Yaie University Library

39002001429837

YALE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Copyright 1891. M P. Rice.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL

AND

POLITICAL HISTOKT

OF THE

UNITED STATES.

BY
De. H. yon HOLST,
PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY Off FREIBUQQt

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN
By JOHN J. LALOE, A. M.

1859-1861.
HARPER'S FERRY-LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.

VOL. YIL

GHICAUU:
OALLAGHAN AND COMPANY.
1892.

Copyright, 1892.
BY
CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY.

STATE JOURNAL PRTNTING COMPANY,.
Printers and Stereotypies,
kadison, wis.

AN OPEN LETTER

TO

Dk. Heinrich von Sybel.
(In lieu of the Preface.)
My Very Dear Friend:
This volume brings to a close my work on the Constitu
tional History of the United States, to which you gave the
first impulse more than twenty years ago. It does not, as
my readers will probably expect, follow the course of events
up to the actual outbreak of the civil war. Although that
event, for very intelligible reasons, has been considered
hitherto as the end of the old Union and the beginning of
the new, I have deemed it best to stop short of it. The
deeper I made my studies, and the more I endeavored to
comprehend the essence of things, the less could I accept
that view; and still, so far as I am aware, its correctness
has never yet been questioned. Naturally, there can be
only a very partial justification for assigning any particular
day as the boundary between the two. So far, however, as
it is proper to draw such a dividing line at all, it seems to
me that the grave closed over the coffin which slavery had
made for the Union under the constitution of 1789, not
amid the thunder of cannon of the 12th of April, but amid
the festal music of the 4th of March, 1861. Yet, I see the
decisive element, not in the fact that Abraham Lincoln took
the place of James Buchanan, but simply in this, that by
the constitutional end of the Thirty -sixth congress the way

IV AN OPEN LETTER.
was cleared for the collision of the rebellion and the federal
government. I well know that this opinion, like many others I have
expressed, will meet with decided and wide-spread contra
diction. I think, however, that I may consider it as the
best fruit of my labors during the twenty -three years which
have elapsed since I began my studies for this work, that
their results have met not only with rich recognition, but
also with abundant and violent opposition. Contradiction
and acquiescence have stimulated us to efforts of varying
intensity, to which we are indebted for the amplification,
clarification and deepening in many ways of our historical
knowledge. And I have reason to hope that my book has
not yet ceased to be a working force in this respect.
This is the main ground of my confidence that those with
out whose powerful assistance I could not have begun it, and
still less continued and completed it, will not regret the
help they gave me. Although I know best myself wherein
and how far I have fallen below the desirable, I hesitate
all the less to say this much without any reserve, as, while I
again give public expression to my warmest gratitude for
aid received, I venture to beg all to bear in mind that the
shortcomings of my work, whatever they may be,, cannot
be ascribed exclusively to a lack of ability. The Prussian
Academy of Sciences and the government of Baden were
able to afford me the possibility of completing the book by
their munificent liberality in placing at my disposal the
means to undertake, for the purpose of study, a journey to
the United States in the year 1878-79, and to sojourn re
peatedly in London. But they were not able to alter in the
least the fact that an essential precondition of a satisfactory
solution of the problem was a constant and intimate asso
ciation with the intellectual life of the American nation in
its living, progressive development in all its phases and in

AN OPEN LETTER.

its every direction ; and this precondition could not, in the
nature of things, be fulfilled to the extent required and in
the right way, in a university of southern Germany and in
a city of medium size. Under any circumstances, the dif
ference between what my ability and my desire would have
been is very clear; but the fact that I was obliged to work
under conditions which in many and important respects
were by no means favorable will not be left entirely out of
consideration by those who would pass a just judgment
upon the result of my labors.
With my most cordial thanks, Devotedly yours,
Hermans von Holst.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

CHAPTER L
HELPER'S " CRISIS " AND JOHN BROWN.
Condition and Prospects of Parties. — ''Uncle Tom's Cabin" and
Helper's "Impending Crisis." — Helper's Statistics. — His Declara
tion of War. — The Pretended and Real Address of the Book. — The
Circular of the 9th of March, 1859, and the Recommendation of
the Representatives. — Criticism of this Step. — Its Effect in the
South. — Kansas and the Wyandotte Constitution. — Character of
John Brown. — Brown in North Elba and Kansas. — History of
the Origin of the Riot at Harper's Ferry. — The Conference at
Peterboro' on the 22d of February, 1858, and Travels in the East. —
The Chatham Convention. — Forbes's Treason. — Return to Kansas
and the Events of December 20th. — Virginia as a Field of Opera
tions. — The- Kennedy Farm. — Harper's Ferry. — The First Im
pression of the Riot. — The Preliminary Hearing by Governor
Wise. — Differences of Judgment and of Impressions of the Riot. —
Wise and Buchanan. — Harper's Ferry as a Trump Card. — Self-
condemnation of the South. — State Law and State Reason versus
Morals. — Criminals and Martyrs. — Meaning of Brown's Gallows. —
Brown's Demeanor and its Effects. — The Golden Fruit of Brown's
Act. — The Beginning of the End. — Northern Democrats and the
Meeting in the Academy of Music. — The Irrepressibleness of the
Conflict. — A Slavocratic Opinion of the Saviors of the Union
CHAPTER II.
THE ELECTION OF SPEAKER OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH CONGRESS.
Mason Moves the Appointment of a Committee of Investigation.—
Trumbull's Answer. — Fessenden's and Chandler's Declarations. —
Effects of the Republican Counter-blows. — The Electoral Battles

VUI TABLE OP CONTENTS.
of 1859.— Condition of Parties in New York.— The State Elections
of the 8th of November in New York and New Jersey. — Demo
cratic Policy of Intimidation. — Situation of Parties in the House
of Representatives. — The First Passage at Arms in the Election
for Speaker, and Clark's Resolution. — Effect of the Blow on the
Signers of the Recommendation of Helper's "Crisis." — The Re
publicans Between Hammer and Anvil. — Clark's Speech. — An
swer of the "Americans" Through Gilmer. — Millson's Speech. —
Sherman's Speech. — Situation and Attitude of the Republicans. —
Negative Result of the Debate. — Announcement of the Admin
istration Party Through Pryor. — Characterization of the Further
Debates. — Futile Attempt of the Democrats to Gain Their End by
a Change of Candidates. — Buchanan Sends his Message to Con
gress. — Its Reference to a Revolution in a Constitutional Form. —
Other Contents of the Message and its Reception by Public Opin
ion. — Winslow's Conference Committee. — Resolutions of the Com
mittee in the House. — The Committee's Secret Programme. — The
McQueen Agreement. — Brown's Resolution in the Senate. — The
Vote of the 26th of January for the Whig, W. N. H. Smith.—
Pennington's Election. — Criticism of the Result • 60
CHAPTER IH.
THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION.
Significance of the Republican Victory. — Meaning of the History
of the Struggle. — The South Arming. — Attitude of the Repub
licans Towards the Preparatory Acts of the Southern Radicals. —
Resolutions of Jefferson Davis. — Brown Demands Positive Pro
tective Legislation for Slavery. — Davis Asks for the Recognition
of the Principle Warranting Brown's Demand. — Clingman's
Criticism of the Same. — The Object of Davis's Manoeuvre. — Doug
las's Charge that the Resolutions Were Addressed to the Charles
ton Convention. — The Programme of the Radical Slavocracy for
the Charleston Convention. — Cushing President of the Conven
tion. — Majority aud Minority Reports of the Platform Commit
tee. — Endeavors to Come to an Understanding. — Victory of the
Douglas Democrats. — Cochrane and Slidell. — The Situation. —
The Secession of the Southern Delegates. — Vain Attempts of the
Rump to Make a Nomination. — Adjournment to Baltimore and
Richmond.-^ Two Platforms and No Candidate. — The Feeling in
the Two' Democratic Camps. — Jubilation of the Republicans - 110

TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX
CHAPTER IV.
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION.
Crittenden's Opinion of the Situation and the Convention of the
Union Party. — The Republicans in Search of Allies. — The Covode
Committee.— The Constitutional Question. — Importance of the
Displeasure at Corruption. — A Plenteous Crop of Republican
Candidates. — The Situation of the Republican Party. — The Phys
iognomy of the Convention. — The Candidacy of Cameron and
Chase. — Greeley and Bates's Candidacy. — Greeley against Sew
ard. — Criticism of Greeley's Attitude. — Inopportuneness of Sew
ard's Candidacy. — Seward's Partisans on His Candidacy. —
Charles Francis Adams on the Same. — Other Seward Partisans
on Lincoln's Nomination. — Early History of Lincoln's Candi
dacy. — Its Expediency. — The Decisive Question. — Real Position
of the Question of Candidates When the Convention Met. — As
certainment of Feeling by the Massachusetts Convention. — Elec
tion of the Chairman and Victory of Seward's Friends on a
Previous Question. — The Platform. — Giddings's Motion. — The
Nominations. — Various Criticisms on it ..... 149
CHAPTER V.
THE BALTIMORE CONVENTION.
Alexander H. Stephens's Opinion of the Policy to be Pursued by the
Slave States. — The Policy of the Radical Slavocracy Until the
Baltimore Convention. — Beginning of the Debate on Davis's Reso
lutions. — Benjamin's Claim that the Majority in Charleston Was
Only Apparent, and that the Party Would Unite Again. — Pugh's
Answer and the Real Situation. — Davis and Douglas. — Mutual
Unmasking. — The Democratic Pact and the Dred Scott Decis
ion. — Clingman and Brown as Marplots. — Collamer's Motion. —
Clingman's Second Motion.— Adoption of Davis's Resolutions and
Meaning of the Discussion. — Sumner's Speech. — Preliminary
Questions and Attempts at an Understanding in Baltimore. — The
Doings in the Convention. — The Nominations. — The Double Face
of the Douglas Democrats. — The Nominations and the Double
Face of the Maryland Institute Convention. — The Grotesque
Picture of the Last Presidential Election in the Old Union - - 187

X TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VL
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
Douglas as an Agitator for Himself.— The Victory of Bell and
Breckenridge in the Popular Election Out of the Question. — The
Real Question Decided on the 6th of November. — Position of the
Southern Delegates on it. — Inevitableness of the Catastrophe. —
Position of the Bell-Everett Party.— Douglas.— The Fusion
Plan.— The Project of the Withdrawal of the Anti-Republican
Parties in Favor of a New Candidate of All " Friends of the Con
stitution.'' — Douglas Opposes it on the Ground that His Followers
Would Then Go Over to the Republicans.— Proof of the Correct
ness of This View. — Douglas and Kansas. — His Motion of the
16th and His Speech of the 23d of January.— Refutation by Doug
las of the Claim that Douglas was the Foremost Champion of
Freedom. — The Task of the Republicans in the Electoral Cam
paign.— How They Met the Threats of Secession ; Effects of These
Threats. — Criticism of Republican Tactics.— Agreement of These
Tactics with Their Real Convictions. — Happy Consequences of
Shortsightedness and Blindness. — Weed, Greeley and the " In
dependent" Scorn the Threats of Secession. — Seward on the
Threats. — The State Elections in October and Their Effects on the
Republicans. — Firm Attitude of the Stock Exchange and Grow
ing Confidence. — The Nascent Uneasiness of the Stock Exchange
Only Strengthens the Republicans in Their Views. — The News
from the Southern Market Has the Same Effect. — Chase. — Meet
ing of the 5th of November before the Stock Exchange in New
York. — Message of Governor Gist. — The Election. — Joy of the
Republicans and Secessionists. — Under the Lead of Judge Ma
grath the Highest Federal Officials in Charleston Resign and the
Legislature Resolves to Call a Convention. — The Dissolution of
the Union Begun. — Preservation or Restoration of the Union? - ^>11
CHAPTER VII.
WRONG CALCULATIONS OF THE REPUBLICANS.
Inferences Drawn and Consequences that Followed from the Popu
lar Vote in the Slave States. — Continued Blindness of the Repub
licans Despite the Uneasiness of the Stock Exchange. — " A First-
class Panic." — How the " 'Independent* Explained it." — A Ma-

TABLE OF CONTENTS. XI
noauvre of the Government of Georgia. — The Fundamental Defect
in the Reasoning of the Republicans. — The Resolutions of the
Radical Leaders of Mississippi in Jackson. — Secession with a View
to Reformation in Accordance with Slavocratic Ideas.— Belief of
the Republicans that Secession Would be Confined to the Cotton
States. — The Slavery Interest in the Border States. — Direct Evi
dence that Slavery Was the Cause of Secession. — As Slavery is
the Basis of the Confederacy, the Restoration of the African
Slave Trade is Inevitable. — Virginia and the African Slave
Trade. — The Border States and Secession. — What the Fire-eaters
Expected of the Border States. — Correctness of their Calculation,
and Consequences of the Error in the Calculation of the Republi
cans. — Inability to Understand One Another on the Moral Ques
tion. — Secession and the Churches. — Southern View of the Ques
tion of Law and its Importance. — The Assumed Groundlessness
of the Revolution. — Lincoln's Powerlessness. — Why the Seces
sionists Must Move Forward. — No w or Never 1 ... -24*
CHAPTER VUL
WRONG CALCULATIONS OF THE SECESSIONISTS.
Self-delusion of the Secessionist Leaders. — They Consider a Serious
Attempt at Subjugation Impossible. — Threats of Northern Demo
crats.— Who Will Go with New England? — The Expected Veto
of the West against the Employment of Force. — The Mississippi
in the Southern Calculation. — Decrease of its Relative Impor
tance. — The Freedom of the River of More Importance to the
South than to the West. — The Ideal Interests of the West and .
the Coercive Pressure of Geographical Conditions. — The Union
a Vital Question for the West. — Europe and Secession. — Cotton
in the Calculation of the Secessionists. — Distress in England. —
English Workmen. — Cotton and the North. — Southern Views on
the Importance of the Relation of Capital and Labor in the Two
Sections with Respect to Secession. — The South Considers the
Success of an Attempt at Coercion Impossible, and Therefore
Believes it Would Not be Made. — Races of Masters and Races of
Slaves. — Prophecy and Announcement of Jefferson Davis. — Poor
Preparation of the North for a War, and Probable Effects of De
feats in the Beginning. — Uniting Effect of a War on the North. —
Subjugation of the South in Order to Restore the Old Union Im
possible. — Inevitable Consequences of This ----- 283

XU TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX
BUCHANAN AND THE DOCTRINE OF NON-COERCION.
Importance of Buchanan's Position on the Crisis. — Scott's Memo
rial of October 29-30. — Buchanan's Justification and Criticism
of the Same. — Buchanan Asks a Written Opinion of the Attorney-
General. — Nature and Meaning of the Task. — Black's Character
istics. — The Weak Point in the Fundamental Proposition of the
Opinion. — Covering of the Question of the Duties of the Presi
dent by the Question of His Rights. — Pretended Preconditions of
the Right to Use Military Force. — Criticism of This Argument. —
Marshall against Black. — The Fundamental Defect in Black's
Reasoning. — Black's Interpolations. — The Devoured Lamb and
the Devouring Wolf Change Parts. — Pretended Self-annihilation
of the Constitution. — Inconsistency of Black's Allegations. —
Property but Not Life May be Fought for. — The Annual Message
of December 3d on the Cause of the Crisis. — Buchanan's Self-
refutation. — His Opinion on the Right of Secession. — Buchanan
and the Right of Revolution. — The Annual Message on the Duty
of the President. — Legal and Political Condemnation of the Use
of Force and Positive Proposals. — The Fundamental Sophism in
Buchanan's Reasoning. — The Question of Coercion in the Phila
delphia Convention. — Curtis's Defense of Buchanan and its Ref
utation. — Facts and Right. — Logical Consequences of the Non-
coercion Doctrine. — Hale and Morris's Opinion of the Message. —
Its Meaning and Effect - - -'- - - - - - 81S
CHAPTER X.
VOGUE LA GALERE.
Congress Shares the Guilt of the Policy of Passivity. — R. Davis
. on the Feeling of Southern Members of Congress. — The Majority
of the Republican Representatives, by the Adoption of Boteler's
Amendment, Declare Themselves Ready to Negotiate Conces
sions.— The Committee of Thirty-three.— Buchanan's Confer
ences with the Representatives of South Carolina on the 8th and
10th of December. — Cass's Withdrawal.— Black Becomes Secre
tary of State and Edwin M. Stanton Attorney -General. — Re
newed Pressure by Scott and the Mission of Caleb Cushing. — The

TABLE OF CONTENTS. XIU
Reorganized Cabinet.— Floyd.— The Secretary of the Interior.—
Buchanan.— Seward and Weed.— The Article of the Albany
" Evening Journal " of the 7th of December.— Criticism of the
Same. — Reaction in the North and Seward's Astor House Speech
of December 22d.— Lincoln.— The Crittenden Compromise and the
Secession of South Carolina.— The Committee of Thirteen and
H. Hamilton's Mission. — South Carolina's Summons and Ander
son's Removal to Fort Sumter. — The Instructions of the 11th of
December. — Buchanan and the Commissioners of South Caro
lina. — The Second Letter of the Commissioners and the Breaking
Off of the Negotiations. — Floyd's Resignation and the Cabinet
Crisis Caused by Buchanan's Intended Answer to the Commis
sioners. — Crittenden's Resolution of the 3d of January. — The
Caucus of Southern Senators of the 5th of January. — The Atti
tude of Congress .......... 853
CHAPTER XI.
THE LAST ATTEMPTS AT A COMPROMISE.
The Message of the 8th of January. — The Secession of Mississippi
and the "Star of the West." — Criticism of Anderson's Conduct. —
How the Administration Judged it. — The Consequences. — Pub
lic Opinion in the North and the Progress of the Secession Move
ment. — Significance of the Calling of the Montgomery Conven
tion as to the Attempts at a Compromise. — Results of the En
deavors of the Committee of Thirty-three. — Powell's and Clark's
Motions in the Senate. — Northern Legislatures Place Money and
Trqops at the Disposal of the President. — The Secession of Geor
gia and the Doings in the Senate on the 21st and 22d of January. —
Virginia's Invitation to a Peace Conference. — The Secession of
Louisiana and Buchanan's Message of January 28th. — Conse
quences of Virginia's Demand and the Message. — The House Bur
ies the Reynolds Bill and South Carolina Declines Virginia's Invi
tation. — Opinions of Thaddeus Stevens, Pryor and C. F. Adams
on the Situation. — Currents of Public Opinion in the North. —
Seward's Speech of the 31st of January. — Its Significance. — Crit
icism of the New York " Tribune." — Apparent Rise of the Compro
mise Prospects. — Texas, North Carolina and the Montgomery
Convention. — The Confederate States of America. — The Peace
Conference and Public Opinion.— Craig's Motion Respecting the
Recognition of the Confederate States and the Stanton Bill. — Cor-

XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS.
win's Manoeuvre.— Criticism of His Motion. — Its Object Was to
Keep the States that had Not Yet Seceded in the Union.— The
Task of the Peace Conference Supposed to be Confined to That
Same Purpose.— Three Northern States Send No Representatives
to the Peace Conference. — Chandler's and Bingham's Letters. —
General Characterization of the Debates in the Peace Conference. —
Seddon and Cook. — Blunt Declaration of the Southern Delegates
against the Majority Report and its Offers. — The Southern Del
egates Refuse All Counter-performance. — Buckner's Amendment
to Field's Motion and the Vote on it. — Virginia Will Not Permit
Coercion. — Demands of the Southern Delegates. — The Pub
lished Results and the Real Results of the Peace Conference. —
The Vote on the First Section. — Conscious Self-delusion the
Last Sheet-anchor. — Douglas on the Employment of Force. —
McKean's Constitutional Amendment to Legalize Treason. — The
House of Representatives Rejects Crittenden's Resolutions and
Adopts the Corwin Amendment. — The Resolutions of the Peace
Conference in the Senate. — Douglas and His Admission. — Adop
tion of the Corwin Amendment in the Senate. — Criticism of
This Result of the Compromise Efforts. — The Inauguration.—
Right and Facts. — The Latter Again Assert Their Full Rights.—
The Confederacy Must Move Forward, and Thus Break the
Chains that Bound the Arms of Nemesis. — Conclusion • • ;

HARPER'S FERRT-LINCOLFS IMUG (JRATIOK.

