the conceptions which appear in them in an a priori intuition ; these can be given only a pos- teriori, in experience, which, however, is itself possible only through these synthetical principles. If we are to form a synthetical judgment regarding a con- ception, we must go beyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we keep to what is contained in the conception, the judgment is merely analytical it is merely an explanation of what we have cogitated in the conception. But I can pass from the conception to the pure or empirical intuition which corresponds to it. I can proceed to examine my conception in concreto, and to cognize, either a priori or a posteriori, what I find in the object of the conception. The former a priori cognition is rational-mathematical cognition by means of the construction of the conception ; the latter a posteriori cognition is purely empirical cognition, which does not possess the attributes of necessity and universality. Thus I may analyze the conception I have of gold ; but I gain no 440 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. new information from this analysis, I merely enumerate the different properties which I had connected with the notion in- dicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical clearness and arrangement, but no addition has been made to it. But if I take the matter which is indicated by this name, and submit it to the examination of my senses, I am enabled to form several synthetical although still empirical propo sitions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I should construct, that is, present a priori in intuition, and in this way attain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the transcendental conception of reality, or substance, or power is presented to my mind, I find that it does not relate to or indicate either an empirical or pure intuition, but that it indicates merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which cannot of course be given a priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot proceed a priori without the aid of expe- rience to the intuition which corresponds to the conception ; and, for this reason, none of these conceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition, they can never present more than a principle of the synthesis* of possible empirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a syn- thetical* cognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method, and it renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical cognition, though it cannot present us with any intuition a priori. There is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the properties of universality and an a priori origin in common, but are, in their procedure, of widely different cha- racter. The reason of this is, that in the world of phaeno- mena, in which alone objects are presented to our minds, there are two main elements the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined completely a priori, and the matter or content that which is presented in space and time, and which, consequently, contains a some- * In the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the em- pirical conception of an event but not to the intuition which presents this conception in concrete, but only to the time-conditions, which may be found in experience to correspond to the conception. My procedure ; , therefore, strictly according to conceptions ; I cannot in a case of this kind employ the construction of conceptions, because the conception is merely a rule for the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intui tions, and which, therefore, cannot be given a priori. THE DISCIPLINE OF PTTUE REASON. 441 thing an existence corresponding to our powers of sensation* As regards the latter, which can never be given in a deter- minate mode except by experience, there are no a priori no- tions which relate to it, except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible sensations, in so far as these belong (in a possible experience*) to the unity of consciousness. As regards the former, we can determine our conceptions a priori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators of the objects of the conceptions in space and time these ob- jects being regarded simply as quanta. In the one case, reason proceeds according to conceptions, and can do nothing more than subject phaenomena to these which can only be deter- mined empirically, that is, a posteriori in conformity, however, with those conceptions as the rules of all empirical synthesis. In the other case, reason proceeds by the construction of con- ceptions ; and, as these conceptions relate to an a priori in- tuition, they may be given and determined in pure intuition a priori, and without the aid of empirical data. . The exa- mination and consideration of everything that exists in space or time whether it is a quantum or not, in how far the par- ticular something (which fills space or time) is a primary sub- stratum, or a mere determination of some other existence, whether it relates to anything else either as cause or effect, whether its existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection with and dependence upon others, the possibility of this ex- istence, its reality and necessity or their opposites, all these form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of concep- tions, and this cognition is termed philosophical. But to de- termine a priori an intuition in space (its figure), to divide time into periods, or merely to cognize the quantity of an in- tuition in space and time, and to determine it by number, all this is an operation of reason by means of the construction of conceptions, and is called mathematical. The success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of mathematics, naturally fosters the expectation that the game good fortune will be its lot, if it applies the mathematical method in other regions of mental endeavour besides that of quantities. Its success is thus great, because it can sup- port all its conceptions by a priori intuitions, and in this way, vnake itself a master, as it were, over nature ; while pure philosophy, with its a priori discursive conceptions, bungles 442 TBANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP METHOD. abont hi the world of nature, and cannot accredit or shovr any a priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions. Masters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of this method ; indeed, it is a common persuasion, that it is capable of being applied to any subject of human thought. They have hardly ever reflected or philosophized on their favourite science a task of great difficulty ; and the specific difference between the two modes of employing the faculty of reason has never entered their thoughts. Rules current in the field of common experience, and which com- mon sense stamps everywhere with its approval, are regarded by them as axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of space and time, with which (as the only primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their minds, is a question which they do not trouble themselves to answer ; and they think it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure concep- tions of the understanding and the extent of their validity. All they have to do with them is to employ them. In all this they are perfectly right, if they do not overstep the limits of the sphere of nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from the world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcen- dental conceptions (instabilis tellus, innabilis undo), where they can neither stand nor swim, and where the tracks of their foot- ateps are obliterated by time ; while the march of mathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway, which the latest posterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment. As we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and certainly, the limits of pure reason in the sphere ot transcendentalism, and as the efforts of reason in this direction are persisted in, even after the plainest and most expressive warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experi- ence into the splendours of the intellectual world, it becomes necessary to cut away the last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We shall accordingly show that the mathe- matical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by the least advantage except, perhaps, that it more plainly exhibits its own inadequacy, that geometry and philosophy are two quite different things, although they go hand in hand in the field of natural science, and, consequently, that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other. THE DISCIPLINE OF PUEE SEASON. 443 The evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. I shall be satisfied with showing that none of these forms can be employed or imitated in philosophy in the sense in which they are understood by mathematicians ; and that the geometrician, if he employs his method in philosophy, will succeed only in building card-castles, while the employment of the philosophical method in mathema- tics, can result in nothing but mere verbiage. The essential business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the limits of the science ; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is naturally circumscribed and limited to this particular depart- ment of knowledge, cannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself above its direction. 1. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indi- cates, the representation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a thing within its own limits.* Accordingly, an empirical conception cannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such a conception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a certain class of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not cogitate under the word which indicates the same object, at one time a greater, at another a smaller number of signs. Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of gold, in addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that of resisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this quality. We employ certain signs only so long as we require them for the sake of distinction ; new observations abstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception never remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a conception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and its properties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word water, but proceed to observa- tion and experiment; and the word, with the few signs * The definition must describe the conception completely, that is, omit none of the marks or signs of which it is composed ; within its own limits, that is, it must be precise, and enumerate no more signs than belong to the conception ; and on primary grounds., that is to say, the limitation of the bounds of the conception must not be deduced from other concep- tions,, as in this case a proof vould be necessary, and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking its place at the head of all the judgments we have to form regarding an object. 444 TBANSCEITOENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD. attaelied to it, is more properly a designation than a concep- tion of the thing. A definition in this case, would evidently be nothing more than a determination of the word. In the second place, no a priori conception, such as those of sub- fitance, cause, right, fitness, and so on, can be defined. For 1 can never be sure, that the clear representation of a given conception (which is given in a confused state) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation is adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is presented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations, which we do not observe in our analysis, although we employ them in our application of the concep- tion, I can never be sure that my analysis is complete, while examples may make this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact. Instead of the word definition, I should rather employ the term exposition a more modest expression, which the critic may accept without surrendering his doubt* as to the completeness of the analysis of any such concep- tion. As, therefore, neither empirical nor a priori concep- tions are capable of definition, we have to see whether the only other kind of conceptions arbitrary conceptions can be subjected to this mental operation. Such a conception can always be defined ; for I must know thoroughly what I wished to cogitate in it, as it was I who created it, and it was not given to my mind either by the nature of my understand- ing or by experience. At the same time, I cannot say that, by such a definition, I have defined a real object. If the conception is based upon empirical conditions, if, for example, I have a conception of a clock for a ship, this arbitrary con- ception does not assure me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object. My definition of such a conception would with more propriety be termed a declaration of a pro- ject than a definition of an object. There are no other conceptions which can bear definition, except those which contain an arbitrary synthesis, which can be constructed a priori. Consequently, the science of mathematics alone possesses definitions. For the object here thought is pre- sented a priori in intuition ; and thus it can never contain more or less than the conception, because the conception of the object has been given by the definition and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition from any other source. THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 445 Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely expositions of given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are con- structions of conceptions originally formed by the mind itself; the former are produced by analysis, the completeness of which is never demonstratively certain, the latter by a syn- thesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed, in a philosophical definition it is only explained. From this it follows : a. That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathe- matical usage of commencing with definitions except by way of hypothesis or experiment. For, as all so-called philoso- phical definitions are merely analyses of given conceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form, must precede the analysis ; and the incomplete exposition must pre- cede the complete, so that we may be able to draw certain in- ferences from the characteristics which an incomplete analysis has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the complete exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a full and clear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the commencement of our labours.* In mathematics, on the contrary, we cannot have a conception prior to the definition ; it is the definition which gives us the conception, and it must for this reason form the commence- ment of every chain of mathematical reasoning. b. Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is given only in and through the definition, and thus it contains only what has been cogitated in the definition. But although a definition cannot be incorrect, as regards its content, an error may sometimes, although seldom, creep into the form. This error consists in a want of precision. Thus the common definition of a circle that it is a curved line, every point in which is equally distant from another * Philosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as contain some of the elements requisite to form a complete definition. If a con- ception could not be employed in reasoning before it had been defined, it would fare ill with all philosophical thought. But, as incompletely defined conceptions may always be employed without detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements contained in them proceeds, imperfect defi- nitions, that is, propositions which are properly not definitions, but merely approximations thereto, may be used with great advantage. In ma- thematics, definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy ad melius esse. It is a difficult task to construct a proper definition. Jurists are still without a complete definition of the idea of right. 4i6 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTBINE OF METHOD. point called the centre is faulty, from the fact that the determination indicated by the word curved is superfluous. For there ought to be a particular theorem, which may be easily proved from the definition, to the effect that every line, which has all its points at equal distances from another point, must be a curved line that is, that not even the smallest part of it can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the other hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either by the in- troduction of signs which do not actually exist in the concep- tion, or by wanting in that completeness which forms the es- sential of a definition. In the latter case, the definition is necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain of the completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the me- thod of definition employed in mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy. 2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain, are a priori synthetical principles. Now, one con- ception cannot be connected synthetically and yet immediately with another ; because, if we wish to proceed out of and beyond a conception, a third mediating cognition is necessary. And, as philosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of concep- tions alone, there is to be found in it no principle which de- serves to be called an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, may possess axioms, because it can always connect the pre- dicates of an object a priori^ and without any mediating term, by means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the case with the proposition, three points can always lie in a plane. On the other hand, no synthetical principle which is based upon conceptions, can ever be immediately certain, (for example, the proposition, Everything that hap- pens has a cause), because I require a mediating term to con- nect the two conceptions of event and cause namely, the con- dition of time- determination in an experience, and I cannot cognize any such principle immediately and from couceptions alone. Discursive principles are, accordingly, very different from intuitive principles or axioms. The former always re- quire deduction, which in the case of the latter may be alto- gether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason, always self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be the degree of certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to such a distinction. No synthetical proposition of pure trans- THE DISCIPLINE OF PUEE EEASON. -147 sendental reason can be so evident, as is often rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two are four. It is true that in the Analytic I introduced into the list of principles of the pure understanding, certain axioms of intuition ; but the prin- ciple there discussed was not itself an axiom, but served merely to present the principle of the possibility of axioms in general, while it was really nothing more than a principle based upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of transcendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself. Philosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right tc impose its a priori principles upon thought, until it has established their authority and validity by a thorough-going deduction. 