is ee EO: Bias ts c Rises ae e se eee See Se oe. o ens on oe oS oe ie pan Be os tie ev ehe co ss Pa Crea oe eee oe ee ee ee Fea Seen Tee Ss See ene) Su a ee aePrefatory Chapter I Soe Sa =e a Se oe Chapter II ------ Chapter IV ------- Chapter V -------- Bibliography --~--- cae — = a onme THE SHANTUNG algo Wa I “ ap ane p—~ > Declaration of and Germany - Neutrality - Violat ion of. = Japan ese Oc upatio China Severed Diplons with devant i reaties - SI THE VERSAI LLES ry 49) Situation Pre ence -= Argume legates - Jap titude in the cision of the The Withdrawa tion = The eY c+ rs ss ap © ee ~~ @ ry f i ty @ @ a es | 2 ’ . e~ cr @ © b-( y ° D ) w t eh {2, ct @ ct ct i t «| @ ry — = © @ @ y > OP @ mt t~ u cr ws ~ 0O©QO0 OM < rh @ © a 0 J ct t J c> €a © @ ~~ @ Cb i Wm @ eS mo ct Q re ct 73 4 if - @ b> my) co er? © y oaorH @® 2 @ f-- Ry - 3 w DP rh® © cm cttoo Hy ty @ © 4 nil v @ sailles Treaty. THE JUSTICE OF THE WASHINGTON Fae: Ra, 4 tO bk? 0 “I rePREFATORY NOTE , S ~~ ¥ rt co + ~ ~ * g p aC " m l= 4 ey } TP? These pages attempt a Scnerai surv of the controversy over the Shantung Pro- vince between the Republic of China and qc the Imperial Empire of Japan. They dis=- ct - @ 62) © cr ct j}— 6) t cuss the principal features of ments, both the Versailles Settlement and * by both the Powers = in the view of a Chinese student,de , rf . S 4 44 ay * ~* nunc, te S44 y quocumgque gas Litora litoribus contrari Vaee ab imprecor, arma nepotesque,"Cr A FT —_—_ —_— SS <——- = aa sae 3 a In dealin with the main events which léd to the settlement, it is not necessary to enter into the details of the origin of the German lease of Kiao-chau, the port of Tsing-tau, and of the eco- nomic concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany, Suffice it to say that, taking advantage of a situation resulted by the murder of two German missionary priests in the province during the Boxer up-rising, the German Government in 1898 forc ra @ «2 the Chinese Government, of the Tsing dynasty, to make treaties granting for the period of ninety-nine years the lease and conces- sions, by which the sovereign authority over this "Holy Land", the birth place of Confucius, was to all intents ceded to Germany, Immediately upon the signing of the treaties, the German Go- yernment at once improved the harbor, fortified the area, and be- gan railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung Pro- vince. The out-break of the Great War found Germany in possession of the leased peninsula and in substantial control of the area under the concession. On August 15, 1914, the Prussianized Japanese Government dispatched to the German Government an Ultimatum in the following terms :; " We consider it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove the causes of all disturbance of the Peace in the Far East and to safeguard general interesta as ) ) > contemplated in the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain. In order to secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia the establishment of which is the aim of the said agreement,the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it to be its duty to give advice to the Imperial German Government to carry out the following two propositions "(1) To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters the German men-Of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn; "(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15th, to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a@ view to the even= tual restoration of the same to China. " The Imperial Japanese Government announces at the same time that, in the event of its not receiving by noon of August 23rd an answer from the Imperial German Government signifying unconditional acceptance of the above advice offered by the Imperial Japanese Government, Japan will be compelled to take such action as it may deem necessary to meet the situation." On the Imperial German Government failure to comply with these demands, or advice, the militaristic Japanese Government landed troops at Lung-kow, a port situated one hundred and fifty miles from Tsing=-tau and in a mountainous district, practically devoid of roads suitable for military purpose, Just why Lung-kow should have been the spot from which Japan first started war operations against Germany, remained a question that the Far East was unable to answer at the time, but events that followed after the disem barkation brought out the answer clearly. By this unnecessary action Japan had deliberately violated the neutrality of China. And, though England had joined in the European War because Germany had violated the neutrality of Bel-gium, the British Government, for some reason unknown to the rest f the world but too prevalent in the minds of the Chinese, did not think it necessary, when all the eyes of the world were upon Europe, + © to protest loudly, to her ally in China, against the very thing that had seemingly so shocked her in Belgium. The Japanese troops, assisted by a small British contingent, Pty took possession of the leased port after some skimishes on November 6, 1914, and occupied the territory traversed by the German rail- Waye Instead of returning the captured port to China, the Japan Government took over the Shantung railroad and the concessions and enforced a control in the province more extensive and drasti ct hay +e Germany had ever attempted. By such scheme Japan sought to drive the "mailed fist" policy of Germany from China in order that she could replace it with the "mailed fist" policy of Japan, whic!) ” SD i & been modeled after that of her former Teutonic tutor in arms? Apparently the actual occupation of this Chinese territory in- duced a change in the policy of the "mailed fist" Government at Tokio, for in December, 1914, Baron Kato, the Minister of Foreign Affairs - one of the most beloved statesman of the Chinese, espe- Cially the inhabitants of the Shantung Province! - declared that the restoration of Tsing-tau, and thereof Shantung, to China,"is to be settled in the future" and that the Japanese Government had made no promises to do so, This declaration, which seemed in contradiction of the Ultima—- tum of August 15, 1914, to Germany, was made in the Japanese Diet, In January, 1915, the Japanese, still eagerly improving the oppor- tunities presented by the preoccupation of Europe, presented to China the infamous "Twenty-one Demands" part of which were kept se-cret from the outside world - these demands, if accepted entire . e & 2 would have made China practically a vassal of Japan, It was but another atrocious example of how Japan tried to promote peace in the Far East and cordial relationship between China and h @ @ rself! Japan was endeavoring to take another decisive Step toward reali- zing her desire to dominate China! It is needless to go into these demands further than to quote that which concerned the Shantung question " The Chinese Government agrees that when the Japanese Government hereafter approaches the German Government for th cT $ & G Ze ‘ ransfer of all @® rights and privileges of whatsoever nature enjoyed by Germany in the Province of Shantung, whether secured by treaty or in any other manner, China shall give her full assent thereto," The important point to be noted in this demand is that Japan did not consider that the occupation of Tsing-tau and the seizure of the German concessions transferred title to her, but looked for- ward to a future transfer by treaty. When China obdvjected, Japan sent a forty-eight hour ultimatum M fg)! (May 7), and China was forced to submit to a large portion of these demands. In no position to resist the avaricious Japanese Govern- ment,and with everything to lose by defying her powerful but un=- righteous neighbor, China was forced to be humiliated and accede to seeing her neutrality and territorial integrity violated. It can be safely affirmed that, except for the duress of the ultimatum with the accompanying demonstration of force , China would not have acceded to the violation, and that it was coercion —- coercion ap- plied to a friendly nation while in the relations of peace and ami- ty = that extorted the consent. It is obviously in accordancewith the spirit of international law to maintain that such a con- sent obtained under duress or coercion should have invalidated Ja- pan's possession of the former German rights and privileges in the Shantung Province. China, following the action which had taken by the United States on February 3, 1917, severed diplomatic relations with the Imperial German Government on March 14, 1917; and five months later declared war against her announcing at the same time that the treaties, con- ventions, and agreements between the two countries were by the de= Cclaration abrogated ; " All the treaties of whatever nature between China and Germany as well as Austria-Hungary are abrogated, as also all such provi- sions of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, and other similar in- ternational agreements in so far as they conc @ rn China and Germany as well as Austria-Hungary," This was duly taken notice of by the legations addressed, in- cluding that of Japan, Summarizing the outstanding conditions here, it can be held that Japan had no right to land her troops at Lung-kow, march throught Chinese neutral territory and seize the German Kiao-chau Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines. By this unnecessary act Japan had violated China's neutrality and sovereignty. Further= more, that China's declaration of war did abrogate the lease con- vention of 1898(March 6), and thus automatically regained the for- mer German concessions arising out of the convention and entitled her to the custody and the possession of the Kiao-chau Chinan Rail- way and the adjoining mines, pending the final settlement at the Peace Negotiation; and that Japan's possession of German rights in Shantung was not validated by the consent of the Peking Government,for, as we have seen, the consent was extorted under the duress of an ultimatum,ae eS ae >: eR mie eS Aol dL ES Sym cit LE ME RS — SEE S| =a Se ee | [ee —_— == = =e eee — ee Ss ooo This was the state of affairs when the Peace Conference assen= bled at Versailles in 1919, Germany had by force compelled China in 1898 to cede to her certain rights in the Province of Shantung, Japan had seized these rights by force in 1914 and had by threats forced China in 1915 to agree to accept her disposition of them when they were legally transferred by treaty at the end of the war, China in 1917 had, on entering the war against Germany, abrogated all treaties and agreements with Germany, a0 that the ceded rights no longer existed and could not legally be transferred by Germany to Japan by the Treaty of Peace, since the title was in China, In fact, any transfer or disposition of the rights in Shantung former- ly belonging to Germany was a transfer or disposition of rights be- longing wholly to China and would deprive that country of a portion of its full sovereignty over the