& - EftH . * , : WOT A PERIODICAL THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 305 IL V.9 cop .2. NOT A PERIODICAL The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its return on or before the Latest Date stamped below. Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University. University of Illinois Library NOV24 DEC 9 JAH-02V SEP 2 972 972 92 1901 L161 O-1096 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES VOL. IX DECEMBER, 1920 No. 4 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU BOARD OF EDITORS : ERNEST L. BOGART JOHN A. FATRT.TB ALBERT H. LYBYER COPYRIGHT, 1922 BY THE UNIVERSITY OP ILLINOIS The Economic Policies of Richelieu BY FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM, PH. D. Assistant Professor of Modern European History in the University of California To my Father and Mother CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE PREFACE . . . . . . . . 9 I. INTRODUCTION . 13 Richelieu is known chiefly by his political accomplish- ments. The aim of this study is to point out that he was an economic as well as a political statesman. The economic side of his career has been underestimated, and a study of this is important in order to attain a fair estimate of his character and accomplishments. II. THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM ...... 17 A. The 17th century was the age of mercantilism. Def- inition of the mercantilistic view of which Richelieu was on the whole a true exponent. B. The age of Henry IV and Sully was the first in which the economic side of French development was recognized and fostered. Both Sully and Henry IV lacked definite conceptions of economic doctrine, and what they accomplished along such lines largely disap- peared after the death of Henry IV. The meeting of the Estates General in 1614. C. Montchretien 'a economic treatise was published about 1614. In it he brings out the need of a great man at the head of affairs of state to meet the various economic problems. The economic philosophy of Montchretien was very similar to Richelieu's. It is probable that the Cardinal read and was influenced by Montchr4tien 's book. III. THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN RICHELIEU, THE KING AND THE THREE ESTATES .... 29 A. The King Richelieu regarded the King as the father of his coun- try, responsible to God alone. He and the Cardinal were to do all they could to build up the state of which the King was the sole earthly owner. B. The Nobility -. : . Richelieu wanted to diminish the political power of the nobles and increase their economic and other useful- ness. He recognized the justice of their claims to a large place in the administrative functions of the country, and frankly opposed them only in so far as they injured the development of the state. CONTENTS [550 C. The Clergy Eiehelieu favored a national clergy as a valuable factor in the welfare of the state. He recognized their eco- nomic as well as their religious importance. D. The Third Estate Eiehelieu, according to some writers, considered the Third Estate from the point of view of the welfare of the nation, even though such consideration might prove detrimental to the position of that body. Yet he did have sympathy for thej Third Estate from the very first and tried to better its position. Other problems prevented the completion of his plans in its behalf, which one can find expressed in his Testament Politique. IV. THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EIOHELIEU'S POLICY OF CEN-. TRALIZATION 46 Centralization, according to Eiehelieu, was a means of state building. In becoming ' ' grand master, chief and general superintendent of navigation and commerce," he took his first important step in the economic central- ization of power in the hands of one man. Eiehelieu *s treatment of all individuals was based on their contri- bution for or against the public welfare. The economic importance of the Intendants, the reduction of the powers of the Parlements, and Eiehelieu 's relations toward the Huguenots. His ideas concerning the selec- tion of royal officials. The government furthered any schemes beneficial to the public welfare : i.e., Hospitals. V. BlCHELIEU AND THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE 62 The financial policy of Eiehelieu is difficult to treat. It must be considered as a whole, even though it was incomplete at the time of the death of the Cardinal. This phase of his administration is not so bad as has been depicted, as is shown by a study of: A. French finances during the administration of Eiehelieu, and the efforts made to reform them; B. the theoretical financial views of the Cardinal as found in his Testa- ment Politique. VI. THE ECONOMIC EELATIONS OF EICHELIEU TO AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND INTERNAL COMMERCE .... 82 What little Eiehelieu accomplished in the field of inter- nal affairs was hindered by the requirements of his ex- ternal policy. Nevertheless, his internal administra- tion was based on the same unconscious mercantilistie 551] CONTENTS 7 principles which he followed in his external affairs. Peace was needed before the maximum attention could be paid to internal problems. His efforts to develop agriculture, industry, and internal commerce. VII. THE IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RICHELIEU AS RE- GARDS A MARINE 92 Richelieu, appointed to the position of ' ' grand master, chief, etc.," used this office as a means for carrying out his ideas in regard to creating a great marine. Causes which influenced him to take action along this line. His accomplishments, in the way of building up the war and merchant marine. The importance of his work. VIII. THE IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RICHELIEU AS RE- GARDS COLONIZATION 108 Little done before Richelieu's time, but unprecedented growth in French colonization under his direction. His early ideas with regard to colonization. His ac- complishments, and the results of this phase of his administration. IX. RICHELIEU AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMERCE 125 The rise of foreign commerce during the age of Riche- lieu made it naturally an important part of his admin- istration. As Superintendent of the marine and commerce, he tried to develop trade to the utmost, as illustrated best in the articles of the ' ' Code Michaud. ' ' Difficulties encountered in his efforts to develop com- merce. Richelieu's conception of the value of commerce as an important part of the ' ' great state ' ' idea, as illustrated in his commercial relations with other great Europeon powers, the Levant, and minor countries. General ideas of the Cardinal concerning trade as expressed) in his Testament Politique. X. THE ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN THE DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 141 Richelieu advocated a combined continental and colonial policy. He planned that the internal economic devel- opment of France should be carried out extensively after the Thirty Years' War was over. His "welfare of the State" doctrine which was the guiding force of his administration was not understood or compre- hended by the common people. The economic elements in his diplomatic relations with Spain, England, Hol- land, Italy, and the northern States. The economic 8 CONTENTS [552 phase of the Thirty Years' War. Eichelieu's purpose in entering the war from an economic point of view. XI. CONCLUSION 172 Mazarin carried out only the external political phase of Richelieu 's policy. Thus France lost a great opportun- ity. Colbert took up the economic program again but irreparable damage had been done. In conclusion, mer- cantilism was the keynote of the Cardinal's economic policy. He looked forward to a period of universal peace, and an opportunity for a political and economic reconstruction of France. His two general contribu- tions to economic thought and practice. APPENDIX A. BIBLIOGRAPHY ........ 180 APPENDIX B. THE AUTHENTICITY OF RICHELIEU 's Testament Politiqite 189 BIBLIOGRAPHY TO APPENDIX B 195 PREFACE This study attempts to bring out the economic phase of the administration of Cardinal Richelieu. At present he is rightly regarded as one of the great French statesmen. He is more than that, for he may well be considered one of the first economic leaders in French history. This is the central theme of the treatise and although the study cannot claim to be regarded as a final treatment of the subject, nevertheless, if it should aid in the development of similar investigations in the future, the writer would feel amply repaid. The attempt has been made here to use as fully as possible the letters, contemporary memoirs, the interesting Mercure Francois and other sources available in a consideration of this fascinating age. This study was carried on mainly in graduate work at the Uni- versity of Illinois. It is impossible therefore to thank all persons to whom the writer is indebted for advice and criticism. Es- pecial gratitude is due to Professor A. H. Lybyer of the Univer- sity of Illinois, whose scholarly direction and inspiring criticism have made this study possible. Acknowledgement should also be made of the many valuable suggestions given by Professor L. M. Larson of the University of Illinois, and Professors H. I. Priest- ley and C. E. Chapman of the University of California. Fin- ally, grateful notice should be taken of the kind and efficient way in which the staff of the library of the University of Illinois has assisted in the search for materials. FRANKLIN CHARLES PALM UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA MAY 26, 1922 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU Car chacun sait que, quoique vous fassiez, En guerre, en paix, en voyage, en affairs, Vous vous trouvez toujours dessus vos pieds. Works of Voiture, II, 426-7. Edition Ubicini. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION If one were to ask the average well informed individual con- cerning the career of the Cardinal de Richelieu, the reply would be one which would convey little more than an intelligent appre- ciation of the political acts of this great and interesting man, for these have been regarded as constituting the dominant phase of his life. His genius along this line was clearly brought out in his conduct of the French participation in the Thirty Years' War, his settlement of the religious question in France, and his relations with foreign powers, the nobility, the Pope, the Queen Mother, and other eager opponents of his ideas. ' ' One is accustomed by habit to consider Richelieu in his struggle against Austria on the outside, the nobles and Protestants on the inside, as only a diplomat of keen and profound conceptions, a statesman ad- vancing to his designs with an unflinching energy, tfee founder of the absolute monarchy. ' ' * There is another side to his career which had no inconsiderable importance in directing and influencing his entire life and achievements, namely, the economic phase. History has placed such an emphasis on the other part of his life that it is difficult even to ask if economic interests held any place in that spirit which was agitated by such great designs. For example, did Richelieu have an economic purpose in his capture of La Ro- chelle ? Was his aim in entering the Thirty Years ' War purely political? Did the Cardinal have an economic philosophy? It is to be the purpose of this study to determine the economic elements which entered into the life and deeds of Richelieu, and thereby to establish the claim that this man was not only a magnificent statesman, but also an able economist, with all the crude but important economic conceptions of his time. To build France up as a strong unit, both political and economic, was i Pigeonneau, H., Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1889, II, 375. 13 14 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [556 the goal of his ambition, which a premature death prevented him from reaching. The economic aspect of Richelieu's achievements has been generally neglected, although it has been noticed by a few writers. One says that "most historians have glided rapidly over the economic side of Richelieu's career." 2 Others have claimed that there is a gap in our general histories, and that, if Richelieu had despised or neglected economic problems it would have shown a weakness in his spirit. Yet, far from putting them back to second place, he brought them to the front and studied them with passion. He certainly did not im- part second-rate ideas in his treatment of commerce, the marine, and colonization. 3 Another writer who has treated Richelieu's career from the administrative point of view, claims that the Cardinal's work as an administrator was not inferior to his political ability. He created in all directions a vigorous impulsion to national energy, which if continued along those lines would have produced wonderful results.* The same writer in defending the case of Richelieu as far as concerns his entire administrative career has succeeded in bringing to light the economic aspect of the man. In fact, most of his administrative reforms were of direct or indirect ecbnomic importance. When he proceeds to point out the fact that Richelieu centralized the monarchy and laid France open to administrative reforms, by ruining the political positions of the Protestants and the nobles, by giving the council of state a superior place, by diminishing the power of local government and establishing fixed duties in the generalites 5 he really indicates the first steps taken toward an economic reform of the country which Richelieu fully in- tended to carry through. Many difficulties, however, prevented the great minister from accomplishing all he desired. Most people have neglected to take these into consideration and thus he has been denied a fair judgment of his career upon the eco- nomic side. His great internal and external achievements seem im- zPigeonneau, II, 375-6. 8/Md., 376. Mercure Francois, le (1604-44), a Paris, XII, 516-18. 16 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [558 surface rather than to condemn the surface indications?" In other words criticised by some because he fostered wars, and by others because he made peace, his problems were very modern indeed, and it is no wonder that many sides of his career (the economic for example) have been submerged because of a mis- taken perspective of the difficulties involved. It seems profitable, therefore, to dwell for a while upon the economic activities of Eichelieu and to show that most phases of his administration were more or less influenced by them. To trace the economic thread is the problem of this study. This involves an examination of its importance in the confusing unsolved period of the first half of the seventeenth century, the age of Richelieu. CHAPTER II THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM The seventeenth century was distinctly the age when mercan- tilism reached its height. Mercantilism was the natural out- come of a series of historical events which caused men to grasp and understand the economic theories of the doctrine without realizing that they really were developing a distinct school of economic thought. It did not take long, however, to discover and to formulate, along definite lines, the philosophy behind it, once it had become the cardinal feature of the nation's develop- ment. It is desirable to distinguish some of the important factors which led to the practical application of mercantilistic ideas and the consequent theoretical formulation, because, as will be shown, Richelieu based his entire administration on the principles of the mercantilistic doctrine and in doing so was one of the most enlightened exponents of that system. The mercantilistic age seems to fall in the period of transition from medieval to modern conditions, and really grew out of those changes. "la fact," says one writer, "the decomposition of medieval feudal life into modern existence is one of the two chief aspects of modern life. ' ' * He goes on to say that the new system based on individual activity and scientific conviction has superseded the old military activity and supernatural be- liefs of the middle age. Thus he maintains that industry has been substituted for warfare. It often seems better to con- sider industry as another cause for warfare. Moreover, the beginnings of the separation of church and state, thd growth of commerce and industries, and the discovery of the new world with all its important consequences had a strong influence in developing the modern era to the detriment of the medieval age with its feudalistic basis of existence. They resulted in the growth of the state as the vital force which was to expel all 1 Bridges, F. H., France under Bichelieu and Colbert, Edinburgh, 1866, 5-10. 17 18 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [560 the needless and unhappy phases of the past ages, and a new kind of feudalism came into existence in which the state, or its king, was the actual feudal lord and his subjects were his vassals. As a result when one reaches the stage in history where the state takes the lead in controlling the destinies of man, then appears the modern age and with it the so-called period of mer- cantilism. As to a definition of the mercantilistic age, it may best be defined in terms of the state. "It is not," says Schmoller, "so much a doctrine of money or tariff barriers, protective duties, ior navigation laws as it is a doctrine which involves something far greater, namely, the total transformation of soci- ety, and its organization as well as that of the state and its in- stitutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial policy by that of the state. Now followed a struggle between state and district against the great nobility, the towns, the corporations, and provinces, the economical as well as the political blending of the struggle of these isolated groups into large wholes, the struggle for uniform measures and coinage and for a well ordered currency and credit. ' ' 2 Thus the mercantilistic doc- trine was that philosophy which centered everything economic and political in the hands of the state. When one assumes the general definition of Schmoller, that mercantilism implies state-building, it is also necessary to realize that this general idea includes a series of theories which prevailed to various degrees in different minds: in the first place, a tendency towards overestimating the importance of possessing a large amount of precious metals; secondly, towards an undue exaltation (a) of industry which works up material over indus- try which provides it, and (b) of foreign trade over domestic; thirdly, towards attaching too high a value to a dense population as an element of national strength ; and fourthly, towards invok- ing the action of the state in furthering artificially the attain- ments of the several ends thus proposed as desirable. 3 Thus the three earmarks of the mercantile system are: (1) attention to commerce (the importance of which was exaggerated), (2) cultivation of a favorable balance of trade, (3) prohibition in 2 Schmoller, G., The Mercantile System, New York, 1902, 51. s Ingram, J. K., History of Political Economy, London, 1904, 36-37. 561] THE AGE OP MERCANTILISM 19 duties, bounties, and development of monopolies, etc. 4 All these things led to the struggle of nations not only for political but for economical predominance. States became, as it were, artificial hothouses for the rearing of urban industries, etc. 5 Most of these characteristics will be found existing during the administration of the great Cardinal. In following out the policies of his administration, Richelieu conformed approximately to the common mercantilistic con- ception as described above. In doing so he was especially for- tunate in having certain predecessors to guide him in his actions. Henry IV and his minister, Sully, laid the foundation or at least made the excavations for the economic system of that century. The economist Montchretien drew up in 1615 the first French work on the subject of economics. Its crude but timely ideas correspond to the theoretical basis for Richelieu's administration. It represented the thought of the time and so Richelieu, whether he read it or not, followed its precepts with astonishing accuracy. This work together with the contributions of Henry IV and Sully requires brief consideration. The age of Henry IV and Sully marked the rise in France of a consciousness of the economic side of life. People had not been really aware of its presence in the fifteenth century. The progress of public peace and well being, the influence of the Italian custom, had given to the commerce of luxuries an impulse hitherto unknown. The age of discoveries had awakened the enterprise of the Norman mariners who began following in the tracks of the Portuguese and Spanish navigators about the same time as the English. 6 Thus France began to assume a place of economic as well as political importance in the affairs of the world. As a consequence the men at the head of the government, whether they were kings or prime ministers, began to consider and solve matters which were primarily of economic importance, on that basis alone, and were influenced in their political policies by the economic results to be obtained thereby. Louis XI, at the close of the fifteenth century, initiated the economic growth of France especially by his centralization and * Ibid., 50. s Ibid., 39. 6 Pigeonneau, II, 54-55. 20 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [562 unification of the government. But it was left to Henry IV and Sully, who came in after the religious wars, at the end of the sixteenth century, to make the first direct efforts to solve the commercial questions confronting the French nation. The first problem encountered was the proposition of securing internal peace. The edict of Nantes settled the matter so far as the religious strife was concerned. The nobles were also subdued by a combination of payments and force. Thus in a short time both Henry and Sully were ready to strengthen the economic position of France. Now at this time existed the peculiar situation where a king and his helper both had their own ideas on the subject and tried to carry them out regardless of the opinion of the other party. For example, Henry IV en- deavored to make France, and especially Paris, the artistic and industrial center of the world, much to the disgust of Sully, who favored the encouragement of agriculture. 7 As a consequence, France at this time underwent a temporary expansion in agricul- ture, industry, colonies, the marine, and internal and external commerce. By their accomplishments Henry IV and Sully laid, in a more or less haphazard and incomplete way, the foundations which Richelieu and Colbert were to complete or ruin. One writer aptly sums up the work of Henry IV as follows : ' ' He did his best to facilitate the downfall of the old system (feudal) and to encourage the new. He tried to remove the shackles upon industry and commerce; to improve the finances and found trans-Atlantic colonies, etc. He looked forward to a common European arbitration agreement, of a universal peace, and to accomplish this which might be by others defined as a policy of the balance of power, he set in motion the movement against the forces of retardation, namely Austria and Spain. " 8 In other words, the policy of Henry IV was directed in one way along the line of international relations, and thus, while atten- tion was given to the building up of the state, it was not the central theme of his administration. However, all of these excellent and well planned policies were ended when Henry IV was killed in 1610, and fourteen years of economic, as well as political stagnation, were to follow. 7 Pigeonneau, II, 289-290. s Bridges, 25-26. 563] THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM 21 A certain writer says that "the death of Henry IV was de- plorable in that the brilliant impulses which he had impressed on the economic life of the country were stopped and existed no more. ' ' 9 This is not wholly true, for one can find in the treatise of Montchretien a clear presentation of the doctrine of the time, and this work had a definite influence on the economic future of France. Yet, in a practical sense, the tasks of Henry IV were incomplete. "The peasants existed but that was all; credit and commerce reestablished themselves with difficulty; the systems of roads and canals were only outlined; colonial experiences had only begun and habits of order, of economy, and of honesty, which Sully had introduced into the financial administration, had not yet become traditions, etc. ' ' 10 It would be interesting to speculate upon what might have occurred if the rule of Richelieu had succeeded that of Henry IV in 1610. But as it actually happened, the government de- clined rapidly under Marie de Medicis. She was not able to understand or follow the good policy of her husband. The money saved by Sully was spent, taxes increased, colonies and the marine were neglected, and the new colonial policy was saved only through the energy and ability of Champlain. 11 The death of Henry IV then meant an industrial crisis both of a commercial and monetary nature. Troubles which he had set- tled appeared again. Foreign states disregarded treaties with France, excluded French commerce, sank French vessels, and imposed unfair duties upon French vessels entering their ports, in spite of the privileges they had in French harbors. Things went from bad to worse until finally in 1614 a meeting of the Estates general was called in a vain effort to remedy the situation. The result of this gathering was not insignificant. Riche- lieu, in his Memoirs, says that the assembly ended as it began, by doing nothing to advantage for either the king or the public. "It was a financial burden in itself," he claims, "while the corruption it opposed still continued." 12 He fails, however, Gouraud, C. M., Histoire de la Politique Commercial de la France et son Influence sur le Progres de la Bichesse Publique, Paris, 1854, 174-175. ! Pigeonneau, II, 350-352. 11 Ibid. 12 Richelieu, A. J., Cardinal, due de, Memoires, (Petitot Edition), vols. X-XXX, Paris, 1821-1829, X, 383. 22 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [564 to mention the fact that the king promised to carry out the reforms asked by the assembly and neglected to do so. The in- teresting features of the gathering are that it indicates a reaction against the bad conditions of the time, that Richelieu was present at the meeting and thus realized what was wrong, and finally, that Montchretien was led to publish his Traicte de I'oeconomie politique, in which he planned a solution for the troubles of France. The Cardinal must have been strongly affected by these two events, and his later actions indicate that he was. 13 Thus, at the very beginning of his career eco- nomic problems were placed before him alongside of the benefic- ial, practical beginnings of Henry IV and Sully, so that he could not help but be influenced by all these things. It is im- portant, indeed, that the ideas were furnished by an assembly of the people, and by the first French economist. Surely the modern world in a commercial sense, both practically and theo- retically, began for France at that period. Montchretien was very careful in his work to develop his idea of a paternalistic form of government. "The education of the nation," he said, " is the same as in the family." 14 However, there are some liberal conceptions in this treatment, as he recognized the development of the third estate and a certain amount of individualism. 15 Furthermore, he maintained that the social organization extends beyond the interest of individuals and the family, of the locality and the province, or even the particular interest of the nation. 16 This idea involves a multi- plicity of relations between the different divisions of the govern- ment and territories which only great men by their genius can comprehend, and by their position and resources can justify so as to increase the general prosperity, or, aided by science and guided by the experience of individuals, can the practice justify, according to the theories of political economy. In other words, he said that the situation called for a great man, and indeed a great leader in the person of Richelieu presently took is Montchretien based his work upon the accomplishments of Henry IV. Eichelieu and Colbert carried out the industrial and commercial con- ceptions depicted in his treatise. See Montchretien, Introduction, LXXXIX. i* Montchr4tien, Introduction, LV. uJ., Introduction, LVI. id., Introduction, XXV. 565] THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM 23 advantage of the opportunity, and carried out the major part of the program outlined by Montchretien. A brief summary of the leading ideas of this early economist may be given, arranged in relation to similar ideas or practices on the part of Richelieu. He begins in his treatise by describing to the king the excellent resources and situation of France. Richelieu in his Testament Politique repeated Montchretien 's ideas almost verbatim. 17 He then complains that France lacks men to invent and to do. Too many of her men go to Spain, England, Germany, and Flanders. Richelieu had this same idea, as will be shown later. He then advocates the development of agriculture and manufactures, so important to the strength of a nation. The whole tone of the book is to "build up the power of the French nation with the rich resources available," a true mercantilistic doctrine. He advises the king to study the commercial systems of England and Holland as accounting for their remarkable growth. Mont- chretien continuously had the interests of France at heart and does not consider outside interests as Henry IV did. The Cardi- nal conforms with his view in this respect. Montchretien recognizes both free trade and protection as combined and not separate. "Send your surplus abroad," he says, "but keep what you need and protect it." To carry out this idea both ex- ternal and internal trade have important roles. However, it is with foreign commerce that he is chiefly concerned, as was also the case with Richelieu. "All society, generally speaking," he says, "seems to be com- posed of government and commerce. ' ' 18 Thus the merchants are an important class of people. The stress laid upon com- merce by Richelieu will be shown later. Both believe that gold and silver are important, as they supply the necessities for all men; and it is interesting to note that both men in their ideas concerning commerce, industry, etc., constantly refer to the public good, whose interests they claim to follow. Montchretien devotes especial attention to commercial rela- tions with England. That country he claims limits the use of the products of French industries in England, for her own* benefit, while obtaining fair treatment for her own goods in IT Testament Politique II, 133-135. is Montchr6tien, 137-146. 24 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [566 France. 19 Everything possible is done to ruin French com- merce by extra taxes, etc. England desires to get control of navigation. One thus can see that the commercial rivalry be- tween France and England was coming to the front at this time, and it actually* was to be one of the first problems con- fronting the Cardinal. Montchretien, on the other hand, admires Holland and desires France to be on good terms with her. 20 The fact that they are so near and have mutual interests makes it best to be on friendly terms. Kichelieu also had a great admiration for what the Hollanders had accomplished. Both of them wished France to study her and imitate what she had done rather than actually to compete with her. As to Spain, Montchretien complains about the failure to treat French traders in Spain as Spanish traders are treated in France. He says, "French subjects are not allowed or per- mitted in Spain except if they wish to enrich the king of Spain. She is jealous of her colonies and taxes French traders un- fairly. " 21 As a result, he claims that it is the duty of the French to see that they are treated justly by the Spanish, as the Dutch have done for their own citizens. "For if Holland could do this, cannot we ? " A policy of this nature will lead to the augmentation, the welfare, and the repose of France, and the employment and use of its most courageous subjects, who would like nothing better than to undertake long and difficult duties. By authorizing and protecting the trade of France, this policy will increase commerce. Spanish ships have orders to destroy all French vessels found on the ocean, whether they are Huguenot or Catholic. Thus it is the task of the king to restore the use of the sea, which is common and free to all the world, and on which the French have a natural and legitimate right. How well this part of his work was carried out by Richelieu, who believed in these ideas, will be brought out later. It may be added that no better proof of the early economic rivalry between England, is Montchretien, 196-197. Montchretien believed that the severe treatment of foreigners originated by England had resulted in a commercial and mone- tary crisis. He opposed any concession to that nation except on the basis of reciprocity. See Montchretien, 129-130, footnote; 134-135. 