UNIVERSITY OF 
 II UNOIS LIBRARY 
 
 AZ MPAiSS
 
 » 
 
 >»>» 
 
 THO U GHTS 
 
 DETAILS 
 
 HIGH AND LOW PRICES 
 
 THE LAST THIRTY YEARS. 
 
 PART I. 
 ON THE ALTERATIONS IN THE CURRENCY. 
 
 BY THOMAS TOOKE, F.R.S. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE-STREET. 
 
 1823.
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WH1TEFRIARS.
 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 It was my intention to have comprised 
 the consideration of all the chief causes to 
 which I ascribe the high and low prices of 
 the last thirty years in one publication, 
 which I expected to have completed by 
 this time. 
 
 But I did not sufficiently consider the ex- 
 tent of the work which I had undertaken, 
 and I was not aware that the little leisure I 
 could command would hardly admit of my 
 accomplishing such a task within the period 
 which I had originally proposed. I men- 
 tion this merely to account for not having 
 advanced beyond the first division of the 
 topics that I have to discuss. At the same 
 time, the general interest which is at this 
 moment directed to the consideration of 
 the question of the currency, has induced 
 me to hasten the completion of this part 
 
 a 2 
 
 
 «7oOi<
 
 of my subject, and to lay it in its present 
 detached form before the public. 
 
 For the discussion of the relative im- 
 portance of the other causes, which have 
 mainly contributed to the fluctuations of 
 prices in the interval embraced by this 
 inquiry, I have not yet made any prepara- 
 tion beyond the collection of materials, 
 and I cannot say how soon I may be able 
 to put them in a shape fit for publication. 
 
 I intend, if I can find sufficient time for 
 the completion of this work, to attach to it 
 a table of prices of a great variety of articles 
 coming under the description of general 
 merchandise, in the London market, for an 
 uninterrupted series of years, extending as 
 far back as the commencement of 1782. 
 
 That was the year in which the price 
 current of the longest standing of any in 
 London was established, and I have availed 
 myself of the opportunity of collecting the 
 quotations from its very commencement. 
 
 The interval, indeed, embraces a period 
 beyond that which I have undertaken to 
 investigate, but the extended information
 
 thus derived cannot fail of throwing great 
 additional light on the question of the de- 
 gree of influence to be respectively attri- 
 buted to the several circumstances, which 
 maybe supposed to have operated on prices 
 since 1793. 
 
 It would have been desirable to have in- 
 serted the whole series of these quotations 
 in the present publication, with a view to 
 more easy reference, but they are not in a 
 state of sufficient forwardness for the pur- 
 pose. In fact, it was not until I had 
 made some progress towards the com- 
 pletion of this part of my work, that I was 
 able to obtain the materials and the assist- 
 ance requisite for the construction of such 
 a table. 
 
 January, 1823.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Introduction ...... 1 
 
 Sect. I. — Question stated ... .6 
 
 Sect. 2. — Definition of Terms . . .8 
 
 Sect. 3. — Arguments of those who ascribe a greater 
 Effect to the Bank Restriction than that in- 
 dicated by the Difference between the Mar- 
 ket and Mint Price of Gold . . IS 
 
 Sect. 4. — Examination of the Effect of the Bank Re- 
 striction and Resumption of Cash Payments 
 on the Value of the precious Metals iu the 
 commercial World . . .21 
 
 Sect. 5.— Examination of the Effect of the Bank Restric- 
 tion on the economised Use of Money, and 
 on the Facility of Credit . . .43 
 
 Sect. 6. — Examination of the alleged Connexion be- 
 tween the Bank Restriction and a progres- 
 sive Advance of Prices . . .63 
 
 Sect. 7. — Explanation of the Causes of the Extension 
 
 and Contraction of Private Paper and Credit 87 
 
 Sect. 8. — Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of 
 
 Private Paper, from 1807 to 1811 . 9G 
 
 Sect. 9. — Fluctuation of Prices, and of the Amount of 
 
 Private Paper, from 1 8 1 1 to 1 8 1 6 121
 
 Vlll 
 
 Sect. 10. — Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of 
 Private Paper, from 1816 to the passing 
 of Mr. Peel's Bill . . .149 
 
 Sect. 11. — Great Variations in the Amount of Private 
 Paper and Credit, not exclusively incidental 
 to a Currency whose Basis is inconvertible 
 Paper . . . . .169 
 
 Sect. 12. — Reasons for thinking that the State of Prices 
 during the Bank Restriction does not war- 
 rant the Presumption of any diminished 
 Value of the precious Metals . .177 
 
 Sect. 13. — Survey of Prices down to the present Time 184 
 Sect. 14. — Conclusion . . . .199 
 
 Appendix .... . 207
 
 THOUGHTS, &c. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The public seem to be divided between the 
 merits of two contending and opposite opinions 
 on the subject of the great fluctuations which 
 have occurred during the last thirty years in 
 the prices of corn and other commodities. 
 
 The one refers all the phenomena involved 
 in these fluctuations to alterations in the value 
 of the currency, and considers all other circum- 
 stances that can have had any influence to be 
 so subordinate as not to be worth mentioning. 
 
 The other attributes little or no effect to the 
 state of the currency, but ascribes the late 
 range of high prices wholly to the war, and the 
 present low ones wholly to the transition from 
 war to peace ; not to war, as obstructing supply, 
 and to peace simply, as removing the ob- 
 structions ; but to war, as creating extra de- 
 mand and consumption or waste, and to peace, 
 
 B
 
 2 
 
 as involving the cessation of that demand : to 
 the last war, more especially, as having con- 
 ferred upon this country the monopoly of trade, 
 which ceasing with the peace, a state of com- 
 parative stagnation and low prices is the natural 
 consequence. 
 
 The partizans of the former opinion overlook 
 the important circumstance, that a very great 
 rise of prices had preceded the Bank restriction, 
 and that there were periods during its con- 
 tinuance, when corn and many other articles 
 were very high, while the currency was, accord- 
 ing to any acknowledged test, at no depre- 
 ciation. 
 
 On the other hand, those who ascribe every 
 thing to war-demand and monopoly, seem not 
 to be aware that not only corn, but many other 
 articles more decidedly affected by demand for 
 naval and military purposes, fell in price during 
 intervals of some length, pending the greatest 
 exertions of the war, and did not rise again, ex- 
 cept from circumstances more connected with 
 a diminished supply than with an extra demand; 
 and that the articles, of which alone we had 
 the monopoly by the war, were precisely those 
 which, at particular periods of it, were most 
 depressed in price. 
 
 Widely as the respective advocates of these 
 conflicting opinions differ in other respects,
 
 they seem to agree in considering that, to what- 
 ever degree the varieties of the seasons may 
 affect prices for short periods, the fluctuations 
 thence arising do not account for a high average 
 spread over more than the two or three years 
 during which any marked alternation between 
 scarcity and abundance may have prevailed ; 
 and, consequently, that the state of the seasons 
 is not at all to be taken into consideration, in 
 endeavouring to account for an average of 
 prices spread over a range of only Jive years, 
 when compared with another average of nearly 
 a hundred years*. 
 
 These opinions appear to me to be very er- 
 roneous, and to be calculated, according as 
 either side may predominate, to produce great 
 practical evil; such as tampering with the cur- 
 rency on the one hand, or abating the abhor- 
 rence of war on the other. I feel, therefore, 
 impelled to contribute my humble efforts to 
 combat opinions so fraught with error and mis- 
 chief, and to suggest grounds for the formation 
 of a juster estimate than has yet been made of 
 the causes of the great variations of prices which 
 have marked the period in question. 
 
 The principal causes of those variations may, 
 I think, be classed under the following heads : 
 
 * See Mr. Attwood's letter of the 16th Nov. 1822, ad- 
 dressed to (he Editor of the Farmer's Journal. 
 
 B 2
 
 1. Alterations in the value of the currency. 
 
 2. War, with its attendant taxes ; and the re- 
 turn to peace. 
 
 3. Varieties of the seasons. 
 
 The order in which I have thus placed them 
 is not the obvious one in point of time. The 
 alteration in the system of our currency did 
 not occur till four years after the war ; but it is 
 the cause most commonly placed in the fore- 
 ground of all discussions on the subject : and, 
 moreover, there is the further reason for so 
 placing it, that until it be disposed of, and the 
 exact degree, or at least the maximum of its 
 influence be appreciated, no estimate can be so 
 well made of the relative importance of the 
 other causes. 
 
 There are, indeed, two other circumstances 
 which must have influenced prices, viz. the in- 
 crease of population, and the improvements in 
 agriculture and manufactures ; but, as they 
 have apparently been uniform and progressive 
 in their operation, in opposite directions, 
 they do not form any prominent part of the 
 grounds on which the great fluctuations of 
 prices can be accounted for. In as far as the 
 mere increase of population might be supposed 
 to account for any part of the range of high 
 prices, it must be admitted as preventing their 
 being now so low as they otherwise would be :
 
 and, as the improvements in agriculture and 
 machinery were in progress during the whole 
 period, although perhaps not so rapidly in the 
 earlier part of it, they must have operated as a 
 corrective against so great an advance in the 
 price of those articles, to which they applied, 
 as might, from the operation of other causes, 
 have taken place : this cause, therefore, need 
 only be incidentally referred to as accounting 
 for the further fall of the particular com- 
 modities to which it is applicable, below the 
 level at which they might otherwise have sub- 
 sided. 
 
 I shall, accordingly, confine myself to the 
 consideration of the relative importance of the 
 three leading causes which I have mentioned; 
 viz. the currency, the war, and the seasons.
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Question stated. 
 
 At the time when the paper system was at 
 its height, — when there was the greatest differ- 
 ence between paper and gold, it was confidently 
 maintained by the advocates of that system 
 (and these then included the great majority of 
 persons who took part in the discussion on the 
 subject) that it was not the paper that had be- 
 come cheaper, but the gold that had become 
 dearer; that Bank notes were not depreciated, 
 but that gold had risen in value; consequently, 
 that no part whatever of the advance of nominal 
 prices, in this country, was attributable to the 
 Bank restriction. That doctrine seems now to 
 be pretty nearly exploded, but it has given way 
 only to be replaced by one equally extravagant. 
 An opinion has arisen of late, and has been 
 countenanced and spread by no mean autho- 
 rities, that the paper was depreciated, not 
 merely to the degree indicated by the rise of 
 gold above the mint price, but to a much greater 
 and almost indefinite extent; that, in fact, al- 
 though other causes may have concurred in
 
 producing the elevation of general prices in 
 this country between 1797 and 1814, and the 
 decline since that period; such other causes, 
 whether in detail or collectively, sunk into 
 utter insignificance, compared with the altera- 
 tions in our currency. Now, as in one part of 
 that period, the prices of necessaries and of 
 many other articles advanced to the extent of 
 from 50 to 100 per cent, and upwards, and have 
 subsequently declined to or below the level 
 from which they rose ; and, as the average depre- 
 ciation indicated by the price of gold did not in 
 the first 1 2 years after the suspension of cash 
 payments exceed about 4 per cent, nor on the 
 average of the succeeding five years about 20 
 per cent., w r e have to seek, according to the 
 supporters of this opinion, in the mode of ope- 
 ration of the Bank restriction, for all the excess 
 of the alleged effect beyond that comparatively 
 trifling difference between the paper and its 
 standard.
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Definition of Terms. 
 
 In order to preserve distinctness in the 
 view which I propose to take of the degree of 
 influence to be ascribed to alterations in our 
 currency, by the Bank restriction and subse- 
 quent resumption of cash payments, it may be 
 desirable for me to state the meaning which I 
 attach to the terms depreciation of money and 
 currency, excess or over-issue of paper. 
 
 By depreciation of money, when applied ge- 
 nerally, I understand the diminished value of 
 the precious metals in the commercial world. 
 
 By depreciation of the currency, I mean that 
 state of it in which the coin is of less value in 
 the market than, by the mint regulations, it 
 purports to be, or in which the paper, that is 
 compulsorily current, is of less value than the 
 coin in which it promises to be payable. A 
 debased coinage, or one subject to a seignorage, 
 if not accompanied by a principle of limitation 
 as to the total amount of money in circulation, 
 will naturally not be of the same value in ex- 
 change as if the coin were perfect, or the prin-
 
 9 
 
 ciple of limitation strict*; and the difference 
 will be marked by an excess of the market price 
 
 * As the principle of limitation here alluded to, through 
 which alone a seignorage can be compatible with the main- 
 tenance of the full nominal value of the coin to which it is ap- 
 plied, may not be quite familiar to all my readers, I subjoin a 
 short explanation of it from a paper which I delivered in to 
 the Lords' Committee on the resumption of cash payments in 
 1819. (See Appendix to the Report, p. 181.) 
 
 " Seignorage is synonymous with debasement, unless con- 
 nected with a principle of limitation. 
 
 " The rationale of this principle may be thus illustrated. 
 Suppose the circulation of the whole country to be confined to 
 gold, and to consist of twenty millions of sovereigns of the 
 present weight and standard ; if, by some sudden process, 
 each piece were reduced by one-twentieth, or five per cent., 
 but the whole number of pieces strictly confined to the same 
 amount of twenty millions ; then, other circumstances being the 
 same, the relation of commodities, &c. to the numerical amount 
 of coin being undisturbed, there would not, it is evident, be 
 any disturbance of prices ; and if gold bullion in the market 
 was previously at 31. 17s. lOfd. per ounce, it would, other 
 things remaining the same, continue at that price ; or, in other 
 words, 46^. 14s. 6d. in gold coin, weighing nineteen-twentieths 
 of a pound, would purchase in the market a whole pound of 
 uncoined gold of the same standard. 
 
 " But if the quantity of gold thus abstracted from each piece 
 were coined into one million of additional pieces, and re-issued 
 into circulation, the twenty-one millions wouldlhen exchange 
 for no more than the former twenty millions; all commodities 
 would rise 5 per cent., and among them gold bullion, which 
 would then be at 41. Is. 9%d.; or, in other words, 461. 14s. 6d. 
 in coin would only purchase nineteen-twentieths of a pound of 
 uncoined gold."
 
 10 
 
 above the mint price of the metals. With re- 
 gard to the term depreciation, as applied to 
 paper, if Bank promissory notes be issued in a 
 deteriorated state of the coinage, and be really 
 convertible on demand into the coin in which 
 they purport to be payable, they cannot be said 
 to be depreciated : the actual payment is equal 
 to the promise to pay; the fault is in the coin- 
 age, not in the paper. There may, therefore, 
 be a depreciation of the currency in which paper 
 circulates, and an increase of the market above 
 the mint price of the metals, without any de- 
 preciation chargeable to the paper: such was 
 the state of the currency in this country pre- 
 vious to the great reformation of the gold coin 
 in 1773. 
 
 Again, if the metallic part of the currency 
 be really deteriorated, and if the paper, which 
 purports to be payable on demand in that coin, 
 be not so in fact, and cannot command as 
 much gold or other commodities in this market 
 and in foreign markets, as the same nominal 
 amount in coin would do, the paper is de- 
 preciated, and the measure of its depreciation 
 is the difference of the quantity of gold which 
 the coin and the paper can respectively pur- 
 chase. 
 
 In a perfect state of the coin, provided the 
 exportation and melting of it be allowed, there
 
 11 
 
 cannot, it is evident, be any excess in the 
 market above the mint price of the metal. It 
 is possible, in such a case, that the coin may, 
 even without a seignorage, be more valuable 
 than bullion ; but it is utterly inconceivable 
 that it should be less valuable : if, therefore, 
 in such a state of the coin, there be in general 
 circulation bank notes which, by law or custom, 
 pass current in all transactions ; and if, under 
 these circumstances, the market should be 
 above the mint price of gold — the whole of the 
 difference would constitute the exact measure 
 of the depreciation of the paper. Till, how- 
 ever, the act called Mr. Peel's bill, the gold 
 coin, although not materially deteriorated, 
 could not by law be exported or melted; if, 
 therefore, there happened to be an extra de- 
 mand for gold, for exportation or for con- 
 sumption in domestic manufacture, the price 
 of bullion might rise above the mint price 
 by the amount of the risk of the penalty 
 on the export or melting ; and this difference 
 might, for limited periods, exist in a pure 
 metallic currency consisting, it is true, of un- 
 deteriorated coin, but of coin rendered less 
 valuable by being divested by law of some of 
 the uses to which it might otherwise be applied. 
 This difference could never be considerable, 
 nor of long duration. Probably one half per
 
 12 
 
 cent., or at the utmost one per cent., would 
 compensate for the disqualification ; and as the 
 evasion of the law would certainly operate to 
 some extent, the quantity of coin would be 
 reduced and that of bullion increased, till the 
 level were restored ; a process which would 
 not occupy many weeks. So far, then, as this 
 trifling difference goes, an allowance may be 
 made in deduction, under the circumstances 
 supposed, from the excess of the market above 
 the mint price of gold, as a measure of the de- 
 preciation of bank notes previous to the passing 
 of Mr. Peel's bill. There may therefore, it is 
 evident, be cases — rare ones indeed, and to so 
 small an extent that they may safely be neg- 
 lected — in which the depreciation of paper 
 may not be exactly commensurate with the 
 excess of the market above the mint price of 
 gold. 
 
 On the other hand, if there be standard gold 
 for sale in the market, which the holder of bank 
 notes not convertible at the Bank can buy, the 
 difference between the quantity which he can 
 thus obtain, and that which the paper promises 
 but does not pay, clearly constitutes the utmost 
 limit of depreciation of the paper. It has been 
 said that there were considerable intervals, 
 during the Bank restriction, when there was 
 no gold in the market, none, being wanted for
 
 13 
 
 the circulation, and so little for other purposes, 
 that in fact months, and sometimes a year or 
 two, elapsed without any price being quoted ; 
 and that consequently there was no longer any 
 standard by which the depreciation of the 
 paper could be measured. In such case, I con- 
 ceive that the foreign exchanges offered a suf- 
 ficient criterion. But it is contended that the 
 exchanges afforded no such standard, because 
 when the exchange was nominally against us, 
 it might be really in our favour ; and that 
 during all this time gold would no more be a 
 criterion of the degree of depreciation, than 
 any other commodity. Giving all due credit 
 to the ingenuity displayed in this objection, I 
 cannot admit that it has any weight ; for there 
 can be no doubt, that when the computed ex- 
 changes marked the greatest depreciation, viz. 
 between 1809 and 1814, the real exchanges 
 must have been against us to the full extent of 
 the expenses of the transmission of the metals 
 (which expenses varied from 5 to 10 per cent.), 
 because during that interval large payments 
 were made to the Continent for account of our 
 Government, coincidently with unusually large 
 importations of corn. Gold, likewise, under 
 such circumstances, as indeed under most 
 others, is a commodity or merchandise, and 
 there may be no motive for importing it be-
 
 14 
 
 yond what would apply to any other com- 
 modity, as cotton or indigo ; but it so happens, 
 that, in the point under consideration, gold is 
 the specific thing promised, and the proportion 
 of that specific article which the paper can 
 command is the measure of the value of the 
 latter. Now, by the supposition, gold is not 
 wanted at home ; for if it were, it would be 
 imported, and there would of course be a price, 
 and that price would be a test : but not being 
 wanted at home, the only purpose for which it 
 could be required by the holder of a bank note 
 would be to make a payment or a purchase 
 abroad ; and the question in determining the 
 value of the bank note is, what quantity of 
 gold it can command abroad, allowing for the 
 expenses that would have attended the trans- 
 mission of a quantity from hence for the same 
 purpose. 
 
 Thus, suppose the exchange to be 25 per cent, 
 below par, bank-notes for 46/. 145. 6d., which 
 ought to be equivalent to a pound of standard 
 gold here, will buy, through the medium of a 
 bill of exchange, only '75 of a pound at Ham- 
 burg : but the expenses of transmission from 
 hence being, suppose 5 per cent, (and they ex- 
 ceeded that proportion at the time when the 
 exchanges were most depressed), if a pound of 
 gold had been transmitted from hence, it would
 
 15 
 
 only be equal to *9<5 of a lb. at Hamburg: there- 
 fore, as the test of the paper is the proportion 
 of what it can effect, compared with what the 
 full quantity of gold, if obtainable on demand 
 for it here, would do; the difference of ex- 
 change below par, deducting from that differ- 
 ence the expenses of transportation, will, in the 
 absence of a market price for gold here, afford, 
 for all practical purposes, an adequate criterion 
 of the depreciation of the currency : thus, if 
 the exchanges are %5 per cent, below par, 5 per 
 cent, being allowed for expenses, 20 per cent, 
 will mark the degree of degradation of the paper 
 below what it would be, if convertible on de- 
 mand into gold of the full legal weight and 
 standard. For it is clear, that in a converti- 
 ble state of the paper, the maximum of the 
 amount that can be kept in circulation for any 
 length of time will be determined by the real 
 par of exchange, minus the expenses of trans- 
 mission of the metals. 
 
 Consistently with the foregoing explanation 
 of the sense in which I use the word " depre- 
 ciation/' as applied to the promissory notes of 
 the Bank of England, there can be no difficulty 
 in defining what is the proper meaning of an 
 excess^ or over-issue of them. These terms are 
 relative to what ? Most obviously to the en- 
 gagement or condition under which the notes
 
 16 
 
 were originally issued ; namely, that of their 
 being payable on demand in coin. Whatever 
 be the amount in circulation, whether greater 
 or less than at a former period, or still the same, 
 should circumstances arise to create a demand 
 for coin in exchange for the paper, in such a 
 degree as to endanger the power of the Bank 
 to fulfil its engagements of paying in coin, 
 the circulation is excessive ; there is an over- 
 issue of paper, and the true, proper, and only 
 remedy is a diminution of it. In fact, there is 
 no other standard to which the terms of excess 
 and over-issue of paper can be referred, if it be 
 liable to payment on demand. And as the sus- 
 pension of that liability was originally enacted, 
 and subsequently, from time to time, prolonged, 
 with an express declaration, that a return to 
 that liability, on its previous footing, should 
 eventually take place, the object of those to 
 whom the regulation of the value of the paper 
 was committed should have been to preserve it 
 from intermediate depreciation. Now, the test 
 of the depreciation of bank-notes, according to 
 the preceding explanation of the term, is, in 
 default of a payment on demand, an excess in 
 the market price of gold, and, in the absence of 
 any quotation of gold, a depression of the foreign 
 exchanges below the limits of the expense of 
 transmission of the metals.
 
 17 
 
 These definitions and tne deductions from 
 them will, probably, by those whose opinions 
 I am about to examine, be admitted to prove 
 the depreciation of paper, during the Bank re- 
 striction, to the extent for which I contend j but 
 those persons maintain that the alterations in 
 the value of our currency, as a consequence of 
 that measure, were greater than can be inferred 
 by sl reference to those tests j that, in short, 
 those tests may be allowed in proof of the mini- 
 mum, but not of the maximum of its effect on 
 the prices of corn, and other commodities.
 
 18 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Arguments of those who ascribe a greater effect to the Bauk 
 Restriction than that indicated by the difference between 
 the Market and Mint Price of Gold. 
 
 The arguments in favour of this opinion, viz. 
 that the value of money was depreciated by the 
 Bank restriction, and enhanced by the resump- 
 tion of cash payments in a much greater degree 
 than that indicated, at any time, by the differ- 
 ence between paper and gold, proceed upon the 
 following grounds : — 
 
 1. That the banishment of the metals, gold 
 principally, from the circulation of this country 
 during the restriction, and the recent recal of 
 them for the resumption, affected, in a consi- 
 derable degree, the value of gold and silver in 
 the commercial world, diminishing their value 
 during the former, and increasing it in the latter 
 period. 
 
 2. That the compulsory paper system, esta- 
 blished by the Bank restriction, had the effect 
 of "heightening all those expedients to which 
 a prosperous state of society naturally gives 
 birth, for economizing the circulating medium, 
 bringing the whole of it into activity, and mul-
 
 19 
 
 tiplying it virtually by the substitution of credit 
 for currency.*' 
 
 3. "That the increase of prices was progres- 
 sive, from the year 1797 to 1814, subject only 
 to such fluctuations as arise out of the nature of 
 the respective commodities," " and that it was 
 not accompanied by a growing difference in the 
 value of Bank paper and gold." That " the 
 constant and invariable connexion of increase 
 of price with the Bank restriction, is a forcible 
 proof of such a relation as that of cause and 
 effect subsisting between the two phenomena." 
 That " the near approach of the termination 
 of that restriction has produced a fall of prices, 
 greatly exceeding the difference between paper 
 and gold ; thus still further corroborating that 
 connexion, and proving almost demonstratively, 
 that the prices from 1797 to 1 810 were to a cer- 
 tain degree artificial, and that the comparison 
 of paper with gold, during that period, did not 
 afford a test of the real amount" (of the fall in 
 the value of the currency). 
 
 These arguments are extracted from an article 
 in the Quarterly Review for July last, on the 
 state of the currency. The article is ascribed 
 to the pen of an author deservedly eminent for 
 some former publications connected with the 
 discussion which preceded Mr. Peel's bill, and, 
 judging only from the present specimen, he is 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 evidently well acquainted with the general bear- 
 ings of the subject. I have, therefore, selected 
 this as the ablest and most compendious exposi- 
 tion of the views of those who maintain what, 
 on grounds which I shall proceed to state, ap- 
 pears to me to be a most exaggerated and er- 
 roneous opinion of the effect of the alterations 
 in our currency.
 
 2i 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Examination of the effect of the Bank Restriction and resump- 
 tion of Cash Payments on the value of the precious metals 
 in the commercial world. 
 
 On the first of these grounds assigned for the 
 depreciation of money during the Bank restric- 
 tion, and for the enhancement of it since the 
 restoration of our currency, (viz. the amount of 
 the metals spared from the circulation of this 
 country ; thus adding to that of the rest of the 
 commercial world during the former period, 
 and reabsorbed from thence in the latter), I 
 have to observe, in the first place, that the 
 cause assigned appears inadequate to have pro- 
 duced any considerable effect on prices, sup- 
 posing it to have been uncompensated by circum- 
 stances of an opposite character; and, in the next 
 place, that in point of fact circumstances did 
 occur of a description calculated to balance at 
 least, if not to outweigh, the alleged effect. 
 
 The amount of gold coin circulating in this 
 country, previous to 1797, has been variously esti- 
 mated : the late Lord Liverpool stated it at thirty 
 millions; in the Lords' Report, 1819, page 11, the 
 amount is assumed at twenty-five millions. Mr.
 
 Qc) 
 
 Whitmore (Bullion Report, 1810, page 120), and 
 Mr. Harman (Commons' Report, 1819, page 40), 
 computed that it did not exceed twenty millions 
 in the three years preceding the Bank restriction. 
 Upon this last estimate, the writer of an ad- 
 mirable article in the Supplement to the Ency- 
 clopaedia Britannica, under the title of Money, 
 remarks, that though this last estimate is pro- 
 bably rather below the mark, there are good 
 grounds for concluding that it is the most ac- 
 curate of any that have hitherto been framed, 
 and that it has come as near the truth, as it is 
 perhaps possible in such matters. Allowing, 
 therefore, that this last sum is a little, and only 
 a little, underrated, and that, consequently, the 
 estimate in the Lords' Report is decidedly be- 
 yond the mark, a medium between these will 
 leave about twenty-two and a half millions, as 
 the utmost probable amount of gold coin in cir- 
 culation previous to 1797. Of this sum it is a 
 question how much was available for exporta- 
 tion. Exportation was not then indeed allowed ; 
 but there is no doubt that a good deal went out 
 in contraband. Some deduction is to be made 
 for the practice of hoarding, which is naturally 
 very much extended by the introduction of a 
 compulsory paper circulation. What that de- 
 duction should be must naturally be matter of 
 very vague conjecture ; but I believe that it
 
 23 
 
 ought to be much larger than is commonly 
 allowed. There was scarcely an individual of 
 a class above that which is limited to the means 
 of bare subsistence that had not a hoard, greater 
 or less, of guineas, provided against the various 
 contingencies that were considered as endan- 
 gering the value of paper, either in degree, as 
 by over -issue, or totally, as by foreign invasion 
 or domestic convulsion. And, in proof of the 
 existence of the practice of hoarding to a consi- 
 derable extent, it may be sufficient to refer to the 
 fact that, between the summer of 1815 and the 
 summer of 1 8 1 7, when peace was fully established, 
 and when, by the partial notices of resumption 
 of payments in specie by the Bank, there was a 
 near prospect of the complete restoration of the 
 value and security of paper, large sums in gui- 
 neas * were poured into the hands of the Lon- 
 
 * As an instance of the extent of this practice, I make the 
 following quotation from the evidence of Mr. Stuckey, an emi- 
 nent banker in Somersetshire, given before the Lords' Com- 
 mittee of 1819:— 
 
 " In 1817, we had a circulation of guineas, which we found 
 very inconvenient. It cost us near 100/. to transmit gold and 
 silver to London in the first six months of the year 1817- 
 People were then in the habit of coming to our bank with 
 guineas, requesting we would give our notes for them. I sup- 
 pose they had been hoarded. I brought up 1000 guineas in 
 May 1817, and taking them to our London banker, they re- 
 quested as a favour I would not leave them; they had lately
 
 24 
 
 don bankers by their correspondents in the 
 country, and by their customers in town. I 
 have heard those sums variously estimated; but, 
 upon the whole, I conceive that an allowance of 
 three or four millions would be rather within 
 than beyond the mark. It is probable, too, that 
 the amount of treasure in the Bank of England 
 must, at various periods, during the restriction, 
 particularly down to the year 1809, have been 
 much larger than it had been a few years pre- 
 vious to 1797. 
 
 On these two points, viz. the probability of 
 the Bank possessing a large treasure, and of the 
 practice of hoarding by individuals, during the 
 restriction, I have the sanction of Mr. Hus- 
 kisson's opinion, as stated in his pamphlet in 
 1810: — 
 
 4 * It is no secret, that the Bank, soon after 
 the restriction, bought and imported a very 
 considerable supply of gold. It has since issued 
 
 sent in so many to the Bank of England, that they did not like 
 to trouble them any more. Besides, the Bank only took those 
 which were quite full weight. The result was, that I took them 
 to a dealer in coin, and sold them at 31. 17*. 6d. per ounce." 
 
 Among other inducements to bring out hoards in 1816, 
 one was, that light guineas, which had been previously of 
 more value than those of full weight, from being legally sale- 
 able, were, in consequence of the fall in the market price of 
 gold, becoming of less than the current value.
 
 25 
 
 very little. To these facts I may add my con- 
 fident opinion (though this, of course, can be 
 only matter of opinion), that it is, therefore, 
 actually possessed of a large stock of gold." 
 
 " A great quantity of gold, which is now 
 hoarded, would also make its appearance, if 
 guineas were restored to their use and value 
 as currency. In this respect the country is in 
 the same situation as it was in King William's 
 time, when our metallic currency was so much 
 depreciated. Before the determination to re- 
 store that currency to its standard, pieces of 
 full weight were as scarce as guineas are now; 
 but when that determination was taken and car- 
 ried into effect, a great quantity of good money, 
 which had been hoarded, was brought back into 
 circulation." 
 
 From these considerations it would seem, 
 that a sum of from twelve to fifteen millions is 
 an ample allowance for the quantity of gold 
 which went to increase the mass of the precious 
 metals in the rest of the world, and which, so 
 far as it went, must have tended, cceteris pa- 
 ribus, to diminish their value. 
 
 In estimating what effect, other things being 
 the same, the addition of twelve to fifteen mil- 
 lions to the circulation of the rest of the com- 
 mercial world might have on general prices, or, 
 in other words, on the value of the precious
 
 26 
 
 metals as compared with corn and other com- 
 modities, it would be requisite to have some 
 idea of the total amount of gold and silver exist- 
 ing in the world for the general purposes of use 
 and ornament, viz. as coin, bullion, plate, and 
 jewellery. 
 
 It will, I think, occur to every one, on a little 
 reflection, that the amount must be very large 
 considering their durableness, the ages through 
 which they have been accumulating, and the 
 vast surface of population over which they are 
 distributed. Dr. Adam Smith says, " the price 
 of all metals, though liable to slow and gradual 
 variations, varies less, from year to year, than 
 that of almost any other part of the raw produce 
 of land ; and the price of the precious metals is 
 even less liable to variations than that of the 
 coarse ones. The durableness of the metals is 
 the foundation of this extraordinary steadiness 
 of price." — " Some part of the iron which was 
 brought from the mine two or three hundred 
 years ago may be still in use, and perhaps 
 some part of the gold which was brought from 
 it two or three thousand years ago." — " The 
 proportion between the masses of iron which 
 may be in use in two different years, will be 
 very little affected by any accidental difference 
 in the produce of the iron mines of those two 
 years ; and the proportion between the masses
 
 27 
 
 of gold will be still less affected by any such 
 difference in the produce of the gold mines.*' 
 (p. 328, 3d edit.) What is here said of gold 
 must, with reference to the present point of 
 discussion, be understood to apply to gold and 
 silver collectively, as it is their aggregate 
 amount which is to be considered as affecting 
 bullion prices generally. 
 
 Although, therefore, in the absence of any 
 sufficient data for computation*, it might be 
 unsafe to name any sum as an approach to the 
 value of the whole mass of the precious metals, 
 there is, I conceive, no hazard in assuming it 
 in general terms to be so large, that an addition 
 to, or abstraction from it, of twelve to fifteen 
 millions, other things remaining the same, would 
 barely make 1 per cent., and certainly not c 2 per 
 cent, difference in their value. 
 
 But other things were not the same. For 
 while, as a consequence of the Bank restriction, 
 about twelve or fifteen millions of our coin 
 went abroad, there was, in consequence of the 
 wars on the Continent, which were, with few 
 
 * I was not aware, at the time of writing this, that there 
 existed any computation of the kind, but I have since met 
 with one by Gregory King (in his Political Conclusions), 
 wherein he reckons, that the stock of the precious metals 
 existing in the world in the year 1688 was 850 millions. His 
 calculation is so curious, and bears so much upon the present 
 subject, that I insert it in the Appendix.
 
 28 
 
 intervals, coincident with the period referred 
 to, a great and unusual absorption of the metals, 
 and particularly of gold, in the treasures and 
 military chests of the belligerent powers. It is 
 probable that, at the same time, more of the 
 metals than usual was hoarded by the inhabit- 
 ants of those states of the Continent which 
 were either the seat of war, or which had issued 
 paper to excess. There were likewise some 
 periods of the war, particularly the interval be- 
 tween 1808 and 1813, when, by the violent 
 anti-commercial decrees and regulations of the 
 French government, there was great difficulty 
 and danger attending the transmission of bills 
 of exchange, and when, in fact, commercial 
 operations, depending on credit, were nearly 
 suspended. Such obstructions to circulation 
 were equivalent to a diminution in the amount 
 of the currency. So striking were these cir- 
 cumstances, both separately and collectively 
 considered, that they were, by the great ma- 
 jority of those who at that time took a part in 
 the discussions on this subject, appealed to 
 as very much outweighing the effect of the 
 quantity of gold rendered available for the 
 purposes of the Continent, by the substitution 
 of paper in this country. 
 
 It was, as I have before stated, the general 
 answer to all charges against the conduct of the
 
 29 
 
 Bank, in suffering the depreciation of its notes, 
 that gold had become scarce, and not paper 
 over abundant : and I am ready to admit that 
 there was ground for so much of the answer as 
 went on a prima facie presumption that gold 
 had become somewhat scarce relatively to a 
 former period ; or, at least, that supposing the 
 precious metals to have been otherwise of a given 
 value, the obvious effect of the war, and of the 
 peculiar circumstances attending it, was to en- 
 hance their value. Accordingly, the Bullion Re- 
 port of 1810, (p. 2) nearly at its outset states as 
 follows : " It will be found by the evidence, that 
 the high price of gold is ascribed by most of 
 the witnesses entirely to an alleged scarcity of 
 the article, arising out of an unusual demand 
 for it upon the Continent of Europe. This un- 
 usual demand for gold upon the Continent is 
 described by some of them as being chiefly for 
 the use of the French armies, though increased 
 also by that state of alarm and failure of con- 
 fidence which leads to the practice of hoarding." 
 But this, if true, formed no justification of the 
 departure of the paper from its standard. 
 Whether gold had increased or diminished in 
 value, it was the business of those who had the 
 regulation of the paper to make it conform to 
 the value of gold. The promise to pay ought 
 at all times to have been of equal value to the
 
 30 
 
 actual payment. All, however, that I mean 
 here to prove is, that the impression was very 
 general at that time, that the value of the 
 precious metals had increased in Europe. 
 
 Much stress has occasionally been laid on 
 the circumstance of Russia, Austria, and the 
 United States of America having, concurrently 
 with this country, substituted a paper for a me- 
 tallic circulation, thereby adding to the depre- 
 ciation of the value of the metals ; and having 
 since required a supply of the metals, to restore 
 the credit of their several banks, thus contri- 
 buting, with the demands by this country for 
 the same purpose, to enhance the value of gold 
 and silver. 
 
 With regard to Russia, it is to be observed, 
 that she had established a compulsory paper 
 currency for many years before our Bank re- 
 striction, and that the circulation of that empire 
 was as fully saturated with paper to the ex- 
 clusion of the precious metals before the year 
 1792 as at any subsequent period. If, therefore, 
 the amount of the metals spared by her was 
 calculated to produce any effect on their value 
 in the rest of the world, that effect must have 
 been felt before the period at which the com- 
 parison of general prices, as influenced by the 
 Bank restriction, commences. In 1817 and 1818, 
 indeed, by the simultaneous occurrence of large
 
 31 
 
 loans to the Russian government, with a very 
 great demand for corn and other articles of the 
 produce of Russia, the exchanges rose, or, in other 
 words, the value of the paper ruble improved so 
 much, that gold and silver were largely remitted 
 thither from the rest of Europe : the amount 
 thus absorbed into Russia in those two years 
 was estimated at about ten millions sterling. It 
 was at the same period that an export of the 
 metals, to nearly a similar amount, took place 
 from this country. It is true that it was gold 
 chiefly that went from this country, while the 
 importation into Russia was chiefly of silver : 
 but the operation was equalized by France 
 taking a great part of our gold, and sparing 
 some portion of her silver. Thus, the import 
 into Russia was virtually balanced by the export 
 from hence j leaving the circulation of the rest 
 of Europe undisturbed. Of this large sum in 
 gold and silver, however, which Russia ab- 
 sorbed in those two years, there is reason to 
 believe that she has retained little, if any ; for 
 since the commencement of 1819, the exchange 
 of Russia, or, in other words, the value of the 
 paper ruble, fell progressively till the close of 
 1821, rendering the exportation of the metals 
 from thence very profitable ; therefore the pre- 
 sumption is, that they must have found their 
 way out, notwithstanding the prohibition of the
 
 32 
 
 exportation : thus contributing to restore the 
 amount applicable to the circulation of the rest 
 of Europe. In fact, the whole of the financial 
 operations of that empire may be considered as 
 having had no permanent effect worth mention- 
 ing on the value of the metals, within the period 
 embraced by this inquiry. 
 
 Austria had, I believe, little of a pure me- 
 tallic currency remaining when the Bank re- 
 striction took place in this country ; and I have 
 not heard of her having hitherto absorbed any 
 large amount of gold or silver for the restoration 
 of a metallic basis to her circulation. 
 
 The banks of the United States of America 
 did not suspend their cash payments till after 
 the breaking out of the last war with this coun- 
 try, viz. in 1812, (which, by the way, was after 
 the principal phenomena of high prices of agri- 
 cultural produce and of high rents had already 
 taken place) ; and that was the period when, 
 from the gigantic scale to which the operations 
 of the war in Europe had been extended, there 
 was the greatest demand for specie, both for 
 the purposes of the military chests and of pri- 
 vate hoarding ; moreover, singular as it may 
 appear, yet such was the fact, in the autumn of 
 that year, while the French were on the ad- 
 vance to Moscow, and during their stay there, 
 the Russian exchange improved so much, having
 
 S3 
 
 advanced from 14r/. to 24>d. and upwards for 
 the paper ruble, that gold and silver formed the 
 best remittance thither in exchange for her pro- 
 duce, which was then in great demand, from 
 the fear that the French might cut off all future 
 supplies ; accordingly, a good deal of specie was 
 sent thither, and probably did not return from 
 thence till between 1814 and 1816, when the 
 exchange fell again below its former lowest 
 level. Slight as this circumstance may be, I 
 mention it merely as proving, in concurrence 
 with the other sources of demand arising out 
 of the operations of the war, that there was in 
 all probability an extra absorption of specie in 
 Europe from those causes, fully compensating 
 for the disengagement of what was spared from 
 the banks of the United States. And after all, 
 as the circulation of that country, before the 
 suspension, did consist and still consists of a 
 large proportion of paper very imperfectly con- 
 vertible, there is reason to believe that the 
 amount of specie, disengaged in the first in- 
 stance and eventually resumed, cannot, under 
 any circumstances, have had any important in- 
 fluence on the value of the precious metals in 
 Europe. As, therefore, it appears that there 
 was no coincidence in point of time in the dis- 
 engagement of the precious metals from the 
 circulation of Russia, Austria, and the United 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 States with the Bank restriction, the amount of 
 specie (inconsiderable as it was) spared from 
 those states cannot be included in the means of 
 accounting for the rise in prices which is so 
 confidently stated to have commenced in 1797* 
 and to have been progressive till the near ap- 
 proach of the termination of that restriction. 
 
 But if the addition to the general mass of the 
 precious metals, spared for other purposes by 
 the substitution of paper for coin in this coun- 
 try, pending the Bank restriction, cannot, on 
 the grounds which I have stated, be fairly in- 
 ferred to have produced, under any circum- 
 stances, a sensible effect on the value of money; 
 and, if there were circumstances, such as those 
 already mentioned, which were calculated, at 
 least, to compensate if not to outweigh that 
 effect : then it follows, by parity of reasoning, 
 that the reabsorption, by the resumption of cash 
 payments, of a similar amount of specie to what 
 had before been spared, cannot have been at- 
 tended with a greater effect in an opposite direc- 
 tion. This must be understood mutatis mutandis, 
 viz. the disengagement of the sums employed for 
 military purposes, and the return of security to 
 commercial intercourse, renewing the facilities 
 of circulation on the continent, and diminishing 
 the inducement to hoarding; and it must be 
 understood as proceeding on the supposition
 
 35 
 
 that the quantity of gold required for the re- 
 storation of the convertibility of our currency 
 does not exceed the amount which circulated 
 previous to 1797- Hitherto, it is clear, that not 
 so much has been required. Whether any and 
 how much more may be requisite will depend 
 upon the footing on which the circulation of 
 country notes is to be regulated. Of course, if 
 a larger quantity of specie were to become 
 necessary for the circulation of the United 
 Kingdom than existed previous to 1797> the 
 argument must be modified to the extent of 
 that excess ; but in consequence of the economy 
 introduced into the use of money, it is probable, 
 that even if the country one-pound notes are 
 eventually withdrawn, a smaller sum of coin 
 will suffice than was necessary previous to 
 1797. 
 
 The reasoning, thus far, proceeds on the 
 supposition, that the question is confined to the 
 effect produced by the Bank restriction on the 
 value of gold and silver collectively: and as far 
 as relates to their aggregate value, there ap- 
 pears to be no sufficient ground for inferring 
 any material variation in it since 1797* as a 
 consequence of the alterations in our currency. 
 But a separate question arises as to the effect of 
 those alterations on the value of gold, as com- 
 pared with silver: and, as the demand for this 
 
 d2
 
 30 
 
 country has been almost exclusively for gold, it 
 appears reasonable to conclude, that such an 
 extra demand for it would raise its price re- 
 latively to silver. This inference appeared to 
 me so plausible, that I was at first disposed to 
 acquiesce in it, as a sufficient explanation of 
 the degree (viz. between 4 and 5 per cent.) in 
 which the two metals have receded from their 
 ordinary proportion in this market ; but the 
 following considerations have since struck me, 
 and incline me, at least, to doubt whether silver 
 may not really have fallen, while gold has merely 
 maintained its former value. 
 
 If the masses of the two metals in Europe 
 have not undergone any alteration, then the 
 change in their relative value can arise only 
 from a difference in the demand for the uses to 
 which they are respectively applicable. Now, 
 supposing the use of them for all other pur- 
 poses than that of money to be undisturbed, 
 then as, according to the preceding view, gold, 
 during the period in which we spared it, was 
 in extra demand, as money on the Continent 
 for military purposes and for hoarding, and 
 was occasionally at an extra price, while on no 
 occasion did it sink below the proportion which 
 existed prior to 1797> it follows, that when that 
 extra demand ceased by the peace, there would 
 be no motive on the Continent for retaining,
 
 37 
 
 at an extra price, so much of the gold as was 
 beyond the ordinary purposes of mere con- 
 venience as currency — none being absolutely 
 necessary, as the standard or basis of their cir- 
 culation, which is silver. 
 
 It may, therefore, fairly be questioned 
 whether there is any thing thus far of extra 
 demand to account for its extra price relatively 
 to silver: and supposing the answer to be in 
 the negative, gold can only have risen in value 
 compared with silver by a falling off in the 
 ■relative supply of the former : but gold is a 
 more durable metal than silver, and the sources 
 of supply, although very much more limited, 
 are not liable to such great variations as occur, 
 or as at least are supposed to have occurred of 
 late, in the produce of the silver mines. In 
 as far, therefore, as the recession in the com- 
 parative value of the two metals may be re- 
 ferred to a supposed alteration in their relative 
 quantities, the presumption seems to be rather 
 that the supply of silver must have increased, 
 than that of gold fallen off. And the pre- 
 sumption, a priori, that silver has increased in 
 quantity, at least in Europe, receives no small 
 additional weight from the consideration, that 
 not only the demand for silver to the East 
 Indies, which was very large (insomuch that 
 in the three years ending 1819-20, the balance
 
 38 
 
 of import of treasure into India on the Com- 
 pany's and private account amounted to nearly 
 nineteen millions sterling)*, has ceased within 
 the last two years, but that the stream has 
 reversed its course, and the importations from 
 thence hither have been very considerable. I 
 am inclined to think that this cause alone will 
 go far towards accounting for the fall in the 
 price of silver in this market. The supplies 
 come chiefly, if not wholly, in the first instance, 
 to this country; but being much beyond what 
 is wanted here for the purpose of coin or manu- 
 factures, the surplus must be re-exported : but, 
 as in the present state of our trade, having large 
 stocks of foreign raw materials in our mar- 
 ket, and an unusual abundance of home pro- 
 duce, while our manufactures still maintain 
 sufficient superiority to admit of their exporta- 
 tion, there is no other adequate return which 
 the Continent can give for our surplus silver, 
 than gold : and, accordingly, I understand that 
 the principal bullion transactions between this 
 country and the Continent, for some time past, 
 have consisted of exports of silver and imports 
 of gold. But, in order to admit of such trans- 
 actions being carried into effect, it is necessary 
 
 * For an account of the total imports of treasure into India 
 from 1808-9 to 1819-20, see Appendix.
 
 39 
 
 that gold should be as much higher, and silver 
 as much lower, in this market than on the 
 Continent, as to defray the charges of trans- 
 port, interest, and commission, on both sides : 
 and this will account for the disproportion be- 
 tween the two metals being greater here than on 
 the Continent*. This greater disproportion can 
 continue only as long as this market receives 
 the chief supplies of silver from the East and 
 West, and dispenses them to the rest of Europe. 
 As far as the supply from the East Indies is 
 concerned, I suspect that it cannot be of long 
 duration, and that in the course of the fluctua- 
 tions of trade the whole of what has of late 
 been received from thence will be re-shipped 
 thither. The low price of the raw produce of 
 India here, and the necessity of finding returns 
 for British goods sent thither, combined with 
 the financial arrangements of the government 
 
 * As the relative proportion of the market prices of gold 
 and silver at Paris may be matter of interest in connexion 
 with the present discussion, 1 insert in the Appendix a table 
 of the quotations of them for the last four years, accompanied 
 by an explanation of the footing on which these metals are 
 purchased by the mint, and re-issued in the shape of coin. 
 Subjoined to it is a statement of the quantities of gold and 
 silver coined by the mints of France in the four years ending 
 in 1821. This information was procured for me by a friend 
 who has recently returned from Paris, and on whose accuracy 
 I can rely,
 
 40 
 
 there, have occasioned the remittances of bul- 
 lion from India to England : if cotton, sugar, 
 rice, and other East India produce, should ad- 
 vance in Europe so as to admit of export from 
 India, the tide will turn again, and the silver 
 will go back. With regard to the supply of 
 silver from South America, I am assured that 
 the importation, either direct or through the 
 West Indies, has been, during the last two 
 years, on a larger scale than usual. Whether 
 the total supply from the mines has increased 
 or otherwise, there are no certain means of 
 knowing ; but it is the opinion of the best in- 
 formed persons, in the trade with that part of 
 the world, with whom I am acquainted, that the 
 produce of the silver mines has increased, and 
 is still increasing : nor is there any impro- 
 bability on the face of this supposition. It 
 does not appear a necessary consequence of 
 the internal war of Spanish America, occupy- 
 ing, as it has done, but small numbers and a 
 small surface, compared with the whole po- 
 pulation and territory, that it should have ab- 
 stracted any capital and labour from the work- 
 ing of the mines, which it must have been a 
 great object with whichever of the contending 
 parties was in possession of them, to make as 
 productive as possible. But, with the same 
 capital and labour, the same mines have already,
 
 41 
 
 in all probability, become more productive, by 
 the application of improved machinery ; for it 
 was stated, some time ago, that steam-engines 
 of greatly increased powers were in the course 
 of being sent out to the mining districts ; and, 
 according to that statement, several must have 
 been long since in operation. Independent of 
 the inference, on these grounds, that there is 
 rather an increase than a falling off in the pro- 
 duce of the mines, it appears probable that 
 Spanish America and the Brazils must have 
 parted with a larger proportion than usual of 
 their stock of specie, whatever that may have 
 been, because their importations of European 
 manufactures have been large, while their ex- 
 ports have been restricted, or at least been 
 reduced greatly in value, by the fall in the 
 price of their produce. These circumstances 
 collectively are likely to have increased the 
 supply of silver in a greater proportion than 
 that of gold, and give reason to suspect that the 
 fall in the price of silver arises from a relative 
 increase of its quantity, and consequent diminu- 
 tion of its value, rather than from a diminished 
 quantity and increased value of gold. 
 
 The arguments and the facts, therefore, as far 
 as I can collect them, strike me to be rather in 
 favour of a supposition that the aggregate supply 
 of the precious metals in Europe may have some-
 
 42 
 
 what increased of late, and at any rate they mi- 
 litate against any presumption of a falling off. 
 But I am ready to admit that all the informa- 
 tion hitherto accessible, relating to the propor- 
 tion of the supply and demand of the precious 
 metals, is vague and insufficient to build any 
 practical conclusion upon ; and the only object 
 of the arguments which have here been brought 
 forward is to afford grounds for calling in question 
 the opposite presumption, which, in my opinion, 
 has been much too generally and hastily ad- 
 mitted. 
 
 Having thus offered arguments, which to my 
 mind are conclusive, against the presumption of 
 any sensible effect from the alterations in our 
 currency, under the circumstances in which they 
 took place, on the value of the precious metals 
 in Europe, it remains to examine what influence 
 may be ascribed to the second class of circum- 
 stances, which, as a consequence of the Bank 
 restriction, are stated to have affected the value 
 of money in this country, in a much greater de- 
 gree than that indicated by the difference be- 
 tween paper and gold.
 
 45 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Examination of the Effect of the Bank Restriction on the eco- 
 nomised Use of Money, and on the Facility of Credit. 
 
 These circumstances are, in the words of the 
 article in the Review, which I have taken as my 
 text, " that a compulsory paper system, esta- 
 blished by the Bank restriction, has had the 
 effect of heightening all those expedients, to 
 which a prosperous state of society naturally 
 gives birth, for economising the circulating 
 medium, bringing the whole into activity, and 
 multiplying it virtually by the substitution of 
 credit for currency." 
 
 The effect here ascribed to the Bank restric- 
 tion is resolvable into two distinct parts : — 
 
 1. The heightening of all the expedients for 
 economising the circulating medium, and bring- 
 ing the whole of it into activity. 
 
 2. The multiplication of the circulating me- 
 dium virtually by the substitution of credit for 
 currency. 
 
 This distinction is a very important one for 
 the purposes of the present inquiry. 
 
 The expedients for economising the use of 
 the currency, although they do not take date
 
 44. 
 
 from the Bank restriction, and certainly had 
 their origin in causes wholly distinct from it, did 
 experience a considerable improvement about 
 that time ; and this coincidence is assumed by 
 the writer in question as cause and effect. " The 
 universal adoption of paper (he says) led to the 
 universal practice of those expedients for econo- 
 mising money, which only partially prevailed in 
 a mixed currency; that is, only so far as it con- 
 sists of paper ; since it is by means of paper 
 that the contrivances are carried into effect." — 
 " And (he adds) there is less temptation to 
 hoard paper than there is to hoard specie ; it is, 
 therefore, always drawn from its hiding-place, 
 and circulates freely in the market." 
 
 This mode, however, of accounting for that 
 coincidence as cause and effect, is not consistent 
 either with the reason of the thing, or with what, 
 both from my own recollection and from that 
 of the best living authorities on that subject, I 
 can state to have been the fact. 
 
 As to the reason of the thing, the motives to 
 economise the use of the currency are twofold, 
 viz. that of convenience, and that of interest. 
 With regard to the inducement to simplify and 
 spare any unnecessary circuitousness of pay- 
 ment from a view to mere convenience, it is 
 clear that it must exist more strongly in pro- 
 portion as the currency consists in great part
 
 45 
 
 of coin. And I am perfectly convinced that, 
 if, from any cause whatever, bank notes were 
 totally withdrawn from circulation, the motives 
 to simplify payments on a large scale to the 
 utmost degree would become so intense, as pos- 
 sibly to suggest expedients for a still further 
 saving. With regard to the smaller temptation 
 to hoard paper than specie, and to its therefore 
 circulating more freely, it is to be observed 
 that the temptation to hoard specie is greatest 
 when compulsory paper prevails ; and there is 
 every reason to believe, that in this country 
 much more gold was hoarded after than before 
 the restriction ; but in point of fact, all the 
 larger payments among merchants and bankers 
 were, for some years previous as well as sub- 
 sequent to the Bank restriction, transacted 
 through the medium of paper ; and as it is to 
 these transactions that the economised use of 
 the currency applies, there is not the shadow 
 of a ground for ascribing to motives of conve- 
 nience, arising out of that measure, the height- 
 ening of the expedients of economy. But if 
 the Bank restriction supplied no motives of 
 mere convenience for economising the use of 
 the currency, that measure, or, more properly 
 speaking, the circumstances connected with it, 
 held out the strongest inducement possible of 
 immediate and obvious advantage to the indi-
 
 46 
 
 viduals concerned in large payments to improve 
 to the utmost "the art of transacting the same 
 business with less money." The circumstances 
 to which I allude, and which held out this in- 
 ducement, were the very reverse of those sup- 
 posed by the reviewer ; for he assumes that an 
 indefinite facility of procuring money was a 
 necessary consequence of the Bank restriction; 
 whereas in point of fact, at the period when the 
 suspension of cash payments at the Bank took 
 place, and for some time after, the suffering 
 from scarcity of money was very great. So far 
 from any unusual facility of raising money, there 
 was an utter impossibility for any merchant to 
 obtain loans or discounts except upon the very 
 best security, nor even upon this to any consi- 
 derable amount. None but first rate bills, not 
 having more than sixty-five days to run, were 
 discountable at all, and even of this description 
 the Bank did not take all that were offered, 
 having prescribed limits for each house. And 
 as to discounts by private bankers, they were 
 nearly out of the question, as it was natural 
 they should be, seeing that while the law re- 
 stricted the rate of interest on private securi- 
 ties, the rate on public securities through the 
 greatest part of 1 797 was considerably higher. 
 The 3 per cent, consols were at one time below 
 48, Exchequer bills at 2/. 10s. and navy bills
 
 47 
 
 above 15 per cent, discount. This enormous 
 rate of interest rendered the use of money, even 
 for the shortest intervals, valuable ; and, ac- 
 cordingly, it was about this time that the prac- 
 tice was introduced among the London bankers 
 of borrowing bank notes of one another for only 
 a few hours ; this practice was not only in itself 
 such an increase in the velocity of the circula- 
 tion as was equivalent to a saving in the amount 
 of the currency, but, by the value which it con- 
 ferred on the use of a given sum for even a few 
 hours, was the immediate occasion of devising 
 some of the means of lessening the detention 
 which might be caused by the transmission of 
 any amount beyond the very smallest that might 
 suffice for the mutual adjustment of the daily 
 balances. It is, therefore, to the scarcity of 
 money which, from causes that it is foreign to 
 my present purpose to investigate, prevailed 
 about the period of the Bank restriction, and 
 not to the opposite effect ascribed to that mea- 
 sure, that the greatest improvement of the ex- 
 pedients for economising the use of the cur- 
 rency is owing. 
 
 Not only, however, are the occasion and ob- 
 ject of the improvements alluded to erroneously 
 described, but a most fallacious inference is 
 drawn as to the effect of this " art of transact- 
 ing the same business with less money" in de-
 
 48 
 
 predating the value of the currency. There is 
 no doubt that, if the number of transactions 
 remained the same, and the numerical amount 
 of the currency were not diminished, the in- 
 creased velocity and economy of the circulating 
 medium would depreciate its value exactly as 
 an addition to its amount, cceteris paribus, would 
 do, and the evidence and measure of the de- 
 preciation would be found in the difference be- 
 tween the paper and its standard. But at the 
 period referred to, and for some years after, 
 while the money transactions of the country 
 were progressively increasing, the numerical 
 amount of the currency, according to the re- 
 ceived computation, had been diminished. This 
 circumstance of increased transactions and di- 
 minished circulating medium formed one of 
 the puzzles to those who, at a subsequent pe- 
 riod, contended that the difference between 
 paper and gold could not be ascribed to an ex- 
 cess of paper. 
 
 Allowing, however, for the sake of argument, 
 that the Bank restriction was the cause (which 
 it was not, in the sense used by the reviewer) 
 of greater economy in the use of the currency, 
 and that this greater economy was one of the 
 causes of the depreciation of the value of money 
 beyond the degree indicated by the difference 
 between paper and gold; how happens it that,
 
 49 
 
 although all the refined machinery of the banking 
 system subsists unimpaired, and is perhaps un- 
 dergoing further improvements, it has no longer 
 the depreciating effect ascribed to it ? Really 
 in order to have been good for any thing in the 
 argument which it was brought forward to sup- 
 port, this economy of the currency should have 
 been proved, not only to have arisen from, but 
 to have terminated with, the restriction ; and 
 it is proved to have done neither. On the con- 
 trary, while the prevailing complaint is of a 
 tendency the very reverse of depreciation in the 
 value of money, it is notorious that circum- 
 stances are in progress calculated still farther to 
 economise the use of it. Not only are improve- 
 ments daily taking place (as stated by the au- 
 thorities quoted in the review) among the 
 bankers, in their payments on the largest scale ; 
 not only is the practice of lodging money with 
 a banker becoming more general, as including 
 a large proportion of the smallest classes of 
 tradesmen ; but there is less detention in the 
 very minutest channels of circulation, inasmuch 
 as, by the institution of savings banks, the most 
 inconsiderable sums, which must, but for this 
 mode of investment, have been dormant as petty 
 hoards in the hands of mechanics and menial 
 servants, have become, and are becoming, daily
 
 50 
 
 more available to swell the amount of currency 
 applicable to general purposes. 
 
 So large is the aggregate saving of the func- 
 tions of money from the foregoing causes, which 
 have acquired their principal activity since the 
 period of the Bank restriction, and which have 
 not yet apparently reached their utmost de- 
 velopement; that, notwithstanding the extended 
 functions of money consequent on an increased 
 population, and on an enlarged scale of pecu- 
 niary transactions, a smaller numerical amount 
 is now requisite to circulate commodities at the 
 same prices than before that period. Accord- 
 ingly, if even the country circulation of one 
 pound notes were now to be withdrawn, so that 
 the currency should be on exactly the same 
 footing as it was before 1797, there is every 
 reason to believe that the amount of coin re- 
 quisite for this purpose would be decidedly less 
 than it was for a few years preceding that date. 
 
 At any rate, we may safely dismiss this from 
 the list of causes concurring to produce the 
 depreciation and subsequent enhancement of the 
 value of money resulting from the restriction 
 and resumption of cash payments by the Bank. 
 
 The next effect ascribed to the Bank re- 
 striction is " the multiplication of the circulating 
 medium virtually by the substitution of credit 
 for currency."
 
 51 
 
 The manner in which the Bank restriction is 
 supposed to have produced these effects, is thus 
 stated. 
 
 " In such a system, country banks find a less 
 stock necessary to answer demands than they 
 would keep if liable to pay in specie. In the 
 former case, one in twenty is deemed sufficient ; 
 in the latter, one-fifth, or perhaps one-fourth, 
 would be the safe proportion. The moral cer- 
 tainty that a banker feels, that he shall not be 
 called upon to discount his own notes, is a 
 strong temptation to issue them to the utmost 
 practicable extent. He sets all the canvas his 
 vessel will carry, more than in common pru- 
 dence he would do if there were any appre- 
 hensions of a coming gale. But the Bank 
 restriction was a kind of security against all 
 sudden and unexpected movements, a sort of 
 monsoon, which, after passing one session of 
 parliament, he was sure would continue to the 
 next ; and while that lasted, nothing was likely 
 to happen that could disturb his course." 
 
 " All the merchants examined agree in stating 
 that country paper increased with the increase 
 of Bank paper. If, therefore, the Bank re- 
 striction was the cause of excessive issues from 
 the Bank, a fact which is at this time hardly 
 open to dispute, it must be charged with pro- 
 ducing that excessive issue of country paper 
 
 F,2
 
 52 
 
 also, which was an invariable concomitant of 
 the other." 
 
 " It has already been observed, that the power 
 of procuring money, if wanted, is tantamount 
 to the actual possession. To use a scholastic 
 phrase, money in posse is equivalent for all pur- 
 poses of trade to money in esse : it gives an 
 equal spirit of enterprise to the buyer; and, when 
 that power is become notorious, equal confi- 
 dence to the seller. Now it cannot be doubted 
 that this hypothetical wealth was greatly aug- 
 mented by the system of the Bank restriction. 
 If the Bank was always ready to discount bills 
 upon real mercantile transactions ; if country 
 banks, in imitation of this example, did the same ; 
 not only were transactions entered into which, 
 without such facility, never could have taken 
 place, but numerous contracts were effected for 
 which actual payment was not required at the 
 time, and was, in fact, never made ; other trans- 
 actions in the mean time having taken place 
 which either directly or indirectly had the 
 effect of balancing these ; thus performing, 
 without regular book entries, the very office of 
 a bank; the seller building as securely upon the 
 credit of the buyer, (a credit never actually put 
 to the test) as upon his tangible property." 
 
 On this statement, I have to observe, as on 
 many others brought forward by the advocates
 
 53 
 
 of the doctrine of indefinite depreciation, that 
 the facts assumed, and the inferences drawn 
 from them, are equally erroneous. 
 
 The country banks are not yet legally bound 
 to pay in specie, nor is it at all probable, consi- 
 dering the great improvements in the system of 
 banking, that if they were now under the obli- 
 gation of paying in cash, any thing like so large 
 a reserve would be requisite as before 1797. 
 
 That the Bank restriction did not operate as 
 a security against all sudden and unexpected 
 movements, may be inferred from the expe- 
 rience of 1810, when there was as violent a 
 crisis of commercial credit as the memorable 
 one which had occurred in 1793; and the num- 
 ber of bankers against whom commissions of 
 bankruptcy were issued was exactly equal in 
 1810 to what it was in 1793, viz. twenty-six in 
 each. And with respect to the " monsoon, 
 which after passing one session of parliament, 
 the country banker was sure would continue to 
 the next ; and while that lasted, nothing was 
 likely to happen thatwould disturb his course — " 
 we may ask, what the author of this simile has 
 to observe upon the succession of hurricanes 
 which swept away so many banking and mer- 
 cantile establishments within the two years 
 which elapsed after the passing of the act of 
 1814, which continued the restriction over that
 
 64 
 
 period? In that interval the commissions against 
 bankers were, twenty-nine in 1814 and twenty- 
 six in 181o. In 1816 there was a further re- 
 newal for two years, and the number of com- 
 missions in that single year against bankers was 
 thirty-seven • and yet in these three years, viz. 
 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average annual circu- 
 lation of Bank of England notes exceeded by 
 upwards of three millions the annual amount of 
 the three preceding years. What shadow of 
 ground, then, is there for the assumption that 
 the restriction held out a security which in- 
 duced and enabled the country bankers to issue 
 and maintain in circulation an indefinite amount 
 of notes ? 
 
 But the supposition that an excessive issue 
 of country bank paper must of necessity have 
 been an invariable concomitant of the excessive 
 issues of the Bank of England, is further sup- 
 ported by the following reasoning ; viz. that 
 " money in posse is equivalent for all purposes 
 of trade to moneymme;" that "this hypo- 
 thetical wealth was greatly augmented by the 
 system of the Bank restriction ;" that " the 
 Bank was always ready to discount bills upon 
 real mercantile transactions ;" and that country 
 bankers had every inducement and facility to 
 imitate the example of extended issue, and must 
 therefore be presumed to have done so.
 
 Ob 
 
 If by money in posse be understood the con- 
 fidence which the merchant, tradesman, or 
 farmer may have of being able, at the shortest 
 notice, to raise money or obtain credit on un- 
 doubted security, whether of bills or of trading 
 or farming stock, then I maintain, without fear 
 of contradiction, that money in posse — that this 
 hypothetical wealth — was infinitely less abun- 
 dant during the Bank restriction than it is now. 
 Whatever may have been the theory of the 
 Bank Directors as to the impossibility of an ex- 
 cess of their issues, as long as they were limited 
 to the discount of bills not exceeding sixty-five 
 days to run, founded on bond jide mercantile 
 transactions, it is well known that they did not 
 (fortunately as I think) act up to these prin- 
 ciples, and that they did, in fact, impose other 
 limitations, the effect of which was that, at par- 
 ticular periods, money was not always to be ob- 
 tained, even upon bills that came within the 
 description of the limits stated. 
 
 And, as to other descriptions of bills, and 
 securities, however unexceptionable, there were 
 times during the restriction when it was totally 
 impossible to raise money upon them. On such 
 occasions I have known a ruinous difference 
 exist between moaey and credit sales, notwith- 
 standing the undoubted solvency of the buyer, 
 whom at the moment it might only suit to pur-
 
 56 
 
 chase on credit. What, indeed, was the ground 
 for the parliamentary grant of Exchequer bills, 
 to be advanced by way of loan, on sufficient 
 security, to the distressed manufacturing and 
 mercantile interests in 1811, but the notoriety 
 of the fact, that accommodation in the money 
 market on private security, however good, was 
 at that time difficult, and, in some cases, impos- 
 sible to be obtained ? 
 
 At present, (and I appeal to every one con- 
 versant with the state of the money market for 
 the correctness of the assertion) there is an 
 overflow of capital offering out on loan, when- 
 ever there is even the appearance of tolerable 
 security. There is an absolute avidity to lend 
 (witness the eagerness with which loans have 
 been lately contracted for by individuals in this 
 country to foreign powers, without much appa- 
 rent regard to the eventual security) and a 
 general invitation is held out to speculation by 
 the facility of raising money upon whatever 
 goods may become the object of adventure. 
 But yet this facility, greater within the last 
 twelve months than has ever been experienced 
 in our commercial history, is evidently not of 
 itself sufficient, with some few exceptions, to 
 infuse enterprise into the buyer, or firmness 
 into the holder. 
 
 Failing, however, of sufficient grounds, from
 
 57 
 
 reasoning, a priori, to infer a necessary con- 
 nexion between the increase of country paper 
 and Bank of England paper, it is yet asserted 
 that, in point of fact, country paper always did 
 increase with Bank paper. This assertion, al- 
 though countenanced by the statement of vague 
 impressions on the part of some of the witnesses 
 examined in 1819, is at variance with the ela- 
 borate estimate in the Lords' Report (page 13), 
 founded upon the best data accessible. That 
 estimate, which commences with 1810, exhibits 
 several instances of an increase of the Bank of 
 England notes, accompanied or followed by a 
 diminution of country paper : but the divergence 
 of relative amount would have been still more 
 striking, if the statement had included 1808 
 and 1 809. In those two years, although in the 
 first of them there was scarcely any addition 
 worth mentioning, and in the second an addition 
 of only about two millions to the amount of Bank 
 of England notes, there was a great and sudden 
 extension of country paper, as well as of private 
 paper generally. 
 
 The Bullion Report of 1810 (page 28) refers 
 to the increase of country paper in those two 
 years in the following terms : " Your Committee 
 are led to infer, from all the evidence they have 
 been able to procure on this subject, not only 
 that a great number of new country banks has
 
 been established within these last two years, but 
 also that the amount of issues of those which 
 are of an older standing has, in general, been 
 very considerably increased." And there is 
 abundant testimony to the same effect from 
 other sources : but the fact is so well established, 
 and so much within the recollection of many of 
 my readers, as to render superfluous the accu- 
 mulation of evidence. It must likewise be in 
 the recollection of most persons conversant with 
 the money market at that time, as it is perfectly 
 fresh in my own memory, that there was within 
 the same period a great extension of transactions 
 on credit, and an extended circulation of mer- 
 cantile bills. The amount cannot, of course, 
 be estimated with accuracy, but there is every 
 reason to suppose that the aggregate increase 
 was out of all usual proportion to the circulation 
 of Bank of England notes. At any rate, what- 
 ever that extension might be in those two years, 
 it is very certain that the amount was much 
 greater in 1809, and in the early part of 1810, 
 than in the succeeding twelve months ; because, 
 in the summer of 1810, as has already been ob- 
 served, credit in the commercial world sustained 
 a very severe blow ; a great number of country 
 banks were destroyed; and, of those banks 
 which stood their ground, the circulation was, 
 of necessity, very much contracted. Some re-
 
 59 
 
 duced their issues from a prudential regard to 
 their own security, and others from necessity, 
 in consequence of the distrust which was felt 
 towards such establishments as, although they 
 might have weathered the storm, were not of 
 first-rate solidity. 
 
 But this great reduction of country bank- 
 notes, and probably still greater reduction of 
 private paper of other descriptions, took place, 
 as nearly as possible, simultaneously with the 
 largest addition which, within an equal period, 
 was ever made to the circulation of the Bank of 
 England : the addition, from the 26th Feb. to 
 the 25th Aug. 1810, being rather more than 
 four millions. 
 
 c 26th Feb 20,429,281 
 
 1810/ 
 
 (.25th Aug 24,440,175 
 
 (Commons' Report, 1819, Appendix, p. 281.) 
 
 Again, on the average of the years 1814, 
 1815, and 181 6, the issues of the Bank of Eng- 
 land were larger by three millions per annum 
 than those of the preceding three years. 
 
 1811, Average amount .... 23,282,000 
 
 12, Ditto .... 23,237,000 
 
 13, Ditto .... 24,023,000 
 
 3)70,542,000 
 
 Mean of the three years .... 23,514,000
 
 60 
 
 1814, Average amount . : . . 26,901,000 
 
 15, Ditto .... 26,886,000 
 
 16, Ditto .... 26,574,000 
 
 3)80,361,000 
 26,787,000 
 
 {Lords' Report, 1819,^. 13.) 
 
 And yet it must be within general recollec- 
 tion, as well as apparent from the statement 
 referred to, that, during those three years, a 
 great reduction took place in the circulation of 
 country paper ; not to mention the great fall of 
 prices which accompanied this extended issue 
 of Bank of England notes, and which will be 
 matter for subsequent consideration. So much, 
 in the mean time, for the assertion of the fact 
 of coincidence of increase of country paper with 
 that of Bank of England paper. 
 
 It appears, then, that there did not exist a 
 perpetual security to country bankers, nor a 
 constant facility of discount to London mer- 
 chants during the Bank restriction ; that if this 
 security and facility had existed, without suf- 
 ficient motives for the use of it, there would not 
 necessarily have been an increase of country 
 paper, nor of transactions on private credit; 
 and finally that, on several occasions, a great 
 increase of Bank of England notes was ac-
 
 61 
 
 companied by, or coincident with, a very con- 
 siderable diminution of the circulation of every 
 other description of paper. 
 
 How then, it may be asked, is the great in- 
 crease of country and private paper generally, 
 which was observable at particular periods 
 during the restriction, to be accounted for? 
 I believe that this question admits of being 
 satisfactorily answered ; but I propose to re- 
 serve the explanation till I come to the con- 
 sideration of prices at the period commencing 
 in 1807-8, when the fluctuation of them seems 
 to have been connected with great variations in 
 the amount of private, as contra-distinguished 
 from Bank of England paper. 
 
 In the mean time, however, if the facts and 
 presumptions, stated in the passages which I 
 have quoted, had been correct, still there would 
 be no ground for the inference so strenuously 
 contended for ; viz. that the Bank restriction 
 depreciated our currency in a greater degree 
 than that indicated by the difference between 
 paper and gold. For supposing the restriction 
 to have occasioned a constant excess of Country, 
 as well as of Bank of England notes, it is clear 
 that the aggregate excess, beyond what could 
 have been maintained under a system of con- 
 vertibility into coin, whatever might be the 
 proportions of the component parts of the cir-
 
 62 
 
 culating medium, would, according to the now 
 generally received, and, I believe, only true 
 doctrine of money and exchanges, have equally 
 affected the value of the whole : and the degree 
 of depreciation would have been equally marked 
 by a rise in the price of gold, or by a depression 
 in the exchanges, or by both, whether the cir- 
 culating medium were really augmented in nu- 
 merical amount, or only virtually enlarged by 
 the substitution of credit for currency.
 
 6S 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Examination of the alleged Connexion between the Bank 
 Restriction and a progressive advance of Prices. 
 
 If the assumed influence of the Bank re- 
 striction and subsequent resumption of cash 
 payments, on the value of the precious metals 
 in Europe, and on that portion of the circulation 
 of this country which consists of private paper 
 and credit, be proved to be insufficient, upon 
 any general grounds of reasoning, to have pro- 
 duced the alleged effect of a greater depreciation 
 of money, in the first instance, and a greater 
 enhancement, subsequently, than has been in- 
 dicated by the difference between paper and 
 gold, it is still contended, by the advocates for 
 the doctrine which I have been combating, that 
 " The constant and invariable connexion of 
 increase of price with the Bank restriction, is a 
 forcible proof of such a relation as that of cause 
 and effect subsisting between the two pheno- 
 mena. The near approach of the termination 
 of that restriction has produced a fall of prices 
 greatly exceeding the difference between paper 
 and gold ; thus still further corroborating that
 
 64 
 
 connexion, and proving, almost demonstratively, 
 that the prices from 1797 to 1810 were, to a 
 certain degree, artificial ; and that the com- 
 parison of paper and gold, during that period, 
 did not afford a test of their real amount." 
 And, for the more perfect establishment of this 
 point, upon which so much depends, a table is 
 exhibited of prices collected from the tables 
 printed in the parliamentary reports on this 
 subject (gold being reserved for the last co- 
 lumn), with the following introductory remark : 
 " It will be remembered that 31. 17*- lOjrf. 
 is the mint price of an ounce of gold ; so that 
 all above that sum may be regarded as the 
 difference between Bank-paper and gold, — a 
 difference very inconsiderable till the year 1810, 
 although the price of labour and of the ne- 
 cessaries of life rose, during the same period, 
 seventy or eighty, and, in some articles, more 
 than cent, per cent."
 
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 66 
 
 The first observation I have to make on a re- 
 ference to this table is, that there is no price of 
 gold quoted in 1800, nor again in 1809 ; but it 
 appears, from the Appendix to the Commons' 
 Bullion Report in 1819 (pages 294 and 802), 
 that there were several transactions in foreign 
 gold coin in those two years, and throughout 
 the whole period of the war after 1799, foreign 
 gold coin generally fetched as much as standard 
 gold bullion in this market, whenever there were 
 any transactions at the same time in both. Now, 
 in the year 1800, there were weekly quotations 
 of the price of foreign gold coin, from the end 
 of May to the middle of December, all at 4/. 5s. 
 per oz., and for the last fortnight in December 
 of that year, and the first fortnight in January, 
 1801, at 4/. 6s. per oz. ; after which, with a 
 trifling fluctuation, and a few intermediate trans- 
 actions in the market, the price subsided in 1804 
 to 41. per oz., at which, for upwards of a year 
 and a half, viz. from April 1 804 to October 1 805, 
 there are quotations of both foreign and standard 
 gold, not less than once a fortnight, and gene- 
 rally once a week, arguing great frequency of 
 transactions. Again, foreign gold is quoted in 
 February and March 1809, at 4/. 10s., and in 
 April and May of the same year, at 4/. 1 IT., from 
 whence it fell to 4/. 4>s. 6d. in November 1810. It 
 may be of importance to bear these circumstances
 
 67 
 
 in mind, with a view to the correctness of any 
 estimate of the depreciation of bank-notes, as 
 measured by the price of gold. This, however, 
 is a point that may more properly be reserved for 
 discussion, when we come to the consideration 
 of the causes of the principal phenomena exhi- 
 bited in the relative value of paper and gold. I 
 will now proceed to examine the merits of this 
 table, as tending to establish the fact, that " the 
 constant and invariable connexion of increase of 
 price with the Bank restriction, is a forcible proof 
 of such a relation as that of cause and effect sub- 
 sisting between the two phenomena." And I have 
 no hesitation in pronouncing the document in 
 question to be incomplete, inadequate to the 
 object proposed, and calculated, as here brought 
 forward, to lead to the most erroneous conclu- 
 sions. 
 
 In the first place, it is incomplete and in- 
 adequate ; because it gives the prices, at inter- 
 vals, of no less than five years each, between 
 1795 and 1805; and it so happens that 1800 
 and 1805, which form the points of comparison 
 with the first of the series, include the great rise 
 of necessaries immediately consequent upon two 
 very bad harvests, viz. 1799 and 1804. The 
 intervals, too, which are passed over, include 
 great fluctuations of price, arising from political 
 obstructions to importation, as well as from ex- 
 
 F 2
 
 68 
 
 traordinary casualties of the seasons. It does 
 not state at what time in each year the prices 
 were fixed ; a very important point, where the 
 articles are furnished by contract, which in- 
 clude anticipations of cheapness or dearness, 
 and therefore do not, in all instances, give the 
 actual price in the general market. Nor, in the 
 quotation of the price of meat, does it distin- 
 guish the kind ; and by the way, it so happens, 
 that in the parliamentary tables there is no such 
 word as meaty the column being headed by the 
 word jlesh, which probably includes pork : this 
 is a material variance from the original docu- 
 ments, inasmuch as the supply of the navy during 
 the war operated in a greater degree on the price 
 of pork than on that of beef and mutton. 
 
 In the next place, it is calculated to lead to the 
 most erroneous conclusions ; for there is hardly 
 one article, besides flour and meat, included in 
 this extract from the Greenwich contract prices, 
 that can be said to afford any fair ground of 
 comparison for judging of the relative value of 
 money. Butter and cheese are affected by the 
 state of our political relations with Holland ; as 
 we depend for part of our supplies on importa- 
 tion from thence. Malt ought not to be intro- 
 duced, because its price, during the period re- 
 ferred to, includes a varying rate of taxation ; 
 and because, divested of the tax, it must follow
 
 69 
 
 the price of barley. Carpenters' wages do not 
 form a fair criterion of the general rate of wages 
 through the country : their occupation requires 
 more or less of skill, and it is a description of 
 labour which, during the war, was in constant 
 demand for the purposes of a progressive in- 
 crease of ship-building, both for the navy and 
 merchant service. Candles follow, at some in- 
 terval, the fluctuations of tallow, and this again 
 is an article, for a large proportion of which we 
 depend on importation ; it is liable, therefore, 
 to be affected in a very considerable degree, and 
 indeed has been so affected, by obstructions, 
 arising from war or other causes, to our re- 
 ceiving the usual supplies from Russia ; but, in 
 point of fact, the price of tallow, and conse- 
 quently of candles, was lower in 1807 than it 
 had been in J 797. And as to coals, the freight 
 forms so large a proportion of their cost, that 
 the increase of their price proves little else 
 than an increase of freight, which, it is well 
 known, reached a very great height, in conse- 
 quence of the peculiar circumstances of the 
 war. 
 
 Setting aside, then, the imperfect and incon- 
 clusive extract from the Greenwich Hospital 
 account, and referring to commodities on a 
 larger scale for a comparison of prices, let us 
 see how far the allegation of " the constant and
 
 70 
 
 invariable connexion of increase of price with the 
 Bank restriction" is borne out by facts. 
 
 The criterion most commonly referred to, by 
 those who have treated of variations in the value 
 of money, is the price of corn : now, referring 
 for the prices of corn to a table (which I insert 
 in the Appendix) contained in the Commons' 
 report of 1819 (p. 344), it will appear, on a 
 careful inspection of it, that there is nothing 
 like a progressive increase from 1797* com- 
 mencing, as the reviewer, and so many writers 
 and speakers before him, would lead the public 
 to suppose, in 1797- 
 
 The fact is, that a great rise occurred two 
 years before the restriction ; that, for two years 
 after, prices rather fell ; and that, having again 
 risen in consequence of two successive bad 
 seasons, combined with obstructions to importa- 
 tion from abroad occasioned by the war, they 
 continued to fall till the summer of 1804, when 
 they were as low as in the summer of 1793, and 
 lower than in January, 1797*. The comparison 
 of the extreme points formed by these dates, 
 beginning with the date of the Bank restriction, 
 will stand thus : 
 
 * The following extract from the account of Windsor prices 
 of wheat and malt at Eton College,, inserted in the Appendix 
 to the Lords' Report on the Corn Laws, 1814, (p. 141), will 
 serve to confirm this statement.
 
 71 
 
 Wheat. Rye. 
 
 Barley. Oats. 
 
 Beans. Pease. Oatmeal. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 Jan. 1/97, 55 9 35 7 
 
 32 3 18 
 
 31 6 36 6 39 5 
 
 Jan. 1804, 52 3 32 3 
 
 23 11 21 7 
 
 37 5 42 3 40 9 
 
 (Commons' Report on Resumption of Cash 
 
 i Payments, 
 
 1809, p. 344 .) 
 
 
 
 
 Wheat per bushel 
 
 . Malt per bushel. 
 
 
 L. s. d. 
 
 L. s. 
 
 d. 
 
 1792 Michaelmas 
 
 7 6 
 
 5 
 
 °2 
 
 1793 Lady Day 
 
 ■ 7 7i 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 6 4 
 
 5 
 
 2 
 
 1794 Lady Day 
 
 6 6 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 1795 Lady Day 
 
 S 10i 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 11 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 1796 Lady Day 
 
 12 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 8 Of 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 1 797 Lady Day 
 
 8 9 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 6 9 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 1798 Lady Day 
 
 6 9 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 6 9 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 1799 Lady Day 
 
 7 4 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 11 7 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 1800 Lady Day 
 
 15 9 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 o 
 
 1801 Lady Day 
 
 1 2 If 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 1802 Lady Day 
 
 8 6 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 8 3f 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 1803 Lady Day 
 
 7 ,6 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 Michaelmas 
 
 7 6 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 1804 Lady Day 
 
 7 U 
 
 4 
 
 8
 
 72 
 
 Hence it appears that there was a decided fall 
 in the price of corn, in the aggregate, after the 
 lapse of seven years from the Bank restriction, 
 instead of the progressive rise asserted so con- 
 fidently to have been the necessary effect of that 
 measure. And, although it may be an anti- 
 cipation of what will come more properly under 
 consideration among the supposed effects of 
 war on prices, I cannot resist the opportunity 
 of presenting, by a reference to the same table, 
 the following comparisons. 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Beans. 
 
 Pease. Oatmeal. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 Jan. 1794, 
 
 49 8 
 
 36 5 
 
 33 5 
 
 22 1 
 
 40 10 
 
 41 4 39 3 
 
 . . 1804, 
 
 52 3 
 
 32 3 
 
 23 11 
 
 21 7 
 
 37 5 
 
 42 3 40 9 
 
 Jul. 1793, 
 
 51 3 
 
 37 1 
 
 32 3 
 
 23 5 
 
 38 7 
 
 38 3 42 9 
 
 . . 1804, 
 
 52 1 
 
 34 
 
 27 3 
 
 24 1 
 
 35 11 
 
 38 5 39 6 
 
 Here, then, it is evident that, if allowances 
 be made for the difference between paper and 
 gold in the respective periods, the prices of 
 wheat were really lower in the latter than in the 
 former years, between which is an interval com- 
 prising eleven years of war and seven years of 
 Bank restriction ; and the prices of spring corn 
 were clearly lower in the aggregate, without 
 that allowance. And there is no doubt, keeping 
 these extreme points in view, that the extraor- 
 dinary fluctuations of price which characterized
 
 73 
 
 the intermediate period may be satisfactorily 
 accounted for by a reference to the seasons. 
 For it is matter of historical notoriety, and it 
 may still be in the recollection of many of my 
 readers, that the period in question comprized 
 four seasons, viz. 1794, 1795, 1799, and 1800, 
 which in their total produce, allowing for ex- 
 tended cultivation and improvements in agri- 
 culture, were throughout Europe the most de- 
 ficient within the last hundred and twenty years : 
 there was likewise a large proportion of severe 
 winters in that interval, and it is well known 
 how great a difference there is between a long 
 hard winter and an open one, in the consumption 
 of dry food by cattle. On this point I shall 
 have occasion to dwell more at large hereafter. 
 In the meantime, I ask, upon what ground of 
 fact or reasoning can the high prices included 
 in such a period be ascribed in fairness to altera- 
 tions in the currency beyond the degree indi- 
 cated by the difference between paper and gold, 
 when, after a sufficient time has elapsed for the 
 subsidence of the extraordinary effects of such 
 an unusual succession of bad seasons, there is a 
 restoration to a level even somewhat lower than 
 that from which the rise is assumed to have 
 taken place, and to have continued progres- 
 sively ?
 
 74 
 
 I have here confined the examination of the 
 prices of corn to the interval ending with the 
 summer of 1804, because the bad harvest of 
 that year, followed by two seasons of only 
 average produce, occasioned a fresh range of 
 high prices. In 1807 there was a renewed 
 tendency downwards, but that tendency was 
 soon checked ; and at the close of that year 
 commenced a fresh era, the phenomena of 
 which will require separate consideration. My 
 immediate purpose is merely to negative the 
 assumed invariable connexion of the rise of 
 prices with the continuance of the Bank re- 
 striction ; and it seems to me that this purpose 
 is sufficiently answered, as far as relates to the 
 price of corn, by the full proof here exhibited 
 of the absence of such coincidence for so long 
 a period as the first seven years of the series to 
 which the assertion applies. 
 
 The article next in importance to corn is 
 meat. Under this term, and for the purposes 
 of the present inquiry, I include only beef and 
 mutton. Veal, lamb, and pork, depend so much 
 on casualties of demand, as not to admit of any 
 accurate average of price. Pork in particular 
 seems in its produce to have scarcely kept pace 
 with the war demand, and accordingly main- 
 tained its price, during part of the period to
 
 75 
 
 which I am about to refer, when beef and mut- 
 ton fell. The quotations of beef and mutton at 
 Smithfield market were, 
 
 
 
 a-, d. s. d. 
 
 January, 1 797, 
 
 Beef 
 
 3 6 to 4 6 
 
 
 Mutton 
 
 4 4 to 5 
 
 January, 1S08, 
 
 Beef 
 
 3 6 to 5 
 
 
 Mutton 
 
 4 4 to 5 1 
 
 (See Appendix.) 
 
 Making a difference, at the end of eleven years, 
 so trifling as not to be worth mentioning. 
 
 There was, indeed, as in the case of corn, an 
 intermediate range of high prices as a conse- 
 quence of the bad seasons of 1799 and 1800 — 
 but for that very reason, those high prices should 
 be excluded from any ground of inference as to 
 the value of the currency. The following ex- 
 tract from the account of the contracting prices 
 at the Victualling Office, which unfortunately 
 does not go farther back than the commence- 
 ment of 1801, shows the high price which beef 
 had reached after the bad seasons above men- 
 tioned, and how progressively it had declined 
 till the end of 1808. The prices here quoted 
 are stated to be for the supply of fresh beef at 
 Deptford yard :
 
 76 
 
 1801 . Nov. 69s. 7d per cwt. N. B. This is the first date 
 quoted at Deptford ; but there is a 
 quotation for Plymouth Yard in March, 
 1801, as high as 80*. per cwt. 
 
 1802 No price quoted for Deptford ; but the average 
 
 for Plymouth in that year was 55*. 
 
 1803. Dec. 55s. 6d. 
 
 1804 54*. 8rf. 
 
 1805 52*. 6d. 
 
 180G 50*. 
 
 1807 No price at Deptford ; but at Plymouth it is 
 
 quoted 45*. 8d. 
 
 1808 50*. 
 
 (Appendix to Lords' Report on the Corn Laws, 1814, 
 p. 137.J 
 
 It may be worth while to add, as an instance 
 of extraordinary fluctuation arising evidently 
 from the effects of the seasons, that the price 
 paid by the Victualling Office for flour in Ja- 
 nuary, 1801, was as high as IWs. per sack, and 
 in May, 1804, as low as 38s. 4c?. 
 
 As well might it be said that these instances 
 of a fall in price after 1801 were proofs of an 
 enhancement, or, as it has sometimes been called, 
 an appreciation of the currency, as that the rise 
 between 1797 and 1801 should be thought to 
 prove the depreciation. 
 
 It has further been asserted, that labour, as 
 well as necessaries, experienced a progressive 
 advance during the period referred to. I have
 
 77 
 
 already suggested grounds of objection to the 
 admission of the wages of carpenters, in and 
 near London, as affording a sufficient ground 
 of inference with respect to the general rate of 
 wages in the country : and the same objection 
 applies, in point of principle, to the admission 
 of the higher price paid for some other descrip- 
 tions of labour, which happened to be in great 
 relative demand. It is clear that, during the 
 progress of a war, on such a scale as the last, 
 there must have been an unusual demand for 
 full-grown able-bodied men ; and the encou- 
 ragement held out to a great extension of tillage, 
 during the same period, might be supposed to 
 have added to the demand ; and as the supply 
 could barely, within the period, keep pace with 
 the extra demand, a considerable portion of that 
 description of persons might naturally be ex- 
 pected to command a high rate of wages. Of 
 this description were soldiers, sailors, labourers 
 in husbandry, carpenters, bricklayers, domestic 
 men-servants, and many others. The greater 
 pay which they (subject, however, to many 
 important exceptions) received, would accord- 
 ingly afford no ground of inference of deprecia- 
 tion in the currency. But the labour that did 
 not come within the reach of such peculiarity 
 of demand appears not only not to have ex- 
 perienced any rise, but actually, in several in-
 
 78 
 
 stances, to have fallen in price during the period 
 in question. There is, from authentic sources, 
 concurrent testimony to this effect. 
 
 The following statements are extracted from 
 the minutes of evidence in the Lords' Report 
 of 1814 on the corn laws. It should he ob- 
 served, that these statements were there brought 
 forward to prove a connexion, or, more pro- 
 perly, a general coincidence, between a rise in 
 the price of corn and a fall in the rate of wages, 
 and vice versa. I have nothing to do, in the 
 present stage of my argument, with that as- 
 serted connexion ; it is sufficient for my purpose 
 that these statements, as far as they go, prove 
 the negative, and, in some instances, the very 
 reverse of the imputed progressive advance in 
 the price of labour, as well as of necessaries, 
 from the date, and as a consequence, of the 
 Bank restriction. 
 
 Patrick Milne, Esq. M. P., examined : 
 " Q. Can you state to the Committee any par- 
 ticular instance of agricultural work that you 
 may have contracted for, in a dear year and a 
 cheap year? — A. I can state a very strong in- 
 stance, that happened to myself last year : I 
 wished to inclose a farm at the latter end of the 
 year 1812 or the beginning of 1813: I sent for 
 my bailiff, and told him, that I had inclosed, 
 about twenty-five years ago, a good deal of
 
 79 
 
 land ; that the inclosure, at that time, cost me 
 three shillings per ell of thirty-seven inches ; 
 that a neighbour of mine, two or three years 
 ago, had made similar inclosures, which cost 
 him five shillings per ell ; that I thought he 
 had paid too much, and that I ought to do it 
 cheaper. The answer I got from my bailiff 
 was, that provisions were very high ; that the 
 labourers were doing double work ; and that, 
 of course, there was less demand for labour ; 
 and that he could do those inclosures last year 
 at a cheaper rate than I had ever done them ; 
 and he actually executed this inclosure at about 
 two shillings and sixpence per ell. He again 
 came to me, and told me, that J had proposed 
 to him to do some ditching and draining upon 
 another farm, which I did not intend to do till 
 about a twelvemonth after, from the circum- 
 stance of not being fully in possession of the 
 whole farm : he requested I would allow him to 
 do it that season, as he could do it so much 
 cheaper ; and that a great many labourers were 
 idle from having a little work, in consequence 
 of those who were employed doing double work. 
 I desired him to go on with that labour likewise, 
 and he actually contracted for very large ditches 
 at sixpence an ell, which I do not think I could 
 now do under from one shilling to one shilling
 
 80 
 
 and sixpence, in consequence pf the fall in 
 provisions. 
 
 " Q. Have you any statement of the price 
 of manufacturing labour, per piece now, in 
 cottons, or in any other commodity, for any 
 number of years ? — A. I have not, from Scot- 
 land ; I can very easily get them : but I was 
 at some pains to endeavour to see how far 
 those ideas I had with regard to labour ap- 
 plied to England ; and for that purpose I wrote 
 to Manchester and to Stockport, to get state- 
 ments of their labour in those quarters; and 
 I have two statements, one from Blackburn, 
 which gives the price of manufacturing a piece 
 of common goods, such as they call 74< printing- 
 calicoes, from 1792 to 1814: it is here com- 
 pared with the average price of grain in each 
 year, taken from the record of the Windsor 
 market, kept at Eton College. " 
 
 Mr. Milne delivers in two statements, which 
 I have here compressed into one, omitting the 
 column containing the price of wheat.
 
 81 
 
 Wages for weaving the l T4s. 
 
 Wages for weavir 
 
 g the 80^ Cambric 
 
 Printing Calico in Lancashire. 
 
 at Stockport. 
 
 Years. 1 
 
 April. 
 
 June. 
 
 December. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1792 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 1793 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 1794 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 1795 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 1796 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 1797 
 
 7 6 
 
 
 
 1798 
 
 7 
 
 21 6 
 
 21 6 
 
 1799 
 
 7 o 
 
 22 6 
 
 21 
 
 1800 
 
 8 
 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 1801 
 
 8 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 1S02 
 
 10 
 
 24 
 
 23 0inSep.25.s\ 
 
 1803 
 
 9 
 
 20 
 
 16 
 
 1804 
 
 7 6 
 
 16 
 
 20 
 
 1805 
 
 8 6 
 
 19 
 
 15 
 
 1806 
 
 7 6 
 
 15 
 
 11 6 
 
 1807 
 
 7 6 
 
 14 
 
 14 
 
 1808 
 
 5 6 
 
 11 
 
 12 6 
 
 1809 
 
 6 6 
 
 16 
 
 16 
 
 1810 
 
 8 6 
 
 15 6 
 
 10 
 
 1811 
 
 5 6 
 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 1812 
 
 6 6 
 
 11 6 
 
 11 
 
 1813 
 
 8 
 
 12 
 
 15 
 
 1814 
 
 10 
 
 16 to 17s. 
 
 In April and May 
 20*. to 21s., and 
 some speculators 
 
 
 23)172 
 
 
 
 
 
 gave 22s. to 23s. 
 
 
 7 6 aver. 
 
 
 The Earl of Mansfield, a member of the com- 
 mittee, delivered in a letter from his factor in 
 Scotland, Mr. James Wood, containing answers 
 to a set of queries, from which the following 
 are extracts : 
 
 Q. In what year of the last fourteen was ma- 
 
 G
 
 82 
 
 nufacturing labour the lowest ? — A. In the year 
 1811. 
 
 Q. In what year of those fourteen was manu- 
 facturing labour the highest? — A. In the year 
 1805. 
 
 Q. What is the rate of manufacturing labour 
 at present ? — A. A medium between the highest 
 and lowest as above. The average price of 
 weaving for the last fourteen years appears to 
 be six shillings. In 1805, nine shillings was 
 paid for weaving a piece; and in 1811, the 
 same work was done as low as three shillings. 
 
 The letter closes with the following passage : 
 
 " The present rate of ploughman's wages is 
 from sixteen pounds to eighteen pounds, having 
 within these last three years declined from three 
 to four pounds per annum. Day labour is two 
 shillings in summer, and one shilling and six- 
 pence in winter. In every case good hands are 
 meant." 
 
 The Earl of Lauderdale, likewise a member 
 of the committee, delivered in statements of 
 which the following are copies, omitting only 
 the prices of wheat, which have nothing to do 
 with my present object, viz. to negative the 
 assertion of a necessary connexion between the 
 Bank restriction and a progressive advance in 
 the price of labour.
 
 83 
 
 Prices 
 
 if Weaving per Ell, 
 
 /?fl/rf fl/ Glasgoxo. 
 
 Year. 
 
 1200 Book Mus- 
 
 1200 Jaconot 
 
 1000| wide checks, stout 
 
 
 lins | wide. 
 
 J wide. 
 
 made. 
 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1790 
 
 15 1 
 
 
 8 ^ 
 
 3 
 
 43 
 
 
 1791 
 
 15 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 *a 
 
 
 1792 
 
 15 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 67 
 
 1793 
 
 15 
 
 .2 9 
 
 8* 
 
 .8 <=> 
 ^2 
 
 54- and 54- 
 
 1794 
 
 19 
 
 I s 
 
 64- 
 
 "3 s 
 
 5 T 
 
 1795 
 
 H* 
 
 ■11 
 
 8 
 
 o =£ 
 
 \3 c3 
 
 6 and 6| 
 
 1796 
 1797 
 
 HI 
 
 104- 
 
 fa 
 
 8t 
 74- 
 
 3fc 
 
 6 T 
 6 t 
 
 1798 
 1799 
 
 n 
 
 H 
 
 5 ■% 
 3 2 
 
 1 i 
 
 74- 
 74- 
 
 32 
 3 3 
 
 6 
 
 6 and 64; 
 
 1800 
 
 94 
 
 
 74- 
 
 S * 
 
 6| and 64^ 
 
 1801 
 
 94 
 
 19 
 
 *7 1 
 IT 
 
 el 
 
 64- 
 
 1802 
 
 8 T 
 
 o 
 
 6 
 
 o 
 
 ^3 
 
 64/ and 6 
 
 1803 
 
 9t 
 
 8" 
 
 6 J 
 
 M|<« 
 
 54 
 
 1804 
 
 8V 
 
 
 H' 
 
 
 5t 
 
 1805 
 
 IP 
 
 1 ' 8 
 
 
 8| 
 
 
 •H 
 
 180G 
 
 12 
 
 
 8^ 
 
 
 6 
 
 1807 
 
 84- 
 
 
 6t 
 
 
 S| to 6 T 
 
 1808 
 
 71 
 
 
 54- 
 
 OJ 
 
 6 
 
 1809 
 
 7 
 
 i.* 
 
 5 
 
 L S< 
 
 6 to 64; 
 
 1810 
 
 8 
 
 « 
 
 7 
 
 OJ 
 
 fe 
 
 early 6 T to 7 T > latterly 54; 
 
 1811 
 
 5 
 
 
 3t 
 
 5 to 54; 
 
 1S12 
 
 H 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 54- 
 
 1813 
 
 74- 
 
 
 G 
 
 
 5^ and 6 
 
 1814 
 
 9t> 
 
 
 7 
 
 
 6 
 
 And not only is the progressive advance in 
 necessaries and wages, which has been ascribed 
 to the Bank restriction, in a degree beyond the 
 difference between paper and gold, negatived 
 by a reference to the facts which have been 
 here brought forward ; but by the following 
 table it will appear that several leading articles, 
 constituting the raw materials of some of our
 
 84 
 
 most important branches of manufacture, be- 
 sides the principal articles of colonial produce, 
 were as low in 1807 as they had been in the 
 spring of 1797, and in some instances lower. 
 
 Table of Prices, exclusive of Duty on Importation, extracted 
 from Prince's Price Current. 
 
 
 
 
 1797. 
 
 
 
 
 1807. 
 
 
 
 
 
 £ 
 
 . s. d. 
 
 £ 
 
 . s. d. 
 
 £. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 £ 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 Cotton. 
 
 .Georgia per lb. 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 2 3 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 
 Pernambuco . 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 3 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 3 
 
 
 
 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 Coffee . 
 
 . B.P. superior, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 per cwt. . . . 
 
 5 
 
 14 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 inferior . 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 12 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Iron . . . 
 
 .Swedish p. ton 
 
 21 
 
 10 
 
 22 
 
 10 
 
 19 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 Russian .... 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 10 
 
 15 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Madder 
 
 Dutch p. cwt. 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 4 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Oil . . . 
 
 . Galipolyp.ton 
 
 63 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 
 
 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Greenland . . . 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Linseed 
 
 49 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pepper 
 
 ,E. India black 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 1} 
 
 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 Saltpetre. . . . per cwt. 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 2 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 Silk... 
 
 . Piedmontese 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 thrown, p. lb. 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 Reggio 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 6 6 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 Sugar . 
 
 . B. P. Jamaica 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 per cwt. . . . 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 3 
 
 15.0 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 E. I. white . . 
 
 5 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 brown. . 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 Refined loaves 
 
 4 
 
 12 
 
 5 
 
 12 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 Tallow. 
 
 .Russia, Y. C. 
 
 2 
 
 16 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 Tar . . . 
 
 American per 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 Swedish .... 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 Tobacco Virginia p. lb. 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 
 
 9| 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 And of such articles as were higher in 1807 
 than in 1797 there is not one that I am aware
 
 35 
 
 of, of which it may not be proved that it existed 
 in a state of scarcity real or apprehended (re- 
 latively to the computed rate of consumption) 
 either from the casualties of the seasons, or 
 from obstructions and increased charges of im- 
 portation, or from extra war demand. Thus, in 
 1800 and 1801, hemp, from the combined effect 
 of the great demand by the navy, and of an ap- 
 prehended failure of supply from Russia, in 
 consequence of an embargo by the Emperor 
 Paul, advanced to 851. per ton ; but it after- 
 wards declined, and in the spring of 1804 was 
 at 48/. to 49/., being about 51. per ton lower 
 than it had been in the spring of 1797. It rose 
 again subsequently to 1804 in consequence of 
 the precariousness of the state of our inter- 
 course with Russia. The same remark applies 
 to timber and other articles of importation from 
 the Baltic. 
 
 Having brought the comparison of the prices 
 of commodities down to 1807, and proved the 
 absence of any observable connexion of the 
 state of them with the Bank restriction beyond 
 the difference (which was then the most trifling 
 imaginable) between paper and gold, I shall 
 proceed to the examination of the extraordinary 
 fluctuations which have characterized the sub- 
 sequent period. But those fluctuations were 
 so strikingly accompanied with corresponding
 
 86 
 
 variations in the amount of private paper and 
 credit, that the consideration of the circum- 
 stances affecting the one will necessarily include 
 a reference to the other. 
 
 Preparatory, therefore, to entering upon the 
 further examination and comparison of prices, 
 I shall proceed to the explanation, which I had 
 reserved at page 61, of the circumstances upon 
 which any great and sudden variations in the 
 amount of private paper and credit depend.
 
 87 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Explanation of the Causes of the Extension and Contraction 
 of private Paper and Credit. 
 
 The circumstances most conducive to an en- 
 largement and contraction of the circulation of 
 private paper are identical with those which 
 give rise to a spirit of speculation and over- 
 trading on the one hand, and to stagnation and 
 despondency on the other. 
 
 The circumstances which give rise to a spirit 
 of speculation and over-trading are scarcity, or, 
 in other words, deficiency of the supply of some 
 important article or articles compared with the 
 average consumption, and the opening of new 
 and extensive markets, or, in general, of any 
 new sources of demand. 
 
 Agricultural produce, which forms by far the 
 largest portion as well as the most valuable class 
 of commodities, and which, as it includes the 
 subsistence of the labourer, and supplies the 
 raw materials of some manufactures, affects the 
 value of many other commodities, is that of 
 which any casual scarcity most powerfully con- 
 tributes to a temporary increase of the circu-
 
 88 
 
 lation of private paper. A great proportion of 
 country bank notes is, or was, issued upon the 
 security of landed property and farming stock, 
 upon the stock of country corn-dealers and 
 millers, and upon the personal security of trades- 
 men within the district of the banks. Now it is 
 clear that upon the occurrence of any tendency 
 to a rise in the price of corn and other agri- 
 cultural produce from actual or apprehended 
 scarcity, there will be an increased disposition 
 on one side to borrow, and on the other an in- 
 creased confidence in lending. Some may have 
 in view to buy in anticipation of their own 
 eventual wants, or on speculation of being able 
 to resell at a profit, or to be enabled to purchase 
 landed property which then appears a bene- 
 ficial investment. Others are disposed to bor- 
 row with a view of being enabled to hold for a 
 longer period the articles which they are already 
 possessed of, in the expectation of realizing 
 prices so much higher as will over-balance the 
 expenses of keeping. On the other hand, the 
 lenders, under these circumstances, feel every 
 inducement of interest to extend their ad- 
 vances : if the personal or other security pre- 
 viously offered were just sufficient, it now be- 
 comes ample by the rise in prices which has 
 already occurred, and by the further rise which 
 on such occasions is always confidently ex-
 
 89 
 
 pccted. Thus, a scarcity of agricultural pro- 
 duce, which would, under a fixed amount of 
 currency, advance money prices in a ratio more 
 or less beyond the mere proportion of deficiency, 
 is the occasion of an actual increase in the 
 amount of the circulating medium, which in- 
 crease is again, while progressive, the occasion 
 of accelerating the rate, and extending the range 
 of the rise in prices. The same effect of gene- 
 rating an increased amount of private paper, 
 and an increased disposition to substitute credit 
 for currency, is observable in the case of a casual 
 deficiency of any other articles of general con- 
 sumption. Thus, any decided deficiency of 
 wool, or cotton, or sugar, &c. will induce spe- 
 culation, and a multiplication of paper or of 
 transactions on mere credit, in the branches of 
 trade connected with those articles, and ac- 
 cording to the number and extent of them, will 
 the effect be perceptible, or not, on the mass of 
 the circulation. 
 
 Next in importance to a scarcity of agricul- 
 tural produce, or of imported commodities, as 
 affecting the quantity of private paper, and the 
 amount of operations on credit, is the opening 
 of new and extensive markets. Such openings, 
 when presented to the enterprising spirit of the 
 merchants and manufacturers of this country, 
 are generally seized with avidity, and entered
 
 90 
 
 upon to an extent, in most instances, much be- 
 yond what the effective demand, or, in other 
 words, what the capacity of making a return of 
 equivalents is eventually found to justify. But 
 whatever, in the result, may prove to have been 
 the exaggeration of the extent of the opening, 
 the immediate effect commonly is to induce all 
 those who are within the sphere of attraction 
 to buy goods, not only to the extent of their 
 capitals, but likewise of their credit : the ex- 
 porting merchant gives his acceptance to the 
 manufacturer, for the utmost amount which 
 the latter will grant him credit for ; the manu- 
 facturer, at the same time, having cleared his 
 hands of finished work, buys an additional quan- 
 tity of the raw material, not only sufficient to 
 replace, but probably to extend his stock, and 
 possibly his buildings, machinery, &c. For these 
 purposes he gives his acceptance, as far as his 
 own credit is available, and may further dis- 
 count the acceptances which he has received, 
 thus converting the credit of his customer, con- 
 jointly with his own, into the means of obtain- 
 ing the temporary command of capital beyond 
 what his own property or credit would afford 
 him. To the general reader it would be irk- 
 some to follow me through a detail of every 
 step, by which bills of exchange and promissory 
 notes are multiplied on such occasions ; and to
 
 91 
 
 the practical reader, who is fully acquainted 
 with the process, it would be superfluous. It is 
 sufficient, in general terms, to point out that an 
 increase of paper of this description, which, in 
 many instances, is applicable, for a limited pe- 
 riod, to the purpose of money, in raising general 
 prices, may be the consequence of the opening 
 of new markets. 
 
 Independent of the paper created on such 
 occasions by the prevalence of a spirit of spe- 
 culation, whether arising from deficiency of 
 supply, or from increased demand, there is a 
 further effect produced on prices, in both 
 cases, by an extended substitution of mere 
 credit in transactions of purchase and sale in 
 some branches of trade, in which it is not usual 
 to deal through the medium of acceptances ; 
 and it is clear that an increased use of credit, 
 for the purposes of purchase, may operate on 
 prices as effectually without, as with, the inter- 
 vention of paper. 
 
 But the circulation of bills of exchange and 
 mercantile notes, as well as transactions on mere 
 credit, must be eventually limited by the ne- 
 cessity of payment, in that which constitutes the 
 basis of the currency. The interval, however, 
 may sometimes be considerable. Country bank- 
 notes are not payable at fixed periods ; and mer- 
 cantile bills admit of being renewed, or fresh
 
 9% 
 
 credits may be granted to replace those that 
 have expired. This extra circulation may con- 
 tinue, it is evident, for some length of time, 
 while confidence prevails, which it usually does 
 as long as the occasion for high prices subsists. 
 
 Whenever the extension of private paper 
 has been great and sudden, the reaction is in- 
 evitable. The process by which the reaction 
 takes place is this : — 
 
 When the rise in price, from scarcity, has 
 attained a certain height, two effects necessarily 
 follow ; a diminution, greater or less, of the 
 consumption, according as the article is more 
 or less necessary, or admits of substitutes ; and 
 increased supply, as far as increased efforts can 
 produce it : but the supply of the great articles 
 of consumption is dependant on casualties of 
 season, and of political or commercial events ; 
 and these are the subjects of speculation, which, 
 when once fully roused, generally goes beyond 
 the mark. Accordingly, the price may con- 
 tinue to rise for some time after the original 
 cause of advance has ceased ; that is, after the 
 supply has become adequate to the average 
 consumption : there is then a pause in the ad- 
 vance, till a favourable season, or large im- 
 portation, or both together, give a decided 
 impulse downwards. The most adventurous, 
 or those who had bought most largely at the
 
 93 
 
 highest prices, are most commonly those who 
 have traded on the largest proportion of bor- 
 rowed capital. Upon the first decided decline 
 of the market, they become unable to fulfil their 
 engagements ; the country banker takes the 
 alarm, and calls in his advances, or at least de- 
 clines to renew them ; those who had borrowed 
 of him, and who had been previously but just 
 solvent, cease to be so, in consequence of not 
 being able to realize the prices at which they 
 had bought. The weakest of the country banks 
 become themselves insolvent, in consequence of 
 a few losses of this kind, and there is a consequent 
 distrust of the more solid establishments, which 
 are therefore exposed to a run, and compelled 
 to contract their issues. All bills of exchange 
 or acceptances for goods are scrutinized, and 
 few but those with first-rate names become con- 
 vertible. Purchases on credit are made with 
 difficulty, and not only is there a diminished 
 inclination to advance money on loan, or on the 
 security of goods, and to sell on credit, but 
 there is less disposition to borrow or to buy 
 among those who are most deserving of credit ; 
 for as the prospect of lower prices, in con- 
 sequence of returned abundance, becomes more 
 clear, there is less inducement among such per- 
 sons, who are generally among the most prudent, 
 to add to their stock of goods, beyond the ab-
 
 94 
 
 solute wants of their trade, or to be enabled, 
 by borrowed means, to keep on hand any sur- 
 plus stock. The London bankers, on such oc- 
 casions, participate in the alarm, and increase 
 their reserves of cash. Thus a complete in- 
 version may be easily conceived of the process 
 by which the previous increase of paper, and 
 activity of circulation, had been produced. The 
 reaction following extensive shipments, made in 
 consequence of exaggerated anticipation, is at- 
 tended with effects analogous in their kind, and 
 is sometimes more suddenly felt (although, per- 
 haps, inferior in extent) than that resulting 
 from returning abundance of raw produce. But, 
 when these general causes coincide, the joint 
 effect must be greater than if they operate at 
 different and separate periods. 
 
 It is evident, from this view, that a currency, 
 consisting, as ours does, of a considerable por- 
 tion issued through the medium of credit, is 
 subject to great variations in that proportion ; 
 that those variations, originating, in most cases, 
 in a spirit of speculation and the reaction from 
 it, tend to extend the range, and to accelerate 
 the rate, of the consequent fluctuations in price, 
 supposing that the rest of the currency, as dis- 
 pensed by the Bank of England, were stationary 
 in amount. If the Bank of England, under the 
 circumstances described as tending to enlarge
 
 95 
 
 the circulation of country and private paper, 
 should simultaneously increase its issues, whe- 
 ther through the medium of discounts, or of 
 advances to government, it is clear that the rise 
 of prices would be greater and more rapid ; as, 
 on the other hand, a contraction of its issues, if 
 it should coincide with a return of abundance, 
 and with a reaction from speculation, would 
 aggravate the fall of prices, and consequent 
 distress.
 
 90 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 Fluctuation of Prices, and of the Amount of private Paper, 
 from 1807 to 1811. 
 
 Dating from different periods in 1807 and 
 1808, we come to a new epocha, characterized 
 by the greatest fluctuations in the prices of 
 commodities, in the relative value of paper and 
 gold, and in the foreign exchanges with this 
 country. 
 
 Applying, therefore, the description of the 
 causes which occasion an enlargement or con- 
 traction of private paper (as given in the pre- 
 ceding section) to the period now under con- 
 sideration, it will appear that all the circum- 
 stances which I have enumerated as being cal- 
 culated to excite a spirit of speculation and 
 overtrading, and consequently an extension of 
 private paper, and of transactions on credit, 
 came into combined operation in the interval 
 which elapsed between the end of 1807 and the 
 beginning of 1810. 
 
 The close of the year 1 807 found us, by the 
 events of the war, excluded from direct com- 
 mercial intercourse with every country in Eu-
 
 97 
 
 rope, Sweden excepted ; and there was, conse- 
 quently, a prospect of scarcity of every article of 
 European produce, for our supply of which, in 
 whole or in part, we depended on importation 
 from the Continent. About the same time, too, 
 began our disputes with the United States of 
 America, which occasioned a very restricted 
 and precarious commercial intercourse with that 
 country, and threatened at every moment to cut 
 off our usual supplies of produce from thence. 
 The prospect of scarcity, thus held out, natu- 
 rally excited a spirit of speculation; and in pro- 
 portion as that prospect became realized, was 
 the speculative demand extended till different 
 periods in 1808 and 1809, when the obstructions 
 to importation, from political causes, nearly 
 reached their height. And it was about the 
 same time that the deficiency of our own growth 
 of agricultural produce, from the unfavourable- 
 ness of the seasons, concurred, with the diffi- 
 culty of obtaining relief by importation, to ex- 
 tend the spirit of speculation to corn. The 
 scarcity, however, of other commodities being 
 first felt, and, in some instances, an apprehen- 
 sion being entertained of a total failure of fo- 
 reign supply, these took the lead in exhibiting 
 examples of the most rapid advance of price. 
 
 After the attack on Copenhagen, and the final 
 withdrawing of our naval and military forces 
 
 ii
 
 98 
 
 from thence, Russia and Denmark joined in the 
 war against us. The Baltic being thus shut 
 against any direct commercial intercourse with 
 this country, it was not clear that any part of 
 our usual supplies of necessary articles from 
 thence could be obtained by any channel, how- 
 ever circuitous, or at any expense, however 
 great. It was naturally supposed that Russia 
 might, whether compelled by France, or of her 
 own accord, make a point of depriving this 
 country of some of the materials essential to 
 the maintenance of a navy ; and of these the 
 foremost was hemp. This article, in conse- 
 quence of such apprehensions, advanced from 
 58/. in the summer of 1807, to 118/. per ton, in 
 the course of 1808. 
 
 Flax, on nearly the same grounds, rose from 
 68/. to 140/. per ton. 
 
 Memel timber reached 15/. per load ; having 
 varied, during 1 806-7, from 31. 13s. to 7/. Deals 
 and other descriptions of wood in proportion. 
 
 The following are some of the many other 
 articles that participated in the advance : — 
 
 Baltic linseed rose from 5 Is. to 150s. per 
 quarter. 
 
 Russia tallow rose from 54.?. to 110s. percwt. 
 
 In consequence of the occupation of Spain 
 by the French, it was imagined that the ex- 
 portation of wool from thence would be ren-
 
 99 
 
 dered impracticable, or that, at any rate, the un- 
 settled state of that kingdom would materially 
 diminish the produce. Under this impression 
 a very great speculation was entered into, and 
 the price rose from 6s. Id. and 6s. 9d. to 22s. and 
 25s. per lb. for the Leonessa, and from 2s. 6d. 
 and 5s. to 13s. and 18s. for Seville. 
 
 Our principal dependence for a supply of silk 
 was, at that time, on Italy ; and there was a 
 double ground on which the French, who then 
 exercised dominion over the whole of that 
 country, would do their utmost to prevent our 
 obtaining any from thence. One motive would 
 be that of distressing us, and another would be 
 that of giving a more decided superiority to their 
 own manufactures. It is not to be wondered 
 at, therefore, that this article advanced con- 
 siderably, viz. Piedmont thrown silk, from 30s. 
 and 42s. to 90s. and 108,9. 
 
 The orders in council on our part, and the 
 non-intercourse acts, and various embargoes, on 
 the part of the United States of America, were 
 calculated to favour speculations in the produce 
 of that country ; and accordingly Georgia cotton 
 advanced from 9d. and 1 s. to 2s. and 2s. 6d. per 
 lb., and Virginia tobacco from 4\d. and 8d. to 
 Is. Aid. and 2s. 
 
 Corn, as before mentioned, was not among the 
 foremost of these objects of speculation, because, 
 
 h 2
 
 100 
 
 though the harvest of 1807 was not one of ge- 
 neral abundance, nor had the two preceding 
 ones been of more than average produce, so as 
 to create any considerable surplus, it was not 
 decidedly deficient ; and the price was already 
 at a somewhat elevated range ; but the crops 
 of 1808 were partially deficient; and as the de- 
 ficiency, however small, could not be made up 
 but by an importation, which was only practi- 
 cable at an enormous expense of freight and 
 other charges, amounting, on wheat, in some in- 
 stances, to 50s. the quarter, and upwards, over 
 and above the prime cost ; a speculative de- 
 mand arose upon the prospect thus held out, of 
 security against interference by importation, ex- 
 cept as a consequence of a great rise. The spirit 
 of speculation, thus directed, was confirmed and 
 extended by the result of the harvest of 1 809, 
 which was in every respect a bad one ; got in 
 late, and in a damp sprouted condition ; de- 
 ficient in quantity, and inferior in quality. 
 
 Several other articles might be enumerated as 
 having advanced considerably, in consequence 
 of actual or apprehended scarcity arising from 
 the peculiar state of politics. Those which I 
 have mentioned are sufficient to prove that the 
 most important of the two principal conditions 
 on which I have stated the sudden enlargement 
 of private paper to depend, viz. scarcity, actual
 
 101 
 
 or apprehended, of agricultural produce, and of 
 other articles of extensive consumption, was ful- 
 filled in the amplest manner. 
 
 Now, it so happened that the cause next in 
 importance, tending to the same effect, viz. the 
 opening of new markets for our exports, came 
 into operation contemporaneously with the for- 
 mer. The transfer of the seat of government 
 from Portugal to the Brazils, and the virtual 
 emancipation of the Spanish colonies from the 
 control of the mother country, opened the trade 
 of the whole of South America in 1808; and 
 as, by the course of the war, we possessed the 
 entire dominion of the seas, it was, in fact, to 
 this country, exclusively of the rest of Europe, 
 that this opening was presented. So vast and 
 comparatively untried a field was not held out in 
 vain to the merchants and manufacturers of this 
 country ; and, accordingly, the spirit of specu- 
 lation was on the alert to export every article 
 that might, not only probably, but possibly, come 
 into demand. On such an occasion there was 
 abundant scope for the display of the avidity, 
 miscalculation, and delusion, which commonly 
 accompany, and possibly may be necessary, how- 
 ever lamentable, consequences of the activity, 
 industry, and enterprise which characterise our 
 mercantile and manufacturing interests. Ship- 
 ments were made to South America to an
 
 102 
 
 amount much beyond the proportion of capital 
 which the adventurers could fairly command, 
 and still more beyond what the consumption of 
 the places, for which the investments were 
 destined, could absorb upon the condition of 
 making adequate returns. The same remark 
 applies, in many respects, to the shipments to 
 the Baltic, Heligoland, and to Malta, which 
 were, for all practicable purposes, new markets, 
 being resorted to chiefly by new adventurers, 
 who were tempted by the prospect of extraor- 
 dinary gain, if they eluded the anti-commercial 
 decrees of Bonaparte, and of those powers 
 which were subservient to him; for most of 
 the old establishments had given up altoge- 
 ther, or had suspended, till the return of peace, 
 their intercourse with the ports on the Conti- 
 nent, from which, during that period of the war, 
 all direct communication was cut off. As usual, 
 in such cases, the event proved that the prospect 
 of gain was exaggerated, and the risk under- 
 rated. 
 
