331.89 
 M55S
 
 
 
 •
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 
 
 AT URBAHA-CHAMPAI6N 
 
 STACKS
 
 STRIKES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES: 
 
 A REMEDY. 
 
 BY 
 WALTER GORDON MERRITT 
 
 A condensed version of this Monograph appears 
 in "THE OUTLOOK" for January 8th, 1910, and 
 this pamphlet is published with its permission. 
 
 Published fot Circulation by the 
 
 American Anti-Boycott Association 
 
 27 WILLIAM STREET - NEW YORK CITY
 

 
 STRIKES AND PUBLIC UTILITIES: A REMEDY 
 
 The occurrence of a considerable number of strikes on public 
 utilities during the last year, with the attendant loss and incon- 
 venience to the public, renders timely a review of this evil and 
 a search for a remedy. While most of these strikes were ter- 
 minated without causing great public affliction or attracting any 
 considerable public attention, the comparatively recent disturb- 
 ances in Georgia and Philadelphia developed to serious and 
 menacing proportions and commanded the attention of the whole 
 country. 
 
 The Georgia Railroad, like all of the important railroads in 
 this country, is an interstate commerce utility over which the 
 Federal Government may exercise control under the broad con- 
 stitutional power to control and regulate interstate commerce. 
 On all matters directly affecting the conduct of interstate com- 
 merce Congress may legislate to the exclusion of State interfer- 
 ence. For this reason the strike on the Georgia Railroad raises 
 the question of the relation of our Federal Government to labor 
 controversies that may arise on any of our numerous, important, 
 and almost indispensable railroads. The Georgia Railroad owns 
 J^and operates about 300 miles of road, but its operations were 
 totally suspended, and the use of its tracks for commerce, upon 
 which the people had been taught to rely as a necessity, was 
 absolutely abandoned on account of a dispute concerning about 
 75 firemen. The strike lasted twelve days, and for five days 
 not a wheel turned on the whole system. In this short time all 
 transportation in that section was generally interrupted, includ- 
 ing the delivery of the United States mail, business was seriously 
 interfered with, entailing immense losses, and physical suffering 
 became so imminent that there were frantic appeals from dif- 
 ferent communities on account of the threatened famine. The 
 strike was finally settled by a compromise on the arrival and 
 interposition of a member of the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
 sion, who went to Georgia to investigate the situation in the 
 performance of duties imposed on him by the Federal statutes. 1 
 
 l The Erdman Law was passed by Congress in 1898 and provides machinery 
 | for voluntary arbitration. Three arbitrations, including that of the Georgia Railroad, 
 have been effected under it. 
 
 P 
 
 6512
 
 The strike in the City of Philadelphia was on the local trac- 
 tion lines, and accordingly could only be reached by State laws 
 and State authority unless it had become such a general insur- 
 rection as to call for the intervention of Federal troops. It was 
 an astounding sight to see that third city of this country, and the 
 city of men of traditional peace, in disorder and chaos, many 
 of its streets disturbed by violence and much of its business 
 interrupted for a full week, because of a strike on a street railway 
 system. When one beholds a usually orderly city with its normal 
 life suspended, with property openly destroyed on its streets in 
 defiance of law, and with lives of its citizens endangered by 
 assaults, a natural love of law and order demands some reason- 
 able safeguard against a repetition of similar happenings. 
 
 But these two disturbances, confined to comparatively small 
 areas, but mildly suggest the evils and dangers that might be 
 caused by strikes on public service corporations. The terrors 
 of the anthracite coal strike of 1902 are still unforgotten, but 
 the strike of the American Railway Union in the early summer 
 of 1894 above all others demonstrates the dangerous possibilities. 
 It will be remembered that this great strike grew out of an effort 
 to aid the striking employees of the Pullman Car Company by 
 a combined refusal of railroad employees of many different com- 
 panies to handle or haul any cars made by that company. It 
 resulted in the sudden abandonment of the railroads by about 
 100,000 men and the paralysis of some twenty-four lines center- 
 ing in Chicago. It was not a local strike limited to a city or 
 State, but a vast National disturbance extending throughout the 
 whole Middle West and the Far West and causing lawlessness 
 and disorder wherever the telegrams of the union reached. 
 
 The situation is best revealed by reviewing some of these 
 telegrams exchanged between Debs and Phelan, the two principal 
 union leaders : 
 
 Debs to Phelan : 
 
 "June 27, 1894, 
 "Indications are that all western lines will be 
 tied up solidly before sunset to-day." 
 
 Phelan to Debs : 
 
 "June 28, 1894. 
 "I cannot keep others out if Big Four is 
 excepted. The rest are emphatic on all together 
 or none. The tie-up is successful." 
 
 Debs to Phelan : 
 
 "June 29, 1894. 
 "About 25 lines now paralyzed. More follow- 
 ing. Tremendous blockade." 
 
 4
 
 Debs to Phelan: 
 
 "July 2, 1894. 
 "Knock it to them hard as possible. Keep Big 
 Four out and help get them out at other places." 
 
 Phelan to Debs : 
 
 "July 2, 1894. 
 "Going out all round. Firemen a unit. Will 
 soon be an avalanche to us. Working outside 
 points." 
 
 Debs to Phelan : 
 
 "July 2, 1894. 
 "Hold Big Four solid. Going out to-day at 
 every point. Gaining ground rapidly." 
 
 Debs to Phelan : 
 
 "July 2, 1894. 
 "Advices from all points show our position 
 strengthened. Baltimore & Ohio, Pan Handle, Big 
 Four, Lake Shore, Erie, Grand Trunk and Michi- 
 gan Central are now in fight. Take measures to 
 paralyze all those that enter Cincinnati. Not a 
 wheel turning on Grand Trunk between here and 
 Canadian line." 
 
 These telegrams tell only half the story, for they naturally 
 disclose nothing of the acts of the lawless mobs in different parts 
 of the country. To understand that aspect of the situation one 
 should read the mass of letters and telegrams that passed be- 
 tween Attorney-General Olney and the marshals and district 
 attorneys of the many States and territories frantically wiring 
 for instructions and funds to enforce the laws against the ruling 
 mobs and the fast spreading disorders. Nothing short of the 
 combined force of our army and judiciary was able to re-establish 
 the supremacy of law. 
 
 Now, the simple but appalling truth is, that there is nothing 
 in our laws to-day which forbids a strike as far-reaching and 
 as disastrous as the coal strike of 1902 or the railroad strikes of 
 1894, or denies the right of a combination of men to create such 
 a critical condition. This does not mean that the Debs strikes of 
 1894 were lawful or that every railroad strike is lawful any more 
 than it means that every strike in an ordinary industry is lawful, 
 but it does mean that there has been no distinction drawn between 
 strikes on public service corporations and strikes on ordinary 
 corporations, and that the law, while imposing certain peculiar 
 obligations on the employer in a public service corporation to 
 accommodate the public, has illogically refrained from impress- 
 ing the same obligation on the employees or placing any com- 
 parative limitation on their liberty.
 
 It is not improbable that a strike so timed and arranged as 
 to necessarily cause immediate loss of life and property would 
 be declared unlawful, whether it affected a public service corpora- 
 tion or not. This may be and should be the rule as to a strike 
 of the pumpmen in the mines, when a combined cessation of 
 their work will result in flooding and ruining the property, and 
 such should be the rule as to a strike of trainmen who abandon 
 their train in a way that would endanger life and property. But 
 this principle has never been generally recognized, and the pos- 
 sibility of its future recognition affords little or no protection 
 against the evil in question, as the public may at any time be 
 deprived of the use of public facilities by a strike which does 
 not offend it. The enforcement of such a principle of law would 
 in no way prevent a general and almost simultaneous with- 
 drawal from service by prearrangement of all railroad employees 
 as rapidly as the men ran their trains into some station or con- 
 venient piece of sidetracking. 
 