territory affected, In view of these facts, the Chinese delegates to the Peace Con- ference brought their case relating to Shantung to the Council of Ten on January 35th, 1919, They asserted that the former German rights should be restored to China because the leased territory was inhabited by the Chinese and was an important district ina province which was the cradle of the Chinese civilization, Further, they refused to acknowledge the legal validity of the treaties and @greements with Japan affecting Shantung, and fortified their atti- tude by the following arguments ; "(1) China had declared war on Germany since August 1917 and had abrogated all her treaties with Germany, including the Lease Con-vention and the railway and mining agreements, As the treaty of 1898, on which the Treaty signed and the notes exchanged with Ja- pan in 1915 relating to Shantung are based, had now ceased to be valid, it followed that everything derived from it was ipso facto void. "(2) Even if it was said that this argument was of no avail, it could be easily seen that the treaty of 1915, relating to Shantung, and the conditions concerning the restoration of Kiao=-chau had only been accepted as a temporary settlement, because it was implied in the treaty itself that the whole question would be examined at the conclusion of the war. China had agreed to give her full consent to any agreement that might be arrived at, but had not undertaken not to participate in the negotiations preceding the agreement, Now that she was authorized to appear at the Peace Conference to plead her own case, she had the right to determine the conditions On which, and on which alone, she would give her full consent, "(3) China demanded direct restitution of Kiao-chau by Germany and not throught the agency of Japan. This procedure, she be=- lieved, was only proper in view of her belligerency against Ger= many and would save the trouble of taking two steps to make the transfer, when it could be effected by one. "(4) In presenting this demand she was not ignoring the sacrifice made by Japan in capturing Kiac-chau from Germany; but, on legal ground, she could not confer on Japan any compensation because the attack constituted an act of violation of China's neutrality. To cultivate goodwill and friendship with Japan she would open Kiao- Chau of her own free will to Japanese trade, and establish an Inter= national Settlement for the convenience of her subjects as well asthose of other States, There was no need of a Concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan, because a special area, with its government in the hands of the foreign residents, would afford the Japanese all the security and comfort which they desire. "(5) The intrusions of Japanese soldiers and officials had outra- ged the feelings of the Chinese in the Shantung Province and had Ad oe ry nearly brought about a riot which, as the Chinese Government feared, might have produced very serious conseguences on the relations be- tween the two countries. It should be remembered that Japan had Originally no right to station troops or establiah Civil Adminis- tration Bureaux in Shantung, and if she was not requested by China to pay a@ compensation for this usurpation of rights, she should at least withdraw and abolish them without demanding anything from China, "* The Japanese delegates not only refused to accept the arguments of the Chinese, but they were infuriated at the fact that the case was brought before the Conference at all. Pressure was brought to bear on the Government in Peking, asking it to instruct its dele= gates in Versailles to change their attitude toward Japan. Had it not been for the intervention of the American Minister in Peking on behalf of China, Japan might have served her another ultimatum, The whole American delegation in Versailles appreciated the points of view of the Chinese and the justice of their claims. Great Britain and France, while they were sympathetic with China so far as the principles of justice and nationality were concerned, failed to see their way to help her because they had been engaged to sup= port Japan by the secret treaties signed in February 17 and March | * Modern China(a political study) by Sih-Gung Cheng. Pages 251 - 258, :1, 1917, at a time when they were in no position to refuse Japan's request.* In April 65-30, 1919, when the question of Kiso-chau was brought before the Council of Three for final decision, people in authorita- tive quarters, especially the Americans, were very hopeful that it would be decided in China's favour, By this time, the Italian de- legation had withdrawn from the Conference owing to the disputes on Fiume, and Japan, taking advantage of the embarrassing situation, threatened to follow the example of Italy, should she not be given satisfaction. Moreover, she warned the Council that, as she had already been defeated on the proposal of racial equality, she could not possibly acquiesce in another reverse without injuring her hon- our and pride, Great Britain and France, the other members of the Council of Three, had always reminded Mr, Wilson, the third member of the Council, of their support to Japan according to the terms of the se- cret agreements, and it was feared that should Japan be allowed to withdraw, they would align themselves against the President of the 09 United States, The consequence would prebably be a break-up of the Conference, and at time when the whole world was longing for peace such a break-up would be too dreadful an event. And