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THEODORE ROOSEVELT
AND HIS TIME
SHOWN IN HIS OWN LETTERS

BY
JOSEPH BUCKLIN BISHOP
EDITOR OP "THEODORE ROOSEVELt'3 LETTERS TO HI3 CHILDREN"
AUTHOR OP "THE PANAMA GATEWAY," ETC.

WITH ILLUSTRATIONS

VOL. I.

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SON'S
1920

Copyright, 19 19, 1920, by
charles scribner's sons
Published September ipso

THE SCRIBNtR PRESS

TO
HIS FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN

INTRODUCTION
Five years or more before his death Theodore Roose
velt said he wished me to write the history of the period
which covered his public career. His reason was that I
had been in his close confidence during the greater part
of that period and knew the inside of every movement
nearly as well as he knew it himself. We talked often on
the subject and in the early spring of 1918 the project
took definite form. He turned over to me for exclusive
use all his personal and official correspondence together
with other material relating to his public career from the
time he was elected to the New York Legislature in Novem
ber, 1881, till his life ended.
I began work at once, and at the time of his death I had
completed the first draft of the story of his public life
down to the year 1905, and had received his approval of it.
At different stages of the work I went over with him what
I had written and had the inestimable advantage of his
suggestions, obtaining from him incidents and anecdotes
which added immeasurably to the interest and historical
value of the narrative, making it virtually his own. Be
tween us we evolved a general plan for the history, which
was to let the story of his career be told, as far as possible,
in his own letters, utterances and acts.
This was an arduous but not a difficult task to perform.
It was arduous because the material was virtually inex
haustible, but it was not difficult because of the quality
of Roosevelt's letters. One of his private secretaries has
estimated that during his public career he wrote 150,000
letters. Copies of these have been preserved. With them

viii INTRODUCTION
are the original letters of the many correspondents that he
had in all parts of the world — authors, poets, historians,
artists, explorers, naturalists, statesmen, prime ministers,
kings, emperors. He not only touched life at all points,
but on its intellectual side touched the highest points in
every land. Not only is the correspondence limitless in
its range, but from beginning to end it is Roosevelt himself
and hence unlike the correspondence of any other person.
Emerson, in his observations upon great men, says that
"He is great who never reminds us of others." No man
ever met this test more fully than Theodore Roosevelt.
Nature has made many millions of men but she has made
only one Theodore Roosevelt. From the beginning to
the end of his life he was himself and was unlike any one
else. It was this clearly defined personality, at once unique
and commanding, which concentrated upon him the atten
tion of the world and made his name familiar in all civilized
lands. Fame of this phenomenal sort is given only to a
dominating personality. Its bestowal is to be explained
only by an examination. of the man as revealed in his words
and acts. Roosevelt's letters not merely reflect his per
sonality, they reveal it with all the fulness of a frank
and truthful man talking to tried and trusted friends. His
letters are not merely like his talk, they are his talk — frank
and free, with rays of irrepressible and always joyous
humor playing about it, and with deft and sure thrusts at
the foibles, vanities, perversities, and weaknesses of man
kind. Few men have had a keener insight into human mo
tives or could detect more quickly the real nature of them.
When he sat down to write or to dictate a letter to a con
genial friend, he did not compose, he talked. Whatever
was uppermost in his mind at the time came out without
restraint or reservation. As he wrote most freely in mo
ments of greatest stress, at the height of crises created by
himself in his struggle for the triumph of causes dear
to his heart, his letters give us a veritable "inside history"
of his time. They push aside the screen that hides the

INTRODUCTION ix
wires which control great events and we see them operat
ing before our eyes. We see, in very truth, history in the
making, shown and explained to us by the man who himself
is making it.
We get also a complete self -revelation of the man, of the
motives, desires, and principles which guided his life. It is
this quality of self-revelation, more than any other per
haps, which makes his letters so admirable a vehicle for
telling the story of his career. Many writers have sought
to depict the man Roosevelt, and many others will repeat
the effort, but none has, and none can, depict him as he
really was with that vivid clearness in which he stands self-
revealed in his letters. All sides of this many-sided man
are disclosed there — the intellectual, which covered all fields
of human knowledge, ancient and modern; the political,
which shows him to have been a sagacious statesman of the
first rank rather than a politician, for as a politician he
repeatedly broke the fundamental rules of the game; the
executive and administrator first of a great State and then
of a great nation, whose motto was action, action and still
more action, and who accomplished great and supposedly
impossible tasks by the driving force of his character ; the
diplomatist and peacemaker, a role which he played with
greater success than any other man of his time ; and finally,
the inspiring and uplifting leader of his countrymen, the
intense, vigilant, militant, uncompromising patriot, eager
to serve the nation in peace or in war, who throughout his
life was first and always an American.
It is the purpose of the present study of the man and his
time to let his words and acts tell the story of his career and
also of the epoch which it constitutes in American history,
an epoch in which he was the leading and molding figure.
As the narrative concerns itself chiefly with his public
career, it passes briefly over his ancestry, childhood and
youth, a full account of which he has given in his 'Auto
biography,' and begins in detail with his entry into politi
cal life.

x INTRODUCTION
While in a few instances, in order to maintain the con
tinuity of the narrative, the present record overlaps the
'Autobiography,' it really supplements and completes it,
and the two works together constitute authentically the Life
and Letters of Theodore Roosevelt as designed by himself.
J. B. B.
September, 1920.

CONTENTS VOL. I. PAGE
Introduction 
CHAPTEK I. Ancestry, Childhood and Youth .... 1
II. Legislature — First Term  6
III. Legislature — Second Term  17
IV. Legislature — Third Term  24
V. First Appearance in National Politics. Mr.
Blaine's Candidacy  33
VI. Literary Labors — Tilt with Jefferson Davis
— Candidate for Mayor  39
VII. Civil Service Commissioner  43
VIII. Police Commissioner  58
IX. Assistant Secretary of the Navy .... 70
X. The War with Spain  92
XI. Governor of New York — First Year . . . 109
XII. Governor of New York — Second Year . . 128
XIII. Nominated and Elected Vice President . . 134
XIV. President — Early Declarations of Policy . 148
XV. The Booker Washington Incident . . . 165
XVI. Controversies with General Miles . . . 171
XVII. The Northern Securities Suit  182
XVIII. Incidents of a Busy Year  188
XIX. Coal Strike Settlement  198
XX. The Kaiser and Venezuela  221
XXI. Popular Approval — Views on Various Subjects 230
XXII. For President in 1904 — Futile Opposition —
His Own Attitude  243
XXIII. Notable Sentiments in Speeches and Letters —
Alaska Boundary — Wide Range of Reading 256
xi

xii CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
XXIV. Securing the Panama Canal . . 270
XXV. Securing the Panama Canal — Concluded 291
XXVI. National Convention and Campaign of 1904 312
XXVH. Attitude toward Campaign Contributions —
Judge Parker's Charges . ... 328
XXVIII. Visit of John Morley at the White House 337
XXIX. Illuminating Letters on Various Subjects,
Including Questions of Policy 343
XXX. Inaugurated President — Death of John Hay 362
XXXI. Russo-Japanese Peace Conference 374
XXXII. Russo-JapAnese Peace Conference — Concluded 401
XXXIII. Messages to Congress — Paul Morton Case —
Senate on Santo Domingo and Arbitration
Treaties . . . 425
XXXIV. Rebukes to Riotous Strikers and Lynchers —
Dealings with Senators — Letters on Vari
ous Subjects . . . . . . 438
XXXV. Builder of the Panama Canal . 449
XXXVI. Secret History of the Algeciras Convention 467
XXXVII. Secret History of the Algeciras Convention
— Concluded  488

ILLUSTRATIONS VOL. I.
Theodore Roosevelt, 1908  Frontispiece FACING FACE
Theodore Roosevelt, New York Legislature, 1881 ... 10
Theodore Roosevelt, Police Commissioner, 1895 .... 60
Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1897 . 72
Theodore Roosevelt, Governor, 1899  112
Inauguration Medal, 1905, and Coinage designs, by Augustus
Saint-Gaudens, 1906  360
The completed Panama Canal, 1919  450

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
AND HIS TIME

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
AND HIS TIME
CHAPTER I
ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH
Theodore Roosevelt, the second of that name, was born
in New York City on October 27, 1858. His ancestors on
the paternal side were of Holland stock, and on the
maternal side were Scotch, Irish, Huguenot and English
descent. The first Roosevelt to come to America was Klaes
Martensen van Roosevelt, who reached New Amsterdam
about 1644, and from that time for seven generations, from
father to son, every one of his descendants was born in
New York City. They were mainly merchants who held
prominent positions in the affairs of the city and in its
commercial and social life, before, during and after the
Revolutionary War.
The ancestors of the grandmother of the second Theo
dore came to Pennsylvania with William Penn, those of his
mother came to Georgia from Scotland, her grandfather
being the first Revolutionary President of Georgia. Some
of the Roosevelt ancestors on both sides served respect
ably, but without distinction, in the army during the Revo
lution, and others rendered similar service in the Conti
nental Congress and in local legislatures. Those in the
South were for the most part planters. Two brothers of
Roosevelt's mother served in the Confederate navy during
the Civil War, one as admiral, who was the builder of the
famous Confederate war sloop Alabama, and the other as
midshipman on the same vessel.
These facts about Roosevelt's ancestry are taken from his
'Autobiography' (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920) which
1

2 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
contains much interesting information about his forbears,
with affectionate tributes to those immediately preceding
him, and charming reminiscences of his childhood. His
letters supply some additional material which is well worth
quoting. He invariably discouraged efforts to make him
appear as an "infant prodigy" who had given early signs
of future greatness. During his first term as President,
Mr. Richard Watson Gilder, then editor of the Century
magazine, expressed a desire to publish a sketch of his
childhood days with photographs of him at various stages
of growth. In avowing his objection to the project, Roose
velt wrote to Mr. Gilder, on August 20, 1903 :
"For reasons which I am wholly unable to explain even
to myself I somehow rather shrink from having a sketch of
my younger days prepared. Perhaps my reason for caring
little for the sketch of my younger days is that as far as 1
can remember they were absolutely commonplace. I was a
rather sickly, rather timid little boy, very fond of desultory
reading and of natural history, and not excelling In any
form of sport. Owing to my asthma I was not able to go
to school, and I was nervous and self-conscious, so that as
far as I can remember my belief is that I was rather below
than above my average playmate in point of leadership;
though as I had an imaginative temperament this some
times made up for my other short-comings. Altogether,
while, thanks to my father and mother, I had a very happy
childhood I am inclined to look back at it with some wonder
that I should have come out of it as well as I have ! It was
not until after I was sixteen that I began to show any
prowess, or even ordinary capacity; up to that time, except
making collections of natural history, reading a good deal
in certain narrowly limited fields and indulging in the usual
scribbling of the small boy who does not excel in sport,
I cannot remember that I did anything that even lifted me
up to the average."
His love for his father, whom he spoke of always as the
best man he had ever known, amounted to adoration. Writ-

ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 3
ing to Edward S. Martin, on November 26, 1900, he said :
"I was fortunate enough in having a father whom I have
always been able to regard as an ideal man. It sounds a
little like cant to say what I am going to say, but he really
did combine the strength and courage and will and energy
of the strongest man with the tenderness, cleanness and
purity of a woman. I was a sickly and timid boy. He not
only took great and untiring care of me — some of my
earliest remembrances are of nights when he would walk
up and down with me for an hour at a time in his arms
when I was a wretched mite suffering acutely with asthma —
but he also most wisely refused to coddle me, and made me
feel that I must force myself to hold my own with other
boys and prepare to do the rough work of the world. I can
not say that he ever put it into words, but he certainly gave
me the feeling that I was always to be both decent and
manly, and that if I were manly nobody would laugh at my
being decent. In all my childhood he never laid hand on
me but once, but I always knew perfectly well that in case
it became necessary he would not have the slightest hesi
tancy in doing so again, and alike from my love and respect,
and in a certain sense, my fear of him, I would have hated
and dreaded beyond measure to have him know that I had
been guilty of a lie, or of cruelty, or of bullying, or of
uncleanness or of cowardice. Gradually I grew to have
the feeling on my own account, and not merely on his.
"There were many things I tried to do because he did
them, which I found afterwards were not in my line. For
instance, I taught Sunday school all through college, but
afterwards gave it up, just as on experiment I could not
do the charitable work which he had done. In doing my
Sunday school work I was very much struck by the fact
that the other men who did it only possessed one side of
his character. My ordinary companions in college would,
I think, have had a tendency to look down upon me for
dqing Sunday school work if I had not also been a corking
boxer, a good runner, and a genial member of the Porcel-
lian Club. I went in for boxing and wrestling a good deal,

4 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and I really think that while this was partly because I liked
them as sports, it was even more because I intended to be
a middling decent fellow, and I did not intend that any one
should laugh at me with impunity because I was decent.
It is exactly the same thing with history. In most coun
tries the Bourgeoisie — the moral, respectable, commercial,
middle class — are looked upon with a certain contempt
which is justified by their timidity /and; unwarlikeness.
But the minute a middle class produces men like Hawkins
and Frobisher on the seas, or men such as the average
Union soldier in the Civil War, it acquires the hearty
respect of others which it merits."
It is easy to trace in this tribute of supreme filial devo
tion the influences which molded the son's character and
laid firm and sure the strong foundations upon which he
built his subsequent career, winning world-wide fame and
honor and the enduring faith and affection of his country
men. He was, as he said in his letter, a sickly and timid boy.
Cordially supported and encouraged by his father, he began
quite early to improve his physical condition through regu
lar gymnastic exercises, including boxing lessons. When
he was ten years old he was taken on a trip to Europe which
he "thoroughly hated''' and from which he gained nothing,
and a second one four years later which he "enjoyed thor
oughly" and profited by. On his return from this second
trip he began serious study under a private tutor (Arthur
Cutler, later founder of the Cutler School in New York) in
preparation for college, and in the fall of 1876, having by
his systematic exercise brought himself into excellent physi
cal condition, he entered Harvard "University.
"I thoroughly enjoyed Harvard," he says in his 'Auto
biography,' "and I am sure it did me good, but only in the
general effect, for there was very little in my actual studies
which helped me in after life." Before he left Harvard in
1880 he had begun the writing of his "History of the Naval
War of 1812," which he completed in the following year and
published in 1882. Although he said later of the opening

ANCESTRY, CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 5
chapters that they "were so dry that they would have made
a dictionary seem light reading by comparison," the book
had such genuine historical merit that it has remained till
this day as the standard work on the subject.
On October 27, 1880, he married Alice Hathaway Lee,
daughter of George Cabot Lee. She died on February 14,
1884, leaving one child, Alice, who became the wife of
Nicholas Longworth on February 17, 1906. On December
2, 1886, he married in London Edith Kermit Carow,
daughter of Charles Carow of New York. By this mar
riage there were five children, Theodore, Kermit, Archi
bald, Quentin and Ethel.

CHAPTER H
LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM
Theodore Roosevelt's public career began in January,
1882, when at the age of 23 he entered the New York Legis
lature as a member of its lower house. He had been grad
uated from Harvard in 1880 and had spent the following
year in the study of law. His inclination toward the legal
profession was not strengthened by his studies for it seemed
to him that some of the teachings of the law books and of
the class-room were against rather than in favor of the
attainment of justice. Then, too, the standards set by many
successful lawyers who were in the service of great cor
porations, were incompatible with the idealism which he,
in common with other high-minded men, entertained. It
was a period, not yet closed, in which many of the ablest
and most eminent members of the bar devoted their talents,
not so much to the strict observance of the law, as to find
ing ways by which their clients could violate the spirit if
not the letter of the law and escape its penalties. The
effect of studies under these conditions made an impres
sion upon young Roosevelt's mind which was never wholly
effaced, but which deepened and strengthened as time went
on and found expression later in his action as President in
the direction of regulating and controlling the conduct of
great corporations.
While studying law he began to take an active interest
in politics and his comfortable financial condition enabled
him to give time and attention to political matters which
he would otherwise have been obliged to concentrate upon
earning a livelihood. He had been left by his father suf
ficient means to permit him to make the earning of addi
tional money a secondary matter. He said in after life that
6

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 7
it was the possession of this inheritance which enabled him
to accept offices at a salary inadequate for the support of
himself and his family and through which he secured
advancement in public life. Instead of making his inheri
tance the excuse for an idle and purposeless life, as many
another man in like situation has done, he used it as an aid
to a life of action and public usefulness.
In 1880, the machinery of party organization in New
York City was entirely in the hands of men who made
politics a profession by means of which they earned a live
lihood. As the Republican party was in a hopeless minor
ity in the city, the men in control of its organization used
it mainly as a basis for combinations or "deals" with
Tammany Hall, receiving in return minor offices from the
Tammany authorities and various other favors. The
Republican district organizations formed social and politi
cal clubs and these selected all the candidates for office, who
were usually men who could be depended upon to "obey
orders," that is, to act as the party bosses commanded. It
was somewhat difficult for a man of young Roosevelt's type
to become a member of a district club, as candidates had to
be regularly proposed and elected, as in any other club.
When Roosevelt declared his intention of becoming a
member of the club in his district, which was known as the
"silk-stocking" district of the city because of the wealth
and social eminence of a large proportion of its voting
population, his friends ridiculed him, saying that the men
in control of city politics were not gentlemen, but saloon
keepers, street-car conductors and the like, and that he
would not only be unable to exert any influence but would
be subjected to unpleasantness and even brutality. His
reply was characteristic of the man. ' ' I answered, ' ' he says
in his 'Autobiography,' "that if this were so it merely
meant that the people I knew did not belong to the govern
ing class, and that the other people did— and that I
intended to be one of the governing class; -that if they
proved too hard-bit for me I supposed I would have to
quit, but I certainly would not quit until I had made the

8 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
effort and found out whether I really was too weak to hold
my own in the rough and tumble."
He was admitted to membership and after a year's
association had so held his own as to become on good terms
with enough of his fellow members to win their nomination
for member of the Assembly, or lower branch of the Legis
lature, in spite of the fact that he had been an open oppo
nent of their machine methods and had fought a losing
fight with them on more than one occasion. There was no
doubt in their minds about his anti-machine sentiments or
about his inflexible determination to uphold them at any
and all times. In fact, they obtained fresh light on the
subject as soon as he was nominated. The Assembly dis
trict included sections of Fifth and Sixth Avenues, and the
party leaders thought at first they would take him on a
personal canvass through the liquor saloons along Sixth
Avenue. The canvass ended with the first saloon. The
candidate was introduced with proper solemnity to the
proprietor, who was an important political personage, and
who began to catechize him as a suppliant for favor. When
he said that he expected Roosevelt as member to treat the
liquor interests fairly, he got a rather sharp reply that all
interests would be treated fairly, and when he added that
he regarded existing licenses as too high he got in response
an assurance that the candidate did not consider them high
enough and would endeavor to have them made higher.
The interview at this point assumed so stormy an aspect
that the candidate was withdrawn by his backers on a plea
of pressing engagements elsewhere, and no other saloons
were visited, it being explained to him that he would better
confine his energies to his friends in Fifth Avenue and
leave to others the burdens of the canvass in Sixth Avenue.
These details of the first steps of Roosevelt in political
life are given as throwing important light upon his subse
quent career, for they disclose the same characteristics that
he displayed in all its later stages.
He was successful in the election, and in January, 1882,
took his seat in the Legislature a new man in politics,

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 9
totally unknown outside the limits of the district that he
represented. He had at the time no intention or expecta
tion of abandoning the profession of law for a political
career. He wrote immediately after his election, to a class
mate, Charles G. Washburn of Worcester, Mass., that find
ing it would not interfere with his> law studies he had
accepted the nomination, "but don't," he added, "think
I am going to go into politics after this year, for I am not. "
Almost from the moment of his entrance he took a com
manding position among his associates. The Assembly
was nearly evenly divided between Republicans and Demo
crats, the latter having a bare majority of one vote. The
Democrats themselves were divided between Tammany and
anti-Tammany members. The half dozen Tammany mem
bers sought to dictate the nomination for Speaker by putting
up a candidate of their own, thus depriving the regularly
nominated Democratic candidate of a majority. There was
thus provided an ideal situation for a "deal" between the
machine Republican members and the handful of Tammany
members in favor of the nomination of a Speaker who
would divide the patronage of the Assembly between his
supporters. "Deals" of this character had been a well-
established custom for many years, whenever the oppor
tunity arose, and one was confidently anticipated at this
time. In fact, the first steps of it had been taken, when the
new and unknown member from New York arose to explain
his vote while the deadlock was in progress. He said that
the .Democrats were in the majority and should be per
mitted to organize the Assembly. No harm was being done
by the delay, and he was convinced after talking with gentle
men among his constituents who had large commercial in
terests that they would be relieved rather than annoyed by
the absence of legislation. The Democrats were responsible
for the delay and they would receive whatever blame the
people might administer for it. As for the Republicans,
they were opposed to any combination with the Democrats.
The effect of this unexpected speech was instantaneous
and, so far as the proposed "deal" was concerned, deadly.

10 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
As it was the first utterance of Roosevelt as a holder of
public office it is interesting to record the comments that
were made on it by the newspapers at the time. One said:
"Assemblyman Roosevelt made a very favorable impres
sion by his first speech." Another: "His sensible and
welkdelivered remarks brought him many hearty congratu
lations from the older members." An Albany correspond
ent of another: "The next orator was Mr. Theodore
Roosevelt of the twenty-first, a Republican. This young
gentleman has been dubbed 'Oscar Wilde' by his admiring
colleagues, who were much amused by his elastic move
ments, voluminous laughter and wealth of mouth. But his
speech to-day was well-considered and put." Another
correspondent, like the one just quoted, writing for a
Democratic journal, felt moved to ridicule while bestowing
praise: "Young Mr. Roosevelt of New York, a blond
young man with eyeglasses, English side whiskers, and
Dundreary drawl in his speech, made his maiden effort as
an orator. He objected to talk of Republican aid to the
Democrats. . . . The older Republican members who
have been trying to make party capital by representing the
State as going to ruin because the Democrats did not or
ganize the Legislature, wriggled uneasily in their seats
when young Mr. Roosevelt pictured the complacency of the
people over the deadlock. There was no way to stop him,
however, and he got through without interruption. An
effort to undo what he said to-day will probably be made
to-morrow." It was impossible to undo it for the simple reason that
daylight had been let into the scheme by "Young Mr.
Roosevelt" — he was to be accused of the "atrocious crime
of being a young man" for many years afterwards — and
the "deal" was abandoned, for political trickery of that
sort must be carried on in secret or it cannot succeed. The
anti-Tammany candidate for Speaker was elected by aid
of the Tammany votes and Roosevelt had scored his first
victory over the united powers of evil in politics.
The second victory followed quickly on the steps of the

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, NEW YORK LEGISLATURE, 1881

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 11
first. An effort was made to regain what had been lost in
the Speakership contest by a scheme to deprive the Speaker
of the power to appoint subordinate officers in the Assem
bly, lodging it in the hands of the clerk, who was a Repub
lican. The defeated Tammany members had united with
the Republican "dealers" in this project. A Republican
caucus was held and a resolution was introduced by an
expert Republican "dealer" to approve the plan. Mr.
Roosevelt, who had been joined by a half-dozen other young
members who shared his independent views, denounced the
plan so vigorously that it was defeated by a nearly unani
mous vote. The press of the State had been fully aroused
by the action which Roosevelt had taken in the Speakership
contest and its hearty approval of his course had made
Republican members very timid about opposing him.
He had been made a member of the Committee on Cities,
and as soon as the Speakership controversy was settled he
turned his attention to needed legislation for the city of
New York, bringing in a bill which provided for the elec
tion of Aldermen by Assembly Districts and the election of
the President of the Board by the city at large. This abol;
ished the existing method which included a system of minor
ity representation that had worked chiefly in the interest
of "deals" and the consequent success of the most undesir
able candidates, and assured the choice of a President of
the Board who, because of the method of his election, would
be a less objectionable person than was possible under the
old system. The measure was fought viciously by the poli
ticians of both parties but was supported warmly by the
reputable press of the city and was enacted. It was the
first step toward an improvement in the quality of the mem
bership of the Board of Aldermen, and was the basis of
further steps in the same direction in subsequent years.
The action of his first legislative session which attracted
most widespread attention and subjected Roosevelt to
abuse and ridicule was his effort to secure the impeach
ment of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State. The
Justice had been charged in the press with allowing him-

12 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
self to be used as an instrument in their business by men
connected with railway interests in New York City. Roose
velt introduced a resolution calling for an investigation by
the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly. In support of
it he made a carefully prepared speech, setting forth in
detail the charges in the case. Strong opposition was at
once made to the resolution, led by one of the oldest Repub
lican leaders in the Assembly and warmly espoused by the
leader or boss of Tammany Hall. It was the old combina
tion that Roosevelt had fought and overcome in the Speak
ership contest.
The press of the city and State was divided on the ques
tion, the more reputable portion favoring investigation and
the Tammany Democratic portion bitterly opposing it and
assailing Roosevelt personally. As, on the occasion of bis
first speech in the Assembly, these press comments are of
illuminating value, especially in view of other comments
which were made at various stages of his career.
In reference to his speech in presenting the resolution
the New York Times said it was ' ' A very concise and vigor
ous presentation of the essential facts in the case," and
added :
"Mr. Roosevelt has a most refreshing habit of calling
men and things by their right names, and in these days of
judicial, ecclesiastical, and journalistic subserviency to the
robber-barons of the Street, it needs some little courage
in any public man to characterize them and their acts in
fitting terms. There is a splendid career open for a young
man of position, character, and independence like Mr,
Roosevelt who can denounce the legalized robbery of Gould
and his allies without descending to the turgid abuse of the
demagogue, and without being restrained by the cowardly
caution of the politician."
The New York World represented the opposite view and
taking the side of Tammany and its Republican allies, said
on various occasions:
"The son of Mr. Theodore Roosevelt ought to have
learned, even at this early period of his life, the difference

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 13
between a call for a legislative committee of inquiry and a
stump speech.
"Why not allow Mr. Roosevelt to impeach the Judge at
once, try him and convict him? Why irritate an estimable
youth into making a spectacle of himself to no purpose?"
Concerning the quality of Mr. Roosevelt's speech, the
Albany correspondent of the New York Sun said: "It was
delivered with deliberation and measured emphasis, and
his charges were made with a boldness that was almost
scathing." Another correspondent wrote: "The bold
language used by Mr. Roosevelt to-day has been the prin
cipal topic of conversation among the members to-night."
Every parliamentary trick and device was used to defeat
the resolution. An ex-Governor of the State, who was the
oldest Republican member and an expert "dealer" of many
years' practice, talked against time when the resolution
was introduced and prevented a vote being reached. He
alluded to Roosevelt repeatedly as the "young man from
New York," and in this and subsequent sessions led the
opposition on the floor, upheld invariably by the Republi
can Speaker in the chair, who represented the district in
which the accused Judge lived. Among other efforts to
secure defeat it was asserted on the floor that a member
of the Roosevelt family had been "squeezed" in some
operation by the elevated railway authorities and he was
trying to "get even" with them by assailing the Judge.
This was promptly refuted. Roosevelt, undaunted and
undismayed, overcame all obstacles, steadily pressing for
a vote, and when the time for it arrived the resolution was
adopted by a vote of 104 in favor to only 6 against. So
strong was popular sentiment throughout the State in
favor of Roosevelt's course that few of the members who
had been opposing it in private ventured to do so openly
when they were forced to go on the record.
Commenting on this result, Harper's Weekly, then edited
by George William Curtis, said :
"It is with the greatest satisfaction that those who are
interested in good government see a young man in the

14 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Legislature who, like Mr. Roosevelt, does not know the
meaning of fear, and to whom the bluster and bravado of
party and political bullies are as absolutely indifferent as
the blowing of the wind."
The investigation resulted in two reports from the Judi
ciary Committee, one by the majority against impeachment
of the Judge and one by a minority in favor of impeach
ment. The "Black Horse Cavalry," as the forces of evil in
politics were called, had triumphed. The Committee mem
bers whom they controlled had voted, without the slightest
regard to the evidence, against impeachment. Their action
was fore-ordained from the beginning. Roosevelt made an
earnest effort to have the Assembly adopt the minority
report, but without success, for the same forces were in
control there. The majority report was adopted by a vote
of 77 to 35. This action was denounced by the reputable
press of the city and State as a disgrace to the Assembly
and a shameless act of "whitewashing." Unbiased pubhc
opinion throughout the State was virtually unanimous in
the belief that the evidence presented had established
beyond question the guilt of the Judge. The Assembly
won a temporary triumph, but a great moral victory was
accredited to Roosevelt, who stood higher than ever in
public estimation.
Roosevelt further incurred the bitter enmity of the
Elevated Railway Company by opposing and securing the
failure of a measure designed to relieve it of the burden
of about one-half of its just taxes. A bill which had
passed the Assembly relating to the taxation of corpora
tions was surreptitiously amended in the Senate and passed
by that body in such form as to fix the rate of taxation
to be levied upon the elevated railway corporation at 4 per
cent of gross receipts, instead of 8 per cent as levied by the
city authorities on that and other corporations. An effort
was made by the "Black Horse Cavalry," assisted by one
of their number in the chair, to force the bill through the
Assembly under "gag law." Roosevelt objected, insisted
upon reading official protests from the New York city

LEGISLATURE— FIRST TERM 15
authorities, showing that the bill would deprive the city of
at least a quarter of a million dollars, and in explaining his
vote declared: "It is a steal pure and simple, the most
monstrous that has been perpetrated here this year. The
way it is being pushed through under the gag law shows
the motives of those who are thus acting." He was unable
to defeat the bill in the Assembly, but his denunciation led
to full publicity in the press regarding its nature and the
method of its passage, raising a storm of protest through
out the State, and leading to a veto by the Governor.
Roosevelt's opposition was justified three years later when,
after much litigation, the courts decreed that the Elevated
companies owed taxes in excess of $1,500,000, as levied by
the city authorities.
Roosevelt's experience made upon him what was shown in
later years to be a lasting impression. "Various men,"
he says in his 'Autobiography,' "whom I had known so
cially and had been taught to look up to, prominent business
men and lawyers, acted in a way which not only astounded
me, but which I was quite unable to reconcile with the
theories I had formed as to their high standing." He
relates a conversation with a member of a prominent law
firm, an old family friend, which should be reproduced here,
not only because of its bearing upon Roosevelt's subsequent
career, but for another reason which will be mentioned
presently. He records that this family friend took him to
lunch one day with this outcome:
"He explained that I had done well in the Legislature,
that it was a good thing to have made the 'reform play,'
that I had shown that I possessed ability such as would
make me useful in the right kind of law office or business
concern ; but that I must not overplay my hand ; that I had
gone far enough, and that now was the time to leave poli
tics and identify myself with the right kind of people, the
people who would always in the long run control others and
obtain the real rewards which were worth having. I asked
him if that meant that I was to yield to the ring in politics.
He answered somewhat impatiently that I was entirely

16 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
mistaken (as in fact I was) about there being merely a
political ring, of the kind of which the papers were fond
of talking;, that the 'ring,' if it could be called such — that
is, the inner circle — included certain big business men, and
the politicians, lawyers and judges who were in alliance
with and to a certain extent dependent upon them, and that
the successful man had to win his success by the backing of
the same forces, whether in law, business, or politics.
' ' This conversation not only interested me, but made such
an impression that I always remembered it, for it was the
first glimpse I had of that combination between business
and politics which I was in after years so often to oppose."
The gist of this friend's advice was that Theodore Roose
velt should cease to be himself, change the personality to
which his first success as a public man was due, and become
somebody else. Time was to show that this disinterested
friend was the forerunner of a vast host of the same type.
Throughout his career, at every stage of its progress,
politicians, statesmen, editors, clergymen, educators and
others bestowed upon him like advice, begged him to go
their way instead of his own, cease to be himself, and
become the sort of man they thought he should be. Abun
dant evidence on this point will be forthcoming as this
narrative proceeds.

CHAPTER III
LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM
The prestige that he had won during his first term in the
Legislature secured Roosevelt a renomination without
opposition by the Republican organization of his district,
and with the warm support of the press he was reelected
by an increased majority. His conduct during this session
showed the same characteristics that had marked the pre
ceding one. In spite of the advice of well-meaning friends,
he persisted in being himself. He received his party's
nomination for Speaker, which was merely honorary, as
the Democrats had a majority in the body. At the preced
ing session a bill had been introduced reducing the fare on
the elevated railways in New York City from 10 cents to 5.
It was introduced as a "strike" upon the railway company,
that is, with the intention of making the company use money
to secure its defeat. When they were convinced that money
was being so used, Roosevelt and his reform associates
supported it, and were confirmed in their conviction when
on final passage the very members who had introduced it
voted against it. It was reintroduced at the succeeding
session, when the company decided not to use money for its
defeat but to fight it on its merits. The entire "Black
Horse Cavalry," including its original supporters, voted
against it, but the honest members, including Roosevelt and
his associates, voted for it, though doubtful about its prin-,
ciple, being influenced largely in their action by the charac
ter of the opposition. It was passed, and when it reached
the Governor, Grover Cleveland, he vetoed it on the ground
of unconstitutionality. When an attempt was made to pass
it over the veto, Roosevelt supported the veto in a speech
17

18 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
which will always stand among the most thoroughly charac
teristic utterances of his career. Never was he more
entirely himself than he was in this confession of error in
judgment and act. In the course of it he said :
"I have to say with shame that when I voted for this
bill I did not act as I think I ought to have acted and as I
generally have acted on the floor of this House. I have to
confess that I weakly yielded, partly in a vindictive spirit,
toward the infernal thieves and conscienceless swindlers
who have had the elevated railroad in charge, and partly
to the popular voice of New York.
"I realize that they (managers of the railway) have done
the most incalculable wrong to this community with their
hired newspapers, with their corruption of the judiciary,
with their corruption of past legislatures. It is not a ques
tion of doing right to them. They are merely common
thieves. It is not a question of doing justice to them. It is
a question of doing justice to ourselves. It is a question of
standing by what we honestly believe to be right, even if in
so doing we antagonize the feelings of our constituents.
"We have heard a great deal about the people demand
ing the passage of this bill. Now, anything that the people
demand that is right, it is most clearly and most emphat
ically the duty of this Legislature to do; but we should
never yield to what they demand if it is wrong.
"I would rather go out of politics feeling that I had done
what was right than stay in with the approval of all men
knowing in my heart that I had acted as I ought not to."
This remarkable declaration, the like of which was rarely
ever heard in a legislative body, was received with jeers
and veritable howls of delight by the newspapers that had
abused Roosevelt in the impeachment controversy and in
his other assault upon the elevated railway tax relief bill.
They were quite sure that he had wrecked his political
career and that little more would be heard of him. One of
them spoke of him as a young man of whom it could be
truly said

LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 19
"His strong point is his bank account,
His weak point is his head."
Another one said : ' ' The popular voice of New York will
probably leave this weakling at home hereafter." Another
spoke of the deliverance as the "last dying speech and con
fession" and declared that to say it showed "characteristic
manliness," as a contemporary had done, was, "if not
trampling on a grave, certainly amounts to dancing on the
side of it." Still another regretted that "a son of Theo
dore Roosevelt should have brought this discredit upon a
name made honorable by the private virtues and public
services of his father. ' '
These prophets undoubtedly had faith in their predic
tions. Roosevelt had opposed what seemed to be an over
whelming popular sentiment and his critics could not be
lieve that a public man could do that and not invite political
ruin. Roosevelt himself had grave doubts on the subject
but they had not influenced his action. When, in 1918, I
was going over with him the account here given of this
portion of his career, we read together the passages I have
cited from this memorable speech. After a moment's
thought he said: "Let it stand. I expressed myself more
strongly at the time than I would have done had the inci
dent occurred later in my life, but I am willing to have
what I said go into the record unchanged for the position
I took then I have always held and hold to-day. ' '
Among his letters I find one to his son Theodore at Har
vard, written on October 20, 1903, which contains an 'inter
esting allusion to this episode in his legislative career:
"Immediately after leaving college I went to the Legis
lature. I was the youngest man there, and I rose like a
rocket. I was reelected next year by an enormous majority
in a time when the Republican party as a whole met with
great disaster; and the Republican minority in the Assem
bly, although I was the youngest member, nominated me for
Speaker, that is, made me the leader of the minority. I
immediately proceeded to lose my perspective, and the

20 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
result was that I came an awful cropper and had to pick
myself up after learning by bitter experience the lesson
that I was not all-important and that I had to take account
of many different elements in life. It took me fully a year
before I got back the position I had lost, but I hung steadily
at it and achieved my purpose."
Another man who took a leading part in the incident and
who, like Roosevelt, was destined to attain the highest office
in the gift of the people of the nation, was Grover Cleve
land. Many years later, in the fall of 1891, in the course
of an intimate conversation with him at his residence in
New York City, I spoke of his veto of the five cent fare bill.
With that unrestrained frankness which was characteristic
of him, he said :
"I was convinced that the bill was wrong, that it was
unjust and might lead to practical confiscation. I had no
choice but to veto it, but I had not a doubt in the world that
by so doing I was ruining my political career. As I got into
bed that night after writing and signing my veto message
I said to myself, 'Grover Cleveland, you've done the busi
ness for yourself to-night. ' The next morning I went down
to the Executive Office feeling pretty blue but putting a
smiling face on it. I didn't look at the morning papers,
didn't think they had anything to say that I cared to see.
I went through my morning mail with my secretary, Dan
Lamont, pretending all the time I didn't care about the
papers but thinking of them all the time just the same.
When we had finished I said, as indifferently as I could,
'Seen the morning papers, Dan?' He said 'yes.' 'What
have they got to say about me, anything?' 'Why, yes, they
are all praising you.' 'They are! Well, here, let me see
them!' I tell you I grabbed them pretty quickly and felt
a good deal better."
Roosevelt soon made it apparent that whatever might
be the effect upon his political fortunes, the affair had not
in the slightest degree lessened his courage or modified his

LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 21
determination to follow his own convictions in spite of all
obstacles. He continued to be himself, and in doing so
demonstrated very quickly that he had not lost his popu
larity, neither had his fighting vigor abated. Several acts
and utterances during the remainder of the session are
worthy of record for they were the keynotes of his subse
quent career.
One that all the veteran politicians regarded as
"suicidal" had occurred during his first term in the Legis
lature and was repeated in the second. An item was
included in the regular Supply Bill appropriating a sum
of money for a private institution called the Catholic Pro
tectory. Roosevelt objected to it on the ground that it was
unconstitutional because it violated the stipulation of the
State constitution which forbade the use of public money
for a private institution. Furthermore, such proposals
brought into the Legislature the question of politics and
religion. He had opposed a similar grant to a Protestant
institution on precisely the same grounds and he should
continue to fight all such tooth and nail. He had many
warm personal friends in the Catholic faith and the man
who had done more for him politically than any one else
was a Catholic. He believed that he was acting in unison
with the sentiment of those intelligent members of the
Catholic Church who indorsed the utterances of one of the
greatest of Catholics, Daniel O'Connell, that religion ought
to be kept from politics.
Roosevelt's opposition did not avail to defeat either the
Catholic or Protestant appropriation, both being voted by
a large majority. This early stand is noteworthy as being
the first assertion of a rule of conduct which he maintained
inflexibly throughout his career, and which, be it said to the
honor of the great body of both Catholics and Protestants,
won for him their confidence and esteem.
On several other occasions he gave utterance to convic
tions and principles of conduct which he ever afterwards
upheld, showing that at this early stage of his career his
character was already established on immutable lines. A

22 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
bill was introduced to amend the Penal Code so as to permit
publishers and editors of newspapers to be sued for libel
in any place in the state in which their newspapers circu
lated. This was declared to be an effort to gag the press,
and a motion was made to kill the bill by striking out its
enacting clause. In supporting this motion, Roosevelt said:
"Taking it for granted that this is a bill for gagging the
newspapers, I trust that the motion will prevail. I think
that if there is one thing we ought to be careful about it is
in regard to interfering with the liberty of the press. We
have all of us at times suffered from the liberty of the press,
but we have to take the good and the bad. I think we
certainly ought to hesitate very seriously before passing
any law that will interfere with the broadest public utter
ance. I think it is a great deal better to err a little bit on
the side of having too much discussion and having too viru
lent language used by the press, rather than to err on the
side of having them not say what they ought to say,
especially with reference to public men and measures. I
heartily agree with the propositon to have the enacting
clause of the bill stricken out."
The motion was carried without a division. Thirty-four
years later, during the European War, Roosevelt upheld
the same position in regard to criticism of the Wilson
Administration's conduct of the war, having never varied
from his first adherence to it.
Roosevelt succeeded in getting before the Assembly at
this session a bill reforming the Civil Service of New York
City by applying to it the provisions of the national Civil
Service law. He could not get it passed by the Democratic
body, but he was able, at a committee hearing on its provi
sions, to get his views on the subject placed upon record.
"My object," he said, "in pushing this measure is less to
raise the standard of the civil service than it is to take the
office-holders out of politics. It is a good thing to raise
the character of our public employees but it is better still
to take out of politics the vast band of hired mercenaries

LEGISLATURE— SECOND TERM 23
whose very existence depends on their success, and who can
almost always in the end overcome the efforts of men whose
only care is to secure a pure and honest government, for
in such a contest the discipline of regulars, fighting literally
for their means of livelihood, is sure in the end to over
come the spasmodic ardor of volunteers."
This was a thoroughly bad session of the Legislature and
the most that Roosevelt and the little band of men whom
he led could accomplish was to defeat some of the worst
jobs. Roosevelt, instead of being a ruined man, came out
of the session standing higher in public esteem than ever
before. One of the press commentators said : "Mr. Roose
velt lasted to the end, when he was stronger than at the
beginning." Another: "Mr. Roosevelt enjoys the dis
tinction of having convictions and living up to them."
Another: "Mr. Roosevelt's voice and vote are sure for
what is honest, wise and progressive."

CHAPTER IV
LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM
In the State election of 1883 the Republicans secured a
majority in both houses of the Legislature. Roosevelt was
reelected, in spite of the opposition of some of the party
machine leaders of his district whose interests and schemes
he had antagonized. It was quite generally admitted that
his course in the two preceding Legislatures had been the
chief influence in causing the Democratic defeat. One of
the most influential of the Republican newspapers outside
the city of New York said: "It should not be forgotten
that Theodore Roosevelt led the Republican minority in
the last Assembly and that the minority has grown into a
powerful majority. Much of the success of the Republicans
in the recent elections was due to the record made by these
legislators in opposition to Democratic schemes of extrava
gance and corruption. Much of that record was due to the
sleepless activity of their intrepid leader, Theodore Roose
velt. He led the minority to victory, and it is only fitting
that he should now receive a grateful acknowledgment of
his services by being elevated to the Speakership."
He frankly declared himself a candidate for Speaker and
received the warm support of all except the most avowedly
partisan of the Republican journals of the State. But from
the outset of the canvass, the old leaders of the party who
represented the interests which he had antagonized in his
fearless opposition to "deals" with Tammany Hall and
other disreputable partisan doings, formed a combination
against him and in the end adroitly compassed his defeat.
They brought this about by having the most discredited of
the machine leaders in his district pretend to support him
24

LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 25
till the vote in caucus was reached, when they deserted him
and nominated the rival candidate.
The Speaker thus chosen soon revealed his obligations
to the members of the combination to which he owed his
election. He could not refuse to appoint Roosevelt to the
chairmanship of the Committee on Cities, but in placing
him there he associated him with a body of men who were
known not to be in harmony with his views and who could
be depended upon to hinder rather than help him in work
of great importance which he had avowed his intention to
undertake. Once again, the newspapers that had persist
ently assailed him since his appearance in public life, in
dulged joyfully in prophecy of his ruin, either as accom
plished or speedily to ensue. "This will not be a Happy
New Year to the exquisite Mr. Roosevelt," said the chief
of them, "but Mr. Roosevelt is comparatively young, and
time is a kind physician." This prophet was not long in
discovering that this year was destined to be, if not the
happiest of Roosevelt's life thus far, the most active and
most useful of his Legislative career.
The Speaker, in addition to "packing" the Committee
on Cities against Roosevelt, sought to thrust upon him a
clerk whom he had not chosen and did not desire, but ener
getic personal protest persuaded the Speaker to abandon
his purpose. It soon became apparent that, whatever might
be the predilections of the members of the Committee, the
chairman had views of his own and was determined to put
them into practice. His first act was to introduce two
measures of great importance to New York City, one giving
the Mayor absolute power of appointment and removal of
heads of departments, abolishing the confirming power over
such appointments exercised by the Board of Aldermen.
The other was a High License bill, greatly increasing the
liquor license fees in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants.
Few measures could be devised that would be more certain
to incur the bitter hostility of corrupt political interests
than these two. Through their confirming powers, the
Aldermen were able to thwart all efforts for good govern-

26 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
ment of the city that a Mayor might make. They would
confirm the appointment only of men of their own sort and
a worse sort could not be imagined. They gave a bad
Mayor full excuse for all objectionable selections that he
might make for he could always say that no others would
be confirmed. In regard to high license, the politicians of
both parties catered to and were in close alliance with the
liquor-dealers, and viewed with wrath and alarm any
measure that threatened to disrupt those relations.
Closely following the organization of the Legislature,
special committees were appointed in both houses to inves
tigate municipal departments in the city of New York.
Roosevelt was placed at the head of the Assembly Com
mittee and he entered at once upon the task assigned to it
with enthusiasm and determination. There had been many
such committees in the past but few of them had accom
plished much of permanent value, for the reason that as
soon as they began to make revelations that were damag
ing to the city's rulers, the political machinery of both
parties was put in operation to "call them off," that is,
stop the inquiry or sidetrack it into comparatively harm
less channels. An attempt was made at the outset to estab
lish a check on the Assembly Committee by a proposal to
have it work jointly with the Senate Committee. Roosevelt
defeated this by flatly declining the proposal, a proceeding
which was fully justified by the obvious fact that the Senate
Committee had been made up, not for a genuine investiga
tion, but for one of the old kind.
He took full control of the Assembly Committee from
the start, and began at once to make revelations which
startled the city and ultimately attracted the attention of
the country. Various well-established devices were tried
by the disreputable politicians of both parties to arrest his
progress, but for the first time in the history of legislative
investigations they failed utterly because of his vigilance
in foreseeing and thwarting them. Within a few weeks
he had aroused such an overwhelming popular sentiment in
his support that all efforts to hamper him ceased. His

LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 27
committee made a report summing up in the plain and
vigorous language of its chairman the results of its labors
and proposing for enactment seven measures of reform
which provided for a complete change in the methods of
city government, abolishing the old system under which
the corrupt politicians of both parties had been robbing
the city for many years. These became known as the Roose
velt reform bills. The city press, with a few insignificant
exceptions, supported these measures. Great mass meet
ings of citizens were held to advocate their passage as well
as that of the bill abolishing the confirming powers of the
Aldermen and that decreeing high liquor licenses. In the
end, the seven, as well as the Aldermanic measure, were
passed, but the High License bill, although favored by the
Church Temperance Society and the leading Protestant
clergymen of the city, failed of final passage. This was
many years before the appearance of the prohibition wave
which later swept over the country and Roosevelt's posi
tion at the time was in harmony with that held by the great
body of temperance advocates.
In addition to the city reform bills, Roosevelt succeeded
in securing the passage of a civil service bill, applying the
provisions of the national Civil Service law to all cities of
the State having a population of 20,000 or more. A des
perate effort was made to have the police force of New
York City exempted from the provisions of the law, but
Roosevelt defeated this by investigating the Police Depart
ment and showing that the worst evils in the force were
due to the practice of making appointments to it on political
influence alone. He tried also to have the Police Depart
ment put under a single head and to abolish the Bureau of
Elections, which was under the control of an expert Repub
lican "dealer," the most pernicious and rascally specimen
of his class and time, but the political mercenaries of the
two parties, grievously crippled in their business as they
were by the other Roosevelt reform bills, were able to rally
sufficient strength to defeat these additional assaults.
It is worth while, in order to show the high place which

28 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Roosevelt had won in public estimation during this third
session, to quote a few of the comments which the press of
all parties and shades of opinion, in New York and else
where, made upon him at the time. The Democratic jour
nal which had so often predicted his ruin and had informed
him that his New Year was not to be a happy one, was one
of the warmest in his praise. When his seven bills were
before the Legislature, this journal said of him:
"Mr. Roosevelt, to whom the credit of the bills already
passed or certain to pass is due, has displayed a boldness,
directness and energy of which much older and more
experienced politicians might well be proud. We are will
ing to accord honor wherever it is due. We only wish we
had a Democratic House of Representatives at Washington
as efficient and vigorous as the Republican State Legisla
ture, and a Democratic Congressman as active, resolute and
practical as Assemblyman Roosevelt."
Another city journal, which was later to become one of
his most captious critics, spoke of his work in the Legisla
ture as "influential and memorable," adding: "There
have been no disagreements among the members of his
Investigating Committee. He has been able to inspire his
associates with something of his own zeal for reform, and
has apparently had no difficulty in securing their complete
faith in the fearless disinterestedness of his labors."
During the exciting scenes in the Legislature when the
Roosevelt bills were on final passage, with all the "dealers"
seeking, sometimes with the covert aid of the Speaker, to
defeat them, the city newspapers placed their Albany
despatches under such headlines as "A Big Day for Roose
velt"; "Under Roosevelt's Whip"; "Roosevelt's Brilliant
Assault on Corruption"; "Theodore, the Cyclone Hero of
the Assembly."
In sections of the country outside of New York State,
the newspapers held up Roosevelt as a model for imitation
by young men everywhere. A Boston journal said of his
political career, "Though less than three years in length,
it is long enough to show how much can be achieved by a

LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 29
young man of ability and integrity, who has the wit to
organize practical reforms, the faculty to inspire others
with his own faith in his measures, and the tact and persis
tency to secure their adoption by the requisite majority."
Another journal in the same city called attention to a purely
Rooseveltian method which he followed throughout his
career: "His example and career should stimulate others
equally favorably situated to do something in the line where
he has wrought so well. We never heard that Roosevelt
sneered at American politics or affected to deride those
engaged in the comparatively humble business of law
making. On the contrary, he has sought to elevate politics
by turning it into right channels and has honored the office
of State representative." Another New England journal
said: "Mr. Roosevelt is rapidly making toward the front
rank of leadership in New York. And his progress comes
as the natural result of vigorous, effective and unimpeach-
ably honest work for the city in which he dwells. He has
been called a ' swell, ' but it would be well if every State had
just such swells who are not afraid of the people, know
what they want and, more than that, know how to satisfy
the popular desire for relief from municipal burdens."
A Philadelphia newspaper said: "The career of this
young man, who has gone boldly and honorably into public
life, ought to shame thousands who complain that politics
are so dirty that no decent gentleman can engage in them. ' '
A Western journal said: "Mr. Roosevelt, like William
Pitt, is accused of the awful crime of being a young man.
It is a very great pity that we have not some more young
men like him in public life. Let them all come to the front
and take part in the government."
The weekly illustrated journals broke out in full page
cartoons of Roosevelt in various guises. One of them repre
sented him with a huge pair of scissors clipping the claws
of the Tammany Tiger ; another as Ajax defying the cor
rupt influences behind police corruption ; another as a wood
man cutting down a huge tree of municipal graft and
rascality; another represented him garbed as a policeman,

30 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
entitled "Our New Watchman, Roosevelt," in the act of
dismissing the political bosses. When Governor Cleve
land signed the Roosevelt bills, Nast published a cartoon,
representing Roosevelt standing with the bills before
Cleveland, who was seated at his desk, pen in hand, in the
act of signing. This was entitled "Reform without
Bloodshed." The action of the highest court of the State in regard to
the constitutionality of a measure which he had succeeded
in having made a law during his final term in the Legisla
ture is worthy of special record here for reasons which will
be stated presently. The measure, which had been pro
posed by the Cigar-Makers' Union, prohibited the manu
facture of cigars in tenement houses. Roosevelt was ap
pointed one of a committee of three to investigate condi
tions in tenement houses and see if the legislation was
desirable. He made several visits to the houses in which
the work was carried on, going sometimes with other mem
bers of the committee and at other times alone. What he
saw convinced him that the legislation was not only desir
able but vitally necessary if the children of the workers in
question were to grow up fitted for the duties of American
citizenship. He ardently championed the bill and per
suaded Governor Cleveland to sign it, though it was a
crudely drawn measure. When it was carried to the Court
of Appeals, on a question of its constitutionality, the court
in 1885, held that it was not a proper exercise of the police
power, that it interfered with the profitable and free use
of his property by the owner or his lessee, and that a con
stitutional guaranty was violated. In rendering its deci
sion, the court said :
"It cannot be perceived how the cigar-maker is to be
improved in his health or his morals by forcing him from
his home and its hallowed associations and beneficent influ
ences to ply his trade elsewhere."
As Roosevelt in his personal visits to the tenement houses
had found that in nearly all cases the work had been car
ried on by men, women and children living, working, eating

LEGISLATURE— THIRD TERM 31
and sleeping in the same rooms, sometimes in one room,
and in one instance, by two families in one room, two
women, two men, several children and an adult male
boarder, his disgust and wrath at these remarks about
"hallowed associations" and "beneficent influences of his
home" were deep and abiding. He says in his 'Auto
biography': "It was this case which first waked me to a dim and
partial understanding of the fact that the courts were not
necessarily the best judges of what should be done to better
social and industrial conditions. The judges who rendered
this decision were well-meaning men. They knew nothing
whatever of tenement-house conditions ; they knew nothing
whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor, of three
fourths of their fellow-citizens in great cities. They knew
legalism but not life . . . This decision completely
blocked tenement-house reform legislation in New York for
a score of years. It was one of the most serious set-backs
which the cause of industrial and social progress and
reform ever received."
Viewed in the light of his subsequent career the lasting
impression that his legislative experience had made upon
Roosevelt's mind can easily be traced. His early view that
the laws of the land, as expounded in text books and class
rooms and interpreted by lawyers and courts, operated
often against rather than in favor of the attainment of
justice, had been confirmed by that experience. This was
the inevitable effect of his unsuccessful attempt to secure
the impeachment of a judge notoriously guilty of improper
dealings with a railway corporation, and equally so of the
decision of the Court of Appeals upon the measure cited
above. His course as President in regard to the regulation
and control of great corporations, and his later views in
regard to the recall of judicial decisions, were no new
developments of opinion, but the logical result of many
years of serious thought. Equally so was the stand which
he took during his service as President and maintained with
undiminished zeal afterwards, in favor of social and indus-

32 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
trial betterment or reform. Whatever opinion may be held
in regard to his course on these questions, no one can say
truthfully that it was due to sudden impulse, or was in
spired by a desire to gain temporary political capital. His
conduct was based on precisely the same ideas and prin
ciples that had actuated his course in the Legislature many
years earlier, and was inherent in the character of the man.

CHAPTER V
FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS— MR.
BLAINE'S CANDIDACY
At the end of his third term in the Legislature, Roosevelt
had become a distinct personality in national politics. His
advance had been remarkably rapid. When in the summer
of 1881 he decided to take an active part in political affairs
he was, as I have said, practically unknown outside the
limits of his own Assembly district. Before the end of his
third term his fame had extended over the entire country.
He had won such a position of leadership in his party in the
State that when the time came to elect delegates to the
Republican National Convention in the spring of 1884, he
was, with the hearty approval of the great mass of his
party, chosen as the chief of the four delegates-at-large.
So strong was popular sentiment in his favor that he easily
overcame an organized effort by the old machine leaders
in the State Convention to prevent his selection.
He went to the National Convention an avowed advo
cate of the nomination of Senator George F. Edmunds of
Vermont as the Republican candidate for the Presidency
in preference to James G. Blaine, who was the favorite of
a majority of the delegates. The Blaine supporters were
in control of the National Republican Committee and sought
to organize the Convention in their interest by having a
man of their choice, ex-Senator Powell Clayton, of Ala
bama, made temporary Chairman. The National Com
mittee submitted this selection to the Convention for ap
proval. Senator H. C. Lodge, a delegate from Massachu
setts and like Roosevelt an avowed Edmunds supporter,
nominated a colored man, ex-Congressman John R. Lynch
of Mississippi. In support of Senator Lodge's motion,
33

34 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Roosevelt took the floor and made his first speech in a
national convention. As this was his first appearance in
the field of national politics the impression which he made
upon his audience is worthy of record. The New York
Times of June 4, 1894, published this account from its
convention correspondent :
"Up from the midst of the Empire State delegates rose
a slight, almost boyish figure. It was that of an active,
nervous, light-haired, gray-eyed man who had just thrown
off a straw hat and scrambled to his perch on the chair, with
juvenile activity. Everybody knew the man, for there is
not a State headquarters which he has not visited in his
canvass for Edmunds, and scarce an influential delegate
with whom he has not conversed in a straightforward,
manly way, carrying conviction even when he could not
convert. It was Theodore Roosevelt, of New York, the
leader of the younger Republicans, and he was greeted
with a rousing burst of applause as he stood waiting to
speak. When he spoke it was not the voice of a youth, but
of a man — and a positive, practical man. His sensible
speech was in delightful contrast with the plausible apol
ogies of the men who had endeavored to excuse the outrage
which the National Committee had committed."
The speech itself is of historic value for in it Roosevelt
established a precedent for a similar position which he
took 28 years later in another national convention. Its full
text was as follows :
"I trust that the motion made by the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Lodge) will be adopted, and that we
will select as chairman of this convention that representa
tive Republican, Mr. Lynch, of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman,
it has been said by the distinguished gentleman from Penn
sylvania (Mr. Stewart) that it is without precedent to
reverse the action of the National Committee. Who has
not known numerous instances where the action of a State
committee has been reversed by the State convention? Not
one of us but has known such instances. Now there are,
as I understand it, but two delegates to this convention who

FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS 35
have seats on the National Committee; and I hold it to be
derogatory to our honor, to our capacity for self-govern
ment, to say that we must accept the nomination of a pre
siding officer by another body; and that our hands are tied,
and we dare not reverse its action.
"Now, one word more. I trust that the vote will be taken
by individual members, and not by States. Let each man
stand accountable to those whom he represents for his vote.
Let no man be able to shelter himself behind the shield of
his State. What we say is, that one of the cardinal doc
trines of the American political government is the account
ability of each man to his people; and let each man stand
up here and cast his vote, and then go home and abide by
what he has done.
"It is now, Mr. Chairman, less than a quarter of a cen
tury since, in this city, the great Republican party for the
first time organized for victory, and nominated Abraham
Lincoln, of Illinois, who broke the fetters of the slave and
rent them asunder forever. It is a fitting thing for us to
choose to preside over this convention one of the race whose
right to sit within these walls is due to the blood and the
treasure so lavishly spent by the founders of the Republi
can party. And it is but a further vindication of the prin
ciples for which the Republican party so long struggled.
I trust that the Honorable Mr. Lynch will be elected tem
porary chairman of this convention."
The effect of the speech was shown in the result of the
ballot, for Mr. Lynch was elected by a vote of 431 to 382.
The convention asserted its right to reverse the action of
the National Committee, even if by doing so it "violated
precedent." By the nomination of Mr. Blaine, which followed later,
Roosevelt was confronted with what in many respects was
the most serious crisis of his career. He had to decide
which of two courses he should choose. He must separate
himself completely from his party and become an absolute
Independent, or stay within his party and support its regu
larly nominated candidate. The nomination of Mr. Blaine

36 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
had been fairly won. He was unquestionably the choice
of the convention. There was no claim that the will of the
majority had been subverted either through the action of
a committee on contested seats or in any other way. The
problem before him was thus a quite different one from that
presented to him twenty-eight years later in the National
Republican Convention of 1912. In opposing the nomina
tion of Mr. Blaine he and his Republican associates had
been acting with a considerable body of professional Inde
pendents, that is, men without allegiance to either of the
great political parties. Though he had been during his
brief public career an avowed Republican, seeking to
accomplish all his reforms through Republican aid and
inside party lines, his Independent associates, as soon as
the Blaine nomination was made, assumed that he
would leave his party and join them in seeking to ac
complish Blaine's defeat by supporting the Democratic
candidate. In fact, they not merely asked but demanded
that he abandon the course which he had followed since his
entry into political life and upon which he had built his
public career. They were sincere in their belief that he
should do this. It seemed incredible to them that he could
do anything else. He gave them full credit for sincerity,
but declared that the question was one that he must insist
upon deciding for himself. He admitted frankly that he
had worked hard for the nomination of Edmunds and was
savagely indignant at his defeat, but he declined to say at
once what course he should pursue in regard to the nomi
nation of Mr. Blaine. Various devices were used to force
him to declare his intentions, some by Republican politi
cians, and others, not entirely creditable, by leading Inde
pendents, but all in vain. He insisted upon deciding the
question for himself, and in his own way and time. He went
direct from the convention in Chicago to his ranch in
Dakota, and several weeks later put forth a formal state
ment in which he defined his decision as follows :
"I intend to vote the Republican Presidential ticket.
While at Chicago I told Mr. Lodge that such was my inten-

FIRST APPEARANCE IN NATIONAL POLITICS 37
tion, but before announcing it I wished to have time to
think the matter over. A man cannot act both without and
within the party ; he can do either, but he cannot possibly
do both. Each course has its advantages and each has its
disadvantages, and one cannot take the advantages or the
disadvantages separately. I went in with my eyes open to
do what I could within the party; I did my best and got
beaten, and I propose to stand by the result. It is impos
sible to combine the functions of a guerilla chief with those
of a colonel in the regular army; one has a greater inde
pendence of action, the other is able to make what action he
does take vastly more effective. In certain cpntingencies
the one can do most good, in certain contingencies the
other; but there is no use in accepting a commission and
then trying to play the game out on a lone hand.
"During the entire canvass for the nomination Mr. Blaine
received but two checks — one was at the Utica Convention,
the other was the Powell Clayton incident. I had a hand in
both, and I could have had a hand in neither had not those
Republicans who at Utica elected me as the head of the
New York State delegation supposed that I would in good
faith support the man who was fairly made the Republican
nominee. I am by inheritance and by education a Repub
lican; whatever good I have been able to accomplish in
public life has been accomplished through the Republican
party; I have acted with it in the past, and wish to act with
it in the future ; I went as a regular delegate to the Chicago
Convention, and I intend to abide by the outcome of that
Convention. I am going back in a day or two to my West
ern ranch, as I do not expect to take any part in the cam
paign this fall."
This determination not to take part in the campaign he
recalled later, for reasons which were eminently charac
teristic. "When I started out to my ranch two months
ago," he said in October, "I had no intention of taking any
part whatever in the Presidential canvass, and the decision
I have now come to is the result of revolving the matter in

38 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
my mind during that time. It is altogether contrary to my
character to occupy a neutral position in so important and
exciting a struggle, and besides my natural desire to occupy
a positive position of some kind, I made up my mind that
it was clearly my duty to support the ticket."
His decision called forth bitter denunciation from the
Independents, who declared that he had deserted his prin
ciples, and predicted with absolute conviction that he had
wrecked his career. The Democratic press took a similar
view of his future and declared that he had always been a
"humbug" and a "political charlatan," a "reform fraud"
and a "Jack-in-the-box politician," who had now been thor
oughly found out. He faced the storm of disapproval and
abuse calmly, and in a reply to an open letter of regret
and remonstrance from an Independent he wrote:
"I thank you for your good opinion of my past services.
My power, if I ever had any, may or may not be as utterly
gone as you think, but most certainly it would deserve to
go if I yielded any more to the pressure of the Independents
at present, when I consider them to be wrong, than I yielded
in the past to the. pressure of the machine when I thought
it wrong."
He declined a renomination for the Assembly, which he
could have had without opposition, and two separate offers
of a nomination for Congress in as many districts in which
he was eligible as a candidate, on the ground that his
private interests, which had been neglected during his
service in the Legislature, demanded all of his attention.

CHAPTER VI
LITERARY LABORS— TILT WITH JEFFERSON DAVIS-
CANDIDATE FOR MAYOR
Duking his first term in the Legislature Roosevelt pub
lished, in May, 1882, "The Naval War of 1812," the open
ing chapters of which he had written while a student in
Harvard. He had finished it while engaged in his tussle
with machine politics in the Legislature, demonstrating
thus early in his career his ability to turn aside from public
and political duties and concentrate his mind upon literary
work. This was merely the first of many instances of the
kind which occurred quite regularly in his subsequent
career. The publication of the Naval History came at the
moment when his efforts to secure the impeachment of a
judge were nearing their climax and when the fight over
his other reform measures was absorbing public attention.
The book was everywhere well received and the compli
mentary reviews of it in the press appeared side by side
with comments, favorable and unfavorable, upon his legis
lative achievements. The book is notable as containing a
warning to the nation of the need of thorough preparedness
for war as the surest guaranty of peace — a warning which
he repeated at every opportunity during the succeeding
thirty-five years, the wisdom of which was amply justified
when the folly of persistent disregard of it was demon
strated with such disastrous consequence at the entry of the
United States into the European War in 1917. In his
preface, written in 1882, he said :
"The operations of this war on land teach nothing new;
it is the old, old lesson that miserly economy in preparation
may in the end involve a lavish outlay of men and money
which, after all, comes too late to more than partially off-
39

40 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
set the evils produced by the original shortsighted parsi
mony. It was criminal folly for Jefferson and his follower,
Madison, to neglect to give us a force either of Regulars
or of well-trained Volunteers during the 21 years they had
in which to prepare for the struggle that any one might see
was inevitable."
"The necessity for an efficient Navy is so evident that
only our almost incredible shortsightedness prevents our
at once preparing one."
In a condensed history of the same war, which he wrote
for an English Naval History in 1897, fifteen years later,
he reiterated his earlier views, saying :
' ' There never was a better example of the ultimate evil
caused by a timid effort to secure peace and the refusal to
make preparations for war than that afforded by the
American people under the Presidencies of Jefferson and
Madison." Another notable passage in this condensed history was
the following in regard to pacifists, who many years later
played so harmful and despicable a part in the European
War: "Both Britain and America have produced men of the
'peace-at-any-price' pattern, and in America, in one great
crisis at least, these men cost the Nation more in blood and
wealth than the political leaders most recklessly indifferent
to war have ever cost it."
After the close of the Presidential campaign of 1884,
Roosevelt returned to his ranch in Dakota, spending much
of his time there for several years, making occasional visits
to his home in New York. He took charge of two cattle
ranches and varied his duties as ranchman with hunting
trips and in writing magazine articles and books. In 1885
he published "The Hunting Trips of a Ranchman," two
volumes; in 1886, the "Life of Thomas H. Benton"; in
1887, the "Life of Gouverneur Morris"; in 1888, "Ranch

LITERARY LABORS— TILT WITH JEFFERSON DAVIS 41
Life and Hunting Trail" ; in 1890, "History of New York";
and in 1893, ' ' The Wilderness Hunter. ' ' All of these books
were written in whole or in part during this period.
In his Life of Benton, written thirty years before the
entry of the United States into the European War, there
appears this additional reference to pacifists :
"A class of professional noncombatants is as hurtful to
the healthy growth of a nation as a class of fire eaters, for
a weakness or folly is nationally as bad as a vice, or worse.
No man who is not willing to bear arms and to fight for
his rights can give a good reason why he should be entitled
to the privilege of living in a free country. ' '
Two manuscript letters of rare interest appear in Roose
velt's correspondence of 1885. One is from Jefferson Davis,
written apparently in his own hand, and the other is a
copy, in Roosevelt's own hand, of his reply. They are:
Beauvain, Miss.,
September 29, 1885.
Mr. Theodore Roosevelt,
New York, New York.
Sik: You have recently chosen publicly to associate the name
of Benedict Arnold with that of Jefferson Davis, as the
only American with whom the traitor Arnold need not fear
comparison. You must be ignorant indeed of American history if you
do not know that the career of those characters might be
aptly chosen for contrast, but not for similitude ; and if so
ignorant, the instinct of a gentleman, had you possessed it,
must have caused you to make inquiry before uttering an
accusation so libelous and false.
I write you directly to repel the unproved outrage, but
with too low an estimate of you to expect an honorable
retraction of your slander. Yours, etc.,
(Signed) Jefferson Davis.

42 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
New York, October 8, 1885.
"Mr. Theodore Roosevelt is in receipt of a letter pur
porting to come from Mr. Jefferson Davis, and denying
that the character of Mr. Davis compares unfavorably with
that of Benedict Arnold. Assuming the letter to be genuine
Mr. Roosevelt has only to say that he would indeed be sur
prised to find that his views of the character of Mr. Davis
did not differ radically from that apparently entertained
in relation thereto by Mr. Davis himself. Mr. Roosevelt
begs leave to add that he does not deem it necessary that
there should be any further communication whatever be
tween himself and Mr. Davis."
In the autumn of 1886 he was offered and accepted the
Republican nomination for Mayor of New York City. He
was also nominated for the office by a Committee of Busi
ness Men and an Independent Committee of Citizens. His
nomination was based upon his record in the Legislature,
and in his letter of acceptance and campaign speeches he
pledged himself, if elected, to devote all his energies to
securing honest and efficient city government without re
gard to partizan considerations of any sort. The contest
was a three-cornered one, with Abram S. Hewitt as the
nominee of Tammany and other Democratic organizations,
and Henry George as the nominee of labor and sociahst
organizations. The Independents, or Mugwumps as they
were called, unable to forgive Roosevelt for his advocacy
of Blaine, supported Mr. Hewitt, who was elected. He was
a man of ability and probity, who had made an excellent
record in Congress, and the Independents took the ground
that even with his Tammany support he could be depended
upon to be a better and more useful Mayor than Roosevelt
would be able to be with the support of the Republican
Machine. Time was to show within a few years that Roose
velt as a oity official could be depended upon so thoroughly
to give the city valuable service in spite of Republican
Machine support that the same Independents would lament
his departure from municipal administration.

CHAPTER VII
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER
In May, 1889, President Harrison appointed Roosevelt a
member of the United States Civil Service Commission.
The conditions of the civil service at this time were such as
to make the position an alluring one to Roosevelt. He had
been an active and zealous advocate of civil service reform
since the moment of his entry into public life. Various
efforts had been made for twenty years or more to over
throw the spoils system as applied to the civil service of
the country, but with only slight success. In 1871, Presi
dent Grant yielded sufficiently to the demands of civil
service reform advocates to appoint a Civil Service Advi
sory Board of seven members, with George William Curtis
as chairman. This Board proposed a set of rules and regu
lations which in the following year were enlarged so as to
make them applicable to the Departments at Washington
and the Federal offices in New York City. These rules and
regulations were put in force, with a very moderate amount
of success, and continued in force till 1875, under constant
assault by the politicians of both parties. In 1875 the oppo
sition of the politicians became so formidable that Con
gress yielded to it and refused to grant an appropriation
for the expenses of the Advisory Board, whereupon Presi
dent Grant suspended the operation of the rules.
There was organized immediately in New York, under
the leadership of Mr. Curtis, the Civil Service Reform
Association, which developed into The National Civil
Service Reform League with Mr. Curtis as President.
Roosevelt was a member of this League and took a leading
part in the campaign of education which it conducted
throughout the country. Its agitation of the reform re-
43

44 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
suited in January, 1883, in the introduction, by Senator
Geo. H. Pendleton of Ohio, of a bill to establish the merit
system in the civil service of the Government. It was
passed by both houses of Congress and went into effect in
July, 1883. As recorded in previous chapters, Roosevelt
endeavored in the same year to have the provisions of this
law applied to the civil service of New York City, but was
prevented by the opposition of the Democratic majority.
In the succeeding Legislature, that of 1884, which had a
Republican majority in both houses, he succeeded in hav
ing a bill passed which applied the provisions of the law to
all cities of the State having a population of 20,000 or more.
There were 23 such cities at the time.
When the Pendleton law went into effect it brought about
14,000 Government employees into the classified service,
but the enforcement of its provisions was fiercely and per
sistently obstructed by the politicians of both parties.
When Hayes entered upon the Presidency under pledges
of support to the reform, high hopes were cherished by its
advocates that valuable progress would be made during his
administration, but these were not realized. Little prog
ress was made. President Garfield did not live long enough
to take action in the matter, and only slight progress was
made under President Arthur. He appointed an efficient
Commission of three members, with Dorman B. Eaton, one
of the leading advocates of the reform, as chairman, but
beyond drawing up a set of rules this Commission was able
to accomplish little. President Cleveland came into office
with the confident hope of the Mugwumps, who had given
his candidacy valuable support, that he would greatly
enlarge the scope of the rules. By Executive Order he
brought 7,000 additional places into the classified service,
and during his term, by natural growth, 4,500 others were
included. At the close of his term he extended the rules
so as to include employees in the railway mail service. He
had during this, his first term, greatly disappointed the
advocates of the reform by making what was very nearly a
"clean sweep" in the Presidential appointees and unclassi-

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 45
fled offices in the service, including fourth class postmasters.
When Harrison became President he extended the time
for enforcing Cleveland's order in regard to the inclusion
of railway mail service employees for so long a period that
before it went into effect nearly all Democratic employees
had been removed.
When Roosevelt entered upon his duties, on May 13, 1889,
the situation of affairs in the Commission was one quite
satisfactory to the politicians. There had been at the time
of his appointment only a single member of the Commis
sion. One had resigned in October, 1888, and one had been
removed in February, 1889. The work of the Commission,
which had been dallying on in a merely perfunctory man
ner, had come to virtual stagnation. The appropriation
for it was quite inadequate for effective service, and the
salary of a Commissioner, which had been fixed purposely
at $3,500, was so small as to give reasonable assurance that
no one with an alarming amount of ability or force would
be likely to accept the position. The contingency of a
young man of private means, with a patriotic desire to per
form useful public service, as was the case with Roosevelt,
being willing to accept such a place, had not been foreseen.
During the six years of the law's existence its enforcement
had been quite uniformly so gentle that the business of
practical politics had not been seriously disturbed. The
various Commissions had been composed of men of quiet
disposition and mature years, whose natural inclination was
to follow the lines of least resistance in all matters of policy.
They were affected more or less by the attitude of both the
politicians and the public generally toward the law as being
not a real law but a kind of sentimental proposition put
forth to please a lot of "fool reformers." For many years
declarations in the national platforms of both political
parties had been composed and adopted on this basis alone.
The law of 1883 had been passed with the same general idea
in the minds even of those who had voted for it. It would
serve as a sop for a few "long-haired cranks," and would
amount to nothing in practise.

46 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The manner in which the law was enforced during the
first six years justified this view. In many instances its
administration was a sham, and in all instances no effort
was made to detect, expose and punish violations of either
its letter or spirit. There was no more peaceful abode of
official life in Washington in May, 1889, than the serene
home of the Civil Service Commission when Theodore
Roosevelt, in abounding health and vigor from his six years
of ranching and hunting life, walked in and took possession,
after the retirement of the incumbents. While he was nom
inally one of a Commission of three members, from the
moment of his entry he was, in the words of the newspaper
correspondents at Washington, himself the whole Commis
sion. This was true, so far as leadership in its activities
was concerned, but he was cordially supported by Hugh S.
Thompson, whom President Harrison had appointed a mem
ber at the same time, and later by John R. Proctor, who was
added to the Commission in December, 1893.
Of these two associates Roosevelt always spoke in the
highest terms. In his 'American Ideals' he says :
"I was myself a Republican from the North. Messrs.
Thompson and Proctor were from the South, and were both
Democrats who had served in the Confederate armies ; and
it would be impossible for any one to desire as associates,
two public men with higher ideals of duty, or more resolute
in their adherence to those ideals."
When in 1869 Charles W. Eliot became President of Har
vard University and introduced radical changes, Oliver
Wendell Holmes said of him that he "turned the whole Uni
versity over like a flapjack." A revolution, no less com
plete, took place immediately in the Commission's peaceful
home. Roosevelt entered upon his duties on May 13, 1889.
Accompanied by Commissioner Thompson, he went almost
immediately to New York and conducted an investigation
of the manner in which the Civil Service Law was adminis
tered in the Custom House there. On June 5, the Commis
sion published a report in which it declared that examina-

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 47
tions for admissions to the service, as conducted by the
local board, were characterized by "great laxity, negligence
and fraud;" that the "members of the board openly sneered
at and ridiculed the law which they were supposed to en
force;" that the testimony adduced as to the misconduct of
three employees was conclusive and they should be removed
by the Collector ; and that one of them should be prosecuted
by the U. S. District Attorney for "criminal violation of the
law." This action was so radical a departure from the
established procedure of the Commission that it caused a
genuine sensation. It was the first formal notice that the
Civil Service Law was a real law and capable of enforce
ment by the courts like any other law. From New York
City, the Commissioners visited various post offices in New
York State, finding irregularities, and on June 18 they
started on a tour of the principal Western cities, inquiring
into the manner in which the law was enforced in the Gov
ernment service in each. On the eve of departure Roose
velt made a frank statement for the press in regard to the
Commission's ideas and purposes. "We have," he said,
"to do two things. One is to make the officials themselves
understand that the law is obligatory, not optional, and the
other is to get the same idea into the heads of the people."
The tour was a veritable campaign of education, for full
publicity was given to its proceedings and discoveries, and
a convincing demonstration was made that the full power
of the Commission would be exerted to have the law rigidly
enforced and violators of it punished. Several postmasters
were convicted of violations and were removed, and a great
awakening of public interest was caused.
During 1889, 1890 and 1891, Roosevelt pushed this cam
paign forward relentlessly, without regard to the political
character of the persons affected. When he inquired into
the methods pursued in the Baltimore Post Office, he became
involved in a controversy with the Secretary of the Treas
ury, Charles Foster, and John Wanamaker, the Postmaster
General, both of President Harrison's Cabinet, and a tre
mendous uproar filled the entire land. The wrath of the

48 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
politicians of the Republican party, which had been steadily
rising since Roosevelt began his campaign, fairly burst into
flame. Mr. Foster and Mr. Wanamaker protected the ac
cused officials in Baltimore, whose removal was demanded
by the Commission, and in doing so Mr. Wanamaker made
assertions that Roosevelt, speaking for the Commission,
declared to be false. An investigation was conducted by a
Committee of Congress, and Roosevelt's position was sus
tained. He had not only assailed members of the Cabinet,
who were his superiors in the Harrison Administration,
but had charged one of them with seeking to condone wrong
doing in his department, and, what was more, had proved
his charge. This treatment of a man who was not only a
Cabinet officer, but the founder of the famous Bethany
Sunday-School in Philadelphia, shocked the sensibilities
of every Republican politician in the country and the outcry
for Roosevelt's official head was vociferous and insistent.
Fury was added to the demand by the shrieks of joy which
came from the Independent or Mugwump press, whose edi
tors forgot their lack of faith in Roosevelt because of his
Blaine support and hailed him as the nation's most valiant
reformer. The very citadel of spoils politics, the hitherto
impregnable fortress that had existed unshaken since it was
erected on the foundation laid by Andrew Jackson, was tot
tering to its fall under the assaults of this audacious and
irrepressible young man. In Congress and in the party
press, in all quarters where politicians gathered, a situation
existed like that described by Thackeray in his "White
Squall": "Then all the fleas in Jewry
Jumped up and bit like fury."
The biting of the spoils fleas in Congress was especially
sharp. An investigation of the Commission was proposed,
and eagerly welcomed by Roosevelt, who met his accusers
face to face and demolished ruthlessly all their assertions
as to the character of his work. He demonstrated that the
examinations for admission to the service which the Com
mission conducted were thoroughly practical and designed

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 49
especially to test the fitness of each candidate for the work
that he was to do. He showed that in each instance in which
fraud or misconduct had been charged against employees
ample proof had been adduced, and that in each and every
instance the offender had been recommended for punish
ment without regard to his political affiliations. The good
old spoils doctrine of asking in regard to a rascal before in
flicting punishment, "Whose rascal is he — ours or the other
party's?" had been utterly disregarded by him.
Some of the efforts made by the distracted Congressmen
to save their cherished system reveal how complete was
their misconception of the man with whom they had to deal.
In the first annual report of the Commission, under date of
June 30, 1889, occurs this passage, evidently penned by
Roosevelt :
"The object of the law is to give to the average American
citizen what it takes away from the professional politician.
How little this object is understood by some men in public
life may be gathered from recent proposals to parcel out
all the offices among the different Congressional districts
according to the political faith of the Congressmen repre
senting them. This would, of course, simply mean a revival
of the patronage system, with an added touch of chaos. It
is apparently brought forward in the simple faith that all
that is needed is to divide the offices among the politicians
of both parties instead of among those of only one, and
ignores the very common-sense view, which insists that the
offices are not the property of the politicians at all, whether
of one party or of the other or of both ; but, on the contrary,
that they belong to the people, and should be filled only with
reference to the needs of public service."
While defending himself in Congress, Roosevelt made
frequent addresses in various parts of the country, explain
ing and expounding his acts and policy, and contributed
promptly to the newspapers various replies to all attacks
of consequence made through their columns. Before many
months had passed he had won to his support all the more

50 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
reputable and influential newspapers of the country, and
had secured both the attention and confidence of the great
body of public intelligence. So strong was public opinion
in his favor that even the irate Congressmen felt compelled
to bow to it, for when in 1890 a proposal was made to repeal
the Pendleton law they almost unanimously declined to
support it.
Heroic efforts were made by the editors of extreme partis
san Republican newspapers to find language adequate to the
needs of the occasion. One editor in a single article spoke
of Roosevelt, as "Mr. Theossehoss Roosevelt;" "Eosy
Roosy;" " Tintinnabulating Ted;" "Rollicking Ranch
man;" "Scion of a diluted ancestry who has slapped Mr,
Harrison and Mr. Wanamaker;" "Terrapin Teddy;" "Fa-
vorite-son-of-a-gun of reformer;" "Descendant of the way-
back Roosevelts from Rooseveltville, " and a "Jane dandy."
Other partisan editors, less gifted in the use of vitupera
tive epithets, assumed to believe that Roosevelt's rigorous
enforcement of the law would have the beneficent effect of
securing its repeal by showing what a foolish and imprac
ticable statute it was. One of these, in the Albany
Evening Journal, whose publisher, William Barnes, was
destined later to develop into one of Roosevelt's most bitter
political enemies, was particularly strong in holding this
view. ' ' Go it, Roosevelt, ' ' he said. ' ' If any man can repeal
the Pendleton law during the coming four years his name is
Teddy. If Teddy Roosevelt is not chained down, no power
under heaven can prevent the repeal of the law before
President Harrison's term shall have expired. The Amer
ican idea of party, party power and party responsibility
will survive the Mugwump attack made under the guise of
Civil Service reform."
Another editor, in the New York Sun, which was an open
defender of the spoils system, said:
"Mr. Roosevelt deserves the thanks of the spoilsmen. He
is proving almost every week that the Civil Service Law is
incapable of enforcement. The only men who could live up

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 51
to it are the Mugwumps, and they do not appoint to office or
get appointed.
"Mr. Roosevelt and his brethren in belief simply postu
late a state of things which does not exist. They assume
that the American people are poor unfortunates who suffer
from the spoils system. The American people are all right
and they know it. The professors of Chinese quackery
cannot persuade them that they are ill. Besides the Gov
ernment of the United States belongs to them; and don't
you forget it."
The enraged spoilsmen, including Senators and Repre
sentatives in Congress, descended in swarms on President
Harrison and besought him to remove Roosevelt for the
sake of party and country. They pointed out to him that
he had ample justification for such a course in Roosevelt's
treatment of Mr. Wanamaker, which was virtually an attack
on the President himself. They started a report that the
President had decided on his removal and the partisan press
warmly commended such action. When such action failed
to be taken, they began to express pity, even contempt for
him and represented him as in a state of great irritation
about Roosevelt's course but lacking the courage to get rid
of him. "Poor Harrison!" said the New York Sun. "If
he has erred he has been punished. The irrepressible, bel
ligerent, and enthusiastic Roosevelt has made him suffer
and has more suffering in store for him."
Whatever may have been the feelings of the President —
and there is little doubt that he had no idea when he ap
pointed Roosevelt that he would prove to be so veritable a
bull in a china shop — he refused to remove him and stood
by him firmly till the end of his term.
When Cleveland succeeded him in 1893, it was declared
by the partisan press of both parties that he would not
think for a moment of retaining Roosevelt. The most
earnest advocates of his retention were the civil service
reformers. Carl Schurz, who was President of the Civil
Service Reform League, was especially active, as the fol-

52 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
lowing letter, written two months before Cleveland's inau
guration, shows: "Solitude,"
Pocantico Hills, Westchester,
January 4, 1893.
My dear Mr. Roosevelt:
I trust you will not take it as an indiscretion on my part
that I communicated to Mr. Cleveland what you had written
me about calling upon him. I have just received his answer.
He writes: "I want to see Mr. Roosevelt and if he will
indicate when and where he can meet me I am quite sure
I can suit my engagements to his convenience."
I take this to indicate that Mr. Cleveland wishes very
much to see you, and I would suggest that you meet him as
soon as possible. You might communicate with him directly
in order to agree with him as to the when and where. Or,
if you prefer to make the necessary arrangement through
me, I am perfectly willing to serve as an intermediary and
shall do so with pleasure.
I must confess that the tone of Mr. Cleveland's invita
tion to you gratifies me exceedingly. It is a very good sign
of his disposition. I have had no conversation with him
upon the subject and do not know whether he intends to ask
you to remain a member of the Civil Service Commission
during his presidency. That part of his letter which I have
quoted seems to suggest that such a thing is possible. If he
should make such a request then I most earnestly hope—
and I think this is the universal feeling of the civil service
reformers throughout the country — that you will not a mo
ment think of saying no. I trust you will consider what a
great work you can do, and that there is not another man
in the country who can do it as well as you can. Your con
tinuance in your position at Mr. Cleveland's request would
be a great event, and in itself a large program for the
next four years.
Perhaps we may meet before you see Mr. Cleveland.
Sincerely yours,
C. Schubz.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 53
Cleveland retained Roosevelt as Commissioner and he
remained in the position till May 5, 1895, when he resigned
to accept the position of Police Commissioner in New York
City. Cleveland, like Harrison, stood by Roosevelt when
in 1894 he assailed John G. Carlisle, Secretary of the Treas
ury, for removing subordinates in his department for polit
ical reasons. Roosevelt says in his 'Autobiography': "I
was treated by both Presidents with the utmost considera
tion." When he resigned in 1895, the classified service had been
extended to practically the entire executive forces through
out the United States, including approximately 85,000
places. The great value of his six years of service, how
ever, did not lie in the increased number of places brought
within the rules but in the revolution that he had accom
plished in the minds of both the politicians and the people
regarding the law and its merits. The old idea that it was
a "fool law," the outcome of the impracticable dreams of
a lot of "crank reformers," had been dispelled forever.
Its character as a real law with beneficent effects, was firmly
established. The time-honored theory that "to the victors
belong the spoils," if not completely destroyed, had re
ceived shocks from which it could never recover. Not only
had there been created a public sentiment in favor of the
law and its enforcement, but against such features of the
spoils system as levying assessments upon office-holders
and members of the civil service and the slavish employ
ment of them for partisan political work, — against these
practises a vigilant moral sense had been aroused which
made it not only difficult but dangerous for party bosses to
continue them, lest the severe penalties of the law be in
curred. Whatever violations were committed subsequently,
were conducted with extreme caution and in lessening num
ber as time advanced. If civil service reform had not been
completely accomplished, it had been placed upon a firm
foundation and its steady progress in the future in spite
of all attempts to overthrow it had been assured.
When in the spring of 1895, it was announced that the

54 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Mayor of New York had offered the position of Police Com
missioner to Roosevelt and the latter had declared his pur
pose to accept it, the Washington correspondent of the New
York Sun, a newspaper often conspicuously unfriendly to
Roosevelt, wrote, under date of April 23 : "What will be
come of the Civil Service Commission when Mr. Roosevelt
leaves it can only be conjectured. He has been the only
vital force in the Commission since it came into existence,
and any man who shall take the place after him must show
extraordinary enthusiasm, ability, and moral principle, or
suffer in comparison."
Roosevelt's correspondence during the six years that he
was Civil Service Commissioner, like that of all other pe
riods of his career, reveals him as the eager and indefati
gable reader of books and the interested companion of
writers of them. An essayist, critic and author in whose
work he took keen interest was Brander Matthews, and
from a large number of letters, many of them in his own
hand, that Roosevelt wrote to him at this time, I am cour
teously permitted by Mr. Matthews to make a few citations
which I have chosen as showing both the wide range of his
reading and the irrepressible play of his humor.
His interest in Revolutionary War history was disclosed
in many letters, notably so in some that he wrote while he
was President to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, author of
'The American Revolution,' from which I shall quote in
later chapters of this narrative. Writing to Mr. Matthews,
on May 7, 1893, in reference to a work on the Revolutionary
period that had appeared recently, he said:
"There is a wealth of picturesque incident which has
never been utilized in the fighting between Tarleton's red
dragoons, Ferguson's riflemen, Cornwallis 's admirable
grenadiers of the line, and the stolid, well drilled, valiant
Hessian infantry on the one side, and on the other the
continental line troops of Greene and Wayne, the light
horse of Harry Lee, the homespun militia-men, and the wild
riflemen of the backwoods, with their wolfskin caps, and

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 55
their hunting tunics, girded in with bead- worked belts;
while the painted Indian tribes add yet another element. It
ought to be written up purely from the military side, by
some one able to appreciate brave deeds by whomsoever
done, and the equal valor displayed by friend and foe."
In another letter to Mr. Matthews, on June 29, 1894, he
says of a volume of essays by a young writer who was win
ning his way to fame :
"Mr. Blank is entirely wrong in thinking that Shake
speare, Homer and Milton are not permanent. Of course
they are ; and he is entirely in error in thinking that Shake
speare is not read, in the aggregate, during a term of years,
more than any ephemeral author of the day. Of course
every year there are dozens of novels, each one of which
will have many more readers than Shakespeare will have in
the year ; but the readers only stay for about a year or two,
whereas in Shakespeare's case they have lasted, and will
last, quite a time! I think that Mr. Blank's ignorance,
crudity and utter lack of cultivation make him entirely unfit
to understand the effect of the great masters of thought
upon the language and upon literature. Nevertheless, in his
main thought, as you say, he is entirely right. We must
strike out for ourselves; we must work according to our
own ideas, and must free ourselves from the shackles of
conventionality, before we can do anything. As for the lit
erary center of the country being New York, I personally
never had any patience with the talk of a literary center.
I don't care a rap whether it is New York, Chicago, or any
place else, so long as the work is done. I like or dislike
pieces in the Atlantic Monthly and the Overland Monthly
because of what they contain, not because of one's being
published in San Francisco or the other in Boston. I don't
like Edgar Fawcett any more because he lives in New York,
nor Joel Chandler Harris any the less because he lives at
Atlanta; and I read Mark Twain with just as much delight,
but with no more, whether he resides in Connecticut or in
Missouri."

56 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The joyous humor of Roosevelt is visible in the following
citations from the letters to Mr. Matthews :
Washington, Aug. 26, 1893: "I have a rather good
story for you. Recently a sister of a friend of mine was
at a dinner in London, where tbere was also that somewhat
heavy English wit, Comyns Carr. He began inveighing
against the 'higher education of women,' and stated that
he was going to introduce a society to promote their lower
education. She sweetly asked what women he meant—
English, French or American? He fixed her with an eye of
cold disapproval, and, prancing into the trap, responded:
' I should begin with American women ! ' to which she, with
a merely explanatory air: 'Oh, but you know, Mr. Carr,
American women are not at all too highly educated for
American men!' "
Washington, Dec. 9, 1894: "When you see your friend
Kipling again tell him that his 'Walking Delegate' has been
used as a tract in the Senate. Manderson, of Nebraska, first
saw its possibilities. Do you know him? He has a most
gallant record in the Civil War, where he was badly
wounded ; and now has at last overthrown the populists in
his State, in a square knock-down-and-drag-out fight, and
is going to leave the Senate, as he finds he can't afford to
stay in politics. He tried the article on Peffer, who is a
well-meaning, pin-headed, anarchistic crank, of hirsute and
slab-sided aspect; it didn't do Peffer any good — he isn't
that kind — but it irritated him, and so it pleased Mander
son. Wolcott, of Colorado, whom you met here, is now
going to try it on Kyle, of South Dakota. Lodge would
like to use it, but he is anathema to the populists anyhow,
as he comes from Massachusetts and is a Harvard man—
a record that would taint anything."
Washington, June 7, 1904 : "I simply must send you this
choice bit of wisdom from a British brother. It comes in a
letter of Mrs. Edith Wharton's to young Lodge:
" 'I sat last night next to a Mr. F., Lord S's son, who had
been all over the South African War and was very keen
about military matters. We talked about Conan Doyle's

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONER 57
book, and then I asked him if he had ever read Sir George
Trevelyan 's history of the 'American Revolution.' No, he
hadn't, but would make a note of it. Capital book, eh? I
said the descriptions of the fights were wonderful; that I
had told Sir G. T. that I thought his 'Battle of Bunker
Hill' was the best battle picture I knew and he had an
swered that Lord Wolseley had told him the same thing.
"Mr. F. (keenly interested). 'Oh, really? I must read
that. Trevelyan 's an army man himself, I suppose?'
"Me. 'No, I think not. You know he was  '
"Mr. F. 'Oh, of course. Out there as a correspondent,
I suppose.' " ! ! !
"Is not this really too good to be true?"