20 Ibid., 207-208. 21 Ibid., 208-209. 567] THE AGE OP MERCANTILISM 25 Spain, and France can be obtained than in this treatise by Montchretien, an enlightened contemporary. Turning to the Levant, he urges the development of silk man- ufactures at home, instead of obtaining these articles from the Levant, a wasteful method because of the heavy duties imposed by the Levantine countries and Italy. He refers to the at- tempts of England to form a company in the Levant, and after affirming the fact that Russia constitutes a new outlet for trade, he turns to -a discussion of colonization. He was a strong advocate of efforts along this line. Thus he advises the formation of companies like the Dutch East Indian company (the one formed in 1595). ''Such companies," he says, "would make France strong and powerful. ' ' 22 His treatment of financial conditions in France was based on the cardinal principle of preserving peace and quiet in the land and being fair with the people. He says that there were great riches in the land which would aid the true finances of the country. They were wheat, salt, wine, cloth, and silk. "This country is so flourishing and abundant in all that one can desire that it is not necessary to borrow from one 's neighbors. " 23 It is not at all the abundance of gold and silver, or the quantity of pearls and diamonds which makes the state wealthy, but it is the resources of things necessary to maintain life, etc. Montchretien had absolute faith that the resources of France were such as to solve all financial troubles if used properly. Both Richelieu and the economist had a sublime trust in the ability of the French to overcome all commercial odds by this means. Both desired to conserve the people and make them happy. Just as the owner of a large plantation wants to build it up to its greatest extent, both economically and physically, so these two interesting men desired to build up France commercially and also to increase the happiness of the people, not only by internal means but by external additions of colonies to be obtained by the development of navigation. 24 Now in order to put down the colonial rivals of France not only a strong army but a strong navy was needed. Like Riche- 22 Montchretien, 248-255. 23 Ibid., 237-244. 24 Hid., 283. 26 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [568 lieu, Montchretien discusses the geographical position of France with its two oceans, etc. He urges the development of the ad- mirality. Again, like the Cardinal, he cites the success of Holland on the sea, "If Henry IV had used his money to build up harbors instead of the useless canal de Braire, our commerce would be much greater than it is at present. " 2t> To develop commerce and a strong marine, and thereby make a strong state, was constantly in his mind. At this point it may be added that both Montchretien and Richelieu, advised the king to encourage the building of boats by financial support or to sell some vessels himself, to be used for trade outside of the kingdom. The very fact that the Cardinal as soon as he came into office turned his attention toward colonization, the building up of a marine, and commerce in general, indicates that he was strongly influenced by similar views, perhaps obtained from Montchretien 's treatise. 26 Both men claimed that they were actuated by the purpose of "the public welfare," as being the greatest aim of the king. They appreciate the importance of each of the three estates. Richelieu emphasized that of the nobles, and Montchretien the third estate. They both desired to increase the riches of the people by means of the development of the arts and manufac- tures, the increase of navigation, and the reestablishment of commerce, which was perishing day by day in the kingdom. 27 One cannot help but notice the similarity between the intro- duction of Richelieu's Testament Politique and Montchretien's work. Both bring out the disorders of the time and the reme- dies to be undertaken in order to enrich the crown and the asMontchre'tien, 306-308. 26 For further views of Montchretien concerning the duties of the King, the people, the Estates General, the finances and the laws, all of which are closely related to Richelieu's ideas, see Montchretien, 336-354. 2? Montchretien, 3, note. An interesting comparison might be made of this quotation of Montchretien's with one of Richelieu's, regarding the gov- ernment. "Si la nature des disordres ou vous vivons maintenant portait que vous fissiez deux reformations differentes, 1'une a 1'appetit du commun, et 1'autre par les vrayes maximes d'etat et de police que 1 'usage des affaires vous apprend je ne doute point que le semblable n'arrivast." Richelieu: "II semble, fait dire Richelieu a Louis XIII dans le pre- amble de la declarations de 1641, que 1 'establissement des monarches estant fonde par le government d'un seul, cet ordre est comme I'ame que anime et que leur inspire autant de force et de vigeur qu 'a et de perfection. ' ' 569] THE AGE OF MERCANTILISM 27 state. There seems to be no doubt in the mind of Montchretien 's editor that Richelieu did read the work. "Richelieu," he said, "was the deputy of the clergy at the Estates General when Montchretien published his treatise, so not only the industrial and commercial measures of the Cardinal, but also the maxims on commerce, the marine, and manufactures which one finds in his Testament Politique, reflect the spirit of Montchretien. ' ' 28 Other writers have similar views on this issue. For example, one maintains that Richelieu's theories concerning commerce and navigation were not original. ' ' He borrowed or derived them from documents of the reign of Henry IV, of which the cahiers of the assembly of notables of 1617 and 1627, and the Estates General of 1614 were one source and MontcLretien 's Traicte d'Oeconomie Politique was another, from which the Cardinal obtained many of his views. ' ' 29 Another writer brings out the fact that Montchretien provided the colonial formula for Riche- lieu to follow. ' ' As regards colonial companies, ' ' he says, ' ' Mont- chretien recalls the methods followed by Holland and England, forestalling Richelieu or rather giving him a formula." 80 (He refers to the Cardinal's speech at the assembly of notables, to be taken up later.) Montchretien claimed that there was no better way to carry on colonies than by societies such as Hol- land used, or a council of many individuals instead of one in- dividual effort. So colonial exploitation by privileged companies is the means advised by the economist. He is thus in that respect the inspirer of the political economy of Richelieu. He has formulated all the economic principles of the seventeenth cen- tury and is the first and the most penetrating of the seventeenth century economists. This study will attempt to show how Riche- lieu took up many of his ideas and tried to put them into execu- tion. That the Cardinal ever read the book is not known because he has never, so far as can be ascertained, mentioned the name of Montchretien in his writings. The similarity, however, be- tween the views of the two would indicate that the Cardinal 28 Montchretien, Introduction, XX-XXI. 2 Pigeonneau, II, 381-382. so Desehamps, L., Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France, Paris, 1891, 61-62. 28 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [570 did so. The letters and memoirs of Richelieu prove that he was interested in these problems, and the fact that he favored literary efforts of all kinds, and would be likely to read a treatise dedicated to the Queen Mother and her son Louis XIII, strengthens the probability of his having read it. The important deduction to be made is the existence of a general economic tendency both theoretical and practical in France when Richelieu came to power. The mercantilistic doctrine with the state as a center was the natural commercial philosophy for a statesman to follow. And while this statement might seem to detract from the originality of Richelieu's beliefs, this is not so when one looks into the matter. For, although a man may not conceive a view, it takes a certain amount of genius and originality to make the practical application. The ideas of Mont- chretien required economic statesmanship of a high grade. (An inquiry may now be made whether the Cardinal possessed that quality together with his political capacity.) Was Cardinal Richelieu not only a political but also an economic statesman? To what extent did he continue the practical accomplishments of Henry IV and Sully, and carry out the theories of Mont- chretien ? CHAPTER III THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN RICHELIEU, THE KING, AND THE THREE ESTATES Richelieu from the first took the tasks confronting the King, the people and himself with intense seriousness. Dominated by his paternalistic conception of the King as the father of the people, responsible only to God, he desired to do everything he could to enable the King to build up a strong mercantilistic state of which he was the sole owner. In his general scheme of government all classes had their particular places and obliga- tions. This idea was true even of the Cardinal himself. Loyal to the individual who could alone represent the French nation, whom he loved so well, the Cardinal at the beginning pledged his fidelity, saying, "I will do all that will be possible, for, by following the good inclinations of the king, one receives an assured repose, the fruit of the service which I render his maj- esty according to my duty.-' 1 In his Testament Politique he recalls his first ambitions when called to office. "As soon as your majesty was pleased to admit me into the management of your affairs, I resolved to use my utmost efforts to facilitate your great designs, so useful to the state and glorious to your person. ' ' 2 One sees from the start the constant strife to obtain all advantages possible for the king and the state, and no better illustration can be given of the unselfish interest of the man apart from personal gain than his constant fidelity to his ruler and the latter 's welfare. Richelieu did, to be sure, look after his own personal fortune. His "Will and Testament" proves that he left great wealth, 3 most of which he bequeathed to his relatives. It also shows 1 Richelieu, A. J., Cardinal, due de, Lettres, Instructions Diplomatiques, etc., Ed., G. Comte d'Avenel. Paris, 1853-1877, III, 159. 2 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, 1, 8-9. s Eichelieu, Memoires, X, 122. 29 30 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [572 his own personal commercial ability. A good share of his money, land, etc., was obtained by gifts from the king. He refused, how- ever, many attempts of the rulers to bestow pensions on him, and indeed maintained that at the court the minister must not think of making a personal fortune but must plan only for the development of the welfare of the state, 4 which he must have seen would in the end benefit him. Yet it is clear that the Cardinal looked upon his office as meaning something other than a mere money making proposition and a means of obtaining high honor. 6 In 1624 Eichelieu came into power as first councillor. At once he began to carry out the duties of his office according to his mercantilistic belief, by recognizing the two elements which he must consider and whose welfare he must constantly promote by advice and deeds, namely, the king and the people, or the king and the state (including the people). "The greatest obli- gation of a man is the saving of his soul," he says, "the most important duty of the king is the repose of his subjects, the conservation of the state in its entirety, and the welfare of his government; for which reason, it is necessary to put down so severely the injuries done to the state, that the severity of the vengeance will prevent a recurrence. The repose of the state is the dominant thing. ' ' 6 The welfare of the nation, politically and economically, is the main theme of all his writings. Indeed, he says that the king has the right to do anything, even though it is against religion, to save his state. 7 No better expression can be given of the political and economic ideas of Riche- lieu. One even finds a tinge of the conception of a larger field than the mere state, when he says that the king must be liberal but only at the right time. He must reward merit. For that not only does the public but the entire world a service of which the reward to the state is only a partial return of the huge interest. 8 The works of Richelieu revealed a suppressed fear of the inabil- ity of the king to look out for the country. The reason for * Richelieu, Lettres, III, 204-205. s Eichelieu, Testament Politique, 1, Introduction, 4-5. e Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 15. Lettres, II, 168 et seq., Ill, 159. Ul>id., XI, 285. s Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 196. 573] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31 this state of mind is clear when one remembers the political weaknesses which existed through the youth and ineffectiveness of the king, as well as the unfortunate economic condition of France in 1624. The king's power was in a bad way. "Indeed some people even brought up the idea of electing a ruler. But the majority with Kichelieu believed that the absolute power of the ruler was best for the welfare of the country. He made the king the incarnation of public safety and interest." 9 The Cardinal in his Testament Politique has clearly stated his posi- tion as related to the king when he says that the ruler must act according to. reason and public interest. In this respect he would choose men to carry out those things he could not do. By their working together, he had no doubt that the greatest good for France would result. 10 "For," he says, "nothing ought to divert us from a good enterprise. We must do all we can to carry through those things we undertake with reason. ' ' " Thus one cannot fail to see the common, though unconscious, economic conceptions of that time which dominated Richelieu in his ideas concerning his duties as minister, and those of the king his master. It is a mercantilistic state he pictures, with the king as its earthly owner. Therefore it is the chief concern of those who govern this piece of property to see that the people who work on it, namely the subjects, are taken care of; that their welfare is aided, and also that the state in a national sense is to be developed to its fullest extent. By doing so a strong state would be created, a credit to its king and its min- isters, whose constant aim must be the welfare of France. What was his attitude with regard to the Three Estates ? Eichelieu, following the traditional French scheme, divided the people of France into three classes and considered all individuals as related to one of these orders. 12 They were the nobility, the clergy, and the third estate, which included the rest of the peo- ple. However it is an interesting fact that the Cardinal looked Caillet, 26. 10 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 197-199. 11 Ibid., I, 265. Richelieu 's efficiency in governing is best illustrated in that part of the Testament Politique in which he advises the King to consider the important things and not to bother with the details. See Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 195. 12 Ibid., I, 182. 32 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [574 upon all these classes as constituting one people, and when he attacked any class or sect of individuals, such as the Huguenots, he did so for the public good, that is, the benefit of all. As a consequence it was said that while the general public praised him, individuals hated him and tried to bring about his fall. 13 His efforts to reform the finances and to build up commerce and colonies were, in general terms, the lines along which he tried to aid the people, instead of particular groups. Centralization of the government was the only efficient way by which they could be benefited. His efforts to bring this about illustrate only too well the economic and political purposes involved. Yet in treating the people as a whole he had to consider their various classes and the rights due to each. 14 He recognized the system as being for the best, but in doing so he constantly had in view the welfare of the state. The class in which he placed the high- est hopes were the nobles, who he believed were destined to play the leading part in the destinies of France. In his treatment of this section of the population of his native land, the Cardinal had constantly in mind the welfare of the nation. This is shown by the fact that he confronted and at- tempted to solve two problems with respect to them. Namely, first to prevent them from being politically independent of the central government, and secondly, to make them useful members of society and the state. What he did with respect to depriving the nobility of political rights will be taken up in the next chapter. But one might add, that when Richelieu ordered in 1626 the razing of the castles and chateaus of the nobles, 15 a measure which was the outcome of his opposition to the separate political power of the nobility (which began as far back as 1617 ), 16 he changed the entire economic policy of France, not only in the increase of internal freedom of trade but in the altered position of the noble class. 17 They were no longer inde- pendent of the central government socially, politically, or eco- is Bichelieu, Memoires, XXIV, 191. !* Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 81. 15 Isambert, A. E., Eecueil General des Anciennes Lois Francoises, etc., 29 vols., Paris, 1829, XVI, 192-193. J Richelieu, Memoires, II, 6. " Rambaud, A., Histoire de la Civilisation Fran$ais, 2 vols., Paris, 1898, I, 574. 575] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 33 nomically. They were subject to the will of the state. This con- cept was just a part of the plan of Richelieu "to put down the turbulent nobles and obtain by that means repose for the common people, prosperity for the king, and increased grandeur for the monarchy." 18 However, when Richelieu had deprived this class of people of their independent powers, he did not oppress them and try to push them down into the lower estate. On the contrary he favored them. He looked at them not only from a political but also from an economic point of view; and saw in them "one of the principal sinews of the state, capable of contributing much to its conservation and establishment. " 19 In fact he and the king shared the same views, for the latter called them "the right arms of the state. ' ' 20 Richelieu tried to make a definite use of the nobles. He saw that they could fit into certain positions, especially those which were rewarded with many honors. "His ability to converse with the world, etc. ... all adapt him to certain func- tions. ' ' 21 So that if Richelieu wanted to deprive them of their political right to oppose the government, he also desired to find a method by which they could live with dignity and serve their country both in a political and economical sense. Not only Richelieu but many of the nobles themselves de- sired a part in the upbuilding of France. In a statement of their condition presented to the king by the assembly of notables in 1627, one obtains a fair idea of their ambitions. The exposition begins with an account of the distressing condition of the nobles, who are without any power or purpose. They then ask for the reestablishment of the nobility "as the greatest power to upbuild France, and to remedy its miserable condi- tion. ' ' Mention .is made of their former splendor and service. They are now in poverty and without power and are oppressed. Unwarranted abuses by some of their number (by many as a matter of fact) has deprived them of the administration of jus- tice, finance, and all the councils of the king. "Aid us, and put us in our former place, and the kingdom will gain thereby i* Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 244-256. J Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141. zoMercure Francois, XVII, 65. 21 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141. et seq. 34 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [576 and your reign will be more glorious and have a greater splen- dor. ' ' 22 However they showed their selfishness when they asked for control of governmental, church, and army offices and other unreasonable favors. The fundamental thing was that they desired a more active part in the government. ' ' Herein is where Richelieu erred," says one writer, "in not giving them a more important place in the administration of the government, as a way of safe-guarding the right and well being of the nobility. ' ' 23 Yet, judging from their demand it is doubtful whether the nobles ought to have been considered. Nevertheless the Cardinal did make efforts to use them for the good of the nation. He devotes a section of the Testament Politique to the differ- ent means of aiding the nobility and making them subsist hon- orably. "They must be respected," he says, "as one of the principal sinews of the state, capable of contributing much towards its preservation and settlement. Having been injured by vast numbers of business men, who have been elevated at their expense, it is my duty to protect them against any at- tempts of such individuals. Yet the people under the nobility must be protected from certain offices. It is a common fault in those that are born in a certain order to exert violence against the people to whom God seems to have given arms with which to get their livelihood rather than to defend themselves." 2 * In this statement one sees the entire attitude of Richelieu. He did not oppose the nobility because he had any prejudice against them, but he did stand against them in so' far as they were a detriment to the whole state in that they interfered with the economic contribution of the third estate, one part of the country. In order to aid them he carried out several of the demands of the assembly of notables. For example, he established a mili- tary school for young nobles, who were to be trained to adminis- ter and develop the nation within and extend and protect it abroad. 25 They were to have a part in the government, but were to be trained for their work and could only keep their positions by great services and superiority of ideas. 26 The ^Mercure Francois, XII, 40-46. 23 Pigeonneau, II, 376-377. 2*Bichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 141-146. zslsambert, XVI, 466-470. 26Caillet, 122. 577] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35 very fact that the nobility realized this made them ask for the military school. This request was an effort to stay the decadence of the class. Efforts were made to aid the nobles in other ways. Many were given good positions and favors to keep them in line with the government. For example, "Chateauneuf was granted a better governmental position in spite of his bad intentions toward the government. " 27 ' ' Indeed, ' ' Richelieu says, ' ' common people were replaced by nobles in the king's household because it would increase the number of those who are to help the people bear the burden of taxation, which they are overwhelmed with at present. ' ' 28 This is an economic way of looking at the prob- lem. The Cardinal was willing to do all he could to help the poor people, but he regarded the privileges of the nobles as something necessary and a part of the natural order of events. The fact that the Cardinal desired the nobles to enter all phases of French life and thus, through their abilities, help in the development of France, is best illustrated by his provision that they were to be allowed to engage in commerce without loss of honor. 29 Moreover, individuals were ennobled because of their successful colonial or commercial ventures. He thus strove to bring the exclusive order down to the everyday phases of life, and while he recognized their privilege, he wanted them to retain these only in so far as earned by economic or political efforts. The ultimate goal was to be of course the building up of the state. He really intended to make this class the brains and administra- tion of the country. The older men were to formulate the plans of government and the younger men were to carry them out. 30 He desired to use these men as official agents in the development of France politically and economically as well. The inefficient corrupt character of the members of the noble class prevented the success of the plan, and in the long run brought on the French Revolution and their ruin. They wanted a political pension and not an economic position. But after all, the great thing that Richelieu accomplished with respect to the nobles was to ruin their individual 27 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 40-45. as Ibid., I, 215-217. ^Mercure Frangois, XII, 3640. so Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 2425. 36 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [578 political power and open to them opportunities to serve the state politically or commercially, a course of action certainly worthy of a statesman. That he weakened this class by adding to them by means of the creation of titles because of activities in the field of literature or in the field of commerce, is very true. But what better proof is there of his economic tendencies ? He realized that the sale of offices to the nobles was bad and tried to stop it, but he could not bring about a reform in one night, as he admitted. 31 In opening to the nobility the chance to engage in political or commercial opportunities whereby the state was to be strengthened, he acted in keeping with his eco- nomic and political views, 32 and with the fundamental theory of mercantilism. The same viewpoint was true with regard to the clergy, "In conformity with his doctrine of the state, Richelieu opposed ultramontanism and proclaims," says one writer, "the absolute independence of civil power and the necessity of a national clergy. " 33 To be plain the Cardinal desired the clergy to join their interests with those of the nation. In fact the church had something more than a religious influence in France at that time. "It was an age of hospitals and schools which were conducted by the clergy. They were the leaders of philanthropic work. ' ' 3 * Richelieu as Bishop of LuQon was well aware of the importance of that class, and indeed tried to use his position to diminish the oppression of the common people. Thus he wanted them to use their powers for the interest of the state and its economic and social betterment. Indeed, he said that he pre- ferred the welfare of the king and the grandeur of the state to the interest of Rome, even though he was of the clerical order. That in brief explains his attitude. He desired a na- tional clergy. On the other hand some of the clergy recognized this position taken by the Cardinal. They appreciated the fact that he de- sired the unity of all the people in France for their common conservation. "Your majesty," said one of their representa 31 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 165-167. 32 Ibid., I, 141-147. 83 Caillet, 55. 60-62. 579] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 37 tives, "treats offensively and defensively, solely for the protec- tion of the altar of France from the enemy." They outwardly, at least, then joined the king and his administration "whether it would be to keep up commerce or preserve the security of the state in common defense, knowing that the sovereign law of political government is the safety of the people. ' ' 35 Thus they promised to do all they could to keep up the glory of the state. This action indicates that at least a part of the clergy appreciated the attitude Richelieu took towards them, and wanted to "do their bit" towards developing the nation, even in keeping up commerce. Richelieu considered the clergy as being capable of serving in other capacities besides the religious side of affairs. (Doubt- less he was thinking of his own case.) For instance, he says that the churchmen are best for public tasks because they have less self-interest and other distracting influences such as fam- ilies. 36 Economically speaking he desired to get out of them the most possible for the aid of the central government. How- ever he believed that their important function was on the religious side. Herein he admits that many reforms are needed such as an effort to get good bishops, to change the system of appeals and courts, unjust exemptions, etc. 37 "In fact," he writes in a letter, ' ' the King must be obeyed, by great and small, and he must fill the bishoprics with wisely chosen and capable men. ' ' 38 While admitting the importance of learning and of its propagation, he desires to see the monasteries limited in number, as well as other religious houses, because of the fact that there is a loss, probably economic, in having too many of them. 39 So he forbade the establishment of any more without the consent of the king. 40 In conformity with his plan to get all he could out of the ssMercure Frangois, XVI, 527-528. Richelieu, Testament PoUtique, I, 304. 37 /bid., I, 62-63. 38 Biehelieu, Lettres, III, 181. so Ranke, L. von, Samtliche WerTce, Leipzig, 1874, IX, 212. Ranke says that Richelieu diminished the number of monasteries as they were a hind- rance to trade or business. loisambert, XVI, 347. 38 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [580 clergy, especially the upper strata, 41 he tried to obtain as much financial support from them as possible. For example, in 1628, he requested money for the upkeep of the army and navy. By giving some, the clergy would relieve the common people. So they granted three millions of livres.* 2 He would have liked to exclude them from exemptions of taxes. 43 On other occasions he demanded certain amounts of money from the clergy and they objected. Busy with his European wars he permitted them to hold a council and decide what they would pay and he accepted it, as he had other matters which kept him busy. 44 As will be shown later, Richelieu opposed the Huguenots not on religious but on political and economic grounds, except that he encouraged their individual economic prosperity. This opposi- tion was just a part of that central theory of state building which he carried out so well, and of which not only the nobles and clergy but the Third Estate was a part. Richelieu regarded the Third Estate from the same point of view as the nation, and for doing so he has been condemned. One writer says that Richelieu always sacrificed the well being of the population to the grandeur of the nation without thinking that there was no more true and solid grandeur than in the union of these two factors, public prosperity, and national glory. In fact he accused the Cardinal of having no true love of the people. And whereas the latter followed Henry IV in his attempts to build up the state he did not imitate him with respect to the improvement of the welfare of the people, which was one of the aims of his predecessor. 46 Now it is quite correct to say that the Cardinal built up everything for the interest of the state. That was the central part of his political and economic philosophy. He recognized the people as constituting a part of the great nation and con- sequently they must be aided as a class. He looked at them 4iBonnefon, P., La Societe Frangaise du XVII Siecle, Paris, 1903, 85. Richelieu neglected the lower clergy, probably considering them a part of the Third Estate so far as social standing was concerned. In this he made a mistake. **Mercure Francois, XIV, 179. 43 Caillet, 83 et seq. 44 Ibid., 87. 