thus, on May 1, 1919, the Chinese delegates were verbally informed of the outline of the decision, transferring, "without any reservation", all the rights formerly belonging to Germany to Japan. The Chinese delegates protested against the decision, and offered on May 24 to sign the treaty with a reservation regarding the clauses relating to Shantung, so as to defend their rights and yet not to make an open breach with the Allies. Informed on June 24 by the EF eee ES * Millard's Review - Supp.,July 17,1920;pp.1-3Secretary-General of the Conference that no reservation was permit-= ted, they suggested "that they should sign the treaty while making a separate declaration in writing that such a Signature should be subject to a reservation which would enable China, after Sicning, to as) "© 3 4 ask for the reconsideration of the Shantung question" This pro= posal was again rejected, The delegation, however, secure a modification of wording "so that the Signing of the by the Chinese might not be understood as prec sluding China from asking at a Suitable moment for a reconsideration of the Shantuno g question", This last attempt at compromise again failed and the delegates decided not to appear at Versailles on June 28, 1919, The articles of the Treaty of Versailles relating to Shantung embodied these decisions ; ARTICLE 156 : Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title and privileges - particulerly those concerning the territory of Kiao-chau, railways, mines, and submarine cables - which she acquired in virtue of the Treaty concluded by her with. China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrangements relative to the Province of Shantung. All German rights in the Tsing-tau-Tsinanfu Railway, including its branch lines, together with its subsidiary property of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights and privileges attaching thereto. The German State submarine cables from Tsing-tau to Shanghai and from Tsing-tau to Chefoo, with all the rights, privileges and properties attaching thereto, are Similarly acquired by Japan, freeand clear ef all charges and encumbrances, ARTICLE 157 : The movable and immovable property owned by the German State in the territory of Kiao-chau, as well as all the rights which Germany might claim in consequence of the works or improvements made or of the expenses incurred by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear of all charges and encumbrances, ARTICLE 158 : Germany shall hand over to Japan with-in three months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the ar- chives, registers, plans, title-deeds and documents of every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the administration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, of the territory of Kiao- chau. Within the Same period Germany shall give particulars to Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two preceding Articles,- 13 SeuAr T&S [il EO $276:3 ..0h- 22 [es ct es 3 J t Py = hey z= J The Shantung Settlement,as embodied in the Versailles Peace Treaty, June 38, 1919, was not so evidently chargeable to secret negotiations though the decision was finally reached throught that notorious method. The decision came almost at the last moment be- fore the Treaty with Germany was completed. This decision, as we have seen, was all favorable to the ambiticus Imperial Japanese Government, was the result of a "confidential arrangement with the Japanese delegates by which, in the event of their claims being granted, they withdrew their threat to decline to sign the Treaty of Peace -",* This threat was intended to coerce the arbiters of the Treaty terms by menacing the success of the plan to establish a League of Nations - it was a species of 'blackmail' not un- known to international relations, It was the impression of the members of the American Delegation that the departure of the Italian Delegation from Paris and the uncertainty of their return to give formal assent to the Treay with Germany, an uncertainty which existed at the time of the decision of the Shantung Question, had much to do with the anxiety of the President as to Japan's attitude, His line of reasoning was lo- gical, but in the other members’ judgément was based on the false premise that the Japanese would carry out their threat to refuse to accept the Treaty and enter the League of Nations unless they obtained a cession of the German rights. The American delegates did not believe at the time that the Japanese delegates would have * The Peace Negotiation - by Robert Lansing.made good their threat. The superior international position, which she held as one of the Five Great Powers in the Conference, and which she would hold in the League of Nations as one of the Prin- Cipal Powers in the constitution of the Executive Council, would never have been abandoned by the Tokio Government. The Japanese delegates would not have run the risk of losing this position by adopting the course pursued by the Italians, It is fair to presume that, if the conflicting claims of the militaristic Japan and the Republic of China to the alleged rights of Germany in the Chinese territory had been settled upon the merits through the medium of an impartial commission named by the Con- ference, the Treaty provisions relating to the disposition of those rights would have been very different from those which the Council of Three ordered to be drafted. Before a commission of the Con- ference no persuasive reasons for conceding the Japanese