 There are also other kinds of strikes that are unlawful and 
 can be prevented, whether on public service corporations or 
 private corporations. The railroad strikes in 1894, which were 
 sympathetic and took the form of a boycott against the Pullman 
 cars, were unlawful for that reason, as is also an analogous strike 
 of employees in a shoe factory because they are unwilling to use 
 racks made in a non-union woodworking mill. The same is true 
 under many rulings of a strike to secure the employment of union 
 men exclusively and establish a closed shop. All these strikes 
 are equally unlawful in whatever business they occur, but their 
 illegality is in no way inconsistent with the startling proposition 
 that a peaceful strike seeking higher wages and better conditions 
 of employment for the strikers themselves may at any time ter- 
 minate our primary fuel supply, leave our cities in darkness, 
 suspend the operations of our street railways and paralyze the 
 railroad operations of the country, as was done in 1894, thereby 
 causing enormous business losses and physical suffering. The 
 thought of an obstinate and protracted strike of railroad em- 
 ployees is fearful, and its far reaching consequences are unim- 
 aginable. It would be difficult to break the union monopoly of 
 skilled engineers and trainmen and the attempt to operate trains 
 with inexperienced hands would, to say the least, be hazardous. 
 
 Generally speaking, we have been exceedingly fortunate in 
 the number and extent of strikes on public service corporations 
 since 1894, and have not by any means experienced the fullness 
 of disaster and disturbance which this unremedied situation 
 might produce. The fear of a hostile public opinion has deterred 
 both employer and employee from, provoking a situation which 
 would cost the general public both convenience and safety. One
 
 constantly reads in the daily papers apprehensive news items and 
 editorials concerning the proposed strike of certain switchmen, 
 firemen, or engineers, as the case may be, but the number of 
 these threatened strikes which actually occur is small, although 
 our escapes have been narrow. There is, however, no security 
 against disturbances under leadership such as now dominates our 
 labor unions, and history proves that good management and 
 benevolent treatment of employees are but small safeguards 
 against conflicts, as witness the tribulations of the Utopian Na- 
 tional Cash Register Company, of Dayton, Ohio. Even so con- 
 servative and intelligent a leader as P. M. Arthur, former chief 
 executive of the Locomotive Engineers, declared a boycott against 
 the Ann Arbor Railroad and ordered strikes on connecting lines 
 because those companies were attempting to perform the legal 
 duty imposed upon them as common carriers, by hauling the 
 cars of the Ann Arbor Railroad. This combination, which was 
 unlawful for many reasons, was enjoined, but if a leader of the 
 type of Mr. Arthur will initiate such a combination there is good 
 reason for providing further protection against it and the more 
 frequent type of strike which the law does not now forbid. The 
 alarming strike of the postal employees in France also indicates 
 the extent of the dangers which confront us. A strike of gov- 
 ernment employees, or a strike of a monopoly like a railroad, 
 is not like a strike against competing companies which tests only 
 the financial endurance and courage of employer and employee, 
 but.is a strike against society. As railroads come more and more 
 under government domination, all such strikes become more like 
 a rebellion. 
 
 Neither is the spirit of compromise, which has avoided many 
 strikes on railroads, and of which we have just spoken, without 
 its serious objections. These compromises and makeshifts, born 
 of a fear to encounter public wrath, if the public service is tem- 
 porarily discontinued by a strike, have doubtlessly increased the 
 cost of operation, interfered with the discipline of employees and 
 impaired the efficiency and safety of the service. Rather than 
 provoke a strike an employer will yield the enforcement of a rule 
 which may be best for the public safety and convenience. The 
 relation of employer and employee on a railroad should, by reason 
 of the peculiar character of the service, embody much of the 
 character of strict obedience which prevails between a captain 
 and a private in an army. It is not possible to carry out this 
 conception, however, if the employee is partially in control and 
 the employer is fearful of provoking a strike. For this reason, 
 as well as others, there would be an advantage to the public in 
 having the grievances of employees corrected by some other 
 method than the right to strike and the fear of its exercise. An 
 adjustment between employer and employee, effected through
 
 mutual fear and without the intervention of a third party, is more 
 regardful of the interests of the two rival parties than of the 
 public good. 
 
 It is not easy to prescribe a practical cure for the evils of 
 strikes on public service corporations, and a discussion of the 
 situation must not begin with preconceived convictions, but in 
 the broad receptive spirit which carefully weighs all suggestions 
 before it accepts or rejects. There is, however, one conviction 
 on which this article proceeds at the risk of appearing to violate 
 the writer's own rule. This is the conviction that there is a real 
 evil which requires a remedy and that the remedy must be radical 
 and drastic enough to effectually prevent all strikes on public 
 service corporations. If mild methods like conciliation will sub- 
 stantially attain this end they are more to be desired than legis- 
 lative interference of a more compulsory nature, but if they are 
 not sufficient, more radical measures will be welcome, as the 
 means must be adequate for the end. It is not believed that arly 
 evil involved in a well-conceived remedy will equal the evil 
 sought to be reached. One who fairly balances the dangers of 
 the two situations must choose legislative interference as the 
 lesser. 
 
 The necessity for dealing with this situation is immediate. 
 Strikes and large combinations are not easy to control by the 
 strong arm of the law if they become the settled habit and prac- 
 tice of a people, for in the number of persons involved they 
 become in some cases in the nature of an insurrection, and the 
 difficulty of punishing each offender is great. On the other hand, 
 laws passed against combinations before they have been too long 
 an accepted privilege are more readily acquiesced in. Generally 
 speaking, the public conception of the right rule of conduct does 
 not transgress our laws, and a law against a certain kind of 
 combination leads the public to abandon that combination and 
 regard it as something wrong. It is in this way educational in 
 the highest degree. For this reason it would have been better 
 for this country if it had long ago adopted a system of legislation 
 restricting strikes on public service corporations as other 
 countries have done, and for the same reason further delay is 
 objectionable, as it will lead the working people to grow stronger 
 and more determined in their assertion of the right to strike. 
 Already the strike seems to be regarded as a sacred, inviolable 
 and unrestricted right, and it is difficult to convince people that 
 it may be legal or illegal, depending upon the object to be attained 
 and the methods of carrying it out. 
 
 In discussing the various remedies which may suggest them- 
 selves, it must be borne in mind that a suggestion made as to 
 public service corporations, where the public interest is peculiar
 
 and the obligations of the proprietors extraordinary, is in no 
 way a necessary criterion for ordinary private corporations or 
 an ordinary business. The law has always treated quasi public 
 corporations as a class by themselves, impressed with certain obli- 
 gations to the public which differentiate them from ordinary 
 corporations. When a man utilizes his private carriages and 
 horses in connection with a public stage line he dedicates them 
 to the public service and forfeits much of the independence of 
 control which ownership of property usually implies. He can- 
 not discontinue the service unreasonably and he cannot refuse to 
 furnish accommodations to all the public, friends or enemies, 
 who desire to travel by his stage. The same principle applies to 
 railroads, street railways, lighting plants and many other facilities 
 upon which public safety and convenience and the transaction of 
 business is peculiarly dependent. The absolute control of the 
 property is surrendered by the investors when they undertake to 
 supply the public with such important facilities. The franchise 
 may also be forfeited if operations are discontinued. These dis- 
 tinctions, which apply also to innkeepers and other kinds of 
 public utilities, are too well known and have been too long 
 established to require further elaboration. They rest upon a 
 sound and unquestioned rule of public policy. It is the more 
 strange, therefore, that the law has not extended this distinction 
 into the relations of men employed by railroads and other public 
 service corporations and deprived them of such liberty as would 
 make possible a sudden and disastrous interruption in the opera- 
 tion of public utilities. Judge Jenkins, in a decision rendered 2 
 while a United States Judge, but which was much criticized 
 because of the sweeping injunction granted, saw the wisdom 
 of this fundamental principle, and said : 
 
