THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 332. V.ZB THE CURRENCY QUESTION FREED FROM MYSTERY, A LETTER TO MR. PEEL, SHOWING HOW THE DISTRESS MAY BE RELIEVED WITHOUT ALTERING THE STANDARD. " Auro pulsa Fides."— Propert. " inviso torquemur ab auro — Copia nulla faniem relerat. — Peccavimus ergo ■Serf miserere, precor, specioso que eripe damno." — Ovin. de Mid \. LONDON : JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY. MDCCCXXX. CHARLES WOOD AND SON, PRINTERS, Poppin's Court, Fleet Street. ,ETTER TO MR. PEEL. Sir; You are reported to have said on the first day of this parliamentary session, that you held it to be the paramount duty of a public man to remember that his opinions are fallible ; to re-examine them with candour when circum- stances seem to throw a doubt on their correct- ness ; and to abandon them without hesitation when he is convinced they are wrong. These sentiments are as rational as they are honourable to you ; and in a late instance you have proved that you can act up to them. I am, therefore, led to hope that you will not prove less open to reasoning and the force of events on the currency, than on that equally, but not more, important question of last ses- sion ; and great as are the benefits which this country has reaped from your timely yielding to the convictions of experience in that case, there is at least an equal need at present for a similar exercise of candid inquiry and patriotic deter- mination, to save the country from dangers fully as great as those that threatened her security on the former occasion. It is now admitted on all hands, indeed it is felt by too many to be disputed, that the cause of the prevailing distress is the impossibility of obtaining remunerating prices for any of the products of industry ; prices, that is, which will cover the costs of production, in which are included many heavy fixed money payments for rent, rates, taxes, debts, mortgages, annuities, &c. As these payments remain stationary, while the returns, out of which they are to come, have diminished daily for the last four years, and as this is general to every branch of production, it is evident, not only that the cause must be equally general, but also that the inevi- table result of such a trade, namely bankruptcy, must soon be equally universal. But while nearly all who write or speak on the subject, see in the general declension of prices the immediate cause of the general dis- tress, all do not agree in referring this fall of prices to the same primary cause. There is a common conviction, that the state of the cur- rency, and the alterations it has endured from the legislature within the last twelve years, are at the bottom of the mystery ; but how the thing has been brought about precisely, seems to be a puzzle to the many, and not very clear even to the most enlightened reasoners on the subject. Indeed, since by the greater number of the latter I find the fall in prices attributed to the act of 1819, for the resumption of cash pay- ments, which goes by your name, I am inclined to believe that the question, though perfectly simple, is as yet very little understood. May I hope you will give me your attention for a few minutes, while I attempt to show, what appears to me as demonstrable as any problem in Euclid, viz, that the act of 1819 did not neces- sarily contract the currency, or raise prices, in any material degree ; and that it is to the inse- cure character of our banking system, together with the small-note bill of 1826, a measure wholly uncalled for by any rational motive what- ever, unfitted to the evil it was meant to remedy, passed in haste, which has been in full operation barely ten months, and which has not yet com- pleted its work ; that to these two combined causes, purely of legislative creation, and to these alone, is owing the progressive but permanent fall in prices, that has drained away the life-blood of the national industry, till the crisis is nearly arrived b 2 4- which must destroy its whole system at once. That there may be a revival in future, after the pay- ment of the debt of nature has cancelled all other debts, is not impossible; but this is cer- tain, that the whole fabric of society in Great Britain must be violently broken up and re- modelled, when the national industry is declared insolvent ; and that day is not far off, if no suffi- cient change of treatment is adopted. If I succeed in convincing you that the general distress of the country is to be traced to these sources, you will at once perceive that the remedy is an easy and a simple one, very different indeed from the alteration of the standard, fixed in the most solemn manner, after mature deliberation, eleven years ago, which so many of the writers and speakers on the subject are driven by the exigency of the case to propose ; and against which alone the arguments as to national faith, justice to creditors, and public consistency, can he at all directed. The act of 181,9 identified money with gold. It fixed, to be sure, a very high standard, three or four per cent, higher than the price of gold at that time, and therefore raised in that propor- tion the value of money, and with it all public and private burthens on industry. But it gave us v. fixed standard, when for thirty years before we were at the mercy of the bankers, who might at any time raise or lower the value of money, as completely as if it had been done by act of parliament, by contracting or enlarging their issues to any extent they pleased. Moreover, it gave us the old standard of English gold cur- rency ; and I will not even say the sacrifice of an addition of three or four per cent, to all fixed money engagements, including the taxes, was too great to save the national faith from any thing that might be construed into a blot. We had borrowed immense sums in a depreciated paper currency ; in order to avoid the possible accusation of defrauding our creditors, we agreed, in 1819, to pay them, if they demanded it, in gold, and in gold too of the old undimi- nished standard. Surely this was the utmost that the most scrupulous of consciences could fancy we were pledged to. No one, that I ever heard, has ventured to assert that we were under any obligation to force our creditors to take gold, instead of paper, whether they would or no ! Yet this is what the act of 1826 has done. The act of I8I9 left every one the option between paper and gold. Habituated as we were to the use of paper, and to the advantages of convenience that it possesses over metal, every one was contented with paper. In no part of the country, with the single exception of the county of Lancaster, was gold made use of in circula- tion. There was, consequently, but a temporary demand for gold in consequence of the act of 18 19. Bankers however could not, for some time, be aware to what extent gold might or might not be demanded of them ; and they, therefore, for a time greatly contracted their issues, and supplied their coffers with gold. Hence, in fact, the fall in prices and the distress of 1821 and 1822. But it was then found out by bankers that the public preferred paper to gold, and the demand for the latter ceased ; fresh supplies of paper were issued, and gold went entirely out of circulation. Prices, in consequence, rose with the increase of the circulating medium ; and the prosperity year of 1824, is alone sufficient proof that the act of 1819 did not necessarily contract the currency ; for certainly never was there such an amount in circulation as then. It is established then, that the act of 181 9 did not necessitate the substitution of gold for paper to any extent, and did not therefore necessarily cramp the circula- tion, or lower prices. Had the banking system of England been sound ; had the credit of the paper issuing banks rested on the same broad basis as that of the Scottish banks, it is easy to show there would have been at no time much more or much less paper issued than was required by the ordinary and unexcited business of the country ; there would not have happened either the speculative mania and hollow prosperity of 1824, or the perilous crash of credit of 1855 ; the small notes would have found no enemies in 1826; and the distress, which has been daily winding its folds closer and closer around us since that year, would not have brought on the dangerous crisis in which the nation is placed in 1830. Pray God it may be extricated