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PRESENTED BY

Frank A. Geldard“@OPTUM ©“OPTU M”

BY

JOHN PALMER GAVIT

AUTHOR OF ‘“‘AMERICANS BY CHOICE,” ‘‘COLLEGE,”’ ETC.

Formerly Managing Editor of the ‘‘ New York Evening Post’”’
Chief of the Washington Bureau of the
Associated Press, etc.

WITH AN

INTRODUCTORY NOTE FOR AMERICAN READERS

 

PUBLISHERS
BRENTANO’S
NEW YORK
1927Printed in Great Britain at
The Mayflower Press, Plymouth, William Brendon & Son, Ltd.TO

THE VALIANT SPIRIT

OF

Dr. HAMILTON WRIGHT

“The Sword of the Lord
and of Gideon”ACKNOWLEDGMENT

T would require a very long list to enumerate all of the
persons to whom the author of this book is indebted
for invaluable assistance in its preparation. To all of
them, especially including those who have helped me
without knowing that they did so, I extend my grateful
appreciation. I refrain from more specific mention,

because .. . “Opium” has a long arm, and neither

conscience nor mercy !

J. eG

THe CENTURY CLUB,
New York«K CIty.t
bi
Ext
fi
t
tr)
be
i
3?
3FOREWORD

IVILIZED mankind is only now awakening to the

problem involved in the growing addiction to, and
indiscriminate traffic in, narcotic drugs. It is only
beginning to realize that it is no longer a question of
suppressing in the Far East an Oriental vice, or of keep-
ing it in its primitive forms from invading the slums of
European and American cities; nor yet of saving
occasional individuals from the beginning or the conse-
quences of a ruinous habit. The world is slowly coming
to recognize the existence of a world problem and a
world task of the first magnitude; momentously im-
portant and exceedingly difficult, demanding complete
international unity of intelligence and administrative
co-operation. Difficult because deeply rooted in ancient
ignorance and social habits, in perverse appetites and in
the greed of gain. Immensely important because the
steadily increasing threat is against the welfare of all
races and nationalities, of all communities—in the
United States and Canada, in Europe, South America,
Australia and New Zealand; in Africa, India, Japan,
Siam, China and the islands of Far Eastern seas ; more
and more in every corner of the inhabited earth. No
place where people live is sheltered from this peril which
menaces men, women and children as few other things
ever have menaced them.

The complex nature and the obstinacy of the problem
were vividly disclosed in the great International Opium
Conferences held under the auspices of the League of
Nations at Geneva from November 3, 1924, to February
19, 1925. To anyone who, whether as participant or as
attentive spectator, sat for all those weeks in the midst
of those gatherings of the nations, observing the inter-
play and conflict of diverse interests and opinions, it is
no source of surprise that the people of all the nations

1Xx FOREWORD

represented or unrepresented therein, were bewildered by
the conflicting and frequently unintelligible reports
which emanated from them. The writers of those reports
were not only more or less subject to the national bias
and prejudices of their respective allegiances and a
certain abiding jealousy of supposedly conflicting political
and commercial interests; they were also more or less
confused and bemuddled by lack of familiarity with an
exceedingly intricate and baffling subject. In that
respect they were no worse off than all except a very few
of the delegates to the conferences! And the perplexity
of all concerned was in no way diminished by the fact
that there were not one conference but two, and that the
limitations and insufficiencies of the first protracted and
generally bedevilled the second ; incidentally disclosing a
serious incompatibility of council among those whose
unity of purpose and policy is absolutely indispensable
to effective measures.

The single purpose of this book, by one who, for nearly
four months, followed the Geneva Conferences, and
meanwhile gave somewhat careful study to some of the
principal aspects of the subject, is to pull together the
main threads of the problem as a whole for the benefit of
the ordinary reader. The writer assumes it to be un-
necessary to stress the personal aspects of drug addiction ;
to dwell upon the folly, the certainly disastrous conse-
quences, of tampering with narcotic drugs save under
the strict instructions of the competent and conscientious
physicians who administer them with increasing reluc-
tance and caution. This is an attempt to make reason-
ably clear, despite their many and complex ramifications,
some of the chief factors in the international problem,
with the hope of contributing, if may be, somewhat to
its ultimate solution.

JOHN PALMER GAVIT.

GENEVA,
SWITZERLAND, 1925,CHAPTER

if.
IIT.
IV.
Vv.
Wats
VII.

VET.

EX,

C.

INDEX .

GONDENTS

No LoNGER THE OLD PROBLEM

A GLANCE AT THE History oF IT
Some Basic FactTors

REVENUE TuHat Costs Too Muc# .
Tue Puases or It rw INDIA
CuInA—SINNED AGAINST AND SINNING

THE GENEVA OplumM CONFERENCES :
(1) THe First CONFERENCE

THe GENEVA OptuM CONFERENCES :
(2) THe SrconD CONFERENCE

So Far, So Goop—Wuat NExtT ?

APPENDICES

Text or THE Hague Convention oF 1912

First Orrum CoNFERENCE—AGREEMENT, PRO-
TOCOL AND FrnaL ACT ; : :

Smconp Opium CONFERENCE—CONVENTION,
ProrocoL AND Frnaut Act 3 ‘ F

PAGE

10
30
51
92

169

193
219DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS
(AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE FOR AMERICAN READERS)

UCH progress in the war against the abuse of narcotics

as has been made during the two years and more that
haye elapsed since this book was written, goes mostly to the
credit of the Enemy. The “ Allies ’—meaning the govern-
ments upon whom in the last analysis must fall the responsi-
bility for his defeat—are still, so far as measures having any
real effect are concerned, content with pious utterances,
admirable writings on paper, talking in terms of good inten-
tion, while “fishing behind the net”. The drug manufac-
turers—with a few distinguished exceptions—the “ dope ef
peddlers, the increasing army of addicts of raw and prepared
opium, morphine, heroin, and cocaine, continue to flourish
and spread their unholy cause. The illicit traffic increases
steadily.

In certain respects of minor detail, this volume is subject
to errata. Some of the illustrative statistics might be amplified
and brought down to date. But even a complete revision
would not alter their truthfulness or their sinister significance.
Nor would this author in any substantial way change his
statements of fact or modify his conclusions. Since the
original publication of this book no appreciable error of fact
has been drawn to my attention ; no allegation of unfairness
or undue bias in any behalf; no omission of any matter
necessary for an intelligent understanding of the problem.
On the whole, the situation remains precisely what it was,
‘‘ only more so”.

Certain things have happened since 1925 which the reader
of the following chapters needs to know. This introductory
note is for the purpose of mentioning what seem to be the
most important of them, namely :

The radical change in the policy of the Government of
India.

xiiixiv AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The somewhat dramatic entry of Italy upon the fighting-
front, and the consequent calling of the immediately im-
pending extraordinary session of the Opium Advisory
Committee of the League of Nations.

The Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry to Persia.

The new perils of the ‘“‘ Chaine Duanes ’’.

The present status of the Geneva Convention of 1925, in
respect of ratification and the projected establishment of the
Central Board.

The only evidence of downright conviction of sin and
intention toward works meet for repentance during the past
two years has been afforded—strange and unexpected as that
might seem—by the Government of India. That Government
has done precisely what the American delegation demanded
of it in the Second Geneva Conference ; what the spokesmen
for India and for the British regime generally declared could
not and would not be done ; that is, it has pledged itself un-
equivocally to diminish its export of opium by ten per cent a
year until in 1936 it shall have discontinued it altogether. It
is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this declaration ;
it means nothing less than a complete about-face in policy.
It means incidentally that the venerable, sacrosanct Report
of the Royal Commission of 18931, which hitherto has been
as it were the bible of the Indian opium policy, has gone at
last into the junk-heap of forgotten things where it belongs.
It means further the abandonment of the always absurd
contention that steps of reform must wait upon the sup-
pression of the mythical ' Smuggling from China ”—that
convenient bugaboo of the standpatters in both of the Geneva
Opium Conferences.

Moreover, there is a new factor in the India situation: a
plea of guilty in behalf of the mysterious domain of the Indian
Native States. At a conference at Simla, May 26, 1927, of
representatives of thirty-three of the Native States, convened
to discuss measures for dealing with the opium evil in these
independent territories, the Viceroy of India, Lord Irwin,
acknowledged (I am not aware that it ever was admitted
before, officially, by either the British or the Indian Govern-
ment) that the Native States of India, as such, are on the

* See in this volume pp. 96 et seq.AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE XV

same footing as British India and every other party to the
Versailles Treaty, with respect to the obligations of the
Hague Opium Convention of 1912. Said Lord Irwin :

The Treaty of Versailles, by which the League of
Nations was brought into being, and which automatically
involved the ratification of the Hague Opium Convention,
was, as you remember, signed by representatives of India,
including a ruling Prince, His Highness the Maharaja of
Bikaner, and thereby India—not merely British India—
became a party to this convention.

In the course of this speech, the Viceroy acknowledged,
what other representatives of India always have denied, that
the Native States contain “enormous stocks of opium for
which there is at present no legitimate outlet ”, and that “ a
stream of smuggled opium is flowing from the States ”. No
one can deny, said Lord Irwin, “that large quantities of
opium are smuggled out of Indian States, not only into
British India, but into other States as well ”’.

It is interesting, however futile now, to reflect upon the
difference it would have made in the Geneva Conferences,
had this candour been shown by the representatives of the
Indian Government !*

It is easy to overestimate the practical results of India’s
new posture. The British Medical Journal for July 16, 1927,
Says :

The latest figures available from India show that while
the area under poppy cultivation has been reduced from
133,500 acres in 1923-24 to 114,198 acres in 1924-25,
the amount of opium produced increased from 2,122,000
lbs. in the former year to 2,340,000 lbs. in the latter,
while the revenue of the Government of India from
opium, which was Rs.1,66,02,095 in 1923-24, amounted
to Rs.2,93,52,437 in 1925-26.

An outstanding development of the past year has been the
entry of Italy into the activities of the Opium Advisory
Committee. In September, 1926, in the Fifth Commission of
the Assembly of the League of Nations (that division of the

1 For other remarks about opium smuggling from the Native States,
see in this volume pp. 95-6.XVi AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Assembly having to do with so-called humanitarian matters,
including the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs),
Italy, by the voice of Signor Stefano Cavazzoni, demanded a
place on the Advisory Committee. He called attention to the
fact that hitherto that Committee had consisted exclusively
of representatives of the countries engaged in the production
of narcotics. He protested in all but so many words that a
group charged with the duty of watching and curbing this
world-menacing business ought to contain somebody beside
those who needed to be watched and curbed. Italy was
finding herself one of the victim countries, and would like to
have a hand in the watching and curbing.

The demand was complied with, Signor Cavazzoni was
added to the Advisory Committee, and at the succeeding
session thereof, in January and February, 1927, made himself
exceedingly evident. Unquestionably backed by the full
support of his Government and the personal interest of
Signor Mussolini, he declared that Italy was in the war to stay,
and purposed to fight for thoroughgoing measures, more
particularly including the curtailment of production of
narcotic drugs on the basis of ascertained legitimate needs
and a proper system of rationing among the nations. To his
insistence more than to any other influence is due the calling
of an extraordinary session of the Advisory Committee in late
September, 1927, for the special purpose of studying the
causes and other aspects of the illicit traffic. That session is
impending as these words are written. It would be unfair
and injudicious to attempt to forecast the proceedings.

During the two years since the original publication of this
book, the Commission of Inquiry in Persia, of which Frederick
A. Delano of Chicago was chairman, and which was appointed
as one of the results of the Second Geneva Conference of 1925,
has functioned, reported and subsided. It is no disparagement
of its work to say that it was and could be only a gesture.
Its findings have simply confirmed what everybody knew in
advance ; namely, that there is enormous production of opium
in Persia; that the industry is an economic necessity of the
people under existing conditions; that the substitution of
any other crop depends upon non-existent factors of transpor-
tation and agricultural development requiring a very largeAN INTRODUCTORY NOTE Xvil
public investment which Persia appears in no position to
make. The Government officially is anxious to curb the out-
put, but the practical politics of the situation are insuperable.
Meanwhile, the export of opium from Bushire on the Persian
Gulf, and the smuggling across all of the internal borders,
continues and increases. Beyond any reasonable doubt,
Persia is the principal source of the illicit traffic in raw opium.

It is difficult at this writing to appraise the precise status
of the Geneva Convention of 1925. It is not in force, and
nobody can say when, if ever, it will be. Under its own terms
it can only come into force ninety days after the deposit with
the League of Nations of ratification by the last of ten Powers,
which must include at least seven of those represented in the
Council of the League, and two of those seven must be per-
manent members.! At its ninth session (Jan.—Feb., 1927) the
Opium Advisory Committee adopted resolutions urgently
calling attention to the tardiness of members of the League
in bringing the Convention into force. At that time, of
members of the Council, only Great Britain and Salvador had
ratified ; since then, ratifications have been deposited by
France and Poland. Thus the requirement of two permanent
members is satisfied. On the face of it we have also two of
the indispensable five other members. Outside of the Council
we have more than the necessary three. Japan, the Nether-
lands, and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps others, are said to be
in more or less promising stages toward ratification. There
are ominous by-questions to complicate the situation. For
example, with reference to Salvador—will her ratification,
made while she was a non-permanent member of the Council,
be valid for this purpose after her membership expires in the
present year ?

And if and after the Convention comes juridically into
force, there is the reluctance of not a few of the States members
of the League to assume the substantial and inevitably grow-
ing expense of the Central Board created by the Convention.

nembers are now Great Britain, France, Germany,

1 The permanent n
h a place reserved for the United States). The

Italy, and Japan (wit fo
non-permanent members are Poland, Chili, Roumania (three years) ;

Colombia, Netherlands, China (two years) ; Belgium, Salvador,
Czechoslovakia (one year, expiring 1927).AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Corollary to that is a disposition in some quarters unfriendly
to the whole business to hamstring the Board by a picayune
scale of salaries. The Convention presupposes a Board of the
highest degree of character and independence, as well as of
exceptional technical attainments. Such persons are scarcely
to be had cheaply. Not to mention the temptations for poorly-
paid officials in such a job.
Evidently the Convention has still a stony road to travel.

XVili

 

The loopholes in the Hague Convention of 1912—to say
nothing of those in the Geneva Convention of 1925 not yet in
force—have been studied attentively by the manufacturers
and traffickers interested in circumventing the restrictions.
Out of this study, by experts of the highest chemical and
legal skill, has grown up a technique of evasion and smuggling
going far toward undermining the entire structure of defence.
There is now the phrase, ‘‘ Chaine Duanes”’, meaning in
effect “‘ shackles for the Customs”. This applies to a series
of derivatives not specifically mentioned in the Convention,
harmless in themselves so far as habit-forming qualities are
concerned, but capable of being turned by relatively simple
chemical processes into “ dope ’’. Into this class falls ecgonine,
the primary derivative from the coca-leaf ; probably also the
innocent-sounding “‘ coca-extract ” (which I suspect to be
ecgonine itself) exported from Java, and, I believe, codein.
Substances not in themselves classed as habit-forming, “‘ not
liable to similar abuse and productive of like ill-effects as
morphine, heroin or cocaine ”’, are not within the scope of the
Hague Convention, and therefore can lawfully pass, under
undisguised labels, through the Customs. ‘This indicates a
most serious hiatus in the wall of defence. The dope business
overlooks no details.

Increasingly suspicion attaches to codein, a secondary
derivative of opium, made directly from morphine. It is not
restricted under either of the Conventions. Hitherto it has
not been classed as habit-forming; but many authorities
regard it as on a par in all essentials with morphine. Dr.
Ernest E. Walters, in his contribution on “ Diarrhceas in the

* See p. 4lin this volume. The Geneva Convention brings ecgonine
under restriction. It is not mentioned in the Hague Convention.AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE xix

Tropics’ to The Practice of Medicine in the Tropics (London,
1922), describes codein as “simply an expensive and less
efficient form of opium ”’. The important point is that up to
this date, opium for manufacture of morphine to be made into
codein is ordinarily outside the restrictions applying to that
which is to stop with the morphine stage. Once the codein is
manufactured, it is relatively free to be made into its own
derivatives, such as ewcodal and dicodid, both of which, though
as yet little known and not generally available for addiction,
are habit-forming narcotics. The Health Committee of the
League of Nations, in a memorandum dated June 28, 1927,
deals extensively with these two new derivatives of morphine,
and declares both to be substantially as dangerous as morphine
itself.

Eventually, codein will have to come under the same
vigilant restriction as morphine and cocaine, and the raw
material from which both are made.

Remains after all the single, simple, basic fact that at least
ten, perhaps fifty, possibly hundreds of times the world’s
legitimate need for these narcotics, is being poured out of the
drug-factories. All of the producing nations are at present
competing for the “ market’’. In the article in the British
Medical Journal of July 16, 1927, quoted above, referring to
the export of morphine from Great Britain, occurs the follow-
ing luminous comment :

Although we are assured that no export of morphine
is permitted ‘‘ until the Department is satisfied that it is
required for legitimate purposes,” it is difficult to believe
that strictly medical requirements are responsible for the
large consignments licensed for export when the amount
of the alkaloid produced in other countries is borne in
mind.

This hits the nail squarely upon its head. This is the hub
of the whole matter. Nobody is really deceived about it.
No elaborate study of the sources and methods of illicit traffic
is necessary. Attempts to stop smuggling, while this condi-
tion persists, are simply child’s-play, stamping out individual
sparks in a forest fire. The only thing needed is common
honesty, and the sincere application of such common sensexx

AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

and energy and international co-operation as are used in
fighting epidemic disease. In the ninth session of the Opium
Advisory Committee, Sir John Campbell, then presiding, put
the situation in a nutshell when he said in substance :

Every person in this room knows the reason for the
illicit traffic, and understands the nature of the only
possible remedy. It is unjust and an entire misconception
to blame the League of Nations or the Opium Advisory
Committee. Neither has any power to compel sovereign
nations to keep the word they already have solemnly
given. There are at most fifty—perhaps not more than
forty—drug factories in the whole world. By the Hague
Convention the individual governments assumed definite
obligation to limit the manufacture, sale and use of these
narcotic drugs to legitimate purposes, and to co-operate in
the fulfilment of these obligations. The governments
have not done this. The solemn international obligations
have not been fulfilled.

That is all there is to it. All of the detail presented in the
pages which follow converges precisely upon this point.“OPIUM”

CHAPTER I
NO LONGER THE OLD PROBLEM

N its face it would seem a proposition simple enough :
Opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine, hasheesh or
whatnot other habit-forming drug is dangerous stuff.
Its production, distribution and use should be limited
and controlled so as to confine it to purposes strictly
medical and scientific. Any other use obviously is an
abuse to be described and proscribed as illegitimate ; to
be suppressed by all the powers of Government—not
only within national boundaries but internationally by
Governments co-operating loyally and unselfishly for the
protection of their own peoples and the welfare of man-
kind. As a matter of common sense, the need must be
to survey the situation, to pool all available information,
and in full view of the difficulties of all kinds to devise
practicable methods and interlocking machinery whereby
progressively to limit and as soon as possible effectively
suppress the production, distribution and consumption of
this dangerous stuff—save for the relatively infinitesimal
quantity needed in medicine and bona fide scientific ex-
perimentation—from the initial cultivation of the original
plants to the final disposal of the ultimate drugs.
But it is not so simple as that. The moment you lift
B9 OPIUM

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   

the lid of this Pandora’s Box you are bewildered and
suffocated by a cloud of things seemingly having little
to do with the merits of the subject. Things historic,
racial, social, political, economic—even religious; sur-
vivals and repercussions of old happenings, customs,
policies, relationships ; tariffs, taxation, budgets; brig-
andage, piracy, revolutions, international wars and their
aftermaths ; questions chemical, medical, meteorological ;
issues of national sovereignty ; even the matter of the
illicit traffic in privately manufactured arms and am-
munition. One needs only to follow round the corner
—not to mention underground—any of these ramifica-
tions, to be lost in the maze; anyway to realize with a
sort of dismay the complexity of the factors combining
and interlacing to make up “‘ the problem of narcotics.”

The apparent conflict of purpose which appeared in
both of the Geneva Conferences and which for a long time
will confuse council and retard progress in this matter
arises from the existence and incompatibility of at least
two fundamentally differing conceptions of the nature
of the problem and therefore of the kind of measures
local, national and international, and the degree of mutual

concession and co-operation, necessary for its solution.

>

Formerly, ‘Opium ” meant an exotic, Oriental vice,

originating in the dim ancient past of that vague,

ce >

mysterious world “‘ East of Suez,” and creeping regret-
tably but slowly and altogether disreputably, out into
the slums, the criminal dregs, the despised and self-
contained purlieus of civilization. Seen in that light,
“Opium ” was a matter chiefly for missionary effort at

the source and among the negligible submerged, by those

Un er arr srr oarsTHE OLD PROBLEM 3

who have a nose and penchant for that sort of thing: the
foreign medical missionary, the Salvation Army and such-
like ; for education—a cosmically deliberate process—
among the Oriental peoples. Also, to be sure, for more
enlightened and less shamelessly selfish administration
on the part of the Western nations which, after a long
period of undisguised unscrupulous exploitation, were
beginning to camouflage their handling of the ‘“‘ White
Man’s Burden ” by at least more mellifluous phraseology ;
some of them to adopt a technique less brutal, more
constructive, and in the end more profitable.

It is no longer like that. It is no longer the “‘ raw ” or
the “ prepared’ opium that chiefly imperils the people
of either East or West. Without in the least diminishing
the effort to reduce the slavery of India, China or other
Eastern countries to their own more primitive forms of
addiction, we have now to face the fact that everywhere,
including the Far East, those forms of the evil are giving
place to a new and vastly more menacing thing, in the
form of “ high-tension ’ manufactured drugs—morphia,
heroin and other derivatives of opium and cocaine. While
the countries ‘“‘ East of Suez ” continue to be the principal
sources of the raw material, these drugs made from it—
barring a certain quantity manufactured in Japan—do
not come from the Orient. They come, in great and
increasing quantities, from the expensively equipped, skil-
fully and scientifically conducted pharmaceutical labora-
tories of the ‘“‘ civilized’? West—Great Britain, the
United States, France, Holland, but chiefly from Swit-
zerland and Germany. And despite all measures of
restriction and control, despite all meticulous distinctions

¢

between “legitimate ’’ commerce and “illegitimate ”’

smuggling, they are spreading in all directions, seeping4 OPIUM
in among the populations of all the countries of the
world.

The Western countries and Japan have adopted
legislation, in most cases drastic enough upon its face,
but in action only partially effective at best, to protect
their own nationals from the ravages of narcotic drugs ;
but the flow of the poison is now the other way—from
West to East. And there stands forth the new question :
Shall we maintain, for the benefit of “‘ civilized” pockets,
and even on the ground that we are thus saving “ inferior
native populations from other forms of taxation, a double
standard : one for the protection of our own nationals, the
other for “‘ East of Suez”? 2 What may be said in defence
of a policy which “saves” the natives of those Far
Eastern countries from paying taxes for their governing,
out of one pocket, while from the other it takes vastly
greater sums by sale to them of a poison which not only
depletes their power to produce either taxes or decent
living, to develop their capacities and fulfil any joyous
destiny, but destroys them, body and soul ?

Even if there were respectable defence for it as a
matter of ethics, the policy is suicidal from the point of
view of Government itself. The evil is no longer localized
as an affair of the submerged, of the negligible ‘‘ inferior ”
of any class or race; in any stratum of society or conti-
nent or hemisphere. On no theory can drug-addiction,
in any of its forms, be regarded as a thing of “ domestic
concern.” As we shall see presently, it is more than
probable that even in the primitive fashions of addiction
of the Far East opium plays a sinister part in making
those regions—India for a special example—hot-beds of the
infectious diseases which at times spread out all over the
world. ‘The thing has become a vivid menace to allTHE OLD PROBLEM 5

humanity, and the whole world must grapple with it as
a matter of mere self-preservation.

The basic point of view must be altered. This is no
longer a missionary question; still less is it mainly a
commercial question. There must come a realization of
the changed nature of the situation confronting the world
in 1925; its contrast with that of the period closing
with the formulation of the ‘‘ Hague Convention of 1912 ”’;
an appreciation of the fact that both strategy and
weapons must be adapted to new conditions. Also that
with the adoption of that convention by virtue of its
inclusion ipso facto in the peace treaties closing the
Great War, a new kind of national and international
obligation and common responsibility have been assumed.

Fifty years ago—even twenty—it might perhaps have
been sufficient to discuss as a question of ethics and
practical administration whether opium, coca-leaves, or
even manufactured drugs could be produced in a country,
complacently used in accordance with ancient domestic
customs and moral standards (however much to the detri-
ment of its own inhabitants), and made a source of
Government revenue, without endangering the inhabitants
of other countries.

From this point of view the local customs and habits
were of purely local concern. If a nation saw fit to
saturate itsel{—even including its babies—with narcotics
of any kind, it was nobody else’s business. Let each
Government meet as it saw fit, and could, its own prob-
lems of health and behaviour—and revenue. So far as
the rest of the world was concerned it was quite sufficient
—going a long way indeed—if the individual Government6 OPIUM

undertook to see to it that the opium which it produced
(in quantities to suit its own discretion) went to supply
only its own people, and was exported to such other
countries only as should certify that they wanted it.

This view of the matter—and it is essentially the view
registered in the Hague Convention of 1912—leaves it to
each nation for itself to control within its own borders
and possessions the production of the basic crops and
raw materials ; to limit import and consumption and the
manufacturing of derivative alkaloids as well as internal
transport and sale; and as regards export to insist
rigorously upon impeccable authentic official ‘‘ import
certificates ’’ from those other countries which say they
want the stuff; to prohibit altogether export to those
which declare that they want none.

This point of view serves as justification for the idea
underlying for instance the statement of an exceedingly
humanitarian Englishman, quoted in a letter recently

received by the present writer, as follows :

In India, for example, the natives are to a large extent
dependent upon the culture of the poppy for their
livelihood. Sweep away that and... you take away
the people’s means of living. It would be analogous to
a decree declaring that the Canadian farmer should no
longer raise wheat !

Well, let us waive for the moment the fact that while
this statement might apply to Persia, Turkey and Jugo-
Slavia, it does not apply to India—certainly not to
British India, where! the Indian Government subsidizes
the poppy crop by loans without interest, sometimes even
goes out of its way to induce farmers to “engage for

* As one may learn from the India Year Book for 1924, p. 823.THE OLD PROBLEM 7

poppy,” and is the sole purchaser of the resulting crops,
at prices which it fixes itself. Waive also the fact that,
as we shall see presently, officials in British India speak

>

of wheat as “the competing crop.” Assume the state-
ment to be true . . . what if, instead of wheat, a neces-
sary food of the world, the farmers of Canada, or any
other country, were raising great crops of rattlesnakes or
typhus germs! Suppose, moreover, that these delectable
staples (to whose injurious effects their own Government
declared them immune by reason of immemorial addiction
and customary tolerance) were being raised in quantities
so far beyond any possible, even pseudo-legitimate,
demand that of bare economic necessity they must find
or create outside markets for them—to say nothing of
the inevitable leakage over the national borders.
Suppose, if you like, that the world actually needed
for legitimate medical and scientific purposes a relatively
infinitesimal quantity of rattlesnakes or typhus serum,
and that every country which could produce them was
greedily competing for the entire “ market,’ and mean-
while producing them without stint or substantial control.
Then you would have something like a parallel. How
long would the public opinion of the world accept the
idea that this cheerful industry was the private affair of
the producing country, or have patience with or pity
for the farmers whose livelihood was dependent upon it ?
The very existence of the Hague Convention, and of
the Geneva Conferences designed to strengthen it by
however little, is indication that the world is slowly
awakening from the lethargy involved in this earlier
point of view. It has begun to see that the production
of these poisons, whether as raw material or as manu-
factured derivatives, is not an exclusively private affair ;8 OPIUM

at least it must be apologized for and the world made
to believe it is being controlled. It has begun to see,
too, that these things cannot be allowed to drift about
subject to ordinary hit-or-miss supply-and-demand, like
potatoes or tinware; that it is not adequate to handle
them by means of good-natured, platitudinous declara-
tions of intention to be observed if and when and how it
is convenient and profitable. In a degree far beyond that
conceived in the period before the Hague Convention it
has become international business of the most urgent
character, for the same reason that the protection by
some religious sects of plague-infected rats has become
more than a local affair.

The old, obsolete form of the problem has merged into
and become a much wider and more difficult one, of the
international aspect of this question—that of how to
protect the inhabitants of all countries, of the world as a
whole, by common knowledge, common understanding of
purpose, and thoroughly unified endeavour, with all the
necessary sacrifices and contribution of individual con-
cession on the part of each. We have reached in the war
against narcotics a stage analagous to that in the Great
War, when separate interest, separate judgment, separate
action must give way to unity of policy.

Whether on a train in America, at a railroad station
in France or Sweden, in a chemist’s shop in London or
Tokio ; in China, India, Macao, Java, or on a ship from
Marseilles or Bushire in the Persian Gulf, a consignment
of raw opium, or drugs, like a man with cholera or bubonic
plague, is no more the private affair of an exporter, a
smuggler, or a particular Government than a person with

| smallpox in a New York tenement house is the private
affair of himself and his family.THE OLD PROBLEM 9

It is a cardinal mistake to suppose that the battle-line
is where it was in January, 1912, when the Hague Con-
vention was produced. It is far in the rear of the firing-
line of those days. We are no longer trying to defend
the frontier of Belgium ; we are as it were at the Marne,
and there have been no retarding battles in the swift
retreat. Especially during the World War the campaign
has been going almost by default. Here and there out-
posts, even considerable sectors, are trying, mostly with
obsolete weapons and old tactics, to stem the tide ; but
it has swept, and is sweeping, round their flanks, and

taking them in the rear.CHAPTER I]

A GLANCE AT THE HISTORY OF IT

ae YTIC addiction is no new thing in the world.
zi The story of the poppy as the source of opium, and
of the coca-leaf, the ‘‘ divine plant ”’ of the Incas of Peru
and the Indians of the Cordilleras of the South American
Andes, goes back into the dimmest recesses of antiquity.
The use of these things for mere sensual delight always
has received the disapprobation of the judicious, and it
is quite impossible to fix any date as marking the begin-
ning of efforts to eradicate it. It is unnecessary to
devote much space here to the ancient history of this
subject. The thing to note is that the modern phase of
it; its growth into the dimensions of a world-menace,
is parallel with, and may be regarded as substantially
the product of, the white man’s exploitation of other
races, the white man’s invention and science ; the white
man’s organization of the world for the financially profit-

>

able ends of “ business.” What Mahatma Ghandi said
recently of the India Government may be said as truly
of other governments having authority in the Far East :

‘ It will be no defence to urge that the vice has existed
in Indiafrom time immemorial. Noone organized the vice,

as the present Government has, for purposes of revenue.”

The white man’s conscience never has been clear about
it; the foreshadowings of a Nemesis have troubled his
most prosperous occasions.

10HISTORY OF OPIUM 11

Warren Hastings, who was in India in the days of the
East India Company, as long ago as 1788, declared opium
to be “a pernicious article of luxury, which ought not to
be permitted but for the purpose of foreign commerce
In 1817 the Directors of the East India Company
itself wrote from Calcutta that “if it were possible to

>

only.’

prevent the use of the drug altogether, except strictly
for the purpose of medicine, we would gladly do it in
compassion to mankind.”

As early as 1832 a committee of the British Parliament
reported that the revenue from opium “could not be
abandoned without seriously impeding the development
of the country’; but the important fact is that such a
report indicates the previous existence of a considerable
movement of British protest. There was thereafter
constant and increasingly urgent recurrence of the sub-
ject in Parliament—always with the inference that the
thing was an evil; never any defence except that it was
an unavoidable, a necessary evil.

In 1843, just after the British Empire had forced open
the gates of China for the British opium smugglers and
secured for them $6,000,000 of indemnity for opium
seized and destroyed by the Chinese Government, Lord
Ashley offered in Parliament a resolution to the effect
that the continuance of the opium monopoly and trade
was “utterly inconsistent with the honour and duties
of a Christian kingdom.”

In 1874 was organized the British Society for the Sup-
pression of the Opium Trade. Lord Shaftesbury was the
first president. In 1875 it was moved in the House of
Commons by Sir Mark Stewart that His Majesty’s
Government should carefully consider ‘‘ with a view to
the gradual withdrawal of the Government of India from12 OPIUM

the cultivation and manufacture of opium.” In 1891
there was for the first time an actual majority in the
House for an anti-opium resolution, which averred that
“the system by which the Indian opium is raised is
morally indefensible.” And in 1892 the Secretary of
State for India declared that the policy of the India
Government had as one of its objects, ‘ checking and
limiting the habit amongst the people of consuming
licensed opium, as far as is possible without driving them
to smuggling or to the use of harmful narcotics.”

The next year saw the appointment of the famous
“Royal Commission of 1893,” to whose report of 1895
we shall make more detailed reference subsequently.
That report was, and to a great extent still is, an opiate
for the British conscience. Nevertheless, its slumber has
been troubled, and its stirrings now are accentuated by
a new stimulant. It begins to look as if the work of
conscience would be spurred by Fear !

It is significant that the argument of all the Western
nations which still exploit the East carries with it the
inference of confession and avoidance: Opium is dan-
gerous stuff and ought to be brought within the limited
and diminishing requirements of science; but... any-
thing immediate is impracticable. If we don’t sell it,
somebody else will. Besides, we need the money! If we
abandon this source of revenue we shall have to lay
new taxes, which will fall not only upon the opium
addicts but upon irritable folk not prepared to accept
the sacrifice for their fellows. Who knows what they
might do about it ? This is no time to be rocking politi-
cal boats in the Far East. Plausible enough, perhaps,
but there is reason to believe that the intelligent people

of the Far East, including especially India and China,HISTORY OF OPIUM re

are not so devoted to opium as their white brethren

affect to believe.

The United States acquired a direct contact with the
Far Eastern opium problem with the cession of the
Philippine Islands by Spain after the war of 1898, and
for a time made the vice a source of revenue ; but within
a few years took drastic prohibitory action—so far as
legislation went; wrote off an annual income of half
a million dollars and took on at least as much again in
additional expense for enforcement. The effectiveness
of the enforcement is a matter of dispute: one need
only look at the enormous coast-line of those islands,
and reflect upon the present struggle to keep liquor out
of the United States itself, to have his doubts. But at
any rate it may be said that there is no deliberate
governmental policy of deriving revenue from the vice.
Already within her own borders America was acquainted
with the smoking of opium by Chinese and degenerate
whites; already the evil of addiction to manufactured
narcotics was raising its malignant head.

In 1906 Dr. Hamilton Wright, for many years the
implacable foe of opium in the Far East, and under his
inspiration the Rt. Rev. Charles H. Brent, now Protestant
Episcopal Bishop of Western New York, but then Mis-
sionary Bishop of the Philippine Islands, inspired Presi-
dent Roosevelt to move for international action. Previous
to that there had been an increasing missionary move-
ment against opium, especially in England. The time
was ripe. Even so long ago, the doom of ‘“‘ Opium” was
ringing, as that of slavery had rung a half-century and

more before.14 OPIUM

 

Largely as a result of Mr. Roosevelt’s initiative an
International Opium Commission met in 1909 at Shang-
hai, at which were represented Austria-Hungary, China,
France, Germany, the British Empire, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Imperial Russia, Siam
and the United States of America—all countries con-
cerned in one way or another with the raising of the
opium-poppy and the manufacture and use of opium
products. Turkey, which raised and to some extent
consumed opium, was invited but did not attend.

If one would realize the degree of progress made to
this day in the struggle to free the world of this affliction
—if only in respect of the growing revolt of conscience
and the education of public opinion—it is necessary only
to read the proceedings of that Conference, in which
sordid politics and cynical commercial greed were ram-
pant. We have not time now for details of that.

There was no formal treaty as the result of this meeting,
but its deliberations led to an International Conference
three years later, in January, 1912, at the Hague—like-
wise convened upon the initiative of the United States—
at which were present delegates from Germany, United
States, China, France, British Empire, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, Siam, all of whom
signed the treaty then adopted, which is now known as
the “‘ Hague Convention of 1912,” and which constitutes
the foundation of all present-day international action
on the subject, as well as of most of the legislation and
administrative regulations enacted by the nations
severally.

It is easy to cavil at that convention. The account of

1 The text of the Hague Convention is given in this volume, Appen-
dix A, p. 256.HISTORY OF OPIUM 15

the proceedings displays the usual reluctance of govern-
ments generally to tamper with a status quo, especially
if it involves any source of revenue. It is pretty sordid
reading. But it proved on the whole that there is such
a thing as world-conscience, and such a thing as decent
public opinion. With all its shortcomings, with all of
its evidences of “‘ pussy-footing ” and evasion and com-
promise between world-altruism and commercial interests,
between conscience and expediency, the Hague Conven-
tion was at least an acknowledgment by the group of
nations which call themselves “‘ great ” that the problem
of narcotics is international—a charge upon the whole
world’s common sense and common responsibility. It
was more than a stirring in sleep; it was the beginning
of being awake. It would be straining words to call it,

as some do, “a great step in advance.”

The Hague Convention defined ‘raw. and “.pre=
pared ” opium, “ medicinal drugs ” derived from opium
and the coca-leaf ; provided timidly for a certain degree
of restriction and vigilance in distribution, and for the
‘ oradual and effective ’’—implying the eventual total—
suppression of opium smoking in Far Eastern countries
and possessions, and prescribed measures ostensibly
designed to limit the manufacture of drugs to medical
and scientific needs, and to control international traffic
in both opium and manufactured drugs, together with
certain special, even if perfunctory, provisions intended
to assist China in her own struggle with illegal production
of opium.

One of the extraordinary things about the Hague
Convention was its provision for a most obscure and16 OPIUM

cumbrous method for bringing it into force; that necessi-
tated two more conferences—in 1913 and 1914—the last,
in June, adopting a “protocol of cloture,” by virtue
of which the Convention was to be in force, as regards
those nations which should then have signed it, on
December 31, 1914, and at the date of signature as regards
those signing it thereafter.

At the time of the final conference in June, 1914, only
eleven nations had ratified the Convention. In the order
of ratification :

1913. Denmark, Siam, Guatemala, Honduras, Vene-
zucla, United States of America, Portugal.
1914. China, Sweden, Belgium, Italy.

Great Britain and the Netherlands ratified in July,
immediately following the last Conference.

By the prescribed 3lst December, and for five years
and more thereafter, the whole world was plunged in the
turmoil and aftermath of a war which sooner or later
swept into its horrors and preoccupations directly or
indirectly every nation concerned in the subject-matter
of the Convention. The narcotic problem—if they thought
of it at all—seemed the least of their troubles. So far as
international interest or action was concerned, the war
against narcotics took its place with the war against
original sin. It came to a standstill, and that, as in all
such warfare, meant not standing still but retrogression.

The widespread use of morphine and cocaine as ano-
dynes against human agony, and, still worse, as a means
of mental relief from the deadly despairs and fears, dis-
gusts and monotonies of war, turned loose at the end
many uncured and more or less incurable addicts to
continue and spread their addiction. To spread—for oneHISTORY OF OPIUM 17

of the awful concomitants of this vice is a kind of per-
verted missionary impulse to propagate itself by making
new addicts; quite apart from and in addition to the
motive of gain by selling the stuff to them.

“Opium ” did not stand still, or lose any ground during
the world war. Very far from it. Opium and its even
more deadly allies, the manufactured drugs, accelerated

?

their activities in all directions. ‘‘ Opium” has no
conscience and acknowledges no flag. It masquerades in

many guises

 

among them those of “‘ medical necessity,”
“business interest,’ and “ national sovereignty’; but
it knows no patriotism, save as it understands all too well,
and doggedly obstructs, that really protective patriotism
which is its enemy.

In order to be able to assess approximately the degree
of enthusiasm of the nations for this warfare against
narcotics and the extent to which since 1912 they have
been committed—whether they realized and acknow-
ledged it or not—at least to the modest principles of the
Hague Convention, it is worth while to classify them
still further with regard to their promptitude in ratifying
it. As we have seen, only eleven states, including but
five of the original signatories, had ratified before the
final conference was held in June, 1914; two more
ratifying in the following month, before the outbreak
of the world war. Nicaragua and Norway ratified in
November, and Brazil in December. Thus, under the

<

terms of the “ protocol of cloture”’ of June, 1914, the
3lst of December found the convention lacking the
ratification or other confirmatory action of a very im-
portant four of the original signatories—France, Japan,

Cc18 OPIUM

Persia and Russia. France and Japan are brought in

by the Versailles Treaty, Persia and Russia never have
ratified at all. Germany accepted it, so to say, at the
cannon’s mouth.

Furthermore, the really effective action—that of sign-
ing the ‘“ protocol of signature,’ closing the record of
acceptance—was taken prior to the operation of the
Versailles Treaty only by the following :

1915. China, United States of America, the Nether-
lands, Honduras, Norway.
1919. Belgium, Luxemburg.

Through the initiative of certain leaders in the old
anti-opium warfare there was inserted in the Versailles
Treaty of Peace with Germany—and subsequently into
the other peace treaties which closed the war with
Germany’s allies—a provision automatically bringing the
Hague convention into force for each of the signatories
of those treaties. The text of Article 295 of the Versailles

Treaty of Peace with Germany reads as follows :

Those of the High Contracting parties who have not
yet signed, or who have signed, but not yet ratified, the
Opium Convention signed at The Hague on January
23rd, 1912, agree to bring the said Convention into force,
and for this purpose to enact the necessary legislation
without delay and in any case within a period of twelve
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

Furthermore, they agree that ratification of the present
Treaty should, in the case of the Powers which have not
yet ratified the Opium Convention, be deemed in all
respects equivalent to the ratification of that Convention
and to the signature of the Special Protocol which was
opened at The Hague in accordance with the resolutions
adopted at the Third Opium Conference in 1914 for
bringing the said Convention into force.HISTORY OF OPIUM 19

This device brought Germany, Austria, Hungary and
Bulgaria in as it were ‘‘ by the neck.” And it brought
in automatically all the willing signers of the Peace
Treaties; but did not affect the neutrals. Denmark
(with Iceland) and Spain ratified in 1921, Finland and
Luxemburg in 1922, Chile and Ecuador in 1923, Colombia
in 1924. Switzerland, after a hard struggle under her
cumbrous method of referendum, and despite the bitter
opposition of the drug interests, completed her ratifica-
tion in January, 1925, while the Second Opium Con-
ference was in session at Geneva, with her delegation
doing its best to restrain any further interference with
those interests.

States which in August, 1925, had not yet ratified the
Hague Convention of 1912 include :

Abyssinia, Afghanistan, Andorra, Argentine Republic,
Australia, Canada, Irish Free State, New Zealand, South
Africa, Native States of India, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Paraguay, Persia, Russia, San Marino, Turkey.

Furthermore, there is a hazy condition with regard to
many important territories. For example, Spain takes
the position that its colonies, such as Fernando Po, Spanish
Guinea and Spanish Morocco, are not separately bound
by the convention. If they are bound at all, it is as
included under the Spanish ratification. One effect of
that theory is that any importation of drugs into Spain
and thence transported, say, to Spanish Morocco, would
be still in Spain, a matter of internal distribution, and
not a matter of international concern, however open the
door for smuggling out from those territories. If
these colonies are altogether unaffected by the Conven-

tion it greatly undermines Spain’s co-operation.20 OPIUM

Another somewhat indefinite situation exists with
reference to the former German territories administered
under Mandates. The “A” and “ B” Mandates, cover-
ing respectively Syria and the Lebanon and Palestine,
and the Cameroons, Togoland, Tanganyika Territory and
Ruanda-Urundi in Africa would seem to be protected by
provisions and action taken under them specifically
mentioning and applying past and future conventions
on the subject of the traffic in drugs. But the “C”
Mandates, covering South-West Africa, New Guinea,
Western Samoa, Nauru and the Pacific Islands north of
the Equator, contain no relevant provisions. The local
authorities have, however, issued proclamations specific
in varying degrees, generally aimed at the prohibition or
control of narcotics. The regulation in British Togoland
would seem to permit the importation of any patent or
proprietary narcotic ‘‘ medicine,’ regardless of its in-
gredients. In South-West Africa there appear to be no
special regulations on the subject. In New Guinea,
complete prohibition applies alike to liquor, opium and
firearms. The Japanese in the South Sea Islands forth-
with established complete prohibition. It would appear
that except for smuggling of ‘‘ prepared”’ opium for
smoking by the Chinese, the evil in most of these colonies
is not opium derivatives or cocaine, but the products of

>

Indian hemp, hasheesh and “ bhang.’’ The question of
reasonably uniform regulations, and uniform responsi-
bility, in all the mandated territories is a matter to which
the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations
might well devote some definite attention, not alone for
the sake of the natives, but because those territories
offer special opportunities as bases for the smuggling
trade,HISTORY OF OPIUM 21

The Covenant of the League of Nations entrusted to
the League the duty of acting generally as a channel of
communication among the nations and supervising the
execution of agreements such as the Hague Convention,
which previously had imposed this duty, so far as that
particular agreement was concerned, upon the govern-
ment of the Netherlands. Beside which, Holland asked
to be relieved of the duty.

3y virtue of this, the First Assembly, in December,
1920, empowered the Council to take the matter in hand.
Nobody seems to have had any clear idea as to what
should be done, much less any forebodings about the
troubles involved in the responsibility thus “ wished ”’
upon the League of Nations by the perplexed and weary
members of the Peace Conference.

The Council proceeded forthwith to constitute an
‘‘ Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other
Dangerous Drugs.”’ That Committee has been active ever
since, assisted by an extremely well-informed, vigilant and
competent ‘‘ Opium Section” in the division of the League
Secretariat devoted to social and humanitarian matters.

At first the ‘‘ Opium Advisory Committee,” as it is
usually called, represented only Great Britain, France,
Holland, Japan, Portugal, India, China and Siam—all
members of the League and located or having possessions
in the Far East. Later were added representatives of
Germany and Jugo-Slavia, and the United States sent a
delegation to serve in a “ consultative > capacity. In
1925, after the Geneva opium conferences, Bolivia was
invited to name a member, in view no doubt of her interest
in the production of the coca-leaf, raw, material of cocaine.

In addition, the Committee has had as “ assessors ”
(persons regarded as peculiarly familiar with the problem)22 OPIUM

Sir John Jordan, for fifty years identified with the British
diplomatic service in the Far East and fifteen years
British Minister at Peking; Mrs. Hamilton Wright,
widow and successor in devoted, enthusiastic and self-
sacrificing service in this cause of Dr. Hamilton Wright,
the valiant American pioneer warrior against opium, and
M. Henri Brenier of the French Customs Service, long in
Indo-China, chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Hague Opium Conference of 1912, and particularly well-
informed with regard to all phases of the narcotic problem.

Naturally, the nations nominated for the Opium
Advisory Committee would, and did, select for its per-
sonnel persons presumed by their experience to be especi-
ally well-informed upon the subject. Certain leading
members of this Committee have been so influential in
its work, and probably will be so influential in the future,
as they were in the two conferences at Geneva, that it
is worth while to know them.

Outstanding among them is Sir Malcolm Delevingne,
Assistant Under-Secretary for Home Affairs in the
British Government, and unquestionably dominating in
its policy on this subject. He has earned a conspicuous
place in the warfare against narcotics in Great Britain
by a brave, impartial and dogged enforcement of the
British Dangerous Drugs Act of 1920 (passed in com-
pliance with the obligations recognized under the Hague
Convention brought into force in that year under the
peace treaties.) He has made himself highly obnoxious
to the traffickers in narcotics. Sir Malcolm never has
been in the Far East, and while he is familiar with every
phase of the opium policy of Great Britain, his special
interest is in drugs and the prevention of their abuse in
and smuggling into his homeland. Like others of hisHISTORY OF OPIUM

countrymen, he regards the question of opium production
and consumption in India as an internal affair of that
Government, and opium-smoking as a separate, more or
less subordinate, and possibly insoluble problem of the
Far East. He was in large degree responsible for making
the “ prepared’ opium devoted exclusively to that use,
the subject of a separate conference. While his sincerity,
devotion and constructive attitude in the warfare against
narcotics are above suspicion, he is plainly not oblivious
to the fact that Great Britain has an important export
trade therein, and has a lawful right to conserve it while
at the same time protecting itself against the nefarious
product of other countries. To him the primary desidera-
tum in any event is to suppress the illicit traffic in drugs.

Searcely less conspicuous and influential in the Ad-
visory Committee has been Mr. John Campbell,' long an
outstanding factotum of the India Government's opium
policy, particularly active in its propaganda in defence of
that policy. He was for nearly thirty years in the Indian
Civil Service in various capacities, including those of
the Municipal Board of Cawnpore and local magistrate.
He is now retired therefrom. His is not a diplomatic
temperament ; his manner and attitude—whatever the
merits of his contentions—almost invariably enraged his
opponents, particularly the Americans and the Chinese,
and agreement between him and them on any subject
has been exceedingly rare. After the mid-winter recess
of the Geneva Conferences—he was a member for India
in both—he was for some reason not announced” with-
drawn from both, and returned to his post in Greece as a
member of the League of Nations Commission assisting
in the repatriation of the Greeks from Turkey.

1 Now Sir John Campbell—knighted in June, 1925.24

 

OPIUM

    

W. G. Van Wettum, who was President of the first

conference at Geneva, was a member for the Netherlands

in the Hague Conference of 1912.

His experience with

the opium business has been extensive ; he was for many

years Inspector of the Dutch opium monopoly in Java.

He is of a highly conservative temperament, responding

negatively to the urgency of reformers and idealists and

very positively to any Dutch commercial interest ; the

vigilant sentinel against encroachment either upon the

drug manufactures and exports of Holland or the flourish-

ing business of exporting coca-leaves from the Dutch

possessions in Java.

G. Bourgois, second and most active delegate for France

in both Geneva conferences, was at the Hague for France

in 1912, and has been from the outset extremely influential
in the Advisory Committee. He is attached to the French
Foreign Office, but was for many years identified with
the French interests in the Far East, in Japan and

Indo-China.

His Excellency A. M. Bartholomeu Ferreira, Portuguese
Minister at Berne, also was at the Hague in 1912. He is
very much alive to the fact that the Government of
Macao, Portugal’s tiny colony across the harbour from
Hong Kong and at the doorway to Canton, supports itself
by the revenue from opium, gambling and other vices.
Is not Macao “the Monte Carlo of the Far East”? If
he had lacked anything in appreciation of these points,
he was supported in both conferences by the presence of
Dr. Rodrigo Rodriguez, the Governor of Macao.

All of these men—I purposely omit, as occupying other
points of view, and less experienced, the representatives
of the other nations on the Advisory Committee—are

extremely well posted about the opium situation, especi-HISTORY OF OPIUM 25
ally in the Far East, and are at the same time (I am not
imputing necessarily any improper motives, personal or
official, to any of them) vigilant in their watchfulness of
the business and political interests of their respective
nations. More than that, it must always be remembered
that each, whatever his personal opinions, is sharply
circumscribed by instructions from his government.
Without endorsing Mr. Porter’s blunt and _ tactless
characterization of this group in the second conference

93

as “the Opium Bloc,” one may without great injustice
regard as on the whole not inappropriate the description
of them by someone during the first conference as “‘ the
bodyguard of the status quo.”

Of the American participants in the work of the
Advisory Committee, Stephen G. Porter of Pittsburgh
is Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives. He has come to something
of the crusader’s state of mind on the subject of opium ;
but evidently the emphasis of his interest is upon the
production of the raw material and the failure of the
European nations to accept responsibility for their
subjects in the Far East in the same degree as for those
in their homelands ; upon the necessity of the abandon-
ment of these things as a source of revenue, and upon
the important part which attitude on this subject plays
and still more will play in the relations between the
Western and the Oriental peoples. The defects in Mr.
Porter’s attitude in this affair in my judgment have been
of two kinds: first, a congenital absence of personal
tact and imagination in dealing with European psy-
chology ; and second, a failure to realize that in inter-
national relations it is impossible to accomplish more
than the minimum represented by the least common26 OPIUM

denominator. An international conference is not a politi-
cal convention in which majority rules; no sovereign
nation can be forced to accept the judgment of a roll-call.

Bishop Brent made his acquaintance with opium
during his many years of missionary service in the
Philippines, beginning in 1901. As we have seen, it is
largely due to his initiative that we owe the enlistment of
the United States in the international war against opium.
He has represented the United States in all of its partici-
pation therein. He was President of the International
Opium Commission at Shanghai in 1909, a delegate to the
Hague Conference in 1912, and to the second Geneva
conference in 1924. His point of view is, and doubtless
will continue to be, missionary, and vocal with idealistic
zeal at every stage. He is the uncompromising enemy
of compromise. To him this question is a moral question ;
he is scornful toward every suggestion of expediency.

Dr. Rupert Blue, formerly Surgeon-General of the United
States, is primarily a sanitarian. His interest in this
subject is that of a medical man who has had personal
experience with the victims of drug addiction. In every
angle of it his attitude is that of a destroyer @ outrance.

Very much the same is the attitude of the other
Americans associated with the Committee: Mrs. Wright
and Edwin L. Neville, the latter probably the best-
informed technically, who recently has become secretary
of the United States legation at Tokio.

Whatever the peculiarities and limitations of its per-
sonnel, the value of the work of the Advisory Committee
thus far hardly can be exaggerated. If nothing else, it
has disclosed the appallingly complex and difficult nature
of the task before the world. But it has done much else.
Already it has brought about, with the co-operation ofHISTORY OF OPIUM 27

other organs of the League of Nations Secretariat and
with the approval of the Council, certain concrete, even if
inadequate, steps in the direction of control of the nar-
cotic traffic, by means of a system of licences, import
certificates and other details of customs procedure.
Especially it has originated the first attempt to ascertain
the world’s requirements in opium and drugs. To it will
be owing—if and when actually established—the system
of exchange of information through the proposed Per-
manent Central Board (of which more later), regarding
each nation’s legitimate needs of raw material and drugs,
as a basis for co-operative control of production and ex-
port. Furthermore, by almost continuous public dis-
cussion it has clarified and organized a body of information

from almost every angle of approach.

It might be argued that the League of Nations could
have gone much farther than it did under the action of
the First Assembly. It might perhaps have established
forthwith such a Central Board as is now provided for in
the new drug convention adopted at Geneva in February,
1925. It might have given such, or greater, powers to
the Advisory Committee. But that would have been
going too fast, as witness the vicissitudes of the 1924
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes! We have still far to go before the nations will forget
their imaginary political and business interests in these
matters. Anyway, let us look at the facts as they stand.

In May, 1923, the Opium Advisory Committee received
from its American delegation, and adopted as its own28 OPIUM

(with the reservations described below), the following
declaration as to the intent and spirit of the Hague
Convention :

1. If the purpose of the Hague Convention is to be
achieved according to its spirit and true intent, it must
be recognized that the use of opium products for other than
medical and scientific purposes is an abuse and not
legitimate.}

2. In order to prevent the abuse of these products it
is necessary to exercise the control of the production of
raw opium in such a manner that there will be no surplus
avatlable for non-medical and non-scientific purposes.

In adopting this declaration, all of the nations repre-
sented, except China and India, made reservations
virtually excepting from it the smoking of opium in the
Far East. The United States delegation, however, de-
clared that it interpreted this reservation as merely a
reaffirmation of Chapter II of the Hague Convention,
which in effect recognizes that the practice in those regions
can be suppressed only “ gradually.”

The delegate for India (Mr. John Campbell) made for
that Government a more significant reservation, having
reference to the Indian habit of eating opium. He recorded
the proviso that :

The use of raw opium, according to the established

practice in India, and its production for such use, are
not illegitimate under the Convention.

Concerning this reservation the American delegation
made no official comment.

The report of the Opium Advisory Committee came
before the Assembly of the League of Nations in Septem-

1 The italics are mine.—J. P. G.HISTORY OF OPIUM 29

ber, 1923, and was discussed in detail by the Fifth Com-
mittee of that body. Upon that Committee’s recom-
mendation the Assembly adopted a series of resolutions,
the effect of which in general was to adopt the report
and recommendations of the Opium Advisory Committee
and to direct the Council of the League to provide for two
International Conferences :

The first to seck measures to effectuate the provisions
of Chapter II of the Hague Convention—dealing with
the subject of the use of ‘‘ prepared ’’ opium in those Far
Eastern countries and possessions where opium smoking
is still ‘“‘ temporarily ’’ lawful under that chapter, and
further to assist China in suppressing the illegal production
of opium.

The second to endeavour to find agreement as to the
limitation of the manufacture of the dangerous drugs, and
of the production for export and likewise the import, of
‘‘raw ” opium and the coca-leaf for such manufacture—
“as a means of giving effect to the principles submitted
by the representatives of the Untled States of America, and
to the policy which the League, on the re commendation of

the Advisory Commitice, has adopted.”

In accordance with these resolutions, the Council
called the two Conferences, which were held at Geneva
in immediate succession, beginning respectively on the
3rd and 17th of November, 1924.CHAPTER III
SOME BASIC FACTORS

OR anything like a clear understanding of “Opium”

it is essential to have in the mental background,
not only the historical essentials summarized in the
preceding chapter, but certain facts and details of a
somewhat special character, each presenting a problem
in itself, but all inextricably interwoven. One must know
to begin with, in at least a general way, something of
the various narcotic substances which we have chosen to
group under the generic title ‘‘ Opium,” although not
all of them are derived from the opium-poppy. One
must know something of the part that revenue and its
attendant political phenomena play in augmenting the
difficulty of the situation. One must have some idea of
the conditions in India and China which are and always
have been major factors in this tangled business.

