THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 1984 Prepared by Norman Ansley Chief, Polygraph Division Office of Security National Security Agency and Marcia Garwood, Ph.D. Research and Special Branch Polygraph Division Office of Security National Security Agency Technical Editor Gordon H. Barland, Ph.D. 1984 Reprinted by the American Polygraph Association, 1984. Reprints available at $8.00 per copy, postpaid from the APA, P.0. Box 1061, Severna Park, Maryland 21146. Checks must be payable to American Polygraph Association. THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 1984 ' 4 * TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER Page FOREWORD 2 OVERVIEW 3 CHAPTER 1 - UTILIZATION OF THE POLYGRAPH 5 1.1 THE POLYGRAPH IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 5 1.1.1 Federal Agencies 5 1.1.2 Polygraph Examiners in the Department of Defense 5 1.1.3 Number of Examiners (Table) 5 1.1.4 Annual Polygraph Utilization (Table) 6 1.2 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 6 1.2.1 History 6 1.2.2 Polygraph As An Aid To Investigation 6 1.2.3 Tables on Use in Criminal Investigations 7 1.2.4 Ecculpatory Examinations 7 1.2.5 Criminal Investigation Case Examples 8 1.2.6 Criminal Conduct Revealed during Screening Examinations 9 1.2.7 Examples of Crimes Admitted during Screening Examinations 9 1.3 INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 10 1.3.1 History 10 1.3.2 Specific Investigations of Espionage 12 1.3.3 Examples of Polygraph Cases - Espionage 12 1.3.4 Espionage Detected During Screening Examinations 14 1.3.5 Suitability Statistics 16 1.3.6 Use of Polygraph in Army Personnel Security 17 1.4 POLYGRAPH and the TRADITIONAL METHODS 18 1.4.1 1953 - Study of Polygraph/Background 18 1.4.2 1983 - Study of Polygraph/Background 20 1.4.3 1974 - 1979 Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Pers 21 1.4.4 1981 - Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Personnel 22 1.4.5 1983 - Study of Interviews/Polygraph 23 1.5 SURVEYS OF EXAMINEES 23 1.5.1 1951 Survey of Atomic Energy Commission Employees 24 1.5.2 1956 Survey of NSA Applicants 25 1.5.3 Surveys in Law Enforcement and Commerce 26 1.6 QUALITY CONTROL 28 1.6.1 Selection and Training 28 1.7 US ARMY POLYGRAPH TRAINING FACILITY 30 1.8 PRIMARY POLYGRAPH TESTING TECHNIQUES 31 1.8.1 Zone Comparison Technique (ZCT) 31 1.8.2 Modified General Question Technique (MGQT) 32 1.8.3 Relevant/Irrelevant (R/I) 32 1.8.4 Peak of Tension (POT) 32 1.8.5 Counterintelligence Screening Test (CIST) 32 1.8.6 Other Techniques 32 33 fiV $ 07 $ CHAPTER 2 - RESEARCH ON POLYGRAPH CRITERION 2.1 FIELD STUDIES 33 2.2 FIELD STUDIES OF CRITERION VALIDITY 2.2.1 Relationship Between the Decisions of Blind Examiners r 2.2.2 Relationship Between Different Types of Examiner r 2.3 Laboratory Studies 2.3.1 Control-Question Test - Criterion Validity 2.3.2 Control-Question Test - Reliability 2.3.3 Relevant-Irrelevant Technique - Criterion Validity 2.3.4 Relevant-Irrelevant Test - Reliability 2.3.5 Guilty Information Tests - Criterion Validity 2.3.6 Guilty Information Tests - Reliability 33 38 43 45 45 51 52 53 54 57 CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS OF RESEARCH 58 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 ANALYSIS 58 61 The Bersh Field Validation Study Laboratory Experiments with Mock Crimes Experience of Prof. Investigators and Quality Control Pers 62 62 L : 3.5 Summary 63 CHAPTER 4 - SUMMARIES OF RESEARCH 64 4.1 FIELD ABSTRACTS 64 4.1.1 Gordan H. Barland and David C. Raskin (1976) 64 4.1.2 Akiva Ben-Ishai (1962) 66 4.1.3 Philip J. Bersh (1969) 67 4.1.4 M. E. Bitterman and F. L. Marcuse (1947) 68 4.1.5 Avital Ginton, et al (1982) 69 4.1.6 Eugene C. Edel and Jacob Jacoby (1975) 71 4.1.7 Eitan Elaad and Esther Schahar (1976) 72 4.1.8 Robert H. Edwards (1981) 73 4.1.9 Frank Horvath (1977) 74 4.1.10 Frank S. Horvath and John E. Reid (1971) 76 4.1.11 Fred L. Hunter and Philip Ash (1973) 77 4.1.12 Verne W. Lyon (1936) 78 4.1.13 Jesse Orlansky (1962) 79 4.1.14 Robert B. Peters (1982) 80 4.1.15 David C. Raskin (1976) 82 4.1.16 Stanley M. Slowick and Joseph P. Buckley (1975) 84 4.1.17 Douglas E. Wicklander and Fred L. Hunter (1975) 85 4.1.18 Jan Widacki (1982) 86 4.2 LABORATORY ABSTRACTS: CONTROL QUESTION TECHNIQUE 87 4.2.1 Gordon H. Barland (1981) 87 4.2.2 Gordon H. Barland and David C. Raskin (1975) 90 4.2.3 M. T. Bradley and Michel Pierre Janisse (1981) 92 4.2.4 Robert J. Gatchel, et al (1983) 94 4.2.5 David L. Hammond (1980) 95 4.2.6 Charles Robert Honts (1982) 97 4.2.7 D. C. Raskin and R. D. Hare (1978) 99 4.2.8 L. I. Rovner, D. C. Raskin and J. C. Kircher (1978) 101 4.2.9 William M. Waid, Emily C. Orne, and Martin T. Orne (1981) 102 4.2.10 William M. Waid, Martin Orne, and Stuart Wilson (1979) 104 4.2.11 Jan Widacki and Frank Horvath (1978) 106 4.3 LABORATYRY ABSTRACTS: RELEVANT - IRRELEVANT TECH 107 4.3.1 Richard H. Blum and William Osterloh (1968) 107 4.3.2 Eileen J. Correa and Henry E. Adams (1981) 109 4.4 LABORATORY ABSTRACTS: GUILTY KNOWLEDGE AND PEAK 111 4.4.1 Kristen D. Balloun and David S. Holmes (1979) 111 4.4.2 P.0. Davidson (1968) 113 4.4.3 Miroslav Dufek (1969) 115 4.4.4 Jana Kronbergerova and Miroslav Dufek (1969) 117 4.4.5 David T. Lykken (1959) 118 4.4.6 David T. Lykken (1960) 119 4.4.7 Kazuo Ohnishi, et al (1976) 120 4.4.8 Robert M. Stern, et al (1981) 121 4.4.9 William M. Waid, et al (1978) 123 4.4.10 William M. Waid, et al (1981) 126 4.4.11 Kazunoba Yamaoka and Akihiro Suzuki (1980) 128 REFERENCES 129 INDEX 132 THE ACCURACY AND UTILITY OF POLYGRAPH TESTING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 1983 1 FOREWORD This analysis of the scientific literature on the accuracy of the polygraph, with supporting information on use and utility, was prepared at the direction of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard G. Stilwell, General, USA (Ret.)* General Stilwell, with the concurrence of the Director of the National Security Agency, appointed Norman Ansley to lead a working group of senior examiners from the military services to prepare a report, setting forth the basis upon which the polygraph is utilized in the Department of Defense. In addition, the report was to include information on the use and results of polygraph testing in the Department. The working group, listed below, provided information from their resources on the use of the polygraph and case examples. They also served as an editorial board, reviewing the text. This report was prepared by Norman Ansley, Chief, Polygraph Division, Office of Security, National Security Agency, and Marcia Garwood, Ph.D., Research and Special Branch, Polygraph Division, Office of Security, National Security Agency. Gordon H. Barland, Ph.D., served as a scientific editor of the report. William Fedor, Deputy Director (Personnel Security) Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs, and William H. Bell, Security Specialist, Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs Directorate, ODUSD (P), represented DoD in the development of this report. THE WORKING GROUP Norman Ansley Chief, Polygraph Division Office of Security National Security Agency Robert A. Brisentine, Jr. Chief Polygraph Examiner U.S. Army Law Enforcement U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command Louise S. Fuse Deputy Polygraph Program Manager U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command B. Frank Bloomingburg Special Assistant Scientific Investigations Headquarters, Naval Investigative Service James E. Hardy Chief, U.S. Air Force Polygraph Program Headquarters, USAF Office of Special Investigation 2 OVERVIEW The federal government has over sixty-five years of experience with polygraph techniques in criminal and counterintelligence testing. Beginning in 1951, the Department of Defense established a polygraph school for the training of military examiners. It conducts basic and advanced courses and now trains almost all of the polygraph examiners in the federal service. The use of the polygraph for the investigation of crimes is a well established practice. Known errors in the field use are exceedingly rare. Where examinees are found to be deceptive during testing, the confession rate is consistently high, despite the fact that all of these criminal suspects had already been interrogated by an experienced investigator. Moreover, there is nothing about the polygraph technique that likely to cause a false confession because of the requisite low key questioning. The use of the polygraph to confirm admissions and confessions with additional testing also reduces the possibility of false confessions. This study includes a number of representative cases of criminal investigations in which the polygraph has played a significant role. The polygraph is extremely useful in intelligence and counterintelligence operations. There is positive evidence of the deterrent effect of screening examinations. Examples of espionage and attempted espionage cases detected by polygraph examinations are included in this study. Without the polygraph as an investigative tool, a number of espionage cases never would have been solved. Helmich, Kampiles, and Barnett probably would not have been successfully prosecuted without the skillful application of polygraph techniques. In addition, there is definite evidence that some extremely sensitive U.S. intelligence operations