s '■ THE UNIVERSITY OF Illinois' LIBRARY 33Z B875 V.5 AN INQUIRY INTO THE STATE OF THE FINANCES OF GREAT BRITAIN; IN ANSWER T O Mr. morgan's FACTS. By NICHOLAS VANSITTART, Esq^ LONDON: PRINTED FOR J. OWEN, NO. l68, PICCADILLY. M.DCC.XCVl. AN INQUIRY, &c ABOUT two years ago I had occa- sion, in answer to the gloomy pre- dictions of Jasper Wilson, to take a cursory view of the resources of the Na- tion, and to examine the general state of its Commerce and Finances. I then en- deavoured to shew " on how vain a foundation the fears of the desponding rested," ajid the events of the moment- ous and important period which has since elapsed, had in my opinion so E proved ( ^ ) proved the corre6lncssof my statements, and the justice of my conclusions, that 1 httle expe6led to have been again called upon to defend them. A work however has lately appeared, not in the form of a Newspaper Essay, or an ano- nymous Pamphlet, but of a grave discus- sion, the avowed produ6lion of a Gentle- man of acknowledged talents, and who may even rank very high amongStates?nen, if his own definition of the sciences of Government and Finance be just---/to tke o?ie requires o?ily a little Co7nmofi Sense ^ and the other only a little co^nmon Arithmetic. In that work, supported by the authority of Mr. Morgan's name, and impressed on the public attention by the solemnity of its title, " Fa£is addressed to the serious attention of the People of Great Britain y^ the same strain prevails, of lamentation and despondence, which distinguished Jasper Wilson's florid declamations. Facts are always valuable, but I believe the x^?Xfads\o be widely different from Mr. ( 3 ) Mr, Morgan's statement ; and I should lament on much better grounds than any concern for my reputation as an Author, if such, facfs were true, as the inevitable Bankruptcy and approaching ruin of my Country. Mr. Morgan declines entering into any inquiry as to the justice and necessity of the War, though it seems reasonable to have entered into some such inquiry before he charged the Ministry * with error, miscondu^, wickedness and inca- pacity. But as I have already laid my opinion on those points before the Pub- lic, I can have no obje6lion now to fol- low his example, in separating them from the present discussion. He likewise de- clines " entering into a description of the carnage and miseries by which this War has been so peculiarly distinguished, and which must sicken every friend of huma- nity, well knowing that considerations * See Preface to Fa<5ls, &c. B 2 of ( 4 ) of this kind seldom influence the Coun- cils of Statesmen, or even sufficiently rouse the indignation of a People, who," he observes, " do not begin seriously to feel for the miseries of their fellow-crea- tures, till misfortune presses immediately on themselves." After thanking Mr. Morgan, in the name of the Nation, for his compliment to our Benevolence, I shall dismiss this subject also, because I believe the true authors of the carnage and miseries are sufficiently known and detested already. Having just hinted at these prelimina- ry points in his Preface, he observes (in his second page), that the warmest ad- vocates for the War, acknowledge its prospect at present to be neither encou- raging nor consolatory. On this part of the subject, he says he feels no disposi- tion to enter ; though he cannot forbear slightly recurring to it afterwards, and asking (p. ii), *' whether our Debts have ( 5 ) have been compensated by the vahie of our Conquests in Corsica, Isle Dieu, and elsewhere f It may be- remarked, that elsewhere is a word of comprehensive meaning, and includes Martinique, To- bago, all the principal Posts in St. Do- mingo, the French Settlements on the Continent of India, Malacca, Cochin, Ceylon, and the Cape of Good Hooe. But as I never attempted, nor wished to defend the War on account of the ad- vantages of Conquest, and as Mr. Mor- gan decferes his design is not to examine the operations of the War Minister, but those of the Minister of Finance^ I shall confine myself to the same line of discus- sion. Mr. Morgan enters upon his princi- pal subject by observing, that " it is a melancholy truth, that every War in which we have been engaged for the last century, has uniformly been more ex- pensive than any that had preceded it.'* It ( 6 ) It is certain that the expences of War, like all other expences, must increase in proportion to the advanced price of those articles which the Government is obliged to purchase* ; and it is no more possible for the Government, than for an indivi- dual, to maintain any Establishment now, on the same income which was sufficient to support it a certain number of years ago. Mr. Morgan proceeds to observe, ' that the American War was considered ' as having reached the highest point of ' profusion ; and that neither the Credit ' nor the Resources of the Nation (p. 3) , '• could survive a repetition, much less * an aggravation, of the evil: but that * the experience of the three last years ' had shewn, that the limits of our Ex- * penditure were at a much greater dis- ' tance, than the extravagance even of * Naval Stores are at this time, on the whole, considera- bly rnore than 35I. per cent, higher than in the American War ; and Viftualling Stores have probably risen in their price in a still greater proportion. Ship-building has increased about iqK per cent. '* that ( 7 ) " that War had taught us to place them. * ' Of this fa6l no doubt can be entertain^ " ed by any person Vv4io is the least ac- ' ' quainted with Pubhc Affairs ; and the " foUowing Statements are given, not *' with the view of proving what is al- '* ready so well known, but in order to *' point out the enormous magnitude of *' the sum by which the Expences of the " four first years of the present, have ex- " ceeded those of the same term in the " American War." At the hazard of being considered by Mr. Morgan as a person not the least acquainted with Public Affairs, 1 venture not only to doubt, but to deny these asser- tions ; appealing at the same time to his candour, whether it be fair to bring the years 1776 and 1777, in which we were only engaged in a contest with our Ame^ rican Colonies, whose Revolt was then unsupported by any Foreign Power, into comparison with the exertions of the pre^ sent ( 8 ) sent War? In 1776, only 10,000 addi- tional Seamen were voted ; and so small an increase of expence was thought ne- cessary, that it appears by Mr. Mor- gan's own statement (page 14), that the Sum borrowed did not exceed i ,827,500!, In 1777, the Contest beyond the Atlantic became more alarming in its appearance ; but it was not till about the middle of 1778 that Hostilities with France com- menced. The first Campaign of the pre- sent War began as early in the year as the month of February ; but on that cir- cumstance I shall lay no stress. I am wil- ling to enter into a fair comparison of the Expences of the four years, commencing with 1778, and of the four years, com- mencing with 1793, arguing on a suppo- sition that the Expences of the present year are provided for. I have in Table I. stated the Estimates of each year ; but I shall by no means admit that a fair comparison can from thence be formed of the a6tual Expence in the two periods. In ( 9 ) In the American War the Floating Debt of the Navy and Ordnance accumulated in an irregular manner, and the defi- ciencies of one year not being provided for in the next, the Unfunded Dciot increased by the end of the War to the immense extent of twenty-seven mil- lions*. In the present War, all the Ex- traordinary Expences of every year, as far as they could be ascertained, have been carried to account in the next Supply, so that no accumulation of Unfunded Debt has been suffered to remain, beyond the ascertained and avowed amount for which Taxes have been pro- vided. I shall not here enter into any detail of the various benefits result- ing: from this excellent arrang-ement.--- They are indeed sufficiently obvious to everv one who considers the ad- vantage of going to market with ready money, instead of paying in Promissory Notes, at a considerable discount. I shall only observe, that adding to the Estimates * The exaft sum was 26,867,993!. c the ( lo ; the increase of Navy Debt and Ordnance Debentures incurred in the American War, and a fair proportion of the Floating Debt unprovided for at the close of that War, the amount will be found to exceed the largest statement of the Expcnces of the present W^ar. Leaving this statement v^^ithout further comment, I shall proceed to consider the amount of the Debt incurred in the present War. This Mr. Morgan represents as more than double the Debt incurred during the same period, in the most expensive War that had ever been carried on by this Country. Table 11. will shew the exa6t amount of the Funds created during the periods we are comparing, the Annuities being includ- ed in both. Here Mr. Morgan at- tempts to add the Imperial Loan, as if a possible eventual charge was to be considered as a debt incurred in the first instance. Except protesting against this do6trine of Mr. Morgan's, that the Surety for a Debt is the immediate Debtor, ( >• ) Debtor, I do not much differ from this part of his account. But his statement of the Unfunded Debt is of a sinp-ular o nature indeed: In this instance his Fancy had more room to display itself, and he has given it full scope. With regard to the Debt of the present War, on the first article I have only to observe, that the five millions of Navy Debt are intended to be funded, and that there exist adequate Funds for defraying the Interest, so that they only differ from a Funded Debt in not being regularly reduced into Stock. The next article is a curious one, " Vote of Credit— -four millions." 