I. Of Opium itself—three distinct phases :

(1) Raw Opium—primary product of the poppy-plant—
papaver somniferum L. The spontaneously-coagulated
juice or gum obtained by slitting or lancing the unripe
seed-pods or capsules at the base of the blossom, and
subjected to but the simplest manipulation—blending
and wrapping in several thicknesses of the dried petals,
in balls of the size of two fists, to prepare it for packing
and transport.

Poppies will grow almost anywhere, but commercially
profitable cultivation requires not only favourable soil and
30BASIC FACTORS 31

 

climate, but especially cheap labour, because slitting the
pods and gathering the exuded sap, while not laborious,
are time-consuming processes performed entirely by hand
and requiring little intelligence or skill. Poppies are
grown for opium upon a considerable scale in Persia,
Turkey,! India and China ; toa lesser extent in Turkestan,
Afghanistan, Siberia, Serbia, Macedonia, - 3ulgaria, Greece
and Egypt; with negligible production in Siam, Chosen
(Korea), Indo-China and a few other regions.

“Raw ” opium is the ordinary “ opium ” of commerce,
and as such is exported from the producing countries.
From this primary material are made both the “ pre-
pared” opium used only for smoking, and the drug-
derivatives, medicinal opium, morphine, heroin and
codein. “ Raw” opium is the subject of Chapter I of
the Hague Convention of 1912. Furthermore, it is “ raw ge
opium which, simply rolled into pellets, is eaten, or,
dissolved in liquid, is drunk, by an overwhelming pro-
portion of the people, and commonly given to the infants,
of India. This practice must be carefully distinguished
from that of the smoking of opium.

(2) Prepared Opium, used exclusively for smoking, is
the ‘“‘raw ” opium, subjected to relatively simple pro-
cesses of cooking and fermentation to fit it for that use
only. It is of the consistency of thick molasses (treacle)
or glue.

Opium smoking is to a great extent the vice of the
Chinese, in China and elsewhere, especially in the Far
East ; but it is practised to some extent in Persia, Turkey,

1 It must be remembered that the poppy is used for purposes other
than opium. In Turkey, for example, where opium-smoking is not
prevalent, the oil from the seed is used by the peasants in lamps, and

also for food and butter, and for soap. In other countries it is used

like olive-oil, for cooking.32 OPIUM

Burma and other countries by other than Chinese, and
by a small proportion of degenerate white persons all
over the world who can manage to get hold of the neces-
sary “prepared” opium. Opium is not smoked to any
considerable extent in India except in Burma, and even
there almost exclusively by Chinese. “ Prepared ” opium
is the subject of Chapter II of the Hague Convention,
and to it exclusively was devoted the so-called “‘ First

?

Opium Conference” at Geneva in 1924-5, immediately

ce

in advance of the “ Second,” which was devoted chiefly
to the subject of drugs. The withdrawal of the American
delegation was due especially to their failure to induce
the Second Conference to take up the subject of ‘‘ pre-
pared’ opium, in view of their dissatisfaction with the
results of the First, in which the United States did not
participate.

(3) Opium Derivatives—Drugs. This may be taken
to mean medicinal opium, tincture, powder, laudanum,
etc. ; morphine, the principal alkaloid of opium ; heroin,
the trade name of diacetylmorphine, made from mor-
phine. Codein, also made from morphine, while a
narcotic poison, is not at present generally regarded as
habit-forming, and was not included within the re-
strictions of either the Hague Convention or the Con-
vention adopted by the Second Geneva Conference.
Nevertheless from codein may be derived two as yet
little-known habit-forming drugs, eucodal and dicodid.

All of these substances differ really from opium, either
“raw ” or “ prepared ”’ only in that they are the concen-
trated morphia essence of the poppy. Morphia is morphia,
in all of them, but the percentage of morphia is of course
very much higher in the drugs than in the simpler forms
of opium.BASIC FACTORS
II. Of Cocaine :

Cocaine is not derived from the poppy-plant, or from
opium at all, but from the leaves of the coca-shrub,
Erythroxylon, of various species, growing wild or culti-
vated, or both, in various parts of the world; notably
in Peru and Bolivia where they seem to have originated,
and in Dutch Java, to which they were transplanted.

There is also, and increasingly, synthelic cocaine, made
artificially, which may or may not be commercially
profitable as a substitute, and may or may not prove as
habit-forming as the product of the natural leaves.

The South American Indians, in their native Cordil-
leras and in the labour gangs of Chile, Argentine and
elsewhere in South America, chew the leaves, green or
dried, solely because of their intoxicating “‘ virtues,” as
their fathers have done from the remotest times ; and the
dried leaves are sold more or less surreptitiously for their
narcotic effects in other parts of the world. But the
manufacture of the alkaloid (drug) cocaine requires an
elaborate chemical process, carried on in the pharma-
ceutical laboratories of Europe, America and Japan.
Generally speaking, only the coca-leaves, or at most the
primary extract therefrom, are exported from the

countries which grow the shrub.

Ill. Of Indian Hemp:

Under various names—hasheesh, esrar, chiras, djamba,
bhang, etc.—the products of Cannabis sativa L. are used
as narcotics. They are made from a resin or gum derived
from the flowering or fruiting tops of the pistillate
(female) plant.

The final protocol of the Hague Convention of 1912
suggested the desirability of attention to Indian Hemp,
implying the probability that internal legislation and
international agreement on the subject would become

D34 OPIUM

necessary. Turkey and Egypt both raised the question
in the Second Conference at Geneva, and appealed
successfully to have the narcotic products of hemp covered
by the new Convention. Any suppression or restriction
of cultivation of the hemp plant is complicated, however,
by the fact that the tough fibres of its stalk are used for
various purposes, including the making of rope and twine.

All these substances are characterized by the effects—
not merely narcotic, but habit-forming and physically and
mentally destructive—concerning which, with reference
especially to opium and cocaine, the London Times of
April 7, 1923, aptly said :

In all countries with European civilization, there are no
two opinions as to the physical and moral ruin wrought by
the consumption of these so-called ‘‘ drugs of addiction.”

There is, of course, a legitimate use for narcotic drugs
—although the word “ legitimate,” as used in the Hague
Convention and other documents and utterances in con-
nection with this question, has been severely stretched,
so as to cover, for instance, the ancient and widespread
practice in India of eating and drinking “raw” opium,
and the “temporarily permitted” smoking of ‘“ pre-
pared”’ opium in other Oriental countries. One may
observe at all the critical points what Mr. Roosevelt used
to call “ weasel words” and phrases, sucking the virility
out of otherwise definite pledges and prohibitions. The
present writer’s use of the word “‘ legitimate ” means the
uses of bona fide medicine and bona fide scientific ex-
perimentation. Any use not medical or scientific means
addiction in some degree. In this restricted sense, the
“ legitimate ” use is diminishing, because increasingly the
medical profession doubts its wisdom and dreads its after-

effects, and is diligently searching for anesthetics andBASIC FACTORS 35

anodynes of other sorts, natural and synthetic. No
argument is really necessary to enforce that point, or to
support the statement that outside of that use, nobody
has any business with opium, codein, cocaine—much less
with heroin and the hemp-preparations (particularly the
latter), which reputable medicine has repudiated as having
no medical value commensurate with the harm they do.
And as for the hypodermic syringe or needle—the mere
possession of it by a layman is prima facie evidence of
addiction.

Not until recently has there been available any authorit-
ative or even approximate estimate of the amounts of
raw opium and cocaine required for the medical and
scientific needs of the world. This is a question which has
perplexed those interested in the subject of narcotics from
any point of view. The Health Committee of the League
of Nations, the Opium Advisory Committee, a mixed sub-
committee representing both of these, and the Commission
of Experts (“Committee F’’) of the Second Geneva
Conference, all have discussed and worked over it. Finally
there emerged from the discussion the following figures,
which may be accepted as representing generously the
amount of raw opium and crude cocaine! needed per

1 In estimating the drug-equivalent of a certain quantity of raw
opium, it is useful to refer to the figures prepared by Prof. Knaffl-Lenz,
late of the Secretariat of the League of Nations. (They are to be found
in the League Document ODC 1 (1), dated Geneva, July 22, 1924;
Part II, page 51.) From his tables it appears that of raw opium con-
taining 10 per cent of Morphia it requires :

1 unit to make 10 units of medicinal opium (tincture or powder).
7:8 units to make 1 unit of salts of heroin.
8-8 units to make 1 unit of heroin.

10-0 units to make 1 unit of morphine or codein.
*83 units of morphine to make 1 unit of heroin.
As for cocaine: the coca-leaf on the average affords from 1 to 2 per

cent of crude cocaine, which in turn works into 85 per cent and upwards
of the finished drug.36 OPIUM
capita per annum for these uses by the population of the
world within reach of modern medical service :

Of raw opium, 450 milligrams (about 7 grains).

Of cocaine, 7 milligrams (about -11 of a grain).
> oO o

Of the allowance of 450 milligrams of raw opium the
practical distribution for manufacture into drugs would

be in milligrams approximately as follows :

134 mgms. to produce 134 mgms. medicinal opium.

183 es - 18:3. ,, morphine.
113 = * LI:3.. 3... \cOdesn.
20 A ig ZO heron:

Of the 1,747,000,000 estimated total population of the
world, it was reckoned that 744,000,000 could be taken as
the figure for the total population represented in the phrase
‘“‘ medical and scientific needs.” Resorting to this figure,

we find these world-needs working out in tons about as

 

follows :
For medicinalopium . : 100 tons.
,, morphine ; Z . (ESTOS oy
~. codein, . 3 : : Sar.
heroin . : ; : tar,
» wLOLAL NEEDS, . : Sa0:

Add to this an allowance of, say, 70 milligrams per
capita for such small proportion of the natives of Asia and
Africa as somehow might manage to get access to Western-
trained doctors—call it 57,000,000—and you will get an
additional four tons. Total, 340 tons.

Let us be more generous still, and allow the 70 milli-
grams per head for all of the natives—say, 950,000 ,000—
as if they could reach the doctors. Instead of 4 tons, that
would make it not quite 67, and make the world-total a
bit over 400 tons—403, to be exact.BASIC FACTORS 37

If you consider this too narrow, a counsel of perfection,
let us go to the limit, and shovel in the full 450 milligrams
per year for every man, woman and child in the world.
That will give us as the total conceivable medical and
scientific needs of the whole world, 786 tons of raw opium
per year.

Nobody really knows how much raw opium—still less
how much coca-leaf—is produced in the world. But the
various kinds of estimates, produced by those with
motives whether to exaggerate or to minimize the pro-
duction, and by those whose aim is only to know the
truth, come out at last to a probable total world production
(including 5,000 tons attributed to China) of about 8,600
tons—more than ten times what we have seen to be the outside
possible legitimate needs of the world. This 8,600 tons is
more than twice as much as the total of figures compiled
in 1923 by the Opium Section of the League of Nations
Secretariat for the year 1922. The British delegation at
the Second Conference—having certainly no motive for
understating the production—utilized this computation

—in pounds (avoirdupois) :

Country. 1922.
Kurope :

Bulgaria . 22,000 Ibs.

Greece . ; : : 50,000 ,,

Jugo-Slavia . ‘ : : : ZODOUU) ag

Near East and Egypt :

Mipyit oe ae ee ee 5,000 ,,
Turkey . ; : ~ 650/000! ;,
Middle East :

Persia 540,000Country. 1922.

East and Far East :

Afghanistan ; E : , 25,900 ibs.
Chinese and Russian Turkistan . ; 44,000 ,,
China. : ‘ : ; . 4,400,000 ,,
India (including Burma) . : . £904:000 =
Indo-China : : : ; 5 10,400 ,,
Japan (including Korea and Formosa) . 11,0060. 43
Siam ; : . ‘ ; : 15.400.
Total Production : : ; .  1,962°5700"..

Roughly, about 4,000 tons. Showing upon its face the
absurdity of the widely circulated allegation that China
alone is producing 15,000 tons. This tabulation charges
her for 1922 with only a bit over 2,000. But of China later.

The figures for “legitimate use” are subject to dis-
count, because much depends upon the percentage of
morphia in the opium, and upon whether it is used in the
“raw’’ state, as ‘‘ prepared”? opium for smoking, or
manufactured into morphine and thence into codein or
heroin. It is deceptive, too, to compare the tonnage of
Macedonia, Persia or Turkey with that of India or China,
because you never can be quite sure whether it is estimated
“as is” or in terms of 10 per cent morphia-content.
The percentage of morphia in the opium produced in these
countries respectively differs substantially :

China : : ‘ 7 to 74
India i : ‘ 9.5: 10
Turkey : 5 i li, 2s
Persia ‘ d ; 12. ,, 12%
Macedonia . ‘ ; Leeae

The difference depends principally upon the process
of production. The first “‘ lancing ’’ of the poppy gives the
highest percentage of morphia ; every lancing after thatBASIC FACTORS 39

—assuming that the gross product is blended, as usually
it is—lowers the average. The practice in Macedonia
ordinarily is to lance only once, which gives small bulk
but a very high morphia-content and consequently a
high price. The greedy Chinese squeeze the poppy to the
last drop, and their opium is the lowest thing in the market.
So a ton of Chinese opium obviously may bea very different
thing from a ton of Macedonian, containing more than
twice as much potential deviltry. But in the long run
the essential thing is the “‘ kick”’ in the morphia, which
is—morphia, whether the poppy from which it came grew
in Gwalior or Semiryetchensk, in Yunnan or Persia.

Cocaine, . . . that brings us to the harmless-looking
leaves of the shrubs ZLrythroxylon (the coca-shrub) of
various species from which cocaine may be derived.
They grow in the Cordilleras of Bolivia and Peru in South
America, in Dutch Java, in British Nigeria, and doubtless
in other parts where they have as yet escaped the com-
mercial and narcotic-seeking eye of man.

The delegate from Bolivia on November 27, 1924, made
to the Second Opium Conference a long statement, in
which he sought to give the impression that the habitual
chewing of the coca-leaf universal among the Indians
of the High Sierras of Bolivia,—to the extent of * hundreds
of kilograms ” in the lifetime of the average Indian—was
not only innocuous but even beneficial. Perhaps there is
something peculiar about the climate of Bolivia, or the
physical diathesis of the Bolivian Indian in this respect.
One speculates: for it so happens that the Government

of Peru, Bolivia’s northerly neighbour, had already filed
with the League of Nations a report of its Ministry of40 OPIUM

Commerce, dated Lima, July 12, 1924, on its coca-leaf
exports, in the course of which was described minutely
the manner in which the Peruvian Indians prepared the
coca-leaf for eating, with the remark :

“This is their manner of indulging the terrible cocaine
craving !”

Unfortunately, there was no Peruvian representative
present in the Conference. A Peruvian delegate was
appointed and expected: he was heard from, but he never
hove in sight to compose this conflict of testimony ; so
the Second Conference swallowed without a gulp the
3olivian’s version of the matter. One who has his doubts
has to fall back on other authority ; such as that of Dr.
W. E. Dixon, of the Medical Department of Cambridge
University, formerly Professor of Materia Medica and
Pharmacology in King’s College, London, who in a paper
read October 24, 1924,1 before the Society for the Study
of Inebriety, quoted T'schudy as recognizing the inveterate
coca-chewer “by his uncertain walk; he is apathetic,
his eyes are sunken and surrounded by a purple areola ;
his lips show a tremor, his teeth are green and encrusted
and his breath fetid.”

However, no doubt it is premature to excite ourselves
about the Indians of the Cordilleras. According to the
Bolivian delegate, Bolivia neither makes nor uses cocaine,
and its export of coca-leaves goes mainly to Argentina
(85 per cent) and Chile (15 per cent). During the past four
years, he stated, about 1,500 tons had been exported, of
which Germany got about 2 tons, and Great Britain a
negligible quantity.

From the Peruvian official statement it appears that
a total of about 765 tons of coca-leaf were exported during

* See British Journal of Inebriety, January, 1925.BASIC FACTORS 41

1920, 1921 and 1922, to the United States, Great Britain
and Chile ; together with about 24 tons of raw cocaine—
‘imported from abroad ”’ ; the statement does not define
‘‘ abroad.”? The Peruvian coca-leaf is described as con-
taining about 1 per cent of crude cocaine, which in turn
gives 85-90 per cent of pure cocaine.

The figures from Bolivia and Peru by no means account
for the staggering amount of cocaine afloat in the world.
It is all made from coca-leaves. From what source ?

The bulk of the raw material comes from Java. Mr.
Van Wettum, the Netherlands delegate, objected to any
proposal in the direction of controlling the production of
coca-leaves, because, he said, the shrub not only grows
wild in Java, but is used by the farmers there for “ living
hedges.”” Nobody in Java ever chewed the leaves, and
they were not used for the manufacture of cocaine in
Java. A statement of ‘‘ The Opium Policy in the Nether-

5

lands Indies ” circulated at Geneva, said :

Thus far, it has not been used for the manufacture of
cocaine in the country itself ; the whole crop being ex-
ported in the shape of leaves. The manufacture of
cocaine is not excluded, but is subject to a special licence,
a strict supervision being, however, guaranteed.

A factory at Sokaboemie in Java has made a so-called
“ coca extract ” from the leaves, which has been exported
to some extent; but Mr. Van Wettum was emphatic in
conversation with me in his assertion that no cocaine or
ecgonine has been made in Java. However that be, it is
worthy of note that the Swiss drug interests at Basle
recently gained control of the Sokaboemie factory, and
the first thing they did was to apply to the Dutch authori-
ties for a licence to make cocaine! Thus far the permission

has been refused.42 OPIUM

In connection with the assertion that the coca shrub
“ grows wild” in Java, one’s tenderness towards those
“ living hedges’ is somewhat modified by the following
excerpt from the authoritative Encyclopedia of the Dutch
Indies :1

COCA—A plant from South America, cultivated there
for a long time for the narcotic properties of its leaves.
In Java this plant was imported for cultivation to extract
the alkaloid : cocaine, from the coca-leaves when its medical
value became known. The most highly-cultivated kind
of coca in Java is: Erythroxylon coca, Lam., var. S pruce-
anum Burck.

Cocaine throws its dark shadow even across the Treaty
of Versailles. I quote from “‘ Rapport sur les Travaux de
la Commission des Réparations de 1920 4 1922. Tome II
et appendices ”’ :

En exécution du paragraphe 2 de l’Annexe VI, Partie
VIIT du Traité de Versailles, le Gouvernement allemand
prend l’engagement de livrer & la Commission des
Réparations tous les produits chimiques pharmaceutiques
synthétiques et sels de quinine fabriqués en Allemagne
a partir du 1° Juillet 1920, jusqu’A concurrence de 25%
des quantités produites.

Cependant la production de cocaine et de codeine ne sera
livrée que jusqu’d concurrence de 12-5% de la production
totale de chacun de ces produtts (p. 450).”

1 Encyclopaedié van Nederlandsch-Indié, second edition, vol. I,
page 494. Martin Nighoff, Gravenhage, 1917, with supplement to 1924.
(Translation: In compliance with paragraph 2 of Annex VI,
Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles, the German Government engages
to deliver to the Reparations Commission all the synthetic chemical
pharmaceutical products and salts of quinine made in Germany, up
to 25 per cent of the quantity produced.
Furthermore, the production of cocaine and codein shall be delivered
up to 12-5 per cent of the total production of each of these products.)BASIC FACTORS 43

The United States and Great Britain renounced their
claims upon these drugs, but France, Italy, Belgium, and
Japan took theirs. What became of it ?

On January 27th, 1925, United States Federal Agent
seized in Brooklyn narcotics estimated to be worth
$450,000. At least a considerable portion of them were
in barrels masquerading as olives, from Italy. The drugs
were in bottles wrapped in cotton, and with a few olives
around the bungholes of the barrels. They came origin-
ally from Germany, and there is good reason to suspect
that they represented part of the cocaine intended for
Italy under the reparations arrangement, and somehow

   

gone astray.

I have before me as I write original issues of the Spot
Goods Reporter, published in Yokohama, Japan, and claim-
ing a circulation of over 10,000 a month “ all over Japan
and the entire Far East.’’ Its announcements and accom-
panying circulars (the latter printed in English and
Japanese) declare its purpose to be to bring together,
‘ confidentially and with the strictest discretion,” buyers
and sellers of any sort of merchandise. The issues are
devoted to lists of items of ‘‘spot goods”’ of every
imaginable kind, from steel rails to second-hand clothing
and rubber rings, wanted and offered.

The issue of October 2, 1920 (Vol. 1, Nos. 31/32) con-
tains, in the list of ‘‘ Spot Goods Offered,” the following
items :

No. 804, Code-word MAGSO, MORPHIUM HYDRO-
CHLORIDE. Offer 25/30 tbs., genuine packing at 16 oz.
WEIGHTMAN brand. Y20 per ounce, incl. duty, spot Tokio.

No. 806, Code-word MAGVY,—MORPHIUM HYDRO-

CHLORIDE. Genuine goods, following lots: 20 tins

HOFFMAN’S Cubes at 25 02, Price Y345 per tb net,OPIUM

 
    
     
  
  
   
   
   
      
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
   

15 tins smiTH’s Cubes at 10 oz. Same price. 30 tins
MERK’S Powder at 1 ib. Y325 per tb. net. Spot Yoko/
Tokio, duty paid, cash on delivery.
No. 808, Code-word MAHER,—COCAINE, crystal, offer
100 tons in 25 oz. tins. Grade N.C.F. Dutch manu-
facture. Y22 per oz., incl. duty, spot Tokio.
. No. 810, Code-word MAHTO,—COCAINE, crystal. Can
supply any amount, up to 1,000 tons. In 25 oz. tins.
BOEHRINGER'S brand. Y21 per ounce, duty paid, spot
Tokio.

Now, 100 tons of Cocaine would supply a half-grain dose
for every man, woman and child in the world—white,
yellow, brown and all the other colours known between the
two Poles; civilized and uncivilized,

 

and go half-
way round again. And “‘ up to 1,000 tons,” in the trade-
parlance of the Far East, means “ quantity unlimited ;
go as far as you like.’’!

At almost the very moment, in September, 1923, when
the Fifth Committee of the League of Nations was splitting
hairs as to whether there should be one Conference or
two, and while certain Powers having possessions in the
Far East were contriving to prevent any outside inter-
ference or unskilled tampering with the status quo as
regards the eating, drinking and smoking of opium by
their subjects, there was seized at Calcutta in one ship
the equivalent of 600,000 doses of cocaine ; in another the
equivalent of 250,000 doses. And while a part of that
cocaine was labelled as having been manufactured in J apan,
the greater part of it bore well-known marks to show that
it came from Darmstadt and Mannheim in Germany.

* Other issues of the Spot Goods Reporter, about the same time, con-
tained both requests for and offers of these drugs. It will be observed
that the brands mentioned represent respectively America, Switzerland,

| England, Holland and Germany. And all the offers represented goods
on the “ spot ” and duty paid, in Japan.

  

PU ies,BASIC FACTORS 45

The London Daily Mail recently reported the case of
a man who received a sentence of one year in jail for

illegal possession of 96,000 doses of cocaine.

The Committee of Experts of the Second Geneva Con-
ference, and behind them the Opium Advisory Committee,
the Health Committee of the League of Nations, and the
Mixed sub-committee of both, worked out the medical
and scientific needs of the world :

Of cocaine, 7 milligrams (about eleven-hundredths of a
grain) per capita per annum.

For the 744,000,000 people regarded as within reach
of modern medical service that works out to 5,208 kilo-
grams—a little more than 5 tons. But, as in the case of
raw opium, a few pages back, let us be liberal: let us
give everybody living among the whole world’s estimated
total of 1,747,000,000 people, his 7 milligrams of cocaine
a year. For that you will need a trifle over 12 tons.

Keep that in mind, and compare it with the staggering
amounts seized from time to time ; with the Spot Goods
Reporter’s offer of any amount “ up to 1,000 tons.”

Java alone in 1922 reported exports of 1,283,503
more than enough to supply the

 

kilograms of coca-leaves
12 tons of cocaine theoretically required for the whole
world, civilized and uncivilized. And Bolivia and Peru
without Java’s contribution exported leaves equivalent
to nearly the 5 tons of the rationally estimated needs.
Of cocaine proper, Germany for 1920 acknowledged export
and re-export of more than 5 tons ; France alone of nearly
3 tons. Switzerland reported no export of cocaine, but
acknowledged the manufacture of 1:2 tons in 1920 and
1:6 tons in 1921. Switzerland has less than 4,000,00046 OPIUM

population, and 7 milligrams of cocaine a year would
entitle her to only 28 kilograms; that is, 28/1000ths of
one ton. What became of the rest ? Possibly before we
have finished this study we shall have acquired material
out of which to frame at least a guess about that.

Of cocaine addiction Sir Clifford Allbutt, M.D., K.C.B.,
F'.R.S., says in his essay on “‘ Opium Poisoning and Other
Intoxications ” ;1

The slavery to Coca is worse than that to morphine ;
it is more destructive of mind and body, and harder to
put aside. The morphinist still retains some desire to
defeat his enslaver, and is filled with gratitude, at any
rate for the time, when the cure is complete. The
cocainist, on the other hand, is so reduced in intelligence
that he neither desires emancipation nor feels any thrill
of joy when released ; his brain is so benumbed that he
cares nothing for freedom. Hence the prognosis of cocain-
ism is worse, even when skilfully handled,

Whatever part for good or ill the coca-leaf as such may
play in the uplifting and inspiration of the South American
Indians ; with whatever esthetic complacency we may
contemplate it in the “living hedges” of Java: it be-
comes a very different and sinister thing in the hands
of the pharmaceutical chemist. The discoveries and
technique of civilization have transmuted it into acommon
enemy, whose medical utility on even the smallest scale is
under increasing suspicion. The coca-leaf, like so many
other of the gifts of God, becomes in civilized hands a
poison which can almost beyond cure turn a man into a
beast.

It is from that point of view that the coca-leaf must
hereafter be seen, and dealt with accordingly.

{ * In A System of Medicine, by Many Writers, Macmillan, London,
1908.BASIC FACTORS 47

A more or less plausible defence may perhaps be made
for the practices of India with respect to the eating of
opium and even to the feeding of it to the Indian babes-
in-arms ; or for the smoking of opium by the Chinese.
These are time-honoured customs imbedded in ancient
habit, and requiring for eradication a long and laborious
process of education. Perhaps their evil effects may he
said even to be exaggerated by prohibitionist and mis-
sionary zeal. But no such defence can be offered for
addiction there or elsewhere to the manufactured drugs.

Naturally, the point of view from which any nation
will see this whole subject will depend somewhat upon its
own relation to and interest in one or more of the several
aspects in which it may present itself. At least theoretic-
ally there are three groups of countries. Their differing
postures were vividly evident in the Opium Conferences,
as they have been for thirteen years and more with
reference to the Hague Convention :

Producing Countries—those which cultivate the poppy-
plant or the coca-shrub and export raw or prepared opium,
coca-leaves or their extract, ecgonine, from which cocaine
is made. Also those from which come the products of the
Indian hemp.

Manufacturing Countries—those which import the raw
materials, raw opium, coca-leaf or ecgonine, and manu-
facture in their various forms the derivative drugs for
their domestic uses and export. These are especially
Germany, Switzerland, Great Britain, Holland, United
States, France, Japan.

Consuming Countries—those which neither produce
raw materials nor manufacture drugs, but have to import
such as they need, or say they need. They include those
regions of the Far East which produce either none orOPIUM

insufficiently of the raw opium, and have to import it
and make it into the “‘ prepared ” for the smoking which
is still “‘ temporarily ” permitted in their territories.

6

The term “consuming” is becoming less and less a
distinctive one, because while opium-smoking is still
largely confined to the Chinese, and opium-eating is the
exclusive privilege of India, the addiction to the manu-
factured drugs is spreading rapidly throughout practically
all parts of the world. In that respect virtually every
nation has become a “ consuming country.”

Long ago were published warnings, including one by
Dr. Holmes in his ‘‘ Opium” article in the Encyclopedia
Britannica, that manufactured morphine would supplant
both “raw” and “ prepared” opium in the Far East,
including India, and would prove a far more serious evil.
At that time heroin had not been discovered—to be de-
nounced within a few months by its discoverer and then
to go on and gain its present criminal reputation as a drug
of no medicinal value to offset its merciless quality as an
incurably habit-forming, soul-destroying agency. And
cocaine, then regarded not only as a valuable and innocu-
ous local anesthetic but even as a remedy for morphinism,
had not yet begun to figure in its present réle of more
dangerous as well as more powerful supplanter of mor-
phine for addiction. Time has more than justified these
forebodings.

With all respect for contrary opinion, I believe that
there should not have been two conferences. The
subject of “Opium,” of drug addiction, is not separable
any more, if ever it was. The growing of the poppy and
the production of “ raw ” and “ prepared ” opium ; theBASIC FACTORS 49

cultivation of coca-leaves and the making of ecgonine and
raw cocaine ; the gathering from the hemp blossom of the
poison-bearing resin, have alike one purpose. The dis-
tinction between one kind of opium and another, Chinese,
Indian, Persian, Turkish, Macedonian or whatnot else,
is only that of the quantity of intoxicating morphia that
can be gotten from each. Cocaine and hemp are only other
means of producing an intoxication similar, even if more
insidious and less curable. The ‘‘ raw’ and “ prepared ”’
opium, eaten and drunk, or smoked, as the case may be,
in Oriental countries and made by their governments
the source of great revenue (despite smuggling in and out),
is essentially the same stuff that is used by the “‘ civilized ”’
Western nations for the manufacture of morphine and
heroin, only a very little of which comes at last to any
better use. The problem, however intricate and difficult,
is one problem, not two. It all hangs together and must
be treated as a whole.

In treating it as a whole, the conscience and intelligence
of the world will have to recognize and deal with first,
the outstanding fact that there is now being produced of
this stuff, more—probably very much more—than ten times
as much as the world uses or can use for any purpose except
addiction.

That means inexorably that somewhere there is or must
be found, or made, a market for it. A constant supply
of new consumers. Nobody raises poppies on a great
scale, or cultivates the coca-shrub—even in “living
hedges ’’—out of mere perversity or simply as a contribu-
tion to the landscape. Nobody manufactures narcotic
drugs in order to have a large collection of them. Beyond
the exceedingly small amount required for the uses of
medicine, every ounce, every grain, of this enormous
E50 OPIUM

production has its destination in the person of an addict,
actual or prospective. Finding or making a market,
whether among the reckless and ill-instructed youth of

America and Europe, or among the unsuspecting folk of

half-civilized or savage lands, ever ready to take on the
“superior”? white man’s vices—at the white man’s
price !—means and can mean nothing but the entrapping
of new addicts, who, once enmeshed, will be sure-fire

customers.CHAPTER IV
REVENUE THAT COSTS TOO MUCH

NY government that could be indifferent to the
existence of colonial revenue of upward of $50,000,000
a year, which if abandoned must be somehow replaced,
would be a fit subject for a Commission de lunatico in-
quirendo. So, when representatives of Great Britain, or
any other of the governments which derive revenue for
their support from the drugging of their subject peoples
in the Far East profess, as indeed they all do—and did
in both of the Geneva Conferences—that they are neither
moved nor hampered by financial considerations, anyone
with a sense of humour must suspect Pickwickian reserva-
tions. Probably we are justified in not taking that parti-
cular protestation over-seriously. Indeed, bare candour
compels recognition of the fact that in this exceedingly
perplexing problem the question of abandoning and
replacing an established source of revenue, in some cases
furnishing at least half of the support of government, is
one of the most obdurate factors.

The record of Great Britain’s writhings of conscience
about opium discloses this aspect of the subject as con-
stantly in the forefront of discussion. As recently as 1923,
a special commission, headed by Lord Inchcape, investi-
gating the Indian finances, said of the opium revenue:

Having reviewed the expenditure under the opium
head we recommend that the possibility of reducing the

51OPIUM

price paid to cultivators for opium be carefully watched
with a view to reduction. We are informed that there will
be a reduction of about 20 lakhs! in expenditure in 1923-24,
and, in view of theimportance of safeguarding this important
source of revenue, we recommend no further reduction.

As we shall see presently, in the chapter on the Indian
aspects of this question, the Indian Opium Department,
at a time not long before this, was urging an increase in
the price paid to cultivators, in order to induce them to
increase their poppy acreage and thus offset inroads upon
the revenue by wheat—“‘ the competing crop.”

The British Imperial Government does not receive any
of the opium revenue of India or the Crown Colonies.
Indeed, according to Wie T. Dunn,? at Hong Kong “ the
restrictive measures successively adopted by the Govern-
ment had by 1910 curtailed the revenue to such an extent
that in that year the British Government granted £9,000
to the colony to replace the loss of revenue from opium.”
I believe it is true of France, Holland, Portugal and Japan
that all of the opium revenues go to the colonial treasuries
for the purposes of local government. Ordinarily none
of the home countries would tax themselves by so much
as a farthing, an escudo or a rin, to make up a loss in
colonial revenue. To abolish the opium revenue would
mean new taxes, which would fall not alone upon the
alien Chinese opium smokers and their more or less de-
spised providers and associates, but upon the just and
the unjust of the general population, including Europeans
who now largely escape taxation. This is hardly a pro-
pitious time in the Far East, especially India, to be adding

1 A “lakh” of rupees is now equivalent to £10,000. There are 10
rupees to the pound sterling at present.

2

* The Opium Traffic in its International Aspects : Thesis for Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, Columbia University, 1920.TOO COSTLY REVENUE 53

to political instability by experimenting with new forms
and victims of taxation. One suspects that a part at
least of the irritation displayed by the delegations of the
governments concerned towards the Americans in the
Second Opium Conference arose from the fact that they
were demanding that very thing; were “throwing a
monkey-wrench”’ into Far Eastern machinery which
lately hasn’t been working any too well at best.

Space is not available, nor is it necessary, to go into
detail as to the part that opium plays in governmental
revenues in the Far East; it is indisputable, however,
that it is substantial—in some cases preponderating. It
was stated in the British Parliament last year (1924) that
the proportion of the opium revenue to the whole in the
British Crown Colonies varied from 0-75 per cent in
Ceylon to 45-5 per cent in the Straits Settlements :
North Borneo 12-3, Sarawak 14:0, Brunei 14-9, Federated
Malay States 16:8, Hong Kong 22-4, Kelanton 23:5,
Johore 34-25, Trengganu 37-7, Kedah 38-3, Perlis 44:3.

It is difficult to figure precisely the percentage part that
opium plays in the revenue of India proper ; the official
reports do not facilitate any synthesis on that subject.
Some apologists for the Indian situation put it as low as
3 per cent. Probably it is much larger than that, but
if not, the fact would seem to discount Lord Inchcape’s
anxiety about “‘ this important source of revenue.”

The Government of French Indo-China estimated for
1923 that 21 per cent of its revenue would come from
opium. The Netherlands East Indies expected in 1923
to derive approximately 11 per cent of its revenue from
this source. The Government of Macao (Portuguese)
does not, so far as I can ascertain, officially expose its
revenue from this source ; the Opium Advisory Committee54 OPIUM

at its fifth session was informed that the average consump-
tion of opium annually in Macao was 2,266 grains per
head, and we know that the opium “ farmer ”’ there pays
about $2,000,000 gold annually for his monopoly. In-
asmuch as (according to Whitaker's Almanack) the total
revenues of Macao for 1920-21 were $2,631,981, and
inasmuch as the government of that redolent spot—
affectionately referred to sometimes as ‘“‘ the Monte
Carlo of Hong Kong,” and sometimes as “ the hell-hole
of the Pacific ’—is supported considerably if not prin-
cipally by the subsidizing of opium, gambling and other
vices, we may fairly assume at least that the opium factor
is exceedingly important from the fiscal point of view.
On the other hand, it is only fair to quote the Portuguese
statement in the first conference that the opium revenue
is devoted :

Principally to works of charity, health and social
welfare which will enable it effectively to combat the use of
opium and later to dispense with this form of revenue.
These works are almost entirely for the benefit of the
Chinese population, since . . . almost the whole popu-
lation of Macao is Chinese. Among the works in question
are included the sanitary improvement of the Chinese
quarters in our Colony, which are considered to be the
most sanitary in the whole of the East, improvement
in the water supply, and principally work on the harbour
of Macao. . . . It will be followed by further work of
social welfare and education, to which the whole of the
revenue from opium will be devoted. ... Facts and
figures will continue to justify the action of the Portuguese
Government in a colony which it has administered from
the earliest days, not by virtue of conquest but because
of services rendered to humanity and particularly to the
Chinese people, whom we have helped to free from the
state of piracy of which they were the victims.

   

>TOO COSTLY REVENUE 55

The Portuguese gave, however, neither any figures at
all nor, beyond this general assertion, any facts to
illuminate the staggering consumption of more than 2,000
grains of opium per capita per annum. Compare that
with the alleged 36 grains per capita, the exaggerated
total for the United States which, casually mentioned in
the Second Geneva Conference by Lord Cecil, aroused Mr.
Porter to denounce it as “ a vile slander.”

The kingdom of Siam during the years 1916-1920 derived
from opium between 23 and 24 per cent of its total revenue.
Persia’s opium revenue represents at least 12 per cent of
the whole, and probably considerably more than that ; I
have seen the opium revenue of Persia estimated as high
as 50 per cent of the total indirect taxes of the country.

A constantly-embittering factor in the Far Eastern
situation—embittering many things beside the opium
question—is the characteristic assumption on the part
of the European of inherent racial superiority ; together
with its corollary, that the main excuse-for-living on the
part of the Oriental is to contribute to the welfare,
financial and otherwise, of the said European. It is even
worse than that. This cynical attitude underlies most of
the arguments against any interference with opium-
smoking, not to mention the capitalizing of gambling
and other vices. The familiar formula is :

‘‘ We must have our labour supply ; hence we must not
interfere with the ‘ recreations ’ which attract that labour
and help to keep it contented. I must have coolies for
my brickyard, to unload my ships, to get the stuff out of
my go-down. And the coolies are Chinese ; they must
have their recreations. No opium, no coolies.”Lennar tyes

  

06

OPIUM

This point of view is not imagined here: read this
excerpt from the careful analysis of the measures suggested
by the Opium Advisory Committee, from the Court of
Directors of the British North Borneo Company, bearing
date of May 29, 1924:

A free flow of Chinese labourers and settlers is vital
to the progress and development of North Borneo, and
the Government would hesitate to introduce measures
which, in the present state of Chinese feeling, must
necessarily restrict immigration and have a disturbing
effect on the resident Chinese population.

Remember, too, that North Borneo is not an instance
in which, as in India, the Government took over an
inheritance of ancient customs and the past of a purely
commercial exploitation such as that of the old East
India Trading Company. This is a modern situation.
The British North Borneo Chartered Company got its
charter in 1882, and it is for all intents and purposes the
Government of Great Britain’s third (the rest is Dutch)
of the island of Borneo. On the strength of that charter
(says the Handbook of the State of British North Borneo,
1921), the chartered company “ took over all the rights,
sovereign and territorial, . . . and proceeded to organize
a Service for the administration of the territory and the
development of its resources.” According to the latest
and most authoritative book on the subject of North
Borneo, issued under the imprimatur of the President of
the British North Borneo Company himself,! the Company
derives a large part of its revenue from gambling, pawn-

+ British North Borneo, an Account of its History, Resources and
Native Tribes, by Owen Rutter, F.R.G.S., F.R.A.I., with an intro-
duction by the Rt. Hon. Sir West Ridgway, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.L.,

President of the British North Borneo Chartered Company, London,
1922,TOO COSTLY REVENUE 57
broking and opium. As therein stated, the opium busi-
ness is a recently-acquired enterprise of the Company :

In 1915, the Chartered Company, at the request of the
Colonial Office, took over the opium traffic which had
previously been farmed out, and now buys direct from
India, selling at the same rates laid down in Labuan and
the Straits Settlement to licensed dealers. . . . The traffic is
carefully supervised and the opium is only sold to the adult
Chinese population, among whom the annual consumption
averages 15-2 ounces. Apart from the pointof view of persons
interested in stamping out opium smoking there is not very
much to be said against the Company’s trade in the drug.*

The total revenue for 1920 was £425,333 sterling, of
which customs-receipts were £105,179, and excise (opium,
gambling and pawnbroking) £193,954. Says Mr. Rutter :

It will be seen at a glance that 70 per cent of the total
revenue of the territory comes under the heading of
customs and excise. . . . It is, from the shareholder’s
point of view, the most important branch of the Service ;
without it there would be no dividends.}

According to a statement filed in both Geneva Confer-
ences by the Dutch delegation (“‘ The Opium Policy in
the Netherlands Indies ’’) :

Vast regions ... are largely dependent for their
economic development on the supply of labour from else-
where, frequently non-native workers, and, should the
use of opium be wholly prohibited, it would be impossible
or at least extremely difficult to hire labourers, so that the
public welfare would suffer materially from such a measure.

The British Malaya Opium Committee of 1923 reported
among other things :

We cannot avoid reflecting upon possible disturbance of
the free influx of Chinese labour which might result from

   

1 The italics are mine,—J.P.G,mera

OPIUM

restrictions of this nature (i.e. registration, rationing, etc.),
unless this system were applied universally wherever the
Chinese can earn a livelihood. Any check on a free flow
of labour from China would have disastrous effects on the
economic position of British Malaya, and these territories
would be faced with a steadily dwindling revenue and a
steadily increasing expenditure, owing to costly pre-
ventive services and establishments required to make the
system effective.

Waiving any question of morality, any ethical com-
punctions about a government’s not merely tolerating
a notorious vice, but at a profit actually providing the
material with which its subjects may drug and otherwise
demoralize themselves; waiving, too, any personal
hesitation on the part of shareholders in the matter of
dividends avowedly dependent upon the exploitation of
that vice; ... all this proceeds upon the widely-
prevalent assumption that the taste for opium is something
congenital in the Oriental—the Chinese especially—that
it does not injure him as it does the European ; indeed
that he could not or anyway would not live without it.
Neither of these things is true, even though on more than
one occasion the attempt to suppress opium smoking
has been followed by strikes of large numbers of coolies.+
Opium has no different effect upon an Oriental from that
which it has upon any other kind of human being.
Medical testimony on that subject is overwhelming and
virtually unanimous—even if common sense required it.
The British Malaya Opium Committee—certainly not
given to favouring the Chinese in this matter—in the
course of its investigation of 1923 made a census of opium

1 H. A. Van Coenen Torchiana, in his Tropical Holland, 1921, tells

of such a strike when the Dutch prohibited the smoking of opium in
Banka.59

TOO COSTLY REVENUE

smokers, and developed the fact that a little more than
13 per cent (13-3) of them brought their habit with them.
As for the rest: Anywhere from 60 to 85 per cent of them
acquired the habit after arriving in Malaya. The situation
is exactly similar to that existing in American lumber

camps when liquor, prostitution and gambling—with

 

pawnbroking on the side—are the only “ recreations ”’
provided for great masses of labourers.

Utterances like those of the British North Borneo
Company, and many others that can be cited, illustrate
perfectly the ‘‘ hard-boiled” attitude of a certain type
of bearers of “‘ the White Man’s Burden” toward any
attempt to free the Far East from the thraldom of opium.
They cast a sinister shadow upon even obviously sincere
declarations regarding the impracticability of definite
steps toward reform.

There is nothing inadvertent in the absurdity that a
Chinese who attempts to smoke opium in London puts
himself in peril of the law, while in the Far East the same
British Government not only will permit him to do it, but
will itself furnish—at a comfortable profit—the opium with
which to do it ; will salt away that profit for government
revenue (in the Straits Settlements some 45 per cent of
the whole) and in official documents stoutly maintain that
it doesn’t hurt him—that he cannot get along without it.
One man, concerned in the enforcement in Great Britain
of the British Dangerous Drugs Act, said to me quite
frankly of this inconsistency :

“Of course it is illogical. But you must understand
that it isn’t so much that we don’t want opium smoking
in London: it is that we do not want the Chinaman in
London. We do want him—we must have him—in Straits
Settlements and in North Borneo.”60 OPIUM

Occasionally we find the idea wearing the countenance
of a kind of complacent pity ; as for example in these
words of the late W. W. Rockhill, formerly the Ambassa-
dor of United States to China.! Writing in 1890 of the
opium-addiction of the squalid villagers that he saw during
a sight-seeing trip through North-west China, especially
in Kansu, Mr. Rockhill said :

If it destroys their appetite for food, so much the
better, for they will have stilled the gnawing pangs of
hunger which otherwise they would feel every instant
of their lives; and under the effects of the drug their
imagination is excited, they talk, forget their woes, and
enjoy themselves for a brief while. Men, women, and
often young girls and boys, indulge in opium smoking.

No doubt there are innumerable persons, Whites as
well as Orientals, who can and do use opium, eating as in
India, or smoking as in China, for a long time—perhaps
even all their lives—in something that can be called
moderation, without its producing visible physical
disaster. (This cannot be said of addiction to the deriva-
tive drugs, whose “ legitimate’ use, even under medical
restraint, is so dangerous that conscientious physicians
prescribe them with concern and increasing reluctance and
caution.) But to realize by how much the general use of
opium exceeds that of alcohol as a beverage in its personal
and social peril one need only turn a page or two of the
voluminous literature of the subject. Samuel Merwin,
the well-known American writer, whose magazine articles
in 1907—8? contributed materially to the American awaken-

1 The Land of the Lamas: Notes of a Journey through China, Mongolia
and Tibet, by William Woodville Rockhill, New York and London, 1891.

* Compiled in Drugging a Nation, Fleming H. Revell Co., New
York and Chicago, 1908,TOO COSTLY REVENUE 61
ing on the subject, gives an appalling picture of the
desolation of villages, whole country-sides, in China, by
the poverty caused primarily by the vice, and the physical
ruin of the emaciated victims who had sold even the beams
of their wretched houses to buy opium. Victims
characterized by ‘‘ the opium face,’ best described as
“a peculiarly withered and blasted countenance” ;
by upset digestion and elimination, chronic diarrhea,
lost power of resistance to disease—dull and devitalized
folks who must have more of the narcotic in order to
resume activity.

The Chinese have ‘‘ The Ten Cannots ” to describe the

condition of the opium addict. He cannot—

1. Enjoy sleep.

2. Rise early.

3. Be cured if sick.
4. Plan anything.

5. Walk any distance.

.

6. Enjoy wealth.
7. Help needy relations.

Get credit, even if an old customer.
9. Decently await his turn to smoke.

10. Give up the habit.

In the last analysis, and allowing for the exceptional
person characterized by unusual “tolerance ”’ or self-
control, who may set foot upon this perilous way without
becoming profoundly and permanently enslaved, there are
only two classes of addicts. This applies even more cer-
tainly to those given to the use of the more powerful
drug-derivatives.

I. Those who are beginning, who have not yet shown
the visible effects: who still imagine that they could—62 OPIUM

even though they do not—stop it; that they can dally
with the danger and escape unscathed—the novitiates.

II. Those who resorted to the drug in one form or
another to palliate pain or find temporary surcease from
mental misery, and have lost all power to abandon it,
because they must have it now to relieve the acute distress,
physical or mental, or both, occasioned by the drug
itself. The slaves—who probably will never know
freedom.

I recently received a letter significant of the prevailing
state of indifference and ignorance on this subject. It
happens to have been written by an Englishman: but
it might as well and as readily have come from anyone of
many Americans of my acquaintance, or residents of any
other country. In it occurs this sentence written in all
seriousness :

It is only inferior and degenerate people who resort
and succumb to this drug-vice ; therefore it would be a
good thing not to interfere with but to encourage the
commerce in narcotics deliberately, in order to kill off
the riff-raff of the populations, and generally to thin out
the inferior races.

Ignoring the barbaric ethics expressed in this utterance ;
even if it were based in any truth, it is necessary to
emphasize the fact that its primary assumption is not
true. As I have remarked before, this used, in its primi-
tive forms, to be an esoteric vice, confined to Orientals
and to the shame-abandoned white denizens of disreput-
able quarters. It isso no longer. The drug-menace is not
confining itself to, or excluding itself from, any part of the
world or any order of persons. It is invading—has in-
vaded—every class in society, including armies and navies
and groups responsible on land and sea for the safety ofTOO COSTLY REVENUE 63

their fellows. It spares neither old nor young; the
wretched pedlars of this stuff have as little scruple to
sell it to children on their way to school as to smuggle it
into prisons for the confirming of criminals who may
indeed have been set by it upon their downward way.
Like death, it seems to love a shining mark: there is an
appalling list of brilliant people, some young and very
promising, who first sought incitement or diversion in
rash experiment and soon found themselves enmeshed
beyond rescue. Compared with this, ordinary alcoholism
is merciful and easy to cure. Moreover, drunkenness
cannot be long concealed ; but drug addiction usually
is far on its way before it discloses itself in outward
signs,

No intelligent person honestly believes, however much
he may pretend to believe, that the effect of any of these
narcotics is in any important respect different or in the
long run less injurious upon an Oriental than upon a
Knight Commander of the Bath, a Chevalier of the Legion
of Honour or a Son of the American Revolution. Indeed,
I can produce responsible testimony from authorities
familiar with medical practice in the Far East to the effect
that the white person shows, if anything, the greater
tolerance. The very fact (for it seems to be a fact) that
the Oriental labourers—and the Indians of the South

American mountains too, for that matter—can eat or

 

smoke opium, or chew coca leaves with less immediate
injury than persons living sedentary lives, has been given
the rather obvious explanation that violent physical
exercise tends, in a measure, to offset the effects of any
narcotic. Over against which stands the fact that these
labourers, once addicted, are notoriously both miserable

‘

“dope.” The

and incapacitated when deprived of their64 OPIUM

Japanese in Formosa have an infallible method of sorting
out the addicts from among the Chinese temporarily
admitted at the time of tea harvest: they quarantine
them all for 48 hours. Those who show the familiar
symptoms of deprivation are excluded. They do not
entertain the delusion that any sort of narcotic drug
makes a man in any respect a better worker. Japan looks
upon a “ dope fiend”’ of any sort as a person infected
with a disease which she will not knowingly admit within
her borders. In Formosa she enforces the system of
registration and rationing, and waits for the addicts
already there to die.

What the intelligent white man really thinks about
“dope”? in any form he manifests by the strict laws
against its abuse in his own country. What he really
believes about it in the territories for which he is respon-
sible in the Orient he shows, too, when anything important
is at stake. The document “The Opium Policy in the
Netherlands Indies” is unequivocal on the subject; all
the excuses for tolerance are those of expediency.
Observe :

The use of opium is wholly forbidden to the native
crews of the Navy and to native soldiers.

As a rule opium-using labourers are not admitted to
the government undertakings.

Without a medical prescription Europeans are not
allowed to possess opium. (On the issue of this pro-
hibition in 1911, an exception was made for such as were
accustomed to take opium. A non-transferable licence
was issued to them. At the close of 1921 nine Europeans
were still in possession of such a licence.)

No opium is sold to persons under 18.

And while this document duplicates the argument of
the British North Borneo Company that without per-TOO COSTLY REVENUE 65

mitting opium it would be difficult if not impossible to
get Chinese labour :

_. Where, as with the tin workings in the Island
of Banka, the entire prohibition of the use of opium would
be a danger to the undertaking, the Government has earn-
estly endeavoured, by adopting effective measures, to
arrive at the ultimate extinction of the evil. Workmen
newly engaged by this important concern, which almost
exclusively employs Chinese workers, are forbidden the use
of opium.1 Only such as were active with the under-
taking before the year 1917, and then already indulged
in the opium habit are allowed to continue, subject to

severe restriction.

When the Government of India for example, having
bought its opium from the cultivator at the lowest price
that will tempt him to grow it, sells it to a retailer, or
to a colonial government, or to the chartered North
Borneo Company, at a profit, and the latter sells it to its
retailer, at a profit, and the latter sells it to as many
customers as he can induce to buy it . . . every copper
of the profits, together with the cost of production and
distribution, comes out of the ultimate consumer. The
same is true when the transaction is with the authorities
of Java, Indo-China, Siam, Formosa, or with the farmer”
at Macao, for the “‘ benefit ’’ of consumers in those terri-
tories. And save for the very small consumption attri-
butable to bona fide medical and scientific uses, every
penny of the revenue comes in the last analysis from some
human being who ought not to have it. In the vast

ce

preponderance of instances, the ultimate consumer is @
slave to his addiction, wretched and incompetent without
his drug, and on the way to still greater wretchedness and.

1 The italics are mine.—J.P.G.Uti

 

   

66 OPIUM

incompetence with it. We cannot repeat too often, nor
bear too closely in mind, the bottom fact that morphia is
morphia, cocaine is cocaine, and hasheesh is its own
hellish self, whatever excuses may be made for their
distribution outside the field of honest medicine; that
every effort and subterfuge goes to the getting of ‘‘ dope ”
to the addict and raking off the profits rooted in his
addiction. And these facts apply, whether the subject
was born in London, Montreal or Kansas City ; in Bang-
kok or Hankow; in Santa Cruz de la Sierra of Bolivia,
or in the jungles of Tanganyika.

Dr. Carleton Simon, Special Deputy Police Commissioner
of New York City having charge of police activities with
respect to narcotics, delivered early in May, 1925, an
address, in the course of which he suggested that the dis-
covery of a synthetic opium would destroy the incentive
for cultivating the opium poppy, by destroying the market
for the raw opium. Thereupon Mr. Herman A. Metz,
head of a great pharmaceutical corporation in New York
and largely concerned in the manufacture of drugs,
announced the offer of a prize of $100,000 to the first
person who should invent a method of artificially pro-
ducing opium—the identical opium molecule—at a cost
sufficiently low to compete with the natural product of
the poppy. He laid down the condition that the winner
must surrender all rights in the process, the control of the
new narcotic to be under restrictions established by inter-
national agreement.

This looks plausible enough off-hand, but it seems to me
that Dr. Simon and Mr. Metz, with the best possible
intentions, overlooked essential considerations—not toTOO COSTLY REVENUE 67

mention cocaine, the deadly ally and supplanter of
morphia.

The proportion of the total production of opium used
in the manufacture of drugs is relatively a minor part of
the whole. It certainly is not more than 25 per cent ;
it may be as small as 10 per cent. Nobody knows, be-
cause nobody knows how much opium is produced in the
world. We have already seen that it surely is at least ten
times, and probably a great deal more than ten times, as
much as is required for medical and scientific uses.

At least half of it is produced in China (however unlaw-
fully) and in India. Virtually all of the Chinese product
is consumed in China for smoking, together with large
quantities smuggled into China from Persia, Turkey,
Central Asia, Afghanistan, etc. (As I expect to show
later, I believe the alleged smuggling of opium owt of
China is largely mythical, the legend being encouraged by
reason of various motives, political and otherwise.)
Something like half of the product of India is consumed
in India for pseudo-medical purposes and in the ancient
widespread practice of eating and drinking it and almost
universally feeding it to infants, as well as to live-stock,
including elephants. The rest is sold, quite lawfully
under the Hague Convention, by the India Government
to other governments, principally in the Far East, and

‘

almost entirely to be made by them into “ prepared ”’
opium for smoking. The opium produced in Siam,
Indo-China and elsewhere in the Far East goes to smoking.
I do not suppose Mr. Metz intends his munificence to
create a new source of supply for the opium smokers!
Nor to take the place of the considerable quantities of
poppy-seed used in Turkey and Jugo-Slavia for oil
extensively used, as olive oil is used, for cooking, butter,68 OPIUM

soap, etc. Yet every one of those seeds is a potential
source of raw opium.

The cause of the overflow of morphine and the heroin
that is made from it is not primarily in the Oriental poppy-
fields, in the over-production of the raw material; but
in the uncontrolled manufacture of the high-power drugs
from a relatively small part of the total product of raw
opium—in the pharmaceutical laboratories of the West.
Also and equally the fact that in the absence of effective
international co-operation and under the delusion that
these substances can be properly or safely the subject
of ordinary commercial competition, each of the nations
engaged in this manufacture regards it as legitimate to
compete for the entire market. Some of them are none
too scrupulous as to the character of that market. That
is the principal reason for the existence of the prodigious
surplus, and the surplus is the cause of the illegitimate
traffic, whose great profits in turn inspire production.

Every nation party to the Hague Convention of 1912
pledged itself, under Article 9 of that Convention, to
limit the manufacture (as well as the sale and use) of these
substances ‘exclusively to medical and_ legitimate
purposes.” Not one of them, including the United
States of America, has done it, or, as I see it, made any
substantial effort to do it. Insisting upon the possession
of licences, and the collection of an import tax (both
sources of governmental revenue, by the way), is not
limitation of manufacture. There is only one place where
manufacture can be limited, and that is in the factory.
Not only has the Hague Convention not been complied
with by any nation in that respect, but in the Second
Geneva Conference every suggestion aimed in that direc-
tion was promptly stepped upon.TOO COSTLY REVENUE 69

Indispensable, however, to the limitation of manu-
facture of drugs (as it is likewise to the restriction of the
production of raw material) is adequate knowledge of the
legitimate needs of each country and of the world as a
whole. No such knowledge exists; nor will it exist
without some central international clearing-house of
information, frankly and reliably put in possession of the
facts. Such a clearing-house is provided for in the drug-
convention adopted by the Second Conference; but its
establishment and functioning awaits the ratification of
that convention by the particular nations specified in the
convention itself. Of that, more in a later chapter. In
the meanwhile, the nations struggle along, each after its
fashion and in accordance with its own idea of the situa-
tion and of its own commercial and political interests ;
with only a very limited measure of international comity
and co-operation.

To this date, the nations most advanced in the effort
to solve this problem have been content, so far as action
shows, with legislation intended to suppress the abuse of
narcotics by restricting manufacture, distribution and
administration to persons (more or less carefully investi-
gated and more or less strictly supervised) holding
licences for which relatively small fees are charged ; with
the imposition of import taxes upon raw material and a
certain moral pressure to reduce the amount of imports,
and increasingly severe penalties upon infringement of
these laws. Internationally, there has been established
and generally—but by no means universally—adopted, a

>

system of “import certificates,” under which no export
of the narcotics covered by the Hague Convention is
authorized without certification by the importing country

that it is for lawful use. Also the nations, with a varying70 OPIUM

degree of vigour, have struggled with the increasing illicit
traffic, exchanging information about seizures, etc., mean-
while doing their best, and with a varying degree of
success, to suppress smuggling into and unlawful distribu-
tion within their own domains.