would have been penetrated by hostile intelligence services if the polygraph had not been employed in screening for clearance and access. Examiners conducting screening cases have obtained confessions from applicants of their intention to commit espionage. In other cases they developed such significant admissions that penetration attempts by hostile intelligence were detected and neutralized. Screening has also kept our intelligence agencies from hiring some extremely undesirable people. Examiners, in FY 82, obtained admissions from applicants of undetected crimes involving murder, attempted murder, arson, rape, and numerous other felonies. The polygraph field is one of those rare situations where the practice has outpaced the research. While scientists are debating how the various testing formats work, and are trying to devise a satisfactory theoretical framework, others are conducting research on the development of improved techniques and advanced instrumentation. Much of the literature which discusses the issue of polygraph validity was written for other purposes. Some of the polygraph research is very limited in scope, some is dated, and some is flawed in design. Despite these limitations the research produces results significantly above chance. Those studies which approximate field conditions by using field instruments, trained and experienced examiners, standardized techniques, and a complete field pretest interview, produce higher rates of accuracy than those conducted with one physiological channel, make-shift or novel techniques, and untrained personnel. The polygraph is not limited to our culture. It is significant that research results are similar throughout the world, regardless of varied cultures and languages. 3 It is important to realize that polygraph examinations are not conducted in isolation. Their use is always In the context of a larger program. They play a role in investigations but they are never a substitute for investigation. Polygraph examiners do not make recommendations or decisions in regard to further investigation or the adjudication of the results. In screening, the polygraph examination is not used alone for clearance and access. It is an adjunct to the national agency check and background investigation. Decisions and adverse actions are not made solely on the results of an anlysis of polygraph charts. All other factors in a situation are considered before decisions are made. Used with prudence, and a full knowledge of its limitations, the polygraph will continue to play a role in our criminal justice system and counterintelligence operations. 4 CHAPTER 1 - UTILIZATION OF THE POLYGRAPH 1.1 THE POLYGRAPH IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1.1.1 FEDERAL AGENCIES The polygraph is currently used by the Department of Defense, United States Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Postal Inspection Service, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Administration, Drug Enforcement Administration, Central Intelligence Agency, United States Marshals, United States Customs Service, and the Department of Labor (Anti-Racketeering). These agencies often provide polygraph service to those federal law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies and activities which do not have polygraph examiners. The Department of Defense elements which currently have polygraph programs are the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, the United States Army Intelligence and Security Command, the Naval Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, the U.S. Marine Corps Criminal Investigation Division, and the National Security Agency. These fifteen agencies are represented on the Federal Interagency Polygraph Committee which meets quarterly, or more often if necessary. Although informal, the committee has achieved the adoption of minimum standards for the selection and training of federal examiners. The Committee has also established and operated an advanced polygraph seminar. Each year, the FBI hosts a one-week seminar attended by seventy or more federal examiners at its training facility at Quantico, Virginia. The program of instruction is planned and coordinated by a different federal agency each year, although in some years two agencies combine to put on the instruction. 1.1.2 Polygraph Examiners in the Department of Defense All polygraph examiners in the Department of Defense must meet the minimum requirements set forth in DoD regulation 5210.48 plus those established in each service or agency. DoD examiners are college graduates, experienced investigators, U. S. citizens, at least 25 years old, and specifically selected for their maturity and judgment. All have been subjected to a thorough screening examination with a polygraph, and have been the subject of an extensive background investigation. The basic polygraph training of military examiners is the twelve-week course conducted by the Army at the Military Police school, Fort McClellan, Alabama. All examiners then serve a closely supervised internship of six to twelve months. 1.1.3 Number of Examiners As of September 1983, the Department of Defense had 153 certified examiners. That number does not include interns or those in basic training. DoD CERTIFIED EXAMINERS Army Army Marine CID INSCOM Navy Air Force Corps NSA Total 1980 39 9 11 20 8 13 100 1981 42 9 12 20 6 30 119 1982 44 12 14 20 6 26 122 1983 50 15 15 40 6 27 153 5 1.1.4 Annual Polygraph Utilization ANNUAL POLYGRAPH UTILIZATION (Number of Examinations) Army CID Army INSCOM Navy NIS Air Force 0SI Marine Corps CID NSA Total 1980 4005 214 1317 1415 258 5676 12885 1981 3690 281 1185 1418 245 7418 14237 1982 3686 390 1337 2026 263 9672 17374 1.2 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 1.2.1 History The Federal Bureau of Investigation and its predecessor, the Bureau of Investigation, made use of the polygraph technique occasionally from 1917 into the 1930's. In the mid-1930's Leonarde Keeler, who was then at the Northwestern University Crime Laboratory, trained an FBI agent in polygraph technique. A few years later he trained an agent from the United States Secret Service. The Army began to have agents trained as examiners in World War II, and when Leonarde Keeler established the first polygraph school in 1948 the federal government began to expand the use of the polygraph for criminal investigations. Today fifteen federal agencies or departments have polygraph programs. 1.2.2 Polygraph As An Aid To Investigation In criminal cases, the polygraph is not used in the Federal Government as a substitute for investigation. Field investigation is usually conducted as far as circumstances permit before the polygraph plays a role. This requirement for prior investigation plus a prior and separate interview of all prospective polygraph subjects is mandatory in the Department of Defense, and may be waived by DoD officials only in the most unusual circumstances. Despite these restrictions, the polygraph is widely used in criminal investigations. Defense counsel in criminal cases frequently ask for exculpatory examinations. The Army, which is the greatest user of the polygraph for law enforcement purposes in the Federal Government, has utilized the polygraph in 17% to 19% of its investigation of felony crimes during the last year and a half. Further, the Army has used the polygraph in 95% of its criminal investigations pertaining to crimes for which the maximum penalty is 15 years or greater. The effectiveness of this effort is illustrated by comparing the percentage of felony cases solved by the Army with the national rate. The Army solved 64.7% of their felonies while the national average for the same period was only 19.5%. The use of the polygraph was one of the significant reasons for this extraordinary achievement. The following tables depict the extent of use of polygraph examinations in criminal investigations in DoD, the pretest and post test confession rates, and the administration of exculpatory polygraph examinations which are requested by the suspect or his attorney: 6 1.2.3 Tables on Use in Criminal Investigation Army CID Navy NIS Air Force OSI US Marine Corp s Totals 1980 3990 1209 1336 255 6790 1981 3677 1049 1304 240 6270 1982 3665 1210 1745 261 6881 PRETEST ADMISSIONS OR 1 CONFESSIONS Army Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps CID INSCOM NIS OSI CID 1980 12.5% 21.5% 11.5% 10.0% 1.9% 1981 10.3% 16.0% 8.9% 13.3% 3.7% 1982 10.7% 13.3% 11.0% 12.0% 3.4% POST TEST ADMISSIONS OR CONFESSIONS OF DECEPTIVE SUBJECTS Army Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps CID INSCOM NIS OSI CID 1980 46.4 % 19.4% 34.4% 35.6% 50.0% 1981 44.7% 27.7% 36.5% 33.3% 52.4% 1982 48.7 % 51.3% 30.1% 31.2% 36.7% 1 . 2.4 EXCULPATORY EXAMINATIONS (Requested by the suspect or his attorney) Percentage of total cases in parenthesis Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps CID NIS OSI CID 1980 328 (8.2%) 239 (18. 1%) 506 (35.6%) 39 (15.1%) 1981 349 (9.5%) 164 (13. 8%) 466 (32.9%) 24 ( 9.8%) 1982 324 (8.8%) 209 (15. 