STUDIES ON ETHNIC GROUPS IN CHINA
Stevan Harrell, EditorSTUDIES ON ETHNIC GROUPS IN CHINA
Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers
Edited by Stevan Harrell
Guest People:
Hakka Identity in China and Abroad
Edited by Nicole ConstableGUEST PEOPLE
Hakka Identity
in Chinn and Abroad
Edited by
NICOLE CONSTABLE
University of Washington Press
Seattle and LondonSTUDIES ON ETHNIC GROUPS IN CHINA
is supported in part by a grant
from the Henry Luce Foundation to the
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
of the University of Washington.
The publication of
Guest People: Hakka Identity in China, and Abroad
is supported in part by a grant from the
Henry M. Jackson Foundation.
Copyright © 1996 by the University of Washington Press
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
publisher.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Guest people : Hakka identity in China and abroad / edited by Nicole Constable,
p. cm.—(Studies on ethnic groups in China)
ISBN 0-295-97469-9 (alk. paper)
1. Hakka (Chinese people) I. Constable, Nicole. II. Series.
DS731.H3G83	1996	95-17857
951—dc20	CIP
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. °°TO THE HAKKA AMONG WHOM WE HAVE BEEN GUESTSContents
Introduction
What Dots It Mean to Be Hakka?
NICOLE CONSTABLE
3
1/ The Hakka or “Guest People”
Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeast China
M YRO N L . COHEN
36
2/ Hakka Villagers in a Hong Kong City
The Original People ofTsuen Wan
ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
80
3/ Poverty, Piety, and the Past
Hakka Christian Expressions of Hakka Identity
NICOLE CONSTABLE
98
4/ Form and Content in Hakka Malaysian Culture
SHARON A. CARSTENS
124
5/ Still “Guest People”
The Reproduction of Hakka Identity in Calcutta, India
ELLEN OXFELD
149
viiCONTENTS
6/ The Hakka Ethnic Movement in Taiwan, 1986-1991
HOWARD J. MARTIN
176
7/ The Hakka Paradox in the People’s Republic of China
Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence
MARY S. ERBAUGH
196
Glossary
232
References
235
Contributors
269
Index
271
viiiMaps
7.1. HAKKA LANGUAGE AREAS
2 0 0
7-2. SOVIET BASES
201
73. HAKKA COUNTRY AND 19 35 PROVINCIAL
BOUNDARIES
2 0 2
7.4. LONG MARCH ROUTES
203
IXNote on Romanization
Most of the Chinese terms in this volume have been romanized in
Mandarin pinyin with several exceptions: The terms Hakka (Mandarin:
Kejia) and Punti (Mandarin: Bendi) are written according to their most
familiar English spellings rather than in their less-common pinyin
forms. Place names outside the People’s Republic of China generally
follow local custom (e.g., Hong Kong, not Xianggang), and personal
names follow either individual or personal preferences or the standard
recognized spelling (e.g., Sun Yat-sen, not Sun Zhongshan). Unless
otherwise indicated, oral colloquial expressions are cited in the dialect in
which they were spoken. A glossary of Chinese characters appears at the
end of this volume.
xGUEST PEOPLE
Hakka Identity
in China and AbroadIntroduction
What Does It Mean to Be Hakka?
NICOLE CONSTABLE
The term Hakka, which literally means “guest people” or “strangers,” is
the name of a Chinese ethnic group whose ancestors, like those of all
Han Chinese, are believed to have originated in north central China.
Estimated to number in the tens of millions today, Hakka now reside
mainly in Southeast China, Taiwan, and regions of Southeast Asia, but
the Hakka diaspora extends to virtually every continent in the world.
The main question we pose in this volume—“What does it mean to
be Hakka?”—may appear deceptively simple. The easy answer—which
has been accepted and even preferred by many scholars who have
worked in Hakka communities—is that Hakka are simply those who
call themselves Hakka or who are so labeled by others. While we agree
that this is an important starting point, it has too often been assumed
that to merely “know” that a person, a community, or a custom is
Hakka is sufficient. As we argue in the course of this volume, this is not
enough. We need to examine the cultural and historical construction of
Hakka identity, and its social, political, and economic relevance in differ-
ent locales and particular contexts.
The number of English-language anthropological works based on
field research in Hakka communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and in
other regions has gready increased during the past two decades, but most
of this literature does not pose questions pertaining to Hakka identity.
Important and interesting though such studies of the Hakka may be for
their contributions to sinology and anthropology (e.g., Myron L. Cohen
1976, Pasternak 1972, Strauch 1984), the fact that the subjects of the study
are Hakka as opposed to members of other ethnic or dialect groups has
not been considered of great importance. Although there are some impor-
tant exceptions (cf. Blake 1981, Myron L. Cohen 1968, and Lamley 1981),1
1.	This includes the majority of the very interesting papers that were presented at the
first International Conference on Hakkaology, held at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, September 24-26,1992.
3NICOLE CONSTABLE
Hakka has generally been treated as an essential, unchanging, unprob-
lematic label—a given or objective truth, rather than a topic for analysis
in and of itself. Thus scholars of Hakka language, religion, or community
structure, for example, have been less concerned with the Hakka factor of
the equation than with the topic in question. They largely gloss over or
ignore the question of who exactly the Hakka are, and what Hakka means
in different contexts.
In the chapters that follow, Hakka ethnicity is not treated as a given.
In our attempt to develop a more complex understanding of Hakka
identity, we do not neglect issues of who is labeled Hakka, or of Hakka
self-ascription. These issues have long been acknowledged to be of
central importance to the study of ethnicity. Nor do we avoid popular
notions and generalizations about Hakka origins and history. These,
however, we take as starting points in an attempt to separate objective
Hakka history and experience from the more localized constructions
and expressions of Hakka identity.
The contributors to this volume have also been influenced by the
growing number of anthropological works on the cultural and historical
construction of identity that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g., Blu
1980, Comaroff and Comaroff 1992, Daniel 1984, Kondo 1990, Michelle
Rosaldo 1980, Eric Wolf 1982), as well as those that emphasize both the
experiential side and the symbolic expressions of various types of identi-
ties (e.g., Alter 1992, Behar 1993, Lavie 1990, Renato Rosaldo 1986,
Turner and Bruner 1986). In this volume we collectively describe the
diverse histories of Hakka communities, the way Hakka identity is
culturally constructed and symbolically expressed in different contexts,
and the sociological significance Hakka identity takes on in each setting.
It is not enough to speak of a monolithic Hakka identity. The Hakka
diaspora reaches well beyond the geographic borders of mainland
China. Although their estimates are judged as high, members of various
international Hakka associations claim that there are as many as seventy-
five million Hakka worldwide today, with thirty to thirty-five million
residing outside mainland China.2 Since the seventeenth century, and
particularly during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Hakka who
came mainly from Guangdong agricultural communities emigrated to
Taiwan, Malaya, and other regions of Southeast Asia, and as far as
South Asia, Africa, Oceania, Europe, the Caribbean, and North and
2.	Many scholars consider these estimates, particularly the ones for Hakka outside the
mainland, excessively high. For further estimates, see Erbaugh (this volume).
4INTRODUCTION
South America. Hakka emigrated for a number of reasons, but their
motives were mostly economic and, in some cases, political? They often
worked as manual laborers, taking up opportunities created by capitalist
and colonial expansion. They built railways, labored in mines or planta-
tions, worked as farmers, or set up small businesses. The descendants of
these early Hakka immigrants speak different languages, eat different
foods, and belong to different economic classes and political parties, yet
they may retain the name Hakka and identify themselves as such.
In and of itself, this cultural diversity does not create a significant
problem for anthropologists, whose models have long rejected the naive
equation of an ethnic group as a cultural unit.3 4 But this does raise the
practical and theoretical question of what these Hakka share with one
another, with those who still reside on the mainland, and those who
have emigrated in recent years, besides the label Hakka.
As we see in this volume, Hakka identity is of widely varied political,
economic, social, and personal significance. Its relevance varies depend-
ing on time and place. The settlers of the Hakka communities we exam-
ine left mainland China at different times—as early as the seventeenth
century and as recently as the twentieth—and Hakka now live in ex-
tremely diverse situations. But Hakka communities are not so endlessly
varied and infinitely distinct from one another that they preclude any
useful analysis. The communities we describe in this volume are dis-
tinct, but they share historical origins in South China. Moreover, they
share certain ethnic processes that are of more generalizable signifi-
cance. We do not, in other words, simply accept the Hakka claim that
Hakka all share an innate bond, nor do we acquiesce to the postmodern
dilemma that there appear to be such infinite subjectivities of Hakka
identity that they defy wider social or cultural patterning. As John
Comaroff and Jean Comaroff have argued for anthropology in general,
“If our models are supple enough, they should make sense of even the
most chaotic and shifting social environment. . . . Absence and discon-
nection, incoherence and disorder, have actually to be demonstrated”
3.	Following the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), for example, many Hakka—including
those who were not involved in the uprising—fled South China for fear of political
persecution. At about the same time, and following the Hakka-Punti Wars (1850-67) and
the turmoil of the late nineteenth century, members of many Hakka Christian congrega-
tions are also known to have fled to Hong Kong, North Borneo, and elsewhere in order
to escape religious and ethnic oppression (see Constable 1994:37).
4.	See Bentley (1983:2-3) for a critique of the equation of social groups with culture
emits.
5NICOLE CONSTABLE
(1992:24). Our challenge is to make sense of shifting Hakka collective
identities, their similarities, apparent discontinuities, and divergences.
A central question that this volume raises is the extent to which
common mainland cultural origins—not to say Hakka identity—
explain the similarities we find among Hakka communities, or whether
some of the patterns we witness arise from more general processes of
social change or ethnic interaction in the new setting. We need to
account for the common stereotypes found in many of our cases regard-
ing, for example, hardworking Hakka women, political patriotism, co-
operativeness, and agricultural or working-class occupations, and we
also need to question the extent to which these ideological patterns are
reflected in social reality. In the diverse ethnic contexts in which Hakka
now reside, they may be recast in a subordinate social and economic
position or find themselves in different situations of hierarchy or in-
equality. These may replicate, to some extent, earlier ethnic hierarchies
from mainland China, or they may be quite distinct. Thus one question
we raise relates to the connection between Hakka ethnic consciousness
and class or other systems of inequality.
Because many of our observations regarding the Hakka contribute to
understanding ethnicity and ethnic processes in general, I have found it
particularly useful, throughout this introduction, to refer to some of the
general propositions and patterns regarding ethnicity described by
Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:49—67). In general, the contributions to
this volume support the Comaroffs’ view that ethnicity is the product of
historical processes but is not primordial; that ethnicity is not “a unitary
‘thing,’ ” but it “describes a set of relations and a mode of conscious-
ness” (1992:54); that ethnicity originates in systems of political and
economic inequality; and that ethnicity “tends to take on the ‘natural’
appearance of an autonomous force, a ‘principle’ capable of determining
the course of social life” (ibid.:6o). Our cases also clearly illustrate the
way ethnicity “may be perpetuated by factors quite different from those
that caused its emergence, and may have a direct and independent
impact on the context in which it arose” (ibid.:61).
Whereas Comaroff and Comaroff draw mainly on examples from
Africa, the Hakka cases in this volume support and further illustrate
many of their points. The social patterns we observe in Hakka communi-
ties generally have more to do with the wider ethnic processes and
sociological patterns of which they are a part than with the “fact” that
they are Hakka. On the other hand, some of the cultural patterns upon
6INTRODUCTION
which the idea of social differences is inscribed appear to be more
uniquely Hakka, despite differences in the social contexts in which they
occur.
HISTORY AND THE EMERGENCE OF HAKKA CONSCIOUSNESS
One answer to our central question, as many Hakka are likely to sug-
gest, and the contributors to this volume would agree, lies in Hakka
history. Hakka are not only those who define themselves or are so
labeled by others; they are those of whom it can be said that their
ancestors shared a real or imagined history. There are two types of
history in which we are interested in this volume. One is the collective
history that Hakka believe they share, and that is often the most basic
theme in the rhetoric about what it means to be Hakka. The second
refers to the particular historical forces out of which Hakka ethnicity first
emerged. These forces may have since caused Hakka ethnicity to dimin-
ish, to be perpetuated, or, possibly, to become a potent force in its own
right. These two histories are not necessarily the same, but they may
overlap.
The first history is fairly easy to collect or solicit from Hakka infor-
mants, and because it is simply a subjective point of view, we need not
necessarily be concerned with its accuracy or “factual basis,” or with
reducing it to one authoritative version. Its importance is primarily in the
belief by Hakka themselves that it is true and based on fact. As such, it can
take on a special power in the mobilization of ethnicity as a social force.
This type of history is reflected in the quotations from my own infor-
mants and those cited by Ellen Oxfeld, in Howard Martin’s citations
from spokespersons in the Taiwan Hakka movement, and in Sharon
Carstens’s translations from Hakka association (huiguari) volumes.
The second kind of history, which, as Myron Cohen, Mary Erbaugh,
and other authors illustrate, may be derived in part from the first, is far
more difficult to critically and accurately ascertain. It involves an at-
tempt to identify the historical forces through which Hakka ethnicity is
constructed. Through this type of history, as Comaroff and Comaroff
propose, our objective is “to show as cogently as possible . . . how
realities become real, how essences become essential, how materialities
materialize” (1992:20). This second kind of history is, of course, like the
first, a mental construct claiming a basis in fact. But it is perhaps best
described as a “second order” construction of history, one that attempts
7NICOLE CONSTABLE
to explain how the first view of history came about, and one that aspires
to be more consciously critical and analytical. As Comaroff and Coma-
roff suggest, it requires a “historical imagination.”5
The idea that history provides the key to ethnic identity is not new
(cf. Keyes 1976,1981:5). But when Charles Keyes discusses ethnicity as a
“cultural interpretation of descent,” as a kind of descent writ large, this
glosses over significant distinctions between ethnic and totemic groups
who also share a collective identity. As Comaroff and Comaroff explain,
while totemism emerges with the establishment of symmetrical
relations between structurally similar social groupings—group-
ings which may or may not come to be integrated into one
political community—ethnicity has its origins in the asymmet-
ric incorporation of structurally dissimilar groupings into a sin-
gle political economy. (1992:5+)
The asymmetric or unequal relations between ethnic groups is of central
importance, as it is from an awareness of inequality, not merely cultural
difference, that ethnic consciousness develops. “The emergence of ethnic
groups and the awakening of ethnic consciousness are . . . the product of
historical processes which structure relations of inequality between dis-
crete social entities” (ibid. :$5). The inequality between groups comes to
be viewed, at least by those who belong to the group in a superior
position, as justified by the ascribed, intrinsic character of each group.
Thus Cantonese and Hokkien have accused Hakka of being uncivilized
barbarians, while each of these groups claims to be “more Chinese than
the other” (Blake 1981:4), and “Hakka, in turn, view the Cantonese and
Hokkien ... as descendants of aboriginal barbarians” (ibid. :5).
Assertion of the importance of history should not be mistaken to
mean that ethnicity is merely a function of primordial ties. As the
Comaroffs have written, “Contrary to the tendency, in the Weberian
tradition, to view it as a function of primordial ties, ethnicity always has
its genesis in specific historical forces, forces which are simultaneously
structural and cultural” (1992:50). As they go on to explain, “It is the
marking of relations—of identities in opposition to one another—that
is ‘primordial,’ not the substance of those identities” (ibid. :5i). Many
5.	This is not to say that the first kind of history cannot influence social change as well.
See Comaroff and Comaroff (1992:3-48) for their detailed discussion of the importance of
history to what they call “neomodem” anthropology.
8INTRODUCTION
Hakka themselves, of course, present Hakka identity as primordial,
factual and essential—it did not emerge, it persisted. Many scholars
share this view. However, this Hakka history, which begins centuries
ago, in time immemorial, paradoxically predates the existence of the
name Hakka, of Hakka ethnicity, and the existence of the Hakka as a
social group distinct from other Chinese. It should thus be clear that
this history was not experienced at the time as Hakka history, regardless
of later Hakka sentiments, because Hakka had not yet emerged as an
ethnic group. And, significantly, this history is in many ways indistin-
guishable from Chinese history in general. Nonetheless, this history has
been claimed as their own by many Hakka and provides the ideological
basis for the notion of a universal, shared Hakka identity (see Constable
1994:20-58).
Versions of both histories converge momentarily with the widespread
belief that Hakka are the descendants of Han Chinese people who
migrated southward from north central China before the fourth century
c.E., and who, by the fourteenth century or so, had setded in China’s
southeastern provinces (see Cohen, this volume). From there they
spread farther south and overseas to several of the communities de-
scribed in this volume). As discussed below, the particular dates and
stages of migration have been a topic of debate (cf., Myron L. Cohen
1968, Constable 1994, Hsieh 1929, Kiang 1991, S. T. Leong 1985, Lo Wan
1965, Luo Xianglin 1953, Moser 1985, Jerry Norman 1988, Ramsey 1987),
but it is well accepted that the main body of those who later became
Hakka migrated from north central China.
Han Suyin, herself descended from Hakka ancestors, colorfully de-
scribes in her autobiographical family history how Hakka fled south-
ward to escape the advance of Chinggis Khan and the Mongol invasion
during the thirteenth century:
The Hakkas were driven further south, or to mountainous poor
areas. . . . Because of their mobility, hardihood and fierceness,
the dynasties began to regard the Hakkas as potential pioneers,
good for resettling the sub-populated areas. . . . Circumstance
thus defined their group character: clannish, thrifty, loyal to
each other, bad neighbours and ready fighters, the name Hakka
stuck to them and they became proud of it. (1965:24)
Like Han Suyin, many Hakka writers associate Hakka “character” with
their historical experiences, and here again the history with which
9NICOLE CONSTABLE
Hakka define themselves—in the form of character and qualities—may
be separated from the actual forces that created the identity itself. Hakka
historian Hsieh T’ing-yu explains:
The character of the Hakkas is shown quite clearly in their name
and history. They are a strong, hardy, energetic, fearless race
with simple habits but a very contentious and litigious disposi-
tion. Self-reliant and active, their rapid expansion and fondness
of property have often brought them into conflict with their
neighbors. . . . The Hakkas are proud of the literary accomplish-
ments of their ancestors; they claim many well-known lite-
rati. . . . The Hakkas are a “people of the future,” unhampered
by the prejudices or the easy-going slackness of the old land
owners. . . . Fundamentally the Hakka is a farmer, forced by
poverty to struggle with the unproductive soil. . . . They usually
occupy the hilly and less fertile districts, while the Punti [earlier
Chinese inhabitants]6 remain in possession of the fertile deltas
and plains. . . . The sexes are not so strictly separated in domes-
tic life as in the case with some of the other Chinese. The
women folk are strong and energetic, and have never adopted
foot-binding as a custom. (Hsieh I929I2O3-5)7
These quotations illustrate how ideas about Hakka history permeate a
Hakka self-image. As passages from James Michener’s historical novel
Hawaii illustrate, popular images of the Hakka hard work and industri-
ousness are not found exclusively in Hakka texts and Hakka association
publications.
6.	Punti (Mandarin: Bendi) are the earliest Han Chinese inhabitants of a region. This
term is often translated as “natives” or “indigenous” inhabitants. Even though there may in
fact have been earlier non-Han inhabitants in a particular region, they are not usually
referred to as Punti. In Guangdong the Punti are Yue (Cantonese speakers); in Fujian they
are Min (Hokkien). In both cases this distinguishes the Chinese who were already settled in
the area from Hakka and other later arrivals. In Hong Kong Punti are legally classified as
those who resided in the New Territories before 1898; thus, members of a number of older
Hakka lineages are classified as Punti. In Hong Kong, in certain contexts, the term Punti
may be used to refer to Cantonese natives. As Elizabeth Johnson (this volume) describes,
Hakka who are descended from those who were resident in Hong Kong before 1898 may
distinguish themselves as benturen (also meaning “indigenous people”).
7.	For a revised and slightly modified version of this article, which was one of Hsieh’s
bachelor’s degree requirements at Yenching University, see Char and Kwok (1969), which
includes a collection of Hakka mountain songs.
IOINTRODUCTION
In one scene of the book, set many generations ago, a Cantonese man
named Uncle Chun Fat is helping the American Dr. Whipple recruit
Chinese laborers to work on a Hawaiian sugar plantation. Chun Fat
wants to enlist Punti laborers from his natal village, but Dr. Whipple
will agree only to an arrangement in which half of the men are Hakka.
Chun Fat wonders how Whipple has heard about the Hakka and asks:
“Why you want Hakka? No good Hakka.” Dr. Whipple looked
him sternly in the eye, and his forty years of trading for J & W
fortified his judgement. ‘We have heard,” he said slowly, “that
Hakka are fine workmen. We know that the Punti are clever, for
we have many in Hawaii. But Hakka can work. . . .” Chun Fat
began cautiously, “Maybe Hakka work well but too much
fight.” (1959 397)
Dr. Whipple and Chun Fat then proceed to climb from Low Village,
the Punti village, to High Village, where the Hakka reside. The climb to
High Village is strenuous, but as Dr. Whipple approaches, he experi-
ences a feeling of identification with the Hakka.
Whipple looked about him as if he had come upon familiar
terrain and thought: “The climb was worth it. This feels like a
New England Village. I’m home again, in China.” The feeling
was intensified when strong, sullen and suspicious Hakka began
cautiously gathering about him, and he could see in their conser-
vative faces portraits in yellow of his own ancestors. (1959:39s)8
The particular historical forces out of which Hakka ethnic conscious-
ness emerged, and the period during which Hakka ethnicity was gener-
ated are debated. If we accept the proposition that ethnicity involves
“subjective classification, by the members of a society, of the world into
social entities according to cultural differences” and “the stereotypic as-
signment of these groupings—often hierarchically—to niches within the
social division of labor” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:52) or, as Fredrik
Barth (1969) proposed, that ethnicity requires at least two groups in
8.	Swiss missionaries who worked in Hakka regions of Guangdong in the early twenti-
eth century described to me the same feeling of being “back home” in that mountainous
region of China, which was similar to the Alps. They also spoke of the honest,
hardworking, rugged Hakka who reminded them of pious European villagers.
IINICOLE CONSTABLE
competition over resources, then Hakka identity could not have emerged
earlier than the seventeenth century. It was at that time, S. T. Leong
asserts, that Hakka came into contact with other Chinese, who were
culturally distinct and with whom they competed for resources (1980:14).
When the ancestors of the present-day Hakka arrived in South China,
their language and some of their customs distinguished them from
other Chinese whom they encountered. In this new environment the
Cantonese label Hakka (Mandarin: Kejia) which, as mentioned above,
translates literally as “guest people” or “stranger families,” or less liter-
ally as “newcomers” or “settlers,” may have first served as a way to
differentiate in population registers the newcomers from the local inhab-
itants (S. T. Leong 1980). Hakka ethnic affiliation is thus likely to have
originated from an attribution of ethnic identity to them by other
Chinese. But the term Hakka has since become accepted by the people
themselves as a group or ethnic label, as “an emblem of common pre-
dicament and interest” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:53).9
Exactly when and where Hakka cultural differences coalesced into an
expression of social group differences is difficult to say. It is clear, how-
ever, that a conscious, collective group identity did not form in all regions
where Hakka speakers existed, and its relevance clearly shifted in the
different regions to which Hakka populations emigrated.10 As one Hong
Kong Hakka man explained to me, it was not until he left Meixian
(known as Jiaying or Kaying until this century), the region of eastern
Guangdong where he grew up, and came to Hong Kong in the 1920s,
that he realized that he was Hakka. Back home, he explained, everyone
was Hakka, so he never really thought about it. In some regions of
Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, Hakka speakers worked as tenants or
farmed and settled in the less fertile, hilly regions, while the Punti among
whom they lived maintained their hold on the more fertile plains. In these
new social situations, Hakka and Punti gradually became integrated into
a single political economy (see Cohen, this volume).
As was mentioned above, the date of the emergence of a Hakka ethnic
consciousness—as opposed to their existence as a cultural category of
9.	Unlike other Chinese, such as the Cantonese, Chaozhou (Teochew), and Shang-
hainese, whose identities and languages correspond to the name of their place of origin,
the Hakka, whose place of origin is a topic of debate, generally accept the label Hakka
(S. T. Leong 1980).
10.	Hakka consciousness and Hakka-Punti conflicts in areas of Guangxi where the
Society of God Worshipers (Bai Shangdi Hui) first made inroads are discussed by Kuhn
(1977); see also Constable (1994: chap. 2).
12INTRODUCTION
people or a dialect group—has been widely debated. But certainly before
the nineteenth century Punti rhetoric about the Hakka bears “the asser-
tive stamp of protectionist ideology; a legitimation of [their own] con-
trol over economy and society. Concomitantly, it involves the negation of
similar entitlements to others, often on putative cultural or ‘civilizational’
grounds, and may call into doubt their shared humanity” (Comaroff and
Comaroff 1992:52).
Punti exhibited their protectionism, for example, in their attempts to
prevent Hakka from participating in the Chinese civil service examina-
tions, thus attempting to prevent them from achieving positions of
authority in the government hierarchy (Lo Wan 1965:95—96, 113). As
early as 1789 a separate examination quota was set up in certain parts of
Guangdong in order to reduce the competition and the conflicts “be-
tween the minority groups and the rest of the population” (Chang
Chung-li 1955:81; see also Lamley 1990, S. T. Leong 1985).
By the early nineteenth century Hakka rhetoric had begun to reflect a
strong and growing ethnic consciousness. Hakka asserted their own
legitimacy and espoused their views of exclusive Hakka history (S. T.
Leong 1985:302-307). Of course, unlike the Punti, they attempted not
to protect their position, but to improve it. By the end of the nineteenth
century Hakka consciousness had blossomed, and there is little doubt
that for many Hakka—especially those living in ethnically mixed or
urban areas—ethnic identity had assumed both “experiential” and “prac-
tical salience” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:53).
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, due to the local wars
between the Hakka and Punti in Guangdong and Guangxi, and the
prominent Hakka involvement in the Taiping Rebellion, Hakka drew
the attention of foreign scholars, missionaries, travelers, and writers.
Many of these writers were influenced by Hakka converts or informants
they encountered, or by Hakka written sources, which flourished by the
beginning of the twentieth century and exuded Hakka pride (see esp.
Hsieh 1929, Luo Xianglin 1933). Still other Europeans echoed the state-
ments of non-Hakka Chinese informants who doubted that the Hakka
were “true Chinese.” They often cast the Hakka as even more “strange
and exotic” than other Chinese, suggesting that they were “backward”
or “primitive” like the mountainous “hill tribes” of South China."
11.	Regardless of their particular bent—whether they viewed Hakka as more or less
Chinese than others they encountered—Western sources nonetheless projected what Ed-
ward Said (1979) has described as an Orientalist discourse on the subject.
NICOLE CONSTABLE
In the early twentieth century a number of English-language publica-
tions contributed to the competing version of Hakka history, which
suggested that Hakka were “less Chinese” than other groups in South
China. The Encyclopedia of Missions, for example, described the Hakka
as a “peculiar race or tribe, inhabiting the mountains near Canton and
Swatow, who are a lower social rank than the local Chinese” (cited in
Campbell 1912:474). The 1920 edition of Geography of the World, a text
book by Roger D. Wolcott published by the Commercial Press of
Shanghai, also suggested that Hakka were a “backward people” (Hsieh
1929:207). Wolcott’s views of the Hakka were derived from the work
of Timothy Richard, a nineteenth-century Welsh missionary who
wrote Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire (S. T. Leong
1985:311). As Hsieh explains, Wolcott’s entry on the Hakka was trans-
lated in “Kaying [Jiaying] Magazine,” a local Hakka publication, and
the statement that the Hakka were “a wild and backward people” set
off extensive protests from Hakka organizations around the world
(1929:20). Thus European historical texts influenced the process of
history, and generated social action in the form of a mass meeting of
Hakka concerned about their identity. The conference was held in 1921
in Guangzhou (Canton) and included over a thousand representatives
from five provinces. Resolutions were passed and Wolcott was forced
to retract his inflammatory statement (ibid.). Yet as late as 1945 the
Encyclopedia Britannica still reported that the Hakka might not be
“true Chinese,” but might instead “be related to the Burmese and
Siamese” (Moser 1985:236).
As was mentioned above, this theory has been repeatedly criticized in
the work of Chinese and non-Chinese scholars, as well as many Euro-
pean missionaries, who draw primarily from genealogies and local histo-
ries to document Hakka origins and migrations from north central
China (e.g., Eitel 1873-74, Hsieh 1929, Luo Xianglin 1933, Piton 1873-
74. See also Cohen, this volume, for an outline of these migrations).
Linguistic evidence, although not in agreement about the exact time of
“proto-Hakka” migrations, supports the claim that Hakka language has
some unmistakably northern features (cf. Hashimoto 1973, Moser 1985,
Jerry Norman 1988, Ramsey 1987, Sagart 1982, Paul S. J. Yang 1967).
Jerry Norman classifies Hakka language as part of the “southern group”
of Chinese languages, which have existed since the first to third centu-
ries c.E. (1988:222). But rather than refuting the idea of northern ori-
gins, this only suggests an even earlier period of migration than Luo
Xianglin’s (1933) earliest wave (during the fourth century)—one more
14INTRODUCTION
compatible with Hsieh’s (1929) scheme of classification (see also Cohen,
this volume).
In keeping with these views of northern origins, Hakka often identify
themselves, and are officially counted in the People’s Republic of China,
as Han rcn (Han persons), descendants of the Han dynasty (206 b.c.e.
—220 c.E. ), members of the ethnic Chinese majority (see David Yen-ho
Wu 1991). More to the point however, is that the Hakka are undoubt-
edly as Chinese as the Cantonese and Fujianese, who also developed
from northern Chinese populations. Like these other groups, Hakka are
likely to have mixed to some extent—both genetically and culturally—
with other southern non-Chinese populations with whom they came
into contact and, like these groups, they continue to assert their identity
as preeminently Chinese (Blake 1981:4-5; Kiang 1991; Carstens, Consta-
ble, and Oxfeld, this volume).
But despite the academic and anecdotal arguments to the contrary,
the idea that the Hakka might not be “pure” Chinese has persisted in
some quarters, particularly in situations where ethnicity is viewed as the
vehicle through which power struggles are expressed or articulated.12
This is not surprising when we consider how ethnicity is related to
power. As we shall see, although Hakka ethnicity arose out of the
group’s subordinate position within the Chinese economic and social
structure during and perhaps earlier than the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, in many of the cases we discuss occupations or class differ-
ences no longer break down along ethnic lines. Hakka ethnicity no
longer strictly corresponds to economic or class differences. Neverthe-
less, derogatory images of Hakka, which were generated during times
of greater conflict and competition, may persist and produce an ideol-
ogy of class hierarchy.
CASE STUDIES AND APPROACHES
The contributors to this volume address the question “What does it
mean to be Hakka?” from a number of theoretical vantage points and in
a variety of sociocultural, political, geographical, and historical con-
texts. Some are more concerned with meaning and interpretation, and
others with history and social organization. Yet all deal with issues of
12.	A belief in the persistence of these ideas exists in and around Shung Him Tong, in
the New Territories of Hong Kong, but not in Kwan Mun Hau (see Johnson and
Constable, this volume; Blake 1981).
15NICOLE CONSTABLE
power (symbolic or more explicitly political) and with the historical and
situational relevance of Hakka identity, and all would agree that Hakka
identity, as with any ethnic label, ought not to be treated as an essential
permanent or unchanging category, although it may present itself as
such. One contributor (Mary Erbaugh) is a linguist and the other six are
anthropologists who have conducted intensive field research within
Hakka communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, India, and the
People’s Republic of China.
Myron Cohen’s chapter was originally written in 1963 and published
in 1968. It is presented here, three decades later, for several reasons: to
make this landmark study more widely available to sinologists, China
anthropologists, and Hakka scholars in particular; to provide important
contextual and background material for the rest of the volume; and for
the sake of its subtle contribution to intellectual history and the history
of anthropological thought.
Although the overall picture Cohen presents is still widely accepted,
the article may in some ways seem outdated. It was written in the more
“objective” and “factual” mode of the time, which did not question an ob-
jective existence of group identity. Dialect, for example, is treated by Co-
hen as a given, not as constructed. The original article also predates G.
William Skinner’s influential work on locality and marketing regions
(1964), and since it was written, more information regarding Hakka migra-
tions has become available (notably S. T. Leong 1980,1985; Lo Wan 1965).
Cohen’s article is nonetheless still a very significant piece. It provides
useful historical and sociological background material—both for the
study of the Hakka in general and for the chapters in this volume—
focusing primarily on the Hakka in Southeast China during the nine-
teenth century. Most important, perhaps, is how it documents the emer-
gence of dialect as a sociocultural variable, one that went beyond the
social categories of kin, class, or locality, and that provided the basis for
social alliance and social action. In many ways this article demonstrates
the instrumental and political use of Hakka identity in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. Although Cohen wisely avoids reference
to the Hakka as a self-conscious ethnic group, the material he presents
can be used as a clear example of what is referred to as the instrumen-
talist or circumstantialist approach to ethnicity, which was characterized
by the work of Abner Cohen (1969, 1974) and Fredrik Barth (1969)-13
13.	See also Bentley (1981, 1983, 1987, 1991) and Keyes (1976, 1981) for discussions of
various approaches to the study of ethnicity.
16INTRODUCTION
Cohen demonstrates how nineteenth-century conflicts and collective
action aligned with Hakka/Punti dialect differences, thus illustrating
one part of the process by which Hakka identity became the basis for
motivating collective action.
Elizabeth Johnson focuses in her chapter on the Hakka identity of the
people of Kwan Mun Hau, in the New Territories of Hong Kong. At
the turn of this century Kwan Mun Hau was a two-surname village
located in a relatively isolated region comprised of twenty Hakka-
speaking rural villages. It has since become incorporated into the largely
Cantonese-speaking industrial city of Tsuen Wan. Johnson asks what it
means to be Hakka for people whose ancestors settled in the New
Territories during the eighteenth century, and who are officially ac-
knowledged by the Hong Kong government to be Punti—original
inhabitants of the area and acknowledged as an “indigenous” New
Territories population. Kwan Mun Hau people, however, refer to them-
selves as benturen (indigenous), and reserve the use of the term Punti
for the Cantonese-speaking indigenous population.
As Johnson explains, Hakka identity is not perceived as being particu-
larly important in Kwan Mun Hau, nor does it take the same form as in
other cases described in this volume. Unlike the Calcutta Hakka de-
scribed by Oxfeld, the Kwan Mun Hau Hakka do not consider them-
selves “still guests.” Unlike the perception of the people of Shung Him
Tong, which I describe in chapter three, Kwan Mun Hau people are not
defensive of their Hakka identity, nor do they consider it stigmatized, or
something they must preserve. Moreover, Hakka identity in Kwan Mun
Hau is not the basis for political action, as is the case in Taiwan (see
Martin, this volume).
The form Hakka identity takes in Kwan Mun Hau can be explained
by the historical background, social organization, and political context
of Tsuen Wan. For the people of Kwan Mun Hau, Hakka identity is of
far less importance than their status as Punti or, as they would specify,
benturen, or as Tsuen Wan people. They derive economic and political
benefits from both their Punti and Tsuen Wan identities, but not from
being Hakka. Yet despite a decline in the use of Hakka language in the
Kwan Mun Hau region, and despite the fact that many of their purport-
edly Hakka practices have disappeared, there is still some sense in which
people identify themselves as Hakka and consider themselves culturally
distinct from other dialect groups around them. As Johnson illustrates,
Hakka identity is expressed mainly through private and domestic ritu-
als. But overall, for the people of Kwan Mun Hau, being Hakka is
17NICOLE CONSTABLE
“neither a matter of shame nor pride, but simply one aspect of their
being, acknowledged, but not asserted” (Johnson, this volume).
My own chapter is also based on fieldwork in Hong Kong, but the
people among whom I conducted research belong to a community very
different from that described by Johnson. On the whole, the people of
Shung Him Tong (a village in the northeastern New Territories
founded after the turn of this century by Hakka Christians) have a much
stronger sense of Hakka identity than do the people of Kwan Mun Hau.
Unlike Kwan Mun Hau, which was established in a predominantly
Hakka region, Shung Him Tong settlers arrived in an area dominated
by a powerful Cantonese lineage.
I describe how ideas about Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong are
expressed verbally and symbolically, through gender roles and the con-
struction of a Hakka Christian cemetery. In contrast to the people of
Kwan Mun Hau, the people of Shung Him Tong are in a sense doubly
stigmatized by their Hakka and Christian identities. Unable to escape
Hakka identity in the narrow confines of the local rural face-to-face
community in which they live, they have chosen to interpret it in a
positive light, and in a way that is compatible with their Christianity.
Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong is maintained not because of the
way it is tied to earlier economic or political struggles between Hakka
and Cantonese, or because of any particular class structure, but because
of Christianity. Christianity has influenced Hakka identity in at least
three important ways: it created a social context in which Hakka iden-
tity was considered important, it provided a reason to perpetuate Hakka
identity, and it influenced the form Hakka identity could take. Most
important, perhaps, is that within the context of Shung Him Tong,
asserting Hakka identity became a way for people to link their Chinese
and Christian identities, and to claim that they could be both. In Shung
Him Tong, as in Taiwan and Calcutta, we find that Hakka ethnicity is
“perpetuated by factors quite different from those that caused its emer-
gence” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:61).
Sharon Carstens’s chapter is based in part on her fieldwork in the
Hakka Chinese community of Pulai in Malaysia. For most of her discus-
sion, however, Carstens casts her net further afield so as to analyze the
connection between social and cultural patterns found among Hakka in
Malaysia and Hakka patterns that existed centuries ago in China. Pulai
villagers, like many Hakka Malaysians, are descendants mainly of Hakka
men who emigrated to Malaysia during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in search of gold and who, largely unsuccessful in their at-
18INTRODUCTION
tempts, turned instead to subsistence rice farming. Among Pulai Hakka
in Malaysia, Hakka identity seems secondary and of far less significance
than a broader Chinese identity, which stands in juxtaposition to ethnic
Malays.
Carstens asks whether, despite the apparent lack of concern for Hakka
identity and culture among most Hakka in Malaysia, certain social and
cultural patterns found among them can still be considered Hakka. She
identifies three distinctive characteristics of Pulai villagers—economic
conservativeness, egalitarian political orientation, and distinctive gender
roles—and asks whether these are peculiarly Hakka features transmitted
from China, or whether they might be more simply explained by the
rural socioeconomic environment in which Pulai Chinese found them-
selves. Utilizing Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of “habitus,” Carstens argues
(as does Bendey 1987,1991) that one need not necessarily be aware of, or
consciously able to articulate, one’s ethnic identity in order to repro-
duce ethnic cultural patterns. Thus Carstens suggests that Malaysian
Hakka have unconsciously reproduced Hakka cultural patterns despite
their disinclination to emphasize Chinese dialect-group differences.
The Hakka community' of Calcutta is described by Ellen Oxfeld (see
also Oxfeld 1993). The Hakka are the largest of the three Chinese ethnic
groups in Calcutta, some of whom arrived in West Bengal as early as the
end of the eighteenth century. The Hakka tanners among whom Oxfeld
studied, however, arrived only during the First World War, and have
since overwhelmingly adopted the polluted but lucrative occupation of
leather tanning. Oxfeld takes an interactional approach to Hakka ethnic-
ity in Calcutta and shows that to understand it, we must consider the
wider context of state and local politics, the stratified economy, and the
socioreligious principles of the host society—primarily the Hindu con-
cepts of purity and pollution. Oxfeld shows how Hakka define them-
selves vis-a-vis other Chinese and the wider Indian community, and also
how they are perceived by others.
Although Calcutta Hakka live and work in an Indian community,
they still define and identify themselves as Hakka. In contrast to Malay-
sia, where Chinese are also a minority, but where Hakka downplay
Chinese dialect-group differences, Calcutta Hakka maintain a clear dis-
tinction between themselves and other Chinese. Calcutta Hakka express
a hierarchy of “otherness” with non-Chinese referred to as gui (ghosts),
non-Hakka Chinese as lao (fellows), and themselves as ren (persons).
Their identity, again in marked contrast to Hakka in Malaysia as well as
on the Chinese mainland, is tied to an image of Hakka as sharp business
19NICOLE CONSTABLE
people with a strong entrepreneurial ethic. Their dominance and suc-
cess in the tanning industry is linked with their view of wealth as the
basis of power and the measure of success. Among Calcutta Hakka, we
again hear the claim that they are the loyal bearers of Chinese tradition.
Cantonese, in contrast, are considered either more Westernized or more
Indianized than are Hakka.
Several Hakka individuals encountered in the chapters by Johnson,
Carstens, Constable, and Oxfeld express a perception or expectation of
decline in Hakka identity, often as a result of decline in use of Hakka
language and decline in knowledge of Hakka customs or the perceived
relevance or awareness of Hakka identity. Yet as the example of the
Hakka movement in Taiwan suggests, these concerns are not necessarily
indications that Hakka identity is disappearing or diminishing—merely
that the outward manifestations and expressions are changing.
In his chapter Howard Martin shows that what may appear on the
surface to be a marked lack of relevance of and concern for ethnic
identity may be significantly revitalized within a short period of time.
Martin describes the recent resurgence of Hakka identity in Taiwan.
This Hakka movement was not in evidence during the early 1980s.
While it is too soon to tell exactly what direction the Hakka political
movement will take, or to predict what longer-lasting impact it may
have, it is clear that while the overt political relevance of so-called ethnic
identities waxes and wanes, their existence—aside from their overt po-
litical significance—is far more complex. Identities that appear to have
faded or diminished may well resurface as political factors or other
variables change.
Martin outlines the development of three trends in the Hakka move-
ment in Taiwan since the mid-1980s, which political leaders label loosely
as traditionalist, moderate, and radical, and he explains briefly how the
wider issue of political liberalization has allowed for the emergence of
ethnic politics. Each faction within the Hakka movement has different
ideas about what it means to be Hakka, different goals, and different
visions for Taiwan’s political future. Traditionalists look to reunification
with the mainland, while radicals oppose Chinese reunification. Tradi-
tionalists draw on images of the old and glorious Hakka past before
they arrived on Taiwan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, and they view themselves as one with all Hakka worldwide. In
contrast, the younger, more radical faction of the Hakka movement in
Taiwan appeals to Hakka in a “Hakka anthem” to “stop repeating that
Hakka are so extraordinary,... so remarkable” and to instead “struggle
20INTRODUCTION
with uplifted heads for freedom, and recreate Hakka spirit” in Taiwan.
This anthem asks Hakka not to focus on former Hakka glory, but to
construct a new identity based on “migration from China, suffering,
shedding sweat and blood, pioneering, and establishing roots in Tai-
wan.” The “New Hakka,” Martin writes, “do not intend to borrow the
greatness of the old to create a sense of ethnic solidarity.” And yet, even
these “new” images of the Hakka and their history on Taiwan clearly
draw on and echo many of the traditionalists’ themes.
Mary Erbaugh looks at the recent reemergence of Hakka studies in
the People’s Republic of China today and asks why—since the early
decades of this century until very recently—so little was said about the
Hakka and the important role of Hakka-speakers and individuals from
Hakka regions in Chinese revolution. Basing her study primarily on
written sources and historical documents, and supplementing it with
interviews, Erbaugh illustrates and substantiates what has long been
claimed by many overseas Hakka: that an overwhelming and dispropor-
tionate number of Hakka have been involved in the process of commu-
nist revolution, the Chinese Communist Party, and the top levels of
Chinese government. Most of these public figures, however, kept silent
about their Hakka identity. And despite the important role of Hakka,
the communist revolution has not been perceived as a Hakka ethnic
movement.
Erbaugh describes several important factors that, until very recently,
helped to obscure the importance of the Hakka in China. Perhaps the
most important involves the Chinese national ideal of Han unity, to
which Hakka and non-Hakka alike are committed, especially those who
were active in the communist movement and who attained high offices
in government. Hakka who succeed in politics take pride in their
achievements as Chinese, Erbaugh notes, rather than as Hakka. An-
other factor is the importance in matters of ethnicity of official historical
categories, such as locality or place of origin, which tend to obscure the
importance of the Hakka, since they do not belong to any one region or
locale. Another is the stigmatized nature of Hakka identity.
Most interesting about this case is that the rapid emergence of public
discourse about the Hakka corresponds to the declining political role of
Hakka individuals. Paradoxically, at what might have been considered
the peak of Hakka political power, Hakka identity was kept silent. An
important question raised by Erbaugh’s essay is Why, just as Hakka
leaders are dying off and Hakka distinctive traits are disappearing, are
Hakka studies beginning to flourish in China? According to Erbaugh,
21NICOLE CONSTABLE
mainland scholars date the recent burgeoning of Hakka studies to Deng
Xiaoping’s return to power in 1977, when “reformers reduced central
control, encouraged local market economies, and aggressively solicited
overseas ties.” Linked to these changes are growing contacts with more
ethnically aware overseas Hakka, and also the increasing acceptability of
minority differences and “otherness.” Like Martin, Erbaugh shows how
the expression of ethnic identity can be either impeded or promoted by
state policies.
SOME RECURRENT THEMES
Despite the geographical, historical, and cultural diversity of the Hakka
groups described in this volume, much of the discourse about Hakka
identity revolves around a set of remarkably homogeneous themes.
These themes may be said to help structure the history and/or collective
memory of particular Hakka communities in such a way as to maintain
the integrity of certain key ethnic concepts. While there are numerous
recurrent themes and further comparisons that can be drawn from the
case studies described in this volume, I will limit my discussion here to
the following key issues: the widespread notion that the Hakka are poor
and rural, their reputation for unique gender roles, the problematic
relationship between Hakka identity and Chinese identity, differing
degrees of ethnic consciousness among Hakka communities, and the
importance of Hakka language to ethnic identity.
Poverty and Rural Occupations or an Entrepreneurial Ethic?
Hakka are widely thought of as poor and hardworking farmers. As
should already be clear, in most cases this image relates more to percep-
tions about the Hakka, or to the Hakka past, than to present reality. The
articles in this volume show that the actual socioeconomic positions of
the Hakka today are many and varied. In the Christian community of
Shung Him Tong we find a broad spectrum of occupations and class
identities: a highly educated group of Hakka who work as teachers,
scholars, and bureaucrats (some at the highest level of the Hong Kong
government), as well as factory workers. Only a small minority are
farmers. In Calcutta the Hakka primarily are successful entrepreneurs,
tanners, and shoemakers, and they are also found in the restaurant and
haircutting businesses. Their occupations set them apart from Calcutta
Cantonese, who predominate as carpenters, and Hubeinese, who gener-
22INTRODUCTION
ally are dentists. The Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau are now mainly land-
lords and small business owners. In mainland China before the commu-
nist revolution, as Erbaugh points out, Hakka were far more likely to
work in sideline industries than to be landlords. Many worked in mines,
or in urban areas as ricksha pullers, barbers, or teahouse clerks. After the
revolution Hakka regions of the mainland remained poor, but a number
of Hakka individuals attained high government posts. In Malaysia and
Taiwan, as in China, Hakka are still well represented in agriculture, but
they are involved in other occupations as well.14
Although Hakka may once have been tenant farmers on the main-
land, they no longer are exclusively poor and powerless, and they span
various economic classes. Yet in many settings this has not altered their
reputation. As a man in Hong Kong explained, one reason this stereo-
type persists is that successful Hakka readily pass as Cantonese. Cer-
tainly in most parts of Hong Kong, and also in Malaysia, this often
appears to be the case.15 Sharon Carstens observes that Malaysian Hakka
who became economically successful “seemed especially interested in
investing themselves with the credentials of proper Confucian gende-
men and displaying their loyalty to general symbols of Chinese high
culture” (this volume). This is also suggested by Mary Erbaugh’s analy-
sis of Hakka who reached positions of power in the People’s Republic
of China. Upper-class or successful Hakka are better able to escape the
stigma of being Hakka, and are therefore more likely to present them-
selves as successful Chinese than successful Hakka. As Comaroff and
Comaroff describe this process, “on leaving the underclass” those who
become successful “must either seek to discard their ethnic identities—
which, after all, mark the predicament from which they contrived to
escape—or sustain the contradiction of being a member of a group
whose primary class position is different from their own” (1992:63). For
the prominent mainland Chinese leaders who came from Hakka regions
and spoke Hakka but who never presented themselves as Hakka in
i+. Chua and Tan describe how Dabu Hakka dominate the pawnbroking trade in
Singapore (1990:67-77). See also Clyde Kiang (1991:38-47) for a list of notable Hakka
politicians, entrepreneurs, and professionals.
15. Shung Him Tong provides a notable exception. Regardless of their degree of
economic success, Hakka Christians of Shung Him Tong are very likely to continue to
identify themselves as Hakka and to be regarded as such by others, at least within the local
context of the church and village. In the wider context of urban Hong Kong, however,
most Shung Him Tong residents could easily pass as Cantonese (see Constable, this
volume).
23NICOLE CONSTABLE
public, however, political considerations and ideals of Han Chinese
national unity were also important factors.
Why, then, do some successful Hakka continue to identify themselves
as Hakka? In Shung Him Tong the answer lies in the fact that they are
also Christian. In Taiwan it may be that upwardly mobile Hakka have
identified their group as a potentially powerful social force. In other
situations, such as in Kwan Mun Hau, upward mobility has been accom-
panied by a decline in the importance of Hakka identity (if, indeed,
ethnicity was ever consciously articulated there).
Calcutta Hakka are in a very different situation. There, economic
success does not serve to blur the boundaries between Hakka and other
Chinese (or Indians), nor does it cause the Hakka to present themselves
as Chinese instead of Hakka. On the contrary, ethnic distinctions are
strengthened by the inversion of the hierarchy that existed in mainland
China. In Calcutta Hakka economic success depends in part on main-
taining ethnic boundaries to protect monopoly over the tanning indus-
try (cf. Barth 1969, Abner Cohen 1969). As Ellen Oxfeld suggests, citing
Eric Wolf, ethnicities are “historical products of labor segmentation”
(1982:581). Similar to the competitive situation between Hakka and
Punti out of which Hakka ethnicity first emerged in China, Hakka
ethnicity in Calcutta is related to the segmentation of the labor market.
In the new setting, however, Hakka are in a position of power relative
to other Chinese, and Hakka consciousness can only contribute to main-
taining their position.
In contrast to the Hakka of Calcutta, with their entrepreneurial ethic,
Pulai Hakka told Carstens that “Hakka have no head for business.”
Carstens suggests that lack of business success along with mainly rural
residence and rural occupations (such as plantation work and mining)
among the Hakka of Malaysia may be explained primarily by the legacy
of rural occupations and economic conservativeness back in China. Yet
if this is the case, the legacy clearly takes on new meanings in the new
context. The Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau do not frame the issue in terms
of Hakka versus non-Hakka business ability, but in terms of newcomers
versus natives. The newcomers, they suggest, are forced by their circum-
stances to be “more capable and enterprising” than Kwan Mun Hau
natives, who are more economically conservative and rooted in the
place. In Shung Him Tong we find yet another permutation. There
Hakka insist that it is not that they are unable to succeed in commerce,
but that because they are Christian, they have little desire to do so.
Although the Hakka of Calcutta are the most explicitly entrepreneurial
24INTRODUCTION
of the cases we examine, and they appear unique in their expression of an
entrepreneurial ethic, this ethic is associated with and supported by simi-
lar notions about the Hakka that appear in other locales. According to
Oxfeld’s Hakka landlady, Cantonese in Calcutta are less financially suc-
cessful than Hakka because they are overindulgent. “When Cantonese
make money, they get lots of servants, eat with ivory chopsticks, and use
tablecloths,. . . but Hakka keep working hard” (Oxfeld, this volume).
The idea of Hakka frugality and thrift is also expressed by the Hakka
Christians of Shung Him Tong. According to a young Hakka school-
teacher from Shung Him Tong, “Hakka people are very good people—
hardworking, thrifty, and practical. Not like the Punti, who like to have a
good time and are not hardworking. When they [Punti] make money
they just become opium addicts, in contrast to [Hakka] people like my
grandfather, who was poor and saved a little bit of money so he could buy
some land” (Constable, this volume). In these vastly different contexts,
similar statements distinguish Hakka from other Chinese. In one case the
emphasis is on entrepreneurial success, in the other, morality and piety.
Unique Gender Roles
As is noted in several of the chapters of this volume, the belief that
Hakka women are particularly hardworking and that Hakka gender
roles mark them off from other Chinese is extremely widespread among
scholars and among Hakka and non-Hakka alike. During the nine-
teenth century westerners traveling in Hakka regions of China observed
that women worked very hard in the fields, did work that non-Hakka
often assigned to men, and were less likely to have bound feet than were
other Chinese women. Hakka women’s contributions to agricultural
work and the custom of leaving girls’ feet unbound are often unques-
tionably linked with the poverty and greater demands for agricultural
labor that existed in the harsher regions of China in which Hakka often
resided. However, in many Chinese agricultural regions, including
many Cantonese areas in Guangdong, regardless of the degree of pov-
erty, daughters’ feet were bound at an early age and women worked
only within the confines of their homes. In Hakka regions this was not
usually the case. It is widely believed that even girls who were born into
wealthy Hakka families were unlikely to have their feet bound, and that
Hakka women who married into wealthy families often continued to
participate in manual labor outside of their homes.
Nineteenth-century Hakka gender roles are often regarded simply as
25NICOLE CONSTABLE
logical economic adaptations and as essentially Hakka. Such assump-
tions neglect the fact that this particular gendered pattern of labor
represents only one possible response to economic circumstances, and
also fail to ask how such characteristics came to be widely identified as
uniquely Hakka, although they are not. The practice of footbinding, for
example, originated in the north as a marker of elite status, and was later
emulated by members of the lower classes in many other regions of
China. Scholars believe that by the nineteenth century footbinding was
practiced to some extent throughout the country, but that it was least
popular in the southern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian (Carstens,
this volume; Gaw 1991:12-13; Levy 1966; see also Anagnost 1989). In the
wealthy silk-producing regions of the Canton Delta footbinding was
not widely practiced, and although it was not a Hakka area, women
there shared Hakka women’s reputation for independence, diligence,
and making important economic contributions to their households
(Stockard 1989:175).
Female participation in agricultural work, unbound feet, and the
greater degree of freedom attributed to Hakka women are features that
are characteristic of non-Han minorities as well (Constable, this vol-
ume). Such cultural practices have therefore been used to support the
view that Hakka were at best very unorthodox Chinese, at worst not
Chinese at all. The association of these practices with Hakka and other
low status groups is also likely to have further fueled the perceived need
for poor non-Hakka Chinese to bind their daughters’ feet and to restrict
their public roles.
Because of the widespread persistence and extreme uniformity of the
stereotypes of Hakka gender roles today, it is tempting to conclude that
these stereotypes maintain a strong factual basis. Specific research on
the economic roles of Hakka women, however, points to the problem
with such broad generalizations. In Calcutta, for example, Ellen Oxfeld
found that Hakka women are widely recognized as an important source
of labor in the tanning industry and that their hard work and economic
contribution is regarded as uniquely Hakka. However, Hakka women
in Calcutta who belong to wealthier and more economically successful
families are less likely to participate directly in the daily operation of the
family firm (Basu [Oxfeld] 1991; Oxfeld 1993, and this volume).
While it is certainly likely that in the Hakka (or pre-Hakka) past, at
least during the last century, Hakka women played a very active and
visible economic role in the public sphere, in contrast to many of their
non-Hakka Chinese neighbors in the immediately surrounding regions,
26INTRODUCTION
this is far less likely to be the case today. Undoubtedly, Hakka women
continue to make important economic contributions, but many, as in
Hong Kong, find themselves in new, more urban, and socially heteroge-
neous situations where the pattern of female extra-household work has
become far less of a uniquely Hakka pattern than it once was.
Moreover, to acknowledge the important economic roles of Hakka
women in particular contexts is not to say that Hakka women actually
work harder than other women. All we can say is that in some contexts
they appear more likely than other women to participate in extra-
household work, and that when they do, their work is often perceived
in ethnic terms. In Hong Kong, among the people of Shung Him Tong,
one commonly hears the assertion that Hakka women work harder than
other Chinese women and are given a greater public role. But, as in
Calcutta, it does not appear that all Hakka women work equally hard,
or that they categorically work harder or more often outside of their
homes than non-Hakka women in the region. According to Sharon
Carstens, there is some indication that in Malaysia Hakka women have
played a greater role in extra-household production—in tin mining and
rubber tapping—than have women from other dialect groups. Hakka
women in Pulai still commonly participate in agricultural work and are
thought to have particularly “strong backs” and “strong wills” com-
pared with women from other groups. As in Shung Him Tong, how-
ever, their hard work does not appear to translate into greater power or
influence in community affairs. Kwan Mun Hau people also believe that
Hakka women have a distinctive role, although it is not as explicidy
economic, and that Hakka unity, inclusiveness, and egalitarianism distin-
guish them from the non-Hakka in the region. These features are all
expressed in their ancestral hall worship. In contrast to Cantonese halls,
in which only the tablets of certain prominent male ancestors are in-
stalled, Hakka halls display only one tablet, that of the founding ances-
tor, so that in theory and belief all ancestors—rich and poor, men and
women—are included.
The persistence and uniformity of Hakka gender stereotypes may
suggest the reproduction of older patterns in new contexts, but more
likely it is explained by a more general, more universal, growing pattern
of female labor participation in the formal sector of the economy world-
wide, paired with a constructed and widely articulated idea about essen-
tial Hakka gender roles. What still requires further explanation is why,
as female labor outside of the home becomes less and less exclusively
Hakka, the stereotype of hard-working Hakka women and unique gen-
27NICOLE CONSTABLE
der roles should persist. And why, even in Calcutta, where financial
success is associated with a decrease in women’s participation in family
enterprises, do we still find such a stereotype?
One possibility is that Hakka gender stereotypes today are not linked
to any actual numbers or percentages of Hakka working women, but to
the idea that characteristics that at one time served to identify Hakka and
other groups as poor or backward can now be interpreted in a very
different way. In many societies, including mainland China, allowing
women to participate in the paid work force has gained political currency.
Indeed, as I assert in my chapter, the idea of Hakka women’s involvement
in the public sphere, at least in Shung Him Tong, has come to be associ-
ated with modernity and progress. Ideas pertaining to Hakka gender
roles now help lay claim to a type of Hakka protofeminism, women’s
liberation, and gender equality that is historically constructed as having
been far ahead of its time. As was discussed in the previous section, when
members of an ethnic group become increasingly upwardly mobile, we
would expect, following Comaroff and Comaroff, at least some members
to discard ideas and practices that distinguish them from other elites.16
Such may be the case for wealthy Calcutta Hakka. In other cases, how-
ever, leaving the underclass may not be accompanied by a need to repudi-
ate Hakka gender roles, because they can be adapted and transformed to
fit a new rhetoric of gender equality.
The connections among Hakka identity, class mobility, and gender
roles deserve further research. The essays in this volume suggest that
despite changes in the economic and social position of Hakka in various
settings, and despite the fact that greater numbers of non-Hakka
women have entered the public work force in many regions where
Hakka live, the idea or perception of distinctive Hakka gender roles
persists (see also Blake 1981, Pasternak 1983). Even in Calcutta, where
Hakka women’s roles vary with the family’s economic status, this reputa-
tion endures (Oxfeld, this volume). In some cases—perhaps those most
closely resembling the Hakka rural past—Hakka gender roles are still
articulated as an economic necessity. In others, ethnic patterns may be
giving way to ideas about class mobility. In yet others, particularly those
in which Hakka seek to actively transform and legitimize Hakka iden-
tity, gender roles may be transformed into a modern discourse of gender
equality—one that does not necessarily reflect social reality.
16. See Erbaugh (this volume) for a discussion of the fascinating example of Sun Yat-
sen’s family.
28INTRODUCTION
The Hakka, as Chinese
In several of the cases in this volume, Hakka claim to be both distinctly
Hakka and preeminently Chinese. This is a bit of a paradox. Mary
Erbaugh explains that the Hakka as a whole have seen themselves as the
preservers of traditional northern Han culture. The Hakka of Calcutta
claim that they are more faithful bearers of Chinese tradition than are
other Chinese, and the Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau have couplets outside
their ancestral hall that read “The descendants of those who came from
Henan continue / The customs of the North are retained.” The Hakka
of Malaysia—both rich and poor—insist on being respected as “true
[Han] Chinese” and are determined to preserve their Chinese cultural
traditions (Carstens, this volume). The Hakka of Shung Him Tong do
not claim to have preserved all of the customs of the north, since many
conflict with their Christian beliefs and practices, but they do claim that
Hakka are the purest Chinese. As was mentioned earlier, the idea that
they are the most Chinese of all is not unique to the Hakka. Ethnicity
commonly involves a claim to purity or authenticity.
While it would be easy to say that these cases all share the fundamen-
tal feature of equating Hakka identity with being Chinese, if we look
more closely, we can see differences in the ways Hakka and Chinese
identity are related. To the Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau and Pulai, Hakka
identity is only of secondary importance to the fact that they are Chi-
nese. We have seen that for the successful Hakka of Malaysia wealth
provides the means to express Chineseness, not Hakkaness. For the
people of Kwan Mun Hau, secure in their status as Punti (or benturen)
and Tsuen Wan natives, there is little question in their minds, or those
of others, but that they are Chinese. In contrast, in Shung Him Tong to
be Hakka is to assert one’s Chineseness, despite possible accusations
that one is no longer Chinese because one is Christian. In Shung Him
Tong there is also a desire to defend the preeminence of Hakka Chi-
neseness. In Calcutta Hakka identity appears to be even more exclusive.
Calcutta Hakka view themselves as Chinese, but place an emphasis on
their superiority as Hakka. In Taiwan there appears to be little doubt
that Hakka are Chinese, but in recent years Hakka identity has taken on
far greater importance and the distinction between Hakka and others is
now being emphasized.17
17. Cantonese, both in mainland China and overseas, assert that they are people of the
Tang dynasty, rather than the Han dynasty.
29NICOLE CONSTABLE
What is shared in all of these cases is the provision by Hakka history
of means to argue that Hakka are the most Chinese Chinese. As one
missionary writer aptly put it, Hakka history is essentially “nothing
else than an outline history of the Chinese in general” (Piton 1873—
74:225). On one level we cannot deny that this is true: all Chinese
claim to have north central Chinese origins and the Hakka are no
different (Blake 1981). We should also note that many of the characteris-
tics with which Hakka describe themselves (diligence, honesty, hard
work, etc.) also reflect archetypally Chinese values. But although in
many significant ways the history and culture of the Hakka resemble
those of other Chinese, Hakka are at the same time regarded as dis-
tinct. It may be precisely the flexibility of Hakka history—that it is at
once distinct from and the same as Chinese history—which makes it
adaptable to a variety of different claims and situations. The same view
of Hakka history is shared by those who choose to emphasize their
distinctiveness and by those who choose to emphasize their connec-
tions with other Chinese.
Hakka Consciousness
Most of the Hakka communities described in this volume are comprised
of populations that descended from emigrants who, originating in dif-
ferent villages and regions, left China at different times. One question
this raises—which is impossible to answer, but interesting to speculate
about—is whether there is any correlation between the time and place
from which people migrated and the importance of Hakka identity in
the new immigrant community. For example, would communities
founded by later emigrants exhibit a stronger degree of Hakka con-
sciousness than those established by seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century emigrants?
While this question presumes that Hakka communities in China be-
came increasingly conscious of their Hakkaness through time, we know
that the pattern, more accurately, also varies from one location to an-
other. The more isolated and homogeneous Hakka-speaking communi-
ties (such as Meixian) seem less likely to be ethnically aware than those
in which Hakka and Punti live interspersed, such as the Shenzhen or
Bao’an regions of Guangdong, which adjoin the New Territories of
Hong Kong. As we have already asserted, a sense of ethnicity originates
in an environment in which competition between groups comes to be
understood as ethnic. But we have also suggested that by the end of the
30INTRODUCTION
nineteenth century Hakka consciousness in Guangdong and Guangxi
had reached a peak and was fairly widespread.
Since we have little specific information concerning the degree of
Hakka consciousness in different mainland communities to begin with,
or even enough information to say much about the particular communi-
ties in China from which immigrants came, our answer can only be
speculative. But the question itself raises some important issues. While
we would not expect the ethnic sentiments of early immigrants to be
perpetuated over centuries except under certain conditions, the stronger
sentiments of later immigrants are more likely to persist over a short
period of time, despite their possible lack of—or changed—relevance.
Thus what deserves attention is not so much the mere perpetuation of
Hakka identity, but the specific conditions in which it continues to be of
relevance or in which its significance declines.
Of the cases described in this volume, the most recent immigrants are
the Hakka of Calcutta, who arrived around the time of World War I,
followed by the Hakka of Shung Him Tong, who began to arrive after
the turn of this century. Indeed, these two communities exhibit a much
stronger sense of Hakka identity than do the Kwan Mun Hau Hakka,
who arrived mainly during the mid-eighteenth century, and the Hakka
of Malaysia, who arrived mainly during the seventeenth and early eigh-
teenth centuries. The Hakka of Taiwan, who arrived there at about the
same time as Hakka went to Malaya, present an interesting exception.
In Taiwan Hakka identity most clearly takes the form of an ethnic
political movement, but this is most likely a modern development that
has emerged out of local political history.
The Hakka in Malaysia are certainly far less conscious of their Hakka
identity than are those in Taiwan, Shung Him Tong, or Calcutta. In the
new context other allegiances, based on local or on Chinese (as opposed
to Malay) identity, have taken on greater relevance. In Kwan Mun Hau
and Malaysia people acknowledge when pressed that they are Hakka,
but show little concern for their Hakka identity. Their more relevant
identity is Punti. Although not Cantonese, they, as early settlers in the
New Territories, have more in common in terms of status with the New
Territories Cantonese Punti than with later Hakka immigrants, such as
the people of Shung Him Tong.
The Shung Him Tong Hakka have come much more recently to
Hong Kong, many of them from linguistically mixed Hakka and Punti
regions of southern Guangdong. In contrast to the socioeconomic posi-
tion of the people of Kwan Mun Hau, Shung Him Tong people arrived
3iNICOLE CONSTABLE
in a region dominated by powerful Cantonese-speaking Punti lineages,
and in which they were a Hakka minority. Today the memory of the
animosity and competition between Hakka and Cantonese-Punti plays
a role in the maintenance of Hakka identity, and Christianity provides
the key.
Hakka identity in Calcutta is not maintained merely as a remnant
from the past, but, as we have suggested, with renewed and vital signifi-
cance in the new context. In Calcutta, where Hakka dominate the tan-
ning industry, they maintain social boundaries between themselves and
other Chinese and, as in Shung Him Tong, they declare their superior-
ity over other Chinese. In Taiwan, as Howard Martin suggests, it was
only after the government lifted martial law and the political climate
allowed for the emergence of opposition politics that a Hakka political
movement was mobilized. Similarly, Mary Erbaugh demonstrates the
importance of political change in the recent reemergence of interest in
the Hakka in the People’s Republic of China. These cases suggest that
time of migration is only a minor factor, alongside a number of other,
far more important issues, including the new ethnic landscape, political
climate, and other, less predictable, issues.
Langc
Hakka language is an important consideration in each of the chapters,
but particularly in those of Cohen, Martin, and Erbaugh. According to
Martin, the common thread that ties together all Hakka in Taiwan—
whether they be traditionalists or radicals—is their concern for Hakka
language. Erbaugh also emphasizes the historical importance of lan-
guage among the Hakka in China during the Taiping Rebellion and
also during the Long March (1934-36) and its aftermath, and she hints
at the possibility of Hakka language serving as a badge of Hakka iden-
tity at a time when other public expressions of ethnic distinctiveness
were officially criticized and publicly denounced.
In Hong Kong in particular Hakka language is on the decline (as it
appears to be in Taiwan and Malaysia) and for many Hakka this is
perceived as a threat to Hakka identity. To some this threat is not such a
serious one, but, as in Taiwan, it can quickly become transformed into
an important and volatile political issue. Despite the decline in Hakka
language in many regions, the contributions to this volume do not
support the view that there is necessarily a direct and predictable correla-
32INTRODUCTION
tion between linguistic and ethnic demise. Although language may be a
sociocultural variable (see Cohen, this volume), it is clearly not coter-
minous with ethnicity; nor does a language or dialect group automati-
cally or necessarily form an ethnic group. Language as a cultural charac-
teristic may become a powerful ethnic symbol, as has Hakka language in
Taiwan, or as in the cases described by Benedict Anderson (1983). But
the existence or persistence of Hakka language does not, as in the case
of Kwan Mun Hau and many regions of China, suggest the necessary
coexistence of a correspondingly strong sense of Hakka identity. The
reverse is also true: as several of the chapters here illustrate, the demise
of Hakka language does not necessarily point to the decline of Hakka
ethnicity.
CONCLUSION
This volume demonstrates that there are few, if any, actual observable
cultural differences that distinguish Hakka from others across the
board. Hakka language is diminishing in a number of settings, Hakka
mountain songs (shun ge) are rarely sung, and Hakka clothing is no
longer worn. But ideas about Hakka distinctiveness—that they have
distinctive gender roles; that they are cooperative, hard working, egali-
tarian, or frugal; and that they share a common past—persist.
Hakka identity was first formed at a time when the Hakka were an
underclass. Today it is clear that not all Hakka are poor, but the stereo-
type of Hakka poverty continues to shape identity. Hakka individuals
can respond to such a stereotype in a number of different ways and can
consider it as either a negative or positive quality. Like Hakka leaders in
the People’s Republic, they may choose to ignore it, or even cease to
identify themselves as Hakka. Alternatively, like many overseas Hakka
and recent Hakka scholars in the People’s Republic, they may embrace
Hakka identity and transform or resist negative stereotypes. In some
cases, where there appear to be contradictions between the real-life
economic situations of Hakka and the existing stereotypes, the discrep-
ancy may be attributed to individual differences, or to differences be-
tween the Hakka past and the Hakka present, or, as in Kwan Mun Hau,
Hakka identity may simply lose much of its salience. Such responses are
likely to vary among communities, among individuals within the same
community, and even for the same individual in different social contexts
or periods of the life cycle. What is clear, however, is that many of the
33NICOLE CONSTABLE
stereotypes Hakka are faced with are relatively consistent, although the
applicability of the stereotype to particular situations, and the response
to it, vary widely.18
Many of the contributions to this volume also suggest that there are
some patterns, tendencies, or differences that are not merely unfounded
beliefs of or about the Hakka. They propose that Hakka identity is not
merely an ideological construct. While on the surface this position may
seem to imply a return to an essentialist approach to ethnicity, the authors
in this volume attempt to escape this pitfall through careful attention to
history, the use of Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” (1977; see also Bendey
1987,1991), and careful concern for the different settings, situations, and
ways in which people define themselves and experience their identity.
Hakka in different situations may share certain characteristics as a result
of their common past—consciously or unconsciously transposed into the
new setting—but, more often, new meanings take shape against the
backdrop of a new cultural environment.
The challenge is to explain how these themes have come to be related
to the Hakka, bearing in mind that common patterns do not imply a
primordial identity; their persistence and reappearance during different
times and in different places need to be explained and accounted for. We
describe in this volume the genesis, persistence, and transformation of
Hakka ethnic consciousness in China and other settings, and the rea-
sons that Hakka identity in places such as Kwan Mun Hau and Pulai
seems to be breaking down, why it has reemerged in Taiwan and main-
land China, and why, in Shung Him Tong and Calcutta—for very
different reasons—it persists. Much work remains to be done.
Although several of the authors in this volume have made a conscious
attempt to include explicitly Hakka voices in their work, I must agree
with Comaroff and Comaroff that we do not speak for the Hakka;
rather, we speak about them (1992:9). In this regard we heed the
Comaroffs’ warning:
If we take our task to be an exercise in intersubjective transla-
tion, in speaking for others and their point of view, our hubris
will cause us no end of difficulties, moral and philosophical.
18. As Vincent Crapanzano has written, “One of the characteristics of stereotypic
thinking is the reduction of movement through time to a symbolic instant that is perhaps
psychologically satisfying to the thinker but is rarely sufficient to the subject of his
thought” (1980:32). Such is also the case for stereotypes about the Hakka.
34INTRODUCTION
And if we see it to lie in the formal analysis of social systems or
cultural structures, statistically or logically conceived, we evade
the issue of representation and experience altogether. But if,
after an older European tradition, we seek to understand the
making of collective worlds—the dialectics, in space and time,
of societies and selves, persons and places, orders and events—
then we open ourselves to conventions of criticism widely
shared by the nonpositivist human sciences. Then, too, we may
traffic in analytic constructions, not in unverifiable subjectiv-
ities, and can acknowledge the effects of history upon our dis-
courses. (1992:12)
This volume necessarily presents only a “partial truth” (Clifford 1986)
about the Hakka, and we are also, unavoidably, co-opting others’
voices.19 Yet we do not claim to have the final word on Hakka identity.
In keeping with current works in anthropology that argue against the
imposition of essential categories, yet acknowledge the importance of
their existence for those who live them, our hope is for the essays in this
volume to become part of a growing and ongoing dialogue on the
subject of Hakka identity.
I am especially grateful to the Hakka individuals among whom we
have worked over the years. Without them this volume would not be
possible. The project as a whole has also benefitted in various ways
from the help of Nancy Abelmann, Joseph S. Alter, Andrew Y. L.
Cheung, Charles Chung, Pei-yi Guo, Lorri Hagman, Stevan Harrell,
William A. Shack, Robert Sundick, James L. Watson, Rubie S. Wat-
son, and Robert Weller. I also wish to thank the outspoken individuals
who attended the panel “What Does It Mean to Be Hakka?” at the
1989 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies; Myron L. Cohen,
who served as the discussant for the panel; the contributors to this
volume; and several colleagues and students at the University of Pitts-
burgh and Western Michigan University.
19. On this theme see Clifford (198?), Clifford and Marcus (1986), Marcus and Fischer
(1986), Said (1989), and Zhang Longxi (1988).
35i/ The Hakka or “Guest People”
Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable in Southeast China
MYRON L. COHEN
This essay is concerned with developing the proposition that the linguis-
tic diversity of Southeast China was a variable influencing the social
organization of the region. That differences in language were used to
differentiate social groupings will be demonstrated through a study of
the interaction of Hakka-speakers in Guangdong and adjoining areas of
Guangxi with speakers of Cantonese.
An anthropologist may point to several features of Southeast China
which marked off that region from the remaining territory occupied by
the Han Chinese. In so doing, he may choose to maintain a synchronic
perspective, but yet insist upon a flexible baseline so as to enable a
sufficient documentation of any points developed. This approach has
been adopted by the one work attempting an anthropological analysis
of Southeast China as a whole. Maurice Freedman’s Lineage Organiza-
tion in Southeastern China is based upon material some of which is
“avowedly sociological,” but of which “a great part. . . derives from a
very heterogeneous collection of books and articles,” involving “jumps
in space and time” (1958 :vi). Drawing upon nineteenth-century and pre-
Communist twentieth-century data, Freedman presents a model for the
social organization of Guangdong and Fujian. The present essay takes
Freedman’s monograph as a starting point, and seeks to add another
dimension to the image of southeastern Chinese society which has
already been presented.
