[Printed by authority oLthe State of Illinois.] 
 
 
 Circular. 
 
 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, 
 STATE OP ILLINOIS, 
 
 The Adjutant General’s Office, 
 ^ October 21i 1915, 
 
 The following reprint is made for the use of Officers of the 
 National Guard of Illinois in connection with work in Army 
 Instructions. ' 
 
 P. S. Dickson, The Adjutant General, 
 
 ^ DUTIES OP INPANTRY OPPICERS AND NONCOMMISSIONED 
 OPPICERS IN EXTENDED ORDER AND COMBAT 
 
 EXERCISES. 
 
 Corporals: Read 6b I. D. R., last paragraph I. D. R. 22, 42, 
 ' 43, 75, 98, last of 103, 124, 125, 126, 127, 133 to 143, 146 to 158 
 (see changes). Note that the Corporal, School of the Company, 
 is in the middle of the squad; School of the Squad (acting alone) 
 he is either in front or behind his squad, but the Corporal during 
 firing, either when the squad is acting alone or in company, is 
 all over the squad. 
 
 The Corporal is now the real commander, placing himself 
 where he is capable of handling all his men, correcting their 
 faulty sight setting, their aiming, their use of ammunition, their 
 use of cover, keeping them calm and intent upon the proper per- 
 formance of their functions, using the rifle with all the care and 
 precautions for effectiveness and safety as are used in range 
 practice, seeing that they advance always a^ the command. Are 
 I carefully at the proper target, and use their ammunition for its 
 1 fullest value. It matters little whether the .Corporal use his own 
 
 I rifle at all. I think it best in the National Guard that the Cor¬ 
 
 poral should NOT use his rifle for firing, but devote all his time 
 and energy to the active command of his men; it is best unless 
 his men are unusually well trained and experienced in war, and 
 even then he will have all the work he can do without firing at 
 all. 
 
 I All officers and noncommissioned officers should under¬ 
 stand that the handling of the rifle by the private is in 
 
 ' accordance with the firing regulations: the sighting, the 
 
 position, the aiming, the trigger squeeze, the sight-setting above 
 
 i all things, the elevation and deflection corrections, the use of 
 the sling, the use of the lock, penalizing the excessive use of 
 ammunition, attention to the Tvhistle and oral command; these 
 things the Corporal MUST attend to, and he must in addition 
 |j| watch the enemy, watch the superior noncommissioned officers 
 
 I and officers who immediately command him and study the ground 
 
 I so as to utilize its advantages and avoid its disadvantages. As 
 I the Corporal works, keeping his men calm and attentive to the 
 I performance of their duty, correcting their errors and omissions, 
 so will the efficiency of the company be. It follows then that a 
 Corporal must be not only superior in intelligence, loyalty and 
 
2 
 
 obedience, but letter perfect in the Drill Regulations and the 
 Firing Manual, and no amount of careful, painstaking instruc¬ 
 tion in these things will be wasted. Sergeants, under the new 
 order, would be better off if not armed with the rifle, except for 
 the detached action which they are constantly required to super¬ 
 vise and for use in the bayonet encounter. Whenever any officer 
 or noncommissioned officer begins to fire in battle, his attention 
 becomes wholly absorbed in his own firing and he becomes 
 wholly oblivious to what is happening around him and while he 
 may be firing effectively himself, the whole of his proper com¬ 
 mand may be wasting its efforts and ammunition. A sergeant 
 should never fire when with the company, and in detached action 
 should restrict the use of his rifle practically to self defense. 
 Until troops are thoroughly trained and in excellent discipline, 
 it will always be preferable that the corporals do not fire. If 
 they use all their time for coaching, instructing and advising, the 
 time may come when the men will be so thoroughly habituated- 
 to the proper use of the rifle that they no longer require close' 
 supervision and the corporal may then fire. It is true that with 
 the noncommissioned officers not firing, the company loses the 
 fire effect of some of its best shots, but the army loses the battle 
 firing of its best shots with the commissioned officers, for, if we 
 examine the composition of the rifle teams in the late National 
 Competitions, we find that nearly the whole of National Guard 
 teams were commissioned officers and fifty per cent of the 
 Infantry, Cavalry, Navy and Marine Corps teams were com¬ 
 missioned officers. Note also that the Regular Army in the 
 Department Competitions had to rule commissioned officers out 
 of the competitions and in place of active participation, allowed 
 to them medals equal to that of any enlisted competitor when 
 the officers’s score exceeded that of the enlisted medal winner 
 by five per cent. But, on the other hand, note the dffect of fire 
 of excellent shots at ranges beyond those in which the danger 
 space is continuous and when the estimation of range is 
 erroneous (Balck, I, p. 168 et seq). Note also, that in the war 
 strength Infantry company, there are eighteen noncommissioned 
 officers who might fire and eighty-four privates - (including 
 artificer) who should fire, twelve squads with a corporal or lance 
 corporal for each. The corporal should be an adept in the use 
 of motions and signals, for though the sergeants and com¬ 
 missioned officers are supplied with whistles, the corporals are 
 not and even if they were, the whistle is good only for calling at¬ 
 tention to a signal which follows it and the corporal is close enough 
 to all his men to immediately indicate his will, but he can not 
 expect to do so by voice during firing, likewise he must under¬ 
 stand the signals of his superiors, not only those of the drill 
 regulations, but those which will be devised as circumstances 
 require. 
 