CHAPTER I.
HELPER'S "CRISIS" AND JOHN BROWN.
"Ho political party had any reason to look back at the
history of the Thirty-fifth Congress with satisfaction. The
country had, it is true, been forced a great way forward
towards the solution of the all-embracing slavery question,
during the last two years, and the Thirty-fifth Congress,
by its actions and omissions, had no small share in bring
ing that question nearer to a settlement. Only negative
results, however, had been achieved, and the progress made
consisted in the fact that the radical failure of old means
and methods had been well-nigh demonstrated.
No party had a success to record which it could consider
a safe basis for the achievement of further successes. All
came out of the hot but barren struggle of that legislative
period weaker than they had entered it. Although pas
sion, interest, or moral conviction sustained their resolution,
there was no real, bellicose ardor in any party, because no
party could be filled with the confidence of victory, and
the future seemed delivered over entirely to the malignant
gods of chance.
The republicans were too conscious of the condition of
affairs in their own camp to yield to the sweet illusion
that the quarrel in the camp of the enemy made them cer
tain of victory. They were still, in an eminent degree, a
l

2 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
nascent party, and had to suffer very keenly from the in
evitable consequences of that fact. A great part even of
those who had already joined it — the aggressive elements
and real leaders themselves not excepted — could not or
would not entirely forget the creed of the party to which
they had previously belonged. This fact influenced more
or less the attitude of the party towards the different per
sonages of great prominence in the politics of the country,
aggravated the difficulty of putting forward — what, in
the long run could not be avoided — a party programme
on the political problems other than the slavery question
that existed, and frequently caused a not unimportant dif
ference in the whole way of 'looking at the slavery ques
tion itself. And if this must have greatly limited the free
dom of action on which mainly depends what degree of
energy can be developed, that freedom must have been
limited still more, in consequence of the fact that there
was frequently a possibility of success, only on condition
that the remnant of the parties of the past still vegetating
under the old names, were induced to give their votes to
the republican candidates.1 Hence, Greeley thought that
the republicans had never yet been, and would not very
soon be, in a condition to get a hundred electoral votes
" on a square issue," and prophesied " with perfect certainty
that they (we) would be horribly beaten," if Seward or
Chase were nominated as a presidential candidate, with
the platform of 1856.2
* Thus, for instance, Charles A Dana wrote on the 1st of September,
1859: " Here in New Jersey is a state election at hand which it is im
portant not to lose. Another is to take place in New York. The Ameri
cans hold the balance of power in both. Their party is in the act of
final dissolution. Shall we let the fragments fall into the arms of the
Locofocos?" Pike, p. 444.
* Greeley to Geo. E. Baker, AprU 28, 1859. Barnes, Life of Th. Weed,
II, p. 255.

ANTI-DOUGLAS democrats. 3
The conservative democrats were in a better condition,
inasmuch as there was no difference of opinion among
them as to who was to be their presidential candidate.
But, notwithstanding this, they scarcely ventured to, claim
that their prospects were more brilliant, although — and
with perfect right — they were just as far from consider
ing their cause hopeless. Douglas had not failed to make
endeavors to appease the anger of the slavocracy at his
opposition in the Lecompton question. All the speeches
he had made on his journey through the southern states
at the end of 1858 had that object in view. In Memphis
'November 29) he had recommended himself to them by
the emphatic declaration that the Union must acquire
more Mexican territory, and Cuba besides.1 In New Or
leans (December 6) he had pledged himself and his fol
lowers, unconditionally, to the Dred Scott decision, at
the same time laying special stress on the limitations of
power to which the territorial legislatures were subjected
by the constitution as interpreted by the courts;2 and
again professed the doctrine that the constitution recog
nized the slaves as property on an equal footing with all
other property.3 The history of the second session of the
Thirty-fifth Congress had shown how fruitless this love-
1 " So it is with the island of Cuba ; . . . it is a matter of no con
sequence whether we want it or not; we are compelled to take it, and
we can't help it."
2 Compare with this the declaration in the Freeport debate with Lin
coln, vol. VI, p. 238, etc.
'"I, in common with the democracy of Illinois, accept the Dred Scott
decision of the supreme court of the United States, in the Dred Scott case,
as an authoritative exposition of the constitution. Whatever limitations
the constitution, as expounded by the courts, imposes on the authority
of a territorial legislature, we cheerfully recognize and respect in con
formity with that decision. Slaves are recognized as property, and
placed on an equal footing with all other property. Hence, the owner

4 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
making was. Forced by John Brown, out of consideration
for his adherents in the northern states, to profess anew
and without reserve his Freeport doctrine, — declared more
and more loudly, and more and more violently, to be the
worst enemy of the south by the radical slavocrats, — the
whole people shown by his removal from the chairman
ship of the committee on territories how bitterly in earn
est the radicals were in their loathing for him, — all this
must have put a heavy damper on the enthusiasm of even
his most devoted friends. And great as was Douglas's in
ventive slyness, it was not equal to the task of constructing
a new formula by means of which the contending party
fractions might delude themselves as to their differences,
or even of artificially creating a question for the sake of
which his southern opponents would have agreed to desist,
for a time, from trying to effect a settlement of the ques
tion of principle, and to follow him into the field as the
leader of the whole party. He knew nothing better to do
than to go about among writers, in order, with printer's
ink, to win new converts to the saving power of the doc
trine of Popular Sovereignty, and at the same time give
his most seriously discredited consistency a better reputa
tion. In both respects he achieved less than nothing. So
thorough a finishing stroke had been given to the doctrine
of Popular Sovereignty, both with tongue and pen, and it
had been so completely reduced ad absurdum by the actual
development of things, that no effectual propaganda could
now be made for it. Precisely his essay in Harper's Mag
azine1 made that completely impossible, for now Attorney-
of slaves — the same as the owner of any other species of prop
erty — has a right to remove to a territory, and carry his property with
him. "
1 This article elicited from Lincoln the caustic remark: " His expla
nations, explanatory of explanations, are interminable."

ANTI-DOUGLAS DEMOCRATS. O
General Black entered the lists against him, and destroyed
what reputation- he had left for consistency on this ques
tion.1 The fact that Black's own constitutional views were
no less open to criticism than those of his opponent could
not detract from the convincing force of his polemic, in
so far as it made Douglas himself refute Douglas. In
Douglas's original following there might have been many
whom nothing could make waver in their absolute faith
in their prophet. But whoever had not hitherto professed
his doctrine could not now honestly take it up; since
Douglas, on the one hand, laid down the principle that
every political creed must be radically wrong that could
not be proclaimed in the same sense in all parts of the
Union;2 and, on the other, he himself illustrated its alleged
infallibility b}^ his incapacity to ward off new attacks on it,
except by giving it a new coloring and formulating it witty
more oracular vagueness. But it would have been exceed
ingly foolish to consider it impossible, on this account, that
his endeavors to obtain votes would not meet with any
success worth mentioning. It was only too conceivable
that a very large part of the numerous, uncertain, waver
ing elements might ultimately go with him, spite of his
doctrine, because the victory of the party representing it
seemed to afford the best prospects that further and more
serious disturbances of domestic peace would be avoided.
The other democratic wing had, like the republicans, no
universally recognized leader, and bad, moreover, no single,
positive programme. It consisted of many groups, fading
1 Black's articles appeared in the Washington Constitution, and were
reprinted by Ch. F. Black in Essays and Speeches of Jeremiah Black,
pp. 212-242.
2 The phrase: "No political creed is sound or safe," in his speech of
February 23 (Speeches, p. 282), he strengthened in his speech of Sep
tember 9, 1859, in Cincinnati, into: "Any political creed is radicalb
wrong." The New York Tribune, September 10, 1859.

HARPER'S FERRY — LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
gradually into one another, all of whom had the slave-hold
ing interest as the polar star of their politics, but who were
determined thereto by very different motives, who wanted to
operate with very different means, and who even pursued
very different aims. Between the "northern man with south
ern principles," whom personal interest, constitutional.views,
or anxiety for the domestic peace of the country, made ever
ready to serve the slavocracy, although he in no way desired
to promote slavery itself, but, at the worst, was entirely indif
ferent to it, — between such a man and the southern fanatic,
who, conscious of his aim, labored for the dissolution of the
Union, because, in politics, he knew no interest but that of
the slave-holders, there was so great a distance, that, at bot
tom, the only thing all the groups were fully united on was
the wish and endeavor to leave none of the other parties at
the helm. Hence, the moment power was wrested from
it, the dissolution of the party would begin. How this was
accomplished might decide the fate of the Union, and the
fate of the Union would depend primarily on whether the
Douglas democrats or the republicans came into power.
In the former case it would become so much harder for the
radicals to force the south into their extreme policy that
they would, presumably, abstain from any attempt to carry
out their programme immediately. If two democratic
presidential candidates were put up, it was not inconceiv
able that this consideration would induce many in the
southern states to vote for Douglas, although neither his
person was acceptable to them nor his Popular Sovereignty
doctrine sufficient for them. The number of those was great
who, despite their conviction of the necessity of extorting
further concessions to the slave-holding interest, preferred
the continuance for a time of the status quo to seeing the
Union put in peril. If the candidate of the south were
chosen, this danger would be averted and the first precon-

dition of the possibility of the realization of their wishes
would be fulfilled. But it was precisely the putting up of an
opposing democratic candidate that made Douglas's elec
tion improbable, provided the decision lay in the election
by the people. The election of such a candidate was, as a
matter of course, next to impossible ; for in none of the free
states had he the slightest prospect of winning against
Douglas and the republican candidate, and it was very
doubtful, at least, whether he would carry all the border
states. The case might be very different, indeed, if the
election went to the house of representatives. The Doug
las, democrats might then find themselves confronted by
the alternative of voting for him or helping elect the re
publican, and how they would vote, under such circum
stances, could scarcely be a question. "Whether this
possibility, or the consideration mentioned above, ultimately
prevailed with the southern democrats who stood between
the conservatives and the radicals, might easily decide the
issue of the electoral campaign, if only one republican and
two democratic candidates were in the field.
That this would be the case was, however, far from cer
tain. The number of those who would have nothing to do
either with a republican or a democratic candidate of any
description was too small to enable them to carry off the
prize, but large enough to allow them to put up a candi
date of their own without becoming objects of ridicule.
In several, and in some large, states they might easily win,
if the democratic party were split. If they went into the
electoral campaign united as an independent party, they
would introduce into it a new and serious element of un
certainty. Then, indeed, the fate of the Union, in the criti
cal condition in which it had existed ever since its origin,
would depend on a long series of incalculable and intricate
contingencies. The greatest danger to which any demo-

8 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
cratic republic can be exposed would have arisen: at a
period when frightful danger threatened, the disruption of
parties would have gone so far that there would no longer
be any public opinion.
Under these circumstances, it might 'easily happen that
occurrences which, of themselves, had only a symptomatic
importance, might become events of immense scope, by
exercising a dissolving or consolidating influence on one
or other of the great parties.
Two such incidents introduced the Thirty-sixth Congress
in a manner calculated to increase the fear that it would
be the last one of " this Union " under the constitution.
A book was once more destined to play a part of great
importance in the history of the slavery question. As
much was now said and written about Helper's " Impend
ing Crisis " as formerly about " Uncle Tom's Cabin;" as
much, but in a very different way, for the two books had
only this in common, that they were directed against slav
ey. Harriet Beecher Stowe had fully attained her object :
to bring it directly to the living consciousness of the peo
ple, by a realistic picture of slave life, that even negro
slaves were human beings, and that, therefore, the slavery
question had not only an economic, political and constitu
tional phase, but also a moral one, which a civilized, Chris
tian people should not and could not lose sight of without
guilt or without disgrace. Precisely because she had no
definite political aim, her book exercised a powerful, polit
ical effect. Her antagonists had no weapons against her
except the claim that her descriptions were false. But
they were bound to produce the proof of this assertion, and
their attempts to do so, in the main, failed. But where
she had succeeded in reaching the conscience through the
imagination and the sentiments, people henceforth ap
proached the concrete questions raised by the further de-