Freedman (1958:2-9) was interested in establishing for Southeast
China the significance of the localized and stratified patrilineage in the
Author’s note, 1996: I originally wrote this article for a conference in 1962, and a year
later it served, slightly expanded, as my master’s essay for the Department of Anthropol-
ogy at Columbia University. In 1968 this later version was published in Ethnohistory (vol.
15, no. 3., pp. 237-292) with only a few minor editorial changes. With the kind permission
of Duke University Press, on behalf of that journal, it is reprinted here. In preparing this
36THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
ordering of interpersonal relations and the constituting of social group-
ings. The localized lineage certainly was one of the elements of the Han
Chinese sociocultural repertory that saw a great development in the
Southeast, and a manifestation of this was the common occurrence of
villages inhabited by members of one lineage only.
In regards to regional differentiation, Southeast China possesses yet
another distinctive feature. This is the very great number of mutually
unintelligible tongues to be found in the area. Guanhua (Mandarin),
says R. A. D. Forrest:
has largely replaced the original local dialects all over China
north of the Yangtze River. But the provinces of the South and
Southeast, from Kiangsu [Jiangsu] to Kwangtung [Guang-
dong], have maintained intact their local forms of Chinese,
sometimes called the “dialects”par excellence. (19+8:10)
Apart from the Wu dialects, spoken in the vicinity of the mouth of the
Yangtze, Forrest distinguishes “three main groups of dialects: Canton-
ese, Hakka, and the Fukien [Fujian] dialects” (1951:673). Hakka and
Cantonese are primarily confined to Guangdong, although there are
extensions of both into Guangxi. Of the Fujianese group, the Shantou
(Swatow) and Chaozhou dialects are also spoken in Guangdong, in the
extreme North (ibid.:673—74).
We may thus note the interesting fact that Fujian and Guangdong,
the very two provinces where “the coincidence of agnatic and local
community. . . appears to have been most pronounced” (Freedman
1958:1), was also a region displaying considerable linguistic heterogene-
article for its reappearance in this volume I have limited myself to correcting a small
number of typographical errors and revising my translation of one Chinese term.
Author’s note, 1968: This paper was submitted in 1963 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Anthropology,
Columbia University. An earlier version, entided “Dialectical Differences and Social Rela-
tions: Cantonese-Hakka Interaction in the 19th century,” was presented at the Seminar on
Micro-Social Organization in China, held at Cornell University, October 11-13,1962, and
sponsored by the Subcommittee on Chinese Society of the Joint Committee on Contem-
porary China of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Re-
search Council.
Editor’s note, 1996: The body of this article remains in very much the same form as when
it was first published. Minor editorial changes have been made in order to maintain
consistency with the rest of this volume. The most significant change is that, as far as
possible, Chinese terms in the original article have been changed to pinyin romanization.
37MYRON L. COHEN
ity. But the presence of several dialects in an area of considerable size in
itself does not indicate that interaction between different linguistic
populations was significant in terms of group formation and constitu-
tion, i.e., in terms of social organization. Additional bits of information,
however, bring out the point that the linguistic diversity of Fujian and
Guangdong was carried down to the local level, and that many of the
inhabitants of the two provinces may have found themselves frequently
dealing with people speaking dialects other than their own. Forrest
finds that the Fujian “dialects,” though “sharply defined against the two
great dialects of Kwangtung [Guangdong],” nevertheless do “differ
between themselves.” In addition to the Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou,
Chaozhou, Jianyang, and Jianning dialects of the Fujianese group, there
are others, including the dialect of Fuzhou City, which is ‘said not to be
understood further than some forty miles from Fuchow [Fuzhou] it-
self” (Forrest 1951:675—76). And when Forrest tells us that in Guang-
dong “there is no clear boundary between Cantonese and Hakka, as the
two peoples tend to occupy separate villages in the same areas”
(1951:674), a linguistic fact takes on sociological significance.
The scanty Western-language material relevant to a study of the inter-
action between the different linguistic populations of Southeast China
has, for a variety of historical reasons, almost exclusively dealt with the
setdement of the Hakka among the Cantonese, and the subsequent
conflicts that developed between the speakers of these two dialects.
Indeed, it was the proportions which these conflicts reached during the
mid-nineteenth century that initially stimulated Westerners to note and
publish facts on the Hakka and Cantonese, their differences, and their
disputes. Undoubtedly, a careful examination of Chinese-language mate-
rial will yield much data on the significance of linguistic differences in
I am most grateful to Howard J. Martin for voluntarily taking on the painstaking and
time-consuming task of converting Wade Giles and idiosyncratic systems of romanization
to standard pinyin. In cases where original sources did not provide Chinese characters for
personal or place names, rather than guessing at the intended character, the original
spelling has been retained. Within English quotations pinyin romanization of Chinese
terms is provided in brackets whenever possible.
More has been written on Hakka migrations since the original version of this article
was written (see, for example, Kiang 1991, Lo Wan [1965], and S. T. Leong [1980,1985]).
On Hakka language, dialect groupings, and linguistic analyses of the origins of Hakka
language, see Jerry Norman (1988), Moser (1985), Paul Yang (1967), and Hashimoto
(1973). On the relevance of Hakka dialect to the Taiping Rebellion, see Kuhn (1977),
Erbaugh (this volume), and Constable (1994: chap. 2). Additional sources are provided in
the Introduction to and References in this volume.
38THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
the social configuration of Fujian, and in those parts of northern
Guangdong where the interaction was among speakers of different
Fujianese dialects or between them and Hakka and Cantonese. But the
utilization of Chinese sources dealing with local conditions in all of
Guangdong and Fujian would require a research effort beyond that
demanded in an essay of this sort. The Western material relating to
Hakka-Cantonese interaction has within it information sufficient to
suggest the major outlines of a more restricted study. I have therefore
utilized data drawn from Chinese sources only to amplify points which
otherwise would be inadequately covered, and to provide a historical
introduction. While this essay is thus a case study of the interaction
between two linguistic populations only, it should be noted that Hakka-
speakers were intermixed with Cantonese over wide areas of Guang-
dong (as well as adjacent parts of Guangxi). A significant part of
Southeast China is thereby involved. The full areal extent of Hakka-
Cantonese interpenetration will emerge in the following section.
It would be best to conclude these introductory statements with a
brief summary of those parts of Freedman’s work that relate to the
present essay.
Freedman (1958) considers that southeastern Chinese society in the
main was given its configuration by the interplay of two modes of
organizing relationships. Individuals would be members of landed and
stratified patrilineages where there would be access to corporate re-
sources, and where the lineage would operate as a unit for either the
defense or the expansion of its corporate holdings and perhaps also the
private holdings of lineage members. Given the high degree of localiza-
tion and nucleation, often resulting in the lineage being congruent with
the village, political and economic differentiation would take place
within the context of organized communities of agnates, and the advan-
tages offered by membership in a corporate group would be unequally
distributed. This indeed was a reflection of the fact that the kin-based
lineage was immersed in a larger society, one with strong socioeco-
nomic class differentiation.
All of China was characterized by a gentry-peasantry dichotomy, in
which the possession of wealth, mainly or ultimately in the form of
land, would enable one to prepare himself or his children for eligibility
in the state bureaucracy. And between those eligible for participation
and the local representatives of state power there was a mutual bond
involving membership in the same socioeconomic class. This bond was
manifested in the monopoly which the gentry of any region would
39MYRON L. COHEN
possess over access to the local representatives of the state. In regard to
the southeastern Chinese lineage, class differentiation thus had a func-
tional value, for it meant that there would be individuals who could
represent the corporation in dealings with the state. But the gentry also
represented the state in dealing with the lineage, and this, plus the
position of the gentry as landlords and as manipulators of corporate
wealth, led to a continuing tension between the gentry and the peas-
antry. Antistate activity took the form of participation in secret societies,
the membership of which crossed lineage lines. This indicated both the
inability of the lineage to fully defend its corporate interests against the
state and the limitations of kinship bonds in an economically differenti-
ated society.
It can be seen from the above that the model Freedman presents for
Southeast China involves a balancing of the principle of group affilia-
tion through agnatic kinship against that of group affiliation through
participation in statewide class alignments. In this essay I will strive to
validate the assertion that associated with the linguistic heterogeneity of
Southeast China was the fact that dialect was a third structural variable,
a third means of group affiliation.
I
Evidence relating to Hakka-Cantonese conflicts should be viewed in
conjunction with the historical record of the Hakka migration to South-
east China from the North and with certain historical developments
which were concurrent with it. In this way it will be seen that there were
many specific factors involved in the process by which antagonistic
linguistic populations emerged in Guangdong and Guangxi.
The most comprehensive discussion of the sequence of Hakka migra-
tion is contained in the works of Luo Xianglin (1933; 1950). Both Luo
and other writers on the subject (Campbell 1912; Eitel 1873—74; Hsieh
1929; Piton 1873-74) rely heavily upon data drawn from the lineage
genealogies of groups currently recognizable as Hakka-speakers. The
use of such data presents two problems of interpretation: (1) whether
such sources are uniformly reliable for the entire period with which they
deal; and (2) at what point do these sources relate to the Hakka as a
linguistically differentiated population?
Hsien-chin Hu (1948:12; cf. Freedman 1958:7; Chinese and Japanese
Repository 1865:282) has indicated that not until the Song dynasty (960-
1279) did the lineage begin to assume its present form; not until then
40THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
did the keeping of genealogies as we know them today commence. The
unreliability of pre-Song family records has also been attested to by
writers of the Hakka. Luo Xianglin’s (1933:41) plea that genealogies
must be used for research on Hakka migrations even prior to the Song
“movement to revise the genealogies” is based upon their importance as
practically the only source of earlier data, but involves an acknowledg-
ment of their deficiencies. Hsieh T’ing-yu (1929:211) and Charles Piton
(1873-74:225) are disturbed by the similar descriptions of origins and
migrations which are to be found in the pre-Song portions of both
Hakka and Cantonese lineage records. These similarities may in part be
accounted for by the fact that the intensified absorption of non-Han
groups in Southeast China, following the removal of the Song dynasty
to the south of the Yangtze (Wiens 1954:183), occurred during the very
period in which there was a general reconstruction of genealogies. The
genealogical records produced by newly arriving Chinese might have
served as models for the older inhabitants of the region.
As to the original home of the Hakka, there is only the genealogical
evidence as a guide, and this indicates that previous to the Eastern Jin
(317—420) the ancestors of the Hakka were primarily to be found in
Henan (Luo Xianglin 1933:63).
Luo interprets the present distribution of the Hakka as the result of
five successive “migratory movements” southward. The first of these
began in 317 c.E. in conjunction with the southward flight of the Jin,
and extended as far as central Jiangxi (1933:43, 45). Towards the end of
Tang (618—907), the campaigns of Huang Chao gave stimulus to a
second migration (ibid. :5o). Henan was again affected, from which
province there were movements to Jiangxi and southern Fujian, while
some of those previously settled in northern and central Jiangxi also
entered southern Fujian as well as immediately adjoining parts of
Guangdong (ibid. :46). Huang Chao was not active in north-central
Jiangxi so that the earliest immigrants there remained unmolested
(ibid. :46). It is for this region that George Campbell reports that “the
t’u t’an [tutan, “local speech”] which we readily identify with the Hakka
at first becomes less intelligible than the Mandarin, as we go northward,
so we are at a loss how to classify the people” (1912:474)- The contrast
between this northwestern sector of linguistic gradation and the sharp
dialect differentiation which elsewhere marks off the Hakka from their
neighbors leads us to suspect that during the migrations at the end of
Tang, Hakka was not yet strongly differentiated from the speech of
contiguous Chinese. The ancestors of the Hakka at this point were in
41MYRON L. COHEN
the forefront of Chinese overland migration, for Xu Songxi has shown
that the groups being encountered, and at least to an extent absorbed,
by the Hakka in southern Fujian were non-Han (19+6:162).
Certainly the genealogical records do attest to the continuity between
the late-Tang settlement of southern Fujian and the present Hakka
population in that area and in Guangdong. There is even a high degree
of specificity: a great many, if not the majority, of Guangdong Hakka
appear to trace their ancestry directly to the Fujianese village of Shibi
(Shakpiak) in Ninghua County (Nenfa), Tingzhou fit (prefecture)
(Campbell 1912:47+; Hsieh 1929:216; Luo Xianglin 1933:55-57; Piton
1873—74:222). The material relating to Shibi would seem to indicate a
high degree of nucleated settlement involving speakers of the Hakka
dialect. This concentration and relative isolation of Hakka-speakers in
southwestern Fujian and the concurrent absorption of neighboring
non-Han groups extended from the close of the Tang through the
Southern Song (1127-1279), and lasted perhaps as long as four hundred
years (Hsieh 1929:211; cf. Oehler 1922:351).
Although the main impact of Hakka migration was to be felt later, the
Hakka “incubation period” in southwestern Fujian already had begun to
show signs of ending during the Southern Song. Tingzhou, in the center
of the Hakka district, was described as follows in a memorandum of 1171
recorded in the Fujian tongzhi (Fujian provincial gazetteer): “Ting-chou
[Tingzhou] has the most bandit troubles in Fukien [Fujian]. In a period
often years, we have been forced to take arms thrice. . . . Many people are
out of employment and become bandits” (quoted in Hsieh 1929:212).
Across the border, in that region of northern Guangdong today com-
prising Meixian and its vicinity, the situation was quite different. There
the countryside was comparatively underpopulated, but the inhabitants
seemed to have title to all the cultivable lands. Meizhou, the destination
of many of the immigrants from southwestern Fujian, was described by
the Southern Song scholar Wang Xiangzhi in his Tudi jisheng (The
wonders of the world). In Meizhou, Wang writes: “The land is ne-
glected and the people are lazy; farmers are few and the cultivators are
all sojourners from Tingzhou and Ganzhou [in southern Jiangxi]; there-
fore no one suffers from a lack of fields” (quoted in Luo Xianglin
1933:57).
These earlier inhabitants of northern Guangdong were soon dis-
placed or absorbed by a growing stream of Hakka from Fujian. During
the changeover from Song to Yuan rule Hakka began to enter Guang-
+2THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
dong in great numbers, deriving from the adjoining xian1 of Ninghua,
Changting, and Shanghang, with the majority of persons still departing
from Shibi (Luo Xianglin 1933:54). Concurrent with the filling up of the
entire northern and eastern part of Guangdong with Hakka-speakers
was a steady decrease in the population of Ninghua xian (county). The
Ninghua xianzhi (Ninghua County gazetteer) records a drop in the
Xian’s population from 35,000 “families” in 1253, during the Southern
Song, to 12,588 “families” in 1391, at the beginning of the Ming (1368—
1644), and to 5,279 “families” at its close (Hsieh 1929:219). These figures,
even though their accuracy may be questionable, suggest that while the
fierce fighting attendant to the Mongol occupation of the region in 1277
(Luo Xianglin 1933:50—51) might initially have contributed to the deple-
tion of the population, the presence of emptier lands to the south
continued the process.
The census figures also suggest that there was not a steady process of
population outflow in conjunction with population growth. What we
see, rather, is the result of a prior imbalance: overpopulation within a
restricted area and underpopulation elsewhere, presuming equivalent
ecological carrying capacity. In addition to the isolating factors posed
by mountainous terrain, we may assume that a relatively predictable if
diminishing food supply might for a time offset any pioneering tenden-
cies within an area of high population density. In addition, the possibil-
ity that the inhabitants of a comparatively underpopulated region might
hold and have the means of asserting prior rights to some or all poten-
tially usable lands would to an extent limit the quantity and quality of
land available to newcomers. But if the population of a given locale
would begin to exceed the carrying capacity of the land, a surplus
population would be created, and forced to seek new means of subsis-
tence. The new means might take the form of banditry, or would be
sought through emigration. In the latter case pioneers would not only
be searching for lands for themselves, but might transmit information
back to the home region. (George Campbell notes that from the estab-
lishment of a school in Meizhou by a Ninghua scholar during the
Southern Song, “both places were known to each other” [1912:477].)
The involvement of many individuals in the pioneering activities of a
few meant that information about new settlement possibilities could
1. A xian is an administrative unit below the provincial level. It is usually translated as
“county” or “district.”
43MYRON L. COHEN
lead to large-scale movements from the overpopulated regions, so that
within a short period of time people of diverse origin might be living
interspersed with the “natives” of previously sparsely settled areas.
During the very period of the buildup of a large Hakka population in
southwestern Fujian, the province of Guangdong was undergoing inten-
sive sinicization. The growing penetration of the Chinese administra-
tive apparatus during the Tang and Northern Song (960-1127) was not
initially accompanied by an appreciable increase in the influx of Han
Chinese into the area (Xu Songxi 1939:177-78). It was with the transfer
of the Song capital south of the Yangtze that the intensive absorption
and setdement of the Southeast commenced (Wiens 1954:183).
Now the sinicization at this time of Southeast China, especially
Guangdong, set the stage for the encounter of linguistically heterogene-
ous but Chinese populations. We have already noted that during the
Song the development of lineage organization was associated with the
spread of Chinese culture. When, at the end of the Southern Song, large
numbers of people began to enter Guangdong from the north, they
were confronted by a population that had come to possess a cultural
repertory quite similar to their own. There were differences, chief
among them being dialect. Most of Guangdong was probably now
populated by Cantonese-speakers, and it was at this juncture that the
inhabitants of the mountainous regions of southwestern Fujian entered
Guangdong and became known as the “Guest People”—Kejia or, in its
Cantonese pronunciation, Hakka (cf. Oehler 1931:8). In contradistinc-
tion, the older inhabitants assumed for themselves the title of Punti
(Bendi, “Natives”) (cf. Laai 1950:92). In the emergence of Guangdong’s
cultural landscape it can be seen that, at least in the historical sense, the
development of localized agnatic groupings and the establishment of
different linguistic populations were associated phenomena.
The movement we have discussed has been classified by Luo Xianglin
as the third Hakka migration, and its general direction was from south-
ern Jiangxi and southwestern Fujian to the eastern and northern sectors
of Guangdong. It was associated with the flight of the Song across the
Yangtze and the subsequent conquest of all China by the Mongols
(i933 -'50). By the end of the Yuan, northern and eastern Guangdong
were exclusively Hakka regions (ibid.: 58).
The fourth period of Hakka migration is considered to have begun
on an intensive scale with the Manchu conquest in 1644. The main
route was from northern and eastern Guangdong to the middle portion
of the province as well as to its central coastal areas. Hakka-speakers also
44THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
reached eastern and central Sichuan, eastern Guangxi, and Taiwan.
Hakka from southern Jiangxi and southern Fujian as well as from the
Meixian region of Guangdong moved into western Jiangxi and south-
ern and central Hunan (Luo Xianglin 1950:34).
The resumption of the southward push was conditioned by a process
of population nucleation in northern Guangdong similar to that which
had occurred in Fujian. Throughout the Ming and early Qing the
Hakka population in northern Guangdong had been steadily expanding
(Luo Xianglin 1933:59). There is evidence that prior to the Manchu
invasion, population pressure in the Jiaying zhou (prefecture) region
(including Meixian) was already forcing considerable emigration and
creating a bandit problem. Government officials might expedite the
former to control the latter. The Titmxia chunguo libing shu (Merits and
faults of all the countries in the world) says that Boluo, in central
Guangdong, had
heretofore . . . consisted of the native inhabitants only. The
fields were extensive and the people few. . . . During the reign
of Kia-Lung [1522-73], there were increasing mountain bandits
in the northeastern part of the province, but the district was the
least disturbed by the disorders. ... In the year 1548-49, the
people from Hsingning and Ch’anglo [Xingning and Chang-
lou, districts in Jiaying zhou] carried their belongings and
came. . . . The local inhabitants objected, but the officials said
that these districts were crowded and poor . . . and that it was
better to let them stay with the natives. After this . . . others
from Ting Chou [Tingzhou] and Chang Chou [Changzhou] in
Fukien [Fujian] also came. . . . The natives were weaker and the
newcomers stronger. Hence disputes and quarrels arose. (Cited
in Hsieh 1929:220)
The middle of the Qing saw Hakka-speakers already spread through-
out many parts of Guangdong, and by 1730 large numbers of Hakka
were in the vicinity of Guangzhou (Eitel 1873:162). There was now a
wide area in which speakers of the Hakka and Cantonese dialects lived
interspersed, and the subsequent “history” of the Hakka strongly fea-
tures violence between these two populations.
During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the continuing
expansion of the Hakka population in the region stretching from the
northeast to the southeast of Guangzhou, especially in the vicinity of
45MYRON L. COHEN
Sihui, Kaiping, Enping, and Taishan, led to increasingly frequent con-
flicts with the Cantonese; the most violent battles occurred after 1856
and lasted until 1867, when the governor of the province decreed the
establishment of the subprefecture of Chiqi as a sort of reservation
where Hakka displaced by the fighting could reestablish themselves.
table 1.1
Agricultural Land and Population Density of Hakka Xian and of Xian which
Were the Sites of the 1850-67 Hakka-Cantonese Conflicts
XIAN OF THE NORTHERN GUANGDONG HAKKA ZONE
(Hakka-speakers the only Chinese [Han] Agricultural Population)
Amount of
Xian1	cultivated land (in mu)2	Percentage of total2	Population3	Mu per person
Lechang	207,100	11.00	106,740	1.94
Renhua	194,700	II.00	46,492	4-19
Nanxiong	671,500	16.05	202,943	3-31
Ruyuan	153,100	5.30	87,106	1.76
Qujiang	906,300	12.85	241,904	3-75
Shixing	205,500	5.10	94,454	2.18
Pingyuan	143,600	5-45	101,790	1.41
Jiaoling	111,100	8.75	107,854	1.03
Meixian	380,200	7-25	548,091	.69
Dabu	111,400	3.30	262,104	•43
Lianxian	519,400	17-90	215,872	2.41
Wengyuan	242,000	9.00	134,557	1.80
Yingde	639,000	7-45	288,475	2.22
Lianping	155,500	3.50	86,641	1-79
Heping	216,000	7-50	162,349	i-33
Longchuan	122,400	3-50	317,249	■39
Xingning	86,200	2.40	467,836	.18
Wuhua	139,800	3.65	328,787	•43
Zijin	308,300	6.60	210,284	•47
Lianshan	52,100	1.85	41,885	1.24
Yangshan	318,000	5.80	201,841	1.58
TOTAL:	5,883,400	7.38	4,255,154	1.38
Continued on next page
46THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
table 1.1 {Continued)
XIAN IN WHICH HAKKA SETTLERS
CAME INTO VIOLENT CONFLICT WITH THE CANTONESE
BETWEEN 1850 AND 1867
Xian4'	Amount of cultivated land (in mu)	Percentage of total2	Population!	Mu per person
Sijiu	8s7,6oo	II-35	162,665	5-27
Gaoyao	1,063,600	25-95	479,874	2.22
Gowning	322,300	33.20	100,941	319
Xinhui	1,245>100	44-95	881,605	I-4I
Enping	299,900	9.20	233,585	1.28
Zengcheng	824,000	24.00	365,003	2.26
Heshan	308,900	15-40	246,572	1-25
Yangchun	322,300	5.10	288,256	1.12
Kaiping	346,800	15-45	498,988	.70
Taishan	2,254,700	18-35	737,084	3-06
TOTAL:	7,845,200	17-45	3,994,573	1.94
1.	Lou Xianglin (1950:53-54).
2.	Chinese Economic Yearbook, vol. 1, (1935: V50— P'ss) - A mu equals 0.0667 hectares.
3.	Administrative Districts (1947:73-79).
4- Lou Xianglin (1933:3, 62).
Since Chiqi ting, formed out of a portion of Taishan xian, was too small
to hold all of the refugees, many went on to the extreme southwestern
tip of mainland Guangdong as well as to Hainan Island and overseas.
Luo Xianglin sees in the order of 1867 the commencement of the fifth
period of Hakka migration, a migration still in progress at the time of
his writing (19333, 63; 1950:32-33)-
The nineteenth-century Hakka migration into the interior of Guang-
dong was a regional manifestation of a growing pressure of population
upon land resources throughout China. This pressure was felt more
consistently in Guangdong than in areas such as the Yangtze Delta,
where a brief respite was later obtained due to population losses in-
curred during the Taiping Rebellion (Ho 1959:167—68).
Surveys and estimates made during the 1930s and 40s indicate that
differential population density still prevailed in Guangdong, with the
47MYRON L. COHEN
northern Hakka zone having less cultivated land per person than the
xian surrounding and comprising the Pearl River estuary, the region of
the most violent Hakka-Cantonese conflict. If we view internal migra-
tions as a process of adjusting population distribution to the carrying
capacity of the land, the attraction offered by the central Guangdong
xian becomes clear. (See table i.i.)
Though Hakka migrations may be said to continue to this day, by the
late nineteenth century the spread of Hakka-speakers throughout
Guangdong was an accomplished fact. In addition, speakers of southern
Fujianese dialects had been settling in parts of the province. The hetero-
geneous nature of the countryside did not go unnoticed at the time.
E. J. Eitel remarks that
the population of the Canton Province is at the present time as
mixed as the population of England was some time after the
Norman conquest. The first invaders, who now-a-days style
themselves Puntis . . . have assumed ownership of the Province,
and, on the whole, successfully struggled with the other invad-
ers, two different races . . . who are now-a-days distinguished
by the names Hak-ka and Hok-lo (or Ch’aou-chow-men)
[Chaozhou], . . . The Hok-los kept for the most part near the
seacoast and the banks of the larger rivers, and did not spread
far over the interior of the Province; whilst the Hak-kas . . .
spread all over the country. (1867:47)
The net result of the successive southward expansions of the Hakka
was that by 1950, of the ninety-seven Guangdong xian, fifteen were en-
tirely Hakka-speaking in composition while an additional fifty were in-
habited by Hakka living in some degree of dispersion among speakers of
other dialects. In twenty-eight of the latter xian, Cantonese comprised all
or part of the non-Hakka population (Luo Xianglin 1950:53—54).
11
The foregoing historical sketch gives an indication of the extent, both
temporal and spatial, of Hakka settlement among speakers of other
dialects. Available data also allow for an examination of the ways this
settlement was carried out among Cantonese speakers in Guangdong
and adjoining parts of Guangxi.
+8THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
Note initially that departures from Hakka districts could be either on
an individual or group basis, and that different emigrating groups
would be differently constituted. From what informants born in
Meixian have told me, it appears that people leaving Hakka districts for
other parts of Guangdong would often go by themselves. They might
go together with their families, which could be extended to varying
degrees. Business associates or friends might accompany each other, and
departing groups could also include remote kinsmen, affines as well as
agnates. But whether such groups would all settle in the same locale was
problematical, for the dispersion involved in emigration might be car-
ried even further by limited settlement possibilities.
The amount and type of land available for use by newly arrived
Hakka immigrants could be conditioned by several factors. The most
important of these involved the system of land tenure in Guangdong,
which was such that, barring state interference, all land, either culti-
vated, uncultivated, or waste, would already be part of an individual or
corporate estate. When the New Territories were still “new,” the British
recorded that
all hills and waste lands are claimed by the nearest villages or
most powerful clans in the neighbourhood, or even at a dis-
tance. Even portions of the sea and the bed of the sea,
foreshore, sand beaches and any land whatever which may be
turned into use and profit are claimed. (Hong Kong i9ooa:i7)
According to Chen Han-seng, lands in the making were also claimed
by localized lineages in the Pearl River Delta region:
River current and sea tide work daily and incessantly to bring
sediments and to form sandy but exceedingly fertile lands; and
by protection and the planting of a certain kind of grass
thereon, they may be converted into cultivable fields within
three years. For such new lands the wealthy clans compete
among themselves to pay the taxes, in order that they might
claim their ownership. (1936:29)
Eroded hillsides, from which only grass could be procured, might
be controlled by either agnatic or territorial groupings. C. K. Yang
notes that the poor peasants of Nanching, a multisurname village near
49MYRON L. COHEN
Canton, “could not cut grass that was within the boundaries of neigh-
boring villages” (1959:67). In the Hakka areas of northern Guangdong,
localized lineages would have claim to all available grasslands. Accord-
ing to W. Bernard Paton, it was “not uncommon for trouble to arise
with a neighboring clan over this grass cutting business. Sometimes
the cutters are accused of encroaching beyond their rightful bound-
aries” (n.d.:67).
Thus, as a result of the historical sequence of settlement in Guang-
dong, Hakka arriving in a region new to them would find all land
already under claim. But to hold title to land is not necessarily to obtain
agricultural wealth from it. Hakka entrance into Cantonese-held re-
gions was expedited by the fact that much of the land claimed was not
under cultivation. Yet the lands available for lease were of a poorer
variety, being less accessible to water for irrigation. The pattern of
Hakka settlement would in part be determined by the location of the
more valuable lands, for these lands would already be farmed by
Cantonese-speakers. In hillier zones, highly productive lowlands would
of course be interspersed among poorer hillside plots, so that initial
Hakka settlement would involve a high degree of dispersion among
Cantonese-speakers. This seems to have been the case over a wide area
of Guangdong and adjoining parts of Guangxi during the nineteenth
century. In the New Territories, the process of Hakka settlement has
been described as follows: “They first settled in the narrow mountain
valleys, and there high up in the smallest valleys they laid out their rice
fields, where there was to be found only a small stream” (Oehler
1931:15)-
A similar situation was reported by a late-nineteenth-century traveler
among the “hills in central Canton” who said that “through all the
region traversed on this journey I found that the Puntis, or native
Cantonese, occupy most of the plains and level arable land, while the
Hakkas are taking possession of the upper and less accessible valleys”
(Henry 1886:273).
Shortly afterwards, H. Compte Meyners d’Estray noted that in six of
the xian of Guangzhou Prefecture the Hakka were still outnumbered by
the Punti:
Here the Punti. . . have remained masters of the soil. They
inhabit generally the fertile valleys and force the Hakka ... to
content themselves with the mountains, where the land is less
fertile; there, where the immigrants are less numerous, they pay,
50THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
ordinarily, the rent of the lands to the first inhabitants of the
country. (1890:31)
This situation prevailed in other regions where the Hakka were re-
cent arrivals among Cantonese-speakers. A local observer said that dur-
ing the early-eighteenth-century settlement of Guangxi by the Hakka,
“there was much mountain valley and waste land in [Guangxi], The
Hakka people have been hired to cultivate the lands” (quoted in Laai
1950:94).
The limited lands available for Hakka settlement were not conducive
to the immediate clustering of large groups of people at one locale.
Statements relating to the initial appearance of Hakka on Cantonese-
owned lands indicate that the new arrivals would first settle on a very
small group or even individual basis. Meyners d’Estray characterizes the
Hakka migration as proceeding “by innumerable little branches who
spread out over Kwangtung [Guangdong].” He adds that the Hakka
slip into the midst of the Punti “as little families” (1890:32). Later he
remarks that they enter Cantonese regions “one by one or by several
families at a time” (ibid.:32). That the Guangdong Hakka “live in scat-
tered hamlets or houses” prompted Wilhelm Oehler to conclude that
“for this reason they ... are not as clannish as other tribes” (1922:353).
The association between tenant status and a dispersed settlement
pattern was noted in Guangxi. Laai Yi-faai cites the Xunzhou fuzhi
(Xunzhou prefectural gazetteer): “Those wealthy people who own large
areas of land are quite willing to let [the Hakka] cultivate the land in
return for rent. [The Hakka’s] houses are built in the fields far from
neighbors” (1950:96).
The “wealthy people” in the above statement presumably were pri-
vate owners, and not the representatives of larger corporate bodies; yet
there is more specific evidence which indicates that Hakka would settle
on lands belonging to individual as well as collective landlords. Johann
Heinrich Vomel says of the Hakka that while they show a propensity
toward becoming roving peddlers and specialized craftsmen in non-
Hakka regions of Guangdong, and in this capacity do not as a rule
maintain long periods of residence “in a foreign region,” yet,
on the other hand in many places they are in a tenant relationship
with the Punti, in whose fields they have settled, so that through
the payment of a small sum of rent a kind of dependency-
relationship is still expressed, even though they have always been
5iMYRON L. COHEN
working the field. Or the dependency-relationship will be main-
tained through the continuing payment by the Punti of the land
tax, even though the field belongs to the Hakka, from whom he
still collects the [requisite] sum. (1914:598)
Permanent tenure, with the landlord responsible for tax payments,
was also found in the New Territories, where it was recorded that there
were
disputes between individual landlords, as distinct from clans,
and tenants as to whether rent is to be paid to the landlord or to
the Government. These disputes having arisen owing to the
tenants having confounded the rent due to their landlords and
the Crown rent due to the Government. (Hong Kong i9ooa:8)
The confusion which the British saw between rents and taxes was due
to the permanent tenure which certain farmers held toward the lands
they were working. We would want to know how Hakka newcomers
could arrive at such a favorable position on Cantonese-held lands. The
tenancy system we are dealing with here was similar or identical to the
“joint ownership of land” which Chen Han-seng says was to be found
in northern Guangdong. There
the landlord . . . often possesses only the so-called liang-tien
[liangtian] meaning the land for which tax or liang must be
paid; and the tax responsibility is supposed to justify the rent
collection. The tenant often owns what is chi-tien \jitian\, mean-
ing the soil itself, or the surface. (1936:52)
Chen adds that two theories attempt to account for the origin of joint
ownership. One would have the original peasant owners placing them-
selves under the protection of powerful families to obtain tax reduc-
tions. Peasant “gifts” to their benefactors eventually developed into a
regular rent, which was then fixed through the landlord’s assumption of
permanent rights to the subsoil of the land. The other theory was that
“the claim to permanent use of the surface of the land derived from a
long period of permanent tenancy.” People who would assume owner-
ship of “cultivable but uncultivated government lands” would lease
them out to tenants: “Much cost of development and primary cultiva-
tion had to be borne by these tenants; a lease contract therefore became
52THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
customary under which the landlord could not transfer the tenancy”
(ibid.: 52-53).
Of the two theories, it is obviously the latter which would apply in
the case of Hakka setdement. For corporately owned lands there is
much more direct evidence that newly arrived Hakka stimulated the
activation of dormant holdings for which they received permanent guar-
antees of tenure. The Report on the New Territories at Hong Kong states
that
it is noteworthy that the majority of those who bring out-of-
the-way plots of land under cultivation are Hakkas. . . . This
due to the industry of the Hakkas . . . and also to the fact that
the best and most available land had been appropriated by the
Puntis before the Hakkas settled in the district. The Hakkas
have . . . reclaimed large tracts from the sea, and made many
a hillside, hitherto barren, yield good crops. (Hong Kong
I9ooa:i6)
The same source describes very clearly the relationship between the
initial cultivation of corporately claimed lands and permanent tenure:
When land is brought under cultivation for the first time, the
cultivator . . . applies in the first instance to the clan or village
which has taken the land under its protection. Generally, the
arrangement with the clan or village results in a lease in perpetu-
ity being made out stating the situation of the land and the
amount of rent in grain or local money that has to be paid by
the cultivator. (Ibid. 39)
Also note: “The clans have . . . claimed large tracts of land, which they
have never occupied, but which they have leased in perpetuity to others,
who undertake to bring the land under cultivation” (ibid.:2o).
The evidence I have presented allows a reconstruction of the first stage
of Hakka settlement of parts of Guangdong and Guangxi already occu-
pied by Cantonese. Initial Hakka settlement was conditioned by the
availability of land of a restricted type, which in turn was a manifestation
of the differential population density between fairly contiguous areas,
which in the past had influenced Hakka emigration. The arrival of
Hakka-speakers could lead to the formation of a relationship of benefit
both to themselves and their Cantonese landlords. Indeed, if we grant the
S3MYRON L. COHEN
term “dialect group” sociological significance, the Cantonese-Hakka rela-
tionship at this stage may be described as symbiotic. But I have no
evidence to justify calling the Hakka-speakers a dialect group. Neverthe-
less over wide areas Hakka would be obtaining subsistence in return for
which they would increase the amount of wealth derived by the Canton-
ese from already existing holdings. The Hakka tenants lived interspersed
among Cantonese-speakers, some of whom were their landlords. We
have seen that some of the landlords would be villages or kin-based
corporate bodies. The two linguistic populations at this stage had differ-
ent settlement patterns; this was reflected in a strict linguistic exclusive-
ness in Cantonese villages, with the absence of Hakka settlement at
village sites already developed. Charles Piton notes that
where the Hakka are mixed up with the Punti, they are consid-
ered as intruders, and have very often no share in the local idol
and must therefore satisfy themselves with worshipping their
ancestors, which they do ... in want of a proper ancestral hall.
(1870:219)
The lack of an ancestral hall here reflects tenant status and the conse-
quent absence of individuals of sufficient wealth to endow such a struc-
ture (cf. Freedman 1958:47). But Hakka nonparticipation in territorial-
based forms of institutional worship indicated their physical exclusion
from Cantonese villages (cf. Freedman 1958:81).
hi
Though initial Hakka settlement was of advantage to the speakers of
both dialects, there is evidence that landowning individuals or corpo-
rate bodies might display a degree of hesitation before granting the
permanent tenure necessary to induce the arrival of Hakka cultivators.
In the early eighteenth century, Ho Ping-ti tells us,
Some conscientious provincial officials repeatedly memorial-
ized . . . that unless security of tenure was guaranteed by the
government there was no hope of attracting the surplus popula-
tion of eastern Kwangtung [Guangdong] to develop the fertile
land that was plentifully available in the west-central section of
the province. (1959:219)
54THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
The concern of the provincial officials was due to an ambivalence on
the part of landowners, indicating that the latter perhaps realized the
ultimate consequences of permanent Hakka settlement might be very
different from the immediate ones. For in any given region, increasing
Hakka immigration coupled with an overall increase in population
would soon place the hitherto symbiotic Cantonese-Hakka relationship
within a very different framework. Numerical increase in the Hakka
population was accompanied by an effort to expand and secure, rent-
free, the lands which they were farming. Such activities on the part of a
population definable in linguistic terms led to the formation by both
Hakka-speakers and Cantonese-speakers of groupings the members of
which took common dialect as a sign of common interests relating to
the securing of agricultural holdings. Moreover, relationships involving
mobilization for the defense of aggrandizement of such holdings could
be defined on the basis of common or different dialect. Laai Yi-faai
recapitulates a development of this sort in Guangxi:
At first the Punti landowners were quite satisfied to allow the
Hakkas to cultivate the land in return for rents. Gradually more
lands were cultivated by Hakkas who were tenants, and more
Punti landowners treated their lands as an investment from
which they obtained interest in the form of rents. This process
had the effect of consolidating the Hakkas more firmly in the
area dominated by the Puntis, for . . . they had to hang together
in order to check the exploitation of the Punti landowners.
Furthermore, the infiltration of the Hakka population in the
Punti area created a situation of constant competition between
the Hakka tenants and the Punti tenants. The latter, like the
Hakkas, also wanted more land for cultivation. The hatred on
the part of the Punti tenants was gradually intensified; and
feuds were fought in 1851 between the two groups, as, for exam-
ple, in the district of Yung-ch’un [Yongchun]. Under these cir-
cumstances the Hakka were further drawn together to face op-
position of not only the Punti landowners but also of the Punti
peasantry. The differences in dialect. . . made the two groups
even more hostile to one another. (1950:94-95)
If Hakka-Cantonese conflicts were in fact aligned along dialect lines,
it follows that if one or both of the opposing sides consisted of an
economically stratified population, resources differentially distributed
55MYRON L. COHEN
but relevant to defense would in some fashion be made available to all
the speakers of the dialect concerned. Unless this were the case, we
would be hard put to affirm the equivalence of common dialect with
common economic interest. This in fact did happen in the Guangxi
struggles, for we learn from Laai that the Punti landlords soon began to
avail themselves of a group of professional fighters, sometimes known
as the tuanlian (local militia) (1950:96). Inasmuch as the fighting in-
volved land for rental as well as land for permanent ownership, the
actions of the Cantonese landlords aided both their own cause and that
of the Cantonese tenants. Piton may have noted the same phenomena in
Guangdong, where, he says, “on the outbreak of any local feuding the
Hakka takes the field in person” while the Puntis often “hire mercenary
troops to do the fighting for them” (1873-74:224).
Since the dispersed settlement pattern of the Hakka precluded struc-
tural localized groupings of a large size, the conflicts with the Canton-
ese in Guangxi necessitated the mobilization of individuals from over a
wide area. The Xunzhou fuzhi, after relating how the Hakka live in
houses “built in the fields far from neighbors,” adds that “the relation-
ships among them” are
yet. . . extremely intimate. When there are enemies or feuds
against the [non-Hakkas], a call for help is answered by the
hundreds who, with spears on their shoulders and shovels on
their backs fight so furiously that they have a contempt for
death. (Laai 1950:96)
If the violent end of a Cantonese-Hakka symbiotic relationship re-
sulted in the expansion of Hakka holdings, the establishment of Hakka
villages soon followed. It is for good reason that the dispersed pattern
of Hakka settlement does not tally with the way population distribution
in general has been described for Guangdong. It appears that the agricul-
tural tasks which engaged the bulk of the people of Guangdong favored
residence in nucleated villages. The strategic value of their sites gave
villages greater durability than did the agnatic groupings which might
at any given juncture comprise then. I will briefly digress from the main
theme of this essay to develop this point.
It is commonly recognized that the population of most of the Chi-
nese countryside, including the Southeast, was to be found settled in
discrete villages (Freedman 1958:1, 8; Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:14,560).
This is clearly the case in the present-day New Territories, where “the
56THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
general pattern of rural settlement is that of nucleated villages” (Tregear
1958:53). In terms of population constitution, however, there emerges
no consistent pattern of association between a given village and one or
more agnatic groupings. A village, to be sure, might still be inhabited
by the agnatic descendants of the village founder. This was the case in
the Guangdong village that Wang Xingrui briefly investigated. A
single-surname settlement, the village had been founded during the
Southern Song by the lineage ancestor (1935:43). Another example is
the village of “Pu-lu-wei,” founded by a branch of the “Chin” lineage
during the Qianlong period (1736—95) (Chinese and Japanese Repository
1865:283). It was the nearby village of “Ho-au,” however, that was first
settled by the Chin lineage, during the Song, and we are told in the
same source that
Ho-au was at that time inhabited by two clans of the K’ung and
Liang names, but who disappeared in the degree as our number
[the Chin lineage] increased. These clans built the Yung-fuh
temple, the only public building in and near Ho-au. (Ibid.)
Moreover, other villages were inhabited at different times by different
lineages. In the early part of the twentieth century, “Phenix [sic] vil-
lage,” in northern Guangdong, consisted in the main of individuals
bearing the same surname. When the ancestor of this group first moved
to the village during the later Ming, towards the end of the sixteenth
century, it was already occupied by people from other lineages. These
latter managed to persist in the village until as late as the Qianlong
period (Kulp 1925:68—69, 292). In the village of “Nanching,” near
Guangzhou, “there seems to have been an ecological succession of
clans,” and “old villagers said that in the dim past there was a Hua clan
and a Fang clan” (C. K. Yang 1959:12).
We may also note that the variations over time in patterns of occu-
pancy were matched by a lack of consistent congruence between lineage
and village. While Chen Han-seng initially states that in Guangdong
“usually one village is inhabited by one clan” (1936:37), his more specific
examples indicate that there was a great deal of variation in village
composition. In “Chao-an,” he reports, “nearly one-half of the villages
of the entire district are inhabited by people bearing the same clan
name,” and in Huiyang “more than one-half of the villages . . . are so
inhabited.” Yet while it would certainly appear that single-lineage vil-
lages were “clearly very common” (Freedman 1958:3), we will later see
57MYRON L. COHEN
how internal population movements did make for the appearance of
multisumame villages in Guangdong.
Descriptions of farming village sites in Guangdong indicate that their
location was determined, or at least influenced, by the southeastern
mode of agricultural production. The quality of agricultural land mainly
depended upon the availability of water for the inundation irrigation
necessitated by wet-rice farming, and so there was a strong negative
correlation between land elevation and productive value, with steadily
diminishing returns precluding any use for rice-growing purposes of
land beyond a certain elevation (C. K. Yang 1959:24-25). We would
expect that the more productive lands would be left for farming, and
that a village would be situated within reach of them; in less level terrain
it would have to be located on the side of a hill between the lands
farmed and the lands left uncultivated. Such was the case in the hilly
sectors of the New Territories (Tregear 1958:84), as exemplified by
“Chong Village,” a Hakka settlement there. The location of Chong
Village is such that “a low tree-covered hill rises behind the village and
in front is a pond and terraced fields dropping away to the valley floor”
(Pratt 1960:148). In Guangdong, Eitel noted that Hakka villages “are
invariably built each on the brow of a hill or at any rate backed by a
small grove of trees” (1867:39).
In the level rice-growing plains, the location of a farming village
might also be determined by certain features of the physical environ-
ment. In the New Territories, again, villages “situated on the flat paddy
plains are almost invariably sited on patches of slightly higher land and
stand as islands in the midst of their fields” (Tregear 1958:53). Consider-
ations of flood control as well as the preservation of the most produc-
tive lands for agricultural purposes presumably would enter into such
an arrangement.
It is clear that the village mode of settlement did not correspond to
the kind of Hakka settlement initially required by the poor and scattered
quality of the residual lands left to them. Yet village settlement was the
best adjustment to the agricultural and environmental demands of the
Southeast, and Hakka would soon begin to group themselves into new
villages and take over old ones. With the possible exception of the type
of settlement discussed immediately below, either peaceful or violent
village formation would involve a readjustment of holdings which
would engender much hostility along dialect lines.
In certain cases, the peaceful establishment of Hakka villages could
come about through state interference in local affairs. Very widespread
58THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
in its effect was the series of decrees commencing in 1660, which called
for the evacuation inland of the entire coastal population of Guang-
dong, Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Shandong (Luo Xianglin 1950:27).
Of these provinces, Fujian and Guangdong were the hardest hit (Xie
1930:812). The Chiqi xianzhi (Chiqi County gazetteer) says that between
80 and 90 percent of the coastal population of Guangdong perished
when they were driven inland (Chiqi 1920:8/23). In 1684, when the
order to return was given, “of the people of various xian who had been
driven inland, not more than two or three could return to each village”
(Luo Xianglin 1950:27). Guangdong officials then petitioned that colo-
nists be settled there, and among those arriving were many from the
Hakka zone in northern Guangdong and adjoining parts of Fujian and
Jiangxi. The gazetteer relates that many of these Hakka settled in the
xian of Taishan, Heshan, Gaoming, Kaiping, Enping, Yangchun, and
Yangjiang, where “many lived interspersed with the natives” (Chiqi
1920:8/33). When the Hakka arrived in the coastal regions, the level and
most fertile lands had already been secured by the Cantonese, for the
latter had lived in areas adjoining the evacuated zone and so were able
to enter first (ibid. :8/4b). This was the case over a large part of the
Guangdong coast extending at least as far north as Haifeng and Lufeng.
There, it appears that as late as the 1920s and 1930s Hakka-speakers were
still primarily tenants on Cantonese-owned lands (Wales 1952:199; cf.
Eto 1961:163—64).
But whether the Hakka were tenants or owner-cultivators, coastal
lands available to them were not conducive to the settlement at one
locale of newly arriving groups of kinsmen. This is clearly borne out by
the following description of the fragmentation of Hakka agnatic group-
ings entering into the Xiangshan xian coast sectors.
Part of the Chen lineage is to be found in the Xiangshan village
known as Zhanyong. The lineage founder’s descendant in the ninth
generation moved from his ancestral home in Xingning (in the northern
Hakka region) to Zengcheng, in central Guangdong. He had four sons,
the eldest being Yinglue. Then “Yinglue’s sons divided into six large
fang.”1 In 1732, the fang of the three oldest moved to Zhanyong, where
they “again divided and dwelt” in Shenwan, Guyou, Shagang, Ziding,
and Gouhuan, all of which were in the same xian. In 1737 the founder of
the Liu lineage also moved from Xingning to Shenwan, where his
descendants resided at the time the Xiangshan xianzhi (Xiangshan
2.	The fang is a subdivision of family, lineage, or other agnatic unit.
59MYRON L. COHEN
County gazetteer) was written. This village and Zhanyong in addition
were two of the four settled by the descendants of Mao Yuanfeng, who
arrived at Xiangshan in 1725, having moved from Wuhua (Xiangshan
xianzhi, cited in Luo Xianglin 1933:262).
Thus we find that in Zhanyong we have at the minimum members of
the Chen and Mao lineages, in Shenwan there are Chens, Lius, and
Maos, and that both the Chens and Maos were dispersed among other
villages as well. It seems safe to say that the limited settlement possibili-
ties the region offered for arriving Hakka meant that available village
sites could not completely absorb extended agnatic groupings. To se-
cure the best of what land was obtainable, agnates would have to scatter
across several villages, and this resulted in the formation of multi-
surname communities.
A recent account from the New Territories contains another example
of the formation of a multisurname Hakka village. Harold Ingrams
describes how a Hakka named Kong Tai Kuen arrived at the “Land of
the Jumping Dragon,” a region consisting of several villages all inhab-
ited by Cantonese belonging to the Tang lineage:
Kong rented a house and became a tenant farmer. He recom-
mended two of his relatives to come along also, but they stayed
only three years and then returned to the Kong ancestral vil-
lage . . . while Kong gave up farming . . . and moved to Fan
Ling. (1952:162)
But Kong also recommended another Hakka, Chan Lok Chom, a
convert who was a “Reverend of the Basel Evangelical Missionary Soci-
ety.” Chan arrived in 1897 and, “intending to settle down as a farmer, he
rented a house” in one of the Tang villages, “but in 1898 he decided that
his Punti farmhands were too much for him and his neighbors too diffi-
cult, so ... he made up his mind to return to mission work and rented his
land to kinsmen, Chan Kiu and his father” (Ingrams 1952:163).
Chan Kiu arrived in 1900, and “meanwhile other Christian Hakkas,
of the family of Lin, had come in ... to farm.” Two of them
built a row of eight houses for themselves and the Chans, form-
ing the nucleus of a Hakka village. The Tangs never did like the
intruding Hakkas, and one of them said that the houses would
interfere with the Fung Shui \fengshui, lit. “wind and water,”
i.e. geomantic configuration], (Ibid.)
60THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
But the matter was settled by the district officer, and “the village was
founded in 1902” (ibid.).3
The village grew larger and larger. . . . There are about 20
houses or terraces in the village now. . . . Today the village . . .
consists of a collection of multiple families. There are Tsuis and
Lins and Pangs and Chans and Cheungs . . . and Tangs—about
ten different families not related by blood. Herein lies the differ-
ence between them and the Punti Tangs, none of whom are
Christians. Not all of the villagers are in the Church or on the
land, though there is scarce a family not represented in one or
the other. (Ibid.)
The heavy Christian influence in this village probably played a part in
attracting certain nonagnates to one settlement. But the common de-
nominator of all the villagers was dialect, not religion. Both examples
indicate that the “fragmentary and heterogeneous nature of the lineage
elements” which made up the Chinese populations migrating to certain
parts of the Nanyang or Southeast Asia (Freedman 1957:24) was dupli-
cated by the Hakka in Guangdong itself, and was accentuated during
settlement.
It is of some consequence that the incident regarding fengshui was
recorded in the New Territories, a region in which peace and social order
is enforced by a powerful state apparatus. I suspect that had the dispute
occurred in those areas of Guangdong or Guangxi where state authority
was tenuous, recourse might have been had to violent means of settle-
ment. For it is clear that while both peaceful and warlike measures were
employed by the Hakka as they developed their villages, resultant pres-
sures reinforced at the village level the strict linguistic dichotomization of
the countryside. Wilhelm Oehler depicts the changeover from Cantonese
to Hakka occupancy of villages in quite absolute terms:
It is an impressive sight, that of the old Punti villages, enclosed
by ivy-covered brick walls and towers half in ruins and sur-
rounded by ditches, and all about the rows of white houses of
the Hakka, into whose hands the greater part of the land has
fallen. Soon after the appearance of a Hakka house inside the
3.	Editor’s note: The village described here is Shung Him Tong, the community of
Hakka Christians described by Constable in this volume.
6lMYRON L. COHEN
walls of a Punti village, the Puntis disappeared completely.
(1922:35)
That the shift in population was as complete as described by Oehler is
borne out by a British survey of the New Territories conducted at the end
of the nineteenth century. The investigators reported that Hakka villages
“are inhabited solely by members of their own race, just as the Punti
villages are inhabited only by Cantonese, though there are a few villages
in which both races are represented” (Hong Kong i9Oob:i88-89).
Simple arithmetic shows that the mixed villages were few indeed, for
of the 423 villages in the New Territories, 161 were Cantonese-speaking
and 255 were inhabited by Hakka (Hong Kong 1900b: 188-89), leaving
only seven where Cantonese and Hakka lived side-by-side. Fuson, writ-
ing in 1926 mentions a village near the New Territories border which
thirty years before had been inhabited solely by Cantonese: “Today,” he
says, “only Hakka live in that village” (1929:12).
Even where Hakka villages had formed, Cantonese villages tended to
be larger and wealthier. It must be remembered that an initial condition
of Hakka settlement was the fact that the holdings of Cantonese villages
were large enough for them to have land to spare. In addition, the
poorer lands, which the Hakka farmed, would not allow the mainte-
nance of nucleated populations as large as those of the Cantonese. The
225 Hakka villages in the New Territories were inhabited by 36,070
people, averaging out to 160.3 persons per village; the 161 Cantonese
villages contained a population of 64,140, or 398.3 persons per village
(Hong Kong I9oob:i89). “Since the Hakka in general are poorer
than . . . the Punti,” notes Hubrig, “their houses and villages are not
built or arranged as well, so that even from a distance one can distin-
guish a Hakka village from a Punti village” (1879:102).
He adds that “Punti villages are closed, surrounded by walls and
moats, whereas the villages of the Hakka for the most part are open”
(ibid.: 103). Cantonese holdings could support larger village populations
than those of the Hakka, and they might also be capitalized in the form
of fortifications. Indeed, at the village level Hakka-speakers could still
be predominandy tenants working Cantonese lands. Hsiao Kung-chuan
describes the conflict that could emerge out of such a situation. In 1852
Enping was the scene of a series of fights where “in a number of villages
‘all the tenants who cultivated the land of the Puntis refused by force to
pay rent. . . . ’ In some instances Hakka tenants slaughtered their Punti
landlords and put the torch to their houses” (1960:431)-
62THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
Thus the formation of Hakka villages might not detract from the
need for large-scale mobilizations when strife would develop with the
Cantonese. The Chinese and Japanese Repository describes a Hakka-
Cantonese conflict in which many Hakka villages, containing an un-
specified number of lineages, engaged in a long and largely successful
campaign to expand their holdings at the expense of a single Cantonese
lineage, the “Chin” (1865:283). In what is now Huiyang, members of
the Chin lineage had come to be the sole inhabitants of the town of Ho-
au, and in the early part of the eighteenth century had built in addition,
Pu-lu-wei. Pu-lu-wei,
as early as 1737 . . . was surrounded by a wall of about 20 feet
high, with sixteen parapets, which gave it the air of an old
castle. The length of the wall is about half an English mile, and
is surrounded by a ditch from 10 to 20 feet deep, and from 50 to
60 wide. (Ibid.)
The remainder of the description indicates that the Chin holdings
had extended considerably beyond the two villages:
After many changes of fortune, Ho-au was in 18+3 involved in a
conflict with the Hakka, which nearly ruined the entire clan.
About three English miles south-west of Ho-au there is a mar-
ketplace, which was built by the people of Ho-au. The Hakka,
to whom the market was let, refused in that year to pay their
taxes, and . . . appeal was had to arms. Both parties fought for
about six years, when another market-place, also belonging to
Ho-au, gave occasion to a conflict with even more powerful
clans.
In 1850 more than 90 villages united for the extermination of
the Chin clan. Pu-lu-wei fell by treachery, and the people were
stripped of the last piece of dress they had on their person; but
though more than 5,000 men surrounded Ho-au, where only
from 300 to 500 fighting men were, the Hakka had not the
courage to enter the village, but moved off without any booty.
Both parties being at last exhausted, peace was concluded, one
of the market places lost to the Chin clan, the other submitted,
and promised to pay further rent.
In 1856 war broke out anew, and frightful murders would
6?MYRON L. COHEN
have been committed, had not the writer of these lines induced
the parties to come once more to terms. (Ibid.)
It is interesting to note from the above that arrangements could be
made for an orderly transfer of property as a result of victories or defeats
sustained in the course of armed conflict. The same held true in the New
Territories, for there, we are told, “some land in the Kowloon district is
held under a tide by capture, where the clans fought and the losing clan
gave up a field as the price of the cessation of hostilities” (Hong Kong
i9ooa:2j).
It seems obvious that even in the most disturbed times some security
of possession was necessary so that agricultural work might continue.
Fighting at the level of contesting villages of course also could involve
more than one Cantonese village or lineage. Meyners d’Estray makes
the general statement that
several communities inhabited by members of one single tribe
[Hakka-speakers or Cantonese-speakers] often form alliances
against the intruders or against the original inhabitants with the
goal of dispersing or exterminating the opposing party, and
taking possession of its goods. (1890:99-100)
A specific instance of such an “alliance” is taken from the Enping
gazetteer by Hsiao Kung-chuan:
During the reign of Hsien-feng [Xianfeng] (1851-1861) the
Hakkas caused disturbances. . . . The various clans that dwelt
within a radius of ten Zz+ organized themselves into a group . . .
calling itself Wu-fu Pao. Funds were raised and a building
erected at Sa-hu-hsii. . . where meetings were called to discuss
matters as they arose. (1960:343)
We should note that this last reference to Enping as well as the
conflict at Ho-au seems to have involved the participation, at least on
one of the opposing sides, of defined local groupings which united on
the basis of common dialect. There seems to have been at Ho-au a
steady growth in the number of villages engaging the Chin lineage, and
the references to the conclusion of the hostilities indicate that there was
4.	A li is a measure of distance approximately equivalent to one-half kilometer.
64THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
a structured leadership on both sides which could make decisions affect-
ing the combatants involved. To have an effect such decisions would
have to apply to territorially bounded units and at Enping the dimen-
sions of these units and their links are clearly described.
Another instance where the speakers of one dialect all were members
of a grouping definable on other than linguistic grounds is to be found
in the Chiqi xianzhi. By 1855, the gazetteer relates, fighting, which was
then current between the Hakka and the Cantonese, had spread to
Yangjiang ting (now a xian), which was on the coast and south of the
main area of conflict. Here the Hakka were comparatively few in num-
ber. During 1855 and 1856, most of the Hakka living in the Wubao region
of the xian fled north to certain Hakka areas in Xinning. There was one
exception, however, and this exception is instructive. ‘The various vil-
lages of the Lin lineage,” we are told, “were quite wealthy and did not
desire to flee.” They therefore agreed to split their fields with the Can-
tonese, and the two groups (Lin and the Cantonese) “jointly requested
the ting office to record the agreement” so that “at that time a calamity
was avoided” (Chiqi i92o:8/8b).
In Yangjiang, then, the flight of the bulk of the Hakka and the
isolation of the Lin lineage resulted in the immediate localization of the
conflict. There was no longer a population intermixed with the Canton-
ese that was definable in terms of dialect only, and which might include
persons or groups whose holdings would in varying degrees be vulnera-
ble to Cantonese attack. There was rather an integrated Hakka lineage,
one which obviously contained individuals able to represent the group
and make the concessions necessary to preserve at least some corporate
holdings. This points to the problem with which we must later deal; for
we will see that in the areas where Hakka and Cantonese continued to
live interspersed, there would be no convenient congruence of a dialect
population with a localized grouping, and thus no readily available
means by which conflicts involving alignments along dialect lines might
be contained or negotiated.
IV
The material I have presented seems to indicate that in rural Guang-
dong and adjoining Guangxi, village settlement was strictly along dia-
lect lines. One would also assume that the network of affinal ties would
by-and-large also be restricted to people speaking the same dialect. But I
do not know of any studies of mainland Southeast China which have
65MYRON L. COHEN
devoted attention to this problem, and any statements must remain on
the level of conjecture. There is, however, some evidence which indi-
cates that certain features of southeastern Chinese social organization
would minimize the effect on dialect distribution of whatever intermar-
riage between speakers of different dialects did occur. Phenix village,
located in northern Guangdong, was inhabited by a group of agnates
speaking the Chaozhou dialect of southern Fujianese. The Hakka term
for speakers of this dialect is usually rendered in English as Hoklo,
though Daniel Kulp writes Holo (1925:79). The situation of Phenix
village is described as follows: “In seven [xian] round about Phenix
village, Hakka is spoken. The [xian] in which the village is located is
the only one in which no Hakka is spoken.” There was thus an entire
xian from which the Phenix village lineage could presumably draw
Chaozhou-speaking wives. Yet, “when exogamous marriages with
Hakka girls bring these new brides into the village, they are faced with
the necessity of learning a new language” (ibid.: 79).
Now Kulp gives us no idea as to the extent, if any, that “exogamous
marriages with Hakka girls” were necessitated by a lack of Chaozhou
women from other lineages. What he does tell us of significance is that
the virilocal residence demanded by localized patrilineages could act as a
force maintaining dialect differences even when speakers of one dialect
might be outnumbered by and intermarry with a population speaking
another dialect. A group of male agnates could maintain their nucle-
ation and enforce dialect conformity on the part of newly arrived wives.
This fact emerges in a stronger way from Lin Yueh-hwa’s description of
the Hwang [Huang] lineage-village in northern Fujian. The founding
ancestor, we are told,
had migrated out of south Fukien [Fujian] up along the Min
River and had settled down . . . long ago in this little village of
the Hwang lineage. It was his misfortune that at the time of his
arrival all the land surrounding the village was already occupied
by the earlier settlers. Yet by dint of hard labour, he had gained
a foothold in the village. (1948:60)
Ninety-nine percent of the village population now belongs to the
Hwang lineage, and only the village inn is run by outsiders (ibid.).
Today the Hwang villagers, all of the same descent, are closely
bound together in so fierce an allegiance to each other against
66THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
outsiders that their settlement is named “the barbaric village.”
Moreover, the clan still retains a special brogue of the dialect of
South Fukien which the neighboring villages do not under-
stand. When the Hwang villagers do try to communicate with
outsiders, they must use the dialect of the whole district, the
Kutien dialect. ... To this very day the first ancestor’s descen-
dants, in their hearts as well as in their language, are truly a clan.
(Ibid.)
While it is to be doubted that Hakka is the dialect involved in this
case, it is nevertheless clear that here an alien dialect was in fact pre-
served even though to all women marrying in, it would initially be
unintelligible. Lin says that a reason for its maintenance was the mutual
reinforcement exercised by lineage solidarity and dialect differentiation.
In the context of an isolated lineage this is certainly true. But I will later
discuss the possibility that kin-based solidarity might be extended to
nonkinsmen speaking the same dialect. For our purposes, the most
important aspect of Lin’s description is that it illustrates what may be
called the “dialect-preserving” possibilities afforded by southeastern Chi-
nese lineage organization.
v
We have seen that in Guangdong and adjoining parts of Guangxi kins-
men or coresidents in the same village might unite with outsiders speak-
ing the same dialect for purposes of defense and offense. Hakka-speakers
not localized into villages also might so unite. It is thus obvious that in
regions of Hakka-Cantonese intermixture the boundaries setting off lo-
calized groupings might be rendered irrelevant in terms of alignments
based upon common or different dialect. In an effort to discern structural
coherence in large-scale mobilizations based upon common dialect we
should examine the one sociological model which takes into account the
fact that not all conflict in Southeast China proceeded along kin-based or
village lines.
Maurice Freedman has said that in Southeast China, “there would
appear to have been two alignments of conflict, which cut across each
other. In some conflicts lineages were ranged against lineages; in other
conflicts, lineages, or class sections of them, were united in their com-
mon hostility to the state” (1958:124).
I have attempted to demonstrate that the first alignment, with the
67MYRON L. COHEN
important qualification that “village” might in certain cases be substi-
tuted for “lineage,” could in mixed Hakka-Cantonese areas be involved
with alignments based upon dialect. “Common hostility to the state”
might mean membership in secret societies cutting across kin lines, and
if members were found in highly differentiated lineages we may suspect
that they gave expression to the latent opposition of the common peo-
ple to the representatives within their communities of the centralized
government.
If we accept the dichotomization of Southeast as well as the rest of
China along class lines, we must add that there is evidence that differ-
ences in dialect might qualify the common front presented against the
state. I derive this evidence entirely from William Stanton, who, when
speaking of the Triad Society in Hong Kong, notes that
in some lodges the members are chiefly Puntis, and as a whole,
these are the most lawless. . . . The members of both the Man
On and the Fuk I Hing lodges are Hoklos, and these, like the
Fukienese and others speaking a similar dialect, combine princi-
pally for mutual assistance in sickness or distress, or their quar-
rels. Some of the Hakkas combine to commit unlawful acts such
as piracy, armed robberies and blackmailing, but most of them
seem to carry out the precepts handed down and keep the aim
in view for which the Society was founded. (1900:28)
A Triad uprising in Huizhou, where Hakka live interspersed among
Cantonese, is described by Stanton:
In 1886 there was an insurrection of about three thousand Triad
men ... at Nimshan in the Waichau [Huizhou] prefecture of the
Kwangtung [Guangdong] province. This was chiefly amongst
the Hakka population and was caused by the oppressive acts of
Government officials, several of whom were slain at the first
outbreak. On this occasion four hundred men from Hong Kong,
principally stonecutters, assembled at Kowloon, armed with
swords and revolvers and commanded by two chiefs . . . whose
aim was to reinforce the Nimshan army. (Ibid.:23)
It is quite probable that these stonecutters were also Hakka. Occupa-
tional specialization in urban centers seems to a large extent to have been
divided along dialect lines, and of the many descriptions of this I will
68THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
choose from Rudolf Lechletis, who quite categorically tells us that “on
the island of Hongkong, all the stone cutters are Hakkas” (1878:359).
We see, then, that dialect alignments might be expressed in non-kin
based groupings, which as sociological entities were well established in
China. But I do not know if membership in such groupings would
completely satisfy the organizational requirements of a large Hakka
population, which might be socially differentiated. One could deduce
from the material I have presented so far that wherever the Hakka
population contained individuals of gentry rank, these might unite with
commoners in times of great duress. This has been reported by Hsiao
Kung-chuan for the fighting in Enping (1960:425), and gentry figure
prominendy in the Chiqi xianzhi s description of the mid-nineteenth-
century Hakka-Cantonese conflicts throughout central Guangdong. In
the gazetteer it is claimed that “native gentry” (tu shen) caused the
spread of the Hakka-Cantonese fighting to Xingning in 1856, by publiciz-
ing a false report of an imminent Hakka attack (Chiqi 1920:8/93). In
June of the same year, the following “Hakka gentry” (Ke sheri) were said
to have organized the defense against an expected Punti attack in a
region of Xingning xian-. the shengyuan (lowest-level degree holder)
Chen Guangzhi, and the jiansheng (next-to-the-lowest-level degree
holder) Jiang Beijun, Li Zhaolong, Chen Hongdai, and Zhong Hongsi
(ibid. :8/i3b). In the same source it is protested that gazetteers written by
Cantonese invariably give distorted descriptions of Hakka-Cantonese
conflicts. In the Xingning xianzhi (Xingning County gazetteer),
in reference to the Hakka people [Ke min], they are always
called “Hakka bandits” [Kefei]. The Hakka gentry [Ke shen] are
called “rebel chieftains” (ni shou] or are called “bandit chief-
tains” [zeishou],”
but,
in this work [Chiqi xianzhi] a fair balance is maintained in
everything recorded concerning the native populace and gentry
[tu zhong shen min]. They are always referred to as “natives” [tu
ren] or “native gentry” [tushen], (Ibid.:8/ioa-io/b)
In regard to secret societies, it can be added that, even if placed in
different “lodges,” members of the same society speaking different dia-
69MYRON L. COHEN
lects presumably would have gone through the same initiation rites (cf.
Freedman 1958:123), and in many ways feel bound together by common
obligations and aims. It may be that the establishment of “lodges” on a
dialect basis prevented tensions which otherwise would have arisen in
an organization whose hostility was toward the state and the persons
representing it, rather than toward different but equivalent sectors of
the peasant population.
To return to the question I have posed, if recognition on the basis of
common dialect did indeed involve more than kin-based and territorial
loyalties during times of Hakka-Cantonese strife, then, barring the inter-
position of peace from outside sources, it can be expected that conflicts
between different dialect populations might in an uncontrolled fashion
spread over wide areas where people speaking the different dialects lived
interspersed. This is indeed what happened in nineteenth-century
Guangdong and Guangxi, and an examination of these events will show
us that the structural problems posed were in one fashion or another
solved.
At about the middle of the last century, there seem to have been two
regions where Hakka-Cantonese conflicts were especially widespread
and violent. One was centered in the valley of the Yu River in southern
Guangxi, extending from Yongchun through Gui to Guiping. The strug-
gles were most severe in Gui, where one authority, probably in 1848,
reported that Hakka-Punti feuding had been going on for five years (Laai
1950:179). By 1850, Hakka-Cantonese conflicts had spread throughout the
southeastern part of Guangxi and into adjoining western Guangdong
(ibid.). B. C. Henry was referring to this fighting when he observed that
“the stockaded villages, forts, and barricades in the mountains [near
Hepu, in western Guangdong] bear witness to their [the Hakka’s] strug-
gles in the past” (ibid. .1886:144). The disturbances in Guangxi ultimately
would have much more than a regional significance, for it was here that
the displaced Hakka became adherents to the doctrine advocated by
Hong Xiuquan and Feng Yunshan (Boardman 1952:14). But we must for
the moment direct our attention to Guangdong proper.
The other zone of Hakka-Cantonese feuding was in central Guang-
dong, and although the conflict here had no great repercussions on a
national scale, it was the cause of much destruction within the province.
By 1851, feuding was already endemic in Enping, Kaiping, and Xinning
(Taishan), to the southwest of Canton, as well as in Zengcheng, which
was to the northeast of the same city (Luo Xianglin 1933:3). A Hakka
“informant” of Elisabeth Oehler-Heimerdinger (n.d.:63) told her that
70THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
the troubles in his region began as early as 1851, when his village was
burnt by Cantonese.
Bandits were also active in the countryside, and some of them were
associated with the Red Turbans. E. J. Eitel supplies a report by W. F.
Mayers, whom he says had a position in the English “consular service.”
According to Mayers, as given in Eitel, Cantonese hostility towards the
Hakka reached a climax when the latter assisted the government in
suppressing the “Hung-t’ow rebellion.”
For very many years clan fights have been common between the
two groups [Hakka and Punti], but the mutual antipathy grew to
a climax after 185+, in which year the Hakka clans located there
remained for the most part faithful to the government, during
the rebellion which was largely joined by the Puntis until sup-
pressed by the Viceroy Yeh. At this time, Hakka and Punti clans
dwelt interspersed over all the S. W. districts notably [Xinning,
Xinhui, Enping, Kaiping, Gaoming, and Heshan]. After the sup-
pression of the Hung-t’ow rebellion, the ill feeling between the
races took the shape of an internecine warfare, in which the
authorities were powerless to interfere. (Eitel 1873:162-63)
Luo Xianglin adds that Yangchun xian was also involved. He notes
that Hakka actively assisted in the suppression of the original rebellion,
and that in doing this (and here he is quoting from a joint report submit-
ted by the viceroy of Liang-Guang5 and the governor of Guangdong),
“their motivations were very deep.” The fighting became generalized
when the Hakka killed several members of the “native gentry,” where-
upon the Hakka-Cantonese conflict “spread like wildfire” (1933:3).
By i860, Mayers says, the fighting was so severe that there were
“shipments of arms and even the dispatch of armed steamers from
Hongkong to assist one or other of the belligerent parties” (Eitel
1873:163). Hakka speakers were gradually driven out of increasingly large
areas of the Western Circuit, an administrative district in Guangdong,
and formed many “wandering bands.” Towards the end of 1862, many of
these attacked and occupied the coastal town of Guanghai, “until driven
out by an Imperial force cooperating with the Punti clans.” During
1864, the remnants of the displaced Hakka, “who had become half
5. The Liang-Guang (lit., “two Guang”) refers to the provinces of Guangdong and
Guangxi.
71MYRON L. COHEN
banditti, half refugees,” gathered in the mountains of the Western Cir-
cuit, where
at various points. .. such as [Nafu, Jinji, Wuhang, and
Chishui] . . . they established little Republics, in which they
tilled the ground, built habitations, and defended themselves as
best as they could against the incursions of. . . [the] Punti. (Eitel
1873:163)
In 1866 several measures were taken to end the fighting and resettle
the Hakka, and in the following year the Governor of Guangdong
ordered a portion of Taishan (Xinning) xian set aside exclusively for
Hakka settlement. Cantonese in the area, which was constituted as
Chiqi ting, were ordered to give up their lands to the Hakka, in return
for which they received vacated Hakka farms in the interior (Luo
Xianglin 1933:62). There are various estimates as to the number of casual-
ties which resulted from the fighting, and Luo says that the total losses
on both sides in dead, wounded, and missing were at least five-
hundred-thousand (ibid.: 3). For our purposes, it is safe to say that many
lives were lost, and that the fighting reached very large proportions
indeed.
The fighting in Guangxi and Guangdong followed logically from the
conditions of Hakka settlement. A discussion of this involves a restate-
ment of some points already covered. That in China kinship was the
most obvious force structuring social relationships and binding people
into groupings hardly needs to be dwelt upon. For the moment we are
concerned with the larger kin-based grouping, the patrilineage. We
have seen that Hakka-speakers might be in a situation where, due to
recency of arrival and constrictions in living room, they simply would
not have localized lineages. At a certain point in their setdement they
might not even have villages, so that the defense or expansion of their
agricultural holdings could not involve rigidly defined localized group-
ings. In places where Hakka had been settled for a longer period of
time, or where there was more land available, lineages and villages could
develop. Both types of groupings, of course, are sociological entities,
and in Southeast China there was a good chance that they would be
convergent. In general, we would expect that decisions regarding con-
flicts with one’s neighbors would go through recognized channels, and
that a resolution, once made, would involve a number of people, all of
whom would be units in a recognizable social structure. But the circum-
72THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
stances of Hakka settlement were such that to limit behavior involving
defense and offense to individuals encompassed within structured rela-
tionships would, in a hostile Cantonese-speaking environment, be
highly maladaptive. Indeed, it might even be impossible, for the issue
involves a two-sided discrimination of friends and enemies. If, over a
wide area, Hakka-speakers would be engaged in expanding their hold-
ings, then Cantonese could regard them all as a common foe. During
the fighting in Guangdong a common Cantonese slogan was “Hate the
Hakka and differentiate dialects” (Chou Ke fen sheng) (ibid.:3, 116;
Oehler-Heimerdinger n.d.:64).