 These causes of over-trading in speculative 
 exports, coinciding with the inducements held 
 out by scarcity to speculation in agricultural 
 produce, and in imported commodities, com- 
 bined to realize the process by which private 
 paper is generated and augmented ; and, accord- 
 ingly, the extension of it was probably greater
 
 103 
 
 and more sudden within the two years, viz. 
 1808 and 1809, to which I am referring, than 
 had ever before been witnessed within a similar 
 period. 
 
 As a large proportion of these speculations 
 took place in 1808, I am satisfied, as well upon 
 the grounds already stated, as from my own 
 distinct recollection of the state of the circula- 
 tion in London, and from what information I 
 had of the state of the country circulation, that 
 the increase of private paper, and of transactions 
 on credit in that year, was very considerable. 
 I can recollect, moreover, that there w T as a great 
 briskness in the general circulation ; a rapidity 
 in the interchange between goods and money 
 or credit, which is an invariable attendant on 
 speculative periods. 
 
 This great increase of paper and of transac- 
 tions on credit, produced by circumstances fa- 
 vourable to speculation, occurred in the first 
 instance, be it observed, unaccompanied by any 
 extension worth mentioning of Bank of England 
 notes; but in 1809, the causes of extended circu- 
 lation of private paper and credit still subsisting 
 in a greater or less degree, the Bank of England 
 (instead of diminishing its issues, as it ought to 
 have done, with a view to counterbalance the 
 increase of private paper, and to arrest the fall 
 of the exchanges which had taken place rapidly
 
 104 
 
 at the close of 1808) extended the amount of its 
 notes by nearly two millions; and this extension 
 of Bank of England paper, coming in aid of the 
 increased amount of private paper, doubtless 
 contributed to extend the range of high prices, 
 in the degree marked by the further depression 
 of the exchanges, which continued to fall pro- 
 gressively till the spring of J 810. As, however, 
 the prices of the articles referred to had risen 
 in 1808, in some instances, to their greatest 
 height, without any extension of Bank of Eng- 
 land paper, so a large proportion, or indeed 
 nearly all of them, fell considerably in the course 
 of 1810, notwithstanding an enlargement of the 
 Bank circulation, of no less an amount than 
 seven millions * above what it had been in 1808 : 
 and as the growth of private paper had, with 
 the advance of prices in 1808, been unaccom- 
 panied by any increase of Bank paper ; so the 
 destruction of an unprecedented amount of pri- 
 vate paper, attended by a fall of prices, rapid 
 beyond example, occurred simultaneously with 
 the largest addition ever made, within an equal 
 space of time, to the circulation of the Bank of 
 England. 
 
 The circumstances which led to this fall of 
 
 * 26th Aug. 1808 - - LA 7,365,266 
 26th Aug. 1810 - - 24,446,175 
 
 (Appendix to Commons' Report 1819, p. 2S\.)
 
 105 
 
 prices, and destruction of private paper, were a 
 restoration of comparative abundance of com- 
 modities for home consumption, and a reaction 
 from the speculative shipments of the two pre- 
 ceding years. As real or apprehended scanti- 
 ness of supply, and an exaggerated anticipation 
 of demand, had led to high prices and an en- 
 largement of the circulation of private paper, 
 so returning abundance and postponed demand 
 occasioned a recoil of prices and a reduction of 
 private paper to the level from whence both had 
 risen. That there was in 1808 a real scantiness 
 of supply*, compared with the average con- 
 sumption, of all the articles which became the 
 objects of speculation, may be proved by re- 
 
 * Of the falling off of supply, take the following instances ; 
 many others might be brought forward, which it would be 
 tedious to enumerate. 
 
 Iinj)orts into Great-Britain. 
 
 1806 
 1807 
 
 1808 
 
 Sheep and 
 Lambs' Wool. 
 
 lbs. 7,333,993 
 
 11,768,920 
 
 2,353,725 
 
 Raw and 
 Thrown Silk. 
 
 lbs. 1,317,841 
 
 1,123,943 
 
 776,414 
 
 Cotton. 
 
 bales 261,738 
 282,667 
 168,138 
 
 At.d, to show how the importations afterwards increased 
 
 1809 
 1810 
 
 6,845,933 
 10,936,224 
 
 1,199,935 
 1,792,206 
 
 440,382 
 561,173
 
 106 
 
 ference to the quantities imported of foreign 
 commodities, and to the notoriety of the fact 
 of a decidedly bad harvest in 1809, as affecting 
 our own agricultural produce. This actual de- 
 ficiency was itself sufficient to justify a great 
 part of the rise ; and as, in the early part of 
 the grand experiment (which I date from the 
 close of 1807 and beginning of 1808) made by 
 Bonaparte for our exclusion from all intercourse 
 with the Continent of Europe, it was uncertain 
 whether a considerable and almost indefinite 
 period might not elapse before the deficiency 
 could be relieved by importation, a further rise 
 was necessary upon two grounds ; the one to 
 limit consumption, and the other to hold out a 
 sufficient inducement to overcome the very 
 great obstructions to importation. The ad- 
 vance proved, indeed, as is usual in cases of 
 speculation, to be more than adequate to both 
 these purposes. The stocks of those articles 
 which had been most scarce were eked out by 
 economy in the consumption, and, in some in- 
 stances, by the employment of substitutes ; as, 
 for example, iron was extensively substituted 
 for hemp and timber. At the same time, mea- 
 sures w r ere taken, by means of licences from the 
 government of this country, and of simulated 
 papers, which were calculated to lull the vi- 
 gilance or satisfy the scruples of the govern-
 
 107 
 
 r 
 
 ments which were the unwilling tools of the 
 French, to obtain a supply by importation. 
 These measures, which were successful as to 
 the main object of obtaining an adequate sup- 
 ply, did not come fully into operation, as to the 
 bulk of the commodities in question, till dif- 
 ferent periods in 1809 and 1810; but between 
 the close of 1809 and the summer of 1810 the im- 
 portation became considerable. In the summer 
 of 1810, likewise, the coming harvest, for which 
 fears had been entertained, assumed a favour- 
 able aspect. There was, accordingly, by the 
 summer of 1810, a great fall in the price of 
 nearly all the articles which had experienced 
 any considerable rise in the two preceding 
 years \ and of a large proportion of them the 
 fall was to the level from whence they had, in 
 that interval, risen, and in a few instances 
 lower.
 
 108 
 
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 109 
 
 While this great fall was taking place in the 
 price of the bulk of imported commodities, a 
 total stop was put to our exports to the Baltic, 
 by the extensive confiscations which had oc- 
 curred in the ports of Germany, Prussia, and 
 Russia. The returns, too, from South America 
 were now coming round, and these left a ruinous 
 loss to the exporters, many of whom had bought 
 the goods on credits maintained by the circu- 
 lation of accommodation paper. 
 
 From the close, therefore, of 1809, through 
 1810, there was a complete exemplification of 
 the circumstances which I have described as 
 being conducive to a reduction of private paper, 
 and to a diminution of transactions on credit, 
 viz. stagnation and despondency, as succeed- 
 ing to a state of speculation and over-trading. 
 And so many circumstances on so large a 
 scale combining in the same direction, the re- 
 duction of private paper, the destruction of 
 credit, and the fall of prices, were greater and 
 more rapid than were ever before or have 
 since been known to have occurred within so 
 short a space of time. A general dismay pre- 
 vailed throughout nearly all branches of trade 
 during the last six months of 1810 and the few 
 first months of the following year, when the 
 depressing causes had acquired their greatest 
 influence. The following extracts, which I
 
 110 
 
 have made from the commercial reports inserted 
 at the end of each number of the Monthly Ma- 
 gazine, convey the best and most accurate de- 
 scription, that I have met with, of the state of 
 distress which then prevailed. 
 
 Monthly Commercial Report, 1st August, 1810. 
 
 " The failures of several houses of the very first respect- 
 ability, both at London and in different provincial towns of 
 Great Britain, have, within the last month, been unpre- 
 cedented in number and importance. A West India broker, 
 who has long been considered the first in his line, was, we 
 are told, the prime cause of the stoppage of a banking-house, 
 whose credit was previously unimpeached. The several banks 
 in the country, connected with the London house, of course 
 shared its fate, and from them the evil spread to merchants, 
 manufacturers, traders, and, in short, to the very servants and 
 dependants of these, numbers of whom are thrown out of em- 
 ployment, and their families deprived of bread. Speculations 
 in Spanish wool, an article which has fallen about fifty per 
 cent, are considered as the origin of those unlooked-for 
 disasters. Five Manchester houses have stopped payment in 
 the city, and, we are sorry to add, have involved numerous 
 industrious persons, both in town and country, in their ruin. 
 The demands upon the five houses are said to amount to two 
 millions; but it is supposed that their real property will ulti- 
 mately cover all deficiencies. Speculative exports to South 
 America are the rock upon which these houses have split. In 
 consequence of these unexpected events, public credit is at the 
 present moment as low as ever it has been in the memory of 
 manj the fluctuation of price in the money market is unpre- 
 cedented, and the depression so considerable, that omnium is 
 fallen to two and a half per cent, discount. We understand
 
 Ill 
 
 that some respectable merchants have waited upon the Bank 
 directors, in order to solicit their aid towards the alleviation 
 of the burthens with which our internal commerce is at pre- 
 sent borne down. The result of this application is not as yet 
 publicly known j we trust it will prove favourable. The re- 
 newal of our intercourse with the United States of America 
 has in some sort benefited the manufacturing interests; but 
 this felicitous effect is almost swallowed up in the vortex 
 of those calamities, which it has been our painful duty to 
 record. 
 
 " Holland. — All trade between Great Britain and this de- 
 voted country is completely put a stop to by the rigorous exe- 
 cution of the French emperor's anti-commercial decrees. It 
 is even reported that the captains and part of the crews of two 
 vessels were shot for violating the prohibition. 
 
 " Prussia. — Money is so extremely scarce in the Prussian 
 ports, that the merchants can with difficulty collect sufficient 
 to defray the import duties; and interest is represented to be 
 at the extravagant rate of two and a half per cent, per month." 
 
 1st December, 1810. 
 
 " A numerical evidence of the present state of trade may be 
 deduced from the number of bankruptcies in the London Ga- 
 zette, inserted in this Magazine : 
 
 They amounted this month, in 1810, to 2/3 
 The same month, — 1809, — 130 
 Ditto - - - — 1808,^- 100 
 Ditto - - - — 1807, — 97 
 Ditto - - - — 1806, — 6.~> 
 Ditto - - - — 1805, — 87 
 Ditto - - - — 1804, — GO 
 Besides stoppages and compositions, equal in number to half 
 the traders in the kingdom! These failures throughout the 
 kingdom have wonderfully affected the manufacture of every
 
 112 
 
 description of goods, and a general want of confidence exists 
 between the manufacturer and the export merchant. The 
 speculators at Liverpool have completely overstocked the dif- 
 ferent markets of South America, where, at present, English 
 manufactured articles can be purchased at a loss of twenty per 
 cent, to the exporter, with the exception of a few articles, on 
 which little or no credit could be obtained here." 
 
 1st January, 1811. 
 
 " In our last Report we stated the vast increase of bank- 
 ruptcies within the last month, compared with similar months 
 for seven years back, and we regret to say that they still con- 
 tinue to increase in number, and that confidence in the mer- 
 cantile world seems nearly at an eud. 
 
 " Discount, unless bills, &c of a few of the first houses in 
 the city, can only be done through the medium of bill-brokers 
 at an extra commission, exclusive of the regular interest. 
 
 " In Lancashire, the cotton manufacturers appear by the 
 late Gazettes, as well as by private information, to be greatly 
 distressed, and business quite at a stand. In Manchester, 
 and other places, houses stop not only every day, but every 
 hour. Cotton wool is in no demand at any price, and no ex- 
 port of the manufactured goods, except a few fine sorts to Rio, 
 &c. The trade of Birmingham, Sheffield, &c. quite at a stand, 
 and no orders for execution there, except a few for our home- 
 consumption. At London, Liverpool, and Bristol, the king's 
 stores are full of all kinds of colonial produce, as coffee, 
 sugar, rum, &c. for security of their duties, and the proprietors 
 in the greatest possible distress, not being able to force sales 
 of these articles." 
 
 To prove that these are not exaggerated de- 
 scriptions of the commercial distress which pie-
 
 113 
 
 vailed in this country at that period, I need 
 only refer to the parliamentary debates in the 
 spring of 1811, from which I have made as 
 many extracts as my limits will permit. 
 
 Extracts from the Report of the Select Committee 
 of the House of Commons on the State of Com- 
 mercial Credit, 1th of March, 1811. 
 
 " Your committee found that memorials had been presented 
 to his majesty's treasury, towards the latter end of the last 
 and the beginning of the present year, stating the great em- 
 barrassments and distress which were felt amongst the manu- 
 facturers in the cotton trade in Glasgow and Paisley and their 
 vicinity, and praying for public assistance ; that the same 
 were confirmed by the representation of a meeting held in the 
 city of London on the 12th of February, which sent a deputa- 
 tion to wait upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer with a copy 
 of the resolutions adopted at that meeting. These resolutions 
 your committee have inserted in the appendix to this report. 
 
 " Your committee found, by the evidence of the witnesses 
 they examined, that those statements and representations were 
 founded on fact. 
 
 " It appeared to your committee, that the principal part of 
 the distress which was complained of had arisen out of great 
 and extensive speculations, which commenced upon the open- 
 ing of the South American markets in the Brazils and else- 
 where, to the adventures of British merchants. 
 
 •* Your committee also found that great distress was felt in 
 a quarter which was much connected with this trade, namely, 
 amongst the importers of produce from the foreign West India 
 islands and from South America. 
 
 " That great part of the returns for the manufactures which 
 were exported to those parts of the world came home in sugars 
 
 I
 
 114 
 
 and coffee, which not being entitled to sale in the home market, 
 there were no immediate means of realizing their value. 
 
 " These representations of the distress experienced in the 
 trade of the cotton manufacturer and exporter, and from the 
 want of market for foreign colonial produce, were also con- 
 firmed by respectable merchants and traders in London ; who 
 also stated that the embarrassments were felt in other branches 
 of trade, not connected with foreign commerce or colonial 
 produce." 
 
 Extract from the Speech of the Chancellor of the 
 "Exchequer, in the Debate on the Commercial 
 Credit Bill. 
 
 " The consideration of this important subject, he observed, 
 divided itself into three heads ; — first, the nature and extent 
 of the evils which the manufactures and commerce of the 
 country were enduring ; — secondly, what were the causes of 
 those evils ; — and, thirdly, the measures by which the evils 
 might with the greatest probability be removed. With respect 
 to the first of these considerations, he apprehended there could 
 be no difference of opinion whatever, but that the nature and 
 extent of the distress described in the Report of the Select 
 Committee rendered it advisable that parliament should, if 
 possible, adopt some measure by which that evil might at least 
 be diminished. It appeared distinctly by the report, that the 
 distress, originating with the merchant, and disabling him 
 from paying the manufacturer, was felt most severely by the 
 manufacturer and those employed by him. All the principal 
 manufacturers had been compelled to contract, and some 
 wholly to suspend their works. It appeared by the report 
 that there was scarcely a cotton manufacturer in the kingdom 
 who had not diminished, by one half, the number of persons 
 employed in his mills ; and that many of the smaller manu- 
 facturers had discharged their people altogether. It appeared
 
 115 
 
 also that those who were retained by the first description of 
 manufacturers were retained at a reduced rate of wages. The 
 consequences must necessarily be, as they were represented to 
 be in the Report of the Select Committee, that the most cala- 
 mitous distress prevailed throughout many of the manufac- 
 turing districts. The report also stated that the merchants 
 who traded with the Western World, not being able to find an 
 adequate market for their produce, this circumstance ag- 
 gravated the distress of the manufacturers ; and the whole 
 operating upon the other branches of trade, although not im- 
 mediately connected with those to which he had referred, pro- 
 duced a general want of confidence, and suspension of credit, 
 which required the prompt and effectual application of some 
 adequate remedy." 
 
 The commercial distress of that period was 
 not confined to the United Kingdom. It pre- 
 vailed on the Continent of Europe, as may be 
 observed by the foregoing extracts : and that 
 the same description of distress applied to the 
 commerce of the United States, will appear 
 from the following extract of a letter from New 
 York, dated 11th of Feb. 1811, communicated 
 to me by a friend largely interested at that time, 
 as well as at present, in the trade with that 
 country. 
 
 " Such times for money were never known, and all con- 
 fidence among merchants is totally and indeed very justly de- 
 stroyed. Since the middle of December we have had between 
 sixty and seventy failures in this city, and many more are ex- 
 pected to fail in the course of this and the following month." 
 
 I am indebted to the same friend for the ¥61- 
 
 i 2
 
 116 
 
 lowing extract of a letter from his Liverpool 
 house, dated 22d of Nov. 1810. 
 
 "Liverpool, 22 Nov. 1810. 
 " The effects of a vast import of colonial and American pro- 
 duce, far above the scale of our consumption at the most pros- 
 perous periods of our commerce, and attaining a magnitude 
 hitherto unknown to us, have, in the present cramped state of 
 our intercourse with the Continent, developed themselves in 
 numerous bankruptcies, widely spreading in their influence, 
 and unprecedented in extent of embarrassment ; it is but 
 fair, however, to ascribe a portion of these evils to the con- 
 sequences of a sanguine indulgence of enterprise in extensive 
 shipments of our manufactures to South America, which so 
 confidently followed the expedition to La Plata, and the re- 
 moval of the government of Portugal to Brazil : they are 
 further aided by the speculations which prevailed during the 
 various stages of the American non-intercourse, and which, 
 unfortunately, were not confined to the duration of the circum- 
 stances which excited them. In the struggle to support them- 
 selves, the speculators have had recourse to new and extensive 
 engagements in the face of probabilities and facts too incon- 
 trovertible to have been slighted, until the united action of the 
 accumulating imports, and the want of an adequate vent, have 
 overwhelmed them. The event only can enable us fully to ap- 
 preciate the effects of this imprudence, which more than any 
 preceding defalcations have involved the mercantile character 
 of our country, and destroyed confidence in a degree that will 
 require a long period of prosperous circumstances to retrieve." 
 
 I have been the more minute in dwelling 
 upon the commercial history of that period for 
 the following reasons : 
 
 It exemplifies in the fullest manner the causes
 
 117 
 
 of the great fluctuations in the quantity of 
 private paper. 
 
 It proves that the largest addition ever made 
 within so short a time to the amount of the 
 Bank of England issues* was insufficient to re- 
 place fully the amount of private paper de- 
 stroyed within the same period : for, on a refer- 
 ence to the price of gold and to the state of 
 the foreign exchanges, it will be seen that the 
 former fell from 4/. lis. which it had been at 
 in May, 1809, to 4/. 4s. 6d. in Nov. 1810; and 
 the exchange on Hamburg rose from 28s. Gd. 
 in Nov. 1809, to 3ls.9d. in Sept. 1810. 
 
 It negatives the assumed progressive advance 
 of prices, from the supposed effect of the Bank 
 restriction in depreciating the value of money 
 in a degree much beyond the difference between 
 paper and gold; and suggests adequate and in- 
 telligible causes for the great variations in price, 
 which occurred in the interval between the 
 close of 1807 and beginning of 1811. 
 
 It proves the total want of foundation for the 
 assertions and inferences contained in the fol- 
 lowing passage in the article in the review from 
 which I have so often quoted : 
 
 " We know that when the commerce of a 
 country is in a high degree of prosperity, 
 the balance of payments is in favour of that 
 country ; and this balance is, in the regular 
 
 * Sec page o9.
 
 118 
 
 state of the currency, indicated by a rise in the 
 exchange. Now it is undeniable that, during 
 the greater part of that period of which we are 
 treating, the trade of the country was in a state 
 of unexampled prosperity. Never were our 
 manufactures more active, nor our shipping 
 more employed. It is needless to dwell upon 
 a fact so notorious. Yet during the whole 
 of that period the exchanges were nominally 
 unfavourable. In 1810 the depression was so 
 great as to indicate a loss of twenty-five per cent, 
 or more with Hamburg. Yet no check had 
 been given to our commerce. On the contrary, 
 the only complaint heard was of the practice of 
 over -trading, encouraged by the extraordinary 
 profits realised in almost every branch of trade." 
 Such opinions are not confined to the writer 
 of that article ; they prevail pretty generally 
 among persons who are not in business, or who, 
 if in business, are not old enough to have had 
 any direct experience of the vicissitudes at- 
 tending the period referred to. And as in 
 those tremendous fluctuations so large a num- 
 ber of commercial establishments were swept 
 away, without leaving a trace of their having 
 existed, the proportion of individuals, who were 
 interested in, and who have survived, that cri- 
 tical period, is probably very small compared 
 with those who only know as a matter of general 
 notoriety, that a high range of prices prevailed
 
 119 
 
 about the time referred to, and who have no 
 idea of high prices, but as a sign of prosperity. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark 
 that it was about the time when the distresses 
 of 1810 were beginning to manifest themselves, 
 that the Bullion Committee, which was ap- 
 pointed in the spring of that year, made its re- 
 port : and I well remember that among those 
 who were suffering at that period, it was no 
 uncommon thing (more especially with such 
 persons as were advocates for an unlimited 
 paper currency) to ascribe the whole of the fall 
 of prices, and the consequent distress, to the 
 doctrines and recommendations contained in 
 that report. They little thought how innocent 
 the report was of the effects imputed to it ; for, 
 in fact, as has been already stated, the Bank 
 enlarged its issues at that precise period very 
 considerably, without any apparent reference, 
 or rather deference, to the sound and unanswer- 
 able reasonings contained iu that luminous pro- 
 duction. 
 
 The recoil of prices of agricultural produce 
 which took place in the summer of 1810, as a 
 consequence of the favourable weather which 
 prevailed during the getting in of the harvest, 
 was of very short duration. The wheat was 
 got in in good condition, and being brought 
 quickly to market, at the same time that a 
 large importation was pouring in, the fall of
 
 120 
 
 price was rapid, and those who had speculated 
 on the previous bad weather were severe suf- 
 ferers, and many corn-dealers, among others, 
 were ruined; a circumstance which contributed, 
 with the others which I have noticed, to con- 
 tract the issue of paper. But in the following 
 winter it was discovered that the wheat had 
 not escaped injury from the unfavourableness 
 of the early part of the season, and that it was 
 below an average produce ; insomuch that, 
 notwithstanding a large importation, the total 
 stock for sale was not more than adequate, at 
 comparatively high prices, to meet the con- 
 tingencies of a new harvest. The hay crops, 
 too, proved deficient in an extraordinary de- 
 gree ; which contributed to keep up the price 
 of cattle. And, as in the following year, viz. 
 1811, there was a great failure of the wheat 
 crop, the prices of agricultural produce gene- 
 rally resumed a tendency upwards; and the in- 
 terval of depression in the latter part of 1810 
 was so short and so partial, that it had no in- 
 fluence upon rents or upon the value of land. 
 It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if the 
 agricultural interest is considered as having pro- 
 ceeded in a course of prosperity unchecked by 
 the events which were so severely felt by the 
 mercantile and manufacturing interests, during 
 the period referred tp.
 
 121 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of Private Paper 
 from 1811 to 1816. 
 
 The suffering state of commerce did not con- 
 tinue, however, in the same degree of intensity 
 beyond the spring of 1811, when it seems to 
 have reached its height. 
 
 At that time, as we have seen, it attracted 
 the notice and interference of Parliament. An 
 act was passed in April, 1811, granting a sum, 
 not exceeding six millions of Exchequer bills, 
 to be advanced by commissioners to the dis- 
 tressed merchants and manufacturers, by way 
 of loan on adequate security. This measure, 
 in consequence of which, however, not more 
 than two millions were eventually advanced, 
 was then, as it probably is still, supposed to 
 have arrested the tendency to depression, and 
 to have contributed to the subsequent revival 
 of trade. In that opinion I did not and do not 
 participate. If the causes of abundance of 
 commodities at home and our exclusion from 
 foreign ports had continued, there would have 
 been no ground for a rise of prices : and if
 
 122 
 
 prices had not risen, the parties who borrowed 
 the Exchequer bills would have been injured 
 instead of benefited by the facility of holding 
 their goods so much longer; as they would 
 thereby have incurred loss of interest, ware- 
 house rent, and other expenses, and must at 
 last have submitted to the same, if not to lower, 
 prices than they might originally have obtained. 
 But whether the measure was or was not calcu- 
 lated to do the good intended, I believe that it 
 did not come into operation at all, till circum- 
 stances had occurred favourable to a revival of 
 the spirit of speculation, and, consequently, to 
 a removal of the causes of the then existing 
 distress. 
 
 Those circumstances were, the complete ex- 
 pulsion of the French from Portugal, and the 
 progress of the British army in Spain, which 
 opened nearly the whole Peninsula to a com- 
 mercial intercourse with this country ; the glut 
 of our exports to South America and the West 
 Indies had been carried off by low prices, and 
 a brisk demand had succeeded: the intention 
 of Russia to resist the French was becoming 
 manifest, and an anticipation was confidently 
 entertained of a relaxation of the prohibitions 
 against imports into the Russian ports. 
 
 The progress of improvement is described in
 
 1<23 
 
 the following extracts from the periodical work 
 ■which I have before quoted: 
 
 Monthly Commercial Report, 1st June, 1811. 
 
 " The expulsion of the French out of Portugal has once 
 more opened a trade with that country, and, in consequence 
 of it, vast quantities of goods of the manufacture of Great Bri- 
 tain are now shipping for Lisbon and Oporto, among which 
 the manufactures of Manchester, &c. will not be of the least 
 in quantity. Linens, calicos, and woollen cloths, are in great 
 demand in Portugal. 
 
 " South America. — In our last we stated the trade of this 
 country to be rather brisk, and have the pleasure now to say 
 that every mail from the Brazils confirms it." 
 
 1st July, 1811. 
 
 " Since our last report, the manufactories have revived in 
 a great degree, chiefly owing to large orders for all kinds of 
 woollen, linen, and cotton goods having arrived here for the 
 markets of Portugal and of South America. The goods of 
 Birmingham and Sheffield are also in great demand at these 
 markets. Credit and confidence, we are happy to say, revive, 
 and the towns of Manchester, Nottingham, &c. feel vast 
 benefit from the happy change that has taken place. 
 
 " The West India Islands are now in want of all kinds of 
 British manufactured goods, as the stock in hand in these 
 islands has been purchased up with avidity for the Spanish 
 settlements. Irish linen, sheeting, &c. render a full profit of 
 twenty per cent, more than the usual profit attached to such 
 speculations : in fine, in spite of all Buonaparte's edicts and 
 restrictions, the commerce of our country flourishes."
 
 This improvement, however, as it so imme- 
 diately succeeded to a period of great distress, 
 was not yet marked by such eagerness of spe- 
 culative shipment as had distinguished 1808 
 and 1809. 
 
 While our export trade was thus slowly re- 
 covering, there appeared towards the autumn 
 of that year a more marked tendency to a 
 general advance in the prices of agricultural 
 produce and of imported raw materials. The 
 harvest in this country had turned out unpro- 
 ductive, in an extraordinary degree j and the 
 same cause of deficiency seems to have ex- 
 tended over the greater part of Europe. There 
 was therefore very little prospect of relief by 
 importation, more especially as the expenses of 
 freight and insurance continued as high as ever. 
 Very high prices of almost all descriptions of 
 agricultural produce were the consequence ; 
 and, as the range of high prices (with an in- 
 terval of depression at the close of 1810, so 
 short as not to have been felt at all by the land- 
 lord, and very little by the farmer) had been of 
 an unusually long continuance, it was hastily 
 concluded, as it unfortunately but too often is, 
 that the causes of that high range were per- 
 manent. This, accordingly, was the period in 
 which rents experienced a great rise, and spe- 
 culations in land became very general. Hence
 
 125 
 
 naturally arose the ground, already noticed, for 
 an extension of country bank paper ; and there 
 is no doubt, as well from the reason of the 
 thing as from the best accessible evidence, that 
 the circulation of country paper acquired a great 
 extension and briskness, which by the continued 
 operation of the same general causes (the har- 
 vest of 1812 having proved partially deficient) 
 continued till the summer of 1813. 
 
 During the same interval, that is from the 
 summer and autumn of 1811, there occurred a 
 renewed scarcity, partly real and partly appre- 
 hended, of many leading articles of importation. 
 In consequence of the discouragement arising 
 from the low prices in this country of 1810 and 
 the beginning of 1811, there was little induce- 
 ment to import in the face of enormous charges; 
 freights and insurances from the continent of 
 Europe continuing as high as ever, so that, with- 
 out an advance of prices here, little or nothing 
 would, in some instances, have been left for 
 prime cost. The stocks, therefore, of wool, 
 silk, cotton*, hemp, flax, tallow, timber, &c. 
 became scanty towards the end of 1811; and 
 
 * This will appear from the following comparison of the 
 imports into Great Britain : 
 
 Wool. Silk. Cotton. 
 
 1810. .lbs. 10,936,224 lbs. 1,792,206 bags, 561,173 
 1811.. 4,739,972 622,383 326,231
 
 126 
 
 there were grounds at the same time for appre- 
 hending a further scarcity. The preparations 
 by the French for the invasion of Russia gave 
 reason to fear that, however disastrous to the 
 former it might eventually prove, the inter- 
 mediate consequence would be a cutting off of 
 the supplies of naval stores and of other pro- 
 duce ; and as the French spread over Prussia, 
 all shipments from thence became more difficult 
 and hazardous. Our differences with America 
 were then rapidly tending to an open rupture, 
 and the produce of that country naturally par- 
 ticipated in the causes of advance. Thus by 
 far the majority, in point of importance, of im- 
 ported commodities, requisite as raw materials 
 for the supply of our manufactories, and essen- 
 tial for the support of our navy, became, from 
 real and anticipated scarcity, objects of specu- 
 lation ; which, again, naturally gave rise to an 
 extension of mercantile transactions on credit, 
 both with and without the intervention of paper: 
 and this state of comparative scarcity, which 
 formed the basis of the extension of credit and 
 of the circulation of private paper, continued, 
 with only a few variations incidental to pecu- 
 liarities of demand, till different periods in 1813. 
 Articles of export experienced a moderate 
 degree of improvement down to the close of 
 1812, with the exception of such descriptions
 
 127 
 
 as were exclusively or chiefly calculated for the 
 United States — and these of course were much 
 depressed by the war which then broke out. 
 By the retreat of the French from Moscow, not 
 only the ports of Russia were secured from the 
 danger of being again shut against us, but daily 
 tidings were received of other ports in the north 
 of Europe being opened to a trade with this 
 country ; and sanguine expectations were enter- 
 tained that the ports of France itself would, at 
 no remote period, be open to us. The new 
 markets, for such they might then be called, 
 thus presented, and the prospect of more, gave 
 rise to a speculative demand for all the articles 
 really wanted, and for many others which it 
 was anticipated would probably be wanted, by 
 the countries with which we had thus suddenly 
 come into communication. Colonial produce, 
 as it had been most depressed by our previous 
 exclusion from those markets, experienced the 
 greatest and most rapid advance ; but many 
 other articles of export participated in the de- 
 mand which prevailed thenceforward till the 
 spring of 1814, with greater or less intensity, 
 according as the events of the war seemed to 
 hasten or retard a general peace. The con- 
 clusion of the war was then hailed as holding 
 out the prospect of an unlimited consumption, 
 among the inhabitants of the Continent, of the
 
 t 
 
 128 
 
 articles from the use of which they had been so 
 long debarred. 
 
 The interval, therefore, between the close of 
 1811 and the beginning of 1814 united once 
 more the conditions on which a great extension 
 of private paper and of transactions on credit 
 has been shown to depend ; and there is con- 
 current testimony that such extension did really 
 take place to a very considerable degree during 
 that interval. But the average circulation of 
 Bank of England notes, from July 1810 to Dec. 
 1813, experienced no increase, as will appear 
 from the following statement, extracted from 
 the Report of the Lords' Committee, 1819, 
 page 323. 
 
 " Account of the average amount of Bank of England notes 
 in circulation, including Bank-post bills. 
 
 1810 July to December £.24,188,605 
 
 1811 January to June 23,471,297 
 
 July to December 23,094,046 
 
 1812 January to June 23,123,140 
 
 July to December 23,351,496 
 
 1813 January to June 23,939,693 
 
 July to December 24,107,445 
 
 Thus again proving that a great rise of prices, 
 and a considerable extension of private paper, 
 might take place without any increase of Bank 
 of England notes. And the fall in prices which 
 took place, dating from different periods of 
 1813, in agricultural produce, and from the
 
 129 
 
 spring and summer of 1814, in nearly all other 
 articles (which fall continued till the close of 
 1816), accompanied by a great reduction of 
 private paper, and a very large increase of Bank 
 of England notes '*, still further exemplifies the 
 view which I have taken of the main causes on 
 which the sudden growth and diminution of 
 private paper, and the greatest fluctuations in 
 the prices of commodities, depend. 
 
 It has indeed been very generally supposed, 
 that the fall in prices in this instance, viz. from 
 1814 to 1816, is sufficiently accounted for by 
 the sudden restoration of peace, and the con- 
 sequent near approach of the termination of the 
 restriction. 
 
 What effect the peace, or the prospect of it, 
 may have had on prices, independent of the 
 Bank restriction, will be matter of separate in- 
 quiry, when the nature and extent of the in- 
 fluence of war and peace on prices come to be 
 considered. It is sufficient, for the present, to 
 observe, that as far as it was the peace, and the 
 peace only, that affected prices, the alleged 
 alteration of the value of the currency was clear 
 of the charge. And as to the assumed effect 
 of the near prospect, at that period, of the 
 termination of the restriction, there appears to 
 be no ground whatever for the supposition, in- 
 
 * See page 60. 
 
 K
 
 130 
 
 asmuch as it is now well known that the Bank 
 was not only perfectly passive as to any pre- 
 parations for that event, but that it did not 
 scruple to enlarge its issues throughout 1814 
 and 1815, and part of 1816, the very interval 
 during which the fall of prices was greatest. I 
 can state, moreover, distinctly of my own ex- 
 perience, on a large scale of sales and purchases 
 at that time, that not a single transaction, that 
 I was concerned in or aware of, was entered 
 into with the slightest reference whatever to 
 the termination of the Bank restriction. The 
 tendency to an improvement of the exchanges 
 and to a decline in the price of gold was looked 
 upon to follow, as a matter of course, the ces- 
 sation of government expenditure abroad, and 
 the great preponderance of our commercial ex- 
 ports, now that the ports of the Continent were 
 opened to us. 
 
 But, in point of fact, the decline of prices of 
 agricultural produce had begun in 181 2, and a 
 considerable number of imported articles had, in 
 the course of 1813, exhibited a tendency down- 
 wards ; yet all this while the exchanges were 
 falling, and the price of gold rising; thus com- 
 pletely negativing the idea that any speculation 
 on the prospect of a resumption of cash pay- 
 ments operated to occasion that fall of prices. 
 Indeed the fact that the fall in agricultural pro- 
 duce, and in commodities imported from the
 
 131 
 
 Continent of Europe, took place in 1812 and 
 1813, in the face of declining exchanges and a 
 rise in the price of gold, which enhanced the 
 cost of importation, and that exportable produce 
 continued rising in the spring of 1814, in spite 
 of what is usually a disadvantage, viz. a rising 
 exchange and a falling price of gold, might be 
 considered by all, who are not wedded to a 
 system, to be decisive on the question of the 
 supposed connexion between the great fall of 
 prices in 1813 and 1814 and the prospect of the 
 resumption of cash payments. 
 
 The fall in agricultural produce, which had 
 commenced in the autumn of 1812, became 
 more decided after the harvest of 1813, which 
 proved to be very abundant. It was this 
 decidedly favourable season which developed 
 the full effects of the encouragement that had 
 been held out by the long previous range of 
 high prices to the application of great additional 
 capital to the land. The extent to which that 
 encouragement had operated is stated, by the 
 Committee on the Corn Laws, in 1814 (Report, 
 p. 3.), in the following terms: 
 
 " It appears to your Committee to be established by all the 
 evidence, that, within the last twenty years, a very rapid and 
 extensive progress has been made in the agriculture of the 
 United Kingdom : that great additional capitals have been 
 skilfully and successfully applied, not only to the improved 
 management of lands alreadv in tillage, but also to the con- 
 
 K °Z
 
 132 
 
 verting of large tracts of inferior pasture into productive 
 arable, and the reclaiming and inclosing of fens, commons, 
 and wastes, which have been brought into a state of regular 
 cultivation." 
 
 There had not only thus been an increased 
 breadth of land in improved cultivation, but 
 the produce per acre was unusually large. The 
 whole fall, resulting from these causes, will 
 clearly appear by the following extracts from 
 the table of prices in the Appendix : 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1812, July 1 
 
 140 9 
 
 90 
 
 77 
 
 50 8 
 
 1813, Jan. 1 
 
 119 10 
 
 82 2 
 
 64 2 
 
 44 3 
 
 July 1 
 
 116 3 
 
 74 2 
 
 57 9 
 
 42 10 
 
 1814, Jan. 1 
 
 76 7 
 
 47 
 
 40 7 
 
 27 2 
 
 July 1 
 
 67 9 
 
 41 9 
 
 35 
 
 25 
 
 Here is a fall exceeding fifty per cent, within 
 two years, during which the price of gold* at- 
 
 * To put the extent of the fall in the value of wheat in a 
 still stronger point of view, it may be worth while to com- 
 pare the quantity of gold which a quarter of wheat would 
 command on the 1st July, 1812, and the 1st Jan. 1814: 
 
 On the 1st July, 1812, a quarter of wheat, at 
 140s. 9d. would, with the price of gold at 41. 
 1 8*. 6d. commaud 1 *43oz. of gold, which, at 3/. 
 17s. lOfflf. is equal to £5 11 4 
 
 On the 1st January, 1814, a quarter of wheat, at 
 76s. 7d. would, with the price of gold at 5/. 
 10s. command only # 69oz. of gold, which, at 
 3/. 17s. lOfd. is equal to £2 13 8 
 
 Being a fall of about 51^ per cent. £2 17 8
 
 133 
 
 tained the greatest height that it ever reached, 
 and was, on an average, higher than at any 
 preceding or succeeding period. Moreover, 
 while the decline in corn was most rapid, the 
 price of gold was actually rising ; viz. from 
 June, 1813, when gold was at 51. 2s. 6d. to the 
 close of that year, when it got up to 5l. 10s. 
 The fall in commodities imported from the 
 continent of Europe was taking place in pro- 
 portion as the opening of the ports from whence 
 they were shipped diminished some of the ex- 
 penses ; but the fall was at first slow, because 
 the continued hostility of Denmark, and the 
 war with the United States of America, kept 
 freights and insurances at a high rate. Still it 
 was actual or prospective abundance that occa- 
 sioned the tendency to a fall at the close of 
 1813. This fall in the prices of agricultural 
 produce, and the depression observable in arti- 
 cles of import from the Continent, must have 
 had some effect at that time in diminishing the 
 quantity of country bank notes and of private 
 paper, but that effect may have been compen- 
 sated by the great quantity of mercantile paper 
 and of transactions on credit that must have 
 arisen from the speculations on the indefinite 
 
 The metallic price of a quarter of wheat, on the 1st Jan. 1814, 
 was 53*. 8d., being lower than it was on the 1st Jan. 1797, 
 when the price was 55*. 9d.
 
 134 
 
 demand of the Continent for colonial produce, 
 and other articles of export from this country. 
 The earliest shipments of such exportable 
 commodities as had been bought at the low 
 prices answered of course, and the profits 
 thence arising naturally encouraged the sub- 
 sequent speculation. This speculation, and 
 the consequent over-trading, proceeded to a 
 most extravagant length in the course of 1814. 
 It began, as I have already noticed, with the 
 great reverses of the French in 1812, and went 
 on, with fluctuations, according to the vicissi- 
 tudes of the subsequent military operations, till 
 the peace of Paris, which was the consummation 
 of the views of the speculators ; the ports of 
 France, as well as those of all the rest of Eu- 
 rope, being opened to a direct commercial in- 
 tercourse with this country. It had been usual, 
 in former periods, to consider that colonial pro- 
 duce should rise in war and fall in peace, in 
 consequence of the difference of the charges of 
 importation ; but the period in question was 
 supposed to form an exception to this general 
 rule : it was calculated that the inhabitants of 
 the Continent, having been so long debarred 
 by the anti-commercial decrees of their govern- 
 ments from the enjoyment of sugar and coffee, 
 and of various other descriptions of commo- 
 dities which could then be obtained only from
 
 135 
 
 this country, would require a supply, at almost 
 any price, of most of the articles that had been 
 accumulated here during the absence of demand. 
 Proceeding on this supposition, a great number 
 of adventurers, departing from their ordinary 
 pursuits, entered into speculations with an avi- 
 dity similar to that which we have more re- 
 cently witnessed in the speculations in the 
 foreign stock-market, but on a much larger 
 scale. Many retail tradesmen who failed in 
 1814 and 1815 were, upon a disclosure of their 
 accounts, found to have been concerned in ship- 
 ments of sugar and coffee to the Continent. 
 The contagion spread to the outports ; and it 
 was said that a large proportion of the shop- 
 keepers residing in them, who failed at that 
 time, owed their ruin to having been tempted 
 into speculations of the kind which I have de- 
 scribed. In short, the spirit of over-trading in 
 that extensive class of commodities reached the 
 utmost pitch that had ever been witnessed here, 
 as may be judged by a comparison of the prices 
 of the following articles in the years 181 1, 1812, 
 1813, and 1814:
 
 136 
 
 H 
 
 o 
 
 cr 
 
 : SO JU 
 
 L-( ffi p 
 
 s 5 c 
 
 a a 
 
 2 -f£- 
 
 e a> o 
 
 CTq 13 CfQ 
 P T) S 
 
 TBI 
 
 : • o- 
 
 i pa 
 
 P P o 
 
 NOP 
 
 o 
 
 ,W 
 
 w <i w o S 
 
 o o o 
 
 tf 
 
 < P s; ct 
 £ctq 2. •» 
 
 ""B 
 
 03 
 
 = . 3^3 
 
 s a n 
 o £ o 
 
 , T3 
 
 o to •— •— © — ooooo — ►— to — WOO 
 
 ©tO© ij)k ©©tOGO©©©Oi©4i.O©©?' 
 t0©0 >— ^IO»©«©»fck or, ©©©©©©&« 
 
 a 
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 OUU to ©U)©©©©©tc03^. — w©t> 
 
 I— • ►— I— I _K-K-^-H-^, 
 
 © GO GO CO OO<D^MCM00OC)t00ii-? 
 
 go©© os <oooaaowooooc«si- 
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 tO©© Ji. C0©O©OO>t0©©©©©©S« 
 
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 OQiOi Cr» — ©"MtOtOOtOUiOCi'M©*-. 
 
 oo©© £> co©©©co©too©©©©©a, 
 
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 ©OOCs .£> ©Oi©©©©©05Cn*vjtot^ c ^N, 
 
 m go *>. »i| "O^-abOMbsa^cooo? 1 
 
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 4~
 
 137 
 
 A reverse, from speculations so entered into 
 and conducted, was inevitable ; the shippers 
 found to their cost, when it was too late, that 
 the effective demand on the Continent for colo- 
 nial produce and British manufactures had been 
 greatly over-rated ; for whatever might be the 
 desire of the foreign consumers to possess arti- 
 cles so long out of their reach, they were limited 
 in their means of purchase; and accordingly 
 the bulk of the commodities exported brought 
 very inadequate returns. The low prices, which 
 alone the consumers abroad were able to pay, 
 were still further reduced in value by the ad- 
 vance in our exchanges, which was accelerated 
 by the very extent of those shipments. And it 
 is a well known fact, that the losses upon a 
 great proportion of the goods shipped to the 
 Continent in the spring and summer of 1814. 
 were very great ; not less, I have reason to be- 
 lieve from what I heard at that time of the 
 result of many of them, than 50 per cent. In 
 some few instances, by rare good fortune, there 
 might be a gain, but in as many there was a 
 total loss. Cases of more aggravated loss oc- 
 curred where the shippers, unwilling to incur 
 so heavy a sacrifice as would be entailed by re- 
 mittances at an exchange becoming daily more 
 unfavourable for them, were induced to receive 
 returns in goods which, from this and other
 
 188 
 
 causes, coming in excessive quantities, could 
 not be sold here within 30, 40, and sometimes 
 50 per cent, of the cost ; a process by which, 
 including loss of interest, it may easily be con- 
 ceived that the whole value of the original in- 
 vestment might be nearly absorbed. The dis- 
 astrous effects of these ill-judged and extrava- 
 gantly extensive speculations began to manifest 
 themselves in the numerous failures which took 
 place towards the close of 1814; these conti- 
 nued increasing in number, as the several losses 
 were ascertained, through 1815 and the early 
 part of 1816. 
 
 While so much private paper was in the 
 course of being annihilated, and so great a re- 
 duction was going forward in transactions on 
 credit, in consequence of the disasters attend- 
 ing the export trade ; a similar process, which 
 had begun somewhat sooner, was in progress in 
 the trade of imports from the Continent, and 
 above all, in the inland trade connected with 
 the markets of our own agricultural produce. 
 The decline of prices and the consequent losses 
 in this last, which is the most important of all 
 the branches of industry, had already, towards 
 the close of 1813 and in the early part of 1814, 
 occasioned the failure of several country banks; 
 the number of commissions against which in 
 1814 amounted to twenty-nine; in this number
 
 139 
 
 would probably be included those banks that 
 had suspended payment towards the close of 
 1813. 
 
 Through 1815 and a great part of 18 16 all 
 the causes calculated to diminish the amount of 
 private paper came once more into combined 
 operation; and there can be no doubt that a 
 vast reduction did take place in the amount of 
 country bank notes, of mercantile bills, and of 
 transactions on credit without the intervention 
 of paper. Jn this case as in the former period 
 (viz. 1810 and 1811), the proximate causes of 
 the great destruction of private paper were a 
 fall of prices from abundance, and a reaction 
 from speculative shipments and general over- 
 trading ; the remote causes were, those which 
 constituted the grounds for the speculations 
 and over-trading, viz. scarcity, actual or appre- 
 hended, of food and raw materials at home, and 
 new and extraordinary sources of demand for 
 our manufactures and colonial produce abroad. 
 The mere abstraction of these grounds for a 
 rise of prices and for an enlargement of private 
 paper, naturally left both to subside to their 
 proper level ; but as rising prices and expand- 
 ing private paper gave the appearance of pro- 
 sperity, so the inevitable recoil of the one and 
 contraction of the other convey the impression
 
 140 
 
 of gloom, and are certainly attended with con- 
 siderable suffering. 
 
 These alternations having occurred on so ter- 
 rific a scale in the interval that elapsed between 
 the close of 1807 and 1816, I may, perhaps, be 
 excused for dwelling somewhat longer upon 
 them. It has appeared that that interval ex- 
 hibited two distinct periods of rise and fall of 
 prices, of growth and diminution of private 
 paper, viz. from 1807 to 1811, and again from 
 1811 to ]8l6; and that the causes operating 
 in both were similar in kind. But they differed 
 in degree and duration, particularly as applied 
 to agricultural produce ; and an explanation of 
 the circumstances in which they differed may 
 still further elucidate and confirm the reasoning 
 by which I have endeavoured to account for 
 the fluctuations which so preeminently marked 
 the whole interval. 
 
 Of articles of importation for home consump- 
 tion, whether as food or as raw materials, the 
 fall of prices in 1810 and 1811 was in some 
 cases not so low as to the level from which they 
 had recently risen, and in but few was it lower. 
 The charges of conveyance of such bulky com- 
 modities continuing as high as ever and in some 
 instances higher, (as the hostility of Sweden 
 then completed our exclusion from direct inter-
 
 141 
 
 course with the north of Europe, and our dis- 
 putes with the United States tended evidently 
 to a rupture) it was clear that the importation 
 must quickly fall off, which it accordingly did. 
 Thus, although there was abundance as to the 
 actual stock on hand, there was every appear- 
 ance of an eventual recurrence of scarcity. It 
 must be observed further, that as the high prices 
 in 1808 and 1809 had been the condition sine 
 qua non of a relief from scarcity by diminished 
 consumption and by importation ; so the low 
 prices of 1810 and part of 1811 were necessary 
 to carry off the immediate redundance, and to 
 deter importation to the same extent; but the 
 lowest level requisite for that purpose was 
 higher than in the period previous to 1807 by 
 all the difference of the charges of importation 
 in the two periods. As soon, therefore, as the 
 immediate glut was worn off, there was a re- 
 newed tendency to speculation upon reduced 
 stocks and eventual scarcity. 
 
 The fall which took place in wheat upon the 
 large importation of 1810, coinciding with the 
 fine weather which prevailed during the harvest 
 of that year, was much less in degree and dura- 
 tion than was the case in other commodities, 
 because the actual quantity was soon found to 
 be less than had been estimated, inasmuch as 
 our own crops were ascertained to be deficient
 
 142 
 
 in a greater degree than could be compensated 
 by the importation of that year, large as it was. 
 And the still greater failure of the crops in this 
 country in 1811 coinciding with a similar failure 
 in other parts of Europe, gave a more decided 
 impulse to a renewed range of high prices, 
 which lasted more or less till the summer of 
 1813. Thus, the interval of depression from 
 actual or supposed abundance was only mo- 
 mentary; and there was immediately afterwards 
 a constant and quick succession of grounds for 
 speculating on, actual or contingent scarcity. 
 But after the harvest of 1813 till that of 181 6 
 the fall was nearly uninterrupted, because, at 
 every step of it, the effect of actual was aggra- 
 vated by that of still greater contingent abun- 
 dance. In 1814 there was an importation of 
 corn at greatly reduced charges of conveyance, 
 and the large produce of our own crops again 
 in 1815 was more than sufficient to counteract 
 any chance of improvement from the monopoly 
 granted by the corn bill in that year. 
 
 It is obvious, therefore, why, without any 
 reference to the prospective alterations in the 
 system of our currency as the cause, the failures 
 of country banks were so much more numerous 
 upon the relapse of prices between 1813 and 
 1816 than in 1810. But, if the recoil of prices 
 of agricultural produce in 1810, and of many
 
 143 
 
 other commodities, was not of long duration, and 
 did not proceed below the relatively high level 
 from whence they had risen in the two preceding- 
 years ; there was a large class of commodities 
 which, having risen but little in 1808 and 1809, 
 fell in 1810 and 1811 to a lower level than they 
 had ever been at before, and continued depressed 
 for a greater length of time. This remark may 
 apply, probably, to some branches of manufac- 
 tures, to those more especially which depended 
 on a demand for the supply of the United States 
 of America, and which were, consequently, very 
 much depressed by the war with those states ; 
 but I now allude to colonial produce, and par- 
 ticularly to coffee and sugar. The depression of 
 coffee, for nearly two years, was not only below 
 what it had ever before been at, but much lower 
 than it has ever been since ; and sugar was, for 
 some kinds, at least, lower then than it is even at 
 present. Now, if from the prices of that period 
 (viz. 1810-11) be deducted, first, the difference 
 between paper and gold, and then the difference 
 of freight and insurance compared with the pre- 
 sent period, some idea may be formed of the 
 intensity of suffering w T hich must have prevailed 
 amongst the parties concerned in producing and 
 importing such commodities. The reverses in 
 1810 and 1811, from over-trading and hazardous
 
 144 
 
 exports, probably exceeded in amount those 
 which occurred from 1814 to 1816. 
 
 On a comparison of the two periods, my im- 
 pression is, that the mercantile losses and the 
 consequent destruction of mercantile paper, as 
 well as of confidence in transactions on credit, 
 were, if any thing, greater in the first than in 
 the second ; while, on the other hand, the fall 
 of prices of agricultural produce was so much 
 greater and longer continued, and the conse- 
 quent loss of farmers, landlords, and of all per- 
 sons connected with them so extensive, in the 
 period between 1813 and 1816, as to sink into 
 utter insignificance the reverses experienced by 
 the corn trade in 1810. A comparison of the 
 number of commissions of bankruptcy issued 
 in the respective periods, distinguishing those 
 against country bankers, tends to confirm this 
 impression ; for it will be observed that the 
 commissions against country bankers in 1810, 
 1811, and 1812, were little more than half of 
 those in 1814, 1815, and 1816, while the total 
 number of bankruptcies was greater in the for- 
 mer than in the latter period.
 
 145 
 
 Total number of Commissions against 
 commissions. bankers. 
 
 1810 j 
 
 1811 v . . 7042 47 
 
 1812 S 
 1814 
 
 1514 * 
 
 1815 > 
 
 1816 * 
 
 6627 92 
 
 On a survey of the whole of these fluctua- 
 tions from 1807 to 1816, conceiving, as I do, 
 that the commercial reverses between the sum- 
 mer of 1814 and that of 1816 were the inevita- 
 ble consequence of the speculations and over- 
 trading of the two preceding years, as also that 
 the still greater reverses of 1810 and 1811 might 
 clearly be traced to the high prices and over- 
 trading of 1808 and 1809, I have no hesitation 
 in declaring my firm belief that the whole of 
 that period was productive of a preponderance 
 of suffering and calamity to the commercial in- 
 terests of this country. The state of high ex- 
 citement produced by the rapid transitions of 
 political events — the great and feverish activity 
 of adventurers to elude prohibitory decrees, and 
 to avail themselves of unexpected openings — 
 the extraordinary alternation of scarcity and 
 abundance of all kinds of commodities — the 
 spirit of enterprise displayed in the under- 
 takings of fire-offices, docks, canals, and bridges
 
 146 
 
 — -the extensive employment of shipping, as 
 transports, at however great a national expense 
 — the high prizes held out where the blanks, 
 however, were in disproportionate number — 
 the splendor of the military achievements which 
 terminated the war — all contribute to cast a 
 glare over the retrospect resembling the sun- 
 shine of prosperity. 
 
 But, confining my observations to the state of 
 commerce, I am satisfied that those who min- 
 gled in the scenes, and who were not blinded 
 to all that surrounded them by too intent a 
 pursuit of their own immediate objects, will bear 
 witness with me to the long intervals of gloom 
 — to the sudden changes from the reputation 
 of fortunes rapidly acquired, to bankruptcy and 
 ruin — to the extreme depression of our manu- 
 facturers in 1810, 1811, and 1812— to the de- 
 struction, or, at least, suspension from business, 
 of a great majority of the old establishments 
 connected with the ports of the continent of 
 Europe, and of the United States of America, 
 which were shut against us by the events of 
 the war — to the confiscations of British pro- 
 perty in consequence of the French decrees — 
 to the immense losses of the underwriters in 
 1810 and again in 1814— to the recoil which, 
 even previous to 1814, had begun to take place 
 in the value of fire-office, canal, dock, and bridge
 
 147 
 
 shares — to the depreciation necessarily inci- 
 dental on a peace to the shipping, and to the 
 foreign establishments dependant for their value 
 on a continuance of the war — and they cannot, 
 I think, avoid coming to the conclusion, that 
 the gloom of adversity really prevailed under 
 that appearance of splendor which deluded the 
 superficial or distant observer. A reference to 
 the list of bankrupts for the last thirty years, and 
 a comparison ofthe annual average number from 
 1810 to 1816, with that of the preceding and 
 succeeding period *, will go far to bear out this 
 assertion ; and if it be considered that the num- 
 ber of private compositions to that of bankrupt- 
 cies is in the proportion of probably not less 
 than four to one — if further, the number of in- 
 dividuals involved by loss of situation or pro- 
 perty in every failure be included in the view, 
 some, though I suspect a very inadequate idea 
 may be formed of the extent of suffering that 
 attended the splendid but unsound state of com- 
 merce that prevailed during those years. What, 
 it may be asked, do I mean to say that the 
 
 * Average annual number of bankrupts — 
 
 For seven years ending 1809 • • 1272 
 For seven years ending 1816 . • 2231 
 For six years ending 1822 . . . 1397 
 For the year 1822, the number was only 1094. — For the 
 whole series, see Appendix. 
 
 L 2
 
 148 
 
 country did not advance in wealth during the 
 period in question ? By no means. The country 
 did, I am persuaded, advance in wealth and in 
 population, in spite of the great fluctuations of 
 prices, and of the precarious, -and, in the ma- 
 jority of cases, disastrous state of commerce. I 
 am equally convinced, that an accumulation of 
 capital has been going forward, still more ra- 
 pidly since that time, notwithstanding, what J 
 I am ready to admit and deplore, the suffering 
 state of the agricultural interest.
 
 149 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 Fluctuation of Prices and of the Amount of private Paper, 
 from 1816 to the passing of Mr. Peel's Bill. 
 
 If I have succeeded in giving a satisfactory- 
 solution of the causes of the great fluctuations 
 of price, and of the corresponding expansion 
 and contraction of private paper and credit 
 which occurred in so remarkable a degree from 
 1807 to 18 16, it may still be a question how 
 far the same mode of reasoning, the same ge- 
 neral rule derived from observation, will serve 
 to account for the elevation of prices and the 
 renewed extension of private paper which oc- 
 curred between the autumn of 18 16 and that of 
 1818, and for the subsequent continued decline 
 of prices and contraction of private paper. I 
 have already pointed out how little coincidence 
 there was in the preceding interval, between the 
 increase or decrease in the amount of Bank of 
 England notes, and that of private paper, and 
 have, moreover, remarked that the most striking 
 instances of a great rise of general prices oc- 
 curred without any increase of Bank notes, 
 while, on the other hand, the most memorable 
 instances of a sudden fall took place contem- 
 poraneously with large additions to the Bank
 
 150 
 
 circulation. But the advocates for the doctrine 
 which ascribes all or nearly all the fluctuations 
 of price to the Bank restriction, overlook some 
 of the real facts when they insist on instances 
 only of coincidence which seem to suit their 
 purpose of proving the connexion which they 
 assume. Thus the article on currency in the 
 Quarterly Review has the following passage ex- 
 planatory, as the writer doubtless thinks, of the 
 whole process of the rise and fall of prices : 
 " From the year 1810 the price of gold rose 
 considerably, as measured in Bank paper, till 
 the year 1814. In 1811 the bullion committee 
 sat, which recommended in vain the limitation 
 of Bank issues in order to correct this disparity. 
 The Bank increased instead of diminishing its 
 issues till 1816, when, upon a sudden contrac- 
 tion, nearly to the extent of three millions, 
 prices of all kinds fell, and the price of gold 
 again came down nearly to a level with the 
 mint price." 
 
 Now, according to the hypothesis of this very 
 writer, as the Bank increased instead of di- 
 minishing its issues till 18 16, prices should have 
 risen, or, at any rate, not have fallen till then ; 
 and the context gives reason to infer accord- 
 ingly that prices did not fall till then : for it 
 says, " when (viz. 1816) upon a sudden con- 
 traction, nearly to the extent of three millions, 
 prices of all kinds fell." It so happens, how-
 
 151 
 
 ever, that the prices of agricultural produce 
 had begun to fall three years before, and those 
 of other commodities from two to three years 
 before. There was therefore a very great fall 
 between the summer of 1813 and the end of 
 1815, a period in which, as stated in the fore- 
 going quotation, the Bank increased its issues. 
 But upon what ground the assertion is made of 
 a sudden contraction to the extent of nearly 
 three millions, I am at a loss to conceive, no 
 such fact appearing in any of the accounts that 
 I have seen of the amount of Bank of England 
 notes in circulation. There was a sudden in- 
 crease of notes in the last six months of 1814, 
 while prices were falling rapidly ■, but this in- 
 crease was only in part withdrawn during the 
 two following years ; and the amount still left 
 in circulation in 1816 stood at nearly three 
 millions higher than it had done in 1813, or at 
 any time previous to 1813. 
 
 Average amount of Bank of England notes in circulation, 
 including Bank Post Bills. 
 
 January to June, 1813 . . . .£23,939,693 
 
 July to December, 1813 24,107,445 
 
 January to June, . 1814 25,511,012 
 
 July to December, 1814 28,291,832 
 
 January to June, . 1815 27,155,824 
 
 July to December, 1815 26,618,210 
 
 January to June, .1816 26,468,2S3 
 
 July to December, 1816 26,681,398 
 
 (Report of the Lords' Com. 1819, p. 323.)
 
 \5 C > 
 
 So much for the correctness of the statement 
 in that extract of the precise time and occasion 
 of the fall of prices : but in order to be con- 
 sistent in accounting for the subsequent rise, 
 the writer goes on to say, " The embarrassment 
 caused by this contraction induced the Bank 
 again to extend its issues in the latter end of 
 1817; the effect of which measure was instantly 
 felt in a correspondingjncrease of prices, so as 
 to prove beyond contradiction the intimate con- 
 nexion between the two things, — a connexion 
 which is, we apprehend, at this time not dis- 
 puted." 
 
 Here again is a misrepresentation of the facts 
 of the case, inasmuch as this statement would 
 lead to the supposition that the increase of the 
 issues of the Bank of England had preceded the 
 first tendency to an advance in prices ; and that 
 the advance, when it did take place, corre- 
 sponded in degree and duration with the in- 
 creased circulation of Bank notes. In reality, 
 however, the tendency to a general advance in 
 prices had commenced in the last six months of 
 1 8 16, at which time there was not any increased 
 issue. Wheat had already, by the end of that 
 year, risen 100 per cent.; and as the unfavour- 
 ableness of the season had extended over the 
 greater part of Europe, there was a prospect of 
 a still further advance.
 
 1.53 
 
 Average Price of Wheat. 
 
 s. d. 
 1st January, 1816 .... 53 7 
 
 1st July, 1816 73 8 
 
 1st January 1817 .... 104 10 
 
 (See Appendix.) 
 
 Many other important commodities likewise 
 were at that time, although at no decided ad- 
 vance, yet what is technically called looking up. 
 The stocks of importers, dealers, and manu- 
 facturers had become considerably reduced ; 
 and there was beginning to be a general con- 
 fidence that prices had for that period seen 
 their lowest, as the supply of several articles 
 had become evidently below the average con- 
 sumption. What was the cause of this falling 
 off of supply will be the subject of explanation 
 hereafter, when I come to a general statement 
 of prices and quantities : it is sufficient here to 
 state the fact that there was, towards the close of 
 1816, a scarcity, or evident approach to scarcity, 
 of several leading articles, such as silk, wool, 
 coffee, hemp, tallow, &c.*; and all these were 
 consequently beginning to attract attention. A 
 
 * Imports into Great Britain. 
 
 Silk. Wool. Coffee. 
 
 ■o i Bags and 
 
 lb. lb. Casks. Barrels. 
 
 1815, 1,800,333 14,991,713 48,200 207,900 
 
 1816, 1,137,922 8,117,804 34,700 86,100 
 
 Hemp. 
 
 Tallow. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 36,575 
 
 32,061 
 
 18,473 
 
 20,855
 
 154 
 
 general spirit of speculation, although not yet 
 developed, was therefore on the eve of display- 
 ing itself; and while there was this scope for 
 anticipation of an advance of prices at home, 
 there was great encouragement to extended 
 shipments to the United States of America and 
 the East Indies. 
 
 In 1815 and the early part of 1816 the ex- 
 ports from this country had been made with 
 great forbearance and prudence, because almost 
 every class of merchants was, at that time, suf- 
 fering from the effects of too great eagerness of 
 adventure : this forbearance was, of course, at- 
 tended by a large profit on what had been sent ; 
 and the consequence of the favourable result of 
 shipments on a small scale was, as usual on 
 such occasions, not only that some of the re- 
 gular houses extended their shipments, but that 
 fresh adventurers embarked in them to a con- 
 siderable extent. 
 
 So many circumstances, combining to the 
 creation of private paper, and to the multiply- 
 ing of transactions on credit, would, I am per- 
 suaded, have been felt in a general advance of 
 prices in 1817> if there had been no increase 
 whatever in the circulation of the Bank of 
 England : and, in fact, corn had already reached 
 a higher price in the first six months of 1817 
 than it has ever since been at ; and several
 
 155 
 
 other articles had also risen by that time, al- 
 though not yet in any considerable degree ; 
 all, however, indicating revived confidence and 
 an increase of transactions. Now, down to 
 July, 18 17, the increase of Bank of England 
 notes was very inconsiderable, viz. about 
 .£700,000 above the average of 1816, but still 
 a million below the average of the correspond- 
 ing six months of 181.4 ; and there was no issue 
 of gold worth mentioning during the first six 
 months of 1817. Will any person, then, con- 
 tinue to maintain that the rise of prices, down 
 to the end of June, 1817, (wheat and several 
 other descriptions of agricultural produce having 
 at that time advanced above a hundred per cent.) 
 corresponded with the addition made within 
 the same period to the circulation of the Bank 
 of England, the rise of prices, moreover, having 
 preceded even this addition ? There is no 
 doubt, however, that this addition, small as it 
 was, proved to be excessive, because it co- 
 incided with circumstances calculated to en- 
 large the circulation of private paper ; and the 
 exchanges, accordingly, as early as the first 
 six months of 1817, manifested a tendency 
 downwards, and the price of gold upwards : 
 and if the Bank directors had not, unfortunately, 
 upon system, disregarded, in the regulation of 
 their issues, the indication by which their pre-
 
 156 
 
 decessors, previous to 1797> professed to be 
 guided, they would have been warned to con- 
 tract, instead of enlarging, their issues. But 
 if the increase of about .£700,000 Bank notes 
 in the first six months of 1817 was excessive, 
 under the circumstances described, what is 
 to be said for the prudence or propriety of 
 the further increase which took place to the 
 extent of near two millions on the average 
 of the following six months, when all the cir- 
 cumstances tending to make the former amount 
 excessive were in full operation? — when, by 
 a simultaneous issue of gold, the circulation 
 was still further, although for a moment only, 
 enlarged ? Such an enlargement of the basis of 
 the currency, cooperating with the causes fa- 
 vouring the extension of country bank notes and 
 private paper generally, tended certainly to ac- 
 celerate the rise of prices of such articles as were 
 in a relative degree of scarcity, and to promote 
 the spirit of speculation and over-trading ¥ . 
 
 * It may, on a cursory glance, be matter of surprise, that 
 the enlargement of our circulation, from these concurrent 
 causes, did not diminish the value of it, relatively to other 
 countries, in a greater degree than was indicated by the fall 
 of the exchanges in 1817 and 1818. But the wonder will 
 probably cease, when it is considered that the scarcity of corn 
 and of many other commodities, in 1816 and part of 1817, was 
 felt through the greater part of Europe, and that the spirit of 
 speculation, thus roused, extended itself among the chief com-
 
 157 
 
 Several articles that had been the objects of 
 speculation reached their utmost elevation by 
 the close of 18 \J : some others being still 
 scarce, or supposed to be so, relatively to an 
 increased consumption, continued to advance 
 till August and September, 1818. There was, 
 accordingly, down to that period, a consider- 
 able briskness of circulation, and a frequency 
 of transactions on credit ; and, in general, the 
 spirit of speculation, having been so fully excited, 
 did not immediately subside with the cessation 
 of the original impulse : that spirit had likewise 
 been kept alive, with reference to agricultural 
 produce, by the extraordinary character of the 
 weather in the summer of 1818. It must be 
 within the recollection of most of my readers 
 
 mercial towns of the continent of Europe, and of the United 
 States of America. The great spirit of adventure, too, in 
 shipments to the East and West Indies was not confined to 
 the merchants of this country. And, accordingly, there was 
 an augmented circulation of mercantile paper and of trans- 
 actions on credit in other countries as well as in this. 
 
 The same causes which have contracted the circulation of 
 mercantile paper here are well known to have operated in pro- 
 ducing a similar effect abroad. And, in general, I would ob- 
 serve, that the phenomena connected with the periodical en- 
 largement and contraction of mercantile bills and credit in the 
 principal places of the commercial world admit of being ac- 
 counted for on principles analogous to those, which I have 
 applied to the explanation of the great variations which have 
 occurred in this country.
 
 158 
 
 that a drought of four months prevailed from 
 May to September, and apprehensions were, in 
 consequence, entertained of stunted crops of 
 every kind of vegetation. Hay got up to eight 
 pounds per load ; beans, turnips, and potatoes, 
 were supposed to have totally failed j large 
 orders were sent, and ships chartered, to fetch 
 beans from the Mediterranean ; oil-cakes were 
 in such demand, that linseed advanced consi- 
 derably; and the crops of corn, though healthy, 
 were expected to yield below an average pro- 
 duce. It was on the ground of these anticipa- 
 tions of scarcity, that British corn was bought 
 freely on speculation, and that many farmers 
 were induced to hold back their stocks : many 
 persons, likewise, importers as well as dealers 
 and farmers, reasoned erroneously on the opera- 
 tion of the corn-laws, and supposed that when 
 once the ports were shut, having the monopoly 
 of the home market, they would be secure of 
 obtaining, at worst, within a trifle of the open- 
 ing prices. Hence, the price was prevented 
 from falling sufficiently to shut the ports till 
 the February following, and there was a large 
 importation of corn from the Baltic in 1818. 
 
 But the result of the harvest disappointed 
 these anticipations : the drought had not ex- 
 tended to Ireland, nor to Scotland, nor indeed 
 much to the north of the Trent, in England ;
 
 159 
 
 and even in those parts where the drought had 
 prevailed, the quality and condition of the corn 
 were generally good enough to compensate, in 
 some measure, for the shortness of the straw: 
 the autumn, too, turned out singularly genial 
 for the recovery of the pastures, and was fol- 
 lowed by a mild open winter. 
 
 I have been thus particular in a description 
 of the season of 1818 (which, in strictness, would 
 come more properly into a subsequent part of 
 this work), because the extent and variety of 
 miscalculations upon particular descriptions of 
 produce were greater than I have ever known : 
 and the effect of those miscalculations on prices 
 was very considerable while they lasted. All 
 these circumstances, both as affecting agricul- 
 tural produce, and other commodities, were cal- 
 culated to keep up, if not to extend, the amount 
 of private paper, and of transactions on credit, 
 till an advanced period in 1818. By the autumn, 
 however, all speculations on scarcity, for that 
 season, had ceased, and prices assumed slowly 
 that tendency downwards which, with a few in- 
 termediate abortive speculations upon the pre- 
 cariousness of subsequent seasons, has continued 
 till within these few weeks. At the same time, 
 with the cessation of apprehensions of scarcity 
 of our own agricultural produce, there was a 
 general increase in the stock of imported com-
 
 160 
 
 modities : the rise of price of a large proportion 
 of them had taken place in the year before, and 
 sufficient time had therefore elapsed to admit of 
 the encouragement thus held out, being fol- 
 lowed by a greatly enlarged importation in the 
 autumn of 1818. And while European, Ame- 
 rican, and West Indian produce (coffee ex- 
 cepted) were thus coming forward in abun- 
 dance, unusually large supplies of cotton and 
 sugar were poured in from the East Indies. 
 
 It is material to bear in mind that, by the 
 convergence of all these channels, a general 
 abundance was restored by the autumn of 1818 ; 
 and, what was perhaps of fully as much in- 
 fluence on the eventual course of prices, it was 
 discovered that many of the sources of supply 
 could furnish a much larger quantity upon the 
 slightest additional encouragement. There was, 
 therefore, not only the full weight of actual 
 abundance on the markets, but there was the 
 further depressing effect of contingent, and al- 
 most indefinite, abundance. The death-blow, 
 accordingly, was given to the range of high 
 prices as early as between July and October, 
 1818: and I have dwelt the more at large upon 
 the circumstances leading to this point, because, 
 in as far as the restoration of abundance was an 
 adequate cause for a fall of prices to the full 
 extent to which they were eventually depressed,
 
 161 
 
 it negatives the assumption of a connexion be- 
 tween that fall of prices and the prospect of the 
 near termination of the Bank restriction. That 
 prospect was certainly no ingredient in the fall 
 of any of the commodities that I was practically 
 concerned in at that time ; nor is it probable 
 that it should have been : for, with the excep- 
 tion of a few individuals, advocates of the paper 
 system, who, it afterwards appeared, had some 
 private interviews with ministers to deprecate 
 the resumption of cash payments, the public 
 generally, or at least the mercantile public, 
 seemed to attach little importance to the sub- 
 ject. I am alluding to the autumn of 1818: 
 the case was different in the spring of 1819. 
 The fall of prices having then become manifest, 
 the tocsin of alarm which was sounded by the 
 advocates of the paper system, brought forward 
 in support of it all those who were suffering, or 
 expected to suffer, from that fall, and who were 
 ready in perfect good faith to attribute to an 
 alteration in the currency what was the con- 
 sequence of their own miscalculation of pro- 
 bable supplies. In truth, what need of resort- 
 ing to the supposed agency of an occult and dis- 
 puted cause, when there existed one plain, pal- 
 pable, and irresistible, as relating to the com- 
 modities which experienced soon after that time 
 the most decided fall, viz. a great and over- 
 
 M
 
 162 
 
 whelming increase of quantity. Take the fol- 
 lowing, among several other instances : — 
 
 Imports into Great Britain. 
 
 Silk. Wool. Cotton. 
 
 1816. lbs. 1,137,922 8,117,864 bales 370,000 
 
 1817. — 1,177,693 14,715,843 — 477,160 
 
 1818. — 2,101,618 26,405,486 — 665,300 
 
 Hemp. Tallow. Linseed. 
 
 1816. tons 18,473 tons 20,855 qrs. 70,892 
 
 1817. — 22,863 — 19,193 — 162,759 
 
 1818. — 33,020 — 27,011 — 237,141 
 
 Now can any body, acquainted with the 
 course of markets, hesitate for a moment to 
 pronounce what must be the effect of such an 
 excess of supply? and what indeed can be more 
 legitimate or simple than the inference, that if 
 the scantiness of supply in 1816 and 1817 was 
 a sufficient ground for a considerable advance, 
 the restoration of abundance would fully ac- 
 count for the fall ? It is well known, however, 
 that the resistance to a change, whether from a 
 low to a high, or from a high to a low range of 
 prices, is at first very considerable, and that 
 there is generally a pause of greater or less 
 duration before the turn becomes manifest ; in 
 the interval, while sales are difficult or imprac- 
 ticable, unless at a difference in price, which
 
 163 
 
 the buyer, in the one case, and the seller, in 
 the other, are not yet prepared to submit to, 
 the quotations are regulated by the last trans- 
 actions, but are said to be, and are, in fact, no- 
 minal. A struggle of this kind prevailed more 
 or less, according as the articles were in greater 
 or less abundance, through the autumn, and 
 into the winter of 1818-19, when many articles 
 which had become unsaleable from excess were 
 still quoted at nearly as high prices as they had 
 attained at any time in 1 8 1 8 . I mention this, in 
 order to point out the disingenuousness, or igno- 
 rance, which has induced some of the opponents 
 of Mr. Peel's bill to bring forward price currents 
 of February 1819 (being the time when the 
 committees of inquiry into the state of the cur- 
 rency were appointed) for the purpose of con- 
 trasting the quotations of that date with those 
 of the present time. But leaving such reason- 
 ings and such proofs to the fate they deserve, I 
 have to remark, that the process by which pri- 
 vate paper and transactions on credit are dimi- 
 nished came once more into operation at the 
 close of 1 8 1 8 and beginning of 1 8 1 9. The most 
 extensive failures commenced in the cotton 
 trade, being that in which the excess was first 
 and most decidedly felt, and which was on the 
 largest scale in point of amount. Importers, 
 speculators, and manufacturers, were success- 
 
 M 2
 
 164 
 
 ively mined by having embarked too largely 
 upon the anticipation of the maintenance of the 
 former range of high prices. Similar disasters 
 followed in several other branches of trade; 
 and these reverses, and the consequent distress, 
 were not confined to this country: indeed, it 
 may be of importance to observe, that extensive 
 failures at Paris, Amsterdam, and Hamburg, 
 and other places on the Continent, in several in- 
 stances, preceded the disasters which were felt 
 here. The fall in the prices of agricultural 
 produce was more slow than in 1815 and 18 16, 
 as it was from a lower range, and consequently 
 the failures of country banks were not so sudden 
 or extensive, nor the contraction of their notes 
 so immediate ; but still the tendency to a dimi- 
 nution of their issues must have been felt early 
 in 1819. At the same time that there was so 
 decided a reduction of private paper and credit 
 going forward, as the consequence of renewed 
 abundance of native and imported articles, there 
 were considerable failures connected with a re- 
 coil from over-trading in shipments to the East 
 and West Indies, and to the United States. This 
 reaction was naturally felt in all the branches of 
 manufacture connected with the articles which 
 had been the objects of speculative export : and 
 here again was a very adequate cause for a great 
 reduction of paper, and of transactions on credit.
 
 165 
 
 There was, thus, a combination of all the cir- 
 cumstances requisite to diminish that part of 
 the circulating medium which does not consist 
 of Bank of England notes or coin, and to in- 
 crease the functions of the remaining part by 
 the diminished occurrence of purchases and 
 sales on credit without the intervention of paper. 
 And the fact corresponds with what, from pre- 
 vious reasoning, it ought to be ; for there is no 
 doubt of a very great reduction having taken 
 place since 1818, in the aggregate of private 
 paper, and of transactions on credit. The con- 
 tinuation of the same circumstances, viz. abun- 
 dance, or, at least, adequateness of supply, pre- 
 cluding any exercise to the spirit of specula- 
 tion, and the absence of any new inducement 
 for over-trading on an extensive scale, fully ac- 
 counts for the confinement of credit to the ac- 
 customed channels of trade; credit in those 
 channels being necessary for the proper distri- 
 bution of commodities from the producers and 
 importers to the consumers. In this state of 
 things, there is less competition of borrowers, 
 and consequently a reduction of the rate of in- 
 terest ; the reduced rate of interest again tend- 
 ing to diminish the cost of production, and 
 thus being a fresh element of cheapness. It is 
 perfectly clear, therefore, that by the conjoint 
 operation of these causes, the restoration of the
 
 166 
 
 value of the currency was inevitable, unless, in- 
 deed, which was hardly probable, an overwhelm- 
 ing and unprecedented increase in its issues were 
 purposely resorted to by the Bank of England. 
 To prove that these causes were amply sufficient 
 to occasion a restoration of the value of the cir- 
 culation without any contraction of the basis of 
 the currency, it is only necessary to refer to 
 the declaration of the governor of the Bank, 
 who stated, in a court of proprietors, on the 
 21st March 1822, that " if the Bank had erred, 
 it was not on the side of a reduction of the 
 circulating medium ; for, upon looking at the 
 amount of their issues, he found that on the 9th 
 March 1822, their issues exceeded, by the sum 
 of 3,859,000/. those of the same date in the pre- 
 ceding year (9th March 1821), and that the 
 latter exceeded the issues of the 9th March 
 1820, by the sum of 3,440,000/. It was, there- 
 fore, quite clear that the repayment of the Go- 
 vernment debt, called for in July 1819, did not 
 induce the Bank to diminish their issues ; for 
 they had been increasing them in the years 
 which had since followed." 
 
 In answer to a question from a proprietor, the 
 governor added, " that the account of issues 
 from which he had quoted, of course included 
 the sovereigns issued by the Bank." 
 
 And an ex-Bank director has made a declara-
 
 167 
 
 tion to a similar effect in print : " With regard 
 to the effect of Mr. Peel's bill on the Bank of 
 England, I can state, from having been in the 
 direction during the last two years, that it has 
 been altogether a dead letter. It has neither 
 accelerated nor retarded the return to cash 
 payments, except as, by ordering the repayment 
 often millions of Exchequer bills to the Bank, 
 it enabled it to expend those ten millions in 
 the purchase of bullion without in any way cur- 
 tailing its other advances. The directors of 
 the Bank of England, as plain practical men, 
 have pursued plain practicable means, without 
 turning to the right hand or to the left, as con- 
 verts to the new doctrines promulgated by the 
 Bullion Committee, and by so doing have al- 
 ready thrown into general circulation, within 
 the last twelve months, more than eight mil- 
 lions of sovereigns, without having diminished, 
 except in the most trifling degree, the usual 
 average of its notes of five pounds and up- 
 wards." — C Considerations, §c, by S. Turnery 
 Esq. p. 40. J 
 
 According to these statements, then, the effect 
 of Mr. Peel's bill on the conduct of the Bank 
 was altogether a dead letter ; and I firmly be- 
 lieve it to have been so. So strong, indeed, 
 was the tendency of the causes which I have 
 enumerated to improve the value of the cur-
 
 168 
 
 rency, the amount of the basis of it remaining 
 the same, that it would have required a great 
 effort on the part of the Bank, avowedly and 
 of settled purpose to put itself out of condition 
 to fulfil its engagements. Supposing the Bank 
 directors to have been capable of entertaining 
 such a design, which I do not believe, they would 
 hardly have taken the responsibility upon them- 
 selves of carrying it into effect without the sanc- 
 tion of the Legislature. Not only, therefore, 
 was Mr. Peel's bill, in my opinion, wholly in- 
 operative to occasion, or even hasten, the re- 
 storation of the value of Bank paper ; but it 
 would have required, in order to prevent that 
 restoration, a solemn act of parliament for the 
 purpose of debasing the standard.
 
 MJ 
 
 SECTION XL 
 
 Great Variations in the Amount of private Paper and Credit 
 not exclusively incidental to a Currency whose basis is in- 
 convertible Paper. 
 
 It may, perhaps, be objected that the great 
 extension of private paper and credit, which I 
 have described as growing out of the tendency, 
 from other causes, to a rise of prices, and as in 
 its turn accelerating the rate and extending the 
 range of that rise, would not have existed at all, 
 or at least not to the same extent, if the Bank 
 restriction had not existed. But a reference to 
 facts will prove that such a growth of private 
 paper and credit is not exclusively incidental to 
 a currency whose basis consists of inconvertible 
 paper ; for, it will appear that not only a cur- 
 rency consisting of coin and convertible bank- 
 paper, but that a currency having a purely 
 metallic basis, without any portion of paper- 
 money, is likewise liable to a superstructure of 
 private paper which, under certain circum- 
 stances, may contribute to a temporary and 
 artificial rise of prices. 
 
 The conditions essential to the susceptibility
 
 170 
 
 of great temporary changes in any country in 
 the value of the currency, independent of any 
 alteration in the value of the basis of that cur- 
 rency, whether convertible paper and coin, or 
 coin only, are — a situation favourable to trans- 
 actions of great commercial extent and import- 
 ance — great activity and enterprise in its in- 
 habitants — and a facility, greater or less, of 
 obtaining credit. 
 
 For the purpose of illustrating this position, I 
 will refer to instances of great fluctuation in the 
 amount of the circulating medium, by the ex- 
 tension and contraction of private paper and 
 credit. 
 
 1. In the case of the United States of America, 
 where the currency consists of coin with a large 
 proportion of paper, which is strictly by law, al- 
 though rather imperfectly in practice, converti- 
 ble into coin. 
 
 2. In the case of this country, in which, pre- 
 vious to the Bank restriction, the currency con- 
 sisted of a large proportion of coin with paper 
 perfectly convertible into coin. 
 
 3. In the case of Hamburg, where the cur- 
 rency is purely metallic. 
 
 I need not dwell on the case of America, be- 
 cause I have already had occasion to notice the 
 extensive failures which occurred there, espe-
 
 171 
 
 cially in New York, in 1810-11 : and those 
 failures suppose a previous great extension of 
 private paper and credit. 
 
 In proof of the position as relates to this 
 country, previous to 1797> it might be sufficient 
 to refer, in general terms, to the great failures of 
 banking as well as of mercantile establishments, 
 attended with a great diminution of private 
 paper, which are known to have occurred in 
 1793*, and from which a great previous exten- 
 sion of paper and of transactions on credit is ne- 
 cessarily to be inferred. But the following state- 
 ment, extracted from the late Mr. Henry Thorn- 
 ton's evidence before the Lords' committee of 
 secrecy on the Bank affairs, in 1797, gives so 
 distinct a view of the large fluctuations in the 
 amount of country bank notes between 1792 
 and March 1797, and is so illustrative of the 
 point which I have endeavoured to establish, 
 
 * The following extract from the list of Bankruptcies will 
 place the fact in a striking point of view : 
 
 Total number Against country 
 of commissions. bankers. 
 
 1790 747 
 
 1791 769 1 
 
 1792 934 1 
 
 1793 1956 26 
 
 (See Appendix.)
 
 17'2 
 
 that I cannot resist the opportunity of insert- 
 ing it. 
 
 " Will you assign the reason why you state the year 1793 
 as the time at which the diminution of country bank notes 
 began to take place ? That was the period of very consider- 
 able failures in this country, and especially of the country 
 bankers. — Having been desired to inquire into the state of the 
 paper circulation in the country, I some days ago wrote to 
 about fifteen or sixteen country bankers in different places, 
 with whom I was either acquainted or connected ; and I de- 
 sired them to state to me the comparative amount of their 
 notes payable to bearer on demand, naming particularly to 
 them the period preceding the failures in 1793, and also the 
 period subsequent to it, as well as the present time. 
 
 " Will you state the result ? — First, I will state by itself 
 the account which I received of the whole circulation of notes 
 at Bristol. The relative quantity circulated at the several 
 periods named was furnished, I believe, by the six Bristol 
 bankers themselves, and I consider it, therefore, as accurate. 
 
 Assuming the quantity of cash paper, as they call 
 it, or paper for which cash may be demanded, which 
 was circulated in 1792, and previous to the run on all 
 country bankers, to be expressed by the proportion of 10 
 
 The amount circulating at midsummer, 1793, and in 
 1794, taking the average of these six banks, will be 
 nearly as 3^ 
 
 The amount circulating at midsummer, 1796, to Jan. 
 1797, will be nearly as 5 A 
 
 The amount circulating since Feb. 1797, (being the 
 period of the stoppage of the cash payments of the 
 Bank of England), will be nearly as . . . . 3-&r 
 
 According to such rough estimate as I am 
 able to form, the amount in value of the Bris- 
 tol notes for which cash might be demanded,
 
 173 
 
 circulating on the first of these periods, may 
 
 have been about =£360,000 sterl. 
 
 In the second period .... 140,000 
 
 In the third period .... 220,000 
 
 In the fourth period, which reaches nearly 
 t o the present day (31st March) . . 130,000 
 
 The following may be depended on as a 
 pretty accurate account of the notes to bearer 
 on demand, circulated at nearly the same 
 period by a considerable Newcastle bank be- 
 fore 1793, about . . . £160,000 to 180,000 
 
 Some time after 1793 the circulation of 
 this house increased, one of the Newcastle 
 houses leaving off business, to about . . 200,000 
 
 Before the stoppage of the cash payments 
 of the Bank, the circulation was reduced to 110,000 
 
 Since that time it has been about . . 80,000 
 
 I am informed by a considerable bank in 
 the county of Devon, that according to the 
 best opinion they can form, the quantity of 
 Bankers' notes payable on demand to bearer, 
 issued in their county, may have been in 1 792 ,£120,000 
 
 That in 1793 the difficulties of the times 
 reduced that sum almost to nothing, but that 
 it soon increased to perhaps about . . 60,000 
 
 And continued at about that sum until after 
 the stoppage of the cash payments of the 
 Bank, when it fell to the amount at which it 
 now stands, of about .... 20,000 
 
 I have obtained information on nearly the same points from 
 other banks in a variety of parts, viz. Ashburton, Carlisle, 
 Exeter, Hinckley, Lichfield, Scarborough, Sleaford, Stamford, 
 Stockton, Tiverton, and Woodbridge : each of these issue or- 
 dinarily notes to bearer on demand, though the quantity is- 
 sued by several of them is never considerable. I have en- 
 deavoured to compute the relative average quantity of notes
 
 174 
 
 payable on demand, and issued by all these banks, at the four 
 different periods I before named, and I conceive that, supposing 
 the amount issued by them all before ] 793 to be as . 90 
 
 The amount for the same time after 1793, will be 
 about as . ....... 63 
 
 The amount before the stoppage of the cash pay- 
 ments at the Bank, about . . . . .78 
 
 And since that time about . . . . .40 
 
 What occurred at Hamburg at the close of 
 the last century is a proof that even a purely me- 
 tallic currency admits of a large superstructure 
 of private paper and credit, which may be sub- 
 ject to sudden contraction and extinction. The 
 bank of that city presents an example of the 
 most correct regulation of a metallic standard 
 that has hitherto been known; there is no paper 
 whatever current as money, yet, under circum- 
 stances favourable to speculation, there was a 
 very great increase of its general circulation, 
 through the medium of private paper and of 
 transactions on credit in the years 1797 and 
 1798. Hamburg then enjoyed, in consequence 
 of the occupation of Holland by the French, 
 the advantage of being the chief port through 
 which the interior of Germany and the countries 
 adjacent could be supplied with the commodities 
 of which they stood in need, from this country 
 and from America: and, as there happened, 
 during the greater part of the period to which 
 I am referring, viz. 1797 and 1798, to be a
 
 175 
 
 scanty supply of imported commodities, espe- 
 cially of colonial produce, and an increased de- 
 mand for immediate consumption, a speculation 
 arose which was carried on to a considerable 
 extent, and maintained, in great part, by a cir- 
 culation of paper ; prices of colonial produce 
 were driven up immoderately, and those who 
 had embarked earliest appeared to be making 
 large fortunes, and were thus, for a time, in 
 high credit. But, as usual in such cases, the 
 consumption of the commodities which had 
 been the objects of speculation was reduced by 
 the advanced cost, and, consequently proved 
 much less than had been anticipated, while the 
 supplies were much larger. The inevitable re- 
 sult was a destruction of the paper which had 
 been created there, and which had extended it- 
 self, along with the speculation, to other towns 
 of Germany, and some in Holland. These, 
 therefore, participated in the reaction. The 
 number of houses that failed at Hamburg be- 
 tween August and November, 1799, was eighty- 
 two, and the amount of their engagements up- 
 wards of 29,500,000 banco marks, or about 
 c£ 2,500,000 sterling. The rate of discount rose 
 during that interval to 15 per cent. A con- 
 temporary description of the distress which was 
 felt there is contained in the following com-
 
 176 
 
 mercial report, extracted from the periodical 
 work to which I have before referred. 
 
 1st November, 1799. 
 
 n The embarrassments of the merchants at Hamburg have 
 increased to an alarming degree, and during the whole month 
 of October every mail that has arrived has added several 
 names to the unfortunate list of houses which have stopped 
 payment in that city, where there are scarcely any persons in 
 the mercantile line, whatever may be their wealth and con- 
 nexions, who have not experienced considerable difficulties, 
 while the effects thereof have extended to Bremen, Frankfort, 
 Amsterdam, and many other of the principal trading towns on 
 the continent." 
 
 I might mention other instances, such as the 
 failures at Paris and in other parts of the con- 
 tinent, at the close of 1818. Now failures sup- 
 pose the use of credit ; and the use of credit, 
 in as far as it extends in any degree beyond 
 the accustomed channels of trade, must produce 
 a temporary advance in the price of the articles 
 to which it is applied.
 
 177 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 Reasons for thinking that the State of Prices during the Bank 
 Restriction does not warrant the Presumption of any dimi- 
 nished Value of the precious Metals. 
 
 From the historical sketch which I have drawn 
 of the period from 1807 to the passing of Mr. 
 Peel's Bill, it must be observed, that the circum- 
 stances connected with supply and demand were 
 so extraordinary, that they must, in any state of 
 the currency, have been attended with a pro- 
 digious effect on prices, and on the amount of 
 private paper and credit. The causes to which 
 I have alluded account for so great a proportion 
 of the rise observable at particular times in that 
 interval as to leave, certainly, nothing more to 
 be ascribed to the currency than so much as is 
 marked by the difference between paper and 
 gold. That difference must, no doubt, be con- 
 sidered as the criterion and measure of depre- 
 ciation of Bank notes, according to any intel- 
 ligible definition of the value of paper purport- 
 ing to be payable on demand ; because, if they 
 had actually been convertible, there must have 
 been a contraction of the basis of the circula-
 
 178 
 
 tion sufficient to have raised the exchanges, and 
 to have brought down the market to the mint 
 price of gold. 
 
 I am so far from thinking that there is any 
 reason to infer a diminished value of the precious 
 metals during the prevalence of the highest 
 prices, between 1808 and 1814, compared with 
 the period anterior to it, or rather anterior to 
 1797, and subsequent to 1819, that the fact of 
 prices not having been at a higher range in 
 consequence of the scarcity arising from the 
 seasons, combined with the unprecedented ob- 
 structions to importation, appears to me to af- 
 ford strong grounds of presumption that the 
 increased functions or demand for gold and 
 silver, for the purposes of war and hoarding, 
 and of supplying the place of diminished cir- 
 culation of bills of exchange on the continent, 
 must have exhanced their value in a somewhat 
 greater degree than could be counterbalanced 
 by the quantity spared from the circulation of 
 this country. The opinion of Mr. Say is so far 
 at least in favour of this view, that he refers to 
 certain critical periods when gold was in great 
 demand, and he distinctly denies that there was 
 any diminution of the value of the metals in 
 France during the war, or any enhancement 
 since the peace, as a consequence of the altera- 
 tions in our currency. In his letter to Mr.
 
 179 
 
 James, (which appeared in the Morning Chro- 
 nicle on the 21st of August last, and which is 
 likewise inserted in the Appendix to Mr. Wes- 
 tern's last pamphlet), he says — 
 
 " You address to me several questions, of which the prin- 
 cipal is, to know if prices have undergone in France the same 
 revolution as in England? 
 
 '* As regards the precious metals, I can answer — no. At 
 certain critical periods, gold, as being lighter and more easily 
 conveyed, was in great demand and rose a little, as compared 
 with the silver money. 
 
 " As regards wheat, the price has never been more variable 
 than within the last twenty years. There have been very good 
 crops, and very bad crops, and the contracts for the armies 
 (made sometimes at any price) augmented the effects of the 
 vicissitudes of the season. 
 
 " Below is the average price of wheat in the important 
 market of Roye, in Picardy, one year with another, for the 
 fourteen years ending in 1816. The measure of Roye is equal 
 to 52 litres 52 centimes : — 
 
 
 U. 
 
 so. 
 
 de. 
 
 
 11. 
 
 so. 
 
 de. 
 
 11. 
 
 SO. 
 
 de. 
 
 1803 
 
 5 
 
 17 
 
 9 
 
 1808 
 
 5 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 1813 8 
 
 7 
 
 11 
 
 1804 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 1809 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 3 
 
 1814 7 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 1805 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 1810 
 
 9 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 1815 11 
 
 12 
 
 7 
 
 1806 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 1811 
 
 16 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 1816 20 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 1807 
 
 8 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 1812 
 
 13 
 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 '* The medium price for the fourteen years gives for the 
 measure of Roye 9 liv. 19 sous, which is nearly 29 livres for 
 the septier of Paris ; but this price is evidently too high, as 
 these fourteen years contain two years of famine and three 
 epochs of supplies for Buonaparte, for the important cam- 
 paigns of Moscow, of Leipsic, and of the hundred days. 
 
 " The price of wheat for 1821 has been lower than for 
 some time past : this is undoubtedly occasioned from a suc- 
 
 n2
 
 180 
 
 cession of crops which have been good throughout. Wheat is 
 rising a little this year, because the crops in some parts are 
 found not to be so good as was before expected. 
 
 " The price of colonial produce has fallen much in France ; 
 but this proves nothing more than the advantage of having the 
 sea free, and the cultivation of sugar, &c. being established 
 through all parts of the torrid zone. 
 
 " Although it is difficult, consequently, to judge of the value 
 of money after the variation in the price of such or such an 
 article, nevertheless we can state, that things generally have 
 not fallen in price in France since the depreciation and the 
 restoration of the paper money of England, except as far as 
 particular circumstances may have contributed ; as the intro- 
 duction of cheaper and more expeditious processes of fabrica- 
 tion, &c. I do not believe, therefore, that there is any ground 
 for saying that the fall of prices in England has its analogy on 
 the Continent. It appears to me that it proceeds entirely from 
 the alterations in the value of your money*." 
 
 It will be observed that I have quoted more 
 from Mr. Say's letter than what relates to the 
 extra-demand for gold during particular periods 
 of the war, for the purpose of showing that his 
 opinion coincides with mine as to the absence 
 of any rise in the metallic price of corn and 
 other commodities, " except as far as particular 
 circumstances may have contributed. ,, 
 
 Now surely the reasoning of Mr. Say applies 
 
 * It is requisite to bear in mind that Mr. Say, in speaking 
 of the currency of this country, proceeds upon the authority of 
 Mr. James, who estimates the depreciation, arising from the 
 alterations connected with the Bank restriction, at full fifty 
 per cent.
 
 181 
 
 with infinitely more force to the grounds on 
 which corn and other commodities rose in this 
 country during the same interval ; for we had 
 four years of what he would call famine, viz. 
 very bad harvests, 1804, 1809, 1811, and 1816, 
 without the intervention of two seasons in suc- 
 cession of general abundance, or, as he would 
 term it, of " crops which have been good 
 throughout," between 1804 and 1812. And if 
 colonial produce rose in France during the latter 
 years of the war to 5s. and 6s. per lb. for sugar, 
 Is. per lb. for coffee, and 18s. per lb. for indigo, 
 from political obstructions and increased charges 
 of conveyance, without any inference, in Mr. 
 Say's opinion, of a diminished value of money, 
 may not the same explanation be extended to 
 the causes of the high price of such imported 
 commodities as were necessary in this country 
 for our manufactures and for the use of our 
 navy ? 
 
 Is it to be wondered at that silk should have 
 been so dear as it was, when the only means of 
 procuring it from Italy was over-land through 
 Germany, and in some instances through Russia 
 and Sweden ? What would be the nett proceeds 
 to the producer in Italy, or to the importer 
 here, at the highest prices obtained for any large 
 quantity, after deducting the expenses of land 
 carriage from the extreme south to the extreme 
 north of Europe, and of a shipment from Arch-
 
 182 
 
 angel or Gothenburgh at an enormous rate of 
 freight and insurance, with all the further 
 charges of simulated papers and bribes to 
 Custom-house officers ? If the charges of im- 
 porting hemp and flax were increased from 20 
 per cent, to 120 per cent, on the prime cost, or 
 from 51. to 30/. and in some instances to 40/. 
 per ton, these articles being indispensable for 
 the use of the navy, was not a rise to this ex- 
 tent inevitable ? For the freight alone of timber 
 from Riga, the prime cost of which was lower 
 than it is now, there were instances in which 
 from 8/. to 10/. per load and upwards were paid : 
 the freight is now 24s. per load. I will not now 
 multiply examples, as they will come more pro- 
 perly into view when I have occasion to appre- 
 ciate more particularly hereafter the proportion 
 that is to be ascribed to the war and the seasons 
 in the fluctuations of prices. It is sufficient to 
 remark that the more the instances of a rise of 
 prices are examined into, the more clearly will 
 they be found to be (with an allowance at the 
 utmost for the difference between paper and 
 gold) explained upon the grounds which I have 
 repeatedly stated, viz. scarcity, from the seasons 
 and political obstructions, or extra demand, from 
 peculiar and temporary causes. But it is mate- 
 rial further to observe, that while such great 
 stress, in most of the discussions on this subject, 
 has been laid on the circumstance of many arti-
 
 183 
 
 cles having risen in price between 1808 and 
 1814, no attention seems to have been paid to 
 the great and long continued depression of other 
 articles. Colonial produce, notwithstanding the 
 increased charges of importation, was, in several 
 instances, lower than it had ever been before. 
 Man}' descriptions of manufactures were in the 
 most deplorable state of depression ; and wages, 
 (as I have stated at page 77) except in cases of 
 extra demand, were actually reduced, even in 
 nominal amount,at the time when the necessaries 
 of life had risen most. Moreover, various kinds 
 of raw materials, imported at the most extra- 
 vagant rates of freight and insurance, were sold 
 in 1810 and 181 1, and again in 1813 and 1814, 
 at prices that would not pay more than the mere 
 charges, without leaving one farthing for prime 
 cost. Now, if from these reduced prices be 
 deducted 20 per cent, as about the average dif- 
 ference between paper and gold from 1808 to 
 1814, it will leave so low range, that applying 
 the same rate of deduction to the highest prices 
 at which any considerable quantities were sold 
 in 1808 and 1809, and in 1812 and 1813, the 
 medium or average will afford a result of very 
 moderate metallic prices, by no means justify- 
 ing the inference of any diminished value of 
 gold and silver, but rather the reverse.
 
 184 
 
 SECTION XIII. 
 
 Survey of Prices down to the present Time. 
 
 Reverting again to the fluctuations of prices 
 in this country, it is of material importance, in 
 estimating the degree in which the Bank restric- 
 tion contributed to the speculations with which 
 they were connected, to recur to the following 
 fact, which I noticed before, viz. that many im- 
 portant articles experienced, between the autumn 
 of 1807 and the first three months of 1809, 
 nearly as great an elevation as they ever after- 
 wards attained, and in some instances a greater : 
 in several, the advance was upwards of 100 per 
 cent. Now the average amount of Bank of 
 England notes in 1808 experienced no increase 
 worth mentioning, compared, not only with that 
 of the year before, but with that of the four 
 years preceding. And as the exchanges were 
 for the first nine months of 1808 higher than 
 they were on an average in the year 1792, and
 
 185 
 
 the price of silver lower #, (no price of gold being- 
 quoted in 180S) there is no reason to believe 
 that the Bank, if it had then been liable to pay 
 its notes in coin, would have experienced any 
 drain or seen any ground, from the state of the 
 exchanges, to have reduced its issues. The 
 inference, therefore, is plain, that the great rise 
 of prices in question might, and I have no doubt 
 would, under the peculiar circumstances, have 
 taken place as well without as with the Bank 
 restriction. It was not till the close of 1808, 
 after the greatest part of the rise had taken 
 place (which, indeed, was in great part a neces- 
 sary rise, as a condition of supply under the 
 extravagantly increased expenses of convey- 
 ance), that the preparations which were already 
 in progress by the transmission of funds for the 
 large importation that was forthcoming, in con- 
 sequence of the great encouragement held out 
 
 * Prices of Silver and Course of Exchange on Hamburgh. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 792 
 
 
 
 
 
 1808. 
 
 
 Standard 
 
 Standard 
 
 New 
 
 Span- 
 
 Excl 
 
 ange 
 
 New 
 
 Span- Exchan. 
 
 
 Gold per 
 
 Silver per 
 
 ish Dollars 
 
 w 
 
 th 
 
 ish Dollars with 
 
 
 Ounce. 
 
 Ounce. 
 
 per Ounce. 
 
 Hambro'. 
 
 p. o ( 
 
 ance. Hambro'. 
 
 January, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 24 
 
 34 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 34 4 
 
 February, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 34 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 3 34 4 
 
 March, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 44- 
 
 5 
 
 31 
 
 34 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 34 6 
 
 April, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 34 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 34 6 
 
 May, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 5i 
 
 5 
 
 44 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 34 9 
 
 June, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 34 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 3 34 9 
 
 July, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 34 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 3 35 3 
 
 August, 
 
 3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 .5 
 
 4 
 
 34 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 3 35 2 
 
 Septembei 
 
 ,3 17 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 8 
 
 N. B. No price of standard silver or gold quoted in 1808. 
 
 (Parliamentary Papers ordered by the House of Commons, 
 March 4, 18U.)
 
 186 
 
 by the high prices here, produced any material 
 impression on the exchanges : then, hut not till 
 then, that is, at the close of 1808 and beginning 
 of 1809, the Bank would, under the liability 
 to pay in coin, have been compelled to con- 
 tract its issues in order to meet the pressure 
 upon the exchanges. The depression of the 
 exchanges in that year, occasioned in the first 
 instance by an importation of commodities ge- 
 nerally to an almost unparalleled extent, and 
 chiefly in foreign ships, whose owners were to 
 be paid by bills on the continent, was increased 
 by the expenditure of our government abroad, 
 and by the effects of the very wet harvest in 
 this country rendering a large supply of foreign 
 corn necessary. But the reduction of Bank- 
 notes, requisite to have counteracted these 
 causes of depression of the exchanges, would, 
 in all probability, have been small in amount: 
 I judge so from the circumstance that, not- 
 withstanding the addition of about two mil- 
 lions, which the Bank made to its issues in 
 1809, when the propriety of an opposite course 
 was clearly indicated, so great was the transition 
 from scarcity to abundance of imported com- 
 modities, that a recoil of the prices of those 
 articles which had previously risen most com- 
 menced in the summer of that year; and soon 
 after, viz. at the close of 1809 and beginning of
 
 187 
 
 1810, as a necessary consequence of the fall of 
 prices of nearly all commodities (I do not in- 
 clude agricultural produce), which continued 
 from that time, there was a great destruction 
 of private paper. This destruction of private 
 paper seems somewhat to have preceded the 
 further issue of Bank of England notes, which 
 took place in 1810, as the exchanges rather 
 advanced, and the price of gold fell somewhat, 
 in the course of that year, viz. from 4/. lis. to 
 4/. 4s. 6d. There can be little doubt, therefore, 
 that if the Bank had so regulated its issues as to 
 have preserved the value of its paper on a level 
 with that of gold, it might have done so, after 
 an intermediate and perhaps very trifling re- 
 duction, consistently with having a much larger 
 amount of notes in circulation in 1810 than it 
 had in 1808. 
 
 Applying this supposition of what would have 
 been the regulation of the Bank issues, under a 
 liability of paying in coin, to the speculations 
 and fluctuations between 1807 and 1811, the 
 probability is, that the rise of prices would have 
 been checked a little earlier, and the fall have 
 proceeded somewhat more rapidly: but the ef- 
 fect of that would have been to have diminished 
 the importation (which proved to be too large) 
 by the close of 1809, and so far the eventual fall 
 of prices would have been less in 1810 and the
 
 188 
 
 early part of 181 1 than it actually was ; and, in 
 that case, the renewed scarcity of 1 8 1 1 would 
 have been felt earlier, and there would have 
 been an earlier renewed rise of prices. The con- 
 clusion is, that the great and partly speculative 
 rise of prices, connected with a great increase of 
 private paper, in 1808, was uninfluenced in the 
 first instance, though it might be in some mea- 
 sure protracted, by the Bank restriction ; and 
 that, as the fall was eventually the greater by 
 the delay, the average of the prices, taking the 
 whole range of that fluctuation (at the end of 
 which there was, probably in consequence of 
 the general discredit, less private paper in cir- 
 culation than before it began), was as low as it 
 would have been if there had been no inter- 
 mediate enlargement of private paper, and as 
 low, less the difference between paper and gold, 
 as it would have been if the Bank restriction 
 had not existed. Thus far as to the speculation 
 in imports : the same reasoning applies, in some 
 degree, to the great speculation and consequent 
 enlargement of private paper, connected with 
 the immense shipments to South America. 
 These began in 1808, when they would equally 
 have taken place if the Bank restriction had not 
 existed; they were probably, indeed, somewhat 
 promoted and extended in 1809, the inducement 
 to over-trading still continuing, compared with
 
 189 
 
 what they might have been if the restriction 
 had not existed ; but in consequence of this 
 extension in 1809 the reaction was so much 
 greater in 1810, and the prices of all the 
 manufactures, affected by the sudden suspen- 
 sion of demand, were depressed in so much 
 greater a proportion as the extension of them 
 had been encouraged by the previous extra de- 
 mand : thus the same result follows, viz. that 
 the medium prices of those commodities, in this 
 country, w^ere not affected beyond the degree 
 indicated by the difference between paper and 
 gold, on the average of the three years in ques- 
 tion, by the speculation and consequent en- 
 largement of private paper, or by the Bank 
 restriction. 
 
 From what I have previously stated of the 
 grounds on which the great speculations, both 
 in imports and exports, took place between 
 1811 and 1814, a similar process of explanation 
 would enable me to prove that the enlargement 
 of private paper, during that time, not only did 
 not depend upon the Bank restriction, except 
 in the degree in which a contraction of the basis 
 must always narrow the superstructure, but that 
 the advance of prices, resulting from that en- 
 largement, was compensated by the eventual 
 decline (a great part of which depended on 
 causes distinct from the change from war to
 
 190 
 
 peace), so that the average was at least as low 
 as if the speculation had not existed, perhaps 
 lower*. Upon the same grounds, it would ap- 
 pear that the rise of prices in 1817 (founded on 
 the scarcity of 1816), which preceded the in- 
 crease of Bank issues, although it was extended 
 and protracted by that most unaccountable and 
 apparently ill-judged increase, carried within 
 itself, supposing the seasons moderately pro- 
 pitious, the principle of compensation, by in- 
 creased produce and a corresponding depression 
 of prices. Accordingly, a part of the excessive 
 supplies since that time must have been the ne- 
 cessary result of the previous exaggerated de- 
 mand. And as scarcity, real and apprehended, 
 was the main cause of the advance of prices be- 
 
 * In general it may be observed, that speculation, whether 
 with capital belonging to the parties engaged in it, or bor- 
 rowed, cannot have the effect of raising prices, except during 
 the period within which a diminished demand and increased 
 supply have not time to operate. Beyond that period, the 
 extra decline fully compensates, and frequently more than 
 compensates, for the previous extra advance. This happily is 
 a protection, in the nature of things, to the consumer, against 
 any indefinite and progressive or average rise of prices, as 
 measured by the precious metals, supposing the mass of these 
 and the quantity of commodities to be respectively unaltered, 
 and applying the position only to articles in respect of which 
 no monopoly or restrictive regulations are enforced by the 
 state.
 
 191 
 
 tween 1816 and 1818, so the abundance, actual 
 and contingent, since that time, both of home 
 produce and of imported commodities, has been 
 quite sufficient to account for the subsequent 
 decline, without imputing any agency to the 
 currency beyond the improvement of the paper 
 as compared with gold. 
 
 Of the fact of abundance of supply of the 
 leading articles of consumption, there cannot, 
 I should think, be any reasonable doubt. 
 
 Let any corn factor be asked, whether the 
 supplies of wheat and flour in Mark-lane, at the 
 close of 1821 and through the first half of 1822, 
 were not quite sufficient to have produced the 
 fall of prices and the apparent tendency to a 
 further depression, as long as there was no se- 
 curity against a continuance of so overwhelming 
 a supply ; and whether there is any appearance 
 of a want of funds, or of inclination on the part 
 of buyers to speculate if they could be satisfied 
 of an inadequateness of the stock in this coun- 
 try? Indeed, since the tide of supply has some- 
 what abated, within the last three months, there 
 is a decided improvement in the market. The 
 same may be observed of oats. Barley, being 
 decidedly short in quantity, has got up to a 
 high price, relatively to wheat. 
 
 The extremely low price of cattle has of late 
 attracted so much attention, that I insert a
 
 192 
 
 statement of the numbers sold at Smithfield for 
 the last four years : 
 
 
 Neat Cattle. 
 
 Sheep and Lambs 
 
 1819, 
 
 135,226 
 
 949,900 
 
 1820, 
 
 132,933 
 
 947,990 
 
 1821, 
 
 142,133 
 
 1,107,230 
 
 1822,* 
 
 143,830 
 
 1,353,043 
 
 The comparative increase has been equally 
 great at Liverpool and Hull ; and I am told 
 that the supplies at the other markets in Eng- 
 land have been no less superabundant. How, 
 then, can there be any difficulty in account- 
 ing for the very low prices of meat during 
 the last twelve months ? It may be said, that 
 this excessive supply has arisen from distress, 
 and that it cannot continue : this may«be true ; 
 but whatever be the cause, the excess actually 
 in the market must equally affect the price. 
 There has been a trifling falling off in the quan- 
 tity within these few weeks, and a little corre- 
 sponding advance in the price. 
 
 * Not having the actual number sold in 1822, I have com- 
 puted it by the number at market, as follows : 
 
 Neat Cattle. Sheep and Lambs. 
 
 1821, At market, 159,505 1,282,900. 
 
 1822, Do. 161,410 1,567,714. 
 
 At market. Sold. At market. Sold. 
 
 As 159,505 are to 142,133 so are 161,410 to 143,830 
 As 1,282,900 are to 1,107,230 so are 1,567,714 to 1,353,043 
 
 (See Appendix.)
 
 193 
 
 With regard to imported commodities, I am 
 not aware of one of which the present depression 
 cannot be fully accounted for by reference to 
 the supply, compared with the average con- 
 sumption. 
 
 Of wool, not only the importation has been 
 larger on an average of the last few years than 
 in any preceding period, but the home produce 
 must have been greatly augmented, judging by 
 the increased number of sheep to which I have 
 referred. 
 
 The importations of cotton have been on so 
 extensive a scale, as to leave no question of the 
 sufficiency of the ground for a low range of 
 prices. The only difference of opinion that 
 exists as to this article, is whether, allowing for 
 a progressive increase of consumption, at the 
 same rate as that at which it has proceeded of 
 late years, supposing no corresponding increase 
 of supply, there may not be a deficiency by the 
 end of 182k And the very suggestion of a 
 doubt, on so remote a contingency, has had the 
 effect of occasioning considerable speculative 
 purchases, at some advance in price. 
 
 Silk was, from continued abundance of supply, 
 at a low price till last summer, when, in con- 
 sequence of reported injury to the crops in 
 Italy, a rise of 20 to 30 per cent, took place on 
 the descriptions likely to be affected by that
 
 194 
 
 circumstance; but the advance being greater 
 than the manufacturers in France would give, 
 a larger proportion has been shipped hither, and 
 the price has receded. 
 
 Sugar fell to its late low range in consequence 
 of the very large importations into Europe from 
 the Havannah, the Brazils, and the East Indies, 
 down to the close of 1821, when all the ports of 
 the Continent were absolutely glutted with this 
 article. It has required above a year of falling 
 prices and diminishing supplies to get rid of 
 that glut. As the stocks at the principal places of 
 consumption are now becoming reduced, there 
 is some revival of demand at improving prices. 
 
 Among our staple articles, there is reason to 
 believe that the low price of Iron is accounted 
 for partly by the increased power of machinery 
 applicable to mining, and partly by a falling off 
 in the exportation in consequence of the restric- 
 tive regulations in France, to which country a 
 great deal was previously sent. Of Copper, the 
 produce in the last two years* has been larger 
 than in any former equal period, while at the 
 same time the war demand has ceased, and the 
 export to Germany and France has of late been 
 interfered with by exports thither from Russia. 
 
 * Annual amount of the weekly sales of copper ore, in 
 Cornwall, for the last five years, ending 30th June, viz. 
 
 Tons. Tons. Tons. 
 
 1818, 6,469 1820, 6,915 1822, 9,140 
 
 1819, 6,944 1821, 7,770
 
 195 
 
 That the depression, therefore, has not been 
 greater than it is, proves the great increase of con- 
 sumption for domestic and commercial purposes. 
 As a further presumption, if any were want- 
 ing, that the low price of the articles referred 
 to, as existing in abundance, lead to no fair 
 ground of inference of increased value of the 
 currency, I may mention some articles, which, 
 being scarce, or apprehended to be so, have 
 proportionately advanced in price. Indigo, in 
 consequence of a falling offin the actual supply, 
 and of a reported failure of the forthcoming 
 crop, is at a higher range of prices than it was 
 at throughout the war. Whalebone, from a 
 short supply, has advanced above 100 per cent. 
 Greenland oil is 30 per cent, higher than it 
 was last year. Coffee, as is well known, has 
 preserved a price on the average of the last five 
 years higher than in any preceding period of 
 equal length. Hemp, in consequence of a fall- 
 ing offin the importation of 1821, experienced 
 immediately a speculative demand, and rose in 
 the course of a few weeks upwards of 50 per 
 cent, on the price in bond, viz. from 26/. 10s. 
 to 42/. 105. or from 36/. to 52/. per ton, in- 
 cluding duty. But the effect of this advance 
 was to bring forward an increased supply, and 
 the stock now for sale is half as large again as 
 it was at this time last year. 
 
 o 2
 
 196 
 
 I might go on in the same way, proving of 
 every article with which I am directly or in- 
 directly acquainted, that in every case of de- 
 pression there is, or has been, an excess of quan- 
 tity, relatively to the estimated rate of consump- 
 tion, fully adequate to account for the present 
 low range ; and conversely, that where there is 
 actual or apprehended deficiency, prices not 
 only are not depressed, but are as high as in a 
 similar state of relative supply they would have 
 been in any former state of the currency, sup- 
 posing the expenses of conveyance to be the 
 same in each period, and allowing only for the 
 difference between paper and gold. 
 
 But if a reference to the prices of commodities, 
 combined with the quantities and other circum- 
 stances affecting them, proves the total absence 
 of any ground for imputing to the alterations in 
 our currency a greater influence than that which 
 has been indicated by the difference between 
 paper and gold; the same conclusion will be 
 borne out with regard to the asserted influence 
 of those alterations on the wages of labour. 
 
 With regard to manufacturing labour, it was 
 proved by the documents which I quoted in 
 Section VI. that so far from a progressive rise 
 of wages having taken place coincidently with 
 the duration of the Bank restriction, there was 
 in many important instances a fall, and that,
 
 197 
 
 after a lapse of several years, they were lower 
 than when the suspension of cash payments 
 took place. In order further to prove that as 
 that measure had not the effect ascribed to it, of 
 raising the w r ages of manufacturing and some 
 other descriptions of labour, so the near pro- 
 spect afforded by the peace of the termination of 
 the restriction did not depress them, I have to 
 refer the reader to a very important statement 
 in the Appendix. By this statement, which has 
 been communicated to me from a source that 
 warrants the most perfect reliance on the care 
 and correctness with which the facts have been 
 collected and stated, it will appear, that at Man- 
 chester, and the other principal seats of the 
 cotton manufacture, there was no fall, and in 
 several instances a rise in the average of manu- 
 facturing labour, from the commencement of 
 1814, after the value of the paper had begun to 
 improve, to the close of 1820 (beyond which 
 date the table does not reach) when its value 
 was completely restored, and when a great in- 
 flux of gold had already taken place. Other 
 descriptions of labour in the same district ap- 
 pear to have retained a singular degree of 
 steadiness through the whole period of eleven 
 years comprised in that statement. Indeed, by 
 the very table of Greenwich Hospital prices, it 
 appears that, although the w*ages of carpenters,
 
 198 
 
 &c. had risen greatly during the Bank restric- 
 tion, they did not fall perceptibly between 
 1814 and 1819, as they ought to have done 
 according to the hypothesis which accounted 
 for the fall in the prices of commodities by the 
 near prospect held out in 1814 of the termina- 
 tion of the Bank restriction. 
 
 I am assured by an eminent manufacturer, 
 that in the great clothing districts in the west 
 of England with which he is connected, the 
 workmen are and have for some time past been 
 in full employ at wages as high as they were on 
 the average before 1814. And 1 understand 
 that wages, in other manufacturing places, have 
 not experienced a fall in any thing like the de- 
 gree in which the prices of necessaries have 
 fallen. The wages of labour generally in London 
 have not, it is well known, fallen in any greater 
 proportion since 1813, than the difference be- 
 tween paper and gold, and in several instances, 
 not so much. And of such descriptions of labour 
 as have experienced any further fall, it may be 
 proved that, as they had previously risen from 
 extra demand, arising from causes distinct from 
 the state of the currency, the fall was inevitable 
 from the mere abstraction of such extra demand.
 
 199 
 
 SECTION XIV. 
 
 Conclusion. 
 
 I have thus described and attempted to ex- 
 plain the most signal instances of the fluctuations 
 of prices, accompanied by the greatest variations 
 in the amount of private paper and credit from 
 the close of 1807 to the present time: and 
 having previously, while adducing arguments 
 and facts in opposition to the opinions and as- 
 sertions of those who maintain the doctrine of 
 indefinite depreciation, accounted for the state 
 of prices from the date of the restriction bill 
 down to 1807, I will proceed to recapitulate the 
 principal points which I have thus far endea- 
 voured to establish : 
 
 That there are reasonable grounds for sup- 
 posing that the utmost effect of the disen- 
 gagement and subsequent reabsorption by this 
 country of the amount of the precious metals 
 which circulated as coin, previous to 1797> can- 
 not have exceeded 1 or at the utmost 2 per 
 cent, on the value of the metals in the commer- 
 cial world ; but that this effect was probably 
 more than counterbalanced by the increased
 
 200 
 
 functions of metallic money on the continent, 
 arising from the wants of the large armies, the 
 practice of hoarding, and the diminished circu- 
 lation of bills of exchange during the war, and 
 by the cessation of these increased functions on 
 the return of peace. 
 
 That the degree in which the market prices 
 of gold and silver have of late receded from the 
 mint proportion may with greater probability 
 be referred to an increased produce and dimi- 
 nished value of silver than to an increase in the 
 value of gold. 
 
 That the economy introduced into the use of 
 the currency had no necessary connexion with 
 the Bank restriction : that the utmost effect of 
 this economy has been to obviate the necessity 
 for an increased amount of currency to the full 
 extent that might otherwise appear to have been 
 requisite to correspond with the increase of 
 population and of money transactions : and that, 
 at any rate, as the same economical contrivances 
 are still practised, and are, if any thing, further 
 improved, they must continue to operate as a 
 cause of depreciation. 
 
 That there did not exist any necessary con- 
 nexion between the increase of Bank of Eng- 
 land notes, and a corresponding increase of 
 country Bank notes and private paper; for that, 
 in point of fact, the most remarkable instances
 
 201 
 
 of a sudden extension of country bank notes and 
 private paper were not accompanied or imme- 
 diately preceded by an increase of Bank of Eng- 
 land notes : that, on the contrary, some of the 
 largest additions to the circulation of the Bank 
 of England were made when there was the 
 greatest destruction of private paper. 
 
 That there was not a constant facility of dis- 
 count of private paper during the Bank re- 
 striction ; and that, if there had been, it would 
 not of itself account for the occasional pheno- 
 mena of sudden enlargement of private paper 
 and credit ; for a still greater facility of credit 
 exists at present, but there is an absence of 
 sufficient motives for the employment of it. 
 