in time to prevent a catastrophe ! There is no mystery in the matter of the cir- culation, though it has been much and need- lessly mystified. A certain quantity of the cir- culating medium is required to carry on the varied money dealings of the country. If the banks are not limited in their issues of paper, there will be almost always a sufficient supply ; because persons possessed of property will then always be able to command money upon it. Should there on the other hand be an over- issue of paper currency, as compared with the demand occasioned by the real bona fide transactions of the country, the immediate consequence must be a fall in the value of money, that is, a rise in prices. The price of' gold cannot, in this country, rise with every thing else, but it will 8 rise abroad, because there it maintains the same relative value to goods as before. There is, therefore, a bonus to be gained upon its exporta- tion. It is demanded of bankers for this pur- pose ; they find their error, and restore the balance by contracting their issues. There is nothing dangerous, nothing to be dreaded, in this remedial process, by which the over-issue of paper tends speedily to correct itself; if the paper is all sound, and so esteemed by the public. But if, as is the case in England, an unwise law of partnership, and the monopoly of a great bank- ing company prevent the formation of country banks on a broad and secure foundation, and at the same time any individual is permitted with- out check, control, or security, to throw as much paper money on the market as he can get the public to keep for a few months ; under these disadvantageous circumstances, there is sure, in the first place, to be an immense over-issue of notes by such persons as speculate on the credu- lity of the public, and coin paper only as the means of raising money for a thousand rash or fraudulent schemes, trusting to secure themselves before the day of retribution arrives ; and, secondly, when the notes begin to be returned in consequence of their over-issue, one or two of these speculating and hollow banks fail ; the public, being unable to distinguish clearly between the solvent and the insolvent, those whose notes rest upon real, and those which were issued on fictitious and insufficient security, loses its con- fidence in all, a panic is created, and a run upon almost all banks ; many of which, however fairly conducted, are from the suddenness of the demand unable to meet it, and fail in conse- quence. The holders of their notes, particularly of the smaller, suffer greatly ; but the general revulsion of credit, the calling in of all notes and bills, and the suspension of transactions, which accompany the panic, leave behind still more disastrous results. This is what occurred, and from the state of the law I have adverted to, could not but occur in 1824 and 1825. But these disasters are not in any way necessarily incident to a paper circulation. They are, on the contrary, solely and clearly occasioned by its hollow, ill-regulated, and insecure character. This is proved not only by the rationale of panic, but likewise by the fact, that in Scotland and Ireland, where there is a comparatively sound and secure paper currency, though far from being as perfect as it might be made, there has been, not even in 1825, either panic or failure among the banks. The confusion and dangers of 1825, though they were much exaggerated at the time, from 10 their principally affecting the metropolis, the seat of parliament and the government, called for, and, it might have been supposed, pointed out, a remedy. That remedy obviously should have been some measure by which worthless banking- houses might be prevented from imposing on the public, and issuing paper on light security, which they could not be certain of being able to pay on demand ; some measure which should compel all banks to find security for their issues ; and thus at the same time prevent the insolvency of banks, and that contagious dread of their insolvency which has so often produced the failures that could not otherwise have occured. Instead of adopting some measure of this sort, and placing the paper currency on a sound and stable basis, which would have entirely remedied the evil, without cramping the circulation in any unwholesome degree, parliament left the laws untouched which prohibit the formation of banks on a broad footing, left the great mass of paper as unsafe, and far more discredited, than before, and passed an act, by which banks of the most notorious stability, willing and able perhaps to offer security to ten times the amount of their issues, are prevented from issuing any notes under five pounds in value ! The result of this conduct, of what was done, coupled with what was omitted to be done, might 11 have been, and was by many, foreseen, exaetly as it has since taken place. We know perfectly well that a certain proportion of the transactions of this country is carried on by means of money passed from hand to hand in sums of less than five pounds. There is scarcely an individual in the country of any class that does not keep some loose cash by him, in his pocket or his purse, to answer his daily exigencies. All the retail shops, large and small, must keep supplies of change for obvious purposes. The greater part of the immense mass of the petty retail trade through- out the kingdom, as well as the payment and expenditure of wages, is carried on by the agency of small parcels of money, under five pounds in value. It is evident then that a definite, and in- deed a very large, proportion of the currency cir- culating at any time, must consist of such small parcels of money. If within any particular dis- trict, as a county for example, there is a million of money required to facilitate the various pay- ments and exchanges that are going on in it, a fixed proportion of this million must consist in parcels of money under one shilling, to act as change for shillings ; another proportion in parcels of money under a pound, to act as change for pounds ; another proportion in par- cels under five pounds ; and so on. This change is required for the convenience of the retail 12 trade, and small money payments; and since banks are by law forced to cash, that is change their notes, on demand, nobody will forego this con- venience of having a sufficiency of small money for carrying on his business, or making his pur- chases. It is so easy to step or send to the bank, and there they must get it when they want it. Hence this law of proportion in the currency, which at first sight would not appear to be so peremptory, is, notwithstanding, inevit- able. Bankers cannot, from this necessity, issue a single five or ten pound note without being prepared to give the required proportion of change with it, in money of smaller denomina- tion, either at the time or directly after. If they issue more high notes than the due and recognized proportion to the quautity of smaller money in their district, the extra proportion of notes will be returned upon their hands, for change. It is therefore an invariable law, founded on the simple reasons I have given, and which holds equally good with the larger description of currency, which consists of bills and notes above ten pounds, that the quantity of larger parcels of currency must always main- tain a fixed proportion to the quantity of smaller, or cash, circulating with them. More than this proportion will not remain afloat ; but will be leturned directly upon the issuer's hands to be 13 changed. Hence it is that a contraction of the smaller sorts of currency is of necessity a pro- portionate contraction of the large. The one cannot keep afloat without a due admixture of the other. What proportion of money in parcels under five pounds, is required for the convenience of change, ought to appear from the proportion of one and two pound notes in circulation previous to their withdrawal. The statement of the Chan- cellor of the Exchequer in 1826, was, that they then amounted only to two millions and a half; and it was contended by him, that when these were withdrawn, their place would be filled up chiefly by five pound notes, and that conse- quently there would be no great call for gold in lieu of them. But what is the fact ? On the first day of the present session the Duke of Wellington communicated to Parliament the information, that there is no less than twenty- eight