 "One has not the right arbitrarily to quit service 
 without regard to the necessities of that service. 
 His right of abandonment is limited by the assump- 
 tion of that service and the conditions and exigen- 
 cies attaching thereto. It would be monstrous if a 
 surgeon, upon demand and refusal of larger com- 
 pensation, could lawfully abandon an operation 
 partially performed, leaving his knife in the bleeding 
 body of his patient." 
 
 and again, 
 
 "The railway is a great public highway. Its pri- 
 mary duty is to the public. In the interest of the 
 public it must be kept a going concern, although it 
 
 2 See Justice Harlan's opinion in Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed., 310, which modified 
 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 60 Fed., 803.
 
 prove unremunerative to the shareholders. Bond- 
 holders and shareholders invest their money in 
 view of the public nature of the enterprise. Their 
 rights and interests are subordinated to the public 
 duty charged upon the road. And so, also, 
 employees in entering the service assume obliga- 
 tions co-extensive in kind with that of the corpor- 
 ation." 
 
 It would seem to be reasonable to provide that one who 
 entered the service of a quasi public corporation should forfeit 
 some of his liberty as a condition of his employment and an 
 assurance of the performance of the implied obligation he 
 assumes. Yet the truth is that this general principle laid down 
 by Judge Jenkins has never been adopted, and the injunction in 
 support of which he gave this opinion was so modified on appeal 
 as to impliedly overrule and nullify it. In fact, Mr. Justice 
 Harlan, now of our United States Supreme Court, expressly 
 repudiated this principle, holding that it established a rule of 
 conduct which the legislature alone could prescribe. 2 Thus, while 
 distinctions have been drawn between quasi public corporations 
 and ordinary corporations, affecting the obligations of the officers 
 and stockholders in many ways, these distinctions have never 
 been extended to employees, and their right to strike is as 
 unlimited when they are employed by public service corporations 
 as it is when in other employment. The advocacy of this article, 
 however, like the theory underlying much legislation in other 
 countries, is that a distinction should be drawn by the legislature 
 between the right to strike on public service corporations and the 
 right to strike on ordinary private corporations ; and that 
 employees of public service corporations should be impressed 
 with special obligations to the public as suggested by Judge 
 Jenkins. 
 
 Various experiments have been tried by other countries to 
 deal with this situation, and probably the best known of all is 
 the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907. The 
 immediate cause of this act was the strike of the coal miners of 
 Alberta, which threatened to deprive the people of fuel£ The act 
 is limited to public utilities and does not attempt to prohibit 
 strikes except to enforce their temporary postponement. It pro- 
 vides for a reference and an investigation of disputes by a con- 
 ciliation board and imposes penalties for calling a strike or 
 declaring a lockout during the hearings. The report of the board 
 is then made public, and it is confidently hoped and expected 
 that public opinion, crystalized by such a report, will effect a 
 settlement. Undoubtedly this act has accomplished a measurable 
 good and has more than justified its enactment for, while the 
 results are partly a matter of speculation, it is probable that a 
 
 10
 
 large number of strikes have been avoided in this way. This act 
 also reduces the disastrous effect of a strike, for it gives the 
 employer considerable opportunity to prepare for the emergency 
 and provide other employees for continuing the service without 
 interruption. The unions may well object that it emasculates the 
 strike without providing for any other means of correcting their 
 grievances, for a strike which takes place after an. employer has 
 had ample time to prepare loses many of its terrors. 
 
 But from the point of view of the public safety and con- 
 venience, the principal fact is that this piece of Canadian legis- 
 lation does not prohibit, and has not entirely prevented, strikes. 
 The strike of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in the summer of 
 1908 is proof of this statement, for this strike took place after 
 this law went into effect and the board of conciliation acting 
 thereunder had reported. Furthermore, if the board should be 
 equally divided or almost equally divided on the merits of any 
 controversy, its report would scarcely serve to focus public opin- 
 ion to any great extent. The act, therefore, is satisfactory as far 
 as it goes, but it does not prevent the great public wrong of inter- 
 rupting the service on public utilities, and is in that way open 
 to the charge of inadequacy. It is notable, too, that when the 
 act was proposed and discussed there were many employers and 
 employees who felt that it should go the full length of provid- 
 ing compulsory arbitration. 
 
 The plan adopted in Victoria is very suggestive. It provided 
 that any employee who should cease to discharge the duties of 
 his employment on account of the then existing strike should be 
 considered a striker and should forfeit all rights to any pension 
 fund or annuity, as well as any legal privileges arising out of his 
 position. Provisions were made for restitution of his privileges 
 in the discretion of the railway commissioners with the consent 
 of the governor and council, but the privileges were so valuable 
 that their threatened loss might well act as an effective deterrent 
 to control strikes. 
 
 A few other remedies that are suggested by the laws of 
 different countries may well be mentioned at this point. Several 
 European countries provide that railroad employees must give a 
 notice of a certain number of days of their intention to withdraw 
 from service. Germany denies employees of railroads the right 
 accorded to most other employees of organizing trade unions for 
 the purpose of conducting strikes. In Belgium one who leaves 
 the employ of the government service on the railroads will not 
 be reinstated. France provides imprisonment for engineers or 
 firemen who abandon their posts while the train is on a run. In 
 Italy when the railway employees proposed to strike, they were 
 told that they would be regarded as public employees engaged 
 
 11
 
 in an unlawful combination against the government. Nether- 
 lands imposes a penalty on any official or employee of a rail- 
 road who refuses to perform his duty with a view to interrupting 
 traffic. Of course, in some of these countries the government 
 owns or controls the railroads, but the variety of legislation on 
 this point manifests, nevertheless, a common appreciation of the 
 dangers and inconvenience accompanying strikes on public service 
 corporations and the necessity of preventing them. Should our 
 country remain behind these others in enlightened government of 
 this kind? 
 
 In treating this subject as far as it relates to the United 
 States it will clarify the situation if at the outset we confine our 
 attention to interstate railroads and the attitude of the United 
 States government toward them. The problem concerning street 
 railways and other public service corporations which are subject 
 to State laws exclusively is so similar in its nature that it can 
 then be treated very briefly without much repetition. The several 
 States must be relied upon to supply the remedy for strikes on 
 public service works within their limits, while the United States 
 government must supply the remedy as to interstate commerce, 
 but in either case it is the same problem as to the relation of 
 government to quasi public corporations, and it is immaterial for 
 our purposes whether we take up some individual State for 
 consideration or our Federal government. In view of this fact, 
 and because they are of greater importance, we will first con- 
 sider the question of the Federal control of railroads as it relates 
 to strikes. 
 
 We already have statutes which embody some of the virtues 
 and faults of the Canadian Industrial Disputes Act for our 
 Federal laws since 1898 have provided for conciliation and arbi- 
 tration in case of labor disputes on railroads. Whenever a 
 controversy arises concerning conditions of employment which 
 threatens to interrupt the service, the chairman of the Interstate 
 Commerce Commission and the Commissioner of Labor must, 
 upon the request of either party to the controversy, put them- 
 selves in communication with both parties and endeavor to effect 
 an amicable settlement. If these commissioners fail in their 
 endeavors to effect a settlement in this way, it is their duty to 
 attempt to bring about an arbitration for which the act also 
 provides, but the weakness of the act is apparent in the fact that 
 even this work of investigation and conciliation cannot be under- 
 taken on the initiative of the government but only on the request 
 of one of the parties. 
 