 That the motives for the extended use of 
 private credit, observable at particular periods 
 during the Bank restriction, were speculation 
 on scarcity of articles for home consumption, 
 and exaggerated anticipation of demand on the 
 opening of new and extensive markets : and 
 that these motives were supplied in so extra- 
 ordinary a degree by political obstructions to 
 importation, combined with seasons unpropi- 
 tious to our home produce, and by the events 
 of the war, as fully to account for the great 
 augmentation of the circulation through the 
 medium of private paper — for the great rise of 
 prices — and for the fall, after some interval, in
 
 202 
 
 the exchanges (unaccompanied by any corre- 
 sponding increase of Bank notes), without re- 
 ferring to the Bank restriction any part of these 
 effects, beyond the excess indicated by the dif- 
 ference between paper and gold; for in that 
 degree only would the Bank, under a liability to 
 pay in specie, have been obliged to counteract 
 the enlargement of private paper by a reduction 
 of its own issues. 
 
 That the opposite circumstances, viz. tran- 
 sitions from scarcity to abundance, and the re- 
 action from overtrading, are sufficient to explain 
 the instances of sudden and extensive reduction 
 of private paper, of improvement in the ex- 
 changes, and of a fall in the price of gold, in the 
 face of an increase of Bank of England notes. 
 
 That a continuance of abundance, both of 
 imported commodities and of articles of home 
 produce, the consequent want of any reasonable 
 ground for speculation on a prospect of scarcity, 
 and the absence of any new or extra source of 
 demand for exportable commodities, affording no 
 inducement to over-trading in extensive ship- 
 ments on credit, may satisfactorily account for 
 the continued decline in the amount of private 
 paper and of transactions on credit from 1819 
 to the period when these reached their lowest 
 amount, which may probably have been some 
 months ago.
 
 203 
 
 That consequently there was a tendency to 
 an improvement in the value of the circulating 
 medium, by the reduction of private paper, 
 quite adequate to have produced the re- 
 storation of Bank notes to a par with gold : 
 supposing, therefore, that no measures would 
 have been taken by the Bank directors expressly 
 to defeat that tendency, the restoration of the 
 value of the currency to its standard was in- 
 evitable, without the intervention of Mr. Peel's 
 bill. 
 
 That the susceptibility of a large superstruc- 
 ture of private paper and credit is not confined 
 to a currency whose basis consists of incon- 
 vertible paper ; but that a currency consisting 
 of convertible paper and coin, or even of coin 
 only, is, under circumstances in all other re- 
 spects similar, liable to considerable variation 
 in the amount of the circulation, through the 
 medium of private paper. 
 
 That an expansion and contraction of private 
 paper in this country might, and probably would, 
 have occurred, less only in the degree indicated 
 by the difference between paper and gold, 
 equally without, as with the Bank restriction. 
 
 That, by a reference to the particular facts, 
 the variations in the amount of private paper 
 manifestly had not any influence on the average 
 of metallic prices, or of prices less the average
 
 204 
 
 difference between paper and gold : thus proving, 
 by a detail of particulars, what would be a de- 
 monstrable inference from the doctrine of the 
 exchanges as now generally received. 
 
 That there w r as no progressive rise in the 
 prices of necessaries and in the wages of labour 
 during the period of the Bank restriction, and 
 consequently no ground for the assertion so 
 confidently made of the existence of " a con- 
 stant and invariable connexion of increase of 
 price with the Bank restriction, as a forcible 
 proof of such a relation as that of cause and 
 effect subsisting between the two phenomena :" 
 for corn was as low in the summer of 1804, and 
 meat as low in 1808, as they had been in 1797, 
 and many other descriptions of commodities 
 were in 1807, and again in 1810 and 1811, as 
 low as they had been at the commencement of 
 the Bank restriction ; moreover, many descrip- 
 tions of labour were lower in 1811 than in 
 
 1797- 
 
 That in every case the intermediate rise of 
 commodities admits of being accounted for by 
 circumstances so powerfully affecting the supply 
 and demand, as barely to require the allowance 
 afforded by the difference between paper and 
 gold ; and that therefore there is some ground 
 for the suspicion that the increased functions of 
 metallic money, during particular periods of
 
 20.5 
 
 the war, more than balanced the effect of the 
 disengagement of it from the circulation of this 
 country. 
 
 That the fall of prices between 1814 and the 
 autumn of 1816, the rise from that time to the 
 autumn of 18 IS, and the subsequent decline to 
 the present time, may equally be accounted for 
 by circumstances connected with the supply of 
 commodities relatively to the average rate of 
 consumption, without referring to alterations in 
 our currency any part beyond the degree indi- 
 cated by the difference between paper and gold, 
 consequently without ascribing any influence to 
 Mr. Peel's bill. 
 
 And, finally, as the result of the whole of the 
 reasoning and facts which have been adduced, 
 that the utmost effect of the Bank restriction 
 on prices may be measured by the average ex- 
 cess of the market price above the mint price 
 of gold.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 No. I. 
 
 A Calculation of the Quantity of Silver and Goldin England, 
 France, and Holland, in Europe, and in the World in general, 
 and qf the Increase and Consumption thereof, Anno 1688. 
 
 (Extracted from a MS.* dated 1696, in the British 
 
 23 
 Museum, Bib. Had. No. 1898, Plut.— C. p. 82.) 
 
 This calculation is built upon this hypothesis : 
 
 1. That the silver and gold in Europe at the discovery of 
 y c West Indies, near 200 years ago, was but 45 millions ster- 
 ling, but is now about 5 times as much, or 225 millions. 
 
 2. That there has been 520 millions of silver and gold im- 
 ported into Europe from America, within these last 180 years, 
 besides what has been produced in Europe, or imported into 
 it from Asia and Africa. 
 
 Whereby the account of Europe stands thus: 
 
 The existing stock of silver and gold in 
 
 Europe 180 years ago 45 mills, sterl. 
 
 Produced in Europe within these last 180 
 
 years 8 mills. 
 
 Imported into Europe from Asia in manu- 
 factures 2 mills. 
 
 From Africa in gold dust, &c. . . 15 mills. 
 From America in specie 520 mills. 
 
 In all. ... 590 mills. 
 
 * Entitled Natural and Politicall Observations and Conclusions upon the 
 State and Condition of England, by Gregory King, Esq. Lancaster H.
 
 208 
 
 Whereof 545 millions having been produced in Europe or 
 imported into it within these last 180 years, viz. 
 In the first eighty years, 205 mills, or 2,560,000/. p. ann. 
 
 And in the last hundred years, 340 mills, or 3,400,000/. p. ann. 
 We may conclude, that the existing stock of silver and gold 
 in Europe, 
 
 Being 200 years ago, 45 mills. 
 Was 100 years ago, 100 mills. 
 And is at present, 225 mills. 
 It has increased : 
 
 In y e first 80 years 55 mills, or 700,000/. p. ann. 
 In y e last 100 years 125 mills, or 1,250,000/. p. ann. 
 
 180 mills. 
 So this last 100 years Europe has 
 
 Produced and imported 340 mills, or 3,400,000/. p. ann. 
 Increased 125 mills, or 1,250,000/. p. ann. 
 
 Consumed and exported 215 mills, or 2,150,000/. p. ann. 
 
 Now before we come to the particulars how this 215 millions 
 in gold and silver has been consumed in Europe within this 
 last 100 years, we shall consider in what the 225 millions, 
 which we estimate to be the present stock of Europe, in gold 
 and silver, and things made thereof, doth consist, viz. 
 
 Coyned silver 
 
 Coyned gold 
 
 Bullion 
 
 Lay plate 
 
 Church plate 
 
 Medalls and rarities . . 
 
 Gold and silver thready 
 and wire, and things > 
 made thereof in wear J 
 
 Do. in stock for trade . . 
 
 In Europe 
 
 In England. 
 
 In France. 
 
 In Holland. 
 
 in general. 
 
 £ 
 
 of 
 
 £ 
 
 110 mills. 
 
 8,500,000 
 
 18,000,000 
 
 7,000,000 
 
 28 mills. 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 2,000,000 
 
 8 mills. 
 
 1,000,000 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 46 mills. 
 
 4,000,000 
 
 9,000,000 
 
 1,500,000 
 
 20 mills. 
 
 200,000 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 100,000 
 
 5 mills. 
 
 200,000 
 
 900,000 
 
 300,000 
 
 6 mills. 
 
 400,000 
 
 1,400,000 
 
 100,000 
 
 2 mills. 
 
 200,000 
 
 600,000 
 
 300,000 
 
 225 mills. 
 
 17,500,000 
 
 39,400,000 
 
 12,800,000
 
 209 
 
 Whereupon we have estimated the consumption of y c 315 
 millions of gold and silver in Europe within this last 100 years, 
 which is 3,150,000/. per ann. as followeth: 
 
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 210 
 
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 the gold and silver of Europe is consumed, is in things made 
 of gold and silver thread and wire, and in coyn or bullion ex- 
 ported in trade ; these two articles alone being 7 parts in 8 of 
 the whole consumption of the gold and silver of Europe. 
 
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 stock 1 80 years ago at 500 mills. 
 
 The produce this last 180 years, 1200 millions : the 
 
 consumption 850 mills. 
 
 The increase 350 millions, which added to the 500 
 
 millions, make y e present stock 850 mills.
 
 '211 
 
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 212 
 
 No. III. 
 
 Prices of Gold and Silver at Paris. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Gold in bars.' 
 The Kilog.; 
 $§$3434 40 
 
 1000 <>{J: ' ' 
 
 Pieces of '20 
 or 40 Frs. 
 Premium 
 
 in Frs. 1000. 
 
 silver in bars- 
 The Kilog. 
 4SSS 218 89 
 
 900 1Q7 
 1000 *»• 
 
 Piastres 
 per Piece. 
 
 London at 
 1 month date, 
 per £. sterl. 
 
 
 Premium 
 
 
 
 Premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 on Frs. 1 000. 
 
 
 
 3nFrs. 1000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frs. 
 
 Cs. 
 
 
 Frs. 
 
 Cs. 
 
 Frs. 
 
 Cs. 
 
 1818. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 January . . 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 24 
 
 15 
 
 February . 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 80 
 
 March . . . 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 85 
 
 April .... 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 60 
 
 24 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 64 
 
 23 
 
 80 
 
 June 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 64 
 
 23 
 
 75 
 
 July . 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 64 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 August . . . 
 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 64 
 
 23 
 
 95 
 
 September 
 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 64 
 
 24 
 
 15 
 
 October . . 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 5 
 
 55 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 November 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 So 
 
 5 
 
 60 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 December 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 o 
 
 <& 2 
 
 5 
 
 55 
 
 23 
 
 45 
 
 1819. 
 
 A 
 
 
 
 M t 
 
 
 
 
 
 j January . . 
 
 3 
 
 's 
 
 o 
 14 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 2 *« 
 
 3 u 
 
 5 
 
 55 
 
 23 
 
 20 
 
 February 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 •2 B 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 40 
 
 March . . . 
 
 Ph 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 Cm 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 45 
 
 April .... 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 75 
 
 May 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 23 
 
 70 
 
 June .... 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 50 
 
 24 
 
 75 
 
 July 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 85 
 
 August . . 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 80 
 
 September 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 24 
 
 95 
 
 October . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 25 
 
 20 
 
 November 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 24 
 
 65 
 
 December 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 85 
 
 1820. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 January . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 80 
 
 February 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 24 
 
 80 
 
 March . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 April .... 
 
 
 
 
 
 O . 
 
 5 
 
 36 
 
 25 
 
 20 
 
 May . 
 
 
 
 
 
 . o 
 
 £2 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 25 
 
 35 
 
 June . . . . 
 
 Frs. Cs. 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 - - 
 
 5 
 
 38 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 S ?£< 
 
 5 
 
 38 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 August .. . 
 
 6 50 
 
 4 
 
 50 
 
 
 5 
 
 38 
 
 25 
 
 60 
 
 September 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 Cm 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 25 
 
 55 
 
 October . . 
 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 25 
 
 60 
 
 November 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 25 
 
 55 
 
 December 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 25 
 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 25 
 
 45
 
 213 
 
 Years. 
 
 Gold in bars. 
 The Kilog. 
 {22£ 3434 40 
 Tooo 309 ' 
 
 Premium 
 
 Pieces of 20 
 or 40 Frs. 
 Premium 
 
 Silver in bars. 
 
 The Kilog. 
 
 ^218 89 
 .soo_ 197 
 
 Piastres, 
 per Piece. 
 
 London at 
 1 month 
 date, per 
 
 
 on Frs. 1000. 
 
 1000 lvl 
 
 Premium 
 
 
 
 „£. sterling. 
 
 
 on Frs. 1000. 
 
 
 on Frs. 1000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Frs. Cs. 
 
 Frs. Cs. 
 
 Frs. Cs. 
 
 Frs. 
 
 Cs. 
 
 Frs. 
 
 Cs. 
 
 1821. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 January . . 
 
 5 
 
 2 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 25 
 
 55 
 
 February . 
 
 9 
 
 5 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 March . . . 
 
 7 50 
 
 5 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 43 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 April .... 
 
 7 50 
 
 6 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 44 
 
 25 
 
 60 
 
 
 8 50 
 
 6 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 25 
 
 65 
 
 
 8 50 
 
 7 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 25 
 
 70 
 
 Ditto 13.. 
 
 12 
 
 10 
 
 O O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 July. 
 
 11 50 
 
 8 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 39 
 
 25 
 
 70 
 
 August . . . 
 
 6 
 
 4 50 
 
 2 50 
 
 5 
 
 39 
 
 25 
 
 45 
 
 September 
 
 6 50 
 
 5 
 
 1 50 
 
 5 
 
 39 
 
 25 
 
 55 
 
 October . . 
 
 7 50 
 
 5 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 37 
 
 25 
 
 55 
 
 November 
 
 6 50 
 
 3 50 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 32 
 
 25 
 
 45 
 
 December 
 
 6 50 
 
 3 50 
 
 1 50 
 
 5 
 
 36 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 1822. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 January . . 
 
 6 50to7 
 
 3 0to3 503 0to3 50 
 
 5 38 
 
 to37 
 
 25 
 
 35 
 
 February . 
 
 4 0—4 50 
 
 2 0—2 50 2 0—2 50 
 
 5 34 —33 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 March . . . 
 
 3 50—4 
 
 1 50—2 03 0—3 50 
 
 5 32 
 
 
 25 
 
 25 
 
 April .... 
 
 4 0—4 50 
 
 2 50—3 2 50—3 
 
 5 31 
 
 
 25 
 
 15 
 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 30 
 
 —29 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 
 1 0—1 50 
 
 1 25 — 1 75 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 29 
 
 —284- 
 
 25 
 
 35 
 
 July 
 
 4 50—5 
 
 2 50—3 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 284- 
 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 August . . . 
 
 6 0—6 50 
 
 2 50—3 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 284 
 
 
 25 
 
 40 
 
 September 
 
 5 0—5 50 
 
 2 50—3 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 284- 
 
 
 25 
 
 40 
 
 October . . 
 
 S 0—5 50 
 
 3 0—3 50 
 
 1 50—2 
 
 5 284- 
 
 
 25 
 
 50 
 
 November 
 
 6 0—6 50 
 
 2 50—3 1 50—2 
 
 5 29 
 
 —30 
 
 25 
 
 40 
 
 December 
 
 4 0—4 50 
 
 1 50—2 1 50—2 
 
 5 29 
 
 —30 
 
 25 
 
 30 
 
 It is to be observed that 1000 francs in bars (gold bullion) 
 are at a greater premium than 1000 francs in gold coin. 
 
 In France a kilogramme of gold ~-^ fine is coined into 155 
 pieces of 20 francs, or 3100 francs ; but only 3091 of these 
 francs are given to the person who carries the kilogramme to 
 the niiut to be coined. The par price of a kilogramme of bar 
 gold is not 3100 francs, but 3091 ; consequently a buyer of
 
 214 
 
 a kilogramme of bar gold in the French market, at 5 per mil. 
 premium, must pay 3106*5 francs for itj but when he buys 
 155 pieces of 20 francs, which also weigh a kilogramme, at 
 2\ per mil. premium, he must pay 3107'7 francs for them, so 
 that weight for weight a kilogramme of bar gold at 5 per mil. 
 premium, is rather cheaper than a kilogramme of coined gold 
 at 2^ per mil. 
 
 A kilogramme of silver -j%- fine is coined into 200 francs, of 
 which three are retained at the mint for coining the kilo- 
 gramme. 
 
 Silver is to gold, in the French coins, as 1 to 15^; but as 
 197 is the par price of a kilogramme of silver, and 3091 the 
 par price of a kilogramme of gold, silver is to gold really as 
 1 to 15AV- 
 
 In England an ounce of gold is coined into 934^ pence ; but 
 one ounce of standard gold contains 440 grains of pure gold 5 
 444 grains of pure gold are coined into 943 pence. 
 
 An ounce of standard silver contains 444 grains of pure 
 silver, which is coined into 62 pence. Silver is to gold in 
 England, when at par, as 1 to 15-jVV* One ounce troy is equal 
 to 31*08 grammes. 
 
 In France the mint constantly buy gold and silver to coin 
 it on their own account, which they can do to more advan- 
 tage than an individual, because there is an allowance for 
 remedy, of which they can avail themselves, and the expense 
 may not be so great as the law allows. 
 
 Gold coin, and that by retail, is only at a premium in France 
 at this time of 2\ per mil. 5 in the price current it is marked 
 1-50 to 2. 
 
 When silver in bars is at a premium of 1 f. 50 c. per mil., 
 it may, in fact, be at par, or rather under par ; for the mint 
 may possibly have a profit in buying bar silver at If per mil., 
 which amounts to 986 f. 50c. per mi!., and which they can 
 issue for 1000 frs.
 
 215 
 There has been coined in the mints of France- 
 Gold. Silver. 
 
 1818, Frs. 125, 900,000 25,300,000 
 
 1819, 51,900,000 21,800,000 
 
 1820, 27,600,000 18,700,000 
 
 1821, 400,000 66,700,000
 
 216 
 
 No. IV. 
 
 An Account of the Average Prices of Grain per Quarter, in 
 .England and TVales, on 1st January and 1st July, in each 
 Year, from 1792 to 1819, both inclusive. — (Commons' Report 
 on Resumption of Cash Payments, 1819. — Page 344.) 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Beans. 
 
 Peas. 
 
 Oat- 
 meal. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 S. 
 
 d. 
 
 5. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 S. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1792. Jan. 1, 
 
 42 
 
 4 
 
 30 
 
 2 
 
 27 
 
 2 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 8 
 
 32 
 
 10 
 
 33 9 
 
 July 1, 
 
 39 
 
 2 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 8 
 
 17 
 
 8 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 32 9 
 
 1/93. Jan. 1, 
 
 47 
 
 2 
 
 33 
 
 8 
 
 29 
 
 10 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 34 
 
 8 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 36 11 
 
 July 1, 
 
 51 
 
 3 
 
 37 
 
 1 
 
 32 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 5 
 
 38 
 
 7 
 
 38 
 
 3 
 
 42 9 
 
 1794. Jan. 1, 
 
 49 
 
 8 
 
 36 
 
 5 
 
 33 
 
 5 
 
 22 
 
 1 
 
 40 
 
 10 
 
 41 
 
 4 
 
 39 3 
 
 July 1, 
 
 51 
 
 8 
 
 37 
 
 9 
 
 31 
 
 8 
 
 22 
 
 1 
 
 40 
 
 9 
 
 41 
 
 10 
 
 37 11 
 
 1795. Jan. 1, 
 
 55 
 
 7 
 
 39 
 
 4 
 
 34 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 
 11 
 
 45 
 
 6 
 
 51 
 
 10 
 
 41 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 77 
 
 2 
 
 57 
 
 3 
 
 41 
 
 10 
 
 27 
 
 8 
 
 47 
 
 11 
 
 56 
 
 10 
 
 46 2 
 
 1796. Jan. 1, 
 
 89 
 
 10 
 
 54 
 
 1 
 
 36 
 
 7 
 
 24 
 
 2 
 
 43 
 
 9 
 
 46 
 
 8 
 
 46 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 81 
 
 5 
 
 46 
 
 9 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 21 
 
 3 
 
 39 
 
 2 
 
 43 
 
 1 
 
 42 11 
 
 1797. Jan. 1, 
 
 55 
 
 9 
 
 35 
 
 7 
 
 32 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 1 
 
 31 
 
 6 
 
 36 
 
 (i 
 
 39 5 
 
 July], 
 
 49 
 
 8 
 
 29 
 
 6 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 
 15 
 
 6 
 
 24 
 
 2 
 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 32 
 
 1798. Jan. 1, 
 
 51 
 
 5 
 
 30 
 
 10 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 9 
 
 29 
 
 3 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 36 11 
 
 July 1, 
 
 50 
 
 4 
 
 31 
 
 1 
 
 29 
 
 4 
 
 22 
 
 7 
 
 30 
 
 8 
 
 32 
 
 9 
 
 38 7 
 
 1799. Jan. 1, 
 
 49 
 
 2 
 
 32 
 
 3 
 
 29 
 
 4 
 
 19 
 
 7 
 
 32 
 
 5 
 
 35 
 
 9 
 
 38 8 
 
 July 1, 
 
 64 
 
 4 
 
 44 
 
 6 
 
 35 
 
 11 
 
 30 
 
 3 
 
 42 
 
 8 
 
 45 
 
 
 
 46 2 
 
 1800. Jan. 1, 
 
 92 
 
 7 
 
 59 
 
 10 
 
 45 
 
 11 
 
 32 
 
 5 
 
 63 
 
 1 
 
 59 
 
 2 
 
 61 5 
 
 July], 
 
 134 
 
 5 
 
 88 
 
 1 
 
 69 
 
 1 
 
 51 
 
 1 
 
 79 
 
 5 
 
 78 
 
 10 
 
 83 5 
 
 1801. Jan. 1, 
 
 139 
 
 
 
 92 
 
 2 
 
 80 
 
 11 
 
 43 
 
 11 
 
 78 
 
 7 
 
 84 
 
 3 
 
 74 8 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 129 
 
 8 
 
 84 
 
 1 
 
 69 
 
 7 
 
 37 
 
 2 
 
 63 
 
 1 
 
 68 
 
 11 
 
 73 9 
 
 1802. Jan. 1, 
 
 75 
 
 6 
 
 48 
 
 2 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 4 
 
 44 
 
 7 
 
 44 
 
 3 
 
 44 5 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 67 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 1 
 
 31 
 
 3 
 
 19 
 
 8 
 
 34 
 
 7 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 1803. Jan. 1, 
 
 57 
 
 1 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 2 
 
 37 1 
 
 July], 
 
 60 
 
 4 
 
 36 
 
 11 
 
 24 
 
 9 
 
 22 
 
 8 
 
 34 
 
 6 
 
 38 
 
 11 
 
 40 3 
 
 1804. Jan. ], 
 
 52 
 
 3 
 
 32 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 11 
 
 21 
 
 7 
 
 37 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 3 
 
 40 9 
 
 July 1, 
 
 52 
 
 1 
 
 34 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 3 
 
 24 
 
 1 
 
 35 
 
 11 
 
 38 
 
 5 
 
 39 6 
 
 1805. Jan. 1, 
 
 86 
 
 2 
 
 52 
 
 9 
 
 43 
 
 10 
 
 26 
 
 11 
 
 48 
 
 5 
 
 51 
 
 6 
 
 42 6 
 
 July 1, 
 
 89 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 6 
 
 43 
 
 6 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 11 
 
 48 
 
 2 
 
 44 6 
 
 1806. Jan. 1, 
 
 75 
 
 11 
 
 44 
 
 7 
 
 37 
 
 5 
 
 26 
 
 7 
 
 43 
 
 2 
 
 42 
 
 7 
 
 42 10 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 81 
 
 10 
 
 48 
 
 7 
 
 37 
 
 10 
 
 28 
 
 9 
 
 43 
 
 11 
 
 42 
 
 4 
 
 44 7 
 
 1807- Jan. 1, 
 
 76 
 
 9 
 
 48 
 
 9 
 
 40 
 
 8 
 
 27 
 
 8 
 
 45 
 
 8 
 
 48 
 
 3 
 
 44 3 
 
 Julvl, 
 
 73 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 1 
 
 36 
 
 8 
 
 28 
 
 6 
 
 43 
 
 3 
 
 50 
 
 1 
 
 44 9
 
 217 
 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Beans. 
 
 Peas. 
 
 Oat- 
 meal. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 J. 
 
 S. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 1808. Jan. 1, 
 
 69 
 
 5 
 
 47 
 
 3 
 
 39 
 
 3 
 
 29 
 
 8 
 
 55 
 
 4 
 
 71 
 
 
 
 46 7 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 81 
 
 1 
 
 56 
 
 2 
 
 44 
 
 7 
 
 38 
 
 8 
 
 63 
 
 3 
 
 64 
 
 1 
 
 53 
 
 1809. Jan. 1, 
 
 90 
 
 4 
 
 59 
 
 4 
 
 44 
 
 6 
 
 33 
 
 4 
 
 64 
 
 4 
 
 70 
 
 1 
 
 51 2 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 88 
 
 1 
 
 56 
 
 5 
 
 44 
 
 4 
 
 31 
 
 11 
 
 59 
 
 4 
 
 61 
 
 9 
 
 50 3 
 
 1810. Jan. 1, 
 
 102 
 
 6 
 
 59 
 
 4 
 
 50 
 
 6 
 
 30 
 
 3 
 
 56 
 
 8 
 
 57 
 
 5 
 
 53 1 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 113 
 
 4 
 
 64 
 
 8 
 
 49 
 
 9 
 
 30 
 
 6 
 
 55 
 
 4 
 
 59 
 
 6 
 
 54 5 
 
 181 1. Jan. 1, 
 
 94 
 
 7 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 41 
 
 7 
 
 26 
 
 3 
 
 50 
 
 4 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 50 5 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 86 
 
 11 
 
 43 
 
 6 
 
 38 
 
 6 
 
 27 
 
 5 
 
 42 
 
 9 
 
 44 
 
 4 
 
 49 9 
 
 1812. Jan. 1, 
 
 106 
 
 7 
 
 55 
 
 11 
 
 51 
 
 4 
 
 31 
 
 10 
 
 57 
 
 3 
 
 64 
 
 8 
 
 51 2 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 140 
 
 9 
 
 90 
 
 
 
 77 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 8 
 
 75 
 
 8 
 
 72 
 
 4 
 
 51 6 
 
 1813. Jan. 1, 
 
 119 
 
 10 
 
 82 
 
 2 
 
 64 
 
 2 
 
 44 
 
 3 
 
 87 
 
 3 
 
 90 
 
 2 
 
 48 7 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 116 
 
 3 
 
 74 
 
 2 
 
 57 
 
 9 
 
 42 
 
 10 
 
 81 
 
 
 
 84 
 
 1 
 
 45 6 
 
 1814. Jan. 1, 
 
 76 
 
 7 
 
 47 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 7 
 
 27 
 
 2 
 
 52 
 
 2 
 
 54 
 
 5 
 
 36 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 67 
 
 f) 
 
 41 
 
 9 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 43 
 
 11 
 
 47 
 
 7 
 
 30 8 
 
 1815. Jan. 1, 
 
 65 
 
 8 
 
 41 
 
 4 
 
 32 
 
 s 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 
 39 
 
 8 
 
 44 
 
 1 
 
 31 11 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 67 
 
 10 
 
 38 
 
 11 
 
 30 
 
 8 
 
 25 
 
 5 
 
 36 
 
 2 
 
 39 
 
 11 
 
 31 
 
 1816. Jan. 1, 
 
 53 
 
 7 
 
 34 
 
 4 
 
 25 
 
 11 
 
 19 
 
 9 
 
 31 
 
 !) 
 
 34 
 
 
 
 27 2 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 73 
 
 8 
 
 40 
 
 2 
 
 29 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 3 
 
 34 
 
 9 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 26 1 
 
 1817. Jan. 1, 
 
 104 
 
 10 
 
 63 
 
 10 
 
 51 
 
 11 
 
 31 
 
 9 
 
 61 
 
 3 
 
 57 
 
 9 
 
 39 8 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 109 
 
 1 
 
 65 
 
 2 
 
 55 
 
 6 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 10 
 
 52 
 
 11 
 
 44 6 
 
 1818. Jan. 1, 
 
 85 
 
 4 
 
 50 
 
 9 
 
 45 
 
 11 
 
 27 
 
 10 
 
 52 
 
 5 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 34 7 
 
 Julyl, 
 
 84 
 
 4 
 
 53 
 
 1 
 
 48 
 
 3 
 
 33 
 
 
 
 57 
 
 10 
 
 54 
 
 1 
 
 36 8 
 
 1819. Jan.l, 
 
 78 
 
 1057 
 
 9 
 
 63 
 
 6 
 
 35 
 
 1 
 
 72 
 
 3 
 
 70 
 
 9 
 
 38 6 
 
 27th Feb, 1819. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 \V. DOWDING.
 
 218 
 
 No. V. 
 
 Prices * of Beef and Mutton at Smithfield Market, to 
 sink the Offal, per Stone of 8 lbs. 
 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 
 
 
 Mutton. 
 
 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 rf. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 *. 
 
 d. 
 
 Jan. 1796, 
 
 3 
 
 to 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 to 5 
 
 
 
 1797, 
 
 3 
 
 6 — 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 — 5 
 
 
 
 1798, 
 
 3 
 
 — 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 — 4 
 
 6 
 
 1799, 
 
 3 
 
 — 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 — 4 
 
 2 
 
 1800, 
 
 3 
 
 6 — 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 — 5 
 
 4 
 
 1801, 
 
 3 
 
 8 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 7 
 
 
 
 1802, 
 
 4 
 
 6 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 7 
 
 
 
 1803, 
 
 4 
 
 — 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1804, 
 
 4 
 
 6 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1805, 
 
 4 
 
 — 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 — 5 
 
 6 
 
 1806, 
 
 4 
 
 4 ~ 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 — 5 
 
 8 
 
 1807, 
 
 4 
 
 8 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 — 4 
 
 8 
 
 1808, 
 
 3 
 
 6 — 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 — 5 
 
 4 
 
 1809, 
 
 3 
 
 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1810, 
 
 4 
 
 8 — 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 6 
 
 1811, 
 
 5 
 
 — 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 — 6 
 
 8 
 
 1812, 
 
 5 
 
 — 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1813, 
 
 5 
 
 — 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 8 
 
 1814, 
 
 5 
 
 4 — 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 — 7 
 
 6 
 
 1815, 
 
 4 
 
 4 — 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 6 
 
 1816, 
 
 4 
 
 4 — 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 — 5 
 
 4 
 
 1817, 
 
 3 
 
 4 — 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 — 4 
 
 8 
 
 1818, 
 
 3 
 
 8 — 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1819, 
 
 4 
 
 4 — 
 
 5 
 
 8 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 — 6 
 
 
 
 1820, 
 
 4 
 
 4 — 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 — 5 
 
 8 
 
 1821, 
 
 3 
 
 8 — 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 — 5 
 
 8 
 
 1822, 
 
 2 
 
 8 — 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 — 4 
 
 
 
 1823, 
 
 2 
 
 8 — 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 — 3 
 
 8 
 
 * Extracted from the January Numbers of the Gentleman's Magazine. 
 There are no quotations in it for 1794 and 1795.
 
 219 
 
 No. VI. 
 
 Account of the Number of Commissions of Bankruptcy 
 issued from 1 790 to 1 822. 
 
 
 Number of com- 
 
 
 missions in each 
 
 Years. 
 
 year. 
 
 1790 
 
 747 . 
 
 1791 
 
 769 . 
 
 1792 
 
 934 . 
 
 1793 
 
 . 1,956 . 
 
 1794 
 
 . 1,041 
 
 1795 
 
 879 . 
 
 1796 
 
 954 . 
 
 1797 
 
 . 1,115 . 
 
 1798 
 
 911 
 
 1799 
 
 717 . 
 
 1800 
 
 951 
 
 1801 
 
 1,199 . 
 
 1802 
 
 1,090 . 
 
 1803 
 
 . 1,214 . 
 
 1804 
 
 . 1,117 . 
 
 1805 
 
 . 1,129 . 
 
 1806 
 
 . 1,268 . 
 
 1807 
 
 . 1,362 
 
 1808 
 
 . 1,433 . 
 
 1809 
 
 . 1,382 . 
 
 1810 
 
 . 2,314 . 
 
 1811 
 
 . 2,500 . 
 
 1812 
 
 . 2,228 . 
 
 1813 
 
 . 1,953 . 
 
 1814 
 
 . 1,612 
 
 1815 
 
 . 2,284 . 
 
 1816 
 
 . 2,731 
 
 1817 
 
 1,927 . 
 
 1818 
 
 . 1,245 
 
 1819 
 
 . 1,499 . 
 
 1820 
 
 . 1,381 
 
 1821 
 
 . 1,238 . 
 
 1822 
 
 . 1,094 . 
 
 Number of com- 
 missions against 
 bankers in each 
 year. 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 26 
 2 
 7 
 6 
 3 
 3 
 6 
 8 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 5 
 
 I 
 
 5 
 
 7 
 
 26 
 
 4 
 
 17 
 
 8 
 
 29 
 
 26 
 
 37 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 Down to 1818 is extracted from the Appendix to the Lords' Report, p. 426. 
 From that time the numbers are extracted from the common monthly lists, 
 which do not distinguish the commissions against bankers.
 
 220 
 
 No. VII. 
 
 Specification of the Number of Beasts, and Sheep and Lambs, 
 brought to Smitkfield each Lunar Month of the last two 
 Years, ivith the mean Prices of the best Meat, each Month, 
 per Stone of 8 lb. 
 
 1821. 
 
 1822. 
 
 First 4 weeks . 
 
 Eleventh .... 
 
 Twelfth 
 
 Thirteenth . . . 
 
 Whereof sold 
 
 Bea3ts. 
 
 Sheep and 
 Lambs. 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Mut. 
 
 Beasts. 
 
 Sheep and 
 Lambs. 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Mutt. 
 
 11,675 
 11,145 
 10,558 
 11,316 
 10,589 
 
 9,483 
 10,374 
 
 9,524 
 10,397 
 11,066 
 14,643 
 
 4,341 
 24,394 
 
 74,600 
 
 79,180 
 
 75,100 
 
 80,000 
 
 87,310 
 
 103,140 
 
 121,590 
 
 120 080 
 
 135,360 
 
 113,030 
 
 107,840 
 
 96,280 
 
 89,390 
 
 s. d. 
 
 4 10 
 
 5 3 
 
 4 10 
 
 5 
 4 8 
 4 9 
 4 4 
 4 4 
 4 4 
 4 4 
 4 2 
 4 
 3 9 
 
 *. d. 
 5 1 
 5 4 
 5 1 
 4 9 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 4 2 
 4 
 3 8 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 
 3 8 
 3 4 
 
 12,595 
 11,760 
 12,037 
 11,815 
 11,294 
 10,554 
 9,604 
 10,078 
 12,474 
 14,659 
 15,601 
 14,400 
 14,539 
 
 97,660 
 
 88,170 
 
 84,000 
 
 107,070 
 
 123,801 
 
 132,320 
 
 150,030 
 
 152,139 
 
 151,070 
 
 157,410 
 
 121,614 
 
 106,200 
 
 96,230 
 
 s. d. 
 4 
 4 
 4 
 3 9 
 3 6 
 3 5 
 3 4 
 3 4 
 3 1 
 3 2 
 3 
 3 4 
 3 9 
 
 *. d. 
 
 3 5 
 
 4 
 4 
 3 5 
 3 
 3 
 3 4 
 3 3 
 
 2 10 
 
 3 
 3 1 
 3 
 3 6 
 
 159,505 
 
 1,282,900 
 
 
 
 161,410 
 
 1,567,714 
 
 
 
 142,133 
 
 1,107,230 
 
 
 
 The numbers actually sold this 
 year (1822) we have no means 
 of ascertaining otherwise than 
 by taking them in the same pro- 
 portion to the numbers brought 
 to market as in 1821. 
 
 WILSON and LANCASTER. 
 
 London, 11th Jan. 1823. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 TKINTED BY" THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
 
 No. VIII. 
 
 A Statement exhibiting at one View the JVages of Labour generally in the Town of Manchester and the other p?-incipal Seals of the Cotton Manufacture : with an Account oj the Prices of sundry Articles 
 of Provisions, and of the Monies expendedfor the Relief of the Poor chargeable to the Township of Manchester, during the Years 1810 to 1818, and to November 9.r,th, 1819. 
 
 Flour, per dozen lbs. (good seconds) . 
 Meal, per ditto 
 
 Bacon, per lb. 
 
 Irish butter, per lb. . 
 
 Fine spinners . 
 Coarse ditto . . 
 Women ditto . 
 
 Beelers 
 
 Stretchers. . . . 
 Pickers 
 
 WEAVING. 
 
 Nankeens 
 
 Best "4.7-8 calicos 
 
 Third do. do. do 
 
 Strong do. 9-8 do. 
 
 Velveteens 
 
 Bolton cambrics, 60 reed 6-4 
 
 Manchester, 80 do. do. 
 
 Quillings, 36 do. 
 
 Fancy articles 
 
 PRINTING AND BLEACHING. 
 
 Calico Printers 
 
 Bleachers and Finishers 
 
 Block Cutters 
 
 Fustian Cutters 
 
 Dyers and Dressers. . 
 
 Skein Dyers 
 
 Hat Finishers 
 
 Tailors 
 
 1 
 
 The rate of wages has I 
 14 i 
 16 
 
 Shoemakers 
 
 Iron-founders 
 
 Whitesmiths 
 
 Carpenters 
 
 Stone-masons(allowing for loss of time J 
 
 in the winter months) . J 
 
 Bricklayers, do 
 
 Painters, do 
 
 Slaters, do 
 
 Plasterers, do 
 
 Bricklayers' and Plasterers' Labourers. 
 Spademen 
 
 Poor, exclusive of County Rat . 
 and Constables' Accounts, in the ( 
 
 Town of Manchester J 
 
 Deduct for money gained by the la- I 
 bour of the Poor in the House... ( 
 
 bead, for food only, for each ye 
 
 
 
 1 10 
 
 12 
 15 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 16 10} 
 
 14 
 
 o 16 n 
 
 o 17 " 
 
 t'k during the whole of the 
 
 15 7 
 
 9 11 
 
 13 6 
 
 10 1 
 
 8J 
 6{ 
 11 
 
 19 
 15 9 
 15 
 
 1809-10. 
 26,300 17 8 
 178 12 5 
 
 26,122 5 3 
 
 10 9 
 
 12 7 
 
 14 9 
 
 14 8 
 
 varied , but their 
 14 
 16 
 
 10 
 II 
 11 
 14 
 15 
 
 , have been from -':!s. 
 
 19 
 15 9 
 15 
 
 1810-11. 
 25,021 10 9 
 168 14 9 
 
 24,852 16 
 
 14 
 16 
 15 
 16 
 
 19 
 15 
 15 
 
 1811-12. 
 
 34,123 15 2 
 
 223 2 3 
 
 33,900 12 11 
 
 16 
 15 
 16 
 
 1812-13. 
 
 45,774 9 6 
 
 263 18 7 
 
 45,510 10 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 2* 
 
 
 
 
 
 »* 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 H 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 i 30s. per week 
 14 
 16 
 15 
 
 1813-14. 
 
 33,286 14 8 
 
 157 14 10 
 
 33,128 19 10 
 
 O II 
 
 85 
 
 64 
 
 o o 104 
 
 o 17 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 3 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 3 
 
 1 6 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 16 
 2 
 1 
 
 
 2 
 6 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 12 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 15 9 
 15 
 
 1814-15. 
 
 21,038 4 
 
 119 13 5 
 
 20,918 10 7 
 
 2 1 
 i. In 14J. 
 
 o o 74 
 
 54 
 
 8 
 
 11 
 
 6| 
 
 17 
 10 
 14 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 18 
 1 
 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 1815-16. 
 
 23,961 6 
 
 112 11 8 
 
 23,848 8 10 
 
 O 17 
 10 
 
 O 14 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 18 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 (I 
 
 O 
 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 16 
 13 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 1816-17. 
 
 53,969 9 9 
 
 321 10 
 
 53,647 19 9 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 1' Mj 
 
 
 
 (. 15 
 
 1) 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 1 9 
 
 H 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 I) 
 
 1 15 
 
 In 
 
 I I 
 
 19 
 
 15 9 
 
 15 
 
 1817-18. 
 43,827 4 4 
 187 12 11 
 
 43,639 11 5 
 
 17 
 10 
 14 
 
 14 
 
 n 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 n 
 
 1 5 
 
 R 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 19 
 15 
 IS 
 
 1818-19. 
 
 31,681 8 
 
 114 8 I 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 hesc are the average retail prices of each 
 year, according tu the heat inform) 
 that could be procured. 
 
 SPINNING. 
 
 » the years 1811, 1812, and 1813, the 
 earnings of a part of the Spiuners 
 reduced by a restricted allowance of 
 work, and not by a reduced ra 
 wages. 
 
 WEAVING. 
 
 These are the uett earnings of the we 
 taken on the average of each year, after 
 deducting twopence halfpenny ii 
 shilling for winding the weft, flour 
 used in dressing the warp, and other 
 outgoings. Of this deduction the greatei 
 part is for winding, which is generally 
 done in the family. 
 
 The principal articles of manufacture, and 
 J the earnings of men of ordinary sk 
 working twelve hours per day, have 
 formed the basis of this statement. 
 
 A considerable proportion of the vte 
 of plain goods is performed by wi 
 and children, and their earnings will be 
 according to their strength and skill. 
 
 The present rate of wages is rather lower 
 than the average of the whole year 
 1819. 
 
 31,566 19 11 
 
 17 
 10 
 14 
 
 Not stated. 
 14 
 16 
 15 6 
 18 
 
 Not stated. 
 18 6 
 18 
 
 1819-20. 
 
 59,078 16 
 
 164 13 1 
 
 28,914 2 11
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Sect. I . — Examination of the Effect of Taxation on 
 
 the Fluctuation of General Prices . 1 
 
 Sect. 2.— Examination of the Effect of the extra De- 
 mand or Consumption supposed to arise 
 out of a State of War in general . 6 
 
 Sect. 3. — Examination of the Effect of the extra 
 Demand or Consumption attributed to the 
 late War . . 22 
 
 Sect. 4. — Examination of the Effect of the Monopoly 
 of Trade and general Excitement during 
 the late War . . 40 
 
 Sect. 5. — Effect of War, as obstructing Supply, on 
 
 general Prices . . . .47 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Sect. 1. — Introduction . . 1 
 
 Sect. 2. — Character of the Seasons from 1688 to 1792, 
 
 both Years included . . .9 
 
 Sect. 3. — Character of the Seasons from 1793 to 1821 , 
 
 both Years included . . .49 
 
 Sect. 4. — Effect of Quantity on Price . . 87
 
 VI 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Sect. 5. — Application of the Principle of the "Effect 
 of Quantity on Price" to the State of 
 Agriculture, from 1793 to 1812, as expla- 
 natory of the high Price of Corn, during 
 that Period . . . .113 
 
 Sect. 6.— Application of the Principle of the " Effect 
 of Quantity on Price" to the State of 
 Agriculture, since 1812, as explanatory of 
 the Fall of Prices . . .131 
 
 Sect. 7. — Recapitulation .... 139 
 
 APrENDIX TO PART III. 
 
 No. 1 . — Extract from the Translation of a Speech made 
 by M. Le Caradeuc de la Chalotais, Pro- 
 cureur-general to the Parliament of Brit- 
 tany, on the 20th of August, 1764; when 
 he carried into Court the Edict of the 
 Month of July, 1 764, requiring it to be 
 registered . . . .145 
 
 No. 2. — Extract of an Address to the different Classes 
 of Persons in Great Britain, on the Present 
 Scarcity and High Price of Provisions. 
 By the Rev. Septimus Hodson, M. B. 
 1795 . . • .152 
 
 No. 3. — Extract from the Farmer's Magazine. — Vol. 1. 
 
 p. 102 . . . 155 
 
 No. 4. — Extract from an Inquiry into the Causes and 
 Remedies of the late and Present Scarcity 
 and High Price of Provisions, in a Letter 
 to the Right Hon. Earl Spencer, K. G. 
 First Lord of the Admiralty, &c. &c. &c. 156 
 
 No. 5. — Extract from the Farmer's Magazine, Nov. 
 
 1807 • • • • 159
 
 Vll 
 
 No. 6. — Extract from the Farmer's Magazine, De- 
 cember, 181] . . .161 
 
 No. 7. — Petition of the Inhabitants of Liverpool to 
 
 the Prince Regent, 1811 . . 163 
 
 No. 8. — Extract from the Farmer's Magazine, August, 
 
 1812 . . . 166 
 
 No. 9. — Extract from the Farmer's Magazine, No- 
 vember, 1812 . . .167 
 
 No. 1 0. — Extract from the Translation of a French 
 Work entitled " On the Legislation and the 
 Commerce of Corn, wherein the Questions 
 relating to Exportation, Importation, Boun- 
 ties, Prohibitions, Provisions of Corn by 
 Public Authority, &c. are fully discussed." 169 
 
 No 1 1. — An Account of the Windsor Prices of Wheat 
 
 and Malt at Eton College . .172 
 
 No. 12. — An Account of the average Price of all Sorts 
 of Grain, in each Year, from the 5th 
 January, 1791, to the 5th January, 1823. 177 
 
 No. 13. — An Account of the Quantity of Corn ex- 
 ported from and imported into England, 
 from Michaelmas, 1696, to Christmas, 
 1754 • . • • .178 
 
 No. 14. — An Account of the Quantity of Grain ex- 
 ported from and imported into Great 
 Britain from the Year 1755 to 1822 . 180 
 
 No. 15. — An Account of the Quantity of Grain, Flour, 
 and Meal, imported from and exported to 
 Ireland, from 1773 to 1822 . .182 
 
 No. 16. — Number of Cattle and Sheep sold in Smith- 
 field, from 1732 to 1822 . . 184 
 
 PART IV. 
 General Remarks . . 1
 
 via 
 
 APPENDIX TO PART IV. 
 
 No. 1. — Table of Prices, exclusive of Duties, from 
 
 1782 to 1822, both Years inclusive . 1 
 
 No. 2.— An Account of the Quantities of various 
 Articles imported into Great Britain from 
 all Parts of the World in each Year from 
 1781 to 1822 . ... 72 
 
 No. 3. — An Account of the Quantities of various 
 Articles exported from Great Britain to 
 all Parts of the World in each Year from 
 1781 to 1822 . . . 74 
 
 No. 4. — An Account of the Quantity of Rape and 
 Cole Seed, Linseed or Flax Seed, and 
 Clover Seed white and red, imported into 
 Great Britain from Foreign Countries, 
 from the 5th January, 1801, to the 5th 
 January, 1823. . . .76 
 
 No. 5. — An Account of the Quantities and average 
 Standard or Price of fine Copper sold in 
 Ores in Cornwall from the Year 1800 to 
 1822, both inclusive . . .77 
 
 ERRATA. 
 
 PART III. 
 
 Page 10, 8th line from the bottom, for " which have," &c. read, " which / 
 have,'' &c. 
 19, 1st line ,for «■ til," read, " till." 
 
 23, 5th line from the bottom, for "correspondence," read, "letters." 
 23, note, 3d line from the bottom >t /or " 1785," read, " 1758." 
 49, for " Section II." read, " Section III.'' 
 74, note, 3d line from thebottom,/or " 1801," read, "1800." 
 135, 1st linear " ven," read " even." 
 
 169, Appendix, 6th line, for "printed for T. Longman, 1766," read, 
 " printed for T. Longman, 1776."
 
 THOUGHTS, &c 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Examination of the Effect of Taxation on the Fluctuation of 
 General Prices. 
 
 In estimating the manner and degree in which 
 war and the transition from war to peace may 
 affect general prices, two distinct questions arise: 
 the one is, how far the taxes requisite to defray 
 the extraordinary expenses attending a state of 
 war are calculated to raise prices; and the other 
 is, whether the prices of commodities in general 
 (including food and necessaries), independent 
 of the degree in which they may be affected 
 directly or indirectly by taxation, are liable to be 
 influenced by war, and in what degree, through 
 the medium of supply and demand. 
 
 With regard to the first question, it must be 
 observed, that the effects of taxation on prices 
 are liable to vary according to the mode in 
 which the taxes are imposed. 
 
 B
 
 An income or property tax, equally levied 
 upon all classes, would not, in any way that I 
 can conceive, tend to raise general prices. 
 
 Taxes levied upon particular commodities 
 have, in general, the effect of raising the price 
 of those commodities ; and manufactured arti- 
 cles must be raised in price in some proportion 
 to whatever tax may be imposed on the raw ma- 
 terials. But it does not seem to be a necessary 
 consequence of taxes upon one set of commo- 
 dities, that all other commodities, although un- 
 taxed, should be raised in price, while there 
 are strong grounds of presumption that, under 
 some circumstances, there might be an opposite 
 tendency. 
 
 The conditions through which taxes upon one 
 set of commodities are calculated to have an 
 indirect or circuitous effect in raising the price 
 of untaxed commodities, are, that the objects 
 taxed should be the ingredients or the instru- 
 ments of production ; and that such taxes should 
 not apply generally, and nearly equally to all 
 productions. 
 
 If the taxes be laid on the ingredients or in- 
 struments of production of some particular article 
 and not of others, it is clear that such article 
 must advance in price as the condition of con- 
 tinued supply ; without such advance the article 
 would not yield a profit equal to that in other
 
 3 
 
 occupations, and it would, after some interval, 
 cease to be produced in equal quantity, till the 
 diminished supply should raise the price in some 
 proportion to the tax. 
 
 But if taxes on the instruments of production, 
 as on corn, or other necessaries of the labourer, 
 or on the materials composing machinery and 
 the implements of husbandry, apply equally, or 
 nearly equally, to all branches of industry, they 
 cannot have the effect of raising the price of 
 the produce to which they are applied ; for, 
 provided the power of reproducing in general 
 be not impaired, there will be no inducement 
 to withdraw capital from one occupation and to 
 transfer it to another. An advance of price is 
 not, under such circumstances, a condition of 
 continued supply. 
 
 In this country the taxes on the necessaries 
 of the labourer and on the instruments of pro- 
 duction do not apply exclusively to agriculture; 
 they apply, at least in an equal, and probably in 
 more than an equal, degree, to other branches 
 of industry ; and therefore, according to the 
 principles which I have here stated, they are 
 not calculated to have the effect of raising the 
 prices of agricultural produce, nor, in general, 
 of raising the prices of other articles that are not 
 the immediate objects of taxation. 
 
 b 2
 
 It is not my intention, at present, to enter 
 into a detailed statement of the grounds for this 
 opinion, which would involve a discussion of 
 the intricate subject of the principles of taxa- 
 tion. Nor is it at all essential to the purposes 
 ©f this inquiry, that I should put the patience of 
 my readers to so severe a trial. It is sufficient 
 to remark, in general terms, that if the level of 
 the prices of articles not taxed, agricultural 
 produce, for instance, were raised by the taxes 
 laid on other articles, it would follow, that if 
 the whole amount of taxation levied during a 
 war were continued in peace, there would, as 
 far as taxation is concerned, be no fall of prices 
 in the transition from war to peace. 
 
 As, therefore, the whole amount of taxation 
 (including land-tax, tithe, and poor-rate) down 
 to last summer, was as great as during the war, 
 with the exception of the income tax, the in- 
 ference is, that in as far as untaxed commodi- 
 ties and labour were raised by that cause, the 
 same cause subsisting down to the summer of 
 1822, must have prevented prices from falling 
 to the level to which they would otherwise have 
 declined. And, as I have only to account for 
 the contrast between prices during the war and 
 since the peace, the lowest point having been 
 reached before any remission of taxation, the
 
 income tax excepted, I may fairly exclude the 
 operation of taxes from among the causes of the 
 fluctuations in the prices of untaxed commodi- 
 ties, such as agricultural produce, or of com- 
 modities divested of the taxes to which they 
 may be liable on importation or consumption. 
 
 I shall therefore proceed to examine how far 
 war, independent of taxation, may have contri- 
 buted to the fluctuation of prices.
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Examination of the Effect of the extra Demand or Consump- 
 tion supposed to arise out of a State of War in general. 
 
 The opinion of those who consider the range 
 of high prices which prevailed from 1793 to 
 1814, as fully accounted for by the war, and the 
 subsequent fall as an inevitable consequence of 
 the transition from war to peace, proceeds on 
 the following grounds : — 
 
 1. The extra demand or consumption arising 
 out of a state of war. 
 
 2. The monopoly of trade, and the stimulus 
 or excitement to general activity. 
 
 The reasoning in support of the opinion, that 
 the principal phenomena of high prices may be 
 ascribed to the effects of war, through the me- 
 dium of extra demand, without any reference 
 to circumstances affecting the supply, may be 
 stated in substance as follows : — 
 
 That the whole of the government expenditure 
 for naval and military purposes may be regarded 
 as creating a new source of demand for the ar-
 
 tides constituting the expenditure, and conse- 
 quently as tending to raise the price of such 
 articles. 
 
 That not only the price of those commodities, 
 which come directly under the description of 
 naval and military stores, must experience an 
 advance in consequence of the increased de- 
 mand, but that the price of corn and other neces- 
 saries must likewise be affected in a considerable 
 degree by the additional consumption occasioned 
 by the maintenance of the men composing the 
 fleets and armies. 
 
 That not only the demand for seamen and 
 soldiers must tend directly to raise the rate of 
 wages of the description of labourers from among 
 whom these men are taken, and indirectly the 
 rate of wages generally ; but that the increased 
 demand for various kinds of manufactured ar- 
 ticles requisite for the equipment of fleets and 
 armies, is calculated further to raise the rate of 
 wages; and that this increased demand for la- 
 bour, and the consequent advance of wages in 
 general, naturally occasion increased consump- 
 tion by the labouring classes. 
 
 Thus, the government expenditure in all its 
 ramifications is thought to extend the sphere 
 and increase the intensity of demand for neces- 
 saries, to operate directly or indirectly in pro- 
 moting briskness of circulation, to vivify every
 
 8 
 
 branch of industry, and consequently to stimu- 
 late exertion to an increase of every kind of 
 production. 
 
 The cessation, by the peace, of all such extra 
 demand, the great customer war being with- 
 drawn, (when by the stimulus of previous high 
 prices there was a general increase of produc- 
 tion,) would naturally, it is supposed, account 
 for falling markets and consequent distress 
 among the producing classes, and reduced 
 wages, and diminished consumption; these lead- 
 ing, through a long course of suffering, to the 
 only remedy, viz. a diminished production. 
 
 The fallacy of this doctrine, which represents 
 a general elevation of prices, both of commodi- 
 ties and labour, to be a necessary consequence 
 of a state of war, proceeds (and cannot other- 
 wise than so proceed) on the supposition that 
 the money expended by the goverment consists 
 of funds distinct from and over and above any 
 that before existed ; whereas it is perfectly 
 demonstrable, that an expenditure by govern- 
 ment, whether defrayed by immediate taxes to 
 the whole amount, or by loan on the anticipa- 
 tion of taxes to be levied, is nothing but a 
 change in the mode of laying out the same sum 
 of money; and that exactly to the uttermost 
 farthing what is expended by government would 
 and must have been laid out by individuals upon
 
 9 
 
 objects of consumption, productive or unpro- 
 ductive. 
 
 I am here supposing, that both on the part 
 of government and on that of individuals, the 
 habit of hoarding to any extent is out of the 
 question. If government were in the practice 
 of collecting a surplus revenue in coin in time 
 of peace, and of accumulating it as treasure to 
 be expended on the occurrence of a war, then 
 indeed there would be a marked difference in 
 general prices on the transition from peace to 
 war; but even this addition to the circulating 
 medium would be limited in its effect on prices 
 to the time within which the treasure was in a 
 course of progressive outlay, until its natural 
 distribution into other countries was effected. 
 A similar effect would follow, if individuals 
 were in the habit of hoarding, and if, for the 
 purposes of war, they were obliged to give up 
 their hoards to the use of government. But 
 these suppositions are quite foreign to the prac- 
 tice of the times which are under consideration. 
 
 But although, upon the breaking out of a war, 
 there would not and could not be any increase 
 in the sum total of demand, (the quantum of 
 the circulating medium remaining unaltered), 
 there would be a disturbance of the relative 
 proportion of the prices of commodities. The 
 articles which might suddenly be the objects of
 
 10 
 
 government demand would rise ; but, on the 
 other hand, those articles which would, but for 
 the war, have been purchased by individuals, 
 from the fund which is withdrawn from them, 
 would experience exactly an equivalent fall : 
 in general, on such occasions, the demand by 
 government, being sudden and on a large scale, 
 for commodities of which the supply has not 
 had time to accommodate itself to such extra 
 demand, may produce a considerable rise in the 
 price of such commodities; while the corre- 
 sponding abstraction of demand being spread 
 over an infinitely greater surface, would operate 
 in a manner that might be hardly perceptible, 
 but would not be the less real on the sum of 
 general prices. 
 
 I have assumed that the quantity of money 
 in circulation remains the same. If a state of 
 war includes the supposition of an increase in 
 the quantity of money, then indeed the case 
 would be altered. But an increase of currency 
 for government purposes must be either in coin, 
 which can only be obtained by cheapness re- 
 latively to other countries, and consequently sup- 
 poses the reverse of dearness, which is ascribed 
 to war ; or in paper, which involves the question 
 of depreciation, and this has already been dis- 
 posed of. 
 
 If the war supplies are raised within the year
 
 11 . 
 
 by direct taxation, that is, by an income or pro- 
 perty tax, it is so perfectly clear, that whatever 
 is expended by government must be exactly so 
 much abstracted from what would otherwise 
 have been the expenditure by individuals, and 
 that there can consequently be no elevation of 
 the aggregate of prices, whatever may be the 
 disturbance of the relative value of commodities 
 and labour among each other, (the aggregate 
 supply of these remaining the same) as to appear 
 like a truism. But it may be a question whether 
 the raising of money by loan, the interest of 
 which only is to be defrayed by direct taxation, 
 might not enable government to buy to a greater 
 amount than would be counterbalanced by the 
 diminished power of individuals to purchase. 
 A moment's consideration, however, will be suf- 
 ficient to convince any one that there can be no 
 rise of general prices in this case any more than 
 in the former : the money advanced to govern- 
 ment would, but for such loan, have been laid 
 out equally in purchases, though probably not 
 of the same commodities, or would have been 
 lent on private securities to such persons as 
 would have laid it out in purchases. It is pre- 
 cisely of the nature of money advanced by way 
 of mortgage to individuals ; the lender would 
 have, when he had advanced the money, just so 
 much less to lay out as the borrower had more.
 
 12 
 
 It may be said that the borrower might spend 
 it in the maintenance of unproductive labour, 
 whereas the lender might otherwise have laid it 
 out reproductively : this might or might not be 
 the case, and the difference might eventually 
 affect the quantum of production ; but we have 
 supposed the aggregate supply to be undimi- 
 nished by war ; for how far it may be calculated 
 to diminish supply is a separate question. All 
 that is now contended for is, that there cannot, 
 by the mere loan to government, be any addi- 
 tion to the total of demand for commodities, 
 whatever might be the difference in the relative 
 proportions of them. 
 
 In the case of indirect taxation, that is, of 
 taxes on commodities, whether for defraying 
 the whole expenditure or the mere interest of 
 loans, the articles immediately taxed must, as I 
 have already admitted; rise in price in some pro- 
 portion to the tax : but a rise in price from this 
 cause would be unconnected with the supposi- 
 tion of any increased demand affecting com- 
 modities generally which is assumed by those 
 who consider the expenditure of government, 
 whether from taxes or loans, as forming a fresh 
 fund. 
 
 Viewed therefore upon general grounds, the 
 conclusion appears to be irresistible, that the 
 extra demand or consumption arising from go-
 
 13 
 
 vernment expenditure cannot have the effect of 
 raising the aggregate of prices ; and this con- 
 clusion from general reasoning is fully borne 
 out by a reference to facts. 
 
 It is of course to be understood that articles 
 which are subject to a tax, such as malt, or to 
 increased charges of importation, such as co- 
 lonial produce, or to extra demand for naval 
 and military stores, such as saltpetre and cord- 
 age, do not come into the comparison of general 
 prices. With these exceptions, it will appear 
 that there is no observable coincidence of a rise 
 of price during war, and a fall during peace. 
 On the contrary, it so happens that, in the case 
 of agricultural produce, and of several other 
 important commodities, there was for upwards 
 of a hundred years previous to 1793 as low a 
 range of prices during periods of war as during 
 the intervals of peace. This has been eminently 
 the case with respect to wheat j and the fact is 
 in itself so curious, that I am induced to give 
 the following tables.
 
 14 
 
 -»-> Es 
 
 +» E 
 
 «»*« 
 
 «« -J **"l* "»*°*t **»«* "ft 
 
 cu 
 
 ^ 
 
 jCX C* O CN (NOW««W 
 
 1> 13 M „! <U ** 
 
 > r fl) W u r 
 
 t- 5 >- -T-lj • 
 
 Dpi: o ° a i* 
 
 Set) .a ^5 <« 
 
 S 2 S gJ .2 ' 
 
 i s «<*' 1 
 
 •r; *C O <D £ 13 ' 
 
 „, a> a; -g — 
 
 8 6o,a .s ■§ S 
 
 cooooooocooooooiaa 
 
 ■£ P .5 
 
 Si S o *■> 
 
 13 -a s _• 
 
 ca qj c 
 
 <" S 5- S 
 
 St- cr o. 
 
 ._ a> Si cc 
 
 2 * 8-s 
 
 m co „ S 
 
 CO - cu -S 
 
 +-3 S £ 
 
 
 s < 
 
 
 
 1^ 
 
 NOlH-lM-HM-.™ 
 
 
 O O CM CN 00 (35 
 
 DC 
 
 h|» 
 
 cS 
 
 CN 00 tt *~» Oi O 
 
 eo 
 
 6fi 
 
 X 
 
 UhHHHiIH 
 
 c 
 
 — 
 
 < 
 
 — 
 
 
 
 91 
 
 HH - 
 
 co <ci 
 
 "** -"i+ m* *»t+ 
 
 •— — Tr"5W«1C5ao 
 
 iisweinr---. -* — 
 
 
 : : : :> \ : : : s m 
 
 IT- U N 00 O! O - Ol S Jr; 
 
 — oo <5 
 
 i ;iO^00?(O't'-(NMClONWON00'-NO>MU5T00inn-"* 
 
 OlCOOHOtOMOM p 
 
 tS^ 
 
 cn 
 
 b bo 
 I 2 
 
 24 
 
 w OJ U W U J 
 
 is Omm « 
 
 £ _ — — 
 
 P^ CO CM — — 
 
 00 00 
 
 I 
 
 Cj3CN>-CX,eO<OCOO5C>00-N 
 — | — C* — — i — -i co « C* ©) 
 
 - * 
 
 as 
 
 NMrfil5(CNCOC7)0-iO) 8> 2 
 OOOOOOOO^ — — ^ !> 
 
 FH — <* < I •-
 
 15 
 
 A result nearly similar is observable in the 
 price of meat. This is the more striking be- 
 cause the demand for victualling the navy is 
 calculated to operate in a greater degree on 
 this description of food than on corn. 
 
 The following extract from the Victualling 
 Office prices, taken from the appendix to Sir 
 Frederic Morton Eden's work entitled " State 
 of the Poor," (p. 86), will prove that the prices 
 of most of the articles there enumerated were 
 as high in the periods of peace as in those of 
 war. 
 
 WAR. 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Butter. 
 
 Cheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 Date. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 1740 
 41 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 /. s. d. 
 1 3 7| 
 1 4 94 
 1 4 4 
 19 2\ 
 18 3^ 
 
 19 9i 
 
 1 1 3f 
 19 4| 
 
 d. 
 
 OI I S 
 Z T TTT 
 OI 7° 
 *-T TTT 
 OI 4 8 
 Z T TTT 
 
 26 
 Z TTT 
 13 94 
 
 1- 4" in 
 
 <S 54 
 
 « TTi 
 
 01 12 
 
 At ttt 
 
 2 -J 3 
 
 03 79 
 
 Z 4 TTI 
 
 /. s. d. 
 1 11 04 
 1 16 3| 
 1 12 9 
 17 2 
 I 2 5^ 
 1 1 9 
 1 4 8| 
 1 4 0-J- 
 
 d. 
 
 Si 3 4 
 J 4 TTT 
 <23 6 r 
 J 4" TTT 
 at 4. 
 J Y TTT 
 Ol 7 2 
 Z 4" TTi 
 91 70 
 Z * TTT 
 91 36" 
 ^4" TTT 
 91 6 S 
 Z T TTT 
 
 2i 34 
 ^T TTT 
 
 OI 48 
 
 *» TTT 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 44 
 *45 
 46 
 47 
 49 
 
 
 
 9 years. 
 
 
 91 9 i 
 Z1 TTT 
 
 26 88 
 
 ZU TTT 
 
 
 
 Average. 
 
 
 2£ -427 
 
 
 21 -643 
 
 
 
 * Aii extensive mortality among the cattle is recorded to have occurred 
 in 1745, and to have lasted three years; this will account for the rise of 
 prices after 1744. And but for this circumstance, the prices for the whole 
 period of that war, low as they were, would in all probability have been 
 still lower.
 
 16 
 
 PEACE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE. 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Butter. 
 
 Cheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 Date. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 1749 
 50 
 51 
 52 
 53 
 54 
 
 /. s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 OI 1 2 
 Z if TTT 
 
 90 
 £ TTT 
 
 01 I" 
 ^•? TTT 
 
 J 4" TTT 
 
 I 6 
 z TTT 
 
 01 >°7 
 Z 4 TTT 
 
 I, s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 OI 3 6 
 z 2 TTT 
 OI 7* 
 
 ■^vr TTT 
 
 03 98 
 Z- 4" TTT 
 Q 7 2 
 J TTT 
 
 ^4" TTT 
 
 Q I 02 
 
 J TT1" 
 
 d. 
 
 5 
 
 H 
 
 4 
 
 2' 
 
 6 years. 
 
 
 1J 4 TTT 
 
 
 17 96 
 A' TTT 
 
 28| 
 
 
 Average. 
 
 
 2 -841 
 
 
 2f'476 
 
 4-729 
 
 
 WAR. 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Butter. C 
 
 Iheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 Date. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 1. s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1. s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1755 
 
 
 9 1 49. 
 •*? TTT 
 
 
 01 30 
 
 •>T TTT 
 
 H 
 
 
 56 
 
 
 01 65 
 ^4" TTT 
 
 
 QI 36 
 •''2 TTT 
 
 5-h 
 
 3 
 
 57 
 
 
 OI 8 
 Z T TTT 
 
 
 03 7 
 
 J 4" TTT 
 
 •5t 
 
 3i 
 
 58 
 
 
 OI <5S 
 Z T TTT 
 
 
 A 1 6 *> 
 ^*4 TTT 
 
 5tV 
 
 3 
 
 59 
 
 
 OI 81 
 Z t TTT 
 
 
 Q3 43 
 "*f TTT 
 
 *t 
 
 9 1 
 
 *■ T 
 
 £0 
 
 
 75 
 ■* TTT 
 
 
 « 5 8 
 J TTT 
 
 5 I 
 
 2t 
 
 61 
 
 
 OI 6 6 
 
 •^4" TTt 
 
 
 •21 S« 
 -*? TT5 
 
 5 
 
 2| 
 
 62 
 
 
 O 3 i 
 ^ TTT 
 
 
 (jl 92 
 J 5 TTT 
 
 64 
 
 3tV 
 
 8 years. 
 
 
 1 Q 105 
 ly TTa 
 
 
 zy TTT 
 
 43 £ I 
 
 »& 
 
 Average. 
 
 
 2^-617 
 
 
 3-^562 
 
 5-406 
 
 2-555
 
 17 
 
 FIRST PEACE OF PARIS. 
 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Butter. 
 
 Cheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Date. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 1, 
 
 s. d. 
 
 tf. 
 
 /. 
 
 5. 
 
 £ 
 
 £ 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1763 
 
 
 
 9 8a 
 
 
 
 
 
 5| 
 
 2| 
 
 64 
 
 
 
 OI 6 
 Z 4~ TTT 
 
 
 
 
 45 40 
 
 ** TTT 
 
 5| 
 
 34 
 
 65 
 
 
 
 OI »6 
 *4" TTT 
 
 
 
 
 41 I 8 
 ** TTT 
 
 5tV 
 
 3tV 
 
 67 
 
 1 
 
 5 5 1 
 
 OI l O 2 
 Z a TTT 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 3 T 3 * 
 
 68 
 
 1 
 
 5 34 
 
 OI 94 
 Z T ITT 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 2 1 3 
 
 z Tff 
 
 69 
 
 I 
 
 2 9 
 
 OI 84 
 •^4" TTT 
 
 I 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 1 I (5 
 J T TTT 
 
 J T? 
 
 OI4 
 
 70 
 
 1 
 
 2 2* 
 
 OI 5 8 
 Z 4" TTT 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 .1! 84 
 
 ^4" TTT 
 
 H 
 
 3| 
 
 71 
 
 1 
 
 2 6 
 
 91 7 2 
 ■^4" TTT 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 3t 
 
 41 6 2 
 *T TTT 
 
 6f 
 
 3| 
 
 72 
 
 1 
 
 6 3 
 
 03 3 8 
 
 n Til 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 51 - 6 
 J T TTT 
 
 6-J 
 
 3 * 
 
 J 8 
 
 73 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 OI 32 
 •*T TTT 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 1 1 
 
 ei 44 
 °4" TTT 
 
 7 
 
 3| 
 
 74 
 
 1 
 
 8 81 
 
 TTT 
 
 1 
 
 IS 
 
 3 
 
 4 44 
 
 ^ TTT 
 
 64 
 
 3 T 5 * 
 
 11 years. 
 
 
 ~o 1 fi 
 aD TTT 
 
 
 3fi 3 38 
 JU ^ TTT 
 
 64 |. 
 
 34f4 
 
 Average. 
 
 
 24-195 
 
 
 44-4-18 
 
 5-898 
 
 3-162 
 
 WAR. 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 P 
 
 ork. 
 
 Butter. 
 
 Cheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 Date. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 1775 
 
 76 
 77 
 78 
 79 
 80 
 81 
 82 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 I 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 5. d- 
 
 10 44 
 
 8 7 
 8 b\ 
 
 5 8 
 13 2 
 
 11 2 
 
 6 3 
 6 8 
 
 d. 
 01 2 
 
 J 4" TTT 
 
 28 
 
 J TTT 
 
 3 y. 
 
 34 
 
 r 4.0 
 J T TTT 
 93 28 
 z 4 TTT 
 93 48 
 Z 4 TTT 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 2 
 1 
 2 
 
 s. d. 
 4 74- 
 
 2 Hi 
 
 3 HA 
 3 
 
 IS 6 
 9 
 
 17 6 
 1 
 
 d. 
 
 43 14 
 *4" TTT 
 41 47 
 *T TTT 
 41 54 
 *T TTT 
 41 48 
 *T TTT 
 
 4 5 « 
 f TTT 
 4i 5 2 
 *4 TTT 
 
 4 8 
 * TTT 
 
 AL 6 4 
 
 *4 TTi 
 
 5 T I 
 6| 
 
 7 T 
 8 
 
 8| 
 7| 
 
 5-8412 
 
 6-2035 
 
 3| 
 3f 
 34 
 3i 
 
 34 
 
 3-7977 
 
 3-7574 
 
 8 years. 
 
 
 91.1 =6 
 Z +T TTT 
 
 
 354 TTT 
 
 55-357 
 
 28-055 
 
 Average. 
 
 3- 312 
 
 
 4i-75S 
 
 6-92 
 
 3-507
 
 18 
 
 SECOND PEACE OF PARIS. 
 
 
 Bte 
 
 f. 
 
 Pork 
 
 
 Butter. 
 
 Cheshire 
 Cheese. 
 
 Date. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 b. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb.- 
 
 
 1. s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1. s. d. 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 d. 
 
 1783 
 
 1 10 
 
 o 5)6 
 ° TTT 
 
 none bought 
 
 
 6-4917 
 
 4-5541 
 
 84 
 
 none bought 
 
 
 none bought 
 
 
 7-3405 
 
 4-5512 
 
 85 
 
 C 1 5 6 1 
 |_ readymoney I 
 
 O 1 IOI 
 "*sT TTT 
 
 r 2 5 01 
 |_ ready money J 
 
 4 3 3* 
 
 6 .A* 
 " TTT 
 
 4 -rfr 
 
 86 
 
 18 6 
 
 Q 2+. 
 J TT2 
 
 
 
 6 ' I 
 
 V TTX 
 
 4 A 
 
 87 
 
 16 5 
 
 03 3 6 
 
 
 
 « 84 
 3 TTT 
 
 4 TTT 
 
 88 
 
 i y i 
 
 o 5 2 
 J TTT 
 
 2 -7 11 
 
 £ 60 
 
 " TT2" 
 
 5 .A 3 . 
 
 «•' TTT 
 
 4 20 
 
 * TTT 
 
 sy 
 
 l y 2 
 
 Q 56 
 •* TTT 
 
 2 3 11 
 
 41 92 
 
 *T TTT 
 
 A 9 8 
 4 TTT 
 
 3 »SJ 
 
 •> TTT 
 
 yo 
 
 l 8 y 
 
 <2 36 
 ■* TT2T 
 
 2 3 2 
 
 41 5 6 
 
 ^2 TTT 
 
 a 1 7 
 
 ° TTI 
 
 4 S5 
 
 * TTT 
 
 yi 
 
 1 8 6 
 
 Q 24 
 
 J TTT 
 
 2 6 5 
 
 A3 1O0 
 
 ^X TTT 
 
 6 A 
 
 4 T^r 
 
 92 
 
 1 8 7 
 
 Q 28 
 
 2 6 5 
 
 4.3 1 00 
 
 ^4 TTT 
 
 6 ttV 
 
 4 x\\ 
 
 years. 
 
 
 27-L . ?. 
 
 
 -^ y TTT 
 
 6o-8yo 
 
 43'48y 
 
 verage. 
 
 
 3-119 
 
 
 4|;488 
 
 6-08y 
 
 4-3 4y 
 
 The following prices of wool, taken from the 
 same work, will show that that article was, in a 
 very marked degree, higher during the periods 
 of peace, than during those of war. 
 
 SUFFOLK WOOL THE TOD. 
 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. War. 
 
 /. s. d. 
 
 1755 
 56 
 57 
 58 
 59 
 60 
 61 
 62 
 8 Years 
 Average 
 
 i74y 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 I 1 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 53 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 6 Years 
 
 5 7 
 
 
 
 Average 
 
 17 
 
 10 
 
 /. * 
 
 d. 
 
 13 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 6 11 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 44
 
 19 
 
 First 
 
 peace 
 
 of Paris. 
 
 
 
 /. s. 
 
 d. 
 
 
 1763 . . 19 
 
 
 
 1775 
 
 64 
 
 
 19 
 
 6 
 
 76 
 
 65 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 77 
 
 66 
 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 
 78 
 
 61 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 79 
 
 68 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 80 
 
 69 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 70 
 
 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 82 
 
 71 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 72 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 8 Yet 
 
 73 
 
 
 15 
 
 6 
 
 
 War. 
 
 74 
 
 1 2 Years 
 
 Average 
 
 1775 
 76 
 
 77 
 78 
 79 
 80 
 81 
 82 
 
 8 Years 
 
 Average 
 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 10 2 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 10 
 
 /. s. 
 
 d. 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 6 
 
 18 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 13 
 
 6 
 
 11 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Average 
 
 5 14 6 
 
 14 31 
 
 LEWES FINE WOOL THE TOD. 
 
 War. 
 
 /. *. 
 
 1 11 
 
 1 11 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 1 4 6 
 
 I 9 6 
 
 1 17 3 
 
 1 17 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 6 
 
 12 5 3 
 
 I 10 8 
 
 1783 
 84 
 85 
 86 
 87 
 88 
 89 
 90 
 91 
 92 
 
 Second peace of Paris. 
 
 /. s. d. 
 1 14 6 
 
 1 18 6 
 
 1 18 6 
 
 1 16 6 
 
 2 
 1 6 
 O 6 
 
 3 O 
 7 
 
 4 
 
 10 Years 21 4 O 
 
 Average 2 2 5 
 
 Other articles might be enumerated as af- 
 fording a similar result. 
 
 Nor do the wages of labour appear to have 
 been, in general, higher during war than in the 
 
 c 2
 
 20 
 
 intervals of peace : this will appear by the fol- 
 lowing extract from the Greenwich Hospital 
 prices in the Appendix to the Commons' Re- 
 port on the Resumption of Cash payments 
 (page 338.) 
 
 Peace 
 
 War 
 
 5 17 ' 
 I"' 
 
 1730 
 1735 
 '40 
 '45 
 Peace 1750 
 
 War V 755 
 War \1760 
 
 Peace {l7?0 
 
 War I 1775 
 War I 1780 
 
 Peace | yrjQQ 
 
 Carpenters 
 
 Bricklayers 
 
 Masons 
 
 per day. 
 
 per day. 
 
 per day. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 *. d. 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 fj 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 10 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 10 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 10 
 
 2 6 
 
 2 4 
 
 2 10 
 
 Plumbers 
 
 per day. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 2 
 
 G 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 Here then, through the course of such a 
 series of years, we have surely proof sufficient 
 that it is not a necessary consequence of a state 
 of war that wages, agricultural produce, and 
 other articles not taxed, or not the immediate 
 objects of war consumption, should rise ; for 
 that in fact they were lower, in the majority 
 of instances, during the periods of war than in 
 the intervals of peace. That they should in 
 some have been lower in war than in peace 
 might, perhaps, to a certain extent, have been 
 owing to a disturbance of the channels of cir-
 
 21 
 
 dilation, and to an increase in the functions 
 of money, while the principles and practice of 
 banking and credit were so imperfectly under- 
 stood. At the same time, the greater cheap- 
 ness of the periods of war must, in some degree, 
 have arisen from their coincidence with more 
 favourable seasons. But still the fact itself of 
 the relative cheapness of periods of war in the 
 whole term is decisive, at least against the pre- 
 ponderating effect ascribed to it, of raising the 
 prices of provisions, and of commodities ge- 
 nerally, independent of the degree in which 
 they may be taxed ; and what, perhaps, is the 
 most decisive consideration of all against the 
 assumption of that preponderating influence, is 
 that the period of the greatest cheapness in the 
 whole term of 105 years, viz. the period be- 
 tween 1740 and 1748, is precisely that of an 
 uninterrupted and very large war expenditure, 
 defrayed chiefly by loans.
 
 22 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Examination of the Effect of the Extra-Demand or Consump- 
 tion attributed to the late War. 
 
 So far as to the presumption of the effect of 
 war generally, in raising prices : but it has been 
 asked, " who, that contemplated the character 
 of the late war, that referred to the great mi- 
 litary force which was employed in Europe, and 
 to the consequent demand of all the great arti- 
 cles of consumption, could for a moment think 
 of comparing the events of that war, and the 
 state of things growing out of it, with the events 
 and effects of former wars * ?" Now, with de- 
 ference to the high authority from which this 
 question proceeds, I answer, that as to this par- 
 ticular effect of war consumption, it is only a 
 question of degree, whatever the difference of 
 the nature of the contest may have been in 
 other respects ; and further, that upon the ge- 
 neral grounds before stated, the extra demand 
 for such objects by the belligerent powers must 
 be compensated, and probably more than com- 
 
 * Lord Liverpool's Speech, 16th July, 1822.
 
 23 
 
 pensated, by corresponding privations on the 
 part of their subjects. 
 
 With regard to the alleged effect of war de- 
 mand in raising the price of provisions, that 
 must doubtless be the case in the immediate 
 neighbourhood of large armies in a state of 
 active military operations ; it being scarcely 
 possible that the local supply can accommodate 
 itself, except at a great advance of price, to so 
 sudden and casual a source of extra demand. 
 But applying to this country the supposition of 
 extra demand, arising out of a state of war, it 
 is to be observed, that the quantity of food re- 
 quired for the maintenance of the soldiers and 
 sailors composing the war establishment is not 
 all so much beyond what would otherwise have 
 been consumed. The only effectual addition of 
 demand is for that part which is beyond what 
 would have been the consumption of the same 
 individuals in their former occupations ; but 
 from this addition, small as it must be, compared 
 with the mass over which it is distributed, is to 
 be deducted that proportion which was supplied 
 from the places abroad where our fleets and 
 armies were occasionally stationed. Subject to 
 these deductions, if the computation could be 
 accurately made, it would appear that the total 
 of the increase of consumption by the war, re- 
 latively to the whole quantity for sale, could
 
 24 
 
 have but a very trifling and barely perceptible 
 influence on the price of the principal articles 
 of food. But, whatever may be the amount of 
 that extra demand for purposes of war consump- 
 tion, I am inclined to think that it is more than 
 compensated by the diminished consumption of 
 the rest of the community. 
 
 This diminution of consumption may be effected 
 in various ways by the increased economy which 
 must be the consequence of the increased taxa- 
 tion necessary to meet the expenses of the war 
 among the poor, and among the classes imme- 
 diately above these. 
 
 If the taxation be direct, it is clear that the 
 classes which have to pay the tax will have a 
 smaller sum to lay out upon necessaries, or upon 
 indulgences become necessary by habit ; and, 
 in their choice of evils, some may prefer sacri- 
 ficing a portion of food not absolutely essential 
 to existence, rather than give up any portion of 
 the clothing and fuel to which they have been 
 accustomed. 
 
 In the case of indirect taxation, that is, of 
 taxes laid on consumable commodities, the same 
 effect will follow. For instance, rather than 
 forego their usual quantity of tea, which may 
 be doubled in price by the tax, a poor family 
 may abridge its indulgences in an occasional 
 pudding or pie. But the greatest saving of con-
 
 25 
 
 sumption on the part of the bulk of the com- 
 munity, in the case of diminished means, by- 
 direct or indirect contributions to the war, is in 
 the resort from a higher to a lower description 
 of food : that is, according to the degree of 
 pressure, and particularly when the diminished 
 means happen to coincide with seasons of dearth. 
 It is well known that on such occasions recourse 
 has been had first to the coarser sorts of wheaten 
 flour; next to bailey and oats; then to beans and 
 peas ; and finally to potatoes ; not to mention 
 contrivances for the greater economy in the use 
 of food by soups, &c, which were so familiar 
 to the public in particular periods of the war. 
 It has been seen in the tables which I have 
 exhibited in the first part of this work, of the 
 fluctuation of manufacturing wages, how much 
 the funds applicable to the maintenance of that 
 part of the community are subject to occasional 
 abridgement ; and it may thence be easily con- 
 ceived to what an extent the diminution of the 
 consumption of that class alone may go in coun- 
 terbalancing the extra consumption by soldiers 
 and sailors. 
 
 This view of the counterbalancing effects of 
 the privations of the lower classes, under cer- 
 tain circumstances, is strengthened by a refer- 
 ence to the increase of consumption by them 
 under opposite circumstances, such as have of
 
 26 
 
 late existed, viz. full wages, and a low price of 
 provisions. Indeed, the striking fact of the in- 
 crease of consumption of corn and meat, which 
 has taken place within the last year or two, is 
 decisive of the inference as to the process which 
 must take place under the opposite circum- 
 stances. The assertion of an increase of the 
 consumption of wheat can of course rest only 
 on general observation ; but the information 
 leading to this conclusion is derived from such 
 extensive sources, and from authority which is 
 of so respectable a description, besides that every 
 ground of presumption tends to the same infer- 
 ence a priori, as to leave no reasonable doubt of 
 the fact of increased consumption *. Whether the 
 increase be to the extent now supposed by those 
 who venture upon such computations is another 
 question, upon which I shall not at present enter 
 further than to observe, that the lowest esti- 
 mate affords fair grounds for concluding that the 
 increase of consumption within the last two or 
 three years is greater than it was in any equal 
 period of the war, allowing fully for the differ- 
 ence of the population at the two periods. 
 
 But while the increase of the consumption 
 of wheat is matter only of inference, though 
 on good grounds, the increased consumption 
 
 * See Mr. W. W. Whitmore's Speech 26th Feb. last.
 
 27 
 
 of meat is a fact of which the evidence seems 
 to be unequivocal. The returns of the num- 
 ber of cattle and sheep sold at Smithfield 
 will establish this point, as relates to the con- 
 sumption of London and its neighbourhood in 
 the two last years, compared with any period 
 of the war ; and the returns of the numbers 
 slaughtered at some of the other principal towns 
 in the kingdom seem to place the matter be- 
 yond any doubt, and exhibit an extraordinary 
 increase during the last two years, compared 
 with any equal period of the war. 
 
 Now, as consumption is the measure of effec- 
 tual demand, and as the consumption has of late 
 been considerably greater, and has increased at 
 a more rapid rate than at any period of the war, 
 it is incumbent on those who ascribe all the 
 phenomena of the high prices of provisions to 
 war demand, to show why the smaller consump- 
 tion during the war should be connected with 
 a rise of prices, while the greatly increased con- 
 sumption since the peace should have been at- 
 tended by a fall of prices. Considering the pro- 
 gressive increase of population, with the rapid 
 improvement of our manufactures, which was 
 going on down to the breaking out of the war, 
 there is every reason to believe that, but for 
 the war, there would have been a still greater 
 consumption of food and other necessaries than
 
 28 
 
 actually occurred; and that consequently, sup- 
 posing the scarcity arising from the seasons, 
 and the obstructions to importation, or the dif- 
 ficulty of obtaining a supply from abroad, to 
 have been the same in peace as in war, we should 
 have had prices full as high, if not higher, 'less 
 always the difference between paper and gold. 
 It may be said, that the demand or consump- 
 tion during the war, as regards provisions, was 
 not indeed greater than it is now, nor perhaps 
 so great ; but that it was of a peculiar descrip- 
 tion, more sudden, and relatively to a smaller 
 supply. That it was relatively to a smaller 
 supply is what I admit, and it is to that relative 
 smallness of supply in the former, and to the 
 abundance in the latter period, that the con- 
 trast of prices in the two periods is mainly attri- 
 butable. The facts of scarcity, as prevailing 
 more or less during the former, and of abund- 
 ance during the latter period, have already 
 been noticed, and I shall again have occasion to 
 recur to them for the purpose of stating more 
 fully the nature and causes of those circum- 
 stances. 
 
 It is, therefore, only, according to the sup- 
 position, upon the peculiarity and suddenness 
 of demand that the difference of effect upon 
 prices between a given consumption through 
 government and individual expenditure de-
 
 29 
 
 pends. The supposition, however, of a greater 
 influence by government purchases, than by 
 purchases to a similar extent on the part of 
 individuals, requires but a single remark : a 
 reference to the Victualling-office prices will 
 prove that government did not pay more for 
 the same articles, at the same time, than private 
 buyers, and in few instances so much. This 
 remark is applicable to the Victualling-office 
 purchases even in former wars, when it is well 
 known that government contracts were made 
 on terms less advantageous, compared with the 
 market price, than in the last war ; the prin- , 
 ciple of competition having been more exten- 
 sively and systematically acted upon in the 
 latter than at any former period. 
 
 If then the nature or mode of demand for 
 provisions, arising from government expen- 
 diture, is not calculated to produce such an 
 extraordinary effect on prices, still it may be 
 contended that the suddenness of it, before 
 the supply can have accommodated itself to 
 the supposed extra demand, is sufficient to ac- 
 count for the rise. But I have already stated 
 grounds for thinking that, as far as relates to 
 provisions, the government demand is not all, 
 or even in great part, beyond what would 
 otherwise have existed ; and that at any rate 
 the whole extra quantity consumed by sol-
 
 30 
 
 diers and sailors in time of war, beyond what 
 would have been consumed by them in their 
 former occupations, would form so trifling a 
 proportion to the whole mass, as to produce no 
 sensible impression on prices. The presumption 
 to this effect is fully confirmed by facts. At 
 the breaking out of the war in 1793 there was 
 indeed a trifling rise in the price of provisions ; 
 but not greater than seemed to be taking place 
 from other causes, the season being, as will be 
 seen hereafter, one of indifferent produce. On 
 the 1st January, 1793, immediately preceding 
 the commencement of hostilities, the average 
 price of wheat was 47s. %d. ; on the 1st January, 
 1794, it was 495. 8d. : the contract price of beef 
 at the Victualling-office in 1793 was 11. \0s.4>d. 
 per cwt., and in 1794 1/. lis. I0d\ a difference 
 in both cases not worth mentioning, and fully 
 accounted for by the season. But the renewal 
 of the war in 1803 was the occasion of a much 
 more sudden increase of demand by the Victual- 
 ling-office than in 1793. I do not know what 
 the relative quantities purchased were ; but the 
 number of men raised for the army and navy 
 in 1803 and 1804 was, as is well known, much 
 larger than in any former period of the war, 
 and therefore the suddenness of the supposed 
 extra demand might be expected to have raised 
 prices considerably ; but how stands the fact ?
 
 31 
 
 The prices paid by the Victualling-board were 
 as follows : 
 
 Flour Salt Beef 
 
 per sack. per tierce. 
 
 s. d. I. s. d. 
 
 1803, May 52 6 
 
 June 54 2 . 9 9 10 
 
 July and August .... 53s. and 54 
 
 October 55 . 8 10 4 
 
 1804, February 45 
 
 April and May. .. 40s. Id. and 38 4 
 
 June to Sept 41*. 8d. and 56 
 
 October 67 10 . 6 17 6 
 
 showing a decline in the prices of flour and 
 meat till the summer of 1804, when the effect 
 of the bad harvest of that year began to be felt. 
 The prices of meat continued falling till the 
 close of 1808. Indeed, this great and sudden 
 demand by the Victualling-board had not only 
 no permanent effect in raising prices*, and thus 
 
 * As further illustrative of this point I have to observe, that 
 the price of meat, after a trifling fall at the conclusion of the 
 war in 1801, rose again, in the course of the peace of 1802, to 
 a higher level than it had been at in the three last months of 
 the preceding war ; and that it was not till the re-commence- 
 ment of hostilities in 1803 that it again resumed a decided 
 tendency downwards. The following extract from the Farmer's 
 Magazine for Feb. 1802, will serve to explain the state of the 
 cattle markets at the relative periods.
 
 32 
 
 improving the condition of the agricultural in- 
 terest j but it is well known that the fall of 
 prices, which had been progressively taking 
 place in corn till the summer of 1804, was pro- 
 ductive (as every great fall of prices must be) 
 of considerable distress to that class ; and the 
 state of suffering from that cause was the ground 
 for passing Mr. Western's corn bill in that year. 
 Again, the renewed hostilities of 1815, which 
 terminated with the battle of Waterloo, and 
 which, for the short time they lasted, were con- 
 nected with a greater suddenness, as well as 
 magnitude of preparation, than on any former 
 occasion, had not even a momentary effect in 
 arresting the agricultural distress, which had 
 begun with the fall of prices before the termi- 
 nation of the former war. 
 
 If it be contended that, without laying any 
 
 '? It was generally believed that the cessation of hostilities 
 would have had a considerable effect in reducing the value of 
 butcher's meat; hence a fall from ten to fifteen per cent, took 
 place over the whole kingdom upon that event being declared. 
 This fall, without dispute, proceeded from the force of opinion, 
 as it took place all at once before the least alteration in the 
 demand occurred ; therefore has not been lasting. Instead of 
 continuing to fall, or even remaining at the prices then noted, 
 cattle and sheep have risen considerably, and threaten to ad- 
 vance still higher."
 
 S3 
 
 stress on the mere suddenness of the demand, 
 the effect on prices would be in proportion to 
 the extent of the expenditure by government at 
 the different periods ; let the persons holding 
 this opinion reconcile the following facts to their 
 hypothesis. 
 
 Wheat. Rye. Barley. Oats. 
 
 *. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 
 1793 July 51 3 3/1 32 3 23 5 
 
 1794 51 8 37 9 31 8 22 1 
 
 1795 77 2 57 3 41 10 27 8 
 
 1796 81 5 46 9 34 3 21 3 
 
 1797 49 8 29 6 24 4 15 6 
 
 1798 50 4 31 1 29 4 22 7 
 
 1799 Jan. 49 2 32 3 29 4 19 7 
 
 (See Appendix to Part \.) 
 
 Here are six years of war conducted at a 
 progressively increasing expenditure, and yet 
 the prices of corn, after having been raised by 
 intermediate bad seasons to a great height, sub- 
 sided to a lower level than they were at in the 
 first year of the war ; and I can recollect that 
 great complaints were made by the farmers of 
 the low prices to which they were obliged to 
 submit at the close of that period *. I have al- 
 
 * In the autumn of 1 798 beef in Smithfield market averaged 
 from 2s. 8d. to 3s. 6d. per stone, mutton from 2s. 2d. to 2s. lOd. 
 
 D
 
 34 
 
 ready shown that in 1804, when the expenditure 
 by government was greater than at any former 
 period, prices of corn had declined to the level 
 at which they had been on the first breaking out 
 of the war. 
 
 But, in as far as mere extent of expenditure 
 by the Victualling-office, as well as by other de- 
 partments of government, was concerned, there 
 was no period of the war in which it was on so 
 extensive a scale as in the last six months of 
 1813, when our armies in the Peninsula were 
 almost wholly subsisted by supplies from this 
 country ; when large fleets of victuallers were 
 despatched in succession to the different ports 
 of Spain and Portugal ; and when our naval and 
 military establishments in general were on a 
 footing of the most profuse expenditure. And 
 yet it will be seen that this profuse expendi- 
 ture had not power to prevent the great fall 
 in the price of corn, which I noticed in my 
 former part as having taken place in these six 
 months ; of which fall a further proof is af- 
 
 and veal from 3s. Ad. to As. 6d. Hay averaged in St. James's 
 market 21. 12s. and straw 1/. 16s. per load. 
 
 There are no Victualling-office returns yet made for the 
 period between 1795 and 1801 ; the probability is, that these 
 would show a proportionate depression in the prices of flour 
 and meat at the close of 1798.
 
 35 
 
 forded by the actual purchases of the Victual- 
 ling-board, viz. 
 
 s. d. 
 In Sept. 1812, the price paid for flour per 1 , , , 7 
 
 sack was J 
 
 And in November, 1813 65 2 
 
 Making a difference of. 46 5 
 
 or upwards of 40 per cent. 
 (Appendix to the Lords' Rep. on the Corn Laivs, p. 139.J 
 
 The prices of meat, indeed, were rising while 
 wheat and flour were falling ; but this circum- 
 stance affords a prima facie presumption that 
 the same general cause could not affect both, 
 when they were going in opposite directions. 
 The dearness of provender in 1810, 1811, and 
 1812, resulting, as I shall hereafter have occa- 
 sion to show, from the seasons, will fully ac- 
 count for the high prices of meat, without re- 
 sorting to the operation of war demand. 
 
 There are particular articles of which the 
 demand for naval and military purposes forms 
 so large a proportion to the total supply, that 
 no diminution of consumption by individuals 
 can keep pace with the immediate increase of 
 demand by government ; and, consequently, the 
 breaking out of a war tends to raise the price of 
 such articles to a great relative height ; but, 
 even of such articles, if the consumption were not 
 
 d 2
 
 36 
 
 on a progressive scale of increase so rapid that 
 the supply, with all the encouragement of a re- 
 latively high price, could not keep pace with 
 the demand, the tendency is (supposing no im- 
 pediment, natural or artificial, to production or 
 importation) to occasion such an increase of 
 quantity, as to reduce the price to nearly the 
 same level as that from which it had advanced. 
 Thus saltpetre, which was at from 65s. to 25s. 
 per cwt. between the close of the American 
 war in 1783, and the breaking out of the Con- 
 tinental war in 1792, rose, by the end of 1795, 
 when nearly all Europe was in arms, to the 
 greatest height that it ever attained, viz. from 
 132a\ to 170s. per cwt.; but it declined from 
 that time, and was as low at several subsequent 
 periods, allowing only for the difference of the 
 expense of importation from India (which of 
 course was very much greater in time of war), 
 as it had been on an average of the preceding 
 peace. 
 
 Hemp, which, in the interval of peace fol- 
 lowing 1783, had varied from 20/. to 40/. per 
 ton, making a mean price of 30/. rose by the 
 close of 1796 to 591. ; but in the two years fol- 
 lowing the price fell to 32/., being as low, al- 
 lowing for the difference of freight and in- 
 surance, as it had been, on an average, in the 
 preceding interval of peace ; and there were
 
 37 
 
 several subsequent occasions when, making the 
 same allowance, it was equally low. In the 
 spring of 1804, when the purchases for the navy 
 were on a larger scale than they had ever before 
 been, the price was lower than in the autumn 
 of 1802. Foreign iron reached its greatest 
 height in 1801, and fell nearly progressively 
 through the remaining period of the war to the 
 level of what it had been at previously to 1793. 
 
 I might extend the remark to several other 
 articles which are peculiarly affected by war 
 demand ; but it would fatigue the reader to 
 enumerate them here ; and if he has any wish to 
 try further the truth of these observations, he 
 is referred to the general statement of prices in 
 the Appendix to Part IV. 
 
 With regard to articles which are not direct 
 objects of government expenditure, there has 
 been no observable connexion between a state 
 of war and a rise of prices, or a state of peace 
 and a fall of prices, beyond what may be di- 
 stinctly accounted for by a difference in the 
 charges of importation. Colonial produce rose, 
 indeed, in the early part of the war, beyond 
 the increased charges of importation ; but that 
 circumstance is fully explained by the sudden 
 diminution or cessation of one of the prin- 
 cipal sources of supply, in consequence of
 
 38 
 
 the revolution in St. Domingo, which immedi- 
 ately preceded the breaking out of the war with 
 France. That island had previously produced 
 a very large proportion of the sugar and coffee 
 annually imported into Europe ; and as its pro- 
 duction was nearly, if not quite suspended for 
 some years after the revolution, a scarcity was 
 felt of those articles, till the extended cultiva- 
 tion of our own islands, of the French islands of 
 Martinique and Guadaloupe, and of the Dutch 
 colonies in the West Indies, nearly made up the 
 deficiency. 
 
 The advocates for the doctrine of increased 
 demand, arising out of the war, for all the 
 great articles of consumption, must include in 
 their supposition a greater actual consumption. 
 I have already offered reasons against the sup- 
 position of any increase of the consumption 
 of provisions during war; but the evidence is 
 still more decisive against the supposition of 
 increased consumption, during war, of other 
 leading articles which are not the direct objects 
 of government expenditure. The returns of the 
 excise prove distinctly a great and progressive 
 increase, since the peace, of the consumption 
 of many of the most important articles; and 
 evidence to the same effect may be derived 
 from a reference to the table of quantities in
 
 39 
 
 the appendix to the 4th part of this work. In 
 order to support the hypothesis of increased con- 
 sumption during war, there ought to be proof of 
 larger quantities produced or imported during 
 the war than in the subsequent peace, for in- 
 creased consumption supposes increased pro- 
 duction ; whereas, in point of fact, there has 
 been, and continues to be, a larger quantity pro- 
 duced or imported since the peace, down to the 
 present time, than in any period of the war.
 
 40 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Examination of the Effect of the Monopoly of Trade and 
 general Excitement during the late War. 
 
 It has been contended that, admitting no in- 
 fluence by war demand upon prices, except of 
 articles that are used as naval and military 
 stores, there was a considerable effect produced 
 on general prices by the monopoly which the 
 war, as a consequence of our ascendancy at sea, 
 and of our exclusive possession of the East and 
 West Indies, conferred on the trade of this 
 country. As instances of the extent of the mo- 
 nopoly of trade which we thus enjoyed, we are 
 referred to the number of British vessels which 
 were progressively increasing (and employed at 
 advanced freights,) with the continuance of the 
 war ; to the crowded state of the river and of 
 the docks ; to the consequently full employment 
 of the various branches of industry connected 
 with the building, repairing, and outfit of ships 
 in the port of London, and in many of the out- 
 ports ; to the comparatively high rents obtained 
 for wharfs and warehouses, and water-side pre-
 
 41 
 
 mises generally; and, in short, to all the signs 
 of great commercial activity. 
 
 A part of this description is true. Never was 
 the shipping of this country more actively em- 
 ployed, or at higher freights ; and scarcely a ship 
 belonging to any other nation could sail without 
 a license from the government of this country. 
 The whole of the exportable produce of the East 
 and West Indies, and of a great part of South 
 America, came to our ports ; and no part of the 
 Continent of Europe could obtain a supply of 
 coffee, sugar, and other colonial articles, except 
 from this country. So far we may be said to have 
 enjoyed the monopoly of trade ; but it remains 
 to connect that description of monopoly with 
 the high prices ascribed to it. Now it so hap- 
 pens, that not an article which was the subject 
 of that monopoly was, as far as I am aware, at 
 a higher price in this country than it would have 
 been under the most free competition. While 
 that monopoly was most strict, viz. in 1811 and 
 1812, prices of sugar, coffee, dye-woods, cotton, 
 spices, and some descriptions of manufacture, 
 which were the objects of our exclusive trade, 
 were precisely those which, if a deduction be 
 made for the difference between paper and gold, 
 were more depressed than they ever have been 
 before or since. And it was only in the almost 
 certain prospect of peaee, and consequently of
 
 42 
 
 the near termination of the monopoly, that the 
 prices of those commodities experienced any 
 decided advance, viz. in 1813-14. 
 
 Dr. Johnson defines the word " Monopoly" 
 as " the exclusive privilege of selling ;" but, if 
 the thing to be sold exists, and is offered for 
 sale in as unlimited a quantity as it would with- 
 out that privilege, what is the use of it to the 
 party invested with it? If, when the French and 
 Dutch colonies in the West and East Indies 
 were ceded to this country, their produce had 
 been suppressed or destroyed, and their cul- 
 tivation prohibited, then indeed there would 
 have been something substantial in our mono- 
 poly, as far at least as related to price ; and the 
 planters, or the proprietors of the produce of 
 our old colonies, would have derived from that 
 circumstance a decided benefit. Instead of 
 which, by a large outlay of British capital, the 
 French West India islands, and the Dutch set- 
 tlements of Demerara and Surinam in the west, 
 and Java in the east, were rendered more pro- 
 ductive than they ever before had been. The 
 collective and increased produce from all these 
 sources, when poured into this country, while 
 the export to the Continent was restricted, oc- 
 casioned the real depression attending a glut, the 
 very opposite state to that which is commonly 
 supposed to be the consequence of a monopoly.
 
 43 
 
 The very high prices of those articles in 1813 
 and 1814 were, as I have already shown, in 
 great part the result of ill judged speculations, 
 and were not realized by the exporters in the 
 eventual returns ; but even supposing these 
 prices to have been realized, they were so transi- 
 tory, as not to afford a compensation for the 
 long previous depression ; and they cannot at 
 any rate be considered as the result of a mono- 
 poly arising out of the war, when they were 
 only the consequence of the opening of new 
 markets by a peace. It is natural that those of 
 our merchants who received the consignments 
 unincumbered with advances; merely as agents, 
 ship-builders, and all the subordinate classes 
 connected with them; the proprietors of lighters, 
 wharfs, warehouses, and all water-side premises; 
 should be gainers by this forced concourse of 
 business in the port of London ; but their gains 
 were aggravations of the losses of the persons 
 interested in the result of the imports. 
 
 As to a monopoly of the carrying trade by 
 this country during the war, I am at a loss to 
 conceive on what grounds it can be supposed 
 that we possessed it. We had not only no car- 
 rying trade, properly so called, meaning by it 
 the conveyance of cargoes from one foreign 
 port to another, but we were actually under the 
 necessity of relaxing the operation of the na-
 
 44 
 
 vigation laws, and of allowing to foreign vessels 
 the permission of bringing the produce of states 
 to which they did not belong to this country. 
 From 1807 to 1813 the whole of our large im- 
 portations of the bulky commodities from the 
 Baltic, and from Archangel, were brought in 
 foreign bottoms, very few of which belonged to 
 the countries where they were loaded. Pre- 
 vious to 1808 the Americans enjoyed by far the 
 largest proportion of the carrying trade ; and it 
 is well known that the advantages which they 
 enjoyed in this respect were the main occasion 
 of the collisions which led eventually to the war 
 between this country and the United States. 
 Subsequently to our disputes with America, a 
 swarm of Pappenburg, Mecklenburg, Hanover, 
 and Lubeck vessels crowded the sea for the 
 purpose of carrying on the trade between the 
 Continent of Europe and this country, and the 
 freights earned by these vessels were on several 
 occasions, for a single voyage, equal to the whole 
 cost of the ship. British ships at that time, al- 
 though possessing no part of the carrying trade, 
 and although excluded from nearly the whole 
 of the direct trade between the Continent of 
 Europe and this country, were likewise however 
 employed very beneficially for their owners ; in^ 
 asmuch as the demand for transports by go- 
 vernment was on a scale of such progressive
 
 45 
 
 increase that the supply could scarcely keep pace 
 with it. There was a further reason indeed for 
 the extensive employment of shipping at that 
 period ; which was, that in consequence of the 
 detentions for convoy, and in consequence (as 
 in the case of the trade with the Baltic) of the 
 navigation being in some instances more cir- 
 cuitous and hazardous, where two or three 
 voyages are now made, only one could then be 
 accomplished. 
 
 With regard to the excitement or stimulus 
 ascribed to the war, the terms are so vague in 
 the way in which they have been commonly 
 used, as to mean equally any thing or nothing. 
 It may easily be conceived that high prices 
 operated as a stimulus or excitement to in- 
 creased production, and that increased produc- 
 tion again occasioned the low prices, and con- 
 sequent discouragement ; but the question is 
 as to the cause of the high prices, and how the 
 stimulus supposed to arise out of the war was 
 calculated to occasion the high prices (always 
 allowing, as I do, for the effect of war demand 
 in raising, at least for a time, the prices of 
 military and naval stores). The answer to that 
 question is comprised in what has already been 
 said on the supposed extra demand arising out 
 of the war : the effective demand must be li- 
 mited by the means of payment, and the sti-
 
 46 
 
 mulus or excitement arising out of a state of 
 war cannot supply any extra means of payment 
 except by previous increase of production. 
 
 The source of confusion, I have no doubt, 
 arises from mistaking the stimulus to speculation 
 originating in the actual or apprehended scarcity 
 incidental to the events of a war, for the natural 
 and necessary effects of war ; and from not con- 
 sidering that scarcity during peace has (witness 
 the activity of speculation resulting from the 
 scarcity of 1816-17) produced effects exactly 
 similar to those which have been ascribed to the 
 war, while in some former wars the opposite 
 effects were observable, viz. stagnation and low 
 prices.
 
 47 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Effect of War, as obstructing Supply, on general Prices. 
 
 Enough has been said to prove that war 
 cannot operate in raising general prices through 
 the medium of increased demand, the quantity of 
 money and its rate of circulation continuing the 
 same ; and that there is no sufficient ground 
 for ascribing any effect in raising general prices 
 to the monopoly of trade, or to the increased 
 excitement and activity which characterized 
 the last war. 
 
 The remaining question is, what effects are 
 to be ascribed to war as regards supply? And 
 the answer may be, in general terms, that it is 
 the tendency of war to diminish supply. The 
 mode in which war maybe calculated to operate 
 to this effect, is, 1st by a diminution of repro- 
 duction, and 2nd by impediments to com- 
 mercial communication. 
 
 It will be readily admitted that the imme- 
 diate and obvious tendency of a state of war 
 is to abstract a portion of the capital and la- 
 bour, which would otherwise have been em- 
 ployed in reproduction ; and if, from the course
 
 48 
 
 of military operations, or from arbitrary go- 
 vernment exactions, an apprehension should 
 be superadded of insecurity of property, there 
 will be a further cause for diminished produc- 
 tion ; so that dearth and impoverishment are 
 likely to be the consequences of a state of war 
 in a country thus situated. 
 
 On the other hand, there may be, coin- 
 cidently with a state of war in any particular 
 country, circumstances calculated to counter- 
 balance, and even to outweigh, the tendency in 
 question : 
 
 1. Increased activity and industry in the 
 mass of the population, so that the portion re- 
 maining, after the abstraction of labourers for 
 the purposes of war, may be able and willing 
 to produce as much as, or even more than, was 
 previously produced. 
 
 2. Increased disposition on the part of in- 
 dividuals to accumulate capital, so as to com- 
 pensate for the war expenditure, without any 
 diminution of the funds applicable to repro- 
 duction. 
 
 3. Improvements in agriculture and ma- 
 chinery, tending to increase reproduction with 
 the same or less capital and labour. 
 
 4. Greater security of property relatively 
 to other countries, thus inducing an influx of 
 capital from abroad.
 
 49 
 
 All these circumstances concurred in this 
 country, during the whole of the late contests, 
 and the consequence was an increase of pro- 
 duction and population in spite of the opposite 
 tendency arising out of a state of war. 
 
 The effects, however, of the preponderating 
 tendency of circumstances favourable to re- 
 production, as far as relates to agriculture, 
 were repressed, or, at least, prevented from re- 
 ceiving their full developement, by a course of 
 seasons more than usually unpropitious, as I 
 shall endeavour to show by and by. 
 
 Although the war cannot be said to have 
 operated upon the supply of agricultural pro- 
 duce of our own growth and of other native 
 commodities sufficiently to outweigh the cir- 
 cumstances favourable to reproduction, it ope- 
 rated most powerfully in obstructing, thence 
 increasing the cost, and thereby diminishing 
 the supply of such commodities as we stood 
 in need of from abroad. It is therefore to 
 war chiefly as affecting supply, by obstructions 
 to importation, at a time when, (as it will ap- 
 pear hereafter) by a succession of unfavour- 
 able seasons, our own produce became in- 
 adequate to the average consumption, that any 
 considerable proportion of the range of high 
 prices is to be attributed. It is, in fact, 
 only with reference to the nature and de- 
 
 E
 
 50 
 
 gree of the impediments to commercial com- 
 munications that the last war, as far as relates 
 to prices, is to be distinguished from former 
 wars — coinciding as that did with a succession 
 of seasons which made us dependent on other 
 countries for an adequate supply of food. 
 
 Gigantic and terrific as that contest was, of 
 which it has been truly said, that " compared 
 with that crisis, there was nothing similar, un- 
 less it were that aera at which the irruption 
 of the Barbarians subverted the Roman empire," 
 the effect of it upon prices would have been 
 very different, if, allowing the same scale of 
 military and naval operations, and consequently 
 of war expenditure, it had been divested of its 
 anti-commercial character ; or if, possessing its 
 anti-commercial character, it had not occurred 
 contemporaneously with years of scarcity in 
 this country, approaching in some instances to 
 famine. 
 
 I have already, in the former part of this 
 work, had occasion to notice, in general terms, 
 the degree in which the price of some com- 
 modities was increased by the enormous charges 
 of importation: and I will add only a few more 
 particulars, by way of showing the connexion 
 between the extraordinary political obstruc- 
 tions to commercial intercourse, and the high 
 prices of those commodities which have been
 
 51 
 
 adduced as instances of indefinite depreciation 
 of the currency by one party, and of the equally 
 indefinite effects of war demand by another. 
 
 As the period between 1808 and 1813 is that 
 which is commonly referred to as exemplifying 
 these two positions respectively, I give the fol- 
 lowing specimens of the charges of importation 
 to which commodities that we stood most in 
 need of were subject in 1809, compared with 
 the charges of importation in 1822, and the 
 reader will thence judge whether the high 
 prices of those articles are attributable to war, 
 as increasing the demand, or to war, as ob- 
 structing the supply. 
 
 The freight, and premium of insurance*, from 
 St. Petersburg to London in 1809 and 1822, on 
 the average of the seasons, were as follows : 
 
 1809 1822 
 
 /. I d. I. s. d. 
 
 On Hemp . . per ton 30 3 
 
 Tallow . . 20 2 
 
 Linseed . per quarter 2 5 4 6 
 
 * In 1809 there were instances when 30/. per ton was paid 
 for theft-eight alone of hemp; and the insurance varied from 
 20 to 40 per cent., making these two items of charge amount 
 to between 40/. and 50/. per ton on hemp, and in a similar 
 proportion on other articles of importation from the Baltic. 
 But I have rather taken the medium rate which prevailed 
 through the season. There was no very material reduction in 
 those charges till 1813. 
 
 E 2
 
 52 
 
 The charges of importation in those two 
 years on all other commodities from the Baltic 
 were in the same proportion. 
 
 I have already noticed in the first part of 
 this work the enormous expenses attending 
 the importation of silk by a circuitous route* 
 from Italy through the north of Europe. Some 
 came likewise through France, and the charges 
 of conveyance from Italy to Havre and duty 
 of transit amounted to nearly 100/. per bale 
 of 2401b., net weight, exclusive of freight and 
 insurance from Havre hither. The whole ex- 
 pense of freight and insurance from Italy does 
 not at present amount to more than 61. per bale. 
 
 But, while the cost of articles imported from 
 the Continent of Europe was thus enhanced by 
 the difficulty of communication, the same cause 
 raised the price of colonial produce and of some 
 kinds of British manufactures to a still greater 
 proportionate height on the Continent, inas- 
 much as the vigilance and severity of the de- 
 crees of the enemy were exercised more directly 
 against imports from, than against exports to, 
 this country. One or two instances may serve 
 to show the degree in which these obstructions 
 
 * On one occasion two parcels of silk were despatched from 
 Bergamo at the same time, one by the way of Smyrna and 
 the other by the way of Archangel ; the former was a twelve- 
 month and the latter two years on its passage.
 
 53 
 
 were calculated to raise the prices of such com- 
 modities abroad. 
 
 The charges of freight and French license on 
 a vessel of little more than 100 tons burthen 
 have been known to amount to 50,000/. for the 
 voyage merely from Calais to London and back : 
 this made the proportion of freight on Indigo 
 amount to 4s. 6d. the pound ; the freight in 
 1822 was about Id. per pound ! 
 
 A ship, of which the whole cost and outfit 
 did not amount to 4000/., earned a gross freight 
 of 80,000/. on a voyage from Bordeaux to 
 London and back. 
 
 Among the means devised by the ingenuity 
 and enterprise of adventurers to elude or over- 
 come the obstacles presented by the decrees of 
 the enemy, one in particular, which was re- 
 sorted to on an extensive scale, deserves men- 
 tion as illustrating, in a striking manner, the 
 degree in which those obstacles were calculated 
 to increase the cost to the consumer. Several 
 vessels laden with sugar, coffee, tobacco, cotton 
 twist, and other valuable commodities, were 
 despatched* from hence at very high rates of 
 freight and insurance to Salonica, where the 
 
 * At a considerable additional expense; the refined sugar 
 ■was packed here in small boxes made for the express pur- 
 pose, to contain not more than about 2 cwt. each, so as to 
 admit of being slung one on each side of the horse or mule 
 for conveyance overland.
 
 54 
 
 goods were landed, and thence conveyed on 
 horses and mules through Servia and Hun- 
 gary to Vienna, for the purpose of being 
 distributed over Germany, and possibly into 
 France. Thus, it might happen, that the in- 
 habitants of that part of the Continent of 
 Europe most contiguous to this country could 
 not receive their supplies from hence, with- 
 out an expense of conveyance equivalent to 
 what it would be if they were removed to a 
 distance of a sea-voyage twice round the globe, 
 but not subject to fiscal and political obstruc- 
 tions. It is not to v be wondered at that the 
 articles subject to such expenses should be sold 
 at enormously high prices, for these prices were 
 the condition requisite to overcome the ob- 
 stacles to supply. I have already noticed the 
 prices of sugar, coffee, and indigo, in France 
 in 1811, and I will now only add that raw 
 cotton was, at one time, as high as 10 and llfrs. 
 the pound. 
 
 With just as much reason might the high 
 prices, on the Continent, of articles subject to 
 such obstructions be resorted to in proof of the 
 effects of war demand, as the high prices in 
 this country, of timber, hemp, flax, silk, &c. 
 and of the manufactured articles into the com- 
 position of which these raw materials entered, 
 be considered to prove the extra-demand and 
 consumption arising out of the war.
 
 55 
 
 A part, although perhaps only a small part, 
 of the extra cost of conveyance might, in the 
 first instance, be defrayed by the producer ; 
 it is clear, however, that if, before that in- 
 creased charge, he got only a remunerating 
 price, he would gradually diminish his supply, 
 or, at least, not extend it as he might otherwise 
 have done, and that the consumer eventually 
 would have to pay the whole, or nearly the 
 whole, of the increased charges. The adjust- 
 ment of the proportion in which the extra- 
 charges would, in the mean time, be borne by 
 the consumer and the producer respectively, 
 might vary according to the respective wants 
 and means of each. 
 
 Applying this view of the increased charges 
 of conveyance to the price of corn in this 
 country, it may serve to account, in some de- 
 gree, for the lower price in some of the periods 
 of war than in periods of peace down to 1793. 
 For if we were in the habit of growing more 
 than enough for our own consumption, then, 
 upon the occurrence of a war, and consequent 
 increased charges of conveyance, supposing no 
 increased want, nor anticipation of increased 
 want of corn abroad, the foreign consumer 
 would have no inducement to pay an increased 
 price, in the first instance at least ; and the pro- 
 ducers here, in order to dispose of the same
 
 56 
 
 quantity as before, must submit to make some 
 sacrifice, to compensate for a part of the extra 
 charge of conveyance. Such sacrifice, we know, 
 was made by the holders of colonial produce 
 and by some of our manufacturers, in order to 
 force an export at particular periods of the last 
 war. 
 
 On the other hand, as in the war that com- 
 menced in 1793, we occasionally required, 
 whether from the course of the seasons, or 
 from other causes, an increased supply of corn 
 from abroad to make up for the deficiency of 
 our own produce ; and as, in some instances, 
 the cause of increased want by this country, 
 viz. unpropitiousness of the seasons, coincided 
 with a similar state of the season abroad, we 
 were under the necessity of defraying nearly 
 the whole of the charges of conveyance. I say 
 nearly the whole, because the foreign grower 
 must have paid some part of them ; inasmuch 
 as there can be no doubt that the price at the 
 shipping ports would have been higher, although 
 here it might have been considerably lower, 
 had it not been for those extra charges of con- 
 veyance : the consumer here would have been 
 more abundantly supplied at lower prices, 
 while the foreign exporter might have ob- 
 tained a higher price for a larger quantity. 
 In general terms it may be said, that the ob-
 
 5? 
 
 structions to commercial communication arising: 
 out of war tend to produce dearth of imported, 
 and glut of exportable commodities, subject of 
 course to the peculiarities of demand affecting 
 particular descriptions. And if it had so hap- 
 pened that in the last war we had habitually 
 grown as much corn beyond the proportion of 
 our own consumption as we did between 1740 
 and 1750*, and that the seasons had been 
 equally favourable to the growth, we should 
 have witnessed a totally different set of pheno- 
 mena connected with prices. The transition 
 from war to peace might, as was the case on 
 several former occasions, have been attended 
 with a rise of prices of agricultural produce, 
 and nothing would have been heard of the 
 distress of the landed interest as resulting from 
 the peace, nor would a state of war be considered 
 as the source of their prosperity. 
 
 But as the case really was that, by the course 
 of the seasons, and by an increase of population 
 
 * The lowest prices of wheat in the whole of that period 
 of cheapness occurred in the height of the war with France, 
 viz. in the years 1743, 4, and 5 ; and a better proof cannot be 
 given of the distress arising from the want of a market for our 
 surplus produce, which must have occasioned that extreme 
 degree of depression, than the fact that in 1745, notwith- 
 standing the war, an exportation of corn to France was allowed 
 for a certain limited time, but to a large amount.
 
 58 
 
 outrunning perhaps the extent of cultivation,- 
 we stood in need of a supply of corn from 
 abroad during the greater part of the last war, 
 it clearly follows, from the preceding view, that 
 the price was higher than it otherwise would 
 have been by the increased charges of convey- 
 ance arising out of the war. 
 
 The measure, therefore, of the utmost effect 
 of the war upon prices will be found in the in- 
 creased charges upon the importation, and in 
 the consequently diminished supply of the ar- 
 ticles of which we stood in need, without sup- 
 posing any increased demand arising out of the 
 war, except for such articles as come imme- 
 diately under the description of military and naval 
 stores. Of a great number of articles, with that 
 exception, the whole rise of prices above what 
 they were before 1793, or subsequent to 1814, 
 may be accounted for by increased charges of 
 importation, allowing always for the difference 
 between paper and gold. Of some few the 
 supply may have been affected by the course of 
 military operations at particular periods of the 
 war, as silk in Italy, wool in Spain, and hemp and 
 flax and tallow in Russia. Of the rest, including 
 agricultural produce in this country, the whole 
 variation in price, beyond the difference between 
 paper and gold, and beyond the increased 
 charges of importation incidental to a war, may,
 
 59 
 
 in my opinion, be fully accounted for by a re- 
 ference to the state of the seasons, as well in 
 this country as in those from which we drew 
 part of our supplies *. 
 
 * Since the text was thus far written, there have been im- 
 portant political changes, which have involved the chance of 
 this country being engaged in a new war j and the prevailing 
 errors respecting the nature and extent of the effects of war 
 on prices cannot be better exposed than by a reference to 
 the fluctuations which markets have recently (April, 1823,) 
 undergone. 
 