6%) 542 (26.8%) 31 (11.8%) 7 1.2.5 Criminal Investigation Case Examples In 1980, an Army captain was killed when his parachute failed to open. Investigation revealed that the static line of the officer's parachute had been intentionally cut. As this crime occurred in an airborne division, the possibility existed that other parachutes had been cut and that additional military members would be fatally injured during parachute jumps. As 160 parachute riggers had an opportunity to commit this crime they were all considered suspects. A decision was made to use the polygraph swiftly to determine the individual responsible for sabotaging the parachute. Five days after the death of the officer, use of the polygraph resulted in the identification of the person who sabotaged the parachute, who then confessed. In 1982, a serviceman had been scheduled for trial for the rape and sodomy of a female military member. Based on a polygraph administered to the alleged assailant, who requested this test in exculpation, it was determined that he had not committed any sexual crimes with or upon the complainant. A subsequent polygraph examination of the female complainant resulted in a confession that she had made a false complaint because she was angry at some members of her former military unit. In this instance, the polygraph prevented an innocent man from going to trial for the serious crimes of forcible rape and forcible sodomy. In June 1982, a female military person reported in a sworn statement that a male military person had assaulted her with intent to commit rape. A criminal investigation of the alleged incident failed to confirm or deny her complaint. Subsequently, the alleged incident became a security clearance matter and was reopened. The alleged perpetrator admitted "playing around" with the complainant, but denied any aspect of assault or attempted rape and he volunteered to undergo a polygraph examination. As a result of the examination, the male military person confessed to all the charges made by the complainant. A civilian employee operating a government owned service (gas) station on a military installation was suspected of falsely reporting a $1,800.00 robbery of the service station. HE was administered a polygraph examination which indicated deception. The employee then admitted stealing the $1,800.00 himself and identified a local military member as an accomplice. An individual was tried and sentenced to life in prison for the murder of a fellow soldier. This individual asked the Army to give him a polygraph examination for exculpation. The results revealed that he had not committed the murder. The investigation was reopened and the actual perpetrator of this crime was apprehended and the innocent solder was released from prison. This matter would not have been resolved without the use of the polygraph. The body of a nine-year-old girl was found in a trash dumpster on a military installation. An autopsy revealed the child had been sexually molested and the cause of death was asphyxia. Investigation revealed that an individual reported he had been robbed in the vicinity of the dumpster on the night in question. Further investigation revealed the complainant of the robbery had been in a bowling alley, which was the last place the girl was seen alive. The subject was offered a polygraph examination and he agreed. The examination results indicated deception on the issues of kidnapping and killing the girl. During the subsequent interrogation by the polygraph examiner, the subject made a full confession. 8 A U. S. military member was suspected of setting a fire aboard a ship that resulted in excess of one million dollars damage; he denied the charges. The military member was administered a polygraph examination which indicated deception, whereupon he confessed to intentionally setting the fire. An individual charged with Possession and Sale of Controlled Substance maintained his innocence during the investigation and requested an exculpatory polygraph examination. The examination was administered by an Army examiner and the individual was found to be truthful when he denied criminal participation in the possession and sale of the controlled substance. The polygraph evidence was not considered during the pre-court martial hearings nor was it allowed to be introduced during the court martial proceedings. The individual was convicted and sentenced to serve time in prison. Following the conviction, the examiner continued the investigation and identified a civilian subject who confessed to the examiner that he committed the crime for which the military member was sent to prison. The examiner then coordinated efforts to obtain the release of the innocent military member from prison. 1.2.6 Criminal Conduct Revealed during Screening Examinations A detailed analysis was made of the admissions made during the testing of 20,511 applicants for clearance and access at NSA from 1 October 1975 through 28 February 1979. There were 695 persons, 3.4% of the total, who admitted to the commission of a felony. In almost all of these cases the perpetrator had gone undetected. Among the few who had been caught, there were six who had been convicted, but who had falsified their forms to conceal the arrest, conviction, and time served. The admissions included murder, armed robbery, forcible rape, burglary, arson, embezzlement, hit and run driving with personal injury, thefts of expensive items or large amounts, smuggling and wholesale selling of illegal drugs. In addition, 2,489 persons (12.1%) admitted to misdemeanors. These admissions included petty theft, simple assault, tax evasion, falsification of travel vouchers, malicious damage, indecent exposure, prostitution, selling illegal drugs and controlled substances for profit, deliberately writing bad checks, and other forms of fraud. Some of these cases may have been felonies. When there was doubt, they were statistically classified as misdemeanors. Not all of the misdemeanor admissions were disqualifying. The purchase, use or possession of illegal drugs was not listed in this category. There were 8,383 (40.1%) who admitted to the use of an illegal drug on at least one occasion. There were 2,228 (10.9%) who admitted using amphetamines, barbiturates, hallucinogens and similar substances. There were 704 (3.4%) who admitted to the use of heroin, cocaine, or opium. The statistical rates for the admissions of crimes and drugs have changed very little since that survey. 1.2.7 Examples of Crimes Admitted during Screening Examinations The following admissions were made to NSA examiners during screening examinations. All are from FY 1982 cases: 9 An applicant for an engineering position at NSA, employed as an engineer by another government agency, admitted that his engineering degree was phony (he bought it through mail order from London for $100). He also admitted that he shot and wounded his second wife (his prison term was not on his SPH) and his present wife is missing under unusual circumstances that he would not explain. An applicant admitted to setting fire to the trailer that his ex-wife and child lived in. He had been questioned by the Michigan State Police as a suspect (attempted murder/arson) but denied it, and refused their offer of a polygraph test. An applicant said he killed a young girl while in combat in Vietnam. He recognized her as a young girl when he shot her the first time, then for no reason he could give, he shot her several more times at close range. He called it murder. He also admitted stabbing a stranger in the face with a knife in an argument over some beer. An applicant admitted to the forcible rape of his ten year old niece, which was never reported to the police. An applicant for a position in which he would carry a firearm, admitted he had been charged with attempted murder but not tried for lack of evidence. He admitted firing his shotgun at six people, and hitting all of them. An applicant admitted to firing a rifle into his estranged wife's home in an attempt to murder her. He fled Connecticut which had a current warrant outstanding for his arrest. 1.3 INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY 1.3.1 History The instrumental detection of deception was first used in an investigation for the Army when a Secret Code Book was stolen from the Surgeon General's safe in 1917. The thief was detected among the 70 suspects tested, but he was not confronted. Followed from Washington, D.C. to New York City, he was apprehended in the act of passing the code book to a German agent. During World War I the Army trained a group of psychologists at Camp Greenleaf in lie detection techniques for counterintelligence purposes, but the Armistice was signed before they were put to use (Marston 1938). Beginning in the 1940's, the polygraph was used at the Oak Ridge atomic facility for screening of employees. Operated entirely under contract by a private company, the program continued until 1951 when the security responsibilities then under contract were taken over by the government (Trovillo 1951). At the end of World War II at Camp Wetherill, New Jersey, the Army used the polygraph to examine 274 German prisoners of war who had been screened and selected for police leadership positions in the post-war German Government. A team of seven experienced examiners using RI Technique asked questions about Nazi party sympathy, communist sympathy, plans to engage in sabotage or subversion, activity for the Gestapo, SS, or SA, and serious crmes. The results cleared 156 Germans (57%) for senior police positions. There were 8 inconclusive cases (3%) and 110 (40%) were not recommended. The examiners obtained admissions