3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition, can be termed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what is, but it cannot convince us that it might have been otherwise. Hence a proof upon empirical grounds cannot be apodeictic. A priori conceptions, in discursive cogni- tion, can never produce intuitive certainty or evidence, however certain the judgment they present may be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because it does not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of conceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be given a priori in accordance with conceptions. The method of algebra, in equations, from which the correct answer is deduced by re- duction, is a kind of construction not geometrical, but by symbols in which all conceptions, especially those of the re- lations of quantities, are represented in intuition by signs ; and thus the conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the fact that every proof is submitted to ocular evidence. Philosophical cognition does not possess this advantage, it being required to consider the general always in abstracto (by means of conceptions), while mathematics can always consider it in concrete (in an individual intuition), and at the same time by means of a priori representation, whereby all errors are ren- dered manifest to the senses. The former discursive proofs ought to be termed acroamatic* proofs, rather than demon' strations, as only words are employed in them, while demon- strations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a reference to the intuition of the object. * From ttcpoa/ian/eoi TV. 448 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. It follows from all these considerations, that it is not con- sonant with the nature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to employ the dogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of mathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and can only hope for a fraternal union with that science. Its attempts at ma- thematical evidence are vain pretensions, which can only keep it back from its true aim, which is to detect the illusory pro- cedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits, and by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the dim regions of speculation, to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason must not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with such confidence, as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon with such security upon its premises, as to consider it un- necessary to take a step back, or to keep a strict watch for errors, which, overlooked in the principles, may be detected in the arguments themselves in which case it may be requisite either to determine these principles with greater strictness, or to change them entirely. I divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or immediately certain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetical proposition, based on conceptions, is a dogma ; a proposition of the same kind, based on the con- struction of conceptions, is a mathema. Analytical judgments do not teach us any more about an object, than what was con- tained in the conception we had of it ; because they do not extend our cognition beyond our conception of an object, they merely elucidate the conception. They cannot there- fore be with propriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds of a priori synthetical propositions above-mentioned, only those which are employed in philosophy can, according to the ge- neral mode of speech, bear this name ; those of arithmetic or geometry would not be rightly so denominated. Thus the customary mode of speaking confirms the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at, that only those judg- ments which are based upon conceptions, not on the construc- tion of conceptions, can be termed dogmatical. Thus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a single direct synthetical judgment based upon con- ceptions. By means of ideas, it is, as we have shown, in- THE DISCIPLINE 05 PUliE EEASON. 449 capable of producing synthetical judgments, which are ob- jectively valid ; by means of the conceptions of the under- standing, it establishes certain indubitable principles, not, however, directly on the basis of conceptions, but only indi- rectly by means of the relation of these conceptions to some- thing of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible experi- ence. When experience is presupposed, these principles are apodeictically certain, but in themselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized a priori. Thus the given concep- tions of cause and event will not be sufficient for the demon- stration of the proposition, every event has a cause. For this reason, it is not a dogma ; although from another point of view that of experience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper term for such a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it does require to be proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being the condition of the possibility of its own ground of pooof, that is, experience, and of forming a necessary presup- position in all empirical observation. If then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dog- mata are to be found ; all dogmatical methods, whether bor- rowed from mathematics, or invented by philosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and inefficient. They only serve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to deceive philosophy, whose duty it is to see that reason pursues a safe and straight path. A philosophical method may, however, be systematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered, itself a system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of investigation ac- cording to principles of unity, the material being supplied by experience alone. But this is not the proper place for discuss- ing the peculiar method of transcendental philosophy, as our present task is simply to examine whether our faculties are capable of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure reason, and how far they may proceed with the materials at their command. CHAPTER FIRST. SECTION SECOND. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemic*. Reason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, 6 G 450 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. which must always be permitted to exercise its functions with- out restraint ; otherwise its interests are imperilled, and its in- fluence obnoxious to suspicion. There is nothing, however useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim exemption from the searching examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect of persons. The very existence oi reason depends upon this freedom ; for the voice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather like the vote of the citizen of a free state, every member of which must have the privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, %nd possess even the right of veto. But while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of criticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgment of this court. Pure reason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly conscious ol a strict observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a higher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the con- trary, it must renounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy. Very different is the ease, when it has to defend itself, not before a judge, but against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on the negative side, in opposition to those made by reason on the positive side, its justification xctr* av&>&Kror is complete, although the proof of its propositions is xar' aXydciav unsatisfactory. By the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions made by reason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions advanced by other parties. The question here is not whether its own statements may not also be false ; it merely regards the fact that reason proves that the oppo- site cannot be established with demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher degree of probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance ; for, although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one can prove that she is not the rightful possessor. It is a melancholy reflection, that reason, in its highest exer- cise, falls into an antithetic ; and that the supreme tribunal for the settlement of differences, should not be at union with itself. It is true that we had to discuss the question of an apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a misconception. In conformity with the common prejudice, THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE EEASON. 451 phenomena were regarded as things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis was required in the one mode or in the other, (it was shown to be impossible in both) ; a demand entirely out of place in regard to phseno- mena. There was, then, no real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions the series of phenomena given in them- selves has an absolutely first beginning, and, tliis aeries is abso- lutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions are perfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena as plisenomena, are in themselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they are things in themselves, must lead to self-contradictory inferences. But there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding can- not be provided against, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, fo example, the theistic proposition : There is a Supreme Being ; and on the other hand, the atheistic counter-statement : There exists no Supreme Being ; or, in psychology : Every- thing that thinks, possesses the attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is utterly different from the transitory unity of material phaenomena ; and the counter proposition : The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its nature is transi- tory, like that of phsenomena. The objects of these questions contain no heterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they relate to things in themselves, and not to phaenomena. There would arise indeed, a real contradiction, if reason came for- ward with a statement on the negative side of these ques- tions alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof on the affirmative side must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without necessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at least, the interest of reason in their favour an advantage which the opposite party cannot lay claim to. I cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable think- ers Sulzer among the rest that in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto in use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of pure reason the existence of a Supreme Being, and the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that this will never be the case. For on what ground can reason base such synthetical propositions, which do not relate to the objects of experience and their internal possibility ? But it 452 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. is also demonstratively certain that no one will ever be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. For, as he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is bound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of a pure intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which can enable him to enounce synthetical judgments in regard to things which transcend the region of experience ? We may, therefore, rest assured that the opposite never will be demon- strated. We need not, then, have recourse to scholastic argu- ments; we may always admit the truth of those propositions which are consistent with the speculative interests of reasor in the sphere of experience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with the practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a critic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which can- not fail to disconcert him ; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have on our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and can therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm in- difference. From this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason. For the only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and psychology ; but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to fear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons ; and these may be laughed at, as mere child's play. This consi- deration restores to Reason her courage ; for what source of eonfidence could be found, if she, whose vocation it is to de- stroy error, were at variance with herself and without any reasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose ? Everything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are serviceable ; they destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system, and must always find a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised against the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason, are objections given by the nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a destination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what purpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest interest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with cer< THE DISCIPLINE Of PUBE KEASOW. 453 tainty, and our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the glimpses we may chance to seize ? It ia very doubtful whether it is for our benefit to advance; bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such obscurity ; perhaps it would even 3e detrimental to our best interests, But it is undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investi- gating, as well as the critical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own interests, which are ad- vanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of its views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers forcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to cer- tain pre-conceived designs. Allow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him only with the weapons of reason. Have no anx- iety for the practical interests of humanity these are never imperilled in a purely speculative dispute. Such a dispute serves merely to disclose the antinomy of reason, which, as it has its source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason is benefited by the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgments are corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion to dispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ, in the presence of reason, the language of a firmly- rooted faith, even after we have been obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge. If we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume a phi- losopher endowed, in a, degree that few are, with a well- balanced judgment : What motive induced you to spend so much labour and thought in undermining the consoling and beneficial persuasion that Reason is capable of assuring us of the existence, and presenting us with a determinate conception of a Supreme Being? His answer would be: Nothing but the desire .of teaching Reason to know its own powers better, and, at the .same time, a dislike of the procedure by which that faculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and prevented from confessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon a rigid self-examina- tion. If, on the other hand, we were to ask Priestley <-a philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation, but was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism what his motives were for overturning those two main pillars of 454 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OI 1 METHOD. religion the doctrines of the freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope of a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of resurrection,) this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of religion, could give no other answer than this : I acted in the interest of reason, which always suffers, when certain objects are ex- plained and judged by a reference to other supposed laws than those of material nature the only laws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be unfair to decry the latter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize his para- doxical opinions with the interests of religion, and to under- value an honest and reflecting man, because he finds himself at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural science. The same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed, and quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract speculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the object of them lies en- tirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the sphere of pure ideas. What is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present case to menace the best interests of hu- manity ? The course to be pursued in reference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each thinker pursue his own path ; if he shews talent, if he gives evidence of profound thought, in one word, if he shows that he pos- sesses the power of reasoning, reason is always the gainer. If you have recourse to other means, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to humanity, if you excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand nor sympathise with such subtle speculations, you will only make yourselves ridiculous. For the question does not con- cern the advantage or disadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries ; the question is merely, how far reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all kinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exer- tions of speculative reason, or must renounce all reliance 011 it. Instead of joining the combatants, it is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle a laborious struggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in its result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of thought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect TliE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 455 to be enlightened by Reason, and at the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt. Moreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits imposed on it by its own nature are sufficient ; it is un- necessary for you to place over it additional guards, as if ita power were dangerous to the constitution of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no victory gained, which needs in the least disturb your tranquillity. The strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we can- not but wish that it had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which ought to be its essential condition. In this case, we should have had at an earlier period a ma- tured and profound criticism, which must have put an end to all dialectical disputes, by exposing the illusions and preju- dices in which they originated. There is in human nature an unworthy propensity a pro- pensity which, like everything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be conducive to the good of humanity to conceal our real sentiments, and to give expression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once safe and promotive of the common good. It is true, this ten- dency, not only to conceal our real sentiments, but to profess those which may gain us favour in the eyes of society, has not only civilized, but, in a certain measure, moralized us ; as no one can break through the outward covering of re- spectability, honour, and morality, and thus the seemingly- good examples which we see around us, form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long as our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to re- present ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not our own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of nature to lead us from the rude- ness of an uncivilised state, and to teach us how to assume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But when true principles have been developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our habit of thought, this convention- alism must be attacked with earnest vigour, otherwise it cor- rupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositiong with the mischievous weed of fair appearances. I am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresenta- tion and hypocrisy in the sphere of speculative discussion. 