Though hostile attitudes and actions need not alter the structure of
the group expressing them, under certain circumstances the behavior
usually associated with structured relationships may lose its clarity of
definition. Thus, alignments on the basis of common dialect could
result in ever expanding aggregates of people being pitted against each
other. And this is what happened in Guangxi and in Guangdong. An
informant has told me that a common saying among the Hakka living in
Huiyang, a xian shared with the Cantonese, was “Acknowledge one’s
dialect, not one’s surname” (Rensheng, bu renxing).
Now, although I do not think that Oehler-Heimerdinger’s account of
the Hakka Cantonese fighting in Guangdong is proper material for
analysis, it certainly does depict widespread destruction of Hakka and
Cantonese people and villages (n.d.:6i-i26). The resultant fragmenta-
tion of even nuclear families did for a time bring chaos to wide areas. It
was under such circumstances that common or different dialect could be
the only criterion remaining by which an individual’s behavior towards
another could be defined. From Mayers’s description we may gather,
however, that the turmoil did resolve itself, insofar as discernible group-
ings developed within the Hakka population. And information in the
Chiqi xianzhi gives us a fairly good idea as to what the “republics” of
which Mayers speaks actually were. The gazetteer does not supply much
data about the specific locales mentioned by Mayers, except to refer to
them frequendy as refuges to which many Hakka fled. Other settle-
ments, however, also places of refuge, are described in greater detail.
We have already noted the involvement of Hakka gentry in the con-
flicts with the Cantonese. The Hakka gentry, whose prestige and power
within their own lineages and villages derived from participation in a
nonlocalized nationwide upper class, were in a position to direct mili-
tary activities involving Hakka-speakers from many villages and lin-
eages. Having a tradition of managerial responsibility, they played a key
73MYRON L. COHEN
role in the establishment of fortified bases within which Hakka from
over wide areas would seek protection. The gentry would organize the
manpower thus assembled into military units. Under these circum-
stances previously localized agnatic groupings, forced to come together
at restricted and strategic sites, were absorbed into larger defense units
whose only common characteristic was that of dialect. The gazetteer
tells us, for example, that in June 1856, Cantonese in what was then the
Chiqi region of Xingning killed a Hakka. The fighting spread, with the
Hakka villages in the rural subdistricts {dong) of Chonglou, Sijiu, and
Wushi undergoing attack. Additional attacks were feared, and two
Hakka gentry of the village of Chonglou, the gongsheng (holder of the
third-highest degree) Yang Zizhao and the jiansheng Yang Yuanfeng
were concerned “that since the Hakka were dispersed, their situation
was such that it would be difficult [for them] to defend themselves.”
They then issued a call, and sixteen localized lineages, which had been
distributed among eight villages, arrived at Chonglou: the Huang, Wu,
and Zhu lineages of Shishan; the Yang, Li, and Zhou lineages of
Daxiaoma; the Ye, Yang, Wei, and Zhou lineages of Huangshuihang;
the Li lineage of Tonggu; the Zhang lineage of Shijiao; the Tang and
Yang lineages of Henglong; the Lin lineage of Shangjing; and the Jiang
lineage of Pangbo. The Hakka gathered at Chonglou then “divided into
eastern and southern camps, prepared dwelling places, and considered
means of defense” (Chiqi i92o:8/i5b). Later, after additional Cantonese
attacks, the military arrangements were formalized by the “establish-
ment of a bureau” {sheju), directed by the two gentry mentioned above
and one other man. It was their task “to manage all affairs relating to the
mobilization of able-bodied men and preparations for defense” (Chiqi
I92o:8/i6a).
Another Hakka defense position was established in a coastal region of
the Western Circuit. In this area there were over four-hundred Hakka
villages, of which the gazetteer specifically names twenty-six: three of
these were single-surname villages inhabited by the Zheng, Chuan, and
Ye lineages; there were in addition six two-surname villages, distributed
across which were the Lin, Xie, Tang, Huang, Chen, Zeng, Long, and
Deng lineages or lineage aggregates. At Shenjingxu (Zheng lineage), the
following Hakka gentry “established a bureau”: the wuju (militaryjarm,
holder of the second-highest military degree), Zhong Dayong; the
shengyuan Zheng Rong, Huang Tengfang, and Chuan Tenghui; and the
wusheng (military shengyuan, holder of the lowest military degree) You
Qigao. They then “selected able-bodied men to defend it” (ibid.:8/i2a).
74THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
Many more examples of the “establishment of bureaus” could be
drawn from the gazetteer, and these involved Cantonese as well as
Hakka. Indeed, on one page of the gazetteer seven locales are cited at
which Cantonese were said to have “established bureaus” (ibid.:8/9a).
The two examples I have given, however, suffice to show that in the
absence of existing groupings capable of coping with the problems
presented by conflicts aligned along dialect lines, new groupings could
emerge. Of course, I do not know if the “establishment of bureaus” was
the only way by which the Hakka-speakers of central Guangdong
would gather for combat. Nevertheless it is clear that the very phenom-
ena of defense and offense which we are discussing must at a certain
point involve either a formal or an informal organization. Even an ad
hoc arrangement is, after all, an arrangement.
That discrimination along dialect lines involved something less than
complete confusion also emerges from work that has been done by Laai
(1950) on the formation of the Society of God Worshipers during the
Hakka-Cantonese feuding in Guangxi. I have noted that the fighting
there probably had been going on since the early 1840s, and that it had
spread to adjoining parts of Guangdong. In 1844 Hong Xiuquan and
Feng Yunshan arrived in Guangxi after having attained very little suc-
cess in propagating their ideas among the Hakka of their native Hua
xian, near Canton. In Zigu Village, Gui xian, where a “cousin” of
Hong’s with the surname Wang lived, they set about preaching an
iconoclastic, monotheistic doctrine with heavy Christian and anti-
Manchu overtones. Hong returned to Guangdong the same year, and it
was not until 1847 that he rejoined Feng in Guangxi. By that time Feng
had succeeded in attracting over three thousand converts to a religious
society now called the Society of God Worshipers (Boardman 1952:12-
14). In this presentation I am not concerned with an analysis of the
factors which led to the original conversions in Guangxi or with the
transformation of the Society into a revolutionary army. The fact re-
mains that much of the recruitment of its members revolved upon the
Society’s providing an organizational framework to which a large popu-
lation of Hakka-speakers, embroiled in a conflict with the Cantonese,
might attach themselves on the basis of common dialect.
Laai notes that there were several factors making for confusion in
Guangxi. A series of droughts afflicting the area
had the most serious effect on the land of high elevation; this
was the land cultivated by the Hakkas. In the lands which the
75MYRON L. COHEN
Hakkas rented from the Puntis, the result of the drought was to
cut productivity, so that Hakka tenants had less income and
couldn’t pay their rent. (1950:184)
During the same period (1846—50), pirate activities in the Guangxi
riverine system increased greatly (ibid.: 107), and by 1848 “the domina-
tion of the Yii River and the Hsun [Xun] River by the . . . pirates . . .
virtually isolated the . . . territories south of the rivers from the Kwangsi
[Guangxi] provincial administration” (ibid.: 143-44). Associated with
this and the unemployment resulting from the exhaustion of several
large silver mines in and about Gui xian was the appearance of many
land-based bandits (ibid.:ioj-iO4). These bandits, however, formed
only one element of what was essentially a rural response to the decline
of centralized rule. Larger villages and towns in Guangxi organized
gentry-directed tuanlian (ibid.: 185). Secret societies were also promi-
nent in the area (ibid. :17s).
In the midst of this turmoil there remained the basic duality in the
countryside between populations speaking different dialects, and so
Hakka-Cantonese feuds began to increase (ibid.: 172). Most of the larger
villages were inhabited by Cantonese-speakers, who were able to orga-
nize and finance the tuanlian on an independent local basis (ibid.: 185).
For the Hakka, who were more dispersed, such an arrangement was
impossible. Yet throughout the late 1840s an organization which
seemed to have been designed to meet the needs of the Hakka had been
developing. Although it had bases, it was not localized with respect to
membership. Its various branches, indeed, were united by a common
ideology which sharply distinguished them from other groupings. But
the Society of God Worshipers, which had been introduced into
Guangxi by two Hakka-speakers, was also notable for its linguistic
exclusiveness.
By 1850 the Society had a large membership organized into units
spread over at least fifteen xian in southeastern Guangxi and western
Guangdong (ibid.: 176—77), amounting to one-fifth of the area of the
former province, and one-sixth of that of the latter (ibid.: 184). The
membership of the Society was quite heterogeneous, and included repre-
sentatives of many specialized occupational classes in addition to “land-
owners and members of the lower intellectual class such as clerks and
graduates of public examinations” (ibid.: 167). Although no “high offi-
cials” or “persons of the high intellectual class” joined the Society, it was
unusual in that its leadership contained “wealthy persons” (ibid.:i68).
76THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
Laai sees in the diverse membership of the Society many persons
“whose interests collided.” He believes, however, “that the great driving
force which welded them together despite conflicts among themselves
was the dialect, namely the Hakka dialect, spoken among the groups
joining the Society” (ibid. 1171).
It was, of course, in the context of Hakka-Cantonese fighting that an
organization with such a variegated membership could arise. One in-
stance of a Hakka-Cantonese feud was related to the missionary Theo-
dore Hamberg by Hung Jen-kan (Hong Rengan), a relative and early
convert of Hong Xiuquan. After noting that “the . . . Hakka villages are
very numerous in Kwang-si [Guangxi], though in general not so large
and opulent as those of the Punti,” Hamberg tells how
a feeling of enmity has long existed between the two classes
[Hakka and Punti], and every new incident only served to aug-
ment the hatred. At that time a very rich Hakka of the surname
Wun had taken a girl as his concubine, who had been promised
to a Punti man, and having agreed to settle the marriage with
her parents by paying a large sum of money, he peremptorily
refused to give her up to the Punti claimant. . . . Soon after, a
civil war commenced between the Puntis and Hakkas of the
Kwei [Gui] District, in which gradually a number of villages
were involved. The fighting began on the 28th of the eighth
month [September 1850], and during the first days the Hakkas
had the advantage. . . . Gradually, however, the Puntis grew
bolder and ... as their number was considerably larger, they
defeated the Hakkas and burnt their houses, so that these had
no resting-place to which they could resort. In this distress they
sought refuge among the Worshippers of God, who at this time
lived dispersed in several districts, in congregations counting
from one to three hundred individuals. They willingly submit-
ted to any form of worship to escape from their enemies, and
received the necessary supplies, which they were now destitute
of. (1854:48-49)
While the distinctive ideology of the Society made possible its mainte-
nance over the area, it was through its provision of a structure to which
embattled Hakka could align themselves that its membership was ob-
tained. But in October 1850, the Society was ordered to mobilize, and
became an anti-Manchu revolutionary army. Many non-Hakka joined in
77MYRON L. COHEN
what was now the Taiping Rebellion (Laai 1950:197), the subsequent
development of which is beyond the scope of this essay.
CONCLUSION
I have tried to show that, through specific sequences of migration and
settlement, differences in dialect could have an important influence in the
alignment and formation of social groupings in Guangdong and
Guangxi. I have made only the most qualified attempt to develop a
concept of “dialect group.” For, if we mean by this term all speakers of
one dialect, it clearly lacks sociological validity. If, however, we take
dialect to be a sociocultural variable, in the same sense as kinship or
territoriality, I think it can be shown that the broad range of social
relationships which dialect discrimination could influence makes it a
primary force in shaping group formation. The manifestation of this
variable in sociologically significant ways depends, I believe, on the prior
existence of factors conducive to the formation of groups of many kinds.
Overpopulation and weakening imperial control certainly were such fac-
tors in nineteenth-century China (Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:503), and
throughout southern China growing rural autonomy led to the establish-
ment of localized groupings of many sorts, and for all of them defense
was a basic problem (Michael 1949). Hakka-Cantonese conflicts were
part of a larger picture, and I do not think it can be shown that the
disorders in Guangdong and Guangxi would not have occurred, albeit in
different form, if these two provinces had been occupied by Cantonese-
speakers or Hakka-speakers only. The significance of difference in dialect
is not universal, and in certain urban contexts there is indeed a tendency
for Hakka to give way to Cantonese (Forrest 1951:674). But many specific
forms of social activity did directly relate to differences in dialect, and no
statements as to the social organization of the area can be complete
without taking this into account.
The analysis made in this essay has been limited to a geographically
restricted area of China. It would be well to discuss briefly its bearing
on Chinese society as a whole. We may mention that in diverse parts of
China, and at different times, the juxtaposition of different linguistic
populations apparently could lead to primarily hostile patterns of inter-
action (cf. Hsiao Kung-chuan 1960:421-23) perhaps similar to those
which existed between the Hakka and the Cantonese. But whether such
interaction and the resultant group formation was of sufficient fre-
quency to warrant consideration as an important theme in Chinese
78THE HAKKA OR “GUEST PEOPLE”
society outside the Southeast is, to my knowledge, a question still unan-
swered. We can approach the matter from another angle, however, and
note that groupings and interpersonal relationships based upon any one
of a number of possible points of reference shared in common have
played an important part in giving Chinese society its configuration.
Morton H. Fried has spoken of this as “something which might be
called t’ungism [“tongism,” from tong, “the same; together”] . . . and
which might be translated as “togetherness” (1962:20). Tongism
applies to people drawn together because they speak the same
Chinese sublanguage, come from the same province, come from
the same county, come from the same town, or have graduated
from the same middle school or college, or are members of a
particular class year or either of these. (Ibid.:25)
The bonds of tongism thus might cut across ties of kin, class, and
residence. It is a concept broad enough to subsume groupings resulting
from different historical processes, and based upon a variety of func-
tional requirements. Indeed, the presence of such groupings contrib-
uted to the complexity of Chinese society. In this essay I have attempted
to indicate some of the developments which led the Hakka, as well as
the Cantonese, to form groupings differentiated on the basis of dialect.
In a general analysis of Chinese society these groupings may be consid-
ered examples of tongism writ large.
792 / Hakka Villagers in a Hong Kong City
The Original People of Tsuen Wan
ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
People who identify themselves as Hakka live in a wide variety of
contexts, both in China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) and over-
seas. Unlike those who are more recent immigrants to their current
places of residence, the Hakka villagers of Tsuen Wan, a district on the
southwest side of the New Territories of Hong Kong, consider them-
selves to be the original people of their area. They sometimes use the
term benturen, meaning “original people of the place,” for themselves.
This is in contrast to the term bendiren (usually rendered Punti), with
the same meaning, which is used by and in reference to those early
settlers of the New Territories who speak Cantonese. Like the Punti, the
Hakka are defined as indigenous by the Hong Kong government, and
are allowed special rights.
What does it mean to be Hakka, for people who are long-settled,
deeply attached, even now, to their land and the tombs of their ances-
tors (Hayes 1991,1993), and who were once the sole occupiers of an area
and its first identified inhabitants, sharing it only with the boat people
based in its harbor?1 Their status as original people makes them different
from the people of Shung Him Tong (see Constable, this volume) and
the other later arrivals who constitute the majority of Hong Kong’s
population.2
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 1991 conference of the Associa-
tion for Asian Studies, at a panel entitled “What Does It Mean to Be Hakka?”
1.	Ronald Ng discusses the symbiotic relationship between the Hakka and fishing
people (1969:54). In Tsuen Wan the division was less precise because the Hakka also
participated in fishing and seafood-gathering.
2.	There may also be significant cultural differences between the two original land-
dwelling groups of the New Territories, the Hakka and Cantonese. Although one impor-
tant comparative study of ethnicity in a market town has been done by C. Fred Blake
(1981), existing ethnographies of rural Cantonese and Hakka communities do not permit
comparison because those concerning Cantonese people were almost all done in large,
80HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
This question, asked now, must have a different and more complex
answer than it would have had fifty years ago. The Hakka people of
Tsuen Wan now inhabit a predominantly Cantonese-speaking city, and
have lost the economic activities that once brought them together in
shared enterprise. Some of the visible markers of Hakka cultural differ-
ence, acknowledged by them as expressions of ethnic identity, have
disappeared. These include features of women’s dress,5 the heavy out-
door work done by women, unicorn dancing,4 and the singing of moun-
tain songs while working together. They are now virtually gone in
Tsuen Wan, although somewhat in evidence in more remote areas of the
New Territories.5
During the past twenty-five years I have done two periods of field-
work in Kwan Mun Hau, a two-lineage village in central Tsuen Wan,
visited frequently, and developed close relationships with some fami-
lies.6 Initially, the question of their Hakka identity was of little con-
cern to me, and my field notes show that my informants rarely men-
tioned the fact that they are Hakka.7 More recently, I have begun
discussing this question with them and paying closer attention to
single-lineage villages, while the few Hakka ethnographies were done in small, multi-
surname villages. Without controlling size and wealth, systematic comparisons cannot be
done with confidence.
3.	These include wearing a rectangular headcloth and/or a flat hat called a “cool hat”
with a black cloth fringe, an apron made of three panels stitched together, and relatively
plain, dark clothes. The apron, headcloth, and hat are often fastened on with hand-woven
decorative bands with colored patterns (see Elizabeth Johnson 1976). These items of dress,
especially the cool hat, may sometimes be worn by others. Clothing is not a strict ethnic
marker, especially given the fluidity of the boundaries between language groups.
4.	In this region lion dancing is associated with Cantonese people and unicorn danc-
ing with Hakka. See Hayes ( [9773:225).
5.	Hakka wedding and funeral laments were also distinctive. See Blake (1978) and
Elizabeth Johnson (1988).
6.	During 1968-70 and 1975-76 I lived and did research in Kwan Mun Hau Village.
My first research was supported by Population Council, and my second by the Joint
Centre on Modern East Asia. I would particularly like to thank the people of Kwan Mun
Hau for their hospitality and help. Yau Siu-kwong, in particular, has given me valuable
and carefully-considered advice on earlier versions of this paper. Yau Yuk-lin, Yau Yuk-
kuen, Yau Chan Shek-ying, Yau Tsang Yung-hei, Yau Tin-loi, and Kwok Yung-heng and
his wife have also been very helpful. I would also like to thank those people who have
provided comments and suggestions, including James Hayes, James L. Watson, and
Graham Johnson.
7.	See Nicole Constable’s comments on the question of anthropologists’ frequent
earlier lack of attention to ethnicity in her introduction to this volume.
8lELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
some of the problems raised in this volume. For example, do the
Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau consider themselves to be “guest people”
in the sense of being sojourners? Do they consider themselves stigma-
tized because of being Hakka, as in the examples described by Nicole
Constable and Mary Erbaugh? Is the assertion of their Hakka identity
important to them, and something they would use to contrast them-
selves with others or as a basis for action, as suggested by Howard
Martin, Constable, and Myron Cohen? Finally, in the present situa-
tion of extraordinary change, is their Hakka identity something they
feel they must preserve and defend? I have concluded that most peo-
ple would give negative answers to these questions, and therefore I
must ask why this should be. In analyzing this problem, we must
examine more closely the historical background of Tsuen Wan, the
nature of the social organization that developed there, and, in particu-
lar, aspects of the political context in which Tsuen Wan people find
themselves and in which, unlike the majority of Hong Kong people,
they actively participate.
THE VILLAGES OF CONTEMPORARY TSUEN WAN
The new city of Tsuen Wan on the southwest side of Hong Kong’s New
Territories, with its industrial base and population of nearly eight hun-
dred thousand, might seem an improbable place to find Hakka people,
who are often stereotyped as being poor and rural. A walk through the
dingy industrial districts and high-rise residential developments of that
city reveals the occasional surprise: Hakka villages, their names on en-
trance arches, their ancestral halls prominent among the houses, and
their protective shrines nearby. With some effort, the regional temple to
Tian Hou, queen of heaven, can also be found, her view recently
changed from a prospect of coastal fields and rivers to a complex of
high-rise apartment blocks. There are about thirty villages in Tsuen Wan
District, all of them Hakka, as identified by themselves, outside observ-
ers, and the Hong Kong government (Hayes 1991:109). Some of the
villages remain outside the bounds of the city in their original locations
in the foothills of Tai Mou Shan, the biggest mountain in Hong Kong,
and on the nearby islands, but the majority of the original Hakka people
now live within the urban area. Most of these villages have been moved,
in their entirety, to new village-style houses in more peripheral areas to
make way for urban development. Such moves, arrived at through
protracted negotiations between the Hong Kong government and the
82HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
indigenous villagers, are a common feature of the contemporary devel-
opment of the New Territories.
Memories of the rural life of more than a generation ago remain,
however. In Kwan Mun Hau, the village I know best because it was my
fieldwork site, the small shop/mahjong parlor/social center still bears the
name Country Village Store. In the small amount of space among the
houses, some families have tiny vegetable plots and raise a few chickens.
Many material aspects of their former rural life, based on farming,
fishing, and firewood-cutting, are preserved in the neighboring village
of Sam Tung Uk, which, because of its distinctive Hakka architecture (it
is an enclosed compound with a central ancestral hall) has been restored
as a museum.
RECENT HISTORY
There were approximately seven hundred villages in the New Territories
in 1898, and slighdy less than half of the population at that time was
Hakka, the great majority of the remainder being land- or water-
dwelling Cantonese speakers (Hayes 1983:4). The Hakka people of the
New Territories are part of a continuous line of Hakka settlement from
Bao’an County (now incorporated into the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone) through eastern Guangdong and into Fujian, these being the
most recent points of origin of the Hakka migrants to the New Territo-
ries during the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) (Blake 1981:10). There are areas
of the New Territories in which the majority of the original population
is Hakka, including Sai Kung, Sha Tin, the Hang Hau Peninsula and
the Tai Po region (Hong Kong 1957:38). In Sha Tau Kok (Allen Uck
Lunn Chun 1985:230) and Tsuen Wan all the indigenous villages are
Hakka.
The Hakka people ofTsuen Wan are in many ways different from the
others presented in this volume, and not simply because they are now
urban, as are those studied by Ellen Oxfeld. They differ also in the fact
that they consider Tsuen Wan to be their native place, where they
belong to an integrated complex of lineages and villages, a separate
social system located within the physical environment of the city. Their
lineage and marriage ties extend through the New Territories and across
the border into Guangdong. Their tombs, beginning with those of the
founding ancestors, who arrived near the beginning of the Qing dy-
nasty, are widely dispersed through the hills of the New Territories.
Unlike the Hakka people of Calcutta (Oxfeld, this volume), they do not
8?ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
consider that they are “still guest people” who might move on, but
“Tsuen Wan people” and “original local people.” The memory of their
migration to Tsuen Wan, originally from North China and later from
adjacent areas of Southeast China, is preserved in their genealogies, in
oral tradition concerning the arrival and setdement of ancestors, and, in
the case of the Yau lineage of Kwan Mun Hau Village, in the couplet on
the boards hung outside the ancestral hall at festivals, which states
The descendants of those who came from Henan continue;
The customs of the North are retained.
Although Tsuen Wan people do not consider themselves to be so-
journers, this is not to say that emigration from Tsuen Wan did not take
place. From the middle of the nineteenth century through the first
decades of the twentieth, Tsuen Wan men went abroad looking for
improved economic opportunities. A few found them, but the majority
did not return wealthy. The tablet commemorating the 1897 renovation
of the Tian Hou Temple records large numbers of donations from
Tsuen Wan emigrants in many parts of the world, as widely scattered as
Hawaii, South Africa, Panama, the Caribbean, North America, and
Southeast Asia, although Tsuen Wan had only about three thousand
people at that time (Hayes 1983:115—16). The dispersed nature of the
migration and the fact that contributions were sent back suggests that
these emigrants saw themselves as sojourners abroad, although some
stayed permanently in Southeast Asia and established lineage branches
there (Aijmer 1967). In contrast to more remote areas of the New
Territories, where emigration has increased during the twentieth cen-
tury (e.g., James Watson 1975), it has become less necessary in Tsuen
Wan because of the new economic opportunities there, although re-
cently some people have sought foreign residence to improve their
political security and their children’s educational opportunities.
Most of the earliest members of the Tsuen Wan lineages arrived there
in the first half of the eighteenth century. That they settled on land that
had once been occupied by others is suggested by the fact that they paid
“land tax” to the Tang (Deng) lineage of the New Territories. This im-
plies that the Tang had had earlier tenants there, before the earlier Qing
evacuation of the coast (1662—69), although their control could have
been asserted after Hakka settlement of the region (Hayes 1983:118—19).
Regardless, the rescinding of the evacuation order allowed Hakka people
to move onto the vacated lands. Local oral tradition suggests there may
8+HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
have been evidence of earlier settlers. One variant of the story associated
with the Kwan Mun Hau earth god shrine to the Nine Honorable Grand-
fathers states that the Chan lineage founder was joined in doing martial
arts by the ghosts of nine men who had lived in the area making salt, and
who had died defending it from pirates. After his first rice harvest, he is
said to have built a shrine in their honor, and they have continued to be
worshiped as protectors of the village.
Oral tradition about early settlers also includes Tsuen Wan people’s
assumption that language affiliation, the basis of their cultural identity,
is not fixed, but may change over time. Several people I interviewed
expressed the conviction that some of the Tsuen Wan lineages were
originally Hoklo or Cantonese, but became Hakka over time. A mem-
ber of one lineage said that one of its branches became Chaozhou
(Teochew) after emigrating to Southeast Asia. A well-known example
of language change in the New Territories is the Liao lineage of Sheung
Shui, now Cantonese, whose members say they were once Hakka and
who still maintain close ties with some small Hakka lineages (Baker
1968:28, 38-41, 195). James Hayes found lineages and villages that
claimed to have changed language affiliation over time, and he also
reports that there are areas of the New Territories where a mixture of
Cantonese and Hakka is spoken, and some villages where there are
speakers of both languages (19773:29—30, 207). In Tsuen Wan local
people discussed past changes in dialect affiliation by their own and
other local lineages without concern at acknowledging that they had
not always been Hakka. This may be because Tsuen Wan people have
had little involvement in the twentieth-century Hakka-identity move-
ment, with its concern for asserting the existence of essential and distinc-
tive Hakka characteristics and a unique history.8
THE NEW TERRITORIES POLITICAL CONTEXT
In 1898 the New Territories was leased to Britain, joining the original
colony of Hong Kong Island, and its later addition of Kowloon. The
eighty-four thousand indigenous inhabitants were guaranteed special
rights by the Convention of Peking and administrative proclamations
made at that time (Hayes 1991:116). Since then these have been defined
to include the right to maintain rights to their family and lineage lands,
8.	This is in contrast to the village of Shung Him Tong, made up of Hakka people of
diverse origins, described by Constable in this volume.
85ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
although these were registered and became subject to regulation of use
and even the possibility of resumption, with compensation, by govern-
ment; the right to bury their dead in the hills; the right to manage
property and kinship relations according to various aspects of Chinese
customary law, as interpreted by themselves and the district officers;
and, after World War II, the right to elect representatives to the govern-
ing bodies of the New Territories (Hayes 1993:96, personal communica-
tion; Graham E. Johnson 1973:110; 1977).
Early in this century, some New Territories villages were moved to
make way for reservoir construction. In recent years, as the New Territo-
ries development plan has involved the creation of new cities where
market towns had been before, old villages have been destroyed and the
villagers moved to new housing after negotiations to determine the
terms of settlement. These include the costs of the necessary rituals
(Hayes 1991)- In such situations, agricultural land has been converted
through various mechanisms to building land, which often, if wisely
managed, has provided villagers with a new source of income from the
rental of flats and buildings. Those Kwan Mun Hau families who had
larger holdings and who managed to keep their land during and after
World War II now have comfortable incomes from rents, and the two
lineages of the village, the Yau and Chan, have regular income from the
urban property held in the trusts of their founding ancestors and vari-
ous smaller trusts. In the late 1960s the Yau lineage had the reputation of
being the best-managed and most prosperous in Tsuen Wan. The in-
come from the urban property of this lineage now enables the members
not only to maintain their hall and tombs and to worship at the tombs
annually in impressive style, but also to divide cash profits on a regular
basis. The Chan lineage also sends buses of members to worship at the
tombs of ancestors during the Chong Yang Festival in the ninth lunar
month. Over a period of at least two weeks, both Yan and Chan lineages
worship at the tombs of their ancestors in descending order, starting
with those immediately above their local founders and ending with
recent generations. Large numbers of people and impressive offerings
are involved in the worship of ancestors, and banquets follow.
Lineages and villages are not coterminous in Tsuen Wan, as some
villages include more than one lineage and some lineages have members
in more than one village or hamlet. The villages of central Tsuen Wan
are also drawn together by their common worship at the Tian Hou
Temple, and collectively sponsored opera performances celebrating
Tian Hou’s birthday (by Cantonese, not Hakka troupes) have recently
86HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
been resumed. A chamber adjoining the Tian Hou Temple is devoted to
commemorating twenty-seven martyrs killed in a prolonged mid-
nineteenth-century conflict with Shing Mun, a cluster of villages higher
up the mountain that were moved in the late 1920s to make way for a
reservoir (Hayes 1977b). Despite the temporal correspondence of this
battle with the Hakka-Punti wars, these villages were also Hakka, and
there is no written or oral record of conflict with people of other dialect
groups. Every year at the autumn equinox the Tsuen Wan Rural Com-
mittee gathers here, their presence announced by the temple bell, for
formal worship first of Tian Hou, and then of the martyrs.9 They also
worship annually at the collective tombs, where unidentified bones are
placed (Hayes 1991:128).10
The continuation of this practice suggests that Tsuen Wan local lead-
ers still feel loyalty to the region they represent, loyalty that must be
expressed through ritual as well as political participation. According to
Ronald Ng, “In a Hakka community there does not seem to be a
decrease in the intensity of loyalty from family to clan, clan to village, or
village to community as is experienced in other parts of the New Territo-
ries. This may largely account for the stability of Hakka society”
(1969:59) In Kwan Mun Hau people affirmed the close relationship
between the two lineages, and the pennant used by the Yau lineage
proclaims that “the Yau lineage of Tsuen Wan sweeps its tombs,” rather
than identifying them with their primary village. Tsuen Wan was origi-
nally united by an alliance (yue) and a governing body of elders called
the Tsuen On Kuk, which met before World War II in the Tian Hou
Temple and regulated local affairs (Graham E. Johnson 1977:110). The
unity of the locality is now strongly reinforced by the current political
system, which gives a degree of political power and considerable eco-
9.	John Brim (1974) describes the roots of village-alliance temples in local-level social
organization.
10.	Responsibility for the occasional worship of affinal ancestors and others with
whom those responsible have kinship ties is a topic that merits further investigation. This
is not done routinely, but only for those who are apparendy special cases, perhaps people
without descendants. The Yau lineage of Tsuen Wan worships at a tomb shared by a
couple who may be the founder’s wife’s parents and a long-term servant of their founding
ancestor. According to James Hayes, the second ancestral hall of the Ho lineage of Muk
Min Ha Village in Tsuen Wan is devoted to the founder’s wife’s parents, and the Chung
lineage of Hoi Pa Village has taken responsibility for the tombs of some unknown people
(personal communication, 1992). Allen Chun also describes the worship of affinal ances-
tors (1985:290-91).
87ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
nomic advantage to the indigenous people. Each district has its rural
committee, which represents its original people to the government, and
the New Territories as a whole has an advisory body called the Rural
Consultative Committee (Heung Yee Kuk), a formal system that was
instituted in 1948 (Hayes 1991:115; Graham E. Johnson 1973:112). These
bodies help to create bonds of common interest among the indigenous
people regardless of their dialect affiliation.
Their status as indigenous people of the New Territories is important
to Tsuen Wan people—apparently much more important than the fact
that they are also Hakka. The Tsuen Wan people I interviewed in the
late 1960s in general did not spontaneously compare themselves with
those of other dialect groups and rarely made statements about Hakka
characteristics.11 Those statements that were made were often not flatter-
ing, having to do primarily with the hard work of women as opposed to
men. Unlike the Hakka Christians of diverse origins quoted by Nicole
Constable (this volume), the Tsuen Wan people I interviewed did not
show familiarity with the literature or discourse extolling the superior-
ity of Hakka traits and the historical accomplishments of Hakka indi-
viduals.11 12 In Kwan Mun Hau in the late 1960s, a few men belonged to
the Chongzheng Hui (an international Hakka association), although
this may have been a means of expressing their pro-Taiwan sentiments
in a time of severe political polarization. The greater portion of the
Kwan Mun Hau people were left-wing, and so to join this association
would have been a political impossibility. Furthermore, to do so would
seem, I would think, redundant, because being Hakka is an assumed
part of their identity and there are no apparent instrumental reasons for
asserting it. Other aspects of their identity are more salient, and useful,
these being the fact that they are Tsuen Wan people and New Territories
natives. Both of these constitute defined groups, while Hakka is an
unbounded category. The terms “Tsuen Wan people” and “New Territo-
ries natives” have political definitions, and both carry political and eco-
11.	Sharon Carstens (this volume) found the people of Pulai to show similar attitudes
and behavior, in contrast to the people of Shung Him Tong (Constable, this volume).
12.	Examples of this rhetoric can be found in the publications of the Tsung Tsin
(Hakka) Association in Vancouver, B.C., which includes Hakka people who immigrated
to Canada from a remarkable variety of countries around the world. For example, their
twentieth-anniversary publication includes this statement: “The Hakkas are considered to
be the cream of the Chinese race. They are being described as hard working, independent,
patriotic, willing to accept challenges, never satisfied with less than the best in the pursuit
of education and a strong cohesive family orientation.”
88HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
nomic benefits. To emphasize language differences within this context,
at present, would seem not at all advantageous. In general, Tsuen Wan
natives in the late 1960s participated only in the Sports Association and
the Chamber of Commerce, both associations of their own creation.
The voluntary associations proliferating at that time met the needs of
immigrants who lacked the kinship and locality ties of the Tsuen Wan
people (Graham E. Johnson 1973).
RELATIONS WITH NON-HAKKA PEOPLE
After an initial resistance to the appearance of non-Hakka outsiders in
their district, Tsuen Wan people seem to have developed an open-
minded attitude towards them, especially as the economic advantage of
the rents they paid became evident. Some people said they learned to
understand the dialects their tenants spoke. However, during the pro-
cess of village relocation, James Hayes observed a clear process of “puri-
fication,” in which nonlineage property owners were denied the right to
move to the new village sites, “to regain the original lineage composi-
tion of the setdements” (1991:122). It seems that they were asserting
their prior rights as original settlers, and disadvantaging later claims.
The men I interviewed were able, when questioned, to make compari-
sons between themselves and the immigrants to Tsuen Wan, although
they were thinking of themselves as indigenous people, not necessarily
as Hakka. Their answers are revealing both in the nature of the self-
image they show and in the extent of consensus they reflect. They stated
that outsiders were more capable and enterprising than natives, and
much better able to earn money. The bitterness of their earlier poverty
and the hard work required to survive were very important to them, and
were freely acknowledged by both men and women. Hayes says: “The
Tsuen Wan area was poor. The local elders never failed to impress this
point upon one” (1983:123). C. Fred Blake’s work on ethnicity in the
town of Sai Kung in the New Territories describes an awareness of a
“legacy of poverty” (1981:150) as being characteristic of Hakka people
there; this is also the case in Tsuen Wan. Their willingness to state this
may be more typical of Hakka people.
The men interviewed also said that outsiders were forced by circum-
stances to be self-reliant, and that they were free “like birds” to go
wherever there might be opportunities, while natives were tied to one
place. On the other hand, they said that they themselves were able to
depend on the property their ancestors had left them, and that they
89ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
were unified when necessity demanded it and would support each other
in conflicts. Outsiders were fragmented and had only voluntary associa-
tions to bring them together. Nicole Constable illustrates the role of
voluntary associations well in her chapter, showing how Hakka immi-
grants of diverse origins created a village, church, and cemetery that
provided them with an identity contrasting with those around them
(this volume). In contrast, Tsuen Wan people do not need to assert their
Hakka identity because they can draw on their long-established lineage,
village, and regional ties for support.
Despite Kwan Mun Hau men’s statements that they felt somewhat
inadequate in relation to the newcomers around them, I never heard
anyone express a sense of being stigmatized because of being Hakka,
despite the assertions in the literature that such discrimination exists (cf.
Constable and Erbaugh, this volume). According to my observations,
being Hakka was neither a matter of shame nor pride, but simply one
aspect of their being, acknowledged, but not asserted. Only once was I
told a story suggesting discriminatory attitudes on the part of others—
it was reported that a man who married a Hakka woman was told that it
was like marrying a water buffalo, but the story ended positively with
the teller reporting that the woman demonstrated her worth during a
water shortage by being able to carry water up six flights of stairs. This
lack of sense of stigma may come in part from the fact that Tsuen Wan
people dominated their region, and had no nearby wealthy or more
powerful members of another dialect group with whom they might be
compared. One also has to ask whether it might be a stereotype that has
been perpetuated by the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
writings on the Hakka, with little social reality.
EXPRESSIONS OF HAKKA CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
An indicator of whether Tsuen Wan people feel that being Hakka is an
important part of their identity, worthy of preservation, is the fate of
their language in a situation in which they are surrounded with speakers
of other dialects, overwhelmingly Cantonese. These include even their
tenants, who are now half the population of Kwan Mun Hau Village.
Before the Second World War, Hakka was virtually universal in the
region, and the schools taught in Hakka, with the exception of one
Cantonese school that existed even then. Those who worked outside the
area had to be able to function in Cantonese. One man told me that he
and his father went to the Cantonese-language school because it was
90HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
appropriate to do so when they were surrounded by Cantonese people.
In Kwan Mun Hau, by the late 1960s all except the oldest women and
one or two illiterate men were able to speak Cantonese. Today middle-
aged and younger people speak unaccented Cantonese and no one
would be aware of their Hakka identity outside the village context.
Within the village, however, and when village people are together in
public places such as teahouses, those who are middle-aged and older
use Hakka by choice. At the 1992 Chong Yang tomb worship of the Yau
lineage, Hakka was predominant, although people switched comfort-
ably back and forth to accommodate non-Hakka wives and those chil-
dren who do not speak it. The ancestors were addressed in Hakka. The
previous year, the women I observed making offerings at the ancestral
halls and shrines during the Winter Solstice Festival also spoke among
themselves in Hakka. Likewise, the men attending the worship at the
martyrs’ shrine spoke Hakka among themselves and it was the language
of the ceremony. Their continued use of Hakka in situations where it
would be equally convenient to speak Cantonese suggests that it re-
mains meaningful to them as a familiar mother tongue and a symbol of
shared identity. That identity has many aspects, however, including
their ties to their locality, villages, and lineages. Tsuen Wan people’s
general lack of spontaneous assertion of their Hakka identity suggests
that the locality aspects may be more important.
One recent development that may help to perpetuate their use of
Hakka is the reactivation of ties with related lineages in the Hakka-
speaking areas over the border in Guangdong, where most of the peo-
ple do not speak Cantonese. I have never heard concern expressed that
the language should be preserved, however, although young people
who do not understand it may be teased within the village. One man
who is deeply involved in lineage affairs and local history said that he is
making no effort to teach Hakka to his son, because it will be of no use
to him and, ironically, because he might be teased by other people if he
used it. The fact that Hakka continues to be used at present among the
local people, who are equally fluent in Cantonese, suggests that it is
considered appropriate in this context and is comfortably familiar, but
the realization that it may disappear within a generation does not seem
to be cause for concern. One factor mitigating against the preservation
of Hakka is the fact that many men now marry Cantonese women or
those of other origins, again a situation that does not seem to be cause
for concern, even though this may mean that these women do not know
how to conduct rituals such as ancestor worship correctly. In the past
91ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
Tsuen Wan men obtained wives from within the district, but also from
widely dispersed Hakka areas of the New Territories, including Tai Po,
Sha Tin, and Yuen Long.1’ As marriages are no longer arranged, old
networks no longer function, and wives come from disparate origins.
Certain foods, made specially for festivals, are identified by local
people as being Hakka and are still made for offerings, gifts, and family
consumption. These include steamed cakes made for festivals, rice-flour
balls boiled in sugar syrup made before a daughter is married, and
various special dishes cooked for lineage and wedding banquets. Al-
though these familiar foods are still made and valued, others are being
added to the repertoire. The local Hakka restaurant, formerly the site of
banquets, is now in danger of going out of business as people choose
the more elegant, diverse, and expensive foods offered by other cuisines.
Precisely specified foods are presented as part of the bride price to the
families of Hakka brides, but adaptations to the requirements of others
are made if the bride is not Hakka. Like other changes, this is treated in
a matter-of-fact way, without regret for the loss of conformity to local
tradition.
As with language and food customs, the details of ritual practice may
be defined as “habitus”13 14—learned ways of doing important things
correctly—and valued, or at least followed, in a private context, but not
understood or articulated in a way that makes a public statement of
identity. Publicly conducted ancestor worship—the Chong Yang wor-
ship at lineage tombs, which is highly visible as the buses set off from
the village with flags flying—is not markedly different from that of
Cantonese lineages in the New Territories, except perhaps for the exten-
sive participation of women and the simplicity of the paper offerings.
Within the villages, however, the visible expressions of hall and domes-
tic worship are distinctively Hakka. The single tablet in the ancestral
hall was stated by some informants to be specifically Hakka. Anthro-
pologists also have noted this difference from the local Cantonese (e.g.,
Blake 1981:92). Domestic worship is conspicuous by its virtual absence.
While Cantonese families in the New Territories maintain and worship
extensive ancestral tablets at home (e.g., Nelson 1974), Hakka ancestors
are represented by soul tablets at home only in those cases in which
their souls have not yet been installed in the single collective tablet in
13.	About 15 percent of the wives in my 1970 census sample came from Tsuen Wan; the
remainder came from widely scattered areas.
14.	See Carstens (this volume) and Bourdieu (1977).
92HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
the ancestral hall. Very few Kwan Mun Hau homes had ancestral tablets
in the late 1960s. The rule generally followed is that a soul cannot be
incorporated into the hall tablet while there are senior members of the
family still living. At the ceremony held shortly after the death of a
senior person, those souls that are waiting can be incorporated into the
hall tablet with him or her. The ceremony, conducted by a Hakka priest,
involves carrying temporary tablets, with their incense pots, to the
ancestral hall, and passing tablets and their incense pots over a red cloth
to the main altar, where the incense ashes are added to those in the main
hall incense pot.
The single tablet is the focal point of each ancestral hall, in contrast to
Cantonese halls, with their many rows of individual tablets, represent-
ing the souls of those lineage members wealthy or genealogically impor-
tant enough to have had tablets installed on their behalf. Each Hakka
tablet that I have seen has the following inscription, sometimes supple-
mented with an additional character on each side: “The spirit place of
the ancestral deceased father and deceased mother of the — descent
group hall.” The tablet stands behind a small incense pot on the altar
that is flush against the back wall, under which is an earth-god shrine.
In front of the altar is a table, decorated with an embroidered cloth on
special occasions, where the incense pot is placed and where there are
lamps and other fittings. It is here that offerings and flowers, as well as
incense and candles, are placed on special occasions. A knowledgeable
senior member of the Yau lineage, Yau Chung-fan, explained several
important aspects of the tablet’s meaning as follows:
Its real meaning is the founder’s soul, but its secondary meaning
is for all the people of the Yau lineage who have passed the age
of sixty. . . . The main purpose of the tablet is to represent the
founder; remembering the rest is only secondary. This is the
easiest method to remember the others. It is too complicated to
have other tablets in the hall. This is the main difference be-
tween Hakka and Cantonese. The Hakka’s are almost the same
as theirs, but simpler.
People attributed this characteristic of simplicity to themselves in vari-
ous contexts: simpler foods, simpler rituals and offerings, simpler
good wishes on special occasions. They do not organize ceremonies
of purification every ten years, for example, nor do they make offer-
93ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
ings to hungry ghosts, relying instead on their ancestors to protect
them.1’
In Hakka lineages ancestor worship other than tomb worship has a
single focus, the ancestral hall, and home worship is both rare and
temporary. This corresponds to Myron Cohen’s description of Hakka
ancestor worship in Taiwan, which also has a single focus, the collective
tablet(s) in the compound hall (1969:170—74). In Kwan Mun Hau,
ancestors’ identities are merged in the context of hall worship, and their
birth and death days are not formally recognized. Hall worship is charac-
terized by unity, clarity of focus, and inclusiveness. The emphasis is on
the founder, the first person to open the place, and on the merged but
acknowledged identities of all those who followed him (see also Aijmer
1967:57). Their individual identities are recognized in the genealogy, but
not the hall. In contrast, for Cantonese people in the New Territories
ancestor worship normally has two focal points, the hall and the home,
and so it has an individualized aspect as well as a collective one.15 16 Its
hierarchical and selective nature is also significant, in that only the
wealthy and important receive hall worship, and oldest sons would, in
theory at least, have responsibility for worshiping home tablets.
The practice of hall and tomb worship of ancestors in Kwan Mun Hau
appears to be different from that of local Cantonese lineages in that
women participate, although comparisons should be made with caution
because most research on Cantonese people has been done in large single-
lineage villages. Women began to participate after the Second World War,
according to one informant. At most major festivals they can be seen
carrying offerings to the ancestral halls, and they join in the Chong Yang
tomb worship, although they play a secondary role and also do most of
the heavy work' Men take charge at New Year and during wedding
rituals, and they also have sole responsibility for the conduct of lineage
affairs, including the management of lineage property. In contrast to the
Christian women of Shung Him Tong, Kwan Mun Hau women, despite
the importance of their former economic role, do not have the right to
speak publicly in formal lineage or village contexts.
15.	C. Fred Blake says that Hakka people in the Sai Hung region of Hong Kong also
favor simplicity in the worship of gods, and are critical of the ritual expenditures of
Chaozhou people (1981:103), who come from eastern Guangdong and speak a dialect
related to Fujianese.
16.	Howard Nelson, however, says that small Cantonese surname groups may worship
ancestors at small halls instead of at home (1974:263-64).
94HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
The practice of ancestor worship in Kwan Mun Hau has continued
despite urbanization, and in fact has been reinforced by the increasing
values of the ancestral trusts. A minority of Tsuen Wan lineages are
Christian and they minimize hall ritual and conduct tomb worship
differently. In Kwan Mun Hau carrying out the worship properly—
following traditions that have been learned and whose practice may be
beneficial to the dead and the living—seems to be a source of comfort
and pride. People who are not lineage members may be invited to
participate in the banquets that follow, and having the means to carry
out these affairs, and also weddings and funerals, properly and well,
must be a source of satisfaction. Unlike the Hakka cemetery of Shung
Him Tong, however, they do not seem to be used to assert the legiti-
macy, worthiness, or identity of the group. Visitors are not taken to the
ancestral hall and shown it as a statement of legitimacy. It is maintained
because lineage members have inherited an obligation to do so, as they
also inherited the ancestor’s property.
CONCLUSIONS
Those aspects of the lives of Tsuen Wan villagers that remain distinc-
tively Hakka, particularly their language and the practice of ancestor
worship, have been maintained in a situation where it has not been
necessary to do so. In addition to the people’s strongly felt obligation to
worship their ancestors, they still use their language among themselves,
although this may not continue into the next generation. These prac-
tices can be seen as private and shared symbols of common identity, but
not as public assertions of Hakka distinctiveness. They normally are
expressed only within a private context, not when Hakka interact with
others, and so cannot be seen as maintaining ethnic boundaries.17
The people of Tsuen Wan seem to accept being Hakka, and the
practices that help to express this, as one aspect of their multifaceted
identity. This includes, most importantly, the fact that they are Chi-
nese,18 but also their identification with their locality, as New Territories
natives and Tsuen Wan people. The fact that the Hakka aspect of their
identity is becoming increasingly limited and situation-specific in its
17.	Important theoretical statements on ethnic-group interaction and boundary main-
tenance are found in Barth (1969).
18.	Barbara Ward (1965) presents a clear and thought-provoking analysis of Kau Sai
fishing people’s sense of their identity in relation to other Chinese people.
95ELIZABETH LOMINSKA JOHNSON
expression and visibility does not seem to be perceived as a problem.
Until now they have participated very little in the movement to research
Hakka history and extol the accomplishments of earlier Hakka people.
Their energies, instead, have gone into increasing and preserving knowl-
edge of their own lineages.19 The Yau lineage has added to its genealogy
through contact with related groups in China, and has twice printed
revisions for all its member families. Maintaining their villages and
tombs and defending them against the incursions of urban development
have also been ongoing concerns (Hayes 1991). They have felt little need
to draw on their Hakka identity as a platform for social or political
action because their lineages, villages, and regional ties provide them
with a strong base.
As Howard Martin demonstrates, however, circumstances can change
and cultural differences can become the basis for politically self-aware
action groups. Various changes are taking place in Hong Kong that may
affect Tsuen Wan people’s sense of their own identity. One is a growing
interest in Hong Kong local history, fostered by the government’s alloca-
tion of resources to create museums and designate historic sites. Al-
though the Sam Tung Uk Museum was created with little local input,
people are at least aware of its existence. One young man told me he goes
there from time to time to look around; an older man said he wouldn’t go
“because I know all about Hakka things!” Still, it is a publicly visible
expression of the history of the Hakka people of Tsuen Wan, much-
visited by other Hong Kong people. In the last few years one local leader
has organized the public singing of Hakka mountain songs during the
Tian Hou Festival, an event that apparendy is enthusiastically attended,
although the singers have to be brought from the more rural area of Sai
Kung. The development of local history museums in Hong Kong is
paralleled by a growing academic interest in Hakka history and culture.
The First International Conference on Hakkaology was held in 1992 at
the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and a number of such conferences
have been held recently in the People’s Republic of China, where research
on this subject is being supported for the first time in forty years. The
attention given to these events in the media may help to increase the
interest of local Hakka people in their own language, history, and culture.
The political situation of Hong Kong is also changing, and the future
is uncertain, to say the least. This uncertainty may be one reason why
19- James Hayes states that over half of the fifty Tsuen Wan lineages have genealogies,
and that twelve more had them until the Second World War (1983:117).
96HAKKA VILLAGERS IN A HONG KONG CITY
people seem to be showing increasing interest in Hong Kong’s distinc-
tive local history and culture, knowing that they may soon be threat-
ened. The rights—or, some would say, privileges—of the indigenous
people have been, and continue to be, questioned (Graham E. Johnson
1977),20 and after 1997, when Hong Kong becomes part of China once
again, there may be less tolerance for the system that has supported
their special status. Certainly China for several decades after 1949 did
not demonstrate support for lineages and their property, but in the
years since the open-door policy was implemented in 1978 there has
been increasing tolerance that is reflected in the rebuilding of halls and
tombs, especially in areas with Hong Kong and overseas Chinese con-
nections (see Woon 1989). If it were to happen that indigenous status no
longer gave New Territories people a power base, they might, as How-
ard Martin (this volume) suggests, turn to their Hakka identity as
another basis for organization. Although one would predict that being
Hakka would continue to become increasingly irrelevant in contempo-
rary Hong Kong, new circumstances may result in another change in
the lives of Tsuen Wan people.
20. See also, for example, an article in the South China. Morning Post, weekend of
January 2-3, 1993, headed “NT Villagers Cash in with Secret Deals.”
97$/ Poverty, Piety, and the Past
Hakka Christian Expressions of 'Hakka Identity
NICOLE CONSTABLE
Shung Him Tong Tsuen, the village of the “hall of humble worship,” is
a Hakka Protestant community that was founded in the northeastern
part of the New Territories of Hong Kong in 1903. From the time of my
earliest contact with Shung Him Tong people in 1984, and again when I
conducted a year of field research there in 1986 and 1987,1 was struck by
the apparent facility (sometimes bordering on a sense of urgency) with
which many Shung Him Tong people spoke of being Hakka. They
referred to themselves as Hakka with a strong sense of pride, they
directed me to books and theories about Hakka history, and they
spewed off long lists of famous Hakka people without batting an eye.
Although not everyone there could be considered an active bearer of
Hakka identity, Hakka is an important element of Shung Him Tong
community identity.
The Hakka consciousness exhibited by a number of Shung Him Tong
people was very different from the attitude of other people whom I
encountered in Hong Kong who claimed that their ancestors were
Hakka but that they no longer were, or who said that Hakka identity is
no longer important or meaningful in Hong Kong, or who admitted
when pressed that they were of Hakka ancestry, but who never took it
upon themselves to advocate its value or importance.
I am grateful to the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council for
Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council; the National Endowment for
the Humanities Summer Stipend Program; the University of California at Berkeley,
Humanities Research Grant; and the Western Michigan University Faculty Research and
Creative Activities Support Fund for supporting the research upon which this chapter is
based. I also wish to thank Joseph S. Alter, Nancy Abelmann, Kathleen Adams, Jeanne
Bergman, Andrew Y. L. Cheung, Stevan Harrell, Mary Porter, William A. Shack, Robert
Sundick, and James L. Watson for comments, suggestions, and encouragement. An earlier
version of this chapter was presented at the 1991 conference of the Association for Asian
Studies, at a panel entided “What Does It Mean to Be Hakka?”
98POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
The sense of Hakka identity that exists in Shung Him Tong seems to
be much stronger and more clearly and self-consciously articulated than
that among the Malaysian Hakka described by Sharon Carstens (this
volume), or the Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau only a few miles away,
described by Elizabeth Johnson (this volume). Unlike the people of
Kwan Mun Hau, who have maintained certain Hakka traditions but
who do not seem to have a correspondingly strong or conscious sense
of Hakka identity, the people of Shung Him Tong lack a number of
practices that are sometimes said to characterize the Hakka in Hong
Kong. For example, unlike the people of Kwan Mun Hau, they have no
ancestral halls that can be distinguished in style from those of their
Cantonese neighbors and they do not practice a distinct form of ances-
tor worship that might be identified as Hakka. Like many Hakka in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Calcutta, their Hakka language also
appears to be on the decline, and they no longer dress in clothes that
were once considered distinctively Hakka, nor do they sing Hakka
mountain songs.1 Yet despite the lack of certain traditional cultural
markers, their Hakka identity, in many ways, remains vital, and thus it
demands further explanation.
Several factors might account for the striking difference in the sense
of importance of Hakka identity in Kwan Mun Hau and Shung Him
Tong. The Hakka of Kwan Mun Hau are Punti (i.e., legally classified as
“native” or “indigenous” inhabitants, pre-1898 residents of the New
Territories) or what they call bentu. As such, they receive political and
economic benefits as Tsuen Wan people and as New Territories natives.
In contrast, the people of Shung Him Tong are relative newcomers, and
an ethnic minority in what has been a predominantly Cantonese-
speaking Punti region of the New Territories. Such differences in their
social status might suggest that Hakka identity is maintained in Shung
Him Tong because of its political or economic salience.
Certainly during the early decades of the community, especially during
the 1920s and 1930s, this was one part of the picture. At that time, when
1.	I found, as Elizabeth Johnson did in Tsuen Wan, that Cantonese is spoken fluendy
by all but the oldest residents of Shung Him Tong. Some young people speak only
Cantonese, but many could understand and also speak Hakka. My research was carried
out mainly in Cantonese and English, and thus the spoken Chinese that is cited in this
essay is romanized Cantonese following the Yale system in Parker Huang’s Cantonese
Dictionary (1970). Other Chinese terms follow the Mandarin pinyin romanization, while
place names in Hong Kong follow the local spellings according to the Gazetteer of Place
Names (Hong Kong i960) or Hong Kong Streets and Places (Hong Kong 1983,1985).
99NICOLE CONSTABLE
Cantonese Punti in the region wielded more economic and political
power than they do today, allying themselves with other Hakka-speakers
yielded certain advantages for Shung Him Tong people. Many became
financially prosperous and some attained powerful posts in the Hong
Kong government. By the 1940s and 1950s the conflicts that corre-
sponded to Hakka-Cantonese differences around Shung Him Tong and
in Hong Kong at large, however, had greatly diminished, as had the
economic differences between the two groups. Today the interests of the
people of Shung Him Tong no longer align with ethnic divisions as they
may have during earlier decades. Local Punti and other non-Hakka neigh-
bors may be considered allies in opposition to more recent immigrants,
for example. Since political and economic factors no longer correspond
with ethnic distinctions, they cannot account for the current importance
or ongoing significance of Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong.
The single most important factor in explaining the high degree of
Hakka consciousness among Shung Him Tong residents is—somewhat
paradoxically—their Christianity. Christianity, and the accompanying
institutional framework of the church, can be said to have influenced
Hakka identity in at least three important ways: it created a social
context in which Hakka identity was shared, often ascribed, and as-
sumed to be important; it provided a reason to perpetuate Hakka iden-
tity; and it influenced the form Hakka identity could take.
The missionaries from the Basel Evangelical Missionary Society, who
arrived in China just after the middle of the nineteenth century, chose to
focus their evangelizing efforts almost exclusively on Hakka speakers
and in Hakka regions of Guangdong. In so doing, the mission stations,
churches, and schools they established created a new social context in
which Hakka identity could be expressed. Members of this new social
group shared not only their religious views, but also their language and
the label Hakka. Regardless of the degree of Hakka consciousness be-
fore the conversion of Hakka to Christianity, the church provided a
setting in which Hakka identity was assumed, and could be nurtured
and articulated. Shung Him church, historically tied to the Basel mis-
sion, is widely known throughout the Fanling region as a “Hakka
church,” and its members are usually presumed to be Hakka even in the
few cases in which they are not.2
2.	This helps to explain why passing as Cantonese has not been an option for the
people of Shung Him Tong, as it has been for those in other regions of the New
Territories (see Johnson, this volume; also Baker 196S).
IOOPOVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
Conversion to Christianity also helped create a reason to perpetuate
Hakka identity. To non-Christian Chinese, especially during the second
half of the nineteenth century, but still today, conversion to Christianity
was considered an act that alienated individuals from their Chinese roots
and thus estranged them from their Chinese identity. Chinese Christians,
in the wake of the Opium War (1839-42), at a time when foreign imperial-
ism was particularly abhorred, had, in the eyes of non-Christians, trans-
formed themselves into “barbarians” or “foreigners” by embracing an
alien faith. They destroyed their idols, no longer performed the proper
death rituals, stopped contributing to local shrines and temples, and,
perhaps worst of all, ceased worshiping their ancestors. Without such
practices, how could they be deemed proper Chinese? In the context of
Shung Him Tong, asserting Hakka identity—an identity that some be-
lieved carried with it some very negative implications—became an impor-
tant way for Hakka to link their Chinese and Christian identities and to
claim that they could be both.3
Christianity also influenced and severely limited the form Hakka iden-
tity could take in Shung Him Tong. Unlike some less conservative
churches in Hong Kong, which allow, for example, Chinese couplets
over the doorway of the church and bowing or burning incense at the
grave of an ancestor, and which tolerate a certain degree of religious
syncretism, Shung Him church, having inherited the stance of nineteenth-
century Swiss and southern German pietists, strongly disapproves of
such activities. The people have therefore had to devise secular ways to
express their Hakka and Chinese identity to themselves, to one another,
and to outsiders. The last, while the most difficult to do under such
constraints, has also been, in some ways, the most important.
In this chapter I address the question of what it means to be Hakka in
Shung Him Tong by focusing on several verbal and nonverbal expres-
sions of Hakka identity and describing the social and historical context
in which these expressions acquire significance. The case of Hakka
identity in Shung Him Tong illustrates the limitations of both instru-
mentalist and primordialist (or sentimentalist) approaches to the study
of ethnicity, neither of which can satisfactorily explain the continued
relevance of Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong, or the particular
meaning it has acquired there. Verbal expressions of Hakka identity
3.	There were, of course, material advantages to converting to Christianity, especially
with regard to education. For more details on this topic see Smith (1985) and Constable
(1994).
IOINICOLE CONSTABLE
from Shung Him Tong illustrate how the people there distance them-
selves from existing negative stereotypes about the Hakka and construct
a Hakka identity that is compatible with their Christian beliefs. Both
the role of women in the Hakka church and the conception of the
Hakka Christian cemetery can be read as symbolic expressions of Hakka
identity that are unique to Shung Him Tong and that help mediate the
ambivalence and inherent conflicts between Hakka, Chinese, and Chris-
tian identities. The particular construction of Hakka identity of the
people of Shung Him Tong paradoxically serves both to link them to
and alienate them from the wider Hakka and Chinese non-Christian
community described in other chapters of this volume.
SHUNG HIM tong: SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The area surrounding Shung Him Tong is still largely rural, but it is
located within walking distance of a small but busding market town, a
modern high-rise housing estate, and the Fanling train station, from
which it is an easy commute into Kowloon and other parts of Hong
Kong. The church building, with its modem architecture, stands out
in this rural setting as the first clue that this is no typical New Territo-
ries village, as both insiders and outsiders to the community often
reminded me.
Shung Him Tong is unusual for a number of reasons. Of its approxi-
mately two hundred residents, well over 90 percent are Christian and an
even larger percentage are Hakka.4 This is quite striking given the fact
that at the turn of this century Lung Yeuk Tau, the larger region in
which Shung Him Tong is located, was still dominated by Cantonese-
speaking Punti who belonged to one of the most powerful higher-order
lineages in Hong Kong, the Tang (see Faure 1986; Potter 1968; Rubie S.
Watson 1985,1982).5
+. The population of Shung Him Tong is difficult to pinpoint. Some residents reside
in the village only during certain times of the year or the week. The geographical bound-
aries of the region also vary according to the official boundary, which included some 1,300
people in 1986, or the unofficial social boundaries of the community. The figure I am
using here is a rough estimate based on the commonly perceived social and geographic
boundary of Shung Him Tong, which corresponds most closely to the traditional borders
of the village and the perception of most residents.
5.	It is important to note here that in the context of Shung Him Tong, all Punti were
Cantonese speakers, in contrast to the Punti of Tsuen Wan described by Johnson in the
previous chapter, who were Hakka-speakers. The Cantonese name Tang is often written
Teng (pinyin: Deng) in English-language publications.
102POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
As several local and Hong Kong-wide government administrators
remarked, many of the villagers, beginning with the earliest residents,
attained a very high level of education, not at all typical of rural villagers
in the New Territories. According to one district official, Shung Him
Tong Village has produced more university graduates per capita than
even the most urban and elite districts of Hong Kong. Shung Him
Tong claims among its most prominent past and present residents one
of the founders of Chung Chi College at the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, the first ethnic Chinese secretary of Chinese affairs in the
Hong Kong Government, one of the founders of the Heung Yee Kuk
(an important New Territories governing body), the founder of the
famous Wah Yan College in Kowloon, and several university professors
and government officials. The prominence of many of Shung Him
Tong’s native’s is linked in part to their connection with the Basel
mission.6
Ling Kai Lin, the recognized founder of Shung Him Tong, was born
around the middle of the nineteenth century in the Bao’an district of
southern Guangdong, which adjoined what later became the New Terri-
tories of Hong Kong. When he was a young man he, along with his
father and other members of his immediate family, converted to Chris-
tianity. He then worked many years as a missionary for the Basel mis-
sion, and his children were educated at mission schools. In 1903, shortly
after his retirement, Ling and his sons “purchased” some land in the
New Territories from the Tangs (which was in fact leased in perpetuity
from the Hong Kong government). They then invited other relatives
and Hakka Christian friends to join them. As was common in other
parts of the New Territories, poorer kin were willing to work the land as
tenants (see Rubie S. Watson 1985), and the wealthier arrivals bought
their own land in the area.
By the 1930s Shung Him Tong’s population included eleven house-
holds of eight different surnames, all of whom were Hakka and Chris-
tian. Three of the household heads had worked at one time as missionar-
ies for the Basel mission, many had been mission educated, and several
were related to one another by marriage. At first the pattern of settle-
ment in Shung Him Tong resembled that of other local villages, in that
6.	Shung Him church is one of about twelve in Hong Kong that are members of the
Tsung Tsin Mission, also known as the “Hakka church.” The member churches were
affiliated with the Basel mission until their independence. Tsung Tsin Mission is now a
member of the larger group of Lutheran churches in Hong Kong.
103NICOLE CONSTABLE
many of the first settlers shared surname ties and came from the same
native villages in Bao’an or near what is now the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone, across the border from the colony in Guangdong. But
Shung Him Tong’s population quickly grew to include people from
more distant regions of Guangdong who shared neither surname nor
native place. What linked these immigrants to other people in Shung
Him Tong were their Christian beliefs—particularly their shared affilia-
tion with Basel mission schools and churches—and also the fact that
they were Hakka.
As mentioned above, the Basel missionaries worked primarily in
Hakka regions of Guangdong and among Hakka speakers in Hong
Kong. After the defeat of the Taiping Rebellion, and in the wake of the
Hakka-Punti Wars (see Cohen, this volume), Hakka people in South
China were the target of persecution and hostility. During that time the
numbers of Hakka converts to Christianity gready increased. It is likely,
given these historical events, that many Basel mission converts already
shared a sense of Hakka identity when they joined the church. The
missionaries, in their writings, certainly labeled them Hakka (e.g., Eitel
1867, Oehler 1922, Piton 1873-74). One of the main attractions of Shung
Him Tong Village, as the Lings and other Hakka Christians recorded in
their family and village histories (Pang 1934), was that they expected to
have a safer, more peaceful home in the British colony than in their
native places in Guangdong, where they had suffered persecution both
as Hakka and as Christians.
Here I shall only briefly mention that the establishment of the com-
munity was not without conflict.7 The earliest struggles were with the
local Tangs, followed in the 1930s by those with wealthy Cantonese
developers and with new immigrants to the area. These conflicts were
generally resolved to the satisfaction of Shung Him Tong people either
through the efforts of Shung Him Tong church/village leaders, by
activating their connections with the Heung Yee Kuk, through their
ties to the British government, or through their voluntary associations.
In the 1920s, in contrast to Kwan Mun Hau villagers, several Shung
Him Tong people decided to join the Hong Kong—based international
Hakka organization, the Chongzheng Hui.8 Luo Xianglin, a famous
Hakka historian who later joined Shung Him church, was one of
7.	For more on this topic see Constable (1994: chap. 3).
8.	This, I believe, was viewed more as a useful political link with other local Hakka
than as a statement of pro-Taiwan or Nationalist sentiments.
104POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
those who was instrumental in the founding of the association. In the
1930s the leaders of Shung Him Tong also organized a Hakka mutual
aid association with the main function of protecting Hakka in the
Lung Yeuk Tau region from robbers and hostile neighbors. Today few
Shung Him Tong people belong to the Chongzheng Hui, and the
local Hakka association, which lasted only until the 1950s, has been
largely forgotten. A large gong—once used as an alarm to alert neigh-
bors of trouble—stands in an old house as the only concrete reminder
of past concerns.
While in the past conflicts between Hakka and their Cantonese or
Punti neighbors were quite common, today around Shung Him Tong
ethnicity is rarely believed to be the cause or basis of conflicts. During the
past three decades the Punti population of the nearby villages has dimin-
ished and has been largely replaced by Hakka, Cantonese, Chaozhou, or
other immigrants from Guangdong. Some older local conflicts between
Hakka Christians and local Cantonese are still known of, but no one
mentions them openly. As one older Hakka Christian explained, “We
don’t like to bring that up because we don’t want to cause trouble or bad
feelings.” More to the point, however, is that the people of Shung Him
Tong no longer need to activate ties based on Hakka identity to resolve
their conflicts and address their concerns.
Outside of the context of their village, church, and the wider Tsung
Tsin Mission to which Shung Him church belongs, the people of Shung
Him Tong are very much like other people in Hong Kong today who
are unaware of each other’s ethnic identity, or learn of it only by chance.
They exhibit no visible markers to identify them as Hakka and their
spoken Cantonese is indistinguishable from that of other longtime
Hong Kong residents. Their coworkers, clients, business associates, and
classmates are not exclusively Hakka. In the village context, however,
the situation is quite different. Church members and Shung Him Tong
residents are still labeled as Hakka by people from the surrounding
regions. Many of their closest friends are Hakka, and over the past
several years, most of the marriages I am aware of in Shung Him Tong
have been between Hakka Christian villagers. As one man in his forties
explained to me, the young people tend to interact most with other
Shung Him church members or with members of other Tsung Tsin
Mission churches. Although they might invite non-Hakka friends and
schoolmates to visit the church, few people from outside the local com-
munity join the church because it does not appeal to them. To many
people, he explained, it appears to be a rather exclusive Hakka village
105NICOLE CONSTABLE
church, and outsiders are often put off by the use of Hakka during the
Sunday service.9
ETHNICITY AND HAKKA IDENTITY
Hakka identity is best understood as historically constructed and, fol-
lowing Charles Keyes’s definition of ethnicity, is best defined as a claim
to common identity based on putative shared descent—as a type of
“descent symbolism” and Active kinship (Keyes 1981; see also Bendey
1991). Unlike more symmetrical kinship groupings, ethnicity is the prod-
uct of an awareness of asymmetric or unequal relations (Comaroff and
Comaroff 1992:55; E. Wolf 1982). As was pointed out in the Introduc-
tion, there is littie question as to the importance of economic or politi-
cal inequality in the initial emergence of Hakka ethnicity, during the
nineteenth century or perhaps earlier. But ethnicity is not necessarily
maintained by the same circumstances out of which it originally
emerged. Thus a so-called “instrumentalist” explanation does not ade-
quately explain persistence or maintenance, or the form that Hakka
identity takes today in Shung Him Tong.
Instrumentalist or circumstantialist approaches, characterized by the
classic work of Abner Cohen (1969,1974) and Fredrik Barth (1969), and
still popular in other fields of social science, tend to overemphasize the
instrumental or manipulative use of ethnicity to gain or maintain politi-
cal power and economic advantage over another social group, and to
underplay the historical and ideological construction of ethnicity. A
more instrumentalist approach would suggest that if Hakka identity
persists, then it must serve some material or instrumental ends. This,
however, is clearly not the case in contemporary Shung Him Tong.
Hakka-Punti conflicts have greatly diminished over the past few de-
cades around Shung Him Tong, and there are no longer political or
economic interests that line up along ethnic lines. In the wider context
of Hong Kong in recent years, distinctions based on political views, or
between older Hong Kong residents and recent immigrants, have be-
come far more relevant than ethnic ones. The marked decrease in the
overt political relevance of Hakka identity since the first part of this
century, however, has not been accompanied by a corresponding decline
in or disappearance of Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong.
9.	In 1986 Shung Him church began translating Hakka sermons into Cantonese, and
Cantonese sermons into Hakka, in an attempt to attract more people to the services.
106POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
A primordialist explanation for the persistence of ethnicity places the
emphasis on shared sentiments, which are passed from one generation
to the next and are thought to derive from a shared primordial past (see
Bentley 1991, Geertz 1973, Isaacs 1975a). These bonds—based on a com-
mon language, religion, or history, for example—are believed to create
the basis for ethnic ties, which are maintained or resurface in new social
contexts to satisfy sentimental or emotional ties to the past. One prob-
lem with this approach is that ethnic identity is almost always cast as
primordial—that is, as having roots in time immemorial—but as Eric
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) have illustrated in the case of
what they call “invented traditions,” what is important is that people
believe “traditions” to be old, not that they are in fact so. Language,
history, or religion may or may not be constructed as symbols of group
affiliation, and they may or may not have been inherited from a previ-
ous generation. In and of themselves such imagined bonds are not the
source of the identity, nor can they explain its persistence, disappear-
ance, or reappearance in a different form and context.
As Charles Keyes (1976,1981), G. Carter Bentley (1981,1983,1987,1991),
and Stevan Harrell (1990a) have pointed out, and as most contemporary
anthropologists concur, ethnicity need not be of the either/or variety. An
exclusive focus on either the primordial or the instrumental basis of
ethnic identities unnecessarily restricts the types of questions to be asked,
and cannot sufficiently explain the persistence and the maintenance of
ethnic identity in situations such as Shung Him Tong where it has lost its
political and economic salience. In order to understand why Hakka iden-
tity remains of greater concern and interest in Shung Him Tong than
among other Hakka in Hong Kong who live in more anonymous urban
areas and who can easily avoid any reference to their Hakka identity, the
specific history of the church community must be considered. Shung
Him Tong illustrates how ethnicity “may be perpetuated by factors quite
different from those that caused its emergence” (Comaroff and Comaroff
1992:61). As members of a community that is labeled Hakka, the people of
Shung Him Tong are more likely to become aware of their Hakka heri-
tage. Yet Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong is far more than a mere
survival. It maintains its relevance and is distinct from the Hakka identity
of people in many other Hakka communities.
As the essays in this volume collectively suggest, there may be some
repeated themes, patterns—or, as Sharon Carstens refers to them,
“tendencies”—that are associated with Hakka in different regions. But
the patterns Carstens identifies as economic conservatism, egalitarian
107NICOLE CONSTABLE
political attitudes, and special gender roles—regardless of whether one
believes they originated from a common Chinese past or a more re-
cently constructed ideology—take on different meanings in the particu-
lar contexts in which they are found. The Hakka entrepreneurs of Cal-
cutta are clearly not as economically conservative as some of the other
Hakka described in this volume. Where patterns such as these are
found, despite their similarities in form, they may take on very different
meanings. Economic conservativeness, distinctive gender roles, and
egalitarian ideals, for example, may characterize both the Hakka of Pulai
and those of Shung Him Tong, but these patterns necessarily hold
different meanings for Hakka Christians and non-Christians. Likewise,
history, language, and other cultural factors may be used in the expres-
sion, construction, and legitimation of Hakka identity, thus creating an
impression of essentialism or primordialism, but superficial similarities
diminish when they are examined within the different social and histori-
cal contexts in which they are produced.
Although no longer directed exclusively towards utilitarian, objec-
tive, or material goals, issues of power and domination are central to the
contemporary conception of Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong.
Power must be understood to include power in the sense described by
such writers as Bourdieu, which includes power over “symbolic capital”
(1977). The Hakka of Shung Him Tong seek to reappropriate the mean-
ing of “Hakka,” and to contest the stigma they believe is associated with
it. Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong is not simply manipulative of
material resources or local political power; it involves control over sym-
bolic meanings—in this case, power over the other dominant and hege-
monic implications of Hakka identity.