claims could have been urged on the basis of an agreement on the part of Japan to adhere to the League of Nations or to abandon the attempt to have included in the Covenant a declaration of equality between races, It was only through secret interviews and secret agree- ments that the threat of the Japanese delegates could be successful- ly made. The decision was made possible because the sessions of the Council of the Heads of States and the conversations concerning Shantung were secret, " It was a calamity for the Republic of China and unfortunate for the presumed justice written into the Treaty that President s would decline to 41) Wilson was convinced that the Japanese delegat accept the Covenant of the League of Nations if the claims of Japan to the German rights were denied. It was equally unfortunatethat the President felt that without Japan's adherence: 4 wD ct oO c SS @ C2 © @ a cr co He | GO i b C2 _ Mm Loe oO He} as rendered at the Versailles Peace Conference by the Council of r Three in 1919 was unjust and outrageous, for, the Council has de- liberately awarded these legitimate rights of China to Japan - a state that has perpetuated the crime of violation of China's neu- trality and sovereignty. Instead of requiring the offending state to restore the former German rights to the rightful sove- reign owner, which should be the dictates of reason and con- science,"The Three" condoned and encouraged Japan's conduct by awarding her the German rights in Shantung,. The inconsistency is all the more glaring when it is seen that, in the case of Germany, her violation of Belgium neutrality was 80 severely condemned and penalized, but in the case of Japan, the Prussianized Empire of the East, for her violation of China's neutrality, especially in view of the absence of any ground of mi- litary necessity, she was not only not penalized, but on the con- trary, awarded the right, not of Germany, but of China-a friend- ly ally and loyal associate in the War, " It appear clear," as the Chinese Peace Delegation at Versail- les put it, "that the Council has been bestowing to Japan rights, =—= ee * The Peace Negotiation - by Robert Lansing; pp.258-259,not of the Germany, but of China; not of the enemy, but of an ally. A more powerful ally has reaped benefits at the expense, not of the common enemy, but of a weaker ally." " If it be right for a policeman, who reccvers your purse, to keep the contents and claim that he has fulfilled his duty in re- turning the empty purse, than Japan's conduct may be tolerated, we ily, 9 " If it be right for Japan to annex the territory of an then it cannot be wrong for Italy to retain Fiume taken from the enemy " If we support Japan's claims, we abandon the democracy of China to the domination of the Prussisnized militarism of Japan, " We shall be sowing dragons' teeth. ) " It can not be right to do wrong even to make peace, Peace ig desirable, but there are things dearer than peace, justice and freedom, "* In the Versailles Conference China was offered as the sacri- fice for peace? This ends the account of the Versailles Settlement and the negotiations which led up to it. The consequences were those which were bound to follow so indefensible a decision as the one that was reached, Public opinion in the United States was al- most unanimous in condemning it and in denouncing those responsi- ble for so evident a departure from legal justice and the princi- ples of international morality. No plea of expediency or of ne=- cessity excused such a flagrant denial of undoubted right. The popular recognition that a great wrong had been done to a nation weak because of political discord and an insufficient military establishment, in order to wim favor with a nation strong because of its military power and national unity. * The Peace Negotiations - by Robert Lansing; pp.<60-261.The long and dangerous controversy between China over the Province of Shantung in accordance with the Versailles Settlement was finally settled by the signing of a treaty be- tween these two powers on February 4, 1968, in Washington, during the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, which had opened its sessions on November lc, 192 Under the treaty China is to receive back from Japan the for- mer German properties, concessions, railways, port, mining, ma- ritime customs and other rights and privileges. Thus was writ= ten,apparently, the final chapter in a perilous controversy that had raged without cessation ever since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty which had confirmed Japan's claim to the former German rights in Shantung. Many time since the signing of the Treaty of VerSailles, Ja- pan had tried to approach China to negotiate on this dispute, but the Chinese Government had steadfastly refused to accept the demands which the Japanese Government made the condition of an "eventual return" of Shantung,. Meantime, Japanese military forces ruled the disputed peninsula with the Prussianized "mailed fist". This Washington Settlement had not been achieved without a struggle, for from the moment when the discussions opened on December 1, 1921, the difficulties of reaching an agreement were constantly in evidence. The terms on which Japan should handx over the Tsing-tau-Tsinanfu Railway to China constituted the chief barrier on which the negotiations threatened to be shatter- ed. Several times a deadlock was established, and Japan ulti-mately declared that she had gone to the fullest extent of her power of concession, The