2,500,000!. were indeed raised by a Vote of Credit last year, and provided for in the Sup- plies in December, so that they are no longer any debt^ and the other i ,500,000!. to the best of my Icnowledge, never had any existence at all. The next article even improves upon this ; it is a debt of *' one million not paid by the East India Company, but talcen as part of the Sup- plies in 1794 and 1795.'* The Govern- c 2 ment ( 12 ) rnent not receiving this sum, to which it was entitled, was obliged to raise the Money by other means, and it still continues due ; so that instead of a Debt, it is a6lually a Credit, which I have no doubt the Government will sooner or later realize. The last ar- ticle is that of Exchequer Bills ; but as 5,500,0001. were kept circulating in time of Peace, it is only the amount exceeding that sum, which can be con- sidered as a debt occasioned by the War ; so that Mr. Morgan's Budget of /. l6,000,00Q Is filled up by Debt already provided for - £. 5,000,000 Imaginary Debt - - 9,500,000 Aiflual Credit - - 1,000,000 — ^.15,500,000 Which leaves the Excess of real Unfunded Pebt no more than - - *j^. 500,000 This statement requires no observa- tions, nor is it easy to make such upon it ^s are consistent with my respe6l for Mr. Morgan. But in his improved Edi- tion he so far attempts to account for it, * Which is the Excess of Exchequer Bills, including the Vote of Credit, beyond thoge issued and usui'.lly circulate^ \n time of Peace. as ( 13 ) as to enumerate a variety of articles, which he says " may not only be placed " against the Unfunded Debt incurred '^ previous to Hostilities, but so far ex - *' ceed it as to carry the Expence of the " War to one hundred millions, exclu- *' sive of the Imperial Loan." The only real article unprovided for, of those in- cluded in his enumeration, is 1,500,000!, Navy Debt, incurred beyond the sum in- tended to be funded, to which I will add, for the sake of a clear view of the total Expence, 2,500,000!., which has been stated as lilvely to be added to the Navy Debt in the course of the year. I will further allow between five and six mil- lions for future miscellaneous and extras ordinary Expences. As to the new imaginary articles by which he supports his old ones, I shall leave them to share the same fate, and only observe, that the utmost Expence, as far as it can yet be foreseen, will not exceed at the end of this year, sixty-five, or at the utmost seventy millions. If the Expences of the War mean the Money spent in it, as Com- - moa ( H ) mon Sense seems to require, he must re- sort to his fund of imaginary articles, for five and thirty, or at least thirty millions, to make up his calculation.* But if in defiance of the common meaning of words, Mr. Morgan intends to state all the Stock created in the War as so much money adlually expended, his exagger- ations will only amount to about twelve millions. And this naturally leads me to consider the Loans raised in each period, with a general view of the National Debt, and to examine the plan adopted for its redu6lion. * The money raised by Loans during the War, amounts to - - j^. 5 1,500,000 The Navy Debt funded in 1794 and J 795, - 3,536,422 Navy Debt about to be funded, - 5,000,000 Further increase of Navy Debt, _ 1,500,000 Expefted increase of ditto within the year, 2,500,000 Increase of Exchequer Bills, - - 500,000 X- 64,536,422 Allow for possible Excess, for Contingencies, and Extraordinaries, to 31st Dec. 1796, - SA^hSl^ £. 70,000,000 It ( 15 ) it has always been a favourite amuse- ment, and sometimes an useful occupa- tion, of men versed in calculation, to speculate on sub)e6ts of Finance. The infallible schemes devised by young Po- liticians for paying off the National Debt, are as numerous as the impreg- nable Fortresses traced on paper by young Engineers : nor have I any doubt, that of the 36,000 plans lately laid be- fore the French Committee of Finance, for redeeming theAssignats,a great num- ber appeared demonstrably true to their inventors, and extremely plausible to those who took them into consideration. But one is naturally unwilling to believe that Vauban has built on a false foun- dation, or that Dr. Price, and the heir of his talefits and his principles, have cal- culated on fallacious grounds. Espe- cially when one considers the magisterial consequence with which they pronounce their Decrees, and the digniiied autho- rity with which Ministers are arraigned for not attending sufficiently to their suggestions. Yet I am compelled to ob- serve, ( i6 ) serve, that these Gentlemen seem to have contented themselves with specula- tions in their closets, without much in- quiry among men of business, into the practicability of executing their plans. It no doubt arises from this abstraction from the affairs of common life, and not from any wilful misrepresentation, that Mr. Morgan, blaming Mr. Pitt for borrowing on terms less favourable to the Pubhc than his Predecessor in Office, selects as a fair comparison, four years in which only 14,760,0001. were raised by Loans, to oppose to four in which 51 millions and a half have been borrowed. I shall therefore take the same four years of the American War, of which I have already stated the Expences ; not be- cause they are more favourable to my argument, but because they are more just ; for I shall presently shew, that they are much less favourable than a fair comparison would require. Table III. shews the Money borrowed, and the Stock created during the two periods I have ( '7 ) I have compared, by which it appears that Lord North, for thirty-seven mil- lions borrowed, gave upwards of fifty- seven minions of Stock : Mr. Pitt, for something less than fifty-four millions nine hundred thousand pounds, gave only seventy-eight millions ; so that, according to Mr. Morgan's method of calculation, the larger sum was bor- rowed on more favourable terms than the smaller, by about six millions. One of our most distinguished Statesmen dif- fers indeed so totally from Mr. Morgan's ideas, as to have stated his opinion, that the Capital Stock created -is a matter of perfect indifference, and that the only circumstance to be attended to, is the In- terest paid. The same Table will shew the rate of Interest on each of the Loans in these periods ; and the result of my comparison will be no less satiS' fa6lory to Mr. Fox than Mr. Morgan. The average rate of Interest from 1778 to 1781, was - , - - /-S 13 Si That of the Loans during the present War 410 9I Difference in favour of the present War . £. i 2 8 D It ( i8 ) It is necessary to remark, in order to prevent any mistake that might arise from inattention to this circumstance, that in the years of the American War to which I refer, the Lottery was given as a part of the bonus to the Subscribers to the Loan ; I have therefore considered the profit arising from the Lottery, as so much additional Principal, the Interest of which, as making a part of the Interest of the Loan, is brought to acr count in Table 111. before referred to. In the present War, the Lottery having been applied to other public purposes, docs not produce any addition of the same sort. I must likewise observe, that 1 by no means intend in this comparison to censure Lord North, who probably did the best the situation of Pnbhc Credit then admitted ; but I must neverthelesii maintain, that the terms of the late Loans, considering they were contradled at a time when the National Debt was increased near loo millions, are a de- ( '9 ) a decisive proof eitliei* of extraordi- nary prosperity in the State, or ability in the Minister. Mr. Morgan, how- ever, exclusive of all comparisons, criticizes the Loans of the present War very severely, and not content with censuring them, he foresees much worse to come. With his future Loans, the mere phantoms of his imagina- tion, I can have nothing to do, but with regard to the one last contra6led, I am sure Mr. Morgan cannot have conversed with any man of business. He takes it for granted that Mr. Pitt could have made this at the rate of 120I. of 4I. per cent. Stock, for every lool. borrowed ; that is, thr.t instead of the present principal and interest^ ci?id a bonus nivkich he estimates at 7I. 13s. 8d. half- penny, the Lenders would have agreed to §s.