 It is advisable in extended order in peace training, that the 
 corporal give no oral commands except “follow me” and use 
 the prescribed signals for all others; this for two reasons: first, 
 that the men become accustomed to the signals; second, watch¬ 
 ing for signals requires closer attention. 
 
Sergeants: What applies to the Corporal applies also to 
 the Sergeant. The Sergeant must see that the Corporal does 
 his duty but must also he prepared to assist the Corporal in 
 maintaining control of his m^en, particularly so where any reen¬ 
 forcement has taken place or otherwise where the men of dif¬ 
 ferent units have become intermingled. It is at such occasions 
 that disorder is created and control destroyed. Sergeants and 
 Platoon Leaders must be ready for this and take immediate 
 action assigning new men to squads, seeing particularly that the 
 new men obey the corporals to whose command they may be 
 assigned, and likewise seeing that men of their own company 
 obey the orders of a corporal from another company v/hen like 
 circumstances make his assignment to the command of that cor¬ 
 poral desirable or necessary. The tactics of Infantry require 
 that in battle each Infantry Officer and soldier place himself 
 under the authority of the nearest Infantry Commander. By 
 analogy, it is the duty of an Infantry leader or commander to 
 assume command of those nearest him without regard to com¬ 
 pany, battalion or regiment, and to forego, in battle, the com¬ 
 mand of those whom, by virtue of his regiment and company 
 assignment, he is normally entitled to command but who have 
 become separated from him in the incidents of battle. I abjure 
 all infantry officers and noncommissioned officers to observe 
 these things for they are incidents to the crisis of battle and at 
 the time v/hen control is most vital and ordinarily least effective. 
 
 Many of the Sergeants will be utilized as Platoon Com¬ 
 manders. Those who are not utilized as Chiefs of Platoons are 
 assistants to Chiefs of Platoons and will assist platoon com¬ 
 manders whether directed to do so or not. Just as a file closer 
 in close order has the normal function of correcting errors and 
 insuring steady marching and accurate drill, so a Sergeant who 
 has no platoon to command in extended order has the duty of 
 preserving the calm, steady and accurate execution of battle 
 orders and should observe and report all matters which he has 
 no authority to control. In the main, the duties of such sergeants 
 will be those of platoon commanders under the control and 
 direction of platoon commanders. They are also available for 
 detached action and may be advantageously used in the obser¬ 
 vation of fire and possibly as range finders. 
 
 Chiefs of Platoons: The Drill Regulations fix twenty-five 
 men as the limit which one person can control by voice in action, 
 hence the company is divided into platoons so that there shall 
 be two to four squads each, preferably three, but never more than 
 four; to the command of these, the Lieutenants and Sergeants 
 are assigned in order of rank, but a vacancy created by casualty 
 in battle would be filled by seniority in the platoon or by assign¬ 
 ment of the captain pending the termination of the engagement, 
 without change in the command of other platoons. 
 
 In peace strength companies, and particularly in those in 
 which discipline and training is not yet at its greatest efficiency, 
 I think it advisable to make platoons of two squads, normally, 
 both for better instruction, and in order to give sergeants an 
 opportunity for practice of their legitimate functions. 
 