millions of gold and eight millions of sil- ver at present in circulation, or thirty-six millions of bullion to only twenty-nine millions of notes ! The Chancellor of the Exchequer, entering more into detail, mentioned that actually more than forty-four millions of sovereigns have been issued from the mint since 1824! Sixteen millions of this enormous mass of gold is supposed to have 14 been either exported or melted down ; that being, it appears, the amount of gold demanded of the Bank of England during those periods when the exchanges were against us, and there- fore favourable to the exportation of gold. In questions of this nature, where the public have no access to the documents on which the government officers found their opinion, that opinion is hardly to be questioned. We must therefore, till proof to the contrary be produced, abide by the repeated statements of the First Lord of the Treasury and the Chancellor of the Ex- chequer, that there is thirty-four millions of gold and silver at present in circulation. If, however, the amount of one and two pound notes circulating in 1825 was at all correctly given at two and a half millions (the Duke of Wellington, however, on better grounds cal- culated it at six millions), it is evident that twenty-eight millions of sovereigns cannot be required merely for the purpose of change. It is much more probable that a very large propor- tion of them are demanded of bankers in prefer- ence to their five and ten pound notes, through the general distrust of country banks, which the crash of 1825 occasioned, and which the legis- lature unfortunately took no measures to coun- teract by placing, or even allowing these esta- 15 blishments to place themselves, on a sounder footing. Another very large quantity of sovereigns is no doubt removed from active circulation, and hoarded, by persons, who, from a similar distrust in bank notes, and the generally inadequate re- turns for the employment of capital, prefer keep- ing a deposit of gold by them, to be secure against all contingencies. This feeling is preva- lent to a great extent in country districts, and will account for much of the immense quantity of bullion said to be in circulation. But, whatever objects the holders may have in view, the fact remains clear, that there are actually twenty- eight millions of gold absorbed by the wants of the country. It is also evident, that the absorption of this enormous amount of gold can only be owing to one or both of two causes ; viz. 1 . The effect of the act of 1 826, the withdrawal of small notes necessitating the substitution of gold for the purpose of change; and, 2. The ge- neral distrust of paper, owing to the extra- ordinary omission of the legislature of that year to provide for giving real security to bankers' issues, the want of which had been so forcibly demonstrated by the occurrences of the preceding year. Instead of acting on the knowledge that the panic and dangers of 1825 had been owing to the law which prevents banks from being 1G established in England on such a footing as may effectually secure them from failure, or the dread of it, Parliament not only left the country banks just as insecure as before, but actually did its utmost to destroy the small remnant of confi- dence the public were likely to retain for their issues after the crash of 1825 ; made it apparently a study, both in the speeches of its members, and the tone of the measure of 1826, to heap all possible obloquy on these establishments, while continuing a law which took from them all power of improving their condition; utterly unconscious of what a moment's consideration would have shown to be the necessary result of such proceed- ings, namely, a demand on the part of the coun- try for gold to an enormous amount, in prefer- ence to this vilified and unquestionably insecure paper. It is then to the legislation of 1826 — to that which was done, coupled with what was left undone, that is, in my opinion, solely owing whatever demand for bullion has shown itself since that date. Now what may this be? Of the actual twenty-eight millions of gold, how much are we to believe to have been in circulation previous to 1826 ? If the very large quantity of paper in circula- tion in 1824-5 be considered, it is difficult to 1? believe that there could have been more than four or five millions of gold then in the country *. Suppose there were even as much as eight ; this will leave twenty millions as the additional quan- tity of gold required (not merely demanded, for, as has been seen, sixteen millions more have been coined), but required and absorbed by the wants of the country since 1826. Now does any one suppose that a demand for twenty millions of gold, to be provided within three years, iri addition to the usual demand for other purposes, will not raise the value of gold all over the world ? It would be idle to attempt to guess at the quantity of gold available for purchase in the civilized world. But twenty millions of sovereigns must make a very large hole in it. Suppose, for any purpose, as the making a new set of regalia, that twenty millions of pearls were indispensably wanted in England, * Mr. Mushet calculates, that at the utmost there were nine millions of gold in circulation in 1824. At the close of 1825, after the exchanges had been for more than a year against us, and a vast amount of paper had been issued, the greater part of this gold had probably left the country. The Bank of England had gold in its coffers in 1824, to the amount of fifteen millions, but this was drained away during that and the subsequent year, till in December, 1825, scarcely a sovereign remained in them. — Mushet on Currency, 1826. C does any one believe that pearls would not rise in value, perhaps to double or treble their former exchangeable worth ? It is impossible to ascertain directly the rise in the value of gold occasioned by this enormous demand for it. Its money-price will not of course measure it, since the law of 18 19 made money to rise with gold. Its rise of price, com- pared with silver, fails equally as a test, because the demand for silver as change, both in England and in other countries where it is jointly with gold the standard of value, must have increased with the scarcity of gold. In fact, the silver in circulation having risen from four to eight mil- lions, its value must have risen proportionately, though not quite in the same degree as gold *. The only real criterion of the rise of the value of gold is to be found in the fall of every thing else compared with it ; and such a fall has been experienced since 1825, to the extent of at least one-fourth, or 25 per cent ; that is to say, that a sovereign will now purchase in the wholesale markets the same quantity of commodities of almost every description, which could only be obtained for twenty-five shillings before 1826. * Hence appears the futility of supposing that prices would have heen prevented from falling by a joint silver and gold standard. 19 Here then is an obvious and adequate cause, followed by its natural and propor- tionate effect. It is undeniable in theory, that the act of 1826, coupled with an unsound and discredited system of paper-issue, by causing a new and forced demand for gold in this coun- try to the extent of at least twenty millions, could not, from the ordinary laws of supply and demand, but raise its value in proportion. Gold, however, had been, by the act of 1819? identified with money. The rise in value of the sovereign was an equal rise in the value of the pound sterling, causing a proportionate fall in the price, or money-value of every other commodity. This fall appears in fact to have been about one- fourth. Moreover, the additional quantity of gold re- quired, to the extent of at least twenty-four millions, must have been purchased abroad by English capital to that amount. If this large sum came from the pockets of the unproductive classes, as would have happened if it had been laid out on foreign products for their consump- tion, it would have been no further loss to the country at large ; but being compulsorily ex- pended by the classes engaged in production, upon a circulating medium with which to carry on their transactions, it was a sacrifice that fell irredeemably upon them. It is an abstraction C 2 20 of so much from the capital annually employed by them in production ; of such a portion of capital as would