45 Richelieu, Lettres, I, Introduction, GUI, CIV. 581] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 39 from the cold, calculating point of view of the statesman and economist, who believes that you must build up all the parts in order to increase the grandeur of the whole, but care must be taken to have in view constantly the whole rather than to weaken common advancement by an undue emphasis placed upon some part. This was his theory with respect to the rela- tions of the people to the state and even with regard to the relation of individuals to the people as a whole. For example, he says in his Testament toward the end of his life that the public interest ought to be the goal of those who govern the state, or at least the mass should be preferred instead of indi- vidual people. He cites Spain as an example, as having been made great through emphasis on the people as a whole. "By means of reason and justice this should be the method of councillors and kings of the future. ' ' 46 He asks the future government to consider the welfare of its peoples but in doing so he says, "all classes should stay in their proper boundaries, and thus trouble would not arise. ' ' 47 In spite of the fact that Richelieu is considered to have had no personal sympathy with the people, but instead appeared to base all his ideas upon problems concerning the welfare of the state; nevertheless, he did have human sympathy for them. He realized their difficulties and would have liked to solve them. He tried to do so but he knew that the strongest means to obtain aid for the people was through a strong nation. That is why he put the latter doctrine to the front, even though the citizens had to suffer temporary oppressions. It was done with the hope of better conditions for the common people in the future. Richelieu was a farsighted man. He admitted the sufferings of the people due to the wars, but he saw the benefits to be derived in the future because of them, not only by the king but by the people as a body. "War," he says, "is for the best interests of the people as a whole in that it keeps the state from ruin. ' ' 48 In another place he says that the interest of France is the interest of its citizens, and the most important obligation of a king is the 46 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 267-270. 4i Ibid., 181-182. *8 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 87. 40 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [582 repose of his subjects and the conservation of the Kingdom.* 9 He admitted that war made the people suffer, and he tried to prevent it when possible. However, he also recognized the fact that the average individual could not understand the ultimate benefits to be derived by war and thus was apt to oppose it at inopportune times. ' ' The miseries and afflictions of the people of France," he says about 1630, "who have suffered under very great and almost incredible poverty, made peace a desirable thing, and the king as their king and father was obliged to urge it. The frequent disorders taking place in many towns brought up the fear of a continuation of the war, because of the need of more money to wage it. The people in general, especially merchants, blamed the government for heavy taxes, etc." In conclusion it is interesting to note that he says the king as their father was obliged to seek peace for them. 50 It is quite evident that there was a strong peace party in France, led by the merchants, who did not like to pay the bills of war. Yet the problem resulting seems to explain why Eichelieu did not take active steps to aid the people at this time. In fact he could not. The political and economic status of France as related to other nations had to be settled first before he could attend to the internal economic problems confronting him. He had to develop his foreign commercial policy first and then his internal commercial program. He could only accomplish the latter when the general status of France in the world at large was established. This task occupied the last ten years of his life. Only a beginning could be made with respect to internal af- fairs, although throughout his administration he was at least sympathetic toward the common man. One of the most important phases of Richelieu's career is his bishopric of Lucon. The very fact that he was a church- man, and a conscientious one at that, tends to indicate that he must have known about the unhappy conditions of the people. That he did was also shown by letters written during his ad- ministration as bishop. In 1608, when he first became bishop, he wrote to the people that "time will show the affection which I bear toward you, more than words can do. It is for that * Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 15. BO Ibid., XXVI, 86-87. 583] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 41 reason that I wait for deeds to let you know that all my attentions are for your welfare." 51 He follows this up a few days later with a letter to the local tax collector, protesting against the unfair assessment of taxes, bringing out the misery and poverty of the inhabitants from the excessive tattles, etc., and he closes with a plea for moderation of the taxes and equalization among the different sections of France. 52 This letter is followed by another the next year (1609) to a high official (probably Sully) asking him to aid the poor by a reduction of their taxes. When he became secretary of war in 1617, he desired to aid the poor people. Also in 1627, at the assembly of notables he again advocated attention to the welfare of the common people. 54 He said that the greatest thing that a king can do is to protect public faith, as it is an inalienable friend which is always to be found present. He made the assertion that the people who now contribute more of their blood than their sweat to the expenses of the state should be aided. ' ' In proportion as you help the people and better their condition, the more you can obtain from them. ' ' 55 This certainly is a sound economic doctrine and shows that the Cardinal appreciated the fact that improved labor conditions would bring better results. In 1627 Richelieu was advocating the uplifting of the common people to a surprising extent. One writer states "that he even said, that he was to do it all in six years. ' ' 56 Unfortunately he was not able to carry it out before his death. That he believed in it in theory to the very last was shown in his Testament. "This does not excuse him," says d'Avenel, "why did he not aid them during the period 1627 to 1642 ?" 57 He did to a certain extent, as will be shown in the chapter on finances. But one must remember that during that time France was involved in a great European war, to preserve her economic and political status as a nation ; that she was trying to overcome r >i Richelieu, Lettres, I, 15. 52 Ibid., 1, 18. 53 /bid., I, 20. s* Ibid., I, Introduction, CII-CIII. ss Mercure Francois, XII, 790. se Richelieu, Lettres, Introduction, XCII-XCIII. 57 Ibid., Introduction, CII-CIII. 42 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [584 internal political troubles ; that a certain amount of territory and centralization of government was necessary before the finances could be improved; and lastly, that the great Cardinal was hindered by numerous petty plots of individuals which disturbed the nation during the entire period. What chance did he have to fund a debt or attempt any important internal reform? The center of difficulty in regard to the third estate was of course the heavy taxes. Between 1627 and 1632 he intended to discharge the people from the burden of three millions of livres and asked them, in recognition of this desire on the part of the government to aid them, to keep the peace. 58 The same idea is brought out in his Testament. He says that the public welfare should be the only end of those who govern the state. "If private interest is preferred to public good then harm is done. But if the public interest is the first con- cern, then the state will be happy and escape miseries. The particular interest of the king and the people go hand in hand. We must therefore aid the public and prepare for their pres- ervation. ' ' 59 The means to do this was to be the reform of the finances, for he says, "If the finances are properly ar- ranged, the people will love him out of pure personal interest. This affection is very important to a king. It is worth more than gold or silver. " 60 In other words a king cannot do much with his money without the love of his people, a rather business- like way of beginning the problem. And he not only states it but tries to solve it by proposing to reduce the revenues de- manded of the people by three-fourths. This will be taken up in a later chapter. 61 Richelieu has been criticised for his economic conception of the common people. He has brought out this idea in his treatment of the question of the relation between the amount of labor a man should do and his physical strength. "In regard to this problem," he says, "all authorities agree that when the people are too comfortable, or have too easy a time, it is impossible to keep them within the bounds of duty, because they are more ssMercure Francois, XII, 36-40. 5Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 267-271. BO Ibid., II, 115-117. ei See Chapter V, 73-81. 585] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 43 ignorant than the other classes, and to keep them within the limits of reason and within the law, they must be kept occupied. If discharged from their duties or obligations, they would think themselves released from obedience, like mules used to burdens. But like these animals, their burdens must be moderate. The common people need protection. Common sense must determine the proportion between the burden and the strength of those who bear it. The relation of the loads and the ability of the people must be religiously observed. A prince cannot be esteemed good if he exacts from his subjects more than is necessary. Yet those people are not the best who never raise more than is absolutely necessary. ' ' 62 This passage seems to indicate the economic turn of the Cardinal's mind as no other part of his work does. He desired efficiency in France. He wanted her to produce a sur- plus. His idea was a strong nation built up of healthy, busy people who would work and produce so that France could become a great political and economic power. To bring this about he even went so far as to advocate extra taxation of the rich. For he says, "Sovereigns must, if possible, make use of the abundance of the rich before they bleed the poor. ' ' 63 This remark has a socialistic tinge which is rather out of place in the seventeenth century. No, it does not seem fair to say that Richelieu was unsympathetic with the common people. He really tried to aid them not only financially and politically, but commercially as well. Richelieu was a business man and the welfare of France was his business. The development of the economic side of France was one of the most important phases of his administration, and, indeed, affected the common people by bringing on what might be called a social revolution. "Richelieu," says a writer, "has been, without wishing it, one of the most powerful agents of that economic evolution and social change, which tends little by little to level the ranks and which left to the nobles no other super- iority except that of privilege. The commercial man no long- er resembled the trader of the past with his simple and rude manners, who busied himself with his cloth, etc. and passed his life in going from town to town with goods on the backs of *2 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 179-182. es Ibid., I, 181-182. 44 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [586 his mules. Now, often raised in his calling to the side of some magistrate's son, he was no longer a merchant but the head of a firm of speculators, who had his departments and his corres- pondents at Cadiz, London, Frankfort, etc." 64 "Big business" was beginning at that time. Richelieu did all he could to en- courage it by allowing the nobles to engage in it without losing their rank and also by creating nobles from those of the third estate who made a success of commerce and permitting them to join the royal court. 65 Efforts were made to reestablish com- merce, to renew and amplify its privileges, and to bring it about that the profession of trade should be honored by the people. 66 As a result of the increase in commerce, class feeling was en- gendered. It caused trouble between the nobility and the common people, in that the nobles claimed that they were better than the common man even though they engaged in trade. Also, the third estate did not want the privileged class to engage in com- merce and protested about it. Lastly, the rise of many middle class people to the ranks of nobility can be noticed as a result of this economic and social change. 67 The middle class began to assume a place of importance so that even Richelieu was forced to try to influence them in his Mercure Franqois, the first so-called French newspaper. 68 In conclusion, Richelieu's attitude toward the King and the Three Estates was that of a mercantilist. The latter were a part of the state of which the King was the father or owner. As his overseer the Cardinal's chief duty was to build up the state, although he was keen enough to see that this really in- volved the welfare of the people of France. As a result, he had a sincere interest in their betterment, 69 and by his many accom- plishments he helped to prepare the way for the social and eco- nomic, as well as the political, changes which came later. No better phrase can illustrate the Cardinal's deep and heartfelt 6* Pigeonneau, II, 456-458. eslsambert, XVI, 527. <*Meroure Francois, XII, 36-40. " Levasseur, E., Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1911, I, 259. Deschamps, 129. 6 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 180 et seq. 587] THE ECONOMIC RELATIONS 45 interest in them, than the close of that section of his Testament dealing with the third estate, in which he pleads with the king to consider always their interest, and affirms that nothing would give him greater pleasure than to have the king try to carry out, after his death, what he has tried to do when he was on earth ; namely, to build up a strong state and a happy people therein. 70 70 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 180 et seq. CHAPTER IV THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RICHELIEU'S POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION Richelieu, when he came into power in 1624, realized that if he was to make the King supreme and build around him a great state, he had to take steps that would lead to the centralization of all internal political, social, or economic forces, under direct or indirect control of the royal government. "The Huguenots shared the Kingdom with us," he said, "and the nobles con- ducted themselves as if they were not subjects of the King, and the most powerful governors of the provinces as if they had been sovereigns of the Kingdom. ' ' x All this, he claimed, dimin- ished the authority of the King. 2 People looked after their own interests rather than the state, and this neglect on the part of the king's advisers caused great injury to the development of France. To strengthen the power of the Royal House in internal affairs was his first problem. It was the only way to develop the nation. That Richelieu devoted his personal attention to this side of the development, and left Father Joseph to carry on the major part of the political questions of the Thirty Years' "War, indicates the importance he placed upon this phase of his administration. Now to bring about a thorough internal change, he had to remove all troublesome obstacles, which involved naturally the accumulation of power in the hands of the King and his Prime Minister, the destruction of the political independence of the nobles and Huguenots, and the centralization of all local forces under the direct or indirect control of the King and his govern- ment, especially the chief Councillor, who was to be a very im- portant officer. Richelieu has left ample evidence as to the qualifications of a chief minister of the King. He must have in mind constantly his duty to the King and to the state. There should be more i Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 6. id., I, 7. 46 589] POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION 47 than one councillor to advise the ruler, but one should be above the others. 3 "However," he says, "this man should have public approbation, for if everybody likes him, he will be most able to do good. ' ' 4 This minister should be able to advise the King in all the phases of government. Louis XIII understood the vast importance of the Cardinal. 5 Indeed, he even permit- ted him to have a deliberative voice in the Parlement of Paris, just as he had in the council of state. 6 As the king's chief ad- viser he had access to all the parts of the French government. He was supreme. All was centralized in his hands, subject of course in theory to the final word of his master. However, it is interesting, and important to notice, that the office upon which Richelieu laid the most emphasis was that of "grand master, chief, and general superintendent of the naviga- tion and commerce of France. ' ' The fact that he obtained it dur- ing the early part of his administration brings two important points to light, namely, the economic interest of the Cardinal, and the means by which independent nobles, governors, and other powers were removed in the interest of centralization. It was the first great step by which Richelieu could carry out personally his political and economic program. Bad internal conditions made this necessary. "There existed in France," says one writer, "two institutions incompatible with the unity of ministerial power, as with the order and finance and administration. They were, first, the jurisdiction of the high conn&table of France and secondly, the office of the admir- alty. ' ' 7 Both were suppressed. Richelieu in his Memoirs, mentions the abuses brought about by Montmorency, the last of the connetables. The office and its mate the admiralty, which had as much power on the sea as the former on the land, were suppressed, "because," he said, "they weakened the control of the King and were harmful to the finances, which were the ordinary expense of war, together with that of the local officials of that department. ' ' 8 The admiral had, likewise, large sums of money 3 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 232-240. Ibid., I, 244. 5 Bonnefon, Introduction, II. *Mercure Francois, XIII, 365. i Martin, H., Histoire de France, 6 vols., Paris, 1861, II, 244. s Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 212-213. 48 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [590 to spend on the navy. The question raised was as to whether or not they expended the money as it should be spent. It was quite evident from the complaints of the soldiers and others that much of it was wasted, and that, as a result, their finances were in bad shape. Naturally, this led to the suppression of those offices in the interest of the state. It happened that in 1627 they were both made vacant by death, so that by abolishing them the people were to be aided by decreased expenditures. 9 This was the view Kichelieu desired the people to take. It is inter- esting to notice how, in carrying out all his great acts, he con- stantly appealed to the effect upon their purses. He desired to get control of the armies on land and sea, but wanted the people to look upon it as an economical change for their benefit. His aim was not only along financial lines, however. He desired to build up the commerce of France, and this office enabled him to do so without local hindrances. But just what were its duties? The answer to this question gives a clue to the economic policy of Richelieu. "In the first place," says the edict, "he must treat with all kinds of persons. He must look over propositions of our subjects relating to commerce, decide concerning the merit, utility, etc., of all agree- ments, articles, contracts, etc., concerning the sea and its enter- prises. . . . He is to look after commerce, which is so useful to France. Our navigation rights and sea enterprises are under his charge. All those embarking on sea trips, can now go to him for permission. Before this no one knew to whom to go. All the evils of the marine are to be removed, etc. ' ' 10 The Cardinal was to have full charge of navigation, the advancement of com- merce, and the security of Frenchmen on the seas, in times of peace. In times of war, other offices might be created. 11 The importance of this office can only be appreciated when one real- izes that it put the control of commerce fully in the hands of Richelieu, and indicated that this part of his administration was to be one of the dominating factors of his career. Trade was to be fostered by it for the honor and grandeur of the state and the profit and increase of public wealth. 12 It was 9 M ercure Francois, XIII, 354-358. loj&uf., XIII, 361-362. 11 Ibid., XIII, 362-364. XIII, 359-360; XIV, 4-46. 591] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 49 clearly a part of his centralization policy. Indeed, says one writer, "Richelieu took the control of the maritime provinces away from local governors, and concentrated it in his hands, in order that it should grow at an astonishing rate." 13 He realized that centralization in time of need meant efficiency and quick results. This is what he wanted on the economic side of his ad- ministration. The office, really that of secretary of commerce, marks the first great step taken in the economic development of France, and it is an evidence of Eichelieu's unselfish motives that the first abuses which he remedied were those by which) he might have profited. He would take no pay for his duties in this office, nor would he take a share in the salvage. 14 Yet he had enough economic shrewdness to know that he would benefit financially by other means, of a more quiet nature. However, this mercantilist^ policy of centralization, which the Cardinal used as the dominant keynote of his administration, is to be found also elsewhere than in the changes in the royal government. The unity of the King and the common people against the nobles is a feature which plays a part in this pro- gram. The idea was not original with him, for one can see its beginnings in the early Capetian days, and again in the reign of Louis XI, "whose sole aim was to constitute the French nation by removing the incubus, without whose removal its ex- istence was impossible, namely, feudal aristocracy. Thoroughly devoted to looking on the frivolous etiquette of the nobles with undisguised scorn, assuming the dress and society of commoners, Louis XI was the true precursor of Richelieu. ' ' 15 Nevertheless, little was accomplished in the way of reducing the power of the nobles until Richelieu's time. When he undertook the administration of France, he saw the nobles still at their attempts to strengthen feudalism by means of various internal and external conspiracies. He feared a combination of troubles. "What would happen if the nobles or Huguenots united with Spain ? " he asked. It is quite evident that he saw the economic as well as the political and religious consequences. For a Spanish victory might and probably would isGouraud, C., 193-244. i* Martin, II, 244. is Bridges, 16-25. 50 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [592 have meant not only the supremacy of the nobles, but it would have permitted the Spanish Catholic nation to overrun France, thus preventing the political and religious equilibrium which the Cardinal hoped to establish in Europe as a necessory prere- quisite for his future plans of making France a great economic as well as a political state. 1 * Consequently Richelieu decided that he had to weaken or destroy the political power of the nobles. The destruction of most of their fortresses and castles unnecessary to the defense of the kingdom was the most important step taken to attain this desire. 17 It was brought about with the express purpose of eliminating needless expense, of preventing trouble, and of delivering the people from the inconvenience, both economic and political, which they had suffered from the existence of the local quasi-independent powers. 18 As a result, it made the nobles, the courtiers, and the common people more independent citizens. They .could trade with more freedom, and France re- ceived a direct economic stimulus through this act. It cut down the expenses of government and made for peace and tranquillity in the land. Therefore, it was a very important economic meas- ure. With the same purpose in mind the Cardinal prohibited the carrying of weapons except by permission. 19 Also, he brought about the edict against duels, on the ground that it was best for the conservation and growth of the state. He said that the general welfare of the people was ahead of the interests of par- ticular individuals. 20 In other words, he did all that he could to better social and economic conditions in France for all the people, by depriving certain classes of rights unjustly claimed. This was done with the express purpose of making France grow. Richelieu did not succeed in his attempts to reform social con- ditions. The blight of war prevented the fulfillment of this phase of the development of France. Nevertheless, he had in- itiated a social reform, and was, therefore, in so far, a forerunner of the French Revolution. He left the nobles mere courtiers, and the French Revolution deprived them of all their privileges. is Richelieu, Lettres, II, 82-84. 17 Ibid., II, 320. Caillet, 124. islsambert, XVI, 192-194. 19 Ibid., XVI, 175; Mercure Francois, XIII, 399-400. 20 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 294-297. 593] POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION 51 Richelieu desired the nobles to earn their exemptions. They failed to respond, and this caused their fall. The Cardinal was not radical in his changes. His was a con- servative type of mind. In his reform of the government, in his replacement of officials and removals of nobles in office, he was very slow and exact in the steps he took. "The disorders," he says, "which have been established by public necessities and strengthened by reasons of state, cannot be reformed without time. Changes must be accomplished by degrees without passing from one extreme into another. ' ' He then admits that care must be taken in the removal of officials. Efforts must be made to keep them within the bounds of their duty, for the public wel- fare. 21 Richelieu was willing to give in to some nobles or prov- inces in various proportions, if he saw that it was for the in- terest of the state to do so. Numerous examples can be given, as where he refused to abolish certain taxes because all the prov- inces would not agree to it, 22 and where he exiled the ruler or governor of Rouen and later allowed him to return. 23 "Les messieurs de Saint-Halo" refused to permit the King to con- struct some vessels in their port. The Cardinal showed them that it was for their interest in the protection of their commerce to do so, and promised in return to increase their franchises. 24 Richelieu added to or took away the privileges of individuals, with the sole purpose of public welfare as he saw it. 25 No better indication that Richelieu wanted to be consid- ered the benefactor of the people can be found than in the dispute over the Cardinal's administration between Richelieu and Gaston, brother of the King. The latter accused the Car- dinal of working for his own ends and causing the great misery of the people. In reply Richelieu said that the unfortunate state of the people hurt him. However, he pointed out the fact, that it was largely due to the uprisings caused by Gaston and others, which had retarded him in his efforts to aid them. 26 Richelieu 21 Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 159. 22 Montehre"tien, Introduction, XC. 23 nid., Introduction, XC. 24/&id., Introduction, XC. as Richelieu, Memoires, II, 217-218; Lettres, IV, 200-201; Mereure Francois, XII, 325-326; XIV, 70-139;. 156-160; Isambert, XVI, 339. 26 Mereure Francois, XVII, 264. 52 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [594 constantly asserted that as soon as the political disturbance inside France should be put down and Spain be defeated on the outside, he would turn his attention toward the aid of the people, "which I so much desire." 27 "The King," he says, "has no other aim than the grandeur and welfare of the Kingdom. ' ' Another way by which Richelieu weakened the nobles and aided the people was in the appointment of intendants. These newly created government officials were charged with the man- agement of financial and judicial affairs in the local provinces, but were responsible to the central government. This power had been in the hands of various nobles, who had used their authority for their own personal financial benefit, so that the appointment of these new officials had a distinct economic aspect. 28 The reduction of the power of the Parlements, especially that of Paris, has an economic interest besides its part in the general centralization idea of Richelieu. He desired them to attend to their judicial affairs, and leave the government alone. 29 He did not ask either the Estates General or the Parlements to aid him in getting control of the nobility, because both of these bodies supported the party he struggled against, namely, the great landowners. 30 Therefore, the destruction of the political power of the Parlements as well as that of the nobles was neces- sary for the centralization of the government, and the aid of the people. According to Richelieu's scheme France was not to have a government of the poor by the rich. It was to be a government by a central hereditary monarchy over both classes. "In other words," says one writer, "feudalism in the hands of Richelieu was concentrated into a single institution, hereditary monarchy." 31 By this he hoped to do away with most internal and external evils and build up a strong state. No wonder he put down all conspiracies so severely. Indeed, his effort to end the disorders of the court of justice, by having the King appoint men of merit and integrity, 32 only serves to illustrate 27 Mercure Frangois, XVII, 130-133, 192-194; Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 8 ; Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 349-350. 28 For further information concerning the Intendants, see Chapter V, 84 et seq. 29 Mole, Memoires, 4 voaols. Paris, 1855, I, 478-482; II, 3. so Bridges, 30-31. 31/ftwZ., 31. 32 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 168. 595] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 53 the fact that he tried, in theory at least, to reform all the parts of the royal and local governments, in order to build up a strong- ly centralized kingdom in which the people should enjoy a hap- pier social and economic life. Practically, Richelieu was apt to favor certain classes in his appointments, as when for example he made the Archbishop of Bordeux admiral of one of his fleets. The latter was not especially efficient in this new calling. In 1641 the fleet was defeated by a Spanish squadron near Tarra- gona, and Richelieu admitted that he had made a mistake by removing the Archbishop from command. 33 There was one political element in France which attracted the attention of Richelieu more than any other single factor, on account of its independence and opposition to the interests of the state. It was the organization of the Huguenots. In his Political Testament he says that at the beginning of his admin- istration, he promised the King to employ all his industry and all the authority given him, to rule the Huguenots, etc. 84 Their control constituted one of his first problems in carrying out his great scheme of centralization. ''It is certain," he said, "that the downfall of La Rochelle, (politically speaking), is the end of the miseries of France and the beginning of its repose and good fortune." 35 It was the idea of attaining a future peace and the development of France thereby, which caused Richelieu to take a severe attitude toward these people from the start. ' ' As long as the Huguenots have a foothold in France," he writes, "the King will never rule within and can take no glorious action with- in or without." 36 The destruction of their political power was a necessary preliminary to the welfare of the ideal centralized state. 87 Nevertheless, in bringing about this change the Cardinal did not desire to injure the Huguenots personally. "If they stay quiet," he said, "they will be treated as citizens, with the due protection of laws, etc." 38 They had a place and value as 33 Perkins, J. B., EicJielieu and the Growth of French Power, New York, 1904, 179. s* Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 8-9. ss Richelieu, Lettres, III, 161. Richelieu, Memoires, XXII, 430. 37 Aa Bishop of Lucon, Richelieu lived near the Huguenots and thus waa well aware of their religious, political, and economic power. salsambert, XVI, 143. 