4 
 
 The Drill Regulations prescribe that the platoon commander 
 has a post five paces in rear of the center of his platoon. While 
 observing the action of the whole platoon, this is a good place 
 to be and the voice should carry to both ends of the platoon ex¬ 
 cept during moderate firing; but an active platoon commander 
 is on the line, in the line, at both ends, and at all parts, always 
 coaching and directing. In advances he leads, he is the first 
 file in platoon column and ahead of the line in rushes and, 
 when he halts or drops to cover, the platoon halts and drops to 
 cover in line with him. The most important function of the 
 Chief of Platoon is Fire Control. All officers and all sergeants 
 should be thoroughly conversant with the provisions of Part III, 
 Small Arms Firing Manual, at least the first three chapters, 
 likewise in the Drill Regulations the following: School of the 
 Company, paragraphs 199 to 257, 290 to 326 and Part II. This 
 paper is not intended to take the place of such very necessary 
 study, but only in amplification of it. The main duty of the Chief 
 of Platoon as stated is fire control and consequently fire dis¬ 
 cipline; a certain target is assigned to him and it is his duty to 
 so direct the fire of his platoon upon that target as to overcome 
 the resistance of the troops composing that target; when to 
 fire and when not to fire, the intensity of the fire, when to in¬ 
 crease or diminish the rate of fire, the determination and chang¬ 
 ing of range, the determination of the effect of the fire of his 
 platoon, the determination as to the possibility of advancing 
 and the manner in which that advance can be made; all these 
 are functions of the platoon commander as well as the super¬ 
 vision of the corporals and the work and control of the 
 squads. While the Drill Regulations and References indicate 
 that a platoon is the largest body that can be directly controlled 
 by voice, in practice such control will be found difficult, hence 
 the Chief of Platoon is provided with an efficient whistle, one 
 short blast of which calls attention of the corporals to the signal 
 which is about to be given, and troops should be trained in the 
 conventional signals coincidentally with their general training 
 in battle formations and technique. See I. D. R. 234. The Cap¬ 
 tain will from time to time, as he sees proper, assemble the 
 range finders and correct the ranges given; he will also as 
 occasion demands, change the assignment of target and other¬ 
 wise direct the action of platoons in accordance with conditions. 
 
 The Company Commander: The direction and control of the 
 company as a whole lies in the Captain who operates through 
 the Platoon and Squad leaders, using the best estimators, re¬ 
 gardless of rank, as Range Finders and the Musicians as messen¬ 
 gers and as prescribed in 235 I. D. R. The Captain points out 
 or describes the general target for the company and the target 
 for each platoon, making sure that the location is accurately 
 determined and understood. In considering paragraph 247, I. 
 D. R., one must have in mind the effect of windage and a keen 
 appreciation of the refaction of the line of sight to the line of fire, 
 for it is evident that if a target at 1,000 yards is hit with sights 
 directed upon it and elevation of 1,050 yards, the elevation must 
 be less to hit the same target if an object 200 yards further is 
 
t 
 
 used as an aiming point, though mathematical computation will 
 not take the place of the observation of fire effect. 
 
 In general, the Captain supervises and directs all the advance 
 of the company. This does not, however, prevent the advance 
 of a subdivision in accordance with what is the known will 
 of the Captain—that is, if it is known that the Captain desires 
 the company to advance as it may be possible, and it is im¬ 
 practicable for the company as a whole to advance but a platoon 
 commander finds that his platoon can make an advantageous 
 rush so as to act as a key or base unit for the company, it is 
 quite permissible and desirable that such rush be made. 
 