HELPER S STATISTICS. 9
velopment of the slavery problem, in a different frame of
mind. Thought was influenced by the feelings awakened
by her, and the latter were very gradually transformed,
in different measures and in different ways, into political
action. The slavocracy had not been able to prevent this;
for, as Calhoun had rightly said, constitutional deductions
could not change the moral feelings of men nor lastingly
prevent their manifestation by acts. But even apart from
this, the very form of the attack had made it impossible to,
meet it with the heavy guns of a political battle. The
slavocracy would have only made themselves ridiculous if
they had attempted it. They did not for a single moment
ignore how great a mistake that would have been. Even
in their denunciations of the tendency of the novel, they
had not, for the most part, exceeded certain bounds, either
because too violent language might have been looked upon
as a proof of the truth of the picture, or because it was evi
dent that a horror of slavery and not hatred of slave-hold
ers had dictated the book.
In glaring contrast with this relative moderation was the
language now used in the south, both by radicals and con
servatives, against Helper's book. "While in the north it did
not produce a particle of the sentimental excitement with
which rich and poor, educated and uneducated alike, had
read "Uncle Tom's Cabin," but only created a sensation,
and that only in very narrow circles of people, until agita
tion by the politicans extended it among the masses, in the
south it generated unprecedented acrimony. The proxi
mate cause of this was that the viper came from its own nest.
Helper was a North Carolinian. This increased his guilt
tenfold in the eyes of the south. Moreover, that fact made
the significance of his attack much greater, for the op
ponents of slavery would naturally not fail to represent the
incontrovertibility of his testimony as a self-evident conse-

10 harper's ferrv — Lincoln's inauguration.
quence of his southern origin. It was sought to meet this
with the charge that he was a disreputable, worthless fel
low, who had already figured as a common criminal.
"Whether, and to what extent, this charge was founded
in fact, need not be examined here, for the only thing that,
in the public interest, could be considered, was the value
and the truth of the contents of his book, and these were
not affected by the charges. And that the south declared
the book to be a base libel could not be recognized by the
north as a sufficient refutation of his assertions, any more
than the suspicions cast upon his personal character. The
mass of statistical data which Helper adduced in support of
his thesis, that slavery was an economic curse which had
made the south, as compared with the more than royal
wealth of the north, a miserable, ragged scullion, could not
be dismissed by calling him a mendacious knave. On the
other hand, they were just as far from being, as a great
many northern politicians claimed, and, in part, really be
lieved, an irrefutable proof of the truth to nature of the
frightful picture he had drawn of the economic condition of
the south, although Seward's statement may have been
quite right, that his figures were as reliable as any statistical
data could have been, at that time, in the United States.
He had well understood the easy art of finding in his
sources the things his object called for, and which threw
the most glaring light upon the picture he desired to paint,
while he let his eye sweep past whatever might influence
its color or perspective in a way opposed to his intentions.
In a word, the book was not the study of a statistician : a
political pamphleteer aglow with passion had, without un
derstanding and without scruple, pressed statistics into his
service. But the slavocracy should have been the last to ac
cuse him of a crime on that account, for they had long
proven themselves unsurpassable masters in such a misuse

helper's declaration of war. 11
of statistics. His gloomy picture, however, was infinitely
nearer the truth than the fabulous wealth which they fig
ured out for the south, by adding the entire export value of
their staple products as receipts to the entire slave popula
tion at the selling value of individual slaves. And they
would certainly have been satisfied with opposing, as they
had done in numberless similar cases of attack before, to
this pessimistic description, their own fantastical calcula
tion, if Helper had not drawn, from his data, the conclusion
that the country was systematical^' ruined, in favor of the
small minority of slave-holders, and at the expense of the
great majority of non-slave-holders.
Such was the thema probandum of his book, and he had
entered on its demonstration in order to tear away from
the eyes of all concerned the bandage tied over them
by the hard-hearted, inconsiderate selfishness of the slav
ocracy, to summon them to draw the practical conse
quence that followed from it, and to enforce their rights.
This he not only said in plain terms but shouted in the
very face of the slavocracy.1 It was a formal declaration
of war not only against slavery but in the first place
against the slave-holders, and the war was to be waged by
their own infatuated followers, whom they had for genera
tions robbed of wealth, education and real freedom. Even
if it were to be a bloodless war, waged only with voting
ballots, abstention from intercourse and similar means,2 it
1 The programme of the non-slave-holders, and some of the most vio
lent parts, may be read in Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of
the Rebellion, pp. 59-62. The quotation of a single sentence must
suffice here: "Our own banner is inscribed: No co-operation with
slave-holders in politics ; no fellowship with them in religion ; no affili
ation with them in society ; no recognition of pro-slavery men, except
as ruffians, outlaws and criminals." Page 156.
2 It is very significant that, notwithstanding this, Pryor, of Virginia,
accused him of having incited the non-slave-holders to rebellion against

12 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
was none the less the beginning of a struggle of life and
¦death. But was not Helper a harlequin who, with a crazy flour
ish, was endeavoring to make everybody believe that his
wooden sword was Brutus's dagger? Did the slavocracy
need to care any more about the angry challenge of a single,
hitherto entirely unknown man, than the moon about the
baying of a dog? They knew well enough how certainly
they could count upon their following of non-slave-holders,
but they knew also that Helper knew that as well as
they. "What then had determined him to his unheard-of
course? Big as he might talk, no one could imagine that
he was a fanatic after the manner of Lloyd Garrison, who
had, singly and namelessly, declared a war of life and death
against slavery. That be was an irresponsible fool could
not be inferred from his book. The slavocracy had never
been able to deceive themselves into believing, that, indeed,
there was no conflict of interests between themselves and
the non-slave-holders; and, for a long time back, occasional
complaints had escaped their most intelligent politicians, of
the increasing indications that the non-slave-holders were
beginning to grow conscious of such a conflict. If they did
not wish to live only for the present moment, but had also
an ej'efor the future, Helper's appeal to the non-slave-holders
was certainly deserving of their serious consideration. Even
in the most menaced states, Missouri and Texas, there was
question, here, of so distant a future,that Helper would,
undoubtedly, have used much more moderate language, if
the slave-holders. " But the peculiarity of that book was that Mr. Helper,
for the first time in the history of this country, had invoked, with all
the power of passion, with all his limited resources of rhetoric, the non-
slave-holders of the south to rise in rebellion against the slave-holders.
That was the peculiar merit of his book." Congr. Gl., 1st Sess., 86th
Congr., p. 49.

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON.

RECOMMENDATION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES. 13-
he had really written his book to effect the downfall of
slavery, by making the south a house divided against itself.
His book was intended to find a market not among the-
non-slave-holders but in the free states, and its appearance
became an event of symptomatic importance, from the fact
that Helper 'believed he would be able to insure a brilliant
success for himself there, by plentifully seasoning it with the
richest spices. It would be doing him an entirely undeserved
honor to accord him a place among the exciters of the
storm. The petrel does not bring the storm, but only an
nounces its approach with unerring instinct.
Helper had rightly appreciated the situation. Some of
the republican leaders in New Tork, among them Greeley
and Thurlow "Weed, had issued a circular on the 9th of
March, 1859, in which they had not only warmly recom
mended the book, but suggested the idea of having, a selec
tion from it printed for gratuitous distribution, in large
numbers. In order to procure the money necessary for
this purpose, they requested from the members of the
house of representatives a written recommendation of
the enterprise, and received sixty-eight signatures.1
How the times had changed ! "When Garrison, a rope
around his neck, was dragged through the streets of Boston
by a mob of " gentlemen," and when, in so many other cities
and towns of the north, the hunting of abolitionists was at
tended by orgies scarcely less revolting, who could have
imagined that in less than a generation the official repre
sentatives of one of the great national parties would, in
this manner, recommend a book which bore, in a high de
gree, the character of a libel on, and of an inflammatory pam
phlet against, the slavocracy, and which besides, as might be
1 "We, the undersigned, members of the house of representatives of
the national congress, do cordially indorse the opinion and approve the-
enterprise set forth in the foregoing circular."

14 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
¦shown by internal as well as external evidence, owed its or
igin to the impure motives of a political aspirant. But the
gentlemen had, by their hot,party zeal, allowed themselves
to be misled into taking more than one unwise step.
Unquestionably they had only intended to promote the
widest possible distribution of what they considered a good
"campaign document." But, even now, it might have
been doubted whether the book would prove specially val
uable for the purpose of agitation. It indeed furnished
rich material for republican stump-speakers, and it was sure
that its foulest and most vigorous parts would be greeted
with thunders of applause. It was not very certain, on
the other hand, that many votes could be gained by it
among the wavering; and that, after all, was the main
thing. There would be no reason to wonder, if, to a great
extent, it should have, rather, a repelling effect in these cir
cles, and for the reason, among others, that the republicans
had approved its distribution, in the manner mentioned.
They had thus assumed the political and moral responsi
bility for its form and matter, and its form and matter were
such that they met with a just and severe reproof for them.
Their party programme limited their struggle against slavery
to the prevention of its further extension in the territories
of the Union; any intention of taking aggressive steps
against it in the states was most decided!}' and most em
phatically denied. The authors of the circular of the 9th
of March, and the sixty-eight men who had recommended
it, had violated, if not the terms, at least the spirit, of this
solemn assurance, in the grossest manner. It had not been
reserved for Helper to discover the conflict of interests be
tween the slavocracy and the non-slave-holders. It had
already been frequently discussed without its having been
possible to make any just complaint on that account. But
Helper sought to incite the non-slave-holders to give ex-

IMPORTANCE OF THE RECOMMENDATION. 15
pression to that conflict in the most ruthless political
and social struggle, until the annihilation of slavery had
been accomplished. To start a propaganda for a book
which had its raison d'etre in this, without making any
reservation whatever in the recommendation of it, meant,
of course, the approval of Helper's object; and hence the
recommendation of it, as it was sent out into the world by
sixty-eight republican representatives, in their official char
acter, was unquestionably an aggressive intermeddling in
the domestic affairs of the slave states, whether they so in
tended it or not.
They had sinned against the party programme in a way
that seriously compromised not only themselves person
ally, but the party also. The very tone of the book was
such that the whole people, so far as they had domestic
peace and the continued existence of the Union at heart,
were warranted in calling them to account for having thus
unreservedly approved it. If the north was to be won
over to views against the slave-holders in harmony with
that tone, it was as inequitable as it was foolish to wish to
preserve the Union under the present constitution. Who
ever preached hatred of the slave-holders in this way must,
in accordance with the requirements of logic, end in de
manding the destruction either of the Union or of the con
stitution; for the slave-holders were the absolutely dominant
party in the southern states, and hatred could not be the
cement in the foundation of a democrative federation in
which it was left to each state to determine independently
for itself how it should act with respect to slavery. Per
haps hatred for slavery could not but grow ultimately into
hatred for the slave-holders, if the slave-holders continued
bent on the strengthening and extension of slavery. But
the republican party still held the continued existence of
the Union and the maintenance of the constitution to be