The position of the United States in this matter is more
than ordinarily difficult. For one thing, its immense
coast-line and the long frontiers of Canada and Mexico
make smuggling comparatively easy. Very lately treaties
have been negotiated with both Canada and Mexico pro-
viding mutually for the extradition of offenders against
the anti-narcotic laws—a long step in advance which
ought to be taken among all the nations.

But a difficulty peculiar to the United States lies in the
heterogeneous character of the legislation of the States
among themselves, and the great discrepancy in the
degree and efficiency of enforcement of what laws they
have. The American legislation on this subject is a
patchwork ; some of it still in the vague and ineffectual
condition belonging to the first stages of awakening.
And in some States and localities the police authorities,
regardless of the adequacy of the law, give slight co-
operation to the Federal enforcement, if indeed they do
not actively obstruct it. The result is that the whole
blanket is hardly stronger than its weakest spot. Once
a quantity of narcotics is safely over the border it can be
transmitted anywhere in the United States with little
probability of interference. Yes, even by mail; for un-
less there is positive reason for suspicion, the average
parcel is transmitted without question to its address.
This is especially true of transit by rail as baggage or byTOO COSTLY REVENUE 71

the express companies. Owing to the difference in weight
and fragility, it is much easier to detect a consignment of
liquor, now illicit under the Prohibition Law, than of
drugs, small in bulk and giving forth no disclosing gurgle
of liquid ; nor upon rough handling any crash of glass.

Prohibition Commissioner R. A. Haynes, in an official
statement presented in October, 1923, to the Conference
of State Governors at Washington, analysed the statutes
of the various States on the subject of narcotics, and dis-
closed a bewildering and on the whole discouraging
hodge-podge, without any trace of common conviction or
purpose or any coherence of policy. He showed, for
example, that New York State had no anti-narcotic law.
As late as March 6, 1925, this was a fact; on that date
the State Prison Commission made public a voluminous
report in which it urged the enactment of such a law, dis-
closing a tragic condition of affairs, especially in New
York City, but also in all of the large cities of the State.
Addicts testified before the Commission that proscribed
narcotic drugs

: are sold on the streets in all parts of New York
City. Witnesses told the Committee that they could buy
it as easily as chewing gum. . . . The large cities through-
out the State, according to the report, are full of drug-
pedlars. . . . The traffic is carried on generally through
organized gangs with foreign connections, and officers and
sailors on ships are often the intermediaries. Addicts
pay from $25 to $95 for a week’s supply.

It appeared in Commissioner Haynes’s analysis of the
State laws that (to take a few instances at random) the
law of Kansas was wholly inadequate and the Federal

1 From summary of the Report published in New York Z'imes of
March 7, 1925,5
/

OPIUM

bo

officers received practically no local co-operation ; that
Maine produced no copy of any law whatever, and its
officials gave little attention to the subject ; that Missis-
sippi restricted only cocaine ; that Missouri appeared to
have no anti-narcotic legislation ; that North Carolina’s
law was inadequate; that Oregon’s futile statute was
enacted in 1902.

The immensity of the task of the Narcotic Division of
the Prohibition Unit appeared in the Commissioner’s
statement that there were at that time in the United
States no less than 286,405 registrants entitled to handle
narcotics; including manufacturers, importers, whole-
salers, druggists, dentists, physicians, over all of whom a
field force of only 170 persons had to maintain surveil-
lance in the fifteen geographical divisions, including not
only the United States proper, but also Hawaii and
Alaska, and with a Federal appropriation of only about
$750,000 a year. This, despite the fact that during the
five years beginning 1919 there was covered into the
United States Treasury a clear profit of more than

$3,000,000. Said the Commissioner :

During the period since the Harrison (anti-narcotic)
Law has been in operation, the actual cost of enforcement
has totalled $3,526,459-94, while the amount collected
as fines, penalties, etc., has aggregated $6,384,751-45,
none of which is used to defray the costs of enforcement,
but is turned into the general funds of the United States
Treasury.

Included in the receipts, presumably, are the fees for
United States licences: $3 for physicians, dentists and
veterinary surgeons, up to $24 for manufacturers and
importers.

Six hundred thousand dollars a year of clear revenueTOO COSTLY REVENUE 73

for Uncle Sam out of the “‘ dope ”’ business. From which,
at least, he may well clear himself before he is in a posi-
tion to point fingers of scorn at anybody else! He might
at least devote all of it to the enforcement of the law.

Mr. Porter, chairman of the United States delegation
to the Second Geneva Conference, displayed great indigna-
tion at Lord Cecil’s mention of ‘“‘ 36 grains per capita ”’ as
the reputed annual consumption of opium in the United
States, declaring it ‘‘ a vile slander upon a great people.”
Whereupon Lord Cecil promptly withdrew the statement.
The statement was not true, but it has had wide circula-
tion. What Commissioner Haynes said to the Conference
of Governors in October, 1923, was that in the five-year
period, 1910-1915, ‘‘ Sufficient opium was imported to
furnish each man, woman and child in this country with
36 grains.” That was a very different thing ; but even
at that it did not take into account re-exports, clandestine
or other, from the United States. There appears to be no
doubt, however, that the consumption of narcotics in the
United States is disproportionately large. The Com-
missioner gave the importation for 1922 as about 7 grains
per capita of opium in morphia equivalent of § of a grain.
Of cocaine he estimated the use as } of a grain per capita.

The fact is that nobody knows how much narcotics are
used in the United States, or in any other country. All
the official figures have to do with recognized importations
through regular channels and paying import-tax, Mr.
Haynes went on to say :

It is estimated that from 50 to 60 per cent of the
various narcotic drugs consumed in this country by the
ordinary ‘‘dope-fiend”’ or drug-addict are smuggled into
the country across our international borders and through
the various ports of entry on our shores,74 OPIUM

This carries with it the corollary that the other 50 or
40 per cent of the drugs used by the addicts is not smug-
gled, but proceeds in the last analysis from raw material
or drugs lawfully imported into or manufactured in the
United States; so we come back to the question of
adequate legislation and enforcement ; but, still back of
that, to that of the limitation of manufacture to legitimate
needs, which was solemnly—or at any rate specifically—
promised by every nation, including the United States,
in which these drugs are fabricated, and which no nation
whatever has performed, or seriously attempted to
perform.

One thing which has complicated and aggravated the
matter of smuggling drugs into the United States is its
intermingling with the smuggling of liquor. The ships on
“Rum Row,” the fleet of vessels gathered just outside
the twelve-mile limit, waiting for a chance to get their
liquor-cargoes to the shore, have carried increasingly
supplies of “‘dope” of various kinds. The profit on
smuggled drugs is usually much greater than that on
alcohol, and the distribution easier because of the smaller
bulk and consequently greater ease of concealment, and
the fact that the government officers are searching not
so much for drugs as for liquor.

In this connection it is asserted that one of the im-
portant bases of the smugglers of both liquor and drugs
is the little island of St. Pierre de Miquelon, off the coast
of Newfoundland, whence the contraband can be trans-
shipped or otherwise taken on both to the United States
and to Canada.t St. Pierre de Miquelon is a French

? Illuminating side-lights are thrown upon this situation and the
illicit. traffic generally in a little book called Les Pirates de TAvenue du
Rhum, by Pierre Mac Orlan; published aux editions du sagittaire by
Simon Kra, at 6 Rue Blanche, Paris.TOO COSTLY REVENUE 75

colony, whose ostensible occupation is chiefly fishing.
Here is an opportunity for France to exemplify her
enthusiasm for international co-operation.

It is not my purpose to go minutely into the situation
in the United States ; what has been said above is only
in the endeavour to show that no country can stand alone
in this warfare; that the welfare of each depends now
upon the co-operation of all; that the weakness or in-
effectiveness of each or any is a source of peril to all.
Isolation is both a suicide and a crime against the world.

The intentions of the United States never have been
open to question ; I know of nobody who questions them.
The deadlock in the Second Opium Conference, the with-
drawal of the American delegation from the conference,
and the resulting defects in the convention finally adopted
(in so far as it may be supposed that continued American
participation might have made the result more satis-
factory) grew out of the insistence of the Americans upon
the letter of the instructions which bound them, embodied
as they were in a resolution of both Houses of Congress
approved by the President :

Provided, That the representatives of the United States
shall sign no agreement which does not fulfil the con-

ditions necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming
narcotic drug traffic as set forth in the preamble.

Vital in the purview of that preamble was definite
limitation of the production of raw material ‘“‘in such a
manner that there will be no surplus available for non-
medical and non-scientific purpose’’; also definite steps
toward carrying out the provisions of the Hague Con-
vention on the subject of the suppression—“ effective,”76 OPIUM

even if “ gradual ”’—of opium-smoking. The Americans
would tolerate no exclusion of “ prepared’ opium from
the consideration of the Second Conference, especially in-
asmuch as the First Conference had done nothing sub-
stantial about it. They could not sign, under their in-
structions, any convention which left out of account by
far the largest part of the production and use of opium.
They refused to be party either to the dumping of respon-
sibility upon China for the illicit traffic in opium, or to
permitting the plight of the Orientals to be left at a stand-
still. Most of all they protested against making condi-
tional what in the Hague Convention had been accepted
as obligatory. This was about production of raw material ;
they did not lay their stress on the question of limiting
manufacture.

I do not know whether there are constitutional barriers
which would operate in the United States against an
attempt to carry out the pledge which we assumed under
the Hague Convention and have not as yet complied with
—to limit manufacture. That is a question for lawyers
and courts. I know of no such attempt, beyond the in-
direct and rather feeble one of trying to control the im-
portation of raw material, including flat prohibition of
the import of opium for the manufacture of heroin ; nor
of any proposal by anybody to amend the Constitution
of the United States or of any State, so as to permit the
carrying out of our contract with the other nations. Our
best excuse would have to be that none of the other parties
had done any more than we!

The problem of controlling production, whether of the
raw material or of manufactured drugs, is full of diffi-TOO COSTLY REVENUE 77

culties, none of which can be met by insinuations or
recriminations between the countries concerned. Each
must recognize the practical difficulties with which the
others have to contend. It is undeniably true that given
the same, or increasing demand, and an uncontrolled
source of supply, any curtailment of authorized produc-
tion and distribution will be answered instantly and zpso
facto by increase of smuggling, along the line of least
resistance. India at least controls her production, knows
the extent of it, and sells it only to countries which
certify that they want it for lawful purposes. But with-
out any control or accounting worthy of the name opium
is produced in Persia, Turkey, China, Jugo-Slavia, Greece,
Afghanistan, Russian Central Asia, Siberia, et al., and the
governments get out of it what revenue they can. In
some cases that revenue is a substantial if not prepon-
derant part of the whole support of government.

But governmental revenue is not the only considera-
tion. There is the question of the livelihood of the
cultivator, and the economic interests of the various
classes concerned in the production. Persia filed with the
Second Geneva Conference a remarkably candid official
statement, acknowledging that her production of opium
had got out of hand; pleading the enormous practical,
social, political and economic difficulties thwarting any
effort to suppress it, and begging for help. Its landowners,
its politicians, and even some of its religious leaders, it
would appear, are deeply involved in the business ; its
agricultural labour is greatly dependent upon poppy-
cultivation. Every effort of the government to interfere
results in social and political unrest ; anything of a really
drastic character probably would provoke serious dis-
turbances if not revolution. It is pointed out also thatOO Fit in

 

78 OPIUM

even if the cultivation of substitute crops were under-
taken on any large scale, great difficulties would confront
their marketing by reason of the absence of adequate
means of transport. Persia has only 350 miles of railroad ;
few practicable roads. And opium, as compared with
wheat, or tea, for example, is a thing of small bulk and
easy transport. A quantity of large money value can be
carried on one donkey or camel, or on a man’s back.
Persia asked for an investigation of the situation ; more
particularly for a large loan with which to begin the work
of substitution; to provide tools, seed, fertilizer—and
education. The conference, after a long and more or less
futile discussion in committee, considered a proposal
to have an international commission investigate the
Persian situation; but in the end it came to nothing
practical—a vague general reference to the Council of the
League of Nations to ‘‘ examine ”’ the suggestion.1 And
Persia signed the convention of the Second Conference
with a reservation completely dependent upon com-
pliance with her request for financial aid.

When you come to the question of the substitution of
other crops for the revenue-producing opium, such as
wheat, cotton, tea, silk, or what not, and the institution
of new industries to utilize them for export, you run at
once into the obstacle of old treaties and other conditions
preventing the raising of customs-duties to protect such
industries. Also things like mortgages on the existing
opium revenue! The matter of tariff-autonomy arises
the moment you ask Siam, for instance, to forgo the
very large proportion of her revenue which comes from
opium. She is tied up by ostensibly perpetual treaties,
with powerful neighbours hitherto reluctant to waive
1 See Article V of Final Act, Appendix C, page 279.TOO COSTLY REVENUE 79

any advantage. That is one reason, among others,
why sophisticated Orientals make their own cynical
reservations when “‘ West of Suez’? makes pious pro-
fessions on the subject of opium, and urges the substitu-
tion of crops and the introduction of new industries.}
However, against the protestations of the opium-
raising countries on the subject of crop-substitution
remains the fact that only certain regions are practically
available for the poppy; that usually it is a part-time
crop. In some regions another crop is planted immediately
afterward. Ordinarily the cultivation of the poppy comes
at a time when the peasant is least occupied with other
work, and in any event the cultivation and harvesting
are not particularly laborious. The returns are quick
and sure. Other things being equal, the farmers return
to poppy-cultivation because it pays better than other
things. And precisely on that basis alone, the near-
sighted governments predicate their taxation.
Near-sighted, yes. . . . In my New England garden
I willingly complied with government instructions to
uproot and destroy my fruitful rows of currant and goose-
berry bushes—why ? Because it was officially averred
on authority of science that those plants were the inter-
mediaries for the transmission of the ‘“ white pine
blister-rust ”’ which threatened New England’s lumber
industry. And all of the States have made and expen-
sively enforced quarantines to keep the “ gipsy”’ and

1 Since writing this paragraph I have learned of promising negotia-
tions between Siam and certain other governments contemplating the
abrogation or modification of these treaties in the direction of tariff-
autonomy. Inasmuch, however, as there is many a slip between even
the most satisfactory negotiations and actual ratification ; as there will
still remain the ever-present ‘‘ most-favoured-nation ” clause to nullify
any partial or individual concession, I shall let it stand. Also there will
survive the supercilious treatment of China in these matters, and all the
abuses of “ extra-territoriality ’’—off the same piece.80 OPIUM

‘“ brown-tail’’ moths and parasites of corn and other
crops, and foot-and-mouth diseases of cattle, from crossing
the imaginary lines between the States. Poppy plants and
coca-leaves—are they not also subjects of industry and
commerce, of profits and revenue? If the interests of
mere people stand in the way, so much the worse for the
people ; all the more if they are of what we are pleased
to regard as “inferior race.’ And yet—slowly we are
of all races not

’

coming to recognize in “ mere people’
only our brethren, but productive capital of the most
important and valuable kind, compared with which even
lumber and “living hedges” and cattle are relatively
secondary. We have to acknowledge that government
must have its revenues. But at any cost? To be sure,
we do fight hard and spend lavishly to keep out of our
countries and suppress infectious disease; but there
operates there the factor of Fear: fear for self and loved
ones. Not yet have the governments, not to mention the
masses of the people, seen in the narcotic traffic the
occasion for that kind of fear, under stress of which they
will begrudge no cost and regard the trafficker precisely
as the common

 

as they would a trafficker in the plague
enemy.

The trafficker. . . . It may seem fantastic to envisage
a vast organization, with tentacles reaching out into all the
corners of the earth, to distribute the excessive production
to the ultimate addict and to help make new ones as the
production increases. Nevertheless the farther one pursues
inquiry in this field, the more the facts concur in that
significance. There is something more than coincidence,
something unerring and exceedingly sinister, about theTOO COSTLY REVENUE 81

way in which the channels of detected illicit traffic lead
back converging almost invariably to a very few centres,
a very few manufacturing concerns in a very few places
in a very few countries. In the nature of the situation,
this is to be expected. A trade of such magnitude naturally
must have its establishment: its centres of large-scale
production ; its body of information and code of strategy ;
its system of distribution and routes of traffic from
definite and ascertainable places; its known whole-
salers and jobbers. Beyond that it works down of
course through a shifting army of peripheral delivering
agencies and individuals—frequently themselves addicted.
Hitherto there has been no person or agency inter-
nationally responsible for gathering information about
this intricate system, much less any charged with the
duty of contending with it. To this day this warfare is
being carried on—so far as it is carried on at all—by the
governments severally, each for itself, and with about
the degree of success that such scattered effort might be
expected to attain. The effort thus far has been chiefly
that of each to protect itself from the output of the others,
while at the same time being careful to conserve its own
commercial interests in the business !

This is not necessarily to imply bad faith on the part
of any. It is simply the situation naturally arising out
of the psychology of a commercial world which has not
yet recognized the intensity of this peril; has not yet
created an international unity of fear and of purpose, or
machinery for common action. And some are still dog-
gedly, cynically intent only upon making the most of the

c

situation “‘ while the making is good.”

An important part of the duties assigned by the new
international drug convention, adopted by the Second
Gye 82 OPIUM
Conference at Geneva, to the Central Board therein
provided for, is that of watching “ continuously . . . the

>

course of the international trade’ in narcotics. Inevit-
ably that will mean a rapidly growing body of information
about the illicit traffic, and for that purpose a properly
manned and equipped service of investigation. Assuming
the necessary ratifications to put the convention in force,
the entire usefulness and success of the Central Board will
hang largely upon the willingness of the nations to tolerate
and support that part of the work, without which the
other activities of the Board will be relatively futile. In
any event, it probably must be at least two or three years
before the Central Board can be appointed and begin to
function. As we shall see later, the conditions precedent
even to the coming into force of the convention are
ominous of substantial delay.
Meanwhile the officers charged with the enforcement
of the anti-narcotic laws of such governments as have thus
A far taken this matter seriously are running continually
across the lines of communication of two perhaps differing
but frequently co-operating and sometimes coinciding
groups of international smugglers. One is the closely-
knit organization of Europeans and Japanese and
Chinese individuals, dealing in the manufactured drugs,
largely from Germany and Switzerland ; the other a more
scattered and less perfectly co-ordinated congeries of
syndicates and individuals, to a considerable extent of
Chinese nationality, dealing in “raw” and “ prepared ”
opium, especially from Turkey and Persia, but also to some
extent from India and China, in the Far East particularly
and chiefly engaged in smuggling it into China. This
distinction between the groups of smugglers is, however,
largely theoretical ; for the illicit traffic in drugs and opiumTOO COSTLY REVENUE 83

goes hand-in-hand, merging, and in most cases coming
down at last to delivery through the same agencies and
individuals. Moreover, the personnel and machinery which
handled opium in the former time when the import of
Indian and other opium into China was lawful is to a
great extent still extant ; retaining its special and detailed
knowledge of sources of supplies, markets and methods
of distribution. It is a fact, and natural, that constantly
are turning up in the smuggling cases brought to light
many of the same individuals who used to be active in
the lawful traffic. The old-time “ farmers,” in such places
as Hong Kong and Singapore, now replaced by the
government monopolies, were ideally equipped and pos-
sessed of a highly-trained personnel. It was largely
because of the disclosure of their irregularities that the

>

‘farms’ were abolished. They constitute a ready-made
organization for the use of the international smuggling
system. They never had any difficulty in raising the
tremendous amounts of capital which they paid for the
“farming ”’ privilege, although on the face of the figures
one hardly could detect in the legitimate business the
attraction of the investment.

The activities of the various governments continually
cut the lines of communication of these interacting
smuggling groups ; but they grow together again speedily
and sprout in new directions after the fashion of the fabled
hydra. The hydra, you will remember, could grow again
any severed head except the immortal middle one: when
Hercules cut off that one, the creature died. The narcotic
trade has two such heads; one in the production of the
plants from which they make the raw material ; the other
in the factories, where out of that raw material they make
the drugs. The first is a very difficult matter. The second. 84 OPIUM

has its strength in the callous commercial greed of the
manufacturing nations. Nothing but an awakened fear
and sleeplessly vigilant co-operation among those nations
can accomplish that execution.

A striking indication of the widespread ramifications
of the smuggling organization is to be found in the follow-
ing list reported by the British Government of its tracing-
down of persons engaged in the traffic. Let the official
report tell it :

Information obtained in the course of investigations
into the illicit drug traffic in other countries has from time
to time been communicated by the British Government
to the Governments concerned. Information implicating
firms or persons within their jurisdiction has been com-
municated to the following countries :+

Number of

Country. Traffickers.
Germany . : ; 28
Japan ; : : ea 22
Switzerland ; :
France. :
Netherlands
United States
Belgium
Austria. ; : :
Cuba
Denmark .
Esthonia
Italy
Spain
Sweden . : : ,

Or

ft pel pel eet et et OO OD OC

In some cases the British Government has been in-
formed that the information has led to the prosecution

1 In the report the countries are arranged alphabetically ; I have

arranged them in mathematical order. One may observe without

! implying criticism, that Great Britain here reports no smugglers of
British nationality.—J.P.G.TOO COSTLY REVENUE 85

and conviction of the persons implicated. In the case,
however, of the most important firms engaged in the
traffic, such as ——-! at Basle and ———! (Hamburg),
no action has up to the present apparently been taken
to suppress their operations. No information has yet
been received from Japan as to action taken against any
of the firms to which the attention of the Japanese
Government has been drawn.

The intricate character of these transactions and the
difficulty of detecting them, as well as the impossibility
of preventing them without closely interlocking co-opera-
tion on the part of all the producing nations, and an
absolute control over manufacture, may be seen in one
instance related in a report of the British Government for
1923. That was the case of a seizure at Hong Kong,
October 11, 1922, of 2,500 ounces of cocaine and 2,400
ounces of morphine, and the arrest of a Japanese citizen
who was attempting to smuggle the drugs into the colony.
From papers in possession of the smuggler it was learned
that he was assisted in his operations by a British subject
in London. This Englishman obtained in Paris the
morphine which was of British manufacture and the
cocaine which was of French. The morphine was sent
to Basle in Switzerland, where it was concealed in the
upholstery of a shipment of furniture and shipped via
Marseilles to Hong Kong, on the same ship in which the

1 The report gives definite names: but for sufficiently obvious
reasons, I do not feel called upon personally to assume that responsibil-
ity. The British Home Office doubtless will furnish the names to any
responsible inquirer.

2 Great Britain does not manufacture cocaine from the coca-leaf. It
was because one British concern did an illicit business in morphine
by shipping it to a branch in France, whence it was re-exported (despite
the pledge of France not to allow re-export) that the British cancelled
the licence of the firm, which is now extinct,vine

86 OPIUM

Japanese smuggler carried also the cocaine in his personal
baggage.

It further appeared that this Japanese was operating
for a Japanese firm having branches in Amoy, Formosa
and Osaka, and that they were in connivance not only
with this particular Englishman, but with other drug
traffickers, from Copenhagen, Hamburg, Brussels and
other continental places, including Basle, and that their
lines led out not only to Japan, but especially to Vladi-
vostok, whence had been obtained a large number of
import certificates by means of which drugs might be
“lawfully ” obtained.

The usual method (says this British report) was to
purchase the drugs in various countries, export them to
Basle, and there pack them for smuggling as sugar of milk
or other innocuous chemicals. . . . Many firms abroad
worked in collusion, notably of Basle, and of
Freiburg-Baden, both of whom have been found to have
been carrying on an extensive smuggling trade with the
Far East. The Freiburg firm are known to obtain much
of their narcotics from of Switzerland, and to smuggle
the drugs from that country.

 

 

 

The arrest and conviction of the Englishman in London
interrupted a scheme to send $200,000 worth of morphine
to the Far East, and still another by which the Basle and

c

Freiburg concerns ‘‘ were arranging to send out regular
shipments of drugs to Shanghai disguised as chlorate of
potash.”

Indications of a definite international organization turn
up constantly in connection with large-scale seizures.
When $500,000 worth of narcotics were seized in a New
York hotel in September, 1922, one man who was arrested

was found to have been making regular trips to Europe87

99

TOO COSTLY REVENUE

to purchase drugs for the nationally-operating “ ring
which had its head-quarters in that hotel; another was
alleged to be the “ East Side distributor ” for the business ;
that is, the person through whom the drugs found their
way into the great tenement house district of the
city. And that the operations interlocked with those
of the smugglers of raw opium from the Orient was
shown by the fact that among the things seized were
plates for the printing of Chinese labels for ‘‘ prepared ”
opium made in the United States from smuggled raw

material.

From the addict’s point of view—whether he eats or
smokes opium, injects morphine or whiffs heroin or cocaine
__it makes no difference, the narcotic effect being the same,
whether the drug is “ licit ” or “ illicit ” ; whether it has
come to him through an authorized agent, tax and duty
paid, or by the hands of smugglers. From where he sits,
government and smuggler are simply business competitors.
To too large an extent do the governments look at it this
way also: seeing the smuggler as one who is subtracting
from revenue.

The difference in possible attitudes appears in such a
matter as the policy towards disposal of seizures and
rewards for making them. The Chinese Central Govern-
ment invariably destroys its seizures of narcotics, and thus
achieves a dead loss ; not only in respect of the destruction
of exceedingly valuable material which is utterly unlawful
and contraband ; but because of rewards paid to inform-
ants and to officials who make the seizures. There has
been of late some tendency to deprecate undue zeal in
searching for narcotics, on the theory that the customsOPIUM

service is primarily a revenue-collecting administration
rather than a reward-seeking police force. The result is a
relatively smaller proportion of seizures, so that they do
not maintain even the conventional ratio of 10 per cent of
the smuggling. As long as governments see narcotics
as a subject rather of revenue than of ruthless suppression,
this condition will continue.

One of the most effective possible measures for sup-
pressing illicit traffic is not resorted to at all: that is,
the heavy bonding of all persons having anything to do
with this business. The Second Opium Conference at
Geneva in its Final Act (Section IV), ‘“‘ draws attention
to the advisability in certain cases of requiring dealers
who are licensed by the Government to trade in the sub-
stances covered by the Convention to deposit or give
sureties for a sum of money sufficient to serve as an
effective guarantee against their engaging in the illicit
traffic.”

When Dr. Chodzko, the delegate for Poland, proposed
this measure, Sir Malcolm Delevingne expressed the
opinion that severe penalties provided a_ sufficient
deterrent. But of what use is a severe penalty written
in a law in the case of a criminal who has consummated
a prodigious transaction and fled the jurisdiction—
especially in absence of provision for extradition? If
there were a cash deposit or bank security commensurate
in amount with the possible magnitude of the transaction,
it would not injure the law-abiding and it would go far
to deter the criminally inclined. Even if the govern-
ment itself should pay the premiums upon the bonds
of the manufacturer and wholesaler, the occasional
very large forfeiture might prove even a source of

1 See Appendix C, page 298, in this book,TOO COSTLY REVENUE 89

revenue cleaner than some of that derived from sub-
sidizing vice. The organized illicit traffic exists only
because it is enormously profitable. It must be made too
costly to pay.

It all comes back at last to the question of fundamental
attitude, on the part of governments and of the people
behind the governments. So long as this business is
regarded simply as a business; in which anybody who
can get licensed in absence of positive evidence of unfitness
is entitled to engage at will in adding to the total pro-
duction of these poisons ; so long as the poisons themselves
are regarded as mere commodities like grain or shoes and
allowed to move about subject only to certain mild
technical restrictions without too vexatious scrutiny of
source and destination—the overproduction will continue
to plague the world by its automatic competitive search
for and creation of new markets.

As things are now, a nation can wear a countenance
of cherubic innocence befitting a famous, unquestioned
and jealously-guarded position of neutrality in the matter
of armed warfare, and yet, as a large-scale producer of
manufactured narcotics, be inflicting by a default as
deadly as malice irreparable wounds upon its neighbours
far and near.

A great nation, regarded and regarding itself as of
superior civilization, assuming or inheriting rule over a
vast population conventionally looked upon as of “ in-
ferior ’’ race, could by sheer indifference to opportunity
and governmental duty accept complacently ancient
ignorance and time-honoured addictions retarding the
development and lowering the vitality of masses of its
subjects.

There could be such a thing, I suppose, as a nation90 OPIUM

coveting for its own overcrowded population the territory
of a neighbour, and exhibiting at least a gravely-winking
governmental tolerance towards smuggling into that
territory—even by some of its own nationals—of great

“c

quantities of an agency of sure though “ peaceful”
destruction.

A government whose avowed policy it was not only to
undermine other governments but to overturn a whole
civilization and social order, might, I suppose, with what-
ever misguided folly, think it judicious strategy to institute
or encourage the large-scale production of raw material
such as the poppy and the coca shrub, and even to establish
new manufactories of narcotic drugs, with a view of
spreading them abroad.

There could be such a thing, I suppose, as a nation
wholly and dramatically disarmed after defeat in a great
war, and ringed about by powerfully-equipped and
anxiously-vigilant conquerors; and yet, technically
expert and inexhaustible in the production of narcotics,
in a position and not unwilling to supply their populations
with substances for addiction more insidious than disease

. revenge direct and strategy indirect, against some
future Day.

I refuse to believe—even though others may—that such
implications as these fairly represent the character or the
considered intent of any of the peoples whose national
identity might be guessed from these fantastic suggestions
—however much certain utterances and actions of in-
dividuals among them might seem to justify the insinua-
tions. I refuse to believe that decent, normal folk of any
nation or race, for the sake of some imaginary national
political or commercial advantage, or of governmental
revenue—not to mention dividends to shareholders—TOO COSTLY REVENUE 91

will consent in the long run and in the light of a clear

knowledge of the facts, to a policy predicated upon the

assumption that it is tolerable to involve the ruin of their
fellow-men. Least of all when they come to realize that
the policy involves an inevitable by-product and parallel
of ruin at home.CHAPTER V
THE PHASES OF IT IN INDIA

hee and circumstances, together with a certain
amount of propaganda—some of it maliciously
mendacious ; some merely misinformed—have served
to make Great Britain in general, India in particular, the
visible centre of the opium problem in the Far East.
France, Holland, Portugal and Japan, to say nothing
of the purely Oriental governments in Siam and China,
still less of those in the Native States of India, all have
subject dominions in which opium features largely among
the sources of revenue, and none of these States, with the
possible exception of Japan in Formosa, has done any
more than the India Government has done, if even as
much—to control and reduce the production of opium.
The Great Britain and the India of to-day have not had
in the eyes of the world, either fair allowance for the
difficulties which they inherited from the long past—their
own, that of the East India Company and still more that of
the people of India ; or fair credit for the intent and the
measure of success achieved in “ gradually” circum-
scribing the evil in India. Or for what they actually did
and are still doing with reference to suppressing the for-
merly large and profitable exportation of Indian opium
to China. Both governments have been and are now
targets for attack not always fair or ingenuous. Never-
theless they remain in the eyes of the world, including
92OPIUM IN INDIA 93

many sincere friends of both, conspicuously responsible
in the present situation. And this despite the India
Government’s own continuous aggressive, even somewhat
over-anxious, propaganda in defence of its policy.

If the cultivation of the poppy and the production
and use of opium within a country were exclusively an
internal affair, not within the competency of international
discussion—not to speak of intervention—the Government
and the people of India might be left, so to speak, to stew
in their own poppy-juice, awaiting the slow growth of
popular as well as administrative intelligence. But,
unfortunately, neither the opium nor the ideas of the
India Government on the subject have been confined
within its legal jurisdiction. Both have overflowed and
are overflowing into the outside world, and have thus
become a subject of international concern. For several
reasons.

In the first place, the Indian apology for the use of
opium, and its long-continued contention that it is not
especially harmful, afford the backbone of the general
laissez-faire attitude of the Far Eastern governments. If
Great Britain and India should once make a definite
unequivocal declaration of their honest belief that it is
all bad business and that they will spare no effort to
abolish it, it would forthwith change the whole face of the
situation. If either should go so far as to say: “No
matter who else makes profit out of it, we shall not.”
. . . In 1842, after China had paid $21,000,000 indemnity
to Great Britain for interfering with the British opium
smugglers, and had lost Hong Kong and control of the
“Treaty Ports,” the Emperor Kiang said :

‘Tt is true that I cannot prevent the introduction again

of this flowing poison. Gain-seeking and corrupt menOPIUM

for profit and sensuality will defeat my wishes; but
nothing will induce me to derive revenue from the vice
and misery of my people.”

Second, there is, as we shall see presently, excellent
reason to suspect that the ancient addiction to opium

 

eating in India—and the other habitual uses of opium
elsewhere in the Orient as well—is an important contrib-
utory factor in the virulence and excessive mortality of
the cholera, plague, malaria, and other infectious diseases
which are endemic in that part of the world and a constant
menace to other nations.

Third, India produces a great deal more opium than
is ‘“‘ needed ”’ for its own domestic consumption, legitimate
or illegitimate ; enough by itself to supply all the opium
smokers in the world ; and that means that vast quanti-
ties produced in Persia and Turkey—not to mention
China or the smaller producing regions—are set free for
the illicit traffic.

This is not to endorse the popular impression that it is
the opium of India which is now spreading out through
the world. That impression is not justified. In point of
fact, India is the only country producing opium on a large
scale which has its production under real control, knows
on the whole where it goes, and gives dependable statistics.
The India Government has been loyal to its pledge to
permit none of its product to be exported to China, or
to any other country whose laws prohibit import of opium ;
not only insisting rigorously upon official import certifi-
cates from the country of ostensible destination, but even
in suspected instances taking steps to investigate the
conditions surrounding their issue. It has declared its
readiness to cancel any contract upon request, and upon
its own motion has begun to cut down the supply goingOPIUM IN INDIA 95

under its long-standing contract with Macao, in view no
doubt—though it does not say so—of the suspicion as to
the use Macao makes of some of it. I will go so far as to
say that in my judgment India has more scrupulously,
anyway more effectively, complied with the Hague
Convention than any other country, not excepting the
United States of America. Save for such Indian opium
as may be smuggled over the northern frontier (an un-
known amount, probably not very large), the entire
Indian product is either consumed in India or passes out
lawfully through the hands of authorized officials, includ-
ing the “ farmer” at Macao, into the other Far Eastern
territories for the smoking which is “‘ temporarily ”’ per-
mitted under the Hague Convention. The declared
domestic policy of India is gradually to reduce the pro-
duction and increase the price, and their figures indicate
considerable progress in that direction; but they take
good care not to push the price to a point where smuggled
goods will invade the market.

I am speaking here of British India. As for the vast
mysterious territory of the Native States, the India
Government acknowledges! that it knows nothing what-
ever about the production there of the famous “‘ Malwa ”
opium, so much admired and preferred to all other by
the Chinese, who used to import virtually the whole
product. The India Government is sustained by a fine
faith that inasmuch as the Native States have no direct
access either to the sea or to Chinese territory except across
its own, it therefore can guarantee that none of the Malwa

1 See Indian Year Book, 1924, page 823. ‘‘ In the native states of
Indore, Gwalior, Bhopal, Javra, Dhar, Rutlam, Mewar and Kotak
the British Government has no concern with the cultivation of the

poppy, or the manufacture of the opium. . . . No statistics of culti-
vation or production are available.”’QUOT nr,

OPIUM

opium gets out unbeknownst. The bare truth is that the
India Government does not know whether it does or not.

For the same reason as that applying to Chinese opium ;
namely, its relatively low percentage of morphia, the
Indian product cannot compete ordinarily in the world
market as material for the manufacture of drugs. But it
can and does compete in China with the native product ;
not only because its morphia-content is higher, but be-
cause the Chinese like it better—nobody seems to know
exactly why.

The central fact in the opium policy of the India Govern-
ment is that it is frankly, even boastfully, grounded upon
the report of a Royal Commission, appointed by Queen
Victoria, September 2, 1893, in accordance with Parlia-
mentary action, and reporting under date of April 16,
1895. That report to this day is flung in the faces of all
objectors as if it were Something issued from Sinai, a
“* faith once delivered to the Saints.”

Look at the personnel of the Commission, which was
presided over by Earl Brassey.1 Among its nine members
it included Sir James Broadwood Lyall, former Governor
of the Punjab ; Sir Lakshmiswar Singh, the Maharajah of
Darbangha, an Indian dignitary and large landowner ;
Arthur Upton Fanshawe, of the Indian Civil Service,
Director of the Indian Post Office ; R. G. C. Mowbray, a
Conservative Member of Parliament avowedly opposed
to interference with the status quo; Haridas Viharidas,
late Dewar (Prime Minister) of Junargarh, representing
the Native States of India—which produce the famous

1 Thomas, Earl Brassey, better known to the public perhaps
through the first Lady Brassey’s delightful account of their voyage
round the world in Lord Brassey’s yacht “‘ Sunbeam.”OPIUM IN INDIA 97

Malwa opium ;—and Sir William Roberts, M.D., a promin-
ent English physician, and the only medical member of the
Commission. Only two of the nine members represented
the anti-opium movement: Arthur Pease, Esq., who
signed the report without publicly audible demur, and
Henry J. Wilson, M.P., who early in the proceedings
took the place of W. S. Caine, M.P., at first appointed
but unable to serve.

One need be neither cynical nor especially sophisticated
in practical legislative politics to discern with half an
eye that this reverend body, appointed to satisfy an
increasingly insistent protest in England against the opium
traffic, was meticulously and skilfully “ hand-picked ”’ for
the particular purpose of acquitting the status quo—to
“whitewash ”’ the opium practices of India and the opium
policy of the India Government. This is clear to even a
casual reader of the Parliamentary debates leading up to
the appointment of the Commission : of the Report and
accompanying documents, and especially of the vehem-
ently dissenting report of Henry J. Wilson. It is evident
beyond doubt that—as might have been expected—the
Commission was carefully shepherded throughout its
travels in India, saw and heard in the main exactly—and
only—what the India Government desired it to see and
hear. And reported accordingly.

The India Government, in its official pamphlet, “‘ The
Truth about Indian Opium,” as late as 1923 reiterated the
statement, which originated with the Secretary of the
Royal Commission, that the Society for the Suppression
of the Opium Traffic

. itself recorded the opinion that the appointment

(of the Commission) constituted “ the greatest and most
solid forward step that the movement for the suppression

HOPIUM

of the opium trade has yet made,” and considered that
the Commission was “as fair-minded and impartial a
tribunal as the Society could have desired to hear its

>>

cause.

This, like some other things in that official pamphlet
is less than ingenuous; for in point of fact, the endorse-
ment thus quoted was not made by the Society ; it was
an exuberance of optimism on the part of the Secretary,
J. G. Alexander, in an editorial in The Friend of China,
before the Commission was appointed—almost three
years before the publication of the report.

The real views of Mr. Alexander about the Commission
are to be found in his naive and sweet-spirited contem-
porary letters,! written on the spot and at the time when
he was tagging the Commission about India—as welcome
as a wet and waggy dog !

“We all appreciate,” said Lord Brassey to Mr. Alex-
ander upon one occasion after the latter had testified,
‘that in the encounter in which you are engaged with the
Government of India upon its own ground, you are placed
in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty.”

Mr. Wilson’s dissenting report exhibits vividly and
beyond any common-sense doubt the tactics of the India
Government : one can see that a good deal of pains was
taken to control the impression that the Commission
should receive. Anti-opium evidence was, let us say, not
encouraged. Mr. Wilson more than intimates that some
witnesses whose testimony might have been heretical did
not appear by reason of being diverted by one means or
another.

Be all this, however, as it may. Give to the Commission

1 Joseph Gurney Alexander, by Horace G. Alexander (his son), The
Swarthmore Press, Ltd., London. (Preface dated July, 1920.)OPIUM IN INDIA

the utmost credit for both intelligence and good faith.
Remains nevertheless the dismal fact that its Report
was made and published in 1895—+thirty years ago! In
those days morphia was honestly supposed to have both
prophylactic and curative properties—to be in the true
sense a remedy.

At the Shanghai Opium Conference in 1909, Sir Cecil
Clementi Smith, Crown Advocate at Hong Kong, following
Dr. Hamilton Wright’s introduction of a resolution in
favour of restricting the use of opium to “ legitimate
medical practice,”’ said :

“To put it perfectly plainly, and to be entirely frank,
the British delegation is not able to accept the view that
opium should be confined simply and solely to medical
uses.”’

The Indian policy stands pat. The Royal Commission’s
Report of 1895 “‘ being dead, yet speaketh.’ In the words
of “The Truth about Indian Opium,” its findings “still
stand as a complete justification of the Government’s
policy.”” That pamphlet in 1923 reiterated a declaration
of Lord Hardinge’s Government of India in 1911, to the
effect that the use of opium was not a serious detriment
to the people of India; that the drug was a “ treasured
household remedy” and any attempt to suppress it,
even if it could succeed, would inflict great hardship on
the people of India, would be fraught with the most
serious consequences to the people and the Government,
and that “‘ it is not necessary that the growth of the poppy
and the manufacture and sale of opium in British India
should be prohibited except for medical purposes.”

It must be remembered that opium is in India not only

’

a “‘treasured household remedy,” or, aside from that,

merely a means of miserable addiction of poor abandoned100

wretches. It has, for one thing, a wide use among cattle,
not alone as a veterinary remedy, but as a stimulant—
I suppose to divert their attention from what it means
to be a cow in India! Nay, more, .. . in the Indian
Assembly at Delhi on March 13, 1925, Mr. J. L. McAllum,
representing Burma, objected to statistics cited during a
debate on the Government’s opium policy, because they
took no account of the consumption of opium by elephants,
which, he said “‘ take opium in large doses.”

The truth is that the greatest use of opium in India is
as a ‘‘ booze,” not for cattle, or even for elephants, but
for people. In that same debate at Delhi one of the
principal speeches was by a native Indian, Dr. 8. K. Datta,
and Sir Basil Blackett, the Finance member of the
Cabinet, characterized it as a moderate and sincere
exposition of “‘the temperance view.” Mr. Cosgrave
pleaded for the coolies of Assam, who, he said, had found
it preventive of the evil effects of hard work and illness.
“Why,” he asked, ‘should the rich members of the
Assembly drinking wine in Delhi deprive the coolie of his
solace ? ”

Raw opium, dissolved in water or other liquid, is, as
the Royal Commission found, generally used in India as a
stimulant, with or without visibly harmful effects, quite
as alcohol in various forms is used in “enlightened ”
lands ; in social gatherings, and even in certain religious
and quasi-religious ceremonies. There is some reason
to suppose that its vogue as a “ booze ’’ is due in part to
the more rigid Mohammedan and Buddhist objections
to alcohol. Also, it is claimed by some persons that its
use as a stimulant is less harmful than that of alcohol in a
very moist, hot climate.

However these things may be, the practice is so deeplyOPIUM IN INDIA 101

imbedded in the social fabric, in ancient traditions and
customs, that one may fairly accept the view that it would
be quite impossible to enforce, and might be politically
injudicious to attempt to enforce, any sort of abrupt
prohibition ; even though many persons in a position to
know insist that the natives, as a whole, would welcome
it. In any event, the problem is obviously one of education
of the people, as well as of the officials, native and Euro-
pean, to the fact that opium is not a remedy but an active,
injurious poison, and that its use after the Indian fashion
is in no important respect better than that of alcohol or
than the smoking of opium—which all respectable Indian
folk conventionally affect to despise.

The National Christian Council of India, Burma and
Ceylon has recently issued a pamphlet? in which is amassed
a formidable body of virtually unanimous testimony from
persons of many sorts and classes, native and other, includ-
ing numerous doctors, familiar with the use of opium in
India, to the effect not only that it is injurious per se, but

ce

that its medical and ‘‘ semi-medical ”’ use constitutes but

a small factor in the universal consumption ; that any-
where from 40 to 85 per cent of it is ‘‘ mere addiction ’’—
bad habit.

The India Government refuses to carry on any sort
of propaganda among the people as to the injurious effects
of opium-addiction. Mr. Campbell, then chief delegate for
India, in November, 1924, asserted in the First Opium
Conference that when the Government attempted any
sort of propaganda the people invariably did the opposite.
In support of this extraordinary statement he cited the
alleged fact that in the campaigns against the plague the

1 Opium in India, published by National Christian Council of India,
Burma and Ceylon; 111 Russa Road, Calcutta, 1924,102 OPIUM

natives had defied the Government instructions, but when
the Government left them to their own devices, they
carried them out of their own accord! Mr. Campbell
was not at pains to explain the instance to which he
doubtless had reference: when during a battle with
plague in India devotees of a certain religious sect,
opposed to the killing of animals for any reason, benignly
saved the lives of plague-infected rats which the Govern-
ment was trying to exterminate, and released them in
other places, thus spreading the pest.
So, when the First Conference inserted in its draft
Convention Article VII, providing that
The Contracting Powers shall use their utmost efforts
by suitable instruction in the schools, dissemination of

literature and otherwise, to discourage the use of prepared
opium within their respective territories,

it was largely at the instance of the Indian delegation that
these words were added :

except where a Government considers such measures to be
undesirable under the conditions existing in its territory.

The Netherlands delegate had some compunctions too,
suggesting that propaganda against the use of opium
might suggest the idea to folks who hadn’t thought of it !

To be sure this had reference especially to the smoking
of opium, which, as a rule, is not practised in India,
except among the Chinese in Burma.

In 1925, the India Government is subsidizing the
cultivation of the poppy by loans without interest, pur-
chasing under exclusive power the entire crop at prices
fixed by itself, and selling it to its own people ; as well as to
the rest of the world by periodical auction at Calcutta, forOPIUM IN INDIA 103

export subject only to the presentation of an import certifi-
cate attesting another government’s approval of the same.
What if, instead of subsidizing the poppy-crop, the
India Government should put a premium upon the cultiva-
tion of other crops instead, by withholding such loans, and
giving its financial advantage only to such farmers as
would raise—say wheat? Wheat, for lack of which at
times India suffers from famine. Discover some prospect
of this in the following—it is from paragraph 2 of the
official report of C. L. Alexander, Secretary of the Board
of Revenue, to the Separate Revenue (Opium) Depart-
ment of the United Provinces ; dated March 3, 1921:

2. As the previous year had been an unfortunate one
and cultivators were consequently in need of money,
it might have been expected that settlements would have
been obtained without difficulty for the full area re-
quired ; but the area fell short by 16-15 per cent.

This shows that the price offered for opium was still in-
adequate. An average return of Rs.33-1 per bigha, even
taking into account the prices obtained for seed and in
some cases leaf and trash falls very far short of the profit
obtainable from the cultivation of wheat, the competing
crop. . . . It is satisfactory that the price of opium has
been raised again, and will in future be Rs.15 per seer.
The Board hope that this will lead to a fuller area being

obtained next year.

There appears the same significance in paragraph 4
of the report of Mr. C. E. Wild, the Government Opium
Agent, from the opium factory at Ghazipur, dated
January 18, 1921:

4. The season was again an unfortunate one for the
crop. . . . Showery and cloudy weather at the critical
time of lancing checked the flow of the latex and in the

end the yield was very disappointing. This misfortuneOPIUM

was accentuated, as wheat, the chief competing crop, did not
suffer and gave excellent results.

To make the picture complete, and vision the farmers
of India insisting upon raising poppies and ready to
revolt if it is interfered with, note paragraph 23 in Mr.
Wild’s report :

23. The thanks of the department are due to Mr. H.
Young and Pandit Champa Ram, Special Managers,
Courts of Wards, for their assistance in inducing the
men on their estates to engage for poppy. Quite an appre-
ciable area was obtained through their help.

These reports! also dwelt considerably upon the fact
that in the Ghazipur factory the India Government was,
at that time, producing opium alkaloids from the thin
dhoi (a liquid by-product of the packing of raw opium).
“ Unfortunately,’ laments Mr. Alexander, “in August,
1920, all shipments of alkaloids were stopped under
telegraphic orders from the Government of India, and it
was necessary to find other markets.” Mr. Wild reported
(paragraph 14) that “by advertising our laboratory
products a large demand for medical opium in cake and
powder is arising.” As we have seen, however, the produc-
tion of opium derivatives has not been and probably will
not be, except under extraordinary conditions such as
existed during the war, a practicable industry in India.
It is definitely asserted by those in a position to know,
that it is not done there to any considerable extent.

Apologists for the practices in India seem always to
take it for granted that the eating (and drinking) of opium,

1 Published at Allahabad: By the Superintendent, Government
Press, United Provinces, 1921. No. 179/V.0.334(10) of 1921.OPIUM IN INDIA 105

in vogue there, are somehow less noxious than the
smoking of it, as practised by the Chinese and others in
the Far East. There is no substantial justification for
this, the Royal Commission of 1893 or any other ante-
diluvian authority to the contrary notwithstanding. To
ordinary common-sense it would appear obvious that to
swallow all of the morphia in a dose of opium would be
more injurious than to inhale such portion of it as could
be obtained from the smoke of burning in a pipe. After
one of the apologists for opium eating had spoken in the
Second Opium Conference of the alleged injurious effects
of smoking as compared with eating opium, someone said
to him :

“Very well, I have two cigars. I propose to demoralize
myself by smoking one of them, while you eat the other.”

Dr. Frankland Dent, analysing opium smoking for the
Straits Settlements Opium Commission of 1908, found that
opium yields only about 1 per cent of its morphia in the
smoke, and that only a very small proportion of that
would remain on the mucous membranes of the smokers’
lungs. On the other hand, Sir David Galloway, M.D.,
commenting on this in his essay on opium-smoking,
remarks upon the presence of little-known secondary
toxic products of combustion having nothing directly to
do with the morphia-content of the smoke. Probably
the same may be said of tobacco-smoking.

Dr. Galloway, by the way, was a member of the Malaya
Opium Committee! of 1923, and in a paper read before
the Fifth Congress of the Far Eastern Association of
Tropical Medicine in that year, he said :

I scarcely think I require to demonstrate to you how
much more harmful is the eating than the smoking of

1 Referred to in Chapter IV of this book, page 57.OO

opium on the physical condition of the individual, but
there are other pernicious effects which seem to cling to
eating opium. The first of those is that the amount which
is eaten is far in excess of the amount which is necessary to
neutralize the effects of the smoking which has been given
up. The second is that the desire to increase constantly
the dose is far greater in eating than in smoking, and thus
the earning capacity of the eater is steadily encroached
on, and a time comes when he cannot afford to buy even
the dross to satisfy his craving, and he begins to look round
for a cheaper method of indulgence. The only cheaper
method is morphine injection, and it cannot be too clearly
understood that the unsatisfied opium eater is the potential
morphine injector.

Dr. Edward Morell Holmes, President of the British
Pharmaceutical Conference of 1900, Honorary Member
of the American Pharmaceutical Association, and
now Emeritus Curator of the Museum of the London
Pharmaceutical Society, writing of ‘‘Opium”’ in the
last (1911) edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica,
Says :

Opinions differ widely as to the injurious effect of the
habit; the weight of evidence appears, however, to
indicate that it is much more injurious than opium

smoking.

Aside from the representatives of China, Japan and
Siam, there were no Far Eastern Orientals in either of
the Opium Conferences to speak for themselves. Great
Britain, India, France, the Netherlands, Portugal—
controlling India, its Native States, Burma, the British
Crown Colonies, Indo-China, Java, Macao, were all repre-
sented by Europeans. There was no Indian present to
speak for the Indian people ; nevertheless a loud voice
was heard from India, in the form of a petition, signedOPIUM IN INDIA 107

by or in behalf of more than a quarter of a million
persons, and headed by the names of the Mahatma Ghandi,
Ramanandra Chatterjee and Rabindranath Tagore. And
it said :

The undersigned, viewing in the growing addiction to
narcotic drugs a deadly menace to individuals and to
nations, an insidious, rapidly-growing poisoning of the
human race, which can be overcome only by co-operation
among all nations, respectfully petition the International
Opium Conference assembling in November, 1924, to
adopt measures adequate for total extirpation of the plants
from which they originate, except as found necessary for
medicine and science in the judgment of the best medical
opinion of the world.

In a dispatch from Santinikitan (near Calcutta) to the
Manchester Guardian under date of January 12, 1925,
Mr. Ghandi is quoted as saying :

If the whole of the opium traffic were stopped to-day
and the sale restricted to medical use only, I know there
would be no agitation worth the name. Furthermore,
from the moral standpoint, there is no defence of the
Indian opium policy.

The All-India Congress Committee, meeting at Ahmed-
abad, June 27-29, 1924, declared by resolution its opinion
that

. . . The opium policy of the Government of India is
altogether contrary to the moral welfare of the people of
India and other countries; ... that the people of
India would welcome the total abolition of the opium
traffic for purposes of revenue, and . . . that the pro-
duction of opium is out of all proportion to the medical
requirements of India,| 108 OPIUM

In January, 1925, the following telegram to the League
of Nations was circulated in the Second Opium Confer-
ence, then-in session at Geneva :

Allahabad, 10th January, 1925.

Indian National Congress passed following resolution
at Belgaum regarding opium traffic: Congress is of opinion
that policy of Government of India in using drink and
drug habit of people as source of revenue is detrimental
to moral welfare of people of India and would therefore
welcome its abolition. Congress is further of opinion that
regulation by Government of India of opium traffic is
detrimental not only to moral welfare of India but of whole
world and that cultivation of opium in India which is
out of all proportion to medical and scientific require-
ments should be restricted to such requirements.

At about the same time came a telegram also from
Allahabad, attributed to the ‘‘ Liberal Federation,” and
saying :

Liberal Federation supports restriction opium medical
requirements : Chintamani, secy.

A month later, under date February 18, 1925, there
was distributed in the Conference this letter from C.
Sankarannair, President of the Indian Social Conference :

Fort, Bombay,
31st December, 1924.
SIR,

As President of the Indian National Social Con-
ference held at Belgaum on the 26th December, I have
been requested to forward to you for such action as you
may think fit to take, the following resolution, proposed
by Mr. Sunder Singh, seconded by Mr. Muzumdar, and
unanimously passed at the above Conference, and to
call your special attention to the second paragraph of the

resolution, ;OPIUM IN INDIA

The text of the resolution is as follows :

TOTAL PROHIBITION

This Conference declares that Indian public opinion is
strongly in favour of the policy of total prohibition of the
manufacture, import and sale of intoxicating drugs and
drinks, except for medicinal purposes, and urges the
Government of India and Provincial Governments to
declare immediately that it is their intention to adopt
that policy as early as possible, and to take prompt steps
to give effect to it.

This Conference accords its hearty support to the
endeavours made in the League of Nations to prohibit
the production of and trade in opium except for medicinal
purposes, but it is strongly of opinion that the manufacture
of and trade in alcoholic liquors, should be included in
the international agreement to effect this object.

This Conference expresses its high appreciation of the
excellent report of the Bombay Excise Committee, and
conveys its congratulations to its chairman and members
for the exhaustive arguments they have adduced in
support of their able plea for Prohibition as the only
acceptable policy for India.

This Conference further places on record its gratifica-
tion at the resolutions passed by some Provincial Legisla-
tive Councils, particularly the Bombay Council, recom-
mending the adoption of Prohibition as the goal of Excise
policy.

And this Conference empowers the President to com-
municate to the Secretary of State for India, the Govern-
ment of India and Provincial Governments, this resolu-
tion, and the second part of the resolution to the General
Secretary of the League of Nations,

This resolution is particularly interesting and import-

ant; not alone because it comes from a formidably

respectable and representative body of native Indian

people, but because it is welcomed by both the assailantsand the defenders of the India Government’s opium
policy. By the assailants because it shows that intelligent
Indian people indulge in no delusions about opium as a
“treasured household remedy” whose disappearance
would “‘inflict great hardship”; they class it with
drink, and want it treated accordingly. By the defenders
of the opium policy because it calls for prohibition of
opium and drink alike, and is therefore, from their point
of view, open to all the objections that can be urged
against prohibition. They presume that prohibition
means illicit manufacture, smuggling and “ boot-legging ”
generally, and that is their whole case against it—as
regards liquor and opium alike.

The India Government claims now that the control
of the internal situation is no longer in its hands; that
it is within the power of the Indian people themselves to
establish prohibition of opium if they choose to do so.
A memorandum circulated by the delegation in the
Second Opium Conference said :

The control of opium has, under the Constitution
introduced in 1919, been transferred to the Legislative
Councils of the various provinces, except in one instance,
and further restriction of consumption is a matter for
those Councils to deal with, and is no longer within the
powers of the Central Government. The possibility of
further advance in the direction of the suppression of the
use of opium depends upon public opinion among the
electorate to those Councils, and the Government of
India has made it known that it will not interfere with
the discretion of the Councils in this matter.

So we come back to the question of education—educa-
tion of people and government alike. And at that point
arises a consideration going far to remove the question
from the category of merely domestic affairs.OPIUM IN INDIA 111

In the British House of Commons on February 23,
1925, there was an interesting interchange following a
question by Mr. Johnston, Socialist member from Dundee,
about infant mortality in Bombay, and an answer by
Earl Winterton, Under-Secretary of State for India. The
inference from Mr. Johnston’s question, as it appeared in
his remarks, was that the extraordinarily heavy mortality
among infants in Bombay was due largely to the all but
universal practice in India of “‘ doping ”’ babies with opium.

There is no question about the existence of this
practice. Sir William Roberts, M.D., the only medical
member of the Royal Commission, devoted a considerable
portion of his memorandum (attached to the Com-
mission’s Report) to that subject. He had professional
compunctions about it, remarking that the practice
certainly was “‘ very objectionable ’’ from the European
point of view, but warning his English readers against
judging it from that standpoint, in view of the “ peculiar
conditions ” surrounding infancy in India, and the alleged
‘exceptional tolerance for opium of Indian infants.”
It seems not to have occurred to him that anybody could
be given ‘“‘ exceptional tolerance’ for almost anything
by habituating him to it from his birth!

