INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF SAFETY IN RE
INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE
LINE OF THE KEY SYSTEM TRANSIT COMPANY AT ^OAKLAND,
CALIF., DECEMBER 4, 1924
January 12, 1925.
To the Commission :
On December 4, 1924, there was a rear-end collision between a
passenger train of the Key System Transit Company and a passenger
train of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad on the line of the
Key System Transit Company at Oakland, Calif., which resulted
in the death of 8 passengers and 2 employees off duty, and the injury
of 36 passengers and 2 employees. The investigation of this accident
was conducted jointly with the Railroad Commission of> the State of
California.
LOCATION AND METHOD OF OPERATION
The Key System Transit line is an electric railway using 600 volts
direct current for propulsion purposes; it comprises street-car lines
in Oakland and other cities in the East Bay district, and the Key
Division, on which this accident occurred, on which trains are oper¬
ated from junction points with the street-car lines to the Key System
Pier Terminal, located 3.85 miles west of San Pablo Avenue, Oak¬
land. At the pier connections are made with ferryboats which are
operated to Market Street, San Francisco. In order to reduce the
number of train unit operations on the Key Division it is the prac¬
tice to consolidate trains in each direction between junction points
and the Pier Terminal and the trains on this division consist of
from one to as many as eight cars. Trains of the San Francisco-
Sacramento Railroad are also operated over the Key System tracks
from Fortieth Street and Shatter Avenue to the Pier Terminal.
The operation of these trains between those points is under the super¬
vision and control of the Key System Transit Company.
That part of the Key System line on which this accident occurred
is located upon a fill extending into San Francisco Bay. It is a
double-track line equipped with an automatic block-signal system
combined with an automatic train-stop system. The signals are of
28692—25
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
the tliree-position, upper-quadrant type and the automatic train
stop is of the overhead mechanical trip type. Alternating current
control circuits and single-rail track circuits are used. The signals
are mounted on center trolley poles and the automatic stop arm is
connected to the spectacle casting of each signal and operates si¬
multaneously therewith. When the signal is in the danger position
the stop arm is in position to engage the arm of a valve located on
the car roof. Should the car pass a signal and a stop arm in this
position the valve is automatically operated to cause an emergency
application of the air brakes. In the vicinity of the point of ac¬
cident trolley poles are spaced 105 feet apart and signals and
Pig. 1.—Signal pole 104, looking eastward. Eastbound signal in clear position ; west¬
bound signal at stop, with automatic stop arm extended
automatic stops are installed on each fourth pole, or 420 feet apart.
A full-block overlap is provided by the control circuits, which are
arranged to display one caution and two stop signals behind each
train. The arrangement of signals in this vicinity is intended to
provide for the movement of trains under a headway of 45 seeonds
and was designed to provide adequate braking distance for Key
System trains which with the propulsion current used are operated
at a maximum speed of approximately 36 miles an hour and at this
speed require a distance of from 300 to 350 feet in which to stop.
Signal 104 is located 11,321 feet west of signal 46 at tower No. 2.
Approaching the point of accident from signal 46 the track is tan-
28692—25. (Face p. 2.)
ACCIDENT AT1 OAKLAND, CALIF.
3
gent for a distance of 6,197 feet, then there is a 30' curve to the right
633.72 feet in length, followed by 4,491 feet of tangent to signal
104, the tangent extending a considerable distance beyond that
signal. The accident occurred practically opposite signal 104,
located at a point about VA miles east of the Pier Terminal, at about
7.54 a. m. ±
At the time of this accident a light rain was falling and the range
of clear vision was limited to a distance of approximately one-half
mile.
DESCRIPTION
The trains involved in this accident were Key System westbound
train No. 729 and San Francisco-Sacramento westbound train No.
15. Train No. 729 was a consolidated train of the Oakland Twelfth
Street line and consisted of four center entrance motor cars, Nos.