16 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
possible as unanimously as did the democrats of the north
ern states, and desired them just as honestly; and hence it
was its duty to brand with the same unanimity and honesty
the preaching of the gospel of hatred against slave-holders,
as unpatriotic, and as an attempt against the constitution
and the Union.
The affair, however, had, as already intimated, yet an
other side, which lent it direct, practical importance. The
conservatives of the south looked upon the conduct of the
New Tork authors of the circular and of the sixty-eight
representati ves who had signed it not only as an insult, but as
an act of infamy. The book, therefore, served not as a wedge,
but as a welding hammer, on the different groups within
the slavocracy, and Helper and his republican backers had
therefore only played into the hands of the radicals. This
soon became plain enough; for, owing to a further lack of
tact, the last of Hel per's " Im pending Crisis " had not yet by
any means been heard of. Before we turn to this second
phase of the Helper controversy, we must speak of an event
of incomparably greater importance that had happened in
the meantime.
The endeavor to bring the Kansas question to a stand
still and to remove it from the order of the day, by Eng
lish's bill, had completely failed. After the proposition of
the bill had been rejected by the territory, Buchanan had
recommended to congress an appropriation of money for the
taking of the census on which the law had made a new effort
for its admission as a state dependent. The finance commit
tee of the senate had thereupon made a motion with respect
to that appropriation which was at first adopted. Osten
sibly, however, in order to avoid unpleasant controversies,
this adoption was reversed, despite Pugh's warning that
the refusal of an appropriation would be considered as a
practical non-acceptance of the census condition. Even

JOHN brown's character. 17
while the Thirty-fifth Congress was in session this prophecy
had begun to be fulfilled. By a law of the 11th of Febru
ary, 1859, the territorial legislature had ordered a popular
vote, on the fourth Monday in March, on the question
whether the transformation of the territory into a state
should be proceeded with. An overwhelming majority
had answered the question in the affirmative, and, in June,
a census was taken and the election of delegates to the con
stitutional convention was had. This census was not such
an one as English's bill required, but it could be inferred
with certainty from its result1 that Kansas had the popula
tion required by law for the election of a representative.
The convention met at "Wyandotte on the 5th of July, and
the constitution drawn up by it was approved at a popular
election by 10,421 against 5,530 votes, October 4th.2
There was no particular excitement created by these
events anywhere. The conviction now evidently prevailed
on all sides that Kansas had, at last,1 won its cause against
the slavocracy. This was unquestionably true, even if it
could not be predicted how quickly the obstacles which the
slavocracy would naturally still put in the way of its ad
mission as a state could be overcome. But even if the
Kansas question could be considered, in the main, as set
tled, the spirit which the Kansas troubles had awakened
and nurtured to maturity was not, in consequence, imme
diately banished, nor did it die out at once. At the moment
when the ratification of the* Wyandotte constitution became
1 Over 71,700. From six counties, however, no reports whatever were
received, and in many other parts of the territory the census was de
monstrably very incomplete. See Pendleton's data, Congr. Globe, 1st
Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1645.
2Graw's figures, lb., p. 1640. In the official report to congress we
read, " by a majority of nearly 6,000." lb., p. 910. The data given in
the text are taken from this source. Graw's data also vary here in
part 2

18 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
known, its bitterest, but at the same time its most blissful,
fruit was plucked on the soil of Virginia.
Since the Missouri border ruffians had ceased to be the
principal champions of the slavocratic cause, and it was no
longer sought to get by brute force what could be obtained
by knavery and cunning, there was not much heard, outside
of a small circle, of John Brown. He, however, had not
thought for a moment that his work was done, because there
would presumably be no further reason for him in Kansas to
go about, by day and by night, through wood and plain, with
his trusty gun, to play his fierce game against the propagan
dists of slavery. From his youth up he had had the feeling
in his daily devout reading of the Bible that the words of the
Holy Book in which he saw the condemnation of slavery im
posed on him an entirety personal and special duty with re
gard to that plague-sore on the social body of the American
people. His hair had begun to grow gray without this vague
feeling having cleared and condensed into a definite re
solve; but, notwithstanding this, it had, in all the vicissi
tudes and hard trials of his career, taken ever deeper root
in the life of his intellect and bis heart, because that life
was as intense as it was narrow in its bounds. His school-
ing had not extended beyond the elemental branches, and
he had not distinguished himself either by any great ambi
tion or any great thirst for knowledge. As he had a clear
eye and a sober, wary judgment, his travels and manifold
connections with business as a sheep-raiser and wool-trader
had not been useless in the general development of his
mind. Fortune did not smile upon him, although he thor
oughly understood his business and was thoroughly earnest
in everything he took in hand. There were times when he
found it difficult to procure" the barest necessaries for his
numerous family. But the more the vicissitudes of life as
sailed him the less did he set his heart on the things of this

JOHN brown's character. 19
world. He did not feel it an act of resignation and it cost him
no sacrifice when, in 1849, he removed to North Elba, in Essex
county, New Tork. Here too, in the stillness of the mighty
rocks of the Adirondacks, he did not become a dreamer with
back turned on the world. A typical American, from the
top of his head to the sole of his foot, life and stirring
industry were to him inseparable ideas, and when the
whole neighborhood resounded with praise of the stock he
had raised, it afforded him no less heart-felt satisfaction
than the greater business success which had once seemed to
him the sure beginning of the acquisition of a respectable
fortune. Apart from his industry in his avocation, his
family and his religion had previously constituted almost
the entirety of his deeper inner life, and now, in his rural
isolation, all his leisure time was devoted to them. "I and
my house desire to serve the Lord." The simplicity of
heart, truthfulness and Old-Testament absoluteness with
which he chose this saying as the inviolable law of his en
tire thought and action transformed his more than plain
farm-house into the cradle of a deed memorable in the his
tory of the world. He plunged ever deeper into the Book
of Books, but not as into an inexhaustible source of dog
matic subtilities. The Almighty God, whose name is Jus
tice and Love, had not spoken to men to give them riddles
to solve, but to announce to them a holy and unchangeable
will, that they might do it, in thought, word and deed — in
the smallest things as well as in the greatest. The scripture
needed no interpretation for him. Thuait is written; act
in accordance therewith, for what will it profit thee to gain
the whole world and lose thy own soul? Such was the
simple doctrine with which he endeavored to impregnate
his family as well as himself, and which, with the ingenuous
ness of a child but the authority of a patriarch which could
not be doubted, he gave as answer to every question which

20 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
had a place in his heart and theirs. And he was at the same
time so unselfish and so true, that his wife and children soon
learned to think and will precisely as he did, thorny and
steep as might be the way pointed out to them by him as
the path of duty.
His removal to North Elba had shown that he had the
fate of the negroes as much at heart as ever, for it was con
nected with the philanthropic enterprise of Gerrit Smith to
establish a model colony of free persons of color. It was,
therefore, natural that the energetic aggressive movement of
the slavocracy in the following years forced him to medi
tate more seriously and more self-sacrificingly on what it
was God's will he should do in the matter. When, therefore,
the slavocracy began to try to acquire Kansas by force, he
soon and clearly saw where his place was. What he there
experienced and what he there did — his way of thinking
and feeling taken into consideration — made it forever im
possible for him to return to his plow. After he had proved
what manly courage could accomplish against the slavoc
racy, after his own son had fallen a victim to the Moloch of
slavery, and after he had settled with his God for the terrible
deed at Potawattomie,1 his mortal hatred of slavery could
not but find further expression in thought, word and deed.
1 According to the material brought to light very recently in John
Brown's history, there seems now scarcely a doubt possible that the
" execution " must, after all, be traced directly to him, and that his de
nial of the deed can only be understood to mean that none of the un
fortunates met his death at Brown's own hand. The picture drawn
of his character, however, undergoes no material change on this ac
count, for that he unreservedly approved the act has been not only
conceded, as I remarked in a previous volume, by his ardent ad
mirer, Redpath, but specially called attention to. The burin must only
grave one of the principal lines more sharply and more deeply. That
the whole expression of the picture becomes, in consequence, a sterner
one, I, of course, do not deny, but this effect does not take place at the
expense of the powerful impression it makes ; rather does it increase still

JOHN BROWN AND FORBES. 21
A pretty dense cloud still hovers over the origin of the
Harper's Ferry insurrection. Historical research will prob
ably never be able to dissipate it entirely; for both what
we know about it and about its course forces us to the con
clusion that Brown himself had really never become clear
in his own mind as to How he was to accomplish what he
wanted, and that he had, after all, only the most general
notion as to What he wanted — the freeing of the slaves.
Frederick Douglas gives a detailed account of a conversa-
more the already striking resemblance to the rude greatness of many
Old-Testament saints. Neither the new facts brought to light by his
friends, like Sanborn (The Life and Letters of John Brown), or by his
detractors, like ex-Governor Robinson, of Kansas, and Amos F. Law
rence (cfr. The Boston Evening Transcript, May-July, 1884, passim),
nor the personal opinions they have expressed of him, have given me
any occasion to consider the description I gave of him in the Preussis-
schen Jahrbuchern (xii, pp. 350-392, American edition by Frank Pres
ton Stearns, Boston, Cupples & Hurd, 1889) as false in any important
particular, although in some minor details corrections have become
necessary. The many additions that might be made to his history
would only confirm what I have already said there. But it need
not be wondered at if, in the next succeeding decades, very different
and much more unfavorable views should find numerous representa
tives in the United States. Even his contemporaries, who were under the
direct influence of the tragedy of Harper's Ferry, were, for the most
part, entirely incapable of understanding John Brown, and only had a
feeling, to a greater or less extent, of what was right. But for those
born since his death the understanding of Brown's motives is rendered
much more difficult, because they completely lack the guidance of
feeling, since they know only from hearsay of the dark times when the
Alp of slavocratic supremacy weighed on the intellectual and moral
life of the American people : and it will, I am firmly convinced, be
come daily harder, I am almost tempted to say more impossible, for them
to obtain a living picture of those times. But I am firmly convinced,
too, that the deeper research penetrates into the history of slavery in
the United States, the more strongly will it confirm the judgment
passed upon John Brown by the popular instinct, when, for four terrible
years, the existence of the Nation was trembling in the balance. On
the Potawattomie question, ee especially Sanborn, pp. 258-261.