That is exactly what they do. Dr. Roberts declared
that it was the practice, beginning at or soon after birth,
to give the infant a daily dose of from ;'s to ;y of a grain,
and steadily increase it, even to one or two grains, “ ac-
cording to the age and necessities of the child.’ At the
age of from three to even as late as five years the youngster
was ‘‘ weaned ”’ of his addiction. The Royal Commission
stated, and so did Dr. Roberts, that in Bombay “children’s
pills” (called bala gol’) were especially manufactured,
in two strengths of } and } of a grain of opium each, and

flavoured with various harmless spices. Yes,soldlike candy.OPIUM

I do not know whether this delectable confection is
still in vogue in Bombay. There was a rather half-
hearted denial of it from the India delegation in the
Second Opium Conference when Dr. Chodzko, the delegate
of Poland, asked about it; but the denial was not in-
sisted upon when the Pole produced the text of the Report.
But I do know that the practice of giving opium to babies
in India continues. A prominent member of the India
Government told me so in Geneva in December, 1924, and
Earl Winterton, in the debate referred to above, acknow-
ledged that the matter was under investigation. It is
a well-known fact that the Indian women working in the
factories or at home, habitually “‘ dope” their babies
to keep them quiet while they work. Dr. Roberts said
that nursing mothers in India even put opium on their
nipples to make the babies take it.

Mr. Johnston, of Dundee, declared in that Parliamentary
interchange that the infant mortality in Bombay in 1921
was 666 per thousand : Earl Winterton said it was 178-11.
Both cited official authority. The one was probably too
high: the other almost certainly too low. The third
edition of Turner and Goldsmith’s Sanitation in India,
published at Bombay in 1922, gives the crude infantile
death-rate there for the 20-year period 1901-1920 as
follows :

1901 574-5 1911 379°8
1902 542-8 1912 448-2
1903 532°3 1913 381-1
1904 459-2 1914 385-1
1905 557-1 1915 329-2
1906 534°7 1916 387°8
1907 423-6 1917 409-6
1908 450-1 1918 590°3
1909 404-7 1919 6528
1910 413-9 1920 552-2OPIUM IN INDIA 113

For certain technical statistical reasons, these figures
are subject to some slight discount downward ; but the
average works out to approximately 470, and in some
years it was far above 500 : which means, to put it bluntly,
that of every two children born in Bombay in such a year,
one died before he was a year old.

It is unfair, however, to attribute to opium alone the
excessive infant mortality in Bombay. There are many
other factors: of climate, hot-weather diseases, dirt,
flies, general ignorance. We have a very high infant
mortality in the slum sections of American cities, and it
cannot be attributed to opium.

Be the precise figures of infant mortality what they may,
there is one aspect of this question which has been wholly
neglected in all the discussions of the habitual use of
opium in India that I happen to have seen; an aspect
of such tremendous importance that I cannot understand
why it has been so completely overlooked. It ought to
be taken very seriously into account by both the defenders
and the assailants of the existing opium policy in the
Far East, as well as by those in Western countries who
are contending with the evil of manufactured derivatives
of opium and other narcotics. That is the relation of
these things to infectious disease. Malaria, for instance,
and cholera. Especially cholera.

ce

When Sir William Roberts was so casually “ white-

washing ’”’ the opium practices of the Indian people,
he did not know, he could not have known, that during the
thirty years—so productive and eventful in respect of
the development of the sciences of medicine and sanita-
tion—between the publication of the Royal Commission’s
Report in 1895 and the year of Our Lord 1925 there would

be revolutionary changes in the attitude of the medical
IIO

114

profession on the subject of narcotics—opium in particular.
This is a consideration greatly overlooked by those who
defend the Indian opium policy on the strength of the
Commission’s findings. It would be possible to frame a
defence of overcrowding in the New York or the London
Zoo by reference to the menagerie technique said to have
been practised in Noah’s Ark !

Specifically, Dr. Roberts could not have known—
because they were not made public until 1898—of the
experiments in respect of cholera and opium made in
Prof. Elie Metchnikoff’s laboratory in the Pasteur
Institute by Cantacuzene, Oppel and Gheorghiewsky.*
Metchnikoff himself tells about them in his /mmunity
in Infectious Diseases, published by the Cambridge
University Press in 1905. These men found invariably
that they could immunize guinea-pigs against cholera,
unless they had had opium. In every case those treated
with the narcotic died—of cholera. And the reason was
always the same. As Metchnikoff says (page 306), those
subjected to opium died, “‘ because the leucocytes, on
account of the narcotic action of the opium, were tardy

 

in coming up.”’

Dr. Hans Zinsser, Professor of Bacteriology in the
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University,
New York, reporting and commenting upon these dis-
closures in his Infection and Resistance (Macmillan, 1918),
points out that ‘ animals treated with opium are very
much more susceptible to infection than are normal
controls. . . . These experiments indicate very definitely
the inadvisability of using morphine and similar narcotics
in infectious diseases.”

Sir Leonard Rogers, Lieut.-Colonel, Indian Medical

1 Described in Ann. de l’Inst. Past., vol. 12, 1898.OPIUM IN INDIA 115

Service and Professor of Pathology in the Medical College
of Calcutta, in his paper “ Cholera Asiatica,”’ contributed
to the volume The Practice of Medicine in the Tropics
(London, 1922) is emphatic in his denunciation of “ certain
old forms of treatment,’ among them in particular the
use of opium, of which he says, “ if it has any effect at all
it will favour the retention of the toxins formed by the
cholera vibrio. Opium, moreover, most strongly pre-
disposes to the deadly continued suppression of the urine
and is absolutely to be avoided in cholera,”’

This view of the effect of opium upon cholera is con-
firmed in his /ssentials of Tropical Medicine (London, 1920)
by Dr. Walter E. Masters, Medical Officer, Gold Coast,
West Africa, long experienced in Belgian Congo and South
America. Incidentally Dr. Masters is equally emphatic
in his urgency against the use of opium in yellow fever.

Dr. Ernest E. Walters, Major in the Indian Medical
Service, director of the King Institute of Preventive
Medicine of Madras, in his contribution on ‘‘ Diarrhceas in
the Tropics’ to The Practice of Medicine in the Tropics,

‘ ,

writes of the “‘ peculiar form” of this affection due to
habitual drugging with opium, and found commonly
among opium eaters.

Manson-Bahr and Perry, in their essay on “ Bacillary
Dysentery,” in the same collection of papers, declare that
in that disease “‘ the routine use of opium in the treatment
of dysentery cannot be too strongly deprecated.”

Sir William Roberts, in the Royal Commission Report,
dilated upon the use of opium as a prophylactic and
febrifuge, with reference especially to the malaria which
is endemic in India. It was pardonable from him, because
he was writing at a time when malaria was attributed to

a ““miasma’”’ rising steam-like from the surface of116

swamps. We know better now. I have been unable to
find one modern authority who suggests the use of
opium or any other narcotic as either a prophylactic or
a remedy for malaria. Sanitation in India, by Turner
and Goldsmith ; Fevers in the Tropics, by Sir Leonard
Rogers ; I'he Prevention of Malaria, by Sir Ronald Ross ;
The Prevention of Malaria in Federated Malay States, by
Dr. Malcolm Watson—all go deeply into the subjects
of causes and means of infection and of treatment ; not
one of them mentions opium as of any value—not even
if administered directly to the germ-carrying mosquito,
whose importance in this particular connection was little
suspected by Sir William Roberts when he was writing
about malaria for the Royal Commission’s Report—
thirty years ago.

There was indeed a time when all over the world opium
was supposed to be efficacious for the prevention and the
treatment of malaria. Still survives in some quarters the
belief that this drug facilitates the operation of quinine.
But Dr. S. P. James, Adviser on Malaria to the British
Ministry of Health, formerly Secretary of the Com-
mission for the Study of Malaria in India, remarking
that in olden times before quinine became generally
available in England, the consumption of opium in the
principal marsh districts was enormously greater than the
healthier upland districts, declares that “the common
belief that opium assists the action of quinine is without
foundation.”! Malcolm Watson says, in The Prevention
of Malaria (p. 117): “I have often wished to try the old
native remedy of opium with the quinine, but have
never felt quite justified in doing so.”

1 Article, ‘‘ Malaria—Treatment,” in The Practice of Medicine in
the Tropics, vol. II, page 1648, London, 1922.OPIUM IN INDIA 117

The modern medical literature on other diseases in the
tropics virtually all deprecates the use of narcotics, and
especially opium. Of yellow fever, Dr. Walter E. Masters
says (in Hssentials of Tropical Medicine, London, 1920,
p. 371):

“To alleviate the symptoms—relieve pain by asperin
or phenacetin—never opium.”

Of diabetes in the tropics, Dr. Ernest E. Walters says
that in the Far East opium has a considerable reputation
in the treatment of the disease, but—

I have never been able to convince myself of its value.
. . . (And) Codeine is simply an expensive and less
efficient form of opium.

And so on. One searches in vain for modern medical
support for the superstition that opium is in any proper
sense either a remedy or a prophylactic ; anything except
an anodyne against pain. And yet, in the Second Opium
Conference at Geneva in February, 1925, Mr. Harold
Clayton (who succeeded Mr. Campbell as head of the
India delegation), exhibited to the conference, somewhat
as a South Carolina plantation hand might have exhibited
the left hind-leg of a rabbit ‘“ killed in a graveya’d in de
da’k ob de moon” ; as if the mere sight of it would be a
proof of its efficacy—a small bottle of chlorodyne (con-
taining opium among other things) and declared that he
would not go anywhere in India without it. And this
more than twenty years after Cantacuzene and his
colleagues in the Pasteur Institute had demonstrated
that opium helped the cholera bacillus to kill its victims.
These old-wives’ delusions do take an unconscionable
time a-dying !118 OPIUM

To be sure, this is a question for medical experts ; for
fearless and candid research, of Cantacuzene’s kind. But
of any disease of infection, whose cure requires the vigilant
operation of the natural guardians of the system, a school-
boy might have guessed that narcotics would retard the
defence. The medical testimony corroborates the guess.
Of course, opium does to the leucocytes (the white
corpuscles of the blood), normally the vigilant sentries
and scavengers which guard the body against infections,
precisely what it does to the human individuals—puts
them to sleep, or leaves them unfit for their job. They
work stupidly, or maybe not at all.

This consideration puts a new face upon the danger to
the whole world of opium addiction among the teeming
peoples of the Orient in the countries which are hot-beds,
forcing-grounds, starting-places, of the epidemics of in-
fectious diseases which decimate their populations and
sometimes spread out all over the world. From a new
angle appears justification of those who challenge the
right of the Powers located or having possessions in the
Far East to sequestrate the matter of the opium addiction
of their subjects as a subject of purely ‘“‘ domestic con-
cern.”

No informed person makes light of the enormous diffi-
culties confronting any serious, sincere attempt to
control, to circumscribe, eventually to extirpate, the
addiction of the people of India, China and other Oriental
countries to the use of these narcotics. Anything in
the nature of abrupt prohibition would be an empty
gesture, a farce, doing doubtless more harm than good.
But it is time for Great Britain, which is responsible for
the government of India, to recognize that the day has
come, not so much for a new policy as for a new point ofOPIUM IN INDIA

view. It is time to put the Report of the Royal Com-
mission of 1893 away in some museum of antiquities
where it is long overdue, and face the front in the light
of what has since been learned, and the fact that its
position is the backbone of reactionary opposition all
over the world. And in the light also of the fact that
that opposition facilitates the invasion of the high-power
drugs which are taking the place of opium in India as

they are everywhere else.CHAPTER VI
CHINA—SINNED AGAINST AND SINNING

ET it never be forgotten that China invented the

4 anti-opium movement. Probably nowhere in the
world at this moment is there stronger, more convinced,
better organized or better-informed support for the cause,
despite the fact that narcotic-addiction is raging in China
just now like a pestilence, as it has done in times past.
For that very reason, nowhere is there better first-hand
information—from experience—about the personal and
social disaster wrought by this vice. Conviction on the
subject expressed itself vigorously in China before the
Western world knew there was such a thing as opium.
Now, after a period of freedom, gained by an unparalleled
exhibit of national self-denial and governmental efficiency
in enforcement, China is again debauching herself, not
only by the widespread smoking of “‘ prepared’ opium,
made from raw material which, despite prohibitory laws
more drastic and until recently far better obeyed than
the American laws against liquor, she grows herself and
smuggles from all of the other producing countries; but
by increasingly widespread use of the high-power deriva-
tives which are pouring over all her borders, especially
from Germany, Switzerland and Japan. The present
state of affairs in China ensues upon the breakdown
and disorganization of government.

It is no part of our present purpose to analyse this
120OPIUM IN CHINA 121

aspect of China’s plight ; to seek the origins, the political
motives and sources outside of China which are respon-
sible for the recurrent turmoil in China. That is another
story, requiring the tracing into perhaps unsuspected
‘ civilized ’” quarters of one of the most tortuous threads
of the sinister tangle known as the Problem of Narcotics.
We shall keep to the main lines, meanwhile trying to be
fair to China, greatly as she may be to blame.

It is customary to refer to the vice of opium-smoking
as indigenous to China, with the inference that there is
something about the Chinese physique and character that
seems to make the use of opium not only relatively harm-
less but even necessary to his happiness and well-being ;
furthermore to assert that it is a custom going back into
the remotest antiquity of that ancient land.

Nothing of the kind. As China counts time, the vice
is a modern acquisition. And it was introduced by
Europeans, white men, not more than three hundred
years ago.

Opium was known in China, as it was in India, in very
ancient times; it is supposed to have been brought in
the first place from Arabia, or perhaps from Persia
whence it is flowing to this day; though the Persians
say it came there from India. But in both India and
China it was used almost exclusively as a medicine,
starting no doubt with the discovery of its pain-killing
property, and much in vogue especially in damp and
swampy regions because of its supposed virtues as a
prophylactic and febrifuge against malaria. There
appears little or no reason to suppose that in those old
days its use anywhere in the Far East partook of the
nature of a widespread vice.

It seems to have been early in the seventeenth century122 OPIUM

when Portuguese traders first introduced tobacco into
the Far East, and with it the practice of smoking. There
grew up—some writers say at first in Formosa whence it
crossed the straits to the Chinese mainland—a fashion of
mixing with the tobacco a small quantity of opium, which
these European traders brought along with the tobacco,
naturally doing all they could to encourage its use.

Professor Westel W. Willoughby, head of the depart-
ment of political science at Johns Hopkins University,
and legal adviser of the Chinese Government, 1916-17,
and of the Chinese delegations at the disarmament and
opium conferences, says ;*

Although the peculiar properties of opium and the fact
that it could be obtained from the poppy-plant were
well-known in China for many years before, there is no
good evidence that it was used except for medicinal
purposes before the beginning of the Manchu rule (a.D.
1644). Early in the eighteenth century, however, the
smoking of the drug had become a widespread vice ;
for in 1729 we find an edict of the Emperor forbidding the
sale of opium and the maintenance of places where it
might be smoked.

From that time on (Professor Willoughby goes on to
say), the vice has been the subject of continuous official
hostility and prohibition.

It was not through any failure of intent on China’s
part, but precisely because of the effectiveness of her
procedure in carrying out her prohibition of the narcotic
that at the muzzles of “civilized” guns she was com-
pelled to abandon that prohibition.

1 In his Foreign Rights and Interests in China, Johns Hopkins,
University Press, 1920.OPIUM IN CHINA 123

It is usual to say that Great Britain waged the so-called
“ Opium War ” of 1840 principally if not exclusively in
order to compel China to permit the importation of
opium. This is, to say the least, a straining of the facts.
That was indeed, one of the results of the war; but
opium was only one of the causes; or, if you insist, it
was only the immediate occasion. The Emperor sent to
Canton a particularly energetic official, one Lin Tseh-hsu,
with instructions to put a stop to the smuggling of opium
through that port, which was being done mostly in
British ships. He did it. He demanded, and got, and
forthwith destroyed in spectacular and thorough-going
fashion, by mixing with lime and pouring into the river,
a large amount of opium in the possession of the British.
When Capt. Charles Elliott, the British Superintendent of
Trade, refused to sign a bond authorizing the summary
confiscation of all ships which in future should be found
carrying opium, he and other English people were im-
prisoned. There were other episodes, such as a riot by
British sailors hunting for liquor in the shops. But behind
it all, as Prof. Willoughby says (and he certainly cannot
be suspected of unfairness to the Chinese), lay the un-
compromisingly hostile attitude and undisguised con-
tempt of the Chinese towards all manner of Europeans,
especially the British, whom they did not regard and
would not treat as their equals from any point of view.
The explosion was inevitable, and it could have but one
result.

The Chinese paid an indemnity of $21,000,000, in-
cluding $6,000,000 for opium worth perhaps a third of
that sum, and were forced to surrender Hong Kong
outright to the British and open to foreign trade the
“treaty ports’ of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo andOPIUM

Shanghai. As a matter of fact, opium was not discussed—
“ the tail went with the hide.”

Even then the Chinese did not learn the lesson ; fifteen
years later there was a second war, and this time France
participated as Great Britain’s ally. Between them they
effectually removed from the Chinese mind the delusion
of racial superiority so far as concerned such practical
matters as physicalforce. And the two wars riveted opium
upon China for fifty years ; not only in respect of import
of opium from India, but of the resumption of permitted
cultivation in China itself. Incidentally, they established
at China’s doorstep centres, first of legalized importation
of opium and later of smuggling of opium and drugs.

Thus much of history. Let the past bury its dead,
and hope that this is another day. Come down to modern
times and read the article about “Opium” by Dr.
Edward Morell Holmes in the Encyclopedia Britannica
(1911). Mr. John Campbell himself, who upon every
occasion has been exceedingly critical of China, assures us?
that it is impartial :

The Chinese Government, regarding the use of opium
as one of the most acute moral and economic questions
which as a nation they have to face, representing a total
annual loss to the country of 856,250,000 taels (approxim-
ately $600,000,000 U.S.), decided in 1906 to put an end
to the use of the drug within 10 years, and issued an
edict on the 20th of September, 1906, forbidding the con-
sumption of opium and the cultivation of the poppy. As
an indication of their earnestness of purpose the Govern-
ment allowed officials a period of six months in which to
break off the use of opium, under heavy penalties if they
failed to do so...

(Then follows a brief account of the prohibition of

1 See Minutes, Fourth Session of Opium Advisory Committee,
January 8, 1923, page 12.OPIUM IN CHINA 125

opium in the Philippines by the United States Govern-
ment, and the Shanghai Opium Conference of 1909.)

. . . The British Government made an offer in 1907
to reduce the export of Indian opium to countries beyond
the seas by 5100 chests, i.e. one-tenth of the amount
annually taken by China, each year until the year 1910,
and that if during these three years the Chinese Govern-
ment had carried out its arrangement for proportionally
diminishing the production and consumption of opium
in China, the British Government were prepared to con-
tinue the same rate of reduction ; so that the export of
Indian opium to China would cease in 10 years ; the re-
strictions of the import of Turkish, Persian and other
opiums being separately arranged for by the Chinese
Government, and carried out simultaneously.

The good faith of China in carrying out its part of the
bargain, and its success in enforcing its own determination,
are not seriously disputed. Dr. Holmes goes on to say
that Mr. E. S. Little, after travelling through Western
China, reported in May, 1910, “ that all over the province
of Szechuan ”’ (the chief poppy-growing district), “‘ opium
had almost ceased to be produced, except only in a few
remote districts on the frontier.”

Eric Teichman, Chinese secretary to the British
Legation at Peking, then on special service to the Tibetan
frontier, in his T'ravels of a Consular Officer in North-west
China, wrote in 1917, of the province of Kansu parti-
cularly, that while it used to be a centre for the best opium

‘

grown in China, the trade there was now “ more or less

extinct,’ and added :

The success of China’s measures for the suppression
of poppy cultivation has been one of the most striking
events in her recent history. . . . Further the success

1 Cambridge University Press, 1921.OPIUM

which has been attained has been accomplished in the
face of great obstacles, such as the revolution, after which
there was a general recrudescence of cultivation.

This was corroborated by Sir John Jordan (at that
time Teichman’s superior as British Minister at Peking),
who told the Opium Advisory Committee in 1923 that in
1917 China was practically free from opium cultivation.

But, while there can be equally no question as to the
good faith, or, in the main, as to the efficiency of the British
and Indian Governments in carrying out their end of the
agreement, opium continued to flow into China, together
with an increasing amount of manufactured drugs. In
1920, according to a memorandum filed by the Inter-
national Anti-Opium Association with Sir Beilby Alston,
British Minister at Peking, upon his return to England,
Sir Francis Aglen, the Inspector-General of the Chinese
Maritime Customs, had reported that during the previous
three years the Chinese Customs had seized 40 tons of
opium, 50 hundredweight of morphia and nearly 20
hundredweight of cocaine. The aggregate value of these
seizures was estimated at $10,500,000 (Mex., equivalent
to about $5,250,000 U.S.). The memorandum attributed
to the Chinese Maritime Customs the opinion that a large
part of the opium being smuggled into China was “ of
Indian origin’’; but if it was, it is fairly certain that
it was smuggled either over the frontiers or from some
country to which India legitimately exported it. Sir
Francis Aglen was quoted as remarking that these seizures
represented but a small percentage of the total smuggling
of narcotics into China.! (It is roughly estimated by

1 The memorandum of the Anti-Opium Association was published

in full, with much other illuminating information on the general sub-
ject, in the Peking and Tientsin Times, September 6, 1920.OPIUM IN CHINA 127

customs officers generally that even the most effective
vigilance detects at the maximum not more than 10 per
cent of smuggled material.)

Well, China has badly backslid. No intelligent Chinese
or candid friend of China denies that. With the collapse of
effective government in China, and the political chaos which
has supervened, the grip on the opium situation broke, and
the cultivation of the poppy and the production of opium
have been resumed on an increasingly extensive scale.

Mr. Teichman, in the preface of his book, quoted above,
says that his remarks of 1917 about the disappearance
of poppy cultivation “ no longer hold good ’’—

In the spring of 1919 the writer travelled for days
through districts in Western Szechuan where the cultiva-
tion of opium had previously been completely eradicated,
without ever being out of sight of the countless fields
of red and white poppy in full bloom : the price of opium
was everywhere rapidly falling, and the populations of
the out-of-the-way cities were again sodden with the drug.

Indeed, in some sections, opium cultivation has
become virtually compulsory. The local military chief-
tains and leaders of bands of armed brigands, as means of
income and to pay the expense of their guerilla warfare,
have compelled the farmers, under pain of death, to
cultivate the poppy, promptly appropriating part or all
of the fruits. A letter from South Szechuan to the Inter-
national Anti-Opium Association! in 1924 is significant
and typical :

The long-dreaded has taken place: military orders
to sow poppy. An ex-robber in charge of cultivation in

1 See Minutes of Sixth Session, Opium Advisory Committee,
August 4-14, 1924, page 120.our district has threatened our Christians with the
murder of their children if they refuse to plant poppy.

An idea of the technique of the thing, and the brazen
attitude of public officials in some parts of China, may be
gained from this translation of the text of an official
proclamation of a magistrate of T’ien Ch’uan district,
dated October 2, 1924:

Orders have been received from the Superior Author-
ities to the effect that the application of the people of the
Yachow jurisdiction for permission to grow opium has
been granted. As regards T’ien Ch’uan it has been
settled that in upland parts 4,500 wo shall count as 1 mou
and in dyke land 3,000, a fine! being collected of $3 per
mou. The fine must be paid before planting and the report
as to planting, together with the money, must be sent
in between the Ist of the Ninth Moon and the 15th of the
Tenth Moon of the old calendar (equivalent to Sept. 29th
and Nov. 11th).

The burden on the people of the district of raising funds
for army pay has this year been particularly heavy, but
in the present permission to grow opium they have an
excellent opportunity to recoup themselves completely.

Reports and money should be sent in without delay to
the nearest rural authorities in order that officials may be
sent to verify the facts. It is important that the people
act without hesitation in this matter.

(Seal of T’ien Ch’uan Hsien.)

In addition to such facts as these is the undeniable
fact that at the close of 1923 a wholly misleading if not
altogether untruthful report was made by a Chinese High

1 The ‘‘ fine” is tribute to the existence of the Chinese law pro-
hibiting absolutely the cultivation of the opium poppy. Looks very
much like the custom not unknown in America of periodically col-
lecting ‘‘ fines’ from prohibited vices—allowing them to go on just
the same !—J.P.G.

2 aN asresins eens ees

     
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
   

_

OPIUM IN CHINA 129

Commission as to opium cultivation in various provinces.
It was calculated to give the impression that there was
virtually no poppy cultivation in districts notoriously
devoted to it. The essential falsity of this report went far
to justify—or seem to justify—charges against China made
in both of the Geneva Conferences. Of the fact of China’s
backsliding there can be no honest question.

Doubtless multitudes of the Chinese are willing enough
to enter upon this lucrative production on their own
account, taking advantage of the palsy of the Govern-
ment to enforce the still-existing law, in the enforcement
of which the old despotism was merciless. And there is

abundant reason to suppose that one of the principal

ec 3)

factors in the recurring “‘ rebellions

in China is the lust
for the immense profits obtainable from the traffic in
opium. Increasing evidence of powerful and far-ramifying
organizations in China to garner and augment them. }

Many members of the Chinese official class are involved
in this business, as they have been in the past. Official
participation in bootlegging and other remunerative
violations of law is not an American invention—vide the
records of illustrious backing of one Captain William
Kidd, pirate de luxe / J. O. P. Bland, in his biography
of the late Li Hung Chang,? quotes Dr. G. E. Morrison,
correspondent of the London Times, as having stated in
1894 that while that distinguished Chinese diplomat was
vocal in disapproval of the use of opium and of the traffic
in it, the Li family was among the largest owners of poppy-

* Here comes in collaterally the question of the illicit traffic in
privately manufactured arms and ammunition. If the Chinese
brigands could not get modern rifles, artillery and other munitions
(whence 7), they could not keep China in a continual uproar, and some
government might resume the interrupted suppression of opium pro-
duction. But that is, perhaps, “‘ another story.’’—J.P.G.

* Ii Hung Chang, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1917.
K130 OPIUM

growing land in Central China. He asserted, further, that
Li Hung Chang’s adopted son, Li Ching Fang, as Minister
abroad, was equally eloquent against the vice and the
trade, and equally a beneficiary of the production of the
raw material for both. Mr. Bland repeats the familiar
insinuation that the efforts of such Chinese to stir up
missionary zeal against the importation of Indian opium
and to give the impression that India was flooding the
world with it were inspired by their notorious interest in
the home industry.

At the same time there has been a great increase in
addiction to opium-smoking and the use of narcotics of all
available kinds. Evidence of this comes from all parts of
China. For example, a letter from Yungsui in the province
of Hunan says: “ You can smell opium in front of almost
every house as you go through the street. The people will
tell you of the terrible effects of the drug while they con-
tinue to puff away at the opium-pipe.”’

The International Anti-Opium Association, which by
the way includes many Chinese in its membership and
support, made in 1923-24 an investigation! which showed
beyond question the prevalence of poppy cultivation
and production of opium in a majority of the provinces
of China; although it showed also that in some of them
the governors still enforce the law against cultivation in
their territories, even if they cannot prevent the smuggling
into them of opium from the surrounding provinces.
And of drugs.

The curse of opium in China is not solely in its direct
injury to the addicts. It has disastrous indirect effects.

1 The results are set forth in an Annex to the Minutes of the Sixth
Session of the Opium Advisory Committee.OPIUM IN CHINA 131

It is a close ally of the floods in the great shallow river
valleys which constitute a leading cause of the recurrent
famines. As Samuel Merwin says in his Drugging a
Nation, from which I already have quoted :

Where the delicate poppy is reared, it demands and
receives the best land. It thrives in the rich river-bottoms.
It has crowded out grain and vegetables wherever it has
spread, and has thus become a contributing factor to
famines. Its product, opium, has run over China like
a black wave, leaving behind it a misery, a darkness, a
desolation that has struck even the Chinese, its victims,
with horror.

Merwin quotes an appeal from four viceroys to the
Emperor, to the effect that

China never can be strong and stand shoulder-to-
shoulder with the powers of the world unless she can
get rid of the habit of opium-smoking by her subjects,
about one-quarter of whom have been reduced to skeletons
and look half-dead.

The overcrowding of the land, the inadequate methods
of agriculture upon soil which must produce great crops if
the people are not to starve, but cannot do so in great
regions because of the floods which ruin it ; the resulting
famines and the consequent disorganization of social
and family life, constitute one of the factors in the present
situation, because thousands of men, especially vigorous
young men, take to brigandage, and help to swell the
forces of the military chieftains who keep the country
upset, the poppy growing and the illegal opium trade
thriving.

1 An instructive discussion of the relation between flood, famine

and brigandage in China is to be found in Chapter XII of The Character
of Races, by Ellsworth Huntington, Scribner’s, New York, 1924.132 OPIUM

On the strength of the evidence of renewed cultivation
of the poppy in China, it has become the fashion to attri-
bute to that country the bulk of the illicit trade in “ raw ”’
and “‘ prepared”’ opium. In the Geneva Conferences,
Great Britain, India, France, Holland and Portugal all
made the alleged or potential smuggling from China their
pretext for refusing to prohibit now or within any
definitely measurable time the production and use of
opium within their territories. For this purpose the
amount of the Chinese production has beén grotesquely
exaggerated, though the only definite figure ever given was
a rather hysterical missionary estimate transmitted with-
out comment by the International Anti-Opium Association
—against the validity of which the Chinese representatives
vigorously protested—of “‘ 15,000 tons a year,” which is
probably a good deal more than is produced at present in
the whole world. It is difficult to understand how anybody
at all informed about opium could repeat the figure with
a straight face; yet Mr. Campbell (whose intelligence
cannot be questioned) did so repeatedly in the First Geneva
Conference, with the implication that India was in danger
of being overwhelmed by a flood of Chinese opium.

Yet, as recently as January 8, 1923, Mr. Campbell
seems not to have regarded China—whose internal con-
ditions then were substantially the same—as a serious
contributor to the world situation. When on that day
the Opium Advisory Committee was discussing the sources

of opium, Mr. Campbell

. wished to give some approximate statistics regard-
ing the production of opium in Turkey and Persia, with
the effect of affording a concrete idea of the gravity of the
situation. These had been obtained partly from trade
sources, and the figures for Turkey referred to the pre-warOPIUM IN CHINA 133

Turkish Empire. From these statistics it appeared that
about two-thirds of the whole quantity of raw opium
available for world consumption outside of the producing
countries was produced in Persia and Turkey. This was
the central fact which the Committee should keep in
mind. India was responsible for about one-third of the
total quantity, and the control was most strict.

During the War (Mr. Campbell added) the supply from
Turkey and Persia being cut off, practically all of the
morphine used by the Allied Armies was made from
Indian opium which the Indian Government supplied at
pre-war prices. . . . The Indian Government . . . was
anxious that some practical proposal should be adopted
which would have the effect of controlling the other two-
thirds of the world’s supply.?

The Committee of Experts of the Second Opium Con-
ference at Geneva accepted as reasonable an estimate
of 8,600 tons as the total annual production of raw opium
in the world, and that included 5,000 tons attributed to
China. But we have an even better estimate: better
because disinterested so far as China is concerned. When
the drug interests of Basle in 1923 were doing their utmost
to prevent the belated ratification by Switzerland of the
Hague Convention of 1912, they made a scrupulously,
scientifically thorough study of the whole situation as
regards opium and narcotics, and issued, for confidential
circulation, a pamphlet in the course of which they
analysed and co-ordinated all the information available
about opium production, concluding as regards China that:

It follows that the actual production will be 5 million
kilograms a year.?

 

1 Minutes, Fourth Session, page 11. The italics are mine.—J.P.G.

2 Tl en resulterait que la production actuelle serait 5 million kgs. per
an.—From pamphlet: La Convention Internationale de VOpium, et sa
Ratification par la Suisse : Etude Documentaire par Il Industrie Suisse
Intéréssé ; Bale, Geneva, Schénenwerd, Zéfingen, Octobre, 1923.134

This is approximately 5,000 tons, which tallies with the
estimate of the Committee of Experts, as well as with other
reasonable estimates and the general probabilities. It is
indeed remarkable that this figure emerges from almost
any angle of approach.

We may fairly assume that in the old days before 1907,
when the production of opium was legal, China was
producing as much as she could to compete with upward of
3,100 tons annually imported from India. Dr. Holmes in
his Britannica article says that she consumed then 380,000
piculs a year, of which she produced 325,000.1 If her
normal consumption, with a presumably smaller popula-
tion, was anything like 380,000 piculs, the illegal pro-
duction now, by however much it may exceed the con-
servative estimate of 5,000 tons—even if it be 15,000 or
more—cannot leave any great margin for export, licit or
illicit. In fact, however, China is not producing now all
that she could. According to information that I deem
reliable, in at least eight of the twenty-one provinces
there is little or no production of opium. Not all of the
provincial governors have bowed the knee to this Baal.
But there is no province into which smuggled opium is
not going. Smuggled opium—and drugs.

It is impossible to say how much opium is being pro-
duced in China. Nobody knows. But anybody who cares
to inquire can learn that enormous amounts of both
opium and drugs are pouring into China. And that has

been going on increasingly for twenty years. China's
neighbours, especially on the north and north-east,
promptly took advantage of the slowing down and
stoppage of opium cultivation in China after 1907. In

1 A “picul,” “chest” or “ package” of opium is 133} Ibs. avoir-
dupois. Thus, 325,000 piculs would be approximately 20,000 long tons.OPIUM IN CHINA 135

the Maritime Province of Siberia, around Vladivostok—
persons who were there at the time have told me—
poppy-crops broke out like a skin disease. Poppy
cultivation became a veritable rage on the part of almost
everybody who had a few square yards of land. Nor was
it confined to China’s northern neighbours ; opium came
from all directions. Sir John Jordan, at the first meet-
ing of the Opium Advisory Committee, at Geneva, May
4-5, 1920, declared himself ‘‘ in a position to prove that
a very great quantity of opium was entering China every
year.” His assertion was not challenged ; nor could it be.
True as it was then, it is even more so now.

The evidence of this appears curiously in much of the
documentary evidence put forth to convict China of
smuggling opium owt. For example there is a report from
the British Foreign Office to the League of Nations,
dated March 24, 1924, based on a British consular report,
showing a heavy traffic in opium between Chinese
Turkestan and Asiatic Russia. But clearly the opium
is passing into China, cotton and silk from the region of
Uch Turfan in China going out in exchange for it. Says
the British communication :

Two rolls of cotton cloth costing one taelt in Uch
Turfan will fetch enough to buy 16} ounces of opium.
The chief commodities which are sold in Semiryetchensk
to pay for the opium are Kashgar cotton cloth, boots and
shoes, fleeces, English muslin and thread. . . . Enormous
quantities of manufactured and unmanufactured leather,
as well as of cloth, dyes, etc., were imported into Russia
from Chinese territory in 1920 and 1921 in exchange for
opium at highly favourable rates. . . . While the Govern-

1 The value of the tael varies widely in various parts of China.
In this connection it can be roughly figured at about 70 cents (3
shillings ; 12—14 franes, French).
2 The italics are mine,—J,P.G.OPIUM

ment of Chinese Turkestan claims credit for prohibiting
the cultivation of the poppy in the province, it is clear

. . that it is more profitable for them to exchange the
cotton and silk fabrics which have long been produced in
the country for foreign opium, which can be obtained at
highly favourable rates from the neighbouring countries,
than to grow an inferior quality of opium at home.

Now, waiving such apparent inconsistencies in the
British report as this reference to “ inferior quality ”’ of
the Chinese opium in contrast with a previous statement
in the same document that it is so good that only higher
Chinese officials can afford it, and therefore the inferior
Russian article can compete with it ; the British cannot
in fairness have both sides of the argument. Nor do the
Chinese concede it. Under date of December 9, 1924,
the Civil Governor of Sin Kiang replies hotly to the charge,
alleging that his application of the death penalty and
other punishments including life-imprisonment have
entirely stopped poppy-culture in the province ; but that
there is a heavy incoming traffic in opium by foreigners,
including British subjects, some of whom he calls by name.
He charges that the Chinese officials have drawn the
attention of the British and Russian consuls to the activi-
ties of their nationals in this business—‘‘ unfortunately
our protests met with no genuine or adequate reply. All
we do is to burn the seized opium and to allow the offenders
against our laws and the International Convention to
escape, because these foreign smugglers are protected by
consular jurisdiction.” Further :

We would mention, too, that in the month of August,
1919, we informed the British Consul in our province that
numerous foreign nationals, including British subjects,
were importing opium into the south of our provinceee enone eon ot anno ne somone

Ty

  

OPIUM IN CHINA 137

through British territory, or through territory guarded
by British troops or officials,! and asked him to report
the fact to the British authorities of those places in order
to prevent the opium traders from passing the frontier
if they were nationals of countries other than China, or to
deliver them over to our authorities if they were Chinese.
The British Consul consented to request the competent
authorities to take steps in the sense desired, but foreign-
ers continue to smuggle on the frontier as before, and
Chinese traders who take refuge in territories under
British control are never handed over to the Chinese
authorities, and are therefore protected and go unpun-
ished.

The document accuses the British of failure to inform
the Chinese authorities of various matters alleged by
them, and protests against their receiving first notice of
them through a communication of the Foreign Office to
the League of Nations. As for the Russians, the Civil

Governor of Sin Kiang goes on to say :

Since the revolution, the Russian authorities have
abandoned the system of passports outside our frontiers,
and when Chinese subjects cross the frontier at Ili to
enter Russian territory, the Russian authorities allow
them to enter freely and provide them with land for poppy
cultivation. Such remunerative freedom has, it is true,
tempted some of our more unscrupulous subjects who
have crossed the frontier. . . . Time and again we have
addressed urgent requests to the Russian authorities
beyond our frontiers asking them to extradite these
poppy-cultivators established within their territory, in
order that we may punish them.

The only difficulty consists in suppressing opium
smuggling because a large number of foreign nationals
protected by the privilege of extra-territoriality conduct

1 The province of Sin Kiang adjoins the north-west corner of
Tndia.—J.P.G.OPIUM

a contraband trade along our frontiers and in our territory,
wilfully disregarding the laws of China, the Convention
and the treaties, in spite of our protests and repeated
applications to the foreign consulates and authorities.1

Another document of similar significance as to the
Chinese destination of the extensive smuggling of opium—
this time dealing with the product unquestionably grown
in China itself—is a British Government memorandum
(O.C. 246) circulated in the Second Opium Conference at
Geneva, dated January 22, 1925, and reporting the re-
sults of a trip by the British Consul-General at Yunnan-
Fu in March and April of the previous year. This docu-
ment fully corroborates the reports of heavy opium-
culture in Yunnan (the southernmost province of China,
adjoining Indo-China). But the extraordinary aspect of
it is that it accounts for every pound of opium produced
in Yunnan as being evther consumed in that province or
shipped to other parts of China. Even such of it as got
out through Indo-China seemed to be on its way back into
China through the border port of Moncay and the adjoin-
ing Tung Hing.

We have indeed to confirm this British official a specific
and somewhat dramatically well-authenticated instance
in which Yunnan opium found its way into outside terri-
tory ; but even in that instance the record (and the record
is not Chinese) shows in so many words, and as the excuse
of the French officials who permitted it, that it was
definitely on its way back into China.

The military Governor of Yunnan (who somehow has
gained lately the reputation of being one of the richest

1 The full correspondence is to be found in League of Nations

Documents, O.C. 156, 1923, O.C. 183, 1924, C. 120.M.67, 1924, and O.C.
257, 1925. (AJl mentioned in the last-named.)OPIUM IN CHINA 139

men in China) has difficulty in getting the opium, raised
under the muzzles of his guns in defiance of the law of
China, out of his province. He is surrounded on the north
and east by high mountains, on the west by British
Burma, and on the south by French Indo-China. (We
need not stress the powerful French influence over Yunnan
—doubtless in this matter that is extraneous.) On one
occasion this Governor did get his opium out—by rail
through Tonkin, with the express permission of French
officials in Indo-China. In the First Opium Conference at
Geneva, on November 6, 1924, this affair was the subject
of a lively interchange between Dr. Sze, the Chinese
Minister at Washington, head of the Chinese delegation at
Geneva, and M. Clinchant, then the senior delegate of
France.

It appeared that this wholly illegal transaction was
reported by the British chargé d'affaires to the French
Government at Paris. In reply he received from the
Prime Minister, M. Poincaré himself, a letter dated June
22, 1923, which was read to the conference by M. Clinchant
—in part as follows :

It was owing to the insistence officially of the authori-
ties of Yunnan that the Governor of Indo-China had
considered it right to authorize as an exceptional measure
the transport via Tonkin of a consignment of Yunnanese
opium, of which the destination was another southern
province of China.1 The dispatch of this consignment
was not a case of transit properly so-called, and the
authorization granted was justified by the facts pre-
sented to the Governor-General of Indo-China. I have
nevertheless given instructions that it shall not occur

again,

1 The italics are mine.—J.P.G,.140 OPIUM

Undoubtedly there is smuggling of opium out of China
—nobody can say how much. Just because the Chinese
opium is of inferior potency and therefore cheaper in all
markets normally, it is no doubt smuggled out to some
extent, to compete especially with the Indian article
in that market to which the Indian opium is largely con-
fined ; namely, in the territories in the Far East where
opium still is lawfully smoked. Also no doubt to some
extent over the borders of Burma and India proper,
where the lower price will tempt the poor. A real control
of production in any other of the producing countries, or
any cause operating to curtail supply or raise the price,
might give the Chinese opium a chance even in the world
market. After all, morphia is morphia, and the law of
demand and supply overrides the imaginary lines of
political geography and considerably evades the most
vigilant custom-houses.

On January 27, 1925, the customs authorities at Cal-
cutta seized “‘ prepared ” opium presumed to be Chinese,
concealed in life-jackets on the steamship “ Tairea,”’ upon
her arrival from China. The opium was packed in tins,
hermetically sealed; the top impressed with Chinese
characters. It was inferred that this indicated the
existence in China of a modern packing-plant for the
tinning of opium, and obviously the prevalence of a heavy
smuggling out of its product. Well, in the first place,
there are considerable canning enterprises in China, for
the tinning of vegetables, fish, crab-meat, etc.; under
existing conditions in China it would not be difficult to
arrange for the tinning of opium as well—with or without
the connivance of the responsible owners of the plant.
But let that pass ; a more important consideration would
be the amount of the opium,OPIUM IN CHINA

b

There were “ 132 tolahs’
you didn’t know that a “ tolah”’ is 180 grains! In other

of it—an imposing total, if

words, this was a seizure of a trifle over three pounds,
avoirdupois. A good deal of publicity was given to this
seizure ; for the reason, in my opinion, that it was the
first identifiably Chinese opium to be seized at Caleutta—
at any rate, I have been able to find no published announce-
ment of any other. As for its being in fact Chinese ;
probably it was, but one would like to know whether the
“Tairea”’ (which by the way runs out of the opium-
saturated port of Bushire on the Persian Gulf) stopped
overnight at Macao, where, as we shall see presently,
there exist both the opportunity and the incentive to
make ‘‘ prepared ”’ opium look as if it came from China.
In any event, compare this with the tons, the hundreds
of tons, of opium undeniably going into China.

The British authorities at Hong Kong reported seizures
there in 1923 of more than 50,000 ounces (some 3} tons) of
opium declared to be Chinese. They seized also a large
quantity of Chinese documents which disclosed the
existence and the methods of wealthy and powerful
syndicates of Chinese engaged in smuggling. A British
memorandum announcing this declares that “‘ the amount
of Chinese raw opium mentioned in the documents
examined amounted to over 600,000 taels (800,000 ounces)

9?

smuggled within a period of 12 months.” The memoran-

dum asserts that this opium was “‘ mostly of Chinese origin.”’
The British authorities in Malaya announced that their

seizures in 1923 and the first eight months of 1924 were :

1923 1924 (8 mos.)
Steamers from Europe 21 7
Steamers from India 15 8

Steamers from ChinaPerna,

142

Lord Cecil told the Second Opium Conference on January
21, 1925, that the total consumption of Indian govern-
ment (lawful) opium at Hong Kong was 224 tons a year ;
that the papers of only one Chinese syndicate disclosed
that it was smuggling an amount equal to that total. And
the Malaya announcement attributed to one syndicate
the smuggling of opium at the rate of 567 kilograms a
month—6,084 (more than 6 tons) a year.

Of the 229 steamers seized in 1923 only 36 are named ;
of these 18 were British, 11 Dutch ; one each respectively
Belgian, Norwegian, Chinese and Danish ; three not listed
in Lloyds. At the beginning of the present year (1925)
Great Britain issued regulations forbidding British ships
to be used in this traffic. A good and much-needed
example ; a long step would be taken toward the sup-
pression of narcotic smuggling if every nation would
make the owners and masters of ships heavily responsible
in respect of this traffic.

It does not necessarily follow that Chinese syndicates
and individuals are dealing in Chinese opium, or that a
ship from China with opium on board necessarily got it
there. One unsophisticated might suppose that the
cargoes of those ships seized in Malaya consisted entirely
of opium ; whereas in fact most if not all of the seizures
were relatively small in bulk. Yet in the conference at
Geneva Lord Cecil used the expression ‘laden with
opium”! One hopes that the ‘‘Tairea,’’ for example,
will not be described as “laden” with its ‘‘ 132 tolahs ”’—
three pounds, five ounces.

One of the biggest seizures, of 84 tons of raw opium,
in a cave on an island near Hong Kong, was largely of
opium from Persia.

Consider now the results of a sensational raid by theOPIUM IN CHINA 143

police in the International Settlement at Shanghai in the
same month of January, 1925, in which those “ 132
tolahs ” turned up at Calcutta. It is thus described in a
Shanghai dispatch to the London Times of February 16th :

In cupboards was discovered opium estimated at the
value of $1,250,000. There was also a mass of documents
revealing an immense organization for the import of
Turkish opium. This is shipped from Constantinople
to Vladivostok, but diverted at Shanghai, where delivery
is taken outside the Woosung Forts, and the cargo trans-
ferred thence to the Kaingnan arsenal, both places being
outside the Shanghai harbour limits. . . . The names of
firms at Constantinople and Basle [Switzerland], and a
Japanese firm were mentioned, as well as those of the
Chinese, as implicated. A telegraphic code for dealing
in opium, heroin, morphia and cocaine was found, as well
as contracts made out in dollars, yen, sterling and
Turkish currency, amounting to millions of dollars.

This discovery was made as a by-product of a civil suit,
ensuing upon the falling-out of some of the parties,
quarrelling over the division of the spoils. The papers
in the case afford an illuminating exhibit of persons and
methods in the illicit traffic.

There is no method by which Chinese opium, or ¢licit
opium from any other source, can be identified with
certainty. A morphia-content below 10 per cent, other
things being equal, would justify a presumption that the
specimen was Indian or Chinese; if below 9 per cent
probably the latter. But neither after blending with
high-percentage Persian or Turkish—which is commonly
done—could be unmistakably identified. There is no
difficulty about disguising it completely.144 OPIUM

When the British authorities at Hong Kong or Singa-
pore, the Dutch in Java, the Japanese in Formosa, or the

‘

“farmer” at Macao, make into “ prepared” opium for
legalized smoking in their territories the “ raw” opium
which they purchase from the India Government, it is
customary to put into it a certain special and more or
less secret chemical ingredient, having no perceptible
effect upon the opium, for the sole purpose of identifica-
tion ; just as the “‘ farmers ”’ in those places used to do
for their own protection in order to distinguish it from
smuggled stuff. Upon analysis this ingredient discloses
itself. Therefore an analyst can tell whether a specimen
of prepared opium was made in accordance with the
official formula of any of the authorized factories. But
the making of prepared opium is not more difficult than
the distilling of moonshine liquor, and one can put in the
secret ingredient or not, as suits his purpose. There
might readily be such a thing as motive, on the part—let
us imagine—of a “farmer” at Macao, in boiling some
opium which (for some reason known to himself) he did
not wish to have recognized as coming from Macao, to
omit the identifying ingredient, and even to mark it with
Chinese labels or other characteristics calculated to have
it attributed to ‘‘ Chinese smuggling.” So, if it should
be seized by vigilant customs officers, say at Hong Kong,
or Singapore, they would be likely to say :

“Aha! More Chinese opium ! ”’

Otherwise, if it bore the Macao trade-mark, they might
say instead :

“See here, Indian opium is running out through the
bunghole at Macao. If that fellow has opium to smugg
or is letting it get away from him, we must see that India
curtails his supply.”

le,OPIUM IN CHINA 145

It calls for no diagram to demonstrate that many kinds
of people engaged in or contributing to the opium
smuggling trade might have very powerful incentives to
make their opium look as if it had been smuggled out of
China. The technique hitherto seems to have been to
assume that any opium that could not be perfectly
identified as respectably authentic must be Chinese.

In the evening of September 22, 1922, a great haul of
drugs—14,000 assorted packages, cans and bottles of
cocaine, morphine and heroin, weighing from one to
three ounces each—was made in an hotel in West Fortieth
Street, New York City. The drugs were declared by
Dr. Carleton Simon, Special Deputy Police Commissioner
in charge of the narcotic squad, to have a sales value of
more than $500,000. Among the things then seized were
plates for printing Chinese opium labels. This indicated,
according to Dr. Simon, as quoted in the New York
Tribune of September 23, “ that smoking opium was
being manufactured from crude opium and was being
canned, labelled and sent to the illicit trade as far west
as Vancouver and Los Angelos.”

Glance for a moment at that “ farmer” of Macao—a
Chinese syndicate, by the way—to whom the Portuguese
Government for a price entrusts the opium monopoly.
He pays in the neighbourhood of $2,000,000 gold for the
privilege. A Macao dispatch dated May 21, 1920, to a
Shanghai newspaper, says :

The bidding was very keen to-day for the opium
monopoly for the three years commencing August 1, the
first offer being $2,500,000 (Mex.) annually. Spirited com-
petition brought the price up to $3,950,000, and the farm
was adjudicated to the Lee Sing Company, Hong Kong.

LSOU a iii,

146 OPIUM

As W. H. G. Aspland, General Secretary of the Inter-
national Anti-Opium Association, described the situation
in the Peking and Tientsin Times of November 29, 1924:

By an agreement between Great Britain and Portugal
in 1913, Macao is permitted to import not more than 260
chests (36,400 tbs.) yearly of Indian Opium for local
consumption, and 240 chests (33,600 ibs.) for re-export
to countries permitting import. The amount for home
consumption is apparently unalterable, but that for
re-export is not so, provided proof is given that the
transaction is in lawful pursuance of the decisions of the
Hague Convention."

The First Opium Conference at Geneva adopted an
agreement that there shall be no re-export of “ raw ”- OF
‘prepared’ opium ; therefore the 240-chest transaction
would become unlawful. But a new contract for three
years (ending in 1928) has just been awarded by the
Portuguese Government to the Macao “ farmer,” and
Portugal signed with a reservation protecting that fact.
On the face of it, the “farmer ”’ will go out of business after
1928, because under the new Agreement Portugal has
agreed to the abolition of the “farmer.” The only other
“farmer,” so far as I know, is the British North Borneo
Company, and that, as we have seen, is by way of being
itself the Government of that territory.

Well, what becomes of the 240 chests which the Macao
“farmer” is legally authorized to re-export ? Presum-
ably these are for the benefit, for instance, of the Chinese
or others in the South American republics. But one
cannot be sure. There was an occasion when a consign-

1 That is to say, that none is re-exported without an import certifi-
cate from the country of destination. As I have said elsewhere in this
book, the India Government has lately begun to cut down the amount
of opium sold to Macao, presumably impressed by the general suspicion
as to the conditions surrounding the disposal of it—J.P.G.

3 See Note, page 168.OPIUM IN CHINA 147

ment of opium from Macao indentured for Mexico fell
into the hands of the Chinese Customs and turned out to
be molasses! What had become of the opium? The
Chinese believed that it had been smuggled into China.

On May 17,1919, the steamship ‘‘ Amherst”’ cleared from
Hong Kong for Java. On June 4, the Macao Government
supplied the customary export certificate that 153,600
taels (over 200,000 ounces) of prepared opium had been
shipped on the ‘‘ Amherst’ for Chile. Three days later, the
vessel put back to Hong Kong for repairs. There was no
opium on board. What became of it ? The vessel hardly
had been out of Chinese waters !

There are some 71,000 Chinese in Macao. More than
half a pound of opium per capita per annum is an enor-
mous consumption. In point of fact, it can’t be done.
Hong Kong has—on paper—a similar ratio. “Is it im-
probable,” asks Dr. Aspland, “ that some at any rate of
the Indian opium seizures along the Chinese coast are
surplus chests from Macao? If a Government in return
for a massive financial consideration allows a local
Chinese firm to juggle with 70,000 pounds of opium
yearly, can a limit be set to the callousing annuity atten-
dant on such a traffic ?- Opium and gambling, gambling
and opium—so Macao balances her budget.”’

Consider the price that the Macao “ farmer ”’ pays for
500 chests of raw opium to the India Government ; add
to that the cost of making it into ‘‘ prepared.’ Subtract
that from the legitimate market-price at which the latter
may be sold in places where such sale is lawful. You
will be puzzled to know why anybody should bid so
briskly for so poor a net return. Is there something else
—such as the privilege of carrying on a general traffic in
opium, on the edge of an unlimited market, with nobody148 OPIUM

looking on to make sure that only “ legitimate ” opium
is either bought or sold ?

Not only that: the “ farmer’ becomes the only
custodian of narcotics ; in that domain he is the author-
ized representative of the Government. It is his business
to see that there is no illicit traffic to interfere with his
own monopoly. In his ‘ go-down” (warehouse) are
stored the seizures. His are the only boats allowed to go
about the harbour at night without lights. Practically,
there is nothing to prevent his buying opium or narcotic
drugs where and from whom he pleases, in quantities to
suit all the possibilities of disposal, legitimate or illegiti-
mate. And a leakage of narcotics from any source,
however lawful the original possession, means a loose
supply for the channels of illicit traffic. Opium used to
come openly from Macao to San Francisco ; thence from
bonded warehouses (not being regarded therein as an
import into the United States) to Mexico, whence it was

smuggled back over the border.

The report of the Anti-Opium Association’s investiga-
tion of 1923-4, cited above, included an illuminating bit
of description, for example from the province of Kiangsu,
which does not grow the poppy, and contains the large
cities of Shanghai, Soochow and Nanking :

Smuggling is rampant, whether in magnificent liners
dirty tramp steamers or Chinese junks. With huge
profits on every shipment landed, smugglers have formed
combines with millions of dollars available for financing
ventures and buying brains to outwit the authorities. ...

Nanking is the centre of extensive morphia-pill traffic,
whilst Shanghai is the premier city in China for whole-
sale smuggling of and traffic in opium and narcotics,7

 

  

OPIUM IN CHINA 149

It is estimated that the maritime customs, native customs
and police authorities seize about $10,000,000! worth
of narcotics and opium yearly.

Four furnaces are built at Pootung for the destruction
of these drugs. The value of a burning in January,
1924, amounted to a million dollars, and at the furnaces
could be seen Persian, Indian, Siberian, Fukien, Yunnan
and Szechuan opium, as well as anti-opium pills, opium
mixtures, opium in balls, slabs, packages and boxes ;
also morphia, heroin and cocaine. In the morphia heap
were the pound boxes and 50-gramme bottles from
Switzerland and Germany ; bottles, tins and bags from
Japan; and, most prominent of all, one hundred five-
pound tins of morphia from Wink & Co., London. This
latter had probably been shipped to Europe before June,
1923, at which time this company had its licence to manu-
facture cancelled by the British Home Office.

An indication of the extent to which manufactured
drugs are supplanting the much less virulent “‘ prepared ”’
opium in China may be seen in such reports as this from
Shantung, published in the Peking and Tientsin Times of
December 22, 1924. Incidentally it shows, too, that the
Indian habit of eating opium is growing up in parts of
China :

At Ch’u Hsien, a wholesale morphia pill-maker named
Wang Lo-Shan is concerned with a daily sale of 500,000
pills within his district. It seems almost incredible,
but with a small army of pedlars covering a daily round,
it is quite possible. The little country town of Ping
Yuan has eleven retail pill sellers, and at Teng Hsien,
eight pill-makers and a drug store at which $1,400 worth
of morphia was seized recently. In the record of 30 towns,
the habit of morphia and opium is about equally divided.
Of course, quantity (of morphia) is the destructive

1 This is of course dollars ‘‘ Mex.,’’ roughly half the value in U.S.

gold,OPIUM

element, and this record of Shantung proves what we have
always maintained, that once the morphia habit is de-
veloped there will never be a reversion to opium, unless
the former is absolutely unprocurable. The man who
swallows a dozen morphia pills a day has swallowed more
physical destruction than the average opium-smoker, and
he does it without the loss of time involved in the
laborious smoking process.

Reports from many parts of China show an increase
in the habit of opium-eating, because it is easy and less
expensive. The desired effect is produced by a very much
smaller quantity. This habit is very noticeable in the
monopoly countries in the East, where, owing to the high
cost of opium, many coolies divide their daily quantum
into three parts ; two are eaten during the day, and the
third smoked in the leisure of the evening.

‘China could not very well foresee,” said a director of
the Anti-Opium Association, in a published statement in
1920, “ that the mere fact that she was prohibiting opium
was going to be made use of by others to exploit her with
drugs; ... that the Japanese would take advantage of
the opportunity to sell, nay, to force upon China a sub-
stitute infinitely worse than opium.

“There never had been any extensive production of
morphia in Great Britain until the demand for it was
created by Japan entering the market as the biggest
purchaser.”

