REPLY TO. A CRITIQUE IN THE SATURDAY REVIEW ON THE SCOTO-OXONIAN PHILOSOPHY. By M. P. W. BOLTON, LONDON : CHAPMAN & HALL, 193, PICCADILLY. 1862. ~ ae 3 0112 072869180 07 LONDON : BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS, | 42 KB 6 a JU REPLY CRITIQUE IN THE SATURDAY REVIEW. A writer in the Saturday Review has essayed to controvert some of the arguments urged by me against the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel. I had pointed out that, according to their doctrine, belief in the Infinite, (or in an Infinite Being,) could not be placed either in Consciousness or out of it: the former supposition being destroyed by their arguments against Cousin, the latter by their argu- ments against Schelling. The writer attempts to meet this difficulty. For this purpose he declares that there is a latent ambiguity in the assertion that belief is a mode of Consciousness. ‘That Conscious- ness is indeed implied in belief, so that a man cannot believe without being conscious that he believes : but that he is conscious only of the fact of his belief, not of the external object which he believes. All this, which is professedly put forward as a solution of the difficulty, offers in reality no solution ' P 40888 4 whatever. The ambiguity in the word Consciousness makes no division in the actual Consciousness. We may shift as we please our use of the term: but we cannot erect two Consciousnesses of different natures, one to contain thought, cognition, &c., and the other to contain belief. We must admit, with Kant and Hamilton, the unity of Consciousness: we must recognise, as they do, that thought, cognition, intui- tion, feeling, belief, are all modes of the same Con- sclousness. Now, according to the principles of Hamilton and Mansel, this Consciousness is essentially a limitation, every mode of it being a determination of the subject in a particular manner: therefore by its very nature it is pronounced impotent for all concern with the Infinite, and all its modes are held disqualified for relation with an Infinite Object. On the other hand, according to the teaching of the Reviewer, one of its modes is not affected with this impotence: the par- ticular determination of it termed belief has concern with the Infinite, and stands in relation to an Infinite Object. Clearly here, instead of explanation, we have discrepancy: the Reviewer undertakes to sup- port the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel: he suc- ceeds only in contradicting it. But further, when the Reviewer asserts that we are conscious of our belief, but not of the thing which is the object of our belief, instead of agreeing with the authors whom he professes to defend, he flatly contradicts them. Hamilton, in D arguing against the theory of Brown, especially reprobates the position here adopted by the Reviewer, maintaining, in accordance with his general principle, that we cannot possibly be con- scious of a belief unless we have some consciousness or knowledge of the object of the belief. The Reviewer, affecting to treat this doctrme as mine, censures it in the most unceremonious manner, as one whose fallacy needs no exposure. But he shuts his eyes to the very note-worthy fact, that the doctrine which he thus contumeliously condemns is not mine, but Hamilton’s. The Reviewer has intimated to us that he is not a blind disciple of Hamilton and Mansel, nor particu- larly concerned to defend their speculations. But he avails himself too freely of the privileges of a candid friend, when he censures as glaringly fallacious the doctrine which Hamilton has taken such great pains to establish against Reid and Brown, and upon which he bases his whole theory of Perception. To proceed in this way is not to defend Hamilton, but on the contrary to strike the severest possible blow at his philosophical reputation. Well may Hamilton ex- claim, “Save me from my friends!” He would far prefer that his philosophy should be openly attacked, than that it should be mangled and brought to shame by imbecile patronage. We may however consider the argument of Hamilton and Mansel quite apart from the meaning of the term Consciousness; and free from all 6 ambiguity which may thence arise. Their grand argument,—that on which their whole polemic against Cousin and other philosophers is based, is simply this— an Infinite Bemg cannot be an object of thought or cognition, because thought and cognition ~~ are finite, and imply relation and distinction. (1) The objection which I take to this reasoning 1s, that belief falls within its scope, just as much as thought and cognition; imasmuch as the former, as well as the latter, is finite, and implies relation and distine- tion. The argument, therefore, has the fatal defect of proving too much: if admitted, it ruins Cousin’s thesis, but it equally rums the thesis of Hamilton and Mansel. Now, how does the Reviewer deal with this objec- tion? By telling us that he has nothing to do with the validity of these arguments of Hamilton and Mansel! But if he has nothing to do with the validity of the reasonings on which Hamilton and Mansel rest their case, he has very little concern with my Essay, the principal object of which was to test the validity of those arguments. He quotes my reasoning on this subject, but, instead of answering it, contents himself with complaining of its tediousness, and tells me that it would have been far better to have