456 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. where there is less temptation to restrain the free expression of thought. For what can be more prejudicial to the interests of intelligence, than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceai the doubts which we feel in regard to our statements, or to maintain the validity of grounds of proof which we well know to be insufficient ? So long as mere personal vanity is the source of these unworthy artifices, and this is generally the case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of practical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstra- tion, the vanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side ; and thus the result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the dispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where the mass entertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle speculators is nothing less than to shake the very founda- tions of public welfare and morality, it seems not only prudent, but even praiseworthy, to maintain the good cause by illusory arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage of lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical conviction, and of com- pelling us. to confess our inability to attain to apodeictic cer- tainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that there is nothing in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause than deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws of honesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject, is the least require- ment that can be made. If we could reckon with security even upon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the important questions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have been either decided long ago, or would very soon be brought to a conclusion. But, in general, the uprightness of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the cause ; and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny, than by those who uphold these doc- trines. I shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish to see a righteous cause defended by unfair argu- ments. Such will now recognise the fact that, according to the principles of this Critique, if we consider not what is, bin what ought to be the case, there can' be really no polemic of pure reason. For how can two persons dispute about a thing, THK DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 457 'the reality of which neither can present in actual or even in possible experience ? Each adopts the plan of meditating Qn his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he ca, what is more than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it indicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his assertions directly comprehensible and cer- tain, but must restrict himself to attacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements Denounced by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth, while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable only to experience ; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative dis- cussions, that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly lays open his own weaknesses. The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all speculative disputes ; for it is not involved in these disputes, which have an immediate relation to certain ob- jects and not to the laws of the mind, but is instituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason. Without the control of criticism reason is, as it were, in a state of nature, and can only establish its claims and assertions by war. Criticism, on the contrary, deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own institutiou, secures to us the peace of law and order, and enables us to discuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the former case, disputes are ended by victory^ which both sides may claim, and which is followed by a hollow armistice ; ill the latter, by a sentence, which, as it strikes at the root of ail speculative differences, ensures to all con- cerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dog- matising reason compel us to look for some mode of arriving: at a settled decision by a critical investigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave it and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits indi- vidual freedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the common good of all. This freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly etating the difficulties and doubts which we are ourselves uu able to solve, without being decried on that account as tur- 458 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTK1NE OF METHOD. bulent and dangerous citizens. This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which recognises DO other judge than the universal reason of humanity ; and as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable. It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous, any bold assertions against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the largest and most moral class of the community; for that would be giving them an importance which they do not de- serve. When I hear that the freedom of the will, the hope of a future life, and the existence of God have been over- thrown by the arguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book ; for I expect that he will add to my knowledge, and impart greater clearness and distinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. But I am perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has not succeeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in possession of irrefutable demonstrations of these important propositions, but because this transcendental critique, which has disclosed to me the power and the limits of pure reason, has fully convinced me that, as it is insuffi- cient to establish the affirmative, it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the truth of the negative answer to these questions. From what source does this free-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no Supreme Being? This proposition lies out of the field of possible ex- perience, and, therefore, beyond the limits of human cogni- tion. But I would not read at all the answer which the dog- matical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent, because I know well beforehand, that he will merely attack the fallacious grounds of his adversary, without being able to establish his own assertions. Besides, a new illusory argu- ment, in the construction of which talent and acuteness are shown, is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning, and in this respect the old and every-day sophistries are quite useless. Again, the dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism, and enables us to test and correct its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety in regard to the influence and results of his reasoning. But, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical care against such writings, must we not A r<* THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASOW. 459 nerve them from the knowledge of these dangerous assertions, nntil their judgment is ripened, or rather until the doctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to withstand all attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter they may come 1 If we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the sphere of pure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such disputes otherwise than by becoming a party in them, and setting counter-assertions against the statements advanced by our opponents, there is certainly no plan more advisable for the moment, but, at the same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the future, than this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time, and thus preserving it for so long at least from seduction into error. But when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion of thought, places such writings in their hands, will the so-called convictions of their youth stand firm ? The young thinker, who has in his armory none but dogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent, and who cannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in those of the opposite party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds of proof which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of proof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the suspicion that the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors. He thinks he can find no better means of shewing that he has outgrown the discipline of his minority, than by despising those well-meant warnings, and, knowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of the poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were trained. Exactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued in academical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a thorough training in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in order to bring the prin- ciples of this critique into exercise as soon as possible, and to demonstrate their perfect sufficiency, even in the presence of the highest degree of dialectical illusion, the student ought to examine the assertions made on both sides of speculative questions step by step, and to test them by these principles. It cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies 460 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. inherent in these propositions, and thus he begins early ta feel his own power of securing himself against the influence of such sophistical arguments, which must finally lose, for him, all their illusory power. And, although the same blows which overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own speculative structures, if such he has wished to rear ; he need not feel any sorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, as he has now before him a fair prospect into the practical region, in which he may reasonably hope to find a more secure foun- dation for a rational system. There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason. Both parties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they pass beyond the limits of nature, and can find no tangible point of attack no firm footing for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as vigorously as they may, the shadows which they hew down, immediately start up again, like the heroes in Walhalla, and renew the bloodless and un- ceasing contest. But neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment of pure reason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality in all speculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place weapons in the hands of the party on the one side as well as in those of the other, and to remain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce btruggle that ensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of view, to be a part fitting only a malevolent disposition. But, when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy and blindness, and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is no other practicable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings and pretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that reason, staggered by the reflections thus forced upon it, finds it necessary to moderate its con- fidence in such pretensions, and to listen to the advices of criticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much less regard the conviction of our ignorance, not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism, but as the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with itself. On the con- trary, scepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from its dogmatic dreams, and exciting it to a more careful invest! gation into its own powers and pretensions. But, as scepticism SCEPTICISM FOT A PEBMAXEM 1 STATE TOE BE A SON. 461 appears to be the sliortesi road to a permanent peace in the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by the many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous dislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present to my readers this mode of thought in its true light. Scepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason. The consciousness of ignorance unless this ignorance is recognized to be absolutely necessary ought, instead of form- ing the conclusion of my inquiries, to be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things, or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is accidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in the first case, to a dogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant ; in the second, to a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and that it consequently absolves from the duty of all farther investiga- tion, is a fact which cannot be made out upon empirical grounds from observation, but upon critical grounds alone, that is, by a thorough-going investigation into the primary sources of cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason can be made only on a priori grounds ; while the empirical limitation of reason, which is merely art indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be com- pletely removed, can take place only a posteriori. In other words, our empirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to know. The former cognition of our ignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis, is a science ; the latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the inferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it really appears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am igno- rant how far this surface extends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever I go, I always see before me a space in which I can proceed farther ; and thus I know the limits merely visual of my actual knowledge of the earth, although I am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But if I have got so far as to know that the earth is a sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I can cognize a priori and determine upon principles, from my knowledge of a small part of thia 462 TBA1TSCENDENTAL DOCTEUTE OP METHOD. surface say to the extent of a degree the diameter and cir- cumference of the earth ; and although I am ignorant of the objects which this surface contains, I have a perfect know- ledge of its limits and extent. The sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level surface, with an apparent horizon that which forms the limit of its extent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To reach this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a principle, are alike in vain. But all the questions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon, or, at least, in its boundary line. The celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who believe that they have given a sufficient answer to all such questions, by declaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge a horizon which, however, Hume was unable to determine. His attention especially was directed to the principle of causality ; and he remarked with perfect justice, that the truth of this principle, and even the objective validity of the conception of a cause, was not commonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon a priori cognition. Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its authority from its universality and necessity, but merely from its general appli- cability in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective necessity thence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to establish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all experience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the region of the empirical. This procedure, of subjecting thefacta of reason to exami- nation, and, if necessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This censura must inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of principles. But this is only the second step in our inquiry. The first step in regard to the subjects of pure reason, arid which marks the infancy of that faculty, is that of dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, is that of scepticism, and it gives evidence that our judgment has been improved by experience. But a third step is necessary indicative of the maturity and manhood of the judgment, which now lays a firm SCEPTICISM NOT A PERMANENT STATE FOB KEASO1C. 463 foundation upon universal and necessary principles. This ia the period of criticism, in which we do not examine the facia of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its powers, and in regard to its capability of a priori cognition ; and thus we determine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge, but its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable principles, not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in regard to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a resting-place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dog- matical wanderings, and gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may pursue its way with greater certainty ; but it cannot be its permanent dwelling- place. It must take up its abode only in the region of com- plete certitude, whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to the limits which bound all our cognition. Reason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the bounds of which we have only a general know- ledge ; it ought rather to be compared to a sphere, the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its surface that is, the nature of a priori synthetical propositions and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond the sphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize ; nay, even questions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the subjective principles of a complete determination of the relations which exist between the understanding-con- ceptions which lie within this sphere. We are actually in possession of a priori synthetical cog- nitions, as is proved by the existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate experience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles, he may have some reason to doubt whether they are really a priori ; but he cannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of the steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say : If we perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to determine the extent and limits of reason ; but, till we can do this, all propositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the doubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance of criticism, is well grounded ; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the ability 464 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTKLNE OF METHOD. to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a thorough critical investigation. All the con- ceptions produced, and all the questions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but in that of icason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either valid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the solution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered only from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human facul- ties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore bound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature. The polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who erects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective principles on which it is based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of his designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in itself, scepticism does not give us any certain informa- tion in regard to the bounds of our knowledge. All unsuccess- ful dogmatical attempts of reason are far fa, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But this can- not help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason cherishes of better success in future endeavours ; the investigations of scepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and powers of human reason. Hume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all scep- tical philosophers, and his writings have, undoubtedly, ex- erted the most powerful influence in awakening reason to a thorough investigation into its own powers. It will, therefore, well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of reasoning which he followed, and the errors into which he strayed, although setting out on the path of truth and certitude. Hume was probably aware, although he never clearly de- veloped the notion, that we proceed in judgments of a certain class beyond our conception of the object. I have termed this kind of judgments synthetical. As regards the manner in which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience, no doubts can be entertained. Experience is itself a synthesis of perceptions ; and it employs perceptions to increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another perception THE DISCIPLINE OT PURE REASON. 