22 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
tion he had with him on the project, as early as 1847, in
Springfield.1 Such an account, jotted down from memory
after so many years, can, of course, have no claim to the
exactness of an original document. What was then said,
and what happened twelve years later, gradually became,
as may be easily understood, indistinguishable in Douglas's
memory. But, after this testimony, it cannot be doubted
that Brown even then entertained the idea of systematic
ally attacking the lion in his den; and the earnest follow
ing up of this idea presupposed the knowledge how seriously
slavery might be injured by the simple fact that the slave
holders were deprived of the feeling of security. Whether
the idea had thus early ripened to such an extent into a
formal scheme, that a plan of operations with its base in
the rocky regions of the border states could be drawn up,
must remain undecided here. It is certainly not probable;
for, considering John Brown's character, it would be dif
ficult to explain why we hear nothing much earlier of efforts
of any kind to prepare the way for the carrying out of his
idea. The oldest documentary intimation of his intention
that has yet been discovered is contained in a letter written
in August, 1857, that is at a time when the worst period
of the Kansas troubles had come to a close.2 But at this time
he was busily engaged in preparations, from which it cer
tainly follows that he had resolved on a more persistent and
systematic warfare against the slavocracy than heretofore.
In the spring he had formed a connection with one Hugh
Forbes, an old Garibaldian. His demonstrative talk against
all the tyrants of the world, his martial appearance, his
skilful handling of the sword, and especially the excellent
1 Life and Times, pp. 279-282.
* In a letter of August 17, 1857, from Tabor, Iowa, to his family, we
read: "Should no disturbance occur, we may possibly think best to
work baok eastward ; cannot determine yet." Sanborn, p. 414

JOHN brown's movements. 23
testimony he bore to his own military capacity, prepossessed
Brown in his favor.1 He engaged him, at $100 a month, as
drill-master for himself and his men. That the first idea,
in these military exercises, was the intention of being able
to act more vigorously in case the pro-slavery party in
Kansas should again venture to appeal to force, seems
scarcely to admit of a question now. But the laconic an
nouncement in the letter quoted, that, under certain cir
cumstances, he would direct his operations towards the
east, points unmistakably to the fact that, after what had
happened in Kansas, he considered the cessation of the
struggle impossible; if he was needed there no longer, he
meant, from the start, only to infer therefrom that he would
have to carry it on, on some other stage.
Hence, although the fears entertained during the first
half of the year by the Free-state party, that the bloody
troubles would be renewed, proved unfounded, he became
more active than ever. On the 11th of September he asked
Theodore Parker to procure for him five hundred or one
thousand dollars for secret purposes.2 Late in the autumn
he returned from Tabor, in western Iowa, where he had
spent the last months, to Kansas, and began to look about
for people ready to follow him wheresoever he might lead
them. As soon as he had found half a dozen from whom
he believed he could expect this, he went with them to
Ohio, taking with him the arms which had been placed at
his disposal — of course to be used only in the territory —
by the Kansas committee of the eastern states. The winter
was to be spent in military exercises under a second drill-
1 It must, however, be said, that Garibaldi expresses himself in warns
terms of Forbes. He calls him: "II prode colonello Forbes, inglese,
amante della causa italiana come il primo dei noi, coraggioso ed ones-
tissimo milite." Garibaldi, Memorie Autobiographiche, p. 241.
2 "For secret service and no questions asked." lb., p. 422.

24 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
master.1 Brown himself went further east in order to pro
cure the means for the execution of his design. The first
step in this direction was the organization of a secret league,
on Canadian soil. The preparations for this were made in
Rochester, where he kept himself concealed in the house
of Frederick Douglas. From there he visited his old pa
tron,' Gerrit Smith, in Peterboro'. On the 22d of February,
1858, he there made the latter, F. B. Sanborn and Edwin
Morton acquainted with his plans. His friends were hor
rified, and did their best to dissuade him from his purpose.
But for him there was not even a possibility of valid ob
jections. He had made them his confidants, not in order
to inquire their opinion, but to get their support. He had
come not to hear but to be heard. This soon became clear
to his frie/ids, and the longer they listened to his words,
the more they felt the power that lies in absolutely unshak
able conviction. They were overcome not by his argu
ments but entirely by the force of his moral will. They
were not convinced, but they believed they should not re
fuse his request to help him to the money he needed.
During the weeks following, Brown went through Brook
lyn on a similar mission to Boston. Only few of the most
trusty champions of the cause of freedom were informed
of his presence, and even these were, for the most part,
initiated into his plans only as far as was necessary to in
duce them to loosen their purse-strings. Then, after he
had visited Philadelphia, in order to confer with some per
sons of color, whom he thought he could expect to under
stand and sympathize with his design, he went through
Peterboro' and North Elba to Canada. In the first half
of May he there held a convention, in Chatham, which
1 The quarrel between Brown and Forbes, to which we shall here
after refer, necessitated a change of the original plan. Springdale,
Iowa, was finally chosen as the winter quarters of the little band.

FORBES TURNS TRAITOR. 25
adopted a provisional constitution drawn up by him, ac
cepted him as commander-in-chief, and appointed a com
mittee of seven whites and four colored persons to fill any
offices created by the provisional constitution which might
happen to become vacant. All who were oppressed were
declared to have a right to the full protection of the provis
ional constitution, and its adoption was pleaded for on the
ground that slavery was " none other than a most barbar
ous, unprovoked and unjustifiable war of one portion of
its (the country's) citizens upon another portion," and that
it was in glaring contradiction with the eternal truths pro
claimed in the Declaration of Independence.
To what extent this constitution deserved the unlimited
ridicule with which it was overwhelmed, after the failure
of the Harper's Ferry insurrection, need not be discussed
here. That constitution certainly proved that John Brown
was no genius in statesmanship. Whether, notwithstand
ing this, it would not have answered its object very well,
if that object had not miscarried at the very first step, is
a different question. In the eyes of his comrades, the con
stitution was a binding, legal instrument, and it made him
commander-in-chief; and this was the only thing that could
have had any practical importance in an undertaking such
as he contemplated. It must be conceded, none the less,
that his want of political judgment is put in so glaring a
light by no other act of his life as by the holding of the
Chatham convention ; and this, not so much because the
contents of its constitution will not stand criticism, as be
cause he now held such a convention at all.
It is plain that the danger would be greatly increased if
the matter became known. If, therefore, he considered it
necessary not only, as hitherto, to connect himself, in the
deepest secrecy, with a few persons, specially worthy of con
fidence, but to call into existence a comprehensive organ-

26
ization, with a kind of governmental apparatus, he should
have done so only provided he was in a condition to follow
up this step immediately, by the first deed. He had not
planned a revolution which would rage like a prairie fire
over the entire territory of the slave states. All he had in
tended from the start was, with a handful of associates, to
remove the first stones from the dam that held in check the
deep and mighty waters, which would then, in the nature of
things, cut an ever-widening path for themselves. Two
weeks after the convention had adjourned (on the 25th of
May) he was compelled to inform his family, from Chatham,
that he was reduced to complete inaction for want of money.1
Only a week later a friend from Ohio had to inform him
that certain participants in the convention had failed in
order to give themselves an air of importance to keep their
own counsel.
A traitor, however, had already got the start of these
babblers. The Englishman, Forbes, whose reliability had,
from the first, appeared in a verj' doubtful light, may
also have been a fanatic on freedom from conviction, but
he was one mainly by profession. Instead of entering on
his office as drill-master, he consumed his pay in the pub
lication of a military manual in New Tork,2 in order to
serve the good cause. In August, 1857, he had, indeed,
gone to Tabor, but left it again in the beginning of Decem
ber. His claims, however, were in the inverse ratio of his
achievements. But as Brown himself had nothing, he
made a bold attempt to hold the Kansas committee of
Massachusetts responsible for the fulfillment of the obliga
tions which the former had, he claimed, entered into with
1 " We are completely nailed down at present for want of funds; and
we may be obliged to remain inactive for months yet for the same rea
son. You must all learn to be patient." Sanborn, p. 456.
2 7 Manual of tlie Patriotic Volunteer.

EPISODE OF THE TWENTIETH OF DECEMBER. £i
him. As, notwithstanding the scarcely vested threats with
which he strewed his bitter complaint, he was not as suc
cessful in this as he desired, he began to disseminate in
political circles at Washington what he himself knew of
Brown's designs. Some of the friends of the latter, more
or less acquainted with his plans, were, fortunately for him,
in a position early to get wind enough of this to thwart
the game of the traitor. Immediately after the Chatham
convention, John Brown received, through them, the first
information of Forbes' treason. It was accompanied by
the declaration that he must postpone his undertaking a
year; if none of Forbes' prophecies were fulfilled during
that time, they would be forgotten in Washington as a false
alarm. This was not good advice, but a command. The
members of the Kansas committee had waxed warm. They
called upon him to surrender the arms which they had
placed at his disposal, and categorically declared that such
arms should not be employed, under any circumstances,
in any undertaking whatever, outside the territory. They
urgently insisted that he should return to Kansas. As the
other friends on whom he had counted most, like Gerrit
Smith, entirely approved these views, he had, to his sorrow,
to act in accordance with them, for without arms and with
out money he could of course accomplish nothing.
In consequence of another bloody deed, the so-called
Hamilton or Trading-post murder of the 19th of May, Kan
sas was again in a state of the greatest excitement when
Brown entered it. He held himself ready to take part in
the struggle, at any moment, provided it was begun by the
opposite side, but he by no means desired it.1 The shoot-
1 On the 20th of July, 1858, he writes from the Missouri line (Kansas
side) to Sanborn : " A constant fear of new troubles seems to prevail on
both sides of the line, and on both sides are companies of armed men.
Any little affair may open the quarrel afresh. ... I have concealed'

28 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ing down of white men, by one another, could be of no use
to the slaves; his thoughts and endeavors were no longer
directed towards making war on slave-holders, but only
towards rescuing their victims from them.
Soon after this he was attacked by a violent fever, from
the effects of which he suffered until into the winter. He
did not allow the year to close, however, without strongly
reminding friends and foes alike of his existence. During
the night of the 20th of December, two little crowds of
Free-state people, one of which was led by Brown, crossed
the Missouri line, to free five slaves who were to be sold in
a few days. As they succeeded in this without any trouble,
they fell upon other plantations and carried away with
them six more slaves as booty. One of the slave-holders
had been shot by the other division when he attempted to
offer resistance. ' Brown had, as he bluntly states in his
own report to the New Tork Tribune? given orders to his
men to take everything of value with them as well as the
slaves. " It is only just that the means needed to free the
slaves should be taken from the unrightfully acquired
wealth of the slave-holders " — such was even now the prin
ciple he openly proclaimed.
This bold blow caused great excitement throughout the
entire country. Such terror prevailed among the slave
holders on the Kansas border that it was stated by many
that a growing movement was noticeable among them to
sell their slaves or to remove with them into safer places.
If this were true, it was evidently based upon the fear that
the fact of my presence pretty much, lest it should tend to create excite
ment; but it is getting leaked out, and will soon be known to all. As
I am not here to seek or secure revenge, I do not mean to be the first
to reopen the quarrel. How soon it may be raised against me I can
not say ; nor am I over-anxious. A portion of my men are in other
neighborhoods." Sanborn, p. 475.
1 Printed in Sanborn, pp. 481-483.