655, 656, 664 and 665, in the order named, with Conductor Noone
and Motorman Compton in charge. The motorman of this train
received a caution signal indication at signal 104 on account of pre¬
ceding trains being delayed due to switching operations at the Pier
Terminal. Approaching this signal Motorman Compton shut off
power and when about opposite pole 106 applied the brakes for the
purpose of bringing his train to a stop; the train stopped with the
head end some distance east of signal 100, which was in the stop
position, and the rear end practically opposite signal 104. While
standing at this point the rear end of this train was struck by San
Francisco-Sacramento train No. 15.
San Francisco-Sacramento train No. 15 consisted of motor car
1014 and was in charge of Conductor Knoblock and Motorman Bru¬
baker; this train was en route from Concord, Calif., to Oakland Pier
Terminal. The last stop made prior to the accident was at tower
No. 2 on the Key Division, where .it was stopped at signal 46 and
held until two Key System trains had proceeded toward the pier.
After train No. 729 had cleared, the route was lined up for train
No. 15; that train then proceeded toward the pier and while running
at an estimated speed of about 20 miles an hour collided with the
rear end of Key System train No. 729, which was standing near
signal 104.
Motor car 1014 telescoped the rear car of train No. 729 for a dis¬
tance of 18y2 feet. It came to a stop with the head end of car 1014
at a point 37 feet west of signal 104, and the rear end of car 665, the
last car of train No. 729, was 18 feet 6 inches west of signal 104.
Car 665 was constructed with steel underframe, steel side frame
and steel body plates, having wooden lining and wooden roof con¬
struction. It was 57 feet 7y2 inches long, weighed 60,000 pounds,
and the distance from top of rail to top of 8-inch buffer beam was
Fig. 2.—Key System car 665 telescoped by car 1014 ; signal pole 104 opposite car 1014
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
ACCIDENT AT OAKLAND, CALIF. 5
48 inches. The rear portion of this car was practically demolished,
the damage probably being due in part, at least, to the fact that the
floor line and top of the body buffers were lower than the floor and
buffers on the San Francisco-Sacramento car. Motor car 1014 was
of steel-underf rame construction, having wooden •superstructure. It
was 57 feet 10 inches long, w^eighed 93,260 pounds, and the distance
from top of rail to top of 8-inch buffer beam was 53 inches. The
platform of this car over rode the floor of the Key System car. The
forward end of car 1014 and a partition 7 feet from the head end
were demolished, pipe connections and other equipment broken or
torn from the car, and the truck on the damaged end was driven
Fig. 3.—Interior of car 665 after separation from car 1014
backward about 10 feet, bending foundation brake gear rods and
causing other damage. The leading pair of wheels of this truck was
derailed.
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE
The employees injured were Motorman Brubaker and Conductor
Knoblock, of train No. 15. Motorman Brubaker, on advice of coun¬
sel, refused to testify and declined to give a statement of any charac¬
ter, on the ground that anything lie might say could be used against
him, in criminal proceedings which were thought to be pending.
Motorman Compton, of train No. 729, stated that on the morning of
the accident there was a light rain but the view was good. When he
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INTERSTATE COMMERC]'] COMMISSION
had reached a point practically opposite signal 108, he saw that
signal 104 was in the caution position; he shut off power, made a
full service application of the air brakes, and had no difficulty in
bringing his train to a stop before reaehing signal 100, which was
in stop position. He stated he immediately sounded a whistle signal
for the flagman to go back and then released the brakes; within 30
or 35 seconds after stopping he felt the shock of the impact, which
moved his train forward a distance of 3 to 4 feet. Motorman Comp¬
ton said the head end of his train stopped at a point about 130 feet
east of signal 100 and he thought the rear end cleared signal 104
by a few feet. He stated the reason he stopped at that distance from
signal 100 was because he made a full service application in order to
be certain that his train would not pass the signal, and had he re¬
leased so as to approach nearer to it before stopping he probably
would have overrun the signal. In making this stop he stated that he
shut off power as soon as he saw the caution signal, at which time
he was running at full speed, and made a brake application at about
the second pole east of the caution signal.
Conductor Noone, of train No. 729, stated that approaching the
point where the accident occurred his train was running at a speed
of from 30 to 35 miles an hour, and that it came to a stop with the
rear end extending slightly east of signal 104. He was in the rear
car of his train. As soon &s the train stopped the motorman sounded
the whistle signal for the flagman to go back; he took up flagging
equipment, got out the center door on the left-hand side of the car
and started back, but the collision occurred before he reached the
rear end of his train and without his having seen the approaching
train.