to Nazi Party membership by 24 10 candidates, and to SA by two and SS by one. Three were communists, of which one was a party organizer. Among the Nazis was the Party Treasurer from 1933 to 1938 (Linehan 1978). In 1947 the newly formed Central Intelligence Agency began using the polygraph in support of operations and for specific investigations. They also began to use the polygraph in screening. By 1950, CIA was screening all applicants. In May 1951, the Armed Forces Security Agency, predecessor of the National Security Agency, began using the polygraph to expedite the clearance processing of more than a thousand employees who had been hired but could not be cleared until the background investigation had been completed. Because of the Korean War, those investigations were taking from nine to eighteen months to complete. Accordingly, AFSA gave top secret access on an interim basis to employees based on a satisfactory polygraph examination and a National Agency check. Soon thereafter, AFSA-NSA began screening local applicants before they were hired and by 1953 was giving polygraph examinations to all applicants prior to employment. During the years 1951 to 1983 a number of other special activities in the Department of Defense have used the polygraph for clearance and access determinations, and for operational purposes. Some of these polygraph operations were for specific projects of a limited duration, others were for long terms. Acting on recommendations of a DoD Select Panel on Personnel Security, Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued a Memorandum on 6 August 1982 which established an aperiodic counterintelligence polygraph program in the Department of Defense for those persons who have SCI access. Mr. Carlucci also restored the Reinvestigation Program in DoD. The Carlucci polygraph program was implemented only in the National Security Agency. Other elements of DOD needed a revision in the DOD polygraph regulation before they could begin. The polygraph regulation was under revision when Congress expressed an interest in the proposed expansion of the polygraph in the Department of Defense. On March 11, 1983, the President issued National Security Decision Directive Number 84 "Safeguarding National Security Information," which was separate from the DoD action. Among the many security measures in NSDD 84 is the requirement to revise regulations and policies so that employees may be required to take a polygraph examination in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Congress will hold additional hearings, on NSDD84 and the polygraph, and has passed legislation which prohibits The Department of Defense from expanding the use of the polygraph beyond that existing on 5 August 1982 (the day before the Carlucci Memorandum), until 15 April 1984. NSA is exempt from this moratorium. The moratorium is to provide Congress with time for hearings and, if necessary, subsequent legistative action. 11 1.3.2 Specific Investigations of Espionage In many cases, espionage activity is initially detected by other means, and the role of the polygraph examination is to find the guilty persons among those suspects developed by investigation. Not infrequently, the examiner will get admissions that are useful in furthering the investigation, or get confessions. Polygraph examinations were important to the successful prosecutions of Barnett, Kampiles, and Helmich. All received lengthy sentences for violation of the espionage statutes. And in each of these cases the polygraph examination was important to counterintelligence analysis and damage assessment. Other espionage cases have been detected through screening operations conducted by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Here, again, the examiners have obtained information in sufficient detail to initiate investigations, and in some cases have obtained confessions. It is important to note that in the screening situation, the applicant initiates the contact by applying for assignment, employment, or some form of access. The applicants know beforehand that they will be given a polygraph examination. The decision to take the examination and risk exposure must be a difficult one to make. There are several known cases in which agents have refused an assignment to seek employment where the classified access required a polygraph examination. This deterrent effect is illustrated by the refusal of Christopher Boyce to accept a job with the CIA as a courier between the United States and sites in Australia. He feared that the examination would reveal his espionage activities. He refused again for the same reason on a later occasion when his Soviet handler suggested he apply for work at CIA (Lindsey 1979). Likewise, Barnett opted not to apply for a staff position at CIA or NSA because he feared the polygraph test. Prime Minister Thatcher (1982), in her statement on the report of the Security Commission about the Prime Case, said that "The Commission concludes that the polygraph is the only measure of which it could be said with any confidence that it would have protected GCHQ from Prime's treachery, either because it would have deterred him from applying to join or would have exposed him in the course of examination. In view of this and of the extreme gravity of the damage caused by Prime, the Government accepts the Commission's recommendation that a full and thorough pilot scheme should be carried out. The Commission recognizes that a polygraph examination would be seen by some as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. But we are dealing with matters of the highest national security, and those who have access to the nation's most sensitive secrets must expect to be subject to the most rigorous vetting procedures." 1.3.3 Examples of Polygraph Cases ~ Espionage A U.S. directed informant with access to the intelligence and security functions of a foreign power reported on an unidentified agent inside a highly sensitive U.S. communication center, and said that foreign government officials were reading U.S. classified communiques almost as soon as they were put on the wire. These communiques dealt with highly sensitive activities involving the Defense and State Departments, and the White House. Investigation led to five suspects. All were interviewed with sworn statements executed denying any activity on behalf of the foreign government. Investigation produced no additional indication of espionage activity. All five suspects agreed to undergo examination 12 66 Introduction to forensic sciences in the administration of justice or criminal justice, and some courses are devoted to practical training in criminalistics. Such programs are offered at George Wash¬ ington University in Washington, D.C. and at John Jay School of the City College of New York City. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has continuously sup¬ ported forensic sciences in the United States through periodic schools that offer additional training for criminalists in the United States. A young college graduate of today who has majored in a natural science may be wise to consider the criminalistic laboratory as a career or as a means of obtaining experience before entering a private laboratory career. REFERENCES 1. Mac Donnell, H. L.: Flight characteristics of blood. Research project and report. National 3 Institute of Law Enforcement, Washington, D.C., LEAA, 1974, PR 71-4. NILE & CJ, 4 1971. 2. Moenssens, A., Inbau, F., and Moses, R. E.: Scientific evidence in criminal cases. New York, 1973, Foundation Press. Thorvvald, J.: Century of the detective. New York, 1966, Harcourt Brace and World. Walls, H. J.: Forensic science: introduction to scientific crime detection, ed. 2, New York, 1974, Praeger Publishers. on the polygraph. Four of the five were determined by the examiner to be innocent of involvement. The remaining individual was reported as deceptive and subsequently confessed that he was, in fact, in the employ of the foreign power. He admitted furnishing far more information to the foreign power than was reported by the U.S. informant. Much of the information he admitted providing to the foreign power was subsequently confirmed by the U.S. directed informant. A U.S. military member was arrested after selling classified material to undercover federal agents following documented contact with the Soviets. The military member denied any additional contacts or any additional violations. He was administered a polygraph examination in which showed deception. He subsequently admitted to additional Soviet contacts and possession of additional classified information at his residence. A U.S. controlled agent allowed himself to be recruited by a foreign intelligence service in 1978. From 1978 until 1982, the agent was met periodically by a foreign case officer, but never in the United States. In April 1982, the foreign intelligence service agreed to have a courier meet the agent in the United States. The courier was arrested when the meeting took place. He was tried and convicted. Throughout his interrogation following his arrest, he did not identify anyone else in the U.S. who might be efnga^d in espionage against the U.S. The convicted courier subsequently agreed to undergo a polygraph examination. The examination resulted in the courier furnishing the names of several persons in the U.S. known