54 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [596 Frenchmen, and he recognized that fact. One writer sug- gests that he rather favored those Huguenots who devoted them- selves to agriculture, industry, and commerce. "He opened to their enterprise all the French colonies except Canada. ' ' 39 The Cardinal appreciated their economic importance as individuals, but depreciated their political strength as a body. To preserve the former and ruin the latter was necessary in order to develop France along either political or economic lines. "There is no King, Prince, sovereign, nor any state so well governed that it approves a rebellion of its subjects; for an uprising would be fatal to the existence of the state. ' ' 40 And Richelieu means not only the political but the economic state as well. The Hugue- nots could not remain either politically or economically inde- pendent. In 1615 Montchretien 's treatise on economics placed great em- phasis on the value of the salt industry in France. "I would remark to your majesty," he says, "that all the trade, not only of Frenchmen but of foreigners, depends upon the salt of the Kingdom." Salt can be a great source of revenue for France, he points out, as it is a public necessity for all. In fact the English, Dutch, Italians, etc., should pay the same revenues as the French (which evidently had not been the case pre- viously). 41 In another place, he advocates the transfer of salt to other parts of France by Frenchmen, instead of foreigners, as had been the case. 42 It would seem that Montchretien was well aware of the economic importance of the French salt re- sources. Also, one can see in the above citations another indication of Richelieu's fostering care for the development of French labor and transportation. It is interesting to note that at the time when Montchretien was advocating retaliation against foreign countries which in- jured French commerce, England resented this attitude (as will be shown later) , and thus was brought about an industrial mone- tary crisis in France. 43 Hard times helped to bring on the re- volt of the Huguenots, who were becoming more and more ad- dicted to the pursuits of trade and industry, and also led to the 39Rambaud, I, 572. toMercure Francois, XIV, 104. 4i Montchretien, 235-236. 42/fctd., 185-186. ** Ibid., 129-130, Editor's note. 597] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 55 uprisings of the nobles who sought to profit by popular dis- content, and recover their lost prestige. 44 Thus a commercial rivalry between England and France, and a political and econ- omic struggle between France and the Huguenots developed into a three-cornered fight, with the English in alliance with the Huguenots, who in turn were aided by many ambitious nobles. The struggle centered around the capture of the islands of Oleron and Re, which of course would result in the fall of La Rochelle. Richelieu said, that the island of Oleron was of great importance in that it controlled the outlet of the Clarente and the Sendre rivers, and could be of inconvenience to the traffic of the Garonne river, and thus injure the King's taxes and commerce. 45 It thus becomes clear that Richelieu had a com- mercial motive for the conquest of those islands. He desired the advantages obtained from their wines, wheat, and salt. Of course Richelieu's views were bitterly opposed by the peo- ple of La Rochelle. The Huguenots claimed that the French had constantly tried to hinder the commerce of that place, by which it existed. In reply, the King and Richelieu accused the people of La Rochelle of doing injury to the com- merce of other towns, as Orleans for example. "They do not keep their promises," the King said. 46 He told them on another occasion that the commercial growth of La Rochelle made them try to imitate the Parlememt of Paris and oppose the govern- ment. "Now the word is given by their master and it is to be enacted according to his pleasure. Otherwise, it is contrary to the laws of his subjects, the divine law and other rights of the people. 47 In other words, the commercial as well as the political laws of the central government were to dominate over any province or town. Any special commercial privileges of La Rochelle were subject to the will of this central body. It is certainly interesting to note that the Huguenots claimed that they revolted to get commercial rights. They bemoaned the unfairness of France in attacking La Rochelle, confiscating its goods, and forcing it to seek English aid. In reply, the royal government has the following to say: "O unfortunate fort so 4* Montchretien, 129-130. 43 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 343-344. 46 Mercure Francois, XIV, 94. 47 Ibid., XIV, 90-94. 56 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [598 fatal to France, infidelity, so dearly purchased. Since in your substance is found the force of our misfortune, your ruin will be the true remedy. Who will believe the fact, that they were capable of hazarding the honor of France and the loss of the islands and the fort of Re, and our liberty thereby. " 48 It is clear that the French feared above all the conquest of this territory by the English. At this point it may be observed that the economic basis of Eichelieu's desire to put down internal rebellion was prob- ably partly due to this loss of revenue, which must have been largely responsible for the unfortunate financial condition of France. 49 Furthermore, "the activity of commerce, which rend- ers the Kindom flourishing, would be interrupted, as a result of the Huguenot trouble," says the Mercure Francois. 50 It is evident that commercial gain and financial loss were the factors behind the oposition to the Huguenot and English control in France. On the other hand, the Huguenots pointed out the fact that a treaty of peace had been made between England and France with their aid. But they had found little to warrant their carrying out the articles of that treaty. They had been prom- ised free disposition of salt, which they possessed on the islands, and of their other products, yet all the salt on the island of Re had been taken away from them since the treaty. By the same agreement liberty of commerce was promised, the retention of privileges, and the reestablishment of the island of Re as a re- treat for the naval forces, but none of these had been carried out. 51 In fact the Huguenots were emphatic in their claims that economic injustice caused them to revolt. Later on, in 1627, they asked why commerce was hindered. They hinted that something must be behind it all. A plain exposition of the importance of trade and the production and distribution of salt was given and they declared that England wanted the islands. 52 The gov- ernment in reply claimed that the Huguenots had fostered the 48 Mercure Francois, XIV, 102. "d'Avenel, G. de, Richelieu, Monarchic Absolue, 4 vols., Paris, 1859, II, 275; Mercure Frangois, XIV, 102. so Mercure Francois, XIV, 102. si Ibid., XIV, 89-90. tU, XIV, 100-103. 599] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 57 English alliance and that the commercial complaint was a mere false mask, and accused the Huguenots of starting the whole trouble. The central authorities failed to explain, however, why the Huguenots should have so acted. The personal element was brought into the controversy be- cause there was at least one individual who believed that Riche- lieu had personal motives in his capture of La Rochelle. "For," says Gaston d 'Orleans, the bitter royal opponent of the Car- dinal, ' ' by his control of that place he could monopolise the salt sent to England and France as a whole." 53 (Evidently the importance of the salt trade as applied to La Rochelle justified the ardent efforts of all parties to retain control of it.) Indeed, Gaston claims that if Richelieu should fortify properly the is- lands around La Rochelle, he could render France tributary for the salt trade, and possess the principal revenue of the kingdom. Viewed in retrospect the Huguenot affair was one of the steps in Richelieu's efforts to centralize all the trade of France. His assuming the office of superintendent and grand master of com- merce and navigation was another. However, the important de- duction from it all is that the British, the French, and the Hu- guenots all desired the control of the salt supply, which, being near La Rochelle, became the logical economic bone of contention for all parties. As a matter of fact, one finds that in 1629, Richelieu was appointed Lieutenant General of the islands of Re and Oleron and several other places. 5 * He actually controlled Oleron, and perhaps Gaston was not wholly in the wrong. At least one can be assured that the Cardinal realized the importance of that region, though to what extent he was influenced by patriotic or personal reasons is a question which is difficult to settle. It seems quite clear, however, that the Hug- uenot affair was not simply a political, but also an economic problem. In the second place, it is evident that Richelieu brought about not only political, but economic centralization in his hand- ling of the Huguenot situation. In keeping with his mercantil- istic policy he did not desire either political or economic decentralization within France. In his efforts to create an efficient and centralized economic ss Mereure Francois, XVII, 216-218. 5* Mote, II, 2. 58 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [600 state Richelieu had certain ideas as to the kind of man he desired for the King's household and other official positions. He desired the positions to be filled from the nobility, yet every individual appointed to office in the King's household should be qualified for his place. 55 While he believed the class system was best for France, yet even here he considered the interests of the common people. For by limiting these positions to the nobility he would leave more people liable to taxes and in that respect would aid the people. He then openly advised the King to appoint men on the merit system, and not sell the offices. ' ' Thus virtue will be the reward for office, not money. ' ' 56 He even outlined the requirements as to what constitutes a good council- lor. 57 Above all he must be faithful to God and the state. He can attend to his own business and the state's also, but in a conflict of interests, the welfare of the nation comes first. 68 In- deed, when Richelieu says that a minister must be chosen accord- ing to his capacity, and his reward as a faithful public servant is that of fame which is the greatest, he seems like some of our modern idealists with socialistic impulses. In fact ''state socialism" seems to be an underlying premise. A happy state, a happy people would make a great King and a magnificent France ; this sums up his philosophy. Fame should not be the only reward of a minister of the King's household. "He should be given enough to live on in comfort and be able to labor for the grandeur and benefit of the kingdom. " 59 If a man has the honesty, ability, and fore- sight to merit a governmental position of this sort and to work for the welfare of the state, the government should provide for his economic existence. Richelieu has a practical way of exam- ining political matters, which indicates that he saw their eco- nomic importance as well as their political or social value. SB Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 207. sejfttd., I, 208-216. 37 Ibid., 1, 217-218. 58 Ibid., I, 225-226. 59 Ibid., 195-196. D 'Avenel has pointed out that the officers of the King 's household, as chambellan, grand ecuyer, and grand maitre of the King, were charged with various domestic duties of the royal house, but had no political functions. Richelieu evidently wanted to make these officials of more po- litical and economic value to the state. See d 'Avenel, Monarchic Absolut, I, 55. 601] POLICY OP CENTRALIZATION 59 Good officials were necessary to build up a strong state not only politically, but economically as well. "A person's interest is not to be compared with that of the public welfare. ' ' 60 It seems that this idea of obtaining men for office by the merit system is entirely in harmony with the mercantilistic conception of the strong state. Richlieu admits this, when he claims that one of the greatest advantages that can be procured for a state, is to give everyone a position suitable to his genius and capacity. 01 A man who is capable of serving the public in cer- tain functions may ruin it in others. What would have been the history of France, if Richelieu had been able to carry out these views? They were conclusions reached as a result of his years of work for the nation, and which he desired to be carried out by those who followed him. Failure to do so, was one of the contributing factors in the events which followed in French history. What a difference it would have made if this advice had been followed, ' ' Princes must be careful of their given promises. A Prince does harm to appoint a friend to a position for which he is incompetent. A personal friendship should not come before the interests of the state. ' ' 62 However, when one examines his administration as a whole, it will be seen that the Cardinal did not carry out his ideas to the letter. He knew that to change a custom takes time. There- fore, in such matters as the sale of offices versus the merit sys- tem, he admits at the last that a man must submit to certain weak conditions, and prefer a moderate regulation to a more austere settlement, which would probably not be so successful. "He who brings justice in by the lump, may sell it at retail, but on the other hand, a man who buys an office may conduct it aright, so as not to lose what he put into it. " 63 He believed in not rushing into radical changes. He admits that he would be more popular with the common people if he advocated the suppression of the sale of offices. However, he believed that the welfare of the state is best maintained as it is now. 64 The nation was not strong enough as yet to bring about the required change, eo Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 282. si Ibid., I, 296. 62/&wZ., I, 299-301. 63/&id., I, 156-158. e* Ibid., I, 163-165. 60 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [602 which could better take place at a later time, while bad effects might result if he abolished it at this time. Evidently he judged all changes on the basis of the present and future welfare of the state. Again he said repeatedly that merit should rule the Prince and his appointments, but admitted that he had not fol- lowed out this idea. "The reason for it," he says, "is due to the fact that while disorders were in vogue, without any possi- bility of a remedy, reason required that order should be extracted out of the troubles. This was my intention in preserving or keep- ing in offices in my care people whom I could oblige to follow strictly my intentions and plans. If it had been possible during the troubles of a reign agitated by different storms to settle the regulation I propose, I would have been a very religious observer of it. ' ' 65 Richelieu believed that an idea in theory and in practice becomes two different things, which can both exist only if the welfare of the state permits. In the case of the merit system, however, he did hope to see it succeed in the end. Before he could carry out many of his plans along these lines, he had to restore peace in France. He hoped to do so by means of a large army centralized in the hands of the royal govern- ment. "For," he says, "a Prince must be powerful by the strength of his frontiers and the strength of his army. The welfare and the repose of the state depend on the fidelity and repose of its defenders. ' ' 66 The army was another means by which France was to be made ready for the great economic change which would take place when peace arrived. Alas, the great Cardinal had departed before that eventful day oc- curred. It is interesting to notice, however, that in spite of the many distractions of war, Eichelieu tried to use the centralistic poli- cies of the government to bring about great social improvements. For example, "lettres patent" were granted a certain individual who offered to aid in the foundation of an institution for the incurable. "There are," said the edict, "many hospitals and monasteries for curable troubles." Therefore, the government considered such an institution needed for the welfare of its people and allowed its establishment according to fixed rules. es Eichelieu, Testament Politique, I, 188-191. ee Ibid., II, 1-3 ; Isambert, XVI, 386. 603] POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION 61 It was to be exempt from taxes, and to be favored in all ways by Jthe government. 67 The letter, published in 1637, shows that the government was interested in and fostered all schemes which could be of benefit to the general public welfare. It even went so far as to investigate the hospitals and their bad admin- istration, which prevented the poor from being received. This evil was to be remedied; the Mayors and Bishops were to look after their interests. The poor were to be aided by new laws; public employment was to be provided. "By not working," Richelieu said, ' ' they deprive the public of the services which it could receive by their labor. ' ' 68 This statement indicates solici- tude for the interests of the poor and the state as well, rather surprising but entirely in harmony with the general plan of government. He seemed to be interested also in the physical wel- fare of the people. The establishment of a Royal Garden at Paris for the culture of medicinal plants, would indicate a gen- eral governmental plan to preserve and conserve the health of the people and thus make France strong. For the government knew that the health of man is the most desired and precious of things. "To aid the universities in their research along this line and to help the people in their collection of medical plants, we desire to establish this garden, etc. ' ' 69 All this formed part of the one political, economic, and social conception of Richelieu, namely, to build up a great state along these lines. To reduce the nobles, to put down the political and economic power of the Huguenots, and to unify and make efficient the governmental organization as a whole were elements of one scheme which was essentially centralistic not only on the political, but also on the economic side. He was successful in his efforts to attain this program. Yet his financial policy is gener- ally considered his one great failure. Thus it merits considera- tion. 67 Isambert, XVI, 474-477. es Richelieu, Lettres, II, 180. 69 Isambert, XVI, 161-162. CHAPTER V The financial phase of Richelieu 's administration is a very dif- ficult subject to treat. It has been, in itself, fairly well devel- oped in financial works dealing with the time. But as a part of a general economic scheme, the weak phases of his activities in this line take on a new meaning, and thus require considera- tion from a new point of view. In the light of a broader interpretation of the elements enter- ing into the financial administration, it does not seem possible to accept the common conception of this part of the great Car- dinal's work. That the weakest phase of Richelieu's ministry was his administration of the finances, is probably true; but considering all conditions involved, one cannot say it was a fail- ure. The accusation that he made no effort to relieve the burdens of the people, or that he failed completely in his efforts to reform the abuses of the financial administration is false. 1 It is an unjust interpretation of the man's career, and necessitates a vindication, although, in one sense, other writers have attended to this more or less successfully. 2 Richelieu in developing the financial side of his administration was guided by his one general purpose, namely, to build the great state, of which the financial system was a necessary part. But it could be improved only in times of peace and thus appears the real explanation for what failures there were in the Car- dinal's policy, namely, a long period of war which was like- wise a necessity in the preliminary development of the great state. Richelieu realized that he could carry out a general finan- cial reform only in times of peace. He points out in his Testa- ment Politique that he ruined the Huguenots, put down the 1 Lodge, R, Eichelieu, London, 1896, 174. 2 Caillet, 254, etc. 62 605] THE FINANCIAL, ADMINISTRATION OP FRANCE 63 nobles, and undertook a great war against powerful external enemies, in order to assure a good peace and repose for the future. 3 Why? He goes on to say that the tolerance of these abuses has prevented any attempts to attain his aims, of which the reform of the finances is one. The Cardinal's main interest during his administration was in carrying out the duties of ''superintendent of navigation and commerce, etc." As a result he intrusted the principal care of the finances to the superintendent of finances. Yet he gave attention to financial matters throughout his life, and left, in his Testament Politique, a clear and concise solution of the whole problem, to be applied later. This subject will be treated in two parts, first the achieve- ments and problems of Richelieu and his financial superintend- ents during his administration, and secondly, the general theoretical solution of the problems as expounded by the Cardinal in his last great work. In considering his achievements or intentions, one must bear constantly in mind the main purpose behind all his ideas, namely the grandeur of the state and the elements entering into the attainment of that ideal. It was in 1615 that Richelieu first took an active public in- terest in the finances of the country. He spoke then as a repre- sentative of the clergy against the sale of offices, which increased the burden on the poor people, who were not able to bear much more. "Finances," he said, " are the true nerves of the state and should be administered with economy and with the reduction of expenses, such as pensions, etc. ' ' * Also he maintained that the number of people who were exempt from paying taxes should be decreased,, all in the interest of justice and the welfare of the poor. However, internal dissention prevented any actual accomplishment except the temporary establishment of a cham- ber of justice to study the question of finances. 5 Nevertheless, this meeting of the Estates General marks the beginning of the reaction against the heavy taxes and the unfair exemptions of certain classes. The assembly had heard the demands of the third estate for the establishment of a real 3 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 85. * Richelieu, Mtmoires, X, 203, 321-322, 340, 358. s ' ' This chamber was created in 1624 and revoked in 1625. So little was done. " Isambert, XVI, 147. 64 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [606 tattle borne by all owners of ' ' immovable property. ' ' 6 From now on this tax was one of the goals of their ambition. None appreciated better than Richelieu the immense waste of funds which had been going on since the death of Henry IV. Huge amounts had been spent on pensions for various nobles. Indeed he said, that ' ' the economy of Henry IV and what he has left alone has preserved France. But it will not last, and the very fact that the nobles who have obtained most of the money claim that it was given to foreign statesmen, makes an under- standing necessary at once. ' ' 7 Richelieu took two steps in 1625 to remedy the situation. He advocated publicity in the disposition of money obtained in taxes, and a reduction of the expenses of the government. 8 To carry out the above purposes he brought about a temporary establishment of the chamber of justice, 9 and the replacement of corrupt officials by honest ones. 10 "A change of officials," he said, "is not a good thing, but there are times when a nation is saved by means of such changes." " Richelieu carried out this idea by replacing several financial officials who were connected with various instances of corruption. 12 However, nothing was really accomplished except the stirring up of a little excitement among the nobles, until 1626, when the two inefficient individuals by the names of Champigny and Marillac were replaced by the Marquis d'Effiat, in the office of superintendent of finances. ' ' His administration, ' ' said one writer, ' ' can be placed beside that of Sully and Colbert in merit and importance. ' ' 13 The position of superintendent of the finances was, next to that of chancellor, the* most important. He had charge not only of the finances but also of all of the internal administration. In fact, next to Richelieu, he took precedence. D'Effiat took full advantage of his powers and showed his ability from the very beginning. The first thing he did was to have the assembly eEichelieu, Memoirs, XI, 240-243. Tlbid., XI, 240-243. s Richelieu, Lettres, II, 177-179. 9 See p. 93, note 2. 10 Mole", I, 337. 11 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 25-26. 12 Ibid., II, 26, 209-211, 330; Memoires, XXII, 354-356. is Caillet, 268. 607] THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE 65 of notables called. At this meeting, he presented to the depu- ties a valuable statement of the financial condition of France. He indicated the lack of funds for everyday expenses. Money had been collected ahead of time 14 and bad management of the finances had been endured ever since the age of Henry IV. 15 Just as Spain had suffered because of heavy war expenditures and no peace, so France was on the verge of ruin because of the state of her treasury. Efforts had been made to aid the finances by selling the domain of the King; by the creation of offices and increase of tattle, but to no avail. "However, when peace is declared," he said, "the King wants to aid his people, put down the internal disorders, and increase the rights and wages of sovereign companies, etc. This meeting is to offer solu- tions of the present problem. The King especially desires a decrease of the tattles for the benefit of the people, because of their terrible condition. Also, supremacy for France abroad needs good home finances. Expenses and receipts must be made at least to balance." 16 "One of the means," he said, "of bring- ing this about is to supervise more strictly the amount of money collected and spent. ' ' 17 That there was too much chance for "graft" was the keynote of his discourse. He intended to put the finances of France back where they had been in the times of Sully, and the methods used were fundamentally those of the latter. His remarks indicate the unfortunate financial condition and the problems confronting d'Effiat if he was to improve them. However, the great expenditures brought about by unforeseen external and internal troubles prevented him from accomplish- ing much, except to keep down the public debt, which was a great work in itself. For example, one way by which he dimin- ished the expenses of the government was by reducing the inter- est rate on money advanced to the government from 16 or 20 per cent to 10 per cent. 18 Strict economy and increased credit would have worked wonders in spite of the ever-existing dis- turbances. i*Mercure Francois, XII, 804. is Ibid., XII, 790-794. i6/&td., XII, 802-809. " Ibid., XII, 794. XIV, 589-590. 66 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [608 Richelieu also delivered a speech to the assembly of notables, in which he tried to justify the heavy expenditures made so far in his administration. ' ' Everyone knows that in matters of state real results are not often achieved at little expense. The great numbers of soldiers necessary inside and outside of France explain it clearly and so we cannot doubt the necessity. The in- tegrity of the administration guarantees the honesty of the ex- penditures ; and the oppression of the outside powers and internal rebellions threatening the ruin of the Kingdom, explain their need. 19 He tried to point out that the great expenditures were for the welfare and future grandeur of France, and so far as he went he was right. In advocating a state of preparedness in the future for the preservation of France, 20 he strikes a chord which is more or less modern. In fact Eichelieu here justified his administration, and of course it was for the superintendent of finance to obtain the money in the best way available, even though the people had to suffer as a consequence. The Cardinal became so infatuated with his external plans of building up a great commerce, a large navy, and making France strong by means of a great army, to be used against her ever-present enemies, that he seemed to have forgotten all his financial schemes for improvements. Of course the death of d'Effiat in 1632, followed by the appointment of two weak superintendents, both theoretically working at the same task, accounts for the weakness of the financial policy to a certain extent. Richelieu realized that in the death of his great financial minister d'Effiat he had suffered an immense loss, and both he and the King were greatly affected by his death. 21 Yet he should have done better in replacing him. The two men, Bouthilier and Bullion, who divided the duties of this office, were not strong men. This contributed largely to the unfortunate financial con- dition of France in 1642, which will be taken up later. Further- more, from 1632 to 1642 was the period in which Richelieu was engaged in the important diplomatic, economic, and military activities of the Thirty Years' War. Expenses, on this account, together with part of the former costs of the large Francois, XII, 756-760. td., XII, 760-761. 21 Eichelieu, Lettres, IV, 337. 609] THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE 67 marine, were contributing factors toward the unfortunate finan- cial condition of France at his death. Richelieu constantly harped on the need of great armies which in turn explained why the expenditures were so heavy. At one time he cited the success of the armies in France as an explana- tion of the bad finances, and promised a future reform. Quoting from the philosophers the saying, "that which is first in inten- tion is the last in execution," he promised reforms in the name of the King, for the people, (1) by the decrease of the tallies, (2) by revoking undue exemption privileges, (3) by abolishing luxury and waste, and (4) by the increase of commerce. 22 This promise is an excellent example of the clear economic viewpoint of the man. He had a definite economic policy even if conditions were such as to prevent him from carrying it to completion. He even claimed that he had the interests of the people in mind, while confronted with financial problems involved in raising great armies and navies. From the first, he had tried to raise troops in various provinces in order to protect their commerce and ships, and to secure freedom of the sea for them. 23 One must not be too hasty in condemning the man when one considers the independent ideas of the various classes and indi- viduals in France. How to raise money and also respect indi- vidual privileges was certainly a problem. For he knew the time was not ripe to do away with all special exemptions. In 1630 Richelieu used his own personal funds to pay the army in Italy, the government having failed to send him the required amount. He even went so far as to borrow money for the army from individuals. 24 In 1634, he again admitted that war had cost a great deal and was a burden upon the poor, but he affirmed it was a necessity in order to save those men and to build up the nation. 25 He tried to aid the people by decreasing the wages of the troops, who were then the best paid in the world. 26 Towards the last he was so deeply affected by the financial side of affairs that, in a letter to Bouthilier, he said that the 22 Beaurepaire, Ch. de, Cdhlers des Etats de Normandie, 3 vols., Eouen, 1877. Ill, 205. zs Bichelieu, Mtmovres, XXIII, 125. 2* Eiehelieu, Lettres, III, 694. ^MSmoires, XXVIII, 4. Lettres, II, 297-298. se Eiehelieu, Lettres, IV, 523-525. 68 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [610 latter should decide financial matters, but if they were brought before the King Richelieu would give his opinion. 27 By 1638, the finances were in a very bad shape, as is shown by the fact that Richelieu, in a letter to M. de Bullion, com- plained of the non-payment of the troops. Money was asked for the marine, the army, fortifications, etc. 28 In fact, Rich- lieu had finally realized that he was involved in a death struggle, and had concluded that victory was the only sal- vation for France regardless of monetary consequences. As late as 1641 he wrote in a letter that the King must provide for a great navy even if he has to borrow the money, for power on the sea is necessary. 29 If the Cardinal could have had per- sonal charge of the financial end of things, it might have been different. However, it was a physical impossibility to handle all the affairs at the same time, as an intensive study of the prob- lems involved will prove. 