 The Major: Prior to formation for battle, the Major determ¬ 
 ines what, if any, additional ammunition is to be used, what 
 companies shall compose the firing line, support and reserve, 
 determines the order of the companies in line, points out the 
 target, subdivides it so that each company has a definite target 
 or objective, states the relations of neighboring troops, if there 
 be any, gives the end to be attained by the action, states the 
 front of companies in the firing line—that is, determines and 
 orders the intervals between skirmishers—states the conditions 
 of the enemy so far as known. He v/ill also provide for flank 
 protection if the battalion be operating alone or with an exposed 
 flank. This, however, does not relieve the Captain of a flank 
 company of the duty of either providing his own flank protection 
 or furnishing connection with the flanking groups provided by 
 the Major. Correct tactics do not permit any officer to depend 
 wholly upon another to protect him against surprise when he 
 can see for himself that his flank is unprotected or can not see 
 that it is protected. The Major indicates when the fire fight 
 shall begin but does not necessarily do this before the deploy¬ 
 ment of the battalion; in fact, it is preferable that he withhold 
 this decision until the advance makes the hostile condition ap¬ 
 parent—that is to say, that in the attack particularly, the time 
 for deployment of the battalion into its company combat units 
 will usually be at such distance from the enemy that his strength 
 and vigor can not be so well determined as to fix the time for 
 the beginning of the fire action. The rule is that where su¬ 
 premacy is sought, the least distance at which fire may be 
 opened upon an enemy, either in attack or defense, the more 
 effective and decisive will that fire action be, particularly if it 
 can be brought to bear suddenly and in great volume. This is 
 always true in the attack; on the defense, the reason for taking 
 the defensive may be recognized inability to overcome and pur¬ 
 sue the enemy or the orders may require that the attacking 
 enemy be stopped or delayed, hence while we have but the one 
 rule for the attack, that of withholding fire until arrival within 
 effective ranges, the battle conditions of the defense may re¬ 
 quire either that they hold or delay the attacker by fire at the 
 longer ranges, or, for the purpose of greater damage and more 
 certainty of success in the counter attack, that they withhold 
 their fire until reasonably certain that the range is such that 
 they can suddenly overpower and disorganize the attacker by a 
 
6 
 
 burst of well-directed fire followed up by a vigorous counterat¬ 
 tack. Ammunition supply always governs the attack, for after 
 the beginning of the fire action, it may be considered that there 
 will likely be no additional ammunition through the day or at 
 least until the termination of the action. 
 
 For the defense, it is usually considered that they have all 
 the ammunition they can possibly use or that there are means 
 of replenishing ammuniton during the engagement. This may 
 not be the fact, as the defender may be no better supplied than 
 the attacker, but it is always considered that as the attacker 
 has the physical fatigue of the advance and is consequently 
 less accurate in his aiming and holding while the defender may 
 have the advantage of using a rest for the rifle, the attacker 
 must frequently advance fully exposed while the defender re¬ 
 mains quiescent, that the defender may have availed himself 
 of an opportunity for determining the range to all control points 
 in the direction of the attack so as to be able to announce cor¬ 
 rect sight settings while the attacker must depend upon his best 
 estimates followed up by subtracting his estimates of the dis¬ 
 tance advanced from that estimate. Hence there are many rea¬ 
 sons why the fire of the defender should be more effective man 
 for man than that of the attacker and for that reason less am¬ 
 munition per man should be required for the defense. The 
 psychology of the situation may give some mathematical ad¬ 
 vantages. 
 
 The Major may not announce the time for opening fire and 
 the advance may be stopped at some stage and be unable to 
 continue without supporting fire, whereupon it will become the 
 duty of the ranking officer present to determine whether or not 
 fire shall be opened. The following points, however, should be 
 kept in mind: 
 
 1. Some casualties do not indicate that supporting fire is 
 essential to further advance. 
 
 2. The first shot is frequently fired by a nervous recruit and 
 is taken up all along the line unless strenuous efforts are exerted 
 to prevent it. 
 
 3. The beginning of fire action is the beginning of the de¬ 
 struction of control, for after a man begins to fire, he looks more 
 to himself and less to his officer. 
 
 4. Do not let your men “shoot up their nerve” or “fan the 
 brush,” both are admissions of cowardice and declarations of 
 your inability to control them. 
 
 The first shot may. be fired by an old soldier who has 
 observed an excellent target and cannot control his desire to 
 take advantage of it; this frequently happens where a force is 
 creeping up unseen by the enemy and when officers and non¬ 
 commissioned officers are not w^atching their subordinates as 
 closely as they watch the enemy. This is a tendency wffiich is 
 found in all troops, and is counteracted only by constant w^atch- 
 fulness and perfect control and to order such firing stopped and 
 to stop it is insufficient, the man who caused it must immediately, 
 be taken to account. The necessary rebuke is, of course, public. 
 
7 
 
 and intended not only for the correction of the soldier at fault, 
 but for the prevention of line “accidents,” consequently while 
 the language used may be most caustic, it must not transgress 
 that unwritten rule which prohibits an officer from taking 
 advantage of his position for the abuse of one under him, neither 
 must offensive appellations be applied. The rebuke, in other 
 words, is publicly and immediately administered, and should 
 leave the soldier crestfallen and ashamed but should not stir up 
 f resentment either in him or in those who hear it, and should 
 
 be effective notice to all within hearing that unauthorized firing 
 will not be tolerated. Such things make or break discipline and 
 the Lance Corporal is as competent to administer such a rebuke 
 as the Captain. It does not hurt if every leader from the Cor¬ 
 poral to the Captain takes advantage of the occasion to assist 
 in the ignominy of the culprit. 
 