 The board of arbitration for which the act provides in the 
 event that mediation and conciliation by the commissioners fails, 
 
 12
 
 is but a temporary board chosen for the purposes of the particu- 
 lar controversy and not like many State boards of permanent 
 standing. It consists of three members, one chosen by the com- 
 pany, one by the employees and a third chosen by the two first 
 selected. On the failure of the two arbitrators first selected to 
 agree upon a third arbitrator within five days after their first 
 meeting, he is to be chosen by the Commissioner of Labor and 
 the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The 
 arbitrators have power to issue subpoenas for witnesses, to com- 
 pel the production of books and to administer oaths. If neces- 
 sary, they may invoke the aid of the United States Courts for 
 this purpose. The award is to be filed in the office of the Clerk 
 of the Circuit Court of the United States and judgment entered 
 thereon, but exceptions may be filed against said award and are 
 heard by the United States Circuit Court. During the course 
 of the arbitration no employee shall be discharged except for 
 inefficiency, violation of law or neglect of duty, and the employees 
 shall not unite in any strike. ....The award of the arbitrators shall 
 continue in force for one year, but the only protection to the 
 public and the only restriction against further strikes or boy- 
 cotts is a provision, which forbids the employer to discharge an 
 employee, and an employee to quit work, because of dissatisfac- 
 tion with the award, at any time within three months after the 
 award except on giving thirty days' notice in writing of such 
 intention. It is thus possible and lawful under this act for any 
 railroad company or employee to give immediate notice of dis- 
 satisfaction with the award after its rendition and to inaugurate 
 a strike or lockout within thirty days. It is also permissible for 
 either party to declare a strike or lockout, as the case might be, 
 at any time after three months without notice, as if no arbitra- 
 tion had taken place. The act would seem to be even less satis- 
 factory than the Canadian Industrial Disputes Act, for it does not 
 provide for any investigation and award except by the consent of 
 the parties, while the Canadian Act contemplates a compulsory 
 investigation and report regardless of their consent. Even the 
 harmless work of conciliation can only be undertaken on the request 
 of either party and not on the initiative of the government or the 
 suffering public. When the consent of the parties is actually 
 obtained for arbitration, it accomplishes but little more than the 
 Canadian Act, for it has no binding force beyond the provision 
 that forbids strikes or lockouts within three months, except on 
 thirty days' written notice. This affords but slight protection to 
 the public and but slight inducement or justification for parties 
 to enter into the protracted, harassing and inconvenient hearings 
 of arbitration. In the eleven years that this law has been on our 
 statute books, only three arbitrations have been effected under it, 
 including that which more recently terminated the strike on the 
 Georgia Railroad. There have also been a number of successful 
 
 13
 
 mediations. Like the Canadian Act this Federal statute is open 
 to the charge of inadequacy and leaves unsolved the problem set 
 before us of effectually abolishing strikes on public utilities. Let 
 us therefore proceed. 
 
 The problem is twofold : ( 1 ) the negative consideration 
 which must effectually abolish strikes on public service corpora- 
 tions; (2) the affirmative consideration which deals with the 
 necessity of providing some protection to employees in lieu of the 
 protection now afforded by the right to strike. 
 
 In dealing with the first aspect of the problem, the most log- 
 ical piece of legislation is a prohibition against strikes on public 
 service corporations. This should not be startling. The right to 
 strike is not an inherent or constitutional right which cannot be 
 controlled, regulated or prohibited. At common law a strike was 
 declared unlawful and it has come to be permitted not because it 
 was the logical outgrowth of legal principles established in the 
 past or because of legislation, but as a measure of expediency 
 recognized by the courts for the protection of the working class 
 against the encroachments of the more powerful employer. It 
 is in its nature the same as a combination of capitalists to control 
 prices and no one would suggest that such a combination could 
 not be regulated or forbidden. A prohibition against strikes does 
 not in any way deny the individual his right to work or not to 
 work, but only the right to do those things which in themselves 
 are in restraint of trade and involve a voluntary surrender of an 
 important part of his individual freedom of action. As in 
 Germany, men who seek employment in a public service corpor- 
 ation should have impressed upon them the obligation of not 
 quitting work simultaneously by prearrangement in a way to 
 interrupt the service and should be denied the privilege of organ- 
 ization for that purpose. Such legislation should make such com- 
 binations both criminal and civil offenses and provide for the 
 remedy of injunction as well as damages in a civil suit and 
 penalties in a criminal prosecution. 
 
 It is probable that proper penalties specified in such a law 
 would act as an effective deterrent against any general violation 
 of it, but even if an attempt were made to organize a strike 
 contrary to the law it could be controlled by the injunctive process 
 of the courts. Equity will never grant an injunction ordering 
 men to remain at work, as it is manifestly impracticable to 
 enforce such a decree, but equity can and will enjoin men from 
 organizing and instigating a strike and conducting the usual and 
 necessary preliminaries to the organization of a strike. Strikes 
 are not voluntary or natural uprisings or coincident withdrawals 
 of men from employment, but involve elaborate preparations so 
 
 14
 
 that all men, willing and unwilling, will act in concert. As 
 Carlyle said: "Insurrection is difficult, each individual uncertain 
 of his next neighbor; totally uncertain of his distant neighbors." 
 Moreover, the frequent resorts to violence and intimidation 
 measure the difficulties of organizing and maintaining a strike 
 and demonstrate the necessity for disciplinary and coercive 
 measures on the part of the union to bring about concerted action. 
 
 It is these elaborate but necessary preparations for a strike 
 and the various means of maintaining them that can always be 
 enjoined where strikes are unlawful and could be enjoined in the 
 case of employees in public service corporations if they are for- 
 bidden to strike. The injunction, while limited to this unlawful 
 strike, would forbid the calling of a meeting to consider the 
 strike, the actual voting on the question of the strike, the 
 announcement of the result of any vote, the communication of 
 any orders and decrees of the union concerning the strike, the 
 inducement of any men to quit work and join the strike, the 
 inducement of any men to refrain from work for the purpose of 
 maintaining the strike, the collection of any fines for refusing to 
 strike, the expulsion of a union member for refusing to strike, 
 and finally the payment of any strike benefits. An injunction 
 against these acts would make any man liable to punishment for 
 contempt of court, who, with knowledge of the injunction, com- 
 mitted any of them. In the face of such a situation no strike 
 could exist; for all coercive and persuasive measures would be 
 eliminated. 
 
 There are also various measures which suggest themselves as 
 proper expedients in connection with the enforcement of the 
 criminal aspect of the law. It would be well to provide that no 
 employee could quit the service without filing a written notice of 
 intention so to do with some government officer who would be 
 forbidden to receive or file more than a certain number of 
 notices each day. This would provide for such a gradual retire- 
 ment of employees as would make it practicable for the railroad 
 company to continue the operation of its trains without serious 
 interruption and would also provide a definite and simple way to 
 enforce penalties for the violation of this very simple and 
 definite rule. 
 
 The principle suggested by the Victoria strike might also be 
 applied in this country by providing for the forfeiture of certain 
 rights and privileges among those who violate the law. If some 
 form of old age or sickness insurance is ever established by the 
 government, or the railroads and government jointly, as is to be 
 hoped, the law could provide for a loss of those benefits to the 
 violators of a law prohibiting strikes on public service corpor- 
 ations, but in the absence of such an arrangement the law might 
 
 15
 
 license the employees of the railroads and provide for certain 
 examinations as a condition of the granting of such license. This 
 license would be forfeited as to all those who broke the law pro- 
 hibiting strikes, and could be restored on the payment of a certain 
 sum of money which would act as a penalty. In cases where the 
 law is violated more than once the license could be forfeited in 
 the discretion of the proper government official. The remedy 
 might be compared to that already existing as to masters, mates 
 and engineers of steam vessels, all of whom are licensed by the 
 Federal government. If any one of those officers wrongfully or 
 unreasonably refuses to perform his duties his license is revoked 
 and for disobedience or desertion he is penalized. There are also 
 other licensed vocations which will suggest themselves to readers. 
 The danger of this system of licensing is that which was experi- 
 enced from the Pennsylvania Law licensing employees for coal 
 mining. The license provision was used to stem the law of supply 
 and demand and create such a scarcity of labor as to artificially 
 raise the rate of wages. To avoid this, the commissioner should 
 not be allowed to refuse licenses because there are no available 
 positions, but should license all applicants who are qualified. 
 