The construction of Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong has involved
a continuing, although not entirely successful or satisfactory, attempt to
reappropriate it from an assortment of other competing sources. Differ-
ent meanings of “Hakka” are imposed—or have been threatened to be
imposed—on the Hakka from a variety of directions and at different
times: by other Han (or ethnic Chinese), by popular rhetoric, by official
policy in the People’s Republic of China that attempts to blur the
differences between Hakka and other Han, by local Cantonese who
imply that Hakka are less Chinese or not Chinese at all, by nineteenth-
century missionaries who defined Hakka in relation to Christian quali-
ties, by Hong Kong government tourist brochures, which reinforce
certain popular stereotypes about the Hakka, and also by Chinese and
foreign social scientists and anthropologists (myself included) who
108POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
claim some particular knowledge or authority on the subject of the
Hakka. All of these sources provide definitions against which and with
which Hakka also attempt to define themselves as pure Chinese, good
Hakka, and pious Christians.
z
REFLEXIVE EXPRESSIONS OF HAKKA IDENTITY
During the nineteenth century “Hakka” sometimes served as a deroga-
tory label that referred to people whose language and customs differed
from those of the Cantonese-speaking Punti of Guangdong. As a
nineteenth-century missionary wrote, “A thorough-bred Punti [Canton-
ese],” when asked about the Hakka “would certainly, in the case of his
ever condescending to acknowledge that he had ever heard of such
people, turn up his nose and tell you that the Hakkas are quite beneath
your notice, that they are a kind of semi-barbarians, living in poverty
and filth” (Eitel 1867:81). Derogatory stereotypes of the Hakka were
often related to the issue of whether they are “really Chinese” or descen-
dants of “barbarian tribes.”
Several cultural differences between Hakka and Punti helped fuel the
assertion that Hakka—particularly during the nineteenth century—
were different from other Han and that in some ways they resembled
so-called “hill tribes” or Chinese “national minorities.” Two key features
that were used to support this view, and that are examined in more
detail below, are the unorthodox behavior and treatment of Hakka
women, and the Hakka’s supposed lack of loyalty to the land and thus
to their ancestors—an accusation that is all the more powerfully di-
rected towards Hakka Christians.
In Hong Kong today, as in Taiwan and nineteenth-century China,
Hakka are widely reputed to be poor, rural farmers, and Hakka women
have a reputation for working extremely hard. These images, expressed
by Hakka and non-Hakka, also appear in tourist brochures and in
popular media, but rarely make explicit reference to the possibility of
Hakka non-Chinese origins. In the People’s Republic of China today
the Hakka are officially considered part of the Han Chinese majority
nationality, not one of the national minority groups. The question of
Hakka origins has repeatedly been “laid to rest” by scholars of the
Hakka and by Hakka themselves, who are satisfied that Hakka claims to
northern Chinese origins around the fourth century are substantiated
by historical and linguistic evidence (e.g, Cohen, this volume; Hsieh
1929; S. T. Leong 1980; Luo Xianglin 1965; Moser 1985; Jerry Norman
109NICOLE CONSTABLE
1988). But to some people of Shung Him Tong, this is still a very
sensitive issue. Any negative stereotypes of the Hakka, and any refer-
ence to their “questionable origins,” constitute a grave insult because of
the underlying implications about Chinese identity.
The examples below illustrate some of the most common ideas about
the Hakka that I heard from Hakka themselves (mostly Christians, but
also non-Christians). They all echo the popular view that Hakka are
industrious and hardworking, honest, thrifty, straightforward, coopera-
tive, diligent, and practical—qualities that are also, significandy, be-
lieved to be essentially Chinese (see Eugene N. Anderson 1968, Blake
1981). These qualities and characteristics, as they were expressed to me in
Shung Him Tong, are all embedded in a cultural construction of the
Hakka past—a history that contains their connection to north central
China—the cradle of Chinese civilization. Hakka characteristics are
viewed in a sense as adaptations to the poverty and hardships experi-
enced during repeated historical patterns of persecution, migration, and
resettlement. They are also qualities that are very compatible with
Hakka ideas about “good Christians.”
Although Chinese interethnic conflicts are infrequent in Hong Kong
today, ideas about ethnic differences and memories of ethnic conflicts
provide an important backdrop for Hakka expressions of identity. As
Keith Basso has eloquently argued in the case of Western Apache and
their joking imitations of “the white man” in the United States, people
often define themselves by who they are not (1979). Implicit—or some-
times explicit—in Shung Him Tong Hakka expressions of self is a
comparison with Punti, Cantonese, or, less often, Chaozhou. Such de-
pictions of “the other” reflect power relations (Said 1979, 1989; Zhang
Longxi 1988); those who are culturally dominant control the symbolic
capital of the other by controlling their identity. The Hakka resist sym-
bolic domination by asserting their own definitions of themselves.
The discussions of Hakka identity I heard in Shung Him Tong are
notably devoid of descriptions of visible markers or customs. Occasion-
ally I was told about Hakka foods that were still widely eaten, but
songs, clothing, and other distinctive markers were only rarely men-
tioned, and then usually in connection with non-Christian Hakka, or
Hakka in the past. When during my first month of research in Shung
Him Tong I told one man I was an anthropologist doing research on
the Hakka, he told me that they were certainly Hakka, and that I would
find Hakka history there in the village, but if it was “customs”
(jaahpgwaari) I was looking for, I was in the wrong place. Shung Him
noPOVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
Tong was a Hakka village, without a doubt, but it was a modern Chris-
tian community, he told me. If I wanted to learn about Hakka customs,
I should visit some of the older Hakka villages in the New Territories
where there still were Hakka ancestral halls, Hakka was spoken more,
and women wore Hakka-style clothes and jewelry. Or better yet, he
suggested, I should some day go and study Hakka who lived in Sabah
or other rural regions of Southeast Asia. There I would find Hakka
culture. History, however, he could tell me about, and he began to cite
Hakka genealogical connections to north central China of various vil-
lage families.
The following extract of a conversation I had with a seventy-year-old
man demonstrates several typical patterns pertaining to discussions of
Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong. First, he compares the Hakka to
non-Hakka, in this case Punti (Cantonese). Second, he regards Hakka—
especially Hakka Christians—as morally superior to the generally wealth-
ier, politically more powerful, and culturally dominant Cantonese. And
third, his depiction of the recent history of Shung Him Tong as having
repeated broader patterns of more distant Hakka history serves to
strengthen and substantiate various Hakka Christian claims about their
identity.
“What makes Hakka different” he began, “is their history, language,
and the fact that they are hardworking and honest.” I asked whether the
Cantonese are not also hardworking and honest. He thought for a
minute and reluctandy admitted that yes, “of course Cantonese parents
teach their children to be honest and hardworking, but the Hakka are
even more likely to be so because of their history. They have had to be
to survive.” As he often explained to me, Hakka have had to struggle,
and to live in hilly areas where the land is not so good. “The Canton-
ese,” he explained, “were in the plains [in Guangdong] longer and are
richer and learned not to work so hard. They got lazier.”10 “The Canton-
ese,” he once said, “think of Hakka as inferior, aggressive, and unedu-
cated, but Hakka people have shown that they are wrong. . . . Other
people may try to be good and honest and hardworking, but Hakka
people have had to be.”
Making the transition from general Hakka history to the history of
io.	On another occasion when I asked him how Hakka people learned to be
hardworking, he said it was probably mostly from their parents, but also was “in their
blood and inherited.” The church, he said, “may also tell people to work hard, but not in
the same way that people work hard because they are Hakka.”
IllNICOLE CONSTABLE
Shung Him Tong, he went on to describe the early founding of the
village, how Shung Him Tong people didn’t let outsiders “bully them,”
and how they organized themselves:
The early settlers got education and built a church and a school.
The other people in the area have no such organizations. The
Hakka people would farm and dig and build buildings and work
very hard and show that they are not the way other people think
of them. Other people don’t have the same capabilities as Hakka
people. They [non-Hakka] might smoke opium and gamble
away their money. They can’t hold on to their money because
they are weak. Look at [he names three neighboring villages, and
gestures in their direction]—before, there were Cantonese peo-
ple in those villages, but where have they gone? Now it’s largely
Hakka people. I don’t know where they went! Hakka people are
capable and have their culture and traditions.
A young woman schoolteacher in her thirties who is related to one of
the earliest immigrants to Shung Him Tong put the same points quite
succincdy, again contrasting the Hakka and their Cantonese neighbors:
Hakka people are very good people—hardworking, thrifty, and
practical. Not like the Punti, who like to have a good time and
are not hardworking. When they [Punti] make money they just
become opium addicts, in contrast to [Hakka] people like my
grandfather, who was poor and saved a little bit of money so he
could buy some land.
The pattern of mentioning one’s parents’ or grandparents’ generation in
reference to the Hakka was often a way of connecting the distant past
with more immediate and personally known events. A university-
educated man in his forties who no longer lives in the village but who
was also related to one of the founding families of Shung Him Tong
connected the Hakka distant past with his grandmother’s way of life:
In the past the Hakka lived on the . . . less fertile land in a natu-
rally harsh environment to make a living . . . and they have some-
how developed a kind of diligence. . . . But, observing and think-
ing about my grandmother [a respected church elder in her
time], I somehow have the idea that Hakka are hardworking and
112POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
straightforward people. They aren’t as prone to deception. . . .
Maybe this is the mark of being country people, of living a very
simple life.
To each of these three people, Hakka culture and traditions—depicted
as qualities and character traits—are best expressed by looking at the
past and at Hakka and village history. Rarely did they identify or men-
tion specific customs and practices as Hakka.
Hakka are also well aware of the negative qualities attributed to them
by non-Hakka. Like the older man suggests in the first quotation above,
Hakka are “not the way other people think of them.” They know, for
example, that they are considered poor and stingy. Poverty, however, is
not always regarded by Hakka as a negative characteristic and, along
with the hardships experienced by them, is considered the basis for a
number of their good qualities. As one young man whose family joined
the church in the 1940s put it, because Hakka were poor,
there is a strong “we” feeling among [them]. They are support-
ive and treat each other as brothers. They are hardworking,
honest, straightforward, and they stick together even when they
live in foreign countries. They are also stubborn. In the past all
Hakka people suffered a lot and were persecuted. These are the
characteristics that describe Hakka people and they also de-
scribe good Christians.
In this quotation, what non-Hakka describe as “clannishness” has been
described positively as mutual support, unity, and cooperativeness aris-
ing from times of hardship and poverty. Also important in this quota-
tion is that poverty, cooperativeness, and thrift—expressed as one-time
characteristics of all Hakka and found in several of the other cases
described in this book—are decisively equated with those of “good
Christians.” The equation of Hakka moral character with that of pious
Christians—in opposition to Punti (Cantonese) non-Christians—is
also implicit in the first two quotations above. References to Hakka
piety, or the idea that Hakka were already closer to becoming Christian
than were other Chinese are also found in some nineteenth- and early-
twentieth-century European writings about the Hakka. Some European
missionaries viewed the Hakka as more likely than other Chinese to
become Christian because their religion was said to be closer to mono-
113NICOLE CONSTABLE
theism, their treatment of women was “healthier,” and they were more
likely to be monogamous."
Hakka of Shung Him Tong depict themselves as hardworking in
contrast to other Chinese. They believe that in the past they were
poorer than most others, especially the Cantonese. Another difference
lies in the honesty and morality ascribed to the Hakka in contrast to the
dishonesty and immorality of others. Such a view is emphasized by the
pious and moralistic stance of Hakka Christians. In the following state-
ment the poverty of the Hakka is transformed into wealth. In contrast
to the wealth of the Punti, however, which Hakka Christians believe
corrupts and leads to immoral activities, the wealth of the Hakka is
earned through honesty and hard work. It is implied that Hakka keep
their wealth because they do not gamble or squander their money on
drugs or prostitutes. As an elderly village man put it:
We [Hakka] were threatened and treated like outsiders; we had
a hard time. . . . Well, the [Punti] Tang were lazy. Perhaps they
smoked too much opium and played mahjong all the time and
gambled and lost their money. . . . The Hakka have the reputa-
tion of going through China and usurping the land from the
wealthy landlords by working very hard.
On the surface this statement may appear strikingly similar to that of
Ellen Oxfeld’s Hakka landlady in Calcutta, who explained that “when
Cantonese make money, they get lots of servants, eat with ivory chop-
sticks, and use tablecloths, . . . but Hakka keep working very hard” (this
volume). In both cases Hakka are frugal and hardworking and Canton-
ese squander their money. But, although the generalizations about
Hakka and Cantonese are similar, it is important to note that the spe-
cific examples provided by the man from Shung Him Tong of what
Cantonese are said to do with their money carry a far more moralistic
message. Non-Christian Hakka, even in the communities surrounding
Shung Him Tong, are very likely to partake in mahjong and other forms
of gambling, which Hakka Christians disdain.
While this man and other people from Shung Him Tong told me that
the Hakka are known for “taking over and becoming landlords” (Can-
tonese: Hakka jim deihjyuh\ this is not a view I ever heard expressed by
ii.	For more on this theme, see Constable (1994: chap. 6).
114POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
non-Hakka. To non-Hakka, Hakka are often viewed as stingy. What
non-Hakka think of as stinginess, however, is to Hakka thrift. In con-
trast to the wasteful Cantonese, who eat only the leafy greens of the
choisam, the Hakka, I was told by one woman, eat the whole vegetable,
stalk and all. During one conversation at which both Hakka and non-
Hakka were present, a Cantonese woman married to a Hakka man said,
“The Hakka don’t spend their money and they are stingy. But unlike
other Chinese who are careful with their money, the Hakka don’t get
rich.” Her Hakka husband defended himself and all Hakka and de-
scribed his grandfather’s thrift and generosity. A little later in the eve-
ning he began to expound on the many famous and successful Hakka,
to which his Cantonese brother-in-law responded, “But the Chaozhou
are even more successful!”
References by non-Hakka to Hakka success (or lack thereof) usually
refer to financial success. To defend themselves, the Hakka of Shung
Him Tong interpret success more broadly to include academic, moral,
political, or social success. Along similar lines, I was directed to a man
who is often cited in the village as an example of a successful Hakka. He
is a retired politician who has not lived in the village since he was a
child. After I very briefly explained that I was conducting research in the
Hakka community, he interjected, ‘Why not study the Chaozhou?
They’re much more interesting.” I asked why this was so, and he an-
swered that they are “much more [economically] successful. Hakka who
become successful are no longer Hakka.” He considers himself a case in
point. As a successful person, he no longer identifies himself as Hakka,
and non-Hakka are unlikely to assume that he is Hakka. He lives in an
exclusive part of Hong Kong, his children have married non-Hakka,
and in public he speaks flawless Cantonese. It is also important to note
that, like many other members of his branch of the family, he is a
practicing Catholic and rarely attends the Hakka church, only on occa-
sions such as weddings and funerals.
Scholars also perpetuate the idea that “few Hakka became successful
in business” (e.g., Moser 1985:245). It is not that there are in fact no
successful Hakka entrepreneurs—the Hakka tanners in Calcutta are a
vivid example of business success (see Oxfeld, this volume), but, as is
suggested by the quotation above, Hakka who are economically success-
ful may better fit the stereotype of successful Chinese entrepreneurs
than that of poor Hakka farmers. To people with whom I spoke in
Hong Kong—who conveniently forgot that Aw Boon Haw, whose
115NICOLE CONSTABLE
fortune was based on Tiger Balm medicine, and C. J. Soong, founder of
the Bank of China, are both Hakka (ibid.)—the idea of wealthy Hakka
entrepreneurs seemed as comically incongruous and as much a contra-
diction in terms as would the idea of rich Oakies or hillbillies in the
United States.
Even among the Hakka of Shung Him Tong—who are quick to list
many famous Hakka politicians, scholars, and entertainers—one finds
a marked lack of Hakka who have achieved commercial success. In
part this shortage may be because Hakka are proud of their heritage of
frugality and hard work, but such can also be said of the wealthy
Hakka in Calcutta. From the point of view of the people of Shung
Him Tong there is another explanation. Success in business, they
say, requires illegal or dishonest, immoral activities. Gambling, invit-
ing important contacts to the jockey club and the horse races, and
living the high life all are—from their Christian point of view—
considered corrupt and corrupting, yet necessary for success in the
field of commerce.
For Hakka Christians this is in part a rationalization, but it is also
true that their success lies not in commercial enterprises, but in educa-
tion, politics, and civil service—fields that were traditionally and offi-
cially held in high esteem both by the Chinese and by their church
community. Although Max Weber’s Protestant ethic equates business
success with grace and salvation, for the people of Shung Him Tong
wealth is often thought to be a sign of corruption. Thus, in striking
contrast to the Hakka of Calcutta, who view capitalism as a legitimate
route to upward mobility, the Hakka of Shung Him Tong believe, and
are reassured, not by material wealth but by the thought that “the
meek shall inherit the earth.”12 They share with the Hakka of Calcutta
an idea of Hakka frugality and thrift as positive characteristics that
render them superior to the Cantonese, but they do not consider
wealth the ultimate measure of success. Like the Hakka of Malaysia,
they believe Hakka are not particularly skilled in business, but it is not,
they claim, that “Hakka have no head for business,” as a Hakka Malay
explained to Sharon Carstens, but rather that they choose not to. The
stereotype of Hakka poverty and lack of business acumen articulates
12.	As is discussed in greater detail by Ellen Oxfeld (this volume) and Hill Gates
(1987:260-61), in late Imperial China capitalism offered an alternative to the state-
controlled system of degrees and government office as a legitimate route to upward
mobility.
116POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
well with their image of being good Christians and their beliefs about
their Hakka heritage.
HAKKA WOMEN AND HAKKA IDENTITY
Like many of the women belonging to non-Chinese “hill tribes,” with
whom the Hakka were sometimes compared during the nineteenth
century, the image of Hakka women did not fit the shy, modest, femi-
nine, Han ideal of the nineteenth century (Diamond 1988). Although
Hakka were patrilineal and patrilocal, as were other Han, Hakka
women are said to have been allowed more freedom than were other
nineteenth-century Chinese women. For Chinese women of that time,
freedom was not considered a good thing. For other Han Chinese
binding one’s daughter’s feet was a point of pride, status, and wealth—
an indication of the strict control of a patriarchal society over women.
That Hakka women’s feet were not bound suggested that they were
undisciplined, unrestrained, and uncontrolled by Hakka men, who
were, by implication, weak and to some extent subordinate to their
wives. On a symbolic level, the behavior of Hakka women posed a
serious threat to Han patriarchal hegemony.
In many historical and missionary documents from the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries (e.g., Campbell 1912, Lechler 1878, Oehler 1922,
Piton 1873-74), in commemorative publications of the International
Hakka Association, and in travel magazines and tourist publications in
Hong Kong, one easily finds many statements, generalizations, popular
images, and stereotypes regarding Hakka women. Hakka women still
capture the imaginations of many observers. In tourist brochures visi-
tors to Hong Kong are told to look for women in distinctive circular,
flat, straw hats with black cloth trim. These, they are told, are the
famed, hardworking Hakka women. In fact, these hats (as well as darker
skin, stockier builds, and larger feet) often serve more as class or occupa-
tional markers than as ethnic ones, but women seen doing agricultural
or construction work—especially if they are wearing circular, black-
fringed hats—are often mistakenly assumed to be Hakka. This re-
inforces not only the working-class stereotype of the Hakka, but also
the reputation of Hakka women as extremely hardworking compared to
other Chinese women.
No Hakka or non-Hakka I have ever spoken with has disagreed with
the claim that Hakka women are extremely hardworking. Hakka men
might deny and resent the stereotype that they are lazy compared to
117NICOLE CONSTABLE
Hakka women, but both sexes in Shung Him Tong express pride in the
fact that Hakka women work very hard.13 Their idea of hard work goes
well beyond the essentialized image of women farmers or construction
workers in the supposed Hakka hat. As one older man said when de-
scribing his mother, Hakka women are taught to “be an official’s wife
and go out from the drawing room” (jouhdak gunleung, cheutdak
tengtong). This means, he explained, that Hakka women are expected to
be good, proper, officials’ wives as well as being able to cook and clean.
‘They should be able to talk intelligendy to important guests and also
do hard work.”
The double requirement placed on Hakka women—that they be
competent in both the domestic and public spheres—is interpreted by
many Hakka as evidence of advanced or modern views regarding the
emancipation of women. The important and visible role of Hakka
women in the Taiping Rebellion (as leaders and as military trainees) is
also cited to demonstrate enlightened views regarding women. It was
not, according to Hakka men (and some women), that Hakka women
had to work in the home as well as in the fields because they were poor,
subservient, or exploited, or because the men frequently emigrated or
were lazy, but because they were entitled to work (see also Eberhard
1974). Thus a recent rhetoric of gender equality has come to be associ-
ated with Hakka women’s work outside the home. According to mis-
sionary records and many Hakka I spoke with, even when Hakka in the
past were wealthy enough not to require women to work outside the
home, women never had their feet bound. While to other Han this was
a sign of Hakka low status, as one man from Shung Him Tong asserted
with pride, it is to Hakka an indication that in the nineteenth century
they were well ahead of the times in promoting women’s liberation.
I was told by one man that, because of their ability to work hard,
Hakka women rarely have become beggars or prostitutes. Such views
were presented by both men and women, with one difference. Several
Hakka women in Shung Him Tong (including the church evangelist and
the daughters of two church elders) explained, with reference to their
own and their mothers’ work loads in both the domestic and the public
spheres, that “Hakka men are so spoiled that the women have to do
13.	Burton Pasternak also found among Hakka men in Taiwan disagreement with the
idea that “they spend a lot of time sitting around talking while their wives do all the
work,” although they are the first to admit that “their wives are among China’s most
industrious” (1983:25).
II8POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
everything.” Others put it in terms of male laziness or helplessness, thus
casting the labor of women in the realm of necessity rather than privilege
or choice. While they agreed with the popular image of the hardworking
Hakka woman, many women articulated an awareness of the inequality
and the contradictions posed by their “liberated” position.
In Shung Him Tong the roles of women in the operation of the
church and in church-related activities reflect what is in retrospect con-
structed as traditional Hakka approval for the visible and equal public
roles of women. While the pastor is a man, there is a woman evangelist
who delivers the sermon at least once a month. There is usually a
woman translator who renders the Hakka sermon into Cantonese each
Sunday, and of the group of four people who are selected each week to
collect offerings, two are always women, one older and one younger.,+
The apparent symmetry of the church functionaries, board of directors,
and elders is offset by the relative imbalance in the congregation itself—
in which women are clearly in the majority. In terms of church decision
making, I was told that women often go along with what the male
elders and board members (who are often their husbands) decide, but,
at least publicly (as in the past), they play a secondary and less vocal
role. Women may be visible, but they are not equal. Women in the
church are cast in support roles. The treasurer is a man, but Sunday
school classes are taught primarily by women, and evangelizing work is
also largely performed by women. The power relationship between
Hakka men and women is thus reproduced in the context of the church.
The pattern of women performing what the man above referred to as
“hard work” as well as “intelligent conversation to entertain important
guests” is still the rule, and women have become, in a sense, objectified
as a symbol of Hakka identity, an embodiment of Hakka qualities, and
the basis for a Hakka claim to a rhetoric of modernity.
THE CEMETERY
Although Hakka in the nineteenth century were mainly intensive agri-
culturalists who were sedentary compared to nomadic groups of North
and Northwest China and swidden agriculturalists of the southern hills,
or even boat people, Hakka sometimes faced many of the same insults
i+. Non-Hakka whom I asked insisted that this gendered division of labor and the
conscious attempt at visual balance is unique to the Hakka church, but this question
remains open for further research.
119NICOLE CONSTABLE
and accusations of inferiority from their non-Hakka neighbors. Hakka
were accused of being less rooted to the land than the Punti, which also
implied that they were less dedicated to their ancestors. As their name
suggests, they had a reputation for migrating frequently. Although they
were far less transitory than most “hill tribes” or other Chinese ethnic
minorities, and Hakka often settled in an area for several centuries, their
name and their less elaborate ancestral halls (see Johnson, this volume)
suggested to their Chinese neighbors that they were less civilized outsid-
ers who did not show proper respect for their ancestors. Hakka (and
other Chinese) who converted to Christianity, and therefore no longer
practiced ancestor worship and rites, were even more prone to be ac-
cused of no longer being Chinese, having forsaken and deserted their
ancestors.
As James Watson (1988) and Myron Cohen (1991) have suggested,
“orthopraxy”—the proper structure for the practice of funerary, mar-
riage, and other rituals—was more significant in Imperial China as a
marker of Han identity than was “orthodoxy,” or the concern for unified
belief that might underlie any given ritual. The concept of orthopraxy
helps to explain why to their non-Hakka, non-Christian neighbors,
Hakka Christians are considered to be, in a sense, no longer Chinese: the
structure of their rituals appears wrong. But the people of Shung Him
Tong place greater emphasis on unified belief, and claim that a continued
concern for, and knowledge of, the importance of the ancestors, for
example, can be maintained without the traditional heathen practices
associated with their worship.
The Shung Him Tong cemetery is a place of great pride for a number
of reasons that go well beyond its practical purpose. The cemetery gives
testimony to a number of positive characteristics that the people of
Shung Him Tong attribute to the Hakka in general and to Hakka
Christians in particular, and on a symbolic level the cemetery is an
important feature in the claim to their Chinese identity. As such, the
cemetery can be read as a material expression of a number of central
tenets of Hakka identity, most of which are tied to ideas of Hakka
history.
When I first began investigating the information recorded on grave
markers, no one in the community seemed particularly surprised or
disturbed. On the contrary, a number of people said that it was an
important place for me to look if I wanted to learn about the commu-
nity. The famous Hakka historian Luo Xianglin, who had been a dedi-
cated church member and elder and who was buried in the cemetery,
120POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
had also done research there. Each grave marker contained genealogical
information including the deceased’s place of birth, his or her photo-
graph or portrait, a list of his or her descendants, and the native place of
his or her recent ancestors.15
In addition to a visit to the church and school, virtually every tour of
the village included a visit to the village cemetery or a walk to a view of
the cemetery. It was clearly a point of pride for a number of reasons. It
provided the opportunity to discuss several prominent villagers who are
buried there, and was noteworthy because Shung Him Tong is one of
the few villages in the New Territories to have the advantage of its own
cemetery. According to Hong Kong law, only Punti—defined in this
case as descendants of those who resided in the New Territories before
1898—have the legal right to burial in authorized regions of the New
Territories. Most others are buried in one of the official public cemeter-
ies. Through the initiative of some of the early village leaders, however,
the people of Shung Him Tong petitioned for the land behind the
village and, after great persistence and numerous financial contributions
from the villagers, permission was granted for a Christian cemetery in
1931. In order to appreciate the significance of such a feat, one must
realize the great limitations placed on burials for non-Punti in the New
Territories and also the limitations on burial land and land in general in
Hong Kong. The cemetery suggests the rootedness of the Hakka in the
area, the permanence of their community, and their ability to overcome
hardship and local opposition.
Many parts of the Shung Him Tong cemetery are found covered in
weeds and overgrown except at Easter time. The usual paper and food
offerings presented at the grave sites at funerals and during the Qing
Ming and Chong Yang festivals in Hong Kong are forbidden at the
Shung Him Tong cemetery, and are rarely seen at the graves. But Easter,
which everyone explains corresponds closely to Qing Ming, is the time
when the entire church “family,” as it is called, visits the graves, brings
flowers, and sings hymns there. Several elderly women mentioned that
they would be happy to be buried there because even if their descen-
dants forget them, they would be guaranteed a visit from the church
family at least once a year. A similar concern may have occurred to the
few early village residents who chose to transfer the remains of several
ancestors from Guangdong to the Shung Him Tong cemetery.
15. The spatial arrangement of the cemetery also reflects relative status of members of
the Shung Him Tong community (see Constable 1994:10+).
121NICOLE CONSTABLE
Hakka Christians are robbed of the ability to express their Chinese
identity—particularly their genealogical connections to a glorious Chi-
nese past—through the usual means of a family altar or ancestral hall. For
this reason the cemetery fills an important void. It at once heeds the Chris-
tian proscriptions against ancestor worship and clearly and publicly de-
picts people’s connections to the past. Out of a similar concern that Chris-
tians might lose an important link to their past, Luo Xianglin attempted
to establish an ancestral hall for the Luo lineage in Hong Kong with one
side for non-Christian worship and another for Christian prayer.
Likewise, the cemetery serves as a kind of public genealogy or histori-
cal text. This is not difficult to accept if one considers that a mimeo-
graphed volume on Shung Him Tong history compiled by the household
heads in the 1930s (Pang 1934) is one of the main sources for Luo’s famous
history of the Hakka (Luo Xianglin 1965). Luo’s work, which is strongly
influenced by his personal and professional connection to Shung Him
Tong, has been referred to as a “veritable bible for the Hakka” (S. T.
Leong 1980) and provides the basis for the Hakka history that is repro-
duced in Hakka associations worldwide. In Shung Him Tong even those
who have not read Luo Xianglin’s book know of it and know its main
points. The book itself is a symbol of Hakka legitimacy. Other Hakka in
Hong Kong and further afield who express pride in their Hakka identity
often assert—whether they are aware of it or not—many of the central
tenets expressed in Luo’s writing (e.g., the huiguan quotations cited by
Carstens, this volume). That is not to say, however, that Hakka identity is
the same everywhere.
CONCLUSION
For the people of Shung Him Tong, Hakka identity is conceived of
largely as subjective qualities and character traits that are believed to be
rooted in history—a history of temporal and spatial migrations connect-
ing them to the core of China. History, as a concrete text, is memorial-
ized in grave markers, gender roles, and everyday conversations. Hakka
identity in Shung Him Tong continues to be expressed and negotiated
within the parameters of what is deemed appropriate—pious Christian
belief and behavior.
Contrary to what one might expect, and unlike Christian and other
types of religious conversion that are said to serve as a means to “escape
a stigmatized identity” (Berreman 1979, Juergensmeyer 1982), Christian-
ity has played an important role in perpetuating, transforming, and
122POVERTY, PIETY, AND THE PAST
strengthening Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong. Like the early set-
tlers who suffered the double stigma of being both Hakka and Chris-
tian, the current residents must also struggle to define themselves and
construct a positive self image. This helps to explain why their Hakka
identity is more often asserted, and more clearly reflexive, and also more
defensive at times, than that of other Christian or non-Christian Hakka
who live in the more anonymous urban regions of Hong Kong.
This Christian/ethnic identity is an ingenious blend of symbolic forms
wherein the prominence of women, the consumption of the whole
choisam, and the construction of a cemetery all serve to strategically inte-
grate aspects of Christian faith with ethnic stereotypes. Although not
political in the way in which the Hakka movement in Taiwan is (see
Martin, this volume), Hakka identity in Shung Him Tong still has politi-
cal implications in terms of the symbolic capital under negotiation.
Hakka identity, as it is expressed in Shung Him Tong, both incorporates
and resists definitions of the Hakka imposed from outside by Punti,
European missionaries, the state, and other sources.
Their brand of Christian beliefs requires that they reject many cul-
tural practices that their non-Christian neighbors consider essentially
Chinese. The rejection of “proper” rites, customs, gambling, mahjong,
and horse racing, and the introduction of what neighbors perceive as
foreign, peculiar, or amusing Christian practices alienates them from
other Chinese. Their insistence on a Hakka identity defined as essen-
tially primordial and historical allows them to argue that they are at
once pious Christians and more Chinese than their neighbors. By exten-
sion, their identity as well educated, successful Hakka challenges the
state-perpetuated image of the Hakka as poor, rural folk.
Hakka identity takes on a very particular meaning in the context of
Shung Him Tong, but it also echoes certain themes expressed by other
Hakka—both Christian and non-Christian—within and beyond Hong
Kong. Many of the ideas held by Hakka Christians in Shung Him Tong
regarding Hakka history, the role of women, hard work and industry,
and a commitment to the land and the ancestors, are themes that appear
in the publications of Hakka associations worldwide. It is noteworthy
that Luo Xianglin himself popularized many of the stereotypes and
images that appear in these publications. Thus, at least on the level of
rhetoric, Hakka Christians are linked with all Hakka worldwide. While
one could interpret this in a primordialist way, to do so would essen-
tialize the past—a past that is more appropriately seen as the product of
strategic imaginings.
1234/ Form and Content in Hakka
Malaysian Culture
SHARON A. CARSTENS
I began my research for this chapter with a question at once radical and
old fashioned: Is there such a thing as Hakka culture? Can we now (or
could we ever) identify a distinctive set of cultural characteristics shared
by a majority of Chinese who consider themselves Hakka? Certainly
Hakka in different times and places have argued for patterns of cultural
distinctiveness vis-a-vis other groups, even as they sought wider social
recognition in the status hierarchies of Chinese or overseas Chinese
society. But can we distinguish core behavioral or attitudinal patterns—
beyond matters of detail in dress, food, or ritual observances—that set
Hakka apart repeatedly not only in China, but in the communities they
established in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world? And can these
differences help us to better understand the similar socioeconomic posi-
tions that Hakka seem to share in many places?
I recognize, as I ask this question, that it would be easier to respond
simply in the negative, and to go on to explore quite different and
unique formations of Hakka culture and identity as they have developed
in response to specific situations and relations with other groups. And I
recognize that other researchers, facing a similar question, have argued
against such an interpretation (cf. Pasternak 1972). Yet there are certain
Research on the Hakka community of Pulai (1978—90), the Malaysian Hakka Kapitan
Yap Ah Loy (1984), and Hakka Malaysians in general was supported by a Fulbright
Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, a Beloit College Cullister Foundation Grant, a Ful-
bright Faculty Research Fellowship, and a Portland State University Research and Publi-
cations Grant, all of which I am pleased to acknowledge. Research and writing of this
chapter involved numerous conversations with a variety of people who expressed interest
in “the Hakka question.” Their input and enthusiasm have been invaluable, as have the
comments of friends and colleagues—including Ed Wickberg, Mary Somers Heidhues,
Tom Biolsi, Julie Nemer, Nicole Constable, and John Nausieda—on the chapter itself. An
earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 1991 conference of the Association for
Asian Studies, at a panel entitled “What Does It Mean to Be Hakka?”
124HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
features of Hakka cultural adaptations in Malaysia that have continued
to puzzle me and seem to call for a more thoroughgoing investigation
of patterns and possibilities. This chapter is thus an attempt to explore
the question of Hakka culture, focusing on Hakka Malaysians but going
wider afield as necessary.
HAKKA PATTERNS IN PULAI: 1978
When I arrived in the Hakka Malaysian community of Pulai to begin
anthropological research in early 1978,1 had just spent sixteen months in
Taiwan, where I had studied the Hakka dialect in Taizhong; visited
Hakka areas in central and southern Taiwan; attended Hakka weddings,
temple festivals, and folk-singing competitions; interviewed Catholic
nuns who had worked in Hakka areas in mainland China; and elicited
stereotypes about Hakka from my mosdy Taiwanese Hokkien students
and friends. Keenly interested in “things Hakka,” I carried to Malaysia
tapes of Hakka folk songs recorded in Taiwan (which I assumed would
be greatly appreciated by the Pulai villagers) and a set of questions to
ask them about their Hakka culture.
What I found was a group of people who spoke a version of Hakka
quite different from the one I had studied, who claimed not to under-
stand the Hakka folk songs on my tapes, and who seemed to have very
little to say about distinctive differences between Hakka and other dia-
lect groups in Malaysia, no matter how hard I probed.1 Unlike the
Hakka of Shung Him Tong described by Nicole Constable (this vol-
ume), the Hakka component of Pulai cultural identity was relatively
unimportant compared to people’s attachments to the Pulai community
(as a historic, geographic, and cultural entity) and a sense of themselves
as rural, poor Chinese in a state increasingly controlled by and preferen-
tial to its Malay population. A few old people were able to sing some
Hakka mountain songs, and certain wedding and funeral customs were
identified as Hakka, yet when the old Hakka gendeman who was knowl-
edgeable in these ritual practices died during my time there, several
Pulai people commented in an unemotional way that they would now
1.	In keeping with terms commonly used in the general literature, I have chosen for
the purposes of this paper to refer to Hakka language as a dialect and to dialect groups as
both linguistic and sociological categories. While the extent to which linguistic divisions
were used as the basis for actual group formation have clearly varied, the term “dialect
group” remains a convenient shorthand for Chinese who speak the same language.
125SHARON A. CARSTENS
have to rely on the Cantonese expert in the nearby town to direct these
rituals.
The Pulai villagers were descendants of Hakka Chinese miners who
had traveled to Kelantan in search of gold beginning in the seventeenth
or early eighteenth century. As the gold supplies diminished, the less
successful of these miners did not return to China, but began to engage in
subsistence rice fanning while they continued to dig for gold on the side.
Many took local Orang Asli (aborigine) and Siamese women for wives,
creating a settled Chinese community in the fertile Galas River valley a
hundred miles south of Kota Baharu, the capital of Kelantan. Pulai
Hakka continued to identify strongly with their Chinese heritage as they
built temples, employed teachers to educate their children both in the
Confucian classics and in the martial arts, and communicated in Hakka
rather than Malay or other local languages. Non-Chinese women were
incorporated into the community, given Chinese names, and worshiped
like other Pulai women after their death along with their spouses at
family ancestral altars. The isolation of the area was shattered by the
Japanese occupation in the 1940s, followed by the communist-led insur-
rection known as the Emergency, which drew on the resources and sup-
port of rural Chinese such as the Pulai villagers. In 1950, in the wake of
several incidents, including the murder by communists of the local head-
man, all Pulai families were removed from the area and resettled in New
Villages (controlled, involuntary, relocation settlements) in Terengganu,
Johore, and nearby Gua Musang. A decade later they were allowed to
return to their ancestral lands and gradually rebuild the community
where I was privileged to reside in 1978.
Although Pulai people were not inclined to identify their cultural
patterns and practices as specifically Hakka, certain distinctive features
seemed to set them apart from other Chinese Malaysians. First, Pulai
people seemed rather conservative in their economic orientation, prefer-
ring to rely on subsistence rice farming as the basis for their family’s
support, and only slowly clearing land for cash-crop rubber plantings.
In nostalgic stories about the past, men and women spoke fondly of
living off the land, including gathering fruit and hunting in the nearby
jungles, and they compared their communal cooperation in agricultural
activities, weddings, fhnerals, and religious festivals in a favorable way
with the cold, impersonal social relations of urban dwellers. Most Pulai
men, particularly married men with children, chose not to work for the
local Chinese logging concerns, whose jobs offered lucrative wages but
also considerable physical risks. Pulai sons and daughters were encour-
126HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
aged to learn trades such as sewing, auto mechanics, or electrical wiring,
but were not directed toward the business world. In clear contrast with
the usual stereotypes of Chinese in Malaysia, and the Hakka of Calcutta
described by Ellen Oxfeld in this volume, Pulai people were known to
remark that they had “no head for business.”
Second, the Pulai area continued to be suspected of harboring com-
munist guerrillas in the nearby jungle. Two years before my arrival
about twenty Pulai men, including the Pulai headman, had been ar-
rested and jailed under the Internal Securities Act for allegedly aiding
and abetting the guerrillas. The economic conservatism I witnessed was
difficult to reconcile with Pulai men’s voluntarily involving themselves
in such a risky political enterprise, and a part of me continued to disbe-
lieve the government’s accusations. However, a Hokkien Special Branch
officer claimed that somewhere between 50 and 80 percent of the com-
munist guerrillas living in the jungle were Hakka, with Cantonese as the
second largest group. He explained that Hakka and Cantonese were
more likely to live in rural areas near the jungle fringes. Accustomed to
rural hardships, they adapted more easily than (urban) Hokkien to
being jungle guerrillas. Although the officer did not remark on Hakka
political orientations, he complained repeatedly about the uncoopera-
tive attitudes of Pulai Hakka in assisting the government with informa-
tion on suspicious activities. Given the circumstances, I obviously could
not ask Pulai people directly about their attitudes toward or support of
leftist politics, but it was clear that the internal political and economic
organization of the Pulai community had a decidedly egalitarian orienta-
tion. The recurrent leadership crises that plagued the community ap-
peared to be influenced, if not caused, by a pronounced distrust of both
specific leaders and powerful people in general. Economic differences
between individuals or families were generally denied or minimized,
and all adult males were encouraged to participate in community meet-
ings and to serve on various committees with elective membership.
A third distinctive feature related to gender divisions and gender
roles. Pulai women routinely engaged in agricultural work, both in rice
cultivation and in rubber planting and tapping. Although men usually
performed the heavy labor of plowing or felling trees to clear land,
women could and did manage such tasks in the absence of available
men. The heavy agricultural labor of Pulai women was identified as
typical of the Hakka. I was also told, mostly by non-Hakka, that Hakka
women were known not only for their strong backs, but also their
strong wills. Yet the shared labor in family enterprises did not translate
127SHARON A. CARSTENS
into shared positions in community affairs beyond the family. That
Pulai men and women recognized clear divisions of space and task in
public activities was visible in the coffee shops on a daily basis, and in
community meetings and temple rituals, where men were considered
the proper spokesmen for their families in matters of community issues
and representations to the gods. And yet, even here there was a notable
exception: a woman’s ritual organization known as the funu hui col-
lected money from local women and sponsored its own worship of the
gods during the Pulai temple festival honoring Guan Yin, the goddess
of mercy.
HAKKA PATTERNS BEYOND PULAI
The disinclination to emphasize dialect-group differences among Pulai
people in the 1970s appeared to be common among Chinese Malaysians
in general during this period. Although comments on dialect-group
differences sometimes arose in casual conversations, such remarks
seemed to represent more of a shared discourse about being Chinese
than an attempt to classify and act upon significant social distinctions
(Carstens 1983:91-92; Strauch 1981:83-84). Hakka informants from
Ipoh, Raub, and Kuala Krai who were quizzed directly about the dis-
tinctive characteristics of Hakka culture and asked whether they could
differentiate Hakka from other Chinese in terms of anything other than
language usage usually said they could not. One Hakka leader in the
Kuala Krai Hakka Association observed that Hakka and Cantonese
from Ipoh probably shared more in common than Hakka from Ipoh
and Hakka from Kuala Krai. He said that even in China Hakka had
been a diverse group, and that one’s place of residence in Malaysia was
now more influential in shaping a person’s character than the place of
one’s ancestral origins in China.2
Yet even while the evidence of the 1970s pointed to a growing break-
down in the salience of dialect-group identity in the wider social relations
of Malaysian Chinese life, a number of more general features of these
groups were still discernible. Among the most obvious were patterns of
occupational specialization and urban or rural residence. According to
the 1970 Malaysian census, Hakka were the second-largest Chinese dia-
lect group in peninsular Malaysia, and the largest group in both Sarawak
2.	See Newell (1962:4-5) for a similar observation about Chaozhou (Teochew) in
Province Wellesley in 1955.
128HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
and Sabah.3 In peninsular Malaysia Hakka were more likely to live in rural
areas (57.1 percent) than Cantonese (39.9 percent) or Hokkien (51 per-
cent), but less likely than Chaozhou (Teochew) (61.1 percent). Further-
more, the largest concentrations of Hakka were generally found in the
most interior districts of the states, in areas adjacent to the north-south
chain of jungle highlands.4 Although a larger number of Hokkien
(542,318) than Hakka (394,263) were rural, occupational divisions made it
more likely that rural Hokkien were shopkeepers or petty merchants,
while Hakka worked as manual laborers in tin mines or on rubber planta-
tions.’ Hakka were a minority in all of the oldest, largest, and wealthiest
cities, such as Kuala Lumpur, Penang, and Melaka. Even in Ipoh, where I
was told that Hakka made up about 50 percent of the Chinese population,
Cantonese was said to be the lingua franca on the street. Hokkien and
Cantonese were identified consistendy as the wealthiest and most influen-
tial merchants, and their domination of business was used to explain their
political and social domination as well. In contrast, urban Hakka were
typically employed in artisan-type activities, in drugstores, and in pawn-
broking (Cheng 1969:59,1985:96; Lee Poh Ping i985:i44).6 Given their
3.	In peninsular Malaysia Hakka comprised 22.1 percent of the Chinese population,
compared with Hokkien at 34.1 percent, Cantonese at 19.8 percent and, Chaozhou at 12.5
percent. The other speech groups enumerated were: Hainanese (4.7 percent), Kwongsai
(2.5 percent), Hokchiu (1.9 percent), Henghua (.5 percent), and other (1.6 percent). In
Sabah Hakka made up 57 percent of the Chinese population, while in Sarawak, with 31
percent of the total, they slightly outnumbered Chinese from Fuzhou (Foochow) (See
various tables, Malaysia 1972).
4.	See population figures detailed by state, district, and community group (Malaysia
1972).
5.	Much of my evidence for this statement comes from consistent reports by both
Western social scientists and Chinese observers. See, for example, Cheng (1976:54), New-
ell (1962:4), Nyce (1973:114), and Strauch (1981:54-57). For evidence of similar patterns in
Sarawak and Sabah see Then (1953) and Han Sin Fong (1975:76).
6.	This is not to maintain that there were no wealthy Hakka, or no successful Hakka
merchants, but that these were considered the exception rather than the rule. Nyce
(1973:146) reported that in Chinese New Villages in the 1960s, Hakka were stereotyped as
workers and “natural” supporters of the Socialist Front, while Hokkien were identified
with the “businessmen’s party,” the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA). He argued
that this was a class division, rather than one of dialect group, for wealthier Hakka would
also join the MCA. Nevertheless, he also admitted that the general division between
“socialist” Hakka workers and “entrepreneur” Hokkien held true.
Further proof of the underrepresentation of Hakka in the MCA was evidenced by
their minority position on the Central Working Committee of the Party (1949—57), where
they were given only six seats out of thirty-two, with Hokkien holding twelve, Cantonese
eleven, Hainanese two, and Chaozhou one (Heng 1988:67).
129SHARON A. CARSTENS
numerical strength, how did one account for the relative economic and
political weakness of the Hakka in Malaysia?
One possible explanation might be associated with the types of dis-
tinctive characteristics identified for Pulai villagers, including their eco-
nomic conservatism, their egalitarian political attitudes, and their spe-
cial gender roles. Such patterns may have not only set Hakka apart from
other Chinese, but also hindered the development of a more stratified,
capitalist-oriented group whose wealthier members could compete on
an equal footing with other Chinese. One needs to ask, however, if
these were peculiarly Hakka features, or if they might be more simply
explained by the rural socioeconomic environment in which Pulai Chi-
nese found themselves. One way of testing this hypothesis would be to
compare the features identified for Pulai with other Hakka and non-
Hakka rural Chinese Malaysian communities. Unfortunately, we lack
the necessary comparative ethnographic evidence to do so.7
Ju K’ang T’ien’s work in Sarawak in 1948 provides the only other
detailed ethnographic description of Malaysian Hakka (T’ien 1953) .8 It is
noteworthy that his observations concerning Hakka socioeconomic po-
sitions coincide with those made in Nicole Constable’s chapter (this
volume): Hakka in Sarawak accounted for a majority of Sarawak Chi-
nese, yet they were largely rural, mosdy rubber farmers, and were domi-
nated at the upper socioeconomic and political levels by urban Hokkien
and Chaozhou businessmen. T’ien claimed that occupational divisions
between dialect groups had originated, at least in part, in China, where
Hakka were mainly rural farmers, while Hokkien and Chaozhou were
more likely to have been urban merchants (ibid. 35—36). Yet since most
immigrants from all dialect groups had come from rural backgrounds,
T’ien maintained that it was the urban/rural split in both Sarawak and
China, rather than dialect-group differences or origins per se, that ac-
counted for the main variations in social organization and socioeco-
nomic power (ibid.:38). T’ien was not interested in probing the possible
distinctiveness of dialect-group cultures, but he did note an intense
concern with education in the rural areas that were largely Hakka
(ibid.:72—73), as well as a Hakka tradition of keeping clan secrets con-
7.	Ethnographies of other rural Chinese Malaysian communities certainly exist, but
they focus on different issues and do not provide comparable data on the socioeconomic
patterns and attitudes observed in Pulai.
8.	Two student exercises (Cheah 1965, Chee 1971) provide information on Hakka popu-
lation concentrations and associations in Singapore and Malaysia, but lack the depth and
sociological sophistication of T’ien’s study.
130HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
ceming pugilistic techniques (ibid.:26). Furthermore, his Hakka infor-
mants themselves attributed the economic divisions in Sarawak to the
different economic experiences of dialect groups. T’ien wrote that “vari-
ous Hakka informants complained ruefully that they knew there was no
possibility of their attaining financial power or even commercial suc-
cess. The Teochew [Chaozhou] and Fukienese [Fujianese], they said,
had all the experience of urban life and commercial enterprise, while the
rural Hakka had none.” He even admitted that there may have been
something to this argument, as he himself observed the chaos of Hakka
shops and the business sense of Fujianese and Chaozhou shopkeepers,
which Hakka lacked (ibid. 158-59).
T’ien was not alone in associating Chinese cultural adaptations in
Malaysia with the distinctive backgrounds of the various dialect groups
in China. Observations about different types of Chinese holding particu-
lar occupational niches in Malaya and the Straits Setdements were repeat-
edly made by early Chinese and European writers, some of whom even
perceived differing physical and personal propensities for Chinese from
different areas of China (cf. Newbold 1971:12-13; Pickering 1876:440;
Tweedie 1953:217; Vaughan 1854:3). These sorts of interpretations suggest
another avenue of investigation: the possibility that cultural patterns and
socioeconomic experiences associated with Hakka or other dialect
groups had first developed in China, and subsequently shaped their adap-
tations to Southeast Asia. In order to pursue this line of questioning, it is
useful to briefly review the distinctive features of Hakka culture in China,
and then ask whether these features enable us to better understand the
particular adaptations that Hakka made historically in their work and
residence in Malaysia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.
HAKKA IN CHINA
Most discussions of Hakka in China commence with descriptions of
their successive migrations from Central to South China, around the
fourth century c.E. from Henan to central Jiangxi, and spreading dur-
ing the Tang and the Song periods first to southwestern Fujian and then
to northeastern parts of Guangdong (Cohen, this volume). By the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, certain areas of northeastern Guang-
dong were purely Hakka, and many more Hakka had spread across the
central part of the province, settling as tenant farmers in Cantonese
areas and pushing on into Guangxi, areas of Sichuan, and Taiwan (Co-
hen, this volume; Moser 1985:236—42). In the areas of Guangdong
131SHARON A. CARSTENS
where they settled, they became known as “Guest People” (pronounced
“Hakka” in Cantonese), and they also came to refer to themselves as
“Guest People” (“Hak Ngin” in Hakka) (Eitel 1891-92:265).
In linguistic and cultural terms, the Hakka were clearly Han Chinese,
yet they did not tend to assimilate with other Han populations in the
areas of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi where they settled.9 Hakka
spoke a distinctive Sinitic language and exhibited a set of distinctive
cultural features that tended to set them apart from the other local popula-
tions. While many of these cultural traits could be found among other
Han populations as well, their unique combination and frequency of
occurrence were seen to describe the special nature of the Hakka char-
acter. Certain of these features were related to the relatively poor geo-
graphic regions where Hakka had settled, and the need to supplement
agricultural income with other forms of employment. Thus, Hakka
women took responsibility for many agricultural tasks that in other areas
of South China would have been left to men. One might argue that the
preference for unbound feet in Hakka women, which made agricultural
work possible, and a rather different gendered division of labor were
among the most unique features of Hakka culture.10 11 Hakka men sought
alternative employment in a number of fields, including mining, handi-
crafts, trade, and scholarship (Wong Tai Peng 1977:49). They also served
as professional soldiers (Eitel 1873—74:162; Moser 1985:240). Hakka from
Jiaying Zhou were particularly renowned for their scholarly propensities,
which enabled many to pass the civil service exams; those who did not
receive government employment usually became teachers or looked for
other forms of nonmanual work.11
9.	Assimilation did occur with some Hakka who migrated to Sichuan. Han Suyin’s
Hakka ancestors, for example, became landed gentry in Sichuan, married women with
bound feet, and, by her father’s generation, no longer spoke the Hakka dialect (1965:28-35).
For a more novelistic view of Hakka history and culture see this same work (pp. 22-28).
10.	Although its incidence varied somewhat from region to region in China, foot-
binding was an accepted practice for Chinese families who aspired to higher social standing
in Fujian and Guangdong during the Qing period (Levy 1966:53-54). The Hakka prefer-
ence for unbound feet was unique in that it was tied to dialect-group culture rather than
social class. Of course, according to the standards of Cantonese culture, this made all big-
footed Hakka women low class by definition.
11.	A Maryknoll sister now living in Miaoli in Taiwan who worked in Meixian during
the 1940s told me that while most Hakka men worked in Hong Kong or Southeast Asia,
those who did stay home would never work manually except in dire circumstances. They
would sit around at home or work as teachers, civil servants, or businessmen if they had
the chance. Meanwhile their wives did the heavy agricultural labor.
132HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
However, a willingness to perform hard physical labor in occupations
such as mining was another remarked-upon Hakka feature (Wong Tai
Peng 1977:54—59). Hakka were known for their physical stamina in
pioneering situations, and these situations also seem to have promoted
a tendency among them to stick together and fight when necessary to
support their neighbors. Even their style of fighting was said to be
distinctive. In the battles that erupted between the Cantonese and the
Hakka in central areas of Guangdong in the mid-nineteenth century,
Hakka employed more egalitarian fighting styles, with every man, in-
cluding gentry, taking the field, whereas Cantonese villages were more
inclined to hire mercenaries (Cohen, this volume).
It is important to emphasize that none of these “Hakka” traits were
totally unique to the Hakka, and that variations among Hakka of differ-
ent classes living in diverse circumstances were not unknown (Piton
1873—74:225). Nevertheless, it would be fair to say that Hakka as a group
were generally poorer than other Chinese in the areas where they lived,
and that in acknowledging traits that kept them unique and apart from
others, they developed an ethnic consciousness that affected their
modes of adaptation when they, like others, began to travel overseas.12 13
THE HISTORY OF HAKKA SETTLEMENTS IN GREATER MALAYA
Compared with Hokkien and Cantonese traders who had done business
in Southeast Asia and had settled in small numbers in Southeast Asian
ports from at least the sixteenth century, Hakka were relative latecomers
to the region.1’ Mining seems to have been what finally attracted them
to the Malayan area. During the eighteenth century Hakka miners be-
came active in gold mining in Kelantan and Pahang (Carstens 1980), tin
mining on the island of Bangka (Jackson 1969, Heidhues 1992), and
gold mining in West Borneo (Jackson 1970). The largest mining popula-
tions were found in Bangka and West Borneo, with more than six
thousand Chinese in Bangka in the 1780s (Heidhues 1992:29) and thirty
thousand in West Borneo by the 1790s (Jackson 1970:23), most of whom
were Hakka.
12.	Kuhn (1977) makes a similar argument for Hakka pioneers in nineteenth-century
Guangxi.
13.	Some Penang Hakka claim that their ancestors left China at the end of the Ming
dynasty and traveled to Penang via Siam and Kedah (Wen Zi Chuan 1979:719—20). While
a few Hakka may have setded in Malaya prior to the eighteenth century, further evidence
of their numbers or economic enterprises does not exist.
133SHARON A. CARSTENS
Mining operations were usually initiated by local Malay royalty, who
invited Chinese miners to develop ore deposits, profiting both through
Malay control of food and mining supplies, and by taxes on the ore
itself. News of these mining developments seems to have spread quickly
in Hakka areas of China; aspiring miners entered the mining areas both
singly and in small groups, and organized themselves into working
units known as kongsi. Most newcomers had to work for a year or more
to refund the cost of their passage to a mine owner, but their subse-
quent employment and payment was, for the most part, based on a
share system, with profits divided among all mining workers in the
kongsi according to an agreed-upon scheme. In the West Borneo
goldfields, Chinese miners soon freed themselves from Malay control,
organizing larger mining unions and kongsi, which included not only
mining workers but also artisans, traders, and Chinese agriculturalists
who supplied food to the mines. Fellow kongsi members cooperated in
economic enterprises and swore oaths of brotherhood to each other in a
ceremony that took place once a year on the feast day of Guandi. Most
kongsi were organized according to egalitarian principles, with the elec-
tion of officials by the shareholders, and the union of kongsi into larger
federations wherein each unit was given representation.14
Hakka miners did not organize themselves into kongsi and cooperate in
mining unions and federations simply on the basis of being Hakka, but
were often subdivided in terms of their area of origin in China, with the
principle divisions in West Borneo being Guangdong Hakka from
Meixian, Dabu, and the Hakka districts northwest of Shantou (Swatow).
Kongsi organized along subdialect lines often competed with each other
for control of water and mining lands, and larger kongsi were capable of
swallowing up smaller ones or simply chasing them out of an area (Jack-
14.	For evidence on kongsi organizations and the share system, see Henry Norman
(1904:557) for Kelantan/Pahang, Jackson (1969:50-51) and Heidhues (1992:37-40) for
Banka, and Jackson (1970:61-70) and Heidhues (1993) for West Borneo. A considerable
literature exists on the Borneo kongsi systems, including the classic study of J. J. M. de
Groot (1885), who relates the kongsi in Borneo to the egalitarian orientation of Chinese
village society. The most useful sources of reference for my purposes have been Heidhues
(i993), Jackson (1970), Ward (1954), and Wong Tai Peng (1977). Wong is particularly
interested in the political structure of “'kongsi democracy,” whose origins he traces back to
thirteenth-century share systems in the Yunnan copper mines and the Fujian sea-merchant
kingdoms of the late Ming and early Qing. Once again it is important to note that the
kongsi arrangements were not unique to the Hakka, but that Hakka use of them seemed
consistent with broader patterns of Hakka culture.
H4HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
son 1970:50-57). This pattern of Hakka fighting against other Hakka was
to be repeated in the tin-mining areas of the Malay Peninsula in the
nineteenth century. Furthermore, there were, with time, growing in-
equalities among kongsi workers and shareholders, particularly within the
largest kongsi federations (Heidhues 1993).
The wealth earned by Hakka miners in eighteenth-century Bangka
and West Borneo was considerable (Jackson 1970:28—30), but when tin
and gold deposits began to diminish and other conditions for mining
became less favorable, the miners and the profits earned from these
mines do not seem to have been transferred to other enterprises within
Southeast Asia.15 There does not appear to have developed at this time a
core group of wealthy Hakka entrepreneurs who turned their mining
profits to investments in other Southeast Asian endeavors, which might
have provided occupational and investment opportunities for future
Hakka sojourners. Why this failed to happen is not clear, but some
speculations are in order if we hope to better understand Hakka pat-
terns. One possibility is that Hakka may have been more inclined to
send their profits home, because of the relatively impoverished condi-
tions in their home areas in China.16 A further factor may have been the
division of profits according to the share system. While leaders certainly
earned more than the average worker, the share system more evenly
divided the wealth, which may have limited the possibility of large-scale
investment for some. It is also possible that the wealthier Hakka miners
found it difficult to break into the merchant networks controlled by
Hokkien in Southeast Asian port cities. Only with the expansion of the
colonial economies in the last half of the nineteenth century did oppor-
tunities for investment become more widely available to Chinese from a
variety of backgrounds.
15.	The period of greatest prosperity in Banka was between 1750 and 1780 (Heidhues
1992; Jackson 1969:35). Borneo’s prosperity lasted into the first half of the nineteenth
century. Deposits in the two main mining areas around Montrado and Mandor began to
show signs of depletion in the 1820s, but the real end to the industry came with the Dutch
abolition of the kongsi in 1850 (Jackson 1970:24). Thus, the transfer of investments might
have been expected to occur between the late eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries.
16.	Jackson (1970:30) records that one observer estimated that between one-half and
two-thirds of the gold mined in Borneo was sent back to China, while another observer
thought it was higher. Leong Kok Kee (1981:47) claims that, compared to Cantonese and
Hokkien, Jiaying Hakka sent comparatively larger amounts of their earnings back to
China and were more likely to return to China for visits. He uses this as one explanation
for Hakka economic backwardness in Penang.
135SHARON A. CARSTENS
Former Hakka miners in West Borneo and elsewhere who did not
return to China generally turned to subsistence farming or the develop-
ment of cash crops (Carstens 1980, Chew 1990, Heidhues 1992) ,17 Many of
these men married local women, establishing families for themselves in
the new setting. The unions between Hakka men and local women in
West Borneo, Bangka, and peninsular Malaya, however, were quite differ-
ent from those between Hokkien and native women in other parts of Java
and Malaya. Hokkien who married non-Chinese women in Java, Melaka,
and Terengganu developed hybrid cultures, known as Peranakan in Java
and Baba in Melaka, which incorporated selected indigenous patterns of
language usage, clothing and food styles, and/or kinship practices
(Clammer 1980, Coppel 1973, Gosling 1964, Li Chung Chu 1975). Hakka,
in contrast, generally integrated the local women they married into
Chinese-style families and continued to educate their children in the
language and culture of their Hakka fathers. Hakka remained more
clearly Chinese in their identity, even when they adapted in minor ways to
local customs (Carstens 1980, Coppel 1973, Purcell i967:97).18 It is not
clear whether differences in the gendered divisions of labor between
Hakka and Hokkien similar to those seen in China were also reproduced,
but the marriage patterns and cultural conservatism of these earlier
Hakka immigrants were clearly distinctive.
Hakka settlements and enterprises in the Straits Settlements and the
Malay States during the nineteenth century followed common patterns,
17.	In Sarawak former Hakka gold miners settled into agricultural occupations, while
Hokkien Chinese developed trading relations with native forest collectors in the interior,
reproducing once again the division of Hakka as rural producer and Hokkien as trader
(Chew 1990).
18.	Skinner (1963:104-105) explains the difference in Hakka and Hokkien patterns of
cultural mixing in Indonesia by the areas where the two groups settled, suggesting that
Hokkien who settled in Java were more “naturally” attracted to the more complex cultures
of this area and thus more susceptible to change, while Hakka who lived in Banka and
Borneo would have found nothing they cared to emulate in local indigenous practices.
One problem with this interpretation is that the same pattern does not hold true for
Malaya, where rural Hokkien in Terengganu and Kelantan acculturated and sometimes
assimilated with rural Malay culture, while Hakka did not (Carstens 1980; Gosling 1964;
Purcell 1967:97). It also appears that Hakka who resided in Melaka from at least the latter
part of the eighteenth century and married local women continued to speak Hakka and
identify with Chinese cultural practices. For example, the “Baba Chinese” woman whom
Yap Ah Loy married in 1865 was bom in Melaka of mixed parentage, but, according to her
grandson, spoke Hakka with her children (personal interview, Kuala Lumpur, 1984).
136HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
with smaller groups of Hakka residing in the more urbanized Straits
Settlements, where they were employed largely as artisans (Yen 1986:191),
while larger concentrations of workers gravitated to the tin-mining dis-
tricts in the Malayan interior. In the Straits Settlements, Hakka founded
many of the earliest huiguan, mutual aid associations with membership
based on dialect and area of origin in China.19 According to Wu Hua
(1980:4), the early organization of Hakka huiguan was due to the smaller
numbers of urban Hakka and their relatively weak economic positions
via-a-vis other dialect groups. It might also be tempting to infer from this
that Hakka demonstrated a particularly strong sense of dialect-group
cohesiveness in the overseas environment. However, such explanations
conflict with other evidence. In Taiping, Perak, the first huiguan was
erected by Hokkien who were in the minority, while in early Kuala
Lumpur, where Hakka miners and traders comprised the dominant dia-
lect group, Hakka established the first huiguan.20 It is also important to
recognize that huiguan were only one possible form of cooperation
among Chinese immigrants, who also organized themselves in kongsi,
temple associations, and secret societies, with membership based entirely
or in part on dialect and subdialect loyalties. Thus, any treatment of
cooperative, cohesive “in-group” tendencies would have to consider all
of the different categories of mutual-aid groups, a project beyond the
scope of this chapter.21
Hakka predominated in the development of tin-mining areas in penin-
sular Malaya throughout the nineteenth century, making up the majority
of mining workers as well as mining organizers and traders in the towns
that developed around the major mining centers in Negri Sembilan,
19.	The earliest Chinese huiguan in Melaka were organized by Hakka from Huizhou
(1805), Dabu (1820), and Jiaying (1821). In Penang the Jiaying huiguan, founded in 1801, is
also credited as the earliest, while in Singapore a similar group formed in 1823. For a
complete list of Chinese dialect associations in Singapore and Malaya from 1801 to 1870,
see Yen (1986:322-31).
20.	Wu Hua (1980:29-30), in fact, contradicts his own previous explanation for early
Hakka associations in Melaka and Penang by crediting Yap Ah Loy’s establishment of the
first Hakka huiguan in Selangor in 1854 to the fact that Hakka were a majority in the area.
Although Hokkien shopkeepers and miners were definitely in a numerical minority in the
tin-mining areas of Perak during the 1860s and 1870s (Khoo 1972:168-75), the first huiguan
in Taiping was the Fujian huiguan in 1859, followed by the Hainanese huiguan in 1869, the
Huizhou (Hakka) in 1877, and the Guangdong in 1887 (Xu Yim Qiao 1979:33).
21.	See, for example, Khoo’s (1972:75) description of leadership disputes among
Jiaying Hakka at Ranching, near Kuala Lumpur, in the 1860s.
137SHARON A. CARSTENS
Selangor, and Perak. While Hakka obtained mining concessions and
recruited the necessary workers, the major financial backing for these
enterprises came from Hokkien Baba and European merchants in the
Straits Settlements (Khoo 1972:58-67). The system of payment for tin-
mining workers in the second and third quarters of the century is not
clearly documented, but even later where there was some evidence of
share systems, the major profits from the industry accrued to the financial
backers, including those who made their money by advancing supplies
and opium to the miners (Wong Lin Ken 1965:60-81). In other words,
the financial arrangements for the average Hakka tin miner in peninsular
Malaya do not appear to have been as favorable as those in the West
Borneo goldfields.
As in West Borneo, different Hakka subgroups vied for control of
mining areas, with violent clashes between miners organized by kongsi
or secret societies a common occurrence during the third quarter of the
century. Hakka leaders in the interior were often as well known for their
prowess in the martial arts as for their business success, their wealth, or
their philanthropy (Carstens 1993). Although these leaders were offi-
cially appointed by the Malay rulers in the area, their selection seems to
have been based on a combination of election and appointment, and
would-be mining leaders who lacked the support of the workers would
not be appointed kapitan, no matter how wealthy they were.
Some Hakka miners in the interior did become very wealthy, yet their
success did not seem to translate into increased power for Hakka as a
whole. The clearest example of this is seen in the Kuala Lumpur area,
which was settled by Hakka miners and traders beginning in the late
1850s. Much of the economic and commercial development of the area
could be credited to the efforts of the Huizhou Hakka and their kapitan,
Yap Ah Loy, who by the time of his death in 1885 controlled both a large
area of mining land and two-thirds of the real estate east of the Kiang
River in Kuala Lumpur Town. In 1891 the Hakka made up 64 percent of
the Chinese in Selangor (71 percent in Kuala Lumpur), but by 1901 they
had fallen to only 34 percent of Selangor’s Chinese population, with
Cantonese 29 percent and Hokkien 28 percent (Jackson 1964:52—53).
According to Jackson, Cantonese, with their business skills and their
capital, often took control of tin mining when the industry “increased in
scale, and financial and commercial organization became more intri-
cate” (ibid.:52). A similar tendency was mirrored in a Chinese saying
quoted in an article on the history of Hakka in Penang:
138HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
Hakka build a city [ka-ibu]
Cantonese prosper from the city [wangbu]
Chaozhou and Hokkien control the city [zhanbu].
(Wen Zi Chuan 1979:718)
What, then, of the Hakka miners and merchants who did succeed?
Were their patterns of attaining success or responses to this success notice-
ably different from Chinese of other dialect groups? For the most part,
the wealthiest Hakka entrepreneurs of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries were self-made men who came from poor or modest
family backgrounds.22 23 * Some had family connections in Southeast Asia
going back to their grandfather or father, but others arrived in their teens
and managed to work their way up very quickly. Having achieved finan-
cial success, they sought to legitimize their social standing by contribut-
ing to social causes, both in Southeast Asia and back in China. Contribu-
tions to the building of huiguan, temples, hospitals, schools, and other
institutions were a common means by which wealthy overseas Chinese
merchants earned honor and respect in the wider Chinese community.
Wealthy Hakka followed similar patterns but were disproportionately
involved in certain areas. Almost all of the biographies of successful
Hakka emphasize the founding of schools, including not only the typical
dialect-oriented schools in Malaya and China, but also the first modern
Chinese middle school in Penang in 1904 and some of the first schools for
girls (Wen Zi Chuan 1979, Xu Yun Qiao 1979). Hu Zi Chuan, known as
the tin-mining king, is credited with founding nine different schools in
Penang, Ipoh, and his home county of Yongding in Fujian (Wen Zi
Chuan 1979:720). Individual Hakka also were especially attracted to at-
taining official recognition from the Chinese authorities, in the buying of
official degrees,25 in holding office at Chinese consulates in Singapore
22.	See the biographies of famous Hakka in Xu Yun Qiao (1979) and Wen Zi Chuan
(1979). See also Yen Ching-hwang’s (1987) article on class structure and social mobility in
the Chinese community of nineteenth-century Singapore and Malaya. Of the five figures
used to illustrate social mobility, one is Hokkien, one Chaozhou, and three are Hakka,
including Zhang Bi Shi, Yap Ah Loy, and Yao De Sheng.
23.	Hakka, of course, were not alone in their purchase of honorary degrees and titles
from the late Qing government. However, my own impression, based on the lists of
figures in Yen Ching-hwang’s (1970) article, is that wealthy and successful Hakka mer-
chants and miners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were somewhat
more likely to purchase these honors than were successful Chinese of other dialect groups.
H9SHARON A. CARSTENS
and Penang,24 and in involvement with economic development projects
back in China.25 The group of successful Hakka businessmen who formed
the core contributors to Penang’s Zhonghua Middle School and the
elaborate Buddhist monastery and temple complex, Kek Lok Si, included
Hakka from such diverse geographic regions in China as Yongding,
Meixian, Zengcheng, and Dabu (Wen Zi Chuan 1979, C. S. Wong 1963).
Cooperating on the basis of a shared Hakka identity, they chose to spon-
sor projects that clearly transcended this identity. Hakka, when given the
opportunity, seemed especially interested in investing themselves with
the credentials of proper Confucian gentlemen and displaying their loy-
alty to general symbols of Chinese high culture. Their distinctive mar-
riage practices with native women, which incorporated these women and
their children into the Chinese cultural world, showed similar evidence of
conservative cultural tendencies.
The involvement of overseas Chinese in programs and causes back in
China raises the issue of political leanings. Famous Hakka such as
Zhang Bi Shi and some of his compatriots were known for their sup-
port of the more conservative reformists in the late Qing government.
In contrast, the leaders of the Confucian Revival movement and the
Nationalist and Reformist movements in Singapore and Malaya were
mainly Hokkien merchants (Yen 1976a, 1976b, 1982a). Yet factors other
than dialect group may have been more powerful predictors of choices
in political involvement. Chinese leaders who supported the more revo-
lutionary causes leading to the 1911 revolution were generally younger,
and did not hold Qing titles or have investments back in China, leading
Yen Ching-hwang to emphasize the class differences between radicals
and conservatives (1976^264—86). In fact, the one example of a revolu-
tionary martyr cited by Yen (1976b) was Wen Sheng Cai, a Hakka from
24.	Leong Kok Kee (1981:47) remarks that while three out of the five Qing consuls in
Penang were Jiaying Hakka, this did not reflect the relative strength of Penang Hakka as a
group. “In fact, Chia-ying Hakka had never played leading roles in the Chinese society of
Penang. For example, since its formation in 1903, none of the presidents or vice-presidents
of the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce were Chia-ying Hakka although some of
them sat in the committee. Similarly since 1920 when the post was created until 1941, the
presidents of the Penang Kwangtung and Tengchew Association were not Chia-ying
Hakka.”
25.	Four of the six major figures identified by Godley (1981) as “mandarin-capitalists”
involved in development projects in late Qing China were Hakka. See also Yen Ching-
hwang (1982b).
140HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
Perak, memorialized in another collection as a famous Hakka figure (Xu
Yun Qiao 1979).26
Information on specifically Hakka activities during the twentieth cen-
tury is generally difficult to locate. During the early decades Hakka
women, along with other Chinese women, began to arrive in Malaysia
in increasing numbers (Lim 1967). There is some indication that Hakka
women were more inclined to work outside their homes, in tin mining
and rubber tapping, than women from other dialect groups, with the
possible exception of certain categories of Cantonese women.27 The
continuation of such distinctive gender roles probably reinforced gen-
eral attitudes toward Hakka from both within and without their group.
The other intriguing observation often made about Malaysian Hakka
concerns their involvement in leftist politics during the Emergency and
afterward (Miller 1955:20, Purcell 1967:214).28 Unfortunately, aside from
anecdotal comments of the type made by the Special Branch officer
cited previously, information on the dialect composition of Malaysian
Chinese communists does not seem to exist. It is interesting, in this
context, that Hakka in 1960s Indonesia were identified as rightist in
political orientation. According to Skinner (1963:116), the relatively
poor and marginal status of Indonesian Hakka led them to support the
then revolutionary Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT, Guomindang) dur-
ing the early twentieth century. But as Chinese politics shifted in later
26.	Leong Kok Kee (1981:43) similarly notes more conservative and more radical
divisions among Penang Jiaying Hakka in their political stands during this period.
27.	See Siew (1953:14-17) and Lai (1986:56). Both Hakka and Cantonese women
worked as dulang (pan) washers in tin-mining areas. Lai identifies the Cantonese female
laborers as those who had refused marriage, and mentions their formation of all-female
work collectives. Hakka women, in contrast, were more likely to be married and to
contribute their labor and wages to the household income. When queried about Hakka
employment patterns a middle-aged Hakka woman, raised in Melaka, told me in 1978 that
during her youth, Hakka would send their wives and daughters out to work, while
Hokkien and men from other dialect groups discouraged this practice. But now, she said,
there really was no difference, for all Malaysian Chinese women worked as necessary
outside their homes.
28.	According to Purcell, “The Hailams, who provided most of the domestic servants
in Malaya, are a race somewhat different from the mainland Chinese and are said to have a
good deal of aboriginal blood in their veins. They were the first to take the left line in
politics, partly, perhaps, to increase their prestige with other Chinese by drawing atten-
tion to themselves. Later the Khehs (Hakkas) also showed a disposition to leftist politics.
They, too are a type of Chinese distincdy apart from the remainder and with a reputation
for impatience of authority and independent views” (1967:214).
141SHARON A. CARSTENS
decades, traditional Hakka support for the Nationalists, then represent-
ing the Republic of China on Taiwan, placed them in a rightist position
vis-a-vis the Hokkien merchants, who by the 1960s were more closely
associated through trade with the People’s Republic of China.
One pattern that does seem discernible in the activities of both
wealthy and poorer Malayan Hakka is an insistence on being respected
as true (Han) Chinese and a determination to preserve Chinese cultural
traditions. From the late nineteenth century on a series of publications
issued by both European missionaries and other Chinese authors associ-
ated Hakka with non-Han groups in China. Hakka responded by orga-
nizing mass meetings in Guangzhou in 1921 and in Singapore in 1936
demanding retraction of such statements. They also publicized their
own versions of Hakka history, which focused on their origins in North
China (Char 1969:6—7, Ye Zhong Ling 1986). The attraction of wealthy
Malayan Hakka in the early twentieth century to investments in educa-
tion, official degrees, and official offices can partially be understood in
this light, as can the special way in which Hakka incorporated non-
Chinese women into Hakka families. Part of the attraction of commu-
nism to Hakka in Malaysia and to Chinese Nationalists in Indonesia
might draw upon a related explanation: both groups encouraged a
nationalist orientation that eliminated dialect distinctions in favor of
Mandarin and a common Chinese identity.