-- 6d. per cent, mere interest y 25 per cent, less capital, and no bonus at all. When Mr. Morgan produces the list of Bankers that would have subscribed D 2 to ( 20 ) to such a Loan, it will be time enough to discuss the merits of it with him. As the last Loan is the only one which Mr. Morgan has chosen to examine, I shall now proceed in his own order, to inquire into the total amount of the Na- tional Debt. The general account of the Funded Debt on the 5th of January, 1796, without making any dedu6lion for what has been purchased by the Com- missioners for reducing the National Debt, amounts to--- Princlpal, Interest. Managemcrit. Stock created before Jan. 5, 1784 - ^.211,365,254 7,937,231 107,824 Between Jan. 5, 1784, and Jan. 5, 1788 - 26,867,993 1,209,939 12,950 Since Jan. 5, 1788 47,536,423 2,284,209' 25,304 In 1796* - ^ 26,100,000 783,000 iIj74> X.3ii>847,67o 12,214,579 157,725 "•• There is" no account of this yet in the Exchequer, but it must be nearly as here stated* To ( 21 ) • To this should be added five millions of Navy Debt orovided for, but not vet funded; 500,000!. increase in Exchequer Bills ; 1,500,000!. Navy Debt already^ incurred ; and 2,500,000!. estimated for the Expences of the present year, which will complete the view of the public in- cumbrances beyond the Floating Debt in time of Peace, except as far as any in- crease may arise from Extraordinary Ex- pences not yet ascertained. In this Statement, the Annuities of all kinds are included in the Interest, as being periodical yearly payments, but not in the Principal : in the first place, because they will expirp of themselves after a certain time ; and secondly, be- cause they have no precise and definite Capital. Mr. Morgan, by calculating the value of the Annuities, increases the Capital of the Debt about twenty-five miilions.--- His ( J2 ) His calculations are of an unfavourable kind, but I shall not dispute them, as T admit the Annuities to be a real part of the Debt, though not capable of being reduced to any exacl Capital; but he goes a great way farther, adding above eighteen millions more for the imaginary Debt of which I ha\'e spoken before. i\s Mr. Morgan refers back to his former Statement of that subjeft, I shall con- tent myself with referring back to mine. The correcting his Accounts would not essentially have lessened the pathos of his succeeding lamentations ; I cannot there- fore but wish Mr. Morgan had so far re- garded his charaAer as a Calculator, as not to fall into an error of 18 millions Sterling. But what I most objedt to in these lamentations is, that he points out r>o remedy for the evils which he de- plores. He tells us, indeed, " that this *' Country has the greatest reason to la" " vinnt^ or rather to execrate these mea- " sures. ( 23 ) ** sures, which have so often interrupted *' its peace for the last Century." But as he does not tell us what those measures were, I am pertccUy at a loss what to ex- ecrate^ and possibly might fix upon ob- jects very different from those which Mr, Morgan has in view. Mr. Morgan here enters into a specu- lation upon the future Peace Establish* ment, and the Rental of the Kingdom. As our business is with Fatls, I shall not follow him farther in this loose and un- certain speculation, than just to state my opinion (not wholly unfounded) , that he is mistaken to the amount of some hun- dred thousands pounds a-year, in the first Article, and at least ten millions in the second. I am now come to the consideration of the plan adopted for redeeming the National Debt ; and having before stated its total amount, shall now mention the sum bought up by the Commissioners. The ( ^4 ) The total Capital of the Debt is - ^. * 3 1 1 »S47,67a Value of the Annuities, according to Mr. ' Morgan _ - _ 24,750,269 Unfunded Debt, including what is ex- pcfled within the year _ _ . 9,500,000 C- 346,077,959 Stock redeemed by the Commisbioners - 18,001,655 £. 328,076,284 But as every Reader must be struck with the enormous difference between Mr. Morgan's total and mine, it is necessary to enter into some explanation of it. A part arises from his brin"in<2: in his Imao;i- nary Debt. But the great difference (no less than fifty millions) arises from his converting sixty-three millions of 5 and 4 per cents, and near 1,700,000!. a year in Annuities at one stroke into 3 per cent. Stock. Mr. Morgan expresses so much indignation at every Minister who borrows in a 3 per Cent. Fund, tliiit I little snspe6led he v^^ould execute that which the worst of Ministers, in the worst of times, has never thought of. Mr. • Supposing the Delbt of this year as stated in p. 20. Morgan ( -5 ) Morgan says this is done to give an ac- curate account of the Debt. ---How an account is to be rendered accurate by making it false, I am at a loss to gues^. If it is by way of computing the progress made by the Commissioners in redeem- ing the Debt, the reasoning fails equally, for as the 4 and 5 per Cents, are redeem- able at par, as well as the 3 per Cents, the Sinking Fund, when applied to their redu6lion, will extinguish them as fast, and ev^n according to Mr. Morgan's calculation, much faster; making no allowance at all for his fifty millions of additional Capital. I particularly wish him to take some opportunity of stating his reason for making the Debt appear so much larger than it really is: only one occurs to me, and that I never can suspe6t to be the true one, because it would be as little re- concileable to common honesty, as the ac- count itself is to common sense or common arithmetic, ^ Here ( 26 ) Here Mr. Morgan is so terrified at the dreadful phantom he has conjured up, that he sinks into the lowest despond- ency ; and after reckoning up the wars and rumours of war which this century has produced already, dooms us to war- fare, bankruptcy and ruin in times to come. That a great part of this century has been spent in war, I am ready with Mr, Morgan to regret, but my observations on the subje6l have only led to one gene- ral conclusion- --that Peace has always continued longer in proportion as France was left in an exhausted state at the conclu- sion of the IVar, Thus the Peace of Pa- ris lasted considerably longer than that of Aix-la-Chapelle ; and that of Utrecht, which was concluded when France was on the eve of bankruptcy, was by far the longest as well as most secure in this century. Whether this observation can lead to any just conclusions as to the per- manence ( ^7 ) ttianencc of a future Peace, I am far from taking upon myself to decide. But instead of dwelling longer on this subjeft, I shall proceed to consider the efFefts of the system established for re- ducing the National Debt. ** The plan " (says Mr. Morgan), whichthe Chan- " cellor of the Exchequer has adopted " for redeeming the National Debt, is " well known to have been one of the " three which at his request were com- " municated to him by Dr. Price in the '* year 1786, and though originally the " weakest of the three, was not only mu- " tilated and enfeebled by his alterations " at its first establishment, but rendered *' still more inefFe6tual by subsequent ne- " o:le6l and mismanao-ement." It here is necessary to make a few remarks upon the plans alluded to, as they are stated inMr. Morgan's Review of Dr. Price's Writings on Finance ; not with an in- tention of investigating them thoroughly, which would require a good deal of lei- E 2 sure ( 28 } sure and much intricate calculation ; but of obviating' the natural conclusion, that the Minister must necessarily be wrong in adopting tile weakest of the plans, and still more so in mutilating it. On the two not adopted I shali only observe at present, that whatever might be theic merit in other respects, they requn*ed an addition of 600, oool. a year in new taxes to be imposed within hve years. This w^as thought improper, if not imprac- ticable, at that time (1786) by the Mi- nister ; more so I believe by the Nation, but most of all by Dr. Price and Mr. Morgan themselves, who have contend- ed ever since, that the Revenue was above a million yearly deficient ; so that to have executed either of these plans, new Taxes must annually have been imposed to the amount of at least 1,6005000!. The third plan (which however was no new invention or discovery, being nothing more than a calculation of the effect of applying a million annually in the purchase of Stock) was in sub- - ^ ' stance ( 29 ) Stance adopted, but some alterations were made, which entitle it, in Mr. Morgan's opinion, to no better terms than mutilated^ hnpotent and defeBive ; yet he is never more vehement on any occasion than in the reproaches h« addresses to Mr. Pitt, for not attributing the merit of this im- potent plan to Dr. Price, Surely if Mr. Pitt spoiled the plan, he made it his own, and it would have been an injustice to Dr. Price to make him pass for the Author of it. Before I examine the ef- fect which this jfiuti/aU'd plan^ under Mr. Pitt's negligent and unskilful management, has produced, I must state a few general observations on the subject. The Cal- culators of plans for reducing the Na- tional Debt, never attend to any thing but the quickest possible means of pay- ment. As Calculators^ they do rioht; but when they arraign Ministers with such dogmatical haughtiness for not following their systems, it is proper to ask if an enlightened Minister has not some other considerations to attend to. The ( sO The National Debt is indeed, irl on^ point of view, a charge upon the gene- ral mass of National Property, which is defrayed by deducting a certain por- tion of every man's income by means of taxation: In another^, it constitutes the property, and furnishes the income of a great and respe6table class of the Inha- bitants of the Country : In a third, it is a deposit for Capital not otherwise cm^ ployed. The e5ctinction of the Debt is not, how- ever, by any means the only purpose which the Redeeming Fund is found to answer ; it regulates in a considerable degree the ordinary rate of Interest, and the general state of Credit as well private as public-. iBy producing a regular and steady supply bf money in the market, it prevents great and sudden fiu6i;uations,and coun* tera6ls fraudulent combinations to influ^ fence the price of Stock. That these are objects of great importance in a Com- ftiercial Country, Mr. Morgan will not ( 3' ) not deny ; nor has he attempted to shew, that in any of these points of view it has proved impotent and defe6^ive. Of its effect in supporting Public Cre-r dit, no stronger evidence can be given, than the comparison before stated of the Loans in the last War and the present : it will be difficult othervv ise to account for the reduced rate of Interest at which the Money has been obtained. If this be true (and I only give it as a conjeclure on which every Reader will form his own conclusion), the Public are indebted tQ Mr. Pitt's mutilated plan for saving ^ perpetual Annuity of jT. 585,812, worth, at 4 per cent.