 Towards the latter part of January, when the speech of 
 the King of France, indicating approaching hostilities be- 
 tween that country and Spain, made its appearance, a spe- 
 culation arose here upon the chance of this country becoming 
 involved in the contest, and an advance of price took place 
 immediately in many articles. Saltpetre and hemp were of 
 course the first objects of speculative demand, as being mi- 
 litary and naval stores j the former advanced in a few days 
 from 28s. to 40s., the latter from 38/. to 421. Colonial pro- 
 duce likewise rose considerably, and there was so far a suf- 
 ficient ground for the advance, as extensive orders w r ere re- 
 ceived for purchases of sugar, coffee, &c. to be shipped to 
 France, upon the apprehension that in the event of a war with 
 this country, France would be excluded from direct supplies 
 of that description of commodities. Corn and meat, which 
 had begun to rise before any apprehensions of war, seemed to 
 advance more rapidly when rumours of a warlike tendency 
 were most prevalent, and it is probable that the common 
 opinion of the connexion between war and high prices did 
 accelerate the rise. Several other articles likewise expe- 
 rienced an advance ; and if a war involving this country had
 
 GO 
 
 immediately broken out, the general rise of prices would have 
 been exclusively ascribed to that event. But how stands the 
 case now that the apprehension of immediate war as relates 
 to this country has subsided? Why, those articles which 
 would and must in the event of hostilities have advanced, for 
 some time at least, very considerably, viz. saltpetre and hemp, 
 have receded completely back to the level from which they 
 rose 5 while sugar, which, as I had occasion to state in the 
 first part of my work, was becoming less superabundant than 
 it had been in the markets of Europe, and had consequently 
 a tendency to improve, is now ten per cent, at least higher 
 than it was when the warlike rumours first began to prevail. 
 Corn, after receding, in consequence of the subsidence of 
 those rumours, which had apparently accelerated the rise, 
 has resumed its tendency upwards, and is now at a higher 
 price, as is meat likewise, than when the apprehensions of 
 war were most prevalent. 
 
 Flax, of which the consumption would have been increased 
 by a war, advanced in a very trifling degree till after the ex- 
 pectation of that event had subsided, and the price has since 
 risen between 71. and 8/. per ton, or nearly 15 per cent. 
 Lead has likewise risen since last month. The rise in price 
 of these and of several other commodities would, if war had 
 broken out, have been ascribed to that event, without any 
 very minute investigation of the precise dates at which the 
 rise had commenced, or any critical examination of the mode 
 in which they could be affected by that event. 
 
 The general rule by which the mere effects of war, divested 
 of other circumstances, may be expected to affect the price of 
 any particular article, is to determine the degree in which the 
 difficulty of production, or the expense of conveyance, is 
 likely to be increased. This will in general be the utmost 
 measure of advance upon imported commodities ; while ar- 
 ticles of export may be depressed, in as far a3 the market for
 
 61 
 
 them may be narrowed by a war : at the same time even these 
 articles may be raised in price under the apprehension of 
 hostilities, because the markets which would be likely to be 
 shut by the actual occurrence of a war would require an extra 
 quantity, and therefore cause an extra demand while the event 
 was only impending.
 
 THOUGHTS, &c. 
 
 PART III. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 Nothing has struck me as being more strange 
 in all the late discussions and reasonings upon 
 the subject of the high and low prices of the 
 last thirty years, than the little importance 
 which has been attached to the effects which 
 a difference in the character of the seasons is 
 calculated to occasion. Individuals interested 
 in the markets for agricultural produce are 
 habitually alive to the prodigious influence of 
 the weather, at particular periods, on the result 
 of the harvest in point of quantity, and still more 
 in point of exchangeable value : and yet the 
 same individuals, when called upon to account 
 for a range of high or low prices at an an- 
 tecedent period, perfectly within their recol- 
 lection, seem wholly to neglect or overlook the
 
 2 
 
 consideration of the possibility of any influence 
 on an extended scale of that cause, to which 
 in detail, or in accounting for the produce of 
 any particular year, they cannot help attaching 
 a weight preponderating over every other. 
 The farmer naturally, and almost instinctively, 
 watches, with painful anxiety, the several critical 
 periods in the growth of the different descrip- 
 tions of produce, and infers, according as ap- 
 pearances are decidedly unfavourable or pro- 
 pitious, and as they extend, or are supposed to 
 extend, generally to the same descriptions of pro- 
 duce in other districts, the probability of a great 
 alteration in the price : thus severe frost, or 
 heavy rains at the blooming time, or unfavour- 
 able weather at harvest, or general indications 
 of blight or mildew, or other extensive injury 
 from some peculiarity in the atmosphere, lead 
 him irresistibly to the conclusion that, sup- 
 posing the same cause to apply to the greater 
 part of the country, there must be a great rise 
 in price, whatever may be the state of the 
 currency, or the aspect of politics. If, on the 
 contrary, after a year of bad produce and high 
 prices, appearances are favourable for the grow- 
 ing crops ; or if, after threatening indications of 
 injury in the earlier stages of vegetation, the 
 weather suddenly becomes propitious, all parties 
 interested in the price immediately anticipate
 
 a fall, without refining upon the supposed 
 agency of other causes. 
 
 Yet such being the paramount influence of 
 particular seasons upon the price, it is sur- 
 prising that not a single witness examined by 
 the Agricultural Committee in 1821, with the 
 exception of myself, seems to have included in 
 his consideration of the means of accounting 
 for the prevalence of the high prices from 1793 
 to 1813, and the comparative low prices from 
 the latter year to that time, the possibility of 
 different proportions of good and bad seasons in 
 the two intervals, compared either with each 
 other, or with intervals of equal length in 
 periods antecedent to 1793. Indeed, one of 
 the witnesses examined by the committee went 
 so far as even to deny, in general terms, that 
 an abundant harvest had any considerable effect 
 on the price of wheat. The question and answer 
 are as follows : " Do you think, then, that an 
 abundant harvest has no effect upon the price 
 of wheat ?" — " Very little ; but some*." 
 
 So conscious was I, indeed, of the startling 
 appearance of the opinion which I had ex- 
 pressed before the Committee, of the preva- 
 lence of seasons of a particular character, fa- 
 vourable or unfavourable, through periods of 
 
 * Thomas Attwood, esq. Minutes of Evidence, Agri- 
 cultural Report, 1821, p. 252. 
 
 F
 
 considerable length, that at the close of my 
 examination I thought it right to appeal to 
 what would be admitted as the highest au- 
 thorities, viz. the recorded opinions to that 
 effect of Dr. Adam Smith and Mr. Burke ; my 
 quotation from the latter of whom, in support 
 of my view on the subject, was referred to in 
 the body of the Agricultural Report. 
 
 The general opinion has been, that although 
 there might be a considerable variation in the 
 character of particular seasons compared with 
 others, the range of those variations could not 
 be supposed to extend over more than three, 
 four, or at the utmost, five years ; or in other 
 words, that, assuming the extent of cultivation 
 to be the same, the aggregate produce of every 
 three, four, or at the utmost, five years, would 
 be the same. And the ground for this opinion 
 seems to have been suggested by the experience 
 of the period of twenty years ending in 1813, 
 which presents the recurrence of years of de- 
 cided scarcity, in no instance exceeding four 
 years from each other. The bad harvest of 
 1816 tended to confirm the same conclusion: 
 and, as during that interval the produce of this 
 country was inadequate to the consumption 
 without a foreign supply, and as a foreign 
 supply could not be obtained during the war, 
 except at very high prices, nor after the pass-
 
 big of the corn bill of 1815, till the price had 
 reached upwards of 80s., the practical effect of 
 this impression was to create great confidence 
 in continuing and extending cultivation. 
 
 If this opinion of the recurrence of bad sea- 
 sons at nearly equidistant periods, or of the 
 aggregate produce of any four or five years 
 being equal to that of any other four or five 
 years, the cultivation being the same, or rather 
 in the same proportion to the population, be 
 admitted to be correct, the conclusion might 
 naturally be, that no part of the great differ- 
 ence in the average price of corn during the 
 twenty years ending in 1813, compared with 
 the prices since that time, or anterior to 1793, 
 could be referred to the influence of the sea- 
 sons. And certainly if this conclusion were 
 proved to be well founded, there would be no 
 alternative but to seek in the circumstances 
 affecting the value of the currency, or in the 
 war, and in the transition from war to peace, 
 for the whole of the fluctuation. Accordingly, 
 this implied assumption, arising from a neglect 
 of a more extended view of facts as connected 
 with that point, removes some part of the 
 wonder which otherwise might be felt at seeing 
 persons of great ability, and extensive informa- 
 tion, espouse an exclusive hypothesis of the 
 sufficiency of one of the two causes before- 
 
 f2
 
 6 
 
 mentioned, to produce all the phenomena of 
 prices that are now the subject of investigation. 
 The advocates for either hypothesis perceiving 
 all the absurdity of referring any considerable 
 part of the difference of prices to the other, 
 find the inference in favour of their own view 
 irresistible. 
 
 Now, as in the preceding parts of this in- 
 quiry, I have endeavoured to prove that the effects 
 of the alterations in the currency, by the bank 
 restriction, are limited to the difference between 
 paper and gold, and that a state of war can 
 only have operated on the aggregate of prices 
 by a diminished or obstructed supply of com- 
 modities ; and as the influence of these causes, 
 thus limited, is inadequate to account for the 
 greatest part of the fluctuation of prices at par- 
 ticular periods, or through the whole range 
 embraced by this inquiry, we have to seek for 
 some other cause or causes of powerful agency 
 to account for the difference. One cause ob- 
 viously presents itself as fully adequate, even in 
 the opinion of the most determined advocates 
 for either of the exclusive theories of currency 
 or war, to account for a great fluctuation of 
 prices from year to year, or within a period 
 more or less limited, viz. the difference in the 
 produce of particular seasons. 
 
 May it not, therefore, be a fair ground of
 
 7 
 
 inference a priori, from the inadequateness of 
 the other circumstances which have been ad- 
 duced to account for the high range of prices 
 between 1793 and 1813, and for the subse- 
 quent decline, that a cause so powerfully af- 
 fecting short periods may have acted for a 
 greater length of time than is commonly assigned 
 to its operation, and may have gone far, if not 
 the whole way, to account for that part of the 
 fluctuation of prices which is left unexplained 
 by the currency, and by the obstructions to 
 supply, arising out of the war ? 
 
 But the assignment of a considerable effect 
 to the influence of this cause in accounting; for 
 the high and low prices of the last thirty years, 
 is not only justified by inference from the in- 
 adequateness of any other known circumstances 
 to have produced those effects : it will, I think, 
 be found, that a reference to the history of the 
 seasons, and of their connexion with the price 
 of provisions during the periods through which 
 their agency can be clearly traced, will confirm 
 and establish that conclusion. 
 
 The course which I shall pursue in endea- 
 vouring, by an extensive induction of facts, to 
 establish the grounds for imputing to the variety 
 of the seasons, a very large proportion of the 
 fluctuations of the prices of corn, and of some
 
 8 
 
 other commodities, which have been so much 
 the subject of controversy, is 
 
 1st, To examine by a reference to the best 
 evidence within my reach, the general descrip- 
 tion of seasons for so long a course of years, an- 
 tecedent to 1793, as may afford some guide for 
 conjecture, as to the term during which there 
 may be a preponderance of seasons of a par- 
 ticular character of favorableness or unfavour- 
 ableness. 
 
 2d, To give a short statement of the character 
 of every season, from 1793 to the present time. 
 
 3d, To estimate the mode and degree in 
 which the variations of supply resulting from 
 the difference of seasons, are calculated to affect 
 prices. 
 
 4th, To point out some of the general effects 
 of variations in price, as resulting from the dif- 
 ference of the seasons.
 
 9 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Character of the Seasons from 1688 to 1792, both Years 
 included. 
 
 Lv examining the character of the seasons, 
 with a view to determine their influence on pro- 
 duce and prices anterior to 1793, it seems to be 
 sufficient for the purposes of this inquiry, to go 
 as far back as 1688 ; because that is the year 
 in which the celebrated corn bill, first of William 
 and Mary, was passed, granting a bounty on 
 the exportation of corn ; and which is by many, 
 therefore, considered as a new era in the history 
 of our corn trade ; because, for any considerable 
 period prior to that time, the materials, whether 
 as to actual description of the seasons, or as to 
 the possible influence of other causes on the 
 price of corn, are more imperfect than in the 
 succeeding interval ; because the table inserted 
 in the second division of this work, with a view 
 to illustrate the effects of war demand begin- 
 ning with that date, will serve the purpose of 
 reference for this part likewise j and because, 
 seeing that the interval of 105 years, which I am
 
 10 
 
 about to examine, furnishes proofs of seasons of a 
 particular character of favorableness or unfavor- 
 ableness, for terms as long as those for which I 
 am contending, it affords grounds of presump- 
 tion prima facie j quite strong enough in favor 
 of my position. If, therefore, I had materials 
 and leisure, and sufficient reliance on the 
 patience of my readers, to induce me to carry 
 the investigation into a more remote period, my 
 position might indeed be strengthened, but 
 could not well be invalidated. But, even going 
 no farther back than 1688, I have not in my 
 possession, nor have I leisure to search for ma- 
 terials to enable me to furnish a direct descrip- 
 tion of the seasons in regular series from that 
 time ; and an attempt indeed to furnish it, if I 
 were in possession of those materials, would 
 swell this part of my work to a disproportionate 
 size : I shall, therefore, content myself with 
 o-iving a sketch of the direct historical notices 
 which have met with of any particular de- 
 scription of seasons ; and in the absence of any 
 such direct notice, I shall refer to the price, as 
 showing a sufficient ground of presumption as 
 to the general productiveness or unproductive- 
 ness of certain seasons. 
 
 It may be a question how far quotations of 
 price are admissible as evidence of the state of
 
 11 
 
 the seasons, when the degree in which price 
 may be affected by the seasons is the very ob- 
 ject of investigation. The answer is, that doubt- 
 less direct historical testimony would be better 
 authority ; but that, in the present case, the in- 
 ference to be drawn from the quotations of price, 
 anterior to 1793, may be quite sufficient for 
 practical purposes, when there is no direct de- 
 scription. I insert in the Appendix an account 
 of the Windsor prices, from the Lords' Report 
 on the Corn Laws, 1814, and continued in the 
 Appendix to the Agricultural Report of the 
 Commons' Committee, 1821, in which the price 
 is set down for Lady-day and Michaelmas, of 
 each year. 
 
 From this account, any very marked variation 
 in the produce or promise of the season may be 
 clearly inferred by a reference to the difference 
 between the quotations of the spring and autumn, 
 when nothing in the state of the currency or any 
 other important circumstance calculated to af- 
 fect prices, is recorded to have occurred. The 
 inference to this effect is strengthened by the ac- 
 cordance of direct notices of the state of the sea- 
 sons, whenever they are given with the indication 
 conveyed by the variation between the Lady- 
 day and Michaelmas prices. Hence, in the ab- 
 sence of any historical notice, it may be safely
 
 12 
 
 concluded, when no considerable difference is 
 observable in the quotations from six months 
 to six months and from year to year, that the 
 seasons have preserved a general uniformity of 
 character. 
 
 This account does not go further back than 
 1697 ; but there is sufficient testimony of the 
 general state of the seasons for the term between 
 1688 and that year. 
 
 I have here incidentally to observe, that the 
 price of wheat was declining in the two years 
 preceding 1688 — the yearly averages being 
 11. 10s. 2^d. per quarter for 1686, and 1/. %s. 
 4-14 for 1687. 
 
 This low and declining state of prices pro- 
 duced, as usual on such occasions, considerable 
 distress among the landed interest, and was, 
 probably, the ground on which the celebrated 
 Act of the 1st of William and Mary, granting 
 a bounty on the exportation of corn, was passed. 
 Whether, as the effect on opinion of the 
 passing of this bill, or as the consequence of 
 the state of the weather, of which I do not 
 find any particular notice, the price advanced 
 to 2/. Os. 10j^. as the average for 1688. Not- 
 withstanding the corn bill, however, the price 
 fell on the average of the three following 
 years.
 
 13 
 
 But, in 1692, commenced a series of extra- 
 ordinarily bad seasons ; they have been tra- 
 ditionally referred to as the barren years at the 
 close of the seventeenth century*. 
 
 Of these seasons there are some chronological 
 notices connected with the prices of provisions 
 in a publication entitled " An Inquiry into the 
 Prices of Wheat, Malt, and, occasionally, of 
 other Provisions, as sold in England from the 
 Year 1000 to the Year 1765." (Folio, published 
 for T. Longman, 1768.) — From which the fol- 
 lowing are extracts. 
 
 " 1692. Great rains in autumn ; an earthquake was felt 
 in England, and in most parts of Europe. 
 
 " 1 693. A very wet summer ; this unseasonable weather 
 extended to France, where numbers perished for want, not- 
 withstanding they imported much corn from Sweden and 
 Denmark. In Kent, turnips made a considerable share of 
 bread for the people. 
 
 * In the Farmer's Magazine, for January, 1800, (vol. I. 
 page 103,) is a passage in which the editors, after noticing 
 the importance of a register of the seasons, add " Such a 
 register will not only inform the present generation, but 
 must also prove very interesting to posterity. We need 
 hardly say, that if similar information could be procured 
 concerning the causes which occasioned the scanty crops 
 at the end of the seventeenth century, traditionally called 
 the barren years, it would be considered as a particular 
 obligation."
 
 14 
 
 " 1694. A very wet summer. 
 
 '.* 1695. Many of the Scotch are driven into Ireland by 
 the excessive price of corn. 
 
 " 1 696. A very wet summer. A great want of money 
 in specie ; but this was soon remedied by the new coin 
 coming out*. 
 
 " 1698. A very wet summer. The peace, and dearness 
 of corn in England, facilitate it to the French to seduce our 
 manufacturers ; with these they establish a woollen manu- 
 facture for cloths and woollen goods in Picardy. Great 
 complaints are made of the dearness of provisions and decay 
 of trade. 
 
 " 1699. A wet summer. These cold and wet seasons 
 lasted more than seven years; the dismal effects of famine 
 were felt in most parts of Europe." 
 
 The scarcity resulting from such seasons is 
 noticed by Dr. Adam Smith, in the following 
 terms : " The scarcity which prevailed in Eng- 
 land from 1693 to 1699, both inclusive, though 
 no doubt principally owing to the badness of the 
 seasons, and, therefore, extending through a 
 considerable part of Europe, must have been 
 somewhat enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, 
 accordingly, the further exportation of corn was 
 prohibited for nine months." As the price, on 
 
 * The state of the weather in 1 697 is not noticed in this 
 publication ; but, as the price advanced at the Michaelmas 
 of that year to 8*., and on the Lady-day following to 8*. 9d. 
 per Windsor bushel, the presumption is that the harvest 
 must have been unfavourable.
 
 15 
 
 the average, was above that up to which the 
 bounty was payable, it does not appear how 
 that measure could have enhanced the price, 
 and I quote the passage merely as evidence of 
 the notoriety of the fact of the prevalence of 
 scarcity through the greater part of Europe 
 during an interval of about seven years. 
 
 The relatively high prices of that period can, 
 indeed, not be satisfactorily accounted for in 
 any other way. The bounty must, on the 
 grounds which I have stated, have been wholly 
 inoperative to that effect ; or, rather, in as far 
 as it was calculated to force a surplus produce, 
 it might, when the exportation was prohibited, 
 have had a temporary effect in a contrary 
 direction, viz. of preventing the rise to so 
 great an extent as might otherwise have taken 
 place. 
 
 Some writers have ascribed the dearness of 
 provisions, at that time, to the debased state 
 of the silver coinage ; but, I am inclined to 
 think, that little, if any part, of the relatively 
 high prices can be ascribed to that cause. The 
 debasement of the coin was nearly, if not quite, 
 at its greatest height in the three years pre- 
 ceding 1692 ; and yet the price of wheat, on 
 the average of those three years, did not ex- 
 ceed 1/. 9s. 3d. per quarter. And, in 1687, the
 
 m 
 
 price was 1/. 2s. 4>d.; while, in 1692, it was at 
 21. Is. 5%d. ; and, in 1693, at 31. Os. \-\d. As 
 far, therefore, as the debasement of the cur- 
 rency went, the prices immediately pre- 
 ceding 1692, low as they were, would have 
 been still lower, if the coin had been perfect ; 
 and it leaves the whole advance, commencing 
 in 1692, as compared with the preceding periods, 
 to be accounted for by the seasons. In the 
 course of the years 1694 and 1695, measures 
 were taken for a new coinage ; and the effect 
 of these measures, while they were in progress, 
 was to occasion great scarcity of circulating 
 medium, by the inducement to hoard the more 
 perfect pieces, and to reject the imperfect. 
 In 1695 a proclamation was issued, prohibiting 
 the currency of the clipped money. In the 
 early part of 1696, being the interval between 
 the crying down of the old, and the issuing of 
 the new coin, the scarcity of money seems to 
 have been severely felt, as appears by the fol- 
 lowing extracts from Evelyn's Memoirs. 
 
 " June 11, 1696. Want of current money to carry on 
 the smallest concerns, even for daily provisions in the mar- 
 kets. Guineas lowered to 22s., and great sums daily trans- 
 ported to Holland, where it yields more, with other treasure 
 sent to pay the armies, and nothing considerable coined of 
 the new, and now only current stamp, cause such a scarcity, 
 that tumults are every day feared ; nobody paying or re-
 
 17 
 
 ceiving : so imprudent was the late parliament to condemn 
 the old, though dipt and corrupted, till they had provided 
 supplies. To this, add the fraud of the bankers and gold- 
 smiths, who, having gotten immense riches by extortion, 
 keepe up their treasure in expectation of enhancing its 
 value." 
 
 Nothing can indicate more strongly than 
 this description the great stagnation, and con- 
 sequent enhancement of the value of the cir- 
 culating medium*; and it is probable, there- 
 fore, that prices, high as they were from de- 
 ficiency of supply arising out of the seasons, 
 would have been still higher in the interval 
 immediately preceding I696, if the contraction 
 of the circulation had not been greater with a 
 debased, than it subsequently was with a more 
 perfect coin. In 1696 the new coin began to 
 appear, and, in the course of the two following 
 years, the reformation of the currency was 
 completed ; but it was precisely in this interval, 
 viz. from 1696 to 1699, both years included, 
 (the two last being years of peace), that prices 
 reached their greatest height. A further pre- 
 
 * I find that Mr. Huskisson, in his speech last session 
 (recently published) on Mr. Western's motion., quotes from 
 archdeacon Coxe's publication of the correspondence be- 
 tween king William and the duke of Shrewsbury, several 
 particulars which fully confirm this statement of the scarcity 
 of money and general stagnation which prevailed in 1696.
 
 IS 
 
 sumption against the supposition of the cur- 
 rency having had any material influence in this 
 high range of prices, is derived from the cir- 
 cumstance that a similar rise, confined likewise 
 to the same period, occurred in France. 
 
 The prevalence then of an extraordinary 
 succession of bad seasons from 1692 to 1699, 
 and the cessation of the unfavourable weather 
 for two or three years after, combined with 
 the extension of cultivation which was, in all 
 probability, encouraged by the high prices, are 
 fully sufficient to account for the fluctuation 
 between 1691, and the summer of 1703. 
 
 The harvest of 1703 seems to have been un- 
 favourable, as the price of wheat rose by Lady- 
 day following to nearly double of what it had 
 been in the preceding spring, viz. 
 
 Per Bushel of 9 Gallons. 
 *. d. 
 
 1703. Lady Day. . .39 
 Michaelmas . .53 
 
 1704. Lady Day . .73 
 
 (See Appendix.) 
 
 At Michaelmas, 1704, it fell to 4>s. 4<d., in- 
 dicating that the crops of that year had proved 
 abundant; and, from that time (the govern- 
 ment expenditure, be it remarked, arising from
 
 19 
 
 the war being then on a very large scale) til 
 1708, it continued at a low range, viz. from 
 3s. 3d. to 3s. lOd. The following is a notice of 
 this period, extracted from the work which I 
 have already quoted. 
 
 " 1706. — Historians take notice that about this time the 
 kingdom was blessed with plenty ; that the people cheerfully 
 contributed to the expense of the war." 
 
 The same author proceeds to say : 
 
 " 1708. — A hard frost, which brought on a prodigious 
 scarcity of provisions, more in France than in England. In 
 general the summer was cold and wet. . 
 
 " 1709. — The queen, in her speech to parliament, com- 
 plains of corn being exported at such high prices as dis- 
 tressed the poor. Exportation prohibited for one year. 
 There fell this year rain to the depth of 264 inches. I think 
 the mean depth of rain falling in England is 194 inches. 
 
 " 1710. — Exportation prohibited for one year." 
 
 The effect of this variation of the seasons on 
 prices is strikingly exemplified in the following 
 quotations : 
 
 1708. Lady Day 
 Michaelmas 
 
 1709. Lady Day 
 Michaelmas 
 
 1710. Lady Day 
 
 Per Bushel of 9 Gallons. 
 s. d. 
 . 3 10 
 
 . 6 6 
 . 8 1 
 . 11 6 
 . 11 6 
 
 (See Appendix.) 
 
 Being a rise of 200 per cent, in two years. We 
 were then indeed at war, as we had, however, 
 
 G
 
 been during the previous low prices ; but as if 
 to negative the possibility of ascribing the rise 
 in this instance to war demand or consumption, 
 it so happens that the price fell again in 1712 
 to 45. 9d. Nay, even further to prove how in- 
 dependent of the war the fluctuation in price 
 was, having continued at 4s. 9d. till the peace 
 of Utrecht, in 1713, immediately after that 
 event, but of course as a consequence of a bad 
 harvest, the price rose (at Michaelmas, 1713,) 
 to 8s., or 70 per cent. The price likewise rose 
 in France immediately after the peace of Utrecht 
 in a similar proportion. Here, then, in the in- 
 terval of twenty- two years, from 1692 to 1713, 
 are no fewer than twelve years of bad or indif- 
 ferent produce, and consequent high prices, 
 arising evidently from inclemency or unpro- 
 pitiousness of the seasons ; being as large a pro- 
 portion as I shall have to account for from 1793 
 to 1812. 
 
 But that proportion, or thereabouts, might in 
 both cases be supposed to apply generally, and 
 thereby lead to the expectation of the recur- 
 rence of a similar number of bad seasons, with 
 more or less regularity in any other equal series ; 
 I shall, therefore, proceed to point out a series of 
 greater length, in which the proportion of bad 
 or indifferent seasons was very small* viz. in a 
 series beginning with 1730.
 
 21 
 
 It may, however, be desirable to premise, that 
 from 1714 to 1725 there appears to be no re- 
 markable feature of dearness or cheapness, and 
 therefore no ground of inference, in the absence 
 of any historical notice, of decided scarcity, or 
 abundance. From 1725 to 1729, inclusive, was 
 a period of some, though not of a severe degree 
 of dearth, as may be inferred from the state of 
 prices, and from the change from export to 
 an excess of import in 1728 and 1729 # . Of 
 the years 1727, 1728, and 1729, the following 
 are the notices in the work I have before re- 
 ferred to. 
 
 « 1727. — The tinners of Cornwall rise, and plunder the 
 granaries in that county, provoked thereto by the scarcity 
 of corn, occasioned by the excess of exportation. 
 
 " 1728. — An act passed settling the price of imported 
 corn. The Lords declare the trade and manufactures of 
 England to decay. 
 
 " 1729. — A general sickness. An act relative to the im- 
 portation of corn." 
 
 These sixteen years, viz. from 1714 to 1729, 
 if added to the former term of twenty-two, may 
 contribute to reduce the proportion of bad 
 seasons, as compared with the whole series of 
 years from 1692 to 17^9, but will still leave a 
 
 * See Appendix for prices. The excess of import of 
 wheat was 70,757 quarters in 1728, and 21,322 in 1729, 
 while for thirty years before and thirty years after there was 
 a constant excess of export. (See Appendix.) 
 
 G 2
 
 22 
 
 very large proportion of bad and indifferent 
 seasons, even on the extended term of thirty- 
 eight years. 
 
 From 1730 to 1739, both years included, 
 there does not appear to have been one season 
 attended with any general or marked deficiency. 
 The highest quotation of wheat in this interval 
 is 5s. 9d. the bushel of nine gallons at Michael- 
 mas, 1735, having three years before been as 
 low as 3s. 3d.; but this advance may be ac- 
 counted for without the supposition of a bad 
 harvest : first, the cheapness of the preceding 
 years had induced what seems afterwards to 
 have proved to be too large an export*; and, 
 secondly, barley was at a price so high re- 
 latively to wheat for some time previous, as 
 to have occasioned more of the former and less 
 of the latter to have been sown : so at least 
 may reasonably be inferred from the following 
 comparison of the prices of wheat and malt. 
 
 Wheat. Malt. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 1732, Michaelmas 3 3 3 2 
 
 1735, ditto 5 9 2 10 
 The conclusion accordingly is, that there was 
 not one decidedly bad season in the interval of 
 ten years, from 1730 to 1739. 
 
 Quarters. 
 * Excess of export in 1733, 427,192 wheat. 
 Ditto 1734, 498,190 ditto. 
 
 (See Appendix.)
 
 23 
 
 The winter of 1739-40 is recorded as having 
 been one of unparalleled severity and duration, 
 and the following harvest was unfavourable, in- 
 somuch that wheat rose at Michaelmas, 1740, 
 to fs. 10 J*/, per bushel of nine gallons. 
 
 From that time there seems to have been 
 again an uninterrupted series of ten good or 
 abundant seasons, viz. from 1741 to 1751. The 
 testimony to this effect rests on the best possible 
 authority. The author of the celebrated Corn 
 Tracts # , who is so often quoted by Dr. Adam 
 Smith, and who has furnished materials and 
 facts for the great bulk of succeeding writers 
 on the subject of corn, expressly says (page 20, 
 2d ed.) " We had ten as good years as ever were 
 known in succession from 1741 to 17-51. " 
 
 In addition to this testimony as to the general 
 character attaching to the term from 1741 to 
 1751, I have met with casual descriptions of 
 particular years ; and thefollowing extractsfrom 
 the correspondence of Mr. Peter Collinson, a 
 celebrated botanist, to Linnaeus, containing those 
 descriptions, may not be unamusing, at the same 
 time that they will tend to form something like 
 a standard of what may be considered as a fine 
 
 * These (of which the first edition appeared in 17S5) 
 were published anonymously, but have been generally 
 ascribed to Mr. Charles Smith.
 
 season, to which to refer a comparison of the 
 seasons of more recent occurrence, as well as of 
 those from 1793 to 1813. 
 
 " London, Jan. 18, O. S. 1743. 
 
 " We have now a wonderful fine season, that makes our 
 spring flowers come forth. 1 am sure you would be delighted 
 to see my windows filled with six pots of flowers, which the 
 gardener has sent me to town *, viz. great plenty of aconites, 
 white and green hellebore, double hepatica, crocus, poly- 
 anthus, periwinkle, lauristinus, vernal red cyclamen, single 
 anemonies, and snowdrops. None of these were brought 
 forward by any art, but entirely owing to the temperature of 
 the season, though some seasons I have known things for- 
 warder than now." 
 
 « London, Oct. 26, 1747, O. S. 
 
 « My garden is in great beauty, for we have had no frost, 
 a long, dry, warm summer, and autumn grapes very ripe. 
 
 " The vineyards turn to good profit, much wine being 
 made this year in England." 
 
 « London, Oct. 3, 1748, O. S. 
 " We have had a fine summer. Great plenty of all sorts 
 of fruits and grain, and a very delightful autumn. It is now 
 as warm as summer ; no bearing of fires. My orange trees 
 are yet abroad. My vineyard grapes are very ripe : a con- 
 siderable quantity of wine will this year be made in England. 
 We have not had one frosty morning this autumn. Marvel 
 of Peru, double-flowered nasturtium, and all other annuals 
 are not touched. My garden makes a fine show." 
 
 " May 8, 1749. 
 " How the winter has been in Sweden I do not know, but 
 at London the like warmth and mildness were never remem- 
 
 * Mr. Collinson's country house was at Mill Hill.
 
 25 
 
 bered. Our autumn was long, warm, and dry, with a few 
 slight frosts before Christmas ; but we have had since fine, 
 warm, dry weather, and no frosts or snow. Our gardens 
 were in great beauty in January and February : almonds, 
 apricots, and peaches in blossom. Feb. 23. I went into the 
 country. The elm hedges had small leaves ; standard plums, 
 almonds, and crocuses in full blossom ; gooseberries shewing 
 their fruit. In short, it would be endless to talk to you of 
 the wonders of this season. March 5. The fig in my London 
 garden had small leaves when peas and beans under south 
 walls were in blossom." 
 
 The exuberant abundance, resulting from sea- 
 sons of which these letters afford a few speci- 
 mens, is moreover referred to in several pam- 
 phlets, to which the dearths of 1757 and of some 
 subsequent periods gave rise. 
 
 From what the author of the Corn Tracts 
 states, the seasons from 1752 to 1755 seem to 
 have been of doubtful produce ; for his words 
 are, after mentioning the ten good years in suc- 
 cession, " Nay, if the common opinion is right, 
 we have had sixteen." But we may conclude, 
 that if not decidedly abundant, they were not 
 deficient in any considerable degree ; for there 
 was a large export in some of those years, a 
 great want of corn being experienced in the 
 south of Europe in that interval, and the prices 
 at home were not raised very materially by that 
 export. 
 
 I have been induced to trespass on the pa-
 
 26 
 
 tience of my readers with so long a detail of the 
 seasons in the interval from 1730 to 1755, be- 
 cause they present a series of twenty-six years, 
 with the intervention of only one of a decidedly 
 unfavourable character, viz. the winter of 1739- 
 40, followed by a bad harvest ; and because the 
 inferences from the fact are of incalculable im- 
 portance as to the probable or possible effect 
 of such a succession of favourable seasons on 
 prices, independent of any alteration in the cur- 
 rency or in the financial measures of the go- 
 vernment, and independent likewise of transi- 
 tions from war to peace. 
 
 But confining the comparison to the years 
 ending in 1751, it appears that there was only 
 one bad or deficient out of twenty-two, while in 
 the equal series ending in 1713, there were 
 twelve bad or deficient. 
 
 The degree of cheapness resulting from a 
 succession of good seasons, or of seasons un- 
 marked by the intervention of any one of great 
 deficiency, is so curious as to be worth exhibit- 
 ing more in detail than is usually done, as the 
 tables containing average prices are generally 
 confined to the quotations of wheat, and do not 
 give the whole range of variations even of that 
 single article. The following are the quotations 
 of prices at Mark -lane and Bear-quay, for fif- 
 teen years, and they afford a confirmation in de-
 
 27 
 
 tail of the greatest depression having occurred 
 during a very large government expenditure 
 defrayed by loans : — 
 
 January Prices of Grain at 
 given in the Gentleman's 
 Appendix to Sir Frederick 
 
 Years. Wheat. 
 
 Mark-lane and Bear-quay, as 
 Magazine, extracted from the 
 Morton Eden's tvork (page 80.) 
 
 War. 
 
 War 
 
 fl742, 
 
 | 1743, 
 
 | 1744, 
 
 -{ 1745, 
 
 | 1746, 
 
 I 1747, 
 
 1 1748, 
 
 1749, 
 
 1750, 
 
 1751, 
 
 1752, 
 
 1753, 
 
 1754, 
 
 1755, 
 
 1756, 
 
 { 
 
 26 to 29 
 
 20 2.3 
 
 19 
 18 
 
 16 
 27 
 26 
 27 
 24 
 24 
 33 
 29 
 27 
 24 
 22 
 
 21 
 20 
 
 24 
 30 
 28 
 32 
 29 
 27 
 34 
 33 
 33 
 26 
 26 
 
 Barley. 
 
 15 
 15 
 1 1 
 12 
 10 
 8 
 13 
 17 
 14 
 14 
 17 
 17 
 17 
 12 
 14 
 
 to 
 
 20 
 20 
 13 
 15 
 12 
 12 
 14 
 18 
 17 
 17 
 19 
 18 
 19 
 14 
 15 
 
 Oats. 
 s. 
 
 12 to 
 13 
 
 9 
 12 
 12 
 
 6 9d. 
 
 9 
 
 14 
 12 
 13 
 
 12 6d. 
 10 Gd. 
 12 Qd. 
 10 
 12 
 
 15 
 16 
 12 
 
 16 
 14 
 
 12 
 
 16 
 14 
 14 
 16 
 12 
 13 
 13 
 13 
 
 The harvests of the four years from 1752 to 
 17<55, although not attended with any marked 
 deficiency of general produce, were considered 
 by the author of the Corn Tracts as having 
 yielded rather scanty or bare average crops. 
 Yet, scanty as they may have been, there was 
 a considerable exportation to the south of Eu- 
 rope, where the crops were more deficient than 
 in this country: the exportation was of course, 
 under such circumstances, extended by the 
 bounty somewhat beyond what it otherwise 
 would have been, and the consequent rise in
 
 28 
 
 price in 1753 and 1754, although the average 
 price of wheat was under 405. per quarter in 
 both of those years, occasioned to a population 
 accustomed for so long a period to cheapness 
 of provisions, the contrast of dearth, and ex- 
 cited great dissatisfaction at the bounty, as 
 having contributed to it. 
 
 The following are among the chronological no- 
 tices of this period, in the work which I have 
 before quoted : — 
 
 " 1753. The people in the west, Manchester, Yorkshire, 
 and many other counties, rise, on account of the high price of 
 provisions, and the exportation of corn : eight people are 
 killed at Leeds. 
 
 '* 1754. For more than sixty years past the French have 
 infringed on our woollen manufactures. In cases of need, 
 they are assisted with corn from England, with a large dis- 
 count or bounty, and with other provisions from Ireland. 
 
 " 1755. Great quantities of corn and provisions sent to 
 Lisbon, on account of their distress by the late earthquake." 
 
 But the harvest of 1756 proved greatly de- 
 ficient, as well in this country, as through the 
 greater part of Europe ; and the scarcity thence 
 arising was attended with a very considerable 
 advance of price, and with severe suffering 
 among the lower classes, which is thus noticed 
 in the same work : — 
 
 " 1756. Many insurrections in England, on account of 
 the scarcity of corn, and the high prices of provisions. The 
 king expresses to the parliament his concern for the suffer- 
 ings of the poor, and the disturbances to which they have
 
 29 
 
 given rise ; and exhorts them to consider of proper measures 
 to prevent the like mischiefs hereafter. The exportation of 
 corn prohibited from Christmas." 
 
 It may be worth while to break the course of 
 this description of the seasons, in order to show 
 the prodigious effect on price of one season of 
 decided scarcity, when, from previous exporta- 
 tion or scanty crops, there was no considerable 
 old stock. The quotations of wheat in Mark- 
 lane, in 1756, before the deficiency of the 
 harvest of that year had been ascertained, 
 were 22s. to 26s. 
 
 In January, 17-57* the price rose to 49s. 50s. 
 
 February . . 47s. 51s. 
 
 March . . . 46s. 54s. 
 
 April . . . 64s. 
 
 May . . . 64s. 
 
 June . . . 67s. 72s. 
 The prices afterwards declined, although 
 slowly, as the deficiency of that year had been 
 so great and general. 
 
 The six succeeding seasons, viz. from 1757 to 
 I762, both years included, seem to have been 
 favourable : the particular character of some of 
 them is noticed in Collinson's correspondence. 
 
 " December 25 and 27, 1757. 
 " The extraordinary heat of our summer has ripened all 
 sorts of fruit to perfection. In two gardens I saw this year 
 pomegranates against south walls, without any art, ripened 
 beyond what can be imagined in so northern a climate ; they 
 look extremely beautiful, and are of the size of some brought
 
 30 
 
 from abroad. Our autumn has been long, dry, and warm, 
 and so continues ; for a few slight frosts have not stripped the 
 garden of flowers at Christmas-day. The winter season is 
 not closed before the spring flowers begin ; for there are 
 plenty of polyanthus, narcissus, pansies, and sweet vio- 
 lets," &c. 
 
 "July 25, 1759. 
 " We had the mildest winter ever known. Our spring was 
 early and very agreeable, and our summer the finest and 
 warmest since 1 750. Great plenty of all sorts of grain and 
 fruits. New wheat, of this year's produce, has been the 21st 
 inst. at market." 
 
 '« London, Sept. 2, 1762. 
 " We have had a delightful warm summer ; all the fruits 
 of the earth very good and in great plenty." 
 
 The season of 1763 is thus noticed by Col- 
 linson : — 
 
 " London, September 15, 1763. 
 " Almost every day rain since the middle of July; the 
 spring and summer very dry to that time. Very great plenty 
 of grass and all sorts of corn, but the weather unkindly for 
 the harvest." 
 
 Of the succeeding season I find no direct 
 
 notice by Collinson ; but as the price* rose at 
 
 Michaelmas, 1764, the harvest of that year may 
 
 * In the chronological table of prices, and of the events 
 connected with them, in the work before referred to is the 
 following passage : — " 1764. The king reminds his parlia- 
 ment of the high prices of corn, occasioned by the exportation 
 of it. The parliament find the price of beef to be 3d. per 
 lb. to the vendor. Beef, mutton, and veal, at Exeter, Ad. 
 to Aid:* 
 
 N. B. In the same work, under the date 1724, beef, mut- 
 ton, veal, and pork, are stated to have been at l|rf. per lb. 
 at Exeter.
 
 31 
 
 be presumed to have been unfavourable ; at the 
 same time, as there was a large export, it is pos- 
 sible that the advanced price may in some mea- 
 sure have been occasioned by an unusual de- 
 mand for corn abroad. 
 
 Collinson gives the following description of 
 the season of 1765 : — 
 
 " London, September 17, 1765. 
 
 " You, my dear friend, surprise me with telling me of 
 your cold and wet summer ; whereas our summer has been 
 as much in the extreme the other way. For all May, June, 
 and July were excessively hot and dry ; but six or seven 
 rainy days in three months, so that all our grass fields look 
 like the sun-burnt countries of Spain and Africa. The be- 
 ginning of August we had some fine rains, but they did not 
 recover our usual verdure ; since to the present writing hot 
 and dry weather, not a drop of rain for fourteen days. Our 
 hay is very short, and oats and barley a middling crop ; but 
 of wheat, which we most wanted, good Providence has fa- 
 voured us with a plentiful crop and a good harvest, which 
 began two weeks sooner than in common years." 
 
 After this fine, though not very productive 
 season, there was a series of nearly ten years, 
 marked by a very frequent recurrence of un- 
 propitious seasons : and as henceforward a new 
 epocha commenced in the corn trade of this 
 country, marked by a range of relatively high 
 prices, and accompanied by a change from a 
 balance of export to a balance of import of 
 grain, it may be worth while to pause here for 
 the purpose of considering some of the pheno- 
 mena presented by the period ending in 1765.
 
 All the writers who have turned their atten- 
 tion to the subject of the prices of corn have 
 been struck with the circumstance of the cheap- 
 ness of the period from 1700 to 1765, compared 
 with the average price of the preceding cen- 
 tury, and have endeavoured variously to ac- 
 count for that circumstance. The pamphlets 
 with which the press teemed, upon the change 
 from low to high prices, referred all the pheno- 
 mena of the fluctuation, according as it suited 
 the views of the writers, to the operation of the 
 bounty on exportation. The question respect- 
 ing the effects of the bounty seems, indeed, to 
 have given rise to as much controversy at that 
 time, as the more recent question of the bank 
 restriction has since done. 
 
 The advocates for the bounty contended, that 
 the cheapness of corn was wholly attributable 
 to that measure, while, upon every occurrence 
 of a season of dearth, the scarcity and conse- 
 sequent high price was by the adversaries of the 
 bounty referred to the excess of exportation 
 which had been thus artificially encouraged. 
 
 It is not my intention to enter upon a dis- 
 cussion of the principle and policy of the bounty 
 on the exportation of corn * 5 I have only the 
 
 * The ultimate effect of a bounty on the exportation of 
 corn may, I think, be clearly proved to be that of raising 
 the price to the consumer at home, by eventually inducing
 
 following short remarks to make upon it, as con- 
 nected with its effects on prices. 
 
 If the bounty is to have the credit of the 
 low range of prices, which is chiefly ob- 
 servable between 1715 and 1765, how happens 
 it that a similar degree of cheapness should have 
 prevailed in France during precisely the same 
 interval, as it appears to have done by the fol- 
 lowing statement of prices, extracted from the 
 article " Corn Laws and Corn Trade," in the 
 supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
 
 " The following is a table of the price of the septier of 
 the best wheat, bl'e de tete, weighing 2401bs. mark the septier, 
 at the Rosoy or Paris market for 146 years, ending with 1788 : 
 
 livres. sous, deniers. 
 
 1643, to 1652, 35 14 1 
 
 1653, 1662, 32 12 2 
 
 1663, 1672, 23 6 11 
 
 1673, 1682, 25 13 8 
 
 resort to land of an inferior quality, and thereby increasing 
 the cost of production. On this point, as on most others 
 involving any important principle in political economy, I 
 have the advantage of agreeing with Mr. Ricardo, who, 
 page 368, Principles of Political Economy, 3d edition, 
 after observing that " the natural price of corn is not so 
 fixed as the natural price of commodities, because with any 
 great additional demand for corn, land of a worse quality 
 must be taken into cultivation, on which more labour will 
 be required to produce a given quantit}', and the natural 
 price of corn will be raised," adds, " by a continued bounty, 
 therefore, on the exportation of corn, there would be created 
 a tendency to a permanent rise in the price of corn."
 
 34 
 
 
 
 livres. 
 
 sous. 
 
 deniers. 
 
 1683, 
 
 to 1692, 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 1693, 
 
 1702, 
 
 31 
 
 16 
 
 1 
 
 1703, 
 
 1712, 
 
 23 
 
 17 
 
 1 
 
 1713, 
 
 1715, 
 
 33 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 1716, 
 
 1725, 
 
 17 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 1726, 
 
 1736, 
 
 16 
 
 19 
 
 4 
 
 1736, 
 
 1745, 
 
 18 
 
 15 
 
 7 
 
 1746, 
 
 1755, 
 
 18 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 1756, 
 
 1765, 
 
 17 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 1766, 
 
 1775, 
 
 28 
 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 1776, 
 
 1785, 
 
 22 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 
 1786, 
 
 20 
 
 12 
 
 6 
 
 
 1787, 
 
 22 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 
 1788, 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 General average of the 146 years 24 liv. 1 so. 4 den. 
 
 And this degree of cheapness, be it observed, 
 took place under a system of corn laws, the very- 
 reverse of what prevailed in this country, the 
 exportation thence being absolutely prohibited. 
 Accordingly, while the low prices in this coun- 
 try were, by the advocates for the bounty, 
 ascribed to our encouragement of exportation, a 
 similar depression of prices in France was, by 
 most French writers, attributed to the discou- 
 ragement of exportation, and to the occasional 
 encouragement of importation. So strong was 
 the impression there that the low prices were 
 occasioned by the restrictive regulations which 
 prohibited, not only the exportation to foreign 
 countries, but the free circulation from pro- 
 vince to province, that in 1763 the government
 
 3,5 
 
 of France was induced to issue a declaration, 
 allowing the free circulation of grain in the in- 
 terior, and an edict in the following year 
 granting a general liberty of export as well as 
 of import, subject only to modification as to 
 the price at which the export was to cease, 
 viz. 12 livres 10 sous the quintal, equal, accord- 
 ing to the author of the Corn Tracts, to about 
 28s .the quarter, London measure. 
 
 The translation of a speech by M. LeCaradeuc 
 de la Chalotais, procureur-general to the parlia- 
 ment of Britanny, when he carried into court 
 the edict of the month of July, 1764, to be re- 
 gistered, is given by the author of the Corn 
 Tracts, and it is so full of valuable information 
 as to the state of the corn trade in France for a 
 century preceding, at the same time that it bears 
 so strongly upon the points which I am discuss- 
 ing, that I am induced to insert a considerable 
 part of it in the Appendix. 
 
 In this speech we have the confirmation of 
 the fact which I before stated, of the low range 
 of the price of wheat in that country as well as 
 in this, during the period in question, and of 
 the fall being attributed to the want of liberty 
 of export. I may hereafter have occasion to 
 make some further remarks upon that document, 
 in the meantime I would ask, can the same 
 effect, viz. of an extraordinary degree of cheap- 
 
 H
 
 36 
 
 ness, compared with any anterior or succeeding 
 period, be ascribed to systems so opposite ? 
 
 There must, then, have been some general 
 cause tending to such a similarity of general 
 effect, viz. of the low price of corn in the fifty 
 years preceding 1765. That general cause was 
 sought by Dr. Adam Smith, and other writers, in 
 a supposed alteration in the value of the metals. 
 Silver was inferred to have increased slowly in 
 value after the close of the 17th century ; and 
 there were some plausible reasons for that 
 opinion, although they have since appeared to 
 be without sufficient grounds. The only satis- 
 factory solution of that general effect will, I 
 suspect, be found in a reference to the fact 
 which I have noticed, of the prevalence of 
 an extraordinary proportion of favourable sea- 
 sons. The description which I have given ap- 
 plies, more or less, to the whole term between 
 1715 and 1765, but more especially to the sea- 
 sons from 1730 to 1765. In that interval of 
 thirty-six years, there were in this country only 
 two seasons, as far as I have been able to trace, 
 of great and general scarcity, viz. 1740 and 
 1756 ; and there is every reason to believe that 
 the same prevalence of seasons of a favourable 
 description was experienced in France. Mr. 
 Lowe, in his very useful and valuable work on 
 the present state of England, has the following
 
 37 
 
 remarks ; in the justness of which I perfectly 
 concur, on the prevalence of a general simi- 
 larity of seasons in Europe within certain 
 latitudes. 
 
 " The public, particularly the untravelled part of the 
 public, are hardly aware of the similarity of temperature 
 prevailing throughout what may be called the corn-country 
 of Europe, we mean Great Britain, Ireland, the north of 
 France, the Netherlands, Denmark, the north-west of Ger- 
 many, and, in some measure, Poland, and the north-east of 
 Germany. All this tract is situated between the 45th and 
 55th degrees of latitude, and subject, in a considerable 
 degree, to the prevalence of similar winds. Neither the 
 superabundance of rain which we experience in one summer, 
 or its deficiency in another, are by any means confined to 
 Great Britain and Ireland ; while in winter both the in- 
 tensity and duration of frost are always greater on the 
 continent. Exceptions certainly exist in particular tracts, 
 but in support of our general argument, we have merely to 
 recall to those of our readers who are of an age to recollect 
 the early part of the war, or who have attended to registers 
 of temperature, the more remarkable seasons of the present 
 age: thus, in 1791-, the spring was prematurely warm on 
 the continent as in England : there, as with us, the summer 
 of 1798 was dry, and that of 1799 wet: again in 1811 the 
 harvest was deficient throughout the north-west of Europe 
 generally, from one and the same cause, blight ; while that of 
 1816 was still more generally deficient, from rain and want 
 of warmth. In regard to a more remote period, we mean 
 the 17th and 18th centuries generally, if the temperature 
 has not been so accurately noted, we find, from the co- 
 incidence in prices, that it is highly probable that there pre- 
 vailed a great similarity in the weather of the continent ; 
 thus, in France, the latter years of the 17th century; the 
 
 H 2
 
 38 
 
 seasons of 1708 and 1709, as well as several of the seasons 
 between 1764 and 1773, were as unpropitious, and attended 
 with as great an advance of price, as in England." (Page 
 149.) 
 
 Mr. Lowe considers the cheapness of corn 
 in this country for the fifty years, ending 
 in 1765, as in some degree accounted for by 
 the exemption from bad seasons ; but he like- 
 wise attributes a great deal to the state of 
 peace which prevailed during so large a por- 
 tion of that interval, not adverting to the cir- 
 cumstance, that the most striking instance of 
 cheapness was during a period of war. 
 
 It would be difficult, indeed, to suppose the 
 occurrence of a series of so many years, with 
 the intervention of only two seasons of decided 
 scarcity, without inferring that a general cheap- 
 ness of provisions must be the consequence. 
 
 We come now to a period of dearness of pro- 
 visions, prevailing not only in this country, but 
 in the rest of Europe ; and this dearness, like 
 the preceding cheapness, was referred to the 
 most contradictory causes. In France it was 
 ascribed to the recent permission of exporta- 
 tion, while in this country it was attributed to 
 the temporary suspension of the bounty, and 
 of the liberty of exportation, while others re- 
 ferred it to a previous excess of export ; not to 
 mention the clamours usual upon every occur-
 
 39 
 
 rence of dearth against farmers, millers, and 
 bakers. Adam Smith, in the following passage, 
 refers it, in my opinion, to the right cause. 
 
 " The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years 
 past, indeed, has occasioned a suspicion that the real value 
 of silver still continues to fall in the European market. 
 This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to have 
 been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourableness of the 
 seasons, and ought therefore to be regarded, not as a per- 
 manent, but as a transitory and occasional event. The 
 seasons for these ten or twelve years past have been un- 
 favourable through the greater part of Europe ; and the 
 disorders of Poland have very much increased the scarcity 
 in all those countries, which, in dear years, used to be sup- 
 plied from that market. So long a course of bad seasons, 
 though not a very common event, is by no means a singular 
 one; and whoever has inquired much into the history of 
 the prices of corn in former times will be at no loss to re- 
 collect several other examples of the same kind. Ten years 
 of extraordinary scarcity, besides, are not more wonderful 
 than ten years of extraordinary plenty. The low price of 
 corn from 174<1 to 1750, both inclusive, may very well be 
 set in opposition to its high price during the last eight or 
 ten years." (Vol. I. p. 310. 3d ed.) 
 
 Of the prevalence of a series of bad seasons, 
 or, at least, of the very frequent recurrence of 
 them in this country, and in a still greater 
 degree, perhaps, in the rest of Europe, in the 
 interval between 1765 and 1776, there can be 
 no reasonable doubt. The season of 1766, and 
 some of the effects of the deficient crops of that 
 season, are thus described by Collinson.
 
 40 
 
 " London, Sept. 25, 1766. 
 " We hare had a most uncommon rainy summer, which 
 was no way propitious to the growth of wheat ; but it pleased 
 Providence to send us the finest hot and dry harvest ever 
 known, yet the warm constant rains drew up the wheat so 
 much to stalk, that the ears are very light. I hope there will 
 be sufficient to support the nation, now we have prudently 
 stopped the exportation ; for so great are the wants, and 
 the demand for foreign markets was so great and so press- 
 ing, that it advanced the price so considerably as to occasion 
 insurrections in many parts of the kingdom, to stop by force 
 the corn from being exported ; but now a proclamation is 
 come out to prevent it, I hope all will be quiet again." 
 
 The letters of Collinson are discontinued 
 after the winter of that year ; and I have not 
 met with distinct notices of the description 
 of particular seasons from that time till 1776. 
 There are, indeed, in the correspondence of 
 the Abbe Galliani, and some other writers at 
 that period, abundant references to the exist- 
 ence of scarcity in France, approaching to fa- 
 mine, in part of that interval. But the testimony 
 of Dr. Adam Smith, who wrote from personal 
 and recent observation and information, is quite 
 decisive as to the prevalence of bad seasons in 
 this country, and over a great part of Europe, 
 during the whole period. This change in the 
 character of the seasons is quite sufficient to 
 account for the change from our being ex- 
 porters to our becoming importers of corn. 
 The difference in quantity between the export
 
 41 
 
 at one period, and in the import in the other, 
 is not near so great as the probable difference 
 between a good and a bad harvest : it is not 
 necessary, therefore, to resort to the supposition 
 of any alteration in the state of population 
 relatively to the extent of cultivation. It is 
 possible that a rapidly increasing population 
 might somewhat have outrun the extent of 
 cultivation ; but it could hardly have done so 
 to such a degree, and so suddenly, as to ac- 
 count for the transition from a large export of 
 corn in 1764, to an import in I767*. 
 
 The able and well-informed writer of the 
 article in the Supplement of the Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica, which I have before referred to, 
 ascribes the greater part of the transition from 
 an export to an import to a difference in the 
 consumption at the different periods j but, 
 allowing the utmost for a difference in the rate 
 of consumption, on the ground stated in that 
 article, such a cause is, I apprehend, wholly in- 
 adequate to have produced that effect within 
 the period referred to. Besides that, an in- 
 creased consumption is more generally the con- 
 sequence of cheapness than the immediate cause 
 of dearness ; and it was the relative dearness 
 
 * See Appendix.
 
 42 
 
 which, in that instance, occasioned the excess 
 of import. 
 
 Of the seasons in the seven years, from 1776 
 to 1782, I have not any distinct record at hand; 
 but they may, I think, be inferred to have been 
 favourable, and to have been attended with fair 
 average crops, because, with an increased and 
 increasing population, the produce was suf- 
 ficient for the consumption. The whole excess 
 of import of grain of all kinds in those seven 
 years amounted only to 28,978 quarters ; while 
 of wheat alone there was an excess of export, 
 on the balance of the whole term, amounting 
 to no less a quantity than 524,103 quarters. 
 In point of value, therefore, there was an ex- 
 cess of corn exported in the seven years ending 
 in 1782 ; and the price was on an average lower 
 in those seven years than in the seven preceding 
 or succeeding: so that the alteration of the 
 corn laws in 1773 had, in no possible view, the 
 effect imputed to it by the advocates of the 
 bounty on export, and of the greater restriction 
 to importation. We had imported largely for 
 the five years preceding that alteration, and 
 we ceased to import on the balance of seven 
 years, in a period during which the law so 
 altered was in force. 
 
 The harvest of 1782 proved to be very un-
 
 43 
 
 favourable. In Scotland the weather during 
 the whole of that year was as inclement as the 
 season of 1799 afterwards proved to be; and 
 in the Farmer's Magazine for 1800 there is a 
 minute description of the similarity in point 
 of weather of those two years. In the rest of 
 the island there was a deficiency of produce, 
 although not to so great a degree as in Scotland. 
 A winter of great severity followed, prices rose 
 considerably, and a large importation of corn 
 took place in 1783. 
 
 As an instance of the great and sudden altera- 
 tion of prices, occasionally arising from the oc- 
 currence of even a single bad season, when 
 there is not, as there appears not to have been, 
 a large stock on hand, I subjoin an extract 
 from the Annals of Agriculture (vol. 3. p. 366.) 
 of a communication from Mr. William Pitt, dated 
 Pendeford, April 4, 1785, entitled 
 
 " CONTRASTS." 
 
 The following contrast of effects arising from dissimilar 
 seasons, now so recent, may perhaps appear striking in 
 some future succession of regular seasons, and, as they will 
 not take up much room, may be worth preserving from 
 oblivion, by registering it in the Annals of Agriculture. I 
 doubt not but yourself and many others can recollect cir- 
 cumstances more remarkable ; the following have come under 
 my own immediate observation.
 
 44 
 
 PVinter succeeding the harvest 
 ofl781. 
 
 I. s. d. 
 
 Barley of the best 
 quality sold in the 
 markets of Staf- 
 fordshire, our cus- 
 tomary bushel, of 
 9£ gallons, down to 2 
 
 Wheat, immediately 
 after the harvest, 
 clean for seed, 
 the above mea- 
 sure, per bushel 5 
 
 Spring- season, 1782. 
 
 Bought 60 bushels of 
 Dutch oats for 
 seed, delivered at 
 home, per bushel 18 
 
 A friend of mine sold 
 clover seed of a 
 good quality at the 
 common market 
 price, which was 
 per cwt. Ill 6 
 
 Winter succeeding the harvest 
 o/1782. 
 
 /. s. d. 
 Barley of the same 
 
 quality sold in 
 1 the same markets, 
 
 same measure, 
 
 common price, 
 
 per bushel, 7s. to 7 2 
 Wheat of the best 
 
 quality, same mea- 
 
 sure, per bushel, 
 
 105. to 10 6 
 
 Spring, 1/83. 
 
 Sold out of the pro- 
 duct oats that had 
 lain a month in the 
 wet, and so da- 
 maged in the stack 
 by rain during 
 making and carry- 
 ing in bad order, 
 that they moulded 
 and grew together, 
 per bushel 3 6 
 
 Bought again clover 
 seed of the same 
 quality for his own 
 sowing, at per 
 cwt. 5 10
 
 45 
 
 /. s. d. I. s. d. 
 
 1782. Bought Wor- 1784. Hops inferior 
 
 cestershire hops of in quality to the 
 
 excellent quality, opposite, bought 
 
 at per cvvt. 2 2 at per cwt. 5 12 
 
 The harvests of 1783 and 1784 do not ap- 
 pear to have been unfavourable, but they were 
 followed by severe winters. The eifect of so 
 frequent a recurrence of winters of great severity 
 was felt in a comparative scarcity and high 
 price of animal food ; and this description of 
 dearth induced the Corporation of London, in 
 1786, to appoint a committee for the purpose 
 of inquiring into the causes of the high price 
 of provisions. The first resolution of the com- 
 mittee in their report is sagely couched in the 
 following terms: 
 
 " Resolved, that it appears to your committee, from the 
 three different papers mentioned in the evidence of Mr. 
 Montague, principal clerk in the Chamberlain's office, and 
 Mr. Tomlinson, receiver of the tolls in Smithfieldj. market, 
 containing an account of the number of cattle and sheep 
 brought into the said market during the last thirty-six 
 years, that from the year 1732 to 1778, the same had 
 annually increased in a very considerable degree ; and that 
 there has been a greater increase from 1778 to 1783; but 
 the decrease that has happened during the years 1 784 and 
 1785, we are of opinion, from the evidence that has been 
 laid before us, arises from the pernicious system of fore- 
 stalling in the vicinity of this metropolis."
 
 46 
 
 The committee likewise attacked the pre- 
 vailing tendency to new inclosures as one of the 
 concurrent causes. I should not have noticed 
 this strange document, but for the following in- 
 formation which the inquiry brought forth. The 
 magistrates of Sunderland, in answer to the in- 
 quiries, write, 
 
 " For the last three years we have had two very dry 
 summers, and three very severe winters, which caused 
 much destruction among sheep and lambs in the spring, 
 and occasioned a great consumption of all kinds of fodder ; 
 and even great quantities of oats were used after hay, straw, 
 and turnips were eaten up." 
 
 There are other answers to a similar pur- 
 port : I shall only further extract the concluding 
 part of one from Arthur Young, dated August, 
 1786. 
 
 " Last winter hay, straw, and fodder of all kinds were 
 scarcer and dearer than ever known in this kingdom. Severe 
 frosts destroyed the turnips and cattle of all kinds, and sheep 
 suffered dreadfully ; many died, and the rest were in ill 
 plight to fatten early in this summer." 
 
 Attached to the report of the committee is 
 a statement of the numbers of cattle and sheep 
 sold at Smithfield, from 1732 to 1785. Sir 
 Frederic M. Eden has inserted that statement 
 in his work, and continued it down to 1795; 
 and as a statement of that kind in regular series, 
 down to the present time, may be useful, I in- 
 sert one in the Appendix.
 
 *7 
 
 The winter of 1788-9 was again a very severe 
 one, and followed by a backward spring. The 
 crops of 1789 were indifferent ; but prices 
 abroad being relatively high, there was no im- 
 portation, and the Windsor price of wheat in 
 consequence rose by Lady-day, 1790, to 8s. 3d. 
 the bushel of nine gallons. 
 
 The only remarkably abundant season in the 
 period after 1786 was the year 1791, which is 
 described in the Annals of Agriculture, (vol. 
 24, p. 321), as one of singular abundance and 
 felicity. And the produce of that season, co- 
 operating with a large importation, reduced the 
 Windsor price of wheat by Lady-day, 1792, to 
 5s. 9d. the nine gallon bushel. The year 1792 
 is stated in the Annals of Agriculture to have 
 been " remarkable for an extremely wet summer, 
 by which the crop of wheat was much injured 
 every where." 
 
 On a review of the whole period, from 1782 
 to 1792, both years included, there seems to 
 have been, after the very bad harvest of 1782, a 
 large proportion of severe winters and backward 
 springs in the earlier part of the series, and, 
 with the exception of 1791, no instance of very 
 abundant produce. Consequently the prices of 
 provisions may be presumed to have been at a 
 somewhat higher level, and the importations of
 
 48 
 
 corn to have been on a larger scale than they 
 would have been if the seasons had been of full 
 average produce in the whole term, or, in other 
 words, as favourable as an equal series of con- 
 secutive years has been described to have been 
 in some former instances.
 
 49 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 Character of the Seasons from ]/93 to 1821, both Years 
 included. 
 
 So much, in my opinion, depends upon the 
 character of the seasons, dating from 1793, in 
 the explanation of prices, and so little appears 
 to be in the recollection of the public generally 
 respecting them, that I may be allowed to be 
 somewhat minute in the description of each. 
 
 In the Annals of Agriculture, Arthur Young, 
 writing in April, 179<5, after having described 
 the summer of 1792 as having been extremely 
 wet, and the crops of wheat as having been 
 injured every where, proceeds to say, 
 
 " The summer of 1793 was a very dry one, in which, 
 though the wheat was moderate, the spring crops generally 
 proved deficient. In the last summer, 1 794, the wheat turned 
 out, very unexpectedly to many growers, a failing produce ; 
 :he drought in many parts of England parched the spring 
 corn to that degree, that I believe the leguminous crops 
 have scarcely returned even the seed committed to the 
 ground for them. Hence we find that there have been three 
 seasons in succession unfavourable to the production of 
 sovie kinds of grain ; the dearness of all is a natural conse- 
 quence." (Vol. 24, p. 321.)
 
 50 
 
 Of the seasons of 1794 and 1795 there is a 
 very full account in a fragment of what was in- 
 tended to be a larger work, under the title of 
 " Thoughts and Details on Scarcity," by Mr. 
 Burke, written in November, 1795 ; and as 
 every thing that may bear on this subject, from 
 the pen of such a writer, cannot fail of being 
 interesting, I venture to lay before the reader 
 the following extract, which might otherwise 
 appear to be of disproportionate length. 
 
 " With regard to the harvest of 1794-, in relation to the 
 noblest grain, wheat, it is allowed to have been somewhat 
 short, but not excessively, and in quality for the seven-and - 
 twenty years, during which I have been a farmer, I never 
 remember wheat to have been so good. The world were, 
 however, deceived in their speculations upon it — the farmer 
 as well as the dealer. Accordingly the price fluctuated be- 
 yond any thing I can remember ; for at one time of the 
 year I sold my wheat at 14/. per load (I sold off all I had, 
 as I thought this a reasonable price) when at the end of the 
 season, if I had then had any to sell, I might have got thirty 
 guineas for the same sort of grain. I sold all that I had at 
 a comparatively low price, because I thought it a good 
 price, compared with what I thought the general produce 
 of the harvest; but when I came to consider what my own 
 total was, I found that the quantity had not answered my 
 expectation. It must be remembered that this year of 
 produce (the year 1794), short but excellent, followed a 
 year, 1793, which was not extraordinary in production, nor 
 of a superior quality, and left but little in store. At first 
 this was not felt, because the harvest came in unusually
 
 51 
 
 early — earlier than common by a full month. The winter 
 at the end of 1794 and beginning of 1795 was more than 
 usually unfavourable both to corn and grass, owing to the 
 sudden relaxation of very rigorous frosts, followed by rains, 
 which were again rapidly succeeded by frosts of still greater 
 rigour than the first. 
 
 rt Much wheat was utterly destroyed. The clover grass 
 suffered in many places. What I never observed before, 
 the rye grass, or coarse bent, suffered more than the clover. 
 Even the meadow-grass in some places was killed to the 
 very roots. In the spring, appearances were better than 
 we expected. All the early sown grain recovered itself 
 and came up with great vigour ; but that which was late 
 sown was feeble, and did not promise to resist any blights in 
 the spring which, however, with all its unpleasant vicissi- 
 tudes, passed off very well; and nothing looked better than 
 the wheat at the time of blooming: but at that most critical 
 time of" all, a cold, dry, east wind, attended with very sharp 
 frosts, longer and stronger than 1 recollect at that time of 
 year, destroyed the flowers, and withered up in an astonishing 
 manner the whole side of the ear next to the wind. At that 
 time I brought to town some of the ears, for the purpose of 
 showing to my friends the operation of those unnatural 
 frosts, and according to their extent I predicted a great 
 scarcity. But such is the pleasure of agreeable prospects, 
 that my opinion was little regarded. 
 
 " On threshing, I found things as I expected — the ears not 
 filled, some of the capsules quite empty, and several others 
 containing only withered hungry grain, inferior to the appear- 
 ance of rye. My best ears and grains were not fine ; never 
 had I a grain of so low a quality — yet I sold one load for 21/. 
 At the same time I bought my seed wheat (it was excellent) at 
 23/. Since then the price has risen, and 1 have sold about two 
 load of the same sort at 23/. Such was the state of the market 
 when I left home last Monday. Little remains in my barn. 
 
 1
 
 52 
 
 I hope some in the rick may be better, since it was earlier 
 sown, as far as I can recollect. Some of my neighbours have 
 better, some quite as bad, or even worse. I suspect it will 
 be found that wherever the blighting wind and those frosts 
 at blooming-time have prevailed, the produce of the wheat 
 crop will turn out very indifferent. Those parts which have 
 escaped will, I can hardly doubt, have a reasonable produce. 
 As to the other grains, it is to be observed, as the wheat 
 ripened very late (on account I conceive of the blights), the 
 barley got the start of it, and was ripe first. The crop, 
 with me and wherever my inquiry could reach, was excel- 
 lent, in some places far superior to mine. The clover which 
 came up with the barley was the finest I remember to have 
 seen. The turnips of this year (1795) are generally good. 
 The clover sown last year, where not totally destroyed, gave 
 two good crops, or one crop and a plentiful feed; and, 
 bating the loss of the rye grass, I do not remember a better 
 produce. 
 
 u The meadow-grass yielded but a middling crop, and 
 neither of the sown or natural grass was there in any farmer's 
 possession any remainder from the year, worth taking into 
 account ; in most places there was none at all. Oats with me 
 were not in a quantity more considerable than in commonly 
 good seasons. But 1 have never known them heavier than 
 they were in other places. The oat was not only a heavy 
 but an uncommonly abundant crop. My ground under peas 
 did not exceed an acre or thereabouts, but the crop was great 
 indeed. I believe it is throughout the country exuberant. 
 It is, however, to be remarked, that as generally of all the 
 grains, so particularly of the peas, there was not the smallest 
 quantity in reserve. The demand of the year must de- 
 pend solely on its own produce ; and the price of the spring 
 corn is not to be expected to fall very soon, or at any time 
 very low. Uxbridge is a great corn market. As I came through 
 that town, I found that at the last market day barley was at
 
 53 
 
 40s. a quarter; oats there were literally none, and the inn- 
 keeper was obliged to send for them from London. I for- 
 got to ask about peas. Potatoes were 5s. the bushel. In 
 the debate on this subject in the House, I am told that a 
 leading member of great ability, little conversant in these 
 matters, observed, that the general uniform dearness of 
 butcher's meat, butter, and cheese, could not be owing to a 
 defective produce of wheat ; and on this ground insinuated 
 a suspicion of some unfair practice on the subject, that called 
 for inquiry. Unquestionably the mere deficiency of wheat 
 could not cause the dearness of the other articles, which ex- 
 tends not only to the provisions he mentioned, but to every 
 other without exception. 
 
 " The cause is indeed so very plain and obvious, that the 
 wonder is the other way. When a properly directed inquiry 
 is made, the gentlemen who are amazed at the price of these 
 commodities will find, that when hay is at six pounds a 
 load, as they must know it is, herbage, and for more than 
 one year, must be scanty ; and they will conclude that if 
 grass be scarce, beef, veal, mutton, butter, milk, and cheese, 
 must be dear. 
 
 " But, to take up the matter somewhat more in detail ; if 
 the wheat harvest in 17°i, excellent in quality, was de- 
 fective in quantity, the barley harvest was in quality ordinary 
 enough, and in quantity deficient. This was soon felt in the 
 price of malt. Another article of produce (beans) was not 
 at all plentiful. The crop of peas was wholly destroyed, so 
 that several farmers pretty early gave up all hopes on that 
 head, and cut the green haulm as fodder for the cattle, then 
 perishing for want of food in that dry and burning summer. 
 I myself came off better than most — I had about the fourth 
 of a crop of peas. It will be recollected that, in a manner, 
 all the bacon and pork consumed in this country (the far 
 largest consumption of meat out of towns) is when growing 
 fed on grass, and on whey or skimmed milk j and when fatting 
 
 i 2
 
 54 
 
 partly on the latter. This is the case in the dairy coun- 
 tries, all of them great breeders, and feeders of swine; but, 
 for the much greater part, and in all the corn countries, 
 they are fattened on beans, barley-meal, and peas. When 
 the food of the animal is scarce, his flesh must be 
 dear. This, one would suppose, would require no great 
 penetration to discover. This failure of so very large a 
 supply of flesh in one species naturally throws the whole de- 
 mand of the consumer on the diminished supply of all kinds 
 of flesh, and, indeed, on all the matters of human sustenance. 
 Nor, in my opinion, are we to expect a greater cheapness in 
 that article for this year, even though corn should grow 
 cheaper, as it is to be hoped it will. The store swine, from the 
 failure of subsistence last year, are now at an extravagant 
 price. Pigs, at our fairs, have sold lately for fifty shillings, 
 which two years ago would not have brought more than 
 twenty. As to sheep, none> I thought, were strangers to the 
 general failure of the article of turnips last year ; the early 
 having been burned as they came up by the great drought 
 and heat; the late, and those of the early which had escaped, 
 were destroyed by the chilling frosts of the winter, and the 
 wet and severe weather of the spring. In many places a full 
 fourth of the sheep or the lambs were lost ; what remained of 
 the lambs were poor and ill fed, the ewes having had no milk. 
 The calves came late, and they were generally an article, 
 the want of which was as much to be dreaded as any other. 
 So that article of food, formerly so abundant in the early 
 part of the summer, particularly in London, and which in a 
 great part supplied the place of mutton for near two months, 
 did little less than totally fail. 
 
 " All the productions of the earth link in with each other. 
 All the sources of plenty in all and every article were dried 
 or frozen up. The scarcity was not, as gentlemen seem to 
 suppose, in wheat only. 
 
 " As to the lesser articles, they are like the greater. They
 
 55 
 
 have followed the fortune of the season. Why are fowls 
 dear? Was not this the farmer's or jobber's fault? I sold 
 from my yard to a jobber six young and lean fowls, for four- 
 and-twenty shillings ; fowls, for which two years ago the 
 same man would not have given a shilling a piece. He sold 
 them afterwards at Uxbridge, and they were taken to London 
 to receive the last hand. 
 
 " As to the operation of the war in causing the scarcity of 
 provisions, I understand that Mr. Pitt has given a particular 
 answer to it; but I do not think it worth powder and shot." 
 (Page 33.) 
 
 As the degree of deficiency arising from the 
 excessive drought and scanty crops of 1794, and 
 the want of a surplus from 1793, had not, in 
 consequence of the harvest being unusually for- 
 ward, and the corn being brought in fine con- 
 dition, and very early to market, been suf- 
 ficiently appreciated, the price did not rise soon 
 enough to check the consumption ; and it was 
 not till the winter and spring following that the 
 insufficiency of the stock on hand, to meet the 
 consumption at the average rate, became ap- 
 parent. At the same time the weather was 
 extremely unfavourable to the growing crops, 
 which were known to have sustained great 
 injury. A very general alarm then arose ; the 
 price advanced rapidly, and there was more 
 real ground for apprehending a famine than 
 perhaps even in the more memorable scarcity 
 and higher prices of 1799 and 1800. But the 
 advance in 1795 was checked by peculiar cir- 
 cumstances. In the early part of that year,
 
 56 
 
 and, indeed, for some time previous*, govern- 
 ment had taken the alarm at the indications of 
 severe dearth, and adopted some extraordinary 
 measures of precaution. All neutral ships, 
 bound with corn to France, were seized and 
 brought into this country, and their cargoes 
 paid for with a profit to the proprietors. This 
 measure was adopted with the double view of 
 relief to ourselves, and distress to the enemy, 
 as a still greater scarcity prevailed in France 
 than here : at the same time the government 
 of this country employed agents to buy corn at 
 the ports in the Baltic. This was done because 
 it was apprehended that our own merchants 
 would be deterred from purchasing so freely 
 as was desirable, by the great advance of price 
 which had taken place in the north of Europe, 
 in consequence of large purchases for account 
 of the French government. Of the policy of 
 this measure, as interfering with the ordinary 
 
 * As far back as 1792 government had made purchases 
 of foreign corn, which was then in considerable quantity in 
 London under the king's lock. I have already described 
 the season of 1792 as an indifferent one in this country: in 
 France it was worse, and the French government had em- 
 ployed agents to obtain supplies of corn from hence. Our 
 government, in order to prevent the exportation without 
 incurring the invidiousness which would have attended a 
 prohibition of export under the peculiar circumstances of 
 those times, resorted to the measure alluded to ; and it was 
 carried into effect without being generally known.
 
 57 
 
 course and true principles of trade, Mr. Pitt 
 spoke doubtingly ; but rested the justification of 
 it upon the extraordinary and alarming cha- 
 racter of the emergency. The measure was, 
 indeed, objectionable upon various grounds, 
 which it would lead me too far to enter upon at 
 present; and I only mention it, because, while it 
 proves the urgency of the crisis, it accounts 
 for the advance of prices, as the thing turned 
 out, not being so great as it otherwise might 
 have been. The government being possessed of 
 a stock of corn both in hand and forthcoming, 
 directed its agents, about the time just before 
 the harvest in 1795, when the deficiency became 
 most distinctly felt, to distribute their stocks 
 in such portions and at such prices as were 
 likely most effectually to supply the immediate 
 exigency. Whatever may be said, and too much 
 cannot, in my opinion, be said against the 
 policy of the measure, it seems to have been 
 conducted with great ability, and to have been 
 favoured by circumstances. If the weather at 
 the harvest of 1795 had not turned out fine, and 
 if the succeeding winter had not been one of 
 the mildest, as the preceding had been one of the 
 severest upon record, prices would have ad- 
 vanced to a greater height, perhaps, than they 
 ever attained ; and the interference by govern- 
 ment in artificially keeping down the prices at 
 one time would have aggravated the scarcity,
 
 58 
 
 and eventual rise in price, by having kept the 
 consumption up at a greater rate than it could 
 have been, if the market had been allowed to 
 take its natural course ; but, as I have observed, 
 circumstances favoured the measure. The mis- 
 chief to the crops was confined to what had 
 taken place before the harvest ; they were well 
 got in, and therefore applicable to immediate 
 use : the winter was open, and there was the 
 prospect of relief by an early and abundant 
 importation, which was favoured by a bounty 
 granted by parliament*. Accordingly, the 
 average price of wheat, which in August 1795 
 reached the height of 1135., declined progres- 
 sively from that time. 
 
 The season of 1796 was happily a plentiful one; 
 and concurring with an importation amounting 
 to 854,521 quarters of wheat, and with an ex- 
 tended cultivation, occasioned a large aggregate 
 produce. The price fell rapidly in the last six 
 months of 1796 ; the average on the 1st Jan. 
 
 * An act was passed in 1795, granting a bounty of 16s. to 
 20s. per quarter, according to quality, on wheat, and 6s. per 
 cwt. on flour, from the south of Europe, till the quantity im- 
 ported should amount to 400,000 quarters, and from America 
 till it should amount to 500,000 quarters; and 12s. to 15s. 
 from any other part of Europe till it should amount to 500,000 
 quarters, and 8s. to 10s. after it exceeded that quantity; 
 to continue till the 30 September, 1796. (Comber on Nat. 
 Subsist, p. 201.)
 
 59 
 
 1797? being as low as 55s. 9d., or less than half 
 what it was in Aug. 1795. 
 
 In 1797 the spring was backward, the summer 
 variable and rather cold, the harvest wet and 
 stormy, and the general reports of the crops un- 
 favourable both as to quality and quantity. In 
 consequence of the apprehensions entertained of 
 injury from the weather, prices advanced from 
 52s. 3d., the average of wheat in August, to 59s. 
 Id., the average on the 21st October. But, not- 
 withstanding that the result of all that could be 
 ascertained of the crops proved some deficiency 
 of quantity, as well as inferiority of quality, 
 prices declined by the close of the season to 
 an average of 52s. 8d. for wheat. This decline 
 was apparently occasioned by the surplus of 
 the former year, combined with a farther im- 
 portation of 407,242 quarters of wheat in 1797* 
 It is consequently clear, that if this year's crops 
 had been abundant, the fall in price would have 
 been more considerable. 
 
 The season of 1798 proved to be moderately 
 abundant; and the harvest being early, and the 
 crops well got in, prices declined in the autumn 
 of that year to 47-s. 10c?. for wheat, 29s. for 
 barley, 19s. lOd. for oats ; but the further de- 
 pression was checked by the early severity of 
 the winter which followed, and a fresh cause of 
 high prices occurred, in consequence of two 
 seasons in succession, attended with a still
 
 60 
 
 greater degree of scarcity than had marked 
 even those which had occurred only three years 
 before. 
 
 The season of 1799, from its commencement, 
 to its close, was perhaps as ungenial to the pro- 
 ductions of the earth, and to the animal crea- 
 tion, as any upon record ; and the inclemency 
 extended over a great part of Europe, par- 
 ticularly over those countries which constitute 
 the sources of supply, in ordinary years, to the 
 rest of Europe. In this country, and particularly 
 in the north of the island, many fields of corn 
 were still uncut as late as November, and some 
 were not cleared till the January following. It 
 would be endless to attempt to describe the 
 sterility and desolation which characterized that 
 year : I will only subjoin one or two extracts, 
 in the Appendix, from contemporary publica- 
 tions, of the principal features of that and the 
 following year. No wonder, then, that the 
 price of wheat advanced considerably in the 
 
 course of that year, viz. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1st January, 1799, average price 49 2 
 1st January, 1800 ditto 92 7 
 
 The season of 1800, after a cold, backward 
 spring, assumed rather a favourable aspect, the 
 early part of the summer being dry and hot; but 
 the promising appearances were soon changed 
 into the dismal reality of renewed or continued
 
 61 
 
 scarcity. A small part only of the crops was got 
 in before heavy and almost incessant rains began. 
 Of the wheat, that part which was secured in the 
 southern districts of the island before the rains 
 commenced, and therefore in good condition, 
 proved to be light, coarse, and unproductive : 
 this was the quality of the grain generally. 
 But the rains which came on in August caught 
 a considerable portion of the wheat still in 
 the fields, even in the home and some of the 
 southern districts, and injured the whole of the 
 crops in the northern parts of the island. 
 
 Bad, however, as were the crops in England, 
 they were still worse in Scotland. Considerable 
 purchases were in consequence made in Mark- 
 lane, between the harvest of 1800 and that of 
 1801, for the purpose of shipping to Scotland. 
 Under these circumstances, notwithstanding 
 an importation of foreign corn to a very large 
 amount, that of wheat alone being 1,242,507 
 quarters ; the price of corn advanced to the 
 following rates, on the average, on the 1st of 
 January, 1801 ; viz. 
 
 Wheat, 13&?.— Rye, 92s. 2d.— Barley, 80.?. lid. 
 Oats, 43s. lid. — Beans, 78s. 7d. — Peas, 845. 3d. 
 Oatmeal, 74s. Sd. 
 
 In Mark-lane, in the course of that season, 
 the price of wheat reached the extravagant 
 height of 1845., and the quartern loaf, for four
 
 62 
 
 weeks, was at Is. I0±d., being higher than it 
 has before or since been. 
 
 Not only was there this great rise in every 
 description of corn ; every article of animal 
 food participated in the advance ; for, inde- 
 pendent of the ungenial influence of such a 
 season as that of 1799 on cattle, sheep, and live 
 stock generally, the deficiency of the pasture, 
 and the extravagant price of fodder of all kinds, 
 occasioned the hurrying of half-fed cattle to 
 market, and produced an eventual scarcity, 
 which was felt for two or three years following. 
 
 Accordingly, in the spring of 1801, when 
 these causes had produced their full effect, the 
 following were the quotations of meat in Smith- 
 field : 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 Beef 5 to 6 6 per stone of 81b. 
 
 Mutton 6 6 8 
 
 Veal 6 8 6 
 
 Pork 6 6 7 
 
 In retail Beef 10 10^ per lb. 
 
 Mutton 11 12 
 
 Veal 12 1 2 
 
 A rise in the price of the produce of the 
 dairy would naturally follow from the same ge- 
 neral causes. 
 
 It may be seen by the proceedings in parlia- 
 ment in 1800, what was the degree of alarm 
 felt by the legislature, and by the government, 
 at the terrific appearance of the continuance of 
 such a state of dearth. A bounty was voted
 
 63 
 
 for the importation of foreign grain ; but great 
 as were the inducements held out by a bounty 
 so framed as to secure to the importer the high 
 minimum price of 100s. a quarter, the arrivals 
 from abroad through 1800 were perfectly in- 
 commensurate with the urgent want that was 
 felt of every description of corn. 
 
 Having thus given a sketch of the seasons 
 for the eight concluding years of the eighteenth 
 century, it may be desirable to pause, for the 
 purpose of observing the extraordinary propor- 
 tion of bad and indifferent harvests, and severe 
 winters, within that period ; the effects of scar- 
 city of produce having been aggravated by the 
 greatly increased consumption, which is inva- 
 riably attendant upon long and hard winters. 
 There were in that period no fewer than four 
 of great and general deficiency, viz. 1794, 1795, 
 1799, and 1800; two of bare average produce, 
 1793 and 1797; two only of good crops, 1796 and 
 1798; and there were four severe winters among 
 the eight, viz. 1794-5, 96-7, 98-9, and 99-1800; 
 followed, as such winters almost invariably are, 
 by cold backward springs : a proportion un- 
 paralleled since the close of the seventeenth 
 century. 
 
 The season of 1801 proved favourable on the 
 whole*; and the effect of such a season, co- 
 
 * The produce of 1801 is thus described in the closing 
 number for that year of the Farmer's Magazine :
 
 64 
 
 operating with a considerable importation, (that 
 of wheat alone being 1,396,360 quarters) was 
 to depress prices very much. This depression 
 was rapidly in progress before the preliminaries 
 of peace with France were signed, and before 
 the slightest expectation was entertained by the 
 public of such an event. 
 
 The weather in 1802 was not quite so favour- 
 able as that of 1801, and the produce of the 
 year was not generally considered above an 
 average. 
 
 The principal feature of the season of 1803 
 was a drought of several weeks' continuance, 
 and the general produce, though good, was not 
 large. Unmarked as these two seasons were by 
 any character of extraordinary abundance, they 
 seem to have been more than sufficient, with a 
 small importation, to meet the average rate of 
 consumption ; for till the summer of 1804, after 
 a few intermediate fluctuations, prices tended 
 downwards, and were lower in the spring of 
 that year than they are in the present spring of 
 1823. 
 
 " The favourable prospect presented in our last number 
 is now almost completely realized ; and though the crop of 
 grain in Britain cannot with justice be reckoned uncom- 
 monly good, yet from the extensive information transmitted 
 to us, we are warranted to pronounce it equal at least to 
 that raised in ordinary years. No shaking winds, nor rot- 
 ting rains, have prevailed, as in the two preceding years, to 
 destroy the fruits of the husbandman's labour."
 
 65 
 The following were the average prices for 
 
 England and Wales : 
 
 
 
 March 3, 1804. 
 
 Ap 
 
 ril 19, 1823. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Wheat 49 6 
 
 
 50 4 
 
 Rye . 33 2 
 
 
 28 5 
 
 Barley Q9. 8 
 
 
 32 7 
 
 Oats . 19 9 
 
 
 22 8 
 
 As a remedy for the agricultural distress 
 which then prevailed, a new corn bill was 
 passed in the session of 1804. It was at first 
 supposed that the rise of prices, as it imme- 
 diately followed that measure, was the conse- 
 quence of it : and several petitions were pre- 
 sented to parliament, in the spring of 1805, 
 against the bill, as the alleged cause of the high 
 price. A committee was appointed to take 
 those petitions into consideration, and the evi- 
 dence clearly proved that a very extensive in- 
 jury, that had been sustained by the crops of 
 corn, was the principal occasion of the. rise. 
 Indeed, all doubt of the real cause of the ad- 
 vance may now be considered as removed. As 
 the harvest approached, appearances became 
 unfavourable ; and the result justified the ap- 
 prehensions, for the crops proved decidedly de- 
 ficient in quantity, and inferior in quality*. 
 
 * Extract from Farmer's Magazine for Nov. 1 804 : 
 
 " From the various accounts transmitted to us, it appears
 
 66 
 
 The corn bill was a dead letter, for the price of 
 wheat advanced soon afterwards 9,0s. above the 
 importation rate. 
 
 The harvest of 1805 proved to be one of 
 average produce, and the importation was of 
 some magnitude. As soon as the crops were 
 secured, and found to be comparatively produc- 
 tive, the price of corn fell considerably, viz. from 
 89-?., the average for wheat on July 1, 1805, to 
 75s. lid., the average on Jan. 1, 1806. There 
 was subsequently an advance, in consequence 
 of the doubtful appearances in the spring and 
 summer of 1S06. But as the result of that sea- 
 son was not unfavourable, although the crops 
 were not considered quite equal to those of the 
 preceding year, and although the importation 
 from the continent did not exceed 200,000 
 
 that in England wheat turns out a short crop, and that the 
 quality in several cases is of a very inferior description. 
 This is evident, from the average price of flour approaching 
 so near to that of wheat; a circumstance which cannot hap- 
 pen, unless when the grain is materially defective. Perhaps 
 we are not far from the mark, when we rate the- deficiency 
 of produce at one-fourth, compared with that of the pre- 
 ceding year. In Scotland, though the grain is in few in- 
 stances so plump and well coloured as last season, yet the 
 return per acre is much nearer to the ordinary produce, 
 than among our southern neighbours ; for in Scotland the 
 rains were later, not so heavy, nor of so long continuation, 
 as with them."
 
 67 
 
 quarters of wheat, prices remained nearly sta- 
 tionary *. 
 
 The season of 1807 was fine and dry from 
 June till the first week in September, and the 
 crops were secured in most parts of England 
 and Wales in good order. The wheat was ge- 
 nerally considered to be about an average crop, 
 but spring corn, beans, pease, and turnips, were 
 greatly deficient j and the pastures were much 
 burnt, making fodder scarce ; so that the ag- 
 gregate produce in England and Wales was de- 
 ficient, but in Scotland it was much more so. 
 The weather in that part of the island was 
 highly unfavourable to the harvest, as will be 
 seen by an extract from the Farmer's Magazine, 
 inserted in the Appendix. In Ireland too, the 
 potatoe crops had partially failed. Upon the 
 whole, therefore, the season of 1807 seems to 
 have been attended with a considerable de- 
 ficiency of general produce, wheat only ex- 
 cepted. But as the crops of wheat in England 
 were secured in good condition, and came early 
 to market, the price declined till the close of 
 that year, although all other grain advanced 
 considerably. The following winter set in 
 unusually early, which of course increased the 
 
 * The importation from Ireland was about 100,000 quar- 
 ters of wheat in that year, an act having passed in the ses- 
 sion of 1806, permitting a free intercourse in grain between 
 Great Britain and Ireland. 
 
 K
 
 68 
 
 consumption of all kinds of grain, more espe- 
 cially as hay was scarce and dear. 
 
 The appearances that a serious scarcity of 
 food was likely to be felt before the coming 
 harvest induced parliament, on a report of a 
 committee of the House of Commons, to pro- 
 hibit the distillation from grain* ; and the same 
 prospect had a natural effect on the corn mar- 
 ket, and prices advanced accordingly in the 
 spring of 1808. 
 
 The crops of 1808 proved more deficient 
 than those of the preceding year. The memo- 
 rably hot days in the early part of July were 
 considered to have done great injury to the 
 wheat, and they were followed by a great deal 
 of wet and stormy weather, from that time till 
 the getting in of the harvest. Some of the 
 other crops suffered, although not in the same 
 degree with wheat, and the aggregate produce 
 was below an average. This was the period, too, 
 when our communication with the Continent 
 had become very much obstructed, so as to pre- 
 clude the expectation of any considerable relief 
 
 * One of the motives which induced the legislature to 
 prohibit the distillation from grain was, doubtless, to afford 
 some relief to the West India planters, by the substitution 
 of sugar in the distilleries ; but the immediate occasion and 
 the professed object of the measure were distinctly stated to 
 be the actual and apprehended deficiency of grain and of 
 potatoes.
 
 6.Q 
 
 from foreign supply. In point of fact, there was 
 an excess of export of about 15,000 quarters of 
 wheat, occasioned probably by the wants of 
 Spain and Portugal. The high price, therefore, 
 (wheat having advanced by July to an average of 
 Sis. Id. per quarter, and by January following to 
 90s. 4d.) was a necessary condition for eking 
 out a reduced supply of our own growth, when 
 the obstructions to importation had become 
 great, and were thought in that year to be in- 
 surmountable. Nothing, indeed, can better 
 prove the magnitude of those obstructions, than 
 the circumstance that an average price of up- 
 wards of 80s. when the exchange and the price 
 of gold were nearly at par, was insufficient to 
 bring forward any foreign supply worth men- 
 tioning. 
 
 The harvest of wheat in 1809 proved to be 
 worse even than that of 1808. The rains set 
 in, in the early part of July, and continued 
 with scarcely any intermission till October. 
 It will be sufficient to bring it to the recol- 
 lection of my readers, if I remind them that 
 that was the season in which the ill-fated ex- 
 pedition to Walcheren took place ; for it must 
 be well remembered how much the calamitous 
 sickness which attended it was aggravated by 
 the rains which prevailed, from its embarkation 
 to its return. As a consequence of that bad 
 harvest, the average price of wheat was, on the 
 
 k 2
 
 70 
 
 1st of Jan. 1810, 102s. 6cl. Previously, how- 
 ever, to any indication of mischief to the crops 
 of 1809, government seems to have been alive 
 to the deficiency of the growth of the preceding 
 year, and to have adopted measures for facili- 
 tating an importation. It appears to have suited 
 the views of the French government, at the 
 same time, to promote an exportation of corn, 
 which happened then to be unusually abundant 
 and cheap in France and the Netherlands. Li- 
 censes were accordingly obtained from both 
 governments, and many cargoes of wheat were 
 received from thence. 
 
 Measures were likewise taken, when the har- 
 vest of 1809 was ascertained to be deficient, to 
 get supplies from other quarters, in the anti- 
 cipation of a further great advance in price 
 in this country, sufficient to cover the great 
 expense of freight, insurance, and licenses, 
 amounting collectively, in many instances, to 
 from 30s. to 50s. a quarter and upwards. As 
 a consequence of these measures, about 350,000 
 quarters of wheat were imported from the Con- 
 tinent in 1809. As prices rose here, notwith- 
 standing this supply from abroad, the induce- 
 ments to import were continued through the 
 following year, in the course of which the 
 supply of foreign wheat amounted to 1,400,000 
 quarters. 
 
 The spring of 1810 was singularly cold and
 
 71 
 
 ungenial ; a series of dry east winds prevailed 
 for many weeks together, and made the hay 
 crops remarkably deficient*. From the same 
 cause, the spring crops and the wheat were 
 generally thin upon the ground ; but in con- 
 sequence of the weather becoming fine imme- 
 diately preceding the harvest, and the fine wea- 
 ther during the harvest, the produce turned 
 out to be rather better than had at one time 
 been apprehended ; and the prices of corn ge- 
 nerally, and of wheat in particular, fell in the 
 autumn of that year. The enormous supplies 
 of foreign corn which were poured in during 
 the summer naturally contributed to this effect ; 
 but the apprehensions which had previously been 
 entertained proved well founded, for it appeared, 
 that notwithstanding the very large importation, 
 there was very little old stock to meet the en- 
 suing harvest. 
 
 The harvest of 1811 proved to be very de- 
 ficient. The following is an account of it, from 
 one of the circular monthly reports of that 
 period (Oct. 1811). 
 
 " The state of the wheat crops seems now to be ascer- 
 tained with probable accuracy throughout the island, as 
 somewhat below an average quantity, and far inferior to 
 that of last year in point of quality. Reckoning both quan- 
 
 * The price of hay rose, in the course of the winter fol- 
 lowing, to 1 1/. the load.
 
 72 
 
 tity and quality, persons of* the most general information 
 decide upon a deficiency of a full third. There will be a 
 considerable quantity of black wheat, and in many parts of 
 the north the barley is strongly smutted." 
 
 This estimate was fully confirmed ; for, in 
 another monthly report, in December, 1811, it 
 is said 
 
 " The former statements respecting the defects of the 
 crops of wheat, both in quantity and quality, are fully and 
 unfortunately confirmed. The autumnal price of wheat is 
 indeed at an enormous height, although the farmers have 
 been universally liberal in supplying the markets, con- 
 sidering the season ; and as there are various impediments 
 to foreign supplies in times like the present, the real state 
 of things cannot be too widely promulgated, with a view to 
 timely economy in expenditure." 
 
 And further from an agricultural report in 
 May, 1812, 
 
 " The stock of wheat on hand, in the most productive 
 eastern counties, is alarmingly deficient, according to the 
 best accounts which can be obtained, and the general 
 opinion is that very considerable foreign supplies will be 
 needed, during the summer, to eke out the residue until 
 the new corn shall be fit for use." 
 
 As a corroboration of the general estimate 
 of the defective state of the crops of that year, 
 I insert, in the Appendix, an extract from the 
 Farmer's Magazine, describing the deficiency 
 very particularly ; and the copy of a petition 
 from Liverpool, stating that deficiency as a 
 ground for the application to continue the 
 prohibition of the distillation from grain.
 
 73 
 
 It is the more important to bear these par- 
 ticulars in mind, because it was clearly as a 
 consequence of a deficiency so great and alarm- 
 ing, at a time when, owing to a failure of the 
 harvest of wheat on the Continent, as well as 
 in this country, and of the continuance of 
 exorbitant charges of importation, the average 
 prices of wheat and other grain reached their 
 greatest height. The deficiency of the stock 
 of grain in the country in the summer of 1812, 
 and the absence of any prospect of considerable 
 relief by importation, were the more alarming, 
 as apprehensions were entertained of the result 
 of the coming harvest, which was backward, 
 and presented unfavourable appearances. On 
 the 1st July, the average price of wheat was 
 1405. 9d. 
 
 As the want of a surplus of corn in the 
 country on the eve of the harvest of 1812, and 
 the absence of any prospect of relief by im- 
 portation, made us entirely dependent for sub- 
 sistence upon the produce of the forthcoming 
 crops, and as so much, therefore, turned upon 
 the event of that harvest, it may be desirable 
 to record, somewhat in detail, the prospects 
 and eventual estimate of the crops of that year. 
 I therefore insert, in the Appendix, some ex- 
 tracts from contemporary reports relating to 
 those points. Making all due allowance, the 
 crops of grain, generally, and of potatoes, in
 
 74 
 
 that year, appear to have been somewhat under 
 an average. 
 
 The winter of 1812 began early and severely ; 
 it was the memorable one of the retreat of the 
 French from Moscow. This early severity of 
 winter, co-operating with the deficiency of 
 stocks of grain, and the absence of any foreign 
 supplies of magnitude, kept prices at a high 
 range, so that they were nearly as high in the 
 spring of 1813 as they had been in the spring 
 of 1812. 
 
 Now, upon a review of these six seasons in 
 succession, each of which was marked by de- 
 ficiency of produce, at a time when the dif- 
 ficulties of importation were so great, I would 
 ask, whether it requires a resort to the supposi- 
 tion of a depreciation of the currency beyond 
 the degree indicated by the difference between 
 paper and gold, or to the effect of a war demand, 
 to account for a range of very high prices 
 during all that interval. And referring to the 
 whole period of twenty years, from 1793 to 
 1812, both years included, the seasons may be 
 estimated as follows : eleven more or less de- 
 ficient*, six of average produce f , and three only 
 of abundant crops t. Or, confining the view 
 to the last ten years of the series, it will be 
 
 * Viz. 1794, 95, 99, 1801, 1804, and 1807, to 1812. 
 + Viz. 179.3, 97, 1802, 1803, 1805, 1806. 
 I Viz. 1796, 1798, 1801.
 
 15 
 
 found that no fewer than seven were deficient, 
 and three only that can be considered as being 
 of average produce. 
 
 I shall now proceed to the description of the 
 seasons following 1812, beginning with the 
 harvest of 1813. 
 
 The produce of that year was one of un- 
 doubted and general abundance. The weather 
 had proved favourable, upon the whole, to 
 the crops of every description ; and, as the ex- 
 tent of tillage had been greatly increased, as 
 appears by the number of new enclosure bills 
 in the preceding five years, at the same time 
 that much fresh capital was applied to land 
 already in cultivation ; and that the mode of 
 husbandry was greatly improved ; the united 
 effect of these causes was felt in a larger ag- 
 gregate produce of grain than had ever before 
 been realized in this country, in any single year. 
 
 Mr. Driver, an eminent land-surveyor, in his 
 evidence before the corn committee of the 
 House of Commons, in 1814, was asked 
 
 " Do you recollect, within twenty years, any harvest so 
 productive as the last ? — I do not recollect the years, but I 
 think there have been some as productive. 
 
 " Do you remember any harvest so productive within the 
 last ten years ? — No. I do not think there has been *." 
 
 Mr. Hodgson, of Liverpool, stated it, in his 
 * Minutes of Evidence, page 14.
 
 76 
 
 evidence before the agricultural committee, in 
 1821, to be the largest crop he had ever known. 
 
 " Can you state, as far as your survey was then established, 
 what was the crop of 1813? — We have every reason to be- 
 lieve it was the greatest crop we have ever known. 
 
 " When you say, you have every reason to believe it was 
 the greatest crop you have ever known, you have other 
 reasons for that opinion ? — We have other reasons, and ge- 
 neral observation from the time that the grain of that season 
 remained in considerable quantity, I think two or three years 
 afterwards *." 
 
 In fact, it was not till two or three years 
 after, viz. in 1815, that the superabundance of 
 the produce of 1813 was ascertained, by its still 
 making its appearance in the market. But, 
 while corn was falling in 1813, in consequence 
 of the superabundance of produce, the price of 
 meat kept up, and was at unprecedentedly high 
 prices till the summer and autumn of 1814. 
 The cause of the relatively high price of meat 
 is easily explained. The remarkably cold spring 
 of 1810 had made grass so short, that hay, for 
 some time after, was at from 10/. to 11/. the load ; 
 the pastures and turnips were proportionably 
 deficient : and this deficiency was not soon re- 
 covered, while the high price of corn, till 1813, 
 did not admit of its being allotted as a substi- 
 tute for herbage to cattle. The stock of oats 
 had been run so short just before the harvest 
 of 1812, that the price, for a week or two, 
 
 * Minutes of Evidence, page 264.
 
 77 
 
 reached 80s. per quarter; and there was an 
 instance of a sale as high as 84s. Oil cakes, like- 
 wise, were at a very high price, in consequence 
 of the scarcity of linseed, arising from the ob- 
 structions to importation. It was natural, there- 
 fore, that cattle and sheep should become scarce 
 and dear, as a consequence of such dearth of pro- 
 vender, and as a consequence, likewise, of the 
 great relative encouragementto extended tillage. 
 But, in 1813, circumstances were reversed: by 
 the fall in corn, while meat kept up or advanced, 
 there was every inducement to recur to the 
 rearing of stock, and the foundation was laid 
 for the abundance of cattle and sheep which 
 depressed the meat market in 1816. 
 
 The crops of 1814 did not exceed an average 
 in produce per acre ; but the total supply, in- 
 cluding the large surplus of the former year, 
 and importations from abroad, which were then 
 coming in at reduced charges, tended, after a 
 little speculation in July, on the reports of in- 
 jury to the wheat by an extensive blight, to 
 depress the price. 
 
 1815 was,upon the whole, an abundant season, 
 and, as a consequence of two abundant seasons 
 out of three, the decline of price was great and 
 rapid, till the bad weather, which, for several 
 weeks previous to the harvest of 1816, threatened 
 severe and extensive injury to the growing crops.
 
 78 
 
 The apprehensions entertained on this score 
 were fully realized by the result of the harvest 
 of 1816. The injury to the crops of corn by a 
 cold backward spring, and a wet summer and 
 autumn, with a singular absence of solar heat, 
 was very great. The quality was almost uni- 
 versally bad, being got in wet, and unfit for im- 
 mediate use. The prices rose here above 100 per 
 cent., and in France, where the deficiency seems 
 tohavebeen stillgreater, they rose nearly 200 per 
 cent, above what they had been two years before. 
 The pastures, and green food in general, for 
 cattle, were, however, abundant. Though the 
 prices, therefore, of corn rose, as is well known, 
 those of animal food did not partake in the ad- 
 vance, as they had done in consequence of some 
 of the former bad seasons. 
 
 Of the produce of 1817 various estimates 
 were made. The w r eather, till harvest, was wet 
 and unfavourable, and the harvest itself was 
 late ; but the weather cleared up in the last 
 few days of August, and it continued favour- 
 able through a great part of September. The 
 price of corn fell, in consequence, rapidly for a 
 few weeks, sufficiently to close the ports in 
 November of that year. But as the weather 
 during harvest, though favourable in the main, 
 was foggy and calm, with only short intervals 
 of brilliant sunshine ; and, as the rains again
 
 79 
 
 set in before the harvest was fully completed, 
 the samples of new wheat, when brought to 
 market, were found to be damp and cold, and 
 not fit for immediate use. There being, at the 
 same time, very little old corn of good quality 
 remaining, the few samples of the new which 
 were fit for use were in great demand, and 
 fetched very high prices, which opened the 
 ports again in February following. But the 
 eventual produce of 1817 proved, as I after- 
 wards understood, to be much better, both as 
 to quality and quantity, than had been originally 
 supposed ; and, upon the whole, it may be con- 
 sidered as having been an average crop ; but 
 the impulse to high prices having been given, 
 they did not immediately subside upon the 
 cessation of the original cause. 
 
 I have already described the season of 1818 
 in a former part of this work, and, considering 
 the excellence of the quality and condition of 
 the corn, and that the crops were undoubtedly 
 abundant in Ireland and Scotland, it may be 
 presumed to have been a full average. 
 
 This estimate of the seasons of 1817 and 1818 
 corresponds with the estimate made by Mr. 
 Hodgson, that they were good crops. Mr. 
 Wakefield, a surveyor of the first eminence, 
 likewise staled that the produce of corn in 
 1818, notwithstandingthe shortness ofthe straw,
 
 80 
 
 was greater than had been expected. But the 
 speculation and miscalculation that prevailed 
 as to both seasons, and particularly the latter, 
 which was a most extraordinary one in every 
 respect, concurred in occasioning a large im- 
 portation, and in keeping up prices beyond 
 what they would have been, if the result of 
 our own produce had been correctly estimated, 
 and if there had not been considerable delusion 
 as to the operation of the corn bill. 
 
 The harvest of 1819 proved, in its result, to 
 be likewise a full average in point of quantity, 
 and the quality was also good. Mr. Wakefield 
 considers it as having been a year of abundant 
 produce. Mr. Hodgson, I observe, places it 
 in his scale of the comparative productiveness 
 of the crops, as being under an average pro- 
 duce per acre, but admits that the whole of the 
 growth of corn in the united kingdom was 
 beyond an average in point of quantity, and he 
 accounts for this circumstance by the supposi- 
 tion that the extended tillage and diminished 
 number of cattle rendered the produce of wheat, 
 in that year, much larger than was indicated 
 by the figure. I believe that, independent of 
 the ground stated by Mr. Hodgson, for the 
 total produce of 1819 proving more consider- 
 able than his estimate, as denoted by the figure 
 28 compared with 32, which, according to his
 
 81 
 
 scale, denotes an average ; there are other 
 means of accounting for the circumstance, of 
 which I think there is now no doubt, that the 
 aggregate produce of the united kingdom proved 
 to be clearly beyond an average. 
 
 That which afforded the principal ground 
 for rating the wheat crop of 1819 as below an 
 average, was the injury which was known to 
 have been occasioned by a sharp frost in the 
 end of May or the beginning of June in that 
 year. All the wheat which was then about 
 blooming was found to be materially injured, 
 and not to produce the usual number of grains ; 
 but the mischief did not extend to the north of 
 England, nor to Scotland, where the crops were 
 not in a state sufficiently forward to be sus- 
 ceptible of injury from that cause. The quan- 
 tity of straw on the ground was uncommonly 
 large in that year. Moreover, in Ireland, the 
 crop of wheat was indisputably abundant, as is 
 proved by the large importations from thence 
 in 1820. 
 
 Of the abundance of 1820 there can be no 
 doubt. Mr. Wakefield says, in his evidence, 
 " The last harvest has been one of the finest 
 ever known in England j" and he afterwards 
 adds, " I think there is a wonderful quantity of 
 corn in the country. I now think that there is 
 as much corn left in the country as generally in
 
 82 
 
 common years there is after harvest*." And 
 according to Mr. Hodgson's estimate, likewise, 
 the crop of wheat, in particular, w T as very con- 
 siderably beyond an average. Indeed, there is 
 evidence of every kind to prove the very great 
 superabundance of all descriptions of produce 
 in that year. 
 
 The season of 1821 is so recent as to require 
 no particular description. It is well known 
 that the rains set in so violently and critically 
 just before, and during the harvest, as very 
 much to endanger, and, in some degree, even- 
 tually to injure, the crops. There was accord- 
 ingly an extensive speculation, which, for a 
 short time, raised the average price of wheat 
 above 70s- But the quantity turned out be- 
 yond expectation, and seems to have exceeded 
 an average, for there is still some of that year's 
 wheat remaining in the market. The quality 
 was, indeed, greatly inferior, a large proportion 
 being sprouted, and the whole, on an average, 
 not weighing more than 5TJ to 58lb. the bushel. 
 It may be a matter of surprise that, considering 
 the ill condition in which that harvest was got 
 in, so much of the wheat was available for 
 human food, and so little effect of its inferiority 
 perceptible in the bread which was made of it. 
 This I have heard ascribed to greater care than 
 * Evid. Agricult. Com., page 217, April 5, 1821.
 
 83 
 
 had ever before been taken in the preparation 
 of the wheat for market by a much more ex- 
 tensive practice of kiln-drying, and by a new 
 process to improve the colour. 
 
 The produce of the season of 1822 is still 
 a matter of some uncertainty, which cannot, 
 perhaps, be determined till a nearer approach 
 to the next harvest. From all that I can learn, 
 I am disposed to concur with Mr. Whitmore's 
 opinion " that the crop of this year (1822) will 
 not prove an average one, taking every sort 
 of grain into account*." 
 
 The correctness of this estimate seems now 
 to be corroborated by the reduced supplies of 
 corn, not only in Mark-lane but in the country 
 markets, for the last few months, and by the 
 general opinion now prevailing, that the stock 
 of grain in the kingdom is considerably less 
 than it was at this time last year. As prices 
 are, in consequence of this opinion, advan- 
 cing, and are already as high as they were in 
 particular periods of the war, and as it is only 
 for the decline of prices down to the close of 
 1822, that I have to account, I shall exclude 
 the last season from the comparison. At the 
 same time, as the spring corn alone of 1822 was, 
 in the estimates made last summer, supposed 
 
 * Letter on the present State and future Prospects of 
 Agriculture (page 84.) 
 
 L
 
 84 
 
 to be deficient, and as the wheat came very 
 freely and unusually early to market, and in 
 condition for immediate use, none of the effects 
 of the general deficiency of that season could 
 be considered as having been felt in arresting 
 the tendency to a decline from the abundance 
 of the former seasons, till nearly the close of 
 last year. 
 
 The same remark applies to the meat mar- 
 kets. I have no doubt that the scarcity of the 
 last winter, combined with the shortness of tur- 
 nips and the increased dearness of keep gene- 
 rally, while it tended to aggravate the glut a 
 few months ago, has contributed to reduce the 
 stock of cattle and sheep much below what it 
 had been for some time before ; and, as a con- 
 sequence of that reduction of stock, prices have, 
 as is well known, advanced rapidly of late, 
 being now again as high as they were in several 
 periods during the war. 
 
 I therefore confine the comparison of sea- 
 sons so as to embrace only the period ending 
 in 1822, before the deficiency of the last har- 
 vest became matter of speculation, and before 
 the severity of last winter and the backward- 
 ness of the present spring gave further coun- 
 tenance to that speculation. Confining the 
 comparison accordingly, we have nine seasons, 
 among which there is only one, viz. that of
 
 85 
 
 1816, which was unquestionably bad, while 
 there are three of great abundance, viz. 1813, 
 15, and 20, and five of fair average produce, 
 leaving the produce of 1822 as yet uncertain. 
 
 If the description of these nine years be com- 
 pared with that of the nine years from the har- 
 vest of 1804 to that of 1812, or again with that 
 of the twenty years from 1793 to 1812, the 
 difference of produce of the respective periods 
 is quite sufficient to account for a very great 
 difference in the average price. 
 
 The description which I have here given of 
 the seasons may, by some of my readers, be 
 thought too minute, while to others it may ap- 
 pear that the proofs are not sufficiently detailed 
 and conclusive. To the first I would answer 
 that the inferences with respect to prices to 
 be drawn from the fact of the relative produc- 
 tiveness of the seasons is so important as to 
 justify a detailed reference to all the evidence 
 readily accessible for the purpose of duly ap- 
 preciating it. To the second I can only say 
 that my own recollection of the impression pro- 
 duced at the time upon prices, by the estimated 
 productiveness of each of the seasons from 
 1793, is perfectly fresh and distinct, and that 
 it is confirmed by the recollection of such of 
 my acquaintance, as were largely concerned in 
 
 l 2
 
 86 
 
 the corn trade during the whole period, and who 
 may be considered competent judges of the ge- 
 neral correctness of my description. I must 
 therefore refer those who feel disposed to seek 
 for further confirmation of what I have stated 
 to the only authorities which I am aware of as 
 existing, viz. the pamphlets and periodical pub- 
 lications of the day.
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 Effect of Quantity on Price. 
 
 In order to judge of the degree in which the 
 variations of the seasons, such as I have de- 
 scribed them, are calculated to affect the prices 
 of produce, it may be necessary to premise 
 some general observations on the effects of quan- 
 tity on price. 
 
 It is no uncommon thing to meet with per- 
 sons, who, in reasoning upon prices of corn and 
 other commodities, take for granted that the 
 variations in price must be in exact proportion 
 to the variations in the quantity which may, at 
 different times, be actually in the market or in 
 the country for sale ; and who, if the variations 
 in price do not correspond with the variations in 
 quantity in exact proportion, infer that there 
 must be something in the currency, or some un- 
 usual cause in operation, to account for what ap- 
 pears to them so anomalous an effect. Thus, if 
 the quantity of corn at any time in the country 
 were ascertained to be eleven millions of quar-
 
 88 
 
 ters, and at another time only ten millions, they 
 would infer that the price in the latter case 
 should advance ten per cent., or in other words 
 that the smaller quantity should be only equal 
 in value to the larger ; and they would infer 
 the same of other commodities. On the other 
 hand, by parity of reasoning, they conclude 
 that prices should fall in proportion to the in- 
 crease of quantity ; that is, if the quantity be in- 
 creased one-tenth, the price should fall nine 
 and one-eleventh per cent. : so as to make the 
 larger quantity of the same value only as the 
 smaller. But experience of the course of mar- 
 kets proves that such a conclusion is perfectly 
 erroneous. 
 
 It is found that prices vary in a ratio very 
 different from the variation in quantity, and 
 that the difference of ratio between quantities 
 and prices is liable to alter, according to the 
 nature of the commodity, but is greater, pro- 
 bably, in the case of corn than in that of most 
 other articles of extensive consumption. 
 
 For the present I shall confine my remarks to 
 the general effects of scarcity or abundance 
 on the price of corn : observing only that the 
 same rules apply to other articles, allowing for 
 a difference in degree according as they come 
 more or less under the description of necessa- 
 ries ; according as they are more or less perish-
 
 89 
 
 able — more or less bulky and expensive to 
 keep in proportion to their value — and accord- 
 ing as a difference in price may extend or limit 
 the consumption. 
 
 The fact that a small deficiency in the pro- 
 duce of corn, compared with the average rate 
 of consumption, occasionally causes a rise in 
 price very much beyond the ratio of the defect, 
 is obvious upon the slightest reference to the 
 history of prices at periods when nothing in 
 the state of politics or of the currency could 
 be suspected to have had any influence. I had 
 occasion to notice instances of this kind in my 
 evidence before the Agricultural Committee, in 
 1821*. And some still more striking maybe 
 observed in the fluctuations which I have al- 
 luded to in the course of the present work. 
 
 The reader may satisfy himself still more 
 fully on this point, by referring to the table 
 in the Appendix of the half-yearly Windsor 
 prices, by which he will occasionally perceive a 
 difference in price between the Lady-day and 
 Michaelmas quarter, much beyond any con- 
 ceivable difference in the produce of the harvest. 
 Some writers have attempted to deduce a 
 strict rule of proportion between a given defect 
 of the harvest, and the probable rise of price. 
 The rule of this kind that has been most 
 
 * Minutes of Evidence, (page 229.)
 
 90 
 
 commonly referred to is one by Gregory King, 
 which is introduced in the following passage by 
 D'Avenant : — 
 
 " It is observed, that but one-tenth the defect in the 
 harvest may raise the price three-tenths ; and when we have 
 but half our crop of wheat, which now and then happens, 
 the remainder is spun out by thrift and good management, 
 and eked out by the use of other grain : but this will not do 
 for above one year, and would be a small help in the suc- 
 cession of two or three unseasonable harvests. For the 
 scarcity even of one year is very destructive, in which many 
 of the poorest sort perish, either for want of sufficient food, 
 or by unwholesome diet. 
 
 " We take it, that a defect in the harvest may raise the 
 price of corn in the following proportions : 
 
 Defect. Above the common rate. 
 
 1 tenth /" -g *) 3 tenths 
 
 2 tenths V J f 8 tenths 
 
 3 tenths < ■! /" 1-6 tenths 
 
 4 tenths i 1 1 3*8 tenths 
 
 5 tenths \ 1 J 4-5 tenths 
 
 So that when corn rises to treble the common rate, it may 
 be presumed that we want above one-third of the com- 
 mon produce ; and if we should want five-tenths,^ or half the 
 common produce, the price would rise to near five times 
 the common rate."— (D' Avenant, vol. II. pages 224 and 225.) 
 
 It is perhaps superfluous to add, that no such 
 strict rule can be deduced ; at the same time, 
 there is some ground for supposing that the 
 estimate is not very wide of the truth, from ob- 
 servation of the repeated occurrence of the fact, 
 that the price of corn in this country has risen
 
 91 
 
 from 100 to 200 per cent, and upwards, when 
 the utmost computed deficiency of the crops 
 has not been more than between one-sixth and 
 one-third of an average. 
 
 All that can be said, therefore, in general 
 terms, is that a decided deficiency of supply is 
 commonly attended in the case of corn, more 
 than in that of most other articles, with an ad- 
 vance in price very much beyond the degree 
 of the deficiency. And the reason of the fact 
 is as clear upon a little reflection, as the fact 
 itself is upon the slightest observation. 
 
 The process by which the rise beyond the 
 proportion of defect takes place, is the struggle 
 of every one to get his accustomed share of 
 that which is necessary for his subsistence, and 
 of which there is not enough or so much as 
 usual for all. Supposing a given deficiency, the 
 degree in which the money price may rise 
 will depend upon the extent of the pecuniary 
 means of the lowest classes of the community. 
 In countries where the pecuniary means of the 
 lowest classes are limited to the power of ob- 
 taining a bare subsistence in ordinary times, as 
 in Ireland, and on many parts of the continent, 
 and where neither the government, as in France, 
 nor the poor laws and contributions by wealthy 
 individuals, as in England, come in aid of those 
 means, a proportion of the population, accord-
 
 92 
 
 ing to the degree of scarcity, must perish, or 
 suffer diseases incidental to an insufficient sup- 
 ply of food, or to a substitution of inferior and 
 unwholesome diet. And the increased compe- 
 tition of purchasers being thus limited to the 
 classes above the lowest, the rise in price may 
 not be very considerably beyond the defect of 
 quantity. But in France*, where it is apart of 
 the general policy of the government to pro- 
 vide by the purchase of corn, in times of dearth, 
 for the subsistence of the lowest classes, and 
 particularly for that of the inhabitants of Paris ; 
 and in this country, where the poor laws create 
 a fund for the maintenance of the lowest 
 classes, at the expense of all the classes above 
 them — where moreover, the voluntary contri- 
 butions of richer individuals swell that fund — 
 it is clear that the competition of purchasers, or 
 in other words the intensity of demand, would 
 be greatly extended, while the supply being 
 limited, the price would rise very considerably 
 beyond the ratio of the deficiency f. The final 
 
 * It may be observed, by the extract in the first part of 
 this work (page 179) from Mr. Say's letter, that the fluc- 
 tuations in the price of wheat in France, in consequence of 
 variations in the seasons, viz. in 1811, and again in 1816, 
 were as great as in this country. 
 
 •J* So powerful indeed is the tendency of our poor laws, 
 and of the disposition of the wealthier classes in this coun-
 
 93 
 
 effect of a rise in price so much beyond the 
 defect of the crops, when that increased rise 
 is produced by the causes mentioned, is to 
 apportion the privations resulting from scarcity 
 over a larger part of the population ; thus di- 
 minishing the severity of pressure upon the 
 lowest class, and preventing or tending to pre- 
 vent any part of it from perishing, as it might 
 otherwise do, from actual want. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance to bear in 
 mind the operation of the principle of the 
 great increase of price beyond the degree of 
 deficiency, with a view to accounting not only 
 for the high range of prices, but, likewise, for 
 the extraordinary prosperity which attended the 
 agricultural interest* during the first two-thirds 
 of the period that I am considering, and which 
 
 try, to add to the pecuniary means of the lowest classes, 
 for the purpose of enabling these to bid against those im- 
 mediately above them for a full share of food, or such a 
 share at least as may be a preservation from starving — 
 that if there were a deficiency of a quarter, or even of only 
 an eighth, in the existing stock, compared with the average 
 rate of consumption, and that there were no prospect of 
 making up the deficiency by importation, there is scarcely 
 any assignable limit to the possible rise in price. 
 