FORM AND CONTENT IN HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
Having explored the general information available on Malaysian Hakka,
let us return to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter. In
asking about Hakka culture, I noted that my approach was at once old
fashioned and radical, and I would like to begin my concluding discus-
sion by clarifying this statement. I would argue that “old fashioned views
of culture” of the pre—World War II variety conceptualized cultures as the
historical products of peoples united by language, geography, and a
distinctive set of customs (cf. Benedict 1934). One could define the core
features of these cultures and identify individuals as group members
whose behavior conformed to these basic features. This notion of discrete
sociocultural units was seriously challenged in Leach’s (19S4) pioneering
study of highland Burma, where fluidity over time better described the
relations between social groups and cultural practices. The subsequent
interest in questions of ethnic groups and boundaries (cf. Barth 1969),
and the possibility of situational maneuvering by individuals claiming
142HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
different cultural statuses (cf. Nagata 1974), suggested a very different
concept of cultural identity based more on form and political maneuver-
ing than on any specific content.
If one were to apply this notion of cultural identity to Hakka, we
would focus on the cultural features Hakka in specific circumstances
chose to emphasize as they identified themselves in opposition to other
Chinese dialect groups. We would assume that their self-definition
would vary in relationship to the groups with which they chose to
contrast themselves, leading to similar variation in cultural content. The
problem with this view of culture is that it tends to ignore the inescap-
able historical depth of cultural patterns, and to give conscious ethnic
definitions too much weight in the overall understanding people come
to have of themselves as cultural beings.
My own approach to the question of cultural definition attempts to
combine understandings gained from both the earlier and later ap-
proaches. As the historically based product of a complex mix of socio-
economic adaptations, the cultural patterns by which people come to
understand themselves and live their lives are not always consciously
understood (as in Bourdieu’s [1977] notion of “habitus”), yet these
patterns nevertheless exert a continuing influence on the structures indi-
viduals impose on their lives. In this sense, cultural patterns are viewed
both as structural and structuring. While individuals and the circum-
stances they encounter may cause change in these patterns, the most
basic understandings and patterns are usually reinforced in numerous
ways in the various domains of life and do not change easily or quickly.
In fact, the comments made by Ju K’ang Tien’s Hakka informants in
Sarawak cited above reverberate with this sort of understanding.
Applied to the Hakka in China, this notion of culture would pay
close attention to the manner in which specific socioeconomic environ-
ments shaped cultural patterns, most notably the treatment of women,
modes of cohesiveness and egalitarianism, and emphasis on physical
stamina and martial arts. The patterns exhibited generally fell within the
range of Chinese cultural variation. Apart from the emphasis Jiaying
Hakka seemed to place on education, most Hakka traits would be
familiar to other lower-class, rural Chinese. Yet the fact that Hakka
spoke a different dialect and kept themselves separate from other Chi-
nese groups must have made these characteristics seem special.
In migrating to work in Southeast Asia, the cultural patterns devel-
oped in China seem to have continued for Hakka in general. This does
not mean that Hakka automatically identified themselves as distinct
143SHARON A. CARSTENS
from other Chinese because they were Hakka, or that being Hakka
made them automatically cooperate with others who were similarly
identified. There was clearly considerable variation in the consciousness
by which Hakka claimed to be distinctive and different from Chinese of
other dialect groups. Yet I would argue that a conscious awareness of
patterns followed in China that were now, in the new setting, recog-
nized as distinctively Hakka was not necessary for these very patterns to
continue. Simply by living and working among others who thought
and lived as they did, Hakka would tend to reproduce the cultural
patterns developed by their ancestors. Thus in identifying Hakka cul-
tural patterns, I would speak of tendencies for Hakka to follow certain
occupations or organize themselves in certain ways based on their his-
torical cultural background. Chinese from other dialect groups, particu-
larly those who came from family backgrounds resembling those of the
rural Hakka, may also have followed some of these patterns. Still, I
would argue that there is something distinctive about Hakka culture in
general in that one could not argue that the same set of features is
generally typical for any other Chinese dialect group.
The most self-conscious statements of Hakka identity among Chinese
in Malaysia and Singapore are found in the special volumes issued by
kuiguan,29 and it is interesting to note the extent to which the state-
ments they make about Hakka culture correspond to the patterns dis-
cussed here. Like the huiguan volumes issued by Chinese of other dia-
lect groups, the Hakka publications feature articles on the history of
these associations and provide biographies of past and current illustri-
ous members. Many of the volumes include information about the
home area back in China, often culled from Chinese gazetteers, some-
times complete with maps and color photos of local homeland scenery.
In Hakka volumes interest in the Chinese past is expressed in articles
about the Hakka migrations from Central China to the South and
translations of (positive) Western missionary views of the Hakka. Very
little is written in these volumes about the history of the Hakka in
Southeast Asia.30 There are, instead, more general articles about Hakka
29.	A quick survey of the titles of articles listed in the Index to Chinese Periodical
Literature on Southeast Asia, 1905-1966 (Nanyang Index 1968) suggests that articles discuss-
ing the customs of specific dialect groups such as the Hakka were not common in Chinese
periodicals, but were restricted to the specialized huiguan volumes.
30.	Among the few exceptions are Wen Zi Chuan’s (1979) article on the history of the
Hakka in Penang. See also Leong Kok Kee’s (1981) more scholarly paper on the Jiaying
Hakka in Penang.
144HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
folk songs, Hakka women, or distinctive Hakka customs.31 The issue of
what makes Hakka distinctive, from a Hakka point of view, is dealt with
in a particularly interesting manner in an article published in two Hakka
commemorative volumes in 1965. The following translated segment dem-
onstrates a conscious awareness of core Hakka values, which I would
maintain have been repeatedly reproduced in both general and specific
ways in Hakka communities in the wider Malayan region.32 According
to Chun An,
The Hakka gentleman has an abundance of natural character.
Even if he is so poor as to have nothing to return to, he will not
be made a fool of. If anyone treats him with contempt, or acts
toward him in an impolite manner, he will swear to oppose him
to the death. Or his independent character will be aroused,
going from weakness to strength and turning defeat into gain.
In treatment of people he greatly loves “face/dignity.” This
face includes ceremonies, solemnity, moral character, position,
etiquette, reputation. . . . Normally he loves social intercourse
and is diligent in entertaining with courtesy and warmth. If he
happens upon a ceremony for capping, marriage, or death, he is
able to honor the rules according to old forms, to preserve
traditional ceremonies. If one has merely wealth and does not
have the qualifications for face, even people in remote places
will scorn him. Apart from this, [the Hakka gentleman] highly
values the literary aspects of social intercourse. One who is able
to write essays on ethics and morality is respected by the masses
as though he were divine nobility as was customary in preced-
ing generations.
Most Hakka are educated; during the Qing the number of
males who were literate approached 70 percent, but most fe-
males were illiterate, as this was the custom of the time. After
31.	See, for example, Shen (1951), Yang Qiu Hong (1965), Chun An (1965), Zhang Fu
Ling (1971), Wen Ji Cheng (1979).
32.	Chun An’s article is an extensive treatment of the “Hakka question” in eighteen
sections: (1) Introduction, (2) A Definition of Hakka, (3) Hakka Reputation (deals with
the question of whether the Hakka are Han Chinese), (4) Hakka Ancestors, (5) Hakka
Migrations, (6) Hakka Territories, (7) Hakka Population, (8) Hakka Geographic Circum-
stances, (9) Hakka Climate, (io) Products from Hakka Areas, (11) Hakka Language, (12)
Hakka Customs, (13) Hakka Distinguishing Characteristics, (14) Hakka Religion, (15)
Hakka Scholarship, (16) Hakka Literature, (17) Hakka Arts, (18) Conclusion.
145SHARON A. CARSTENS
the Republic was founded people who attended school in-
creased and the educational system of that period was more
developed, so that illiteracy was gradually done away with.
The Hakka gentleman has a great spirit of adventure. No
matter whether old or young, he considers that as long as he is
alive, with this spirit it is hard to slow down even a little, as
[friends] lead one another along. Many [a Hakka] goes overseas
for development [fiizban]. Even if he has no background in an
enterprise, even if he must struggle with privation and hardship
in the beginning, he is prepared to work for a living, as willing
as if it were for sweetmeats, until he gradually has savings. Then
he will set up a small stall, which will expand into a shop, and he
will build his fortune as before, until finally he becomes a
wealthy person. . . . When he has accumulated enough to rely
on, he could change from acting as a partner in business to
being a shareholder in the manner of most towkays [toujia], but
not he, for his spirit of adventure would not allow this to hap-
pen. Today in overseas Chinese society Hakka who have risen in
this way are numerous. If such achievements are great, how
could it be by chance?
Hakka like to learn martial arts and fighting skills because of
their former environment, in which the aborigines often fought
with the Hakka. The aborigines planted and tilled with sword
and fire. The most fierce in character of all of the southern
barbarians would rely on their power over terrains of strategic
importance in order to hold the Hakka hostage. For this reason
most Hakka liked to be skilled in fighting as a means of self-
defense; they suffered with other native peoples of Guangdong
and Guangxi during the invasions of the southern barbarians
from Zhejiang, living together in an inferior environment.
There were, in truth, multiple reasons for the [Hakka] spirit of
adventure. Fifty years ago in Hakka areas those who studied
martial arts stood at about 70 percent. Whether one’s occupa-
tion was farming, wage labor, or business it was all the same—
during their vacations the youthful students would practice box-
ing, which served as a kind of extracurricular activity, both as a
form of exercise and as defense against foreign aggression. . . .
The rights and obligations of Hakka males and females are
uniformly equal. Already it is fashionable to favor women, and
in the village and large family systems there is no custom of men
146HAKKA MALAYSIAN CULTURE
working while women do not. The work of plowing and plant-
ing is done by women or by one or two men who might be
living at home. When there is no agricultural work they do
common auxiliary jobs at home, such as spinning and weaving,
sewing, weaving bamboo curtains, making paper, and other
skilled handicraft work. From early times Hakka women had
natural feet, and for this reason they were, compared to women
from other groups, more healthy and beautiful; this is the most
often remarked-upon feature in the Chinese folk histories.
(1965:64-66)
CONCLUSION
What, then, does the future hold for Hakka Malaysians? Under what
circumstances might we expect the old patterns to continue? Alterna-
tively, how might certain of these very characteristics encourage transfor-
mations of other cultural patterns that have been associated with
Hakka?
Let me begin by observing that, although Chinese Malaysians do not
generally emphasize cultural differences between members of different
dialect groups, dialect and subdialect loyalties continue to be employed
in exclusivistic ways for certain purposes. Huiguan, based on dialect
group and one’s ancestor’s place of origin in China, have not disap-
peared from the Malaysian scene. Moreover, there are recent examples
of such organizations expanding their activities in economic spheres by
forming limited capital-holding companies for the exclusive benefit of
their members.”
Given new systems of electoral politics, it is possible that the larger
numbers of Hakka voters could put more of their kinfolk into positions
of power and authority. This was Ju K’ang Tien’s (1983) interpretation
of political changes in the Sarawak Chinese community between 1948
and the 1980s. Yet the pattern is clearly not uniform, for in Sabah, where
Hakka form the majority dialect group, Edwin Lee (1968:323) observed
that Hakka leaders in the 1960s, in direct contrast with leaders in other
dialect groups, did not sponsor exclusive Hakka associations capable of
supporting generalized Hakka interests. Lee suggested that dispersed
33.	The Chinese-Ianguage news magazine Tazhou zhoukan [Asia weekly] featured an
article on this topic	zhoukan 1991). Thanks to Chin Siew Ben for sharing this
with me.
147SHARON A. CARSTENS
settlement patterns among the largely rural Hakka, as well as the Hakka
propensity for stubborn self-reliance, were the most important factors
in explaining this pattern.
Hakka emphasis on education could result in other types of change.
Those who pursue higher education in the English or Malayan stream
could find their Hakka values subtly and not-so-subtly altered. This
appears to be the case with many of the children and grandchildren of
the Hakka farmers of Kudat, Sabah, who now work as urban profession-
als and service workers (Hill and Voo 1990). Anecdotal evidence from
Hakka I have met in the United States and Malaysia suggests that
Hakka are more inclined than other Chinese to use education (rather
than business) as a means of socioeconomic mobility, and that this has
resulted in larger numbers of Hakka who are English-educated profes-
sionals. These people add that Hakka are also more inclined to educate
daughters as well as sons, and it might prove interesting to study female
Chinese professionals on this score.
Other features of Hakka culture would seem to have a decreasing
relevance in current Malaysian society. A fondness for martial arts and
preference for egalitarian modes of organization might fit well with
isolated agriculturalists (or leftist jungle guerrillas), but such lifestyles are
clearly becoming a thing of the past. Finally, we must note that current
marriage patterns, with increasing rates of intermarriage between mem-
bers of different dialect groups, will affect the cultural patterns of the next
generation. In short, I would postulate that clear distinctions between
the cultural patterns of Hakka and non-Hakka will continue to erode,
and that a shoring up of such patterns in the future would require much
more conscious efforts to retain cultural distinctness.
148si Still “Guest People”
The Reproduction of Hakka Identity in Calcutta, India
ELLEN OXFELD
A small number of Hakka Chinese immigrants to Calcutta entered into
the manufacture of leather during the World War I era. This occupation,
considered to be polluting by high-caste Hindus and normally left to
untouchables or Muslims, proved to be a lucrative source of income.
Although the entire Chinese population of Calcutta consists of no more
than eight thousand individuals, the Hakka now own and operate the
vast majority of tanneries there, and their contribution to the Indian
leather industry is far from negligible on a national scale. Calcutta is one
of three major centers of the tanning industry in India, exceeded only by
the cities of Madras in the south and Kanpur in the north.
The Hakka do not comprise Calcutta’s entire Chinese population.
Cantonese from Guangdong and immigrants from Hubei have also
settled in Calcutta. The Cantonese, Hubeinese, and Hakka have each
retained their native language, and each occupies a different economic
niche. The Cantonese are primarily known as carpenters, while the
major business of the small Hubeinese community is dentistry. The
Hakka, in addition to their involvement in tanning, own and operate
shoe shops, hairdressing salons, and restaurants. But the tanning indus-
try still engages the largest number of Calcutta’s Hakka population, and
the Hakka community as a whole is by far the largest of the three
Chinese subgroups.1
This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted during the years 1980-82, and again in the
summers of 1985 and 1989, in a community of Hakka Chinese who had found a profitable
niche in Calcutta’s leather industry. An earlier version was presented at the 1991 conference
of the Association for Asian Studies, at a panel entided “What Does It Mean to Be
Hakka?”
1.	Although the Calcutta census has never broken down the Chinese population on
the basis of language, the numerical dominance of the Hakka is evident. There are two
Chinese schools for Hakka students and only one for Cantonese. Furthermore, the
Hubeinese and Cantonese are frequendy able to converse in Hakka, while few Hakka
1+9ELLEN OXFELD
The Chinese tanning area is situated on the eastern periphery of
Calcutta in an area known as Dhapa (also sometimes referred to as
Tangra or Tapsia since it straddles two districts of those names). Ap-
proximately three hundred tanning businesses, the majority employing
between five and fifty workers each, are found there. Housed in large
concrete buildings of two and three stories, or small one-story struc-
tures with tile roofs, these factories are connected by a maze of unpaved,
frequently muddy paths as well as open sewers through which the
byproducts of the tanning process flow. The tanneries in this rust-
colored industrial environment serve as both residences and factories for
the Hakka.
This chapter investigates the constitution of Calcutta Hakka ethnic
identity, utilizing as a starting point Orlando Patterson’s definition of
ethnicity as “that condition wherein certain members of a society, in a
given social context, choose to emphasize as their most meaningful basis
of primary, extrafamilial identity certain assumed cultural, national, or
somatic traits” (1975:308).
I would add to Patterson’s definition of ethnicity an insistence that
ethnic identity is not simply a matter of how a group chooses to define
itself, but also a question of the identity that others ascribe to it. The
manner in which others view an ethnic group may play into the group’s
self-perceptions in a variety of ways. Group members may incorporate,
reject, invert, or ignore the images others have of them. And the images
others have of an ethnic group will in turn color the attitudes group
members hold toward these others.
Ethnic identity is viewed here as dialogical or reflexive, in the sense
that it is created, maintained, and reaffirmed through a continuous set
of oppositions between one’s own group and others.2 To use Fredrik
Barth’s (1969) language, ethnic interaction creates ethnic boundaries,
but the “stuff” these boundaries enclose, the particular diacritica uti-
lized as ethnic boundary markers, can be discovered only by looking at
particular contexts of interaction.
learn Cantonese or Hubeinese. Cantonese and Hubeinese informants assert that this is
due to the fact that the Hakka now dominate Chinese life in Calcutta. Finally, the number
of tanning businesses (approximately three hundred in 1980) clearly establishes tanning as
the most important occupation of the Hakka. Only shoe shops come close (one hundred
fifty in 1980).
2.	Where one of these others is the state, as Stevan Harrell has so trenchantly demon-
strated in a paper on Yi communities in Southwest China, the process by which groups
create self-definitions is exceedingly complex (Harrell 1990b).
150STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
In the case at hand, three elements seem important in establishing
and maintaining Calcutta Hakka identity: state and national politics, an
ethnically differentiated and stratified economy, and a host society with
a religious system based on the symbolic opposition of purity and
impurity.3
I should make clear at the outset that although this chapter empha-
sizes the interactive nature of ethnic identity, it also acknowledges that
the process of ethnic-identity creation is a historical one. In other
words, an emphasis on interaction need not lack historical depth. Eth-
nic identities reproduce “differentiated social formations” (Bentley
1987:42), but changes in social conditions over time may create the need
for either investing ethnic identities with new meanings or for dissolv-
ing certain ethnic categories altogether. Says G. Carter Bendey, in a
recent article on ethnicity and practice, “As individuals develop new
ways of dealing with a changing world, old truths erode; as what was
formerly inconceivable becomes commonplace, degrees of sharing and
affinity, hence ethnic identities, become problematic. At the least, under
these conditions ethnic symbolism is likely to take on different mean-
ings for differentially adapted segments of a population” (ibid. :43).
Keeping in mind this potential of ethnic identities to transform them-
selves in response to changing conditions, and also remembering that
the chapters in our book ask what it means to be Hakka, I conclude this
chapter with some questions about how the meaning of being Hakka
may change for Calcutta Hakka who emigrate to Toronto.
OCCUPATION AND ETHNICITY IN CALCUTTA
Even before I came to Calcutta to do fieldwork, I was aware that it is a
city in which ethnicity is a critical social, cultural, and economic force.
Located in West Bengal, the great array and diversity of ethnic, reli-
gious, and caste groups that comprise Calcutta’s population is due
partly to its role as the preeminent city of Northeast India.
Despite its teeming population and well-publicized urban problems—
poor sewage, overcrowded and polluted slums (bustee), multitudes of
3.	There is a vast literature that debates the origins of these distinctions themselves.
Some argue that they serve to organize exploitative economic relations, and others that
they are based on fundamental symbolic oppositions (e.g., Dumont 1970, Kolenda 1985,
Mencher 197+)- For our purposes here, we will simply note the influence of beliefs about
purity and impurity upon Calcutta’s Hakka. The debate about the origins of this system
itself is far beyond the scope of this chapter.
151ELLEN OXFELD
pavement dwellers, public transportation that is bursting at the seams—
and despite the fact that Calcutta has now been overtaken by Bombay as a
center of industry, the city continues to be a magnet that attracts migrants
from not only the surrounding Bengali countryside, but also from the
neighboring states of Bihar and Orissa, from more distant states within
India (such as Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu), and from
Bangladesh and Nepal. At one time Calcutta hosted a sizeable Jewish
community and a smaller Armenian one. This continuous migration to
Calcutta has been augmented by the great human waves associated with
the partition of India in 1947 and by subsequent wars with Pakistan,
culminating with the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, when millions of
refugees poured into West Bengal and Calcutta. Indeed, in the years
between 1881 and 1961, immigrants from outside West Bengal continu-
ously comprised over 50 percent of the city’s population (Chakraborty
1990:11).
Founded at the close of the eighteenth century by traders belonging
to the East India Company, Calcutta eventually served as the capital of
British India, until political agitation and unrest forced the British to
relocate the capital to Delhi in 1911. Calcutta’s predominance as a major
port and center of trade, finance, and industry has continued since the
days of the East India Company (Lubell 1974:3), and indeed the Cal-
cutta region preceded other parts of the country in the process of indus-
trialization (ibid.: 14). Greater Calcutta is still the most populous city in
India (Geib and Dutt 1987:32); in 1981 the population of its metropoli-
tan district was 9.2 million, making it one of the ten largest metropolises
in the world (ibid.: 132). Furthermore, unlike Bombay and Delhi, no
other major urban centers are found within hundreds of miles of Cal-
cutta (Lubell 1974:2). Although the growth of the city is now said to be
“merely” 25 percent per decade, or the same rate as India as a whole
(Stevens 1983:3), the ethnic, caste, and religious diversity of the city
continues to be a preeminent feature.
When I refer to ethnicity in Calcutta I refer to several types of groups.
First, there are immigrants from outside South Asia, such as the Chi-
nese and the Armenians. Second, there are people from South Asian
countries other than India, such as Nepal and Bangladesh. Third, there
are people from other Indian states, who speak languages other than
Bengali. In addition, many of these groups, all of whom can be referred
to as “ethnic” groups within Calcutta, are subdivided along caste and
religious lines. Hence, Hindu Bengalis, as well as Hindu immigrants
from other states in India, have a multitude of caste affiliations. Not
152STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
only are most of these groups endogamous with respect to marriage,
but, in addition, many are also associated with distinct occupational
niches. Religion also divides the migrants. Migrants to Calcutta from
the state of Punjab, for example, include Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs.
The differentiation of groups in Calcutta is therefore based on several
cross-cutting categories, including language, religion, caste, class, and
regional origin. And each subdivision created by the combination of
one or more of these categories tends to be associated with clusters of
particular occupations. For instance, Hindi-speaking people include
groups as varied as migrants from rural areas in Bihar and Marwaris, a
trading people with origins in central India. While Biharis are industrial
laborers and pushcart and ricksha operators, Marwaris are industrialists
and businesspeople. South Indians, on the other hand, are commonly
associated with clerical and administrative work (Bose 1968:39), while
Sikhs are found in large numbers in the transport business (ibid.138).
Amongst Bengalis, who share language and ethnic affiliation, occupa-
tional differentiation is organized according to caste categories and/or
regional origin. (Since Bengalis are native to Calcutta, one would ex-
pect a greater differentiation of roles within their group than among
immigrants).
Even the leather business is organized according to linguistic, caste,
religious, and/or regional categories. The Hakka buy rawhide from
North Indian Muslims; they employ scheduled caste4 Bihari migrants as
laborers and Nepalese as guards; and they sell their leather to Punjabi
Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs.
While such ethnic variability might remind one of the ethnic diversity
of American cities, such as New York, there is an important distinction.
Although ethnicity is certainly a major component of socioeconomic
4.	The term “scheduled” caste is usually used to designate those groups who are
known as “untouchables,” i.e., with whom contact is considered especially polluting
within caste ideology. The sociologist R. A. Schermerhorn points out that the term
originated during the 1930s when the British desired to categorize for census purposes
those castes with whom contact “ ‘entails purification on the part of high-caste Hindus,’ a
dejure definition. Lists or schedules of such castes were drawn up for the purpose of
singling out those groups suffering civil and religious disabilities” (1978:29). There are
problems with this definition, since all castes are hierarchically ranked and contact be-
tween a relatively higher group and a relatively lower group—no matter what their
particular identity—always entails the possibility of pollution for the higher group. Even
among groups defined as untouchable, for instance, there is a hierarchy of relative purity.
Nevertheless, the term is generally applied to those groups who in a particular region are
defined as “the most defiled of all, the ones who can pollute all others” (ibid.iso).
15?ELLEN OXFELD
status in American cities, particularly in the case of African American
and Hispanic populations, there is a wide spread of income within each
ethnic group. In Calcutta, however, as Brian J. L. Berry and Philip H.
Rees point out in their study of the city’s factoral ecology, the occupa-
tional differences between ethnic groups are greater than those within
them. The only exception to this is among Bengalis, where castes are
connected to occupational roles (1969:490).
One reason for the continuing importance of ethnicity in the social
structure of Calcutta is the city’s economy of scarcity. As Nirmal Kumar
Bose stated, in reference to Calcutta, “Because there are not enough
jobs to go around everyone clings as closely as possible to the occupa-
tion with which his ethnic group is identified and relies for economic
support on those who speak his language, on his coreligionists, on
members of his own caste and on fellow immigrants from the village or
district from which he has come. By a backwash, reliance on earlier
forms of group identification reinforces and perpetuates differences be-
tween ethnic groups” (1966:102).
To some extent, therefore, the Chinese are simply one of many
groups in Calcutta affiliated with a particular economic niche. As with
most ethnic, caste, and religious groups in this diverse city, the Chinese
not only occupy particular economic roles, but are endogamous with
respect to marriage and social life. On the other hand, their status as
foreigners associated with a country that has been engaged in hostilities
against India, combined with their association with a particularly de-
graded occupation (leather making), lend a certain uniqueness to their
role and give them an outsider status greater in degree to that of other
immigrants to Calcutta.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CENTER AND PERIPHERY
Ethnic, caste, and religious distinctions play important roles in both the
Indian leather industry and Calcutta’s economy. However, in addition
to the strong association between occupation and ethnicity, Calcutta
also adds a geographic demarcation. Nirmal Kumar Bose (1966, 1968)
examined this phenomenon extensively and charted in a series of maps
the social, ethnic, and religious composition of Calcutta. He demon-
strated that there was a tendency for higher caste and class groups to be
associated with the center of the city, and for lower caste and class
groups to be associated with the periphery.
The primacy of the central area in Calcutta has continued since
154STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
British times and results from the interaction of both political and
economic forces. When the British founded Calcutta, they built an
imperial stronghold, Fort William, near the river and surrounded it
with a large open area called the Maidan. They did so as a defensive
tactic. The fort was so strategically placed that although British troops
inside could easily see attackers (Lelyveld 1975:12), outsiders attempt-
ing to close in could not observe the fort until they were within firing
range. The British residential quarter adjoined this protected area.
Presently the Maidan functions as what the journalist Joseph Lelyveld
calls “the city’s lungs” (ibid. 112), the only open green space left. This
area and bordering sections of the old native quarter continue to be
prime real estate, partly because of their proximity to the open space
of the Maidan, and partly because the major shopping district is lo-
cated in this central area. Therefore, the high value of the center in
Calcutta is closely linked to its original importance in securing British
military, political, and economic power, and to its subsequent desirabil-
ity for both residential and commercial use.
What is significant is that both spatial and occupational demarcations
distinguish ethnic, caste, language, and religious groups in Calcutta.
And these distinctions are reflected in and help maintain social separa-
tion. Calcutta is not a melting pot. Instead, each of the many groups
maintains its separation from the others, rarely intermarrying and con-
servatively guarding its own customs and ways of life. For instance,
Calcutta’s schools cater to groups according to the language spoken.
One finds Bengali, Hindi, English, Gujarati, and Chinese schools. Fur-
thermore, many groups have their own associations, and few associa-
tions are based on a cross-ethnic membership (Tysen 1971). Indeed, in
Calcutta questions of assimilation and acculturation are irrelevant. If the
Chinese were to assimilate, for instance, with which group would they
do so?
The existence of these relatively endogamous, occupationally demar-
cated, and geographically clustered subgroups, as well as the contrast
between center and periphery, bear some resemblance, on a larger scale,
to the organization of Indian villages. But while in villages there is a
division of labor based primarily on caste, in Calcutta the basis for this
division has extended to include not only caste, but also language,
religion, and regional origin.
As in a village, however, the economic interactions of groups have
not broken down the barriers among them, which are reproduced
through social and domestic organization. Indeed, the multitude of
155ELLEN OXFELD
groups in Calcutta resemble the collectivities alluded to by Barth in his
work on ethnic boundaries: “Their agreement on codes and values need
not extend beyond that which is relevant to the social situations in
which they interact” (1969:16). While many of these groups interact in
the economic sphere, their separate ethnic identities remain unscathed.
Most striking, both the ethnic organization of Calcutta and the caste
differentiation of Indian villages are reflected in an opposition between
center and periphery. Just as low castes and classes are associated with
the peripheral areas of Calcutta, in many Indian villages the untouch-
able outcasts are found in distinct quarters outside the village proper.5
CHINESE TANNERS: PERIPHERALITY AND IMPURITY
One must be cautious not to stretch the analogy between village India
and Calcutta too far, for the historical reasons behind the opposition of
center and periphery differed in these two locations; the establishment
of British military and commercial power was not a factor in the center/
periphery distinctions in Indian villages, as it was in the colonially
created city of Calcutta. In both cases, however, a knowledge of the
values embedded in caste society is critical to understanding the contem-
porary social significance of these spatial oppositions, particularly the
tanning community’s location on the eastern periphery of the city.
The ideology underlying the Hindu caste system is based on a distinc-
tion between purity and impurity. Organic waste products are impure
and so, therefore, are activities such as eating, sex, defecation, and
menstruation. Furthermore, all people, animals, and things may tempo-
rarily undergo states of pollution through engaging in such polluting
activities or through contact and interchange with others who are in a
polluted state (see Kolenda 1985). All beings and things can be polluted,
and may be hierarchically ranked according to their relative degree of
pollution. Occupation is an important component of such ranking,
since certain occupations, by their very nature, expose their practitio-
ners to greater contact with pollution.6 For instance, those who deal
5.	Neither Indian cities nor villages are unique in terms of the significant symbolic role
played by space within them. As Walter Firey pointed out in a pathbreaking study,
undertaken over forty years ago, of the city of Boston, “Space may be a symbol for social
values” (1980 [1947]:i69).
6.	There is a broad and vigorous debate about the nature of the caste system in India,
and the extent to which it is ideologically based. Some scholars, such as Dumont (1970)
assert that the ideology of purity and pollution underlies and orders the social relations
156STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
with human waste—such as sweepers, barbers, and launderers—are
always in a more impure state than those whose occupations involve less
contact with pollution, such as priests.
Significantly, none of the occupations engaged in by Calcutta
Chinese—whether it be the hairdressing, restauranting, tanning, and
shoemaking of the Hakka, the carpentry of the Cantonese, or the
dentistry of the Hubeinese—is associated with high-caste activities in
traditional Hindu thought. In a system in which status of groups is
determined by the relative purity or impurity of their occupations,
there is no doubt that tanning is viewed as one of the most supremely
impure tasks. This is due to its association with dead cattle and the
necessity of working with hides; death pollutes by making the entire
body a waste product, and the association with slaughter of the sacred
cow adds to the impurity.
It is not uncommon for immigrant minority groups throughout the
world to engage in occupations that are denigrated by their host soci-
eties, or at least by the higher-status members of those societies. The
Chinese specialization in vocations in India that are associated with lower
castes—even untouchables—adheres to this pattern. What is fascinating,
however, is the manner in which Indian society has incorporated the
Chinese tanning community. The peripheral geographical position of the
Chinese within Calcutta’s urban space is in many ways analogous to that
of an untouchable community within an Indian village.
The Chinese tanning community is in the eastern corner of Calcutta,
adjacent to the city dump. The Indian residents of the areas surround-
ing it (Tiljala, Tangra, and Tapsia), come primarily from the chamar
caste, a group traditionally considered untouchable and whose custom-
ary occupation was leather work (Bandyopadhyay 1990:79). The periph-
erally and isolation of the tanning district, as well as the association
with an impure task, bring to mind the definition of untouchability
employed by Louis Dumont:
that can be observed among castes. Others, such as Mencher (1974), argue that this
ideology is not shared by all castes. Still others, such as Marriott (1968), argue that the
ranking of castes within villages cannot be explained solely in terms of relative purity and
pollution, but must be derived by an analysis of transferal of different categories of food
among castes. But while the degree to which the ideology of purity and pollution is
universally shared, and the degree to which all occupations can be ranked according to it,
has been disputed, no one would deny that work with rawhide and leather is considered
within caste ideology to be an impure occupation associated with castes traditionally
placed in the category of untouchable.
157ELLEN OXFELD
We shall define untouchability in the way that is most current
by the segregation into distinct hamlets or quarters of the most
impure categories. This feature is pan-Indian, as is the associa-
tion with a religiously relevant function (quartering of dead
cattle and consumption of meat, leather tanning, role in incin-
eration or cleaning of rubbish and excrement, pig rearing and
consumption of pork). (1970:134)
Of course, considerations of purity and impurity are not the only
factors that prevented the Chinese from setting up their tanning opera-
tions nearer to the center of the city. The Chinese themselves emphasize
other considerations in the selection of Dhapa as their site for tanning.
Dhapa, formerly a marshy and swampy area, had the requisite amounts
of available water, an essential for tanning. Furthermore, although close
enough to the city to do business with buyers and suppliers, it was still
relatively uninhabited and real estate was cheap. Conversely, Chinese
shoe shops, whose original clientele was largely European and high-
class Indian, had to be situated in the center of the city near the major
shopping areas these groups frequented.
While several explanations can be found for the tanning community’s
peripheral location, there is no doubt that this geographic marginality
and their degraded occupation have served to isolate the Chinese tan-
ners even more than other Chinese subgroups in Calcutta.
INDIAN VIEWS OF THE HAKKA
It is important to point out that Indians, including Bengalis, are not
aware of language differences within Calcutta’s Chinese community.
They usually refer to the Chinese as one group, and their attitudes seem
to be influenced primarily by the Hindu religious ideology described
above and by national politics, specifically by the fact that India and the
People’s Republic of China went to war in 1962.
There is no doubt that the Sino-Indian Conflict has been critical to
Indian attitudes toward the Chinese. A common remark is that India
was “stabbed in the back” by China, a reference to the fact that prior to
the outbreak of hostilities, relationships between the two countries ap-
peared congenial. While some individuals clearly differentiate between
the Chinese who live in India and the People’s Republic of China,
others do not. One woman, for instance, told me that ever since 1962
she has regarded all Chinese as her enemies. And even those who were
158STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
not alive at that time, or not old enough to remember the events, still
seem to be affected by the conflict. Said one young man, “Everybody
knows that China stole Indian territory, so Chinese can’t be trusted.”
At the time of the conflict, many Chinese residents of India were
stripped of their Indian citizenship (this was done by a legally dubious
promulgation declaring that no one could be an Indian citizen if their
ancestors were citizens of a country engaged in hostilities with India).
Chinese Indians who had become citizens of China when relationships
between India and China were good were now even more exposed,
since they were suddenly citizens of an enemy country. Several thousand
Chinese Indians were rounded up and placed in a detention camp in the
Rajasthan desert, where many remained for several years. An equally
large group was deported to China.
However, while the loss of rights many Chinese experienced at that
time is often one of the first items of conversation mentioned by Chi-
nese, many Bengalis, as well as other Indians whom I met, claimed that
they were not aware that the Chinese were deprived of their citizenship
rights on account of the hostilities. When I raised the issue, some
insisted that I had my facts wrong, or tried to explain it by saying that
those who had lost their citizenship must have done something wrong.
There were good Chinese and bad Chinese, one acquaintance argued,
and if you were a good Chinese you would definitely be allowed to be a
citizen.
But political history was not the only factor that influenced the way
Indians, and particularly Bengalis, talked about the Chinese. Dissimilari-
ties in diet were also frequently alluded to. In India diet is an especially
significant marker of caste, ethnic, and/or religious affiliation. Chinese
are set apart from both Hindus, who generally abstain from beef, and
Muslims, who abstain from pork. In a situation in which diet is such a
critical concern and symbol, it is not surprising that it is one of the most
frequently mentioned items when ethnic groups discuss and define each
other. The apparent Chinese willingness to eat almost anything was
often cited as proof of their peculiarity. As a Bengali acquaintance put it,
“They do eat rice [a staple of the Bengali diet], but I also heard that they
eat frogs and snakes!”
To this focus on the impurity of food intake, a trait common to all
Chinese from the standpoint of many Calcuttans, a view of the tanning
area as particularly unclean was frequently added. While I was doing my
fieldwork and my sister came to visit me for two weeks, she fell ill for a
few days. This was a rather common occurrence for travelers, but many of
159ELLEN OXFELD
my Indian friends were sure that these health problems resulted from
being in the tanning district. Later, one of my friends wrote in a letter to
my sister, “Next time you come . . . stay with us. It is difficult to stand
TANGRA [Dhapa] environment. Ellen has developed a bit of immunity.”
In fact, for most Calcuttans, the tanning area is a place to avoid—a
slightly mysterious, even dangerous location. One young college stu-
dent, for instance, told of his reactions everytime he passed the area on a
bypass road bordering it. “Tangra is considered a rather unsafe area for a
variety of reasons . . . the moment somebody mentions Tangra the two
things you think of are Chinese, and you don’t want to be there . . . and
people are rather intrigued by the Chinese because they have, you know,
they have their ‘walled city1 [an allusion to the appearance of the tanner-
ies from afar] . . . there are these huge walls, and you can’t see inside . . .
people think it’s mysterious, you don’t know what is going on, you kind
of wonder what happens there.”
Although a range of feelings about the Chinese, and particularly
about the Chinese tanning community, are expressed, such comments
indicate that attitudes of hostility, avoidance, or at the very least, beffid-
dlement are not uncommon. The conflict between India and China,
Hindu ideas about purity and pollution, and the structure of ethnic
relations in Calcutta, a city in which economic role and ethnic identity
are closely correlated for all groups, all contribute to the maintenance of
these ideas.
HAKKA VIEWS OF OUTSIDERS
The suspicion with which Indians view the Calcutta Chinese is recipro-
cated by an equally mistrustful attitude on the part of the Hakka toward
outsiders. From the vantage point of the Calcutta Hakka, Indians, West-
erners, and, to a marked but somewhat lesser extent, non-Hakka Chi-
nese, are outsiders, and these distinctions are clearly revealed through
Hakka terms for these groups. In fact, these terms are used in situations
that, for an outsider, sometimes create almost ludicrous juxtapositions.
Several years after my introduction to the Calcutta Hakka commu-
nity, when I was conducting research in Toronto, I met two sisters from
the community who had recently immigrated to Canada. We got to-
gether on a Sunday afternoon for a reunion and decided to visit the CN
Tower, the tallest structure in the city. I had my camera with me, and we
all thought it would be nice to have a picture of the three of us in the
vicinity of the famous structure. As a middle-aged, Caucasian man
160STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
passed by, one of my friends shouted in Hakka to her sister, “Oh look,
there goes a fan gui [lit., “barbarian ghost” or “foreign devil”]. Let’s ask
him to take a picture for us!” Thegui in question assented to our
request and my friends thanked him cheerfully, remarking afterwards
how nice it had been for him to help us out.7
Westerners are frequently called Jaw^zrz in the colloquial speech of the
Hakka of Calcutta. Ghosts (gui) have frequently been associated in
popular Chinese religion with outsiders and undesirables, such as ban-
dits and beggars (see A. Wolf 1974), yet the term fangui is used not only
when consciously denigrating a foreigner, but also in neutral or even
positive situations such as the one above. Like the residents of the
immigrant Chinese community in California described by Maxine
Hong Kingston (1975), the Calcutta Chinese use the word gui fre-
quently when referring to community outsiders. Indeed, the Calcutta
Hakka use the word for “person” (rrw), only in reference to Chinese
people. Thus, Chinese are called Tang ren (lit. “people of the Tang
[dynasty]”).
Yet when specific subgroups of Chinese are referred to, as opposed to
the Chinese people as a whole, the Hakka also make important distinc-
tions. When talking about themselves, they continue to use the appella-
tion ren. Indeed, they usually refer to themselves as “people of Meixian,”
thereby distinguishing themselves not only from other Chinese, but even
from Hakka who do not come from Meixian, Guangdong, from which
all Calcutta Hakka originate. But the Calcutta Hakka use the word loo,
translatable as “fellow”—a word connoting a vulgar person, a hillbilly or
hick—when referring to the Cantonese or Hubeinese. Thus, a Cantonese
is referred to as a Guangfu loo, rather than a Guangfa ren.
The Hakka distinguish between themselves and other Chinese groups
in other ways as well. From their perspective, the Cantonese do not
work as hard, are not as frugal, and, depending on the speaker, are
either more Indianized or more Westernized than the Hakka; in all
cases, the Hakka are portrayed as more loyal carriers of Chinese tradi-
tion than are other Chinese subgroups. “Those Cantonese,” asserted
one young Hakka man to me in denigrating tones, “they mix Hindi and
English in with their Chinese.” My first landlady in Dhapa, Mrs. Jia,
liked to compare Cantonese and Hakka working habits, and would
7.	I usually spoke in Mandarin with my informants, many of whom had attended the
local Chinese school, where Mandarin was the medium of instruction. Therefore, I use
Mandarin transliteration for Chinese words in this chapter.
161ELLEN OXFELD
imply that Cantonese in Calcutta were less successful financially than
the Hakka because they were overindulgent. “When Cantonese make
money,” she informed me, “they get lots of servants, eat with ivory
chopsticks, and use tablecloths,. . . but Hakka keep working hard.”
The distinctions Hakka make between themselves and other Chinese
in Calcutta are replicated in social organization. Lawrence Crissman
(1967) has drawn attention to what he calls the “segmentary structure”
of many overseas Chinese communities. These societies are divided into
progressively segmenting subdivisions based on language, native place,
and surname. It is only vis-a-vis non-Chinese that they present a united
front. In the internal social structure of the Calcutta Chinese commu-
nity, non-Hakka Chinese are definitely viewed as a category of outsider.
In referring to all other categories of outsiders, however, a much
sharper distinction is made by the Hakka, since in these cases the word
gui, rather than the less negative appellation lao, is used. Westerners are
called fan gui, while Indians are usually referred to as wu gui (lit., “black
ghosts” or “black devils”). When referring to an individual Indian man
speakers will frequendy append the wordgui to his surname. Thus, Mr.
Sen becomes Scngui.
In their speech, therefore, the Calcutta Hakka differentiate them-
selves from two levels of outsiders: first, other speech groups among the
Calcutta Chinese, and second, Indians and Westerners.8 While Western-
ers are no longer highly visible or numerous actors within Calcutta’s
ethnic landscape, and therefore Hakka ideas about them are not con-
standy reinforced through interaction, this is not true of Indians.
Chinese interactions with Bengalis, for instance, often occur in set-
tings that, for the Chinese, reinforce negative stereotypes. Chinese are
most likely to encounter Bengalis when they have dealings with govern-
ment bureaucrats. Because many Chinese are still classified as foreign-
ers, such contacts are not infrequent. Registering yearly with the For-
eigners Office or making repeated applications for citizenship requires
numerous meetings with government officials, and such interactions are
8.	The definitions of Westerner and Indian are primarily cultural and contextual,
rather than purely biological. This is illustrated by the fact that Chinese families that have
had no sons will sometimes adopt babies of non-Chinese descent in circumstances in
which it is not possible to find a baby of Chinese descent. These children are raised as
Chinese and considered Chinese. On the other hand, the children of mixed Chinese-
Indian marriages are not necessarily considered Chinese, even though they have some
Chinese ancestry. They are usually classified, instead, according to the language they use at
home.
162STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
seldom pleasant experiences. Indeed, one of the most frequent griev-
ances I heard was that the only way to get anything done was to bribe
an official. Less prosperous community members complained that be-
cause they did not have enough funds at their disposal to bribe effec-
tively, they were at a perpetual disadvantage in securing citizenship
papers, or in getting permits related to the conduct of their business,
such as export licenses.
Bengalis also meet with government bureaucrats, of course, and they
are not strangers to unmotivated, inefficient, or even corrupt officials.
But since the officials are usually from the ethnic group to which they
themselves belong, Bengalis will not conceptualize such interactions in
ethnic terms. Rather, such behavior is often seen as a sign of the times
(shemoi kharap, “times are bad”) or as a symptom of bad government in
general.
When Chinese encounter difficulties in their dealings with bureau-
cracy, however, they often blame the Bengali bureaucrats themselves,
claiming that Bengalis are lazy and that the Bengali government work-
ers will provide services only in return for bribes. Furthermore, they
assert that because they are Chinese, they can be taken advantage of
more than other groups. After a disappointing inquiry about a delay in
the processing of his papers for a passport application, one Hakka
acquaintance complained that you could get it done very quickly if you
gave extra money to the official in charge. “They all need money for
their daughters’ dowries . . . and they know we can’t object because we
are Chinese.”
The feeling that Chinese will never be treated fairly only because they
are Chinese is quite pervasive. One year before I arrived, a band of
dacoits9 attacked a tannery. Three people were killed before the dacoits
fled across the marshy area bordering Dhapa. Most Dhapa residents felt
that the police had done nothing about the incident and had not tried to
apprehend the culprits because the victims were Chinese. Ultimately the
police did apprehend some people who they alleged were the perpetra-
tors. Most Dhapa Chinese claimed that the matter was pursued only
because they had complained to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi and
the embassy had interceded with the police on their behalf.
While Hakka interactions with Bengalis tend to occur in the bureau-
cratic sphere, their interactions with most other Indian groups are usu-
ally economic or commercial. Hakka tanners sell their leather primarily
9.	Dacoit (armed robber) is a word commonly used in Indian English.
163ELLEN OXFELD
to Hindu, Muslim, and/or Sikh Punjabis, and they buy their rawhide
from Muslims from Uttar Pradesh and/or Punjab. Most of their employ-
ees are Biharis of the chamar caste, as well as a smaller number of
Nepalese and North Indian Muslims. Bihari women are employed as
servants-to wash clothes, do household work, or watch over small chil-
dren (they do not cook since they are unfamiliar with Chinese cuisine,
and their Chinese employers do not seem anxious to teach them—one
of the many ways in which the ethnic boundary is maintained).
In short, Hakka interactions with Indians occur primarily in bureau-
cratic or economic contexts, where Indians are officials, workers, suppli-
ers, servants, or customers. These contacts also require that the Hakka be
conversant in a number of languages. In their interactions with tanning
workers, rawhide merchants, and leather buyers, their primary language
is Hindi. Hakka who run shoe shops in the center of the city may also
need to know some Bengali. Those who run restaurants or beauty parlors
may use a combination of Hindi, English, and Bengali. There are also
generational differences with respect to these language competencies.
Younger community members, who have attended English-medium
schools, are more likely to be competent in English as well as Hindi.
Older individuals, whose schooling was primarily in Chinese-medium
schools, are still likely to know Hindi, which they speak with their em-
ployees; but they are unlikely to be competent in English.
Of course, the fact that Chinese interact with Indians primarily in the
economic sphere does not mean that such interactions are totally imper-
sonal or cold. For instance, in order to secure credit on favorable terms,
the tanners go to considerable lengths to demonstrate their trustworthi-
ness to their suppliers, particularly the rawhide merchants. Occasionally
an extremely important supplier or buyer will be invited to a wedding
feast. But attendance at a large life-cycle celebration, at which there are
hundreds of guests, is the usual limit to the social intimacy that would
occur between a Chinese and an Indian who had important business
connections. Few outsiders ever have a chance to enter into close per-
sonal relations or interactions with the Chinese.
It is only in the English-medium schools, to which more and more
young Chinese are being sent, that interactions that are not primarily
economic or bureaucratic take place with different Indian ethnic groups.
But even in these settings there is a tendency for Chinese to segregate
themselves or to feel that they are excluded by others. One resident of
Dhapa reflected on his years in an English-medium boarding school in
this way:
164STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
There would be a lot of name calling . .. even in teamwork you
are more or less left to the last. . . mind you there were some
pretty good [Indian] friends that I still keep in touch with
now. . . . It’s interesting ... I would get along better with an-
other minority, such as Anglo-Indian, you know, or somebody
they would consider different, such as an Armenian.
While other young people from Dhapa talked of their experiences in
English-medium schools in a more positive way, many emphasized that
even if they had Indian friends, they would not bring them home. I
observed that only on rare occasions did Indian school friends visit.
AN ENTREPRENEURIAL ETHIC
Hakka separation from other ethnic groups is facilitated by the interac-
tion of caste, ethnic, religious, spatial, and economic organization in
Calcutta. This separation is reflected not only in patterns of interaction
and in Hakka attitudes towards outsiders, but also in the fact that
Indian society has exerted so little influence on the substantive aspects
of Hakka cultural values. Most non-Hindu minorities in India have
been powerfully affected by the caste system. For instance, many tribal
groups from the Indian subcontinent have been incorporated into the
surrounding society as castes. They have attempted to raise their status
not by rejecting Hindu practices, but by imitating higher-caste customs,
such as abstention from eating beef. In so doing, they have indicated
their acceptance of the basic premises of the caste system (Srinivas
1966:6). Furthermore, Indian Christians and Muslims, whom one
might expect to have renounced caste as a result of their ideological
traditions, have castelike divisions within their populations (Dumont
1970:206—7, 211). Even groups such as Parsis and Jews, who have immi-
grated to India from other countries, have come to replicate some
elements of caste within their own group structures.10
10.	Parsis not only adopted caste notions about commensality, but also assimilated
Hindu notions of purity and pollution. In 1903, for instance, a Parsi judge expressed his
opposition to the idea that Parsi priests could admit lower-caste Hindus into the Parsi
community without first “making them give up their unclean professions” (Fischer
i973:94).
Among some groups of Indian Jews, castelike patterns were also present (I use the
past tense here, because most Indian Jews have now emigrated to Israel and other coun-
tries). The Cochin Jews of the South Indian state of Kerala, for instance, were internally
165ELLEN OXFELD
Despite the all-encompassing nature of the caste system, however,
none of the Cantonese subgroups in Calcutta has fallen into the patterns
described above. They explicitly reject caste ideology in favor of a status
system almost exclusively based on wealth. Thus, unlike certain Indian
merchant communities (see Bayly 1983), the Calcutta Chinese have not
tried to convert their wealth into higher status by entering into business
activity that would be judged as more pure from the standpoint of the
caste hierarchy. As pariah entrepreneurs, the Chinese have succeeded
economically precisely because they have not assimilated caste ideology.
One member of the community explained this to me in starkly sociologi-
cal terms during the first few weeks of my fieldwork when he stated,
“We don’t have castes. Your blood doesn’t matter. We have classes.
What matters is how much money you make.” Indeed, in this commu-
nity, wealth is the chief measure of status, and owning one’s own busi-
ness is viewed as the best means of acquiring wealth.
This fact was clearly illuminated for me one day, shortly after I had
settled into my Chinese landlady’s house, when her nephew took me to
visit and to introduce myself to some families in Dhapa. On the way
home, he told me that under normal circumstances he would not even
speak with the families we had just met. “They might know me as my
father’s son,” he remarked, “because my father taught at the Chinese
school for so many years. But they’re rich people, and they only talked
with me today because I brought you along.”
This high priority accorded to the achievement of wealth as a measure
of status is not atypical of other overseas Chinese societies. G. W. Skin-
ner (1968) has discussed the importance of wealth in Southeast Asian
overseas Chinese communities, as a criterion for leadership as well as a
measure oft status. As he points out, one reason that wealth is the
primary component of status in these communities is that most Chinese
emigrated in order to better their economic positions. “Unlike the
Jews,” says Skinner, “the Chinese went abroad in the first place specifi-
cally to make money, and unlike the Jewish diaspora, that of the Chinese
excluded the traditional elite of their homeland. In consequence status
for overseas Chinese was almost a direct function of wealth” (ibid.: 195).
divided into castelike divisions with prohibitions on intermarriage (Mandelbaum 1939:424)
and on entering each other’s temples (Strizower 1962:112-13). And the Bene Israel, a Jewish
community centered in Bombay, had endogamous subdivisions, one of which was consid-
ered particularly polluted in the sense that both commensality and intermarriage with them
was forbidden (ibid.:3o).
166STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
What is most critical here is that since status within the Calcutta
Chinese community is based almost exclusively on wealth, there is no
concept, as in caste ideology, that certain occupations or social groups
can be compared in terms of relative purity and impurity. Nor is there
any sense that social status can be inherited and is not dependent upon
one’s present social situation. Caste ideology ranks a multitude of
endogamous groups in terms of their relative purity and pollution.
Furthermore, one inherits one’s caste; no matter how one may change
one’s life situation, one cannot change caste. Unlike other minority
groups in India, the Calcutta Chinese have not adapted elements of
caste ideology or practice.
Indeed, from the point of view of the Calcutta Hakka, any job is
worthwhile if it is a profitable source of income. While tanning is
viewed within caste ideology as a polluting occupation, one performed
only by a particular untouchable caste, Dhapa Chinese consider tanning
a good business because it is so lucrative.11 Tanning is also viewed as far
superior to white-collar desk jobs, where salaries rarely amount to more
than a fraction of the earnings possible in even modesdy successful
tanning businesses.
In fact, running one’s own business (in whatever line presents the most
possibilities) is viewed by the Calcutta Hakka as the ideal economic
activity and, unless circumstances make it absolutely impossible, as far
superior to salaried employment. Not only do they see this as providing a
greater income, but, in addition, they feel that one has more control over
one’s life. That business means family business is an assumption so deep
that it is rarely discussed. But one need only look at the evidence to see
that this is the case; of the 297 tanning businesses in Dhapa in 1982, only
two were partnerships involving nonrelated individuals.
11.	The differences between the Calcutta Chinese view and the stance held by those
who accept the premises of the caste system was made clear to me in an interview I
conducted at the Leather Research Institute in Calcutta. One of the officers of the
organization pointed out that although a certain percentage of seats at the leather technol-
ogy institute are reserved for chamars, few members of this caste apply, despite the fact
that admission to a leather technology institute would mean a good-paying job, after
completion of coursework, with a large leather manufacturer.
Since the basis for the stigma ckamars suffer is the polluting occupation they tradi-
tionally followed, those who are in a position to apply to an institute of higher education
are unlikely to choose such a field. Chinese have not become involved in tanning as the
result of training by institutes. These practices make evident the difference between
evaluating tanning from within the caste system, as a polluting and stigmatizing occupa-
tion, and from without, as a potentially lucrative one.
167ELLEN OXFELD
The high value placed on entrepreneurship as a way of life was one of
the themes that was most frequently and explicitly articulated to me.
For instance, one of my good friends and best informants, Mr. Zhou,
was always perplexed as to why I would want to return to the United
States to teach. One day, while discussing the advantages of business as
opposed to salaried employment, he asked me, “If you wanted to start a
business what would you do?”
“Well, I would borrow money and invest it,” I replied.
“There you go, it’s taking you so long to do your research, but you
would know exactly what to do to go into business.” As he shrugged his
head, he added, “You’ll never do well when you work for others!”
Indeed, for Mr. Zhou, it was difficult to understand why one would
choose work other than business if given the option. In his view, salaries
were fixed and limiting, while business opened up the possibility of
multiplying one’s resources exponentially through the application of
one’s own efforts. One of his favorite sayings, composed of four four-
character phrases, was that there were four types of people: those who
harmed themselves and others (hai ren	those who helped them-
selves but harmed others (hai ren those who harmed themselves to
help others (li ren hai jiy, and those who helped themselves while help-
ing others (li ren And, as if taken straight from Adam Smith and
Jeremy Bentham, Mr. Zhou would then proceed to expound on the
evident superiority of the fourth type—those who help themselves and
thereby benefit others. This happy outcome, he would add, can most
easily be achieved by engaging in one’s own business.
A corollary of this preference for business was the assumption that no
one with intelligence would wallow for long in the shadows of an
employer. “You can never keep a good foreman,” one factory owner
told me, “because if he is any good, he’ll start a business of his own.”
Clearly, for both Mr. Zhou and other members of the Dhapa commu-
nity, one goal of such business activity was to increase the material well-
being of oneself and one’s family. But it is not only the pursuit of a more
comfortable fife that makes wealth desirable in Dhapa—it is also the
status that accompanies it and the ability to influence and to be re-
spected by others.
12.	The use of such four-character phrases is pervasive in everyday Chinese speech as
well as in written texts. They are used for many purposes, including greeting, congratulat-
ing, enjoining, and describing recognizable traits or situations. Their compactness and
economy of expression are usually lost in translation.
168STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
The importance of wealth can be felt in many ways in the Hakka
community. Whether an individual or family is hen you qian (very
wealthy) or mei you qian (poor) is usually the first item mentioned in
any discussion about them. The in-betweens excite very little comment.
It is the wealthy who serve as community leaders—for example, as
heads of business associations. Furthermore, community social life is
focused on the ceremonies and celebrations that surround major life-
cycle rituals, providing numerous opportunities for wealthy individuals
to validate publicly their financial success. The wealthiest families stage
more lavish and larger weddings and birthday celebrations than do
other families, and the number of tables at a reception (ten people to a
table) may be the talk of the town for several days before and after it is
held (more than fifty tables is usually cause for extended comment).
Likewise, the funerals of wealthy individuals are attended by larger
numbers than are those of less prosperous individuals, even though the
criteria that supposedly determine who should attend such functions are
constant.
Indeed, because wealth is so critical to status, I had to quickly change
my graduate-student ways of relatively frugal and simple living. When I
first moved to my landlady’s house, for instance, I walked to the local
Chinese school where I taught English every morning. It was not far,
not even a twenty-minute walk. But several Hakka acquaintances kept
urging me to take a ricksha or buy a bicycle or motorscooter. Much to
their relief, I finally bought a bicycle. They had worried that because I
walked, people would think I was poor, and would look down upon
me. Later, when my parents came to visit me in Calcutta, my landlady
constantly reminded me to let people know that they were staying in the
best hotel in Calcutta.
This emphasis on wealth does not exclude other characteristics from
garnering status for a family or individual within the community. Nor
does it mean that in all cases a wealthy individual will truly be respected.
If community members feel someone gained wealth through cheating,
or some other unfair means, they will certainly call him a “scoundrel”
(jian zet) behind his back; and a person who is not rich, but who works
loyally for his or her family will be granted a certain degree of respect.
But no one denies the importance of achieving wealth as an ultimate
goal, and many other qualities are valued precisely for the part they play
in enabling a family to achieve prosperity.
We must not forget that in Chinese society, both on the mainland and
overseas, monetary thinking and commoditization have a long history.
169ELLEN OXFELD
As Hill Gates points out, late imperial Chinese society “included impor-
tant capitalist elements. . . . The Chinese treated the major factors of
production—land, labor, and capital—as commodities, with well-
developed markets for each” (1987:260). Gates states that capitalism did
not play a “hegemonic” role in late imperial China, because “capitalist
elements were always subordinated to state control” (ibid.). Neverthe-
less, “a constrained but powerful capitalist worldview was reproduced
constantly by the Chinese populace as an alternative to the bureaucratic/
feudal vision enshrined in the formal structure and practice of the state”
(ibid.:261). That is, capitalism, in its more accessible petty-capitalist or
small-scale owner production variant, appeared as an attractive alterna-
tive for working people, since it “offered a social model of upward
mobility based direcdy on wealth rather than on connection with the
state through the highly limited channels of degree- and office-holding”
(ibid.).
Indeed, Chinese society has been monetized to increasing degrees
since the eleventh century (Elvin 1973:149). It is a society in which even
rural areas have been finked with a national market in some items for
almost a thousand years (ibid.: 106) and in which “increased contact
with the market made the Chinese peasantry into a class of adaptable,
rational, profit-oriented petty entrepreneurs” (ibid.: 167).
Stevan Harrell argues that there has long been a “Chinese entrepre-
neurial ethic, a cultural value that requires one to invest one’s re-
sources ... in a long-term quest to improve the material well-being and
security of some group to which one belongs and with which one
identifies closely” (1987:94).
Even popular Chinese religious practice reflects a worldview thor-
oughly influenced by monetary thinking. After the introduction of Bud-
dhism into China, the belief that a person’s soul is reincarnated in
another being after death became infused in popular Chinese religious
thought. But in a Chinese variant, this belief took on a curiously mone-
tary expression: souls are not just reincarnated, they need funds to do
so. The urban Taiwanese whom Hill Gates studied, for instance, ex-
plained to her that souls en route to reincarnation borrow large sums
from celestial treasuries. This money is “used to purchase a body for
reincarnation, the rest defrays the cost of the individual’s particular lot
in fife, a matter determined prior to birth. Some[,] indebted for large
sums, will receive wealth, high rank, and other blessings in fife while
those who give less must five with correspondingly straitened means”
(1987:268).
170STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
As a result, individuals are constantly attempting to pay off these
debts throughout their lives. Burning paper money (paper representa-
tions of cash, not actual currency) to the gods is one way of paying off
this debt, and even after one dies, one’s relatives burn large amounts of
paper money, for, as Gates explains, one needs to “pay off the ac-
count ... if the spirit is to enter unencumbered into a new and presum-
ably more fortunate incarnation” (ibid.). Thus, “we see the human
body, the length of its life, and the quality of that life equated to specific
sums of money—as extreme an example of the penetration of a money
economy into human existence as metaphor can express” (ibid.:270).
Such religious practices are also quite common in the Calcutta Chi-
nese community, where monetary symbolism is a pervasive part of ritual
life. Indeed, among the Calcutta Chinese, the entire process of reincarna-
tion is conceptualized in rather concrete terms in which large amounts
of money and material goods are necessary for a fortuitous journey to
reincarnation. In order to ease the heavenly travels of the recently de-
ceased, paper replicas of the expensive accoutrements of modern living
appear prominently among objects burnt as offerings (on one occasion
that I witnessed this included a life-size three-dimensional paper Fiat
car). The need for cash is emphasized as an essential element in almost
all aspects of the afterlife.
“Suppose you live in India now, but after you die you come back as
an African,” my first landlady explained to me one day. “How will you
get to Africa? By boat? By car? The best way is by airplane, but for that
you’ll need money, because the ticket is so expensive!”
Thus, in the case of the Calcutta Hakka we have a situation in which a
high priority is placed on entrepreneurial thinking for reasons implicit
in both their ethnic role in India and in a cultural ethos carried with
them from their country of origin and perpetuated in their overseas
environment.
This entrepreneurial ethic contrasts markedly with the values evident
in some of the other Hakka communities described in this volume. For
instance, in the Malay Hakka community described by Sharon Carstens
people described themselves as having “no head for business,” and the
Hakka in Malaysia were weak economically relative to other Chinese
groups. Similarly, Elizabeth Johnson cites Blake’s description of the
Hakka’s “legacy of poverty” and comes to similar conclusions about the
Hakka in Hong Kong.
Both Johnson and Carstens also suggest that the Hakka among
whom they did fieldwork held an egalitarian ethic and that this may be
171ELLEN OXFELD
connected to their poverty relative to other Chinese groups in the area.
While Carstens suggests that Hakka experiences of poverty relative to
other groups on the Chinese mainland may have influenced their adapta-
tion to their overseas environment, my data on the Calcutta Hakka
indicates that any notion of shared Hakka orientations embedded in
deep-seated historical memory must be balanced by an awareness of the
impact of the local context in which the particular Hakka community
resides.
HAKKA IDENTITY AND WOMEN’S ROLES
Interestingly, the entrepreneurial ethic of the Calcutta Hakka has also
influenced another feature of Hakka social organization that has been
addressed by several of the other essays in this volume—the sexual
division of labor. Carstens, Constable, and Johnson all note the promi-
nent economic role played by Hakka women in their communities. This
role, they state, is frequendy mentioned as a distinctive feature of Hakka
culture by Hakka themselves, who often use it to contrast themselves
with other local Chinese communities. In the Calcutta Hakka commu-
nity women’s economic roles, in the form of their active participation in
the work of running family enterprises, are notable. And, as in these
other cases, this is frequendy commented upon by the Calcutta Hakka
themselves, contributing to their own sense of a distinct identity.
However, unlike women’s economic roles in the other Hakka commu-
nities discussed in this volume, those of the Calcutta Hakka vary with
the family’s economic status. Women in families that own larger firms
are much less likely to participate directiy in the daily operation of their
family businesses than are those in families with smaller firms. Further-
more, their access to property and income is not dependent on the
degree to which they participate in family enterprise. For instance, in
some families, women control the income generated by the sale of
tanning waste products, but there is no correlation between this and
their participation in the family business.
A woman who works hard in her family enterprise will enjoy the
esteem and respect of her community and family. If her family’s business
is large and successful, she also has status as a member of a wealthy
family, and she has access to certain resources within the business.13
13.	For a more detailed discussion of the sexual division of labor among the Calcutta
Hakka, see Basu (1991).
172STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
Thus, the extensive role played by Hakka women in income-producing
activities is also influenced by context. In this case, business participation
decreases with financial success, suggesting that both Hakka identity and
economic resources influence women’s roles.
conclusion: what does it mean to be hakka?
Most of the material I have presented in this chapter can be understood
in terms of a contextual, interactionist approach to ethnicity. For in-
stance, language differences, one of the most irreducible mechanisms of
maintaining ethnic distinctions, are reinforced by Calcutta’s ethnically
variegated economy and society, one in which there is only the organiza-
tion of difference, and never a dominant group to which others can
assimilate either linguistically or culturally. The fact that Cantonese and
Hakka occupy separate occupational niches in Calcutta, for instance,
certainly helps to maintain their differences. Likewise, the political situa-
tion and dominant religious ideology have deeply influenced Indians’
ideas about their overseas Chinese population, and in turn, these ideas
have indelibly affected Hakka attitudes toward outsiders.
A number of scholars who have written about ethnicity, however,
have criticized this context-oriented approach, stating that it ultimately
reduces ethnic groups to mere interest groups and that it underesti-
mates the affective power of ethnic-group identity (see Glazer and
Moynihan 1975:19). These scholars point out that “primordial” identifi-
cations, based upon shared physical and cultural traits as well as upon
shared descent, often bind members of an ethnic group together (e.g.,
Isaacs 1975b).
Recently, however, the dichotomy between these approaches has it-
self been questioned. G. Carter Bentley utilizes Pierre Bourdieu’s no-
tion of “habitus” to explain the affective power of ethnic attachments.
Habitus, he explains, is comprised of conscious and unconscious inclina-
tions and outlooks inculcated and internalized from the earliest years of
a person’s life, and ethnic identity is integral to these. Bentley shows
that it is precisely because of their power, because they are part and
parcel of one’s most strongly internalized behaviors, outlooks, and obli-
gations, that ethnic bonds are so profound a force in the reproduction
of social formations (1987:42).
Because ethnic identity is so fundamental in the formation of people’s
conscious and unconscious understandings of the world, Bentley as-
serts, individuals may experience “crises of ethnic identity” when they
173ELLEN OXFELD
undergo changed social circumstances (ibid. 143). In such cases they may
respond with new formulations of ethnic identity, or they may reinvigo-
rate existing notions (ibid. :43). For instance, in making sense of their
situation, the Calcutta Hakka often draw upon the label that was origi-
nally applied to them by the Cantonese in Guangdong—that of “guest
people.”
“You know, we are the guest people, and we keep moving from place to
place. We even did that in China,” one friend in Calcutta told me. It was a
refrain I heard frequently among residents of the tanning community.
But this term has continued potency for them not because of some
primordial identification with past experiences, but because it describes
their present situation, in which they are clearly an ethnic minority, and
still on the move. Indeed, beginning in the late 1970s many Hakka
began to emigrate from Calcutta to Europe, Australia, and particularly
to Toronto. Emigrants point to a fear that new tensions between India
and China will again threaten their security in India, and to a desire to
diversify the economic activities of family members as reasons for their
decision to leave India.
As one Hakka friend who had migrated from Calcutta to Toronto
told me, “We look at what happened to the Sikhs [referring to Indira
Gandhi’s assassination in 1984 by a Sikh and the subsequent attacks
upon and killing of Sikhs by angry mobs] and we think we are just
as noticeable. If China goes to war with India again, it could happen
to us.”
In Toronto the Calcutta Hakka once again find distinctions between
both Chinese and non-Chinese others to be socially significant. To-
ronto’s urban geography, with its huge Chinatown and numerous
Chinese-run businesses scattered throughout the city, serves as a daily
reminder to the immigrants of their own aspirations to succeed in
business, and of their present inability to do so.
For although the Calcutta Hakka are successful entrepreneurs in In-
dia, their Indian assets do not amount to much when converted to
Canadian currency. Most end up working in factories, having—at least
for the short term—postponed their entrepreneurial aspirations until
they can acquire more capital.
Thus, in addition to comparing themselves with the multitude of
non-Chinese groups in Toronto, Hakka from Calcutta frequently, and
sometimes resentfully, contrast their situation with that of other Chi-
nese immigrants. Wealthy immigrants from Hong Kong, in particular,
are frequently the target of their comments.
174STILL “GUEST PEOPLE”
But how will the Calcutta Hakka identify themselves and be identi-
fied as the length of their residence and their numbers increase in To-
ronto? Will the next generation still refer to themselves as “people of
Meixian?” Or will they instead see themselves as descendants of Chinese
Indians or as members of a more vague and amorphous category of
Chinese Canadians? Will they speak Hakka at all? One Calcutta Hakka
who had immigrated to Toronto hinted at the potentially shifting na-
ture of Hakka identity when he said to me in the summer of 1986,
‘When we talk about home, we talk about Calcutta—it’s still our root.
For our father it’s China, and for my children, it’s Brampton [an area of
Toronto].”
Given the extremely different realities of employment, education, and
politics, one might hypothesize very dissimilar trajectories for Hakka
identity in Toronto and Calcutta. The signs that this will be the case are
already in place: the Calcutta Hakka immigrants in Toronto are em-
ployed in a variety of occupations rather than in a specialized ethnic
niche associated with a degraded occupation; they reside in areas dis-
persed throughout the city, rather than in an isolated community at the
periphery; and their children, who are educated in Toronto’s public
schools, are beginning to use English rather than Hakka in interactions
with their parents.
As Eric Wolf has stated in an analysis of labor immigration under capi-
talism, “Ethnicities rarely coincided with the initial self-identification of
the industrial recruits, who first thought of themselves as Hanoverians or
Bavarians rather than as Germans, as members of their village or par-
ish . . . rather than as Poles, as Tonga or Yao rather than as ‘Nyasalanders.’
The more comprehensive categories emerged only as particular cohorts
of workers gained access to different segments of the labor market and
began to treat their access as a resource to be defended both socially and
politically. Such ethnicities are therefore not ‘primoridal’ social relation-
ships. They are historical products of labor market segmentation”
(1982:381).
The trajectory of Calcutta Hakka identity in Toronto, however, is the
subject of another essay.
1756/ The Hakka Ethnic Movement
in Taiwan, 1986—1991
HOWARD J. MARTIN
This chapter describes and explains the Hakka ethnic movement (Kejia
zuqun y undong) in Taiwan. Despite the youth and rapid growth of the
movement, it has already differentiated into traditionalist, moderate,
and radical branches, which reflect variation in ideas of Hakka identity
and in responses to political conditions in Taiwan. The material dis-
cussed was collected in 1991 and consists of interviews with recognized
leaders and publications authored by activists.
As an examination of the early period in a self-defined ethnic move-
ment, this chapter contrasts with several of the case studies in this
volume. The Taiwan Hakka movement is an islandwide phenomenon,
but has important centers of activity in Xinzhu and Miaoli xian (in
northern Taiwan) and in Taipei. The fact that the movement does not
derive from village- or district-level historical tradition means that his-
tory is negotiable, subject to interpretation, and not wedded to particu-
lar localisms, traditions, and figures. Nicole Constable, in contrast,
shows how village and local history in Shung Him Tong have contrib-
uted primary elements, out of which Hakka identity is constructed and
affirmed. She also describes how a heterodox religion, Christianity,
contributes to maintaining the residents’ identity. The movement in
Taiwan, however, embraces people whose religious practices are within
the Chinese tradition. Unlike the Hakka of Shung Him Tong, those
Research between May and September 1991 was supported by a grant from the Luce
Foundation, funds administered by the Taiwan History Field Research Program, and by a
fellowship from the Pacific Cultural Foundation. I gladly acknowledge institutional sup-
port provided by the program staff and the institutes of Modem History and Ethnology
at Academia Sinica, Taipei. I also wish to thank Huang Chuo-chuan, Yang Ching-ting,
Chuang Ying-chang, Lin Mei-rong, P’an Ying-hai, and Chung Chao-cheng for their
insights and interest. An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 1991 confer-
ence of the Association for Asian Studies, at a panel entitled “What Does It Mean to Be
Hakka?”
176THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
involved in the Taiwan movement can call on no particular local history
to affirm their identity, since Hakka Taiwanese history is intended to
synthesize the experiences of Hakka from all over the island.
In contrast to the residents of Shung Him Tong, the Tsuen Wan
Hakka studied by Elizabeth Johnson share susceptibility to many of the
forces eroding Hakka identity in Taiwan. Industrialization and its
consequences—increased literacy, mass communication, and social inter-
action (especially marriage) with greater numbers of non-Hakka—have
lessened overt signs of ethnic difference and have created an environ-
ment in which the bilingual can adapt more readily than those who
speak only Hakka. Much of the thinking that guides leaders and activ-
ists in the Taiwan movement is a reaction to such diminishing ethnic
distinctions. Tsuen Wan people are similar to most unaffiliated Taiwan
Hakka; that is, many are unaware of any need to actively pursue or
maintain Hakka identity as an adaptive economic or political strategy in
life.
Ellen Oxfeld’s discussion of Hakka tanners in Calcutta describes cul-
tural, religious, and economic positions in Indian society that contrast
with the situations of Hong Kong and Taiwan Hakka. The Calcutta
Hakka are culturally alien and remain distinctly Chinese in Indian society,
and have adapted as immigrants by occupying an economic niche that is
stigmatized in both religion and society. As natives and as fully conver-
sant Chinese, Taiwan Hakka live in a society lacking ethnic boundaries as
insurmountable as the ones facing Calcutta tanners. The slight barriers to
full integration with Hokkien and mainlanders in Taiwan society are
primarily a matter of using language appropriate to circumstances. For
the majority of Taiwan’s Hakka population this is not difficult. Public-
school instruction and most radio and television programming is deliv-
ered inguoyu (Mandarin, lit. “national language”), the official language
of public affairs and politics. Hokkien (mmncmhua) is the mother tongue
of the majority of Taiwan’s inhabitants and dominates in the economy.