* a capital of 14,646,312!. But how far Mr. Pitt has mutilated Dr. Price's plan, with regard even to the Rer d.emption, appears from a com.parison of the first seven years of the calculation in Mr. Morgan's book, with the sum acr * I consider 4 per Cent, as nearly the general average of Interest in a series of years. tuallv tiially redeemed by the Commissioners, which was, - - jf. 10,109,403 The sum, as calculate-d by Dr. Price - - ^9,112,705 Balance in favour of the adlual payments, - >C'99^?^95 And if the comparison was carried down to the present time, its result would be still more favourable. But Mr. Morgan imputes blame to the Commissioners for having con- stantly purchased Stock, except in x)ne instance, in the three per cents. --- Now, as the 3 per cent. Funds always bear a greater proportional price than the Funds which pay a higher rate of In- terest, he reproaches the Commissioners with having laid out the Public Money in purchasing that Stock which was dearest in proportion to its real value. What other reasons the Commissioners might have, I do not know ; but there are three so obvious, that I am astonished Mr. Mor- gan ( 33 ) GAN should not have attended to them. First, that by purchasing that Stock of which the greatest nominal Capital could be bought for the same price, a greater progress would be made towards en- abling the Commissioners to pay off the 5 per cents, at par, or, which would probably be more eligible, to reduce the interest of them * : this alone might be much more than equivalent to the making purchases a little more advanta- geous in the mean time. The second is, that the 4 per cents, forming a much smaller Capital than the 3 per cents, the market would have been much more afFe6ted by purchases made in that Stock ; and any continuance of purchases in it, would probably have brought up their price to par ; and considering merely the interest, the average rates at which the Commissioners have pur- chased have been equally advantageous * It will be recollefted, that these objefts are not at- tainable till 25,000,000!. of the 3 or4j!er cents, shall iiave beer, redeemed. F with ( 3+ ) with the buying 4 per cents, at par, since those purchases have, at an average, scarcely exceeded 75 per cent. The third reason is, that as the Stock-holders are not obhged to accept less than 100 per cent, for any species of Stock, it is the interest of the Public to redeem the Capital of the Debt while it bears a price much below par, that they may not be obliged afterwards to pay for it at par. Thus, between 1786 and 1792, the 3 per cents, rose 27 one-half per cent; and had Peace continued, would in all pro- bability have risen to par ; after which I allow it would have been the business of the Commissioners to redeem the Stock which bore the highest rate, unless a bar- gain had been made for reducing the In- terest. As Mr. Morgan has taken no notice of these reasons, I cannot but think the Commissioners had some better motive for purchasing 3 per cents, than a wish " to appear to make a progress in dis- *' charging i 35 ) " charging the Debt, while that progress *' has in fa6l been retarded." . The single instance in which the Sink- ing Fund has been apphed in pur- chasing 4 per cents. Mr. Morgan seems to consider as something mysterious f ; nothing however can be more easily ex- plained : It had been found that at these times when the 3 per cent. Consolidat- ed Annuities were shut, and the Com- missioners were consequently under the necessity of purchasing 3 per cent. Re- duced, the price of the latter invariably rose, as there is alwavs much less of that Stock on sale, on account of the smallness of its Capital. This circum- stance having been observed, the Com- missioners last year, at a time when the 3 per cent. Consols were shut, dire6led their purchases to be made in the 4 per cents, in order to prevent that loss to the Public which would have arisen + See Fafts, p. i8. - F z from ( 36 ) from buying the 3 per cent. Reduced at an advanced price. As to the omission of reducing the 4 per cents, m 1792, at the time they had risen to 96, I can only say, that as there was a general expedlation of the conti- nuance of Peace, and of their consequent- ly rising still higher, the Minister seems to have waited to take advantage of the most favourable opportunity ; in which he was certainly g}yAtY oi not fareseeing what "ino^ BODY for e saw. It would be doing great injustice to Mr. Pitt's measures, to omit all men- tion, as Mr. Morgan has done, mad- vertently no doubt, of the additional sum of one per cent, on the Capital of the Stock created, which, in consequence of an A61 of Parliament proposed by him, is pro- vided in all the new Loans. It required some hardiness of resolution, to propose that a Nation so distressed and overbur- dened as Mr. Morgan represents this to pe, ( 37 ) be, should expose itself to an ad- ditional annual charge, which has ac- tually amounted to 770,0001. in order to avoid entailing their debts upon posterity (see Table IV.) ; and some fertility of resource was necessary, to find the means of raising four millions annu- ally, by additional Taxes, when all the evident obje6t:s of taxation seemed ex- hausted. Nor is less praise due to the regulation by which the produce of the new Taxes is submitted in a distin6l and separate form, to the scrutinizing eyes of Parliament, rendering it impossible to confound the new resources with the old, and to conceal deficiencies in a confused mass of Accounts. What the a6lual pro- duce of the Taxes imposed during the War, has been, I shall have occasion hereafter to state ; but miust here make some short remarks on the general sys- tem of funding, and the particular plan adopted by Mr. Pitt. Those ( 38 ) Those who contend that a Capital ought never to be created in fiinding be- yond the sum a6lually received, do not sufficiently consider how averse the Len- ders would be to advance their Money upon a Stock which might in the course be paid off, or reduced. They naturally require either that their Stock should be made irredeemable a certain number of years, or that some other advantage should be given to them adequate to their risque. This was found necessary when the Navy Bills were funded in 5 per cent. Stock in 1784 and 1785, and even with that sti- pulation, and the little probability that then appeared of their being ever paid off, the Holders of the Bills were unwil- ling to subscribe. It is besides, always an obje6l with the Money Lenders, to speculate on the chance of the Funds ris- ing considerably in case of any favoura- ble event, and for this chance they will often give a consideration more than ade- quate. On ( 39 ) On the other hand, the addition of a large nominal Capital to the National Debt, is not only discouraging in its ap- pearance, but may prolong the duration of the Debt, and expose the Public to the danger of paying, in the course of Redemption, a much greater sum than they have received. But without pre- tending to decide between two such authorities as Mr. Fox and Mr. Mor- gan, I shall only observe, that the extraordinary merit of the system of fimding adopted by the Minister, is to unite, in a very great degree, the ad- vantages of both ideas. It derives an advantage from the speculative views of the Lender, by indulging him with a Fund at a low rate of Interest, for which he is willing to give a compensation rather more than adequate : while on the other hand, as a greater additional Capital of Stock is created, the Sink- ing Fund, which, by a Law passed dur- ing the present Administration, must always bear the same proportion to the additional ( 40 ) additional Capital created, is increased in an equal degree. Thus, in whatever Fund the Money is borrowed, the time of Redemption, on which Mr. Morgan lays the greatest stress, is nearly the same. This mode of funding, in fa6t, reduces all the Loans lately contracted, to tem- porary Annuities ; the exa6l duration of which cannot indeed be foreseen, but is circumscribed within certain limits. It would be easy to prove, on this principle, that even if it had been possible to procure Money on 4 per cent. Funds, without sinking their value in the market more than the 3 per cents, were depressed by the Loans raised in them, the advan- tages of such a system would have been very questionable. Having ascertained the a6lual amount of the Expences of the present War, I must observe, that there are two other points of view in which