465 But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a conception, and to extend our cognition a priori. We attempt this in two ways either, through the pure un- derstanding, in relation to that which may become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to such properties of things, or of the existence of things, as can never be presented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as he ought to have done, but regarded this augmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the spontaneous gene- ration of understanding and reason, independently of the impregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called a priori principles of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary, and regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in ex- perience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we attribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange assertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the relation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from the conception of a thing to the existence of something else ; and hence he believed he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from which we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in framing a judgment that is to extend our cognition a priori. That the light of the sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it hardens clay, no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions which we previously possessed of these substances ; much less is there any a priori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which experience alone can certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of Transcendental Logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately beyond the content of the conception which is given us, we can always cognize completely a priori in rela- tion, however, to a third term, namely, possible experience the law of its connection with other things. For example, if I ob- serve that a piece of wax melts, I can cognize a priori that there must have been something (the sun's heat) preceding, which this effect follows according to a fixed law ; although, without the aid of experience, I could not cognize a priori and in a de- terminate manner, either tk cause from the effect, or the effect H H 466 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. from the cause. Hume was therefore wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the determination according to law t the contingency of the law itself ; and the passing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an a, priori proceeding, constituting the objective reality of the conception), he confounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always, of course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which, has its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, as a mere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of imagination, which can present only contingent, and not ob- jective connections. The sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally from a defect, which was common to him with the dogmatists, namely, that he had never made a systematic review of all the different kinds of a priori synthesis performed by the understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take one example among many, that the principle of per- manence was of this character, and that it, as well as the principle of causality, anticipates experience. In this way he might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the a priori operations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the understanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were ; he created a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us any determi- nate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance ; he examined and condemned some of the princi- ples of the understanding, without investigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He denies, with truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further, and declares it to be utterly inadequate to the a priori extension of knowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in the faculty ; and thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too. That is to say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based uponfacta, which are contingent, and not upon prin- ciples, which can alone demonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions. As Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which, however, his attacks are mainly directed TUB DISCIPLINE OF PURE BEASON. 467 reason does not feel itself shut out from all attempts at the extension of a priori cognition, and hence it refuses, in spite of a few checks in this or that quarter, to relinquish such efforts. For one naturally arms one's-self to resist an attack, and be- comes more obstinate in the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced. But a complete review of the powers of reason, and the conviction thence arising that we are in possession of a limited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of higher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and in- duces reason to rest satisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain. To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with prin- ciples, the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own powers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition, these at- tacks of scepticism are not only dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all his state- ments, however plausible they may appear. And thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we are thus far advanced, we need fear no further attacks ; for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor becoma involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits. Thus the sceptical procedure in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of reason, but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its cir- cumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish its claims to its legitimate possessions. CHAPTER FIRST. SECTION THIRD. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Hypothesis. This critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend the bounds of knowledge, by means of pure specu- lation, are utterly fruitless. So much the wider field, it may KB 2 468 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. appear, lies open to hypothesis ; as, where we cannot know with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses, and to form suppositions. Imagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to invent suppositions ; but, these must be based on something that is perfectly certain and that is the possi- bility of the object. If we are well assured upon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to the reality of the object ; but this supposition must, unless it is utterly groundless, be connected, as its ground of ex- planation, with that which is really given and absolutely cer- tain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis. It is beyond our power to form the least conception a priori of the possibility of dynamical connection in phsenomena ; and the category of the pure understanding will not enable us to excogitate any such connection, but merely helps us to understand it, when we meet with it in experience. For this reason we cannot, in accordance with the categories, imagine or invent any object or any property of an object not given, or that may not be given in experience, and employ it in a hypothesis ; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of rea- soning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon concep- tions of things. Thus, we have no right to assume the ex- istence of new powers, not existing in nature, for example, an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition, a force of at- traction without contact, or some new kind of substances occupying space, and yet without the property of impenetra- bility ; and, consequently, we cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances than that observ- able in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, or any kind of duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible experience are for reason the only con- ditions of the possibility of things ; reason cannot venture to form, independently of these conditions, any conceptions of things, because such conceptions, although not self-contradic- tory, are without object and without application. The conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and do not relate to any object in any kind of ex- perience. At the same time, they do not indicate imaginary or possible objects. They are purely problematical in their nature, and, as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties* THE DISCIPLINE OF PUEE REASON. 469 form the basis of the regulative principles for the systematic employment of the understanding in the field of experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become mere fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemon- strable ; and they cannot consequently be employed, as hypo- theses, in the explanation of real phaenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple, for the purpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and neces- sary unity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of all our inquiries into its internal phaenomena, although we cannot cognize this unity in concrete. But to assume that the soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception) would be enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable as many physical hypotheses are, but a proposition which is purely arbitrary, and in the highest degree rash. The simple is never presented in experience ; and, if by substance is here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the possibility of a simple phcenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords no good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of intelligible properties of sensuous things, although as we have no conception either of their possibility or of their impossibility it will always be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. In the explanation of given phaenomena, no other things and no other grounds of explanation can be employed, than those which stand in connection with the given phsenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental hypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to ex- plain the phaenomena of nature, would not give us any better insight into a phaenomenon, as we should be trying to ex- plain what we do not sufficiently understand from known em- pirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The principle of such a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfac- tion of reason, but it would not assist the understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to aims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds and according to natural laws ; and the wild- est hypotheses, if they are only physical, are here more ad- missible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as that of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of ignava ratio, w'lich requires us to give up the 470 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. search for causes that might be discovered in the course of experience, and to rest satisfied with a mere idea. As regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of these causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of phenomena j because, as they are to us nothing more 'than phaenomena, we have no right to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of their con- ditions. Transcendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible ; and we cannot use the liberty of employing, in the absence of physical, hyperphysical grounds of explanation. And this for two reasons ; first, because such hypotheses do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress ; secondly, because this licence would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which i that of experience. For, when the explanation of natural phsenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature ; and our in- quiries are brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the requisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle, which is incomprehensible, and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of thought, as to contain the conception of the absolutely primal being. The next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency. That is, it must determine a priori the conse- quences which are given in experience, and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself. If we require to employ auxiliary hypotheses, the suspicion naturally arises that they are mere fictions ; because the necessity for each of them requires the same justification as in the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their testimony is invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect cause, we possess suffi- cient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to aims, the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe ; but we find ourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the ivorld and the exceptions to these laws, to employ new hypo- theses in support of the original one. We employ the idea of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation of all the theories we may form of its phsenomena ; but when we meet with difficulties in our way, when we observe in the soul phaenomena similar to the changes which take place in THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE KEA8ON. 471 matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These may, inched, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, because the only witness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been called in to explain. We are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions re- garding the immaterial unity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being, as dogmata, which certain philosophers pro- fess to demonstrate a priori, but purely as hypotheses. In the former case, the dogmatist must take care that his arguments possess the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of such ideas is probable, is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a proposition in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can either cog- nize a proposition entirely a priori, and as necessary, or it can cognize nothing at all ; and hence the judgments it enounces are never mere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations that nothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable judgments on the nature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena, or they may relate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of an actually existing cause. In other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the world of experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention ; unless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and have some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance. But, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure speculative reason, they may be em- ployed in the defence of these answers. That is to say, hypo- theses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of dogmatism. By the defence of statements of this character, I do not mean an attempt at discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation of the arguments of opponents. All a priori synthetical propositions possess the peculiarity, that, although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the ideas contained in the proposition, is not in pos- session of sufficient knowledge to establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is as little able to prove the truth of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the one party to be superior to the other in the sphere of specu- lative cognition ; and it is this sphere accordingly that is the proper arena of these endless speculative conflicts. But vie 4/2 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. shall afterwards show that, in relation to its practical exercise^ Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of pure speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon perfectly sufficient grounds ; because all such supposi- tions destroy the necessary completeness of speculation a condition which the practical reason, however, does not con- sider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore, Reason is mis- tress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to prove which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof accordingly rests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little knowledge regarding the subject discussed, and is as little able to prove the non-existence of the object of an idea, as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its reality, it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the philosopher who maintains his proposition as a practi- cally necessary supposition (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ, in self-defence, the same wea- pons as his opponent makes use of in attacking him ; that is, he has a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of sup- porting the arguments in favour of his own propositions, but to show that his opponent knows no more than himself re- garding the subject under discussion, and cannot boast of any speculative advantage. Hypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason, only as weapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical assertions. But the opposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. For speculative reason is, in the sphere of transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The difficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old but never superannuated claims ; and we must seek them out, and settle them once and for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External tranquillity is hollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies in the nature of human reason, must be destroyed ; and this can only be done, by giving it, in the first instance, freedom to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send out shoots, and thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to try to discover new objections, to put weapons in the hands of our opponent, and to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We have nothing to fear from these conces& : ons ; on the contrary, we may rather hope thai THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON. 473 we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will ever venture to dispute. The thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure reason, which, although but leaden weapons, (for they have not been steeled in the armoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be employed by his opponents. If, ac- cordingly, we have assumed, from a non-speculative point of view, the immaterial nature of the soul, and are met by the ob- jection that experience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are mere modifications of the sensuous organism, we can weaken the force of this objection, by the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental phae- nomenon, to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and consequently all thought, relates in the present state of our existence ; and that the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous exercise of our power of cog- nition, and the beginning of the intellectual. The body would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the cause of thought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the sensuous and animal, but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life ; and the dependence of Hie animal life on the constitution of the body, would not prove that the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We might go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their extreme consequences those which have already been adduced. Generation, in the human race as well as among the ir- rational animals, depends on so many accidents of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the laws enacted by the government of a country, of vice even, that it is difficult to believe in the eternal existence of a being, whose life has begun under cir- cumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent upon our own control. As regards the continuance of the ex- istence of the whole race, we need have no difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to general laws ; but, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could hardly ex- pect so wonderful an eifect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these objections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis, that all life is properly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that it neither began in birth, nor will end in death. We may assume that thi life is nothing morf 4/4 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life ; that the whole world of sense is but an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which we exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a dream ; and that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we should see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which did not begin at our birth, and will not cease with the destruction of the body. And so on. We cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, iior do we seriously maintain the truth of these assertions ; and the notions therein indicated are not even ideas of reason, they are purely fictitious conceptions. But this hypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our opponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the complete impossibility of all that we have as- erted ; and we have to show him that he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility, and that he can as little compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can .ay a secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of experience. Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent must not be regarded as de- clarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons them, so soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a simply negative position in relation to propo- sitions which rest on an insecure foundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher ; but to uphold the objections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement, is a proceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position of a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a subject. It is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere, are valid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to opposite transcendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of possible experience conditions of the possi- bility of things in general is just as transcendent a procedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be ap- plied to no objects except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The judgments enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not be enounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the hy- potheses we have been discussing are merely problematical THE DISCIPLINE OF PUBE REASON. 475 judgments, which can neither be confuted nor proved ; while, therefore, they are not personal opinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to be raised. But we must take care to confine them to this function, and guard against any assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which would involve reason in inextricable diffi- culties and contradictions. CHAPTER FIRST. SECTION FOURTH. The Discipline of Pure Reason in relation to Proofs. It is a peculiarity which distinguishes the proofs of tran- scendental synthetical propositions from those of all other a priori synthetical cognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its conceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, a priori, the objective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses. This is not merely a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possi- bility of the proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am required to pass, a priori, beyond the conception of an object, I find that it is utterly impossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the conception. In mathematics, it is a priori intuition that guides my synthesis ; and, in this case, all our conclusions may be drawn imme- diately from pure intuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with conceptions of the under- standing, we are guided by possible experience. That is to say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that the given conception (that of an event, for ex- ample,) leads directly to another conception (that of a cause) for this would be a saltus which nothing can justify ; but it shows that experience itself, and consequently the object of experience, is impossible without the connection indicated by these conceptions. It follows that such a proof must demon- strate the possibility of arriving, synthetically and a priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which was not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular attention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing 4/6 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTitlNE OF METHOD. the straight path indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective association. The illusory conviction, which rests upon subjective causes of association, and which is con- sidered as resulting from the perception of a real and objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this reason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of sufficient reason, have, according to the uni- versal admission of philosophers, been quite unsuccessful ; and, before the appearance of transcendental criticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be abandoned to appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a proceed* ing which always proves that the problem, which reason ought to solve, is one in which philosophers find great diffi- culties), rather than attempt to discover new dogmatical proofs. But, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason, and if I aim at passing beyond my empirical concep- tions by the aid of mere ideas, it is necessary that the prooi should first show, that such a step in synthesis is possible (which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the proposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from the unity of apperception, is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer to the objection, that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a conception which is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which must be inferred if at all from observation, it is by no means evident, how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought, although in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness and cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent to my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so far absolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one ; and hence I can indicate this representation by the motion of a point, because I have made abstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that, given merely the moving power of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple substance, merely because the representa- tion in my mind takes no account of its content in space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is very different from the objectively simple ; and hence the Ego, which is simple in the first sense, anay, in the second sense, ai THE DISCIPLINE OF PUKE BEASOS. 477 indicating the soul itself, be a very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is evident, that in all such arguments, there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without some such surmise our suspicion would not be excited in refer- ence to a proof of this character,) at the presence of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a criterion of the pos- sibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at proving more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the observation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the proposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it necessary to presuppose the possibility of extending our cognition a priori by means of ideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest caution ; we require, before attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to extend the sphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason, and from what source we are to derive knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of conceptions, nor relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall thus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by ^ot expecting frem reason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and teaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of cognition. The first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a transcendental proof, before we have considered from what source we are to derive the principles upon which the proof is to be based, and what right we have to expect that our con- clusions from these principles will be veracious. If they are principles of the understanding, it is vain to expect that we should attain by their means to ideas of pure reason ; for these principles are valid only in regard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure reason, our labour is alike in vain. For the principles of reason, if employed as objective, are without exception dialectical, and possess no validity or truth, except as regulative principles of the syste- matic employment of reason iii experience. But when such delusive proofs are presented to us, it is our duty to meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgment ; and, although we are unable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based, we have a right to demand a deduc- tion of the principles employed in it ; and, if these principles have their origin in pure reason alone, such a deduction ik 478 TRANSCENDENTAL DOC TRINE OF METHOD. absolutely impossible. And thus it is unnecessary that we should trouble ourselves with the exposure and confutation of every Rophistical illusion ; we may, at once, bring all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of fallacies, before the bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon which all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculi- arity of transcendental proof is, that a transcendental propo- sition cannot rest upon more than a single proof. If I am drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but from intuition corresponding to a conception, be it pure intuition, as in mathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition which forms the basis of my inferences, presents me with ma terials for many synthetical propositions, which I can connect in various modes, while, as it is allowable to proceed from dif- ferent points in the intention, I can arrive by different paths at the same proposition. But every transcendental proposition sets out from a con- ception, and posits the synthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this conception. There must, there- fore, be but one ground of proof, because it is the conception alone which determines the object ; and thus the proof cannot contain anything more than the determination of the object according to the conception. In our Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the principle, Every event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective possibility of our conception of an event. This is, that an event cannot be determined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of experience, unless it stands under this dynamical law. This is the only possible ground of proof ; for our conception of an event possesses objective validity, that is, is a true conception, only because the law of causality determines an object to which it can refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been attempted such as that from the contingent nature of a phsenomenon ; but when this argument is considered, we can discover no criterion of contingency, except the fact of an event of something happening, that is to say, the existence which is preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thua we fall back on the very thing to be proved. If the propo- sition, Every thinking being is simple, is to be proved, we keep to the conception of the Ego, which is simple, and to which all thought has a relation. The same is the case with THE DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON'. 479 the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which it based solely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens realissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any other manner. This caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of reason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one proof of its thesis is possible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in favour of a proposition, we may be sure that not one of them is con- clusive. For if he possessed one which proved the proposi- tion he brings forward to demonstration as must always be the case with the propositions of pure reason what need is there for any more ? His intention can only be similar to that of the advocate, who had different arguments for different judges ; thus availing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments, who, without going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of the case which seems most probable at first sight, and decide according to it. The third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is, that all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect, but always ostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the truth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth , the apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition, but it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The latter is, accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly philosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they have an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact, that the mode of arguing by contradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question more clear, and approxi- mates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional demonstra- tion. The true reason why indirect proofs are employed in dif- ferent sciences, is this. When the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too various or too profound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cog- nition from its consequences. The modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of* its inferences to the truth of a proposition, would be admissible if all the inferences that can be drawn from it are known to be true > for in this case there can be 490 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP METHOD. only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is th* true one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses all our powers to discover all the possible inferences, that can be drawn from a proposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish to prove the truth of a hypothesis ; in which case we admit the truth of the conclusion which is supported by analogy that, if all the inferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all other possible inferences will also igree with it. But, in this way, an hypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens of reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a rigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one inference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be false. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series of the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we Heed only take the opposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must the opposite be itself false ; and, consequently, the proposition which we wished to prove, must be true. The apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is impossible to mistake a subjective re- presentation for an objective cognition. Where this is pos- sible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition mav contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the objective cognition ; or it may happen that both proposi- tions contradict each other only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be objective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be false, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the One from the falseness of the other. In mathematics such subreptions are impossible ; and it is in this science, accordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science of nature, where all asser- tion is based upon empirical intuition, such subreptions may be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observa- tions ; but this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the transcendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective, which is the rea. medium of all dialectical illusion ; and thus reason endeavours. THE DISCIPLINE OF PTJKE BEASOiN. 481 hi its premisses, to impose upon us subjective representations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure reason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the counter-statement. For only two cases are possible; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of the inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective con- ditions of reason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every speculatiye proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on subjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with justice be denied) ; or, both propositions, being dia- lectical in their nature, are based upon an impossible con- ception. In this latter case the rule applies non entis nulla sunt predicata ; that is to say, what we affirm and what we deny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of arriving at the truth is in this case impos- sible. If, for example, we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is false, either that is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space. Both are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phaenomena (as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) is self-contradictory j and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed, be unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as every thing in the phseno- menal world is conditioned) with the unconditioned deter- mination and finitude of quantities which is presupposed in our conception. The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illu- sions which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy. It may be compared to a champion, who maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted, by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and the purity of that honour ; while nothing can be proved in this way, except the respective strength of the combatants, and the advantage, in this respect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing that each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to regard the subject of dispute as beycnu the power of man to 1 1 482 TBANBCENDENTAL DOCTEUfE OF METHOD. decide upon. But such an opinion cannot be justified ; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the remark : Non defensoribus istis Tempus eget. Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease ; not, how- ever to the advantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition, and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if parties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the difficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence ; or they will, by the help of criticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been mocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight, and to confine itself within the limits of its proper sphere that of practical principles. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER SECOND. THE CANON or PUBE REASON. It is a humiliating consideration for human reason, that it is incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in need of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path, and to expose the illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consider- ation ought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this disci- pline is exercised by itself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds, moreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents ; and thus what remains of its possessions; after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed, is secure from attack or usurpa- tion. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all philo- sophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative THE CANON OP PURE REASON. 483 character, it is not an organon for the extension, but a dis- cipline for the determination of the limits of its exercise ; and without laying claim to the discovery of new truth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error. At the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong to the domain of pure reason, and which become the causes of error only, from our mistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason continually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human mind to find a firm foot- ing in some region beyond the limits of the world of experi- ence ? It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in which it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation ; but in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other way that lies open to it, the path of practical reason, it may meet with better success. I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles ot the proper employment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its analytical department, is a formal canon for the faculties of understanding and reason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding; for it alone is competent to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employ- ment of a faculty of cognition is possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of pure speculative reason is, as has been shown, completely impossible. There cannot, there- fore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this faculty for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical ; and conse- quently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely a dis- cipline, and not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of pure reason, in which case there must be a canon for this faculty, this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the practical use of reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate. THE CANON OF PURE REASON. SECTION FIRST. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason. There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the field of experience, to attempt to reach the 484 TEASSCEITDENTAL DOCTEI^E Or METHOD. utmost bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone, and dot to rest satisfied, until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic whole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in its practical interests alone ? Setting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its speculative exercise, I shall merely inquire re- garding the problems, the solution of which forms its ultimate aim whether reached or not, and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These highest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity ; otherwise the highest interest of humanity could not be suc- cessfully promoted. The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things : the freedom of the will, tne immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The speculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small ; and, for its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental investigation a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. \Ve should be loth to undertake this labour, because the dis- coveries we might make would not be of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We may find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the intelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phaenomena or expressions of this will, that is, our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable maxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to explain these in the same way as we explain all the other phsenomena of nature, that is to say, according to its un- changeable laws. We may have discovered the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this know ledge to explain the phseiiomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future ; because our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence, we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims existing in the arrangement of the world comprehen- sible ; but we should not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or disposition, or, inferring any, where it is not perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the specula- THE CANON OF PUEE BEASON. 485 tive use of reason, that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the teaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from something that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three pro- positions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot be employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience ; they are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless results of the severe but unprofitable efforts of reason. If, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propo- sitions is perfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost en- deavours to induce us to admit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our practical, and not to our speculative interest. I term all that is possible through free-will, practical. But if the conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a regulative, and not a constitutive, influ- ence upon it, and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral philosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one ultimate end that of happiness, and to show the agreement which should exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere, accordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action, for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely a priori. On the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given by reason entirely a priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are, on the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be pro- ducts of pure reason. Such are the moral laws ; and these alone belong to the sphere of the practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon. All the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy, are, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned problems alone. These again have a still higher end the answer to the question, what we ought to do, if the will is free, if there is a God, and a future world. Now, as this problem rektea to our conduct, in reference to the highest aim of humanity, it is evident that the ultimate inten- 486 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEUTE OF METHOD. tion of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been directed to the moral alone. We must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philoso- phy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the other hand, to fail in clearness, by' saying too little on the new subject of discussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to the transcendental, and ex- cluding all psychological, that is, empirical elements. I have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the conception of freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding transcendental conception, which cannot be employed as a ground of explanation in the phae- nomenal world, out is itself a problem for pure reason. A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum), when it is determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only, that is, when it is de- termined in a pathological manner. A will, which can be de- termined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently by motives presented by reason alone, is called a freewill (ar- bitrium liberum) ; and everything which is connected with this free will, either as principle or consequence, is termed practical. The existence of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone. For the human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects the senses ; on the contrary, we have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of desire. But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to our whole state, that is, is in the end good and useful, are based entirely upon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or objective laws of freedom, and which tell us what ought to take place, thus distinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which does take place The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws. * All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and consequently, in an indirect manner, at least, to objects of feeling. But as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere of our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgments, in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical judgments, do not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do with pure a priori cognitions alone. THE CANON OF PUBE REASON. 487 Whether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these AWS, determined in its turn by other influences, and whether the action which, in relation to sensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in relation to higher and more remote operative causes, really form a part of nature, these are questions which do not here concern us. They are purely speculative questions ; and all we have to do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which reason has to present. Experience de- monstrates to us the existence of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea of transcendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason in relation to its causal power of commencing a series of phsenomena should be independent of all sensuous de- termining causes ; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore re- mains a problem for the human mind. Bat this problem does not concern reason in its practical use ; and we have, therefore, in a canon of pure reason, to do with only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason Is there a God ? and, Is there a future life ? The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative, and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already fully discussed this subject in the antinomy of pure reason. THE CANON OF PURE REASON. SECTION SECOND. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason. Reason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of experience, and, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that sphere, from thence to speculative ideas, which, how- ever, in the end brought us back again to experience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though useful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations. It now remains for us to consider whether pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and whether it will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure reason* 488 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD, as we have just stated them. We shall thu THE CANON OF PUEE REASON. 49J otction. If, on the other hand, it has its ground in thf. particular character of the subject, it is termed a. persuasion. Persuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgment of this kind has only private validity ia only valid for the individual who judges, and the holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth depends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgments of all understandings, if true, must be in agreement with each other ; (consentienlia uni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished, from an external point of view, from persua- sion, by the possibility 01 communicating it, and by showing its validity for the reason of every man ; for in this case the presumption, at least, arises, that the agreement of all judg- ments with each other, in spite of the different characters of individuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the object, and thus the correctness of the judg- ment is established. Persuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distin- guished from conviction, that is, so long as the subject views its judgment simply as a phenomenon of its own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds of our judgment, which are valid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we have then the means, though only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing conviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgment ; in other words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion. If we can, in addition to this, develope the subjective causes of the judgment, which we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive judgment as a phse- nomenon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective character of the object, we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer deceived by it, although, if its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot hope altogether to escape its influence. I can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for every one, that which produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for myself, if it is agreeable to me ; but I. cannot, and ought not, to attempt to impose it as binding upon ethers. K K 498 T2JLNSOENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objec- tively valid), has the three following degrees : Opinion, Belief, and Knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judg- ment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjec- tively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively in- sufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself) ; objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all). I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple conceptions. I must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at least, by which my judgment, in itself merely problematical, is brought into connection with the truth, which connection, although not perfect, is still something more than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if, in relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my judgment is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to truth. In the judgments of pure reason, opinion has no place. For as they do not rest on empirical grounds, and as the sphere of pure reason is that of necessary truth and a priori cognition, the principle of connection in it requires universality and ne- cessity, and consequently perfect certainty, otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence it is absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics ; we must know, or abstain from forming a judgment altogether. The case is the same with the maxims of morality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is allowed, but we must know it to be so. In the transcendental sphere of reason, on the other hand, the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is too strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot form a judgment at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgment, such as produce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative enquiries, inasmuch as they cannot stand without empirical support, and are incapable of being communimed to others in equal measure. But it is only from the practical point of view that a theo- retically insufficient judgment can be termed belief. practical reference is either to skiU or to morality ; to THE CANON OF PUBE REASON. 499 former, when the end proposed is arbitrary and accidental, to th? latter, when it is absolutely necessary. If we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment are hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only comparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under which the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely, and for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions, under which the attain- ment of the proposed end would be possible. In the former case my supposition my judgment with regard to certain conditions, is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a necessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of a patient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He observes the symptoms, and con eludes, according to the best of his judgment, that it is a case of phthisis. His belief is, even in his own judgment, only contingent : another man might, perhaps, come nearer the truth. Such a belief, contingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends, I term pragmatical belief. The usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion, or his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. It frequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and assurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of his being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause. Sometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at ten. For he does not hesi- tate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is proposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his being mistaken a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation. If we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole life on the truth of any proposi- tion, our judgment drops its air of triumph, we take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus prag- matical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the inter- ests at stake. Now, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to some object, and where, accordingly, oui judgment is purely theoretical, we can still represent to our* KX2 500 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTEINE OF METHOD. Reives, in thought, the possibility of a course of action, for which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any means existed of ascertaining the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely theoretical judgments an analoyon of practical judg- ments, to which the word belief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I should not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition, if there were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience, that, at least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that I have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of which I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are inhabitants in other worlds. Now we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the universe I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this idea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe presents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if everything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a condition of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for me to ignore it especially since, in addition to these considerations, abundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so far as my knowledge extends, under which this unity can be my guide in the investigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has ordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently the hypothesis of a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the investigation of nature is the condition under which alone I can fulfil an end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since the result of my at- tempts so frequently confirms the utility of this assumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it, it follows that it would be saying far too little to term my judgment, in this case, a mere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical con- nection, I may assert that I firmly believe in God. Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be called a practical, but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature (physico- theology) must also produce in my mind. In the wisdom o( s Supreme Being, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate THE CANON OF PURE EEA.SON. 501 to the development of the glorious powers of human nature^ we may find equally sufficient grounds for a doctrinal beliei in the future life of the human soul. The expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty from the objective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the subjective. If I should venture to term this merely theoretical judgment even so much as a hypothesis which I am entitled to assume ; a more complete conception, with regard to another world and to the cause of the world, might then be justly required of me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I assume anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much ot the properties of suoh a being as will enable me, not to form the conception, but to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the guidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct of my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a position to give a speculative account of it. But mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in sta- bility. We often quit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which occur in speculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it again. It is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action is absolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law in all points. The end is here incontrover- tibly established, and there is only one condition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this end can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical validity namely, the existence of a God and of a future world. I know also, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the moral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should be), I am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a future life ; and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would render me Uateful in my own eyes. 'Ihus, while all tiie ambitious attempts of reason to pene- trate beyond the limits of experience end in disappointment, (here is still enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of 602 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a future life ; for, if he knows this, he is just the man whom I have long wished to find. All know- ledge, regarding an object of mere reason, can be communi- cated ; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the instrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral certainty ; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I must not even say : It is morally certain that there is a God, &c., but : 1 am morally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral nature, that I am under as little apprehension of having the former torn from me as of losing the latter. The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion, is that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments. If we give up this assumption, and take a man who is entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, the question which reason proposes, becomes then merely a problem for speculation, and may, indeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy, but not by such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.* But in these ques- tions no man is free from all interest. For though the want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral interests, still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear the existence of God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to any certainty of the non-existence of God and of a future life, unless since it could only be proved by mere reason, and therefore apodeictically he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both, which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be a negative belief, which could not, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments, but still could produce an analogon of these, by operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evU dispositions. But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, * The human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must of necessity do,) takes a natural interest in morality, although this interest is not un- divided, and may not be practically in preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you will find the reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of uniting the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take care at the outset, or at least mid-way, to make aier. good, you will never force them into an honest belief. THE ARCHITECTONIC OF PUKE REASON. 503 ir. opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than two articles of belief? Common sense could have done as much as this, without taking the philoso- phers to counsel in the matter ! I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason, even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only negative, for on this point something more will be said in the next section. But I ask, do you require that that knowledge which concerns all men, should transcend the common understanding, and should only be revealed to you by philosophers ? The very circumstance which has called forth your censure, is the best confirmation of the correctness of our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not have been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction, and that in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot advance further with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER THIRD. THE ARCHITECTONIC or PURE REASOH. By the term Architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without systematic unity, our knowledge cannot be- come science ; it will be an aggregate, and not a system. Thus Architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in cognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our Methodology. Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an uncon- nected and rhapsodistic state, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system. It is thus alone that they can advance the ends of reason. By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under one idea. This idea is the conception given by reason of the form of a whole, in so far as the conception determines a priori not only the limits of its content, but the place which each of its parts is to occupy. The scientific idea contains, there- fore, the end, and the form ot the whole which is in accord? 504 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. ance with that end. The unity of the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and through which all have a re- lation to each other, communicates unity to the whole system, so that the absence of any part can he immediately detected from our knowledge of the rest ; and it determines a priori the limits of the system, thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an organism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio) ; it may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external additions (per appositionem) . It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which does not add any limb, but, without changing their proportions, makes each in its sphere stronger and more active. We require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that is, a content and an arrangement of parts deter- mined a priori by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not projected in accordance with an idea, that is, from the stand-point of the highest aim of reason, but merely empirically, in accordance with acciden- tal aims and purposes (the number of which cannot be pre- determined), can give us nothing more than technical unity. But the schema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason presents us with aims a priori, and does not look for them to experience), forms the basis of architectonical unity. A science, in the proper acceptation of that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from observation of the similarity existing between different objects, and the purely contingent use we make of our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary external aims ; its consti- tution must be framed on architectonical principles, that is, its parts must be shown to possess an essential affinity, and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms the condition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of a science must give a priori the plan of it (monogramma), and the division of the whole into parts, in conformity with the idea of the science ; and it must also distinguish this whole from all others, according to certain understood principles. No one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have *ome idea to rest on as a proper basis. But, in the elaboration af the science he finds that the schema, nay, even the defi THE ABCTIITECTONIC OIF PUEE BEASOff. 505 a'tion which he at first gave of the science, rarely corresponds with his idea ; for this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason, its parts undeveloped and hid even from microscopical obser- vation. For this reason, we ought to explain and define sciences, not according to the description which the originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in reason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the science already accumulated. For it will often be found, that the originator of a science, and even his latest successors, remain attached to an erroneous idea, which they cannot render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in determining the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the limits of their science. It is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a long time in the collection of materials, under the guid- ance of an idea which lies undeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite plan of arrangement, nay, only after we have spent much time and labour in the technical dispo- sition of our materials, does it become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to architectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance with the aims of reason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio cequivoca by the mere confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness only with the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason ; and thus is not only every system organized accord- ing to its own idea, but all are united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form members. For this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all hu- man cognition, the formation of which, at the present time, considering the immense materials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not indeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the Architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason ; and we begin from the point where the main root of human know- ledge divides into two, one of which is reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition, the rational being; placed in contradistinction to the empirical. If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively considered, all cognition is, fr>m a subjective pcint of view, either historical or rational. Historical cogni- 506 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. .ion is cognitio ex datis, rational, coynitio ex principiis. What- ever may be the original source of a cognition, it is, in relation to the person who possesses it, merely historical, if he knows only what has been given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was communicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus the person who has learned a system of philosophy, say the Wolfian, although he has a perfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions and arguments in that philosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system, he possesses really no more than a historical knowledge of the Wolfian system ; he knows only what has been told him, his judgments are only those which he has received from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is at completely a loss to find another. He has formed his mind on another's ; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge has not been drawn from reason ; and, although, objectively consi- dered, it is rational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely histo- rical. He has learned this or that philosophy, and is merely a plaster-cast of a living man. Rational cognitions which are objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can be so termed from a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by the individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles ; and it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has been already learned, can spring up in the mind. All rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on the construction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical, the latter mathematical. I have already shewn the essential difference of these two methods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may be objectively philosophi- cal and subjectively historical, as is the case with the majority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their system, and who remain in a state of pupillage all their lives. But it is remarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid, from the subjective point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the same distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophi- cal cognition. The reason is, that the only way of arriving at this knowledge is through the essential principles of reason, And thus it is always certain and indisputable ; because reason THE ABCHITECTOHIC OF PIJBE BEASON. 507 is employed in concrete but at the same time a pnori* that is, in pare, and therefore, infallible intuition ; and thus all causes of illusion and error are excluded. Of all the a, priori sciences of reason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy unless it be in an historical manner cannot be learned ; we can at most learn to philosophise. Philosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition We must use this term in an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype of all attempts at philosophizing, and the standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be judged. In this sense, philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science, which does not exist in concrete, but to which we endeavour in various ways to approximate, until we have disco- vered the right path to pursue a path overgrown by the errors and illusions of sense, and the image we have hitherto tried to shape in vain, has become a perfect copy of the great proto- type. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy it does not exist ; if it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it ? We can only learn to philosophize ; in other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them. Until then, our conception of philosophy is only a scho- lastic conception a conception, that is, of a system of cogni- tion which we are trying to elaborate into a science ; all that we at present know, being the systematic unity of this cogni- tion, and consequently the logical completeness of the cogni- tion for the desired end. But there is also a cosmical concep- tion (conceptus cosmicus] of philosophy, which has always formed the true basis of this term, especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in the ideal of a philoso- pher. In this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason (teleologia rationis humance), and the philosopher is not merely an artist who occupies himself with conceptions, but a law-giver legislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be in the highest degree arrogant to as- sume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that we had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea ilone 508 THA.NSCENDENTAL DOCTE1TTE OF METHOD. The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logi- cian, how far soever the first may have advanced iii rational, and the two latter in philosophical knowledge, are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement and formation of concep- tions ; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above them all, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments for the advancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone can we call philosopher ; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power resides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of systematic" unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of rea- son. This idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.