A few observations can be made from this brief comparison with other
chapters in this volume. First, the Taiwan Hakka movement does not
have a locus of strength or organization in a well-defined community;
one goal of Hakka activists is to appeal to all Hakka on the island. In
consequence, neither history nor identity can be strongly identified with
particular locales. Second, the movement does not now embrace all
Hakka on the island; participation is voluntary and thus premised on
personal interest. Third, Taiwan Hakka are members of an increasingly
open Chinese society in which least-common-denominator elements of
177HOWARD J. MARTIN
consumer economics are pervasive. A tendency to assimilate with the
majority Hokkien is apparent to many concerned Hakka. The primary
public expression of ethnicity in Taiwan is how well—or how poorly—
one speaks Hakka, Hokkien, or Mandarin. Violence, alien appearance or
culture, practice of heterodox religions, and economic marginalization
do not characterize the island’s Hakka population.
The Hakka movement in Taiwan arose out of a perception that
Hakka interests were excluded from the debate over Taiwan’s political
future. The goals of the movement are at once ethnic and political:
ethnic goals are centered on preserving Hakka values and identity, and
political goals are oriented toward creating legal guarantees that protect
Hakka interests. The movement is not directed by one structured organi-
zation, but consists of various interest groups, which often cooperate
but also initiate actions independently. The movement is inventing
Hakka identity as much as it is attempting to preserve it. Having for
decades lived under regimes (Japanese and Nationalist Chinese) whose
strategic goals opposed vigorous displays of ethnic insularity, people in
the movement are forced to consider alternate interpretations of what it
means to be a Hakka in Taiwan.
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES
The issues raised in this chapter could not have been addressed in 1986
when I concluded more than two years of field and library research in
Taiwan. The Taiwan Hakka movement did not exist at that time, except
in so far as Hakka were interested in their history and participated in
opposition politics in concert with Hokkien and dissident mainlanders.
The state of ethnic consciousness was such that analysts (Gates 1981, M.
Chang 1990) rightly collapsed the different ethnic origins of the Taiwan
population. Hakka and Hokkien were counterpoised as native Taiwan-
ese (benshengreri) to mainland immigrants (waishengreri), and the ana-
lysts’ arguments were cast in political and economic terms. Taiwan’s
marginalized population of aborigines (yuanzbumin) did not enter into
the analysis of ethnicity until radical activists organized a political move-
ment in 1986 (Yang Changzhen i99ia:58).
This perspective must now be modified; it is no longer possible to
discuss ethnicity (zuqun tezhi) in Taiwan without distinguishing Hok-
kien, Hakka, and aborigines from one another and from the popula-
tion of mainland immigrants. Such once-sensitive issues as Taiwan’s
history of violent interethnic conflict (xiedou), prejudicial ethnic stereo-
178THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
types, and perceptions of anti-Taiwan bias in the ideology of the ruling
party are now discussed and analyzed openly, without the cautious
circumspection that characterized the voicing of dissident opinions in
the past. The reason for this transformation in intellectual life is the
gradual liberalization of political expression initiated in late 1986 by
President Chiang Ching-kuo. Shortly after Chiang’s liberalization, self-
declared ethnic movements (zuqun yundong) were established. Aborig-
ines founded the first movement (Yang Changzhen 1991a). The Hakka
movement followed the aborigine lead; movement leaders date its
founding as a popular, mass movement to a large-scale public demon-
stration held in Taipei on December 12, 1988. The ostensible purpose
of the demonstration was to call attention to the decline of the Hakka
language; the primary demand was for television programming using
the Hakka language (Baozhong Hui 1989:158—59). Active ethnic move-
ments exist now in Taiwan and the political landscape has changed
dramatically. It follows that the need for a new perspective on Taiwan
ethnicity exists.
The Taiwan Hakka movement is broadly similar to ethnic movements
in other countries. It is about issues connected to ideas of the self as a
member of a group different from others in society. The movement is
concerned with the definition of Hakka identity (rentong), how to pre-
serve this identity in a modern state, and how to restructure Taiwan
society so that ethnic interests receive the protection of law. By the
standards of the ferocious ethnic fighting afflicting formerly communist
nations, the Hakka movement does not present a threat of violence.
Indeed, one central idea is that ethnic-group interests be protected
within a constitutional framework. However, the debate over what
constitutes Hakka identity, the proper goals of the movement, and how
to influence political life in Taiwan is serious and worth appraising.
STRUCTURE AND IDEAS
Leaders of the Hakka movement describe three factions: traditionalists,
moderates, and radicals. Defined by different assumptions about what it
means to be Hakka and different political perspectives, these factions
overlap, and the intellectual boundaries between them are permeable.
People who assume leadership positions or who are spokespersons for
the various positions know each other. Although conflicting positions
on ethnic issues sometimes lead to personal animosities, relations in
public are cordial and cooperative. The movement is not riven by fac-
179HOWARD J. MARTIN
tional extremes but is rather undergoing a process of clarification in
which the relevant issues are identified and variant positions adopted.
The Hakka also are positioning themselves politically, for as they create
ideas about their identity and Taiwan’s future, ethnic issues overlap with
political ones.
Traditionalists
The basic assumption of Hakka traditionalists in Taiwan is that the
Hakka population of the world is, or should be, a unified whole (da
Kejia zu), one that ideally is solidary and in constant contact. In order
to maintain the ties linking this widely dispersed population, traditional-
ists look to common origin as the potent unifying myth. The traditional-
ist view of Hakka history depends heavily upon and derives much
strength from mainland Chinese Hakka history. Eminent Hakka of
former dynasties, past glories, the history of Hakka migration, and the
all-but-unexplored truth that the Hakka language preserves Tang dy-
nasty court language (guanhua) are particularly important symbols of
unity in the traditionalist view (Chen Yundong 1989).1
The assertion that modem Hakka speak a more pure, classical form of
the Chinese language is an important symbol, for it implies that Hakka
were members of the cultural elite in ancient China. By claiming linguis-
tic descent directly from an ancient court language, Hakka symbolically
assert a superior position in the hierarchy of Chinese society, although
one Hakka scholar has taken claims of this nature as evidence of Hakka
ethnocentrism (minzu ziwo zhongxin pianjiari) (ibid.:i2,1991:44). Yang
Xisong (1990:10) makes an assertion that contradicts theories of lan-
guage change: “It can be said that the language of the Hakka has
remained almost unchanged since it formed” in the remote past; this
assertion is not accepted by others (Luo Zhaojin 19913:25). What is
important is not the validity of Yang’s assertion, but the implication that
the Hakka language is a more pure Chinese dialect from which its
speakers derive a sense of pride.
The traditionalist view of ethnic unity leads many to support the
Nationalist position on Taiwan’s political reunification with the Peo-
1.	It is revealing to note that the architecture of the proposed cultural center in Xinzhu
symbolizes and abstracts the form of a mainland Chinese Hakka roundhouse (tulou)
(Chen Ban 1991; Chen Yundong 1989:5+, 64, and 1991; Lin Huowang et al. 1991). There is
no evidence to show that immigrant Hakka in Taiwan built structures of this type.
180THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
pie’s Republic of China. The deeply felt idea of Hakka unity is expressed
as a blood relationship (xueyuan guanxi), which is temporarily in a state
of disruption due to the bitter disputes between the Nationalists in
Taiwan and the Communists in the People’s Republic. Traditionalists
hope that once the political questions are resolved, the natural state of
unity will be restored. Intellectuals arguing for reunification base their
positions on the experiences of other divided nations, notably Korea,
Vietnam, and Germany. Traditionalists argue that future Chinese reuni-
fication should follow the course of Germany rather than Vietnam; the
process of gradually warming relations between North and South Ko-
rea, and increasing semiofficial contacts between Taiwan and the PRC
are discussed with keen interest. Critics of the traditionalist position
assert that the German (or Korean) model does not fit the Chinese
reality because Taiwan’s fifty-year colonial experience under the Japa-
nese and more than forty years under the Nationalists have caused
social, political, and economic changes of such magnitude that island
society differs too greatly from that of the mainland for successful inte-
gration (Yang Changzhen i99ia:6o).
In matters of national politics the traditionalists face a dilemma aris-
ing from the fact that Taiwan’s political liberalization resulted in the
legalization of opposition political parties. In practical terms, the only
party with the strength to challenge the Nationalists is the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP, Minzhu Jinbu Dang). The DPP is internally
divided into several major factions, one of which supports national
independence for Taiwan (the xinchaoliu faction), and one of which
advocates a more moderate “Taiwanification” of democratic processes
(the meilidao faction).2
Neither of these contrary positions compels strong support from
traditionalist Hakka. Those in the DPP who advocate independence are
a direct threat to ethnic unification. The faction that advocates demo-
cratic reforms and increased Taiwanese participation in national politics
is viewed with suspicion; many Hakka feel that this faction favors major-
ity Hokkien interests and brushes Hakka concerns aside. Furthermore,
a distinction is often made between support for a reunification policy
and support for the ruling party as a political entity. Support for reunifi-
cation is not the only issue that concerns Hakka; the perception of bias
2.	The internal divisions of the DPP are not addressed here. A good introduction to
political issues and trends in the Republic of China for the period 1986-90 is contained in
Leo Y. Liu (1991).
181HOWARD J. MARTIN
in government policy against Hakka language and culture also enters
into political thinking.
Critics of the traditionalists think their political ideas are primitive
and unclear. Less moderate critics feel that Hakka who support reunifi-
cation fail to give due weight to Taiwan’s delicate relationship with the
mainland and the practical problems of achieving a workable union.
Much of the Hakka debate labors under the weight of this evolving
relationship; if the relationship develops peacefully, the ethnic debate
on Taiwan will proceed smoothly. However, if the cross-straits dialogue
lapses into hostility, ethnic interests will be shunted aside so that this
larger question may be confronted.
Moderates
Moderates maintain that differences between the Hakka in Taiwan and
those in mainland China are too great to bridge. One formulation of
this position views Taiwan’s political history as a succession of quite
different regimes (the Dutch; the Ming loyalists under Koxinga; the
Qing; the Japanese; and the Nationalists); in this view, the policies of
each regime created social, political, and economic differences from
mainland China. The Chinese nature of Taiwan society is not suspect,
but Taiwan’s history of colonization and external rule is contrasted with
an idealized image of China as a monolithic nation that developed
relatively free from alien influences. The contrast between Taiwan and
the mainland is perhaps a distortion of history, but it is a satisfactory
rationale to support the moderate stance on Hakka ethnic unity.
One fact that conditions this stance is that contact between people on
opposite sides of the Taiwan Strait was somewhat restricted during the
Japanese period and has been prohibited for most of the Nationalist
period. Moderates feel that this span of almost one hundred years has
created an unbridgeable gap.3 An informant expressed his feelings on
this: “If I went back to Wuhua [xian, the ancestral home in Guangdong],
it would be only to take a look around, to see what’s there.” He went on
to say that although he would participate in kinship rituals with mainland
3.	Travel to the mainland to see relatives is not, with few exceptions, now forbidden.
The tourist trade from Taiwan has developed with astonishing speed since most prohibi-
tions were eliminated in the late 1980s. Most of those who visit specifically to see kinfolk
are post-Liberation mainland immigrants, but Taiwanese do trace relatives who have been
separated for generations.
182THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
relatives, he would do so only out of an obligation to very remote ances-
tors, and not as a means of affirming solidarity with people who have no
connection to his life in Taiwan. If kinship bonds are weak, ethnic bonds
are weaker.
Political positions adopted by Hakka moderates are based on the
realistic, yet cynical, view that both the Nationalists and the DPP either
ignore or respond to ethnic issues (language, culture, and history) de-
pending on political exigencies. Leading figures think the Hakka are
treated as a useful political tool (zhengzhi gongju) whose support is
sought only when it suits party needs.4 Hakka susceptibility to this
treatment results from minority status (He 1991:64). The intellectual
response to this perception of political marginality is to think of the
Hakka as a bloc that can be used to ameliorate inattention. The island-
wide Hakka population is conceived of as a swing-vote bloc. Translated
into electoral politics, if Hakka can be motivated to vote as one on
ethnic issues, they may play a role in excess of numerical strength and
achieve positive results.
Motivating Hakka to act in unison is not easy. People active in the
movement stated that the Hakka population’s indifference and apathy
toward ethnic issues (see Johnson, this volume) are the real obstacles to
strengthening the Hakka position in government. Activists maintain
that Hakka voting strength is linguistic: people vote for those who
speak their language. One example is drawn from Xinzhu xian, where
the population is split between an urban area (Xinzhu City) and a mix
or rural villages and small towns. The majority of city residents are
Hokkien; Hakka dominate the rural precincts. According to one infor-
mant, who is a school principal, it is “natural” that city residents vote for
Hokkien-speakers and that country people vote for Hakka-speakers.
When questioned about this state of affairs, this reflective and precise
schoolmaster said that whether candidates in the hotly contested elec-
tions are capable politicians or willing to press ethnic demands is not a
material consideration.
The question of unification or independence is avoided completely by
many Hakka moderates. One moderate leader attributed this avoidance
+. One local issue that has the flavor of political expediency is the reconstruction of the
Hakka Martyrs Temple (Yimin Miao) Middle School in Fangliao, Xinzhu xian (see also n.
6, below). Only after a personal visit from a high-ranking government official was recon-
struction given serious encouragement. The Martyrs Temple has special significance for
Hakka in northern Taiwan, and is a symbolic center of the movement.
18?HOWARD J. MARTIN
to Hakka dependence and weakness. He maintained that if Taiwan takes
the step to nationhood, the Hakka minority will be weak in national
politics and incapable of pressing for protection. But if unification with
the People’s Republic of China occurs, the Hakka will be forced to
contend with a government and an ideology the majority find alien and
ruinous. The view of this moderate is that neither independence nor
unification is desirable given Hakka strength on Taiwan, “So our politi-
cal situation is strange and ridiculous.” Moderate leaders are aware that
choosing either independence or unification will eventually be neces-
sary, but they will not decide until forced to do so by developments over
which they have little influence. Attention is therefore directed to creat-
ing a more democratic political system and to local issues that affect the
quality of daily life.
The moderate view of ethnic relations envisions a democratic Taiwan
in which the equal rights of all ethnic groups are preserved in law and
pursued in policy (Liu Guozhao 1990:13)? The thinking of moderate
leaders is decidedly unformulated. The eventual structure of a demo-
cratic government, the possibility of ethnic conflict in a democracy, and
the methods of assuring equal rights receive little attention. But Hakka
moderates have not simply adopted the political rhetoric of the post-
1986 opposition movement; moderates are conscious of new issues and
are in the process of deciding what the ethnic implications are and what
positions to adopt.
Radicals
The radical stream of the Hakka movement is more articulate and better
organized than its traditional and moderate counterparts. This results
from active participation in opposition politics and from the involve-
ment of young intellectuals who have university-learned analytic skills;
their fresh perspectives, theoretical sophistication, and aggressive propa-
gation of new views have propelled several into positions of authority at
relatively young ages.
The leaders of this stream think of themselves as democrats and
ethnic pluralists (duoyuari) rather than as radicals; their views are radical
only in contrast to those of traditionalists and moderates. Opinions
5.	The idea of legally sanctioned equal rights for ethnic groups is also shared by many
in the radical stream; the difference is that many radicals support Taiwan’s independence
from mainland China.
184THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
differ on all major issues, but members of the radical stream generally
endorse Taiwan’s independence, a strong Hakka presence in national
politics, and the creation of “new Hakka” in Taiwan (Li Qiao 1991a: 3,
i99ib).
Ethnicity: The New Hakka
Radical intellectuals and leaders cite their concern over Hokkien chau-
vinism (shawen zhuyi), increasing alienation from Hokkien-dominated
opposition politics, an apprehension that Hakka identity faces extinc-
tion because of numerical inferiority, and the effect of social mobility in
Taiwan’s industrial economy as the major factors that precipitated the
formal organization of Hakka ethnic organizations (Chen Qiuhong
1991:42; He 1991:64). These concerns led in 1987 to the publication of
Hakka Storm (Kejia fengyun), a magazine organized by writers, teach-
ers, and politically active intellectuals with the expressed aim of advanc-
ing Hakka interests (Wu Jinxun 1991:1).6 He Xinxing (1991:64) marks
the founding of Hakka Storm as the beginning of ethnic differentiation
within opposition politics. The magazine was the first forum designed
to express Hakka positions on social, political, and cultural issues (Wu
Jinxun 1991:4). Editorial goals included raising ethnic consciousness,
enhancing solidarity, solidifying political influence, and struggling for
Hakka interests. Hakka Storm, and the interest it attracted, also pro-
vided a platform for debate about Hakka ethnicity.
One trend in the radical definition of Hakka ethnicity consciously
centers on Taiwan as the point of common origin. Unlike traditionalist
views of worldwide unity and moderate indecision, the radical stream
rejects the symbolic link of all Hakka through blood bonds to the
Chinese mainland. Taiwan is the new Hakka homeland, and the Hakka
there are “new Hakka.” This concept of Hakka ethnicity is expressed in
an anthem written by Zhong Zhaozheng, a well-respected author and
forceful voice in the radical stream. Zhong wrote the lyrics for the
6.	By 1990 Hakka Storm was in economic trouble. New editors were added, the edito-
rial tone was moderated, and new patrons were found; the reinvigorated publication
became Hakka Magazine (Kejia zazhi). Support from the governing committee of the
Martyrs Temple has been especially noteworthy. The temple is dedicated to the souls of
loyal Hakka martyrs who fought with the Qing against rebels, primarily Hokkien, in the
late eighteenth century. It is the center of a rotating ritual cycle that ties Hakka districts
together as a ritual group. Hokkien do not participate.
185HOWARD J. MARTIN
anthem using vernacular expressions; it is intended to be sung in
Hakka.
“The New Hakka” (Xin ge Kejiaren)
Stop repeating that the Hakka are so extraordinary;
Stop repeating that the Hakka are so remarkable.
The suffering and difficulty cannot be fully told;
Crossing the sea from China, coming to Taiwan,
Endlessly drenched in sweat and blood;
Opening the mountains, cutting the forests, establishing roots;
We are the new Hakka.
Don’t reject this land for being too small;
Our blood runs in just this land.
Don’t reject this land for being too weak;
Our hopes are simply right here.
We are the new Hakka.
Struggle with uplifted heads for freedom, and recreate the
Hakka spirit;
Struggle with passion for democracy, and recreate Hakka
radiance.
We are the new Hakka.
(Taiwan Hakka Association 1991:18; lyrics by Zhong
Zhaozheng, 1990)
The theme that gives vitality to ‘The New Hakka” is a vision of
Taiwan-based ethnicity—a theme that implicitly criticizes pride in
former glory as a source of Hakka identity. Migration from China,
suffering, shedding sweat and blood, pioneering, and establishing roots
in Taiwan are important images.7 China, by implication, is no longer
home. The “new Hakka” do not intend to borrow the greatness of the
old to create a sense of ethnic solidarity. Li Qiao confirms this view by
contrasting symbolic images of strength and weakness: ‘The Hakka
need to be Israelis, not Gypsies; Taiwan is the last stop in our migra-
tion” (199^:7).
The new critique of the old strikes at sources of Hakka pride. One
7.	For representative works on Hakka pioneering in Taiwan see Zhuang and Chen
(1982); Huang Zhuoquan (1989) and Huang Rongluo (1989).
186THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
example is revealing. Hakka traditionalists claim modern national lead-
ers (including Sun Yat-sen, Deng Xiaoping, Li Kuan-yew [former
prime minister of Singapore], and Li Teng-hui [president of the Repub-
lic of China]) as either fully Hakka or as descendants of Hakka ances-
tors.8 As symbols of power and influence, the men in these positions
affirm that Hakka participate in national affairs at the highest levels and
have the stature necessary to influence national and global events. In
this view, borrowed glory reflects on the entire ethnic group. However,
reflected glory does not translate into increased respect for the Hakka:
“Do those who like to say these kinds of things understand the nature of
the times? Are they just comforting themselves? Living among the
glories of the past is anachronistic, demeaning, and self-oblivious”
(Zhong Zhaozheng, in Taiwan Hakka Association 1991:4).
The ideas that constitute the new Hakka identity were formed not only
in reaction to other conceptions, but were also called forth by perceptions
of anti-Hakka prejudice and domination by Hokkien and mainlanders.
Dominated politically by minority mainlanders and economically by the
majority Hokkien, the Hakka risk becoming invisible in the cities and
mere bystanders in the countryside (Chen Qiuhong 1991:42-3; Li Qiao
I99ia:2). Loss of Hakka identity is a process imperceptible to many, who
do not participate in the ethnic movement and who may not be aware
that they have an ethnic identity (zuqun rentong') to protect (Zhong
Fumei 1990:20). Twin pressures to conform to Hokkien practices in
economic life and to government practices in political life are effective
agents of acculturation. Boundaries between Taiwan’s three major ethnic
categories are highly permeable and increasingly a matter of speaking the
appropriate language. The problem for Hakka, however, is that the
boundaries are permeable in one direction only: from Hakka to Hokkien
and Mandarin. One activist and author summarizes the problem by stat-
ing, “In this state of oblivion you have already turned mainlander! You
have already turned Hokkien!” (ibid.:2i).
The radical effort since 1987 to formulate a new, Taiwan-oriented
ethnic identity resulted from dissatisfaction with the Hokkien domina-
tion of opposition politics and from a mounting sense of a loss of
identity through absorption into the consumer economy and the main-
lander political ideology. The ideological foundation of the new identity
8.	Mary Erbaugh’s contribution to this volume is a detailed description of Hakka
networks operating before the founding of the People’s Republic. She makes good use of
evidence from scattered sources to demonstrate how Hakka gained leading positions.
187HOWARD J. MARTIN
combines elements that are recognizably ethnic (having to do with
origins and boundaries) and political (relating primarily to the structure
of government and the debate over Taiwan’s future).
Nationalism: The New Taiwan
The radical stream of the Hakka movement favors political reforms that
attend to the needs of different ethnic groups on the island. Democrati-
zation of political processes is the fundamental goal, but radicals also
stress that a liberalized regime should recognize that Taiwan society is
multiethnic and multilingual. Whether Taiwan should declare indepen-
dence or reunify with the Chinese mainland is a question that receives
no unanimous answer. Thinking about political issues facing the entire
population of the island is mixed; ideas contain elements that advance
ethnic interests and elements that are consciously chosen to benefit all
the island’s inhabitants. The ethnic and political positions members of
the radical stream adopt reflect both new political realities and the post-
1986 rise of ethnic consciousness.
The political reality is that the Hakka are a minority and cannot hope
to achieve through ethnic isolation a position of strength. Therefore,
the question is not whether Hakka should participate, but rather how to
effectively use limited political strength. Cooperation with Hokkien is a
theme that recurs throughout political discussions. “If Hakka who par-
ticipate in opposition politics want to become influential politicians,
they need to transcend their Hakka backgrounds. They will not get
elected by depending only on Hakka votes” (Chen Qiuhong 1991:41; see
also Li Qiao i99ia:2). Short-term expediency dictates that minorities
must shun their ethnic identities in public in order to increase political
influence. But, after a multiethnic power base has been established,
long-term goals may be pursued (He 1991:64).
The most systematic political thinking occurs among movement lead-
ers who support independence and reject reunification. Should Taiwan
choose the former, one radical leader has proposed several principles
that should guide the new state. First, political conduct should be pre-
mised on the rule of law and not of parties or people. Presidential
powers should be constitutionally limited, in order to avoid domination
by powerful autocrats like Chiang Kai-shek. Second, ethnic equality
should be written into a reformed constitution so that the rights of all
groups are guaranteed; the goal is ethnic coexistence without oppres-
188THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
sion. Third, the ideal new Taiwan is a democracy in which “the people
are the rulers, [and] the government is the servant of the people”
(Zhong Zhaozheng 1991:1; see also Zhong Fumei 1990; Li Qiao
i99ib:7).
How far Hakka should press ethnic issues within the political context
is a matter of debate. Two positions have emerged, both of which
address the ethnic tensions in opposition politics. One position calls for
ethnic politics in which differences between Hakka and (primarily)
Hokkien are accented in an attempt to preserve identity and maintain
prerogative:
Who, besides the Hakka themselves, will come forth to nurture
our own culture, language, and political rights? Thus, to in-
crease respect for ethnic minorities and determine the values of
Taiwan’s pluralistic culture, the more that languages and cul-
tures are differentiated, the better; the alternative is assimilation
[tonghua] and extinction. (Chen Qiuhong 1991:42)
The argument in favor of preserving distinct identities rests on the
understanding that Hakka are a minority; if they would preserve this
identity, they must struggle to do so themselves, for other groups will
not. An overtly political expression of this position is an argument for
political autonomy (zuquan zaiwo) in which all ethnic groups “demand
equal, reasonable positions and room to develop” (Li Qiao 1991a:?).
Finally, an extreme expression of the desire to preserve distinctions
through political autonomy is found in the suggestion that Taiwan
adopt geographic divisions modeled on the Swiss canton system; Tai-
wan’s administrative divisions would be realigned to correspond with
the ethnic composition of local populations (Yang Changzhen 1991b).
A second position regarding the balance between ethnic and political
issues complements the first. This position is based on the recognition
that Taiwan is an ethnically plural society. One informant summarized
the idea by remarking that “Hakka should identify with Hakka and
identify with Taiwan” as a society composed of different ethnic groups.
Constitutional reform should proceed so that laws preserving the rights
of each ethnic group are enacted, for the betterment of both the state
and the groups (Liu Guozhao 1990:1?). In this view, it is a serious
mistake to create artificial contradictions between ethnic groups; so as
to “avoid the ‘historical error’ of interethnic conflict [xiedou]” (Li Qiao
189HOWARD J. MARTIN
1991a:?; see also Harrell 1990a),9 new ethnic (Hakka) and national (Tai-
wanese) identities should emerge. The possibility that ethnic conflict
may develop is taken seriously; one author maintains that if economic
stability endures, ethnic problems will “become the most important
political question once unification or independence is settled” (Yang
Changzhen 1991^49).
ETHNIC SYMBOLS: HISTORY AND LANGUAGE
Despite variation in points of view, movement activists agree that lan-
guage and history define Hakka identity, and that both are threatened
by the economic forces and political structures the movement was estab-
lished to influence. The sense that the movement is in a state of emer-
gency can only protect and invigorate (qicmgjiu) these aspects of iden-
tity, rather than fully promote (ticbcmg) Hakka interests. Leaders sense
that they are engaged in a rearguard action to preserve Hakka identity.
Time for reflection is lacking and little effort can be expended to exam-
ine what Hakka identity means. The result is that people treat language
and history as emblematic givens and as material for slogans in the
movement’s activities. Arguments advanced proceed little beyond the
desire to preserve “good” Hakka culture and to allow the rest to disap-
pear (Liu Fuzeng 1991:8).
History
The unique experiences of the Hakka in Taiwan are important aspects of
identity to many, but historical knowledge is limited and stereotypical.
Hakka are known for their pioneering spirit; many districts bordering
Taiwan’s mountainous interior were opened to Chinese colonization by
Hakka pioneers. The Hakka are able to withstand deprivation and de-
nial, for the lands they opened were positioned between hostile, unac-
culturated aborigines (shengfan) in the mountains and untrusting Hok-
kien neighbors on the western plains. Last, the Hakka are known for
fidelity; loyalist forces raised to combat antistate rebels and foreign
invaders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries very often came
from Hakka centers. The knowledge and application of history typical
9.	Pointed references to interethnic conflict refer to the bloody past. Conflicts between
Hakka and Hokkien were a major problem for Qing administrators between the 1680s and
the 1860s (Dai 1979, Hsu 1980, Lamley 1981, Ownby 1990).
190THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
of movement leaders contrasts with the pursuit of identity through
history that Nicole Constable (this volume) outlines for the people of
Shung Him Tong. Although people who do significant historical re-
search on Hakka subjects publish regularly, no synthesis reflecting the
new ethnicity has emerged as a standard.
Stereotypical images of the Hakka experience do not have to be true.
It is enough that they are thought to be so, for they reinforce qualities
that are prized: the Hakka are conservative, frugal, enduring, self-
respecting, and loyal (Li Qiao 19913:2). Although historical information
exists for the Qing period, little is available for the Japanese (1895-1945)
and Nationalist periods. People explain this gap in terms of colonial
exploitation and Nationalist oppression. The Japanese, it is felt, were
not concerned with the events that would comprise Taiwan history;
their colonial mentality acted to obscure Hakka history.
It is also thought that the Nationalist government has actively sup-
pressed Taiwan history for political reasons. Educational policy has
been marshaled in support of the national goal of a unified China and
studies of Taiwan have been suppressed in favor of a continental view of
Chinese history. Hakka university students point out that standard texts
are devoted to the history and geography of mainland China; one infor-
mant remarked, “I studied everything about the provinces that border
the Yangtze River but didn’t know anything about Taiwan until after I
graduated and began to study Taiwan history on my own.” Taiwan, in
this view, is a society with an unknown history, and Hakka history is
blank because the Hakka are a minority.
Language unites all elements in the Hakka movement; its status is tied
to the fate of the people.10 It is feared that Hakka, as a spoken language,
is declining in Taiwan. The reasons offered for this vary, but many think
that the language will become extinct and be replaced by Mandarin and
Hokkien. Apprehension over the state of the language led to a signifi-
cant event in the early stage of the Hakka movement, the “Return My
Hakka Language” (Huan wo Kehua) demonstration.
10.	This point is made in most of the contributions to this volume. Myron Cohen’s
description (this volume) of Hakka settlement and social organization in South China
offers compelling evidence that common language has been particularly important in the
definition of who the Hakka are.
191HOWARD J. MARTIN
This demonstration was held in Taipei on December 28,1988, and was
the first Hakka ethnic demonstration in Taiwan. It was also the first
peaceful mass demonstration since the Japanese period to present ethnic
grievances. Organized by people in the radical and moderate streams, it
was consciously designed to appeal to the whole spectrum of the Hakka
population. This goal was achieved by simplifying issues and sponsoring
the demonstration, in part, through the central Hakka religious site in
northern Taiwan, the Martyrs Temple (Baozhong Hui 1989:158)." Ac-
cording to Luo Zhaojin, the demonstrators placed three concrete de-
mands before the national government (19913:25). First, Hakka televi-
sion programming should commence. Second, legal restrictions on the
use of dialects in the broadcast media should be repealed. Third, bilin-
gual education in the public schools should be instituted. The authori-
ties have reacted slowly, and the demands have met with limited success.11 12
The “Return My Hakka Language” demonstration was significant
because it presented for the first time in public an issue that could unite
most Hakka. An equation between language fluency and Hakka identity
is expressed in speeches, publications, and interviews (Liu Fuzeng
1991:8; Wang Dehong 1990; Zhong Fumei 1990). The formula is a
compact way of expressing an ethnic truth: in order to be a true Hakka,
one must speak Hakka, and Hakka should not fear rejection for speak-
ing their language when the situation is appropriate (Liu Guozhao
1990:11). Language, not common origin or shared blood, is elevated as
the primordial characteristic Hakka use to identify themselves.
Evidence suggests that spoken Hakka is accepting a great number of
loan words and is losing place to Hokkien and Mandarin (Yang
Jingding 1991). First, a survey of two hundred Hakka primary-school
students revealed that the majority of the youngest students could not
pronounce their names in Hakka and that few older students could do
so. Second, descriptive statistics strongly suggest that the parents of
Hakka school-aged children routinely speak the language between them-
selves only about half the time (48 percent) and use Hakka with their
children even less (21 percent) on a daily basis (Wang Dehong 1990:35
11.	See notes 4 and 6.
12.	At the time this chapter was written, television news and weather broadcasts in
Hakka were scheduled to begin in September 1991 (Luo Zhaojin I99ib:i; Taiwan Hakka
Association 1991:7-8). Bilingual education is officially supported by the Xinzhu xian
administration. Hakka language classes are taught in schools on the basis of voluntary
participation; the government “neither prohibits nor encourages” these classes, according
to one teacher.
192THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
ff.). The evidence is not conclusive, but does give the impression that
unless measures are adopted to revive it “Hakka is headed for a natural
extinction” (personal communication from a primary-school teacher,
1991).
Language thus stands as the element that can be emphasized in order
to separate Hakka from other groups. The 1988 language demonstration
made this point clear, for although it was political in nature, it detached
Hakka interests from opposition activity and was an exercise in ethnic
politics. The position adopted by politically active Hakka, however, is
that the languages and cultures of all ethnic groups in Taiwan should be
protected in law. The Hakka position is unique because it offers protec-
tion to Hakka, Hokkien, and Mandarin; while radicals in the DPP
support making Hokkien the sole official language of Taiwan, and Na-
tionalists advocate the sole use of Mandarin. The Hakka position is
advantageous because it at once exerts pressure on the government to
deal with ethnic concerns and secures a uniquely Hakka position in the
political opposition.1’
INTERNAL CRITICISM
The Hakka movement is not without internal critics. An undercurrent
of indecision about whether the Taiwan Hakka constitute a distinct
ethnic group exists at the heart of the movement. Chen Yundong argues
that if the Hakka are regarded as Han Chinese, they must be thought of
as a subcategory created through historical and linguistic processes
rather than as a distinct ethnic group (1989:11). Chen’s point is that cul-
tural variation among the Chinese is high, but that intergroup bound-
aries are permeable; given this, the notion of the Hakka as a distinct
ethnic group with a categorical identity is not reasonable. One moder-
ate thinker asserted that “the Hakka are not a race \zhongzu\ or a people
[minzu], but a dialect group \yuzu\.” He explained this thought by
citing Taiwan’s transition from an agricultural to an industrial and ser-
vice economy, rural to urban migration, and government education
policies. In his view, these factors have reduced Hakka and Hokkien
cultural differences almost to the vanishing point. Language maintains
13.	Resentment over the centra] government’s insistence on the continued use of
Mandarin as the national language is openly expressed. The DPP makes a point of using
Hokkien at rallies and in the legislature both as a symbolic slap at the Nationalist Party
and as a means of communicating the party’s Taiwan focus.
193HOWARD J. MARTIN
group boundaries but does not create segregation, ignorance, and ani-
mosity. Sharon Carstens (this volume) makes the same point; similar
social and economic forces are acting to reduce distinctions among the
Chinese population of Malaysia. Malaysian Hakka may need, in her
view, to adopt special measures to avoid full assimilation.
The critics are active movement members and organizers who share a
skepticism about the existence of the Hakka as an ethnic group and
about the utility of language to unify the group. They are not fully con-
vinced that the movement is an ethnic one and ask whether the Hakka
do, or should, have goals distinct from those of other segments of the
population. In this paradigm, if protecting Hakka language (or history
or culture) drives the movement, it is not an ethnic movement but a
linguistic (or historical or cultural) one. They ask why this course
should be followed. A response predicated on the instrumental use of
ethnicity as a political force is satisfactory to some. The idea is that
Taiwan’s political future is very unclear and fraught with danger, and
Hakka must create opportunities to contribute to the debate and to
stake a claim to the future (information from interviews). The move-
ment’s most articulate critics align with the radical faction, which in-
vented the idea of the “new Hakka.” However, I think that rather than
deny that Hakka exist, which their most direct statements imply, the
critics are attempting to create an understanding of how to be Hakka in
Taiwan.
CONCLUSION
The Hakka movement in Taiwan is not unified; no center of authority
or symbolic significance exists. Streams within the movement define
Hakka solidarity in various ways. With the exception of rescuing the
language from an inevitable decline, common goals do not exist. Inter-
nal critics even question whether the Hakka exist as an ethnic group
distinguishable from Hokkien and mainlanders.
The structure of the movement reflects the national political debate,
and a fundamental question dividing Hakka from Hakka is over the
fate of Taiwan. Radicals prefer independence from mainland China,
but traditionalists contend that unification is necessary. Those in the
moderate center remain uncommitted, and advocate improving the
quality of people’s lives. Divisions within the movement are not rancor-
ous, however.
History is a potent symbol in the movement as a whole, but does not
i94THE HAKKA ETHNIC MOVEMENT IN TAIWAN
receive a uniform interpretation; what is important to some is not to
others. The greatest contrast exists between traditionalist and radical
interpretations. Traditionalists emphasize the undisputed links with
mainland China to construct an image of overarching Hakka unity.
Radicals consciously construct a Taiwan-centered Hakka identity that
denies the relevance of former glory.
The single issue that has demonstrated the power to move the Hakka
ethnic movement from the realm of intellectual debate to mass appeal is
the perception that the Hakka language is in retreat. The common view
is that the language is under attack from both within and without, with
declining use of Hakka in Hakka homes. The argument that national
policies and the Hokkien-dominated economy force minority Hakka to
use other dialects has been successfully used to rally support for the
movement.
Political liberalization beginning in 1986 provided an opportunity for
the Taiwan Hakka movement to develop. However, active promotion
of Hakka issues and attempts to reinterpret identity developed within
opposition politics, not only as a result of Hakka opposition to the
Nationalist government. The process of defining the issues, formulating
positions, and debating political alternatives began when Hakka became
convinced that the political opposition existed primarily to advance
Hokkien interests. Hakka ethnic activity is thus also a product of differ-
entiation within the opposition political movement.
19571 The Hakka Paradox in
the People’s Republic of China
Exile, Eminence, and Public Silence
MARY S. ERBAUGH
Most of this book considers Hakka identity outside China. But 90
percent of the world’s approximately 37 million Hakka speakers live in
the People’s Republic, largely in an area referred to by overseas Hakka
and by mainland Hakka scholars as the “Hakka heartland,” the thirty-
three “purely-Hakka” counties straddling the mountains between west-
ern Fujian, eastern Guangdong, and southern Jiangxi (Min-Yue-Gan)
(ChineseEncyclopedia 1988:237). Mainland Chinese are strikingly less vo-
cal about Hakka identity than are their outside cousins, and many still
reject the word Hakka. For reasons that are examined below, since the
establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949 until quite recently, little
has been written of Hakka identity on the mainland, and Hakka identity
has not been publicly expressed. Hakka language, on the other hand, is
frequently discussed in print.
Although common language is not necessarily an indication of the
existence of a conscious “ethnic identity” (see Introduction, this vol-
ume), it does offer a potentially powerful social bond and may also serve
as a badge of identity, especially when it is a language (such as Hakka)
that few outsiders learn. As a linguist, I attempt here to place the recent
upsurge in contemporary mainland studies of the Hakka within a
broader historical context, with a special emphasis on language. My
focus is not explicidy on how people on the mainland perceive of them-
selves as Hakka—since, given their silence, this is very difficult to assess.
I am more interested in what those who are often assumed to be Hakka
I thank Dick Kraus and Cynthia Brokaw for much information and many critiques.
Much of the political history in this chapter is documented in greater detail in Erbaugh
(1992). Kind permission has been granted by China Quarterly to duplicate material from
“The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as a Hakka Enterprise”
(China Quarterly 132:937-68).
196HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
by other mainland and overseas Hakka—by virtue of their language,
place of origin, or self-ascription—have done, especially with regard to
revolution. In the twentieth century many individuals from Hakka re-
gions of China fought for Communist revolution. Yet within mainland
China much of that history remains shrouded in silence, and it is not
openly expressed as “Hakka history.”
The word Hakka is a hostile Cantonese coinage, as clear an epithet
for impoverished wanderers as “Gypsy” or “Okie.” A defining feature of
guests (ke) is that they will eventually go home. But Hakka migrants,
lacking a viable native place to return to, have been forced to define
themselves against an ethnic other. Although their emergence has been
uneven, Hakka consciousness and scholarship have been traced back
about two centuries by mainland scholars, to the massive migrations to
coastal Guangdong, Sichuan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. There,
gazetteers first described Hakka language and customs as distinctive in
order to refute Cantonese charges that they were “barbarous.” Hakka
associations sprang up, especially in treaty ports and in Southeast Asia.
Similar ethnic attacks during the 1920s to 1930s, the peak era for so-
called “race science,” stimulated a “flourishing stage” of Hakka scholar-
ship, during which Luo Xianglin, a Hong Kong Christian, responded
with his pioneering work. A “silent era” followed on the mainland,
from the Japanese attacks of 1937 to the end of the Cultural Revolution
(1966—76). Mainland writing about Hakka during that time was “as
scarce as phoenix feathers and unicorn horns.” Yet during this same
silent era, socialist revolution had unusual appeal to land-hungry main-
land peasants in Hakka regions. Some became heroes, or even China’s
highest leaders, including Deng Xiaoping. But, for a variety of reasons,
these leaders did not identify themselves as Hakka. Once contacts with
overseas Chinese resumed during the reform era, mainland Hakka cre-
ated a “flourishing revival” of Hakka scholarship. They are also revising
Hakka identity, rendering it with new, positive views of non-Han minor-
ity culture and “otherness.”
Stigmatized groups may accept or reject the dominant group’s assess-
ments. The construction of Hakka identity closely follows Henri Tajfel’s
(1974) model for intergroup relations. Groups that reject inferior status
often assimilate with the dominant group and demand equality. But
they may also redefine negative characteristics and create new dimen-
sions for comparison. The most convincing demands for Hakka equal-
ity are often voiced by sophisticated, highly educated multilinguals. The
process of redefinition is farthest along precisely where Hakka have
197MARY S. ERBAUGH
assimilated most to prosperous, anomic, highrise urban life in Taipei,
Hong Kong, and Calcutta, as the other chapters in this book make clear.
Redefining negative characteristics is also easier once they can be safely
rendered historical. Public expressions of Hakka culture have long dis-
cussed migration and poverty in terms of mobility, thrift, and endur-
ance. Now, in the People’s Republic, socialist ideals reinforce emergent
comparisons. “Barbarism” is redefined as valuable exchange with minor-
ity culture; heterodoxy as openness to reform, including women’s
rights; and constant fighting as military service that forged a modern
nation. What is not voiced publicly, but is a matter of pride within
mainland Hakka circles, is the role of Hakka in communist revolution.
The silence is confined to twentieth-century mainland history. Hakka
traditions are often familiar to missionaries and Western anthropolo-
gists who were forced to concentrate their field research in Hong Kong
and Taiwan after 1949. But ethnography has mosdy ignored national
politics. Many overseas Hakka support the Worldwide Hakka Federa-
tion, but its anticommunist and Christian constituencies shun Chinese
Communist Party history. Non-Chinese sources discuss ethnicity, but
are often uninformed, careless, or vague. And the people referred to as
Hakka are litde known outside Hakka districts of the People’s Republic.
‘What’s a Hakka?” asked a scholar from the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences. His confusion was not unusual.
Few non-Hakka on the mainland know that Deng Xiaoping is consid-
ered a Sichuan Hakka or that in 1984 half of China’s highest govern-
ment body, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, came from
Hakka backgrounds. In 1988 individuals from Hakka regions of the
country appeared at three times the chance rate among China’s 105
highest officials—those at the level of minister (buzhang) or above (Li
Gucheng 1988). Silence is reinforced by the tangled status of ethnicity in
China, the antitraditionalist thrust of the revolution, and its still-painful
aftermath. But a paradox exists between the concentration of Hakka on
the mainland and their public silence until the late 1980s. Partly, they are
overwhelmed by numbers. The 33 million mainland Hakka-speakers are
only 3 percent of the population. People of Hakka descent, not necessar-
ily Hakka-speaking, form a much higher percentage of the outposts of
“cultural China,” in Taiwan (2 million, at least 10 percent), Hong Kong
(600,000, 10 percent), and Singapore (700,000, 25 percent). But the
actual numbers of Hakka overseas are far smaller than in the People’s
Republic (table 7.1); and far smaller than their voices might indicate.
Orthodox Communist history describes revolution in seamless, de-
198HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
TABLE 7.1
Estimated Overseas Chinese Populations
	Percentage of Chinese Descent	Number of Chinese Descent	Number of Hakka Descent
Malaysia	32%	6,000,000	2,000,000
Thailand	14%	8,000,000	2,600,000
Vietnam	2%	1,000,000	333,000
Philippines	1% (?)	690,000	230,000
Indonesia	1% (?)	2,000,000	666,000
U.S.A.	0.7%	1,600,000	533,ooo
Based on population figures and ethnic breakdowns for each country in Famighetti et
al. (i993). Hakka population is estimated at 33 percent of Chinese. Indonesia and the
Philippines do not provide figures for Chinese. I estimate 1 percent, based on Tu (1991:11-
20).
ethnicized terms, moving smoothly from the founding of the Chinese
Communist party in 1921 to the labor organizers of the 1920s and the
peasant activists of the 1930s, who founded collective governments
known as soviet bases. The Red Army then made its heroic Long
March from the southern soviets to a new base at Yan’an in the North-
west. Mao Zedong and the Party fought on from there until they
expelled first the Japanese and then the Nationalists, taking national
power in 1949. The public record does not mention that Hakka were
deeply involved at each stage as Party founders, labor and peasant
organizers, and military heroes. Six of the nine main soviet bases were
in Hakka country. The Long March led largely Hakka-speaking sol-
diers from Hakka village to Hakka village up through Sichuan (see
maps 7.1-7.4). After 1949 the People’s Republic had many Hakka
leaders, especially in the military. One list of eleven early Communist
“national heroes” is 27 percent Hakka, nine times the chance rate.
They include two Long March leaders, marshals Zhu De and Chen Yi,
as well as Song Qingling, who married Sun Yat-sen before becoming a
leader in her own right.1 Yet mainland publications virtually never
mention the Hakka background of these individuals—not even in a
forty-one volume set of biographies of Party heroes—in vivid contrast
1. Three other heroes are Hunan natives from the Xiang dialect area: Mao Zedong,
Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi. The non-Hakka non-Hunan heroes are: Li Dazhao
(Hebei), Qu Qiubai (Jiangsu), Zhou Enlai (Jiangsu), and Dong Biwu (Hubei).
199★ Capital of the early Communist
Central Soviet collective
b . / 1 Hakka Language Areas
map 7.1. Hakka Language Areas
Based on Li Lugeng and Zhang Luhong (1987:7) and Province-by-Province Atlas
(1977)- Hakka areas are drawn according to Chinese Encyclopedia (1988:238),
supplemented by Luo Xianglin (1933:57—58). The pinyin edition of Province-by-
Province Atlas offers an alphabetical index of every county seat. Topographic
maps add important perspective, as also in Geelan and Twitchett (1974:4—5).
Color photos of base areas appear in Lawrence (1986).
200map 7.2. Soviet Bases
Supplemented according to Chinese Encyclopedia (1989, vol. 2, maps 2 and 3, pp
1300-1303).
201map 7.3. Hakka Country and 1935 Provincial Boundaries
Based on Li Lugeng and Zhang Luhong (1987:9), supplemented by color map 3
in Chinese Encyclopedia (r989, vol. 2, facing p. 1303).
202map 7.4. Long March Routes
Based on Li Lugeng and Zhang Luhong (1987:9), supplemented by color map 3
in Chinese Encyclopedia (1989, vol. 2, facing p. 1303).
203MARY S. ERBAUGH
to the routine highlighting of the identity of minorities. Memoirs are
equally silent. The subject of Hakka participation in the Communist
revolution remains so sensitive that a foreign article was among the
first to raise it in print (Erbaugh 1992).
OBSCURING FORCES: HAN UNITY, OFFICIAL
CATEGORIES, AND GUEST IDENTITY
Why are Hakka so obscure? Three converging factors mask their pres-
ence: ideals of Han unity; official categories that do not easily ac-
commodate Hakka; and the slow, uneven construction of Hakka identity.
Seamless cultural unity is a traditional Chinese ideal, one which Hakka
defend as ardently as do other Han. Hakka who achieve national success
are hailed for their achievements as Chinese. The Taiping rebels of the
nineteenth century did not proclaim a Hakka Kingdom, but a Heavenly
Kingdom. Rulers from the Qinshi Emperor to Mao Zedong are hailed
for unifying the empire, whatever the cost. Unlike many of his contempo-
raries, Mao never studied abroad. And, unlike them, “he never wasted
time worrying about his Chinese identity. . . . He was effortlessly and
supremely confident about being Chinese, almost the way Churchill was
about being English” (Wang Gungwu 19913:263). Many campaigns de-
nounce “localism” {difang zhuyi'y “splittism” (fenlie zhuyif and lack of
unity. But “centralism” (zhongyangjiquan zhi) has positive connotations.
Many Chinese consider public discussion of local ties to be inflamma-
tory or in poor taste. Discomfort with diversity remains strong. One
scholar commented that public discussion of Hakka identity might em-
barrass them. But local ties are basic to the personal connections under-
lying the power network. Nominal political position often understates
clout, since the legal and legislative systems are weak. Deng Xiaoping
resigned all his official posts in 1989, but remained the paramount
leader. The backgrounds of leaders remain largely beneath the surface.
Revealing the concentration of Hakka leaders could spur charges of
nepotism, an offense to both traditional and revolutionary morality.
The only mainland leader routinely identified as Hakka was Marshal Ye
Jianying, a proud native of Meixian, Guangdong, the Hakka “capital.”
But Ye was invoked almost as a token, and tokenism honors the individ-
ual as a substitute for attending to group concerns.
Inapplicable official categories pose a second barrier. History and pol-
icy are centralized in China, promulgated from northern capitals. Termi-
nology can be archaic or incorrect, such as referring to the Hakka as “the
204HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Cantonese.”2 But the basic categories—dynasty, clan or lineage, and
province—render peripheral people literally borderline, or marginal. Re-
peated migration also diluted the Hakka presence in dynastic histories.
Multisurname villages may have less interest in writing elaborate lineage
histories, and local history is often literally provincial. A study of Fujian
revolutionaries, for example, will omit events just across the border in
Jiangxi or Guangdong. The Hakka have no province (or rich former
colony) to call their own. Yue Cantonese control both Guangdong and
Hong Kong, while the Fujian Min dominate both Fujian and Taiwan.
But Hakka are scattered athwart at least six provinces. Regional eco-
nomic subsystems center on lowland market hubs (Skinner 19773:212,
216; 1977b) whose boundaries are just as unforgiving; Hakka straddle the
boundaries of at least five of the eight major systems.
Neither the mainland nor Taiwan publishes even provincial popula-
tion breakdowns for Hakka-speakers (or any other Han ethnolinguistic
group). Table 7.2 offers an estimate, in which percentages are virtually
the same as in 1928.
A third issue is the slow and uneven construction of a conscious Hakka
identity. No scholar disputes the northern origins of the ancestors of
today’s Hakka. The issue is when and how Hakka developed a separate
identity. How did they come to be distinguished and to distinguish
themselves from the millions of other poor migrants and “shed people”
(pengmiri) (Averill 1983) ? What did they adopt from their non-Han neigh-
bors, especially the She (a Miao-Yao people who often call themselves
Shanmin, “Mountain People”) ? And why did they remain distinct from
the Cantonese and the Min? Hakka enthusiasts sometimes erroneously
apply the rough, binary categories of the Song dynasty population
registers—of Han “guests” (ke) versus aboriginal “natives” (zbu), a drag-
net that can include virtually every Han south of the Yangtze. Current
scholars conduct increasingly careful debates over whom to include—
neither every southern migrant nor only Hakka-speaking residents of the
heartland (Wu Fuwen 1992, Wang Hongyou 1992, Wang Tsu-de 1992).
Even Chinese popular vocabulary offers finer ethnic distinctions than
does English. “Descendants” (houyi) of an ethnic group are aware of their
ancestry, even though they have assumed a different dominant identity.
2.	English readers can be confused by the Hoklo, who are not Hakka at all but Min
people from southern Fujian living in Guangdong. Hoklo is the Cantonese pronunciation
of the characters for “Fu[ jian]” and “fellow,” pronounced Fu lao in Mandarin. “Hokkien”
(Min for “Fujian”) also refers to people of southern Min ancestry.
205MARY S. ERBAUGH
TABLE 7.2
Provincial Hakka Breakdown
	Hakka Percent of Provincial Population	Estimated Number of Hakka
Guangdong (includ-	24%	15,000,000
ing Hainan)		
Fujian	24%	6,000,000
Jiangxi	22%	7,000,000
Guangxi	9%	3,000,000
Sichuan	1%	1,000,000
Hunan	0.5%	500,000
Based on 1985 population figures in Xu Meiyu et al. (1987:2), for a national
population of one billion. Provincial breakdowns are extrapolated by dividing
the population of each province by the number of counties, as listed in Adminis-
trative Divisions (1981). Counties listed as purely Hakka in Luo Xianglin (1933),
Hashimoto (1973), and Chinese Encyclopedia (1988:237—39) are calculated as
straight percentages of provincial populations. Partly Hakka counties are calcu-
lated at 25 percent. The 1928 distribution is almost identical, according to similar
projections based on China Tear Book (1928:42-45). Guangxi figures are from
Yang Huandian et al. (1985:184). Sichuan figures are from Cui (1985:10-11).
Some Fujian figures come from Li Yuming et al., eds. (1986). Other provincial
figures are extrapolated from Xu Meiyu et al. (1987:2).
“Members of a certain bloodline” (xuetontf), in contrast, remain unaware
of their roots.
Many Hakka refuse the Hakka (Kejia) label. Guangdong Hakka pre-
fer the politer forms “guest person” (ke ren) or “guest in the population
register” (keji). Others prefer “person who has come” (laireri) (Moser
1985:239). In Guangdong, Punti (Bendi) implies Cantonese ethnicity.
But Hakka natives of the long-settled Fujian and Jiangxi heartlands also
call themselves Bendi.3 Many peasants in 100 percent Hakka areas hold a
village-based identity, with no special ethnic label for themselves. If
pressed, they may call themselves “Tingzhou people,” for the small
Fujian town (since renamed Changting) that 90 percent of Hakka fore-
bears passed through. But in 1992 when some Changting and Ninghua
residents were asked, in Hakka, whether they were Hakka, they replied,
3.	In Hong Kong, Punti defines an important legal status for those whose ancestors
settled in the New Territories before the British lease of 1898.
206HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
“No, how could we be? It’s those people down in Dabu [Taipu] who
are Hakka” (Wu Fuwen 1992).
Native-place identity is central to—and literally worshiped in—the
dominant Han tradition. Emily Honig (1992) discusses how native
place functions much like race or religion in the construction of ethnic
identity. Self-ascribed Hakka, however, ground their identity far more
in shared language and culture, arguing that the ancestors fled south in
order to preserve the best of northern Han culture. Migrants would dig
up the ancestors’ bones and carry them in jars to each new settlement.
Overseas and treaty port Cantonese and Fujian Min organized mutual
assistance associations by clan or native place. But Hakka associations
were based on language, and called “associations for those who revere
the true [Chinese] tradition” {ChongzhengHui) (Cheng 1992, Yen 1992).
Migration can spur the creation of a new identity, especially in en-
counters with a hostile ethnic group. Honig (1992) analyzes poor north-
ern Jiangsu peasants who take village-based identity for granted until
they migrate to Shanghai. Language is their only major cultural differ-
ence from the more prosperous Wu-speakers of Shanghai. Mandarin-
speaking, but poor, the migrants find themselves lumped together un-
der a hostile new label as Subei (from “north [Jiang]su”). As such, they
face virulent prejudice in work, housing, education, and marriage. Yet
recently they have begun to accept the Subei label, and use it to unite in
constructing a positive ethnic identity.
The very recent Hakka migration to mixed areas revised the “guest”
identity in ways unimagined for those in the heartland. Guesthood
gradually became a badge of honor in Southeast Asia, where migrants
drilled their children on their Hakka identity. One woman recalls a
household routine, shared by many families in Sarawak, of sitting on
her grandfather’s lap each morning, as he asked, in Hakka:
“Who are you?”
“Ah Kher [her name].”
“What kind of person is Ah Kher?”
“Ah Kher is a guest person [ke ren}.”
“What kind of guest person?”
“A guest person from Dabu.” (M. Lo 1992)
Language is the most important Hakka cultural identifier. Like the
Subei people, modem Hakka resemble other Han in almost every cus-
tom. But Guangxi Hakka considered the refusal to speak Hakka lan-
207MARY S. ERBAUGH
guage a betrayal, banning violators from ancestral halls and their names
from family tombstones (Yang Huandian et al. 1985:184). Guangdong
Hakka say “Go by your dialect, not your surname” (Ren sheng, bu ren
xing) (Cohen, this volume). Sichuan Hakka still say, “You can sell off
your ancestral land, but never sell out your clan’s language” (Neng mai
zu tian, bu neng mai zong yan) (Cui 1985:10).
Hakka (Ke) counts as one of the seven main Chinese dialects.4 Some
claim that it is very close to Mandarin. But a thousand years’ residence
south of the Yangtze has rendered it a southern dialect, so close to the
Gan dialect of Jiangxi that they used to be classed as a single Gan-Hakka
dialect (Jerry Norman 1988:210—13; see also Liang 1985). The separation
of the dialects may well date to a period of rising Hakka consciousness.
Cantonese, Min, and Wu dialects vary so dramatically that villagers often
cannot understand their neighbors a few miles away. The fact that Hakka
is clearly intelligible across its entire territory is a testimony to recent
migration. For example, Sichuan Hakka-speakers visiting Guangzhou in
1982 overheard Hakka teenagers from northern Guangdong speaking a
dialect identical to their own (Cui 1985). Hakka can serve as a common
language, much as Yiddish allowed Ashkenazi Jews to communicate all
across Europe and the United States. But Hakka also offered a valuable
natural code in wartime, since it is not mutually intelligible with either
Min or Cantonese. Many Hakka have long been multilingual, such as
Deng Xiaoping, who learned both Mandarin and French in a Catholic
middle school. By now, almost all Hakka speak another dialect in addi-
tion to, if not instead of, Hakka.
HAKKA IN REVOLT: A SYNERGY OF SITUATION
AND HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY
Was Hakka participation in revolution a matter of chance? Did it de-
velop only after Shanghai Party leaders fled to the nearest defensible
hinterlands, which just happened to be Hakka? Obviously, a synergy
developed between Hakka peasants and Party leaders transplanted to
Hakka country. But the record shows that Hakka-speakers and peasants
4.	The others are: Mandarin (the mother tongue of about 75 percent of mainlanders);
Wu (native to 6 percent, near Shanghai); Cantonese (3 percent of the mainland, 93 percent
of Hong Kong); Min (2 percent of the mainland, in Fujian; and 75 percent of Taiwan);
Xiang (2 percent, mostly in Hunan); and Gan (2 percent, mosdy in Jiangxi). See Jerry
Norman (1988), Ramsey (1987), and entries for individual dialects in Chinese Encyclopedia
(1988).
208HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
in Hakka regions also participated heavily in the very beginnings of
revolution. Although Hakka have a widespread reputation for involve-
ment in rebellion and warfare, their socioeconomic situation undoubt-
edly made socialist revolution attractive, helped them survive it, and
even helped shape its course.
Cantonese and Min antagonists have described Hakka as rootless,
poor, barbarian fighters. Stated more neutrally, Hakka were highly mo-
bile newcomers, poor, heterodox, militarily active, and had close links
to minorities. As migrants, they had fewer local ties to discourage rebel-
lion, and were more hardened for guerrilla war. But poverty is likely to
have been the most important factor in attracting individuals from poor
Hakka regions to revolution. As late migrants, they typically lived on
the worst, rockiest land, often as squatters in areas devastated by war,
famine, or plague. The Hakka heartland includes the poorest counties
of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi. Fujian as a whole is 95 percent
mountains, with less arable land per capita than any other province
(Benton 1992:124). Guangdong is 70 percent mountains. And Meixian
prefecture has three of the poorest counties in Guangdong (Wuhua,
Fengshun, and Dabu). The other four Meixian counties are also poor,
plagued by bad soil, high mountains, poor transit, little industry, and
very high population (Jiaoling, Mei, Pingyuan, and Xingning counties)
(Han Suyin 1965:28; Moser 1985:253; Vogel 1989:242). In the early twenti-
eth century so many Meixian men labored overseas that women outnum-
bered men six to one (Han Suyin 1965:28). Nationwide, Hakka-speakers
were much less likely to be landlords, and much more likely to be tenant
farmers, miners, soldiers, blacksmiths, masons, or barbers. In western
Fujian only 15 percent of peasants owned land; rents ranged from 60 to
80 percent of the crop. Over 25 percent of males were jobless wanderers
(liumang wuchan) compared to 5 percent nationwide (Longyan Commit-
tee 1987:2,35,185,190).
Westerners sometimes ask naively whether the Hakka are an official
“national minority” (shaoshu minzu). The Hakka themselves tradition-
ally insist that they are Han, preservers of a purer Han culture than that
of either the Cantonese or northerners (who have been “corrupted” by
the Mongols and Manchus). Persistent claims that the Hakka are not
Han are incorrect. All Han Chinese intermarried with non-Han, espe-
cially in the South (Jerry Norman 1988:210—13). Hakka have often been
outraged by hostile comparisons with the minorities. Guangdong
Hakka protested a 1930s government publication describing them as
“barbarous” and “speaking a bird-like chatter” (S. T. Leong 1985:316). In
209MARY S. ERBAUGH
1958 they protested a Beijing University publication calling them a na-
tional minority (Yin 1958).
Hakka have, however, often had unusually close, positive relations
with non-Han peoples, especially the She. Unlike most minorities, the
She traditionally live intermixed with the Han in small dispersed settle-
ments scattered from Zhejiang across Fujian to Guangdong. Many
Hakka traditions show a strong She influence, if not direct borrowing.
Intermarriage has long been common, and Hakka with the surnames
Pan (pan), Lan (blue), Zhong (bell), and Lei (thunder) almost certainly
have She ancestors. Even Hakka mobility may have been stimulated by
the adoption She-style swidden agriculture. Both groups relish contests
in which “mountain songs” are sung. She women’s status is higher than
that of most Han women, with frequent matrilocality and equal inheri-
tance. Hakka women around Changting traditionally dressed much like
She, in aprons with colorful embroidered borders, silver jewelry and
headdresses, and “boat-shaped topknots” wrapped in red yarn (chuanzi
ji). Many She speak Chinese, especially Hakka. The She language itself
is so strongly influenced by Hakka that it is sometimes mutually intelligi-
ble. Outsiders find it hard to follow the distinctive pronunciation, but it
is fairly standard across She territory. Before 1949 the overwhelming
majority of She were extremely poor tenant farmers or woodcutters
(Benton 1992:270; Chen Yuanxu 1992; Chinese Encyclopedia 1986:393—95,
1988:239; Jiang Binzhao 1992; Li Mo 1993; Ramsey 1987:285).
Although this reputation may have been in large part constructed in
retrospect by ethnically conscious Hakka, Hakka do appear to have been
more receptive than other Han to new, heterodox, ideas. Religion and
ancestor worship in Hakka regions are reputed to often be less elaborate,
and shamanism more widespread. Hakka also disproportionately con-
verted to Christianity, as Nicole Constable discusses in this volume.
Xunwu City, a Jiangxi market town of 2,600, had five churches (and
thirty brothels) in the 1920s; in nearby Shanghang, Fujian, six churches
occupied a sixth of the land in the county seat (Longyan Committee
1987:4; Mao 1990:116, 211). A relative open-mindedness, coupled with
poverty, may have made many people from Hakka regions of China more
receptive to both Taiping and Communist reforms. Women’s liberation
is said to have met less resistance among Hakka. Hakka tradition already
encouraged women to avoid footbinding, keep substantial sums from
their dowries, and work outside the home for cash, often plowing or
doing other heavy work. Ideals also supported female education and
discouraged daughter-selling, concubinage, and prostitution.
210HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Hakka academic achievement is less widely known. Handicapped by
a lack of financial networks and isolation from markets, Hakka parents
had less incentive to urge their sons toward business, and were more
likely to direct them towards academic accomplishment. By the late
nineteenth century, an unusually high percentage of Hakka passed the
imperial exams. Even in Xunwu County, four hundred scholars (xiucai)
passed, as did Zhu De himself the year they were abolished. Some 80
percent of Meixian males were literate. But the poorer the region, the
less schooling parents could afford. Mao Zedong estimated the literacy
of Xunwu males at 40 percent in 1934, and half of those knew only
about two hundred characters, scarcely enough to keep accounts. Only
10 percent of men were literate in western Fujian. But even this com-
pared favorably to 1 percent literacy around Yan’an (Longyan Commit-
tee 1987:190; Mao 1990:191,194; Moser 1985:240; Smedley 1956:67-69).
In addition, a disproportionate number of Hakka studied abroad, in-
cluding Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Chen Yi, and Zhu De.
As was described by Sharon Carstens (this volume), Hakka also have a
reputation for military prowess. Because Hakka often were at war with
their neighbors, even their architecture reflects life under siege. Whole
mixed-surname Hakka villages in Fujian, Jiangxi, and Guangdong often
lived—and still live—communally in tulou, huge, circular, multistory
fortresslike complexes. These rammed-earth structures are easy and
cheap to build, but elegant and well insulated, with all living units of
equal size and shape. Outside windows on the lower floors are mere rifle-
slits. But huge central courtyards, some as big as football fields, let in light
and air. Courtyards contain the communal ancestral shrine, wells, lavato-
ries, granaries, vegetable gardens, and animal pens. Residents can survive
inside for several months.5
Land wars with Punti fueled the Taiping Rebellion, led by Hong
Xiuquan, the Guangdong Hakka who called himself the “second son of
God.” Hakka tenant farmers, miners, and artisans joined in huge num-
bers. Taiping communalism, land reform, and opposition to footbinding
5.	I had an opportunity to visit several southwestern Fujian roundhouses outside
Shuyang Village in Nanjing County in 1989, and in August of that year, Han sheng
magazine devoted an entire issue to the Fujian roundhouses (see also Lung [1991:37—42,
72-75] and photos in Mao [1990]). Many roundhouses were built as recently as the
Cultural Revolution, the last time collective labor was readily available. Although they are
often called “Hakka houses,” historians agree that the Hakka copied the style from the
southern Min, the builders of about a third of the surviving fortresses (Fang 1992). U.S.
spy satellites used to scrutinize the roundhouses as suspected nuclear missile silos.
211MARY S. ERBAUGH
harmonized with existing values, as did the promotion of women offi-
cials. The Taiping “heavenly kingdom” also promoted vernacular lan-
guage reform, using both spoken and written Hakka to reinforce solidar-
ity against outsiders, facilitate communication among Taipings of all
ranks, and mislead the enemy (Liu Cun-han 1992; Shih 1967:49,226-28,
305-306, 315). Taiping law banned regional rivalries and stressed equal
treatment for Hakka and Punti (Wang Qingcheng 1992). However, in
Guangdong many Punti joined the Taiping rebels, then expelled the
Hakka members. Other statutory ideals lapsed as the Taipings occupied
ravaged Hangzhou, occupied Nanjing for three years, and devastated
fifteen provinces, leading to some thirty million deaths. After the
Taipings were put down, the Hakka-Punti land wars killed nearly a mil-
lion people, including tens of thousands in Taiwan. The government
relocated many Hakka away from Guangdong, and set up Hakka quotas
for military and civil service exams (Lamley 1990; S. T. Leong 1985:288—
90, 295). But Taiping-based paramilitary societies remained common,
especially among hilltop Hakka.
By the late nineteenth century, Hakka rebels foreshadowed national
revolution with an intricate combination of communal organization,
protest, cultivation of sympathizers inside the government, and military
strength outside. One Guangdong observer noted:
These scattered [Hakka] settlements form a confederation
among themselves, and forthwith demand a reduction of the
ground-rent. . . . But, lest the Government should interfere,
they are careful to inform the mandarins beforehand that they
will pay lawful ground-rent to them. Besides, in many public
offices in the Kwang-tung province, the subordinate employees
are Hak-kas. As this class of village wars is looked upon as
harmless by the authorities, they only interfere to squeeze both
parties. The Punti employ bravos to fight for them, while the
Hak-kas fight their battles for themselves, and that is why the
latter always win. (Eitel in Thomson 1898:77-78)
HAKKA AND NATIONALIST REVOLUTION
As a group, Hakka never came close to Cantonese, Fujianese, or Shang-
hainese financial success. But the role of Hakka individuals in civic leader-
ship has increasingly become a focus of pride. Wang Gungwu argues that
212HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
overseas Chinese Hakka, stigmatized and outnumbered, pioneered a
modern Chinese national identity. In the early twentieth century, they
downplayed their embattled local history to invoke a broader Chinese
heritage as they pressed for the creation of a modem republic. This
broader identity spread first among overseas Fujianese and Cantonese,
then entered China itself via the overseas activities of Sun Yat-sen (Wang
Gungwu 1991b, 1992). Modem revolutionaries also downplayed regional
differences as they pushed toward national solidarity.
Hakka regions produced many revolutionary leaders. But they did
not appear to readily identify themselves as Hakka. Explicit proof of
Hakka background—not to mention an attribution of Hakka con-
sciousness—is extraordinarily elusive. Other subgroups are less ob-
scure. Determining who is a Xiang or a Wu is simple; they live in com-
pact areas where talking about ethnicity is a local hobby. However,
because Chinese biographers scrupulously list birthplace, and because
most Hakka villages were ethnically homogeneous a century ago, and
Hakka today recognize a network of place names as a code, one can
surmise the probable Hakka identity of various leaders on the basis of
place of origin, language, and/or self-ascription.6
Sun Yat-sen provides the ultimate example of a national leader who
remained silent about his possible Hakka background. His Hakka roots
cannot be documented securely. Non-Hakka southerners would be hor-
rified if they were. Sun is invariably discussed as a national hero, the
“father of the country” (guofit), especially in Taiwan, where his ‘Three
People’s Principles” remain the preeminent ideological statement. “Sun
the Silent,” as his biographer Paul Linebarger called him, despaired of
Chinese unity, and criticized China for being “a sheet of loose sand”
(1925:246). Referring to himself as a Hakka would have damaged both
his fund-raising and his political base. Yet most Hakka, and many
Hakka historians, including Luo Xianglin, claim Sun as their own (Luo
6.	In central Guangdong, however, Hakka villages often alternated with Cantonese
and/or southern Min ones. The place-name criteria also misses Hakka who were born in
major cities. For this study I have examined biographies and memoirs of more than two
hundred leaders, collating their birthplaces with dialect maps. I count as Hakka those
individuals born in one of the thirty-three Chinese counties that were purely Hakka in
19;}, and for whom I find a supplemental reference as Hakka. “Probable Hakka” are
natives of purely Hakka counties, or of the additional 150 strongly Hakka counties, for
whom I find no additional Hakka documentation. Unless otherwise stated, biographical
information comes from Klein and Clark (1971).
213MARY S. ERBAUGH
1933,1954 [i943], 1965; Benjamin Yang 1990:160). Sun’s descendants are
said to disagree, but one son, Sun Ke, headed the Worldwide Hakka
Federation.
Details from Sun’s life are provocative. He grew up in a mixed Can-
tonese area of the Pearl River Delta where Hakka were recent migrants,
but quite assimilated. His family lived in the mixed-surname village of
Choy Hung (Mandarin: Cui Heng), which most men left behind to
labor overseas (Linebarger 1925:37—38, 57—62). He attended a village
school that was traditional, but admitted girls (Restarick 1931:5). The
teacher was a Taiping veteran who inspired Sun with tales of Hong
Xiuquan (Schiffrin 1980:22). When Sun went to Honolulu at age thir-
teen, he was said to have spoken Hakka and been nicknamed “Hong
Xiuquan” (Moser 1985:247). He described how, on the times he re-
turned home, the fortresslike village houses were often under attack by
marauders: “The first matter for my care was to see my rifle was in order
and to make sure plenty of ammunition was still left. I had to prepare
for action for the night” (Shinz 1989:369). Sun also trained as an herbal
healer, a traditional Hakka profession, which he integrated with West-
ern medicine. He spoke Hakka with Hakka supporters, Cantonese with
Cantonese, and was more comfortable with English than with Manda-
rin. Also suggestive is that the Tongmeng Hui, a secret society closely
associated with Sun, liberated Tingzhou in 1911 and named it [Sun] Yat-
sen City (Li Yuming et al. 1986:35; Qui 1992).7
The chief evidence against Sun as a Hakka reconstructs his genealogy
as non-Hakka (Tan 1963). Evidence from language and footbinding is
more circumstantial. Scholars at Sun Yat-sen University who analyzed
recently discovered phonograph records of his speeches heard a strong
Pearl River Delta Cantonese accent in both his Mandarin and Canton-
ese, but no trace of a Hakka accent (Lin Jiayou 1992). Sun’s biographer,
a friend who interviewed him over several months, devotes a chapter to
footbinding. Sun asked his mother to unbind his sister’s feet. She re-
fused, exclaiming in horror, “Would you have your sister as a Hakka
woman or a Chinese woman? Would you have her as a stranger or as
7.	Luo Xianglin’s genealogy uses a copy of a partial family tree supplied by Sun’s older
sister. It also rests, bizarrely, on Linebargefs romanization of the name of Sun’s ancestral
village. Unable to find anything corresponding to “Kung Kun” on the East River, Luo
argues that Sun used a nickname because of a Hakka taboo on identifying one’s ancestral
village to outsiders (1954:15).
214HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
one of us?” (Linebarger 1925:81). The biography includes a family photo-
graph showing Sun’s mother and two sisters-in-law with bound feet.
But neither Linebarger nor other scholars note that it also includes two
women relatives with unbound feet. A recent, lavish mainland biogra-
phy reprints the portrait, but crops it off at the knees (In Memory 1981:
plate 40). Footbinding was not, in fact, unknown among prosperous,
upwardly mobile Hakka in mixed areas of Guangdong and Sichuan.
Sun’s background probably cannot be resolved. Possibly he had mixed
ancestry. Possibly he was a Hakka-speaking Yue Cantonese.
COMMUNIST ORGANIZING
The 1911 republic tried to promote ethnic and political harmony. But
even inside the Nationalist Party, the rift between left and right widened
toward civil war. Many grew increasingly attracted to anarchism, or to
international communism, whose ideals included an eventual “wither-
ing away of the state.” Different dialects were eventually to give way to
one national language.
The founders of the Chinese Communist Party were self-consciously
modern intellectuals, enthusiastic organizers of the May Fourth era
rejection of Confucian and other traditions. Three of the twelve young
men who attended the 1921 founding meeting in Shanghai were Hakka
(according to the criteria described above), eight times the chance
rate. Almost as surprising, they came as delegates from China’s three
most cosmopolitan cities—Guangzhou, Beijing, and Shanghai. Zhang
Guotao, born in Jishui, Jiangxi, came from Beijing University to repre-
sent Beijing. Chen Gongbo, of Nanhai, Guangdong, was a radical
journalist who represented Guangzhou. And Li Da, of Lingling
County, Hunan, who represented Shanghai, headed a progressive
Shanghai girls’ school. Many of the founders faced troubled futures;
several died very young. But the three Hakka seem especially problem-
atic, further obscuring their history. Both Zhang Guotao and Chen
Gongbo represented a losing faction, the Party’s theoretical wing,
which argued that revolution was premature. Zhang Guotao defected
to the Nationalists in 1938. Chen Gongbo looks even worse. The defini-
tive Chinese reference work, the Ci hai (Sea of words) (1979), identifies
him as a traitor (hanjian). Chen, who wrote a Columbia University
thesis on the Party founding, joined the Japanese occupation govern-
ment. China executed him in 1946. Only Li Da led a thoroughly honor-
215MARY S. ERBAUGH
able life, as a sociology and law professor rumored to have ghostwritten
many of Mao’s works.8
Hakka were also prominent in the labor movement. Orthodox Marx-
ists held that the urban proletariat would lead the revolution. Hakka
workers, militant and far from home, organized some of the most suc-
cessful unions. Peng Pai organized the many Guangzhou ricksha pullers
who were fellow Hakka natives of Hai-Lu-Feng (Galbiati 1985:177).