30 Yet he did from the very first try to bring about some constructive financial legislation. Richelieu displayed a certain amount of economic caution and ability when at the beginning of his administration he urged the need of making the best of conditions. "Since God is the only being who will do something for nothing, in order to arrive at his good ends, it is necessary either to diminish the ordinary expenses or increase our receipts or do both. However, it is impossible to retrench in the necessary costs of the state. 31 To think of such a thing would be a crime. This is why the King prefers the public to his own individual interest, and retrenches on his own household expenses in preference. You can judge the necessity of every other man doing the same thing even when he cuts down on some things involving his own person. Each should aid according to his means, and the small efforts of the poor should have a place with the larger aids of the rich. The most austere rules are and may seem mild, when they have no other end than the public safety and well- being. ' ' 3Z Could anything be more modern than this statement ? 27 Richelieu, Lettres, IV, 647. 28/ftid., VI, 245-247. 29 Ibid., VI, 806-807. so Beaurepaire, III, 1-3. si Mercure Francois, XII, 759-761. 32 The assembly of notables at the beginning of Richelieu's administra- 611] THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OP FRANCE 69 Richelieu admits that war is necessary for the good of the state. Therefore it is necessary for all to do their "bit" toward meet- ing the inevitable heavy expenditures. But many for various reasons failed to respond to similar exhortations ; and therein lies the failure of his policy. The nobles and the clergy did not fulfil their part of the bargain, though he had a sublime faith in the patriotic feeling of the upper classes of the people. His belief that educated individuals would all work for the public welfare was a great mistake. 33 The Cardinal did all he could to carry out this idea by pun- ishing corrupt officials. "No official who looks after only his individual interests should retain office. ' ' 3 * Yet he was lenient because of the King, who desired his favorites kept in office. 35 Again one sees that the faith of the Cardinal in every man's interest in the state, and his conservative attitude toward vio- lent changes in offices caused him to leave inefficient men in various positions, and resulted unsatisfactorily for the nation. The most interesting phase of Richelieu's efforts to meet the financial situation in 1626, was his attitude toward the common people. He admitted that in wartime the people contributed not only labor but their blood. Therefore, he advocated making the people contribute only enough to keep them from losing the habit of paying taxes, and they were to be heavily taxed only when foreign enterprises or internal rebellion necessitated extra- ordinary means, for the welfare of the state. 36 Thus, Richelieu was entirely consistent in obtaining the money of the people as far as possible in times of emergency. He only carried out what he had said in 1626. His great mistake is to be found of course in his attitude toward the exemption of the privileged classes, which he permitted. tion had succeeded in bringing into the foreground the need of retrenchment in government expenses, of decreasing the taille, and making other financial reforms, and lastly of doing away with corrupt officials. People in France realized that these problems had brought about the ruin of Spain, and they wished to avoid similar disasters, in order to save the state. See Mercure Francois, XII, 774-783. 33 Mercure Francois, XII, 760, et seq. 34 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXII, 256. SB Ibid., XXII, 345-348, 357. 36 Eichelieu, Lettres, II, 302-303. 70 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [612 In 1630, a special council for the consideration of the finances was formed. The superintendent of course was the head of it, and its reports were usually accepted by the council of state. This change was accomplished through the Cardinal 's efforts and indicates his interest in that department. The council, however, not only had charge of the finances but also of matters dealing with the roads, bridges, and other public works. It is interesting to note that Richelieu tried to appoint nobles to positions in the various councils and thus interest them in affairs of state. 37 But the most interesting and important improvement in the matter of finances, was the development between 1633 and 1637 of the system of Intendants of justice, police, and finances, which was one of the most important accomplishments of Riche- lieu, because it took away from Parlement, the nobles, local gov- ernments, etc., all rights to a monopoly of the collection of governmental taxes. 38 The Intendants carried out the decrees and reported to the central governmental councils, and had sup- ervision of all affairs which concerned the taxes and adminis- tration of public funds. The main purpose in appointing them was to centralize the administration of finances, in accordance with Richelieu's general plan of centralization. Their appoint- ment aided the people, who in many cases suffered from corrupt local governors and nobles charged with the collection of taxes. 39 It was the special duty of the Intendant to look after the inter- ests of the common people. Generally speaking, they were established in order to bring about local unity in all parts of the administration, namely, the police, justice, and finances, and to see that these were controlled by the central government. Yet Richelieu permitted the Intendants in the performance of their duties, to make certain allowances for the franchises and local liberties of provinces or cities. He did this in order that they should build up commercial industry. 40 The Cardinal desired the supremacy in a political sense of France, but he was willing to grant political or economic privileges to those who would use them for the interest of France, by developing their commercial sfCaillet, 23. ss Isambert, XVI, 442-450; Caillet, 45-54. so In 1626, careful instructions were laid on the ' ' tax commissioners to avoid corruption." Isambert, XVI, 165-174. *o Montchr6tien, XCI. 613] THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE 71 or industrial resources. Exceptions were valid only when they resulted in increased grandeur for the entire state. In many cases the Intendant really usurped the despotic position of the noble and thus the people did not gain by the change. Richelieu was conservative in his plans for specific financial reform in that he advocated no general retrenchments on the ground that they would not pay for the reason that the expense of bringing them about would make them failures. For example, he did not put much faith in the selling of so-called "bonds," because the King never received more than a third of their amount, while much time was consumed in examining the se- curities upon which they were based. 41 He did favor greater returns by means of increased commerce and a strong marine. "By means of both," he said, "France could make herself more powerful in money than any King of the Christian world. ' ' One of the most important ways by which the taxes were to be increased was by means of the gabelle on salt, which both the French and foreigners obtained near La Eochelle. No wonder he was so interested in obtaining control of that city. 42 All the provinces of France were to pay this gabelle, and any parts exempt before should have their privileges transferred to the collection of the tailles. This was not a good tax because it worked a hardship on the common people. Richelieu also showed a lack of insight in the collection of revenue, namely, in the matter of commerce. Trade was to be stimulated in order to obtain more money for France. 43 The French were to pay slight duties on the export of goods, but a limited number of imports paid duties, light at first but heavy later on. Thus, ' ' while Richelieu obtained more money for taxes, he did not see as Colbert did, that by decreasing the duties instead of increasing them, he would increase the receipts because of the growth of commerce. ' ' 44 Kichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 264. Bonds were sold during the age of Richelieu, with the tailles, the aides, gdbelles, and other taxes as security. Very often it was difficult to find out whether a certain tax could be accounted good security, since it might have been spent in advance. /&{Levasseur, I, 265. 21 Isambert, XVI, 148. 22 Richelieu, Memoires, XXII, 39; XXIII, 257-258; Sourdis, I, Introduc- tion, III- VII. 23 Eichelieu, Testament Politique, II, 49-52. 671] THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN COMMERCE 129 be shown later, Richelieu's diplomacy, to a large extent, was centered around his attempt to obtain a just recognition of the commercial rights of France by England, and also a claim for equality on the seas. 2 * Of course he had to temper these demands, because of his desire to retain the British as an ally against the Hapsburgs. Nevertheless, he recognized the fact that French commerce needed protection on the seas and should have it. During the Huguenot affair, commerce with England was prohibited. 25 Richelieu at that time was really afraid of an alliance of England, Spain, Holland, and Savoy against France. 28 It was not long, however, before efforts were made to bring about an alliance between the two countries, which resulted in the treaties of 1629 and 1632, whereby friendly commercial relations with England were restored, much to the credit of Richelieu, who even wanted to establish certain rules of the seas which would govern commercial relations in the future. 27 After 1632 Richelieu relaxed his efforts to settle critical com- mercial questions, as he knew that the Thirty Years' "War pre- vented any such action on his part. On the whole, therefore, commerce between the two nations went on as usual. Most of the trade was in English boats, and the English continued to annoy the French merchant who came to trade at London, by taxes, formalities, etc. 28 France had to become stronger on the seas before she could settle commercial relations with her rival. Richelieu was well aware of the power of Holland, and was a strong admirer of her commercial success. It was between the years 1610 and 1625, that Holland assumed a strong position on the seas, in the colonies, etc. She became at that time the great economic rival of England. In a commercial way, trade with Holland was kept up and fostered during the administration of Richelieu. That country was the diplomatic ally of France against the Hapsburgs, so that he was unable to undertake any economic action against her except to injure her trade with Spain through France, by means of ordinances. Political and 24 See Chapter XIII; Beaurepaire, II, 84-85, 166-7; Richelieu, Lettres, II, 490. as Richelieu, Lettres, II, 774 ; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 506-507. 26 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 335. 27 See Chapter XIII, Lettres, VII, 676; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 581. 28 Levasseur, I, 264. 130 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [672 economic necessity elsewhere prevented a direct economic con- nection between these two lands, although two treaties in 1624 and 1627, arranged a more or less clear basis of friendly economic relationship with regard to the seas and colonies. 29 It is in a study of French commerce in the Levant that one can obtain the best illustration of the real economic rivalries of Holland, England, and Spain with France. Since the death of Henry IV, the former important commercial relations between France and Turkey had diminished, while the influence of Holland and England in Turkey had increased. Centralization of the government of France took away thtd., II, 54-64. soMercure Francois, XXIII, 125; Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 81. si Wakeman, H. O., European History (1598-1715), :iS T ew York, 1916, 116. 32 Pigeonneau, II, 423. 689] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 147 Spain was a danger to the development of France; therefore, it should be destroyed. However, enmity to Spain should not pre- vent France from taking advantage of any opportunity to better herself, even though it should lead to trade with a nation with which they were at war. French merchants actually became the overland carriers of goods between Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany. 83 Richelieu was guided by the same nationalistic ideal in his diplomatic relations with England. The latter country, he claimed, had failed to observe the various clauses of the com- mercial treaty of 1623. They placed various restrictions upon the importation of French goods, such as cloth for example. Now the French desired their government to retaliate and con- sequently there arose in France the demand that the English should be treated in France as the French were treated in England. 34 Therefore when Richelieu came into office he had the problem confronting him of arranging commercial relations which would be satisfactory to both countries. One of the first steps in that direction was the marriage of Henrietta of France to the English Prince of "Wales. The Cardinal hoped that this alliance would result not only in the establishment of good relations between the two countries, but that it would serve as a counterweight to the grandeur of Spain, 35 and also would prevent a powerful commercial and col- onial alliance between England and Holland. 36 The effect of this alliance was temporary, although both Eng- land and Holland lent boats to France in 1625, to be used against La Rochelle at a time when France was at war with Spain. The explanation for the change is simple when one considers not only the religious side of the marriage alliance but the commercial difficulties in the way of a happy consum- mation of its aims. France and England were beginning the as Calendars of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Venetian Series), London, 1912-1916. XX, 162. s^Levasseur, I, 273. 35 Eichelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 78. se Ibid., XXII, 293. Richelieu must have had in mind the failure of Buckingham to bring about a marriage alliance between the two royal houses of Spain and Eng- 'land. See Montague, F. C., Political History of England, New York, 1911, VII, 110-117. 148 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [690 intense commercial rivalry on the sea which, was to be the key- note of their diplomatic relations for the next two hundred years. Indeed, Eichelieu in a letter said that the three roots of trouble between France and England were first, the relig- ious difficulties concerning the right of Henrietta in that re- spect; 37 secondly, the commercial side as seen not only in the retention of French vessels and their goods by the English, but in the retaliation in a similar manner by the French; 38 in the third place, the aid of La Rochelle by the English. 39 However, the first cause of trouble could have been settled easily if the latter points in dispute had not prevented any lasting solu- tion during the entire period. In fact, one might say that the first four or five years of Richelieu's administration were taken up with a sharp commercial controversy with England, with the military base of operations at La Rochelle. After that, this rivalry was extended over the seas toward various colonies, where the actual rivalry of the two nations is seen to the fullest extent. The Thirty Years' War complicated to a certain ex- tent their diplomatic relations so far as Europe was concerned, because England was a much sought-for ally, in that particular struggle. 40 Taking up the commercial phase of the trouble, one discovers a sharp rivalry on the sea, which resulted in depredations on French commerce, which in turn led towards the preparation of a war marine to protect French merchants. 41 Richelieu stated 37 Even the marriage of Henrietta had its economic side because the French in spite of the demands of the English had failed to pay the dowry which had been promised. In fact the Venetian ambassador summarized the causea of the trouble between the two countries as follows: (1) the La Rochelle affair, (2) navigation troubles, and (3) the question of the dowry. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 66. as Ibid., XIX, 592. ' ' Seizure of vessels on both sides makes both nervous. Starting as a friendly dispute between Denmark, England, and France in 1626 over the question of navigation, it now began to assume serious proportions." See Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 482-483. 39 Eichelieu, Lettres, II, 243. 40 So far as affairs in Europe were concerned, the relation of France and England in the Thirty Years' War was influenced largely by territorial desires. The question of the Palatinate and Lorraine was at issue. Eng- land was interested in the former and France the latter. Neither country was enthusiastic over the demands of the other. See Revue des\ Questions Historique, 1889, XLV, 489-501. 41 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 279-281 ; 305. Sourdis, I. Introduction, II-III. 691] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 149 openly in 1627 that he was going to protect French trade on the sea. 42 Furthermore, in following out this policy of pro- tection for French commerce, he used the same mercantilistic policy toward England as toward Spain. He would not permit the importation of English cloth, but wanted England to send over her raw materials, such as iron, hides, etc. 43 He desired to build up the manufactures of France, as being one of the requirements of a strong state. It is no wonder that England was afraid of the results that would follow if Richelieu carried out his policy. 4 * Colonial interests began to occupy a place in the English- French relations as early as 1626. "For," says Richelieu, "the establishment of the company of Morbihan in 1627 alarmed the English and the Dtutch who fear our control of the sea as an ultimate goal. ' ' 45 This fear on the part of the English is substantiated by the reports of the Venetian ambassador to England in 1627. He says, "the dispute over the Queen's household and the shipping are merely pretexts and not diffi- cult to adjust 46 but after that they would never permit the French to strengthen themselves at sea, because they are so close. More than one person told me frankly that not to oppose this would amount to giving the French the keys to his majesty's dominions." 47 He goes on to point out the fact that the French look upon Richelieu's attempt to build up a marine as a means whereby he could make himself supreme, not only over England and her India trade, but in France itself. This and other quotations indicate that the English feared the col- onial aspirations of the French and realized that the control of the sea was the means by which France might not only break 42 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 389-390. Pigeonneau, II, 423. 4* In his report concerning the relations existing between France and England in 1626, the Venetian Ambassador to England says, "Richelieu's care for naval affairs, either by means of a company or otherwise; the pas- sage of the Galleons from the Mediterranean to the ocean and other man- oeuvres of France all furnish pretexts for comments, suspicions, etc." See Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 592. Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 127. 46 France had failed to pay the rent for the ships loaned by the English for use against the Huguenots in 1626, much to the disgust of the English. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123. "Ibid., XX, 98-99. 150 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [692 up their beginnings of an empire, but even attack England itself. 48 "The secretary Conway," writes the Venetian ambas- sador in 1626, "whom I visited spoke to me and read a letter addressed to the King announcing the great attention paid by Richelieu to maritime affairs, the ships expected from Holland, and others off La Rochelle and in the ports of Brittany and Normandy, the arrangement made by the merchants for a com- pany to trade off the East Indies etc. This is contrary to the common weal and is not generally understood, etc. ' ' 49 Both England and Prance seemed to realize that they were to be mortal enemies for control of the sea and all that goes with it. As one writer says, ' ' Richelieu constantly believed that Spain, England, and Holland derived their greatness and power from the marine. Like a genius, he plunged into the future. He knew that Spain would not control her colonies much longer, that Holland, whether she maintained herself or not, would never be the great danger to France. But as for England, he feared her and the more she increased in power, the stronger he wished to make France. ' ' 50 The capture of merchant ships by both sides served as the basis of their opposition to each other. "This has to be stop- ped, ' ' says Richelieu, ' ' or war will result. ' ' 51 Consequently the great economic struggle between these two important na- tions found a first significant expression in 1626 over this question of navigation. 52 Richelieu even went so far as to call the English pirates, accusing them of committing all sorts of outrages against the French merchant ships. "No heed was taken of any agreement made with France." 53 In fact, they *s Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 242. The Venetian ambassador in France writes in 1627, ' ' They are making forty pieces of artillery in the foundries here for the fleet, according to the invention of Targoni I wrote of. . . The terrible results they produce are shown by experiments . . . be- fore the Cardinal, etc. He called upon me yesterday and said he was going in a fortnight to Brittany, not only to reduce La Rochelle but he boasts that he will enter the ports of England itself, etc." * Ibid., XX, 31. BO Gouraud, I, 191. "Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 236-237. 62 Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 222-223, 286; XX, 267. 53 Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 271-272, 277. Henry IV, notwithstanding his dire need of the English Alliance, frequent- 693] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 151 even took advantage of the faith the French placed in peace agreements between the two nations. 54 Of course he failed to consider the English side of the case. At any rate it is clear that at the start, the Cardinal decided that if France was to be powerful and wealthy, the English must be overcome. 55 Matters were brought to a head by the establishment of a marine, as has been discussed before. 56 Efforts were made to arrange a satisfactory solution of the affair by means of negotia- tions. However, the piracies committed upon the merchant ships of both nations brought in another element which made a peaceful settlement difficult. In 1627 the King of England forbade all commerce with France, and confiscated French ves- sels and goods found in England. Louis XIII in retaliation for- bade his subjects to trade with England and accused the latter of breaking her agreement. 57 Evidently the La Rochelle affair and the marriage question were not the leading points at issue between these two powers. Richelieu now believed that he had a good cause, and it is interesting to note how he tried to influence public opinion against England. For example, the Mercure Francois mentions the accusation of the English, that the French were laden with taxes, etc. "However," it says, "if the people of France suffer because of the war, the English endure just as much, and curse the Duke of Buckingham for having caused the rupture of com- merce. The merchants have lost all their trade, and the people are overburdened with the military expenses. All for the im- aginary purpose of obtaining power. ' ' 58 Many traces of the ly protested against the violation of the freedom of French ships. See Cheyney, E. P., A History of England. New York, 1914, I, 446. s* Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 314. os Ibid., XXIII, 270-271 ; Sourdis, Introduction, II-III, Lettres, II, 561. se See Chapter VII. 57 Mercure Francois, XIII, 200-206. f*Ibid., XIII, 832-833. Richelieu had good reason to desire the support of his people, because of the fact that the war with England ruined the business of French merchants along the coast, who constantly complained on this account. The English even expected the fall of the Cardinal because the merchants of Bordeaux, Rouen, Gascony, Guienne, etc., depended on English trade. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123, 151, 257. 152 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [694 birth of the intense rivalry of these nations may be seen at this time. Both suffered, but were willing to endure, because of the bright rewards of the future and the thoughts of the weakness and sufferings of the other side. Public opinion was influenced then as now in the direction of material gains. The resem- blance of the past to the present appears when Richelieu in the Mercure Francois, accuses the English of double-dealing and lining up his allies against him. 59 In a certain sense it would seem that the edict prohibiting all commerce with England, ex- cept by the permission of Richelieu, was the first step in the economic struggle between the two nations which was to come to a climax in the famous blockade phase of the Napoleonic War. But the match which really started the struggle in 1627 was found in the aid given the Huguenots by the English. Not satisfied with undergoing the displeasure of the Cardinal with respect to the marriage alliance and the question of French and English commerce, the English had incurred his wrath by taking issue with him in regard to La Rochelle. They had captured the island of Re and had, he believed, tried to draw other people to their side, using as a pretext the religious ques- tion. 60 At that time salt was one of the principal products of the 59 Mercure Francois, XIII, 833-835. eo Trevelyan says that English interference in the Huguenot question stultified the European policy of both nations. "The Duke of Bucking- ham," he says, "couldn't blind Parliament to the truth, even by under- taking, with huge Protestant bluster, the relief of those very Huguenots whom he had been helping Richelieu suppress." He then goes on to say that the English were sent to seize the island of Re off La Rochelle which was to serve as a basis for English commerce and privateering at the ex- pense of France, secured by the neighbourhood alliance of the great Hugue- not party. See Trevelyan, G. M., England under the Stuarts, New York, 1910, 136-138. Another English writer says that Buckingham took command in 1627 with instructions first to offer the citizens of La Rochelle the help which they would need if threatened with attack by their King, and then to make good the English mastery of the sea and destroy French and Spanish com- merce. "This conquest of Re would have given the English a good basis for naval operations and political intrigue. ' ' See Montague, F. C., History of England (1603-1660). Political History of England, VII, New York, 1911, 143-144. 695] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 153 external commerce of the French. 61 Both political and econ- omic interests influenced her to engage in it, and develop the exportation of that important commodity. A valuable trade in salt was carried on in northern Italy and with the Swiss. 62 This might account to a certain extent for Richelieu's interest in that part of Europe. Furthermore, the large amount of salt consumed in Flanders has a peculiar significance when one comes across attempts on the part of Austria and Spain to gain ab- solute control in that country, much to the distress of France, as will be shown later. La Roehelle was one of the best salt ports on the ocean, in spite of efforts of Richelieu to build up other harbors where foreigners could obtain this commodity. 63 However, the great geographical discoveries had brought about the rising impor- tance of all the Atlantic ports. 64 As a result, La Rochelle, Nantes, Dieppe, etc., became very important not only in the eyes of Richelieu, but in the eyes of foreign nations as well. Further- more, they were Huguenot strongholds. The basis of the trouble was of course England's interest in the Huguenots. The Cardinal felt that England did not have much personal sympathy for the latter. He was materialistic enough to base the affair on the principle of a struggle for sea power. Indeed, to dominate the sea was the desire of France. "None of them," he says, "not even the Huguenots, saw the advantage of the control of La Rochelle because of its salt mines. ' ' 65 Richelieu was probably mistaken in the latter part of his assertion. For it is not unlikely that the economic importance of La Rochelle, especially with regard to the salt mines, was the controlling factor in causing England, Spain, and Holland to be friendly toward the Huguenots. Fundamentally, the struggle between England and France was one for sea power even at that time. 68 But the salt mines and the control of the ei See Chapter VII. ez D'Avenel, Absolue MonarcJrie, II, 275. es Ibid., Ill, 194-5. *Lavisse, E., Histoire de France, 9 vols., Paris, 1896, VI, 277. es Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 262. Yet Eichelieu entertained a fear of the economic relations existing between La Rochelle and the English, so that he tried to keep track of the trade carried on between them. See Richelieu, Lettres, II, 499. ee Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 77, 191-192, 282. 154 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [696 Garonne and Loire rivers, together with the revenues to be obtained from the Dutch and other peoples as a consequence of the possession of the salt mines, must have been objects of desire to the English, especially since they carried on an important commerce in that commodity with La Kochelle. 67 The Venetian ambassador at London seems to have had difficulty in swallowing the statement of the English minis- try that they had lately conceived of the war against the French as based upon the sole preservation of the reformed church and the public weal. 68 There can be no doubt that England had a certain economic interest in the welfare of her fellow Protes- tants in La Rochelle. 69 On the other hand, Richelieu at this point frankly admits that one of the predominating motives back of his desire to retain La Rochelle was commercial, namely, the control of the salt mines. As a first step in opposition to the efforts of England with regard to La Rochelle, Richelieu proposed a union with Spain. He did this not only for political but also for economic reasons, and even though this plan failed it is of importance because it illustrates his diplomatic skill in political as well as in economic affairs. He knew that Spain and France were com- petitors in the salt trade. Therefore he proposed a scheme where- by a price was to be set on that commodity which was to be raised or lowered only by common consent. In this agreement he brings out the importance of the salt trade with the northern countries, and then says that a mixture of Spanish and French salt would 67 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 341. Calendars of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Domestic Series), (1625-1642), London, 1858-1887, X, 534, 553. s Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 374. "After the capture of B6, they (the English) mean to attempt Oleron, which is also very important on account of its salt pans, and both islands are very convenient as they command the mouths both of the Garonne and the Loire, the chief rivers of France, enabling their possessors to take toll sufficient to pay the cost of the garrison and the fleet with something over, indeed, some say that already certain Dutch ships which went to lade salt evaded a duty claimed by the English, by main force and flight." From a report of the Venetian ambassador in England in 1672. See Cal- endars, (Venetian), XX, 341. 6 9 The French claimed that the English did not aid the Huguenots for religious but for territorial and commercial reasons. See, Mercure Fran QOIS, XIII, 809-811; XIV, 9-14. 697] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 155 offer the best market, due to the fact that one was too strong and the other was too weak. 70 He offered Spain a partnership in a salt monopoly as an inducement towards an alliance against England. The commerce in this commodity must have been very important to have caused him to use it as a means of bring- ing about such a vital union. Even though he did not succeed in this plain, he went ahead and took action against the English, who were constantly prey- ing upon the French commerce. The Duke of Guise was ordered to prepare a fleet and to oppose them. 71 The English were ready to meet them, for the fear of a union between France and Spain had caused that country to take a definite stand in her relations to La Rochelle. 