 These various remedies or means of enforcing the law 
 against strikes on public service corporations should be cumu- 
 lative with the one limitation that a man should not be penalized 
 more than once for the same offense. 
 
 Legislation of this kind would seem to be the natural, direct 
 and desirable remedy for the evils of strikes on public service 
 corporations, but it entirely deprives the employees of what is 
 regarded as their necessary and proper weapon of defense 
 against oppression and abuse on the part of their employers. The 
 right to strike and the fear of its exercise has done much to 
 remedy abuses between employers and employees and the pro- 
 posed remedy forbids it among the vast number of working 
 people engaged by transportation and lighting companies as well 
 as many others. What assurance is there that the working people 
 in these branches of business will not be underpaid and mis- 
 treated if such legislation is passed? Must we not substitute 
 some protection to counterbalance their loss of the right to 
 strike ? 
 
 Answering these questions together it may well be ques- 
 tioned if any abuse of employees would arise by denying the right 
 to strike in one industry if the right is still exercised in all other 
 industries. There is a decided and palpable competition among 
 different and independent industries of the most dissimilar char- 
 acter and for that reason if no other the conditions of employ- 
 ment on railroads where the right to strike would not be allowed 
 would, in a measure, have to be equally attractive and agreeable, 
 
 16
 
 with the improved conditions of employment in industries where 
 the strike and the fear of the strike forces the employer to a more 
 liberal recognition of his employees' interests. Neither would 
 public opinion or the established ideals and practices of our day 
 tolerate any retrogression to the oppression and abuse of labor. 
 It is a question whether the dire results that some people would 
 expect from the abolition of strikes on public service corpora- 
 tions are not grossly overestimated, but it cannot be doubted that 
 it would furnish an opportunity for temporary oppression. 
 
 It is certain, however, that the thoughtful public would not 
 be willing to prohibit strikes on public service corporations with- 
 out substituting some measure of defense to give the employees 
 equal assurance against unjust treatment, and the character of 
 this substitute is the feature which stirs the opposition of many 
 people. Such a substitute must of course provide for the inter- 
 position of some third party when employers and employees fail 
 to agree and if it is to be a measure of any real efficacy it must 
 be rcognized and enforceable at law. This spells legislation fix- 
 ing the terms of employment or some measure similar to com- 
 pulsory arbitration. The objections to both of these methods are 
 to most people insurmountable and the prejudice against them is 
 so strong that they are even unwilling to give them fair consid- 
 eration. They think the remedy a step in socialism and govern- 
 mental regulation of business far in advance of anything that this 
 country has yet entertained. 
 
 Before condemning too hastily any regulation by a govern- 
 mental agency of the relations of employer and employee in pub- 
 lic service corporations it is well to understand to what extent we 
 have already acquiesced in government regulation of public 
 service corporations and more particularly interstate railroads, 
 which we are considering at present. Even many details of the 
 relation of employer and employee are directly fixed by statute 
 to-day. Laws exist very generally in the different States inspect- 
 ing factories, forbidding the employment of children until they 
 reach a certain age; restricting the hours of employment of all 
 persons in mines ; providing the manner and frequency of pay- 
 ment of wages. In connection with railroads we find laws con- 
 trolling mechanical devices used, so as to protect employees from 
 accidents, and laws absolutely forbidding the employment of 
 adult men for more than a certain number of hours a day. The 
 Interstate Commerce Commission also has power to review and 
 correct unjust and unreasonable rates and to compel adequate 
 service. 
 
 So the idea of regulating certain details of the relation of 
 employer and employee in public service corporations by some 
 governmental agency and of supervising such corporations gen- 
 
 17
 
 erally is not entirely new to the statute books of our State and 
 Federal government, although it has not been attempted in this 
 country as far as I know to fix a rate of wages in any private 
 corporation by statute or any other governmental agency. The 
 commission appointed by President Cleveland in 1894 under the 
 United States Statutes to investigate the great railroad strikes, 
 was so impressed with the crisis through which the country had 
 just passed that it dared to make such a recommendation in no 
 uncertain terms. The Hon. Carroll D. Wright was one of the 
 three members of this commission by virtue of his position as 
 commissioner of labor, and a very thorough investigation of the 
 trouble was made through the examination under oath of people 
 representing the various interests involved. Included in the final 
 report of the commission was an appendix containing a summary 
 of the various remedies that had been suggested to the commis- 
 sion, and they covered a very wide field. The commission made 
 many recommendations of a minor sort which were subsequently 
 embodied in our statutory law, but most significant of all was its 
 recommendation concerning arbitration. In reviewing the short- 
 comings of conciliation through a commission that merely investi- 
 gates and urging the necessity of more effective measures, the 
 commission said : 
 
 "Public opinion enlightened by the hearings 
 before such a commission will do much toward 
 settling many difficulties without strikes and in case 
 of strikes will intelligently sustain the side of right 
 and justice and often compel reasonable adjust- 
 ments. Experience, however, has taught that public 
 opinion is not alone powerful enough to control rail- 
 roads. Hence power to review and enforce the just 
 and lawful decisions of the commission against rail- 
 roads ought to be vested in the United States 
 Courts. There can be no valid objection to this 
 when we bear in mind that we are now dealing 
 simply with quasi public corporations and not with 
 either individuals or private corporations. What is 
 safe and proper as to the former might be unsafe 
 and unjust as to the latter. That which is done 
 under the act to regulate commerce as to rates can 
 safely and ought properly to be done as to railroad 
 wages, etc., by a commission and the courts." 
 
 This recommendation was never adopted by Congress and 
 seems to have entirely passed out of the public mind and public 
 discussion. Yet in view of the steps that have been taken to-day, 
 in the form of governmental regulation of public service corpor- 
 ations by commission, it is probably true that if this country had 
 
 18
 
 just experienced as dangerous and disastrous a labor crisis as that 
 of 1894 and such a remedy were suggested it would be adopted. 
 Such a power is absolutely necessary to add symmetry to the leg- 
 islative scheme we have already adopted concerning the regula- 
 tion of public service corporations and its omission is unaccount- 
 able. Possibly it was the fear of arousing still further opposition 
 to their proposed bill that made the advocates of a public service 
 commission refrain from such a natural recommendation. 
 
 The plan which is here advanced differs from that recom- 
 mended by the United States Strike Commission of 1894 in that 
 it prohibits strikes and provides that the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission may hear and determine grievances of employees 
 from time to time in the same way that it hears and determines 
 grievances of shippers or passengers for the correction of unjust 
 and unreasonable rates. It proposes to give employees who sell 
 labor to railroads the same opportunity for presenting complaints 
 as those who purchase transportation for themselves or property. 
 The strike commission, on the other hand, did not recommend 
 that strikes be forbidden by law and never intended to have the 
 commission or courts interfere to enforce compulsory arbitration 
 except in extreme cases. To quote its own words : 
 
 "A tribunal, however, should not intervene in 
 mere quarrels between employer and employed 
 unless the public peace or convenience is involved, 
 but when it is a clear case of public obstruction 
 whether caused by individuals or a corporation." 
 