Most of the anarchist-organized unions of Guangzhou barbers and tea-
house clerks were Hakka as well. And Su Zhaozheng, a probable Hakka
from Guangdong’s Zhongshan County, organized the highly effective
Hong Kong Seaman’s strike of 1922 and the Guangzhou—Hong Kong
strike of 1925-26; he remained on the Party’s Politburo until he was
killed in 1929 (Klein and Clark 1971). Many miners were Hakka, and
some of the most militant dug coal at Anyuan in northwestern Jiangxi.
There, Li Lisan, the most important Communist labor organizer, orga-
nized the Anyuan strike of 1922, an icon of eventual Communist victory.
Li, a probable Hakka, was an orthodox Marxist, bom in Liling County,
Hunan, across the border from Anyuan. He retained a faith in worker
revolution as he became the most important leader at Party Central in
Shanghai. But workers formed less than one half of one percent of
China’s population; the Communists were nearly wiped out before they
finally recruited among the peasants (Shaffer 1982:3).
Peasant revolution struck orthodox Marxists as implausible if not ab-
surd. But peasants made up 85 percent of China’s population, memories
of the Taiping Rebellion remained strong, and Hakka peasants proved
particularly receptive. When radical land reform came to Pingjiang on the
Hunan-Jiangxi border in the late 1920s, radicals confiscated land out-
right, then often farmed communally, in patterns nearly identical to
Taiping land policy in the same area (Benton 1992:353). The use of Hakka
dialect as a common language helps explain how highly mobile outside
activists managed to organize the overwhelmingly illiterate, linguistically
splintered South. When Mao reported that about half of Hunan peasants
8.	The founders were: Mao Zedong, He Shuheng, Dong Biwu, and Zhou Fohai (all
from Hunan); Chen Tanqiu, Li Hanjun, and Liu Renqing (all from Hubei); Wang Jinmei
(Shandong); Deng Enming (Guizhou); and Bao Huiseng (Guangzhou) (Song 1986, vol.
1:139—40). Zhou Fohai also went over to the Japanese. Biographical details come from
their entries in the Ci hai (1979), Boorman and Howard (1967), Klein and Clark (1971),
and Zheng Fulin (1988). Party founder Li Da is not the Li Da in the People’s Liberation
Army. An orthodox Cultural Revolution account of the founders appears in Han Suyin
(1972:90-9+).
216HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
were organized in 1927, five of the thirteen counties he considered “al-
most completely organized” were heavily Hakka (Pingjiang, Liuyang,
Liling, Leiyang, and Chen). Mao probably spoke very little Hakka,
though he may have understood a good deal. His social survey of purely
Hakka Xunwu County in Jiangxi, just seventy kilometers up the valley
from Meixian, relied on a research team and interpreters. It transcribes
Hakka vocabulary, song lyrics about poverty and battle, and dialogue
between landlords and peasants who are borrowing grain or selling a son
(Mao 1990:37, 40,164-65,168,174-76,189, 254-55).
Mao and other organizers also had important, early success in the
Jinggang Mountains between Hunan and Jiangxi. Gregor Benton de-
scribes how the boundary between the Punti and Hakka was “razor-
sharp.” The Punti controlled the official government, while Hakka mili-
tias and two Hakka bandit chiefs battled constantly over land, schooling,
and other resources. The Communists recruited the chiefs, who com-
pletely controlled access to the mountains, but then had to placate them.
Rifts widened between the more educated Punti Party members and the
Hakka fighters; one saying went, “The Party is Tu [Punti (Bendi/tu)], the
gun is Ke” (Benton 1992:380—82). Mao’s report from the Jinggang Moun-
tains deplores these conflicts. He politely refers to the Hakka as keji, but
describes Hakka-Punti hostility as a “peculiar feature” of border regions,
one that weakened revolution because it undercut class struggle (Mao
1967:93-94)-
Activists also organized rural collective governments known as so-
viet bases (suweiai, a Chinese transliteration of the Russian term for
“popular collective government”). During their peak around 1932, the
soviets governed some forty million people, seizing landlords, redistrib-
uting land, and organizing literacy, health, feminist, and military pro-
grams that pioneered many post-1949 nationwide innovations. Six of
the nine most important soviets were in heavily Hakka areas (map
7.2). Leftists were under constant attack, so organizers deliberately
sited the soviets in isolated areas with poor communication. The use
of Hakka dialect offered partial protection for messages to distant
allies. These had to be carried or memorized by an often-illiterate
messenger; or sent by shortwave radio, often without the use of code.
Hakka market women were particularly effective couriers. The first
successful soviet was on the Guangdong coast at Hai-Lu-Feng (map
7.2, no. 1, 1927—28) and was organized by Peng Pai, son of a local
landlord family so assimilated that it spoke Hakka only on ritual occa-
sions. Peng Pai, who learned more Hakka to become effective, also
217MARY S. ERBAUGH
worked with Lin Boqu to organize branches of the Peasant Associa-
tion all across Guangdong. Lin, a probable Hakka from Hunan’s
Liling County, headed the Nationalist Peasant Department before he
became a pioneering communist organizer. The Peasant Association
attracted many Hakka, especially unhappy soldiers. The head of the
Meixian Peasants Association, Gu Dacun, detained many landlords,
was military director of a short-lived East River Soviet, then survived
its annihilation to lead five thousand guerrillas (Galbiati 1985:123—26,
180-83; Harrison 1972:142, Lu and Liu 1983).
Revolution also came early to western Fujian. Local reformers, many
educated in Xiamen, had pushed for mass education in the vernacular
from 1919 on. Organization was unusually strong, especially in Yong-
ding. “Local pragmatists” carried out land reform before the Party
ordered it, but tried not to make it too harsh. All men and women over
age sixteen could vote (except criminals, landlords, opium addicts, and
adherents of any religion, whether Daoist, Christian, or shamanist). A
variety of schools and night classes were organized. The women’s move-
ment was unusually strong, with campaigns whose slogans included
“male-female equality,” “freedom of marriage,” “don’t adopt a baby
bride for your baby son!” “abolish foot binding!” and “abolish concubi-
nage!” The indigenously organized Western Fujian Soviet, with its capi-
tal at Changting, eventually controlled ten counties. Five were purely
Hakka (Changting, Shanghang, Wuping, Yongding, and Ninghua); the
remainder had substantial Hakka populations (Qingliu, Guihua, Lian-
cheng, Longyan, and Jianning). Before, the soviet peasants had been
able to afford rice only three months a year; by 1933 a ban on rice exports
(reinforced by a Nationalist blockade) let them eat rice six months a year
(Longyan Committee 1987:7,14,120,185).
Lethal Nationalist attacks, especially the 1927 massacre of Shanghai
leftists, forced many leftists to flee for their lives. Party Central moved
out of Shanghai to a Jiangxi soviet at Ruijin, a purely-Hakka county just
thirty kilometers from Changting, protected by mountains one thou-
sand meters high (map 7.2, no. 2). This became the Central Soviet,
controlling twenty counties, four of them purely Hakka (Ruijin,
Huichang, Anyuan, and Xunwu). Most of the remainder were heavily
Hakka (especially Yudu, Xingguo, Ningdu, Shicheng, and Guang-
chang). Just two (Nanfeng and Liquan) fell outside Hakka territory.
The Southwestern Jiangxi Soviet in the Jinggang Mountains (no. 3),
was strongly Hakka (especially Ninggang, Suiquan, Yongxin, and
218HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Chaling counties). The Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet (no. 4) included heavily
Hakka Pingjiang and Xiushou counties. Meanwhile, in Sichuan, Zhang
Guotao and his army organized an Eastern Sichuan Soviet (no. 5)
around the miserably poor Hakka highland towns of Bazhong and
Tongjiang, where one thousand families supported two hundred opium
dens (Chang Kuo-t’ao 1971:312—27; Benjamin Yang 1990:134). The
Northeastern Jiangxi—Fujian Soviet (no. 6) was largely in Min and Gan
country, though many Hakka lived in its capital at Hengfeng. Soviets
outside Hakka country included the West Guangxi Soviet (no. 7), the
Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet (no. 8) and the Western Hunan—Hubei
Soviet (no. 9). Hakka were not native to Yan’an or Shaanxi.
Mountain revolution desperately needed good relations with minori-
ties. The She, one of the very few non-Han groups to join in with
enthusiasm, brought important strengths. The She had organized centu-
ries of mountain rebellions, and were famed for their solidarity as fierce,
stubborn fighters. Class and ethnicity formed an unusually close match
among this very poor group. After one She joined the Party in 1927,
peasant associations spread widely, most She areas became revolution-
ary bases, and many villages were sovietized. Revolutionaries with the
characteristic She-Hakka surnames Pan, Lan, Zhong, and Lei formed a
fair percentage of the western Fujian fighters (Longyan Committee
1987). The She also supported rebellion by providing sentries, safe
houses, hospitals, a clothing factory, a weapons repair shop, and a
prison. Women and children carried messages using the She language,
an excellent natural code (Benton 1992:270—72; Li Mo 1993; Longyan
Committee 1987:222-69).
In Vietnam too, a strikingly similar socioeconomic configuration
seems to have made socialist revolution attractive to one particular
minority. The Tay (Tho, Dairen) are an ethnic Tai subgroup, related to
the Thai. Their cousins across the Chinese border in Yunnan include the
Zhuang (who also showed early enthusiasm for revolution), as well as
the Dai, Nong, and Liao. Like the She, the Tay faced grinding moun-
tain poverty, but had relatively good relations with a dominant group,
widespread bilingual skill, a fairly complex economy, and considerable
contacts in town. The Tay carried out land reform in 1945, hid Ho Chi
Minh and other guerrillas, and fought with the Viet Cong. Many be-
came heroes, and a Tay now serves as president of Vietnam’s National
Assembly {Chinese Encyclopedia 1986:87; A. Terry Rambo, personal com-
munication, 24 February 1994).
219MARY S. ERBAUGH
FIGHTING AS A WAY OF LIFE:
GUERRILLAS, LONG MARCHERS, AND YAN’AN
Fighting became a way of life for hardened, local militias. Many of the
toughest fighters were also the most independent. Separatism posed
constant problems. Hakka warlord Chen Jiongming led repeated battles
against the Republican government for the secession of eastern Guang-
dong and western Fujian. Sichuan, Fujian, and Hunan provinces tried
to secede as well. Paramilitary secret societies also continued to rebel;
both Deng Xiaoping’s father and Zhu De were leaders in the Older
Brother Society (Schram 1966). Dissatisfaction in the Nationalist Army
increased throughout the 1920s, and even officers began to defect. But
as late as 1927 the only real Red Army was the local, heavily Hakka, Hai-
Lu-Feng Army. Its commander, Zhu De, joined forces with his old
Berlin classmate Ye Ting, a Guangdong Hakka who had once supported
Guangdong secession. Both participated in the prophetic Nanchang
Uprising, considered the founding of the Red Army, when a whole
Nationalist division defected to the Communists in 1927. Zhu and Ye
led two thousand soldiers away through the Hakka mountains and
soviets of Guangdong.
By 1929 Zhu De, backed by Chen Yi, wanted to “enlarge Communist
operations” into the Hakka heartland of eastern Guangdong. Mao op-
posed this as bad strategy. Zhu attacked anyway, and was defeated. By
1930 the Central Committee opposed setting up additional soviets on
the Guangdong-Fujian-Jiangxi border, and condemned further expedi-
tions there as putting local short-term gains ahead of national revolu-
tion. Western Fujian guerrillas defied orders to attempt a link-up with
the Meixian guerrilla Fang Fang and the East River Guerrillas, but were
defeated outside Meixian in 1931. Almost immediately afterward Li
Lisan proposed liberating all of Jiangxi. The Western Fujian Soviet
vowed to liberate the whole nation, starting with Hakka country. They
attacked Dabu, were defeated again, and saw their ranks drop from
three thousand to four hundred (Kuo 1968:24—28; Longyan Committee
1987:132—36). Yet Fujian radicals grew increasingly radical, particularly
on the border between Hakka and Min country, where gangs forced
women to bob their hair. Radicals banned “superstitious practices,”
including burning incense or ritual candles, worshipping the gods,
tomb sweeping, fortune telling, and extravagant weddings, down to the
bride’s parents’ gift of a chicken. These moves disproportionately af-
fected the more prosperous and ritually active Min. A bitter purge
220HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
ensued (Longyan Committee 1987:137-39), but an entire Nationalist
Army of twenty thousand, mosdy Hakka, defected to the Communists
soon after (Benjamin Yang 1990:64).
The Nationalists tightened their blockade around the soviets, ban-
ning even the import of salt to these landlocked counties. Seasoned
infantry and aerial bombers stepped up their attacks, forcing the Com-
munists to abandon the soviets in a withdrawal that came to be called
the Long March. Zhu De and Ye Jianying led the main flank of the
marchers out of the Central Soviet in October 1934. An extremely high
percentage of the eighty-six thousand marchers were from Hakka re-
gions. Preparations were minimal, though Zhou Enlai negotiated a
fairly smooth evacuation with the Guangdong Hakka warlord Chen
Jitang. Ren Bishi (a Hunan Xiang, as was Mao) and Xiao Ke (a proba-
ble Hakka) scouted the early route around Xiao’s native territory on the
Hunan-Guangdong border (Alley 1977; Longyan Committee 1987:218—
19, Benjamin Yang 1990:100-103). But ragged troops spent a year under
constant attack, zigzagging north over nearly ten thousand kilometers
of mountains, deserts, swamps, and the Tibetan plateau, before they
found refuge at Yan’an (map 7.4).
The early route moved from Hakka village to Hakka village, where
marchers were better able to beg for shelter. Peasants along the route
were often angry and out of supplies, but early casualties were low.
Hakka fighters had a greater chance to fade into the mountains, and
desertions reached twenty thousand even before a gory battle at the
Xiang River, on the border of Hakka country. Only about thirty thou-
sand marchers reached Zunyi in Guizhou, where Mao’s peasant faction
finally gained the upper hand and ordered a linkup with Zhang
Guotao in Sichuan. But Zhang declared the Long March a failure and
deliberately marched his troops out of range. Zhu De mediated, but
disputes continued. As the marchers fled up the Tibetan plateau, sur-
vival came increasingly to depend on negotiations with angry minori-
ties with excellent historical grounds for hostility. One of the few
effective negotiators was Liu Bocheng, a probable Hakka from a
mixed Han-minority area of Sichuan. Even Liu’s adulatory official
biography mentions his recollection that “listening to my explanation,
the Yi looked rather doubtful” (Hsiao Hua 1978:74—76). Less then
twenty thousand of the original marchers reached Yan’an (Harrison
1972:245—50, Benjamin Yang 1990:105—106,125).
Chances of survival were just as poor, and the atmosphere even more
demoralized for those left behind “to carry on the struggle.” Some thirty
221MARY S. ERBAUGH
thousand stayed back at the Central Soviet—mostly sick, local fighters
with only one gun for every three revolutionaries. Their commander,
Chen Yi, lacked even the code to decipher the final radioed instructions
from the Central Committee. Nationalist troops rapidly took over six-
teen thousand prisoners, and executed many. Benton (1989, 1992) ana-
lyzes the grisly aftermath in the former soviets, which came to be known
as the Three-Year Guerrilla War of 1934—37. The Nationalists killed the
families of leftists down to the infants, sold women into prostitution, and
burned whole villages and forests. In some places, where they placed a
bounty on severed heads, they collected so many that they accepted pairs
of ears instead. They also killed many She and burned their villages, some
three times over. By April 1935 a Nationalist report boasted: “There is not
a dwelling that has not been burned, there is not a tree that has not been
felled, there is not a fowl or a dog that has not been killed, there is not an
able-bodied man remaining” (Benton 1992:68).
Yet Gregor Benton describes how many leftists survived under-
ground. Chen Yi, a marked man, stepped inside a house only twice in
three years. Nationalist soldiers had particular difficulty if they did not
speak Hakka (Harrison 1972:242-43). The Nationalists forced whole
villages into exile, but people slipped back to work in the mountains
making charcoal or paper, gathering herbs, or chopping wood. Some-
times, when the Nationalists forced peasants to chop down the forests
that hid the guerrillas, leftists could persuade them to come late, leave
early, and chop with the dull side of their blades. Survivors of some
former soviets recovered better than others. Much depended on luck.
And the better the roads, the easier the Nationalist attack. But Benton
also analyzes other factors, in addition to raw heroism, that aided sur-
vival. Numerous overlapping factors allowed the survivors of the West-
ern Fujian Soviet to recover better than most. The area was isolated
enough for shelter, but had sufficient connection to the coast to receive
information. The mild climate allowed year-round forage and sleeping
in the woods. Human factors were also critical. The soviet had been
indigenously organized, making it flexible and sensitive to local people.
The Central Soviet, in contrast, where transplanted intellectuals con-
versed in Russian until the eve of the Long March, had particular
difficulty in recovering. (Eliminating Central was the top Nationalist
priority.) Leaders at Western Fujian were better educated than those at
many other soviets, such as Western Hubei—Southern Hunan, and so
were able to write appeals to sympathizers in the cities or inside the
government. Self-reliant women and solidarity with the She were other
222HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
important assets (Benton 1989:62, 1992: 67-68, 96-98, 125, 485; Chen
Tiejian 1983:107).
Hakka Long Marchers became guests again when they finally reached
Yan’an. Southern rivalries cooled in the North, where the use of Manda-
rin linked refugees from all over China (S. T. Leong 1985:285). There
Mao consolidated his power, brokering the integration of the urban
idealists with peasant guerrillas. Mao was probably ambivalent about
the Hakka, grateful for their militancy, but relieved to have their power
diluted. Zhang Guotao had a final falling out and defected to the Na-
tionalists in 1938. But many southern guerrillas, including Chen Yi,
survived to find their way north, where they formed the core of the
New Fourth Army. Mao also led a rectification campaign in 1942, which
set the rules for political loyalty that were enforced until the late 1970s.
Rectification forced all factions to focus on their changed situation at
the new base. It also targeted abuses associated often, but not exclu-
sively, with Hakka guerrillas, especially “mountaintopism” (shantou
zhuyi), the tendency for local chiefs to ignore central authority. Eventu-
ally Chen Yi, Zhu De, and many other Long Marchers led the battles
that overthrew first the Japanese and then the Nationalists.
POST-1949 NATIONAL POWER:
ETHNIC SILENCE, HIGH POSITION
Hardened by decades of civil war, the Communists sought a “scientific”
socialism with strong central control when they took national power in
1949. They acted immediately to weaken local loyalties, with severe im-
pact on local traditions. Native-place associations were closed, only
government-sponsored religious organizations were permitted, and “feu-
dal” or “superstitious” customs were suppressed. Beijing also tried to
forge better relations with the minorities by strongly discouraging “Han
chauvinism” (da Han zhuyi) and designating minority nationalities to
receive subsidies and affirmative action. Han subgroups, including the
Hakka, were explicidy forbidden to apply. The one major area of toler-
ance for local culture was language. Nationalist policy had suppressed the
dialects, while the Communists tacidy encouraged bilingual education.
And traces of Taiping language reforms lingered in new promotions of
simplified characters and a highly accessible vernacular style.
Many Hakka heroes became national leaders. Chen Yi served as for-
eign minister and in many other high posts. Li Lisan became minister of
labor. Guo Moruo, who did dangerous reconnaissance in wartime
223MARY S. ERBAUGH
Chongqing, headed the Academy of Sciences. The president of the
Chinese Medical Association was Fu Lianchang. Raised in a Changting
Christian orphanage, Fu made the Long March, then led strong cam-
paigns against venereal disease and prostitution, and for birth control
and public health. Deng Xiaoping administered Sichuan, assigning Hu
Yaobang, his loyal Jiangxi Hakka Long March subordinate, to Deng’s
own home county. (Mao followed the same patronage pattern when he
assigned his successor, Hua Guofeng, to administer Mao’s home county
in Hunan.) Land reform was at least partly modeled on Hakka commu-
nal agriculture. Ye Jianying designated three counties in Meixian prefec-
ture as land reform models (Fan and Ding 1983:80). The chief agricul-
tural planner of the Great Leap Forward (1958—60) was Vice Premier
Tan Zhenlin, a Hunan Hakka veteran of the Jinggang Mountains pe-
riod and the Three-Year War. The Great Leap, which led to disastrous
famine, probably marked the peak of his career. Hakka were especially
prominent in the military. Ye Jianying became commander in chief of
the People’s Liberation Army. Of ten seasoned fighters who were
named marshals (a rank above general), three were indisputably Hakka:
Ye Jianying, Zhu De, and Chen Yi. Two more were probably Hakka:
Liu Bocheng and Nie Rongzhen. Fang Fang, the Meixian guerrilla,
held many posts under Ye Jianying before transferring to overseas Chi-
nese liaison, where his ability to speak Mandarin, Cantonese, and
Hakka were real assets.
The Cultural Revolution was particularly difficult for many Hakka
leaders. Mao’s faction promoted a Yan’an-style ideology. This empha-
sized self-reliance, which resulted in suspicion of foreign contacts, and
also encouraged struggle against enemies, a collective economy that
promoted the countryside over the cities, and strict Party discipline for
everyone, including intellectuals. Overseas ties became a severe liabil-
ity, as did any support for a market economy. Mao’s faction may have
felt some animus for their Hakka co workers. The military, certainly,
had remained relatively outside the Maoists’ control. Chen Yi, Ye
Jianying, Tan Zhenlin, and others tried vainly to reverse the Cultural
Revolution with the “February Adverse Current” of 1967. Deng Xiao-
ping was denounced as a villain second only to soon-to-be deposed
Chairman Liu Shaoqi. Deng was exiled to an old Jiangxi base, where
he oiled machinery and played bridge until he was rehabilitated in
1973. When he fell again in 1976, Ye Jianying secredy flew him to safety
in the Guangdong Military Region, then lobbied his case with the
Central Committee. When Deng was rehabilitated again in 1977, Ye
224HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
backed him strongly against Mao’s handpicked successor, Hua Guo-
feng (Franz 1988:211, 252-5?, 258). In the shadowy world of late Cul-
tural Revolution palace politics, Mao’s faction invoked Yan’an with
increasing fervor. “Localism” and other offenses associated with Hakka
guerrillas became code words for attacks on Deng and his group.
Attacks were often worded as denunciations of Zhang Guotao, the
Hakka fighter who had defected in Sichuan nearly forty years before.
Meanwhile Deng’s faction developed a competing Long March iconog-
raphy featuring many Hakka heroes.
THE DENG XIAOPING ERA:
HAKKA POWER, ICONOGRAPHY, AND POVERTY
Deng’s return in 1977 rehabilitated many Hakka leaders. Both real and
symbolic power increased, despite continued poverty in the Hakka heart-
land. The high point probably came around 1984, when Hakka individu-
als made up half the Standing Committee of the Politburo, eleven of the
105 top leaders, and many of the lower rank. The heritage of strong
women is not evident, though Nie Rongzhen’s daughter, Nie Li, is a
colonel general.
Long March iconography proliferated, as Deng took care to high-
light his own role in early communism (Alley 1980; Franz 1988; Thomp-
son notes to Mao 1990:30—31). Dozens of Long March biographies and
memoirs appeared, still without mentioning the word “Hakka.” News-
papers published accounts of reunions between Long Marchers and
their now-middle-aged children, whom they had been forced to leave
behind to be raised by peasants in the Hakka heartland (Huang Ping
1988). Long March iconography came to be used by a variety of groups.
Intellectuals who had resisted Maoism often invoked Ye Ting, the mili-
tary hero who had been court martialed, then killed in 1946. Popular
new posters pictured him wearing a romantic cape as he scratched
poems of resistance onto his prison walls. Many viewed Hu Yaobang as
a patron of intellectuals. A hagiographic biography, which linked Hu’s
virtues direcdy to a Hakka-chauvinist account of his heritage, was pub-
lished in Hong Kong and circulated informally on the mainland (Yang
Zhongmei 1988). The student demonstrations of 1989 began when the
seventy-three-year-old Youth Leaguer died suddenly in mid-April, his
death becoming the excuse for the early deployment of massive activi-
ties organized for the anniversary of the May Fourth reformist student
movement of 1919. By late May the frail, elderly Marshals Nie Rong-
225MARY S. ERBAUGH
zhen and Xiang Xiangqian (of Shanxi) wrote Deng Xiaoping to urge
tolerance for the demonstrators. But Deng and the military recycled
Long March iconography to glorify the geriatric mania for central con-
trol, which culminated in the Beijing Massacre on 4 June 1989. After the
massacre, the icons only increased, part of a propaganda campaign to
glorify the army and thus, indirectly, justify Deng’s role. Cultural
troupes toured the long-ignored Hakka soviet base areas on the Fujian-
Jiangxi border to perform “local songs” for retired veterans (Min 1989,
Zheng Hanming 1989).9 A propaganda poster honoring the fiftieth
anniversary of the Party founding featured a portrait of Deng, sur-
rounded by Long March images, with the wild geese associated with
exile and reunion flying overhead (Yang Guchang 1991).
Still, Hakka areas remained poor, despite the success of individual
politicians. Peasant lifespan doubled nationwide after 1949, and income
increased. But the rural interior remained behind, and neither Yan’an
nor Hakka peasants have prospered. Hakka leaders apparendy avoided
the common corruption of pumping huge sums into their home dis-
tricts. Deng has never returned to the hometown he last saw in 1920
(WuDunn 1991). And the government investment that came was over-
whelmed by high population and baseline poverty. During 1950s land
reform, old Fujian base areas, including Changting and Qingliu coun-
ties, were so poor that people who had sweet potato porridge to eat
were classed as landlords. During the Cultural Revolution an intellec-
tual mother and daughter sent to Qingliu found themselves the only
literate females in town (Fu Ping, personal communication, 12 February
1988). Xiamen Red Guards also made their way to villages near Qingliu,
Changting, and Liancheng, hoping to recruit the peasants whom they
had heard were “brave but ignorant, and therefore easier to command.”
They found that 80 percent of the peasants had never been to the county
seat, most women were illiterate, and even salt was scarce. The city
teenagers fell ill on the local diet; one banker’s son snorted that the place
was like “Black Africa” (Ling 1972:297-304).
China’s poorest regions are in the extreme Northwest, far from
Hakka country. But even in the 1980s and 1990s Meixian, Changting,
and Ruijin remain poor and isolated, at least a day’s grueling drive from
the nearest railway, a severe handicap for trade. Many villages are con-
si. But after the massacre, outraged Chengdu students who, like Deng, were natives of
Guang’an, rushed back to the Deng family graveyard to dig up the bones. They found
soldiers already in place to arrest them (Chan and Unger 1990).
226HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
nected only by unpaved road. Meixian Prefecture still has the poorest
counties and highest population density in Guangdong. Annual per
capita income for the Meixian metropolitan region was only US$108
(401 yuan) in 1985 (Moser 1985:253; Vogel 1989:242-47). Western Fujian
Hakka counties remain the poorest in the province. Few official figures
are available, but gazetteers offer provocative details. By Chinese stan-
dards, the county seats remain very small and lacking in amenities.
Changting City had 380,000 people in 1982, Liancheng City had
150,000, and Qingliu City 170,000. The economy rests on agriculture,
with manufacturing restricted mosdy to bamboo products. Even recom-
mended tourist spots bear grim testimony to the aftermath of war,
among them martyr’s cemeteries for those executed by the Nationalists,
sites of long-destroyed buildings where Zhu De or Chen Yi once slept,
the caves where they hid, and the Changting prison where writer Qu
Qiubai was shot (Li Yuming et al. 1986:32-36; 1987:43-48). Even so,
Hakka country, including western Fujian, has grown much more pros-
perous since the Cultural Revolution. Ming historian Cynthia Brokaw
spent nearly a month in the small Liancheng County town of Sibao in
autumn 1993, researching a long-defunct imperial-era publishing indus-
try. She reports that Sibao had five thousand people and no running
water. Communications were difficult over narrow mountain roads,
and the two telephones in town often did not work. However, food was
adequate and people did not appear malnourished. Electricity was avail-
able, if erratic. The town had acquired a few television sets, and built a
movie hall to show a weekly martial arts film. The cultural level is said to
be unusually high. Boys finish grade school or junior high, although
girls often drop out earlier. A high school is available at the county seat.
Almost everyone can speak some sort of Mandarin. Distinctive Hakka
traditions survive and people speak Hakka. Elderly women wear a blue
tunic with black trim, said to be a traditional Hakka woman’s garment.
Elaborate silver jewelry is on sale at the market, and some children wear
protective silver amulets. Many Daoist ceremonies are celebrated. And
the town boasts a tiny new Hakka Studies Center (Brokaw, personal
communication, 20 January 1994).
EMBRACING OTHERNESS:
OUTSIDE CONTACTS AND REVISED IDENTITY
Mainland scholars date the revival of Hakka studies directly to Deng
Xiaoping’s 1977 return, when reformers reduced central control, encour-
227MARY S. ERBAUGH
aged local market economies, and aggressively solicited overseas ties.
The Hakka, like the Cantonese, the Min, and the Wu, took advantage of
decreased Party scrutiny to revive many local traditions. They are also
busily revising Hakka identity. The Long March veterans remained
relatively free of ethnic corruption, and appear not to have spawned a
new Hakka clique. By 1992 no Hakka remained on the Standing Com-
mittee, and the only probable Hakka among the fifteen members of the
1989 Politburo had stepped down.
Outside contacts are probably the most important stimulus for the
construction of a distinctive Hakka identity. Tens of millions of overseas
Chinese have come to the mainland looking for their roots, stimulating
the revival (and revision) of many traditions. Many pay to be buried on
Chinese soil, with traditional Daoist funerals, music, and opera (Dean
1988). Their investment also boosts the economy; even tiny Sibao boasts
a fancy new house built with overseas funds. Belated attempts to solicit
overseas Hakka investment to match Cantonese and Fujian capital are
underway. When the word “Hakka” finally came out of the closet and
into the headlines of People’s Daily in 1991, it solicited overseas funding
for Meizhou urban renewal, a Hakka folk festival, and a proposed
Beijing Museum of Overseas Chinese History featuring Hakka history
(Renmin ribao 1991, Nie 1991).
Assimilation can render ethnic distinctions acceptable, especially if
they are nostalgic. The visible results of the Hakka revival are scholarly
work and positive recognition of minority connections. The most con-
spicuous revivalism comes from the most nearly assimilated urban
groups. Taiwan Hakka led the way in December 1988, inspiring their
mainland cousins with fourteen thousand protestors who demanded
that the Nationalist government “return our mother tongue” and per-
mit the use of Hakka in government, schooling, and broadcasting. As
Howard Martin describes in this volume, Taiwan Hakka culture centers
and speech contests proliferated and Hakka Magazine published ac-
counts of highly varied activities (see also Chiu 1992; Huang Hsuan-fan
1993:57-65). Beijing then attempted to appear more tolerant of local
language and culture than was Taipei. Mainland Hakka enthusiasts took
advantage of the opening.
Scholarly recognition offers supreme prestige. “Hakkaology” (Kejia-
xue), a newly named academic field that embraces the “guest” label, was
launched in December 1989. Meixian hosted an international confer-
ence, conducted in Hakka, and used overseas support to upgrade the
local teacher’s college into Jiaying University. Over sixty Hakka studies
228HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
centers sprang up nationwide, even outside Hakka country at East
China Normal University in Shanghai and the Academy of Social Sci-
ences in Beijing. A newly founded International Association for
Hakkaology held its convention at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong in 1992.10 Forty mainland scholars, many of them non-Hakka,
presented papers, along with twenty-eight Hong Kong, Taiwan, or
overseas Chinese, and nine Japanese and Western researchers (including
Erbaugh, Johnson, and Martin of this volume).
Most presentations and discussions were in Mandarin or English,
with simultaneous translation. The sole presentation delivered in Hakka
language came as a peace offering from a bilingual Hong Kong Canton-
ese pastor. Most authors avoided comparison with other Chinese, and
described the Hakka in flattering terms. Poverty was not discussed. Party
history remained off limits, except for an earlier version of Mary
Erbaugh’s paper (1992), which went unchallenged. But the papers were
also highly informative and ventured into much previously taboo main-
land territory, including the Daoist ceremonies now performed in Fujian
(Dean 1988, Lagerwey 1992, Ye Mingsheng 1992). Others reached out
toward Taiwan and overseas by discussing the diaspora, Christianity, and
Sun Yat-sen. Several solicited investment, and interpreted Deng Xiao-
ping’s visit to the booming Shenzhen Economic Development Zone (in
part-Hakka Bao’an County) as support for Hakka entrepreneurs. Discus-
sion was friendly but frank. Many lobbied for greater access to the
mainland: “What do you mean you’re ‘still investigating’ whether Sun
was a Hakka? You have all those materials you won’t let us see!” “Why
can’t we meet on the mainland?” Calls for professionalism abounded:
“By that definition, the entire U.S. is Hakka too!” “Every Hakka geneal-
ogy I’ve ever seen has ancestors in the ‘northern nobility’!” Some decried
the study of Hakka in isolation, or compared only with northern Chi-
nese, since Hakka language and customs share so much with those of
other southerners. Many urged circulation of primary materials and
foreign studies (Chen Shenglin 1992, Wang Hongyou 1992, Wang Tsu-de
10. Additional sponsors included the Centre d’Anthropologie de la Chine du Sud et
de la Peninsule Indochinoise of the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique in
Paris; the Aw Boon Haw Foundation (of the Tiger Balm fortune); and the Hong Kong
Hakka Association. Asiaweek (Yazhou zhoukan) honored the conference with a cover story
on the Hakka for its Chinese edition (but not the English one) (Xin 1992). To encourage
communication, the References in this volume note the affiliation of the authors of the
Hakka conference papers cited in this chapter.
229MARY S. ERBAUGH
1992). Some warned—accurately—that some early Western and Japa-
nese studies had solicited Hakka support for the imperialists.
The biggest surprise was the positive view of minorities. Confident
that Hakka have finally been accepted as Han Chinsese, several scholars
discussed positive minority influences on Han culture (Chen Shenglin
1992, Jiang Binzhao 1992, Li Mo 1993, Zhang Youzhou 1992)- Mainland
affirmative action is desirable enough that many Han now switch to
minority registration on their official identification cards. The She re-
main one of China’s smaller minorities, numbering only 630,000. But
this number is a phenomenal 71 percent increase between 1982 and 1990
alone.11 Most of the increase comes from switched registration, almost
certainly by Hakka. David Wu discusses how a switched ethnic registra-
tion need not require a change in culture, but it does change the inter-
pretation of the new identity (1991:167-68).
Mainland minority policy now also serves as a model for Han local
culture lobbyists, even in Taiwan. Taiwanese, Hakka, and indigenous
activists have goaded the Nationalists toward greater language and politi-
cal power by using both the Western term “human rights” {ren quan) and
the socialist term “minority nationality.” Tibet provided a startling model
in 1987 when Taiwanese protestors invoked a Beijing proposal to make
Tibetan the primary working language of Tibet; this is far more liberal
than anything the Nationalists allow on Taiwan (Huang Hsuan-fan
1993:56). (Beijing scuttled the plan after the 1989 riots in Lhasa.) Main-
land Hakka scholars who criticized the Academy of Social Sciences for
ignoring local Han subcultures carefully avoided the term “minority
nationality,” but referred to the Hakka as a “subethnic group” {minxi), a
recent coinage, possibly inspired by English. They argued that the Hakka
are distinct according to Stalin’s four criteria for defining a minority
nationality: distinctive language, territory, customs, and identity.
ASSIMILATION VERSUS COMING OUT
Hakka pleasure in “coming out” is understandable. Reticence in discuss-
ing recent politics reflects an embattled history, as well as possible back-
lash. Cantonese and Fujian local cultures are experiencing revivals at
least as strong, and far better financed. Glorifying Hakka culture could
later backfire via a revival of negative stereotypes. In fact, Cantonese
11. China’s overall population increased only 12 percent. Minority population jumped
28 percent, largely from switched registration (Beijing Review 1990).
230HAKKA IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
who dislike the communist regime use old anti-Hakka stereotypes to
excoriate the Long March as the “Hakka Road,” to denounce Mao
Zedong with far-fetched claims that he had Hakka ancestors, and de-
nounce Deng Xiaoping as “that litde Hakka” (Friedman 1995:556-58).
Hakka invocations of Deng Xiaoping’s support may play well in 1994,
but what will happen when Deng dies? Many also look uneasily at
Eastern European ethnic revival and civil war.
Nationwide reforms have superseded many of the Hakka customs that
once seemed progressive. The value of Hakka as a common language has
been undercut by the success of a Mandarin vernacular, even as decades of
peace (and better technology) make it obsolete as a code. Peace devalues
local militias. The southern economic boom could hardly have less use
for peasant rebels—or communal agriculture. Chinese women now have
at least statutory equality, and outside work for cash. Overseas Chinese
can take surprising pride in a strong China, whatever they think of its
government. A strong nation can actually permit freer expression of local
identity. Pride in a modern nation, which Hakka helped to pioneer, can
dilute the more parochial local passions, and permit even sojourners to
view the nation as their native place.
231Glossary
Terms marked (C) are Cantonese, those marked (H) are Hakka, and
those marked (*) use the common English spelling. All other terms are
Mandarin pinyin.
Bendi AM	fang M
bendiren AM A	fazhan
benshengren AAA	fengshui ® A
bentu A A	fenlie zhuyi A^A^
benturen AAA	funuhui
buzhang Chaozhou (Teochow, Chaochou,	gongsheng MA Guangfu lao M A^
or Chiu Chao*) $8 jW	Guangfu ren Jj^AA
choisam (C)	guanhua 'g’gg
Chong Yang	gui
Chongzheng Hui	guofu g95£
Chou ke fen sheng	Guomindang US KM
chuanziji	guoyu ggig
daHanzhuyi AM A St	hai ren hai ji AS 3
da kejia zu A^rs^S^	hai ren li ji A A^J fl
difang zhuyi MAAjg	HakNhin(H) A A
dong jJbJ	Hakka (*) (Kejia)
duoyuan	Hakka jim deihjyuh (C)
fan gui	MA Han M
232GLOSSARY
hanjian
henyouqian
Hokkien (*) (Fujian)
Hokklo (*) (Fulao)
houyi
"Huan wo Kehua"
huiguan
jaahpgwaan (C) |B
jianzei
jiansheng
jitian JEffl
jouhdak gunleung, cheutdak
tengtong (C)	’ tb
kaibu
ke or Ke
Ke/ei g#
Ke min K
ke ren
Ke shen
keji
Kejia
Kejia fengyun
Kejia zazhi
Kejia zuqun yundong
M
Kejiaxue
kongsi (*)
lairen
lao
n a
li ren hai ji ^IJXW3
lirenliji
Z/ang H
liangtian JjgfB
liumang wuchan
mei you qian t&'fi
meilidao
minnanhua
minxi
Min-Yue-Gan
Minzhu Jinbu Dang
ft
minzu
minzu ziwo zhongxin pianjian K
Neng mai zu tian, bu neng mai
zongyan
nishou iSitt
pengmin
Punti (*) (Bendi) XM
qiangjiu
Qing Ming
233GLOSSARY
ren A	waishengren j'h^A
ren quan A$£	wangbu RE^
Ren sheng, bu ren xing fgS'F	wugui
	wiy'w
rentong fig Ir]	wushen 2^^
shange il| ffc	xian
Shanmin jJLl K	xiedou M-4*
shantou zhuyi	Xin ge Kejiaren $r<f@^|?A
shaoshu minzu A ft K	xinchaoliu #r$fjj5rE
shawen zhuyi	xiucai
She &	xuetong
sheju	xue yuan guanxi
shengfan AS	
shengyuan Ail	YiminMiao UK J®
Shung Him Tong (*)	yuanzhumin IM'ftK
Subei 5£4L	Yue $]
suweiai	yuzu
Tang ren >A	zei shou fttt
tichang	zhanbu
ting IS	zhengzhi gongju jgrftjA#
tonghua JWJ -ft	zhongyang jiquan zhi A A ft W
toujia	®I
Tsung Tsin Mission (*)	zhongzu
tu ±	zhu A
tu ren A A	zuquan zaiwo
tu shen A	zuqun rentong j&3¥f&|n]
tu zhong shen min +	K	zuqun tezhi
tuanlian	zuqun yundong i£1i¥3SSb
tulou Aft?	
tutan	
234References
Administrative Districts
1947 Zhonghua Minguo xingzheng quyujianbiao (Administrative districts
of the Republic of China). Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Administrative Divisions
1981 Administrative Divisions of the People’s Republic of China. Beijing:
Cartographic Publishing House.
Aijmer, Goran
1967	“Expansion and Extension in Hakka Society.” Journal of the Hong
Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 7: 42-79.
Alley, Rewi
1977	“Meixian, the Great Hakka Center.” Eastern Horizon 16 (5): 16—30.
1980 “Guang’an, Birthplace of Deng Xiaoping.” Eastern Horizon 19 (8):
7-14.
Alter, Joseph S.
1992 The Wrestler's Body: Identity and Ideology in North India. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Anagnost, Ann
1989	“Transformations of Gender in Modem China.” In Gender and
Anthropology: Critical Reviews for Research and Teaching, edited by
Sandra Morgen, 313—42. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropo-
logical Association.
Anderson, Benedict
1983 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Na-
tionalism. New York: Verso Press.
Anderson, Eugene N.
1968	“Prejudice and Ethnic Stereotypes in Rural Hong Kong.” Kroeber
Anthropological Society Papers 37: 90-107.
Averill, Stephen C.
1983 “The Shed People and the Opening of the Yangzi Highlands.”
Modem China 9 (1): 84-126.
Baker, Hugh D. R.
1968 A Chinese Lineage Village: Sheung Shui. London: Frank Cass and
Co.
235REFERENCES
Bandyopadhyay, Raghbab
1990	“The Inheritors: Slum and Pavement Life in Calcutta.” In Calcutta,
The Living City, edited by Sukanta Chaudhuri, 78—87. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Baozhong Hui (Baozhong Association), ed.
1989	Baozhong Timin miao chuangjian liangbai zhounian jinian tekan
(Special publication on the two hundredth anniversary of the
Baozhong Martyrs Temple). Xinzhu County, Xinpu Town: Bao-
zhong Weiyuanhui.
Barth, Fredrik
1969	“Introduction.” In Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, edited by Fredrik
Barth, 9-38. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Basso, Keith
1979 Portraits of “The Whiteman”: Linguistic Play and Cultural Symbols
Among the Western Apache. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Basu, Ellen Oxfeld
1991	‘The Sexual Division of Labor and the Organization of Family
and Firm in an Overseas Chinese Community.” American Ethnolo-
gists (4): 700—718.
Bayly, C. A.
1983	Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of Brit-
ish Expansion, 1770-1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Behar, Ruth
1993 Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story. Bos-
ton: Beacon Press.
Beijing Review
1990	“Population of China’s Ethnic Minorities.” Beijing Review 33 (De-
cember 24—30): 52.
Benedict, Ruth
1934	Patterns of Culture. New York: Mentor Books.
Bentley, G. Carter
1981	Ethnicity and Nationality: A Bibliographic Guide. Seattle: University
of Washington Press.
1983 ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Ethnicity and Nationality.” Sage Race
Relations Abstracts 8 (2): 1-53; 8 (3): 1-26.
1987	“Ethnicity and Practice.” Comparative Studies in Society and History
7.9 (1): 24—55.
1991	“Reply to Yelvington.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 33
(1): 169—75.
236REFERENCES
Benton, Gregor
1989	“Communist Guerrilla Bases in Southeast China after the Start of
the Long March.” In Single Sparks: China’s Rural Revolutions, ed-
ited by Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein, 82-91.
Amonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
1992	Mountain Fires: The Red Army’s Three-year War in South China,
1934-1938. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Berreman, Gerald D.
1979	“Self, Situation, and Escape from Stigmatized Ethnic Identity.” In
Caste and Other Inequities: Essays on Inequality, edited by Gerald D.
Berreman, 164—68. Meerut: Folklore Institute.
Berry, Brian J. L., and Philip H. Rees
1969 “The Factoral Ecology of Calcutta.” American Journal of Sociology
74 (5): 445-91.
Blake, C. Fred
1978	“Death and Abuse in Chinese Marriage Laments.” Asian Folklore
Studies 37 (1): 3—33.
1981 Ethnic Groups and Social Change in a Hong Kong Market Town.
Asian Studies at Hawaii, no. 27. Honolulu: University Press of
Hawaii.
Blu, Karen
1980	The Lumbee Problem. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boardman, Eugene Powers
1952	Christian Influence Upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion. Madi-
son: University of Wisconsin Press.
Bonacich, Edna
1973	“A Theory of Middlemen Minorities.” American Sociological Review
38 (October): 583-94.
Boorman, Howard, and Richard C. Howard
1967	Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Bose, Nirmal Kumar
1966 “Calcutta: A Premature Metropolis.” Scientific American 213 (Sep-
tember): 91—102.
1968	Calcutta: 1964, A Social Survey. Bombay: Lalvani Publishing House.
Bourdieu, Pierre
1977	Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Brim, John
1974	“Village Alliance Temples in Hong Kong.” In Religion and Ritual
237REFERENCES
in Chinese Society, edited by Arthur P. Wolf, 93—104. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Campbell, George
1912 “Origin and Migration of the Hakkas.” Chinese Recorder and Mis-
sionary Journal 43: 473-80.
Carstens, Sharon
1980 “Pulai: Memories of a Gold Mining Settlement in Ulu Kelantan.”
Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 54 (2):
50-67.
1983	“Pulai, Hakka, Chinese, Malaysians: A Labyrinth of Cultural Iden-
tities.” In The Chinese in Southeast Asia: Identity, Culture, and Poli-
tics, edited by L. A. P. Gosling and Linda Lim, 79-98. Singapore:
Maruzen Press.
1993	“Chinese Culture and Polity in 19th Century Malaya: The Case of
Yap Ah Loy.” In “Secret Societies” Reconsidered: Perspectives on the
Social History of Modem South China and Southeast Asia, edited by
David Ownby and Mary F. Somers Heidhues, 120—52. New York:
M. E. Sharpe.
Chakraborty, Satyesh
1990	“The Growth of Calcutta in the Twentieth Century.” In Calcutta,
The Living City, edited by Sukanta Chaudhuri, 1-14. Calcutta:
Oxford University Press.
Chan, Anita, and Jonathan Unger
1990	“Voices from the Protest Movement, Chongqing, Sichuan.” Aus-
tralian Journal of Chinese Affairs 24: 259-79.
Chang Chung-li
1955 The Chinese Gentry: Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century
Chinese Society. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Chang Kuo-fao
1971	The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party 1921 -1927. Vol. 1. Lawrence,
Kansas: University of Kansas Press.
Chang, Michael Mau-kuei
1990	“Toward a Theoretical Understanding of the ‘Shen-Ji-Wen-Ti’ in
Taiwan, Focusing on 1986—1990.” Presented at the International
Conference on Ethnicity in Taiwan, Ohio State University Center
for East Asian Studies, Columbus, Ohio, December 15-16.
Char, Tin-yuke, and C. H. Kwok
1969	The Hakka Chinese, Their Origin and Folksongs. San Francisco: Jade
Mountain Press.
238REFERENCES
Cheah Kam Kooi
1965 “The Hakka Community in Singapore.” Academic Exercise, Uni-
versity of Singapore.
Chee Liew Seong
1971	“The Hakka Community in Malaya with Special Reference to Their
Associations, 1801-1968.” Master’s thesis, University of Malaya.
Chen Ban
1991	“Dajia yi qi canyu: Xinzhu xian wenhua zhongxin di jianshe”
(Let’s all take a look: The design for the Xinzhu County cultural
center). Keija zazhi (Hakka magazine) 16: 68-72.
Chen Han-seng
1936 Landlord and Peasant in China: A Study of the Agrarian Crisis in
South China. New York: International Publishers.
Chen Qiuhong
1991	“Kejiaren di suming, zi chu zhi dao yu meng” (Hakka fate, self-
understanding, and desires). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 18:
40-44.
Chen Shenglin (History, Zhongshan University)
1992	“Kejia yanjiu zai Zhongguo dalu faxing zhi zhanwang” (The re-
vival and future direction of Hakka studies in mainland China).
Presented at the International Conference on Hakkaology, Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong, September.
Chen Tiejian
1983 “Qu Qiubai.” In Zhonggong Dang shi renwu zhuan (Biographies of
Chinese Communist Party members), edited by Hu Hua, vol. 38:
1-122. Xi’an: Renmin Chubanshe.
Chen Yuanxu (History, Fujian Normal University)
1992	“Fujian Kejia, She zu yitong jianlun” (Relationships between the
Hakka and the She). Presented at the International Conference on
Hakkaology, Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Chen Yundong
1989	Taiwan di Kejiaren (Taiwan’s Hakka). Taipei: Taiyuan.
1991	“Kejia yuanliu di ling yi guandian” (A different perspective on the
origins of the Hakka). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 15: 39-44.
Cheng Lim-Keak (Geography, Singapore University)
1969 “The Chinese Community in Kulim Town.” Master’s thesis, Victo-
ria University of Wellington.
1976 “Mengkuang: A Study of a Chinese New Village in West Malay-
sia.” Research Project Series no. 1. Singapore: Nanyang University
239REFERENCES
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate
Studies.
1985	Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore: A Socio-Economic Geogra-
phy with Special Reference to Bang Structure. Singapore: Singapore
University Press.
1992	“The Hakka community in Singapore: A Study of Adaptation,
Change, and Continuity.” Presented at the International Confer-
ence on Hakkaology. Chinese University ofHong Kong, September.
Chew, Daniel
1990	Chinese Pioneers on the Sarawak Frontier 1841-1941. Singapore: Ox-
ford University Press.
China Tear Book
1928 Shanghai: North China Daily News and Herald.
Chinese and Japanese Repository
1865	3:281-84.
Chinese Economic Tearbook
1935	Zhongguo jingji nianjian (Chinese economic yearbook), vol. 1
(shang). Shanghai: Shangwu Yinshuguan.
Chinese Encyclopedia
1986	Zhongguo da baike quanshu (The great Chinese encyclopedia), s.v.
“minzu” (ethnography). Beijing: Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu
Chubanshe.
)
1988	Zhongguo da baike quanshu (The great Chinese encyclopedia), s.v.
“yuyan wenzi” (languages and writing systems). Beijing: Zhong-
guo Da Baike Quanshu Chubanshe.
1989	Zhongguo da baike quanshu (The great Chinese encyclopedia), s.v.
“jun shi” (the military). Beijing: Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu
Chubanshe.
Chiqi
1920 Chiqixianzhi (Chiqi County gazetteer). Lai Jixi et al.
Chiu, Jennifer
1992	“Hakkas in Taiwan: 300 Years Strong.” Free China Journal 30 (Sep-
tember): 3-4.
Chua, Daphne, and Thomas T. W. Tan
1990	“Hakkas in the Pawnbroking Trade.” In Chinese Dialect Groups:
Traits and Trades, 67—77. Singapore: Opinion Books.
Chun, Allen Uck Lunn
1985	Land Is to Live: A Study of the Concept ofTsu in a Hakka Chinese Vil-
lage, New Territories, Hong Kong. Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago.
240REFERENCES
Chun An
1965 “Kejia wenti zhi yanzhou” (Research on Hakka questions). In
Basheng Keshu gonghui zhounian jinian tekan (Kiang Hakka Asso-
ciation memorial volume). Kiang, Malaysia: Kiang Hakka Associa-
tion, 57—70.
Ci hai Editorial Committee
1979	Ci hai (Sea of words). Shanghai: Cihai Chubanshe.
Clammer, John
1980	Straits Chinese Society: Studies in the Sociology of the Baba Communi-
ties of Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore: University of Singapore
Press.
Clifford, James
1983 “On EtJmographic Authority.” Representations 2: 118-46.
1986	“Introduction: Partial Truths.” In Writing Culture: The Poetics and
Politics of Ethnography, edited by J. Clifford and G. Marcus, 1-26.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
-------and George Marcus, eds.
1986	Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Cohen, Abner
1969 Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study ofHausa Migrants in
Toruba Towns. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1974 “Introduction: The Lessons of Ethnicity.” In Urban Ethnicity, ed-
ited by Abner Cohen, ix-xxiv. ASA Monographs, no. 12. London:
Tavistock Publications.
Cohen, Myron L.
1968	“The Hakka or ‘Guest People’: Dialect as a Sociocultural Variable
in Southeastern China.” Ethnohistory 15 (3): 237-92.
1969	“Agnatic Kinship in South Taiwan.” Ethnology 8 (2): 167—81.
1976 House United, House Divided: The Chinese Family in Taiwan. New
York: Columbia University Press.
1991	“Being Chinese: The Peripheralization of Traditional Identity.”
Daedalus 120 (2): 113—34.
Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff
1992	Ethnography and the Historical Imagination. San Francisco: West-
view Press.
Constable, Nicole
1994 Christian Souls and Chinese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong
Kong. Berkeley: University of California Press.
241REFERENCES
Coppel, Charles A.
1973	“Mapping the Peranakan Chinese in Indonesia,” Papers in Far East-
ern History 8: 143—67.
Crapanzano, Vincent
1980	Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Crissman, Lawrence
1967 “The Segmentary Structure of Urban Overseas Chinese Communi-
ties.” Man 2 (2): 185-204.
Cui Rongchang
1985 “Sichuan fangyan de biandiao xianxiang” (The making of the
Sichuan dialects). Fangyan (Dialects) 1: 6-14.
Dai Yanhui
1979	Qingdai Taiwan zhi xiangzhi (Civil administration in rural Taiwan
during the Qing dynasty). Taipei: Lianjing.
Daniel, E. Valentine
1984	Fluid Signs: Being a Person the Tamil Way. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
de Groot, J. J. M.
1885 Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo (The kingship of Borneo). ’s-Graven-
hage: M. Nijhoff.
Dean, Kenneth
1988	“Funerals in Fujian.” Cahiers de’extreme Asie 4: 19-78.
Diamond, Norma
1988 “The Miao and Poison.” Ethnology 27 (1): 1—26.
Dumont, Louis
1970	Homo Hierarchies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Eberhard, Wolfram
1974	Studies in Hakka Folktales. Taipei: Chinese Association for Folk-
lore.
Economic Review, 1079-1980
1980	Alipore, West Bengal: Government of West Bengal Press.
Eitel, E. J.
1867 “Ethnographical Sketches of the Hakka Chinese.” Notes and Que-
ries on China and Japan 1 (5): 49,1 (6): 65-67,1 (7): 81-83,1(8): 97-
99, 1 (9): 113-14, 1 (10): 128-30, 1 (11): 145-46,1 (12): 161-63.
1873—74 “An Outline History of the Hakkas.” China Review 2: 160—64.
1891-92 “Ethnographic Sketches of the Hakka Chinese.” China Review 20:
263-67.
242REFERENCES
Elvin, Mark
1973	The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Erbaugh, Mary S.
1992	“The Secret History of the Hakkas: The Chinese Revolution as a
Hakka Enterprise.” China Quarterly 132: 937—68.
Eto Shinkichi
1961	“Hai-Lu-Feng—the First Chinese Soviet Government.” China
Quarterly 8: 161-83.
Famighetti, Robert, et al.
1993	World Almanac and Book of Facts 1994. Mahwah, New Jersey: Funk
& Wagnalls.
Fan Si and Ding Jiaqi
1983	“Ye Jianying.” In Zhonggong Dang shi renwu zhuan (Biographies of
Chinese Communist Party members), edited by Hu Hua, vol. 40:
1—116. Xi’an: Renmin Chubanshe.
Fang Yong (Architecture, Overseas Chinese University, Quanzhou, Fujian)
1992 “Lun Kejia tulou jianzhu de lishi wenhua beijing” (About the
historical and cultural background of the Hakka’s earth tower).
Presented at the International Conference on Hakkaology, Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong, September.
Faure, David
1986 The Structure of Rural Chinese Society: Lineage and Village in the
Eastern New Territories, Hong Kong. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Firey, Walter
1980 Land Use in Central Boston. 1947. Reprint, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Fischer, Michael
1973 Zoroastrian Iran Between Myth and Praxis. Ph.D. diss., University
of Chicago.
Forrest, R. A. D.
1948 The Chinese Language. London: Faber and Faber.
1951 “The Southern Dialects of Chinese.” Appendix 1 in Victor Purcell,
The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 673-76. London: Oxford University
Press.
Franz, Uli
1988	Deng Xiaoping. Boston: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Freedman, Maurice
1957	Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore. Colonial Office, Colo-
243REFERENCES
nial Research Studies, no. 23. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office.
1958	Lineage Organization in Southeastern China. London School of
Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, vol. 18. London:
Athlone Press.
Fried, Morton H.
1962 “Kinship and Friendship in Chinese Society.” Presented at the
Seminar on Micro-Social Organization in China, Cornell Univer-
sity, Ithaca, N.Y.
Friedman, Edward
1995 National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China.
Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
Fuson, C. G.
1929 “The Peoples of Kwangtung: Their Origin, Migrations, and Pres-
ent Distribution.” Lingnan Science Journal 7: 5—22.
Galbiati, Fernando
1985	P’eng P’ai and the Hai-Lu-Eeng Soviet. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Gates, Hill
1981	“Ethnicity and Social Class.” In The Anthropology ofTaiwanese Soci-
ety, edited by Emily M. Ahem and Hill Gates, 241—81. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
1987	“Money for the Gods.” Modem China 13 (3): 259-77.
Gaw, Kenneth
1991	Superior Servants: The Legendary Cantonese Amahs of the Far East.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Geelan, P. J. M., and D. C. Twitchett
1974	Times Atlas of China. Cartography by Kyobunkaku Ltd., John Bar-
tholomew and Son Ltd., and Hunting Surveys Ltd. New York:
Quadrangle.
Geertz, Clifford
1973 “The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and
Civil Politics in New States.” In The Interpretation of Cul-
tures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz, 255—310. New York: Basic
Books.
Geib, Margaret, and Ashok Dutt
1987	Atlas of South Asia. Boulder: Westview Press.
Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel Moynihan
1975	Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
244REFERENCES
Godley, Michael
1981	The Mandarin-Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise
in the Modernization of China, 1893-1911. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gosling, L. A. P.
1964	“Migration and Assimilation of Rural Chinese in Trengganu.” In
Malaysian and Indonesian Studies: Essays Presented to Sir Richard
Winstedt, edited by John Bastin and R. Roolvink, 203—22. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Hamberg, Theodore
1854 The Visions ofHung-Siu-Tshuen and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrec-
tion. Hong Kong: China Mail Office.
Hamilton, Gary
1978 “Pariah Capitalism: A Paradox of Power and Dependence.” Ethnic
Groups 2: 1—15.
Han sheng (Echo magazine)
1989	August.
Han Sin Fong
1975	The Chinese in Sabah East Malaysia. Asian Folklore and Social Life
Monographs, vol. 67. Taipei: Orient Culture Service.
Han Suyin
1965	The Crippled Tree. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
1972 The Morning Deluge: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Revolution, 1893-
I9S4. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
Harrell, Stevan
1985 “Why Do the Chinese Work So Hard? Reflections on an Entrepre-
neurial Ethic.” Modem China 11 (2): 203-26.
1987	“The Concept of Fate in Chinese Folk Ideology.” Modem China 13
(1): 90-109.
1990a “From Xiedou to Tijun: The Decline of Ethnicity in Northern
Taiwan, 1885-1895.” Late Imperial China n: 99—127.
1990b “Ethnicity, Local Interests, and the State: Yi Communities in
Southwest China.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 32 (3):
515-48.
Harrison, James Pinckney
1972	The Long March to Power: A History of the Chinese Communist Party,
1921-72. New York: Praeger.
Hashimoto, Mantaro J.
1973	The Hakka Dialect: A Linguistic Study of Its Phonology, Syntax and
Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
245REFERENCES
Hayes, James
1977a	The Hong Kong Region, 1850-1911. Hamden: Archon Books.
1977b “A Village War.” Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society 17: 185—93.
1983 “The Tsuen Wan Sub-District from Chinese Genealogies,” 112-26;
and “Introduction,” 1-15. In The Rural Communities of Hong Kong:
Studies and Themes, edited by James Hayes. Hong Kong: Oxford
University Press.
1991 “Government and Village: Reactions to Modem Development by
Long-Setded Communities in the New Territories of Hong
Kong.” In An Old State in New Settings, edited by Hugh D. R.
Baker and Stephan Feuchtwang, 107-36. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
1993 Tsuen Wan: Growth of a New Town’ and Its People. Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press.
He Xinxing
1991	“Kejia yundong di fansi—jiantan Kejia zazhi" (Reflections on the
Hakka movement—and on Hakka magazine). Kejia zazhi (Hakka
magazine) 13: 64—65.
Heidhues, Maty F. Somers
1992	Banka Tin and Mentok Pepper: Chinese Settlement on an Indonesian
Island. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
1993	“Chinese Organizations in West Borneo and Banka: Kongsi and
Hui.” In “Secret Societies” Reconsidered: Perspectives on the Social His-
tory of Modem South China and Southeast Asia, edited by David
Ownby and Mary F. Somers Heidhues, 68-88. New York: M. E.
Sharpe.
Heng Pek Koon
1988	Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Asso-
ciation. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
Henry, B. C.
1886 Ling-Nam, or Interior Views of Southern China. London: S. W.
Partridge and Company.
Hill, R. D., and Min Shin Voo
1990	“Occupational and Spatial Mobility in an Overseas Chinese Agri-
cultural Community: The Hakkas of Kudat, Sabah, Malaysia.”
Sojourn 5 (2): 194—218.
Ho Ping-ti
1959	Studies on the Population of China. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press.
246REFERENCES
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds.
1983	The Invention of Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hong Kong
1900a	Report on the New Territories at Hong Kong. London: His Majesty1 s
Stationary Office.
1900b	Papers Laid Before the Legislative Council on Hong Kong, 1899. Hong
Kong: Government Printer.
1957	Hong Kong Annual Report 1957. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
i960	A Gazetteer of Place Names in Hong Kong, Kowloon and the New
Territories. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
1983	Hong Kong Island, Lantau and the Outlying Islands. Vol. 1 of Hong
Kong Streets and Places: The Official Guide. Hong Kong: Govern-
ment Printer.
1985	Kowloon and the New Territories. Vol. 2 of Hong Kong Streets and
Places: The Official Guide. Hong Kong: Government Printer.
Honig, Emily
1992	Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Hsiao Hua
1978 “Crossing the Greater Liangshan Mountains.” In Liu Po-cheng and
Others. Recalling the Long March, 71-78. Peking: Foreign Lan-
guages Press.
Hsiao Kung-chuan
i960 Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century. Seatde:
University of Washington Press.
Hsieh Uing-yu
1929 “Origins and Migrations of the Hakkas.” Chinese Social and Politi-
cal Science Review 13 (220): 208-28.
Hsu, Wen-hsiung
1980 “Frontier Social Organization and Social Disorder in Qing Tai-
wan.” In China’s Island Frontier, edited by Ronald G. Knapp, 87—
105. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.
Hu, Hsien-chin
1948 The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions. Viking
Fund Publications in Anthropology, vol. 10. New York: Viking
Fund.
Huang Hsuan-fan
1993	Yuyan, shehui, yu zuqun yishi: Taiwan yuyan shehuixue de yanjiu
(Language, society, and ethnic identity: Research in Taiwan so-
ciolinguistics). Taipei: Wenhe Chuban You Xian Gongsi.
247REFERENCES
Huang, Parker Po-fei
1970	Cantonese Dictionary: Cantonese-English, English-Cantonese. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Huang Ping
1988	“Bei huan li he: Lu Dingyi xun er zhao nu wushi nian” (Sorrow
and joy, parting and reunion: Lu Dingyi’s fifty-year search for his
lost children). Baogao wenxue (Reportage) 7: 34-38.
Huang Rongluo
1989	Du Tai beige (A lament upon crossing to Taiwan). Taibei: Taiyuan.
Huang Zhuoquan
1989	“Huang Nanqiu xiansheng nianpu chugao” (An account of Huang
Nanqiu’s life, year by year). Taiwan fengwu (Taiwan Folklore) 37
(3), 38 (1,2,3,4), 39 (1).
Hubrig
1879 “Uber die Hakka-Chinesen” (On Hakka Chinese). Verhandlungen
der Berliner Gesellschaft fur Anthropologie, Ethnologie, und
Urgeschichte (Proceedings of the Berlin Society for Anthropology,
Ethnology, and Prehistory). Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie (Journal of
Ethnology) 11: 99-105.
In Memory of Mr Sun Yat-sen
1981 Ji’nian Sun Zhongshan xiansheng (In memory of Mr. Sun Yat-sen).
Guangdong Sheng Shehui Kexue Yuan Lishi Yanjiu Shi, Zhong-
shan Daxue Lishi Xi Sun Zhongshan Yanjiu Shi, Guangdong
Sheng Zhongshan Xian Cuiheng Sun Zhongshan Gu Zhu Bian
(Compiled by the History Research Division of the Guangdong
Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, the Sun Yat-sen Research
Division of the History Department at Sun Yat-sen University, and
the Sun Yat-sen Residence Group of Cuiheng, Zhongshan County,
Guangdong Province).
Ingrams, Harold
1952	Hong Kong. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office.
Isaacs, Harold R.
1975a Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change. New York:
Harper and Row.
1975b “Basic Group Identity: The Idols of the Tribe.” Ethnicity: Theory
and Experience. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., 29—
52. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jackson, James C.
1964	“Population Changes in Selangor State, lSso-iSpi.” Journal ofTropi-
cal Geography 19: 42—57.
248REFERENCES
1969	“Mining in Eighteenth-Century Bangka: The Pre-European
Exploitation of a ‘Tin Island.’” Pacific Viewpoint 10 (2): 28-
54-
1970	“Chinese in the West Borneo Goldfields.” Occasional Papers in
Geography, no. 15. Hull: University of Hull.
Jiang Binzhao (Anthropology Research Institute, Xiamen University)
1992 “Kejia de mingcheng xingchen jiqi yu She zu de guanxi” (The
origin of the word ‘Hakka’ and its relation to the She people).
Presented at the International Conference on Hakkaology, Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong, September.
Jiang, Joseph P. L.
1968 “Toward a Theory of Pariah Entrepreneurship.” In Leadership and
Authority: A Symposium. Gehan Wijeyewarndene, ed., 147-62. Sin-
gapore: University of Malaya Press.
Johnson, Elizabeth L.
1976	“ ‘Patterned Bands’ in the New Territories of Hong Vang" Journal
ofthe Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 16: 81-91.
1988	“Grieving for the Dead, Grieving for the Living: Funeral Laments
of Hakka Women.” In Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modem
China, edited by James L. Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, 135—63.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Johnson, Graham E.
1973 “In-migration and Community Expansion in Hong Kong:
The Case of Tsuen Wan.” Journal of Oriental Studies 11 (1):
107-14.
1977	“Leaders and Leadership in an Expanding New Territories Town.”
China Quarterly 69: 109-35.
Juergensmeyer, Mark
1982	Religion as Social Vision: The Movement Against Untouchability in
20th-Century Punjab. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Keyes, Charles F.
1976 “Towards a New Formulation of the Concept of Ethnic Group.”
Ethnicity 3: 202—13.
1981 “The Dialectics of Ethnic Change.” In Ethnic Change, edited by
Charles F. Keyes, 3-30. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Khoo Kay Kim
1972 The Western Malay States: 18S0-1873. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Kiang, Clyde
1991	The Hakka Search for a Homeland. Elgin, Penn.: Allegheny Press.
249REFERENCES
Kingston, Maxine Hong
1975 The Woman Warrior. New York: Random House.
Klein, Donald W., and Anne B. Clark
1971	Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-196S. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press.
Kolenda, Pauline
1985	Caste in Contemporary India. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press.
Kondo, Dorinne
1990	Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese
Workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Philip A.
1977 “Origins of the Taiping Vision: Cross Cultural Dimensions of a
Chinese Rebellion. ” Comparative Studies in Society and History 19(3):
350—66.
Kulp, Daniel Harrison
1925 Country Life in China: The Sociology ofFamilism. Vol. 1, Phenix Vil-
lage, Kwangtung, China. New York: Teachers College, Columbia
University.
Kuo, Warren
1968 Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party. Taipei: Institute
of International Relations.
Laai Yi-faai
1950 The Part Played by the Pirates of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces
in the Taiping Insurrection. Ph.D. diss., University of California,
Berkeley.
Lagerwey, John
1992	“Taoism among the Hakka in Fujian.” Presented at the Interna-
tional Conference on Hakkaology, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, September.
Lai Ah Eng
1986	“Peasants, Proletarians and Prostitutes: A Preliminary Investiga-
tion into the Work of Chinese Women in Colonial Malaya.” Re-
search Notes and Discussions Paper no. 59. Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.
Lamley, Harry J.
1981 “Subethnic Rivalry in the Ch’ing Period.” In The Anthropology of
Taiwanese Society, edited by Emily Martin Ahern and Hill Gates,
282—318. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
1990	“Lineage Feuding in Southern Fujian and Eastern Guangdong
under Qing Rule.” In Violence in China, edited by Jonathan N.
250REFERENCES
Lipman and Stevan Harrell, 27-64. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Lavie, Smadar
1990	The Poetics of Military Occupation: Mzeina Allegories of Bedouin Iden-
tity under Israeli and Egyptian Rule. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Lawrence, Anthony
1986	China: The Long March. London: Merhurst Press.
Leach, Edmund
1954	Political Systems of Highland Burma. Boston: Beacon Press.
Lechler, Rudolf
1878 “The Hakka Chinese.” Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal 9:
352-59-
Lee, Edwin
1968 “The Emergence of Towkay Leaders in Party Politics in Sabah.”
Journal of Southeast Asian History 9: 306—24.
Lee Poh Ping
1985	“World-View of Social Belonging among the Chinese in Malaysia
and Singapore.” In Malalysian World-View, edited by Mohd. Taib
Osman, 131—46. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Lelyveld, Joseph
1975 Calcutta. Hong Kong: Perennial Press.
Leong Kok Kee
1981 “The Chia-ying Hakka in Penang, 1786—1941.” Malaysia in History
24: 39-48.
Leong, S. T.
1980 ‘The Hakka Chinese: Ethnicity and Migrations in Late Imperial
China.” Presented at the annual meeting of the Association for
Asian Studies.
1985	‘The Hakka Chinese of Lingnan: Ethnicity and Social Change in
Modern Times.” In Ideal and Reality: Social and Political Change in
Modem China, 1860-1949, edited by David Pong and Edmund S. K.
Fung, 287—326. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
Levy, Howard
1966	Chinese Footbinding: The History of a Curious Exotic Custom. New
York: Walton Rawls.
Li Chung Chu
1975 “A Description of Singapore in 1887.” Translated by Chang Chin
Chiang. In China Society 25th Anniversary Journal, 20-29. Singa-
pore: China Society.
251REFERENCES
Li Gucheng
1988	Zhonggong zui gao lingdao ceng (Chinese Communist Leaders at
the highest ranks). Hong Kong: Mingbao Chubanshe.
Li Lugeng and Zhang Luhong, eds.
1987	Zhongguo lishi ditu tianchong lianxi ce (Fill-in-the-blanks map work-
book for Chinese history), vol. 3 (di san ce), “Zhongguo lishi”
(Chinese history). N.p.: Renmin Jiaoyu Chubanshe.
Li Mo
1993	“Lun Kejia de xingcheng ji minzu ronghe” (On the development
of the Hakka people and ethnic assimilation). Zhongguo shi yanjiu
(Research on Chinese history) 4: 117—29.
Li Qiao
1991a “Kejiaren zai Taiwan shehui di fazhan” (The development of the
Hakka in Taiwanese society). Taiwan Kejia xiehui xun (Taiwan
Hakka Association newsletter) 1: 2—3.
1991b	“Kejiaren di zhengzhi lichang” (The Hakka political position). Tai-
wan Kejia xiehui xun (Taiwan Hakka Association newsletter) 1: 7.
Li Yuming et al., eds.
1986	Fujian Sheng shi xian cheng qu tu ce (Maps of Fujian Province’s
Cities, Counties, and Municipal Districts). Fuzhou: Fujian Sheng
Ditu Chubanshe.
1987	Fujian Sheng jiaotong luyou tuce (A travel and transit guide to
Fujian Province). 2d ed. Fuzhou: Fujian Sheng Ditu Chubanshe.
Liang, Yougang
1985 “Guangdong Sheng beibu Hanyu fangyan de fenbu” (The distri-
bution of Chinese dialects in northern Guangdong Province).
Fangyan 2: 89—104.
Lim Joo Hock
1967	“Chinese Female Immigration into the Straits Settlements, 1860-
1901.” Journal of the South Seas Society 22: 58—110.
Lin Huowang et al.
1991	“Xinzhu xian wenhua zhongxin zhi lu—xiang xiang weilai di
wenhua zhongxin” (On the Xinzhu xian cultural center—thinking
about the future center). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 16: 69—72.
Lin Jiayou (Sun Yat-sen University)
t992 “Guanyu Cuiheng Sun shi shi fo Kejia ren de wenti” (Research on
the problem of whether the Sun clan in Cuiheng Village are
Hakka). Presented at the International Conference of Hakkaology,
Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
252REFERENCES
Lin Yueh-hwa
19+8 The Golden Wing: A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Linebarger, Paul
1925 Sun Tat Sen and the Chinese Republic. New York and London:
Century.
Ling, Ken
1972	The Revenge of Heaven: Journal of a Toung Chinese. New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons.
Liu Cun-han (Guangxi Normal University)
1992	“Taiping Tianguo wenshu Kejiahua kaoshi” (Textual research on
Hakka in the documents of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom). Pre-
sented at the International Conference on Hakkaology, Chinese
University of Hong Kong, September.
Liu Fuzeng
1991	“Kejia wenhua di dingyi” (A definition of Hakka culture). Taiwan
Kejia xiehui xun (Taiwan Hakka Association newsletter) 1: 8.
Liu Guozhao
1990	“Keijia zuqun zai shehui zhong suo banyan di jiaosi” (The role
played by the Hakka ethnic group in society). Kejia zazhi (Hakka
magazine) 12: 10-13.
Liu, Leo Y.
1991	“Self-Determination, Independence and the Process of Democrati-
zation in Taiwan.” Asian Profile 19: 197—205.
Lo, Miriam Kui-Kiaw
1992	“Ta Taipu Kak Family of Twenty-Five Generations: Visit by an
Overseas Chinese Relative.” Presented at the International Confer-
ence on Hakkaology, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Lo Wan
1965 “Communal Strife in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Kwangtung: The
Establishment of Ch’ih-Ch’i.” Harvard University, East Asian Re-
search Center, Papers on China 19: 85—119.