otherwise have afforded a profit to its owners, and employment to perhaps a million of labourers at fair weekly wages, and a decent maintenance, reckoning the families of the latter at an average of five, iojive millions of souls ! But in the complicated transactions of this great commercial empire, there will always be an immense mass of outstanding money engage- ments, bills, debts, and contracts. The rise of one-fourth in the value of money added of course as much to the real value of every money engage- ment, including the public debt and the expenses of government ; while, on the other hand, the subtraction of twenty-four millions from the productively employed capital of the country, in order to purchase a metallic circulation, reduced, in perhaps an equal degree, the returns to its industry, out of which all these heavy money engagements must be paid, before the capitalist, manufacturer, farmer, or tradesman can put one shilling into his pocket ! The state of the currency since 1826 may therefore be justly and strictly described as " A legislative contrivance for diminishing the re- turns of the productive industry of the country, and at the same time increasing the charges upon 21 it, public as well as private." That distress, general and severe, should be the result, is no more surprising than that Sangrado's patients should have sunk under a very similar treatment, by which their veins were exhausted and their diet lowered at the same time ; no more surpris- ing than that a farmer should be ruined by an increase of rent coming upon him simultaneously with a fall in the price of his produce, This is, in fact, one out of the many ways in which the measure has affected all classes of producers. A gradual declension of prices has necessarily this effect, that year after year the proceeds of the sale of commodities fall short of the costs of their production. If continued for some time, such a process cannot fail to effect a vast destruc- tion of capital, and ruin the greater number of the productive classes. If the operation of the law of 1826 had not unfortunately been spread over three years, its destructive nature would have disclosed itself at once, and caused the abandon- ment of the measure. The rise of the value of money, and the fall of prices, would then have been sudden ; and coming immediately after the enactment of the law, the connection of the cause and effect could not have escaped the most pre- judiced. Its spoliatory character would then have been more directly apparent, and the gene- ral execration would have pursued it. But its 22 effect on those who are burthened with perma- nent money contracts is not the less iniquitous and cruel, because it allowed them a partial respite, ruined them only by degrees, and took three years to fill up the measure of its robbery. In the case of money engagements made for periods of short duration, such as all the vast mass of credit transactions, where the credit ranges from three months to twelve, the effect has been infinitely more calamitous than if the law had been carried into immediate operation. The gradual declension of prices which has ac- companied the gradual withdrawal of the one pound notes, and the equally gradual absorption of an immense amount of gold into the currency, has affected the business of the productive classes in the most lamentable manner. Their under- takings are of course calculated on the prices of the day ; bills are drawn, and money engage- ments entered into, in the expectation of these returns. When the goods are ready, if a fall of price has taken place, a loss is unavoidably sus- tained. If the fall is owing to the ordinary causes of fluctuations in price, the loss is such as every trader expects occasionally to meet with ; and is sure to be compensated in the next, or some subsequent speculation, by an increase of price, under parallel circumstances. But, when the caube is extrinsic to the business ; when the 23 fall is not a mere oscillation below the average, to be made up by a subsequent rise above it, but is succeeded by a still further fall, accompanied by a similar loss, and this by another and ano- ther, till the tradesman, unconscious of the hid- den mischief that is daily frustrating his reason- able anticipations, and lured on to still further risks by the vain hope, founded on all the ordi- nary experience of commerce, that when things are at their worst they must mend, that low prices must be succeeded by high ones, finds at last his entire capital slipping from under him ; — such a treacherous and prolonged process is like slow destruction by torture, far more cruel and disastrous than if the blow had been dealt at once, and openly *. * It has been denied that low prices are an injury to the country at large. Most unquestionably they are not, but a prodigious benefit to all parties, when they are produced in the ordinary and legitimate way, by a diminution in the costs of production, or by the triumph of competition over monopoly. If the plenty and cheapness of the raw material, and the in- vention of improved processes or machinery, cause a reduc- tion in price, as has happened to such an extent of late years in the article cotton, this fall of price is a benefit to the pro- ducer as well as to the consumer, since it opens a wider market for the sale of his goods. This fall, be it observed, is anticipated by him. It is occasioned by circumstances within his range of information, and he takes his measures accordingly. But whatever fall of price is occasioned by a forced and artificial rise in the value of money, is a transfer of property from the industrious to the idle. It benefits the 24 It will not do to say that these injurious effects are temporary ; that the currency has been put on a sound footing, and that all we have to do is to retrench our expenditure, and Jeave trade to recover itself. These flourishes are very well to lull the conscience of a receiver of fixed payments (be he place-holder, fund- holder, or mortgagee), who is, for a time, profit- ing by the change. But, in the first place, the currency, so far from being put on a sound foot- ing, is (that part of it at least which consists of paper) less esteemed by the public than ever, as is shown by their requiring such an immense amount of goJd in lieu of it : and, secondly, if the present proportion of gold in our circulation is to be permanent (and it must be so, if our banking system is not placed on such a footing as will secure the confidence of the public) ; if our present public and private debts are to be considered permanent (and I do not think an " equitable adjustment" would be relished by consumer (unless he happens to be a producer too, and then he loses more than he gains by it), but injures the producer in a greater degree. It is greatly injurious also to the commu- nity, both by occasioning an absolute waste of the national capital, part of which is expended and consumed without being reproduced ; and by throwing uncertainty and distrust into every business, discouraging the efforts of sober, patient, and prudent industry, and infusing all the chances and the spirit of gambling tuto every branch of trade. 