it is very impor- tant to consider them. The one is a com- ( 41 ) comparison of the Expenditure with the force adlually exerted ; for it is clear, that a sum, moderate in itself, may be lavish and extravagant ; and one appa- rently vast, may be judicious and oscono- mical, in proportion to the efficacy with which each has been employed. Were Mr. Morgan's assertions therefore true, that " the Expences of the four first ' ' years of the present War are two- Jiirds '' greater than those of the four first " years of the most extravagant War in " which this Country had ever been en- " g^g^^ »'* ^^^ ^^^^ t^^ *' Debt incurred " by the present War is more than " double that incurred during the same *' period," (both of which assertions, or, as Mr. Morgan chuses to call them, fadis^ are totally destitute of foundation), still the Administration might deserve the praise of frugality, if the Force they employed was increased in a still greater proportion. I mean therefore to compare the Force employed by Land and Sea, during the four years chosen by Mr. G Morgan, ( A^ ) Morgan, with that which has been maintained c present year. maintained during the three last and tlic ■ A comparative statement of the Naval Force employed in each of the periods alluded to, will be seen in Table V. ; but to form an accurate idea of the im- provement of our Fleet, it must also be recolle6bed, that the number of three - decked Ships has been very much hi- creased, and the new Vessels of almost every rate construiSled on a much larger scale than formerly. Two new classes of ships have indeed been added to our Navy, that of eighty-gun Ships on two decks, and that of large and powerful Frigates carrying eighteen or twenty-four pounders upon their main decks. And this circumstance I mention the rather, as it must recall to Mr. Morgan's mind the pleasure which he in common "wdth every other Englishman must feel, in re- colle6l;ing how many fine Ships of each of these descriptions have been transferred from ( 43 ) from the Navy of our Enemies to our own. The increase of the Army has been still more extraordinary, as may be seen also in Table V. ; and in a com- parison of Expence, it is particularly to be observed, that the Cavalry have been augmented in a still greater pro- portion than the Infantry. But exclu- sive of the addition to the regular 'Forces of the Kingdom, a defence of a new and unusual kind has been created, in the va- rious Corps of Volunteers, not less im- portant to the preservation of internal tranquillity than to the protection of the Country against a Foreign Invader. It ought likewise to be considered as a circumstance of great consequence in in- creasing the necessary Expenditure, that in the present War our Armaments have been rapid beyond all former example. In the American War, we began with a small force, and gradually increased it in G 2 pro- ( 44 ) proportion as the number of our Enemies augmented. In the present instance, the tempest burst suddenly over our heads, and our preserve ation depended upon im- mediate exertion. We wer^ called upon to pass instantly from a weak Peace Establishment, to the utmost efforts of our Military and Naval strength, Having compared the Force employed in the present War with the Charge it has occasioned, I shall proceed to consider that Expence in another point of view, not less important- --a comparison with the Expenditure of our Enemies. For when two great Powers are engaged in War, their Expences must necessarily be in some degree proportionate and reciprocal. --- Every exertion on the one part must be opposed by an effort on the other; and though much may be saved by accuracy and economy, it is impossible that the vigour of Military Operations should be increased without a corresponding in* crease of Expence. I mean therefore to ■- -^ shew, ( 45 ) shew, that in every former War, for more than a Century (as far as I have been able to procure any account), our Expencesbore a much larger proportioa to those of our Enemies than in the present. The Naval and Military Expences of King William's War with France, including Ordnance, amounted yearly to ahout ^.4,227,000 The Expences of the same kind, of Louis XIV. during the same time, t'^abcut 7,696,000 The aversge Expences of the Succession War, were about - - 5,100,000 Those of Louis XIV. at the same time, about . _ _ 9,000,000 It must however be observed, that Great Britain was far from holding that distinguished rank in the Alliance against Louis the XlVth, which she mamtains in the present Confederacy against the French Republic. The extraordinary Expences of the Dutch in King Wil- I^iam's War, exceeded those of England ^bout 1505O00I. per annum. The ( 46 ) The averagt Expences of the War with France and Spain, from 1744 to 1748, were about - - £• 8,50o,o»o The average Expences cf the War from 1756 to 1763, were about . - l7>77o,ooo The Expences of France during the same time, were about - - - I r, 100,000 The Expences of the American War were yearly about - - - * 23,200,000 Those of France in the same time - 15,000,000 No accounts are to be met with, at all to be depended upon, of the Expences of Spain, Holland or America : the latter indeed were chiefly defrayed by Paper Money^ extremely uncertain in its value. It is not possible to estimate with any accuracy, the Expences of the French in the present War, as they have also been principally discharged inapaper currency, the value of which cannot be easily ascer- tained at every period of its emission. But when the immense amount of that Paper Money is considered, and we add to it the vast sums raised by Contributions In the Conquered Countries, and by curious modes of plunder and confiscation at home, it will be (li-'lcult to suppose the real value of tlie'.r Expences short of * See Sir John Sinclair's History of the Revenue. eight}^ C 47 ) eighty millions sterling a-year, since the commencement of the War-|-. But the magnitude of the sum expended is a trif- ling evil, compared with the means by which it has been raised : the Capital of a mighty Nation has been thereby nearly exhausted, its Commerce ruined, its in- + Le Coulteux estimated, last November, the real value of ail the Assignats then in circulation, to have amounted, according to the rate of depreciation at the time of their respeflive issues, to five milliards, or upwards of 200 millions sterling |. To this must be added, all the confiscations, both of land and moveables, the requisitions of cash and effeds of every kind, the Dutch Subsidy, and all the sums extorted in the Netherlands and Germany ; but those who are inclined to pursue this sub- jeft, will find ample and accurate information in Mr, D'lvERNois' State of the Finances of France. Since that Estimate was made, the acknowledged amount of Assignats has been swelled by no less a sum than 20 milliards ; a Forced Loan, as far as has been found prac- ticable, has been carried into effedl, which was calculated to produce 24 millions sterling ; and by the last accounts received from France, we find, that in the Debate of 2 3d February, Dubois de Crance states, that 1500 millions of livres in specie (about 60 millions sterling), will be necessary to be raised for the next Campaign, which is exclusive of the Navy and all other charges, 7 The nominal value of there Assignats was at least 20 milliards. dustry ( 48 ) dustry destroyed, and Property within it reduced almost to any empty name. Having considered the Expences of the War, and the Debt occasioned by them, Mr. Morgan proceeds to make some Miscellaneous Observations, equally accu- rate and equally conrolatory with his re- marks on these subjects. He observes, that " from the first establishment of the " Consolidated Fund in 1786, the Ex- '' penditure lias invariably exceeded the *•' Revenue." The deficiencies in the six " years preceding the War amounted to " Seven Millions nearly, which were " supplied by Loans and extraordinary *' Receipts." For the proof of this, he refers to his Revievv^ of Dr. Price's, Writings (p. 57), where indeed we meet with an extraordinary attempt to shew that the deficiency of the Revenue in five years preceding 1791, amounted to no less than 6,380,0001. This must not a little have astonished the Nation, who had been informed by the Sele6l Com- mittee ( 49 ) mittee (from whose Report Mr. AIor- GAN professes to have taken his mate- rials), that in these years 4,750,000!. had been employed in the discharge of the National Debt, and that the new Debt amounted only to - - :£^- 1,789,589 viz. Loan by Tontine in 1789 1,002,140 Ditto by Short Annuities - 187,000 Unfunded Debt of various kinds 600,449 The statement in Table VI. will immediately explain the mystery ; and the difference between that statement and Mr. Morgan's, will be found to arise merely from my having followed the only method which he considers as intelligi- ble and honest.