CHAPTER VIII
POLICE COMMISSIONER
With the entrance of Roosevelt upon his service as Police
Commissioner in New York City, in the spring of 1895,
there began between him and myself a close personal friend
ship which continued unbroken throughout his career, grow
ing steadily in mutual confidence and affection with time.
The present narrative from this point onward will be writ
ten in the light which this intimacy threw upon his motives
and character, and its statements will be illuminated and
corroborated by citations from confidential letters written
by him both to myself and to other persons, and by authentic
anecdotes and episodes which have hitherto either not been
made public or given publication in inaccurate form.
Kipling once said of New York City, as the result of his
observations during several visits, that it had a gov
ernment of the worst elements of the population tempered
by occasional insurrections of respectable citizens. An in
surrection of this kind occurred in November, 1894, when a
reform Mayor, William L. Strong, was chosen on a non
partisan ticket. The uprising of righteous indignation had
been caused by revelations of shameful misconduct on the
part of the Tammany government, especially in the Police
Department, and in the care of the city's streets. Mayor
Strong at first asked Roosevelt to accept the office of Street
Cleaning Commissioner but he, feeling that he had no spe
cial fitness for it, declined. The Mayor then appointed him
a Police Commissioner in a Board of four members, he to
be the President of the Board. As this was a position in
the line of good municipal government to which he had
devoted himself while in the Legislature, he accepted gladly
and with the distinct understanding that he should admin-
58

POLICE COMMISSIONER 59
ister the affairs of the department with entire disregard
of partisan politics and solely as a good citizen interested
in promoting the welfare of good citizens.
The task before him was not a light one. For many years,
in fact from the very beginning of its organization, the
Police Department had been subjected to political influences
of the most demoralizing sort. Its powers of administra
tion were vested in a bi-partisan board, composed of two
members of each political party, selected by the party
bosses for the position. They divided both the spoils of
the department and the appointments to the force; When
Roosevelt took office there was a regular tariff for appoint
ments and promotions, and these could be obtained only
by its payment. The entire force was permeated with cor
ruption in every department of activity. A very large
revenue was collected by the force from vice and crime and
the unlawful sale of liquor, and this was divided among
the higher officials of the force and the political leaders.
In fact, the entire Department was organized for the pur
pose of exercising a licensing power, outside of the law,
which was far more valuable in pecuniary results than the
license laws of the city themselves. As both party organi
zations shared in these illicit gains, to attack the system
was to assail both and to challenge the furious wrath and
bitter hostility of both.
This was a fight after Roosevelt's own heart. It was in
essence the counterpart of his fight in the Legislature and
his subsequent fight in the Civil Service Commission — a
fight against political criminals and lawbreakers, corrupt
methods in politics and corrupt politicians, wherever found
and without regard to party names or affiliations. He be
gan the fight at once, using in it the weapons he had em
ployed in its predecessors, full publicity, strict enforcement
of law, and utter disregard of partisan political considera
tions. Trials of members of the force on various charges
of neglect or misconduct, which had previously been con
ducted in secret, were conducted before the full Board in
public. Appointments and promotions were made after

60 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
examinations and on merit and fitness alone. Neither the
payment of money nor the word of a political boss was any
longer sufficient to "get a man on the force," or to secure
his promotion in its service.
One of the chief sources of blackmail by the police, in
fact, the fundamental source, was the law requiring liquor
saloons to be closed on Sunday. This law was in 1895 the
bulwark of the most stupendous system of political black
mail any modern city has known. The largest saloons were
owned by the great breweries, and these paid blackmail in
large sums to the party bosses as the price of immunity
from police interference with Sunday side-door selling.
The small saloons, operated by their owners, were left to
the police to blackmail as they chose. This state of affairs
was well known, but all efforts to put an end to it by so
amending the law as to permit the sale of liquor during
certain hours on Sunday were defeated in deference to the
religious sentiment of the State, and were not supported
by more than a small portion of the religious elements of
the city itself. It was held to be a "compromise with evil"
to legalize any degree of selling on Sunday. In fact, it
was held, perhaps not openly but tacitly, that illegal selling
through side-doors on Sunday was preferable to open sell
ing by permission of law.
If police blackmail had been confined to Sunday liquor-
selling, the evil would have been serious enough, but this
was not the case. From blackmailing the illegal liquor-
dealer the police turned naturally for additional revenue
to all other forms of illegal industry, — vice, gambling, crime
of all kinds, pedlers, merchants who wished to make for
bidden use of sidewalks and streets, and to every practise
or proceeding that depended upon police favor. The reve
nue from these sources ran up into the millions, and the
politicians of both parties were sharers of it.
When, therefore, Roosevelt declared his intention to en
force the Sunday-closing law rigorously, the outcry from all
political quarters was tremendous. The politicians and the
newspapers that they were able to control were as furious

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, POLICE COMMISSIONER, 1895

POLICE COMMISSIONER 61
in their wrath as their kind had been when Roosevelt began
to enforce the Civil Service law. They declared that the
attempt was pure foolishness, that the law was obsolete,
a mere "blue law," and was never intended to be enforced
anyway. A Tammany spokesman said, "We believe the
law should be enforced, but with intelligence and discrimi
nation," to which Roosevelt retorted: "That is a good deal
like believing in truthful mendacity." To another objector
who advocated less rigor, he replied: "You cannot half
obey the law." To another: "I am enforcing honestly a
law that hitherto has been enforced dishonestly. " It was
predicted that the proceeding was useless because it was
not possible to enforce the law, but for several months it
was enforced with beneficial results, as the records of crime
and disorder showed. At the end of that period a magis
trate was discovered who was able to decide that under the
law a drink could be had with a meal and that a sandwich
or a pretzel constituted a meal, and Sunday selling was
partially resumed; but the main object,* the stopping of
blackmail, had been largely attained. Although Sunday-
selling through side-doors of saloons was gradually re
sumed, it was done more furtively than before and never
again attained anything approaching its former dimen
sions. At the outset of his police administration Roosevelt had
what seemed to be the cordial support of his three asso
ciates in the Board. They professed full agreement with
him, and he accepted their professions in good faith, be
lieving them to be as sincere as he was himself. They con
tinued to work in harmony with him for several months,
but at the end of that period two of them, yielding to the
demands of the political organizations to which they owed
their selection for their positions, broke away and sought
to defeat his purposes by causing a permanent deadlock in
the Board. This was the method the political bosses, who
found themselves powerless to control Roosevelt's action,
or to persuade the Mayor to attempt to control it, resorted
to as the only means of defeating his policy and saving their

62 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
illicit profits from total annihilation. They had tried in
various other ways to get rid of him. One was a proposal
for the Legislature to pass a law abolishing the City Police
Board and creating a State police force with a head ap
pointed by the Governor. This was defeated by an over
whelming popular protest. They subsequently succeeded
in getting the Civil Service law impaired, under the guise
of amendments which "took the starch out of it." Roose
velt says in his 'Autobiography': "They attempted to
seduce or frighten us by every species of intrigue and ca
jolery, of promise of political reward and threat of polit
ical punishment."
I had intimate personal knowledge on this point for I
was closely associated with Roosevelt during the entire
period of his police service. The Evening Post, of which I
was at the time a subordinate editor, was cordially support
ing his policy and I was in almost daily confidential confer
ence with him. Having as a journalist of many years' ex
perience in the devious ways of New York politicians,
acquired an exact knowledge of many of them, I had warned
Roosevelt when he entered upon his duties to be on his
guard against one of his fellow commissioners who was in
the Board as the representative of a small and particularly
vicious political organization. In accordance with an inva
riable and incurable tendency — which he was never able to
overcome — he persisted in placing full confidence in this
man, simply because the man professed full devotion to
him. "He may be, as you say," he replied to my repeated
warnings, "a tricky politician, but I am sure that he is
loyal to me." To this I could only say, as I did many
times: "He is a snake in the grass, and sooner or later
he will smite you."
It was this member that the enraged politicians selected
as their first agent for the undermining and paralyzing of
Roosevelt's policy. The man was a political schemer by
nature, possessing a certain order of low cunning, and cov
ering his designs with plausible professions of virtuous
convictions. He was frequently present at the conferences

POLICE COMMISSIONER 63
with Roosevelt and myself and always expressed accord
with us. On one occasion when the three of us had been din
ing together, he accompanied me toward my home after
we had separated from Roosevelt. As soon as we were
alone, he said: "You have great influence with Roosevelt.
I wish you would stop him from talking so much in the
newspapers. He talks, talks, talks all the time. Scarcely
a day passes that there is not something from him in the
papers about what he is doing and the Police Board is
doing, and the public is getting tired of it. It injures our
work." I laughed and said: "Stop Roosevelt talking? Why,
you would kill him. He has to talk. The peculiarity about
him is that he has what is essentially a boy's mind. What
he thinks he says at once, thinks aloud. It is his distin
guishing characteristic, and I don't know as he will ever
outgrow it. But with it he has great qualities which make
him an invaluable public servant — inflexible honesty, abso
lute fearlessness, and devotion to good government which
amounts to religion. We must let him work in his own way
for nobody can induce him to change it. Furthermore, he
is talking for a purpose. He wishes the public to know
what the Police Board is doing so that it will have popular
support." The commissioner said nothing further and we parted
rather coldly. About noon of the following day, Roosevelt
called me on the telephone and asked me to lunch with him.
As soon as we were seated at a narrow table he leaned for
ward, bringing his face close to mine, and with appalling
directness said: "P  came into my office this morn
ing and said : 'You think Bishop is a friend of yours, don 't
you ? ' ' Yes, ' I replied. ' Well, you know what he said about
you last night? He said you had a boy's mind and it might
never be developed.' "
Roosevelt's eye-glasses were within three inches of my
face and his eyes were looking straight into mine. Know
ing my man, I did not flinch. "Roosevelt, I did say that.
Did he tell you what else I said ? " "No, that is what I want

64 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
to hear." When I had told him, he brought his fist down
on the table with a bang, exclaiming:. "By George, I knew
it!" "There, Roosevelt," said I, "is your snake in the
grass, of which I warned you — the meanest of mean liars,
who tells half the truth."
I relate this incident fully because of the light it throws
upon a dominating element in Roosevelt's character — its
unflinching directness. How many men in like situation
would have acted as he did? P  surely did not suspect
such a proceeding. His hope was to put an end to the pub
licity which Roosevelt was systematically giving to the
Police Board's work for the purpose of securing popular
support and thus making it both difficult and dangerous for
the politicians to stop it.
When the scheme failed, this commissioner threw off all
disguise and became an open opponent of the Roosevelt
policy. He was soon afterwards joined by a second member
who succumbed to the pressure of the Republican boss, and
the two established a permanent deadlock in the Board by
refusing to attend its meetings. The conduct of the first
revolting commissioner became so notoriously bad that the
Mayor preferred charges against him and after pubhc
hearings on the same, recommended his removal by the
Governor. The Governor, who was the man who had origi
nated the proposal to "take the starch out" of the Civil
Service law, declined to approve the Mayor's recommenda
tion. While the deadlock paralyzed to considerable extent fur
ther progress of Roosevelt's policy, it did not undo the
very important results which had been achieved. Not only
had the practise of blackmail been to a great extent ban
ished permanently from the force but there had been cre
ated throughout its members a distinct morale which had
been almost totally lacking when he entered upon his duties.
This had been accomplished not only by making appoint
ments and promotions on merit and fitness but by prompt
recognition in all cases of individual service which displayed
courage and devotion in the performance of duty. Every

POLICE COMMISSIONER 65
man in the force had become convinced that faithful per
formance of duty was certain to receive quick recognition
and full reward — that promotion was sure along that line,
and that it could be obtained in no other way. The mem
bers of the force discovered that the Roosevelt policy was
securing for them what they had not formerly possessed, —
the respect of the public, and this knowledge gave them the
most powerful of all incentives to upright conduct, — a feel
ing of self-respect. When he resigned from the Board in
April, 1897, Roosevelt left in the Department a force that
had to a large extent undergone a moral transformation.
It had received a large transfusion of members who had
come into it under honorable conditions, free from all de
basing characteristics, and who owed their presence to their
personal merits and not to the favor of bosses and not to
the payment of money. Not all the old evils had been eradi
cated, for the evil results of years of corrupt management
could only be completely removed by the abolition of the
force, but a new standard had been set which was destined
to endure. Although under a partial reversion to the old
order of control which followed his exit, some of the former
evils were restored, the force never reverted to the dis
graceful condition in which he found it. Appointments and
promotions were never again made on the basis of boss
favor and cash payment alone, but mainly on merit, and
the levying of blackmail as a general police practise was
never resumed.
A clear statement of Roosevelt's method of dealing with
members of the force appears in a letter which he wrote,
on January 10, 1898, while Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
to John McCullagh on his appointment to the position of
Chief of Police. After expressing his delight at the pro
motion, he said :
"Now, Chief, I want you to let me say a word to you
merely as a man who has backed you and been your friend.
You have drawn one of the big prizes ; and in my opinion
you have fairly won it by courage, ability and good con-

66 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
duct. The Chief of the Police of Greater New York is the
foremost police officer in the entire world, and he is one
of the six or eight most important men in New York itself.
You have reached the pinnacle. Your place is assured.
You will leave a name and a great reputation to your chil
dren. Now, on the other hand, it is a place of great tempta
tion, — political, and worse than political, temptation. All
kinds of chances to go crooked without much risk of detec
tion will offer themselves. I have the utmost confidence in
you. I feel that in the future, as during my own two years
of service, your conduct will amply and -over and over jus
tify the attitude your friends took on your behalf. But
I do want you to realize most seriously that you must not
ever make the least slip, for if you make even a small one
it will give men a hold upon you. Both Byrnes and Conlin
had very great chances before them, but they could not
stand the strain; only a man of indomitable will, of great
power, and a resolute purpose for integrity, can. I am very
sure you are such a man, and I confidently look forward
to the event proving my belief to be right, and that every
man of us will be able to be proud of you and proud of the
officers under you."
An ultimate result, not by any means the least beneficial
of the Roosevelt policy, was the abolition a few years later
of the bi-partisan board method of control and a substitu
tion of control by a single commissioner responsible solely
to the Mayor. This reform was due in large measure to the
demonstration which had been made during Roosevelt's
term of the evils of bi-partisan management through a
board of four members. It was a demonstration of the evils
of divided responsibility, rather than of bi-partisan con
trol, for his board had not divided on partisan lines, one
of his opposing members being a Democrat and the other a
Republican. His faithful and loyal supporter, Avery D.
Andrews, was a Democrat, a graduate of West Point, and
an honest and fearless man who proved himself as inhos
pitable to partisan political influences as Roosevelt himself.

POLICE COMMISSIONER 67
While Police Commissioner, Roosevelt continued and
deepened the interest in the welfare of the poorer classes
of the Community which he had developed while member
of the Legislature. As President of the Police Board he
was also a member of the Health Board, and in the latter
capacity he was brought into close relations with conditions
of life in the tenement house districts. He had made per
sonal visits to these districts as a member of a legislative
investigating committee about ten years earlier and the
impressions which had then been made upon his mind as to
the crying need of reform and betterment remained un
impaired. These impressions had been strengthened by
the revelations made in a very remarkable book by Jacob
A. Riis, entitled "How the Other Half Lives," which was
published in 1890. He formed an intimate friendship with
Riis, which lasted throughout the latter's life, and spoke
of him when he died as next to his father the best man he
had ever known, saying of his book that it had been to him
both an enlightenment and an inspiration for which he
could never be too grateful. In company with Riis he
visited the tenement house regions, often at midnight, in
order to see for himself just what conditions were, just
what the police were doing in regard to them, and what the
Health Department was doing to regulate and improve
them. That a fresh and powerful impetus was imparted
to his interest in the social welfare of the masses by these
visits is recorded in his 'Autobiography':
"My experience in the Police Department taught me
that not a few of the worst tenement houses were owned by
wealthy individuals who hired the best and most expensive
lawyers to persuade the courts that it was 'unconstitu
tional' to insist on the betterment of conditions. These
business men and lawyers were very adroit in using a word
with fine and noble associations to cloak their opposition to
vitally necessary movements for industrial fair play and
decency. They made it evident that they valued the Con
stitution, not as a help to righteousness, but as a means for
thwarting movements against unrighteousness. After my

68 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
experience with them I became more set than ever in my
distrust of those men, whether business men or lawyers,
judges, legislators, or executive officers, who seek to make
of the Constitution a fetich for the prevention of the work
of social reform, for the prevention of work in the interest
of those men, women, and children on whose behalf we
should be at liberty to employ freely every governmental
agency." A striking tribute to Roosevelt's character and public
usefulness was paid to him at the time of his departure
from the Police Department by Mr. E. L. Godkin, Editor
of the New York Evening Post, who had been on many
occasions one of his most severe critics. When it was an
nounced that Roosevelt had been nominated by President
McKinley as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Godkin
wrote him an earnest letter of protest, in which he said :
"I have a concern, as the Quakers say, to put on record
my earnest belief that in New York you are doing the
greatest work of which any American to-day is capable,
and exhibiting to the young men of the country the spec
tacle of a very important office administered by a man of
high character in the most efficient way amid a thousand
difficulties. As a lesson in politics I cannot think of any
thing more instructive."
That he firmly believed during his service as Police Com
missioner that he would never again hold a public office, I
have personal knowledge. Toward the end of that service
he said to me during a long and intimate conversation rela
tive to the difficulties and obstacles he was encountering:
"This is the last office I shall ever hold. I have offended
so many powerful interests and so many powerful politi
cians that no political preferment in future will be possible
for me. All the liquor interests, including the great brew
eries, and all the party bosses will oppose me, and no politi
cal party will venture to defy an opposition so fatal as that
is. I realized this when I began my fight for the enforce-

POLICE COMMISSIONER 69
ment of the Sunday law and against police bribery and cor
ruption, but it was the only course I could honestly pursue
and I am willing to abide by the consequences. ' '
An interchange of views between Roosevelt and Presi
dent Cleveland in regard to the importance of strict main
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine, which took place while
Roosevelt was Police Commissioner, may be noted here.
When in December, 1895, Cleveland startled the country
with his famous Venezuela message, Roosevelt wrote of his
action: "It would be difficult to overestimate the good
done in this country by the vigorous course taken by the
National Executive and legislature in this matter." In
recognition, President Cleveland wrote to Roosevelt, on
March 26, 1896:
"I note with pleasure what you write in regard to the
Venezuela affair and thank you for it. It has taken a little
time and thought for the good people to understand our
position in the matter but as usual they are coming around.
"It seems to me that you and I have both been a little
misunderstood lately."

CHAPTER IX
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Soon after the election of McKinley to the Presidency
in 1896, friends of Roosevelt began to urge upon the new
President the desirability of appointing him to some posi
tion in his administration, preferably in the Navy Depart
ment, because of his well-known interest in naval matters.
Chief among these friends was Senator H. C. Lodge, who
was as earnest an advocate of the building of an efficient
navy as Roosevelt himself. Senator Lodge made a visit to
McKinley, at the latter's home in Canton, Ohio, in Decem
ber, 1896, and had an intimate conversation with the Presi
dent-elect which he set forth in a confidential letter to
Roosevelt under date of December 2. This letter is of his
torical interest as revealing McKinley's attitude of mind
not only toward Roosevelt, but toward the most pressing
question that was to confront the new President on taking
office — the situation in Cuba.
"He asked me about Cuba," wrote Senator Lodge, "and
we went over the whole of that very perplexing question.
It is very much on his mind and I found he had given it a
great deal of thought. He very naturally does not want to
be obliged to go to war as soon as he comes in, for, of
course, his great ambition is to restore business and bring
back good times, and he dislikes the idea of such interrup
tion. He would like the crisis to come this winter and be
settled one way or the other before he takes up the reins,
but I was greatly pleased to see how thoroughly he appre
ciates the momentous character of the question."
Striking evidence of the reputation for "driving force"
which Roosevelt had earned for himself by his conduct in
70

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 71
public office, is furnished in this passage from the Senator's
letter :
"He (McKinley) spoke of you with great regard for your
character and your services and he would like to have you
in Washington. The only question he asked me was this,
which I give you: 'I hope he has no preconceived notions
which he would wish to drive through the moment he got
in.' I replied that he need not give himself the slightest
uneasiness on that score, that I knew your views about the
Navy, and they were only to push on the policies which had
been in operation for the last two or three administra
tions." The possibility mentioned by the President-elect, that
Roosevelt might prove too strong a man for the place, was
urged by opponents of his appointment in Washington
when he was proposed for Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
after McKinley had been inaugurated and his Cabinet an
nounced. A letter from Senator Lodge at Washington to
Roosevelt, under date of March 8, 1897, gives interesting
information as to the high character of his supporters and
the arguments used in opposition to his selection:
"I have seen Long (Secretary of the Navy) and he is
entirely open-minded — has not yet taken the question up —
will not for some little time — says that McKinley will ap
point, but he supposes he will be consulted. He spoke in
the highest terms of you. The only thing resembling criti
cism was this queer one: 'Roosevelt has the character,
standing, ability and reputation to entitle him to be a Cabi
net Minister — is not this too small for him?'
"The hitch, if there be one, is not with Long but with
the White House. Whether there is any real resistance I
cannot tell, and absolutely the only thing I can hear adverse
is that there is a fear that you will want to fight somebody
at once.
"You have enough friends earnest for you to make a
Secretary of State. John Hay has written and spoken and
urged in the most earnest way at all opportunities. Hanna

72 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
is entirely friendly and wants you here. Piatt is not lift
ing a finger against you. I saw Bliss (Cornelius N, Secre
tary of the Interior) this morning. He spoke of you in the
warmest terms and in the most affectionate way — said you
were just the man. Hobart (Vice-President) after adjourn
ment to-day, came up to me and said: 'You are, I know,
interested in Roosevelt. He is a splendid fellow— I think
everything of him — just the sort of man we ought to get.
What can I do?' He said he had an appointment with the
President this afternoon and would urge you then upon
him. "I believe we are coming out all right. In any event,
you have, I think, a right to be proud of such support as
that I have described and you have not raised a finger and
it has all come voluntarily. All I have done is to plan
and direct it a little."
President McKinley sent Roosevelt's name to the Senate
on April 6, 1897, and the nomination was confirmed on
April 8. He assumed the duties of the office on April 19.
On the day of the Senate's confirmation of the nomina
tion, the Washington Post, which had bitterly opposed
Roosevelt while Civil Service Commissioner, made him the
subject of an editorial article in which it said that it was
"by no means sure" that his appointment was a "matter
of regret, ' ' and that while ' ' of course he will bring with
him to Washington all that machinery of disturbance and
upheaval which is as much a part of his entourage as the
very air he breathes, who knows that the service will not
be a little better for a little dislocation and readjustment!"
Of Roosevelt 's qualities, the editor added :
" He is inspired by a passionate hatred of meanness, hum
bug, and cowardice. He cherishes an equally passionate
love of candor, bravery and devotion. He is a fighter, a
man of indomitable pluck and energy, a potent and force
ful factor in any equation into which he may be introduced.
A field of immeasurable usefulness awaits him— will he
find it?"

From a photograph by Van der Weyde
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 1897

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 73
As soon as Roosevelt had familiarized himself with the
detail work of his office he began a series of visits to the
various navy-yards and to vessels of the fleet. Early in
May he took a trip on a torpedo-boat which he had been in
specting because of a slight injury caused by an accident,
and made an official report to the Secretary of the Navy
which marked a new departure in documents of that kind,
for instead of being a dry, formal record of an accident, it
contained decided views as to the qualities and dispositions
of the men who should command naval vessels, and
especially torpedo-boats. After saying that no practical
damage had been caused, he added :
"Boats so delicate, which, to be handled effectively must
be handled with great daring, necessarily run great risks,
and their commanders must, of course, realize that a pre
requisite to successfully handling them is the willingness
to run such risks. That they will observe proper precau
tions is, of course, required, but it is more important that
our officers should handle these boats with dash and daring
than that the boats should be kept unscratched. There
must be developed in the men who handle them that mixture
of skill and daring which can only be attained if the boats
are habitually used under circumstances which imply the
risk of an accident. The business of a naval officer is one
which, above all others, needs daring and decision and if
he must err on either side the nation can best afford to
have him err on the side of too much daring rather than too
much caution."
This report was hailed by the press with expressions of
delight as revealing a new spirit in the Navy Department.
One newspaper correspondent said it had ' ' snap and vigor
that made it read more like a page out of one of Mr. Roose
velt's books than the ordinary red-tape document." An
editor hoped that the report would prove to be the first of
a series of papers setting forth his views of naval men and
things in general, because "we have been running along
in a groove for altogether too many years."

74 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
This hope was soon realized, and the interest which the
report had aroused in naval matters was greatly stimulated
a few weeks later when Roosevelt delivered a carefully
prepared address before the Naval War College, at New
port, R. I., at the opening exercises on June 2, 1897. This
address is so notable as the first elaborate expression of
Roosevelt's views on the subject of national preparedness
that somewhat liberal quotation from it is desirable in
order to show the lifelong consistency of his course on this
question. He had first given expression to those views in
.his history of "The Naval War of 1812," in 1882, and had
repeated them in his "Life of Benton," in 1887, and in his
condensed history of the war of 1812, which he wrote in
1896 for the English Naval History, but in each of these
instances he had written briefly and in general terms. The
Naval War College address was clearly the result of several
years of serious thought and study of the subject. Eead
in the light of his virtually continuous advocacy of the same
subject during the years which intervened between our war
with Spain and the outbreak of the great European War in
1914, it is found to contain all the principal ideas which he
expounded with such tireless energy during that period, and
especially when he foresaw that Germany's conduct was
certain to force the United States into the war. A few cita
tions will demonstrate the accuracy of this statement:
"A century has passed since Washington wrote 'To be
prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote
peace.' We pay to this maxim the lip-loyalty we so often
pay to Washington 's words ; but it has never sunk deep into
our hearts. Indeed of late years many persons have re
fused it even the poor tribute of lip-loyalty, and prate about
the iniquity of war as if somehow that was a justification
for refusing to take the steps which alone can in the long
run prevent war or avert the dreadful disasters it brings
in its train. ' '
"In this country there is not the slightest danger of an
over-development of warlike spirit, and there never has

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 75
been any such danger. In all our history there has never
been a time when preparedness for war was any menace to
peace. On the contrary, again and again we have owed
peace to the fact that we were prepared for war; and in
the only contest which we have had with a European power
since the Revolution, the war of 1812, the struggle and all
its attendant disasters, were due solely to the fact that we
were not prepared to face, and were not ready instantly
to resent, an attack upon our honor and interest ; while the
glorious triumphs at sea which redeemed that war were
due to the few preparations which we had actually made."
".The danger is of precisely the opposite character. If
we forget that in the last resort we can only secure peace
by being ready and willing to fight for it, we may some day
have bitter cause to realize that a rich nation which is sloth
ful, timid, or unwieldy is an easy prey for any people which
still retains those most valuable of all qualities, the soldier
ly virtues."
• "Preparation for war is the surest guarantee for peace.
Arbitration is an excellent thing, but ultimately those who
wish to see this country at peace with foreign nations will
be wise if they place reliance upon a first-class fleet of first-
class battle-ships rather than on any arbitration treaty
which the wit of man can devise."
"A really great people, proud and high-spirited, would
face all the disasters of war rather than purchase that base
prosperity which is bought at the price of national honor."
"Cowardice in a race, as in an individual, is the unpar
donable sin, and a wilful failure to prepare for danger may
in its effects be as bad as cowardice. The timid man who
cannot fight and the selfish, shortsighted or foolish man
who will not take the steps that will enable him to fight,
stand on almost the same plane. ' '
"As yet no nation can hold its place in the world or can
do any work really worth doing unless it stands ready to

76 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
guard its rights with an armed hand. That orderly liberty
which is both the foundation and the capstone of our civi
lization can be gained and kept only by men who are willing
to fight for an ideal ; who hold high the love of honor, love
of faith, love of flag, and love of country."
"It has always been true, and in this age it is more than
ever true, that it is too late to prepare for war when the
time of peace has passed."
"Tame submission to foreign aggression of any kind is
a mean and unworthy thing; but it is even meaner and
more unworthy to bluster first, and then submit or else
refuse to make those preparations which can alone obviate
the necessity for submission."
"In public as in private life a bold front tends to insure
peace and not strife. If we possess a formidable navy,
small is the chance indeed that we shall ever be dragged
into a war to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. If we do not
possess such a navy, war may be forced on us at any time.",
* "Diplomacy is utterly useless where there is no force
behind it; the diplomat is the servant, not the master, of
the soldier."
» "No nation should ever wage war wantonly, but no nation
should ever avoid it at the cost of the loss of national honor.
A nation should never fight unless forced to ; but it should
always be ready to fight."
"Every feat of heroism makes us forever indebted to the
man who performed it. All daring and courage, all iron
endurance of misfortune, all devotion to the ideal of honor
and of the glory of the flag, make for a finer and nobler
type of manhood."
"If ever we had to meet defeat at the hands of a foreign
foe, or had to submit tamely to wrong or insult, every man
among us worthy of the name of American would feel dis
honored and debased."

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 77
"We ask for a great navy, partly because we think that
the possession of such a navy is the surest guarantee of
peace, and partly because we feel that no national life is
worth having if the nation is not willing, when the need
shall arise, to stake everything on the supreme arbitrament
of war, and to pour out its blood, its treasure, and tears
like water rather than submit to the loss of honor and
renown." Published in full in the principal newspapers of the land,
the address attracted wide attention and aroused animated
discussion. It was universally recognized as sounding a
new note in the conduct of national affairs. Nothing similar
to it had been heard in the deliverances of other public
men. It was the voice of Roosevelt, and of Roosevelt alone,
and it stirred the country like the sound of a trumpet.
There had been many addresses by naval officials at the
War College, but never before had an Assistant Secretary
of the Navy or any other navy official made an address like
this. What did it mean? To an apparent majority of the
people, if the comments of the newspapers were an accu
rate reflection of popular sentiment, it meant a welcome
change. With few exceptions, the leading journals of the
country expressed warm approval of the address. The
New York Sun, seldom friendly to Roosevelt, called it a
"manly, patriotic, intelligent and convincing appeal to
American sentiment in behalf of the national honor, and
for the preservation of the national strength by means
requisite for self-defense and vigorous aggressive resist
ance to efforts to interfere with our progress and natural
dominion." The New York Herald said : "The current of
this fine address is filled with a flow of splendid patriotism,
from its opening sentence to its close, and its careful read
ing can scarcely fail to inspire the youth of America with
the same lofty spirit of devotion to our country's honor,
glory and prosperity that actuated its utterance by the
speaker." The Washington Post, dropping its uniformly
captious attitude toward Roosevelt, declared that in his

78 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
address he had "honored both himself and the country,"
and exclaimed: "Well done, nobly spoken! Theodore
Roosevelt, you have found your proper place at last— all
hail ! ' ' From Maine to California, the general verdict was
expressed in similar terms.
That Roosevelt was endowed, in a really marvelous de
gree, with the gift of vision his correspondence indubitably
shows. He saw clearly what men would do because he had
accurate knowledge of and calm judgment upon what men
had done. He saw clearly into the motives and actions of-
men and nations because he had mastered their history and
could gage their conduct in the future by that of the past.
He had read human history, not for the purpose of
strengthening his prejudices, but of informing his mind,
and from fulness of mind and matured conviction he spoke.
When Roosevelt entered upon his duties as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, trouble with Spain over conditions
in Cuba was visibly impending, and the possibility of war
was foremost in his mind when he made his Naval War
College address. That he was keeping close watch upon
developments in other countries, especially in Germany, is
shown by his letters. In his correspondence during the
months immediately following his assumption of office,
reference to ultimate trouble with Germany is of frequent
occurrence. On August 2, 1897, in a letter to Captain B. H.
McCalla, U. S. N., he wrote: "I entirely agree with you
that Germany is the power with which we may very pos
sibly have ultimately to come into hostile contact. How I
wish our people would wake up to the need for a big navy!"
A few days later, August 11, he wrote a long letter, re
markable for the intimate knowledge that it displayed of
conditions in European countries, to Cecil Arthur Spring-
Rice, then with the British Legation at Berlin and afterward
British Ambassador at Washington. In it he said. "As
an American I should advocate — as a matter of fact do
advocate— keeping our navy at a pitch that will enable us to
interfere promptly if Germany ventures to touch a foot of
American soil. I would not go into the abstract rights or

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 79
wrongs of it; I would simply say that we did not intend to
have Germans on the continent, excepting as immigrants,
whose children would become Americans of one sort or
another, and if Germany intended to extend her empire here
she would have to whip us first."
The same idea was repeated in a letter to General James
H. Wilson on August 23, 1897: "We cannot rival England
as a naval power . . . but I do think we ought to stand
ahead of Germany."
In two letters, written early in 1898, he predicted trouble
with Germany in South America if the Kaiser should at
tempt to acquire territory there. In one, February 5, 1898,
addressed to'F. C. Moore, New York City, he wrote: "Of
all the nations of Europe it seems to me Germany is by far
the most hostile to us. With Germany under the Kaiser
we may at any time have trouble if she seeks to acquire
territory in South America."
In another, addressed to Charles A. Moore, New York
City, February 14, 1898, the prediction was repeated. The
literal accuracy of the prophecy was confirmed in 1902,
when the Kaiser attempted to acquire territory in Vene
zuela and was prevented by the prompt action of Roosevelt,
as President, in serving notice upon him that unless he de
sisted the American fleet under Admiral Dewey would sail
for Venezuela and oppose his project by force of arms.
Writing again to F. C. Moore, on February 9, 1898, he
gave this comprehensive statement of his views in regard
to an American foreign policy:
"I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with a
purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every Euro
pean power. I would begin with Spain, and in the end
would take all other European nations, including England.
It is even more important to prevent any new nation from
getting a foothold. Germany as a republic would very
possibly be a friendly nation, but under the present des
potism she is much more bitterly and outspokenly hostile
to us than is England.

80 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME

(C

'What I want to see our people avoid is the attitude
taken by the great bulk of Americans at the beginning of
this century, and the end of the last, when the mass of the
Jeffersonians put the interests of France above the inter
est and honor of America, and the mass of the Federalists
did the same thing in England. I am not hostile to any
European power in the abstract. I am simply an American
first and last, and therefore hostile to any power which
wrongs us. If Germany wronged us I would fight Ger
many; if England, I would fight England."
It should be said in regard to this reference to England,
that after what he considered to be the handsome way in
which England acted toward the United States during the
Spanish War, Roosevelt's attitude toward that country
underwent a radical change — a change that was strength
ened later by England's course in the war with Germany.
The most striking of Roosevelt's predictions at this time
appears in his letter to Mr. Spring-Rice, already alluded
to. In his review of conditions in foreign countries, he
paid especial attention to Russia, a country which Mr.
Spring-Rice had recently visited, and in concluding fore
shadowed, with remarkable accuracy, twenty years in ad
vance, the revolution of 1918 :
"If Russia chooses to develop purely on her own line
and to resist the growth of liberalism, then she may put
off the day of reckoning; but she cannot ultimately avert
it, and instead of occasionally having to go through what
Kansas has gone through with the Populists, she will some
time experience a red terror which will make the French,
Revolution pale."
These predictions in regard to the course of events in
foreign countries, interesting as they are, occupied only
casual space in the great mass of correspondence that
Roosevelt conducted during the year in which he held the
office of Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His dominating
idea during the early part of that period was the condi-

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 81
tion of affairs in Cuba and the imperative necessity of
American interference. He was frankly and ardently in
favor of interference in Cuba on the ground of humanity ^
and, after the blowing up of the Maine, in favor of war
with Spain in defense of the national honor. He was vir
tually alone in the McKinley Administration in advocating
this policy. So completely was this the case that he might
have said of his function in the Administration during the
year which preceded the war with Spain what Socrates in
his 'Apology' said of his function in the Athenian state:
"The state is exactly like a powerful high-bred steed, which
is sluggish by reason of his very size, and so needs a gadfly
to wake him up. And as such a gadfly does God seem to
have fastened me upon the state ;, wherefore, besetting you
everywhere the whole day long, I arouse and stir up and re
proach each one of you."
In his 'Autobiography' Roosevelt calls the war with
Spain ' ' The War of America the Unready. ' ' It might with
equal truth be called "The War of McKinley the Unwill
ing," for he and his official associates refused to engage in
it till refusal was no longer possible without dishonor.
They were supported in this course by Thomas B. Reed,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by a group
of Senators under the leadership of the Senate's most
powerful member, Eugene Hale, of Maine. Secretary Long,
Roosevelt's superior officer, was more than lukewarm upon
the question of building up the navy, which Roosevelt con
sidered to be of the highest importance. Upon all these
persons Roosevelt acted as the persistent and irritating
gadfly. The full story of his efforts and of the develop
ments of this interesting period stands revealed in his
correspondence. Roosevelt had been an earnest and persistent advocate of
a big navy for ten years or more before he entered the
Navy Department, and it was inevitable, therefore, that in
assuming office his first thought should be in that direction.
One of his early letters, addressed to the editor of the New
York Sun, August 16, 1897, contains this passage : "I am

82 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
rather afraid that there is a very foolish feeling growing
that we now have enough of a navy. It would be horrible
folly to stop building up our navy now."
Secretary Long's lukewarm attitude on the subject was
revealed quite early in their official intercourse, and on
August 26, 1897, Roosevelt mildly expressed his regret in
a letter to the Secretary who was away on a vacation: "I
know you will excuse my saying that I can't help being
sorry you have reached the conclusion that we are not to
go on at all in building even, say, one battleship and five
torpedo-boats."
• A letter to Senator Lodge, written a few weeks later,
September 15, 1897, reveals the fact that Roosevelt had
brought the subject to the President's attention and secured
the overruling of the Secretary. This letter is interesting
also for the glimpse it affords of McKinley's personality:
' ' The President has returned and yesterday I went driv
ing with him. Generally, he expressed great satisfaction
with what I had done, especially during the last seven weeks
that I have been in charge of the Department. Of course
the President is a bit of a jollier, but I think his words did
represent a substratum of satisfaction.
' ' He is evidently by no means sure that we shall not have
trouble with Spain ; and though he wants to avoid both, yet
I think he could be depended upon to deal thoroughly and
well with any difficulty that arises. ... I told him that
I would guarantee that the Department would be in the
best possible shape that our means would permit when war
began, and that, as he knew, I myself would go to the war.
He asked me what Mrs. Roosevelt would think of it, and I
said that both you and she would regret it, but this was one
case where I would consult neither. He laughed and said
that he would do all he could to guarantee that I should
have the opportunity I sought if war by any chance arose.
"To my great pleasure he also told me that he intended
we should go on building up the Navy, with better ships
and torpedo-boats, and that he did not think the Secretary

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 83
would recommend anything he (the President) did not ap
prove of. '

>»

Two efforts were made by Roosevelt in the latter part of
September, 1897, when the Cuban situation seemed threat
ening, to induce Secretary Long to take decisive action of
some sort in the direction of naval preparedness. On Sep
tember 20 he wrote to him at Hingham, Mass. :
"From what the President and Judge Day (Secretary
of State) say it would seem that advices from Spain are
not altogether satisfactory. I do not anticipate any trouble,
but if there is we should have warning just as far in ad
vance as the President will permit, and should be ready
to take the initiative at once. If in the event of trouble we
wait to receive the attack we will have our hands full, and
the greatest panic would ensue, but if we move with the
utmost rapidity with our main force on Cuba, say under
Admiral Walker, and a flying squadron under Evans, or
some such man, against Spain itself, while the Asiatic
squadron operates against the Philippines, I believe the
affair would not present a very great difficulty."
And on September 30, he sent a long and formal letter
urging the steady and rapid upbuilding of the Navy, and
saying: "A great Navy does not make for war but for peace. It
is the cheapest kind of insurance. No coast fortifications
can really protect our coasts; they can only be protected
by a formidable fighting Navy.
"I believe Congress should at once give us 6 new battle
ships, 6 large cruisers, and 75 torpedo-boats, 25 for the
Pacific and 50 for the Atlantic. I believe we should set
about building all these craft now, and that each one should
be, if possible, the most formidable of its kind afloat."
About the same time he saw the President again, writing
to Senator Lodge on September 21: "The President has
been most kind. I dined with him Friday evening, and yes-

84 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
terday he sent over and took me out to drive. I gave him
a paper showing exactly where all our ships are and I also
sketched in outline what I thought ought to be done if
things looked menacing about Spain, urging the necessity
of taking an immediate and prompt initiative if we wished
to avoid the chance of some serious trouble."
In December the outlook was even more threatening and,
with a side glance still on Germany, he wrote on the 17th,
to Lieutenant-Commander W. W. Kimball, U. S. N.: "I
doubt if those Spaniards can really pacify Cuba, and if the
insurrection goes on much longer I don't see how we can
help interfering. Germany is the power with whom I look
forward to serious difficulty; but oh, how bitterly angry I
get at the attitude of some of our public men and some of
our publicists!"
On January 14, 1898, Roosevelt again sent a formal letter
to Secretary Long, giving the location and armament of
the various ships of the Navy at the moment, and fairly
imploring him to act :
"I feel that I ought to bring to your attention the very
serious consequences to the Government as a whole, and
especially to the Navy Department — upon which would be
visited the national indignation — for any check, no matter
how little the Department was really responsible for the
check — if we should drift into a war with Spain and sud
denly find ourselves obliged to begin it without prepara
tion, instead of having at least a month's warning, during
which we could actively prepare to strike. Some prepara
tion can and should be undertaken now on the mere chance
of having to strike.
"Certain things should be done at once if there is any
reasonable chance of trouble with Spain during the next
six months. For instance, the disposition of the fleet on
foreign stations should be radically altered, and altered
without delay. For the past six or eight months we have
been sending small cruisers and gunboats off to various
parts of the world with a total disregard of the fact that
in the event of war this would be the worst possible policy

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 85
to have pursued. ... If we have war with Spain there
will be immediate need for every gunboat and cruiser that
we can possibly get together to blockade Cuba, threaten or
take the less protected ports, and ferret out the scores of
small Spanish cruisers and gunboats which form practical
ly the entire Spanish naval force around the island."
On February 15, 1898, the battleship Maine was blown up
in Havana harbor, and on the following day Roosevelt
wrote to a friend: "Being a Jingo, as I am writing con
fidentially, I will say, to relieve my feelings, that I would
give anything if President McKinley would order the fleet
to Havana to-morrow. This Cuban business ought to stop.
The Maine was sunk by an act of dirty treachery on the part
of the Spaniards, I believe ; though we shall never find out
definitely, and officially it will go down as an accident."
Secretary Long had returned to Washington and was on
duty when the Maine explosion occurred. On February 19,
Roosevelt addressed a formal letter to him which was the
most solemnly earnest of the series of prods thus far ad
ministered to him. One passage which I have placed in
italics was especially significant in view of the Secretary's
well-known attitude toward building up the navy:
"In reference to our conversation of yesterday, and to
a brief conversation which I had with Judge Day this morn
ing before you came, let me again earnestly urge that you
advise the President against our conducting any examina
tion in conjunction with the Spaniards as to the Maine's
disaster. I myself doubt whether it will be possible to tell
definitely how the disaster occurred by an investigation,
and it may be that we could do it as well in conjunction
with the Spaniards as alone. But I am sure we could never
convince the people at large of this fact.
"There is another subject of which I spoke to you yes
terday, and about which I venture. to remind you. This is
in reference to additional warships. I was informed that
both Speaker Reed and Senator Hale had stated that we
should cease building any more battleships, in view of the

86 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
disaster to the Mame. I cannot believe that the statement
is true, for of course such an attitude, if supported by the
people, would mean that we had reached the last pitch of
national cowardice and baseness. I earnestly wish that you
could see your way clear now, without waiting a day, to
send in a special message, stating that in view of the disas
ter to the Maine (and perhaps in view of the possible needs
of this country) instead of recommending one battleship
you ask for two, or better still, that four battleships be
authorized immediately by Congress."
This letter evidently alarmed Secretary Long, for a few
days later, on February 25, he wrote a personal note to
Roosevelt in his own hand, saying he should be absent from
the Department for a day's quiet rest, directing him to re
voke an order Roosevelt had issued in regard to getting
the naval vessels ready for action, and adding: "Do not
take any such step affecting the policy of the Administra
tion without consulting the President or me. I am not away
from town and my intention was to have you look after the
routine of the office while I get a quiet day off. I write to
you because I am anxious to have no unnecessary occasion
for a sensation in the papers." The passage which I have
placed in italics is especially significant.
Writing to Henry White, then Secretary of the American
Embassy at London, on March 9, 1898, Roosevelt said:
"Of course I have nothing to say as to the policy of the
Government, but I hope this incident (Maine) will not be
treated by itself, but as part of the whole Cuban business.
There is absolutely but one possible solution of a perma
nent nature to that affair, and that is Cuban independence.
The sooner we make up our minds to this the better. If
we can attain our object peacefully, of course we should try
to do so ; but we should attain it one way or the other any
how." When the news arrived of the sailing of the Spanish
torpedo flotilla from the Canaries for Porto Rico, on March

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 87
15, 1898, Roosevelt went at once to the President, and, as
he wrote to Captain R. D. Evans of the navy on the follow
ing day, told him that "we ought to treat the sailing of the
flotilla exactly as a European power would the mobilizing
of a hostile army on its frontier. ' ' He did not confine his
exhortations to the President, but, as appears from the sub
joined extract from a letter to Brooks Adams, on March 21,
1898, extended them to the Cabinet as well :
"Personally, I feel that it is not too late to intervene in
Cuba. What the Administration will do I know not. In
some points it has followed too closely in Cleveland's foot
steps to please me, excellently though it has done on the
whole. In the name of humanity and of national interest
alike, we should have interfered in Cuba two years ago, a
year and a half ago last April, and again last December. The
blood of the Cubans, the blood of women and children who
have perished by the hundred thousand in hideous misery,
lies at our door; and the blood of the murdered men of the
Maine calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of
atonement which can only come by driving the Spaniard
from the New World. I have said this to the President
before his Cabinet; I have said it to Judge Day, the real
head of the State Department; and to my own Chief. I
cannot say it publicly, for I am of course merely a minor
official in the Administration. At least, however, I have
borne testimony where I thought it would do good."
The response that he received was clearly not encourag
ing, for on March 24 he wrote to Captain A. T. Mahan, who
was a cordial sympathizer in his efforts: "I think I told
you that I advised the President and the Secretary to treat
the sailing of the torpedo flotilla from the Canaries for
Porto Rico as an act of hostility. I have repeated the ad
vice to-day. I do not think it will be regarded."
His inability to stir the Administration to action was both
discouraging and depressing to him. On March 27, he re
ceived a letter, written the day before, from William Tudor,

88 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
an old and valued friend in Boston, in which the writer
said: "It is hard to credit the newspaper reports that the
Cabinet by a large majority intend to pass over the blow
ing up of the Maine. Those of us who are not speculating
in the stock market believe that this is merely put forward
by the Administration to gain time.
"I believe that the blowing up of the Maine with the con
nivance of the Spanish authorities cannot be passed over.
With wholesale murder there can be no question of arbitra
tion. If you allow Spain to get her torpedo fleet across the
Atlantic the Administration will be responsible for the loss
of more ships. The first act of war was the blowing up of
the Maine; the second is the sending of this torpedo fleet to
Porto Rico. Are we to wait until more of our ships are de
stroyed before acting? I protest against this peace-at-any-
price policy of the Government, which does not represent
the views of a tenth of the American people."
To this Roosevelt responded on March 28: "I agree
from the bottom of my heart with all you say. I feel
humiliated and ashamed. Every argument you advance I
have personally advanced with all the force there was in
me, both to the President and the Cabinet; and in vain."
To his brother-in-law, Captain W. S. Cowles, of the navy,
he wrote in similar strain on March 29 :
"I am utterly disgusted at the present outlook in foreign
relations. I can only hope that the Senate, under the
leadership of men like Lodge, will rise to the needs of the
hour and insist upon immediate independence for Cuba and
armed intervention on our part. Nothing less than this
will avail. Shilly shallying and half measures at this time
will merely render us contemptible in the eyes of the world;
and what is infinitely more important, in our own eyes too.
Personally I cannot understand how the bulk of our people
can tolerate the hideous infamy that has attended the last
two years of Spanish rule in Cuba; and still more how they
can tolerate the treacherous destruction of the Maine and

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 89
the murder of our men! I feel so deeply that it is with
very great difficulty I can restrain myself."
On the following day, March 30, he wrote again to Cap
tain Cowles :
"Of course I cannot speak in public, but I have advised
the President in the presence of his Cabinet, as well as
Judge Day and Senator Hanna, as strongly as I knew how,
to settle this matter instantly by armed intervention; and
I told the President in the plainest language that no other
course was compatible with our national honor, or with the
claims of humanity on behalf of the wretched women and
children of Cuba. I am more grieved and indignant than
I can say at there being any delay on our part in a matter
like this. A great crisis is upon us, and if we do not rise
level to it, we shall have spotted the pages of our history
with a dark blot of shame. ' '
On the same day, to another brother-in-law, Douglas
Eobinson, of New York, he wrote :
"Neither I nor any one else can give you more than the
merest vague forecast of events. The President is resolute
to have peace at any price. As far as he is concerned, un
less the Spaniards declare war, we will not have it. Con
gress, however, is in an entirely different temper. The
most influential man in it, Tom Reed, is as much against
war as the President, and the group of Senators who stand
closest to the President are also ferociously against war.
Nevertheless, Congress as a whole wishes either war or
action that would result in war. Their most patriotic and
able men take this view, and I doubt if they can be much
longer restrained. Therefore I think it about a toss-up
whether we have war or peace. The trend of events is for
war. Congress is for war. All it needs is a big leader;
but the two biggest leaders, the President and the Speaker,
both of whom have enormous power, are almost crazy in
their eagerness for peace, and would make almost any sac
rifice to get peace."

90 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Writing to Elihu Root, on April 5, 1898, he reveals the
sources from which came the most powerful pressure
against war and to which the Administration was yielding:
"You would be amazed and horrified at the peace-at-any-
price telegrams of the most abject description which come
in multitudes from New York, Boston, and elsewhere to the
President and Senators.
"Not only is the peace sentiment of the eastern seaboard
not the sentiment of the country at large, but I doubt
whether this sentiment exists in the strata lower than the
wealthiest even in the East.
"The President has taken a position from which he can
not back down without ruin to his reputation, ruin to his
party, and, above all, lasting dishonor to his country; and
I am sure he will not back down.
"Thank Heaven, this morning it looks as if the Admin
istration had made up its mind to lead the movement in
stead of resisting it with the effect of shattering the party
and of humiliating the nation. Judge Day, who together
with that idol of the Mugwumps, Secretary Gage, has been
advocating peace under almost any conditions, has just
told me that he has given up and that the President seems
to be making up his mind to the same effect. Of course
from the military standpoint it is dreadful to have delayed
so long."
To a college classmate, Dr. Henry Jackson, of Boston,
who had written to him in support of peace-at-any-price,
he sent this characteristic rejoinder on April 6, 1898:
"I beheve it criminal for us to submit to the murder of
our men, and to the butchery of Cuban women and chil
dren. The resources of diplomacy have been exhausted.
This nation has erred on the side of over-bearance.
When you talk of this war being undertaken to satisfy the
political greed of a parcel of politicians you show the most
astounding ignorance of the conditions. The only effective
forces against the war are the forces inspired by greed and

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 91
fear, and the forces that tell in favor of war are the belief
in national honor and common humanity."
The pre-war portion of the correspondence closes with
this despondent view of the situation as it appeared to him
on April 7, 1898 : "If you are puzzled you can imagine the
bitter wrath and humiliation which I feel at the absolute
lack of plans. We have our plans in the Navy, and beyond
that there is absolutely nothing. The President doesn't
know what message he will send in or what he will do if we
have war."
Four days later, April 11, 1898, President McKinley, left
with no alternative by the obviously tricky conduct of the
Spanish government in proposing an armistice which was a
sham on its face, made up his mind that war was inevitable,
and sent a message to Congress asking it to empower him
to end hostilities in Cuba and to secure the establishment
of a stable government ' ' capable of maintaining order and
observing its international obHgations." Congress, after
full discussion, adopted, on April 19, joint resolutions de
claring the people of Cuba free and independent, demand
ing the surrender of all Spanish authority in the island, and
directing and empowering the President to enforce the
resolutions by using the full land and naval forces of the
United States. Spain declared war formally on April 24,
and the United States did the same On April 25.

CHAPTER X
THE WAR WITH SPAIN
That the Navy was reasonably well prepared for the war
solely because of the efforts of Roosevelt, is clearly revealed
by these citations from his correspondence. For months
he had been working unceasingly with the hearty co-opera
tion of the ablest men in the service to get material in
readiness and have the ships properly equipped and com
manded. It was due solely to him also that Admiral Dewey
was in command of the Asiatic squadron and that that
squadron was ready to sail from Hong Kong to the Philip
pines at a moment's notice and was in condition to win the
battle of Manila. There is abundant proof in support of
these statements.
When the question of appointing a commander of the
Asiatic squadron arose in the fall of 1897, Roosevelt, in
accordance with his established policy of gathering from
every source information as to who were the best men to
occupy the fighting positions, ascertained that sound naval
opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of Dewey for the com
mand of a squadron. He had been struck by an incident
in Dewey's career in which he had, without authority from
the Navy Department and on his own responsibihty, bought
a supply of coal in preparation for a threatening emer
gency. "The incident," Roosevelt says in his 'Autobi
ography,' "made me feel that here was a man who could be
relied upon to prepare in advance, and to act promptly,
fearlessly, and on his own responsibility when the emer
gency arose. Accordingly I did my best to get him put in
command of the Asiatic fleet, the fleet where it was most
essential to have a man who would act without referring
things back to the home authorities." 02

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 93
The manner in which Roosevelt's desire was accom
plished is told as follows by Admiral Dewey himself in his
'Autobiography' (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913) :
"The most influential officer in the distribution of assign
ments was Rear-Admiral A. S. Crowninshield, chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, and a pronounced bureaucrat, with
whose temperament and methods I had little more sym
pathy than had the majority of the officers of the navy at
that time. He would hardly recommend me to any com
mand ; and his advice had great weight with John D. Long,
who was then Secretary of the Navy.
"Theodore Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the
Navy. He was impatient of red tape, and had a singular
understanding both of the importance of preparedness for
war and of striking quick blows in rapid succession once
war was begun. With the enthusiastic candor which char
acterizes him, he declared that I ought to have the Asiatic
Squadron. He asked me if I had any political influence.
I expressed a natural disinclination to use it. He agreed
with the correctness of my view as an officer, but this was a
situation where it must be used in self-defense. One letter
from an influential source in favor of Howell had already
been received by the department.
" 'I want you to go,' Mr. Roosevelt declared. 'You are
the man who will be equal to the emergency if one arises.
Do you know any Senators ? '
"My heart was set on having the Asiatic Squadron. It
seemed to me that we were inevitably drifting into a war
with Spain. In command of an efficient force in the Far
East, with a free hand to act in consequence of being so far
away from Washington, I could strike promptly and suc
cessfully at the Spanish force in the Philippines.
" 'Senator Proctor is from my State,' I said to Mr.
Roosevelt. 'He is an old friend of the family, and my father
was of service to him when he was a young man. '
" 'You could not have a better sponsor,' Mr. Roosevelt
exclaimed. 'Lose no time in having him speak a word for
you.'

94 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"I went immediately to see Senator Proctor, who was
delighted that I had mentioned the matter to him. That
very day he called on President McKinley and received the
promise of the appointment before he left the White House.
"When I next met Crowninshield he told me that al
though I was to have the appointment — a fact which did
not seem to please him any too well — Secretary Long was
indignant because I had used political influence to obtain it.
I went at once to see Mr. Long and said to him :
" 'Mr. Secretary, I understand that you are displeased
with me for having used influence to secure command of
the Asiatic Squadron. I did so because it was the only way
of offsetting influence that was being exerted on another
officer's behalf.'
" 'You are in error, Commodore,' said Mr. Long. 'No
influence had been brought to bear on behalf of any one
else. '
' ' Only a few hours later, however, Mr. Long sent me a
note in which he said that he had just found that a letter
had been received at the Department which he had seen for
the first time. It had arrived while he was absent from the
office and while Mr. Roosevelt was Acting Secretary, and
had only just been brought to his attention."
Dewey was appointed, sailed for his post on December
7, 1897, and in February began to assemble the fleet at Hong
Kong, doing so "entirely on my own initiative, without any
hint whatever from the department that hostilities might
be expected. It was evident that in case of emergency Hong
Kong was the most advantageous position from which to
move to the attack."
News of the blowing up of the Maine did not reach him
officially till February 18, 1898, when he received the fol
lowing cable message :
Dewey, Hong Kong:
Maine destroyed at Havana February 15th by accident.
The President directs all colors to be half masted until fur-

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 95
ther orders. Inform vessels under your command by tele
graph. Long.
Of this message Dewey writes : "Its wording shows how
carefully our government was moving in a moment of such
intense excitement. ' ' What happened next, is described by
him as follows:
"Though President McKinley was still confident that
war could be averted, active naval measures had already
begun, so far as navy-yard work upon ships and initial in
quiries with regard to the purchase of war material was
concerned. But the first real step was taken on February
25, when telegraphic instructions were sent to the Asiatic,
European, and South Atlantic Squadrons to rendezvous at
certain convenient points where, should war break out, they
would be most available.
"The message to the Asiatic Squadron bore the signa
ture of that Assistant Secretary who had seized the oppor
tunity, while Acting Secretary, to hasten preparations for
a conflict which was inevitable. As Mr. Roosevelt reasoned,
precautions would cost little in time of peace and would
be invaluable in case of war. His cablegram was as follows :
Washington, February 25, 1898.
Dewey, Hong Kong:
Order the squadron except the Monocacy to Hong Kong.
Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain,
your duty will be to see that the Spanish Squadron does
not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in
Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.
Roosevelt.
"The reference to keeping the Olympia until further or
ders was due to the fact that I had been notified that she
would soon be recalled to the United States."
Dewey obeyed these instructions and proceeded to get
his fleet in readiness for sailing for Manila at a moment's

96 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
notice, so that when the following order came from Secre
tary Long, on April 25, two months after Roosevelt's mes
sage to Dewey, he was ready to obey :
"War has commenced between the United States and
Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence
operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must
capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor."
Thus was the famous battle of Manila fought and won
by a commander whose appointment had been secured by
Roosevelt against the wishes of Secretary Long and whose
fleet had been thoroughly equipped for the conflict by an
order that Roosevelt had sent on his own responsibihty in
the absence of his chief.
A few months later Secretary Long's personal attitude
toward the course pursued by his assistant was revealed in
the following letter to Roosevelt from Senator Lodge, de
cidedly the most interesting and illuminating letter in the
present collection: (The italics are mine.)
Nahant, Mass., September 21, 1898.
Dear Theodore:
I am going to ask for five minutes of your crowded time
to read this letter and give me a little help. I am getting
together of course the necessary materials for my war
articles. The second one will be about Manila, and as the
first is well advanced I am already gathering facts for the
second. I intended to begin by a reference to your order to
Dewey of February 25th. You no doubt remember that
memorable Saturday afternoon when I came in and found
you and Crowninshield sending out this order which was
of such enormous importance and value in the subsequent
operations. I wrote to Crowninshield that I knew the pur
port of the order, but that as a matter of caution I should
be much obliged if I could have its exact terms. Here is a
copy of what he said in reply. If you do not smile when
you read it I shall be surprised :

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 97
"Replying to your note of September 19th, I have spoken
to the Secretary and he is unwilling to give you the exact
language of the order referred to. You will probably see
yourself that to do so might appear to put us in a light of
being almost over-prepared; in other words, it might seem
that the Department) had as early as February 25th, the
date of the order, made up its mind that there was to be war
anyway. Other orders issued about this time could only be
called precautionary, but by some this particular order
might be construed as indicated above."
Here follows what I have said in reply to him, which I
think will make you smile also :
"Many thanks for your letter of September 19th. I only
asked for the language of the order of February 25th to Ad
miral Dewey out of a spirit of caution which many years of
historical studies have cultivated in me. I know the purport
of the order as I happened to be in the office that afternoon
when you and Mr. Roosevelt were sending it off, and a
general statement such as I can make from memory will
serve my purpose perfectly well. I confess that now that
the war is over and when one of the things of which every
body is most proud and for which the Department received
the most unstinted praise was the state of preparation in
which the Navy found itself, I cannot conceive that any
human being should criticize the Department for being
over-prepared, but of this no doubt the Department is the
better judge. I shall speak of the order sent out by you
and Mr. Roosevelt in my articles as one of the wisest things
that was done, a proposition which I consider proved by the
little affair at Manila on the 1st of May. My intention was
simply to refer to it as an order of the Department, but if
the Secretary has the slightest objection to my doing so I
will say that the order was sent by Mr. Roosevelt as Acting
Secretary, and I have no doubt the Colonel of the Rough
Riders will accept the responsibility of being over-prepared
with perfect equanimity."
Now what I want of you is to give me your best recollec
tion of the general purport of the order. I remember it

98 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
pretty well myself, but I want to have your memory to con
firm mine, and that will be all-sufficient for the statement
I wish to make. There is something very comic in our dear
Secretary thinking he will be criticized for being over-
prepared and precipitating the war if that order is pub
lished. H. C. Lodge.
In his book, "The War with Spain" (Harper & Brothers,
1899), Senator Lodge records the incident as follows:
"On February 25 a cable message was sent to Commo
dore Dewey by Mr. Roosevelt directing him to assemble
his squadron at Hong Kong, retain the Olympia which had
been ordered back to San Francisco, and be prepared in
case of war for offensive operations in the Philippines. On
the 3d of March the Mohican was sent with ammunition to
Honolulu, there to await the Baltimore, which was to take
the ammunition on board and proceed at once to join the
Asiatic Squadron. No wiser or more far-sighted precau
tions were ever taken by an administration than these, and
it was all done so quietly that no one on the outside knew
what was happening."
Writing to John Hay, Secretary of State, on July 1, 1899,
Roosevelt gave his own view of what would have been the
outcome at Manila if Dewey had not been in command and
if the fleet had not been in a condition of thorough prepara
tion. "In last year's fighting, as the President knows, there
was a good deal of hesitation in sending Dewey to the
Asiatic Squadron. It was urged very strongly by the
Bureau of Navigation that Howell was entitled to go.
Finally, and most wisely, the Secretary decided to disre
gard the argument of seniority and to send Dewey. If he
had not done so, there would have been no Philippine prob
lem at present, for our fleet would have done nothing more
than to conduct a solemn blockade of Manila until our coal
gave out, and then go away."

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 99
An additional instance of Secretary Long's personal at
titude toward Roosevelt was revealed several years later
in an article which he published in the Outlook magazine.
Concerning this Roosevelt wrote to him on October 12, 1903 :
"In the Outlook, in an article written by you, there has
appeared this statement about me when I was Assistant
Secretary to you: 'Just before the war he, as well as some
naval officers, was anxious to send the squadron across the
ocean to sink the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers of the
Spanish fleet while we were yet at peace with Spain. ' I am
sure that you did not intend to state the proposition just
as it is here expressed. My memory is that I wished to
treat the sending over by Spain of her battleships and de
stroyers as a cause of war. My memory is also that when
two or more of the armor-clads of Spain were in Havana —
not on the coast of Spain — just before the outbreak of hos
tilities, I desired some of our ships sent down to watch
them. Do you not refer to these two facts?
"I would not bother you about this, my dear Governor,
but it seems to me to be a very serious accusation, when
brought against me by a gentleman of your high standing,
my former chief ; and it has seemingly been so accepted by
the public at large, if I am to judge by the activity of the
gentlemen of the press in seeking interviews with me this
morning." To this letter Mr. Long wrote a reply in which he pro
fessed to see no difference between what he had written and
what Roosevelt thought he should have written. In a
second letter, October 15, 1903, Roosevelt wrote :
"I thank you for your letter. I am sure I need not tell
you how well I know your kindly feelings toward me, which
feelings found full expression in the general tenor of your
article. I think, however, that it was a pity that in such
an important matter as this I was not given a chance to try
to refresh your memory on any point where we differed.
It is perfectly true that I wished a declaration of war long
before we did declare it ; and I also desired notice to be sent

100 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
to the Spanish Government that we should treat the sailing
of the fleet as an act of war, and then meet the fleet on the
seas and smash it before it could act on the defensive. It
was to my mind obvious that armed cruisers and torpedo-
boats could not be used against the insurgents, and could
only be intended for use against us. But this last is aside
from the point. Don't you think the two statements you
have made as to my attitude are in themselves a little in
consistent? You speak in one case as if I wished to send a
fleet over to Spain and sink the Spanish boats while we
were still at peace. In the other case you speak of the
Spanish vessels as having sailed, and my being anxious to
meet them on the sea and smash them. I am sure that you
will recall that I had been urging a declaration of war for
some time — that is, urging a declaration that we should
take certain acts, or. failures to act, as warranting such
declaration after notice had been given. In the case of the
sailing of the torpedo-boats, I did wish us to notify the
Spanish Government that we should treat their being sent
as an act of war. In the form in which the statement is
made in the Outlook, I cannot admit that either I or any
naval officer whom I was associated with made it — indeed
I do not recall such a suggestion made by any one, and cer
tainly I never made any such suggestion myself, as that
we should send a squadron across the ocean to sink the
ships and torpedo-boat destroyers while we were yet at
peace with Spain. As I recall it and all that I remember
any naval officer urging, was that we should notify the
Spanish Government that we should treat their sailing as
an act of war and that we should then conduct ourselves
accordingly." As shown in his correspondence, Roosevelt had resolved
very early in the controversy about Cuba that if there
should be a war with Spain he would take part in it. He had
mentioned this purpose to McKinley in his interview with
him in September, 1897, quoted above, and in January fol
lowing, when the probability of war became strong, he

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 101
sought to get into the service in a New York militia regi
ment as a major under Colonel Francis Vinton Greene,
saying he "was going to go somehow." On March 9, 1898,
he wrote to Captain C. H. Davis of the navy that "if there
is a war I want to get away from here and get to the front
if I possibly can. ' ' On the following day he wrote to Gen
eral Whitney Tillinghast, Adjutant-General of New York :
"Of course I can't leave this position until it is perfectly
certain we are going to have a war, and that I can get down
to it. I don't want to be in office during war, I want to be
at the front ; but I would rather be in this office than guard
ing a fort and no enemy within a thousand miles of me. Of
course being here hampers me. If I were in New York City
I think I could raise a regiment of volunteers in short order
when the President told me to go ahead, but it is going to be
difficult from here."

Colonel Greene had written that for various reasons it
was not practicable for Roosevelt to go to war under him,
and on March 15 Roosevelt again wrote to him :
"I don't agree with you as to my post of duty. I don't
want to be in an office instead of at the front ; but I dare
say I shall have to be, and shall try to do good work wher
ever I am put. I have long been accustomed, not to taking
the positions I should like, but to doing the best that I was
able to do in a position I did not altogether like, and under
conditions which I didn't like at all. But I shall hope still
that in the event of serious war I may have a chance to
serve under you."
Writing to Adjutant-General Tillinghast again on March
26, he said :
"It looks to me as though matters were coming to a
climax, and we should soon see actual trouble with Spain.
I wish the Governor would say whether or not he believes
that the State militia would be sent out of the State, that
is, down to Cuba as part of an expeditionary force, or

102 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
whether we shall raise volunteers. If the latter, will you
present my regards to him and ask if I may not be allowed
to raise a regiment? I think I can certainly do it."

On the same date he wrote as follows to William Astor
Chanler, a member of Congress from New York : ' ' Things
look as though they were coming to a head. Now, can you
start getting up that regiment when the time comes? Do
you want me as Lt.-Colonel? Also, remember that to try
to put toughs in it — still worse to try to put political heelers
in — will result in an utterly unmanageable regiment, for
midable to its own officers and impotent to do mischief to
the foe."
His reasons for desiring to get into the war were set
forth in full in a very striking letter which he wrote, on
March 29, 1898, to Doctor Sturgis Bigelow, in Boston.
There is much material for sober thought in this letter for
those critics of Roosevelt who have charged him with favor
ing war because of sheer love of fighting :
"I do not know that I shall be able to go to Cuba if there
is a war. The army may not be employed at all, and even
if it is employed it will consist chiefly of regular troops ; and
as regards the volunteers only a very small proportion can
be taken from among the multitudes who are even now
coming forward. Therefore it may be that I shall be un
able to go, and shall have to stay here. In that case I shall
do my duty here to the best of my ability, although I shall
be eating out my heart. But if I am able to go I certainly
shall. It is perfectly true that I shall be leaving one duty,
but it will only be for the purpose of taking up another.
I say quite sincerely that I shall not go for my own pleasure.
On the contrary, if I should consult purely my own feehngs
I should earnestly hope that we would have peace. I like
life very much. I have always led a joyous life. I like
thought and I like action, and it will be very bitter to me
to leave my wife and children ; and while I think I could face

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 103
death with dignity, I have no desire before my time has
come to go out into the everlasting darkness. So I shall
not go into a war with any undue exhilaration of spirits or
in a frame of mind in any way approaching recklessness
or levity.
"Moreover, a man's usefulness depends upon his living
up to his ideals in so far as he can. Now, I have consist
ently preached what our opponents are pleased to call
'Jingo doctrines' for a good many years. One of the com
monest taunts directed at men like myself is that we are
armchair and parlor Jingoes who wish to see others do
what we only advocate doing. I care very little for such
a taunt, except as it affects my usefulness, but I cannot
afford to disregard the fact that my power for good, what
ever it may be, would be gone if I didn't try to live up to the
doctrines I have tried to preach. Moreover, it seems to me
that it would be a good deal more important from the stand
point of the nation as a whole that men like myself should
go to war than that we should stay comfortably in offices
at home and let others carry on the war that we have
urged." A way was opened for Roosevelt to get into the war when
Congress authorized the raising of three National Volun
teer Cavalry Regiments, wholly apart from State contin
gents. The Secretary of War, General Alger, offered him
the command of one of these regiments, but Roosevelt de
clined it, saying that after six weeks' service in the field
he would feel competent to handle the regiment, but that
he did not at the time know how to equip it or how to get
it into the first action. He recommended for the command
his friend Leonard Wood, who was as eager to get into the
war as he was, saying to the Secretary that if he could ap
point Wood Colonel he would accept the Lieutenant-Colo
nelcy. This was done, and the famous regiment of Rough
Riders was formed. Its official name was the First United
States Volunteer Cavalry, but because it was largely com
posed of Western ranchmen, it was promptly nicknamed

104 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Rough Riders, and under that picturesque title passed
through the war and into history.
When he sent in his resignation from the Navy Depart
ment he received, among others, the following letters:
Naw Department, Washington,
May 7, 1898.
My dear Mr. Roosevelt:
I have your letter of resignation to the President, but as
I have told you so many times, I have it with the utmost
regret. I have often expressed, perhaps too emphatically
and harshly, my conviction that you ought not to leave the
post of Assistant Secretary of the Navy, where your ser
vices have not only been of such great value, but of so much
inspiration to me and to the whole service. But now that
you have determined to go to the front, I feel bound to say
that, while I do not approve of the change, I do most heart
ily appreciate the patriotism and the sincere fidelity to your
convictions which actuate you.
Let me assure you how most profoundly I feel the loss I
sustain in your going, for your energy, industry and great
knowledge of naval interests, and especially your inspiring
influence in stimulating and lifting the whole tone of the
personnel of the Navy have been invaluable.
I cannot close this reply to your letter without telling
you also what an affectionate personal regard I have come
to feel for you as a man of the truest temper and most loyal
friendship. I rejoice that one who has so much capacity
for public service and for winning personal friendships
has the promise of so many years of useful and loving life
before him.
My heart goes with you, and I am,
Very sincerely yours,
John D. Long.
Hon. Theodore Roosevelt,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department.

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 105
Executive Mansion, Washington,
May 9, 1898.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
Although the President was obliged to accept your resig
nation of recent date, I can assure you that he has done
so with very great regret. Only the circumstances men
tioned in your letter and your decided and unchangeable
preference for your new patriotic work have induced the
President to consent to your severing your present connec
tion with the Administration.
Your services here during your entire term in office have
been faithful, able and successful in the highest degree, and
no one appreciates this fact more keenly than the President
himself. Without doubt your connection with the Navy
will be beneficially felt in several of its departments for
many years to come.
In the President's behalf therefore I wish at this time to
thank you most heartily and to wish you all success in your
new and important undertaking, for which I hope and pre
dict a brilliantly victorious result.
With sincere respect and cordial esteem, believe me,

Faithfully yours,
John Addison Porter,
Secretary to the President.
Hon. Theodore Roosevelt,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.
Among the many letters of congratulation that Roosevelt
received at the close of the war were the following from
John Hay, then United States Ambassador to England,
and James Bryce, afterwards Viscount Bryce, author of
the "American Commonwealth":
American Embassy, London, July 27, 1898.
Bear Roosevelt:
I am afraid I am the last of your friends to congratulate
you on the brilliant campaign which now seems drawing to

106 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
a close, and in which you have gained so much experience
and glory. When the war began I was like the rest ; I de
plored your place in the Navy where you were so useful
and so acceptable. But I know it was idle to preach to a
young man. You obeyed your own daemon, and I imagine
we older fellows will all have to confess that you were in
the right. As Sir Walter wrote :
One crowded hour of glorious Ufe
Is worth an age without a name.
You have written your name on several pages of your
country's history, and they are all honorable to you and
comfortable to your friends.
It has been a splendid little war ; begun with the highest
motives, carried on with magnificent intelligence and spirit,
favored by that Fortune which loves the brave. It is now
to be concluded, I hope, with that fine good nature, which
is, after all, the distinguishing trait of the American char
acter. Faithfully yours, John Hat.

Hindleap Lodge,
Forest Row, Sussex,
September 12, 1898.
My dear Roosevelt:
Our hearty congratulations on your safe return and on
the laurels you have won. I was sorry you retired from a
post in which you were doing so much first-rate work as the
Assistant Secretaryship of the Navy. But you have justi
fied your action, and have had an experience which will be
of the utmost service to yourself and I hope to your coun
try, too.
How stupendous a change in the world these six months
have brought. Six months ago you no more thought of an
nexing the Philippine Isles and Porto Rico than you think
of annexing Spitzbergen to-day. In the interest of the
United States, I am uneasy at the change, because the new
enterprises you will enter on are enterprises for which

THE WAR WITH SPAIN 107
your Constitution and government have not been framed;
and mistakes may be made, many and serious, before you
develop the institutions needed. Perhaps it is because
we have had such a lot of experience, some of it most unsat
isfactory, with our tropical colonies, that I am more anxious
to see the American people purify city government and do
certain other jobs at home than to see them civilize the
Malays and aborigines of Luzon. However, you are clearly
"in for it," and what I hope you will do is to have a healthy
despotism governing these tropical semi-savages and even
the Spanish Creoles. No talk of suffrage or any such con
stitutional privileges for them, but steady government by
the firmest, most honest men you can find, and no inter
ference if possible by Congress when the firm and honest
men have been found.
It is a happy result of the last six months that your people
and ours seem nearer together in sympathy than ever be
fore. You will have noticed that nearly every one here
applauds your imperialistic new departure. We are here
growing more imperialistic than ever.
My wife joins in best regards — I hope by next year to be
writing to you to Albany. Sincerely yours, James Bryce.
An amusing side-light upon the military conduct of the
operations in Cuba during the Spanish War is cast in this
letter from Roosevelt to Senator Lodge under date of
March 3, 1899 :
"Lee, the British Military Attache, told me a lovely story
the other day. He met the Russian Military Attache in
London and gave him a dinner, at which the Russian waxed
eloquent over his sufferings at Santiago, and, as capping
the climax, described how, when he went to pay his respects
and say good-by to General Shafter, the latter looked at
him with his usual easy polish and grace, and remarked:
'Well, good-by. Who are you, anyway, the Russian or the
German?' I shouted. Think of the feelings of Yemiloff,

108 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
the nice little military and diplomatic pedant, on the one
hand, and on the other, of good, vulgar Shafter 's magnifi
cent indifference to ethnic and diplomatic niceties!"
One further citation from Roosevelt's correspondence
relating to this period may properly be made here. When
in March, 1901, General Funston executed his brilliant feat
of capturing Aguinaldo, the leader of the Philippine insur
gents, thus completing the American conquest of the Phil
ippines, Roosevelt wrote, on March 30, 1901, a letter of con
gratulation to Funston, in which he predicted a national
condition of unpreparedness which was strikingly like that
in which the country found itself when it was compelled to
declare war with Germany in 1917 :
"This is no perfunctory or formal letter of congratula
tion. I take pride in this crowning exploit of a career filled
with cool courage, iron endurance and gallant daring, be
cause you have added your name to the honor roll of Amer
ican worthies. Your feat will rank with Cushing's when
he sank the Albemarle. Otherwise, I cannot recall any
single feat in our history which can compare with it.
' ' Our people as a whole are unquestionably very short
sighted about making (war) preparations. Under such cir
cumstances it is always possible that we may find ourselves
pitted against a big military power where Ave shall need to
develop fighting material at the very outset, and then I
am one of many millions who would look with confidence
to what you would do. Incidentally, if that day is not too
far distant, I shall hope to be serving under or alongside
of you. I think I could raise at once a brigade of three or
four such regiments as I commanded at Santiago."
As Colonel Roosevelt's active participation in the war
with Spain has been set forth by himself in his 'Autobiog
raphy' and in his book, 'The Rough Riders,' no account
of it is included in the present narrative.

CHAPTER XI
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR
On his return from the war with Spain, in September,
1898, Roosevelt was greeted with great popular enthusiasm,
and was offered almost immediately two nominations for
the Governorship of the State. The first offer was made
tentatively by an emissary from T. C. Piatt, then United
States Senator and absolute boss of the Republican organi
zation in the State. The emissary said he had come, not to
offer the nomination, but to ascertain if Roosevelt desired
it, and, if in the event of nomination and election, he would
"make war" on Mr. Piatt and the organization, or would
confer with them and give fair consideration to their views
of party policy and the public interest; he asked for no
pledges but simply for a frank definition of Roosevelt's
attitude toward existing party conditions. It was well
known at the time that Piatt had been forced, quite unwil
lingly, to turn to Roosevelt as the only candidate who could
save his party from what seemed to be certain defeat be
cause of the unpopularity of the existing Republican ad
ministration under a subservient Piatt man in the Gover
norship. Roosevelt replied to the emissary that he would
like to be nominated, and that if elected he would not make
war upon Piatt or anybody else, if war could be avoided;
that he desired to be Governor and not a faction leader;
that he would confer with the organization men, as with
everybody else who seemed to him to have knowledge of and
interest in public affairs, and that as to Piatt and the organ
ization leaders, he would do so in the sincere hope that there
might result always harmony of opinion and purpose; but
that while he would try to get on well with the organization,
the organization must with equal sincerity strive to do
109

110 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
what he regarded as essential for the public good ; and that
in every case, after full consideration ' of what everybody
had to say who might possess full knowledge of the matter,
he should have to act finally as his own conscience and
judgment dictated and administer the State government as
he thought it should be administered. This was reported
to Piatt and ultimately accepted by him.
While this nomination was pending, the independent or
ganizations of the city of New York, on September 9, put
forth a statement in the press declaring that after full con
sideration they had agreed to offer the nomination for Gov
ernor to Roosevelt for the following, among other reasons:
"Mr. Roosevelt's magnificent record makes him the
natural candidate for Governor. We need not describe
Theodore Roosevelt. Our reasons for nominating him are
plain. We think that the evils of our public fife can be
traced to the exclusive control over nominations by party
bosses and their creatures. While Roosevelt is a party
man, he is one in whom the masses of the people of both par
ties feel a confidence amounting to devotion, and who in
his person represents independence and reform.
' ' There is nothing which his mind sees as evil that he
would not expose as readily in his own party as in that of
his opponents. To have such a man for Governor, with the
experience in administration which he possesses, would be
of incalculable benefit to the State!"
To this declaration there was appended a full state ticket
with Roosevelt at its head for Governor and candidates for
all other State offices. It was an anti-Republican organiza
tion ticket throughout and compelled Roosevelt, if he should
accept the nomination, to run as an out-and-out indepen
dent candidate without hope of support from the Republi
can party, and consequently without hope of election. The
inevitable result of his candidacy under these conditions
would have been the election of the Democratic ticket.
After putting forth their declaration, the Independents
took no further action, making no formal nomination of

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 111
their ticket. In the meantime, Piatt had accepted Roose
velt's terms and, on September 24, Roosevelt wrote a letter
to the Independents, in which, after saying that it was some
what embarrassing to decline a nomination which had never
been offered to him, he found himself unable to accept for
the following, among other reasons:
"It seems to me that I would not be acting in good faith
toward my fellow candidates if I permitted my name to
head a ticket designed for their overthrow ; a ticket, more
over, which cannot be put up because of objections to the
character or fitness of any candidate, inasmuch as no can
didate has been nominated.
"I write this with great reluctance, for I wish the sup
port of every Independent. If elected Governor, I would
strive to serve the State as a whole, and to serve iny party
by helping it serve the State."
The leaders of the Independents, ignoring what they had
said in their declaration of September 9, — that while he was
a party man he "represented in his person independence
and reform," and that he would "expose evil as readily in
his own party as in that of his opponents" — turned upon
him in wrath and declared that he had "surrendered to
Piatt." They ignored also, what was well known to all
men, that he was acting in strict accord with the line of
conduct which he had followed unvaryingly from the outset
of his political career, that is, fighting evil inside of his
party rather than fighting the party itself because some of
its leaders and members were guilty of evil deeds. He had
followed this policy as a member of the Legislature, as
Civil Service Commissioner, and as Police Commissioner.
All efforts to induce him to act as a chartered Independent
and not as a party man had failed. "My desire," he de
clared in response to these efforts, "is to achieve results,,
not merely to issue manifestoes of virtue." Nobody
knew better than the Independents what his attitude
was, for he had stated it directly to them many times, but
on every succeeding occasion for stating it, they persisted

112 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
in accusing him of deserting his principles. This method
of treatment they persisted in after he became President,
in spite of the fact that in every public office that he held
he accomplished more of the results which they professed
to desire than any other public man of his time. They
would not reconcile themselves to his refusal to follow their
method of political conduct in preference to his own. In
the case of the Governorship nomination, they had sought
to force Piatt to endorse their nomination of Roosevelt in
stead of having him nominated by the Republican party,
and when they failed in this effort they refused to support
Roosevelt because Piatt had nominated him in another way.
Finally, they put in the field a complete Independent ticket
and when election day arrived it polled a total vote of 2,103,
which was less than an average of one vote for each election
district of the State.
Roosevelt was nominated unanimously for Governor by
the Republican Convention on September 27, and made a
vigorous campaign. Piatt says in his 'Autobiography' :
"Roosevelt made a dramatic campaign. He fairly
pranced about the State. He called a spade a 'spade,.' a
crook a 'crook.' The Rough Rider romped home on election
day with over 17,000 plurality.
"I have always maintained that no man besides Roose£
veit could have accomplished that feat in 1898." "¦
Immediately following the election, John Hay, then Sec
retary of State, wrote to him as follows :
"While you are Governor, I believe the party can be
made solid as never before. You have already shown that
a man may be absolutely honest and yet practical; a re
former by instinct and a wise politician; brave, bold, and
uncompromising, and yet not a wild ass of the desert. The
exhibition made by the professional Independents in voting
against you for no reason on earth except that somebody
else was voting for you, is a lesson that is worth its cost."
Roosevelt was inaugurated Governor on January 1, 1899,
and in a brief address he outlined clearly the course of

THEODORE ROOSEVELT, GOVERNOR, 1899

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 113
action that he had maintained throughout his political ca
reer: "We must realize, on the one hand, that we can do little
if we do not set ourselves a high ideal, and, on the other,
that we will fail in accomplishing even this little if we do
not work through practical methods and with a readiness
to face life as it is, and not as we think it ought to be.
Under no form of government is it so necessary thus to
combine efficiency and morality, high principle and rough
common sense, justice and the sturdiest physical and moral
courage, as in a republic. It is absolutely impossible for a
republic long to endure if it becomes either corrupt or cow
ardly; if its public men, no less than its private men, lose
the indispensable virtue of honesty, if its leaders of thought
become visionary doctrinaires, or if it shows a lack of
courage in dealing with the many grave problems which it
must surely face both at home and abroad, as it strives to
work out the destiny meet for a mighty Nation.
"It is only through the party system that free govern
ments are now successfully carried on, and yet we must
keep ever vividly before us that the usefulness of a party
is strictly limited by its usefulness to the State, and that
in the long run he serves his party best who helps to make
it instantly responsive to every need of the people and to
the highest demands of that spirit which tends to drive us
onward and upward."
It is perhaps worthy of note that in his inaugural address
he recommended the admission of women to the suffrage in
voting upon school matters. Not till many years later, in
1911, did he come out openly in favor of general suffrage
for women.
His first message to the Legislature, sent in on January
4, attracted unusual attention and was warmly commended
by the press, by none more so than the few Independent
journals which had not found themselves able to support
his candidacy. The part of his message which commanded
heartiest approval was that in which he condemned the law

114 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
' ' taking the starch out of the Civil Service, ' ' of which his
Piatt predecessor in the Governorship had secured the en
actment, and recommended its repeal and the restoration
of the original law.
In considering Roosevelt's administration as Governor
it should be borne in mind that he came into office when the
boss system of political control was at the very summit of
its power. Senator Piatt was the absolute owner of the
Republican party in the State. When it was in office, he
was the real ruler of the State. He dictated all appoint
ments, including those for the bench, and exercised all the
powers of the Legislature. Under the guise of campaign
contributions, he collected vast sums from the corporations
and these he used to defray the election expenses of can
didates for the Legislature, with the tacit or implied un
derstanding that when elected they should follow his "or
ders ' ' in all cases in which he chose to issue them. If they
disobeyed, they knew they would not be renominated. The
corporations gave their contributions also with the tacit
understanding that their interests would be protected, that
legislation which they desired would be enacted, and that
legislation which they considered hostile would fail. They
sent no agents to Albany, but personally saw Piatt in his
New York office. The corporations not only made heavy
campaign contributions to him as the Republican boss, but
to the Democratic boss as well, so that whatever party was
in power in the State, the interests of the corporations were
protected. In emergencies, both party bosses worked to
gether to give the desired and paid-f or protection. Roose
velt knew all about this combination of Big Bosses and Big
Business because of his experience in the Legislature, where
he had on more than one occasion found both bosses united
in defense of their "invisible government" against his
efforts to impair its unlawful and corrupt privileges. He
entered upon his duties with full knowledge of the evil with
which he had to contend. His two years in the Governor
ship mark the beginning of an epoch in American history,
for during those years he dealt the first of a series of deadly

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 115
blows at the "invisible government" which ended finally
in its destruction and permanent disappearance from Amer
ican political life. The Big Boss is no more. He survives
in modified form in Tammany Hall, and perhaps in other
local organizations, but as a national power he has passed
from the scene. His downfall dates from the advent of
Governor Roosevelt at Albany, as this narrative will show
as it proceeds. That of Big Business, as the partner in
political and business misconduct, dates also from the same
advent, for a new era in governmental regulation and con
trol was inaugurated then.
Senator Piatt was not long in discovering that Roosevelt
and not Piatt was thenceforth Governor of the State. A
short time before the inauguration, Piatt, who at the time
was an old and feeble man, asked Roosevelt to call on him,
which he did. One of the important positions that the new
Governor would have to fill was that of Superintendent of
Public Works. Under the previous administration there
had been gross scandals in the canal construction work,
which was in charge of this department of the State gov
ernment, and the selection of a new head for it was the
most important one that Roosevelt would have to make.
When he called upon Piatt the latter informed him that he
was glad to say he had found an admirable man for
the place, had offered it to him and had just received a tel
egram from him saying he would accept it. Roosevelt, real
izing the importance of the crisis thus created, replied that
he was very sorry but he could not appoint the man. An
explosion followed, but Roosevelt remained calm, saying
again that he must decline to accept any man chosen for
him and must choose one for himself. He politely and
firmly maintained his position. Piatt ultimately yielded
and Roosevelt appointed the man of his own choice, an
eminent engineer and veteran of the Civil War, who admin
istered the office with honesty and efficiency. Roosevelt
also appointed a commission consisting of two Democratic
lawyers of high standing to investigate the conduct of the
Republican officials who had mismanaged canal affairs and

116 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
whom he had declined to reappoint, for the purpose of as
certaining if they were criminally liable under the law. His
desires in appointing this commission were set forth in a
letter which he wrote, on January 3, 1899, to Benjamin B.
Odell, Jr., who was then Chairman of the Republican State
Committee and the foremost of Piatt's trusted lieutenants:
"I would like to appoint a counsel to represent me in
this canal business, and in view of the possibility and even
probability of failure, I want to get a strong man, one who
is not identified in any way with my interests, so that there
shall be no possible question as to our having made every
effort to get a conviction, so far as the effort can properly
and honestly be made. With this end in view I think I
shall appoint X., of Buffalo. They say he is a very big
lawyer, and I believe he supported Bacon (the Independent
candidate for Governor) — a harmless form of entertain
ment on his part."
The investigation was made and the Commission re
ported that it would be inadvisable to prosecute for criminal
conduct because of the impossibility of securing a convic
tion. From the beginning of his administration Roosevelt con
sulted Piatt in regard to appointments and other matters,
meeting him generally in New York City at the end of the
week, usually at breakfast at a hotel or in a private house.
He did this because Piatt being in Washington and Roose
velt himself in Albany, it was the most convenient meeting-
place, especially for the Senator, who was in infirm health.
There was never any secrecy about these meetings, Roose
velt insisting that full publicity be given to them; never
theless they were uniformly interpreted by the Governor's
Independent critics as affording indubitable evidence of his
complete subserviency to Piatt and as proof of his infi
delity to his virtuous professions. They were nothing of
the sort. Frequently other persons were present, men
who were interested in various reform measures, and the
invariable object was to get Piatt's unwilling consent to

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 117
legislation and other acts which were distasteful to him.
No impartial person can examine the records of Roose
velt's administration at Albany and not reach the conclu
sion that in all matters of serious controversy with Piatt,
at these breakfasts and elsewhere, Roosevelt came out
victor. As he says in his ' Autobiography ' :
"My object was to make it as easy as possible for him
(Piatt) to come with me. As long as there was no clash be
tween us there was no object in my seeing him; it was only
when the clash came or was imminent that I had to see him.
A series of breakfasts was always a prelude to some active
warfare. In every instance I substantially carried my
point, although in some cases not in exactly the way I had
originally hoped."
Piatt himself bears similar testimony, for in his 'Auto
biography,' he says:
"Roosevelt had from the first agreed that he would con
sult me on all questions of appointments, Legislature or
party policy. He religiously fulfilled this pledge, although
he frequently did just what he pleased. In consulting me,
Roosevelt proved himself the antithesis of X., who repudi
ated every contract he ever made with me."
An impartial and just verdict was pronounced in the same
matter many years later by the New York Times. When
in September, 1918, a member of Tammany Hall was made
the Democratic candidate for Governor of New York, the
Evening Post reverted to its original contention that the
breakfasts were proof for Roosevelt's subserviency to Piatt
by saying: "Will he (the Tammany candidate) come down
to the city to lunch regularly with Murphy (the Tammany
boss) as Theodore Roosevelt used to come to breakfast
with Piatt." On this the Times commented : "If he does,
and the luncheons don't do Murphy any more good than the
breakfasts used to do Piatt, there is not much for us to
worry about."
Roosevelt's method of dealing with the Senator is clearly

118 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
shown in the letters he wrote to Piatt from time to time.
One under date of February 10, 1899, when the question of
appointing a new Surrogate for New York City was under
consideration, runs as follows:
"Let me again say, my dear Senator, what I know you
are aware of, that in this business about the Surrogate, I
have not the slightest purpose beyond getting a thoroughly
good man who will do the work well, who is a Republican,
but who is also a man thoroughly satisfactory to the bar
and to the people."
Precisely such a man was ultimately appointed.
Similar ideas of public service are expressed in a letter
which he wrote on January 26, 1899, to William M. Collier,
whom he had appointed a member of the State Civil Service
Commission :
"I am sure you will justify my choice. I beheve you to
be a thoroughly excellent man. We must keep the manage
ment of the law up to the highest point ; I want to make civil
service reform a big feature of my administration."
Early in his administration a very persistent and for
midable effort was made to induce him to pardon a woman
convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of a mem
ber of her own sex. Some of his most devoted friends
joined in this effort, among them Jacob A. Riis, to whom he
wrote as follows on February 8, 1899 :
"This is a woman convicted of a very cruel murder of
another woman. I have exactly the same feeling that you
have about womanhood and about the burdens which nature
has placed upon woman and the duty of man to make them
as light as possible. For instance, where a poor seduced
girl kills her child to hide her shame, I would infinitely
rather punish the man who seduced her than the poor
creature who actually committed the murder. But there
are some fiends among women, and I hardly think, old man,
that we help womanhood by helping these exceptions."

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 119
To another of the petitioners, who had clearly aroused
his righteous wrath by a suggestion of political conse
quences, he wrote on February 21, 1899:
"You may rest assured that the last thing that will in
fluence me will be any statement that no man can become
President if he allows a woman to be executed. In the first
place, being myself sane, I have no thought of becoming
President. In the next place, I should heartily despise the
public servant who failed to do his duty because it might
jeopardize his own future."
He refused to pardon the woman and she was executed
as sentenced, and no harmful political consequences ensued.
A very interesting letter, written on February 10, 1899,
to Andrew D. White, U. S. Ambassador at Berlin, gives a
frank revelation of his ambition as Governor and his views
of his own political future :
"So far I am getting along well but it means an infinity
of hard work and a great deal of resolution with no small
amount of tact and good nature. The satisfaction which I
have is that I don't look for anything more in politics.
People are continually writing me that my career has only
begun, and they make me almost angry, for my usefulness
in my present office is largely conditional in the fact that I
don't expect to hold another, and so nobody has got a twist
on me in any way. I could not get along at all if I had to
try and shape my course with a view to favors to come,
either from the people or from the politicians. I hope to
keep the party united and to make a good Governor, and if
I can go out having done that, I shall be more than con
tented." One of Roosevelt's most valued and devoted friends was
James C. Carter, who for many years was universally rec
ognized as the leader of the bar of New York City and as
one of the ablest and most highly honored of its citizens.

120 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Mr. Carter had written to the Governor a friendly criticism
upon some of his public utterances and in reply, on June 7,
1899, Roosevelt wrote :
"I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 2nd
instant and genuinely appreciate it. I realize just the
danger that you speak of in making such utterances as I
make ; but it has always seemed to me that an almost greater
danger is that of hypocritically stating that one can do more
than one intends or can possibly be done. I have gone on
the principle of telling the reformers just as I tell the pol
iticians, exactly what I will do, and then doing it rightmp to
the handle. Of course I have made mistakes and I will
make more, but I don't think they will be vital, and at any
rate the whole game will be played on the table and not
under it—if you will pardon the simile."
The dominating achievement of Roosevelt's first year in
the Governorship was his success in compelling the Legisla
ture to pass a law taxing as realty the franchises of the
public service corporations of the State. For many years
valuable franchises of this kind had been granted by the
Legislature without provision for just compensation to the
State, generally through arrangements made by the recip
ients with the party bosses, often by direct bribery of legis
lators. Roosevelt had become familiar with this abuse
while member of the Legislature and had entered upon the
Governorship with a clear conviction that the abuse should
not only be arrested but that means should be devised for
enabling the State to secure the income of which it had been
deprived. He refused to permit the grant of new fran
chises on the old terms and turned his attention to the prep
aration of remedial measures. The most valuable of these
franchises had been granted to street railway companies in
the city of New York, made enormously more valuable by
the substitution of electric for other power.
A bill had been introduced in the Legislature of 1898 pro
viding a form of taxation on public service franchises but
it had made no progress. It was reintroduced in 1899.