25 the persons I am opposing), then the unjust pressure felt by those who are required to pay these debts in a more valuable currency than they were contracted in, must be equally perma- nent. The question then is, whether such com- pulsion, so essentially unfair and ruinous to the productive classes, that is to nineteen-twentieths of the community, be necessary ? Whether it is absolutely expedient, firstly, to insist that the proportion of our circulating medium, which represents sums under 5/., shall consist of bul- lion ? and secondly, to allow every individual who chooses to call himself a banker to coin paper-money, and yet at the very same time to forbid paper to be issued by companies of indi- viduals, whose names and bulk of property would ensure security to their issues, and, with other safeguards easy to devise, would effectually pre- vent improper or over-issues, and their conse- quences, re-action, failures, panic, and general bankruptcy ? Is this a state of the law called for by such paramount necessity as justifies the spoliation of three-fourths of the nation, and the risk of ruin to all ? The question has been sufficiently answered by the preceding remarks, from which it appears, that the act forbidding the issue of small notes was not only not required by the circumstances of 1824, 5, and 6, but was precisely the reverse of 26 the remedy really wanted. There was a panic on the subject of banks and notes, caused (notoriously caused, for there was none in Scotland) by the insecure foundation of our English country banking system ; — the govern- ment and legislature, infected with the conta- gion, passed a hasty law, of which they were far from perceiving the effect, limiting the aggregate issues of bank notes, instead of calmly deliberat- ing how they could best add to their* security. Nothing but the children's game of ' cross purposes' ever equalled the mal-apropos of such a step. The question was, " How to prevent notes from being issued, unsupported by credit, ivhich shall at all times defy suspicion ;" and the answer was given, " Let every body who chooses continue, unchecked, to issue the large notes (that is, nine-tenths or more of the whole), and let nobody whatever issue the small ones !" This was like an attempt to put a stop to the high- way robberies of last century, by enacting that no traveller should cross Hounslow Heath with less than five pounds in his pocket. What magic was there in the small notes, whether two and a half or six millions, that all the dangers of over-issue and panic were to be caused by their presence, and prevented by their absence ? By this wise legislation, fraudulent or impru- dent parties are still permitted, in moments of 27 commercial excitement, to issue as many notes upon fictitious or improper securities as before ; and, in periods of the opposite character, the general distrust of banks, as banks now by law are (that distrust, ivhich in reality occasioned all the mischief's of 1825), is heightened and con- finned by the conduct of Parliament ; while an evil of enormous magnitude, undreamt of at the time, is superadded — the necessity, namely, of providing a gold circulation of twenty-eight mil- lions, and eight millions of silver; in other words, of sinking unproductively that immense sum abstracted from productive employment, and at the same time raising the value of money to such a degree, that the prices of every pro- duct of industry are depressed one-fourth, while rents, debts, annuities, mortgages, taxes, and every money engagement to which that produce is liable, remain unchanged ! It must be observed, that this rise in the value of money being caused by the rise in value of gold, owing to the extraordinary demand for it, is wholly independent of any contraction of the currency ; that is to say, it is the cause, not the effect of such contraction ; and would be equally true and equally disastrous, were the currency, by possibility, as ample as it ever was*. * I cannot but think that much of the confusion in which 28 But it is in fact absurd to imagine, that with the unexampled stagnation of trade now prevail- the currency question has been involved, is owing to the as- sumption that it is always a contraction of the currency that occasions a general fall of prices, instead of the fall of prices that diminishes the amount of circulation required of bankers. I think it might be shown, in detail, that the alternating see- saws of general prosperity and general distress, which oc- curred in 1818, 22, 24, and 29, were owing primarily to variations in the demand for, and consequently the value of gold, occasioned by the fluctuations in the public confidence in our unguaranteed credit currency. When casual circumstances, some of them political, as the recognition of the American republics, excited commercial speculation, caution was lulled or blinded, gold was no longer required by bankers or their customers, and fell in value; that is, prices rose. This added to the tendency to speculation, and enabled bankers to issue more notes, and more than the property of some of them could answer. But the over-issue was the effect, not the cause of the rise in prices ; which was at first occasioned by the low value of gold. As, however, gold went out of request here, it became profitable to export it ; and the higher prices rose in this country, the greater the bonus on its exportation. The Bank of England, at length, became aware of the drain that was going on upon its coffers, and the danger of it ; and contracted its issues. This gave rise to the panic, which fell directly on the country banks. Distrust was then for some time the order of the day. Every body preferred gold to paper. Gold, and money with it, rose in value ; and prices fell, causing in turn the fit of distress. That a disposition to these alternations of excitement and alarm is, to a certain extent, inherent in the commercial system, is 29 ing throughout the empire, the currency in cir- culation can be of great amount ; it is absurd to suppose, that when no five pound bank note can issue without the accompaniment of six pounds ten shillings in gold and silver, that the currency true ; — but to allege that they must always, with a paper cur- rency, proceed to such extremities, is eminently false. It is a sound, safe, bona fide paper currency that is alone wanted to regulate and equalize these dangerous oscillations. When credit is high and general, opportunity is afforded to fraudulent and speculating parties, by the aid of imprudent, if not equally fraudulent, banks, to put a large mass of paper of all sorts in circulation ; and by raising prices still higher, to add still more to the excitement, until perhaps it is worked up to the disgraceful state of mania which we saw in 1 824. But, if no banks could issue paper without such guarantee as would satisfy government, and ensure the repayment of their issues, the certainty of responsibility would infuse such cau- tion and prudence into their issues, with the foreknowledge they must have that a rise of prices is sure to be followed shortly by a call for sovereigns, as will effectually deter them from encouraging any commercial excitement ; but, on the contrary, lead them to repress it by a guarded issue of notes. Their direct interest, and consequently their endeavours, would always be to prevent over-excitement, or such rise in prices as will lead to a demand upon them for gold ; to keep the state of the commercial markets as near to an equilibrium as the fluctuations of supply and demand will admit of ; and to check the impetus which prices are apt to acquire, during either a fall or a rise, from carrying them beyond the point about which the real circumstances of the case should occa- sion them to vibrate. 30 will not he short of' the demands of the im- mense mass of husiness usually transacted in this great commercial country ; for whose entire dealings all the gold in the world would not suffice. The truth is, the facts brought forward by the Duke of Wellington and Mr. Huskisson to show that there is no contraction, go exactly to prove the reverse. The mistake is owing to the ambiguity of terms. Money is said to be plentiful in the city, or the money-market, when there is an abundance of capital lying idle in the hands of persons, who are unwilling themselves, and cannot persuade others, even by offering it at the lowest rate of interest, to put it in circu- lation, or active employment. This is evidently a proof that the money which is in circulation, is less than there would be in a more wholesome and flourishing state of trade. Why do capi- talists refuse to borrow and circulate money ? Because they cannot employ it in any productive way to advantage, owing to the markets being already glutted with goods which cannot be sold even at losing prices j because the bringing any fresh supply of money into circulation, instead of improving prices, must lotver them still further, by causing an instantaneous demand for more gold and silver ! The currency is placed in such a state by the law of 1826, and the want of security for bank notes, that the issue of a 31 fresh million of money in notes must create a new and instant demand for more than half a million in hullion ; and from the impossibility of procuring this without a rise of its value, must cause a further general fall of prices ; by which commerce, instead of being relieved, would be plunged in still deeper embarrassment. But, whether the currency is to be supposed contracted or not, its value, since it was iden- tified with gold by the act of 1819, and that, by the measure of 1826', and the want of a