omitted it. In this way, wise in his generation, he does his best to conceal the awkward fact that he does not in the least know how to get rid of my objections. We may be very sure that he would not have professed this sublime indifference as to the validity of the 7 Scoto-Oxonian dialectic, if he had felt in the smallest degree able to maintain it. We gather, therefore, that though unwilling to admit its mvalidity, yet in his heart he is pretty nearly convinced of it. But let us follow somewhat further our guide and philosopher. He urges that if my reasonings against belief in the Infinite and Absolute are meant for any- thing more than an argumentum ad hominem, they may be disposed of by a summary process. ASolvitur ambulando. Here, so far as the Infinite is concerned, he is quite right. It is indeed vain to argue that belief in an Infinite Being is impossible, because belief 1s finite and involves relation and distinction, when is practically belief in an Infinite Being is found to exist. Tt is quite true, therefore, that the difficulty presented by such an argument is summarily disposed of. So/- vitur ambulando. But if the difficulties urged in this reasoning against the credibility of the Infinite are thus dissipated, the difficulties urged by Hamilton and Mansel against its cogitability, being precisely the same, vanish simultaneously. From this im- portant circumstance the Reviewer conveniently averts his eyes. I consider that belief in the Infinite, (2. e., in that which is Infinite,) is a patent and indisputable fact. If, therefore, arguments are adduced by any writer which prove to be incompatible with this belief, this circumstance enables us to pronounce that those arguments are erroneous. I have endeavoured to show that the arguments of Hamilton and Mansel, 8 are incompatible with this belief: that the same arguments by which they imagine themselves to prove that an Infinite Being cannot be an object of thought or of cognition, equally show that such a Being cannot be an object of belief. Hence I infer, not that we must abandon belief in an Infinite Being, but that we must abandon belief in the arguments of Hamilton and Mansel. I have thought that rational people were perfectly competent to discern for them- selves the right alternative; but it seems that for having paid this moderate compliment to the intel- ligence of my readers, my critics hold me grievously suspect of Atheism. The case of the Unconditioned and Absolute is very different. The sense of these terms is not fixed: and it depends entirely on the sense attached to them whether they should be believed or disbelieved. On this more presently. The Reviewer proceeds to accuse me of monstrous unfairness in my mode of representing Mr. Mansel’s doctrines, particularly for attributmg to him dis- paragement of the Infinite as a term dishonourable to God. ‘This, it is said, is wholly unfounded. It is not denied that he disparages that which we style the Infinite, name the Infinite, term the Infinite: but it is contended that he does not in the smallest degree disparage the term Infinite. Now, let us recall for awhile what Mr. Mansel teaches us concerning the term Infinite. So long as it is amere abstract term, united to nothing 9 else, like any other abstraction, it says nothing; but he tells us it becomes contradictory the instant it is | used in the concrete, 7.¢e.,im conjunction with any cogitable term, such as thing, object, &c. And this contradiction can only be avoided by maintaining entire mental quiescence, in which case, as Mr. Mansel _ admits, the term and the expressions involving it are wholly idle and unprofitable. But if we venture to exercise any mental activity on the expressions of which this term forms a component part, we fall at every step into hopeless contradiction, by which finitude and infinitude, existence and non-existence, consciousness and the absence of consciousness, &c., &c., are all equally posited, and equally denied. Will it be pretended that a term which is either wholly nugatory, or else co-operative in the production of such lamentably infelicitous results, has nothing in it dishonourable to God ? * Finally, the Reviewer denounces as the grossest fallacy of all, the inference which I deduce from Mr. Mansel’s injunction, bidding us to think of God as personal. It may follow, he says, from Mr. Mansel’s teaching, that in thinking of God we must think of Him as finite, but not that God is finite. Certainly no such consequence would follow if it were admitted by Mr. Mansel that to a finite thought there may correspond an infinite object. But this is just what Hamilton and Mansel deny. They con- tend that the object of a finite thought must itself be * See Notes A and B. 10 finite. Now when we think of A, A is the object of our thought; a proposition calling for little proof, and hardly admitting of denial on the part of Hamilton and Mansel, who constantly affirm that thought necessarily implies the relation of subject to object. . It follows then inevitably, according to their teaching, that if we can think of A,—if A is the object of our thought,—A is finite: and consequently that if we can think of God,—if God is the object of our thought,—God is finite. The Reviewer may cry out against this as a gross fallacy: but the fallacy is not chargeable upon me, but on the premises supplied by Hamilton and Mansel. (2) 'The Reviewer tells me that he