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 121
Roosevelt gave it careful examination, and became con
vinced of its wisdom and justice, or, as he expressed it,
what it proposed to do was ' ' a matter of plain decency and
honesty." As under the rules of the Legislature a bill
could always be taken up out of its turn and passed if the
Governor sent in a special emergency message on its behalf,
Roosevelt decided to take that course. The moment his pur
pose was made known to Piatt and his machine leaders, they
implored him, threatened him, and used every means they
could devise to turn him from his purpose. They assured
him that if he took this action he could never again be nom
inated for any public office, as no corporation would sub
scribe to a campaign fund if he was on the ticket, and all
corporations would subscribe to a fund of the opposite
party to beat him.
This was frank recognition of the real cause of their
wrath and dismay, namely, that the bill aimed a deadly
blow at the very center of the Big Boss and Big Business
combination, for if it were to pass the Legislature, no cor
poration would buy protection in future because of uncer
tainty that the goods would be delivered.
Roosevelt saw all and listened to all, but declined to be
swerved. The bill had passed the Senate and had been
"hung up" in the Assembly. The Legislature was on the
eve of adjournment, and the opponents of the bill were sure
that its doom was sealed. On the evening of April 28, the
Legislature being in session, Roosevelt sent an emergency
message to the Assembly, demanding the immediate pas
sage of the bill; The machine leaders were beside them
selves with wrath, and the Piatt Speaker tore up the mes
sage without sending it to the Assembly. At seven o'clock
the next morning the Governor was informed of what had
occurred. At eight o'clock he reached his office, and sent
immediately by the hand of his secretary another emer
gency message to the Speaker, which opened as follows:
"I learn that the emergency message which I sent last eve
ning to the Assembly on behalf of the Franchise Tax Bill
has not been read. I therefore send hereby another mes-

122 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
sage on the subject. I need not impress upon the Assembly
the need of passing this bill at once."
The secretary conveyed to the Speaker an intimation from
the Governor that if this were not promptly read the Gov
ernor would appear in person and read it. The opposition
collapsed and the bill was taken up and passed by a large
majority. The outcry against the bill had not been confined to
the bosses of the two parties who had united for its defeat
through the instinct of preservation. A large portion of
the press had also opposed it, treating it as a demagogic
measure, conceived in the spirit of unreasoning hostility
to wealth and advocated by Roosevelt in the hope of gaining
popular support. As soon as it was passed, the party
bosses and the lawyers of the corporations affected, united
in impressing upon the Governor their profound convic
tions that it contained inadvisable provisions in regard to
the methods of levying taxation, urging him not to sign
it, but to wait a year until a more perfect measure could
be passed at the next session. The Governor had 30 days
in which to sign the bill. He told the objectors that he
agreed with them as to the defective provisions, but that he
would rather have it with them than not have it at all; that
he was not willing to trust to what might be done a year
later, and that he would, therefore, reconvene the Legisla
ture in special session and seek to have the bill amended;
that if the Legislature declined to amend it, he would sign
it in its present form. On May 22, 1899, he issued a call
for a special session in which he set forth his attitude to
ward the form of taxation embodied in the bill, in a state
ment which is of permanent interest as showing the motives
which actuated him not only then but in other efforts in the
direction of governmental control and regulation which he
made a few years later as President of the United States:
"I am perfectly well aware, as Chief Justice Marshall
says, 'The power of taxation is the power of destruction.'
But this applies to every species of property. If dema-

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 123
gogues or ignorant enthusiasts who are misled by dema
gogues, could succeed in destroying wealth, they would, of
course, simply work the ruin of the entire community, and,
first of all, of the unfortunates for whom they profess to
feel an especial interest. But the very existence of un
reasoning hostility to wealth should make us all the more
careful in seeing that wealth does nothing to justify such
hostility. We are the true friends of the men of means ; we
are the true friends of the lawful corporate interests, which
do good work for the community, when we insist that the
men of means and the great corporations shall pay their
full share of taxes and have their full share of the public
burdens. If this is done, then, sooner or later, will follow
public recognition of the fact that it is done; and when
there is no legitimate basis for discontent the American
public is sure, sooner or later, to cease feeling discontent."
The critics and opponents of his course in securing the
enactment of the bill had charged, while the measure was
pending, among other things, that he was acting from im
pulse and in a reckless disregard of consequences, not fully
realizing what he was doing. When his call for a special
session appeared they declared that it was a humiliating
confession of ignorance on his part, of his own inability to
frame an effective measure. On this form of attack the
Tribune of May 23, 1899, commented as follows :
"Governor Roosevelt's course in calling the extra session
of the Legislature is in sharp contrast with what would be
regarded as 'good policy' by 'sharp politicians.' His en
gaging frankness in dealing with public problems takes
their breath away.
"It is easy to say that the Governor has called the extra
session to get himself out of a scrape, and people who want
him to be in a scrape are quick to say it. As a matter of
fact, the extra session was called at the suggestion of the
franchise-holders. ' '
Efforts were made when the special session came to
gether to outwit and defeat the Governor by various de-

124 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
vices. One was to withdraw the law and thus prevent him
from signing it in its present form. Another was to pass
amendments that would nullify its effect. He defeated all
of these by holding the original bill as a whip over the heads
of the machine leaders, saying it could not be withdrawn
and he would sign it at once unless such changes as he de
sired were made. The bill was amended as he requested
and was passed by large majorities in the two houses.
No sooner had it become law than the lawyers of the
corporations who had asked for the changes, challenged its
constitutionality in the courts and based their challenge
on the changes which they themselves had requested. One
of these legal luminaries was David Bennett Hill, at various
times Democratic Governor, Democratic Boss and United
States Senator. For six years the constitutionality of the
law was disputed in the courts. It was sustained first in the
Supreme Court of the State ; then, on April 23, 1903, unan
imously sustained by the Court of Appeals of New York;
and, finally, on May 29, 1905, also unanimously, by the Su
preme Court of the United States. Among the counsel
assailing the constitutionality of the act were several of the
most eminent corporation lawyers of New York City.
When the final decision was rendered there was paid
over to the State Treasury taxes which had been withheld,
amounting with interest for six years, to more than $26,-
000,000. In addition to the Franchise Tax Law the Governor, by
persistent personal effort, secured the passage by the Leg
islature of 1899 of a new Civil Service Law which he pro
nounced the "best in the Nation." He had during his ser
vice as Governor continued his investigations of tenement
house conditions in New York and had secured the passage
of a law which was the first effective exercise of real and
intelligent supervision of industries carried on in tenement-
houses. It abolished "sweat-shops" from New York City
for all time. "Not a single law," he said in reviewing the
Legislature's work, "has been put on the statute books
which ought not to be put there, and not a single appoint-

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 125
ment had been made which ought not to have been made."
After the adjournment of the Legislature and before the
special session was called, Senator Piatt wrote a long letter
to Roosevelt which is of interest not only in revealing
Piatt's mental attitude toward the Franchise Tax measure
but in revealing also the fact that in forcing the Legisla
ture to act in the matter the Governor had not consulted
the boss. In his letter the Senator said :
"When the subject of your nomination was under consid
eration, there was one matter that gave me real anxiety. I
think you will have no trouble in appreciating the fact that
it was not the matter of your independence.
' ' The thing that did bother me was this : I had heard
from a good many sources that you were a little loose on
the relations of capital and labor, on trusts and combina
tions, and, indeed, on those numerous questions which have
recently arisen in politics affecting the security of earnings
and the right of a man to run his own business in his own
way, with due respect of course to the Ten Commandments
and the Penal Code. Or, to get at it even more clearly, I
understood from a number of business men, and among
them many of your own personal friends, that you enter
tained various altruistic ideas, all very well in their way,
but which before they could safely be put into law needed
very profound consideration. . . . You have just ad
journed a Legislature which created a good opinion through
out the State. I congratulate you heartily upon this fact
because I sincerely believe, as everybody else does, that
this good impression exists very largely as a result of your
personal influence in the Legislative chambers. But at the
last moment, and to my very great surprise, you did a thing
which has caused the business community of New York to
wonder how far the notions of Populism, as laid down in
Kansas and Nebraska, have taken hold upon the Republican
party of the State of New York."
The Senator's curious use of the word "altruistic" caused
Roosevelt much amusement. In his reply he assured the

126 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND, HIS TIME
Senator that he was as much opposed to Populism in every
stage as the greatest representatives of corporate wealth
were, and defined his real position as follows :
"I do not believe that it is wise or safe for us as a party
to take refuge in mere negation and to say that there are
no evils to be corrected. It seems to me that our attitude
should be one of correcting the evils and thereby showing
that, whereas the Populists, Socialists and others really do
not correct the evils at all, or else only do so at the expense
of producing others in aggravated form, on the contrary
we Republicans hold the just balance and set ourselves as
resolutely against improper corporate influence on the one
hand as against demagogy and mob rule on the other.
I understand perfectly that such an attitude of moderation
is apt to be misunderstood when passions are greatly ex.
cited and when victory is apt to rest with the extremists
on one side or the other ; yet I think it is in the long run the
only wise attitude. ... I appreciate absolutely (what
Mr. Piatt had said) that any applause I get will be too
evanescent for a moment's consideration. I appreciate
absolutely that the people who now loudly approve of my
action in the franchise tax will forget all about it in a fort
night, and that, on the other hand, the very powerful inter
ests adversely affected will always remember it."
When preparations were in progress for the parade in
New York City in honor of Admiral Dewey, the hero of the
Battle of Manila, Governor Roosevelt wrote on August 8,
1899, this characteristic letter to Avery D. Andrews, his
former associate in the Police Board and at the time Adju
tant General of the State :
"Everybody seems to be united in wanting me to ride
at the head of the militia in the Dewey parade. What do
you think of it ? If you think well of it, will you, in the first
place, engage for me that black horse I rode up to camp
as my steed, and will you in the next place tell me what I
should wear? I know I have got to wear a black coat and a
top hat. Would it do for me to wear a black cutaway coat,

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— FIRST YEAR 127
gray riding breeches and black top boots, or do I have to
wear a black frock coat, which is an uncomfortable thing to
ride in? The average Governor, I suppose, rides in gray
trousers. Is this necessary? I suppose I have got to make
up my mind to look either like a fake riding school master,
or else like the president of a St. Patrick's day procession
on parade. Which of these disagreeable alternatives is the

His experience with the Franchise Tax question had
turned Roosevelt's mind naturally to the consideration of
trusts. On August 15, 1899, he wrote to Charles F. Scott,
a Kansas friend :
"I have been in a great quandary over trusts. I do not
know what attitude to take. I do not intend to play a dem
agogue. On the other hand, I do intend, so far as in me
lies, to see that the rich man is held to the same accounta
bility as the poor man, and when the rich man is rich enough
to buy unscrupulous advice from very able lawyers ;, this is
not always easy."
In the midst of his struggles with Senator Piatt and the
Legislature he began during his first term as Governor to
write the "Life of Oliver Cromwell," completing it in the
summer of 1899.

CHAPTER XII
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR
Roosevelt's second year as Governor opened with the
fiercest fight that he had yet had with Senator Piatt. It
arose out of a difference of opinion between the two con
cerning the reappointment of an official, Payn, who was one
of the most devoted of Piatt's followers, a county boss in
the Piatt machine, and a thoroughgoing old-time spoils
politician. He had held the office of Superintendent of In
surance for several years and his conduct in its administra
tion, as shown by investigations which the Governor had in
stituted, was far from being what it should have been. His
term was about to expire and the Governor announced in
advance of the meeting of the Legislature in January, 1900,
his determination not to reappoint him. Piatt at once issued
an ultimatum to Roosevelt that he must be reappointed or
he would fight the Governor, saying that the incumbent
would remain in office anyway, since under the Constitution
he could only be removed with the consent of the Senate
and he would continue in office till his successor was con
firmed by the Senate, and he, Piatt, could control the Senate
absolutely. Roosevelt kept his temper, allowing Piatt to
do the threatening and blustering, and selected a candidate
for the position who was a man of character, a Republican
and a friend of Piatt's, whose position in the party was such
as to make it difficult for the Senate to reject him. Piatt,
in a stormy interview with Roosevelt in New York City,
refused to accept the man, saying to Roosevelt that if he
insisted, it would be war to the knife, and his (Roosevelt's)
destruction and possibly the destruction of the party.
Roosevelt replied that he was sorry he could not yield,
that if the war came it would have to come, and that he
128

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 129
should send to the Senate the name of his chosen candidate
on the following morning.
Following closely on the heels of the interview, Roose
velt received a message from Piatt's chief agent, asking
for an appointment for the evening. Roosevelt named the
Union League Club, and the two met there. The agent
went over the same ground that Piatt had covered, declar
ing that Piatt would never yield, that he was certain to
win the fight, that Roosevelt's reputation would be de
stroyed, and that he wished to save him from such a lament
able smash-up as an ending to his career. Roosevelt re
peated his decision, and saying that nothing was to be ac
complished by further talk, arose to go away. The agent
repeated that it was Roosevelt's last chance, that ruin was
ahead of him if he refused it, but that if he accepted every
thing would be easy. Roosevelt shook his head and an
swered : ' ' There is nothing to add to what I have already
said." "You know it means your ruin?" said the agent.
' ' Well, we will see about that, ' ' answered Roosevelt. ' ' You
understand," continued the agent, "the fight will begin to
morrow and will be carried to the bitter end." "Yes,"
replied Roosevelt, as he reached the door, adding "Good
night" as he opened it. Before he could pass out, the agent
exclaimed: "Hold on! We accept. Send in Blank's name.
The Senator is very sorry, but he will make no further op
position." The name of Roosevelt's candidate was sent to the Senate
and confirmation followed. Piatt's own account of the in
cident, as given in his 'Autobiography,' shows that after
the struggle was over he was able to take a humorous view
of it. Speaking of Roosevelt 's "whirlwind fashion of clean
ing house ' ' at Albany, he says :
"He threw Superintendent of Insurance Louis F. Payn
out of his job so quickly as to send that official to me with
a cry : 'I warned you that fellow would soon have you dang
ling at his chariot wheel. You would not believe me. He
has begun by scalping members of your ' Old Guard. ' He '11
get you, too, soon. '

130 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"Roosevelt told me that he proposed to remove Lou
Payn. I protested, but he was removed, and I was con
sulted about the appointment of his successor."
While Roosevelt's private struggle with Piatt was in
progress the Independent leaders and newspapers were de
manding that he must make open war on the boss as the
only way of political and moral salvation for himself. At
the very moment of his triumph he received on January 24,
1900, from the Rev. Dr. Parkhurst a telegram, which was
also given to the press, which ran as follows :
"If you distinctly, uncompromisingly and frankly throw
down the gauntlet to T. C. Piatt the whole State will stand
by you. Choose ye this day whom ye will serve."
Just what would have been the result if the Governor had
followed this advice, proffered in the unruffled serenity and
assurance of absolute ignorance of actual conditions, was
explained by Roosevelt in a letter which he wrote several
months later, on June 11, 1900, to Henry L. Nelson:
"I needed 26 votes. By canvass I found that I would
have two Democratic votes for me and 21 against me, and
that I should lose in any event two Republican votes whom
Payn could control without any reference to Piatt or the
organization. This left me a leeway of just one vote, and
it is of course unnecessary to say that in any mere fight
between Piatt and myself he could have controlled several
votes, no matter how strong I made the issue. On the other
hand, I had succeeded in making the case so strongly that
as long as I resolutely declined to mix it in any way with
a factional fight in the Republican party and simply took
the ground that I would support any thoroughly upright
and competent man against Payn, I was in a position of im
pregnable strength and could win out. What conceivable
object or purpose even the brain of Dr. Parkhurst could see
in my, at such a time, wholly changing the issue and secur
ing the irrevocable retention of Payn by a denunciation of
Piatt, who had just assented to my proposition to take

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 131
the man I had first suggested, it is impossible for me to
imagine." This incident is of value as an illustration of the persist
ent inability or unwillingness of the professional Indepen
dents to discover any merit in Roosevelt's method of fight
ing evil men and evil practises in his own party. They
could not fail to see that he was accomplishing results, but
because he was accomplishing them in his own way rather
than in the way that they told him he should adopt, they
saw no virtue in him. Like Dr. Parkhurst, they were con
stantly declaring when a crisis arose between him and evil
powers in his party, that he was "at the parting of the
ways," and that if he did not select their way he would
enter on the broad road that led to destruction. He inva
riably chose his own way, but in spite of the fact that de
struction never followed, the prediction of ruin was repeated
with undiminished confidence whenever a new "parting"
was discerned.
This method of treatment continued with unvaried per
sistency after he became President, greatly to his amuse
ment. After a particularly enjoyable instance of it in 1902
he wrote to me on April 23 of that year :
"One delightful feature about the editorials in the
Evening Post on this perpetual 'parting of the ways' is
that each time there is an unconscious assumption that they
must have been mistaken the time before ; for I have always
gone down what they consider the wrong road, yet on each
occasion they speak as if I had hitherto been doing right,
but was now about to commit a criminal blunder!"
A concise and comprehensive statement of his course iri
regard to Senator Piatt during the period of his Governor
ship was made by Roosevelt in a letter to the Rev. Dr. T. R.
Slicer on June 29, 1900 :
"I have never done and shall never do one thing I ought
not to do at the request of Senator Piatt, and the whole suc
cess of my administration has been due, as much as to any

132 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
other one cause, to the fact that I have been able to work
with the organization. It was because of this fact, coupled,
of course, with the fact that I intended resolutely without
wavering to have my own way on questions of deep prin
ciple, that I have been able to carry my point as regards
every important matter."
Writing again to his friend, James C. Carter of New York
City, on March 19, 1900, he gave a general statement of his
tribulations with reformers, enclosing a striking quotation
from Macaulay:
"The other day I came across something in Macaulay
about Scotland in 1690, which runs as follows :
" 'It is a remarkable circumstance that the same country
should have produced in the same age the most wonderful
specimens of both extremes of human nature. Even in
things indifferent the Scotch Puritan would hear of no com
promise ; and he was but too ready to consider all who rec
ommended prudence and charity as traitors to the cause of
truth. On the other hand the Scotchmen of that generation
who made a figure in Parliament were the most dishonest
and unblushing time servers that the world has ever seen.
Perhaps it is natural that the most callous and impudent
vice should be found in the near neighborhood of unreason
able and impracticable virtue. Where enthusiasts are ready
to destroy or be destroyed for trifles magnified into impor
tance by a squeamish conscience, it is not strange that the
very name of conscience should become a byword of con
tempt to cool and shrewd men of business.'
"It seems to me that this paragraph portrays pretty well
the conditions which make self-government so difficult in
New York City. On the one hand we have the sodden
masses of poor, ignorant and sometimes vicious people who
are the ready-made tools for Tammany or any other ma
chine. On the other, we have good men, or at least well-
meaning men, who have permitted the practical capacity for
self-government to atrophy. In Scotland in the last quarter
of the 17th century, the existence of the unreasonable Puri-

GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK— SECOND YEAR 133
tan did not tend to make public life better, but, for the
reasons given by Macaulay, to make it worse; and it was
not until he lost some of the very qualities of which I com
plain in many reformers to-day, that he became a practical
force for righteousness. Heaven knows I appreciate the
need of disinterestedness, of public spirit, of all that we as
sociate with the name of reform ; and it is because I do ap
preciate the need that I hate to see men in New York who
ought to be forces on the right side, not only decline to go
with decent men who are striving practicably for decency,
but by their course alienate shrewd and sensible men from
all reform movements."
During his second year he gave careful consideration to
a bill which had been introduced in the Legislature which
aimed to limit the aggregate of insurance that any com
pany could assume. After a thorough study of the subject
he reached the conclusion that whatever evils might exist
in the insurance business they were not due to the volume
of it but to the methods employed in obtaining it. He
reached the conclusion then, which he adhered to without
variation or modification afterwards in all his efforts to
regulate and control big business, that the line should not
be drawn on size but on conduct. He declined to favor the
pending bill. Several years later, during the Governor
ship of Mr. Hughes, a bill of the same nature was made
law but it worked so badly that Governor Hughes himself
signed its repeal near the end of his second term.

CHAPTER XIII
NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT
Early in the second year of his term as Governor, in fact,
near the close of the first year, Roosevelt's peace of mind
began to be disturbed by proposals to have him nominated
for Vice-President. On December 29, 1899, he wrote as
follows about it to Senator Lodge:
"Piatt told me that you and Chandler wanted me nomi
nated; that some of the far- Western Senators wanted me
because they thought I would strengthen the ticket in their
States ; but that the general opinion was that it would not
be a wise move for me personally as I should be simply
shelved as Vice-President and could do nothing, for if I
did anything I should attract suspicion and antagonism.
All my Western friends keep writing me to the same effect.
I do not think I have had a letter from any of them advis
ing me to take the nomination, and I have had scores ad
vising me not to take it. ' '
Writing again to Senator Lodge, on January 22, 1900, he
said: ' ' On Saturday Piatt for the first time stated to me very
strongly that he believed I ought to take the Vice-Presi
dency both for national and for State reasons. I beheve
Piatt rather likes me, though I render him uncomfortable
for some of the things I do.

>>

On February 1, 1900, he wrote a long letter to Senator
Piatt giving his reasons for not desiring the nomination:
"I can't help feeling more and more that the Vice-Presi
dency is not an office in which I could do anything and not
an office in which a man still vigorous and not past middle
134

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 135
life has much chance of doing anything. I have thoroughly
enjoyed being Governor. I have kept every promise, ex
pressed or implied, I made on the stump and I feel that the
Republican party is stronger before the State because of
my incumbency. Certainly everything is being managed
now on a perfectly straight basis and every office is as clean
as a whistle. Now, I should like to be Governor for an
other term, especially if we are able to take hold of the
canal in serious shape. But as Vice-President I don't see
there is anything I can do. I would be simply a presiding
officer and that I should find a bore."
Writing again to Senator Lodge, on February 2, 1900, he
said: "In the Vice-Presidency I could do nothing. I am a com
paratively young man yet and I like work. I do not like
to be a figure-head. It would not entertain me to preside
in the Senate. I should be in a cold shiver of rage at
inability to answer hounds like P  and scarcely more
admirable M  and H  . So, old man, I am going to de
clare decisively that I want to be Governor and do not want
to be Vice-President."
On the following day, February 3, 1900, in a letter to
Senator Lodge, he explained why Senator Piatt was in
favor of the nomination :
"I have found out one reason why Senator Piatt wants
me nominated fox the Vice-Presidency. The big moneyed
men with whom he is in close touch and whose campaign
contributions have certainly been no inconsiderable factor
in his strength, have been pressing him very strongly to
get me put in the Vice-Presidency, so as to get me out of
the State. It was the big insurance companies, possessing
enormous wealth, that gave Payn his formidable strength,
and they to a man want me out. The great corporations
affected by the franchise tax, have also been at the Sena
tor. In fact, all the big moneyed interests that make cam
paign contributions of large size and feel that they should

136 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
have favors in return, are extremely anxious to get me out
of the State. I find that they have been at Piatt for the last
two or three months and he has finally begun to yield to
them and to take their view. Outside of that the feeling
here is very strong against my going. In fact, all of my
friends in the State would feel that I was deserting them,
and are simply unable to understand my considering it."
Writing to Senator Piatt on February 7, 1900, he ex
pressed a decided preference for some other position :
' ' The more I have thought over it, the more I have felt
that I would a great deal rather be anything, say professor
of history, than Vice-President. ' '
On April 3, 1900, he sent to Senator Marcus A. Hanna,
who was opposed to his nomination, his reasons for not
desiring it :
"Let me point out that I am convinced that I can do most
good to the national ticket by running as Governor of this
State. There will be in New York a very curious feeling of
resentment both against myself and against the party
leaders if I run as Vice-President, and this will affect our
vote I believe; whereas if I run as Governor I can
strengthen the national ticket more than in any other way.
I do not think we can afford to take liberties in this State."
In common with his other friends I was strongly opposed
to the nomination of Roosevelt for Vice-President.
Throughout his service as Governor I had been in constant
and intimate association with him and had been fully in
formed of every step that he had taken in his efforts to put
his ideas into practise, including his struggles with Sena
tor Piatt. There was no doubt in my mind that desire to
get him out of the State was the chief if not the sole
cause of the movement to nominate him for the Vice-Presi
dency. His usefulness to the State had been shown to be
so great that it seemed to me nothing less than a public
misfortune to take him away at what was really only the

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 137
opening stage of his work, and in the hope of defeating
the movement, I wrote letters to men of influence in the
Republican party at Washington and elsewhere entreating
them to oppose it. Among others I wrote to my long-time
friend John Hay, then Secretary of State. He was a close
friend and admirer of Senator Hanna, and his reply, which
undoubtedly reflected the views of the Senator, is of inter
est as demonstrating the risk involved in political prophecy.
Department op State,
Washington, April 14, 1900.
My dear Bishop:
I have your letter of the 10th of April, and I think you
are unduly alarmed.
There is no instance on record of an election of a Vice-
President by violence, and I think people here are looking
in quite another direction. Yours sincerely, John Hay.
If there was at that time no record of an election of a
Vice-President by violence, a record was soon to be made
of the nomination of a candidate for that office by precisely
that method.
Only a few days earlier, April 11, 1900, Roosevelt, who
cordially approved my efforts to secure opposition to the
Vice-President movement, wrote to me :
"The dangerous element, as far as I am concerned, comes
from the corporations. The (naming certain men) crowd
and those like them have been greatly exasperated by the
franchise tax. They would like to get me out of politics
for good, but at the moment they think the best thing to
do is to put me into the Vice-Presidency. Naturally I will
not be opposed openly on the ground of the corporations'
grievance; but every kind of false statement will continual
ly be made, and men like (naming the editors of certain
newspapers) will attack me, not as the enemy of corpora
tions, but as their tool! There is no question whatever
that if the leaders can they will upset me."

138 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
In similar vein he wrote to John Proctor Clarke, on April
15, 1900:
"There is unquestionably a strong desire to make me
take the Vice-Presidency. Many corporations have served
notice on the Republican leaders that they won't contribute
if I am nominated for Governor, and that they will do
their best to beat me. This is mainly on account of the
franchise tax, but also on account of various other acts
which I am bound to say I still regard as extremely credit
able — as, to be frank, I do their whole opposition, if it
comes to that."
Senator Piatt's perturbed state of mind is revealed in
the following letter from Roosevelt to Senator Lodge, on
June 9, 1900 :
' ' Senator Piatt is not in a pleasant frame of mind with
me, chiefly because of the franchise tax. He told me last
night that he thought it would lose me so many votes as to
jeopardize my election."
On June 12, 1900, a week before the assembling of the
National Republican Convention, Roosevelt wrote to Gen
eral F. V. Greene :
"The Organization, pressed by the corporations, is still
very anxious to have me nominated for the Vice-Presidency.
It is, however, entirely too late now for me to alter my
position. I will not accept under any circumstances, and
that is all there is about it."
The National Republican Convention met at Philadelphia
on June 19, 1900. Roosevelt attended as a delegate from
New York and was genuinely surprised to discover on ar
rival that there was a very strong sentiment among the
delegates in favor of his nomination. Just what happened
subsequently is best told in letters that he wrote to his
friends after the convention adjourned. Writing to the
Rev. Dr. Lyman Abbott on June 27, 1900, he said :
"The nomination came to me at Philadelphia simply be-

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 139
cause the bulk of the enormous majority of the delegates
were bent upon having me whether I wished it or not, and
all the more because Senator Hanna objected to it. Sena
tor Piatt wished me nominated and, as you saw, I absolute
ly upset him and stood the New York machine on its head,
forcing them without one exception to stand against me
and support another candidate. When I did this I supposed
that it completely dissipated the possibility of -my nomina
tion. The effect was just the opposite. The delegates who
had already been saying that they would not have Senator
Hanna dictate whom they should or should not nominate,
now merely said: 'So Roosevelt has stood Piatt on his
head, has he? Well, that settles it. We might not wish
him placed on the ticket by Piatt, but now we have got to
have him anyway.' "
To Hon. Geo. H. Lyman, he wrote on June 27, 1900 :
"Every real friend of mine will consistently speak of
me as exactly what I am — the man chosen because it is be
lieved he will add strength to a cause which, however, is
already infinitely stronger than any strength of his — a man
absolutely and entirely, in the second place, whom it is
grossly absurd and unjust to speak of in any other capacity.
This is the attitude which must be assumed in the most
emphatic way."
On the same date he wrote to Senator Hanna proffering
his campaign services:
"I wish in this campaign to do whatever you think wise —
whatever is likely to produce the best results for the Re
publican ticket. I am as strong as a bull moose and you
can use me to the limit. One side of the problem is the fact
that I must not seem to neglect my duties as Governor of
New York."
While the nomination had not been welcomed by him,
Roosevelt accepted it philosophically and regarded it as
marking the end of his political career. He said to me at

140 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
the time that he felt neither disappointment nor depres
sion ; that he had won a modest amount of military honor,
had been Governor of New York, as well as held other im
portant public offices, and could leave to his children the
record of a career of which they would not be ashamed.
As for occupation, he proposed to resume study of the law
and enter upon active practise of that profession. He
added: "If I have been put on the shelf, my enemies will
find that I can make it a cheerful place of abode."
To Edward S. Martin, he wrote in similar vein on Novem
ber 22, 1900:
"I do not expect to go any further in politics. Heaven
knows there is no reason to expect that a man of so many
and so loudly and not always wisely expressed convictions
on so many different subjects should go so far ! But I have
had a first-class run for my money, and I honestly think
I have accomplished a certain amount."
Among the first to congratulate Roosevelt on his nomi
nation was Secretary Hay who wrote to him on June 21,
1900: "As it is all over but the shouting, I take a moment of
this cool morning of the longest day in the year to offer
you my cordial congratulations. The week has been a rack
ing one to you. But I have no doubt the future will make
amends. You have received the greatest compliment the
country could pay you, and although it is not precisely
what you and your friends desire, I have no doubt it is all
for the best. Nothing can keep you from doing good work
wherever you are — nor from getting lots of fun out of it.
"We Washingtonians, of course, have our own little
point of view. You can't lose us; and we shall be uncom
monly glad to see you here again."
To which Roosevelt replied on June 25, 1900, from Saga
more Hill :
"Well, I now join the innumerable throng of New York's
Vice-Presidential progeny in esse or posse. I should like
to have stayed where there was real work ; but I would be

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 141
a fool not to appreciate and be deeply touched by the way
I was nominated ; and the one great thing at the next elec
tion is to reelect the President, and if my candidacy helps
toward that end, well and good.
"If only the New York machine (which I had to stand
on its head, as a preliminary) will defer its policy of feed
ing grudges fat until after election ! I earnestly hope they
will nominate in my place some man who will strengthen,
not weaken, the national ticket."
Before finishing his duties as Governor, Roosevelt had
an opportunity, which he was prompt to improve to the
utmost, to show his mettle as the Chief Executive of the
State. On the eve of the Presidential election in November,
1900, the Tammany Chief of Police issued an official order
to his subordinates directing them to disregard orders that
had been issued by the Chief of the State Bureau of Elec
tions, orders that were essential to the securing of an
honest election in the city. Roosevelt had, as Governor, no
power over the Chief of Police but he had power over the
Mayor of the city, and from his residence in Oyster Bay
where he was at the time, he sent the following letters:
State of New York
Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900.
To the Mayor of the City of New York.
Sir: My attention has been called to the official order
issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies. Unless you
have already taken steps to secure the recall of this order,
it is necessary for me to point out that I shall be obliged
to hold you responsible as the head of the city government
for the action of the Chief of Police, if it should result in
any breach of the peace and intimidation or any crime what
ever against the election laws. The State and city authori
ties should work together. I will not fail to call to sum
mary account either State or city authority in the event

142 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
of either being guilty of intimidation or connivance at fraud
or of failure to protect every legal voter in his rights. I
therefore hereby notify you that in the event of any wrong
doing following upon the failure immediately to recall
Chief Devery 's order, or upon any action or inaction on
the part of Chief Devery, I must necessarily call you to
account. Yours, etc.,
Theodore Roosevelt.
State of New York
Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900.
To the Sheriff of the County of New York.
Sir: My attention has been called to the official order
issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies.
It is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of
the law, and I shall hold you strictly responsible for any
breach of the public peace within your county, or for any
failure on your part to do your full duty in connection with
the election to-morrow. Yours truly,
Theodore Roosevelt.
State of "New York
Oyster Bay, November 5, 1900.
To the District Attorney of the County of New York.
Sir: My attention has been called to the official order
issued by Chief of Police Devery, in which he directs his
subordinates to disregard the Chief of the State Election
Bureau, John McCullagh, and his deputies.
In view of this order I call your attention to the fact
that it is your duty to assist in the orderly enforcement of
the law, and there must be no failure on your part to do
your full duty in the matter. Yours truly,
Theodore Roosevelt.

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 143
The effect of the letters was instantaneous. The Mayor
directed the Chief of Police to rescind his order, and the
Sheriff also took prompt action. The District Attorney re
fused to heed the letter addressed to him, assumed an atti
tude of defiance of the Governor, and Roosevelt removed
him from office. A quiet and honest election followed.
Secretary Hay wrote a congratulatory letter to the Gov
ernor on his performance, and to this Roosevelt replied on
November 10, 1900 :
"I am really grateful to Croker for making Devery
commit an overt act which put the whole gang in my power.
I immediately took some secret steps which have never
come out, getting into communication with the Adjutant
General instantly, so that in the event of need I could have
any regiment of the National Guard out at once. I believed
that they would take water as they actually did. If they
had not, I would have taken off the heads of the Mayor,
Sheriff and District Attorney within 48 hours — that is, just
long enough for the legal formalities of a trial to be com
plied with, and if by any possible construction I could have
gotten at Croker and Hearst, I should have done all that
was within my power to make them pay to the last cent
for any misconduct, which really would have been due to
them." While devoting his energies unremittingly to his duties
as Governor, Roosevelt followed closely all developments
in national and international affairs and expressed his
views thereon freely in his correspondence with friends.
When the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty was published, in
1900, he took a position in regard to its provisions which
foreshadowed accurately the course that he followed later
as President in securing the fortification of the Panama
Canal. Writing to Capt. A. T. Mahan on February 14,
1900, he said:
"As you know, I am heartily friendly to England, but I
cannot help feeling that the State Department has made a
great error in the canal treaty. We really make not only

144 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
England but all the great continental powers our partners
in the transaction, and I do not see why we should dig the
canal if we are not to fortify it so as to insure its being
used for ourselves and against our foes in time of war."
He gave public expression also to his disapproval of the
treaty, with effects described in the following letter to Dr.
Albert Shaw:
"My published statement about the canal treaty has, as
I anticipated it would, caused no little trouble. Hay has
written me a confidential letter of grieved protest. To me
his position is simply incomprehensible."
To Secretary Hay's remonstrance Roosevelt replied as
follows on February 18, 1900:
State of New York,
Executive Chamber, Albany,
February 18, 1900.
I hesitated long before I said anything about the treaty
through sheer dread of two moments — that in which I
should receive your note, and that in which I should re
ceive Cabot's (Senator Henry Cabot Lodge). But I made
up my mind that at least I wished to be on record ; for to
my mind this step is one backward, and it may be fraught
with very great mischief. You have been the greatest
Secretary of State I have seen in my time — Olney comes
second — but at this moment I cannot, try as I may, see that
you are right. Understand me. When the treaty is
adopted, as I suppose it will be, I shall put the best face
possible on it, and shall back the Administration as heart
ily as ever ; but oh, how I wish you and the President would
drop the treaty and push through a bill to build and fortify
our own canal.
My objections are twofold. First, as to naval policy. If
the proposed canal had been in existence in '98, the Oregon
could have come more quickly through to the Atlantic; but
this fact would have been far outweighed by the fact that

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 145
Cervera's fleet would have had open to it the chance of
itself going through the canal, and thence sailing to attack
Dewey or to menace our stripped Pacific Coast. If that
canal is open to the warships of an enemy, it is a menace to
us in time of war; it is an added burden, an additional
strategic point to be guarded by our fleet. If fortified by
us, it becomes one of the most potent sources of our pos
sible sea strength. Unless so fortified it strengthens
against us every nation whose fleet is larger than ours.
One prime reason for fortifying our great seaports is to
unfetter our fleet, to release it for offensive purposes ; and
the proposed canal would fetter it again, for our fleet would
have to watch it, and therefore do the work which a fort
should do; and what it could do much better.
Secondly, as to the Monroe Doctrine. If we invite for
eign powers to a joint ownership, a joint guarantee, of
what so vitally concerns us but a little way from our bor
ders, how can we possibly object to similar joint action say
in Southern Brazil or Argentina, where our interests are
so much less evident? If Germany has the same right that
we have in the canal across Central America, why not in the
partition of any part of Southern America? To my mind,
we should consistently refuse to all European powers the
right to control, in any shape, any territory in the Western
Hemisphere which they do not already hold.
As for existing treaties — I do not admit the "dead hand"
of the treaty-making power in the past. A treaty can al
ways be honorably abrogated — though it must never be
abrogated in dishonest fashion. Yours ever,
Theodore Roosevelt.
A few weeks after the election, on November 22, 1900,
Roosevelt wrote this characteristically frank and generous
letter to ex-President Grover Cleveland :
"During the last campaign I grew more and more to
realize the very great service you had rendered to the whole
country by what you did about free silver. As I said to a

146 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Republican audience in South Dakota, I think your letter
on free silver prior to your second nomination was as bold
a bit of honest writing as I have ever seen in American
public life. And more than anything else it put you in the
position of doing for the American public in this matter
of free silver what at that time no other man could have
done. I think now we have definitely won out on the free
silver business and, therefore, I think you are entitled to
thanks and congratulations."
It may not be inappropriate for me to add to this just
tribute a brief account of a personal interview which I had
with Mr. Cleveland, at his house in New York City, in the
winter of 1891. It was soon after he had written his letter
on the silver question in which he had come out squarely
for the maintenance of the gold standard. I told him that
I had been watching with great interest the reception given
to the letter by Democratic newspapers throughout the
country and had been surprised by the small amount of ad
verse criticism it had aroused. He said, as nearly as I can
recall his words and I am sure that I give the substance
accurately :
"Well, I have been tempted to say something of the kind
for several months, but I refrained because I knew if I said
it there would be a cry raised ' Oh, he wants to be President
again !' Now, Bishop, I've been President, and a man who
has had it once is not overanxious to have it again. But
the time seemed to have arrived when I ought to speak and
so I let 'em have it.' Then, with a complete change of
manner, and with a twinkle in his eye, he grasped me by the
knee and in a confidential tone said: Bishop, you'll find
there's some pretty good politics in that letter too!"
And there was, for it secured for its writer a unanimous
nomination for the Presidency and a triumphant reelection
a year later.
Roosevelt's service as Vice-President was destined to be
very brief. His anticipatory fears lest he should find the

NOMINATED AND ELECTED VICE-PRESIDENT 147
duty of presiding over the Senate a bore were never
realized, for he occupied the chair only a week. Writ
ing, on March 16, 1901, to his friend, Cecil Arthur Spring-
Rice, he thus described his experience :
"I have really enjoyed presiding over the Senate for the
week the extra session lasted. I shall get fearfully tired
in the future no doubt and of course I should like a more
active position."
He adhered to his purpose of resuming the study of the
law, and wrote to John Proctor Clarke on the subject, on
March 29, 1901 :
"Just a line in reference to my studying law. I have
been one year in the law school and at that time was also
in my cousin John's office. Now, could I go into an office
in New York — say Evarts & Choate — or study in New York
or here in Oyster Bay, so as to get admitted to the bar be
fore the end of my term as Vice President?"
He also wrote on the same subject to Alton B. Parker,
then Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of New York,
and three years later his Democratic opponent for the Presi
dency, and was advised by him to study in the District of
Columbia Law School. He accepted this advice in a letter
dated May 31, 1901:
"As soon as I get back to Washington I shall begin to
attend the law school there and when I have completed my
two years' course and feel myself fit I shall apply for the
examination."

CHAPTER XIV
PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY
President McKinley, while attending the Pan-American
Exposition in Buffalo, on September 6, 1901, was shot by an
anarchist. Roosevelt went at once to Buffalo, as did also
several members of McKinley's Cabinet. The wound was
not regarded by the physicians in attendance as mortal and
for a day or two the President's condition seemed so favor
able that they declared him to be practically out of danger.
On receiving this assurance Roosevelt joined his family in
the Adirondacks. A day or two afterwards, September 14,
1901, he went on a long tramp through the forest, climbing
Mount Tahawus. As he was descending the mountain
and was resting upon a shelf of land which overlooked the
surrounding country, he saw a guide approaching on the
trail from below. When the guide reached him he handed
him a telegram saying that the President was worse and
that he should go at once to Buffalo. He was ten miles
away from the clubhouse at which he was lodging, and it
was then late in the afternoon. It was dark when he
reached the clubhouse and it was some time before a horse
and wagon could be procured by which he could be conveyed
to the nearest railway station, North Creek, which was
between forty and fifty miles away. The night was dark
and the roads, being the ordinary ones of the wilderness,
were far from good. He and the driver were the sole occu
pants of the vehicle. The horses were changed three times,
and the station was reached at dawn, where Roosevelt
learned that McKinley was dead, and that he was President
of the United States. A special train was awaiting to take
him to Buffalo. On the evening of the same day, in the
148

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 149
house of a friend, Ansley Wilcox, in Buffalo, he took the
oath of office in the presence of Secretary Root and other
members of McKinley's Cabinet, and a few other persons.
After taking the oath, he said :
"In this hour of deep and terrible national bereavement,
I wish to state that it shall be my aim to continue absolute
ly unbroken the policy of President McKinley for the peace,
prosperity and honor of our beloved country. ' '
One of the first letters to reach him was the following
from Secretary Hay, written from Washington on Septem
ber 15, 1901, a letter such as only John Hay could write, and
which touched Roosevelt very deeply :
My dear Roosevelt:
If the Presidency had come to you in any other way, no
one would have congratulated you with better heart than I.
My sincere affection and esteem for you, my old-time love
for your father — would he could have lived to see you where
you are! — would have been deeply gratified.
And even from the depths of the sorrow where I sit, with
my grief for the President mingled and confused with that
for my boy, so that I scarcely know, from hour to hour,
the true source of my tears — I do still congratulate you,
not only on the opening of an official caaeer which I know
will be glorious, but upon the vast opportunity for useful
work which lies before you. With your youth, your ability,
your health and strength, the courage God has given you
to do right, there are no bounds to the good you can ac
complish for your country and the name you will leave in
its annals.
My official life is at an end — my natural life will not be
long extended ; and so, in the dawn of what I am sure will
be a great and splendid future, I venture to give you the
heartfelt benediction of the past.
God bless you. Yours faithfully,
John Hay,

150 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The new President left Buffalo for Washington on Sep
tember 16,1901, and on the following day he called a meeting
of the members of the Cabinet and asked them to remain in
office which they consented to do, Hay with the others. He
attended the funeral of President McKinley at Canton,
Ohio, and on September 20, took up his residence in the
White House. In accordance with an invitation which he
had sent to me on his journey from Buffalo, I was his guest
in the White House on the evening of that day, no one else
being present, for his family had not arrived and no other
guest had been asked. We had a long and intimate con
versation in which he talked freely of his policies and pur
poses as President. I said to him that no man had ever
entered upon the office more absolutely free of all obhga
tion to any one than he had; that he owed his possession
of it to no one, but that, on the contrary, he had acceded
to it in spite of persistent efforts of his most zealous
enemies to prevent him from ever reaching it ; and that he
would enter upon his duties with the certainty of holding
the office for seven years. He replied at once, and with
great emphasis :
"I don't know anything about seven years. But this
I do know — I am going to be President for three years,
and I am going to do my utmost to give the country a good
President during that period. I am going to be full Presi
dent, and I rather be full President for three years than
half a President for seven years. Now, mind you, I am no
second Grover Cleveland. I admire certain of his quahties,
but I have no intention of doing with the Republican party
what he did with the Democratic party. I intend to work
with my party and to make it strong by making it worthy
of popular support."
He went on to say that he should not abandon a single
one of the principles that had formed the basis of his public
career, and that no matter how powerful might be the in
fluences brought to bear to induce him to waver on a single
one of them, he should not yield a hair's breadth. When

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 151
I dwelt upon the fact that influences which were certain
to combine against him were far more powerful than any
that he had encountered hitherto, he replied that he was
perfectly well aware of that but had no fear of ultimate
victory since he was sure that the people would be on his
side, and he should always let the people know what he was
trying to accomplish.
That he was deeply impressed with the great responsi
bilities which had been placed upon him was apparent in all
he said to me, and the same feeling found expression in the
letters which he wrote at the time. To his friend, Senator
Lodge, he wrote on September 23, 1901 :
"It is a dreadful thing to come into the Presidency in
this way; but it would be a far worse thing to be morbid
about it. Here is the task, and I have got to do it to the
best of my ability, and that is all there is about it."
To Richard Olney, who had been Secretary of State in
President Cleveland's Cabinet, and who had sent him a
letter of confidence and good wishes, he replied on the same
date: "I know I need not tell you that I appreciate to the full
the burdens placed upon me. All that in me lies to do will
be done, to make my work a success. That I shall be able
to solve with entire satisfaction to myself or any one else
each of the many problems confronting me, I cannot of
course hope for, but I shall do my best in each case, and in
a reasonable number of eases I shall hope to meet with
success. At any rate, I want you to know one thing. I can
conscientiously say that my purpose is entirely single. I
want to make a good President and to keep the administra
tion upright and efficient; to follow policies external and
internal which shall be for the real and ultimate benefit of
our people as a whole, and all party considerations will be
absolutely secondary."
There was general recognition, not only in Washington
but throughout the country, that Roosevelt's accession to

152 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
the Presidency meant the opening of a new epoch in
national history. The Republican party had been for many
years becoming more and more the party not merely of
conservatives but of reactionaries. Its policy was con
trolled by the great industrial and commercial interests
which had grown into enormous proportions during the
preceding quarter of a century. These, with the allied rail
way interests, constituted a veritable imperium in imperio,
an invisible government more powerful than the govern
ment itself. The representatives of these interests argued,
with all the sincerity of profound conviction, that since
under their guidance and through their development the
country had attained the greatest prosperity it had ever
known, it was only just that the country should be given
the kind of government most favorable to them. Their
reasoning had never found more complete acceptance than
was the case under President McKinley's administration.
The first note of protest lifted by any Repubhcan official
and leader had come from Roosevelt while he was Governor
of New York. The entire country had heard it, and the
powerful interests whose dominion it threatened had com
bined in a determined effort to render him powerless by
"placing him on the shelf" of the Vice-Presidency, thus
retiring him from public life. Knowing the man through
his course in the Governorship they knew what confronted
them when he became the Executive of the nation. The
period of complacent acquiescence in things as they were
had closed.
A new period, of action in the field of the things that
ought to be, was about to open. Henry Adams, who had
known Roosevelt long and intimately, in his very remark
able book, "The Education of Henry Adams," says of him
as he entered upon the Presidency :
"Power when wielded by abnormal energy is the most
serious of facts, and all Roosevelt's friends knew that his
restless and combative energy was more than normal.
Roosevelt, more than any other living man within the range
of notoriety, showed the singular primitive quality that

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 153
belongs to ultimate matter — the quality that mediaeval
theology assigned to God — he was pure act. ' '

The record of his first year in the Presidency amply
confirms this view of Roosevelt's dominant quality, for it
is crowded with action, most of it in directions hitherto
carefully selected for inaction.
From the very beginning, the new President left no room
for doubt as to his unchanged attitude toward public office
and public duty. He stood, as he had throughout his career,
for honest, decent and efficient government in the interest
of all the people, and whatever change was necessary to
secure it, that change he should seek. Regarding his policy
towards the new insular possessions, he announced on
September 24, 1901, in reply to some inquiries by politicians
on the subject, that "absolutely no appointments in the
insular possessions will be dictated or controlled by political
considerations." On September 26, 1901, he wrote to
William H. Hunt, Governor of Porto Rico :
"In dealing with the Philippines, Cuba and Porto Rico
my purpose is to give Taft and Wood and yourself the
largest liberty of action possible, and the heartiest support
on my part. In taking up the question of the lesser ap
pointments I want to consult especially you three men, for
I have the utmost confidence in each of you. I shall certain
ly not appoint any man whom any one of you who has to
be over or with that man disapproves of."
In accordance with his purpose of working with the
leaders of his party whenever possible rather than against
them, he wrote a cordial letter to Senator Marcus A. Hanna,
of Ohio, requesting an early conference with him. Senator
Hanna had been universally recognized as the "power be
hind the throne ' ' in the McKinley administration and there
was much speculation as to the maintenance of harmonious
relations between him and the new President owing to sup
posed radical differences of opinion concerning the proper

154 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
use of public offices. Senator Hanna's response to the
President 's request, made from Cleveland, date of October
12, 1901, is an interesting document :
"I am in receipt of yours of the 8th inst. and reply that
I will see you at the earliest time possible consistent with
my duties here. Have had a full talk with Mr. Payne
(Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and sub
sequently Postmaster General in Roosevelt's Cabinet)—
there are many important matters to be considered from a
political standpoint and I am sure we will agree upon a
proper course to pursue. Meantime 'go slow.' You will
be besieged from all sides and I fear in some cases will get
the wrong impression. Hear them all patiently but reserve
your decision — unless in cases which may require imme
diate attention. Then if my advice is of importance Cor
telyou can reach me over the 'long distance.' "
The politicians of the Republican party had early infor
mation concerning the new President's ideas about the
proper use of public office. On the first day that he held a
reception for visitors, September 21, 1901, he said to three
Southern Congressmen who asked about his pohcy in re
gard to appointments in the South :
"I am going to be President of the United States and
not of any section. I don't care that (snapping his fingers)
for sections or sectional lines. When I was Governor of
New York I was told I could make four appointments in
the army. When I sent in the names three of the four men
were from the South and the other was from New York.
They were brave men who deserved recognition for services
in the Spanish War and it did not matter to me what States
they were from.
"Half my blood is Southern and I have lived in the West,
so that I feel that I can represent the whole country.
"If I cannot find Republicans I am going to appoint
Democrats. I intend to make such appointments as will
induce every Southern man to respect the Republican
party."

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 155
In accordance with this declaration, he announced on
October 7, 1901, that he should appoint as Judge of the
United States District Court in Alabama, Thomas G. Jones,
a liberal Democrat and an ex-Confederate. This selection
was made without consulting Senator Hanna and in viola
tion of the established custom of consulting him about all
Southern appointments. The Senator wrote asking why
there had been such haste in the matter, and the President,
under date of October 8, 1901, replied :
"The reason I wanted to decide about the judgeship in
Alabama quickly was because my experience has taught
me that in such a case a quick decision really prevents bit
terness." On the day following the appointment a letter was re
ceived by the President from Grover Cleveland commend
ing Mr. Jones for the position. Replying to this on October
9, 1901, the President wrote:
"I hardly know whether to say I am glad or sorry that
I had appointed Mr. Jones Judge before I received your
letter. But this I can say, that it was the greatest gratifica
tion to find that you would be glad of the appointment and
thought so well of him."
About this period, the President said to an Illinois Repre
sentative who was pressing the claims of a constituent to
office: "I want it thoroughly understood that no Presidential
appointee has a prescriptive right to hold office. I intend to
consult only the pubhc welfare in making appointments.
As long as a man proves himself fit and efficient his posi
tion is safe. When he shows himself unfit and inefficient he
will be removed."
A few days later a Senator from Illinois who was urging
the appointment of a constituent to a position said: "He
is backed, Mr. President, by the Illinois organization  "
but before he could get any farther, the President inter-

156 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
rupted him: "I wish to say, Senator, that I want to stand
well with the organization, and all that, but I wish it dis
tinctly understood that I will appoint no man to office, even
if recommended by the organization, unless he is wholly
qualified for the position he seeks and is a man of in
tegrity." Another and very powerful Senator from a Western
State approached the President with a request that a
favorite army officer be advanced to the rank of Brigadier
General. He seemed to think that the favor was to be
granted merely for the asking but he found the President
antagonistic. He was forced to argue the matter and had
started on that line when the President, with a wave of the
hand, motioned him to subside. "It is of no use, Senator,
for you to talk any longer. I simply will not do it and that
is all there is about it. I have refused every Senator who
called to see me on similar missions, and I must refuse you.
It is not worth while to argue about the matter."
Senator Bailey of Texas went to the President with a
similar request, saying that the promotion which he sought
was favored by the entire Legislature of Texas. "But,"
said the President, "it is opposed by all the man's superior
officers." "I don't give a damn for his superior officers!"
exclaimed the Senator. "Well, Senator," said the Presi
dent, "I don't give a damn for the Legislature of Texas."
He refused to promote the Senator's man, and promoted
an officer who hailed from Texas and who had performed
excellent service in the war with Spain.
In refusing to promote army officers on personal grounds,
the President put an end to an abuse which had been grow
ing steadily for several years. As he said to the Senator
above mentioned, he had denied similar requests from other
Senators. One of these was a Senator from Maine, who
was joined in the request by a Representative from the
same State. To the latter Roosevelt wrote under date of
November 9, 1901 :
"General X. has been in several times to see me, more
often than any other candidate for promotion. He has an

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 157
excellent record but seems unable to understand the utter
impropriety of doing what he asks, which is, not to pro
mote him to a vacancy but to punish some man now in the
service by forcing him to retire in order to do a favor to
General X. It is barely possible that some case would
arise of so extreme a character as to justify such a pro
ceeding, but I can hardly imagine it. There is no warrant,
whatever for doing it in General X. 's case as an exception,
and it surely cannot be advocated as a general policy. It
is not a question of giving General X. a promotion. It is a
question of doing him a favor to which he has no more
claim than hundreds of other officers, by doing a serious
wrong and injustice to a man now in office."
On the same day he sent a similar letter to the Maine
Senator. Writing to a friend in Kansas, on October 9, 1901, he
stated again his policy in regard to Southern appointments :
"I want to get hold of some man or men in Arkansas
who will give me an absolutely square deal, when I ask for
information about applicants for public office. Of course,
where I can find a thoroughly fit and proper Republican to
appoint I want to appoint him. If I cannot find one, then
I want to take the best Democrat there is. Under no cir
cumstances do I intend to make an improper appointment
or to put an inefficient or corrupt man into office. I want
to have the same high standard in office in the South as in
the North."
Writing to Senator Lodge, on October 11, 1901, he out
lined briefly his general policy on economic subjects and ap
pointments :
"On the general economic questions I shall do just about
what I outlined in my letter of acceptance (as nominee for
Vice-President) and in my speeches on the stump, unless
some good reason can be shown why I should change at any
point. In the appointments I shall go on exactly as I did
while I was Governor of New York. The Senators and

158 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Congressmen shall ordinarily name the men, but I shall
name the standard, and the men have got to come up to it."
A few weeks later, when the question of reappointing the
occupant of an important Federal office in New York City
was under consideration and the President was known to
be in favor of a change, a volatile young politician who
was acting as errand boy from Senator Piatt called upon
the President in the interest of the incumbent. In the
course of the conversation, the visitor threatened the Presi
dent with the vengeance of the party organization if he did
not reappoint the official. The President sprang from his
chair, saying that in the selection of officers for the public
service he was guided only by the fitness of the applicants,
and adding: "If you come here to threaten me, I will ask
you to withdraw immediately and let me go on with my
work." The visitor began to stammer an apology but be
fore he could find expression he found himself in the hall
way outside the President's office.
One letter which the President wrote during the first
weeks of his administration is worthy of record as showing
his early desire to have Germany made fully aware of his
attitude on the Monroe Doctrine. It was addressed, on
October 11, 1901, to Baron H. S. von Sternburg, then Ger
man Consul at Calcutta, India, afterwards German Ambas
sador at Washington :
"I most earnestly desire to have Germany and the United
States work hand in hand. I regard the Monroe Doctrine
as being equivalent to open door in South America. That
is, I do not want the United States or any European power
to get territorial possessions in South America but to let
South America gradually develop on its own lines, with an
open door to all outside nations, save as the individual
countries enter into individual treaties with one another."
Very soon after Roosevelt's accession to the Presidency,
representatives of the powerful financial interests already
alluded to called upon him and sought to persuade him to

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 159
modify his views in regard to trusts and kindred matters.
He told them frankly that he should not do so, and offered
for their perusal those passages on such subjects that he
had prepared for his first message to Congress in Decem
ber. Among others, these passages were submitted to Sen
ator Hanna, who wrote to him advising him not to give so
much prominence as he had to them, advice that was dis
regarded. In a confidential letter to his brother-in-law,
Douglas Robinson of New York City, on October 14, 1901, he
gave an entertaining account of one valiant but fruitless
effort to get him to go back on himself and his record:
"I am very fond of X. He is one of the men whom I
most respect. But, to be perfectly frank, he did not appear
to advantage in the talk he had with me on the evening in
question. This is no reflection on him. He was occupying
exactly the same attitude that Y. occupies on this question.
Both of them are men of the highest character, who are
genuine forces for good as well as men of strength and
weight. But on this particular occasion they were arguing
like attorneys for a bad case, and at the bottom of their
hearts each would know this if he were not personally in
terested; and especially if he were not the representative
of a man of so strong and dominant a character as W. In
plain English, what W. wanted me to do was to go back on
my messages to the New York Legislature and on my letter
of acceptance of the nomination for the Vice-Presidency,
as well as on theMinneapolis speech, which was by no means
as strong as either the messages or the letter.
"Now if I felt convinced that I had been wrong in what
I had hitherto said, or even if I were doubtful about it,
I should not have the slightest hesitation in announcing
that I have changed my mind ; but as a matter of fact I was
right. I intend to be most conservative, but in the interests
of the big corporations themselves and above all in the
interest of the country, I intend to pursue, cautiously but
steadily, the course to which I have been publicly committed
again and again, and which I am certain is the right course.
I may add that I happen to know that President McKinley

160 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
was uneasy about this so-called trust question and was re
flecting in his mind what he should do in the matter.
X. wanted me to do nothing at all, and say nothing except
platitudes ; accept the publication of what some particular
company chooses to publish, as a favor, instead of demand
ing what we think ought to be published from all companies
as a right."
On the eve of the assembling of Congress the President
invited me to the White House, saying that he would like
to have me go over the message. After reaching Washing
ton I called upon John Hay, Secretary of State, who had
been my honored and valued friend for many years. When
I said to him that I was going to read the message, he re
marked: "You will be greatly interested. The President
has written every word of it himself. Under McKinley,
all of us in the Cabinet contributed portions relating to
matters in our departments; the message was thus a com
posite document. Roosevelt has written the whole of his
himself; it is the most individual m'essage since Lincoln."
The message had been awaited with great interest, not
only by the members of both houses of Congress, but by
the general public as well, because of the universal recog
nition of the entry of a new force in national administra
tion. It was the first Presidential message sent to Con
gress in print rather than in script. This was a new de
parture, ordered by Roosevelt, as in keeping with the times.
His action caused mild comment at the time, and was the
forerunner of a much more radical departure five years
later, which caused far more agitated comment, when he
sent in a special message illustrated with photographic
reproductions, giving the results of his trip to Panama to
inspect the canal work which had just begun.
The reception of the message by Congress revealed the
deep interest with which it had been awaited. The account
sent out to the country by the Associated Press read:
"It was listened to with marked respect in the Senate.
Not in many years have the members of the House listened

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 161
with such rapt attention to the annual message of a Presi
dent of the United States as they did to-day to the reading
of the first message of President Roosevelt. Every word
was followed intently from the announcement of the tragic
death of President McKinley in the opening sentence, to
the expression of the closing wish that the relations of the
United States with the world should continue peaceful. The
reading occupied two hours, but not over a dozen members
left their seats until it was finished. Several times there
was applause, and at the close there was an enthusiastic
demonstration on the Republican side."
The Washington correspondent of the Chicago Record-
Herald wrote :
"President Roosevelt's message to Congress has one uni
versal and enthusiastic approval at the National Capital.
Not for many years has a similar State paper aroused
greater interest or met with warmer reception. The praise
accorded it comes from men of both political parties.
"Usually the annual message of a President is treated
with scant courtesy by the commoners. They listen a while,
then succumb to the allurement of the smoking-room or
restaurant. To-day they sat still and when the end came
there was applause loud and hearty. Democrats joined in
it, which they had a right to do, for he is their President,
too ; and in all the 20,000 words they had searched in vain
for the party leader, the politician, the mere phrase-maker.
They knew they had listened to a man who thinks, to a man
who can write, to a man who writes well and clearly because
he thinks well and clearly; and every word of it from the
head of the Government, not a word from the head of a
political organization."
There was in the message an entirely unmodified re
affirmation of his previously expressed views about trusts.
A few of the more important passages only are cited here,
as the full text is available in the volumes of his public
papers :

162 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
' ' There is a widespread conviction in the minds of the
American people that the great corporations known as
trusts are in certain of their features and tendencies hurt
ful to the general welfare. This springs from no spirit
of envy or uncharitableness, nor lack of pride in the great
industrial achievements that have placed this country at the
head of the nations struggling for commercial supremacy.
It does not rest upon a lack of intelligent appreciation of
the necessity of meeting changing conditions of trade with
new methods, nor upon ignorance of the fact that combina
tion of capital in the effort to accomplish great things is
necessary when the world's progress demands that great
things be done. It is based upon sincere conviction that
combination and concentration should be, not prohibited,
but supervised and within reasonable limits controlled; and
in my judgment this conviction is right. ' '
"Great corporations exist only because they are created
and safeguarded by our institutions ; and it is therefore our
right and duty to see that they work in harmony with these
institutions." ' ' The first essential in determining how to deal with the
great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts-
publicity. In the interest of the public, the Government
should have the right to inspect and examine the workings
of the great corporations engaged in interstate business."
' ' There is utter lack of uniformity in the State laws about
them. Therefore, in the interest of the whole people, the
Nation should, without interfering with the power of the
States in the matter itself, also assume power of super
vision and regulation over all corporations doing an inter
state business."
He recommended the creation of a new Cabinet officer,
to be called the Secretary of Commerce and Industries, and
suggested the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment

PRESIDENT— EARLY DECLARATIONS OF POLICY 163
giving powers of regulation and control of corporations in
case such powers could not be exercised under authority of
Congress. Soon after he became President the following amusing
correspondence passed between him and his long-time and
cherished friend, Owen Wister: Monday, September 23, 1901.
Dear Theodore: I don't know the crime of yours which
this earnest ass reveals. I shall not answer him because
silence has a cumulative eloquence which I prefer. But
make yourself gay over the solemn screed. Ever yours, 0. W.
(Enclosing the following letter)
Boston, Mass., September 22, 1901.
Owen Wister, Esq.,
Dear Sir:
I observe, at the end of an article bearing your signature,
the following:
"He (Theodore Roosevelt) has striven in his books to
do honor to great Americans in the past."
I am informed, on authority that seems conclusive, that
Mr. Roosevelt, in one of his works, speaks of Thomas Paine
as a "dirty little Atheist": that, on having it proven to
him by a more careful, or more truthful historian, that in
these three words he had made three mis-statements (or a
triple misi-statement), and that Mr. Paine was neither
"dirty," "little," or "Atheist," he has never made for
them any apology, correction, or even withdrawal.
For any other than an illiterate man to declare Paine to
be an atheist, seems impossible ; for an educated historian
to do so, when page after page of his best known work is
devoted to argument in favor of the existence of a God,
seems hardly compatible with honesty.
Like Mr. Roosevelt, I have no agreement or even sym
pathy with Paine 's religious ideas; but, unlike him, I do
not consider disagreement with them a legitimate excuse

164 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
for libelling and vilifying one of the greatest men of his
time. In the opinion of thoughtful scholars, Mr. Roosevelt's
ignorant and spiteful mis-statements about Thomas Paine
effectually discredit him as a historian ; and they seem also
to contradict the paragraph from your article, which I
quote at the beginning of this letter. Yours truly,
P. G. P  .
Personal. September 25, 1901.
Dear Dan:
This is delightful. I ought not to have used the exact
word atheist. He admitted the existence of an unknown
God, but denied there was a God of the Christians. As to
whether he was dirty or not, it is a mere matter of private
judgment. I was recording in the sentence the fact that he
had stayed several weeks in bed without getting out for
any purpose, and that as a consequence a swine in a sty
was physically clean by comparison. Faithfully yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.

CHAPTER XV
THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT
No act of Roosevelt during his entire career in the Presi
dency was more thoroughly characteristic or created a
greater commotion throughout the land than his having
Booker T. Washington, the negro educator and orator, as
his guest at dinner in the White House on October 18, 1901.
The news of it roused the South to fury, and even in the
North there was a division of opinion in regard to the pro
priety of the act. That Roosevelt anticipated no such out
burst of disapproval when he invited Mr. Washington, I
have personal knowledge. I had been spending a day and
a night with him in the White House and on the morning
of the 18th he asked me if I could not stay over another
night, saying that Booker Washington was coming to dinner
and he would like to have me meet him. I replied that I was
extremely sorry I could not, for there was no man in the
country whom. I respected more highly or whom I would
more gladly meet, but it was imperative that I return to
New York. Neither one of us alluded to Washington's
color, and it did not occur to me for a moment that there
could be any objection to his presence at the White House
table. No intimation of doubt on the point came from the
President, but in a letter which I shall quote he says he
felt a moment's qualm. When the storm burst I wrote him
expressing my astonishment, and in reply he said: "I
really felt melancholy for the South at the way the
Southerners behaved in the matter."
A few weeks later, November 8, 1901, he wrote a letter on
the subject to Albion W. Tourgee, who was the United
States Consul at Bordeaux, France. Mr. Tourgee was an
165

166 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
American lawyer and jurist and a veteran of the Civil War,
who had acquired wide fame as the author of a book on the
reconstruction of the South after the war, entitled 'A
Fool's Errand.' He had written in remonstrance to the
President because of his general policy toward the negro.
Roosevelt's letter, aside from its reference to the Booker
Washington incident, is of interest and value because of
its impressive statement of his views upon the entire negro
problem. I quote the following passages :
"When I asked Booker T. Washington to dinner I did
not devote very much thought to the matter one way or the
other. I respect him greatly and believe in the work he has
done. I have consulted so much with him it seemed to me
that it was natural to ask him to dinner to talk over this
work, and the very fact that I felt a moment's qualm on
inviting him because of his color made me ashamed of my
self and made me hasten to send the invitation. I did not
think of its bearing one way or the other, either on my own
future or on anything else. As things have turned out, I
am very glad that I asked him, for the clamor aroused by
the act makes me feel as if the act was necessary.
"I have not been able to think out any solution of the
terrible problem offered by the presence of the negro on
this continent, but of one thing I am sure, and that is that
inasmuch as he is here and can neither be killed nor driven
away, the only wise and honorable and Christian thing to
do is to treat each black man and each white man strictly on
his merits as a man, giving him no more and no less than
he shows himself worthy to have. I say I am 'sure' that
this is the right solution. Of course I know that we see
through a glass dimly, and, after all, it may be that I am
wrong; but if I am, then all my thoughts and beliefs are
wrong, and my whole way of looking at life is wrong. At
any rate, while I am in public life, however short a time
that may be, I am in honor bound to act up to my beliefs
and convictions. I do not intend to offend the prejudices
of any one else, but neither do I intend to allow their preju
dices to make me false to my principles."

THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 167
I have said that there was a division of opinion in the
North on the subject of the famous dinner. A striking
illustration of this is afforded in the comment which the
New York World, the foremost Democratic newspaper of
the North, made editorially on October 20, 1901 :
"An American named Washington, one of the most
learned, most eloquent, most brilliant men of the day— the
President of a college — is asked to dinner by President
Roosevelt. And because the pigment of his skin is some
shades darker than that of others a large part of the United
States is convulsed with shame and rage.
"The man is a negro. Therefore in eating with him the
President is charged with having insulted the South. This
man may cast a ballot but he may not break bread. He may
represent us in the Senate Chamber, but he may not 'join
us at the breakfast table.' He may educate us, but not
eat with us ; preach our Gospel, but not be our guest ; en
lighten our minds, but not entertain our bodies ; die for us,
but not dine with us.
"Truly Liberty must smile at such broad-minded logic,
such enlightened tolerance. Or should she weep?"
An interesting corollary to this disturbing incident is
afforded in a letter that Roosevelt wrote, two years later,
on October 29, 1903, to Dr. Lyman Abbott:
"Yesterday the Episcopal Bishops and clergymen called
to see me. The Bishops of Kentucky, Mississippi, Ala
bama, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, etc., etc., were
all there. Among them was an archdeacon from North Car
olina and a clergyman from Maryland, both of them ne
groes. They came into the White House in line among the
rest of the bishops, deacons, and doctors of divinity. No
body shrank from them ; nobody seemed to think it unnat
ural that I should receive them in the White House. These
high prelates of the Episcopal church brought their wives
and daughters along in their company. They did not sit
down at the table, but they all were received by Mrs. Roose
velt and myself on the same terms. If any of them took

168 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
any refreshment the colored men doubtless did so too. I
wonder whether these same Southern bishops and clergy
men were shocked when, two years ago, Booker Washington
sat down at my table with me? In South Carolina, at Flor
ence, I have just reappointed a negro postmaster with the
approval of the entire community. Why South Carolina
should go crazy over the appointment of an equally good
negro as collector of the port of Charleston I do not know.
Why the Southerners should be glad to visit the White
House in company with a colored archdeacon, and yet feel
furious because I received in only slightly more intimate
fashion a great colored educator I am again at a loss to
understand. ' '
Subsequently the President wrote two notable letters,
from which I shall quote, defining fully his views in regard
to the treatment of the colored race and the appointment
of colored men to public office. The first was to Mr. R. G.
Rhett, of Charleston, S. C, under date of November 10,
1902: "How any one could have gained the idea that I had said
I would not appoint reputable and upright colored men to
office, when objection was made to them solely on account
of their color, I confess I am wholly unable to understand.
"So far as I legitimately can I shall always endeavor to
pay regard to the likes and dislikes of the people of each
locality, but I cannot consent by my action to take the po
sition that the door of hope — the door of opportunity— is
to be shut upon all men, no matter how worthy, purely
upon the grounds of color. Such an attitude would accord
ing to my conviction be fundamentally wrong. The ques
tion of 'negro domination' does not enter into the matter at
all. You yourself know that the enormous majority of my
appointments in South Carolina have been of white men,
and so far as I know, of white men whose good character
and uprightness were not questioned. The question simply
is whether it is to be declared that under no circumstances
shall any man of color, no matter how good a citizen, no

THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 169
matter how upright and honest, no matter how fair in his
dealings with all his fellows, be permitted to hold any office
under our government. I certainly cannot assume such an
attitude, and you must permit me to say that in my view it
is an attitude no one should assume, whether he looks at it
from the standpoint of the true interest of the white men of
the South or of the colored men of the South — not to speak
of any other section in the Union. It seems to me that it
is a good thing from every standpoint to let the colored
man know that if he shows in marked degree the qualities
of good citizenship — the qualities which in a white man we
feel are entitled to reward — then he himself will not be cut
off from all hope of similar reward."
The second letter was written under date of February
23, 1903, to Mr. Clark Howell, editor of the Atlanta Consti
tution: "Now as to what you say concerning Federal appoint
ments in the South. Frankly, it seems to me that my ap
pointments speak for themselves and that my policy is self-
explanatory. So far from feeling that they need the slight
est apology or justification, my position is that on the
strength of what I have done I have the right to claim the
support of all good citizens who wish not only a high
standard of Federal service but fair and equitable dealing
to the South as well as to the North, and a policy of con
sistent justice and good will toward all men. In making
appointments I have sought to consider the feelings of the
people of each locality so far as I could consistently do so
without sacrificing principle. The prime tests I have ap
plied have been those of character, fitness and ability, and
when I have been dissatisfied with what has been offered
within my own party lines I have without hesitation gone
to the opposite party — and you are of course aware that I
have repeatedly done this in your own State of Georgia.
I certainly cannot treat mere color as a permanent bar to
holding office, any more than I could so treat creed or birth
place—always provided that in other respects the applicant

170 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
or incumbent is a worthy and well-behaved American citi
zen. Just as little will I treat it as conferring a right to
hold office. I have scant sympathy with the mere doctri
naire, with the man of mere theory who refuses to face
facts ; but do you not think that in the long run it is safer
for everybody if we act on the motto, 'All men up,' rather
than that of 'Some men down'?"

/

CHAPTER XVI
CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES
An incident which excited much attention and varying
comment occurred in December, 1901, during the prolonged
controversy between Admirals Sampson and Schley con
cerning the conduct of the latter in the naval battle of San
tiago during the war with Spain. The Naval Court of In
quiry, which investigated the case, made a report on De
cember 16, which was adverse to Schley. In a published
interview on December 17, General Nelson A. Miles, who
was then the Lieutenant-General of the army, its highest
officer, condemned the finding of the Court and upheld
Schley's side in the controversy. He was rebuked officially
by the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, for this expression
on the ground that it was in violation of the army regula
tions which forbid expression by military men of opinions
of any kind, either of praise or censure, in matters of the
kind. The President approved the order of rebuke. Gen
eral Miles went to the White House to protest to the Presi
dent, and was shown into the reception room, where he
found the President in conversation with a number of per
sons. Striding up to the President, and interrupting the
conversation, the General said: "Mr. President, I have
come here to protest against that order of Secretary Root. ' '
Before he could get any further, the President, noticing
his excited condition, said quietly : ' ' Step into the Cabinet
room, General, and I will see you there presently. ' ' Instead
of heeding this request, the General said again, loudly for
all to hear: "Mr. President, I am here to protest, etc."
Again the President said, this time impressively: "Gen
eral, I advise you to step into the Cabinet room!" Again
the General declined to do so, repeating his previous utter-
171

172 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
ances, whereupon the President, stepping closely to him and
speaking with emphasis and distinctness, said, in substance:
"General Miles, you are a veteran with a distinguished
record. I wish to show you courtesy, but if you insist upon
my telling you what I am about to, I shall do so. Your con
duct has been not merely silly but insubordinate and un-
military. You have done what you could to damage the
navy and damage the army. Secretary Root is absolutely
right, and you deserve a severe reprimand from the stand
point of the discipline absolutely essential to the army's
welfare." No account of this interview was given out from the
White House, but General Miles allowed a version of his
own to reach the press in which it was made to appear that
the President had turned upon him in anger when he en
tered the room and had subjected him to humihation by ad
ministering a rebuke to him publicly. The President never
took the trouble to contradict this inaccurate report. The
version herewith given is authoritative and strictly truthful.
To a Western editor who had written to the President in the
interest of General Miles, Roosevelt rephed, December 10,
1901 :
"I take it for granted that you will cordially agree with
me that such action as that of General Miles is to be repri
manded severely, from the standpoint of the discipline ab
solutely essential if the Army and Navy are to amount to
anything; and this without regard to which side he takes.
"As for the Schley matter, most emphatically I shall en
deavor to do absolute justice. But you must let me say that
in doing justice I should be ashamed to take into considera
tion whether what I did was popular or not. I hope I shall
not have to take any part at all in a matter that purely re
fers to President McKinley's administration, and with
which I have nothing whatever to do ; but if I do have to
take it up I shall decide the case absolutely on its merits,
and I shall no more consider whether a majority of the
people are for or against a given man than I should con-

CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 173
sider it if I were a judge sitting upon the bench deciding
the rights or wrongs of a particular case."
The verdict of the Sampson-Schley court of inquiry, after
having been approved by the Secretary of the Navy, was,
at Schley's request, referred to the President for review
on January 7, 1902, and on February 18 following the Pres
ident confirmed it on the ground that it decreed substantial
justice. General Miles got himself into further trouble with the
War Department a few weeks later. He made formal ap
plication on February 17, 1902, to the Secretary of War to
be sent to the Philippines, with ten men of his own selection
from Cuba and Porto Rico, to take full control there from
the military and civil authorities, conduct a thorough in
quiry, and return with such a number of native Filipinos
as seemed desirable, and then enter into consultation with
members of Congress as to a plan for the future control
of the islands.
Secretary Root, in a memorandum dated March 5, 1902,
which was approved by the President, denied the applica
tion, saying that to grant it would practically be to super
sede Governor Taft and General Chaffee, who were in
charge of the Philippines, and would be a reflection on their
successful conduct of affairs in the islands. To this Gen
eral Miles replied in a letter, March 24, 1902, reviewing the
action of the President and Secretary, endeavoring to show
it had been wrong, and assuming as evidence of his conten
tion that certain charges which had been made of official
misconduct in the Philippines were true, although they were
at the time under investigation and unproved. On this
letter Secretary Root made a memorandum, on March 25,
1902, reviewing the General's conduct in the matter and
saying: "In the interest of good discipline and effective service
such a course is much to be regretted. Such charges ought
not to be published against our countrymen, whom we have
sent to labor and fight under our flag on the other side

174 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
of the world, before they can be heard in their own de
fense." On this memorandum the President wrote, March 27,
1902 :
' ' The memorandum of the Secretary of War is approved
as a whole and as to every part. Had there been any doubt
before as to the wisdom of denying General Miles 's request,
these papers would remove such doubt. ' '
General Miles brought it about that this correspondence
was made known to members of Congress, and its pubhca
tion was called for and procured. He also was beheved to
have been instrumental in securing the pubhcation in the
press of a letter containing the charges alluded to in his
second letter to the Secretary of War, charges which were
withdrawn later by the writer of the letter because no evi
dence could be adduced to sustain them.
While this episode in the career of General Miles was in
progress, the President wrote a confidential letter to Sec
retary Root in which a very strong light is thrown on the
mental peculiarities of the General. It is now pubhshed for
the first time:
Private and- Confidential. March 7, 1902.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
It seems to me that, for your private use at the present
time, and with a view to making a permanent record of
certain facts, I ought to send this memorandum to you in
connection with the request of General Miles which you
have so properly disapproved. This is the request which
General Miles first showed me in a far more offensive form;
the request at that time being couched in language which
amounted to an endorsement by the head of the army of
some of the most offensive and most unfounded slanders
which have been put forth on the stump and in Congress
by the violent traducers of the army and of the nation.
The course of General Miles in giving his endorsement to

CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 175
these utterly baseless slanders against the army of which
he is himself the head was precisely on a parallel with his
recent memorandum, in which he impliedly endorsed the
statements of the least responsible demagogues, to the ef
fect that the army was gathered near great cities for the
purpose of overawing workingmen.
During the six months that I have been President, Gen
eral Miles has made it abundantly evident by his actions
that he has not the slightest desire to improve or benefit
the army, and to my mind his actions can bear only the
construction that his desire is purely to gratify his selfish
ambition, his vanity, or his spite. His conduct is certainly
entirely incompatible, not merely with intelligent devotion
to the interests of the country, but even with intelligent de
votion to the interests of the service. President McKinley
and you yourself have repeatedly told me that such was
the case during the period before I became President.
To show the animus of General Miles in these matters and
the extreme unwisdom of trusting him in any position
where he can imagine it to be for his interest to discredit
the American Government or the American Army, I re
capitulate here what I have already told you and President
McKinley as to something that occurred about three years
ago. At that time I had testified or was about to testify
as to certain shortcomings in the War Department during
the Spanish War. General Miles seemingly construed this,
not as a desire to tell the truth, whoever was affected, but
as a championship of himself against Secretary Alger and
President McKinley. I was Governor of New York, and
had come on here to visit Senator Lodge. At the time, our
army was engaged in the har^ fighting which accompanied
the outbreak of the Filipino insurrection. General Miles
made repeated efforts to see me, and finally succeeded and
had a long conversation with me, in Lodge 's house, on the
afternoon of Sunday, February 26, 1899. He proposed to
me that we should join forces and that he should run for
President while I ran for Vice-President. His estimate of
the political situation was utterly fatuous, and the propo-

176 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
sition was interesting only because, in the first place, it
showed the man's political folly, and, in the second place,
it gave me a glimpse of a most unpleasant side of his char
acter as Major-General commanding the army. He based
his main hope of being able to upset President McKinley
and deprive him of a renomination or reelection upon
what he regarded as the probable failure of our arms in
the Philippines. He repeated again and again, obviously
with the utmost satisfaction, that disaster would certainly
befall our troops and that possibly they might be driven
out of the islands, and that this would discredit the admin
istration of President McKinley and further the ambition
of- any one who was against him.
After listening to him for some time, I remarked that of
course every one was bound to work for the success of our
arms in the Philippines and to hope for it. This called
forth the most perfunctory acquiescence on his part; and
after a minute's pause he harped back to what he had been
saying already and repeated two or three times, that dis
asters were certain to come ; that there would be disgrace
to the nation and that then President McKinley would suf
fer ; and that the disgrace which befell our army would vin
dicate himself (Miles) and help the opponents of the Ad
ministration. His attitude was so foolish, and from a political stand
point he was so vague in his notions as to what should be
done to achieve his ambition, and so ignorant of the fact
that if the country did become hostile to McKinley the ad
vantage was bound to accrue to somebody other than him
self, that I should not have thought of the matter again had
it not been for the very unpleasant impression which his
conduct necessarily made upon me in view of his being
the commanding general of the army. I told Senator Lodge
of the matter at the time. - The following July you came
into your present office; and I was impressed more and
more, as I thought over the matter, by the danger which
might result from the fact that the general commanding the
army, who was advising you in the most confidential man-

. CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 177
ner as regards the course you were to follow in the Philip
pines, was really counting on the failure of that course as
the stepping-stone to his own political ambition. I finally
became convinced that, inasmuch as General Miles was in
a frame of mind which caused him to take delight in disas
ters to the American arms unless success would redound
to his own personal advantage, it would be well to caution
President McKinley against him. I accordingly told the
facts to the President. Later on the President told me that
Miles had tried his best to persuade him (President McKin
ley) to accept Miles as a candidate for Vice-President on
the same ticket with him.
In view of these facts, I think that General Miles ought
only to be employed when we are certain that whatever tal
ents he may possess will be used under conditions which
make his own interests and the interests of the country
identical. Faithfully yours,Theodore Roosevelt.
The closing episode in the public career of General Miles
occurred in 1903. On August 8 of that year he was retired
by limit of age, Secretary Root issuing the regulation
formal order to that effect. A great clamor was at once
raised in and out of the press because no letter or word of
commendation of the General accompanied the order. The
New York Times was especially vehement, saying the re
tirement of this ' ' splendid soldier ' ' without a word of praise
was "an amazing blunder which may even assume the pro
portions of a veritable calamity to the administration."
Two letters which the President wrote at the time may be
cited in explanation of his course. The first was to Clarke
Davis, editor of the Public Ledger of Philadelphia, under
date of August 24, 1903 :
"I had no knowledge that any one would suggest my
writing a letter to Miles any more than to any of the other
Generals I had retired. The matter merely did not occur
to me, and of course I did not speak about it to Mr. Root.

178 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
But if I had spoken about it to Mr. Root, I should most cer
tainly have backed him in refusing to give any special rec
ommendation to General Miles. It does not seem to me
that the matter of General Miles 's disloyalty to the army
is one the knowledge of which is confined to the Adminis
tration. Take his last report on the Philippines, which
was made public with the findings upon it. Therein it ap
pears conclusively that this old soldier has devoted himself
to a venomous slander of the army under his supposed con
trol. "As I told you in my last letter, General Miles asked me
to go in with him, he as Presidential candidate and I as
Vice-Presidential candidate, to upset McKinley for re
nomination. Of course he had a perfect right to make this
proposition ; although I do not think it is advisable for the
General commanding the army, who has just been commis
sioned Lieutenant-General by the President, to seek a nom
ination at the expense of that President. But assuming
that his conduct was proper in this regard, the thing that I
minded was the sinister pleasure he showed at the thought
that McKinley would be hurt by disasters to the army in the
Philippines, and his eager belief that these disasters were
coming and would hurt McKinley so that he (Miles) might
step into McKinley's place. In other words, the General
commanding the army was hoping for political preferment
at the expense of the President, whose adviser he was sup
posed to be, through disaster to the army of which this
same General was in titular command.
"When I came in as President I was willing to forget
all this; to remember only Miles 's gallant conduct forty
years before in the Civil War and the fact that he had
also done well in the Indian warfare — although not as well,
for instance, as Crook, whose intriguing and underhanded
enemy he ever showed himself to be. Accordingly I tried
my best to keep on good terms with him. But it was ab
solutely impossible. The man has not one feeling which
should characterize an officer and a gentleman, save that
only of physical courage. He is a foolish creature possess-

CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 179
ing only the power for intrigue and for demagogy, but not
of military capacity.
"But what counts for a hundredfold more than this, I
became convinced that there was no single recommendation
he was making which had in view anything but his own
advancement. He was anxious not to benefit the army, but
to harm Secretary Root, and tq gratify his spite on the va
rious officers of whom he disapproved. I have never met
any officer of the army as wholly indifferent to its welfare
as is Miles; and this, whether the matter at issue be the
putting down of Filipino bandits, or the use and abuse of
the canteen, or establishing a cavalry school, or anything
else. I do not believe he is capable of considering anything
but his own personal interest. In particular the course he
has followed, again and again, seeking to discredit our
troops in the Philippines and giving currency to reports of
outrages by them which he well knew to be unfounded, has
been such as to have warranted me in removing him
from his position as Lieutenant-General. I am not sure
that I did right in letting him serve out his term, but most
certainly I should have been wrong and I should have in
flicted harm on the army if I had thanked him for his
treachery and misconduct."
The second letter was to Senator Lodge, who was then
in London, serving as member of the Alaskan Boundary
Commission. This was under date of September 3, 1903:
"The public generally and the soldiers in particular have
gone frantic because we did not single Miles out for special
commendation when he retired from the service — a thing
we have done in the case of none of the other generals
with Civil War records who have retired. We are a queer,
emotional, hysterical people on occasions, and in the Miles
matter as in the Schley matter we have shown at our worst.
Miles has for the two years of my Presidency, and of course
for some years before that, shown himself the most dan
gerous foe and slanderer of the army which he was sup
posed to command. Nothing will hire me to praise him.

180 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
There has been really a great gust of popular anger against
me ; I am not writing too strongly when I say popular anger.
The feeling against me, especially in the Grand Army, is
so bitter that certain of my friends in Illinois and Indiana
have told me that they believe that if the election were held
at present I should lose both those States! However, I
cannot help thinking that such folly will burn itself out be
fore a year is over."
A final demonstration of personal idiosyncrasy on the
part of General Miles occurred a few weeks later and is re
corded in the following correspondence. On October 8,
1903, the President wrote to Governor Franklin Murphy
of New Jersey:
"A few days ago General Miles went to one of the lead
ing men in New York and told him, as illustrating my
attitude toward property, that you had recently said that I
had informed you that I was certain I was going to win the
Northern Securities suit and thereby ruin Pierpont Morgan
and Jim Hill, or, to use his exact words, 'turn Morgan and
Hill into the street.' My informant was somewhat upset
over the matter and at first declined to allow me to see
you about it. I told him that I should insist upon this, be
cause I was absolutely certain that the story was merely
a lie of Miles and that you had never said one word such
as you were represented as saying. Indeed, my memory is
that we did not speak of the Northern Securities suit at all,
and of course I never at any time used any such language as
that imputed to me about Hill or Morgan, or expressed
the slightest feeling of vindictiveness or personal hostility
toward either.
"I am half ashamed to bring such an absurd falsehood
to your notice. I wish you to understand that if I alone
were cognizant of it, I should not bother you to deny it,
for I should never think a second time of it ; but it is aston
ishing what some sensible men are capable of believing, and
so I should like you to write me just a line on the matter."

CONTROVERSIES WITH GENERAL MILES 181
To this Governor Murphy replied immediately : ' ' Thank
you greatly for calling my attention to the report which
has reached you. You are entirely correct in your opinion
of it. It is a lie in its statement and in its inference. ' '
In response to this, the President wrote, on October 10,
1903 : "I thank you for your letter. It is exactly the letter
I supposed I would get from you. Perhaps the report orig
inated as you suggest — most likely General Miles simply
made it up from the beginning."

CHAPTER XVII
THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT
When Roosevelt became President the vital question
about the control of trusts or great corporations was
whether the National Government had the power to exercise
such control. A decision of the Supreme Court in 1895,
in a suit brought under President Cleveland's administra
tion against the Sugar Trust, held in effect that under the
Constitution the National Government had not such power.
The suit had been brought under the Sherman anti-trust
law of 1890, which was designed to destroy monopoly and
curb industrial combinations like the Sugar and Tobacco
Trusts. The decision of the Supreme Court, known as the
Knight decision, was in effect that the National Govern
ment had no power over the corporations, and it was so
interpreted by them, for under it, virtually all the trusts
in the country were formed later. One of them, known as
the Northern Securities Company, was formed shortly be
fore Roosevelt became President, and was a union or
merger of practically the entire railway system of the
Northwest, the chief lines being the Northern Pacific and
Great Northern Roads.
Early in 1902 the President took up with the Attorney
"General, Philander C. Knox, the question of testing the
legality of this merger in the courts. The Attorney Gen
eral advised him that, in his judgment, an action would be
sustained. Without consultation with other members of
his Cabinet, the President directed the Attorney General
to begin the suit. No intimation of his purpose had reached
the public, and when, on the late afternoon of February 19,
1902, Mr. Knox gave out through the press a brief an
nouncement that the President had so directed him, a tre-
182

THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 183
mendous commotion followed. Mr. Knox simply said that
some time previous the President had requested an opinion
from him as to the legality of the merger and that he had
recently given him one to the effect that, in his judgment,
the merger violated the Sherman Act of 1890 ; whereupon,
the President had directed him to have suitable action taken
to have the question judicially determined ; a bill in equity
was in preparation, and it was probable that proceedings
would be instituted in a Federal Court in Minnesota.
This announcement was published in the morning news
papers of February 20, 1902, its publication having been
withheld till after the close of the stock market for obvious
reasons. It fell upon the financial world literally like a bolt
from the blue. The members of the President's Cabinet,
with the single exception of the Attorney General, got their
first intimation of the President's purpose from the news
papers. The chief personages in the merger were J. Pier
pont Morgan and James J. Hill, undisputed kings of the
financial and railway worlds. They employed as legal ad
visers the ablest lawyers in the country, recognized leaders
of the bar throughout the land. Not one of these advisers,
it was shown subsequently, shared the view taken by Mr.
Knox. Many of them were openly vocal in their indigna
tion and contempt, declaring that the President had been
led into an act of folly on the advice of "an unknown coun
try lawyer from Pennsylvania. ' ' Precisely this statement
was made to me by one of them, and when I reported it to
the President, he replied: "They will know this country
lawyer before this suit is ended," a prophecy which was
amply fulfilled.
The effect of the news of the suit in Wall Street was thus
recorded in the stock market report of the Tribune on
February 21:
"Not since the assassination of President McKinley has
the stock market had such a sudden shock as was caused"
by the announcement on Wednesday night of President
Roosevelt's purpose to proceed to test the legality of the

184 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
merger of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Roads.
Not the slightest intimation of the President's proposed
move reached Wall Street in the course of the day on
Wednesday. ' '
For the first time in many years the National Adminis
tration had acted in a matter of great financial importance
without any advance news of its purpose reaching Wall
Street. That in itself was a disturbing fact for it showed
that all existing avenues of "inside information" had been
closed. The Attorney General filed a bill in equity in the United
States Circuit Court at St. Paul on March 10. The defense
was based expressly on the ground that the Supreme Court
in the Knight case had explicitly sanctioned the formation
of such a company as the Northern Securities Company.
The representatives of privilege intimated, and sometimes
asserted outright, that in directing the action to be brought
the President had shown a lack of respect for the Supreme
Court, which had already decided the question at issue by
a vote of eight to one.
J. Pierpont Morgan went to Washington and had an in
terview with the President, Attorney General Knox being
present. Mr. Morgan protested against the President's
conduct in acting without letting him know of his purpose
in advance. The President replied: "That is just what
we did not want to do." "If we have done anything
wrong," said Mr. Morgan, "send your man (meaning the
Attorney General) to my man (naming one of his lawyers)
and they can fix it up." "That can't be done," said the
President. "We don't want to fix it up," added Mr. Knox,
' ' we want to stop it. " Then Mr. Morgan asked : ' ' Are you
going to attack my other interests, the Steel Trust and the
others?" "Certainly not," replied the President, "unless
we find out that in any case they have done something that
we regard as wrong."
When Mr. Morgan retired, the President said to Mr.
Knox: "That is a most illuminating illustration of the

THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 185
Wall Street point of view. Mr. Morgan could not help
regarding me as a big rival operator, who either intended
to ruin all' his interests or else could be induced to come to
an agreement to ruin none. ' '
I was informed later by one of Mr. Morgan's counsel that
Mr. Morgan went to his hotel and wrote a very indignant
and violent letter to the President which was never deliv
ered because it was stopped on the way by my informant,
who persuaded the irate financial magnate of its unwisdom.
The case was first tried in the United States Circuit Court
at St. Paul and a decision in favor of the Government was
rendered on April 9, 1903. It was appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States and was argued in behalf of the
Northern Securities Company by the ablest corporation
lawyers in the country. It was admitted that the conten
tion of these lawyers that the merger had been sanctioned
by the Knight decision was sound, and the question pre
sented to the Supreme Court was simply whether it would
reverse itself by reversing that decision. This it decided
to do, by a vote of 5 to 4, on March 14, 1904, when it ren
dered a majority decision that the merger had been formed
in violation of the Sherman Law. The power of the Gov
ernment to exercise control over combinations was thereby
permanently established, and the result was hailed as a
notable triumph for the President and the Attorney Gen
eral. The New York Tribune said of it on March 15, 1904 :
"The decision completely justifies the much denounced
action of President Roosevelt. It is not he who stops the
merger, but the Supreme Court. The highest tribunal in
the nation decides that the plan to control these competing
railroads is illegal. Those who formed it may think that
a hard saying and a wrong one, but they cannot blame the
President as an irresponsible disorganizer for taking the
same view of the law as the Supreme Court, nor complain
because he requires them to obey the law, and when he
thinks they are disobeying it submits the question to judi
cial decision."

186 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The action of the President was subjected to sharp criti
cism until the final verdict was rendered but he was able
to retain his equanimity under it, as his private corre
spondence shows. On May 6, 1902, he sent this letter of
introduction to the Attorney General:
"This is my good friend, Mr. Smalley, a correspondent
of the London Times. I want him to have a talk with you,
because in New York he lives at the Metropolitan Club and
meets largely the gentlemen who since the merger suit
have crossed themselves at the mention of our names."

On June 3, 1902, he wrote to General James H. Wilson:
"I am sorry that the financial men should be tempted to
criticize me but I have never been more certain of anything
than that I was right in taking the actions which they crit
icize. It is above all to the interests of the men of great
wealth that the people at large should understand that they
also have to obey the law."
Following closely upon the decision in favor of the Gov
ernment by the St. Paul Circuit Court, the Attorney Gen
eral, on May 10, 1902, began proceedings against the Beef
Trust, filing a petition to restrain it in the United States
Circuit Court of the Northern District of Illinois. A deci
sion in favor of the Government was rendered by this court
on May 26, 1903, and affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States on January 31, 1905. Other similar suits
of minor importance were instituted at this time and won
by the Government. During the years following 1903,
there were others of large importance instituted and won
by the Government.
When, in April, 1903, the Supreme Court of the United
States rendered its decision upholding the New York Fran
chise Tax Law, the news of the court's action reached Pres
ident Roosevelt while he was on a speaking tour in the
West. He expressed his natural gratification in a letter
to Secretary Knox, which is notable also for its reference

THE NORTHERN SECURITIES SUIT 187
to educational influences which may affect the minds of
judges as well as laymen : Ottumwa, Iowa,
April 28, 1903.
"I have just received a telegram to the effect that the
Franchise Tax Law in New York has been declared consti
tutional by the Supreme Court. This was something very
near my heart for I felt that the Franchise Tax Law was the
most definite and important contribution to decent and in
telligent government made by me while I was Governor.
I am, therefore, very much pleased with the news. I write
you because I think that the reflex action of what you have
done during the past year and a quarter is in no small de
gree responsible for the decision. The courts can be edu
cated just as the public can be educated, and the suits you.
have carried on and the decisions you have secured in the
United States Courts have had, I am convinced, a very pro
found effect elsewhere. Unless I am greatly mistaken one
of the places where this effect is visible is this Franchise
Tax decision."