JOHN BROWN IN VIRGINIA. 29
success might provoke an attempt to introduce system, on the
borders, into this new mode of warfare against slavery. We
know already that this anxiety was not only well founded,
but that it was rather considerably less than there was good
reason for. Brown's resolution had long since been irrev
ocably formed, and it was directed towards something far
greater than stealing occasionally over the border, in the
darkness of the night, to carry off a few slaves, and trans
port them, by the underground railway, to Canada. Only,
it was not on the slave-holders of Missouri that he in
tended to try first the efficacy of his specific against the
poisonous cancer of slavery. On the 2d of December he
had written to his children in Ohio: "Am still preparing
for my other journey," and the unpremeditated episode of
the attack of the 20th of December 1 caused no change in
his preparations.
His family knew exactly what he meant by " another
journey." He had long been firmly resolved to begin, in
Virginia, the war he wanted to wage against slavery. Vir
ginia was the mother of American slavery, and public opin
ion still looked upon her, to a certain extent, as the leading
state of the whole south. What had appeared as mere ad
vance-post skirmishing on the Kansas border of Missouri
assumed here the character of a storming of the enemy's
citadel. Every success achieved here would have a hun
dred times more weight by the impression it would make
in the two halves of the country. Moreover, Brown was
convinced that he could count more confidently here than
in any other place on thorough success. He thought he
had found in the mountains a strategic base of incalculable
strength for the operations he had planned, and the multi
tude of slaves afforded him, in his opinion, a sufficient guar-
1 One of the five slaves who were to have been sold had come over
to Kansas, and had begged the Free-state people for help.

30 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
antv that he would not have to seek in vain for strong
hands, in sufficient numbers, into which he might place the
arms he had brought with him. The self-evident conclu
sion that he would have not only to cope with the local
forces, but that immediate and vigorous interference, both
by the state and by the federal government, was certain,
because such an onslaught on slavery in "Virginia would be
looked upon by them as an attack on slavery in general,
was not drawn by this man who otherwise calculated so
soberly and judged so warily. His only care was how to
procure the money he needed; although there was question
of scarcely any more than could be obtained any day, in
the south, for a plantation negro of the first class. His old
friends in the east had not, indeed, withdrawn their assist
ance from him, but the anxious days they had passed on
account of Forbes' treachery had cooled their ardor and
made them much more cautious in their relations with him.
Even Gerrit Smith had written on the 26th of July, 1858,
that he would certainly not close his purse to him in the
future any more than in the past, but added: "I do not
wish to know Captain Brown's plans; I hope he will keep
them to himself."
It was the end of June before Brown had so far mastered
.all the difficulties in his way that he could start with his
two sons, Owen and Oliver, and one Anderson, for the
scene of action. He assumed the name of Smith, passed
himself off as a farmer who intended to buy in the neigh
borhood, and leased a vacant out-of-the-way farm building
near Harper's Ferry. The little place is situated on the
Maryland border at the confluence of the Potomac and the
Shenandoah, and was specially important on account of
the United States arsenal located there.
No unfortunate accident interrupted the preparations on
the Kennedy farm. Although it was noticed that its ten-

JOHN BROWN

the insurrection. 31
ants employed their time in a manner scarcely in harmony
with the intention they had expressed of settling there,
the suspicion of their neighbors was not yet aroused. The
entire and rather large stock of arms was carried grad
ually and successfully to the place and securely hidden.
Brown's expected comrades also had arrived without at
tracting any great attention. But 'now, at the very last
moment, everything was again put in doubt. Not until it was
absolutely necessary to inform them of it did Brown tell
his comrades that the first blow would be struck against
Harper's Ferry. They well knew that they had taken their
lives in their hands when they joined him, but such fool-
hardiness exceeded even what they had deemed possible.
They remonstrated so strongly that Brown resigned the
commandership-in-chief with the declaration that he could
not undertake the responsibility for the abandonment of
the undertaking, but would willingly subordinate himself
to another leader. The choice of another leader, however,
was so evidently synonymous with the abandonment of the
whole affair that they re-elected him with the promise of
obeying his commands without contradiction.
With twenty-two men, six of whom were colored, Brown
began his war of extermination against slavery. The lit
tle host set out from the Kennedy farm in the evening of
the 17th of October. No one met them on the fatal road,
for it was Sunday, and the night was dark and cheer
less. Telegraphic connection was destroyed; the watch
man on the railroad bridge over the stream taken prisoner
before he could give an alarm ; the gate to the courtyard
of the arsenal broken in, and the guard there also over
powered. Scouting parties sent in different directions
brought in prisoners as hostages. The number of the latter
finally exceeded that of their captors, in the arsenal. So
far, everything had succeeded wonderfully well. By mid-

32
night the place, whose inhabitants had no suspicion of
what was going on, was completely in Brown's power,
without a drop of blood having been shed or even a shot
fired. But what was gained by all that? Like the man in
the fable, Brown had caught the wolf by the ears.
When the railway train coming from the west did not
receive the customary signal, a porter from one of the cars
was sent out to look for the watchman. The sentinel left
behind by Brown challenged the man, and shot him down
when he refused to obey the command to halt. The first
blood shed by these freers of the slaves was the blood of a
colored man. This was an evil omen.
After a while Brown allowed the train to continue its
journey. He himself guided it over the bridge, because
the train-conductor suspected that it had been destroyed.
In this way the cutting of the telegraph wires was rendered
useless, for, in from two to three hours, at most, the news
of the occurrence had reached Washington. Endeavors
have been made to show that this step was an inconceivable
act of imprudence on the part of Brown. He is said to have
stated himself that he was induced to take it by the prayers
of the travelers; he did not want to prolong the anxiety
of their families. The dreadful judge and avenger of Pot-
awattomie had, indeed, so tender and childlike a heart that
such a sentimental consideration might have the greatest
weight with him. But we may characterize it as at least
questionable whether he would have been guided by it, in
this case, if his judgment had not been in accordance with
his feeling. A messenger on horseback carrying a dispatch
to the nearest telegraph station could send the news to
Washington just as quickly as it could be carried by a rail
way train, and a further increase of the number of his pris
oners was therefore worse than useless to him. The
decision to allow the train to continue its journey was an

failure of the insurrection. 33
admission that he could not advance any further, and he
could not take more because the slaves remained entirely
quiet; not even one of them betrayed the slightest inclina
tion to join him. It was so plain that in consequence of
this nothing more was to be gained, that several of his com
rades earnestly advised him to vacate the place, so long as
it was in his power to do so. It may well be assumed that
if he had followed this advice he could have saved his own
life and that of his men. But would this not also have
been the abandonment of the whole undertaking for which
he had toiled so long with unbounded devotion? He had
indeed informed Colonel Washington, who had been capt
ured by his men, that he intended to exchange him and
his fellow-prisoners for slaves. It, however, is certainly
not probable that this condition would have been accepted,
even if he had reached a skulking-hole in the mountains
with his prisoners, for the families of the latter would have
considered it impossible that he would dare to do them
any harm ; and even if they wanted to accept his condi
tion, it would scarcely have been suffered by the rest of the
population and bj7 the official authorities. But supposing
he had received a slave in exchange for every prisoner, the
most he could do would have been to convey them safely
to Canada, as he had the freed men of the 20th of Decem
ber. This would have ended his game, and he would have
been himself the first to complain bitterly that only a mouse
was born after all the throes of the laboring mountain. It
was folly from the first to consider it possible that he could,
without the excitement of a general insurrection of the
slaves, gather about him such a force that he could not
only maintain himself permanently in the mountains, but
continue to act on the offensive with success — keeping
with him only the most resolute men capable of bearing
arms, and assigning all the others to the service of the
3

34 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
"underground railroad," to assist in transportation,1 and it
was ten times greater folly now to cling to this plan for
even a moment, and not solely because the reinforcements
received would have added to his handful of men only a
second handful, but, above all things, because these people
would have been in every case selected for him by the
slave-holders themselves. On the other hand, it was clear
as the noonday sun that to remain in Harper's Ferry meant
inevitable ruin. It seems inconceivable that Brown did not
recognize this as well as his associates. The question, there
fore, forces itself on us, why, notwithstanding, he rejected
their advice.
Sanborn relates that Brown subsequently, for the first
time in his life, accused himself of having lost his self-com
mand. This confession points directly to the only satis
factory explanation that can be found. This stroke of his
had not broken the chains of a single slave, but it had rent
the veil that had hitherto hung over his eyes. Brown not
only saw, like his associates, that the success achieved could
not be maintained, but he also felt that no advantage could
be derived from it, and that with this false blow his whole
undertaking had failed. This it was that deprived him of
his self-command and made him irresolute. The former
consideration urged him to withdraw, the latter fettered
his feet. There is nothing to show that in the struggle of
these conflicting feelings he had even now gone so far as
to reach the clear idea and conscious resolve rather to per
ish in his impossible undertaking than by abandoning it
to pay the ransom of his own life and the life of his men.
He wavered only until no choice was left him. But, when
1 That, at least, seems to have been his intention. The principal reason
why nothing more definite can be said on the matter is, as has been al
ready remarked, unquestionably, that he had not himself gotten beyond
vague, general ideas.

the insurrection and the country. 35
retreat had become impossible, he ceased to waver and im
mediately recovered, to the fullest extent, the clearness of
his mind and the unbreakable energy of his will; over
powered and brought to the ground he indeed might be,—
but stretch out his arms to the jailer that he might be
handcuffed, — never! What he had presumed to attempt
might be impossible, but it was not wrong. He was not
the evil-doer, but those who placed themselves as an ob
stacle in his way, wickedly trampling the command of the
Eternal God under foot: This genuine scion of the old
Puritan race had for years pressed forward over bloody
thorns without his eyelids quivering, until his whole intel
lectual and moral being became completely absorbed in
this conviction; he could only live up to it in dreadful
earnestness, or die for it with an earnestness equally ter
rible : there was no third way open to him ; and what would
have otherwise been the crazy undertaking of a lunatic be
came bj' this fact a mighty deed in the history of the
world. Motionless, astonishment and blind terror had held the
inhabitants of the place, as if spell-bound, for a while.
Gradually, however, they surveyed the situation far enough
to enable them to proceed to the attack themselves. Brown
had widely scattered his little band in order to keep all
seemingly important points in his power. But two or three
men who might have sufficed for a surprise, could not, of
course, offer a successful resistance. In a short time, all
the men, at the different outposts, were either shot or taken
prisoner. Brown himself with his main force and the pris
oners, who were treated with the greatest consideration, had
withdrawn into the engine-house, and had barricaded it as
well as possible. He absolutely rejected the repeated sum
mons to surrender. An active firing was kept up on both
sides the whole day. It is a remarkable fact that none of