Brakeman Hamma, of train No. 729, stated that when his train
stopped near signal 100 he was collecting fares in the leading car
of the train. He estimated the time of impact at about 30 seconds
after his train came to a stop.
Brakeman Yan Dalsen, of train No. 729, was in the third car
from the head end, and had finished collecting fares. He also
estimated that the shock of collision came about 30 seconds after the
train came to a stop, and thought his train was moved forward a
distance of about 4 feet.
Motorman Hobson, who was deadheading on train No. 729, was
riding in the motorman’s compartment of the third car from the
head end. He stated that as soon as the train stopped Motorman
Compton sounded the whistle signal for the flagman to go back;
he raised the cab window and on looking toward the rear saw train
No. 15 about two car lengths from the rear of train No. 729, moving
at a speed which he estimated to be about 30 miles an hour. He
ACCIDENT AT OAKLAND, CALIE.
7
realized at once that a collision was unavoidable and as there was
not sufficient time to get out he braced himself and waited for the
shock of impact.
Conductor Ivnoblock, of train No. 15, stated that from Concord to
Fortieth Street, Oakland, his train consisted of two cars; at the
latter point the rear car was cut off and they proceeded toward the
Pier Terminal with one car, which was in good operating condition.
Their train was stopped at tower No. 2 because of signal 46 being
set against them, and he saw train No. 729 leave that point, his own
train following about 1 y2 minutes later. He stated his train made
the usual speed between tower No. 2 and the point of accident and
he did not see train No. 729 after leaving the tower until just before
the collision occurred. Approaching the point of accident the
motorman made a service application of the brakes, which was fol-
lowed very closely by an emergency application due to the auto¬
matic train stop valve arm striking the trip arm operated in con¬
nection with the signal. He heard the exhaust of air from the
automatic stop valve and the emergency application of the brakes
resulting therefrom threw him off his balance. He then looked for¬
ward and saw the rear of train No. 729 only about two-car lengths
ahead. Conductor Ivnoblock estimated that when the service appli¬
cation was made by the motorman the speed of his train was from
35 to 40 miles an hour, and he thought that perhaps 30 seconds
elapsed before the emergency application occurred. After the emer¬
gency application he thought the brakes locked the wheels as the
car seemed to slide forward until the impact of collision came. Con¬
ductor Ivnoblock stated that Motorman Brubaker operated train No.
15 from Bock Kidge to the point of accident; he had no conversation
with the motorman except a word or two when he got on the train
at Bock Bidge, but there was nothing out of the ordinary in connec¬
tion with the operation of the train between Bock Bidge and the
point of accident.
Motorman Willis, of the train which folio wed train No. 15 west¬
ward from tower No. 2 on the morning of the accident, stated that
he operated his train under clear signals at a speed of about 30
miles per hour. He stated his range of vision extended for at least
half a mile, and after passing through the subway under the South¬
ern Pacific Bailroad west of tower No. 2, train No. 15 was constantly
in view until the time of the accident. He thought that train was
running at a higher rate of speed than he was able to attain.
Motormen on other trains which were being operated over this line
on the morning of the accident stated that the rain did not obscure
signals, and that, although the rails were wet, they had no difficulty
in properly controlling and stopping their trains in accordance with
signal indications.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
Towerman Corker, who was on duty at tower No. 2, stated that
when train No. 15 arrived at his tower it was held about one minute
to allow train No. 729 to leave in its regular turn. Train No. 15
left tower No. 2 as soon as the switches were lined up for its route,
the signal cleared, and the flagman recalled, which he thought was
about 45 seconds after the departure of train No. 729. No exact
record of the time of departure of trains from that point is kept.