* In view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one ultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other aims are subordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment. This ultimate end is the destina- tion of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed Moral Philosophy. The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all other spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason why the ancients always included the idea and in an especial manner of Moralist in that of Philosopher. Even at the present day, we call a man who appears to have the power of self-govern- ment, even although his knowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher. The legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects Nature and Freedom, and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those of ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally, merge into one grand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy of Nature relates to that which is, that of Ethics to that which ought to be. But all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or the cognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The former is termed pure, the latter empirical philosophy. The philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic, that is, an inquiry into the powers of reason in regard to pure a priori * By a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily take an interest ; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined ac- cording to scholastic [or partial] conceptions, if it is regarded merely a to certain arbitrarily proposed ends. THE AECHITECTONIC OF PUliE BEASO1T. 509 eognition, and is termed Critical Philosophy ; or it is, secondly, the system of pure reason a science containing the syste- matic presentation of the whole body of philosophical know- ledge, true as well as illusory, given by pure reason, and is called Metaphysic. This name may, however, be also given to the whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may designate the investigation into the sources or possibility of a priori cognition, as well as the presentation of the a priori cognitions which form a system of pure philo- sophy excluding, at the same time, all empirical and mathe- matical elements. Metaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and tha*. of the practical use of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the Metaphysic of Nature, or the Metaphysic of Ethics. The former contains all the pure rational principles based upon conceptions alone (and thus excluding mathematics) of all theoretical cognition j the latter, the principles which deter- mine and necessitate a priori all action. Now moral philo- sophy alone contains a code of laws for the regulation of our actions which are deduced from principles entirely a priori. Hence the Metaphysic of Ethics is the only pure moral philo- sophy, as it is not based upon anthropological or other empi- rical considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is commonly called Metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure Moral Philosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we must allow it to retain the name of Metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should insist on so terming it in our present discussion. It is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which differ from others both in kind and in origin, and to take great care that they are not confounded with those, with which they are generally found connected. What the chemist does in the analysis of substances, what the mathematician in pure mathematics, is, in a still higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that the value of each different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the operations of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a Metaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of reflection ; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought and cognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of a science of this kind \ as old as 510 TBANSCEltDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. speculation itself ; and what mind does not speculate eithei in the scholastic or in the popular fashion ? At the same time, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable clearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our cognition the one completely a priori, the other a posteriori ; and hence the proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just idea of a science which has so long and so deeply engaged the attention of the human mind, has never been established. When it was said Metaphysic is the science of the first principles of human cognition, this definition did not signalise a peculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree ; these first principles were thus declared to be more general than others, but no criterion of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are more general, and therefore higher, than others ; and as we cannot distinguish what is completely a priori, from that which is known to be a posteriori where shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher and so-called first principles, from the lower and subordinate principles of cognition ? What would be said if we were asked to be satis- fied with a division of the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those following them ? Does the fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier centuries? it would be asked. In the same way I ask : Does the conception of ex- tension belong to metaphysics ? You answer, yes. Well, that of body too ? Yes. And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are unprepared to admit this ; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics. From this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination of the particular to the general cannot determine the limits of a science ; and that, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference in the con- ceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fun- damental idea of metaphysics was obscured on another side, by the fact that this kind of ci priori cognition showed a certain similarity in character with the science of mathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing an a priori origin ; but, in the one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the construction of conceptions. Thus a de- cided dissimilarity between philosophical and mathematical cognition comes out a dissimilarity which was always felt, but which could not be made distinct for want of an insight THE ARCHITECTCXMC OF PURE REASOZT 511 into the criteria of the difference. And thus it happened that, as philosopher* themselves failed in the proper development oi the idea of their science, the elaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim, or under trustworthy guid- ance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought to pursue, and always disputing with each other re- garding the discoveries which each asserted he had made, brought their science into disrepute with the rest of the world, and finally, even among themselves. All pure a priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar faculty which originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity ; and metaphysic is the term applied to the philo- cpny which attempts to represent that cognition in this syste- matic unity. The speculative part of metaphysic, which has especially appropriated this appellation, that, which we have called the Metaphysic of Nature, and which considers every- thing, as it is (not as it ought to be), by means of a priori conceptions, is divided in the following manner. Metaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of two parts Transcendental Philosophy and the Physiology of pure reason. The former presents the system of all the conceptions and principles belonging to the under- standing and the reason, and which relate to objects in general, but not to any particular given objects (Ontologid) ; the latter has nature for its subject-matter, that is, the sum of given objects whether given to the senses, or, if we will, to some other kind of intuition, and is accordingly Physiology, al- though only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of reason in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical or hyperphysical, or, more properly speaking, immanent or tran- scendent. The former relates to nature, in so far as our know- ledge regarding it may be applied in experience (in concretn) ; the latter to that connection of the objects of experience, which transcends all experience. Transcendent Physiology has, again, an internal and an external connection with its object, both, however, transcending passible experience ; the former is the Physiology of nature as a whole, or transcenden- tal cognition of the world, the latter of the connection of the whole of nature with a being above nature, or transcendental tvgnition of God. Immanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature aa 512 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTHINE OF METHOD. the sum of all sensuous objects, consequently, as it is sented to us but still according to a priori conditions, for it is under these alone that nature can be presented to our minds at all. The objects of immanent physiology are of two kinds : 1. those of the external senses, or corporeal nature; 2. tht object of the internal sense, the soul, or, in accordance with our fundamental conceptions of it, thinking nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called Physics, but, as it must contain only the principles of an a priori cognition of nature, we must term it rational physics. The metaphysics of thinking nature is called Psychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded as merely the rational cognition of the soul. Thus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts : 1. Ontology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational Cosmology ; and 4. Rational Theology . The second part that of the rational doctrine of nature may be sub- divided into two, physica rationalis * and psychologia ratio- nails. The fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity dictates this division ; it is, therefore, architectonical in accordance with the highest aims of reason, and not merely technical, or according to certain accidentally-observed similarities existing between the different parts of the whole science. For this reason, also, is the division immutable and of legislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a few points to which he ought to demur, and which may weaken his conviction of its truth and legitimacy. In the first place, how can I desire an a priori cognition or metaphysic of objects, in so far as they are given a posteriori? and how is it possible to cognize the nature of things accord- * It must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is generally called physica generalis, and which is rather mathematics, than a philosophy of nature. For the metaphysic of nature is completely different from mathematics, nor is it so rich in results, although it is of great importance as a critical test of the application of pure understand- ing-cognition to nature. For want of its guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common notions which are, in fact, metaphysical have unconsciously crowded their theories of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes evident upon the application of the princi- ples of this metaphysic, without detriment, however, to the employmea* af mathematics in this sphere of cognition. THE ARCHITECTONIC OP PUEE BEA.SOW. 513 ing to a priori principles, and to attain to a rational physi- ology ? The answer is this. We take from experience no- thing more than is requisite to present us with an object (in general) of the external, or of the internal sense ; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter (impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the conception of a thinking being given in the internal empirical representa- tion, / think. As to the rest, we must not employ in our metaphysic of these objects any empirical principles, (which add to the content of our conceptions by means of experience), for the purpose of forming by their help any judgments re- specting these objects. Secondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology, which has always been considered a part of Metaphysics, and from which in our time such important philosophical results have been expected, after the hope of constructing an a priori system of knowledge had been abandoned ? I answer : It must be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics proper ; that is, must be regarded as forming a part of applied philosophy, the a priori principles of which are contained in pure philosophy, which is therefore connected, although it must not be confounded, with psychology. Empirical psychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of Metaphysics, and is indeed excluded by the very idea of that science. In con- formity, however, with scholastic usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics but only as an appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy ; as psychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as an in- dependent study, while it is, at the same time, of too great importance, to be entirely excluded or placed where it has still less affinity than it has with the subject of metaphysics. It is a stranger who has been long a guest ; and we make it welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete system of Anthropology the pendant to em- pirical physics. The above is the general idea of Metaphysics, which, as more was expected from it than could be looked for with justice, and as these pleasant expectations were unfortunately never realised, fell into general disrepute. Our Critique must have fully convinced the reader, that, although metaphysics cannot form the foundation of religion, it must always be one of its most LL 514 TEANSCEISDEITTAL DOCTETTfE OF METHOD. important bulwarks, and that human reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do without this science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic, and, by eleva- ting reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevent* the rayages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in the sphere of morals as well as in that of religion. We may be sure, therefore, whatever contempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its own nature, but according to the accidental effects it may have produced, that it can never be completely abandoned, that we must always return to it as to a beloved one who has been for a time estranged, because the questions with which it is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity, and reason must always labour either to attain to settled views in regard to these, or to destroy those which others have already estab- lished. Metaphysic, therefore that of nature, as well as that of ethics, but in an especial manner the criticism which forms the propaedeutic to all the operations of reason forms pro- perly that department of knowledge which may be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The path which it pursues is that of science, which, when it has once been discovered, is never lost, and never misleads. Mathematics, natural science, the common experience of men, have a high value as means, for the most part, to accidental ends, but at last also, to those which are necessary and essential to the existence of humanity. But to guide them to this high goal, they require the aid of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed as it may, is properly nothing but metaphysics. For the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the com- pletion of the culture of human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable, setting aside altogether the influence which it exerts as a science. For its subject-matter is the elements and highest maxims of reason, which form the basis of the possibility of some sciences and of the use of all. That, as a purely speculative science, it is more useful in preventing error, than in the extension of knowledge, does not detract from its value ; on the contrary, the supreme office of censor which it occupies, assures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it administers for the purpose of securing order, THE HISTOEY OF PUEE BEA8OW. 515 harmony, and well-being to science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible aim the happi- ness of all mankind. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD. CHAPTER FOURTH. THE HISTOET or PUEE REASON. This title is placed here merely for the purpose of desig- nating a division of the system of pure reason, of which I do not intend to treat at present. I shall content myself with casting a cursory glance, from a purely transcendental point of view that of the nature of pure reason, on the labours of philosophers up to the present time. They have aimed at erecting an edifice of philosophy ; but to my eye this edi- fice appears to be in a very ruinous condition. It is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been otherwise, that, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature of God, and the constitution of a future world, formed the commencement, rather than the conclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative efforts of the human mind. However rude the religious conceptions generated by the remains of the old manners and customs of a less cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not thereby prevented from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence and nature of God ; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of pleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to happiness in another world at least, than a good and honest course of life in this. Thus theology and morals formed the two chief motives, or rather the points of attrac- tion in all abstract inquiries. But it was the former that especially occupied the attention of speculative reason, and which afterwards became so celebrated under the name of metaphysics. I shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the greatest changes in metaphysics tooK place, but shall merely give a hasty sketch of the different ideas which occa- sioned the most important revolutions in this sphere of thought. There are three diflerent ends, in relation to which, these revolutions have taken place. L L 2 516 TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OP METHOD. 1 . In relation to the object of the cognition of reason, phi- losophers may be divided into Sensualists and Intellectuality Epicurus may be regarded as the head of the former, Plato of the latter. The distinction here signalised, subtle as it is, dates from the earliest times, and was long maintained. The former asserted, that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that everything else is merely imaginary; the tatter, that the senses are the parents of illusion, and that truth is to be found in the understanding alone. The former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a cer- tain kind of reality ; but with them it was merely logical, with the others it was mystical. The former admitted in- tellectual conceptions, but declared that sensuous objects alone possessed real existence. The latter maintained that all real objects were intelligible, and believed that the pure understanding possessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense, which, in their opinion, served only to confuse the ideas of the understanding. 2. In relation to the on^'wofthe pure cognitions of reason, we find one school maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience, and another, that they have their origin in reason alone. Aristotle may be regarded as the head of the Empiricists, and Plato, of the Noologists. Locke, the follower of Aristotle in modern times, and Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to have imitated him in his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question to a settled conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system, in which he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experi- ence, was much more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. The latter especially, after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind from experience, goes so far, in the employment of these conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul both of them objects lying beyond the limits of possible experience with the same force of demonstration, as any mathematical proposition. 3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to principles. We may divide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry into the naturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason lays it down as his principle, that common reason, without the aid of science which he calls THE HISTORY OF PUEB EEASO1T. 517 lound reason, or common sense can give a more satisfactory answer to the most important questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do. He must maintain, therefore, that we can determine the content and circumference of the moon more certaiUy by the naked eye, than by the aid of mathe- matical reasoning. But this system is mere misology reduced to principles ; and, what is the most absurd thing in this doctrine, the neglect of all scientific means is paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition. As regards those who are naturalists because they know no better, they are certainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading their ignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret, how we are to find the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of Democritus. Quod sapio satis est mihi, noa ego euro Esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones, PERS. is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and praiseworthy life, without troubling themselves with science, or troubling science with them. As regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have now the choice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical, while they are bound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. When I mention, in relation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as regards the latter, David Hume, I may leave, in accordance with my present in- tention, all others unnamed. The critical path alone is still open. 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