CHAPTER XVIII
INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR
The year 1902 was one of incessant activity for Roosevelt
and was fairly crowded with events of far-reaching impor
tance. Next in importance to the beginning of proceedings
against the trusts was the settlement of the great anthracite
coal strike, which will be considered comprehensively in the
next chapter. In the midst of these larger activities the
President was able to find time for the consideration of
many matters of scarcely less vital moment. He had recom
mended earnestly in his first annual message to Congress
that reciprocal trade relations be established with Cuba. A
bill granting reciprocity passed the House but was held up
in the Senate through the influence of the powerful beet-
sugar interests. While it was pending, ex-President Cleve
land wrote a letter, on January 21, 1902, which was pub
lished, in which he came to the support of the President
very heartily, saying:
"It seems to me that this subject involves considerations
of morality and conscience higher and more commanding
than all others.
"The obligations arising from these considerations
cannot be better or more forcibly defined than was done
by President Roosevelt in his message to Congress, nor bet
ter emphasized than has been done by Secretary Root, and
yet Congress waits, while we occasionally hear of conces
sions which rich sugar interests might approve in behalf of
trembling Cuba."
The President sent a special message to the Senate in
June, urging the passage of the bill on the ground of simple
justice to Cuba, but the Senate refused to heed the request.
188

INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 189
A year later, however, a treaty of reciprocity with Cuba,
together with a treaty with Colombia in regard to an Isth
mian Canal, was negotiated and both were ratified by the
Senate in February, 1903, after the President had sent an
ultimatum to that body saying that if the treaties were not
ratified by March 4 he should call an extra session for their
consideration. On March 11, 1902, the President sent his first veto mes
sage to the Senate, refusing to sign a bill removing the
charge of desertion from the naval record of a man who had
deserted during the Civil War. Being his first deliverance
of the kind the President's words attracted wide attention
and elicited general approval :
"There can be no graver crime than the crime of deser
tion from the army and navy, especially during war; it is
then high treason to the Nation, and justly punishable by
death. No man should be relieved from such a crime, espe
cially when nearly forty years have passed since it oc
curred, save on the clearest possible proof of his real inno
cence. In this case the statement made by the affiant be
fore the committee does not in all points agree with his
statement made to the Secretary of the Navy. In any event
it is incomprehensible to me that he should not have made
effective effort to get back into the Navy. He had served
but little more than a month when he deserted, and the war
lasted for over a year afterward. Yet he made no effort
whatever to get back into the war. Under such circum
stances it seems to me that to remove the charge of deser
tion from the Navy and give him an honorable discharge
would be to falsify the records and do an injustice to his
gallant and worthy comrades who fought the war to a finish.
The names of the veterans who fought in the Civil War
make the honor list of the Republic, and I am not willing to
put upon it the name of a man unworthy of the high posi
tion." The President did not permit the pressure of matters of
really momentous importance to turn his attention from his

190 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
inflexible purpose to have appointments in the public ser
vice based on merit and fitness alone. One of his earliest
acts after taking office was to write to Cardinal Gibbons,
and to heads of the Protestant Church, asking their aid in
securing for the army and navy as chaplains men of char
acter and special fitness for the position. On June 10, 1902,
he wrote a letter to the Secretaries of War and the Navy,
of like import, saying :
"I want to see that hereafter no chaplain is appointed
in the Army (and Navy) who is not a first-class man— a
man who by education and training will be fitted to asso
ciate with his fellow-officers, and yet who has in him the
zeal and the practical sense which will enable him to do
genuine work for the enlisted men. Above all, I want chap
lains who will go in to do this work just as the best officers
of the line or staff or the medical profession go in to do
their work. I want to see that if possible we never appoint
a man who desires the position as a soft job. How would
it do to have the applicants of the different creeds pass
some kind of examination before really high-grade clergy
men of their own creeds ? That is, to see that any Episco
pal chaplain has the backing of some such man as Bishop
Potter, Bishop Satterlee, or Bishop Doane; that a Meth
odist was backed in the same way ; and so on through the
different creeds."
Concerning a letter which the Postmaster General had
referred to him for comment, he sent on March 20, 1902, this
suggestion :
"How would it do to answer this letter by pointing out
the extreme difficulty of adopting a rule in reference to the
Illinois Senators which we adopt in reference to no other
Senators whatever? We do not remove any postmasters
unless on charges, but when it comes to a new appointment
we confine ourselves to asking whether the man recom
mended is a thoroughly fit and proper man, giving prefer
ence to the man who is in where we legitimately can."

INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 191
Conditions in the Philippine Islands, where the United
States Government was engaged in suppressing a native
insurrection, were attracting much attention in the spring
of 1902, and reports of barbarous cruelties by American
soldiers upon native prisoners were published in the press.
An order was also published in April, 1902, which General
J. H. Smith, nicknamed "Hell-Roaring Jake," had issued to
his troops directing them to "kill and burn and make a
howling wilderness of Samar." This naturally aroused
much indignation throughout the country, and the anti-
Imperialist faction that had vehemently opposed the tak
ing over of the Philippines instead of making them an in
dependent nation, raised a great clamor about it, demand
ing that the United States troops, be withdrawn at once and
the Filipinos be left to rule themselves. The President
acted at once, sending this order to the Secretary of War :
"Please instruct Governor Taft when he returns to the
Islands to appoint a Commission, say, of three men of the
highest integrity and capacity to report on the conduct of
the military government at the present time toward the
natives and as to whether or not any brutalities or indig
nities are inflicted by the army upon the natives."
On May 9, 1902, he wrote to Bishop Lawrence of Massa
chusetts :
"I hope it is unnecessary to say that no one in the coun
try can be more anxious than I am — save perhaps Secretary
Root — to discover and punish every instance of barbarity
by our troops in the Philippines. No provocation, however
great, can be accepted as an excuse for misuse of the nec
essary severity of war, and above all not for torture of any
kind or shape. Long before any statements had been made
public, and before any action had been taken by Congress,
the War Department had ordered a rigid investigation of
certain of the charges ; the orders of investigation having
gone out over three months ago. The investigation will be
of the most thorough and sweeping character, and if neces-

192 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
sary, will be made by the civil as well as by the military
representatives of the Government in the Islands."
When the clamor over the charges was at its height the
President, on May 30, 1902, delivered the Memorial Day
address in Arlington Cemetery, in which he said:
"Determined and unswerving effort must be made, and
has been and is being made, to find out every instance of
barbarity on the part of our troops, to punish those guilty
of it, and to take, if possible, even stronger measures than
have already been taken to minimize or prevent the occur
rence of all such acts in the future.
"Is it only in the army in the Philippines that Americans
sometimes commit deeds that cause all other Americans to
regret ? No ! From time to time there occur in our country,
to the deep and lasting shame of our people, lynchings car
ried on under circumstances of inhuman cruelty and bar
barity — cruelty infinitely worse than any that has ever been
committed by our troops in the Philippines ; worse to the
victims, and far more brutalizing to those guilty of it. The
men who fail to condemn these lynchings, and yet clamor
about what has been done in the Philippines, are indeed
guilty of neglecting the beam in their own eye while taunt
ing their brother about the mote in his. Understand me.
These lynchings afford us no excuse for failure to stop
cruelty in the Philippines. But keep in mind that these
cruelties in the Philippines have been wholly exceptional,
and have been shamelessly exaggerated. We deeply and
bitterly regret that they should have been committed, no
matter how rarely, no matter under what provocation, by
American troops. But they afford far less ground for a
general condemnation of our army than these lynchings
afford for the condemnation of the communities in which
they occur. In each case it is well to condemn the deed,
and it is well also to refrain from including both guilty and
innocent in the same sweeping condemnation."
This denunciation of lynchings in the South was greeted
with commendation in the North as a characteristically

INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 193
brave utterance of ideas which many entertained but few
had the courage to express in public. In the South it was
denounced bitterly as a sectional utterance, unjust and ill-
timed, but the effect of it throughout the country, including
the South, was to impress forcibly upon the minds of all
thinking persons the real nature of the Southern lynchings
and hence to arouse effective sentiment against them.
As Secretary of War, Mr. Root was responsible for the
administration of affairs in the Philippines, and his staunch
defense of the military and civil authorities there subjected
him to a large share of the hostile criticism. The President
replying to one critic, a Boston clergyman, who had written
to him on the subject, wrote as follows, on June 17, 1902 :
"Just at the moment Mr. Root has been savagely at
tacked. Now Mr. Root, by himself and through Governor
Taft and General Wood and other military and civilian
assistants, has done work which I regard as making the
United States always his debtor. He gave up the position
of leader of the New York bar, with a practise which
brought him in over $100,000 a year, to come down here. If
he serves through my term he will have made a pecuniary
sacrifice of over half a million dollars in order to do the
work he has undertaken. He has worked so as almost to
wear himself out. I am obliged continually to try to make
him ease up and to get him to go out riding with me. He
has not one thought save how to benefit the public service,
how to see that the Army is kept up to the highest standard,
how to secure the faithful fulfilment of our obligations to
Cuba, how to help bring peace and enlightenment and self-
government in the Philippines. During these three years
he has performed a mass of work such as has been per
formed by no other minister of any civilized nation during
the same time, nor has any other minister in any govern
ment of any civilized nation had a task so important which
at the same time he has fulfilled so well. Yet, in spite of
this, he has been most cruelly attacked, usually without any
basis at all, sometimes because an occasional subordinate
has done wrong — or even, as with every other public man

194 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
from Washington and Lincoln down, because an occasional
mistake has been made under him in the Department itself.
' ' There is plenty to criticize in our public life, but I have
never met in any occupation a higher standard of fidelity
to the public good than I meet in many of the men with
whom I have been brought into intimate contact — judges,
Senators, Congressmen, executive officials."
To another, a head of the Catholic Church in a Western
State, he wrote on August 5, 1902 :
"Most assuredly, my dear sir, all that I can do will be
done to see that the Philippine Islands are administered in
the interest, moral and spiritual no less than material and
intellectual, of their inhabitants, and wherever possible, in
accordance with the wishes of the Filipinos. As you doubt
less know, when we took over the Islands there was practi
cally no indication of system at all, so far as the bulk of the
people were concerned. There was no foundation on which
to build. We had to start absolutely new."
When the flood of criticism was at its height, the Presi
dent declared in an address : ' ' The Republic has put up its
flag in those Islands, and the flag will stay there. Where
wrong has been done by any one the wrongdoer shall be
punished, but we shall not halt in our great work because
some man has happened to do wrong. ' '
As soon as the news of General Smith's order to "kill
and burn" reached him, the President, on April 15, 1902,
directed that a court of inquiry be instituted to investigate
it, and when the court returned a verdict of guilty, the
President, on June 16, 1902, ordered the General's retire
ment, saying that "while it is impossible to tell exactly how
much influence the order had in inciting the commission of
deeds which we all regret, his worse than injudicious pro
cedure has destroyed his further usefulness in the active
service of the army."
After the storm of criticism had subsided he received a

INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 195
cordial letter of confidence and approval from Prof. Albert
Bushnell Hart, of Harvard University, to which he replied
on October 30, 1902 :
"The President is not in a position to know how he is
regarded, and moreover, if he has any sense at all he is
entirely aware of the way in which public favor veers and
changes. I have not the slightest idea how I am really
regarded now and of course no human being can tell how
I shall be regarded in a year or two hence. But this is not
the important thing. If a man is worth his salt in such a
position as mine he must appreciate the well-nigh terrible
responsibilities upon him so deeply as to lose all uneasiness
about his own personal fortunes. If I can keep the sincere
good will of men like yourself I shall feel tolerably confi
dent that I have deserved it. In that case I shall be more
than rewarded, no matter what comes in the future."
In June, 1902, the President attended the Commence
ment exercises of Harvard University, his Alma Mater, and
was given the honorary degree of LL.D. In conferring it
President Eliot said: "President of the United States,
from his youth a member of this society of scholars, now
in his prime a true type of the sturdy gentleman and the
high-minded public servant of a democracy." Speaking
at the alumni dinner on June 25, 1902, President Roosevelt,
after saying that it was "a liberal education in high-
minded statesmanship to sit at the same council table with
John Hay," devoted himself mainly to eulogizing the work
of three men who were performing distinguished public
service under his administration — Leonard Wood, Gov
ernor of Cuba; Elihu Root, Secretary of War~ and William
H. Taft, Governor of the Philippines.
In closing his address he said : ' ' Those three men have
rendered inestimable service to the American people. I can
do nothing for them. I can show my appreciation of them
in no way save the wholly insufficient one of standing up
for them, and for their work ; and that I will do as long
as I have tongue to speak!"

196 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Secretary Hay, who was present on the occasion, wrote
to the President from Boston, on the following day:
Hotel Touraine,
June 26, 1902.
Dear Theodore:
I must congratulate you with all my heart on yesterday's
triumph — it was nothing less. That great company was a
corps d'elite, and you had them with you from start to
finish. President Eliot, when you sat down, said, "What
a man! Genius, force, and courage, and such evident
honesty ! ' '
And another thought was in everybody's mind, also.
"He is so young and he will be with us for many a day
to come." We are all glad of that, even the old fellows,
who are passing.
I can never tell you how much I thank you for your kind
reference to me. But your splendid defense of Root, Wood,
and Taft touched me still more deeply. It was the speech
of a great ruler, and a great gentleman — and will not be
forgotten. I am feeling better this morning and expect a few days
in Newbury, N. H, will set me up — for the end of the
session. Yours affectionately, John Hay.
On August 22 President Roosevelt left Oyster Bay for
a speaking tour through New England, delivering ad
dresses in the principal cities and towns. In all of them
he explained fully his views in regard to the chief ques
tions which he had been pressing upon Congress, laying
special stress upon the necessity for legislation affecting
trusts, Cuba and the Philippines and Porto Rico, and se
curing the building of the Isthmian Canal. While near
Pittsfield, Mass., on September 3, he escaped, literally by a
hair's breadth, from instant death. A trolley car, going at
a high rate of speed, collided squarely with the carriage in
which he was riding, an open landau drawn by four horses,

INCIDENTS OF A BUSY YEAR 197
smashing the vehicle, killing instantly a secret service man
who sat on the box with the driver, and throwing out with
great violence the occupants of the carriage, the President,
Governor W. Murray Crane, and Mr. Cortelyou, private
secretary to the President. The President was thrown
fully forty feet, falling on his right cheek, and escaped
death almost by a miracle. Governor Crane and Mr. Cor
telyou were bruised but not seriously injured. The Presi
dent was on his feet at once, crying out : "lam not hurt, ' '
and asking eagerly for the safety of his companions. He
was deeply pained by the death of the secret service man,
William Craig, who had been a most faithful attendant
upon him in all his journeyings. He returned to Oyster
Bay, arriving there in the evening, with the whole right side
of his face swollen and colored a deep purple, and one leg
badly bruised. In spite of his injuries, he started on the fol
lowing day, September 4, for a tour in the South and West,
speaking first at Wheeling, West Va., on September 6. He
visited during the ensuing three weeks, Virginia, Tennessee,
Ohio, Michigan and Indiana, and ended his tour at Indian
apolis on September 24, when an abscess that had developed
on his injured leg, and which threatened to affect the bone,
compelled him to return to Washington. His addresses
during this tour were similar to those delivered in New
England in their emphasis upon the leading questions of
his administration.

CHAPTER XIX
COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT
In the fall of 1902 President Roosevelt performed a service
to the nation which ranks in history as one of the most
patriotic and beneficent of his career, but which, when he
entered upon it, was denounced with more bitterness than
almost any other of his public acts. A universal strike of
the miners in the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania,
involving about 150,000 men, was instituted in the spring of
that year and continued, with steadily increasing animosity
between the mine operators and mine workers, through
the summer and into the autumn, with no prospects of
settlement. Its progress was marked with many acts of
violence on the part of the strikers against the non-union
laborers whom the operators were trying to employ. The
Governor of Pennsylvania had been appealed to and had
sent militia to the mines for the protection of life and
property, but though there were in the later stages of the
strike about 2,000 of these troops, they had shown them
selves unable to put a stop to violence. It was estimated
that during the rioting twenty persons had been killed and
about forty injured, and that much property had been de
stroyed. The Governor was subjected to sharp criticism
for the inefficiency of the force and was accused of sym
pathy with the strikers. Although called upon repeatedly
to confess the inadequacy of the State militia to restore
and preserve order, and to appeal to the National Govern
ment to come to the aid of the State, he refused to do so.
With the approach of winter, a general feeling of alarm
began to spread over the land, especially in the East, for
in all States east of the Mississippi River anthracite coal
was the almost exclusive fuel, and the supply had fallen so
198

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 199
low by September 1 that it was practically impossible to
obtain any except in small quantities. Total failure of the
supply seemed imminent, and this meant appalling distress
in the entire East, with peril of rioting in all the large
cities. All persons in authority were seeking anxiously for
some powerful means by which to bring about a settlement.
The operators of the mines, who had united in an associa
tion of their own, were deaf to all appeals, believing that
if they held out a little longer the sufferings of the miners
would compel them to yield — that they would be starved
into submission. They persisted in declaring, in spite of
indisputable evidence to the contrary, that there was no
danger of a coal famine, that there was an existing supply
ample for the winter's needs, and that they were deter
mined to permit no outside interference with the manage
ment of their own business.
President Roosevelt had been watching the situation with
much solicitude for several weeks, and his anxiety had been
increased by appeals which came to him when the advent
of cold weather drew near, to take some action to avert the
calamities which were threatening. The Governor of
Massachusetts, the Mayors of New York and other large
cities in the imperiled region, sent word to him that if the
existing coal scarcity continued and became, as seemed
likely, a famine, the misery throughout the East would be
come appalling and the consequent public disorder so great
that frightful consequences might ensue.
Writing to Senator Lodge, on September 27, 1902, the
President gave this account of the difficulties in the way of
action on his part and the political considerations which
were hindering a settlement:
"The real concrete trouble is in connection with the coal
strike. There is literally nothing, so far as I have yet been
able to find out, which the National Government has any
power to do in the matter. I have been in consultation with
Quay, on the one hand, and with Sargent on the other, as
to what I can do, each of them having been in touch with
both the representatives of the operators and with Mitchell.

200 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
One of the great troubles in dealing with the operators is
that their avowed determination in connection with the
present matter is to do away with what they regard as the
damage done to them by submitting to interference for
political reasons in 1900. From the outset they have said
that they are never going to submit again to having their
laborers given a triumph over them for pohtical purposes,
as Senator Hanna secured the triumph in 1900. They are
now repeating with great bitterness that they do not intend
to allow Quay to bully them into making any concession
for his political ends, any more than they would to allow
Hanna do it for his.
"Unfortunately the strength of my public position be
fore the country is also its weakness. I am genuinely inde
pendent of the big moneyed men in all matters where I think
the interests of the public are concerned, and probably I am
the first President of recent times of whom this could be
truthfully said. I think it right and desirable that this
should be true of the President. But where I do not grant
any favors to these big moneyed men which I do not think
the country requires that they should have, it is out of the
question for me to expect them to grant favors to me in
return. I treat them precisely as I treat other citizens;
that is, I consider their interests so far as my duty requires
and so far as I think the needs of the country warrant. In
return they will support me in so far as they are actuated
purely by public spirit simply as accordingly they think
I am or am not doing well ; and so far as they are actuated
solely by their private interests they will support me only
on points where they think it is to their interest to do so.
The sum of this is that I can make no private or special
appeal to them, and I am at my wits' end how to proceed."
On September 27, 1902, he wrote also to Senator Hanna
on the same subject:
"What gives me the greatest concern at the moment is
the coal famine. Of course, we have nothing whatever to
do with this coal strike and no earthly responsibility for it.

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 201
But the public at large will tend to visit upon our heads
responsibility for the shortage in coal precisely as Kansas
and Nebraska visited upon our heads their failure to raise
good crops in the arid belt, eight, ten, or a dozen years ago.
I do not see what I can do, and I know the coal operators
are especially distrustful of anything which they regard
as in the nature of political interference. But I do most
earnestly feel that from every consideration of public
policy and of good morals they should make some slight
concession." To this Senator Hanna replied on September 28, 1902 :
"I am in receipt of yours of the 27th inst. and reply that
I share with you the anxiety in regard to the coal situation.
After leaving Oyster Bay I spent the balance of the week in
New York raising money for the Congressional Committee,
and trying to see what more could be done with the strike.
Confidentially, I saw Mr. Mitchell (the public knows noth
ing about that). I got from Mr. Morgan a proposition as
to what he would do in the matter. And I got Mitchell to
agree to accept it if the operators would abide by the deci
sion. I really felt encouraged — to think I was about to
accomplish a settlement. I went to Philadelphia and saw
Mr. Baer (George F. Baer, President of the Reading Rail
road) and to my surprise he absolutely refused to enter
tain it. You can see how determined they are. It looks as
if it was only to be settled when the miners are starved
to it. And that may be weeks ahead as they are getting
liberal supplies from their fellow workmen all over the
country. "I am not unmindful of the importance of this coal situa
tion and will not miss an opportunity to help it if I can. But
the position of the operators from the beginning has put
all efforts of mine in a false light before the public so I am
only able to hold the confidence of the men, and serve them
if I can."
From this point to its successful conclusion, the story of
the President's efforts is best told in the letters that he

202 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
wrote and received during their progress. On September
30, 1902, he wrote to Senator Lodge:
"After consultation with Root, Knox, Murray Crane and
others on the one side, and after previous consultation with
Senator Quay, Sargent and others from their standpoint,
I have been inclined to think that there was a chance of my
doing something anyhow. I have not yet worked the matter
out perfectly clearly in my mind, but yesterday Root went
to see Morgan and explained to him that in three or four
days I should take some action, probably by inviting the
operators to come to see me and requesting in good faith
an effort on their part to come to an agreement, by arbitra
tion or otherwise, with the miners. Thus I shall have a
free hand to do what I deem best. I may be unable to do
anything now, but I may tell them that I shall advise action
along the lines I have explained in my speeches but of a
much more radical type in reference to their business unless
they wake up. I am also, however, to see the representa
tives of the coal miners. At any rate I am thoroughly
awake and will do what I can. ' '
On October 1, he invited the operators and representa
tives of the mine workers to come to Washington on October
3, for consultation with him for the purpose of endeavoring
to reach a settlement. When this was announced, a storm of
protest came from the newspapers which had been uphold
ing the cause of the operators in the strike. They declared
that his course was without authority under the Constitu
tion, that its immediate effect would be to prolong the strike
by encouraging the strikers to persist, and that for a Presi
dent to interfere in the affairs of private corporations was
a proceeding so unconstitutional as to make him liable to
impeachment. The invitation was accepted by both parties to the con
troversy, and in a brief address to them on assembling the
President made it very clear that he did not for a moment
assume that he had any authority whatever for his action:
"I disclaim any right or duty to intervene in this way

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 203
upon legal grounds or upon any official relation that I bear
to the situation; but the urgency and the terrible nature
of the catastrophe impending over a large portion of our
people in the shape of a winter fuel famine impel me, after
much anxious thought, to believe that my duty requires me
to use whatever influence I personally can to bring to an
end a situation which has become literally intolerable.
With all the earnestness there is in me I ask that there be
an immediate resumption of operations in the coal mines in
some such way as will, without a day's unnecessary delay,
meet the crying needs of the people. I do not invite a dis
cussion of your respective claims and positions. I appeal
to your patriotism, to the spirit that sinks personal con
sideration and makes individual sacrifices for the general
good." The operators showed very plainly that they resented
the President's action and had come in a thoroughly bel
ligerent and uncompromising mood. Immediately after
the close of the conference, the President wrote to Senator
Hanna, October 3, 1902 :
"Well, I have tried and failed. I feel downhearted over
the result, both because of the great misery made for the
mass of our people, and because the attitude of the opera
tors will beyond a doubt double the burden on us while
standing between them and socialistic action. But I am
glad I tried anyhow. I should have hated to feel that I had
failed to make any effort. What my next move will be I
cannot yet say. I feel most strongly that the attitude of
the operators is one which accentuates the need of the
Government having some power of supervision and regula
tion over such corporations. I should like to make a fairly
radical experiment on the anthracite coal companies to
start with! At the meeting to-day the operators assumed
a fairly hopeless attitude. None of them appeared to such
advantage as Mitchell, whom most of them denounced with
such violence and rancor that I felt he did very well to
keep his temper. Between times they insulted me for not

204 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
preserving order (and they evidently ignored such a tri
fling detail as the United States Constitution) and attacked
Knox for not having brought suit against the Miners Union
as violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law."
Reports of the conference were published in the news
papers of October 4, and on the following day the President
received, what was undoubtedly one of the most welcome
and gratifying letters of his life, the following from Grover
Cleveland : Princeton, October 4, 1902.
My dear Mr. President:
I read in the paper this morning on my way home from
Buzzard's Bay, the newspaper account of what took place
yesterday between you and the parties directly concerned
in the coal strike.
I am so surprised and "stirred up" by the position taken
by the contestants that I cannot refrain from making a
suggestion which perhaps I would not presume to make if
I gave the subject more thought. I am especially disturbed
and vexed by the tone and substance of the operators' de
liverances. It cannot be that either side, after your admonition to
them, cares to stand in their present plight, if any sort of
an avenue, even for temporary escape, is suggested to them.
Has it ever been proposed to them that the indignation
and dangerous condemnation now being launched against
both their houses might be allayed by the production of
coal in an amount, or for a length of time, sufficient to serve
the necessities of consumers, leaving the parties to the
quarrel, after such necessities are met, to take up the fight
again where they left off "without prejudice" if they
desire ?
This would eliminate the troublesome consumer and pub
lic; and perhaps both operators and miners would see
enough advantage in that, to induce them to listen to such
a proposition as I have suggested.
I know there would be nothing philosophical or consis-

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 205
tent in all this ; but my observation leads me to think that
when quarreling parties are both in the wrong, and are
assailed with blame so nearly universal, they will do strange
things to save their faces.
If you pardon my presumption in thus writing you, I
promise never to do it again. At any rate it may serve
as an indication of the anxiety felt by millions of our citi
zens on the subject.
I have been quite impressed by a pamphlet I have lately
read, by a Mr. Champlin of Boston, entitled, I believe, "The
Coal Mines and the People." I suppose you have seen it.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,
Grover Cleveland.
To the President.
This letter was not given out to the public, of course;
neither was any hint given of its existence. If it had been
published, the effect upon the furious denouncers of the
President's course would have been ludicrous in the ex
treme, for they were declaring that he was doing what no
other President had ever done, or had ever thought of
doing; and yet here was the only living Democratic ex-
President upholding him in what they called his unconsti
tutional and revolutionary course!
To Mr. Cleveland's letter, the President replied on Octo
ber 5, 1902, in a letter which gives what may be called the
historic account of the proceedings at the conference. It is
here published in full for the first time. October 5, 1902.
My dear Mr. Cleveland:
Your letter was a real help and comfort to me. Through
out this matter I have been thinking of what you and Mr.
Olney did in the Pullman car strike, and have been going
over with Carroll D. Wright what, from his inside knowl
edge, he believed were your views at that time ; and if ever
the necessity arises for my interference to restore order
in Pennsylvania on the call of the constituted authorities

206 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
or to protect government property by force of the United
States regular army, I shall try to use this force with the
same firmness that you showed. But it has been rather
exasperating to have our more foolish friends yelhng that
it was my business to send troops into Pennsylvania, when
there is as yet no more warrant for doing so than there is
for Mayor Low to send his New York police there. Of
course, as a matter of fact, I cannot send them in at present,
when no government property has been menaced and when
there has been no appeal to me by the constituted authori
ties. I would have just as much right to send them to Troy
when there was a railroad strike; or to have demanded
them when I was Police Commissioner and there was a
clothing cutters' strike.
The attitude of the coal operators at the conference be
fore me was very exasperating. They used language
toward Mitchell and his colleagues which was well calcu
lated to make them so angry that they would consent to
nothing. They refused point blank to even consider what
I regarded as Mitchell's entirely fair proposition. Some
of them assailed me for not having put troops into Penn
sylvania — they might just as well have assailed you for
not leading an independent body of coal and iron police
thither — and one, Mr. Wilcox, made a long argument to
show that the Attorney General was derelict in his duty
in not bringing suit to dissolve the labor union on the
ground that it was violating the Sherman Law. This last
proposition, by the way, may be considered as an offset to
the proposition contained in Mr. Champlin 's pamphlet to
which you refer. Under the Sherman Act Mr. Wilcox, on
behalf of the operators, wishes me to bring suit against the
miners, and Mr. Champlin that I should bring suit against
the operators in the interest of the miners. Of course, if
I brought suit against either I should probably have to
bring suit against both, and under the decision in the sugar
case it seems to me perfectly clear that neither the miners
nor the operators, as such, could possibly be held to have
violated the Sherman Law.

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 207
I am very reluctant in view of the operators' attitude
toward me to propose any plan to them at all. Curiously
enough, if they had given me an opportunity I should have
proposed just the plan you outlined, that is, that there
should be a resumption of operations until April first, up
to which time the two parties might seek to reach an agree
ment; and then, when the distress of the public would not
be so terrible on account of the approach of warm weather,
there would be less damage from their going on with their
quarrel. By the way, you may have noticed that your old friend,
The Sun, is now attacking me with the same infamous dis
regard of truth that it used in its assaults upon you.
I think I shall now tell Mitchell that if the miners will
go back to work I will appoint a commission to investigate
the whole situation and will do whatever in my power lies
to have the findings of such commission favorably acted
upon. This seems to be the only step I can now take, or
at least the best step at the moment to take. I feel the
gravest apprehension concerning the misery pending over
so many people this winter and the consequent rioting
which may and probably will ensue.
Now, my dear sir, let me thank you again for the real aid
and comfort you have given me. You know what a pleasure
it is to hear from you at any time. By the way, I was very
glad to be able to make your friend O'Reilly Surgeon
General. I know how well you think of him.
With warm regards to Mrs. Cleveland, Faithfully yours,
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.
Hon. Grover Cleveland,
Princeton, N. J.
P. S. Of course, if the Pennsylvania authorities would
do their whole duty, there would be no need to appeal to
me at all.
Writing to Robert Bacon, on October 5, 1902, the Presi
dent said:

208 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"The situation is bad, especially because it is possible
it may grow infinitely worse. If when the severe weather
comes on there is a coal famine I dread to think of the suf
fering, in parts of our great cities especially, and I fear
there will be fuel riots of as bad a type as any bread riots
we have ever seen. Of course, once the rioting has begim,
once there is a resort to mob violence, the only thing to Ao
is to maintain order. It is a dreadful thing to be brought
face to face with the necessity of taking measures, how
ever unavoidable, which will mean the death of men who
have been maddened by want and suffering."
The radical nature of some of the appeals that reached
him is shown in a letter to Senator Lodge on October 7,
1902 :
"I am feeling my way step by step trying to get a solu
tion of the coal matter. Most of my correspondents wish
me to try something violent or impossible. A minor but
very influential part desire that I send troops at once with
out a shadow of warrant into the coal districts, or that I
bring suit against the labor organization. The others de
mand that I bring suit against the operators, or that under
the law of eminent domain, or for the purpose of protect
ing the public health, I seize their property, or appoint a
receiver, or do something else that is wholly impossible.
My great concern is, of course, to break the famine ; but I
must not be drawn into any violent step which would bring
reaction and disaster afterward."
In a statement of his position which he wrote to me on
October 13, 1902, he left no doubt as to his attitude toward
violence : ' ' Most emphatically I shall not compromise with
lawlessness. I have been told, on excellent authority, that
the disorder has been very great and of very evil kind.
On equally good authority, I am told the exact contrary.
I shall speedily find out for myself. I stand against social
ism; against anarchic disorder."
The President wrote again to Mr. Cleveland on October

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 209
10, regretting that he could not, because of the injury to his
leg, accept the latter's invitation to be his guest at Prince
ton during the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson to the
Presidency of Princeton University on the 25th of that
month, and adding:
"Now I am going to requite you ill for your hospitality
by asking you to do a service which I know you will be
most reluctant to undertake, and which I only ask because
I feel we are in the midst of so serious a crisis and one so
deeply affecting the welfare of our people.
"My efforts to get the operators and miners to agree
failed, chiefly through the fault of the operators. I then
asked the miners to go back to work so that the pressing
necessities of the public might be met, promising at once
to appoint such a commission as Mr. Mitchell had suggested
and stating that I would do all in my power to have the
recommendations of that commission adopted, of course
meaning that I should do all in my power to have whatever
legislation they advocated enacted, as well as making up
their recommendations in all other ways. But Mitchell re
fused on behalf of the miners to entertain this proposition.
In other words, both sides have resolutely persisted in
regarding first their own interests and treating the inter
ests of the public as wholly secondary, and indeed as not
to be considered at all.
"I shall now direct Carroll D. Wright to make a full and
careful investigation of the present conditions and of the
causes that have led to these conditions, including the ques
tion whether there has been violence and if so to what ex
tent ; and what if any steps should be taken to prevent the
recurrence of these conditions. I wish to join with him
two eminent men — men of such character that save in, a
crisis like this I would not dream of appealing to them to
render any Government service. In all the country there
is no man whose name would add such weight to this in
quiry as would yours. I earnestly beg you to say that you
will accept. I am well aware of the great strain I put
upon you by making such a request. I would not make it

210 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
if I did not feel that the calamity now impending over our
people may have consequences which without exaggeration
are to be called terrible ; and I feel that your services may
be invaluable to the nation at this time."
Replying on October 12, 1902, Mr. Cleveland wrote :
My dear Mr. President:
Since the receipt of your letter yesterday I have given
its subject matter serious consideration.
You rightly appreciate my reluctance to assume any
public service. I am also quite certain that if my advice
was asked as to the expediency of naming me in the con
nection you mention, I should, as a matter of judgment,
not favor it.
I cannot, however, with proper deference to your opinion,
consider this phase of the question as open to discussion.
I have therefore felt that I had only to determine whether
your request involved a duty which I ought not to avoid,
and whether my engagements and the present demands
upon my time would permit me to undertake it.
So far as the latter are concerned this is my situation:
I am to take part and say something at President Wilson's
inauguration on the 25th inst., and I have agreed to do the
same at the opening of the new building of the Chamber
of Commerce in New York on the 11th of November. My
preparation for the inaugural exercises is complete ; but for
the other occasion it is hardly begun. I am absurdly slow
in such work.
I have no idea of the time which would be exacted by a
compliance with your request, nor how early you would
expect a result from the Commission.
I feel so deeply the gravity of the situation, and I so
fully sympathize with you in your efforts to remedy pres
ent sad conditions, that I believe it is my duty to undertake
the service if I can do so and keep the engagements I have
already made.
This I will leave for your decision — only suggesting that

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 211
I ought to have the next week at least for preparation to
keep my New York engagement.
If after reading this you shall notify me that you still
think I can undertake the duty you suggest, will you deem
it amiss if I hint that I should be glad to know who the
third member of the Commission will be?
Your obedient servant,
Grover Cleveland.
This letter contains a reference to a plan which the Presi
dent had formed, but had not disclosed, when his efforts
with the operators and mine workers had failed. He had
decided that if they would not consent to the appointment
of a commission, he would resort to drastic measures, as
sume powers which the Constitution did not specifically
give him, and appoint an investigating or arbitrating com
mission without regard to whether or not the operators
asked for it or agreed to abide by its decisions. He asked
Mr. Cleveland, in the letter quoted above, to accept a place
on such a commission, with Carroll D. Wright and one
other person. Mr. Cleveland's reply, which is given above,
shows that he was not troubled with doubts about the uncon
stitutionality of the President's proposal, for he gave his
consent to serve.
This commission was only part of the President's plan.
The investigation which it was to conduct would take time.
In order that mining operations might be resumed as
speedily as possible, the President consulted with Senator
Quay, who was all powerful in Pennsylvania politics, and
was assured by him that whenever the President desired
him to do so he would have the Governor of the State notify
the President that he could not keep order in the coal re
gions and needed Federal interference. The President
then informed Major-General John M. Schofield that in
case of Federal interference he wished to send him to the
coal regions with the regular army troops with instruc
tions to act as receiver of the mines, take full charge, put
down all violence, and disregard any orders from the

212 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
operators. The President asked the General if, in case
the operators went to court and had a writ served on him,
he would do as was done under Lincoln, simply send the writ
on to the President. After a little thought the General re
plied that he would. Roosevelt said : "All right, I will send
you. ' '
No one except Senator Quay, General Schofield and two
members of Roosevelt's Cabinet had knowledge of this
part of the President 's plan. He had arranged with Sena
tor Quay, who was in Pennsylvania, to telegraph to him
when the moment arrived at which he (Roosevelt) wished
the Governor to notify him of his need of Federal inter
ference; the message was to be: "The time for the re
quest has come." The President had all preparations
made for starting the troops within half an hour.
Whether knowledge of the President's purpose leaked
out or not cannot be stated, but something acted as a
powerful incentive upon the operators, producing a sud
den change of front. It may have been a hint of Mr. Cleve
land's willingness to stand openly with the President.
After receipt of Mr. Cleveland's letter of consent, Secre
tary Root, at the President's request, went to New York
on a private mission. In a letter, written to the President
on June 23, 1903, to contradict some erroneous assertions
about the coal strike settlement that had been made in a
newspaper, Secretary Root described this mission and its
results as follows, showing that the operators refused to
accept Mr. Cleveland as a member of the commission,
being naturally unwilling to have such convincing evidence
as would thereby be given to the public of the wisdom and
justice of the President's course:
"I went to New York and spent the better part of a day
with Mr. J. P. Morgan on his yacht Corsair, and during
this interview we drafted an agreement x>f arbitration for
a commission to be appointed by you. Mr. Morgan got the
signature of the operators to this paper with a single modi
fication. The modification required that the arbitrators
appointed by you should belong to certain specified

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 213
classes — an army engineer, a business man familiar with
the coal business, a Judge of the locality, a sociologist, etc.,
etc. When this paper was presented to the miners they in
turn wished for some modification of the proposal, and it
appeared that they would be satisfied to enter into the
agreement if Bishop Spalding could be added to the list of
arbitrators, and Mr. Clark could be appointed to the place
which called for a sociologist. As the operators' signa
tures had been obtained by Mr. Morgan, in order to ascer
tain whether the operators would assent to these appoint
ments I telegraphed for some member of Mr. Morgan's
firm to come to Washington, and Mr. Bacon and Mr. Perkins
came, and upon learning the situation they opened tele
phonic communication with the representatives of the oper
ators in New York, and secured their assent to the appoint
ment of Bishop Spalding and Mr. Clark. When that had
been done you asked Mr. Bacon and Mr. Perkins if the oper
ators would not consent to have Mr. Cleveland appointed in
lieu of an appointment of an army engineer, saying that you
had already asked him to act on a committee of investiga
tion and had secured his assent, and that you would like to
appoint him as one of the arbitrators. They went away, and
after a short time came back and said they had communi
cated with the operators by telephone, and the operators
would not assent to the appointment of Mr. Cleveland in
lieu of an army engineer, or to any further change in their
proposal." When the refusal of the operators to accept Mr. Cleve
land was communicated to the President, he sent the follow
ing telegram and letter to him on October 16, 1902 :
The White House,
Washington, October 16, 1902.
Hon. Grover Cleveland, Princeton, N. J.
Deeply grateful for your letter. Propositions that have
been made since have totally changed situation so that I
will not have to make the demand upon you which three

214 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
days ago it seemed I would have to for the interest of the
nation. I thank you most deeply and shall write you at
length. Theodore Roosevelt.
My dear Mr. Cleveland:
I appreciated so deeply your being willing to accept that
it was very hard for me to forego the chance of putting you
on the commission. But in order to get the vitally neces
sary agreement between the operators and miners I found
I had to consult their wishes as to the types of men. Of
course I knew that it was the greatest relief to you not to
be obliged to serve, but I did wish to have you on, in the
first place, because of the weight your name would have
lent the commission, and in the next place, because of the
effect upon our people, and especially upon our young men,
of such an example of genuine self-denying patriotism—
for, my dear sir, your service would have meant all this.
I do not know whether you understand how heartily I thank
you and appreciate what you have done.
Faithfully yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
An entertaining account of the final agreement is given
by the President in this letter to Senator Lodge under date
of October 17, 1902 :
' ' The crisis came at the last moment. Between the hours
of 10 p. m. and 1 a. m., I had Bacon and Perkins on here, on
behalf of Morgan but really representing the operators.
Neither Morgan nor any one else had been able to do much
with those wooden-headed gentry, and Bacon and Perkins
were literally almost crazy. Bacon in particular had be
come so excited that I was quite concerned over his condi
tion. The operators had limited me down by a full proviso,
to five different types of men, including 'an eminent sociolo
gist.' This was a ridiculous proviso because I could have
appointed bad men in every case and yet be kept to its
letter; and they ought to have given me a free hand. The

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 215
miners, on the other hand, wanted me to appoint at least
two extra members myself, or in some fashion to get Bishop
Spalding (whom I myself wanted), and the labor union man
on the commission. I regarded their contention as per
fectly reasonable, and so informed Bacon and Perkins and
the operators. The operators refused point blank to have
another man added, and Bacon and Perkins came on nearly
wild to say that they had full power to treat on behalf
of the operators, but that no extra man should be added.
Finally it developed that what they meant was that no extra
man should be added if he was a representative of organ
ized labor ; and argue as I could, nothing would make them
change; although they grew more and more hysterical, and
not merely admitted, but insisted, that the failure to agree
meant probable violence and possible social war.
"It took me about two hours before I at last grasped the
fact that the mighty brains of these captains of industry
had formulated the theory that they would rather have
anarchy than tweedledum, but if I would use the word
tweedledee they would hail it as meaning peace. In other
words, that they had not the slightest objection to my ap
pointing a labor man as an 'eminent sociologist,' and add
ing Bishop Spalding on my own account, but they preferred
to see the Red Commune come rather than to have me make
Bishop Spalding or any one else 'the eminent sociologist'
and add the labor man. I instantly told them that I had
not the slightest objection whatever to doing an absurd
thing when it was necessary to meet the objection of an
absurd mind on some vital point, and that I would cheer
fully appoint my labor man as the 'eminent sociologist.'
It was almost impossible for me to appreciate the instant
and tremendous relief this gave them. They saw nothing
offensive in my language and nothing ridiculous in the
proposition, and Pierpont Morgan and Baer, when called
up by telephone, eagerly ratified the absurdity; and ac
cordingly, at this utterly unimportant price, we bid fair to
come out of as dangerous a situation as I ever dealt with."

216 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Writing to Finley Peter Dunne ("Mr. Dooley") a few
days after agreement was reached, October 20, 1902, the
President revealed his thorough enjoyment of the final
scene :
"I have not had the heart to write to you until this coal
strike was out of the way. Now I feel like throwing up my
hands and going to the circus ; but as that is not possible I
think I shall try a turkey shoot or bear hunt or something
of the kind instead. Nothing that you have ever written
can begin to approach in screaming comedy the inside of
the last few conferences before I appointed the strike com
mission, and especially the complicated maneuvers by
which, weaving in and out among the tender susceptibilities
of the operators and the miners, I finally succeeded in
reconciling both to the appointment of the president of the
labor union as an 'eminent sociologist.' "
The appointment of the commission was hailed with
universal relief and approval, for pending the investiga
tion work in the mines was to be resumed at once. From
one end of the country to the other the President was
praised for his efforts, and there was not a dissenting voice
anywhere, even the most zealous guardians of the Con
stitution joining in it. Foreign newspapers also joined in
the chorus of approval, the London Times saying:
"In a most quiet and unobtrusive manner the President
has done a very big and entirely new thing. We are wit
nessing not merely the ending of the coal strike, but the
definite entry of a powerful Government upon a novel
sphere of operation. President Roosevelt did not assume
his task as the amateur mediator ; he did not enter upon
it without counting the cost, or without the support of con
victions and ideas far outrunning the ostensible subject-
matter of his action. His personal prestige and reputation
are enormously enhanced by the immediate public service
he has rendered, and they will be immeasurably enhanced
when the American people grasp, as they rapidly will, the

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 217
far larger issues involved in his striking departure from
precedent. "Let the Americans stick to their President and
strengthen his hands. If there is any living man who can
show them the way out of the dangers threatening them,
that man is Mr. Roosevelt."
Writing to me on October 18, 1902, he said :
"I am being very much overpraised by everybody, and
although I suppose I hke it, it makes me feel uncomfortable
too. Mind you, I speak the literal truth when I say I know
perfectly well I do not deserve what is said of me. It
really seems to me that any man of average courage and
common-sense, who felt as deeply as I did the terrible
calamity impending over our people, would have done just
what I did."
The Commission was announced on October 15, as fol
lows: Brigadier General John M. Wilson, retired, formerly
Chief of Engineers, U.S.A. ; E. W. Parker, expert mining
engineer, chief statistician of the coal division of the U. S.
Geological Survey and editor of The Engineering and
Mining Journal; George Gray, Judge of the United States
Circuit Court, Delaware ; E. E. Clark, Chief of the Order of
Railway Conductors, sociologist; Thomas H. Watkins,
practically connected with the mining and selling of coal;
Bishop John L. Spalding, of Illinois; Carroll D. Wright,
U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Recorder of the Commission.
The Commission, which was accepted by the operators,
and by the mine workers in convention, came together at
the White House on October 24, 1902, for organization and
for instructions from the President. Judge Gray was
chosen Chairman. In a brief address, the President said :
"By the action you recommend, which the parties in
interest have in advance consented to abide by, you will
endeavor to establish the relations between the employers
and the wage workers in the anthracite fields on a just and
permanent basis, and as far as possible to do away with any

218 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
causes for the recurrence of such difficulties as those which
you have been called to settle."
The Commission began its labors at once and continued
them for nearly four months, hearing a great mass of testi
mony and thoroughly investigating all phases of the prob
lem. Its report was completed in March, 1903, presented
to the President on the 21st of the month, and published
in the newspapers on the following day. As both parties
to the Commission's inquiry had pledged themselves in
advance to abide by its decisions, there was no question of
acceptance, but both parties expressed themselves publicly
as fully satisfied with the findings, each claiming a victory
over the other.
The verdict by press and public was one of unanimous
approval. That uttered by the Tribune, on March 22, 1903,
may be cited as a fairly accurate sample of the whole :
" 'A sweeping victory for the miners!' exclaims one
commentator upon the report of the President's Commis
sion on the anthracite coal strike. 'A bomb in labor circles!'
declares another with equal assurance. Both are wrong.
The report gives victory to one of the parties to the con
troversy. But it is not the miners, nor is it the operators.
It is rather that third party whose interests are permanent,
though too often overlooked by both the others and their
hot champions — the public. So far as the two parties first
named are concerned, each has partly won and partly lost,
as was to be expected. The public, whose demands were
simply that justice should prevail, seems to have won on
every point.
"It was a generous and patriotic act of the President to
intervene in the strike, appoint this Commission, set the
mines m operation again, and thus fill the empty coal bins
throughout the land. It has also been a generous and patri
otic act of the Commissioners to investigate the matter be
fore them in so impartial and painstaking a manner, to
make at the end so wise and just a report. To the President
and to them the sincere gratitude of the nation is due."

COAL STRIKE SETTLEMENT 219
The main points of the Commission's findings were that
the miners should have a ten per cent increase in wages ;
that non-union labor and union labor should be treated on
equal terms ; that all disputes between operators and min
ers should be referred to a Board of Conciliation of six
members, three chosen by the operators and three by the
organizations of mine workers; in case of failure by the
Board to agree, the question in dispute should be referred
to a United States Circuit Judge of the District as umpire,
and his decision should be final. The findings of the Com
mission were to be obligatory upon operators and workers
for three years.
Time has completely justified the President's course.
Not only did the findings of the Commission secure peace
in the anthracite mines during the three stipulated years,
but permanently, for since 1902 there has been no strike
there and no serious labor trouble. The system of settling
disputes has worked smoothly and with entire success.
Among other direful predictions that were made anent the
President's course was one that in interfering in a labor
dispute he had established a precedent that would lead to
constant interference of the same sort in future and would
encourage all labor agitators to promote strikes in the con
fident belief that the President of the United States would
intervene and settle them. Not a single instance of the
kind has occurred which can be traced to President Roose
velt's action as the inspiring cause. The great lesson of
the settlement which the President had secured and which
impressed the people of the land was that the labor prob
lem had entered upon a new phase, was no longer only an
economic problem, but a moral and human one. The work
ers had been compelled to unite to secure not merely their
economic but their simple human rights, and a body of
men who commanded the respect and confidence of the
country had decreed that those human rights should be
recognized and protected.
When the report of the Commission was received by the
President, he wrote as follows to Judge Gray :

220 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
White House, Washington,
March 24, 1903.
My dear Judge Gray:
Pray permit me through you to thank the members of
the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission for as important
a piece of public service as any equal number of men have
in our time rendered the country. When you were ap
pointed, we were within measurable distance of a great
national calamity. By your acceptance of the position, and
the wisdom, fearlessness and absolute fairness of your
course since, you not only averted that calamity but per
formed great and lasting service to the nation. This service
was rendered at a heavy personal cost to each of you, and
to those of your body who were in public service it was
simply an additional burden. But such service as you gave
could not be bought, and perhaps it is as well for the coun
try that it should be given at a personal sacrifice, as was
true in this case. Thanking you again most heartily, I am
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.

CHAPTER XX
THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA
Early in December, 1902, an opportunity came for the
President to assert the position he had held for many years
in regard to the Monroe Doctrine, and he was quick to seize
it. No publicity was given at the time, nor for many years
afterward, to the manner in which he compelled the German
Kaiser to execute a complete backdown. Details of the in
cident were published for the first time in 1915, in William
Roscoe Thayer's "Life of John Hay." The publication
would have attracted wide attention in ordinary times, and
coming as it did in the first year of Germany's great war
with the rest of the world, it aroused especial and very deep
interest. There was some question raised as to the authen
ticity of the author's story, and to corroborate its truth
and prevent all future denial, Roosevelt wrote a letter
to Mr. Thayer in which he gave his personal version
of the incident, and supplemented Mr. Thayer's version
with some corroborative evidence which had recently come
into his possession and which established its accuracy be
yond dispute. This letter was published later as an ap
pendix in a second edition of Mr. Thayer's book. In ac
cordance with the expressed wish of Roosevelt it is repro
duced here as the final and authoritative account of the
incident : Sagamore Hill, August 21, 1916.
My dear Mr. Thayer:
There is now no reason why I should not speak of the
facts connected with the disagreement between the United
States and Germany over the Venezuela matter, in the
early part of my administration as President, and of the
final amicable settlement of the disagreement.
221

222 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
At that time the Venezuelan Dictator — President Castro
— had committed various offenses against different Euro
pean nations, including Germany and England. The Eng
lish Government was then endeavoring to keep on good
terms with Germany, and on this occasion acted jointly with
her. Germany sent a squadron of war vessels to the Vene
zuelan coast, and they were accompanied by some English
war vessels. There was no objection whatever to Castro's
being punished, as long as the punishment did not take the
form of seizure of territory and its more or less permanent
occupation by some Old-World power. At this particular
point, such seizure of territory would have been a direct
menace to the United States, because it would have threat
ened or partially controlled the approach to the projected
Isthmian Canal.
I speedily became convinced that Germany was the
leader, and the really formidable party in the transaction;
and that England was merely following Germany's lead
in rather half-hearted fashion. I became convinced that
England would not back Germany in the event of a clash
over the matter between Germany and the United States,
but would remain neutral ; I did not desire that she should
do more than remain neutral. I also became convinced that
Germany intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and
turn it into a strongly fortified place of arms, on the model
of Kiauchau, with a view to exercising some degree of con
trol over the future Isthmian Canal, and over South Ameri
can affairs generally.
For some time the usual methods of diplomatic inter
course were tried. Germany declined to agree to arbitrate
the question at issue between her and Venezuela, and de
clined to say that she would not take possession of Vene
zuelan territory, merely saying that such possession would
be "temporary" — which might mean anything. I finally
decided that no useful purpose would be served by further
delay, and I took action accordingly. I assembled our
battle fleet, under Admiral Dewey, near Porto Rico, for
"maneuvers," with instructions that the fleet should be

THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 223
kept in hand and in fighting trim, and should be ready to
sail at an hour's notice. The fact that the fleet was in West
Indian waters was of course generally known; but I be
lieve that the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Dewey,
and perhaps his Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State,
John Hay, were the only persons who knew about the order
for the fleet to be ready to sail at an hour's notice. I told
John Hay that I would now see the German Ambassador,
Herr von Holleben, myself, and that I intended to bring
matters to an early conclusion. Our navy was in very ef
ficient condition, being superior to the German navy.
I saw the Ambassador, and explained that in view of the
presence of the German Squadron on the Venezuelan coast
I could not permit longer delay in answering my request
for an arbitration, and that I could not acquiesce in any
seizure of Venezuelan territory. The Ambassador re
sponded that his government could not agree to arbitrate,
and that there was no intention to take "permanent" pos
session of Venezuelan territory. I answered that Kiauchau
was not a "permanent" possession of Germany — that I
understood that it was merely held by a 99 years' lease;
and that I did not intend to have another Kiauchau, held
by similar tenure, on the approach to the Isthmian Canal.
The Ambassador repeated that his government would not
agree to arbitrate. I then asked him to inform his govern
ment that if no notification for arbitration came within a
certain specified number of days I should be obliged to
order Dewey to take his fleet to the Venezuelan coast and
see that the German forces did not take possession of any
territory. He expressed very grave concern, and asked me
if I realized the serious consequences that would follow
such action ; consequences so serious to both countries that
he dreaded to give them a name. I answered that I had
thoroughly counted the cost before I decided on the step,
and asked him to look at the map, as a glance would show
him that there was no spot in the world where Germany in
the event of a conflict with the United States would be at a
greater disadvantage than in the Caribbean Sea.

224 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
A few days later the Ambassador came to see me, talked
pleasantly on several subjects, and rose to go. I asked him
if he had any answer to make from his government to my
request, and when he said no, I informed him that in such
event it was useless to wait as long as I had intended, and
that Dewey would be ordered to sail twenty-four hours in
advance of the time I had set. He expressed deep appre
hension, and said that his government would not arbitrate.
However, less than twenty-four hours before the time I
had appointed for cabling the order to Dewey, the Em
bassy notified me that his Imperial Majesty the German
Emperor had directed him to request me to undertake the
arbitration myself. I felt, and publicly expressed, great
gratification at this outcome, and great appreciation of the
course the German Government had finally agreed to take.
Later I received the consent of the German Government
to have the arbitration undertaken by The Hague Tribunal,
and not by me.
At that time there was in New York as German Consul-
General a very able and agreeable man, Dr. Buenz, a na
tive of Holstein. He was intimate with a friend and then
neighbor of mine, Mr. A. W. Callisen, whose father was
born in Schleswig, and who, incidentally, was and is exact
ly as straight an American as I am. Mr. Callisen intro
duced Dr. Buenz to me; and I found the doctor an excep
tionally well informed man about American matters and
indeed about world affairs generally. He was at my house
on several occasions, and I discussed many things with him,
including the German and American navies. I had, how
ever, no idea that he had any knowledge whatever of this
phase of the Venezuelan affair until after your book ap
peared. Mr. Callisen happened to read it, was much inter
ested in the part referring to Venezuela, and wrote to a
friend of his, Mr. Ambrose C. Richardson, of Buffalo, a
letter running in part as follows :
" 'A Chapter of Diplomacy' (Mr. Thayer's account) in
terested me greatly, all the more as I knew Dr. Holleben

THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 225
personally, and, what is still more to the purpose, his
most intimate friend, Dr. Buenz, at that time German
Consul-General at New York. The story is absolutely true,
and here is the sequel..
"The German and British Governments firmly counted
on our well established jellyfish squashiness and felt sure
they had a free hand. The Kaiser and Junker party espe
cially had everything cut and dried, and counted the affair
as accomplished. The first time Holleben informed his
government that probably Roosevelt's attitude was a bluff;
but on second thought went to his friend Buenz for advice
as B. knew the American people better than any German
living, and was a close friend of Roosevelt's (I introduced
him) and hence a good judge of the situation. Buenz at
once assured him that Roosevelt was not bluffing, and that
he could count on his doing as threatened; and that in a
conversation Roosevelt had shown that he had an intimate
knowledge of the strength and condition of the German
fleet which was . . . (then) no match for ours.
"Holleben was obliged to eat his own words and tele
graph in hot haste to Berlin, where his message fell like a
bomb shell. You know the rest. This resulted in Holleben 's
being recalled and dismissed from the diplomatic ser
vice. . . . When he sailed from Hoboken not a single mem
ber of the diplomatic corps or German official dared to see
him off. Only Buenz (and I) dared to brave official dis
approval, and went on board to bid him farewell. I went
at Buenz 's request."
A copy of this letter came into my possession and I
showed it to Mr. Callisen when he was here, at my house,
on May 7 last. He wrote alongside the part I have quoted :
"The above is absolutely accurate. (Signed) A. W. Calli
sen." Mr. Callisen informed me that he had not intended
the letter for publication, but that as the copy had been
shown to several people I was at liberty to make whatever
use of it I desired.
After your book appeared some person wrote a letter

226 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
to the press stating that at the time of the Venezuela inci
dent the American fleet was not mobilized under Admiral
Dewey in the West Indies. The letter was sent to Mr.
Henry A. Wise Wood, of the National Security League,
who thereupon wrote to Admiral Dewey for information
on the subject. Admiral Dewey answered as follows:
Office of
The Admiral of the Navy
Washington May 23, 1916.
Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood,
25 Madison Avenue,
New York City.
My dear Mr. Wood:
I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 22,
asking me to set you right respecting certain facts regard
ing Colonel Roosevelt's action over Venezuela.
I was at Culebra, Porto Rico, at the time, in command
of a fleet consisting of over fifty ships, including every
battle ship and every torpedo boat that we had, with orders
from Washington to hold the fleet in hand and be ready
to move at a moment's notice. Fortunately, however, the
whole matter was amicably adjusted, and there was no need
for action.
Hoping the above statement is exactly what you want,
and thanking you for the compliments you pay me, I am,
Very truly yours,
George Dewey.
This letter was published in the press; and Mr. Wood
then sent me copies of the correspondence. Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
It was on December 8, 1902, that Germany and England
severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela. President
Roosevelt soon afterwards had with the German Ambas-

THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 227
sador the first interview in which the Ambassador had
claimed that Germany was establishing a "pacific block
ade" and that its occupation of territory was only "tem
porary." That the President was correct in his estimate
of England's attitude was shown ten days later, December
18, 1902, when Mr. Balfour, then Prime Minister, said in
the House of Commons :
"I think it quite likely that the United States will think
that there cannot be such a thing as a 'pacific blockade,'
and I personally take the same view. Evidently the block
ade involves a state of war. ' '
This declaration was received with general approval,
showing that English opinion was in accord with it. It was
published prominently in American newspapers and the
German Ambassador undoubtedly saw it. On December 18,
there also appeared in the newspapers a despatch from
Washington saying that the fighting ships of Dewey's fleet
had been ordered to rendezvous at the Island of Trinidad,
directly off the coast of Venezuela. The German Ambas
sador doubtless saw this also. On the morning of December
19, 1902, the following, obviously inspired, Associated Press
despatch from Berhn was published:
"The answer of Germany to the arbitration proposal in
behalf of Venezuela, received through the United States,
is its acceptance. The delivery of this reply to the United
States for transmission to Minister Bowen (American
Minister to Venezuela) is delayed for a day or two for tac
tical reasons. Four days ago the German Gevornment was
in favor of rejecting arbitration, and that is understood
to have been the temper of the British Foreign Office, also.
While it is impossible to trace the steps which led to the
reversal of this view, it appears that it was caused by the
state of public opinion in the United States, so far as Ger
many is concerned, as it is understood here. ' '
Three days later, December 22, 1902, the Kaiser formally
requested President Roosevelt to act as arbiter, but after

228 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
careful deliberation he declined, on December 26, and the
case was referred to The Hague Tribunal. There was no
publicity given to the President's conversation with Dr. von
Holleben. Even Admiral Dewey knew nothing except that
he was instructed to hold his fleet in readiness for orders.
In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1903, the
President thus stated the facts in the case, giving no hint of
his personal diplomatic proceedings in bringing about a
peaceful solution:
"It will be remembered that during the second session
of the last Congress Great Britain, Germany, and Italy
formed an alliance for the purpose of blockading the ports
of Venezuela and using such other means of pressure as
would secure a settlement of claims due, as they alleged,
to certain of their subjects.
"Their employment of force for the collection of these
claims was terminated by an agreement brought about
through the offices of the diplomatic representatives of the
United States at Caracas and the Government at Wash
ington, thereby ending a situation which was bound to cause
increasing friction and which jeopardized the peace of the
continent. Under this agreement Venezuela agreed to set
apart a certain percentage of the customs receipts of two
of her ports to be applied to the payment of whatever obli
gations might be ascertained by mixed commissions ap
pointed for that purpose to be due from her, not only to
the three powers already mentioned, whose proceedings
against her had resulted in a state of war, but also to the
United States, France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Norway, and Mexico, who had not employed
force for the collection of the claims alleged to be due to
certain of their citizens.
"A demand was then made by the so-called blockading
powers that the sums ascertained to be due to their citizens
by such mixed commissions should be accorded payment in
full before anything was paid upon the claims of any of
the so-called peace powers. Venezuela, on the other hand,
insisted that all her creditors should be paid upon a basis

THE KAISER AND VENEZUELA 229
of exact equality. During the efforts to adjust this dispute
it was suggested by the powers in interest that it should be
referred to me for decision, but I was clearly of the opinion
that a far wiser course would be to submit the question to
the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. It
seemed to me to offer an admirable opportunity to advance
the practise of the peaceful settlement of disputes between
nations and to secure for The Hague Tribunal a mem
orable increase of its practical importance. The nations
interested in the controversy were so numerous, and in
many instances so powerful, as to make it evident that
beneficent results would follow from their appearance at
the same time before the bar of that august tribunal of
peace. "Our hopes in that regard have been realized. Russia
and Austria are represented in the persons of the learned
and distinguished jurists who compose the Tribunal, while
Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway, Mexico, the United
States, and Venezuela are represented by their respec
tive agents and counsel. Such an imposing concourse of
nations presenting their arguments and invoking the deci
sion of that high court of international justice and inter
national peace can hardly fail to secure a like submission
of many future controversies. The nations now appearing
there will find it far easier to appear there a second time,
while no nation can imagine its just pride will be lessened
by following the example now presented. This triumph of
the principle of international arbitration is a subject of
warm congratulation and offers a happy augury for the
peace of the world."

CHAPTER XXI
POPULAR APPROVAL— VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS
The elections of November, 1902, showed unmistakably
that the President had the hearty support of the people of
the country in his course during the first year of his ad
ministration. The chief issues were his treatment of trusts
and the settlement of the coal strike, and on these he won a
signal triumph. Not only had all the Republican State con
ventions of the year strongly approved his policies but had
declared in favor of his election to the Presidency in 1904.
The Republicans elected the largest majority of members
of the House of Representatives that their party had se
cured in a midway election during Republican a(hmnistra-
tion for thirty-four years. A few days after election, on
November 11, 1902, the President went to New York to par
ticipate in the dedication of a building which had been
erected by the Chamber of Commerce of that city as its
permanent home. At a banquet in the evening the Pres
ident delivered the principal address. Fifteen years later,
when the European war was in progress, the closing pass
ages of this address were recalled as evidence of far-sighted
wisdom on the part of Roosevelt. It was :
"We are glad indeed that we are on good terms with all
the other peoples of mankind, and no effort on our part
shall be spared to secure a continuance of these relations.
And remember, gentlemen, that we shall be a potent factor
for peace largely in proportion to the way in which we make
it evident that our attitude is due, not to weakness, not to
inability to defend ourselves, but to a genuine repugnance
to wrongdoing, a genuine desire for self-respecting friend
ship with our neighbors. The voice of the weakling or the
craven counts for nothing when he clamors for peace ; but
230

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 231
the voice of the just man armed is potent. We need to
keep in a condition of preparedness, especially as regards
our navy, not because we want war, but because we desire
to stand with those whose plea for peace is listened to with
respectful attention. ' '
This was not the first utterance of the kind that Roose
velt had made, but was in fact a repetition of what he had
said twenty years earlier in the preface to his ' ' History of
the War of 1812," which he wrote in 1882, quoted in Chap
ter VI, and in his address before the Naval War College in
1897, quoted in Chapter IX.
In his Chamber of Commerce speech the President gave
an outline of his ideas on the subject of social and indus
trial reform — a question that was steadily growing to
larger importance in his mind :
"No patent remedy can be devised for the solution of
these grave problems in the industrial world ; but we may
rest assured that they can be solved at all only if we bring
to the solution certain old-time virtues, and if we strive to
keep out of the solution some of the most familiar and most
undesirable of the traits to which mankind has owed un
told degradation and suffering throughout the ages. Arro
gance, suspicion, brutal envy of the well-to-do, brutal indif
ference toward those who are not well-to-do, the hard re
fusal to consider the rights of others, the foolish refusal
to consider the limits of beneficent action, the base appeal
to the spirit of selfish greed, whether it take the form of
plunder of the fortunate or of oppression of the unfortu
nate — from these and from all kindred vices this Nation
must be kept free if it is to remain in its present position
in the forefront of the peoples of mankind. On the other
hand, good will come, even out of the present evils, if we
face them armed with the old homely virtues ; if we show
that we are fearless of soul, cool of head, and kindly of
heart; if, without betraying the weakness that cringes be
fore wrongdoing, we yet show by deeds and words our

232 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
knowledge that in such a government as ours each of us
must be in very truth his brother's keeper."
He went to Tennessee in November, speaking at Mem
phis on the 19th of that month, when he dwelt upon the
Government's work in the Philippines, saying:
"There is no question as to our not having gone far
enough and fast enough in granting self-government to the
Filipinos ; the only possible danger has been lest we should
go faster and further than was in the interest of the Fili
pinos themselves. Each Filipino at the present day is guar
anteed his life, his liberty and the chance to pursue hap
piness as he wishes, so long as he does not harm his fellows,
in a way which the Islands have never known before during
all their recorded history."
Speaking at a banquet of the Union League Club in Phil
adelphia on November 22, 1902, he paid high tribute to the
ability and services of Attorney General Knox, adding:
"The question of the so-called trusts is but one of the
questions we must meet in connection with our industrial
system. There are many of them and they are serious;
but they can and will be met. Time may be needed for
making the solution perfect ; but it is idle to tell this people
that we have not the power to solve such a problem as that
of exercising adequate supervision over the great indus
trial combinations of to-day. We have the power and we
shall find out the way. We shall not act hastily or reck
lessly, and a right solution shall be found, and found it
will be."
In his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1902,
the President said that the views which he had expressed
in his message of 1901, in regard to the desirability of
national control and regulation of trusts and corporations,
had, in his opinion, been emphasized by experience, and he
defined his general attitude on the subject as follows :
"Our aim is not to do away with corporations; on the

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 233
contrary, these big aggregations are an inevitable develop
ment of modern industrialism, and the effort to destroy
them would be futile unless accomplished in ways that
would work the utmost mischief to the entire body politic.
We can do nothing of good in the way of regulating and
supervising these corporations until we fix clearly in our
minds that we are not attacking the corporations, but en
deavoring to do away with any evil in them. We are not
hostile to them; we are merely determined that they shall
be so handled as to subserve the public good. We draw the
line against misconduct, not against wealth. Publicity can
do no harm to the honest corporation ; and we need not be
over-tender about sparing the dishonest corporation."
To the Rev. Dr. W. S. Rainsf ord, of New York, who wrote
him a letter criticizing the trust portions of his message
as lacking in specific remedies, he replied, December 27,
1902: "I thank you for your letter. You say it is difficult for
the politicians in Washington to understand what is needed
and not to be timid. I agree with you. But one of my
main difficulties arises from the fact that thoroughly good
outsiders do not understand what is possible to do or indeed
what is done. I am glad you wrote frankly about my mes
sage. I know you expect me to write with equal frankness
in return. Your letter was a genuine disappointment to
me, because it showed you had misunderstood what most
emphatically no man has a right to misunderstand. My
message was absolutely clear. I spoke of the need of
publicity. But are you aware that to make publicity an
issue is mere nonsense unless I frame legislation which will
give us a chance to get it? Are you aware also of the ex
treme unwisdom of my irritating Congress by fixing the
details of a bill, concerning which they are very sensitive,
instead of laying down a general policy? I said in my mes
sage just what I had said in my speeches, only I used the
phraseology appropriate to the occasion. I went over
every word with Attorney General Knox and went just as

234 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME,
far as I thought we could with safety go. He and I are
now in close consultation with the Congressional commit
tees having the legislation in charge.
"Don't you think that you will get a better idea of what
I am after if you remember that I am seeking to secure
action by Congress rather than to establish a reputation
as a stump exhorter ? ' '
The President's sense of humor, for which he was accus
tomed to give devout thanks as a genuine "very present
help iri time of trouble," is revealed constantly in his let
ters. I append two samples. The first was to Secretary
Hay on May 19, 1902 :
Dear John:
The enclosed papers of A  B  in point of fervor
and number would quite justify his appointment as Secre
tary of State; but I understand he only wants the consul
ship at Fort Erie. Senator Piatt and Congressman Alex
ander have nearly burst into tears at the thought of its
going elsewhere — Congressman Alexander is listening to
me as I pen this. If Hitt's man can be put elsewhere, can
we not continue Erie as a feudal appanage of Buffalo?
Faithfully yours, T. R.
The second was to Secretary Root on February 21, 1903,
enclosing a letter of complaint :
To the Secretary of War:
This is austerely called to your attention by the Presi
dent, who would like a full and detailed explanation, if pos
sible with interjectional musical accompaniment, about the
iniquity of making a promotion for the senior Senator from
Maine and refusing to make one for the junior Senator.
Your special attention is directed to the pathos of the con
cluding sentence of the junior Senator's letter. An early
and inaccurate report is requested. T. R.

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 235
A correspondence which took place early in 1903 between
the President and Senator Piatt, of New York, is of interest
as denning the attitude which the President habitually took
with all the Senators of his party in the matter of appoint
ments. He consulted them, and when they proposed to him
men who met his test of character and fitness, he appointed
them gladly, but as he said, in a letter already quoted in
these pages : ' ' They may ordinarily name the men but I
shall name the standard and the men have got to come up
to it." He habitually exercised great care in the selec
tion of nominees for the bench, making inquiries in all
directions from which trustworthy information could be
derived, and reaching a decision only when he thought the
best man had been found. He pursued this course in regard
to a vacancy in the United States District Court in New
York in 1903. When he had decided upon the man he in
formed Senator Piatt of his selection. The Senator, who
was then broken in health and broken also in political
power, and who had presented a candidate of his own choice
for the place, wrote a querulous, even peevish letter to
the President, to which the latter replied at length on
February 22, 1903, saying among other things :
"You say that you 'cannot with any degree of equanimity
consent to the appointment of a man whose chief claim to
recognition is his social standing and whose unfitness for
appointment is known to nearly every member of the bar
in New York — i. e., to every member of the bar who is active
and potential in the practise of the law. ' I do not see how
you can feel thus in view of the endorsements I have re
ceived. (The names of a large number of eminent lawyers
in New York are then given.)
"You say that 'if Mr. H.'s appointment follows this pro
test, I shall view it with absolute disgust. I shall, more
over, experience a diminution of that interest in public
affairs that has been for so many years a vital element of
my life.'
"This, my dear Senator, seems hardly worthy of you.
I cannot believe that you seriously mean that if I should,

236 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
after careful and conscientious thought, conclude to nomi
nate a man recommended as Mr. H. is recommended, and
standing as high as I know him to stand, you would feel
like losing interest in public affairs. My life has been much
shorter than yours, yet I have seen a good many appoint
ments made to Federal position, during the last twenty
years, of which I by no means approve. But it never oc
curred to me, on account of any or all of those appoint
ments, to refuse longer to take an interest in pubhc affairs.
It is, I trust, needless to say that I fully appreciate the
right and duty of the Senate to reject or to confirm any
appointment according to what its members conscientiously
deem their duty to be; just as it is my business to make
an appointment which I conscientiously think is a good one.
"Finally, my dear Senator, you say: 'If you cherish the
belief that Mr. H. will be able to accomplish the pohtical
results that you have in mind, I simply wish to express the
opinion that he cannot, and, moreover, will not, meet your
expectations.' "I am wholly at a loss to know what you mean by this
sentence. The political results I shall have in mind if I
appoint Mr. H. are those that I hope will follow the ap
pointment of a first class man whom the community in
general and the bar in particular will accept as a first class
man in point of character and ability, and whose appoint
ment they will feel reflects credit upon the bench. I' do not
see how bad political results can follow such action, and I
should hope that on the whole the political results will be
good. But I must frankly say that I feel, when the matter
is one of the appointment of a judge, that the wisest and
best politics is to appoint a thoroughly high grade man— if
possible the best man obtainable. It is a matter of very
keen regret to me that we seem unable to agree in this
matter. ' '
Three days later, February 28, 1903, he wrote again to
the Senator, giving notice of his final decision:
"I have been going over and over that judgeship situa-

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 237
tion. I am convinced that the bar and the people generally
who are best competent to judge feel that H. is by all
means the better man, and I do not see how I can avoid
sending in his name. Many of your strongest friends wish
him. It is a matter of the greatest regret to me that our
judgments on this point do not seem to agree. I would not
for one moment act against your wishes if it was a matter
of personal preference, but here my conception of duty
seems to me to require that I should nominate him."
Writing at this period to William H. Taft, then Civil
Governor of the Philippines, he gave, under date of March
13, 1903, this judicial estimate of the character and ser
vices of the Republican leaders in both houses of Congress :
"My experience for the last year and a half, including
the two sessions of the last Congress and the special session
of the Senate which has just closed, has made me feel re
spect and regard for Aldrich as one of that group of Sen
ators,' including Allison, Hanna, Spooner, Piatt, of Connec
ticut, Lodge and one or two others, who, together with
men like the next Speaker of the House, Joe Cannon, are
the most powerful factors in Congress. With every one
of these men I at times differ radically on important ques
tions ; but they are the leaders, and their great intelligence
and power and their desire in the last resort to do what is
best for the government, make them not only essential to
work with, but desirable to work with. Several of the lead
ers have special friends whom they desire to favor, or spe
cial interests with which they are connected and which they
hope to serve. But, taken as a body, they are broadminded
and patriotic, as well as sagacious, skilful and resolute.
Each of them is set in his ways on certain points. Thus,
with both Hanna and Aldrich I had to have a regular
stand-up fight before I could get them to accept any trust
legislation; but when I once got them to say they would
give in, they kept their promise in good faith, and it was
far more satisfactory to work with them than to try to
work with the alleged radical reformers. Aldrich, for in-

238 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
stance, has shied off from a number of propositions in
which I was interested, but if I thought the matter vital
and brought it before him fair and square, I have always
found him a reasonable man, open to conviction and a tower
of strength when thus convinced."
A letter which the President wrote to Secretary Hay, on
March 13, 1903, reveals his consistent devotion to the Mon
roe doctrine and especially his determination to keep the
German Government fully informed as to his position in
regard to it :
"Speck (von Sternburg, German Ambassador) was in
to-day, evidently inspired from Berlin to propose for our
consideration in th*e future the advisability of having the
great Powers collectively stand back of some syndicate
which should take possession of the finances of Venezuela.
His statement was that he believed such action would put
a stop to the motive for revolution in Venezuela, would
make the country peaceful and therefore more or less pros
perous, and would do away with the chance for a repetition
of punitive expeditions by European powers to collect
debts. He said he hoped America would take the initiative
in such a movement, so that it could be begun with her in
the lead. I told him I would not answer offhand but that
at first blush my judgment was very strongly that our
people would view with the utmost displeasure any such
proposal, because it seemed to me that it would not only
tend to produce complication among the guaranteeing
powers but would pave the way for reducing Venezuela to
a condition like that of Egypt, and that the American people
interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as meaning of course that
no European power should gain control of any American
republics." At the end of March, 1903, the President left Washing
ton for a tour in the Western States, and on the eve of de
parture he sent these letters of advice and caution to two
admirals of the navy :

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 239
March 28, 1903.
To Admiral Henry C. Taylor:
"I am going away and I want you and everybody around
the Department to help me in seeing that no chance is given
ignorant, foolish or reckless newspaper men to make state
ments which tend to embroil us with foreign nations. The
last thing I want to see done is an impression conveyed that
we are boasting, or saying anything that will hurt the feel
ings of powers with which we are at peace, and with which
I hope we will continue on terms of friendship. I want to
see every step possible taken to make us the most formi
dable of foes in the event of war, and at the same time to
make it equally evident that no one need fear a war with
us unless from his own fault." March 30, 1903.
To Admiral George Dewey:
"Good-by and good luck to you while I am gone! Now,
my dear Admiral, do let me beg of you to remember how
great your reputation is — how widely whatever you say
goes over the whole world. I know that you did not expect
the interview you had to be printed, but do let me entreat
you to say nothing which can be taken hold of by those
anxious to foment trouble between ourselves and any
foreign power or who delight in giving the impression that
as a nation we are walking about with a chip on our
shoulder. We are too big a people to be able to be careless
in what we say. ' '
Speaking to a great audience in Chicago on April 2, 1903,
the President said:
"I beheve in the MonroeDoctrine with all my heart and
soul; I am convinced that the immense majority of our fel
low-countrymen so believe in it ; but I would infinitely prefer
to see us abandon it than to see us put it forward and bluster
about it, and yet fail to build up the efficient fighting
strength which in the last resort can alone make it re
spected by any strong foreign power whose interest it may
ever happen to be to violate it.

240 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
' ' There is a homely old adage which runs : ' Speak softly
and carry a big stick; you will go far.' If the American
nation will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch
of the highest training a thoroughly efficient navy the Mon
roe Doctrine will go far."
The first mention of the "big stick" adage that I find in
his correspondence is in a letter that he wrote while he
was Governor of New York. During his Presidency the
cartoonists of the daily press seized upon a part of it only
and pictured him invariably with an immense club in his
hand, oftentimes with spikes protruding from the sides
of it. He was thus represented as the champion of the
"Big Stick" policy in governmental administration, and in
that forceful aspect he was placed continuously before the
world. During his Presidency I made collections of the press car
toons about him and took them to the White House with me
on my occasional visits. Usually they were inspected by
him in the presence of such members of the family as hap
pened to be there and they were the cause of much merri
ment, he himself enjoying them as much as any one else.
On one occasion, after a particularly large batch had been
examined, he said, — I give his words from memory: "It is
very curious. Ever since I have been in the Presidency
I have been pictured constantly as a huge creature with
enormous clenched teeth, a big spiked club, and a belt full
of pistols — a blustering, roaring swashbuckler type of ruf
fian, and yet all the time I have been growing in popularity.
I don't understand it at all."
The explanation seemed to me to be simple enough. All
the cartoonists at heart liked him, and there was seldom or
never anything bitter or really unfriendly in their por
trayals of him; they were uniformly good-natured. He,
as I have said, genuinely enjoyed their productions and
had many of the original drawings framed and placed on
the bookcases in his library, both in the White House and
at Oyster Bay.

VIEWS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 241
Writing from the Far West to Senator Lodge, he gave an
interesting glimpse of the movement which was on foot at
the time to make Grover Cleveland the Democratic Presi
dential candidate for a third term :
May 4, 1903.— "I enjoyed meeting Cleveland for I like the
old fellow. It is evident he has the Presidential bee in his
bonnet, and it is equally evident that a large number of
people are desirous of running him again. Bryan would
bolt him, but in spite of this I think he would be a very
formidable candidate. In North Dakota, for instance, they
told me they thought he would run better than any other
Democrat. So they did in Missouri and Iowa.
"I have been well received, indeed, I might say, enthusi
astically received. But, frankly, I have been too long in
public life to be taken in by a good reception, and I have
not the slightest idea how things really stand."
May 23, 1903. — "Most of the people out here believe that
Cleveland will be nominated on the Democratic ticket, and
that he will be a very formidable man to beat — probably
the most formidable Democrat. If nominated he will drive
certain Democrats away. For instance, the Governor of
Nevada and the Mayor of Carson, both Democrats, told me
that they should vote for me if Cleveland were nominated ;
but I find that Pierpont Morgan and other Wall Street
men have been announcing openly within the past fortnight
that they should support Mr. Cleveland against me with all
their power. They would draw a great many votes both
from the honest rich and the fool respectable classes."
The President had appointed as District Attorney for
the State of Delaware, Mr. William M. Byrne, concerning
whom there had been a heated partisan controversy be
cause of his relations with political factional quarrels in
the State. In a letter to him, on March 23, 1903, the Presi
dent said :
"I have named you as District Attorney. Now there is
one thing, and one thing only, that I demand. That is, that
you keep clear of factional politics, and indeed do just as

242 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
little political work as possible, and confine your attention
to making the best record as district attorney that has been
made by any district attorney of Delaware. There must
not be a single legitimate or well-founded complaint against
you. You will of course show neither fear nor favor in
anything you do. Any offender of any kind whose case
may be brought to your attention, or whom you can reach,
is to be prosecuted with absolute indifference as to whether
he is Republican or Democrat, Addicks man or anti-Addicks
man. I have liked you and I think well of you, but under
the circumstances of your appointment and the way in
which it was fought, I have a right to demand that you
walk even more guardedly than the ordinary public official
walks, and that you show yourself a model officer in point
of fearlessness and integrity, industry and ability.
"The question of your confirmation will come up when
the Senate reconvenes. You can help yourself in it more
than any other man can possibly help you; and you can
help yourself only by making a record which will be a just
source of pride to you and to me."
In accordance with the recommendation of the President
in his first message to Congress, repeated in subsequent
messages, Congress passed in February, 1903, an act cre
ating a Department of Commerce and Labor, including a
Bureau of Corporations, and the act was approved on
February 19. The first head of it, George B. Cortelyou,
who had been Secretary to the President, was appointed
two days later.

CHAPTER XXII
POR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION— HIS
OWN ATTITUDE
The Republican State conventions of 1902 had quite gen
erally commended Roosevelt as the party's candidate for
the Presidency in 1904, and it became evident early in 1903
that he was so clearly the first choice of his party that
his nomination was a foregone conclusion. Only one very
short-lived effort was made to prevent it.
It was while the President was in the Far West in May,
1903, that the first surface indication of this effort, whicn
originated in Wall Street, made its appearance. All the
Republican State conventions that had been held had
adopted resolutions declaring in favor of his nomination
in 1904. The Ohio convention was to meet on June 3, 1903.
A week or more before that date two prominent Ohio Re
publican leaders, Senator Foraker and Congressman Gros
venor, had said in published interviews that the convention
would endorse Roosevelt. Senator Hanna, whose relations
with the New York opponents of Roosevelt were known to
be intimate, and who had been spoken of in the press as
their candidate for the Presidential nomination, declared in
an interview that he was opposed to the endorsement of
Roosevelt because the convention of 1903 had no right to
assume the responsibilities of the convention of 1904, whose
delegates would be chosen for the express purpose of choos
ing delegates to the National Convention, and that there
was no precedent for such action except in the case of a
"favorite son." As soon as the interview was published
he sent this telegram to President Roosevelt:
243

244 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Cleveland, Ohio, May 23, 1903.
The President, Seattle, Wash.
The issue which has been forced upon me in the matter
of our State Convention this year endorsing you for the
Republican nomination next year has come in a way which
makes it necessary for me to oppose such a resolution.
When you know all the facts I am sure you will approve
my course. M. A. Hanna.
To this telegram the President replied as follows:
Seattle, Wash., May 25, 1903
Hon. M. A. Hanna,
Cleveland, Ohio.
Your telegram received. I have not asked any man for
his support. I have had nothing whatever to do with rais
ing this issue. Inasmuch as it has been raised of course
those who favor my administration and my nomination will
favor endorsing both and those who do not will oppose.
Theodore Roosevelt.
Senator Hanna had no difficulty in comprehending what
this message meant, and he responded immediately as fol
lows: Cleveland, Ohio, May 26, 1903.
The President:
Your telegram of the 25th. In view of the sentiment ex-"
pressed I shall not oppose the endorsement of your admin
istration and candidacy by our State Convention. I have
given the substance of this to the Associated Press.
M. A. Hanna.
Writing confidentially to Senator Lodge, on May 27, 1903,
the President thus explains his reasons for the action he
took: "After the receipt of the first telegram I thought over the

POR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 245
matter a full twenty-four hours, consulting with Mellen,
Byrnes and Moody and decided that the time had come to
stop shilly-shallying, and let Hanna know definitely that I
did not intend to assume the position, at least passively,
of a suppliant to whom he might give the nomination as a
boon. I accordingly sent him my answer, and as you doubt
less saw, made a similar statement for the public press,
of course not alluding to the fact that Hanna had sent me
the telegram, my statement simply going as one made nec
essary by Hanna's long interview in which he announced
that he would oppose my endorsement by the Ohio Con
vention. I rather expected Hanna to fight, but made up
my mind that it was better to have a fight in the open at
once than to run the risk of being knifed secretly. Mellen
and also Loeb were confident that he would not fight. The
result proved that they were right, as his last telegram
shows. "I am pleased at the outcome as it simplifies things all
around, for in my judgment Hanna was my only formidable
opponent so far as the nomination is concerned."
The accuracy of the President's prediction was verified
by subsequent events. All opposition to his nomination dis
appeared the moment that his reply to Hanna was known.
As casting full light upon the incident, the following cor
respondence between the President and Senator Hanna is
appended: SENATOR HANNA'S LETTER
Cleveland, Ohio, May 25, 1903.
"I wired you Saturday about the question which is com
ing up before our State Convention in regard to a resolu
tion endorsing your candidacy. I was not consulted and
heard nothing about it until Grosvenor 's and Foraker 's
interviews came out in the papers. When asked about it I
at once expressed my disapproval for the following rea
sons — that this State Convention had no right to assume
the responsibilities of the Convention of 1904, whose dele-

246 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
gates would be chosen for the express purpose of choosing
delegates to the National Convention; that it is without
precedent in our State (except in regard to a favorite
son) ; that it places me in an embarrassing position as
Chairman of the National Committee; and last but not
least it is meant to be unfriendly toward me. You know
the past history of several things of kindred nature so I
will not dwell on the motives which are the real incentive
to this action, only that I shall oppose the resolution and
you. may feel sure without anything but the best of motives
and in what I consider your best interests. I am hearing
from all over the country and where the source is most
worthy of consideration. There is but one opinion that this
is an attempt to put me in a false position and to your
injury. "I almost committed an 'impulsive' act myself by stating
in my interview to the Associated Press (copy enclosed)
that I felt sure you would not approve — (under the circum
stances). It is not necessary to hesitate between good and
bad judgment when the motives are known. I spent a few
days in New York last week and remembered your sugges
tion to me. There is need of missionary work there. - But
with this embarrassment thrust upon me will make me a
useless article. Our convention comes the 2nd and 3rd of
June, and promises to be a hot time."
THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY
Ogden, Utah, May 29, 1903.
"I thank you for your letter, which gave me the first
gleam of light on the situation. I do not think you appre
ciated the exact effect that your interview and announced
position had in the country at large. It was everywhere
accepted as the first open attack upon me, and it gave heart,
curiously enough, not only to my opponents, but to all the
curious men who lumped you and me together as improp
erly friendly to organized labor and to the workingmen
generally. The mischievous effect was instantly visible.

POR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 247
The general belief was that this was not your move, save
indirectly ; that it was really an attack by the so-called Wall
Street forces on me, to which you had been led to give a
reluctant acquiescence. I might not have said anything
for publication at all had it not been for the statement that
I approved your course. In the way the movement was
interpreted this looked as if I was approving having my
throat slit. My view was that you of course had an abso
lute right to be a candidate yourself, but that if you were
not one you would be doing me and the Republican party
serious harm by fighting and very probably beating the
proposition to endorse me by the Ohio Convention.
"After thinking the matter carefully over I became sure
that I had to take a definite stand myself. I hated to do it
because you have shown such broad generosity and straight
forwardness in all your dealings with me that it was pe
culiarly painful to me to be put, even temporarily, in a
position of seeming antagonism to you. No one but a really
big man — a man above all petty considerations — could have
treated me as you have treated me during the year and a
half since President McKinley's death. I have consulted
you and relied on your judgment more than has been the
case with any other man. ' '
The fact that he was on the verge of a campaign for his
own election to the Presidency, did not prevent Roosevelt
from taking action which might harm him politically and
possibly cause his defeat at the polls. All appeals to him
to lower his standard of appointments in the interest of his
own nomination and election were rejected with vigor and
finality. To a member of the National Republican Com
mittee who was especially interested in the election of del
egates from the South to the National Convention, he wrote
on March 13, 1903 :
"The most damaging thing to me any one can do is to
give the impression that in what I have been trying to do
for the negro I have been actuated by political motives.
That is why I have been so insistent that neither you nor

248 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
any one else shall take any step to secure a negro or any
other delegation from the South. I do not want the nomina
tion unless it comes freely from the people of the Republi
can States, because they believe in me, and because they
believe I can carry their States. And in the South I want
to make it as clear as a bell that I have acted in the way
I have on the negro question simply because I hold myself
the heir of the policies of Abraham Lincoln and would be
incapable of abandoning them to serve pohtical or per
sonal ends."
To the Governor of a leading Northern State he wrote
on March 23, 1903:
"I do not quite understand the serious tone in which
you speak of the possibility of my appointments returning
to cause trouble in the future. Do you mean as regards
my nomination as President? I have followed your advice
and given no thought whatever to that, agreeing with what
you said, that the way for me to do was to make a first-
class President and let the nomination take care of itself."
A notable incident had arisen in Oregon. There had been
a good deal of fraud and lax work in certain land offices
in' that State, and the President had informed the two
United States Senators from Oregon that he would not re
appoint a certain land official but would appoint in his place
any fit man whom they might name. The two Senators de
clined to select a successor, believing that by so doing the
President would permit the incumbent to remain in office.
On August 25, 1903, the President considerably astonished
the two Senators by sending to each of them a letter in
which he said:
"I cannot permit the incumbent to retain his position
because there is a deadlock about his successor. He will
be removed at once. In appointing his successor, and in
appointing all other officers to these places, I must keep
in mind that it is I who am primarily responsible for the
appointment, not the Senators. If I appoint a man who is

POR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 249
unfit, then of course you must refuse to confirm him; and
as a matter of fact, if you will give me a man of whom I
can approve, I will gladly appoint him. There is no one of
whom I am personally desirous of putting in any of these
positions. But I do not merely desire, but am firmly de
termined to have, a thoroughly good type of man in the
position; and I cannot surrender to any one the right to
decide for me whether or not I believe the man to be a
good one. I cannot permit any one to say to me that such
and such a man shall be appointed and no one else ; nor if I
believe a man to be unfit can I accept any one else 's judg
ment that he is fit. In return, I have of course no right to
insist that the Senate shall accept my judgment as to a
man's fitness. They can reject any nominee of mine; and
if they do so I will try to find some thoroughly good man
whom they will accept. ' '
The President also informed the Senators that, in de
fault of their naming a successor he had chosen a man whom
he hoped they would accept. Furthermore, as additional
information concerning his attitude on land office affairs,
he said it was reported to him that two other positions in
the service were in a disgraceful condition, and added:
"The incumbents must be removed forthwith. Will you
kindly join with your colleague in recommending to me
at once first-class men to put in their places? All I ask is
that these men shall be first-class in every way?"
This open warfare upon the two Senators, an unprece
dented proceeding a few months in advance of a campaign,
did not prevent the State of Oregon from giving its elec
toral vote to Roosevelt in the election of the following year.
Subsequently, Roosevelt's relentless pursuit of the land
office thieves resulted in sending one of the Senators to the
penitentiary. Another incident of like character occurred in September,
1903. On May 18 of that year William A. Miller, Assistant
Foreman of the Government Printing Office, was removed
from his position by the Public Printer, the reason given
for removal being that Miller had been expelled from a

250 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
labor union. Miller filed a complaint with the Civil Ser
vice Commission, alleging that his removal was in violation
of the Civil Service Law. The Commission investigated the
case and decided that his removal was a violation of the
law and requested his reassignment to his position. Pres
ident Roosevelt ordered the Public Printer to reinstate
Miller, saying in his letter to him : ' ' There is no objection
to the employees of the Government Printing Office consti
tuting themselves into a union if they so desire; but no
rules or resolutions of that union can be permitted to over
ride the laws of the United States which it is my sworn
duty to enforce."
The Washington Central Labor Bureau took up the case
on the side of the union and, with the approval of the
American Federation of Labor, sent circulars to more than
500 central labor unions throughout the United States,
claiming a membership of two and a half millions of work
ingmen, in which was embodied the following:
"Whereas, The President of the United States has seen
fit to reinstate W. A. Miller, who is an expelled member of a
trades organization, notwithstanding the overwhelming ev
idence of his moral turpitude, and has also committed him
self to the policy of the open shop, as shown by his let
ters, "Resolved, That the order of the President cannot be re
garded in any but an unfriendly light."
The President, in pursuance of a request by Samuel Gom
pers, President of the American Federation of Labor,
granted an interview on September 29, 1903, to the mem
bers of the executive council of that body, during which the
Miller case was brought up for consideration. The Presi
dent made a statement in which he said:
"As regards the Miller case, I have little to add to what
I have already said. In dealing with it, I ask you to re
member that I am dealing purely with the relation of the
Government to its employees. I must govern my action
by the laws of the land, which I am sworn to administer,

FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 251
and which differentiate any case in which the Government
of the United States is a party from all other cases what
soever. These laws are enacted for the benefit of the whole
people and cannot and must not be construed as permitting
discrimination against some of the people. I am President
of all the people of the United States, without regard to
creed, color, birthplace, occupation, or social conditions.
My aim is to do equal and exact justice as among them all.
In the employment and dismissal of men in the Government
service I can no more recognize the fact that a man does or
does not belong to a union as being for or against him than
I can recognize the fact that he is a Protestant or a Catho
lic, a Jew or a Gentile, as being for or against him. This is
the only question now before me for decision; and as to
this my decision is final."
Writing to his friend, L. Clarke Davis, of the Phila
delphia Public Ledger, on September 21, 1903, a few days
before the interview with the labor union representatives,
he said :
"It is a sheer waste of time for these people, through
such resolutions as those of the. unions you quote, to
threaten me with defeat for the Presidency next year.
Nothing would hire me even to accept the Presidency if I
had to take it on terms which would mean a forfeiting of
self-respect. Just as I should refuse to accept it at the cost
of abandoning the Northern Securities suit, or of repealing
the trust regulatory legislation of last year, or of undoing
what I did in the anthracite coal strike, so I should refuse
to take it at the cost of undoing what I did in this matter
of Miller and the Labor Union. The labor unions and the
trust magnates may perhaps unite against me. If so, I
shall do my level best to make the fight an open one and
beat them — and I think I run a good chance of winning; and
if I fail, I shall not regret the policy I have pursued."
In a letter to Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, in France,
on September 1, 1903, the President gave a fuller outline of
his attitude toward an election to the Presidency :

252 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"Of course I should like to be reelected President, and
I shall be disappointed, although not very greatly disap
pointed, if I am not ; and so far as I legitimately can I pay
heed to considerations of political expediency — in fact I
should be unfit for my position, or for any position of po
litical leadership, if I did not do so. But when questions
involve deep and far-reaching principles, then I believe
that the real expediency is to be found in straightforward
and unflinching adherence to principle, and this without
regard to what may be the temporary effect. When the
matter is one of elementary justice and decency, then there
can be no compromise. Murder is murder, and theft is
theft, and there should be no halfway measure with crimi
nality. There are good and bad men of all nationahties,
creeds and colors ; and if this world of ours is ever to be
come what we hope some day it may become, it must be by
the general recognition that the man's heart and soul, the
man's worth and action, determine his standing. I should
be sorry to lose the Presidency, but I should be a hundred
fold more sorry to gain it by failing in every way in my
power to try to put a stop to lynching and to brutahty and
wrong of any kind ; or by failing on the one hand to make
the very wealthiest and most powerful men in the country
obey the law and handle their property (so far as it is in
my power to make them) in the public interest ; or, on the
other hand, to fail to make the laboring men in their turn
obey the law, and realize that envy is as evil a thing as ar
rogance, and that crimes of violence and riot shall be as
sternly punished as crimes of greed and cunning."
For several months an investigation had been in progress,
in 1903, in the Post Office Department in regard to frauds
of various kinds which had been committed during the
McKinley administration. President Roosevelt ordered a
vigorous and unrelenting inquiry, and appointed special
counsel, in the person of two lawyers of high character and
standing, to take charge of it. Writing from Oyster Bay,

FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 253
on September 4, 1903, to the Postmaster General, Henry C.
Payne, he said:
"I would far rather incur the hostility of a Congressman
or a Senator than do something we ought not to do. The
Post Office Department is now under fire and there is much
baseless distrust of it in the popular mind. Really, you
and I are not responsible for the misconduct. It happened
before either of us came into office; but as long as this
feeling exists we can a hundredfold better afford to incur
the hostility of any politician than to give the slightest
ground for belief that we are managing the Department
primarily as a political machine. If the real or fancied need
of any politician comes in conflict with what you regard as
the good of the service or as equity to any individuals,
disregard that politician utterly and if he complains send
him to me. I shall take up any such case myself. ' '
In many letters written at this time he expressed him
self frankly concerning his political prospects, sounding in
all the same note of inflexible devotion to his guiding prin
ciples of official conduct.
To W. W. Sewell, in Maine, he wrote on September 23,
1903: "Sometimes I feel a little melancholy because it is so
hard to persuade people to accept equal justice. The very
rich corporation people are sore and angry because I re
fuse to allow a case like that of the Northern Securities
Company to go unchallenged by the law; and in the same
way the turbulent and extreme labor union people are sore
and angry because I insist that every man, whether he be
long to a labor union or not, shall be given a square deal
in Government employment. Now, I believe in rich people
who act squarely, and in labor unions which are managed
with wisdom and justice; but when either employee or
employer, laboring man or capitalist, goes wrong, I have to
cinch him, and that is all there is to it."
To his sister, Mrs. Douglas Robinson, he wrote from
Oyster Bay on September 23, 1903 :

254 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
' ' Next Monday I go back to Washington. And for the
thirteen months following there will be mighty little let up
to the strain. But I enjoy it to the full. What the outcome
will be, so far as I am personally concerned, I do not know.
It looks as if I will be nominated. Whether I shall be re
elected, I have not the slightest idea. I know there is bitter
opposition to me from many different sources. Whether I
shall have enough support to overcome this opposition, I
cannot tell. I suppose few Presidents can form the slightest
idea whether their policies have met with approval or not—
certainly I cannot. But as far as I can see those policies
have been right, and I hope that time will justify them. If
it does not, why, I must abide the fall of the dice, and that
is all there is about it."
One phase of his pursuit of persons involved in the frauds
of the Post Office Department is described in a letter to Sen
ator Lodge, under date of September 30, 1903 :
"I had a very ugly time over the indictment of a State
Senator of New York. He is a close personal, political and
business friend of the Republican State Chairman, and of
the State Comptroller. The Chairman is a heavy stock
holder in the concern on behalf of which the crookedness
was done, and he is very naturally bitter against me.
Whether he himself was cognizant of the wrong-doing or
not, I cannot say. It is greatly to be regretted that he is
Chairman of the State Committee. The Comptroller came
down to see me to explain that if the Senator were indicted
it was his judgment that we should certainly lose the State
next fall. I was as polite as possible, answering that of
course I was more interested in carrying the State than
any one else was, but that in the first place I should cer
tainly not let up on any grafter, no matter what the politi
cal effect might be ; and that in the second place, my judg
ment was that whereas we might lose the State if we did
make it evident that we intended to prosecute every guilty
man, we should certainly lose it if we did not."