Electrical Engineer Bell, of the Key System Transit Company,
stated that the signal circuits are so arranged that when a train re-
ceives a clear signal indication the signal remains in clear position
until the last pair of wheels passes the insulated joint in the track
located practically opposite the signal. The purpose of this arrange¬
ment is to prevent the signal and automatic stop arm from assuming
the danger position until the arms of the automatic stop valves on all
cars in the train have passed the signal. He stated that the body of
a Key System car overhangs the rear axle a distance of about 7 feet
6 inches and that the insulated joint at signal 104 is located 4 feet
6 inches west of the trolley pole on which this signal is mounted. As¬
suming that train No. 729 stopped with its rear axle just clearing
the insulated joint at signal 104 there would be two stop signals dis-
played, signal 104, located practically at the rear end of the train,
and the other, signal 108, 420 feet in rear of it; a caution indication
would be displayed by signal 112, 840 feet from the rear of the train.
Mr. Bell reached the scene of the accident at about 9 or 9.15 a. m.,
and found that the rear end of train No. 729 after the collision was
standing 18 feet 6 inches w^est of the center line of pole 104. The
automatic stop arm of signal 108 clearly showed that it had been
struck by an automatic stop valve arm, the mark being very fresh,
and he removed this arm in order to preserve this evidence. Exam¬
ination of the valve arm of car 1014 also showed a fresh mark indi¬
cating that it had been in contact with the automatic stop arm. Ex¬
cept for the removal and replacement of the automatic stop arm on
pole 104 nothing had been done to the signal and automatic stop
apparatus prior to the investigation and it had functioned properly
both before and after the accident. Mr. Bell stated that the signal
system had been placed in service in 1911, and that there are approx¬
imately 18,000,000 forty-five degree movements throughout each year.
During the entire time the system has been in service only four false
clear failures have been reported, the last of which occurred in 1916.
Master Mechanic Jackson, of the Key System Transit Company,
stated that he arrived at the scene of the accident about one hour
after it occurred; while considerable damage to equipment had re-
sulted from the collision, examination disclosed nothing which would
indicate that the brakes had failed to operate properly prior to the
accident. He stated that the channel iron buffer on car 665 was not
ACCIDENT AT1 OAKLAND, CALIF.
9
overridden by the buffer on car 1014 but was driven back over the
top of the center sills, at the same time pulling in the side angle-iron
sills which prevented the sides of the car from being fanned outward
by the telescoping action.
Superintendent Thornton, of the Key System, stated that on the
morning of the accident trains were being operated in their proper
order. Just prior to the time of the accident switching operations
at the Pier Terminal required approaching trains to be stopped and
there were- two trains preceding train No. 729 which were stopped
and held for that reason. He stated that he instructs train-service
employees of the San Francisco-Sacramento Railroad as to their
duties on the Key Division and all motormen understand that they
are required to operate their trains under clear signals and that the
speed of trains is dependent upon the distance of clear vision. He
stated that he impresses upon all employees the importance of ob-
serving what is ahead of them and the fact that the responsibility in
case of accident rests upon the motorman of the following car. He
had not had any trouble with Motorman Brubaker on this line except
once before, on March 1, 1922, when he was involved in a rear-end
collision.
General Manager Mitchell of the San Francisco-Sacramento Rail¬
road stated that the operating agreement between his railroad and
the Key System Transit Company provides that all equipment,
train crews and passengers while on the tracks of the Key System
Transit Company are entirely under the control of and governed
by the rules and regulations of the Key System Transit Company
and officers thereof. Kew employees of the San Francisco-Sacra¬
mento Railroad are required to report to officials of the Key System
Transit Company for examination and instructions before they are
qualified for service.
Superintendent of Electric Equipment Miller of the San Fran¬
cisco-Sacramento Railroad stated that cars of the type of car 1014
are so geared that they can attain a maximum speed of 55 miles an
hour when operated by a propulsion current of 600 volts. After
the accident the automatic stop valve was removed from car 1014
and installed for test purposes on a similar car, No. 1012. The result
of tests in each case was that the brakes were applied and brake-
cylinder pressure of 55 pounds was obtained, the initial brake-pipe
pressure being 70 pounds; after each test a period of from 38 to
73 seconds was required for the brakes to release.