* I have stated the whole Expenditure of each year separately, and shewn the sources distin6f ly from whence that Expenditure was defrayed : while Mr. Morgan strikes out of his account of Income, all those that he calk extra- ordinary resources, though he inserts the whole amount of the ExpenceSj * See Review, 8cc, p. 63, U which ( 50 ) which includes many articles of an occa- sional and extraordinary nature. If it be said that those sources of income were omitted because they could not be ex- pend to occur again, why is the Lot- tery excluded, which, whether a wise resource or not, experience has shewn to be very usual, and one which it will be ahvays in the power of Administration to employ. It is besides not immaterial to optice, that the following temporary and occa- sional articles are included by Mr. Mor- gan, in his account of the ordinary Peace Establishment. To the American Loyalists Hastings's Trial, Foreign Secret Service, Prince's and Civil List Debts, Nevv South Wales, &c. Armament in 1787 Loan to the Stadtholder, dedufting what was repaid, Extraordinary Naval Expences, occasioned by the ships put on the stocks, and im- provements undertaken in the Dock- yards during the American War, in 1786 f n^7 tj 1788 Jn this part of the account I cannot pretend to exadncss, 1 1789 I 1790 Expence of Fortifications and Buildings by the Ordnance - - £' i>336,37^ 927»^73 153,000 - 387,000 - 414,000 189,000 172,000 - 276,000 222,425 /. 4,331,059 Mr. ( 5' ) Mr. Morgan gives no statement of the accounts of 1791 and 1792, though he throws out some conjectures concerning them ; but as I entirely agree with him, *' that it is wiser to ground our faith on " what he has proved^ than what he has *' prophesied," I shall merely again refer to Table VI. which will complete the picture of his Seven Millions Defi- ciency. But the succeeding observations are still more alarming ; and as they are in some degree obscure, it is necessary to quote a pretty long passage, that I may not run any risk of misrepresenting Mr. Morgan's meaning, by attempting to abridge it. " In the last three years, though additional Taxes have been laid to the amount of four millions, these deficiencies have constantly increased, so as in the present year to fall very little short of two millions. It is probable, therefore, that Annual Loans will become necessary in future to provide for the ordinary ExpencesofaPeace Establishment j and these Loans, by requiring new Taxes, will produce further deficiencies, so thnt by borrowing each year, not only to pay the deficiencies of the pre- H 2 " ceding ( 5^ ) ♦« ceding year, but also the interest on the dcTi- *' ciencies in former years, the National Debt ** will be increasing at Compound Interest in the " same manner as it is reduced, but with this ♦' alarming difference, that the operations inthp " one case are ten times more powerful than in *' the other. *' If these are likely to be the effcds of the ** Public Debt with the Expenditure only of a " Peace Establishment, or on the supposition " that the War were immediately closed, what " must be the consequences of obstinately pcr- " sisting in a system of profusion, which, if long " continued, would ruin any Country, however ** unimpaired its strength and resources. *' That the. deficiency in the Revenue pro- ceeds chiefly from the distressed and overbur- thened state of the Nation, is self-evident : but it must also be acknowledged, that it pro- ceeds in some degree from the nature of the Taxes which have lately been imposed. These, in order to render the War less obnoxious, have been laid in such a manner as to cause the least immediate pressure on the poorer part of the people. Now as this class constitutes the great bulk of the Nation, (and if the present War continues, is likely to constitute a much greater) it is obvious that a Tax which is not immediately paid by them can never be effi- cient. Such Taxes as those for Licences to wear Hair-powder, to kill Game, &c. may do to fill up the column of Ways and Meanis in a Mini .iter's Budget, but their produce, ff compared with the serious magnitude of " the: ( :3 ) ** the public exigencies, must always be trifling *' and contemptible." It is impossible to read this without longing for an opportunity to ask ]\h\ Morgan where he made all these ter- rible discoveries ? I cannot but \\ ish he had at least produced some proof oifacis so strange and so important. I am al- most afraid to avow, in opposition to so positive an assertion, that on the autho- rity of every thing I have seen or heard for these three years, and on that of the most authentic Statements I have been able to procure, the whole of this repre- sentation is entirely false, except one cir- cumstance, which Mr. Morgan, in kindness to the Minister, has disclosed, " that the late Taxes have been laid in such a manner, as to cause the least im- mediate pressure on the poorer part of the people." Mr. Morgan indeed ap- prehends, that this attention has render- ed them unproductive, or, in his ovrn polite phrase, " trifling and contemp- tible." J .am happy to have it in my power to console ( 54 ) console Mr. Morgan, by stating the pro- duce of these tnji'mg Taxes, by which it will appear, that though the poor have been spared, and the rich, I hope, not heavily burdened, the public necessities have been amply provided for. The same Statements will shew the truth of Mr. Morgan's assertion, of the increas- ing deficiency in the Revenue, and prove that his Two Millions last year have ex- actly as much real existence as his Seven Millions during the Peace. As tp the future Annual Loans, which are, accord- ing to Mr. Morgan, to be contradled as wxU in time of Peace as War, that being matter of prophecy^ I shall leave it to the undisturbed possession of such regard as may be thought due to it. I must, however, observe, that it is not a little singular, that Mr. Morgan should charge Mr. Pitt with imitating the error of Mr. Neckar, in France, that of car- rying on a War without imposing a new Tax, by borrowing immense sums an- nually, and endeavouring to provide for them by the incffeBual means of economy. I hope and believe Mr. Pitt is as de- sirous ( 55 ) sir'ous as ]Mr. Neckar of carrying the means of ceconomy as far as they will go ; but with what justice he is charged with imposing no new Taxes, the Public do not need the aid of my statement to judge. Successful would he be, indeed, if all' the Nation felt them no more than Mr. Morgan seems to do. But here again it will afford additional satisfa6lion to look a little back to former times, and recall to memory, that the Taxes imposed during the American War, from 1774 to 1783, produced an annual increase of Revenue of only - - £-1,755^^59 while the Interest of the Debt contra6led in the sam.e pe- riod amounted to - - 4,864,000 leaving an annual deficiency of - - - - 3,108,000' While the Taxes imposed during the present Contest, unparalleled in its dan- gers, and unequalled in the force exertecj by the contending Powers, have not only afforded suf^cient to defray the Interest of the sums borrowed, but to discharge, in ( 56 ) in a period of thirty-nine years, the Principal of the Debt itself^* Heated with the suhje6t, Mr. Morgan however goes on accumulating debt upon debt, and calamity on calamit}^, till he exclaims " with two Loans in one year, ** amounting to Thirty-six Millions Ster- *' iing; with a Loan also in the same ^ Comparison of the Interest and Charges of the additions' made to the National Debt since 1786, induding i per cent, annually raised to liquidate the Principal of them, with the produce of the Taxes imposed to answer those charges in the year ending October 10, 1795- •^'ears!. £• £■ Surplus of Defid- 1788. Interc-.t and) Taxes. ency. i:^:rd 59.473 '^rti'r'l '3^.«b5 73.4X. - Annuity ) t793. Inteiest andj Produce of ? ^,a ,.. ^fi a.r Charges ot^ 252,812 Taxes S "°'-'9+ ~ 26,6iS Loan Produce ot ") Taxes, in- i. axc&, 111- I 1704. Interest and) eluding the I 9,08- ChargesofS- 773.324 '^'^^es ot ( "-'• ' Loan ) 1791 con- tinued J ■feb. Produce of "1 1795'. Interest and ? „. Taxes i Charges \^>^-'^^^i from Feb. S 1,040,773 23 to Od. ' 6 56,552 -^ The Hair Powder Tax, which Mr. Morc.\n singles out as particularly oi/tempfible, w^i'i taken at 2 10, cool, and has produced 2oSj70o1. — The Account laid before the House of Commons made its produce about 2o,oool. less, owing to some oi the returns from the Country not being come in. year ( 57 ) " year* to our Ally the Emperor, of *' 4,600, cool, and with an addition to " the Navy Debt of One Million and aai " Half, the whole Supplies of the next " Campaign still remain unprovided !'* I have already considered the Loar^s and Expences ; but it is v^ry odd Mr* Morgan should forget, that so early as page 6, he admitted that the Expence^ of the next Campaign were provided fojr. I certainly canaot promise, nor can the Minister engage, that the a6lual Expen- ces may not exceed the Estimates ; but the Estimates were certainly liberal, and we have all along been reasoning upon a supposition that they were sufficient. By some strange inaccuracy, however, Mr. Morgan has so expressed himself, that his meaning seems to be, that no part of the Supplies of the next Campaign are * I am glad, that at least In the conclusion of his Book, Mr. Morgan will allow that money to have been rea/(y lent to the Empsror : for, in all the former Passages in his work, he has reasoned uponjt as a p^rt of our own Debt. 1 provided ( 58 ) •provided for, which he, as well as every body, else, must know to be dire6tly con- trary to the truth. • He^e. Mr. Mono an concludes, with citing a severe philippic of one of the best lo/': f^//vo/j-,.'-against a Minister now no more, and new-pointing the thunder of Dr.