Japanese were willing to return the railway to the Chinese for a monetary consideration, There was no dispute over the price; the dispute was over only the time for payment and the right of the Japanese to representation in the management of the railway, a right the Chinese have conceded to nationals of other countries having interests in Chinese railways. This the Chinese refused to Japan, Instead, the Chinese offered Mh an outright purchase for cash, whereupon the Japanese retorted that they were willing to accept cash but insisted on representa tion in the management of the railway - to guarantee efficienoy On a line on which they depended for transportation of their products, they explained, This the Chinese refused, and the whole issue was narrowed to whether there would be on the rail- Way a Japanese associate chief traffic manager, associate chie accountant, and associate chief engineer. On such an issue the negotiations were deadlocked and the Conference even might be = < » wrecked for a time, for on it the Chinese were to withdraw e tirely. To most Americans, at this particular point, the Shantun g controversy must seemed to have degenerated into an undignified quibble, with obduracy on both sides as the only obstacle to settlement. So it did seem to the rest of the world. It seem= ed a ridiculously small issue to have consequences so great and the Chinese appeared unreasonable in forcing it to such consequen- ces, The Chinese were to get back their lost province, their sacred soil, and the Japanese were offering to quit it entirely, though they pleaded that the law was on their side in remaining, by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles, to which the majority ofthe Powers were signatories, And though the Japanese thus went nine-tenths of the way to reconciliation, the Chinese refused to come the other tenth to meet them, Appearances were against the Chinese; but there was more reason than one why the Chinese held firm in this phase of the negotiations, To an American business man shipping freight on the Tientsin- Pukow Railway, or to a Frenchman or a Russian, it is quite imma- terial that the traffic manager is British, To an American or Frenchman or Russian shipper it is equally immaterial that the Shanghai-Nanking Railway is under British mortgage and British management, In neither case does the American or Frenchman or Russian suffer unfavorable discrimination by reason of the Bri- tish element in the management. In neither case does a British business man get any advantage thereby; nor does the British Empire profit politically, economically thereby. In short, the British executives do not construe their positions as an oppor- tunity or obligation to serve any nationalistic interests. They are there solely to protect the rights of the investors. C Then, waiving the question of the moral right of Japan to be in Shantunge at all - if there were any basis for the assumption that a Japanese share in the management of the Shantung or the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu Railway would mean only what the British share means in the control of the two railways, one might say the Chinese were unreasonable in their uncompromising stand, But there was no ground for assumption that the Japanese would follow the British example, for all experience was exactly to the con- trary. There is the South Manchuria Railway - there Japanese control has meant Japanese political penetration throughout thewhole region; it has meant the forcing out of British, American, and other traders; it has meant discrimination and loss even to Chinese, From general manager to ticket collectors, every em= ployee is a national agent, construing his position as a duty to enforce discrimination against all that are not Japane oO iL ww @ For a more recent example, the Shantung Railway itse t- bety ¢ 18 @ os j clusive evidence, Since the eviction of the Germans it has been used as a political and economic weapon by the Japanese Government; it has meant an arm to the Japanese militarists. For three suc- cessive years the British Chambers of Commerce in China have sent united protests to their Government against discriminaticns suf= fered by British business men in China by the Japanese occupation cr t+" {2 of Tsing-tau and control of the railway. I the old story in the Far East; where the Japanese come, others must go, It must be clear to everybody that the Japanese might withdraw from Shantung and restored full sovereignty to China, and the pro- vince would still have remained Japanese if the Japanese hold the Tsing-tau-Tsinanfu Railway. "For in an undeveloped country who holds communication holds the country, "* In the light of the foregoing explanation it must also be clear that the Japanese might return the right of ownership in the rail= way to the Chinese and the railway would still have remained Japan- ive voices in its ma= G ese so long as the Japanese retained the deci nagement; and Shantung would still be a Japanese thorn in China's eace of the Orient. Thus the nego= 4 flesh and an obstacle to the tiation resolved itself into the question of the railway, and the railway into the question of its management. The Chinese could * Shantung and the Conference - by Nathaniel Peffernot yield on so dangerous a proposition, and thers was no compromise, Speaking of the goodwill of the Japanese in offering to quit the Shantung Province, Mr. Nathaniel Peffer made this characteristics re= mark;"One comes always back to the matter of