 As stated, the determination of the time for opening fire 
 devolves upon the Major or possibly upon the Captain. It fol¬ 
 lows then that these officers should be well versed in the effective¬ 
 ness of fire, as effected by range, dispersion, angle of fall of the 
 trajectory and its relation to the slope of the ground at or near 
 the target. A study of combat tactics and infantry fire as given 
 in Drill Regulations, Field Service Regulations and the Firing 
 Manual will show when and how fire may be opened by com¬ 
 manders junior to those mentioned. The Major follows the 
 firing line and directs its operations and those of the support or 
 fianking groups; without his orders, each Captain directs the 
 operations of his company according to his own judgment and 
 preserving his general relation to the base. Except for the Major, 
 the firing line has no single commander who exercises super¬ 
 vision or control over it. The base company is not a perfect 
 guide nor is any other company held back because the base com¬ 
 pany cannot or does not advance except that all work together 
 in harmony and giving mutual support as one good team. 
 
 It should be remembered always that in any crisis it is the 
 military senior . present who is responsible, and he has full 
 authority while he is senior. I hope no officer or noncom- 
 j missioned officer will consider my statement that the Major is 
 
 the only commander of the firing so absolutely that he will forget 
 the provisions of the Articles of War; for, as stated, the princi¬ 
 ples of Infantry Tactics may suddenly make your commander 
 some infantry officer you have never seen before, whose name 
 you do not know and may never know, it being sufficient for 
 I you for the moment that he has rank and office proper to such 
 
 commands. 
 
 So much for the duties of officers and noncommissioned offi- 
 ^ cers. Let the corporals master the commands and signals for 
 
 the maneuver and control of squads and the detailed technique 
 ^ of squad movements, the technique of handling the rifle and the 
 
 rules of fire discipline. Let the Sergeant and Lieutenants master 
 those things and the management of platoons, the accurate 
 description of targets, the estimation of distance and direction, 
 the study of topography as it may be used for concealment, for 
 protection and as it affects the efficiency of fire, the distances at 
 
8 
 
 which fire is effective against targets of varying sizes, the aim¬ 
 ing points for moving targets, and formations which are least 
 affected by fire at varying ranges and varying conditions of 
 terrain. For Captains and Majors a careful study of Infantry 
 Tactics, Infantry Fire and the tactics of the three arms, par¬ 
 ticularly that of the Field Artillery. But first and foremost for 
 officers of all grades is the study of the drill regulations and 
 thorough mastery of its provisions. 
 
 The Advance: Troops marching into battle take as careful 
 precautions against surprise as troops marching otherwise where 
 the enemy may be found, but while troops under the latter con¬ 
 dition march with advance guards, rear guards, and flank guards, 
 Infantry marching into battle gets its protection either from its 
 formation, from the posting and marching of combat patrols, or 
 from both. The use of natural cover and fire support are also 
 material aids. As stated, the object in the attack is to advance 
 without ruinous losses to ranges within which effective fire can 
 be had upon the enemy, and without the waste of ammunition in 
 arriving at such distance. 
 
 After the Major has published his orders for the deploy¬ 
 ment of the battalion, the advance guard operations cease; it is 
 withdrawn, and each company marching separately in the gen¬ 
 eral direction of its objective must look after the protection of 
 its own march, both towards the front and towards an exposed 
 flank. It is not to be considered that the orders of the Major for 
 deployment contemplate the immediate deployment of the com¬ 
 panies into line of skirmishers. As a matter of fact, it may be 
 considered that the occasion indicates only that the time has 
 come when it is no longer advisable for the battalion to advance 
 as such. It is an undenied principle of infantry tactics that the 
 close order and column formations be retained as long as can be 
 v/ith reasonable safety. Though the time may have arrived in 
 which the battalion can no longer advance in column, the com¬ 
 panies may still advance in column. When the company can no 
 longer advance in column platoon columns should still be able to 
 advance and after them squad columns and column formation 
 should be retained as long as possible, as marching in line and 
 skirmish line unduly fatigue the soldier, who must be saved as 
 much as possible for his real work. The rule then is column of 
 some kind as long as possible and whenever possible so long as the 
 fire of the detachment is not required or desired, there being an ex¬ 
 ception in which hostile fire is more effective upon a column than 
 upon a line. Your firing manual or any good work upon infantry 
 fire will tell you what that condition is, and as you will always 
 be graded upon your knowledge of the use of fire and its effects, 
 I prefer that you find it for yourselves and learn the reasons, 
 for in searching for it you cannot avoid reading some very inter¬ 
 esting and important facts. The company, then, marches into 
 battle in column or line of column, always toward its objective 
 or target, but not necessarily in a straight line toward that 
 target, rather necessarily not in a straight line toward that 
 target, for in order to be able to march in columns, the com¬ 
 pany must take adavantage of every channel of concealment to 
 