- Price's eloquence against Mr. Pitt's devoted head. This, however, I shall not repeat, because (though I know nothing more of the Nobleman in ques- tion, except that I never met with any person. acquainted with him during life, who did not love and revere his memo- ry ; yet) I think it equally useless and painful to recall a censure, whether me- rited or not, of the dead^ w^hich I have shewn, to be totally inapplicable to the living. Minister. But one very material inquiry, perhaps the most material of all, remains behind ---Whether the Expences of the War, However widely planned, and oeconomi- *.^Vi5v>-i V - cally ( 59 ) cally executed, are not so great as to ex- haust in a dangerous degree the resources of the Nation ? Whether we are not overstraining our sinews, and verging to a state of faintness and debihty, by exertions beyond our strength? I am far from denvins: that our exertions have been great, or from maintaining that thev ouMit to be continued one moment longer than that in which they can be put an end to with safety and honour.' Nor am I disposed to add one to the number of those adventurous Pohticians who have speculated on the extent and final term of the National Resources. But I Avill point out some obvious and apparent cuxumstances, which convince me that I was not too sanguine in my opinions two years ago, and that no efforts hitherto made, are likely to prove fatal or dangerous to the public welfare. One circumstance peculiarly interesting to an Englishman, is the sta:te of our Navigation , and .Foreign Trade ; ^ndin no particular were more destruc- I 2 tive ( 6o ) tive consequences apprehended from the War. I ventured to contradiCi: (. 63 } And so little has Money been found wanting^ for the execution of profitable undertakings, that at this time the fir^t of our Corporations is engaged in an eager contest with a Body of Individuals, to decide which party shall be permitted to expend no less a sum than 800, pool. upon a proje6t-j the success of which must depend totally oil; the extension of the Trade of London ^* Another criterion not less important, may be derived from the produce of the internal Taxes, which falling on almost every article of consumption, excepting these of immediate and absolute neces- sity, furnish a pretty certain indication 4: That the increase of Trade in the second Port in England, has . kept pa^e with that -in the first, will sufficiently appear from the following comparison of the tumbei" of Ships which have paid the Dock-duties at Liverpool in different years : Average of the years 1752 to 1755 inclusive, Average of the years 177J to 1775 inclusive. Average of the years 1783 to 1792 inclusive, Average of the years 1793 to 1795 inclusive, Number Amount of Ships. of Duties. No account. £-^Si 2254 - - 5229 - 3418 . - 8928 . 4114 . . 10,84* of ( H ) of the comforts or necessities of the Peo- ple. Accordingly it has always been found, that when the burdens of the State bore heavily on the Nation, the income of these Taxes gradually declined, and that effedt has been considered as so con- stant during War, as scarcely to afford any reason for apprehension, because it wa'S supposed it would recover of itself after the return of Peace. But if during the presentWar, their produce has scarcely diminished, notwithstanding the great additions made to them, it affords a most extraordinary proof that the general mass of National Property has increased to a degree not only capable of bearing its former burdens, but of supporting so great an additional weight, without in- juring the happiness of the People '[-. + I have before; had occasion to state the produce of the Permanent Taxes to the commencement of the War. In 1793 it amounted to 13,953,000!. 1794 - - 13,827,000!. 1795 - - 13,418,7271. A very pr'oduftive branch of Revenue was cut ofF in .1795, by the stoppage of the Distilleries, which would account for a greater diminution. Mr. ( 6s y Mr. Morgan has indeed, in his ini-. proved Edition, disclosed the secret of this extraordinary produce of the TaxeSi He tells US (p. 48), " it is obvious, that' ' the greater the profusion of Public ' Money, the greater must be the pro- ' duce of the Public Revenue. In the ' present War, which exceeds all that ' ever preceded it in the enormity of its ' Expence, the Revenue must of course ' be increased in a higher degree than in ' any other War, and consequently ' whenever it terminates, the deficiency ' must be so much the more alarming." This is a reason for continuing the W'ar, which its warmest advocates certainly ne- ver thought of. A discovery concealed- from the ignorant Ministers, the Cecils and the Sullys of former times, arid re- served for the enlightened Statesmen of Dr. Price's School, If the Excise and Customs sunk a third before the Peace of Ryswick, it was because the Wars in Flanders and Ireland were not suffi- ciently expensive ;• if the Taxes declined K in ( 66 ) in the American War, it was only be- cause the Ministry were too oeconomi- cal. But by what strange accident can it have happened, that though the Rulers of the French Republic have spent twenty millions a year for their Civil List, and sixty for the War, yet the Taxes in France have scarce produ- ced any thing at all ? I hope Mr, Morgan will tell us in his next im- proved Edition, whether they have been too frugal. As he " feels no pleasure in anticipating evil,"*^ I almost wish he had left us under the happy delusion, that the return of Peace would be as fa^ vourable to the Public Revenue as to the property acquired by private industry, Mr. Mo RG AN is indeed so sceptical , with regard to the Property of the Nation*, as to estimate the Rental of England at only eighteen millions, For this statement he gives us no proof, except the very strange one, that the Land-Tax charged not * Fafts, p. 2|, only ( 67 ) t)nly on lands and houses, but also oil the grozvin^ produce of the Place and Pen- sion List, produces about 1,900,000!. a year. Can it possibly be necessary to in- form Mr. Morgan, or can he possibly suppose his Readers ignorant, that the Land-Tax is assessed according to an invariable rate established above a cen- tury ago ? It is well known to have been so unequally distributed at first, as to afford no adequate criterion of the Pro- perty of the Nation even at that time ; and has not been changed at all on ac- count of any improvements since. But Mr. Morgan's hint respe(5^ing Places ^nd Pensions, makes it not improper to remind him that the redu6lion of the Pension List, and the abolition of use- Icfss Places under the present Administra- tion, far exceeds the amount of any in- crease of Offices which the necessity of the Public Service has rec'iired during: the sam.e period : and that even some t>f those OfEces will be found, on in- 'quiry, to have produced a diminution of K 2 influence, ( 68 ) influence, and saving of expence, which, of itself, much more than counterba- lances the charge brought on the Pubhc *. The * All the Provisions, and Stores of every kind, which used to be furnished by Contraft, or on Commission, by various Persons, ..re now purchased by the Commissioners of the Viflualling, and the Gommissioners for Transports. The amount of Spms paid to Individuals for such Services from 1778 to 1783, was upwards of 17,000,000!. Offices abolished under the Civil List Ad. No. C Above the value of j^. 500 per Annum 37 - 43,600 Under ditto - - _ - 97 _ 13,900 Offices abolished under Treasury Regulations. No. £. Above the value of j^. 500 per Annum 3 - 2,156 Under ditto - r - 141 - 11,469 H4- X.13,625 Offices substituted in lieu of those abolished. No. £. Above the value of ^. 500 per Annum 5 - 3,538 Under ditto - - > _ 57 _ 7,371 62 £. 10,909 No. Annual Value, Number of Offices svippressed 278 - j^, 71,125 . Ditto substituted - 62 - 10,909 216 - £.6o,zi6 Savings by Exchequer Offices - £. 25',o6o Pittoby Auditors of Imprests 32,000 £' Shooo Sinecure ( ^9 ) . The Estimates of the celebrated Ghe- GORY King, make the Rental of the Na» tion, about the time the Land-Tax was imposed, 13 millions, at the following Rates, viz. Arable Land, - - £' o S ^ P^^ Acre. Pasture and Meadovv, - 088 Woods and Coppices, - o j o Forests, Parks and Commons, 038 Heaths, Moors, Sec. - 010 Let those who are acquainted with the value of Land in the present day, de- cide whether the Chancellor of the Ex- Sinecure Offices in Customs, held by persons not resident, which have been suppressed by Mr. Pitt as the Pos- sessors have died. No, Annual Value. Vacant 40 - jT. 11,000 To fall in 84 - 38,000 124 /•49'000 Reduction of Excise Officers since 1783. 765 reduced - _^. 12,345 300 added for Tobacco, &c. 465 Pei isions reduced since 1783. £. 