This was in allusion, no doubt, to the fact that although
the Japanese themselves had not (and, I venture to
believe, will not) become addicted either to opium or to
manufactured narcotics, the importations of morphine
into Japan from Great Britain alone increased from an
average of less than 20,000 ounces a year during theOPIUM IN CHINA 151

decade 1898-1907, to more than 600,000 ounces in 1917.+
If it did not stay in Japan, what became of it? I think
there can be but one answer: it went to China.
Professor W. W. Willoughby, legal adviser to the
Chinese Government (quoted earlier in this chapter), says
on this point :
There is no question that during recent years great
amounts of morphia have been illegally introduced and

sold in China. . . . The responsibility for this has been
laid almost wholly upon the Japanese . . . the drug

being brought into the country, it has been charged,
either under the guise of military supplies, or through
the Japanese parcel post system. The Japanese Govern-
ment has insisted that it has never given any official
sanction to the trade, but has been compelled to admit
the extensive participation of its nationals in it, and has
expressed its intention to make greater efforts in the
future to control its subjects in this respect.

Both of the foregoing statements were made in 1920.
and narcotics—have flowed and been

 

Considerable water
carried under and over bridges since then. For one thing,
the year 1920 marked the real beginning of serious atten-
tion to, if not hysterically eager observance of, the Hague
Convention of 1912. The Japanese claim—I think with
some foundation—that they are being made scapegoats,
and are even the victims of a definite propaganda, by
Western interests aiming to divert attention from their
own activities. This feeling embittered the First Con-
ference at Geneva, and at one stage, after an acrimonious
interchange on this very subject between the Japanese
and British delegates, the Japanese definitely withdrew
from the Conference; although subsequently the situa-

1 This was stated, according to Sir John Jordan, in the Japanese
House of Representatives at Tokio in March, 1920.152 OPIUM

tion was composed and they returned and remained to
the end,

There are, however, allegations and instances of a more
recent date. Ina letter to the London Times of February
25, 1925, Sir John Jordan said, on the basis of informa-
tion freshly received from Peking, after describing North
China as having “ become the dumping-ground for these

«<

drugs,” and as having “‘ gone from bad to worse ”’ :

China produces none of these drugs, but a yearly
increasing quantity pours in from Japan and Western
countries. Last year there was a marked increase in the
quantity of unlabelled and falsely-labelled narcotics
seized by the Customs, which came in mostly on steamers
from Japan. It is pleasant to add that not an ounce of
British or American narcotic drugs was seized in China
during 1923 and 1924.

Japan and Western nations have a grave responsibility
in this matter, as the evil is one of their introduction,
and, unless they face it with more honesty of purpose
than they have hitherto done, I am inclined to agree
with the Anti-Opium Association at Peking, that it
would be better to allow China the continued use of
opium-smoking.

An intelligent and well-informed Japanese friend of
mine, closely identified with one of the Japanese embassies
in Europe and in a position to have access to official in-
formation and opinions, in a personal letter! to me, in
March, 1925, says:

You said Japan is manufacturing and importing in
quantities “much beyond the legitimate use of its own
medicine and science.” In this statement, you have

* Inasmuch as his letter is personal, wholly unofficial and not

intended for publication, I may not more specifically identify the writer ;
but I unreservedly accept his personal sincerity, and have no doubt
that his expressions correctly reflect the Japanese feeling on this sub-
ject.—J.P.G.OPIUM IN CHINA 153

touched on the very situation, if you have in mind to
refer to the period before the Hague Convention generally
went into force in 1921. Japan imported, I admit,
quantities in excess then, but which countries have
effected any international control before that date? The
sad fact was that the major portion of drugs imported
into Japan from 1917 to 1921 was from England and
America. It seems as if the Japanese traders were morally
responsible for distributing them, then the manufacturers
who supplied them are equally responsible. I say further
that at that time the drug distribution of English and
American manufactured goods was carried on by powerful
syndicates located at Hong Kong, Shanghai and else-
where, and the Japanese learned from them only to
follow their example. Before 1921, the drug traders as
well as the manufacturers world over had their free hands
in their business—very wicked business to be sure, but
it was the situation then existed.

Then came the enforcement of the Hague Convention.
What did Japan do when they executed the international
treaty obligation in 1921 ?

1. They have restricted the import of morphine which
became in 1922 only one-twentieth of that of 1921,
amounting to 308 kilos, while in 1923 this became nil.

2. While the manufactured quantity remained station-
ary, about 2,000 kilos annually for the internal con-
sumption.

This amount is for nearly 80 million people. If you
calculate on the basis of the estimate set by the Health
Committee of the League which was 450 mgr. of raw
opium per head per year, Japan’s need is about 3,600
kilos in terms of morphine weight. Therefore, in 1922
and in 1923, Japan’s imports and manufacture was roughly
about 60 per cent of the legitimate need of the country.
I take it that the other 40 per cent is found from the stock
left over from the previous years.

Another fact should be borne in mind. In Japan properOPIUM

(exclusive of her territories: Chosen, Formosa, etc.),
| there were in 1922, 42,829 physicians, 7,738 dentists,
7,176 pharmacists, 4,911 druggists, who had the permit
to dispense with the drugs by the prescription of the
doctors, and 2,790 hospitals, together with scores of
educational and scientific institutions, all of which are at
present permitted to keep such drugs which are necessary
to their work. I ask you if they keep each fifty grams
of drugs in stock what would be the amount for the year ?
And you might calculate also the quantities for Korea,
Formosa, and other parts which are dependent on the
supplies from Japan proper for their needs.

It is quite clear that as far as Japanese authorities are
concerned, they are doing their best to check any leakage
of smuggling out by way of reducing the manufacture and
prohibiting the imports. As a result of this rigid control
at the end of the source of supply, the prices of the drugs
are always higher in Japan (about 20 to 25 per cent)
than in any other countries in Europe or in America.
The world realizes but little this very sacrifice in order
to restrict the amount of drugs needed in the country in
conformity with the treaty obligations.

Referring to Sir John Jordan’s accusation against
Japan, my correspondent touches upon one thing for
' which a certain allowance must be made ; namely, a not
unnatural tendency on the part of friends of China to bear
a prejudice against anything Japanese :

I am sorry indeed that Sir John Jordan has not gone
thoroughly in the situation when he said that the smuggling
of drugs into China is annually increasing from Japan and
Western countries. You know that his source of informa-
tion is from the Anti-Opium Association of Peking.
If you look over the 1923 report of this association, you
will find the larger quantities seized by Chinese Customs
were from European countries and not from Japan,
contrary to the statement made by Sir John Jordan.OPIUM IN CHINA 155

Another thing to be noted is that the mere fact that there
are large amounts of smuggling going on directly between
China and European countries shows that our control
is efficient. If it were not, it could have been much easier
to carry the smuggling with the neighbour just across
the sea than to bring the dangerous drugs over the danger-
ous route from Europe. Furthermore Sir John Jordan as
well as the general public is not aware of the direct
traffic now carried on between Europe and China by way of
Siberia. Just recently I heard that large quantities of
morphine were shipped from Europe to Harbin by the
intermediary of an English bank in Hamburg, and the
next thing you hear is that the Japanese authorities are
responsible for not controlling traffic in Northern Man-
churia, as if it were the Japanese domain.

Well, who but Japan herself is to blame for her bad
reputation in China ? This is not the first time in history
that a chicken has come home to roost. Besides—it
almost never fails—every time you uncover one of these
smuggling affairs in the Far East, you find a German or
a Swiss (in one famous case it was an Englishman) at the
sending end at Hamburg, Freiburg-Baden or Basle; but
it is ten to one you will find a Japanese delivering the
goods.

While the Opium Advisory Committee was in session
at Geneva, in May, 1923, there was seized at Hong Kong
a shipment of 180 lbs.—enough for, say, 10,000,000 doses
—of heroin, originating in Switzerland and en route from
Marseilles to Kobe, Japan ; the consignee being a Japan-
ese well-known to the Japanese police as a drug-smuggler.
This was intended to be delivered at Vladivostok on the
strength of a permit issued by the Soviet authorities there
in November, 1922. This particular shipment never
reached either Kobe or Vladivostok ; but the document156 OPIUM

reporting the episode declares that the authorities at
Vladivostok ‘‘ issue import certificates freely and greatly
in excess of the legitimate requirements of the port and
of the Maritime Province of Siberia.”

In the case of Yasukichi Miyagawa, reported in the
London newspapers of December 13, 1923, who got three
years’ penal servitude for illegal possession of heroin
obtained from firms in Germany and Switzerland, it was
shown that during the last week of October he had ex-
ported from Hamburg more than $165,000 worth of
heroin; that in one consignment he had sent to Japan
1,000 times the amount of morphine used in the London
Hospital in a whole year.

Moreover, the opium-derivatives are not the whole of
this question. There is also cocaine, to which my Japanese
correspondent made no allusion. With the full allowance
of 7 milligrams per capita per annum the 80,000,000
Japanese would be entitled to 560 kilograms of cocaine—
a little more than half a ton. But Japan, which received
a good part of the coca-leaf export of Java, according to
her own report to the League of Nations! in 1921 im-
ported 2,063 and manufactured 2,324 kilograms of cocaine
and salts of cocaine, and in 1922 imported 195 and manu-
factured 3,680 kilograms. Diminishing—apparently (I
have not the figures for 1923 and 1924)—but the first
total is nearly eight times, the second nearly seven times,
the allowance for legitimate purposes. I am glad to
believe, and to repeat what I said before, that the Japanese
are not addicted to drugs. There is nothing in the docu-

1 League of Nations Document ODC-1 (1) dated Geneva, July 22,
1924: ‘Summary of Information received from the Governments
with regard to the Production and Manufacture of Raw Opium and

Coca Leaves, Opium Derivatives and Cocaine ; with Statistical Tables
(Years 1920, 1921, 1922 and 1923).”OPIUM IN CHINA 157

ment quoted to show what became of this very large
imported and manufactured supply of this peculiarly
dangerous narcotic. It is hard to believe that it competed
successfully in the Western markets ; you find no trace
of it in the reported imports of Great Britain, Germany,
Switzerland ; nor would you—they are quite adequate
for the task of supplying their own needs. Where is it
now ? Perhaps the reader will recall that big seizure of
cocaine at Calcutta in September, 1923—most of it was
from Germany and Switzerland; but some of it came
from Japan.

I drew the attention of my Japanese correspondent
whose letter I have quoted above to the matter of cocaine,
which he had failed to mention; also to the extent of
its manufacture in Japan in 1921 and 1922. His reply
is important, not only in its light upon those statistics
in particular, but in its suggestion that the absence of
adequate information about legitimate needs has been a
potent factor in excessive production. I quote in part:

As to the question of cocaine, let me state our side
of the question on the issue, keeping in mind that the
figures you quoted are those of 1921 and 1922. What was
the status of manufacture and trade in cocaine in those
years ? It was only in the second session of the Opium
Advisory Committee, which was held in 1922, that the
Committee passed a resolution to complete information
as to the manufacture of cocaine in order to ascertain
the amount of the world production.

You see from this, that there were at that date no com-
plete statistics in existence. It was fortunate that we had
it and published it. In the absence of definite figures, no
one knew what other countries have produced. There
is another case where “‘an honest fellow gets the
blame.”OPIUM

You have cited the figure of 7 milligrams per capita
per annum as the basis for calculating 560 kilograms
which are allowed for legitimate needs in Japan, and you
asked what became of the quantity over and above this
amount. You will remember in reading the minutes of
the Committee that this figure of 7 milligrams was reached
by an investigator who assisted the Mixed Sub-Committee
of Health and Opium from the incomplete data chiefly
gathered from European countries, and it is the average
figure for the total world consumption, and not to be
taken as an average for any particular country. Some
highly-civilized people may need twice or three times as
much, while the inhabitants of Africa or Thibet may
scarcely need any. Therefore, until a country established
her own annual requirements, one does not know where
it stands.

In 1923 and 1924, Japan made a limited preliminary
inquiry, and according to the amount sold during those
years by retailers, the figure was somewhere near 20
milligrams per head. . . . In 1922, or even in 1923, there
was no way of knowing exactly what quantities were
required in Japan, and in that matter, I do not know
any country that had an exact knowledge until the Com-
mittee decided to look into the matter. In this instance,
let me observe that in your figures you have not allowed
any stock which was found in the hands of several
thousand retailers and wholesalers in Japan, which
constituted, I presume, a considerable quantity.

I have carefully looked into myself the actual regula-
tions in Japan in regard to the manufacture of cocaine,
but there are certain difficulties in limiting the import of
raw material because of the difference in cocaine content
according to the crops of certain years. Then there is
the difference in the method of extracting the cocaine
from coca-leaves. However, these matters can be
approximately established as the experience of the drug
manufacturers improves, and . . . the Japanese Govern-
ment can regulate accordingly.OPIUM IN CHINA 159

In the course of my letter beginning this correspondence
I had taken the liberty of saying :

Knowing as I do how effective law-enforcement is in
Japan—superior to that in my own country—it is difficult
for me to believe that the Japanese Government could
not stop this to at least a great extent (I referred both to
excessive manufacture and to smuggling in Japanese
ships) if it were determined to do so. . . . I willgofurther,
and express the opinion that there is nothing that Japan
could do which would go so far to establish her in the
estimation of the world as a moral force—a moral leader
to the shame of the “ Christian ’’ nations—as to take
drastic measures to stop making her territory the seat
of this nefarious business; to declare war a@ outrance
upon the smuggling of drugs into China. A ringing
declaration on that subject, backed up by such action as
Japan knows very well how to take and has taken in
other matters, would be the best kind of world-politics.
Nothing that Japan could do would go so far as that
to win the gratitude of China.

It is unjust, however, to lay all, or most, of the blame for
the smuggling into China or elsewhere upon the shoulders
of Japan, or the Japanese. The criminals in this business
are not confined to any particular nationality, and the
channels follow whatever may appear to be the lines of
least resistance. Any sort of social upheaval or govern-
mental disorganization or laxity favours illicit traffic in
narcotics. The smugglers change their tactics and shift
their lines as occasion requires ; they are always ahead of
the game.

The British Foreign Office reported to the League of
Nations in January, 1924, that :

Unsettled conditions at Vladivostok have facilitated
the creation of an extensive smuggling trade in narcoticsOPIUM

from that town into the interior, principally to North
Manchuria and China. ... There is also evidence of
the import of morphine, heroin, etc., from Antwerp,
Hamburg and New York.

This communication referred to the alleged fact that
the French Consul at Vladivostok had granted to a French
citizen an import certificate authorizing him to import
more than 80 tons (5,000 poods) of opium—equivalent to
upward of 120,000,000 grains of morphia. The report says
further that

. . Many more permits were issued, and eventually
a Monopoly Bureau was set up in Vladivostok through
which all opium transactions had to pass ; the concession
for this Bureau being in the hands of a Japanese subject.

The British refused to have anything to do with this
business. The India Government declines to honour even
import certificates for Vladivostok without first consulting
the British Consul there. Information received by
the British at Peking showed (the letter said) that there
was “extensive smuggling through Vladivostok into
China.” The facts called for strict control over exports
of dangerous drugs to Vladivostok.

A large part of the opium which eventually lands at
Vladivostok is taken there without any pretence of legality,
in ships which leave their ports of departure indentured
for other places. Not a few of them, so far as official
records go, are “ lost.’’ Others turn up at their destina-
tions without their opium, because it has been taken off
or transhipped at intervening places.

Sabang, on the island of Bintang, Sumatra, in the Dutch
Kast Indies across the way from Singapore, appears to
have been until recently a favourite point for this sort of
thing. A letter from the Government of the NetherlandsOPIUM IN CHINA 161

to the League of Nations in the latter part of 1923 stated
that
Quite recently the attention of the Dutch East India
Government was drawn to the transhipment at Sabang
of large quantities of opium destined for Vladivostok.
The first case was that of the steamer ‘ Ferrare ”’ from
Bushire (Persia) which was lost soon after it left Sabang.
When it arrived at Sabang it was carrying 182 packages
[more than 12 tons] of opium for Macao, and in addition
199 cases [more than 13 tons] of opium which were
unloaded at Sabang and sent on to Vladivostok.

This latter transhipment was permitted, it appears, by
virtue of a telegraphic communication from the Nether-
lands Consul at Vladivostok to the effect that the
authorities there had authorized the import of 200 cases,
and that the requisite papers would come along by post.
They did. I have seen a transcript of one of them—a
receipt for 50,000 roubles gold (approximately $25,000
U.S.) purporting to have been paid by one McDermid—
not a Japanese, by the way, but an American citizen—
to the Vladivostok authorities for permission to import
and then to re-export 200 piculs of foreign opium at that
port. This, you will observe, was opium from Persia.
The Dutch communication goes on to say :

On several occasions opium which was sent in other
vessels to Dairen [Dalny, near Port Arthur—Japanese
territory ], Vladivostok and Kelung [Formosa—Japanese],
had been unloaded at Sabang.

It is further stated that ‘opium coming from the
Persian Gulf and consigned to Macao, China, Japan and
Formosa, had been unloaded at Sabang, and would not
reach its alleged destination.”

Moreover, the Superintendent of Imports and Exports

at Hong Kong asked for information concerning certain
MOPIUM

vessels from the Persian Gulf which had called at Sabang,
their alleged destination, and the amount of opium they
carried. This information was sought because all trace
had been lost of certain ships carrying large cargoes of
opium coming from the Persian Gulf and proceeding to
China via Sabang. In this connection the Government
of the Dutch Indies was informed . . . that along the
Chinese coast opium carried by ships is frequently sold
to persons who take it away in small quantities before the
vessel reaches port.

I know of no evidence to justify any charge that the
Russian Central Government at Moscow was in any direct
or intentional way responsible for the conditions at Vladi-
vostok. Indeed, it was reported to the Anti-Opium
Association in 1924 that the Russian Government had
prohibited the cultivation of the poppy in Siberia and
that the Vladivostok Opium Monopoly of 1922 had been
suppressed. Nevertheless, the Association declared that
narcotics were still finding ‘“‘ easy access through that
port. . . . Through Manchurian towns and ports comes
the amazing quantity of morphia, heroin and cocaine,
which is later smuggled into North China.”! The Russia
of to-day is not a party, whether to the British-Chinese
agreement of 1907, the Shanghai understandings of 1909,
the Hague Convention of 1912, or any other agreements,
expressed or implied, on this subject. The present Russian
Government scornfully rejected the invitation of the
League of Nations to participate in the Geneva Opium
Conferences, taking occasion in its refusal, to express de-
risive sentiments regarding the good faith of the nations
which would participate. For example :

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

1 Minutes, Sixth Session Opium Advisory Committee, Appendix
No. 4, page 124.OPIUM IN CHINA 163

Republics has come to the conclusion that in connection
with the task of fighting the spread of opium and other
drugs, the various States are striving to satisfy their own
commercial interests and gain material benefits. Under
such circumstances, Soviet Russia considers that its
participation would be useless.

And this was before the “‘ various States” had given
in each of the two conferences a striking exhibition of the
justice of the Russian impeachment.

Meanwhile, it is too much the custom, among sonre
who know, or ought to know better, and among those who
do not know at all, to speak of China as a great stagnant
mass of hopelessly benighted humanity, swamped in
ignorance and vice, and subject to the banditry and general
political disorganization which have of late contributed
to the lamentable situation as regards opium. This is a
mistaken view. Underneath the surface disorder the life
of the people of China goes on with the bland phlegmatic
calm of a race whose philosophy ignores the ripples of
time and circumstance, whose invariable habit it has ever
been to absorb its conquerors without a gulp and whose
civilization was ancient before that of any Western
people began. The trade and export statistics of China
even now show little trace of the noisy quarrels of the
politicians. As the Round Table said in March, 1925:

China is passing through one of those phases of political
unrest which again and again in the course of the last
few years have disturbed the surface of her national life.
. . . There is no real civil war there, no revolution, no
great strike, nothing in which the hearts and hands of
the masses are consciously involved. The people of China

are probably more united in sentiment, more sympathetic
to one another, than ever before in their long history.164 OPIUM

If this be true, it bears a happy augury for the outcome
of the present struggle with the curse of narcotic addiction.
Those who speak of China as helpless, apathetic, hopeless
in this matter would better recall the fact that as far as
law and governmental utterance may be taken to express
national intent, China has been, save for the lapse
ensuing upon the wars of 1840 and 1856 when she yielded
to superior physical force, in at least as good a posture
with regard to opium as the United States of America is
now with regard to alcoholic liquors. If some of her public
officials and influential citizens are flouting the law for
the sake of profit and appetite, and thousands of her
common people are following their example . . . cer-
tainly official corruption, law-breaking in high places
and boot-legging are not confined to China !

Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, graduate and Phi Beta Kappa
of Cornell University, minister of China at Washington,
and chief Chinese delegate in both of the Geneva Opium
Conferences, said in the Second on November 20,
1924 :

There is in China a rapidly rising flood of public opinion,
far surpassing what has ever before existed, that the

present production and consumption of opium within
China, which is illegal under Chinese law, shall cease.

Mr. T. Z. Koo, representing the National Anti-Opium
Association of China,! brought to the Geneva Conferences
an appeal, which he and Dr. Sze both said represented
some 1,300 organizations and upwards of two million
Chinese people in nearly all the provinces of China; in
favour of the reduction of opium production to the needs

1 An organization largely of native Chinese ; not to be confused

with the International Anti-Opium Association of Peking, which is of
foreign initiative, though listing many Chinese among its members.OPIUM IN CHINA 165

of medicine and science. This petition, read to the Second
Conference by Mr. Koo, reads in part as follows :

Whereas in China there is a manifest recrudescence of
this evil in recent years, due to the prevalence of civil
strife entailing the regrettable neglect of the law for the
suppression of opium and in part to the increased im-
portation of narcotics from other lands, and

Whereas Chinese emigrants and traders living in the
Straits Settlements, East Indies and other territories
under the jurisdiction of other Powers have to a con-
siderable extent been victims of opium and allied nar-
cotics, and

Whereas we believe co-operation by all nations in con-
trolling production, manufacture and sale of opium
and its allied narcotics is the most effective way to deal
with this menace ;

We, who as a people have been the most direct suffcrers
because of this evil, while affirming our determination,
as representing the will of the Chinese Nation, to eradicate
the production of opium in China in the immediate future
and committing ourselves to overcome all obstructions
to this end, hereby respectfully petition your Conference
to secure an agreement among all nations to limit the
production of opium and its derivatives and of cocaine,
strictly to the amount required by scientific and medicinal
purposes ; thereby greatly helping not only the Chinese
but also the people of other lands in their struggle to over-
throw this evil, and so using the unique opportunities to
fulfil the mission entrusted to you to render a service to
the whole human family.

Mr. Koo mentioned as among the organizations repre-
sented in the National Anti-Opium Association and in
this expression the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce,
the China Medical Association, the Union of Daily
Newspapers, the Red Cross Society of China, the National
Association for the Advancement of Education, theOPIUM

Overseas Chinese Union, the National Council of Churches,
the National Committees of Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A.,
the Boy Scouts’ Union, and the World’s Chinese Student
Federation. In Hong Kong itself, thirteen organizations,
including the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Kung
Tuen Chung Wu (the Federation of Labour formed of
eighty-two guilds), the South China Athletic Association,
the Confucian Society, the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., have
organized a general committee to fight opium there and
to co-operate with similar organizations in other cities,
including Peking, Tientsin, Wuchang, Nanking and
Shanghai. Mr. Koo said that despite the fighting and
the opposition of those who were profiting by the traffic
in opium, they had established 188 anti-opium organiza-
tions in 19 of the 21 provinces of China. They were
determined to press their campaign for suppression,
regardless of what the Geneva Conferences might do or
fail to do. But he added the argument that gave point
and poignancy to his appeal, as it did, to that made
repeatedly in both Conferences by Dr. Sze ; namely, that
China’s task is made immensely more difficult by the
legalizing of opium-smoking in the territories, just outside
her borders, governed by the Western nations. The bad
example in general, and the bad influence upon the Chinese
in those territories, where in fact many of them first
acquire the habit, add greatly to the difficulties besetting
the movement for reform. Manifestly it is difficult to
enforce in Chinese Canton the prohibition of a vice which
is legal in Portuguese Macao and British Hong Kong, just
a little farther down the river.

Nevertheless, these people, representing the best of
Young China, are not discouraged, and there are many
signs, not only that their work is telling, but that theOPIUM IN CHINA 167

unsettled conditions in China are drawing to a close. On
the other hand, in some respects, the situation in China as
regards narcotics is worse and more baffling than it ever
was before. It is one thing to suppress the cultivation of
the poppy, which must blossom in plain sight and cannot
masquerade as anything else. An effective government
such as China has had in past times and may have again
surprisingly soon, if determined to do so can stop, as it
has stopped before, both the cultivation of the poppy
and the production of opium on any general scale. Per-
haps it could stop too, or greatly curtail, the smuggling

cc

or “taw’’ and

ce

prepared’ opium into the country.
But it is quite another matter to deal with the smuggling
in of manufactured drugs, easily concealed and trans-
ported and immensely valuable in proportion to their
bulk, and under the greed-pressure of great profits and the
competition of manufacturing countries to exploit so vast
a market.

At no time, be it observed, even when China under-
took to suppress—and did in fact suppress—her entire
production of opium, did any other nation make any
pledge to reduce its own. All that Great Britain con-
templated, promised or performed as regards the Indian
production was a progressive reduction of export to China,
and even that was conditioned upon China’s good faith
and success. Never to this day has any nation except
China made a straightforward, unequivocal declaration
of purpose, or attempted in practice, to suppress pro-
duction at the source.

China’s record of prohibition and protest on this sub-
ject goes back more than two centuries. She is the only
one of the nations closely concerned with the production
and use of opium which never has defended the practice168 OPIUM

of making the vice a source of public revenue. Twice
certainly she has displayed both the will and the ability
to stamp it out.

Surely enough has been said to justify the assertion that
in all this deplorable business China is to say the least as
much sinned against as sinning! As Bishop Brent said
at Geneva at the opening of the Second Conference :

‘“China does not desire, nor will she be benefited by,
the pity, the cynicism or the criticism of sister nations.
What she does need is their encouragement and their
active aid.”

The good faith of the nations. . . . The time is past
for pious utterances and fine-sounding paper legislation
—stultified as to responsibility by a general disposition
to “‘ pass the buck ” (to China for instance), and nullified
as to effectiveness by reckless willingness on the part of
each to produce of narcotics many-fold the amount
legitimately required by all, and to let it flow to any
market that will take it. Once produced, it must go
somewhere. Narcotics will flow about the world until the
producing nations stop making them beyond legitimate

needs.

IMPORTANT NOTE
No More Indian Opium for Macao !

ge On August 25th, 1925, Sir John Campbell informed the Opium
Advisory Committee at Geneva that owing to its discovery upon in-
vestigation that its opium sold to the Portuguese Government's
‘‘farmer’”’ at Macao was not being confined to lawful uses, the India
Government hereafter would not sell an ounce of opium to Macao!
The same was true, he said, of Persia. This information comes as
this book goes to press, too late for inclusion in the body of this
chapter. It is a pleasure to record this belated recognition by the
India Government of a scandalous situation.CHAPTER VII
THE GENEVA OPIUM CONFERENCES

(1) The First Conference.

\ HY were there two opium conferences at Geneva,

beginning two weeks apart in November, 1924 ?
Already I have ventured the opinion that there should
have been but one; that the subject is one subject, and
should be treated as a whole. Originally only one con-
ference was proposed. An interesting study might be
made of the psychology and politics embodied in the ante-
cedent history of this matter ; but it is a long and tangled
story for which we have neither space nor disposition
here.! Only the “ high spots”’ of fact are necessary as
background for the understanding of what happened—
and did not happen—in the twoconferences. Inany event,
they were inextricably interwoven, and neither can be
understood without constant reference to the other.
Especially did the antecedents, limitations and de-
ficiencies of the first protract and bedevil the second.

1 Useful and on the whole impartial summaries, designed particularly
for the information of the people of the United States, and largely from
the American point of view, are to be found in The International Oprum
Conferences, with Relevant Documents, by Raymond Leslie Buell,
Instructor in Government, Harvard University (World Peace Founda-
tion Documents, vol. VIII, Nos. 2—3); and International Control of the
Traffic in Opium; Summary of the Opium Conferences, etc., with
Appendices, prepared by the Committee on Traffic in Opium of the
Foreign Policy Association, New York. (Pamphlet No. 33, Series of
1924-25, May, 1925.)

169170 OPIUM

Always in the background of both conferences were what
have come to be known as “the American principles,”
already quoted in Chapter IT of this book :

1. If the purpose of the Hague Convention is to be
achieved according to its spirit and true intent, it must be
recognized that the use of opium products for other than
medicinal and scientific purposes is an abuse and not
legitimate.

2. In order to prevent the abuse of these products it
is necessary to exercise control of the production of
raw opium in such a manner that there will be no
surplus available for non-medicinal and non-scientific
purposes.

The key-note of the American position from first to
last ; the centre of the controversy which nearly wrecked
the Second Conference and ended in the withdrawal of the
American delegation, lies right here, in the subject of the
control of the production of raw opium to the end of sup-
pressing it beyond the extremely limited needs of bona
fide medicine and bona fide science. The controversy
goes clear back to the beginning of international dis-
cussion of this business ; it showed itself, as we have seen,
in the Shanghai Conference of 1909. It was out in the
open in the Second Assembly of the League of Nations,
after the Council at its thirteenth session, in June, 1921,
had directed the Opium Advisory Committee to ascertain
the requirements of the world in opium “for medicinal
and scientific purposes.” In that Assembly the repre-
sentative of India contended that these words went beyond
the warrant of the Hague Convention. In India, he
declared (on the strength of course of that famous Royal
Commission Report of 1895), opium was “ legitimately ”
used for purposes not strictly medicinal. So at his behestFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 171

the word “strictly ’ was eliminated, and “ legitimate ”
was substituted for “ scientific.” The Americans never
have conceded the propriety of this substitution, nor the
legitimacy, in any proper sense of the word, of the popular
use of opium for eating in India; but they have been
forced to accept, so far as any official utterance is con-
cerned, the inflexible position of the India Government
(and of Great Britain, too) that that is an internal affair
of India ; the business of nobody else.

It was not until January, 1923, that the United States
began to co-operate with the League of Nations with
regard to opium ; in that month Dr. Rupert Blue appeared

’

in an “‘ unofficial and consultative capacity.” In June of

that year Chairman Porter, Bishop Brent, Dr. Blue and
* relation. It was
at that meeting (of the Advisory Committee) that Mr.
Porter presented ‘‘ the American principles.’ He held

that they represented the real intent of the Hague Con-

‘

Mr. Neville came on in an “ advisory ’

vention ; that it was ‘‘ an ordinary legal principle that
one section of an instrument cannot be so construed
as to defeat the purposes of the whole instrument.” In
the end (as shown in terms by the American proposals to
the Second Geneva Conference in 1924) the Americans
were forced to concede that the Hague Convention cer-

3?

tainly did authorize ‘‘ temporarily’’ the smoking of
opium ; but they never have yielded their insistence that
“temporarily ’’ means what it says; that the nations
have pledged themselves to suppress the smoking of
opium in their territories, and that the only way to
suppress it is to suppress the cultivation of the plant
from which it comes. The American delegation professed
itself ready to examine any counter-proposals, but de-

clined to debate the merits of its own,ft 172 OPIUM

Finally, after much discussion, the following resolution
was adopted :

The Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium accepts
and recommends to the League of Nations the proposals
of the United States representatives as embodying the
general principles by which the Governments should be
guided in dealing with the question of the abuse of danger-
ous drugs, and on which, in fact, the International Con-
vention of 1912 is based; subject to the fact that the
following reservation has been made by the representatives
of the Governments of France, Germany, Great Britain,
Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal and Siam :

“The use of prepared opium andthe production, export
and import of raw opium for that purpose are legitimate
so long as that use is subject to and in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter II of the Convention.”’

The representative of the Government of India
associates himself with the foregoing resolution, subject
to the following reservation regarding paragraph I :

“The use of raw opium, according to the established
practice of India, and its production for such use, are
not illegitimate under the convention.”’

II. The Advisory Committee, appreciating the great
value of the co-operation of the Government of the United

| States of America in the efforts which the League has
for the past two years been making to deal with the ques-
tion of the abuse of dangerous drugs, expresses the belief
that all the Governments concerned will be desirous of
co-operating with that Government in giving the fullest
possible effect to the convention.

The representatives of the United States accepted this
resolution, declaring that the reservation made by France,
Germany, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal
and Siam appeared to be only a reaffirmation of the
Hague Convention as regards the temporary authoriza-FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 173

tion of opium-smoking, and as such to give rise to no
question. As for the Indian reservation, they ignored it.

The Advisory Committee did not specifically recommend
the holding of two conferences—or any conference at all,
for that matter. It did proceed to recommend to the
Council, ‘as a means of giving effect to the principles
submitted by the representatives of the United States
and the policy which the League on the recommendation
of the Committee has adopted,” ... the advisability
of inviting :

(a) The Governments of the States in which morphine,
heroin and cocaine are manufactured and the Govern-
ments of the States in which raw opium or the coca-
leaf are produced for export for the purpose of such
manufacture ;

(b) The Governments having territories in which the
use of prepared opium is temporarily continued under
the provisions of Chapter IT of the Convention, and the
Republic of China,

to enter into immediate negotiations (by nominating
representatives to form a committee or committees, or
otherwise) to consider whether, with a view to giving the
fullest possible effect to the Convention of 1912, agreements
could not now be reached between them, . . . etc.

The subjects mentioned as amenable to such possible
agreement were, in brief :

The limitation of the manufacture of narcotics and of
the import of raw material for this and other purposes and
of its production for export} (excepting that for the legally
authorized smoking) except for medicinal and scientific
use ; and the reduction of imports of raw opium for smok-
ing ; together with measures to be taken by China herself
to suppress illegal production and use of opium within
her own borders.

1 The italics are mine.—J.P.G.174 OPIUM

When the report and resolutions of the Advisory Com-
mittee (from which the above excerpts are taken) came
before the Fifth Commission of the Assembly in September
following (1923) Sir Gilbert Murray, in his capacity as
delegate for the Union of South Africa, introduced a
resolution reading as follows:

I. The Assembly expresses its deep appreciation of the
very valuable work done by the Advisory Committee
on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, adopts
its report and resolutions, and asks the Council to call a
Conference of representatives with plenipotentiary powers,
of the States indicated in Resolution I, in order to put
this resolution into effect.

II. The Assembly expresses the hope that the Council
will take measures to call this Conference in time to
receive a report of its action before the next Assembly
and that it will authorize the Secretariat to gather and
co-ordinate the necessary information and to make all
other material arrangements requisite for the Conference.

Sir Gilbert and the representatives of France, China,
Persia and the United States argued that there should be
but one conference, dealing with the whole subject. Dame
Edith Lyttelton, for Great Britain, and Sir Malcolm
Delevingne, who was present on behalf of the Advisory
Committee, supported the former’s proposed amendment
providing for two separate conferences. They held that
there were two clearly-defined questions, concerning two
differing groups of powers. The minutes of the Fifth
Commission thus summarize Sir Malcolm’s argument :

It was true that the decision as to a limitation of the
amount of opium to the need for smoking would have a
bearing on the work of the second (conference) in con-
sidering the limitation of the production of raw opium ;

but the conference on the Far Eastern question could beFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 175

held first in order to enable the second conference, dealing
with the limitation of the production of raw opium, to
take into consideration the figures fixed by the Far
Eastern conference. . . . The questions concerning the
East could not be dealt with by a committee of the large
conference suggested, for such a committee would of
necessity be obliged to report to the large conference,
although this question only concerned the Far Eastern
States, or States with possessions in the Far East.

It is clear that Sir Malcolm Delevingne really expected
the First Conference to take some steps toward constrict-
ing the consumption of opium for smoking and the pro-
duction and export of the raw material for that purpose.
It is clear also that both he and Dame Lyttelton really
believed that something substantial in the way of joint
or mutually-integrating action would emerge from the
two conferences, actuated (as they hopefully visioned
them) by a common purpose and a common spirit. Dame
Lyttelton urged that in order to avoid loss of time, and
with a view of decreasing expenses, the conferences should
be held in immediate succession. She visualized, and
declared her belief that this would insure, common action
and the establishment of a general plan of campaign against
the production and consumption of opium and other harmful
drugs.

So in the end, be the motives what they may and the
judgment deemed wise or otherwise, the subject was split
in two. And the essential fact to be borne in mind is that
despite all the talk and the prevailing delusions about any
possible co-operation or interchange between the two
conferences, the result insured that the opium business
in the Far East should be to the utmost possible extent
isolated as the exclusive concern of the small group of
Powers having possessions there and deriving revenue from176 OPIUM

it for the support of their colonial governments. It was
almost entirely out of that action and the psychology
underlying and reacting to it, that there arose the con-
flict of interest and purpose which prolonged and ex-
acerbated the proceedings of the Second Conference and
ended in the formal withdrawal of the United States and
China,

The resolutions of the Fourth Assembly of the League
of Nations providing for the conferences, and held to
delimit their scope and functions, were as follows :

Providing for the First Conference: Resolution 5.—
The Assembly approves the proposal of the Advisory
Committee that the Governments concerned should be
invited immediately to enter into negotiations with a
view to the conclusion of an agreement as to the measures
for giving effective application in the Far Eastern
territories to Part II of the (Hague) Convention and as
to a reduction in the amount of raw opium to be imported
for the purpose of smoking in those territories where
it is temporarily continued, and as to the measures which
should be taken by the Government of the Republic
of China to bring about the suppression of the illegal
production and use of opium in China,! and requests the
Council to invite those Governments to send representa-
tives with plenipotentiary powers to a conference for
the purpose and to report to the Council at the earliest
possible date.

Providing for the Second Conference : Resolution 6.—
The Assembly, having noted with satisfaction that in
accordance with the hopeexpressed . . . by the Assembly

1 The Chinese deeply resented the inference that the other powers
were entitled to agree as to measures which China should be told to
take as to her own internal affairs. Their feeling on this subject lay
at the root of their action in withdrawing from the conferences. With
this goes their grievance on the subject of extra-territoriality, which
serves to protect the foreigners engaged in the smuggling of opium and
drugs.FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 177

in 1922, the Advisory Committee has reported that the
information now available makes it possible for the Govern-
ments concerned to examine, with a view to the con
clusion of an agreement, the question of the limitation
of the amounts of morphine, heroin or cocaine and their
respective salts to be manufactured; of the limitation
of the amounts of raw opium and the coca-leaf to be
imported for that purpose and for other medicinal and
scientific purposes, requests the Council, as a means of
giving effect to the principles submitted by the United
States of America, and to the policy which the League,
on the recommendation of the Advisory Committee,
has adopted, to invite the Governments concerned to
send representatives with plenipotentiary powers to a
conference for this purpose, to be held, if possible, immedi-
ately after the conference mentioned in Resolution 5.

So two conferences were held, the first beginning on
November 3, the second on November 17, 1924. The first
had not finished as expected when the allotted two weeks
had passed ; at that time it looked indeed as if its results
would be absolutely ni/—as if no agreement whatever
could be arrived at. To the outsider the First Conference
wore most of the time the air of a committee of experts
gathered to conserve the interests of a threatened in-
dustry. At best, its final effect was generally and chiefly
to regularize and stabilize the status quo. At worst, as
Prince Charoon, the leading Siamese delegate, said at one
stage, it was “a farce.’ Bishop Brent vehemently
denounced it. Mr. Koo, representative of the Chinese
National Anti-Opium Association, excoriated it. Sir
John Jordan, in a letter published in the London Times of

‘

January 13, 1925, described it as ‘‘ abortive.”’
The First Conference was aware of its responsibility ;
that was acknowledged in the preamble of the agreement

which it produced at last, expressly declaring that agree-
Ni 178 OPIUM

ment to be not a substitute for but supplementary to the
| Hague Convention :

Being fully determined to bring about the gradual and
effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade
in and use of prepared opium, as provided for in Chapter

II of the International Opium Convention of January
23rd, 1912, in their Far Eastern possessions and territories,
including leased or protected territories, in which the use
of prepared opium is temporarily authorized ; and

Being desirous, on the grounds of humanity and for the
purpose of promoting the social and moral welfare of their
peoples, of taking all possible steps for achieving the
suppression of the use of opium for smoking with the least
possible delay ;

Having decided to conclude an agreement supple-
mentary to the said International Convention ;

Have nominated for this purpose their plenipotentiaries,

. ete.

The agreement finally adopted registered, even as as-
pirations, only two appreciable forward steps, together
with a promise of extremely dubious value. The Confer-
ence did nothing whatever to meet the demand which the
United States adopted from Sir John Jordan for a pro-
gressive suppression of opium-smoking by a systematic
reduction of the amount of opium exported from India
for the purpose ; much less that the cultivation of the
poppy in India or anywhere else should be outlawed save
for the exclusive uses of medicine and science. Upon all
occasions, India—speaking by the mouth of Mr. (now Siz)
| John Campbell, has held that it is not its business to

dictate the amount of opium which any other country
ought to require. Arbitrary curtailment of export would
be tantamount to forcing other governments to conform

1 The full text of the Agreement will be found in Appendix B, page
267 of this volume.FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 179

to its ideas rather than theirown. Whenever and wherever
any other country enacts prohibition of import, India
forthwith will cease to export to that country. Further-
more, it will permit any government to modify or even
cancel altogether its contract to purchase opium. It even
takes some pains to investigate the good faith and authen-
ticity of import certificates (from Vladivostok, for in-
stance). But it will not refuse its opium to any country
which legally asks for it.4

Article I of the agreement, then, purports to make the
“prepared”? opium business in these territories in all
respects a government monopoly and to abolish the ‘‘ farmer.”
That is to say, the Contracting Powers agree not to lease,
accord or delegate to any persons whatsoever the right
to import, sell or distribute opium; these functions,
together with the making of “ prepared”’ opium from
“raw,” shall be “a monopoly of the government.” This
would be a considerable step in advance ; but paragraph 2
proceeds to insert the usual “‘ weasel words ””—the govern-
ment monopoly is to go into effect ‘‘ as soon as circum-
stances permit.”” And the substitution of fixed salaries for
commissions on sales (thus tending to remove the incentive
of agents and retailers to push sales) “ shall be applied
experimentally in those districts where an effective
Supervision can be exercised by the administrative
authorities.’”’ The difficulty suggested is not imaginary,
either. The British North Borneo Company, in its
comment upon the suggestions of the Opium Advisory
Committee, previously quoted,? emphasizes the difficulty

1 This position has, however, recently undergone modification,
in the cutting-down of the supply furnished under its long-standing
contract with Macao, owing obviously to suspicion as to the disposal

of it.
* Chapter IV, page 56 in this volume,180 OPIUM

of finding honest men to act as agents at salaries within
the possibilities, who would not yield to the temptation
to augment their income by illicit transactions. The
British North Borneo Company, which is by way of being
both government and “ farmer” in the British third of
Borneo, is left free under the agreement adopted by the
First Conference to continue present practices until it
sees fit to alter them. And as for the “farmer” of
Macao, who as we have seen pays some $2,000,000 gold
for the privilege of monopolizing the traffic in narcotics
under conditions notably favouring irregularities, and
who recently has acquired a new three-years’ contract

. we shall see whether, when that contract expires in
1928, “ circumstances ” will permit his extinction. We
shall welcome the bona fide abolition of the Macao
*‘ farmer ” when and if it takes place.

Article VI is the only really considerable, unequivocal
achievement of the First Conference—a very important
one if it is lived up to. It prohibits the re-export of any
opium whatever from any possession or territory into which
opium is imported for smoking. It prohibits also the
transit through or transhipment in such territory of
‘prepared’ opium to other territories. And as for
transit or transhipment of “‘ raw’ opium, it is to be per-
mitted only if the consignment is accompanied by an
import certificate from the country of destination “ which
can be accepted as affording sufficient guarantee against
the possibility of illegitimate use.” These provisions
should be sufficient to take care of the situation at Sabang,
referred to in the previous chapter. It is greatly to be
regretted that the convention adopted by the Second
Convention did not in equally explicit fashion prohibit
the re-export of manufactured derivatives. That,FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 181

however, is perhaps too much to expect at this stage—it
might have interfered unduly with “ legitimate ’’ Western
commerce !

For the rest . . . the agreement to institute educa-
tional propaganda against opium-smoking is to apply
only in case the government sees fit to undertake it.
Upon the proposal to prohibit opium-smoking by minors,
the French delegate remarked that inasmuch as in Indo-
China they had no system of birth certificates, they had
no means of knowing a minor when they saw him.
Nevertheless the convention prohibits the sale of opium to
minors, forbids them entrance to smoking-places, and
pledges the parties to do all they can to discourage the
smoking vice among them.

The parties agree to review jointly from time to time
the situation as regards opium-smoking, and to meet again
in any case not later than 1929.

One of the primary conditions of “ tapering off ’’ opium-
smokmg in a country seems to be the enforcement of the

‘

system known as “ registration and rationing’ ; that is,
the listing of habitual smokers, giving to each a non-
transferable licence to purchase and use a fixed quantity
of opium ; together with the rigid exclusion of the non-
licensed from its purchase or possession, and the exclusion
or deportation of new addicts. Japan uses this method
in Formosa. In temporarily admitting Chinese there to
harvest the tea-crop, for instance, every individual is
quarantined to see whether he must have opium—in
which case he is promptly deported. Japan declared that
within a few years the resident addicts now registered
would be dead ; no new ones are being made or admitted.182 OPIUM

 

She purposed to stamp out the evil in Formosa, regardless
of what others might do. The British delegation urged
the general adoption of registration and rationing in the
smoking territories ; but this was definitely rejected by
France for Indo-China and by Holland for the Dutch
Indies ; even India demurred—although the system is
in more or less successful practice in Burma. The general
objection was that while the plan was theoretically good,
under existing conditions of promiscuous production of
opium in China and elsewhere, smuggling inevitably
would nullify it. Portugal claimed that in a place like
Macao, within an hour’s trip from Hong Kong, the great
and constantly-shifting Chinese population made im-
possible the identification of individual smokers.

On the other hand, Siam announced her intention of
putting the system into force within three years.

Nothing effective was done by either conference about
one thing exceedingly important in any sincere attempt
to assist China in her struggle with the drug-devil ;
namely, about the abuses of extra-territoriality. That is,
the right assumed by the more powerful nations of trying
their own nationals in their own consular courts for offences
against the laws of China. As we have seen, this results in
the protection of unscrupulous foreigners engaged in the
smuggling business. In many instances, patents of
nationality in various European nations have been sold
to Chinese and others engaged in the traffic so as to exempt
them from the drastic penalties of the Chinese anti-opium
laws. This was one of the matters complained of in
connection with the alleged smuggling into Chinese
Turkestan from India and Russian Central Asia, as weFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 183

have already seen. The Chinese resented bitterly the
expression in the Agenda of the First Conference about

‘

its purpose to consider “‘ measures which might be sug-
gested to the Government of the Chinese Republic for
bringing about the suppression of the illegal production
and use of opium.” The Chinese felt themselves entitled
to do some suggesting: particularly that violators of
China’s laws should not be protected under the operation
of extra-territoriality. Nationals of various countries
were concerned in the vast smuggling operation un-
covered at Shanghai in January, 1925. One was a so-
called Spaniard who was formerly a British subject—
until 1911, when the Chino-British agreement stopped the
profit from imports of Indian opium. The Shanghai
dispatch in the London Times describing that affair said :

Apart from the implication of Chinese officials, the case
throws a glaring light on the scandalous sale to Chinese
and others of patents of nationality of the smaller nations.
This is a very old grievance, which does much to justify
the Chinese complaint that extra-territoriality directly
contributes to disorder in China. It is high time the Great
Powers were urged to effect the suppression of the abuse.

Well, they were urged, in both conferences. Little
came of it. China was continuously made “ the goat,”
and at last withdrew from both. The best they got (and
it really does not relate to China at all) was a pious
profession worth the paper that bears it :

Article 9 of the agreement of the First Conference :

The Contracting Powers will examine in the most
favourable spirit the possibility of taking legislative
measures to render punishable illegitimate transactions
which are carried out in another country by a person
residing in their territories.184 OPIUM

Article 29 of the drug-convention repeats that promise
as regards

acts committed within their jurisdiction for the purpose
of procuring or assisting the commission in any place
outside their jurisdiction of any act which constitutes
an offence against the laws of that place relating to the
matters dealt with in the present Convention.

It is to be borne in mind that the agreement of the
First Conference, signed on February 11, 1925, by all of
the participating nations except China, which repudiated
the whole business, concerns only eight governments :
Great Britain, India, France, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Japan, Siam and China. The door was left open for China
to sign if and when she will; but no other power need,
or is expected, either to sign or toratify. Thisis the private
affair of the Far East.

The United States had a perfectly good title to partici-
pate, generally as a signatory of the Hague Convention
including Chapter II, and especially by reason of being
one of the Powers having possessions in the Far East,
even if in those possessions (namely, the Philippine
Islands) the use of “ prepared” opium is not only not
even ‘temporarily’ authorized but absolutely pro-
hibited. Despite the Act of Congress forbidding the
importation or use of opium in the Philippines for other
than medicinal purposes after March, 1908, the Chinese
in those islands both smuggle and smoke it, and instead
of the half-million of revenue received during the first
ten years of American occupation, the Government is at
large expense to fight the illicit traffic. However that be,
the United States made no effort to participate in the

First Conference ; indeed it was said that AmericanFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 185

representatives definitely discouraged at least one inquiry
as to their wish to be included.

Nevertheless, the influence of the United States was a
constantly present and disturbing factor in that Confer-
ence ; the standard it had erected being a kind of ‘‘ bogey”
against which, so to speak, the Conference had to play, or
have excuses for falling below it. That standard was,
however, not of American origin. It was set up by Sir
John Jordan himself before the Opium Advisory Com-
mittee at its sixth session, in August, 1924, as follows :

That the Government of India be invited to reduce its
present export of opium to Japan, Siam and the posses-
sions of the European Powers in the Far East by 10 per
cent each year for a period of ten years, and that the
Governments of Japan, Siam and of the Powers having
possessions in the Far East shall similarly be requested
to reduce pari passu the consumption of prepared opium
in their respective territories and possessions and shall
undertake not to replace the reduction in the Indian
supply by opium obtained from other sources.

The Americans made this their own, including it
substantially in the suggestions which they brought to the
Second Conference. Inasmuch as the First Conference
had done nothing of that kind, they insisted that the Second
Conference should take up the subject. And inasmuch as
very particular pains had been taken to keep that very
matter out of the agenda of the Second Conference, the
issue of “ competency ” arose and could not be allayed. ]
It had long been foreseen ; it was much discussed during
the preparatory stages. In the last analysis it represented
the conflict between the two differing attitudes of mind
toward this whole subject ; complicated by the supposed
conflict of commercial and political interests in a matter186 OPIUM

which ought not to be commercially or politically regarded
and still further embittered by certain incompatibilities
of psychology and personal temperament. The American
attitude was and is that it is altogether a mockery for the
Western nations to enact and enforce anti-narcotic
legislation to protect their homelands, while tolerating,
encouraging and even making profit out of precisely the
same sort of addiction among their subjects in the Orient.
The policy, moreover (as they claimed), creates an excess
of supply which overflows not only into the Philippines
but into other parts of the world. They are not satisfied
to deal only or especially with the relatively small part
of that production devoted to the manufacture of drugs.
The other Powers concerned continually professed both
the desire and the intention to end the smoking evil
especially and the production of opium except for such
uses as they might be justified in calling “ legitimate,”
as soon as possible—in any event ‘‘ eventually,” as the
Hague Convention expressed it. They claimed indeed
that they actually were doing it now. But they insisted
that any immediate arbitrary curtailment of the legally
approved and controlled supply would mean not suppres-
sion in fact but an increase by smuggling and illegal
distribution—so long as production was uncontrolled
in China, Persia, Turkey, etc. This aspect of the question
was much dwelt upon in the First Conference ; but the
issue came to a head in the Second, after the American
delegation had arrived and begun to insist that the whole
question must come within the scope of the second.
Meanwhile the first was in suspense. Its agreement was
drafted and supposedly complete and ready for signature.
On the 8rd of December it was in fact signed by Mr.
Campbell for India, But thereafter the two conferencesFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 187

got more or less inextricably tangled, and for several
weeks it seemed as if they could not be unravelled.
Inasmuch, however, as the subject of the production
and use of “prepared” opium and the legalizing of
smoking, was in the end held as the province of the First
Conference, that part of the story should be told here
with reference to the result of the First Conference as such.

Great Britain at one stage, through Sir Malcolm
Delevingne and again by the voice of Lord Robert Cecil,
proposed the appointment of a special commission, one
member—even perhaps its chairman—to be an American
citizen, to investigate the actual situation in the Far East,
including of course the Philippines. Mr. Porter received
the suggestion with open scorn, even challenging its good
faith, declaring that it meant only more delay and that
no investigation was either necessary or proper to ascer-
tain whether the parties to a solemn international con-
tract (meaning the Hague Convention) should keep their
word. He read a long lecture, buttressed with citations
from standard law-books, about the sanctity of treaties
as contracts. He “ stood there on his bond.’ The United
States would waive none of its rights, as it had evaded
none of its obligations, under that contract.

“The courts do not allow the parties to a contract to
repudiate and nullify it,’ he said in effect, “ simply
because unforeseen conditions arising subsequent to its
execution make it difficult. You promised. When are
you going to begin to keep your promise ? ”’

All of which was deeply resented—none the less because
Mr. Porter was anything but diplomatic or tactful in his
manner andspeech. Great Britain, the Netherlands, India,
Portugal, indignantly insisted that they were doing all
that was humanly possible to carry out the pledge;188 OPIUM

they would not make a definite promise which, they
declared, would have no effect beyond the paper on which
it was written. M. Loudon, head of the Dutch delegation,
very politely but unmistakably insinuated that the pro-
hibition of opium by the United States in the Philippines
was largely a thing on paper. He challenged the American
delegation to produce the latest statistics to show the
contrary. Japan, while standing with the others on the
question of the competence of the Second Conference to
deal with opium-smoking, declared herself ready to accept
immediate prohibition ; her control in Formosa she said
was complete and effective; within a few years sup-
pression would be a fact anyway, no matter what others
might do.

Particularly did the Europeans resent and deny the
inference, thinly veiled in the speeches especially of Mr.
Porter and Bishop Brent, that their motives were sordid
or callous to the welfare of their subjects: that the real
reason for their refusal to institute a definite process
of curtailment of production and consumption was the
profit and revenue derived from both.

While this decidedly acrimonious controversy was going
on in the Second Conference, the First remained in sus-
pense; but it became increasingly probable that its
agreement would be concluded and signed by all the
parties—excepting China. The First Conference did meet
in fact, complete its draft, and fix upon December 13th
as the date for signing. The date arrived, the delegates
gathered to sign. They did not sign. Instead, out of
what seemed a clear sky Sir Malcolm Delevingne an-
nounced that he had instructions from his government to
withhold his signature for the present ; M. Bourgois for

France said he had received no instructions to sign.FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 189

M. Van Wettum, President of the Conference, adjourned
it indefinitely. And Dr. Sze, the Chinese delegate, who
like the spectators had no idea of the meaning of the
situation, remarked that

For ways that are dark, and tricks that are vain,

The First Conference is peculiar !4

Later it became known that M. Zahle, President of the
Second Conference, distressed by the deadlock which
threatened to wreck both Conferences, had telegraphed
to the Council of the League of Nations, then in session at
Rome, with the result that the British and French
delegations at least had been instructed to defer action.
For the moment it looked as if the agreement of the
First Conference was dead, with no epitaph except the
lone signature of the delegate for India. Some even
thought that the Americans had won their battle. Three
days later, on December 16th, in the hope that an interval
for “thinking it over”? and perhaps getting new in-
structions, a general recess was taken, and it was not until
January 19th that the battle was resumed. As it turned

out, however, the conflict was irreconcilable.

This is not to say, however, that the American insistence
was without result. After the Americans had withdrawn
from the Second Conference and the Chinese from both,
the First reconvened and adopted a Protocol designed to
meet the American demand so far as was acknowledged
to be practicable, including the concession of Mr. Porter
to accept fifteen instead of ten years as the period within
which complete suppression might be accomplished.

1 The allusion being, of course, to Bret Harte’s famous poem, “‘ The

5?
Heathen Chinee,”’190 OPIUM

This Protocol! in effect pledges the Powers concerned to
suppress opium-smoking in their territories within a
period of fifteen years, beginning

As soon as the poppy-growing countries have ensured
the effective execution of the necessary measures to
prevent the export of raw opium from their territories
from constituting a serious obstacle to the reduction of
consumption in the countries where the use of prepared
opium is temporarily authorized.

The period of fifteen years is to begin when a commission
(to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations
‘at the proper time’’) decides that ‘‘ as soon as”’ has
arrived. The verdict of that commission on that point
is to be final and binding upon all parties. Meanwhile,
the parties agree “ to co-ordinate their efforts to effect the
complete and final suppression of the use of prepared
opium.”

Moreover, a Protocol adopted by the Second Conference
in the same connection and with the same intent provides,
in Articles I and II, that

The States signatory to the present Protocol, recognizing
that under Chapter I of the Hague Convention the duty
rests upon them of establishing such a control over the
production, distribution and exportation of raw opium
as would prevent the illicit traffic, agree to take such
measures aS may be required to prevent completely,
within five years from the present date, the smuggling
of opium from constituting a serious obstacle to the
effective suppression of the use of prepared opium in those
territories where such use is temporarily authorized.