or suspected by him to be espionage agents for the foreign power he represented. A military service received information from another agency that a military member was involved in espionage with a hostile intelligence agency. Subsequent investigation included a polygraph examination where the member admitted being involved in espionage against the United States for over a year. A military service received information that an officer was involved in espionage. Subsequent investigation disclosed the suspect was a missile launch officer assigned to a western base. During one of his many trips he was arrested. Through his defense counsel, arrangements were made to grant immunity if the officer would disclose all compromises of classified information and pass a polygraph examination to confirm the admissions. He was then thoroughly debriefed by counterintelligence personnel and said he had told everything. However, he made many additional significant admissions to the polygraph examiner before ultimately passing the polygraph test. A foreign civilian who was formerly employed by U.S. Forces, was reportedly providing U.S. documents to a foreign intelligence service. That individual's daughter was married to a member of the U.S. military, and she was also implicated in the espionage activity. During an investigation of these allegations, three sources of information were examined by the polygraph and were determined to be truthful. Those examination results significantly aided in the development of the investigation. The host country police arrested the foreign civilian and his daughter for espionage. The American member of the military forces was interviewed and denied any knowledge of his wife or father-in-law being involved in espionage. He agreed to undergo a polygraph examinaton. The examination resulted In the member admitting that he knew his wife and her father were involved in espionage, and that he did not report that fact, even though he knew he was required to, because he wanted to protect his wife. 13 1.3.4 Espionage Detected During Screening Examinations An applicant reacted to questions about involvement in intelligence for a Foreign government, espionage activity, intent to commit espionage against the United States, the accuracy of his security forms, and other related questions. After the tests, he admitted that his forms were not correct when he listed his academic affiliation during two long tours abroad, amounting to a total of eight years. He admitted that he was, during those years, a scientific advisor to the chief of a foreign military intelligence service. Although he admitted to the examiner that he might pass classified information to that service, he claimed that he had not done so. He had a Secret U.S. clearance before, between tours, and after his work abroad for that agency. He admitted that he was still in contact with the foreign intelligence agency, and the subsequent test charts indicated consistent significant reactions to questions about giving or selling U.S. classified information to that service. An Army Sergeant who had access to cryptologic information applied for a civilian position. During the polygraph examination, he reacted to various relevant questions. In the post-test interview, he admitted to various petty crimes and miscellaneous wrongdoing. The polygraph examiner noted continued specific reactions to relevant questions and when the Sergeant was reexamined several weeks later, the same situation continued. His access was withdrawn and an investigation opened. While that investigation was still in progress, he was found dead in his automobile. It was subsequently determined that he had been engaged in espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. A contractor employee seeking clearance and access reacted to polygraph questions concerning espionage. She told the examiner that her former husband was currently engaging in espionage against the United States for a foreign power. This had been going on for several years while her spouse held various positions in the government and with defense contractors requiring classified access. She gave very specific details on his espionage activities. An applicant for employment reacted to questions about committing espionage, clandestine contacts, and related questions. He admitted that if employed, he would sell classified information to a foreign intelligence service if he could get enough money for it to live comfortably. The applicant had access to classified information while in the service. He continued to react to counterintelligence questions after his admissions. An applicant described his various radical and Marxist connnections including residence with a British Communist Party (CP) member while they both were students at a British university. The applicant visited the Soviet Union twice, both times with British student tours. He became particularly friendly with a young woman who described herself as a student and part-time INTOURIST guide. She was his tour guide on the second trip. Applicant later wrote his tour guide telling her he had applied for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies. The Soviet tour guide came to the U.S., supposedly to visit relatives; contacted the applicant; then arranged to meet the applicant at an airport the day after his polygraph examination. He continued to react to counterintelligence questions during his polygraph testing. 14 An applicant said he had lived with a foreign national, who he said was an intelligence agent of a foreign power, while he was stationed in Berlin with U.S. forces. The applicant provided information about her activities including observation of a transmitter/receiver which was apparently for clandestine use. He did not report her activity to his superiors, despite the fact that she worked for U.S. military finance, because she paid for their apartment and he enjoyed living with her. An applicant for employment who had lived abroad for several years overseas admitted that she was cultivated for several months by the host country intelligence agency and finally offered a position in which she was to travel to another country under a false identity, but as a U.S. citizen, then obtain employment in the target country (not the U.S.). She said that after two days of thoughtful deliberation, she declined. She had not previously reported this to U.S. authorities, and did so during the polygraph test only after reacting to counterintelligence questions. An applicant who was about to retire from military service reacted to questions about intending to commit espionage against the United States. The applicant then described several visits to the Soviet Embassy to make arrangements to defect to the Soviet Union. The Soviet officials took copies of his documents, got extensive biographical information and when they learned of his pending applications for employment with U.S. intelligence agencies, encouraged him to stay in the U.S. An applicant reacted to questions about knowing others engaging in espionage, intent on his part to engage in espionage, and to questions about the truthfulness of the information on his security forms. He admitted that he had been terminated from employment with a U.S. intelligence service after a year of training but before he was assigned to a position. After being fired he worked as a free-lance journalist in the U.S. and abroad, with an Asian partner. During their work, the Asian told him he was a professional and trained intelligence agent for his home country. Although the applicant identified the agent by name, his location in the U.S., and his intelligence service, he would not give many details of their joint activities. After these admissions, he continued to react to questions about intending to commit espionage against the United States and the accuracy of his security forms. An applicant admitted that a Russian, who stayed at his home for several days, asked for a tour of potential military targets in New Jersey. The Russian was allegedly with a Soviet delegation from the USSR Ministry of Health. The Russian took numerous pictures while the subject drove him to all the major bridges and petroleum plants in New Jersey, and to a nuclear power plant. The following year, he allowed two Soviet citizens from the Ministry of Health to stay in his home while they made tours during the daytime. They were vague about where they had been. The applicant provided additional information about other U.S. citizens who were assisting these Soviets in their non-medical activities. One applicant, a frequent traveler to a Communist-bloc country, told the examiner of being drugged, and while drugged, an attempt was made to get him to engage in a homosexual act. Later, he was directly asked to work for the intelligence service of that country against the United States. He said he refused, but he did not report the entrapment attempt or the offer to any U.S. official. 