30,000 a Year. » chequer ( 7* ) l^icquer overstated the actual Rental o{ England at twenty-five millions, eveil inaking no allovrance for the vast trails of Land which have either been recovered from the Waste, or brought into irhpro- ved cultivation, within this Century. About the same time I have been speak- ing of, Davenant computed tlie Ren- tal of this Kingdom to have increased feince the year f6oo, from six millions to at I'east fourteen ; and I scarcely need bbserve, that in all the visible tokens of public improvements, the present Cen- tury has greatly excelled the last. 1 ViriQw no more than Mr. Morgan, on what grounds Mr. Pitt estimated the t*ersonal Property of the Nation ; but believing, for the reasons I have men- tioned, that he very wisely kept much within the truth in valuing the Land, and having seen Estimates which ap- J)"ear to me judicious and reasonable, and which much exceed the amount he men- tioned, am persuaded that in the other mstaupe ( 7* ) instance he was not less moderate and cautious. It might also be proper to inquire into the state of Public Credit, but ha\^r ing already had occasion to discuss that subje6t, in speaking of the Loans con- trailed during the War, I shall make no farther mention of it here. Of the general mass of Income which the People, colle6lively considered, dcr rive either from their industry or their possessions, a certain part is employed in supplying them with the necessaries pf life. Upon this no part of the burden^ of tbi£ State can fall, except in Goyern-T ments of grievous tyranny, such as a short time ago existed (if it does not still exist), in France. And even in that case^ they cannot fall upon the income so em- ployed, till they have nearly exhausted that which was appropriated to any :cs since the commencement of the War, riot including any of the' New Duties^ 1793. 1794; - 1795. Houses and Windows, including Commu- tation - I. ,048,918 i,37+ 8 9 7,003, 2B4 7 7 6,589,080 3 7^ 1,049,602 ro 10 ^,936,277 5 ^ 7,723,912 4 II 1,316,484 7 I Estimates of the fcwr first Years of «}« French and American \Yr.r - i^!- 55,657,029 S ii| 1793- Navy, including Ordnance for Sea Service .... Army Ordnance ^.3,971,915 5 10 3,968,559 8 3 783,766 12 I 794- Navy, inc luding Ordnance for Sea Service . 5.P5',33i II 3 Army . 6,436,560 9t Ordnance - 1,345,008 2 6 79?- Navy, including Ordnance for Sea Service - 6,315,523 3 9 Army - 11,674,358 17 H Ordnance - 2,321,010 13 IQ Navy, including Ordnance for Sea Service,, for 110,000 Seamen, at 4I. per man per month Army, including Foreign Corps Oronancs 7,072,000 9,051,442 i,741-'47i Estimate of the first four Years of the present War - - X- 60,209,955 17 ? TABLE II. ndedDebt incurred by the American War, from 1778 to 1 78 1 inclusive. Principal. Interest. 1778. .per Cent. Stock - " /;. 600,000 180,000 !;o,oool. per Ann. for 30 years, valued then at - - 2,305,860 150,000 '779' , per Cent. Stock - - 7,000,000 210,000 262,jool. for 29 years, valued thenar - - 3,974,5'° 262,500 1780. i per Cent. Stock - - 12,000,000 480,000 117,5001. a-year (estimated at 22 years purchase), for 80 years, valued at - - 4,785,000 217,500 • 178!. J per Cent. Stock + per Cent. 18,000,000 540,000 3,000,000 120,000 ^.57,065,370 2,160,000 Funded Debt incurred in the present War, from 1793 to 1796 inclusive. Principal. Interest. 1793. 3 per Cent. Stock - jT. 6,250,000 187,500 1794. 3 per Cent. 4 per Cent. 62,7911. a-year for 66| years 11,000,000 330,000 2,750,000 110,000 1,343,123 62,791 1795- 3 per Cent. 4 per Cent. 85,5001. a-year for 65I years 18,000,000 540,000 6,000,000 240,000 1,828,876 85,500 1796. 3 per Cent. - - 21,600,000 648,000 4 per Cent. - - 4,500.00° '^°>°°° 58,5001. a-year for 64,1 years 1,251.336 58,5°° ^.74,523,335 2,442,291 Navy Debt funded in 1 704 in 5 per Cents. - 1,926,525 96,326 Ditto ditto in 1795 - 1,609,897 ^°>494 ;C- 78,059.757 2,619,111 Table m. Money borrowed. Capital created, includ- ing Annuities conso- lidated. Rate of Interest in* eluding the Profit ofthe Lottery, and supposing that to be in each year 2oo,oool, 1778 — £. 6jOoo>ooo — /. 8,305,860 — X.4 '9 8 '779 — 7,000,000 — io,974>5'o — 6 I 1780— 12,000,000 — 16,785,000 — 6 I 9 1781 — 12,000,000 — 21,000,000 — 5 12 4 ^. 37,000,000 I' 57*065,370 '793— £>' 4>5oo>ooo — j{^. 6,250,000 —■ £'4r 3 4 1794 — 11,000,000 — '5»o93>i23 — 4 11 '795 — i 8,000,000 — 25,828,876 — 4 14 10 . C 3 1796 — 18,000,000 — 27>35'»336 *m^m 4 14 is.r £,' 51,500,000 ;C-74>523»335 Navy funded in 1 794 & 1795 - 3,398,098 3.536,422 jC.54>898,o98 jC. 78,059,757 TABLE IV. ^ fpUowine Account, the Interest and Charges on Sums borrowed, include the Long Annuities, which were In 1794, 63,498!. in 179^, 86,461!. din I7q6)f9>'j61' Andtlie i per Cent, on the Long Annuities is included in the i per Cent, on the Sums borrowed, and amounted in 1794, 19,6801. iiJ il9S> to 12,8351. and in 1796, to 8,500!. Sums borrowed. Interest and Charges on Sums borrowed. I per Cent, on Sums borrowed. £' Whole Charges in consequence of Sums borrow- ed. £' Capital created by funding Navy, &c. Bills. Interest of Ca- pital of Navy Sills. I per Cent, on Capital of Navy Bills. £. Whole Charge in consequence of funding Navy Bills. £• Total Chargt incurred on Sums borrow- • ed, and Navy Bills funded. £■ );, 4,500,000 190,312 62,500 252,812 '— ' — • — — 252,812 }|. 11,000,000 509,685 147,180 656,865 1,926,52^ 97«H3 19,265 % 16,458 773,323 );• 18,000,000 877,261 252,835 1,130,096 1,609,897 81,219 16,098 97,3»7 1,227,413 ^' 18,000,000 853,901 2,431,159 269,000 1,122,901 — — — — 1,122,901 5Ij5oo,ooo 3,162,674 3,536,422 178,412 35>3^3 213,775 3,376,449 3.536.4" Capita! of Navy Bills. jf' 55.036,422 5 per Cents. 4 per Cents, 3 per Cents, Total. Total Capital borrowed or funded which in Stock is in « 3,536,422 8,750,000 61,350,000 73,636,000 TABLE V. fOWARlSOX OF THE NAVY DUFdNG THE AMERICAN AND THE PRESENT WAR. SHIPS IN COMMISSION. Sliiy-s of Ships of ^ , theme, the 4th rate. Frigates, Sloops, &c. i o wi. ■ 8+ 73 246 December 177S — 7+ i? j"9 _ S^ 20 97 8° 1780-93 17 "3 91 jtSi -^ 86 18 116 90 279 3H ^10 SHIPS IN COMMISSION. I St December 1793 • — i>o 1794- — 93 1795 —104 I St February 1796 — 108 Ships of Ships of , the line, the 4ih rate. Frigates. Sloops, &c. Total. 100 56 243 7 9 18 18 lU 138 13^ ., Re;;ulars. Fter7i778- 55, J 05 '779 — 99,656 1780 — 109,112 '7^' — 105,419 Militia. 32,371 34,259 36,821 37,211 COMPARISON OF THE ARMY Totr^I. '? Troi '^PV^ni779, J7S0, and 1781 127,470 '3j'"9> U;,933 142,630 24,825 Regulars. I St February 1793 — 42,223 1794 — 81,389 J795 — 126,131 1796 — 124,866 Foreign Troops in 1795 Militia. Total. 24,108 66,331 64 278 79 329 86 368 Loca.1 Volunteers. 34,487 115,876 38,189 164,320 Cavalry - 3,577 39,419 164,285 Infantry - 7,943 52.975 INCOME. J by Mr. Morgan - • i^lng in the Exche. INCOME. by Mr. Morgan - ,ottery lied Grants _ Money repaid ncy INCOME. by Mr. Morgan d Week .ottery I Loan repaid Money repaid iXfENDlTURE. /. 14,342,055 Stated by Mr. Morgan 175,408 Dedud for a qjarterly pay- ment of the Sinking tund 697,908 overcharged, as only three quarters were paid in that year ... '.434.497 £. 16,699,868 £,. 16,663,716 250,000 Surplus C- '6,413,716 286,152 £. 16,699,868 17S8. EXPENDITURE.I j{;. 15,482,642 Stated by Mr. Morgan . - £. \6,t 256,985 200,000 94, i8z 8,772 £,. 16,033,809 476,494 1790. EXPENDITURE. j^. 16,354,000 Stated by Mr. Morgan, exclu- 193,978 sive of Armament which 277,606 was provided for in the 34,000 next year ... 271,846 Surplus . . . . ^.16,912,597 218,833 ^.17,131,430 £• 1 7. '3 '.430 INCOME. nt Taxes . . - dMalt 1791. EXPENDITURE. £, 14,132,000 Charges on Consolidated Fund, 2,558,000 including Sinking Fund -. £ 306,250 Navy .... £. 16,996,250 Ordnance . . , r Miscellaneous Deficiency of Grants 11,431,609 2,131,000 1,853,000 443,000 694,000 207,000 Surplus £• 16,759,609 136,641 £. 16,996,250 c :.i. » INCOME. Stated by Mr. Morgan Add Lottery Public Money repaid Unapplied Grants Deficiency . INCOME. Stated by Mr. Morgan Add Lottery Loan Unapplied Grants, &c. Public Money repaid Surplus 1786 1789 1790 Sum of Surplusses Deficiency 1787 1788 Sum of Deficiencies Surplus of five years Permanent Taxes Land and Malt Lottery INCOME. ^ .. EXPENDITURE. )C-'5.398.'34 Stated by Mr. Morgan . . / ,6 rro ta» 243,925 " A.' '"»> 'Ujj''^ 202,427 «. 180,000 ^. 16,023,486 486,817 jC. 16,510,303 .789. EXPENDITURE. /;. 15,908,068 Stated by Mr. Morgan . . /. 17,030,204. 258,175 Surplus ... . *- ;,o8rno7 1,189,140 -* ^ ' 401,769 368,959 £^. 1 8, 1 26, 1 II £. 18, 126, m £. 286,152' 1,085,907 218,833 /. 1,590,892 £. 486,817 476.494 ;^- 963.3" ^ 627,581, But as there was an increase of Unfunded Debt in these five ye. rs, of - . . There would appear a Surplus on the whole account, of Which, if dedufted from the in- crease of Funded Debt in 1789 The real deficiency will be left Stated by Mr. Morgan at £. 600,449 27,132 1,189,140 /■. 1,162,008 6,330.693 1792. EXPENDITURE. jf. 14,354,000 Charges on Consolidated Fund, 2,558,000 including Sinking Fund - j^. 11,431,609 312,500 Army Navy £. 17,224,500 Ordnance . . . — — — Miscellaneous Addition to Sinking Fund Surplus . . - 1,814,000 1,985,000 422,000 583,000 400,000 £• 16,635,609 588,899 £. 17,224,500 2 TABLE VII. COMPARISON OF THE TRADE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN DIFFERENT PERIODS OF PEACE AND WAR, Imports. Exports. fticc 1773 /. 13,019,016 Peace 1773 » ^^•'6,375,428 1774 • 14,399,809 «77+ « 17,288,487 ■775 ■ 14,051,361 average ^. r3,823,39y I77J - 16,326,364 average ;C- '6,663,426 War 1778 - 10,874,237 War 1778 - 12,253,890 '779 - 11,376,069 1779 - '3.530,703 1780 10,836,463 1780 - 12,624,372 1781 11,918,991 average jf. 11,251,440 1781 1 11,332,296 average i;. 12,435,315 Peact 1787 17,804,014 Peace 1787 ■ 17,180,707 1788 - 18,027,170 1788 • 16,283,059 1789 . 17,821,102 1789 - 18,163,488 J790 . 19,130,886 1790 - 18,884,716 '79' - 19,669,782 1791 * 2i>435,4S9 1792 . 19,659,358 average /. 18,685,385 1792 - 23.674,31s average £. 19,270,295 War IJ93 . 19,256,717 War 1793 - 19,365,428 '794 - 22,288,894 '794 - 25,663,272 '79J • 21,359,248 average jT. 20,964,953 »79; - 25,245,643 average £. 23,424,749 1