 Thus under the plan recommended by the strike commission 
 a strike would be organized to correct a grievance and be about 
 to take place in a way that would jeopardize the public safety or 
 convenience before the commission could act. It is submitted 
 that this plan is objectionable, as it waits until the storm has 
 gathered before it acts and then may find that forces have been 
 set in motion which it is difficult to control. It is better far, if 
 government regulation is to continue, to provide for the correc- 
 tion of each substantial grievance as it may appear rather than 
 to allow such grievances to accumulate and gather strength until 
 a strike is threatened. 
 
 If the Strike Commission had foreseen the extent to which 
 we were to adopt paternal legislation and government by com- 
 mission it would probably have made a different recommendation, 
 for the powers given the interstate commerce commission and 
 state public service commissions to-day are of such character as 
 to make the failure to give them power to determine labor contro- 
 versies a strange and improper omission and one that may involve 
 the commission and the public in strange complications. 
 
 19
 
 If the citizens of a town can complain to a governmental 
 commission that freight or passenger rates are excessive, employ- 
 ers and employees should be able to approach the same commis- 
 sion in a petition to determine wages. Rates and wages are 
 inseparably connected and interdependent. You cannot have high 
 wages without charging high rates, and low rates mean low 
 wages, provided justice is to be meted out to the investor in the 
 form of a fair return on the investment. In justice a ruling 
 which reduces rates might include in some instances a ruling 
 reducing wages. 
 
 Looking at the interest of the public we find the commis- 
 sion's power may include the issuing of orders directing the 
 manner and frequency with which trains are run to certain cities, 
 and the fares to be charged for the service, yet it has no power 
 to prevent the absolute discontinuance of the service by a strike. 
 This is illogical and unsatisfactory, for it tells the employer that 
 he must run so many trains a day at prescribed charges, and does 
 not forbid the employee from taking such action as will prevent 
 the operation of all trains. The public should have as much right 
 to demand reasonable conduct on the part of the employee as on 
 the part of the employer. Furthermore it may be the commis- 
 sion's act itself which provokes the strike. 
 
 If the commission finds on a complaint to it that rates are 
 too high, it may also find that the cause for the excessive charge 
 is excessive wages that are being paid. It will then make its rul- 
 ing reducing rates but it will have no power to reduce the exces- 
 sive wages. The employer will accordingly be obliged to reduce 
 wages, which will probably result in a strike interrupting the 
 service. Thus a commission which has power to order the opera- 
 tion of a certain number of trains a day will by its own order, 
 and in the performance of its mandatory duty, create a situation 
 so that no trains are run. It is unjust and unreasonable to 
 employer, employee and the public that such a condition should 
 exist and it would seem that the logical remedy were to extend 
 the powers of the interstate commerce commission so that it 
 could also determine whether wages or conditions of employ- 
 ment are unreasonable or unjust. This plan, together with the 
 suggested legislation abolishing strikes, would seem to furnish a 
 promising solution for such woeful experiences as we have wit- 
 nessed in Philadelphia and Chicago and under the orders of Debs 
 and Arthur. At the same time the plan ought not to meet with 
 opposition. The railroads are already enduring the annoyances 
 and necessary evils that emanate from the interference of a gov- 
 ernmental commission and being subject to governmental control 
 as to the rates they may charge, should be glad to be relieved 
 from that terrible phantom of a threatened strike, by giving the 
 same commission the power to settle controversies with their 
 
 20
 
 employees when they themselves have failed. Their net profits 
 and their opportunities for large returns would be no more 
 jeopardized or restricted by such an extension of the commis- 
 sion's power than they are under the present regime. If the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission is ever divested of its power to 
 hear and determine the questions of reasonable and just rates, 
 there will then be a far stronger argument against the proposed 
 remedy as to strikes, but as long as the commission's present 
 jurisdiction is not reduced there can be no strong, intelligent 
 opposition on the part of the railroads against the plan. 
 
 The labor unions, on the other hand, cannot raise any cry 
 based on a fear of oppression and abuse, for they are not 
 deprived of the right to strike without provision for their proper 
 protection. The determination of their rights by an impartial 
 governmental tribunal cannot gracefully be criticised by them 
 until it has shown itself to be partial, unjust and untrustworthy. 
 
 The same plan of settling labor controversies by a commis- 
 sion should also be attempted in connection with public utilities 
 over which the Federal Government has no dominion, and which 
 are subject only to regulations enacted by the state authorities. 
 Already we have Public Service Commissions in a number of 
 states in which powers to control the relation of employer and 
 employee could be reposed as in the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission. Like the Interstate Commerce Commission these State 
 Commissions also have in most instances the power to regulate 
 rates without the power to regulate wages, and should have this 
 additional power as a necessary part of their duties to protect the 
 public against interruption of service and unreasonable exactions 
 in connection with the service. 
 
 The rapid development in the creation and powers of com- 
 missions, both State and Federal, to protect the public interests 
 in public utilities, seems to have centered itself upon evils like 
 watered securities and excessive rates, which in most cases are 
 imaginary, and to have omitted an evil of unquestioned reality. 
 There has been little ground to complain of unreasonable rates 
 charged by traction companies, except discriminatory ones on 
 railroads, and little ground to complain that investments in the 
 securities of public utilities are insecure, but there has been fre- 
 quent occasion to complain that the service has been interrupted 
 on account of labor controversies. 
 
 Such measures as have been suggested would hardly meet 
 with approval from the majority of railroad officials. But an 
 expression of views which has been elicited by forwarding an 
 advanced draft of this monograph to a small group of railroad 
 officials demonstrates that they are not uniformly opposed to the 
 
 21
 
 idea of compulsory arbitration of labor disputes on public util- 
 ities. By some it is positively approved. Opposition to the idea 
 follows lines of thought already so familiar to the public that they 
 offer little need for further discussion. The foremost among all 
 these ideas is the desire "to be let alone." With a great deal of 
 justice railroads and other large corporations have come to fear 
 that any activity on the part of legislatures may lead to radical 
 ill-considered measures prompted by demagogical motives. There 
 also still exists the feeling that capital invested in railroads is 
 private property, over which the owners may rightly exercise 
 absolute control without governmental interference. The doc- 
 trine of laissez faire is popular and words like "confiscation" and 
 "infringement of rights" are frequently on their tongues. The 
 public, however, will give little countenance to such an argu- 
 ment and is not likely to abandon government by commission 
 because of some abstract theory of justice like this. A more 
 serious argument than all these is the difficulty of securing and 
 maintaining a capable commission of clear visioned, independent, 
 experienced men who can judge impartially and who will have 
 the courage not to compromise unfairly. The difficulty of secur- 
 ing such men and the difficulty and expense of establishing 
 machinery which will promptly execute the enormous burden of 
 work that may be thrown upon it is not to be lightly overlooked. 
 The history of most of the commissions with which this country 
 has had to deal offers little encouragement along this line, but it is 
 unlikely that the people of this country will in the future leave it 
 to the sole voice of railroad officials to determine whether or not 
 they are properly acquitting their duties toward the public. The 
 alternative, therefore, seems to be some government by commis- 
 sion and with this institution recognized the objection to the 
 settlement of labor disputes by it decreases. Neither is it unrea- 
 sonable to hope, that with the increased responsibilities of a 
 commission, and the increased importance which the public will 
 attach to this institution, that the character of men appointed 
 and the administration of its duties will improve. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY. 
 