cannot discover the drift of my arguments, but he considers that on the whole my language is best interpretable on the hypothesis of my Atheism, seeing that I appear to deny belief in the Infinite, the Unconditioned, and the Absolute. With respect to the Infinite, I can clear myself satisfactorily, being able, as above stated, to profess full belief in it; but with reference to the Unconditioned and Absolute, I cannot hope to stand guiltless in the eyes of the Reviewer, inasmuch as L do not believe that God is Unconditioned and Absolute, in the sense which Hamilton and Mansel attach to those terms. I do not believe that God is’ a Being out of all relation and distinction, inasmuch as I believe that He is better than creatures, and superior to them. Consequently I do not regard Lis terms which are negative of all relation and distinction as suitable to describe His nature. ~ I consider, however, that the terms Unconditioned and Absolute are capable of bearing a_ positive meaning, which renders them fit to express attributes of the Divine Being. Thus the term “‘ Absolute”? may be used to denote the Perfect. In this sense its meaning is positive, the idea of perfection being more positive than that of imperfection. In this sense too it does not deny relation and distinction, the perfect being superior to and better than the imperfect. When the term Absolute is used in this sense, I consider it to be properly applicable to God, the Perfect Being. Again, the term Absolute may be used to mean that which is valid in all relations—in which sense it is opposed to that which is valid merely compa- ratively, or in a particular respect. This is the sense in which Kant, when explaining the use of the term, declares that he designs to employ it. In this sense also the term is positive. That which is posited or affirmed in all relations, is more positive than that which is affirmed in some relations and denied in others. A law which is valid in relation to all man- kind is more positive than a law which is valid only in relation to a particular people. The term Absolute as thus used is therefore wholly different from the Absolute of Hamilton and Mansel; since the latter is purely negative, and denies all relation, while the 12 former is eminently positive, and affirms relation. In this sense of the term Absolute, I recognise an Absolute Truth, an Absolute Morality, an Absolute Divine Law. | Again, the term Unconditioned, or Unconditional, is capable of being used in a positive sense, wz., to denote that which exists, or is valid under all circum- stances. In this sense it is opposed to the Con- ditional, which exists or is valid only under certain contingencies, or conditions. ‘The difference between a conditional and an unconditional promise exempli- fies this meaning of the term. I believe that this is the sense in which Kant designs to use the term “ Unbedingte,” when he employs it as closely cognate with the term Absolute. In this sense of the term it is manifest that the notion of the Unconditional is more positive than that of the Conditional. Nor does the term “ Un- conditional,’ in this sense, exclude all relation and distinction. If it did so, its use would always generate contradiction, and thus the phrases “ Un- conditional promise,’ ‘ Unconditional obligation,” &c., would involve contradiction, which is not the case. ‘They would moreover be incredible. (3) In the positive and rational senses above explained, I hold that God is Unconditioned and Absolute, 2. e., that He is Perfect, and that His existence is not con- ditional,—not dependent on particular contingencies. And, in like manner, I hold that there is an Absolute. Truth, and an Absolute Moral Law; not meaning 13 thereby that this Truth and Morality are out of all> relation and distinction, in which case they would not be better than Falsehood and Immorality, nor dis- | tinguishable from them; but meaning that this Truth and Law are valid in relation to all rational and moral, (or spiritual) beings. But precisely because I affirm God to be Uncon- ditioned and Absolute m the positive rational sense, I deny that He is Unconditioned and Absolute in the | negative Scoto-Oxonian sense, or non-sense. As to the charges of Atheism which may be msinuated or hurled against me because I refuse to bow to the — miserable idol which Hamilton and Mansel have set | up, I shall bear them with equanimity. “ Lortem hoc animum tolerare jubebo, Et quondam pejora tuli.” For consolation in my misfortune, I have the com- panionship of Dr. Whewell, and Professor Goldwin Smith, who, equally with myself, repudiate belief in the Unconditioned and Absolute of Hamilton and Mansel, and are equally liable to condemnation as ‘Atheists by the enlightened Rhadamanthus of the Saturday Review. NOTES. eH Note 1, page 6. In the argument bearing on this point, for the summary word “ Consciousness” let the words “ thought, conception, cognition, intuition, feeling,” be substituted, and the phrase “to be conscious” correspondingly altered. In this way the argument is cleared of all ambiguity which may be supposed to attach to the word “ Consciousness.” I would observe that the point urged by me is not that belief is a form of Consciousness, but that belief possesses all the characters, on account of which Hamilton and Mansel pronounce thought, conception, cognition, &¢., to be neces- sarily impotent in respect to the Infinite. Note 2, page 10. See on this Hamilton’s letter to Mr. Calderwood. “You maintain (passim) that thought, conception, knowledge, is and must be finite, while the object of thought, &c., may be infinite.” This appears to me to be erroneous, and even contradictory Hamilton’s Lectwres, vol. 2, p. 531. It is further to be observed, that according to the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel, it is particularly de- clared that thought cannot stand in relation to that which is infinite. Now unquestionably, when we think of A, our thought must have some relation to A; therefore hence too it follows, according to the doctrine of Hamilton and Mansel, that if we think of A, A is finite :—that if we think of God, God is finite. 