FOR PRESIDENT IN 1904— FUTILE OPPOSITION 255
One of the most characteristic of all the letters written at
this time was the following to L. Clarke Davis, of Phila
delphia :
"There is one small point that I should like to speak to
you about. The other day in a very kindly editorial you
spoke of me as saying that I would do anything in the
world not dishonorable or improper or in violation of my
conscience to be reelected as President. I forget the exact
word, but this was the sense. It seems to me that this is
calculated to convey a somewhat wrong impression of what
I said. I do not believe in playing the hypocrite. Any
strong man fit to be President would desire a renomination
and reelection after his first term. Lincoln was President
in so great a crisis that perhaps he neither could nor did
feel any personal interest in his own reelection. I trust
and believe that if the crisis were a serious one I should be
incapable of considering my own well-being for a moment in
such a contingency. I should like to be elected President
just precisely as John Quincy Adams, or McKinley, or
Cleveland, or John Adams, or Washington himself, desired
to be elected. It is pleasant to think that one 's countrymen
thought well of one. But I shall not do anything whatever
to secure my nomination or election save to try to carry on
the public business in such shape that decent citizens will
believe I have shown wisdom, integrity and courage. If
they believe this with sufficient emphasis to secure my nom
ination and election — and on no other terms can I, or would
I, be willing to secure either — why I shall be glad. If they
do not I shall be sorry, but I shall not be very much cast
down because I shall feel that I have done the best that was
in me, and that there is nothing I have yet done of which
I have cause to be ashamed, or which I have cause to re
gret; and that I can go out of office with the profound sat
isfaction of having accomplished a certain amount of work
that was both beneficial and honorable for the country."

CHAPTER XXIII
NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS-
ALASKA BOUNDARY— WIDE RANGE OF READING
During 1903 the President made several speeches on oc
casions of special moment, in which he uttered sentiments
which attracted wide approval, and are as self-revelatory
as his letters. Speaking at the grave of Lincoln, Spring
field, Illinois, on June 4, he said:
"It seems to me eminently fitting that the guard around
the tomb of Lincoln should be composed of colored soldiers.
It was my own good fortune at Santiago to serve beside
colored troops. A man who is good enough to shed his
blood for his country is good enough to get a square deal
afterwards. More than that no man is entitled to, and less
than that no man shall have."
This declaration called forth the publication of a letter
from Lincoln which was said to have been written in 1864,
to General James S. Wadsworth, of New York, and which
contained the following passage:
"How to better the condition of the colored race has long
been a study which has attracted my serious and careful
attention ; hence I think I am clear and decided as to what
course I shall pursue in the premises, regarding it as a re
ligious duty, as the nation's guardian of these people who
have so heroically vindicated their manhood on the battle
field, where, in assisting to save the life of the Republic,
they have demonstrated their right to the ballot, which is
but the humane protection of the Flag they have so fear
lessly defended."
In a speech on Labor Day, September 7, 1903, at Syra
cuse, N. Y., the President said: 256

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 257
"There is no worse enemy of the wage-worker than the
man who condones mob violence in any shape or who
preaches class hatred; and surely the slightest acquaint
ance with our industrial history should teach even the most
short-sighted that the times of most suffering for our people
as a whole, the times when business is stagnant, and capital
suffers from shrinkage and gets no return from its invest
ments, are exactly the times of hardship, and want, and
grim disaster among the poor. If all the existing instru
mentalities of wealth could be abolished, the first and se
verest suffering would come among those of us who are
least well off at present. The wage-worker is well off
only when the rest of the country is well off ; and he can
best contribute to this general well-being by showing san
ity and a firm purpose to do justice to others."
Speaking at the unveiling of a statue of General W. T.
Sherman, in Washington, on October 15, 1903, he said:
"The greatest leaders, whether in war or in peace, must
of course show a peculiar quality of genius ; but the most
redoubtable armies that have ever existed have been re
doubtable because the average soldier, the average officer,
possessed to a high degree such comparatively simple qual
ities as loyalty, courage, and hardihood. And so the most
successful governments are those in which the average pub
lic servant possesses that variant of loyalty which we call
patriotism, together with common sense and honesty. We
can as httle afford to tolerate a dishonest man in the public
service as a coward in the army. The murderer takes a
single life ; the corruptionist in public life, whether he be
bribe-giver or bribe-taker, strikes at the heart of the com
monwealth. ' '
On November 10, 1903, the President convened Congress
in advance of its regular date of meeting in order that it
might consider the legislation necessary to put into opera
tion the commercial treaty with Cuba which had been rati
fied at the previous session. This legislation was passed

258 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
subsequently by both houses of Congress. In his message
at the opening of the regular session, dated December 7,
1903, he took occasion to reassert, without modification, his
policy in regard to the regulation of trusts and the en
forcement of law with equal justice to all :
"The legislation (in regard to trusts) was moderate. It
was characterized throughout by the idea that we were not
attacking corporations, but endeavoring to provide for
doing away with any evil in them; that we drew the line
against misconduct, not against wealth ; gladly recognizing
the great good done by the capitalist who alone, or in con
junction with his fellows, does his work along proper and
legitimate lines.
"Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right
to do as he likes with his property or his labor, so long as
he does not infringe the rights of others. No man is above
the law and no man is below it ; nor do we ask any man's
permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to
the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor."
One of the problems that Roosevelt inherited from the
McKinley administration was the Alaska boundary dis
pute between the United States and Canada. An effort
to settle it through a Joint High Commission had failed,
and in the last days of the McKinley administration a pro
posal was made by the British Government that the matter
be submitted to arbitration. This was under discussion
when Roosevelt acceded to the Presidency. He at once
took control of the question, flatly declined arbitration, and
secured in January, 1903, through the British Minister at
Washington the negotiation of a treaty with Great Britain
which provided for a mixed tribunal of six members, three
Americans and three representatives of Great Britain, to
consider the matter. The American members of the tri
bunal were Senator H. C. Lodge, Elihu Root, Secretary of
War, and George Turner, formerly U. S. Senator from the
State of Washington. The British members were Lord
Alverston, Lord Chief Justice of England, and Sir L. A.

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 259
Jette and A. B. Aylesworth of Canada. Roosevelt's atti
tude toward this tribunal and its possible outcome was
frankly set forth in a letter that he wrote to Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, who at the time was in England and had
sent to Roosevelt an account of a conversation that he had
had on the subject with the Rt. Hon. Joseph Chamberlain
of the British Cabinet. As Roosevelt's letter is of histori
cal value in showing the direct methods which he habitually
employed in diplomatic matters, it is here reproduced in
full: Personal. Oyster Bat, N. T.,
July 25, 1903
My dear Judge Holmes:
I thank you very much for your letter, which I thorough
ly enjoyed. There is one point on which I think I ought to
give you full information, in view of Chamberlain's remark
to you. This is about the Alaska boundary matter, and if
you happen to meet Chamberlain again you are entirely at
liberty to tell him what I say, although of course it must
be privately and unofficially.! Nothing but my very earnest
desire to get on well with England and my reluctance to
come to a break made me consent to this appointment of a
Joint Commission in this case ; for I regard the attitude of
Canada, which England has backed, as having the scantest
possible warrant in justice. However, there were but two
alternatives. Either I could appoint a commission and
give a chance for agreement; or I could do as I shall of
course do in case this commission fails, and request Con
gress to make an appropriation which will enable me to
run the boundary on my own hook. As regards most of
Great Britain's claim, there is not, in my judgment, enough
to warrant so much as a consideration by the United States ;
and if it were not that there are two or three lesser points
on which there is doubt, I could not, even for the object I
have mentioned, have consented to appoint a commission.
The claim of the Canadians for access to deep water along
any part of the Canadian coast is just exactly as inde-

260 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
fensible as if they should now suddenly claim the island of
Nantucket. There is not a man fit to go on the commission
in all the United States who would treat this claim any
more respectfully than he would treat a claim to Nantucket.
In the same way the preposterous claim once advanced, but
I think now abandoned by the Canadians, that the Portland
Channel was not the Portland Channel but something else
unknown, is no more worth discussing than the claim that
the 49th Parallel meant the 50th Parallel or else the 48th.
But there are points which the commission can genuinely
consider. There is room for argument about the islands
in the mouth of the Portland Channel. I think on this the
American case much the stronger of the two ; still, the Brit
ish have a case. Again, it may well be that there are places
in which there is room for doubt as to whether there ac
tually is a chain of mountains parallel to the coast within
the ten-league limit. Here again there is a chance for
honest difference and honest final agreement. I beheve
that no three men in the United States could be found who
would be more anxious than our own delegates to do jus
tice to the British claim on all points where there is even a
color of right on the British side. But the objection raised
by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge, Root and Turner,
and especially to Lodge and Root, was that they had com
mitted themselves on the general proposition. No man in
public life in any position of prominence could have pos
sibly avoided committing himself on the proposition, any
more than Mr. Chamberlain could avoid committing him
self on the question of the ownership of the Orkneys if some
Scandinavian country suddenly claimed them. If this claim
embodied other points as to which there was legitimate
doubt, I believe Mr. Chamberlain would act fairly and
squarely in deciding the matter ; but if he appointed a com
mission to settle up all those questions, I certainly should
not expect him to appoint three men, if he could find them,
who believed that as to the Orkneys the question was an
open one. Similarly I wish to repeat that no three men fit
for the position could be found in all the United States who

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 261
would not already have come to some conclusion as to cer
tain features of the Canadian claim — not as to all of them.
Let me add that I earnestly hope that the English under
stand my purpose. I wish to make one last effort to bring
about an agreement through the commission, which will
enable the people of both countries to say that the result
represents the feeling of the representatives of both coun
tries. But if there is a disagreement I wish it distinctly
understood, not only that there will be no arbitration of the
matter, but that in my message to Congress I shall take a
position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration
hereafter; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will
render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority
to run the line as we claim it, by our own people, without
any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada.
If I paid attention to mere abstract right, that is the posi
tion I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because
I wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled
peacefully and with due regard to England's dignity.
Faithfully yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
Hon. 0. W. Holmes,
Care J. S. Morgan & Co.,
London, England.
It was known at the time that Roosevelt had sent troops
to Alaska, and though the primary object in sending them
was to maintain law and order among the great horde of
gold-seekers in the Klondike, still it was believed that he
would not hesitate to use them in support of his resolve to
ask Congress for the power to "run the line as we claim
it" in case the tribunal failed to reach an agreement. The
tribunal met in London and reached an agreement on Octo
ber 20, 1903. In his message to Congress on December 3,
following, Roosevelt said of the settlement:
"The result is satisfactory in every way. It is of great
material advantage to our people in the Far Northwest.
It has removed from the field of discussion and possible

262 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
danger a question liable to become more acutely accen
tuated with each passing year. Finally, it has furnished
signal proof of the fairness and good-will with which two
friendly nations can approach and determine issues involv
ing national sovereignty to a third power for adjudica
tion." Another notable diplomatic triumph of the year was also
recorded in the same message :
' ' Early in July, having received intelligence, which hap
pily turned out to be erroneous, of the assassination of our
vice-consul at Beirut, I despatched a small squadron to
that port for such service as might be found necessary on
arrival. Although the attempt on the Hfe of our vice-consul
had not been successful, yet the outrage was symptomatic
of a state of excitement and disorder which demanded im
mediate attention. The arrival of the vessels had the hap
piest result. A feeling of security at once took the place
of the former alarm and disquiet; our officers were cor
dially welcomed by the Consular body and the leading mer
chants, and ordinary business resumed its activity. The
government of the Sultan gave a considerate hearing to
the representations of our minister; the official who was
regarded as responsible for the disturbed condition of af
fairs was removed. Our relations with the Turkish Gov
ernment remain friendly; our claims founded on inequit
able treatment of some of our schools and missions appear
to be in process of amicable adjustment. ' '
The cordial and mutually helpful relations that existed
between the President and members of his Cabinet are re
vealed in correspondence which passed between him and
them at various times. On July 11, 1903, he wrote from
Oyster Bay, to Secretary Hay, who was in Washington:
"By this time it is absolutely -needless for me to tell you
not merely what an immense help you are to me, but what
a perpetual delight and comfort. Of course, do not ever
give a thought to the newspaper and other swine who de-

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 263
light to invent tales about our relation. Literally I never
see them. When I came in I thought you a great Secre
tary of State, but now I have had a chance to know far
more fully what a really great Secretary of State you are.
As for those who first of all portray a wholly imaginary
difference between us and then attack me because of that
difference — for Heaven's sake, let them go on!"
To this Secretary Hay responded on July 13, 1903 :
"Dear Theodore:
"I thank you a thousand times for your kind and gen
erous letter of the 11th. It is a comfort to work for a
President who besides being a lot of other things, happened
to be born a gentleman."
A letter to Secretary Hay on November 7, 1903, shows
how careful Roosevelt was not to offend the susceptibilities
of Congress in reference to its prerogatives concerning the
conduct of foreign affairs :
"Uncle Joe Cannon was in this afternoon and was very
nice indeed, but evidently slightly nervous lest the preroga
tives of Congress in foreign affairs should be overlooked
by us. I told him I should ask you to keep in close touch
with Congressman Hitt (Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations) and consult with him on any point
where there would be a chance of Congress feeling that it
had power of action. Will you mind getting in touch with
Hitt and advising with him on any point where such a pos
sibility could arise? I find that Congress is evidently pre
pared to be a little sensitive on the subject, and we might
as well forestall possible criticism. ' '
To Secretary Root, who resigned the war portfolio, his
resignation taking effect in February, 1904, when he was
succeeded by William H. Taft, the President wrote on
August 24, 1903 :
"It is hard indeed for me to accept your resignation ; and

264 HEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
I do so not only with keen personal regret, but with a lively
understanding of the gap your withdrawal will create in
public life. My sense of personal loss is very great; and
yet my sense of the loss to the Nation as a whole is even
greater. You have been over four years Secretary of War.
I wonder if you yourself realize how much you have ac
complished during that period. If you will turn to your
first reports and will read therein the recommendations
you made in order that the army might be put on an effec
tive basis, you cannot but be pleased at the way in which
these recommendations have now been adopted by Con
gress as well as by the administration, and have become
enacted into law or crystallized into custom. We have
never had a public servant of the government who has
worked harder than you have worked during these four
years and a half, and this not merely in point of time, but
above all in point of intensity; and your success has been
equal to your labor. The only reward you have had, or
can have, is the knowledge of successful achievement, of the
performance in fullest fashion of a great public duty, the
doing of which was of vital importance to the nation's
welfare. "Your duties have included more than merely the admin
istration of the Department and the reorganization of the
army on an effective basis. You have also been the head
of the Department which dealt with the vast and delicate
problems involved in our possession of the Philippine
Islands, and your success in dealing with this part of your
work had been as signal as your success in dealing with the
purely military problem. To very few statesmen indeed
in any country is it given at one and the same time to
achieve signal and striking triumph in the administration
and reform of the military branch of the government and
in the administration of what was in effect a department
of insular dependencies, where the problems were new to
our people and were in themselves of great difficulty.
"Moreover, aside from your work in these two divisions
of the government service, I appreciate most keenly the

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 265
invaluable advice and assistance you have rendered me in
innumerable matters of weight not coming directly in your
departmental province, but in which I sought your aid with
the certainty of not being disappointed. Your position on
the Alaska Boundary Commission at the present moment
is an illustration of these services.
"May all good fortune attend you wherever you are;
the American people wish you well and appreciate to the
full the debt due you for all that you have done on their
behalf." Incessant and exacting as were the official activities of
the President during the first two years of his service, he
still was able to find time for a really extraordinary amount
of miscellaneous reading as the following letter, under date
of November 4, 1903, to Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Presi
dent of Columbia University, shows :
"You remember speaking to me about reading and espe
cially about the kind of books one ought to read. On my
way back from Oyster Bay on election day I tried to jot
down the books I have been reading for the past two years,
and they run as follows. Of course, I have forgotten a
great many, especially ephemeral novels which I have hap
pened to take up ; and I have also read much in the maga
zines. Moreover, more than half of the books are books
which I have read before. These I did not read through,
but simply took out the parts I liked. Thus, in ' Waverley, '
I omitted all the opening part; in 'Pickwick' I skipped
about; going through all my favorite scenes. In Macaulay
I read simply the essays that appealed to me, while in Keats
and Browning, although I read again and again many of the
poems, I think there must be at least eighty or ninety per
cent of the poetry of each, as far as the bulk is concerned,
which I have never succeeded in reading at all. The old
books I read were not necessarily my favorites; it was
largely a matter of chance. All the reading, of course, was
purely for enjoyment, and of most desultory character.
With this preliminary explanation, here goes!

266 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"Parts of Herodotus; the first and seventh books of
Thucydides; all of Polybius; a little of Plutarch; iEschy-
lus's 'Orestean Trilogy,' and the 'Seven against Thebes';
Euripides' 'Hippolytus and Bacchse,' and Aristophanes'
'Frogs'; parts of the 'Politics' of Aristotle; (all of these
were in translation) ; Ridgeway's 'Early Age of Greece';
Wheeler's 'Life of Alexander'; some six volumes of Ma-
haffey's 'Studies of the Greek World' — of which I only
read chapters here and there; two of Maspero's volumes
on the Early Syrian, Chaldean and Egyptian civilizations—
these I read superficially; several chapters of Froissart;
the 'Memoirs' of Marbot; Bain's 'Life of Charles the
Twelfth'; Mahan 's 'Types of Naval Officers'; some of
Macaulay 's Essays; three or four volumes of Gibbon; three
or four chapters of Motley; the 'Life of Prince Eugene,'
of Admiral de Ruyter, of Turenne, and of Sobieski (all
in French) ; the Battles in Carlyle 's 'Frederick the Great';
Hay and Nicolay 's 'Lincoln,' and the two volumes of Lin
coln's 'Speeches and Writings' — these I have not only read
through, but have read parts of them again and again;
Bacon's 'Essays' — curiously enough, I had really never
read these until this year; Mrs. Roosevelt has a volume
which belonged to her grandfather, which she always car
ries around with her, and I got started reading this; 'Mac
beth'; 'Twelfth Night'; 'Henry IV; 'Henry V';, 'Richard
II'; the first two cantos of 'Paradise Lost'; some of Michael
Drayton's poems — there are only three or four I care for;
portions of ' Nibelungenlied ' ; portions of Carlyle 's trans
lation of Dante's 'Inferno'; Church's 'Beowulf; Morris'
translation of the 'Heimskringla,' and Dasent's transla
tion of the 'Sagas of Gisli and Burnt Njal'; Lady Greg
ory's and Miss Hull's 'Cuchulain Saga,' together with the
'Children of Lir,' the 'Children of Tuirenn,' the 'Tale of
Deirdre,' etc.; the 'Precieuses Ridicules,' 'Le Barbier de
Seville'; most of Jusserand 's books — of which I was most
interested in his studies of the 'King's Quhair'; Holmes'
'Over the Teacups'; Lounsbury's 'Shakespeare and Vol
taire'; various numbers of the Edinburgh Review from

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 267
1803 to 1850; Tolstoi's 'Sebastopol and the Cossacks';
Sinkiewicz's 'Fire and Sword' and parts of his other vol
umes; 'Guy Mannering'; the 'Antiquary'; 'Rob Roy';
'Waverley'; 'Quentin Durward'; parts of 'Marmion' and
the 'Lay of the Last Minstrel'; Cooper's 'Pilot'; some of
the earlier stories and some of the poems of Bret Harte;
Mark Twain's 'Tom Sawyer';. 'Pickwick Papers'; 'Nich
olas Nickleby'; 'Vanity Fair'; 'Pendennis'; 'The New-
comes'; 'The Adventures of Philip'; Conan Doyle's 'White
Company'; Lever's 'Charles O'Malley'; 'Romances of
Brockden Brown' I read when I was confined to my room
with a game leg; for motives of curiosity and no real en
joyment; an occasional half hour's reading in Keats,
Browning, Poe, Tennyson, Longfellow, Kipling, Bliss Car
man; also in Poe's 'Tales' and Lowell's 'Essays'; some of
Stevenson's stories, and of Allingham's 'British Ballads';
Wagner's 'Simple Life.'
"I have read aloud to the children, and often finished
afterwards to myself, 'The Rose and the Ring'; Hans An
dersen; some of Grimm; some of 'Norse Folk Tales';.
stories by Howard Pyle; 'Uncle Remus' and the rest of
Joel Chandler Harris' stories (incidentally I would be
willing to rest all that I have done in the South as regards
the negro in his story 'Free Joe'). Two or three books by
Jacob Riis; also Mrs. Van Vorst's 'Woman Who Toils,'
and one or two similar volumes; the 'Nonsense Verses' of
Carolyn Wells, first to the children and afterward to Mrs.
Roosevelt and myself ; Kenneth Grahame 's ' Golden Age ' ;
those two delightful books by Somerville and Ross, 'All
on the Irish Shore,' and 'Experiences of an Irish M. P.';
Townsend 's 'Europe and Asia'; Conrad's 'Youth'; 'Phoe-
nixiana'; 'Artemus Ward'; Octave Thanet's stories, which
I always like when they deal with- labor problems ; various
books on the Boer War, of which I like best Viljoen's,
Stevens', and 'Studies' by the writer signing himself
Linesman; Pike's 'Through the Sun- Arctic Forest,' and
Peer's 'Cross Country with Horse and Hound'; together
with a number of books on big game hunting, mostly in

268 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Africa; several volumes on American outdoor life and
natural history, including the reading of much of John
Burroughs; Swettenham's 'Real Malay'; David Gray's
'Gallops'; Miss Stewart's 'Napoleon Jackson'; Janvier's
'Passing of Thomas and Other Stories'; 'The Benefactors';
'People of the Whirlpool'; London's 'Call of the Wild';
Fox's 'Little Shepherd of Kingdom Come'; Hamlin Gar
land's 'Captain of the Gray Horse Troop'; Tarkington's
'Gentleman from Indiana'; Churchill's 'Crisis'; Reming
ton's 'John Ermine of the Yellowstone'; Wister 's 'Vir
ginian,' 'Red Men and White,' 'Philosophy Four,' and
'Lin McLean'; White's 'Blazed Trail,' 'Conjurer's House,'
and 'Claim Jumpers'; Trevelyan 's 'American Revolution.'
Often I would read one book by chance and it would sug
gest another.
' ' There ! That is the catalogue ; about as interesting as
Homer's catalogue of the Ships, and with about as much
method in it as there seems in a superficial glance to be in
an Irish Stew."
A scarcely less notable letter, as disclosing the dimen
sions of the President's omnivorous reading, is the foUow
ing to the Rt. Hon., afterwards Lord, John Morley, under
date of January 17, 1904 :
"It is a temptation to me to write you at inordinate
length about your 'Life of Gladstone.' Incidentally, you
started me to rereading Lucretius and Finlay. Lucretius
was an astounding man for pagan Rome to have produced
just before the empire. I should not myself have thought
of comparing him with Virgil one way or the other. It
would be too much like comparing, say, Herbert Spencer
with Milton, excepting that part dealing with death, in the
end of the third book (if I remember right), I am less
struck with the work because of its own quality (as a fin
ished product, so to speak) than I am with the fact that
it was opening up a totally new trail — a trail which for
very many centuries, indeed down to modern times, was
not followed much farther. He had as truly a scientific

NOTABLE SENTIMENTS IN SPEECHES AND LETTERS 269
mind as Darwin or Huxley, and the boldness of his truth-
telling was astonishing. As for Finlay, I have always been
fond of him. But I would not like to be understood as de
preciating Gibbon. Personally I feel that with all their
faults Gibbon and Macaulay are the two great English his
torians, and there could be no better testimonial to their
greatness than the fact that scores of authors have each
made a comfortable life reputation by refuting some single
statement of one or the other.
"Of course, in reading the Gladstone, I was especially
interested because of the ceaseless unconscious compari
sons I was making with events in our own history, and
with difficulties I myself every day encounter. A man who
has grappled, or is grappling, with Cuba, Panama and the
Philippines, has a lively appreciation of the difficulties
inevitably attendant upon getting into Egypt in the first
place, and then upon the impossibility of getting out of it,
in the second. Perhaps I was interested most of all in your
account of the closing years of Gladstone's career, in which
'Home Rule' was the most important question he had to
face. I suppose I am one of a large multitude to whom
your book for the first time gave a clear idea of what Glad
stone's actual position was in the matter, and of the gross
injustice of the assaults upon him. You make it clear, for
instance, that from the standpoint of Gladstone's assail
ants, even, there was far more to be said against the con
sistency and frankness of the leaders who opposed him
and the leaders who deserted him than against his. To my
mind you prove your case completely, — and I have always
been inclined to criticize Gladstone on this point, although
I have personally been a Home-Ruler ever since reading
Lecky 's account of Ireland in the eighteenth century. On
no position do I feel more cordial sympathy with Glad
stone's attitude than as regards Turkey and the subjugated
peoples of the Balkan peninsula."

CHAPTER XXIV
SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL
The year 1903 marks what Theodore Roosevelt always con
sidered the most notable and widely beneficent achievement
of his Presidential career — the possession of the Isthmus
of Panama and the consequent construction of an inter
oceanic canal across it. His interest in the project began
long before he became President. While he was Governor
of New York, he entered an emphatic protest against a
treaty which Secretary Hay had negotiated with the
British Government and which was presented to the
United States Senate for . ratification on February 5,
1900. This is known as the first Hay-Pauncefote
treaty, designed to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of
1850 and make possible the construction of an Isthmian
Canal. Under the provisions of this first treaty the canal
was not to be fortified and its neutrality was to be guar
anteed by all nations using it. As soon as the text of the
treaty was published, Governor Roosevelt wrote a friendly
but most earnest letter to Secretary Hay in opposition to
it, pointing out what he regarded as very serious defects
in it. This letter is published in full in Chapter XHT of
this volume. It outlined with clearness and force the course
which Roosevelt as President was to carry to success a
few years later when he secured a canal built with Ameri
can money and operated and fortified by Americans with
out the cooperation or interference of any foreign nation.
The Senate refused to ratify the first treaty in the form
submitted, and added amendments which did away
with the neutrality provision and authorized specifically
the fortifying of the canal. These amendments the British
Government declined to accept, and the treaty failed. Sec-
270

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 271
retary Hay was greatly chagrined at the failure and sub
mitted his resignation to President McKinley, who refused
to accept it. Negotiations were resumed and on November
18, 1901, the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty was completed.
Roosevelt had in the meantime acceded to the Presidency
and in laying the treaty before the Senate he said of it
in his first annual message to Congress on December 3, 1901 :
"In this treaty, the old Clayton-Bulwer treaty, so long
recognized as inadequate to supply the base for the con
struction and maintenance of a necessarily American ship
canal, is abrogated. It specifically provides that the United
States alone shall do the work of building and assume the
responsibility of safeguarding the canal and shall regulate
its neutral use by all nations on terms of equality without
the guaranty or interference of any outside nation from
any quarter."
The treaty was ratified by the Senate on December 16,
1901. While it did not in terms authorize the fortifying of
the canal, the British Government consented to the omission
of a clause in the first treaty forbidding fortification, and
subsequently acquiesced in the assumption by the American
Government that it was entitled to fortify under the provi
sion which declared that the United States "shall be at
liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as
may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and dis
order." As soon as the treaty was ratified, attention became con
centrated upon the question of routes for an Isthmian
Canal. A Commission, with Rear Admiral A. G. Walker
at its head, which had been appointed by President McKin
ley in March, 1899, for the purpose of ascertaining and re
porting as to the "most feasible and practicable route,"
reported in December, 1901, to the effect that the cost of
constructing a canal at Nicaragua was $189,864,062, and of
one at Panama, $144,233,000; that the new reorganized
Panama Canal Company offered to sell its rights, property
and franchises for $109,141,500, which would bring the cost

272 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
of a canal by the Panama route up to $253,374,858; that
the Commission estimated the value of the new Panama
Canal Company's property at $40,000,000; and that in view
of the terms offered by that company, the Commission was
of the opinion that the "most practicable and feasible
route ' ' was by way of Nicaragua.
This report was transmitted to Congress by President
Roosevelt on December 4, 1901. On January 4, 1902, the
president of the new Panama Canal Company sent word by
cable from Paris to Rear Admiral Walker that the company
was wilhng to sell its properties and concessions to the
United States Government for $40,000,000. On January
18 the Walker commission rendered to President Roosevelt
a supplementary report, transmitting the offer of the
French company to sell for $40,000,000, and declaring it
to be the commission's opinion, in view of the changed con
ditions, that the "most practicable and feasible route" for
a canal was that by way of Panama.
In the meantime, while these negotiations with the
French company were in progress, the House of Repre
sentatives, on January 8, 1902, passed by a vote of 225 to
25 a bill authorizing the President to proceed with the con
struction of a canal by way of Nicaragua, at a cost of
$180,000,000, and appropriating $10,000,000 on account for
immediate use. When the bill reached the Senate it en
countered vigorous opposition. The supplementary report
of the Walker commission was sent to Congress on January
20, and proved to be the doom of the Nicaraguan project.
An amendment to the House bill was offered by Senator
Spooner which converted it virtually into a new measure.
After a long debate, marked at times by some animosity,
the Spooner bill passed the Senate on June 19, 1902, by a
vote of 67 to 6, and passed the House of Representatives on
June 26 by a vote of 259 to 8. It was signed by President
Roosevelt on June 28. In substance it authorized the Presi
dent to acquire for and in behalf of the United States, at a
cost not exceeding $40,000,000, all the rights, privileges,
franchises, concessions, and property on the Isthmus of

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 273
Panama owned by the new Panama Canal Company; to
acquire from the Republic of Colombia, on such terms as
he might deem reasonable, control of a strip of land, not
less than six miles in width, between the two oceans, in
which to construct and operate a canal; to acquire such
additional territory and rights from Colombia as in his
judgment would facilitate the general purpose; and, when
a satisfactory title had been secured from the new Panama
Canal Company, to proceed to construct a canal of sufficient
capacity and depth to afford "convenient passage for ves
sels of the largest tonnage and greatest draft now in use,
and such as may be reasonably anticipated." In case satis
factory title could not be obtained from the French com
pany, the act authorized the President to take the neces
sary steps to permit of the construction of a canal at
Nicaragua. Immediately following the enactment of the Spooner law
Secretary Hay opened negotiations with Dr. Tomas Her-
ran, Charge d'affaires of the Colombian Government at
Washington, for the conclusion of a treaty between the
United States and Colombia in accordance with the terms
of that law. The negotiations resulted in what is known
as the Hay-Herran convention, which was signed on Janu
ary 22, 1903, Dr. Herran signing with the authority of the
Colombian Government. The treaty was sent to the Senate
on January 23. Writing to Secretary Hay, who was absent
from Washington, on March 12, 1903, the President said :
"I am now sweating blood in the effort to get the two
treaties (Cuban Reciprocity and Colombian) confirmed.
Senator Blank, of course, had been filled with distrust at
the last moment and wanted to propose one or two amend
ments to the Panama treaty. He is an admirable man of
great intellect ; but I wish that every tom-cat in the path
did not strike him as an unusually large and ferocious lion.
The Democrats are doing their best to get into shape to
vote solidly against both treaties. They cannot possibly
do this against the Panama treaty, and I think they will
find it difficult to do so against the Cuban treaty, although

274 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
the latter is as yet by no means out of the woods. Gorman
is a very smooth article, and though he will exercise some
control over the yahoos, he will have to do much as they
desire, and unfortunately, the addition of his ability to their
loose-lipped abhorrence of decency, does not make a really
attractive combination."
The President's prediction as to the fate of the Panama
treaty was verified, for it was ratified without change on
March 17, 1903. It authorized the new Panama Canal Com
pany to sell and transfer to the United States all its rights,
privileges, properties and concessions, as well as the Pan
ama Railroad; ceded to the United States for the purpose
of canal construction a strip of land thirty miles in width
between the two oceans, over which the United States
should have administrative control for police and sanita
tion purposes, but of which the sovereignty should remain
vested in Colombia; stipulated that upon the exchange of
ratifications, the United States should pay to Colombia
$10,000,000 in gold, and in addition, beginning nine years
after the date of ratification, should pay annually, $250,000
in gold. It was pointed out by Secretary Hay, after the
rejection of the treaty by Colombia, that the bonus of $10,-
000,000 was a sum equivalent to two-thirds of what was
reputed to be the Colombian public debt, and that the an
nual payment of $250,000 was equivalent to the interest on
$15,000,000 at the rate at which loans could be obtained by
the American Government.
The Colombian Congress met in extra session, convened
for the purpose of considering the treaty, on June 20, 1903.
It was known that a large majority of its members were op
posed to ratification, and that the Colombian Government
controlled it absolutely. The treaty itself was withheld
on a pretext that it must be signed by the Vice President
before being sent to the Congress. In the meantime a
general clamor was raised for more favorable terms for
Colombia and for amendments that should grant them.
On June 10, 1903, the agent of the new Panama Canal

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 275
Company at Bogota received from the Colombian Govern
ment an official note saying that it did not think the conven
tion would be ratified, because of the opinion that the com
pensation was insufficient, but that, if the new Panama
Canal Company would pay to Colombia $10,000,000, ratifi
cation could be secured.
On July 9, 1903, General Rafael Reyes, spokesman of the
government, requested the American Minister at Bogota
to say to Secretary Hay, as the Minister did at once by
cable, that he (Reyes) did not think the treaty could be
ratified without two amendments — one stipulating the pay
ment of $10,000 gold by the new Panama Canal Com
pany for the right to transfer its isthmus property to the
United States, and the other increasing the bonus which
the United States was to pay to Colombia from $10,000,000
to $15,000,000. These direct attempts to extort more money
as the price of ratification were unsuccessful. Secretary
Hay replied, on July 13, 1903, that neither of the proposed
amendments would stand any chance of acceptance by the
Senate, while any amendment whatever or unnecessary de
lay in ratification of the treaty would greatly imperil its
consummation. Two days later, July 15, 1903, the treaty was submitted
to a special committee of nine in the Colombian Senate.
It was reported to the Senate on August 4, 1903, with a
series of amendments which completely changed the char
acter of the treaty. On July 31, 1903, Secretary Hay sent
the following cable message to the American Minister at
Bogota :
"Instructions heretofore sent to you show the great dan
ger of amending the treaty. This government has no right
or competence to covenant with Colombia to impose new
financial obligations upon canal company and the President
would not submit to our Senate any amendment in that
sense, but would treat it as voiding the negotiation and
bringing about a failure to conclude a satisfactory treaty
with Colombia. No additional payment by the United
States can hope for approval by the United States Senate,

276 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
while any amendment whatever requiring reconsideration
by that body would most certainly imperil its consumma
tion." The substance of this message was communicated at once
to the Colombian Government. On August 12, 1903, the
Colombian Senate rejected the treaty in its entirety by
unanimous vote. On the same date General Reyes called
upon the American Minister and informed him that the
treaty had been rejected by the Colombian Government and
leading senators in the belief that there would be a reaction
in public sentiment in its favor, when it would be possible
to reconsider and ratify it without amendment. He re
quested the American Minister to ask the American Gov
ernment to grant two more weeks' for the consummation of
this plan.
This message was communicated to President Roosevelt
at Oyster Bay, arid on August 19, 1903, he wrote to Secre
tary Hay :
"On your way back cannot you stop here, and we will
go over the canal situation? The one thing evident is to
do nothing at present. If under the treaty of 1846 we have
a eolor of right to start in and build a canal, my off-hand
judgment would favor such proceeding. It seems that the
great bulk of the best engineers are agreed that that route
is the best ; and I do not think that the Bogota lot of ob
structionists should be allowed permanently to bar one of
the future highways of civilization. Of course, under the
terms of the Act we could now go ahead with Nicaragua,
and perhaps would technically be required to do so. But
what we do now will be of consequence, not merely decades,
but centuries hence, and we must be sure that we are tak
ing the right step before we act."
After consultation with the President, Secretary Hay
cabled to the American Minister at Bogota, on August 24,
1903: "The President will make no engagement on the
canal matter, but I regard it as improbable that any definite

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 277
action will be taken within two weeks." Again, on August
29, 1903, he cabled more fully to the American Minister:
"The President is bound by the Isthmian Canal statute,
commonly called the Spooner law. By its provisions he is
given a reasonable time to arrange a satisfactory treaty
with Colombia. When, in his judgment, the reasonable time
has expired, and he has not been able to make a satisfac
tory arrangement as to the Panama route, he will then
proceed to carry into effect the alternative of the statute.
Meantime the President will enter into no engagement re
straining his freedom of action under the statute."
The special committee of the Colombia Senate, on Sep
tember 5, 1903, reported a bill approving the rejection of the
treaty and authorizing the President of Colombia to con
clude treaties for the construction of a Panama canal under
certain conditions, and on terms most generous to Colom
bia, but the measure never came to a vote. It was referred
to a committee that made a report on October 14, 1903,
which was read in the Senate and which presented, without
approval or dissent, a contention that the last extension
of the Wyse concession for a canal at Panama, granted by
Colombia in 1900, and purchased by the French Canal Com
pany, fixing October 31, 1910, as the date for completion of
the canal, was not valid, and that if this was the case, the
previous extension would expire at the end of 1904 and all
canal properties, rights and franchises would revert to
Colombia. Colombia would then be in position to receive
the $40,000,000 which the treaty proposed the United States
should pay to the new Panama Canal Company, as well as
the $10,000,000 bonus, and also be in more advantageous
position for demanding terms from the United States. This
plan found great favor, and it was even contended that
the Colombia Congress had full power to annul the exten
sion in case it saw fit to do so. No action was taken on the
report, and on October 31, 1903, the Congress adjourned.
The President was keeping a close watch upon the pro
ceedings at Bogota, studiously making up his mind as to the

278 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
best course to pursue. On September 15, 1903, he wrote to
Secretary Hay:
"Let us do nothing in the Colombia matter at present.
I shall be back in Washington by the 28th instant, and you
a week or two afterward. Then we will go over the matter
very carefully and decide what to do. At present I feel
that there are two alternatives. First, to take up Nica
ragua ; second, in some shape or way to interfere when it
becomes necessary so as to secure the Panama route with
out further dealing with the foolish and homicidal corrup-
tionists in Bogota. I am not inclined to have any further
dealings whatever with those Bogota people."
He was still considering the subject on October 5, 1903,
when he wrote to Senator Hanna :
"You may have noticed that I have not said a word about
the canal. I shall have to allude to it in my message, but
I shall go over this part of my message with you before
putting it in its final form. I am not as sure as you are
that the only virtue we need exercise is patience. I think
it is well worth considering whether we had not better warn
these Bogota politicians that great though our patience
has been, it can be exhausted. This does not mean that we
must necessarily go to Nicaragua. I feel we are certainly
justified in morals, and therefore justified in law, under
the treaty of 1846, in interfering summarily and saying
that the canal is to be built and that they must not stop it."
A letter which the President wrote at this time to Dr.
Albert Shaw, editor of The Review of Reviews, is of first
importance historically, showing as it does that Roosevelt
refused to give encouragement, even by suggestion, to the
secession of Panama, an event which his most venomous
critics subsequently charged him with bringing about in
guilty and secret connivance with Secretary Hay — an out
rageous slander which persists in some quarters even to
the present day:

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 279
Personal. White House, Washington,
October 10, 1903.
My dear Dr. Shaw:
I enclose you, purely for your own information, a copy
of a letter of September 5th from our Minister to Colom
bia. I think it might interest you to see that there was
absolutely not the slightest chance of securing by treaty
any more than we endeavored to secure. The alternatives
were to go to Nicaragua, against the advice of the great
majority of competent engineers — some of the most com
petent saying that we had better have no canal at this time
than go there — or else to take the territory by force without
any attempt at getting a treaty. I cast aside the proposi
tion made at this time to foment the secession of Panama.
Whatever other governments can do, the United States can
not go into the securing by such underhand means, the
cession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be
dehghted if Panama were an independent State, or if it
made itself so at this moment ; but for me to say so publicly
would amount to an instigation of a revolt, and therefore
I can not say it.
With great regard, Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
President Roosevelt's poor opinion of the Colombian
politicians was shared by Secretary Hay. I was talking
with the Secretary one day during the period in which the
rival negotiations were in progress, in regard to the con
flicting claims of the Nicaraguan and Panama routes. He
was describing with much humor the diplomatic antics of
the representatives of the two governments, when he paused,
and with that inviting twinkle in his eye which always pro
claimed the coming of a happy idea, he said: "Talking
with those fellows from down there, Bishop, is like holding
a squirrel in your lap and trying to keep up the conversa^-
tion."

280 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The Colombian Congress rejected the treaty with full
knowledge that a revolution was impending in the depart
ment or state of Panama. Like knowledge was possessed
by the American Government. On June 9, 1903, Secretary
Hay sent a cable message to the American Minister at Bo
gota, in which he said, in reference to Colombian proposals
to amend the treaty, that the Colombian Government "ap
parently does not appreciate the gravity of the situation,"
that the treaty embodied the propositions presented by
Colombia with slight modifications, and that if Colombia
should now reject it the "friendly understanding between
the two countries would be so seriously compromised that
action might be taken by the Congress next winter which
every friend of Colombia would regret." The substance of
this message was communicated at once to the Colombian
Government. On July 5, 1903, the American Minister sent
the following cable message to Secretary Hay:
' ' Confidential. Have received information privately that
a paraphrase of your cipher telegram of June 9 was read
in the Senate secret session. Created sensation. Construed
by many as threat of direct retaliation against Colombia
in case the treaty is not ratified. This, and the statement
of just arrived members of Congress from Panama that
this department would revolt if the treaty is not ratified,
caused alarm, and the effect is favorable."
Three days after the treaty had been rejected by the
Colombian Senate, the American Minister, writing to Sec
retary Hay under date of August 15, 1903, said: "The
Panama representatives have lately become so thoroughly
imbued with the idea of an independent republic that they
have been more or less indifferent to the fate of the treaty."
Cabling on August 31, to Secretary Hay, the American Min
ister said that Senator Jose Domingo de Obaldia, who had
been appointed governor of Panama, had informed him
that in accepting the position he had told the Colombian
President that ' ' in case the department found it necessary
to revolt to secure canal he would stand by Panama." In

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 281
another message, on September 10, 1903, the American
minister said: "The appointment of Obaldia is regarded
as the forerunner of separation," and in a letter on the
following day he wrote: "Senator Obaldia 's separatist
tendencies are well known, and he is reported to have said
that, should the canal treaty not pass, the department of
Panama would declare its independence, and would be right
in doing so. That these are his opinions there is, of course,
no doubt."
Again, on October 21, 1903, the American Minister wrote
to Secretary Hay: "I have the honor to inform you that
there is no disguising the alarm existing as to the possible
action of the government of the United States should the
feeling of dissatisfaction undoubtedly existing in the de
partment of Panama find expression in overt acts."
The Colombian Congress adjourned on October 31, 1903,
and on the same day the American Minister cabled to Secre
tary Hay: "The people here in great anxiety over con
flicting reports of secession movements in the Cauca and
Panama." In the United States the possibility of a revolution in
Panama, in case of the rejection of the treaty, was a mat
ter of public knowledge in August, 1903. Toward the end
of that month the newspapers began to publish informa
tion in various forms from the Isthmus and Bogota similar
to that quoted above from the files of the State Depart
ment. Toward the end of October it was announced in the
American press that the Colombian Government had al
ready begun the movement of troops to the Isthmus. On
October 15, 1903, the President was informed by Com
mander John Hubbard, of the navy, that a revolution had
broken out in the department of Cauca, and on the follow
ing day, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, of
the United States army, the President received two officers
of the army who had just returned by way of Panama from
a four months ' trip in Venezuela and Colombia. They in
formed him that a revolutionary party was organizing in
Panama with the object of separation from Colombia, and

282 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
was collecting arms and ammunition, and that it was the
general belief on the Isthmus that the, revolution might
occur at any moment, and that their own opinion was that
failure on the part of Colombia to ratify the treaty would
lead to immediate revolution.
In view of this condition of affairs, President Roosevelt,
acting in accordance with the unbroken policy of the gov
ernment since the ratification of the treaty of 1846 with
New Granada, directed the Navy Department to issue such
instructions as would insure having American naval vessels
within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of disorder
there. Orders were issued on October 19, 1903, for one
ship, the Boston, to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nica
ragua ; to another, the Atlanta, to proceed to Guantanamo,
Cuba; and to a third, the Dixie, to prepare to sail from
League Island. On October 30, 1903, a fourth, the Nash
ville, Commander Hubbard, was ordered to proceed to
Colon. On November 2, 1903, when it was evident that an
outbreak was imminent, instructions were sent to the Nash
ville, Boston and Dixie as follows :
"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup
tion is threatened by armed force, occupy the line of rail
road. Prevent landing of any armed force, either govern
ment or insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama.
Government force reported approaching Isthmus in vessels.
Prevent their landing if, in your judgment, the landing
would precipitate a conflict."
Instructions similar to these had been issued repeatedly
during previous disorders of various kinds on the Isthmus,
the latest instance being in September, 1902, when, as in
1856, 1860, 1861, 1873, 1885, and in 1901, sailors and ma
rines from United States war-ships were landed to patrol
the Isthmus to protect life and property and keep transit
free and open. In most of these instances the troops had
been landed at the request of the Colombian Government.
The Nashville arrived at Colon at 5.30 p. m. on November
2, 1903. At daylight on the following morning Commander

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 283
Hubbard learned that a Colombian gun-boat, Cartagena,
had come in during the night with four hundred or five
hundred troops on board. He had her boarded and learned
that the troops were for the garrison at Panama. As he
had not yet received instructions, he did not feel justified
in preventing their landing, and they were disembarked at
8.30 a. m. Their commanding officers, Generals Amaya and
Tovar, with four others, took the train to Panama, leaving
Colonel Torres in command. At 10.30 Commander Hub
bard received the cable message with the instructions cited
above, and at once went ashore. Late in the afternoon he
learned that there had been a revolution in Panama ; that
Generals Amaya and Tovar and the other four Colombian
officers had been seized and were held as prisoners ; that a
provisional government had been established and a military
force of one thousand five hundred men had been organized ;
and that the provisional government wished the Colombian
troops at Colon to be sent to Panama.
The general superintendent of the Panama Railroad had
agreed to transport the Colombian troops, but Commander
Hubbard, on the morning of November 4, 1903, prohibited
the transportation of troops in either direction in order to
preserve the neutrality of the Isthmus and free and unin
terrupted transit. During the forenoon of November 4,
1903, Commander Hubbard was informed that Colonel
Torres had sent word to the United States consul at Colon
that if Generals Amaya and Tovar and the other Colombian
officers who had been seized at Panama were not released
by 2 p. m. he, Torres, would open fire on the town of Colon
and kill every United States citizen in the place. Com
mander Hubbard had all the American citizens of Colon
assembled in the stone building of the Panama Railroad
Company, quickly fortified it as much as possible, and at
1.30 p. m. landed forty-two men from the Nashville to pro
tect the building, with orders not to fire unless fired upon.
The American women and children were placed aboard a
Panama Railroad Company steamer and a German steamer
which were lying at the wharf.

284 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The Colombians surrounded the railroad building soon
after the Americans had taken possession of it, and tried
to provoke attack from the American troops, but the latter
were cool and steady and the effort failed.
At about 3.15 p. m. Colonel Torres entered the building
for an interview, declaring that the whole affair was a mis
apprehension, that he was most friendly to Americans, and
saying that he should like to send the alcalde of Colon to
Panama to see General Tovar and have him direct a dis
continuance of a show of force. This request was granted
and a special train over the Panama Railroad was supplied
by the general superintendent for the alcalde's journey.
At about 5.30 Colonel Torres stated to Commander Hub
bard that he would withdraw his Colombian troops to
Monkey Hill, about two miles outside of Colon, on condition
that the American troops should be withdrawn to the
Nashville. This proposition was accepted and faithfully
complied with by Commander Hubbard. On the morning
of November 5, 1903, Commander Hubbard discovered that
Colonel Torres had not withdrawn his troops to Monkey
Hill, but only to some buildings near the outskirts of the
town, giving a trivial excuse for failure to keep his word.
Learning that it was the purpose of Colonel Torres, in case
he did not receive orders from General Tovar to withdraw,
to bring in his troops and occupy Colon, Commander Hub
bard again landed an armed force, reoccupied the railroad
building, brought ashore two one-pounder guns, and
mounted them in position of defense near the building.
In company with the United States consul he then sought
and obtained an interview with Colonel Torres, in which
he told him that he had re-landed his troops because of his,
Torres, failure to keep his agreement; that his sole pur
pose in landing them was to preserve the lives and prop
erty of American citizens; that his attitude was one of
strict neutrality ; that the troops of neither side should be
transported; and that free and uninterrupted transit
should be maintained, if necessary by force.
He tried to induce Colonel Torres to withdraw to Monkey

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 285
Hill, but the latter replied that it was unhealthy out there.
Later in the forenoon of November 5, 1903, the alcalde re
turned from Panama without orders, and Colonel Torres
marched his Colombian troops again into Colon, but they
made no threatening demonstrations. During the after
noon representatives of the new Panama Government suc
ceeded in persuading Colonel Torres to embark with his
troops on a Royal Mail steamer, Orinoco, and sail to Carta
gena. The gun-boat Cartagena, on which he had come to
Colon, had left port immediately after the threat against
Americans had been made, on November 4, 1903.
In the meantime, while the American naval officer was
preventing bloodshed at Colon, the new Panama Republic
was becoming established on the other side of the Isthmus.
As early as August, 1903, a junta of six men had been
named by advocates of separation in Panama to take the
leadership in plans for securing independence. It had been
decided first to have the revolution on September 22, 1903,
the date set for the adjournment of the Colombian Con
gress. When adjournment was delayed till October 31,
1903, preparations were made to have the revolution take
place on November 4, 1903. The arrival of the Colombian
troops at Colon on November 3 forced the event forward
twenty-four hours.
The Colombian generals arrived in Panama about 11
o'clock on the morning of November 4, 1903, and were re
ceived with courtesy by the authorities and the populace.
Later, when they had got wind of the impending revolution,
they started for the government barracks on the sea-wall
to call out the troops and signal to three Colombian gun
boats that were lying in the bay, in the hope of frustrating
the plans of the revolutionists. On their arrival they were
met by General Esteban Huertas, in command of the garri
son, who was in league with the revolutionists, who ordered
out a company of soldiers and arrested them as prisoners
of war. Governor Obaldia, the Colombian head of the de
partment of Panama, was also arrested, as a mere formal
act of deposition, but was released immediately. The three

286 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Colombian gun-boats were informed by signal that the revo
lution had been effected, it being supposed that they would
acquiesce in it. Two of them did, but the commanding
officer of the third sent official word to the chief of police
that unless the imprisoned Colombian officers were set at
liberty within two hours he would shell the city. At the
expiration of that time he fired two shells, one of which
killed a Chinaman on the street near the barracks, but when
fire was opened upon the vessel from the fortifications she
steamed away, never to return.
On the following morning the two remaining gun-boats
ran up the flag of the new Panama Republic. With the ex
ception of the Chinaman's death the revolution was blood
less. The formal declaration of independence was made on
November 4, 1903. The municipal council of the city of
Panama met and after a free discussion voted unanimously
in favor of separation from Colombia and the creation of
the free and independent Republic of Panama. Pending the
formation of the new republic, the direction of affairs was
placed in the hands of three men, who later, with eleven
others, constituted the Committee of Provisional Govern
ment. At 3 p. m. on the same day a formal declaration of
independence was read at a mass-meeting in Cathedral
Plaza. Generals Amaya and Tovar, with their associates, were
released on November 5, 1903, on pledge of leaving the Isth
mus as soon as possible. They were given a military escort
to Colon, but arrived there too late to sail with Colonel
Torres and the Colombian troops on board the Royal Mail
steamer Orinoco, but they took passage for Cartagena on
November 12, 1903.
The Dixie, with a force of about four hundred men, en
tered the harbor of Colon at 7 p. m. in the evening of No
vember 5, just as the Orinoco was sailing away. On the fol
lowing morning the Atlanta arrived, bringing the combined
American force at Colon up to about one thousand men.
The Maine arrived a few days later. The Boston arrived

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 287
at Panama on November 7, and was joined there later by
three other r-aval vessels.
On November 7, the American Minister at Bogota sent a
cable message to Secretary Hay, saying that General Reyes
was about to start for Panama with full powers, and wished
to be informed by the Secretary before starting if the Amer
ican commander at Panama would be ordered to cooperate
with him with the new Panama Government to arrange
peace and approval of the treaty, which would be accepted
on condition that the integrity of Colombia be preserved.
On the same day the Colombian Government asked to be
informed through the American minister whether it would
be allowed to land troops at Colon and Panama to fight
there along the line of the railway.
These messages were received at Washington on 'Novem
ber 10, 1903, and on the following day Secretary Hay re
phed that it "is not thought desirable to permit landing
of Colombian troops on Isthmus, as such a course would
precipitate civil war and disturb for an indefinite period
the free transit we are pledged to protect."
The Republic of Panama was formally recognized by the
United States on November 6, 1903, in the following mes
sage from Secretary Hay to the consulate-general at
Panama :
"The people of Panama having by an apparently unani
mous movement dissolved their political connection with
the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence,
and having adopted a government of their own, republican
in form, with which the Government of the United States
of America has entered into relations, the President of the
United States, in accordance with the ties of friendship
which have so long and so happily existed between the re
spective nations, most earnestly commends to the govern
ments of Colombia and of Panama the peaceful and equit
able settlement of all questions at issue between them. He
holds that he is bound, not merely by treaty obligations, but
by the interests of civilization, to see that the peaceable
traffic of the world across the Isthmus of Panama shall not

288 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
longer be disturbed by a constant succession of unnecessary
and wasteful wars. ' '
The same message was sent to the American minister at
Bogota on November 6, 1903. Within a few weeks all the
so-called "great powers" of the earth, following the lead
of the United States, formally recognized the independence
of the Republic of Panama, and by the 1st of March fol
lowing practically all the governments of the world except
Colombia had recognized it.
The news of the revolution had scarcely reached Colombia
before its government began to confess judgment on its
conduct toward the Hay-Herran treaty. On November 6,
1903, the American Minister at Bogota sent a cable mea-
sage to Secretary Hay containing an offer from General
Reyes to reassemble the Colombian Congress and ratify the
treaty as signed, or to approve it by government decree,
provided the United States Government would uphold Co
lombia by declaring martial law and suppressing the rev
olution on the Isthmus.
The charge of "conspiracy" between the American Gov
ernment and the revolutionists in Panama was made as
soon as the news of the revolution was pubhshed. Writ
ing to Dr. Albert Shaw on November 6, 1903, the President
said in regard to it :
"I did not foment the revolution on the Isthmus, as you
know from my previous correspondence with you. It is
idle folly to speak of there having been a conspiracy with
us. The people of the Isthmus are a unit for the canal,
and in favor of separation from the Colombians. The lat
ter signed their death warrant when they acted in such
infamous manner about the signing of the treaty. Unless
Congress overrides me, which I do not think probable,
Colombia's grip on Panama is gone forever."
Writing to Lawrence Abbott on November 12, 1903, the
President adduced positive proof that he was not even an
ticipating a revolt :

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 289
"I wish, by the way, I had shown you when you were
here my Message on the Panama subject. I had written it
out and had the rough draft with Hay's marginal correc
tions. It was written the very end of October — that is, less
than a week before the outbreak occurred — and by it you
would have seen that at that time neither Hay nor I was
preparing for the outbreak, and that the message was drawn
up on the supposition that there would be no outbreak, and
that I should have to face the problem of digging the canal
anyhow." In the draft of the message, alluded to in the above letter,
the President had recommended to Congress that the Amer
ican Government take possession of the Isthmus, without
regard to Colombia's wishes in the matter, and proceed to
build the canal. He had written:
"The refusal of Colombia properly to respond to our
sincere and earnest efforts to come to an agreement, or
to pay heed to the many concessions we have made, ren
ders it in my judgment necessary that the United States
should take immediate action on one of two lines ; either
we should drop the Panama canal project and immediately
begin work on the Nicaraguan canal, or else we should pur
chase all the rights of the French company, and, without
any further parley with Colombia, enter upon the comple
tion of the canal which the French company has begun.
I feel that the latter course is the one demanded by the
interests of this Nation, and I therefore bring the matter
to your attention for such action in the premises as you
may deem wise. If in your judgment it is better not to
take such action, then I shall proceed at once with the
Nicaraguan canal."
One of the first acts of the provisional government of the
Republic of Panama was to appoint, on November 6, 1903,
Philippe Bunau-Varilla envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary to the United States, with full powers to
conduct diplomatic and financial negotiations. Bunau-

290 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Varilla was in Washington at the time, and on November
13 he was received formally by President Roosevelt at the
White House. On the following day the Secretary of State
sent a cable message to all the diplomatic representatives
of the United States in foreign countries as follows:
"The President yesterday fully recognized the Republic
of Panama and formally received its Minister Plenipoten
tiary. You will promptly communicate this to the govern
ment to which you are accredited."
Writing to his son, Theodore, on November 15, 1903,
the President thus described the situation at the moment:
"I have had a most interesting time about Panama and
Colombia. My experiences in all these matters give me
an idea of the fearful times Lincoln must have had in
dealing with the great crisis he had to face. When I see
how panic-struck Senators, business men and everybody
else become from my little flurry of trouble, and the wild
clamor they all raise for foolish or cowardly action, I get
an idea of what he had to stand after Bull Run and again
after McClellan's failures in '62 and the party defeat in
the elections of that year, and again after Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville. Why, even in this Panama business
the Evening Post and the entire fool Mugwump crowd have
fairly suffered from hysterics ; and a goodly number of the
Senators even of my own party have shown about as much
backbone as so many angle worms. However, I have kept
things moving just right so far."

CHAPTER XXV
SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL— CONCLUDED
The negotiation of a treaty between the United States
and the Republic of Panama was begun at once by Secre
tary Hay and Bunau-Varilla, and was completed and signed
by them at Washington on November 18, 1903. It was rati
fied by Panama on December 2, 1903.
In his annual message to Congress, December 7, 1903,
and in a special message, January 4, 1904, President Roose
velt gave a detailed account of the revolution at Panama
and of his conduct in recognizing the Republic. In the two
messages he set forth the facts which have been stated in
the present narrative, showing that in 53 years there had
been 53 revolutions on the Isthmus, and giving the full text
of Commander Hubbard's official report. He accompanied
his annual message with the treaty which Secretary Hay
and Bunau-Varilla had drawn. After describing the events
which led up to the recognition of the Republic, he said in
the message of December 7 :
"Under such circumstances, the Government of the
United States would have been guilty of folly and weakness,
amounting in their sum to a crime against the Nation, had
it acted otherwise than it did when the revolution of No
vember 3 last took place in Panama. This great enterprise
of building the interoceanic canal can not be held up to
gratify the whims, or out of respect to the governmental
impotence, or to the even more sinister and evil political
peculiarities, of people who, though they dwell afar off,
yet, against the wish of the actual dwellers on the Isthmus,
assert an unreal supremacy over the territory. The pos
session of a territory fraught with such peculiar capacities
as the Isthmus in question carries with it obligations to
291

292 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
mankind. The course of events has shown that this canal
can not be built by private enterprise, or by any other nation
than our own; therefore it must be built by the United
States." In the same message, he said of the treaty:
"By it our interests are better safeguarded than in the
treaty with Colombia which was ratified by the Senate at its
last session. It is better in its terms than the treaties of
fered to us by the Republics of Nicaragua and Costa Rica.
At last the right to begin this great undertaking is made
available. Panama has done her part. All that remains is
for the American Congress to do its part and forthwith this
Republic will enter upon the execution of a project colossal
in its size and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for the
good of this country and the nations of mankind."
In the special message of January 4, 1904, he said of the
offer of General Reyes, already quoted, to have the treaty
ratified by the Colombian Congress provided the President
would uphold Colombia in declaring martial law and sup
pressing the Panama revolution:
"I pass by the question as to what assurance we have
that they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse
to ratify the treaty if they had the power; for, of course,
I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of the
United States committing an act of such baseness as to
abandon the new Republic of Panama."
In the same message he thus referred to the "conspiracy"
slanders :
"I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which
have been made of complicity by this government in the
revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as desti
tute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for
my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons
might mistake for' acquiescence the silence of mere self-
respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one con
nected with this Government had any part in preparing,

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 293
inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus
of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military
and naval officers, given above, no one connected with this
Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution
except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary
intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current
acquaintance with public affairs."
Between the writing of the two messages to Congress the
President, in several private letters, set forth his convic
tions in regard to the course he had pursued. Writing to
Charles S. Osborn, of Michigan, on December 9, 1903, he
said: "Just at the moment I am more concerned about Panama
than anything else. Of course, to me, the situation is sim
ple. In its essence it is exactly as if a road agent had tried
to hold up a man, and the man was quick enough to take his
gun away. Under such circumstances I would regard it
as the wildest sentimental folly for outsiders to claim that
the road agent did not intend to shoot, and that it was his
gun and ought to be given back to him. By every consider
ation of equity, and of legitimate national and international
interest, what we have done was right. And it will be a
lamentable thing if a twisted party feeling should join with
mere hysteria to prevent at this time the fulfilling of what
has been accomplished."
To the Rev. Dr. David D. Thompson, editor of The North
western Christian Advocate, he entered upon a more elab
orate justification of his conduct, on December 22, 1903 :
"You of course remember that during the Civil War the
leaders of the Confederates in the South, and their allies
both in England and in the North, insisted that the move
ment for the independence of the slave States against the
Union was identical with the movement for the indepen
dence of the original thirteen States as against Great
Britain, and that Jefferson Davis stood exactly as George
Washington did. It is difficult to believe now that such

294 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
arrant nonsense was ever seriously advanced. But it is
not one whit more absurd than to say that the secession
of Panama from Colombia has anything in common with
the secession of the eleven slave-holding States from the
Union in 1861.
"A revolutionary movement can only be justified by
showing that it has ample cause, and that good will follow
from its success. In other words, each revolutionary move
ment must be judged on its own merits. Under Washing
ton, the American Colonies revolted because the Crown and
Parliament of England strove to keep them in subjection.
Their revolutionary movement was right, and it was a good
thing for the whole world that it succeeded. Under Jeffer
son Davis, the Southern States revolted in order to estab
lish a slave-holding republic, and to break up the greatest
experiment at successful democratic republican government
which the world had ever seen. There was no adequate
cause — indeed no cause whatever, — for the attempted se
cession ; and if successful, the movement would have been
fraught with incalculable damage to all mankind. There
fore the two movements, though superficially alike, are in
points of morality at opposite poles from each other, judged
at the bar of history.
"The revolution in Panama, or secession of Panama, is
just like the secession of Greece from Turkey at the begin
ning of the last century, and of the other Christian States
from Turkey later on in the century. Panama has suffered
oppression for years. Not only was its secession justifi
able but if it had had the power it would not have been war
ranted in standing such oppression for twenty-four hours.
No body of men of courage and power, trained as you and
I and our fellow-citizens have been trained in self-govern
ment, in liberty, and in law-abiding habits, would submit
for one day to the oppression habitual under Colombian rule
in Panama.
"Finally, when Colombia, which had plundered Panama,
and misgoverned and misruled her, declined to ratify the
treaty for the canal — which meant giving up Panama's last

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 295
hope — the people of Panama rose literally as one man.
When once this rising had occurred our Government was
bound by every consideration of honor and humanity, and
of national and international interest, to take exactly the
steps that it took."
Several other letters, written at this time, testify to the
sincerity of the President in the matter:
To Samuel W. Small, Georgia:
December 29, 1903. — "To my mind this building of the ca
nal through Panama will rank in kind, though not of course
in degree, with the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition
of Texas. I can say with entire conscientiousness that if in
order to get the treaty through and start building the canal
it were necessary for me forthwith to retire definitely from
politics, I should be only too glad to make the arrangement
accordingly; for it is the amount done in office, and not
length of time in office, that makes office worth having."
To Charles F. Lummis, Los Angeles, Calif.:
January 4, 1904. — "No more cruel despotism outside of
Turkey exists than that of the so-called Colombia Republic,
under present political and ecclesiastical management.
Turkey is worse, but I know of no other power that is as
bad. To the worst characteristics of seventeenth century
Spain, and of Spain at its worst under Philip II, Colombia
has added a squalid savagery of its own, and has combined
with exquisite nicety the worst forms of despotism and of
anarchy, of violence and of fatuous weakness, of dismal
ignorance, cruelty, treachery, greed, and utter vanity. I
cannot feel much respect for such a country.
"If I can do anything to make it better I shall try to, and
try to in good faith. If there is any way I can help them
build railways, even by an act of Congress granting money,
I shall be glad to do it."
To John Bigelow, New York:
January 6, 1904. — ' ' Of course I have no idea what Bunau-
Varilla advised the revolutionists, or what he said in any tel-

296 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
egrams to them as to either Hay or myself ; but I do know, of
course, that he had no assurances in any way, either from
Hay or myself, or from any one authorized to speak for us.
He is a very able fellow, and it was his business to find out
what he thought our Government would do. I have no doubt
that he was able to make a very accurate guess, and to advise
his people accordingly. In fact, he would have been a very
dull man had he been unable to make such a guess."
To Senator Lodge:
January 6, 1904. — "I was interested in one point Senator
Morgan made. That is where he quoted Bunau- Varilla's
article in Le Matin, September 2, and stated that it so fore
shadowed the course I actually took that undoubtedly either
Hay or I must have inspired it — this was the substance of
what he said. Now I am much pleased that he should have
done this. MacVeagh and others have been threatening for
some time to produce telegrams from Bunau-Varilla which
would show such an exact knowledge of our movements, and
even our intentions as regards sending ships to the Isthmus,
keeping order upon it, and recognizing any revolutionary
government, as to make it evident that he had received some
assurances from us. Indeed, they have been saying that
he had asserted in some telegram that he had received such
assurances. Of course as I have said once for all, neither
John Hay nor I, nor any one speaking for us, either directly
or indirectly, gave such assurances or such information in
any shape or way. But it is impossible for me to be sure
what Bunau-Varilla has said or not said, and therefore I
am particularly pleased that Morgan should have brought
out this article in Le Matin. It really is a remarkable fore
cast of what we actually did, and yet on its face it shows
that this forecast was prepared six weeks before Bunau-
Varilla saw either Hay or me ; and, as a matter of fact, it
appeared about a week before I called John Bassett Moore
out to Oyster Bay and for the first time began definitely
to formulate my policy even in my own mind. You see they
have proved too much. They have proved that Bunau-

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 297
Varilla knew what we were going to do six weeks before he
ever saw any of us and some little time before I had even
begun myself to make up my mind what I should do."
To Cecil Arthur Spring-Rice, British Foreign Office,
London:
January 18, 1904. — "I have been having most interesting
times. I have succeeded in accomplishing a certain amount
which I think will stand. I believe I shall put through the
Panama treaty (my worst foes being those in the Senate
and not those outside of the borders of the United States)
and begin to dig the canal. It is always difficult for me to
reason with those solemn creatures of imperfect aspirations
after righteousness, who never take the trouble to go below
names. These people scream about the injustice done Co
lombia when Panama was released from its domination,
which is precisely like bemoaning the wrong done to Turkey
when Herzegovina was handed over to Austria. It was a
good thing for Egypt and the Soudan, and for the world,
when England took Egypt and the Soudan. It is a good
thing for India that England should control it. And so it
is a good thing, a very good thing, for Cuba and for Pan
ama and for the world that the United States has acted as
it has actually done during the last six years. The people
of the United States and the people of the Isthmus and the
rest of mankind will all be the better because we dig the
Panama Canal and keep order in its neighborhood. And
the politicians and revolutionists at Bogota are entitled
to precisely the amount of sympathy we extend to other
inefficient bandits."
Speaking at Dallas, Texas, on April 5, 1905, President
Roosevelt said of his action :
"Especially as regards what was done in Panama, I
want to say that while I was most anxious to deserve the
approval of my countrymen, and while I was very glad to
be elected President, I would without one moment's hesita
tion have given up the second term in the Presidency rather
than not to have begun the Panama Canal."

298 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Secretary Hay was in hearty accord with every step of
the President's course and joined with him in resenting and
refuting the charge of "conspiracy." Writing to James
Ford Rhodes, the historian, on December 8, 1903, the Sec
retary said:
"It is hard for me to understand how any one can crit
icize our action in Panama on the grounds upon which it
is ordinarily attacked. The matter came to us with amaz
ing celerity. We had to decide on the instant whether we
would take possession of the ends of the railroad and keep
the traffic clear, or whether we would stand back and let
those gentlemen cut each other's throats for an indefinite
time, and destroy whatever remnant. of our property and in
terests we had there. I had no hesitation as to the proper
course to take, and have had no doubt of the propriety of
it since."
To General Reyes, the accredited representative of the
Colombian Government, who, in a statement of grievances
that he had sent to Secretary Hay, had spoken of "gross
imputations upon the conduct and motives of the American
Government" as having "appeared in reputable American
newspapers," the Secretary rephed:
"The press in this country is entirely free, and as a nec
essary consequence represents substantially every phase of
human activity, interest and disposition. Not only is the
course of the Government in all matters subject to daily
comment, but the motives of public men are as freely dis
cussed as their acts; and if, as sometimes happens, criti
cism proceeds to the point of calumny, the evil is left to
work its own cure. Diplomatic representatives, however,
are not supposed to seek in such sources material for ar
guments, much less for grave accusations. Any charge
that this Government, or any responsible member of it,
held intercourse, whether official or unofficial, with agents
of revolution in Colombia, is utterly without justification.
"Equally so is the insinuation that any action of this
Government, prior to the revolution in Panama, was the

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 299
result of complicity with the plans of the revolutionists.
The Department sees fit to make these denials and makes
them finally."

In the same reply, the Secretary also wrote :
"The Isthmus was threatened with desolation by another
civil war, nor were the rights and interests of the United
States alone at stake, the interests of the whole civilized
world were involved. The Republic of Panama stood for
those interests ; the Government of Colombia opposed them.
Compelled to choose between these two alternatives, the
Government of the United States, in no wise responsible
for the situation that had arisen, did not hesitate. It rec
ognized the independence of the Republic of Panama, and
upon its judgment and action in the emergency the Powers
of the world have set the seal of their approval. ' '
One especially insidious bit of ' ' evidence ' ' which was cir
culated industriously for the purpose of showing that Sec
retary Hay had been a conspirator, was thus disposed of
in a letter from the Secretary to Senator George F. Hoar
on January 11, 1904 :
"The President tells me that in a letter to him you refer
to a newspaper publication to the effect that in discussing
the subject of the coming revolution in Panama with a
Mr. Duque, on his informing me that the revolution was to
take place on the 23rd of September, I had said to him that
that was too early, and it ought to be deferred. I now find
the same statement copied from the Evening Post in a
speech by Senator Morgan in the Senate.
"It seems rather humiliating to be obliged to refer to
such a story, but since you mentioned it to the President
and since it seems to have made some impression upon
your mind, I venture to say to you, confidentially, that I
never saw Mr. Duque but once, that I never saw him alone,
and that nothing in the remotest degree resembling this
printed conversation was ever said by either of us."

300 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Writing to Professor George W. Fisher, of Yale Uni
versity, on January 30, Secretary Hay said:
"I am sure that if the President had acted differently
when, the 3rd of November, he was confronted by a critical
situation which might easily have turned to disaster, the
attacks which are now made on him would have been ten
times more virulent and more effective. He must have
done exactly as he did, or the only alternative would have
been an indefinite duration of bloodshed and devastation
through the whole extent of the Isthmus. It was a time
to act and not to theorize, and my judgment at least is clear
that he acted rightly."
Finally, in an address, on July 6, 1904, which he made at
Jackson, Michigan, at a celebration of the Fiftieth Anni
versary of the Republican Party, Secretary Hay summed
up the case as follows :
"There has been more noise made over his (President
Roosevelt's) suddenness on the Isthmus of Panama than
elsewhere. It is difficult to treat this charge with serious
ness. The President has made a treaty with Colombia" at
her own solicitation, which was infinitely to her advantage,
to inaugurate an enterprise which was to be for the benefit
of the world. He waited with endless patience while Bo
gota delayed and trifled with the matter, and finally re
jected it, and suggested new negotiations for a larger sum.
Panama, outraged by this climax of the wrongs she had
already suffered, declared and established her indepen
dence. -The President, following an unbroken line of pre
cedents, entered into relations with the new Repubhc, and,
obeying his duty to protect the transit of the Isthmus as
all other Presidents had done before him, gave orders that
there should be no bloodshed on the line of the railway.
He said, like Grant, 'Let us have peace!' and we had it.
It will seem incredible to posterity that any American could
have objected to this. He acted wisely and beneficently, and
all some people can find to criticize in his action is that he
was too brisk about it. If a thing is right and proper to

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 301
do, it does not make it criminal to do it promptly. No,
gentlemen! That was a time when the hour and the man
arrived together. He struck while the iron was white hot
on the anvil of opportunity, and forged as perfect a bit of
honest statecraft as this generation has seen."
A complete justification of the course pursued by the
President was afforded by Elihu Root in an address which
he delivered before the Union League Club of Chicago on
February 22, 1904. In this address Mr. Root showed that
under the Constitution of the United States of Colombia,
adopted in 1863, the State of Panama had been vested with
"absolute and unqualified sovereignty"; that she had never
legally lost this sovereignty but had been deprived of it by
force in 1886 by Rafael Nunez, President of Colombia, who
had declared that the "Constitution of 1863 no longer ex
ists." What Nunez did was thus described by Mr. Root:
"He put Panama under martial law, not during the civil
war, but after its close, and appointed a governor of the
state. He also appointed governors for the other states
in the Confederation. He then directed these governors
to appoint delegates to a constitutional convention ; and the
delegates thus appointed framed what is known as the
Constitution of 1886. The two delegates appointed to rep
resent Panama in this convention were residents of Bogota.
Neither of them ever resided in Panama, and one of them
never had set foot in Panama. The pretended constitution
thus framed by the appointees of Nunez was declared to be
adopted without compliance with a single one of the requi
sites prescribed by the Constitution of 1863 for its amend
ment. It robbed the people of Panama of every vestige of
self-government. It gave them a governor to be appointed
by the president at Bogota, and he, in turn, appointed all
the administrative officers of the department. It left to
the other states their legislatures, but it took away from
Panama its legislature and subjected the Isthmus directly in
all things to the legislative authority of the Congress at Bo
gota. It provided that the president might at any time, in

302 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
case of civil commotion, declare the public order to be dis
turbed, and that he should thereupon have authority to
issue decrees having the force of legislative enactments.
It gave him absolute power over the press and power to
imprison or expatriate any citizen at will. It took away
the property, the powers, the corporate existence, the civil
organization of the state, and placed the property and the
lives of its people absolutely under the authority and power
of a single dictator in a distant capital with which there
was no communication by land, and which it required longer
to reach than it did to reach the city of Washington. This
pretended constitution was never submitted to the people
of Panama for their approval or rejection. It was never
consented to by them."
Concerning the efforts of the people of Panama to regain
their lost sovereignty, Mr. Root said:
"The people of Panama fought to exhaustion in 1885
to prevent the loss of their liberty and they were defeated
through the action of the naval forces of the United States.
Three times since then they have risen in rebelhon against
their oppressors.
"In 1895 they arose and were suppressed by force; in
1899 they arose again and for three years maintained a war
for liberation, which ended in 1902 through the interposi
tion of the United States by armed force. The rising of
November, 1902, was the fourth attempt of this people to
regain the rights of which they had been deprived by the
usurpation of Nunez. The rejection of the canal treaty by
the Bogota Congress was the final and overwhelming injury
to the interests of Panama ; the conclusive evidence of in
difference to her welfare and disregard of her wishes ; and
it also created the opportunity for success in her persistent
purpose to regain civil liberty ; for it was plain that under
the strained relations created by that rejection, the United
States naturally would not exercise her authority again
upon the Isthmus, as she had exercised it before, to aid the
troops of Colombia. She was under no obligation to do so,

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 303
and she could not do so without aiding in the denial of her
own rights and the destruction of her own interests. Upon
that the people of Panama relied in their last attempt, and
they relied upon it with reason. ' '
A most interesting and valuable part of Mr. Root's expo
sition is the following concerning the fraudulent character
of the dictator who was ruling Colombia when the Hay-
Bunau- Varilla treaty was rejected :
"In the meantime there had been a curious grafting of
usurpation upon usurpation at Bogota. In 1898 M. A. San
clamente was elected president, and J. M. Maroquin, vice-
president, of the republic of Colombia. It is true that there
was no freedom of election. Our minister had reported of
a preceding election: 'None but the soldiers, police, and,
employees of the Government voted, thus making the vic
tory of the Government complete' ; but there was a form of
election, and Sanclamente became the only president there
was, and Maroquin the vice-president. Article twenty-four
of the Constitution of 1886 provided :
" 'The vice-president of the republic shall perform the
duties of the executive office during the temporary absence
of the president. In case of the permanent absence of the
president, the vice-president shall occupy the office of the
president during the balance of the time for which he was
elected.' "On July 31, 1900, the vice-president, Maroquin, executed
a coup d'etat, by seizing the person of the president, San
clamente, and imprisoning him at a place a few miles out
side of Bogota. Maroquin thereupon declared himself pos
sessed of the executive power because of the absence of the
president. He then issued a decree that public order was
disturbed, and, upon that ground, assumed to himself legis
lative power under another provision of the constitution,
which I have already cited. Thenceforth, Maroquin, with
out the aid of any legislative body, ruled as the supreme
executive, legislative, civil, and military authority in the
so-called republic of Colombia. The absence of Sancla-

304 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
mente from the capital became permanent by his death in
prison in the year 1902. When the people of Panama de
clared their independence in November last, no Congress
had sat in Colombia since the year 1898, except the special
Congress called by Maroquin to reject the canal treaty, and
which did reject it by a unanimous vote, and adjourned
without legislating on any other subject. The constitu
tion of 1886 had taken away from Panama the power of
self-government and vested it in Colombia. The coup d'etat
of Maroquin took away from Colombia herself the power of
government and vested it in an irresponsible dictator."
Summing up the whole matter, Mr. Root said :
"The people of Panama were the real owners of the
canal route ; it was because their fathers dwelt in the land,
because they won their independence from Spain, because
they organized a civil society there, that it was not to be
treated as one of the waste places of the earth. They
owned that part of the earth's surface just as much as the
State of New York owns the Erie Canal. When the sover
eign state of Panama confederated itself with the other
states of Colombia under the constitution of 1863, it did
not part with its title or its substantial rights, but consti
tuted the Federal Government its trustee for the represen
tation of its rights in all foreign relations, and imposed
upon that Government the duty of protecting them. The
trustee was faithless to its trust; it repudiated its obliga
tions without the consent of the true owner; it seized by
the strong hand of military power the rights which it was
bound to protect; Colombia herself broke the bonds of
union and destroyed the compact upon which alone de
pended her right to represent the owner of the soil. The
question for the United States was : Shall we take this
treaty from the true owner or shall we take it from the
faithless trustee, and for that purpose a third time put
back the yoke of foreign domination upon the neck of Pan
ama, by the request of that Government which has tried to
play toward us the part of the highwayman? There was

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 305
no provision of our treaty with Colombia which required
us to answer to her call, for our guaranty of her sovereignty
in that treaty relates solely to foreign aggression. There
was no rule of international law which required us to recog
nize the wrongs of Panama or the justice of her cause, for
international law does not concern itself with the internal
affairs of states. But I put it to the conscience of the
American people who are passing judgment upon the action
of their Government, whether the decision of our President
and Secretary of State and the Senate was not a righteous
decision. "By all the principles of justice among men and among
nations that we have learned from our fathers, and that all
peoples and all governments should maintain, the revolu
tionists in Panama were right, the people of Panama were
entitled to be free again, the Isthmus was theirs and they
were entitled to govern it; and it would have been a shame
ful thing for the Government of the United States to re
turn them again to servitude."
It should be borne in mind that Mr. Root was not in the
Cabinet at the time of the Panama incident and that his
treatment of it was that of an impartial outside observer.
After the Bunau-Varilla treaty had been sent to the Sen
ate, the President invited the leading Republican Senators
to come to the White House for a consultation with him
self and Secretary Hay concerning it. When the Senators
came they were found, almost to a man, to be in a hostile
frame of mind, but after several hours of earnest discus
sion, they one by one came to the view of the President and
Secretary and promised to support the treaty. As they
were leaving, an eminent Senator from a Western State,
noted for ability as an expert political balancer, said in a
low tone to Hay: "Do it, but be as gentle as you can with
Colombia." "Which," said Hay, in reporting the incident
to me, "reminded me of the instruction of the Western out
law chief : ' Kill him, but kill him easy ! ' "
The treaty was ratified by Panama on December 2, 1903.

306 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
It was sent to the United States Senate on December 7, and
ratified by that body on February 23, 1904. It was ap
proved by President Roosevelt on February 25, and pro
claimed on the following day.
Closely following the ratification of the treaty by the
Senate, the President appointed a Commission to take
charge of the construction of the canal. The full history of
his action in connection with the work is recorded in sub
sequent chapters.
One of the President's final official utterances before
leaving office was a special message to Congress on Decem
ber 16, 1908, in reference to certain newspaper assertions
to the effect that there had been some corrupt action by or
on behalf of the United States Government in connection
with the acquisition of the title and property of the French
Canal Company at Panama. It was charged that an Amer
ican syndicate had acquired the French Canal Company's
property and had sold it to the United States Government
at a "huge profit" to the members of the syndicate, who
included the President's brother-in-law, Douglas Robinson,
and the President-elect's brother, Charles P. Taft. All the
charges were shown subsequently to be absolutely without
foundation. The President used vigorous language in his
message, while setting forth in full all the established facts
in the case, with citations from official records to support
them. The charges had been published originally in the
New York World, and in denouncing them the President
said: "These stories as a matter of fact need no investigation
whatever. No shadow of proof has been, or can be, pro
duced in behalf of any of them. They consist simply of a
string of infamous libels. In form, they are in part libels
upon individuals, upon Mr. Taft and Mr. Robinson, for in
stance. But they are, in fact, wholly, and in form partly,
a libel upon the United States Government. I do not be
lieve we should concern ourselves with the particular indi
viduals who wrote the lying and libelous editorials, articles
from correspondents, or articles in the news columns.

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 307
"The real -offender is Mr. Joseph Pulitzer, editor and
proprietor of the World. While the criminal offense of
which Mr. Pulitzer has been guilty is in form a libel upon
individuals, the great injury done is in blackening the good
name of the American people.
"It should not be left to a private citizen to sue Mr. Pu
litzer for libel. He should be prosecuted for libel by the
governmental authorities. In point of encouragement of
iniquity, in point of infamy, or wrongdoing, there is nothing
to choose between a public servant who betrays his trust,
a public servant who is guilty of blackmail, or theft, or
financial dishonesty of any kind, and a man guilty as Mr.
Joseph Pulitzer has been guilty in this instance.
"It is therefore a high national duty to bring to justice
this vilifier of the American people, this man who wantonly
and wickedly and without one shadow of justification seeks
to blacken the character of reputable private citizens and
to convict the government of his own country in the eyes
of the civilized world of wrongdoing of the basest and
foulest kind, when he has not one shadow of justification of
any sort or description for the charge he has made. ' '
Under the President's direction, Henry L. Stimson,
United States District Attorney for the Southern District
of New York, on March 4, 1909, filed an indictment in the
Federal Court against the New York World for publish
ing the charges. The case was carried on by Henry A.
Wise, Mr. Stimson 's successor, and a great deal of testi
mony was taken. The indictment was quashed, on February
25, 1910, on the ground that the Federal Court did not have
jurisdiction. In the course of the preparation for the trial
the World sent a commission to Panama, accompanied by
its lawyers, to try to discover evidence there that President
Roosevelt and the Government were guilty of complicity in
setting up the revolution. They failed utterly. No such
evidence could be found. A memorandum of the testimony
adduced, mainly by the defendants, which was prepared by
the Assistant District Attorney who had conducted the

308 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
deposition and filed in the official records, concluded as fol
lows: "Not a word of testimony was introduced to show that
any act by the United States Navy or Army which could be
deemed interference or anything more than the carrying
out of the policy which the Government has always pursued
of keeping transit across the Isthmus free from disorder."
In later years, after he had retired from the Presidency,
Roosevelt made several references to his course in secur
ing the canal at Panama which showed complete confidence
in the justice of his acts. Speaking at Berkeley, California,
on March 23, 1911, he said: "I am interested in the Pan
ama Canal because I started it. If I had followed tradi
tional, conservative methods I should have submitted a dig
nified state paper of probably two hundred pages to Con
gress, and the debate on it would be going on yet; but I
took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate and while the
debate goes on the canal does too." The expression "I
took the Canal Zone ' ' aroused much comment and was con
strued by his critics as an admission that he had used arbi
trary and unjustifiable methods. That this criticism did
not trouble him at all was shown in the following passage
from an address that he delivered before the National Press
Club in Washington on January 24, 1918 :
"Panama declared itself independent and wanted to com
plete the Panama Canal, and opened negotiations with us.
I had two courses open. I might have taken the matter
under advisement and put it before the Senate, in which
case we should have had a number of most able speeches
on the subject. We would have had a number of very pro
found arguments, and they would have been going on now,
and the Panama Canal would be in the dim future yet. We
would have had a half century of discussion, and perhaps
the Panama Canal. I preferred we should have the Pan
ama Canal first and the half century of discussion after
ward. And now instead of discussing the canal before it
was built, which would have been harmful, they merely dis-

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 309
cuss me — a discussion which I regard with benign in
terest." While the criticism was irritating because of the natural
unwillingness on the part of reputable men to give the dig
nity of denial to such base accusations, it was at no time
seriously annoying to the President. Usually it was the
subject of mirth with him and his official advisers for the
Cabinet was a unit in support of his policy. A glimpse of
the prevailing good-fellowship between the President and
his associates is revealed in the following note to the Pres
ident from Secretary Hay on December 4, 1906 :
"Can you receive Reyes to-morrow, Saturday? If so, at
what hour? Permit me to observe, the sooner you see him,
the sooner you can bid him good-by.
"I have a complaint to make of Root. I told him I was
going to see Reyes. He replied, 'Better look out! Ex-
Reyes are dangerous.'
"Do you think that, on my salary, I can afford to bear
such things?"
A partial reopening of the controversy was caused by
General Reyes in 1905, when he had become President of
Colombia. He wrote a letter to President Roosevelt con
taining an assertion to which the latter replied as follows
on February 20, 1905 :
"I thank you for your confidential letter. Your quota
tion of me is substantially correct when you say that I ad
dressed you as follows on the occasion of your visit to me
as Colombia's agent in the Panama matter :
" 'If you had been President of Colombia you would have
saved Panama, because you would have known how to safe
guard its rights and the interests of all and would have
avoided the revolution which caused its secession from Co
lombia. In that case my Government could have helped
Colombia to be one of the richest and most prosperous
countries in South America.'
"Like you, I desire to draw a veil over the past, but my

310 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
dear Mr. President, as you speak of your country as being
deeply injured by my country do let me point out to you
that in the words of my own quoted above I was endeavor
ing to show why I thought you would have saved Colombia
from the trouble that befell her had you been President.
This country, so far from wronging Colombia, made every
possible effort to persuade Colombia to allow herself to be
benefited. I cannot seem by remaining quiet to counte
nance for one moment the idea that this country did any
thing but show a spirit not merely of justice but of gener
osity in its dealings with Colombia. Had you been Presi
dent, I firmly believe that this spirit would have been met
with a like spirit from Colombia, and that therefore Co
lombia, by the mere fact of ratifying the treaty agreed
upon with the United States, would have prevented the rev
olution in Panama and would have itself become rich and
prosperous. "You say you are lacking at present the means of ar
ranging in a decorous manner the pending questions be
tween Colombia, the United States, and Panama, and you
ask me to do justice and thereby help you. Of course if I
can help you in any way I will ; but, my dear Mr. President,
I do not quite understand what it is expected we shall do.
If the people of Panama desire to take a plebiscite as to
whether or not they shall resume connection with Colombia,
most emphatically I have no objections and will be delighted
so to inform them; but I cannot press them unless they
desire to do it. So about their assumption of a portion of
Colombia's debt. We have stated that in our judgment
this should be done by Panama and we are informed by
their Minister here, Mr. Bunau-Varilla, that they intended
to do so ; but we cannot force them to do it. As for the
purchase of the Islands, which I understand Colombia
would like to sell to us, our Navy Department does not
deem it to our interest to procure them, and I am very
much afraid that a treaty for their purchase would not be
approved by the Senate of the United States.

SECURING THE PANAMA CANAL 311
"I have shown your letter to Mr. Hay. I wish I could
write you in a manner that would be more agreeable."
When, during the administration of President Wilson, a
treaty was drawn up under which a payment of $25,000,000
was to be made to Colombia, Mr. Roosevelt published an
article denouncing it as a "Blackmail Treaty" and travers
ing in detail the history of his proceedings in getting pos
session of the Isthmus of Panama. He made the same rev
elations in regard to the character and conduct of the fraud
ulent government of Columbia as are quoted in preceding
pages from the address of Mr. Root. In closing he said:
"The proposed treaty is a crime against the United States.
It is an attack upon the honor of the United States which,
if justified, would convict the United States of infamy."
This article is published in full in the volume of Roose
velt's writings entitled "Fear God and Take Your Own
Part." (George H. Doran Company, 1915.)