15 1.3.5 Suitability Statistics When considering for clearance and access those persons who have not yet had the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty and trustworthiness, it is necessary to make judgments from their general conduct. Initial clearance is also the appropriate point at which undesirable people should be barred from access to classified information. The extent and nature of admissions to criminal activity, including drugs, made by NSA applicants, has been set forth elsewhere in this report. Some other aspects of the admissions made during screening should also be reported . Falsification of the Statement of Personal History or Personnel Security Questionnaire is reported only when it is deliberate, and the omission or false entry is significant. Among the 20,511 applicant polygraph examinations conducted at NSA from 1 October 1974 to 28 February 1979, there were 1,573 persons who falsified their security forms. That was 7.7% of the total number of persons examined. Omissions included criminal arrests and convictions, employment where their work was unsatisfactory or they were terminated, less than honorable military service, family, subversive organizations, falsified citizenship, education levels and degrees not attained, foreign travel and numerous other matters. In many cases, but not all, an accurate record would have given information that would have been a bar to clearance and access, or to employment, or both. Mental and nervous disorders were described by 1,306 applicants (6.4%). When appropriate, medical releases were obtained for use by those who conduct the background investigation. In addition, 297 (1.5%) admitted they had attempted suicide. Because these applicants were also interviewed at NSA by a qualified clinical psychologist, an appropriate evaluation and prognosis was possible. There were 2,820 persons (13.8%) who disclosed close contact with foreign nationals. Of particular interest were the 857 persons (4.2%) who admitted close contact with Soviet bloc citizens, whose identities were not listed on the security forms. Many of these were contacts began with foreign language training but developed into friendships, with contacts continuing through personal meetings and correspondence. The examination includes questions about unauthorized divulgence. There were 2,153 persons in the 1974-1979 study who had prior access to SCI level material. Of those, 126 (5.9%) divulged classified information to members of their family and 129 (6.0%) disclosed classified information to others. The admissions, always checked by a classification authority, ranged from a one-time disclosure of confidential information to a member of the family to very serious compromises of extremely sensitive operations to outsiders, including foreign nationals. There were cases where the divulgence was not only serious, but frequent, and sometimes to total strangers. There were a few cases where persons who did not have official access to classified information heard it or saw it, and knowing it was classified, passed it on to other unauthorized persons. The most flagrant case of this kind was the son of a federal official who was stationed abroad. The son had casual access to his father's office, and was able to get improper access to highly classified material in the office without others noticing. He then disclosed this information to the sons and daughters of foreign diplomats and other foreign nationals in order to impress them. The disclosures were serious, but he was never detected while doing this. 16 1.3.6 USE OF POLYGRAPH IN ARMY PERSONNEL SECURITY CASES The U.S. Army has no general personnel screening program in which polygraph is utilized; however, the polygraph is utilized on a selective case-by-case basis. When the U.S. Army Central Clearance Facility (adjudications) receives a completed Background Investigation from the Defense Investigative Service in which there are areas of adverse information which remain unresolved, a polygraph examination may be requested to aid in the resolution. The polygraph examination is offered to the subject on a voluntary basis to aid in clarifying the areas not fully clarified by the investigation. From February 1982 to September 1983, 180 such cases were referred for polygraph examination. Of the 180 cases, 67 subjects declined to take the examination. The following statistics summarize the results of those 113 cases in which the subject agreed to undergo a polygraph examination: Overall Results Nondeceptive Deceptive Inconclusive No Opinion 28(25%) 81(72%) 2(1.5%) 2(1.5%) Where there was Deception Indicated (DI), relevant admissions were obtained in 71 cases (or 88%). The following is a breakdown by area of the DI admissions: Loyalty Drugs Sex Crimes Other Criminal Acts 16(20%) 40(49%) 11(14%) 14(17%) Loyalty cases involve unreported contacts with foreign intelligence, unreported travel to denied areas, unreported contacts with persons within denied areas, association with communist/subversive organizations, and hostage situations. Drug cases involve the use, possession, distribution, purchase or sale of Illegal drugs. Sex cases involved homosexuality, child molestation, and other aberrant sexual practices. Other criminal cases involved admissions to criminal activity other than drug involvement or sex crimes, e.g. theft, embezzlement, fraud, etc. Clearance Actions in Polygraph Cases Deceptive Nondeceptive Clearance Granted: 15 (24%) 24 (89%) Clearance Denied: 36 (76%) 3 (11%) Action was still pending in 19 DI cases and 2 nondeceptive (NDI) cases. Some of the DI cases were cleared up by minor confessions. The above figures indicate that adjudications were not based solely on polygraph results, but on the overall investigative file. 17 1.4 POLYGRAPH and the TRADITIONAL METHODS The polygraph examination is part of the processing for clearance and access in NSA and CIA. Both are necessary for complete coverage. Although many agencies rely entirely on the background investigation, neither NSA nor CIA have considered authorizing SCI access without a polygraph in more than 30 years. During the Korean emergency in 1951, when resources were inadequate to conduct background investigations in a timely manner, NSA granted temporary access based on polygraph results and a National Agency Check, with full access on receipt of the background investigation. 1.4.1 1953 - Study of Polygraph/Background In 1953, the National Security Agency conducted a study of the effectiveness of their emergency procedure of using the polygraph and National Agency Check.* That study considered 3,926 individuals who were processed for-clearance and access by NSA (and its predecessor, AFSA) between 1 November 1951 through December 1952. Of the 3,926 individuals concerned, 3,878 volunteered for a polygraph interview, and 48 refused to do so. These 3,926 individuals are further broken down into two categories: 2,902 who were interviewed prior to employment, and 1,024 who were recruited in the field and were interviewed after they were employed. Of those who refused to take a polygraph test, 41 were applicants and 7 were employees. There were 2,772 complete or partial background investigations reviewed during this study. The disparity between this figure and the total persons in the study is because, generally, when applicants revealed information during the polygraph examination which disqualified them from further consideration, no background investigation was initiated. Another contributing factor is that in the case of 64 employees and 209 applicants the reports of the complete background investigations had not yet been received by the agency at the time of the study. Of the 1,017 employees who were interviewed a total of 448 of the tests indicated no deception and the employees gave no information requiring evaluation, while 569 indicated deception, gave information requiring evaluation, or they were physically or emotionally unfit for testing. Of the 569 employees who required further security evaluation after the polygraph interview, 83 were terminated or permitted to resign in lieu of termination. In 65 of these cases the information which formed the basis for this personnel action was furnished solely as a result of the polygraph interview. Eight persons were terminated solely on the basis of information furnished from the background investigation, and 10 persons were terminated on a composite of the information from the two investigative methods. Of the 8 people who were terminated solely as a result of their background investigations, 3 made no admissions and appeared truthful on the polygraph test, while the other 5 made minor admissions or were unfit for testing. Altogether, 8.10% of all employees in the study were terminated, 78.3% on the basis of information from the polygraph interview, 9.6% on the basis of information from the background investigation, and 12.1% from a composite of the two. In addition to the 83 persons who were terminated, 248 persons covered by this study resigned voluntarily, for reasons unrelated to security, leaving 693, or 67.67% of this group remaining with the Agency. *NSA does not now authorize clearances on a polygraph and an NAC because PL 88-290 requires a full field investigation prior to clearance. 