15 Note 3, page 12. In the case supposed, language involving such expres- sions might be believed under delusion: but the belief would be absurd ; and would necessarily vanish as soon as the delusion was removed. Note A, page 9. The Reviewer argues that if Mr. Mansel allows the ex- pressions “Infinite God,” and “Infinite Person,” to be admissible, 1t is hard to see how he should, “in conformity with such results,” discredit the term infinite as dis- honourable to God. It is, indeed, hard to see this: nor, assuredly, has such a conformity been asserted by me: on the contrary, my aim has been distinctly to set forth the utter non-conformity of such proceedings. The re- sults with which I asserted My. Mansel’s disparagement of the term infinite to be conformable, were those in which he declares that the expressions “ Infinite God,” “ Infinite Person,” &c., are language to which no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself; and that the conjunc- | tion of the adjective infinite with any noun generates | hopeless contradiction. | , It is, no doubt, hard to understand how Mr. Mansel can think it proper to treat in this way the word infinite, and the expressions containing it, while yet he asserts the legitimacy of the expressions “Infinite Person,” &c. But the study of his work makes it clear that in point of fact he does so treat them; and it is on this very account that I complain of the self-destructive nature of his teaching. Again, the reviewer insists with emphasis on the cir- cumstance, that according to Mr. Mansel, the expression “Infinite Person” may possibly be true in a superhuman sense. This possibility does us exceedingly little service, 16 if the expression is contradictory and devoid of truth in its human sense. Mr. Mansel himself declares that we know nothing whatever of the consciousness and intelligence of superhuman beings, and that consequently we cannot in the least tell what is true and what is untrue in relation to them. At any rate it is quite certain that we know nothing whatever of their language and terminology. Any expression therefore, however untrue or futile in its human sense, may possibly be true in a superhuman sense ; and thus the plea urged on this account in favour of the ex- pression “ Infinite Person,’ is one which may be urged in favour of any expression, however unmeaning, false, or blasphemous, according to its human usage. Yet every- body will admit that such a plea would indeed be a poor reason for accepting expressions of this nature as legitimate, and conceding to them a place in human philo- sophy or human theology. In dealing with language, the only sense with which we are concerned is its human sense : of its possible superhuman senses, different from the human, we have (to adopt Mr. Mansel’s words) no know- ledge, and can make no application. What should we think of a philosopher who argued in favour of the admissibility of the expression, “ Silly God,” on the ground that superhuman beings might use the word “silly” in the sense of “selig,’ or in other senses equally suitable to the Divine Nature, and that therefore the expression might possibly be true in a superhuman sense? ‘The possibility is undeniable, nevertheless it is unquestionable that the term “silly” in its present Anglo- human sense would be pre-eminently applicable to such an argument. Note B, page 9. We have seen that it is urged on Mr. Mansel’s behalf, that the disrespectful expressions which I have quoted from him are not applied by him to “ the Infinite,” but to iy, “ that which we are pleased to style ‘the Infinite’” In numerous passages, however, Mr. Mansel speaks similarly of “the Infinite,’ without employing the longer form, ‘“ what we are pleased to style the Infinite.” But, it is contended, in these cases Mr. Mansel denotes, by the expression “ the Infinite,” only the abstract metaphysical notion ; and it seems to be considered that he is free to treat this as dis- respectfully as he pleases. It is important, however, to remember that, according to Mr. Mansel’s doctrine, the theological notion of the Infinite is just the same as the metaphysical one. The defects of the metaphysical notion are not ascribed by Mr. Mansel to errors on the part of metaphysicians, but to the constitution of the human mind, common to them and to theologians. Nor is the notion disparaged by Mr. Mansel as imbecile merely the | notion of an abstract Infinite ; on the contrary, he takes pains to point out that it is the notion of the concrete Infinite ; of that which is Infinite ;—an Infinite Thing, Object or Person. Thus, according to Mr. Mansel’s doc- trine, the theological notion of an Infinite Person, just as