 * By agricultural interest, I mean exclusively farmers and 
 landlords, who are alone benefited by an advance of price 
 resulting from scarcity. The condition of the labouring 
 classes, even of those employed in husbandry, is well known
 
 94 
 
 cannot, in my opinion, be accounted for in any 
 other way. 
 
 It is clearly through the medium of increased 
 price of produce, that farmers gained such great 
 profits pending the term of their leases, and 
 that landlords obtained such greatly advanced 
 rents at the granting of new leases. I have 
 already given reasons for the conclusion, that 
 alterations in the currency had no influence on 
 prices, beyond the degree indicated by the 
 difference between paper and gold, and that 
 war had no influence beyond the obstruction 
 of supply, which could only affect prices in 
 proportion as our own growth was insufficient 
 to meet the average consumption. 
 
 If prices of produce had risen only in exact 
 proportion to the deficiency of growth ; thus, 
 if in commonly good years, an acre of wheat 
 produced 33 bushels, which sold at 6s. per 
 bushel, but, in a bad season, produced only 
 two-thirds of a crop, or 22 bushels, which sold 
 at 9s. the bushel, supposing the expenses of 
 getting in the crops to be the same in both 
 cases, the farmer would be neither gainer nor 
 loser by the deficiency of his crops, that de- 
 
 to be deteriorated in periods of dearth, as the wages of la- 
 bour never rise in proportion to the advance in the price of 
 provisions.
 
 95 
 
 ficiency being here assumed to be general. The 
 deficiency would be a general calamity, and 
 farmers and landlords would bear their shares 
 of it in their quality of consumers. 
 
 But, upon the principle which I have stated, 
 the case would be widely different. In the 
 event of a deficiency of one-third of an average 
 crop, a bushel of wheat might rise to 18s. and 
 upwards*. Now, 22 bushels, at \8s. per bushel, 
 would be worth 19/. 16^., whereas, the 33 
 bushels, at 6s., were worth only 9/. 18s., making 
 a clear profit to the producer of 100 per cent. 
 This, of course, is an extreme case, and can- 
 not, in general, be of long duration ; it sup- 
 poses no great surplus from former years, and 
 no immediate prospect of adequate relief from 
 importation. While the deficiency exists, how- 
 ever, whether in reality, or only in apprehen- 
 sion, such and still greater may be the effect. 
 The more common case, in the period referred 
 to, has been a deficiency in a smaller degree, and 
 a smaller per centage of advance, but protracted 
 through a great length of time. For the 
 sake of illustration of the mode and degree in 
 
 * Considering the institutions of this country relative to 
 the maintenance of the poor, if there should be a deficiency 
 of the crops amounting to one-third, without any surplus 
 from a former year, and without any chance of relief by im- 
 portation, the price might rise five, six, or even tenfold.
 
 96 
 
 which a deficiency in the crops, compared with 
 an average produce, is calculated to affect the 
 condition of the agricultural interest, let us 
 suppose that the average produce of corn in 
 this country were 32 millions of quarters* of 
 all kinds, which would sell at 40,?. per quarter 
 all round as a remunerative price, making an 
 amount of 64,000,000/. to be distributed as 
 wages, profit, and rent, among the labourers, 
 farmers, and landlords : but by the occurrence 
 of a bad crop deficient one-eighth, the price ad- 
 vanced to 60s., there would then be 28 millions 
 of quarters at 60s., making 84,000,000/., being 
 a clear addition of 20,000,000/., to be distributed 
 among the farmers and landlords in the first 
 instance, as increased profit and rent. I say, 
 in the first instance, because increased wages 
 perhaps, and tithes certainly, would form some 
 deduction, if the advance in price, from the 
 continuance of deficiency, lasted for more than 
 one season, or if, by the recurrence of deficiency 
 at short intervals, the advance were, on an 
 average, at the same relative proportion. 
 
 There can be little doubt that, in such a state 
 of things, the agricultural interest would enjoy, 
 not only the appearance, but the reality of pro- 
 
 * It was computed, by Dr. Colquhoun, that the consump- 
 tion of all kinds of grain in this kingdom amounted, in 1812, 
 to 35 millions of quarters, exclusive of seed.
 
 97 
 
 sperity. Confining, therefore, the view to this 
 part of the effect of high prices, resulting from 
 deficient crops, it might appear that there was 
 a creation of so much additional wealth, as was 
 represented by these 20,000,000/. But follow- 
 ing out the view in all its bearings, and tracing 
 the rise of prices from its source, viz. the in- 
 creased payment by the consumers for a di- 
 minished share of food, it will appear that the 
 increased income distributed among the agri- 
 cultural interest was wholly at the expense of 
 the other orders of the community. The ad- 
 vocates, however, for the agricultural claims, 
 which, if they were admitted and could be 
 made operative to their full extent, would arti- 
 ficially perpetuate the effects that could other- 
 wise arise only from the sterility of the soil or 
 the unpropitiousness of the seasons, seem to 
 confine their observation of the consequence of 
 the high price of provisions to the direct and 
 obvious advantages resulting from the increased 
 sum to be distributed among the farmers and 
 landlords ; and infer that this increased sum is 
 the creation of so much additional wealth. It 
 was the same confinement of view to the in- 
 creased sum which an advance in the price of 
 corn occasioned to be distributed in the shape 
 of profit and rent, which led the sect of eco-
 
 98 
 
 nomists in France, who considered the raw pro- 
 duce of the earth as the only source of wealth, 
 to look upon every advance in the price of 
 that produce as so much additional wealth. 
 An extract, which I insert in the Appendix, 
 from a translation of a French work on the 
 Legislation and the Commerce of Corn, written 
 in 1775, will prove that the doctrines of Mr. 
 Webb Hall and of the Agricultural Associa- 
 tion of the present day have had their com- 
 plete counterpart in France. 
 
 While the fact, indeed, and the reason of the 
 fact that, as relates to commodities generally, 
 and to corn more especially, a deficiency of 
 quantity produces a great relative advance in 
 price, has been repeatedly noticed and variously 
 illustrated by several writers ; the converse of 
 the proposition, viz. that an excess of quantity 
 operates in depressing the prices of commodities 
 generally, but of corn more especially, in a ratio 
 much beyond the degree of that excess, was 
 little noticed until the publication of the report 
 of the Agricultural Committee in 1821, or, if 
 casually noticed, was not applied systematically 
 in accounting for instances of great depression 
 of prices, and of consequent distress among those 
 who felt the effects of that depression. In the 
 report of that Committee, the principle to which
 
 99 
 
 I am here alluding, and upon which I was par- 
 ticularly examined, is distinctly stated, and 
 some of the consequences flowing from it are 
 clearly pointed out. The limits to the possi- 
 ble depression in price from the influence of 
 this principle, when brought into operation by 
 the occurrence of seasons of more than usual 
 abundance of produce, cannot, of course, be 
 laid down with any thing like precision; but I 
 am convinced, that they extend to a much 
 lower degree than, even now that the attention 
 of the public is drawn to the operation of the 
 principle, has been conceived to be within the 
 range of possibility. 
 
 If the advance in price, from deficiency, in- 
 crease the aggregate value of the smaller quan- 
 tity, in some instances, to double or more than 
 double the amount in money which the larger 
 or average quantity would have produced, the 
 fall in price from abundance may reduce the 
 value in money of the larger or more than average 
 quantity, to a sum considerably less than that 
 which the smaller would have produced. Thus, 
 suppose that with bad or scanty crops the pro- 
 duce of all sorts of corn were 28 millions of 
 quarters, which, one kind with another, fetched 
 60s. per quarter, or 84,000,000/., and that, upon 
 the full restoration of the ordinary produce, or 
 
 M
 
 100 
 
 32 millions of quarters, the price fell to the 
 average rate of 405., the 32 millions of quarters 
 would be worth only 64,000,000/. or 20,000,000/. 
 less than the smaller quantity had been worth. 
 In this case, by the same sort of, what the 
 French writer last noticed calls, interior arith- 
 metic, by which the 20,000,000/. additional 
 paid by the consumers to the producers of corn 
 had been considered as the creation of so much 
 wealth, the mere cessation of that payment by 
 the restoration of an average quantity of pro- 
 duce, would be considered as the destruction 
 of so much national capital. 
 
 But taking the extremes of fluctuation as re- 
 sulting from a frequent recurrence of bad seasons 
 in one period, combined with obstructions by war 
 or by a corn bill to importation, and of more 
 than usually productive harvests in another, this 
 doctrine of the creation of wealth by scarcity, 
 and destruction of it by abundance, will appear 
 in a still more striking point of view. Sup- 
 pose, for instance, that after the restoration of 
 an average produce of 32 millions of quarters 
 of corn, and the average price of 40a\ two suc- 
 cessive seasons of more than common abund- 
 ance should occur," so as to increase the produce 
 to 36 millions, the price might fall, for one 
 kind with another, to 205. per quarter. Here
 
 101 
 
 would be 36 millions of quarters, worth, at 20s, 
 only 36,000,000/., being 28,000,000/. less than 
 the medium, and 48,000,000/. less than the 
 produce deficient by one-eighth. And if after 
 two or three years of this range of low prices, 
 necessary to carry off the glut by exportation, 
 or extra consumption, or waste, there should 
 supervene two or three decidedly bad harvests, 
 so as to reduce the quantity again to 28 mil- 
 lions, and the price rise, as it might do, to 60s., 
 the national gain and the creation of wealth, 
 according to the doctrine in question, would be 
 no less than 48,000,000/. to be again destroyed 
 by the recurrence of plenty. 
 
 It is sufficient to have pointed out the prac- 
 tical conclusions to which this hypothesis leads, 
 to satisfy any unbiassed reader of its absurdity 
 and extravagance. It must be perfectly ob- 
 vious, that as the additional sum or profit 
 amounting, in some cases, to upwards of 100 
 per cent, divided among the producing classes 
 in consequence of deficiency of harvests, is just 
 so much transferred from the pockets of the 
 consumers, who are not only put on short al- 
 lowance, but are, in proportion to the larger 
 sum that they pay for that short allowance, 
 deprived of other enjoyments, so the diminished 
 sum received by the producing classes on the 
 return of abundance, whether from extended 
 
 m 2
 
 102 
 
 cultivation, or from a succession of good seasons, 
 is so much remaining in the pockets of the con- 
 sumers. 
 
 But, even to the reader who may be satisfied 
 of the absurdity of considering the increased 
 gain of the agriculturists arising from dimi- 
 nished produce as so much creation of wealth, 
 still, at first view, it may appear that this is a 
 mere question of transfer from the pockets of 
 one class to those of the other, and that the 
 gain of the producers, in case of scarcity, is 
 equal to the loss of the consumers; but a little 
 further consideration will show that the dif- 
 ference is very great. In the first place, the 
 gain is of the smaller number, at the expense 
 of the larger : but if this gain of the smaller 
 number is not occasioned by artificial regulations 
 in the nature of monopoly, and arises merely 
 from the casualty of the seasons, the producers 
 are as justly entitled to it as to any part of 
 their property. In the next place, the pro- 
 ducers themselves must, in their quality of 
 consumers, pay the advanced price for their 
 food, which will consequently be a deduction 
 from their profits, not to mention the increased 
 price of the seed or other elements of repro- 
 duction, while the majority of the community 
 suffer actual privation of the quantity of food 
 as well as of the other enjoyments, which, when
 
 103 
 
 they had less to pay for food, they had the 
 means of procuring ; there is, in short, a less 
 sum of the means of subsistence and enjoy- 
 ment, or, in other words, of wealth to be dis- 
 tributed among the mass of the population. 
 
 The reverse of this process upon the occur- 
 rence of plenty is so evident, that an attempt 
 to follow it out is superfluous, beyond the mere 
 statement, in general terms, that there is in the 
 latter case an increase in the sum or quantum 
 of actual means of subsistence and enjoyment 
 among the great majority of the community ; a 
 real, palpable increase of wealth. 
 
 This view of the preponderating evils of 
 scarcity, notwithstanding the prosperity with 
 which it is attended to the producing classes, 
 and of the blessings of plenty, in spite of the 
 distress arising from it to those same classes, is 
 so simple and clear, and so congenial to the 
 good sense and feelings of mankind, that the 
 advocates of the agricultural claims, aware of 
 the unpopularity of lamentation at the conse- 
 quences of abundance, have denied that abund- 
 ance can be the cause of distress. Plenty, say 
 they, has been universally, by the common sense 
 of mankind, pronounced to be a blessing ; it is 
 what we pray for, and what from infancy we 
 have been taught to consider as a good. It 
 is a preposterous doctrine, therefore, and one
 
 104 
 
 that was never heard of before, to assign plenty 
 as a cause of distress ; and (say they) as distress 
 is so generally felt, it must be occasioned by 
 some cause or causes unconnected with abund- 
 ance. They might, indeed, go a step further, 
 and contend, that as plenty of food, and of 
 other commodities, is a blessing, and as at this 
 time there is great distress*, it is impossible that 
 there can be abundance. This is no uncommon 
 sophism, although not, perhaps, usually placed 
 in so glaring a form. It consists in substituting 
 a part for the whole : thus the agricultural in- 
 terest is made to represent the whole of the 
 community, and the distressed state of it is 
 brought forward to negative the possibility of 
 the existence of plenty. 
 
 If I have succeeded in pointing out to the 
 satisfaction of the reader, that the sum total 
 to be divided among the producing classes, 
 upon the occurrence of seasons of more than 
 usual abundance, is below the amount which is 
 
 * Instead of " there is," I should rather say "■ there tvas 
 great distress in 1822 j" for now (April, 1823), in conse- 
 quence of the deficiency, actual or supposed, of the aggregate 
 produce of last year's crops, and of apprehension for the 
 ensuing harvest, which, at any rate, threatens to be back- 
 ward, prices have advanced, and the cry of distress, on the 
 part of the agriculturists, is subsiding, to be succeeded, per- 
 haps, by one more extensive and formidable on the part of 
 the consumers.
 
 105 
 
 the result of an average produce, and greatly 
 below that of a deficient crop, it follows, of 
 course, that plenty, especially when succeeding 
 to scarcity, must be attended with suffering and 
 distress to the agriculturists. That the assign- 
 ment of plenty as a cause of distress to the 
 agriculturists is no new doctrine discovered or 
 invented by the political economists of modern 
 times, may be proved by the circumstance, that 
 upon almost every occasion of a great fall in 
 price from abundance, there have been com- 
 plaints of distress of a description similar to that 
 which has recently prevailed. I believe that 
 the fact of the prevalence of such distress has 
 not been unnoticed by some of the writers of 
 antiquity; but not to alarm the reader by refer- 
 ence to so remote a period, I shall go no further 
 back than to the year 1620, which, I presume, 
 will be sufficiently far to repel the charge of 
 novelty, as applied to the doctrine in question. 
 The price of wheat fell progressively from 
 1617, when, by the Eton tables, it was 43,9. 3d. 
 per quarter of eight bushels, till 1620 and 
 1621, in both which years it is quoted at 27 s. 
 And the effects of this fall are described 
 in the following extracts (which have been 
 obligingly communicated to me by Mr. D'Israeli) 
 from the Sloane MSS. 4174, in the British 
 Museum.
 
 106 
 
 " Mr. John Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Catleton. 
 
 " 12 February, 1620. 
 " We are here in a strange state to complain of plenty j 
 but so it is, that corn beareth so low a price that tenants 
 and farmers are very backward to pay their rents, and in 
 many places plead disability ; for remedy whereof the council 
 have written letters into every shire, and some say to every 
 market-town, to provide a granary or storehouse, with a 
 stock to buy corn, and keep it for a dear year. But though 
 this be well advised, and make a fair show in speculation, 
 yet the difficulties be so many, that it will not be so easy to 
 put it into practice." 
 
 The following was written at the same period. 
 
 " England was never generally so poor since I was born as 
 it is at this present ; inasmuch that all complain they cannot 
 receive their rents. Yet is there plenty of all things but 
 money, which is so scant, that country people offer corn 
 and cattle, or whatsoever they have else, in lieu of rent — 
 but bring no money, and corn is at so easy rates as I never 
 knew it to be at, twenty or twenty-two pence a bushel, 
 barley at nine pence, and yet no quantity will be taken at 
 that price ; so that for all the common opinion of the wealth 
 of England, I fear, when it comes to the trial, it will prove 
 as some merchants, who, having carried on a great show a 
 long time, when they are called upon too fast by their 
 creditors, be fair to play bankrupt." 
 
 I am likewise indebted to the same gentle- 
 man for the following information : 
 
 " Sir Symonds d'Ewes, in his unpublished diary, notices, 
 in 1621, the excessive cheapness and plenty of wheat, the 
 consequence of which was to reduce the price of lands from
 
 107 
 
 twenty years' purchase to sixteen or seventeen*. The best 
 wheat was then 2s. 8d. and 2s. 6d. the bushel, ordinary 2s. ; 
 barley and rye, Is. 3d. 
 
 " The farmers murmured ; the poorer sort traversed the 
 markets to find out the finest wheats, for none else would 
 now serve their use, though before they were glad of the 
 coarser rye-bread. This daintiness was soon after punished 
 by the high prices of all sorts of grain every where, which 
 never since abated." 
 
 Again, in I67O, prices having fallen on a 
 comparison with those which had prevailed 
 during the civil wars, and which had continued 
 more or less high, till 1665, gave occasion to 
 considerable suffering. 
 
 The distress complained of by the agri- 
 cultural interest was the reason of a new corn 
 bill, imposing duties on the importation amount- 
 ing to a prohibition. The state of things after 
 that act is thus described by Roger Coke in 
 his treatise, entitled " The Church and State 
 are in equal Danger with Trade," published in 
 1671. 
 
 " The ends designed by the acts against the importation 
 
 * The fall in the price of land, as indicated by the re- 
 duced number of years purchase, has evidently, in this case, 
 been computed upon the rents which were payable, but not 
 paid ; and the uncertainty whether the low price of produce 
 might not entail a fall of rent would naturally deter pur- 
 chasers from giving so much for land as they would have 
 done before the great reduction in the value of the pro- 
 duce.
 
 108 
 
 of Irish cattle, of raising the rents of the lands of England, 
 are so far from being attained, that the contrary hath ensued. 
 And here I wish a survey were taken how many thousand 
 farms are thrown up since this act; how many thousand 
 farms are abated, some above one-sixth, others above one- 
 fourth, others above one-third : some, I know, which, after 
 two years lying waste, are abated one-half." 
 
 A great fall, notwithstanding the prohibitory 
 system, having taken place in 1687, the distress 
 thence arising was the cause of the memorable 
 corn bill in 1688, granting a bounty on ex- 
 portation. 
 
 After the long period of dearth, which I have 
 described as having occurred between 1692 
 and 1700, abundance having been restored, 
 and the price of wheat in 1702, notwithstanding 
 the breaking out of the war in the year before, 
 and notwithstanding the corn bill, having fallen 
 upwards of fifty per cent., it might naturally be 
 supposed that rents, founded on the previous 
 long range of high prices, could not easily be 
 paid ; and there happens to be testimony that 
 rents were not paid. Evelyn, in his Diary, 
 January, 1703, writes, " Corn and provisions 
 so cheape, that the farmers are unable to pay 
 their rents." 
 
 An interval of comparative dearth again pre- 
 vailed from 1725 to 1729, and a small importa- 
 tion of corn took place in 1728 and 1729, being 
 the only occasion of an excess of importation
 
 109 
 
 during a period of sixty years. But in 1732 
 the average price of wheat fell to 23,v. 8±d., 
 having, in 1728, been as high as 48s. 5^d. per 
 quarter. As might be expected, so great a 
 fall, and to a lower level than had been known 
 for many years before, was productive of con- 
 siderable suffering. The following extract de- 
 scribes it in terms, which, with a very few al- 
 terations, might be supposed to have emanated 
 from Mr. Webb Hall's committee. 
 
 f* The interest of our British landholders has been de- 
 clining several years last past ; it has been a general obser- 
 vation, that rents have been sinking, and tenants unable to 
 make as good payments as formerly, even in counties where 
 there is the greatest circulation of money, the maritime 
 ones, and those near the capital cities of the kingdom. As 
 this is too well known to be their case, they deserve the 
 attention and favour of our legislature : it is proper thev 
 should make a tolerable interest of their money, as well as 
 adventurers in other businesses, which few of them do, who 
 have not enjoyed their bargains twenty years or a longer 
 time, for lands are much dearer now. Wheat this year and 
 last never mounted, in some of the extreme parts of the 
 kingdom, to above three shillings and eight pence per Win- 
 chester ; barley is now sold in the west of England for 
 two shillings per Winchester bushel. Prices are often 
 higher fifty miles round London than elsewhere, which 
 induces several great men to think that countrymen live 
 better than they really do. Country measures (which are 
 frequently larger than the Winchester or legal bushels) con- 
 tribute farther to such mistakes. Before they can pay their 
 rents, wheat of middling goodness ought, I think, to sell 
 for about four shillings and three pence per Winchester,
 
 110 
 
 not in a few places, but throughout the kingdom ; barley 
 for 2s. Gd., peas 2s. 3d., and oats Is. 6d. per Winchester. 
 I know in former times less prices were sufficient; but as 
 circumstances alter, the same thing is altered : corn farms 
 (iron, timber, harvest people, and servants, being much 
 dearer than heretofore) will not yield sufficient profit to the 
 occupiers of them, unless they can have such prices, parti- 
 cularly as cattle, pigs, sheep, butter, and cheese, are now 
 one-third part cheaper than formerly, and what is called 
 a living price. 
 
 " The flourishing condition of the landed interest sup- 
 ports all trade, most trades now (except those which supply 
 luxury, those of gold and silversmiths, lacemen, vintners, 
 painters, dealers in silks, velvets, and high-priced cloths) are 
 in apparent decay; which is not only proved by the general 
 declarations of tradesmen, but by too many instances of bank- 
 ruptcy amongst them. I wish I could say the present times 
 are not the worst. Our exports are, perhaps, as great as for- 
 merly ; whence, then, all this complaint ? Our farmers are 
 worse customers than formerly ; necessity has compelled 
 them to more carefulness and frugality in laying out their 
 money, than they were accustomed to do in better times." 
 (The Landholder's Companion, or Ways and Means to raise 
 the Value of Land, by William Allen, Esq. of Fobstone, in 
 Pembrokeshire, 1734.) 
 
 At that time and for several years afterwards, 
 viz. till 1764, the price of corn in France was 
 likewise at a very low range from the same ge- 
 neral cause ; and it will be seen by reference to 
 the speech of Mr. de la Chalotais, which I have 
 before noticed, that it was a period during which 
 great complaints prevailed of the depressed and 
 distressed state of the agricultural classes in
 
 Ill 
 
 that country. The speaker frequently alludes 
 to the suffering from plenty, for in recom- 
 mending the liberty of exportation as a remedy, 
 he expressly says that, " the too great abund- 
 ance of crops is almost as much to be dreaded 
 as want." He afterwards goes on to say, that 
 " superabundance produceth stagnation, and 
 brings with it a vile price." 
 
 I will only here add, that stagnation and de- 
 clining prices, and general depression of the 
 landed interest in this country, prevailed more 
 or less during the greater part of the American 
 war, when there was a preponderance of good 
 seasons. In the Annals of Agriculture, (vol. 
 25, p. 460), is the following description in the 
 extract of a letter written by Arthur Young, 
 in 1780, of the fall of prices and consequent 
 distress at the period referred to : — 
 
 " In the years 1776, 1777, prices fell considerably; 
 and, in 1779, so low, that very general complaints have 
 been heard of ruined farmers, and distressed landlords ; and 
 at the time I am now writing, the fact holds that there is 
 a considerable fall in all products, and great numbers of 
 farmers ruined. I have the prices of wool for forty years now 
 before me, and that which from 1758 to 1767 was from 18*. 
 to 21s. a tod, is for 1779, only 12*. ; and was in 1778, but 
 145. We must go back to ^o^, to find a year so low as the 
 last. Wheat and all sorts of grain are greatly fallen." 
 
 And again, when after a considerable rise in 
 prices from the bad season of 1782, and some
 
 112 
 
 severe winters following, there was a tendency 
 to a restoration of abundance and declining 
 prices, fresh complaints arose on the part of 
 the landed interest, and gave occasion to the 
 Corn Bill of 1791. 
 
 Of the effects of price as connected with quan- 
 tity on the prosperous or depressed state of 
 the landed interest since 1791, I shall enter 
 more at large in the following section. In the 
 meantime some apology may be due to my 
 readers, for having gone back to periods so 
 remote, for proofs of what appears so clearly to 
 be the necessary effect of quantity on price, 
 viz. that greater plenty than usual of produce 
 will occasion so great a fall in prices, as to 
 make the larger quantity of less value than the 
 smaller quantity at the previous high prices ; 
 that consequently there must be considerable 
 loss and pecuniary suffering among the pro- 
 ducers, and that such suffering must naturally 
 be the subject of complaint. But evident as 
 that proposition may be when distinctly stated 
 to unbiassed minds, it is not the less true that 
 several eminent men in parliament, and some 
 distinguished writers out of it, have inveighed 
 in terms of indignation and ridicule against 
 what they have been pleased to call the novel 
 and outrageous doctrine, that abundance could 
 ever be the cause of distress.
 
 113 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Application of the Principle of the " Effect of Quantity on 
 Price" to the State of Agriculture, from 1793 to 1812, as 
 explanatory of the high Price of Corn, during that Period. 
 
 Applying the foregoing general observations 
 on the effect of quantity on price, and the il- 
 lustrations of it, to the state of the corn trade 
 since 1792, we can be at no loss to account for 
 the main causes of the prosperity which, with 
 short intervals of depression, attended agricul- 
 ture in the first twenty years, and of the distress 
 which, with the momentary respite of 1817-18, 
 it has experienced for the last ten years. 
 
 The first great burst of prosperity clearly 
 followed the deficient harvests of 1794 and 
 1795. 
 
 The average price of wheat was, 
 
 in the year 1793, - 48s. lid. 
 
 and in the years 1795 and 1796, 75s. 8cl. 
 
 The consumption of wheat at the close of the 
 last century was estimated at about eight mil- 
 lions of quarters, and of other grain about twen- 
 ty-two millions of quarters. 
 
 The deficiency of the crops of 1794 and 1795
 
 114 
 
 was estimated at about one-eighth in each year, 
 by Lord Sheffield, in his speech in the House 
 of Commons, on the 13th December 179«5, and 
 that computation was generally supposed to be 
 near the mark, being founded on the best data ac- 
 cessible ; the account will therefore stand thus : 
 If they had been of ordinary or bare average 
 produce, as that of 1793, they would have 
 yielded, suppose 
 
 8,000,000 quarters wheat at 48s. 11^.* - £ 19,506,666 
 But being deficient one-eighth, 7 nr 403 ^33 
 7,000,000 yielded, at 75s. 8d. S 
 
 making a difference or profit of about 7,000,000/. 
 to be divided in each year, among the agricul- 
 tural interest on wheat alone. And as all other 
 grain participated in nearly a proportionate ad- 
 vance, the scarcity being general, assuming the 
 collective value of all other agricultural pro- 
 duce (exclusive of cattle and sheep) to be more 
 than double to that of wheat, and observing 
 the same proportion ofdefect in quantity, the re- 
 sult would be a gain of no less than 2 1 ,000,000/. ; 
 but from this apparent gain is to be deducted 
 
 * As the seasons both of 1792 and 1793 have been de- 
 scribed as somewhat under an average, this price seems to 
 be rather too high for the basis of comparison ; and 42s. 1 1 d. 
 which is the average price for 1792, would probably afford 
 a fairer point of contrast, making of course the gain by the 
 scarcities of 1794 and 1795 so much greater.
 
 115 
 
 the rise in price on that proportion of the pro- 
 duce reserved for the seed, and for the main- 
 tenance of the farmers' families and their work- 
 ing cattle. "What that deduction should be, I 
 am not competent to say, but I should imagine 
 that between one-fourth and one-third would be 
 an ample allowance, and it would still leave from 
 fourteen to sixteen millions profit to the pro- 
 ducers (including the proprietors of tithes) at the 
 expense of the consumers. From that profit there 
 was no drawback by any extra expensiveness of 
 the harvests, as the crops were quickly and well 
 got in, the weather during harvest in each of 
 those years, and particularly in 1794, having 
 been favourable. The tithe and poor rates did, 
 indeed, advance, but it was yet only in a small 
 proportion to that greater extra gain. And 
 with respect to the tithe in general, I would 
 here observe, that if it does not keep pace with 
 any great advance of price, so, on the other 
 hand, when once raised in consequence of con- 
 tinued scarcity, it follows the fall from the re- 
 turn of abundance equally slowly ; and in pro- 
 portion as it does not make a deduction to the 
 full extent of the legal claim during the rise, 
 it continues as a pressure beyond that extent 
 during the fall. 
 
 Allowing, however, a further deduction for 
 increased tithe and poor rate, to the extent of 
 
 N
 
 116 
 
 2,000,000/. there will remain a net profit of 
 from twelve to fourteen millions per annum, or 
 from twenty-four to twenty-eight millions in the 
 two years, to be divided among the farmers and 
 landlords, according to the terms of the leases. 
 Now, a clear gain to this extent might easily 
 be conceived to operate as a powerful stimulus 
 to extended tillage ; and accordingly the num- 
 ber of bills of inclosure on the average of the 
 three years, ending in 1797» was nearly double 
 of what it had been in 1792*. Surely, here is 
 quite a sufficient solution of the cause of in- 
 creased rents, without seeking for it in war de- 
 mand, or in the Bank restriction. But the in- 
 creased tillage and a large importation com- 
 bined, notwithstanding an indifferent harvest, 
 in 1797> to depress prices by the summer of 
 1798. And the process of refunding part of 
 the gains of the two preceding years by the 
 agricultural interest was attended with consi- 
 derable suffering to that class. Complaints 
 
 * Number of Bills of Inclosure. 
 
 1792 . 
 
 .. 40 
 
 1793 . 
 
 ,i 60 
 
 1794 ., 
 
 .. 74 
 
 1795 . 
 
 .. 77 
 
 1796 .. 
 
 . 72 
 
 1797 . 
 
 .. 85 
 
 (Appendix to the Lords' Report on the resumption of cash 
 payments 1819, page 430).
 
 117 
 
 were made in the newspapers of that time of the 
 inability of farmers, in many instances, to pay 
 their rents — those rents of course which had 
 been raised with the rise of produce. This dis- 
 couragement was immediately felt in a corre- 
 sponding reduction of the number of Inclosure 
 Bills, which having in 1797 amounted to eighty- 
 five in number, fell, in 1798, to forty-eight. 
 
 Can any coincidence of circumstances indi- 
 cate more strongly the relation of cause and 
 effect, than the encouragement to increased 
 tillage, in consequence of a succession of scarce 
 years, and the cessation of that encouragement 
 by the return of abundance ? 
 
 But the depression in this instance was not of 
 long duration ; for the season of 1799 opened 
 with all its horrors to the community, and was 
 the dawn of a fresh era of prosperity to the 
 agriculturists, for it was followed in immediate 
 succession by a season nearly equally deficient. 
 The deficiency arising from these seasons is 
 stated in the report of a Committee of the Com- 
 mons upon the scarcity, and the means of re- 
 medying it, at somewhat under one quarter as 
 relating to wheat ; the deficiency of other grain 
 appears not to have been quite so great as that 
 of wheat. Applying, therefore, the same form 
 of comparison of the state of the agricultural 
 interest in 1801, in consequence of the two pre- 
 
 N 2
 
 118 
 
 ceding years of dearth, and estimating the de- 
 ficiency at one quarter, it will stand thus : 
 
 If they had been of average produce, as that 
 of 1798, they would have yielded, suppose 
 
 8,000,000 quarters wheat, at 505. 3d.* £ 20,100,000 
 
 but, being deficient one quarter, 
 6,000,000 quarters yielded, at 104*. Ad. f - 31,300,000 
 
 making a gross profit of upwards of 11,000,000/. 
 on wheat alone, and adding double that sum as 
 the gain by the proportionate advance of other 
 produce, there will have been the enormous 
 sum of upwards of 33,000,000/. in each of the 
 two years, subject to the same deductions as in 
 the preceding statement, and to a further de- 
 duction for the greater expense at which the 
 harvests of 1799 and 1800, but particularly 
 the former, were got in, compared with 1798. 
 But, subject to all possible deductions, the 
 net profit divided among the farmers and 
 landlords must have amounted to upwards of 
 15,000,000/. in each of the two years, on the 
 
 * The price of 1 798 may be considered as perhaps some- 
 what too high for a point of comparison, because there had 
 not been sufficient time for the restoration of a surplus, nor 
 therefore for a subsidence to a fair level, after so great and 
 recent a deficiency as that of 1795. 
 
 f The average price of wheat for 1800 and 1801 was 
 115s. lit?, from which I have deducted 10 per cent, for 
 the difference between paper and gold, an allowance more 
 than adequate to the actual depreciation.
 
 119 
 
 average of which the high prices resulting from 
 the deficient crops were realized. 
 
 Was it to be wondered at, that under these 
 circumstances, there should be an eager resort 
 of fresh capital to the land ? The impulse was 
 irresistible, and consequently the number of 
 Inclosure Bills increased rapidly. The follow- 
 
 ing are the numbers : — 
 
 
 1799 . 
 
 .. 63 
 
 1800 . 
 
 .. 80 
 
 1801 . 
 
 .. 122 
 
 But, from the harvest of 1801, which was 
 abundant, coinciding with a large importation, 
 prices declined progressively till the harvest of 
 1804. Of the distress arising from that fall of 
 prices, which was not arrested by the renewal 
 of the war in the spring of 1803, nor by an un- 
 precedentedly large government expenditure, 
 it is sufficient to give the reader an idea by re- 
 ferring him to the discussions in parliament, 
 which took place at the passing of the corn 
 bill of that year. As the effect of the discou- 
 ragement arising from that fall, the number of 
 Inclosure Bills in 1804 suddenly fell to fifty- 
 two, exactly one-half of what they had been in 
 the year preceding. What connexion, therefore, 
 can be thus far assumed between war demand 
 or expenditure and the encouragement to till- 
 age, when in the very height of the war, and
 
 120 
 
 coincidently with an enormous increase of ex- 
 penditure, prices fell so much as to check the 
 spirit of improvement in so considerable a de- 
 gree. In July, 1804, the average price of 
 wheat was as low as in July, 1793 ; and if the 
 harvest of 1804 had been as abundant as the 
 harvests of 1813, 1815, and 1820, have since 
 been, I am perfectly satisfied that the corn bill 
 of 1804 would have been found to be as inef- 
 fectual in preventing the further fall, and thus 
 remedying the distress, as the corn bills of 1815 
 and 1822 have been. The crops of that year, 
 however, proved to be deficient, and the impulse 
 to a renewal of high prices continued as usual 
 for some time beyond the immediate occasion, 
 and there was of course a revival of agricultural 
 prosperity. 
 
 The crops of the two succeeding years were 
 of average produce, and with an importation in 
 1806 and 1807 to a very moderate extent, prices 
 were drooping for cattle and every description 
 of grain ; and if the season of 1807 had proved 
 to be one of general abundance, and the com- 
 munication with the rest of Europe, and with the 
 United States, had continued undisturbed, there 
 would have been a recurrence of distress to the 
 landed interest, and a new corn bill, which is 
 the general attendant on a fall of prices. 
 
 But at the close of 1807 arose the obstruc-
 
 121 
 
 tions, which I have already noticed, to our in- 
 tercourse with other countries, the extent of 
 which, from the description that I have given of 
 them, must be fresh in the reader's mind. Pre- 
 viously to 1807, our communication with the 
 north of Europe and with the United States of 
 America had been undisturbed, and the only 
 obstruction, arising out of the war, to an im- 
 portation consisted in extra freight and in- 
 surance, amounting on wheat to about 3s. to 5s. 
 per quarter above what they usually are in time 
 of peace. From 1793, therefore, down to 1806, 
 when the ports were virtually open, the average 
 price being mostly above the minimum of 54>s. 
 the importation at the ordinary prices at which 
 the continent is supposed to be capable of raising 
 corn and supplying it indefinitely, might have 
 been expected to be much larger than it was*. 
 
 * It is the more necessary to advert to the circumstance, 
 that at least down to 1806 the sources of supply from 
 abroad were open to us at charges of importation not more 
 than 3s. to 5*. per quarter above those which are usually 
 paid in time of peace from the Baltic ; because Mr. Webb 
 Hall stated in his pamphlet (page 98), that our agriculture 
 languished from the period of the alteration of our corn 
 laws in 1773, until our ports became virtually closed in 
 1 796 ; and he repeats that they were virtually shut from 
 that time to 1813. By this he means that the sources of 
 supply were closed against us by the war for the whole time. 
 It is sufficient, however, to refer to the amount of importation 
 from 1795 to 1806, to disprove this assertion.
 
 122 
 
 The importation was, indeed, on some occa- 
 sions very large, but still, with a few exceptions, 
 in no adequate proportion to the encouragement 
 held out by the high prices in this country. 
 The fact which accounts for this difficulty is 
 important, inasmuch as it explains what appears 
 to have been a still greater difficulty among 
 those who, neglecting the consideration of the 
 effect of the seasons, have sought exclusively in 
 the state of the currency, or in war expenditure, 
 for the explanation of all the phenomena of high 
 prices. 
 
 The fact to which I allude is, the pre- 
 valence and frequent recurrence of unfavour- 
 able seasons in several other countries, during 
 the greatest part of the interval between 1793 
 and 1807. 
 
 The continent of Europe was visited in 1794 
 and 1795 with a scarcity at least equal in se- 
 verity to that which prevailed here : in France 
 the suffering from this cause, aggravated as it 
 was by the law of the maximum, amounted to 
 a famine ; and the ravages committed by the 
 Hessian fly on wheat in America for several 
 successive years immediately preceding that 
 period, precluded the possibility of much relief 
 from that quarter *. 
 
 * Lord Sheffield stated in his speech, December, 1-795, 
 that wheat at Philadelphia, in August of that year, was at 
 12s. 2d. sterling per bushel.
 
 1-23 
 
 1798, which in this country was a good sea- 
 son, was unfavourable, from excessive drought, 
 in some parts of the north of Europe. 
 
 1799 was, if possible, still more unpropitious 
 on the continent than it was here. 
 
 1800 was indeed somewhat less unfavourable 
 there than in this country, which accounts for 
 our having been able to obtain so large a supply 
 of foreign corn in 1800 and 1801. 
 
 1802 and 1803, which were years of fair ave- 
 rage produce in this country, were unfavour- 
 able in the south of Europe. A better proof of 
 this cannot be afforded than the circumstance 
 that, notwithstanding the ports of this country 
 were open at what might seem to be high prices, 
 the importation was comparatively small. So 
 great was the scarcity in Spain during those 
 two years, that the price of wheat rose in the 
 spring of 1804 to nearly six times what it had 
 been in 1800. 
 
 ff The medium price of the load of four funegas of wheat 
 at the market of Medina di Rio Seco in Leon, which was in 
 May, 1800, at 115 reals vellon, rose as follows: — 
 
 May, 1801, 172 reals vellon. 
 
 1802, 263 
 
 1803, 2474- 
 
 1804, 620." 
 
 (Appendix to Bullion Report, 1810, page 185.) 
 
 Thus there was no accumulation during the 
 whole period in the sources of foreign supply.
 
 124 
 
 In the years 1805, 180(3, and 1807, it is pro- 
 bable that the very extensive scale of military 
 operations in the north of Europe interfered 
 with the cultivation of corn, or, at least, with 
 the bringing down of the usual quantities to 
 the ports of the Baltic ; and some of those 
 ports, belonging to Prussia, fell into the hands 
 of the French at the close of 1806. Accord- 
 ingly, though our ports were open, and the ex- 
 pense of conveyance still moderate, the im- 
 portations, in 1806 and 1807, v/ere inconsider- 
 able. 
 
 It was, in truth, scarcity operating, in other 
 countries as well as in this, in advancing the 
 price on the principle already stated, in a ratio 
 much beyond the degree of deficiency, that 
 was the talisman which worked such miracles 
 of prosperity to farmers and landlords. 
 
 After the close of 1807, however, there were 
 intervals when the sources of supply of foreign 
 corn were really shut against us ; and, as those 
 intervals coincided with a deficiency, greater 
 or less, of our own crops, the effect on price 
 of any supposed deficiency was calculated to 
 be in a much greater ratio than it otherwise 
 would have been. In the discussions, there- 
 fore, in parliament, in the spring of 1808, on 
 prohibiting the distillation from grain, one of 
 the arguments most relied on was, that though
 
 125 
 
 the deficiency of the crops of 1807 was con- 
 fined to those of spring corn and of potatoes, 
 and might not, under other cirnmstances, be 
 calculated to create any alarm, the uncertainty 
 of being able to obtain a supply from abroad 
 rendered it expedient to husband our own re- 
 sources. And so far the apprehension was 
 justified — whatever may be thought of the ex- 
 pedience of the interference which was founded 
 upon it ; since, notwithstanding the advance 
 which took place in the price of all kinds 
 of grain in the spring of 1808, and the 
 further rise which occurred when the result 
 of the harvest was known, the whole importa- 
 tion of foreign wheat and flour, in that year, 
 did not exceed 41,388 quarters ; while the ex- 
 portation, probably to the Peninsula, amounted 
 to 69,484 quarters. Freights and insurances 
 had advanced extravagantly in the course of 
 that year, and the license system had not yet 
 been sufficiently organized to admit of ex- 
 tensive importations of any kind. 
 
 The further advance in price, however, as a 
 consequence of the bad harvest of 1809, the 
 license system being by that time matured, in- 
 duced a very large importation at the close of 
 that year ; and still greater supplies came for- 
 ward in 1810. Our being able to get so large 
 a supply arose, apparently, from the circum-
 
 126 
 
 stance that the seasons of 1808 and 1809, which 
 were unfavourable in this country, were not so 
 on the Continent, being an exception to the 
 general observation of the prevalence of seasons 
 of a similar description on the Continent with 
 those in this country ; and wheat was parti- 
 cularly cheap in France in those two years. 
 The great advance, therefore, in the price 
 here, and the cheapness abroad at that par- 
 ticular time, will serve to account for an im- 
 portation on so large a scale as in 1809 and 
 1810, notwithstanding the very high freights 
 and premiums of insurance which were then 
 paid, and which, under other circumstances, 
 would have amounted to a prohibition. 
 
 But, in 1811, the deficiency in this country, 
 arising from the bad harvest of that year, coin- 
 cided with deficient crops on the Continent, 
 and particularly in France, where the price ad- 
 vanced nearly 200 per cent, above what it had 
 been in 1808. High, therefore, as the price 
 here was, wheat having advanced, on the ave- 
 rage, in July, 1812, to 140s. 9d., it was insuf- 
 ficient to cover the great expenses of importa- 
 tion, added to a relatively high price at the 
 shipping ports : some of the ports in the Baltic, 
 moreover, were, during part of that time, in a 
 state of siege ; and were, consequently, wholly 
 closed against us as sources of supply. The
 
 127 
 
 quantity of foreign corn, accordingly, imported 
 in 1811 and 1812, was very inconsiderable ; the 
 balance of the importation of wheat having 
 amounted to only 92,478 quarters in 1811, and 
 to 82,984 quarters in 1812. 
 
 The deficiency of our own crops was not so 
 great in 1811 and 1812, as in 1794 and 1795 ; 
 or, again, in 1799 and 1800. It is clear, there- 
 fore, that the prices of 1811 and 1812 would 
 not have been so high if there had not been a 
 virtual exclusion of foreign supply, which ren- 
 dered it necessary to eke out our own produce 
 by economy ; and this could only be effected 
 through the medium of a relatively high range 
 of prices. The price of wheat was raised, in 
 consequence, on the average of the Jive years, 
 ending in 1813, to no less than 106s. \d. per 
 quarter, subject to deduction for the difference 
 between paper and gold. 
 
 It must be obvious, without fatiguing the 
 reader by a repetition of calculations, that, ap- 
 plying the same rule of comparison, the effect 
 of a succession of crops more or less deficient, 
 in raising prices so much beyond the degree of 
 defect, must have been to afford a great amount 
 of gain to be distributed among the agricultural 
 classes. Independent of the encouragement 
 arising from these profits, continued through so 
 great a length of time, there was now a con-
 
 128 
 
 fidence, which had not before existed, in the 
 prospect of the continuance of them. The 
 average produce of five seasons was supposed 
 to represent what would be the utmost that 
 any five succeeding seasons were likely to 
 yield ; and as there was not, till the close of 
 1812, any appearance of a relaxation of the 
 Continental system of exclusion, a continued 
 absence of foreign competition was fully an- 
 ticipated. Under these circumstances, rents, 
 upon the expiration of leases, were advanced 
 in full proportion to the high range of the 
 prices of produce j and, in several instances, 
 they were raised to treble of what they had 
 been in 1792. Every purchase of land pre- 
 vious to 1811, whether made with or without 
 judgment, turned out favourably according to 
 the then market rates, and it was supposed, in 
 consequence, that money could in no way be 
 so profitably employed as in buying land. Spe- 
 culations, therefore, in land, or, as it is termed, 
 land-jobbing, became general, and credit came 
 in aid of capital for that purpose. A striking, 
 but not, I believe, a singular instance of that 
 description of speculation, was exhibited in the 
 case of a petition lately presented to parliament, 
 representing that the petitioner had, in the years 
 1811 and 1812, laid out 150,000/., partly his own 
 and partly borrowed, in the purchase of land,
 
 129 
 
 which had since fallen so much in value, that he 
 was ruined by the loss ; praying, therefore, to 
 be relieved, by what it has been the fashion 
 to term an equitable adjustment of contracts, 
 but which means, in reality, an indemnification 
 for bad speculations. 
 
 The extension of tillage, and the application 
 of fresh capital to land already in cultivation, 
 proceeded in full proportion to the great gains 
 derived from the produce at such high prices. 
 The number of inclosure bills was 
 
 In 180S* 
 
 92 
 
 1809 
 
 122 
 
 1810 
 
 107 
 
 1811 
 
 133 
 
 1812 
 
 119 
 
 1S13 
 
 111 
 
 1814 
 
 112 
 
 The effect of a cultivation so extended was 
 developed by the occurrence of three seasons, 
 of which two, 1813 and 1815, were remarkably 
 abundant, and one, 1814, a fair average. So 
 great was the increase of produce thence re- 
 sulting, that a fall of prices was inevitable, 
 even supposing the war to have continued. A 
 
 * I have already given the number of inclosure bills down 
 to 1 804 j the number was 
 
 In 1805 . . 71 
 
 1806 . . 76 
 
 1807 . . 91
 
 130 
 
 better proof of this cannot be adduced, than 
 the fact that a great fall did take place upon 
 the occurrence of the first of these seasons of 
 abundance, viz. 1813, notwithstanding the con- 
 tinuance, and even a great extension of war 
 expenditure, and notwithstanding a great rise 
 in the price of gold ; and that the renewal of 
 hostilities with France in 1815, accompanied 
 by a government expenditure, on a larger scale 
 than ever known, for the time it lasted, and by 
 a great rise in the price of gold, could not arrest 
 the fall, which continued till 181 6. The loss 
 arising from the fall in agricultural produce in 
 that period, compared with the highest level 
 which it had attained in 1812 and 1813, has 
 been computed, in the supplement to Mr. 
 Webb Hall's pamphlet, at 72,000,000/. per 
 annum, which proves, as far as that authority 
 goes, that my computation of the amount dis- 
 tributed, as gain upon agricultural produce 
 during the rise from scarcity, is not overrated.
 
 131 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 Application of the Principle of the " Effect of Quantity 
 on Price" to the State of Agriculture, since 1812, as 
 explanatory of the Fall of Prices. 
 
 The suffering by the landed interest from the 
 great fall which began in 1813 was the occa- 
 sion of the corn bill of 1815, which, however, 
 was perfectly ineffectual in resisting the tend- 
 ency to a further decline of prices. But the 
 bad harvest of 1816 intervened, and gave a 
 respite from that state of distress. 
 
 The effect of that single bad harvest, coin- 
 ciding as it did with one equally unfavourable 
 in France, was to raise the price in this country 
 upwards of 100 per cent. ; for on the 1st Janu- 
 ary, 1816, the average price of wheat was 53s.7d. 
 and in June, 1817, reached 112s. Jd. # thus ex- 
 hibiting a further proof of an advance in price 
 greatly beyond the utmost computation of the 
 defect of quantity. There was no pretence for 
 ascribing this advance to a war expenditure ; 
 and it has been shown in the first part of this 
 
 * Appendix to Agricultural Report, 1821, page 381. 
 
 o
 
 132 
 
 work, that the greatest proportion of the ad- 
 vance preceded any increase of bank notes or 
 any considerable issue of gold. What is further 
 decisive on this point is, that the rise of prices 
 in France was still greater than in this country. 
 
 From the peculiarities attending the seasons 
 of 1817 and 1818, a high range of prices was 
 maintained through those two years, notwith- 
 standing that from the experience since derived, 
 there is reason to believe that they were full 
 average crops. I have already described those 
 seasons, and from that description may be col- 
 lected the cause of the deception as to their 
 produce. But opinion of quantity will for a 
 limited time act upon price nearly as much as 
 the reality, although eventually the fall must 
 be so much the greater, as an erroneous opinion, 
 by maintaining the price above a due pro- 
 portion to the actual quantity, must restrain 
 consumption and increase supply. The opinion 
 entertained of the insufficiency of the growth 
 had therefore, while it lasted, the effect of dis- 
 tributing a much greater profit among the agri- 
 cultural classes than was justified by the actual, 
 compared with the supposed, produce. 
 
 The occurrence of a bad season in 1816, and 
 the supposition that those of 1817 and 1818 
 were short of an average produce, countenanced 
 the opinion, that unfavourable seasons must
 
 133 
 
 recur at very short intervals. And as it was 
 further supposed, that even an average produce 
 of our own growth was insufficient for the con- 
 sumption, it was calculated that if by an abun- 
 dant season, or by too large an importation, the 
 average price should fall below 805. it would, by 
 the shutting of the ports, quickly rise again to 
 that rate. That this opinion operated to some 
 extent, I have every reason to believe from 
 what I heard at the time, and have since col- 
 lected from parties interested in the corn trade. 
 This high range of prices, resulting originally 
 from one bad season, and continued through 
 two more seasons, which gave rise to an erro- 
 neous opinion of scarcity, afforded the reality 
 as well as the appearance, as long as it lasted, 
 of prosperity to agriculture. It appears, indeed, 
 by some of the evidence before the Agricul- 
 tural Committee in 1821, that farming had been 
 resumed with increased spirit, in consequence 
 of the encouragement held out in 1817 and 
 1818. 
 
 The effect of the high prices for three 
 years, in two of which the produce did not 
 justify so elevated a range, was to increase the 
 supply by importation, as well as by extended 
 cultivation, and the consequence was, that upon 
 the occurrence of a season of more than usual 
 produce in 1820, after three of average growth, 
 
 o 2
 
 134 
 
 there was a surplus of very extraordinary mag- 
 nitude. Mr. Wakefield stated it as his opi- 
 nion, that the stock of corn on hand in April, 
 1821, was as great as it usually is after harvest *. 
 The stock on hand immediately after harvest 
 can hardly be less in average seasons than four- 
 teen or fifteen months' consumption. Now, 
 confining the computation to wheat, and rec- 
 koning the consumption to be at the rate often 
 millions of quarters per annum, the quantity 
 in the country in April would be between 11 
 and 12 millions of quarters, and deducting the 
 consumption till and during harvest, or about 
 4 millions of quarters, there would remain be- 
 tween 7 and 8 millions of quarters of old wheat 
 at the new harvest. This is no vague sup- 
 position ; for it is corroborated, as much as any 
 mere estimate can be, by the concurrent testi- 
 mony of those who witnessed the large and 
 overwhelming supplies which poured into the 
 market when the speculative rise took place 
 upon the bad weather which prevailed during 
 the harvest of 1821. So large a surplus fully 
 accounts for the subsequent decline in price, 
 
 * Minutes of Evidence Agricultural Committee, 1821. 
 " I think that there is a wonderful quantity of corn in the 
 country j I now think that there is as much corn left in 
 the country as generally in common years there is after 
 harvest." Page 217.
 
 135 
 
 even supposing that the produce of 1821, which 
 is now pretty nearly ascertained to have yielded 
 a full quantity, although of inferior quality, 
 had been a bare average ; for it could only 
 be by an extra consumption that, with a sub- 
 sequent average produce, a surplus so much 
 greater than usual could be reduced. An 
 increased consumption can arise only from an 
 increasing population, which can have but a 
 trifling effect within a year or two, or from 
 such a degree of cheapness as would occasion a 
 larger consumption by the same number. But 
 as it requires a very great elevation of price to 
 eke out a stock deficient only in a very trifling 
 degree, so it requires a great reduction of price 
 to induce or admit of an increased consumption, 
 in any proportion to the excess of produce re- 
 sulting from even a single season of general 
 abundance. 
 
 The existence of so large a surplus, which 
 could not be the effect of the excess of produce 
 beyond an average of the single season of 1820, 
 even with the addition of the importation of 
 1817 and 1818, affords the presumption, in 
 addition to that arising from the description of 
 them, that the crops of 1817, 1818, and 1819, 
 collectively, must have amounted to more than 
 sufficient to meet the consumption. 
 
 The crops of 1821, badly as they were got in,
 
 136 
 
 are supposed to have yielded a full average 
 produce. These five seasons, therefore, ending 
 with the harvest of 1821, form, in point of 
 abundance, a sufficient contrast to the scanty- 
 supply resulting from the five seasons ending in 
 1812. If to the superiority of home produce of 
 the five seasons ending in 1821 be added the 
 excess of importation in the latter period, and 
 if, in estimating the effect of so great an excess 
 of quantity, it be considered that in the five 
 years ending in December, 1812, actual scanti- 
 ness of supply was aggravated by the absence of 
 relief in prospect from importation ; whereas in 
 the five years recently passed there has been 
 an abundant supply actually in the market, and 
 further, a large quantity ready to be poured in, 
 so as to check the range of speculative advance 
 beyond 805., there will appear quite sufficient 
 reason for the difference of price at the two 
 periods ; allowing only for the depreciation of 
 paper in the former period. But if scarcity or 
 mere scantiness of supply, by its powerful effects 
 in raising prices beyond the ratio of the de- 
 ficiency, was the occasion of the distribution of 
 such large sums as profit and rent among the 
 producing classes, the return of abundance, and 
 the consequent depression of price in a ratio 
 beyond the difference of quantity, must occa- 
 sion losses in proportion to the extent and
 
 137 
 
 duration of that fall ; and the losses during 
 the fall would be larger in the aggregate than 
 the gain during the rise, in as far as a resort 
 had been had to the cultivation of inferior 
 soils. 
 
 It may further be remarked, that as the 
 farmers, pending their leases, would be the first 
 gainers during the rise, and the landlords would 
 only realize their profit at the expiration of 
 the leases by an advanced rent ; so, in the re- 
 trograde process, the farmers would be losers 
 in the first instance, and the landlords even- 
 tually at the expiration of the leases, or even 
 before that time, if the losses were greater than 
 what the farmers could sustain : in this case 
 the landlords must abate or forego their rents, 
 according to circumstances, in order to save 
 their tenants from insolvency, and their land 
 from deterioration. 
 
 The exposition here given of the degree in 
 which the seasons have contributed to the pro- 
 sperity of the agricultural interests at one pe- 
 riod, and to the subsequent depression of them, 
 is so far connected with the examination of the 
 causes of the high and low prices in the last 
 thirty years, as the great gains, resulting from 
 the scarcity, which, as the consequence of 
 unfavourable seasons, prevailed, more or less, 
 during the first twenty years, formed the sti-
 
 138 
 
 mulus which, with short intervals, operated to 
 the extension and improvement of cultivation. 
 On the other hand, a more favourable course 
 of seasons in the nine years ending in the sum- 
 mer of 1822, operating upon that extended and 
 improved cultivation, occasioned the abundance 
 to which the subsequent fall of prices, and con- 
 sequent agricultural distress, may be ascribed.
 
 139 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 Recapitulation. 
 
 The points which I have endeavoured to 
 establish as the result of this examination of 
 the varieties of the seasons, and their effects on 
 the high and low prices of the last thirty years, 
 are, 
 
 That seasons of a particular character for pro- 
 ductiveness or unproductiveness are liable to 
 occur in very different proportions in equal 
 series of ,years at different intervals : as, for in- 
 stance, in one interval, viz. from 1693 to 1714, 
 both years included, making twenty-two years, 
 there were twelve seasons more or less unfa- 
 vourable, or of deficient produce ; and, in an- 
 other interval, from 1730 to 1751, making like- 
 wise twenty-two years, there was only one sea- 
 son, which, from historical record, or by infer- 
 ence from fluctuation of price, can be consi- 
 dered to have been decidedly unproductive.
 
 140 
 
 That seasons of nearly a similar description 
 frequently prevailed during the same periods 
 in France, and in some other parts of Europe. 
 
 That the dearness of corn in the period 
 of twenty-two years ending in 1714, and the 
 comparative cheapness in the twenty-two years 
 ending in 1751, in France, as well as in this 
 country, while the value of money, in other 
 respects, seems to have been falling, cannot be 
 accounted for satisfactorily, except by the fact 
 of the occurrence of unfavourable seasons in 
 such different proportions in the two periods. 
 
 That in the twenty years from 1793 to 1812, 
 both years included, there were no fewer than 
 eleven years of greater or less deficiency of 
 produce arising from the seasons, with a con- 
 siderable proportion of long and severe winters. 
 
 That in the interval from 1813 to 1821, both 
 years included, there was only one decidedly 
 bad season, viz. 1816, and only one very severe 
 winter, viz. 1813-14, while there were three 
 harvests of acknowledged great and general 
 abundance, 1813, 1815, and 1820. 
 
 That in the first ten years of the period under 
 examination, viz. from 1793 to 1802, both in- 
 cluded, the proportion of seasons of scarcity 
 was as great on the Continent of Europe as in 
 this country ; and that, therefore, although the
 
 141 
 
 expenses of conveyance were not more than 
 5.9. per quarter on wheat higher than in peace, 
 no adequate supply could be obtained by im- 
 portation, except by a great advance in price. 
 
 That in the ten years from 1803 to 1812, 
 both included, the proportion of seasons of de- 
 ficient produce was somewhat greater than in 
 the first ten years, but the degree of deficiency, 
 of particular seasons, less marked ; that during 
 part of this period, viz. from 1803 to 1807, 
 there was a scarcity in some countries, and no 
 general abundance in the rest of Europe, so 
 that there was not, at any time, the depressing 
 effect of a large contingent supply : and that 
 during the remaining five years, viz. from 1808 
 to 18 12, both included, the deficiency of our 
 own produce could not be relieved by a foreign 
 supply, except on the condition of a rise in 
 price sufficient to defray the extraordinary ex- 
 penses of conveyance (amounting, in some in- 
 stances, to upwards of 50s. per quarter) arising 
 out of the peculiar character of the war during 
 that period. 
 
 That in the nine years ending in 1821, the 
 harvests on the Continent of Europe were still 
 more abundant than in this country, so that 
 when, by the single bad season of 1816, our 
 ports were opened, and partly by erroneous
 
 142 
 
 estimate of the produce of our own crops, and 
 partly by miscalculation of the effects of the 
 corn bill, they were kept open for the two fol- 
 lowing years, an importation of extraordinary 
 magnitude took place ; and that this great im- 
 portation, added to three crops of full average 
 and one of superabundant produce, made a 
 surplus or stock on hand at the commencement 
 of the harvest of 1821, exceeding, as far as 
 evidence can be procured or conjecture made, 
 the reserve at any harvest during the last thirty 
 years. 
 
 That a defect or excess in the supply of any 
 commodity, and of corn more particularly, af- 
 fects the price in a ratio much greater than 
 that of the defect or excess in quantity.' 
 
 That under the operation of this principle, 
 the scarcity arising from the seasons, with a 
 very small allowance for the extra expenses of 
 conveyance in consequence of the war, and for 
 the difference between paper and gold, is suf- 
 ficient to account for the high price of corn 
 during the first fifteen years from 1793 to 1807. 
 
 That under the operation of the same prin- 
 ciple, a smaller deficiency, arising from the 
 seasons, with a very much greater difficulty and 
 expense of importation, from the peculiar cha- 
 racter which the war assumed, and with a
 
 143 
 
 larger allowance for the difference between 
 paper and gold, is sufficient to account for the 
 high price of corn for the five years ending in 
 1812. 
 
 That, dating from the harvest of 1813, a suc- 
 cession of seasons more or less favourable, ope- 
 rating upon an extended scale and improved 
 mode of cultivation, down to the summer of 
 1822, with the intervention of one season only 
 of deficient produce, and combined with a very 
 large importation during part of that interval, 
 have been attended with an increase of aggre- 
 gate produce quite sufficient upon the principle 
 stated of the effect of quantity on price, to 
 account for the decline which took place down 
 to the close of last year. 
 
 That, while the operation of this principle, 
 under the circumstances stated, accounts for 
 the rise and high level of prices, and for the 
 subsequent decline, it fully explains the extra- 
 ordinary prosperity enjoyed by the agricultural 
 interest, with very short intervals of depression 
 during the first twenty years, and for the severe 
 distress which has attended that body during 
 the last ten years of the period in question. 
 But that the great prosperity of the agri- 
 cultural interest, as it arose from scarcity, was 
 attended with great suffering to the rest of the
 
 144. 
 
 community ; while the return of abundance 
 which is productive, during the decline of 
 prices, of great distress to that body, is at- 
 tended with great increase of enjoyment and 
 of real wealth to the rest of the community.
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 PART III. 
 
 No. 1. 
 
 Extract from the translation of a speech made by M. De 
 Caradeuc de la Chalotais, Procur cur- general to the parlia- 
 ment of Brittany, on the 20th of August, 1764; when he 
 carried into court the edict of the ?nonth of July, 1764, 
 requiring it to be registered. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, 
 
 I have the honour to inform you of the most signal 
 benefit with which his majesty can gratify his people, a liberty 
 to trade in corn. 
 
 After having permitted the free circulation in the interior 
 part of the kingdom, by his declaration of the 25th of May, 
 1763, the king grants by this edict, which I bring into court, 
 the entire liberty of exportation and importation. He permits 
 all his subjects to trade in all sorts of corn, grain, pulse, flour, 
 &c. either with natural-born subjects or strangers. 
 
 You may understand this edict, Gentlemen, as a presage 
 of the increase and improvement of agriculture, which will in- 
 fallibly be the source of the re-establishment and prosperity 
 of the kingdom. 
 
 In short, thanks to his majesty and the minister who 
 manages his finances, the system of prohibition seems to be 
 abandoned for ever ; a fatal system, which forbids the subjects 
 of the same sovereign to lend each other mutual assistance,
 
 146 
 
 and cuts off between France and othernations that communica' 
 tion of exchanging superfluities for necessaries, which is so 
 conformable to the order of Divine Providence. Particular 
 permissions, that useless resource, which enriched a few pri- 
 vate persons at the expense of the nation, will not for the 
 future discourage the farmer. We shall no more be in fear of 
 want, nor, which is almost as much to be dreaded, the too 
 great abundance of crops. We shall no more fear, above all, 
 excessive variations in the price of corn, equally hurtful 
 with scarcity itself. In short, we may hope for an equitable 
 plan of taxation, founded upon true and simple principles, the 
 cultivation of the lands, and the augmentation of the riches of 
 the state. 
 
 I shall not stand, Gentlemen, to prove truths, at present 
 too •well known, and carried to the highest degree of demon- 
 stration by so many solid works, which are the produce of the 
 knowledge of zealous and well-informed citizens. 
 
 Who is unacquainted, that it is the earth only giveth riches, 
 because it only produceth and reproduceth annually a new 
 stock ? That the sale of merchandise is the only means to 
 cause a circulation of money, which is only the representation 
 of more real riches, the fruits of the earth ? That a state rich 
 in productions which it can sell, will necessarily be rich in 
 money ? But let its merchandise fail, or find no sales, it 
 feels infallibly the want of circulation of specie, and falls into 
 a languor which, in its effects, is equally bad as poverty. It 
 is therefore certain, that the most useful of all political laws 
 is that which gives the greatest facility to the sale of the pro- 
 ductions of the earth. The necessaries for consumption, taxes, 
 even the trade of the nation, all take their rise from the sale 
 of mei'chandise ; therefore we cannot extend this source too 
 much, nor be too careful how we straighten it ; if it should 
 be dried up, the evils of the state would be without remedy 
 and without bounds. 
 
 I shall confine myself, Gentlemen, to a few slight observa-
 
 147 
 
 tions on the necessity of the exportation of the principal mer- 
 chandise (corn) : they may appear unnecessary, since his ma- 
 jesty hath established its truth in a perpetual and irrevocable 
 edict, an edict conformable to the prayers of the nation which 
 obtained it, to that of the states of this province, to experience 
 which is the instructor of man, to the sentiments of Henry the 
 Great and the illustrious Sully, to the opinion of all those who 
 have examined this question without prejudice and without in- 
 terest ; an examination in regard to which no one hath hitherto 
 presumed publicly to contradict either the reasons, the facts, 
 or the calculations. But it is requisite to encourage the 
 timorous, to instruct those who are not as yet fully informed, 
 to remove all mistrust from the people. We have no reason to 
 fear when we are laying down maxims which promise the good 
 of the state. 
 
 Is there any necessity, by a long chain of reasoning, to 
 prove, that to prevent the sale of corn is to prohibit the cul- 
 tivation ? that such prohibition hath made the profession of a 
 farmer (in France), although the most necessary, the most 
 unhappy of all the professions in the state ? That a free trade 
 in grain, both within and without the kingdom, is the sole 
 and only means to put the farmer and land-owners in a condi- 
 tion to support public and private expenses. 
 
 Let us not fear to descend to particulars ; experience is the 
 foundation of all physical inquiry, calculation is the measure. 
 We arrive at general maxims only by the knowledge of par- 
 ticular facts. 
 
 The necessary expenses of every cultivation whatsoever are 
 the seed, the ploughing, the manure, the expenses to harvest, 
 to lay up and to preserve the crop. It is necessary that the 
 farmer make interest of the money advanced, wherewith to 
 subsist himself and family, pay tithes, taxes, and his landlord, 
 whose expenses ascertain the payment of the other classes 
 of the state, who being composed of neither land-owners nor 
 farmers, live at the expense of those who are. 
 
 v
 
 148 
 
 The earth does not produce every year the best of grain. 
 It must have years of rest ; it is necessary to take into con- 
 sideration good and bad years, and place to the account un- 
 foreseen accidents, for they will not be wanting. 
 
 Now, in calculating these expenses at the lowest rate pos- 
 sible, it appears that the setier of wheat is barely worth to 
 the farmer that which it cost him ; men well skilled in agri- 
 culture have made the calculation, and desire all land-owners 
 to make it themselves : it is a work which relates to all men, 
 and in which all professions are interested. The neat produce 
 of the cultivation of the earth is the only source of the pro- 
 sperity of a farming state ; to know exactly what an acre of 
 land, well cultivated, will produce, in different kinds of mer- 
 chandise, according to the difference of the soils, is the funda- 
 mental problem of agriculture, commerce, and finances. 
 
 If the farmer doth not gain all his expenses and wherewith 
 to satisfy all charges, the earth will remain unfilled, as more 
 than the moiety in this province doth : the starving proprietor 
 will be forced to sustain losses and bankruptcies ; the farmer 
 ruined, badly clothed and badly fed, will sell his little pro- 
 perty; he will take up with his indigent family the art of 
 begging, too common, and which is a disgrace to the nation ; 
 the state itself will suffer ; the taxes will not be collected but 
 with extreme difficulty, and with the greatest rigour ; and it 
 must be acknowledged that this hath been the state of the 
 kingdom (of France) for more than an age. In every pro- 
 vince the earth shows, in an infinity of places, the marks and 
 vestiges of a deserted cultivation : houses unroofed proclaim 
 desertion and depopulation ; the cities and even the capital 
 are peopled with poor, whilst those who have ruined so many 
 families and enriched themselves with their spoils, make 
 parade of a luxury which is an insult on public misery. 
 
 There is, moreover, another principle which manifestly 
 proves the price of corn is too low (in France), and that the 
 farmers are far from being in a happy situation.
 
 149 
 
 The price of corn ought to be in proportion to the value of 
 every merchandise, and every kind of labour, which, after de- 
 ducting the value of the material, ought to cost more or less 
 according to what is paid per day to the workman. 
 
 It is manifest that for about an age past the prices of labour 
 and merchandise are considerably raised (in France). There is 
 none that for this fifty years past hath not experienced this. 
 
 The price of corn, which is the measure of the whole, shoidd 
 then have risen in proportion ; in the meantime, it hath not 
 only not increased, but it is a certain fact, that it hath fallen 
 considerably, and that it would require an age ago a greater 
 weight of silver to pay for a setier than it doth at present. 
 
 In 1649, the Deputy of M , the procureur-general at 
 
 the Chatelet, said, in his requisition of the 6th of March to 
 the police, as a known fact, that wheat was at 15 livres the 
 setier, a moderate price (these are his words) ; but the same 
 setier hath this present year, 1764, been in Paris at 14 livres, 
 and 14 livres 10 sous. It was of less value in the neighbour- 
 ing cantons, and of necessity in the country. 
 
 It appears by the account of prices kept at Paris, that it 
 was worth 18 livres 18 sous in 1649 ; 26 livres 10 sous 5 de- 
 niers in 1650; 25 livres 13 sous in 1651 ; and 24 livres 
 18 sous in 1652. Then the price of wheat hath diminished 
 very much since 1649, that is within 115 years ; and it cannot 
 be denied that other workmanship and merchandise, wages, 
 &c. have greatly increased. 
 
 What shall we think, Gentlemen, of so great a difference, 
 when we reflect that the mark of silver was in 1649 at 28 livres, 
 13 sous, 8 deniers ; that is to say, at almost half less than at 
 this day, (viz. from 1726 at 54 livres 6 sous?) 
 
 The value of the setier of wheat (in money at present in 
 use) was, during these five years, on the average price, at 
 42 livres 2 sous ; these prices are calculated hi The Essay on 
 Moneys, and in the treatise of the Police of Corn. Ought 
 one to be surprised, after these examples, that his majesty 
 • p2
 
 150 
 
 hath fixed the limits of the exportation at 30 livres the setier 
 weighing 240 pounds ? 
 
 It is then proved true to a demonstration, that corn is (in 
 France) at too low a price, in proportion to the advances, to 
 the charges and expenses of the farmer; in proportion to other 
 works and merchandise, and consequently to both public and 
 private expenses. 
 
 But to enable the grower to receive back his charges and 
 expenses, that he may support and pay all taxes ; it is not 
 sufficient even that corn should be of a certain value, it is 
 necessary that value should be regular, the least subject as 
 possible to variation : if he is not certain of selling, and of 
 selling every year for profit, this uncertainty deprives him of 
 all security, and he loses the courage to till. 
 
 Now, this was impossible under a system of prohibitions, 
 under a system of temporary and particular permissions often 
 granted from interest to importunity, scarcely ever free from 
 suspicions. 
 
 A state, whose agriculture is under the direction of pro- 
 hibitive laws, can never cultivate but for its oiun necessary use ; 
 it can never by good make compensation for bad years, for 
 such a state is poor, when it hath a superfluity of grain, and it 
 is poor when it hath too little : the superabundance produceth 
 stagnation, and the failure produceth icant: one brings with it 
 a vile price, and the other excessive dearth. 
 
 These variations, the alternative of liberty and prohibitions, 
 left the farmer in fear, and could not fail to discourage him, 
 because he was obliged to sell at any price whatsoever to 
 satisfy his annual advance. There is nothing but the constant 
 keeping the ports open and a free exportation of grain that 
 can remedy these inconveniences. In time of great plenty 
 that freedom will support cultivation, because the certainty of 
 sales either within the kingdom or to foreigners will make 
 both the landlord and farmer contentedly see their riches lie 
 idle in their magazines. This confidence will make them easy,
 
 151 
 
 and prevent, in unfruitful years, the terrors of want, which 
 often causes real want. The disadvantage of expenses in bad 
 years will be made up by advantageous sales in those which 
 are good ; the poor will find himself comforted by the 
 abundant consumption of the rich, and by th« circulation. 
 He cannot live, if the rich doth not furnish him with the 
 means of subsistence ; and the latter cannot furnish the former 
 therewith, if he doth not draw from the earth sufficient to 
 pay those recompenses and wages, which are the reward of 
 labour. 
 
 But that which ought to remove entirely all his fears of 
 want, is that constant uniformity of the price of corn, which 
 exportation will necessarily produce. The principal end of a 
 free exportation is not so much to sell as to support the mer- 
 chandise at the best price possible, to restore that equilibrium 
 which is supported naturally in the commerce of other mer- 
 chandise.
 
 152 
 
 No II. 
 
 An Extract of an Address to the Different Classes of Persons 
 in Great Britain, on the Present Scarcity and High Price of 
 Provisions. By the Rev. Septitnus Hodson, M.B. 1795. 
 
 It may fairly then be assumed that the present scarcity of 
 corn is real., and not artificial ; but to establish the fact still 
 more strongly, let us inquire into the causes which have com- 
 bined to produce the situation at which we are so justly 
 alarmed. 
 
 1 . It is well known to the corn-factors that the whole stock 
 of the bread corn of last year was so nearly consumed before 
 harvest, that had not the harvest been remarkably early we 
 should at that time have felt a much severer temporary scarcity 
 than we do at present. Instead, therefore, of the markets 
 being supplied after harvest in part with old wheat, new wheat 
 only was brought forward ; and that three weeks or a month * 
 earlier than the average time of harvest. Considerably more 
 of the new wheat, therefore, was consumed by Christmas, for 
 example, than in former years ; so that, unless the crops 
 were so abundant as to be equal to this premature consump- 
 tion, a deficiency must necessarily be felt towards the approach 
 of the following harvest. 
 
 2. Unhappily, however, the yielding of the last crops was 
 by no means equal to the sanguine expectations which were 
 formed of them. Throughout the southern, eastern, and mid- 
 land counties, the ear, which looked very promising to the eye, 
 did not yield much more than four-fifths of corn, all the upper 
 part of the ear being merely chaff. This is accounted for by 
 an unexpected frost in the middle of May, when the wheat 
 was in bloom, which cut off the upper part of the bloom which 
 
 * This is nearly one-twelfth of the whole consumption ! !
 
 153 
 
 was exposed, but did not injure the lower part of it, which was 
 more sheltered. The northern counties were not affected by 
 this accident, the wheat not being in so forward a state. 
 
 3. The premature consumption then of one crop, and the 
 failure of the succeeding crop, u T ill sufficiently account for a 
 scarcity towards the close of the year, without having recourse 
 to the fiction of a monopoly. 
 
 Our next observations must be applied to the high and 
 unprecedented price of butcher's meat. The public opinion 
 does not seem to be made up as to the causes of this additional 
 calamity. The fact seems to be, that the short supply of stock 
 at the present time may be very well accounted for by the cir- 
 cumstances of the last winter. The long continuance of the frost, 
 and the very high price of fodder, made stock of every kind 
 too burdensome for the middling grazier to support. Towards 
 the conclusion of the winter, therefore, the lean cattle of all 
 kinds were sent to market, which used to be kept back till the 
 summer. This evil would not have arisen to the very serious 
 inconvenience which we now feel, if the severe winter had 
 happily been succeeded by a mild and favourable spring. The 
 turnips, however, having been destroyed by the frost, and the 
 grass being checked by the coldness and backwardness of the 
 spring, it became necessary to fodder the cattle at a time when, 
 in the usual course of seasons, they should have been fattening 
 upon abundant pasturage 5 so that graziers who had struggled 
 through the winter, in hopes of a favourable spring, were still 
 obliged to sell off their lean stock, and prematurely supply the 
 market with that provision which should have been reserved 
 for the summer and autumn consumption. The toll of Smith- 
 field market affords a strong confirmation of this statement. 
 By this, it appears that the quantity of stock brought to market 
 in the months of February, March, and April, 1 795, exceed 
 the quantity in the same months in the year 1794, by many 
 thousand head both of beasts and sheep. It is too much to be 
 feared that the graziers, allured by the present enormous
 
 154 
 
 prices of meat, still supply the market with stock that ought 
 not to be brought forward for two or three months to come ; 
 the evil of which must be most severely felt at no great distance 
 of time. Independently of this unfortunate anticipation of the 
 supply, it will be readily perceived what an immense loss of 
 weight of animal food has been sustained by the slaughter of 
 cattle before they had attained their proper condition. Sup- 
 pose 15,000 neat cattle to have been brought to market want- 
 ing ten stone each of their usual weight, there will then be a 
 deficiency of 150,000 stone weight of beef. Apply this calcu- 
 lation, in a due proportion, to the numbers of sheep which were 
 hastened to the slaughter-house by necessity, and we can be at 
 no loss to account for the present high price of butcher's meat.
 
 155 
 
 No. III. 
 
 Agricultural Intelligence for 1799, extracted from the 
 " Farmers Magazine." — Vol. i. p. 102. 
 
 About the beginning of August, heavy rains, accompanied 
 with cold easterly winds, reduced the summer fallows, and 
 turnip fields, into a perfect mire; half rotted a great part of 
 the hay, stopped the growth of the second crop of clover, laid 
 down all the strong corn, and effectually prevented the wheat 
 from filling ; as that grain cannot arrive at perfection if loaded 
 with moisture at that stage of its growth. 
 
 The month of September was, on the whole, rather worse ; 
 indeed, the strong corn lay soaking among water during the 
 greatest part of it. Much of the wheat, from the excess of 
 moisture, died at the root before the ear ripened ; and the 
 straw got a grey colour from the perspiration of the stalk being 
 prematurely stopped ; and, when cut, had an appearance some- 
 thing like as if it had been kiln-dried. The people, in general, 
 were by this time convinced that the grain would necessarily 
 be of inferior quality ; but few believed that it would be so 
 defective in every respect as facts now unequivocally sub- 
 stantiate. 
 
 Oats, which are a hardy grain, suffered less under these 
 unfavourable circumstances, and promised at one time to be 
 generally a medium crop. This has turned out to be the case 
 upon the dry sharp soils ; but those of a different description 
 did not escape so well, and upon the high grounds they were 
 nearly destroyed by two severe nights of frost on the lGth and 
 1 7th of October. Some beans are said to have been also in- 
 jured at that time; but we believe that the loss of this grain 
 will be very trifling, as they are usually sown upon deep rich 
 lands.
 
 156 
 
 No. IV. 
 
 Extract from an Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the 
 late and present Scarcity and High Price of Provisions, in 
 a Letter to the Right Hon. Earl Spenser, K. G. First Lord 
 of the Admiralty, 8fC. fyc. fyc. 
 
 (Printed for J. Wright, Piccadilly, 1800.) 
 
 We hear daily from men, by no means deficient in good 
 sense, that one of the principal causes of the present high 
 prices is the quantity of capital in the country, and the facility 
 of obtaining money by credit, whereby dealers are enabled to 
 speculate, and keep corn out of the market. But it will not 
 be alleged that men, however rich, or however much at a loss 
 to employ their money, will engage in any trade but with a 
 view to gain by it. Now, it is evident, that if they keep up 
 the article beyond a certain point, they must lose; and if it is 
 short of that point, these capitalists are the benefactors and 
 saviours of the community, by feeding the markets, and re- 
 serving such a stock, as under the influence of security of pro- 
 perty, and the check of competition, will exactly serve to carry 
 us round the year, and on terms proportioned to the total quan- 
 tum of provisions, provided their speculations have been made 
 upon sound grounds. It appears that this must have been as 
 nearly as possible the case last year; for that there is no sur- 
 plus of last year's crop, nor of the unexampled importations 
 that were made, is proved by its being necessary prematurely 
 to thresh out part of the crop which has just been gathered in, 
 for the daily supply of the market. This is sufficient answer 
 to those who maintained that corn was unnecessarily kept up; 
 and after what has been said it would be an insult to the 
 meanest understanding to use any words to disprove that it 
 has been hoarded or thrown into the river. The fact appears
 
 157 
 
 clearly to be, that the crop of last year, together with what 
 was imported, has been, with great economy, barely equal to 
 the necessities of the country; and had the dealers in corn been 
 so blind to their own interest as to have hoarded a month's 
 supply, over and above what was wanted, after the gathering 
 in of the new crop, how much less an evil would this have been 
 than to have sold off the whole stock a month before the arrival 
 of the new supply; in other words, to have created a famine, 
 which I repeat it would have been the infallible consequence of 
 bringing the corn to market at the beginning of the season, at 
 the price of a plentiful year. Ought we not in this, as in 
 other instances, to adore the wisdom and goodness of Divine 
 Providence, which, by the spontaneous and irresistible, though 
 silent co-operation of natural and moral causes, accomplishes 
 the most salutary ends, in spite of the vain efforts aud officious 
 interference of human policy? The want of a surplus essen- 
 tially distinguishes this year from former years, and goes far 
 towards explaining the continuation of the high prices, more 
 especially when it is taken into account, that the present crop 
 is considerably below an average one * ; and that the potatoes, 
 which have, for many years, been such an uncommon resource, 
 have greatly failed this year, from the following natural cause. 
 The last summer was the hottest and driest of any upon re- 
 cord, no rain having fallen from the 4th of June till the 19th 
 of August, and the heat was unexampled. This forced the 
 potatoes rapidly to maturity without their attaining their 
 usual size, and when the rains came in August, in place of 
 growing larger, they germinated, which has greatly spoiled 
 their quality. It is evident from this, that the utmost eco^ 
 nomy Avill be necessary in order to carry us round the year, 
 
 * The crops upon the clay grounds, which make a large proportion of the 
 whole, have failed, in consequence of the earth being baked, as it were, by the 
 long and excessive heat which succeeded the wet weather in May. The corn 
 also, which was standing after the 19 th of August, when the rains came on, 
 was generally spoiled, great part of it having grown as it stood.
 
 158 
 
 The last argument I shall use in proof of the reality of the 
 scarcity is the immense importation. From the necessity of 
 importation, for many years past, it is evident that the pro- 
 duction of this country has not in that time been equal to its 
 wants : the annual average importation for twenty years pro- 
 ceeding the present was 160,000 quarters; for the last ten 
 years 400,000; but from the 1st of September, 1799, to the 
 middle of October, 1800, the importation has been between 
 1,100,000 and 1,200,000 quarters. While this statement 
 proves the general deficient state of our agriculture, for a 
 series of years, it carries irresistible conviction, if any proof 
 were still wanting, of the unequalled deficiency of last year; 
 especially when it is also considered that this corn was attracted 
 hither, notwithstanding its being high priced, and hard to be 
 procured abroad; for the crops were scanty last year in the 
 countries bordering on the Baltic ; and the King of Prussia at 
 one time prohibited the exportation of corn from his dominions : 
 and though there was a better crop in America than there 
 had been for some years, it has been deficient there for the 
 last seven years, on account of the devastation of the Hessian 
 fly.
 
 159 
 
 No. V. 
 
 Agricultural Intelligence. — Farmer s Magazine, Nov. 1807- 
 
 The opinion expressed in our last number respecting the 
 several corn crops has been verified by the result ; with a la- 
 mentable addition, that in many of the northern and western 
 districts a large proportion of the crop, at the date of last ac- 
 counts, still remained in the field, exposed to ruin and destruc- 
 tion from the elements, and much of it already in a state ap- 
 proaching to rottenness, unless a favourable change of weather 
 soon intervene and prevent such a melancholy catastrophe. 
 From all the accounts communicated to us, it appears that the 
 several crops (wheat excepted) are every where of little bulk ; 
 indeed, more so than in any year since the memorable 1800, 
 when dearth raged through the land. Wheat, in every point of 
 view, proves to be the best crop ; and in several of the English 
 counties it is estimated as exceeding the ordinary average, and of 
 superior quality to the grain of the preceding year. Barley is 
 probably below par; but oats, beans, and peas, are greatly de- 
 fective, the latter articles particularly so. The failure of beans 
 and peas showed itself about the end of July, when a disease, 
 appropriately called the black jaundice, seized them, and com- 
 pletely stopped further improvement. In no season within 
 our remembrance have beans and peas more generally failed 
 than in this one. It was of no importance whether they stood 
 upon a soil which was strong and light, deep or shallow, rich 
 or poor. On almost aU they met with the like fate ; and the 
 produce is a small shrivelled grain, hardly of a quality fit to 
 be used for seed next season, unless people are compelled to 
 do so by imperious necessity. Whether the disease which in- 
 fected these plants was occasioned by insects at the root, or on 
 the stalk, or by atmospherical influence, is an undecided ques-
 
 160 
 
 tion ; but the consequences will be felt in more ways than one, 
 because, in many districts, the working stock are chiefly sup- 
 ported through the winter months upon the fodder of those 
 grains. Supposing the fodder should contain its usual nourish- 
 ment, which is a doubtful circumstance, still it will not go one- 
 half so far as in former years, having in a manner melted away 
 before harvesting ; of course the expense of supporting working 
 stock must be greatly increased. 
 
 Notwithstanding the short crop, and the alarming condition 
 in which a great part of it remains, markets are not so 
 materially influenced thereby as might have been expected, 
 having on the whole been dull and lower for wheat than in the 
 preceding quarter. So far as respects wheat, the want of 
 demand may be attributed to the full stock of flour on hand 
 at the commencement of harvest; to the general imperfect 
 condition of grain, which would not allow of speculation, 
 especially when the old stock in hand was considerable ; and 
 to the heavy loss sustained last season by corn-dealers, which 
 makes them in this one shy of making extensive purchases. 
 The want of oats and beans must, however, ultimately cause a 
 greater demand for other grains, and occasion the prices of the 
 several varieties to be more upon an equal footing than at this 
 time.
 
 161 
 
 No VI. 
 
 Agricultural Intelligence, extracted from the Farmers 
 Magazine, December, 1811. 
 
 The weather, during the last three months, has been un- 
 commonly capricious, constantly running into extremes, there- 
 by giving much trouble and vexation to the corn farmer. The 
 first three weeks of September answered well for executing 
 harvest work, but before the end of that month a sequence of 
 wet days occurred which threatened destruction to that part 
 of the crop which remained in the fields. In the northern dis- 
 tricts of England, and through the whole of Scotland, one- 
 half of the corns were exposed for three weeks to rains and 
 storms, in consequence of which many of them were severely 
 sprouted; and had not a violent tornado ensued on the 13th 
 of October, probably greater losses would have been sustained 
 than were ever known in this country. But though the cut 
 corns were saved by that storm, the unreaped ones (and in 
 some districts the quantity in that situation was considerable) 
 were almost entirely lost, the straw being left nearly as free of 
 grain as if it had passed through the threshing machine. The 
 two succeeding weeks were busily employed in harvesting the 
 crop and sowing wheat ; after which, such heavy falls of rain 
 came on, that it was hardly practicable for some time to plough 
 any ground, unless of the driest kind, with the slightest pro- 
 spect of advantage. Favourable weather, however, having 
 returned, in the latter part of November, the important pro- 
 cess of sowing wheat was got accomplished in a much better 
 way than could have been expected at that advanced period of 
 the year. 
 
 The wheat crop is less or more a defective one in every 
 district, but more so in some districts than in others. Ac-
 
 162 
 
 cording to our accounts it can rarely be estimated above five- 
 eights of an average crop, though, what is surprising, the 
 quality of the grain is generally good, a circumstance which 
 seldom happens when the crop is a failing one. Indeed, as the 
 failure this season was not, in many instances, occasioned by 
 mildew (at least in Scotland), the grain that was in the ear 
 arrived at complete maturity without being stinted of nourish- 
 ment. The deficiency evidently proceeded from wetness in 
 May — from cold frosty nights in June — from boisterous winds 
 when the plant was under the blossom process — and from want 
 of sun and heat when the grain was formed in the ear of the 
 plant. Wheat is a grain always comparatively unproductive 
 in a cold season such as the last one, and the same remark is 
 applicable to barley, the crop of which, generally speaking, is 
 below an average. Oats, and peas, and beans, may however 
 be considered as fair crops, though, according to our accounts, 
 many of these grains, upon thin soils, suffered so much from 
 the wetness in May and June as not to prosper afterwards. 
 
 From all these circumstances a rise of corn markets was the 
 necessary consequence, though at this time it would be rather 
 rash to speculate or prognosticate upon their state at a more 
 advanced period of the season, when prices may be supposed 
 to have gained their proper level. The present rate of markets 
 will be seen from the accounts which follow. Hitherto there 
 has been little or no importation from foreign countries, and 
 it is understood that the crops upon the Continent are scantier 
 this season than usual.
 
 163 
 
 No VII. 
 
 At a public meeting of the inhabitants of Liverpool, held 
 on the 4th of November, 181 1, John Bourne, Esq. Mayor, in the 
 chair, it was unanimously resolved, upon the motion of John 
 Gladstone, Esq., seconded by Thomas Rodie, Esq., that a 
 petition should be presented to the Prince Regent, praying 
 that he would suspend the further distillation of spirits from 
 grain until the meeting of Parliament. 
 
 THE HUMBLE PETITION, &c. &c. 
 
 Showeth, 
 
 That your petitioners being deeply interested in the welfare 
 of this populous town, and this great manufacturing county, 
 cannot but view with great anxiety the progressive and alarm- 
 ing advance in the prices of corn, in connexion with the fact 
 now ascertained, that the produce of the late harvest is very 
 deficient, and that the weather for gathering it in, in the 
 northern parts of Great Britain, and for preparing the wheat 
 lands generally for the next crops, has been extremely un- 
 favourable. 
 
 That your petitioners are well informed the potatoe crop in 
 Ireland has so materially failed, that this important necessary 
 of life now sells in the Dublin market at the excessive price of 
 six shillings per cwt., from which circumstance your peti- 
 tioners apprehend that the usual supplies of corn from Ireland, 
 upon which the numerous population of this town and the 
 county of Lancaster are known in a great degree to depend for 
 subsistence, are likely to be much curtailed. 
 
 That, in times like the present, when no dependence can be 
 placed on receiving supplies of foreign corn, it becomes of the 
 
 Q
 
 164 
 
 first importance to husband to the utmost the crops of this 
 country. 
 
 That the average weekly prices of corn in England and 
 Wales, according to the returns received in the week ending 
 the 26th of October, as published in the London Gazette of 
 the 2d of November, are as follows : 
 
 5. d. 
 Wheat 101 6 per quarter. 
 Barley 47 4 
 
 Oats 29 10 
 
 Which equal, and, in several instances, exceed the prices at 
 the different periods when the legislature, in their wisdom, 
 thought fit to interpose to prevent the distillation of spirits 
 from grain (the year of extraordinary scarcity only excepted), 
 as will appear from the following comparative statement taken 
 from the official returns. 
 
 Average price of wheat, barley, and oats, in England and 
 Wales, according to the weekly returns nearest to the follow- 
 ing periods. 
 
 Nearest Weekly Returns. 
 
 Date. 
 
 Distillation. 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1795 
 
 Prohibited. 
 
 93 
 
 10 
 
 45 
 
 29 2 
 
 1797 
 
 Removed. 
 
 52 
 
 3 
 
 28 4 
 
 15 10 
 
 1800 
 
 Prohibition. 
 
 133 
 
 
 
 76 7 
 
 41 8 
 
 1802 
 
 Removed. 
 
 76 
 
 9 
 
 44 1 
 
 23 4 
 
 1808 
 
 Prohibition. 
 
 81 
 
 6 
 
 44. 3 
 
 38 10 
 
 1808 
 
 Continued. 
 
 92 
 
 7 
 
 45 10 
 
 33 8 
 
 1809 
 
 Prohibition. 
 
 95 
 
 7 
 
 46 6 
 
 34 4 
 
 1809 
 
 Prohibition. 
 
 101 
 
 9 
 
 50 7 
 
 31 11 
 
 1810 
 
 Prohibition. 
 
 101 
 
 7 
 
 46 5 
 
 27 5 
 
 1811 
 
 The last return. 
 
 101 
 
 6 
 
 47 4 
 
 29 10
 
 165 
 
 That on these grounds your petitioners humbly conceive 
 there exists an urgent necessity for the interposition of the 
 royal prerogative before the meeting of Parliament, more 
 especially as, should the measure be deferred till that period, 
 the distillers will have laid in their stocks of grain for the 
 season, a large proportion of which will either be distilled or 
 converted into a state unfitting it for the food of man. 
 
 And your petitioners will ever pray. 
 
 q2
 
 166 
 
 No VIII. 
 
 Extract from the Farmer s Magazine. — Agricultural Intelli- 
 gence, August, 1812. 
 
 There has seldom, or perhaps never, been a period when the 
 new crop was a subject of greater and more general interest than 
 the present ; and it was our particular wish to obtain the best 
 and fullest information of its appearance. We feel very grate- 
 ful to our correspondents who have enabled us to present re- 
 ports of it, and of the condition of the industrious poor for the 
 last quarter ; and their communications will certainly be per- 
 used with that attention which their peculiar importance must 
 command. 
 
 Though appearances are different, as might be expected, 
 from the diversity of soil and culture, the general character of 
 the ensuing crop, as far as an opinion can be formed of it at 
 this period of the season, must be represented we fear as rather 
 unfavourable. The impression, after a very careful examina- 
 tion of the reports, is, that unless we have two months at least 
 of singularly warm, clear, and dry weather, the grain crops 
 will not reach an average : that common oats, particularly in 
 many situations, and peas and beans generally, must be very 
 late indeed. From recent and afflicting experience of partial 
 failure in the crops of wheat, it is not a matter of surprise if 
 a few of the intelligent writers are a little alarmed at the in- 
 dications of disease which that crop already exhibits in some 
 districts, and which there was but too much reason to expect 
 from the late cold, humid, and ungenial state of the atmo- 
 sphere.
 
 lf>7 
 
 No IX. 
 
 Extract from the Farmer s Magazine. — Agricultural Intelli- 
 gence, November, 1812. 
 
 The new crop is generally allowed to have promised a full 
 average produce before the commencement of the bad weather 
 in the early part of October. What part of it was then ex- 
 posed has suffered much since, both from wind, rain, and 
 frost. Considerable loss has been sustained by handling on 
 the field, and heating in the stack-yard, though comparatively 
 little from a growth in the sheaf. And, at the date of the re- 
 ports, a good deal of oats and beans still remained to be carried, 
 not only in the northern parts of Scotland but even in several 
 of the English counties. 
 
 In a harvest so late, and during the latter part of which 
 the weather has been so unpropitious, the climate and elevation 
 of different districts, and the early or late crops commonly 
 cultivated in each, must be duly considered before there can 
 be any approach to a correct estimate of the crop over the 
 whole of the country. Where the crop had been secured in 
 the month of September both the quantity and quality of the 
 grain is very good, and this has been the case with autumn 
 sown wheat, barley, and early oats, in the most forward 
 counties, though even in these the beans, peas, and late oats, 
 are not expected to produce according to their appearance on 
 the ground, or bulk in the stack-yard. But in those counties 
 where wheat is extensively sown through the winter and spring 
 months, in many high and cold situations, where oats, with a 
 little bean or barley, are the principal crop, a great deficiency 
 is to be found both in wheat and oats from the lateness of the 
 season, and the unfavourable weather at and before the time 
 they ought to have been cut and secured. Perhaps it might
 
 168 
 
 not be far from the truth to state wheat generally as an average 
 crop — oats rather below one — and beans and peas as very de- 
 ficient. The growth of barley is not only partial, but so 
 limited, in Scotland, that it has almost lost its place among 
 the regular rotations of modern husbandry. This opinion may 
 not exactly correspond with the report of any particular 
 county, but it is thought to approach the truth, when the 
 crops throughout the whole country are brought under one 
 general view.
 
 161) 
 
 No X. 
 
 Extract from the translation of a French ivork entitled, On the 
 Legislation and the Commerce of Corn, wherein the Questions 
 relating- to Exportation, Importation, Bounties, Prohibitions, 
 Provisions of Com by Public Authority, fyc. are folly 
 discussed. To which some Notes are added. — Printed for 
 T. Longman., London, 1766. 
 
 It has been several times alleged, that the people were 
 gainers by a rise of price, because the proprietor, having then 
 a greater revenue, he spent more. If corn is worth twenty 
 livres, has it been said, the lands of France will bring in only 
 a thousand millions, and if it is worth thirty livres, the 
 same lands will bring in fifteen hundred millions. So here are 
 five hundred millions more which the proprietors will spend, 
 and it is the people that will reap the benefit of it. After all 
 that I have already said, may I not be dispensed from answer- 
 ing this argument ? 
 
 Is it not visible that these fifteen hundred millions, pro- 
 duced by the rise of corn, would be of no more value to the 
 proprietors than one thousand millions, if taxes, labour, and 
 all the other objects of exchange rose in proportion? 
 
 Is it not clear that this augmentation of fortune for the 
 proprietors of corn is composed only of the diminution of that 
 of the other members of the community ? It is the general 
 harmony which is deranged, and that is all ; for there are not 
 five hundred millions worth of new goods fallen down from the 
 heavens, or sprung out of the earth. If a man has not this 
 simple truth impressed or graven on his mind, he will be in- 
 cessantly tossed about by the most empty reasonings on the 
 pretended gains of the community which are nothing else
 
 170 
 
 but a momentary conquest gained by one class of that com- 
 munity over the lot of the others. 
 
 It is on principles absolutely contrary to those which I ad- 
 vance that those famous calculations of the net produce are 
 founded, so celebrated in the works of the economical writers. 
 We cannot too much applaud the pure and well known zeal of 
 those most worthy persons who distinguish themselves by 
 their attachment to those opinions, and we pay them a sincere 
 homage ; but we think we may permit ourselves to make some 
 observations on a subject of so great importance. 
 
 I saw first that they had sought, under different relations, 
 what was the gain of the proprietor after the payment of im- 
 posts, and of the expenses of culture ; they have found it— 
 they have named this gain, the net produce — very well — 
 hitherto no new light was discovered ; but here it is that one 
 of the essential reasonings begins, and in the sequel of it a 
 theory which does not appear to me to be just. They have 
 found that corn sold, say, at twenty livres the septier, gave so 
 much gain or net produce; and they said, if the price rises to 
 five and twenty or thirty livres, the net produce will instantly 
 be augmented by such a sum. This augmentation, applicable 
 to all the lands in the kingdom, will make several hundred 
 millions of increase in the general net produce. Thus, the 
 dearer corn shall be, the more the net produce will increase, 
 and the more the national wealth Mill be considerable. 
 
 But we have already shown that this way of judging of the 
 wealth of a country was absolutely erroneous. If making a 
 septier of corn be called forty livres instead of twenty was suf- 
 ficient to render the kingdom twice as rich, the monopolists 
 would be the most respectable supporters of the prosperity of 
 a state; an exportation without measure and without limit 
 would become the most sublime combination in administra- 
 tion, and a scanty crop would be the greatest blessing we 
 could receive from providence. Let no one think that I ex- 
 aggerate in this consequence ; I will try to render this pro-
 
 171 
 
 position sensible by a very simple calculation which will perhaps 
 throw a new light upon this matter. 
 
 Let us suppose that the annual consumption of France may 
 be forty-eight millions of septiers. Let us further suppose 
 that there ought to be a surplus of four millions of septiers in 
 the proprietors' hands to keep the balance between the needs of 
 the buyers and of the sellers, and to establish a reasonable 
 price, say twenty livres the septier, for wheat and other grain 
 one with another. As long as these proportions subsist, the 
 proprietors sell or consume every year forty-eight millions of 
 septiers, which, at twenty livres, make nine hundred and 
 sixty millions, and there remains in their hands four millions 
 of septiers unsold, which serve every year to temper their 
 power and to maintain the desired price. 
 
 Let us now suppose that the scantiness of the crops makes 
 an essential part of this precious surplus disappear; then the 
 strength of the proprietors, and the anxiety of the consumers, 
 are so augmented, that the forty-eight millions of septiers are 
 sold at thirty-six and perhaps forty livres. Thus, this year 
 when we have received less from the earth, the corn sold or con- 
 sumed by the proprietors has been represented by a numerary 
 sum twice as great as in the former years. Will they imagine, 
 in that case, that the state has gained nine hundred and sixty 
 millions ? Will they put any confidence in such calculations, 
 which are productive only in proportion to the sterility of the 
 ground, or to the errors of the government ? Surely not. 
 
 Let them tell us that the population of a state augments — 
 that real riches are accumulated in it — we shall see in these 
 circumstances the increase of its prosperity ; but that interior 
 arithmetic, which makes high prices wealth, is, of all mea- 
 sures, the most false and most deceitful.
 
 172 
 
 No. XI. 
 
 An Account of the Windsor Prices of Wheat and Malt at Eton 
 
 College. 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 
 
 per bush. 
 
 per 
 
 aush. 
 
 
 
 per bush. 
 
 per bush. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1G97 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 4 
 8 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1711 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 4 10 
 
 5 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1698 
 , ditto 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 9 
 4 
 
 3 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1712 
 
 . ditto 
 
 6 
 4 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 4 6 
 4 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1699 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 
 10 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1713 
 . ditto 
 
 4 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 
 
 Lady-day ... 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1700 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 3 
 9 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1714 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 4 
 
 9 
 10 
 
 4 2 
 4 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1701 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 9 
 2 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1715 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 6 
 3 
 
 4 4 
 4 4 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. ■ 
 
 1702 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1716 
 
 . ditto 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 Lady-day .. 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1703 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 5 
 
 9 
 3 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1717 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 7i 
 9 
 
 3 8 
 3 8 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 1704 
 . ditto 
 
 7 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1718 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 3 
 6 
 
 3 6 
 3 8 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1705 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 4 
 
 Lady -day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1719 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 3 8 
 
 4 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1706 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas.. 
 
 1720 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 4 
 3 10 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1707 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 10 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1721 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 
 
 3 8 
 3 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1708 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 6 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1722 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 2 8 
 
 Lady-day ... 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1709 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 11 
 
 1 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 Lady- day .. . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1723 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 6 
 
 2 9 
 S 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 1710 
 
 . ditto 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 G 
 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1724 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 3 10 
 3 8
 
 173 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 31ichaelmas. 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day .. 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day .. 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day .. 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1725 
 ditto 
 
 17-26 
 
 ditto 
 
 17'27 
 ditto 
 
 1728 
 ditto 
 
 1729 
 ditto 
 
 1730 
 ditto 
 
 1731 
 ditto 
 
 1732 
 ditto 
 
 1733 
 ditto 
 
 1734 
 ditto 
 
 1735 
 ditto 
 
 1736 
 
 ditto 
 
 1737 
 ditto 
 
 1738 
 ditto 
 
 1739 
 ditto 
 
 1740 
 
 ditto 
 
 1741 
 ditto 
 
 1742 
 ditto 
 
 Wheat 
 per bush. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 5 3 
 
 6 10£ 
 
 6 6 
 5 
 
 4 7i 
 
 5 10| 
 
 6 11 
 6 8 
 
 4§ 
 6 
 
 n 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 5 
 3 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 2 
 3 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 4 10 
 
 5 3 
 
 91 
 
 4 n 
 
 4 3 
 
 4 b 
 4 II 
 
 b 10i 
 
 7 io| 
 
 7 3 
 4 6 
 
 4 3 
 3 9 
 
 Malt 
 per bush. 
 
 s. d, 
 3 6 
 3 6 
 
 3 6 
 3 6 
 
 3 6 
 3 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 4 6 
 
 4 4 
 
 3 6 
 3 3 
 
 3 
 3 3 
 
 3 3 
 
 3 2 
 
 2 10 
 2 10 
 
 2 10 
 2 10 
 
 2 10 
 2 10 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 2 
 3 6 
 
 3 6 
 3 6 
 
 3 2 
 3 4 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 4 2 
 4 
 
 3 10 
 3 10 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 
 Wheat 
 per bush. 
 
 Malt 
 per bush. 
 
 1743 
 ditto 
 
 s. 
 3 
 2 
 
 a. 
 
 n 
 ii 
 
 s. d. 
 3 10 
 3 4 
 
 1744 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 i 
 
 3 
 3 2 
 
 1745 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 2 
 8 
 
 3 
 2 10 
 
 1746 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 2 10 
 
 2 9 
 
 1747 
 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 i 
 
 2 10 
 2 10 
 
 1748 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 2 10 
 
 3 
 
 1749 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 3 2 
 3 2 
 
 1750 
 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 10* 
 3" 
 
 3 2 
 3 2 
 
 1751 
 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 5 
 
 1 
 6 
 
 3 2 
 3 4 
 
 1752 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 5 
 
 2| 
 
 3 
 
 3 6 
 
 3 4 
 
 1753 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 3 4 
 3 6 
 
 1754 
 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 8 
 
 
 3 6 
 3 6 
 
 1755 
 ditto 
 
 3 
 4 
 
 11 
 6 
 
 3 2 
 
 3 2 
 
 1758 
 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 6J 
 9 
 
 3 2 
 3 4 
 
 1757 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 1758 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 5 
 
 
 6 
 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 1759 
 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 
 3 6 
 3 4 
 
 1760 
 ditto 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 9 
 
 3 3 
 3 3
 
 174 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 
 
 per 
 
 jush. 
 
 per 
 
 aush. 
 
 
 
 per bush. 
 
 per bush. 
 
 i. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1761 
 . ditto 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 9 
 
 n 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 1 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1779 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 
 
 3 11 
 3 11 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1762 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1780 
 . ditto 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 4§ 
 9 
 
 3 7 
 3 9 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1763 
 . ditto 
 
 4 
 5 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 3 
 4 
 
 3 
 9 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1781 
 
 . ditto 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 
 9 
 
 3 9 
 3 9 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1764 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 H 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1782 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 3 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1765 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 4 
 
 11 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1783 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 5 2 
 5 5 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1766 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1784 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 
 1* 
 
 5 
 5 5 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1767 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 104 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1785 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 5 1 
 5 3 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1768 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 '1\ 
 Hi 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1786 
 ditto 
 
 S 
 
 6 
 
 10| 
 
 
 5 3 
 5 1 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1769 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 101 
 
 n 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1787 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 7 
 
 ioi 
 
 
 
 4 9 
 4 9 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1770 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 6 
 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 . 1788 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 4 9 
 4 9 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1771 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 7 
 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1789 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 9i 
 
 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1772 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1790 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 6i 
 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1773 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1791 
 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 7* 
 
 3 
 
 4 6 
 4 9 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1774 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 
 5 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1792 
 ditto 
 
 5 
 7 
 
 9 
 6 
 
 5 5 
 5 3§ 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1775 
 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 3| 
 
 5 
 4 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas.. 
 
 1793 
 
 . ditto 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 1i 
 
 '4 
 
 4 
 
 4 9 
 
 5 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1776 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 11 
 
 7 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1794 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 
 5 3 
 
 5 3 
 
 Ladv-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1777 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 3 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1795 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 11 
 
 6 
 
 5 3 
 5 5 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1778 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 5 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1796 
 ditto 
 
 12 
 
 8 
 
 
 01 
 
 5 9 
 5 1
 
 175 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 
 
 Wheat 
 
 Malt 
 
 • 
 
 
 per bush. 
 
 per bush. 
 
 
 
 per bush. 
 
 per bush. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1797 
 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 Lady- day . . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1806 
 ditto 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 
 9 
 
 5 8 
 
 6 8 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas.. 
 
 1798 
 ditto 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 Lady- day . . . 
 Michaelmas. . 
 
 1807 
 ditto 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 
 6 
 
 6 2 
 6 2 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . . 
 
 1799 
 ditto 
 
 7 
 11 
 
 4 
 
 7 
 
 4 
 5 
 
 9 
 5 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1808 
 ditto 
 
 9 
 12 
 
 31 
 
 
 7 2 
 7 2 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1800 
 ditto 
 
 15 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 
 8 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 2 
 
 j Lady-day . . 
 i Michaelmas. 
 
 1809 
 ditto 
 
 12 
 14 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 7 8 
 
 8 2 
 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1801 
 ditto 
 
 22 
 10 
 
 If 
 
 
 
 11 
 9 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 Lady-day . . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1810 
 ditto 
 
 1.5 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 7 2 
 7 2 
 
 Lady- day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 1802 
 ditto 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 6 
 
 3* 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 Lady -day .. 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1811 
 
 ditto 
 
 13 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 6 8 
 6 8 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 1803 
 . ditto 
 
 7 
 7 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 Lady-day .. 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 1812 
 . ditto 
 
 17 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 7 8 
 
 8 8 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 . 1804 
 . ditto 
 
 7 
 10 
 
 44 
 
 
 4 
 5 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 Lady -day . . 
 Michaelmas . 
 
 . 1813 
 . ditto 
 
 17 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 10 2 
 9 8 
 
 Lady-day . . 
 Michaelmas. 
 
 . 1805 
 . ditto 
 
 11 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 7 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 , Lady-day . . 
 
 . 1814 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 6 8 
 
 Note. — The foregoing prices of wheat are not the best prices, it 
 having been the custom of Eton College to ascertain the highest and 
 lowest prices, and to fix a medium price, rather above the average, 
 although the reservation in their leases is " according to the price that 
 the best wheat and malt shall be sold for in the market of Windsor." 
 
 The price of malt is taken according to the best price, after deducting 
 the duty therefrom. 
 
 At Michaelmas, 1793, the nine gallon measure, which had been 
 calculated upon up to that period, was discontinued, and the subsequent 
 prices are according to the eight gallon measure. 
 
 EDWARD BROWN, 
 Registrar to Eton College. 
 
 July 13, 1814.
 
 176 
 
 An Account of the Windsor Prices of Wheat and Malt at 
 Eton College, in continuation of the return made in 1814. 
 
 Michaelmas 1814 
 
 Lady-day 1815 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Lady-day 1816 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Lady-day 1817 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Lady-day 1818 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Lady-day 1819 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Lady-day 1820 
 
 Michaelmas ditto 
 
 Wheat 
 per bushel. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 10 6 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 11 6 
 
 16 6 
 
 12 6 
 
 13 
 11 6 
 
 10 
 
 9 6 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 Malt 
 
 per bushel 
 
 6 8 
 
 6 2 
 6 2 
 
 4 8 
 *G 4 
 
 9 10 
 9 10 
 
 9 4 
 10 
 
 10 2 
 9 
 
 Duty on malt reduced 2s. 2d. per bushel. 
 
 EDWARD BROWN, 
 
 Registrar to Eton College. 
 
 March 20. 1821.
 
 177 
 No. XII. 
 
 An Account of the average Price of all sorts of Grain, in each 
 Year, from the 5th January, 1/91, to the bth January, 1823. 
 
 Year. 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Beans. 
 
 Pease. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1791 
 
 47 
 
 2 
 
 31 8 
 
 26 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 7 
 
 30 
 
 6 
 
 32 2 
 
 1792 
 
 42 
 
 11 
 
 30 8 
 
 26 
 
 9 
 
 17 
 
 10 
 
 31 
 
 7 
 
 32 8 
 
 1793 
 
 48 
 
 11 
 
 35 11 
 
 31 
 
 9 
 
 21 
 
 3 
 
 37 
 
 8 
 
 38 4 
 
 1794 
 
 51 
 
 8 
 
 37 9 
 
 32 
 
 10 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 42 
 
 6 
 
 46 8 
 
 1795 
 
 74 
 
 2 
 
 48 5 
 
 37 
 
 8 
 
 24 
 
 9 
 
 46 
 
 8 
 
 53 4 
 
 1796 
 
 77 
 
 1 
 
 47 
 
 35 
 
 7 
 
 21 
 
 9 
 
 38 
 
 10 
 
 43 6 
 
 1797 
 
 53 
 
 1 
 
 31 11 
 
 27 
 
 9 
 
 16 
 
 9 
 
 27 
 
 6 
 
 33 5 
 
 1798 
 
 50 
 
 3 
 
 30 11 
 
 29 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 
 10 
 
 30 
 
 1 
 
 33 11 
 
 1799 
 
 67 
 
 6 
 
 43 9 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 7 
 
 44 
 
 7 
 
 45 2 
 
 1800 
 
 113 
 
 7 
 
 76 11 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 10 
 
 69 
 
 3 
 
 67 5 
 
 1801 
 
 118 
 
 3 
 
 79 9 
 
 67 
 
 9 
 
 36 
 
 6 
 
 62 
 
 8 
 
 67 8 
 
 1802 
 
 67 
 
 5 
 
 43 3 
 
 33 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 7 
 
 36 
 
 4 
 
 39 6 
 
 1803 
 
 56 
 
 6 
 
 36 11 
 
 24 
 
 10 
 
 21 
 
 3 
 
 34 
 
 8 
 
 38 6 
 
 1804 
 
 60 
 
 1 
 
 37 1 
 
 30 
 
 4 
 
 23 
 
 9 
 
 38 
 
 7 
 
 40 10 
 
 1805 
 
 87 
 
 10 
 
 54 4 
 
 44 
 
 8 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 5 
 
 48 4 
 
 1806 
 
 79 
 
 
 
 47 4 
 
 38 
 
 6 
 
 25 
 
 8 
 
 43 
 
 9 
 
 43 6 
 
 1807 
 
 73 
 
 3 
 
 47 6 
 
 38 
 
 4 
 
 28 
 
 1 
 
 47 
 
 3 
 
 55 11 
 
 1808 
 
 79 
 
 
 
 52 4 
 
 42 
 
 1 
 
 33 
 
 8 
 
 60 
 
 8 
 
 66 7 
 
 1809 
 
 95 
 
 7 
 
 60 9 
 
 47 
 
 3 
 
 32 
 
 8 
 
 60 
 
 9 
 
 60 2 
 
 1810 
 
 106 
 
 2 
 
 59 
 
 47 
 
 11 
 
 29 
 
 4 
 
 53 
 
 7 
 
 55 9 
 
 1811 
 
 94 
 
 6 
 
 49 11 
 
 41 
 
 10 
 
 27 
 
 11 
 
 47 
 
 10 
 
 51 6 
 
 1812 
 
 125 
 
 5 
 
 75 11 
 
 66 
 
 6 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 72 
 
 8 
 
 73 7 
 
 1813 
 
 108 
 
 9 
 
 70 7 
 
 58 
 
 4 
 
 39 
 
 5 
 
 76 
 
 5 
 
 78 6 
 
 1814 
 
 73 
 
 11 
 
 44 6 
 
 37 
 
 4 
 
 26 
 
 6 
 
 46 
 
 7 
 
 50 
 
 1815 
 
 64 
 
 4 
 
 37 10 
 
 30 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 10 
 
 36 
 
 1 
 
 38 10 
 
 1816 
 
 75 
 
 10 
 
 43 2 
 
 33 
 
 5 
 
 23 
 
 6 
 
 38 
 
 4 
 
 38 4 
 
 1817 
 
 94 
 
 9 
 
 56 6 
 
 48 
 
 3 
 
 32 
 
 1 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 51 5 
 
 1818 
 
 84 
 
 1 
 
 54 10 
 
 53 
 
 6 
 
 32 
 
 11 
 
 63 
 
 1 
 
 59 11 
 
 1819 
 
 73 
 
 
 
 49 
 
 46 
 
 8 
 
 29 
 
 4 
 
 55 
 
 5 
 
 56 
 
 *1820 
 
 65 
 
 7 
 
 40 10 
 
 33 
 
 10 
 
 24 
 
 4 
 
 43 
 
 6 
 
 44 11 
 
 1821 
 
 54 
 
 5 
 
 31 1 
 
 25 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 11 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 31 9 
 
 1822 
 
 43 
 
 3 
 
 20 3 
 
 21 
 
 3 
 
 17 
 
 7 
 
 23 
 
 9 
 
 25 7 
 
 * Down to 1820 the averages are taken from papers laid before parliament, 
 the two last years from the weekly returns.
 
 178 
 
 No. XIII. 
 
 An Account of the Quantity of Corn exported from, and imported into England, 
 from Michaelmas, 1 696, to Christmas, 1 754, extracted by the Author of the Corn 
 Tracts, from Documents laid before Parliament . 
 
 To Mi- 
 chaelmas 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Barley. 
 
 Malt. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Oatmeal. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 Quarters 
 
 Exportec 
 
 Imported 
 Quarters 
 
 Exported 
 
 Import ec 
 
 Exportet 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarter.-, 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1697 
 
 14,698 
 
 4<10 
 
 32,852 
 
 211 
 
 51,811 
 
 
 
 295 
 
 1 
 
 2,596 
 
 
 
 1698 
 
 6,857 
 
 845 
 
 30,984 
 
 150 
 
 44,526 
 
 5 L 20 
 
 151 
 
 
 
 1,275 
 
 3,622 
 
 Christ, do. 
 
 28 
 
 844 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 2,059 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 
 
 *1699 
 
 557 
 
 486 
 
 75 
 
 
 
 1,511 
 
 1,280 
 
 30! 
 
 
 
 405 
 
 350 
 
 fl70O 
 
 49,056 
 
 4 
 
 25,8.96 
 
 
 
 37,571 
 
 234 
 
 391 
 
 
 
 27,231 
 
 
 
 1701 
 
 98,323 
 
 J 
 
 2 1 ,953 
 
 
 
 50,447 
 
 20 
 
 285 
 
 
 
 43,917 
 
 
 
 1702 
 
 90,230 
 
 
 
 16,280 
 
 
 
 71,856 
 
 1 
 
 89 
 
 
 
 51,710 
 
 
 
 1703 
 
 106,615 
 
 50 
 
 71,523 
 
 
 
 1 23^29 1 
 
 
 
 159 
 
 2 
 
 58,438 
 
 
 
 1704 
 
 90,313 
 
 1 
 
 30,7<29 
 
 
 
 102,873 
 
 
 
 219 
 
 
 
 29,284 
 
 
 
 1705 
 
 96,185 
 
 
 
 21,386 
 
 
 
 137,396 
 
 
 
 100 
 
 
 
 24,059 
 
 
 
 1706 
 
 188,332 
 
 77 
 
 10,221 
 
 
 
 141,084 
 
 > 98 
 
 62 
 
 480 
 
 49,89-2 
 
 
 
 + 1707 
 
 74,155 
 
 
 
 4,771 
 
 
 
 111,153 
 
 12 
 
 103 
 
 
 
 34,032 
 
 
 
 1708 
 
 83,406 
 
 86 
 
 29,937 
 
 
 
 97,789 
 
 70 
 
 67 
 
 
 
 4,720 
 
 
 
 1709 
 
 169,679 
 
 1,552 
 
 40,512 
 
 606 
 
 139,934 
 
 1 
 
 37 
 
 
 
 166,512 
 
 
 
 §1710 
 1711 
 
 13,924 
 
 400 
 
 5,744 
 
 576 
 
 79,530 
 
 139 
 
 125 
 
 113 
 
 12,215 
 
 
 
 76,949 
 
 
 
 8,412 
 
 
 
 139,975 
 
 
 
 321 
 
 
 
 37,957 
 
 
 
 1712 
 
 145,191 
 
 
 
 19,838 
 
 
 
 191,624 
 
 
 
 303 
 
 
 
 17,735 
 
 
 
 1713 
 
 176,227 
 
 
 
 52,542 
 
 
 
 217,975 
 
 
 
 1,376 
 
 
 
 38,625 
 
 
 
 1714 
 
 174,821 
 
 15 
 
 18,579 
 
 
 
 220,274 
 
 21 
 
 129 
 
 
 
 20,455 
 
 
 
 1715 
 
 166,490 
 
 
 
 5,030 
 
 
 
 103,365 
 
 
 
 303 
 
 
 
 31,161 
 
 
 
 1716 
 
 74.926 
 
 
 
 14,857 
 
 
 
 226,617 
 
 
 
 719 
 
 
 
 40, 1 23 
 
 
 
 1717 
 
 22,953 
 
 
 
 18,435 
 
 
 
 251,083 
 
 62 
 
 404 
 
 
 
 23,031 
 
 
 
 1718 
 
 71,800 
 
 
 
 71,139 
 
 
 
 303,133 
 
 21 
 
 868 
 
 
 
 49,416 
 
 
 
 1719 
 
 127,762 
 
 20 
 
 9,649 
 
 
 
 357,499 
 
 300 
 
 219 
 
 
 
 45,502 
 
 
 
 1720 
 
 83,084 
 
 
 
 4,505 
 
 252 
 
 253,509 
 
 2 
 
 3,471 
 
 
 
 49,241 
 
 
 
 1721 
 
 81,632 
 
 
 
 11,608 
 
 445 
 
 338,942 
 
 
 
 577 
 
 
 
 69,697 
 
 
 
 1722 
 
 178,880 
 
 
 
 37,528 
 
 
 
 366,728 
 
 
 
 324 
 
 
 
 42,579 
 
 
 
 1723 
 
 157,719 
 
 
 
 45,789 
 
 
 
 305,063 
 
 112 
 
 541 
 
 
 
 12,737 
 
 
 
 1724 
 
 245,864 
 
 148 
 
 10,298 
 
 
 
 241,895 
 
 61,630 
 
 516 
 
 
 
 23,441 
 
 
 
 1725 
 
 204,413 
 
 12 
 
 13,782 
 
 
 
 294,025 
 
 2,152 
 
 1,447 
 
 
 
 20,539 
 
 
 
 1726 
 
 142,183 
 
 
 
 20,017 
 
 
 
 335,925 
 
 20 
 
 1,412 
 
 
 
 18,835 
 
 
 
 1727 
 
 30,3 1 5 
 
 
 
 8,688 
 
 100 
 
 241.428 
 
 15 
 
 2,204 
 
 
 
 9,169 
 
 
 
 1728 
 
 3,817 
 
 74,574 
 
 198 
 
 11,745 
 
 195,340 
 
 70,070 
 
 1,383 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 42,205 
 
 1729 
 
 18,993 
 
 40,3 1 5 
 
 4,650 
 
 17,201 
 
 130,743 
 
 184,071 
 
 2,541 
 
 21 
 
 1,460 
 
 132,045 
 
 1730 
 
 93,970 
 
 75 
 
 14,982 
 
 386 
 
 179.446 
 
 95,149 
 
 4,479 
 
 
 
 12,394 
 
 
 
 1731 
 
 130,025 
 
 4 
 
 13,562 
 
 3,503 177,699 
 
 15.892 
 
 1,808 
 
 
 
 2 1 ,089 
 
 
 
 1732 
 
 202,058 
 
 
 
 13,874 
 
 161,075 
 
 12J044 
 
 1,274 
 
 
 
 15,535 
 
 
 
 1733 
 
 427,1991 
 
 7 
 
 37,598 
 
 2] 
 
 203,115 
 
 9 
 
 1,487 
 
 
 
 28,155 
 
 o| 
 
 * No export for one year. 
 Bounty on oatmeal commenced. 
 
 f No bounty for about ten months, 
 
 § No export for one year.
 