 Since the preparation of this monograph, an article has been 
 published in McClurc's Magazine, entitled. "The Best Way to 
 Prevent Industrial Warfare," and written by Charles W. Eliot, 
 President Emeritus of Harvard University. This article deals 
 exclusively with the Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigation 
 Act and is an almost unqualified endorsement of that act. 
 Among other things, President Eliot points out the very success- 
 ful way in which this act has settled threatened strikes on public 
 
 22
 
 utilities. The modicum of success which has followed the inter- 
 vention of this remedy of investigation and conciliation in Canada 
 is certainly a very strong argument in favor of it, but it is open 
 to question whether a similar remedy would work as successfully 
 among the labor unions of this country. The absolute refusal 
 of the switchmen in the northwest to avail themselves of the 
 employers' offer to arbitrate their claims for advanced wages 
 under our Federal Statutes and the willingness of the American 
 Federation of Labor to support them in this position is some 
 indication of the fact that they are regardless of public sentiment 
 and unwilling to abide by conciliatory methods. No one can be 
 ignorant of the fact that the general public believes in arbitration 
 when it involves only the question of wages and hours, and that 
 a refusal to accept an offer of arbitration, when there are statutes 
 which provide for the proper machinery to carry out the arbitra- 
 tion, alienates public sentiment. This Federal statute, ordinarily 
 known as the Erdman Act, which provides for arbitration when 
 the parties are willing to submit to it, has been in operation since 
 1898, and the Commissioner of Labor writes me that in the num- 
 ber of cases that has been brought to his attention, there have 
 been but three instances of arbitration. This report is simply 
 offered as further evidence of the unwillingness of labor unions 
 in the United States to seek arbitration even though it may 
 concern the relations of employees to an important public utility. 
 But a still more remarkable piece of evidence of the difference 
 between one of the Canadian unions and the unions of the 
 United States may be found in a report of a recent resolution 
 passed by that Canadian union when it refused the invitation of 
 the American Federation of Labor to become affiliated with the 
 unions of the United States. The ground given by this Canadian 
 union for the refusal was that it would be necessary to adopt the 
 methods of American Trade Unions : 
 
 "Said methods have consequences which are abhorrent to the 
 law-abiding people in Canada, involving hunger, misery, riot, 
 bloodshed and murder." 
 
 These facts properly raise the question as to whether the 
 partially successful operation in Canada of the Canadian Indus- 
 trial Disputes and Investigation Act is satisfactory evidence that 
 such an act would be a sufficient restraint upon the unions of the 
 United States. 
 
 23
 
 COPIES OF LETTERS RECEIVED FROM LEADING 
 
 RAILROAD OFFICIALS. 
 
 July 30, 1909. 
 
 Dear Sir 
 
 I am in receipt of your favor of the 28th inst., enclosing 
 copy of monograph relating to strikes on public utilities, which I 
 have read with great interest. 
 
 I believe in cases of trouble or disagreement between 
 employers and employees on railroads, both steam and electric, 
 urban or interurban, as well as public utilities producing necessi- 
 ties, such as gas, electric light, water, etc., that arbitration should 
 be made compulsory, to the end that, so far as legislation can 
 prevent it, there should be no stoppage or interference with those 
 utilities on which the business and commerce of the country, and 
 in some cases, not only the health and comfort, but the very life 
 of the communities, depend. 
 
 The Erdman act provides a method of arbitration in the case 
 of railroad strikes, but as it does not make arbitration compul- 
 sory, or forbid suspension of work pending arbitration ; its influ- 
 ence, while good, is simply a moral one and does not, in my 
 opinion, go far enough. 
 
 It should be impossible to absolutely tie up a great railroad, 
 cutting off all means of communication between different sections 
 of the country ; and the only way that this can be brought about, 
 as I see it, is by legislation that will compel both parties to submit 
 controversies to arbitration. 
 
 I prefer not to be quoted in what I have said herein, as I 
 am simply writing my personal opinion for your information. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 24
 
 July 31, 1909. 
 
 Dear Sir : 
 
 I duly received your letter of the 28th instant, enclosing copy 
 of a monograph which you have prepared relating to strikes of 
 employees engaged in the service of public utilities of any kind 
 and containing your suggestions as to the manner of handling all 
 controversies between companies operating or providing public 
 utilities of any kind and their employees on labor questions and 
 conditions governing their employment. I have read same care- 
 fully and return it to you herewith. I do not believe I care to 
 make any criticism or suggest any changes in same. 
 
 Frankly speaking, I do not agree with your views or sugges- 
 tions as to handling these very important matters. As respects 
 railroad companies, I think the United States Government, as 
 also those of the different states, have gone altogether too far 
 now in undertaking to regulate and control the details of the 
 management and operation of these properties. It is entirely 
 contrary to the spirit of our Government and institutions, and, to 
 my mind, it has not been justified nor is it necessary by reason 
 of conditions or situations that have governed in the past, nor can 
 I see that the future handling of these properties or of their 
 relations to the public at large, should require any such inter- 
 ference as has already been undertaken. 
 
 I cannot see anywhere, either in the machinery of our gen- 
 eral government or in that of the different states, that the affairs 
 committed to public officers or politicians are any better or more 
 honestly or ably administered than the affairs of the railroad 
 companies have been by those in charge of the management of 
 them. 
 
 The putting into the hands of the Interstate Commerce Com- 
 mission, or any other public body, of the handling of questions 
 pertaining to wages and conditions of service on railroads is 
 bound sooner or later to put all these important matters into poli- 
 tics. The present Interstate Commerce Commission is not a body 
 that, so far as I can see, has been or is governed by political con- 
 siderations, but I can readily see how it might be made a political 
 machine of tremendous power and importance, and the danger is 
 that appointments may be made as vacancies may occur in the 
 future, which will make the putting of these powers as proposed 
 in the hands of that body very much more objectionable than it 
 ever has been heretofore. 
 
 25
 
 As I view it, the people of this country have suffered very 
 little in the past from strikes which occurred on railroads, and to 
 my mind they had better in the future take their chances as they 
 have done heretofore of loss and inconvenience from such strikes 
 as may occur rather than take action which amounts to abandon- 
 ing the principles the maintenance of which I think is of the 
 highest importance. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 August 3, 1909. 
 
 Dear Sir : 
 
 I feel indebted to you for the chance to read your paper sent 
 me on July 28th. I took it to the country with me and read it 
 very carefully on Sunday. I fully agree with your conclusions, 
 I also agree with all your statements except one, and that one is 
 the intimation in one paragraph that railroad employees may not 
 need a protection from their employers similar to what they try 
 to get by means of the Trade Union. There is a strong tendency 
 to tyranny wherever a man's decision is final or nearly final and 
 among ten thousand railroad officers there are plenty of tyrants. 
 I see no remedy so appropriate and so defensible as the one you 
 propose for the interstate railroads, although the idea is not 
 entirely new, for I have often engaged in discussing the possibil- 
 ity of it with railroad officers, nevertheless your presentation of 
 it is, so far as I know, entirely new. 
 
 I lunched yesterday with Mr. , President of the 
 
 -, and the former President of the , a great 
 
 man and a good man. He was strongly in favor of it, at the 
 same time feeling assured, as he expressed it, that if the proposi- 
 tion were put to vote among active railroad presidents and gen- 
 eral managers it would be overwhelmingly defeated. I think it 
 is probably true that government regulation is still nauseous to 
 most railroad officers, nevertheless we have uniformly recom- 
 mended government regulation, this is quite distinct, however, 
 from government control. You point out clearly that, if that 
 regulation is applicable to rates and to service rendered, it is not 
 only logical but perhaps necessary to protect the railroads from 
 strikes in the carrying out of the Commissioner's orders and in 
 obedience to the law. 
 
 26
 
 Kindly let me know as soon as your monograph is printed by 
 the Association and also let me have three or four copies. I shall 
 expect to pay considerable attention to it. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 July 30, 1909. 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 I have your letter of the 28th inst. 
 