Examination of car 1014 indicated that prior to the collision the
brakes locked the wheels and caused them to slide along the rails as
all eight wheels on the car showed flat spots of from 1 inch to l1/^
inches in length.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE
It is noted from the statement of Motorman Compton, of train No.
729 that he shut off power when he first observed signal 104 in cau¬
tion position and in order to bring his train to a stop made a full
service brake application when at about pole 106. He estimated
that the head end of his train came to a stop about 130 feet east of
signal 100. However, in view of the length of train No. 729 and
the position of the rear end of the last car after the collision, it ap-
pears that the head end of train No. 729 came to a stop approxi¬
mately 185 feet east of signal 100 and that therefore a distance of
430 or 440 feet was required to make this stop.
The evidence clearly established the fact that the signal system
operated properly. That signal 108 was in the stop position at
the time train No. 15 passed it is conclusively established by reason
of the fact that the automatic stop valve arm engaged the trip arm
operated by that signal.
The evidence also establishes the fact that the automatic stop ap¬
paratus functioned to cause an automatic application of the brakes
when train No. 15 passed signal 108, the first stop signal which it
encountered when approaching the preceding train. The very pur¬
pose of the automatic stop system which was in service on this line
is to prevent accidents of this character, and the failure of the auto¬
matic stop system to prevent the accident in this case was due to
the fact, first, that train No. 729 came to a stop at a point which re-
sulted in the minimum braking distance afforded by the automatic
train stop devices being provided, and, secondly, that train No. 15
was being operated at a rate of speed which required greater brak¬
ing distance than the minimum provided by the automatic stop sys¬
tem; a further contributing factor was that the rails were wet and
the wheels locked and slid after the brakes were applied by the
operation of the automatic stop device.
The minimum braking distance provided by the automatic stop
system was based upon tests with cars capable of attaining a maxi¬
mum speed of 36 miles an hour. Train No. 15 consisted of a car
capable of attaining a maximum speed of 55 miles an hour. Accord¬
ing to* the statement of the conductor of this train, the speed at the
time the automatic stop device was operated was approximately 35
or 40 miles an hour. In view of the fact that after the brake appli-
cations made by the motorman and by the automatic train-stop de¬
vice the car ran a distance of more than 400 feet, and collided with
the preceding train at a rate of speed variously estimated at from 20
to 30 miles an hour, the force of impact causing considerable damage
to substantially constructed cars, it is apparent that the speed of this
ACCIDENT AT OAKLAND, CALIF. ll
car materially exceeded 36 miles an hour, the maximum speed pro¬
vided for by the automatic train-stop system installed on this line.
Rules governing the operation of trains under automatic block
signals on this line provide that proper operation is “ to run at an
even speed on a clear or proceed signal, which is the normal position
of such signal.” The rules also provide that a caution signal
“means proceed with caution prepared to stop at the next signal.”
It is apparent from this investigation that Motorman Brubaker
failed to comply with these rules and to control his train as required
by caution and stop signals displayed for his train. There is no evi¬
dence that the signals were obscured by rain, but on the contrary
there is direct testimony from a number of motormen who were op¬
erating trains on this line at the time of the accident that the signal
indications could clearly be seen for considerable distances. In
view of the refusal of Motorman Brubaker to* furnish any statement
in the matter, no explanation of his failure to observe and obey cau¬
tion and stop signals can be advanced.
On the portion of the line where this accident occurred there is no
rule prescribing a maximum speed limit.
CON CLU SION S
This accident was caused by the failure of Motorman Brubaker to
operate his train in accordance with the requirements of existing
rules and to observe or obey automatic block-signal indications; also
by reason of the fact that trains were operated, and were permitted
to be operated, at speeds which required greater distance in which to
bring them to a stop than the minimum braking distance provided
by the automatic stop system as installed on this line.
To provide against a recurrence of an accident of this character,
the Key System Transit Company should at once establish a maxi¬
mum speed restriction for all trains operated over this line, which
will insure that any train can be stopped in the minimum braking
distance provided by the automatic stop system.
All of the employees involved in this accident were experienced
men and none of them was on duty in violation of any provisions of
the hours-of-service law.
Respectfully submitted.
W. P. Borland,
Director.
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