safe paper currency, more than one half of it is made to consist of bullion, — its value has been un- deniably increased, and that to at least the ex- tent of one fourth ; by which all debts, public and private, rents, annuities, mortgages, taxes, and money engagements of all kinds, reaching probably, in the multiplied transactions of this great empire, an amount of several hundred millions of annual payments, must have been increased in value in that proportion ! That distress, unexampled, overwhelming, must be the consequence of measures of this nature, is too clear; and if it is recollected that the whole of these payments, with this tremendous and wholly uncalled-for addition to them, must be made out of the annual proceeds of the industry of the country (for there is no other source of payment of any 32 kind), it will be felt, that should the state of the law, which enforces the present proportion of metal in our currency, be any longer persisted in, that industry has received her death-blow ! There is one circumstance to be here adverted to, which, strangely enough, does not appear to have attracted any attention ; namely, that the rise in the value of gold, and of money, caused by the legislation of 1826, must have equally affected all other countries in the commercial world, which possess a metallic circulation. This explains at once the simultaneous distress of the other great commercial nations, particu- larly France and America; which, from the great extent of their transactions, would be ne- cessarily affected with nearly the same severity as ourselves. They cannot escape from the general fall of prices consequent on the demand for such a prodigious quantity of gold, which we must have drained out of their several circula- tions. It does not appear that they have them- selves discovered as yet, that their present dis- tress is owing simply to an act of bungling legislation of the British parliament, by which a drain of gold was created out of those countries towards England ; causing a proportionate in- crease of all money engagements, and fall of prices, with them as with us. There have been times when a far less injury would have been 33 resented by a declaration of war. But this fact is one only of many, showing how, in the close relations by which commerce knits nations toge- ther, each is interested in the welfare and good government of the other, almost, if not quite as much, as in her own. Our own statesmen seem to have been puzzled by this contemporaneous distress in England, France, and America. Mr. Huskisson even grounds upon it his argument, that the distress must proceed from some other causes than the currency. It is, on the contrary, exactly the strongest proof, that the distress is owing to the state of the currency. Mr. Huskisson has been singularly unfortunate in his choice of argu- ments by which to support his opinions on this question. It is to be hoped that the exposure of the fallacy of the former, will dispose him to reconsider and remodel the latter. The advantages of a paper currency, that is, of a currency which shall save to the country the enormous expense of gold and silver ; setting free the capital, which must otherwise be sunk in the purchase of these commodities, to give employment to industry, and reproduce itself annually in consumable commodities, are so obvious and so well known, that it is needless to dwell on them. They are not denied ; but it is D 34 said they are overbalanced by disadvantages of a greater amount. These are, I. The liability to an over-issue of notes. 2. The insecurity of paper. 3. The distress caused by occasional panics. 1. The objection that paper is liable to be over-issued I have already shown to be ground- less, as respects a sound and bona fide paper currency ; since an over-issue under such cir- cumstances must directly remedy itself, by pro- ducing an immediate call for gold upon the bankers, and rendering an over-issue a very losing trade. There is a vague and unthinking cry abroad still against an unlimited paper cur- rency. With a liability to pay in gold, and a guarantee for the security of notes, the issue of paper will limit itself exactly to the quantity required to keep the value of gold at home up to the level of its value abroad, which must exactly coincide with the quantity required for the real business of the country ; and this is the only wholesome and proper limit that ought ever to exist. A forced act of parliament limitation is a miserable and bungling expedient, which can only do mischief, never good. Let notes be made safe, and the trade in money should be left free to regulate itself, like all others. 2. 3, As the occurrence of panics is only 35 the consequence of the want of sufficiently known and acknowledged security for the pay- ment of the notes, the other two objections re- duce themselves to one head ; and the question is, whether sufficient security cannot be devised for paper issues, which shall effectually prevent the insolvency of banks. This question is in part answered in a work of considerable autho- rity, in language which corresponds so closely with my ideas on the subject, that I will extract the passage. " The failure of parties, by whom notes are issued, is an evil against which, under good in- stitutions, the most powerful securities are spon- taneously provided. If competition were al- lowed to operate freely, and if no restriction were imposed on the number of partners who might be engaged in a bank, the business of banking and of issuing notes, would naturally place itself on a footing which would render paper currency very secure. The number of banks would of course be multiplied, and no one would be able to fill with its circulation more than a certain district. As little risk, where the partners were numerous, would be incurred by each of them ; as the profits would be very sure, and the importance of having a good currency would be sensibly felt, there would be motive sufficient to all the d 2 3G principal noblemen and gentlemen of the county, or other district, to hold shares in the local hank, and add to the security of the public. " In competition with such an establishment, any bank of doubtful credit would vainly endea- vour to introduce its notes into circulation. The sense of interest keeps the attention sufficiently awake on such an occasion ; and where educa- tion and knowledge are tolerably advanced, and the press is free, intellect is not wanting to guide the most ignorant to the most proper con- clusions. The people may be trusted to reject the notes of a suspected party, when they may have those of a party which can claim undoubted confidence. In Scotland, where banking is nearly placed upon this desirable footing, and where paper money spontaneously filled the channels of circulation long before the suspen- sion of cash payments at the Bank of England, there have been few failures in the numerous banks which issued paper, notwithstanding all the fluctuations in the value of money produced by that suspension, and all the convulsions of credit of which those fluctuations were the cause*." To which I may add, that since the * Mill's Elements of Political Economy, p. 147, section resumption of cash payments necessarily in- fused a. greater degree of caution into the management of bona fide banking concerns, even the convulsions and panic of 1825 failed to en- danger the stability of any one Scottish bank. But in addition to these securities, which if banking were set free, would be provided by the interest and intelligence of the parties, there are many direct securities which might be provided by the legislature, to such extent as to obviate the possibility of failure, and consequently also of panic. It might be enacted, for instance, that no bank should issue paper without a license from go- vernment ; to obtain which it should be neces- sary that a list of the partners, under their own hand, and an estimate of their unencumbered property, or of a sufficient part of it to cover the issues, or even twice the issues permitted, be transmitted to government, which, before grant- ing the license, might ascertain the accuracy of the statement. The license should limit the issues to the estimated value of the property so pledged by the partners, or to one half of it, and this limit be secured by means of stamps on the notes. The license should be renewable every year on the same conditions, and no partnership to be altered without a renewal of license. 