72 England probably saw at a glance that this was a plan which promised to put a stop to French commercial and political ambitions. An edict of September 20th, 1627, breaking off relations with England, indicates that the two nations were on the point of an armed conflict. 73 This marks definitely not only the begin- ning of the struggle for control of the sea but also the contest for the colonial empire of the New World. Richelieu had taken the first step toward this great event, when he began to build up the marine. He took a second step when he attempted to increase the political and economic importance of Brittany and Normandy and make the harbor of Brest the commercial em- porium of the world, together with other ports near it. 74 Eng- land likely realized the danger which threatened her and even considered the capture of Brest as a means of thwarting the design of the Cardinal, who would have liked to make this port the center of trade and navigation. 75 She was afraid of the growth of France, and even the commercial alliance proposed between the Hansa cities and France possibly caused her to Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 288-289. 71 Mercure Frangois, XIV, 38 72 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 77. "Isambert, XVI, 215; Richelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 277-278. 74 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 191. islbld., XX, 281. ' ' Something has also been said, ' ' says the Venetian ambassador, ' ' about the Port of Brest, which is considered of great advantage for thwarting the designs of the Cardinal, who would fain make it the center of trade and navigation, but when on the spot they will make their choice. ' ' 156 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [698 fear the Cardinal as an opponent of England's claims to su- premacy on the sea. 76 On account of this distrust of the ambitions of Richelieu, Great Brittain began to look for an ally. It was natural enough that La Eochelle with its economic importance and its relative political and religious independence should attract her. Here was one great opportunity to destroy the growing naval power of France before it could threaten either England or her col- onies. Both countries began negotiations to break the neutral- ity of La Rochelle. The French tried to influence the Huguenots by fear of their land forces, near at hand ; the English by setting forth the interests of the place and by blandishments towards the inhabitants, having issued a decree that all may trade and bring food into the town and islands, as, according to ancient claims, they belong to the English crown, etc. 77 The French proposed force, and the English, an economic alliance and old political claims. Both the English and the French seemed to be well aware of the economic importance of these lands of the Huguenots, as each nation was afraid of the control of the latter by the other. But this fear on the part of the English was likely increased when they saw in the possession of La Rochelle by the French, to- gether with an alliance with Spain, a loss of maritime and col- onial power. On the other hand, the French could see in English control an invasion of their country, and a loss of valuable eco- nomic territory, as well as the chance for future naval expansion. It is not surprising that Richelieu said that he would not talk peace with the English as long as their flag waved above French soil, 78 nor that in his efforts to convert France from a conti- nental into a naval power, he threatened England with dire mis- fortunes, when he should have a fleet large enough to defeat. her. 79 The English knew when he became superintendent, grand master, etc., that they would have to look out for his 76 Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 56. "I believe that Richelieu would gladly listen to this (the proposal of the Hansa towns) for the sake of his marine, and it will generate ill will here by reason of their claims to supremacy at sea," says the Venetian am- bassador to England. 77 Ibid., XX, 341. 7* Ibid., XX, 371. 7 /&?., XX, 179, 199. 699] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 157 increase of naval strength and his political alliances, especially with La Rochelle. 80 It would seem that these two countries began their colonial struggle at this time, and it is to the credit of Eichelieu that France won the first engagement by the capture of La Rochelle. For a while it looked as though both nations must fight to the finish. The sole basis on which the French would make peace with the English in 1629 was that England should give up all thoughts of La Rochelle and the Huguenots forever. 81 Richelieu realized that if France was to attain national politi- cal and economic unity, and was to enter upon an expansive policy, both Spain and England would have to be guarded against. France must have her place in the sun, and her in- terests must not be endangered by either nation. 82 In 1629, the rivalry between the two nations had extended into the distant colonies. Port Royal in Canada and the island of Saint-Kitts had been taken from the French by the English. As a result, Richelieu sent a fleet "to show the English that they were not kings of the sea any more. " 83 In 1629, under the leadership of Cahusac, they recaptured the island of Saint-Kitts. 8 * Richelieu accused the English of entertaining the desire even at this time to cast the French out of Canada, a remarkable forecast of later events. Then came a change in Richelieu's policy. In 1629 he sent Chateauneuf to England as his representative to try to arrange a settlement of disputes and a commercial treaty which would enable both countries to live in a happy union. 85 Under these general directions the ambassador had specific instructions which he was to try to carry out. For example, he was to attempt to settle the dispute with regard to the commercial relations of France and England with Spain, for both nations were trying to prevent each other from trading with the latter. He was also to take up the affair of the flags, in regard to salutes on the high seas. But what was the cause of this change? The Thirty Years' so Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 155. *ilbid., XXI, 7. 82 Biehelieu, Memoires, XXIII, 281. s Eichelieu, Lettres, III, 446-447. **Ibid., Ill, 447-448 ;477-478; 518-519. ss Ibid., Ill, 447-448; 518-519; 477-478. 158 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [700 "War had reached a stage wherein the defeat of the Hapsburgs in Austria and Spain seemed a necessity. Richelieu wished England to join with him in aiding Sweden. 86 Therefore, he had to give up his active struggle with England for control of the sea, in order to obtain her aid in the Thirty Years' "War. "Whether or not he would have continued the conflict after the war if he had lived is a mere matter of conjecture. The probabil- ities are that when peace had been declared and his long de- layed marine had been created he would have taken up again an economic and political opposition to England. 87 Richelieu at this time showed his diplomatic genius by hav- ing his ambassador demand a new treaty from the English, which would bring about secure and free mutual commerce. All agreements in past treaties were to be renewed. 88 Further- more, the problem concerning the restitution of vessels captured by the English was to be taken up, 89 and at least a compromise was to be agreed upon. England was no longer to place her neutrality in question by selling ammunition to the "infidels," which, according to Richelieu, caused even the English people to murmur. 90 The colonial question arose at this time, but the French ambassador wisely placed the emphasis upon the other commer- cial problems. It is significant, however, that in his Memoirs Richelieu reports that the King of England told Chateauneuf , that the King of France would produce a better indication of his desire of living in peace and good friendship with him, by departing from his desire to become master of the sea. 91 Riche- lieu himself points out that even the English centered the en- tire struggle on the control of the sea. "Jealousy of French power on the ocean caused English opposition in 1629," says the Cardinal, "even the merchants of England were envious of those of France." 92 se Richelieu, Lettres, III, 447-448. Pigeonneau II, 414-415. " See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 179. ss Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 198-199; Levasseur, I, 264. 89 A peace agreement had been made April 24, 1629, which* established free commerce, etc. But this agreement had been broken by England. See Eichelieu, Memoires, XXV, 199, also Dumont, V, pt. 2, 580-581. so Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 199-201. ei/bid., XXV, 201-205. 2 Ibid., XXV, 211. The Dutch ambassador in France wrote in 1628 "that the Cardinal clings to his old idea about establishing com- 701] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 159 The recapture of Saint-Kitts strengthened the fears of the English. But Chateauneuf , in a kindly way, assured them that the French desired only to enforce the peace terms, and that they should have no fear of the growing sea power of the French. 93 The English King replied that just as Queen Eliza- beth had warned Henry IV to leave the sea alone, he, Charles I, would do the same. Richelieu, in order to settle the trouble concerning the sea, then sent Count de Nitschdil as a general representative to call on the King of England. But the latter was not willing to con- cede that equality on the sea which Eichelieu demanded. ^ He said that the French were causing trouble by persisting in increasing their marine power. The French representatives laughed at the idea of another person's telling a great ruler what he should do in his state. 9 * Richelieu in reply asserted that the arms of France were always for defence and assis- tance against enemies and never for purposes of oppression. 95 In 1630 De Fontenay-Mareuil took Chateauneuf 's place in England. Richelieu instructed him to try to obtain the resti- tution of Canada, and the restoration of the merchandise and vessels captured since the peace agreement of 1629, and to at- tempt to arrange a good peace between the two crowns, and settle all commercial difficulties. He even mentioned the so-called "Laws of the Sea," as giving the final decision with regard to the restitution of the ships. "Reason and justice are to decide af- fairs," he said. 96 The new ambassador was to try to settle the commercial relations between France and England, and further- more to determine England's attitude in the Thirty Years' War, especially with respect to the Palatinate. 97 94 Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 205-6. panics as in Holland, and extending navigation. The English will never permit this, so as not to put arms in the hands of thousands of hostile neighbors against an open Kingdom like this, and state policy does not allow it." Calendars, (Venetian), XXI, 446. 3 Richelieu, Memoires, XXV, 201-5. A good example of the fears of some of the English people is found in a letter of an English captain in 1630, who was afraid of the intention of France to dominate Canada and New England to the detriment of the English. Calendars, (Colonial, 1574- 1660), London, 1860, I, 106. 95/biO The English, in 1636, were constantly threatened by French ships. The French sailors called the English, "English dogs." Eichelieu accord- ing to reports had promised a sum of money to those men of war who could interrupt the King of England's packet. English vessels coming from La Rochelle, were forced to avoid the French fleets for fear of capture. See Calendars, (Domestic, 1635-1636), IX, 561-562. 101 Eichelieu, Lettres, IV, 559-567. 703] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 161 He even attempted to settle the question as to who should salute when English and French ships met on the high seas. He favored their relative location as determining this matter; that is, if they should meet near the French coast, the English would salute the French, and if they should meet near the English coast it would be vice versa. 102 Nothing was accomplished with regard to this point. In 1637, he again tried to get the English to break their neutrality and come in against Austria and Spain. " However, the gain, ' ' he said, ' ' in selling contraband goods as a neutral with warring nations, made England a neutral. ' ' 103 It is plain that Eichelieu could see the economic forces underneath the diplomacy of the nations at that time, especially when they concerned his en- emies. In his Memoirs in 1637, he says, "Is this neutrality of England due to an honest love of repose, or is it due to the gain to be derived thereby, during such a neutrality, by conveying contraband goods to warring nations as well as carrying on during the wars the entire commerce of France and Spain. Is that why England kept from a direct alliance with France ? ' ' 104 At another place he complains that England constantly aided Spain to the detriment of France. 105 England still feared the French on the sea, and Richelieu realized this as is shown by the fact that he instructed his ambassador there to avoid a dis- cussion of England's imaginary empire of the sea. 106 He knew that England was torn between two policies, the materialistic neutrality, or the aid of the Elector Palatine by participation in the war. It was the aim of France to get her to follow the latter policy. 107 When the Cardinal died, his plans, of course, were left in- complete. What he would have done after the Thirty Years' War is not mere conjecture however, for in his Testament Pol- itique he has strongly advised the necessity of a powerful mar- ine to oppose the claims of the English to being Lord of the Seas." 108 102 Eichelieu, Lettres, V, 66-70. 103 ibid., v, 854-856. 104 Richelieu, Memoires, XXX, 523. 105 Ibid., XXX, 529. loe Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 10-12. 107 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 49-50. ., II, 50-52. 162 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [704 Richelieu looked at England in a large degree from the eco- nomic point of view. He saw in both England and Holland, two of his great rivals in the East Indies and Persia. 109 In fact one must conclude that the former was a definite colonial and com- mercial opponent of France at that time. Spain was on the de- cline and he knew it. England was the enemy of the future and he wanted to prepare against her. If he had lived long enough to carry out his economic policy it is a question whether or not our land would have contained one English-speaking nation as today. At any rate the Thirty Years' War put off the com- mercial and colonial struggle for a hundred years for better or for worse but Richelieu seems to have been aware that it had to come in the end. Turning to Holland, one discovers that Richelieu's attitude in regard to that country was different from that toward England and Spain. As has been shown before, he admired the Dutch industrial and commercial genius, built up in spite of numerous obstacles. Indeed, he described it as a model for the future growth of France. 110 He was at no time actually willing to undertake a hostile attitude toward this nation, although he threatened her with dire punishment when she refused to lend him boats to be used against England. 111 Just as with England, the economic rivalry between France and Holland, even though it existed, was not permitted to dom- inate on account of the Thirty Years' War. 112 In fact it seems that the alliance of 1627 with the Dutch, for mutual protection and satisfactory commercial relations, was an effort on the part of Richelieu to enlist the aid of this country not only to put down the Huguenots, but also to aid in the prosecution of the Thirty Years' War. 113 He was constantly afraid of an alliance between Spain and Holland, 114 even though he did not like to see the Dutch carrying most of the French commerce on their vessels. The treaty of 1627 was arranged with the purpose of removing 109 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 73-74. <>See Chapter IX, 138. in Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 192. 112 Levasseur, I, 266. us Mercure Francois, XIV, 14. 11* Richelieu, A. J. Cardinal, due de, Maximes d'tat, et Fragments Politique du Cardinal de Bichelieu, Ed., G. Hanotaux, Paris, 1880, 730-731. 705] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 163 these difficulties, and of engaging the Dutch to act as the pro- tectors of the French marine which was being built at that time. Improved commercial relations were the result of this treaty. 115 Yet the Dutch were not so friendly as they might have been, as is shown by the incident in which they looked on in glee while the English captured certain French vessels near their coast. 116 The fear of the English by the Dutch, was one of the most bitter complaints made by Richelieu during the Huguenot affair. He says that Spain proved to be a false ally, and Holland an un- neutral neutral, in that she persisted in sending ammunition to the English. She was afraid of the latter country and really favored her. 117 Richelieu did not like this, as is shown by his letters. He thought it right for France to trade with Spain, as their commerce was important; but for the Dutch to do so was wrong. 118 International rights were thus considered from nar- row national points of view. Both Holland and France were looking after their own inter- ests on the sea. The former country had before this supplanted French navigation upon the east coast of Africa, and was very strong in the East Indies. 119 She, like England, took plea- sure in carrying on depredations upon French commerce, even forming an alliance with the Barbary pirates to do so. Riche- lieu tried to force the Dutch to accept terms by which rules of reciprocity should guide their commercial relations. "He did not want to undertake a tariff war," says one writer, "which would have alienated the valuable Dutch commerce and influ- ence. He tried to make the Dutch his associates in enterprises in the East and in the Americas. The treaties of 1627 and 1629 stipulated that they aid the French merchant boats, and allow their men to associate with the French in the navigation to both of the Indies. ' ' 12 In fact, Richelieu desired to settle their us Levasseur, 1, 266; Dumont, V, pt. 2, 523. uoMercure Francois, XIV, 159. i" Richelieu, Lettres, III, 66, 78. 11* Ibid., Ill, 471. Holland as a matter of fact was rather in sympathy with the Huguenots and the English as against Bichelieu. She not only refused to take action as an ally of France, but would only lend boats to the French to be used against Austria and Spain. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 115, 192, 310, 353. us Levasseur, I, 273. 120 Pigeonneau, II, 424-425. This treaty illustrates the fact that Holland also desired to stay by her agreements with England. Probably she was 164 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [706 commercial relations by means of a compromise and thus open north Europe, the Levant, Africa, Canada, the Indies, Persia, etc., to trade. The Cardinal knew that even though Holland was a danger- ous economic and political rival, yet she was the natural enemy of Spain and as such should be used as one of the elements which was to contribute to the defeat of the Hapsburgs. In 1630 he took this stand definitely when he arranged a treaty with Holland which completed those of the past. 121 After this she was one of the allies, and her commercial power was forgotten for the time being by the French. But, the Cardinal did not forget the economic side, as shown by the fact that in his Testa- ment Politique he left plans for obtaining the commerce in the north which the Dutch and the Flemish had controlled. 122 This intention has an added significance when studied in connection with the Thirty Years' War. Richelieu 's relations with Italy were of course interwoven with his purpose of keeping the Spanish and Austrians from uniting through that country, which would have been the death blow to any plans he had with regard to the development of France. Her boundaries had to be secure, not only at that time, but also for the future. 123 He did not desire territory in Italy. In fact he proposed the formation of a confederation in that country, 124 which would keep Austria and Spain separated, 123 for the Cardi- nal frankly admitted in 1637 that the French did not desire new lands in Italy, or on the Rhine border. 126 All he wanted was an opportunity to develop France without fear of foreign invasion, a prerequisite to a strong economic state. Until a lasting peace was assured for France so far as concerned foreign affairs, Richelieu was willing to fight. 127 Indeed the Cardinal goes so afraid of the France of the future. Furthermore, this treaty broke up the Franco-Spanish alliance, much to the disgust of the latter. See Calendar*, (Venetian), XX, 353. See Dumont, etc., V, pt., 2, 462-464, 523, 605-606, VI, pt. I, 69-70, 124-135, 127, 242-243. 121 Isambert, XVI, 356, Dumont, V, pt. 2, 605-606. 122 Richelieu, Testament Politique, II, 69-70. 123 Richelieu, Maximes, d'ttat, 815, etc.; Lcttres, I, 260-267, 294-296. 124 Richelieu, Lettres, III, 239. 125/fttd., VII, 695. "6 ibid., V, 595-597. Bridges 137. 127 Richelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 42. 707] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU 165 far as to claim that peace as he sees it would be a true peace for all Christianity. 128 However, his altruism was not such that this can be entirely accepted. Itaty might have been on the territorial waiting list. Richelieu's relations with the East have been considered. 129 Again, it is the story of commercial rivalries between England, Spain, Holland and France. Also, the Levant had a certain con- nection with the Thirty Years' War, in that the Cardinal at one time was afraid of a possible alliance between Turkey and Austria. He even went so far as to advise his ambassador to prevent Turkey from undertaking any negotiations with the enemy. 130 The alliance was not formed. However, the Cardinal had to neglect his commercial interests in the Orient and permit the Dutch to obtain a good foothold by means of a maritime route around the cape. 131 The Cardinal's interest in Sweden and the North in general was closely bound up in the Thirty Years' War and the question as to the control of the Baltic sea. Of course the aid given by Richelieu to the Swedish King in his attempt to overcome the Hapsburgs has been mentioned by most writers. But the mo- tives which caused Richelieu to do so have been brought forth in rather an unsatisfactory way. The Cardinal did consider that he used this Scandinavian country as a tool to defeat the Emperor. But why? In his Memoirs he says that Sweden en- tered the war on account of the fear of the increasing size of the Emperor's dominions, which threatened her boundaries; and also, to aid the poor northern German states, and preserve freedom of commerce in the Baltic. 132 Richelieu therefore sent" Charnace to Sweden as his representative, who was to tell the King that France was in sympathy with the misery of Germany, and was afraid of the extension of the frontiers of the Empire, whose ambitions had no limits. He desired to furnish troops and money to aid the Swedes, which should be used to maintain the liberty of the Princes, communities, and cities of Germany, and to conserve the security of the two seas, the Baltic, the ocean, 128 Richelieu, Lettres, IV, 29. 129 See Chapter IX. 130 Richelieu, Lettres, VI, 323. isi Levasseur, I, 270. 132 Richelieu, Memoires, XXVI, 397. 166 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [708 and their ports. To do this, the forces of the Emperor should be driven out of Germany and their fortresses demol- ished. Now to assist in this undertaking, France was to furnish money yearly, as long as necessary, and the English, Dutch and Danes were also to aid the Swedes. 133 In other words, Richelieu feared the growing universal power of the Empire. The Danes had failed to stem the tide. Now the control of the Baltic was in danger. Richelieu and his allies, in order to stop this threatened economic and political conquest of the entire north by the empire, urged Sweden to sacrifice herself. She was to restore the free- dom of commerce on the Baltic and the ocean, which Richelieu desired so much. In order to do so, the German princes must be given control of the coast, and the imperial forces had to be pushed back from their advanced position. It may be that his relations with the northern states were largely economic. He saw the value of trade in the north and in the Baltic. In 1640 mention is made of the fact that France did not carry on much commerce with Poland, for it was mostly in the hands of the Austrians. 134 Indeed it is likely that the control of the Baltic was one of the great factors in the Thirty Years' War. At any rate, Richelieu desired the Baltic and its commerce to be free. This desire together with the fall of the Empire was bound to have great economic and political conse- quences. Richelieu, as shown by his efforts to develop foreign commerce, would have been only too glad to increase the French trade in the north. 135 He could have accomplished this aim if the Baltic had become controlled only by the Baltic countries wJth whom he was on friendly terms. The question which now naturally arises is just what con- nection did the Thirty Years' War have with Richelieu's poli- cies? Judging by the Cardinal's ambitions in the north which even extended to the east by way of Russia, one can well infer that his extra European policies both commercial and colonial had a close connection with his continental program. Both parts of his administration were intermingled and he realized that success in each was a necessary preliminary if he wanted to develop and increase the political and economic grandeur Francois, XVII, 469-470. is* Eichelieu, Lettres, VII, 891-892. IBS gee Chapter IX. 709] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 167 of France; or looking at it from another point of view, just as the Seven Years' "War was closely bound up with the colonial struggle of France and England, the Thirty Years' War decided whether or not the Hapsburgs were to be the con- tinental and colonial powers of the world as against the claims of France, England, and their allies. "The possession and ex- ploitation of the colonies had become an international political question at that time." 136 Richelieu continually claimed that France desired no terri- tory as a result of the Thirty Years' War, beyond her natural boundaries. 137 What then was his purpose in entering the war and playing the part he did if one grants him the truth of that statement ? In his Memoirs, he maintains that he sought a permanent peace. He wanted to prevent the ambition of Austria causing her to overcome the weaker German States. Each nation should get what belonged to it. 13 * According to the Cardinal, his pol- icy was to protect the rights of small nations against the growing power of the Empire. He claims that he had no material in- terest in doing so, but only desired a peace which would be for the benefit of all the allies. 139 In a letter to the Swiss Cantons, he assured them that he was working only for a permanent peace, and while fighting for it he would not infringe upon their territory. 140 It might be that Richelieu really believed that a victory over Spain and the Empire would benefit the world. We do know that he constantly considered the welfare of France, even before that of any other nation or group of nations, mak- ing this the guiding force of his entire administration. Now carrying this idea of "state interest" to its logical con- clusion, it seems quite in harmony with the rest of Richelieu's administration to say that his opposition to the Hapsburgs naturally involved an alliance to overpower them on the Baltic as well as on the Mediterranean. Deschamps has mentioned an anonymous Memoir of 1626, which affected Richelieu to a marked extent and indicates the patriotic policy behind the las Deschamps, 80-88. i3r Eichelieu, Memoires, XVII, 403-406. IBS ibid., XXVII, 517-521; Lettres, VI, 243. 139 /bid., XXVII, 499-500. no Ibid., XXX, 340. 168 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [710 Cardinal's administration at that time. The end was a com- mercial and maritime league to weaken Spain on the Mediterra- nean, and the first step was to establish a navy and increased commerce in that field. 141 Richelieu in his creation of a marine accomplished this first step. His attempts to draw England, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden into the war against the Hapsburgs marks the second step taken by Richelieu toward the completion of that plan. 142 In 1632, Richelieu received from a Hollander by the name of Wilhelm Usselinx, a written plan which proposed an associa- tion (commercial and colonial) with Sweden and the German princes. The purpose of it was to drive Spain from the control of seas. The writer gives as his reason for this proposition, that the Hapsburgs of Austria have been the cause of all the trouble for more than a hundred years, and the King of Spain was the chief supporter of that ambitious house. Since the ruler of Spain was powerful only through the money from the American col- onies, France should form a company which would destroy Spain commercially and colonially. 143 Richelieu's efforts to obtain allies against the Hapsburgs indicate that he probably heeded this advice. But it is evident that Richelieu must have realized the eco- nomic importance of an alliance against these powers, for the Mercure Francois, in 1628, published the various efforts of Spain and Austria to form a commercial and political alliance against France, England, and Holland. In 1628, one can read an account of the attempts of the Hapsburgs and Poland to control the Baltic by means of a mutual alliance, together with the aid of the Hanseatic cities, especially Lubeck, Danzig, and Ham- burg, which cities were all offered great privileges, in return for which they should leave the commercial alliance with Hol- land and England. The Hapsburgs even tried to get Sweden by offering Prussia to that country in order to separate her from Denmark (which they desired to overrun). They said openly that their purpose was to control the trade and commerce I" Deschamps, 93-94. 142 ' < His treaties with England, Holland and Germany and his defiance of Spain were all economic policies," says M. d'Avenel, "He extended the boundary of France in order for her to be secure. ' ' See Richelieu, Lettres, I, LXXX. us Deschamps, 96-99. 711 j ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 169 of the Baltic and to ruin the Dutch thereby. To do this they planned a strong fleet on the Baltic. 144 It is not strange that Richelieu was so anxious to bring Sweden and the North German states into an alliance with France. He must have realized that France and her allies were threatened by a combination founded by the Hapsburgs, which might cause their political and economic ruin if allowed to continue. It is no wonder that Richelieu tried to settle the commercial troubles with England and Holland by means of a compromise, in order to meet this great rival. One sees why he neglected the finances as well as commerce more or less. " Spain," says the Mercure Francois, "frankly admitted that in alliance with the Empire, she intended to gain control of the principal com- merce of Europe, by means of control of the Baltic, together with the aid of Lubeck, Danzig, etc. ' ' 145 In 1624 a council of commerce and an admiralty had been established in Spain and in the Netherlands and the navy was increased. Agents were then sent to the German cities offering a commercial treaty with Spain together with the promise of removing all traces of past devastation in those regions. But this plan failed, as the cities refused to unite against England and Denmark, etc. Also, the Empire was not able to seize the control of the straits from Denmark, as Holland, Denmark, and Sweden all opposed that move. It is interesting to note that the result of all these negotiations only served to unite the German cities more closely to Sweden, Denmark, and Holland. Richelieu seems to have appreciated the danger of a sort of zollverein comprising the Imperial lands, Spain, and the Ger- man states, against Sweden, England, Holland and France. This economic union would have resulted in a commercial war which would have been extended to all parts of the world, and so he took steps to prevent its success, by promoting the entrance of Sweden. Unfortunately for Sweden, and happily for Richelieu, Gus- tavus Adolphus was killed in the battle of Lutzen in 1632. For in 1633 appeared in the Mercure Francois a very significant ac- count of the proposed political and economic alliance between Sweden and the northern German states, in order to complete the war against the Hapsburgs, and to begin a commercial and 144 Mercure Francois, XIV, 354, etc. Z., XIV, 355-373. 