18 The clearance of 76 employees was delayed pending receipt of background investigations. Six of these persons were later terminated on the basis of information provided by the background investigation, while in the other 70 cases no information was developed which was a bar to clearance. These persons had been held for the completion of a background investigation because they were unfit for testing, because they refused to volunteer for a polygraph test, or because the information resulting from the polygraph interview was not sufficient to enable analysts to reach a security determination. In the case of 2,902 applicants for employment, 41 persons refused to volunteer for a polygraph interview, leaving 2,861 who were examined with the polygraph. The tests of 1,251 applicants indicated no deception and the applicants gave no information requiring security evaluation. The remainder of the group of applicants, 1,651 persons (56.9%), required further security determination. Of these, 696 (24.3%) were disapproved for clearance on the basis of their admissions during polygraph examination. The 610 (21.3%) who gave minor admissions were evaluated as satsifactory for clearance. Of those 2,902 who applied for employment, 1,765 (61%) entered on duty. Some of the remaining 345 applicants were denied employment for reasons not related to security, others declined proffered employment. There were 19 persons who were approved for hire on the basis of the satisfactory evaluation of their polygraph interview and a National Agency Check whp were later terminated. Eleven of these persons had made no admissions and appeared truthful on their polygraph interview. In 3 cases the individual made minor admissions which were evaluated satisfactorily, and 2 cases involved those who had refused to volunteer for a polygrah test, but were nonetheless hired. A composite of the information from the background investigation and the polygraph test formed the basis for the termination of 2 persons, and the remaining individual was terminated on the basis of information developed during the polygraph interview of another applicant. The 17 persons on whom derogatory information was developed despite clear polygraph test results and no admissions or only minor admissions represent a false negative error rate of 0.6% in the testing of 2,902 applicants. The use of the polygraph interview resulted in a considerable monetary saving in the security clearance of employees. In the group under study there were 696 applicants who were disapproved for hire and 65 employees who were terminated immediately on the basis of information derived from the polygraph interview. Calculated on the basis of a nine-month clearance period at the GS-4 level, this group of individuals would have cost the government $1,814,322 in salary alone while awaiting the completion of a background investigation. This figure is low, since the average salary of individuals awaiting clearances in the agency was above the GS-4 level and the average background time was more than nine months. The study concluded that the background investigation is at its best in areas which are a matter of record, such as employment, education, naturalization, criminal history, etc., although even in these areas more pertinent information was developed through polygraph interviews. On the other hand, in personal matters not of record, the polygraph interview is far more reliable as a producer of information for security determination. In the polygraph interview this information is obtained directly from the subject. It does not, as with the 19 background investigation, come from informants whose motiviation and reliability are often unknown, and who, in a few cases where derogatory information is concerned, are vindictive. The authors of the 1953 study observed that the primary justification for the use of the polygraph interview in personnel screening is not its financial savings to the government, but from the fact that a combination of a complete background investigation and polygraph interview provides more informaton for security determination than can be obtained from any other methods yet devised. Neither the polygraph interview nor the background investigation may be considered complete in itself. Each supplements the other; each improves the validity of security determinations. 1.4.2 1983 - Study of Polygraph/Background In 1983, the National Security Agency conducted a pilot study comparing the information obtained from polygraph interviews where the examiner did not have any information from a background investigation, with background investigations where none of the polygraph developed information reached the investigators. These "dual track" cases are unusual in that the investigation started well before the polygraph examination was conducted. Even so, some of the dual track cases had to be discarded from the study because information developed during the polygraph intervew was totally disqualifying and the Defense Investigative Service was advised to stop the investigation before it was complete. Other cases were deleted from the study because information from the polygraph interview was given to DIS as leads for further investigation, because DIS had not yet closed their case. The subjects whose files were reviewed in this study had already been evaluated as having acceptable information on their Personnel Security Questionnaires, and had received a polygraph interview sometime between 1 October 1982 and 31 January 1983. The polygraph interview and Special Background Investigation (SBI) were conducted independently, without any exchange of information. From a total of 248 randomly selected dual tracks cases, 194 cases were selected as meeting the criterion of complete independence, required by this study. The results of the study revealed that 78% of all information used for evaluation was obtained from polygraph reports. The remaining 22% of information used for evaluation came from the Special Background Investigations. In 113 cases (58%), the polygraph report was of particular value to the clearance adjudicator because it was the only investigative method to develop information for evaluation. By comparison, the SBI developed the only information in two cases (1%). In addition, there were 22 cases (11%) in which the polygraph interview and the background investigation produced dissimilar but useful information, and 14 cases (7%) in which they developed similar information. There were 43 cases (22%) in which neither source produced useful information. Although polygraph Interviews produced far more information than the background investigation, the contributions of the latter were vital, and often on matters not developed or even covered in the polygraph interview. For example, credit is discussed in a full scope polygraph screening examination, but it is not the subject of a specific polygraph question because it is not practical to develop a dichotomous issue. Similarly, character 20 deficiencies, alcoholism, a poor work record, and many other topics are often better learned from the observation of others, or from official records. In addition, the background investigation provides positive "whole person" information. The obvious conclusion was that both sources of informtion are productive, each from different sources, and both vital to the process of evaluation for clearance and access. 1.4.3 1974 - 1979 Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Personnel A study was made of admissions made by applicants who were currently or recently in the military service who were cleared for SCI access and were in a cryptologic service. This table includes the 2,426 who applied in the fiscal years 1974 through 1979. Admissions During Polygraph Interviews, FY 74 - 79 from 2,426 Military Applicants Topics Number of Persons making Percentage Espionage Admissions 13 0.6% Communist, Fascist or Terrorist Activity 25 1.0% Divulgence of Classified Information: To family 135 5.6% To others 132 5.4% Secret Foreign Contacts 1 .04% Soviet Bloc Travel 70 2.9% Soviet Bloc Contacts 60 2.5% Drugs Marijuana 1654 68.2% Marijuana over 100 times 159 6.6% Uppers, Downer, etc. 243 10.0% Cocaine and Heroin 65 2.7% Crimes Misdemeanors 322 13.3% Felonies 68 3.3% Alcohol Problems Past 25 1.0% Present 4 0.2 % Deliberate Falsification of the Security Form 152 6.3% Serious Credit Problems 57 2.3% Psychological Problems Treatment 107 4.4% Suicide Attempted 14 0.5% In regard to the espionage admissions, most knew of or had strong reason to suspect others of engaging in espionage against the United States but had not reported it. A few were personally involved in espionage. See examples in this chapter. 21 1.4.A 1981 Polygraph Results from Cleared Military Personnel A study was made of the 318 applicant cases for FY 81 in which the applicant was currently or recently in the military service in a cryptologic assignment with SCI access. In every case they had been the subject of a Special Background Investigation at some time in their career, and some had update investigations. All these investigative results had been evaluated as satisfactory for clearance and access. In some cases, the background investigation was in the security file available to the examiner. In the majority of cases it was not. The table below lists only that information obtained during the polygraph examination which was not in the security file. The tables exclude all information obtained during background investigation, special investigations, and security interviews. Admissions During Polygraph Interviews, FY 81 from 3l8 Military Applicants Topic Number of Persons making Percentage Espionage Admissions 0 0 Communist, Fascist or Terrorist Activity 1 0.3% Divulgence of Classified Information: To family 13 4.1% To others 10 3.1% Secret Foreign Contacts 0 0 Soviet Bloc Travel 15 4.7% Soviet Bloc Contacts 6 1.9% Drugs Marijuana 141 44.3% Marijuana over 100 times 16 5.0% Uppers, Downers, etc. 31 9.7 % Cocaine & Heroin 12 3.8% Crimes Misdemeanors 38 11.9% Felonies 12 3.8% Alcohol Problems Past 7 2.2% Present x 1 0.3% Deliberate Falsification of Security Form 7 2.2% Serious Credit Problems 14 4.4% Psychological Problems Treatment 14 4.4 % Suicide Attempted 5 1.6% Not all of the admissions listed above were disqualifying. The table does not disclose amounts or recency. Note that the first major topics are similar to the topics usually included among the questions in counterintelligence polygraph examinations used for special access determinations. 