38 Monthly returns, of the amount in circulation by each bank, would complete the security of such establishments. Due notice might be required to be forwarded to government, before any of the property pledged could be disposed of, and the license modified accordingly. The responsibility as to the security of banks formed on these prin- ciples, would rest with government, and the security be equal to that of a government, or national bank, without the disadvantage to which the possible abuse of such a powerful engine would expose the interests of the community. Such an act as is sketched above, or any other contrivance for the same purpose, would restore, or rather (for we have never yet possessed it) would confer on this country the invaluable ad- vantages of a sound paper currency^ composed of all such denominations as convenience may dictate, and which would preserve its issues spontaneously at the amount required for carry- ing on the business of the empire. Any excess must immediately cause gold to be demanded, and the issues contracted, to avoid what would be otherwise a losing business. Such an act would relieve us both from the necessity and the desire of keeping an enormous amount of barren and useless gold in circulation, and restore the capital now sunk in it to the channels of pro- ductive employment, from whence it has been, with such deplorable consequences, withdrawn since 1826. Gold would then fall again to its accustomed level ; and, with gold, money. Prices will rise, not to the height of those that pre- vailed during the moment of morbid excitement in 1824, but to the fair average which the rela- tive cost of the different articles of produce de- termine. Such a measure will act like a charm upon the disease that is now latently disorganiz- ing our whole social system. Justice will be done to all parties, debtor as well as creditor. Industry will revive from the despair to which the late intolerable increase of her former extra- ordinary burthens has reduced her, and the na- tion will be snatched from a catastrophe which I cannot but consider otherwise inevitable. Mr. Mushet admits that if the monopoly of the Bank of England were abolished, and the trade in banking set free, a pure paper circula- tion would be as equable as a pure metallic one, " always full, never in excess ; any attempt at excess would be immediately returned on the bank that made the experiment ; neither would there be any deficiency, as it would be the interest of every banker to keep the circulation to the level of the value of money in other countries. Prices would be steady, capital would be freed from its 40 present violent fluctuations in value, the wages of labour would be uniform,"* &c. And are we to be prevented from realizing all these ad- vantages, and for want of them to be exposed to the risk, if not the certainty, of general ruin, by overstrained scruples upon interfering with the bank charter ? No parliament can bind its suc- cessors to maintain so suicidal a measure, by which the party supposed to be interested in its continuance, the bank itself, is exposed to con- stant risk from its inability to controul the coun- try paper, as was shown in 1825, and the public, the nation at large, is ruined ! One word as to the inefficiency of other reme- dies. The excessive pressure of taxation h gene- rally and justly reckoned the great immediate cause of the distress, and government, aware of this, proposes to reduce the public establish- ments, and thereby save some hundred thousands of pounds. But while they are straining to make -this trifling diminution, they are persisting in a measure which, within the last few months, has * Mushet on Currency, 1826. — How strange that Mr. Mushet should have such a keen perception of the advantages of a pure and free paper currency, and yet wish to substi- tute gold for one half of the circulation ; raising of course the value of all money contracts in proportion, to be dimi- nished again as much when the bank charter expires. 41 added, at the very lowest estimate *, one- fourth to the total of taxation. The same share of the produce of the national industry which is taken now by the tax-collectors, is one- fourth more than what was taken in 1824. The share that remains to the producers is con- sequently in that proportion less. The fifty- eight millions now levied represent and com- maud as much of the property of the country as seventy Jive millions would have done in that day. And while ministers thus add twenty-five millions of taxes with one hand, we are to thank them for taking off a few hundred thousands with the other ! There is a general outcry as to the infamy of a debtor defrauding his creditors ; but is it not equally unjustifiable to allow a creditor to rob a debtor, by taking more than his due r The dis- honesty of the suspension of cash payments is most loudly inveighed against by those very persons who are now perpetrating a still more flagrant injustice in the forced increase of all pecuniary contracts. Granting that national * In order to be within the mark, I have supposed the general fall in prices, since 1825, to be but 25 per cent. A series of comparative tables of prices in a pamphlet just pub- lished " On the present operation of Mr. Peel's Bill," clearly shows the fall to have been nearly 50 per cent, since 181 1>, thus actually doubling the real value of the taxes ! 42 faith required the bill of 181J), it certainly did not call for that of 1826. Still less, if possible, were we pledged to keep up a rotten system of banking, by which all confidence in paper is prevented, and the necessity of a metallic circu- lation incurred. It has been asked, are prices higher in Scot- land under a convertible paper currency, than in England with a gold currency ? Of course the intercourse between the countries must prevent prices remaining higher in Scotland than in this country, except by the difference of the cost of carriage. But there ought to be no doubt that prices are kept from falling still lower, both here and in Scotland, by the continuance of a pure paper circulation in the latter country. Had the small note bill extended to Scotland, probably two or three millions more of gold would have been required ; and can it be be- lieved that this additional demand for so scarce a commodity would not have raised its value, and lowered prices still further ? Scotland suffers equally with England from the effect of the bill of 1826, and England suffers less than she would have done had a gold currency been forced likewise on the other two kingdoms. Another argument against the Scotch bank- ing system is drawn from the alleged over-issue of paper by the banks of that country in 1824-5. 43 But their extended issues in those years were not, like those of England, hased upon hollow or false security, stimulating a rise of prices. We have no right at least to conclude this, for the increased currency of England causing a general rise of prices through both countries, would necessitate a proportionate extension of Scotch currency for the legitimate purposes of commerce, as the sudden fall in 1825 must have occasioned its violent contraction. But the absence of failure among even the smallest banks tends to show that their issues had been directed with due caution, and had in no degree ex- ceeded the demand required by the bona fide transactions of the country, excited as these had been by the English over-issues. There is no jugglery or mystery in the ques- tion. The arguments I have urged may be arranged with clearness in one short train of sequences, which every one must perceive to flow necessarily from each other. The universal distress of the productive in- dustry of Great Britain proceeds, as it could not fail to do, from the universal fall in the money returns, or prices, of the produce of industry,, which has gradually taken place since 1826, but most rapidly since April 1829, while the debts, taxes, rents, and other monied burthens on industry remain unaltered. 