CHAPTER XXVI
NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904
Although opposition to the President's nomination ceased
with the elimination of Senator Hanna as a candidate at the
time of the Ohio State Convention in June, 1903, a series of
efforts was begun early in 1904 and continued for several
months to induce him to give pledges or assurances of va
rious kinds in regard to the course he should pursue after
election. Representatives of various interests that had
been opposing his nomination visited him, assuring him
that these interests had not objected to him as a man but
had been uneasy lest he pursue to extremes certain pohcies
which they regarded as disturbing and harmful. What
these representatives desired was the authority to say to
the interests that, when reelected, he would consult them
about all important matters and be guided by their counsel.
They were afraid that if they could not give this assurance
it would be difficult if not impossible to raise a campaign
fund. The President listened to all of them and to all made the
same reply. He could only promise to proceed in the future
as he had acted in the past; that he should always consult
the leaders of his party and others whose opinion it was
desirable to have, but when the time for action came, he
must follow his own judgment and conscience ; that so far
as a campaign fund was concerned, if one could not be
raised, the campaign must be conducted without it.
Later, when the campaign opened a curious mental con
dition was revealed. The managers of the campaign made
no request for contributions from people who had been
312

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 313
most bitter in their denunciation of the President's poli
cies. These at once complained because they had not been
called upon, asking if failure to do so meant that they were
to be proceeded against after election. One quite promi
nent financial magnate, who had been especially vehement
in denunciation, called upon the managers, and asked:
"What does this mean? Why have I not been asked to
contribute? Have I not just as much right to contribute
as anybody else? Am I to be discriminated against after
election?" These inquiries revealed in a striking manner the concep
tion as to the real nature of campaign contributions which
had prevailed previous to the advent of Theodore Roose
velt in public office. Such contributions were regarded as
purchasing favors of various kinds after election. Roose
velt had encountered and combated this view when he was
Governor of New York, and he was about to encounter and
combat it in his approaching Presidential campaign. Be
fore that campaign ended, it was made clear to all men that
the old view of contributions had passed away and, so far
as Roosevelt was concerned, a new one had taken its place.
While the efforts to extort concessions of one kind or
another were in progress in the winter of 1904, the Pres
ident, on January 27, wrote to a friend who had knowledge
of what was going on :
"To use the vernacular of our adopted West, you can bet
your bedrock dollar that if I go down it will be with colors
flying and drums beating, and that I would neither truckle
nor trade with any of the opposition if to do so guaranteed
me the nomination and election. In the first place, I be
lieve I shall win. In the next place, and what is infinitely
more important, — I am going to fight it out on the line I
have chosen without deviating a hair's breadth from it, win
or lose; for I am sure that the policies for which I stand are
those in accordance with which this country must be gov
erned, and up to which we must all of us live in public or
private life, under penalty of grave disaster to the Nation. ' '

314 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
That he felt reasonably assured of the nomination at
this time is shown in a letter to Dr. Albert Shaw, on Jan
uary 30, 1904:
"In confidence, I can tell you that outside all the South
ern States I am now as certain as I well can be that if
Hanna made the fight (for the nomination), and with all
the money of Wall Street behind him, he would get the ma
jority of the delegation from no State excepting Ohio ; and
from the South I should have from a third to a half of the
delegates, and most of the remainder would have been
pledged to me and would have to be purchased outright
against me. I believe that the best advisers among my op
ponents themselves see this and have very nearly made up
their minds to give up the contest. In a few weeks I think
that most of the Wall Street Republicans will have con
cluded that they have to, however grudgingly, support me.
So much do I believe this that I am a little uneasy lest our
opponents may raise the cry that I have made terms with
them. Fortunately, my nomination has become assured,
in my judgment, before they give up the contest. Besides,
I do not think even such rather thick-headed people as my
opponents would venture to try to make terms with me
now, although there was a tentative effort in that direction
in October and November last. I shall treat them with
scrupulous fairness, anyhow, and in no event would I have
done either more or less."
There was much speculation at this period about prob
able Democratic candidates in opposition to Roosevelt, and
considerable sentiment in favor of Judge Gray, of Dela
ware, whom Roosevelt had placed at the head of the An
thracite Coal Strike Commission. Writing to me on the
subject on February 8, 1904, the President made what
proved later to be genuine prophecy: "I do not think the
Democrats will nominate Gray. In the first place he is
too good a fellow, and in the next place it would be an
absurdity to run him against the Republican party when

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 315
he owes his position to one Republican President and his
prominence to another one."
In February, 1904, Senator Hanna, who had been in fail
ing health for some time, died quite suddenly. Writing to
Ehhu Root, on February 16, 1904, the President gave this
sympathetic estimate of his character:
"Hanna's death has been very sad. Did I tell you the
last letter he wrote was one to me? As soon as he was seri
ously sick I called at the hotel, as a matter of course. For
some inexplicable reason this affected him very much, and
appealed to the generous and large-hearted side of his na
ture, and he at once sent me a pencil note, running as fol
lows: My dear Mr. President:
You touched a tender spot, old man, when you called
personally to inquire after me this a. m. I may be worse
before I can be better, but all the same such "drops" of
kindness are good for a fellow. Sincerely yours,
M. A. Hanna.
Friday, p. m.
"No man had larger traits than Hanna. He was a big
man in every way and as forceful a personality as we have
seen in public life in our generation. I think that not merely
for myself, but the whole party and the whole country have
reason to be very grateful to him for the way in which,
after I came into office, under circumstances which were
very hard for him, he resolutely declined to be drawn into
the position which a smaller man of meaner cast would
inevitably have taken; that is, the position of antagonizing
public policies if I was identified with them. He could have
caused the widest disaster to the country and the public
if he had attacked and opposed the policies referring to
Panama, the Philippines, Cuban reciprocity, Army reform,
the Navy, and the legislation for regulating corporations.

316 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
But he stood by them just as loyally as if I had been
McKinley."

In accordance with his invariable habit when a candidate
for office, the President studiously avoided taking a too
sanguine view of his prospects. Writing on April 4, 1904,
to Henry White in London, he said :
"Nobody can tell how this fight will come out. I have
been astonishingly successful in getting through the policies
in which I believe, and in achieving results ; but often the
mere fact of having a good deal of record is more against
a man than for him, when the question is as to how people
will vote ; for my experience is that usually people are more
apt to let their dislikes than their likings cause them to
break away from their party ties in matters of voting. In
other words, the people of the opposite party who like what
I have done are less apt for that reason to leave their can
didate than the people of my own party who dislike what
I have done are apt to leave me. Politicians proverbially
like a colorless candidate, and the very success of what I
have done, the number of things I have accomphshed, and
the extent of my record, may prove to be against me. How
ever, be that as it may, we now have a big sum of achieve
ment to our credit."
Senator Hanna's death had left the National Republican
Committee without a chairman, and an animated contest
was begun almost immediately over the choice of a succes
sor. The extreme partisan elements of the party were
eager to have one of their own number selected for the posi
tion and urged their wishes upon the President with great
persistency. He, on his part, was determined that no man
should be selected who would be likely to give pledges dur
ing the campaign which he would be called upon to carry
out after election. According to his custom he sought advice
and suggestion from men of all shades of opinion. I was
on one occasion in Washington when a number of per-

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 317
sons of diverse political views were present. Don Cam
eron, the veteran Republican politician and leader of Penn
sylvania, was one of the number and was earnestly advo
cating the selection of an astute and experienced politician
from his own State. He took me aside, and standing very
close to me said with really solemn intensity: "I like and
admire the President. He is a very remarkable man, but
he does some extraordinary things. Now, Mr. Bishop, I am
71 years old ; I have been in politics 70 years ; and the Presi
dent asks me to confer, on the question of a chairman of the
Republican National Committee, with Nicholas Murray
Butler, the President of Columbia University ! Now what
do you think of that?" Mr. Cameron's feeling toward
amateur politicians was shared by all other professionals
of his kind, but the President was merely doing what he
had done many times before, conferring with persons of all
varieties of opinion, and the professionals should have been
used to it, though as a matter of fact they were never able to
comprehend it, or to contemplate it with equanimity. In
the end, the President made his own choice and selected a
man in whom he was sure he could place absolute confi
dence — George B. Cortelyou, his former secretary and, at
the time, Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The selec
tion was opposed vehemently by Senator Piatt of New
York and others of the most powerful bosses of the party,
but in vain. They could not budge the President from his
choice, or even disturb him a particle. Writing to Senator
Lodge, on May 28, 1904, he said :
"I am not in the least worried about the discontent on
the part of some of the political leaders with Cortelyou.
As Murray Crane and Root could not take it, Cortelyou was
the man of all others to have it, and these people will in
the end find out that this is so. He will manage the can
vass on a capable and also on an absolutely clean basis, and
my canvass cannot be managed on any other lines either
with propriety or with advantage. If I win at all this year
it will be because the bulk of the people believe I am a
straightforward, decent and efficient man, upon whose cour-

318 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
age and common sense no less than upon whose honesty and
energy they can depend."
The appointment of Mr. Cortelyou to the chairmanship
of the Republican National Committee was followed by his
resignation as head of the Department of Commerce and
Labor, and the resignation of Attorney General Knox, who
had been elected United States Senator by Pennsylvania,
led to several changes in the Cabinet in June. Mr. Cortel
you was succeeded by Victor L. Metcalf ; William H. Moody,
who was Secretary of the Navy, succeeded Mr. Knox as
Attorney General, and Paul Morton succeeded Mr. Moody
as Secretary of the Navy.
In accepting Mr. Knox's resignation, the President wrote
on June 23, 1904:
"I accept your resignation not only with keen personal
regret, but with a very real feeling of the loss the country
thereby sustains. . . . There is nothing that I can say
which will in any way add to the reputation which you
have won, and no tribute I can pay you will approach in
value that already paid you by the hearty admiration and
respect of your fellow citizens. . . . Many great and able
men have preceded you in the office you hold ; but there is
none among them whose administration has left so deep
a mark for good upon the country's development. Under
you it has been literally true that the mightiest and the
humblest in the land have alike had it brought home to
them, that each was sure of the law's protection while he
did right, and that neither could hope to defy the law if
he did wrong."
In March, 1904, the President aroused a great storm of
criticism and denunciation from the chronic opponents of
his policies by establishing, through executive order, a ser
vice pension of six dollars a month for all veterans of the
Civil War between the ages of 62 and 70 years. It was
claimed by his critics that in doing this by executive order
he was guilty of a "flagrant usurpation" of the legislative

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 319
powers of Congress. In explanation and justification of
his act, the President, on May 28, 1904, wrote a long letter
to his friend, Frederick W. Whitridge, of New York, in
which he said :
"I shall write you so that you may know exactly the facts
about the pension order. There were two sides to the
matter. The first was the situation I had to face as re
gards the party in Congress. The second was the moral
justification of what was actually done. When Congress
met I found that the feeling was overwhelmingly for a full
service pension — that is, $12 a month, beginning at the age
of 62. This was the pension granted by President Cleve
land and a Democratic House to the Mexican War veterans
thirty-nine years after the close of the Mexican War, and
the argument by analogy seemed very strong, namely, that
if men, many of whom afterwards served against the Union,
were entitled to $12 a month at the age of sixty-two, thirty-
nine years after the close of the Mexican War, then thirty-
nine years after the close of an infinitely greater and more
righteous war the Union veterans were entitled to the same
privilege. Moreover, I soon found that Congress was
nearly a unit for the Service Pension bill. If allowed to
get under way unchecked the bill would undoubtedly have
passed both houses with substantial unanimity, and if I
had vetoed it I could not have rallied more than a tenth
of the House nor more than a fifth of the members of the
Senate to my support ; and I should have hated to veto it.
I should have preferred to let them pass a bill authorizing
me to do exactly what I did by executive order. But with
out exception the responsible leaders of both houses as
sured me that it was out of the question to prevent any
such bill from being so amended as to carry some fifty mil
lions a year instead of the five million which will actually
be carried by what was done.
"I found that President Cleveland had established the
rule that a man who was seventy-five years old should be
treated as by that fact having reached the stage of complete
disability, and being therefore entitled to $12 a month pen-

320 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
sion. I found that Pension Commissioner H. Clay Evans,
under President McKinley, had established the age of sixty-
five as similarly entitling a veteran to six dollars a month,
on the ground that he was similarly disabled to the extent
of one-half from earning his living. What I did was to take
these two rates and make the limit sixty-two and seventy
years respectively, instead of sixty-five and seventy-five,
which they actually were — treating the age as an evidential
fact — as a rebuttable presumption of half and complete
physical disability. Inasmuch as nearly eighty per cent of
the veterans are already pensioned, and as I was establish
ing not $12 but $6, this meant an increase of but one-tenth
of what the proposed Service Pension bill would have cost.
"So much for the technical argument. I do not, how
ever, rest the case on this. I hold that the ruling was abso
lutely right and proper. Most of our friends who hve
softly do not understand that the great majority of people
who live by hard manual labor have begun to find their
wage-earning capacity seriously impaired by the time they
are sixty. The man of sixty-two has on the average great
difficulty in getting a new job anywhere if he is dependent
upon the labor of his hands. . . . Now the average wage
worker does not lay by enough money to keep him in his
old age, and when he has fought in the Civil War I am en
tirely willing that he shall be cared for to the extent indi
cated in my order."
The Republican National Convention assembled in Chi
cago on June 21, 1904, and on the following day the country
was given an inspiring illustration of the Roosevelt method
of diplomacy in the protection of American citizens in for
eign lands. An American citizen, Ion H. Perdicaris, had
been seized by a Moroccan bandit named Raizuli, and held
for ransom. To all demands from the American consul for
the release of the prisoner Raizuli replied that unless the
money demanded was speedily paid he would kill him. On
June 22, Secretary Hay, after consultation with the Presi
dent, cabled to the American consul, Mr. Gummere: "We

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 321
want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead," adding that Gum-
mere was not to commit the American Government about
landing marines or seizing the custom house at Tangier.
This cable message was published during the session of the
convention on June 22, and the effect produced was thus
described by the correspondent of the New York Tribune:
"Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead" went through the
Convention like an electric thrill, and it was more talked
about at night than any feature of the day's work. The pre
vailing impression was that if Secretary Hay had sent the
telegram it was after consultation with the President, and
that there must have been ample justification.
"It is pithy, pungent and peremptory. I like it, and so
do the people," said Senator McComas, of Maryland.
"It is the kind of a telegram," said Senator Spooner, of
Wisconsin, "that touches a popular chord. This Govern
ment is bound to protect its citizens abroad as well as at
home. ' '
"The American people will not back down on a mes
sage of that kind," said Representative Grosvenor, of
Ohio. "It may not be exactly in diplomatic words, but its
meaning is unmistakable. The people are quick to respond
when their patriotism is appealed to. The Morocco bandit
will find that there is a united sentiment supporting the
President and Secretary in the stand they have taken."
"It was good, hot stuff, and echoed my sentiments," said
Congressman Dwight, of New York. "The people want an
administration that will stand by its citizens, even if it
takes a fleet to do it."
"It was magnificent— magnificent!" said Senator Depew.
"Every right-minded American will heartily indorse Mr.
Hay's strong stand."
"Do I like it?" exclaimed W. A. Elstun, of Kansas, one
of the delegates. "Bet your bottom dollar I like it. Roose
velt is behind that cable message to that fine old body-
snatcher Raizuli. Out in Kansas we believe in keeping the
peace but in fighting against wrong. Roosevelt and Hay

322 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
know what they are doing. Our people like courage. We'll
stand for anything those two men do."
Three entries in the diary of Secretary Hay, made at the
time, reveal the result of the peremptory cable message :
June 23. My telegram to Gummere had an uncalled-for
success. It is curious how a concise impropriety hits the
public. June 24. Gummere telegraphs that he expects Perdi
caris to-night.
June 27. Perdicaris wires his thanks.
On the following day Roosevelt, who was the only candi
date before the Convention, was nominated by acclamation,
being the only man in our history, who had acceded to the
Presidency through the death of the incumbent, to be so
honored. Writing to Roosevelt from Clinton, N. Y., under date of
July 12, 1904, Elihu Root, who as Secretary of War during
the three years that Roosevelt had been President had inti
mate personal knowledge of his conduct of the office, said:
"I haven't congratulated you on your nomination. I-felt
as if it would be a foolish formahty. There are, however,
some features of it that are very gratifying.
"1. This is the first time that any party has nominated
to succeed himself a Vice President who had become Presi
dent. ' ' 2. This is the first time that the Republican party ever
nominated for President a citizen of the State of New
York. "3. It was a People's nomination and not a managers'.
Every attempt at bargain or deal or combination was the
other way and failed.
"4. The opposition has passed over every man who has
made a record against your policy or action and has nomi
nated a man who never opened his mouth on any national
question. "No one who has antagonized or criticized your admin-

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 323
istration has made sufficient effect on the public mind to
establish any claim to the Democratic nomination.
"I have no doubt about the election, but however that
results you have made a success and it cannot be wiped
off the book. And you have done it yourself. Others have
helped you, but your personality has been the Adminis
tration." From the moment of his nomination till election day in
November the Republican canvass was conducted on Roose
velt's acts in office and on the principles upon which those
acts were based. He was formally notified of his nomina
tion on July 27, 1904, and in a brief speech of acceptance
he reviewed the most conspicuous acts of his administra
tion, giving this emphatic and uncompromising statement
of his position on the questions of corporations and labor:
"We recognize the organization of capital and the organ
ization of labor as natural outcomes of our industrial sys
tem. Each kind of organization is to be favored so long
as it acts in a spirit of justice and of regard for the rights
of others. Each is to be granted the full protection of the
law, and each in turn is to be held to a strict obedience to
the law ; for no man is above it and no man below it. The
humblest individual is to have his rights safeguarded as
scrupulously as those of the strongest organization, for
each is to receive justice, no more and no less. The prob
lems with which we have to deal in our modern industrial
and social life are manifold; but the spirit in which it is
necessary to approach their solution is simply the spirit of
honesty, of courage, and of common-sense. ' '
His formal letter of acceptance was published on Septem
ber 12, 1904, and became at once the text book and chief
source of inspiration of his party in the canvass. In it he
passed in review all the acts of his administration which
had been most severely criticized, including the Northern
Securities suit, the Anthracite Coal Strike settlement, and
the possession of the Isthmus for the Panama Canal, and

324 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
challenged the Democrats to join issue on them before the
people. The challenge was never met. Although it had
been the expectation of the Repubhcan managers that these
three acts would be the chief issues of the campaign, the
Democratic managers sedulously avoided them, thereby
making confession that popular support had been won for
them by the President.
Early in the campaign, a few weeks after Judge Alton
B. Parker had been nominated as the Democratic candidate
and had set forth his views and principles, a temporary
alarm was caused in the Republican camp by the sudden and
entirely unexpected declaration of the New York Sim on
August 11, 1904, that it was in favor of Roosevelt in pref
erence to Parker. As that journal had been the most ven
omous of all the President's critics in condemning his
course toward corporations and trusts, the Republican
managers were alarmed lest its sudden "flop" might give
the impression that a compromise of some sort had been
arranged through which the support of the "Wall-Street
crowd" had been secured for Roosevelt. The manner of
the Sun's declaration gave a semblance of color to this
possible view, for it read :
"As the case is now made up, we prefer the impulsive
candidate of the party .of conservatism to the mildly con
servative, temporizing opportunist representative of the
Hun vote in the background. We have more faith in the
distinct promises of the Chicago platform, not ignoring the
many serious defects of that document, than we have in
the miserable hell broth of disaster and dynamite concocted
at St. Louis a month ago by a party afraid to renounce its
criminal follies, and tasted yesterday at Esopus by a re
spectable candidate, who declares with gusto that its flavor
is admirable."
On the date on which the Sim article appeared the Presi
dent wrote to Mr. Cortelyou, chairman of the Republican
National Committee :
"I know the stress you are under, but as regards this

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 325
Northern Securities business no stress must make us go
one hand's breadth out of our path. I should hate to be
beaten in this contest ; but I should not merely hate, I should
not be able to bear being beaten under circumstances which
implied ignominy. To give any color for misrepresentation
to the effect that we were now weakening in the Northern
Securities matter would be ruinous. The Northern Secur
ities suit is one of the great achievements of my adminis
tration. I look back upon it with great pride, for through
it we emphasize in signal fashion, as in no other way could
be emphasized, the fact that the most powerful men in this
country were held to accountability before the law. Now
we must not spoil the effect of this lesson. ' '
To this letter Mr. Cortelyou replied at once in a letter
in wliich he said :
"I have your letter of August 11 about the Northern
Securities matter. If I did not know you as well as I do
I should resent your sending me such a communication.
Whatever may be my shortcomings — and they are many —
I think I have a fair degree of moral fiber, certainly enough
to measure up to the requirements of this Northern Se
curities case. I am conducting this campaign for your re
election on as high a plane as you have conducted the af
fairs of your great office. It is not likely that one who has
been so intimately associated with you, or who has so much
at heart your welfare and success, would permit any con
sideration whatever to weaken the force and effect of the
splendid achievements of your administration."
As I have mentioned, Roosevelt's formal letter of accep
tance was published on September 12, 1904, and on the same
date the election in Maine resulted in favor of the Republi
cans. Secretary Hay expressed his keen pleasure in regard
to the two events in a joyful letter from his summer resi
dence in Newbury, N. H, on September 13, 1904 :
"Well, my dear Theodore, you had two glorious victories
yesterday. Your letter had been getting better and better

326 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
since I saw it, and it is now what they call a whirlwind
campaign in itself. It is magnificent — not only in sub
stance but in tone and temper. It has the unmistakable
air of a winner, — the force as well as the reserve authority.
"And Maine — we have heard how she went.
She went, by gob,
For Governor Cobb,
And Roosevelt and
Fairbanks too.
"I judge from the tone of our friends the enemy that
they are losing all heart and hope. I am getting sorry for
Parker ; they will turn and rend him before long. I do not
doubt he already wishes that comfortable judgeship back
again. "Everything they do is ridiculous. But their rally in
defense of the Constitution is most absurd of all. One of
these days they will be saying it is unconstitutional to read
tbe Constitution."

Roosevelt's views on the art of painting were set forth
in a letter to P. Marcius Simons, an American artist whose
works he greatly admired, three specimens of which hang in
prominent positions in his Trophy Room at Oyster Bay.
Writing to Mr. Simons, on March 19, 1904, he said :
"Your letter pleased and interested me much. The first
work I saw of yours was the 'Seats of the Mighty,' and it
impressed me so powerfully that I have ever since eagerly
sought out any of your pictures of which I heard. When
I became President, Mrs. Roosevelt and I made up our
minds that while I was President we would indulge our
selves in the purchase of one really first-class piece of
American art — for we are people whom the respective sizes
of our family and our income have never warranted in
making such a purchase while I was in private life! As
soon as we saw 'When Light and Shadow Meet' we made
up our minds at once and without speaking to one another
that at last we had seen the very thing we wanted.

NATIONAL CONVENTION AND CAMPAIGN OF 1904 327
"Mrs. Roosevelt and I feel that in your letter you have
expressed much which we have felt but not formulated. I
agree absolutely with you that art, or at least the art for
which I care, must present the ideal through the tempera
ment and the interpretation of the painter. I do not greatly
care for the reproduction of landscapes which, in effect, I
see whenever I ride or walk. I wish ' the light that never
was on land or sea' in the pictures that I am to live with —
and this light your paintings have. When I look at them
I feel a lift in my soul ; I feel my imagination stirred. And
so, dear Mr. Simons, I believe in you as an artist and I am
proud of you as an American. ' '

CHAPTER XXVII
ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS-
JUDGE PARKER'S CHARGES
A letter which throws interesting light upon the attitude
of the President and Mr. Cortelyou toward campaign con
tributions was the following from the President to Dr.
Lyman Abbott on October 7, 1904 :
"A week ago this Monday Cortelyou was on here, and
he then said to me that if I was elected I would be elected
without a promise or pledge of any kind, express or im
plied, to any corporation or individual. He told me of two
or three amusing instances of efforts to get some kind of
assurance from him, to which his invariable answer was
that they could count upon just treatment — upon my doing
nothing that I did not regard as fair and right; but that
there must be no misapprehension as to my purpose to go
steadily forward along the lines which had marked our
course for the last three years. Then a concrete instance
came up of the way in which he was handling things. You
may have noticed that I had to decide the Customs Stamp
Cigar question. After careful consideration I found that
my decision had to be against the so-called Tobacco Trust,
and in favor of the Independent Tobacco Manufacturers.
' ' Cortelyou had hoped that I would not have to make the
decision, as from the political standpoint at this stage of
the campaign, it was sure to cause irritation whichever way
it went. I told him, however, that I had looked into the
matter very carefully, and had gone over it with Taft and
Moody, and we had come to the conclusion that there was
but one way we could decide and that was in favor of the
Independent Tobacco men. He said very well; that he
wished to know at once, because under such circumstances
328

ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 329
he could not accept any contribution from the Independent
Tobacco men, for we must not be put in a position where
it could be falsely alleged that we got any quid pro quo for
such a decision.
"It seemed to me that this action of his emphasized the
distinction between the campaign he was running and the
campaign most others had run in like circumstances."
Most illuminating of all are these two letters from the
President to Mr. Cortelyou, written near the close of the
campaign :
"I have just been informed that the Standard Oil people
have contributed $100,000 to our campaign fund. This may
be entirely untrue. But if true I must ask you to direct
that the money be returned to them forthwith. I appre
ciate to the full the need of funds to pay the legitimate and
necessarily great expenses of the campaign. I appreciate
to the full the fact that under no circumstances will we re
ceive half as much as was received by the National Com
mittee in 1900 and 1896. Moreover, it is entirely legitimate
to accept contributions, no matter how large they are, from
individuals and corporations on the terms on which I hap
pen to know that you have accepted them, that is, with the
explicit understanding that they were given and received
with no thought of any more obligation on the part of the
National Committee or of. the national administration than
is implied in the statement that every man shall receive a
square deal, no more and no less, and that this I shall guar
antee him in any event to the best of my ability.
"The big business corporations have a tremendous stake
in the welfare of this country. They know that this wel
fare can only be secured through the continuance in power
of the Republican party ; and if they subscribe for the pur
pose of securing such national welfare, and with no thought
of personal favors to them, why they are acting as is en
tirely proper ; but we cannot under any circumstances af
ford to take a contribution which can be even improperly
construed as putting us under an improper obligation, and

330 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
in view of my past relations with the Standard Oil Com
pany I fear that such a construction will be put upon re
ceiving any aid from them. In returning the money to them
I wish it made clear to them that there is not the slightest
personal feeling against them, and that they can count upon
being treated exactly as well by the administration, exactly
as fairly, as if we had accepted the contribution. They
shall not suffer in any way because we refused it, just as
they would not have gained in any way if we had accepted
it. But I am not willing that it should be accepted, and
must ask that you tell Mr. Bliss to return it."
October 27, 1904.
"As supplemental to my letter of yesterday, containing
my request that any contribution which the Standard Oil
people may have made to the campaign be immediately re
turned, I wish to add that my judgment as to the propriety
of this action is confirmed because of the fact brought into
especial prominence by the Standard Oil Company's pubh
cation in the newspapers (which I saw after my letter was
written and sent) that much importance seems to be at
tached to the political attitude of this company. Further
more, in view of the open and pronounced opposition of the
Standard Oil Company to the establishment of the Bureau
of Corporations, one of the most important accomplish
ments of my administration, I do not feel willing to accept
its aid. I request, therefore, that the contribution be re
turned without further delay.
"Of course I do not wish any public statement made
about this matter, nor to take any step that will seem as if
I were casting any reflection upon the Standard Oil people
or their motives in making the contribution."
Roosevelt supposed that his wishes in regard to any
contribution which the Standard Oil Company might have
made had been complied with by the National Committee,
and it was not until four years later (September, 1908)
that he learned the truth about the matter. It was then
made known to him that no contribution had been made

ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 331
by the company or in its behalf but that H. H. Rogers had
contributed $100,000, and had made it as his personal con
tribution ; that the treasurer of the Committee, not wishing
to offend him by refusing it, had not sent it back, and had
not informed Mr. Roosevelt of his action in regard to it.
(See Chapter IX, Vol. II.)
A glimpse at the humorous aspects of the campaign is
given in this letter from the President to Secretary Hay
on August 12, 1904:
"Some of the developments of this campaign are too
deliciously funny for anything. A couple of deliciously
unconscious portrayals of this state of things were recent
ly furnished me, one by B., an ex-Congressman, a Gold
Democrat of Indiana, and the other by D., the Republican
sub-boss from Brooklyn. B. came to me out of the kindness
of his heart, to reassure me, and said in entire good faith :
'Mr. President, Taggart is not nearly so formidable as
these men think ; for aside from the money he has obtained
from his gambling houses, most of his fortune has come
from moneys he has received for running campaigns, which
he has kept for his own purposes. He is a very expensive
campaign manager, and always keeps for himself a large
proportion of the funds placed in his hands. I think this
will offset the fact that he will probably get much more
money this year than the Democrats have obtained for a
long time.'
"D. called me aside, and in great secrecy told me as fol
lows: 'On Monday night Tim Sullivan (Dry Dollar Sulli
van, a Tammany leader who has always been fond of me,
partly because of kindred tastes in the matter of prize
fights) came to my house and said that I was to tell you,
when I came to Washington, from him, that you need not
be at all alarmed about New York because he was going
to do his best to see to it that Tammany men were instructed
none of them to commit any offense which would expose
them to being put in the penitentiary in the interest of
Parker's success.' Not only Sullivan but D. regarded this
as being symptomatic of a great breakdown in the Tam-

332 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
many vote, and as being equivalent on the part of Sullivan
to practically bolting Tammany in my interest."
Throughout the campaign the President had studiously
refrained from making up his mind as to what the outcome
was to be. In July he wrote to Henry White in London:
"As to what the result will be, I have not the shghtest idea.
I have long given up prophesying about the outcome of a
political contest, especially one in which one sees almost
exclusively the people who are friendly and zealous parti
sans; and accordingly all that is heard is favorable."
To Rudyard Kipling he wrote on November 1, 1904 :
"We are now closing the campaign, and the Lord only
knows how it will go. I have done a good many things in
the past three years, and the fact that I did them is doubt
less due partly to accident and partly to temperament.
Naturally, I think I was right in doing them, for otherwise
I would not have done them. It is equally natural that
some people should have been alienated by each thing I did,
and the aggregate of all that have been alienated may be
more than sufficient to overthrow me. Thus, in dealing
with the Philippines, I have first the jack fools who seri
ously think that any group of pirates and head-hunters
needs nothing but independence in order that it may be
turned forthwith into a dark-hued New England town meet
ing; and/then the entirely practical creatures who join with
these extremists because I do not intend that the Islands
shall be exploited for corrupt purposes.
"So in Panama, I have to encounter the opposition of the
vague individuals of serious minds and limited imagina
tions who think that a corrupt pithecoid community in
which the President has obtained his position by the simple
process of clapping the former President into a wooden
cage and sending him on an ox-cart over the mountains
(this is literally what was done at Bogota) — is entitled to
just the treatment that I would give, say, to Denmark or
Switzerland. Then, in addition, I have the representatives
of the transcontinental railways, who are under no delu-

ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 333
sion, but who do not want a competing canal. In the same
way I have alienated some of the big representatives of
what we call the trusts, and have had a muss with the
trades unions on the other side.
"So only a merciful Providence can tell what the outcome
will be. If elected I shall be very glad. If beaten I shall
be sorry ; but in any event I have had a first class run for
my money, and I have accomplished certain definite things.
I would consider myself a hundred times over repaid if I
had nothing more to my credit than Panama and the coal
ing stations in Cuba. So you see that my frame of mind
is a good deal like that of your old Viceroy when he ad
dressed the new Viceroy."
In the closing days of the campaign Alton B. Parker, the
Democratic candidate for President, made several speeches
in which he charged that Mr. Cortelyou had been using the
knowledge that he had gained as Secretary of Commerce
and Labor to extort money from the corporations as con
tributions to the Republican campaign fund. The charges,
uttered cautiously at first by Judge Parker, were gradually
made more direct by him until they amounted to assertions
that a conspiracy had been formed by the President and
Mr. Cortelyou, the President having made him chairman
for the purpose, to levy this blackmail, promising in return
certain immunities or favors to the contributors after elec
tion. The President waited till the charges assumed the
form of direct assertions, when, "lest the silence of self-
respect be misunderstood," he spoke and in no •uncertain
tones, his declaration appearing in the press of the country
on the morning of November 5, 1904, three days before
election. In it, characterizing the charges as "slanderous
accusations," he said:
"Mr. Parker's accusations against Mr. Cortelyou and
me are monstrous. If true they would brand both of us
forever with infamy ; and inasmuch as they are false, heavy
must be the condemnation of the man making them.
"The assertion that Mr. Cortelyou had any knowledge,

334 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
gained while in an official position, whereby he was enabled
to secure and did secure any contributions from any corpo
ration, is a falsehood. The assertion that there has been
any blackmail, direct or indirect, by Mr. Cortelyou or by
me, is a falsehood. The assertion that there has been made
in my behalf and by my authority, by Mr. Cortelyou or by
any one else, any pledge or promise, or that there has been
any understanding as to future immunities or benefits, in
recognition of any contributions from any source, is a
wicked falsehood.
"The statements made by Mr. Parker are unqualifiedly
and atrociously false. As Mr. Cortelyou has said to me
more than once during the campaign, if elected I shall go
into the Presidency unhampered by any pledge, promise or
understanding of any kind, sort or description, save my
promise, made openly to the American people, that so far
as in my power lies I shall see to it that every man has
a square deal, no less and no more."
The President's vigorous utterance met with general and
hearty approval, for Judge Parker's astounding conduct in
virtually calling the President of the United States a con
spirator and blackmailer had aroused the indignation of
decent men of all parties. It was an act of incredible pohti
cal folly, reflecting not only upon its author's ideas of pro
priety, but upon his intelligence. No man who rightly un
derstood the character of the American people would be
capable of such a blunder. The election returns showed
unmistakably the faith that the people had in Theodore
Roosevelt, for they gave him the largest vote in the elec
toral college and the largest popular majority that any can
didate had received.
On the night of election, as soon as the result was known,
he wrote and gave out for publication the following:
"A wise custom which limits the President to two terms
regards the substance and not the form, and under no cir
cumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another
nomination. ' '

ATTITUDE TOWARD CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 335
Writing, on November 10, 1904, to his son, Kermit, who
was in school at Groton, Mass., he gave this interesting ac
count of the scene in the White House on election night :
"I am stunned by the overwhelming victory we have
won. I had no conception that such a thing was possible.
I thought it probable we should win, but was quite pre
pared to be defeated, and of course had not the slightest
idea that there was such a tidal wave. We carried not only
all the States I put down in my letter to you as probably
Republican, but all those that I put down as doubtful, and
all but one of those that I put down as probably Demo
cratic. The only States that went against me were those
in which no free discussion is allowed and in which fraud
and violence have rendered the voting a farce. I have the
greatest popular majority and the greatest electoral ma
jority ever given to a candidate for President.
"On the evening of the election I got back from Oyster
Bay, where I had voted, soon after half -past six. At that
time I knew nothing of the returns and did not expect to
find out anything definite for two or three hours, and had
been endeavoring not to think of the result, but to school
myself to accept it as a man ought to, whichever way it
went. But as soon as I got in the White House Ted met
me with the news that Buffalo and Rochester had sent in
their returns already and that they showed enormous gains
for me. Within the next twenty minutes enough returns
were received from precincts and districts in Chicago, Con
necticut, New York and Massachusetts to make it evident
that there was a tremendous drift my way, and by the time
we sat down to dinner at half -past seven my election was
assured. Mrs. Cortelyou was with us for dinner, just as
interested and excited as we were.
"Right after dinner members of the Cabinet and friends
began to come in, and we had a celebration that would have
been perfect if only you had been present. Archie, fairly
plastered with badges, was acting as messenger between
the telegraph operators and me, and bringing me continual
ly telegram after telegram, which I read aloud. I longed

336 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
for you very much, as all of us did, for of course this was
the day of greatest triumph I ever had had or ever could
have, and I was very proud and happy. But I tell you,
Kermit, it was a great comfort to feel, all during the last
days when affairs looked doubtful, that no matter how
things came out the really important thing was the lovely
hfe I have with Mother and with you children, and that
compared to this home life everything else was of very
small importance from the standpoint of happiness."

CHAPTER XXVIII
VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE
Two days after the election in 1904, John Morley, now Lord
Morley, the distinguished English essayist and author, paid
a visit of several days to President Roosevelt in the White
House. When Mr. Morley 's 'Life of Gladstone' appeared
about a year earlier, the President had written to him the
letter of warm appreciation quoted in Chapter XXIII, and
a cordial correspondence had ensued. When the date of
the visit had been fixed, the President did me the very great
and agreeable honor of inviting me as a fellow guest. Sub
sequently I put in writing an account of some of the inci
dents of this most interesting and memorable visit, which
I submitted to the President and obtained from him per
mission to include in my record of his life. I may, there
fore, without impropriety, reproduce portions of it here,
especially since they are of value in throwing light upon
his personality in much the same way that his letters do.
Mr. Morley and I arrived together on the afternoon of
Thursday, November 10, and found the President in the
highest health and spirits, fairly overflowing with joy be
cause of his great triumph.
From the first the President greatly interested Mr. Mor
ley. The two men had much in common intellectually. Both
had been wide readers and writers of history, and close
students of men and affairs. Each had written a life of
Cromwell. The President's talk, frank, vigorous, and mar
velous in its range over human history, ancient, modern,
and contemporaneous, as it always was when he had a sym
pathetic and understanding listener, was a revelation to
Mr. Morley, who said to me later that he had never heard
anything like it. He spoke of it frequently when we were
337

338 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
alone together, saying repeatedly : ' ' He is a most extraor
dinary man ! ' '
On the morning of the second day of our visit, when the
President left us to go to his office, Mr. Morley asked me
to show him the rooms on the first floor of the White House.
I took him through the Red Room, the Green Room, and
the Blue Room into the large East Room. As we stood in
the center of it and I had given a brief history of it, he
turned to me and, putting his hand on my shoulder, said:
"My dear fellow, do you know the two most extraordinary
things I have seen in your country? Niagara Falls and the
President of the United States — both great wonders of
nature ! ' ' Later in the day I repeated this remark to the
President, and also to Secretary Hay and Secretary Taft,
all of whom, the President no less than his two associates,
enjoyed it greatly. Secretary Hay recorded it in his diary
in incomplete form, and it is so published in Mr. W. R.
Thayer's life of him.
Each day, after the President had left us to attend to his
duties, Mr. Morley and I went to the library in the White
House, where, in frank and intimate conversation, Mr.
Morley asked me to explain such of the allusions to Ameri
can political methods made by the President as he had not
fully understood. There were many such allusions. I re
call one in particular. In describing the elements in poli
tics that had from time to time antagonized him, the Presi
dent said: "By all odds the most contemptible creature
we have encountered in our politics is the Goo Goo." Mr.
Morley, in obvious perplexity, exclaimed: "The Goo Goo?
Really, Mr. President, I don't understand you." He was
much amused on learning that the species referred to was
human and living and not extinct hke the Dodo.
I turned the conversation on one occasion to French his
tory and politics, on which I knew Mr. Morley to be a high
authority, and we spoke at some length of Napoleon. In
the course of our talk Mr. Morley said : ' ' This man whose
guests we are has many of Napoleon's qualities — indom
itable courage, tireless perseverance, great capacity for

VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 839
leadership — and one thing that Napoleon never had— high
moral purpose ! And think what it would have meant for
the world if he had had that ! " I quote from memory and
am not sure of the exact phraseology, but the sense is as I
have expressed it. Taken with the first remark about
Roosevelt, this second one is essential to give accurately
the estimate which Mr. Morley made of Roosevelt's char
acter. The physical vigor of the President impressed Mr. Mor
ley no less than his intellectual activity, being himself a
frail man in rather delicate health. At dinner one evening
the President had a number of prominent labor leaders to
meet Mr. Morley, who was desirous of obtaining informa
tion as to labor problems and conditions in the United
States. There was much animated conversation both during
the dinner and afterwards. When the guests were depart
ing the President followed them into the hall, talking and
gesticulating in his usual emphatic manner. Mr. Morley
touched me on the arm, pointed to him and said: "Look
at him! And he has been doing that all day long!" As
he said this he sank into a chair as if completely exhausted
by the mere sight of such tireless energy.
One subject upon which Mr. Morley talked much with
the President was the announcement which the latter had
made on the night of election declaring his intention not to
take a nomination for another term. He expressed himself
as quite unable to comprehend it, saying that the act seemed
to him as inexplicable as it would have been if Mr. Glad
stone, at the height of his career, had declared after a tri
umph at the polls, that he would never consent to go before
the people of Great Britain again as candidate for Prime
Minister. In explanation of his action the President said that since
the time of Washington the American people had, wisely as
he thought, established a custom against allowing any one
to hold the office of President for more than two consecu
tive terms. Their reason had been that the Presidency
being a great office, the power of the President, especially

340 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
if he had the support of great political and financial inter
ests, could be used effectively to secure his renomination.
There had been much said by his opponents in the cam
paign about his supposed personal ambition and intention
to use the office to perpetuate himself in power. He had not
said anything on the subject prior to election because he
did not wish to say anything that could be construed into
a promise made as a consideration for securing votes. In
making the announcement after election he had chosen
the exact phraseology he used for two reasons: First,
many of his supporters were insisting that as his first term
had consisted of only three years and a half, becoming
President through the death of the incumbent, he would,
at the end of seven years and a half, have really served for
only one elective term so that the third-term custom would
not apply to him. He wished to repudiate this suggestion.
Believing the third-term custom to be wholesome, he was
determined to regard its substance, refusing to quibble
about the form of words usually employed to express it.
Second, he did not wish simply and specifically to say that
he would not be a candidate for the nomination in 1908,
for to specify any year in which he would not be a candi
date would have been widely accepted as meaning that he
would be a candidate in some other year, and he had no
such intention and no idea that he would ever be a candi
date again. He had been asked by newspaper men if his
renunciation applied to 1912, and he had replied that he
was not thinking of 1912, or 1920, or 1940, and declined to
add anything whatever to what appeared in his statement.
So far as the third-term custom was concerned, he added
that it had no application whatever to anything except two
consecutive terms, since every shred of power which a
President exercises while in office vanishes absolutely when
he ceases to hold it, and an ex-President stands precisely
in the position of any other private citizen, and has no
more power to secure a nomination or election than he
would have if he had never held the office, indeed, he prob
ably would have less from the very fact that he had held it.

VISIT OF JOHN MORLEY AT THE WHITE HOUSE 341
The subject was in Mr. Morley 's mind when, soon after
his White House visit, he said in a speech which he made at
the annual banquet of the Chamber of Commerce in New
York, on November 15, 1904 :
"It would be most unbecoming of me to say a word as to
the personality of your new President. I will say this in
passing, that it is very gratifying to me to find that a man
may write a book about Oliver Cromwell and yet be thought
a very good man to whom to trust the destinies of a nation,
because, for no better reason, that I have written about
Oliver Cromwell also. One of his memorable performances
was, as you all know, his self-denying ordinance — a thing
for which Oliver Cromwell himself was solely responsible —
to withdraw himself from active military and public life
at a certain moment. There appears to be something like
a self-denying ordinance announced for the public the day
after election. Whether that was an imitation of Cromwell
or not I do not inquire, but this I do say, without, I hope,
being impertinent, that in your new President you have got
a man. All sorts of events within the four years may break
out upon the world — events in the oldest parts of Europe —
there are lives in the old parts of Europe upon which re
sults may hang; you have in the Pacific enormous risks,
possibihties, open questions, and all I can say is that it will
be a great thing for diplomatists to know that in dealing
with the government that will come into power and office
here on the fourth of March next year, they are dealing
with a man who has behind him, unless I am mistaken, the
American people."
After he returned to England Lord Morley summed up
his estimate of the President in a neat epigram. Writing to
Roosevelt on September 15, 1905, Senator Lodge said :
"Lady Harcourt (widow of Sir Vernon Harcourt) told
me that Morley came to see her when he returned from the
United States. She asked him to tell her about you. He
said : 'He is not an American, you know. He is America. ' "

342 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
To this Roosevelt replied on the same date :
"That was a very nice thing of Morley to say, so long as
it is confined to one or two of my intimate friends who won't
misunderstand it ! Just at the moment people are speaking
altogether too well of me, which is enough to make any man
feel uncomfortable; for if he has any sense he knows that
the reaction is perfectly certain to come under such circum
stances, and that then people will revenge themselves for
feeling humiliated for having said too much on one side
by saying too much on the other. ' '

CHAPTER XXIX
ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS, IN
CLUDING QUESTIONS OF POLICY
A great flood of congratulatory letters poured in upon
the President after his election. His replies to those that
came from personal friends, written as they were in the
full flush of his great triumph, are among the most com
pletely self -revealing that he ever penned. They disclose
the fundamental principles upon which he based his pol
icies, and the profound and matured convictions which ani
mated his public conduct. They show also that his head
was not in the least turned by the victory, that he regarded
it as a vote of confidence by the nation, and that the su
preme joy which he derived from it was the assurance it
gave of overwhelming popular support of the issues for
which he stood and which were dearest to his heart.
Writing to George Haven Putnam, of New York, on
November 15, 1904, he made a vigorous defense of a much
criticized method of procedure that he had followed in ad
vancing his policies :
"I shall do all I can to deserve the confidence the Nation
has reposed in me. But there is one point [in your letter]
which I should like to correct and which I fear is a misap
prehension of yours. You speak of 'men like Quay and
Addicks having no claim under existing conditions to
having any essential part in making me President for the
four years beginning with March 4, ' and this seems to im
ply that you think that in the past three and a half years I
have dealt with them because they had such claim. I have
never dealt with Addicks at all. With Quay and all the
other Senators I have dealt continually, and during the
next four years I shall deal with all the men of this kind
343

344 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
just exactly as I have dealt with them for the last three.
"I have dealt with Quay and with all similar men, not
because I regarded them as making me President, not be
cause I had anything selfish to expect from them, but be
cause, not being a fool, and having certain policies for the
welfare of the Republic at heart, I realized that I could
succeed in these policies only by working with the men of
prominence in the Republican party. That ridiculous
Parker Constitution Club, for instance, numbers among
its members and backers people who at the same time
falsely attack me for imaginary violations of the Consti
tution and then argue that I should try to violate the Con
stitution by disregarding Quay and the other Senators who,
under the first article of that Constitution, are the official
advisers whom I must consult, and without whose acqui
escence I can not make a single appointment. I did not
make these men Senators. They are in the Senate; and I
should be derelict in my duty if I did not try to get along
with them. I should be heartily ashamed of myself if this
election made any real change in my attitude towards them.
This attitude has not been due in the past to any desire
for self -advancement on my part, and therefore there is no
need to change it simply because it is no longer possible
for these men to do anything for my advancement."
In somewhat similar vein he wrote to Owen Wister on
November 19, 1904:
"I have been most abundantly rewarded, far beyond my
deserts, by the American people ; and I say this with all sin
cerity and not in any spirit of mock humility. The stars in
their courses fought for me. I was forced to try a dozen
pieces of doubtful and difficult work in which it was possi
ble to deserve success, but in which it would not have been
possible even for Lincoln or Washington to be sure of com
manding success. I mean the Panama business, the anthra
cite coal strike, the Northern Securities suit, the Philippine
Church question, the whole Cuban business, the Alaska
boundary, the Government open shop matter, irrigation

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 345
and forestry work, etc., etc. In each case, partly by hard
and intelhgent work and partly by good fortune, we won
out. . . .
"It is a peculiar gratification to me to have owed my
election not to the pohticians primarily, although of course
I have done my best to get on with them ; not to the finan
ciers, although I have staunchly upheld the rights of prop
erty; but above all to Abraham Lincoln's 'plain people';
to the folk who worked hard on farm, in shop, or on the rail
roads, or who owned little stores, little businesses which
they managed themselves. I would literally, not figura
tively, rather cut off my right hand than forfeit by any
improper act of mine the trust and regard of these people.
I may have to do something of which they will disapprove,
because I deem it absolutely right and necessary; but most
assuredly I shall endeavor not to merit their disapproval
by any act inconsistent with the ideal they have formed
with me.
"But the gentle folk, the people whom you and I meet
at the houses of our friends and at our clubs ; the people
who went to Harvard as we did, or to other colleges more
or less like Harvard, these people have contained many of
those who have been most bitter in their opposition to me,
and their support on the whole has been much more luke
warm than the support of those whom I have called the
plain people. ...
"But the New York Evening Post crowd are hypocritical
and insincere when they oppose me. They have loudly pro
fessed to demand just exactly the kind of government I
have given, and yet they have done their futile best to de
feat me. They have not been able to do me personally any
harm; but they continually do the cause of good govern
ment a certain amount of harm by diverting into foolish
channels of snarling and critical impotence the energies of
fine young fellows who ought to be a power for good. Take
Carl Schurz 's attack upon me for acting as any gentleman
would act with Hanna and Quay when they were on their
death-beds ;V>r take his statement that because I had seen

346 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Addicks and Lou Payn I was to be repudiated, as 'the
friendship of the wicked has its price.' In the first place,
I have seen Lou Payn just once, at his request. I have
seen Addicks perhaps three times, at his request, of course.
I have never since I have been President done for either
Addicks or Payn one single act; never made an appoint
ment for either of them or done anything else for either
of them; in the next place, I shall continue to see both of
them whenever they choose to call, and to see everybody
else who chooses to call — unless it be some creature who
renders it impossible for me to see him. For instance, if
Hearst, while Congressman-, calls upon me I shall see him
as a matter of course. I continually see 'Dry Dollar'
Sullivan. If my virtue ever becomes so frail that it will
not stand meeting men of whom I thoroughly disapprove,
but who are in active official life and whom I must encoun
ter, why I shall go out of politics and become an anchorite.
Whether I see these men or do not see them, if I do for them
anything improper then I am legitimately subject to criti
cism; but only a fool will criticize me because I see them."
Between the President and Finley Peter Dunne ("Mr.
Dooley") a cordial and thoroughly congenial friendship ex
isted, undisturbed by the latter's many humorous accounts
of notable events in Roosevelt's career. Mr. Dooley pub
lished an article describing the election as an "Anglo-Saxon
triumph," which aroused the President to a lively protest
in which he said:
"Now, oh laughing philosopher (because you are not only
one who laughs, but also a genuine philosopher and because
your philosophy has a real effect upon this country), I
want to enter a strong protest against your very amusing
and very wrong-headed article on the 'Anglo-Saxon Tri
umph. ' In this article, as in everything else you have writ
ten about me, you are as nice as possible as to me person
ally, and the fun about the feeling abroad, including
England, is perfectly legitimate. If you have ever hap
pened to see what I have written on the matter of the

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS ¦ 347
Anglo-Saxon business you may have noticed that I have
always insisted that we are not Anglo-Saxon at all — even
admitting for the sake of argument, which I do not, that
there are any Anglo-Saxons — but a new and mixed race —
a race drawing its blood from many different sources. . . .
"My own view is, that if a man is good enough for me to
profit by his services before election, he is good enough
for me to do what I can for him after election ; and I do not
give a damn whether his name happens to be Casey, or
Schwartzmeister, or Van Rensselaer, or Peabody. I think
my whole public life has been an emphatic protest against
the Peabodys and Van Rensselaers arrogating to them
selves any superiorities over the Caseys and Schwartzmeis-
ters. But in return I will not, where I have anything to say
about it, tolerate for one moment any assumption of supe
riority by the Caseys and Schwartzmeisters over the Pea
bodys and Van Rensselaers. I did not notice any difference
between them as they fought in my regiment ; and I had lots
of representatives of all of them in it. If you will look at
the nomenclature of the Yale, Harvard and Princeton
teams this year, or any other year, and then at the feats
performed by the men bearing the names, you will come to
the conclusion, Friend Dooley, that Peabody and Van
Rensselaer and Saltonstall and Witherspoon are pretty
tough citizens to handle in a mixup and that they will be
found quite as often at the top of the heap as at the bot
tom. "There is nothing against which I protest more strongly,
socially and politically, than any proscription of or looking
down upon decent Americans because they are of Irish
or German ancestry ; but I protest just exactly as strongly
against any similar discrimination against or sneering at
men because they happen to be descended from people who
came over here some three centuries ago, whether they
landed at Plymouth, or at the mouth of the Hudson. I
have fought beside and against Americans of Irish, of
German, and of old Colonial stock in every political contest
in which I have engaged ; I have been a fairly good rough-

348 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and-tumble man myself ; I have never asked any odds ; and
I have generally held my own.
"I am sure you will agree with me that in our political
life, very unlike what is the case in our social life, the
temptation is toward Anglophobia, not toward Anglomania.
The cheapest thing for any politician to do, the easiest, and
too often politically one of the most remunerative, is to
make some yell about England. One of the things I am
most pleased with in the recent election is that while I got,
I think, a greater proportion of the Americans of Irish
birth or parentage and of the Catholic religion than any
previous Republican candidate, I got this proportion purely
because they knew I felt in sympathy with them and in
touch with them, and that they and I had the same ideals
and principles, and not by any demagogic appeals about
creed or race, or by any demagogic attack upon England.
I feel a sincere friendliness for England; but you may
notice that I do not slop over about it, and that I do not
in the least misunderstand England's attitude, or, for the
matter of that, the attitude of any European nation as re
gards us. We shall keep the respect of each of them just
as long as we are thoroughly able to hold our own, and no
longer. If we got into trouble, there is not one of them
upon whose friendship we could count to get us out ; what
we shall need to count upon is the efficiency of our fighting
men and particularly of our neighbor.
' ' There is one thing to which I should like to call your
attention. If an Anglomaniac in social life goes into po
litical life he usually becomes politically an Anglophobiac,
and the occasional political Anglophobiac whose curious
ambition it is to associate socially with 'vacuity trimmed
with lace ' is equally sure to become an Anglomaniac in his
new surroundings."
Several letters which the President wrote at this period
are of interest and value both as displaying his indefati
gable reading habit and disclosing his views upon national

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 349
questions connected with and growing out of the Civil War.
To James Ford Rhodes he wrote on November 29, 1904 :
"I have just finished your fifth volume and am delighted
with it. I do not know whether I told you that during the
campaign I reread your first four. At the same time I read
Macaulay 's 'History' and many of Lincoln's letters and
speeches, and I got real help from all of them. It seems
to me, that allowing for difference of epoch and nationality,
you and Macaulay approach the great subject of self-gov
ernment by a free people in much the same spirit and from
the same philosophical standpoint.
' ' In the last volume I was immensely pleased with every
thing. Perhaps I should bar one sentence — that in which
you say that in no quarrel is the right all on one side, and
the wrong all on the other. As regards the actual act of
secession, the actual opening of the Civil War, I think the
right was exclusively with the Union people and the wrong
exclusively with the Secessionists; and indeed I do not
know of another struggle in history in which this sharp
division between right and wrong can be made in quite
so clear-cut a manner. I am half Southern. My mother's
kinsfolk fought on the Confederate side, and I am proud
of them. I fully believe in and appreciate not only the
valor of the South, but its lofty devotion to the right as it
saw the right ; and yet I think that on every ground — that
is, on the question of the Union, on the question of slavery,
on the question of State rights — it was wrong with a folly
that amounted to madness, and with a perversity that
amounted to wickedness.
"I am much interested in what you say as to Grant's
superiority over Lee in the fortnight's operations ending
at Appomattox, which brought the Civil War to a close.
For the previous year, it seems to me, that Lee had shown
himself the superior, but during this fortnight Grant rose
to his Vicksburg level. A mighty pair of Generals they
were! "Reading your history brings out the essential greatness
of Lincoln ever more and more. Perhaps, as you say, he

350 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and Washington do not come in the very limited class of
men which include Caesar, Alexander and Napoleon, but
they are far better men for a nation to develop than any
of these three giants; and, excepting only these three, I
hardly see any greater figures loom up in the history of
civilized nations. There have been other men as good —
men like Timoleon and John Hampden ; but no other good
men have been as great.
"The trouble I am having with the Southern question—
which, my dear sir, I beg you to believe I am painfully
striving to meet, so far as in me lies, in the spirit of
Abraham Lincoln — emphasizes the infinite damage done in
reconstruction days by the unregenerate arrogance and
short-sightedness of the Southerners and the doctrinaire
folly of radicals like Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens. The
more I study the Civil War and the time following it, the
more I feel (as of course every one feels) the towering
greatness of Lincoln which puts him before all other men of
our time."
More specifically about the Southern question, he wrote
to Henry S. Pritchett, President of the Massachusetts In
stitute of Technology, on December 14, 1904 :
"I have always felt that the passage of the Fifteenth
Amendment at the time it was passed was a mistake; but
to admit this is very different from admitting that it is
wise, even if it were practicable, now to repeal that amend
ment. . . . But it is out of the question that there can be
permanent acquiescence on the part of the North in an ar
rangement under which Mr. John Sharp Williams, the
leader of the minority in the House, as compared with Mr.
Cannon, the Speaker, elected by the majority, has just four
times the political weight to which he is entitled. Mr.
Williams represents a district in which there are three
blacks to one white. It is an outrage that this one white
man should first be allowed to suppress the votes of the
three black men, and then to cast them by himself in order

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 351
to make his own vote equal to that of four men in Mr.
Cannon's district. If this result came about as a natural
effect of a genuine and honest effort to enforce an illiteracy
test, or something of the sort, I believe there would be little
or no objection to it in the North, in spite of the damage
done the North thereby; for I believe that the North has
hearty sympathy with the trials of the South and is gen
erously glad to assist the South whenever the South does
not render it impossible by 'superfluity of naughtiness.'
"The trouble is that there is no such genuine law, and
that there is no white man from a Southern district in
which blacks are numerous who does not tell you, either
defiantly or as a joke, that any white man is allowed to
vote, no matter how ignorant and degraded, and that the
negro vote is practically suppressed because it is the negro
vote. To acquiesce in this state of things because it is not
possible at the time to attempt to change it without doing
damage is one thing. It's quite another thing to do any
thing which will seem formally to approve it. . . .
"My own view of this Southern question is, as I have
said, fundamentally yours and Rhodes'. What I am now
puzzling over is whether it is best simply to go on as I have
gone, saying nothing, or to try to say something. I have
been interested at the great number of requests I am now
receiving from Southern cities to visit them and address
their citizens. I do not know whether it means that they
begin to understand that I am not their enemy, or whether
it is simply the same kind of a feeling that would make
them interested in a circus coming to town. I do not want
to crowd things, or in any way to seem to truckle to the
South, and my present thought is that I shall simply go
through San Antonio, where there is reason for my going,
and defer most of my other visits to the South until a little
later. If I can hammer out just the kind of speech I want
to make, I may make it on Lincoln's birthday; but if I am
not fairly sure that I am saying the right thing I shall
not say anything on the subject."

352 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
In this letter to Mr. Pritchett, the President gives utter
ance to a sentiment about Lincoln and the White House
which all his intimates knew rested upon him like a spell:
"It is curious that you should give utterance to exactly
my thought when you say:
" 'I never go into the White House and through the
corridors and up the stairs where you pass every day with
out thinking of old Lincoln, with his shambling figure, com
ing down the steps in the early morning, in his cloth
slippers, on his way to the War Department to read the
night's dispatches.'
"I think of Lincoln, shambling, homely, with his strong,
sad, deeply-furrowed face, all the time. I see him in the
different rooms and in the halls. For some reason or other
he is to me infinitely the most real of the dead Presidents.
So far as one who is not a great man can model himself
upon one who was, I try to follow out the general lines of
policy which Lincoln laid down. I do not like to say this
in public, for I suppose it would seem as if I were presum
ing, but I know you will understand the spirit in which I
am saying it. I wish to Heaven I had his invariable equa
nimity. I try my best not to give expression to irritation,
but sometimes I do get deeply irritated."
Shortly after election in 1904, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, of the Supreme Court, sent to Roosevelt a little
book by President Eliot, of Harvard, entitled 'The Dur
able Satisfactions of Life.' Two sentences in it, — "Not
one human being in ten million is really long remembered.
For the mass of mankind oblivion, like death, is sure"—
especially attracted the President's attention, and on De
cember 5, he wrote to the Justice this quite remarkable
letter :
"I was rather struck at what President Eliot said about
oblivion so speedily overtaking almost every one. But after
all, what does the fact amount to that here and there a man

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 353
escapes oblivion longer than his fellows? Ozymandias in
the desert — when a like interval has gone by, who will
know more of any man of the present day than Shelley
knew of him? I suppose it's only about ten thousand years
since the last glacial epoch (at least, that is, I understand,
the newest uncertain guess of the geologists) ; and this
covers more than the period in which there is anything that
we can even regard as civilization. Of course when we
go back even half that time we get past the period when
any man's memory, no matter how great the man, is more
than a flickering shadow to us ; yet this distance is too small
to be measured when we look at the ages, even at rather
short range — not astronomically but geometrically. That
queer creature Ware, my pension commissioner, who al
ways uses the terminology of his Kansas environment, but
who has much philosophy of his own, once wrote the follow
ing verses on this very question :
History.
Over the infinite prairie of level eternity,
Flying as flies the deer,
Time is pursued by a pitiless, cruel oblivion,
Following fast and near.
Ever and ever the famished coyote is following
Patiently in the rear;
Trifling the interval, yet we are calling it "History  "
Distance from wolf to deer.
"Whether the distance between the wolf and the deer is
a couple of inches or a quarter of a mile is not really of
much consequence in the end. It is passed over mighty
quickly in either event, and it makes small odds to any of
us after we are dead whether the next generation forgets
us, or whether a number of generations pass before our
memory, steadily growing more and more dim, at last fades
into nothing. On this point it seems to me that the only
important thing is to be able to feel, when our time comes
to go out into the blackness, that those survivors who care
for us and to whom it will be a pleasure to think well of us
when we are gone shall have that pleasure. Save in a few

354 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
wholly exceptional cases, cases of men such as are not alive
at this particular time, it is only possible in any event that
a comparatively few people can have this feeling for any
length of time. But it is a good thing if as many as possible
feel it even for a short time, and it is surely a good thing
that those whom we love should feel it as long as they too
live. "I should be quite unable to tell you why I think it would
be pleasant to feel that one has lived manfully and honor
ably when the time comes after which all things are the
same to every man ; yet I am very sure that it is well so to
feel, that it is well to have lived so that at the end it may
be possible to know that on the whole one's duties had not
been shirked, that there has been no flinching from foes, no
lack of gentleness and loyalty to friends, and a reasonable
measure of success in the effort to do the task allotted.
This is just the kind of feeling that President Eliot's hero
had the right to have ; and a Justice of the Supreme Court
or a President or a General or an Admiral, may be mighty
thankful if at the end he has earned a similar right!"
No President, and no other public man anywhere, was
ever more photographed than Roosevelt, and it is interest
ing to see from a letter, written on November 18, 1904, to
R. W. Gilder, editor of the Century Magazine, what his
feelings on the subject really were :
"I do not want to begin to have new photographs taken.
If I do it in one case, I must do it in others. In the first
place, it is an intolerable nuisance ; and in the next place it
creates a false impression. People do not realize that I do
not like to sit for photographs and that it is only a good-
natured acquiescence on my part when I do. Nqw there is
not the slightest need of a new photograph. Dozens of
excellent ones have been taken. Take any one of these.
It will do just exactly as well."
When Joseph H. Choate resigned the ambassadorship to
England, the President, on December 24, 1904, wrote to
him this cordially appreciative letter:

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 355
"I have just received your letter of resignation coupled
with your private letter in which you ask that it be accepted
and give reasons therefor which would seem to be con
trolling. It is with genuine reluctance that I accept it. You
have rendered not merely loyal but distinguished service.
Not since Mr. Adams has any of our ambassadors to Eng
land served as long as you have served ; and not since Mr.
Adams has any Ambassador in your position rendered
more devoted and more efficient service to the country. I
thank you with all my heart, not only as President, but as
an American citizen, for what you have done; and your
countrymen, you may rest assured, appreciate it to the full,
and when you return will show you by their affectionate
welcome that the great place you already had in their re
gard and esteem has grown even greater. Distinguished
though your career has been, no part of it has been more
distinguished than that which has fallen within the last six
years. "You ask as to the time when you can take your depar
ture; but you mention that you had hoped to complete and
dedicate while yet in England your memorial window to
John Harvard in St. Saviour's Church. You say that you
still hope to accomplish this before your recall reaches you.
If the delay will not inconvenience you I should like to have
you arrange to stay until you can dedicate this window per
sonally. Accordingly, subject as I say to your convenience,
I shall ask you to let me know the date when you expect to
dedicate it, and I shall then notify you, accepting the resig
nation at a time shortly subsequent thereto."
Two letters which the President wrote at this period set
forth in engaging language his views about the duties of
ambassadors and ministers at foreign courts. The first
was addressed, on December 26, 1904, to George von L.
Meyer, who at the time was serving as Ambassador at
Rome: "I desire to send you as Ambassador to St. Petersburg.
St. Petersburg is at this moment and bids fair to continue

356 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
to be for at least a year, the most important post in the
diplomatic service, from the standpoint of work to be done,
and you come in the category of public servants who desire
to do public work, as distinguished from those whose de
sire is merely to occupy pubhc place — a class for whom I
have no particular respect. I wish in St. Petersburg a man
who, while able to do all the social work, able to entertain
and meet the Russians and his fellow diplomats on equal
terms, able to do all the necessary plush business — business
which is indispensable — can do in addition, the really vital
and important thing. . . . The trouble with our ambassa
dors in stations of real importance is that they totally fail
to give us real help and real information, and seem to think
that the life work of an ambassador is a kind of glorified
pink tea party. ' '
The second was to Richard Harding Davis, under date
of January 3, 1905, in response to a letter from him giving
his views and estimates of various American diplomats
whom he had encountered in foreign lands :
' ' There are a large number of well-meaning ambassadors
and ministers, and even consuls and secretaries, who belong
to what I call the pink tea type, who merely reside in the
service instead of working in the service, and these I intend
to change whenever the need arises. The Minister to 
is a nice man with an even nicer wife. He has been eight
years in the service. He is polite to people, gives nice httle
dinners, etc., etc. During all that time it has never made
one atom of real difference to the country whether he was
in or out. He is in the service for his own advantage, not
for the good of the service, although he does all the secon
darily important work well ; and in all probability I shall
change him and promote some man who during all that time
has done really hard work in a place where there is no pink
tea possibility. . . .
' ' I shall not make a fetish of keeping a man in, but if a
man is a really good man he will be kept in. A pink tea
man shall stay in or go out, just as I find convenient. Of

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 357
course, most places at embassies and legations are pink tea
places. A few are not, and in these we need real men, and
these real men shall be rewarded."

In November, 1904, Frederick MacMonnies, the sculptor,
wrote from France to the President expressing a wish to
make a statuette of him. Replying, on November 19, the
President wrote :
"I have just received your very kind note, and of course
I shall be delighted to have you make the little statue or
statuette that you desire, for, my dear sir, I think that any
American President would be glad to have an American
sculptor like you or St. Gaudens do such a piece of work.
But before sending you over the things you would like I
want to point out something. You say that you like that
photograph of me jumping- a fence, and apparently intend
to use that as a model ; but you ask me for my soldier suit.
Now, of course, I do not jump fences in my khaki and with
sword and revolver in my belt — as a matter of fact I rarely
wore my sword at all in the war — and if you want to make
me jumping a fence I must send you my ordinary riding
things. It seems to me it would be better to put me in
khaki and not to have me jumping the fence. Horses I
jump fences with have short tails. The horses I rode in
the war had long tails ; and, by the way, as soon as I got
down to active work they looked much more like Reming
ton's cavalry horses than like the traditional war steed of
the story books. Now, which way do you want to make that
statuette? It seems to me it would be better in uniform."
The statuette was made and reached the White House in
June following. In acknowledging it, the President wrote
on June 5 :
"Mrs. Roosevelt and I are delighted with the statuette;
and, my dear fellow, to have a bronze of me by MacMonnies
really makes me feel as if I were a pretty considerable per
sonage ! I have always been grateful to you and St. Gau-

358 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
dens for just existing, for it is a big asset on the Nation's
credit side that it should have produced you both."
When the statuette was presented to the President, he
said: "I now feel myself a really great man. The distinction
of 'being done' by either St. Gaudens or MacMonnies might
flatter anybody. I had always hoped to have something in
my possession by MacMonnies, but it never occurred to me
that I should have something by MacMonnies of me. The
statuette is exactly as I should like to have it — a cavalry
horse, the rough rider clothes and the emblematic support
to the whole."
For several years President Roosevelt, with the cordial
and enthusiastic cooperation of Augustus Saint-Gaudens,
made persistent efforts to have the artistic quality of our
coinage improved. While he was unable to accomplish all
that he wished, some notable results were achieved. He
greatly admired the sculptor's work, especially the eques
trian statue of General Sherman which stands at the Fifth
Avenue entrance to Central Park in New York City. Writ
ing of this to Saint-Gaudens, under date of August 3, 1903,
he said:
"To my mind your Sherman is the greatest statue of a
commander in existence. But I can say with all sincerity
that I know of no man — of course of no one living — who
could have done it. To take grim, homely, old Sherman,
the type and ideal of a democratic general, and put with him
an allegorical figure such as you did, could result in but one
of two ways — a ludicrous failure or striking the very highest
note of the sculptor's art. Thrice over for the good fortune
of your countrymen, it was given you to strike this highest
note." For making the usual Inauguration Medal which is struck
for every new President, Saint-Gaudens was selected, and
when the medal was received the President, on July 8, 1905,
wrote to him :

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 359
"Really I do not know whether to thank most Frank
Millet, who first put it into my rather dense head that we
ought to have a great artist to design these medals, or to
thank you for consenting to undertake the work. My dear
fellow, I am very grateful to you, and I am very proud to
have been able to associate you in some way with my ad
ministration. I like the medals immensely ; but that goes
without saying, for the work is eminently characteristic of
you. I thank heaven, we have at last some artistic work
of permanent worth, done for the Government.
"I don't want to slop over; but I feel just as if we had
suddenly imported a little of Greece of the fifth or fourth
centuries B.C. into America; and am very proud and very
grateful that I personally happened to be the beneficiary.
I like the special bronze medal particularly."
The success of Saint-Gaudens with the Inauguration
Medal led to a conversation between the sculptor and the
President in regard to the improvement of the coinage in
which the sculptor expressed the belief that the Greek coins
offered the best models. The President took up the subject
with the Secretary of the Treasury and obtained from him
an agreement to employ Saint-Gaudens to submit designs
for the gold coins, which was done. Writing to Saint-
Gaudens on November 6, 1905, the President said in regard
to these designs :
"I want to make a suggestion. It seems to me worth
while to try for a really good coinage; though I suppose
there will be a revolt about it ! I was looking at some gold
coins of Alexander the Great today, and I was struck by
their high relief. Would it not be well to have our coins in
high relief, and also to have the rims raised? The point of
having the rims raised would be, of course, to protect the
figure on the coin ; and if we have the figures in high relief,
like the figures on the old Greek coins, they will surely last
longer. What do you think of this ? ' '
Writing again to Saint-Gaudens on November 14, 1905,
the President said :

360 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"I have summoned all the Mint people, and I am going to
see if I cannot persuade them that coins of the Grecian type
but with the raised rim will meet the commercial needs of
the day. Of course I want to avoid too heavy an outbreak
of the mercantile classes, because after all it is they who do
use the gold. If we can have an eagle like that on the
Inauguration Medal, only raised, I should feel that we would
be awfully fortunate. Don 't you think that we might accom
plish something by raising the figures more than at present
but not as much as in the Greek coins ? Probably the Greek
coins would be so thick that modern banking houses, where
they have to pile up gold, would simply be unable to do so.
How would it do to have a design struck off in a tentative
fashion — that is, to have a model made? I think your
Liberty idea is all right. Is it possible to make a Liberty
with that Indian feather head-dress? Would people refuse
to regard it as a Liberty? The figure of Liberty as you
suggest would be beautiful. If we get down to bed-rock
facts, would the feather head-dress be any more out of
keeping with the rest of Liberty than the canonical Phry
gian cap which never is worn and never has been worn by
any free people in the world?"
To this Saint-Gaudens replied on November' 22, 1905, say
ing : "I can perfectly well use the Indian head-dress on the
figure of Liberty. It should be very handsome. ' '
From the outset of the President's efforts the authorities
of the United States Mint displayed strenuous opposition,
raising objection after objection to the designs submitted
by Saint-Gaudens. In a letter to him, on January 6, 1906,
the President referred to this obstructive attitude :
"I have seen Shaw about that coinage and told him that
it was my pet baby. We will try it anyway, so you go ahead.
Shaw was really very nice about it. Of course he thinks I
am a mere crack-brained lunatic on the subject, but he said
with great kindness that there was always a certain number
of gold coins that had to be stored up in vaults, and that
there was no earthly objection to having those coins as

INAUGURATION MEDAL, 1905
Made directly from the medal designed by Augustus Saint-Gaudens

A

it ¦>;» . . - .. £

\

%. -ISBJjf

\ ¦

"-¦¦¦¦—  •

Obverse of the ten-dollar gold piece, in high relief, Obverse of the ten-dollar gold piece, with the Roose-
and before the addition of the head-dress, on veit feather head-dress. Before the relief was
President Roosevelt's suggestion radically lowered for minting

The high relief form of the flying eagle for the
twenty-dollar gold piece ultimately used, but in
much lower relief. Reverse of coin

The standing eagle design for the twenty-dollar
gold piece, but ultimately used only for the ten-
dollar gold piece and in much lower relief

COINAGE DESIGNS BY AUGUSTUS SAINT-GAUDENS, 1906
Collected by Homer Saint-Gaudens. Photographs by DeW. C. Ward

ILLUMINATING LETTERS ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS 361
artistic as the Greeks could desire. (I am paraphrasing his
words, of course.) I think it will seriously increase the
mortality among the employes of the mint at seeing such a
desecration, but they will perish in a good cause ! ' '
When Saint-Gaudens sent his models for the twenty-
dollar gold coin the President, wrote to him on December 20,
1906: "Those models are simply immense — if such a slang
way of talking is permissible in reference to giving a mod
ern nation one coinage at least which shall be as good as
that of the ancient Greeks. I have instructed the Director
of the Mint that these dies are to be reproduced just as
quickly as possible and just as they are. It is simply splen
did. I suppose I shall be impeached for it in Congress,
but I shall regard that as a very cheap payment ! ' '
The President succeeded in getting the Indian feather
head-dress adopted and expressed his joy thereat in a letter
to Saint-Gaudens on March 14, 1907 :
"Many thanks for your letter of the 12th instant. Good!
I have directed that be done at once. I am so glad you like
the head of Liberty with the feather head-dress. Eeally,
the feather head-dress can be treated as being the conven
tional cap of Liberty quite as much as if it was the Phrygian
cap ; and, after all, it is our Liberty — not what the ancient
Greeks and Romans miscalled by that title — and we are
entitled to a typically American head-dress for the lady."
Saint-Gaudens died in August, 1907, and the last stages
of the work were supervised by his assistant, Henry Hering.
The coins as finally struck were far inferior to those de
signed by Saint-Gaudens, because of their lowered relief,
changes in the lettering and numerals, and careless repro
duction, but none the less they marked a distinct artistic
progress in the national coinage.

CHAPTER XXX
INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— DEATH OP JOHN HAT
The attendance at the Inauguration exercises in March,
1905, exceeded all previous records. It was estimated that
fully 500,000 people were in the city. The weather was ex
ceptionally fine for the season, and thus favorable for the
parade which numbered 35,000 men and was three and a
half hours passing the reviewing stand upon which the
President stood. Roosevelt's correspondence contains
much interesting matter relating to the exercises. On the
night before the exercises he received this memorable letter:
Department op State,
Washington, March 3, 1905.
Dear Theodore:
The hail1 in this ring is from the head of Abraham Lin
coln. Dr. Taft cut it off the night of the assassination, and
I got it from his son — a brief pedigree.
Please wear it to-morrow; you are one of the men who
most thoroughly understand and appreciate Lincoln.
I have had your monogram and Lincoln's engraved on
the ring. Longas, O utinam, bone dux, ferias,
Praestes Hesperiae.* Yours affectionately,
John Hay.
To a telegram of congratulation from Elihu Root, he
replied on March 6, 1905 :
Dear Elihu:
I appreciate the telegram. No one did more than you
* Horace, Odes, IV, V: "Mayest thou, Good Captain, give long holiday
to Hesperia! " 362

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 363
have done to make my first term a success and I thank you
now from the bottom of my heart, my dear fellow.
With love to you and yours,
Your friend,
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.
P. S. The night before the inauguration John Hay did
such a characteristically nice thing. He sent me a ring
containing some of Abraham Lincoln's hair, cut from his
head after he was assassinated, and with my initials and his
engraved on the ring ; saying he wished me to wear it when
I took the oath. Naturally no present could have pleased
me more.
On the same date he wrote to R. B. Roosevelt, in New
York:Dear Uncle Rob:
It was peculiarly pleasant having you here. How I wish
Father could have lived to see it too ! You stood to me for
him and for all that generation, and so you may imagine
how proud I was to have you here. Ever yours,
(Signed) Theodore Roosevelt.
In his Inaugural Address, which was one of the briefest
he ever delivered, President Roosevelt laid most stress
upon the two subjects which occupied first place in his
mind — national preparedness and social and industrial jus
tice. "We wish peace," he said, "but we wish the peace
of justice, the peace of righteousness. We wish it because
we think it is right and not because we are afraid. No weak
nation that acts manfully and justly shall ever have cause
to fear us, and no strong power should ever be able to single
us out as a subject for insolent aggression." The growth
in wealth and population of the country during a century
and a half, had produced perils the very existence of which
it was impossible that our forefathers should foresee. ' 'The
conditions which have told for our marvelous material well-
being, which have developed to a very high degree our

364 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
energy, self-reliance and individual initiative, have also
brought the care and anxiety inseparable from the accumu
lation of great wealth in industrial centers. . . . There is
no good reason why we should fear the future, but there is
every reason why we should face it seriously, neither hid
ing from ourselves the gravity of the problems before us
nor fearing to approach those problems with the unbending,
unflinching purpose to solve them aright."
A long letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, in England,
March 9, 1905, with whom he maintained an intimate corre
spondence for many years, contains an account of the
Inauguration which is interesting as revealing the Presi
dent's personal impressions of the event:
"Well, I have just been inaugurated and begun my second
term. Of course, I greatly enjoyed inauguration day, and
indeed I have thoroughly enjoyed being President. But I
believe I can also say that I am thoroughly alive to the
tremendous responsibilities of my position. Life is a long
campaign where every victory merely leaves the ground
free for another battle, and sooner or later defeat comes to
every man, unless death forestalls it. But the final defeat
does not and should not cancel the triumphs, if the latter
have been substantial and for a cause worth championing.
"It has been peculiarly pleasant to me to find that my
supporters are to be found in the overwhelming majority
among those whom Abraham Lincoln called the plain
people. As I suppose you know, Lincoln is my hero. He
was a man of the people who always felt with and for the
people, but who had not the slightest touch of the dema
gogue in him. It is probably difficult for his countrymen
to get him exactly in the right perspective as compared
with the great men of other lands. But to me he does seem
to be one of the great figures, who will loom ever larger as
the centuries go by. His unfaltering resolution, his quiet,
unyielding courage, his infinite patience and gentleness,
and the heights of disinterestedness which he attained
whenever the crisis called for putting aside self, together

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 365
with his far-sighted, hard-headed common sense, point him
out as just the kind of chief who can do most good in a
democratic republic like ours.
"Having such an admiration for the great rail-splitter,
it has been a matter of keen pride to me that I have ap
pealed peculiarly to the very men to whom he most ap
pealed and who gave him their heartiest support. I am a
college bred man, belonging to a well-to-do family, so that,
as I was more than contented to live simply, and was for
tunate to marry a wife with the same tastes, I have not
had to make my own livelihood ; though I have always had
to add to my private income by work of some kind. But
the farmers, lumbermen, mechanics, ranchmen, miners, of
the North, East, and West have felt that I was just as much
in sympathy with them, just as devoted to their interests,
and as proud of them and as representative of them, as if
I had sprung from among their own ranks ; and I certainly
feel that I do understand them and believe in them and feel
for them and try to represent them just as much as if I had
from earliest childhood made each day's toil pay for that
day's existence or achievement. How long this feeling
toward me will last I cannot say. It was overwhelming at
the time of the election last November, and I judge by the
extraordinary turnout for the Inauguration it is over
whelming now. Inasmuch as the crest of the wave is in
variably succeeded by the hollow, this means that there will
be a reaction. But meanwhile I shall have accomplished
something worth accomplishing, I hope.
"I wish you could have been here on Inauguration Day,
for I should think the eeremonies, if such they can be called,
would have interested you. The Secretary of State, John
Hay, was Lincoln's private secretary, and the night before
the Inauguration he gave me a ring containing some of
Lincoln's hair, cut from his head just after he was assassi
nated nearly forty years ago ; and I wore the ring when I
took my oath of office next day. I had thirty members of
my old regiment as my special guard of honor, riding to
and from the Capitol. And in the parade itself, besides the

366 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
regular Army and Navy and the National Guard, there
was every variety of civic organization, including a dele
gation of coal miners with a banner recalling that I had
settled the anthracite coal strike ; Porto Ricans and Philip
pine scouts ; old style Indians, in their war paint and with
horses painted green and blue and red and yellow, with
their war bonnets of eagles ' feathers and their spears and
tomahawks, followed by the new Indians, the students of
Hampton and Carlisle; sixty or seventy cowboys, farmers'
clubs ; mechanics ' clubs — everybody and everything. Many
of my old friends with whom I had lived on the ranches and
worked in the round-ups in the early days came to see me
inaugurated. ' '
Writing on March 9, 1905, to Gen. Leonard Wood, who
was at Manila, he said:
"Well, the inauguration went off splendidly and I am
getting along with no more than the usual and normal
amount of worry which every President must have. Con
gress does from a third to a half of what I think is the
minimum that it ought to do, and I am profoundly grateful
that I get as much. Next year I believe we shall get im
proved tariff arrangements for the Philippines. Thank
Heaven, we can now make a start in the railroad matters!
But of course, it is one long fight and worry. However, I
am not complaining. Taking it on the whole I have gotten
an astonishing proportion of what I set out to get. When
I became President three years ago I made up my mind that
I should try for a fleet with a minimum strength of forty
armor-clads; and though the difficulty of getting what I
wished has increased from year to year I have now reached
my mark and we have built or provided for twenty-eight
battle-ships and twelve armored cruisers. This navy puts
us a good second to France and about on a par with Ger
many ; and ahead of any other power in point of material,
except, of course, England. For some years now we can
afford to rest and merely replace the ships that are worn
out or become obsolete, while we bring up the personnel."

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 367
An example of Roosevelt's sympathetic aid to authors
appears in the following correspondence with Booth Tar-
kington. Writing to him on March 9, 1905, the President
said: "I like 'In the Arena' so much that I must write to tell
you so. I particularly like the philosophy of the Preface
and the first story. But I like all the stories. Mrs. Pro-
thero does not come within the ken of my own experiences,
but the other comedies and pitiful tragedies are just such
as I myself have seen.
"Do let me know when you get to Washington again."
In replying Mr. Tarkington wrote :
"It is a tremendous pleasure to know that you read and
liked my political stories. The Preface was almost directly
your suggestion. When, in last December, I had the honor
of lunching with you, you spoke of the danger that my pur
pose in these stories might be misunderstood, and that
exhibiting too much of the uglier side might have no good
effect. So I prefixed the Preface, hoping that if you hap
pened to see it you would believe that the Professor was at
least trying to do his best."
The death of John Hay, on July 1, 1905, was a cause of
keen grief to Roosevelt which found expression in many
of his letters. They had been personal friends for many
years before he became President, and their intimate offi
cial association developed their friendship into a deep and
tender affection. Differing widely in many of their char
acteristics, each had a full appreciation of the other's qual
ities, and each supplemented the other, the two working
always harmoniously, even joyously, together. Socially,
they met constantly. Every Sunday morning, on his re
turn from church, the President dropped in at Secretary
Hay's house for an hour's chat. Sometimes it was with
Hay alone; at other times Secretary Taft, or Secretary
Root, or both would be present. He was a fortunate man

368 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
who was honored with an invitation to be present at these
gatherings, for he was then permitted to behold the work
ings of the National Government from its innermost side.
Usually it was the comic aspect which predominated in the
revelation, for the President's prevailing sense of humor
was shared by his colleagues. I was thus honored on sev
eral occasions, and invariably Hay contributed something
that was especially apt and worth repeating. I may, I think,
without indiscretion, introduce here an instance. Secretary
Taft was present on this occasion, and the subject under
consideration was the Philippine Islands. "I see," said
Taft, "that the anti-imperialists are changing their ground
about the Islands. They have been saying heretofore that
we should not have stayed there after the battle of Manila ;
that we should get out of them and leave them to their fate;
and that they are doing infinite harm to us and to our insti
tutions, because in ruling them against their will we are
violating the Declaration of Independence and destroying
our own love of liberty. Now they say that we ought to
give them away, or sell them to Germany or Japan or any
nation that will take them off our hands." "That," said.
Hay, "reminds me of the young woman who had got re
ligion and was telling her experience in conference meet
ing. Wishing to give proof of the thoroughness of her con
version, she said: 'When I found that my jewelry was
dragging me down to hell, I gave it all to my sister.' "
With Hay's sickness and absence from the country these
gatherings were interrupted and they ceased, of course,
with his death. It was natural that his colleagues in the
Cabinet, as well as the President, should feel his loss keen
ly. On the day following his death the President gave out
for publication this statement: "My sense of deep per
sonal loss, great though it is, is lost in my sense of the be
reavement to the whole country in Mr. Hay's death. I was
inexpressibly shocked, as every one was, for all of us, in
cluding Mr. Hay's immediate family, had supposed that all
immediate danger was over, and I had been hoping that
the rest during the summer would put him again in good

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 369
health by the fall. The American people have never had
a greater Secretary of State than John Hay, and his loss
is a national calamity. ' '
Writing to the President, from New York, Mr. Root said :
"I am completely broken up by Hay's death. Dear old
boy, he was right about himself after all.
"I must send you a word of sympathy and condolence.
I know how true your affection for him was and how deeply
you will feel his loss, and how true was his affection for
you — how loyal and sweet the relation. Ah me ! The old
times are passing."
From many letters which the President wrote at the
time the following extracts are taken: July 15, 1905.
To the Rt. Hon. James Bryce, London, England:
"John Hay's loss was to me a personal one in the sense
which could have been true of hardly any other man, for he
was not only a dear friend of mine but a dear friend of
my father. The nation is richer because he has lived ; and
he fell in the harness, as I should suppose every man would
wish to fall." July 11, 1905.
To Senator Lodge:
"John Hay's death was very sudden and removes from
American life a man whose position was literally unique.
The country was the better because he lived, for it was a
fine thing to have set before our young men the example
of success contained in the career of a man who had held
so many and such important public positions, while there
was not in his nature the slightest touch of the demagogue,
and who in addition to his great career in political life had
also left a deep mark in literature. His 'Life of Lincoln'
is a monument, and of its kind his 'Castilian Days' is per
fect. This is all very sad for Mrs. Hay. Personally his
loss is very great to me because I was very fond of him,

370 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and as you know always stopped at his house after church
on Sunday to have an hour's talk with him." July 18, 1905.
To Senator Lodge:
' ' I particularly like what you said about John Hay, and
every word of it was well deserved. He is one of the men
whom we shall miss greatly all the time, and our memories
of him will be green as long as you and I live. But I have
not quite your feeling about his death, so far as making
us melancholy is concerned. You have often said that the
epitaph on Wolfe was the finest thing ever written, and I
cordially agree with you. But Wolfe was still young and
one could mourn his loss. John Hay, however, died within
a very few years of the period when death comes to all of
us as a certainty, and I should esteem any man happy who
lived till 65 as John Hay has lived, who saw his children
marry, his grandchildren born, who was happy in his home
life, who wrote his name clearly in the record of our times,
who rendered great and durable services to the Nation
both as statesman and writer, who held high pubhc posi
tions, and died in the harness in the zenith of his fame.
When it comes our turn to go out into the blackness, I only
hope the circumstances will be as favorable." July 11, 1905.
To Ex-Senator Beveridge:
"Hay was a really great man, and the more credit is
given him the more I am delighted, while the result at the
last election showed how futile it was for my enemies to
try and draw the distinction between what Hay did and
what I did. Whether I originated the work, or whether he
did and merely received my backing and approval, is of no
consequence to the party, and what is said about it is of
no earthly consequence to me. The same people who, not
because they cared for Hay, but because they hated me, in
sisted that everything of which they approved in the man
agement of the State Department was due to him will now
make exactly the same claim in reference to Root and will

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 371
hope thereby to damage or irritate me, whereas in reality
they will not be making the slightest impression upon either
my fortunes or my temper. A year and a half ago these
people said that with Root out of the Cabinet I would be
wholly unable to run the country. Root has been out a
year and a half and now when he comes back they will at
once forget the intervening eighteen months and make the
same assertion. They have already forgotten that Hay
was on the other side of the water during these last peace
negotiations; and, my dear fellow, why in the name of
Heaven should I care?
"I wished Root as Secretary of State partly because I
am extremely fond of him and prize his companionship as
well as his advice, but primarily because I think that in
all the country he is the best man for the position and that
no minister of foreign affairs in any other country at this
moment in any way compares with him. Nobody can praise
him too highly to suit me ; and right away he will begin to
help me in connection with the Venezuelan and Santo Do-
mingan affairs. As for which of us gets the credit for set
tling them, I honestly think you will find Root quite as
indifferent as I am. What we want is to get them settled,
and settled right." July 18, 1905.
To G. v. L. Meyer, Ambassador to Russia:
"Hay's death was a severe personal loss, to me and to
every one who knew him, for no more loyal, lovable and
upright man ever existed, and as a public man he stood
literally alone. America was the richer because he had
lived. As for his death, I am mourning ; but surely there
is not one of us who would not be glad to die as he did,
still in the harness, with his children and his grandchildren
around him, and with so great a record of public service.
I have never been able to feel that the man who died well
on in years with a great and well earned record of victory
behind him, and still in the flu'sh of his triumph, was unfor
tunate. But it is very hard for those he leaves, and above
all for his wife."

372 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The President, very soon after Hay's death, offered the
position of Secretary of State to Elihu Root, who accepted
it. Writing to Senator Lodge on July 11, 1905, the Presi
dent said:
"I hesitated a little between Root and Taft, for Taft as
you know is very close to me. But as soon as I began seri
ously to think it over I saw there was really no room for
doubt whatever, because it was not a choice as far as the
Cabinet was concerned between Root and Taft, but a choice
of having both instead of one. I was not at all sure that
Root would take it, although from various hints I had re
ceived I thought the chances at least even. To my great
pleasure he accepted at once and was evidently glad to ac
cept and to be back in public life and in the Cabinet in such
a position. He will be a tower of strength to us all. I not
only hope but believe that he will get on well with the Sen
ate, and he will at once take a great burden off my mind in
connection with various subjects, such as Santo Domingo
and Venezuela. For a number of months now I have had
to be my own Secretary of State, and while I am very glad
to be it so far as the broad outlines of the work are con
cerned, I of course ought not to have to attend to the
details." Writing on July 29, 1905, to Secretary Taft, who was then
at Manila on a visit, the President gave this as the view
taken by the more hysterical portion of our people of Root's
appointment :
"Up to the first of July you were the one person in the
popular eye. Then you had started for the PhiUppines and
Root suddenly appeared on the stage, and the great Ameri
can public, to use a simile from the nursery, dropped its
woolly horse and turned with frantic delight to the new
cloth doll. The more lunatic portion of the press insisted
that I had made a bargain by which Root was to have the
next Presidency. The fact that to make such a bargain
would show both of us to be not only scoundrels but idiots
was treated as an unimportant detail. By the time you

INAUGURATED PRESIDENT— JOHN HAT'S DEATH 373
come back they will probably drop Root like dross and take
you up as a new returned hero from the Orient and they
will then vividly portray Root's bitter — and entirely imagi
nary — chagrin at my having abandoned him for you."