confidence of faith in the Japanese. They may be never so Sincere now and never so desir~ ous of doing the fair thing in Shantung; but confidence cannot be built up in a day or on a promise, nor can distrust based on expe- rience be undone in a day or by a promise. barrier stands between China and Japan on. other issues than this, and will remain until Japan has given proof in works of a chan heart." At the Conference the Chinese delegates persisted in this refu- © Sal to negotiate, and Japan remained inflexible in her demands, so there seemed to be no hope of any settlement, The entire Conference itself was somewhat hampered by the situation. It was only through the intervention of Secretary Hughes, Chairman of the Conference, & and Mr, Balfour, head of the British delegation, that the Chinese and Japanese delegates, after securing the consent of their respec=- tive governments, consented to tackle the issue in separate nego- tiations outside the Conference, The result of these conversations &S re a cO a) be o 7 be = me Bude € y @ oO Ss ct | | c me oO 3 Fy ¢s i$ d which were opened on December 1l ly two months, was the Treaty signed on February 4th, 1922, ee ao ct © cr ry D> ma b ry cr a rs & ‘ @ ~~ op ¥ tac @ @ mM 6 Under the agreement finally reporte sion of the Conference, China is to pay to Japan 535,406,141 gold marks, —- the assessed value of the properties taken by the Japanese from the Germans during the War, plus the value of the improvements added by Japan, and making allowance for depreciation, Payment is to be made in Chinese treasury notes, and the instalments may bespread over fifteen years, China being given an option to payment within five years. Pending the redemption of the notes, a Japanese traffic manager and Japanese auditor are Banctioned by the Chinese Government; and staff of these two Japanese officials is t Chinese managing director, and the Japanes dually eliminated by substitution; China is al to appoint an assistant traffic manager of in two years and a half after the transfer ted. Japan pledged herself, furthermore, to & forces from Shantunge as soon as China would se ae | guard the railway and other territorties, a a ae 7 SG 4 il . . ~ ; reached on the following questions : > | a) Transfer of public properties and of * ? mi os i an » . . £ T —— wf Syr " The Government Of Japan undertaks cD C customs: to transfer t f) mii ita "9 mi tJ vary OOPS TO nt ¥ 2 EC tne Ywovern= ment of China all public properties, including land, buildings, works 2 = 3 d or establishments in the leased territory of Kiao-chau, m™/ . -_ ’ : whetner formerly possessed by the German Authorities or purchased or con- b structed by the Japanese Government during the Japanese ~ tion of the said territory." Section l,of Artioie II. " It is agreed that upon the coming into force of Treaty the Custom House of Tsing-tau shall be made an ij of the Chinese maritime customs." Section b) Disposition of the mines lying alon " The mines of Tsechuan, Fangtse and the mining rights were formerly granted by be handed to a company to be formed by a = Ae @ £ a Aw+ 4 ole Di de We Ww ay ra —* 5 Y iministra= for which » shallChinese Government, in which the Japanese capital may not exceed the amount of the Chinese capital, The mode and terms of such ar- rangement shall be determined by the Chinese and Sions which are to be appointed for that purpose and which shsz meet immediately upon the coming into force of the present agree=- ment." Article VII. c) Opening of the former German leased territory: " The Japanese Government declares that it has no intention of secking the establishment of an exclusive Japanese settlement or of an international settlement in Tsing-tau, The Chinese Government, on its part, declares that the entire area of the former German leased territory of Kiao-chau will be ope «D +e ea to foreign trade, and that foreigners will be permitted freely to reside and carry on commerce, industry, and other lawful pursuits within such Trea. n © Section 3, Article VIII. d) Purchase by China of the salt industry: " Whereas, the salt industry is a government monopoly in China, it is agreed that the interests of Japanese companies of Japanese nationals actually engaged in the said industry along the coast of Kiao=chau Bay are to be purchased by the Chinese Government on pay- ment of fair compensation —-" Articles IX, e) Return to China of the former German cables: " Japan declares that all the rights and titles and privileges concerning former German submarine cables between Tsing-tau and Chefoo, and between Tsing-tau and Shanghai, are vested in China -" Article X. f) Transfer to China of the wireless stations: " The Japanese wireless stations at Tsing-tau andwd \ - 8 - ai fi, 2 : Shall be transferred to China upon the withdrawal of 0 » ’ 7 the Japane: ud { bh ~ - ¥ la @ yrPradacenanr \ troops at these two places, respectively, with fair compensation ” for the value of these stations —" Article Xi, \} There were minor particulars ached t¢ 3 ft cr ct ) 2 the © cr MO @ article a) > The ceremony of signing this important ( ettlement on February 4th, 1962, took place in the presence of secretary H y . 