much as the metaphysical abstract notion, is declared to be wholly negative and futile——a mere impotence or im- becility. So that what the theologian styles the Infinite is the same as what the metaphysician styles by that name, and whatever language concerning the Infinite is babble about nothing to the one, has precisely the same character to the other. To illustrate Mr. Mansel’s method of proceeding let us take a parallel case. Suppose a writer were to treat with ridicule “what we are pleased to style the Divine, the Revealed, the Christian,” or to talk of men as “babbling about nothing, under the name of the Divine, or of the Christian.” Should we be satisfied by being told that he merely ridiculed “what men styled the Divine and Christian,” or the abstract notions of Deity and Chris- tianity, but did not cast the smallest disrespect on the terms, or the names, or the things? The term and the 18 notion go together: the term is nothing to us except in virtue of the notion (idea, or mental mode) ; and thus it is impossible to ridicule or disparage a notion or idea, without similarly affecting the correlative term. Nor is there any meaning in talking about abstract terms, except with reference to their use in the concrete. Thus, when we speak of “the Divine” or of “Deity” our language ultimately has reference to that which is Divine. A writer, therefore, would by no means be justified in speaking contemptuously of “the Divine” or of “ Deity,” of “the Christian,” or of “ Christianity,” and in ridiculing men as babbling about nothing under those names, on the ground that he was dealing only with abstractions. Mr. Mansel himself clearly recognises that the Infinite and Absolute, which form the staple subject of his dialectic, are not mere metaphysical abstractions, devoid of theolo- gical application and interest. Noticing the objection which may be raised against his Sermons, on the ground that they deal so prominently with these terms, he admits that he has departed widely from the customary language of the pulpit, but will not admit that he has departed from its ideas. On the contrary, he speaks of himself as dealing with the ideas common to Theology and Meta- physics in the terms of the latter. And to justify this course, he pleads that there is a line of argument in which the vague generalities of the Absolute and the Infinite may be more reverently and appropriately employed than the sacred names and titles of God.* Clearly here it is recognised that what is said about the vague generalities of the Infinite and Absolute is capable of being ultimately interpreted into language concerning God, the Infinite and Absolute Being. Now certainly it does not depart so widely from the customary language of the pulpit to talk of men as babbling about nothing under the name of the Infinite, as to talk of them as babbling about nothing under the name of the Divine, or of the Eternal, or of * Bampton Lectures, p. 64. 19 God: but if the former mode of expression is at bottom equivalent to the latter.—if the vague generalities of the Infinite and Absolute are ultimately convertible into the sacred names and titles of the Divine Being, the real gain achieved by using the metaphysical terms instead of the theological is after all not very great. Thus the result arrived at as the terminus of Mr. Man- sel’s course is very different from that which he desires. Instead of affording to the theologian a triumph over the | metaphysician, he affords to the so-called Positivist a triumph over both. The Positivist will readily concur with the Mansellian, when the latter proves that the Infinite is a barren phrase, to which no mode of human thought can ~ possibly attach itself; and will still more warmly applaud him when he proceeds upon this to ridicule the metaphysi- cian as babbling about nothing under the name of the Infi- nite. But after the Mansellian has indulged awhile in his fancied triumph, the Positivist will pluck his ear, and remind him that, on his own shewing, that which he is pleased to style an Infinite Person is just as negative and ~~ barren as “the Infinite” of the metaphysician ; since no mode of human thought can possibly be attached to it, > and since, according to Mr. Mansel’s own test, it is wholly destitute of human truth. That therefore, as the meta- physician has been convicted of babbling about nothing under the name of the Infinite, the theologian is equally convicted of babbling about nothing under the name of an Infinite Person ; whence by a very short step it follows that he babbles about nothing when he talks of a Per- sonal God. BRADBURY AND EVANS, PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS, ADDENDA. a Note C, page 10. If any doubts can remain on this point, it is sufficient to consider Hamilton’s own language. He tells us, “ Thought is only of the Conditioned; because, as we have said, to think is simply to condition.” And again, “ How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the Con- ditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest admiration.’* If then, we can think of God, it follows, according to the above position, that God is Conditioned. And the Conditioned is declared by Hamilton, in the most unmistakeable manner, to be finite. The inference is inevitable : that if we can think of God,—if thought of God is possible, God is conditfoned,—God is finite. * See “ Hamilton’s Discussions,” p. 14.