170 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [712 colonial policy which extended even into the Americas and the East Indies. Gustavus Adolphus planned this in 1626, and Oxenstierna tried to carry it out in 1633. 146 The Swedish leaders were too ambitious, and, as a result, Richelieu became rather cool towards Sweden when he learned about this plan, and the mili- tary successes of her great King and leader made it probable that she might be able to succeed. 147 The Cardinal was not guided purely by political ambitions, when he threw France into the war in 1635 and assumed the leadership in the war by this act. It is possible that something besides political considerations caused a protest on the part of France as to the intentions of Austria to control Liege in 1637, with which France maintained important commercial relations. 148 Speaking in general terms, Richelieu definitely desired France to develop not only on the continent but in colonial possessions as well. Austria and Spain both stood in the way of the first step to be taken toward the achievement of that policy. As a result of the Thirty Years' War, Germany became open to the European powers, and the influence of the Empire a thing of the past. France was thus afforded a chance to expand toward her natural frontiers. Spain fell further in national power. The Portuguese revolution in which Richelieu was especially interested left her Empire in a very weak and helpless condition. What a chance for political and economic expansion of France ! How unfortunate it was for that country, that her minister was unable to live long enough to complete the economic, as well as the political, side of his administration, which he had so well begun ! Thus it was the result of the Thirty Years ' War which decided the first question as to who should control the commerce and the colonial projects of the world. Richelieu helped to frustrate the claims of Spain and the Empire along these lines. Who i*Mercure Francois, XIX, 468-485. In 1630, Gustavus Adolphus ar- ranged a treaty of commerce between Danzig and Sweden. See Dumont, etc., V, pt. 2, 598-599. ! Wakeman, 94. In 1626, Gustavus Adolphus persuaded by Usselinx, an Amsterdam merchant, decided to form the Swedish West India Company and establish settlements in so-called "New Sveden." Oxenstierna con- tinued the policy and in 1638 established a settlement in the state of Delaware. See Tyler, L. G., England in America (American Nation Series), N. Y. 1904, 295-296. "8 Mercure Francois, XXII, 55 713] ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN DIPLOMACY OP RICHELIEU 171 among the allies would be the leader in the economic and pol- itical affairs of the time, was a question of the future. As was said before, Richelieu knew that England was the great power that France would have to contend with for control of the sea, after the ambitions of Spain in that direction had been settled. His external policy was his method of preparing for this coming emergency. In the last place, it does not seem that due credit has been given Richelieu in his conduct of the Thirty Years' War. The very fact that he was able to throw other countries against the enemy by furnishing them with money, certainly indicates his genius. For while he was doing this, he tried to settle internal affairs and develop his external policy, so that after the war France would be able to assume the leading part in European affairs, because of her own great economic and political strength and grandeur. "All this was a matter of prudence," he says, "for by keeping your enemies occupied with your allies, you have time not only to furnish them money, but to save some for yourself. However, when your allies really need you, then it is an act of wisdom and courage to come to their aid. ' ' 149 It certainly would seem that Richelieu followed out to the highest degree his principle of placing the interest of the state first, in his conduct of the Thirty Years' War. After all, what he desired was the political and economic supremacy of France in Europe. In order to achieve this purpose he forgot commer- cial rivalries, made allies, and then pushed them into the war, and finally at the opportune time entered it himself. When he died, international relations were shaping themselves in such a way that he could have turned his undivided attention to the economic development of his nation, and to the questions which would have arisen out of his attempts to develop such phases of his government as colonization. Of course England was a prob- lem for the future. But what would the future have brought if the Cardinal had lived? At any rate the English and French colonial struggle seems to have been the natural outcome of Richelieu's administration. Imperialism had begun. Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 307; Testament Politique, I, 45. CHAPTER XI CONCLUSION The early death of Richelieu was certainly an unfortunate event for the development of France, for his career ended at a time when he was planning to carry to final completion the magnificent political and economic program which he had begun. It was doubly unfortunate because of the fact that his successor, while he was able to carry out the external political phase of Richelieu's administration, nevertheless failed to aid in any way the general economic and internal political ideas promulga- ted by the Cardinal. As a result, whatever Richelieu accom- plished in an economic way was neglected until Colbert came along, and by that time France had lost to a certain extent her great opportunity. One writer suggests that if a man strong in both political and economic affairs had succeeded Richelieu, no doubt the final disappearance of feudalism in the 18th century would not have been delayed. The French Revolution would probably have come; but the horrors of the French Revolution would have been spared. Aristocracy and hereditary monarchy would have been swept away none the less, and the republicanism of modern France would have arisen, as it has arisen in their place, but the substitution would have taken place without con- vulsions and without bitterness. ' ' The question after his death is whether the monarchy will stay with the Third Estate or will turn on them and be conservative. In the first case, there will be the peaceful establishment of the modern era, and in the second, a reign of terror and war. ' ' x The second choice was made, and it is indeed unfortunate that the death of this great man be- came one of the forces leading to the great catastrophe of French history. Colbert, who succeeded Mazarin, was able to build upon the foundation laid by Richelieu. "One must admire," says Gour- aud, "the security of principles, when after twenty years of i Bridges, 40-41 172 715] CONCLUSION 173 civil trouble and debasement of nearly all commerce the founda- tion laid by the latter great man was found nearly intact, and it was upon this that his economic successor built the great com- mercial grandeur of France. ' ' 2 One can easily confirm the truth of this statement by consulting the achievements of Colbert. Indeed to Colbert alone has been given the glory of having made France for a brief period the greatest colonial power of modern times. "In this," says one writer, "he showed himself to be the docile son of Richelieu. He borrowed from him the method of forming companies with privileges and monopolies. The contracts of 1664 were formulated in the same manner as those of the time of the revolution. Indeed the patents of the com- pany of the 'one hundred associates' and the company of the '"West Indies,' seemed to have been written by the same hand." 8 Colbert completed the colonial conceptions of Richelieu. The latter had placed conquest and settlement of the new lands in the first place. He considered the honor and welfare of the Kingdom, and its influence in Europe. Colbert, minister of finances, took upon himself the task of increasing the richness of the country, accomplished by means of colonization, which was an economic effort. He put in the first place the commercial in- terests, which had remained in the second place according to the Cardinal's conception. 4 One might go on and show just in what way Colbert built upon the economic foundations laid by Richelieu with regard to finances, the marine, industry, etc., but it suffices to say that the accomplishments of Richelieu served as a worthy basis for the brilliant protective policy of Col- bert. It is indeed unfortunate that the continental policy of Louis XIV should have prevented the carrying out of the peace- ful economic ideas set forth in the Testament Politique, which Richelieu left to posterity. The keynote of Richelieu's administration from the economic point of view is mercantilism. This study has tried to point out the fact that the great Cardinal was fundamentally a man of that school of thought. Whether he obtained his ideas from Sully, Henry IV, or the first French economist Montchretien, is not certain, but it is evident that the motive behind 2 Gouraud, I, 198. s Deschamps, 144-146. * Ibid., 146. 174 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [716 his administration was mercantilistic as illustrated by his policy of political and economic centralization. Practically all of his actions can be traced back to that belief. For example, in his efforts to create the state, he looked at all classes from the viewpoint of the welfare of the nation. In this respect his conflict with the Huguenots over the salt beds around La Rochelle is a splendid example of his efforts to centralize even the economic side of the government. His financial program sA- though weak was guided by ideal state building. This was smo true of his foreign and domestic commercial policies as well as his colonization schemes and his attempts to create a marine. The welfare of the nation was behind all of them. As to his contin- ental policy, Richelieu desired to overthrow the Hapsburgs, not only for political but for economic reasons as well. That is, to the Cardinal, the downfall of the Hapsburgs was the first step in the colonial and commercial as well as the political aggrandizement of France. His relationship with all nations was centered around this idea and consequently the struggle with England over control of the Huguenots, and the salt region, is only in- teresting in that it shows that the Cardinal was aware of the potential economic forces working within his own land, and his future rival, England. It is granted that Richelieu might have been actuated by other motives in his administration, but one must concede that the policy of a great mercantilistic state around which all his economic policies center is one of the fun- damentals of his administration. For after all, a strong state politically, a good economic foundation, and an era of peace in which work could be accomplished, was the ideal of Richelieu, and no correct conception of his career can be obtained, unless this program is taken into account. That he fully intended to develop his country in the time of future peace is clearly brought out in his Testament Politique, which was written toward the last of his career when he knew that death was going to prevent the carrying out of his plans. "Just as his Memoirs were the accomplishments of the past, so his Testament Politique," he says, "would be the guide for the future. ' ' 5 Then in concluding the first part of his great work, 5 Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 269-271. (Includes introduction to the Testa- ment Politique, and part one.) Testament Politique, Introduction, I, 1-5. 717] CONCLUSION 175 he sums up the keynote of his entire administration when he says; "Up to the present the deeds of your Majesty have been related. I certainly believe that they will end happily if they are followed by a repose, which will give the means by which the state may be heaped up with all kinds of advantages, gains, etc." 6 "Your Majestj r being naturally of a tender constitution, not very healthy, of restless impatient humor, especially when you are with the army, of which you take the leadership, I should think myself guilty of a crime, if I did not make it my humble request for you to avoid war for the future, as much as possible ; which I do upon this basis, that the levity and inconsistency of the French, can only be vanquished by the presence of their master, and that your Majesty cannot, without exposing your- self to ruin, fix upon so lasting a design, nor consequently ex- pect a good success from it. You have shown your valor and military power sufficiently to think of nothing like that for the future, but to enjoy that peace and tranquillity which you have acquired for the Kingdom by your labor, being in a position to defend youself against all those who, contrary to public faith, would offend you anew. ' ' 7 Peace was the final goal to- ward which the Cardinal had worked. And even though he admitted the heavy cost in treasures and suffering, yet he be- lieved that the ideal was worth the efforts and the privations. Like many great men, Richelieu made countless enemies in his attempts to carry out his policies. "But," says Bonnefon, "in contact with the logical and firm policies of the Cardinal, the French people began to take notice of the true interests of the country and the public, and if it had at first been distrustful of the minister because of the brutality of his plans perceived now the farsightedness and the justice of the policies which he conceived and was carrying out. " 8 In this regard the beautiful letter of his contemporary Voiture is significant. The latter praises the farsightedness of the Cardinal's costly military policy, as being a necessary prerequisite for the future wealth and growth of the country. "One must admit," he says, "that instead of ruining France, he has saved her millions by simply taking La Rochelle, which has been in a state of constant revolt and thus 6 Richelieu, Memoires, XI, 394-350; Testament Politique, I, 60. T Richelieu, Testament Politique, I, 196-197. s Sotiete Franeaise due XVIII * Stfcle, 32. 176 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [718 a constant expense. " 9 He then goes on to justify the part taken by Richelieu in the Thirty Years' War. "If the war ends, as it appears to indicate, in a victory, Kichelieu will then find the means of winning the admiration of all. Being as wise as he is, he has realized after so many experiences, what is best; and will turn his attention toward creating in that state the most flourishing of all, after having made it the most formable. He will make evident an ambition which is the most beautiful of anything which can fall into the views of mankind, namely, of creating in France the best and most loved of Kingdoms and not the most feared. He knows that the most true and noble con- quests are those of the heart and the affection; and just as a plant is barren which gives shade and no fruit, so will he enjoy the fruits with which peace is crowned. There is not so much glory in extending the limits of the land as in diminishing the taitte. Richelieu realizes this fact. He also knows that there is less glory in overcoming a hundred thousand men, than in put- ting twenty millions at their ease and security. Also, this great spirit who has only been occupied with the means of furnishing money for the war and of raising men, taking villages and win- ning wars, will occupy himself henceforth, only in establishing repose, riches, and abundance. Instead of being a leader in war, he will lead in the advancement of the arts. He will make new edicts to regulate luxury and establish commerce. Large vessels accustomed to carry arms will bear merchandise, and hold the seas free from pirates, etc. Then the people will admire him and the middle classes will sing his praises. . . " This is a rather en- thusiastic eulogy of the Cardinal, but it is interesting as indicat- ing the growth in sentiment in his favor among the intellectual French people. They began to see the ultimate purpose of Riche- lieu's administration; that war was a necessary evil, accepted only for the sake of better conditions under future peace. A study of Richelieu's life leads to the conclusion that he was an economic statesman and that he was one of the unconscious economic and political founders of the French mercantilistic state. Yet he was not an extreme advocate of the doctrine of mercantilism, for one finds that he differed radically from other influential men of his age. The extreme mercantilistic view held for its fundamental belief that money is wealth. It follows that Voiture, Oeuvres, 2 vols., Ed., M. M. TJbicini, Paris, 1855, I, 271-279. 719] CONCLUSION 177 a nation should have a favorable balance of trade in order to keep gold and silver within its boundaries, and should never let them go out of the land, because it is the possession of specie that makes the state strong. When the Cardinal took up the work of his administration, he believed more or less in this doctrine, which was commonly followed and obeyed at that time. But as he began to study the economic side of the question; as he was confronted with commercial conditions in which the fal- lacies involved in the idea were brought to light in various ways, he gradually came to the conclusion that this theory was wrong, and admitted it. In referring to this change of economic doctrine, M. Masson says that the other French officials still believed in the theory, but Richelieu changed completely to the other side. This change is a very important event in the economic history of that time, because it tends to locate in the age of Richelieu the transitional stage of development from the mercantilistic doctrine to the belief in free trade. Just what was the influence of the Cardinal's ideas upon those who came after him, presents a dif- ferent historical and economic problem. That Richelieu was not strictly a follower of either the old or new school is evident from a study of his life, although the main outlines of his govern- mental policy are based largely upon the mercantilistic concep- tion of the strong state. He may be regarded as an unconscious medium whereby the old mercantilistic views finally became merged into the ideas which finally led to the doctrine of free trade. For example, one of his letters illustrates very well the modern view he possessed in regard to duties on imports. "If one must endure," he says, "the heavy import duties which foreign lands put upon our goods which enter their lands, and upon those which come to us, let us charge such duties on their goods and raise them in proportion as the foreigners raise their duties on us." " Thus he believed in the system of retaliation, which is more or less modern. As a result, it may be asserted that Richelieu deserves more consideration upon the economic side than has hitherto been given him. The Cardinal may indeed 10 Histoire du Commerce Frangaise dans le Levant, 149. 11 Richelieu, Lettres, II, 332. Richelieu desired to make France a strong commercial nation and "in the spirit of reciprocity he gave to foreign mer- chandise the same rights as they gave to French goods." See Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Generate V, 368. 178 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [720 be regarded as a forerunner of the exponents of the modern school of political economy. "The deeds of great men live after them." A man is truly great if he has accomplished something which has a living force in times after his own. All accounts of Richelieu's life have brought out clearly the importance of his political work, but have failed to give similar attention to the economic phase of his career. This treatise has endeavored to take up the internal and external commercial policies of the Cardinal, and has thus limited itself to an interpretation of his economic accomplish- ments. It has tried to establish that Richelieu, as measured by his activities in this particular field of his career, comes up to the requirement as to what constitutes a great man. Two gen- eral contributions to economic thought and practice entitle him to this position. In the first place, he made an addition to the theoretical side of economics by taking a stand in favor of in- creased freedom of trade and opposing the extreme mercantil- istic doctrine. This unconscious contribution made by the Cardinal may have influenced the development of the modern doctrine of free trade. In the second place, his ideas as to "state building," by means of a marine, colonization, and com- merce in general, have formed the basis, as has been said before, of most activities in this particular field ever since. In the last place, Richelieu's political achievements, largely accomplished with the intention of obtaining a peace which would afford an opportunity for France to expand in an economic way, are essentially modern. Traces of his ideas can be found after nearly three centuries in the economic pol- icies of modern France, and of other nations. His greatness cannot be limited to the political sphere, but clearly extends with approximately equal credit into the field of practical economics. Us chantent quel fut ton merite Quand au gre de vos matelots Tu vainquis les vents et les flots. 12 1 2 This poem was written by Jean de Chapelain (1595-1624), and ap- peared under the title : Ode a Monseigneur le Cardinal Due de Richelieu. (Paris, Jean Camusat, 1633). See De Brienne H. A., Memoires, Paris, 1916, I, 241-243. Chapelain ranks among the intellectual men of that age and was a mem- ber of the French Academy. The above poem is considered his best. 721] CONCLUSION 179 Et domptas 1'orgueil d 'Amphitrite. Quand votre commerce affoibli, Par toi, puissamment retabli. Dans nos havres deserts ramena 1'abondance Et que surcent vaisseaux maitrisant les dangers Ton nom seul aux Frangais redonna 1'asseurance Et fit naitre la craints au coeur des etrangers . . . Us chantent tes conseils utiles Par qui malgre Tart des mediants La paix refleurit dans nos champs Et la justice dans nos villes Us disent que les immortels De leur culte et de leur autels Ne doivent qu'a tes soins la pompe renaissante, Et que ta prevoyance et ton autorite Sont les deux forts appuis dont 1'Europe tremblante Soutient et raffermit sa foible liberte. APPENDIX A. BIBLIOGRAPHY The following works are the primary and secondary sources consulted in the preparation of this study. In each group they are placed in the order of their importance. GROUP I Bibliographies 1. Molinier, Augusta fimile, and others, Les Sources de I'Histoire de France depuis les Origines Jusqu'en 1815, 12 vols., See Vols., XI, XII. Paris, 1913. 2. Monod, Gabriel Jacques, Bibliographic de I'Histoire de France, Paris, 1888. 3. Franklin, Alfred, Les Sources de I'Histoire de France, Paris 1877. 4. Belong, Jacques, Bibliotheque Historique, 5 vols., Paris, 1768- 1778. 5. Langlois, Charles Victor, et Stein, H., Les Archives de I'Histoire de France, 3 vols., Paris, 1891 [1893]. Of the five bibliographies, the first one has been found most valuable in the preparation of this study. It covers the field with respect to geographies, general histories, memoirs, and letters. Monod 's work is a single volume in which is found a fairly good limited catalogue of sources and works relating to the history of France from its origin down to 1789. It is arranged chronologically and by classification. The next two bibliographies are older works and thus not so important as the ones just mentioned. Good brief bibliographies concerning this subject may be obtained by consulting (a) Lavisse, E., Histoire de France, Vol., VI, 2 partie, Ch. XI., (b) Lavisse et Ram-, baud, Histoire Generale, Vol., V, Ch. VII., (c) Cambridge Modern History, Vol., IV, Ch. IV. 180 723] APPENDIX A 181 GROUP II Original Sources 1. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Testament Politique, 2 partie, Londres, La Haye, La Februre, 1770. See Appendix B. 2. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, The Political Will and Testament of that Great Minister of State, Cardinal Duke de Richelieu, London, 1695. This interesting old English translation is found in the Harvard College Library, made by some unknown men of the age of Louis XIV. 3. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Memoires du Cardinal de Richelieu (M. Petitot, editor), Vols. X-XXX, Foucault, Libraire Rue des Noyers, No. 37, Paris, 1821- 1829. These memoirs of Richelieu include the years 1610-1638. They are the source of valuable information with respect to his economic ideas. Indeed, in one sense of the word, they are not memoirs, but are a collection of notes sent to him by his agents, advice from his councillors and, finally, his own ideas either jotted down by himself or by his secretaries, and have been used with this in mind. The authenticity of the memoirs is generally accepted, although before the Academie des Sciences Moral et Politiques, on January 7, 1921, M. Louis Batiffol maintained that the Memoirs of Cardinal Richelieu were not authentic, being the work of two compilers, who used Richelieu's papers shortly after his death. Therefore this work must be used with that idea in mind. [See L.Batiffol, "Les Faux Mem- oires du Cardinal de Richelieu" (Revue des Deux Mondes, April 15, 1921)]. 4. Richelieu, A. J. Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Lettres, Instruc- tions. Diplomatiques, et Papiers d'fitat, Ed., Georges, Comte d'Avenel (Documents inedits sur 1'histoire de France), 8 vols., Paris, 1853-1877. A valuable collection, including practically all of Richelieu's correspondence. Unfortunately the letters left out seem to be the ones pertaining to commerce. The editor remedies matters to a certain extent by listing these letters and summing up their main themes. Volume 182 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [724 one of this series contains a splendid introduction by the author. 5. Eichelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Maximes d'Etat et Fragments Politique du Cardinal de Richelieu, Ed., Gabriel Hanotaux, (Collection des documents inedits sur Thistoire de France, vol., LI), Paris, 1880. See Appendix B. 6. Mercure Francois, le, 25 vols., (1605-1644), Paris, J. Richer [etc] . This work is not a journal but is an annual history of which the first volume embraces an account of the events which took place in Europe from 1605-1611. The collec- tion of twenty-five volumes is one of the best sources for the study of the history of that period. Being controlled by the government, it sets forth the views of the admin- istration. There is a strong probability that Richelieu acted as editor in some degree and contributed a number of articles to it. 7. Isambert, Frangois Andre and others, Recueil General des Anciennes Lois Francoises depuis I' an 420, jusqu'a la Revolution de 1789, 29 vols., See vol. XVI, Paris, 1829. 8. Sourdis, Henry de, Archbishop of Bordeaux, Correspondence, Ed., Eugene Sue. (Collection des Documents inedits. . . LVII) 3 vols., Paris, 1839. This is the best source for information concerning Riche- lieu 's marine activities. M. Sue has written an excellent introduction, dealing with the state of the marine under the Cardinal. 9. Montchretien, Antoyne de, L' economic Politique Patronale Traicte de I'Oeconomie Politique . . . Ed., Th. Funck- Brentano, Paris, 1889. This economic work is especially important, because of the fact that this is the first French work of that nature, and also because it sets forth the basis of many of Riche- lieu's economic ideas, whether he was acquainted with it or not. Written in 1615, it is our first real evidence as to the rise of economic ideas in France. 10. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Domestic ser- ies), (1625-1642), 19 vols., London, 1858-1887. Colonial, (1574-1660), vol., I. London, 1860. 725] APPENDIX A 183 11. Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, (Venetian ser- ies), Vols. XVIII-XXI, London, 1912-1916. An important source for a study of the relations be- tween England and France during the administration of Richelieu, both from the English and the Venetian, or neutral, point of view. 12. Voiture, Vincent de, Oeuvres, 2 vols. Ed., M. M. Ubicini, Paris, 1855. This work contains a very interesting eulogy of the Cardinal by a contemporary, with much information in regard to economic matters. 13. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Journal de Monsieur Cardinal Richelieu, (1630-1631), Amsterdam, 1864. Not very valuable so far as this study is concerned. 14. Mole, Mathieu, Memoires. (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), 4 vols., See vols. I-II. Paris, 1855-1857. Mathieu Mole was a member and later president of the Parlement of Paris. These memoirs are therefore im- portant in that they give one an insight into the ideas of Richelieu's opponents. They are also valuable in an eco- nomic study of the period. 15. Beaurepaire, Charles Marie de, Cahiers des fitats de Nor- mandie (1610-1666), (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), 3 vols., See vols. II-III, Rouen, 1876-1879. A good source for the economic study of the period. 16. Talon, Omer, Memoires, Petitot, 2 e serie, Vols. LX-LXIII, See vol. LX, Paris, 1819-1829. Omer Talon was an avocat in Parlement who in 1641 became avocat general. He was a constant opponent of Richelieu, and therefore his writings are valuable as re- gards disputes which arose between the Parlements and the Cardinal. His work is not so much a memoir as a compilation of speeches, extracts from the registers of Parlement, etc. There is much material on the economic side. 17. Brienne, Henri Auguste, Comte de, Memoires de Comte de Brienne. (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), Vol. I, Paris, 1916. 18. Bassompierre, Francois, Marechal de, Memoires, (So- 184 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [726 ciete de 1'Histoire de Prance), 4 vols. See vols. III-IV, Paris, 1870-1877. 19. Goulas, Nicholas, Memoires, (Societe de 1'Histoire de France), 2 vols. See vol. I, Paris, 1879. 20. Tillieries, Leveneur, Comte de, Memoires, Paris, 1863. Tillieries was ambassador to England in 1619 and his memoirs furnish a good source for a study of Anglo- French relations. 21. Dumont, Jean, Corps Universelle Diplomatique du Droit des Gens, (800-1731), 8 vols. Supplement 5 vols. See vol. V, pt. 2, vol. VI, pt. 1. Amst, et La Haye, 1726-1739. This work contains treaties of alliance, peace, commerce, etc., from 800 to 1731. It is a valuable source. The following sources, while not of much value to this study, yet are important in obtaining an all around conception of the accomplishments of the great Cardinal. 22. La Force, Jacques Nompar, Memoires de La Force, 4 vols., Paris, 1843. A faithful "marechal" of Louis XIII. 23. Kohan, Henri, Prince de Leon, Memoires, Petitot, 2 e serie, Vols. XVIII-XIX, 1819-1829. Herein one finds the Huguenot side of the conflict with Richelieu. 24. Orleans, Gaston, due de, Memoires, Petitot, 2 e serie, Vol. XXXI, 1819-1829. 25. Fontenay-Mareul, Frangois, Marquis de, Memoires, Petitot, l e serie, Vols. LI-LII, 1819-1829. 26. Souvigny, Jean, Gangnieres, Comte de, Memoires, 3 vols., See vols., I-II, Paris, 1906-1909. An excellent account of the political accomplishments of Richelieu and Mazarin. GROUP III Secondary Works A. LIVES OF RICHELIEU 1. Perkins, James Breck, Richelieu and the Growth of French Power, (Heroes of the Nation Series), New York, 1900. A good general account of his life. 2. Lodge, Richard, Richelieu, London, 1896. 727] APPENDIX A 185 This book is of especial interest because the author did not consider the Testament Politique of Richelieu as authen- tic and thus did not use it in the preparation of his work. See his appendix C. 3. Zeller, Berthold, Richelieu, London, 1884. 4. Fagniez, Gustave Charles, Le Pere Joseph et Richelieu, 2 vols., Paris, 1894. 5. Price, Eleanor C., Cardinal de Richelieu, New York, 1912. Remarkable for its neglect of the economic side of Riche- lieu 's administration. B. GENERAL HISTORIES WHICH COVER THE PERIOD 1. Martin, Henry, Histoire de France, 6 vols., Paris, 1861. 2. Dareste, Antoine, Histmre de France, 9 vols., Paris, 1884- 1885. 3. Bazin, Anais de, Histvire de France sous Louis XIII et sous le Ministere de Mazarin, ed. 2, 4 vols., Paris, 1846. 4. Ranke, Leopold, von, Franzosiche Geschichte, Vols. II, III. Samtliche Werke, IX, X, Leipzig, 1876-1877. 5. Lavisse, Ernest, Histoire de France, 9 vols. See vol. VI, Paris, 1896. The best French account of this period. 6. Anquetil, Louis Pierre, Histoire de France, 14 vols. See vols. X, XI, Paris, 1805. 