 179 
 
 9 
 
 ■ 
 
 Wheat. 
 
 Bai 
 
 ley. 
 
 Malt. 
 
 Oats. 
 
 Oatmeal. 
 
 Rye. 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 To Mi 
 chaelmas 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarter; 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1734 
 
 498,196 
 
 6 
 
 70,224 
 
 1 
 
 233,124 
 
 9 
 
 3,038 
 
 
 
 10,735 
 
 
 
 1735 
 
 153,343 
 
 9 
 
 57,520 
 
 
 
 219,781 
 
 6,439 
 
 1,920 
 
 
 
 1,329 
 
 
 
 1736' 
 
 118,170 
 
 16 
 
 6 860 
 
 
 
 192.602 
 
 267 
 
 1,196 
 
 
 
 1,220 
 
 
 
 1737 
 
 461,602 
 
 32 
 
 23,669 
 
 
 
 103,718 
 
 7 
 
 1,921 
 
 
 
 7,849 
 
 
 
 1738 
 
 580,596 
 
 2 
 
 70,689 
 
 
 
 188,607 
 
 21 
 
 1,777 
 
 
 
 36, 1 59 
 
 
 
 1739 
 
 .279,542 
 
 22 
 
 54,447 
 
 
 
 191,876 
 
 32 
 
 1,116 
 
 
 
 29,791 
 
 
 
 17-10 
 
 54,390 
 
 5,468 
 
 24,036 
 
 1 
 
 145,527 
 
 1,333 
 
 2,571 
 
 
 
 8,979 
 
 1,090 
 
 • 174! 
 
 45,416 
 
 7,540 
 
 6,614 
 
 15,132 
 
 123,357 
 
 81,821 
 
 1,106 
 
 
 
 7,622 
 
 11,012 
 
 1742 
 
 293,259 
 
 
 
 11,482 
 
 
 
 189,525 
 
 25 
 
 1,380 
 
 
 
 63,272 
 
 
 
 1743 
 
 371,431 
 
 2 
 
 34,995 
 
 
 
 219,217 
 
 12 
 
 1,882 
 
 
 
 88,272 
 
 
 
 1744 
 
 231,984 
 
 2 
 
 20,090 
 
 
 
 219,862 
 
 67 
 
 1,657 
 
 
 
 74,169 
 
 
 
 1745 
 
 324,839 
 
 5 
 
 95,878 
 
 
 
 219,354 
 
 5 
 
 9,770 
 
 
 
 83,966 
 
 
 
 1746 
 
 130 646 
 
 
 
 158,719 
 
 
 
 282,024 
 
 
 
 20,203 
 
 n 
 
 45,782 
 
 
 
 1747 
 
 266,906 
 
 
 
 103, !40 
 
 
 
 361,289 
 
 
 
 2,122 
 
 (i 
 
 92,718 
 
 
 
 1748 
 
 543,387 
 
 6 
 
 73,857 
 
 
 
 349,363 
 
 
 
 3,768 
 
 
 
 103,891 
 
 
 
 1749 
 
 629,049 
 
 382 
 
 52,62 1 
 
 40 1355,469 
 
 
 
 1,281 
 
 
 
 106,312 
 
 
 
 1750 
 
 947,602 
 
 279 
 
 224,500 
 
 330,754 
 
 20 
 
 4,283 
 
 
 
 99,049 
 
 
 
 1751 
 
 661,416 
 
 3 
 
 32,698 
 
 256,547 
 
 2,291 
 
 2,476 
 
 
 
 71,048 
 
 
 
 1752 
 
 429.279 
 
 
 
 106,331 
 
 287,578 
 
 250 
 
 1,590 
 
 10 
 
 57,847 
 
 
 
 1753 
 
 299 608 
 
 
 
 67,049 
 
 1274,424 
 
 33 
 
 7,012 
 
 2 24,835 
 
 
 
 1754 
 
 356,270 
 
 201 47.776 
 
 321,995 
 
 [ 52,421 
 
 3»33( 
 
 1 Ol 42,9 If 
 
 
 
 * No export for one year.
 
 180 
 
 No. XIV. 
 
 An Account of the Quantity of the following Grain exported from 
 and imported into Great Britain from the year 1755. — Extracted 
 from the Appendix to the Lords Report on the Corn Laws, 
 1814, p. 122. 
 
 £3 
 3 
 
 Wheat and Flour. 
 
 Barley and Malt. 
 
 Oats and Oatmeal. 
 
 Rye and Rye- 
 meal. 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1755 
 
 •237,466 
 
 
 
 381,659 
 
 
 
 3,168 
 
 2,886 
 
 43,446 
 
 
 
 1756 
 
 102,752 
 
 5 
 
 269,950 
 
 5 
 
 5,490 
 
 54,758 
 
 29,969 
 
 1,695 
 
 1757 
 
 11,545 
 
 141,562 
 
 63,454 
 
 5,943 
 
 4,693 
 
 9,360 
 
 964 
 
 7,862 
 
 1758 
 
 9,234 
 
 20,353 
 
 11,419 
 
 9.915 
 
 1,831 
 
 33,622 
 
 
 
 365 
 
 1759 
 
 227,641 
 
 162 
 
 208,797 
 
 42 
 
 6,937 
 
 1,460 
 
 41,509 
 
 
 
 1760 
 
 393,614 
 
 3 
 
 291,150 
 
 
 
 14,496 
 
 4 
 
 53,174 
 
 
 
 1761 
 
 441,956 
 
 
 
 413,891 
 
 
 
 11,290 
 
 58 
 
 57,982 
 
 
 
 1762 
 
 295,385 
 
 56 
 
 423,064 
 
 942 
 
 15,992 
 
 17,400 
 
 28,629 
 
 
 
 1763 
 
 429,538 
 
 72 
 
 215,681 
 
 3,228 
 
 3,042 
 
 234,899 
 
 12,951 
 
 
 
 1764 
 
 396,857 
 
 1 
 
 246,891 
 
 5,110 
 
 3,952 
 
 134,772 
 
 27,746 
 
 
 
 1765 
 
 167,126 
 
 104,547 
 
 251,927 
 
 4,611 
 
 12,382 
 
 108,577 
 
 26,295 
 
 5 
 
 1766 
 
 164,939 
 
 11,020 
 
 95,115 
 
 3,736 
 
 11,633 
 
 230,639 
 
 6,045 
 
 140 
 
 1767 
 
 5,071 
 
 497,905 
 
 18,700 
 
 74364 
 
 10,605 
 
 249, 1 63 
 
 53 
 
 65,757 
 
 1768 
 
 7,433 
 
 349,268 
 
 6,587 
 
 20,481 
 
 12,104 
 
 194,743 
 
 150 
 
 57,879 
 
 1769 
 
 49,892 
 
 4,378 
 
 39,825 
 
 221 
 
 13,292 
 
 109,466 
 
 21 
 
 71 
 
 1770 
 
 75,449 
 
 34 
 
 170,409 
 
 29 
 
 28,852 
 
 124,444 
 
 642 
 
 
 
 1771 
 
 10,089 
 
 2,510 
 
 34,198 
 
 228 
 
 35,233 
 
 212,327 
 
 
 
 2,179 
 
 1772 
 
 6,959 
 
 25,474 
 
 14,031 
 
 3,068 
 
 23,599 
 
 106,820 
 
 
 
 4,799 
 
 1773 
 
 7,637 
 
 56,857 
 
 2,475 
 
 63,916 
 
 18,777 
 
 329.454 
 
 
 
 9,255 
 
 1774 
 
 15,928 
 
 289,149 
 
 2,9 H 
 
 171,508 
 
 16,433 
 
 399,499 
 
 2,260 
 
 41,427 
 
 1775 
 
 91,037 
 
 560,988 
 
 51,414 
 
 139,451 
 
 26,485 
 
 384,942 
 
 2,722 
 
 33,574 
 
 1776 
 
 210,664 
 
 20,578 
 
 136,114 
 
 8,499 
 
 34,987 
 
 378,566 
 
 10,999 
 
 3,415 
 
 1777 
 
 87,686 
 
 233,323 
 
 142,725 
 
 7,981 
 
 36,614 
 
 366,446 
 
 946 
 
 18,454 
 
 1778 
 
 141,070 
 
 106,394 
 
 103,930 
 
 42,714 
 
 56,543 
 
 201,170 
 
 1,706 
 
 9,327 
 
 1779 
 
 222,261 
 
 5,039 
 
 85,777 
 
 7,085 
 
 22,286 
 
 348,511 
 
 3,199 
 
 1,693 
 
 1780 
 
 224,059 
 
 3,915 
 
 191,563 
 
 352 
 
 27,023 
 
 195,224 
 
 6,305 
 
 
 
 1781 
 
 103,021 
 
 159,866 
 
 150,468 
 
 56 
 
 41,717 
 
 109,446 
 
 2,701 
 
 10,743 
 
 1782 
 
 145,152 
 
 80,695 
 
 127,744 
 
 13,592 
 
 23,317 
 
 38,562 
 
 4,003 
 
 
 
 1783 
 
 51,943 
 
 584,183 
 
 54,065 
 
 144,926 
 
 11,826 
 
 228,942 
 
 3,365 
 
 81,295 
 
 1784 
 
 89,288 
 
 216,947 
 
 66,889 
 
 77,182 
 
 13,511 
 
 266,998 
 
 6,731 
 
 24,779 
 
 1785 
 
 132,685 
 
 110,863 
 
 1 66,448 
 
 67,212 
 
 25,273 
 
 274,089 
 
 13,163 
 
 28,761 
 
 1786 
 
 205,466 
 
 51,463 
 
 111,598 
 
 62,374 
 
 19,293 
 
 478,473 
 
 6,736 
 
 3,643 
 
 1787 
 
 120,536 
 
 59,339 
 
 135,089 
 
 43,244 
 
 17,098 
 
 512,004 
 
 12,683 
 
 7,054 
 
 1788 
 
 82,971 
 
 148,710 
 
 212,811 
 
 11,479 
 
 14,418 
 
 413,827 
 
 31,220 
 
 
 
 1789 
 
 140,014 
 
 112,656 
 
 345,685 
 
 11,128 
 
 33,285 
 
 437,594 
 
 40,151 
 
 14,845 
 
 1790 
 
 30,892 
 
 222,557 
 
 50,966 
 
 29,718 
 
 14,290 
 
 786,546 
 
 47 
 
 21,682 
 
 1791 
 
 70,626 
 
 469,056 
 
 41,590 
 
 61,134 
 
 16,498 
 
 836,736 
 
 3,528 
 
 56,378
 
 181 
 
 s 
 
 3 
 B 
 
 Wheat and Flour. 
 
 Barley and Malt. 
 
 Oats and Oatmeal. 
 
 Rye and Rye- 
 meal. 
 
 Exportec 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1792 
 
 300,278 
 
 22,417 
 
 49,131 
 
 118,526 
 
 25,337 
 
 1,008,750 
 
 16,151 
 
 13,027 
 
 1793 
 
 76,86S 
 
 490,398 
 
 3,462 
 
 147,169 
 
 18,609 
 
 722,527 
 
 512 
 
 55,594 
 
 1794 
 
 155,048 
 
 327,902 
 
 9,437 
 
 128,568 
 
 16,059 
 
 862,979 
 
 1,919 
 
 25,450 
 
 1795 
 
 18,839 
 
 313,793 
 
 6,416 
 
 18,070 
 
 6,867 
 
 460,377 
 
 274 
 
 21,438 
 
 1796 
 
 24,679 
 
 879,200 
 
 13,133 
 
 40,033 
 
 12,040 
 
 801,373 
 
 122 
 
 163,650 
 
 1797 
 
 54,525 
 
 461,767 
 
 13,123 
 
 64,198 
 
 21,734 
 
 609,119 
 
 487 
 
 8,258 
 
 1798 
 
 59,782 
 
 396,721 
 
 15,076 
 
 116,485 
 
 27,258 
 
 773,994 
 
 680 
 
 6,925 
 
 1799 
 
 39,362 
 
 463,185 
 
 41,386 
 
 19,538 
 
 21,827 
 
 529,539 
 
 144 
 
 22,751 
 
 1800 
 
 22,013 
 
 1,264,520 
 
 5,808 
 
 130,976 
 
 12,019 
 
 545,018 
 
 419 
 
 144,531 
 
 1801 
 
 28,406 
 
 1,424,766 
 
 3,725 
 
 113.966 
 
 15,316 
 
 583,043 
 
 1,852 
 
 146,732 
 
 1802 
 
 149,304 
 
 647,664 
 
 7,875 
 
 17,555 
 
 17,582 
 
 583,780 
 
 6,484 
 
 15,478 
 
 1803 
 
 76,580 
 
 373,725 
 
 43,788 
 
 14,052 
 
 16,533 
 
 521,167 
 
 1,030 
 
 4,099 
 
 1804 
 
 63,073 
 
 461,140 
 
 128,469 
 
 11,596 
 
 19,139 
 
 740,393 
 
 3,798 
 
 2,644 
 
 1805 
 
 77,955 
 
 920,834 
 
 13,457 
 
 43,301 
 
 16,367 
 
 478,411 
 
 3,808 
 
 24,267 
 
 1806 
 
 29,566 
 
 310,342 
 
 23,625 
 
 5,385 
 
 35,997 
 
 540,506 
 
 4,020 
 
 1,014 
 
 1807 
 
 24,365 
 
 400,759 
 
 13,562 
 
 22,132 
 
 31,369 
 
 754,163 
 
 956 
 
 7,394 
 
 1808 
 
 77,567 
 
 81,466 
 
 10,781 
 
 33,739 
 
 27,293 
 
 514,540 
 
 3,986 
 
 5,172 
 
 1809 
 
 31,278 
 
 448,487 
 
 10,900 
 
 28,420 
 
 20,906 
 
 1,121,380 
 
 711 
 
 13,591 
 
 1810 
 
 75,785 
 
 1,530,691 
 
 19,590 
 
 27,211 
 
 25,340 
 
 560,044 
 
 8,933 
 
 90,973 
 
 1811 
 
 97,765 
 
 292,038 
 
 64,273 
 
 43,651 
 
 44,667 
 
 233,649 
 
 35,523 
 
 27,809 
 
 1812 
 
 46,325 
 
 246,376 
 
 62,796 
 
 75,603 
 
 30,453 
 
 353,508 
 
 21,809 
 
 72,818 
 
 1813 
 
 
 
 562,329 
 
 
 
 82,003 
 
 
 
 751,954 
 
 
 
 35,040 
 
 ♦1814 
 
 111,477 
 
 852,566 
 
 54,118 
 
 46,031 
 
 46,945 
 
 815,161 
 
 18 980 
 
 6,044 
 
 1815 
 
 227,947 
 
 384,475 
 
 8,202 
 
 29,578 
 
 29,608 
 
 718,408 
 
 17,892 
 
 1,806 
 
 1816 
 
 121,611 
 
 332.491 
 
 33,691 
 
 78,494 
 
 32,470 
 
 759,708 
 
 8,094 
 
 15,117 
 
 1817 
 
 317,524 
 
 1,089,855 
 
 64,159 
 
 161,812 
 
 72,036 
 
 1,090,111 
 
 46,932 
 
 140,092 
 
 1818 
 
 58,668 
 
 1,694,261 
 
 18.745 
 
 722,843 
 
 33,306 
 
 2,059,134 
 
 68 
 
 78,085 
 
 1819 
 
 44,689 
 
 625,638 
 
 7,396 
 
 394,180 
 
 38,835 
 
 1,376,337 
 
 848 
 
 18,674 
 
 fl820 
 
 94,657 
 
 996,478 
 
 9.967 
 
 117,014 
 
 28,620 
 
 1,599.900 
 
 2,488 
 
 12,239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This account is continued after the year 1813 from tables contained in the 
 Appendix to the Commons' Agricultural Report 1821. The two authorities do 
 not always correspond exactly, but the difference is so inconsiderable as not to 
 be worth mentioning. 
 
 f The only addition since 1 820 would be the exports to and imports from Ire- 
 land, which are given in the next number, and the exports of bonded wheat to 
 the south of Europe. 
 
 R 2
 
 182 
 
 No. XV. 
 
 An Account of the Quantity of Grain, Flour, and Meal, im- 
 ported from and exported to Ireland, in the following years. — 
 Extracted from the Appendix to the Agricultural Report, 
 1821, p. 385. 
 
 H 
 
 Wheat and 
 
 Barley and 
 
 Oats and Oat- 
 
 Rye and Rye- 
 
 **• 
 
 Flour. 
 
 Barley-meal. 
 
 meal. 
 
 meal. 
 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1773 
 
 2,907 
 
 739 
 
 7,475 
 
 190 
 
 59,373 
 
 215 
 
 129 
 
 
 
 1774 
 
 4,423 
 
 732 
 
 20,222 
 
 240 
 
 53,492 
 
 880 
 
 149 
 
 866 
 
 1775 
 
 13,107 
 
 1,081 
 
 20,344 
 
 548 
 
 86,766 
 
 120 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 1776 
 
 11,517 
 
 37,207 
 
 1,929 
 
 1,063 
 
 88,670 
 
 651 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 1777 
 
 16,706 
 
 30,286 
 
 3,849 
 
 608 
 
 71,719 
 
 4,309 
 
 236 
 
 
 
 1778 
 
 •2,966 
 
 53,762 
 
 14,150 
 
 697 
 
 11,847 
 
 34,349 
 
 17 
 
 150 
 
 1779 
 
 1,777 
 
 64,827 
 
 3,822 
 
 1,899 
 
 93,212 
 
 4,384 
 
 O 
 
 541 
 
 1780 
 
 2,384 
 
 46,439 
 
 
 
 9,109 
 
 43,721 
 
 798 
 
 
 
 
 
 1781 
 
 41,315 
 
 2,511 
 
 40 
 
 7,630 
 
 65,967 
 
 12,669 
 
 
 
 
 
 1782 
 
 4,146 
 
 1,295 
 
 11,360 
 
 5,606 
 
 27,569 
 
 856 
 
 
 
 
 
 1783 
 
 558 
 
 39,482 
 
 4,683 
 
 3,109 
 
 31,439 
 
 7,653 
 
 
 
 
 
 1784 
 
 14,423 
 
 50,262 
 
 153 
 
 4,233 
 
 122,053 
 
 2,729 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 1785 
 
 23,810 
 
 7,899 
 
 23,437 
 
 9,820 
 
 243,181 
 
 717 
 
 
 
 
 
 1786 
 
 10,928 
 
 8,869 
 
 53,601 
 
 184 
 
 239,011 
 
 862 
 
 
 
 
 
 1787 
 
 10,225 
 
 974 
 
 39,540 
 
 1,028 
 
 187,369 
 
 2,346 
 
 
 
 
 
 1788 
 
 34,643 
 
 790 
 
 10,622 
 
 2,194 
 
 202,500 
 
 302 
 
 
 
 
 
 1789 
 
 57,951 
 
 506 
 
 9,323 
 
 897 
 
 294,433 
 
 491 
 
 
 
 
 
 1790 
 
 35,444 
 
 462 
 
 16,766 
 
 320 
 
 387,270 
 
 236 
 
 356 
 
 
 
 1791 
 
 18,523 
 
 1,392 
 
 13,021 
 
 505 
 
 316,112 
 
 265 
 
 293 
 
 
 
 1792 
 
 1,272 
 
 1,806 
 
 5,446 
 
 14,270 
 
 557,774 
 
 513 
 
 491 
 
 
 
 1793 
 
 14,572 
 
 1,281 
 
 4,285 
 
 818 
 
 292,533 
 
 393 
 
 30 
 
 
 
 1794 
 
 9,157 
 
 43,097 
 
 17,198 
 
 1,696 
 
 378,609 
 
 70 
 
 414 
 
 21 
 
 1795 
 
 14,493 
 
 804 
 
 
 
 794 
 
 355,204 
 
 446 
 
 
 
 
 
 1796 
 
 4 
 
 409 
 
 
 
 3,011 
 
 341,431 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1797 
 
 40,565 
 
 2,291 
 
 12,268 
 
 180 
 
 334,628 
 
 316 
 
 
 
 
 
 1798 
 
 17,490 
 
 9,626 
 
 49,780 
 
 4 
 
 362,538 
 
 706 
 
 
 
 
 
 1799 
 
 15,315 
 
 5,202 
 
 151 
 
 21,678 
 
 359,306 
 
 1,478 
 
 
 
 
 
 1800 
 
 749 
 
 3,726 
 
 78 
 
 914 
 
 2,410 
 
 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 1801 
 
 524 
 
 585 
 
 
 
 450 
 
 374 
 
 408 
 
 
 
 
 
 1802 
 
 109,519 
 
 1,200 
 
 7,116 
 
 1,896 
 
 341,931 
 
 254 
 
 282 
 
 
 
 1803 
 
 61,270 
 
 2,059 
 
 12,879 
 
 18,864 
 
 266,359 
 
 747 
 
 752 
 
 
 
 1804 
 
 70,100 
 
 707 
 
 2,521 
 
 97,923 
 
 240,023 
 
 180 
 
 206 
 
 
 
 1805 
 
 84,412 
 
 754 
 
 15,656 
 
 751 
 
 203,306 
 
 264 
 
 235 
 
 
 
 1806 
 
 102,483 
 
 2,368 
 
 3,327 
 
 14,259 
 
 357,078 
 
 2,654 
 
 330 
 
 160 
 
 1807 
 
 45,110 
 
 2,429 
 
 23,048 
 
 1,143 
 
 389,649 
 
 773 
 
 431 
 
 
 
 1808 
 
 43,496 
 
 28,521 
 
 30,586 
 
 2,357 
 
 579,974 
 
 1,940 
 
 573 
 
 179 
 
 1809 
 
 68,124 
 
 843 
 
 16,619 
 
 4,036 
 
 845,783 
 
 141 
 
 425 
 
 
 
 1810 
 
 127,510 
 
 2,354 
 
 8,321 
 
 18,432 
 
 493,231 
 
 2,131 
 
 20 
 

 
 183 
 
 g 
 
 Wheat and 
 
 Barley and 
 
 Oats and Oat- 
 
 Rye and Rye- 
 
 8 
 
 > 
 
 Flour. 
 
 Barley-meal. 
 
 meal. 
 
 meal. 
 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 
 Exported 
 
 Imported 
 Quarters 
 
 Exported 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 Quarters 
 
 1811 
 
 147,567 
 
 1,680 
 
 2,713 
 
 27,663 
 
 275,757 
 
 .547 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 1812 
 
 1 60,842 
 
 645 
 
 43,262 
 
 4,306 
 
 390,926 
 
 7,116 
 
 177 
 
 
 
 1813 
 
 217,154 
 
 2,678 
 
 63,560 
 
 10,377 
 
 691,499 
 
 971 
 
 420 
 
 
 
 1814 
 
 228,610 
 
 2,322 
 
 17,344 
 
 15,569 
 
 565,004 
 
 819 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 1815 
 
 192,026 
 
 447 
 
 27,519 
 
 1,533 
 
 597,933 
 
 3,155 
 
 213 
 
 
 
 1816 
 
 122,836 
 
 12,446 
 
 63,629 
 
 922 
 
 684,430 
 
 1,648 
 
 43 
 
 
 
 1817 
 
 60,817 
 
 81,933 
 
 28,019 
 
 29,940 
 
 612,103 
 
 28,643 
 
 614 
 
 3,625 
 
 1818 
 
 111,383 
 
 8,276 
 
 27,220 
 
 16,546 
 
 1,072,339 
 
 1,417 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 1819 
 
 155,980 
 
 4,126 
 
 21,834 
 
 3,286 
 
 790,704 
 
 7,257 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 1820 
 
 409,283 
 
 6,134 
 
 88,343 
 
 4,489 
 
 918,362 
 
 1,859 
 
 138 
 
 75 
 
 * 1821 
 
 576,595 
 
 9,100 
 
 84,933 
 
 3,811 
 
 1,164,15(1 
 
 991 
 
 550 
 
 8 
 
 1822 
 
 467,489 
 
 4,526 
 
 22,666 
 
 22,726 569,611 
 
 37,720 
 
 353 
 
 
 
 * The quantities for the two last years are taken from Custom house returns.
 
 184 
 
 No. XVI. 
 
 Cattle, 8(C. sold in Smithfield*. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Sheep. 
 
 Years. 
 1756 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Sheep. 
 
 1732 
 
 76,210 
 
 514,700 
 
 77,257 
 
 624,710 
 
 1733 
 
 80,169 
 
 555,050 
 
 1757 
 
 82,612 
 
 574,960 
 
 1734 
 
 78,810 
 
 566,910 
 
 1758 
 
 84,252 
 
 550,930 
 
 1735 
 
 83,894 
 
 590,970 
 
 1759 
 
 86,439 
 
 582,260 
 
 1736 
 
 87,606 
 
 587,420 
 
 1760 
 
 88,594 
 
 622,210 
 
 1737 
 
 89,862 
 
 607,330 
 
 1761 
 
 82,514 
 
 666,010 
 
 1738 
 
 87,010 
 
 589,470 
 
 1762 
 
 102,831 
 
 772,160 
 
 1739 
 
 86,787 
 
 568,980 
 
 1763 
 
 80,851 
 
 653,110 
 
 1740 
 
 84,810 
 
 501,020 
 
 1764 
 
 75,168 
 
 556,360 
 
 1741 
 
 77,714 
 
 536,180 
 
 1765 
 
 81,630 
 
 537,000 
 
 1742 
 
 79,601 
 
 503,260 
 
 1766 
 
 75,534 
 
 574,790 
 
 1743 
 
 76,475 
 
 468,120 
 
 1767 
 
 77,324 
 
 574,050 
 
 1744 
 
 76,648 
 
 490,620 
 
 1768 
 
 79,660 
 
 626,170 
 
 1745 
 
 74,188 
 
 563,990 
 
 1769 
 
 82,131 
 
 642,910 
 
 1746 
 
 71,582 
 
 620,790 
 
 1770 
 
 86,890 
 
 649,090 
 
 1747 
 
 71,150 
 
 621,780 
 
 1771 
 
 93,573 
 
 631,860 
 
 1748 
 
 67,681 
 
 610,060 
 
 1772 
 
 89,503 
 
 609,540 
 
 1749 
 
 72,706 
 
 624,220 
 
 1773 
 
 90,133 
 
 609,740 
 
 1750 
 
 70,765 
 
 656,340 
 
 1774 
 
 90,419 
 
 585,290 
 
 1751 
 
 69,589 
 
 631,890 
 
 1775 
 
 93,581 
 
 623,950 
 
 1752 
 
 73,708 
 
 642,100 
 
 1776 
 
 98,372 
 
 671,700 
 
 1753 
 
 75,252 
 
 648,440 
 
 1777 
 
 93,714 
 
 714,870 
 
 1754 
 
 70,437 
 
 631,350 
 
 1778 
 
 97,360 
 
 658,540 
 
 1755 
 
 74,290 
 
 647,100 
 
 | 1779 
 
 97,352 
 
 676,540 
 
 * 1 have extracted the following observations from SirF. M. Eden's work, 
 but I am inclined to think, from what I can collect, that the weight of cattle 
 and sheep, as estimated by him in 1797, is rather overrated. 
 
 " It is said in the first report of the select committee appointed to take into 
 consideration the means of promoting the cultivation and improvement of the 
 waste lands in the kingdom, that the size and weight, both of sheep and 
 cattle, have, probably, increased at least one fourth since 1732; accord- 
 ing to which rate the consumption of meat, with respect to the number of 
 pounds, has augmented much more than it has with respect to the number 
 of cattle and sheep. We may form some idea of the size of cattle and sheep 
 in 1 732, from the size at which they were estimated in a work attributed to 
 Dr. D'Avenant, published in 1710; between which period, and 1732, it is 
 probable that some (though not very considerable) increase in size had taken 
 place. The author estimated the weight of a net carcase of black cattle at 
 370lb. and of a sheep at 28lb. Bullocks now killed in London weigh at an 
 average 8001b.; calves 1481b-, sheep 80lb., and lambs about 50lb. each."
 
 185 
 
 Years. 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Sheep. 
 706,850 
 
 Years. 
 
 Cattle. 
 
 Sheep. 
 
 1780 
 
 102,383 
 
 1802 
 
 126,389 
 
 743,470 
 
 1781 
 
 102,543 
 
 743,330 
 
 1803 
 
 117,551 
 
 787,430 
 
 1782 
 
 101,176 
 
 728,970 
 
 1804 
 
 113,019 
 
 903,940 
 
 1783 
 
 101,840 
 
 701,610 
 
 1805 
 
 125,043 
 
 912,410 
 
 1784 
 
 98,143 
 
 616,110 
 
 1806 
 
 120,250 
 
 858,570 
 
 1785 
 
 99,047 
 
 641,470 
 
 1807 
 
 134,326 
 
 924,030 
 
 1786 
 
 92,270 
 
 665,910 
 
 1808 
 
 144,042 
 
 1,015,280 
 
 1787 
 
 94,946 
 
 668,570 
 
 1809 
 
 137,600 
 
 989,250 
 
 1788 
 
 92,8 '29 
 
 679,100 
 
 1810 
 
 132,155 
 
 962,750 
 
 *1789 
 
 93,269 
 
 693,700 
 
 1811 
 
 125,012 
 
 966,400 
 
 1790 
 
 103,708 
 
 749,660 
 
 1812 
 
 133,854 
 
 953,630 
 
 1791 
 
 101,164 
 
 740,360 
 
 1813 
 
 137,770 
 
 891,240 
 
 1792 
 
 107,348 
 
 760,859 
 
 1814 
 
 135,071 
 
 870,880 
 
 1793 
 
 116,848 
 
 728,480 
 
 1815 
 
 124,948 
 
 962,840 
 
 1794 
 
 109,448 
 
 719,420 
 
 1816 
 
 120,439 
 
 968,560 
 
 1795 
 
 131,092 
 
 745,640 
 
 1817 
 
 129,888 
 
 1,044,710 
 
 1796 
 
 117,152 
 
 758,840 
 
 1818 
 
 138,047 
 
 963,250 
 
 1797 
 
 108,377 
 
 693,510 
 
 1819 
 
 135,226 
 
 949,900 
 
 1798 
 
 107,470 
 
 753,010 
 
 1820 
 
 132,933 
 
 947,990 
 
 1799 
 
 122,986 
 
 834,400 
 
 1821 
 
 142,133 
 
 1,107,230 
 
 1800 
 
 125,073 
 
 842,210 
 
 1822 
 
 142,043 
 
 1,340,160 
 
 1801 
 
 134,546 
 
 760,560 
 
 
 
 
 * Down to the year 1789 the numbers are taken from Sir F. M. Eden's 
 -work on the state of the poor, extracted originally from the report of the 
 select committee appointed to take into consideration the means of promoting 
 the cultivation and improvement of the waste lands in the kingdom. 
 
 From the year 1790 the numbers are extracted from papers laid before 
 parliament.
 
 THOUGHTS, &c 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 In the last part of this work my observations 
 on the fluctuations of prices were entirely con- 
 fined to agricultural produce. In the first and 
 second parts the references to the prices and 
 quantities of commodities were applicable only 
 to detached periods, and embraced merely a few 
 articles selected for the purpose of comparison 
 and illustration. 
 
 But in order to afford the reader an opportu- 
 nity of trying the correctness of my conclusions 
 in the preceding pages, by the largest possible 
 induction of facts, I insert a table of the prices 
 of the principal commodities which come under 
 the description of general merchandise in the 
 London market, for an uninterrupted series of 
 years, from the commencement of 1782 to the 
 close of 1822. I consider the information to be 
 derived from a connected view of this kind to
 
 2 
 
 be so important, that if I had the opportunity 
 of carrying it further back, I should certainly 
 avail myself of it ; but I am not aware of the 
 existence of materials that are accessible for the 
 purpose of a complete series for any period an- 
 terior to 1782, 
 
 The commencement however from that date 
 has considerable advantages. It gives quota- 
 tions for upwards of a year before the termina- 
 tion of the war with America, and thus affords 
 the means of judging of the effects of the transi- 
 tion from war to peace in 1783, and again of the 
 transition from peace to war in 1793. The in- 
 formation, too, which is derived from this table, 
 of the state of prices in the ten years of peace 
 before the breaking out of the long war with 
 France, is important, as exhibiting a view which 
 has been very little attended to, of the level from 
 which the subsequent fluctuations took place. 
 
 In reasoning upon prices, it is desirable, as far 
 as it may be practicable, to connect them with 
 quantities. The prices throw a light upon the 
 variations of quantity, as variations in quantity 
 serve to explain some of the phenomena of 
 prices. Of the quantities of articles of home 
 growth, except in the case of Hops which are 
 the subject of fiscal regulation, there are no 
 means of obtaining correct statements. But of 
 imported commodities in cases where the duties
 
 3 
 
 are levied upon the quantity and not upon the 
 value, the materials for such statements exist 
 in the records of the Custom House : and 
 from the admirable order in which these are 
 kept, they are accessible at the shortest notice. 
 Accounts of quantities drawn from that source 
 have at various times appeared in parliamentary 
 papers; but as they have been generally moved 
 for in order to illustrate some detached or par- 
 tial object, they are so dispersed and the pe- 
 riods so broken, as not to admit of easy or ready 
 reference, for the purpose of general informa- 
 tion, nor to exhibit so entire a display of the 
 fluctuations of quantity in connexion with the 
 fluctuations in price, as is essential to the ob- 
 jects of this inquiry. I have therefore procured 
 and inserted in the appendix, statements of 
 quantities of several of the leading articles. 
 The greater part of these statements are from 
 official documents, and some of them reach as 
 far back as the Table of prices, with a chasm 
 only of those years, of which the Custom-House 
 records were destroyed by the fire of 1813. 
 
 To the table, then, of prices, and to the accom- 
 panying statement of the quantities of some of 
 the articles, in as far as they have not already 
 been included and referred to in the preceding 
 parts of this work, I appeal in further proof 
 of the positions which I have endeavoured to
 
 establish. But preparatory to a judgment of the 
 inferences to be drawn from a view of the prices 
 exhibited in the table, it may be desirable to 
 make a few explanatory remarks on the effects 
 of quantity on price, in continuation of the ex- 
 planation which I had occasion to give in Sec- 
 tion 4, Part 3, and which would have broken 
 in too much upon the course of my argument, 
 if I had then incumbered it with a statement of 
 all the modifications of which it is susceptible. 
 The explanation which I then gave referred 
 to the general effects of quantity on price : and 
 I then pointed out the principle by which it is 
 found, that prices of most commodities, and of 
 corn more especially, vary in a much greater 
 ratio than that of the mere defect or excess of 
 quantity. But the time and extent of the ope- 
 ration of that principle are subject to various 
 modifications arising from the great and almost 
 infinite variety of circumstances which may 
 affect the relations of supply and demand, as 
 far as concerns the market value of a particular 
 commodity. Some of the most important of 
 the modifications, however, to which the appli- 
 cation of the principle is liable, may be deduced 
 from experience, and I will state the most striking 
 of those which occur to me, as they may serve 
 to obviate by anticipation some objections which 
 might otherwise be made to the principle itself.
 
 The objections to which I allude are that, on 
 referring to comparisons of quantities and prices, 
 there is not only not an invariable coincidence 
 of a rise upon every diminution of quantity and 
 vice versa, but that prices sometimes fall coin- 
 cidently with diminishing quantities, or rise 
 with increasing ones; and that there are in- 
 stances, rare ones indeed, in which the lowest 
 prices coincide with the smallest stock for sale, 
 and the highest prices with the largest stocks. 
 
 The answer is, that the facts here stated may 
 be admitted as occasionally occurring, and that 
 they are perfectly reconcileable with the prin- 
 ciple which has been laid down. 
 
 This apparent anomaly may be thus ex- 
 plained : although the cost of production must 
 regulate the price of all commodities on the 
 average of a certain number of years, the imme- 
 diate cause of fluctuations in the market value 
 at particular intervals is to be found in the va- 
 riations of the relative proportion of supply and 
 demand*; but demand, as affecting price, is 
 
 * My observations are here confined to the fluctuations of 
 the market price, resulting from variations in the proportion 
 of supply and demand as relates to particular commodities. 
 In the more general application of the terms to all commo- 
 dities, I fully concur in the doctrine laid down by Mr. Mill, 
 who, in his Chapter on Interchange (Elements of Political 
 Economy) proves with great clearness and force of reasoning 
 that the aggregate of demand must always be equal to the 
 aggregate of supply.
 
 compounded of actual and prospective want, 
 and supply may be distinguished into actual and 
 contingent quantity. 
 
 The demand for and supply of any particular 
 commodity may be said to be balanced, and 
 prices to be on a fair level, when the stock for sale 
 is sufficient to cover the consumption at its esti- 
 mated rate, till the reproduction or importation 
 at the usual time, provided there be no alteration 
 in the cost of production or of importation, or in 
 the state of the seasons or of political relations, 
 leading to the anticipation of an alteration in 
 the amount of future supply. The rate of con- 
 sumption of articles in general use is not liable 
 to great or suddenvariations; and if the actual 
 supply be in the usual proportion, and there 
 be no ground for anticipating any great altera- 
 tion for the future, prices will, of course, be 
 tolerably uniform. 
 
 If, however, there should come, whether 
 from a season more than usually abundant, 
 from improvements in machinery or agricul- 
 ture, or from greater facility and cheapness 
 of conveyance, an increased supply ; this in- 
 creased supply can only be got rid of by the 
 persons into whose hands it first comes, by 
 holding out to the next the inducement of a 
 reduction in price ; that reduction, according 
 to its amount, tempts the successive dealers to 
 increase their stock ; but in purchasing a new
 
 stock, the value of what they had before is pro- 
 portionately reduced ; and at some loss upon 
 the whole they induce, by the offer of cheap- 
 ness, either new consumers to come forward, or 
 those who are already consumers to increase 
 their consumption. But the increase of con- 
 sumption of articles already in general use is a 
 slow process, compared with the possible in- 
 crease of supply under the circumstances stated. 
 There will remain, in consequence, a larger sur- 
 plus than usual to meet the next harvest or the 
 following periodical supply, and the holders of 
 this increased supply must, by the very sup- 
 position of the fall in price, be losers to some 
 extent. Still, if the supply relatively to the esti- 
 mated rate of consumption could be accurately 
 ascertained, both as to the quantity actually in 
 the market, and as to that which might even- 
 tually be forthcoming, there would quickly be 
 an adjustment of the price in some regular pro- 
 portion to the altered quantity, both actual and 
 forthcoming. But it is not of many articles 
 that the stock actually existing for sale can be 
 ascertained, and there are still fewer of which 
 the extent of contingent supply can be pre- 
 cisely defined. 
 
 If, therefore, the supply on hand at any time 
 happens to have been under-rated; and if fur- 
 ther a second, or still more if a third season of
 
 increased supply should occur, every person 
 who has bought with a view to future resale, 
 will lose in proportion to the degree in which 
 he has extended his stock ; and the consumers, 
 (among whom, when speaking of raw materials, 
 manufacturers are usually classed,) most of 
 whom may have been tempted by cheapness to 
 anticipate their probable consumption, by ex- 
 tending their stocks, will find that they would 
 have done better by postponing their demand. 
 Some of the dealers, by the fall in the value of 
 their stock, become insolvent: others appre- 
 hend that they are in danger of becoming so, if 
 the supply, about which they have been so 
 often deceived, should continue to be exces- 
 sive ; they accordingly find it to be the part of 
 prudence to resist the temptation of cheapness, 
 and to diminish, instead of increasing, their 
 stock. The consumer too finds that he should 
 have been a gainer, if for some time past he 
 had only bought in proportion to his immediate 
 wants ; he, therefore, now conceives it to be his 
 interest to eke out his store to the utmost, that 
 is, not to buy more than he can help in ad- 
 vance. Thus, although the supply may, in 
 consequence of long protracted discouragement, 
 be falling off, that part of the demand which 
 consists in the anticipation of future want falls 
 off in a still greater degree, till both reach their
 
 minimum j the consumption all the time going 
 on at its wonted rate, or more probably in- 
 creasing, in consequence of cheapness : and in 
 such cases it may be only when the stock is at 
 length discovered to be below the immediate 
 want for actual consumption, while fresh sup- 
 plies are remote or uncertain, that any decided 
 improvement takes place *. 
 
 This is a process which I have repeatedly ob- 
 served to occur in the articles in which I have 
 been practically conversant, and in most other 
 articles respecting which I have had occasion 
 to obtain information. And the general re- 
 mark resulting from it is, that after a glut has 
 been once fully established, it requires a period 
 of falling prices, and diminishing supplies, till 
 it may so happen, though perhaps rarely, that 
 the lowest prices, and the smallest stocks, may 
 coincide. The converse of the grounds on 
 which I have pointed out that reduced prices 
 
 * There is another case in which a lower price may often 
 coincide with a quantity for sale smaller than on former oc- 
 casions, and this is when, though the stock actually for sale 
 is reduced below its average quantity, there may be grounds 
 for anticipating supplies of greater magnitude than usual, or 
 beyond the estimated rate of consumption : and both with 
 regard to stocks actually existing, and to supplies forth- 
 coming, it is perhaps scarcely necessary to add that, when 
 these are matter of uncertainty, opinion of quantity will act 
 on prices equally, whether that opinion be well or ill founded.
 
 10 
 
 may occasionally coincide with diminished quan- 
 tities, may be traced, reversing each step, to 
 account for the occasional phenomenon of rising 
 prices and increasing quantity, till for a very 
 short time it may occasionally happen that the 
 highest prices may coincide with the largest 
 stocks. 
 
 The process in each direction has, in some 
 degree, been explained in what I stated in the 
 first part of this work on the alternation be- 
 tween speculation and stagnation, or overtrading 
 and undertrading. Thus the lowest price of 
 imported articles coincided with the smallest 
 quantities in 1816, and the early part of 1817, 
 while the highest prices were quoted, nominally 
 at least, when the quantities had nearly reached 
 their greatest magnitude in 1818 *. 
 
 * The reduction of the stocks of commodities in 1816 
 and 1817 is a curious and important fact, and one that has 
 been completely overlooked in the various attempts which 
 have been hitherto made to account for the great rise of 
 prices which occurred in 1817 and 1818. The variety and 
 extent of the articles of raw produce, which existed in a 
 6tate of relative scarcity in 1816 and 1817, will be noticed 
 in the sketch which I shall give of some of the principal 
 causes of the fluctuations, that are exhibited in the tables 
 in the appendix. And if the causes of fluctuation of raw 
 produce are satisfactorily made out, there can be no diffi- 
 culty in accounting for the corresponding variations of the 
 manufactured goods into which these materials enter.
 
 11 
 
 I fear that these remarks may have appeared 
 trite, particularly to such of my readers as being 
 engaged in mercantile pursuits, have themselves 
 come to the same general conclusions : but I 
 have found several persons, who not being con- 
 versant with the details of business, and some 
 even who being engaged in business, but not 
 being accustomed to generalize their expe- 
 rience, have been struck with the circumstance 
 of reduced prices having accompanied dimi- 
 nished stocks ; and thence have concluded that 
 quantity does not govern price, according to 
 any general rule. Whereas, in reality, the dis- 
 crepancy is confined to the quantity actually 
 for sale, compared with what existed at corre- 
 sponding periods of former seasons, supposing 
 the rate of consumption to be unaltered ; while 
 the general rule applies to contingent, as well 
 as actual supply, and to prospective, as well as 
 to immediate, consumption ; and as opinion of 
 future supply, compared with the demand, ope- 
 
 The speculation arising out of that scarcity has already 
 been described in the first part of this work. The effect of 
 the exaggerated demand, and of a rise of prices so much 
 beyond the deficiency, was to bring forward supplies of 
 great magnitude in 1818; but the extent of them was not 
 appreciated till after they had all arrived, and had been some 
 time at market; being then, and not till then, found so 
 much beyond the utmost of the estimated rate of annual 
 consumption. 
 
 S 2
 
 12 
 
 rates for some time upon price in the same de- 
 gree as if it were realized, it is requisite always 
 to make an allowance for that part of the sup- 
 ply and demand which is contingent. It is 
 through the medium of contingent or prospec- 
 tive supply, that any great alteration in the 
 cost of production, if generally known or anti- 
 cipated, has an immediate effect on prices be- 
 fore any alteration in the quantity at market 
 can take place. This contingency, in most 
 cases, affords latitude for the exercise of the 
 most erroneous opinions. According as these 
 tend to exaggerate eventual scarcity or abun- 
 dance, will be the extent of overtrading and 
 speculation for a rise of prices beyond the real 
 occasion, or the stagnation and undertrading 
 which occasion a depression below the proper 
 level. It requires occasionally an interval of 
 some length to bring to any test the miscalcu- 
 lations of individuals, whether in exaggerating 
 or underrating the proportions of demand and 
 supply of any particular commodity. 
 
 Bearing in mind these general remarks, let 
 us now proceed to pass in review each of the 
 articles enumerated in the tables ; and upon 
 that review, I think, it will appear that the 
 difference in the relative proportions of supply 
 and demand, both actual and contingent, is 
 quite sufficient to account for the fluctuations
 
 13 
 
 in price at the several periods, without attri- 
 buting any effect to the depreciation of the cur- 
 rency beyond the difference between paper and 
 gold, or to extra demand arising out of the 
 war, except in the case of such articles as are 
 the immediate objects of government expen- 
 diture. 
 
 Ashes and Barilla were subject, through the 
 whole period of the war, to an increased cost 
 of conveyance, by the difference of freight, 
 which, on such bulky articles, formed a con- 
 siderable proportion of their value. But there 
 were particular periods when we were excluded 
 from direct intercourse with the sources of sup- 
 ply, and the importation consequently became 
 more precarious, as well as more expensive. 
 Accordingly, upon the breaking out of the war 
 with Spain in 1795, from whence we draw our 
 principal supplies of barilla, the price advanced 
 considerably, and of course affected the value 
 of ashes*. Upon the general peace of 1802, 
 prices fell, but they did not advance mate- 
 rially upon the renewal of the war with France 
 in 1803. In 1804 and 5, when hostilities broke 
 out again between this country and Spain, the 
 price naturally rose. In 1808, the stocks both 
 
 * Ashes were at a very high price in 1782, and seem to 
 have fallen 50 per cent, after the close of the American 
 war, as that source of direct supply was again restored.
 
 14 
 
 of ashes and barilla were greatly reduced. At 
 the same time, we were excluded from direct 
 intercourse with the Baltic; and the freight 
 and insurance from thence rose enormously, as 
 I have already had occasion to observe, and it 
 was for some time uncertain whether supplies 
 could at any expense be obtained from that 
 quarter. Our disputes with America were then 
 beginning, and from the peculiar character of 
 the war in Europe at that period, freights ge- 
 nerally were at a very great advance. Thus 
 actual scarcity was aggravated in its effects on 
 price, by apprehended failure of future supply ; 
 and the price rose accordingly to an unpre- 
 cedented height in 1808, before any material 
 increase of Bank of England notes, or any ob- 
 servable depression of the exchanges, had taken 
 place. This advance naturally induced great 
 efforts to overcome the obstruction to importa- 
 tion, and those efforts being successful, the 
 supplies in 1809 and 1810 were so large, as to 
 occasion a depression of the price in 1811, to 
 little more than one-third ofwhat it had been two 
 years before. If the difference between paper 
 and gold in 1811 and 1812 be deducted from 
 the prices in those two years, they would be 
 left below the level of the preceding or suc- 
 ceeding periods of peace. 
 
 The price of ashes advanced, as it may be ob-
 
 15 
 
 served, upon the peace in 1814, when our inter- 
 course with France (where this description of al- 
 kali h appened then to be in demand) was restored ; 
 and the highest prices, with the exception of 
 1808-9, were in 1815 and 16. The subsequent 
 fall may be sufficiently accounted for by the 
 great increase in the importation*. A new 
 source of supply, viz. the East Indies, has within 
 these few years contributed to swell the im- 
 portation. I have not a statement of the im- 
 ports of these articles into Great Britain, but 
 the subjoined account of the imports into Lon- 
 don, from 1814 to the present time, will be 
 sufficient to show the great increase of quan- 
 tity. 
 
 Barilla. 
 
 
 Ashes. 
 
 
 
 American 
 
 Russian 
 
 
 Barrels. 
 
 Casks. 
 
 1814 
 
 2088 
 
 1706 
 
 1815 
 
 1390 
 
 3594 
 
 1816 
 
 5g04 
 
 12^9 
 
 1817 
 
 5949 
 
 3262 
 
 1818 
 
 7414 
 
 1956 
 
 I8I9 
 
 11,546 
 
 1012 
 
 1820 
 
 9836 
 
 622 
 
 1821 
 
 10,271 
 
 484 
 
 1822 
 
 8772 
 
 763 
 
 Bales. 
 
 Tons. 
 
 996 
 
 4377 
 
 61 . 
 
 4802 
 1589 
 
 2799 
 6732 
 8539 
 
 1639 
 
 5028 
 
 2119 
 6156 
 
 5952 
 . 6441 
 
 8407 
 7570 
 
 • 5939 
 . 4689 
 
 * Barilla reached its lowest point of depression last sum- 
 mer, when the uncertainty, whether any and what propor- 
 tion of the duty was likely to be taken off, in consequence of 
 the reduction in the duty on salt, produced, as is usual on 
 such occasions of uncertainty, a considerable degree of 
 stagnation.
 
 16 
 
 Some idea may be formed of the great in- 
 creased consumption, both of ashes and barilla, 
 from the prices having risen considerably since 
 last autumn on account of a small falling off in 
 the relatively large importation. 
 
 Alum, it will be observed, has fallen very 
 considerably, and rather suddenly, within the 
 last three years. 
 
 This article seems, till recently, to have been 
 subject to a qualified monopoly ; the sources of 
 supply having been almost exclusively confined 
 to two great Yorkshire manufactories. It is 
 supposed that there was a secret understanding 
 between them not to undersell each other. 
 The agent of one of them, however, with a 
 species of good faith not very uncommon in 
 such combinations, is said to have gone on en- 
 larging his ton to 21, 22, and 23 cwt. As soon 
 as this became known to the other, a com- 
 petition to sell cheap took place ; and this is 
 one cause of the fall. During the interval of 
 the high prices many other manufactories were 
 established, especially near Glasgow, where a 
 plumose alum of great purity is largely found. 
 In addition to this, less expensive processes 
 have been discovered, so that the Yorkshire 
 and other works are conducted with far less 
 cost than formerly. At the same time some 
 manufactories of this article are said to have
 
 17 
 
 been established on the Continent. And while 
 the article is thus more extensively and cheaply 
 produced, other substances have been applied 
 by the improvements of chemistry, to some of 
 the purposes for which alum was before ex- 
 clusively used. In general, it may be observed, 
 as well of ashes and barilla, as of alum, that 
 the whole class of alkalies and mineral sub- 
 stances, applicable to manufactures, are liable 
 to be peculiarly affected by the great im- 
 provements in chemistry, and that, therefore, 
 if a reduction in price could not be accounted 
 for so clearly as maybe done in these instances, 
 it might very fairly be presumed that substi- 
 tutes had been found, or the use of them super- 
 seded by other and improved processes. 
 
 An inspection of the table of prices will 
 clearly prove the total absence of any coin- 
 cidence of the fluctuations of this article with 
 alterations in the currency. And, as far as 
 any effect of war and peace can be traced, it 
 would lead to the conclusion that peace was 
 rather calculated to raise, and war to depress, 
 the price ; for after having continued at a re- 
 markably steady price throughout the war, it 
 participated in the general rise of articles of 
 export in 1814 and 1815. 
 
 Bristles are now, and have been ever since 
 the peace, at a higher price than they were at
 
 18 
 
 during the first thirteen years of the war ; that 
 is, till the beginning of 1807. As we depend 
 for our supply of that article almost exclusively 
 on an importation from Russia, the great ad- 
 vance in 1808 arose, not only from the very 
 small actual quantity for sale*, but from the 
 apprehension which then prevailed that all 
 future supply would be intercepted for an in- 
 definite length of time. It may be observed, 
 however, that at the close of 1810, the price 
 had receded 50 per cent, in consequence of 
 rather a larger supply being brought forward ; 
 but as the charges of importation continued to 
 be as high as ever, the price naturally recovered, 
 although it never again reached the elevation 
 of 1808. This article, moreover, is one of di- 
 rect government expenditure, the consumption 
 of it for brushes in the army and navy being 
 considerable. But the increased consumption 
 by the rest of the community, since the peace, 
 
 * I have not a statement of the total imports of this article ; 
 but as we depend almost exclusively upon Russia for our 
 supply of it, an account which I happen to have of the ex- 
 port from Petersburg will sufficiently prove the great falling 
 off in the supply in 1808 and 1809. 
 
 1806 
 
 1689 Casks 
 
 1807 
 
 1446 
 
 1808 
 
 673 
 
 1809 
 
 581 
 
 1810 
 
 1120
 
 19 
 
 seems to have more than made up for the 
 cessation of government demand j for the im- 
 portation has been larger in the two last years, 
 than it was, on the average, during the war, 
 and yet the price has, of late, been rising. 
 It is now higher than it was during any part 
 of the war, excepting only the interval between 
 1807 and 1813, when the charges of importa- 
 tion account for the whole difference of the 
 bullion price on the average of that period. 
 
 Coffee is so nearly as high now as it was 
 during the greater part of the war, and so very 
 considerably higher than when the depreciation 
 of paper was greatest, that it is not one of the 
 articles which have been resorted to in proof 
 of a transition from war to peace, or of the de- 
 preciation and subsequent enhancement of the 
 currency. The French part of the island of 
 St. Domingo alone, before the revolution there 
 in 1791, is computed to have produced annually 
 40,000 tons on 3000 plantations : these were 
 nearly destroyed during the troubles which 
 prevailed there, and many of the planters went 
 thence to Jamaica, where they established ex- 
 tensive plantations, which have since made the 
 latter island a source of considerable supply: 
 but many years* were required to produce 
 
 * The coffee-plant does not, 1 am told, bear in less than 
 five years.
 
 20 
 
 from that and other sources an increased quan- 
 tity to make up for the deficiency from St. Do- 
 mingo. Accordingly, the price began to ad- 
 vance in 1791, soon after the revolution in St. 
 Domingo, and, with some intervening fluctua- 
 tions, maintained a considerable elevation, till 
 the confiscations in the ports of the Baltic, in 
 1810, and the rigorous execution of the anti- 
 commercial decrees of the enemy, which were 
 enforced in the other ports of the Continent 
 of Europe, put nearly a stop to all further ex- 
 port. In the interval the importation to this 
 country was large, being swelled by the pro- 
 duce of the other French West India Islands, 
 and of the Dutch Settlements in the East and 
 West Indies ; but the whole quantity from these 
 sources was insufficient by the re-export from 
 hence to fill the chasm created by the cessation 
 of the supply to Europe from St. Domingo : 
 it was, therefore, with few exceptions, in brisk 
 demand ; or, more properly speaking, in a state 
 of relative scarcity through the whole period. 
 
 By the time, however, that our exclusion 
 from export to the Continent took place, the 
 sources of supply had increased in consequence 
 of the previous encouragement from high prices. 
 An increased import, therefore, while the means 
 of export were obstructed, occasioned the ex- 
 traordinary glut and low prices of 1811 and
 
 21 
 
 1812; and it was not till the prospect of peace 
 and the re-opening of the Continental ports, 
 which gave rise to an enormous exportation, 
 that the price revived. It has since continued 
 at a very high range, in consequence of short 
 supplies and an increasing demand ; and the 
 small stocks in hand have given rise to con- 
 siderable speculations on the estimated sup- 
 plies of the different years, which have been 
 attended with corresponding fluctuations in 
 price, as may be observed by the table. 
 
 There is every probability that this article 
 will shortly experience a great fall, owing to 
 increased importations, as the prices for the 
 last five years have been so high, as to afford 
 all possible encouragement to an extended cul- 
 tivation, the produce of which will henceforth 
 be coming forward. 
 
 Cotton is an article, about which so many 
 elaborate statements have been made, as to 
 leave little further to be said. 
 
 The price rather fell during the two first 
 years from 1793. The rise subsequent to 1795 
 was owing to scantiness of supply, the average 
 importation for five years, from 1793 to 1798, 
 both years included, having been less than in 
 the five years preceding 1793. This scantiness 
 of supply occurring at a time when there was 
 a great demand, partly speculative, for our
 
 cotton manufactures to the Continent, prices 
 rose nearly 100 per cent., but fell again on 
 the great recoil of the Hamburg speculation 
 in 1799. From that time it declined, with 
 only a little rally in 1804 and 1805, till 1808, 
 when our disputes with the United States 
 tended to excite a speculation, on a falling off 
 of future supply, at the same time that the 
 actual importation, from all parts, was little 
 more than half of what it had been in the pre- 
 ceding year. The price then rose, and the 
 fluctuation, from that time, has been already 
 described. The high price which this article 
 maintained for three years after the peace in 
 1814, in consequence of a greatly increased 
 consumption, by the opening of the Continent 
 of Europe to commercial intercourse, induced 
 such an extended cultivation, as laid the founda- 
 tion for the very large supplies which have 
 since been received j and as the supplies con- 
 tinue to arrive, without any material falling off, 
 the presumption is, that the prices, low as they 
 have been, and continue to be, are sufficient to 
 defray the cost of production. 
 
 When our supplies were limited to one source, 
 the relative amount of them was, of course, 
 liable to be affected in a much greater degree 
 by the state of the crops from the influence of 
 the weather, than now that the cultivation is
 
 23 
 
 extended through the whole range of the tro- 
 pical climates. Any tendency to a material 
 advance in price, from the failure of the crops 
 in the United States of America, or in the 
 Brazils, would now be checked by the prospect 
 that the encouragement thus held out would 
 bring forward, at no very distant interval, a 
 greatly increased supply from the East Indies. 
 The crops failed in the East Indies two or 
 three years ago ; and the low price at which 
 that description sells here, in comparison with 
 other kinds, has since discouraged the importa- 
 tion from that quarter. But the supplies from 
 other quarters have gone a considerable way 
 towards making up for the deficiency. It 
 would be difficult for the most determined 
 advocate for either of the exclusive theories of 
 currency or war demand, to bring the fluctua- 
 tions of this article in aid of their systems. 
 
 Cochineal, before South America became 
 open to us, was affected by the war with Spain 
 in 179C), and again in 1804, which rendered our 
 importation precarious, and occasionally ex- 
 pensive. It was, moreover, an object of direct 
 war expenditure, and there was an increased 
 consumption from the almost exclusive use of 
 scarlet uniforms by the volunteer corps at par- 
 ticular periods. The price, however, rose in 
 1813 and 1814, upon the prospect of peace, to
 
 24 
 
 a greater height than it ever attained during 
 the war, except in the great speculative de- 
 mand for Germany in 1798, when it advanced 
 upwards of 100 per cent., but fell again in the 
 following year to the level from whence it had 
 risen. The consumption has, of late, been in- 
 terfered with by the substitution of lac-dye, 
 which has been imported, to some extent, from 
 India. The price has, in consequence, de- 
 clined, although not so low as it was previous 
 to the breaking out of the war : it has again 
 fMay 2, 1823), advanced to 24?. and 26s. per lb. 
 Copper is an object of expenditure by govern- 
 ment for the purpose of bolts and sheathing to 
 ships of war. The transports which were in 
 the government service were, likewise, mostly 
 required to be copper sheathed. The price, 
 accordingly, advanced upon the breaking out 
 of the war, although not very considerably 
 during the first few years of it. In 1796 a new 
 source of demand arose from the measures 
 taken by government for a new copper coinage, 
 which was partially issued in 1797« The greatest 
 advance, however, took place in 1805, when 
 an increased demand for the purposes of a 
 fresh coinage, which was issued in the fol- 
 lowing year, in sufficient quantity to fill the 
 circulation, added to the other sources of de- 
 mand, gave rise to an extensive speculation,
 
 %8 
 
 and drove the price up to 200/. per ton, a 
 height which it never exceeded, and rarely 
 afterwards reached. After 1808 it fell nearly 
 progressively till the termination of the war, 
 during the two last years of which it was at 
 130/. and 135/. per ton. If from these prices 
 be deducted the difference between paper and 
 gold, which, in 1813, was about 30 per cent, 
 the bullion price would be left no higher than 
 it is at present. It rose a little, for a short 
 time, upon the peace in 1814, and again in 
 1817. This last considerable rise was in con- 
 sequence of a demand for export. The sub- 
 sequent decline is easily accounted for : first, 
 by a greatly increased produce in this country, 
 and, secondly, by a new foreign source of supply 
 to Germany and France, and to the East Indies, 
 which, till 1819, were almost exclusively sup- 
 plied from hence. 
 
 Of the increased produce, in this country, 
 some idea may be formed, from the statement 
 which I insert, in the Appendix, of the weekly 
 sales of copper ore in Cornwall, for a series of 
 years, commencing in 1800, and brought down 
 to the present time : by this it will be seen that 
 the produce from that source was, in the last 
 year, larger, by between 2000 and 3000 tons, or 
 nearly half as much again as in the average 
 of the thirteen years from 1800 to 1812. Copper 
 
 T
 
 26 
 
 is raised in Anglesey, in Devonshire, in Ireland, 
 and in small quantities in other parts of the 
 united kingdom ; but all these sources are not, 
 collectively, equal to those of Cornwall, and, 
 although the mines of Anglesey have fallen 
 off, I understand that the aggregate produce 
 of copper, in the united kingdom, is decidedly 
 greater than it has been at any former period. 
 
 The new source of foreign supply to which 
 I alluded, is Russia. Till 1818 she had never 
 exported any quantity worth mentioning : but 
 her exports, commencing with that year, have 
 been as follows : 
 
 1818 
 
 155 tons. 
 
 1819 
 
 1419 
 
 1820 
 
 4466 
 
 1821 
 
 5023 
 
 1822 
 
 3545 
 
 If then, notwithstanding the increased pro- 
 duce of our own mines, notwithstanding the 
 interference by Russia, on so large a scale, with 
 our exports, and notwithstanding the cessation 
 of the navy demand, the price is now (May, 
 1823) as high as it was in 1812 and 1813, less 
 the difference between paper and gold, how 
 much higher would it not be, if the produce 
 applicable to the consumption of this country, 
 and of the rest of Europe, were now reduced to 
 what it was during the war
 
 27 
 
 There is an omission, in the price current, of 
 the quotations in 1819, 1820, and 1821, and as 
 it was desirable to adhere strictly to the au- 
 thority of that price current, the omission has 
 not been supplied in the table in the Appendix ; 
 but I collect, from other sources, that the prices 
 were as follows : 
 
 1819 . . .£120 & 116 
 
 1820 . . 110 101- 
 
 1821 . . 95 85 
 
 This decline, it is to be observed, corresponds, 
 in some degree, with the increased produce in 
 Cornwall, and with the increased export from 
 Russia : but such is the increasing consump- 
 tion, that the price rose, last summer, to 106/., 
 and, after an intermediate depression, is now 
 again at that price. 
 
 Flax, although an object of government ex- 
 penditure, in the shape of sailcloth, was at a 
 lower price in the two first years of the war 
 which broke out in 1793, than it had been on 
 the average of the preceding peace. The first 
 decided advance was in 1795, when the im- 
 portation had fallen off considerably, com- 
 pared with the preceding year; at the same 
 time that there was an increasing demand for 
 the navy and merchant shipping. In 1800 
 and 1801, the price rose still further, in con- 
 sequence of an embargo in the Russian ports, 
 
 t 2
 
 by the Emperor Paul; but, after declining a 
 little, when that embargo was removed, the 
 price again advanced, unchecked by the peace 
 of 1802, to a greater height than it had at- 
 tained during any part of the preceding war, 
 the short interval of the Russian embargo ex- 
 cepted. 
 
 The fluctuation between 1807 and 1811, that 
 is, an advance of 100 per cent., and a fall again 
 to the level from whence the rise took place, 
 has already been noticed in the first division of 
 this work, and a reference to the state of the 
 importation will fully explain it, bearing in 
 mind that, in 1808, there was not only an 
 actual falling off in the import, in consequence 
 of the very great expenses and hazard which 
 attended all commercial intercourse with the 
 Continent in that year, but the apprehension 
 of failure of future supply. The subsequent 
 rise, upon the short importation of 1811, and 
 the fall in 1814, when a large actual supply, 
 by importation, concurred with the prospect 
 of abundant contingent supply, by the reduced 
 charges of conveyance, are accounted for on 
 obvious grounds. From that time a greatly 
 increased produce of flax in Ireland, following 
 the encouragement held out by the previous 
 high prices, contributed to augment the ge- 
 neral supply, and depressed the price, in
 
 29 
 
 1816, to as low a rate as it has since been at ; 
 but the importation of that and the following 
 year, combined with the bad season of 1816, 
 occasioned a considerable rise in 1817, which 
 was protracted through 1818 by a speculation 
 on the effects of the drought of that year. 
 The increased importation from the Conti- 
 nent, with the augmented produce of Ireland, 
 are quite sufficient to account for the low 
 range of prices which prevailed till last summer. 
 There appears to have been an extended cul- 
 tivation of flax in Egypt; for, by accounts 
 from Italy, most of the ports of the Mediter- 
 ranean, which used to be supplied with the 
 article from Russia, have recently received as 
 much as they could consume, on lower terms, 
 from Alexandria. Independent of circum- 
 stances arising out of war and peace, to affect 
 the supply of this article, it is liable to be in- 
 fluenced, in a considerable degree, by the sea- 
 sons, both directly and indirectly. Directly, 
 inasmuch as the weather may be favourable 
 or adverse to the growing crops ; thus the 
 drought of last year is supposed to have in- 
 jured or stunted the produce on the Continent* 
 and the effects of that diminished growth are 
 likely to be felt in a reduced importation this 
 year. The supplies from the Netherlands have 
 already began to fall offj and this actual pro-
 
 30 
 
 spective diminution of supply has occasioned a 
 rise of more than 20 per cent, since last sum- 
 mer, the present price (May, 1823,) being 571. 
 per ton. The indirect effects of the season 
 occur in cases when, by the dearth of pro- 
 visions, there is an inducement to extend the 
 cultivation of corn or potatoes, at the expense 
 of other productions, to which the same land 
 would otherwise have been applicable : this 
 cause, there can be no doubt, contributed, 
 among others, to raise and maintain the price 
 of flax at a much higher level during the war 
 than it could otherwise have been at ; and the 
 cessation of the operation of that cause has 
 naturally occasioned prices to subside to their 
 previous level. 
 
 Hemp rose very inconsiderably during the 
 two first years of the war, and was actually 
 lower in those two years than it had been 
 in several instances in the preceding peace. 
 In 1795 and 1796, the price advanced rapidly, 
 in consequence of large purchases in Russia, 
 for account of the French government. The 
 demands by our own government were, like- 
 wise, on an increasing scale in those two years ; 
 but as a consequence of the great advance in 
 price, large supplies came forward in 1798 ; 
 and, notwithstanding that the expenditure for 
 naval purposes was on as large a scale as ever,
 
 31 
 
 the price declined, in that year, very consider- 
 ably. The increasing demand for the navy 
 and for the mercantile shipping of this country, 
 combined with a progressive demand from the 
 United States of America, again raised the 
 price ; but not to the height which it had re- 
 cently reached, till 1800, when the embargo, 
 by the Emperor Paul, gave rise to a specula- 
 tion which drove the price up considerably. 
 The price, of course, fell after his death on the 
 removal of the embargo. 
 
 The fluctuations from 1807 are fully ac- 
 counted for by the extraordinary state of our 
 political relations with the powers of the Baltic. 
 In 1808, the whole importation was only 12,98.5 
 tons, being little more than one year's consump- 
 tion by government alone ; and as there was no 
 ground of reliance upon a future supply of so 
 important an article, the price advanced to the 
 unprecedented height of 118/. But in the 
 two following years, the importation by licences 
 amounted to 
 
 Tons. 
 42,944 . . in J 808 
 
 47,790* . . in 1809 
 
 * From the quantities imported in the five years, from 1 SOQ 
 to 1813, should be deducted upwards of 10,000 tons, which
 
 32 
 
 which reduced the prices as has already been 
 stated in the first part of this work. The 
 advance of the French upon Moscow, com- 
 bined with a short importation in 1811, again 
 occasioned a considerable rise. It has of 
 course fallen since the peace on the double 
 ground of the abstraction of direct govern- 
 ment demand, beyond the small quantity oc- 
 casionally required to keep up the peace esta- 
 blishment of the navy, and of the removal 
 of the extra charges of importation. The rally 
 in 1818 was in consequence of a short importa- 
 tion in the two preceding years. During the 
 very high prices which prevailed between 1808 
 and 1814, iron came into use as a substitute 
 for hemp in cables, and was found, or supposed 
 to answer so well, that it has been continued 
 and greatly extended since the peace j thus 
 greatly reducing the consumption of hemp. But 
 the importation having fallen off in 1821 in a 
 till greater degree than the reduced consump- 
 tion, the price advanced nearly 50 per cent, and 
 
 were brought from India for account of governraent,under the 
 apprehension of a total failure of supply from Russia. That 
 hemp was not found applicable to the purposes of the navy ; 
 the whole of it was therefore sold in 1 8 1 5, and has gradually 
 gone into consumption. That quantity, therefore, should 
 be added to the imports since the peace.
 
 33 
 
 afterwards receded in consequence of a large 
 supply. 
 
 In the importation of 1822, a larger quan- 
 tity than usual came from the Mediterranean 
 and the Adriatic, and it appears, that a very 
 little encouragement would greatly extend the 
 supply from those parts. I have already no- 
 ticed the speculative demand upon the late 
 rumours of war, and the subsidence of the 
 price on the cessation of them. Hemp is 
 subject to be affected by the seasons in the 
 same way as flax, although not always at 
 the same time, not being within the same 
 range of climate ; as a much larger pro- 
 portion of our consumption of hemp than of 
 flax is drawn from Russia. But France grows 
 nearly enough for her own consumption, and 
 it is only when her own crops are deficient, 
 that she draws any considerable proportion 
 of her supply from Russia. Thus, in 1818, 
 the growth in France was deficient, and her 
 consequent demand for Russian hemp contri- 
 buted among other causes to the relatively high 
 prices of the article in that year. 
 
 Indigo requires but little notice. The price 
 now is as high as it was during the greater part 
 of the war, notwithstanding the reduced charges 
 of importation ; and as it reached its greatest
 
 34 
 
 height upon the prospect of the near ter- 
 mination of the war in 1813 and 1814, it can 
 hardly be brought forward as an instance of 
 the indirect effect of government expendi- 
 ture in raising prices ; nor will a reference 
 to this article countenance the opinion, which 
 ascribes to the bank restriction effects much 
 beyond the degree indicated by the difference 
 between paper and gold ; for when that dif- 
 ference was nearly at its greatest height, the 
 price of indigo was considerably lower than on 
 many occasions in the preceding period. It 
 did not participate in the rise which occurred 
 in many other articles between 1816 and 
 1818; and the great advance in it occurred 
 after the passing of Mr. Peel's bill. It may be 
 said, that the advance is in consequence of de- 
 ficient crops, — granted ; but if deficient crops 
 are allowed to be sufficient cause of the advance 
 in this instance, by parity of reasoning abun- 
 dant crops or produce may be allowed to be 
 calculated to depress prices. 
 
 Hops present a striking instance of the in- 
 fluence of the seasons upon price. The pro- 
 duce of each year is exactly represented by the 
 duty which is taken for the whole period, em- 
 braced by the table at the same fixed rate of 
 1^. ajl per lb. After 1808, the table contains the
 
 35 
 
 estimate which is made a few weeks before the 
 actual result of the gathering, and consequently 
 before the duty is ascertained ; and it may be 
 curious to observe how the price fluctuates with 
 the estimate. It is quite sufficient to refer 
 to the table, in order to be satisfied that the 
 variations in price had no observable con- 
 nexion with the bank restriction, or with war 
 demand. 
 
 In 1788, when the duty of the preceding 
 year was 48,227/. the price rose to 220.9. 
 and 340s. which is a higher price, allowing 
 for the difference between paper and gold, 
 than it ever reached during the war. But 
 even in 1813, when the extreme price was 
 420s. it was in consequence of so small a pro- 
 duce as is indicated by a duty of only 30,000/. 
 In the latter part of 1817 5 the price, in con- 
 sequence of two bad crops in succession, rose 
 by speculation to 351. per cwt. but when the 
 estimate of 1818 was made, the fall was sudden 
 to 185s. and ruined the speculators. This oc- 
 curred before Mr. Peel's bill was thought of. 
 From 1818 to 1822, both years included, there 
 has been a succession of no fewer than five years, 
 in no one of which has the duty been less 
 than 130,000/. The average produce of three 
 of these years has been upwards of 200,000/.
 
 36 
 
 and the average of the five years upwards 
 of 187,000/. Whereas in the whole preceding- 
 term, as far back as 1782, there is no in- 
 stance of more than three successive years 
 where the produce has exceeded 100,000/. 
 nor is there any instance of a succession 
 of more than three years in which a season 
 of decided deficiency has not occurred. The 
 only interval, during the war, when three sea- 
 sons of more than average produce had occurred 
 in succession, viz. in 1808, the price fell to from 
 60s. to 80^., which is as low as any quotation by 
 the same authority in the last five years. And 
 in 1804, after two years only of good produce, 
 the price fell to from 60s. to 84.r. In 1794 and 
 1801, the price was still lower after single good 
 seasons. 
 
 Now, without entering into any minute cal- 
 culation, I am persuaded that it will appear that 
 the produce of these last five years is in a much 
 greater proportion to the existing population 
 than the produce of any former five years to the 
 then amount of population, and that the excess 
 of produce fully accounts for the present low 
 range of prices. 
 
 Iron. The first considerable rise in foreign 
 iron did not occur till 1796, when it advanced 
 suddenly about 30 per cent. This was the
 
 37 
 
 year before the bank restriction, and the rise 
 occurred in consequence of the importation 
 having fallen off instead of keeping pace with 
 the increasing demand for consumption in this 
 country and in the rest of Europe, as well as in 
 the United States of America; and the produce 
 of our own mines was at that time comparatively 
 insignificant. Between 1796 and the close of 
 1800 there was no further advance. But the 
 embargo in Russia in the latter year had the 
 effect of raising the price 10 per cent, more, 
 and an additional duty of about 1/. per ton had 
 been laid on the importation in the interval be- 
 tween 1796 and 1798. The advance altogether, 
 therefore, including the new duty, was nearly 
 10/. per ton since 1795 ; and this great ad- 
 vance operated as a sufficient premium for ap- 
 plying increased capital to the production of 
 iron in this country, and for bringing into opera- 
 tion for that purpose all the powers of machinery, 
 which was then undergoing a rapid improvement. 
 Thenceforward the produce of iron in this 
 country proceeded so rapidly that, with the aid 
 of further duties, amounting almost to a prohi- 
 bition of importation, it not only kept pace 
 with the increasing demand, but has eventually 
 nearly superseded the use of foreign iron in this 
 country, and has furnished a surplus for ex-
 
 3S 
 
 portation. The price of foreign iron, accord- 
 ingly, fell almost progressively from 1801 till 
 the close of the war. 
 
 English iron advanced a little between 1800 
 and 1803, as a natural and inevitable conse- 
 quence of the high price of foreign iron, which 
 had been further raised by additional duties on 
 importation ; the quality, moreover, had been 
 improved, and it was therefore really worth 
 more, relatively to foreign iron, than it had be- 
 fore been. From 1803 till the close of the 
 war, and further till 1817, being a period of 
 fourteen years, the price maintained a singular 
 degree of uniformity. In 1816 and 1817 a 
 considerable demand for iron from this country 
 to France took place, and continued through 
 1818 and 1819 on a very extensive scale, 
 which had the effect of raising the price of 
 British iron higher than it had been during 
 any period of the war. But, in 1820, such 
 restrictions were laid on the import into that 
 country as to preclude any further shipments. 
 In the meantime the continued improvements 
 and increased power of machinery having been 
 brought into extended operation so as to aug- 
 ment the produce while the demand for export 
 to France has fallen off, the subsequent decline 
 is sufficiently accounted for.
 
 39' 
 
 Lead. Of the fluctuations of this article I 
 have riot the means of giving any very clear 
 account, because the produce of the mines, or 
 the extent to which they are worked, seem to 
 vary very considerably. But a reference to the 
 dates, when the greatest variations of price oc- 
 curred, will negative the influence both of war 
 expenditure and of the bank restriction. The 
 price in 1788 was as high as 24/. per fodder, 
 and in 1798, after five years of war and one year 
 of bank restriction, was as low as 19/. It got 
 up in 1808, partly by speculation, to 43/., but 
 this was before any material depreciation of 
 paper as indicated either by the exchanges or 
 by the price of gold had taken place, and the 
 price fell during the remainder of the war ; so 
 that from the last six months of 1811 till the 
 peace in 1814 (when there was a temporary ad- 
 vance), the price, deducting the difference be- 
 tween paper and gold, was lower than the pre- 
 sent quotation (May 2) of 25/. lO.v. It would 
 probably be still higher were it not that an in- 
 creased produce of late from the mines of Spain 
 has interfered with British lead in foreign 
 markets. 
 
 Madders are affected in price by the charges 
 of importation, but in a greater degree by the 
 difference of seasons. The fluctuations of this
 
 40 
 
 article are hardly worth recording, further than 
 to observe that from 1808 to 1812 the difficulty 
 and risk of communication with Holland are 
 quite sufficient to account for the great advance 
 in that interval. Since the peace, prices have 
 occasionally been much higher than they were 
 during the first fifteen years of the war. The 
 decline during the last three years is attributable 
 chiefly to a succession of good crops, but in part, 
 likewise, to the circumstance that madder-roots 
 have, of late, been imported in larger quantity 
 than usual from the Mediterranean. And fur- 
 ther, the recent introduction of munjeet, an 
 East India root applicable to some of the same 
 purposes as madder, and now coming here in 
 large quantities, naturally contributes to the de- 
 pression of the latter. 
 
 Oils. — Gallipoli oil, although subject to 
 greatly increased charges of importation (the 
 voyage being a very long one, and the article 
 bulky) during the whole of the war, and more 
 especially during the last five years of it, to an 
 extent fully adequate to account for the ad- 
 vance of price relatively to the period anterior to 
 1793, maintained a higher bullion-price during 
 the first six years of peace following 1813 than 
 that of the whole period of the preceding war. 
 The high price which prevailed between the
 
 41 
 
 close of 1816 and the beginning of 1819 was 
 partly the consequence of a short importation, 
 and partly of the great advance in the price of 
 rape-seed oil, which is extensively used for the 
 same purposes as Gallipoli oil. The subsequent 
 decline is attributable chiefly to an increased 
 importation, and in some degree to the very low 
 price of rape-seed oil. 
 
 Rape-seed oil advanced in the last six months 
 of 181(3 to a higher price than the average of 
 what it had been at during the whole of the 
 war. The deficient importation of rape-seed 
 in 1816, combined with a deficient home 
 growth, accounts, prima facie, for a great rise 
 in the oil ; but the price was further ad- 
 vanced in 1817 by the extravagant speculation 
 which took place in whale-oil ; these descrip- 
 tions of oil being, for some purposes, applicable 
 as substitutes one for the other. The fall of 
 rape-seed oil since 1818 was produced by the 
 opposite state of things to that which had oc- 
 casioned the rise: a large importation of the 
 seed in 1818, a very great increase of the 
 home produce of it since that time, and a fall 
 in the price of whale-oil. 
 
 The natural price of whale-oil is lower in 
 time of peace than in time of war by the 
 difference of freight and insurance in the two 
 periods : but the average of the market price, 
 
 u
 
 42 
 
 during the first five years following the peace 
 of 1814, was as high as it had been on the 
 average of the whole war. It was indeed de- 
 pressed for a short interval, in 1816, to 22/. per 
 ton, but it had been as low during part of 1807 
 and 1808, when freights and insurances were 
 very much higher. The fishery in 1817 was 
 unsuccessful, and the speculation which I have 
 alluded to drove the price up, nominally at 
 least, to 59/. But the consumers did not pay 
 that price*. The recoil of the speculation and 
 a succession of four abundant fisheries occa- 
 sioned a decline, nearly progressive, till the close 
 of 1821 1- The fishery of 1822 proved to be 
 deficient ; and the price advanced at one time 
 fifty per cent. ; but the rise has been checked 
 by the low price of rape-seed oil. 
 
 Linseed oil has followed the variations of the 
 seed, and the causes of those variations will be 
 noticed under the head of that article. 
 
 Provisions. — Under this head will be found, 
 in the tables, the prices of Irish mess beef and 
 pork, and of Irish and Dutch butter. As so 
 
 * The winter of 1817-18 having proved a mild one, ad- 
 mitted of an extensive substitution of rape-oil for the public 
 lamps. 
 
 f There is no doubt that, even with this increased supply, 
 the price would be much higher were it not for the extensive 
 substitution of coal gas for oil.
 
 43 
 
 much has already been said in the course of this 
 work on the subject of the prices of provisions, 
 generally, it seems to be almost superfluous to 
 make a separate reference to this particular 
 kind. To a certain extent, the price of this 
 description of provisions must be affected by 
 circumstances connected with the price of corn 
 and meat, and the produce of the dairy in this 
 country; but Irish mess-beef and pork were 
 liable to be affected in a peculiar degree by the 
 demands for the Victualling-Office : and butter 
 was further affected by the difficulty and ex- 
 pense of importation from Holland, which would, 
 of course, influence the value of that from Ire- 
 land. 
 
 It will be observed, that, though in 1793 (the 
 first year of the war) the prices advanced con- 
 siderably, the greatest rise of mess-beef was 
 during the peace of 1802. The general high 
 range beyond the difference between paper and 
 gold will be fully accounted for by the state 
 of the seasons, and the difficulties of importa- 
 tion, which I have described as affecting the 
 price of all kinds of provisions, from 1793 to 
 1813. 
 
 Rice is affected chiefly by the variations of the 
 prices of corn ; and, during the war, it was sub- 
 ject to greatly increased charges of importation. 
 
 u 2
 
 Saltpetre, being so great an object of direct 
 war expenditure, and being, moreover, an article 
 of great bulk in proportion to its value, and 
 therefore greatly affected by the rate of freight 
 on so long a voyage as that from India, requires 
 little explanation to account for its being higher 
 during the war. The price reached its greatest 
 height in 1795, viz. 170s. per cwt. ; in 1 796 it 
 fell at one time to 4.5s. and rose again to 96s. 
 It seems to have been affected considerably by 
 the scale of hostilities on the Continent. But 
 in consequence of the discoveries in chemistry, 
 by which the French were enabled to dispense 
 with a foreign supply, and by the increased 
 importation from India to this country, by which 
 we were enabled to supply the rest of the Con- 
 tinent at a reduced cost, the price declined per- 
 manently after 17Q8-9, when it reached 145s., 
 and never after was so high as 100s., except 
 during the short interval of speculation in ex- 
 ports in the peace of 1814, and again upon the 
 breaking out of the war which terminated with 
 the battle of Waterloo, in 1815*. The subse- 
 quent decline, and the low range in the last 
 
 * The average bullion-price between 1800 and 1814 does 
 not appear to have been so high as it was during the pre- 
 ceding American war.
 
 45 
 
 few years, may be ascribed to the circumstance 
 of unusually large quantities having been im- 
 ported from India at very low freights. It is 
 likewise supposed to be prepared in India at 
 less cost than formerly. 
 
 Seeds. — The price of these was affected 
 greatly by the seasons, both here and abroad, 
 and by the charges of importation. Sometimes 
 these causes operated in the same, and some- 
 times in opposite directions, during the war. 
 And, in order to show to what an extent the 
 supply fluctuated from these causes, I insert, in 
 the Appendix, a statement of the imports of 
 rape and cole-seed, linseed and clover-seed, from 
 1801 to 1822, both years included. 
 
 Clover-seed rose in the great scarcities fol- 
 lowing the seasons* of 1795-99, and 1800, to a 
 height which was never afterwards exceeded, 
 although the charges of importation were in- 1 
 creased nearly tenfold in the period between 
 1808 and 1813. In 1816-17 the price ad- 
 
 * As a proof of the degree in which this article is affected 
 hy the seasons, it may he as well to notice the following 
 fluctuations: 
 
 Spring of 1782. . 
 
 . . 25*. to 42s. per cwt. 
 
 1783.. 
 
 ..81*. to 117*. 
 
 1784.. 
 
 . . 18*. to 43*. 
 
 1787.. 
 
 . . 65*. to 107*. 
 
 1792. . 
 
 . . 18*. to 40*.
 
 46 
 
 vanced to 1155. as a consequence of a very 
 short importation; the crops abroad, as well 
 as in this country, having proved to be very 
 deficient. A considerable decline took place 
 by the commencement of 1818 ; but the great 
 drought of the following summer gave rise 
 to an extensive speculation, on a probable 
 deficiency, and the price rose again to such a 
 height as to induce a large importation ; this 
 was sufficient, co-operating with renewed 
 abundance here, to depress the price very 
 considerably in 1819. 
 
 Linseed was as low in the spring of 1799, 
 after six years of war, as it had been on the 
 average of the preceding peace. The price was 
 naturally affected by the great scarcities which 
 prevailed, both in this country and on the 
 Continent, at particular periods of the war ; 
 and the importation of 1801 having proved 
 very small, the price in the year of peace 
 following was as high as it had been during 
 any part of the preceding war. I have" already, 
 in the first part of this work, noticed the 
 great rise in 1808 as a consequence of a 
 very short actual supply, and of apprehensions 
 for the future. There was a short supply 
 in 1811, and again in 1813, which contributed 
 to maintain a considerable elevation of price. 
 In 1816, as a consequence of two years of
 
 47 
 
 short importation, combined with a speculation 
 on general scarcity of agricultural produce, the 
 price rose greatly, viz. to 93s. ; and after an 
 intermediate decline, it rose again in 1818, upon 
 an idea that the extraordinary drought, and 
 consequent failure of the turnips in that year, 
 would occasion a very great increase in the con- 
 sumption of oil-cakes. The speculation upon 
 that point proved to be exaggerated ; the failure 
 of turnips was not so extensive as was ex- 
 pected ; and the importation of linseed being of 
 unparalleled magnitude, the price fell, as might 
 be expected, in the following year. The im- 
 portations have since continued to be beyond 
 the average of what they were prior to 1817; 
 and as the abundance of fodder, and the openness 
 of the winters from 1818 till the last, diminished 
 the demand for oil-cakes, the price continued 
 to decline till last autumn. There has since 
 been a considerable improvement, in conse- 
 quence of the severity of the winter and the 
 scarcity of fodder. The quotation on the 2nd 
 of May was 33s. to 43s., and the rise would 
 have been much greater, as a good deal of 
 speculation was directed to the article, but that 
 the tendency to advance has been checked by 
 the arrival of several cargoes from Egypt and 
 Sicily, and by advices that farther supplies, to 
 some extent, are about being shipped from the
 
 48 
 
 Mediterranean hither. The supplies from Egypt 
 are a new feature in this article. It is only 
 within these three years that so much as a single 
 cargo was imported from thence ; whereas, in 
 the course of the last year, the importation to 
 this port alone amounted to upwards of 14,000 
 qrs. ; and it is expected to reach to a still 
 greater extent in the course of the present 
 year*. This new source of supply is the more 
 opportune for the consumers, because the crops 
 having been deficient in the Baltic last year, 
 a scanty importation from thence, coinciding 
 with an increased demand for oil-cakes, might, 
 but for the check of the increased importa- 
 tion from the Mediterranean, have raised the 
 price considerably. 
 
 Rape-seed has been affected, like the other 
 seeds, by the state of the crops in this country, 
 and of those abroad, and by the expenses of 
 importation. The rise of rape-seed in 1816 was 
 
 * The following is a statement which I have received of 
 the quantities of linseed (nearly all Egyptian) arrived at 
 different ports in the United Kingdom, from the Medi- 
 terranean, since the 1st of January last, and further expected 
 this season ; viz. 
 
 20,910 quarters already arrived. 
 
 20,000 (rather more than less) expected in the 
 
 course of the year. 
 
 40,910
 
 49 
 
 entirely the effect of the season, co-operating 
 with a short importation. In 1817 and 1818 it 
 was kept at a high range by the increased con- 
 sumption of rape-oil, in consequence of the ex- 
 travagant speculation which, for twelve months, 
 nearly put a stop to the consumption of whale- 
 oil. The subsequent decline is fully accounted 
 for by the state of the crops, which were un- 
 usually abundant in the two last years ; and in 
 the course of 1822, not only was our own 
 crop abundant, but the importation was con- 
 siderable. 
 
 Silks were lower from the breaking out 
 of the war in 1793 to 1797, than they had 
 been in the preceding peace. In 1797* the 
 importation of raw silk was deficient, and 
 the price of China and Bengal, to which the 
 deficiency probably applied, rose considerably 
 in 1 798. After the average supply was restored 
 by the importations of 1799 and 1800, prices 
 receded. 
 
 The price of silks generally rose again in 
 the peace of 1802 to a higher rate than they 
 had been at during the preceding period of 
 war ; and they rather declined again, in con- 
 sequence of more abundant supplies in the 
 course of the four years following the renewal 
 of the war in 1803, notwithstanding the in- 
 creased charges of conveyance incidental to a
 
 50 
 
 state of war. On a general view of the prices 
 of the different kinds, it appears, that the ave- 
 rage of the whole term of 15 years, from 1793 
 to 1807, allowing for the extra charges of 
 freight and insurance, and for the difference 
 between paper and gold, was lower than it had 
 been in the preceding ten years of peace. But 
 in 1807, in consequence of increasing obstacles 
 to our intercourse with Italy, the supply had 
 greatly fallen off compared with that of the three 
 years preceding. In 1808 it proved to be 
 still smaller ; and in addition to the smallness 
 of the actual quantity at market, there was for 
 a short interval an apprehension that we should 
 be totally excluded from a future supply of 
 some particular descriptions. The speculation 
 upon this actual and still more on the appre- 
 hended scarcity, drove up the price of Pied- 
 mont thrown to 96s. and 112s. per lb. and 
 China and Bengal (the importation of which 
 was likewise very short) participated in the 
 advance. But the advance probably checked 
 the consumption ; for by the close of that year 
 the price of Piedmont thrown and Bengal or- 
 
 ganzine fell to one-half the prices which they 
 
 had recently attained. 
 
 The importation again fell off' in 1811 ; of 
 
 thrown silk the whole supply of that year was only 
 
 20,3361bs. being less than T Vth part of the con-
 
 51 
 
 sumption on the average of the preceding pe- 
 riod of nearly 30 years. Our own manufacture of 
 thrown had indeed increased, but taking raw 
 and thrown together, the importation was little 
 more than one-half of what it had been on the 
 average of the preceding period included in the 
 tables. In 1811 accordingly the price advanced, 
 but from the failure of the former speculation, 
 not to nearly so high a rate as in 1808. It 
 was, however, sufficiently high to bring for- 
 ward a considerable supply in 1812, and prices 
 fell very much by the close of that year, though 
 the war was then on the largest scale, and the 
 depreciation of paper nearly at its height. 
 
 Of the total imports of 1813, I cannot give 
 an account, as the Custom-house records were 
 destroyed by fire. The supplies in 1814 and 
 1815 were considerable, and prices fell accord- 
 ingly. But the consumption and exportation, 
 favored by the fall, left a very short stock on 
 hand at the commencement of 1816, when, 
 as I have observed, will sometimes happen, 
 the lowest prices nearly coincided with the 
 smallest stocks. It was then that a short 
 importation occasioned partly by the pre- 
 vious discouragement, and partly by failing 
 crops, was the foundation, and a very sufficient 
 one, for a considerable advance in price. The 
 rise was not confined to this country, for the
 
 52 
 
 article was scarce and dear in France and 
 Flanders ; and small as the import into Great 
 Britain was in 1816, an unusual proportion was 
 re-exported, chiefly to France. The importation 
 of 1817 being likewise scanty, and coming upon 
 a previously deficient stock, the greatest rise 
 took place, as might be expected, at the close 
 of that and in the beginning of the following 
 year. But by the summer of 1818, the forth- 
 coming supplies being estimated to be more 
 abundant, prices fell ; and it is material to 
 observe, that in this, as in so many other in- 
 stances, the fall began before Mr. Peel's bill 
 was thought of; and the subsequent abundance 
 of the imports must, one would think, satisfy 
 even the most determined opponents of Mr. 
 Peel's bill, that as far as relates to this article 
 at least, the fall of the bullion prices must have 
 been as great, whether that bill had passed or 
 not. 
 
 A comparison of the total imports, deducting 
 in each case the quantities exported, in the five 
 years, ending in 1811, and in the five years, 
 ending in 1822, must likewise, I imagine, 
 satisfy any partizan of the indirect effects of 
 war demand, that the difference of supply, re- 
 latively to the amount of population at the two 
 periods, is enough to account for the difference 
 of the bullion price, without imputing to the war
 
 53 
 
 an increase of effective demand or consump- 
 tion. 
 
 Spices. — Pepper has been declining for many 
 years past, with only occasional rallies, partly 
 from speculation, of which this article has always 
 been a favourite object. The most striking in- 
 stances of these rallies, in the general tendency 
 downwards, were the Hamburg speculation 
 in 1798, the general speculation in exports, 
 on the opening of the Continent in 1814, 
 and a minor speculation, on a reduction of 
 the stock for sale, in the Company's ware- 
 houses, in 1818. This last was overpowered by 
 the effect of the supplies which were conveyed 
 to the ports of the Continent by American ships 
 direct from Sumatra. The decline, and present 
 low range of prices, may be very fully accounted 
 for by the extended cultivation in Sumatra, from 
 whence the supplies continue to be abundant. 
 The presumption, therefore, is, that the price, 
 1ow t as it is, is a remunerative one. It is to be 
 observed, however, that in the consideration of 
 the price of pepper, generally, allowance is to 
 be made for inferiority in the quality of a very 
 large proportion of the late supplies, compared 
 with what was formerly imported. 
 
 Cinnamon was in 1784 as high as 20s. 
 per lb. from thence it seems gradually to 
 have declined, without any fluctuation worth
 
 54 
 
 mentioning, till 1795. The occupation of Hol- 
 land by the French in that year, before we had 
 the means of obtaining any direct supplies, had 
 the effect of raising the price to 18.?. per lb. 
 Soon after, however, when Ceylon fell into our 
 hands, and under a different system from that 
 which prevailed while that island was in the 
 possession of the Dutch, and which consisted 
 in an artificial limitation of supply, the quantity 
 collected there was all brought to this country, 
 and the cultivation was allowed to be extended. 
 The increased supply thus coming forward, 
 tended naturally to depress the price ; and at 
 the same time as the Dutch East India ware- 
 houses in Holland were still well stocked, the 
 depression was increased by the absence of an 
 adequate demand for export : for nearly 10 
 years, therefore, following 1798, this article was 
 at a lower price than it was ever before, or has 
 since been. At the close of 1807, however, 
 the Dutch stock being somewhat exhausted, 
 all orders from the Continent for spices came 
 direct to this country, and the price of cinna- 
 mon improved. It maintained a tolerably steady 
 rate from 1809, till near the termination of the 
 war, when the great speculative demand upon 
 the prospect of peace raised the price, as has 
 been shown in the first part of this work. The 
 average price since the passing of Mr. Peel's
 
 55 
 
 bill has been higher than it was for 15 years 
 after the bank restriction. And the average price 
 since the peace has been considerably higher 
 than the average of the whole period of war. 
 
 The variations in Ginger, which are very con- 
 siderable, are referable chiefly to difference of 
 crops j but I shall content myself with observing 
 that the highest price which this article ever 
 attained was in 1816. The great decline which 
 has since taken place may be ascribed in part 
 to the extent of supplies from the East Indies, 
 the Malabar white interfering more especially 
 with the Barbadoes white ; and in part to a 
 diminished use of ginger generally in Italy, 
 where formerly the consumption was very con- 
 siderable. 
 
 Sugar has been very commonly referred to 
 as an article, the variations of which mia;ht 
 be brought to prove the effects of war demand, 
 or of an indefinite depreciation of paper, as 
 suited the views of the parties who maintained 
 either of the exclusive theories. Trusting to the 
 vagueness of recollection which prevails as to 
 the dates when the variations of price occurred, 
 the advocates for the peculiar effect of war 
 demand in raising prices contend, that as the 
 price of sugar rose at about the period when 
 the war broke out in 1793, to a much greater 
 height than the difference between the charges
 
 56 
 
 of importation in war compared with those of 
 peace, and continued at a considerable eleva- 
 tion till 1808, when we were excluded from 
 exportation to the Continent; and as during 
 all that time there was very little difference 
 between paper and gold, the excess of advance 
 cannot be referred to any other cause so ob- 
 viously, as to that of increased demand, arising 
 out of the war. While on the other hand, 
 those who deny the influence of war demand 
 bring forward the rise in the price of sugar 
 beyond the extra charges of importation, as 
 one among their other proofs that gold was 
 depreciated by the bank restriction j because, 
 say they, neither the seasons, which are brought 
 forward to account for fluctuations in the price 
 of corn, nor any other general circumstance, can 
 account for so long continued an elevation. 
 
 But a short reference to precise dates and 
 prices, and to circumstances affecting the sup- 
 ply and demand at particular periods, will re- 
 move this article, as well as the many others 
 which have already been removed, from the 
 list of such as are calculated to give coun- 
 tenance to either of the theories. It so 
 happens that the first great rise in the price 
 of sugar occurred at the close of 1791, before 
 any idea was entertained of our being in- 
 volved in a war with France ; and in 1792,
 
 57 
 
 it reached as great an elevation as it ever after- 
 wards attained, with two exceptions, viz. the 
 period of the great Hamburgh speculation, 
 between 1796 and 1799, a period, be it ob- 
 served, in which the circulation of paper is 
 admitted even by the advocates of indefinite 
 depreciation to have been remarkably con- 
 tracted ; and again the extravagant speculation 
 on the prospect of peace in 1813 and 1814. 
 The occasion of the rise in 1791 requires only 
 to be mentioned to satisfy the reader that it 
 was fully adequate to produce such an effect. 
 The revolution in the French part of St. Do- 
 mingo was the occasion of the destruction of 
 all the sugar plantations in that island. The 
 extent of these may be conceived, when it is 
 stated, that the annual produce from that source 
 alone was estimated at no less than 80,000 tons; 
 and it was sufficient, with the comparatively 
 small produce of the other French West India 
 Islands, to enable France not only to supply her 
 own consumption, but even to re-export a con- 
 siderable quantity to the North of Europe. 
 Such a chasm required some years of increasing 
 produce from other quarters to fill up, and 
 until filled up, the price was naturally much 
 above a remunerating rate to the producers in 
 the remaining sources of supply, or, in other 
 words, afforded profits much beyond those 
 
 x
 
 58 
 
 which were obtained in productions that were 
 not thus casually limited. It was, therefore, the 
 destruction of St. Domingo, as a source of 
 supply, and not the war, which conferred on 
 our West India planters a monopoly of pro- 
 duction, that enabled them to derive such large 
 profits during several years, which happened to 
 coincide with a state of war. 
 
 But the encouragement arising from profits 
 so large naturally occasioned a great increase 
 of cultivation, and sugar being an article which 
 yields a return of produce upon an extended 
 cultivation more quickly than coffee, the in- 
 creased supply came sooner into operation in 
 reducing the profits of the planters ; and, as is 
 usual on such occasions, was sufficient for some 
 time to depress those profits below the ordinary 
 level. As early as 1799 the supply seems to 
 have out-run what the consumption at the ad- 
 vanced prices could carry off, and thencefor- 
 ward they declined. The importations in 1801 
 and 1802 were of extraordinary magnitude, 
 and these concurring w r ith the restoration of 
 peace, which reduced the charges of convey- 
 ance, accelerated the decline; but the low price 
 here, rendered still cheaper to the foreign con- 
 sumer by the diminished charges of freight and 
 insurance, occasioned a very large export from 
 hence, and produced a rally before the renewal
 
 59 
 
 of the war in 1803. After 1804 the price re- 
 sumed its tendency downwards, and in 1807, 
 before our exclusion from direct intercourse 
 with the ports of Russia, our imports being less, 
 and our exports greater, than they had been in 
 the preceding year, the gazette average of 
 British plantation sugar fell to 305. Qd., which 
 is the lowest point of depression that it had 
 ever reached, with the exception of short in- 
 tervals in the two last years. Foreign sugar, not 
 being admitted for consumption in this coun- 
 try, was lowest in 1811, when the anti-com- 
 mercial decrees of the French were in full 
 operation. 
 
 It was only (as I had occasion to state in the 
 first part of my work) upon the prospect of the 
 emancipation of the continent at the close of 
 1812 that prices recovered effectually. And I 
 have already shown to what an extravagant 
 height they were raised by the speculation on 
 the peace in 1814. The decline from 1814 is 
 not more than commensurate with the enormous 
 increase of supply which has since been poured 
 into Europe, and which seems to have reached 
 its acme in 1821. The increased produce of 
 the Havannah, the Brazils, and the East Indies, 
 and of our own settlements of Demerara and 
 Berbice, are quite adequate to have produced 
 this effect. The glut has in the course of the 
 
 x 2
 
 60 
 
 last few months somewhat abated, and the price 
 is higher than it was previous to the late rumours 
 of war. The last gazette average of British 
 plantation sugar (7th May, 1823) was 34s. 8^d. y 
 being higher than it was for upwards of a twelve- 
 month between 1806 and 1808, when the 
 charges of conveyance, and when all stores re- 
 quired for the plantations, were so much dearer 
 than they are now. 
 
 Spirits. French Brandy rose of course on 
 the breaking out of the war, and continued at a 
 price more or less advanced according to the ex- 
 tent of the obstructions to importation. These, 
 as I have already observed, were greatest in 
 1811 and 1812, and the price was then at its 
 highest elevation. Since the peace, the price 
 has gradually resumed its ancient level, checked 
 only by the bad season of 1816, which did ex- 
 tensive mischief to the vines in France. 
 
 Rum is affected by direct war expenditure, 
 and by extra charges of importation. Subject 
 to an allowance for these circumstances and 
 for occasional speculations on casual deficiency 
 of supply, or on suddenness of government de- 
 mand, there is nothing striking in the fluctua- 
 tions. The fall since 1820 was clearly the con- 
 sequence of the non-intercourse between our 
 West India Islands and the United States of 
 America, which forced all the rum that had
 
 61 
 
 usually found a vent in America to this coun- 
 try, and occasioned a glut which has not yet 
 been got rid off. 
 
 Tallow, in the two first years of the war, 
 was lower than it had been on the average of the 
 preceding peace. In 1795 the price advanced 
 very considerably, nearly 100 per cent, in con- 
 sequence partly of a very short importation, and 
 partly of the deficiency of the home produce of 
 fat from the peculiarities of the seasons of 1794 
 and 1795, which have been so fully described. 
 In 1799 and 1800-1, the price, after an inter- 
 mediate fall, again advanced, in consequence, 
 first, of a deficiency in the home produce from 
 the effects of the season, and subsequently of the 
 embargo by the emperor Paul, which threatened 
 to cut off all future supplies. When these dis- 
 turbing causes were removed, the price gradu- 
 ally declined till the spring of 1807. The 
 treaty of Tilsit naturally gave rise to apprehen- 
 sions of increased obstructions to future sup- 
 plies, and those apprehensions were realized. 
 Accordingly, in the autumn, the price advanced 
 considerably, and, in the course of the following 
 spring, reached a greater height than it ever 
 afterwards attained. The magnitude of those 
 obstructions, as they existed in 1808, may be 
 imagined by the circumstance that, notwith- 
 standing the encouragement held out by so
 
 62 
 
 enormous a price as 1 105. per cwt., the importa- 
 tion was little more than one-quarter of what 
 it had been two years before. Some of the ob- 
 structions to importation being overcome in 
 1809 and 1810, although at a very great expense, 
 the supplies were more abundant, and prices 
 fell in 1810-11; but the great expense of im- 
 portation still continuing, the supplies in 1811, 
 1812, and 1813, fell off again; and this diminu- 
 tion of foreign supply coinciding with a state of 
 the seasons in this country, which had made 
 cattle and sheep scarce and dear, was the occa- 
 sion of a renewed range of high prices. Through 
 1814 and 1815 large importations and an abun- 
 dant home produce reduced the price consider- 
 ably. But, in consequence of two years of short 
 importation, viz. 1816 and 1817, the price rose 
 again, and, in 1818, the extraordinary character 
 of the summer, which I have already described, 
 gave rise to a fresh speculation on the idea that 
 the extreme drought, and want of fodder, would 
 reduce the home produce of fat in a very great 
 degree. The effect of this speculation was to 
 run the price of Russia tallow up to 90s., which 
 it reached in September of that year. The im- 
 portation, however, being larger, and the effect 
 of the season on the home supply being less 
 than was expected, the price began to fall be- 
 fore Mr. Peel's bill was at all the subject of
 
 03 
 
 consideration. It is sufficient to look at the 
 imports since that time, combined, as these have 
 been, in the two last years, with an increase of 
 the home produce, to be satisfied that the in- 
 crease of consumption, great as it has been, 
 must be wholly inadequate to keep pace with so 
 very great an increase of the aggregate supply. 
 Let any one compare the imports of the five 
 years from 1808 to 1812, with those of the last 
 five years, taking at the same time into con- 
 sideration the difference of the home produce 
 at the respective periods, and he will be at no 
 loss to account for the whole difference of price. 
 Tar is very extensively affected as an object 
 of direct war demand, and is moreover, being 
 an article of great bulk in proportion to its 
 value, subject to vary on a very large scale, by 
 the mere difference of freight. The whole of 
 the bullion rise of price, during the last war, 
 may be sufficiently accounted for by these two 
 causes, allowing for the occasional fluctuations 
 connected with speculation, or erroneous opi- 
 nions of individuals in adjusting the supply to 
 the demand. The rise in 1808 was not at all 
 beyond the proportion of the advance of freight 
 from Archangel and the Baltic, and though the 
 freight from America was not increased in the 
 same degree, yet as a very large proportion of 
 the supply of tar came usually from Russia and
 
 64 
 
 Sweden, any sudden increase in the cost of im- 
 portation, which is synonymous in this sense 
 with cost of production, from these sources, 
 would, to a certain extent, govern the market 
 price of the whole. But the advanced price 
 operated as so great an encouragement to in- 
 crease the supplies from America, that the total 
 importations in 1810 and 1811 were sufficient 
 to depress the price very considerably. At the 
 close of 1812, the war with America had the 
 effect of raising the price again, and it reached 
 a great height in 1813. The rally in 1815 
 was a speculation upon the war which ter- 
 minated with the battle of Waterloo. The 
 trifling improvement in 1818 was in a great 
 measure, if not wholly, attributable to a rise in 
 freights which had occurred in that and the pre- 
 ceding year; and again that rise of freights was 
 clearly owing to the circumstance of our ports 
 being open to the importation of foreign corn. 
 Tobacco rose, in the first instance, with the in- 
 creased charges of importation incidental to the 
 war which began in 1793. The great specula- 
 tion in Germany, between 1796 and 1799, which 
 applied to all articles of colonial produce, raised 
 the price of tobacco very considerably; but 
 upon the recoil of that speculation, the price 
 declined, and continued at a low range till 1808, 
 when our disputes with America gave rise to a
 
 65 
 
 fresh speculation and to a further recoil ; for in 
 1810, 1811, and part of 1812, prices were as 
 low as they have been at any time of the suc- 
 ceeding peace. The great rise in 1814, which was 
 owing partly to our renewed intercourse with 
 the continent, and partly to the failure of sup- 
 plies from America, in consequence of the war 
 with that country, has already been described. 
 With the exception of these speculations, the 
 difference of price during the war does not ap- 
 pear, on the average, to have exceeded the dif- 
 ference in the charges of importation at the 
 several periods of war and peace. The varieties, 
 however, of the quality of this article, even 
 under the same denomination, as to the sort, 
 are so great, and so much therefore depends 
 upon the quality of what happens to be in the 
 market, that any conclusion to be drawn, from a 
 view of the quotations, must be subject to great 
 allowance on that score. 
 
 Tea is an article of which the price being 
 under the regulation of a monopoly, and being 
 coupled, moreover, with a tax, which has at dif- 
 ferent periods varied from 12 to 100 per cent., 
 throws little, if any, light upon the question of 
 variations in the value of money. It is, how- 
 ever, an object of general interest ; and as I 
 found it among the articles prepared for my 
 table, I would not reject it. I have only to ob-
 
 66 
 
 serve incidentally of this article, that the greatly 
 increased consumption of it during peace serves, 
 with the increased consumption of most other 
 exciseable articles, as one of the many argu- 
 ments which strike me to be conclusive against 
 the effect ascribed to a war expenditure of ex- 
 tending general consumption. 
 
 Tin seems to have risen considerably in 1791, 
 and to have attained, in 1792, as great a height, 
 within the merest trifle, as it reached during 
 the eight years following. At the close of 1800 
 it advanced again and continued to rise, un- 
 checked by the peace in 1802, till 1807, when 
 the quotation reached 128s. 6c?. per cwt. That 
 was the highest price till 1810, when, the market 
 having been previously rendered bare, by an un- 
 usually large export to India in the three pre- 
 ceding years, a casual demand arose for ship- 
 ments to France, under license, and the price 
 was driven up by speculation to 174s., from 
 whence, however, it rapidly declined till the 
 close of 1812 to 131s. 6d., which, deducting the 
 difference between paper and gold, was lower 
 than it had been in 1792. Upon the peace of 
 1814 it again reached 174s. The demand, partly 
 speculative, for export to the continent, having 
 abated at the same time that the high price had 
 induced an increased production, aided by im- 
 proved powers of machinery, the price thence-
 
 67 
 
 forward declined till the spring of 1819, when it 
 seems to have reached its greatest depression. 
 One of the chief causes of this depression is 
 that the produce of tin from the island of Banca 
 has not only been sufficient to supply part of the 
 demand for the East Indies, which had before 
 been principally supplied from hence, but even 
 to afford an export to this country for the purpose 
 of re-exportation to the continent of Europe. 
 During the three years ending in 1820, the 
 East India Company exported no tin at all to 
 India or China, whereas, in the fifteen years 
 preceding, it had shipped, on an average, be- 
 tween five and six hundred tons per annum ; 
 and in the three years ending in 1809, the ex- 
 ports by the Company had averaged about 7^0 
 tons per annum. The mere cessation of this 
 source of demand will go far towards account- 
 ing for the depression since 1817, when it is 
 considered that the whole annual produce of the 
 mines is computed not much to exceed 3000 
 tons. The price, however, advanced consider- 
 ably in the course of last year, and still more in 
 the present ; for, by the price current of the 2d 
 May, 1823, it is quoted at 123s. 6d., being higher 
 considerably than it was during the first twelve 
 years of the war, and higher, allowing for the 
 difference between paper and gold, than it was 
 during the period between 1808 and the con- 
 clusion of the war.
 
 68 
 
 Whalebone is now higher than it has ever 
 been during the last forty years, with the ex- 
 ception of 1792 and 1793. The variations in 
 the price of this article are so evidently un- 
 connected with the war and the Bank restric- 
 tion, that I shall confine myself to observing, 
 that the price is now about six times what it 
 was in 1811 and part of 1812, and twice what 
 it was at the passing of Mr. Peel's bill, without 
 any allowance for the difference between paper 
 and gold. 
 
 Wheat is inserted in the Table, because it 
 forms one of the most important among the 
 articles of merchandize in the London market, 
 and because it is desirable to preserve the 
 quotations of prices, as founded on transactions 
 in Mark-lane, both in respect of British and of 
 Polish wheat. This latter description may be 
 considered, with allowances for the superiority 
 of its quality, to represent foreign wheat ge- 
 nerally in this market; and I am not aware 
 that there exists any former table of prices 
 containing quotations of that description. The 
 fluctuations exhibited by the prices of Mark- 
 lane, for wheat generally, will, in several in- 
 stances, point out the degree in which specula- 
 tions on the weather prevailed at particular 
 periods, and likewise show the variation in 
 quality by the difference of quotation between 
 the highest and lowest ; none of these par-
 
 69 
 
 ticulars being shown in the yearly averages, to 
 which most of the tables of the prices of wheat 
 are confined. At the same time, none of my 
 remarks relative to wheat, in the former divi- 
 sions of this work, are founded on this table, as 
 I have considered that the Eton tables, and the 
 average returns inserted in the several parlia- 
 mentary reports, are much higher authority and 
 better calculated for the purposes of general 
 reasoning. 
 
 Wool, the supply of which, from abroad, till 
 about the year 1806, came wholly from Spain, 
 began to advance in the latter part of 1791, and 
 reached, in 1792, a height which was not ex- 
 ceeded during the first six years of the war with 
 France, which broke out in the following year. 
 The importation of 1793 was remarkably short, 
 being little more than one-third of what it had 
 been in the preceding year, and yet the price 
 merely maintained itself without advancing. 
 But, in 1794, it receded to what it had risen 
 from three years before, although the charges 
 of importation were increased by war freights 
 and insurances. So much for the effects of 
 war demand in raising prices. Between 1796 
 and 1799, the price advanced, the difficulty 
 and expenses of importation being increased 
 by the war which, in the former year, broke 
 out between Spain and this country; but it
 
 70 
 
 was not till 1799 that it reached the same 
 elevation that it had attained in 1792. The 
 utmost advance, however, after 1799, above 
 the price of 1792, did not exceed 6d. per lb. 
 for Leonesa till the general peace at the close 
 of 1801, when it rose considerably, and con- 
 tinued to advance through the whole of 1802. 
 A new war with Spain was superadded to the 
 war with France in 1804, and yet the price ad- 
 vanced only 3d. above what it had been at in 
 the year before. In 1807, the importation 
 being large, and probably swelled by supplies 
 from a new source, Germany, the price of the 
 lower sorts gave way a little. But, in 1808, 
 arose the speculation on the short actual im- 
 portation, and on the apprehended failure of 
 future supplies, which drove the price up in 
 that and the following year nearly 300 per cent, 
 and which I have already noticed in the first 
 part of this work. In 1811 and 1812, the sup- 
 plies were again scanty, and prices recovered 
 a little from the depression of the preceding 
 year, which, considering the great cost of 
 the importation, was a ruinous one to the 
 holders. 
 
 At the close of 1812 began the decline, which, 
 after a momentary rally in 1817 and 1818, fol- 
 lowing the very short importation of 1816, has 
 continued till the present time. To explain
 
 71 
 
 the occasion of this decline requires only a 
 reference to the quantities imported in the last 
 five years, compared with the five years ending 
 in 1812, or with any other period of five years 
 during the war. 
 
 Wood. — Under this head Logwood is inserted. 
 It is not an article of great importance. The 
 freight forms a considerable ingredient of the 
 cost, and it is, of course, therefore, on an ave- 
 rage, considerably higher in war than in peace. 
 In other respects the observations which have 
 been made relative to articles of colonial pro- 
 duce, generally, will apply to this. 
 
 The chief ingredient in the value of Fir 
 Timber, after deducting the duty, is the ex- 
 pense of conveyance. Upon the peace with 
 America, in 1783, the price fell 50 per cent., 
 and, after a little fluctuation, rose in 1791, 
 upon the Russian armament, which raised 
 freights in the Baltic, and occasioned apprehen- 
 sions for the security of our intercourse with 
 that quarter. There was no further advance 
 during the two first years after the breaking 
 out of the war with France. The rise in the 
 autumn of 1795 was connected with an ad- 
 vance of freight, which was occasioned, at that 
 time, by an unusually extensive employment 
 of shipping for the conveyance of naval stores, 
 and for the importation of corn. It then de-
 
 72 
 
 clined again, and, till 1799, was not higher than 
 it had been in the American war. But, in 
 1799 and 1800, two causes combined to raise 
 the price : viz. the advance in freights, which 
 is always the consequence of large importations 
 of corn ; and restrictive regulations by the Em- 
 peror Paul against the exportation of timber, 
 which were soon followed by a general embargo 
 on the British shipping in the Russian ports. 
 In 1806 the occupation of Prussia by the 
 French was a fresh cause of advance, as it ren- 
 dered one of the greatest sources of supply 
 precarious. To this cause of advance was 
 superadded another and still greater in 1808, 
 by the hostility of Russia and Denmark, which 
 excluded us from direct intercourse with the 
 Baltic, and the freight alone of timber, in the 
 course of that and the following year, rose, in 
 some instances, to 10/. per load. After the close 
 of 1808, however, the high price having checked 
 the consumption, and the license system having 
 removed some of the difficulties of importation, 
 the price fell considerably; but the freight and 
 expenses of conveyance continued high, till the 
 close of 1812. It was about this time that a 
 heavy additional duty was laid on the importa- 
 tion of timber from the north of Europe, which 
 operated as a great bounty on the shipment of 
 timber from Canada. The importation from
 
 73 
 
 our colonies in America thenceforward increased 
 rapidly, more especially after the peace with the 
 United States, which had the double effect of 
 reducing the rate of freight, and of bringing 
 the timber of the United States through our 
 colonies, duty free, into this country. These 
 large supplies from that quarter, and the re- 
 duced cost of importation from the Baltic, suf- 
 ficiently account for the subsequent fall. My 
 observations on the fluctuations of fir timber 
 have been confined to that from the Baltic. 
 The American timber embraces a greater va- 
 riety of qualities, and the variation in price may 
 sometimes arise from the different qualities that 
 happen to be at market. 
 
 Having taken a rapid view of the most pro- 
 minent instances of fluctuation in the price of 
 each of the articles mentioned in the tables, it 
 may be desirable, very briefly, to notice the 
 periods in which any striking alteration of 
 prices was extended nearly simultaneously to 
 a large proportion of them. 
 
 It is a common mistake to date the origin of 
 speculation and high prices from the commence- 
 ment of the war in 1793. If there had then 
 been a general advance of prices, whence could 
 have arisen the great distress and the extensive 
 
 Y
 
 74 
 
 failures which pervaded the commercial world ? 
 The fact is, that there was a very general fall 
 of prices, those of corn and meat excepted, 
 (and there was consequently no agricultural 
 distress) from the close of 1792, and the com- 
 mencement of 1793, till the close of 1794. On 
 looking over the Table of Prices, it will appear 
 that there were very few commodities which 
 were not lower at the close of 1792, and at 
 different periods in 1793 and 1794, than they 
 had been in 1791, and the commencement of 
 1792, and the real fall was still greater than 
 the apparent one, because the cost of importa- 
 tion was greater, by the difference of freights 
 and insurance, after the commencement of the 
 war. This fall was the effect of a recoil from 
 extensive speculations, which were connected 
 with a very great circulation of mercantile 
 paper, extending to the principal commercial 
 places in Europe, and in the United States 
 of America. One of the chief causes of spe- 
 culation seems to have been the prospect of 
 deficiency of colonial produce, in consequence 
 of the revolution in St. Domingo. Other 
 grounds were afforded, by the unsettled aspect 
 of politics; and some articles besides colonial 
 produce happened likewise to be scarce. As 
 usual in times of speculation, the circulation 
 being enlarged by an extensive superstructure
 
 75 
 
 of private paper, many articles for the rise of 
 which there was no sufficient ground of actual 
 or apprehended scarcity participated in the ad- 
 vance. But the rise having been promoted and 
 extended by an enlargement of the circulation 
 of paper and credit without any corresponding 
 enlargement or extension of the basis of the 
 currency ; and the effect of a rise so much, 
 therefore, beyond the immediate occasion being 
 to check consumption, and to increase supply, 
 the fall of prices and consequent destruction of 
 the paper and credit which had been connected 
 with them were inevitable. The lowest point 
 of depression of the prices of such articles as 
 had risen most in 1791 and 1792 seems to have 
 been reached in 1794. 
 