CHAPTER XXXI
RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE
The "crowded" year supreme of Roosevelt's official hfe
was unquestionably that of 1905. In no other does the
record of his activity and achievement stand so high ; in no
other did he exemplify more completely the dictum of
Henry Adams that he was "pure act." He arranged, di
rected and brought to a successful conclusion the Ports
mouth Peace Conference which put an end to the war
between Japan and Russia. He arranged also the Algeciras
Convention which resulted, in 1906, in preventing war be
tween France and Germany over possessions in Morocco.
He took charge of affairs in Santo Domingo and, in the
failure of the Senate to act, brought about a peaceful solu
tion of the troubles between that island and its foreign
creditors. He personally directed the vast amount of offi
cial business connected with the task of getting the ma
chinery of organization in motion for building the Panama
Canal. These were the dominating items in the record of
his year's activity. There were many of less magnitude
which will be mentioned in the course of this narrative.
The crowning achievement of the year was, of course,
the ending of the war between Russia and Japan. The
broad outlines of the methods which Roosevelt pursued in
accomplishing this memorable result are matters of common
knowledge, but the inner history of the incident has never
been revealed. For the first time it is now accessible to his
biographer in Roosevelt's official and private correspon
dence, and can, not improperly, be laid before the world.
As it is told in that correspondence, it is virtually his own
story of what he did, illuminated with expositions of his
own views and motives at the time, and with his own esti-
374

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 375
mates and graphic pen portraits of the chief personages
with whom he was engaged in what to most men would
have been a hopeless struggle almost from the outset. He
himself had serious doubt at many stages as to his ability
to succeed, but he never permitted himself to be discour
aged, and his resourcefulness proved more than equal to all
emergencies. He was at the time his own Secretary of State, for Sec
retary Hay was absent from his post in the last stages of
the illness which ended in his death before the peace was
secured. Every step in the negotiations, extending over a
period of three months, was taken by the President in per
son without the aid of any of his most trusted counselors,
for Secretary Root had resigned from the Cabinet many
months earlier and Secretary Taft was absent on a visit
to the Philippines.
In no other task of his life was the abnormal energy,
mental and physical, of Theodore Roosevelt put to a se
verer test, and from none did he emerge more triumph
antly. His activity was as tireless as his resourcefulness
was inexhaustible. One reads the thick volumes of his cor
respondence with amazement bordering on incredulity.
It is incredible that one man could do so much and do it so
easily and so well. He was not only steadily and irre
sistibly forcing the two warring nations into a conference,
but he was at the same time untiringly bringing, or en
deavoring to bring, other nations like England, France, and
Germany to the support of his efforts. If Russia balked
and showed signs of refusal, he persuaded the Kaiser to
bring pressure upon the Czar in the interest of peace. If
Japan showed similar signs, England was appealed to, to
bring pressure upon her. In the end Germany alone really
helped, and Roosevelt gave unstinted praise to the Kaiser
ever afterwards for what he did then.
Early in the year 1905 President Roosevelt became seri
ously impressed with the strain which the war was bring
ing upon the civilized world and that some means should
be found for arresting it. "From all sources of informa-

376 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
tion at hand," he says in his 'Autobiography,' "I grew
most strongly to believe that a further continuation of the
struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and an even
worse thing for Russia. Japan was already suffering ter
ribly from the drain upon her men, and especially upon her
resources, and had nothing further to gain from continua
tion of the struggle; its continuance meant to her more
loss than gain, even if she were victorious. Russia, in
spite of her gigantic strength, was, in my judgment, apt to
lose even more than she had already lost if the struggle
continued. ' '
Writing to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, on March 9, 1905,
he gave the date of his first move for peace :
"Six weeks ago I privately and unofficially advised the
Russian Government, and afterwards repeated the advice
indirectly through the French Government, to make peace,
telling them that of course if they were sure their fleet
could now beat the Japanese, and if they were sure they
could put and keep six hundred thousand men in Man
churia, I had nothing to say; but that in my own behef
the measure of their mistaken judgment for the last year
would be the measure of their mistaken judgment for the
next if they continued the war, and that they could not
count upon as favorable terms of peace as the Japanese
were still willing to offer if they refused to come to terms
until the Japanese armies were north of Harbin."
On the same date, he wrote to King Edward of England :
"It seems to me that if Russia had been wise she would
have made peace before the Japanese took Mukden. If she
waits until they are north of Harbin the terms will cer
tainly be worse for her. I had this view unofficially con
veyed to the Russian Government some weeks ago; and I
think it would have been to their interest if they had then
acted upon it."
In a confidential letter to Secretary Hay, who was abroad
for his health, the President wrote on March 30, 1905 :

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 377
"Cassini (Russian Ambassador) and Takahira (Japa
nese Minister) have been to see me about peace negotiations,
but we do not make much progress as yet because neither
side is willing to make the first advance. The Japanese
say, quite rightly, that they will refuse to deal unless on
the word of the Czar, because it is evident that no one
minister has power to bind the government. Cassini an
nounces to me that officially the government is bent upon
war, but that privately he would welcome peace. The
Kaiser has had another fit and is now convinced that
France is trying to engineer a congress of the nations, in
which Germany will be left out. What a jumpy creature
he is, anyhow ! Besides sending to me he is evidently en
gaged in sending to all kinds of other people. I am against
having a Congress to settle the peace terms.
"The Chinese obviously desire the war to go on in the
hope that both combatants will ultimately become com
pletely exhausted. The European powers want peace. I
have an idea that the English would be by no means over
joyed if the Japs took Vladivostok. It looks as if the
foreign powers did not want me to act as peacemaker. I
certainly do not want to myself. I wish the Japs and Rus
sians could settle it between themselves, and I should be
delighted to have any one except myself give them a jog
to settle it between themselves. If France will do it, it will
serve the purpose just as well."
A letter that he wrote to the German Ambassador, on
March 31, shows an early purpose on the part of the Pres
ident to cultivate the good graces of the Kaiser, even if he
considered him a "jumpy creature," by making him the
confidant of his endeavors :
"I am happy to tell you in response to your last note
that I" entirely agree with the Emperor that it is unwise for
the peace negotiations, when the time comes to carry them
on, to be considered in a congress of the nations. The Jap
anese Minister has informed me that Japan takes this view
also. I informed the British Ambassador that this was

378 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
my view, and he told me that he had no doubt that the
British Government would also take it.
"I saw the Russian Ambassador, and for your private in
formation will say that I told him that in my judgment it
was eminently to Russia's interest to make peace, and that
I thought, as regards the terms offered by the Japanese,
it would be a case of the sibylline books ; that each delay, if
the delay meant another Japanese victory, would mean an
increase in the onerousness of the terms."
Another confidential letter to Secretary Hay, under date
of April 2, 1905, gives us an extremely entertaining account
of what was in progress behind the scenes :
"I have seen Cassini (Russian Ambassador) twice, Taka
hira (Japanese Minister), Durand (British Ambassador)
and Jusserand (French Ambassador) each once, and Speck
(von Sternburg, German Ambassador) three or four times
during the past week. The Kaiser has become a monomaniac
about getting into communication with me every time he
drinks three pen'orth of conspiracy against his life and
power ; but as has been so often the case for the last year, he
at the moment is playing our game — or, as I should more po
litely put it, his interests and ours, together with those of
humanity in general, are identical. He does not wish a con
gress of the powers to settle the Japanese-Russian busi
ness. As things are at present I cordially agree with him,
and I find that the British and Japanese governments take
the same view. The Kaiser is relieved and surprised to
find that this is true of the English government. He sin
cerely believes that the English are planning to attack him
and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with France in a war
to the death against him. As a matter of fact the English
harbor no such intentions, but are themselves in a condition
of panic terror lest the Kaiser secretly intend to form an
alliance against them with France or Russia, or both, to
destroy their fleet and blot out the British Empire from
the map ! It is as funny a case as I have ever seen of mu-

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 379
tual distrust and fear bringing two peoples to the verge
of war.
"Officially the Russian government announces that it
wishes to go on with the war. Cassini tells me, doubtless
under instruction, that he believes they would like peace
if they can have it on honorable terms ; but that they can not
for a moment consider the question of an indemnity. I
told him that to my mind the point was whether they would
be willing to consider the question of indemnity now, before
the Japanese had obtained any Russian territory, or would
wait until the Japanese had Harbin and Vladivostok, and
that it was for them to ponder whether or not, under such
circumstances, the Japanese would make the terms more or
less onerous. I told Cassini that I was speaking sincerely
in the interest of Russia, not in the interest of Japan, for
I believed that Japan, after the stunning overthrow of the
Russian Army at Mukden, felt that danger was past and
preferred to go on with the war unless all her terms were
complied with.
"There has been a very perceptible alteration in the
temper of the Japanese government and people, not un
naturally. They feel that victory is theirs and that they
are safe from outside interference, and they take a dis
tinctly higher tone. Takahira told me that the Japanese
government, in addition to the points for which they made
war, would insist upon an indemnity. I told him that I
was in hearty accord with them as to the points on which
they had said they felt they must insist prior to the battle
of Mukden, but I would reserve judgment as to what I
would say about the indemnity. It may be that they ought
to have it and must have it, but I did not feel called upon
to express an opinion about the matter at this time.
"Did you ever know anything more pitiable than the
condition of the Russian despotism in this year of grace?
The Czar is a preposterous little creature as the absolute
autocrat of 150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make
war, and he is now unable to make peace."

380 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
On the day following the letter to Hay, above quoted, the
President started on what he called a "week's horrid
anguish in touring through Kentucky, Indian Territory and
Texas; then five weeks' genuine pleasure in Oklahoma and
Colorado on a hunt ; to be followed in its turn by three or
four cindery, sweaty and drearily vociferous days on the
way home." While on his hunt the President was in con
stant touch by telegraph with Secretary Taft who, under
his direction, was continuing the negotiations with the Rus
sian Ambassador and the Japanese Minister. Not entire
ly satisfied with the way in which the affair was advancing,
he telegraphed to Taft on April 27, 1905, from Colorado:
"I shall come in from my hunt and start home May 8 in
stead of May 15 as I had intended. This will be put upon
ground of general condition of public service in Washing
ton so as to avoid talk about Russian- Japan matter,"
adding :
"Meanwhile ask Takahira whether it would not be ad
visable for you to see Cassini from me and say that purely
confidentially, with no one else to know at all, I have on my
own motion directed you to go to him and see whether the
two combatants cannot come together and negotiate direct.
Say that in my judgment it is far better that there should
be no reservations on either side, that I cannot help feeling
that they can make an honorable peace and that it seems
to me it would be better as a preliminary to have an abso
lutely free talk between the representatives of the two
powers without any intermediary at all. If Takahira ap
proves of this, act accordingly."
This was done by Secretary Taft, who telegraphed that
the Japanese Minister had approved and had given a state
ment of peace terms. On April 30, 1905, the President
replied :
"I emphatically agree with the Japanese view that there
should be direct negotiations on all terms of peace between
Russia and Japan. I heartily agree with the Japanese
terms ot^eace, in so far as they include Japan having the

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 381
control over Korea, retaining possession of Port Arthur
and Dalny, and operating the Harbin, Mukden, Port Arthur
Railway, while restoring Manchuria to China with the guar
antee of the open door. As to the proposed indemnity and
the cession of Russian territory I am not yet prepared
to express myself definitely; and, indeed, do not as yet
feel called upon to express myself definitely. Therefore,
in approving Japan's position as to direct negotiations
with Russia on all points concerning the peace, I do not
wish to commit myself one way or the other on the indem
nity and cession of territory matters."
The President did not find matters in a hopeful condi
tion when he arrived in Washington, for on May 13, 1905,
he wrote to Sir George Otto Trevelyan : "For the moment
I have been unable to do anything in getting Russia and
Japan together. I like the Russian people, but I abhor the
Russian system of government and I cannot trust the word
of those at the head. The Japanese I am inclined to wel
come as a valuable factor in the civilization of the future.
But it is not to be expected that they should be free from
prejudice against and distrust of the white race. ' '
Two days later, May 15, 1905, he wrote to Senator Lodge
in London :
"It is evident that Japan is now anxious to have me try
to make peace. Just as Russia suffered from cockyness,
and has good cause to rue her refusal to take my advice and
make peace after Port Arthur fell, so Japan made an error
in becoming over-elated in turn after Mukden and then re
jecting my advice to make peace. Takahira, and I think
the Japanese Foreign Office, agreed with my position, but
the war party, including the army and navy, insisted upon
an indemnity and cession of territory, and rather than ac
cept such terms' the Russians preferred to have another
try with Rojestvensky's fleet. I told the Japanese that if
there was any reasonable doubt, even if not a very great
doubt, as to the final result, it was in my judgment wise
to build a bridge of gold for the beaten enemy. They then

382 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
refused to accept my view. Now they have come around
to it, being evidently much disturbed by the presence of
Rojestvensky's fleet, which in material is somewhat superior
to theirs. For all their courage they are cautious, and I
think they understand what I meant when I told them that
though I believe the chances at least two to one in their
favor, yet that inasmuch as this meant that there was one
chance in three or four that they would be beaten, and
therefore crushed to earth, it would pay them to secure the
proofs of victory without pressing their opponents to de
spair." No progress was made during the ensuing fortnight, and
on May 27, 1905, came the news of the great Japanese naval
victory in the battle of the Sea of Japan. To Baron Kentaro
Kaneko, official representative of the Japanese Govern
ment in the United States, who, from New York, had ex
pressed his joy in a jubilant message to the President, the
latter replied : "No wonder you are happy ! Neither Tra
falgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as com
plete — as overwhelming. As Commander Takashita left
my office this morning, the Secretary of the Navy, looking
after him, said, 'Well, there goes a happy man. Every
Japanese, but perhaps above all every Japanese naval man,
must feel as if he was treading on air to-day.' "
The first overtures for peace came from Japan. They
reached the President four days after the news of the naval
victory. This fact, hitherto unrevealed, is firmly estab
lished in Roosevelt's correspondence. Full and explicit de
tails of all his proceedings in the matter were set forth in
long letters that he wrote in June, 1905, to Senator Lodge
in London, from which I shall quote freely in compiling the
story. In one of these (June 16) he said: "I made my
first move in the peace negotiations on the request of Japan
on the following telegram handed to me by Takahira; it
had been sent to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, on the 31st of May." (As this telegram is of real
historical value, it is reproduced here in full) :

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 383
"With reference to your telegram of the 28th of May,
you are hereby instructed to say to the President that
Japan's signal naval victory having completely destroyed
the force upon which Russia confidently relied to turn the
tide of the war, it may be reasonably expected that the
Government of St. Petersburg will turn now its attention
to the question of peace. The Japanese Government still
adhere to the conviction that the peace negotiations, when
they come, should be conducted directly and exclusively
between the belligerents, but even in such case friendly
assistance of a neutral will be essential in order to bring
them together for the purpose of such negotiation and the
Japanese Government would prefer to have that office un
dertaken by a neutral in whose good judgment and wise
discretion they have entire confidence. You will express
to the President the hope of the Japanese Government that
in actual circumstance of the case and having in view the
changed situation resulting from the recent naval battle, he
will see his way directly and entirely of his own motion and
initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for
the purpose of direct negotiation and you will add that if
the President is disposed to undertake the service, the Jap
anese Government will leave it to him to determine the
course of procedure and what other Power or Powers, if
any, should be consulted in the matter of suggested invita
tion. You will ask the President whether in his opinion
the Japanese Government can, with a view to facilitate the
course (?) advantageously take any other or further action
in the matter and you will make it entirely clear to the
President that the Japanese Government have no intention
by the present communication (?) to approach Russia
either directly or indirectly on the subject of peace."
"I was amused," wrote the President, "by the way in
which they asked me to invite the two belligerents together
directly on my own motion and initiative. It reminded me
of the request for contributions sent by campaign commit
tees to office holders wherein they are asked to make a

384 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
'voluntary contribution of ten per cent' of their salary.
It showed a certain naivete on the part of the Japanese."
After receiving this telegram the President saw Cassini,
the Russian Ambassador. "I told him," he wrote to Lodge,
"to say to the Czar that I believed the war absolutely hope
less for Russia ; that I earnestly desired that she and Japan
should come together and see if they could not agree upon
terms of peace ; and that I should like to propose this if I
could get the assent of Russia and then of Japan, which
latter I thought I would be able to get. • I could not be sure
that Cassini would tell this to the Czar, for he is afraid of
saying what is disagreeable; but I hardly know what to
do else."
Almost immediately following the naval battle, the
Kaiser began to exert himself for peace. On June 3, 1905,
the German Ambassador handed this note to the President :
"The Emperor has just informed me that in the interest
of all concerned he thinks Russia ought to effect peace. He
has requested me to tell you that he is ready to silently
support any efforts which you may feel inclined to make iu
the interest of peace. For both belligerents he considers
this way of mediation the chief est and most unselfish."
On the same date, the American Ambassador at Berlin
sent this message to the President:
' ' The German Emperor has asked me to say to you that
he considers the situation in Russia so serious that, when
the truth is known at St. Petersburg in regard to the re
cent defeat, the life of the Czar will be in danger, and the
gravest disorders likely to occur. The Emperor of Ger
many has written to the Czar, therefore, urging him to
take immediate steps toward peace. The Emperor said to
me: 'I called his attention to the fact that the Americans
were the only nation regarded by the Japanese with the
highest respect, and that the President of the United States
is the right person to appeal to with the hope that he may
be able to bring the Japanese to reasonable proposals. I
suggested to the Czar to send for Meyer and charge him

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 385
with a message to President Roosevelt. Please inform the
President privately, from me personally, of the steps that
I have taken which I hope will be for the benefit of the
world.' "
Precisely what the Kaiser wrote to the Czar in regard to
Roosevelt as a mediator was revealed in January, 1920,
when a batch of his letters to the Czar was found in Petro-
grad and published. In one of them, dated June 3, 1905,
appears this passage:
"I may, perhaps, turn your attention to the fact that no
doubt the Japanese have the highest regard for America
before all other nations. Because this mighty, rising
power, with its tremendous fleet, is next to them. If any
body in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to
induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is Presi
dent Roosevelt. Should it meet with your approval I could
easily place myself — privately — en rapport with him, as
we are very intimate ; also my ambassador there is a friend
of his. Besides, you have Mr. Meyer, whom I know since
years, who has my fullest confidence; you may send for
him, talk with him openly; he is most discreet and trust
worthy, a charming causeur with agreeable manners. ' '
The Kaiser's proposal did not meet the President's
views, for he "did not desire to be asked to squeeze out of
Japan favorable terms for Russia." Furthermore, "I
could not be sure that Cassini would really tell his home
Government what I had been doing or Lamsdorff would
tell the Czar what I wished." He decided to have Meyer,
the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg, see the Czar
in person, and accordingly sent him, on June 5, a cable
message instructing him at once to call on His Majesty,
saying he did so by personal direction of the President, and
repeat to him what the President had said to Cassini.
Meyer was also to say to His Majesty: "If Russia will
consent to such a meeting the President will try to get
Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and

386 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
not saying that Russia has consented, and the President
believes he will succeed."
It will be noticed that in this message to the Czar the
President was conforming strictly to Japan 's wishes about
the "initiative."
On receipt of the President's message, Ambassador
Meyer sought and obtained an audience with the Czar, and
in a letter to the President under date of June 9, he de
scribed the interview at length. The Czar admitted that
he had received a letter from the German Emperor urging
him to make peace, and said: "If it will be absolutely se
cret as to my decision should Japan decline, or until she
gives her consent, I will now consent to your President's
plan that we (Russia and Japan) have a meeting, without
intermediaries, in order to see if we can make peace."
After asking if the President knew or could find out what
Japan's terms were, the Czar continued: "You have come
at the psychological moment; as yet no foot has been placed
on Russian soil, but I realize that at almost any moment
they can make an attack on Saghalien. Therefore it is im
portant that the meeting should take place before that oc
curs." The Czar, apparently, communicated at once with the
Kaiser, for on June 11, the German Ambassador at Wash
ington, handed this message to the President, under direc
tions from Berlin:
"The suspicious Czar has written to the Emperor stating
that if Japan's demands are too exorbitant or too humilia
ting to Russia he would have to break off negotiations at
once. The Emperor thinks that the best thing to start
them well would be if you could ask Japan to submit her
demands to you for consideration before they are for
warded to Petersburg. In case they really should be
exorbitant and too humiliating you could have them held
back. He reiterates that he will do all in his power to make
the Czar accept any demands which you consider to be
within the bounds of moderation. So far as Japan is con-

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 387
cerned, the Emperor thinks that the negotiations better
rest in your hands alone."
The President next had what he called "a perfectly char
acteristic experience, showing the utterly loose way in
which the Russian Government works. ' ' On June 6, 1905,
Cassini showed him a despatch from his government in
which they made no answer to Roosevelt's proposition,
said they would not ask either peace or mediation, but re
quested the President to exercise a moderating influence
on the demands of Japan and find out what those demands
were. On the following day, Meyer sent to the President a
message which directly reversed the Cassini message by
stating: "The Emperor authorized me to say that he ac
cepts and consents to the President's proposition with the
understanding that it is to be kept absolutely secret, and
that the President is to act on his own initiative in en
deavoring to obtain the consent of the Japanese Govern
ment." No information of this message was given to Cassini by
his government, and when it was shown to him he ques
tioned its accuracy, saying: "Meyer may have misinter
preted or forgotten what the Emperor said." The Presi
dent, therefore, had Cassini 's assertion cabled to Meyer,
and Meyer obtained the authority of Lamsdorff, the Rus
sian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the statement that
he had quoted the Czar correctly. Roosevelt at the time
received various messages from Cassini, including a pro
test against his seeing so much of the Japanese Minister
and representatives of the neutral forces. To this the
President replied through the person who brought it that
he considered it impertinent and requested that it be not
repeated. "Cassini also protested," says the President,
"that I was trying to make Russia move too quickly, and
was very indignant over my order interning the Russian
ships at Manila, saying 'this is not the time to establish
new principles of international law.' I had declined to
allow the Russian ships to make any repairs that were

388 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
rendered necessary by the results of the battle, and then
had them interned. I informed Cassini that it was pre
cisely the right time to establish a new principle of inter
national law, when the principle was a good one, and that
the principle is now established."
Having obtained the consent of both belligerents, Roose
velt, on June 8, sent by telegraph an identical note to each
of them stating that the "President feels that the time has
come when in the interest of all mankind he must endeavor
to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible
and lamentable conflict now being waged"; assuring them
that with both the "United States has inherited ties of
friendship and good will" ; urging them "not only for their
own sakes, but in the interest of the whole civilized world
to open direct negotiations for peace with one another";
and offering to do what he properly could, if they felt that
his services would be of aid, in arranging the. preliminaries
as to the time and place of meeting. As casting further
light upon Russian methods of procedure, the President
writes : ' ' Then Cassini must have been told what had hap
pened, for he called upon me and notified me that the Rus
sian Government thanked me and had adopted my sugges
tion. I am inclined to think that up to that time he had not
received the message which he then communicated to me,
that his government had told him nothing whatever as to
their attitude toward peace."
The text of the identical note was published by the Presi
dent, and then what he calls "a rather exasperating inci
dent" occurred. On June 10, 1905, Japan, through its
Minister for Foreign Affairs, accepted the suggestion of
the President and declared that it would appoint plenipo
tentiaries to meet those of Russia at such time and place as
might be found mutually agreeable "for the purpose of
negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and ex
clusively between the two belligerent powers." Cassini,
in his verbal statement to the President, "had accepted
just as unreservedly," but, on June 12, there came from

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 389
Lamsdorff a cable message in which he said he had laid
the note before his August Majesty, that His Majesty was
"much moved by the sentiments expressed by the Presi
dent," and that with regard to the proposed meeting, in
order to see if it is not possible for the two powers to agree
to terms of peace, the "Imperial Government had no
objection in principle to that endeavor if the Japanese
Government expressed a like desire."
The effect of this message is thus described by the
President :
"This note is of course much less satisfactory than
Japan's, for it shows a certain slyness and an endeavor to
avoid anything like a definite committal, which most nat
urally irritated Japan, while at the same time, as it used
the very words of my identical note, it did not offer grounds
for backing out of the negotiations. But. Japan now started
to play the fool. It sent a request for me to get a cate
gorical answer from Russia as to whether she would ap
point plenipotentiaries who would have full power to make
peace, and hinted that otherwise Japan did not care for
the meeting. Meanwhile Russia had proposed Paris for
the place of meeting, and Japan Chef oo. Each declined to
accept the other's proposition. I then made a counter
proposition of The Hague, which was transmitted to both
Governments. It was crossed, however, by a proposition
from Russia that the meeting should take place in Wash
ington. Japan answered my proposition positively declin
ing to go to Europe and expressing its preference for the
United States, as' being half way between Europe and Asia.
Russia having first suggested Washington, I promptly
closed and notified both Japan and Russia that I had thus
accepted Washington."
The succeeding few days were very busy ones for the
President. He had to soothe the Japanese Ambassador on
the question of a categorical answer from Russia as to the
full powers of the Russian plenipotentiaries and convince
the Czar that having once accepted Washington as the

390 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
meeting place he could not change his mind and induce the
President to reverse himself also. On June 15, he handed
to Cassini a memorandum in which he said that he had
received from Japan a statement of its intention to clothe
its plenipotentiaries with full powers to negotiate and con
clude a peace, and suggested that Russia do the same. This
he showed to Takahira and explained to him that he had
withdrawn it later from Cassini on receipt of a message
from Russia saying that its plenipotentiaries would have
full powers since that was the meaning of the title.
No sooner was this question settled than, on June 16,
1905, came a message from Ambassador Meyer to the ef
fect that Lamsdorff had informed him that Russia pre
ferred The Hague for the place of meeting. On the same
date this bit of "inspired" news was sent by the Asso
ciated Press from St. Petersburg:
"The question of the place of meeting of the Russian
and Japanese representatives has been re-opened and there
is a possibility that The Hague instead of Washington may
be selected. After the announcement that Washington had
been selected Russia expressed a desire to have the selec
tion reconsidered and exchanges to that end are now pro
ceeding between Foreign Minister Lamsdorff and Ambassa
dor Meyer and Washington. Russia's preference for The
Hague is based on the obvious advantages that it is en
tirely neutralized, the capital of a small state and the site
of the arbitration court and also by consideration of time."
The President's handling of this situation was thorough
ly Rooseveltian, and resembles that which he used with the
Kaiser in the Venezuela incident of 1902. In reply to
Meyer's message he sent the following: June 16, 1905.
"You will please immediately inform Count Lamsdorff
that I was handed by Ambassador Cassini a cable from him
dated June thirteenth, which ran as follows: 'As regards
the place of the proposed meeting its choice is of only sec
ondary importance since the plenipotentiaries of both Bus-

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 391
sia and Japan are to negotiate directly without any partici
pation by third powers. If Paris, so desirable for many
reasons, encounters opposition, then the Imperial Govern
ment gives the preference to Washington over all other
cities, especially since the presence of the President, initia
tor of the meeting, can exercise a beneficent influence
toward the end which we all have in view.' Accordingly,
after having received word from Japan that she objected
to The Hague, and before I received any notification what
ever about The Hague from Russia, I notified Japan that
Washington would be the appointed place and so informed
Ambassador Cassini. I then gave the same announcement
to the public. It is, of course, out of the question for me
to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the
incident as closed, so far as the place of meeting is con
cerned. If Count Lamsdorff does not acquiesce in this
view, you will please see the Czar personally and read to
him this cable, stating to Count Lamsdorff that you are
obliged to make the request because of the extreme gravity
of the situation. Explain to Count Lamsdorff and if neces
sary to the Czar that I am convinced that on consideration
they will of their own accord perceive that it is entirely
out of the question for me now to reverse the action I took
in accordance with the request of the Russian Government,
which action has been communicated to and acquiesced in
by Japan, and has been published to the entire world. ' '
Promptly on the following day came these two interest
ing responses: Petersburg, June 17, 1905.
President Roosevelt, Washington.
Have just received the following from Lamsdorff: Je
m'empresse d 'informer votre excellence que sa maj este
l'empereur ne voit aucun obstacle au choix de Washington
pour la reunion et les pourparlers des plenipotentiaires
Russes et Japonais. Meyer.

392 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Washington, le 17 Juin, 1905.
Monsieur le President:
Vu certains bruits repandus par la presse, j'ai l'honneur
de porter k Votre connaissance que, conformement a un
telegramme officiel que je viens de recevoir a l'instant meme,
Sa Maj este l'Empereur, mon Auguste Maitre, accepte
definitivement Washington comme lieu de reunion des
plenipotentiaires Russes et Japonais qui seront appeles
a negocier les preliminaires d'un traite de paix.
Agreez, Monsieur le President, 1 'assurance de ma plus
haute consideration. Cassini.
Roosevelt's comments upon the incident are both enter
taining and valuable :
"I think it is beautiful the way in which Cassini virtually
begins his note by speaking of the rumors given currency
by the press, just as if his government had not explicitly
informed me that it desired to change the place from Wash
ington to The Hague. What I cannot understand about
the Russian is the way he will lie when he knows perfectly
well that you know he is lying.
"It is this kind of thing which makes me feel rather
hopeless about our ultimately getting peace. I shall do my
best, but neither the Czar nor the Russian Government nor
the Russian people are willing to face the facts as they are.
I am entirely sincere when I tell them that I act as I do
because I think it in the interest of Russia, and in this crisis
I think the interest of Russia is the interest of the entire
world. I should be sorry to see Russia driven completely
off the Pacific coast and driven practically east to Lake
Baikal, and yet something like this will surely happen if
she refuses to make peace. Moreover, she will put it out
of the power of any one to help her in the future if she now
stands with Chinese folly upon her dignity and fancied
strength. It is a case of the offer of the sibylline books.
I told Cassini, and through Delcasse (French Foreign Af
fairs Minister) told the Russian home government, imme-

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 393
diately after Port Arthur, that they ought to make peace
at once. I reiterated this advice as strongly as possible
after Mukden. In each case my advice was refused and the
result is so much the worse for Russia.
"Japan is suspicious, too, and does not always act as I
should like her to, but it behaves infinitely better than
Russia. Of course, it will make heavy demands. No power
could fail after such astounding victories.
"Remember that you are to let no one know that in this
matter of the peace negotiations I have acted at the request
of Japan and that each step has been taken with Japan's
foreknowledge, and not merely with her approval but with
her expressed desire. This gives rather a comic turn to
some of the English criticisms to the effect that my move
is really in the interest of Russia and not merely in the
interest of Japan, and that Japan is behaving rather mag
nanimously in going into it. My move is really more in the
interest of Russia than of Japan, but it is greatly to the
interest of Japan also.
"Well, I do not have much hope of getting peace, but I
have made an honest effort, the only effort which offered
any chance of success at all."
While holding the Czar inflexibly to his promise as to the
meeting place of the Conference, the President was working
patiently and tirelessly with the Japanese authorities to
keep them from laying too much stress on trifles. Not only
did he reason daily with Takahira, the Japanese Minister,
but he appealed directly to the Japanese Government. On
June 16, 1905, he sent a long message to Mr. Griscom, the
American Ambassador at Tokio, with directions to com
municate it to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
In this message he said :
"At present the feeling is that Japan has been frank
and straightforward and wants peace if it can be obtained
on proper terms, whereas Russia has shown a tendency to
hang back. It will be a misfortune for Japan, in the judg
ment of the President, if any action of Japan now gives

394 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
rise to the contrary feeling. Moreover, in the President's
judgment, there is absolutely nothing to be gained by such
action on the part of Japan. No instructions to the pleni
potentiaries would be of any avail if they did not intend
to make peace. But if, as the President believes, the force
of events will tend to secure peace if once the representa
tives of the two parties can come together, then it is ob
viously most unwise to delay the meeting for reasons that
are trivial or of no real weight."
He was far from being confident of success at this time.
Writing to Lodge on June 16, 1905, he said : ' ' The more I
see of the Czar, the Kaiser, and the Mikado, the better I am
content with democracy, even if we have to include the
American newspaper as one of its assets — liability would be
a better term. Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and
shifty, and so incompetent, that I am utterly unable to say
whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotia
tions at any moment. Japan is, of course, entirely selfish,
though with a veneer of courtesy, and with infinitely more
knowledge of what it wants and capacity to get it. I should
not be surprised if the peace negotiations broke off at any
moment. Russia, of course, does not believe in the genuine
ness of my motives and words, and I sometimes doubt
whether Japan does."
To Benjamin Ide Wheeler he wrote, on June 17, 1905:
"I do not know whether I shall get peace out of this ne
gotiation or not. I have awfully hard sledding in the effort
to get the governments to come together, and am exas
perated almost to the breaking point by such an antic as
this of Russia in now wishing to retract its preference for
Washington and wanting The Hague, which it knows Japan
will not accept. However, I shall do my best."
The following passage from a letter to Lodge, written
just after the negotiations had begun, is especially interest
ing, both psychologically and historically. Note the state
ment of a promised Rothschild loan to Russia:

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 395
"I wish I could tell you all the funny details of these
negotiations of Takahira and Cassini with us. Of course,
if the Russians go on as they have gone ever since I have
been President— and so far as I can find out, ever since the
Spanish War — they are hopeless creatures with whom to
deal. They are utterly insincere and treacherous; they
have no conception of truth, no willingness to look facts in
the face, no regard for others of any sort or kind, no knowl
edge of their own strength or weakness ; and they are help
lessly unable to meet emergencies.
"About the Japanese I feel as I always did. I do not
pretend to know the soul of the nation, or to prophesy as
to what it will do in the future. I do not suppose I under
stand their motives, and I am not at all sure that they
understand mine — although I should think they were plain
to any people. Takahira, as instructed by his Government,
has evidently wanted to feel his way with me. His Gov
ernment does not quite like to tell me what its plans are,
but wants to develop them a little at a time. Thus, they
asked me to find out how England feels as to the terms
they should ask.
"Naturally, England responded that it could not say
until it knew what the proposed terms were; and it then
transpired that Baron Rothschild had said he would raise
a loan for Russia with which Russia should pay Japan the
proposed indemnity if Russia could be persuaded to ac
cept peace on such terms. Evidently the Japanese have
been uncertain whether the British Government knew of
this offer or not, and took the roundabout way through me
to find out.
"Of course, not only Cassini but Jusserand are very
gloomy over Japan's attitude toward outside nations in
the future. That Japan will have her head turned to some
extent I do not in the least doubt, and I see clear symptoms
of it in many ways. We should certainly as a nation have
ours turned if we had performed such feats as the Japanese
have in the past sixteen months; and the same is true of
any European nation."

396 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
On June 15, 1905, the President sent a despatch to White-
law Reid, who had recently arrived in London as the Ameri
can Ambassador to Great Britain, asking him to sound
Lord Lansdowne, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
as to the possibility of England's exerting pressure on
Japan in the interest of peace. Two days later, June 17,
Reid replied, saying that he had sought and obtained an
interview with Lansdowne and that the latter had said that
nothing could be more abhorrent to the British Govern
ment than the thought that any action of theirs could tend
to prolong bloodshed, but he added immediately, it would
be quite another thing at this stage to bring any pressure
upon Japan — especially when they did not even know what
Japan's terms were going to be.
On June 23, 1905, Reid sent to the President a confiden
tial report of a conversation which he had had with King
Edward on the preceding day at Ascot, requesting that it
either be destroyed, or placed among confidential papers
accessible only to the President himself. In this report the
King was represented as saying he thought it was best to
let the contestants arrange their own terms of peace. When
Reid spoke of the possibility of the Russians being driven
out of Vladivostok, the King said at once: "They are hke
ly to be beaten again; it may be going on now." Then,
with great earnestness, taking Reid by the arm and whis
pering in his ear : "In the strictest confidence, between us
personally, not to go to another human being— if they don't
make peace, why should not Japan take Vladivostok, and
be in a position at the end' of the war to be magnanimous
and give it back ? Wouldn 't that ease the final settlement ? ' '
When Reid asked if he might not let the President have
this conversation confidentially, the King hesitated a mo
ment and said : "Well, perhaps, if you think so, not to be
come in any way official, or be seen by anybody else. I
will leave it to you."
All this time the President was keeping a steady pressure
on Russia to convince the Russian Government of the wis
dom of making peace. On June 19, 1905, he wrote a long

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 397
confidential letter to Ambassador Meyer giving his reasons
for thinking Russia should make peace at once. In it he
said: "Peter the Great made peace with the Turks by
surrendering the Crimea. In 1855 Russia made peace with
the English, French and Turks by a surrender of territory.
In either case, to have insisted upon going on with the war
would have meant the conversion of a serious check into
a possibly irretrievable disaster. The same is true now.
In advising this I speak for Russia's interest because on
the point Russia's interests are the interests of the world."
In concluding, he wrote: "You know Lamsdorff and I do
not. If you think it worth while, tell either him or the Czar
the substance of what I have said, or show them all or parts
of this letter. You are welcome to do it. But use your
own discretion absolutely in this matter.
"Russia has not created a favorable impression here by
the appearance of quibbling that there has been both over
the selection of the place and over the power of the pleni
potentiaries whom Russia will appoint. It would be far
better if she would give an impression of frankness, open
ness and sincerity."
A cable message from the President to Meyer on June
23, 1905, showed that the "quibbling" was not confined to
one side of the controversy. He asked Meyer to suggest
to the Russian Government that it send to him the names
of the Russian plenipotentiaries, promising that they would
be kept secret till Japan had done the same, when the
President would announce both. A further effort to bring
the Russian Government to the point of using plain speech
was then made by the President. ' ' The President has re
ceived from the Japanese Government the assurance that
they will name as plenipotentiaries men of the highest rank.
He believes that they are hesitating because they want to
be sure that the Russian plenipotentiaries will also be of
the highest rank." He reminds the Russian Government
that it failed to say, when it consented to appoint pleni
potentiaries, that they were to negotiate and conclude a

398 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
treaty of peace with Japan, and this failure had "evidently
made Japan feel doubtful" whether those plenipotentiaries
would really be appointed for the purpose. "Before any
question of an armistice is raised the President feels
strongly that this point should be settled by the naming of
plenipotentiaries with public instructions that they are ap
pointed to conclude a treaty of peace, this conclusion of
course being subject to the ratification of the treaty by the
respective home governments."
Writing to Senator Knute Nelson of Minnesota, on the
same date that he made this appeal to Russia, the Presi
dent revealed his uncertain state of mind about the final
outcome of his labors : "I have not an idea whether I can
or can not get peace between Russia and Japan. I have
done my best. I have led the horses to water, but Heaven
only knows whether they will drink or start kicking one
another beside the trough."
A day later, June 24, 1905, he sent a letter to Charle
magne Tower, American Ambassador at Berlin, which was
clearly designed to encourage the Kaiser to continue his
application of pressure to the Czar :
"I greatly appreciate the Kaiser's action. Whether we
can get the Japanese and Russians to make peace I do not
know; but I hope you will personally tell the Kaiser how
much I value what he has done, and that in my judgment
it may be imperative to get his aid in order to make the
Czar conclude peace. I hope that the Japanese will be
moderate in what they ask, and I shall endeavor to make
them moderate; but it must be kept clearly in mind that
they are the victors ; that their triumph has been complete
and overwhelming, and that they are entitled to demand
very substantial concessions as the price of peace. The
difficulty will come with Russia, for she will find it hard to
make up her mind to give what it is entirely right and
proper that the Japanese should ask."
Matters began to move a little faster now, but the Presi
dent did not relax his efforts to expedite them. On June

RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE 399
26, 1905, he sent a strong hint to the Russian Government
that it should send its best men to the conference to meet
the best men from Japan :
"The President, in accordance with the communication
from Count Lamsdorff of the 25th, has informed the Jap
anese Government that Russia consents to the meeting
taking place in the first ten days of August, but that the
President hopes if possible the Japanese Government will
arrange to have its envoys here on the first day of August
as he earnestly desires there shall be no delay. Inform
Count Lamsdorff confidentially that the President under
stands that the Japanese Government have under consid
eration as their envoys Baron Komura, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Takahira, Japanese Minister at
Washington. The appointment of Baron Komura repre
sents, of course, the very highest appointment that can be
made by the Japanese Government, being equivalent, for
instance, to my appointing Secretary Hay under similar
circumstances. I am greatly gratified at it, for it shows
that Japan is sending her best men with the earnest desire
to arrange for peace. I have confidentially informed the
Japanese Government that in all probability one of the
Russian plenipotentiaries will be Nelidoff."
On June 30, 1905, Russia sent a request to the President
to get the consent of Japan to an armistice. Why his ef
fort to secure it failed Roosevelt explained to Meyer on
July 7, 1905 :
"I did my best to get the Japanese to consent to an
armistice, but they have refused, as I feared they would.
Lamsdorff 's trickiness has recoiled upon the Russian Gov
ernment. The Japanese are entirely confident that they
can win whatever they wish by force of arms, whereas they
are deeply distrustful of Russia's sincerity of purpose in
these peace negotiations. Russia cannot expect peace un
less she makes substantial concessions, for the Japanese
triumph is absolute and Russia's position critical in the
extreme. I earnestly hope the Czar will see that he must

400 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
at all hazards and all cost make peace with Japan now and
turn his attention to internal affairs. If he does not, I be
lieve that the disaster to Russia will be so great that she
will cease to count among the great powers for a genera
tion to come — unless, indeed, as foreshadowed in your last
letter, there is a revolution which makes her count as the
French did after their revolution."
A letter to Senator Lodge, July 11, throws further hght
on the armistice request :
"At Russia's request I asked Japan for an armistice,
but I did not expect that Japan would grant it, although
I of course put the request as strongly as possible. Indeed,
I cannot say that I really blame Japan for not granting it,
for she is naturally afraid that magnanimity on her part
would be misinterpreted and turned to bad account against
her. The Japanese envoys have sailed and the Russians
I am informed will be here by August first. I think then
they can get an armistice."

CHAPTER XXXII
RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE— CONCLUDED
On the eve of the meeting of the conference, the President
was not sanguine of success. He wrote to Mr. J. St. L.
Strachey, editor of the London Spectator, on July 17, 1905 :
"The Peace Conference is about to meet, but from what
I gather of Witte 's (one of the Russian plenipotentiaries)
attitude the chances are unfavorable for peace. The Rus
sians, having been entirely unable to make war, seem now
entirely unable to make peace, and stupidly unwilling to
face the fact that when their opponents have them at their
mercy the opponents have the same right to exact terms
from them that they would have if they went on and treated
them without mercy. It is just like two wrestlers, when
one of them has the hammerlock on the other; the latter
need not give way if he does not choose to, but if he does
not his arm will be broken. That is the only alternative be
fore him. Entirely for your information I wish to say that
I undertook these negotiations only at the request of
Japan." Ten days later found him assuring the Kaiser that he
was working cordially with him and was grateful for his
cooperation. To Mr. Tower, the American Ambassador at
Berlin, he wrote on July 27, 1905:
"You say that the Chancellor told you 'that M. Delcasse
had formed a plan by which peace was to be made between
Russia and Japan through the mediation of France and
England, and that, under it, an arrangement was contem
plated by which not only Russia and Japan were to obtain
portions of China but that France and England were also
to be indemnified by Chinese territory, as a price of their
401

402 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
intervention ; a course which he said would lead to the de
struction of Chinese sovereignty and the disruption of the
Chinese Empire.' Pray assure the Emperor, either direct
ly or through the Chancellor, that I should absolutely re
fuse to submit to such action by any of the Powers, and
that I will absolutely support the Emperor's policy for the
preservation of the integrity of China, the open door, and
equal rights in China for the commerce of the whole world.
"Also express to the Emperor my great obligation to
him for his courtesy, my great pleasure at the way in which
Germany and the United States are working together, and
my feeling that this means well for the good of the world,
for its peace and its progress. Will you also explain to him
that of course in any such matter as that of this peace ne
gotiation between Russia and Japan, or in the Morocco
business, I cannot do more than a certain amount, because
I do not wish to make people think I am interfering too
much ; but say that I am sure he will understand that when
at any time I hesitate to take some action suggested it is
not from lack of desire to do whatever is in my power, but
lest I put myself in a position which would lessen whatever
usefulness I might have in the future."
No sooner had the President received the report about
the attitude of Witte, one of the Russian envoys, which he
mentioned in his letter to Mr. Strachey, quoted above, than
he sought to turn it to advantage by communicating it to
the Japanese. On July 29, 1905, he wrote to Baron Kaneko,
Japan's official representative in New York:
"Will you show this letter to Baron Komura? I told
Baron Komura that I had word from France that Witte
had said he would not pay an indemnity. I have received
another cable stating that he said he would not pay an in
demnity but would consider paying at least part of Japan's
expenses in the war. I suggest, therefore, that great care
be used about the word indemnity and that if possible it be
avoided. Of course, my information may not be accurate,
as Witte may only have been speaking for effect, but equal-

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 403
ly of course, if he does not object to reimbursing Japan
for her expenses in the war it does not make the slightest
difference to you whether it is called an indemnity or not."
Writing to Whitelaw Reid in London on July 29, 1905,
he reverted to Lansdowne 's statement cited in Reid's letter
of June 17, 1905, already quoted, in a further effort to get
aid from England :
"I think that as regards what Lansdowne said to you the
trouble comes in his own statement that the English are
'indisposed to exert any pressure on Japan about terms
of peace.' If by pressure anything offensive and dictatorial
is meant this is all right. But it is all wrong if it means
that there is no effort to get Japan to do what is best both
for herself and for England, and that is to make peace in
stead of insisting upon terms which may prolong the war
for an indefinite period."
At the same time he was laboring with the British Am
bassador at Washington, Sir Mortimer Durand, for he
wrote again to Reid on August 3 : "Yesterday Durand was
here to say that the British wished peace between Russia
and Japan, but did not feel they could bring pressure on
Japan. I told him just what I wrote you in my last letter —
that if they really wished peace they would advise the Japs
in their own interest to make it."
In the latter part of July the envoys of the two nations
arrived in the United States. Those of Russia were Serge
J. Witte, President of the Czar's Council of Ministers and
ex-Ministers of Finance, and Baron Rosen, who succeeded
Cassini as Russian Ambassador at Washington; those of
Japan were Baron Komura, and Takahira, Japanese Min
ister at Washington. Witte brought with him this auto
graph letter from the Czar: Peterhop, July 18, 1905.
Dear Mr. Roosevelt:
I take the opportunity of Mr. Witte 's departure for

404 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Washington to express to you my feelings of sincere friend
ship. Thanks to your initiative, the Russian and Japanese dele
gates are going to meet in your country to discuss the pos
sible terms of peace between both belUgerents.
I have instructed Mr. Witte, Secretary of State, and my
Ambassador in the United States, Baron Rosen — how far
Russia's concessions can go towards meeting Japan's
propositions. I need not tell you that I have full confidence that you
will do all that hes in your power to bring the peace nego
tiations to a satisfactory conclusion. Believe me
Yours truly, Nicolas.
Soon after their arrival the envoys, each set going sepa
rately, called upon Roosevelt at his residence in Oyster Bay,
where he was spending the summer. On August 5, 1905, he
received the four envoys formally on board the U. S. S.
Mayflower in the harbor of the town. In behalf of the
Government, he had placed a war vessel at the disposal of
each of the two sets of envoys, and they went from New
York on board these vessels to Oyster Bay. On arrival
they were transferred to the Mayflower on which the Presi
dent was waiting to receive them. He greeted them in
formally, introduced the envoys of the two nations to each
other, and while chatting with them slowly moved into the
saloon of the Mayflower, where a luncheon was spread, so
conducting them that as they moved into' the room no one
could tell who went first. There were no chairs about the
luncheon table and consequently all peril of giving offense
by precedence in seating was avoided. Everything had
been carefully arranged in advance by the President in
order that no sign of favoritism on his part could be de
tected, and all passed off as planned. At the close of the
luncheon the President said :
"Gentlemen, I propose a toast to which there will be no

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 405
answer and which I ask you to drink in silence, standing.
I drink to the welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and
peoples of the two great nations whose representatives
have met one another on this ship. It is my most earnest
hope and prayer, in the interest of not only these two great
powers, but of all mankind that a just and lasting peace
may speedily be concluded between them."
The gathering then separated and the envoys, each pair
on a separate warship, with the Mayflower in attendance
for such use as might be desired by them, departed for
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where quarters had been ar
ranged for the sittings of the Conference on arrival there.
The meeting of the envoys on the Mayflower was attended
by a great fleet of private yachts and other water craft, and
attracted attention all over the world as a memorable his
toric event, unlike any that had hitherto occurred in any
land. I spent the night following the meeting with the
President at Oyster Bay and found him weary but much
pleased with the result. He said he had looked forward to
the meeting with anxiety, realizing that a single slip of any
kind on his part that could be construed as favoring one
set of envoys more than the other would be fatal. No such
slip had occurred and he believed that the first and very
important step toward a successful outcome had been taken.
He was fully aware that the attention of the whole world
was concentrated upon him and that if he failed to secure
peace, universal condemnation would be his portion. But
as he said in many of his letters, so he said to me: "I
thought it my plain duty to make the effort. I have done
my best to succeed and shall continue to do it to the end."
From the moment the Conference began its sessions the
President kept a close watch upon its proceedings, was
thoroughly informed of the situation at all times, and was
ceaseless in his efforts to bring about a favorable result
by exerting pressure where it would be effective. It may
be said with truth that he was himself the Conference, for
he was its guiding and controlling force. Its final agree-

406 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
ment was the one which at the outset he had told both the
envoys and their governments that they should make.
Whenever the envoys hesitated and showed signs of indis
position or inability to agree, he sent remonstrance and
appeal both to them and to their home governments, warn
ing them of the serious consequences of failure. By per
suading those governments to accept his views, he won
success in the end, for it was under direct instructions from
Tokio and St. Petersburg that the envoys came together.
That this is an accurate statement of the case is clearly
revealed by the President's messages and letters at the
time. When late in August the envoys were virtually at a dead
lock, the President sent a long cable message to Ambassa
dor Meyer at St. Petersburg instructing him to see the
Czar immediately and personally deliver it to him. In this
he earnestly asked the Czar to believe that in what he was
about to say and to advise he spoke ' ' as the earnest well-
wisher of Russia" and gave him the advice which he would
give him were he a Russian patriot and statesman. He
then told him that the Japanese had abandoned certain de
mands which he himself had felt it would be improper for
Russia to yield to, and to his "surprise and pleasure" had
offered terms upon which he thought a just and honorable
peace could be obtained ; that it seemed to him that it would
be a "dreadful calamity" to have the war continued when
such a peace was obtainable, adding: "Every considera
tion of national self-interest, of military expediency and of
broad humanity makes it eminently wise for Russia to con
clude peace substantially along these hnes, and it is my
hope and prayer that your Majesty may take this view."
On the following day, August 22, 1905, he sent a confiden
tial letter to Baron Kaneko at New York which he said he
would be glad to have him cable to his home government.
In this he said he thought he should tell Kaneko that on
all sides he heard a good deal of complaint among friends
of Japan as to the possibility of Japan's continuing the war
for a large indemnity, and strongly urged Japan not to

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 407
take that course since if taken it would cause the spilling
of an immense amount of blood and Russia would be in no
condition to give any money at all — certainly not enough to
make up the extra amount spent. "Moreover," he con
cluded, "I feel, of course, that every interest of civiliza
tion and humanity forbids the continuance of this war
merely for an indemnity."
One day later, August 23, 1905, he supplemented this ap
peal with another in which he gave specific reasons why
Japan should not continue the war in order to get an in
demnity, and added : "Ethically it seems to me that Japan
owes a duty to the world at this crisis. The civilized world
looks to her to make peace ; the nations believe in her ; let
her show her leadership in matters ethical no less than in
matters military. The appeal is made to her in the name of
all that is lofty and noble ; and to this appeal I hope she
will not be deaf."
August 23, 1905, was a very busy day even for the Presi
dent. In addition to appeal direct to the Mikado, he sought
to reach the Czar through Witte, one of the Russian envoys.
A previous effort of this kind had resulted in his message
reaching the Czar in a form which led to a misinterpreta
tion of the President's meaning. On this occasion he re
quested that his Majesty should himself receive it so that
there might be "no possible question of misinterpretation."
After stating the terms of peace upon which the envoys
were agreed, eliminating all others as unimportant, he said
in this message : "To decline to make peace on those terms
it seems to me is to invite terrible disaster to Russia, and
I should hate to be responsible for the possibility of such
disaster when the alternative is an absolutely just and
honorable peace along the lines indicated."
Again on August 23, 1905, he made one more attempt to
induce England to bring pressure on Japan. He sent a
message to Sir Mortimer Durand, who was at Lenox, Mass.,
stating the points of agreement and disagreement between
the Russian and Japanese envoys as they had developed in
the Conference, and saying: "In my judgment every true

408 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
friend of Japan should tell it as I have already told it, that
the opinion of the civilized world will not support it in
continuing the war merely for the purpose of extorting
money from Russia. I wish your people could get my
view." Writing to Henry White, Ambassador to Italy,
on the same date, he said:
"I am in the last throes of trying to get the Russians
and Japanese to make peace. The Russians are the worst,
because they stand up with Chinese or Byzantine folly and
insist, as Witte has just written me, that Russia will not
admit itself vanquished — making it all that I can do not
to tell them some straightforward truths in uncomplimen
tary language. On the other hand, the Japanese have no
business to continue the war merely for the sake of getting
money and they will defeat their own ends if they do so.
The EngUsh Government has been foolishly reluctant to
advise Japan to be reasonable, and in this respect has not
shown well compared to the attitude of the German and
French Governments in being willing to advise Russia. I
have not much hope of a favorable result, but I will do what
I can." Turning his attention once more to the Czar, also on
August 23, 1905, he sent a message to him through Ambas
sador Meyer outlining the terms he had suggested to the
envoys for final agreement and saying: "Please send this
supplementary cable to His Majesty at once and further
explain that I of course cannot be sure Japan will act on
my suggestions, but that I know she ought to, and that if
Russia accedes to them I shall try my best to get Japan
to accede to them also."
The crisis arrived on August 27, 1905. On the previous
day the Mikado sent this reply to the President's appeal,
made through Baron Kaneko on August 22 :
"The Imperial Government highly appreciates the sin
gleness of purpose and lofty intention with which the Pres
ident has always exerted his powerful influence in the in
terest of civilization and humanity. They beg to express

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 409
their cordial thanks for the sincere and useful advice which
the President, having regard to the sentiment in America
and other countries, has been good enough, at this juncture,
to tender them. The Imperial Government will have no
hesitation in acting on the advice, and they will accordingly,
in the matter of the amount of compensation, consent to
make stiU further concessions."
The promised "concessions" did not apparently reach
the Japanese envoys on August 27, 1905, or if received were
not satisfactory to the Russians, for on that day the Jap
anese envoys abandoned all hope of peace. Baron Kaneko
forwarded to the President from New York a telegram that
he had received from Baron Komura, one of the envoys,
which, wrote Kaneko, caused him to "fear from its tone
that the last day has come." The telegram read:
"At the sitting this afternoon a confidential talk with the
Russian plenipotentiaries has been held at which M. Witte
expressed that there was absolutely no hope for him to ob
tain the consent of the Russian Government to concede to
the last Japanese compromise. In reference to this he
mentioned that even in regard to the matters concerning
Manchuria which have already been agreed upon at nego
tiations, the mihtary party in Russia considers that Russia
has gone much beyond the limit, which fact leaves no room
for them to seriously consider the questions of compensa
tion and cession of Saghalien, and their feeling is bitter
against any further concession. In the face of these facts
M. Witte regarded that any further attempt, on his part,
to a successful conclusion of the conference was absolutely
beyond his power. Whereupon, after agreeing to have a
final meeting on next Monday afternoon, the meeting was
adjourned. "Such being the case, I consider that the last hope. for
peace is gone. Therefore I request that you will kindly
inform the President to that effect at once. Your tele
gram concerning your interview with the President and his
advice has already been cabled to the Tokio Government."

410 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
On August 28, 1905, Komura sent another telegram to
Kaneko, who forwarded it to the President with the re
mark: "I fear that before this letter reaches you we may
hear an awful result of the conference." This telegram
read: "Owing to the delay of the final instruction from the
Government, Minister Takahira, calling on M. Witte last
evening, suggested the postponement of to-day's sitting
until to-morrow — Tuesday. M. Witte 's reply was as fol
lows: " 'Concerning the problems of indemnity and cession of
Saghalien, on wliich we could not agree, the President has
tendered, through the American Ambassador, an advice to
the Czar, to which the latter has replied that under no
circumstances could he consider any further concession
whatever. For the second time, however, the President
instructed the Ambassador to present his counsel to the
Czar, which the former put in a letter, and requested Count
Lamsdorff to present to the Czar. But, on receipt of the
letter, the Czar marked on it: 'No further consideration'
and put it aside. Furthermore, I am under the strictest in
struction, wliich absolutely forbids me to propose any new
proposition, or enter upon discussion on a new compro
mise, which you may make concerning the two problems —
indemnity and the cession of Saghalien. There is of course
no objection as to the postponement of to-morrow's sitting.
But I do not hesitate to say there is no way now open for
me to further discuss on the subject, and even if you pro
pose a new solution of the problem, unless it comes within
the scope of the Czar's reply to the President, I am unable
even to transmit such proposition to the Government.'
"I am profoundly appreciating the earnest and sincere
effort with which the President has been trying to assist
us for the interests of peace and humanity. But the above
being the Czar's position, as presented by M. Witte, I
grieve extremely to put the President into so much trouble
to make another attempt to persuade the Czar, through the

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 411
Kaiser, which, I know, from the words of M. Witte, to be
of no avail whatever."
When these cries of despair reached the President he
made a final effort to force an agreement. Direct to the
Kaiser he sent this message, at the same time sending a
copy of it to the Mikado :
"Peace can be obtained on the following terms: Russia
to pay no indemnity whatever and to receive back north
half of Saghalien, for which it is to pay to Japan whatever
amount a mixed commission may determine. This is my
proposition, to which the Japanese have assented reluc
tantly and only under strong pressure from me. The plan
is for each of the contending parties to name an equal
number of members of the commission and for the commis
sioners to name the odd member. The Japanese assert that
Witte has in principle agreed that Russia should pay some
thing to get back the north half of Saghalien and indeed
he intimated to me that they might buy it back at a reason
able figure, something on the scale of that for which Alaska
was sold to the United States.
"These terms, which strike me as extremely moderate, I
have not presented in this form to the Russian Emperor.
I feel that you have more influence with him than either
I or any one else can have. As this situation is exceedingly
strained and the relations between the plenipotentiaries
critical to a degree immediate action is necessary. Can
you not take the initiative by presenting these terms at
once to him? , Your success in the matter will make the
entire civilized world your debtor. This proposition vir
tually relegates all the unsettled issues of the war to the
arbitration of a mixed commission as outlined above, and
I am unable to see how Russia can refuse your request if
in your wisdom you see fit to make it. ' '
Success crowned this last appeal, for on August 29, 1905,
there came to the Japanese envoys a message from Tokio,
which Baron Kaneko forwarded to the President:

412 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
"The Emperor, after presiding at a Cabinet Council, de
cided to withdraw the demand of money payment for the
cost of war entirely, if Russia recognize the occupation of
Saghalien Island by Japan, because the Emperor regards
humanity and civilization far more than his nation's wel
fare." "This is, of course," commented Kaneko, "exactly the
line of poUcy you wrote to me in your two last letters,
which were submitted to the Emperor."
Later on the same day Baron Kaneko again wrote to the
President :
"The Peace is concluded at last! Our Emperor has
decided on the Une of policy you suggested in your
letters to me, as you know these two letters were trans
mitted by cable to our Government.
"Your advice to us was very powerful and convincing,
by which the peace of Asia was secured. Both Russia and
Japan owe to you this happy conclusion; and your name
shall be remembered with the peace and prosperity of
Asia." An agreement was reached on August 29, 1905, on the
terms laid down by the President, and on September 5,
1905, a treaty of peace embodying them was signed. When
the agreement was announced the whole world broke into
a joyous paean of praise for Roosevelt. Newspapers of all
parties and all lands joined in it. Messages of congratu
lation poured in upon him from crowned heads and the
leading men of his own and other countries. The most in
teresting, of course, were the foUowing:
Neues Palais, August 29, 1905.
President Theodore Roosevelt:
Just read cable from America announcing agreement of
peace conference on preliminaries of peace; am overjoyed;
express most sincere congratulations at the great success

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 413
due to your untiring efforts. The whole of mankind must
unite and will do so in thanking you for the great boon you
have given it. William I. R.
Peterhop, Alexandria, August 31, 1905.
President Roosevelt:
Accept my congratulations and warmest thanks for hav
ing brought the peace negotiations to a successful conclu
sion owing to your personal energetic efforts. My country
will gratefully recognize the great part you have played in
the Portsmouth Peace Conference. Nicolas.
Tokio, September 3, 1905.
The President:
I have received with gratification your message of con
gratulations conveyed through our plenipotentiaries, and
thank you warmly for it. To your disinterested and unre
mitting efforts of peace and humanity I attach the high
value which is their due, and assure you of my grateful ap
preciation of the distinguished part you have taken in the
establishment of peace based upon principles essential to
the permanent welfare and tranquillity of the Far East.
MUTSUSHITO. (Mikado)
Whitelaw Reid wrote from London on September 11,
1905, that at a luncheon where King Edward was present
the latter had said to him that he "was simply lost in ad
miration for the President; that nobody else could have
done it ; and that it was not made any easier by the Czar,
who was evidently afraid to have his army return."
Roosevelt was quite calm under it all, as he invariably
was when action of his won strong approval. Writing to
his brother-in-law, Douglas Robinson, on August 31, 1905,
he said, with unjust criticism in the past clearly in mind :
"Don't be misled by the fact that just at the moment men

414 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
are speaking well of me. They will speak ill soon enough.
As Mr. Loeb remarked to me to-day, sometime soon I shall
have to spank some little brigand of a South American
Republic, and then all the well-meaning idiots will turn and
shriek that this is inconsistent with what I did with the
Peace Conference, whereas it will be exactly in line with it
in reality. Of course I am very much pleased at the out
come. I tried as far as it was humanly possible to get the
chances my way, and looked the ground over very carefully
before I took action. Nevertheless I was taking big chances
and I knew it, and I am very glad things came out as they
did. I can honestly say, however, that my personal feel
ings in the matter have seemed to be of very, very small
account compared to the great need of trying to do some
thing which it seemed to me the interests of the whole
world demanded to be done." September 2, 1905.
To Senator Lodge:
"I am very much pleased to have put the thing through. I
am almost ashamed to say that while physically in fine trim
the last three months have left me feeling rather tired, be
cause from a variety of causes I have not had at hand to
advise with the Cabinet Ministers who were dealing with the
subjects that were at the moment the most important, and so
have had to run everything myself without any interme
diaries."To his daughter Alice (Mrs. Nicholas Longworth), on the
same date :
"I have had all kinds of experiences with the envoys and
with the governments, and to the two latter I finally had
to write time after time as a very polite but also very in
sistent Dutch Uncle. I am amused to see the way in which
the Japanese kept silent. Whenever I wrote a letter to the
Czar the Russians were sure to divulge it, almost always in
twisted form, but the outside world never had so much as
a hint of any letter I sent to the Japanese. The Russians
became very angry with me during the course of the pro-

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 415
ceedings because they thought I was only writing to them.
"It is enough to give any one a sense of sardonic amuse
ment to see the way in which the people generally, not only
in my own country but elsewhere, gage the work purely
by the fact that it succeeded. If I had not brought about
peace I should have been laughed at and condemned. Now
I am over-praised. I am credited with being extremely
longheaded, etc. As a matter of fact I took the position
I finally did not of my own volition but because events so
shaped themselves that I would have felt as if I was flinch
ing from a plain duty if I had acted otherwise. ' '
A note which the President wrote to the German Ambas
sador at Washington, Count Speck von Sternburg, on Sep
tember 6, 1905, shows how cordially and promptly the
Kaiser cooperated with Roosevelt in bringing pressure
on the Czar: "If you see His Majesty tell him (but only
for his own ear) that in Meyer's last audience with the
Czar the latter commented upon the fact that whenever
Meyer made a visit to him, simultaneously there came a
cable from the German Emperor. I think this may amuse
the Emperor."
To Whitelaw Reid, in London, he wrote on September
11, 1905: "The Kaiser stood by me like a trump. I did
not get much direct assistance from the English Govern
ment, but I did get indirect assistance, for I learned that
they forwarded to Japan my note to Durand, and I think
that the signing of the Anglo-Japanese treaty made Japan
feel comparatively safe as to the future."
On September 6, 1905, the President sent a long letter to
the Mikado, written in his own hand, which is well worth
reproducing here in full:
"To His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan:
"Through Baron Komura I send you this letter, to ex
press, as strongly as I can, my sense of the magnanimity,
and above all of the cool-headed, far-sighted wisdom, you

416 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
have shown in making peace as you did. I am sure your
people will soon appreciate to the full the inestimable bene
fit you have thereby conferred upon the empire over which
you bear sway. During the last eighteen months your gen
erals and admirals, your soldiers and sailors, have won im
perishable renown for Nippon. Their glory — your glory,
and your nation's glory — will last as long as history is
written, as long as mighty deeds are remembered, as long
as the race of man endures. You have crowned triumphant
war by a peace in which every great object for which you
fought is secured, and in so doing you have given to the
world a signal and most striking example of how it is pos
sible for a victorious nation to achieve victory over others
without losing command over itself. In every nation there
are hot-heads who demand the impossible, who are discon
tented if they do not get something which, if they were
allowed to try to get it, they would have to pay for it at
a cost altogether disproportionate to, and in excess of, its
value. Had your nation listened at this time to the advice
of such men, they would have led it into a continuance of
the war which, no matter how damaging to Japan's oppo
nent, would also have been necessarily of damage to Japan
far beyond what could have been offset by any resulting
benefit. The greatness of a people, like the greatness of a
man, is often attended quite as clearly by moderation and
wisdom in using a triumph as by the triumph itself. Many
a great victory has been hopelessly marred, and its effects
undone, by its arrogant and short-sighted misuse.
"In this crucial hour your Majesty has shown that the
people of Nippon are true alike to their ancient spirit and
to the needs of the modern world ; for you have shown, and
through you your people have shown, that you and they
possess that rare combination, the combination of the high
valor and foresight which win victories, and the lofty wis
dom which turns them to the best account. ' '
An incident which amused the President occurred on
September 14, 1905. Baron Rosen, who had succeeded Cas-

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 417
sini as Russian Ambassador at Washington, went to Oyster
Bay and presented to Roosevelt a letter from the Czar in
which the latter, after speaking of himself as the "initiator
of the International Peace Conference of 1899," expressed
the belief that a favorable moment had come for system
atizing the labors of that Conference, and continued:
"With this end in view and being assured in advance of the
sympathy of President Roosevelt, who has already last
year pronounced himself in favor of such a project, His
Majesty desires to approach him with a proposal to the
effect that the Government of the United States take part
in a new International Conference, which could be called to
gether at The Hague as soon as favorable replies could be
secured from all the other States to whom a similar pro
posal will be made."
Roosevelt, with that quick insight into human motives
which was one of his characteristics, in a letter to Secretary
Root, thus explains what followed :
"After he had read the letter Rosen began to hem and
haw as to the steps already taken by me a year ago, and
about the fact that The Hague Conference was the pecu
liar pet project of the Czar. I finally interrupted him and
said that I thought I understood what he wished and that
he could tell the Czar at once that I was delighted to have
him and not me undertake the movement; that I should
treat the movement as being made on his initiative, and
should heartily support it. This evidently relieved Rosen
immensely. I rather think that the Czar had felt from
past experience with the Kaiser that there was a fair
chance that I might endeavor to appear as the great origi
nator myself. As a matter of fact I am glad to be relieved
from making the move on my own initiative. I should
have done it if no one else had done it because I think it
ought to be done ; but I particularly do not want to appear
as a professional peace advocate, and it gives us a freer
hand in every way to have the Czar make the movement"

418 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
In a letter to Sir George Otto Trevelyan, written on Sep
tember 12, 1905, the President gave an entertaining account
of the impressions which the envoys of the two nations
made upon him. His report of the views which Witte ex
pressed about Russia are especially interesting in view of
the later developments in that unfortunate nation:
"I am bound to say that the Japs have impressed me
most favorably, not only during these three months but
during the four years I have been President. They have
always told me the truth. They are a very secretive people,
and I speedily learned that I must never read into any
thing they said one word more than was actually down
in black and write ; but so far, whenever they have actually
committed themselves I have been able to count absolutely
on their doing what they said they would. Moreover, they
know their own minds and all act together; whereas the
Russians all pulled against one another, rarely knew their
own minds, Ued so to others that they finally got into the
dangerous position of lying to themselves, and showed a
most unhealthy and widespread corruption and selfishness.
"I suppose Witte is the best man that Russia could have
at the head of her affairs at present, and probably too good
a man for the grand dukes to be willing to stand him. He
interested me. I cannot say that I liked him, for I thought
his bragging and bluster not only foolish but shockingly
vulgar when compared with the gentlemanly self-respecting
self-restraint of the Japanese. Moreover, he struck me as a
very selfish man, totally without high ideals. He calmly
mentioned to me, for instance, that it was Russia's interest
to keep Turkey in power in the Balkan Peninsula ; that he
believed that Turkey would last a long time, because it
would be a very bad thing for Russia to have the Bulga
rians, for instance, substituted for the Turks, for the very
reason that they might give a wholesome, reputable gov
ernment and thereby build up a great Slav State to the
South. He added cynically that such a consummation
might be good for sentimental reasons, but that sentiment
did not count in practical politics. Inasmuch as I person-

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 419
ally think that practical politics are a most sordid business
unless they rest on a basis of honest and disinterested sen
timent (though of course I appreciate to the full that with
this disinterested sentiment there must also go intelligent
self-interest) I could not help feeling much contempt for
the excellent Mr. Witte.
"Witte is curiously frank and very emphatic in his state
ment of the need of a thorough reform in Russia. He put
it upon the perfectly simply ground that in the 20th cen
tury Russia could not hope to move forward to the tre
mendous position which he firmly believed she would ulti
mately reach unless she met 20th century conditions. He
spoke with utter impatience of the reactionaries in Russia,
and in speaking of Dostoyevsky, the author of ' Crime and
Punishment,' he expressed the same horror of his having
been sent to Siberia that one of us would feel. I also sym
pathize with him in his complaint about the hopeless na
ture of many of the Russian reformers, headed by Tolstoi.
These reformers, and preeminently Tolstoi, lack sanity, and
it is very difficult to do decent reform work, or any other
kind of work, if for sanity we substitute a condition of mere
morbid hysteria. Witte also expressed his views about
religious freedom and freedom of conscience in a way that
would command hearty support from you or me."
What Witte thought of Roosevelt was revealed at the
time the above letter was written. A cable message from
Berlin, under date of September 8, 1905, was published giv
ing the following extract from a private letter that he had
written to a friend :
"From a moral point of view the President of the United
States is a statesman of large caliber. Born in a time
when politicians are more children of their century than of
their history, he owes his high position, which he fills more
worthily every day, exclusively to his personal qualities,
as revealed in actions requiring decision, tact and clear
vision. The world recognizes this. When one speaks with
President Roosevelt, he charms through the elevation of

420 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
his thoughts and through that transparent philosophy
which permeates his judgment. He has an ideal and strives
for higher aims than a commonplace existence presents. In
the stubborn struggles of our day men Uke Mr. Roosevelt
have no leisure, for they are soldiers who cannot be re
lieved from the danger line."
Baron Rosen, the other Russian Envoy, in commenting
upon the above in his 'Reminiscences,' says:
"If it had been Witte 's good fortune, as it has been mine,
to have read 'Theodore Roosevelt's Letters to His Chil
dren,' he would have added that profoundly as one must
admire the great statesman, it is impossible not to love the
man who wrote these letters. ' '

Of Roosevelt's services, the Baron writes:
"But both nations owed a debt of profound gratitude to
the great statesman who had the wise insight to realize
that the indefinite continuation of a war which could only
end in the exhaustion of one of them, or of both, could not
possibly serve the true and permanent interests of either
side, nor of the rest of mankind, and who had the moral
courage to undertake the delicate and risky task of media
tion between them, undeterred by the apprehension of
being considered a 'pacifist.' This debt of gratitude was
frankly and unreservedly acknowledged by the rulers of
both nations, however great may have been the disappoint
ment of the militaristic elements on both sides, in whose
eyes a war would naturally be considered rather in the
light of a prize fight, that can only be terminated with honor
by a knockout blow dealt to the vanquished by the victor.
In the eyes of history, however, President Roosevelt's suc
cess in bringing about the Portsmouth Conference and the
subsequent termination of the war by a peace of justice
and conciliation, will ever be regarded as the crowning
achievement of his brilliant career as a statesman and
Chief Magistrate of this great Nation."

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 421
A striking tribute to Roosevelt's services in the Peace
Conference was paid by Prof. Frederic Frommhold De
Martens, a recognized world-wide authority on interna
tional law, who accompanied the Russian envoys and was
their adviser during the negotiations. It was published in
the Outlook in January, 1920. I quote a few of its passages :
"His conduct during the whole time that the peace ne
gotiations lasted has been a marvel of tact. Without ap
pearing to inject himself into the course of the conversa
tions and discussions which took place between the dele
gates, he contrived to keep himself exactly informed as to
all that was going on, and more than once intervened in
the most discreet manner by conveying a hint or a message
to the plenipotentiaries which cleared the skies and brought
things back to their true level.
"I have often wondered where Roosevelt could have ac
quired the immense amount of information which he sud
denly displayed, and I have come to the conclusion that a
great deal of it was due to his extraordinary powers of
intuition which made him draw deductions and conclusions
where others saw only the bare facts. And, moreover, that
Portsmouth Conference, which will surely mark in the his
tory of the world the first effort made by the United States
to stand as an equal at the side of the great nations of
other continents, was essentially Roosevelt's work, and
as such he showed us immediately that he intended, and
that indeed he would, bring it to a good and safe conclu
sion. "That he contrived to do so without showing openly his
hand, and while abstaining from everything that could have
been interpreted as an attempt to interfere in matters
which were not supposed to concern him, was a work which
perhaps no one in the whole world outside of himself would
have been able to perform. The hints which he conveyed
to the plenipotentiaries, and which invariably threw a new
light upon the points that they had not been able to see
or to bring to a solution, were something quite wonderful.
All through our conferences the personality of Roosevelt

422 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
made itself felt, but this was done so artistically, if such
a word may be used, that nobody could have been offended
at the advice which he tendered with such consummate dis
cretion. We Russians had come to Portsmouth without
taking anything that he had said seriously, and yet when
we left the United States it was with the knowledge that all
through our stay there we had been brought in close prox
imity with one of the most powerful personalities now alive
in the whole of the world.
' ' The treaty could never have been concluded had it been
negotiated anywhere else than at Portsmouth, and if the
influence of President Roosevelt had not been exercised all
along in the cause of peace with a persistence which com
manded the admiration of us all. The man who had been
represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness
displayed a gentleness, a kindness, and a tactfulness mixed
with self-control that only a truly great man can com
mand." For his services in securing peace Roosevelt was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize. In acknowledgment he wrote, on
January 8, 1907 :
"I have received the medal and diploma of the Nobel
Prize, and the check for $36,734.79, being the amount of
the prize itself. Thru you I desire to extend to the dis
tinguished body which has conferred upon me this great
honor my heartiest thanks and the assurance of my deepest
appreciation. The medal and diploma will be prized by me
thruout my life, and by my children after my death. I have
turned over the money to a committee, including the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Secretaries of Agriculture and Commerce and Labor, in
trust, to be used as a foundation for promoting the cause
of industrial peace in this country. In our modern civiliza
tion it is as essential to secure a righteous peace based upon
sympathy and fair dealing between the different classes of
society as it is to secure such a peace among the nations of
the earth; and therefore I have felt that the use I have

RUSSO-JAPANESE CONFERENCE 423
made of the amount of the Nobel Prize was one peculiarly
in accordance with the spirit of the gift."
No use whatever was made of the money by the commit
tee and it remained at interest till 1917. In July of that
year the President requested Congress to give it back to
him that he might distribute it among various charities in
the United States and Europe which were affording relief
to sufferers from the European War. The request was
granted and in August, the entire sum, which with accrued
interest amounted to $45,482.83, was so distributed by him.
He also received a gift which he valued very highly from
a group of eminent Frenchmen. This was an original copy
of Sully's "Memoires" of "Henri le Grand" which was
sent to him with the following letter : Paris, January, 1906.
The undersigned members of the French Parliamentary
Group of International Arbitration and Conciliation have
decided to tender President Roosevelt a token of their high
esteem and their sympathetic recognition of the persistent
and decisive initiative, he has taken towards gradually
substituting friendly and judicial for violent methods in
case of conflict between Nations.
They believe that the action of President Roosevelt,
which has realized the most generous hopes to be found in
history, should be classed as a continuance of similar illus
trious attempts of former times, notably the project for
international concord known under the name of the ' ' Great
Design of Henry IV" in the memoirs of his Prime Minister,
the Duke de Sully. In consequence they have sought out
a copy of the first edition of these memoirs, and they take
pleasure in offering it to him, with the request that he will
keep it among his family papers.
The signatures include those of Emile Loubet, A. Carnot,
d'Estournelles de Constant, Aristide Briand, Sully Prud-
homme, Jean Jaures, A. Fallieres, R. Poincare, and two

424 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
or three hundred others. In acknowledgment the President
wrote : April 22, 1906.
To Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, Paris.
Permit me once more to express my thanks to you and
the other donors of the "Memoirs of Sully." With such
signatures the book becomes, not merely one of the two or
three in my library which I value most, but that one which
I value most. I am very deeply touched, my dear sir, by ¦
this gift, and I really do not know how sufficiently to ex
press my appreciation. It is an empty phrase to say that
France is loved and honored in America with peculiar feel
ing. This feeling is general among my countrymen. I
have always shared it; but I shall feel it more than ever
now ; and I shall earnestly strive so to carry myself as not
to forfeit the goodwill of you and the other friends whose
signatures I cherish. I wish I could see all of the signers
on this side of the water, but as that is impossible, I hope
at least to see you.

CHAPTER XXXIII
MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE— SEN
ATE ACTION ON SANTO DOMINGO AND ARBI
TRATION TREATIES
The annual message of the President to Congress, in De
cember, 1904, had been looked forward to with unusual
interest. It was to be the first deliverance of the kind since
he became the elected President of the country. There was
even more than the usual amount of newspaper guessing
and prediction in advance as to what the message would
contain. This centered chiefly about the question of fur
ther legislation in the direction of trusts and railways.
Would the President ask for more stringent laws or would
he remain content with what he had accomplished? When
the message appeared all doubt about his attitude van
ished. He had not in the slightest degree modified the
position on these or any other subjects that he had main
tained with such vigor and determination since his acces
sion to the Presidency. The Government must act directly
in dealing with great corporations, he said, because those
corporations can only become great by engaging in inter
state commerce, which is peculiarly the field of the general
government; and it is an absurdity to expect to eliminate
the abuses in great corporations by State action. "Great
corporations are necessary, and only men of great and
singular mental power can manage such corporations suc
cessfully, and such men must have great rewards. But
these corporations should be managed with due regard to
the interests of the public as a whole. Where this can be
done under the present laws it must be done. Where these
laws come short others should be enacted to supplement
them." The highways of commerce must be kept open to
425

426 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
all on equal terms, and to do this a complete stop must be
put to all rebates. The most important legislative act
needed in regard to the regulation of corporations was one
"conferring upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the
power to revise rates and regulations, the revised rate to
go at once into effect and to stay in effect unless and until
the court of review reverses it."
On the question of the rights and needs of labor, the mes
sage contained a deliverance which the President had the
opportunity to uphold a few months later during labor riot
ing in Chicago, as recorded in the next chapter. "Wage-
workers have an entire right to organize and by all peace
ful and honorable means to endeavor to persuade their fel
lows to join their organizations. They have under no cir
cumstances the right to commit violence upon those,
whether capitalists or wage-earners, who refuse to support
their organizations, or who side with those with whom they
are at odds ; for mob rule is intolerable in any form. ' '
The passages in the message demanding the abohtion of
rebates and giving to the Interstate Commerce Commission
power to fix railway rates excited violent hostiUty among
the interests which had steadily opposed all of the Presi
dent's efforts to secure governmental regulation and con
trol of corporations. There had been a law on the statute
book for several years forbidding the granting of rebates
but it had proved ineffective, and the President's recom
mendation to have it so amended as to put a stop to the
practise was vigorously opposed by the railway interests
and their champions in the press and in Congress. The
recommendation that the power to fix rates be given to the
Interstate Commerce Commission aroused a great clamor
in the press and was denounced as an effort to deprive the
railways of the right to manage their own business. All
the great business interests combined against it and formed
what seemed for a time to be an insurmountable obstacle
to it. All the newspapers which habitually opposed the
President in matters of the kind predicted that there would
be no legislation and held that the issue had precipitated a

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 427
permanent breach between the President and the Senate,
in which the opposition was led by Senator Aldrich of
Rhode Island, the Republican leader and most powerful
member of the body.
Early in January, 1905, the President called a conference
of the leading members of both Houses in his office and
sought to induce them to support his views. It became
evident that a measure embodying his views would pass
the House of Representatives, but would be strongly op
posed in the Senate. On January 30, 1905, while the dis
cussion of the matter was at its height, the President made
an address at the Union League Club in Philadelphia which
was regarded as a challenge to the opponents of his meas
ures because of the bold, almost defiant tone in which he
avowed his position :
"Neither this people nor any other free people will per
manently tolerate the use of the vast power conferred by
vast wealth, and especially by wealth in its corporate form,
without lodging somewhere in the Government the still
higher power of seeing that this power, in addition to being
u&ed in the interest of the individual or individuals pos
sessing it, is also used for and not against the interests of
the people as a whole.
"In some such body as the Interstate Commerce Com
mission there must be lodged in effective shape the power
to see that every shipper who uses the railroads and every
man who owns or manages a railroad shall on the one hand
be given justice and on the other hand be required to do
justice. Justice— so far as it is humanly possible to give
and to get justice — is the foundation of our Government.
"We do not intend that this Republic shall ever fail as
those republics of olden times failed, in which there finally
came to be a government by classes, which resulted either
in the poor plundering the rich or in the rich exploiting and
in one form or another enslaving the poor; for either event
means the destruction of free institutions and of indi
vidual liberty."

428 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
On February 10, 1905, a bill which had been introduced
there on January 20, embodying the President's views on
the power to fix rates, was passed in the House by an over
whelming majority, 326 to 17. This was hailed by the press
as "a great victory for Roosevelt," but the bill was hung
up in Committee in the Senate and no report was made
upon it during the session which ended on March 4, 1905.
That the President had not given up the fight is shown
by this passage in a letter to me on March 23, 1905 :
' ' That we shall have a muss on the interstate commerce
business next year I have no doubt ; but I feel that we can
get the issue so clearly drawit that the Senate will have
to give in. On that issue I shall have a number of my own
party against me. My chief fear is lest the big financiers,
who, outside of their own narrowly limited profession, are
as foolish as they are selfish, will force the moderates to
join with the radicals in radical action, under penalty of
not obtaining any at all. I much prefer moderate action;
but the ultra-conservatives may make it necessary to ac
cept what is radical."
In similar tone was this passage in a letter to Senator
Lodge on May 24, 1905: "The railroads have been mak
ing a most active campaign against my rate-making prop
osition. They think they have it beaten. PersonaUy I do
not believe they have, and I think they are very short
sighted not to understand that to beat it means to increase
the danger of the movement for the government owner
ship of railroads."
The President's faith in success was shown to be well-
founded, for in 1906 the Senate passed a bill which was
approved by him and the Attorney General and which con
ferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the
power to fix rates, thus giving to that body its first real
control over the railways.
The desired additional legislation to put an end to re
bating was also secured, but in obtaining it the President
incurred some of the severest criticism of his career. A

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 429
member of his Cabinet, Paul Morton, Secretary of the
Navy, who had formerly been a railway official, volunteered
evidence showing the guilt of his own company in the mat
ter which was of first value in securing the abolition of the
practise. There was a widespread demand in the press and
elsewhere for the prosecution by the Government of Morton
in the courts. This the President refused to have done.
His reasons for refusing were set forth in a letter, on June
17, 1905, to the Attorney General, Mr. Moody, who had
given an opinion which supported the President's position.
In this letter the President said :
"I entirely agree with your conclusions. In my opinion
you would be wholly without justification in proceeding
individually against the officers of the Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway for contempt when neither the Inter
state Commerce Commission nor the special counsel you
have employed have developed a single fact of any kind
tending to implicate any one of these officers. One of the
officers, Mr. Morton, is a member of my Cabinet. This
fact is not to be allowed to shield him, nor on the other
hand is it to be allowed to cause him to be singled out, or
the officers with whom he is associated to be singled out
for attack."
After pointing out that several other Western railways
had also been guilty of rebating, the President continued :
"There is of course no possible excuse for discriminat
ing one case from the other. Moreover, in this instance
Mr. Morton has of his own accord written me a letter, of
which I enclose you a copy and a copy of my reply. In it
you will see that Mr. Morton not only states in the most
unequivocal manner that he had no knowledge whatever of
the unlawful practise complained of, but also shows by the
quotation of documents issued under his direction, that all
such unlawful practises were specifically forbidden by him,
and that the attention of his subordinates was repeatedly
called to the necessity of complying with the law in this
respect. When there is not one shadow of testimony against

430 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
him, and when whatever evidence has been submitted shows
explicitly that he is not guilty, it would in my judgment
be both absurd and wicked to proceed against him."
Writing to Senator Lodge on May 24, 1905, the Presi
dent said:
"I have of course been greatly worried about Morton.
He is as straight as a string, but the Santa Fe management
acted badly in a rebate case while he was vice-president of
the road and nominally directed the department which cov
ered the action in question. I am convinced that he knew
nothing of it, and therefore will not allow him to be prose
cuted in accordance with the general demand."
In addition to the railway legislation there were two
other matters of large moment which the President pressed
upon Congress in the winter and spring of 1905, and in
dealing with which Congress failed to meet his wishes. One
was a treaty with Santo Domingo, and the other was a batch
of seven arbitration treaties, uniform in terms, with Eng
land, France, Germany, Switzerland, Portugal, Italy and
Spain. For many years the Dominican RepubUc had been
endeavoring to enter into treaty relations with the United
States by which it would be placed under the protection of
the American government, and had been steadily refused.
In 1903 the representative of a foreign government pro
posed to the United States the joint fiscal control of the
Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations which
should take charge of the custom-houses and revenues and
give a certain percentage to the RepubUc and pay the resi
due ratably to the claims of foreign countries. This pro
posal the United States Government declined. In January,
1904, the Dominican minister of foreign affairs visited
Washington and besought the help of the United States
Government to enable the republic to escape financial and
social disorders. This request was also declined. A short
time later, a report was started that the President was plan
ning to annex the island to the United States. Writing to
me on February 23, 1904, he said :

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 431
"I have been hoping and praying for three months that
the Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have
to act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a police
man has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the
island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged
boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-
end-to. Is that strong enough? I have asked some of our
people to go there because, after having refused for three
months to do anything, the attitude of the Santo Domingans
has become one of half chaotic war towards us. If I pos
sibly can I want to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely
necessary to do something, then I want to do as little as
possible. Their government has been bedeviling us to
estabUsh some kind of a protectorate over the islands, and
take charge of their finances. We have been answering
them that we could not possibly go into the subject now
at all."
Neariy a year later the President, on Feb. 15, 1905, sent
a special message to Congress submitting a treaty which
he had concluded with Santo Domingo at the request of its
government, under which the custom-houses of the republic
were to be placed under American control, 45 per cent of
the proceeds to be turned over to the Dominican govern
ment and the remainder to be used by the United States
to pay on equitable basis such a proportion of the foreign
debts as was possible. The President announced that no
step had been taken by the Administration under the terms
of the treaty, saying of it :
"We on our part are simply performing in peaceful
manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in ac
cordance with the earnest request of the government con
cerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily
involved in the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine.
"I call attention to the urgent need of prompt action on
this matter. We now have a great opportunity to secure
peace and stability in the island, without friction or blood
shed, by acting in accordance with the cordial invitation of

432 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
the governmental authorities themselves. It will be un
fortunate from every standpoint if we fail to grasp this
opportunity; for such failure will probably mean increas
ing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, and very
possibly embarrassing foreign complications in addition.
This protocol affords a practical test of the efficiency of the
United States Government in maintaining the Monroe Doc
trine." The Senate paid little or no attention to the treaty, and
on March 6, 1905, the Senate being then in executive ses
sion, the President sent to it another special message urg
ing action at as early a moment as possible and saying:
"Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful
and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that
we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this aid, and
the expressions of friendship repeatedly sanctioned by the
people and the Government of the United States warrant
her in believing that it will not be withheld in the hour of
her need."
Nothing resulted from this second appeal save long de
bates on the treaty and the adoption of trivial amendments,
and the Senate adjourned leaving the treaty unaffirmed.
Writing to me, on March 23, 1905, the President gave this
interesting statement of his views on a third term and the
effect of his attitude upon the Senate:
"I did not make my announcement that I would not ac
cept another term, without thinking it carefully over and
coming to a definite and final conclusion. If you will recall
the words I used you will remember that I not merely stated
that I would not be a candidate ; I added that I would not
under any circumstances accept the nomination. And I
would not.
"Unquestionably this announcement caused me a little
trouble in the Senate, the men coming to the conclusion that
I need not be regarded as a factor hereafter. But I think
the trouble between me and the Senate has been rather

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 433
exaggerated, and I have endeavored to minimize, not em
phasize, it. I do not much admire the Senate, because it is
such a helpless body when efficient work for good is to be
done. Two or three determined Senators seem able to hold
up legislation, or at least good legislation, in an astonish
ing way; but the worst thing the Senate did this year —
the failure to confirm the Santo Domingo treaty — was due
to the fact that the Democratic party as such went solidly
against us, and this fact, coupled with the absence of cer
tain Republican Senators, rendered us helpless to put
through the treaty. The result has been that I am in a very
awkward and unpleasant situation in endeavoring to keep
foreign powers off Santo Domingo and also in trying to
settle Venezuelan affairs."
After the adjournment of Congress the President, acting
in accordance with his established principle that while the
Constitution did not explicitly give him power to act in
such cases, it did not forbid him to do so, put the agreement
into effect.
Writing confidentially on March 30, 1905, to Secretary
Hay, who was in Germany, the President gave this humor
ous account of the situation:
"There has been a rather comic development in the
Santo Domingo case. Morales asked us to take over the
custom-houses pending action by the Senate. I decided
to do so, but first of all consulted Spooner, Foraker, Lodge
and Knox. All heartily agreed that it was necessary for
me to take this action. Rather to my horror Taft genially
chaffed them about going back on their principles as to the
'usurpation of the executive.' But they evidently took the
view that it was not a time to be over-particular about
trifles. I also consulted Gorman, who told me that he had
taken it for granted that I would have to take some such
action as that proposed, and believed it necessary. I un
derstand, however, that this was merely his unofficial opin
ion, and that officially he is going to condemn our action
as realizing his worst forebodings."

434 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Having put the agreement into effect, the President did
not hesitate to use force in upholding it, in case force should
be needed to maintain order. When signs of internal
trouble appeared in the island in the fall of 1905, he sent
this order to the Secretary of the Navy, referring to the
commander of a naval vessel near the island, under date of
September 5, 1905 :
"As to the Santo Domingo matter, tell Admiral Brad
ford to stop any revolution. I intend to keep the island in
statu quo until the Senate has had time to act on the treaty,
and I shall treat any revolutionary movement as an effort
to upset the modus vivendi. That this is ethically right,
I am dead sure, even though there may be some technical
or red tape difficulty."
When Congress came together in December, 1905, the
President included in his annual message a quiet statement
of what he had done, making neither defense nor apology.
He merely said that the Executive Department of the Gov
ernment had negotiated a treaty under which "we are to
try to help the Dominican people to straighten out their
finances," that the "treaty is pending before the Senate,"
and that "in the meantime a temporary arrangement has
been made which will last until the Senate has time to take
action on the treaty. . . . Every consideration of wise pol
icy, and, above all, every consideration of large generosity,
bids us meet the request of Santo Domingo as we are now
trying to meet it." The Senate discussed the treaty for
two years, and during that period the President continued
its execution ; finally, in the spring of 1907, the Senate rati
fied it with unimportant amendments which the President
easily induced Santo Domingo to accept. The results of
his action were described by the President in a speech be
fore the Harvard Union on February 13, 1907 :
"I was immensely amused when at a professional peace
meeting the other day, they incidentally alluded to me as
having made 'war' on Santo Domingo. The war I have
made literally consists in having loaned them a collector

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 435
of customs, at their request. We now give them forty-five
per cent, of the customs to run the Government, and the
other fifty-five per cent, is put up to pay those of their debts
which are found to be righteous. This arrangement has
gone on for two years now, while the coordinate branch of
the Government discussed whether or not I had usurped
power in the matter, and finally concluded I had not, and
ratified the treaty. Of the fifty-five per cent, we have been
able to put two and a half millions toward paying their
debts; and with the forty-five per cent, that we collected
for them they have received more money than they ever got
when they collected one hundred per cent, themselves ; and
the island has prospered as never before. I feel like para
phrasing Patrick Henry: 'If this is "war," make the most
of it.' "
The Senate's course in relation to the seven general
arbitration treaties was in line with the President's de
scription of its methods in his letter of March 23 to me,
quoted above. These treaties provided for reference to
The Hague Tribunal, by mutual agreement, of all minor
disputes not involving national honor. They were sub
mitted to the Senate on January 6, 1905, and it was at once
made known that many Senators were in favor of amend
ing them in a way which the President considered to be
fatal to their usefulness. On February 10, 1905, the Presi
dent wrote a letter of protest to Senator Cullom, Chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he said :
"I learn that the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela
tions has reported the arbitration treaties to the Senate,
amending them by substituting for the word 'agreement'
in the second article the word 'treaty.'
"The effect of the amendment is to make it no longer
possible, as between its contracting parties, to submit any
matter whatever to arbitration without first obtaining a
special treaty to cover the case. This will represent not
a step forward but a step backward. If the word 'treaty'
be substituted, the result is that every such agreement

436 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
must be submitted to the Senate; and these general arbi
tration treaties would then cease to be such, and indeed in
their amended form they amount to a specific pronounce
ment against the whole principle of a general arbitration
treaty. "The Senate has, of course, the absolute right to reject'
or to amend in any way it sees fit any treaty laid before it,
and it is clearly the duty of the Senate to take any step
which, in the exercise of its best judgment, it deems to be
for the interest of the nation. If, however, in the judgment
of the President, a given amendment nullifies a proposed
treaty, it seems to me that it is no less clearly his duty to
refrain from endeavoring to secure a ratification, by the
other contracting power or powers, of the amended treaty;
and after much thought I have come to the conclusion that
I ought to write and tell you that such is my judgment in
this case."
The clear notification in the closing passage of this letter,
that if the amendment was adopted the President would
abandon the treaties, was not heeded, for in executive ses
sion, on February 11, 1905, the treaties as amended by the
Committee were ratified. When they reached the Presi
dent, Secretary Hay, on February 13, 1905, made the fol
lowing statement, which he had drawn up in accordance
with the President 's instructions :
"The President regards the matter of the general arbi
tration treaties as concluded by the action of the Senate on
Saturday. He recognizes the right of the Senate to reject
a treaty either by a direct vote in that sense, or indirectly
by changes which are incompatible with its spirit and pur
pose. He considers that with the Senate amendment the
treaties not only cease to be a step forward in the cause of
general arbitration but are really a step backward, and
therefore he is unable to present them in this altered form
to the countries with which we have been in negotiation."
In conversation with me at the time, Secretary Hay ex
pressed himself as disheartened and completely discour-

MESSAGES TO CONGRESS— PAUL MORTON CASE 437
aged by the result, saying that the treaties represented
many months of painstaking labor and were regarded as a
valuable advance in the cause of general arbitration. He
added that, in his judgment, it was quite useless to make
further effort since the ratification of any really desirable
or useful arbitration treaty could not be hoped for in the
present temper of the Senate. Among those supporting the
amendment were Senators Lodge and Spooner, both of
whom expressed great regret because they found them
selves unable to agree with the President.
After Hay's death, Secretary Root, who succeeded him
in the State Department, took up the treaties, accepted the
Senate amendment, and ratifications were exchanged with
the seven foreign governments concerned. They proved
to be absolutely useless, and so far as they had any effect,
it was to lower the standard which the American Govern
ment had previously maintained upon the question of in
ternational arbitration.
Dr. John Bassett Moore, the recognized authority on in
ternational law, said of their effect, in an address that he
delivered at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International
Arbitration, on May 27, 1914:
"The result of the Senate's action is, that so far as the
United States is concerned, it is in practice more difficult
to secure international arbitration than it was in the early
days of our independence."