The question whether the undertaking referred to in
Article I has been completely executed shall be decided,

Its substance will be found in Appendix B, page 271 of this book.FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE . 191

at the end of the said period of five years, by a Commission
to be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

All this looks plausible enough ; it satisfies, so far as
words go, the demand for a declaration of general intent ;
but (aside from its evasion of the question of using vice as a
source of public revenue) it subjects suppressive action to
contingencies vague and remote. It registers the belief,
of which most of the Europeans made little secret, that
the problem of opium-smoking in the Far East is insoluble.
And it “passes the buck” entirely to the producing
countries, particularly China. It ignores the contention
of the Americans that the pledge of the Hague Convention
left no room for conditional compliance. Mr. Porter
demanded a date for beginning that compliance without
conditions.

Nobody took these Protocols very seriously. On all
sides they were recognized as mere utterances relating to
a situation which seemed unlikely to change in any
substantial respect. The best the London Times could
say for the Protocol of the First Conference, a few days
after its adoption (i.e. February 23, 1925) was:

It must unfortunately be admitted that the resolutions
of the Protocol amount to little more than a noble as-

piration. . . . It can hardly be regarded as a document
‘of great importance.

At the bottom, the controversy represented the nullifica-
tion of all the pains taken by the Far Eastern group to
prevent outsiders from meddling in what they regarded
as—what from the beginning had been—their own

+ The signature of Persia makes compliance with this, as with
all other provisions of the product of the Second Conference (Persia

was not a party to the First) subject to compliance with Persia’s request
for financial assistance in providing for substitute crops, ete.192 OPIUM

exclusive affair; business concerning which, moreover,
they honestly, and not absurdly, believed that they knew
by experience more than any outsiders possibly could
know.

Precisely by reason of the dramatic circumstances of
that controversy ; however one may view either the merits
of the American interference or the manner of its making ;
aside also from varying opinions as to the value of the
concrete results of the First Conference—or of the Second
either for that matter—the fact remains that for the
first time the blaze of world publicity fell upon the Far
Eastern opium situation, and the systems in vogue there
never again can escape it. The old posture of private
ownership and exploitation without regard to public
opinion has been abandoned once for all in the acknow-
ledgment of collective responsibility and international
concern.

The Agreement, Protocol and Final Act of the First
Conference were completed and signed at last on February
11, 1925, eight days before the close of the Second Con-
ference, whose output had to do with the subject of
manufactured drugs and the legal and illegal traffic

therein.CHAPTER VIII
THE GENEVA OPIUM CONFERENCES

(2) The Second Conference.

ORTY nations, including the eight constituting the
First Opium Conference at Geneva, took part in the
Second, which opened November 17, 1924, and adjourned
sine die on February 19, 1925, having been in session more
than one hundred days, with a long recess from December
16 to January 19. The forty participating nations, in
alphabetical order and with the eight of the First Confer-
ence indicated in italics, were as follows :

Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark,
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, India, Irish Free State,
Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Persia, Poland,! Portugal, Roumania, Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Jugo-Slavia), Siam, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United States of America,
Uruguay, Venezuela.

The United States delegation withdrew on the 6th
February, China the following day.

While the First Conference, as has been stated, consisted
almost entirely of persons highly familiar with the subject
of opium, especially as concerned in the affairs of the Far

1 The Free City of Danzig was represented by the delegate for Poland
until late in the Conference, when Danzig withdrew for no stated reason,

Oo 193194 OPIUM

East, the Second Conference as regards the acquaintance
of its personnel with the subject which it was to discuss—
the international traffic in manufactured drugs—was
of an entirely different character. In respect of acquaint-
ance with its subject it was, for the most part, fairly
representative of the world at large; of the average of
the population under each of the forty governments
represented—governments as widely separated in miles
and points of view as the United States and Siam; as
China and Chile ; as Sweden and Uruguay.

Speaking generally, these nations sent to the Confer-
ence, not men among their citizens best-informed and
most interested regarding opium and drug-addiction,
but men who happened to be more or less near and foot-
loose. The representatives of Czecho-Slovakia, Denmark,
Jugo-Slavia, Roumania, Spain and Uruguay were the
Ministers of their governments to Switzerland, most of
them permanently accredited to the League of Nations.
The Bulgarian and Greek delegates were the chargés
d affaires at their legations at Berne. The delegate of
Finland is secretary of the Finnish secretariat at the
League. The Canadian, Hungarian and Irish Free State
delegates were the permanent representatives of their
governments at the League. The Swedish delegate
lives at Geneva. Their respective consuls at Geneva
represented Albania, Luxemburg, Nicaragua and Vene-
zuela. The delegate from Cuba was the Cuban envoy
at Berlin and Vienna. The Australian is official secretary
in the Australian Office at London. The Persian delegate
lives at Monte Carlo.

Even the President of the Conference, M. Herluf Zahle,
who is minister of Denmark at Berlin, and who was
appointed to preside, not by the Conference itself but bySECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 195

the Council of the League of Nations, knew at the outset
practically nothing about the subject. His speech at the
opening of the Conference, while fine and inspiring beyond
desire, displayed an optimism considerably shaken as the
weeks passed. It is an illuminating exercise to compare
it with the one he delivered at the close !
And so on. This is not to asperse in any way their
interest, their intelligence, or their desire to contribute
to the solution of one of the most difficult problems con-
fronting the world ; but it is not too much to say that a
majority of the delegates to the Second Conference got
in it their first acquaintance with this complicated subject.
During it they were overwhelmed and probably con-
siderably bewildered, by the avalanche of words, steno-
graphic minutes, memoranda and pronouncements poured
out upon them daily in increasing floods (which may or
may not have been read), together with verbal arguments
in two languages—each invariably translated into the
other—to which for many weeks they patiently listened.
Also they were privately badgered to vote this way or
that. Among themselves they represented many qualities
and attitudes of mind, as well as many varyingly well-
informed and purposeful forms of instruction from their
governments ; not to mention some who lacked any
instructions at all to guide them in the shifting conditions.

Within this penumbra of somewhat vague information
and interest was a considerable nucleus of men familiar
with the subject by virtue of long experience ; who knew
more or less exactly what they were doing: what they
themselves thought and what their governments wanted,
why they wanted it, and how to obtain it.196 OPIUM

The core of this group was the entire personnel of the
First Conference, and the core of that was the dominating
group in the Opium Advisory Committee of the League—
Campbell, Delevingne, Van Wettum, Bourgois, Ferreira—
strengthened and buttressed by such personalities as
Dr. Rodrigo Rodriguez, Governor of Macao; M. Kircher,
Director of Customs and Excise in Indo-China; M. de
Kat Angelino, Secretary for Chinese Affairs in the Dutch
Indies.

The chief delegate for Japan, and the brains of the
Japanese delegation, M. Sagatoro Kaku, was formerly
Civil Governor of Formosa, and understood to the last
syllable the opium policy of his government. After
delivering a general pronouncement in Japanese, he was
silent through the debates, leaving utterance to the elo-
quent M. Yotaro Sugimura, Counsellor of the Japanese
Embassy at Paris.

Neither China, represented by Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze
(the Chinese Minister at Washington), nor Siam, repre-
sented in both Conferences until the midwinter recess by
Prince Charoon (who is a member of the Opium Advisory
Committee), had much influence in the First Conference
—or the Second either, for that matter—although Dr.
Sze was sufficiently vocal in protest against the treatment
of China.

In a word, virtually every one of this group of delegates
was in a position to be familiar with the ins-and-outs of
opium production and traffic in the Far East; it in-
cluded six of the ten members of the Opium Advisory
Committee, and they not unnaturally constituted a
formidable bodyguard for the status quo, as regards the
interests and the established opium policy of the Western
Nations having possessions ‘‘ East of Suez.”SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 197

The representatives of Turkey and Persia, without
perhaps any special knowledge of the subject, but under
perfectly assimilated instructions from home, brought to
the Second Conference a particularly keen and active
interest in the subject, by reason of the fact that the large-
scale cultivation of opium-crops is an important agri-
cultural enterprise in both.

Familiarity with the subject from quite another angle
characterized the delegation of the United States, Chair-
man Porter, Bishop Brent, Dr. Blue, Mrs. Hamilton
Wright and Mr. Edwin L. Neville, formerly U.S. Consul
in China, Formosa and Japan and now First Secretary of
the United States Legation at Tokio who has been
Secretary of the Narcotic Control Board in the United
States—all of these have been for many years keenly
interested in this warfare.

In still another category fell the delegations of Germany
and Switzerland, together with the group of minutely
informed and extremely vigilant technical experts

 

accompanying them. They seemed quite willing—even
enthusiastic—to support any measures to restrict the use
of ‘‘ raw’ and “ prepared ” opium in the Far East ; but
exhibited quite another attitude when the proceedings
touched upon their own domain—the manufacture of and
traffic in manufactured drugs. The Swiss delegation
worked under the sleepless surveillance of representatives
of the great drug-producing and exporting interests at
Basle, who saw to it that they never missed a trick. The
attitude of the German and Swiss delegations was con-
siderably affected by a real suspicion that other nations
were trying for selfish commercial reasons to curtail one
of their most prosperous manufacturing enterprises.

There was in the Conference a group of doctors, health198 OPIUM

officers, pharmacists, and so on, with a definite knowledge
of the technical aspects of the subject; among them
a very small nucleus of persons like Dr. Blue of the United
States and Dr. Chodzko, former Minister of Health of
Poland and delegate to the International Health Office,
inspired by personal knowledge and conviction on the
subject of both opium and drugs from the physician’s
point of view, however deficient in appreciation of the
political and business aspects of the question.

During the midwinter recess, Great Britain, France and
the Netherlands, beginning at last to recognize the im-
portance of the Conference, if only from the political
standpoint, placed at the heads of their delegations
Viscount Robert Cecil, Lord Privy Seal in the British
Cabinet, M. Deladier, the French Colonial Minister, and
M. le Jonkheer Loudon, the Dutch Minister at Paris. But
whatever of personal and political distinction these men
may have added to their delegations, they added no special
knowledge of the subject. It is, as we have seen, a highly
complicated and difficult subject, and they were obliged
to take, and did take, as fact and wisdom, what was told
them by their own colleagues, who not only had been on
the ground from the beginning of the First Conference,
but were peculiarly well-versed in this field. There was no
substantial change of attitude ; no material mitigation of
the deadlock.

The Americans (who, it must be remembered, were not
party to the First Conference at all) brought to the Second
the complete draft of a

99

Conference as “ suggestions
convention, in form indeed designed to supplant the
Hague Convention, including all of its essentials, togetherSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 199

with much and important new matter to strengthen it
and to carry the standard further and higher. In parti-
cular it was designed to include a new “Chapter II,”
covering the very matters which had been committed to
the First Conference on the subject of “‘ prepared ’’ opium
(opium-smoking). This instantly precipitated the question
of the competence of the Second Conference to deal with
that subject at all. And from its beginning on November
17 (after the usual period of grandiloquently optimistic
and mutually ingratiating speeches) the Second Con-
ference was continually excited and greatly prolonged, by
the persistence of that question. It did not adjourn
until February 19.

The American proposals included provision for the
Permanent Central Board embodied at least in principle
in the convention finally adopted; but this created no
special controversy, because the Opium Advisory Com-
mittee already had favoured and developed that idea,
and it was generally expected that something of the kind
would result from the Conference.

Even a proposal to prohibit the manufacture of heroin
was allowed to go to committee, although that subject
was not on the Agenda of the Conference and an ob-
jection on the ground of competence would have been
germane.

The question of competence arose seriously first when
Mr. Porter moved reference to the appropriate committee
of Article 1 of the American draft, reading as follows :

The Contracting Parties shall enact effective laws or
regulations for the control of the production and distri-
bution of raw opium and coca-leaves so that there shall
be no surplus available for purposes not strictly medical

or scientific,200 OPIUM

(It will be observed that this proposed re-casting of
Article 1 of the Hague Convention, beside adding the
reference to any surplus, carefully omitted the qualifying
phrase: “unless laws or regulations on the subject are
already in existence.” Also that a second paragraph
expressly conceded the propriety of production and export
of raw opium for use in making “ prepared” opium in
those territories where smoking is “ temporarily” law-
ful.)

The Indian delegation instantly raised the question of
competence, and demanded that the President of the
Conference should rule to that effect rather than to require
the Conference to vote on the point of order. Mr. Zahle
insisted upon putting the question to vote, but gave it
as his personal opinion that the matter was within the
competence of the Conference.

The result of the roll-call, which sustained Mr. Porter’s
motion and the view of the President, is interesting :

For the motion—< Aye ’’—26: Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Cuba, Free City of Danzig, Den-
mark, Egypt, United States, Spain, Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Persia,
Poland, Dominican Republic, Siam, Switzerland, Sweden,
Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against the motion—‘‘ No ’—1 : India.

Abstained from voting—9: Australia, Bolivia, Great
Britain, France, Greece, Holland, Portugal, Jugo-Slavia,
Turkey.

Absent: (Though listed and called) Nicaragua, Peru,?
Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia.

1 The States are listed here in the order of their names alphabetically
in French—as they came in the roll-call.

* The name of Peru was continuously listed as represented, but no
Peruvian delegate ever appeared in the Conference,SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 201

The real crisis came when Mr. Porter demanded refer-
ence to committee of Chapter II of the American proposals,
covering the question of “‘ prepared ”’ opium and providing
for a definitely progressive, ten-per-cent-a-year reduction
of opium-production for that purpose. The question
never came toa vote. It was in order to avoid the head-on
collision that the long recess was taken from December 16
to January 19. It was in the argument over this question
that Mr. Porter and Lord Cecil came into controversy
verging on personal acrimony.

When the hopelessness of the situation at last became
unmistakable, and it looked as if the Conference might
come right there to an ignominious and bitter end, the
delegations of Finland and Sweden proposed a compromise,
in the appointment of a joint ‘‘ committee of sixteen,”
eight from each of the two Conferences, to seek some way
out. Mr. Porter accepted this proposal, and the committee
was appointed. There being but eight Powers represented
in the First Conference, the heads of all of their delegations
became zpso facto members of the committee ; the Second
Conference elected as its representatives : United States,
Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, Italy, Persia and Poland.

This cleared the air for the moment, and the Conference
went on with its committee work, upon details of the
convention. All manner of private conferences were held,
of groups and individuals, endeavouring to find some
formula of compromise. Gradually, during the two weeks
following the appointment of the ‘‘ committee of sixteen,”
it was borne in upon all concerned that no formula could
meet the situation.

Up to that time Mr. Porter had centred his attention
chiefly upon his demand for a hearing. All he was asking
was, he said, the reference of the American Chapter II to a202 OPIUM

committee where its merits could be discussed. And that
was precisely what the opposition would not permit, on
the ground that the subject of that chapter belonged to
the First Conference and could not properly be considered
by the Second. The appointment of the joint ‘“‘ committee
of sixteen ”’ cut straight across that difficulty. To it the
whole controversy was referred; it was an appropriate
committee. Mr. Porter got his hearing on the merits.
But it did not improve the situation ; it merely crystallized
it and displayed its hopelessness to the blindest eye.

‘

In the meetings of the ‘committee of sixteen”? Mr.
Porter declined to argue. In fact, it was evidently a
source of some mystification—and irritation—to Lord
Cecil and the others of that standpoint that Mr. Porter
would not answer their arguments. He simply “stood
pat ” upon his view of the “ spirit and true intent ” of the
Hague Convention, and let the other fellows do the argu-
ing. Nearly a year before, the joint resolution of Congress,
approved by the President of the United States, in making
appropriation for the expenses of the American delegation,
had attached this proviso :

That the representatives of the United States shall
sign no agreement which does not fulfil the conditions
necessary for the suppression of the habit-forming
narcotic drug traffic as set forth in the preamble.

The gist of that preamble, which is very long, is in the
“« American principles,” from their acceptance of which all
of the ‘“‘ Far Eastern Group ” had expressly excluded the
production and export of opium for smoking. And inas-
much as that use consumes by far the preponderant
portion of all the opium produced in the world (Mr. Porter
told me he thought as much as 90 per cent of it), theSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 203

Americans felt that no measures which did not attack
that part of the subject could be adequate under their
instructions.

The “‘ committee of sixteen ”’ reduced itself to a “ sub-
committee of five,’ and all the. argument was repeated
therein. All without result. When the “‘ sub-committee
of five ” reported to the “‘ committee of sixteen ”’ that no
agreement was possible and recommended a report to
that effect to the Conference, the Americans did not wait
for the report. On the morning of February 6 they
refrained from attending the Conference, and President
Zahle announced the receipt of a letter from Chairman
Porter declaring that the United States considered its
further participation to be useless. The Chinese delega-
tion withdrew at the same time.

The excitement occasioned by the withdrawal, of the
United States especially, was out of proportion to the
occasion for surprise ; for it must be clear in any dis-
passionate retrospect of the whole situation that the
withdrawal was inevitable from the beginning. For at
least two reasons :

First, that the rigid instructions embodied long in
advance in the form of a law requiring complicated
legislative action for any modification, coupled with Mr.
Porter’s own inexorable point of view in interpreting them
(not forgetting the probability that he himself originated
them) made any yielding or concession impossible.

Second, that the withdrawal was due primarily if not
entirely to the fact that (however one may view the
validity of the reasons assigned for it) the Powers directly
concerned in the production and use of opium in the Far
East are not prepared to meet the views of the American
delegation about the reduction of either production or use.204 OPIUM

Incidentally there is the question of the attitude taken
by the Americans as members of an international con-
ference, in which accomplishment depends at last, always,
not upon majority vote but upon mutual and virtually
unanimous agreement. No matter what pious expression
might be “adopted” as the result of a roll-call, no
sovereign nation, member of such a conference, can be
compelled to accept, much less to enforce, a measure
against its own judgment and will. This was expressed
on the morning after the American withdrawal by M.
Loudon, the leading Dutch delegate, in words reported as
follows :

I think it is desirable to point out, in view of further
meetings of the same sort which may be held at Geneva,
that an international conference presupposes the possibility
of reciprocal concessions and of true and real exchanges
of opinion, and of good will on both sides, and such a
conference is doomed to failure if any one of the parties
has imperative instructions to impose its will upon the
others under pain of leaving the conference. Due regard
to possible divergencies of view and to the force of the
argument which may be advanced by the other side must
be made. If these discussions have been rendered more
difficult and even superfluous, the reason is that Mr.
Porter never took the pains to explain his own point of
view and even to reply to the arguments of his opponents.

This last assertion, while literally true, goes beyond
the real situation ; for everybody understood perfectly
Mr. Porter’s position, which was that the argument about
smuggling as an obstacle to definite measures of suppres-
sion was invalid as a pretext for not complying with the
pledges of the Hague Convention. He steadfastly refused
to be drawn into any discussion of the smuggling issue,
insisting that it was extraneous, And underlying it all,SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 205

even though never definitely stated, was the inference that
the question of smuggling was merely a “ red herring 2
drawn across the trail to divert attention from the real
motive; namely, that of the revenue derived by the
Powers in the Far East from the opium traffic. It was
this element in the American position which chiefly
embittered the situation, reduced it at last to an exchange
of thinly-disguised recriminations, and made agreement

impossible.

After the Americans had gone, the Conference pulled
itself together and went on for two weeks to complete
its convention.

For a short time it looked as if the American Article 1
might be adopted in something like its original substance ;
but there was no one left to fight for it, and in the end this
emasculated result was all that got into the convention :

Article 2. The Contracting Powers undertake to enact
laws and regulations to ensure the effective control of the
production, distribution and export of raw opium, unless
laws and regulations on the subject are already in exist-
ence ; they also undertake to review periodically, and to
strengthen as required, the laws and regulations on the
subject which they have enacted in virtue of Article 1
of the Hague Convention of 1912 or of the present Con-

vention.

Observe that while the caption of Chapter I, in which
this Article occurs, reads “ Internal Control of Raw Opium
and Coca-leaves,’ there is no provision for control of
production of the latter. The Netherlands and Bolivia
especially blocked every effort in that direction, more
particularly on the ground that the coca shrub “‘ grows206 OPIUM

wild ” and that therefore any control of its production is
impracticable.

We have dealt in the previous chapter with the Protocols
and other measures adopted by the two conferences in an
effort to meet the American demands on the subject of
“ prepared ”’ opium.

How much did the Second Conference really accomplish ?
There was much noise of marching and counter-marching,
drawing of swords and putting them up again, rumours of
retreats, defeats and famous victories; but what did it
amount to at last ?

We must remember always that an international treaty,
however admirable in text and significance, and however
numerously signed, at or after the time of its adoption
by an international conference, amounts to no more than
so much white paper unless and until ratified by parlia-
mentary or other appropriate governmental action “ back
home” by the number of precisely specified particular
nations prescribed in its “ enacting clauses.” No nation
is bound by a treaty merely because its representatives
in the Conference which made it have attached their
signatures.

In this instance, the conditions are peculiarly difficult ;
for the convention adopted by the Second Conference
cannot come into force as regards anybody or anything
whatever, until ninety days after its ratification by the
last of ten Powers which must include at least seven of
those represented in the Council of the League of Nations,
with the addition of the United States and Germany
(both of which are invited to participate in the appoint-
ment of the proposed Central Board), and at leastSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 207

two of the seven must be permanent members of the
Council.

Assuming the required ten ratifications, and the con-
vention duly in force, what is its progress-value ?

First, the starting-point of comparison—the existing
international agreement ; namely, the Hague Convention
of 1912.

The calling of the Second Conference implied recognition
of the insufficiency of the Hague Convention and the
measures taken in compliance with it, and an intention to
strengthen and elaborate the protection against the abuse
of narcotics. What was reasonably to be expected of it ?
To answer that we must bear in mind three things :

First and insistently, the standard set up by the Hague
Convention itself in Article 9, reading in part as follows :

The Contracting Powers shall enact pharmacy laws or
regulations to limit exclusively to medical and legitimate
needs the manufacture, sale and use of morphine, cocaine
and their respective salts. . . . They shall co-operate
with one another to prevent the use of these drugs for
any other purpose.

Second, that under the resolution of the Assembly of
the League of Nations providing for its calling, the
Second Conference was to consider especially the limitation
of the manufacture of the habit-forming drugs, and, to that
end, of the production for export of the raw material thereof,
“to the amount required for medical and scientific
purposes.”

Third, the fact that not less (and probably very much

1 See Articles 19 and 36, Appendix C in this book, pages 286-294.

The Council at this writing includes as permanent members Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan, with some probability of the early

addition of Germany. As members chosen for the term of one year are :
Belgium, Brazil, Czecho-Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.208 OPIUM

more) than ten times as much raw material of opium and

ce

coca-leaf is produced as is required for “‘ medical and
legitimate ’’—to say nothing of scientifice—purposes ;
stretching “legitimate ”’ as far as you can with a straight
face. Likewise that the production of the manufactured
drugs is enormously in excess of the medical needs of the
world. Remembering always that every ounce of mor-
phine, heroin or cocaine produced in the world beyond
bona fide medical need means an ounce of narcotic poison
seeking a consumer who in the nature of the case can have
no use for it save for the gratification of an unholy and
injurious addiction. The same is to be said, of course,
of the hemp narcotics—hasheesh, etc.

What effective step did the Second Opium Conference
take or provide for, reasonably calculated to limit the
manufacture of these substances, or the production of the
raw material from which they are made ?

The answer to that is: none whatever.

It did, however, so far as words go, maintain and reiterate
the standard, and improve upon the statement of it. The
convention again pledges the contracting parties to the

ce

enactment of ‘effective laws or regulations to limit
exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the manu-
facture, import, sale, distribution, export and use,”) of
these narcotics. That certainly is an improvement in
terms upon the feeble and hitherto largely unheeded
provisions of Article 9 of the Hague Convention with its

‘unless laws or regulations on the

¢

emasculating proviso
subject are already in existence.”

More than that, the Conference did what the Hague
Convention did not do; namely, provide for at least a
beginning of the one thing indispensable to any effective

1 The italics are mine.—J.P.G.SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 209

international control of this traffic. That is, forthe gather-
ing and correlation of information about it. At present
there is no body of information worthy of the name or of
anybody’s respect or dependence, about the world’s pro-
duction of either manufactured narcotics or raw material.
Until that information exists it is idle to talk about
limitation to the needs of medicine and science, because
nobody knows what those needs are, or to what extent
production is excessive. Even the estimate of 450
milligrams of raw opium and 7 milligrams of cocaine per
capita per annum is only an estimate. An emergency
need for morphine in a relatively small section of the
United States, for example, would not visibly affect the
total average legitimate need of the country for a given
year ; but the same kind of emergency might appreciably
raise the figure for Belgium or Switzerland.

The outstanding feature of the convention adopted by
the Second Conference is its provision for the appointment,
by the Council of the League of Nations, with the assist-
ance of both the United States and Germany (within three
months of the coming into force of the convention), of a
Permanent Central Board, of eight persons, “ who by
their technical competence, impartiality and disinterested-
ness will command general confidence,’’ who are not to
hold any office putting them in a position of direct depend-
ence upon their governments, who shall-serve for a term of
five years and be eligible for reappointment, and in whose
selection due and equitable consideration shall be given
to representation of producing, manufacturing and con-
suming countries.

Germany, by the way, signed the convention subject to
the proviso that she must have a member on the Central
Board.

P210 OPIUM

It was intended by the Advisory Committee which
originated the idea and by the Americans who adopted it,
that this Board should have very large and important
powers, even to the extent of rationing the various
countries ; that is, of apportioning to them respectively
and under varying conditions from time to time the amount
of manufactured and raw materials suited to their
estimated and declared needs. In the committees and
plenary sessions of the Conference, however, its powers
were whittled down, and the Central Board as envisaged
in the convention finally adopted is relatively only the
ghost of itself as originally pictured.

There is accorded to it, however, a power which so far
as I am aware is quite without precedent in international
agreements in time of peace. Article 24 authorizes the
Central Board, in the event of its observing an excessive
and unexplained accumulation of narcotics in any country,
and of its belief that that country is in danger of becoming
a centre of illegitimate traffic therein, ‘‘ to recommend
that no further exports of the substances covered by the
present Convention or any of them shall be made to the
country concerned until the Board reports that it is satis-
fied as to the situation in that country.” This is a very
great power; so great that its granting is surprising in
view of the disposition displayed throughout the Confer-
ence by every country engaged in any aspect of this traffic
to protect its business from interference.

Generally speaking, the inquisitory powers of the Board
are so circumscribed that at the outset it could not be
much more than the repository for such relatively harmless
statistical information as the nations which are in the
business of producing and selling narcotics see fit to

vouchsafe.SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 211

But at the outset that is exactly what is needed—even
if Switzerland, whence at present proceeds a large pro-
portion of the manufactured narcotics in the smuggling
trade, did serve notice that if the information which she
furnished was disclosed to her disadvantage she would
forthwith cease to furnish any. The Board if it ever comes
actually into being, will afford at least the beginnings of
world intelligence about the position in this business.
For the contracting powers agree under the convention to
furnish to the Board, as regards raw material and manu-
factured drugs, data generally as follows :

(a2) Annual estimates more or less accurate! of the
quantities of each of the substances covered by the con-
vention to be imported into the several countries during
the following year “for medical, scientific and other
purposes.” (The phrase “and other” was viewed with
suspicion by some as undermining the hard-won limitation
to medical and scientific needs ; but it was got in by the
Americans in order to include the figures for “ prepared ”
opium.)

(6) Statistics “as complete and accurate as possible ”
for the preceding year as regards production, manufacture,
consumption, stocks in hand, seizures of illicit material
and disposal thereof.

(c) Statistics for the preceding three months, of imports
and exports.

(d) Statistics regarding manufacture and consumption
of “prepared ”’ (smoking) opium. This, of course, applies
only to the countries where opium-smoking is “ tem-
porarily ” authorized, and the Board is expressly forbidden
to express any opinion upon its discoveries on that point

* They are not required or expected to guarantee or be bound by
the estimates, and may, if they choose, revise them. (Article 21.)212 OPIUM

—unless it finds that illicit transactions are taking place
‘‘ on an appreciable scale.”

It is provided that any of the parties to the convention
shall have the “ friendly right’ to draw the attention
of the Central Board to any matter which appears to it to
require investigation. And it appears to be taken for
granted that the annual and interim reports of the Board
shall be made public, although it is required to take steps
to prevent the information which it collects from being
used to facilitate speculation or injure the “ legitimate
commerce ” of any contracting party.

Provision is made for the hearing of grievances by the
Board and appeal from it to the Council of the League ;
disputes not thus resolvable or not settled by arbitration
or otherwise, to be taken before the Permanent Court of
International Justice.

Aside from the provisions concerning the Central Board,
the important affirmative gains in the convention, as
compared with the existing Hague Convention, seem to
consist in :

The stiffening and clarification of definitions, the in-
clusion of Indian Hemp and the potential inclusion of any
narcotic not now included, which the Health Committee
of the League of Nations, advised by the Office Inter-
national d’Hygiéne Publique, may find and declare to be
dangerously habit-forming.

The application to free ports, free zones and bonded
warehouses of laws and regulations at least as drastic as
those applying to other parts of the country in which
they are located.

Some strengthening and clarification of the system of
import certificates and export authorizations.

The Hague Convention was infinitely better than theSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 213

nothing, the anarchy, that prevailed before. At least it
registered international discontent with that situation
and a desire to amend it. It erected something in the way
of standards and better intentions. But it created or
suggested nothing in the way of machinery for effectuating
them. This convention conserves and stiffens those
standards, and provides a beginning of international
machinery by means of which the world may at least
discover its plight and get a basis for intelligent action
when it awakens to the seriousness of it.

The defects in the convention are chiefly those of
omission. So far as I am aware, its severest critics have
not alleged against it any provision affirmatively vicious
—except perhaps the restrictions and difficulties erected
in the way of its coming into force. It is so much of an
advance upon the Hague Convention that one may well
doubt whether in fact it will be sufficiently ratified within
any measurable period of time.

One of its saddest omissions is in its failure to follow
the lead of the First Conference by forbidding re-export of
manufactured narcotics lawfully imported. This leaves
any manufacturing country, party to the convention
or not, free to export narcotics to a country not bound
by the convention or operating the system of import
certificates, and through that country to carry on un-
restricted traffic.

The treatment of the coca-leaf is lamentably inadequate.
The Conference naively swallowed the claim of the Bolivian
delegate that its use by the South American Indians was
harmless, and brushed the subject aside ; impressed also
by the assertion that since the coca shrub “ grows wild,”214 OPIUM

and the natives in Java use it in “living hedges,” its
extirpation beyond the needs of medicine and science
is chimerical. There was no Peruvian delegate present
to support the official Peruvian allusion to the “ terrible

>

cocaine craving ’’ among the Indians; nor to face the
allegation that crude cocaine from Peru is afloat in the
illicit market at Hamburg.

The convention gives no clue by which to identify the
‘“‘ wholesaler ”’ and “ retailer ”’ so as to make the irregular
possession of narcotics in quantity certainly illegal. It
seems to be assumed that the possession of a “ licence ”’ is
sufficient protection against illicit traffic. The same may
be said of the licence to manufacture—as if the mere
possession of it would somehow ipso facto restrain pro-
duction in accordance with the long-standing pledge to
limit it to legitimate needs. Differences in usage of terms
between different countries involve the danger that
reports of stocks in hand will not be on a uniform footing
and therefore incomparable and misleading.

The convention fails to take any account of harmless
substitutes which now or hereafter may take the place
of habit-forming drugs and so virtually force existing
stocks of the latter into the illicit traffic. Incidentally,
it takes too much for granted the supposed innocence of
codein, made from morphine and only less the vehicle
of morphia, and ignores its character as the source of at
least two habit-forming narcotics, ewcodal and dicodid.

The Conference refused to follow the American example
and urging to prohibit the manufacture of and traffic in
heroin, derived from morphine, although the medical
profession is overwhelmingly of the opinion that its
danger far outweighs any possible medical value.

A large loophole is left in the fact that governmentsSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 215

are not required to report stocks of narcotics on hand for
government purposes. The reason assigned for this was
that in case of war such reports would disclose informationas
to what in such event would be army medical supplies. But

93

the First Conference agreed to make the import of “raw

‘

as well as ‘‘ prepared” opium a government monopoly,
and if, as may be hoped, the handling of manufactured
narcotics some day becomes likewise a government
monopoly, then the entire supply might come to be reserved
as a confidential affair; whereas what is most needed is
complete accuracy and publicity as to the whereabouts of
every ounce of this stuff. It should be noted, however,
that stocks acquired or held by governments for eventual
sale are not to be regarded as “‘ for government purposes.”

While great stress is laid in the convention upon the
illegitimate traffic, and the Central Board is enjoined to
watch continuously the course of international trade with
that traffic constantly in mind, no great attention was
paid in the Conference or any committee thereof to the
methods of the smuggling business, and little was done
directly to discourage it. For example, the Conference
refused to adopt anything resembling the following,
suggested by the American delegation :

Each contracting party shall make it a penal offence
for any person within its jurisdiction to procure or assist
the commission, in any place outside its jurisdiction, of
any offence against the laws in force in such place for
controlling or regulating the manufacture, sale, delivery,
distribution, use, possession, export, or import of any of
the substances covered by this convention.

This would have gone far toward meeting the grievance
of China about the abuse of extra-territoriality, so far as
the smuggling of narcotics is concerned.216 OPIUM

Nothing was done toward making such offences extra-
ditable although the United States is in process of enacting
treaties to that effect with Canada and Mexico.

Beyond a feeble recommendation that the subject be
studied, the convention fails to provide for the heavy
cash bonding of all persons dealing in any way in these
substances, so as to rob the illicit traffic of the great profits
which are its principal incentive. When this proposal
was urged by the Polish delegate, Sir Malcolm Delevingne
thought that hard penalties, of fine and imprisonment,
were sufficient. But of what use are these against a
person who has raked in a fortune under the protection
of a mere licence (obtainable at trivial expense) and fled
the jurisdiction—especially if you cannot extradite him ?

The convention makes no definite provision for establish-
ing the world’s bona fide requirements for medical and
scientific purposes, or even for the manufacture of
‘prepared’ opium; without such knowledge, who can
say whether accumulation of stocks of either raw material
or drugs is excessive or a probable source of smuggling ?

While minute provision is made as to the regulation of
legitimate traffic by import certificates, no standard is set
up or suggested for the control or limitation of manufacture,
which is the crux of the whole question.

There appears to be no provision for the control of
manufacture of medicinal preparations containing opium
or other narcotics (such as the so-called “ anti-opium
remedies’). So far as the convention goes in words, it
would appear to be permissible to make these in unlicensed
premises.

The control of free ports, free zones and bonded ware-
houses, is inadequately provided for. Narcotics should

ce

be declared upon arrival at any frontier, These “ no-SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 217

2)

man’s lands’ are indeed among the best storage-places
and bases of the international smuggler. Japan already
has made storage of narcotics in such places illegal.
Narcotics should be under special and incessant surveil-
lance, like gold. It is a question whether their storage
should not be a government monopoly, in special storage-
places under adequate guard.

The convention lays no stress upon the necessity for
uniform legislation, internal or international. Nor does
it offer any premium to ratification ; nor any suggestion
of penalty against a country refusing to co-operate.
Non-participation in anti-narcotic measures should be
regarded prima facie as suspicious.

Paragraph 4 of Article 15 leaves a wide door open ; the
stiffness of regulation is

. without prejudice to the provisions of any inter-
national agreement which limits the control which may be
exercised by any of the contracting parties over the sub-
stances . . . when in direct transit.

The convention makes no provision for its certain
application to such territories as the Saar Basin, and leaves
the signatories free to exempt possessions, protectorates
or overseas territories. What is needed is certainty as to
the status in this respect of every part of the world. Only
so can a “ centre of illicit traffic’ be effectively isolated
and boycotted.

No declaration is made in favour of the invariable and
immediate destruction of illicit narcotics upon seizure.
This is indispensable both to adequate enforcement and
the validity of statistics as to existing stocks; not to
mention the temptation to theft and official corruption.

Incidentally it may be mentioned that while both the
French and the English texts of the convention are de-218

 

OPIUM

clared to be authoritative, they are in some particulars
not exact translations and are thus open to controversy
as to precise significance.

In a word, the world has reached as yet only the stage
of a somewhat but insufficiently solicitous willingness to
control traffic in a commodity, with reference primarily
to the protection of commercial interests and the right
of each country to compete without serious interference
for the whole market. It has not yet acknowledged in any
substantial way the necessity of restricting the output
of the commodity for the common welfare.

The best by-product of the Geneva Conferences was an
amazing amount of publicity, and the awakening of a
public interest which seems to be increasing. To that the
dramatic circumstances of the American withdrawal
contributed notably. If everything had gone smoothly,
and out of peaceful, dull and technical discussions had
emerged a half-result, or even a fairly satisfactory one,
the world might have said :

“Well, that’s that. Now we have opium and drugs
disposed of and we can all go a-fishing.”’

Instead of that, if only because all the world loves a
fight better than an accomplishment, ‘‘ Opium ”’ for an
indefinite period will be a subject of interest charged with
all the thrilling possibilities of international controversy.
Never again will ‘‘ Opium ”’ subside into the mysterious
shadows out of which it has been dragged. The problem
is on its way to solution. But before that much-to-be-
desired consummation, we have a long, long way to go;
a hard battle to fight, with an enemy which never sleeps
or loiters, upon whose domain the sun never sets.

>CHAPTER IX
SO FAR, SO GOOD—WHAT NEXT ?

VEN admitting, as I think we must, that the Geneva
Conferences—having reference particularly to the
Second—registered, in words at least, certain net gains,
perhaps on the whole as much as was to be expected ;
even accepting for the moment a half-loaf as better than
no bread at all; nevertheless, it is exceedingly important
to remember that the net gain, whatever its theoretical
value, as yet is and probably for a long time will continue
to be only on paper. There is a long and arduous road to
be travelled before any of it can be put even nominally
into effect. Meanwhile will grow a false and harmful
sense of accomplishment, as if something had been set in
motion. Nothing has been set in motion. Something
very important has been lost.

Hitherto, the United States has been a leader in the
international war against narcotics ; the various confer-
ences including and since that at Shanghai in 1909 have
been called for the most part upon American initiative.
The withdrawal of the American delegation from the
Second Geneva Conference did more than merely register
dissent from policy and result in an output materially
less satisfactory than it would have been had they stayed
to the end and helped to get the best convention that was
possible in the circumstances—even if they had consum-

mated their dissent by refusing to sign it after all. It
219220 OPIUM

disclosed, embittered and went far to crystallize perman-
ently, a conflict of spirit among the nations which have
been and ought still more to be comrades in this war.
After all is said, the United States and Great Britain are
the logical leaders in it, and the unhappy discord which
displayed itself at Geneva has done irreparable harm to
the morale of forces which presumably were and indisput-
ably ought to be aligned. Especially the pity of it is that
the discord partook so largely of the character of personal
incompatibility. That, however, is a story by itself.

As for the others . . . Germany, most prolific of the
narcotic manufacturing countries (bound to the Hague
Convention in any event by force of arms under the
Versailles Peace Treaty) subjected her assent to and
compliance with the measures adopted by the Conference
specifically to the proviso that she should have a member
on the proposed Central Board. Persia, now perhaps the
greatest exporter, and with Turkey the source of most
of the smuggled “raw” opium, made her signature
subject absolutely to the receipt of substantial financial
assistance in trying to supplant the cultivation of the
poppy with other crops. Having been a neutral in the
Great War, the peace treaties did not make her a party
even to the Hague Convention, and she never has ratified
it. Turkey not only is not a party to the Hague Conven-
tion by any means while at the same time a prolific
producer of opium, but at this writing has not even signed
the Geneva Convention, although a member of the Con-
ference which produced it. Switzerland, second only to
Germany as a manufacturer of narcotic drugs and quite
as notorious as a source of smuggling, was a neutral
in the war and therefore unaffected by the peace treaties,
and ratified the Hague Convention only in 1925. HerWHAT NEXT ?

reluctance in doing so after thirteen years hardly encour-
ages optimism about her participation in any new
measures. France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal,
India, Jugo-Slavia, Greece and others, all more or less
involved in the production of raw materials or both ;
as well as those countries serving chiefly as markets from
which their nationals derive incidental profits, seem still
to labour under the delusion that legitimate commercial
and in some sort political interests are at stake. Withsome
distinguished exceptions, most of the nations, with varying
motives, display, as they displayed at Geneva, a disposi-
tion to hang back, wait, or “let well enough alone.” If
the nations which hitherto have led seem indifferent and

quarrel among themselves, why should the others hurry ?

Technically, to be sure, the situation remains as it was
before. The Hague Convention still stands unimpaired.
The Agreement of the First Geneva Conference specifically
declares itself to be only supplementary thereto. The
Convention adopted by the Second in no perceptible way
weakens the Hague Convention ; indeed, as we have seen,
it reiterates in less equivocal terms the vital major pledge
of that document with regard to the limitation of manu-
facture, even though no party to that pledge has as yet
kept it. And while it would supersede the Hague Con-
vention as among its participants, it expressly preserves
the old obligations as between them and those not adher-

ing to the new—in these words :

Arlicle 31. The present convention replaces, as between
the contracting parties, the provisions of Chapter I, Ill
and V of the convention signed at The Hague onOPIUM

January 23, 1912, which provisions remain in force as
between the contracting parties and any States parties
to the said convention which are not parties to the
present convention.

It would be so in any case. A contract remains binding
upon the parties to it unless and until abrogated by mutual
consent or otherwise in accordance with its provisions.
Neither party can override it lawfully by agreement with
outsiders. In withdrawing from the Second Conference
the American delegation definitely declared its intention
to go on under the terms of the Hague Convention,
abating none of its obligations or its vigour in attempt-
ing to carry them out, and waiving none of its rights
thereunder. None of its rights: that is a thing to
be remembered by those who fear that the new agree-
ments, even if put into force, would in any way nullify
or impair the validity of the Hague Convention.
No matter what arrangements any or all of the other
parties to that convention might make as among them-
selves, every one of them is bound still as a matter of law
to its pledges to the United States under that inter-
national contract—as well as to any other Power electing
to stand pat upon it. That fact was the basis of Mr.
Porter’s entire case in the Geneva Conference. The old
obligation to the United States in all circumstances
remains in all respects a prior claim.

But, however the situation may be legalistically
unaltered, it is not the same. The psychological position
has lost ground lamentably. The United States, as
represented by those whose personal influence probably
will control the official attitude in all important respects,
seems not at present in a mood, nor in any practical wise
to be depended upon, either to resume participation inWHAT NEXT ? 223

the leadership in which hitherto it has been both eager
and conspicuous, or to assist in any way in conserving
the results, such as they were, of the Geneva Conferences.
Indeed, the atmosphere created by and surviving the
events of that conference is hardly such as to encourage
the spirit indispensable to either effective leadership or
whole-hearted co-operation.

As for the new drug-convention—while we may expect
the co-operation of the United States in any advanced
measures that may be taken by others, either under the
convention or regardless of it, her failure to ratify it, and
still more her tacit if not outspoken contempt for the
policy and fruits of both of the Geneva Conferences, are
more than likely to operate as excuses for delay and non-
adherence on the part of other nations.

Without the enthusiastic, aggressive co-operation of all
of the nations—the United States, Great Britain, Ger-
many, France, Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Japan, India,
Persia and Turkey especially (to say nothing of China,
willing enough in spirit but fatally weak in the flesh of
performance) the war fails and will continue to fail. The
battle-line of 1925 and an indefinitely-prolonged future
wears the look of sadly-interrupted liaison /

The Council of the League of Nations, at its meeting in
March, 1925 (immediately after the close of the Geneva
Opium Conferences), proceeded to throw open the drug-
convention adopted by the Second, for signature, to all
nations which neither were represented in the Conference
nor are members of the League. These included Soviet
Russia, Mexico, Afghanistan, Ecuador, Iceland, the
Hedjaz, and the diminutive but independent States of9

_

24 OPIUM

Monaco, at the Mediterranean edge of France; Liech-
tenstein, between Switzerland and Austria, and San
Marino, buried in the midst of the Adriatic side of Italy.
Even the somewhat anomalous political status of the
Soudan did not prevent its being invited independently
of either Great Britain or Egypt, to sign and adhere.
Copies of the convention were sent likewise to States
members of the League which did not participate in the
Conference, and quite particularly to the two which
participated but withdrew before the close; namely,
China which is a member of the League, and the United
States which is not. Under the terms of the convention,
any State represented in the Conference, or to which a copy
of the convention was thus communicated, might sign
as an original signatory up to September 30, 1925, or
“ accede ”’ thereafter.

So now the whole process, so far as concerns effectuating
the results of the Second Conference, including especially
the establishment of the Permanent Central Board, is at
a standstill for the indefinite period which must intervene
before the ratification by a sufficient number of the Powers
specifically prescribed therein, to put the convention into
force.

The words in which Chairman Porter of the American
delegation declared their withdrawal from the Conference
and the continuing attitude of the United States, included
this by way of pledge :

We desire to make it clear that withdrawal from the
present Conference does not mean that the United States

will cease its efforts through international co-operation
for the suppression of the illicit traffic in opium and otherWHAT NEXT ? 225

dangerous drugs. The United States recognizes that the
world-wide traffic in habit-forming drugs can be sup-
pressed only by international co-operation ; but believes
that for the present at least, greater strides in the control
of the traffic may be hoped for if it should continue to
work towards this end upon the basis of the Hague
Convention of 1912.

Mr. Porter even went so far as to acknowledge, con-
cerning the drug-convention (as it stood provisionally and
in process of making, at the time of his withdrawal) that
“in the matter of manufactured drugs and the control
of transportation, an improvement over the Hague
Convention is noticeable.” Owing largely—I believe
chiefly—to the failure of the Americans to stay on and
fight for the best convention obtainable in the circum-
stances, that “improvement’”’ was subsequently con-
siderably diminished ; but, even so, as-it finally emerged
without their help, and as it stands now, the document
marks so great an advance upon the Hague Convention
that failure to put it into effe¢t, or long delay in doing
so, would be in my judgment nothing less than a calamity.
For such a calamity the American attitude will be con-
siderably responsible.

I appreciate fully the reasoning of those who accredit
to Mr. Porter and his colleagues a special degree of fidelity
to something that they are pleased to call “ principle,”
and to the United States as represented by them, a finer
exhibit of moral rectitude than could be claimed by any
other nation represented in the Conference. These
maintain not only that the American delegation was
justified in refusing to yield an inch in its demand for a
definite pledge to outlaw opium-smoking and to restrict
the production of raw material within a specified length
Q226 OPIUM

of time, but that only so—by scorning any sacrifice of
principle to alleged practical fact or to expediency, any
willing modification or implied evasion of the express
terms and obligations of the Hague Convention—could
it conserve its position of moral leadership, definitely
acknowledged in words by the Advisory Committee,
the Council and the League. To those who criticize the
American procedure of enacting into law a year in advance
the instructions which bound the delegation so that if it
could not get its maximum it must quit and go home,
those holding this view retort that the only essential
difference between the American delegation and the others
in this regard was that in one case the instructions,
however inexorable, were plain and known of all men,
while those of the European delegations, not less inexor-
able, were secret. Moreover, these contend, the American
instructions represented an immovable determination to
kill the opium traffic; while the others, however
camouflaged by fine-sounding phrases and _ plausible
excuses, at bottom were designed to perpetuate the evil
and conserve the flow of private profit and governmental
revenue. While they acknowledge that perhaps in some
respects the new drug-convention represents an advance
upon the Hague Convention, they regard that advance as
so small on the whole, so devoid of the measures essential
to the real destruction of the drug-evil, that it would be
better to let the whole product go by the board and after
awhile start afresh, than to allow the world to believe
that something substantial has been accomplished, and
go to sleep again. Let it go, say these ; then in a year or
two, or five maybe—especially if in the meantime the
convention has died by default—the United States with
at least a clear conscience can resume the initiative andWHAT NEXT ? 227

demand a fresh attack. Its flag anyway never has been
sullied by compromise or surrender !

I cannot share this complacency. I think it is based
upon a mistaken view of the situation. But this is not the
first time in history that substantial progress has been
thwarted or retarded by an appeal from something that
was called “ expediency ”’ to something that called itself
“* principle.”’

However one may justify, upon theoretical grounds—or
upon grounds of “ principle,’ if you prefer—the inexor-
able attitude of the Americans ; confidently as one may
assume (and I do assume) that by no act or intentional
omission will the United States abate its own efforts or
embarrass or obstruct those of other nations, whether
under the feeble provisions of the old convention to which
it remains a party, or under the strengthening ones of the
new should the other nations put it into effect ; the fact
remains that regardless of their expressed intentions the
Americans in a lamentable degree have abdicated the
leadership in this business which for a quarter of a century
has been held by the United States. Achilles, sulking in
his tent, leaves the battle-line, even such as it was, not
only the poorer for his absence, but materially broken
and spiritually disheartened. The present condition
destroys, at least for the time being, the morale of the
Allies in this war, and even the appearance of that
international co-operation without which the drug evil
cannot be appreciably checked, much less suppressed,
in the United States or anywhere else. This is not
a trench-warfare. The line is always moving either
forward or back. ‘The situation gives substantial
Support, certainly vast satisfaction, to the common
enemy.228 OPIUM

As I said at the outset of this book, “‘ the apparent
conflict of purpose which appeared in both of the Geneva
Conferences and which for a long time will confuse council
and retard progress arises from the existence of two
fundamentally differing conceptions of the nature of the
problem and therefore of the kind of measures necessary
for its solution.” Let us examine now more carefully those
two fundamentally differing conceptions.

Leave out of account those persons merely indifferent
and cynical, who affect to believe that the victims of this
addiction are inferior and socially negligible persons,
classes and races, flotsam of humanity, whose destruction
means small loss if not net gain; likewise that kind of
‘one who

‘

congenital ‘‘ optimist ”’ somewhere defined as
doesn’t care what happens so long as it doesn’t happen to
him”; in short, all those who are not, or think they are
not, interested in having any anti-narcotic war at all.
Leave out of account, too, those temperamentally
timorous and despairing souls who deprecate the situation
and ‘‘ wish something could be done about,’ but who, all
the more because they realize the formidable character
of problems and perils, shut their eyes, run away, or
abjectly lie down in front of them. Leave out of account
still more those reactionary survivors of antediluvian
schools of economic and political philosophy who still
imagine that some permanent national or racial advantage
can ensue from the negligently or even the forcibly in-
jurious exploitation of other and physically weaker
peoples ; together with their coadjutors, those “ hard-
boiled ”’ devotees of short-sighted ‘‘ business-is-business ”
to whom profit—especially personal profit—is the be-all
and end-all of existence.

Among those undeniably sincere, humane and un-WHAT NEXT ? 229

selfish in their desire to cope with this evil, and more or
less well-informed as to its particulars, there is honest
divergence of conviction. I say ‘‘ more or less well-
informed ”’ because it is peculiarly true of this extra-
ordinarily complex problem that contact with any
aspect of it tends inevitably to distort the perspective.
Few indeed are those who, however deeply and magnani-
mously interested, see it in all its bearings, as a whole.

As I have intimated, there is honest divergence of
judgment among intelligent and wholly interested groups,
seeing the subject from at least two differing points of
view.

I. One of these groups centres its interest chiefly upon
the Far East and upon opium proper, ‘“‘ raw ”’ and “‘ pre-
pared”; upon the cultivation of the poppy and the
production of opium therefrom, particularly in India—
often they seem singularly oblivious to the great output
of Persia and Turkey, and usually underrate the extent
of the backsliding of China and the difficulties in the way of
her recovery. They hold that until the Powers located
or having possessions in those parts abandon their policy
of legalizing and deriving revenue from the addiction in
eating and smoking, the indiscriminate cultivation of the
poppy and the over-production of opium will continue,
and the stuff will spread out over the world, thwarting
all efforts to exclude it, both from direct use and from
conversion into a great and increasing over-supply of
manufactured derivatives. They maintain that to deal
only or chiefly with the drugs is to neglect the lion’s
share—Mr. Porter, for instance, estimated it at 75 or
even 90 per cent—of the total production of opium. For
this reason they do not agree that limitation of drug-
manufacture would substantially affect that production,230 OPIUM

They appear as a rule oddly indifferent to the subject
of coca-leaves, the raw material of cocaine, which every-
where, including the East, is supplanting all forms of
opium, except cocaine’s terrible rival, heroin, made from
morphine, and therefore attributable to opium. I suppose
this general attitude is partly due to the fact that the
nucleus of this group consists of persons, many of them
missionaries, especially interested in the Orient, as well
as the Orientals, and particularly the Chinese themselves,
who hitherto have seen this problem chiefly in terms of
the smoking (and eating) of opium, and only lately have
had to confront the more serious evil of the manufactured
drugs.

It is characteristic of this group to hold Great Britain
in general and the Government of British India in parti-
cular, chiefly responsible for the conditions existing in the
Far East, believing—most of them sincerely; though
this group includes the variously-motivated congenital
haters of “‘ England ’’—that if these two governments
really desired to do so, they could, by example, leadership
and judiciously-applied “‘ pressure”? of various kinds,
force the others concerned into new and better ways.

This first theory of the situation was in the main
represented at Geneva by the American delegation, and its
withdrawal was due almost entirely to the fact that both
of the conferences approached the subject from another
standpoint.

II. The group representing the other theory is variously
constituted, but most of the parties to it converge in the
belief that the main attack under existing practical
conditions should be made with reference to the manu-
factured derivatives, morphine, heroin and cocaine ;
to the control of their manufacture, distribution andWHAT NEXT ? 231

consumption, and especially to the suppression of the
illicit traffic in them. We have taken pains above
expressly to exclude from consideration the whole laissez-
faire array, of the stolidly, timidly or cynically indifferent,
and the callously greedy who welcome profits from any
market regardless alike of conscience and of consequences.
Among those desirous of bettering conditions are such
as honestly believe that the opium practices of India
(exclusively India’s affair, if you please) are relatively
harmless, anyway beyond cure within any measurable
time, and highly inexpedient as a subject of govern-
mental interference under existing political conditions ;
that those of China and the Chinese are equally incor-
rigible. These see no hope in present circumstances of
checking the great production of opium in Persia, Turkey
and China, and therefore believe that any attempt to
enforce immediately prohibition of consumption in the
East would be a futile as well as an impossibly expensive
gesture, certain to be nullified instantly and automatically
by smuggling. Most of them are alive to the increasing
danger from narcotic drugs manufactured in and smuggled
from the West and Japan; but they see this as only a
part of the world-situation, and believe that the pro-
tection of the East as well as of their own homelands can
be accomplished best, if not only, by controlling manu-
facture and suppressing the illicit traffic. Incidentally
there is among some of them the desire to establish “ rules
of the game” for the sake of fair competition in the
‘legitimate’? drug-market. Generally, these people
believe that limitation of the production of drugs will so
constrict the market for the raw material as to dis-
courage the cultivation of the original plants.

To this second group belong an increasing number of232

 

OPIUM

those hitherto of the first-intelligent friends of the
Oriental peoples, who, while fully realizing the evils of
opium eating and smoking, and not underrating the
desire and effort to diminish those and to circumscribe
by every possible means the production of the raw material,
have come reluctantly to believe that those practices are
less injurious on the whole than the addiction to the more
powerful manufactured derivatives which is rapidly
supplanting them. The International Anti-Opium
Association, for example, in its Bulletin of February,
1925, asks: “If China cannot be protected against
narcotic drugs, would it not be wiser for her to retain her
opium 2?”

This theory of the present position is, I have come
to believe, inevitably that arrived at by those who see the
subject whole ; regarding the Far Eastern situation in all
its aspects and with full view of the regional and, if you
please, the racial peculiarities, in existing conditions not
only as practically insuperable by immediate direct
attack, but as in reality the less pressing aspect of a peril
and problem of the whole world. I share with them, after
considerable study of the matter, the belief that we cannot
afford to await, or to expend our chief effort upon the
long process of education and political readjustment
required for the elimination of ancient practices and the
reconstruction of agricultural, economic and _ social
conditions in far outlying regions (however desirable such
elimination)—certainly not by dependence upon fine-
sounding prohibitions which cannot or anyway will not
be enforced—before tackling vigorously that part of the
problem which lies within entirely practicable effective
control and limitation under our “‘ civilized ”’ noses, in the
United States, Europe and Japan: in the place whenceWHAT NEXT ? 233

every ounce of manufactured derivative must emerge
at the outset of its quest of the ultimate consumer.
Namely, the Factory.

It is possible to conceal, or to overlook inadvertently
or intentionally, a field of poppies in an outlying district
of India, Persia or China, or a growth of coca shrub in a
- mountain valley of Bolivia or Peru; or to gaze in rapt
contemplation of innocent verdure upon a “ living hedge ”’
in Java. The making of “raw” opium from the poppy-

c

blossom, or even from it of the “‘ prepared’”’ opium for
smoking, is relatively as simple and easy as the dis-
tillation of ‘“‘ moonshine’ whiskey in a lost Kentucky
valley. (To be sure, the Chinese throughout the empire,
before the present chaotic political condition did, and in
some districts do even now, punish infringements so
drastically—as for instance by the cutting off of heads—
as to discourage even surreptitious cultivation.) But
China is the only country that ever was seriously deter-
mined to suppress production: and did it !

A pharmaceutical laboratory, equipped to make
alkaloids on any profitable scale, cannot be hidden in the
woods. It is an expensive and elaborate affair. It must
import raw material. It can be found and subjected to
scrutiny and governmental discipline quite as readily as
a distillery or a brewery ; more readily than a tobacco
factory. The United States Government has no difficulty
in exerting its sway over every cigar or ounce of smoking
tobacco manufactured within its jurisdiction. Smuggling
is sporadic and all but negligible. The British, French,
Dutch and other governments, collect their taxes upon
every litre of alcoholic spirits. No gold, silver, or paper
money in appreciable amount gets out of the mints or
Government’s printing offices into illicit traffic, and counter-Pi bi 234 OPIUM

ia feiting is punished with prohibitive severity such as would
bi | go far to abolish the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs.
The manufacture of these poisons can be limited and
traffic controlled, and will be—as soon as the governments,
compelled and supported by an awakened public opinion,
become determined to do it.