 In 1795 several circumstances combined to 
 occasion a fresh range of high prices. The pre- 
 vious stagnation and comparatively low prices 
 had, by extending consumption, and checking 
 supply, reduced the stocks of most commodities. 
 Two successive bad seasons rendered every de- 
 scription of agricultural produce in this country 
 and in the rest of Europe scarce ; hence, not 
 only corn and meat, but linseed, rapeseed, and 
 the oils from these, which again affected Galli- 
 poli and whale oil, rose considerably, as did tal- 
 low, of which, moreover, there was a very short 
 importation. Silk in Italy, and the vintages 
 
 y 2
 
 76 
 
 in France, were affected by the same cause. 
 There was an extraordinary competition be- 
 tween our government and that of France in 
 the purchase of naval stores in the north of Eu- 
 rope, which raised the prices of hemp, flax, and 
 timber. The prospect of a war between this 
 country and Spain, which broke out in the year 
 following, affected several descriptions of Span- 
 ish produce. And as barilla rose, alum and 
 other alkalies were affected. Colonial produce, 
 of which a scarcity, consequent on the failure 
 of the supplies from St. Domingo, was now felt 
 more generally throughout Europe, experienced 
 a fresh rise. There was again, therefore, con- 
 siderable speculation and enlargement of private 
 paper, although, from the absence of so great a 
 facility of credit as had been enjoyed in 1791, 
 there was probably not so great an increase in 
 the circulation. A fresh recoil of prices, from 
 renewed abundance of most articles (colonial 
 produce excepted), occasioned, at the close of 
 1796, a considerable reduction of private paper, 
 and the effect of that reduction in a further fall 
 of prices was increased by a contraction which 
 at the same time took place in the issues of the 
 Bank of England. Great commercial distress 
 was the consequence, and a low range of prices 
 through 1797 and 1798. In these two last years, 
 however, while most other articles were in a de-
 
 77 
 
 pressed state, colonial produce rose immode- 
 rately in consequence of the great speculation 
 in Germany, which I have already had occasion 
 to notice, and which terminated so ruinously in 
 the year following. 
 
 Between the commencement of 1799 and 1801 
 a renewed range of high prices is observable. 
 The great scarcity arising from the seasons, the 
 unfavourableness of which again extended over 
 a great part of Europe, affected not only pro- 
 visions, but all the numerous and important 
 articles which I have before alluded to. And 
 while so many articles were influenced by the 
 seasons, a large and important class of commo- 
 dities was raised in price by the embargo of the 
 emperor Paul in 1800-1, viz. hemp, flax, tallow, 
 bristles, linseed, timber, iron. 
 
 The extension of private paper naturally aris- 
 ing out of circumstances so favourable to specu- 
 lation, was checked in its progress by the re- 
 action of the great continental speculation at 
 the close of 1799, and by the failures in this 
 country connected with the result of that dis- 
 astrous speculation : those failures naturally 
 creating a considerable degree of commercial 
 distrust. 
 
 At the close of 1801 there was a very general 
 fall of prices by the coincidence of renewed 
 abundance from a favourable season with the
 
 78 
 
 return of peace (the preliminaries of which were 
 signed in October of that year), which afforded 
 the prospect of future supplies at a reduced 
 cost of importation, and which at once with- 
 drew the demand for such articles as were the 
 immediate objects of government expenditure. 
 But a large export, the consequence of an ef 
 fective demand at low prices, for commodities 
 rendered still cheaper to the foreign consumer 
 by the diminished expenses of conveyance, had 
 reduced the stocks of most articles so much that 
 prices were rising at the close of 1802. 
 
 Between 1803 and 1807 there was considerable 
 fluctuation of particular articles according to 
 the varying aspect of politics, and according to 
 peculiarities of supply and demand affecting 
 each. But as there was no season of extraor- 
 dinary and general abundance or scarcity (the 
 deficiency of corn in 1804 not having been so 
 great as in some former and succeeding in- 
 stances), there was no general rise or fall of 
 prices ; at the same time it may be observed 
 that, except in the case of such articles as were 
 likely to be rendered scarce by the political 
 events then in progress, the tendency was rather 
 downwards. 
 
 I have already noticed the great and general 
 advance which took place in 1808, and the sub- 
 sequent fluctuations accompanied by a great
 
 19 
 
 creation and destruction of private paper, and 
 shall not now recur to them, except for the 
 purpose of referring the reader to the table of 
 prices and quantities, in order that he may see 
 the very great number of articles which partici- 
 pated in the rise, that he may judge, upon an 
 inspection of the quantities of some of the most 
 important of them, how great a part of the rise 
 was an inevitable consequence of so great a re- 
 duction of supply as is observable in that year, 
 combined as the actual scarcity was with ap- 
 prehensions of the failure of future supply. The 
 apprehension, which prevailed at intervals, that 
 all future supply might be cut off, operated in 
 favour of the holders as a temporary monopoly, 
 and there was no assignable limit to the possible 
 advance till that apprehension was removed. 
 
 The fall of prices between 1809 and 1811 
 connected with augmented quantities is equally 
 observable. Let the reader look again at the 
 line of quantities in 1811, and he will be satisfied 
 that there was a sufficient ground for a renewed 
 rise of many articles. But, in this instance, 
 the tendency to speculation was a good deal 
 repressed by the experience of the disasters 
 which had attended the recent speculations in 
 the same articles. All the articles, however, 
 which rose greatly from obstacles to importation
 
 80 
 
 in 1811-12 fell thenceforward as the obstacles 
 were removed or diminished, notwithstanding 
 that the war continued and that the depreciation 
 of paper was going on. 
 
 From the close of 1812 to the summer of 
 1814 a distinct but numerous and important 
 class of articles which had been most depressed 
 between 1808 and 1812 experienced a great 
 rise ; it was, as has already been stated, a rise 
 founded on the speculation or anticipation of 
 the opening of new markets of indefinite extent 
 in the event of a peace. The amount of the 
 exports of the two most important of those 
 articles, viz. coffee and sugar, which may be 
 seen by the table of exports, will give some idea 
 of the extent of that speculation. 
 
 The reaction from that speculation and the 
 decline of prices, from renewed abundance in 
 1814 and 1815, has already been described. 
 
 In consequence of the discouragement and 
 despondency arising from so extensive and 
 rapid a fall, there was a general disinclination 
 in 1816 to embark to the accustomed extent in 
 fresh importations. But this state of commercial 
 despondency, which would of itself have led to 
 diminished supplies in 1816, happened to coin- 
 cide with a very unfavourable season, which oc- 
 casioned a great deficiency of produce not only
 
 in this country but in many other parts of 
 Europe. The inclemency of that season occa- 
 sioned a failure of the vintage in France and of 
 the silk crops in Italy, besides directly or indi- 
 rectly affecting flax, tallow, hops, and numerous 
 other articles. There occurred about the same 
 time an unsuccessful whale fishery. Accord- 
 ingly the scarcity was very general. There 
 are, indeed, no instances, except those of 1808 
 and 1811, of a scarcity or falling off so great 
 and so general, of imported commodities, as 
 in 1816-17. The deficiency is quite striking, 
 upon a reference to those years, in the table of 
 imports ; and several minor articles, not in- 
 cluded in that table, were equally deficient. 
 The rise of prices, therefore, between the close 
 of 1816 and 1818 was founded on a great de- 
 ficiency of actual supply, and it was extended by 
 the speculation which I have before described, 
 and which, as usual, exaggerated the pro- 
 bable demand, while it underrated the eventual 
 supply. That speculation proceeded, in a great 
 measure, on the idea that the prices which 
 had recently prevailed were the result only of 
 sales that had been forced by distress, and that 
 the future level would be considerably higher. 
 The operation of the Corn Bill, too, was in- 
 terpreted to be in favour of a renewed level of 
 high prices. The season of 1818 contributed, as
 
 82 
 
 I have before stated, to extend the range of mis- 
 calculation. Confidence, therefore, in the main- 
 tenance of high prices led to the very large im- 
 ports in 1818 ; and the payment to be made for 
 those greatly increased imports, including corn, 
 naturally improved the demand, and contributed 
 to raise the price of exportable commodities. 
 Accordingly there were few articles, whether 
 of export or import, that did not participate in 
 the advance at some period between the close 
 of 1816 and that of 1818. The rate of freights, 
 and consequently the value of shipping, were 
 raised at the same time by the greatly increased 
 demand for tonnage to convey the corn, and 
 the many other bulky articles, which constituted 
 the very large importations of 1818. 
 
 It would be superfluous to take any further 
 notice of the low range of prices between 1818 
 and the close of 1822, as this period has already 
 been so much dwelt upon in the preceding 
 pages of this work; and I have only to request 
 the attention of the reader to the greatly in- 
 creased importation, on the average of the last 
 five years, of those articles which have expe- 
 rienced the greatest depression. 
 
 The general conclusions to be deduced from 
 the detailed statements which I have given of 
 the principal circumstances that have affected 
 the bullion-prices of each of the articles enu-
 
 83 
 
 merated in the tables, combined with a reference 
 to the particular periods when a rise or fall, 
 nearly simultaneous, of the majority of those 
 articles, was observable, are — That the relatively 
 high bullion-prices of articles divested of tax- 
 ation, and not the object of immediate war ex- 
 penditure, during the twenty years ending with 
 the close of 1812, may be ascribed to the fol- 
 lowing general causes : 
 
 The frequent recurrence of seasons of an un- 
 favourable character. 
 
 The destruction of one great source of supply 
 (St. Domingo); and prohibitions or obstructions 
 of export from others. 
 
 The increased cost of importation, by higher 
 freights and insurance, incidental to a state of 
 war generally, and aggravated, in an extra- 
 ordinary degree, by the peculiar character of 
 commercial hostility and exclusion which cha- 
 racterized the last six years of the late war. 
 
 And that the causes of the decline, which 
 dates from 1813-14, and has continued, after an 
 intermediate rise, in consequence of the ex- 
 tensive scarcity of 181 6-17, till the close of 
 1822, may be classed under the following heads : 
 
 A succession of more favourable seasons, 
 which have developed the effects of an extended 
 and improved cultivation in this country, and 
 in many other parts of the commercial world.
 
 84 
 
 The removal of obstacles from the several 
 sources of foreign supply ; a great extension of 
 some of them ; and the discovery of new ones. 
 
 A reduced cost of importation, by the low 
 freights and insurances incidental to a state of 
 peace. 
 
 Improvements in machinery, in chemistry, 
 and mineralogy, tending to reduce the cost of 
 production of numerous articles, or to provide 
 cheaper substitutes. 
 
 These causes, separately and collectively, 
 account for so large a proportion of the phe- 
 nomena of the high and low prices of the last 
 thirty years, as to leave no ground for imputing 
 to the alterations in our currency any effect 
 beyond the difference between paper and gold ; 
 or to war demand any influence except in the 
 case of articles which are the immediate objects 
 of government expenditure. Indeed, from re- 
 ference, whether to particular facts, as of dates, 
 prices, and quantities ; or to reasoning upon 
 general principles, it is so clear that neither the 
 alterations in our currency, beyond the dif- 
 ference between paper and gold, nor the go- 
 vernment expenditure, can have had the in- 
 fluence, so commonly ascribed to them, on the 
 aggregate of prices, divested of taxation, that if 
 any considerable part of the variations of the 
 level, in the respective periods, did not admit
 
 85 
 
 of being accounted for by the circumstances 
 which I have stated, both generally and in de- 
 tail, there would be no alternative in my opinion 
 but to infer an alteration in the quantity of the 
 precious metals. But there will be no reason 
 for resorting to that inference, if the causes 
 which have been adduced in the course of the 
 present examination be considered adequate to 
 have produced the effects assigned to them. 
 And, on the supposition of the sufficiency of 
 those causes to account for the whole difference 
 of prices, it would follow that, if even there 
 were any ground of direct information on which 
 to found a belief that the supplies from the 
 mines had varied considerably, the legitimate 
 conclusion would be, either that the variations 
 of supply, however apparently large, were still 
 in a very small proportion to the whole mass 
 of the metals ; or that circumstances, affecting 
 the rate of circulation of money, and the pro- 
 portion of paper and credit in the commercial 
 world, at the several periods, had compensated 
 for the variation in quantity, and prevented any 
 sensible influence on prices. 
 
 THE END.
 
 LONDON: 
 
 VRINTET) BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS,
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 TO 
 
 PART IV. 
 
 No. I. 
 
 TABLE OF PRICES, EXCLUSIVE OF DUTY 
 FROM 1782 TO 1822, 
 
 BOTH YEARS INCLUDED.
 
 2 
 
 ASHES. 
 
 
 American, U. S. 
 Pearl. 1 Pot. 1 Duty. 
 
 Dan 
 
 Pearl. 
 
 zig. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Carthagena. 
 Barilla. 1 Duty. 
 
 East India. 
 Barilla. Duty 
 
 1782 
 
 cwt. 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 cwt 
 s. 
 
 64 
 65 
 
 s. 
 
 68 
 70 
 
 cwt. 
 Free. 
 
 cwt. 
 s. s. 
 
 46 50 
 34 35 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 2 M, 
 
 cwt. 
 S. S. 
 
 22 24 
 24 26 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 5 1\ 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1783 
 
 34 
 26 
 38 
 
 42 
 34 
 40 
 
 65 
 26 
 
 70 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 40 
 
 22 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 
 15 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1784 
 
 30 
 35 
 22 
 32 
 
 35 
 40 
 
 27 
 35 
 
 26 
 
 42 
 
 36 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 26 
 34 36 
 
 2 2 T V 
 
 16 17 
 33 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1785 
 
 32 
 25 
 
 35 
 32 
 
 34 
 
 18 
 
 38 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 32 
 
 18 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 
 
 20 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 
 1786 
 
 28 
 32 
 25 
 
 32 
 37 
 35 
 
 18 6 
 26 
 
 30 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 24 
 28 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 24 
 28 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1787 
 
 34 
 25 
 
 28 
 
 37 
 33 
 35 
 
 21 
 24 
 
 33 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 31 
 24 28 
 26 32 
 
 2 3 
 
 29 30 
 31 32 
 
 5 3 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1788 
 
 28 
 26 
 36 
 
 34 
 32 
 38 
 
 22 
 27 
 
 32 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 28 
 24 26 
 28 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 32 
 19 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1789 
 
 34 
 30 
 
 38 
 
 38 
 35 
 42 
 
 27 
 26 
 
 36 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 34 
 
 28 32 
 
 34 36 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 9 20 
 
 23 25 
 
 None. 
 
 21 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1790 
 
 38 
 40 
 38 
 
 42 
 46 
 43 
 
 29 
 26 
 30 
 20 
 
 34 
 29 
 31 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 36 40 
 34 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 20 
 
 17 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1791 
 
 38 
 32 
 
 40 
 34 
 
 20 
 31 
 25 
 
 28 
 32 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 2 3 
 
 15 16 
 
 18 19 
 
 5 3 
 
 None. 
 
 
 179S 
 
 34 
 
 '32 
 
 26 
 
 3£ 
 4C 
 35 
 
 29 
 26 
 30 
 
 32 
 38 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 19 
 
 17 18 
 
 18 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 

 
 
 
 
 
 ASHES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 American, i 
 
 7.5. 
 
 Danzig. 
 
 
 Carthagena. 
 
 East India. 
 
 
 Pearl. 1 ] 
 
 Pot. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pearl. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Barilla. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Barilla. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 
 S. S. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 
 1793 
 
 27 
 25 
 30 
 
 33 
 31 
 34 
 
 25 
 28 
 24 
 28 
 
 35 
 36 
 30 
 33 
 
 Free. 
 
 28 30 
 22 26 
 
 2 3 
 
 16 
 21 
 15 
 
 20 
 22 
 16 
 
 5 3 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 B8 
 
 3? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1794 
 
 24 
 29 
 26 
 
 31 
 31 
 30 
 
 2; 
 24 
 30 
 
 32 
 29 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 28 
 None af- 
 ter May. 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 25 
 
 15 
 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1795 
 
 28 
 50 
 
 32 
 54 
 
 30 
 53 
 
 50 
 
 32 
 60 
 
 56 
 
 Do. 
 
 Uncer- 
 tain. 
 
 Do. 
 
 29 
 35 
 31 
 
 30 
 37 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 58 
 
 46 
 
 52 
 
 
 56 58 
 54 56 
 
 
 33 
 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 1796 
 
 44 
 
 58 
 
 48 
 
 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 4A 
 
 None. 
 
 5 6A 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 70 
 
 26 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 1797 
 
 30 
 60 
 47 
 50 
 
 60 
 70 
 
 58 
 68 
 
 25 
 45 
 
 43 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 51 54 
 
 2 HJ 
 
 35 
 
 57 
 
 37 
 59 
 
 O J-iTTT 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
 54 
 
 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
 62 
 
 40 
 
 47 
 
 
 48 55 
 46 51 
 
 
 51 
 
 55 
 
 
 
 
 1798 
 
 54 
 39 
 
 61 
 55 
 
 51 
 45 
 
 63 
 
 56 
 
 1 4 
 
 3 944 
 
 41 
 44 
 
 45 
 47 
 
 7 3-j-jj- 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1799 
 
 39 
 41 
 
 55 
 57 
 
 41 
 53 
 
 56 
 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 52 
 46 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 48 
 40 
 
 49 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1800 
 
 41 
 45 
 39 
 
 57 
 57 
 45 
 
 49 
 37 
 
 59 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 37 47 
 36 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 
 27 
 30 
 
 37 
 29 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1801 
 
 39 
 44 
 36 
 36 
 
 45 
 59 
 49 
 55 
 
 29 
 34 
 29 
 
 41 
 46 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 40 
 31 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 
 21 
 
 38 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 54 
 
 29 
 
 35 
 
 Free to 12 
 
 30 36 
 16 24 
 
 Free to 12 
 
 23 
 
 25 
 
 Free to 12 
 
 
 
 1802 
 
 24 
 
 43 
 
 17 
 
 29 
 
 May, then 
 
 May, then 
 
 21 
 
 23 
 
 May, then 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 44 
 
 24 
 
 31 
 
 1 6 
 
 3 1144 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 7 7« 
 / /-nr 
 

 
 - _— — . — _________ _ 
 
 ASHES. 
 
 American, L 
 Pearl. | Pot. 
 
 r . S. Dan 
 
 Duty. Pearl. 
 
 zig. 
 Duty. 
 
 Cart ho 
 Barilla. 
 
 gena. 
 Duty. 
 
 East India. 
 Barilla. Duty 
 
 1803 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 31 46 
 22 45 
 
 22 47 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 26 33 
 24 41 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 Do. to 5 
 July, then 
 
 l H 
 
 cwt. 
 s. s. d. 
 
 23 28 
 22 26 
 30 31 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 July, then 
 
 3 1I| 
 
 cwt. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 25 26 
 28 30 
 
 27 28 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 Do. to 5 
 July, then 
 
 8 74 
 
 Cwt. 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d 
 
 1804 
 
 23 49 
 39 49 
 
 25 41 
 34 54 
 
 Do. to 1 
 
 June,then 
 1 3 
 
 26 31 
 30 33 6 
 
 Do. to 1 
 Jun. then 
 4 4 
 
 27 28 
 30 31 
 
 Do. to 1 
 
 Jun. then 
 
 9 74 
 
 None. 
 
 1 
 
 1805 
 
 47 53 
 
 59 74 
 
 42 54 
 44 62 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 Apr. then 
 1 34 
 
 38 40 
 50 56 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 Apr. then 
 4 5 
 
 32 33 
 30 31 
 35 37 
 
 Do. to 5 
 Apr. then 
 10 4 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1806 
 
 64 79 
 69 84 
 
 49 77 
 
 44 54 
 39 61 
 
 Do. to 10 
 May, then 
 
 1 44 
 
 51 63 
 None. 
 
 Do. to 10 
 May, then 
 4 8 
 
 26 28 
 32 33 
 
 Do. to 10 
 May, then 
 10 114 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1807 
 
 49 75 
 64 73 
 54 69 
 
 44 66 
 54 69 
 49 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 51 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 34 
 50 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1808 
 
 59 74 
 71 81 
 57 81 
 
 57 69 
 
 77 89 
 59 79 
 
 Do. 
 
 51 53 
 59 61 
 53 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 59 64 
 75 80 
 
 40 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1809 
 
 59 84 
 48 59 
 50 65 
 
 64 82 
 44 54 
 40 55 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 July, then 
 4 8 
 
 60 61 
 40 55 
 54 59 
 49 54 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 July, then 
 4 8 
 
 58 60 
 
 44 46 
 43 47 
 
 45 51 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 July, then 
 11 4 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1810 
 
 45 61 
 50 65 
 35 49 
 
 35 50 
 45 73 
 30 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 59 64 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 45 49 
 49 52 
 35 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1811 
 
 • 
 
 35 49 
 23 40 
 
 30 47 
 20 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 None till 
 Novemb. 
 24 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 39 
 19 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1812 
 
 25 43 
 44 46 
 
 23 35 
 
 38 41 
 
 Do. to 1 
 
 Sep. then 
 
 9 4 
 
 25 29 
 None af- 
 ter Feb. 
 
 Do. to 1 
 Sep. then 
 9 4 
 
 21 24 
 29 31 
 23 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 23 
 19 21 
 
 11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ASHES. 
 
 
 
 American, U. S. 
 
 Danzig. 
 
 Carthagena. 
 
 East India. 
 
 * 
 
 Pearl. 
 
 Po 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pearl. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Barilla. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Barilla. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 813 
 
 50 
 37 
 41 
 
 54 
 61 
 
 49 
 34 
 39 
 
 52 
 47 
 54 
 
 11 1 
 
 37 38 
 52 55 
 
 11 1 
 
 24 
 25 
 
 25 
 26 
 
 11 4 
 
 14 
 22 
 
 15 
 23 
 
 11 4 
 
 
 41 
 
 71 
 
 44 
 
 67 
 
 
 Russia Pearl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 814 
 
 37 
 44 
 
 59 
 65 
 
 54 
 
 44 
 
 69 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 59 62 
 40 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 16 
 
 27 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 16 
 
 23 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 50 
 
 60 
 
 
 66 68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 815 
 
 None. 
 71 11 
 57 60 
 
 55 
 35 
 75 
 
 65 
 74 
 
 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 58 
 47 52 
 51 59 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 25 
 
 21 
 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 
 11 
 
 20 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 73 
 
 /o 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 73 
 
 
 70 
 
 73 
 
 
 55 51 
 
 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 
 11 
 
 13 
 
 
 1816 
 
 52 
 
 59 
 
 78 
 
 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 63 
 
 
 44 
 
 46 
 
 
 53 55 
 
 
 19 
 
 22 
 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 
 1317 
 
 64 
 53 
 
 55 
 
 43 
 50 
 39 
 
 52 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 58 59 
 61 62 
 49 51 
 47 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 12 
 
 23 
 
 32 
 13 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 12 
 
 16 
 
 22 
 13 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1818 
 
 57 
 46 
 52 
 
 59 
 47 
 
 46 
 43 
 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 47 48 
 38 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 23 
 
 21 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 16 
 
 19 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 51 
 30 
 
 34 
 
 42 
 23 
 
 32 
 
 11 2 
 
 40 41 
 26 27 
 29 30 
 
 11 2 
 
 22 
 19 
 
 23 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 16 
 10 
 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1820 
 
 33 
 
 28 
 
 34 
 31 
 
 28 
 34 
 22 
 
 33 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 27 
 26 
 
 26 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 
 
 17 
 
 20 
 17 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1821 
 
 30 
 29 
 
 31 
 30 
 
 29 
 34 
 30 
 
 30 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 31 
 
 30 
 
 32 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 18 
 15 
 
 17 6 
 
 19 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 12 
 9 
 
 10 
 13 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 38 
 35 
 
 
 
 33 36 
 
 
 15 
 
 15 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 1822 
 
 33 
 40 
 
 43 
 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 14 
 
 17 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 37 
 
 
 176 
 
 186 
 
 
 
 
 
 N. B. After 5 Jan. 1823, the duty on Barilla only 55. 3c?.
 
 g 
 
 
 ALUM. 
 
 BRISTLES. 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 
 English in 
 lumps. 
 No duty. 
 
 St. Peters 
 1st Quality. 
 
 burg. 
 Duty. 
 
 British Plantation, in bond 
 
 or warehoused. 
 Superior. 1 Inferior, j Duty. 
 
 St. Dom\ 
 
 for Expor 
 tation. 
 
 1782 
 
 per ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 20 21 
 
 CVOt. 
 
 1. s. 1. s. 
 Not quoted. 
 
 cvot. 
 s. d. 
 
 cvot. 
 
 s. S. 
 
 76 81 
 
 105 116 
 
 75 86 
 
 cwt. 
 s. s. 
 62 68 
 81 100 
 
 60 72 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 Ware- 
 housing 
 3 6 
 and 
 Home 
 consump. 
 38 6 
 
 cwt. , 
 s. S. 
 
 None. 
 
 1783 
 
 20 21 
 
 22 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 72 83 
 57 66 
 63 72 
 
 63 70 
 
 48 56 
 54 62 
 
 None. 
 
 1784 
 
 214- 224 
 
 22 
 
 21 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 60 68 
 86 105 
 73 80 
 
 54 59 
 
 76 85 
 65 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1785 
 
 22 224 
 19 20 
 
 4 15 5 
 
 4 2 4 7 
 
 1 44 
 
 per doz. 
 lb. 
 
 73 79 
 71 76 
 
 68 72 
 66 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1786 
 
 19 20 
 
 20 21 
 19 194 
 
 4 9 4 12 
 
 5 5 5 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 70 80 
 
 87 95 
 
 65 70 
 78 86 
 
 Do. 
 
 i 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 1787 
 
 19 194 
 
 174 18 
 
 5 7 
 
 6 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 88 96 
 97 100 
 
 78 86 
 86 96 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1788 
 
 17 174 
 144 15 
 
 6 14 
 
 7 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 92 102 
 95 105 
 
 86 90 
 90 94 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1789 
 
 144 15 
 134 
 
 7 7 
 9 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 98 106 
 95 100 
 
 92 96 
 88 93 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1790 
 
 134 
 
 124 13 
 13 134 
 
 8 17 9 17 
 
 8 7 8 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 92 98 
 70 76 
 
 86 90 
 56 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1791 
 
 134 14 
 16 164 
 
 8 7 8 12 
 
 9 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 71 79 
 95 105 
 
 59 70 
 85 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1792 
 
 16* 16 
 
 9 7 
 
 8 17 
 
 9 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 96 105 
 
 109 120 
 
 84 100 
 
 85 95 
 
 100 108 
 
 70 83 
 
 Do. 
 
 None.
 
 
 ALUM. 
 
 BRISTLES. 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 
 English in 
 lumps. 
 
 No duty. 
 
 St. Peters 
 1st Quality. 
 
 burg. 
 Duty. 
 
 British j 
 or 
 
 Superior. 
 
 Plantation 
 
 tvarehous 
 
 Inferior. 
 
 , in bond 
 id. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 St. Dom. 
 
 for Expor- 
 tation. 
 
 793 
 
 per ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 frf 164- 
 
 ctvt. 
 1. S. 1. S. 
 
 9 7 
 10 2 
 
 8 7 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1 41 
 
 per doz. 
 
 lb. 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 90 107 
 96 115 
 94 105 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 73 88 
 83 95 
 
 78 93 
 
 Ctvt. 
 s. d. 
 
 Ware- 
 housing 
 3 6 
 and 
 Home 
 consump. 
 38 6 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. S. 
 
 None. 
 
 794 
 
 164- 16| 
 
 8 7 
 6 14 
 
 8 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 96 116 
 77 95 
 92 112 
 
 85 95 
 66 76 
 74 90 
 
 None. 
 
 795 
 
 16 16| 
 25 26i 
 
 8 7 
 
 9 17 
 9 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 94 112 
 122 145 
 112 132 
 
 72 92 
 
 98 118 
 
 100 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 796 
 
 25 26i 
 
 9 2 
 9 12 
 
 1 544 
 
 per doz. 
 
 lb. 
 
 118 135 
 113 126 
 
 103 116 
 100 112 
 
 Wareh. 
 3 8-j% 
 and H. C 
 
 40 5A 
 
 None. 
 
 797 
 
 25 261 
 
 9 12 
 
 7 2 7 7 
 
 1 54^ 
 
 per doz. 
 
 lb. 
 
 114 126 
 
 132 145 
 
 133 140 
 
 104 110 
 112 130 
 120 132 
 
 Wareh. 
 3 10 A 
 and H. C. 
 42 4A 
 
 None. 
 
 798 
 
 25 261 
 
 7 2 7 7 
 
 8 7 
 
 9 2 
 
 1 IMr 
 
 do. 
 
 128 138 
 158 172 
 
 120 126 
 146 157 
 
 Do. 
 
 and H. C. 
 
 45 8A 
 
 None. 
 
 799 
 
 25 264; 
 22 23 
 
 7 2 
 9 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 156 170 
 185 196 
 116 130 
 
 146 155 
 
 170 184 
 
 98 115 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 800 
 
 22 23 
 
 9 7 
 11 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 116 130 
 130 165 
 118 150 
 126 150 
 
 98 115 
 115 128 
 
 95 115 
 110 125 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 801 
 
 22 23 
 
 11 7 
 14 7 
 9 2 9 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 131 150 
 130 160 
 
 88 110 
 
 115 130 
 
 105 128 
 60 86 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 802 
 
 22 23 
 
 8 17 9 
 
 Do. to 
 
 May, then 
 
 2 0A 
 
 88 110 
 96 128 
 93 115 
 
 60 80 
 70 95 
 68 92 
 
 Do. 
 
 None.
 
 
 ALUM. 
 
 BRISTLES. 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 English in 
 lumps. 
 
 St. 
 
 Petersburg. 
 
 British Plantation, in bond 
 or "warehoused. 
 
 St. Dom 
 for Expor 
 
 
 No duty. 
 
 1st Quality. Duty. 
 
 Superior. 
 
 Inferior. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 tation. 
 
 
 per ton. 
 
 Clvt. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 Cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 1. 1. 
 
 1. S. 
 
 1. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. to 5 
 
 92 
 
 125 
 
 76 90 
 
 Wareh. 
 
 64 V cwt. 
 
 H.C. 
 
 5-1 V lb. 
 
 
 1803 
 
 22 23 
 
 11 
 
 11 11 
 
 July, then 
 
 
 In 
 
 )ond. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 3 
 
 142 
 
 156 
 
 120 140 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 11 11 
 
 Do. to 1 
 
 133 
 
 150 
 
 110 130 
 
 W a reh. 
 74- ¥ cwt. 
 
 H.C. 
 6^ ¥• lb. 
 
 
 1804 
 
 22 23 
 
 11 11 
 
 
 Jun. then 
 
 156 
 
 170 
 
 140 155 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 11 6 
 
 11 8 
 
 2 6 
 
 142 
 
 156 
 
 120 140 
 
 
 1805 
 
 22 23 
 
 11 6 
 
 11 7 
 
 11 8 
 11 15 
 
 Do. 5 Apr. 
 
 then 
 
 2 9 
 
 144 
 165 
 140 
 
 165 
 185 
 170 
 
 125 140 
 140 163 
 115 136 
 
 Wareh. 
 7| ¥ cwt. 
 
 H.C. 
 64 r lb. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 11 7 
 
 10 18 
 
 11 8 
 
 11 10 
 
 Do. to 10 
 
 143 
 
 177 
 
 115 142 
 
 Wareh. 
 
 
 1806 
 
 22 23 
 
 May, 
 then 
 
 152 
 110 
 
 195 
 145 
 
 125 150 
 80 100 
 
 Si W cwt. 
 H.C. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 2 11 
 
 122 
 
 150 
 
 100 120 
 
 7 fib. 
 
 
 
 
 10 13 
 
 
 Do. to 5 
 July, 
 then 
 
 3 
 
 118 
 
 146 
 
 90 117 
 
 
 
 1807 
 
 22 23 
 
 10 
 
 10 3 
 
 132 
 
 160 
 
 95 130 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 14 8 
 
 112 
 
 130 
 
 70 108 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 7 
 
 14 
 
 
 106 
 
 130 
 
 68 105 
 
 
 90 1( 
 
 1808 
 
 22 23 
 
 26 
 
 26 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 95 
 
 120 
 
 60 94 
 
 Do. 
 
 80 
 
 
 
 224- 
 
 23| 
 
 
 116 
 
 130 
 
 90 115 
 
 
 90 11 
 
 1809 
 
 22 23 
 
 224- 
 234- 
 154- 
 164- 
 
 234- 
 244- 
 164- 
 
 m 
 
 Do. 
 
 110 
 105 
 113 
 
 130 
 
 128 
 138 
 
 85 109 
 
 75 102 
 
 76 110 
 
 Cus.&Ex. 
 655. Ad. 
 
 95 1] 
 90 1( 
 
 96 1( 
 
 1810 
 
 22 23 
 25 27 
 24 26 
 
 154- 
 124- 
 
 164- 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 114 
 
 120 
 
 100 
 
 90 
 
 136 
 146 
 120 
 105 
 
 70 112 
 75 115 
 
 68 94 
 60 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 96 I 
 
 106 11 
 
 85 ! 
 
 1811 
 
 24 26 
 
 13 
 
 184- 
 174- 
 
 204- 
 
 184 
 
 Do. 
 
 75 
 54 
 
 95 
 73 
 
 38 74 
 25 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 58 1 
 36 45 
 
 1812 
 
 24 26 
 22 24 
 
 174- 
 
 194- 
 
 1164- 
 
 184- 
 204- 
 174- 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 
 71 
 
 80 
 96 
 
 20 50 
 30 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 45 
 70 J
 
 1 
 
 ALUM. 
 
 I BRISTLES. 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 
 Eng 
 
 lish in 
 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 British Plantation, in bond 
 
 St. Dom. 
 
 
 lu 
 
 nps. 
 
 
 
 
 or warehoused. 
 
 for Expor- 
 
 
 No 
 
 duty. 
 
 1st Quality. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Superior. 
 
 Inferior. 
 
 1 Duty. 
 
 tation. 
 
 
 pet 
 
 ton. 
 
 civt. 
 
 
 civt. 
 
 Clot. 
 
 Ctvt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 
 I. 
 
 1. 
 
 1. s. 1. s 
 
 8. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. S. 
 
 s. d. 
 Cus.&Ex 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 1813 
 
 22 
 27 
 
 24 
 
 28 
 
 18 7 
 15 7 
 18 17 
 
 3 6} 
 
 per doz. 
 
 lb. 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 116 
 
 116 
 105 
 132 
 
 50 85 
 40 75 
 70 110 
 
 65 4 
 
 till July, 
 
 then 
 
 72 4 
 
 70 
 82 
 66 
 96 
 
 78 
 
 92 
 
 80 
 
 110 
 
 
 31 
 
 32 
 
 19 17 
 14 7 
 16 17 
 
 
 118 
 
 142 
 
 80 114 
 
 
 116 
 
 126 
 
 1814 
 
 26" 
 28 
 
 28 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 96 
 105 
 
 118 
 125 
 
 60 96 
 66 103 
 
 Do. 
 
 85 
 90 
 
 100 
 108 
 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 
 96 
 
 115 
 
 60 95 
 
 
 86 
 
 94 
 
 1815 
 
 26 
 30 
 
 24 
 
 28 
 32 
 26 
 
 18 
 17 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 96 
 83 
 
 115 
 110 
 
 60 95 
 50 81 
 
 Do. 
 
 86 
 
 72 
 
 94 
 
 78 
 
 181G 
 
 24 
 
 22 
 
 26 
 24 
 
 18 7 
 12 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 84 
 
 77 
 83 
 
 110 
 104 
 107 
 
 48 83 
 56 72 
 50 82 
 
 Do. 
 
 70 
 62 
 74 
 
 78 
 66 
 
 77 
 
 1817 
 
 24 
 
 22 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 13 
 
 14 7 
 11 7 
 13 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 82 
 80 
 92 
 
 104 
 102 
 112 
 
 54 60 
 74 96 
 
 Do. 
 
 72 
 89 
 
 75 
 97 
 
 
 
 
 12 17 
 14 3 
 
 
 99 
 
 115 
 
 76 98 
 
 
 94 
 
 100 
 
 1818 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 160 
 
 180 
 
 122 153 
 
 Do. 
 
 162 
 
 170 
 
 
 
 
 
 146 
 
 163 
 
 112 145 
 
 
 143 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 148 
 
 166 
 
 110 148 
 
 Do. 
 
 143 
 
 148 
 
 
 
 
 14 3 
 111 
 
 
 102 
 
 128 
 
 78 100 
 
 tillJune, 
 
 93 
 
 97 
 
 .819 
 
 24 
 
 
 3 7 
 
 124 
 116 
 
 150 
 126 
 
 88 119 
 80 115 
 
 then Ex- 
 cise only, 
 
 115 
 105 
 
 122 
 
 no 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125 
 
 155 
 
 86 124 
 
 ]*.*Mb. 
 
 120 
 
 126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
 
 155 
 
 90 128 
 
 
 128 
 
 132 
 
 820 
 
 24 
 
 20 
 
 
 12 
 11 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 122 
 133 
 128 
 
 144 
 150 
 143 
 
 86 120 
 110 132 
 100 125 
 
 Do. 
 
 117 
 133 
 123 
 
 121 
 
 138 
 
 128 
 
 821 
 
 20 
 1G 
 
 10 16 
 111 
 
 Do. 
 
 125 
 131 
 112 
 
 138 
 148 
 132 
 
 105 124 
 
 108 130 
 
 73 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 118 
 
 98 
 
 121 
 102 
 
 
 
 
 12 8 
 11 8 
 
 10 2 4 
 
 121 3 
 
 1Z 2 4 
 
 
 117 
 
 145 
 
 70 116 
 
 
 98 
 
 102 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 120 
 
 140 
 
 104 118 
 
 
 104 
 
 110 
 
 822 
 
 14 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 113 
 
 136 
 
 90 112 
 
 Do. 
 
 97 
 
 102 
 
 
 15 
 
 
 
 116 
 
 144 
 
 92 115 
 
 
 105 
 
 112 
 
 
 
 
 
 112 
 
 138 
 
 80 110 
 
 
 94 
 
 100
 
 10 
 
 COTTON WOOL 
 
 
 West India, i 
 Surinam and 
 
 ncluding 
 
 Berbice. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Boxved Gee 
 
 irgia. 
 Duty. 
 
 Pernambi 
 
 ICO. 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 18 3 
 2 3 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 None. 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 None. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 1783 
 
 19 3 
 11 1 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 10 1 10 
 12 2 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 12 1 10 
 17 2 4 
 12 1 10 
 19 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 1786 
 
 1 10 2 2 
 
 2 3 3 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 2 3 6 
 17 2 8 
 2 2 10 
 19 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 19 2 9 
 12 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 12 7 
 16 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 12 18 
 10 17 
 12 1 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 18 
 14 16 
 
 17 1 10 
 
 Do. J 
 
 1790 
 
 1118^ 
 10 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 18 
 
 18 1 10 
 
 17 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 1119 
 19 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 1 84- 
 
 2 5 2 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 1792 
 
 19 2 6 
 
 18 2 
 
 19 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 5 2 6 
 
 1 10 2 
 
 2 12 3 
 
 Do.
 
 11 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 
 West India, i 
 Surinam and 
 
 ncluding 
 Berbice. 
 Duty. 
 
 Bowed Gee 
 
 )rgia. 
 Duty. 
 
 Pernamb 
 
 uco. 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 18 2 3 
 10 2 
 12 2 2 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 18 1 10 
 1114 
 13 16 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 2 1 2 3 
 1 9 2 
 1 11 2 1 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 1794 
 
 12 2 2 
 11 1 10 
 
 13 1 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 16 
 1 1 3 
 
 13 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 11 2 1 
 16 18 
 19 1 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 13 1 11 
 
 19 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 16 
 19 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 1 11 
 2 3 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 19 2 6 
 17 2 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 2 5 
 10 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 3 2 6 
 1 10 2 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 15 2 6 
 2 2 3 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 2 3 
 2 13 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 11 2 2 
 3 2 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1798 
 
 2 13 4 
 2 6 3 4 
 
 8 9 
 per 1001b. 
 
 1 10 3 
 
 2 5 3 9 
 
 6 6 
 per 1001b. 
 
 3 2 3 4 
 3 13 5 
 
 12 6 
 per 1001b. 
 
 1799 
 
 2 6 3 2 
 
 3 4 4 7 
 16 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 5 3 9 
 
 3 6 5 
 15 2 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 11 3 2 
 
 4 2 4 8 
 2 5 2 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 18 2 9 
 2 3 3 2 
 2 2 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 3 
 14 2 10 
 16 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 9 3 
 2 11 3 1 
 2 9 2 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 2 13 
 19 2 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 3 2 
 15 2 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 9 2 11 
 2 8 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1802 
 
 19 2 9 
 13 2 1 
 15 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 3 
 10 2 8 
 10 3 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 8 2 11 
 2 2 5 
 
 Do.
 
 12 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 1803 
 
 West India, it 
 Surinam and 
 
 winding 
 
 Derbice. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Bowed Georgia. 
 Duty. 
 
 Pernambuco. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 14 2 2 
 12 2 3 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 16 8 
 per 1001b. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 1113 
 8 10 
 10 12 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 16 8 
 per 1001b. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 2 2 4 
 2 2 2 5 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 25 
 per 100 lb 
 
 1804 
 
 10 2 1 
 16 2 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 10 
 14 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 2 3 
 19 2 
 2 3 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1805 
 
 16 2 4 
 15 2 
 
 16 10| 
 
 15 17 
 12 14 
 
 16 10| 
 
 2 3 2 6 
 1 11 2 
 
 25 3f 
 per 100 lb 
 
 1806 
 
 15 2 2 
 
 12 1 10 
 
 13 1 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 13 
 10 11 
 
 12 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 11 2 
 18 19 
 1 11 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 1807 
 
 13 1 10 
 12 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 12 
 10 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 1 10 
 1 10 1 11 
 
 16 10£ 
 per 100 lb 
 
 1808 
 
 12 19 
 2 5 2 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 10 
 2 2 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 1 11 
 2 9 2 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 2 6 3 
 12 18 
 17 2 
 
 16 11 
 per 1001b. 
 
 None. 
 10 10 
 14 16 
 
 16 11 
 
 2 10 2 11 
 18 1 10 
 2 2 3 
 
 16 11 
 per 100 lb 
 
 1810 
 
 1 10 2 3 
 15 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 17 
 10 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 12 3 
 19 1 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 15 19 
 9 13 
 12 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 11 
 7 9 
 10 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 1 10 
 12 13 
 16 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 12 16 
 11 14 
 10 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 11 
 10 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 18 
 
 16 17 
 
 Do.
 
 13 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 
 West Inch 
 
 a. including 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Surinam and Berbice. 
 
 
 Boived Geo 
 
 rgia. 
 
 
 Pernambuco. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 ?. 
 
 d. s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 5. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1813 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 16 11 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 16 11 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 16 11 
 
 > 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 per 1001b 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 per 100 lb 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 per 1001b 
 
 1814 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 3 2 
 
 6 2 
 
 10 2 
 
 2 2 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 1 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 2 
 2 
 
 10 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 
 5 
 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 9 2 
 
 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 1815 
 
 1 
 
 6 2 
 
 1 
 
 till July, 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 till Julv, 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 till Julv, 
 
 1 
 
 11 2 
 
 8 
 
 then 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 then 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 then 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 2 
 
 
 
 8 7 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 8 7 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 8 7 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 
 1816 
 
 4 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 7 
 5 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 10 
 
 2 
 1 
 
 5 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 1817 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 2 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 1818 
 
 1 
 
 8 2 
 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 3 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 I 
 
 91 
 
 y 2 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 
 1819 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 11 1 
 
 1 
 
 11 1 
 
 11 
 
 3 
 6 
 3 
 
 5 7 
 till July, 
 
 then 
 
 6 3 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 7 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 9 
 ii 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 11 
 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1820 
 
 (1 
 
 
 
 11 1 
 
 8 1 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 1 
 
 
 2 
 
 11| 
 
 61. 
 per cent, 
 on value. 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 6 
 H 
 
 61. 
 per cent, 
 on value. 
 
 1821 
 
 (1 
 
 
 
 
 
 8| 1 
 
 n o 
 
 9 1 
 
 81 1 
 
 1 
 11| 
 
 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 till March 
 then free 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 7i 
 
 H 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 H 
 
 10| 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 01 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 H 
 
 — <2 
 
 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 o 1 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 
 1822 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 1 
 7 
 
 H 
 
 hi 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 101 
 81 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 (J 
 
 "2 
 10 
 
 111 
 
 
 1 
 
 ■* 2 
 11 
 
 i| 
 
 Do.
 
 
 
 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1782 
 1783 
 
 1784 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 COCHINEAL. 
 
 COPPER 
 
 FLAX. 
 
 Bengal and 
 
 Surat. 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Spanish, 
 
 g< 
 
 irbled. 
 Duty. 
 
 British, 
 
 In cakes or 
 unmanufac. 
 
 St. Peters 
 12 Head. 
 
 burg. 
 Duty. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 None. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 18 
 19 
 
 lb. 
 d. s. 
 
 6 19 
 6 21 
 
 d. 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 2\ 
 
 Cwt. 
 S. S. 
 
 83 86 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 36 38 
 44 48 
 
 s. d. 
 Free 
 
 None. 
 
 
 19 
 21 
 13 
 
 6 21 
 6 23 
 6 15 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 83 86 
 
 46 50 
 40 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 13 
 12 
 13 
 12 
 
 6 15 
 13 
 6 15 
 14 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 83 86 
 80 83 
 
 40 41 
 45 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 None. 
 
 
 12 
 13 
 
 14 
 14 
 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 83 
 
 78 
 82 
 
 46 48 
 36 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 None. 
 
 
 13 
 12 
 14 
 
 14 
 6 13 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 82 
 
 38 42 
 45 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 1788 
 1789 
 
 None. 
 
 
 14 
 13 
 17 
 
 6 16 
 15 
 19 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 82 
 80 
 
 72 76 
 80 
 
 41 46 
 
 38 40 
 44 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 16 
 18 
 14 
 
 18 
 21 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 3 
 
 80 
 
 44 45 
 30 39 
 42 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 14 
 12 
 13 
 
 16 
 14 
 15 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 80 
 76 
 80 
 
 84 
 
 43 44 
 
 48 49 
 
 Do.. 
 
 1790 
 
 8 10 
 
 
 12 
 15 
 13 
 
 6 15 
 18 
 6 15 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 84 
 
 45 47 
 47 48 
 44 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 8 9^ 
 12 13 
 
 
 13 
 12 
 14 
 13 
 
 3 15 
 14 
 16 
 15 
 
 3 
 6 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 84 
 86 
 90 
 
 41 42 
 35 37 
 
 1 
 
 Do 
 
 1792 
 
 12 13 
 11 10 
 
 13 14 
 
 
 13 
 12 
 
 15 
 14 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 86 
 105 
 
 35 37 
 31 32 
 
 Do 
 

 
 15 
 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 COCHINEAL. 
 
 COPPER 
 
 FLAX. 
 
 Bengal and Surat. 
 1 Duty. 
 
 Spanish, gi 
 
 trbled. 
 Duty. 
 
 British, 
 In cakes or 
 unmanufac. 
 
 St. Peters 
 12 Head. 
 
 burg. 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 13 14 
 11 11 
 10 11 
 
 s. d. 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 12 6 14 6 
 
 13 6 15 6 
 12 14 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 3 
 
 cwt. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 105 110 
 112 114 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 31 32 
 36 39 
 uncertain. 
 33 35 
 
 s. d. 
 Free 
 
 1794 
 
 10 11 
 9 Oil 
 10 11£ 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 6 14 
 12 13 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 None till 
 August. 
 109 6 
 
 33 35 
 28 32 
 38 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 11 11 
 15 1 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 6 14 
 18 19 
 15 6 16 
 
 Free. 
 
 109 6 
 
 38 42 
 54 56 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 17 1 10 
 11 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 6 18 
 14 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 109 '6 
 120 
 
 52 55 
 54 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 10 15 
 18 1 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 17 
 23 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 120 
 
 54 57 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 44 45 
 
 48 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 1798 
 
 18 1 11 
 2 2 2 
 
 41. 
 per cent, 
 on value. 
 
 28 30 
 52 54 
 26 29 
 
 10 
 
 120 
 
 51 53 
 49 50 
 
 52 54 
 
 21 
 per 
 ton. 
 
 1799 
 
 2 2 2 4 
 2 4 2 5 
 11 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 29 30 
 45 46 
 18 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 120 
 140 
 
 52 54 
 
 62 64 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 66 69 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 10 14 
 13 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 20 
 16 6 19 
 24 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 140 
 160 
 
 64 67 
 70 71 
 62 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 15 16 
 12 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 27 
 15 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 160 
 
 73 74 
 
 78 79 
 57 58 
 64 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 1802 
 
 13 16 
 10 12 
 10 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 19 
 16 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 160 None 
 for 4 months 
 
 130 140 
 130 
 
 65 66 
 63 64 
 
 76 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 lb 
 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 COCHINEAL. 
 
 COPPER 
 
 FLAX. 
 
 
 Be 
 
 ;?oW flflc? Surat. 
 
 ■ 
 
 Spanisl 
 
 , garbled. 
 
 British, 
 In cakes or 
 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 unmanufac 
 
 12 Head. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 ton. 
 
 
 
 s 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. s. 
 
 d 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. s. 
 
 1. 1. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 1 2 
 
 16 8 
 
 15 
 
 6 18 
 
 (1 
 
 
 
 
 3 3 
 
 1803 
 
 
 
 9 
 9 
 
 1 2 
 1 
 
 per 
 100 1b. 
 
 23 
 
 22 
 
 26 
 
 25 
 
 C 
 
 c 
 
 111 
 
 130 140 
 140 
 
 83 84 
 78 82 
 
 v o 8 
 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 1804 |j 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 1 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 18 
 26 
 
 25 
 20 
 29 
 
 
 
 ( 
 
 
 
 1 01 
 
 140 
 156 
 165 
 
 80 82 
 82 83 
 
 3f 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 1805 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 1 3 
 1 5 
 
 16 101 
 
 per 
 1001b. 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 1 1 
 
 165 
 200 
 
 80 82 
 70 74 
 
 72 75 
 
 4 
 per 
 
 cwt. 
 
 1806 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 2 
 10 
 11 
 
 ] 5 
 1 
 1 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 
 22 
 
 30 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 1 l a 
 
 1 x i 
 
 200 
 
 182 
 
 71i 72i 
 63 64 
 67 68 
 
 41 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 70 
 
 
 1807 |o 
 
 10 
 11 
 
 1 2 
 1 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 
 19 
 
 29 
 30 
 
 
 
 (i 
 
 Do. 
 
 162 
 147 
 
 72 75 . 
 65 68 
 75 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808^ 
 
 9 
 5 
 
 1 1 
 
 1 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 24 
 
 31 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 147 
 200 
 
 75 80 
 140 142 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 1 9 
 
 16 11 
 
 25 
 391 
 
 30 
 36 
 
 
 
 n 
 
 
 uncertain 
 
 140 142 
 
 4 
 
 1809 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 9 
 
 
 1 2 
 1 4 
 
 per 
 1001b. 
 
 26 
 34 
 30 
 
 32 
 36 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 till April. 
 160 
 
 uncertain. 
 105 107 
 98 100 
 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 1810 
 
 I 
 
 ) 
 
 1 
 6 
 
 1 6 
 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 
 31 
 
 42 
 35 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 160 
 uncertain. 
 
 98 100 
 68 70 
 71 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
 4 
 6 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 
 29 
 
 35 
 31 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 150 156 
 140 146 
 
 72 74 
 100 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 29 
 
 32 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 140 146 
 130 135 
 
 103 105 
 95 100 
 103 108 
 
 Do.
 
 17 
 
 
 COTTON WOOL. 
 
 COCHINEAL. 
 
 COPPER 
 
 FLAX. 
 
 
 
 Bengal 
 
 and Surat* 
 
 
 Spanish 
 
 garbled. 
 
 British, 
 In cakes or 
 
 St. Petersburg. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 unrnanufac 
 
 12 Head. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 ton. 
 
 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 S. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. s. 
 
 I. 1. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 313 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 10 
 10 
 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 11 
 3 
 6 
 
 16 11 
 
 per 
 100 lb. 
 
 32 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 2 41 
 
 130 135 
 
 100 102 
 75 78 
 96 100 
 83 90 
 
 4| 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 314 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 10 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 6 
 5 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 47 
 34 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 38 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 None 
 till Dec. 
 140 
 
 83 90 
 63 68 
 
 68 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 130 
 
 
 315 
 
 
 
 II 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 10 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 till July, 
 
 then 
 
 8 7 
 
 32 
 37 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 
 40 
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 130 140 
 120 130 
 
 70 72 
 76 78 
 68 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 316 
 
 
 
 I 
 
 11 
 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 23 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 28 
 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 120 130 
 
 uncert. from 
 Aug.toNov. 
 
 85 
 
 68 70 
 43 45 
 50 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 317 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 1 
 1 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 34 
 30 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 105 
 133 
 
 52 54 
 69 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 318 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 91 
 6 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 28 
 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 32 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 133 
 123 
 No price 
 
 69 70 
 65 66 
 
 70 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 31 
 
 
 
 
 after Apr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 72 
 
 
 319 
 
 
 
 
 
 61 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 01 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 30 
 
 (1 
 
 
 2 6 
 
 No price. 
 
 None. 
 55 59 
 50 51 
 60 61 
 49 50 
 
 5 
 per 
 cwt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *20 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 51 
 
 °4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 91 
 
 ^4 
 
 9f 
 7i 
 
 6/. 
 per cent, 
 on value. 
 
 26 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 55 
 48 50 
 52 54 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 53 
 
 
 {21 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 8| 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 °4 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 52 
 
 
 ::22 
 
 
 
 [0 
 
 51 
 
 °4 
 43 
 
 ^4 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 
 18 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 In June 
 
 105 
 
 95 
 
 50 52 
 44 45 
 49 50 
 
 Do.
 
 18 
 
 
 HEMP. 
 
 INDIGO. 
 
 St. Pete 
 Clean. 
 
 rsburg. 
 Duty. 
 
 Spanish Cat 
 
 •accas. 
 Duty. 
 
 E 
 
 Superior. 
 
 ast India. 
 Inferior. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 31± 33 
 33^ 36 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 73 4 
 
 or 
 
 3 8 
 
 per cwt 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 9 17 
 10 19 
 
 s. d. 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 6 6 8 
 9 10 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 5 6 
 6 6 6 
 
 s. d. 
 
 o y 
 
 per It 
 
 1783 
 
 34 37 
 24i 27i 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 19 
 11 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 10 
 6 8 
 
 4 5 
 6 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 2 H 2 H 
 
 29^ 32A 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 14 
 7 10 
 
 
 
 6 7 
 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 6 9 
 6 7 
 
 1785 
 
 22 24 
 21 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 12 
 6 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 8 
 5 6 6 3 
 
 4 6 3 
 19 3 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 16 17 
 32 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 10 6 
 
 7 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 7 
 5 6 6 6 
 
 2 6 4 6 
 
 3 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 31 34 
 28 30 
 33 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 9 11 
 
 7 6 7 9 
 
 No fine. 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 8 
 9 9 6 
 6 7 6 
 
 4 6 6 
 3 5 
 2 9 4 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 39 40 
 28 29 
 30 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 10 6 
 6 9 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 8 
 6 3 7 9 
 
 2 9 5 
 2 3 4 6 
 
 Free 
 
 17S9 
 
 28 29 
 30 31 
 26 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 10 
 5 6 9 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 6 8 
 
 8 10 
 
 5 6 
 
 6 J 
 
 Do. 
 
 i 
 
 1790 
 
 sk| 27 
 30 31 
 23 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 9 
 
 6 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 6 9 
 5 9 3 6 
 
 16 2 9 
 3 4 6 
 
 Do 
 
 i 
 
 D<aii 
 
 1 
 
 1791 
 
 25 26 
 20 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 10 6 
 
 7 10 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 9 
 
 8 10 6 
 
 5 6 
 
 7 8 
 
 1792 
 
 23 25 
 
 24 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 11 
 6 6 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 10 6 
 8 6 10 
 
 7 8 6 
 7 8 
 
 J
 
 19 
 
 
 HEMP. 
 
 INDIGO. 
 
 
 St. Petei 
 
 Clean. 
 
 'sburg. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Spanish Caraccas. 
 Duty. 
 
 L 
 
 Superior. 
 
 'ast India. 
 Inferior. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1 
 
 26 27 
 22 23 
 
 26 27 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 73 4 
 
 or 
 
 3 8 
 
 per cwt 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 7 11 
 7 11 6 
 7 10 6 
 
 s. d. 
 Free. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 7 6 8 3 
 
 8 6 10 6 
 8 9 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 6 7 
 5 6 
 5 9 6 6 
 
 
 s. d. 
 Free. 
 
 1794 
 
 27 28 
 29 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 10 6 
 5 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 6 9 6 
 
 8 6 10 6 
 
 3 6 6 
 
 4 7 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 32 33 
 43 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 6 10 9 
 5 6 11 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 6 10 6 
 6 9 7 9 
 
 5 7 6 
 4 6 9 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 50 51 
 
 58 59 
 
 4 0A 
 per cwt 
 
 5 5 11 
 4 6 10 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 6 11 
 7 9 
 
 4 8 6 
 2 6 6 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 53 54 
 37 39 
 43 44 
 
 4 2^4 
 per cwt 
 
 4 6 11 6 
 
 5 9 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 10 
 
 7 11 6 
 
 19 5 
 3 9 6 6 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1798 
 
 35 37 
 32 34 
 
 38 41 
 
 5 2 
 per cwt 
 
 4 6 11 6 
 
 5 13- 6 
 
 22 6 
 
 per 
 
 1001b 
 
 8 6 10 6 
 11 13 6 
 
 3 9 8 
 
 4 9 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1799 
 
 34 37 
 
 46 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 13 6 
 4 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 8 6 
 11 13 9 
 
 3 9 6 6 
 
 4 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 50 51 
 
 72 77 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 12 
 
 5 12 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 9 6 
 
 9 6 12 
 
 3 6 7 6 
 
 4 9 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 80 81 
 85 86 
 43 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 12 3 
 6 6 12 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 11 6 
 
 9 9 11 3 
 
 4 9 8 
 6 9 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 1802 
 
 43 45 
 31 32 
 50 51 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 10 6 
 
 6 6 8 6 
 
 
 Do.
 
 20 
 
 
 
 HEMP. 
 
 INDIGO. 
 
 
 St. Peter 
 Clean. 
 
 sburg. 
 Duty. 
 
 Spanish Car 
 
 xccas. 
 Duty. 
 
 E 
 
 Superior. 
 
 vst India. 
 Inferior. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 1803 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 50 51 
 54 55 
 52 53 
 
 S. d. 
 
 6 2\ 
 per cwt 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 7 6 11 6 
 6 6 11 6 
 
 s. d, 
 
 14 Of 
 
 per 
 
 1001b. 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 9 10 9 
 9 6 11 3 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 7 8 9 
 6 9 
 
 s. d. 
 
 11 8| 
 
 per 
 1001b 
 
 
 1804 
 
 47 48 
 52 53 
 
 6 10£ 
 per cwt 
 
 6 6 11 6 
 8 9 12 
 
 15 7\ 
 
 per 
 1001b. 
 
 9 6 11 3 
 10 12 
 
 6 9 
 
 7 9 6 
 
 13 01 
 
 per 
 1001b 
 
 
 1805 
 
 54 56 
 48 51 
 56 57 
 
 7 
 per cwt 
 
 8 11 6 
 8 9 14 
 
 15 111 
 
 per 
 1001b 
 
 10 12 
 10 13 3 
 10 6 14 
 
 8 6 9 6 
 6 6 9 6 
 8 3 10 
 
 13 3i 
 
 per 
 100 lb 
 
 
 1806 
 
 57 58 
 51 52 
 
 57 58 
 
 7 H 
 
 per cwt 
 
 8 9 14 
 6 6 13 
 
 17 
 
 per 
 
 1001b. 
 
 11 14 
 11 14 6 
 
 8 5 10 6 
 4 10 
 
 14 if: 
 
 per 
 1001b 
 
 
 1807 
 
 62 63 
 57 58 
 65 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 13 
 5 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 6 14 6 
 9 6 12 
 
 4 10 
 3 9 
 
 14 4 
 
 per 
 
 1001b 
 
 
 1808 
 
 67 68 
 117 118 
 114 115 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 9 11 
 4 9 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 6 12 
 
 10 11 9 
 
 9 11 3 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 6 9 6 
 3 6 8 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1809 
 
 117 118 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 94 95 
 
 71 72 
 
 7 8 
 per cwt 
 
 4 8 11 8 
 4 10 6 
 4 2 11 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 6 11 2 
 9 3 10 1 
 
 8 9 10 
 
 9 6 12 
 
 3 6 9 3 
 
 4 9 2 
 2 6 7 
 4 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1810 
 
 75 76 
 
 57 58 
 68 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 8 11 5 
 8 2 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 6 12 6 
 
 10 6 14 
 
 9 6 12 
 
 4 6 9 
 6 10 
 4 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1811 
 
 68 70 
 81 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 6 14 
 4 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 12 
 8 9 6 
 8 6 10 6 
 
 3 6 9 6 
 
 2 6 7 6 
 
 3 7 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 
 
 1812 
 
 82 86 
 99 102 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 9 11 6 
 4 12 
 4 9 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 6 11 6 
 9 11 
 9 6 11 6 
 
 3 9 8 
 
 3 6 8 
 
 4 9 
 
 Do
 
 21 
 
 
 HEMP. 
 
 INDIGO. 
 
 
 St. Pete) 
 Clean. 
 
 sburg. 
 Duty. 
 
 Spanish Car 
 
 accas. 
 Duty. 
 
 E 
 
 Superior. 
 
 ast India. 
 Inferior. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 813 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 81 87 
 72 74 
 77 78 
 72 73 
 
 S. d. 
 
 9 11 
 per cwt 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 9 12 
 6 9 13 6 
 
 s. d. 
 
 4| 
 
 per lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 9 6 11 6 
 12 16 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 6 9 
 3 9 8 6 
 6 11 6 
 
 s. d. 
 
 14 4 
 
 per 
 
 1001b. 
 
 814 
 
 72 73 
 41 43 
 45 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 9 13 6 
 
 7 14 
 6 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 16 
 11 13 6 
 
 7 11 6 
 5 10 6 
 
 o i\ 
 
 per lb. 
 
 815 
 
 45 48 
 49 51 
 33 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 13 
 4 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 6 12 9 
 
 10 12 
 
 9 11 
 
 5 10 
 
 3 6 9 6 
 
 4 8 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 816 
 
 35 36 
 30 33 
 35 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 12 
 3 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 11 
 8 9 10 6 
 
 4 8 9 
 2 7 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 817 
 
 33 
 30 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 11 6 
 
 4 10 6 
 
 5 6 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 11 
 
 8 6 10 
 
 9 6 11 6 
 9 10 
 
 3 6 8 6 
 3 6 8 
 5 6 9 
 5 3 8 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 818 
 
 38 39 
 
 39 40 
 36 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 6 11 6 
 5 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 9 10 
 7 3 9 
 
 5 3 8 6 
 
 4 8 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 36 37 
 
 32 33 
 
 33 34 
 
 9 2 
 per cwt 
 
 5 10 6 
 4 10 
 
 5 
 per lb. 
 
 7 3 9 
 7 9 
 
 4 8 7 
 3 6 6 6 
 
 5 
 per lb. 
 
 .820 
 
 34 35 
 
 35 35 £ 
 30 30£ 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 11 6 
 
 None. 
 
 3 6 8 
 
 No fine. 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 9 
 
 5 6 7 10 
 
 6 4 8 
 
 3 6 6 6 
 
 2 10 5 
 
 3 9 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 821 
 
 29 30 
 27 27\ 
 39 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 9 8 
 • No fine. 
 7 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 4 8 
 8 11 9 
 
 3 9 6 
 5 6 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 822 
 
 421 43 
 28 30 
 27 
 30 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 11 6 
 6 3 11 
 
 8 3 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 10 9 
 
 8 11 
 
 9 12 
 
 5 6 7 
 3 6 7 6 
 3 9 8 6 
 
 Do.
 
 
 HOPS. 
 
 IRON. 
 
 Kent Yea 
 
 rlingSj including 
 Duty. 
 Amount of Duty. 
 
 Eng. in 
 
 Pigs. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 Russia in Bars. 
 Duty. 
 
 Swedish, in Bars. 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 30 90 
 70 135 
 
 /. s. d 
 14,895 12 3 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 6 7\ 
 
 ton. 
 1. 
 
 Hf 
 
 15| 
 
 1. s. d. 
 2 16 2 
 
 ton. 
 1. 
 
 15f 
 171 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. d 
 
 2 16 2 
 
 1783 
 
 120 210 
 90 125 
 
 75,716 14 4 
 
 6 7\ 
 4 <>i 
 
 15f 
 lOf 
 
 Do. 
 
 171 
 15J 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 80 126 
 70 105 
 
 94,389 17 6 
 
 41 ft 
 3 4 
 
 10f 
 15^ 
 
 Do. 
 
 14f 
 17-i- 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 80 118 
 96 120 
 76 108 
 
 112,684 5 2 
 
 3 5 
 5 61 
 
 12J 
 14| 
 
 Do. 
 
 14f 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 70 107 
 50 68 
 40 76 
 
 95,973 15 8 
 
 5 61 
 3 5 
 
 14 
 141 3 
 
 1H 4 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 14£ 
 14f 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 80 105 
 160 200 
 
 48,227 3 4 
 
 3 5 
 
 41 6 
 
 14f 
 15i 
 
 Do. 
 
 15| 
 15f 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 189 240 
 220 340 
 120 160 
 
 145,168 
 
 3 5 
 
 3 7 
 
 15 
 13| 
 
 Do. 
 
 15| 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 110 155 
 150 170 
 115 130 
 
 104,562 7 4 
 
 3 7 
 
 4 7 
 
 13f 
 14| 
 
 Do. 
 
 15| 
 
 \6l 
 
 Do. 1 
 
 1790 
 1791 
 
 95 120 
 
 60 80 
 
 106,541 9 4 
 
 3 7 
 51 71 
 
 J 2 '2 
 
 13 
 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 17 
 
 Do. 1 
 
 80 120 
 
 105 140 
 
 80 105 
 
 90,059 4 1 
 
 ^2 '2 
 
 5 71 
 
 14| 
 14| 
 
 Do. 
 
 15| 
 154- 
 
 Do. 
 
 1792 
 
 80 105 
 50 60 
 56 105 
 
 162,112 19 4 
 
 5 71 
 
 14| 
 15f 
 14| 
 
 Do. 
 
 164- 
 171 
 
 Do.
 
 23 
 
 
 HOPS. 
 
 IRON. 
 
 
 Kent Yea 
 
 rlings, including 
 Duty. 
 Amount of Duty. 
 
 Eng. in 
 
 Pigs. 
 No Duty. 
 
 Russia i 
 
 n Bars. 
 Duty. 
 
 Swedish 
 
 in Bars. 
 Duty. 
 
 793 
 
 cvot. 
 s. s. 
 
 56 112 
 140 230 
 120 200 
 
 /. 5. d. 
 22,619 12 4 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 5 7i 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 14 
 15 
 15| 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 2 16 2 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 16| 
 18J 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 2 16 2 
 
 1794 
 
 200 252 
 
 50 80 
 
 205,063 2 
 
 5 8 
 
 12f 
 15| 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 70 105 
 90 120 
 
 82,348 19 3 
 
 5 8 
 
 13 15| 
 
 16 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 15| 16 
 16$ 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 84. 105 
 56 75 
 
 75,223 16 5 
 
 5 8 
 
 161 171 
 211 221 
 
 3 1 9^ 
 
 171 191 
 
 21| 22f 
 
 o i y-^TT 
 
 1797 
 
 94 130 
 130 175 
 100 112 
 
 157,438 12 3 
 
 5 8 
 
 20 21 
 
 21 20f 
 
 3 4 7A 
 
 21 214 
 
 22 23 
 20 214 
 
 3 4 7£r 
 
 L798 
 
 90 115 
 164 180 
 
 56,032 1 6£ 
 
 5 8 
 
 201 21f 
 19| 201 
 
 3 15 5^ 
 
 22 23 
 21 22 
 
 3 15 5A 
 
 1799 
 
 210 215 
 300 378 
 
 73,279 15 3 
 
 5 8 
 
 20 21f 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 320 353 
 
 235 300 
 310 360 
 
 72,928 7 6 
 
 5 8 
 5| 9 
 
 17 21 
 211 231 
 
 Do. 
 
 214 23 
 224 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 220 320 
 
 50 86 
 
 241,227 8 6 
 
 .H 9 
 
 22f 23^ 
 23| 264 
 
 18 22-J 
 
 Do. 
 
 224 234 
 254 264 
 204 224 
 
 Do. 
 
 1802 
 
 76 110 
 210 252 
 130 180 
 
 Old, 
 15,463 10 6 
 
 51 9 
 
 181 224 
 15f 201 
 
 Do. 
 
 204 224 
 194 204 
 
 Do.
 
 24 
 
 1803 
 
 HOPS. 
 
 Kent Year/ings, including 
 Duty. 
 Amount of Old Duty 
 
 cvot. 
 s. s. 
 
 205 230 
 90 100 
 
 /. s. d. 
 
 199,205 1 11 
 
 Eng. in 
 
 Pigs. 
 No Duty. 
 
 ton. 
 I. I. 
 
 51 9 
 
 7 9 
 
 IRON. 
 
 Russia in Bars. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 ton. 
 I. I. 
 
 16 20 
 
 ton. 
 I. s. d 
 
 4 4 4, 
 
 Sivedish in Bars. 
 Duty. 
 
 ton. 
 I. I. 
 
 20 
 22 
 
 ton. 
 I. s. d. 
 
 4 4 44 
 
 1804 
 
 92 126 
 110 130 
 
 60 84 
 
 177,617 9 9 7 9 
 
 1805 
 
 74 105 
 
 120 147 
 
 95 116 
 
 1806 
 
 116 155 
 86 102 
 
 32,904 12 8 
 
 153,102 15 11 
 
 7 9 
 
 19J 
 
 184 
 
 4 17 1 
 
 7 ^9 
 
 19 
 194 
 
 5 1 
 
 204 21 
 20 21 
 
 4 17 1 
 
 154- 194 
 
 5 7 5| 
 
 19 21 
 194 20- 
 
 5 1 
 
 194 20,' 
 
 5 7 5| 
 
 1807 
 
 88 115 
 120 150 
 
 100,071 15 2 
 
 7 9 
 
 204 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 194 204 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 1809 
 
 1810 
 
 112 140 
 60 80 
 
 251,089 15 7 
 
 75 115 
 
 84 135 63,952 
 
 60 110 
 
 90 147 
 76 125 
 95 140 
 
 1811 
 
 1812 
 
 115 192 
 130 160 
 100 147 
 
 estimated 
 70,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 144 194 
 
 Do. 
 
 194 20 
 174 1&4 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 9 
 
 1810 
 
 73,514 7 
 
 1811, estimated 
 
 140,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 120 160 
 
 140 230| 
 260 280 
 
 1811 
 
 157,085 19 5 
 
 1812, estimated 
 
 25,000 
 
 14* 
 
 191 
 
 5 9 4 
 
 14* 
 
 191 
 
 7 9 
 
 7 9 
 
 141 
 
 181 
 
 141 
 
 ISA 
 191 
 
 Do. 
 
 174- 18 
 154 174 
 
 5 9 4 
 
 154 174 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 154 174 
 
 154 174 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do.
 
 25 
 
 
 HOPS. 
 
 IRON. 
 
 Kent Yet 
 
 xrlings, including 
 Duty. 
 Amount of Old Duty. 
 
 En pr. in 
 Pigs. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 Russia in Bars. 
 
 1 Duty. 
 
 Sivedish 
 
 in Bars, 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1813 
 
 out. 
 s. s. 
 
 260 360 
 340 420 
 200 240 
 
 /. s. d. 
 
 1812 
 
 30,633 10 2 
 
 1813, estimated 
 
 130,000 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 7 9 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 161 19^ 
 12^ 16J 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 6 9 10 
 
 ton. 
 I. 1. 
 
 15£ 171 
 
 161 171 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 6 9 10 
 
 1814 
 
 140 200 
 160 189 
 140 175 
 
 1813 
 131,481 2 7 
 1814, estimated 
 137,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 12| 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 161 171 
 151 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 1815 
 
 160 215 
 
 180 280 
 168 250 
 
 1814 
 140,202 6 1 
 1815, estimated 
 110,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 12| 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 151 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 1816 
 
 120 180 
 
 280 360 
 
 1815 
 
 123,878 16 3 
 
 1816, estimated 
 
 40,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 1 91 1 71 
 
 131 161 
 121 ]§i 
 
 Do. 
 
 151 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 1817 
 
 290 400 
 500 640 
 340 500 
 600 700 
 
 1816 
 46,302 15 9 
 1817, estimated 
 68,000 
 
 7 9 
 
 121 151 
 161 211 
 
 Do. 
 
 151 161 
 
 None. 
 151 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 1818 
 
 540 640 
 110 185 
 
 1817 
 
 66,522 2 6 
 
 1818, estimated 
 
 200,000 
 
 7 9 
 7\ 9 
 
 7 7\ 
 
 8 9 
 
 161 211 
 151 211 
 18 21 
 20 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 151 161 
 181 191 
 16 17 
 
 18 181 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 112 180 
 76 100 
 
 1818 
 199,465 13 6 
 1819, estimated 
 200,000 
 
 8i 91 
 8 9 
 
 20 24 
 17 21 
 
 6 10 
 
 18 19 
 161 171 
 
 6 10 
 
 1820 
 
 76 100 
 70 95 
 80 112 
 70 100 
 
 1819 
 
 242,076 2 2 
 
 1820, estimated 
 
 120,000 
 
 * 
 
 8| 9 
 71 8f 
 
 17 21 
 161 20J 
 141 191 
 
 Do. 
 
 161 l7 i 
 16 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 1821 
 
 70 110 
 63 90 
 63 105 
 
 1820 
 138,330 
 
 1821 
 154,609 10 8 
 
 6 7\ 
 
 6 7 
 
 15 20 
 141 161 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 17 
 151 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 1822 
 
 63 112 
 80 112 
 60 90 
 60 105 
 
 1822 
 203,724 1 1 9 
 
 6 H 
 6 7 
 
 141 16 
 161 181 
 
 Do. 
 
 151 161 
 14 15 
 
 Do.
 
 26 
 
 
 LEAD. 
 
 MADDERS. 
 
 OILS. 
 
 English in 
 
 Pigs free on 
 
 board. 
 
 Dm 
 
 Gamene 
 
 ch 
 
 to Crop. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Gall 
 
 ipoli. 
 Duty. 
 
 Eng 
 No 
 Linseed 
 
 'lish. 
 Duty. 
 Rape. 
 
 Greenl. uithout 
 Casks. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 Fodder of 
 19^ cut. 
 
 18/. 
 19 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 30 70 
 35 100 
 
 cut. 
 s. d. 
 
 9 
 
 per tan 
 236 gall. 
 
 361. 371 
 
 45 48 
 
 per tun 
 252 gall. 
 
 71. 95. 5d. 
 
 236 gal 
 I. 1. 
 
 35 36 
 41 42 
 
 236 gal 
 I. 1. 
 
 24 26 
 
 28 29 
 
 252 gal 
 I. 1. 
 
 25 26 
 
 28 29 
 
 252 gal 
 s. d. 
 
 12 2 
 
 1783 
 
 201 
 17* 
 
 35 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 45 46 
 
 41 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 43 
 46 47 
 
 26 29 
 36 37 
 
 21 22 
 
 28 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 16 I7i 
 18 181 
 
 30 75 
 40 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 39 40 
 51 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 43 
 34 36 
 
 38 39 
 None. 
 29 34 
 
 29 30 
 19 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 
 40 80 
 
 41 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 51 
 40 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 39 40 
 29 30 
 
 38 42 
 36 37 
 
 26 27 
 20 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 17| 
 
 181 
 
 40 85 
 70 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 41 
 
 47 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 35 
 
 S6± 
 
 32 
 
 39 
 
 21 22 
 17 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 184 
 224- 
 
 31 100 
 66 121 
 30 120 
 
 After 
 May 
 free. 
 
 34 
 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 
 40 
 35 
 
 36 
 26 
 
 16 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 224- 
 
 24 
 
 091 
 
 40 120 
 
 22 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 36 
 39 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 35 
 36 38 
 33 34 
 
 24 25 
 23 24 
 
 17 18 
 15 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 224- 
 201 
 
 20 110 
 25 120 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 44 
 38 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 35 
 
 27 28 
 
 24 25 
 29 30 
 24 25 
 
 16 17 
 18 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 1790 
 
 m 
 
 184 
 
 25 120 
 
 30 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 39 
 40 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 31 
 
 27 28 
 
 34 36 
 
 27 28 
 
 17 18 
 21 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 18| 
 204 
 
 30 90 
 35 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 40 
 36 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 30 
 26 27 
 
 28 29 
 33 34 
 30 31 
 
 17 19 
 23 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 1792 
 
 1 
 
 204 
 
 35 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 37 
 41 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 274- 
 
 28 29 
 
 31 32 
 39 40 
 
 23 24 
 25 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 1
 
 27 
 
 
 LEAD 
 
 . MADDERS. 
 
 OILS. 
 
 English in 
 
 
 Dutch 
 
 
 
 
 
 Englis) 
 No Duti 
 
 t. \Greenl. without 
 
 
 Pigs free or 
 
 Gamene to Crop 
 
 
 Gallipoli. 
 
 
 
 
 Casks. 
 
 
 board. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Linseed 
 
 Rape. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1 
 
 
 Fodder of 
 
 civt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 pe> 
 
 tun 
 
 per tun 
 
 236 gat 
 
 236 ga 
 
 1 252 gat 
 
 '252 gal 
 
 
 19^ clot. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 236 
 
 gall. 
 
 252 gall 
 
 I. 
 
 /. 
 
 I. 
 
 I. 
 
 I. 
 
 /. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 After 
 
 42/. 46/ 
 
 
 29 
 27 
 
 30 
 
 28 
 
 39 
 
 40 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 
 1793 
 
 20#. 
 
 35 
 
 90 
 
 May 
 
 56 
 
 58 
 
 71. 9s. 5d 
 
 44 
 
 46 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 12 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 free. 
 
 53 
 
 54 
 
 
 34 
 
 35 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 
 1794 
 
 20| 
 
 18 
 
 30 
 25 
 35 
 
 90 
 
 80 
 
 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 56 
 50 
 
 60 
 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 29 
 
 38 
 
 30 
 40 
 
 35 
 42 
 38 
 
 36 
 44 
 40 
 
 23 
 25 
 
 24 
 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 in 
 
 21 
 
 40 
 26 
 
 106 
 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 47 
 65 
 
 48 
 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 
 50 
 44 
 
 42 
 52 
 46 
 
 38 
 
 58 
 
 40 
 60 
 
 25 
 36 
 
 27 
 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 214- 
 
 204 
 
 40 
 30 
 
 100 
 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 65 
 
 46 
 
 67 
 
 48 
 
 7 7 944 
 
 46 
 51 
 
 47 
 52 
 
 60 
 32 
 36 
 
 62 
 33 
 
 38 
 
 36 
 29 
 35 
 
 38 
 30 
 36 
 
 12 94V 
 
 1797 
 
 194 
 
 30 
 16 
 
 95 
 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 51 
 
 65 
 
 52 
 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 
 35 
 
 52 
 37 
 
 38 
 30 
 34 
 
 40 
 31 
 35 
 
 36 
 28 
 31 
 
 38 
 29 
 32 
 
 13 444 
 
 
 194 
 
 19 
 
 16 
 
 90 
 
 
 65 
 
 68 
 
 
 35 
 34 
 
 36 
 35 
 
 34 
 
 35 
 
 30 
 
 31 
 
 
 1798 
 
 12 
 
 85 
 
 2 3 
 
 70 
 
 71 
 
 9 4 1144 
 
 29 
 
 30 
 
 27 
 
 2S 
 
 30 244 
 
 
 15 
 
 93 
 
 
 60 
 
 63 
 
 
 34 
 
 35 
 
 30 
 
 31 
 
 
 1799 
 
 204- 
 21 
 
 15 
 50 
 20 
 
 95 
 110 
 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 66 
 75 
 64 
 
 68 
 77 
 65 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 
 48 
 
 34 
 51 
 
 33 
 63 
 
 34 
 64 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 27 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 224- 
 25 
 
 28 
 23 
 
 108 
 113 
 
 Do. 
 
 65 
 59 
 
 66 
 62 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 
 48 
 51 
 
 53 
 49 
 52 
 
 53 
 
 57 
 
 64 
 59 
 
 25 
 40 
 
 26 
 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 25 
 
 28 
 
 23 
 43 
 23 
 
 108 
 116 
 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 59 
 61 
 
 60 
 63 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 
 46 
 54 
 
 54 
 
 47 
 55 
 
 57 
 46 
 
 59 
 47 
 
 42 
 49 
 45 
 
 46 
 50 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 28 
 33^ 
 
 23 
 
 118 
 
 
 61 
 
 63 
 
 
 54 
 
 47 
 
 55 
 
 48 
 
 46 
 
 47 
 
 40 
 
 42 
 
 
 1802 
 
 20 
 
 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 
 
 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 
 
 37 
 
 31 
 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 23 
 
 110 
 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 33 
 
 34 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 LEAD. 
 
 MADDERS. 
 
 
 
 OILS. 
 
 
 - 
 
 English in 
 J igs free on 
 
 Dutch 1 
 
 
 
 E 
 
 nslish. 
 
 \Greenl. without 
 
 ] 
 
 Gamene to Crop 
 
 
 Gallipoli. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 
 
 Casks. 
 
 
 board. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Linseed. 
 
 Rap 
 
 e. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Fodder of 
 
 cvot. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 per 
 
 tun 
 
 per tun 
 
 236 gall. ! 
 
 236 
 
 cral 
 
 252 
 
 gal'. 
 
 252 gat, 
 
 
 19^ cut. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 236 gall. 
 
 252 gall. 
 
 /. 
 
 1. 
 
 /. 
 
 I. 
 
 /. 
 
 1. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1803 
 
 33^. 
 33 
 
 21 107 
 20 102 
 
 3 
 
 631. 
 
 66 
 
 53 
 
 641. 
 
 68 
 
 54 
 
 1. s. d. 
 10 16 6 
 
 47 
 64 
 55 
 
 48 
 65 
 56 
 
 41 
 
 50 
 45 
 
 42 
 51 
 46 
 
 32 
 
 38 
 
 34 
 40 
 
 13 9j 
 
 1804 
 
 33 
 
 22 102 
 17 76 
 
 3 4 
 
 51 
 70 
 
 52 
 73 
 
 12 74- 
 
 55 
 
 49 
 
 56 
 .50 
 
 44 
 61 
 
 47 
 62 
 
 36 
 34 
 
 37 
 35 
 
 13 It 
 
 1805 
 
 344- 
 40 
 39 
 41 
 
 17 96 
 
 13 87 
 
 3 5 
 
 70 
 68 
 74 
 
 74 
 70 
 75 
 
 12 5 5 
 
 48 
 44 
 
 50 
 46 
 
 61 
 65 
 51 
 
 62 
 67 
 52 
 
 34 
 38 
 31 
 
 35 
 40 
 32 
 
 13 4ji 
 
 1806 
 
 41 
 38 
 
 17 96 
 
 3 8 
 
 73 
 63 
 
 76 
 66 
 
 13 1 5^ 
 
 39 
 48 
 36 
 
 42 
 50 
 37 
 
 51 
 34 
 
 54 
 35 
 
 27 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 27 
 
 14 3- 
 
 1807 
 
 38 
 30 
 
 17 96 
 
 18 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 64 
 
 68 
 
 67 
 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 
 46 
 40 
 
 37 
 
 47 
 43 
 
 36 
 30 
 
 37 
 31 
 
 26 
 21 
 
 28 
 22 
 
 Do 
 
 
 
 46 86 
 
 
 69 
 84 
 68 
 
 70 
 
 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 
 1808 
 
 28 
 43 
 
 46 170 
 17 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 
 94 
 
 47 
 95 
 
 32 
 56 
 
 33 
 57 
 
 28 
 25 
 
 30 
 26 
 
 Do 
 
 
 
 27 125 
 
 
 / i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 37 
 
 
 1809 
 
 43 
 
 38 
 
 36 136 
 16 116 
 
 4 
 
 67 
 77 
 70 
 61 
 
 70 
 
 78 
 71 
 65 
 
 13 3 4 
 
 94 
 
 168 
 
 75 
 
 88 
 
 95 
 
 170 
 
 76 
 
 90 
 
 56 
 
 72 
 59 
 
 57 
 73 
 60 
 
 36 
 34 
 42 
 
 37 
 35 
 
 45 
 
 7 
 
 1810 
 
 35 
 38 
 33 
 
 36 126 
 26 111 
 
 Do. 
 
 64 
 
 58 
 
 66 
 59 
 
 Do. 
 
 88 
 51 
 
 90 
 52 
 
 59 
 61 
 57 
 
 60 
 64 
 
 58 
 
 38 
 43 
 40 
 
 39 
 44 
 41 
 
 Do 
 
 1811 
 
 33 34 
 
 274- 
 
 26 111 
 46 135 
 
 Do. 
 
 57 
 69 
 
 59 
 73 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 
 48 
 64 
 
 55 
 49 
 65 
 
 57 
 62 
 46 
 66 
 
 58 
 63 
 48 
 67 
 
 42 
 31 
 
 46 
 33 
 
 Do 
 
 1812 
 
 274- 
 
 30 
 
 29 
 
 46 13C 
 105 200 
 
 None. 
 105 235 
 
 Do. 
 
 75 
 87 
 69 
 
 77 
 88 
 97 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 
 54 
 
 61 
 55 
 
 66 
 79 
 76 
 
 68 
 
 80 
 
 78 
 
 34 
 42 
 35 
 
 35 
 43 
 36 
 
 Do 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 29 
 
 
 LEAD. 
 
 MADDERS. 
 
 OILS. 
 
 
 English in 
 
 Dutch 
 
 
 
 English. 
 
 ( 
 
 jfreenl. without 
 
 
 Pigs free on 
 
 Gamene to Crop. 
 
 Gallipoli. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 
 Casks. 
 
 
 board. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 I 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Linseed. 1 
 
 Rap 
 
 e. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Fodder of \ 
 
 CUlt. 
 
 cvot. 
 
 per tun 
 
 per tun 
 
 236 gal\ 
 
 236 gall. 
 
 252 gal 
 
 252 gal 
 
 
 1 9^ civt. 
 
 s s . 
 Hardly 
 
 s. d. 
 
 236 gall. 
 
 252 gall. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 I. 1. 
 
 1. 
 
 /. 
 
 I. 1. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 291. 
 
 any at 
 
 
 83/. 85/. 
 
 
 54 55 
 
 76 
 
 78 
 
 44 45 
 
 
 =513 
 
 29 31 
 
 market 
 
 4 9 
 
 95 97 
 
 15 12 84 
 
 SO 82 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 36 40 
 
 8 3| 
 
 
 29 30 
 
 bef. Dec 
 
 
 85 90 
 
 
 74 75 
 
 63 
 
 64 
 
 56 60 
 
 
 
 
 80 145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 30 32 
 
 55 128 
 
 87 90 
 
 
 80 82 
 46 48 
 
 55 
 
 58 
 
 57 58 
 
 
 R14 
 
 33 34 
 
 60 138 Free. 
 
 58 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 
 
 36 
 
 33 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 28 30 
 
 63 103 
 
 65 68 
 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 42 43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 42 43 
 
 
 815 
 
 28 
 25 
 
 40 115 
 50 124 
 30 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 69 70 
 
 76 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 
 53 
 44 
 
 48 
 34 
 
 50 
 
 36 
 
 32 33 
 
 44 45 
 34 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 816 
 
 25 
 18 
 19 
 
 30 105 
 36 100 
 30 120 
 
 5/. per 
 cent.on 
 value. 
 
 75 76 
 60 61 
 
 82 83 
 
 Do. 
 
 44 
 38 
 56 
 
 35 
 57 
 
 37 
 61 
 
 35 
 22 
 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 83 85 
 
 
 56 
 
 57 
 
 58 
 
 35 38 
 
 
 817 
 
 18 
 26 
 
 30 126 
 46 147 
 
 Do. 
 
 80 81 
 
 84 86 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 
 53 
 49 
 
 42 
 70 
 64 
 
 43 
 72 
 65 
 
 30 31 
 
 58 59 
 
 Do. 
 
 818 
 
 26 
 24 
 26 
 
 46 140 
 35 130 
 35 142 
 
 Do. 
 
 84 86 
 67 73 
 
 85 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 
 43 
 
 58 
 46 
 56 
 54 
 
 60 
 48 
 58 
 55 
 
 58 59 
 33 34 
 41 42 
 37 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 819 
 
 27 
 23 
 
 28 
 
 35 135 
 
 25 120 
 30 100 
 
 5 
 
 85 90 
 57 58 
 66 67 
 59 60 
 
 15 13 
 
 43 
 41 
 
 54 
 45 
 
 48 
 38 
 
 55 
 46 
 49 
 39 
 
 36 37 
 
 32 33 
 38 39 
 
 33 34 
 
 8 3 
 
 
 234 
 
 35 80 
 
 
 58 61 
 
 
 38 39 
 31 32 
 
 40 
 
 41 
 
 30 
 
 
 820 
 
 23 
 
 15 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 
 
 48 
 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 234 
 
 15 88 
 
 
 54 55 
 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 234 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 554 56 
 45 
 504 
 
 
 31 
 
 27 
 29 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 821 
 
 234 
 
 22i 
 
 15 90 
 15 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 
 41 
 
 39 
 42 
 
 25 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 48 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 19 90 
 
 
 504- 
 
 
 31 
 28 
 30 
 29 
 
 42 
 
 43 
 
 22 
 19 
 
 28 
 26 
 
 
 822 
 
 224 
 
 20 77 
 
 Do. 
 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 29 
 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 23 
 
 15 SO 
 
 
 42 43 
 
 
 '- 
 
 2 

 
 
 
 
 
 SO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 RICE. 
 
 Irish mess 
 
 Beef. 
 No Duty. 
 
 Irish mess 
 
 Pork. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 Waterford. 
 No Duty. 
 
 Butter. 
 Dutch. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Care 
 
 Una. 
 Duty. 
 
 Ben 
 
 gal. 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 tierce, 
 s. s. 
 76 80 
 80 84 
 75 82 
 
 barrel. 
 
 s. s. 
 55 56 
 54 55 
 
 57 58 
 
 cvot. 
 s. s. 
 
 56 58 
 54 56 
 
 cvot. 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 cvot. 
 s. d. 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 22 24 
 30 31 
 
 cu-t. 
 s. d. 
 
 7 4 
 
 cvot. 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 cvot. 
 s. d. 
 
 1783 
 
 80 88 
 60 65 
 
 58 60 
 45 50 
 
 57 58 
 53 54 
 60 61 
 
 None. 
 
 
 32 
 
 23 
 30 
 
 33 
 25 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1784 
 
 60 65 
 60 
 70 
 
 45 50 
 65 70 
 
 68 70 
 54 55 
 60 61 
 
 None. 
 
 
 26 
 20 
 
 27 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1785 
 
 66 70 
 70 72 
 
 65 70 
 60 67 
 
 58 59 
 53 54 
 63 64 
 
 None. 
 
 
 19 
 13 
 16 
 
 20 
 15 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1786 
 
 70 72 
 76 77 
 66 68 
 75 78 
 
 66 67 
 63 65 
 65 70 
 
 61 62 
 54 56 
 63 64 
 
 None. 
 
 
 16 
 20 
 
 18 
 
 17 
 21 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1787 
 
 75 78 
 
 76 80 
 uncertain. 
 
 75 82 
 
 65 70 
 
 59 63 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 55 58 
 
 62 64 
 47 50 
 52 57 
 
 None. 
 
 2 6 
 
 17186 
 18 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1788 
 
 75 82 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 70 75 
 
 56 58 
 
 58 60 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 40 50 
 
 52 55 
 47 50 
 51 53 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 14 
 
 19 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1789 
 
 70 75 
 65 73 
 
 40 50 
 44 46 
 
 50 52 
 
 46 48 
 50 52 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 17 
 16 
 
 15 
 19 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1790 
 
 65 75 
 
 76 80 
 
 50 52 
 45 50 
 55 60 
 
 51 55 
 66 70 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 14 
 
 18 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1791 
 
 74 78 
 76 82 
 70 75 
 
 55 60 
 60 63 
 
 56 58 
 
 66 70 
 47 49 
 69 70 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 16 
 
 15 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1792 
 
 70 75 
 63 70 
 75 90 
 
 58 60 
 68 70 
 
 69 70 
 44 47 
 64 66 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1415 6 
 
 18 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 

 
 31 
 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 RICE. 
 
 
 Irish 
 
 mess 
 
 Iris] 
 
 mess 
 
 
 Butter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Waterford. 
 
 
 
 
 Carolina. 
 
 Bengal. 
 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 No] 
 
 Duty. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 Dutch. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 tierce. 
 
 barrel. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 L793 
 
 75 
 100 
 
 90 
 105 
 
 67 
 70 
 
 70 
 
 72 
 
 62 
 70 
 
 68 
 
 65 
 75 
 70 
 
 None. 
 
 2 6 
 
 18 
 15 
 
 19 
 16 
 
 7 4 
 
 None. 
 
 
 1794 
 
 105 
 92 
 
 115 
 100 
 
 74 
 63 
 
 75 
 66 
 
 68 
 70 
 
 72 
 76 
 
 68 
 60 
 
 76 
 
 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 
 22 
 
 18 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 795 
 
 92 
 95 
 90 
 
 100 
 110 
 110 
 
 63 
 
 75 
 
 66 
 
 84 
 
 72 
 80 
 74 
 
 76 
 81 
 76 
 
 58 
 
 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 41 43 
 36 
 45 
 
 37 
 
 7 4 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 then 
 
 Free. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 796 
 
 95 
 110 
 
 110 
 125 
 
 80 
 95 
 
 84 
 
 82 
 105 
 105 
 
 74 
 
 78 
 
 76 
 
 80 
 
 58 
 73 
 
 75 
 86 
 
 2 7| 
 
 38 
 20 
 
 42 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 25 
 10 15 
 
 Free. 
 
 797 
 
 110 
 130 
 
 125 
 140 
 
 84 
 90 
 90 
 
 105 
 
 115 
 
 95 
 
 76 
 85 
 70 
 
 77 
 88 
 73 
 
 78 
 66 
 
 88 
 
 77 
 
 2 9 
 
 20 
 16 
 23 
 18 
 
 21 
 17 
 24 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 15 
 9 11 
 
 11 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 798 
 
 130 
 140 
 
 140 
 147 
 
 90 
 
 95 
 
 73 
 
 60 
 
 74 
 
 63 
 
 67 
 36 
 
 78 
 54 
 
 2 9 
 and 3/. 
 
 17 
 15 
 
 18 
 16 
 
 6 
 
 10 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 110 
 
 130 
 
 65 
 
 71 
 
 78 
 
 80 
 
 62 
 
 78 
 
 percent 
 on val. 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 
 16 18 
 
 
 799 
 
 105 
 110 
 
 126 
 130 
 
 50 
 
 85 
 
 70 
 95 
 
 78 
 93 
 
 82 
 95 
 
 60 
 
 96 
 
 75 
 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 38 
 
 17 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 16 
 11 14 
 
 36 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 110 
 
 130 
 
 85 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 
 105 
 
 100 
 
 108 
 
 
 38 
 41 
 22 
 54 
 
 39 
 45 
 26 
 56 
 
 
 36 38 
 
 
 800 
 
 110 
 
 120 
 
 95 
 
 105 
 
 85 
 
 90 
 
 70 
 
 98 
 
 Do. 
 
 Free. 
 
 43 45 
 
 6 
 
 
 130 
 
 135 
 
 140 
 
 145 
 
 120 
 
 125 
 
 120 
 
 128 
 
 
 
 uncert. 
 
 
 801 
 
 140 
 
 60 
 
 150 
 120 
 
 150 
 50 
 
 170 
 120 
 
 115 
 70 
 
 117 
 75 
 
 112 
 50 
 
 80 
 
 116 
 83 
 92 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 
 21 
 34 
 
 56 
 24 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 uncert. 
 25 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 802 
 
 65 
 150 
 
 120 
 160 
 
 50 
 100 
 
 120 
 115 
 
 79 
 65 
 
 88 
 
 80 
 70 
 92 
 
 80 
 
 74 
 
 110 
 
 98 
 
 86 
 
 118 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 40 
 29 
 30 
 
 36 
 42 
 31 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 8 9 
 
 20 30 
 
 10 20 
 
 11 26 
 
 Free. 
 8 
 8 9 
 
 603 
 
 140 
 152 
 
 150 
 160 
 
 100 
 
 105 
 
 90 
 
 105 
 115 
 
 100 
 
 85 
 114 
 
 94 
 115 
 
 104 
 
 75 
 
 103 
 
 108 
 
 95 
 
 117 
 
 3 6| 
 
 31 
 34 
 36 
 34 
 
 33 
 35 
 37 
 35 
 
 8 9 
 
 y 0-7TT 
 
 5 H 
 
 14 15 
 
 11 20 
 18 30 
 17 31 
 
 5 2
 
 32 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 RICE. 
 
 Iris? 
 
 mess 
 
 Irisl 
 
 ,mess 
 
 
 Blotter. 
 
 
 
 )lina. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Waterford. 
 
 
 Care 
 
 
 Bei 
 
 gal. 
 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 Dutch. | Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 tierce. 
 
 barrel. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 out. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1804 
 
 150 
 100 
 
 155 
 110 
 
 90 
 65 
 70 
 
 115 
 
 70 
 75 
 
 105 
 75 
 96 
 
 113 
 
 80 
 98 
 
 100 114 
 55 66 
 90 112 
 
 3 11| 
 
 33 
 20 
 32 
 40 
 
 35 
 
 21 
 35 
 50 
 
 5 U 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 then 
 
 4 8 
 
 17 
 10 
 13 
 23 
 
 27 
 lb 
 23 
 33 
 
 5 2 
 
 till Jul 
 then 
 4 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
 97 
 
 75 100 
 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 
 
 33 
 
 4 8 
 
 1805 127 
 1 |135 
 
 130 
 
 70 
 
 75 
 
 68 
 
 70 
 
 100 120 
 
 4 01 
 
 36 
 
 41 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 15 
 
 23 
 
 till Jul 
 
 140 
 
 95 
 
 100 
 
 96 
 
 100 
 
 80 85 
 
 30 
 
 34 
 
 then 
 
 21 
 
 2b 
 
 then 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
 
 92 
 
 100 110 
 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 5 \\\ 
 
 30 
 
 34 
 
 5 11 J 
 
 135 
 
 140 
 
 Qfl 
 
 95 
 
 78 
 
 80 
 
 75 78 
 
 
 10 
 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 5 11 J 
 
 1806 
 
 110 
 130 
 
 120 
 140 
 
 85 
 95 
 
 88 
 100 
 
 96 
 
 90 
 
 100 
 92 
 
 100 .118 
 
 80 83 
 
 100 110 
 
 4 31 
 
 27 
 27 
 
 32 
 35 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 6 4 
 
 26 
 22 
 
 28 
 29 
 
 till Jul 
 then 
 6 4 
 
 IftnJ 120 
 1807 130 
 
 126 
 140 
 
 95 
 90 
 
 100 
 93 
 
 90 95 
 
 108 110 
 
 None. 
 
 100 105 
 
 85 102 
 
 Do. 
 
 25 
 23 
 
 34 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 25 2b 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 
 
 122 
 
 115 123 
 
 
 30 
 
 3b 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 118 
 
 
 30 
 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 1808 
 
 120 
 150 
 
 125 
 
 160 
 
 90 
 
 65 
 
 105 
 
 92 
 
 97 
 
 110 
 
 110 
 100 
 115 
 
 126 
 105 
 
 117 
 
 None. 
 106 112 
 100 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 37 
 45 
 35 
 
 45 
 52 
 45 
 
 till 
 April, 
 then 
 
 None. 
 45 bO 
 
 Free. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 120 123 
 
 
 58 
 
 62 
 
 Free. 
 
 
 
 
 
 145 
 
 150 
 
 105 
 
 110 
 
 116 
 
 118 
 
 None. 
 
 
 56 
 
 60 
 
 
 45 
 
 55 
 
 
 1809147 
 
 153 
 
 110 
 
 11? 
 
 82 
 
 84 
 
 95 108 
 
 4 4 
 
 60 
 
 68 
 
 Do. 
 
 55 
 
 60 
 
 Do.j 
 
 
 140 
 
 145 
 
 110 
 
 115 
 
 114 
 104 
 
 lib 
 
 108 
 
 105 125 
 100 122 
 
 
 30 
 32 
 
 32 
 36 
 
 
 22 
 30 
 
 38 
 40 
 
 
 140 
 
 155 
 
 115 
 110 
 
 120 
 115 
 
 108 
 
 110 
 
 90 115 
 
 
 30 
 21 
 
 34 
 25 
 
 
 2b 
 
 34 
 
 
 1810142 
 
 145 
 
 90 
 
 95 
 
 80 124 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 140 
 
 155 
 
 122 
 
 125 
 
 85 105 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 2b 
 
 
 
 160 
 
 165 
 
 
 
 NonetillJul. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1811 
 
 175 
 165 
 
 190 
 170 
 
 110 
 97 
 
 11a 
 
 105 
 
 130 
 115 
 120 
 
 132 
 118 
 126 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 
 36 
 
 27 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 30 
 
 25 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 165 
 150 
 160 
 
 167 
 
 152 
 162 
 
 97 
 100 
 120 
 
 100 
 102 
 122 
 
 126 
 110 
 118 
 
 128 
 118 
 122 
 
 None till 
 
 June. 
 130 134 
 106 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 
 70 
 66 
 
 80 
 
 42 
 
 77 
 68 
 82 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 46 
 35 
 55 
 
 3b 
 48 
 40 
 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 1813 
 
 None. 
 150 160 
 190 195 
 170 175 
 
 None. 
 120 122 
 185 187 
 165 175 
 
 117 
 
 84 
 
 125 
 
 115 
 
 121 
 
 90 
 
 127 
 
 120 
 
 104 110 
 
 70 72 , 5 5 
 90 105 ) 
 
 N. after July 
 
 80 
 48 
 46 
 
 84 
 52 
 52 
 
 Do. 
 16 4 
 
 20 01 
 
 56 
 30 
 40 
 
 70 
 42 
 54 
 
 Do. ; 
 

 
 33 
 
 
 PROVISIONS. 
 
 RICE. 
 
 
 Irish mesi 
 
 Irish mess 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Beef. 
 
 Pork. 
 
 Waterford. Butter 
 
 
 
 Carolina. 
 
 
 Bengal. 
 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 No Duty. 
 
 No] 
 
 Duty. Dutch. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 tierce. 
 
 barrel. 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1814 
 
 178 
 160 165 
 
 165 
 
 125 
 
 125 130 
 
 122 
 138 
 122 
 137 
 
 124 
 140 
 125 
 
 138 
 
 None till 
 March. 
 
 125 130 
 90 95 
 
 138 140 
 
 5 5 
 
 36 
 
 25 
 j56 
 
 40 
 26 
 60 
 
 20 01 
 Free. 
 20 0^ 
 
 25 
 
 20 
 
 50 
 40 
 
 Free. 
 
 
 
 100 
 
 136 
 
 138 
 
 133 135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 140 
 
 90 
 
 111 
 
 116 
 
 140 143 
 
 
 45 
 
 48 
 
 
 20 
 15 
 
 40 
 20 
 
 
 815 
 
 165 170 
 
 100 
 
 120 
 
 121 
 
 94 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 6 
 
 
 140 
 
 70 
 
 None. 
 
 120 124 
 
 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
 113 
 
 120 
 
 103 110 
 
 
 | 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98 
 
 114 
 
 100 108 
 
 Do. 
 
 | 
 
 25 
 20 
 46 
 
 26 
 25 
 
 58 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 20 
 
 28 
 25 
 23 
 
 
 816 
 
 110 115 
 
 85 90 
 
 65 70 
 70 75 
 
 62 
 94 
 
 80 
 
 68 
 96 
 
 85 
 
 77 80 
 70 74 
 80 86 
 
 till Ap. 
 then 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 817 
 
 100 105 
 120 125 
 105 108 
 
 80 
 105 
 90 
 
 102 6 
 
 80 
 
 93 
 
 66 
 
 115 
 
 82 
 
 94 
 
 70 
 
 116 
 
 80 90 
 None. 
 
 70 74 
 
 None. 
 
 100 105 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 
 40 
 34 
 51 
 
 51 
 46 
 36 
 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Ap. 
 
 then 
 
 Free. 
 
 28 
 28 
 24 
 
 35 
 
 30 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Ap. 
 then 
 Free. 
 
 818 
 
 105 
 
 110 6 
 100 
 
 100 
 112 
 105 
 
 115 116 
 130 134 
 
 None. 
 126 127 
 117 118 
 
 100 102 
 110 120 
 
 96 100 
 115 118 
 
 Do. 
 
 45 
 42 
 53 
 42 
 
 48 
 44 
 
 54 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 16 
 
 20 
 
 28 
 25 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 102 6 
 
 102 
 
 108 
 
 112 
 
 115 118 
 
 
 43 
 
 45 
 
 20 01 
 
 17 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 819 
 
 125 
 
 92 
 
 74 
 
 78 
 
 74 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 
 33 
 
 till Ap 
 
 11 
 
 16 
 
 till Ap. 
 
 115 
 
 100 
 
 98 
 
 100 
 
 98 100 
 
 36 
 
 38 
 
 then 
 
 13 
 
 17 
 
 then 
 
 
 125 
 
 90 
 
 74 
 
 75 
 
 90 92 
 
 
 18 
 
 24 
 
 15 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 820 
 
 125 
 115 120 
 130 135 
 
 120 
 
 90 95 
 60 67 6 
 
 65 72 6 
 
 76 
 90 
 
 78 
 82 
 
 78 
 93 
 82 
 84 
 
 90 92 
 
 None. 
 82 86 
 74 75 
 86 88 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 26 
 21 
 
 24 
 27 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 
 10 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 12 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 321 
 
 120 
 
 125 
 
 115 117 
 
 67 72 6 
 57 6 
 
 86 
 95 
 
 68 
 88 
 
 88 
 97 
 72 
 90 
 
 80 85 
 40 42 
 76 82 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 
 19 
 15 
 18 
 
 20 
 19 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 13 
 10 
 12 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 55 
 
 57 6 
 
 54 
 
 84 
 
 92 
 
 72 74 
 
 
 18 
 
 20 
 
 
 8 
 
 11 
 
 
 522 
 
 1101126 
 
 80 
 
 60 
 70 
 
 70 
 76 
 
 84 88 
 40 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 18 
 
 18 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 11 
 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 75 
 
 70 74 
 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 
 8 
 
 12 

 
 34 
 
 
 SALTPETRE. 
 
 SEEDS. 
 
 East India rough. 
 1 Duty. 
 
 Foreign R 
 
 ed Clover. 
 Duty. 
 
 Baltic j 
 for sc 
 
 Linseed 
 voing. 
 Duty. 
 
 Foreign 
 for sou 
 
 Rape 
 
 ting. 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 87 
 72 
 67 
 
 ctvf. 
 s. d. 
 
 7 8A 
 
 civt. 
 s. s. 
 
 25 42 
 
 57 87 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. d. 
 
 2 9 
 
 quarter, 
 s. s. 
 
 30 42 
 50 60 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 2 2 
 
 last, 10 qr. 
 1. 1. 
 
 16 17 
 23 24 
 
 qr. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 1783 
 
 67 
 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 81 
 37 
 
 117 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 58 
 32 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 24 
 
 28 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 62 64 
 
 50 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 33 
 
 43 
 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 45 
 44 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 29 
 32 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 55 
 
 53 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 44 
 19 
 47 
 
 73 
 45 
 
 S3 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 44 
 36 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 32 
 26 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 56 
 49 
 
 Do. 
 
 41 
 20 
 45 
 
 82 
 66 
 102 
 
 Do. 
 
 barrel, cont. 
 about 1 qr. 
 
 36 38 
 40 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 28 29 
 
 29 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 48 
 39 
 
 7 9 
 
 65 
 
 40 
 65 
 
 107 
 44 
 
 84 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 45 
 55 56 
 
 32 38 
 
 Free. 
 
 21 22 
 14 15 
 13 18 
 
 13 3 
 
 1788 
 
 39 40 
 33 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 62 
 12 
 
 22 
 
 81 
 66 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 40 
 
 45 48 
 30 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 18 
 
 14 
 10 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 34 35 
 
 40 
 32 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 
 25 
 37 
 
 57 
 49 
 67 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 38 
 26 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 11 
 
 21 22 
 J 8 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 1790 
 
 31 33 
 
 uncertain 
 
 46 50 
 
 42 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 17 
 
 72 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 40 
 
 29 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 22 
 11 13 
 14 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 42 44 
 38 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 
 
 27 
 
 41 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 40 
 25 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 18 
 14 16 
 
 17 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 1792 
 
 i 
 
 40 
 63 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 27 
 
 40 
 62 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 18 
 23 25 
 
 Do.
 
 35 
 
 
 SALTPETRE. 
 
 SEEDS. 
 
 
 East Ind 
 
 ia rough. 
 Duty. 
 
 Foreign Red Clover. 
 Duty. 
 
 Bailie Linseed 
 for sotoing. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Foreign 
 for sou 
 
 Rape 
 ing. 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 civt. 
 
 s. 
 
 64 
 
 97 
 
 None. 
 
 38 40 
 
 cixt. 
 s. d. 
 
 7 9 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 22 65 
 
 18 45 
 
 28 72 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. d. 
 
 2 9 
 
 barrel, 
 s. s. 
 
 35 40 
 
 38 42 
 
 civt. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 last, 10 qr 
 I. 1. 
 23 25 
 27 28 
 20 21 
 25 26 
 
 qr. 
 s. d. 
 
 13 3 
 
 1794 
 
 52 
 
 None 
 
 till Dec. 
 
 125 132 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 63 
 35 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 40 
 43 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 
 26 28 
 
 24 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 135 
 170 
 155 
 
 Free. 
 
 66 92 
 32 60 
 42 86 
 
 Do. 
 
 48 52 
 58 60 
 40 45 
 50 56 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 28 
 43 44 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 155 
 
 45 
 96 
 56 
 
 Do. 
 
 45 95 
 50 135 
 
 27 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 63 
 42 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 45 
 19 20 
 
 13 1044 
 
 1797 
 
 56 59 
 
 uncertain 
 
 65 68 
 
 58 60 
 
 3 
 
 after- 
 wards 
 
 1 \\\ 
 
 30 60 
 42 67 
 15 40 
 
 30 80 
 
 3 oa 
 
 40 46 
 35 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 19 
 12 13 
 
 16 18 
 
 14 644 
 
 1798 
 
 60 61 
 140 145 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 82 
 15 32 
 18 55 
 
 
 35 38 
 38 42 
 30 35 
 33 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 20 
 11 13 
 
 16 18 
 
 15 84£ 
 
 1799 
 
 140 143 
 95 96 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 50 
 40 120 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 36 
 65 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 28 
 53 57 
 33 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 95 96 
 60 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 126 
 40 85 
 46 140 
 
 Do. 
 
 63 68 
 68 72 
 50 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 47 
 43 50 
 
 20 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 60 61 
 69 70 
 52 54 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 108 
 
 40 85 
 30 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 65 75 
 50 56 
 60 70 
 
 1 4 
 per qr. 
 
 20 38 
 20 28 
 
 20 
 
 1802 
 
 51 52 
 42 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 37 87 
 30 65 
 50 120 
 25 83 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 70 
 40 53 
 
 58 72 
 48 62 
 
 Do. 
 
 till June 
 
 then 
 
 2 3 
 
 20 28 
 18 22 
 20 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 tillJun. 
 then 
 16
 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SALTPETRE. 
 
 SEEDS. 
 
 
 East I nil 
 
 a rough. 
 Duty. 
 
 Foreign R 
 
 ed Clover. 
 Duty. 
 
 Baltic i 
 for so 
 
 'Jnseed 
 wing. 
 Duty. 
 
 Foreign 
 for sow 
 
 Rape j 
 ing. 
 Duty. 
 
 1803 
 
 cwt. 
 s. s. 
 
 35 38 
 61 62 
 
 47 48 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 11 6 
 then 
 3 
 
 cvct. 
 a. s. 
 
 25 85 
 40 105 
 
 70 85 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 6 51 
 
 barrel, 
 s. s. 
 
 53 68 
 48 61 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 2 3 
 
 last, 1 qr. 
 1. L 
 
 22 28 
 32 42 
 29 32 
 
 s. d. 
 16 
 
 1804 
 
 47 48 
 58 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 78 
 25 60 
 50 98 
 
 Do. 
 till July 
 then 
 7 21 
 
 48 63 
 50 60 
 58 65 
 
 2 6 
 
 30 34 
 29 33 
 
 25 28 
 33 35 
 
 Do. 
 till Jul. 
 
 then 
 20 
 
 1805 
 
 58 59 
 85 95 
 78 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 90 
 25 60 
 30 70 
 40 83 
 
 Do. 
 
 till June 
 
 then 
 
 7 3 
 
 57 67 
 45 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 till June 
 then 
 2 7\ 
 
 35 40 
 40 46 
 27 31 
 
 Do. 
 till Jun 
 
 then 
 °0 4 l t 
 
 1806 
 
 63 68 
 52 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 88 
 20 65 
 53 80 
 
 7 9f 
 
 48 55 
 56 62 
 
 2 9 
 
 25 29 
 15 20 
 
 21 n 
 
 1807 
 
 51 52 
 56 57 
 
 48 49 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 75 
 18 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 58 64 
 43 50 
 57 65 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 29 
 21 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 48 49 
 75 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 67 
 37 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 59 67 
 107 113 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 21 
 34 44 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 74 75 
 
 81 82 
 
 4 
 
 40 102 
 60 130 
 20 75 
 50 125 
 
 Do. 
 
 till July 
 then 
 8 
 
 127 150 
 
 80 87 
 80 92 
 
 2 8 
 
 40 44 
 42 48 
 33 38 
 
 22 
 
 1810 
 
 80 82 
 76 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 130 
 65 140 
 40 92 
 
 Do. 
 
 86 102 
 52 64 
 60 73 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 36 
 32 44 
 
 28 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 76 80 
 69 71 
 
 72 76 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 105 
 50 90 
 60 100 
 
 Do, 
 
 67 77 
 50 63 
 85 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 33 
 20 30 
 uncertain 
 60 74 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 ! 
 
 70 72 
 64 68 
 75 78 
 68 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 105 
 60 116 
 50 80 
 70 120 
 
 Do. 
 
 85 107 
 
 80 90 
 
 86 
 
 Do. 
 
 48 60 
 
 Do.
 
 37 
 
 
 SALTPETRE. 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 SEEDS. 
 
 
 
 East India rough. 
 
 Foreign Red Clover. 
 
 Baltic Linseed 
 for soxving. 
 
 Foreign Rape 
 for solving. 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 I Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty 
 
 
 cut. 
 
 CXvt. 
 
 CWt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 barrel. 
 
 cvot. 
 
 last, 10 qr 
 
 qr. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 I. 
 
 /. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 1813 
 
 70 
 
 77 
 
 74 
 
 80 
 
 41 
 
 80 
 70 
 70 
 
 115 
 
 80 
 84 
 
 8 
 
 till Aug. 
 
 then 
 
 12 
 
 75 82 
 81 85 
 83 107 
 
 2 8 
 till Aug. 
 
 then 
 
 3 2 
 
 47 
 
 27 
 25 
 
 52 
 34 
 30 
 
 22 
 
 till Aug 
 
 then 
 
 26 11 
 
 
 85 
 
 90 
 
 
 58 
 44 
 70 
 
 73 
 
 58 
 80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1814 
 
 75 
 
 100 
 
 88 
 
 78 
 105 
 
 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 83 100 
 36 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 16 
 
 29 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 90 
 
 05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1815 
 
 69 
 102 
 80 
 
 70 
 105 
 
 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 
 28 
 
 70 
 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 60 
 37 48 
 40 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 10 
 
 24 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1816 
 
 71 
 41 
 
 75 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 
 23 
 66 
 
 40 
 36 
 
 100 
 
 11 101 
 
 38 55 
 33 47 
 72 93 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 36 
 
 15 
 46 
 
 20 
 
 
 40 
 
 42 
 
 
 55 
 55 
 50 
 63 
 
 102 
 115 
 
 78 
 88 
 
 
 70 88 
 
 
 36 
 
 46 
 
 
 1817 
 
 37 
 
 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 25 
 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 42 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 52 62 
 
 
 40 
 
 46 
 
 
 1818 
 
 43 
 
 38 
 
 44 
 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 58 
 50 
 
 88 
 62 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 60 
 57 73 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 
 
 38 
 20 
 
 40 
 42 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Dec 
 then 
 26 11 
 
 
 
 60 
 
 100 
 
 
 57 63 
 
 
 32 
 
 28 
 
 42 
 34 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
 98 
 
 Do. 
 
 53 61 
 43 53 
 47 62 
 
 
 28 
 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 38 
 31 
 
 40 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 58 
 None. 
 
 till July 
 then 
 
 3 4 
 
 23 
 
 22 
 
 28 
 32 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 
 
 
 
 
 40 
 
 60 
 
 20 
 
 
 20 
 
 24 
 
 20 
 
 1820 
 
 32 
 30 
 
 36 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 
 30 
 
 64 
 
 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 59 
 
 37 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 29 
 25 
 
 26 
 35 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1821 
 
 27 
 21 
 
 29 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 
 
 30 
 35 
 
 48 
 50 
 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 46 
 27 35 
 31 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 
 13 
 
 28 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 
 35 
 25 
 25 
 
 76 
 63 
 32 
 
 
 31 40 
 
 
 13 
 
 20 
 
 
 L822 
 
 29 
 21 
 
 32 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 44 
 23 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 9 
 
 24 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 - 
 
 25 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 31 37 
 
 
 10 
 
 15 1
 
 38 
 
 
 SILKS. 
 
 Thrown. 
 
 Ban 
 
 . 
 
 
 Rati 
 
 . 
 
 Bengal, 
 
 
 
 Piedmont. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Reggio. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Chin 
 
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 Duty. 
 
 Organ se. 
 
 Skein. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 lb 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
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 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1782 
 
 25 
 29 
 
 31 
 
 32 
 
 O l-rTs 
 
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 1 A\ 
 
 19 
 17 
 
 20 
 22 
 
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 15 
 
 24 
 
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 25 
 
 27 
 
 33 
 32 
 
 
 22 
 
 
 17 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 24 
 
 
 1783 
 
 Do. 
 
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 Do. 
 
 18 
 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 15 
 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 22 23 
 
 
 19 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 24 
 
 
 1784 
 
 27 
 26 
 25 
 
 34 
 35 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Au. 
 
 then 
 
 7 4 
 
 22 23 
 21 22 
 
 23 24 
 
 Do. 
 till Au. 
 then 
 4 4| 
 
 19 
 17 
 14 
 
 24 
 24 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 4 41 
 
 
 15 
 15 
 
 15 
 12 
 
 24 
 23 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 
 4 4^: 
 
 
 25 
 25 
 
 31 
 33 
 
 
 23 24 
 
 
 14 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 26 
 
 
 1785 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 16 
 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 20 21 
 
 
 17 
 
 26 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 23 
 
 31 
 30 
 
 
 21 22 
 
 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 25 
 
 
 1786 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 29 
 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 18 
 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 21 22 
 
 
 28 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 25 
 
 
 1787 
 
 24 
 37 
 32 
 
 30 
 
 48 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 23 
 
 27 28 
 
 3 
 
 29 
 26 
 
 33 
 35 
 
 3 
 
 
 13 
 
 17 
 
 24 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 1788 
 
 28 
 21 
 
 46 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 26 
 20 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 25 
 
 17 
 
 35 
 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 16 
 14 
 
 34 
 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 21 
 24 
 
 30 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 15 
 
 25 
 
 Do. < 
 
 1790 
 
 24 
 25 
 
 31 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 22 
 23 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 14 
 15 
 
 24 
 26 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 15 
 16 
 
 25 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 25 
 
 26 
 
 33 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 
 
 24 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 21 
 
 20 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 16 
 13 
 
 24 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1792 
 
 28 
 25 
 
 34 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 25 
 
 25 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 
 20 
 
 24 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 14 
 
 18 
 
 28 
 32 
 
 Do M
 
 39 
 
 
 SILKS. 
 
 
 Th roi 
 Piedmont. 
 
 1>M. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Rai 
 
 Reggio. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 fiaiv. 
 China. Duty. 
 
 Organsene. 
 
 Bengal. 
 Skein. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 lb. 
 5. S. 
 
 25 32 
 22 30 
 
 lb. 
 
 s\ d. 
 
 7 4 
 
 lb. 
 s. s. 
 
 26 26 6 
 21 22 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 3 
 
 lb. 
 s. s. 
 
 18 21 
 15 16 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 3 
 
 lb. 
 s. s. 
 
 lb. 
 s. s. 
 
 18 31 
 13 22 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 3 
 
 1794 
 
 23 31 
 21 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 23 
 19 22 
 23 24 
 
 Do< 16 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 14 22 
 9 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 24 29 
 29 38 
 
 Do 
 
 23 24 
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 Do. 
 