22 1.4.5 1983 - Study of Interviews/Polygraph One of the additional techniques sometimes used in processing people for classified access, particularly SCI, is a thorough security interview. For several years, NSA has conducted security interviews of incoming military personnel assigned to NSA. The interviewers are experienced Special Agents of NSA who are specifically trained for this work. The scope of their interview is very similar to that of the polygraph examinations given by NSA to civilian applicants for clearance and access. A 1983 study at NSA reviewed the information obtained on 13 topics that are covered in both the security interview and the polygraph examination. A random sample of 100 security files containing military security interviews was taken from the list of those military persons who were interviewed between March 1981 and July 1983 on arrival at NSA. Another random sample of 100 cases for that period was taken from the security files in which there was a polygraph examination of a military assignee to NSA who took the examination as part of his processing for civilian employment at NSA. In 49% of the cases, the interviewers obtained admissions from already cleared incoming military personnel which required security adjudication. In all, there were 87 specific admissions. The subject matter included ten of the thirteen topics covered in both the interview and the polygraph examination. The polygraph examiners obtained admissions requiring security adjudication in 82% of the examinations of the already cleared military personnel who were seeking civilian employment. There were a total of 111 specific admissions. The admissions covered nine of the mutual topics. A second analysis compared the security interview conducted on entry and the subsequent polygraph examination of those 100 military persons who applied for a civilian position at NSA. The security interview predated the polygraph examination by a range, of a few months to three years. The polygraph examiner, ofcourse, had access to the interview report prior to the examination. What is interesting is that in these 100 randomly selected cases the examiner got information which predated the security interviews, on nine of the thirteen mutual topics. For example, in 31 cases (31%), the examiner obtained information on drug involvement that predated the security interview. 1.5 SURVEYS OF EXAMINEES 1982 Air Force Survey In 1982 the Air Force began a pilot polygraph project to conduct conunterintelligence/security polygraph examinations of personnel who have access to extremely sensitive and highly classified USAF projects. After the project began, AF0SI began a survey of individuals who had voluntarily taken an examination in connection with that access. The questionnaire was answered in the reception room immediately following the examination out of the presence of the examiner. No identifying data was included with the replies. The 1,355 individuals responding to the survey gave their answers, totaled below in percentages, to each of the six questions. The "other” response includes answers such as "don’t know" and no answers. 23 a. Were you offended, embarrassed, humiliated YES NO OTHER or degraded in any way during any part of the examination? 2.0% 98.0% 0 b. Do you think the examination was unfair in any way? c. Was there any objectionable or unwarranted invasion .9% 99.0% .1% of your privacy during the examination? d. Do you feel counterintelligence security polygraph .7% 99.1% .2% examinations enhance the security of your work environment? e. If you changed jobs and your new employer required a counterintellignece security polygraph examination, would 94.9% 4.1% 1.0% you undergo the examination? f. If an act of sabotage of espionage occurred and you were asked to take a polygraph examination to find the person who committed these acts, would you take a polygraph 98.2% 1.5% .3% examination to resolved the matter? 99.2% .7% .1% There are only two other surveys of employees who have taken polygraph examinations for security clearance and access, or have taken counterintelligence examinations. 1.5.1 1951 Survey of Atomic Energy Commission Employees In 1951, Professor Paul V. Trovillo, a psychologist from Arizona State University, was employed to survey the use of the polygraph by a private contractor, Russell Chatham, Incorporated, at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. His survey covered the use of the polygraph on employees at the Atomic Engergy Commission facilities who had sensitive access. All of the employees had a full field background investigation conducted by the FBI. The period covered by the survey was 17 February 1946 to 10 April 1951. (It is noted that none of the persons involved in the extensive Soviet atomic espionage network which operated during those years were among those who took polygraph examinations at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Whether or not the polygraph deterred Soviet intellignece from an attempt to penetrate the Oak Ridge facility is unknown.) Trovillo reported that approximately 12,000 polygraph examinations were conducted in that period, including applicants for clearance by employees of contractors, and applicants seeking initial employment which required a Q clearance. In addition to the initial polygraph examination, each employee was subject to additional examinations. Depending on the sensitivity of access, some employees were reexamined every three or six months. Trovillo personally interviewed a representative sample of employees who were in the retesting program. The employees included engineers, scientists, clerks, and chemical workers, including their union President. Of the 59 interviewed by Trovillo, only two (3.4%) expressed any resentment toward the polygraph tests (Trovillo 1947). 24 1.5.2 1956 Survey of NSA Applicants A survey was taken of all applicants for employment at NSA who were processed in January 1956. Of the 522 applicants who were surveyed, 361 were male, 362 were unmarried, 186 had a baccalaureate degree in a liberal arts field, and 206 had a degree in a scientific field. The survey covered these statements, with the responses indicated in percentages: a. The polygraph examiner impressed me as being professionally competent and well trained. 1 . strongly agree 58% 2. agree 36% 94% 3. undecided 4% 4% 4. disagree 1% 2% 5. strongly disagree b. In my opinion, the polygraph as security of the Agency. 1 . strongly agree 38% 2. agree 36% 74% 3. undecided 19% 19% 4. disagree 5% 7% 5. strongly disagree c. If examination, for future I would: reasons, I were 1 . be willing 91% 2. undecided 8% 3. refuse 1% agree undecided disagree 1 % by NSA is important to protect the agree undecided disagree 2 % to volunteer for another polygraph 25 1.5.3 Surveys In Lav Enforcement and Commerce The Washoe County Sheriff's Department (Reno, Nevada) surveyed 85 applicants after their preemployment polygraph examinations. The results were tabulated (Putnam 1978) according to the responses to these questions: 1. Were you in any manner embarrassed, humiliated, or degraded by any part of the polygraph examination process? No: 92.9% (n=79), Yes: 7.1% (n=6). 2. In your opinion, was there any objectionable or unwarranted invasion of your privacy during the conduct of the polygraph examination? No: 100% (n=85). 3. Should you be hired, do you believe you will be more secure and comfortable in your work knowing the polygraph is used in personnel evaluation? Yes: 97.6% (n=83), No: 1.2% (n=l), no opinion: 1.2% (n=l). Several very similar surveys of subjects of commercial screening have been made in recent years. Dr. B. A. Silverberg of Canada conducted three surveys of the subjects of polygraph examinations in 1980 asking the same questions used earlier in surveys by Ash (1973) and Buckley (1980). The questions were used again recently by Phannenstill (1983). A table shows the results of the six surveys. The answers which are other than the one listed for each item are mostly the opposite, but there are also a few unclear replies, or no answers at all to that item. 26 SURVEYS OF EXAMINEES OF COMMERCIAL TESTING m ro On C/3 CO O CO ON 00 CN »-• II CU c c o J-l O JO H >-■ cu > f-H •H C /3 o • CO <45 >-< On o z 1 •> CN CO c oo o CM J-l J-l —< CM OJ 0) II o M JO c 03 CO J-i C/3 J-i 0/ o > 00 C ON o 0'''? 4 on oo —< S'? CO oo —< ON —I S'? CM 00 —< O' CM S'? ^-o I'- on On On s^ cn co 00 CM S'? CO ON P" O' *—4 B-? co 00 t ~~i ON —• S'? o- c CM >o u co QJ O J3 C cm So > O 4-1 J-l CO O CL S'? O' CIO O ON CN S'? cv CO I/O ON ON S'? CO cm O L O QJ X C HOt0 >iL*J( 0(0 cn cn -a o