44 This fall of prices is a necessary accompani- ment of the forced rise of the value of money. But money having been, by the act of 1819, made to rise and fall with gold, the gradual rise in the value of money since 1826 was unavoid- ably occasioned by the enormous demand for gold consequent on the withdrawal of the one and two pound notes, and the refusal of Parlia- ment to allow banks to be formed on a footing that would ensure confidence. The desideratum (which an act of the legisla- ture might give us to-morrow) is a pure paper currency, convertible into gold on demand, but never converted, from the confidence of the pub- lic in the bank paper on one side, and the cau- tion of banks, proceeding from a knowledge of the eventual loss consequent on over-issues, upon the other : the joint operation of these causes keeping the currency always at, or very closely about, the amount required for the real business of the country. There are those, particularly among the re- ceivers of fixed money payments, who flatter themselves with the idea, that the distress with which the country rings is, after all, merely a transfer of property (in which of course they are not the losers), merely a hocus-pocus trick of our legislative conjurors, by which the in- dustrious are robbed for the benefit of the idle. 45 They are mistaken. It is a destruction of pro- perty, and a tremendous one, which is going on ; and for this reason. There is a natural energy and sanguine spirit of perseverance in the British character, which will not allow our industrious classes to give way to despair, even at the sight of repeated losses. They struggle on, full of vain hope, redoubling their toil, and paying their rents, their taxes, and their debts, out of their capital. But the capital consumed in this way is never reproduced. It is not till it is exhausted, that the evil will be seen in its full magnitude. The Duke of Wellington does not understand, he says, that people can continue working for one, two, three, or four years, with- out profits. Perhaps they would not, if they had any other resource. But, if all employ- ments are equally unprofitable, no change can benefit them ; and what are they to do ? If the Duke would consider the mass of capital which is irretrievably embarked in this country in land, buildings, machinery, roads, canals, railways, stock, tools, and labourers (who must be either employed or fed in indleness,) he will see, that to give up the employment of this capital would be a total loss, not of profit only, but of principal: therefore they work on, glad if they can get the smallest possible returns upon that remainder of their capital which is still afloat. But even this is 4G failing in all directions. It is eaten into daily by continued losses. The Dnke must, I should think, have known or heard of instances of per- sons in business carrying on for years a losing trade ; paying ont of their capital those annual burthens that should be provided out of profits ; but a day of reckoning comes at last, when the capital is found exhausted, its employer declared insolvent, and his creditors and mortgagees in- volved with him in ruin. Such a process is, in a hundred thousand individual instances, silently but certainly destroying the mass of the pro- ductively employed capital of the country. Nor is the day very far distant, when the classes who rely in fancied security on the proceeds of the labours of others, and are momentarily profiting by their losses, may be surprised with the appa- rition of a general bankruptcy, which will leave them to share a common ruin with those whose talents, skill, industry, and enterprise, could not save them from the consequences of an ignorant and mistaken interference of the legislature with the sources of wealth. To conclude ; though at the risk of repetition, I believe, from all appear- ances, that the whole productive energy of the country is at its last gasp. Its burthens are fixed, while its returns have in every employ- ment been daily diminishing, till employers and labourers are ground down to one common 47 misery. If relief is not speedily afforded, the colossal fabric of British industry, which, through the blessings of a free government, and internal tranquillity, had reached a magnitude utterly unprecedented in the history of mankind ; will crumble, silently and at once, to the level of former barbarous ages ; and this will have been caused, not by the assaults of outward violence, but by the fatal process which, unknown even to the sufferers, has been secretly sapping the materials of its structure, for the last four years, in the forced rise of the value of money, and, consequently, the increase of all the complicated burthens that industry has to support out of diminished means. To you, Sir, whose opinion, on this question in particular, must carry with it much influence in the royal councils and in the legislature, I appeal, in the name of a community suffering under the consequences of a pardonable, but most unfortunate, legislative error. Vindicate the character you have given of yourself. Review the successive variations of condition in which the commerce of the country, internal as well as external, has been placed, in conjunction with the several changes of the currency, during the last twelve years. Recollect that previously to 18 19, there was scarcely any gold in the kingdom. Measure the quantity that has found 48 its way here since : and ask yourself at what sacrifice it must have been obtained. Then turn to the situation of the country, and see in it the realization of the picture, which in theory you will have expected to result, from a law com- pelling- it, at all costs, to provide such a mass of so rare a metal. A real de facto gold currency is the clumsy instrument of a barbarous age. The contrivance of substituting paper pledges to pay gold for the metal in substance, lias been one of the greatest improvements which ever blessed mankind. It is as great a step as that from a spoken to a written language, or from manuscript to print. In spite of the abuses it has suffered from faulty regulation, it has been one of the main causes, as effective a cause as the steam engine itself, of the rapid improve- ment of Great Britain in production and wealth, and of the rate at which we have outstripped the remainder of the world. Does any one believe, that if our commerce had been cramped by restriction to an exclusively metallic circula- tion, we should have made the progress we have made within the last thirty years ? Though one sovereign may not circulate in the country, a paper pound, payable on demand in gold, at an immutable standard, by persons of unquestiona- ble property, is as safe, as invariable, as useful a measure of value, as gold itself. The purpose 40 of a standard is for reference, not daily use. The best, because the most invariable standard of weights and measures is the French metre, the ten millionth part of the distance from the Equator to the Pole; but it does. not follow that every ell of silk should be measured on the meridian. To attempt to make gold really the sole instrument of exchange, or to make it form a large proportion of our currency, is to make us return to the comparative poverty, to the slow rate of advancement, of our an- cestors, or of those countries which still re- tain a purely metallic circulation. Is it not obvious at once, since the quantity of precious metals in the civilized world is limited, and is augmented with the utmost slowness (the in- crease for many years past not even supplying the wants of the goldsmith, much less that of an universal currency ) ; since also the trade, and business, and wealth of a country must always preserve a fixed proportion to its medium of exchange ; that to require that medium, not merely to be measured by, but positively to con- sist of gold, is to tie down the wealth of the nation by a fixed standard to a certain multiple of the actual amount of gold which can be pro- vided for circulation ; is forcibly to check the multiplication of that wealth ; to put a drag E 50 upon the rate of its increase ; to debar the country from profiting by the inexhaustible re- sources of her people's ingenuity, science, and energy ; to compel them to toil without reward, causing the returns of industry to diminish, as its quantity, and their numbers increase ; to condemn the nation, in short, to regulate its acquisitions of the means of enjoyment, by the tardy and variable rate at which the earth can be made reluctantly to give up its unprofitable, and in themselves most worthless ores. I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect, Your very obedient humble Servant, IHARLE3 WOOD ANU SON, PRINTERS, Popplo'E Court, Fleet Street.