And here we stick. The jealousy of national sovereignty,
in large part camouflaging the raw greed of “ business
interests,” is still the obstructing influence. Portugal
declared officially in so many words that she would not
tolerate anything in the nature of international control.
} Germany and Switzerland, the great producers of these
““ goods,” exhibited reluctance to furnish to the Central
Board with accuracy and celerity the data essential to
its usefulness. The Netherlands demurred and got into
the convention provisos that the Board must be scrupulous
in minding its own business. France uttered gloomy
predictions about the enormous labour and expense
j ; involved in supplying at frequent intervals the kind of
data that the plan called for. Even Great Britain, which
with the United States fought for broad powers in the
Board, did not want to see anything erected which would
iE discourage the building-up of “trade.” After the de-
fection of the United States, Great Britain fought alone
for the Board, and in the end had to yield materially to
the disposition to make it weak rather than strong. There
was even for a time a movement (fortunately unsuccess-
ful) to divorce the Board altogether from the League of
Nations and make it a futile little affair of jealously-
guarded, confidential information off in a corner by itself.
You see, the genius of the League, and effective service
by such a Board, even with its narrowly-restricted scope,
demand the utmost of publicity—all the cards in sight—WHAT NEXT? 235

which is exactly what most of the people concerned in this
business do not desire !

The basic point of view must be changed. This is no
longer a question of commerce as such. Nor a missionary
question affecting chiefly the Far Eastern peoples or the
South American Indians, among whom it originated. It
has become the anxious concern of the whole world, and
must be dealt with as radically and as unselfishly as the
most sincere, intelligent, beneficent international co-
operation and administration can contrive.

So the first thing needed is that the leadership in this
warfare should get together. Essential to the getting
together is intelligent knowledge of the facts, upon which
can be based a common conception of policy. The whole
process now is befogged by emotional, uninformed or
half-informed exaggeration on the one side and interested
reticence and obstruction on the other. It is not enough
that the world should realize as it does not yet that
narcotics—however invaluable under proper medical
control—have got entirely out of hand; that the fire
indispensable on the hearth has become a conflagration.
In order even to that preliminary realization, and still
more to effectively-unified action, there must be informa-
tion ; information at present nowhere available, upon at
least three phases of the subject :

First, there must be information, as precise, exhaustive
and up-to-date as possible, expertly correlated and inter-
preted, about the world’s needs and the world’s production
and supply ; a complete and constantly-corrected survey
of the whole position, everywhere in the world.

Second, there must be continuous acquaintance with236 OPIUM

the progress of science and technology in this field, with
respect especially to natural and synthetic narcotics of two
classes :

(a) Newly-discovered habit-forming drugs.

(6) Harmless substitutes for those already known. A
harmless substitute automatically releases just that much
of the harmful one to be thrown, or forced, into the chan-
nels of addiction.!

Third, and equally indispensable, is adequate, up-to-
the-moment intelligence as to the extent, methods,
channels and personnel of the illicit traffic. Only upon
such intelligence can be based an alert and constantly-
improving technique of detection and prevention, such
as international police co-operation brings to bear upon
the protection of life and property against murder and
large-scale robbery and fraud. The illicit traffic in these
disaster-spreading poisons must be on the same footing
as world epidemics of disease. The drug-smuggler must
be under the same ban of outlawry as the pirate, once
“an insoluble problem.”

All this means, in the first instance, an authoritative
stock-taking of the situation in all its bearings, through-
out the world as a whole; including every country,
colony or territory, whether self-governing, subject or
mandated ; to provide material for a war map, so to
speak, clear and comprehensive, as a basis for strategy
and tactics. Without such knowledge, freely and

1 The British Medical Journal and the Lancet, of April 28, 1924,
reported the appointment by the Minister of Health, after consultation
with the Medical Research Council, of a committee ‘‘ to investigate the
comparative value, for the therapeutic purposes for which cocaine is
at present used, of various possible substitutes, and the evidence as to
risk, if any, of such substitutes becoming drugs of addiction.’ The
Secretary is Dr. E. W. Adams, Ministry of Health, Whitehall, S.W. 1,
London, to whom communications relating to the work of the committee
may be addressed,WHAT NEXT ? 237

promptly exchanged and co-ordinated, this full inter-
national co-operation—disinterested in the face of a
common danger—concerted measures of protection will
be impossible, and the attempt futile from the start.

This general purview outlines the job of the Central
Board provided for in the convention adopted by the
Second Conference at Geneva—when and if ever estab-
lished. Sooner or later some such agency will have
to be created. But its scope and powers must go beyond
anything conceived of by the Opium Advisory Committee
with which the idea originated, or by the Americans who
appropriated it, or as yet consented to even in principle,
by any of the nations. That Board, or some other body
in its stead, must serve as the General Staff, organizing
the war against an enemy more powerful, and at the same
time more insidious, than any disease. It must be the
custodian and agent of the knowledge and intelligent
purpose of the world in this field ; the memory and the
directing brain of self-defending humanity. Its powers
must be increasingly full and aggressive; its greatest
weapon swift publicity; its sanctions based in the
essential rightness of informed public opinion. The only
remedy for this affliction lies in the awakened fear and the
enlisted intelligence of mankind. The proper function
of the Board is to arouse and intensify that fear, to
organize and effectuate that intelligence.

The Board was visualized in one of its possible activities
by Mrs. Helen H. Moorhead, secretary of the Opium
Committee of the Foreign Policy Association (New York),
in this fashion :

Picture a map of all the trade routes of the world, with
pins bearing slips of paper marked ‘‘ raw opium,” “ mor-
phine,”’ “‘ heroin,” etc., being moved from port to port,OPIUM

from one caravan stop to the next oasis; showing the
position of the trade and the amounts of each drug as it
moved across the world. The Central Board would be
informed of each ounce of narcotics manufactured or
transported.

Any nation which obstructs the process, or is niggardly
or wilfully tardy with its information, must be viewed
with suspicion as it would be if it refused co-operation
in a battle with the plague. This applies alike to its
behaviour toward the Central Board and to the character
of its internal legislation, administration and social prac-
tices as regards narcotics. It applies as well to its
punctuality in ratifying the new convention.

At least one nation, dilatory in its adherence to the
Hague Convention and for more than that reason under
suspicion as to the scrupulosity of its conduct in respect
of narcotics, was eventually somewhat expedited in its
acceptance of the treaty by the action of certain other
nations which adopted the policy of treating all imports
from that country as suspect. Any shipment of anything
from that particular territory might contain narcotics !
At last the exporters of other, innocuous, commodities
wearied of having their shipments spoil while held up for
special inspection on account of the one industry (and
that conducted by only a very few establishments)
opposed to the ratification of the Hague Convention. The
innocent got tired of suffering for the suspected, and the
thing was done. It can be done again. The economic
boycott is a powerful weapon in the interest of public
health and safety. Eventually it will become one of the
most effective weapons in the armoury of those who
fight narcotics.

With all its weaknesses and limitations as comparedWHAT NEXT ? 239

even with the instrument originally conceived by the
Opium Advisory Committee ; insufficient as it must be
at the outset under the terms of the new convention,
the Board offers at least a beginning—not good enough,
but as good as can be obtained in present circumstances.
Out of it can grow the organization that is needed, as
fast as the knowledge which it gathers and co-ordinates
awakens the world to the need of it. Despite any mis-
guided begrudging of information (the very fact of which
will speak for itself) or any restriction upon the interpreta-
tion by the Board of what it does discover and make
public, the initial display of facts will startle the world.
Even the fragmentary official statistics already available
in the documents issued by the League of Nations in
preparation for and connection with the two opium
conferences at Geneva are ominous of what anything like
a complete exposition will show. This fact alone ought
te stir the nations which honestly desire to better the
conditions, to ratify the convention at the earliest possible
moment and get the Central Board into being and at
least preliminary action.

Probably in the first instance there will be a natural
tendency to appoint exclusively experts, as distinguished
from persons of broad political or humanitarian vision.
Naturally, too, such experts are to be found chiefly among
those now engaged in or allied with the industries and traffic
concerned, and thus especially familiar with them. This
is not by any means necessarily to asperse either their
fitness or their capacity for disinterestedness. One of
the men almost certain to be nominated by his country
for a place on the Board, an adept in respect of technical
knowledge and astuteness, when I suggested that he might
be tempted unduly to favour his own country and the240 OPIUM

chemical interests in which he is a leading figure, said to
me with impressive solemnity :

‘‘ No, Sir! This business has passed the stage for that.
In the war upon the abuse of narcotics, my heart is inter-
national ! ”

Equally naturally, the nations will for a time be jealous
to see on the Board persons who will give at least fair
play to their particular business interests. It will be some
time before they will realize that in this matter “ business
interest ”’ must give way to the interests of humanity.

There will be some danger, too, of a tendency to allow
the Central Board to displace the present Opium Advisory
Committee and possibly even the Opium Section in the
Secretariat, of the League of Nations. That would be a
lamentable error; particularly while the Central Board
is restricted in its scope and powers of initiative. Despite
its defects, including the predilections of its present
personnel especially in favour of the status quo in the Far
East, that committee has done and is doing invaluable
work and has contributed enormously to the subject as a
whole, aided indispensably by the intelligence and con-
tinuous labour of the Opium Section. The Advisory
Committee should now be strengthened, by the addition
to it, perhaps as “‘ assessors,”’ of specialists in the technical
aspects of the subject; particularly in the technique
of running down the smuggler—such for example as
leading police and customs officers experienced in the
detective aspect of the anti-narcotic war. Representatives
of the police and customs services of various nations might
rotate in this service with the Advisory Committee.
Certainly such experts will be attached eventually to the
staff of the Central Board. But at the outset the Board
will be chiefly a fact-finding body. It will be long beforeWHAT NEXT ? 241

it can safely displace the Advisory Committee. However,
facts are what we need just now. ‘To an extent perhaps
little realized, they will speak for themselves.

Complete and current information regarding the world’s
bona fide needs as compared with the world’s prodigious
over-supply of narcotics of all kinds, is absolutely indis-
pensable to the two major factors which must operate
together for any substantial success in meeting the present
situation and safeguarding the future. Without that
twofold, interlocking operation, and without at the same
time a knowledge of the “‘ tricks of the trade,” especially
the illicit trade, the world cannot (a) ration itself as to
production and proper allocation of the supply of raw
material and manufactured product; or (b) achieve
effective co-operation and harmony of proceedure by
practically uniform legislation and administrative method.

Nothing short of iron-fisted government control—
perhaps even government monopoly of production,
storage, distribution in every phase of the traffic, from
beginning to delivery of the finished drug as close as
possible to the ultimate consumer, the patient under
medical direction—will serve to end, or even substantially
to curtail, the illicit movement of these poisons. In other
words, the element of private profit must be eradicated
to the greatest possible extent. No property right or
interest survives a candid examination of the subject.

Every pound of raw opium or coca-leaf, every ounce of
morphine, heroin or cocaine made in the world, must
account for itself, from the shipment and receipt of the
raw material to and by the factory to the vigilantly-

restricted personal possession of the bona fide ultimate
R242 OPIUM

 

consumer under medical guidance. The persons and
establishments authorized to handle the stuff, as growers,
transporters, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, must
be as few as possible, rigorously supervised, heavily
bonded, and under strict regulation.

Every movement of the material should be under
observation and guarantees. The illegal possession of a
single ounce should be treated as if it were counterfeit
money—nay, more, as if it were a virulent unit of the
plague.

The manufactured drugs should be packed in unmis-
takably peculiar containers which cannot be opened
without destroying the original wrapping or suitable
stamp and which cannot be refilled. The unit containers
should be numbered serially or otherwise marked in-
dividually to facilitate tracing of shipments to their
source and to prevent tampering with, abstracting from
or substituting for their contents. Anything not thus
marked, or misbranded or of anonymous origin, should
be treated as contraband. Any quantity, however small,
should be subject to these precautions. Under the Hague
Convention, a quantity below five kilograms of raw opium
need not be marked to disclose its contents. That, of
Persian opium for instance, represents approximately
9,000 grains of crude morphia, which means in practice
that a ton, or any other total quantity, can be trans-
ported without marking if the units are less than five
kilograms. These precautions were objected to in the
second convention on the ground that identifying marks
increased the danger of stealing or tampering en route.
However well-grounded this objection to indications on
the outside of the wrappings or cases in bulk, it does not
apply to the units within ; it is of great importance thatWHAT NEXT? 243

 

the final marketable units should be unmistakably
identifiable as to the source of manufacture and the nature
of the contents, not only as a guarantee against adultera-
tion and substitution, but as a means of tracing respon-
sibility. There seem to be no such compunctions about
the labelling of packages of money—but they are carried
under guard in the strong-rooms of ships and the safes of
express cars. Just as narcotics should be.

There should be no transit, in bond or otherwise, across
forbidden or unprotected territory, and no re-export from
the country of originally legitimate destination. The
original import certificate upon which was based the proper
authorization of export (and emergence from factory
should be treated as export; or, on the other hand, as
import if it is to be retained in the country of origin)
should be retained by the authorities and not surrendered
tothe exporter. And the papers authorizing export should
accompany the consignment to its destination and be
returned to certify delivery. In this regard the new drug-
convention offers a great improvement upon the Hague
Convention and the measures already adopted by some
countries in accordance with it. No scruples or precau-
tions governing transit could be excessive.

I have already spoken of the danger lying in loose con-
trol of free ports, free zones and bonded warehouses. It
may well be that narcotics should not be allowed in such
places at all. The bonded warehouse especially is a great
source of danger and needs rigid scrutiny. As I have said
before, storage of these substances might well be a govern-
ment monopoly.

Shipowners, corporations or individuals, and masters
of ships, should be made heavily responsible and drastic-
ally penalized for participating in or permitting unlawful244 OPIUM

traffic in narcotics. Smuggling in naval vessels—a
common practice—should be punished with special
severity.

Imports of all kinds from a country whose laws, regula-
tions, guarantees, habits and general reputation in these
matters are not up to the world’s best standards should
be viewed with suspicion and habitually inspected with
special rigour. Travellers and immigrants therefrom
should be regarded and quarantined, so to speak, like
persons from a plague-infected port. Their luggage
should have intensive scrutiny. A formidable quantity
of any of these drugs can be carried in very small com-
pass—several thousand dollars’-worth in a hollow walking-
stick. Their bulk with reference to value is comparable
with that of precious stones. There should be no export
whatever of either raw material or drugs to any country
thus suspect—no matter how impeccably authentic its
“import certificate.”

There should be rewards for seizures and for informa-
tion leading thereto, as there are now in matters of internal
revenue and customs-evasion. France rewards seizures
of illicit alcohol; but in matters under the Hague Con-
vention this is left generally to the precarious interplay
between official honesty and the immense profits available
from drug-smuggling.

In respect of licences: they should carry definite
limitations of time and quantity, and inspection of prem-
ises and stocks in hand should be constant and vigilant.
Responsibility under these restricted permissions should
be personal—you cannot jail a corporation, and no fine
practically enforceable will discourage a corporation
against the great temptations involved in this business.
Thefts of drugs and habitual discrepancies in accountingWHAT NEXT ? 245

should involve the cancellation of licences, and no person
whose licence has been cancelled ever should have one
again. No addition of stock, of raw material or manu-
factured, should be permitted to a licensee until all
former supplies have been properly accounted for.

The prompt destruction of all illicit material seized
is of great importance. Otherwise they will not only
present irresistible temptation to corruption, such as re-
sale by dishonest officials—a phenomenon not by any
means confined to the Far East, as the United States
knows all too well in the matter of seized alcoholic liquors
—but will destroy the validity of all statistics purporting
to disclose stocks on hand. A large seizure, such as that
of $450,000-worth of drugs in Brooklyn in the spring
of 1925, or that of a ton (1,000 kilograms) of morphine
at Rotterdam about the same time,! might give to a
relatively small country a supply equal to that which it
had reported as the sum of its legitimate needs for a year.
The police of New York City on June 15, 1925, destroyed
drugs estimated as worth (at pedlar’s prices) $1,500,000 ;
but this represented accumulation during the period of
a whole year, of more than 1,500 parcels, and 2,732
arrests, 97 per cent of them, Dr. Carleton Simon, Special
Deputy Police Commissioner, said, in announcing the
destruction, resulting in convictions. Seized drugs should
be destroyed forthwith.

The needs of the situation cut fine. It is not enough
to seize and destroy opium pipes. Hypodermic needles,
syringes and other devices for the injection of drugs,

1 The dispatch to the London Times of May 1, 1925, from The
Hague, recounting this seizure, said in part :

“The cases, manufactured in Germany, were dispatched from

Switzerland and destined for Canada, and the contents are stated to be
worth £20,000. The police have arrested two Canadians and a Swiss.”246 OPIUM

such as are in the markets everywhere now, as easily
purchasable as candy, or toys, should be placed in the
same category as the drugs themselves, at least to the
extent of permitting them to be sold only to physicians
or upon prescription. In ordinary circumstances the
layman has no legitimate use for such a thing. In very
few States in America does the law restrict their posses-
sion. I know of no other country in the world, excepting
China alone, where they are under restriction, that has
legislation of any kind on the subject.

What is the use or efficacy of a system of licences if it
does not mean meticulous restriction and inspection of the
factory and limitation to legitimate needs of its output ?
If one can produce or get possession of these drugs under
cover of a licence requiring only a reputation for re-
spectability and purchasable at nominal cost, and in one
transaction perpetrate delivery into illicit hands at home
or in a more negligent country of an amount carrying
an enormous profit, even a considerable fine, or a few
months in prison, is a small price to pay. There would be
less of this sort of thing if every step, of manufacturer,
strictly-defined wholesaler, and retailer too, including the
physician, were minutely covered by unmistakable
restrictions ruthlessly enforced, and at the same time
guaranteed by a cash bond so large and penalties so formid-
able, as to put the premium on honesty, rather than, as at
present, upon evasions.

As for the import certificate, we have seen in the situa-
tion at Vladivostok for example, how futile it is in the
presence of port authorities ready to issue it to anyone
who has the price. Without a control that amounts to
the rationing of every country and an embargo against
those countries which refuse to co-operate ; without aWHAT NEXT ? 247

body of current and swiftly-communicated information as
to production, export needs and stocks-in-hand of those
nations whose behaviour entitles them to have this stuff
at all, the import certificate simply legalizes and facilitates
the irregular traffic and penalizes the nation acting in
good faith, for the benefit of the negligent and crooked.

Just as we now safeguard the movement and storage
of high explosives, so must we control the movement of
these dangerous substances. An explosion of “TNT”
or dynamite may devastate its neighbourhood and destroy
a considerable number of lives . . . a very much smaller
bulk of morphine, cocaine or heroin may spread its
disaster over a whole country-side and start the ruin of a
province.

It is well enough to lay stress upon the need of rescue
for those who have become addicted ; to recognize that,
whoever may have been responsible at the outset for
their plight, they are now more or less helpless victims
of an all but incurable disease. There should be no less,
but much more indeed, of that business of mercy and
rehabilitation. Say, if you will, that these poor creatures,
whether in America, in Europe or in China, are folk
congenitally weak, inferior, criminal or what not. Deal
with them in hospitals, or in prisons, or abandon them as
hopeless, in accordance with the prevailing theory what-
ever it may be. There may be room for argument here,
and difference of opinion. But all this is “‘ fishing behind
the net.” With these the mischief is done and for the
most part irrevocable.

There can be no honest difference of opinion as to the
need for throttling this danger, the cause of all this ruin,
at its source. Unfortunately, the situation is complicated
and made more difficult by the fact that within the limits248 OPIUM

 

of medicine and science these substances appear to be not
only useful but in fact indispensable, and that therefore
it is necessary to produce and circulate them in limited
amounts. The problem is that of restricting their pro-
duction to those limited needs, and safeguarding their
manufacture and delivery. To that end we must have
knowledge very much more complete and well-correlated
than is now available ; a technique based upon experience
and far-seeing unselfish study of conditions and of methods
and carried out with full international co-operation. And
we must have a body of informed and awakened public
opinion behind that co-operation.

Thus far the agitation in this matter has been carried
on by more or less scattered groups, each with its own
point of view and theory and in the light of some relatively
local aspect of the problem. Who is going to carry on now
the agitation in the several countries, including the United
States, and especially in those which still imagine it to
be to their interest to continue the status quo if not to
weaken the present inadequate degree of international
co-operation, to get the new drug-convention ratified
under the difficult conditions prescribed in the document
itself, by enough Powers to put it into force ? Especially
to get the Central Board into being and functioning for at
least the beginnings of its most important purpose ?

Far from uniting the leadership, much less inspiriting
the anti-narcotic warfare, the events of the Geneva Opium
Conference left behind discouragement, disharmony, loss
of even such morale as existed before. For all practical
purposes the army is demoralized and in retreat, with no
one in sight to rally it for a stand—not to mention anyWHAT NEXT ? 249

advance against the common enemy. The agreement of
the First Conference represents no progress worth dis-
cussing, and the new drug-convention adopted by the
Second is a thing of printed paper with the odds heavily
against its ever being anything else.

Regardless of these conditions and conflicts of view—
nay, all the more because of them—the time is ripe for
the creation of a voluntary permanent international
organization, outside and independent of official machin-
ery, to create, clarify and focus world public opinion and
unify leadership ; to gather, interpret and publish facts,
to co-operate with and at the same time to spur the public
authorities of all kinds vested with responsibility in any
and every phase of this subject ; to help the governments
to get together, to keep together, and to move forward.

Such an organization would bring together in common
purpose and endeavour and with a view of economy of
expenditure in money and effort, the existing organiza-
tions, such as the International Anti-Opium Association
of Peking, the Chinese National Anti-Opium Association,
the White Cross Association of America, the English
Society for the Suppression of the Traffic in Opium, etc.,
and should encourage the organization of similar societies
in other countries. Without in any way supplanting
or conflicting with these ; but strengthening, encouraging
and co-operating with them and helping them to co-operate
with each other, it would be a clearing-house and medium
of exchange among them. It would inform and help to
co-ordinate the efforts of the great religious bodies of all
lands and faiths, and aid them in provoking effective
impulse and power in the machinery which can put faith
into action.

The nucleus of such an organization naturally wouldee

250

 

OPIUM

be a small group of especially awakened and well-
informed persons, free of narrow personal prejudices and
jealousies and superior to national interests, especially
those of a selfish commercial character. There are men
and women in the world—I could name some of them off-
hand—ready and fit for such an enterprise. There is
available certainly the relatively small amount of money
needed for the initial steps, as well as the larger sums
which will be necessary as the work develops. There is the
need and there is the opportunity.

Nature has demonstrated her ability to create an im-
munity which in the end automatically smothers out an
epidemic of infectious disease. She provides no immunity
against drug-addiction. That from its beginning, whether
in an individual or in the body social, steadily gains foot-
hold and sweep. That is what it has done and is doing
in the world at large. Nowhere has it suffered any set-
back.

This is no summer’s-day enterprise upon which the
nations are forced by their past to enter. It is extra-
ordinarily complicated and difficult ; but it is a matter of
life and death, and every day of half-heartedness, of
delay while pettifogging about ‘“‘ national sovereignty ”’
and miscalled ‘“ business interests,’ makes it only the
more difficult. It comes down at last to the question
whether the world war against the drug-evil is an academic
affair, of pious declarations and empty gestures, defence
of old positions and obsolete pronouncements, proud
consistencies and saving of faces ; or whether, in the face
of a world-peril, the nations shall join in common effort
against an enemy of all mankind, as they would and doWHAT NEXT ? 251

against virulent disease. Making the while the sacrifices
of pride, of temporary and illusory economic and political
advantage and individual sovereignty, which must be
made sooner or later.

They are not yet frightened enough. They fancy that
they are still at the stage represented by the feeble agree-
ments of the Hague Convention of more than a decade
ago. They do not realize that during the preoccupation
of international attention in the World War a situation has
developed and is developing with appalling swiftness which
is both worse and different. It is as if an army had gone
into the war in 1918 equipped only with the weapons and
possessing only the military ideas and knowledge of the
enemy’s character, resources and methods which had
proved fatally defective in 1914. And not only that, but
quarrelling among themselves and suspecting each other.

Meanwhile, the old enemy, opium proper, in new and
immensely more venomous and devastating forms, with
new allies and in overwhelming quantities, directed by
some of the most competent organizing brains in the
world, united by the powerful motive of greed and aided
by discord in the defence, is beating us in detail, and on
all the fronts.APPENDICES

A. THE HaGurE CONVENTION OF 1912, WITH EXCERPTS
FROM THE PROTOCOL AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE
SECOND OPpriuM CONFERENCE OF 1913.

. First Oprum CONVENTION OF 1925—AGREEMENT,
ProTocoL AND Frnau Act.

SECOND Opium CONVENTION OF 1925—CONVENTION,
PROTOCOL AND Frnat Act.APPENDIX A

INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION

(Known as ‘‘ The Hague Convention of 1912’’)}
Signed at the Hague, January 23rd, 1912

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia,
in the name of the German Empire ; the President of the
United States of America ; His Majesty the Emperor of
China; the President of the French Republic; His
Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the
Seas, Emperor of India ; His Majesty the King of Italy ;
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; Her Majesty the
Queen of the Netherlands; His Imperial Majesty the
Shah of Persia; the President of the Portuguese Republic ;
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; His
Majesty the King of Siam,

Desirous of advancing a step further on the road opened by
the International Commission of Shanghai of 1909 ;

Determined to bring about the gradual suppression of the
abuse of opium, morphine and cocaine, as also of the drugs
prepared or derived from these substances, which give rise
or might give rise to similar abuses ;

Taking into consideration the necessity and the mutual
advantage of an international agreement on this point ;

Convinced that in this humanitarian endeavour they will
meet with the unanimous adherence of all the States con-
cerned :

Have decided to conclude a convention with this object,
and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries :

(Here follow the names of the heads of States and their
Plenipotentiaries.)

1 This is the official English translation: the authentic text is in
French. (From League of Nations document O.C.1 (1).)
255APPENDIX A

 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 

CHAPTER I
RAW OPIUM

Definition.—By ‘‘ raw opium ”’ is understood :

The spontaneously coagulated juice obtained from the
capsules of the papaver somniferum, which has only been
submitted to the necessary manipulations for packing and
transport.

Article |

The Contracting Powers shall enact effective laws or
regulations for the control of the production and distribution
of raw opium, unless laws or regulations on the subject are
already in existence.

Article 2
Due regard being had to the differences in their commercial
conditions, the Contracting Powers shall limit the number of
towns, ports, or other localities through which the export or
import of raw opium shall be permitted.

Article 3
The Contracting Powers shall take measures :
: (a2) To prevent the export of raw opium to countries
| which shall have prohibited its entry, and

(6) To control the export of raw opium to countries
j which restrict its import, unless regulations on the subject
are already in existence.

Article 4

The Contracting Powers shall make regulations requiring
that every package containing raw opium intended for export
shall be marked in such a way as to indicate its contents,
provided that the consignment exceeds five kilograms.

Article 5
The Contracting Powers shall not allow the import and ex-
port of raw opium except by duly authorized persons.HAGUE CONVENTION

CHAPTER II
PREPARED OPIUM

Definition.— By “ prepared opium ”’ is understood :

The product of raw opium, obtained, by a series of special
operations, especially by dissolving, boiling, roasting, and
fermentation, designed to transform it into an extract suitable
for consumption.

Prepared opium includes dross and all other residues
remaining when opium has been smoked.

Article 6

The Contracting Powers shall take measures for the gradual
and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade
in, and use of, prepared opium, with due regard to the varying
circumstances of each country concerned, unless regulations
on the subject are already in existence.

Article 7
The Contracting Powers shall prohibit the import and ex-
port of prepared opium ; those Powers, however, which are
not yet ready to prohibit immediately the export of prepared
opium shall prohibit it as soon as possible.

Article 8

The Contracting Powers which are not yet ready to prohibit
immediately the export of prepared opium :

(a) Shall restrict the number of towns, ports, or other
localities through which prepared opium may be ex-
ported ;

(6) Shall prohibit the export of prepared opium to
countries which now forbid, or which may hereafter
forbid, the import thereof ;

(c) Shall, in the meanwhile, prohibit the consignment
of prepared opium to a country which desires to restrict
its entry, unless the exporter complies with the regula-
tions of the importing country ;

SAPPENDIX A

(d) Shall take measures to ensure that every package
exported, containing prepared opium, bears a special
mark indicating the nature of its contents ;

(e) Shall not permit the export of prepared opium
except by specially authorized persons.

CHAPTER III

MEDICINAL OPIUM, MORPHINE, COCAINE, ETC.

,

Definitions —By “‘ medicinal opium ”’ is understood :

Raw opium which has been heated to 60° Centigrade and
contains not less than 10 per cent of morphine, whether or not
it be powdered or granulated or mixed with indifferent
materials.

?

By “‘ morphine ”’ is understood :

The principal alkaloid of opium, having the chemical
formula C,,H,,NO3.

By “ cocaine ”’ is understood :

The principal alkaloid of the leaves of Hrythroxylon Coca,
having the formula C,,H,,NOx4.

By “heroin ”’ is understood :

Diacetyl-morphine, having the formula C,,H,,NOs.

Article 9
The Contracting Powers shall enact pharmacy laws or
regulations to limit exclusively to medical and legitimate
purposes the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts unless laws or regulations on the
subject are already in existence. They shall co-operate with
one another to prevent the use of these drugs for any other
purpose.
Article 10
The Contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours
to control, or to cause to be controlled, all persons manu-

facturing, importing, selling, distributing, and exportingHAGUE CONVENTION 259

morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts, as well as the
building in which these persons carry on such industry or
trade.

With this object, the Contracting Parties shall use their
best endeavours to adopt, or cause to be adopted, the following
measures, unless regulations on the subject are already in
existence :

(a) To confine the manufacture of morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts to those establishments and
premises alone which have been licensed for the purpose,
or to obtain information respecting the establishments and
premises in which these drugs are manufactured and to
keep a register of them ;

(6) To require that all persons engaged in the manu-
facture, import, sale, distribution, or export of morphine,
cocaine, and their respective salts shall be furnished with
a licence or, permit to engage in these operations, or shall
make to the competent authorities an official declaration
that they are so engaged ;

(c) To require that such persons shall enter in their
books the quantities manufactured, imports, sales, and
all other distribution, and exports of morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts. This rule shall not necessarily
apply to medical prescriptions and to sales by duly
authorized chemists.

Article 11

The Contracting Powers shall take measures to prohibit, as
regards their internal trade, the delivery of morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts to any unauthorized persons, unless
regulations on the subject are already in existence.

Article 12

Due regard being had to the differences in their conditions,
the Contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours to
restrict to authorized persons the import of morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts.260 APPENDIX A

Article 13

The Contracting Powers shall use their best endeavours to
adopt, or cause to be adopted, measures to ensure that
morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts shall not be
exported from their countries, possessions, colonies, and leased
territories to the countries, possessions, colonies, and leased
territories of the other Contracting Powers except when con-
signed to persons furnished with the licences or permits
provided for by the laws or regulations of the importing
country.

With this object each Government may communicate from
time to time to the Governments of the exporting countries
lists of the persons to whom licences or permits for the import
of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts have been
granted.

Article 14

The Contracting Powers shall apply the laws and regula-
tions respecting the manufacture, import, sale, or export
of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts :

(a) To medicinal opium ;

(b) To all preparations (officinal and non-officinal,
including the so-called anti-opium remedies) containing
more than 0-2 per cent of morphine, or more than 0-1 per
cent of cocaine ;

(c) To heroin, its salts and preparations containing
more than 0:1 per cent of heroin ;

(d) To all new derivatives of morphine, of cocaine,
or of their respective salts, and to every other alkaloid
of opium, which may be shown by scientific research,
generally recognized, to be liable to similar abuse and
productive of like ill-effects.

CHAPTER IV
Article 15

The Contracting Powers having treaties with China (Treaty
Powers) shall, in conjunction with the Chinese Government,HAGUE CONVENTION 261

take the necessary measures to prevent the smuggling into
Chinese territory, as well as into their Far-Eastern Colonies
and into the leased territories which they occupy in China,
of raw and prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their
respective salts, as also of the substances referred to in
Article 14 of the present Convention. The Chinese Govern-
ment shall, on their part, take similar measures for the sup-
pression of the smuggling of opium and of the other substances
above referred to from China to the foreign colonies and leased
territories.

Article 16

The Chinese Government shall promulgate pharmacy laws
for their subjects regulating the sale and distribution of mor-
phine, cocaine, and their respective salts, and of the sub-
stances referred to in Article 14 of the present Convention,
and shall communicate these laws to the Governments having
treaties with China through their diplomatic representatives
at Peking. The Contracting Powers having treaties with China
shall examine these laws and, if they find them acceptable,
shall take the necessary measures to apply them to their
nationals residing in China.

Article 17

The Contracting Powers having treaties with China shall
undertake to adopt the necessary measures to restrict and
control the habit of smoking opium in their leased territories,
settlements, and concessions in China, to suppress, part passu
with the Chinese Government, the opium dens or similar
establishments which may still exist there, and to prohibit
the use of opium in places of entertainment and brothels.

Article 18

The Contracting Powers having treaties with China shall
take effective measures for the gradual reduction, pari passu
with the effective measures which the Chinese Government
shall take with the same object, of the number of shops in
which raw and prepared opium is sold, which may still exist262 APPENDIX A

in their leased territories, settlements, and concessions in
China. They shall adopt effective measures for the restriction
and control of the retail trade in opium in the leased territories,
settlements, and concessions, unless regulations on the subject
are already in existence.

Article 19

The Contracting Powers having post offices in China shall
adopt effective measures to prohibit the illegal import into
China in the form of postal packages, as well as the illegal
transmission through these offices from one place in China to
another, of opium (raw or prepared), morphine, cocaine,
and their respective salts, and of the other substances referred
to in Article 14 of the present Convention.

CHAPTER V
Article 20

The Contracting Powers shall examine the possibility of
enacting laws or regulations making it a penal offence to
be in illegal possession of raw opium, prepared opium, mor-
phine, cocaine, and their respective salts, unless laws or regula-
tions on the subject are already in existence.

Article 21

The Contracting Powers shall communicate to one another,
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands :

(a) The texts of the existing laws and administrative
regulations respecting the matters referred to in the
present Convention or promulgated in virtue of the clauses
thereof ;

(b) Statistical information as regards the trade in raw
opium, prepared opium, morphine, cocaine, and their
respective salts, as well as in the other drugs or their
salts or preparations referred to in the present Convention.

These statistics shall be furnished with as many details and
within a period as short as may be considered possible,HAGUE CONVENTION

CHAPTER VI
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 22

Any Power not represented at the Conference shall be allowed
to sign the present Convention.

With this object the Government of the Netherlands will,
immediately after the signature of the Convention by the
Plenipotentiaries of the Powers which have taken part in the
Conference, invite all the Powers of Europe and America not
represented at the Conference, that is to say :

The Argentine Republic, Austria-Hungary, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Republic of Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic,
the Republic of Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, the Republic
of Haiti, Honduras, Luxemburg, Mexico, Montenegro,
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Roumania,
Salvador, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Uruguay, the United States of Venezuela,

to appoint a delegate, furnished with the necessary full powers,
to sign the Convention at The Hague.

These signatures shall be affixed to the Convention by means
of a “ Protocol of Signature by Powers not represented,” the
date of each signature being mentioned.

The Government of the Netherlands will, every month,
notify the Signatory Powers of each supplementary signature.

Article 23

After all the Powers, as well on their own behalf as on
behalf of their possessions, colonies, protectorates, and leased
territories, have signed the Convention or the supplementary
Protocol above referred to, the Government of the Netherlands
will invite all the Powers to ratify the Convention with this
Protocol.

In the event of the signature of all the Powers invited not
having been obtained on the date of December 31st, 1912, the
Government of the Netherlands will immediately invite the264 APPENDIX A

Powers which have signed by that date to appoint delegates
to examine at The Hague the possibility of depositing their
ratifications notwithstanding.

The ratification shall take place within as short a period
as possible and shall be deposited at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs at The Hague.

The Government of the Netherlands will every month
notify the Signatory Powers of the ratifications which they
have received in the interval.

As soon as the ratifications of all the Signatory Powers, as
well on their own behalf as on behalf of their colonies, posses-
sions, protectorates, and leased territories, have been received
by the Government of the Netherlands, the latter will notify
all the Powers which have ratified the Convention of the date
on which it received the last instrument of ratification.

Article 24

The present Convention shall come into force three months
after the date mentioned in the notification by the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands, referred to in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

With regard to the laws, regulations, or other measures
contemplated by the present Convention, it is agreed that the
bills or drafts required for this purpose shall be prepared not
later than six months after the entry into force of the Con-
vention. As regards the laws, they shall also be submitted
by their Governments to the Parliaments or legislative bodies
within the same period of six months, or in any case at the
first session following the expiration of this period.

The date on which these laws, regulations, or measures
shall come into force shall form the subject of an agreement
between the Contracting Powers, at the instance of the Govern-
ment of the Netherlands.

In the event of questions arising relative to the ratification
of the present Convention, or to the enforcement either of
the Convention or of the laws, regulations, or measures re-
sulting therefrom, the Government of the Netherlands will,
if these questions cannot be settled by other means, inviteHAGUE CONVENTION 265

all the Contracting Powers to appoint delegates to meet
at The Hague in order to arrive at an immediate agreement
on the questions.

Article 25

If one of the Contracting Powers should wish to denounce
the present Convention, the denunciation shall be notified
in writing to the Government of the Netherlands, who will
immediately communicate a certified copy of the notification
to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which
it was received.

The denunciation shall take effect only as regards the
Power which notified it, and one year after the notification
thereof has reached the Government of the Netherlands.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have affixed their
signatures to the present Convention.

Done at The Hague, January 23rd, 1912, ina single copy,
which shall be deposited and remain in the archives of the
Government of the Netherlands, and of which certified copies
will be transmitted through the diplomatic channel to all the
Powers represented at the Conference.

In the final Protocol, the Conference further expressed the
following veux :

I. The Conference considers it desirable to direct the atten-
tion of the Universal Postal Union :

(1) To the urgency of regulating the transmission
through the post of raw opium ;

(2) To the urgency of regulating as far as possible the
transmission through the post of morphine, cocaine, and
their respective salts and other substances referred to in
Article 14 of the Convention ;

(3) To the necessity of prohibiting the transmission of
prepared opium through the post.

II. The Conference considers it desirable to study the

question of Indian Hemp from the statistical and scientific
point of view, with the object of regulating its abuses, should266 APPENDIX A

the necessity thereof be felt, by internal legislation or by an
international agreement.

The Second Hague Conference, July 1-9, 1913, taking
further steps towards general ratification, among other things
declared unanimously the desire of the participating nations
“to continue, in the direction indicated by the Inter-
national Commission of Shanghai of 1909 and by the First
Conference at The Hague in 1912, the progressive suppression
of the abuse of opium, morphine, and cocaine, as well as of the
drugs prepared or derived from these substances.”

It further requested the Government of the Netherlands to
communicate to the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro, Peru, Roumania, Serbia, Turkey, and Uruguay
the following resolution :

The Conference regrets that certain Governments have
as yet declined or failed to sign the Convention. The
Conference is of the opinion that the abstention of these
Powers would prejudice most seriously the humanitarian
ends sought by the Convention. The Conference ex-
presses the firm hope that these Powers will alter their
negative or dilatory attitude.

The Netherlands Government was requested also to inform
the Swiss Government “that it is mistaken in its belief that
its co-operation will be almost valueless. Contrary to the view
expressed in the letter of the Federal Council of October 25th,
1912, the Conference believes that the co-operation of Switzer-
land will be most useful, while its abstention will jeopardize
the results of the Convention.”APPENDIX B

FIRST OPIUM CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT, PROTOCOL AND FINAL ACT

Signed at Geneva, February 11th, 19251

AGREEMENT

The British Empire (with India), China, France, Japan, The
Netherlands, Portugal, and Siam,

Being fully determined to bring about the gradual and
effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in,
and use of prepared opium, as provided for in Chapter I
of the International Opium Convention of January 23rd,
1912, in their Far-Eastern Possessions and Territories, in-
cluding leased or protected territories, in which the use of
prepared opium is temporarily authorized ; and

Being desirous, on the grounds of humanity and for the
purpose of promoting the social and moral welfare of their
peoples, of taking all possible steps for achieving the suppres-
sion of the use of opium for smoking with the least possible
delay ;

Having decided to conclude an agreement supplementary
to the said International Convention ;

Have nominated for this purpose as their plenipotentiaries :

(Here follow the names of the heads of States and their
Plenipotentiaries. )

Who, having examined the present situation in regard to
the application of Chapter II of the said International Opium
Convention in the above-mentioned Far-Eastern possessions
and territories ; and

Taking note of the fact that the increase of the smuggling

1 This is the official English version. In the case of this Convention,

both English and French texts are authentic.

267268 APPENDIX B

 

of opium in the greater part of the territories in the Far
East since the ratification of the Convention is hampering
greatly the accomplishment of the gradual and effective sup-
pression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of
prepared opium, as provided for in the Convention, and is
even rendering less effective some of the measures already
taken for that end ; and

Taking into account the different situations of the several
countries,

Having deposited their full powers found in good and due
form ;

Have agreed as follows :—

Article I

1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of this article with
regard to retail sale, the importation, sale and distribution
of opium shall be a monopoly of the Government and the right
to import, sell or distribute opium shall not be leased, accorded
or delegated to any persons whatever.

2. The making of prepared opium for sale shall also be made
a monopoly of the Government as soon as circumstances per-
mit.

3. (a) The system of employing persons paid by a fixed
salary and not by a commission on sales for the retail sale and
distribution of opium shall be applied experimentally in those
districts where an effective supervision can be exercised by the
administrative authorities.

(6) Elsewhere the retail sale and distribution of opium
shall be conducted only by persons licensed by the Government.

Paragraph (a) need not be applied if a system of licensing
and rationing of smokers is in force which affords equivalent
or more effective guarantees.

Article II

The sale of opium to minors shall be prohibited. All possible
steps shall be taken by the Contracting Powers to prevent
the spread of the habit of opium smoking among minors,FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 269
Article III

No minors shall be permitted to enter any smoking divan.

Article IV

The Contracting Powers shall limit as much as possible
the number of retail shops and, where smoking divans are
permitted, the number of divans.

Article V

The purchase and sale of ‘‘ dross,” except when the “ dross 24
is sold to the monopoly, is prohibited.

Article VI

(1) The export of opium, whether raw or prepared, from
any Possession or Territory into which opium is imported
for the purpose of smoking shall be prohibited.

(2) The transit through, or transhipment in, any such
Possession or Territory of prepared opium shall be prohibited.

(3) The transit through, or transhipment in, any such
Possession or Territory of raw opium consigned to a destina-
tion outside the Possession or Territory shall also be pro-
hibited unless an import certificate, issued by the Government
of the importing country, which can be accepted as affording
sufficient guarantees against the possibility of illegitimate
use, is produced to the Government of the Possession or Terri-
tory.

Article VII

The Contracting Powers shall use their utmost efforts by
suitable instruction in the schools, dissemination of literature
and otherwise, to discourage the use of prepared opium
within their respective territories, except where a Government
considers such measures to be undesirable under the conditions
existing in its territory.

Article VIII

The Contracting Powers undertake to assist one another in
their efforts to suppress the illicit traffic by the direct exchangeoe

_

 

  

270 APPENDIX B

of information and views between the heads of the services
concerned.
Article IX
The Contracting Powers will examine in the most favourable
spirit the possibility of taking legislative measures to render
punishable illegitimate transactions which are carried out in
another country by a person residing within their territories.

Article X
The Contracting Powers will furnish all information which
they can obtain with regard to the number of opium smokers.
This information shall be transmitted to the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations for publication.

Article XI
The provisions of this agreement shall not apply to opium
destined solely for medical and scientific purposes.

Article XII

The Contracting Powers agree that they will jointly review
from time to time at such dates as may be mutually agreed,
the position in regard to the application of Chapter II of the
Hague Convention of January 23rd, 1912, and of the present
Agreement. The first meeting shall take place at latest in
1929.

Article XIII

The present Agreement applies only to the Far-Eastern
possessions or territories of the Contracting Powers, including
leased or protected territories, in which the use of prepared
opium is temporarily authorized.

At the moment of ratification any Contracting Power may
declare that its acceptance of the Agreement does not include
any territory over which it exercises only a protectorate ;
and may accede subsequently in respect of any protectorate
thus excluded by means of a notification of accession deposited
with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, who
shall forthwith notify the accession to all the other Contracting
Powers.FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 271

Article XIV

The present Agreement, of which the French and English
texts are both authentic, shall be subject to ratification.

The deposit of ratification shall be made at the Secretariat
of the League of Nations as soon as possible.

The Agreement shall not come into force until it has been
ratified by two Powers. The date of its coming into force
shall be the 90th day after the receipt by the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations of the second ratification. There-
after the Agreement shall take effect for each Contracting
Power 90 days after the receipt of its ratification.

The Agreement shall be registered by the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations upon the day of its coming into
force.

Article XV

If one of the Contracting Powers should wish to denounce
the present Agreement, the denunciation shall be notified in
writing to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
who will immediately communicate a copy of the notification
to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which
it was received.

The denunciation shall take effect only as regards the Power
which notified it, and one year after the notification thereof
has reached the Secretary-General.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the above-named plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Agreement.*

Done at GENEVA, the eleventh day of February of nineteen
hundred and twenty-five, in a single copy which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the League of
Nations, and of which authenticated copies shall be transmitted
to all the Contracting Powers.

PROTOCOL
The undersigned representatives of the States signatory
to the Agreement relating to the use of prepared opium signed
this day, duly authorized to that effect ;

1 All of the participating nations, except China, signed Agreement,
Protocol and Final Act.272

APPENDIX B

Anxious to ensure the complete and final execution of the
obligations, and to strengthen the undertakings assumed by
them under Article VI of the Hague Convention of 1912 ;

Taking note of the fact that the Second Opium Conference
has decided to adopt a Protocol by which certain Powers are
to establish within five years at latest an effective control
over the production, distribution and export of raw opium, so
as to prevent illicit traffic ;

Hereby agree as follows :

Article I

The States signatories of the present Protocol recognize
that the provisions of the Agreement signed this day are
supplementary to, and designed to facilitate the execution
of, the obligation assumed by the signatory States under
Article VI of the Hague Convention of 1912, which obligation
remains in full force and effect.

Article II

As soon as the poppy-growing countries have ensured the
effective execution of the necessary measures to prevent the
exportation of raw opium from their territories from con-
stituting a serious obstacle to the reduction of consumption
in the countries where the use of prepared opium is temporarily
authorized, the States signatories of the present Protocol
will strengthen the measures already taken in accordance with
Article VI of the Hague Convention of 1912, and will take any
further measures which may be necessary, in order to reduce
consumption of prepared opium in the territories under their
authority, so that such use may be completely suppressed
within a period of not more than fifteen years from the date
of the decision referred to in the following Article.

Article ITI

A Commission to be appointed at the proper time by the
Council of the League of Nations shall decide when the effective
execution of the measures, mentioned in the preceding Article,FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 273

to be taken by the poppy-growing countries has reached the
stage referred to in that Article. The decision of the Com-
mission shall be final.

Article IV

In the event of any of the States signatories of the present
Protocol finding, at any time during the period of fifteen years
referred to in Article II, that the measures to be taken by the
poppy-growing countries, referred to in the said Article, are
no longer being effectively executed, such State shall have the
right to bring the matter to the notice of the Council of the
League of Nations. If the Council, whether by the report of a
Commission appointed by it to investigate and report upon
the facts, or by any other information at its disposal is satisfied
that the facts are as stated, the States concerned will be en-
titled to denounce the present Protocol. In that case a Con-
ference of the States concerned shall at once be held to consider
the action to be taken.

Article V

During the year preceding the end of the period of fifteen
years referred to in Article II, a special Conference of the States
signatories of the present Protocol shall be held to consider
the measures to be taken in regard to habitual addicts whose
pathological condition is certified by the medical authorities
of the country concerned.

Article VI

The States signatories of the present Protocol will co-
ordinate their efforts to effect the complete and final suppres-
sion of the use of prepared opium. In order to attain this object
as soon as possible the said States, recognizing the difficulties
at present experienced by certain Powers in establishing an
effective control over the production, distribution and ex-
portation of raw opium, make a pressing appeal to the poppy-
growing countries for the establishment between all the States
concerned of a sincere and energetic collaboration which will
lead to the termination of the illicit traffic.

DOh Be 274 APPENDIX B

Article VII
The present Protocol shall come into force for each of the
signatory States at the same time as the Agreement relating
to the use of prepared opium signed this day.

Pie Article VIII
Any State represented at the Conference at which the
present Protocol was drawn up may accede to it at any time
after its coming into force.

FINAL ACT
The Conference, with the exception of the Chinese Dele-
gation, further adopted the following Resolution :—

“It has been pointed out to the Conference that in
some countries the system of licences (or registration) and
rationing has been successful in diminishing the number
of smokers.

‘At the same time, the, Conference has found that,
in other countries, the contraband trade which equals
and even surpasses in extent the legitimate trade, renders
the application of this system difficult, and in the opinion
of the Governments in question useless and in some cases
dangerous.

‘“ Accordingly, the Conference declares that the possi-
bility of adopting these measures or of maintaining them
in those territories where they are now working success-
fully, depends principally upon the extent of the contra-
band trade.

‘Tt therefore leaves to the Contracting Powers which
have not yet applied this system the duty of selecting
the moment when circumstances will allow of its adoption

and of taking in the meantime all such preparatory
measures as they may deem expedient.”

a

ad

The Representative of the British Empire declared that he
signed the Protocol subject to the following declaration :—
“ T declare that my signature of this Protocol is subjectFIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE 275

in respect of British Protectorates, to the conditions
contained in Article XIII of the Agreement signed this
day.”

The Representative of Portugal, on signing the Agreement;

made the following declarations :—

(1) ““The Portuguese Government while accepting
the principle of a monopoly as formulated in Article I,
does so, as regards the moment at which the measures
provided for in the first paragraph thereof shall come into
force, subject to the limitation contained in the second
paragraph of the Article.

(2) ‘‘The Portuguese Government being bound by
a contract consistent with the provisions of the Hague
Convention of 1912, will not be able to put into operation
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 6 of the present
Agreement so long as its obligations under this contract
are in force.”’

The Representative of Siam declared that he signed the

Agreement subject to the following declaration :—

‘«« The Siamese Delegation is instructed to sign the Agree-
ment under reservation of Article I, paragraph 3 (a) with
regard to the time when this provision shall come into
force and of Article V. The reason for these reservations
has been stated by the First Delegate of Siam on the 14th
November, 1924. The Siamese Government is hoping
to put into force the system of registration and rationing
within the period of three years. After that date, the
reservation in regard to Article I, paragraph 3 (a) will fall
to the ground.”’APPENDIX C

SECOND OPIUM CONFERENCE
CONVENTION, PROTOCOL, AND FINAL ACT

Signed at Geneva, February 19th, 19251

Taking note of the fact that the application of the provisions
of the Hague Convention of January 23rd, 1912, by the Con-
tracting Parties has produced results of great value, but that
the contraband trade in and abuse of the substances to which
the Convention applies still continue on a great scale ;
Convinced that the contraband trade in and abuse of these
substances cannot be effectually suppressed except by bring-
ing about a more effective limitation of the production or
/ manufacture of the substances, and by exercising a closer
control and supervision of the international trade, than are
j f provided for in the said Convention ;
Desirous therefore of taking further measures to carry out
4 the objects aimed at by the said Convention and to complete
and strengthen its provisions ;
Realizing that such limitation and control require the close
co-operation of all the Contracting Parties ;
Confident that this humanitarian effort will meet with the
unanimous adhesion of the nations concerned :
Have decided to conclude a Convention for this purpose.
The High Contracting Parties have accordingly appointed
as their Plenipotentiaries :
(Here follow the names of heads of States and their
Plenipotentiaries. )
who, after communicating their full powers, found in good and
due form, have agreed as follows :
1 This is the official English version: both English and French
texts are authentic.
i 276SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 277

CHAPTER I
DEFINITIONS
Article |

The Contracting Parties agree to adopt the following
definitions for the purposes of the present Convention :

Raw Opium.—‘‘ Raw opium” means the spontaneously
coagulated juice obtained from the capsules of the Papaver
Somniferwm L., which has only been submitted to the necessary
manipulations for packing and transport, whatever its content
of morphine.

Medicinal Opium.—“ Medicinal opium ”’ means raw opium
which has undergone the processes necessary to adapt it for
medicinal use in accordance with the requirements of the
national pharmacopceia, whether in powder form or granulated
or otherwise or mixed with neutral materials.

Morphine.—“ Morphine’ means the principal alkaloid of
opium having the chemical formula C, 7H, ,NO3.

Diacetylmorphine-—“ Diacetylmorphine ”’ means diacetyl-
morphine (diamorphine, heroin) having the formula C,,H.,NO;.
Coca Leaf —‘‘ Coca leaf ’’ means the leaf of the Erythroxylon
Coca Lamarck and the Erythroxylon Novo-granatense (Morris)
Hieronymus and their varieties, belonging to the family of
Erythroxylacee and the leaf of other species of this genus from
which it may be found possible to extract cocaine either
directly or by chemical transformation.

Crude Cocaine-—‘‘ Crude Cocaine”
of the coca leaf which can be used directly or indirectly for
the manufacture of cocaine.

Cocaine-—“ Cocaine ” means methyl-benzoy] levo-ecgonine
(D20°= —16°4) in 20 per cent solution of chloroform, of which
the formula is C, 7H,,NOx4.

Ecgonine.—‘‘ Ecgonine ”’ means leevo-ecgonine (1 p20°=
—45°6 in 5 per cent solution of water), of which the formula
is C,H,;NO3. H,0, and all the derivatives of leevo-ecgonine
which might serve industrially for its recovery.

Indian Hemp.—< Indian hemp ” means the dried flowering

means any extract278

 

APPENDIX C

LF or fruiting tops of the pistillate plant Oannabis sativa L.
from which the resin has not been extracted, under whatever
name they may be designated in commerce.

CHAPTER II
INTERNAL CONTROL OF RAW OPIUM AND COCA LEAVES
Article 2

The Contracting Parties undertake to enact laws and
regulations to ensure the effective control of the production,
distribution and export of raw opium, unless laws and regula-
tions on the subject are already in existence ; they also under-

take to review periodically, and to strengthen as required,
the laws and regulations on the subject which they have
enacted in virtue of Article I of the Hague Convention of 1912
or of the present Convention.

Article 3

Due regard being had to the differences in their commercial
conditions, the Contracting Parties shall limit the number
of towns, ports or other localities through which the export
i or import of raw opium or coca leaves shall be permitted.

+ CHAPTER III
INTERNAL CONTROL OF MANUFACTURED DRUGS
Article 4
The provisions of the present Chapter apply to the follow-
ing substances :
(a) Medicinal opium ;
(6) Crude cocaine and ecgonine ;
(c) Morphine, diacetylmorphine, cocaine and their re-
spective salts ;
(d) All preparations officinal and non-officinal (including
the so-called anti-opium remedies) containing moreSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 279

than 0-2 per cent of morphine or more than 0-1 per cent
of cocaine ;

(e) All preparations containing diacetylmorphine ;

(f) Galenical preparations (extract and tincture of Indian
hemp) ;

(q) Any other narcotic drug to which the present Conven-
tion may be applied in accordance with Article 10.

Article 5
The Contracting Parties shall enact effective laws or
regulations to limit exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes the manufacture, import, sale, distribution, export
and use of the substances to which this Chapter applies.
They shall co-operate with one another to prevent the use of
these substances for any other purposes.

Article 6

The Contracting Parties shall control all persons manufactur-
ing, importing, selling, distributing or exporting the substances
to which this Chapter applies, as well as the buildings in
which these persons carry on such industry or trade.

With this object, the Contracting Parties shall :

(a) Confine the manufacture of the substances referred
to in Article 4 (6), (c) and (g) to those establishments and
premises alone which have been licensed for the purpose.

(b) Require that all persons engaged in the manu-
facture, import, sale, distribution, or export of the said
substances shall obtain a licence or permit to engage in
these operations ;

(c) Require that such persons shall enter in their
books the quantities manufactured, imports, exports,
sales and all other distribution of the said substances.
This requirement shall not necessarily apply either to

supplies dispensed by medical practitioners or to sales
by duly authorized chemists on medical prescriptions,
provided in each case that the medical prescriptions are
filed and preserved by the medical practitioner or chemist.APPENDIX C

Article 7
The Contracting Parties shall take measures to prohibit,
as regards their internal trade, the delivery to or possession
by any unauthorized persons of the substances to which this
Chapter applies.
Article 8

In the event of the Health Committee of the League of
Nations, after having submitted the question for advice and
report to the Permanent Committee of the Office International
d’Hygiéne Publique in Paris, finding that any preparation
containing any of the narcotic drugs referred to in the present
Chapter cannot give rise to the drug habit on account of the
medicaments with which the said drugs are compounded and
which in practice preclude the recovery of the said drugs,
the Health Committee shall communicate this finding to the
Council of the League of Nations. The Council will communi-
cate the finding to the Contracting Parties, and thereupon the
provisions of the present Convention will not be applicable
to the preparation concerned.

Article 9

Any Contracting Party may authorize the supply to the
public by chemists, at their own discretion, as medicines,
for immediate use in urgent cases, of the following opiate
officinal preparations : tincture of opium, Sydenham laudanum
and Dover powder. The maximum dose, however, which may
be supplied in such cases must not contain more than 25
centigrammes of officinal opium, and the chemist must enter
in his books the quantities supplied, as provided in Article
6 (c).