 The ground proposed to be covered by you is, of course, in 
 no way so fully covered as by the advisory power granted to the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission by an Act of Congress, 
 approved June 1, 1898, entitled "An Act Concerning Carriers 
 Engaged in Interstate Commerce and Their Employees." Sev- 
 eral arbitrations, including a recent one in Georgia, have taken 
 place under this Act, and I think your discussion is incomplete in 
 omitting reference to it. 
 
 Speaking as to the general principle involved, I regard the 
 attitude of the government toward the corporations in this coun- 
 try as quite indefensible, in that they neither own the public 
 utilities, as in Germany and Austria, nor do they guarantee the 
 dividends, as in France, but disclaiming all responsibility, they 
 have stepped in to exercise authority over almost every admin- 
 istrative act. I think this is a condition that is neither logically 
 nor morally defensible, and cannot be expected to long endure. 
 
 A different aspect will be given to the matter if there is any 
 prospect that the wisdom of Congress and State Legislatures will 
 lead to the simple exercise of their police powers, and to the with- 
 drawal of all the regulating power now given to Public Service 
 Commissions, leaving these Commissions only powers of exam- 
 ination, publishing statistical data from the information obtained, 
 and advising both the corporations and the Legislature as to sug- 
 gested changes or reforms in the law. 
 
 Yours very truly.
 
 August 3, 1909. 
 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 I have read with much interest the paper which accompanied 
 your letter of the 28th instant. It is evident that you have taken 
 pains to treat the subject impartially. In my opinion, however, 
 there are fundamental objections which make the plan imprac- 
 ticable. 
 
 Your citations of Legislative measures affecting the relations 
 between railroads and employees abroad apply generally to Gov- 
 ernment Ownership roads. American conditions are essentially 
 different. Your plan might be practical under Government Own- 
 ership, a condition which we devoutly hope will never obtain 
 here. I do not think that the United States can with profit 
 emulate the "enlightened legislation" to which you refer. 
 
 Any plan which would take out of the hands of the manage- 
 ment, and the men as well, the right mutually to fix rates of pay 
 and working conditions is a step too far toward government 
 ownership and socialism. 
 
 The Interstate Commerce Commission now has much more 
 under its jurisdiction than it can control fairly, expeditiously and 
 effectively. The problem of reasonable rates is far from solution. 
 To add to the duties of the Commission the regulation of wages 
 and conditions of employment would swamp an already over- 
 loaded body with a volume of complex and unfamiliar problems 
 and necessitate doubling the commission, its office and field 
 forces. It would also tremendously increase the power of an 
 already powerful governmental bureau and tend toward danger- 
 ous centralization. 
 
 The few details of operation now regulated by the Commis- 
 sion apply only to the safety of employees and passengers. I 
 know of no criterion for such a marked extension of power and 
 such a radical curtailment of prerogative on the part of both 
 manager and employee. 
 
 Because the Interstate Commerce Commission now controls 
 rates does not appeal to me as a logical reason why they should 
 also control wages and working conditions. By the same reason- 
 ing it is easy to justify Government Ownership. The recogni- 
 tion of the right to regulate rates on interstate freight business 
 does not justify the abandonment of managerial rights to the 
 commission any more than excessive taxation would be justified 
 on the ground that reasonable taxation is recognized as proper. 
 
 28
 
 Your contention (page 20) that high rates must follow high 
 wages and low rates result from low wages is not borne out by 
 the experience of the past two decades. You will find by study- 
 ing the statistics of the Interstate Commerce Commission, that 
 the tendency of rates has been downward and the trend of wages 
 decidedly upward. I can hardly conceive of any governmental 
 commission promulgating an order which would simultaneously 
 reduce rates and wages (as you suggest, page 20). 
 
 On page 6 you mention the embarrassment to which the 
 employer is now put by lack of complete control over his men 
 (on account of the possibility of a strike following the enforce- 
 ment of a reasonable rule or rate of wages). If he is now 
 hampered while still retaining his managerial rights, would he 
 not lose his prerogatives and prestige entirely if the control he 
 now exercises is usurped by the government? 
 
 In my personal opinion legislative enactments and govern- 
 mental commissions will not effectually cure the weaknesses in the 
 present system to which you draw attention. I believe that public 
 opinion and economic laws will continue to exercise the needed 
 safety valves. And my observation leads me toward the belief 
 that the railroads have been overlegislated. The tendency is to 
 reduce rather than increase legislative restriction. 
 
 I am glad to have the opportunity to read and criticise your 
 paper and would like to have a copy when it is printed. I am 
 writing this letter on plain paper, as the views expressed are per- 
 sonal and are not to be taken as those of my employers. 
 
 Very truly, 
 
 June 4, 1909. 
 
 Dsar Sir : 
 
 Your favor of May 19th to Mr. , with reference 
 
 to your pamphlet on "Limitations of the Right to Strike" has 
 been referred to me with request that I communicate with you. 
 
 We are, of course, in sympathy with the movement of the 
 American Anti-Boycott Association and appreciate the copy of 
 your article on limitations of the right to strike which you 
 enclosed.
 
 In respect to railway and other public service corporations, 
 as has been frequently pointed out, the interests of the public are 
 necessarily to be considered in connection with the right of 
 employees to strike. We hardly think additional legislation is 
 necessary except possibly some which might adequately punish 
 strikers when they transcend their rights. Railway companies, 
 however, under the present state of decisions are afforded pretty 
 ample protection by the injunctive process. If any additional leg- 
 islation were suggested it would probably be turned against the 
 railway companies because of the influence exercised by labor 
 unions on legislative bodies. Railroad companies would not care 
 to have a restriction placed upon their right to declare a lockout 
 in a proper case ; yet if legislation were attempted to restrict the 
 right to strike there is danger that bills introduced for such pur- 
 pose would be perverted so as to include and restrict the right of 
 railway companies to lockout. 
 
 On the whole we are inclined to think we can safely rest on 
 the present state of the law. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 June 18, 1909. 
 
 My Dear Sir: 
 
 In acknowledging receipt of your favor of May 19 I would 
 say that reply has been delayed on account of rather extended 
 absences from my office and pressure of other business when 
 here. 
 
 The work which you are conducting has my entire sympathy 
 and approval, and I have read with much interest the pamphlet 
 which you sent me, "Limitations of the Right to Strike;" your 
 argument in the matter strikes me as essential and unassailable. 
 
 As to your proposed pamphlet dealing with the subject of 
 strikes on public service corporations, I am quite strongly of the 
 opinion that it is practically impossible to procure at this time 
 the enactment of any statutes likely to strengthen the position of 
 railroads in connection with the strike question. Any bills that 
 would be passed would, instead of helping us, more likely deliver 
 us further into the hands of the brotherhoods and unions. I am 
 inclined to think that more would be accomplished by endeavor- 
 ing to secure sound judicial interpretations and applications of 
 existing law ; and the maintenance of the "open shop" should be 
 assured. 
 
 30
 
 In paragraph at the bottom of page thirteen of "Limitations 
 of the Right to Strike," I notice the following: 
 
 "If industrial conditions of the future should 
 develop the fact that labor was being oppressed and 
 was not in such a position of strength in its dealings 
 with capital as the good of the State required, the 
 remedy, it would seem, should come from govern- 
 mental regulation of some kind, rather than by 
 placing in the hands of irresponsible citizens fur- 
 ther weapons of aggression through which they may 
 at any time make further onslaughts upon the 
 peace and prosperity of industry and even the State 
 itself." 
 
 The words underscored strike me as contemplating the 
 eventual application of the compulsory arbitration principle ; with 
 that solution of the problem I am not in sympathy. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 31
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 
 
 
 3 0112 084206561