Longyan Committee
1987	Minxi geming genzhudi shi (A history of the revolutionary base in
western Fujian). Zhonggong Longyan Diwei Dang Shi Cailiao
Zhengji Yanjiu Wenyuanhui (The Longyan Prefectural Party
Committee for Historical Research Materials). Beijing: Huaxia
Chubanshe.
Lu Yongdi and Liu Zijian
1983	“Fang Fang.” In Zhonggong Dang shi renwu zhuan (Biographies of
253REFERENCES
Chinese Communist Patty members), edited by Hu Hua, vol. 11:
323-68. Xi’an: Renmin Chubanshe.
Lubell, Harold
1974 Calcutta: Its Urban Development and Economic Prospects. Geneva:
International Labour Office.
Lung, David P. Y.
1991	Zhongguo chuantong minzhu jianzhu (Chinese traditional vernacu-
lar architecture). Bilingual Chinese/English edition. Hong Kong:
Regional Council.
Luo Xianglin
1933 Kejia yanjiu daolun (An introduction to the study of the Hakka in
its ethnic, historical, and cultural aspects) Xingning, Guangdong:
Xishan Shucang.
1950 “Kejia yuanliu kao” (Hakka research). In Xianggang Chongzheng
zonghui sanshi zhounianjinian tekan (Hong Kong Tsung Tsin Asso-
ciation thirtieth-anniversary special publication). Hong Kong:
Tsung Tsin Association.
1954	(1943) Guofujia shi yuanliu kao (An investigation into the ancestry of
the father of our country). Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan.
1965 Kejia shiliao huipian (Historical sources for the study of the
Hakka). Hong Kong: Institute of Chinese Culture, Ling Nam
Publishing Co.
Luo Zhaojin
1991a “Kejiayu di yuanyuan” (The origin of the Hakka language). Lianhe
boo (United daily news) 12 August 1991: 25.
1991b “Dui dianshi Keyu xinwen di qiwang” (Expectations about televi-
sion news in Hakka). Kejiazazhi (Hakka magazine) 16: 1.
Malaysia
1972	“1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: Community
Groups” Kuala Lumpur: Department of Statistics.
Mandelbaum, David G.
1939 “The Jewish Way of Life in Cochin. "Jewish Social Studies 1: 423-60.
Mao Tse-tung
1967 “The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains.” 1928. Reprinted in
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1. Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press.
1971	(1927) “Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan.” In
Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1. Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press.
254REFERENCES
1990	Report from Xunwu. Translated by Roger R. Thompson. 1982. Re-
print, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Marcus, George, and Michael Fischer
1986	Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the
Human Sciences. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marriott, McKim
1968	“Caste Ranking and Food Transactions: A Matrix Analysis.” In
Structure and Change in Indian Society, edited by Milton Singer
and Bernard S. Cohn, 133-71. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
Mencher, Joan
1974 “The Caste System Upside Down, or the Not-so-Mysterious
East.” Current Anthropology 15: 469-78.
Meyners d’Estray, H. Compte
1890 “Les Hakka et les Hoklo: L’autonomie des villages en Chine.”
Revue de Geographic 27: 29—35, 95-103.
Michael, Franz
1949 “Military Organization and Power Structure in China During the
Taiping Rebellion.” Pacific Historial Review 18: 469-83.
Michener, James
1959 Hawaii. New York: Fawcett Books.
Middlebrook, S. M.
1951 “Yap Ah Loy.” Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society 24 (2): 1—127.
Miller, Henry
1955	The Communist Menace in Malaysia. New York: Praeger.
Min Yan
1989	“Fujian Sheng jingxi tuan yanchu fendui shenru quan sheng ge di
jinxing jinglao yongjun weiwen yanchu” (Fujian Province’s Bei-
jing opera troop performs all over the province to show respect for
the elderly and to support the military). Zhongguo wenhua boo
(Chinese cultural news). 20 August.
Moser, Leo J.
1985 The Chinese Mosaic: The Peoples and Provinces of China, London and
Boulder: Westview Press.
Nagata, Judith
1974 “What Is a Malay? Situational Selection of Ethnic Identity in a
Plural Society.” American Ethnologist 1: 331—50.
Nanyang Index
1968 Nanyang yanfiu Zhungwen chikan zhiliao suoyin 190S-1966 (Index to
255REFERENCES
Chinese periodical literature on Southeast Asia, 1905—1966). Singa-
pore: Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University.
Nelson, Howard
1974 “Ancestor Worship and Burial Practice.” In Religion and Ritual in
Chinese Society, edited by Arthur P. Wolf, 251-78. Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press.
Newbold, T. J.
1971	Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits
of Malacca. Vol. 1., 1839. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Newell, William H.
1962	Treacherous River: A Study of Rural Chinese in North Malaya. Kuala
Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.
Ng, Ronald
1969	“Culture and Society of a Hakka Community on Lantau Island,
Hong Kong.” In Hong Kong, edited by I. C. Jarvie and Joseph
Agassi, 53-64. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Nie Chuanqing
1991 “Jianli Zhongguo huaqiao lishi bowuguan you biyao” (We must
build a museum of overseas Chinese history). Renmin ribao (Peo-
ple’s daily), overseas ed., 6 May.
Norman, Henry
1904 The People and Politics of the Far East. 1895. Reprint, New York:
Scribners.
Norman, Jerry
1988	Chinese. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nyce, Ray
1973	Chinese New Villages in Malaya: A Community Study. Singapore:
Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, Ltd.
Oehler, Wilhelm
1922 “Christian Work Among the Hakka.” In The Christian Occupation
of China, edited by Milton T. Staulfer, 351-53- Shanghai: China
Continuation Committee.
1931 Wege Gottes in China: Das Hakkavolk und Busier Mission (Paths of
God in China: the Hakka people and the Basel mission). Stuttgart,
Basel: Evang. Missionverlag.
Oehler-Heimerdinger, Elisabeth
n.d. Im Finstem Tai: Geschichten und Lieder aus China (In the dark
valley: Folktales and songs from China). Basel: Verlag der Mis-
sionsbuchhandlung.
256REFERENCES
Ownby, David
1990	“The Ethnic Feud in Taiwan: What Is This Violence Business,
Anyway? An Interpretation of the 1782 Zhang-Quan xiedou.” Late
Imperial China 11: 75-98.
Oxfeld, Ellen
1993	Blood, Sweat and Mahjong: Family and Enterprise in an Overseas
Chinese Community. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pang Lok Sam
193+ Xianggang Xinjie Longyuetou Chonggiantang eunzhi (History of
Shun Him Tong Village, Lung Yeuk Tau, New Territories, Hong
Kong). Mimeographed manuscript. Hong Kong University Li-
brary.
Pasternak, Burton
1972 Kinship and Community in Two Villages. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
1983	Guests in the Dragon: Social Demography of a Chinese District, 189s-
1946. New York: Columbia University Press.
Paton, W. Bernard
n.d. The “Stranger People,” a Story and a Challenge. London: Religious
Tract Society.
Patterson, Orlando
1975 “Context and Choice in Ethnic Allegiance: A Theoretical Frame-
work and Caribbean Case Study.” In Ethnicity: Theory and Experi-
ence, edited by Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 305—49.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Pickering, W. A.
1876 “The Chinese in the Straits of Malacca.” Fraser’s Magazine (Octo-
ber): 438-45.
Piton, Charles
1870 “The Hia-k’ah in the Chekiang Province and the Hakka in the
Canton Province.” Chinese Recorder and Missionary Journal z \ 218—
20.
1873-74 “On the Origin and History of the Hakkas.” China Review 2 (4):
222—26.
Potter, Jack M.
1968 Capitalism and the Chinese Peasant. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
Pratt, Jean A.
i960 “Emigration and Unilineal Descent Groups: A Study of Marriage
257REFERENCES
in a Hakka Village in the New Territories, Hong Kong.” Eastern
Anthropologist 13 (4): 147-58.
Province-by-Province Atlas
1977	Zhonghua Rentnin Gongheguo fen sheng dituji (A province-by-
province atlas of the People’s Republic of China). Beijing: Ditu
Chubanshe.
Purcell, Victor
1967 The Chinese in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Qiu Quanzheng (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
1992	“Sun Zhongshan de sixiang fangxiang” (The ideological orienta-
tion of Sun Yat-sen). Presented at the International Conference on
Hakkaology, Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Ramsey, S. Robert
1987	TheLanguages of China. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Rentnin ribao (People’s daily)
1991	“Meizhou Shi wei qunzhong ban shishi: Hong yang Kejia wenhua,
cujin qiao xiang kaifa” (Meizhou City carries out new projects for
the masses: Spread Hakka culture, encourage development of the
home counties of overseas Chinese). Overseas ed. 6 May.
Restarick, Harry Bond
1931 Sun Tatsen, Liberator of China. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Rosaldo, Michelle Z.
1980	Knowledge and Passion: Ilongot Conceptions of Self and Social Life.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rosaldo, Renato
1986 “Ilongot Hunting as Story and Experience.” In The Anthropology of
Experience, edited by Victor Turner and Edward M. Bruner, 97-
138. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Sagart, Laurent
1982 Phonologie du dialecte Hakka de Shung Him Tong. Paris: Centre de
Recherches Linguistiques sur l’asie Orientale.
Said, Edward
1979	Orientalism. New York: Pantheon.
1989	“Representing the Colonized: Anthropology’s Interlocuters.” Crit-
ical Inquiry 15: 205—25.
Schermerhom, R. A.
1978	Ethnic Plurality in India. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.
Schiffrin, Harold Z.
1980	Sun Tat-sen: Reluctant Revolutionary. Boston: Little, Brown and
Co.
258REFERENCES
Schinz, Alfred
1989 Cities in China,. Berlin: Gebruder Bomtraeger.
Schram, Stuart
1966	“Mao Tse-tung and Secret Societies.” China Quarterly 27: 1—13.
Shaffer, Lynda
1982 Mao and the Workers: The Hunan Labor Movement, 1920-1923.
Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Shen Yu Hua
1951 “Kejia de fiinu” (Hakka women). PiliKeshu Gonghui kaimu jinian
tekan (Perak Hakka Association opening memorial volume). Ipoh,
Malaysia.
Shih, Vincent Y. C.
1967	The Taiping Ideology : Its Sources, Interpretations, and Influences. Seat-
de: University of Washington Press.
Siew, Chee Nim
1953 “Labor and Tin Mining in Malaya.” Data Paper no. 7. Ithaca:
Cornell University Southeast Asia Program.
Skinner, G. William
1963 ‘The Chinese Minority.” In Indonesia, edited by Ruth T. McVey,
97—117. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc.
1964—65 “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China.” 3 parts. Journal
of Asian Studies 24 (1): 3-44; 24 (2): 195-228; 24 (3): 363-99.
1968	“Overseas Chinese Leadership: Paradigm for a Paradox.” InLeader-
ship and Authority, edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene, 191-207. Sin-
gapore: University of Malaya Press.
1977a “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems.” In The City in Late
Imperial China, edited by G. William Skinner, 275-351. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
1977b “Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China.” In The
City in Late Imperial China, edited by G. William Skinner, 211-249.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Smedley, Agnes
1956	The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
Smith, Carl T.
1985	Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong
Kong. New York: Oxford University Press.
Song Zhenting, ed.
1986	Dangdai ganbu xiao baike (The modern official’s encyclopedia).
Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe.
259REFERENCES
Srinivas, M. N.
1966 Social Change in Modem India. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Stanton, William
1900 The Triad Society of Heaven and Earth Association. Hong Kong:
Kelly and Walsh.
Stevens, William K.
1983	“Calcutta, Symbol of Urban Misery, Won’t Give Up.” New York
Times, 5 June.
Stockard, Janice E.
1989 Daughters of the Canton Delta: Marriage Patterns and Economic
Strategies in South China, 1860-1930. Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Strauch, Judith
1981	Chinese Village Politics in the Malaysian State. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
1984	“Middle Peasants and Market Gardeners: The Social Context of
the ‘Vegetable Revolution’ in a Small Agricultural Community in
the New Territories ofHong Kong.” In From Village to City: Stud-
ies in the Traditional Roots of Hong Kong Society, edited by David
Faure, James Hayes, and Alan Birch, 191-205. Hong Kong: Centre
of Asian Studies, Hong Kong University.
Strizower, Schifra
1962	Exotic Jewish Communities. London: Tomas Yoseloff.
Taiwan Hakka Association (Taiwan Kejia Gonggong Shiwu Xiehui)
1991 Taiwan Kejia Gonggong Shiwu Xiehui huiyuan shouce (Member’s
handbook, Taiwan Hakka Public Affairs Association). Taipei: Tai-
wan Kejia Gonggong Shiwu Xiehui.
Tajfel, Henri
1974	“Social Identity and Intergroup Behaviour.” Social Science Informa-
tion 13 (2): 65-93.
Tan Bian
1963	“Sun Zhongshan jiashi yuanliu jiqi shangdai jingji zhuangkuang
xin zeng” (New evidence on Sun Yatsen’s ancestry and his ances-
tors’ economic situation). Xueshuyanjiu (Scholarly research) 3: 32-
38.
Thomson, John
1898 Through China with a Camera. Westminster, England: A. Consta-
ble and Co.
260REFERENCES
Tien, Ju K’ang
1953 The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure. Monographs on
Social Anthropology, no. 12. London: London School ofEconomics.
1983 “The Chinese of Sarawak: Thirty Years of Change.” Southeast
Asian Studies 21 (3): 275—87.
Tregear, Thomas R.
1958	A Survey of Land Use in Hong Kong and the New Territories. Hong
Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
Tu Wei-ming
1991 “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center.” Daedalus 120 (2):
1-32.
Turner, Victor, and Edward M. Bruner
1986	The Anthropology of Experience. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Tweedie, M. W. F.
1953 “An Early Chinese Account of Kelantan.” Journal of the Malayan
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 26 (1): 216—19.
Tysen, Frank
1971 “Interest Groups in Calcutta.” In Bengal: Change and Continuity,
edited by Robert Paul and Mary Beech, 227-37. South Asia Series
Occasional Paper no. 6 East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State
University.
Vaughan, J. D.
1854 “Notes on the Chinese of	Journal of the Indian Archipelago
T- 1-27.
Vogel, Ezra F.
1989	One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Vomel, Johann Heinrich
1914 “Der Hakka Dialekt.” T’oung Pao n.s., 14: 597-696.
Wales, Nym
1952 Red Dust. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wang Dehong
1990	“Xinzhu xian Wenshan Guoxiao jiazhang dui mixing Kejiayu
jiaoxue zhi diaocha janjiu” (A survey of Xinzhu Wenshan Primary
School Parents’ attitudes toward the implementation of teaching
in the Hakka language). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) n: 34-37.
Wang Gungwu (University of Hong Kong)
1991a “The Chinese in Mao Tse-tung.” In The Chineseness of China, 261—
82. Hong Kong, New York: Oxford University Press.
261REFERENCES
1991b “Among non-Chinese.” Daedalus 120 (2): 135—57.
1992	‘The Hakkas in Migration History.” Keynote address. Interna-
tional Conference on Hakkaology, Chinese University of Hong
Kong, September.
Wang Hongyou (Shenzhen University)
1992 “Zhongguo dalu Kejia yanjiu de xianzhuang yu jin hou fangxiang”
(The contemporary situation and future direction of Hakka studies
in mainland China). Presented at the International Conference on
Hakkaology. Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Wang Qingcheng (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
1992	“Kejia yu Taiping Tianguo qiyi” (The Hakka and the Taiping Rebel-
lion). Presented at the International Conference on Hakkaology.
Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Wang Tsu-de (Jiangxi Normal University)
1992 “Kejia yanjiu de lixing sikao” (A rational reflection upon Hakka
research). Presented at the International Conference on Hakka-
ology. Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Wang Xingrui
1935 “Guangdong yige nongcun xianjieduan de jingji shehui” (Current
social and economic conditions in a village in Guangdong). Shih-
huo 3: 43—49.
Ward, Barbara E.
1954	“A Hakka Kongsi in Borneo.” Journal of Oriental Studies 1: 358-70.
1965	“Varieties of the Conscious Model: The Fishermen of South
China.” In TheRelevance ofModels for Social Anthropology, edited by
Michael Banton, 113—38. New York: Frederick Praeger, ASA (Asso-
ciation of Social Anthropologists) Monographs, no. 1.
Watson, James L.
1975	Emigration and the Chinese Lineage: The Mans in Hong Kong and
London. Berkeley: University of California Press.
1988	‘The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms,
Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance.” In Death Rit-
ual in Late Imperial and Modem China, edited by James L. Watson
and Evelyn S. Rawski, 3—19. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Watson, Rubie S.
1982	‘The Creation of a Chinese Lineage: The Teng of Ha Tsuen, 1669-
1751.” Modem Asian Studies 16 (1): 69—100.
1985	Inequality Among Brothers: Class and Kinship in South China. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University.
262REFERENCES
Weber, Max
1983	Max Weber on Capitalism, Bureaucracy and Religion. Edited by
Stanislav Anreski. 1920-21. Reprint, London: George Allen and
Unwin.
Wen Ji Cheng
1979 “Zhungguo min ge yu Kejia shan ge” (Chinese folksongs and
Hakka mountain songs). In Binglangyu Keshu Gonghui sishi
zhounian jinian kan (Penang Hakka Association fortieth anniver-
sary memorial volume). Penang, Malaysia.
Wen Zi Chuan
1979 “Keren zai Bingcheng” (Hakkas in Penang). In Binglangyu
Keshu Gonghui sishi zhounian jinian kan (Penang Hakka Asso-
ciation fortieth anniversary memorial volume), 717-30. Penang
Malaysia.
Wiens, Harold J.
1954 China’s March Toward the Tropics. Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String
Press.
Wolf, Arthur
1974 “Gods, Ghosts and Ancestors.” In Religion and Ritual in Chinese
Society, edited by Arthur Wolf, 131-82. Stanford: Stanford Univer-
sity Press.
Wolf, Eric
1982 Europe and the People Without History. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Wong, C. S.
1963 Kek Lok Si: Temple of Paradise. Singapore: Malaysian Sociological
Institute Ltd.
Wong Lin Ken
1965 The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914. Tucson: University of Arizona
Press.
Wong Tai Peng
1977 “The Origins of Chinese Kongsi with Special Reference to West
Borneo.” Master’s thesis, Australian National University.
Woon, Yuen-fong
1989	“Social Change and Continuity in South China: Overseas Chinese
and the Guan Lineage of Kaiping County, 1949-87.” China Quar-
terly 118: 324—44.
Wu, David Yen-ho
1991	“The Construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese Identities.” Dae-
dalus 120 (2): 159—80.
263REFERENCES
Wu Fuwen (Hakka Research Association, Longyan Teacher’s Training School,
Longyan, Fujian)
1992	“Kejia chengwei de youlai” (The origin of the Hakka’s name).
Presented at the International Conference on Hakkaology. Chi-
nese University of Hong Kong, September.
WuHua
1980 Malaixiya Huazu huiguan shiluo (A history of Malaysian Chinese
huiguan). Singapore: Nanyang Yanjiusuo.
Wu Jinxun
1991	“Kejia—zuo wei yi zhong yundong di lilunxing changshi”
(Hakka—A theoretical venture in the movement). Kejia- (Hakka)
1: 1, 4.
WuDunn, Sheryl
1990	“A Deputy Culture Minister Is Removed by Beijing.” New York
Times (national edition). 13 June.
1991	“Deng Shuns Hometown, but Still It’s a Magnet.” New York Times
(national edition). 13 May.
Xie Guozhen
1930 “Qingchu dongnan yanhai gianjie kao” (Notes on the expulsion of
the maritime people of Southeast China from living along the
seacoast during the early Qing period.) Guoxue jikan (Journal of
sinological studies) 2: 797-826.
Xin Huoxiang
1992	“Piaobo lilian chuang xin ju” (Recreating a faded history).
Yanzhou zhoukan (Asiaweek). July 12: 34—37.
Xu Meiyu et al.
1987	Zhongguo Aitu ee (China map handbook). Beijing: Zhongguo Ditu
Chubanshe.
Xu Songxi
1939 Yuejiang liuyu renmin shi (History of the peoples of Guangdong’s
river basins). Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju.
1946 Taizu Zhuangzu Yuezu kao (An investigation of the Tai, Zhuang
and Yue peoples). Shanghai: Zhonghua Shuju.
Xu Yun Qiao
1979 “Kejia renshi zai Dongnanya” (Hakka people in Southeast Asia).
In Binglangyu Keshu Gunghui sishi zhounian jinian kan (Penang
Hakka Association fortieth anniversary memorial volume).
Penang, Malaysia.
Yang, Benjamin (Yang Ben)
1984	“Chang Zheng de xingcunzhe rengran lingdaozhi Zhongguo”
264REFERENCES
(Long March survivors remain in control of China). Mingbao
yuekan (Mingbao monthly) 228 (December): 19—20.
1990	From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communists on the Long March.
Boulder: Westview.
Yang, C. K.
1959 A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition. Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press.
Yang Changzhen
1991a “Zugun yundong di linian chongjian—Cong Taiwan Kejia Gong-
gong Shiwu Xiehui di chongli tanqi” (A reconceptualization of eth-
nic movements: Starting with the establishment of the Taiwan Hakka
Public Affairs Association). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 13:58—63.
1991b “Fang xin guohui bangongshi zhuren Change Weijia tan Xu Shikai
‘Taiwan xin xianfa caoan’ di zuqun tiaokuan” (An interview with
new national assembly office director Chang Weijia about Xu
Shikai’s “draft new Taiwan constitution” articles on minorities).
Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 14: 48-49.
Yang Guchang
1991	“Qi yi (xuanquan hua)” (July 1 [a propaganda poster]). Reprinted
in Renmin ribao (People’s daily), overseas ed., 1 July.
Yang Huandian et al.
1985	“Guangxi de Hanyu fangyan (gao)” (Distribution of Chinese dia-
lects in Guangxi [draft]). Fangyan (Dialects): 3: 181-90.
Yang Jingding
1991 “Kejiahua zai Taiwan di yanbian” (The evolution of the Hakka
language on Taiwan). Presented at the Xinzhu Diqu Fazhanshi
Taolunhui (Xinzhu District Historical Development Workshop),
Academia Sinica, Taipei, 6 June.
Yang, Paul S. J.
1967 “Elements of Hakka Dialectology.” Monumenta Serica 26: 305-51.
Yang Qiu Hong
1965 “Kejia funu shenghua yiban” (The general life of Hakka women).
ItiXinjiapo TingheHuiganyibaisishiyizhounianjinian tekan (Singa-
pore Yinghe Association 141st anniversary memorial volume), 4.
Singapore.
Yang Xisong
1990 “Kejiaren yu Minnanren zhi yuanliu tantao—Cong lishixue, yixue,
yuyuanxue di guandian” (A study on the origins of the Hakka and
Hokkien from the perspectives of history, medicine, and linguis-
tics). Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) n: 8—13.
265REFERENCES
Yang Zhongmei
1988	Hu Taobang: A Chinese Biography. Translated by William A.
Wycoff; edited by Timothy Cheek. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe.
Tazhou zhoukan (Asiaweek)
1991	“Zongshi xiangqing geng nenggou zhangwo shangqing?” (Can
clan and native-place sentiments grasp business sentiments?)
Tazhou zhoukan (Asiaweek), August 25: 41.
Ye Mingsheng (Cultural Bureau, Shouning County, Fujian)
1992	“Shanghang gaodiao mu’ou xi yu Kejia zongjiao xinyang guanxi
tan wei” (An inquiry into the relation between the Shanghang
lofty-tune puppet show and Hakka religious beliefs). Presented at
the International Conference on Hakkaology. Chinese University
of Hong Kong, September.
Ye Zhong Ling
1986	“Yao Tong jijin Kezu?” (Are the Yao and Tong related to the
Hakka race?) Tazhou wenhua (Asian culture) 8: 48-55.
Yen Ching-hwang (History, University of Adelaide)
1970 “Ch’ing’s Sale of Honours and the Chinese Leadership in Singa-
pore and Malaya (1877—1912).” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1
(2): 20-32.
1976a “The Confucian Revival Movement in Singapore and Malaya,
1899—1911." Journal cf Southeast Asian Studies 12 (1): 33—57.
1976b The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Ox-
ford University Press.
1982a “The Overseas Chinese and Late Ch’ing Economic Moderniza-
tion.” Modem Asian Studies 16: 217—32.
1982b “Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Singapore and Malaya: 1877-
1912.” Modem Asian Studies 16: 397—425.
1986	A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya: 1800-1911.
Singapore: Oxford University Press.
1987	“Class Structure and Social Mobility in the Chinese Community in
Singapore and Malaya, 1800—1911.” Modem Asian Studies 21: 417—
45-
1992 “Early Hakka Dialect Organizations in Singapore and Malaya,
1801-1900.” Presented at the International Conference on Hak-
kaology, Chinese University of Hong Kong, September.
Yin Meng
1958 “Weishenme ba Kejiahua dangzuo shaoshu minzu yuyan?” (Why
should Hakka be considered a minority language?). Zhongguo
yuwen (Chinese language). 74 (August): endpaper.
266REFERENCES
Zhang Fu Ling
1971 “Kejia shan ge neirong de fenbie” (An analysis of the contents of
Hakka mountain songs). In Senmeilan Makou Kecbu Gonghui
kaimu tekan (Sembilan Makou Hakka Association inaugural vol-
ume) . Negri Sembilanri Sembilan, Malaysia.
Zhang Longxi
1988	“The Myth of the Other: China in the Eyes of the West.” Critical
Inquiry 15: 108-31.
Zhang Youzhou (Chinese Department, Longyan Normal School, Longyan,
Fujian)
1992 “Kejia minxi de xingcheng ji Kejia renjie ding shi lun” (The forma-
tion and categorization of the Hakka). Presented at the Interna-
tional Conference on Hakkaology. Chinese University of Hong
Kong, September.
Zheng Fulin, ed.
1988	Zhongguo geming hejianshe lishi shiqi renwu cidian (A dictionary of
historical figures from China’s revolutionary and construction
eras). Changchun: Jilin Renmin Chubanshe.
Zheng Hanming
1989	“Min-Gan liang sheng shisi xian qunzhong wenhua jiaoliuhui
juxing” (Fourteen counties in Fujian and Jiangxi set up cultural
exchange associations). Zhongguo wenhua bao (Chinese cultural
news), 3 September.
Zhong Fumei
1990	“Kejiaren zai nali” (Where are the Hakka?). Kejia zazhi (Hakka
magazine) 9: 20—21.
Zhong Zhaozheng
1990	“Kejiahua yu Kejia jingshen” (Hakka language and Hakka spirit).
Kejia zazhi (Hakka magazine) 12: 14-15.
1991	“Yi kaikuo di xin yingjie weilai” (Receive the future with an open
heart). Taiwan KejiaXiehui xun (Taiwan Hakka Association news-
letter) 1: 1.
Zhuang Yingzhang and Chen Yundong
1982 “Qingdai Toufen di zongzu yu shehui fazhan shi” (The history of
lineage and social development in Qing dynasty Toufen). Gouli
Taiwan ShifanDaxue lishixue bao (National Taiwan Normal Univer-
sity journal of history) 6: 143-76.
267Contributors
sharon A. carstens is associate professor of anthropology at
Portland State University in Oregon. She has conducted research in
Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, and has written numerous articles on
Chinese culture in Southeast Asia.
myron L. cohen is professor of anthropology at Columbia Uni-
versity. He has conducted long-term research in Taiwan, and more
recently has worked in the People’s Republic of China. He is the author
of numerous books and articles. His most well-known book, House
United, House Divided (1976), is based on research in a Hakka commu-
nity in Taiwan.
Nicole constable is assistant professor of anthropology at the
University of Pittsburgh. She is the author of Christian Souls and Chi-
nese Spirits: A Hakka Community in Hong Kong (1994).
mary s. erbaugh is associate professor of Chinese translation
and linguistics at the City University of Hong Kong. She has conducted
sociolinguistic research in the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, and
Hong Kong, and is currently writing a book about language and power
in twentieth-century China.
Elizabeth lominska j o h n s o n is a curator at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia Museum of Anthropology. She has published
numerous articles based on her long-term research among Hakka in
Hong Kong.
Howard j. martin received a doctoral degree in anthropology
from the University of Virginia in 1990. He has published articles based
on several years of archival and field research in Taiwan and is now
working on an ethnographic history of Hakka in northern Taiwan.
269CONTRIBUTORS
ellen oxfeld is associate professor of sociology and anthropol-
ogy at Middlebury College, Vermont. She has conducted Hakka re-
search in Calcutta and Toronto and is the author of Blood, Sweat and
Mahjong: Family and Enterprise in an Overseas Chinese Community
(1993).
270Index
Aborigines (yuanzhumin), 146,178,179,
190
Academy of Sciences, 224
Academy of Social Sciences, 198, 229,
230
Agriculture: Hakka,5,12,19,23,56,119,
218; women’s participation in, 26; in
Malaysia, 126,127,136; in China, 132
Ancestor halls, 82, 99, in, 122; Hakka vs.
Cantonese, 27, 54, 92-93,120; in
Kwan Mun Hau, 29, 86, 92-93. See
also Ancestor worship; Ancestral
tablets
Ancestor worship, 86, 91-94,101, 210;
and gender, 27, 92, 94-95; of
affines, 87W32; at domestic altars,
92-93, 94; in Kwan Mun Hau, 93-
94, 95; Hakka vs. Cantonese, 93-94;
in Taiwan, 94; and Christianity, 95,
101,120,122; and Chinese identity,
109, 120; offerings, 170-71. See also
Ancestor halls; Ancestral tablets
Ancestors in China, 182-83
Ancestral tablets, Catonese vs. Hakka,
27, 92-93, 94
Ancestral tombs, 83, 87, 96, 97, 207, 208
Anderson, Benedict, 33
Anthropology, 3,5,16, 108,198
Architecture, 83; roundhouses, i8owr,
211, 211WV
Armenians, 152,165
Assimilation: in Hong Kong, 23, 85, 91,
100W2, 105,115; in Malaysia, 23; in
China, 23, 132119, 197-98, 205, 214,
217, 228; in Taiwan, 178
Associations, 90, 104,122,123,147,155;
Hakka, 4,105,197, 207, 229«ro; na-
tive place, 223. See also Chongzheng
Hui; Fund hui; Huiguan; Interna-
tional Hakka Association; Kuala
Krai Hakka Association; Peasant
Association; Secret societies; Tsuen
Wan Sports Association; Tsung
Tsin Hakka Association; World-
wide Hakka Federation
Aw Boon Haw, 115-16
Aw Boon Haw Foundation, 229w.ro
Baba Chinese, 136, i;6ni8, 138
Bandits, 45, 69,163
Bangladesh, 152
Bank of China, 116
Banka, Hakka miners in, 133,135
Bao’an, Hakka, 30, 83,103, 104
Barth, Fredrik, n, 16,106,142,150
Basel Evangelical Missionary Society
(Basel mission), 60,100,103,104
Basso, Keith, no
Beijing Massacre, 226
Beijing Museum of Overseas Chinese
History, 228
Beijing University, 215
Bendi. See Bendiren; Benturen; Punti
Bendiren, 80, 206W;. See also Benturen;
Punti
Bengalis, 163; view of Hakka, 158—60
Benshengren. See Taiwan, native
Taiwanese
Bentley, G. Carter, 107, 151, 173
Benton, Gregor, 217, 222
Bentu. See Benturen; Punti
Benturen, ion6, 17, 29, 80, 99
Biharis, 153,164
Blake, C. Fred, 8ow2, 89, 94wry, 171
Boat people, 119
Boluo, Hakka in, 45
Bourdieu, Pierre, 19, 34,108,143,173
Bribery, 163
Brokaw, Cynthia, 227
Bureaucracy, 163
271INDEX
Burial rights, 86. See also Punti, legal
rights in Hong Kong
Business. See Entrepreneurial ethic
Calcutta: Hakka in, 19-20, 22, 29, 32,
149-75,198; Chinese in, 22-23, 149,
153,157,159; wealth and status, 24,
116,166-67,169,170; gender roles,
26, 28; ethic consciousness, 29,31,
34; entrepreneurs, 127,154; leather
industry, 149,153,154,157; popula-
tion, 149,150,152; center and periph-
ery, 154-56; British rule of, 155;
death and afterlife, 171; women in
family enterprises, 172. See also Can-
tonese, in Calcutta; Dhapa; Educa-
tion, in Calcutta; Occupations, in
India; Sino-Indian Conflict; Sino-
Indian relations
Campbell, George, 41, 43
Canton. See Guangzhou
Canton Delta, 26, 45-46, 48
Cantonese: stereotypes of, 8, 25, no, in,
161-62; intermixing with non-
Chinese, 15; assimiliation of, 85; in
New Territories, 105; in Malaysia,
129,133; in Calcutta, 149,161,173; as
lao, 161; Hakka mistaken as, 205;
economic success, 212; mentioned,
208, 208124, 228. See also Hakka-
Cantonese relations; Yue
Capitalism, Chinese, 11622/2, 169—70
Caste system, Hindu, 152, 153,153224, IJ6-
57227, 165-66; Chinese rejection of,
166
Centre d’Anthropologie de la Chine du
Sud, 22922/0
Chamar (leather workers), 164,16722//
Chan (lineage) of Kwan Mun Hau,
86-87
Changlou, Hakka migrations to, 45
Changting, Hakka migrations to, 206,
210, 226, 227. See also Tingzhou
Chaozhou, 37, 9422/5, 128222; name and
place of origin, 12229, 48; relations
with Hakka, 66, 85, no, 115; in New
Territories, 105; dialect, no; reputa-
tion, 115; in Malaysia, 129,129223,
130,131
Chen Gongbo, 215
Chen Han-seng, 49,52
Chen Jiongming, 220
Chen Jitang, 221
Chen Yi, 199, 211, 220, 222, 223, 224, 227
Chiang Ching-kuo, 179
Chiang Kai-shek, 188
Chinese Communist Party (CCP): lead-
ers, 21,198,199, 204, 208-9; in
Hakka regions, 209; founders, 215;
language policies, 223. See also Chi-
nese communist revolution; Peo-
ple’s Republic of China
Chinese communist revolution, Hakka
participation in, 21,197,199, 209
Chinese identity. See Hakka, as Han
Chinese; Han
Chinese Medical Association, 224
Chinese state (imperial), 39-40; local
representatives of, 39-40; opposi-
tion to, 40, 67-68; authority of, 61,
78; suppression of capitalism by, 170
Chinese University of Hong Kong, 96,
103, 229
Ching Ming festival, 121
Chinggis Khan, 9
Chiqi ting, 46-47, 72, 74
Chiqi xianzhi (Chiqi gazetteer), 59, 65,
69, 73, 74
Chong Yang festival, 91, 92,121
Chongzheng Hui (International Hakka
Association), 88,104,105, 207. See
also Associations
Chou Kefen sheng (Hate the Hakka and
differentiate dialects), 73
Christianity: and Hakka identity, 18, 24,
29,100-102, in, 113-14,120,123,
176; and entrepreneurial ethic, 24,
116—17; and orthodoxy, 120; as stig-
matized identity, 122,123. See also
Ancestor worship, and Christianity;
Basel Evangelical Missionary Soci-
ety; Christians, Chinese; Missionar-
ies; Shung Him Tong
Christians, Chinese: persecution of, 5»j,
272INDEX
29,101,104; converts, 13,60,101,103,
119,122,210; Hakka, 18,29,100,102;
networks of, 61,104; education of,
ioi«j, 103,208; Roman Catholic, 115;
in India, 165; institutions of, 224;
mentioned, 24,94,95,122,229. See
also Christianity; Shung Him Tong
Chun An, 145
Chung Chi College, 103
Ci hai, 215
Class, economic: hierarchy, 5,6,15,22,23,
39,117,135; and mobility, 28,115-16;
and gender, 28,117—18; in Southern
China, 39-40; conflict, 67; among
God Worshipers, 76—77; in Calcutta,
166,167. See also Ethnicity, and social
inequality; Hakka, tenancy
Clothing, Hakka: 33, 81, 99, no, in, 124,
136, 210, 227; hat, 81W3, 117,118; as
ethnic marker, 8ikj, 117; She, 210
Coastal evacuation, 59, 84
Cohen, Abner, 106
Cohen, Myron, 16-17, 94,120
Comaroff, Jean and John, 5, 6, 7, 8, n,
12,13, 28, 34-35
Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese
Empire, 14
Confucian Revival, 140
Confucianism, 23
Convention of Peking, 85
Couplets, 29, 84,101
Crissman, Lawrence, 162
Cultural Revolution, 226, 227; Hakka
language in, 216-17; and Hakka
leaders, 224, 225
Dabu (Taipu), Hakka from, 134,140,
207, 220
Dacoits, 163
Dai (Tai), 219
Dances, unicorn and lion, 81, 8i«4
Daoism, 227, 228, 229
De Groot, J. J. M. See Groot, J. J. M. de
Degree holders, 69,74,139,139«23,198,
211. See also Education, Hakka empha-
sis on; Examinations, civil service
Democracy movement (1989), 225
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
181,183,193,193»«
Deng Xiaoping: era, 22, 225—31; as
Hakka, 187,197,198; as paramount
leader 204; as multilingual, 208;
education of, 211; father of, 220;
denudation of, 224, 231; rehabilita-
tion of, 225-26; and 1989 student
protests, 226
Dhapa, 150,158-68passim. See also
Calcutta
Dong Biwu, I99»j
Dowry, 163
Dress. See Clothing
Earth god shrine, 85, 93
East China Normal University, 229
East India Company, 152
East River Guerrillas, 220
Easter, 121
Eastern Europe, 231
Eastern Jin dynasty, 41
Education: language of instruction, 90-
91, 126,177,192, I92»'2; informal, 91
sumo, 112; Confucian classics in,
126; in Malaysia, 126,139; Hakka em
phasis on, 132,139,143, 145,148, 211;
degrees purchased, 139, 139K2;; in
U.S., 148; and social mobility, 148;
in Calcutta, 1491//, 155,164-65; in
Taiwan, 177,192. See also Degree
holders; Examinations, civil service
Eitel, E. J., 48
Emergency, 141
Encyclopedia Britannica, 14
Encyclopedia of Missions, 14
Entrepreneurial ethic, 22-25, 115-16, 165-
72; in Malaya 135, 138-39,140, 229;
in Calcutta, 149-75 passim;
Fujianese, 212
Essentialism: ethnic, 4, 7, 85,123;
critiques of, 5,16, 35; gender, 27
Ethnic boundaries, 24,95,142,150,155,156,
164,177,187,217. See also Hakka-
Cantonese relations; Hakka-
Hokkien relations; Hakka-Punti
relations
273INDEX
Ethnic consciousness: conditions for, 6,
19, 22, 30—31, 34; development of 7,
8, n, 15; Hakka, 7-16 passim, 22,30-
32, 34, 98-100,106,144—45; in Tai-
wan, 20,178,182,185,189,197-98; in
the People’s Republic of China,
196,197,198, 205, 208, 210
Ethnic group: Hakka as, 3; as a cultural
unit, 5, 5»4, 142-43; competition, 8,
n-12. See also Hakka-Cantonese rela-
tions; Hakka-Hokkien relations;
Hakka-Punti relations; Hakka, iden-
tity; Minority nationalities
Ethnic identity: and critique of primor-
dialism, 8-9, 34; as primordial, 9,
34,101,107,108,123, 173; 175; as in-
strumental, 16,100,101,106,108,
194; as dialogical, 150. See also
Ethnic consciousness; Ethnicity;
Hakka, identity; Hakka ethnic
movement; Identity; Language,
and identity
Ethnicity: and history, 6,151; and social
inequality, 6, 8,106; perpetuation
of, 6,18; and descent, 8,106; de-
fined, 11,150; and competition, 11-
12,13; and habitus, 19, 34,143-44,
174-75; interactional approach to,
19,150-75 passim; and state policies,
22,151; and class, 23, 219; and au-
thenticity, 29; and language, 32-33,
196. See also Ethnic boundaries; Eth-
nic consciousness; Ethnic group;
Ethnic identity; Hakka, identity;
History, and identity; Language,
and identity
Evacuation, coastal, 59, 84
Examinations, civil service, 132, 211; quo-
tas, 13, 212. See also Degree holders
Fan gui (foreign ghosts), 161,162
Fang (branches), 59, 59»2
Fang Fang, 220, 224
Fanling, 100,102
February Adverse Current, 224
Feminism, 28
Feng Yunshan, 70, 75
Fengshui (wind and water), 60, 61
Food: Hakka, 92, no; and ethnic iden-
tity, 159; prohibitions, 159,165; men-
tioned, 136,164
Footbinding: rejection of, 25-26,117,
132,147, 210; symbolic meaning of,
26,117; opposition to, 211-12; and
Sun Yat-sen as Hakka, 214—15; men-
tioned 132K9, syinio
Forrest, R. A. D., 37-38
Four-character phrases, 168
Freedman, Maurice, 36-37, 39-40, 67
Fried, Morton H., 79
Fu Lianchang, 224
Fujian, 36-39 passim; social organization
of, 36; dialects, 36-39 passim; Hakka
population in, 44; Hakka regions
of, 196; in Chinese revolution, 218.
See also Hokkien; Min
Funeral laments, 8i«t
Fund hui (women’s organization), 128
Galas River, 126
Gambling, 114,116,123
Gan, 2o8«4, 219
Gandhi, Indira, 174
Ganzhou, Jiangxi, Hakka immigrants
from, 42
Gates, Hill, 170-71
Gender: stereotypes, 6, 27, 88, 90,113—
14,117; roles, 19, 22, 25-28, 81,107—
9,118-19,127-28,132,145,172-73,
210; and division of labor, 25, 26, 27,
90,117-18,123,136,141,172, 210;
public/private, 26-27, 94,118-19;
power, 27; equality, 28; and ances-
tor worship, 27, 94; and modernity,
28; fund hui, 128; relations, 146-47;
She, 210; women’s movement, 218
Genealogies: reliability of, 40-41; on
grave markers, 121; mentioned, 96,
96K/9
Gentry, 39, 55, 69, 71; Hakka, 73-74
Geography of the World, 14
God Worshipers, Society of, rtmo; and
Hakka-Cantonese feuds, 70; Hong
Xiuquan, 70,75,211,214; Christian
27+INDEX
influence on, 75; as anti-Manchu, 75,
77; linguistic exclusivity of, 76,77;
class aspects of, 76-77; Hong
Rengan, 77. See also Taiping
Rebellion
Great Leap Forward, 224.
Groot, J. J. M. de, 134/1/4
Gu Dacun, 218
Gua Musang, 126
Guan Yin, 128
Guandi feast day, 134
Guangdong, 36-79 passim; social organi-
zation, 36, 78; dialects, 36, 37, 38, 39,
40, 44, 45—46, 48, 50-51; popula-
tion density, 46-48, 48-49; settle-
ment of, 53, 57,59; dialect group
conflicts, 71-72, 73, 75; Hakka
regions in, 196. See also Cantonese;
Yue
Guangfu Im (Cantonese fellows), 161
Guangxi: settlement patterns, 51,53; dia-
lect group conflicts, 71-72, 75; social
groups, 78
Guangzhou, Hakka settlement near,
45-48
Guanhua, 17. See also Mandarin language
Gui (ghost), 19,161-62
Guo Moruo, 223
Guomindang. See Nationalist Party
Guoyu, 177. See also Mandarin language
Gypsies, 186,197
Habitus, 19, 34, 92, 143-44,175,174-75
Hailams, 141/128
Hai-Lu-Feng, 216, 217; army, 220
Hainan Island, 47
Hakka (Kejia): meaning of name, 3,12,
44,132,197; population, 3, 4, 4»A
84,198—99; origins, 5, 6, 9,13-14,
29, 40, no, hi; character, 9-10, 22-
30 passim, 33, 89,107-108,145-47;
mountain songs, 10227, 33, 99,125,
145, 210; tenancy, 12, 51-52,54, 55, 59,
62, 76—77, 103, 209; mass protest in
Guangdong, 14,142, 209; as Han
Chinese, 14,15, 22, 26, 29-30,142,
204, 213; anthem, 20,186; poverty,
22-25, 33, 89, no, 113,133,171,172,
208; as Cantonese, 23, 85, 205; “ten-
dencies,” 30,107-8,141,143,144,
211; xian (counties), 46-49,50, 59,
196, 213, 217, 218-19; settlement pat-
terns, 50,51,55, 61, 65; alliances, 64;
markers, 8i«;, no, 117; customs, 99,
145; economic success, 115, 148, 162,
212; kinship, 136; other names for,
206; 211. See also Clothing, Hakka;
Education, Hakka emphasis on;
Ethnic consciousness, Hakka;
Hakka ethnic movement, Taiwan;
Migrations, Hakka; Occupations;
People’s Republic of China, Hakka
studies in
identity: decline of, 20; as stigma-
tized, 21, 23, 82, 90,122-23,197;
resurgence of, 97; perpetuation of,
107; meaning of, 108-9; piety and,
109, no, 113-14; women as a symbol
of, 119; and history, 190; and dialect,
193; and race, 193; See also Ethnic
consciousness, Hakka; History, and
Hakka identity; Kwan Mun Hau;
Shung Him Tong
language: study of, 4; and origins, 14;
decline of, 17, 20,32,33,37, 90-91,
99,177, 191,195, 231; dialect groups,
36-37, 45, 64,143,193; known as fu
fan, 41; and God Worshipers, 76,
77; used in church, io6«p, 119; in
Taiwan, 178,180,191-93,195; demon-
stration in Taiwan, 179,192, 228;
map of, 200; and identity, 196, 208;
in Hunan, 216; in Chinese revolu-
tion, 222
stereotypes, 10, n, 22-30 passim, 33-
34, 89-90, 93,108, no; patriotism,
6; cooperativeness, 6, no, 116; as
non-Chinese, 14, 26; egalitarianism,
19, 33, 94, 107-8,113,171-72; eco-
nomic conservativeness, 19; rural
residence, 22-25, 82; as archetypally
Chinese, 30; negative, 33; consis-
tency of, 34; poverty, 82; diligence,
112,114; thrift, 112—115 passim. See
275INDEX
also Gender, sterotypes; Hakka,
character; Hakka, “tendencies”
Hakka Church, ioo, i03»d
Hakka ethnic movement, Taiwan, 7, 20-
21,176-95 passim; anthem, 20,186;
trends in, 20; views on reunification
with Mainland China, 20,180-81;
importance of history in, 20,180,
190-91,194-95; factions in, 176,
179-80; traditionalist faction in,
176,180—82,195; moderate faction
in, 176,182-84; radical faction in,
176,184—89,195; organization of,
177; goals of, 178; origin of, 179;
leadership of, 179,184,185; critics
of, 193-94. See also Ethnic con-
sciousness, Hakka; Hakka, lan-
guage, in Taiwan; History, in
Hakka ethnic movement; Martyrs
Temple
Hakka jim deihjyuh (Hakka taking over
and becoming landlords), 114
Hakka Magazine, i86wtf, 128
Hakka Storm, 185
Hakka Studies Center, Sibao, 227
Hakka-Bengali relations, 163
Hakka-Cantonese relations, 8, 11-12,15,
18, 38, 39, 68,100; as conflicts, 38,
39, 40, 45—46, 48-49,55-56, 61, 63,
64, 65, 70—78 passim; as symbiotic,
54-55,56; See also Hakka-Punti rela-
tions; Hakka-Punti Wars
Hakka-Chaozhou relations, 66, 85, no,
115
Hakka-Hokkien relations, 178, 185—90
passim, 190019
Hakkaology Conference, 96, 228-29
Hakka-Punti relations: in Hong Kong,
32, 105; as conflicts, 48-49,55,105,
106, 212, 217; in Guangxi, 71-72. See
also Hakka-Cantonese relations;
Hakka-Punti Wars
Hakka-Punti Wars, 5»4 13, 87,104, 212.
See also Hakka-Punti relations
Hamberg, Theodore, 77
Han (ethnic Chinese), 108,109; Hakka
as, 3, 9,15, 29-30, 36,109, no, 132,
142, 207, 209, 230; unity of, 21, 24,
204, 213; Tang and Northern Song
dynasty expansion of, 44; gender
ideals among, 117-18; patriarchy
among, 117-18; identity of, 95,
9Sni8, 120; native place ties of, 207;
chauvinism among, 220
Han Suyin, ancestors of, 9,132HP, 2i6n8
Hang Hau Peninsula, 83
Hangzhou, Taiping occupation of, 212
Harrell, Stevan, 107,150,170
Hawaii, 10—11
Hayes, James, 85
Henan, Hakka migration from, 41
Heung Yee Kuk, 88,103,104
Hill tribes. See Minority nationalities
Hinduism, 165; concept of purity and
pollution, 19,149,151,151WJ, I53„4,
156, 158,167
Historical imagination, 8
History: and construction of identity,
3-4, 7, 9-io, 16, 35,107, hi, 151; and
Hakka identity, 6,13, 30, 95—96,
no—13,120-22,190-91,194; “sec-
ond order,” 7-8; two kinds, 7;
Hakka as Chinese in, 30,142; in
Hakka ethnic movement, 32,176,
177, 180, 182,190-91,194-95; oral,
84-85; and invented traditions, 107;
memorialized, 122
Ho Chi Minh, 219
Ho Ping-ti, 54
Hobsbawm, Eric, 107
Hokkien: stereotypes, 8; language, io»d,
177,178, 191,192,193, 195; in Taiwan,
125, 177,187-88,192, 193,195; in Ma-
laysia, 127,129,133,142; marriage,
129,130,131,135,136; in Singapore
Nationalist and Reformist move-
ments, 140; gender division of labor
among, 14W27; in politics, 142,183,
185,188; assimilation to, 178; defini-
tion of, 205K2. See also Hakka-
Hokkien relations; Min
Hoklo, 48, 66, 68, 85, 2O5»2
Holo. See Hoklo
Hong Kong, 17-18, 80; women’s roles
276INDEX
in, 27; government, 82,100; politi-
cal change in, 96-97; Hakka popula-
tion, 198. See also Kwan Mun Hau;
Shung Him Tong; Tsuen Wan;
New Territories
Hong Rengan, 77
Hong Xiuquan, 70, 75, 211, 21+
Honig, Emily, 207
Household work, 118,147
Hsieh T’ing-yu, 10, 41
Hu Yaobang, 224, 225
Hu Zi Chuan, 139
Hua Guofeng, 224, 225
Huang Chao, 41
Hubeinese, in Calcutta, 22-23,149,161
Huiguan (mutual aid associations), 7,
137, ri/W, s^nzo, 139,144-47
Huizhou (Waichau), Hakka conflicts in,
68
Human rights, 230
Hunan, Hakka in, 45, 216
Hung-t’ow rebellion, 71
Identity: as culturally constructed, 3-4;
as experiential, 4; symbolic expres-
sions of, 4,18, 95, 101-2,109-23;
and postmodern dilemma, 5; and rit-
ual, 120. See also Ethnic conscious-
ness; Ethnic identity; Ethnicity;
Hakka, identity; History, and
Hakka identity; Language, and
identity
India, 19-20; British rule, 152; Sino-
Indian Border Conflict, 158-60. See
also Calcutta; Sino-Indian relations
Indonesia, 142; Hakka population of,
141,199
Ingrams, Harold, 60
International Hakka Association, 117,
123. See also Associations, Hakka
Ipoh, 128; schools, 139
Israelis, comparison to Hakka, 186
Japanese: rule in Taiwan, 178,182,191;
defeat of, 199, 223; occupation of
China, 215; research on Hakka, 230
Java, 136
Jews, 208; in India, 152,165, ibynio, 166
Jiangsu peasants, 207
Jiangxi, Hakka regions in, 45,196
Jiaying University, 228
Jiaying Zhou, 132; remittances to, 135.
See also Meixian
Johore, 126
Kapitan, 138. See also Yap Ah Loy
Kaying. See Jiaying; Meixian
Kaying Magazine, 14
Ke ren, (guest person), 206
Keji (guest in the population register),
206
Kejia. See Hakka
Kejia zuqun yundong. See Hakka ethnic
movement
Kelantan, Hakka in, 126, 133
Keyes, Charles, 8,106,107
Kingston, Maxine Hong, 161
Kongsi (work organizations), 134-35,137
Koxinga, 182
Kuala Krai Hakka Association, 128
Kulp, Daniel, 66
Kwan Mun Hau, isk/2, 23; Hakka iden-
tity in, 17-18, 24, 29, 3b 33, 34, 81-
97, 99; concept of benturen in, 17,
29, 80, 88, 93, 99; as Tsuen Wan
people, 17, 29, 88, 89, 95; compared
with Shung Him Tong, 17-18, 31,
80, 90, 99; upward mobility in, 24;
ancestor halls in, 29, 86, 92-93; set-
tlement of, 31; Hakka language in,
33; rural life in, 83; Yao lineage in,
84, 86-87, 91, 93, 96; Chan lineage
in, 86-87; sources of income in, 86;
politics in, 88; relations with non-
Hakka in, 89-90; expressions of cul-
tural difference in, 90-95. See also
Tsuen Wan
Laai Yi-faai, 51, 55, 75-76, 77
Labor unions, 134, 216. See also Kongsi
Land reform, 224
Land tenure, 47
Landlords, 39,52,114; Punti, 55, 62, 76;
Tang, 103
277INDEX
Language: as sociocultural variable, 16,
36-79 passim-, and identity, 22,32-
33, 90, i62«i, 173,180,196; in the
Taiping Rebellion, 32, 223; Fujian
dialects, 36-39; and social organiza-
tion in Southeast China, 36-79; dia-
lect groups, 37-38, +0, 41, 54, 65, 67,
78,125»r, 208, 2O8«4; of God Wor-
shipers, 76, 223; Chaozhou dialect,
no; in Calcutta, i49-5O»i, 164; dem-
onstrations, 191-92; as primordial,
192; policies, 193, 223; Gan, 2o8«4,
219; Xiang, 2o8«4, 213; used in Chi-
nese revolution, 222. See also Educa-
tion, language of instruction;
Guangdong, dialects; Hakka, lan-
guage; Hokkien, language; Manda-
rin language; Min; Wu; Yue
Lao (fellows), 19,161,162
Leach, Edmund, 142
Lechler, Rudolf, 69
Lee, Edwin, 147-48
Leong, S. T., 12
Li (measure), 64«4
Li Da, 215, 216
Li Dazhao, 199m
Li Kuan-yew, 187
Li Lisan, 216, 223
Liancheng City, population, 227
Liang-Guang, 71ns
Liao (lineage) of Sheung Shui, 85
Li Qiao, 186
Li Teng-hui, 187
Lin Boqu, 218
Lin Kai Lin, 103,104
Lineage, 36-79 passim, 37, 39, 40, 81;
localized, 37, 39, 49, 72, 94; during
Southern Song dynasty, 40-41, 44;
and land tenure, 47; and land own-
ership, 53, 65, 97; fragmentary, 61;
conflicts, 67; as dialect-preserving,
67; Liao of Sheung Shui, 85; Chan
of Kwan Mun Hau, 86-87; trusts,
86; and identity, 96. See also Tang
of Hong Kong; Villages, and lin-
eages; Villages, multisumame; Vil-
lages, single surname; Yau of Kwan
Mun Hau
Linebarger, Paul, 213
Liu Bocheng, 221, 224
Liu Shaoqi, I99«t, 224
Long March, 199, 203, 221-23, 224; and
Hakka language, 32; Hakka partici-
pation in, 220-21, 231; iconography,
225, 226; bibliographies, 225; veter-
ans, 228
Lung Yeuk Tau, 102,105
Luo Xianglin: on Hakka migrations, 14,
40-41; on Hakka conflicts, 71; life
of, 104-5,120; and Luo family
ancestral hall, 122; as historian, 122,
197; on Sun Yat-sen, 213, 2i4»7
Lutheran Church, IO3»6
Malaya. See Malaysia
Malaysia, 18-19,124-48,194; Chinese
identity in, 19,128,136,142,147;
Hakka occupations in, 23,128-29;
occupational specialization in, 24,
126-42 passim-, Hakka identity in,
29, 99,142,148; agriculture in, 126,
127,136; education in, 126,139; Japa-
nese in, 126; New Villages in, 126,
i29«tf; politics in, 127,140; Canton-
ese in, 129,133; Hakka population
of, 129, 192K.;, 199; Hakka tenden-
cies in, 130,140-41,143; marriage
in, 136,140,148; Chinese in, 194.
See also Pulai; Sarawak
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA),
129,129»4
Manchu conquest: and Hakka migra-
tion, 44-45; opposition to, 77-78
Mandarin language, 37, 41,187, 2o8»4; in
Taiwan, 177,178,191,192,193; in
Yan’an, 223; in Hakka regions, 227
Mao Zedong, 199,199m, 204, 216, 220,
221; use of Hakka, 217; in Yan’an,
223; denunciation of, 231
Marriage, 25,103,148; exogamous, 66;
and dialect, 66-67; laments, 8i»5;
networks, 83, 92; Hakka to non-
Hakka, 91,126, i6s—66mo, 177, 209,
210; Hakka, 92; in Malaysia, 136,
140,148; Hokkien, 136; of Chinese
in India, 153,155; banquets, 169
278INDEX
Martial arts, 85,126, 131,138,143,146,
148, 227
Martyrs Temple (Yimin Miao), 183^4,
i8s»<S, 192
Marwaris, 153
Marxists, 216
Maryknoll mission, ij2«rr
May Fourth era, 215, 225
Mayers, W. F., 71
Meixian (Jiaying, Kaying), 12, 30, 42, 43,
49,134,140, 161,175, 209; Hakka
settlement in, 42, 45; population of,
45, 46; as “Hakka capital,” 204,
209; poverty in, 209, 226, 227, 228;
literacy rate in, 211; peasant associa-
tion in, 218; guerrillas in, 220; land
reform in, 224
Meizhou, 42-43. See also Meixian
Mercenaries, 56, 76,133, 212
Meyners d’Estray, H. Compte, 50
Miaoli xian, and Hakka ethnic move-
ment, 176
Miao-Yao, 205
Michener, James, 10-11
Migrations, Hakka: overseas, 4-5, 9, 47,
84, 131-32; to Southeast Asia, 4,
30-31, 84, 197, 207; waves of, 9,14-
16, 40-47,109,131,1++, 1+6,197;
and Hakka consciousness, 12, 30-31;
to Shung Him Tong, 31; to Malaya,
31, 133-42; to Calcutta, 31,149,152;
to Taiwan, 31,186, 190—91; to
Jiangxi, 41; to Fujian, 41, 48,132; to
Guangdong, 41, 44, 46-50, 53,132,
197; to Sichuan, 45,197; to
Guangxi, 45, 47,132; and kinship
networks, 60; from Henan, 84; to
Hong Kong, 84, 197; from Meixian,
140, 209; to Toronto, 174. See also
Hakka, origins; Hakka, settlement
patterns; History
Militia (tuanlian), 56
Min, 205, 208, 208K4, 2i3»<f, 228; region,
219. See also Hokkien, language
Ming dynasty: Hakka migrations, 43;
loyalists, 182
Mining, 5, 18, 23,126,132,133, 134,136«t7,
137,139, 216
Minnanhua. See Hokkien, language;
Min
Minority nationalities (shaoshu minzu),
221, 223, 230; Hakka as, 13,109,117,
119-20, 209—10, 230; gender roles
among, 109,117; ties to land
among, 109,119-20; Yi, I5O»2, 221;
positive views of, 197, 230; designa-
tion of, 204, 223; Dai, 219; Nong,
219; Zhuang, 219. See also She
Minxi (subetJinic group), Hakka as, 230
Min-Yue-Gan, 196
Minzu. See Minority nationalities
Missionaries, un8, 30, 60; in
Guangdong, 100,104,142,198;
views on Hakka, 108,109,118,144.
See also Basel Evangelical Mission-
ary Society; Christians, Chinese,
converts
Modernity, 119
Mongol invasion, 9, 43, 44
Mountaintopism, 223
Muslims, 149, 153, 164,165
Mutual aid groups. See Huiguan
Nanjing, Taipings in, 212
Nationalist Party (Guomindang), 141-
42; Hakka support for, 141-42, 213-
15; in Taiwan, 180-83 passim, 199; op-
position to, 220; army of, 220, 221;
defection of, 220; conflicts with Chi-
nese Communist Party, 222; lan-
guage policy of, 223, 230
Nationalist revolution, 212-15
Negri Semilan, Hakka miners of, 137-38
Neng mai zu tian . . . (You can sell off
your ancestral land . . .), 208
Nepalis, 152,153,164
New Fourth Army, 223
New Hakka, 21,185,186,194
New Territories, Hong Kong, 30, 80, 83;
Hakka settlement in, 49,50, 53, 56-
57, 58, 60, 62, 80, 83; taxation in, 52;
disputes in, 52; British rule in, 52,
85, 104; population of, 62; Sha Tau
Kok, 83; lease of, 85; government
representatives in, 86; New Towns,
86; Punti rights in, 121. See also
279INDEX
Hong Kong; Kwan Mun Hau; Sai
Kung; Sha Tin; Shung Him Tong;
Tai Po; Tsuen Wan
New Year (lunar), 94
Nie Rongzhen, 224, 226—27
Nine Honorable Grandfathers, 85
Ninghua xian, 43, 206
Nong, 219
Norman, Jerry, 14
Northern Song dynasty, administration,
44
Occupations: of Hakka overseas, 5,
23»J4; of Hakka in China, 6, 23, 24,
51, 68,132, 209; of Hakka in India,
19, 22,149-75 passim-, ethnic special-
ization in, 22-23, 68-69,149, >53,
154,157; in Shung Him Tong, 22; of
Cantonese, 22,149,157; of
Hubeinese, 22-23,149,157; in Tai-
wan, 23; in Kwan Mun Hau, 23; in
commerce, 24-25; in Malaya, 24,
126-42 passim-, Hakka stonecutters,
68-69; of Hokkien, 129,130,131,
135; polluted, 156-57; of She, 210.
See also Agriculture; Gender, and
division of labor; Mining
Oehler, Wilhelm, 51, 61
Okie, 116,197
Opera, Cantonese, 86
Opium Wars, 101
Orang Asli, 126
Orientalism, 131111
Orthopraxy, 120
Pahang, 133
Pakistan, 152
Parsis, 165, i6$nio
Pasternak, Burton, Ii8„rj
Paton, W. Bernard, 50
Patterson, Orlando, 150
Pearl River Delta, 26, 48, 49
Peasant Association, 218
Peasants, 39, 52
Penang, Chinese in, 139-40
Peng Dehuai, 199m
Peng Pai, 216, 217
Pengmin (shed people), 205
People’s Liberation Army, 224
People’s Republic of China (PRC):
Hakka identity in, 21-22, 32,196;
government, 21; Hakka studies in,
21-22,32, 96, 227-30passim-, Hakka
leaders in, 23, 33, 187,196-231 pas-
sim-, women in, 28, 231; Hakka re-
gions in, 46-47,196, 202, 206, 209;
Hakka population of, 196,198, 206,
2301111; silence regarding Hakka in,
196; establishment of, 199; overseas
investment in, 228. See also Chinese
Communist Party; Chinese commu-
nist revolution
Peranakan, 136
Phenix village, 57, 66
Philanthropy, 139,140
Philippines, Hakka population in, 199
Pietists, German, toi
Piracy, 76
Piton, Charles, 41,54,56
Population pressure, 43, 78
Protestants ethic, 116. See also Entrepre-
neurial ethic
Protestants, 98
Pulai, 18-19, 24,125-28,130; gender
roles in, 28; Hakka identity in, 29,
34,125; Chinese identity in, 19, 29,
125,126,128; compared with Shung
Him Tong, 125; marriage patterns
in, 126; economic conservatism in,
126-27; political orientation in, 127;
gender roles in, 127-28; compared
with Calcutta, 127; and Communist
guerrillas, 127
Pu-lu-wei, 57, 63
Punti (Bendi), n,17, 29, 206; definition
of, 10, iond, 44, 99; in Hong Kong,
1011(5, 31, 32, 80, IOO, 102, 102ns 112,
113,114; stereotypes, 25,114; land-
lords, 55, 62, 76; walled villages, 62;
bendiren, 80, 206113; legal rights in
Hong Kong, 80, 85-86, 97, 99,121;
Shung Him Tong views of, 112,113,
114; as Cantonese, 206. See also
280INDEX
Benturen\ Cantonese; Hakka-Punti
relations; Hakka-Punti Wars
Qing dynasty: Hakka migrations, 44-
45, 83, 84; degree holders, I39»aj;
government, 140; literacy, 145;
Taiwan, 182,191
Qingliu City, population, 227
Qingshi emperor, 204
Qu Qiubai, I99»r, 227
Ranger, Terence, 107
Raub, Hakka in, 128
Red Army, 199, 220
Red Guards, 226
Red Turbans, 71
Reflexivity, 98-99,109,123
Religion, 4, 94»w, 122,151,153, 165, 176,
210; Protestants, 98; popular Chi-
nese, 170-71, 210, 218, 228; as super-
stition, 220, 223; Daoism, 227, 228,
229. See also Ancestor worship;
Christianity; Hinduism
Remittances, 83,135/utf
Ren (persons), 19,161
Ren Bishi, 221
Ren sheng, bu ren xing (acknowledge
dialect, not surname), 73, 208
“Return My Hakka Language” demon-
strations, 191—92, 228
Roundhouses. See Tulou
Ruijin, poverty in, 226
Rural Consultative Committee. See
Heung Yee Kuk
Russian language, 222
Sabah,in, 147,148
Sai Kung, 83, 89, 94»75, 96
Sam Tung Uk Hakka Museum, 83, 96
Sarawak, 130,131,143, 147, 207
Secret societies, 40, 68—70, 76,137,138,
214, 220
Segmentary structure, 162
Selangor, population, 138
Sha Tau Kok, 83
Sha Tin, 83; marriage network in, 92
Shan ge. See Hakka, mountain songs
Shanghai, 207, 215
Shantou, Hakka districts, 134
She, 205, 210, 230; dress, 210; in Commu
nist revolution, 219, 222; relations
with Hakka, 219
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, 30,
229
Shibi, Hakka ancestry, 42, 43
Shing Mun villages, conflict with Tsuen
Wan, 87
Shung Him Tong, 1511/2,18, 22, 98—123,
176; compared with Kwan Mun
Hau, 17-18, 31, 80, 90, 99; people
passing as Cantonese, 23; Hakka
and Christian identity in, 24, 98;
ideas about Punti in, 25; women in,
27; Chinese identity in, 29, 31; settle
ment of, 31, 60-61, fiiwj, 103-4; eth
nic consciousness in, 34; cemetery
in, 95,102,119—22; population of,
102, IO2«4; education in, 103; promt
nent people of, 103; Hakka customs
in, no-n; history and identity in,
112-13; church leadership in, 118-19
Sibao, Liancheng County, 227
Sichuan, Hakka in, 198
Sikhs, 153,164,174
Singapore, 139,198
Sino-Indian Conflict, 158-60
Sino-Indian relations: Indian views of
Chinese, 158-60; Chinese views of
Indians, 160-65
Skinner, G. William, 16,141,166
Society of God Worshipers. See God
Worshipers, Society of
Song dynasty: genealogies, 40-41, 44;
Hakka migrations during, 42,131;
conflicts in Fujian, 42; population
registers, 205
Song Qingling, 199
Soong, C. J., 116
Souls, 93,170-71
Southeast Asia, migration to, 4,197. See
also Malaysia; Pulai; Sabah;
Sarawak
Southern Song dynasty, 42, 43
Soviet bases in China, 199, 201, 220; in
281INDEX
Hakka regions, 199, 217; Southwest-
ern Jiangxi, 218; East River, 218;
Hunan-Jiangxi, 219; Northeastern
Jiangxi-Fujian, 219; Central, 221,
222; attacked by Nationalists, 221;
Fujian, 222
Stalin, Joseph, 230
Stanton, William, 68
State. See Chinese state
Stereotypes, 11,34., i4-ni8. See also Canton-
ese, stereotypes of; Gender, stereo-
types; Hakka, stereotypes; Hokkien,
stereotypes; Punti, stereotypes
Straits Setdements, 136-37,138
Student protests, 215, 225-26
Su Zhaozheng, 216
Subei, 207
Sun Ke (son of Sun Yat-sen), 214
Sun Yat-sen, 28nrtf, 199, 213-15, 229; as
Hakka, 187; education of, 214;
genealogy of, 214
Sun Yat-sen University, 214
Superstition. See Religion
Symbolic capital, 108
Tai, 219
Tai Mou Shan, 82
Tai Po, 83; marriage network, 92
Taipei, and Hakka ethnic movement,
176,179,197-98
Taiping, Perak, 137
Taiping Rebellion, 5M3,13, 78,104, 204,
210, 211-12, 216; and language, 32,
76-77, 223; and Hakka migration,
46; Hong Rengan, 77; women in,
118; and ethnic relations, 212. See
also Hong Xiuquan; God Worship-
ers, Society of
Taishan xian, 46, 47, 59, 70, 72
Taiwan: Hakka in, 20—21,23,109,125,176-
95passim-, Hakka upward mobility in,
24; Hakka identity in, 29,34; settle-
ment in, 31,190-91; Hakka language
in, 32; religion in, 176; history of, 177,
190—91,194-95; mainlanders in, 177,
178,187; native Taiwanese in, 178,190;
politics in, 179,183,188,189; reunifica-
tion of, 180-84 passim, 188,194; tour-
ism to People’s Republic of China,
i82«j; nationalism in, 188-90; ethnic
pluralism in, 189; Hakka population
in, 198. See also Hakka, language, in
Taiwan; Hakka etlinic movement;
Taipei
Tajfel, Henri, 197
Tan Zhenlin, 224
Tang dynasty: Chinese identification
with, 29«r7; Hakka migrations dur-
ing, 41, 42,131; administration, 44;
language, 180
Tang (lineage) of Hong Kong, 60, 84,
102, i02»t, 103; landlords in, 103;
conflicts with Hakka, 104; reputa-
tion of, 114
Tang ren, 2gni7,161
Tangra (Tapsia). See Dhapa
Taxation, 52, 84
Tay (Tho, Dairen), 219
Terengganu, 126
Thai, 219
Thailand, Hakka population, 199
Three Year Guerrilla War, 222, 224
Tian Hou: temple, 82, 84, 86-87; festi-
val, 96
Tianxia chunguo libing shu (Merits and
faults of all the countries in the
world), 45
Tibet, 230
Tien, Ju K’ang, 130,131,143,147
Tiger Balm, 116
Tingzhou, Hakka region, 42; people of,
206, 214. See also Changting
Tongism, 79
Toronto, Hakka in, 151,160,174-75
Triad Society. See Secret societies
Tsuen On Kuk alliance, 87
Tsuen Wan, 17, 80-97 passim-, industrial-
ization, 82; population, 82; as native
place, 83; marriage networks, 83,
Hakka settlement in, 89; Hakka
identity in, 177. See also Kwan Mun
Hau
Tsuen Wan Chamber of Commerce, 89
Tsuen Wan Rural Committee, 87
282INDEX
Tsuen Wan Sports Association, 89
Tsung Tsin Hakka Association, iini2
Tsung Tsin Mission, 103/M, 105
T’ut’an (tutan). See Hakka, language
Tuanlian (local militia), 56, 76
Tulou (roundhouses), i8o»r, 211, 211M5
Tungism, 79
United States, Hakka in, 148,199, 229
Untouchables, 149, 153/24,157-58
Viet Cong, 219
Vietnam, Hakka population, 199
Villages: and lineages, 39,57, 63, 67, 68,
86; nucleated, 56,57; single sur-
name, 57, 66, 74; multisumame, 58,
103, 205, 211; structure of, 62; alli-
ances among, 64, 87, 105; in India,
156. See also Kwan Mun Hau; Lin-
eage, localized; Shung Him Tong
Voluntary associations. See Associations
Vomel, Johann Heinrich, 51-52
Wah Yan College, 103
Waishengren (mainlanders), 177,178,187
Wang Gungwu, 212-13
Wang Xiangzhi, 42
Ward, Barbara, <)\ni8
Watson, James L., 120
Wealth. See Calcutta, wealth and status
Weber, Max, 116
Wen Sheng Kai, 140-41
West Bengal, 151
West Borneo, 133,135,138
Western Apache, no
Western Circuit, 71—72, 74
Westerners and Europeans: studies of
Hakka, 3, 230; ideas about Hakka,
13-14, 25, 38,50, 90, 113,123,144;
ideas about Chinese in Malaya, 131
Wolcott, Roger D., 14
Wolf, Eric, 175
Women: participation in agriculture, 26;
in Hong Kong, 27; in Shung Him
Tong, 27; in People’s Republic of
China, 28, 231; in Taiping Rebel-
lion, n&; funii but, 128; in Calcutta,
172. See also Gender
Women’s movement, 218
Wong Tai Peng, 134/114
Worldwide Hakka Federation, 198, 214.
See also Associations
Wu, 37, 208, 208/24, 213
Wu gui (black ghost), 162
Wuhua xian, 182
Xian (county), 43, 43»r
Xiang, 208//4, 213
Xiang Xiangqian, 226
Xiangshan xianzhi (Xiangshan county
gazetteer), 60
Xiao Ke, 221
Xiedou (interethnic conflict), 178
Xingning, 45,59; conflicts in, 69
Xingning xianzhi (Xingning county
gazetteer), 69
Xinzhu xian, and Hakka ethnic move-
ment in Taiwan, 176,183
Xunwu City, 210
Xunzhou fuzhi (Xunzhou gazetteer), 51,
56
Yan’an, 199, 221, 223; literacy in, 211;
ideology, 224; invoked, 225
Yang, C. K., 49-50
Yang Xisong, 180
Yao De Sheng, 139/122
Yap Ah Loy, rtfiniS, 137/220,138, 139/222
Yau (lineage) of Kwan Mun Hau, 84,
86-87, 91, 93, 96
Ye Jianying, 204, 211, 221, 224
Ye Ting, 220, 225
Yen Ching-hwang, 140
Yi, 150K2, 221
Yongding, 139
Yuan dynasty, migrations, 42—43
Tudijisheng (Wonders of the world), 42
Yue, ion6, 37, 205. See also Cantonese;
Language, dialect groups
Yuen Long, 92
Tuzu (dialect group), 193. See also
Language, dialect groups
283INDEX
Zhang Bi Shi, 139/222,140
Zhang Guotao, 215, 219, 221, 223, 225
Zhong Zhaozheng, 185-86
Zhonghua Middle School, Penang, 140
Zbongzu (race), 193
Zhou Enlai, 199/21, 221
Zhu De, 199, 211, 220, 223, 224, 227; and
Long March, 221
Zhuang, 219
Zunyi, 221
284