Article 10

In the event of the Health Committee of the League of
Nations, after having submitted the question for advice and
report to the Permanent Committee of the Office International
d’Hygiéne Publique in Paris, finding that any narcotic drug
to which the present Convention does not apply is liable to
similar abuse and productive of similar ill-effects as theSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 281

substances to which this Chapter of the Convention applies,
the Health Committee shall inform the Council of the League
accordingly and recommend that the provisions of the present
Convention shall be applied to such drug.

The Council of the League shall communicate the said
recommendation to the Contracting Parties. Any Con-
tracting Party which is prepared to accept the recommenda-
tion shall notify the Secretary-General of the League, who will
inform the other Contracting Parties.

The provisions of the present Convention shall thereupon
apply to the substances in question as between the Contracting
Parties who have accepted the recommendation referred to
above.

CHAPTER IV
INDIAN HEMP
Article 11

1. In addition to the provisions of Chapter V of the present
Convention, which shall apply to Indian hemp and the resin
prepared from it, the Contracting Parties undertake :

(a) To prohibit the export of the resin obtained from
Indian hemp and the ordinary preparations of which the
resin forms the base (such as hashish, esrar, chiras,
djamba) to countries which have prohibited their use,
and, in cases where export is permitted, to require the
production of a special import certificate issued by the
Government of the importing country stating that the
importation is approved for the purposes specified in
the certificate and that the resin or preparations will
not be re-exported ;

(6) Before issuing an export authorization under
Article 13 of the present Convention, in respect of Indian
hemp, to require the production of a special import
certificate issued by the Government of the importing
country and stating that the importation is approved
and is required exclusively for medical or scientific
purposes.282 APPENDIX C

2. The Contracting Parties shall exercise an effective con-
trol of such a nature as to prevent the illicit international
traffic in Indian hemp and especially in the resin.

CHAPTER V
CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Article 12

Each Contracting Party shall require a separate import
authorization to be obtained for each importation of any of
the substances to which the present Convention applies.
Such authorization shall state the quantity to be imported,
the name and address of the importer and the name and address
of the exporter.

The import authorization shall specify the period within
which the importation must be effected and may allow the
importation in more than one consignment.

Article 13

1. Each Contracting Party shall require a separate export
authorization to be obtained for each exportation of any of
the substances to which the present Convention applies.
Such authorization shall state the quantity to be exported,
the name and address of the exporter and the name and
address of the importer.

2. The Contracting Party, before issuing such export
authorization, shall require an import certificate, issued
by the Government of the importing country and certifying
that the importation is approved, to be produced by the person
or establishment applying for the export authorization.

Each Contracting Party agrees to adopt, so far as possible,
the form of import certificate annexed to the present Con-
vention.

3. The export authorization shall specify the period within
which the exportation must be effected, and shall state the
number and date of the import certificate and the authority
by whom it has been issued.SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 283

4. A copy of the export authorization shall accompany the
consignment, and the Government issuing the export authoriza-
tion shall send a copy to the Government of the importing
country.

5. The Government of the importing country, when the
importation has been effected, or when the period fixed for
the importation has expired, shall return the export authoriza-
tion, with an endorsement to that effect, to the Government
of the exporting country. The endorsement shall specify the
amount actually imported.

6. If a less quantity than that specified in the export
authorization is actually exported, the quantity actually
exported shall be noted by the competent authorities on the
export authorization and on any official copy thereof.

7. In the case of an application to export a consignment to
any country for the purpose of being placed in a bonded
warehouse in that country, a special certificate from the
Government of that country, certifying that it has approved
the introduction of the consignment for the said purpose,
may be accepted by the Government of the exporting country
in place of the import certificate provided for above. In such
a case, the export authorization shall specify that the con-
signment is exported for the purpose of being placed ina bonded
warehouse.

Article 14

For the purpose of ensuring the full application and
enforcement of the provisions of the present Convention in
free ports and free zones, the Contracting Parties undertake
to apply in free ports and free zones situated within their
territories the same laws and regulations, and to exercise
therein the same supervision and control, in respect of the
substances covered by the said Convention, as in other parts
of their territories.

This Article does not, however, prevent any Contracting
Party from applying, in respect of the said substances, more
drastic provisions in its free ports and free zones than in other
parts of its territories.284 APPENDIX C

Article 15

1. No consignment of any of the substances covered by the
present Convention which is exported from one country
to another country shall be permitted to pass through a third
country, whether or not it is removed from the ship or con-
veyance in which it is being conveyed, unless the copy of the
export authorization (or the diversion certificate, if such a
certificate has been issued in pursuance of the following
paragraph) which accompanies the consignment is produced
to the competent authorities of that country.

2. The competent authorities of any country through which
a consignment of any of the substances covered by the present
Convention is permitted to pass shall take all due measures
to prevent the diversion of the consignment to a destination
other than that named in the copy of the export authorization
(or the diversion certificate) which accompanies it, unless the
Government of that country has authorized that diversion by
means of a special diversion certificate. A diversion certificate
shall only be issued after the receipt of an import certificate,
in accordance with Article 13, from the Government of the
country to which it is proposed to divert the consignment, and
shall contain the same particulars as are required by Article 13
to be stated in an export authorization, together with the name
of the country from which the consignment was originally
exported. All the provisions of Article 13 which are applicable
to an export authorization shall be applicable equally to the
diversion certificate.

Further, the Government of the country authorizing the
diversion of the consignment shall detain the copy of the
original export authorization (or diversion certificate) which
accompanied the consignment on arrival in its territory, and
shall return it to the Government which issued it, at the same
time notifying the name of the country to which the diversion
has been authorized.

3. In cases where the transport is being effected by air,
the preceding provisions of this Article shall not be applicable
if the aircraft passes over the territory of the third country
without landing. If the aircraft lands in the territory of theSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 285

said country, the said provisions shall be applied so far as the
circumstances permit.

4. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of this Article are without prejudice
to the provisions of any international agreement which limits
the control which may be exercised by any of the Contracting
Parties over the substances to which the present Convention
applies when in direct transit.

5. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to transport
of the substances by post.

Article 16

A consignment of any of the substances covered by the
present Convention which is landed in the territory of any
Contracting Party and placed in a bonded warehouse shall not
be withdrawn from the bonded warehouse unless an import
certificate, issued by the Government of the country of des-
tination and certifying that the importation is approved, is
produced to the authorities having jurisdiction over the bonded
warehouse. A special authorization shall be issued by the
said authorities in respect of each consignment so withdrawn
and shall take the place of the export authorization for the
purpose of Articles 13, 14 and 15 above.

Article 17
No consignment of the substances covered by the present
Convention while passing in ‘transit through the territories
of any Contracting Party or whilst being stored there in a
bonded warehouse may be subjected to any process which
would alter the nature of the substances in question or, with-
out the permission of the competent authorities, the packing.

Article 18
If any Contracting Party finds it impossible to apply any
provision of this Chapter to trade with another country by
reason of the fact that such country is not a party to the
present Convention, such Contracting Party will only be
bound to apply the provisions of this Chapter so far as the
circumstances permit.APPENDIX C

CHAPTER VI
PERMANENT CENTRAL BOARD
Article 19

A Permanent Central Board shall be appointed, within
three months from the coming into force of the present Con-
vention.

The Central Board shall consist of eight persons who, by
their technical competence, impartiality and disinterested-
ness, will command general confidence.

The members of the Central Board shall be appointed by
the Council of the League of Nations.

The United States of America and Germany shall be in-
vited each to nominate one person to participate in these
appointments.

In making the appointments, consideration shall be given
to the importance of including on the Central Board, in equit-
able proportion, persons possessing a knowledge of the drug
situation, both in the producing and manufacturing countries
on the one hand and in the consuming countries on the other
hand, and connected with such countries.

The members of the Central Board shall not hold any office
which puts them in a position of direct dependence on their
Governments.

The members shall be appointed for a term of five years, and
they will be eligible for reappointment.

The Central Board shall elect its own President and shall
settle its rules of procedure.

At meetings of the Board, four members shall form a quorum.

The decisions of the Board relative to Articles 24 and 26
shall be taken by an absolute majority of the whole number of
the Board.

Article 20

The Council of the League of Nations shall, in consultation
with the Board, make the necessary arrangements for the
organization and working of the Board, with the object of
assuring the full technical independence of the Board in carry-SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 287

ing out its duties under the present Convention, while pro-
viding for the control of the staff in administrative matters
by the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General shall appoint the secretary and staff
of the Board on the nomination of the Board and subject to
the approval of the Council.

Article 21

The Contracting Parties agree to send in annually before
December 31st, to the Permanent Central Board set up under
Article 19, estimates of the quantities of each of the substances
covered by the Convention to be imported into their territory
for internal consumption during the following year for
medical, scientific and other purposes.

These estimates are not to be regarded as binding on the
Government concerned, but will be for the purpose of serving
as a guide to the Central Board in the discharge of its duties.

Should circumstances make it necessary for any country,
in the course of the year, to modify its estimates the country
in question shall communicate the revised figures to the Central
Board.

Article 22

1. The Contracting Parties agree to send annually to the
Central Board, in a manner to be indicated by the Board,
within three (in the case of paragraph (c), five) months after
the end of the year, as complete and accurate statistics as
possible relative to the preceding year, showing :

(a) Production of raw opium and coca-leaves ;

(b) Manufacture of the substances covered by Chapter
III, Article 4 (b) (c) and (g) of the present Convention
and the raw material used for such manufacture. The
amount of such substances used for the manufacture
of other derivatives not covered by the Convention shall
be separately stated ;

(c) Stocks of the substances covered by Chapters II
and III of the present Convention in the hands of whole-
salers or held by the Government for consumption in the

country for other than Government purposes ;APPENDIX C

(d) Consumption, other than for Government purposes,
of the substances covered by Chapters II and III of the
present Convention ;

(ec) Amounts of each of the substances covered by
the present Convention which have been confiscated on
account of illicit import or export ; the manner in which
the confiscated substances have been disposed of shall be
stated, together with such other information as may be
useful in regard to such confiscation and disposal.

The statistics referred to in paragraphs (a) to (e) above
shall be communicated by the Central Board to the Contracting
Parties.

2. The Contracting Parties agree to forward to the Central
Board, in a manner to be prescribed by the Board, within four
weeks after the end of each period of three months, the
statistics of their imports from and exports to each country
of each of the substances covered by the present Convention
during the preceding three months. These statistics will,
in such cases as may be prescribed by the Board, be sent by
telegram, except when the quantities fall below a minimum
amount which shall be fixed in the case of each substance by
the Board.

3. In furnishing the statistics in pursuance of this Article,
the Governments shall state separately the amounts imported
or purchased for Government purposes, in order to enable
the amounts required in the country for general medical
and scientific purposes to be ascertained. It shall not be
within the competence of the Central Board to question or to
express any opinion on the amounts imported or purchased
for Government purposes or the use thereof.

4. For the purposes of this Article, substances which are
held, imported, or purchased by the Government for eventual
sale are not regarded as held, imported or purchased for
Government purposes.

Article 23
In order to complete the information of the Board as to the
disposal of the world’s supply of raw opium, the GovernmentsSECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 289

of the countries where the use of prepared opium is temporarily
authorized shall, in a manner to be prescribed by the Board, in
addition to the statistics provided for in Article 22, forward
annually to the Board, within three months after the end of
the year, as complete and accurate statistics as possible
relative to the preceding year showing :

(1) The manufacture of prepared opium, and the raw
material used for such manufacture ;
(2) The consumption of prepared opium.

It is understood that it shall not be within the competence
of the Board to question or to express any opinion upon these
statistics, and that the provisions of Article 24 are not
applicable to the matters dealt with in this Article, except
in cases where the Board may find that illicit international
transactions are taking place on an appreciable scale.

Article 24

1. The Central Board shall continuously watch the course
of the international trade. If the information at its disposal
leads the Board to conclude that excessive quantities of any
substance covered by the present Convention are accumulating
in any country, or that there is a danger of that country
becoming a centre of the illicit traffic, the Board shall have
the right to ask, through the Secretary-General of the League,
for explanations from the country in question.

2. If no explanation is given within a reasonable time or the
explanation is unsatisfactory, the Central Board shall have the
right to call the attention of the Governments of all the Con-
tracting Parties and of the Council of the League of Nations
to the matter, and to recommend that no further exports of
the substances covered by the present Convention or any of
them shall be made to the country concerned until the Board
reports that it is satisfied as to the situation in that country
in regard to the said substances. The Board shall at the same
time notify the Government of the country concerned of the
recommendation made by it.

3. The country concerned shall be entitled to bring the
matter before the Council of the League.

U290 APPENDIX C

4. The Government of any exporting country which is not
prepared to act on the recommendation of the Central Board
shall also be entitled to bring the matter before the Council
of the League.

If it does not do so, it shall immediately inform the Board
that it is not prepared to act on the recommendation, explain-
ing, if possible, why it is not prepared to do so.

5. The Central Board shall have the right to publish a report
on the matter and communicate it to the Council, which shall
thereupon forward it to the Governments of. all the Contract-
ing Parties.

6. If in any case the decision of the Central Board is not
unanimous, the views of the minority shall also be stated.

7. Any country shall be invited to be represented at a
meeting of the Central Board at which a question directly
interesting it is considered.

Article 25
It shall be the friendly right of any of the Contracting
Parties to draw the attention of the Board to any matter which
appears to it to require investigation, provided that this
Article shall not be construed as in any way extending the
powers of the Board.
Article 26
In the case of a country which is not a party to the present
Convention, the Central Board may take the same measures
as are specified in Article 24, if the information at the disposal
of the Board leads it to conclude that there is a danger of the
country becoming a centre of the illicit traffic ; in that case
the Board shall take the action indicated in the said Article
as regards notification to the country concerned.
Paragraphs 8, 4 and 7 of Article 24 shall apply in any such
case.
Article 27

The Central Board shall present an annual report on its
work to the Council of the League. This report shall be pub-
lished and communicated to all the Contracting Parties.SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 291

The Central Board shall take all necessary measures to
ensure that the estimates, statistics, information and ex-
planations which it receives under Articles 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 or
26 of the present Convention shall not be made public in such
a manner as to facilitate the operations of speculators or
injure the legitimate commerce of any Contracting Party.

CHAPTER VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 28

Each of the Contracting Parties agrees that breaches of its
laws or regulations by which the provisions of the present
Convention are enforced shall be punishable by adequate
penalties, including in appropriate cases the confiscation of
the substances concerned.

Article 29

The Contracting Parties will examine in the most favour-
able spirit the possibility of taking legislative measures to
render punishable acts committed within their jurisdiction
for the purpose of procuring or assisting the commission in
any place outside their jurisdiction of any act which constitutes
an offence against the laws of that place relating to the matters
dealt with in the present Convention.

Article 30

The Contracting Parties shall communicate to one another,
through the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
their existing laws and regulations respecting the matters
referred to in the present Convention, so far as this has not
already been done, as well as those promulgated in order
to give effect to the said Convention.

Article 31

The present Convention replaces, as between the Con-
tracting Parties, the provisions of Chapters I, III and V of theBITE PEST SR LSE FPS

292

Convention signed at The Hague on January 23rd, 1912,
which provisions remain in force as between the Contracting
Parties and any States Parties to the said Convention which
are not Parties to the present Convention.

1. In order as far as possible to settle in a friendly manner
disputes arising between the Contracting Parties in regard
to the interpretation or application of the present Convention
which they have not been able to settle through diplomatic
channels, the parties to such a dispute may, before resorting
to any proceedings for judicial settlement or arbitration,
submit the dispute for an advisory opinion to such technical
body as the Council of the League of Nations may appoint
for this purpose.

2. The advisory opinion shall be given within six months
commencing from the day on which the dispute has been
submitted to the technical body, unless this period is prolonged
by mutual agreement between the parties to the dispute. The
technical body shall fix the period within which the parties
are to decide whether they will accept the advisory opinion
given by it.

3. The advisory opinion shall not be binding upon the
parties to the dispute unless it is accepted by each of them.

4. Disputes which it has not been found possible to settle
either directly or on the basis of the advice of the above-
mentioned technical body shall, at the request of any one of
the parties thereto, be brought before the Permanent Court
of International Justice, unless a settlement is attained by
way of arbitration or otherwise by application of some
existing convention or in virtue of an arrangement specially

concluded.

5. Proceedings shall be opened before the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the manner laid down in Article

APPENDIX C

Article 32

40 of the Statute of the Court.

6. A decision of the parties to a dispute to submit it for an
advisory opinion to the technical body appointed by the
Council of the League of Nations, or to resort to arbitration,SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 293

shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the League
of Nations and by him to the other Contracting Parties, which
shall have the right to intervene in the proceedings.

7. The parties to a dispute shall bring before the Permanent
Court of International Justice any question of international
law or question as to the interpretation of the present Con-
vention arising during proceedings before the technical body
or arbitral tribunal, decision of which by the Court is, on the
demand of one of the parties, declared by the technical body
or arbitral tribunal to be necessary for the settlement of the
dispute.

Article 33

The present Convention, of which the French and English
texts are both authentic, shall bear to-day’s date, and shall
be open for signature until the 30th day of September, 1926,
by any State represented at the Conference at which the present
Convention was drawn up, by any Member of the League of
Nations, and by any State to which the Council of the League
of Nations shall have communicated a copy of the Convention
for this purpose.

Article 34

The present Convention is subject to ratification. The
instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secre-
tary-General of the League of Nations, who shall notify their
receipt to the Members of the League which are signatories
of the Convention and to the other signatory States.

Article 35

After the 30th day of September, 1925, the present Con-
vention may be acceded to by any State represented at the
Conference at which this Convention was drawn up and which
has not signed the Convention, by any Member of the League
of Nations, or by any State to which the Council of the League
of Nations shall have communicated a copy of the Convention
for this purpose.

Accession shall be effected by an instrument communicated
to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to be

WU ree rere oe294 APPENDIX C

deposited in the archives of the Secretariat. The Secretary-
General shall at once notify such deposit to all the Members
of the League of Nations signatories of the Convention and to
the other signatory States.

Article 36

The present Convention shall not come into force until
it has been ratified by ten Powers, including seven of the
States by which the Central Board is to be appointed in pur-
suance of Article 19, of which at least two must be permanent
Members of the Council of the League. The date of its coming
into force shall be the ninetieth day after the receipt by the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations of the last of the
necessary ratifications. Thereafter, the present Convention
will take effect in the case of each Party ninety days after the
receipt of its ratification or of the notification of its accession.

In compliance with the provisions of Article 18 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, the Secretary-General
will register the present Convention upon the day of its coming
into force.

Article 37

A special record shall be kept by the Secretary-General
of the League of Nations showing which of the Parties have
signed, ratified, acceded to or denounced the present Con-
vention. This record shall be open to the Contracting Parties
and the Members of the League at all times ; it shall be pub-
lished as often as possible, in accordance with the directions
of the Council.

Article 38

The present Convention may be denounced by an instru-
ment in writing addressed to the Secretary-General of the
League of Nations. The denunciation shall become effective
one year after the date of the receipt of the instrument of
denunciation by the Secretary-General, and shall operate
only in respect of the Contracting Party which makes it.

The Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall
notify the receipt of any such denunciations to all Memberser sHaestseet its

    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    

SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 295

of the League of Nations signatories of or adherents to the
Convention and to the other signatory or adherent States.

Article 39

Any State signing or acceding to the present Convention
may declare, at the moment either of its signature, ratification
or accession, that its acceptance of the present Convention
does not include any or all of its colonies, overseas possessions,
protectorates, or overseas territories under its sovereignty or
authority, or in respect of which it has accepted a mandate
on behalf of the League of Nations, and may subsequently
accede, in conformity with the provisions of Article 35, on
behalf of any such colony, overseas possession, protectorate
or territory excluded by such declaration.

Denunciation may also be made separately in respect of
any such colony, overseas possession, protectorate or territory,
and the provisions of Article 38 shall apply to any such de-
nunciation.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have
signed the present Convention.

Done at Geneva, the nineteenth day of February, one
thousand nine hundred and twenty-five, in a single copy,
which will remain deposited in the archives of the Secretariat
of the League of Nations ; certified copies will be transmitted
to all the States represented at the Conference and to all
Members of the League of Nations.

(The original signatories of this Convention, as of February
19, 1925, were Albania, Germany, Belgium, Great Britain,
Australia, France, Greece, Japan, Luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, Persia, Poland, Portugal and Siam. But Germany
made reservation that her signature was subject to her being
represented in the Central Board, Persia ad referendum and
subject to her receiving the aid referred to in her memorandum
requesting a loan for the substitution of crops, and France
as to the possibility of prompt reports to the Central Board
from her outlying possessions. Siam, having no instructions
regarding Indian hemp, made complete reservation of that
subject.)

SOUL Ree UDAPPENDIX C

PROTOCOL

The undersigned, representatives of certain States signatory
to the Convention relating to Dangerous Drugs signed this
day, duly authorized to that effect ;

Taking note of the Protocol signed the eleventh day of
February one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five by
the representatives of the States signatory to the Agreement
signed on the same day relating to the Use of Prepared Opium:

Hereby agree as follows:

I

The States signatory to the present Protocol, recognizing
that under Chapter I of the Hague Convention the duty
rests upon them of establishing such a control over the
production, distribution and exportation of raw opium as
would prevent the illicit traffic, agree to take such measures
as may be required to prevent completely, within five years
from the present date, the smuggling of opium from constitut-
ing a serious obstacle to the effective suppression of the use
of prepared opium in those territories where such use is
temporarily authorized.

IT

The question whether the undertaking referred to in Article I
has been completely executed shall be decided, at the end of
the said period of five years, by a Commission to be appointed
by the Council of the League of Nations.

III

The present Protocol shall come into force for each of the
signatory States at the same time as the Convention relating
to Dangerous Drugs signed this day. Articles 33 and 35 of the
Convention are applicable to the present Protocol.

In faith whereof the present Protocol was drawn up at
Geneva the nineteenth day of February, 1925, in a single copy,
which will remain deposited in the archives of the Secretariat
of the League of Nations ; certified copies will be transmittedPREC CE DR CATCH ET

      
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
    

SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 297

to all States represented at the Conference and to all Members
of the League of Nations.

(The original signatories of this Protocol were Albania,
Germany, Great Britain, Australia, Greece (ad referendum),
Japan, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Siam.)

FINAL ACT
I

The Conference recognizes that, to enable the Convention
relating to Dangerous Drugs signed this day to produce its
full effect, it is essential that it should be applied as widely
as possible in the colonies, possessions, protectorates and
territories mentioned in Article 39 of the Convention. The
Conference accordingly expresses the earnest hope that the
Governments concerned will take the necessary steps to that
end with as little delay as possible, and that the number of
such colonies, possessions, protectorates or territories ex-
cluded from the operation of the Convention may be reduced
to a minimum,

II

The Conference recommends that each Government should
consider the possibility of forbidding the conveyance in any
ship sailing under its flag of any consignment of the substances
covered by the Convention :

(1) Unless an export authorization has been issued
in respect of such consignment in accordance with the
provisions of the Convention, and the consignment is
accompanied by an official copy of such authorization, or
of any diversion certificate which may be issued ;

(2) To any destination other than the destination
mentioned in the export authorization or diversion
certificate.

Ill
The Conference recommends that all States should co-
operate as closely as possible with one another in the sup-
V2298 APPENDIX C

pression of the illicit traffic, and that they should authorize
the competent authorities charged with the administration of
the law on the subject to communicate directly with the
corresponding authorities in other countries.

ry’

The Conference draws attention to the advisability in
certain cases of requiring dealers who are licensed by the
Government to trade in the substances covered by the Con-
vention to deposit or give sureties for a sum of money sufficient
to serve as an effective guarantee against their engaging in
the illicit traffic.

V

The Conference asks the Council of the League of Nations
to examine the suggestion which has been made in the course
of its proceedings, in particular by the Persian delegation,
that a commission should be appointed to visit certain opium-
producing countries, should those countries so desire, for the
purpose of making a careful study (in collaboration with the
Governments of those countries) of the difficulties connected
with the limitation of the production of opium in those
countries and advising as to the measures which could be
taken to make it possible to limit the production of opium in
those countries to the quantities required for medical and
scientific purposes.

VI

The Conference asks the Council of the League of Nations
to invite the Health Committee to consider immediately
whether it would be expedient to consult the International
Health Office regarding the products mentioned in Articles
8 and 10, in order that, if so, a decision concerning prepara-
tions which cannot give rise to the drug habit and a recom-
mendation concerning all other drugs which might come under
the provisions of the Convention may be notified immediately
upon the entry into force of the said Convention,SECOND GENEVA CONFERENCE 299

VII

The Conference requests the Council of the League of
Nations to decide to include in the expenses of the Secretariat
the expenses of the Central Board and its administrative
services.

It is understood that those Contracting Parties which are
not Members of the League will bear their share of the ex-
penses in accordance with a scale to be drawn up by agreement
with the Council.

(The original signatories of the Final Act were Albania,
Germany, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Great Britain, Spain,
France, Greece, Hungary, Japan, Luxemburg, the Nether-
lands, Persia, Poland, Portugal.)

Ca Lt a aeAbyssinia, 19
Accessions (see Ratification)
Adams, Dr. E. W., 236
Addiction, characteristics of, 34, 61 ff., 87
drugs of, 34
Addicts, testify in N.Y. city, 71
5 treatment of, 247
a ultimate consumers, 49, 50, 65
Advisory Committee on Opium, etc., 21,
22, 26, 27, 155; 170, 172, 173,
176, 177, 179, 185, 196, 199,
209, 239 ff.
opinions, 292
Afghanistan, 19, 38, 77, 223
Africa, South-West, 20
Agenda (see Competence)
Aglen, Sir Francis, 126
Agreement, First Geneva Conference, 178,
192, 267 ff.
Air transport of drugs, 284
Alaska, 72
Albania, 19, 193, 194, 295, 297, 299
Alcohol, rewards for seizures, 244
7 tax on, 233
“> versus narcotics, 66, 100
Alexander, C. L., 103, 104
Alexander, Horace G., 98
Alexander, Joseph Gurney, 98
Alkaloids, in India, 104, 133
Allbutt, Sir Clifford, 46
All-India Congress Committee, resolution
of, 107
Alston, Sir Beilby, 126
American “ Article 1,” 199, 205
aa instructions (see Instructions)
e principles, 28, 170, 172, 177,
202

> smugglers, 84
“- suggestions to Second Geneva
Conference, 198, 199
withdrawal (see Withdrawal)

Amherst steamship loses opium, 147
Amoy, 86, 123
Andorra, 19
Angelino, M. de Kat, 196
Anti-Opium remedies, 216, 260, 278
Antwerp, 160
Appeals from Central Board, 212, 292
Appendices, 253 ff.
Appropriation, U.S.A. for enforcement, 72
Arbitration, 212, 292
Argentine Republic, 19, 33, 263
Arms, traffic in, 129
Army supplies of narcotics, 215

TS a

INDEX

 

     
 
   
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 

Ashley, Lord, 11

Asia, Central, 67, 77, 135, 182

Aspland, W. H. G., 146, 147

Assam, use of opium in, 100

Assessors, of Advisory Committee, 21, 22,
240

Auction of opium at Calcutta, 102

Australia, 19, 193, 194, 200, 295, 297, 299

Austria, 19

Austria-Hungary, 14, 263

Austrian smugglers, 84

Babies, opium fed to, in India,

Baggage, narcotics in, 70

Bala goli, 111

Banka, 58

Basle (Switzerland), 41, 85, 86, 133, 155,
197

5, 47 111 ff.

Belgian smugglers, 8

Belgium, 16, 18, 43, a 200, 207, 209,
221, 263, 299

“* Bhang,” 20, 33

Bhopal, 95

Blackett, Sir Basil, 100

Bland, J. O. P., 129, 130

Blue, Dr. Rupert, 171, 197, 198

Bolivia, 21, 33, 39, 45, 193, 200, 205, 233,
263, 299

Bombay, infant mortality at,111, 112, 113

Bonded warehouses, 216, 217, 243, 285

Bonds, 88, 246, 298

“* Booze,” opium used as, 100

Borneo (see British North Borneo Co.)

Bourgois, G., 24, 188, 196

Boycott as anti-narcotic weapon, 210,
238, 246

Boy Scouts ein Kenna) 166

Brassey, Earl, 9

Brazil, 17, 193, ce 201, 207, 263

Brenier, Henri, 22

Brent, Bishop Charles H.,
171, 177, 188, 197

Brigandage in China, 127, 131

British, Chinese charge against, 136 ~

British Empire, 14, 267

British North Borneo Co., 53, 56, 57, 59,
64, 65, 179, 180

British Society for Suppression of Opium
Traffic, 11, 249

British ships smuggling opium, 123, 142

British smugglers, 84, 85, 86

Brown-tail moth, 80

Brunei, 53

Brussels, 86

13, 26, 168,Buddhism and opium, 100

Buell, Raymond L., 169

Bulgaria, 19, 37, 193, 194

Burma, 32, 100, 101, 102, 106. “39, 140
Bushire, 8, 141, 161

Butter, from poppy-seed, 31, 67

Caine, W. S., 97

Calcutta, 102, 140, 157

Cameroons, 20

Campbell, Sir John, 23, 101, 102, 124, 133,
178, 186, 196

Canada, 19, 74, 193, 194, 200, 216, 245

Cancellation of licences, 244

Cannabis sativa, 33, 278

“ Cannots,” the Ten, 61

Cantacuzene, research in cholera, 114,
117

Canton, 123, 166

Cattle, opium fed to, 67, 100

Cecil, Viscount Robert, 55, 73, 142, 198,
201

Central Asia, 67, 77, 135, 182
» Board, 27, 82, 199, 206, 209, 210,
215, 220, 224, 234, 237, 240,
248, 286 ff.
Ceylon, 53, 101
Charoon, Prince, 177, 196
Chatterjee, Ramanandra, 107
Chemists authorized to administer opi-
ates, 280
Chili, 19, 33, 147, 193, 200, 263
China, 8, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 28, 37, 38, 39,
77, 92, 95, 106, Ch, VI (120 ff.),
161, 163-168, 174, 184, 186, 188,
191, 193, 215, 223, 224, 229, 231,
233, 246, 255, 260, 261, 267
> Medical Association, 165
»» Opium production in, 15, 37, 38,
39, 132
» Suggestions to, 173, 174
Chinese Anti-Opium Association, 164, 166,
249

3 as opium-smokers, 31, 47, 48, 52,
55, 56, 57, 58, 69, 60
5 Chambers of Commerce, 165, 166
rs Government destroys narcotics,
87, 149
» labels and plates seized, 87
opium, 38, 49, 96, 143
Chiras, 33
Chlorodyne, 117
Chodzko, Dr., 88, 112, 198, 216
Cholera and opium, 94, 113 ff.
Chosen, 38
Clayton, Harold, 117
Climate and opium, 100
Clinchant, M., delegate of France, 139
Coca-chewing, 10, 33, 39, 40
Cocaine, 33, 35, 39, 41, 46, 48, 49, 73, 157,
158, 209, 230, 241, 255, 258, 265, 266,
277, 278
Cocaine in Versailles Treaty, 42
7 synthetic and substitutes for, 236
is world requirements, 45
Cocainism, 46

 

302 INDEX

Coca-leaf, 10, 33, 39, 40, 41, 42, 156, 205,
213, 214, 230, 241

Codein, 32, 35, 36, 117

Colombia, 19, 263

Commission on “ fifteen-year period,” 190
Ss to Far East, 187
5 British Royal, 1893 (see

Royal Commission)

Commissions on opium sales, 179, 268

** Committee of Sixteen,”’ 201

** Competence,” question in Second Con-
ference, 185, 199

Conference, Shanghai, 1909 (see Shang-

al)
5 of State Governors (U.S.A.), 71
Conferences, in future, 270
Confiscation, 291
Confucian Society, Hong Kong, 166
Constantinople, 142
Constitution of U.S.A., a possible barrier,

76
Consuls, at Second Geneva Conference,
194

Consuming country defined, 47
Containers, 242
Contraband (see Smuggling)
Convention, Hague, 1912 (see Hague
Convention)
fy of Second Conference (see
Drug-Convention)
Cooking with poppy-oil, 67
Copenhagen, 86
Corporations, responsibility of, 244
Cosgrave, Mr., quoted, 100
Cost of an U.S.A., 27
Costa Rica, 19, 263
Cotton versus opium, 78, 135
Council, League of Nations, 21, 207, 209,
223, 286, 292
Counterfeiting, 233
Croats, etc., kingdom of (see Jugo-Slavia)
Crown Colonies, British, 53, 106
Cuba, 193, 194, ay 201, 263
Cuban smugglers, 84
Czecho-Slovakia, 193, 194, 200, 207

Dairen (Dalny), 161
Dangerous. Drugs ae 22
Danish smugglers, 84
Danzig, free city of, 193, 200
Datta, Dr. S. K., 100
Definitions—
Alkaloids, 32, 258, 277
Cocaine, 33, 258, 277
Coca-leaf, 33, 277
Derivatives, 32, 258, 277
Dross, 257
Drugs, 32
Ecgonine, 277
Hasheesh, etc., 33, 278
Heroin, 32, 258, 277
Indian hemp, 278
Medicinal opium, 32, 268, 277
Morphine, 32, 258, 277
Prepared opium, 31, 257
Raw opium, 30, 256, 277(Goo

Deladier, French Colonial Minister, 198

Delevingne, Sir Malcolm, 22, 88, 174, 175,
187, 188, 196, 216

Denmark, 16, 19, 193, 194, 200, 263

Dent, Dr. Frankland, quoted, 105

Denunciation of treaties, 265, 271, 294

Destruction of narcotics, 149, 217, 245

Dhar, 95

Diacetylmorphine, 32, 258, 277, 278,
279

Dicodid, 32, 214

Disease and opium, 4, 111 ff.

Disputes, 292

Divans, smoking, 269

Divergent theories of narcotic problem,
2, 228 ff.

Diversion certificates, 284, 297.

of opium at Sabang, 160 ff.

Dividends from opium, 57

Dixon, Dr. W. E., 40

Djamba, 33

Doctors in Second Geneva Conference,
197

Dominican Republic, 19, 193, 200

Dover powder, 280

Drinking of opium, 100

Dross, 257, 269

Drug-Convention (Second Conference),
conditions of coming
into force, 206, 249,
294

defects of, 213 ff.

attitude of U.S.A. to-
ward, 222, 223

%s i text of, 276 ff.

Drugging a Nation (Merwin), quoted,

131

Drugs (see Definitions)
Dunn, Wie T., cited, 52
Dutch (see Netherlands)
Dutch smugglers, 84
Dysentery and opium, 115

East India Company, 11, 92

East Indies (Dutch), 53, 182

Eating of opium, 5, 28, 48, 100, 104, 105,
106, 149, 171, 172, 182

Ecgonine, 41, 277, 278

Ecuador, 19, 223, 263

Education, 101, 102, 181, 269

Egypt, 34, 37, 193, 200, 201

Elephants, 67, 100

Encyclopedia Britannica, quoted, 48, 106,

24
Erythroxylon, 33, 39, 258, 277
Esrar, 33
Esthonia, 19
Esthonian smugglers, 84
Eucodal, 32, 214
Export control, 212, 241, 242, 243, 260,
269, 278, 279, 282, 283, 284, 297
Express traffic, narcotics in, 70, 71
Extradition, 88, 216
Extra-territoriality, 136, 137, 138, 182,
183, 184, 215, 291

INDEX

 

 

 

  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   

 

303

Factory (see Manufacture, limitation of)

Famine and opium in China, 1:
F a in India, 103

Fanshawe, Arthur U., 96

“Farmer,” the, 54, 83, 144, 145-147, 180

Federated Malay States, 53

Ferrare, steamship, case of, 161

Ferreira, A. M., 24, 196

Fifteen-year period, 189, 190, 272, 273

Fifth Committee, 29, 174, 175

First Geneva Conference, 101, 102, Chap.
VII (169 ff.), 221, 267 ff

Five-year period, 296

Fines, 128, 246 (see Bonds)

Finland, 19, 193, 194, 201

Floods and opium in China, 131

Foochow, 123

Foreign Policy Association, 169, 237

Formosa, 64, 86, 92, 144, 161, 181, 182,
188, 196

France, 8, 14, 17, 18, 21, 43, 45, 47, 52,
85, 92, 106, 124, 133, 172, 174, 182,
184, 193, 200, 207, 221, 223, 234, 244,
255, 267, 295, 299

Free Ports.and zones, 212, 216, 243, 283

Freiburg- Baden, 86, 155

French smugglers, 84

“ Friendly right,” 212, 290

Friend of China, quoted, 98

Galenical preparations, 279

Galloway, Sir David, 105, 106

Gambling, 56, 147

Geneva Opium Conferences,
Chaps. VII-VIII (169 ff.)

German Colonies (see Mandated Terri-
tories)

German smugglers, 84, 85, 155

Germany, 14, 18, 19, 21, 45, 47, 120, 156,
157, 172, 193, 197, 200, 206, 207, 209,
220, 223, 234, 245, 255, 286, 295, 297,
299

Ghandi, Mahatma, 10, 107

Ghazipur opium factory, 103, 104

Gheorghiewsky research in cholera, 114

Gipsy-moth, 79

Government monopoly of prepared opium,

179, 268

28, 48,

of warehousing,
217, 243

Government stocks of narcotics, 214

Great Britain, 21, 43, 51, 92, 106, 133,
150, 157, 167, 172, 182, 184, 187, 193,
200, 207, 220, 223, 230, 234, 255, 295,
297, 299

Greece, 37, 77, 194, 200, 221, 263, 266,
295, 297, 299

Guatemala, 16, 263

Guinea-pigs and cholera, 114

Gwalior, 39, 95

” ”

Hague Convention of 1912, 5, 6, 7, 14,
172, 191, 200, 207, 208, 212,
220, 221, 225, 226, 241, 243, 255
ff., 264, 267, 272, 278, 292

Opium Conferences, 14, 266304

Haiti, 263
Hamburg, smuggling from, 85, 86, 155,
156, 160
Harbin, 155
Harmless drugs, 214, 236, 298
Hasheesh (see Indian hemp)
Hastings, Warren, ll
Hawaii, 72
Haynes, R. A., 71, 73
Health Committee, 35
Pi Officers in Second Conference,
197

“‘ Heathen Chinee, The,”

Hedjaz, 223

Hemp (see Indian hemp)

Heroin, 32, 35, 36, 48, 76, 199, 214, 230,
241, 258, 278, 279

Holland (see Netherlands)

Holmes, Dr. Edward M., 4

Honduras, 16, 18, 263

Hong Kong, 53, 83, 85, 123, 141, 142, 144,
155, 161, 166

Hungary, 19, 193, 194, 200, 299

Hypodermic needles, etc., 35, 245

quoted, 189

277,

8, 106, 124

Iceland, 19, 223
Identification of Chinese opium, 143
Illicit traffic (see Smuggling)
Import control and certificates, 69,
166, 179, 211, 212; 216; 2
244, 246, 258, 269, 278, 279,
281-283
-. taxes, 68, 69
Inchcape Commission, 51
India, 6, 8, 21, 28, 53, 67, 77, Chap. V
(92 ff.), 133, 136, 137, 140, 149,
160, 170, 172, 178, 182, 184, 185,
187, 193, 200, 221, 223, 229, 230,
233, 255, 267 (see Native States)
» Yefuses opium to Macao and
Persia, 168
Indian hemp, 20. 33, 34, 49, 212, 265,
278, 279

“ National Congress, 108

c. National Social Conference,

a opium, 38, 49, 52

», Opium Department, reports of, 52
Indian Opium, The Truth About, 97, 99
Indians as coca-chewers (see Coca-chew-

108

ing)
Indo-China, 39, 53, 67, 106, 139, 181, 182,

Indore, 95

Infant mortality, 111 ff.

Infants and opium (see Babies)

Infectious disease and opium, 4, 111 ff.

Inspection of factories, 246

Instructions to U.S. delegation, 75, 202,
203

International Anti-Opium Association,
130, 148, 154, 162, 232,

249
= Hout renioee, etiquette of,

aeniaticn proposed, 249
Ireland, 19, 193, 194, 200,

255

INDEX

 

 

 

 

   

  

Italian smugglers, 84

Italy, 14, 16, 43, 193, 200, 201,
255

207, 223,

James, Dr. S. P., quoted, 116

Japan, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 38, 43, 47, 52, 85,
86, 92, 106, 120, 149, 160, 152-155,
156, 159, 172, 181, 184, 185, 188, 193,
196, 200, 207, 217, 223, 255, 267, 295,
297, 299

Japanese smugglers, 82, 84, 85, 86, 151 ff.

Java, 8, 33, 41, 45, 106, 144, 156, 214, 233

Javra, 95

Johnston, of Dundee, 111, 112

Johore, 53

Jordan, Sir John, 22,
177, 178, 185

Jugo-Slavia, 6, 21, 37, 77, 193, 200, 221

Jurisdiction (see Extra- territoriality)

126, 135, 152, 154,

Kaku, Sagatoro, 196

Kansas, law of, 71

Kansu, province of, 125

Kedah, 53

Kelanton, 53

Kelung (Formosa), 161

Kiang, Emperor, 93

Kiangsu, province of, 148

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
(see Jugo-Slavia)

Kircher, M., 196

Kobe, 155

Koo, T. Z., 164, 165, 166, 177

Korea (see Chosen)

Kotak, 95

Kung Tuen Chung Wu, 166

Labels on Chinese opium, 145
Labour, Hong Kong Federation of, 166
a supply and opium, 55-5
Laudanum, 32, 280
Laws, exchange of, 264, 291
»» uniform legislation necessary, 217
ys OL USA. it
League of Nations, 21, 27, 28, 176, 189,
190, 194, 223, 234,
270, 292, 293, 294
(see also Council)
Gs “ »» secretariat of, 240
Lebanon, 20
Lee Sing Co. (Macao “‘ farmer ’’), 145
Legislation (see Laws)
ST aemate’ substituted for “‘scientific,”
“WT

re Ute 114, 118
Liberal Federation of India, 108
Theos 68, 72, 214, 244, 246, 268, 274,

Li Ching F Fang, 130

Liechtenstein, 19, 233

Li Hung Chang, 129

Limitation of manufacture (see Manufac-

ture)
Lin Tseh-hsu, 123
Liquor and drug-smuggling, 74
Lithuania, 19Little, E. S., quoted, 125

Loans for poppy- culture, 6, 1

London, opium-smoking in,

Loudon, M. le Jonkheer, 188, 198, 204

Luggage, narcotics in, 70, 244

Lumber industry, 79

Luxemburg, 18, 15, 193, 194, 200, 263,
295, 297,

Lyall, Sir J. 8. 96

McAllum, J. L., 100
Macao, 8, 24, 53, 54, 95, 106, 141, 146,
147, 148, 161, 166, 168, 179,
182, 196, 275
India refuses opium to, 168
McDermid, 161
Macedonian opium, 38, 49
Mail, narcotics by, 70, 151, 262, 265
Maine, law of, 72
Malaria, 94, 113 ff.
Malaya, opium seizures, 141
7 Opium Commission quoted, 57
Malwa opium, 95, 96
Manchuria, 155, 159, 162
Mandated territories, 20
Manson-Bahr and Perry, quoted, 115
Manufacture, limitation of, 68, 74, 76,

207, 208, 221, 233, 246,
258, 279
a of remedies, 260

places of, 258-260
Manufacturing country defined, 47
Marseilles, 8, 85, 155
Masters, Dr. W. E., quoted, 115, 117
Masters of ships responsible, 142, 243
Medical use of opium, 99, 100,
111 ff.

Medicinal opium, 32, 36, 258, 277, 278

preparations, 216

Merwin, Samuel, 60, 131

Metchnikoff, Elie, quoted, 114

Metz, Herman A., 66, 67

Mewar, 95

Mexico, 19, 148, 216, 223, 263

Ministers at Second Conference, 194, 198

Minors and opium-smoking, 181, 268,
269

101,

Missionary view, 230 ff.

Missouri, law of, 72

Miyagawa, Yasukichi, 156

Mohammedans and opium, 100

Molasses, alga for opium, 147

Monaco, 19, 22:

Moncay, 138

Monopoly bureau at Vladivostok, 160

of prepared opium, 179, 267 ff.

Montenegro, nae 266

Moorhead, Mrs. H. H., quoted, 237

Morocco, 19

Morphia, 32, 35, 38, 143

Morphine, 32,
265, 266, 277, 278

Morrison, G. E., quoted, 129

Mosquitoes and malaria, 116

Mowbray, R. G. C., 9

Murray, Sir Gilbert, 174

INDEX

 

 

35, 36, 85, 241, 255, 258,

  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
   
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    

305

Nanking, 148, 166
Narcotic addiction, 34, 40, 46, 60, 61
Narcotics and disease, 111 ff.
ue listed, 32
- packing of, 242
3 problem of, 2, 3, 5,
228 ff., 251
National Anti-Opium Association, China,
164, 166, 249
a Association for Advancement of
Education, China, 165
5% Christian Council, India, 101
% Council of Churches, China, 166
Nationality, patents of, 182 (see Extra-
territoriality)
Native States of India, 19, 92, 95, 106
Nauru, 20
Naval vessels, drug-smuggling in, 244
Needles, hypotlermic, 35, 245
Netherlands, the, 14, 18, 21, 47, 52, 92,
102, 106, 133, 160, 172, 182, 184, 187,
193, 200, 205, 221, 223, 234, 255, 262,
263, 264, 266, 267, 295, 297, 299
Netherlands East Indies, 53, 182
ava)
Neutrals, 19, 220
Neville, Edwin L., 26, 171, 197
New Guinea, 20
New narcotics, 212, 236, 279
New York State, law of, 71
New Zealand, 19
Nicaragua, 17, 193, 194, 200, 263
Ningpo, 123
North Borneo (see British N.B. Co.)
North Carolina, law of, 72
North China, 152
North Manchuria, 155, 159
Norway, 17, 18, 263
Numbering of containers, 243

9, 62, 63,

(see

Office International d’ Hygiéne Publique,
212, 280, 298
Oil from poppy-seed, 31, 67
Opiates allowed, ae
Opinions, advisory, 29
Opium addiction, 60, él, 63, 64, 100
and disease, 94, 111 ff.
» Advisory Committee (see Advi-
sory Committee)
“ Conferences (see Geneva, Hague,
Shanghai)
>) content of drugs, 35, 202
ae policy in Dutch East Indies, 57, 64
as section, League Secretariat, 21,
240

synthetic, 66
ss Opium War,” 11, 123
Opium world requirements, 36, 37
Oppel researches in cholera, 114
Oregon, law of, 72
Osaka, 86
Overseas Chinese Union, 166
Owners of ships responsible, 142

Pacific Islands, 20
Packing of narcotics, 242, 243, 256, 268,
285306

Palestine, 20

Panama, 263

Papaver som niferum, 30, 256, 27

Paraguay, 19, 263

Parcels-post (see Post)

Parliament, British, on opium traffic, 11,
12, 96

Pasteur Institute, cholera experiments,
114, 117

Pease, Arthur, 97

Peddling of drugs in China, 149 ; in New
fork, 71

Peking, 166

Penalties, 88, 215, 246,

Perlis, 53

~I

291 (see Bonds)

Permanent Central Board (see Central
Board)
; Court of International Jus-

tice, 212, 292

Perry and Manson-Bahr quoted, 115

Persia, 6, 14, 18, 19, 31, 37, 39, 55, 67, 77,
78, 133, 168, 174, 186, 191, 193, 194,
197, 200, 201, 220, 223, 229, 231, 233,
255, 295, 297, 298, 299

Persian opium, morphia content of, 38

Personal responsibility, 244

Peru, 33, 39, 45, 200, 214, 233, 263, 266

Philippine Islands, 13, 184, 185, 186, 188

Pine blister rust, 79

Plague, 94, 101

Poincaré, re Tonkin episode, 139

Poland, 88, 112, 193, 198, 200, 201, 216,
299

Police officers as ‘‘ assessors,’’ 240

Political aspects, 12, 62, 53, 77, 78

Pootung, drugs destroyed at, 149

Poppy-culture in China, 127, 128, 131
A »» subsidized in India, 102-

104

Poppy-plant, 30, 31, 79

Poppy-seed, uses of, 31, 67

Population of world, narcotic require-
ments, 36, 45

Port Arthur, 161

Porter, Stephen G., 24, 55, 73, 171, 187,
188, 191, 197, 199, 200-204, 222, 224
225, 229

Portugal, 14, 16, 21, 52, 92, 106, 133, 146,
172, 182, 184, 187, 193, 200, 221, 255,
267, 295, 297, 299

Possession, illegal, 214, 262, 280

Post, narcotics by, 70, 151, 262, 265

Premises, control of, 259, 279

Prepared opium, 31, 32, 172, 179, 185,
199, 200, 201, 211, 257, 258, 2665,

267 ff., 296
Prize for synthetic opium, 66
Problem of narcotics, changed nature of,
0, 20
divergent theories,
2, 228 ff.
Producing country defined, 47
Programme for the future, Chap. IX
(219 ff.)
Propaganda against narcotics, 101, 102,
109, 110, 181, 269

” ”

INDEX

 

 

    

 

Proportion of opium-production used in
drugs, 229

Protocol of cloture,”’ 16, 17

Protocol of First Geneva Conference, 190,
192, 272

of Second
190, 296

“« Protocol of signature,” 18, 263

Prussia, 255

Public opinion in China, 164, 165

“

Geneva Conference,

”

Quarantines: Agricultural, 79; in For-
mosa, 64

Quinine and opium, 116

Race prejudice, 55

Ratification of conventions, etc., 16, 17,
206, 224, 249, 271, 293

Rationing, 181, 241, 246, 268, 274, 275

Rats, protected in India, 101

Raw opium, 30, 36-39, 132, 133, 205, 209,
241, 256, 265, 277

ebellions and opium in China, 129

Red Cross Society of China, 165

Re-export, 146, 180, 213

Registration and rationing,
274, 275

Religious uses of opium, 100

Remedies, anti-opium, 216, 260, 278

Reparations, cocaine in, 42

Reports of Central Board, 290

Requirements of narcotics, 36, 37, 45

Rescue of addicts, 247

Reservations: of Germany, 295; of
India, 28, 172; of Persia, 295; to
First Conference Agreement, 274—
275 ; of Siam, 295

Xesin, of hemp (see Indian hemp)

Results : 3

181, 268,

of First Conference, 178 ff. ; of
Second Conference, 206 ff.

Retailer, 214

Revenue, Chap. IV (51 ff.), 72, 205, 229

Rewards for seizures, 87, 244

Ridgway, Sir West, 56

Roberts, Sir William, 97, 111, 113-116

Rockhill, W. W., 60

Rodriguez, Rodrigo, 24, 196

Rogers, Sir Leonard, 114, 116

Roosevelt, President, 13, 14, 34,

Ross, Sir Ronald, 116

Rotterdam, 245

Roumania, 194, 200, 263, 266

Royal Commission of 1893, 12, 96, 97, 113

Ruanda-Urundi, 20

“Rum Row,” 74

Russia, 14, 18, 19, 77, 135, 136, 137, 162,
163, 255

Rutlam, 95

Rutter, Owen, 56, 57

Saar Basin, 217

Sabang, 160, 161, 180

St. Pierre de Miquelon, 74, 75
Salvador, 263

Samoa, 20Sawa

San Francisco, 148
San Marino, 224
Sarawak, 53
Second Geneva Conference, 19, 32-35,
176, 185, ca VIII (193 ff.),
219, 221, 276 ff
Hague Conference, 266
Secretariat, of Central Board, 286, 287,
299
= of League of Nations, 21, 240
Seizures, 43, 44, 85, 86, 126, 140, 141, 145,

149, 211
Seizures, destruction of, 87, 217, 245
“s ratio of, to smuggling, 88

rewards for, 87, 244
Semiryetchensk, 39, 135
Serbia, 263, 266
Serbs, etc., kingdom of (see Jugo-Slavia)
Shaftesbury, Lord, 11
Shanghai, 86, 142, 143, 148, 149, 166, 183
3 Conference of 1909, 14, 162,
170, 255, 266
Shantung, 149
Ship-masters responsible, 142, 243
Ships in smuggling, 141, 147, 148, 161, 162
Siam, 14, 16, 21, 38, 55, 67, 78, 92, 106,
172, 182, 184, 185, 193, 196, 200, 255,
267, 275, 295, 297
Siberia, 77, 156
Signatories, 271, 295, 297, 299
Silk versus opium, 78
Simon, Dr. Carleton, 66, 145, 245
Singapore, 85, 144
Singh, Sir L., 96
Slovenes, etc., kingdom of (see Jugo-
Slavia)
Smith, Sir Cecil C., 99
Smokers, exchange of information about,
270

registration of, 181, 270
Smoking of opium, 13, 31, 48, 60, 61, 76,
121 (see Prepared opium)
Sp versus eating, 104-106
Smugglers, nationality of, 84, 85, 159
Panels organization, 80-85, 87, 141,

Seortine il, 73, 77, 215, 220, 236, 267,
268, 274, 289, 290

A from China, 67, 132 ff., 141
5 into wane 67, 126, 134 fr
147 ff.,

Soap, from poppy- -oil, 31, 67
Society for Suppression of Opium Traffic,

Sokaboemie, Java, 41
Soochow, 148

Soudan, 224

South Africa, Union of, 174, 193

South America, 11, 33, 146

South China Athletic Association, 166
South Sea Islands, 20

South-West Africa, 20

Soviet Russia (see Russia)

Spain, 19, 193, 194, 200, 207, 263, 299
Spanish smugglers, 84

Spot Goods Reporter, drug-offers in, 43, 45

 

 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 

307

Spruceanum Burck, 42

State legislation in U.S.A., 70

State Prison Commission, N.Y.,
71

Stewart, Sir Mark, 11

Straits Settlements, 53, 59, 165

pium Commission,

report,

”? ”

105

Students, World’s Chinese Federation of,
66

“* Sub-committee of Five,” 202

Substitutes for narcotics, ee 236

Substitution of crops, 6, 7

Sugimura, Yotaro, 196

Suppression of smoking, 257, 258, 268 ff.

Sweden, 8, 16, 193, 194, 200, 201, 207,
263

Swedish smugglers, 84

Swiss smuggle rs, 84, 155

Switzerland, 19, 46, 47, 120, 155, 156, 157,
193, 197, 200, 209, 211, 220, 223, 234,
245, 26 3. 266

Switzerland cocaine manufacture, 46

Sydenham laudanum, 280

Synthetic cocaine, 236 ; opium, 66

Syria, 20

Syringes, hypodermic, 245 (see Needles)

Sze, Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred, 139, 164, 166, 189,

Szechuan, 125, 127

Tael, value of, 135

Tagore, Rabindranath, 107

Tairea, steamship, seizure on, 140, 141

Tanganyika, 20

Tariff autonomy, 78

Taxation, 4, 52

Tea- harvesting i in Formosa, 181

Tea versus opium,

Teichman, Eric, quoted, 125, 127

** Ten Cannots,” the, 6

Thefts of drugs, 244

Tientsin, 166

Tinning of Chinese opium, 140

Tobacco tax, 233

Togoland, 20

Tokio, 8

Tonkin and Yunnanese opium, 139

Torchiana, H. A. van C., 58

Transhipment, 160, 161, 180, 269

Transit, 217, 243, 269, 284, 285 (see Re-
export)

Travellers from suspected countries, 244

Treaties, 78, 206 (see Conventions)

Treatment of addicts, 247

Trengganu, 53

Tschudy, quoted re coca-chewing, 40

Tung Hing, 138

Turkestan, 38, 135, 136, 182

Turkey, 6, 14, 19, 31, 34, 37, 49, 67, 77,
133, 193, 197, 200, 220, 223, 229, 231,
263, 266

Turkish opium, 38, 143

Turner and Goldsmith, Sanitation in
India, quoted, 112, 116

Typhus, 94308

Uch Turfan, 135

Uniform procedure necessary, 217, 241

Union of Daily Newspapers, China, 165

Union of South Africa, 174, 193

United States of America, 13, 14, 16, 18,
21, 32, 43, 47, 55, 68, 70, 73, 170, 171,
184, 187, 193, 200, 201, 202, 206, 209,
220-224, 234, 255, 286 (see Porter,

.G.
Universal Postal Union, 265
Uruguay, 193, 194, 200, 207, 263, 266

Van Wettum, W. G., 24, 41, 189, 196

Venezuela, 16, 19, 193, 194, 200, 263

Versailles, Treaty of, 18, 42, 220

Vice, as source of revenue, 10, 54, 56, 57

Victoria, Queen, 96

Viharidas, Haridas, 96

Vladivostok, 86, 135, 155, 160, 161, 162,
179, 246

Vote, on competence, 200

Walters, Dr. Ernest E., quoted, 114
War interrupts anti-narcotic movement,

etc., 16

Warehouses, bonded (see Bonded Ware-
houses)

Warehousing, as Government monopoly,
217, 243

Sir Malcolm, 116

Watson,

 

 

   

INDEX

Wheat, 52, 78, 103, 104

White Cross Society, 249

Wholesaler, 214

Wild, C. E., 103

Ww illoughby, W. W., 1225 123" 1b!

Wilson, Henry J., 97, 98

Wine versus opium, 100

Wink & Co., 14

Winterton, Earl, 111

Withdrawal of China from Second Con-
ference, 176, 193

s of U.S.A. from same, 32, 170,

176, 193, 200, 203, 219, 225

World Court (see Permanent Court)

World’s Chinese Student Federation, 166

W. orld requirements of narcotics, 36, 209,

216
W. right, Dr. Hamilton (see Dedication),

oie: Hamilton, 22, 197
Wuchang, 166

Yellow fever and opium, 115, 117
Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., Chinese, 166
Yokohama, 43

Young China, against opium, 165, 166
Yunnan, 39, 138, 149

Zahle, Herluf, 189, 194, 200, 203
Zinsser, Dr. Hans, quoted, 114