9 
 
 . avoid exposure to fire. Neither does any company attempt to 
 maintain a certain interval from the companies adjacent to it; 
 
 * the general direction must be preserved and the ultimate forma¬ 
 tion must find the companies at their proper positions in the 
 firing line. Conditions of topography, however, may be said to 
 govern almost absolutely in the march into battle, for while one 
 company may be unable to advance without exposure, the com¬ 
 pany next to it in the line, by varying its course, may be able 
 to continue without being observed and consequently without 
 deploying to pass over open, exposed ground. It is to be noted 
 that if a company is compelled to deploy in passing over open 
 ground and may again advance without exposure, it takes up the 
 column or formation of line of columns most convenient and 
 expeditious as soon as it is practicable and, while one may be 
 able to advance steadily, another may be somewhat delayed by 
 the necessity of deployment and reassembly. Changes of forma¬ 
 tion always take time, but reassembly into at least squad column 
 is a gain of time in marching. Unless the Major orders other¬ 
 wise, one company will not wait for another less advanced 
 provided that tactical unity of the battalion is not lost by the 
 advancement or delay of one or more companies. 
 
 The infantry fights in line of skirmishers at such intervals 
 as the- circumstances require or permit; it also advances under 
 direct fire of infantry in such formation, under indirect fire 
 from artillery, infantry or machine guns; it* advances in such 
 formation as minimizes the casualties. This rule governs the 
 formation of and distance of the supports and reserves. 
 
 I cannot add to, modify, or explain the rule governing 
 density of formation of firing line in its relation to preponderance 
 or superiority of fire. The rule that sufficient rifles must be 
 employed to gain and maintain fire superiority is absolute and 
 for the attacker this superiority must be so great as to permit 
 advance of parts of the line. Though the requirement is abso¬ 
 lute, the method of securing it is not. For the defense, tiers 
 of Are may be utilized; for the attacking force. Are of position 
 covering the advance of the infantry; to gain the density of fir¬ 
 ing line, thin lines in which the single skirmishers are so widely 
 separated as to furnish no material target may have to be util¬ 
 ized. The Drill Regulations describe the advance of thin lines 
 for the avoidance of disastrous casualties, but company com¬ 
 manders must be extremely careful in utilizing this method of 
 advance that the troops do not get out of hand, that the Lieuten¬ 
 ants and sergeants in charge of the various lines keep excellent 
 control of the men under their charge and lead them neither 
 short of nor beyond the desired position and that they direct 
 their activities in the best manner after arrival upon the 
 desired new line. For this reason, I consider that the First 
 Lieutenant is the best officer to lead the first line, in that he has 
 or should have the greatest professional knowledge and exper¬ 
 ience in the control of men. The latter qualification is perhaps 
 the greatest in this tactical situation and, wffiile in the regular 
 service the First Lieutenant or the First Sergeant would usually 
 best fulfill the desired qualifications, it does not necessarily fol- 
 
low that such would be the case in a National Guard or Volun¬ 
 teer Company, the appointment and promotion of officers and 
 noncommissioned officers in the various services not being neces¬ 
 sarily governed by the same consideration. 
 
 Suffice it to say that wffiat you cannot do in one manner, 
 you may accomplish in another, and whatever your method of 
 action, you must bear in mind the fact that to succeed you must 
 keep your men under control. You must keep them always 
 conscious and mindful of your wishes and orders, and until you 
 take your men into action, you cannot he certain of the dis¬ 
 cipline and true character of either your best or your worst, for 
 until your men have had a taste of battle, you must constantly 
 work against the fear of death, which discipline and fear of dig- 
 grace only can overcome until experience in battle shows the 
 error of the common views of war. 
 