7. Kitchin, George William, History of France, 3 vols., Oxford, 1892-1896. 8. Michelet, Jules, Histoire de France, 16 vols. See vol. II, Paris, 1869. 9. Macdonald, John Ronald, A History of France, 3 vols. See vol. II, New York, 1915. C. HISTORIES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WHICH DEAL WITH THE PERIOD 1. Blanqui, [Jerome Adolphe], History of Political Economy, New York, 1880. 2. Ingram, John Kells, History of Political Economy, London, 1904. 3. Schmoller, Gustave, The Mercantile System, New York, 1902. 4. Seeley, John Robert, The Expansion of England, London, 1891. The main criticism of these works would seem to be that 186 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [728 they reveal a universal neglect of the economic side of the administrative career of Kichelieu. D. HISTORIES OF FRENCH COMMERCE 1. Bonnassieux, Louis Jean Pierre, Les Grandes Compagnies de Commerce, Paris, 1892. An excellent account of the French colonial and com- mercial projects during the age of Eichelieu. 2. Deschamps, Leon, Histoire de la Question Coloniale en France, Paris, 1891. A unique work covering the colonial efforts made by France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 3. Gouraud, Charles, Histoire de la Politique Commerciale de la France et son Influence sur le Progres de la Richesse Pub- lique, Paris, 1854. This work is distinguished not only for the abundance of facts, but for the novelty and profundity of its re- views and ideas. 4. Levasseur, Emile, Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1911-1912. An excellent work. M. Levasseur has the ability to pick out the essentials from the non-essentials. 5. Pigeonneau, H[enri], Histoire du Commerce de la France, 2 vols. Paris, 1889. One of the best works covering this phase of French history. The author sees clearly the economic importance of the seventeenth century. 6. Guenin, Eugene, Histoire de la Colonisation* Franc.aise dans la Nouvelle France, Paris, 1896. 7. Masson, Paul, Histoire du Commerce Francois dans le Levant en XVII* Siecle, Paris, 1896. 8. Masson, Paul, Histoire des Etablissemewts et du Commerce Frangaise dans I'Africque Barbaresque (1560-1793), Paris, 1903. 10. Norman, Charles Boswell, Colonial France, London, 1886. This work is not very reliable as the author makes a number of mistakes with regard to important French dates in French colonial history. 11. Weber, Henry, La Campagne Fran$aise des Indes, (1604- 1870), Paris, 1904. 729] APPENDIX A 187 E. FINANCIAL HISTORIES OF FRANCE 1. Bailly, Antoine, Histoire Financiers de la France, 2 vols., Paris, 1830. 2. Bresson, Jacques, Histoire Finmiciere de la, France, 2 vols., Paris, 1843. Both works contain a fair estimate of the financial ad- ministration during the period of Richelieu. 3. Forbonnais, Francois, F. de, Recherche* et Considerations sur les Finances de France, 2 vols., Basel, 1758. F. GENERAL WORKS ON THE PERIOD 1. Wakeman, Henry Offley, European History (1598-1715), New York, 1916. A standard brief general work in English for this period. 2. Caillet, Jules, L f Administration en France sous le Ministere du Cardinal de Richelieu, Paris, 1857. A very conscientious and complete work, but a little confused and apt to neglect the economic phase of the subject. 3. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, Richelieu et la Monarchic Abso- lue, 4 vols., Paris, 1859. The best work concerning the Cardinal from an economic point of view. 4. Bridges, John Henry, France under Richelieu and Colbert, Edinburgh, 1866. A combined economic and philosophical survey of France under Richelieu and Colbert. An extremely val- uable book. 5. Cambridge Modern History, 13 vols., and atlas. Cambridge, 1902-1912. See vol. IV, Ch. IV, "Richelieu." 6. Lavisse, Ernest, et Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire Generale, 12 vols., Vol. V, Paris, 1893-1901. 7. Lavallee, Theophile Sebastien, Histoire des Fran$ais, 6 vols., Paris, 1861. 8. (a) Lavisse, Ernest, et Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire de la Civilisation Franqaise, 2 vols., Paris, 1897-1898. (b) Rambaud, Alfred, Histoire de la Civilisation Franqaise, 2 vols., Paris, 1898. 9. Bonnefon, Paul, Societe Franqaise due XVII* Siecle, Paris, 1903. 188 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [730 10. Gasquet, Amedee Louis, Precis des Institutions Politiques et Sociales de I'Ancienne France, 2 vols., Paris, 1885. 11. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, La Noblesse Frangaise sous Riche- lieu, Paris 1901. 12. Avenel, Georges, Comte de, Pretres, Soldats, et Juges sous Richelieu, Paris, 1907. 13. Normand, Charles, La Bourgeoisie Fran$aise au XVII Siecle, 1604-1661, Paris, 1908. 14. Mims, Stewart Leas, Colbert's West India Policy. New Haven, 1912. See Chapter I. 15. Parkman, Francis, The Jesuits of North America, Boston, 1905. 16. Hanotaux, Gabriel, Origine de I' Institution, des Intendants des Provinces, Paris, 1884. 17. Michaud, Joseph Francois and Louis Gabriel, Biographic Universelle, 45 vols., Paris, 1842-1865. See Vol. XXXV. 18. Montague, Francis Charles, History of England (1603-1660), in Political History of England, VII, New York, 1911. 19. Trevelyan, George Macaulay, England under the Stuarts, New York, 1910. 20. Cheyney, Edward Potts, A History of England, New York, 1914. 21. Bracq, Jean Charlemagne, France under the Republic, New York, 1910. 22. Griffet, Henri, Histoire du Regne de Louis XIII, 3 vols., Paris, 1758. APPENDIX B THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESTAMENT POLITIQUE Because of the fact that this study is based largely upon the writings of Cardinal Richelieu and especially upon his Testament Politique, it seems best to discuss the problem of the authenticity of the latter work, which has been a perennial question ever since it was first published. That it belongs among the most interesting memorials of French history in the 17th century, is shown by the great warmth with which schol- ars have fought over it. "But," says Boehm, "such was the fate of this work that its authenticity, and therewith its value or worth must be placed in doubt because of a succession of circumstances, not yet cleared up. Thus it has been under suspicion until now. An important individual has opposed the treatise and since then various teachers have exerted their ability to defend or approve it. Indeed* few works of the world's lit- erature have been subject to such a searching criticism. ' ' x The Testament Politique was written sometime between the years 1638 and 1642. D'Avenel says that Richelieu continued his memoirs as far as 1638, and seeing that he could not finish them, wrote the former work. 2 It is divided into two parts, the first of which gives a short account of the reign of Louis XIII up to that time, according to Richelieu's interpretation. The second part is concerned mostly with matters of administration, such as colonial development, the marine, finances, etc. Indeed its contents demonstrate that in writing his Testament Politique, Richelieu desired to leave it as a guide for the King after his own death, when the coming peace would afford him a chance to build up his state. Also, it was to serve as a vindication of the Cardinal's administration, which had been grossly at- tacked by many enemies. 1 Boehm, Introduction, 1. zEichelieu, Lettres, VIII, 383. 189 190 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [732 The personal nature of the work accounts for the fact that it was not published, or known at first by the public at large. Indeed, only a few people were aware of its existence. Yet the fact that mention was made of it in a funeral oration upon the Cardinal, which has been found in the British Museum, certainly would indicate that some were acquainted with the treatise and its important contribution. 3 Furthermore, the writer of the oration bemoaned the fact that the King had not pub- lished his copy of the Testament Politique. This showed that the King had a copy which he was keeping secret, and explains the late public appearance of the work. However, since neither the King nor Richelieu left direct evidence that a copy was pre- sented to the former and was to be kept secret, one cannot be certain as to the precise reason for the late appearance of the work. "The probabilities are," says one writer, "that it was considered so important that it was reserved for the King alone and thus its publication was delayed. ' ' * There are a number of copies of the Testament Politique. Among these are four important manuscripts, the first of which is found in the French department of foreign affairs. It was probably brought over in 1705 with the papers of Eichelieu as a whole, which were sent there by permission of Louis XIV. 5 The second manuscript was found in the Sorbonne, which insti- tution obtained it from a former secretary of the Cardinal. The third was found in the possession of M. Frudaine, councillor of state and of the royal council. The fourth belonged originally to M. de Saint-Palaye. The last two were manuscripts found in the hands of private individuals and are thought to be copies of the manuscript discovered in the department of foreign affairs. Thus the first two can be regarded as original, since one was found among the papers of the Cardinal, and the other given by his secretary who recognized its authenticity. In spite of the existence of these copies of the interesting work, the historian Aubery, who took upon himself the task of writing the life of the Cardinal, failed to find it among the papers of Richelieu, which were in the possession of his niece the Duchess of Aiguillon. He went ahead and published in sBoehm, 15. * Ibid., 16-17. 5 Eichelieu, Memoires, XI, 267-268. 733] APPENDIX B 191 1678 a work entitled le Traite de la Regale. But when the Testament appeared about ten years later, the latter work proved that his conception of Richelieu's ideas with regard to the royal prerogative was wrong. Indeed he found his rep- utation as an authority on the life of the Cardinal to be injured, and as a result' it was a question of either his downfall or that of the Testament Politiqiie, and of course he favored the fall of the latter. Thus the fight started. "Aubery in his history of the Cardi- nal Mazarin," says Boehm, "took a determined stand against the authenticity of the work, but his criticism was purely per- sonal and not scientific. ' ' 6 However, his failure to find the manuscript gives evidence of the effort made to keep the work secret as a personal possession of the King. No apparent effort was made between 1642 and 1687, to make the public aware of it. Nevertheless, once it got into print, its intrinsic impor- tance made it an object of eager debate, and the question of its authenticity became a live one. 7 Next comes the great debate of 1749 between the historians Voltaire and Foncemagne with regard to the last writing of the Cardinal. Voltaire hated Richelieu from the very first and saw a chance to pay his respects to the departed churchman. At this point one must take into account the attitude of certain groups toward Richelieu as largely influencing the secrecy of the Testament and accounting for the violent oppo- sition to it. Sympathy could not be expected for the Cardinal or for his work from such opponents as the nobles and the Parlement of Paris. Indeed, it is surprising that they permitted the work to appear at all. It certainly did not suit their polit- ical ambitions, and therein lies the political explanation for the suppression of and the opposition to the great book. On the other hand, Richelieu left some strong friends espec- ially among the intellectual class. Gabriel Hanotaux, for ex- ample, may be cited as the greatest living exponent of the true greatness of the Bishop of Luzon. It is due to such men that a reliable account of the life of Richelieu can be obtained at present. Voltaire made an unauthentic, prejudiced attack which was e Boehm, 18. 19. 192 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OP RICHELIEU [734 answered by Foncemagne in a clear, fair, and concise manner. "In fact," says Boehm, "he knew how to return every thrust with absolute certainty and effect. ' ' 8 However, as the dispute was a personal one, it is not worth considering except in so far as the motives behind it aid in an explanation of the results obtained. The opposition to Richelieu, in a political and personal sense, found a welcome outlet in numerous attacks on his last work. For example, Voltaire's second assault upon the Testa- ment was brought about more from personal enmity against certain Amsterdam publishers than from a desire to oppose the Testament Politique. He was determined to "show up" these publishers as being frauds, and picked upon the last contribu- tion of the Cardinal as a means by which this was to be done. The result was a torrent of sarcastic abusive personal remarks which really meant nothing against the book itself. Opposition developed to the attacks of Voltaire, and the Tes- tament Politique had many defenders. Foncemagne in a letter, made a reply which put the former on the defensive. But nothing positive came out of this conflict. The authenticity of the work was not proved as yet, and the question as to whether Richelieu had written the notes and not the text or vice versa was unsettled. In fact, the crux of the argument now centered around a study of the original manuscripts, which contained the text and some notes written on their borders. Of course, the Cardinal is accused of obtaining his ideas in finances from Sully, but this proves nothing, as Boehm points out, for any writer at that time used the intellectual ideas of the age as common property. This custom is also illustrated in Richelieu's Mem- oirs, but they must be considered likewise a part of his own ideas. 9 Both Foncemagne and Ranke recognized the spirit of Riche- lieu in this work, but when they found anything in the book which reminded them of other authors they put down a question mark as to that particular section. The best example is perhaps the chapter devoted to the finances, which was considered to have been written by Sully or someone else who had read Sully 's works. However, Foncemagne admitted finally that the chap- s Boehm, 23-24. 9 Ibid., 28. Also, that the Cardinal might have obtained his ideas from Montchretien, but what does this prove! 735] APPENDIX B 193 ters concerning the finances and the marine, if not written by the Cardinal, were set down by his secretaries under his super- vision. Boehm does not doubt that they were the ideas of Richelieu and of no one else. 10 The final stage of the controversy was reached when Hano- taux brought out his Fragments et Maximes de Richelieu, which were written by Richelieu without doubt, since his handwriting has been recognized. Now these fragments are a part of his Testament Politique. That is, all the passages having a certain mark are found in the latter work. Furthermore, along the margin of certain passages is found the word Testament, which would tend to prove that particular sections were to be inserted in his last great work. " However, Hanotaux's discovery does not absolutely prove the authenticity of the Politique," says Boehm. 12 It merely supports the funeral oration mentioned above in the proof that the Cardinal actually intended to write a work of that kind. One must further conclude that the real Testament Politique arose uniformly and grew as an organic unit, that it was writ- ten during the latter part of his life, and that it was completed and was not a mere "torso." The Fragments to Boehm are just a part of the work. The marginal notes on the text are changes to be made in the revision of the work. He has no doubt that the fragments, the text, and the marginal notes com- prise what Richelieu planned should be a part of a final copy which he would not be able to finish. 13 Does this explanation not help to explain the late publication of the work and the silence concerning it ? In other words, the Testament Politique we now have is a combination of the text, the marginal notes, and the fragments. That the process of copying might bring about slight mistakes is to be expected, but this fact does not prove the falsity of the work. Finally, when one considers again the purposes which Riche- lieu had in writing this book : (1) to influence the King to wait 10 Boehm, 29-30. 11 Eiehelieu, Maximes d'titat, 707-728. 12 Boehm, 30-31. tU, 30-31. 194 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [736 until the coming peace to take up the great reorganization of the state, (2) to leave a defense of his life-work against future attacks that might be made against him; one cannot doubt its importance and truth: "out of these purposes grew the great interest which Richelieu put into his work and the value he attributed to it. " 14 That he tried to adopt and follow out a system based on what is in his Testament Politique is evident to students of his administration. Indeed, the tenseness and unity of it all, the firmness with which the portions were skill- fully^ inserted in the building up of the whole work, and above all the high personal purpose of it all, makes Richelieu responsi- ble for every line of it. When one studies his life and finds out how he constantly considered the future of France; when one compares this work with his Memoirs and letters, and sees the conformity in style, judgment, and opinions, it seems incon- ceivable that this is the work of any other man than the Cardi- nal. Was there another individual in France capable of writing a book as great as the Testament Politique ? Bonnefon says, "It is a work which shows the man more than the writer, ' ' 15 and this makes it of supreme value; for in reading it, one can conceive of no other personality than that of Richelieu behind it all. Pigeonneau sums the whole matter up when he says that it is his work in thought as in style. 16 The authenticity of the Testament Politique is today generally admitted. 17 i* Boehm, 32. is Bonnefon, 415-416. is Pigeonneau, II, 376-377. "Molinier, XI, 35. BIBLIOGBAPHY TO APPENDIX B The above appendix has been based to a large extent upon material found in the following works. I. Boehm, Ernest, Studium zum Politischen Testamente Richelieus, Leipzig, 1902. Dr. Boehm, in preparation for the doctoral degree, investigated the problem with special reference to the fight over the authenticity of the Testament Politique. The dissertation seems to be sound and has been relied upon for much of the material in the above appendix. II. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Maximes d'fitat et Fragments Politiques du Cardinal de Richelieu. Ed. Gabriel Hanotaux (Collection des Documents Inedits sur L'Histoire de France.) Vol. LI. M. Hanotaux 's remarks in the introduction; throw new light upon the question at issue, and constitute a decisive stage in the controversy. III. Richelieu, A. J. du Plessis, Cardinal, due de, Memoires (M. Petitot, Editor). Vols. X and XI, Paris 1819-1829. M. Petitot brings out clearly in these volumes his idea of the strong relationship existing between the Testament Politique and the Memoires. IV. Molinier, Augusta E., Les Sources de I'Histoire de France, etc. Vol. XII. See appendix A, I-I. 195 INDEX Admiralty, seven bureaus of, 102. Africa, colonies in, 108, 110, 119, 120; commerce in, 163, 164; pirates of, 95, 101; Eiehelieu's accomplishments in, 135. Agriculture, 83-85. Aides, 113. Aiguillon, duchess of, 190. Algiers, commerce with, 135. Aleppo, 132, 133. Alexandria, 131, 132. America, 135; colonies in, 108, 110, 116, 118, 144. American colonies, diplomacy with regard, 168. Americas, 111, 170. Amsterdam, 192. Anne of Austria, 142. Antilles, company of the, 118. Arctic, region of, 117. Army, 38, 60, 67, 68, 72, 83. Asia, colonies in, 108, 110, 111, 119 ; commerce in, 131. Assembly of notables, 65, 66, 95, 125; cahiers of, 27. Atlantic, piracy on, 101. Aubery, 190, 191. Austria, 13, 20; diplomacy with re- gard, 136, 137, 158, 161, 164, 165, 168, 170. Bagdad, 131. Baltic, and commerce, 131; and dip- lomacy, 137, 165-166, 167, 169. Barbary Pirates, 96, 144, 163. Barbary States, 92, 135. Bassompierre, Grand Mar6chal de, 82. Baugy, M. A. M. de, 127. Beer industry, 85. Bonds, 71, 79, 80. Bordeaux, archbishop of, 53. Bourse, the, 160. Bouthilier, superintendent of finan- ces, 66, 67. Braire, canal, 26, 87. Brest, 119, 155. Bridges, 88. British Museum, 190. Brittany, 72, 94, 115^ 150, 155. Brouage d' Orleans, 103. Buckingham, duke of, 151. Bullion, superintendent of finances, 66, 68. Cadiz, 44. Cahiers, of the third estate, 85. Cahusac, French admiral, 157. Canada, colonies in, 113, 116; com- merce in, 164; control of, 159; fur trade in, 139; Huguenots and, 54. Canals, development of, 86-88. Cape of Good Hope, 121. Cape Verde, 120. Capitian, days of, 49. Capitulations, with Turkey, 132. Cartier, Jacques, 116. Caspian Sea, 136. Centralization, economic aspects of, 46-62. Chamber of justice, 64. Champigny, superintendent of fin- ances, 64. Champlain, 21, 108, 109, 114, 117, 118; in America, 116. Charlemagne, 95. Charles I, of England, 159. Charles VI, of France, 95. Charles IX, of France, 88. Charnace, 165. Chartres, 87. Chateauneuf, 35, 157, 158, 159. 197 198 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [740 Chief councillor, 46-47. China, 133; Jesuits in, 119. Clarente, 55. Clergy, and colonization, 111; and finances, 69; member of, 63; Bichelieu's attitude toward, 36- 38. Code Michaud, 100, 125. Colbert, 20; age of, 105; and the marine, 106; and his policies, 172, 173; and taxation, 71; colonies and, 108, 110, 111; importance ol, 64. Coligny, 109. Colonization, Bichelieu's ideas with regard, 108-125. Commerce, foreign, 125-140. Commonwealth of Plato, 81. Comptons, 79. Connetable, office of, 47, 93. Conseil, 95. Constantinople, 131, 132, 133. Conway, 150. Corvees, 84, 88. Cromwell, 125. Danzig, 168, 169. d'Armacon, 87. d'^ffiat, marquis, superintendent of finances, 64, 65, 72, 75. d 'Etampes, 87. De Fontenay-Mareuil, 159. d'Infreville, Leroux, 101. Denmark, commerce of, 136, 137, 144; diplomacy with regard, 168- 169; the marine of, 95. d'Ouehe, 87. Dieppe, 153; and colonies, 119, 120; company of, 116. Distillers, 85. Dominique, 119. Doniol, Henri, 83. Duel, edict against, 50. Dutch East India Company, 25. East Indies, colonies in, 111, 119, 120; commerce with, 139, 150, 163; company of, 116; rivalry over, 138, 162. Elector Palatine, 161. Elizabeth, Queen, 159. England, 23, 24, 25, 27, 54, 55; and French commerce, 138, 139; and Holland, 143; and Huguenots, 174; and marine, 92, 95, 97, 98, 99; and Polish trade, 136; and salt trade, 57, 142; and Seven Years' War, 167; colonies of, 108, 109, 110, 122, 126, 128, 129, 130; commerce of, 163; piracies of, 96; Richelieu's attitude to- ward, 147-162, 168, 169, 171. Entail, 84. Estates General, 21, 27, 52, 63, 85. Europe, 50, 122, 141, 164. Father Joseph, 46, 119, 131. Finances, Bichelieu's administration of, 62-82. Flanders, 89 ; commerce in, 143, 144 ; diplomacy of, 145. Florida, 117. Foncemagne, 191, 192. Foreign commerce, Bichelieu's ideas with regard, 125-141. Fort Bichelieu, 118. Fournier, L. P., 105. France, viewed by Voiture, 176; ac- cording to Bichelieu, 178; colonies of, 99, 108-124; commerce of, 71, 125-140; economic importance of, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25; economic ten- dency in, 28, 31, 35; finances and, 65, 66, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77; industry in, 86 ; local privileges in, 70 ; La Bochelle and, 56; Bichelieu and, 59, 141-171, 172, 173, 174, 175; Seven Years' War and, 167; taxes in, 90. Francis I, of France, 94, 95. Frankfort, 44. French Bevolution, 35, 50, 172. Frudaine, M. councillor of state, 190. 741] INDEX 199 Gabelle, 71, 74, 79, 80. Garde de Sceaux, 144. Garonne, 55, 154. Gaston d' Orleans, 51, 57, 72, 99. Generalities, 14. Genoa, 133. Germany, 23, 89, 133, 165, 166; commerce with, 147; Hanseatic cities of, 99; Thirty Years' War and, 170. German salt, 136. German states, 165, 167. Grand master, chief, and general superintendent of the navigation and commerce of France, office of, 47-49, 57, 82, 92, 113, 119, 125; duties of, 93; Eichelieu's ideas as to office of, 93-94, 102. Grand Ordonnance, see Michaud. Grand Seigneur, 132, 133. Grotius, 118. Guadeloupe, 119. Guiana, 119. Guise, duke of, 155. Gustavus Adolphus, colonial policy of, 170; death of, 169. Guyon, 87. Hamburg, 168. Hanotaux, Gabriel, 191, 192. Hansa cities, 155. Hanseatic cities, 94; diplomacy with regard, 168. Hanseatic-League, decay of, 108. Hapsburgs, 110, 111, 129; diplo- macy with regard, 137, 141, 158, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174. Henry II, of France, 94. Henry IV, of France, 19; colonies in regime of, 108, 119, 120, 159; economic achievements of, 20, 173; end of, 21, 22; failures of, 21, 27, 28; finances and, 64, 65; internal administration of, 83, 85, 87 ; the marine of, 94, 95, 101, 103; the people and, 38. Henrietta of France, 147, 148. Holland, 23, 24, 27, 74; coloniza- tion of, 108, 109, 116, 121; com- merce of, 126, 128, 129, 130, 138, 139, 143, 144; diplomacy with regard, 145, 147, 150, 153, 160, 162, 168, 169 j Eichelieu's attitude toward, 97, 162-164. Huguenots, 15, 32, 38, 46, 49, 100, 129, 142, 143; and commerce, 53, 54, 56, 57; Eichelieu and the, 61, 62, 77, 80, 153-157, 163, 174; ships and the, 96, 97, 103. ' ' Hundred Associates, ' ' companies of, 115, 116, 173. Indies, 98, 112; colonies in the, 115; commerce in the, 164. Industry, in France, 85-86. Intendant Generate, 88. Intendants, 52; creation of, 70, 71; duties of, 88. internal commerce, 86-92. Iron industry, 85, 90. Italy, 89, 98; and Spain, 145; com- merce in, 136; commerce of, 144, 153; diplomacy with regard, 146, 164-165; expeditions in, 108; manufactures in, 122, 139. Japan, Jesuits in, 119. Jerusalem, 131. Jesuits, 119. King, colonies and, 111, 116, 117; centralization and, 46; finances and, 68, 71, 78, 88; Huguenots and, 53, 54; marine and, 99; people and, 52; Eichelieu's at- titude toward, 30-31; war and, 141. King of England, and French com- merce, 151. Laffemas, Isaac de, 95. La Nacelle de Saint Pierre Fleur- delissS, company of, 112. La Roehelle, 53; and salt, 57, 71, 142, 143 ; and the government, 55 ; commerce of, 116; diplomacy with 200 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [742 regard, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152- 157; fall of, 136; Eichelieu and, 174; siege of, 104. Lauson, M. de, 127. "Laws of the sea," 159. Le Eos Sainct Make, 144. Le Traite de la Eegale, 191. Lea messieurs de Saint-Molo, 51. Lettres, patent, 60, 72. Levant, 25, 95, 105; and Spain, 143; colonies in, 119; commerce with, 115, 126, 130, 132, 136, 164; diplomacy with regard, 165. "libelles," in Germany, 15. Li4ge, 170. Loire, 154. London, 44, 129. Louis XI, of France, 19, 49. Louis XIII, of France, 28, 47, 105, 110, 120, 151, 189. Louis XIV, of France, 173, 190. Louis d'or, 91. Liibeck, 168, 169. Luc.on, bishopric of, 36, 40, 191. Liitzen, 169. Madagascar, island of, 119, 120, 121. Mare Liberum, 118. Marie de Medicis, French queen, 21. Marillac, superintendent of finances, 64. Marine, Eichelieu 's ideas with re- gard to the, 92-108. Marseilles, 132, 134. Martinique, island of, 119. Mazarin, Cardinal, 97, 172, 191. Medicinal plants, 61. Mediterranean, 86, 96, 101, 103, 113; a French lake, 135; and the Dutch, 143; and Spain, 144; com- merce in the, 111; control of, 167, 168; rivalry on, 131. Mercantilism, age of, 17-29. Merchants, and colonization, 111. Mercure Francois, 44, 56, 145; col- onies and, 124; commerce and, 90, 92, 95, 144; diplomacy and, 151, 152, 168. Meurier, Jean du, 112. Michaud, code de, 84. Mole, Mathieu, 111, 112. Montchretien, 19, 21; and salt in- dustry, 54; economic ideas of, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 173; marine and, 95. Montmorency, 47, 94, 120. Monts, Sieur de, 116. Morbihan, company of, 115, 122, 147. Morocco, commerce with, 135. Musselmans, Emperor of, 131. Nantes, 153. Naples, 133. Napoleonic War, 151. Navy, 38, 48, 67, 68, 72. Netherlands, 145, 147, 169. Newspaper, aid to commerce, 90. New France, colonies in, 113; com- pany of, 73, 116, 117. New World, discovery of, 91; strug- gle for, 155. Nitschdil, count de, 159. Nobles, colonies and, 111; commerce and, 126; finances and, 69, 70; intendants and, 71; marine and, 95, 101; newspapers and, 90; privileges of, 73, 83; Eichelieu 's attitude toward, 32-36, 49, 50, 52, 61, 62, 64; suppression of, 142. Norman mariners, 19. Normandy, 150, 155. North Africa, commerce in, 135, 139. North America, 108, 118; fur trade in, 114. North German States, 169. Norway, commerce and, 113, 136, 137. Ordonnateur generale, 82. Orient, 111; colonies in, 119; com- merce with, 131, 165. Orleans, 55. 743J INDEX 201 Oleron, island of, 57; importance of, 55. Ottoman Empire, 131. Oxenstierna, 170. Palatinate, 159. Paris, 21; Parlement of, 47; paving of streets in, 86; postal service from, 89; province of, 87; Royal Garden at, 61. Parlement, 47; conflict in a, 115; Richelieu's attitude toward, 52, 55, 70. Parlements, local, 72. Pensions and Richelieu, 79. Persia, 131, 132, 133, 136, 162, 164; Jesuits in, 119. Pieardy, 85. Pierre du Pont, 85. Plato, commonwealth of, 81. Poland, and commerce, 136, 166; and control of Baltic, 168. Port Royal, 157. Portugal, 144; and colonies, 108, 111; and commerce, 128. Portuguese, navigators, 19; revolt of, 146; revolution in, 170. Postal system, 88. Protestants, 13, 14, 117. Provence, 96, 134, 144. Prussia, 168. Quebec, 117, 118. Ranke, 192. Razilly, Isaac de, 110, 115, 120. Re", island of, 55, 56, 103, 152. Eeglement pour la mer, 97. Rhine, border of, 164. "River Rulers," 101. Roads, development of, 88. Robeval, 116. Rome, 36, 133. Rouen, city of, and Morocco; col- onies and, 120, 121; commerce and, 116; governor of, 51; piracy and, 127; Morocco and, 139. Rug industry, 85. Russia, 25; and commerce, 113, 131; and Spain, 143; diplomacy with regard, 166; French commerce with, 136. Saint-Germain, treaty of, 160. Saint-Kitts, island of, 118, 157, 159. Saint Lawrence, river of, 117. Saint-Malo, Les Messieurs de, 126. Saint-Palaye, M. de, 190. Sanson, the geographer, 121. Sanson Napolon, 135. Savoy, 129. Schools, for liberal arts, 83; for pilots, 103; technical, 86; trade, 82. S6guiran, Henri de, 101. Sendre, river, 55. Senegal, colonies of, 119. Seven Years' War, 167. Sicily, 133. Silk industry, 85. Smyrna, 133. Sorbonne, 190. Sou per livre, tax, 74, 75, 79. South America, colonies in, 118. Spain, 20, 23, 24, 25, 38, 49, 52; and finances, 65; and marine, 92, 97, 98, 104, 105; and postal ser- vice, 89; colonies of, 108, 110, 115, 118, 122; commerce and, 126, 128, 129, 130, 136, 138, 139; diplomacy and, 140, 149, 150, 153, 154-155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 169, 170; pirates of, 96, 101; Richelieu's relations with, 142-147. Spanish navigators, 19. Speculations, in food, 89, 90. State Socialism, 58. Sublet des Noyers, secretary of state, 82. Sue, M., 105, 106. Sully, economic achievements of, 20, 21, 22, 28; financial policy of, 75; ideas of, 173; importance of, 64, 65 ; Richelieu 's letter to, 41 ; naval marine and, 94. 202 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU [744 Sulton, 131. Sweden, and commerce, 113, 136, 137; diplomacy with regard, 158, 165, 166; Richelieu and, 168, 169, 170; the sea and, 95. Swiss, cantons of, 167; commerce with, 135, 153; soldiers of, 136. Switzerland, 89. Tattle, tax, 64, 65, 71, 73, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 113. Tarragona, 53. Testament Politique, 15, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 34, 38, 41, 42, 45, 62, 63, 161, 164, 173, 174, 175; and col- onization, 115, 122, 146; and com- merce, 134, 138-139, 164; and fin- ances, 75-81; and the marine, 92, 97-98; authenticity of, 189-194. Third eetate, finances and, 63; Richelieu's attitude toward, 38- 44. Thirty Years' War, 13, 46, 66, 128, 129, 130, 138, 140, 142; and col- onization, 119; and diplomacy, 147, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164-170, 176. Toulon, 103. Tours, 139. Transportation, in France, 88, 89, 90, 107. Tunis, 135. Turkey, commerce and, 130, 131; diplomacy with regard, 165. Ultramontanism, 36. Universities, 61, 88. Usselinx, Wilhelm, 168. Venetian ambassador, report of, 149, 154. Venice, 79. Vettes, river, 87. Voiture, letter of, 175-176. Volga, river, 136. Voltaire, 191, 192. West Indies, colonies in, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121; commerce in, 140; company of, 173; Portuguese and, 138. Wine growers, 85. Witte, Nicholas, 112. Zollverein, 144, 169. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ::B, 1920 No. 4 THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU BY FI1/ I.ES PALM, PH. D. ioJern European History in the University of California PRICE $i.eo PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS UBBANA . 1015, at the post office at ..-(, Illinois ', IQl'l. 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