CHAPTER XXXIV
REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS—
DEALINGS WITH SENATORS— LETTERS
ON VARIOUS TOPICS
Early in April, 1905, the President left Washington to at
tend a reunion of his Rough Rider regiment at San Antonio,
Texas, on the 7th of that month, and later went on a short
hunting trip in Colorado. On the eve of his departure he
made a remark which had wide circulation: "Oh, things
will be all right; I have left Taft sitting on the lid." He
delivered addresses at various points in Texas, including
one before the Legislature of the State, in each of which he
expounded his views in regard to Government regulation
and control of corporations and railways. He was greeted
with great enthusiasm everywhere. On his return trip he
reached Chicago on May 10, at the moment when a general
strike of labor unions was in progress. A committee of
the strikers called upon him to present their cause and se
cure his sympathy. What happened was described by the
President later in two letters that he wrote after reaching
Washington. The first was to Mr. Root, on May 13, 1905 :
"Perhaps the thing that pleased me most was in Chicago
when the labor men called upon me. A good many people
had been anxious that I should dodge Chicago, which of
course I would not have been willing to do under any cir
cumstances. As it turned out, the labor people called on
me themselves and made a statement most foolish and of
fensive, so that they justified me completely in saying good-
temperedly, but with unmistakable emphasis, just what my
attitude was and would be in regard to mobs and disorder
generally." 438

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS 439
The second was to Senator Lodge, who was at the time
in London, on May 15, 1905 :
"When I came to Chicago I found a very ugly strike,
on account of which some of my nervous friends wished me
to try to avoid the city. Of course I hadn't the slightest
intention of doing so. I get very much puzzled at times on
questions of finance and the tariff, but when it comes to
such a perfectly simple matter as keeping order, then you
strike my long suit. The strikers were foolish enough to
come to me on their own initiative and make me an address
in which they quoted that fine flower of Massachusetts
statesmanship, the lamented Benjamin F. Butler, who had
told rioters at one time, as it appeared, that they need
have no fear of the United States army, as they had torches
and arms. This gave me a good opening, and while per
fectly polite, I used language so simple that they could
not misunderstand it; and repeated the same with am
plifications at the dinner that night. So if the rioting in
Chicago gets beyond the control of the State and the City,
they now know well that the Regulars will come. ' '
What the President said to the spokesman of the strikers,
Mr. Shea, who had presented a letter stating their case,
was this :
"I regret that you should in the letter have spoken at all
of the use of the Federal army, as you have there spoken.
No request has been made to me for action by the Federal
Government, but at the same time, Mr. Shea, as you have
in this communication brought up the matter, I want to
say one thing with all the emphasis in my power. In up
holding the law and order, in doing what he is able to do
to suppress mob violence in any shape or way, the Mayor
of Chicago, Mayor Dunne, has my hearty support. I am
glad to be able to say this to you, gentlemen, before I say
it to another body.
"Now, let me repeat that I know nothing of the facts of
the situation. I know nothing of the right or wrong of the
points at issue. What I have to say is based partly upon

440 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
what I regard as the unfortunate phrasing of a letter pre
sented to the President of the United States.
"I have not been called upon to interfere in any way,
but you must not misunderstand my attitude. In every
effort of Mayor Dunne to prevent violence by mobs or in
dividuals, to see that the laws are obeyed, and that order
is preserved, he has the hearty support of the President of
the United States, and, in my judgment, he should have
that of every good citizen of the United States.
"I am a believer in unions. I am an honorary member
of one union. But the union must obey the law just as the
corporation must obey the law. Just as every man, rich or
poor, must obey the law. As yet, no action has been called
for by me and most certainly if action is called for I shall
try to do justice under the law to every man, so far as I
have power. But the first essential is the preservation of
law and order, the suppression of violence by mobs or in
dividuals." At a dinner which the Iroquois Club, a Democratic or
ganization, gave him on the evening of the same day, the
President repeated substantially what he had said to the
strikers' committee, and turning directly to Mayor Dunne,
who was seated near him, said:
"Mr. Mayor, as President of the United States, and
therefore as representative of the people of this country,
I give you, as a matter of course, my hearty support in up
holding the law, in keeping order, in putting down violence,
whether by a mob or by an individual. There need not be
the slightest apprehension in the heart of the most timid
that ever the mob spirit will triumph in this countiy. Those
immediately responsible for deaUng with the trouble must,
as I know you feel, exhaust every effort in so dealing with
it before a call is made upon any outside body. But if ever
the need arises, back of the city stands the State, and back
of the State stands the Nation."
In acknowledging the President's letter Mr. Root wrote
on May 16, 1905 :

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS 441
"I was particularly pleased by the way in which you
treated the labor situation in Chicago. I doubt if most
people realize what a very important and critical situation
was created by the presentation of the labor address. Most
men in your position would have taken the paper for fur
ther examination and have dismissed the committee with
the promise to give it consideration ; and there would have
been the devil to pay afterwards. Your character was,
however, exactly adapted for the best possible treatment
of the emergency, and I think that your instant reading of
the paper and instant response was one of the very best
things you have ever done. ' '
Secretary Hay, who was at Bad Nauheim, Germany, for
his health, wrote under date of May 21, 1905 :
"I need not tell you with what pride and pleasure we
all read your speech at Chicago. It has the true ring of
conscience and authority combined, — the voice of a man
'who would not flatter Neptune for his trident. ' It is a com
fort to see the most popular man in America telling the
truth to our masters, the people. It requires no courage
to attack wealth and power, but to remind the masses that
they, too, are subject to the law, is something few public
men dare to do."
The President gave another illustration of his courage
in October, 1905, when he made a tour of the South, speak
ing at various points in Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia,
Arkansas and Alabama, including a visit to the home of
his mother at Roswell, Georgia. At Little Rock, Arkansas,
on October 25, he was introduced by the Governor of the
State to a large concourse of citizens in the City Park. In his
introductory remarks the Governor made a quasi defense of
the lynching of colored men for supposed outrages upon
white women. In opening his speech the President de
clared that he had been fortunate enough to have spoken
all over the Union and had never said in any State or any
section what he would not have said in any other State or

442 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
in any other section. Turning a few minutes later directly
to the Governor, he said :
"Governor, you spoke of a hideous crime that is often
hideously avenged. The worst enemy of the negro race
is the negro criminal, and, above all, the negro criminal of
that type; for he has committed not only an unspeakably
dreadful and infamous crime against the victim, but he has
committed a hideous crime against the people of his own
color ; and every reputable colored man, every colored man
who wishes to see the uplifting of his race, owes it as his
first duty to himself and to that race to hunt down that
criminal with all his soul and strength. Now for the side
of the white man. To avenge one hideous erime by another
hideous crime is to reduce the man doing it to the bestial
level of the wretch who committed the bestial crime. The
horrible effects of the lynchings are. not for that crime at
all, but for other crimes. And above all other men, Gov
ernor, you and I and all who are exponents and representa
tives of the law, owe it to our people, owe it to the cause of
civilization and humanity, to do everything in our power,
officially and unofficially, directly and indirectly, to free the
United States from the menace and reproach of lynch law."
This courageous dehverance in the very heart of the
country in which lynching was a not infrequent practise,
commanded widespread approval.
In the summer of 1905 several instances arose in which
the President felt moved to very plain speech with Senators
who sought to have him make unfit appointments in the
civil service, or improper promotions in the army, or to
shield some person in the service who had been found guilty
of misconduct. The same Oregon Senator whom he had
rebuked in 1904 and whom he afterwards forced into the
penitentiary, wrote him an impudent letter in May, 1905.
In replying, on the 15th of that month, the President wrote
a long letter, saying at the close :
"My dear Senator, you have written me very frankly.
I shall copy your frankness in this closing paragraph. It

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS 443
has been most unfortunate that so many of the friends
upon whose behalf you have been active should be among
those whose guilt is clearest and deepest. I entirely appre
ciate loyalty to one's friends, but loyalty to the cause of
justice and honor stands above it. I think you are doing
yourself an injury by permitting yourself to be made at
least to seem to stand as the champion of the men who have
been engaged in this widespread conspiracy to defraud the
United States Government and therefore the public of your
own State. . . . You criticize very captiously what has
been done and said by all those whose efforts have resulted
in the uncovering of this great wrong, and of the partial
punishment of some of the wrongdoers. It is easy to
ascribe such motives and to make such criticisms ; but what
is needed now is not the picking of holes in those who are
engaged in the great work of righteousness, but the sturdy
upholding of their hands just so long as they are doing
this work.
"I am from my position the leader of the entire Repub
lican party throughout the Union, in Oregon just as much
as in New York; and in Oregon and New York ahke I shall
count it not an attack upon, but a service to, the Republi
can party if through my agents I can be instrumental in
punishing in the severest possible manner any private citi
zen, and especially any public servant, who while claiming
to be a member of that party has deeply wronged it by
wronging the Nation which the party was created to serve.
When the party ceases to serve the Nation it will lose its
reason for existence ; and most emphatically I shall never,
under any pressure or for any reason whatever, permit
any alleged considerations of partisan expediency to pre
vent my punishing any wrongdoer, whether he belongs to
my party or any other."
To a plea from Senator Piatt of New York for clemency
toward a man who had been dismissed from the service,
the President sent this terse communication on May 22,
1905 : "He was heard in full and given ample opportunity

444 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
to defend himself. He was thoroughly investigated, and
not only was it necessary to dismiss him, but it may be
necessary to indict him."
A Vermont Senator was persistent in seeking to have
an officer in the army promoted as a personal favor. To
him the President wrote on June 3, 1905 :
"In your previous letters you will remember that you
stated that you were anxious to secure 'Vermont promo
tions.' In other words, you have desired that the promo
tions in the Army should be given primarily, not because
the man promoted is the best man for the position, but to
gratify a certain outside individual or to 'recognize' a
certain State. Now I cannot possibly permit such practises
in the Army. It is this kind of practise, carried to an ex
treme, which brings utter demoraUzation to the service,
and in the end, rottenness. Surely it ought to be axiomatic
that the quality and record of the individual officer and the
needs of the service should alone be considered. . . .
"When I uphold the hands of the General Staff by tak
ing their recommendations for promotion as against those
of any outsider, no matter how influential, no matter how
powerful, I am doing my best to prevent our little army
from being reduced to a condition which would be only one
degree above that to which it would be reduced if I toler
ated actual corruption. In so acting, it seems to me that
I am entitled to the support of every good American who
feels that the Army is the property of the Nation, and not
of one party, still less of any individual in that party. I
can no more allow it to be run in the interest of politicians
than I could allow it to be run in the interest of contractors
or patentees. It is to be run in the interest of the entire
American people, and with an eye single to making it the
best that it can possibly be made."
To a Senator from an eastern State whose views on the
proper use of public office were permanently antagonistic
to those of the President, the latter wrote on July 7, 1905:
"Of course I should always like to do anything you ask,

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS 445
and it is a matter of regret to me that I am unable to ap
point your grandson District Attorney of the District of
Columbia as you request. If I felt that I conscientiously
could do so with due regard to the interest of the Govern
ment and of the people of the District I should be really
pleased. We have had difficulty in the office and I have
directed the choice- to be made with peculiar care to obtain
the best man possible. With all these quasi judicial or
legal positions I am obliged to exercise peculiar care. ' '
Amid all the duties that crowded upon Roosevelt in 1905
he found time to indulge his love of reading and to conduct
a voluminous correspondence with all sorts of people on
all sorts of subjects. While he was busy arranging the
Russo-Japanese Conference he was reading and absorbing
a book which carried him back into the 13th Century, after
wards writing, on July 11, to the French Ambassador, M.
Jusserand, this learned criticism of its contents :
"I read Cahun's 'Turks and Mongols' with such thor
oughness and assiduity that at the end it was dangling out
of the covers, and I have sent it to Washington to have it
bound, with directions to deliver it to you.
"I am very much obliged to you for loaning it to me,
and I have been immensely interested in it. It is extraor
dinary how little the average European historian has
understood the real significance of the immense Mongol
movement of the 13th Century and its connection with the
previous history of the Turks, Mongols, and similar
peoples. Until I read Cahun I never understood the se
quence of cause and effect and never appreciated the his
toric importance of the existence of the vast, loosely-bound
Turkish power of the 5th and 6th centuries and of its
proposition to unite with the Byzantines for the overthrow
of the Persians. Moreover, it is astounding that military
critics have given so little space to, or rather have totally
disregarded, the extraordinary Mongol campaigns of the
13th Century.
"I doubt if the average military critic so much as knows

446 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
of the existence of Sabutai, who won sixty victories on
pitched fields and went from the Yellow Sea to the Adri
atic, trampling Russia into the dust, overrunning Hungary
and Poland, and defeating with inferior numbers the picked
chivalry of Germany as he had already defeated the Man-
chu, the Corean, and the Chinese. Moreover the victo
ries were not won by brute superiority of numbers. The
armies of the Mongols were not at all what we understand
when we speak of hordes. They were marvelously trained
bodies wherein the prowess of the individual soldier was
only less remarkable than the perfect obedience, precision
and effectiveness with which he did his part in carrying out
the tactical and strategic schemes of the generals.
"For a Frenchman, Cahun is dry; but the dryness of
writers of your race, if they are good at all, is miles asun
der from the hopeless aridity of similar writers among our
people. Cahun has a really fine phrase, for instance — a
phrase that tells an important truth when he contrasts
the purely personal and therefore in the end not very im
portant wars of Timur, with what he calls the great 'anony
mous' campaigns and victories of the Mongols proper
under Genghis Khan and in the years immediately succeed
ing his death.
"Naturally, this difference in dryness makes an im
mense difference in interest. Thus I took up De la Gorce's
history of the Second Empire because of the allusions to
it in Walpole 's history, which covers much the same period;
but Walpole 's history was only readable in the sense that
a guide book or a cookery book is readable ; whereas I found
De la Gorce exceedingly interesting and filled with much
that was philosophical and much that was picturesque."
On July 19, 1905, in a letter to Henry Beach Needham,
he dropped into this discussion of what constitutes great
ness and how it is won :
"It has always seemed to me that in life there are two
ways of achieving success, or, for the matter of that, of
achieving what is commonly called greatness. One is to

REBUKES TO RIOTOUS STRIKERS AND LTNCHERS 447
do that which can only be done by the man of exceptional
and extraordinary abilities. Of course this means that only
one man can do it, and it is a very rare kind of success or
of greatness. The other is to do that which many men
could do, but which as a matter of fact none of them actually
does. This is the ordinary kind of success or kind of great
ness. Nobody but one of the world's rare geniuses could
have written the Gettysburg speech, or the Second Inau
gural, or met as Lincoln met the awful crises of the Civil
War. But most of us can do the ordinary things, which,
however, most of us do not do. It is of course unnecessary
to say that I have never won a success of any kind that did
not come within this second category. Any one that chose
could lead the kind of Ufe I have led, and any one who has
led that life could if he chose — and by 'choosing,' I of
course mean choosing to exercise the requisite industry,
judgment and foresight, none of a very marked type — have
raised my regiment or served in positions analogous to
those of Police Commissioner, Civil Service Commissioner,
and Assistant Secretary of the Navy."
A few days before the Portsmouth Peace Conference
reached its agreement, in August, 1905, after sending off a
sheaf of cable and other messages to Tokio, St. Petersburg,
and Berlin, which forced the envoys to get together, Roose
velt, on August 25, took a trip in a submarine, a species of
voyage which was regarded at the time as especially per
ilous. Indeed, when it was announced in advance that he
was going, there were protests in the newspapers against
it on the ground that as the head of the nation his life was
not his own and he had no right to risk it. Among the
protests was one from "Mr. Dooley" which closed with the
memorable sentence : "If you must go, Mr. President, take
Fairbanks with you!" He was not deterred but took the
trip, was under water seventy minutes, and while there
made a thorough examination of the vessel and mastered
its method of operation. Writing to his friend, Count von
Sternburg, he expressed views about the future of the sub-

448 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
marine which, addressed to a German, afford curious read
ing after the uses to which the submarine was put by Ger
mans in the European war :
"I myself am both amused and interested as to what you
say about the interest excited about my trip in the Plunger.
I went down in it chiefly because I did not like to have the
officers and enlisted men think I wanted them to try things
I was reluctant to try myself. I believe a good deal can be
done with these submarines, although there is always the
danger of people getting carried away with the idea and
thinking that they can be of more use than they possibly
could be."
The President made two efforts in 1905 to induce Joseph
H. Choate to reenter the diplomatic service. He asked him
to go as the American representative to the Algeciras Con
vention. Mr. Choate at first accepted and subsequently
withdrew his acceptance. He next offered him the position
of American Minister to Japan, and this also Mr. Choate
declined. Writing about the latter position after the close
of the Portsmouth Conference, the President gave this in
teresting statement of his personal views as to services
which an ex-President may perform :
"I found that the Japanese were very anxious we should
send the very highest man possible to Tokio as Minister,
and they say that if that is done they will shortly make
their representative here an Ambassador. They evidently
feel that if Choate were sent there it would be appreciated
as an international compliment. I do not know whether
Choate would go or not. If I were in his place I should be
delighted to go. I have always felt that John Quiney
Adams rendered a real service when he went to Congress
after being President ; that is, he showed more regard for
the work to be done than for the titular position. In the
same way Choate could well afford to spend what would
be a delightful couple of years in Tokio for the sake of
the good that his going would do."

CHAPTER XXXV
BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL
That the United States and the world owe the existence
of the Panama Canal entirely to President Roosevelt, is a
fact which cannot be disputed. Every step in the progress
of that enterprise, from the time of taking possession of
the Isthmus without an instant's delay when the Panama
revolution offered the opportunity, till the water-way be
tween the two oceans was thrown open to the shipping
of the world, was due to his personal action in the early
stages of the work. It was carried to completion under
Presidents Taft and Wilson on the lines' that he had estab
hshed so firmly that they could not be changed. As he said
later, with a frank boldness that astounded his critics:
"Yes, I took the Isthmus, and I am in a wholly unrepentant
frame of mind in reference thereto. The ethical conception
upon which I acted was that I did not intend that Uncle Sam
should be held up while he was doing a great work for
himself and all mankind." Having made up his mind on
the subject, he did not stop to ask if the course would
win popular approval, or even if Congress would approve.
If he had waited for Congress to act, the opportunity would
have passed.
When it came to the question of how to build the canal,
he acted with equal promptness and courage. Here again
he kept himself steadily ahead of Congress, as the record
will show. In fact, Congress, building better than it knew
or suspected, left the direction of the work virtually in his
hands. In the law which it passed, authorizing him to build
the canal through a commission of seven members, Con
gress decreed that the commission should "in all matters
be subject to the direction and control of the President."
4491

450 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Its failure to pass laws giving more specific definition to
the powers which he should exercise, gave the President
the very opportunity that he desired, and which he was
prompt to seize when the necessity for doing so arose.
He invariably gave Congress the opportunity to act before
acting on his own account. Thus, when the first commis
sion of seven members, appointed on February 29, 1904,
though composed of excellent, even superior material,
proved ineffective because of failure to act as an executive
unit, he asked Congress to reduce the number of members
from seven to three. When Congress declined to do this,
he secured the desired result in another way. He requested
and obtained the resignations of the members of the com
mission, appointed a new commission in its stead, and
placed the direction of its affairs in an Executive Commit
tee of three members, making the other four members
merely an advisory engineering body. This arrangement,
while producing excellent results for a time, in turn broke
down on the question of divided responsibihty, leading to a
temporary resumption of seven-headed admmistration.
The President then reached the final solution of the prob
lem by conferring upon a single person absolute powers of
direction and control. The manner in which this was done
will be described presently.
When Congress placed the work of construction in the
President's hands, it left open the question of the type of
canal to be built, whether it should be a lock canal above
sea-level, or one at sea-level. To obtain light on this ques
tion the President invited eminent engineers of the United
States and Europe to form an international board of in
quiry and advise him of their conclusions. Such a body,
composed of eight Americans and five Europeans, assem
bled in September, 1905, and in January following made
two reports, one signed by eight members, five Europeans
and three Americans, in favor of a canal at sea-level, and
one signed by five Americans in favor of a canal with locks
at an elevation of 85 feet above sea-level. The President
referred the reports to the Canal Commission and its Chief

From a copyrighted photograph by Underwood and Underwood
THE COMPLETED PANAMA CANAL
U. S. S. Texas of the Pacific Fleet passing through Gaillard (Culebra) Cut, on August 12, 1919, whsn the entire fleet passed
through, thus demonstrating the capacity of the Canal to supply the chief purpose sought by Roosevelt in
its construction — namely, the union of the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets of the Navy

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 451
Engineer in charge of the work on the Isthmus, for con
sideration, and the Commission and its Chief Engineer
agreed in favoring the lock canal plan. The Secretary of
War also favored it, and the President transmitted the sev
eral reports and findings to Congress with a recommenda
tion that the lock canal plan be adopted.
Of this decision the President said in a speech at Chicago,
on May 10, 1905: "I came to the conclusion that the lock
canal at the proposed level would cost only about half as
much to build and would be built in half the time, with
much less risk; that for large ships the transit would be
quicker, and that, taking into account the interest saved,
the cost of maintenance would be less."
The merits of the two plans were discussed with much
animation in the press of the country, and a debate, marked
at times by animosity, occupied the Senate for several
weeks. Under firm pressure from the President, that body
finally adopted the lock plan by a vote of 36 to 31. The
House, which had been known to be strongly in its favor
from the outset, concurred with the Senate without a divi
sion. My official connection with canal work began in Septem
ber, 1905, when at the President 's request I was appointed
Secretary of the Commission, a position which I held for
nine years, extending not only through President Roose
velt's term of office but through the entire period of canal
construction. The first two years of my service were spent
in Washington and the remaining seven on the Isthmus.
What I write on the subject is based, therefore, on the
intimate personal knowledge which I acquired through my
official duties and relations.
In order to acquaint himself thoroughly with the work
in all its phases, President Roosevelt, accompanied by his
wife, paid a visit to the Isthmus in November, 1906. The
visit, which was notable as being the first instance in which
a President of the United States had passed outside its
territory while holding office, attracted wide attention and
comment. He went on a war vessel of the Navy, and spent

452 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
three days on the Isthmus devoting nearly every daylight
hour to the inspection of canal work from one ocean to
the other. The work at the time was in charge of the
second Commission, and had been under full headway from
the moment that Congress had adopted the lock plan. In
his inspection the President was accompanied by the Chief
Engineer, the Chairman and Secretary of the Commis
sion, the Chief Sanitary Officer and other canal officials.
Every portion of the work, including engineering plans,
sanitary arrangements and regulations for the civil gov
ernment of the Canal Zone, was subjected to minute scru
tiny. The zeal and tireless energy of the President put
to a severe strain the physical strength of more than one of
his companions.
During his visit a formal reception was extended to him
by the President of the Panama Republic, Dr. Manuel
Amador, the exercises being held on the platform of the
cathedral, fronting the central plaza of the city. In re
sponse to an address of welcome by President Amador, the
President assured him that the repubhcs of the United
States and Panama were "joint trustees for all the world"
in doing the work of building the canal, and pledged, on
behalf of the United States, the heartiest support and treat
ment " on a basis of a full and complete and generous equal
ity between the two republics. ' ' A notable passage of his
speech, considering the revolutionary record of Panama—
of more than fifty revolutions in fifty years — was the fol
lowing :
"The sole desire of the United States as regards the
Republic of Panama is to see it increase in wealth, in num
bers, in importance, until it becomes, as I so earnestly hope
it will become, one of the republics whose history reflects
honor upon the entire western world. Such progress and
prosperity, Mr. President, can come only through the pres
ervation of both order and liberty ; through the observance
of those in power of all their rights, obligations, and duties
to their fellow-citizens, and through the realization of those

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 453
out of power that the insurrectionary habit, the habit of
civil war, ultimately means destruction to the republic."
The closing sentence of this passage was delivered with
great force, the President striding to the front of the plat
form and fairly hurling it into the faces of the assembled
crowd of Panamanians. Although it was a condemnation
of what might be called their chief political industry for
half a century, the Panamanians greeted it with shouts of
approval. That the warning was taken to heart, the subse
quent history of the new republic conclusively proves, for
no revolution or insurrection has disturbed its develop
ment in peace and prosperity since that day.
On the eve of his departure from the Isthmus, the entire
canal force was assembled in a great building covering
the largest wharf of the Canal Commission at Cristobal,
at the Atlantic entrance to the canal, in a mass reception
to him. In a speech which he made to the assemblage, the
President said that to each of the canal workers had come
an opportunity such as was vouchsafed to but few in each
generation, adding:
"I shall see if it is not possible to provide for some little
memorial, some mark, some badge, which will always dis
tinguish the man who for a certain space of time has done
his work well on this Isthmus, just as the button of the
Grand Army distinguishes the man who did his work well
in the Civil War."
On his return to Washington the President requested
Francis D. Millet, the accomplished artist and charming
gentleman who lost his life in the Steamship Titanic dis
aster in April, 1912, to make suggestions in regard to the
proposed memorial, and he recommended a medal of the
size of a silver dollar. The Isthmian Canal Commission
was asked for suggestions as to design and inscriptions,
and it recommended that on one side there should be a me
dallion portrait of President Roosevelt and on the other
the seal of the Canal Zone. The first part of the reeom-

454 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
mendation was adopted by Mr. Millet, but the second was
rejected, and instead of the seal there was adopted a bird's-
eye view of Culebra Cut, in the completed canal, with a ship
passing through, and the motto of the seal, "The Land
Divided, the World United," inscribed above it. The work
was placed in charge of Victor D. Brenner, an eminent
sculptor, who modeled a medallion of President Roose
velt at personal sittings at Oyster Bay in July, 1908.
Over one hundred pounds of copper, bronze and other
material from abandoned French locomotives and ma
chinery on the Isthmus were shipped, to the United States
Mint in Philadelphia, and from these the medals were cast.
They were awarded to all Americans in the Canal and
Panama Railway employ who had served two years or more
on canal work. Each additional two years of service was
indicated by the attachment of a bar so inscribed. Distri
bution of the medals, inscribed with the name of the recip
ient and the date of his original employment, was begun
in September, 1909, and over six thousand were dehvered.
They were very highly prized by their owners, and the
bestowal of them contributed materially to the patriotic
pride in their work which was so universal in the canal
force, and which was the chief cause of its remarkable effi
ciency. As recorded in a previous chapter, Roosevelt was the
first President to send a message to Congress in print,
rather than in script as had been the invariable custom.
He estabhshed another precedent in a special message
which he sent to Congress on December 17, 1906, setting
forth in detail the results of his visit to the Isthmus. He
accompanied the text in this instance with reproductions
of photographs showing the condition of the work at va
rious points. This was the first illustrated message ever
transmitted to Congress and its appearance in the Senate
caused a feehng approaching consternation in that august
body, whose members looked upon it as that abhorrent
thing called "an innovation," a breach of tradition amount
ing almost to treason. The House, on the contrary, hailed

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 455
it with joy as a public document of high interest and value
for circulation among the people, and several editions, ag
gregating many thousand copies, were ordered for the use
of members. Its interest and attractiveness were so com
pelling that after a short period of tremors, the Senators
overcame their objections sufficiently to order for them
selves an edition of ten thousand copies. Another pecuU-
arity of the message was that simplified spelUng was used
in it for the first and only time in such a document in our
history. The message had a wide circulation both in the United
States and Europe and was of inestimable service in giving
a clear, specific and unassailable presentation of conditions
on the Isthmus at a time when opinion on the subject had
been confused and misled by a great flood of newspaper
and magazine literature grossly, and often slanderously,
misrepresenting them. In fact, no great national enter
prise was ever subjected to a more persistent assault than
was directed upon the canal work during the first few years
of its progress. The assault was apparently so systematic
as to suggest that powerful influences of some sort were
instigating it. In his special message the President spoke
of two kinds of criticism, honest and malicious, and said
of the latter:
"Where the slanderers are of foreign origin, I have no
concern with them. Where they are Americans, I feel for
them the heartiest contempt and indignation; because, in
a spirit of wanton dishonesty and malice, they are trying
to interfere with, and hamper the execution of, the greatest
work of the kind ever attempted, and are seeking to bring
to naught the efforts of their countrymen to put to the
credit of America one of the giant feats of the ages. The
outrageous accusations of these slanderers constitute a
gross libel upon a body of public servants who, for trained
intelligence, expert ability, high character and devotion
to duty, have never been excelled anywhere. There is not
a man among them directing the work on the Isthmus who
has obtained his position on any other basis than merit

456 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
alone, and not one who has used his position in any way
for his own personal or pecuniary advantage."
In this message the President renewed his request for
a smaller commission, saying that a seven-headed body was,
of course, a clumsy executive instrument, and asking for a
single commissioner with undivided powers and responsi
bilities. This request, like the former one, was not granted.
The President then decided upon a further exercise of his
power under the law, and consolidated the positions of
Chief Engineer and Chairman of the Commission in a
single person. Scarcely had this been done, when both
the Chairman and the Chief Engineer resigned, and the
President was fairly compelled to make a radical reorgan
ization of the Commission. As he said at the time, he had
no alternative except to turn it over to the army. He had
made two efforts to have the canal constructed by civihans,
but in both instances the civilian who was chief engineer
had resigned when he had become tired of the job. It was
useless to try to build the canal with a new chief engineer
every twelve months, since a permanent, stable force was
unattainable under such conditions, and without a perma
nent force satisfactory results could not be achieved. "I
propose now," he said, "to put the work in charge of men
who will stay on the job till I get tired of having them
there, or till I say they may abandon it." A new com
mission, composed mainly of army engineers and an en
gineer of the navy, was appointed and assumed duty on
April 1, 1907.
When I became Secretary of the Commission in 1905
it was giving serious consideration to the question of pro
viding means of recreation for the Americans who. com
prised the clerical, subordinate engineering, and skilled
mechanical elements of the working force of the canal.
Life on the Isthmus was without relief or diversion of any
kind. There were no reputable places of amusement, no
clubs, libraries or reading rooms. There was a constant
dread of sickness, for the health of the Canal Zone had not

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 457
yet been fully established, and with this dread the loneli
ness attending existence in a land not merely foreign but
lacking in most of the familiar comforts of modern civil
ization. The consequence was that after a sojourn of a few
months, the American employees became homesick, discon
tented, and depressed, lost interest in their work, and re
turned to the United States at the earliest opportunity.
During the first two years the annual changes in this part
of the force amounted to 90 per cent. It was clearly im
possible to hope for anything approximating a permanent
force and without a permanent force efficiency could not be
secured. The Commission, working on President Roosevelt's sug
gestion with the National Committee of the Young Men's
Christian Association, drew up a plan for the erection,
furnishing and operating, at the Commission's expense,
of recreation buildings or club-houses in the largest set
tlements of canal workers. It was estimated that each of
these buildings would cost about $35,000, fully furnished,
and that it would cost several thousand dollars a year to
run them under Y. M. C. A. management. The legal ad
viser of the Commission expressed the opinion that such
use of the Commission's appropriations was of doubtful
legality, and that when the bills came before the Comp
troller of the Treasury for approval he might reject them.
I took the matter to President Roosevelt and explained to
him the imperative need, physical and moral, of the
buildings to the welfare of the employees and the progress
of the work. He took the view that they were as necessary
as were suitable living quarters, good food, sanitation, and
other objects of expenditure for the health and welfare of
the force, since with a discontented and constantly chang
ing force the best results could not be secured.
He asked me why the Commission did not go ahead at
once and erect the buildings. When I informed him of the
legal adviser's opinion, he exclaimed: "You go back and
tell that man to keep his mouth shut. He is not there to
find objections;, let the other fellow do that. I want to

458 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
build the canal ; I do not want to be told how not to do it,
but how to do it. You tell the Commission to go ahead
and build the club-houses. I'll take the responsibihty. If
the ComptroUer of the Treasury throws out the bills, I'll
send a special message to Congress, asking for a special
appropriation for the purpose. I will see to it that our
boys down there are properly taken care of."
The club-houses were built, the Comptroller passed the
bills without question, and no objection to the use of the
money was ever raised in any quarter. Before the canal
was completed there were five of these larger buildings,
costing about $35,000 each and about $7,000 a year each
for their operation, together with several smaller ones.
They were the centers of social and athletic activities and
contributed immeasurably to the well-being and content
ment of the force, and, consequently, to the progress of the
work. If President Roosevelt, hesitating about his authority in
the matter, had referred it to Congress for action, it is
safe to assume what the result would have been. As usual
in such cases, there would have been a discussion lasting
anywhere from six months to a year, and, at the end of it,
an appropriation of a few thousand dollars for a single in
adequate building, possibly two. In the meantime the force
would have continued to change at the rate of 90 per cent, a
year, the progress of the work would have been retarded,
not merely for a few years, but for an indefinite period,
with possible failure as the ultimate outcome. Roosevelt's
prompt action made it possible to have several of the
buildings completed within a year, so that their beneficial
influence, so vitally needed, began almost immediately.
After the club-houses were put in operation, their man
agers reported a growing demand for books among the
members, and suggested the purchase of small libraries for
each building, there being no Ubraries or collections of
books for public use anywhere on the Isthmus. When this
suggestion was taken up for consideration by the Com
mission, the legal adviser again raised the question of le-

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 459
gality in connection with such use of the Government
money. Again I went to President Roosevelt, stating the
case to him, and saying that through inquiries to publishers
and booksellers I had ascertained that I could purchase
libraries of selected books, containing each 600 volumes,
for $500 each. "Why don't you buy them?" he asked. I
stated the legal adviser's opinion, whereupon he reiterated
with additional vigor, what he had said on the previous
occasion about the functions of the legal adviser, and
added : "You spend the money ; buy the books, and tell the
Commission I authorize the expenditure."
Again no objection was made by any one to this expendi
ture. The need was a real one. Later, when I was sta
tioned on the Isthmus, I was informed by many members
of the force that they had read every one of the books in
the libraries, and the demand for more was so insistent
that a small sum was set apart each year by the Commis
sion for the purchase of additional volumes. The benefi
cial effects of the presence of the books for use in idle hours
can scarcely be overestimated. Again, it may be asked,
what would have been the answer if Congress had been
requested to appropriate this money?
On the eve of sailing for permanent residence at Panama
in July, 1907, President Roosevelt summoned me to Oyster
Bay for final suggestions and instructions. He asked me,
as soon as I became familiar with the way matters were
going there, to write to him freely about them, telling him
what obstacles, if any, were hampering Colonel Goethals
and interfering with the progress of the work. He bade me
assure the Colonel that he should back him up in every
thing. After I. had been at Panama about a month I wrote
to the President a confidential letter — one of a series, in
fact— in which I told him that there was one very serious
obstacle to the highest attainable degree of progress and
that was the seven-headed Commission — that the first es
sential to the construction of the canal in the best manner
and in the shortest period of time was the placing of auto
cratic power in the hands of one man — Colonel Goethals.

460 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Under date of August 29, 1907, I received a reply from
the President in which he said:
"I am not surprised that the Colonel finds the Commis
sion a cumbersome body. As you know, my own behef has
always been that there should be one commissioner, and
with things as they are at present I would have him the
Chief Engineer of the Commission and let him appoint his
assistants — or have me appoint them if necessary, though
my preference would be to have him do so."
Writing again on September 6, 1907, in reply to another
letter of mine in which I had urged him to repeat the effort,
already made in vain on former occasions, to get Congress
to amend the law and reduce the size of the Commission,
the President wrote:
"Evidently Goethals is exactly the man for the work.
How fortunate we have been to get him ! . . . Wnether we
get the change of law or not, he shall reaUy have all the
powers that he would have if he were the Chief Engineer
in sole charge of the work with the executive under him
and the other engineers as an advisory board. Of course,
the wise thing for him to do is, so far as possible, to act
first and then have his acts confirmed by the Commission."
On receipt of this letter I showed it to Colonel Goethals.
As he finished reading it, he arose from his chair, and with
his always erect figure if possible more erect than ever,
he exclaimed : ' ' Now I have both feet on the ground — and
I'll build the canal!"
How completely the President kept his word will be
shown as this narrative proceeds. I will make one other
extract from his letters of that period in order to show how
unvaryingly the President stood behind Colonel Goethals.
His only question to me, whenever I went to him or wrote
to him asking for some action on his part, was invariably:
"Is this what Goethals wants?" If I answered that it
was, nothing more was said and the action was taken. In
a letter under date of September 11, 1907, the President

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 461
wrote in regard to an official on the Isthmus who had been
the leader in working up opposition to Colonel Goethals :
"He (naming him) has done good work, and I am sure
the Colonel will give him an absolutely fair chance. If
he does well and acts in entire harmony with the Colonel,
he will stay; otherwise he will not. I shall back up the
Colonel on aU points."
The official in question was given "an absolutely fair
chance" by Colonel Goethals, but he failed to improve it,
and he was asked for his resignation. In announcing his
forthcoming departure, under date of May 23, 1908, the
President wrote me a letter which is worth quoting for
its revelation of his attitude toward newspaper assaults:
"Blank is going, so that you need not have any anxiety
on that score. As for scandalous articles of the kind you
enclose, why of course they will appear about you, and
Colonel Goethals and me, and everybody else, and I don't
care a snap of my fingers about them. ' '
When in December, 1907, Colonel Goethals arrived in
Washington, the President at once fulfilled his promise to
put full power into his hands. He told the Colonel to have
an Executive Order drawn up to accompUsh that purpose.
This was done, but when it was submitted to Secretary
Taft, then at the head of the War Department, he said that
he did not think it was entirely in accordance with law, but
as it had been prepared at the President's direction he
advised Colonel Goethals to take it to the White House and
see what the President thought of it. Colonel Goethals, in
his own account of the incident, published in Scribner's
Magazine, in May, 1913, describes what took place as fol
lows: "After reading it, the President reached for a pen, ask
ing if it was satisfactory to me. I replied affirmatively, but
explained that Mr. Taft thought that it was not exactly
in accord with the law. To this the President rephed that
he would take his chances with the law, adding that he
wanted the canal built."

462 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
The Order was signed January 6, 1908, and under its pro
visions Colonel Goethals assumed the autocratic powers
which he exercised without opposition till the completion
of the work. In the narrative in Scribner's Magazine, from
which I have quoted above, Colonel Goethals spoke of the
effect of the Order :
"Now that the Canal is in operation, I doubt if this re
sult could have been accomplished in any other way than
by a single responsible head. This President Roosevelt
realized the first time I met him, and I have consequently
felt that to this Order and to the support given to me in
carrying it out are due the results that have been attained."
In that view I concur absolutely, for I was present on
the Isthmus when this and other similar acts, "backing up
the Colonel at all points," were performed by President
Roosevelt and I know from personal observation that with
out them the canal would not have been built in anything
like the time in which it was.
An incident which occurred immediately foUowing the
election of Mr. Wilson to the Presidency illustrated the su
preme value of Roosevelt's support to Colonel Goethals.
The old opposition forces in the Commission got together
immediately with a new member who had been sent down
by Secretary Bryan, and questioned the absolute authority
which Colonel Goethals had been and was still exercising.
They asked him where he got it, and when he replied that-
it came from the Executive Order of January 6, 1908, they
declared that he exceeded the powers conferred in that.
He admitted it, but added that President Roosevelt had said
to him that he gave him all the powers that he could in that
Order but that if he wanted more power, to exercise it and
he (Roosevelt) would approve his acts. When they charged
that such action was illegal, the Colonel called their atten
tion to the fact that all of President Roosevelt's acts in
reference to the canal had been approved by Congress and
President Wilson in the new Canal Act for the operation
of the canal, and hence had been made lawful.

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 463
This was the incontestable fact in the case. If Roosevelt
"took his chances" with the law, whenever the law seemed
to stand in the way of progress, he won out completely in
the end, vindicating his position that while he could not
do what the law explicitly forbade him to do, he could do
whatever was essential to progress even if the law did
not explicitly empower him to do it.
Time was to justify fully the wisdom and foresight of the
President's decision in favor of a lock canal, for long be
fore the canal was completed the serious difficulties caused
by the "slides" in the walls of the canal through the
mountain range, known as the "Culebra Cut," demon
strated conclusively the impossibility of construction at sea
level. As Colonel Goethals, under whose able and inspiring
leadership the work was carried to completion, said at a
critical moment in the task : ' ' There is not money enough
in the world to construct a canal at sea-level, and, if con
structed, it could not be kept open."
That the President was willing to change the type of
canal, if convinced that he had made a mistake, he showed
in a letter that he wrote to Colonel Goethals on December
13, 1908, when the advocates of a sea-level canal were mak
ing a concerted and vigorous assault upon the lock type by
declaring that the Gatun Dam, which was to hold back the
great lake which was to supply water for the locks, was
so defective that it would never hold water. "Fake"
stories of many kinds were widely circulated in the United
States in support of the assertion. It was in the midst of
this campaign of misrepresentation that the President
wrote :
"I intend to send Mr. Taft down to the Isthmus in Jan
uary, together with four or five of the best engineers in the
country, for a last and complete overhauling of the ques
tion in connection with the Gatun Dam. General Davis and
several others are convinced that the Gatun Dam will be a
failure, and all kinds of rumors come up here about it, while
there is an evident movement in favor of a sea-level canal.
"Now, my behef is, simply as a layman and judging from

464 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
what I have heard, that the present plan is the right plan ;
that the Gatun Dam can be built with entire safety, and that
the sea-level canal is not advisable. But I don't care a rap
about consistency in the matter, and you mustn't either.
Nobody must care anything excepting to get the canal
built according to the best and safest plans. The issue is
altogether too big to be complicated in any way by any
point of pride as to past recommendations by me or by
any one else. I want you therefore to approach the subject
with an absolutely open mind, and to consult with Mr.
Taft and the engineers he will bring with him, purely on
the basis of finding out what the facts are and what is best
to be done. Will you write me freely as to your judgment
now and as to the reasons for your judgment?"
In reply Colonel Goethals expressed implicit faith in the
plan of canal and in the Gatun Dam, an opinion which time
and experience have amply confirmed. He said to me later
in regard to the President 's letter that he had the greatest
admiration for it — considered it a supreme revelation of
Roosevelt's character.
The commission which accompanied Mr. Taft on his visit
made an exhaustive examination of the dam and of the
canal plan and coincided entirely in the opinion of Colonel
Goethals. In fact, it may be said of his securing the building of the
canal, as of getting control of the Isthmus, that President
Roosevelt "won off his own bat." When Congress failed
to give him the powers necessary for the effective construc
tion of the canal, he assumed those powers and conducted
the work through Executive Orders. When Congress de
clined his request to reduce the size of the Canal Commis
sion and concentrate its authority in a single head, he ac
complished his object by issuing an Executive Order which
placed supreme power in the hands of Colonel Goethals.
From time to time his course was denounced in Congress
as illegal and even unconstitutional, but he went calmly and
steadily ahead, and when he had accomplished the build-

BUILDER OF THE PANAMA CANAL 465
ing of the canal, Congress passed an act for its operation
and maintenance in which all his acts were approved. In
this proceeding Congress followed the course of the Senate
in giving approval to his "taking" of the Isthmus by ratify
ing the treaty with the Republic of Panama.
Theodore Roosevelt "took" the Isthmus, and he built the
canal because he placed action and progress above technical
construction of law and was not afraid to take chances with
it when the end to be attained could be reached in no other
way. His attitude toward the law and the use of the Exec
utive power is clearly defined by himself in this passage
from his 'Autobiography7:
"The most important factor in getting the right spirit in
my Administration, next to the insistence upon courage,
honesty, and a genuine democracy of desire to serve the
plain people, was my insistence upon the theory that the
executive power was limited only by specific restrictions
and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed
by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view
was that every executive officer, and above all every exec
utive officer in high position, was a steward of the people
bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the
people, and not to content himself with the negative merit
of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I decline to
adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for
the Nation could not be done by the President unless he
could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief
was that it was not only his right but his duty to do any
thing that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such
action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.
Under this interpretation of executive power I did and
caused to be done many things not previously done by the
President and the heads of the departments. I did not
usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive
power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I
acted for the common well-being of all our people, when
ever and in whatever manner was necessary, unless pre
vented by direct constitutional or legislative prohibition.

466 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of power ;
I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the
substance." His line of action was, therefore, in regard to the canal,
the one which he followed uniformly in the conduct of pub
Uc affairs— not to find reasons for not doing it, but ways in
which to do it — to seek for results and get them. Also, not
to pick out weak men for great tasks, but to select the best
and strongest men he could obtain and, when selected, to
back them to the limit so long as they showed themselves
equal to the task. He found in Colonel Goethals a man of
his own sort, who was not afraid to take power and who
knew how to exercise it. The two made a noble team, and
they scored a "victory of peace" that has brought honor
to the American name throughout the world.

CHAPTER XXXVI
SECRET HISTORY OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE
It is a diplomatic secret that President Roosevelt is enti
tled to the credit of arranging the important Algeciras
Conference of 1906 and dictating the terms on which war
between France and Germany, with the possible involve
ment of England as the ally of France, was averted. His
service as peacemaker in this controversy, rendered in re
sponse to the earnest and repeated appeals of the Kaiser,
was equaled only by that which at the same time he was
rendering to the world in bringing to an end the war be
tween Russia and Japan. Secretary Root said of it to me,
many years later, that he considered it of far greater im
portance to the world than the Portsmouth settlement.
Happily a full history of what Roosevelt did is extant, nar
rated by himself. It is in the form of a letter, addressed
on April 28, 1906, to Whitelaw Reid, then American Am
bassador in London. This letter, which bears the impress
of Roosevelt in every line, contains all the confidential cor
respondence which passed between him and the German
and French Ambassadors, with the communications of their
governments, including messages of the Kaiser. In the end
the President fairly compelled the Kaiser to accept the
terms upon which the final agreement was reached by the
Convention. These documents have never been published,
not even in the Blue Book, as the President says in his let
ter. Their full text is given here as historical material of
the first interest and value. THE LETTER
Absolutely private and confidential.
i# 7 t, -^ APru 28, 1906.
My dear Reid:
Now you are about to receive a quarto-volume from me
467

468 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and I hope it will not daunt you. But there has been so
much that is amusing and interesting, and indeed so much
that has been of importance, in the queer negotiations
wherein I have been the medium between France and Ger
many during the past year that it is possibly worth your
while to know of them a little in detail.
On March 6, 1905, Sternburg came to me with a message
from the Kaiser to ask me to join with the Kaiser in in
forming the Sultan of Morocco that he ought to reform
his government, and that if he would do so we would stand
behind him for the open door and would support him in any
opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is
to France) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Mo
rocco. On the following day he submitted to me a memo
randum to the same effect, stating that the Emperor re
garded France and Spain as "a political unity," who wished
to divide up Morocco between themselves and debar her
markets to the rest of the world, and that if Spain should
occupy Tangiers and France to the Hinterland they would
be able to dominate the roads to the Near and Far East.
I answered this by stating that I did not see my way clear
to interfere in the matter, for I did not think that our in
terests were sufficiently great, but expressed my friendli
ness to Germany generally and my expectation and belief
that her policy was one for peace. I had some further
interviews with Speck, and on April 5th he wrote me again.
This time he maintained that England and France were
allies ; that he must insist upon a conference of the powers
to settle the fate of Morocco. In this memorandum he (the
Emperor) stated that Germany asked for no gains in Mo
rocco; she simply defended her interests and stood for
equal rights to all nations there. He then added, in Speck's
words :
"Besides this she is bound to think of her national dig
nity. This makes it necessary for her to point out to
France that her national interests cannot be disposed of
without asking her for her consent and cooperation. Since
35 years Germany has been obliged to keep an armed de-

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 469
fensive towards France. As soon as France discovers that
Germany meekly submits to her bullying, we feel sure that
she will become more aggressive in other quarters and we
do not consider a demand for a revision of the Treaty
of Frankfort to be far off."
The Emperor evidently felt safe in the position of defi
ance to France, which he had already adopted, because as
he (Speck) said : "According to the information which the
Emperor has received he feels sure that England's aid
to France in the matter will not go beyond a 'diplomatic
support.' This, he hopes, will keep France isolated, and,
with or without a conference, he expects that the status quo
in Morocco can be peacefully improved and, above all, the
rights of all foreigners safeguarded there. ' ' On April 13th
Speck wrote me again, saying that the Italian Government
had informed the Emperor of their sympathy with his po
sition, and of their conviction that France would "only con
tinue her aggressive policy in Morocco, aimed at all non-
French interests, if she feels sure that England will stand
by her and eventually show herself ready to back her up
by force of arms." To this the Emperor added that he be
lieved that the attitude of England would depend upon the
attitude of the United States, and asked us to tell England
that we thought there should be a conference.
On April 25th he wrote me again, saying that the Em
peror would be most grateful to me if I would intimate to
England that I would like to see her and Germany in har
mony in their dealings with Morocco. On May 13th he
sent me another memorandum, insisting that there must
be a general conference and complaining of England for
opposing this conference, and stating that the latter would
only drop her opposition if I would give her a hint to do so.
The Emperor also in this memorandum stated, with a dis
tinct note of self-righteousness, that he had refused invi
tations from France to come to an agreement with her
alone, because he was disinterestedly championing the
cause of the world at large. He then used these words:

470 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
' ' The Emperor states that his policy is absolutely clear and
simple. In spite of special advantages offered to him he
stands by the treaty rights granted to all. Only if he
should discover that he should receive no support from the
interested treaty powers in connection with the open door
and the conference, he would be forced to think of Ger
many alone. Only then — and not before — he would have to
choose between the possibility of a war with France and the
examining of those conditions which France may have to
propose, so as to avoid a war."
During the rest of this letter Speck describes the Em
peror's indignation with the King of England and with the
British Government, and expresses the Emperor's behef
that France, England and Russia possibly with the coop
eration of Japan were aiming at the partition of China.
This last supposition seemed to me mere lunacy, if it was
put forward with sincerity. The comic feature of the
memorandum, considering the closeness of Germany's rela
tions with Russia at the outset of the Russo-Japanese war,
was that the Emperor complained that France, ignoring
aU the laws of nations, had offered the Russian fleet a safe
retreat in the harbors of Indo-China, and had provided that
fleet with means to prepare its attack, which action might
result in a turn of the war in favor of Russia. The Em
peror added :
"On the other hand the Emperor feels that England will
drop this or any other plan, if she finds out in time that it
would be opposed by America. The violent renewal of the
anti-German movement in England seems to be caused by
Germany's attempt to balk any coalition of Powers directed
against China after the conclusion of peace."
On May 29th the Emperor stated that both England and
France had offered to give Germany a sphere of interest in
Morocco if she would accept it and let the question remain
quiet, but that the Emperor had refused, stating that he
was for the maintenance "of the status quo and for the
open door and for equal treatment of all nations whose

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 471
rights were established by treaties. ' ' (It will be seen later
on how comically the Emperor tried to go back on this prop
osition.) Two days later Speck sent me another memo
randum from the Emperor, stating that he regarded the
Morocco question not as an isolated question, but as one
which might deyelop into a starting point for a new group
ing of the Powers. He again, in this memorandum, threat
ened a war with France, using the following language: "If
England is successful in causing the refusal of France to
join in a conference to settle the Morocco question, Ger
many will have to choose between war with France or be
tween an understanding with France with regard to Mo
rocco, which repeatedly has been sought for by France.
Such an understanding, the Emperor beUeves, is to form
the basis of a new grouping of European powers to which
he is strongly opposed, being most anxious to maintain in
the future his attitude, especially with regard to the Far
East, as clearly explained to you. Everything he thinks
depends on the attitude you may consider fit to take to
wards a conference of the treaty powers to settle the Mo
rocco question. England is the only power which opposes
such a conference, though it seems sure she will drop her
objections in case you should participate in the confer
ence." The day after I received yet another letter from
Speck, showing that the United States had signed the con
vention of Madrid with reference to Morocco, in 1880.
Meanwhile my own attitude can be best gathered by the
following two letters, which I sent while on my bear hunt,
one to Taft, who was then acting as Secretary of State in
Hay's absence, and the other to Speck:
Confidential.Dictated by the President in camp, East Divide Creek,
Colorado. Glbnwood Springs, Colo.,
April 20, 1905.
Dear Will:
I think you are keeping the lid on in great shape ! Ap-

472 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
parently the Santo Domingo pot is not bubbling much at
present, but we have troubles enough elsewhere.
The Kaiser's pipe-dream this week takes the form of
Morocco. Speck has written me an urgent appeal to sound
the British Government and find out whether they intend to
back up France in gobbling Morocco. I have told him to
see you and lay the matter definitely before you. There
was one part of the Kaiser's letter which he asked me to
treat as strictly confidential, and I do not know whether
Speck will tell you about it or not. ... I do not feel that as
a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter.
We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in
Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and
Germany in the matter.
At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants
I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely
anxious to bring about a better state of feehng between
England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up
to a condition of desperate hatred of the other ; each from
sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that Eng
land intends to attack him. The English Government and
a large share of the English people are equally sure that
Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this
action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over
Morocco is proof positive that she has not the slightest
intention of attacking England. I am very clear in my be
lief that England utterly over-estimates, as well as mis
estimates, Germany's singleness of purpose, by attributing
to the German Foreign Office the kind of power of con
tinuity of aim which it had from '64 to '71. I do not wish
to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in
Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety
and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. But
I have to leave a large discretion in your hands in this
matter, for if we find that it will make the English sus
picious — that is, will make them think we are acting as
decoy ducks for Germany — why, we shall .have to drop the
business. Fortunately, you and I play the diplomatic game

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 473
exactly alike, and I should advise your being absolutely
frank with both Speck and the British people along the
lines I have indicated, unless you have counter suggestions
to make. Remember, however, that both parties are very
suspicious. You remember the King's message to me
through Harry White and his earnest warning to me that
I should remember that England was our real friend and
that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the
same way the Germans are always insisting that England
is really on the point of entering into a general coalition
which would practically be inimical to us — an act which
apart from moral considerations I regard the British Gov
ernment as altogether too flabby to venture upon.
tT -IP "Sp -jf ^f *
Ever yours,
Theodore Roosevelt, L.
P. S. If you deem it wise to see the British Ambassador
at all, do be careful to explain to him that we are taking
sides neither with France nor Germany, but that we would
like to convey Germany's request for information to Eng
land, and that we are acting in thus conveying it simply
from a desire to make things as comfortable between Eng
land and Germany as possible. . . .
Dictated by the President in camp, East Divide Creek,
Colorado. Personal. Glenwood Springs, Colorado,
April 20, 1905.
Dear Speck:
Your letter containing the Emperor's communication
about Morocco is the first thing that has made me wish I
was not off on a hunt, for I hardly know how to arrange out
here what the Emperor requests. As I told you before,
I dislike taking a position in any matter like this unless
I fully intend to back it up, and our interests in Morocco
are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in en-

474 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
tangling our Government in the matter. You do not have
to be told by me that I am already working in the most cor
dial agreement with the Emperor about China and the
Japanese-Russian war, while I have matters of my own in
Santo Domingo, Venezuela and Panama to which I must
give attention and from which I do not feel it right to be
diverted ; but I have told Taft substantially what you have
said in your letter excepting the portion about the com
munication from the Italian Government which the Em
peror requested me to treat as purely confidential. Will
you take this letter at once to Secretary Taft, show it to
him, and tell him exactly how far you want us to go in
sounding the British Government. Meanwhile I shall write
him, quoting the proposal of the Emperor as to our sound
ing the British Government and shaU suggest his finding
out from Sir Mortimer what the British Government's
views in the matter are. I do not think I should go any
further than this at present. I am sorry I am not in Wash
ington, for I should at once see the British Ambassador
myself and let you know just how things stood.
Thank Admiral von Tirpitz for the very interesting
memorandum of the Navy.
# * * # # #
Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt,
Per W. L. Jr.
Baron H. Sternburg,
German Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.
At the end of May I came back to Washington, and found
Jusserand and Speck both greatly concerned lest there
should be a war between France and Germany. Both of
them were sincerely anxious to avert such a possibility,
and each thought that his own Government ought to make
concessions to avoid the war. Speck, I firmly believe, did
not approve of the action his Government was taking, but

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 475
of course was obliged loyally to back up its position. Jus
serand, on the other hand, sympathized absolutely with the
general French indignation with Germany, but felt that
it was better to yield so far as the conference was con
cerned, if it could be done honorably, rather than have a
war. I saw Sir Mortimer on the matter, but could get very little
out of him. He was bitter about Germany, and so far as
he represented the British Government it would appear
that they were anxious to see Germany humiliated by
France's refusal to enter a conference, and that they were
quite willing to face the possibility of war under such cir
cumstances. I did not think this showed much valor on
their part, although from their point of view it was saga
cious, as of course in such a war, where the British and
French fleets would be united, the German fleet could have
done absolutely nothing; while on land, where Germany
was so powerful, it would be France alone that would stand,
and would have to stand, the brunt of the battle. I desired
to do anything I legitimately could for France ; because I
hke France, and I thought her in this instance to be in the
right; but I did not intend to take any position which I
would not be willing at all costs to maintain.
On June 5th you telegraphed from London that Lans
downe had asked for an indication of my views on the
Morocco situation, and stated that he regarded the pro
posal of joint action of the powers represented in Morocco
as unfortunate, and as possibly planned to embarrass
France. About the same time White cabled from Rome
that the Italian Government evidently feared the confer
ence was inevitable unless France was able otherwise to
pacify Germany's susceptibilities, but that the British Am
bassador felt sure that there would be no conference.
I suppose I need hardly say that the English, French and
Italian representatives all strenuously denied the state
ments as to the propositions which Germany said their
nations had made to her as regards her sphere of interest
in Morocco, etc. I did not regard the various matters in

476 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
which there was this contradiction as important; partly
because I had not at any time credited the three powers
named with having made the several propositions they
were alleged by the German Government to have made.
On June 11th, the Kaiser, through Speck, sent me an
other memorandum, running as follows: "June 11, 1905.
' ' Memorandum — ( Morocco )
"Mr. Rouvier (who has shown himself distinctly friendly
to Germany and has been opposing Mr. Delcasse) has in
directly informed the German Charge d 'Affaires in Paris
that England has made a formal offer to France to enter
into an offensive and defensive alliance with England which
would be directed against Germany. At present the lead
ing statesmen of France are opposed to such an aUiance,
because the majority of the members of the French Gov
ernment still hope to come to a satisfactory agreement
with Germany. But it was emphasized, the time had ar
rived for Germany to make up her mind with regard to
Morocco, otherwise France would be forced to place her
self in closer touch with England.
"Indirectly Germany has been given to understand that
the French Government is desirous of giving her a portion
of Morocco under the name of a 'sphere of interest,' France
apportioning the greater part of Morocco to herself. Such
an offer Germany now can not accept, as it was through
the council of Germany that the Sultan of Morocco placed
himself on the ground of the conference of Madrid. Hence
Germany is pledged by honor to stand by the Sultan.
'Here,' says the Emperor, 'is a curious case: — we may be
forced into war not because we have not been grabbing
after people's land, but because we refuse to take it.'
"My people are sure that England would now back
France by force of arms in a war against Germany, not on
account of Morocco, but on account of Germany's policy
in the Far East. The combined naval forces of England
and France would undoubtedly smash the German navy
and give England, France, Japan and Russia a more free

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 477
hand in the Far East, and Russia might try to cede a por
tion of China to Japan as a war indemnity, instead of part
ing with the island of Saghalien. The previous destruction
of the German navy undoubtedly would be welcomed by
these powers.
"As regards a conference to be held in Morocco, the
British Government has asked for time to consider the
question. The Emperor feels sure that if you could give
a hint now in London and in Paris that, all things put to
gether, you would consider a conference as the most satis
factory means to bring the Morocco question to a peaceful
solution, you would render the peace of the world another
great service, without encountering any risk. In case you
should not feel inclined to take this step the Emperor be
lieves that your influence could prevent England from join
ing a Franco-German war, started by the aggressive policy
of France in Morocco.
"As to the present attitude in France towards the Mo
rocco question a marked change is noticeable since the re
tirement of Mr. Delcasse. Voices are now heard which
consider a conference not only as the most legal, but also
as the safest way to clear a situation which has been cre
ated by the reckless statesmanship of Mr. Delcasse."
It really did look as if there might be a war, and I felt in
honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the
first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a
real calamity to civilization; and in the next place, as I
was already trying to bring about peace between Russia
and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might result in what
would literally be a world-conflagration; and finally, for
the sake of France. Accordingly, I took active hold of the
matter with both Speck and Jusserand, and after a series
of communications with the French Government, through
Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up. Jus
serand repeated to his government substantially just what
I said. I told him that as chief of state I could not let
America do anything quixotic, but that I had a real senti-

478 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
ment for France; that I would not advise her to do any
thing humiliating or disgraceful ; but that it was eminently
wise to avoid a war if it could be done by adopting a course
which would save the Emperor 's self-esteem ; that for such
purpose it was wise to help him save his face. I urged
upon the French Government, in the first place, the great
danger of war to them, and the fact that British assistance
could avail them very, very little in the event of such a
war, because France would be in danger of invasion by
land ; and in the next place, I pointed out that if there were
a conference of the Powers France would have every rea
son to believe that the conference would not sanction any
unjust attack by Germany upon French interests, and that
if all the Powers, or practically all the Powers, in the con
ference took an attitude favorable to France on such a
point it would make it well-nigh impossible for Germany
to assail her. I explained that I would not accept the invi
tation of the conference unless France was willing, and that
if I went in I would treat both sides with absolute justice,
and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against
any attitude of Germany which seemed to me unjust and
unfair. At last, the French Government informed me through
Jusserand that it would agree to the conference. At this
time I was having numerous interviews with both Jus
serand and Speck. With Speck I was on close terms ; with
Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever met, and
whose country was in the right on this issue, I was on even
closer terms. On the 23d of June he received from the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs a despatch running in
part as follows : [Original in French]
"During his recent conversations with you, President
Roosevelt came to the conclusion that however unjust it
might be on the part of Germany to declare war under the
present circumstances, it was nevertheless possible, and
that it should be avoided by the use of conciUation, and

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 479
that among the concessions which we might make a con
ference would without doubt be the least undesirable.
"When communicating to the President our reply to the
German note, be good enough to tell him that his ideas and
advice inspired it. At first we thought that it would suf
fice to contradict the false statements which had been pub
lished regarding our action in Morocco and to show that
such action menaced no interests. We have gone farther
and shown ourselves ready to accept, owing to necessity,"
the idea of a conference, in spite of serious reasons we had
to entertain objections to such a project.
"But nothing has so far occurred to prove that even by
a conference an agreement can be reached. Up to the
present moment it is impossible to determine with certainty
the immediate aim of Germany. The German Ambassador
assures us that so far as Germany is concerned there is in
aU this affair only a question of form and of etiquette, that
it is only to test the right of the signatory powers to the
Convention of Madrid, that a temporary regime of very
short duration would suffice to estabhsh such right, and
that then France could take up again the realization of
her program. But in thus circumscribing the range of
German action, Prince Radolin fails to make in the name of
bis Government any proposition save that of a conference.
The rest, he says, is merely a deduction, which he himself
makes from the nature of things, and he avoids making
known the attitude which the German Government will take
at the conference. At the same time the Emperor takes
steps to inform us in Paris that all the forces of Germany
are behind the Sultan of Morocco, and he uses the most
menacing language towards us at Washington, at Rome
and at Madrid.
"Mr. Roosevelt can avert the danger. Tell him that the
exceptional authority which attaches to his counsel, not
only because of his office, but also because of his character,
his sense of right and justice, and his clear perception of
what are the highest interests, qualify him in supreme

480 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
degree to intervene in favor of the maintenance of peace.
The insistence with which the Emperor has appealed to
him, has left the way open for the President to take the
initiative that we expect from his friendship."

On the 25th of June Jusserand sent a despatch to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, running in full as
follows : [Original in French]
"I talked with President Roosevelt to-night regarding
the reasons for urgent intervention on his part in order
to avoid the break with which Germany would seem to de
sire to menace us. In order to bring him into touch with
the situation, I used the data contained in your two tele
grams. "My appeals were most favorably received. The Presi
dent declared to me that he would have this evening a very
earnest conversation with Baron Sternburg, during which
he would insist, in the first place, upon what the Emperor
owes to himself, and also upon his solicitude for his fame
in history, for no one would understand, or pardon wars
entered into for frivolous reasons. He will emphasize the
very real successes achieved by German diplomacy, and
also the fact of our adhering to his idea of a conference,
under conditions regarding the details of which it is im
possible not to come to an understanding. He will, on the
other hand, allude to the risks to be run, citing the opinion
of French experts on the condition of the French army, and
saying that it is not used by me simply to make an impres
sion, but it is really what they think of the army and that
a German victory is by no means assured. He wiU men
tion finally the support which without doubt would not fail
us and which would be very formidable for Germany. 'I
would like to be sure that my words will bear fruit,' Mr.
Roosevelt added, 'but unfortunately I am not; however, in
any event you can be sure that I will be as energetic as
possible in favor of an amicable understanding and that

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 481
I shall neglect nothing which appears to me as being con
ducive to such an end. '
"I informed the President of the sentiments which Your
Excellency instructed me to express to him. He did not
desire to let me finish, saying that what he was doing was
only too natural to warrant any thanks. I added that the
telegram which I had received from the President of the
Council expressed much gratitude, but not the least sur
prise. 'There,' said the President, 'is the real compliment
which gratifies me.' "
On June 18th, Speck wrote to me, saying that the Em
peror greatly appreciated the change which was noticed in
the policy of France since the action I had taken as regards
the Morocco question, adding, "Your diplomatic activity
with regard to France, the Emperor says, has been the
greatest blessing to the peace of the world." I wrote to
Speck the following three letters, all of which I showed to
Jusserand before I sent them, as I did not wish there to be
any suspicion of double dealing on my part ; and Jusserand
is a man of such excellent judgment, so sound and cool-
headed, and of so high a standard of personal and profes
sional honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed,
it was only because both Jusserand and Sternburg were
such excellent men, that I was enabled to do anything at
all in so difficult and delicate a matter. I could only have
acted with men I was sure of. With such a tricky creature
as the Russian Cassini, for instance, I could have done ab
solutely nothing; and little or nothing with amiable Sir
Mortimer. My three letters were as follows :
Personal. White House,
Washington, June 20, 1905.
Dear Speck:
Pray thank His Majesty and say that if I have been of
any use in keeping the peace I am of course more than glad.

482 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
I shall be in Massachusetts for the next two days, but will
see you Friday or Saturday. Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
Baron H. Sternburg,
The German Ambassador,
Deer Park, Maryland.

White House,
Washington, June 23, 1905.
My dear Mr. Ambassador:
I hope to see you at nine Sunday evening. Meanwhile,
pray communicate to His Majesty that in accordance with
the suggestion I made to Ambassador Jusserand in pur
suance of the letter you sent me, the French Government
informs me unofficially through the Ambassador that it has
ceased its opposition to a conference of the powers on
Morocco. It seems as a matter of course that a program
of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance
with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be
arranged between Germany and France.
Let me congratulate the Emperor most warmly on his
diplomatic success in securing the assent of the French
Government to the holding of this conference. I had not
believed that the Emperor would be able to secure this
assent and to bring about this conference, from which un
doubtedly a peaceful solution of all the troubles will come.
I need not say to you that I consider such peaceful solution
as vitally necessary to the welfare of the world at this time,
and in view of its having been secured by the Emperor's
success in obtaining this conference, I wish again to ex
press my hearty congratulation. It is a diplomatic triumph
of the first magnitude. Faithfully yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.
Baron H. Sternburg,
The German Ambassador.

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 483
White House,
Washington, June 25, 1905.
My dear Mr. Ambassador:
I have received from M. Jusserand the foUowing extract
from a telegram sent to him by M. Rouvier :
"You reported to me your conversation with President
Roosevelt, who asked you to inform us that, according to
his views, much prudence should be used in present cir
cumstances, and that we ought to consider the idea of a
conference as a concession we might make. ... Be so good
as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have
received from us due consideration and have caused us to
take the resolution we have just adopted. We had first
thought that, in order to remove the erroneous impressions
held about our action in Morocco, it would be enough to
show that it threatens no interests whatsoever. But now
we have gone further, and have declared that we are ready
to accept a conference, in spite of the serious reasons we
had to entertain objections against such a project."
I shall ask, Mr. Ambassador, that in forwarding this in
formation to His Majesty you explain that it is of course
confidential. I need hardly tell you how glad I was to secure this in
formation from the French Ambassador. As you know,
I was at first extremely reluctant to do anything in the
matter which might savor of officious interference on my
part; and I finally determined to present the case to the
French Government only because I wished to do anything
I properly could do which the Emperor asked, and of course
also because I felt the extreme importance of doing any
thing possible to maintain the peace of the world. As you
know, I made up my mind to speak to France rather than
to England, because it seemed to me that it would be use
less to speak to England ; for I felt that if a war were to
break out, whatever might happen to France, England
would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her
colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case, I did
not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight

484 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
with England, and instead I made a very earnest request
of France that she should do as the Emperor desired and
agree to hold the conference. The French Government
have now done just what at His Majesty's request I urged
should be done.
Now, in turn I most earnestly and with all respect urge
that His Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this
yielding to his wishes by France. I trust that the Emperor
understands that I would not for any consideration advise
him to do anything that would be against the interest or
the honor either of himself or of his people, any more than
I would counsel such an action as regards my own country;
and I say conscientiously that I am advising just the con
duct that I would myself take under like circumstances;
and I venture to give the advice at all only because, as I
took the action I did on the Emperor's request, it seems but
right that in reporting the effect of this action I should'
give my own views thereon. I say with all possible em
phasis that I regard this yielding by France, this conces
sion by her which she had said she could not make and
which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph
for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now
accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany but
a triumph. You know that I am not merely a sincere ad
mirer and well-wisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty.
I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns
of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and
that it is not only of the utmost importance for his own
people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that
his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired.
I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be
most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about
minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful
calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and
honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great
triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England
and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself
did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 485
tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I
earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept
it as the triumph it is.
With high regard,

Sincerely yours,
Theodore Roosevelt.

Baron H. Sternburg,
German Ambassador.

There was, however, much higgling as to exactly what
should be discussed at the conference ; and both Jusserand
and Speck came to me to say they were still on the verge
of seeing the negotiations broken off. Finally I made a
pencil memorandum as follows: "The two Governments
consent to go to the conference with no program, and to
discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of
course where either is in honor bound by a previous agree
ment with another power." I gave a copy of this memo
randum to Jusserand and the memorandum itself to Speck,
and after they had transmitted it to their respective gov
ernments, I received the assent of both governments to the
proposition. I explained to both that I did not care to ap
pear in the matter, and that no publicity whatever would
be given by me or by any of our representatives to what
I had done, and I thought it far better that it should take
the shape of an agreement freely entered into by them
selves. You may remember that not a hint of any kind got
out throughout the whole of last summer as to my taking
any part in this Morocco business.
Jusserand forwarded my memorandum in a despatch to
his home government, on June 28th, which ran in part as
follows : [Original in French]
"I called to mind the gravef reasons which we have for
discarding all idea of a conference without previously hav
ing drawn up a program, or at least without an under
standing, indicating that which we might have reason to
expect and guaranteeing in particular that solemn inter-

486 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
national undertakings, which have for a long time been
public property, should not be brought into question. We
could not be asked to deny our signature.
'<With a sovereign of the temperament of WiUiam II,
who has just given, by the very documents which he has
furnished to the President, such disquieting proofs of his
lack of moderation and even of exactness, we are more
particularly inclined to a course of prudence than with
another. "Following these remarks the President took a piece of
paper and endeavored to find some formula, which would
be acceptable to the two countries and which would at the
same time respect the pride of WilUam II and our rights.
The text of this formula is given below, which formula,
however, could be slightly modified before being sent, but
in which the general sense will certainly remain the same.
"The President in no wise contends that this is a per
fect and unalterable formula, but he hopes that it perhaps
may offer the basis of an understanding and therefore he
had it submitted to the Kaiser by Baron Sternburg on the
afternoon of Sunday. He is certain that the scope of such
an understanding would be to eliminate from discussion
the advantages of which we have assured ourselves with
various foreign nations, for we have not obtained them
except in consideration of making corresponding conces
sions to their profit, which must remain irrevocable and
which we are in honor bound to live up to. The acceptance
therefore of a formula of this nature would be, in short,
the realization of the program desired by us."
On June 28th I received the following letter from Speck:
Deer Park, Md.,
June 28, 1905.
Dear Mr. President:
I have just received a telegram from Berlin which ex
presses highest satisfaction and gratitude with regard to
the latest step you undertook in the interest of the Morocco
conference.

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 487
The telegram repeats a wire from the German Ambas
sador at Paris, who says that Rouvier is having a most
difficult time. Delcasse 's followers are trying hard to force
him to accept Delcasse 's colonial program, and England is
making a frantic effort to prevent the acceptance of the
invitation to the conference by the council of ministers,
which meets to-day. The Ambassador expresses the belief
that Rouvier 's backing will be strong enough to pull him
through. The Emperor has requested me to tell you that
in case during the coming conference differences of opinion
should arise between France and Germany, he, in every
case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should
consider to be the most fair and the most practical.
In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance which
you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in the
interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives.
Believe me, Mr. President, Yours most sincerely, Sternburg.
To the President op the
United States op America,
Sagamore HiU.

CHAPTER XXXVII
SECRET HISTORT OF THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE-
CONCLUDED
It was a couple of days after this that I received from
both governments the information that they had agreed on
substantially the plan outlined in my memorandum.
On July 11th I received a letter from Jusserand, running
in part as follows :
"I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning
Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the
one we had considered and the acceptation of which you
did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me
from Paris show that your beneficent influence at this grave
juncture is deeply and gratefully felt. They confirm also
what I guessed was the case, that is, that there was a point
where more yielding would have been impossible; every
body in France felt it, and people braced up silently in
view of possible great events."
A fortnight afterwards the Kaiser got uneasy again,
and for some time insisted upon the conference being held
in Morocco, and upon Revoil not being sent by France as
a delegate. Again I had to do some cabling to both the
French and German Governments, but finally the Kaiser's
objections were removed. I had urged Jusserand not to
let his people boast or be disagreeable and try to humiliate
the Kaiser in connection with the conference, because the
important point was for them to get the kernel of the nut,
and they did not have to consider the shell. On August
9th Jusserand wrote me, expressing the thanks of his Gov
ernment for what I had done; the German Foreign Office
thanked me by cable.
After this, trouble ceased as far as I was concerned,
488

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 489
until the Conference met at Algeciras. Soon after the Con
ference opened I began to have a. succession of visits from
Speck and from Jusserand. Jusserand generally gave me
his messages verbally. Speck submitted them in writing.
Loyal though Speck was to his Government, both Root and
I became convinced that down in his heart the honest, brave
little gentleman did not really believe Germany was acting
as she should act. The attitude of France, as represented
by the French representatives at Algeciras, seemed to be
more reasonable; but I was entirely sure of France only
when I could act directly through Jusserand, who rang true
under any and all circumstances. . . .
Germany sought to impress us with the fact that all the
other Powers but England were in her favor. We heard,
however, both from Russia and Italy that they thought
the German position was wrong, and were anxious that we
should do something to prevent Germany from obtain
ing a sphere of influence in Morocco. We became convinced
that Austria was a mere cat's-paw for Germany, and that
Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco,
which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to
desire. She first endeavored to secure a port for herself,
and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzer
land, which we were convinced would, with the adjacent
Hinterland, become in effect German. The French said
they would not yield on these points, and, as you know, it
looked as if the Conference would come to nothing, and that
there would then be the possibility of trouble between
France and Germany. Our view was that the interests of
France and Spain in Morocco were far greater than those
of other powers. Finally we took the matter up by corre
spondence with Germany, as follows, Jusserand being kept
informed of what we were doing:
No. 333. Department op State,
Washington, February 19, 1906.
Excellency: The President has been keeping in mind the suggestion

490 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
of your memorandum of January 29th that the United
States should propose "to entrust the Sultan of Morocco
with the organization of the police forces within his do
mains and to allow him certain funds, and to establish an
international control with regard to the management of
these funds, and the carrying out of the whole plan."
Our advices from Algeciras indicate that the time has
been reached when such a proposal should be made, if at
all, and also that to be effective it should now be somewhat
more specific in regard to the nature of the international
control. If it is acceptable to Germany, the President will make
the proposal suggested with the following details, which
should, perhaps, be called modifications, but which he does
not consider to interfere with the accomplishment of the
end Germany had in view in securing the conference. He
will propose :
1. That the organization and maintenance of police
forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men
and officers to be Moors.
2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished
by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall
be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for
some small preference claimed by France, which he con
siders immaterial).
3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay and assist
ing in management and control be entrusted to French and
Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be ap
pointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their
Legations. That the senior French and Spanish instructing officers
report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the
government of Italy, the Mediterranean Power, which shall
have the right of inspection and verification, and to demand
further reports in behalf of and for the information of the
Powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., to be
deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance.
4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain,

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 491
and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be
appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade,
equal treatment and opportunity in competition for public
works and concessions.
The foregoing draft has been carefully framed with ref
erence to the existing situation at Algeciras, so as to give
it a form which would make concessions from the French
position as easy as possible, and the President thinks that
it conserves the. principle of the open door without unduly
recognizing the claims which rest upon proximity and pre
ponderance of trade interests. He thinks it is fair, and
earnestly hopes that it may receive the Emperor's ap
proval. Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high
est consideration. Elihu Root.
His Excellency,
Baron Speck von Sternburg,
Etc., etc., etc.

Imperial German Embassy,
Washington, February 22, 1906.
Dear Mr. President:
The Emperor has requested me to express to you his
hearty thanks for your offer to mediate in the Morocco
question. He especially appreciates that you will only act
as mediator in agreement with him.
He fully agrees with your views on points 1, 2 and 4 and
considers it a sound idea that the funds for the mainte
nance of the police forces should be paid out of the State
Bank of Morocco, to be founded, and that all Powers can
equally participate in this bank. The question of granting
to France a slight preference he thinks might be discussed.
According to point 3, only French and Spanish officers
and non-commissioned officers are to be selected. This pro
posal covers in the main the last French proposal.
Though the Emperor felt unable to accept this proposal
it has been subjected to another close examination as soon

492 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
as your offer of mediation had been received. But this has
not been able to convince him that a settlement on such
lines could be considered in harmony with the principle
accepted by the conference that all Powers are to receive
equal treatment.
According to the proposal the French and Spanish offi
cers shall not be freely chosen by the Sultan, but be named
by their respective legations. They are to be placed in
charge of the drill, the discipline and the pay of the police
forces of Morocco, and they are also to participate in their
administration and control. This would place the police
forces entirely into their hands, and the police organization
would be tantamount to a Franco-Spanish double mandate
and mean a monopoly of these two countries, which would
heavily curtail the political and the economic positions of
the other nations.
The Emperor is of the opinion that the Sultan should be
permitted a free choice among the other nations. This
would certainly not exclude such modifications which should
be considered as practical. For instance, it might be pos
sible to allow the Sultan to choose the officers among those
nations which are participating in the new State bank,
hence have greater interests in Morocco. It could be fur
ther stipulated, in case France should fear that under the
present conditions the Sultan might favor German officers,
that at least four different nationalities should be taken
into consideration in an equal manner. Ultimately, so as
to acknowledge the special rights of France in Morocco,
the Sultan might place the police control in Tangiers, and
perhaps in some other port, entirely in the hands of French
officers. In all the other ports officers of various nations
would cooperate.
As to the uniformity of the whole of the police force it
would not seem difficult to establish a uniformity in organ
ization and armament by issuing regulations.
In case it should be possible to widen your proposal for
mediation according to the above suggestions, Germany
would gladly negotiate on this new basis and the Emperor

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 493
would be highly gratified if you should be pleased to fur
ther offer your mediation.
Believe me, Mr. President, Yours most sincerely, Sternburg.
To the President op the
United States op America,
Washington, D. C.

No. 342. (L)

March 7, 1906.

Excellency: May I ask you to transmit to the German Emperor a
message from the President which is as follows :
"I have given most earnest thought to Your Majesty's
comments on the suggestion contained in Mr. Root's letter
of February 19th, but I cannot bring myself to feel that I
ought to ask France to make further concessions than the
arrangement suggested in that letter would require. This
being so, I would gladly drop the subject, in which our tra
ditional policy of abstention from the political affairs of
Europe forbids the United States to take sides. I feel,
however, that the events which led to the Conference at
Algeciras forbid me to omit any effort within my power
to promote a settlement of differences.
"By the request of Germany I urged France to consent
to the Conference, giving her very strong assurances of my
belief that a decision would be reached, consonant with an
impartial view of what is most fair and most practical. The
nature, the strength and the justification of these assur-
' ances may be realized by referring to the terms of Baron
Sternburg 's letter to me of June 28, 1905, which said:
" 'The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case,
during the coming Conference, differences of opinion
should arise between France and Germany, he, in every
case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should
consider to be the most fair and the most practical.
" 'In doing this, he wants to prove that the assistance

494 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered in
the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish motives.'
"Under these circumstances, I feel bound to state to
Your Majesty that I think the arrangement indicated in
the above mentioned letter of February 19th is a reasonable
one, and most earnestly to urge Your Majesty to accept it.
I do not know whether France would accept it or not. I
think she ought to do so. I do not think that she ought to
be expected to go further. If that arrangement is made,
the Conference will have resulted in an abandonment by
France of her claim to the right of control in Morocco
answerable only to the two Powers with whom she had
made treaties and without responsibility to the rest of the
world, and she will have accepted jointly with Spain a man
date from all the Powers, under responsibility to aU of
them for the maintenance of equal rights and opportunities.
And the due observance of these obligations will be safe
guarded by having vested in another representative of aU
the Powers a right to have in their behalf full and com
plete reports of the performance of the trust, with the
further right of verification and inspection.
"I feel that if this arrangement be made, Germany will
have accomplished the declared object for her intervention
in the affairs of Morocco and for the Conference. I feel
such arrangement would be in very fact the evidence of the
triumph of German diplomacy in this matter. Looking at
the subject as I do, from this standpoint of an observer
friendly to both parties and having no possible interest in
the result, except the interest of peace, I see grave reasons
to apprehend that if the Conference should fail because of
Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the
measure of concession described in this proposed arrange
ment, the general opinion of Europe and America would
be unfavorable, and Germany would lose that increase of
credit and moral power that the making of this arrange
ment would secure to her, and might be held responsible,
probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 495
that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of af
fairs in Europe.
"As a rule, parties to a past controversy, looking back,
can see that they have ascribed undue importance to mat
ters of difference which were really unimportant. A dis
interested spectator is often able to take such a view at the
time. I believe that I am taking such a view; that if the
suggested arrangement can be made none of the matters
which Germany will not have secured by that are of any
real importance to her, and I most sincerely hope that Your
Majesty may take this view and throw upon France the
responsibility for rejecting, if it is to be rejected, the sug
gested arrangement."
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high
est consideration.
Elihu Root
His Excellency,
Baron Speck von Sternburg,
Etc., etc., etc.

Imperial German Embassy,
Washington, D. C,
March 13, 1906.
Mr. President:
The Emperor's answer to your letter transmitted by me
on the 7th instant is as follows :
"Mr. President:
"I thank you for your repeated kind endeavors to bring
about a solution, satisfactory to all concerned, of the Mo
rocco question. I highly appreciate it that notwithstand
ing all difficulties you have cooperated in solving the dif
ferences. As to the information of my ambassador, men
tioned by you, I can only assure you, Mr. President, that I
am gladly willing to take your advice as a basis of an
understanding. In this sense your proposition contained
in Mr. Root's letter of the 19th ultimo, has been earnestly
considered at once. In principle I consented to it, provided

496 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
that it be given a form to meet the international side of the
question. "I have also given to your recent statements in all points
my fullest attention and entirely agree with you that a
mandate given by the Conference to France and Spain dif
fers in a judicial sense essentially from any action on the
part of France based solely on special agreements with
England and Spain. Such a mandate would give to France
a certain monopoly in Morocco which would prejudice the
economical equality of the other nations, if no sufficient
international counterpoise were created. This idea has
been recognized in your proposal of mediation, and doubt
could only prevail as to the question whether the regula
tions of control, proposed by you, would give an entirely
sufficient guarantee from an international point. In this
respect I think the idea has been developed in a proposal
of mediation brought forward by Austria-Hungary. This
proposal almost covers yours. I have therefore caused
my representatives at Algeciras to be instructed to consent
in principle to the proposition of Austria-Hungary, and I
am inclined to believe that a satisfactory end of the Con
ference would be secured, if you, Mr. President, would like
wise give your consent to that proposition, which seems to
me to be an acceptable development of your proposal."
(Signed) William.
The Austrian proposal has been accepted by the repre
sentatives of all other powers, including Sir E. Nicholson,
the British representative, on account of its distinct inter
national character, as a basis for a definite understanding
at the Conference. As this basis has now been reached it
would seem a pity to cause further postponement by a new
proposal. The support of Austria's mediation in Algeciras
and Paris would in the eyes of the Emperor appear as the
most speedy way to effect a solution of the Morocco ques
tion. I may add that on March 11th the German representa
tive at Algeciras was informed by all his colleagues, in
cluding the British and American, that after the far going

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 497
concessions made by Germany during the sessions of last
Saturday the French opposition could not be justified. In
this sense they have spoken to Mr. Revoil.
I have the honor to be, Mr. President,
Yours most sincerely, Sternburg.
(Received from German Ambassador March 14, 1906.)
"Giving way beyond the Austrian proposals would
gravely endanger the open door. The opposition lies with
the mighty French banking interests which are aiming at
a monopolization of the resources of Morocco."
No. 347. Department of State,
Washington March 17, 1906.
Excellency: It may be useful for me to re-state in writing the answer
of the United States, already given to you orally, to the
questions which you have asked regarding our course upon
the proposal made by Austria on the 8th instant in the
Algeciras Conference.
We do not approve that proposal. We regard it as an
essential departure from the principle declared by Germany
and adhered to by the United States, that all commercial
nations are entitled to have the door of equal commercial
opportunity in Morocco kept open, and the corollary to
that principle that no one power ought to acquire such a
control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the be
lief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that
territory as her own, to the exclusion of others.
This view of international right was interposed against
the claim of France to organize the police in Moroccan
ports through the agency of her officers alone. France has
yielded to this view of international right to the extent of
offering to become, jointly with Spain, the mandatory of
all the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining order
and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of

498 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
them. It was further proposed that an officer of a third
power, acting in behalf of all the powers, should have the
right of general inspection for the purpose of keeping the
powers advised whether their agents, France and Spain,
were observing the limits and performing the duties of their
agency. This arrangement seemed to us to accomplish the
desired purpose. It seemed with two mandatories jointly
charged, no individual claim of possession or control was
likely to grow up ; that, with the constant reminder of the
general right involved in the inspectorship, the duties of
the agency were not likely to be forgotten and it seemed
that the proximity of France and Spain to Morocco, and
their special interest in having order maintained in that
territory, made it reasonable that they should be selected
as the mandatories rather than any other powers.
The Austrian proposal offers an alternative to the ar
rangement which I have described. It is that the eight
Moroccan ports shall be distributed ; that in four the poUce
shall be organized by the French; in three the police shaU
be organized by the Spanish; and that in the eighth port
the police shall be organized by the Swiss or Dutch. This
seems to us to provide for a potential partition of the ter
ritory in violation of the principle upon which we have
agreed with Germany. From our point of view all the rea
sons which existed against leaving to France the control
of all the ports exists against leaving to France the control
of some, to Spain the control of some, and to Switzerland,
either in its own interest or in the interests of any other
powers, the control of one. The very fact of division of
the ports implies the existence of a special right on the part
of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respec
tively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of
three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and
opportunity on the part of all other powers. And the na
tions to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected
in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete con
trol. We do not care whether the Inspector, if there shall
be one, is Italian or Swiss. We do not care whether he

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 499
reports to his own Government, or to the Corps Diplo
matique in Tangier, or communicates the information he
obtains to the powers in any other way. We do consider
that the distribution of ports to separate single powers is
wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose
of both Germany and the United States. If we had suffi
cient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we
should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption
of any such arrangement.
We have not, however, any such substantial interest in
Morocco as to lead us to take that course. Our chief wish
is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of
the controversy which brought the Conference together.
Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever
arrangement the European powers, represented at Alge
ciras, agree upon. If the agreement is upon the Austrian
proposal, or upon any modification of it which includes the
principle of distribution of ports, we shall regret what we
deem to be the failure of the true principle to which we have
given our adherence. We still hope that there may be no
such result.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my high
est consideration. Elihu Root.
His Excellency,
Baron Speck von Sternburg,
Etc., etc., etc. Hotel Cambridge, New Tork, March 19, 1906.
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to inform you of the contents of a tele
gram, just received, which is the answer to my telegram,
forwarded after the conversation I had with you on the
situation at Algeciras :
Sincere regret is expressed that the attitude of Germany
should have led to certain misunderstandings. The Kaiser

500 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
had suggested the Conference so as to find a peaceful way
to solve the question of Morocco.
He appreciates the fundamental idea of your proposal:
cooperation of French and Spanish officers to be about
equally divided in each of the ports.
He would readily join in any proposal at the Conference
which would contain this mixed system and an inspector
general, to which France already has agreed in principle.
Germany abstains from entering into details, so as to
prevent that these should obscure the main points. The
telegram concludes in saying that the immediate removal
of all misunderstandings is far more important to Ger
many than the whole Morocco affair.
Believe me, Mr. President, most Sincerely yours, Sternburg.
I call your attention to the last paragraph in this tele
gram of March 19th. I had previously informed Speck, in
a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in
rejecting our proposals and a break-up ensuefl, I should
feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that
I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of
Germany's justice and good faith; but that if the Emperor
would yield to what seemed to me our very fair proposals,
I should not publish any of the correspondence, and would
endeavor in every way to give Germany full credit for
what was done ; and with that in view would take an early
opportunity to have him (Speck) bring a delegation of
German war veterans to see me, so that I might make a
public statement in praise of the Emperor's position and
expressive of my appreciation thereof, and of my hope that
the relations between France and Germany would become
steadily more friendly. Two or three days after the Em
peror sent his cable saying he had yielded to our request,
Speck called upon me to say that the Emperor very earnest
ly desired that I would make such public utterance. Ac
cordingly I arranged for him to bring the German veterans

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 501
around, and I made them (April 12, 1906) the following
speech, which I had previously gone over not only with
Speck but with Jusserand :
"I welcome you here, my f ellow- Americans ; for among
the many strains that go to make up our composite race
stock in this country, no strain has given us better Ameri
cans than those who are of German birth or blood. It is
our peculiar pride as a nation that in this republic we have
measurably realized the ideal under which good citizens
know no discrimination as between creed and creed, birth
place and birthplace, provided only that whatever the man's
parentage may have been, whatever the way in which he
worships his Creator, he strives in good faith to do his duty
by himself and by his fellow-men, and to show his unflinch
ing loyalty to our common country. In addition to thus
greeting you, my fellow- Americans of German birth, I wish
also to greet the German citizens present, the members of
the German army, belonging to the reserve of that army,
and to welcome them here, especially, Mr. Ambassador, as
they are brought here, by you, yourself an old soldier, who
have endeared yourself to the American people by your
hearty friendship for this country.
"The reverence a man preserves for his native land, so
far from standing in the way of his loving and doing his
full duty , by the land of his adoption, should help him
toward this love and the performance of this duty. If a
man is a good son he is apt to make a good husband; and
the quality that makes a man reverence the country of his
birth is apt to be the quality that makes him a good citizen
in the country of his adoption.
"The ties that unite Germany and the United States are
many and close, and it must be a prime object of our states
manship to knit the two nations ever closer together. In
no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and
for Germany's exalted ruler, Emperor William, than here
in America.
"It is not out of place in closing for me to say a word of
congratulation both to the German people and the German

502 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
Emperor upon the work that has been accomplished in the
Algeciras Conference which has just closed, a Conference
held chiefly because of the initiative of Germany. It was
not a Conference in which we Americans as a nation had
much concern, save that it is always our concern to see jus
tice obtain everywhere, and, so far as we properly can, to
work for the cause of international peace and good will.
In its outcome this Conference has added to the likelihood
of the betterment of conditions in Morocco itself, has se
cured equitable dealing as among the foreign powers who
have commercial relations with Morocco, and has dimin
ished the chance of friction between these powers. In par
ticular it may not be out of place for me to say that I hope
and believe that the Conference has resulted and will result
in rendering continually more friendly the relations be
tween the mighty empire of Germany and the mighty re
public of France ; for it is my hope and wish, as it must be
the hope and wish of every sincere wellwisher of human
kind, that these friendly relations may not only continue
unbroken but may ever grow in strength."
I have since received from Jusserand and Speck, both,
the very cordial thanks of the French and German Govern
ments. McCormick (American Ambassador to France)
has just sent a note running as follows:
"I have the honor to inform you that the Minister for
Foreign Affairs referred immediately on my entering his
room, at his diplomatic reception on Wednesday, to the
cablegram which he had sent to M. Jusserand instructing
the latter to express the high appreciation of the French
Government of the signal aid rendered by President Roose
velt in arriving at a just solution of the differences between
France and Germany with reference to Morocco — 'Ni vain-
queur ni vaincu.' "
There, this is a hideously long communication! I shall
send a copy of it both to Meyer and to White, and shall
show it to Root, but to no one else.

SECRET HISTORT OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 503
None of the documents are to be published in the Blue
Book ; and I need hardly say that it is to be considered as
of the most strictly confidential character.
(Signed) Theodore Roosevej/t.
The Convention assembled at Algeciras, Spain, on Jan
uary 16, 1906, and a treaty was signed on April 6th, follow
ing. The American delegates were Henry White, then Am
bassador to Italy, and Mr. S. R. Gummere, Consul-General
at Morocco. The President had requested Joseph H.
Choate to be a delegate and he had accepted, but he later
recalled his acceptance. The treaty was ratified by the
U. S. Senate on December 12, 1906, with an additional
protocol declining to assume any responsibility for the en
forcement of the provisions of the act. In his message to
Congress, on December 3, 1906, the President gave this
statement of the treaty's effect:
"The Algeciras Convention, which was signed by the
United States, as well as by most of the powers of Europe,
supersedes the previous convention of 1880, which was
also signed both by the United States and a majority of the
European powers. This treaty confers upon us equal com
mercial rights with all European countries and does not
entail a single obUgation of any kind upon us, and I
earnestly hope it may be speedily ratified. To refuse to
ratify it would merely mean that we forfeited our commer
cial rights in Morocco and would not achieve another ob
ject of any kind. In the event of such refusal we would
be left for the first time in a hundred and twenty years
without any commercial treaty with Morocco; and this at
a time when we are everywhere seeking new markets and
outlets for trade."
In recognition of Ambassador Jusserand 's services in the
affair President Roosevelt wrote to him on April 25, 1906 :
My dear Mr. Ambassador:
During the past year our relations have been those of
peculiar intimacy in dealing with more than one problem,

504 THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME
and particularly in connection with the Morocco conference,
and there are certain things which I think I ought to say
to you.
It is the simple and literal truth to say that in my judg
ment we owe it to you more than to any other one man that
the year which has closed has not seen a war between
France and Germany, which, had it begun, would probably
have extended to take in a considerable portion of the world.
In last May and June the relations between the two coun
tries were so strained that such a war was imminent. Prob
ably the only way it could have been avoided was by an in
ternational conference, and such a conference could only
have been held on terms compatible with France's honor
and dignity. You were the man most instrumental in hav
ing just this kind of conference arranged for. I came into
the matter at all most unwillingly, and I could not have
come into it at all if I had not possessed entire confidence
alike in your unfailing soundness of judgment and in your
high integrity of personal conduct. Thanks to the fact that
these are the two dominant notes in your personality, my
relationship with you has been such as I think has very,
very rarely obtained between an ambassador at any time
and the head of the government to which that ambassador
was accredited; and certainly no ambassador and head of
a government could ever stand to one another on a footing
at once more pleasant and more advantageous to their re
spective countries than has been the case with you and me.
If, in these deUcate Morocco negotiations I had not been
able to treat you with the absolute frankness and confi
dence that I did, no good result could possibly have been
obtained, and this frankness and confidence were rendered
possible only because of the certainty that you would do and
advise what was wisest to be done and advised, and that
you would treat all that was said and done between us two
as a gentleman of the highest honor treats what is said
and done in the intimate personal relations of life. If you
had been capable of adopting one line of conduct as a pri
vate individual and another as a public man, I should have

SECRET HISTORY OF ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 505
been wholly unable to assume any such relations with you ;
nor, on the other hand, however high your standard of
honor, could I have assumed them had I not felt complete
confidence in the soundness and quickness of your judg
ment. The service you rendered was primarily one to
France, but it was also a service to the world at large ; and
in rendering it you bore yourself as the ideal public ser
vant should bear himself ; for such a public servant should
with trained intelligence know how to render the most ef
fective service to his own country while yet never devi
ating by so much as a hand's breadth from the code of
mutual good faith and scrupulous regard for the rights
of others, which should obtain between nations no less than
between gentlemen. I do not suppose that you will ever
gain any personal advantage, and perhaps not even any
personal recognition, because of what you have done in the
past year, but I desire that you should at least know my
appreciation of it.

YALE UNIVERSITY

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