 Rushes: Conforming to the opinions of Balck, the recorded 
 experiences of Solaviev and statistics of the Russo-Japanese War, 
 our Drill Regulations prescribe 30 to 80 yards as the limit of a 
 rush. If we consider the time necessary to fire a carefully 
 aimed shot at different ranges, the temporary surprise of the 
 enemy and the time for changing target from a fixed to a mov¬ 
 ing one, v/e may arrive at an understanding of the time that may 
 be allowed for a rush without materially increased danger from 
 the exposure. Balck (I, 83) gives five seconds as necessary to 
 prepare the squad for a rush and ten to fifteen seconds to pre¬ 
 pare the platoon and the following time for the rush to cover: 
 80 meters, 26-30 seconds, 40 meters, 17-20 seconds, 25 meters, 
 10-15 seconds. Consider also about ten seconds after the rush 
 before aimed fire can be taken up. Three platoon rushes of 
 25 yards each will cost about 100 seconds of preparation and 
 exposure without returned fire against some 47 seconds for a 
 single rush covering the same distance. Von Rohne (Balck 
 1,162) gives the following average of aimed shots per minute 
 for trained soldiers: 
 
 Range 400 meters or less 5 rounds per minute. 
 
 Range 400 to 700 meters 4-5 rounds per minute. 
 
 Range 700 to 1,000 meters 3-4 rounds per minute. 
 
 Range 1,000 to 1,300 meters 2-3 rounds per minute. 
 
 Range 1,300 to 1,500 meters 1-4 rounds per minute. 
 
 Range over 1,500 meters 1 round per minute. 
 
 Your experience on the target range has dem^onstrated that 
 the firing of the first shot of a clip of series takes considerable 
 more time than subsequent shots. Continued observations of 
 the attaches during the Russo-Japanese War and their recorded 
 data show that at the shorter ranges, preparation for a rush 
 by subduing the enemies’ fire took greater time but that it was 
 possible to continue the rush for a much greater length than 
 at more remote ranges. The British hold that it pays to make 
 a long rush and take greater casualties on account of the diffi¬ 
 culty of getting a rush started. Did not the subject of battle 
 psychology dominate the subject, I would say unhesitatingly 
 
11 
 
 that the length of rush should be closely related to the time 
 necessary to change target and fire an average aimed shot at 
 the range and that therefore, the short rush would be prefer¬ 
 able, but it would appear that the only safe rule is to study 
 your men, study your ground, study the enemies’ fire and rush 
 as far as you safely can without “winding” your men or subject¬ 
 ing them to disastrous casualties. 
 
 I consider it excellent practice in peace preparation to 
 seek out the small hollows and humps in the ground to the 
 front; teach the men to search these out and run to them with¬ 
 out regard to the exposure in running, for it has a psychological 
 value in that the soldier having fixed his intention upon rush¬ 
 ing to a particular spot once started for it, a burst of fire about 
 him will likely increase his speed in getting to the pre¬ 
 determined place rather than turn him back. Troop leaders should 
 remember that failing to advance allows the men to believe 
 that they cannot advance, hence any advance so that there be an 
 appearance of constancy about it is desirable, to avoid the belief 
 by the men that they are but holding their own and cannot over¬ 
 come the enemy, for if this state of mind becomes fixed only the 
 addition of supporting troops will likely overcome the idea. 
 
 The term “Superiority of Fire” has been seriously mis¬ 
 understood. It refers to a psychological condition rather than 
 to either a preponderance in volume of fire or to fire which 
 predominates in effectiveness, and the correct definition of the 
 term in its military sense would be that fire which by its 
 effect upon the minds of the enemies’ soldiers prevents them 
 from using their own arms wdth, reasonable effectiveness, in 
 other words, that fire which in connection with other incidents 
 of the action “gets the enemies’ goat” so thoroughly that, for 
 the moment, a tactical advantage over him is or may be had. 
 For example, in the defense, without regard to the amount of 
 fire from the enemy, if the defender prevents the further ad¬ 
 vance of the enemy by his fire, he has Fire Superiority whether 
 the fire is that of a few men or of thousands and has not 
 necessarily any relation in fact to the amount of ammunition 
 or casualties of the one party or of the other. 
 
 ScHNEPP & Barnes, State Printers 
 Springfield, III. 
 
 1915 
 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 
 
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