 16 19 
 
 17 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 9 31 
 6 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 29 33 
 
 26 31 
 
 27 33 
 
 7 8-7V 
 
 23 26 
 23 27 
 
 3 tf£ 
 
 17 21 
 
 18 23 
 
 3 144 
 
 
 6 30 
 
 9 27 
 
 O 1-2-0" 
 
 1797 
 
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 8 Q&r 
 
 23 26 
 
 25 27 
 
 *5 o-^ 
 
 17 18 
 21 22 
 
 <J "Ti7 
 
 
 9 27 
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 o O-jtj- 
 
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 27 31 
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 8 /44 
 
 25 27 
 
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 None. 
 
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 24 28 
 
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 .799 
 
 21 28 
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 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
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 24 28 
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 Do. 
 
 
 14 21 
 
 5 22 
 
 12 6 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 800 
 
 25 35 
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 Do. 
 
 Uncert. 
 17 6 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 6 23 6 
 
 23 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 27 
 
 26 28 
 
 126 16 
 11 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 801 
 
 29 40 
 29 36 
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 Do. 
 
 16 18 
 None. 
 20 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 
 21 22 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 28 
 26 30 
 
 11 23 
 5 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 802 
 
 30 40 
 30 36 
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 Do. 
 
 18 19 
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 Do. 
 
 22 23 
 
 24 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 30 
 30 35 
 
 5 30 
 116 25 6 
 
 Do.
 
 40 
 
 
 SILKS. 
 
 
 Thrown. 
 
 
 Ratio. 
 
 
 Raw. 
 
 
 
 Bengal. 
 
 
 
 Piedmont. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Reggio. I Duty. 
 
 China. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Organsene. 
 
 Skein. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb 
 
 
 lb. 
 
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 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
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 s. d. 
 
 
 33 
 
 39 
 
 
 21 6 
 
 23 
 
 
 22 6 
 
 25 
 
 
 29 t 
 
 34 
 
 106 
 
 24 6 
 
 
 180.3 
 
 33 
 
 42 
 
 10 If 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
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 23 6 
 
 26 
 
 4 6 
 
 31 
 
 35 
 
 12 
 
 28 6 
 
 3 4} 
 
 
 31 
 
 35 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 
 28 
 
 31 
 
 6 
 
 23 
 
 
 1804 
 
 31 
 31 
 
 37 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 tillJun. 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 4 6 
 tillJun. 
 
 21 
 20 
 20 
 
 22 
 21 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 28 
 
 31 
 
 6 
 3 
 6 
 
 22 
 20 
 25 
 
 3 If 
 tillJun. 
 
 31 
 
 37 
 
 then 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 then 
 
 then 
 
 29 
 
 34 
 
 then 
 
 
 33 
 
 37 
 
 11 3 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 3 9 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
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 1805 
 
 33 
 
 37 6 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 22 24 6 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 27 
 
 33 
 
 5 
 
 25 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 32 6 
 
 38 
 
 then 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 then 
 
 24 27 
 
 then 
 
 28 
 
 34 
 
 8 
 
 26 
 
 then 
 
 
 
 
 11 6 
 
 
 
 5 1 4 
 
 
 
 5 1A 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 0^ 
 
 
 
 
 11 6 
 
 18 
 19 
 18 
 
 19 
 21 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1806 
 
 33 
 
 37 6 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 tillJun 
 
 24 
 
 27 
 
 tillJun. 
 
 28 
 
 35 
 
 9 
 
 21 
 
 tillJun, 
 
 34 
 
 38 
 
 then 
 
 then 
 
 32 
 
 35 
 
 then , 
 
 25 
 
 33 
 
 6 
 
 20 
 
 then 
 
 
 
 
 12 2 A 
 
 5 5i 
 
 
 
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 4 1 
 
 1807 
 
 30 
 32 
 
 37 
 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 17 
 
 No 
 
 19 
 
 18 
 ne. 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 
 23 
 
 36 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 25 
 
 33 
 
 7 
 9 
 
 20 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 39 
 93 
 96 
 44 
 
 48 
 
 98 
 
 112 
 
 58 
 
 
 No 
 
 ne. 
 
 
 19 
 
 22 
 
 
 27 
 
 38 
 
 9 
 
 23 
 
 
 1808 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 
 
 85 
 
 18 
 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 21 
 
 
 27 
 
 34 
 
 
 34 
 
 41 
 
 14 
 
 34 
 
 
 1809 
 
 52 
 30 
 46 
 
 58 
 43 
 53 
 
 12 4 
 
 19 
 24 
 
 21 
 27 
 
 5 6 
 
 27 
 33 
 
 34 
 
 37 
 
 5 8 
 
 34 
 42 
 
 41 
 51 
 
 14 
 
 18 
 
 34 
 36 
 
 4 
 
 1810 
 
 43 
 50 
 46 
 
 54 
 52 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 
 33 
 24 
 25 
 
 27 
 35 
 
 28 
 
 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 
 32 
 34 - 
 36 
 
 37 
 36 
 38 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 
 44 
 41 
 
 51 
 56 
 46 
 
 18 
 20 
 21 
 
 36 
 39 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 44 
 64 
 
 54 
 
 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 33 
 26 
 
 32 
 45 
 
 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 40 
 32 
 
 54 
 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 
 46 
 
 48 
 51 
 
 23 
 
 22 
 
 39 
 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 64 
 38 
 40 
 
 73 
 
 52 
 54 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 30 
 24 
 
 27 
 32 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 
 32 
 26 
 
 35 
 34 
 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 
 36 
 
 51 
 41 
 
 22 
 12 
 
 37 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 

 
 41 
 
 
 SILKS. 
 
 Thrown. 
 
 Raw. 
 
 Raw. 
 
 Bengal. 
 
 
 
 Piedmont. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Reggio. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 China. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Organsene. 
 
 Skein. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 lb 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1813 
 
 40 
 40 
 
 56 
 54 
 
 14 7| 
 
 24 28 
 
 27 31 
 
 None. 
 
 5 6 
 
 26 30 
 22 27 
 25 29 
 20 22 
 
 6 8f 
 
 36 41 
 31 40 
 31 39 
 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 
 30 
 30 
 
 25 
 
 4 9 
 
 1814 
 
 40 
 35 
 
 50 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 24 25 
 22 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 22 
 
 20 23 
 
 5 1\ 
 
 31 39 
 31 41 
 
 12 
 11 
 
 15 
 26 
 
 3 9 
 
 1815 
 
 38 
 38 
 
 45 
 
 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 6 
 17 6 18 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 23 
 17 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 41 
 31 35 
 
 11 
 11 
 
 26 
 24 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1816 
 
 38 
 35 
 
 45 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 176 186 
 16 176 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 20 
 14 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 35 
 31 38 
 
 11 
 
 8 
 
 24 
 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 34 
 
 64 
 
 39 
 66 
 
 
 176 18 
 
 
 14 17 6 
 
 
 32 38 
 
 8 
 
 26 
 
 
 1817 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 6 24 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 44 
 
 11 
 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 None. 
 
 
 20 30 
 
 
 46 56 
 
 23 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 66 
 
 
 None. 
 
 
 20 30 
 
 
 46 56 
 29 39 
 
 
 
 
 1818 
 
 62 
 
 67 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 6 30 
 
 Do 
 
 19 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 
 
 39 
 
 Do 
 
 
 None. 
 
 
 15 16 
 
 
 21 33 
 
 
 None. 
 
 16 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 •50 
 
 53 
 
 
 23 6 25 
 
 
 15 25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
 30 
 
 53 
 35 
 
 
 24 26 6 
 
 
 17 25 
 
 
 None. 
 
 16 
 
 36 
 
 
 1819 
 
 14 8 
 
 16 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 28 
 
 5 6 
 
 31 41 
 
 13 
 
 30 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 17 19 
 
 
 19 23 
 
 
 34 46 
 
 15 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 30 
 
 35 
 
 
 17 196 
 
 
 19 22 6 
 13 15 
 
 
 34 42 
 
 14 
 
 21 
 
 
 1820 
 
 25 
 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 35 
 
 11 
 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 32 
 
 38 
 
 
 16 16 6 
 
 
 
 34 38 
 
 14 
 
 21 
 
 
 1821 
 
 32 
 26 
 
 38 
 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 6 15 6 
 17 6 20 6 
 
 15 6 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 6 16 
 
 13 6 16 6 
 116 156 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 38 
 None. 
 
 14 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 21 
 14 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 26 
 
 43 
 
 
 15 6 16 6 
 
 
 11 6 15 6 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 27 
 
 
 1822 
 
 33 
 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 6 14 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 6 15 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 10 
 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 33 
 
 48 
 
 
 13 6 15 6 
 
 
 116 166 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 24 

 
 
 
 
 
 SPICES. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cinnamo 
 Ceylon (IstQual.) 
 
 n. 
 Duty. 
 
 Jam. Black. 
 
 Ginger. 
 Barb.White 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pepp 
 E. I. Black. 
 
 er. 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 11 6 
 13 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 4 5 
 
 cvot. 
 S. S. 
 
 36 38 
 21 25 
 
 Clot, 
 s. s. 
 
 78 95 
 69 73 
 
 cvot. 
 
 s. d. 
 10 51 
 
 after 
 10 11| 
 
 lb. 
 d. d. 
 
 22 
 231 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 4H 
 
 1783 
 
 11 6 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 25 
 19 20 
 
 69 70 
 39 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 20 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 18 
 15 16 
 19 21 
 
 31 35 
 35 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 1785 
 
 14 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 24 
 
 22 26 
 19 21 
 
 39 44 
 59 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 18 
 12 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 1786 
 
 13 6 16 
 
 8 10 
 
 13 15 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 21 
 18 19 
 23 25 
 
 59 64 
 
 35 59 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 11 
 
 LU 12 
 
 13 141 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 13 6 16 
 12 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 24 
 21 23 
 
 49 69 
 29 49 
 
 Do. 
 
 141 
 
 m 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 13 14 
 
 14 16 
 12 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 23 
 19 21 
 
 34 49 
 
 39 58 
 29 56 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 
 
 m 
 
 6^ 
 
 1789 
 
 13 14 
 10 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 22 
 25 27 
 22 24 
 
 35 37 
 36 6 37 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 
 m 
 
 Do. 
 
 1790 
 
 11 12 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 24 
 33 35 
 
 36 38 
 42 44 
 39 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 151 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1791 
 
 11 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 34 
 30 33 
 
 44 48 
 
 39 42 
 58 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 m 
 
 18| 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1792 
 
 10 11 
 13 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 48 50 
 75 80 
 60 65 
 
 62 64 
 75 80 
 None. 
 90 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 231 
 16 
 
 Do.
 
 43 
 
 
 SPICES. 
 
 
 Cinnamon. 
 
 
 
 Ginger. 
 
 
 Pepper. 
 
 
 Ceylon 
 
 IstQual. 
 
 ) Duty. 
 
 Jam 
 
 Black 
 
 ■ Barb.White Duty. 
 
 E. I. Black 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 out. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. d 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1792 
 
 13 
 10 
 
 14 
 11 
 
 4 5 
 
 60 
 
 68 
 
 65 
 70 
 
 95 10C 
 130 14C 
 
 11 
 
 15f 
 
 6g 
 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 76 
 65 
 70 
 
 78 
 67 
 
 78 
 
 130 140 
 
 
 
 
 1794 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 120 125 
 
 None. 
 145 150 
 
 Do. 
 
 131 
 141 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 
 70 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 1795 
 
 17 
 15 
 
 18 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 75 
 70 
 
 78 
 80 
 
 130 140 
 140 145 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 15| 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 12 
 
 9 
 
 14 
 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 70 
 
 38 
 
 80 
 52 
 
 140 145 
 120 130 
 
 11 6 
 
 141 
 131 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 7 
 9 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 
 48 
 34 
 
 45 
 61 
 35 
 
 76 90 
 55 70 
 
 12 1A 
 
 141 
 13$ 
 
 91 
 
 1798 
 
 8 
 5 
 
 10 
 6 
 
 4 10 
 
 34 
 
 48 
 
 35 
 
 58 
 
 55 65 
 
 88 98 
 
 13 7A 
 
 I2J 
 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 39 
 
 43 
 
 67 78 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 1799 
 
 4 
 4 6 
 
 5 
 5 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 39 
 27 
 
 43 
 33 
 
 67 72 
 77 87 
 63 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 19 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 4 6 
 
 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 19 
 
 32 
 25 
 
 62 67 
 57 60 
 62 71 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 164 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 4 9 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 5 6 
 
 tillAug 
 then 
 1 6 
 
 21 
 32 
 
 26 
 37 
 
 67 72 
 62 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 18 
 15 
 
 tillMay 
 then 
 1 04 
 
 1802 
 
 4 9 
 4 6 
 
 5 6 
 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 
 22 
 
 27 
 
 32 
 
 30 
 32 
 
 62 77 
 70 85 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 HI 
 
 Do.
 
 44 
 
 
 SPICES. 
 
 Cinnamo 
 Ceylon (1st Qual.) 
 
 n. 
 Duty. 
 
 Ginger. 
 Jam. Black. IBarb.White 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pepp< 
 E. I. Black. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1803 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 6 5 
 4 4 5 9 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 1 6 
 
 Civt. 
 S. S. 
 
 26 31 
 31 36 
 
 civt. 
 s. s. 
 
 66 76 
 
 86 91 
 
 106 116 
 
 civt. 
 s. d. 
 
 14 
 
 lb. 
 d. d. 
 
 11 
 12 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. 
 
 1 2 
 
 1804 
 
 4 6 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 then 
 
 1 10^ 
 
 36 41 
 26 36 
 51 61 
 41 51 
 
 100 105 
 
 96 100 
 
 142 152 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 17 6 
 
 9 
 
 H 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 1 6| 
 
 1805 
 1806 
 
 4 3 5 6 
 4 9 5 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 37 47 
 27 37 
 42 52 
 37 47 
 
 142 152 
 162 172 
 127 142 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 
 17 m 
 
 H 
 
 9 
 
 1 7A 
 
 4 9 5 9 
 4 6 5 6 
 
 2 0| 
 
 37 47 
 32 42 
 40 46 
 
 127 137 
 
 77 87 
 80 100 
 
 17 10i 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 then 
 
 19 01 
 
 9| 
 
 1 Si 
 
 1807 
 
 4 6 5 6 
 7 7 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 38 44 
 30 38 
 40 50 
 
 80 100 
 50 70 
 55 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 H 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 7 7 6 
 7 7 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 44 50 
 40 45 
 55 60 
 
 60 75 
 55 65 
 
 72 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 7 7 4 
 
 8 9 
 
 2 
 
 45 50 
 60 70 
 
 62 68 
 70 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 1 8 
 
 1810 
 
 9 10 
 8 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 65 70 
 55 60 
 60 65 
 
 70 75 
 60 65 
 60 70 
 
 19 4 
 
 n 
 
 12f 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 8 9 
 8 6 9 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 70 
 35 45 
 45 50 
 
 60 70 
 50 60 
 55 80 
 54 65 
 
 Do. 
 
 81 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 8 6 
 
 8 
 
 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 48 54 
 40 48 
 44 54 
 
 50 70 
 65 75 
 55 60 
 86 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 8f 9 
 7 7\ 
 9 91 
 
 Do.
 
 45 
 
 
 SPICES. 
 
 Cinnamon. 
 
 
 Ginger. 
 
 
 Pepper. 
 
 
 Ceylon (IstQual.) 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Jam. 
 
 Black. 
 
 Barb.White 
 
 Duty. 
 
 E. I. Black. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 lb. 
 
 M. 
 
 civt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 5. rf. 
 
 s. 
 •10 
 
 S. 
 
 54 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 19 4 
 
 d. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1 8 
 
 1813 
 
 8 
 
 9 6 
 
 2 4 1 
 
 68 
 
 75 
 
 86 
 
 90 
 
 till Aug 
 
 9 91 
 
 till Aug 
 
 
 10 
 
 10 6 
 
 * ^2 
 
 76 
 
 86 
 
 125 
 
 130 
 
 then 
 
 22 ni 
 
 141 i5i 
 
 then 
 1 11| 
 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 
 77 
 
 82 
 
 127 
 
 157 
 
 
 15 151 
 
 Do. 
 
 1814 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 148 
 
 157 
 
 147 
 
 160 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 21 
 
 till Jul. 
 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 
 
 124 
 
 142 
 
 137 
 
 158 
 
 
 12 13| 
 
 13 14 
 
 then 
 
 1 101 
 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 
 122 
 
 142 
 
 137 
 
 158 
 
 
 101 
 
 
 1815 
 
 15 
 
 15 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 98 
 
 118 
 
 140 
 
 180 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 12 
 
 13 6 
 
 
 138 
 
 153 
 
 180 
 
 220 
 
 
 10 101 
 
 
 1816 
 
 12 6 
 
 9 
 
 11 
 
 13 
 
 10 6 
 
 11 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 138 
 
 77 
 
 153 
 107 
 
 180 220 
 
 None. 
 200 252 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 
 91 91 
 4 ^2 
 
 7 71 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 130 
 
 150 
 
 12 111 
 
 
 
 1817 
 
 11 3 
 9 
 
 11 6 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 77 
 107 
 
 107 
 117 
 
 130 
 
 160 
 
 85 
 
 100 
 
 150 
 
 170 
 
 90 
 
 110 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 91 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 12 
 
 13 3 
 
 
 57 
 
 77 
 
 
 81 8| 
 
 
 
 13 3 
 
 13 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 23 
 
 
 
 1818 
 
 15 
 
 13 
 
 14 
 12 3 
 
 16 3 
 14 
 14 2 
 12 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 57 
 30 
 
 77 
 40 
 
 88 
 70 
 
 100 
 
 72 
 
 10 
 
 71 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 12 3 
 
 9 2 
 
 12 6 
 
 9 4 
 
 2 6 
 
 27 
 13 
 
 37 
 
 27 
 
 57 
 36 
 
 70 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 7\ 8 
 61 6\ 
 
 till Jul. 
 then 
 2 6 
 
 
 9 2 
 
 9 4 
 
 
 13 
 
 27 
 
 37 
 
 40 
 
 
 61 61 
 
 
 1820 
 
 7 10 
 
 8 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 
 17 
 
 17 
 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 8 6 
 
 8 9 
 
 
 10 
 
 22 
 
 17 
 
 27 
 
 
 6i 7 
 
 
 1821 
 
 8 6 
 6 1 
 
 8 9 
 6 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 
 
 9 
 
 23 
 
 22 
 27 
 30 
 
 17 
 52 
 
 27 
 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 6f 7 
 
 71 71 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 6 1 
 
 6 6 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 55 
 
 
 n 71 
 
 6 6} 
 
 
 1822 
 
 8 6 
 
 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 
 27 
 
 27 
 
 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 7 2 
 
 7 4 
 
 
 
 
 52 
 
 82 
 

 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 Muscat 
 Jamaica. 
 
 ados. 
 Duty. 
 
 B. PL 
 
 Gazette 
 average. 
 
 E 
 
 White. 
 
 ast India. 
 Brown. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Hava 
 For Exp 
 White. 
 
 nnah, 
 ortation. 
 Brown. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 S. S. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 1782 
 
 40 
 
 26 
 
 63 
 40 
 
 12 3^ 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1783 
 
 29 
 
 22 
 
 46 
 25 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1784 
 
 18 
 
 28 
 
 34 
 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 © 
 oo 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1785 
 
 26 
 23 
 
 42 
 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 bo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1786 
 
 29 
 41 
 
 40 
 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 > 
 
 a 
 
 £ 
 a 
 
 o 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1787 
 
 38 
 24 
 
 47 
 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 31 
 
 41 
 
 
 £ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1788 
 
 34 
 
 29 
 
 46 
 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1789 
 
 31 
 35 
 
 43 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1790 
 
 38 
 45 
 
 45 
 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1791 
 
 47 
 58 
 
 59 
 65 
 
 tillMay 
 
 then 
 
 15 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1792 
 
 63 
 40 
 
 76 
 
 68 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None.
 
 47 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 Muscavados. 
 
 B. PL 
 
 Gazette 
 
 
 East India. 
 
 
 Havannah. 
 For Exportation. 
 
 
 Jamaica. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 average. 
 
 White. 
 
 Brown. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 White. 
 
 Brown. 
 
 
 Clvt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 cxvt. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 /. s. d. 
 37 16 10 
 
 s. s. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 1793 
 
 53 
 41 
 
 73 
 66 
 
 15 
 
 
 69 
 54 
 
 72 
 71 
 
 None. 
 
 W cent, 
 on sale 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 price. 
 
 
 
 1794 
 
 40 
 32 
 
 67 
 
 58 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 
 60 
 
 80 
 78 
 
 None. 
 
 38 5 6 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1795 
 
 42 
 63 
 
 66 
 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 70 
 60 
 
 81 
 70 
 
 42 
 40 
 
 65 
 
 58 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 O 
 
 00 
 
 o 
 
 be 
 cfl 
 
 s 
 
 > 
 
 09 
 
 +3 
 
 O 
 
 N 
 
 a 
 O 
 o 
 
 66 
 
 78 
 
 45 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 1796 
 
 61 
 65 
 
 75 
 78 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 
 
 68 
 
 70 
 80 
 
 40 
 43 
 
 55 
 62 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1797 
 
 52 
 
 57 
 
 74 
 
 75 
 
 17 6 
 
 55 
 60 
 
 78 
 85 
 
 30 
 30 
 
 50 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1798 
 
 59 
 
 57 
 62 
 
 77 
 75 
 83 
 
 19 4 
 
 53 
 65 
 
 76 
 96 
 
 30 
 35 
 
 50 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1799 
 
 60 
 62 
 
 50 
 
 28 
 
 83 
 87 
 67 
 50 
 
 17 6 
 
 18 2 
 20 
 
 96 
 56 
 
 115 
 
 80 
 
 34 
 30 
 
 80 
 55 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 32 
 
 54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1800 
 
 38 
 34 
 54 
 
 59 
 54 
 70 
 
 20 
 
 
 50 
 62 
 
 70 
 
 84 
 
 32 
 40 
 
 45 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 59 
 
 75 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1801 
 
 47 
 
 68 
 
 tillMay 
 
 
 67 
 
 84 
 
 32 
 
 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 74 90 
 
 60 70 
 
 35 
 
 62 
 
 then 
 
 
 60 
 
 74 
 
 20 
 
 42 
 
 50 60 
 
 35 45 
 
 
 32 
 
 54 
 
 21 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1802 
 
 33 
 26 
 29 
 
 55 
 
 50 
 52 
 
 20 
 
 60 
 46 
 
 75 
 
 52 
 
 20 
 15 
 
 46 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 55 70 
 48 67 
 
 43 50 
 
 40 48 
 
 
 30 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22s. per 
 
 
 
 1803 
 
 40 
 38 
 41 
 
 60 
 58 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 45 
 
 50 
 
 65 
 70 
 
 15 
 
 20 
 
 40 
 45 
 
 cwt. and 
 
 12f per 
 
 cent. 
 
 thereon. 
 
 59 69 
 70 85 
 
 42 56 
 45 68
 
 48 
 
 ■ 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 iV/uscrtuacfos. 
 
 B.Pl. 
 
 Gazette 
 
 
 East India. 
 
 Havannah, 
 For Exportation. 
 
 
 Jamaica. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 average. 
 
 White. 
 
 Brown. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 White. 
 
 Brown. 
 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 1804 ! 
 
 46 
 
 52 
 
 62 
 66 
 62 
 64 
 
 20 
 
 tillMay 
 
 then 
 26 6 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 58 
 
 65 
 75 
 
 30 
 
 42 
 
 46 
 
 56 
 
 29 1| 
 
 66 84 
 70 94 
 
 45 65 
 
 50 70 
 
 1 HI 
 
 52 
 
 
 
 55 
 
 72 
 
 43 
 
 50 
 
 
 60 88 
 
 44 55 
 
 j 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ^2 
 
 65 
 
 27 
 
 49 
 
 6 
 
 67 
 
 77 
 
 51 
 
 62 
 
 29 8 
 
 60 80 
 
 44 55 
 
 1805 
 
 40 
 
 62 
 
 55 
 
 Oi 
 
 62 
 
 72 
 
 41 
 
 55 
 
 70 90 
 
 55 65 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 41 
 1806 jg 
 
 65 
 61 
 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 49 
 45 
 
 6 
 
 
 62 
 50 
 
 72 
 65 
 
 41 
 
 28 
 
 55 
 45 
 
 31 
 
 66 87 
 55 70 
 
 47 57 
 34 44 
 
 29 
 
 58 
 
 
 36 
 
 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1807 
 
 29 
 24 
 26 
 
 28 
 
 58 
 52 
 58 
 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 37 
 30 
 32 
 
 10 
 9 
 6 
 
 56 
 35 
 50 
 
 70 
 50 
 70 
 
 30 
 20 
 25 
 
 55 
 33 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 None 
 till Jul. 
 50 64 
 40 46 
 
 None 
 till Jul. 
 
 27 38 
 24 33 
 
 1 28 
 
 53 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 oc 
 
 53 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 
 
 8 
 
 48 
 
 56 
 
 24 
 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 46 
 
 30 35 
 
 180b 
 
 32 
 
 49 
 
 49 
 
 9 
 
 54 
 
 62 
 
 42 
 
 52 
 
 50 65 
 
 34 46 
 
 
 50 
 
 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 60 
 
 July a 
 
 51 
 
 2 
 
 50 
 
 54 
 
 38 
 
 48 
 
 
 50 58 
 56 62 
 
 33 45 
 45 50 
 
 1809 c c 
 
 48 
 
 scale 
 
 35 
 
 8 
 
 46 
 
 50 
 
 30 
 
 40 
 
 30 
 
 
 48 
 
 59 
 
 of duty 
 
 50 
 
 6 
 
 55 
 
 65 
 
 42 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27to30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 43 
 
 1810 if 
 
 58 
 53 
 52 
 52 
 
 27 
 
 49 
 
 6 
 
 55 
 
 60 
 
 45 
 
 50 
 
 
 55 66 
 
 46 49 
 
 29 
 
 53 
 
 11 
 
 61 
 
 66 
 
 50 
 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 60 75 
 
 50 55 
 
 
 HO 
 
 42 
 
 28 
 
 42 
 
 H 
 
 48 
 
 56 
 
 37 
 
 45 
 
 
 38 51 
 
 25 33 
 
 
 43 
 
 53 
 
 
 44 
 
 9 
 
 54 
 
 62 
 
 40 
 
 52 
 
 
 36 51 
 
 25 30 
 
 1811 
 
 31 
 
 49 
 
 27 
 
 34 
 
 11 
 
 44 
 
 56 
 
 31 
 
 43 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 46 
 
 22 25 
 
 
 42 
 
 58 
 
 
 44 
 
 5 
 
 53 
 
 60 
 
 40 
 
 51 
 
 
 42 56 
 
 26 32 
 
 1812 
 
 42 
 40 
 51 
 
 58 
 55 
 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 
 41 
 49 
 
 5 
 
 7 
 6 
 
 55 
 48 
 53 
 
 65 
 55 
 65 
 
 40 
 39 
 40 
 
 50 
 45 
 51 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 66 
 
 60 78 
 
 32 38 
 42 53 
 
 1813 
 
 57 
 56 
 70 
 
 67 
 68 
 76 
 
 30 
 
 51 
 
 63 
 54 
 
 75 
 
 2i 
 
 8 
 
 
 55 
 56 
 64 
 
 60 
 68 
 75 
 
 41 
 46 
 56 
 
 52 
 54 
 60 
 
 30 
 33 
 30 
 
 66 82 
 
 72 86 
 
 70 82 
 
 10512C 
 
 41 52 
 
 80 100
 
 49 
 
 
 
 SUGARS 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 Muscovados. 
 
 B. PL 
 
 
 East India. 
 
 Havonnoh, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Gazette 
 
 
 
 
 
 For Exportation. 
 
 
 Jamaica. 1 Duty. 
 
 average. 
 
 White. 1 Brown. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 White. Brown. 
 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 77 31 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 1814 
 
 73 
 92 
 50 
 73 
 
 86 
 
 107 
 
 78 
 
 90 
 
 30 
 
 97 2 
 84 10 
 90 3 
 54 3 
 79 91 
 
 55 
 74 
 60 
 
 65 
 
 78 
 70 
 
 58 
 53 
 30 
 
 54 
 65 
 42 
 
 30 
 33 
 30 
 
 106 126 
 
 110 134 
 
 85 112 
 
 96 128 
 
 90 
 96 
 70 
 80 
 
 100 
 
 104 
 
 80 
 
 92 
 
 1815 
 
 70 
 50 
 
 58 
 52 
 
 85 
 72 
 76 
 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 75 5^ 
 
 56 81 
 63 21 
 
 57 01 
 
 60 
 55 
 
 75 
 57 
 
 30 
 28 
 
 48 
 40 
 
 37 
 
 94 120 
 
 74 90 
 84 95 
 
 80 
 60 
 58 
 
 92 
 70 
 70 
 
 1816 
 
 50 
 42 
 52 
 43 
 
 70 
 64 
 67 
 61 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 
 59 61 
 45 
 
 49 01 
 
 60 
 
 47 
 
 75 
 60 
 
 40 
 34 
 
 55 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 80 94 
 50 70 
 52 73 
 
 58 
 44 
 
 70 
 50 
 
 
 43 
 
 67 
 
 
 50 01 
 
 46 
 
 61 
 
 36 
 
 46 
 
 
 52 70 
 
 44 
 
 50 
 
 1817 
 
 40 
 
 45 
 
 61 
 
 67 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 91 
 54 li 
 49 11| 
 
 43 
 58 
 51 
 
 bo 
 66 
 60 
 
 30 
 48 
 37 
 
 42 
 56 
 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 58 73 
 54 70 
 
 46 
 45 
 
 54 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 9f 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 63 
 
 
 48 10 
 
 53 
 
 60 
 
 37 
 
 52 
 
 
 54 70 
 
 47 
 
 51 
 
 1818 
 
 52 
 
 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 9| 
 
 55 
 
 63 
 
 39 
 
 54 
 
 Do. 
 
 68 76 
 
 50 
 
 58 
 
 
 47 
 
 63 
 
 
 47 
 51 01 
 
 46 
 
 60 
 
 34 
 
 45 
 
 
 52 66 
 
 34 
 
 47 
 
 1819 
 
 45 
 33 
 30 
 
 60 
 
 57 
 55 
 
 30 
 
 28 
 27 
 
 50 91 
 38 6 
 42 5| 
 
 46 
 35 
 
 59 
 50 
 
 34 
 21 
 
 45 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 52 66 
 42 58 
 48 60 
 
 39 
 33 
 
 47 
 40 
 
 
 
 
 3o 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1820 
 
 30 
 32 
 31 
 
 56 
 57 
 51 
 
 27 
 
 35 8\ 
 38 U 
 34 8jj 
 
 40 
 32 
 
 49 
 54 
 
 21 
 
 18 
 
 35 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 58 
 56 70 
 46 62 
 
 33 
 36 
 30 
 
 40 
 48 
 37 
 
 
 
 
 
 35 4 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 1821 
 
 33 
 24 
 26 
 
 53 
 
 48 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 36 2{ 
 
 28 9 
 32 7 
 
 32 
 30 
 
 54 
 40 
 
 15 
 18 
 11 
 
 29 
 32 
 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 50 58 
 35 42 
 
 28 
 22 
 
 36 
 
 28 
 
 
 26 
 
 53 
 
 
 31 10 
 
 34 3J 
 
 ■32 
 
 4(1 
 
 11 
 
 30 
 
 
 35 42 
 
 21 
 
 27 
 
 1822 
 
 31 
 
 51 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 l{ 
 
 32 
 
 45 
 
 14 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 32 37 
 
 22 
 
 30 
 
 
 23 
 25 
 
 45 
 53 
 
 
 30 4% 
 
 29 4J 
 
 30 
 
 39 
 
 15 
 
 3C 
 
 
 40 48 
 
 23 
 
 28
 
 50 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 SPIRITS. 
 
 Refinec 
 Free on board of a ] 
 Loaves, i Lumps. 
 
 I. 
 
 3ritish vessel. 
 Crushed.] Bounty. 
 
 Brandy 
 Cogniac. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Rum. 
 
 Jamaica, proof. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1782 
 
 cwt. 
 S. S. 
 
 76 86 
 63 70 
 
 cxvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 70 75 
 55 65 
 
 ctvt. 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 26 
 
 gallon, 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 210 3 1 
 3 4 3 6 
 
 gal. 
 s. d. 
 
 Customs 
 
 and 
 Excise. 
 
 9 H 
 
 gallon. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 3 2 3 4 
 
 4 6 6 
 
 gal. 
 s. d. 
 
 Customs 
 
 and 
 Excise. 
 
 6 in 
 
 1783 
 
 65 78 
 42 60 
 
 53 68 
 
 40 58 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 3 9 
 210 3 1 
 
 9 6 
 
 3 9 4 1 
 2 210 
 
 Do. 
 
 1784 
 
 46 70 
 43 65 
 
 43 65 
 40 56 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 3 3 6 
 2 8 2 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 6 3 2 
 
 3 6 4 4 
 
 5 
 
 1785 
 1786 
 
 48 72 
 45 67 
 
 45 55 
 40 48 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 9 3 
 2 4 2 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 8 3 8 
 2 2 2 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 43 67 
 50 65 
 
 40 48 
 45 63 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 4 2 6 
 2 12 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 2 2 8 
 2 8 3 
 2 2 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 1787 
 
 52 68 
 45 64 
 
 47 55 
 43 50 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 4 2 7 
 2 6 3 
 2 2 2 4 
 
 5 
 
 2 2 2 8 
 
 3 3 4 
 
 4 
 
 1788 
 
 50 65 
 46 62 
 
 45 56 
 43 55 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 6 2 8 
 2 10 3 
 
 2 4 2 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 4 3 
 2 4 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 46 67 
 
 48 72 
 
 42 50 
 50 57 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 4 2 9 
 
 3 5 
 5 4 5 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 6 3 2 
 2 4 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1790 
 
 52 74 
 68 80 
 
 50 58 
 62 72 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 5 5 6 
 
 6 6 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 4 3 
 
 3 6 4 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1791 
 
 67 80 
 90 105 
 
 63 73 
 
 82 98 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 7 6 
 
 7 8 6 
 
 5 10 
 
 4 410 
 2 9 3 9 
 4 4 5 
 
 4 8 
 
 1792 
 
 95 110 
 100 115 
 
 72 96 
 
 87 96 
 92 105 
 60 83 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 7 6 
 5 6 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 4 9 
 
 3 6 4 8 
 
 Do.
 
 51 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 SPIRITS. 
 
 
 Refined. 
 Free on board of a British vessel. 
 
 
 Brandy. 
 
 Rum. 
 
 
 Loaves. 1 Lumps. 
 
 Crushed.! Bounty. 
 
 Cogniac. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Jamaica, proof. 1 Duty. 
 
 
 cast. 
 
 civt. 
 
 Civt. 
 
 civt. 
 
 gallon. 
 
 gal. 
 
 gallon. 
 
 gal. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 S. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d 
 
 . s. d. 
 
 s. d. s. d 
 
 . s. d. 
 
 1793 
 
 85 
 73 
 81 
 
 102 
 
 9C 
 9C 
 
 82 91 
 69 8£ 
 
 None. 
 
 26 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 6 t 
 10 t 
 
 5 10 
 
 4 8 5 4 
 4 4 6 
 
 4 8 
 
 1794 
 
 80 
 66 
 
 94 
 86 
 
 72 88 
 57 76 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 5 C 
 
 7 9 C 
 
 None. 
 
 6 8 
 
 4 4 8 
 
 2 6 3 2 
 
 3 3 9 
 
 5 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 8 
 
 
 5 4 
 
 1795 
 
 82 
 95 
 
 94 
 112 
 
 78 86 
 90 103 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 9 6 
 
 11 
 10 6 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 7 6 
 
 3 4 3 10 
 8 6 8 9 
 
 till Aug 
 then 
 6 
 
 1796 
 
 97 
 105 
 
 112 
 122 
 
 92 104 
 98 112 
 
 None. 
 
 19 6 
 
 9 6 
 7 6 
 
 10 6 
 8 6 
 
 7 6 
 
 9 9 6 
 6 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 92 
 94 
 
 112 
 114 
 
 81 100 
 
 84 102 
 
 None. 
 
 23 6 
 
 8 
 8 
 
 8 6 
 
 9 
 
 8 4 
 
 6 6 8 
 4 6 6 
 
 7 2 7 8 
 
 6 8 
 
 1798 
 
 91 
 120 
 
 110 
 138 
 
 87 103 
 
 107 128 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 
 10 
 
 9 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 2 8 
 4 6 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1799 
 
 107 
 70 
 
 125 
 96 
 
 100 117 
 61 83 
 
 None. 
 
 19 6 
 
 9 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 3 5 6 
 
 3 4 
 
 4 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 83 
 73 
 90 
 
 102 
 
 92 
 
 108 
 
 70 86 
 
 82 96 
 
 None. 
 
 30 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 9 2 
 
 3 9 4 6 
 6 9 8 3 
 
 7 4 
 
 
 88 
 
 104 
 
 82 96 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 
 6 9 8 3 
 
 
 1801 
 
 83 
 81 
 60 
 
 98 
 90 
 80 
 
 78 92 
 70 80 
 54 70 
 
 None. 
 
 33 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 7 
 9 
 
 9 2 
 
 7 6 10 
 4 3 4 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 64 
 
 84 56 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 2 5 6 
 
 
 1802 
 
 60 
 
 56 
 
 78 53 66 
 75 51 65 
 
 None. 
 
 36 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 9 5 
 
 5 6 6 9 
 3 6 5 
 
 7 6A 
 
 
 52 
 
 72j 46 61 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 52 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 SPIRITS. 
 
 Free on 
 
 Loaves. 
 
 Refine c 
 board of a I 
 Lumps. 
 
 I 
 
 Iritish ves 
 Crushed. 
 
 sel. 
 Bounty. 
 
 Brandy. Rum. 
 Cogniac. Duty. Jamaica, proof. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1803 
 
 cut. 
 s. s. 
 
 58 74 
 
 72 82 
 
 cut. 
 s. s. 
 
 53 65 
 69 79 
 
 cut. 
 
 S. S. 
 
 None. 
 
 cut. 
 s. d. 
 
 36 
 
 gallon, 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 8 6 9 
 
 9 10 
 6 7 
 
 gal. 
 s. d. 
 
 9 5 
 13 101 
 
 gallon, 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 5 6 
 
 5 6 7 3 
 3 4 4 9 
 
 gal. 
 s. d. 
 
 7 6A 
 11 1| 
 
 1804 
 
 64 75 
 
 74 88 
 
 60 70 
 67 79 
 
 None. 
 
 43 
 
 6 7 
 uncertain. 
 
 13 104 
 13 11| 
 
 3 4 5 
 2 9 3 9 
 5 6 6 
 
 11 li 
 11 2| 
 
 1805 
 
 74 90 
 
 78 93 
 
 66 82 
 69 84 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 6 6 6 
 4 5 
 
 13 11! 
 
 14 0A 
 
 5 6 6 
 3 3 4 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1806 
 
 67 98 
 57 79 
 
 57 62 
 44 63 
 
 None. 
 
 47 8} 
 50 
 
 4 5 
 2 3 
 
 5 6 
 
 14 0A 
 14 1 
 
 3 4 4 6 
 3 6 4 6 
 
 11 2£. 
 11 31 
 
 1807 
 
 50 77 
 43 69 
 
 39 58 
 36 51 
 
 None. 
 
 53 
 
 4 5 
 
 5 5 6 
 
 14 1 
 
 16 7 
 
 3 4 4 6 
 3 4 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 43 69 
 60 79 
 
 36 51 
 54 66 
 
 42 50 
 54 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 6 7 6 
 3 6 4 6 
 6 6 8 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 4 6 
 6 6 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 60 73 
 
 57 75 
 69 89 
 
 60 73 
 51 70 
 63 79 
 
 59 63 
 51 60 
 63 66 
 59 63 
 
 53 
 
 47 8 
 50 4 
 
 6 6 7 6 
 3 3 6 
 6 6 7 6 
 
 16 7\ 
 
 5 6 6 6 
 
 3 9 5 6 
 
 4 9 6 9 
 
 11 4| 
 
 1810 
 
 71 90 
 85 104 
 57 72 
 
 65 74 
 78 88 
 48 61 
 
 70 72 
 80 81 
 52 59 
 
 45 
 
 48 4 
 
 49 6 
 
 5 6 7 6 
 10 6 116 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 6 
 4 9 6 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 58 73 
 42 60 
 55 68 
 
 50 63 
 34 50 
 
 51 60 
 
 50 56 
 33 40 
 50 56 
 
 47 9 
 50 4 
 53 
 
 10 6 11 6 
 21 6 25 
 13 6 23 
 21 25 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 6 
 4 2 5 3 
 4 6 6 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 57 68 
 52 64 
 63 78 
 
 53 63 
 44 58 
 
 62 72 
 
 60 65 
 44 50 
 70 77 
 
 53 
 50 4 
 
 21 6 27 
 15 16 
 
 20 7\ 
 
 4 6 6 
 
 4 3 5 3 
 
 5 6 6 6 
 
 Do.
 
 53 
 
 
 SUGARS. 
 
 SPIRITS. 
 
 
 Free 
 
 Refined. 
 on board of a British vessel. 
 
 Brandy. 
 
 
 Ram. 
 
 
 Loaves. 
 
 Lumps. 
 
 Crushed. 
 
 Bounty. 
 
 Cogniac. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Jamaica 
 
 , proof. | Duty. 
 
 
 CU 
 
 t. 
 
 CU't. 
 
 cut. 
 
 Cliit. 
 
 gallon. 
 
 gal. 
 
 gall 
 
 r O«. 
 
 gal. 
 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 S. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 S. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 73 
 
 95 
 
 70 
 
 76 
 
 72 
 
 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 6 
 
 7 
 
 6 6 
 
 
 
 1813 
 
 83 
 
 77 
 
 98 
 90 
 
 77 
 73 
 
 87 
 81 
 
 78 
 74 
 
 83 
 81 
 
 50 4 
 
 13 6 
 17 
 
 14 
 18 
 
 20 7! 
 22 7h 
 
 6 6 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 11 6f 
 
 
 118 
 
 135 
 
 115 
 
 130 
 
 116 
 
 126 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 128 
 
 150 
 
 123 
 
 135 
 
 123 
 
 130 
 
 35 
 50 1| 
 35 4 
 
 17 
 6 6 
 5 3 
 
 18 
 7 6 
 5 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 1814 
 
 142 
 
 93 
 
 168 
 120 
 
 136 
 
 78 
 
 154 
 95 
 
 138 
 82 
 
 148 
 
 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 
 4 6 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 125 
 
 145 
 
 115 
 
 131 
 
 116 
 
 122 
 
 
 
 
 
 1815 
 
 116 
 90 
 96 
 
 134 
 107 
 111 
 
 106 
 81 
 93 
 
 121 
 
 93 
 
 101 
 
 105 
 
 84 
 95 
 
 115 
 95 
 
 106 
 
 35 4 
 50 \\ 
 
 5 6 
 
 6 1 
 5 9 
 
 6 4 
 6 6 
 6 
 
 19 3| 
 
 4 6 
 3 
 
 6 6 
 4 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 82 
 
 103 
 
 79 
 
 94 
 
 79 
 
 87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 101 
 
 78 
 
 94 
 
 78 
 63 
 
 84 
 
 72 
 
 50 11 
 
 46 If 
 
 5 6 
 
 6 
 
 
 3 3 
 
 4 6 
 
 
 181G 
 
 67 
 
 80 
 
 62 
 
 73 
 
 4 2 
 
 4 8 
 
 18 9 
 
 2 8 
 
 3 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 70 
 
 85 
 
 64 
 
 76 
 
 7 10 
 
 8 
 
 
 3 9 
 
 5 
 
 
 1817 
 
 68 
 63 
 76 
 65 
 
 85 
 82 
 92 
 83 
 
 63 
 60 
 70 
 62 
 
 75 
 73 
 
 84 
 76 
 
 63 
 
 72 
 61 
 
 70 
 80 
 70 
 
 46 If 
 
 7 
 
 6 8 
 
 14 1 
 
 7 6 
 
 6 10 
 
 14 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 
 
 2 8 
 
 3 6 
 
 4 6 
 
 4 
 
 5 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 68 
 
 85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1818 
 
 70 
 68 
 
 88 
 86 
 
 63 
 
 66 
 
 80 
 
 82 
 
 64 
 67 
 
 72 
 
 74 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 10 
 5 6 
 
 14 
 6 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 
 
 3 8 
 
 5 
 5 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 71 
 
 87 
 
 58 
 
 74 
 
 60 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 3 3 
 
 4 3 
 
 
 
 63 
 
 81 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1819 
 
 63 
 47 
 53 
 50 
 
 81 
 71 
 76 
 70 
 
 57 
 46 
 42 
 
 74 
 64 
 50 
 
 60 
 43 
 
 70 
 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 6 
 4 4 
 3 4 
 
 6 6 
 6 8 
 5 6 
 
 18 10 
 
 3 3 
 
 2 6 
 
 4 3 
 4 
 
 11 7i 
 
 1820 
 
 50 
 49 
 51 
 46 
 
 75 
 74 
 76 
 
 68 
 
 43 
 
 46 
 45 
 
 63 
 64 
 55 
 
 44 
 43 
 
 65 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 4 
 
 2 4 
 2 9 
 
 3 9 
 
 4 
 
 4 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 6 
 
 3 4 
 3 
 
 3 9 
 
 5 2 
 
 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 4 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 1821 
 
 50 
 37 
 
 68 
 
 59 
 
 44 
 31 
 
 60 
 50 
 
 45 
 34 
 
 66 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 10 
 4 2 
 
 3 10 
 
 3 6 
 
 4 9 
 4 2 
 
 18 lOf 
 
 2 2 
 1 6 
 
 4 3 
 2 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 34 
 
 59 
 
 31 
 
 50 
 
 34 
 
 50 
 
 
 4 
 3 
 
 4 4 
 3 4 
 
 
 1 6 
 
 3 
 
 
 1822 
 
 40 
 
 60 
 
 35 
 
 52 
 
 32 
 
 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 10 
 
 3 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 38 
 
 52 
 
 32 
 
 47 
 
 33 
 
 44 
 
 
 1 8 
 
 3 

 
 54 
 
 
 TALLOW. 
 
 TAR. 
 
 TOBACCO. 
 
 Russia, 
 
 y. c. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 American. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Stockh 
 
 olm. 
 Duty. 
 
 For Exportation, in 
 King's Warehouses. 
 Maryland. 1 Virginia. 
 
 1782 
 
 CUlt. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 37 40 
 36 38 
 
 cwt. 
 Free. 
 
 per barrel 
 s. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 p. last 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 12 41 
 
 per barrel 
 s. s. 
 
 23 24 
 
 24 25 
 
 p. last 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 12 A\ 
 
 lb. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 9 121 
 11 14 
 
 lb. 
 d. d. 
 
 10 17 
 
 11 20 
 
 1783 
 
 36 
 29 
 
 39 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 14 
 
 22 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 21 51 
 
 ^4 d 2 
 
 4 io 
 
 None. 
 51 12 
 2f 6i 
 
 1784 
 
 33 
 44 
 
 36 
 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 13 
 
 21 
 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 15 
 
 28 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 4| 9 
 
 3 5f- 
 
 41 81 
 21 6* 
 
 1785 
 
 45 
 42 
 47 
 
 47 
 43 
 
 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 
 15 
 
 17 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 31 7 
 2 5 
 21 7 
 
 n 4* 
 
 1786 
 
 46 
 
 48 
 56 
 
 48 
 50 
 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 
 16 
 
 14 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 19 
 
 18 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 7 
 3 8 
 
 21 41 
 3 5 
 
 1787 
 
 56 
 
 47 
 
 57 
 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 10 
 14 
 
 15 
 11 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 17 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 18 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 81 
 
 21 5 
 
 91 41 
 
 1788 
 
 46 
 33 
 
 38 
 
 47 
 34 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 11 
 
 11 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 12 
 
 15 
 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 81 
 21 8 
 
 3 4f 
 
 1789 
 
 39 
 45 
 
 42 
 
 41 
 
 46 
 44 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 
 13 
 
 12 
 
 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 5| 
 2 8 
 
 21 41 
 
 1790 
 
 41 
 44 
 
 43 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 13 
 11 
 
 14 
 
 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 19 
 13 
 
 16 
 20 
 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 6 
 
 21 7 
 
 21 41 
 21 3 
 
 1791 
 
 40 
 39 
 47 
 
 42 
 
 40 
 
 48 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 12 
 16 
 13 
 
 13 
 17 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 7 
 2| 7 
 
 91 41 
 
 ^2 ^2 
 
 2 4 
 2^ 41 
 
 1792 
 
 47 
 42 
 46 
 
 48 
 43 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 7 
 
 2 7 
 
 21 41 
 ■*? ^2 
 
 2 4|
 
 00 
 
 
 TALLOW. 
 
 TAR. 
 
 TOBACCO. 
 
 Ri 
 
 issia, 
 
 Y. C. 
 
 . 
 
 Amer 
 
 can. Stockholm. 
 
 For Exportation, in 
 King's Warehouses. 
 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Maryland. 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 
 cut. 
 
 civt. 
 
 per barrel 
 
 p. last 
 
 per barrel 
 
 p. last 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 1793 
 
 47 
 
 38 
 
 48 
 39 
 
 Free. 
 
 15 
 13 
 17 
 
 16 
 14 
 
 18 
 
 s. d. 
 12 4i 
 
 18 
 20 
 21 
 
 19 
 24 
 22 
 
 s. d. 
 12 4| 
 
 24 74 
 2f 8 
 
 24- 44- 
 
 1794 
 
 38 
 50 
 
 39 
 51 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 17 
 21 
 
 21 
 
 18 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 23 
 21 
 
 23 
 24 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 24 8 
 
 n 4| 
 
 3 5 
 
 
 56 
 
 58 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 
 3 8! 
 3i 94 
 
 
 1795 
 
 78 
 
 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 5 
 34- 6-L 
 
 1 63 
 
 64 
 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 
 1796 
 
 68 
 58 
 
 70 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 25 
 
 14 
 
 21 
 26 
 17 
 
 11 61 
 
 23 
 28 
 21 
 
 24 
 29 
 
 22 
 
 13 
 
 34- 9| 
 5 9 
 
 44- 7 
 H 84- 
 
 
 56 
 
 62 
 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 
 64- 8 
 7f 12 
 
 6| 9 
 74 12 
 
 1797 
 
 46 
 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 13 2^ 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 13 7 T V 
 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 
 1798 
 
 49 
 56 
 
 50 
 57 
 
 1 6 
 
 20 
 
 28 
 
 21 
 29 
 
 15 5A 
 
 22 
 
 27 
 
 23 
 
 28 
 
 16 0A 
 
 8 13 
 94 15 
 
 8 13 
 114 16 
 
 1799 
 
 56 
 
 57 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 30 
 
 31 
 
 Do. 
 
 94- 15 
 
 10 15 
 
 65 
 
 66 
 
 29 
 
 30 
 
 27 
 
 28 
 
 4 8 
 
 4 7 
 
 1800 
 
 58 
 66 
 
 59 
 
 68 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 33 
 
 27 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 27 
 32 
 
 28 
 34 
 
 Do. 
 
 4i 9 
 6 11 
 
 44 8 
 4 84 
 
 
 68 
 
 70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1801 
 
 75 
 51 
 
 58 
 
 76 
 52 
 59 
 
 Do. 
 
 35 
 15 
 
 36 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 
 19 
 
 35 
 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 104 
 4 12 
 
 44 8 
 34 64 
 
 1802 
 
 63 
 59 
 64 
 
 64 
 60 
 66 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 22 
 
 18 
 23 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 
 25 
 
 22 
 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 11 
 
 34 12 
 
 3 64 
 34 7
 
 56 
 
 
 TALLOW. 
 
 TAR. 
 
 TOBACCO. 
 
 Russia, Y. C. 
 
 A 
 
 merican. 
 
 Stockholm. 
 
 For Exportation, in 
 King's Warehouses. 
 
 
 j Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Maryland. 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 
 cvot. 
 
 cvot. 
 
 per ba 
 
 rrel 
 
 p. last 
 
 per barrel 
 
 p. last 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 1803 
 
 67 68 
 76 77 
 
 2 Of 
 
 22 
 20 
 23 
 
 23 
 21 
 
 26 
 
 s. d. 
 13 6 
 
 27 
 21 
 
 28 
 23 
 
 s. d. 
 14 11 
 
 3 12 
 5 11 
 
 24- 7 
 44- 8 
 
 
 72 75 
 
 
 23 
 
 25 
 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 
 5 11 
 
 4 10 
 
 44- 8 
 34- 7 
 
 1804 
 
 68 69 
 
 2 3^ 
 
 20 
 
 23 
 
 15 
 
 21 
 
 23 
 
 16 7 
 
 
 70 71 
 
 
 26 
 
 29 
 
 
 36 
 
 38 
 
 
 1805 
 
 67 68 
 61 62 
 68- 70 
 
 2 4 
 
 26 
 20 
 26 
 
 28 
 21 
 28 
 
 16 8 
 16 10£ 
 
 36 
 26 
 33 
 
 38 
 28 
 34 
 
 17 01 
 17 10 
 
 4 12 
 4 14 
 
 34- 7 
 4 8 
 
 1806 
 
 66 67 
 54 55 
 
 2 6 
 
 27 
 21 
 
 29 
 23 
 
 17 lOf 
 
 33 
 26 
 
 36 
 
 27 
 
 19 Of 
 
 4 13 
 
 4 8 
 
 1807 
 
 53 54 
 
 71 72 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 
 
 27 
 
 23 
 
 28 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 32 
 
 27 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 13 
 
 5 13 
 
 4 8 
 44- 8 
 
 
 70 71 
 
 Do. 
 
 28 
 
 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 
 
 35 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 13 
 
 44- 8 
 
 1808 
 
 110 112 
 
 44 
 
 46 
 
 48 
 
 50 
 
 94 15 
 
 16 24 
 
 i 
 
 
 106 110 
 uncertain 
 
 
 44 46 
 
 
 48 
 
 50 
 
 
 9 20 
 
 16 24 
 
 1809 
 
 79 82 
 
 2 8 
 
 36 
 31 
 
 38 
 33 
 
 17 lOf 
 
 40 
 
 42 
 
 17 10 
 
 4 11 
 
 44- 10 
 
 
 91 93 
 
 
 
 50 
 
 51 
 
 
 6 12 
 
 7 13 
 
 
 83 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18>0 
 
 83 84 
 64 65 
 
 Do. 
 
 42 
 23 
 34 
 
 44 
 
 28 
 38 
 
 Do. 
 
 51 
 35 
 
 48 
 
 53 
 36 
 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 12 
 
 2 9 
 
 7 13 
 3 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 10 
 
 3 8 
 
 1811 
 
 61 62 
 74 75 
 
 Do. 
 
 41 
 
 26 
 
 44 
 
 27 
 
 Do. 
 
 46 
 35 
 
 48 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 11 
 3 12 
 
 4 9 
 
 4 7 
 
 1815 
 
 , 72 73 
 ' 88 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 
 32 
 
 27 
 33 
 
 Do. 
 
 33 
 
 38 
 
 34 
 39 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 12 
 
 2 7 
 4 84-
 
 57 
 
 
 TALLOW. 
 
 TAR. 
 
 TOBACCO. 
 
 R 
 
 ussza, Y. C. 
 
 American. 
 
 Stock) 
 
 xolm. 
 
 For Exportation, in 
 King's Warehouses, 
 
 
 
 I Duty. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Maryland. 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 
 ctvt. 
 
 cwt. 
 
 per barrel 
 
 r p. last 
 
 peri 
 
 'jar re 
 
 p. last 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 12 bar 
 
 s. 
 
 s. 
 
 12 bar. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 d. d. 
 
 
 88 
 82 
 98 
 
 90 
 
 84 
 
 100 
 
 
 28 30 
 
 s. d. 
 
 33 
 
 34 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 
 1813 
 
 3 2 
 
 None 
 
 after 
 
 February. 
 
 21 4| 
 
 30 
 48 
 36 
 
 31 
 54 
 38 
 
 21 A\ 
 
 44- 84- 
 10 26 
 
 54- 144- 
 10 26 
 
 
 107 
 
 77 
 87 
 
 110 
 
 78 
 88 
 
 
 
 
 36 
 
 38 
 
 
 104- 24 
 
 8 26 
 
 1814 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 35 
 
 27 
 36 
 
 Do. 
 
 20 48 
 10 27 
 
 22 66 
 12 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 34 
 
 
 12 36 
 
 20 60 
 
 1815 
 
 81 
 59 
 
 82 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 30 32 
 24 26 
 
 Do. 
 
 26 
 35 
 21 
 
 29 
 37 
 
 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 18 
 44- 18 
 6 20 
 
 12 48 
 10 21 
 
 
 52 
 
 55 
 
 
 16 20 
 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 
 64- 18 
 
 10 17 
 8 14 
 
 1816 
 
 46 
 
 47 
 
 Do. 
 
 10 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 18 
 
 
 51 
 
 52 
 
 
 13 14 
 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 
 6 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 22 
 
 6^ 13 
 
 
 53 
 
 55 
 
 
 13 14 
 
 
 20 
 
 21 
 
 
 5 20 
 
 7 13 
 
 1817 
 
 51 
 
 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 18 
 
 64- 9 
 
 
 76 
 
 77 
 
 
 13 14 
 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 
 5 20 
 
 6| 20 
 
 54- 9 
 64- 10 
 
 
 75 
 
 76 
 
 
 14 16 
 
 
 19 
 
 20 
 
 
 64- 20 
 
 54- 10 
 9 14 
 
 74- 12 
 
 1818 
 
 77 
 70 
 
 78 
 71 
 
 Do. 
 
 16 20 
 14 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 21 
 
 18 
 
 22 
 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 14 
 No fine. 
 
 
 89 
 
 90 
 
 
 17 18 
 
 
 21 
 
 22 
 
 
 10 24 
 
 
 82 
 
 83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1819 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 18 
 
 15 16 
 
 16 17 
 
 21 6 
 
 21 
 16 
 20 
 
 22 
 17 
 21 
 
 21 6 
 
 10 24 
 84- 24 
 5 24 
 7 23 
 
 64- 12 
 54- 11 
 4 9 
 54- 11 
 
 70 
 62 
 51 
 
 71 
 63 
 52 
 
 
 53 
 
 54 
 
 
 13 15 
 
 
 20 
 14 
 
 21 
 16 
 
 
 7 24 
 
 5 10 
 
 1820 
 
 62 
 
 63 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 20 
 
 5 10| 
 
 
 47 
 
 48 
 
 
 15 16 
 
 
 
 6 20 
 
 34- 8 
 
 1821 
 
 47 
 43 
 45 
 39 
 
 48 
 44 
 46 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 15 
 11 12 
 13 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 15 
 
 14 15 
 
 15 16 
 21 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 20 
 34- 18 
 3i 13 
 
 No fine. 
 
 34- 8 
 2f 7 
 H 74- 
 
 
 43 
 
 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1822 
 
 41 
 54 
 31 
 
 49 
 
 
 14 
 
 15 
 
 9 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 23 
 16 
 
 24 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 34 13 
 
 2f 24 
 
 3-j- 7t 
 3i 8 
 
 55 
 32 
 
 Do. 
 
 ■ 
 
 40 
 33 
 
 42 
 34 
 
 
 10 14 
 
 
 18 
 
 19 
 
 

 
 58 
 
 TEA. 
 
 1782 
 
 1783 
 
 1784 
 
 1785 
 
 1786 
 
 1787 
 
 1788 
 
 1789 
 
 1790 
 
 As in E. I. Company s Wareh. 
 Hyson. Congou. Duty. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. 
 
 7 6 
 6 8 
 
 13 6 
 11 6 
 
 7 2 12 
 6 11 
 
 7 3 
 4 10 
 
 12 
 9 
 
 4 8 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 8 6 
 
 5 8 
 4 10 
 
 9 
 
 7 6 
 
 5 2 
 4 2 
 
 4 6 
 4 6 
 
 9 6 
 8 
 
 4 6 9 
 
 1791 
 
 1792 
 
 4 6 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 9 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 6 
 4 4 
 
 5 6 
 
 5 2 
 
 121 
 
 per cent, 
 on Co.'s 
 saleprices 
 
 4 4 5 6 
 4 5 
 
 4 8 6 4 
 3 10 4 8 
 
 3 10 5 
 
 2 8 5 6 
 
 210 5 6 
 3 4 7 
 2 6 6 
 
 2 10 5 3 
 
 2 9 4 8 
 
 3 
 2 9 
 
 6 4 
 5 
 
 2 10 5 
 
 2 6 4 9 
 
 2 6 
 2 9 
 
 4 9 
 4 6 
 
 4 10 9 6 
 4 6 9 6 
 4 9 6 
 
 4 7 9 6 
 4 9 
 4 6 9 6 
 
 2 9 
 
 3 
 
 4 9 
 
 5 
 
 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 TIN. 
 
 English 
 
 in bars 
 
 on board. 
 
 Ctvt. 
 s. d. 
 
 83 
 83 2 
 
 83 2 
 82 8 
 
 82 8 
 
 84 8 
 
 84 8 
 
 84 8 
 
 84 8 
 77 6 
 
 70 6 
 
 77 
 
 77 
 
 77 
 86 
 
 92 6 
 103 6 
 
 ton. 
 I. I. 
 
 220 265 
 200 260 
 
 WHALEBONE. 
 
 British Fishery 
 Greenland. South Sea. Duty 
 
 200 260 
 150 200 
 153 225 
 
 145 200 
 120 150 
 160 190 
 
 140 195 
 120 155 
 
 130 150 
 100 120 
 160 210 
 
 180 
 
 195 200 
 
 180 190 
 
 170 180 
 140 150 
 
 125 135 
 130 140 
 
 130 150 
 200 210 
 
 170 180 
 150 180 
 200 220 
 
 200 220 
 250 300 
 
 ton. 
 I. I. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 135 155 
 160 180 
 140 160 
 
 120 140 
 
 130 160 
 
 90 110 
 
 80 100 
 
 70 85 
 
 70 80 
 100 110 
 
 90 95 
 100 110 
 
 100 110 
 
 100 120 
 
 90 100 
 
 Free 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do.
 
 59 
 
 
 TEA. 
 
 TIN. 
 
 WHALEBONE. 
 
 As in E. I. 
 
 Hyson. 
 
 Company s 
 Congou. 
 
 Vareh. 
 Duty. 
 
 English 
 
 in bars 
 
 on board. 
 
 BritL 
 Greenland. 
 
 h Fishery 
 South Sea. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 6 9 6 
 4 8 
 4 6 9 10 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 3 5 
 2 6 3 
 
 121 
 
 per cent, 
 on Co.'s 
 saleprices 
 
 cxvt. 
 S. d. 
 
 103 6 
 105 6 
 
 tun . 
 1. 1. 
 
 270 300 
 230 240 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 90 110 
 
 120 150 
 
 80 110 
 
 Free 
 
 1794 
 
 4 6 9 
 4 7 9 6 
 
 4 8 9 
 
 2 8 4 
 
 3 2 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 103 6 
 100 6 
 
 200 230 
 130 140 
 
 80 110 
 104 120 
 
 85 105 
 106 120 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 4 8 8 
 4 7 8 
 
 3 2 4 6 
 2 11 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 100 6 
 99 6 
 
 130 150 
 
 160 180 
 
 150 
 
 100 120 
 110 130 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 4 6 8 
 
 5 8 
 
 2114 
 2 9 4 5 
 
 20 per 
 cent. 
 
 101 6 
 
 102 6 
 
 150 
 115 120 
 
 100 110 
 
 85 100 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 4 7 8 6 
 4 8 8 
 
 2 10 4 5 
 2 4 3 9 
 
 30 per 
 cent. 
 
 102 6 
 
 115 120 
 
 80 88 
 
 85 100 
 70 76 
 
 Do. 
 
 1798 
 
 4 4 8 
 4 6 8 2 
 
 3 3 9 
 3 4 3 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 102 6 
 
 98 
 
 100 
 
 90 105 
 
 80 96 
 
 70 78 
 75 90 
 
 3 per 
 
 cent. 
 
 on 
 
 val. 
 
 1799 
 
 4 6 8 2 
 4 7 7 
 3 10 5 8 
 
 3 5 3 9 
 
 2 5 2 7 
 2 7 3 1 
 
 Do. 
 
 102 
 104 
 
 80 96 
 
 75 85 
 
 75 80 
 65 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 4 7 
 4 2 6 
 4 2 6 6 
 
 2 10 3 4 
 
 2 10 3 7 
 
 3 4 3 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 104 
 110 
 
 75 82 
 70 80 
 
 65 70 
 42 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 4 2 6 6 
 4 2 5 6 
 4 3 6 6 
 
 3 4 3 7 
 3 4 3 6 
 2 10 3 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 110 
 
 111 6 
 
 80 85 
 65 70 
 
 56 60 
 45 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 1802 
 
 4 3 6 6 
 
 4 4 6 6 
 
 5 6 
 
 3 3 8 
 3 3 9 
 2 11 3 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 114 6 
 113 6 
 
 115 6 
 
 65 70 
 50 60 
 
 45 50 
 
 Do.
 
 60 
 
 
 TEA. 
 
 TIN. 
 
 WHALEBONE. 
 
 As' in E. I. 
 
 Hyson. 
 
 Company's 
 Congou. 
 
 'Vareh. 
 Duty. 
 
 English 
 
 in bars 
 
 on board. 
 
 BritL 
 Greenland. 
 
 ih Fishery 
 South Sea. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1803 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 5 6 
 5 5 6 
 4 5 4 10 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 211 3 8 
 2 8 3 8 
 2 6 3 2 
 
 65 per 
 cent. 
 
 cwt. 
 s. d. 
 
 115 6 
 
 ton. 
 /. /. 
 50 60 
 uncertain. 
 35 40 
 30 35 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 45 50 
 uncertain. 
 30 35 
 25 30 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 
 33 9 
 
 1804 
 
 4 2 4 10 
 4 7 5 4 
 
 2 8 3 3 
 
 3 13 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 115 6 
 
 30 35 
 
 28 30 
 
 20 25 
 
 20 28 
 
 37 6 
 
 1805 
 
 4 7 5 4 
 4 8 5 9 
 
 3 13 6 
 211 3 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 113 
 122 6 
 
 28 40 
 25 30 
 
 20 28 
 
 38 3 
 
 1806 
 
 4 8 5 9 
 4 9 5 8 
 4 10 5 10 
 
 211 3 8 
 2 4 3 7 
 2 6 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 128 6 
 124 6 
 
 128 6 
 
 25 30 
 20 25 
 
 20 28 
 20 22 
 
 40 9 
 
 1807 
 
 4 10 5 8 
 4 7 6 2 
 
 2 10 3 9 
 
 3 13 8 
 
 96 per 
 cent. 
 
 128 6 
 
 20 25 
 15 23 
 30 32 
 
 20 22 
 28 29 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 4 7 6 
 
 4 8 5 9 
 
 3 2 3 8 
 3 3 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 118 6 
 120 6 
 
 30 32 
 26 28 
 35 40 
 
 28 29 
 20 22 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 4 8 5 8 
 
 5 6 
 
 3 3 7 
 3 1 3 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 120 6 
 128 6 
 
 30 40 
 55 60 
 50 55 
 55 60 
 
 20 22 
 30 32 
 25 30 
 
 40 
 
 1810 
 
 411 5 10 
 4 7 5 6 
 
 3 1 3 10 
 3 3 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 128 6 
 174 
 
 70 75 
 
 80 90 
 
 75 80 
 
 uncertain. 
 
 33 40 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 4 7 5 6 
 4 9 6 
 
 4 7 5 6 
 
 211 3 6 
 3 3 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 174 
 171 6 
 155 6 
 
 30 40 
 35 40 
 
 22 28 
 30 32 
 26 30 
 
 Do. 
 
 1812 
 
 4 9 6 
 4 9 5 6 
 411 6 
 
 3 3 8 
 3 2 3 8 
 3 3 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 uncertain. 
 139 6 
 131 6 
 
 40 45 
 65 70 
 
 26 30 
 30 32 
 25 30 
 
 Do.
 
 61 
 
 
 TEA. 
 
 TIN. 
 
 WHALEBONE. 
 
 As in E. I. 
 Hyson. 
 
 Company s 
 Congou. 
 
 War eh. 
 Duty. 
 
 English 
 
 in bars 
 
 on board. 
 
 British Fisher 
 
 Greenland. South Sea. 
 
 i 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1813 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 4 11 6 
 4 9 5 10 
 6 17 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 2 11 3 7 
 
 3 3 3 9 
 
 lb. 
 
 96 per 
 cent. 
 
 ctot. 
 S. d". 
 
 140 6 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 
 68 70 
 150 160 
 
 ton. 
 1. 1. 
 26 30 
 65 70 
 75 80 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 
 47 6 
 
 1814 
 
 6 2 7 6 
 6 6 10 
 
 3 5 3 10 
 3 3 3 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 164 6 
 174 6 
 168 6 
 
 150 160 
 
 70 85 
 
 70 85 
 
 110 115 
 
 65 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 1815 
 
 6 6 10 
 5 6 6 6 
 
 3 3 3 9 
 3 2 3 7 
 
 2 7 3 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 148 6 
 152 
 136 6 
 
 85 86 
 
 78 80 
 
 110 120 
 
 90 100 
 
 40 42 
 50 52 
 40 42 
 
 Do. 
 
 1816 
 
 5 9 6 3 
 4 7 5 9 
 4 6 6 
 
 2 7 3 11 
 2 6 3 6 
 2 9 3 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 136 6 
 102 6 
 
 85 90 
 52 55 
 
 75 78 
 
 40 42 
 45 46 
 30 32 
 50 52 
 
 Do. 
 
 1817 
 
 4 6 6 
 4 3 5 9 
 4 6 6 
 
 2 9 3 5 
 2 11 3 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 97 
 
 103 
 
 97 
 
 70 73 
 55 60 
 
 80 84 
 75 80 
 
 50 
 40 
 50 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 1818 
 
 4 6 6 
 4 2 5 10 
 4 5 6 4 
 4 6 6 
 
 2 11 3 7 
 
 3 13 7 
 2 10 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 99 
 
 91 6 
 
 92 6 
 
 75 80 
 
 63 65 
 
 122 125 
 
 118 120 
 
 40 
 30 
 70 
 60 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 4 6 6 
 
 5 1 5 10 
 
 2 10 3 6 
 2 4 3 6 
 
 100 p. c. 
 above 2*. 
 96 p. cent 
 under 2*. 
 
 77 
 81 
 
 77 6 
 
 108 110 
 84 86 
 
 123 125 
 68 70 
 
 60 
 40 
 55 
 30 
 40 
 
 Do. 
 
 1820 
 
 5 1 5 10 
 5 4 6 
 5 7 6 4 
 
 2 5 3 7 
 2 3 3 5 
 2 4 3 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 77 
 81 
 77 6 
 
 72 73 
 92 93 
 58 59 
 63 64 
 
 40 
 60 
 40 
 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 1821 
 
 1822 
 
 5 5 6 2 
 5 3 5 11 
 4 5 6 
 
 2 4 36| 
 2 6 3 6 
 2 7\ 3 3 
 2 8 3 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 77 6 
 
 80 6 
 
 81 6 
 
 65 66 
 88 90 
 70 71 
 95 110 
 
 75 80 
 
 45 
 
 50 
 
 40 50 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 3 6 
 4 0^ 5 10 
 3 11 6 
 3 7 5 10 
 
 2 8 3 7 
 2 6 3 7 
 2 6 3 9 
 2 7 3 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 80 6 81 6 
 98 6 
 
 85 90 60 
 120 130 70 80 
 230 250150 170 
 220 230 110 125 
 
 Do.
 
 62 
 
 
 WHEAT. 
 
 WOOL (Sheep's). 
 
 English. 
 
 Foreign. 
 
 Dantzic and c 
 Konigsberg. 
 
 On 
 
 foreign 
 Duty. 
 
 Spam 
 
 Leonesa. 
 
 sk. 
 Seville. 
 
 Gen 
 Saxon. 
 
 nan. 
 
 Austrian & 
 Bohemian. 
 
 1782 
 1783 
 
 qr. 
 
 s. s. 
 
 32 49 
 44 60 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 
 qr. 
 d. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 3 3 6 
 3 13 8 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 12 19 
 
 13 2 6 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 38 58 
 25 41 
 
 44 53 
 
 45 57 
 25 40 
 
 28 53 
 
 H 
 
 6 
 6| 
 
 3 3 3 7 
 3 7 3 10 
 
 2 9 3 3 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1784 
 
 30 43 
 41 56 
 
 28 40 
 
 30 54 
 36 51 
 32 44 
 
 6 
 ports 
 shut in 
 Dec. 
 
 3 8 3 9 
 3 3 7 
 
 2 6 3 2 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1785 
 
 32 46 
 27 38 
 30 40 
 
 Ports 
 
 shut. 
 
 
 3 3 9 
 3 2 310 
 
 2 3 
 2 2 6 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1786 
 
 29 37 
 32 42 
 28 37 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 3 1 3 10 
 2 9 3 9 
 
 2 6 3 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1787 
 
 33 38 
 40 48 
 39 45 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 2 9 3 10 
 
 19 2 9 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1788 
 
 41 49 
 37 46 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 3 4 3 10 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1789 
 
 42 50 
 48 54 
 
 Ports 
 open by 
 proclama- 
 tion. 
 
 
 3 4 3 10 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1790 
 
 48 57 
 40 53 
 
 49 62 
 30 43 
 34 48 
 
 uncertain. 
 48 59 
 26 39 
 33 43 
 
 6 
 
 ports 
 
 shut in 
 
 Dec. 
 
 3 3 310 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 3 6 3 9 
 3 11 
 
 2 2 9 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1791 
 
 37 52 
 29 43 
 34 47 
 
 38 50 
 25 38 
 30 41 
 
 open in 
 
 March, 
 
 shut in 
 
 Sept. 
 
 1792 
 
 31 42 
 43 53 
 
 Ports 
 shut. 
 
 
 4 6 410 
 3 7 410 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None.
 
 63 
 
 i 
 
 WHEAT. 
 
 WOOL (Sheep's). 
 
 English. 
 
 Foreign. 
 
 Dantzic and 
 Konigsberg. 
 
 On 
 
 foreign 
 Duty. 
 
 Spa 
 Leonesa. 
 
 nish. 
 
 Seville. 
 
 Gen 
 
 Saxon. 
 
 nan. 
 Austrian and 
 Bohemian. 
 
 1793 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 
 41 47 
 47 55 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 
 Shut. 
 
 qr. 
 s. a. 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 6 4 10 
 3 9 410 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1794 
 
 41 50 
 50 60 
 
 Open in 
 
 June. 
 40 48 
 50 57 
 
 6 
 
 3 8 4 
 3 6 3 10 
 3 8 4 
 
 3 
 3 6 
 3 2 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1795 
 
 52 66 
 98 110 
 75 95 
 
 50 60 
 88 92 
 60 90 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 6 4 
 
 2 3 
 13 2 6 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1796 
 
 107 122 
 
 50 66 
 44 56 
 
 62 118 
 35 60 
 20 44 
 
 On imp 
 
 bounty 
 
 in Sep. 
 
 20s. 
 
 3 8 4 3 
 3 8 4 
 
 13 2 6 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1797 
 
 43 53 
 54 75 
 30 50 
 
 30 45 
 44 68 
 
 27 50 
 
 Free. 
 
 3 10 4 4 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 Nooe. 
 
 1798 
 
 30 53 
 22 50 
 32 54 
 
 24 50 
 17 44 
 21 47 
 
 2 6 
 
 3 10 4 4 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1799 
 
 32 54 
 
 77 108 
 
 25 50 
 68 104 
 
 6 
 
 in Oct. 
 
 duty 
 
 free. 
 
 4 4 9 
 
 5 5 1 
 4 9 
 
 2 4 3 4 
 
 2 4 
 
 3 4 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1800 
 
 85 115 
 50 100 
 90 165 
 
 72 110 
 46 95 
 80 150 
 
 Bounty 
 
 accord. 
 
 to aver. 
 
 price. 
 
 4 4 9 
 4 7 5 4 
 
 2 3 3 4 
 
 2 8 4 4 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1801 
 
 70 145 
 
 80 180 
 40 70 
 
 68 140 
 75 170 
 25 70 
 
 Do. to 
 
 Novem. 
 then 
 free. 
 
 5 15 4 
 
 5 9 6 
 
 2 8 4 4 
 
 3 4 5 4 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 - 1802 
 
 60 83 
 40 62 
 
 35 83 
 26 58 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 9 6 
 5 10 6 3 
 
 2 6 5 3 
 4 5 
 
 None. 
 
 None.
 
 1803 
 
 WHEAT. 
 
 WOOL (Sheep's). 
 
 English. 
 
 Foreign. 
 
 Dantzic and 
 Konigsberg. 
 
 On 
 
 foreign 
 Duty. 
 
 Spa 
 Leonesa. 
 
 lish. 
 
 Seville. 
 
 Gen 
 
 Saxon. 
 
 nan. 
 
 Austrian and 
 Bohemian 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 
 45 63 
 40 60 
 
 48 65 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 
 35 60 
 32 54 
 34 57 
 
 qr. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free 
 till Jul. 
 after 6d 
 and 12| 
 p. cent, 
 thereon 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 5 10 6 
 
 6 3 6 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 4 5 
 3 8 5 4 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 None. 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. d. d. 
 None. 
 
 1804 
 
 35 
 70 
 
 56 
 120 
 
 28 55 
 65 118 
 
 6 6 
 
 6 9 
 
 3 6 410 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1805 
 
 60 
 30 
 50 
 
 108 
 75 
 
 80 
 
 55 105 
 34 75 
 
 6d.p. qr. 
 and 21 
 p. cent, 
 thereon 
 
 6 6 
 
 6 7 
 
 6 9 
 6 9 
 
 3 6 410 
 
 2 6 4 9 
 
 3 6 5 3 
 
 None. 
 
 None. 
 
 1806 
 
 50 
 62 
 
 58 
 
 76 
 92 
 
 85 
 
 36 72 
 50 87 
 
 Do. 
 
 and 8^ 
 p. cent, 
 thereon 
 
 6 7 
 
 6 9 
 
 3 6 5 3 
 
 3 6 6 
 3 5 9 
 
 None. 
 
 1807 
 
 50 
 46 
 55 
 
 84 
 76 
 80 
 
 48 84 
 42 75 
 50 76 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 7 
 
 6 9 
 
 3 6 5 3 
 2 6 5 
 
 3 5 9 
 3 6 
 
 None. 
 
 1808 
 1809 
 
 52 
 SO 
 65 
 
 78 
 112 
 100 
 
 48 72 
 75 100 
 60 95 
 
 Do. 
 
 67 
 100 
 
 69 
 106 
 
 2 6 5 
 5 7 
 
 3 6 
 6 8 6 
 
 None. 
 
 76 
 52 
 
 88 
 
 102 
 
 90 
 
 125 
 
 72 98 
 55 78 
 78 115 
 
 10 
 
 120 
 22 
 13 
 
 14 
 26 
 
 15 
 
 60 86 
 
 13 18 
 
 40 90 
 
 90 110 
 
 12 24 
 
 70 116 
 
 7 8 9 
 7 9 6 
 
 1810 
 
 60 
 80 
 60 
 
 106 
 128 
 100 
 
 60 104 
 80 126 
 60 96 
 
 4 
 
 13 
 70 
 
 14 
 
 80 
 
 4 9 
 3 5 
 
 7 10 6 
 4 80 
 
 7 9 
 4 7 
 
 1811 
 
 68 
 55 
 95 
 
 75 
 
 102 
 
 92 
 
 145 
 
 125 
 
 60 102 
 48 90 
 80 145 
 75 125 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 
 9 6 
 
 3 5 
 2 6 5 6 
 
 7 
 
 6 6 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 1 9 
 
 2 6 
 
 1812 
 
 73 
 
 104 
 
 94 
 
 126 
 164 
 140 
 
 76 130 
 
 100 180 
 
 90 150 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 6 
 
 8 6 
 
 10 
 96 
 
 2 6 6 
 2 5 6 
 
 9 
 None after 
 
 2 6 
 Octobei .
 
 65 
 
 
 WHEAT. 
 
 WOOL (Sheep's). 
 
 English. Foreign. 
 Dantzic ant 
 iKonigsberg 
 
 On 
 
 [foreign 
 1 Duty. 
 
 Spa 
 Leonesa. 
 
 nish. 
 
 Seville. 
 
 Ger 
 Saxon. 
 
 man. 
 
 Austrian and 
 Bohemian. 
 
 1813 
 
 qr. 
 s. s. 
 88 130 
 92 135 
 56 6S 
 65 78 
 
 qr 
 s. s. 
 105 135 
 110 145 
 50 60 
 65 78 
 
 qr. 
 s. d. 
 
 8 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 8 6 9 6 
 8 9 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 2 5 6 
 
 3 6 
 3 5 6 
 
 lb. 
 s. d. s. d. 
 
 6 8 6 
 
 lb. 
 
 s. d. s. d. 
 16 5 
 
 1814 
 
 64 82 
 72 90 
 52 78 
 
 63 78 
 66 88 
 50 70 
 
 o H 
 
 8 9 
 7 8 
 
 3 5 6 
 5 6 6 6 
 
 4 5 6 
 
 5 8 
 3 7 6 
 
 2 5 6 
 2 5 
 
 1815 
 
 48 66 
 56 80 
 54 66 
 
 46 66 
 60 78 
 50 62 
 
 Ports 
 shut 
 after 
 May. 
 
 7 6 8 
 6 7 
 
 4 5 6 
 3 4 6 
 
 3 6 7 6 
 
 4 6 8 6 
 
 2 5 
 2 4 6 
 
 816 
 
 56 63 
 90 134 
 
 45 60 
 90 130 
 
 Ports 
 open in 
 Novein. 
 
 6 7 
 
 2 3 4 
 2 6 4 6 
 
 4 6 8 6 
 4 6 8 9 
 
 2 5 6 
 2 5 
 
 2 8 3 
 
 817 
 
 75 128 
 65 135 
 44 98 
 65 103 
 
 90 128 
 80 132 
 46 94 
 55 103 
 
 Ports 
 open. 
 
 6 7 
 
 2 6 4 6 
 
 4 6 8 6 
 4 6 8 
 4 6 9 
 
 2 8 3 
 
 2 7 6 
 
 3 7 9 
 
 818 
 
 65 100 
 
 63 80 
 
 55 103 
 
 65 80 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 7 
 6 6 9 
 
 2 6 4 6 
 
 3 3 5 
 3 3 4 9 
 
 4 6 9 
 4 6 9 6 
 
 3 7 9 
 2 8 
 2 3 8 
 
 $19 
 
 64 80 
 56 72 
 62 76 
 56 80 
 
 58 76 
 50 66 
 52 76 
 
 Ports 
 
 shut in 
 
 Feb. 
 
 6 6 9 
 4 5 
 
 3 3 4 9 
 2 2 6 
 2 2 3 
 
 4 6 9 6 
 
 5 6 8 6 
 
 2 3 8 
 2 3 5 6 
 
 320 
 
 58 62 
 58 74 
 63 85 
 30 63 
 
 50 76 
 52 82 
 50 70 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 5 2 
 
 3 5 
 
 4 4 6 
 3 6 4 3 
 
 2 8 3 3 
 
 2 2 6 
 
 3 4 3 2 
 
 5 6 9 6 
 2 6 8 6 
 
 2 6 6 
 2 3 5 6 
 
 J21 
 
 522 
 
 30 61 
 50 82 
 32 65 
 
 46 50 
 52 76 
 46 64 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 4 6 
 3 3 4 
 
 2 6 3 6 
 
 3 4 6 
 
 2 2 10 
 2 2 6 
 19 2 
 1 10 2 6 
 
 2 8 6 
 
 19 6 
 19 5 6 
 2 7 9 
 
 30 70 
 22 49 
 25 50 
 
 48 64 
 
 30 40 
 
 None. 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 4 6 
 3 6 5 
 3 4 
 3 3 4 6 
 
 1 10 2 6 
 
 2 3 
 
 2 8 6 
 16 7 6 
 16 8 
 
 2 7 9 
 2 6 6 
 16 6 
 2 6
 
 66 
 
 
 WOODS. 
 
 
 Logivood 
 Jamaica. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Fir. 
 Memel. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pine. 
 Quebec. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 1782 
 
 ton. 
 1. S. 1. S. 
 
 11 11 10 
 9 9 10 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 load. 
 1. s. 
 
 3 5 
 3 10 
 
 load, 
 s. d. 
 
 4 1 
 
 load. 
 1. s. 1. s. 
 
 None. 
 
 load, 
 s. d. 
 
 
 1783 
 
 1784 
 1785 
 
 7 
 10 10 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 10 
 1 12 
 
 Do. 
 
 None. 
 
 
 
 12 10 13 
 8 10 9 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 15 
 
 2 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 10 
 
 2 15 
 
 Free. 
 
 
 11 11 10 
 6 6 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 15 
 
 2 5 
 1 13 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 2 6 
 1 10 1 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1786 
 
 6 10 7 
 5 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 17 
 
 2 
 1 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 11 
 
 1 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 1787 
 
 6 6 10 
 5 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 12 
 
 1 5 1 10 
 
 6 8 
 
 2 2 5 
 1 10 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 1788 
 
 5 10 6 
 5 5 6 15 
 5 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 15 
 
 1 11 1 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 11 2 
 
 1 15 
 
 2 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1789 
 
 5 10 6 
 4 4 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 17 18 
 1 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 15 
 
 2 5 
 1 10 
 1 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 179C 
 
 . 4 10 5 
 6 10 7 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 10 1 15 
 
 2 2 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 10 
 1 15 
 
 1 19 
 
 2 3 
 
 Do. 
 
 179] 
 
 6 10 
 5 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 2 
 
 3 3 2 
 2 11 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 3 
 
 1 16 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 179i 
 
 , 5 5 
 6 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 8 
 2 13 
 
 2 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 17 
 
 2 2 
 
 Do.
 
 67 
 
 
 WOODS. 
 
 Logtvooc 
 Jamaica. 
 
 I. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Fir. 
 Memel. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Pine. 
 Quebec. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 1793 
 
 ton. 
 1. s. 1. s. 
 
 6 
 6 10 
 
 ton. 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 load. 
 1. S. 1. s. 
 
 2 8 2 9 
 2 3 
 
 load, 
 s. d. 
 
 6 8 
 
 load. 
 1 s. 1. s. 
 
 1 17 
 
 2 2 
 
 load, 
 s. d. 
 
 Free. 
 
 1794 
 
 8 
 11 12 
 
 13 4 
 
 2 16 
 2 5 
 2 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 
 2 10 
 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1795 
 
 11 12 
 16 16 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 15 3 
 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 10 
 3 15 
 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1796 
 
 14 16 
 13 14 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 2 
 
 2 10 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 5 
 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1797 
 
 13 14 
 12 13 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 15 
 
 3 5 3 10 
 
 10 
 
 2 16 2 17 
 
 2 
 
 2 15 2 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 1798 
 
 14 15 
 40 41 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 10 3 
 
 3 3 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 10 3 15 
 3 3 10 
 5 10 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 1799 
 
 48 50 
 12 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 8 3 10 
 
 4 18 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 15 4 
 
 Do. 
 
 1800 
 
 19 20 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 10 5 15 
 5 15 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 10 4 15 
 4 15 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1801 
 
 18 10 19 
 14 10 15 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 15 6 
 4 5 4 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 5 10 
 4 10 4 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1 6 
 
 1802 
 
 12 14 
 11 13 
 18 19 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 12 3 14 
 3 4 3 9 
 
 16 4 
 
 4 10 4 15 
 3 15 4
 
 68 
 
 
 WOODS. 
 
 
 Logtvood. 
 
 
 
 Fir. 
 
 
 P 
 
 ne. 
 
 
 
 
 Jamaica. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Memel. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 Quebec. 
 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 ton. 
 
 
 ton. 
 
 
 load. 
 
 load. 
 
 
 load. 
 
 
 load. 
 
 
 /. 
 
 s. 
 
 /. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 /. 
 
 s. 
 
 1. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 /. 
 
 s. 1. 
 
 s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 3 15 
 
 
 3 
 
 18 4 
 
 3 
 
 
 1803 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 
 
 15 6 
 
 5 
 
 5 
 
 6 5 
 
 16 4 
 
 5 
 
 8 5 
 
 18 
 
 1 6 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 4 5 
 
 
 5 
 
 13 6 
 
 8 
 
 
 1804 
 
 23 
 
 17 
 19 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 18 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 10 
 
 3 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 
 4 
 3 5 
 
 20 
 25 
 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 
 18 5 
 18 5 
 12 4 
 
 8 
 15 
 
 2 
 
 1 6 
 1 101 
 
 20 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 3 5 
 
 25 
 
 25 6 
 
 3 
 
 18 4 
 
 18 
 
 1 10 
 111 
 
 1805 
 
 23 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 4 
 
 4 
 
 18 5 
 
 18 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 3 15 
 
 4 
 
 8 5 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 3 15 
 
 25 6 
 
 4 
 
 8 5 
 
 13 
 
 1 11 
 
 1806 
 
 18 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 19 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 
 
 8 
 
 6 13 
 
 27 4 
 
 6 
 
 8 6 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 8 10 
 
 
 7 
 
 18 8 
 
 10 
 
 
 1807 
 
 14 
 10 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 11 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 
 6 
 
 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 6 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 13 7 
 13 7 
 
 2 
 18 
 
 Do. 
 
 1808 
 
 10 
 17 
 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 18 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 51 
 
 6 
 15 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 7 
 17 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 
 10 
 
 10 7 
 15 16 
 
 15 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1809 
 
 14 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 14 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 14 10 
 11 10 
 
 27 4 
 
 15 
 10 
 
 17 
 12 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 27 
 
 
 
 28 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1810 
 
 37 
 16 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 
 11 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 9 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 1811 
 
 16 
 12 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 11 
 10 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 10 
 
 11 10 
 
 12 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 12 
 12 
 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 8 
 
 10 
 10 
 
 10 
 9 
 
 
 Red Pine. 
 
 
 1812 
 
 13 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 
 
 Do. 
 
 54 8 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 

 
 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 WOODS 
 
 
 
 
 
 Logwood. 
 
 
 Fir. 
 
 Red Pine. 
 
 
 
 Jamaica. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 Memel. 
 
 Duty. 1 Quebec. 
 
 Duty. 
 
 
 
 ton. 
 
 ton. 
 
 load. 
 
 load. load. 
 
 load. 
 
 
 I. 
 
 s. 
 
 1. s 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1. s. 
 
 1. s. 
 
 s. d. 1. s. 1. s. 
 
 s. d. 
 
 1813 
 
 13 
 10 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 10 10 
 
 9 \\ 
 
 7 10 
 5 10 
 
 8 
 
 8 
 7 
 
 9 % 
 
 64 11 
 
 9 10 10 
 
 10 10 5 
 
 9 15 10 
 
 2 
 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 20 10 
 
 
 11 11 10 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 
 
 22 
 
 
 
 
 11 11 10 
 
 
 1814 
 
 22 
 15 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 16 
 
 Do. 
 
 7 5 
 4 10 
 
 7 15 
 5 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 9 10 10 
 
 None. 
 8 15 9 
 
 Do. 
 
 1815 
 
 14 
 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 
 3 5 
 
 5 10 
 3 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 8 15 9 
 6 6 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1816 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 9 10 
 6 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 5 
 2 5 
 
 3 15 
 3 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 6 5 6 15 
 5 5 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 7 
 
 / 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 5 
 
 3 15 
 
 
 5 10 5 15 
 5 15 6 
 
 
 1817 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 
 5 
 
 8 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 10 
 
 3 5 
 
 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1818 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 8 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 9 2 
 
 3 5 
 3 10 
 
 3 10 
 
 3 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 15 6 
 
 6 6 5 
 
 Do. 
 
 1819 
 
 7 
 5 
 
 10 
 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 10 
 
 2 5 
 
 3 15 
 2 15 
 
 65 
 
 6 6 5 
 5 5 5 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 6 10 
 
 
 2 15 
 
 3 
 
 
 
 
 1820 
 
 5 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 6 
 6 10 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 10 
 2 10 
 2 15 
 
 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 5 5 5 10 
 4 10 4 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 1821 
 
 6 
 9 
 
 
 10 
 
 6 15 
 9 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 3 5 
 3 10 
 
 2 10 
 
 55 
 
 4 10 4 15 
 4 4 5 
 
 10 
 
 1822 
 
 9 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 10 
 
 9 10 
 8 
 
 Do. 
 
 2 5 
 2 10 
 2 15 
 
 2 10 
 2 15 
 
 Do. 
 
 4 4 5 
 4 10 4 15 
 
 Do.
 
 70 
 
 The prices in the foregoing table are extracted from the New 
 London, now Prince's, and London Price Current, which was esta- 
 blished in 1782, and is the oldest and best authenticated I have been 
 able to meet with. 
 
 In order to give as general an idea as it is possible in so small a 
 compass of the variations in price for forty years, I have selected the 
 quotations of the first and last months of each year, with the inter- 
 mediate fluctuations where the rise or fall has not been progressive. 
 
 The figures on the left hand give the lowest quotation of the 
 article, and those on the right the highest ; the range between the 
 two includes, therefore, the necessary scope for the uncertainty of 
 price, which is sometimes observable when the market is in an un- 
 settled state, as well as for the different gradations in quality, which 
 are very great in some articles, as will be seen by the table. 
 
 In the column of " Duties" those only are noted which are levied 
 on importation by British vessels. It is hardly necessary to observe, 
 that whenever there is any great distinction in favour of British 
 vessels, it operates to the exclusion of foreign vessels in the 
 importation of those articles to which the distinction applies. 
 
 The rates of duties were obligingly furnished by Mr. Thos. Cope, 
 of the Long Room, Custom-house, and great pains were taken by 
 him to insure their correctness ; but as several temporary alterations, 
 not noticed in the books of rates, were made in the duties by Orders 
 in Council and otherwise, I have, with a view to still greater cor- 
 rectness, referred to them, and made the proper allowance accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 It is of course not to be expected that a document of this kind, 
 embracing so long a series of years, and such a variety of articles , 
 should be entirely free from occasional errors ; but I think, from the 
 care and attention bestowed, I am entitled to claim a pretty general 
 dependence upon its accuracy. 
 
 A. HINRICHS. 
 
 London, April, 1823.
 
 71 
 
 P. S. I have the following additional remarks to make on the three 
 last articles in the table. 
 
 Wheat (Foreign). The ports were so frequently opened and 
 shut by proclamation, and the rate of duties was so varied, that 
 every particular alteration cannot be expected to be found in a price 
 current not devoted exclusively to that article. 
 
 N. B. The word « shut," as applying to the whole of 1793, was 
 introduced by mistake, as the ports were open by proclamation in 
 May, and shut again at the low duty in June. 
 
 Wool (Foreign Sheep's). There is no column of duties attached 
 to this article in the table ; it was duty free till 5 July, 1803, after 
 that time the duties were as follows : 
 
 s. d. 
 Till 1809, Oi per lb. 
 
 1809 to 1813, 6 8 per cwt. 
 
 1813 to 1819, 7 11 Do. 
 
 1819, 5 July, 1 per lb. 
 
 1819, 10 Oct. to present time, 6d. per lb. 
 
 Woods. The duty as quoted for Quebec timber was merely no- 
 minal till 1821 j as it was always remitted on being certified to be 
 fit for naval purposes, and as such certificate was generally forth- 
 coming, of course the duty was not levied. 
 
 A. H.
 
 72 
 
 No. II. 
 
 An Account of the Quantities of the following Articles imported into 
 
 Years. 
 
 SUGAR. 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 COTTON 
 WOOL. 
 
 SHEEP'S 
 WOOL. 
 
 
 cwts. 
 
 qr. 
 
 lbs. 
 
 cwts. 
 
 qr. 
 
 lbs. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 1781 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5,198,778 
 
 
 1782 
 
 
 
 
 
 11,828,039 
 
 
 1783 
 
 Records 
 
 destroy- 
 forthp.sp. 
 
 
 9,735,663 
 
 
 1784 
 
 ^ed by fire 
 years. 
 
 
 11,482,083 
 18,400,384 
 
 
 1785 
 
 
 
 
 
 1786 
 
 
 
 
 19,475,020 
 
 
 1787 
 
 
 
 
 
 23,250,268 
 20,467,436 
 
 
 1788 
 
 2,066,120 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 32,340 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 
 1789 
 
 1,936,440 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 35,046 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 32,576,023 
 
 2,713,114 
 
 1790 
 
 1,882,106 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 55,988 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 31,447,605 
 
 3,245,329 
 
 1791 
 
 1,813,192 
 
 2 
 
 20 
 
 46,102 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 28,706,675 
 
 2,776,054 
 
 1792 
 
 1,989,230 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 69,028 
 
 3 
 
 17 
 
 34,907,497 
 
 4,513,976 
 
 1793 
 
 2,194,726 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 123,750 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 19,040,929 
 
 1,891,385 
 
 1794 
 
 2,519,181 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 278,088 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 24,358,567 
 
 4,485,582 
 
 1795 
 
 2,151,272 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 360,038 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 26,401,340 
 
 4,902,500 
 
 1796 
 
 2,240,299 
 
 1 
 
 21 
 
 343,427 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 32,126,357 
 
 3,454,211 
 
 1797 
 
 2,139,887 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 354,477 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 23,354,371 
 
 4,653,696 
 
 1798 
 
 2,699,863 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 431,576 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 31,880,641 
 
 2,398,126 
 
 1799 
 
 3,390,974 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 390,237 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 43,379,278 
 
 5,151,711 
 
 1800 
 
 3,164,474 
 
 1 
 
 18 
 
 599,428 
 
 2 
 
 26 
 
 56,010,732 
 
 8,615,284 
 
 1801 
 
 3,976,564 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 
 664,442 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 56,004,305 
 
 7,387,107 
 
 1802 
 
 4,297,079 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 460,543 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 60,345,600 
 
 7,749,112 
 
 1803 
 
 3,185,849 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 219,477 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 53,812,284 
 
 6,020,775 
 
 1804 
 
 3,248,306 
 
 2 
 
 26 
 
 507,432 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 61,867,329 
 
 8,157,213 
 
 1805 
 
 3,178,788 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 354,061 
 
 
 
 23 
 
 59,682,406 
 
 8,546,378 
 
 1806 
 
 3,815,183 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 528,941 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 58,176,283 
 
 7,333,993 
 
 1807 
 
 3,641,310 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 417,642 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 74,925,306 
 
 11,768,926 
 
 1808 
 
 3,753,485 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 726,831 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 43,605,982 
 
 2,353,725 
 
 1809 
 
 4,001,198 
 
 1 
 
 4 
 
 707,906 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 92,812,282 
 
 6,845,933 
 
 1810 
 
 4,808,663 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 828,683 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 136,488,935 
 
 10,936,224 
 
 1811 
 
 3,917,627 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 559,595 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 91,662,344 
 
 4,739,972 
 
 1812 
 
 3,762,182 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 405,744 
 
 3 
 
 12 
 
 63,025,936 
 
 7,014,917 
 
 1813 
 
 The records nf this 
 
 year were dpst.mvpd 
 
 by fire. 
 60,060,239 
 
 
 1814 
 
 4,035,323 
 
 1 
 
 25 
 
 1,029,556 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 15,712,517 
 
 1815 
 
 3,984,782 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 815,440 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 99,306,343 
 
 14,991,713 
 
 1816 
 
 3,760,548 
 
 2 
 
 12 
 
 499,075 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 93,920,055 
 
 8,117,864 
 
 1817 
 
 3,795,550 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 520,255 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 124,912,968 
 
 14,715,843 
 
 1818 
 
 3,965,947 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 427,247 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 177,282,15S 
 
 26,405,486 
 
 1819 
 
 4,077,009 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 373,025 
 
 
 
 12 
 
 149,549,971 
 
 16,190,343 
 
 1820 
 
 4,063,541 
 
 
 
 25 
 
 437,176 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 150,043,082 
 
 10,043,746 
 
 1821 
 
 4,200,856 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 403,035 
 
 1 
 
 9 
 
 130,982,479 
 
 16,680,043 
 
 1822 
 
 3,643,127 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 391,650 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 141,253,993 
 
 1 9,323, 170£ 
 
 Inspector-General's Office, 
 4th April, 1823.
 
 73 
 
 No. II. 
 
 Great Britain from all Parts of the World in each Year from 1781 to 1822. 
 
 SILK 
 (raw) 
 
 SILK 
 
 (thrown) 
 
 TALLOW. 
 
 HEMP 
 
 (undressed.) 
 
 FLAX. 
 
 lb. 
 
 lb. 
 
 CX»t. < 
 
 F- 
 
 lb. 
 
 ctot. 
 
 qr. 
 
 lb. 
 
 cvot. qr. lb. 
 
 730,150 
 
 344,25 1 
 
 
 
 
 473,042 
 
 361,448 
 
 
 
 
 770,989 
 
 389,537 
 
 
 
 
 812,148 
 
 306,6401 
 
 355,045 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 
 564,071 
 
 1 
 
 7 
 
 261,894 2 9 
 
 842,865 
 
 393,259 
 
 260,126 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 472,264 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 
 139,494 1 17 
 
 745,440 
 
 508,005 
 
 255,921 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 592,306 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 257,222 17 
 
 976,673 
 
 470,195 
 
 164,862 
 
 2 
 
 18 
 
 372,812 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 308,101 9 
 
 931,8941 
 
 436,8311 
 
 201,856 
 
 1 
 
 22 
 
 614,362 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 243,324 6 
 
 1,020,008 
 
 241,955 
 
 235,009 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 553,831 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 271,249 1 5 
 
 683,228 
 
 330,9781 
 
 202,173 
 
 
 
 
 
 582,755 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 348,367 1 27 
 
 730,9981 
 
 336,9951 
 
 180,807 
 
 1 
 
 19 
 
 574,622 
 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 225,853 2 6 
 
 487,631| 
 
 398,9481 
 
 330,983 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 618>486 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 321,239 11 
 
 266,2761 
 
 401,662 
 
 244,041 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 488,177 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 209,682 8 
 
 730,885 
 
 403,130 
 
 439,911 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 647,833 
 
 
 
 27 
 
 389,987 2 24 
 
 l,240,954f 
 
 467,687 
 
 450,217 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 752,568 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 418,737 4 
 
 833,618 
 
 333,717 
 
 415,925 
 
 1 
 
 25 
 
 596,419 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 416,120 2 26 
 
 739,111 
 
 275,149 
 
 332,665 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 748,571 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 272,035 3 8 
 
 559,729^ 
 
 396,2101 
 
 556,749 
 
 1 
 
 10 
 
 488,197 
 
 3 
 
 5 
 
 277,443 1 19 
 
 803,799 
 
 384,764 
 
 537,428 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 729,677 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 294,645 1 4 
 
 1,032,381 
 
 449,182 
 
 533,838 
 
 1 
 
 24 
 
 727,319 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 352,919 2 8 
 
 1,189,706 
 
 433,2721 
 
 393,811 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 611,012 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 466,624 2 
 
 802,623 
 
 515,218 
 
 536,652 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 729,786 
 
 1 
 
 25 
 
 354,722 20 
 
 777,799 
 
 346,144 
 
 367,398 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 756,824 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 421,393 1 12 
 
 637,102 
 
 139,312 
 
 148,282 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 259,687 
 
 1 
 
 24 
 
 257,729 18 
 
 698,189 
 
 501,746 
 
 353,177 
 
 
 
 9 
 
 858,875 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 533,367 18 
 
 1,341,475 
 
 450,731 
 
 479,440 
 
 
 
 19 
 
 955,799 
 
 2 
 
 22 
 
 511,970 2 20 
 
 602,047 
 
 20,336 
 
 292,534 
 
 3 
 
 15 
 
 458,547 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 243,899 1 11 
 
 1,330,106 
 
 617,885 
 
 309,323 
 
 3 
 
 8 
 9 
 
 852,015 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 5 
 
 405,304 1 9 
 
 1,634,501 
 
 645,722 
 
 588,914 
 
 3 
 
 545,380 
 
 I 
 
 524,757 1 8 
 
 1,442,594 
 
 357,739 
 
 641,641 
 
 2 
 
 7 
 
 731,505 
 
 2 
 
 26 
 
 351,103 13 
 
 945,792 
 
 192,130 
 
 417,169 
 
 2 
 
 17 
 
 369,467 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 247,424 24 
 
 932,102 
 
 245,59 1| 
 
 385,964 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 457,266 
 
 1 
 
 18 
 
 452,796 2 5 
 
 1,644,647 
 
 456,97H 
 
 542,983 
 
 
 
 18 
 
 660,403 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 458,898 3 23 
 
 1,483,546 
 
 287,645^ 
 
 581,937 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 474,238 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 432,690 2 17 
 
 2,213,917| 
 
 333,294-^ 
 
 805,066 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 418,509 
 
 
 
 6 
 
 440,404 13 
 
 2,118,645f 
 
 339,0311 
 
 619,491 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 241,759 
 
 1 
 
 12 
 
 563,947 2 15 
 
 2,052,963f 
 
 492,594 
 
 782,812 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 598,628 
 
 2 
 
 23 
 
 640,547 2 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 W 
 
 . IRVING. 
 
 h
 
 74 
 
 No. III. 
 
 An Account of the Quantities of the following Articles exported from 
 
 Years. 
 
 SUGAR 
 
 
 SUGAR 
 (refined.) 
 
 COFFEE. 
 
 COTTON 
 WOOL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Actual weight exp. 
 
 
 
 
 
 cwts. qr. 
 
 lbs 
 
 cwts. 
 
 qr. lbs. 
 
 Cwts. q 
 
 r. lbs. 
 
 lbs. 
 
 1781 
 
 1782 
 
 f Record 
 
 « r\r>- 
 
 
 
 
 
 96,788 
 421,229 
 
 
 
 1783 
 
 C stroyed b v ^ 
 
 re. 
 
 
 
 177,626 
 
 1784 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201,845 
 
 1785 
 
 202,954 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 137,489 
 
 24 
 
 39,000 
 
 2 22 
 
 407,496 
 
 1786 
 
 102,032 
 
 
 
 13 
 
 81,750 
 
 3 1 
 
 27,324 
 
 6 
 
 323,153 
 
 1787 
 
 199,416 
 
 I 
 
 8 
 
 76,735 
 
 1 19 
 
 27,988 
 
 2 18 
 
 1,073,381 
 
 1788 
 
 145,257 
 
 
 
 11 
 
 85,401 
 
 1 15 
 
 30,682 
 
 14 
 
 853,146 
 
 1789 
 
 153,813 
 
 1 
 
 15 
 
 138,539 
 
 3 11 
 
 24,425 
 
 7 
 
 297,837 
 
 1790 
 
 142,185 
 
 1 
 
 3 
 
 119,817 
 
 4 
 
 29,357 
 
 3 8 
 
 844,154 
 
 1791 
 
 135,270 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 161,594 
 
 2 27 
 
 34,020 
 
 3 23 
 
 363,442 
 
 1792 
 
 243,068 
 
 2 
 
 14 
 
 226,216 
 
 3 27 
 
 58,621 
 
 1 
 
 1,485,465 
 
 1793 
 
 321,364 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 115,450 
 
 11 
 
 96,166 
 
 1 11 
 
 1,171,566 
 
 1794 
 
 447,405 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 303,999 
 
 2 11 
 
 220,667 
 
 2 17 
 
 1,349,950 
 
 1795 
 
 365,733 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 264,300 
 
 1 24 
 
 306,565 
 
 3 11 
 
 1,193,737 
 
 1796 
 
 366,615 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 188,013 
 
 2 1 
 
 336,339 
 
 1 
 
 694,962 
 
 1797 
 
 561,279 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 179,344 
 
 2 9 
 
 309,268 
 
 2 2 
 
 609,058 
 
 1798 
 
 800,804 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
 248,533 
 
 3 23 
 
 394,848 
 
 15 
 
 601,139 
 
 1799 
 
 410,052 
 
 1 
 
 23 
 
 122,638 
 
 1 18 
 
 281,507 
 
 26 
 
 844,671 
 
 1800 
 
 981,730 
 
 
 
 15 
 
 397,542 
 
 2 14 
 
 607,104 
 
 2 15 
 
 4,416,610 
 
 1801 
 
 635,067 
 
 3 
 
 16 
 
 333,942 
 
 12 
 
 541,869 
 
 3 16 
 
 1,860,872 
 
 1802 
 
 1,142,729 
 
 2 
 
 20 
 
 531,787 
 
 1 26 
 
 569,395 
 
 26 
 
 3,730,480 
 
 1803 
 
 762,919 
 
 
 
 14 
 
 547,274 
 
 24 
 
 268,392 
 
 2 6 
 
 1,561,053 
 
 1804 
 
 454,155 
 
 2 
 
 10 
 
 382,224 
 
 3 16 
 
 412,850 
 
 2 19 
 
 503,171 
 
 1805 
 
 439,662 
 
 3 
 
 22 
 
 390,013 
 
 5 
 
 332,369 
 
 1 11 
 
 804,243 
 
 1806 
 
 307,799 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 415,079 
 
 3 26 
 
 409,189 
 
 20 
 
 651,867 
 
 1807 
 
 659,911 
 
 3 
 
 10 
 
 413,960 
 
 3 11 
 
 424,648 
 
 1 24 
 
 2,176,943 
 
 1808 
 
 354,359 
 
 1 
 
 11 
 
 327,243 
 
 1 13 
 
 250,899 
 
 19 
 
 1,644,867 
 
 1809 
 
 713,447 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 460,732 
 
 10 
 
 848,134 
 
 9 
 
 4,351,105 
 
 1810 
 
 616,895 
 
 2 
 
 17 
 
 413,208 
 
 2 16 
 
 215,278 
 
 2 
 
 8,787,109 
 
 1811 
 
 519,176 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 100,996 
 
 1 19 
 
 210,036 
 
 2 8 
 
 1,266,867 
 
 1812 
 
 674,313 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 284,617 
 
 2 
 
 641,131 
 
 14 
 
 1,740,912 
 
 1813 
 
 Records dest.rnv 
 
 ed by fire. 
 555,335 
 
 
 
 
 
 1814 
 
 1,058,040 
 
 2 
 
 8 
 
 1 26 
 
 1,193,561 
 
 1 26 
 
 6,282,437 
 
 1815 
 
 870,992 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 
 609,247 
 
 10 
 
 897,312 
 
 2 17 
 
 6,780,392 
 
 1816 
 
 670,508 
 
 
 
 21 
 
 584,182 
 
 1 3 
 
 729,426 
 
 3 16 
 
 7,105,054 
 
 1817 
 
 486,695 
 
 3 
 
 23 
 
 697,085 
 
 2 16 
 
 490,386 
 
 1 
 
 8,155,442 
 
 1818 
 
 486,613 
 
 2 
 
 15 
 
 711,185 
 
 1 4 
 
 456,615 
 
 1 19 
 
 15,159,453 
 
 1819 
 
 409,307 
 
 2 
 
 20 
 
 525,219 
 
 2 13 
 
 391,276 
 
 3 16 
 
 16,622,969 
 
 1820 
 
 504,302 
 
 2 
 
 19 
 
 679,560 
 
 2 27 
 
 397,366 
 
 2 24 
 
 7,410,602 
 
 1821 
 
 482,812 
 
 1 
 
 17 
 
 645,357 
 
 1 5 
 
 373,256 
 
 14 
 
 16,305,892 
 
 1822 
 
 411,159 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 374,784 
 
 2 
 
 321,140 
 
 1 9 
 
 20,220,064 
 
 Inspector-Generals Office, 
 25th April, 1823.
 
 7$ 
 
 No. III. 
 
 Great Britain to all Parts of the World in each Year from 1/81 to 1822. 
 
 SHEEP'S 
 WOOL. 
 
 lbs. 
 
 
 367,432 
 56,724 
 90,919 
 162,660 
 111,594 
 119,832 
 645,921 
 87,323 
 121,442 
 67,263 
 272,080 
 110,925 
 27,405 
 98,809 
 46,979 
 44,501 
 195,437 
 361,267 
 24,676 
 39,788 
 57,945 
 21,701 
 23,460 
 76,090 
 30,568 
 157,881 
 73,709 
 123,795 
 
 149,024 
 178,886 
 744,855 
 19-1,076 
 
 97,927 
 475,820 
 
 95,610 
 329,509 
 245,217 
 
 SILK 
 
 (raw) 
 
 16s. 
 
 70,912 
 45,190 
 120,049 
 115,571 
 106,947 
 69,543 
 66,512 
 34,514 
 28,555 
 83,135 
 54,909 
 88,715 
 64,348 
 42,761 
 80,428 
 30,443 
 33,504 
 33,247 
 24,220 
 53,363 
 26,125 
 19,257 
 29,671 
 32,793 
 20,520 
 23,234 
 28,615 
 39,879 
 
 32,720 
 93,972 
 
 300,254 
 74,663 
 
 109,902 
 58,659 
 20,455 
 41,772 
 35,511 
 
 SILK 
 
 thrown) 
 
 lbs. 
 
 HEMP 
 
 (undressed.) 
 
 44,139 
 24,801 
 12,716 
 46,520 
 22,736 
 20,067 
 22,428 
 10,579 
 2,607 
 24,385 
 27,425 
 38,927 
 17,641 
 52,117 
 38,835 
 31,239 
 27,302 
 36,033 
 19,346 
 73,959 
 68,935 
 52,081 
 58,623 
 21,805 
 47,782 
 50,001 
 30,681 
 86,327 
 
 60,714 
 51,658 
 51,567 
 21,200 
 35,125 
 52,139 
 12,004 
 21,889 
 10,397 
 
 ctvts. qr. lbs. 
 
 41,281 
 37,512 
 15,221 
 61,487 
 7,251 
 8,785 
 17,140 
 4,295 
 4,172 
 7,386 
 1,093 
 3,737 
 997 
 4,299 
 5,151 
 16,847 
 16,751 
 17,901 
 3,409 
 4,937 
 6,016 
 5,411 
 2,119 
 1,381 
 2,126 
 11,761 
 9,683 
 4,042 
 
 18,271 
 19,127 
 61,828 
 22,799 
 7,624 
 39,711 
 21,564 
 56,871 
 22,614 
 
 2 2 
 
 3 8 
 1 7 
 1 18 
 4 
 3 18 
 6 
 
 ctvts. qr. lbs. 
 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 3 2 
 24 
 23 
 13 
 23 
 3 8 
 6 
 3 5 
 
 14 
 
 1 13 
 3 9 
 
 2 6 
 2 25 
 22 
 2 1 
 2 12 
 12 
 22 
 
 3 6 
 
 20 
 
 3 4 
 
 3 
 
 16 
 
 22 
 
 9 
 
 
 
 12,772 
 18,927 
 10,705 
 14,060 
 18,633 
 27,372 
 26,780 
 23,703 
 7,009 
 6,834 
 3,075 
 5,113 
 5,605 
 21,041 
 7,276 
 6,486 
 4,875 
 36,908 
 5,525 
 2,696 
 5,836 
 6,668 
 16,231 
 4,298 
 16,934 
 46,288 
 26,675 
 13,811 
 
 32,734 
 33,724 
 21,008 
 23,282 
 42,671 
 31,710 
 18,459 
 33,416 
 12,733 
 
 2 9 
 
 2 3 
 20 
 
 3 17 
 
 
 3 9 
 
 2 5 
 
 1 12 
 
 1 24 
 
 3 11 
 
 2 9 
 
 3 
 
 1 17 
 
 2 12 
 1 13 
 
 24 
 
 1 4 
 
 3 16 
 3 
 14 
 3 25 
 3 25 
 3 17 
 3 24 
 
 2 24 
 2 18 
 
 16 
 
 1 16 
 
 FLAX 
 
 (undressed.) 
 
 ctvts. qr. lbs. 
 
 11,020 
 11,803 
 9,733 
 8,614 
 9,686 
 3,469 
 11,429 
 14,088 
 3,644 
 9,973 
 5,802 
 13,660 
 3,316 
 4,087 
 19,561 
 6,172 
 7,132 
 15,596 
 2,659 
 3,548 
 5,535 
 7,158 
 2,069 
 2,173 
 19,152 
 68,179 
 89,453 
 27,124 
 
 44,548 
 
 18,832 
 
 24,195 
 
 5,441 
 
 3,104 
 
 11,775 
 
 18,101 
 
 8,834 
 
 7,568 
 
 23 
 
 1 1 
 3 
 
 
 2 
 1 
 2 
 
 3 8 
 26 
 3 14 
 18 
 3 9 
 
 7 
 15 
 20 
 20 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 11 
 
 15 
 
 3 
 
 13 
 
 2 17 
 
 8 
 
 3 14 
 
 1 27 
 
 25 
 
 1 7 
 3 4 
 I 27 
 3 10 
 11 
 
 21 
 
 1 22 
 
 26 
 
 1 4 
 
 W. IRVING.
 
 7f> 
 
 No. IV. 
 
 An Account of the Quantity of Rape and Cole Seed, Linseed or 
 Flax Seed, and Clover Seed white and red, imported into Great 
 Britain from Foreign Countries, from the 5th January, 1801, 
 to the 5th January, 1823. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Rape and Cole 
 Seed. 
 
 Linseed or Flax 
 Seed. 
 
 Clover Seed. 
 
 
 Quarters. 
 
 bush. 
 
 Bushels. 
 
 Cnot. q. lbs. 
 
 1801 
 
 8,132 
 
 5 
 
 614,3831 
 
 25,104 1 20 
 
 1802 
 
 65,146 
 
 
 
 1,053,340^ 
 
 55,584 1 27 
 
 1803 
 
 1,452 
 
 3 
 
 865,984 
 
 49,266 8 
 
 1804 
 
 8,827 
 
 7 
 
 1,022,272! 
 
 51,798 1 12 
 
 1805 
 
 9,639 
 
 2 
 
 1,098,431| 
 
 48,540 3 13 
 
 1806 
 
 25,488 
 
 6 
 
 843,436 
 
 58,306 2 14 
 
 1807 
 
 13,333 
 
 4 
 
 l,174,226f 
 
 58,385 2 24 
 
 1808 
 
 50 
 
 
 
 506,332 
 
 25,786 3 5 
 
 1809 
 
 15,475 
 
 2 
 
 1,119,7631 
 
 46,898 1 
 
 1810 
 
 8,581 
 
 7 
 
 1,645,598| 
 
 72,967 18 
 
 1811 
 
 2,659 
 
 
 
 594,01 6| 
 
 43,536 20 
 
 1812 
 
 8,512 
 
 6 
 
 _ 977,652| 
 
 82,031 15 
 
 1813 
 
 The Records of 
 
 this year were 
 
 destroyed by fire. 
 
 1814 
 
 83,500 
 
 Si 
 
 1,364,959| 
 
 42,876 3 3 
 
 1815 
 
 60,083 
 
 1 
 
 766,9834; 
 
 54,646 2 24 
 
 1816 
 
 10,857 
 
 2 
 
 567,138! 
 
 14,986 1 8 
 
 1817 
 
 33,857 
 
 6 
 
 1,302,075| 
 
 45,984 21 
 
 1818 
 
 38,723 
 
 21 
 
 1,897,127^ 
 
 121,448 8 
 
 1819 
 
 7,169 
 
 6 
 
 1,156,1704; 
 
 72,795 1 2 
 
 1820 
 
 4,154 
 
 
 
 1,306,1761 
 
 73,994 3 17 
 
 1821 
 
 9,091 
 
 41 
 
 ^4 
 
 1,084,9591 
 
 65,986 1 
 
 1822 
 
 30,963 
 
 71 
 
 ' 2 
 
 1,191,198| 
 
 40,439 26| 
 
 Custom- House, London. 
 
 W, IRVING,
 
 77 
 
 No. V. 
 
 An Account of the Quantities and average Standard or Price of 
 fine Copper sold in Ores in Cornwall from the Year 1800 to 
 1822, both inclusive. 
 
 Years. 
 
 Fine Metal. 
 
 Price. 
 
 
 tons. 
 
 per ton. 
 1. s. d. 
 
 1800 
 
 5432 
 
 133 6 
 
 1801 
 
 5441 
 
 117 6 
 
 1802 
 
 5419 
 
 110 16 
 
 1803 
 
 5653 
 
 121 19 
 
 1804 
 
 5373 
 
 136 5 
 
 1805 
 
 6186 
 
 169 10 
 
 1806 
 
 6881 
 
 136 15 
 
 1807 
 
 6707 
 
 120 1 
 
 1808 
 
 6737 
 
 100 8 
 
 1809 
 
 6785 
 
 143 8 
 
 1810 
 
 5678 
 
 132 16 
 
 1811 
 
 6139 
 
 120 10 
 
 1812 
 
 6876 
 
 111 2 
 
 1813 
 
 { tnf^ } 3508 
 
 115 13 
 
 1814 
 
 6347 
 
 130 10 
 
 1815 
 
 6526 
 
 117 15 
 
 1816 
 
 6846 
 
 109 6 
 
 1817 
 
 6427 
 
 95 12 
 
 1818 
 
 6469 
 
 121 5 
 
 1819 
 
 6944 
 
 137 2 
 
 1820 
 
 6915 
 
 119 
 
 1821 
 
 7770 
 
 97 16 
 
 1822 
 
 9140 
 
 104 
 
 N. B. This account refers only to copper ore sold at the 
 weekly sales in Cornwall. In addition to this, copper is raised 
 in Anglesea, in Devonshire, in Ireland, and in small quantities 
 in other parts of the United Kingdom. 
 
 THE END.
 
 -\« 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS. 
 
 *