4 saer hy o AM MA NULnASS Ati Mir 3 Balfour, and also of four Far Eastern experts, namely, John tT * Vas La THT Ty oe, rm m ithe i ° Lam son Macmurray and Edward Bell for the United States, and and F,A. Gwatkin for Great Britain, and lastly of a group of news=- paper men, The proceedings the delegates and other participants met at five o'clock, and the a p 4 Ww actual signing of the document occurred half an hour later, rhe two delegations, seated at oppogite sides of the table, Signed al-= ternately, and in the following order for each delegation: China - Dr. Sze, Dr. Wellington Koo, Dr. Wang; Japan - Baron Kato, Baron Shidehara, Mr. Hanihara, Thus ended one of the most serious and dangerous controversy in the Orient; a controversy which carried the potential germ of another world conflict.= = — — — — = =< in = — — so = = — — == ss ——~ — — aes eee — In closing, it would be of interest to the Americans to note the sentiments of the Japanese newspapers at the time this important Treaty was signed in Washington. " Of course much credit is due to the Washington Conference, which decided the fundamental principles of the retrocession of Shantunc.* voiced the Japanese editors of Tokio; but they flattered themselves na hi that after all the "speedy conclusion of negotiations is more sub- % stantially attributable to a great concession made by Japan re _ ) ating to the problem than to the sincerity of China," " Of course the Chinese delegates are sincere," rather grudgingly observed the Tokyo Chugai Chogyo,"for they realize that the settle ment of the problem will have a serious influence upon the abolition of extraterritoriality in China in the event that peace and ordar fail to be maintained in the Shantung Province =---- Japan's sinceri- ty throughout the negotiations reigned supreme. In fact, Japan's attitude is not only sincere but humiliating." From the same source I observed this; " Japan ate humble pie in the Shantung problem, more especially y in the withdrawal of her troops from Shantung. The lease of Kiao- ¢ chau and the Shantung Railway is not retroceded to China but is a- bandoned, All the efforts of Japan in Shantung have been sent to the devil through the humiliating attitude of the Japanese Govern- ment, but it is already a story of the bygone days, and we do not cry over spilt milk. The momentous problem that needs a pains- taking study at the present juncture is how to protect the Japaneseresidents in Shantung and along the Shantune Railway with large bu- a siness interests and investment, The life and property of twenty thousand Japanese residents will be exposed to danger and menace after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops," Concerning the port of Tsing-tau, one of the prominent Tokyo journals had this much to boast about; " It remains a question whether the Chinese police or soldiers can maintain peace and order, If the perfect guaranty of the Chinese authorities be obtained concerning the responsibility to be borne in connection with the maintenance of peace and order alon Shantung Railway, the evacuation of the Japanese troops will be made as quickly as possible. The administration of Tsing-tau as well as of the Shantung Railway will be transferred to the control of the Chinese Government authorities upon the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and the majority of the Japanese residents will at that time either return home or go to Manchuria. If such a state of things Occurs, Japan's trade with Tsing-tau will be divested of much of its present prosperity and Tsing=-tau itself will be destined to ruin -~ 4 “ @ after all, In carefu port promises to rise in ascendency with the present Shantung Rail- way extended to the hinterland and the proposed Hailan Railway con- structed to add much to the prosperity of the seaborne trade, O- pinions agree that Tsing-tau promises to become an entrepot ranking next to Shanghai in future and to occupy the largest commercial port in North China, overshadowing all other ports in existence. The fact that the Japanese make economic development at Tsing=tau with their foothold firmly established there will not only tend toly to the profit the government a for the ent tenance of the ea tO groan under t pathy with the Chi: crifices paid by ¢ Orient and in br chi, "remain to be by asserting tha "sllowed themselve by the Osaka Ma reflected favorab " About four yea ing Shantung were guide Japan's trad co ovt < ite ioe SCrVvVe isarce=- © - re ry pte 0) cS ry =, e 2. ee a concluded," ea te eye wre 4 s 4a (0&4, inm= & ,-o x 4 Ue - ) mh op wad iL ww & VW % abe ¥ Ww 7“? yy ~~" = y Me™ a +4 cy ry €D ~~ ~ mblie Pus w (% on on ao oe » VOnI erance F - fs 7 d ar cr? OigE wy e « & ry & Ve a a} §2 CO ) €0 oO ueViscount Makino, during the interval ole oetween 10 j This “2 h Ww,ir Oo Tat ry i . ‘}. » Japan and China, This cance e Chinese problem, the Shantung problem, has been just effectually oved beyond all possibility of fy y -_ + Ws recrudescencs, tors on both sides,""7 Wh /H or a Tae 1 5 > _ Thies ! _ ~~ 4 - aa ih] as ¥V Carow Wo son ana ay 4 rid et ie ement iT 7 Volume ik< r DP By I <= a) a Y 1 -—¢P y . Yo 7 i% mo — ‘a ie 4 : LW MAW caay > fa > ALIA vompany — A Ca Tracn TT ine VW 7 71 Qa j New York = 1922 ) 17 | ; re 4 4 f* : l-~ . 7 C ™ f C SS Aw T — ; Be The FQGA4 Vs isingtau SV JeirTerson Jones, ( Houghto ‘4fflin Company The River \ Ld : E> **+ ¥ by a wh he A de ioe VOMPany = a 44 aki y ww" . “7 +. s ee a4 4 Ww Cail ri Ape © - 1915 / 4 9 ar 3 ~ 2 * al ~4 ; i a ~~ a ' > Ci« fp". _ . “ = 9% MOG ern UNG + oy ' DY Sih =(UNne Ch Jh4 @ Nr i f Ylawrs A VPwrwaga vy : 1 1 €47 6 \ \ LVLaTrTenaon 450565 —- VALEIU © dod , i " #™ Tans D atinna af fiutea. & R a, os The Foreign Relations of China By Mingch "4 ze: TY T . ~ i eal TT os ie ( Fleming H. Revell Company - New York ‘4 January 4 WT J (I 3 Via C2 @ ty 2 4 ry © iF Ae 1051 i oy ap THO