36 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the prisoners were wounded, but the number of the defend
ers of the engine-house grew less and less. When one of
his sons fell mortally wounded near him, Brown, as he
closed his eyes, said to one of the prisoners: "This is the
third son I have lost in this cause." In the evening, Colonel
Eobert E. Lee arrived from Washington with a division of
marines. He, too, first invited Brown to throw himself on
the mercy of the government and lay down his arms.
Brown answered that the mercy of the government was a
rope for himself and his comrades, and that he preferred
to die on the spot. It needed but little, and that would
have happened; and, if it bad happened, then the powerful
effect would have been lost which was destined to be exer
cised by the motives and character of the man. When the
door of the engine-house was broken down by the troops
running a ladder against it, Brown cried out to them that
he would offer no further resistance. But a lieutenant by
the name of Green ran his sword into Brown's body, and
then, in a blind rage, dealt the unarmed man lying on the
ground several heavy blows on the head.
The first impression made by the news of these doings in
both north and south may be described only as a sensation
mixed with vague terror. Absolute and indignant con
demnation was universal, but beyond this to form any
opinion immediately was impossible: the event was too
inconceivably monstrous. Was Brown a lunatic, whose
proper place was in a madhouse? a fanatic made so by a
thirst for revenge carried even beyond the verge of rage?
or a bush-whacker grown savage even to homicidal mania
by the bloody border troubles, and whose foolhardiness was
fully equal to his atrocity ? In the most varicolored con
fusion, and with every degree of emphasis, all these differ
ent characters were imputed to him at one and the same
time. Many a republican journalist and politician strove

views on the insurrection. 37
to be no less sparing than his democratic colleagues in the
employment of the most glaring colors, in order to nullify
the endeavors that were making to burden the republican
party with this border ruffian.1 A damper, however, was
immediately put upon this wild abuse by men from whom
such action was least expected.
Both Senator Mason, whom Vallandingham, of Ohio, had
joined, and Governor Wise, of Virginia, had immediately
hastened to Harper's Ferry, and had subjected Brown to a
kind of informal examination. This much was entirely
clear from the exhaustive reports published of these con
versations, that the affair would create a sensation all the
more astounding the more completely and clearly it was
laid before the public in the judicial after-play. In con
trast with so many northern journalists, and to some extent
with Vallandingham, the two Virginians proved themselves
perfect gentlemen on this occasion. Neither the subject-
matter nor the manner of their questions could either irri
tate or insult the prisoner, who was severely wounded and
suffering violent pain. His answers were given in the
same dignified and measured tone, and with the utmost
frankness. With calm decision he refused to give any in
formation that might compromise others. Concerning his
own motives and objects, on the other hand, he kept noth
ing back, meeting every question without the slightest pas
sion, equally free from bold defiance as from weak anxiety.
Neither in the matter nor the form of his answers could
the slightest trace of any selfish motive- or of mental in
toxication be discovered. It was unmistakable, not only
that he had acted after the calmest and most mature reflec-
1 The following example will suffice as a proof of this. The Inde
pendent represented in the slavery question the most radical views to
be found in the republican party, and in its number of October 20th it
calls Brown "a lawless brigand."

38 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
tion, but that he had believed he was fulfilling an impera
tive duty ; for the full knowledge that, by the unfortunate
issue of his attack, he was condemned to inevitable death
by the hangman's hand, left his thought and feeling com
pletely unruffled. He might be a fanatic, but not a word
passed his lips from which it could be inferred that he was
a visionary; and to suppose that he was a criminal was
simply foolish, if the word implied anything of moral de
pravity. His sober consciousness of his aim; unbending
energy ; deep, earnest religiousness, and a truthfulness in
accessible to temptation, were revealed in this first exam
ination with such convincing naturalness that Governor
Wise could not help, in the description he gave of his char
acter before a public meeting, to call marked attention to
them, although he in the same breath called him vain and
garrulous. So far as this testimony was favorable to Brown, it was
impossible to object to it. But it was just as impossible to
believe it, without asking one's self the question: what
could have led a man with such a character to do an act
which, according to the law, must be expiated on the gal
lows? Whoever had reason to recoil from seeking earnestly
and honestly for the right answer to this question might
be satisfied with the word " fanatic ; " but that word explains
nothing to him who really wanted to find a solution of the
problem. On the other hand, the demeanor of those who
acted as if their angry condemnation alike of the doer and
the deed had an unassailable foundation in that word,
pointed so clearly to the only explanation discoverable,
that even the most unwilling were not able to close their
eyes to it.
Among all the judgments passed under the immediate im
pression of the first news of the doings at Harper's Ferry,
scarcely a dozen could have been found in which Brown's

WISE AND BUCHANAN. 39
sanity had not been called in question in a more or less em
phatic way. The act was as unanimously declared as sense
less as it was blamable.1 Tet people in Virginia acted as if a
powerful, hostile army had broken into the country; and, in
all the other southern states, an excitement prevailed that
was simply inconceivable, if one had in mind only the impor
tance of the event itself. The New Tork Tribune wrote:
The sham democracy may not admit "that the federal
executive and those of Virginia and Maryland have been
frightened half out of their wits by a madman and a platoon
of followers. Already the bulletins of the w'ar exceed in,
length and ponderousness those of the war of the Greeks
against Xerxes, and still the telegraphic wires groan with
further details." Horace Greeley's paper was certainly no
classic witness in such a question, but in this description it
had been scarcely guilty of exaggeration. The state au
thorities of Virginia thought it incumbent on them to take
such comprehensive measures, in order to be able to hang
Brown and his associates with safety, that the expenditure
growing out of the Harper's Ferry insurrection, according
to official data, swelled to $185,667.2
Governor Wise informed the president on the 25th of
November that he had reliable information of a powerful
conspiracy, extending over several states, to free the pris
oners by force. In order to prevent this, he had already
placed one thousand men underarms, and if necessary would
call out the whole armed force of the state. If a new in
vasion of the state took place, he would, notwithstanding
1 It was so declared by the radical republican papers as emphatically
as by the organs of the southern Fire-eaters. Thus it is called, in the
article already quoted from the Independent of October 20, " in every
point of view, the height of madness;" and it was added that even if it
were " part of a widespread scheme of insurrection," it would still be
" both foolish and criminal."
2 The Independent, March 8, 1860.

40 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
his peaceable intentions, pursue the evil-doers wherever the
armed force of the state could penetrate. He communicated
these facts to the president that he might take steps to pre
serve the peace between the states.1 To this Buchanan an
swered, that the constitution did not authorize him to inter
fere in the manner referred to. But, on the other hand, it was
both his duty and his right to care for the security of federal
property. Hence he had already ordered two companies of
artillery to be sent from Fortress Monroe to protect the ar
senal at Harper's Ferry.2 This half-refusal was accompanied
by the expression of the " hope " that the " energetic meas
ures " already taken by the governor would prove sufficient
1 The letter is so characteristic that I feel called upon to quote it
entire :
" Sir: I have information from various quarters, upon which I rely,
that a conspiracy, of formidable extent in means and numbers, is formed
in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and other states, to rescue John
Brown and his associates, prisoners at Charlestown, Virginia. The in
formation is specific enough to be reliable. It convinces me that an
attempt will be made to rescue the prisoners ; and if that fails, to seize
citizens of this state as hostages and victims in case of execution. The
execution will take place next Friday, as certain as Virginia can and
will enforce her laws. I have been obliged to call out one thousand
men, who are now under arms, and if necessary shall call out the whole
available force of the state to carry into effect the sentence of our laws
on the 2d and 16th proximo. Places in Maryland, Ohio and Pennsyl
vania have been occupied as depots and rendezvous by these desper
adoes, unobstructed by guards or otherwise, to invade this state; and
we are kept in continual apprehension of outrages from fire and rapine
on our borders. I apprise you of these facts in order that you may
take steps to preserve peace between the states. I protest that my pur
pose is peaceful, and that I disclaim all threats when I say, with all the
might of meaning, that if another invasion assails this state or its citi
zens, from any quarter, I will pursue the invaders wherever they may
go, into any territory, and punish them wherever arms can reach them.
I shall send copies of this to the governors of Maryland, Ohio and Penn
sylvania." Congr. Gl., 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 589.
* This letter also is published in full in the Congressional Globe.

wise's course. 41
"for any emergency." Wise, therefore, showed himself
equal to the difficult and responsible task of saving the state
from the specters of its imagination, without any further
assistance from the federal government. The public were
informed by a proclamation that the state would take posses
sion of the Winchester & Potomac Eailway, for military
purposes, during the first three days of December. The peo
ple were invited to stay at home on the 2d of December,
the day of the execution, to protect their property and to act
as a patrol ; if it appeared necessary, a state of siege would
be declared. A proclamation by General Taliaferro, further
threatened with arrest all strangers who could not give a
satisfactory account of themselves. Eailway travelers were
required to provide themselves with passes from Governor
Wise. Two twelve-pounders were mounted before the
jail and a third covered the street to the gallows, which
the crowd attracted by the ghastly spectacle could gape at
only from a considerable distance, because the militia re
quired for its protection, as the reporters of the newspapers
stated, was numbered by thousands. These were only the
measures Wise had considered necessary in order that Brown
might not be snatched from the hands of the hangman. To
prevent similar attempts in the future, or to meet them in a
proper way, his message asked : 1. The formation and main
tenance of an army of the southern states. 2. The passage of
penal laws in the northern states against all agitation for the
abolition of slavery, and, if need be, for the interference of
the military power. 3. Measures of the president for the
safety of the places in the contiguous states which might
be used by "desperadoes" as rendezvouses for an invasion.1
How could all this be made to agree with the fact that
Brown's undertaking was unanimously considered by the
entire people so senseless that they could not consider him
1 The Independent, December 15, 1859.

42 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
sane ? The contradiction was so plain that it could not be
overlooked, and as soon as the question had been asked
people began, in the south as well as in the north, to become
conscious how essential to the proper judgment of the whole
affair the answer to it was. Wise's course by no means met
with undivided approval in the south. He was told even
in his own state that he had immeasurably exaggerated
the matter in order to recommend himself to the demo
cratic national convention as a presidential candidate. The
Wheeling Intelligencer, which made this charge against him,
wras, however, just enough not to place all the responsibil
ity on him. It reproached the politicians in general with
wanting to use the Harper's Ferry riot as a "trump card." '
That this assertion was well grounded is self-evident.
The politicians, indeed, must have been stricken with com
plete blindness not to see what a high trump card Brown
had placed in their hands, and as politicians they should not
at all have refused to use it, even if, as men. they had been
willing and able to impose such a sacrifice upon themselves.
Tet it was a trump, the right employment of which required
very skilful players; but Wise had proven himself a bad
botcher, and the masses of the southern politicians had, in
the first heat of passion, followed him on the wrong road.
Instead of helping the slavocratic cause they seriously in
jured it, because, in their indiscreet zeal, they had tried to
make too much out of the trump. It was precisely the slav
ocratic extremists who accused them of this with the greatest
vehemence. The Charleston Mercury called Wise's conduct
' " The truth, as we read it, and we think it as visible as the sun in
the heavens, is just this: This whole matter is in the hands of politi
cians. They are working it as a trump card, and they will work it
until after the New York election. Governor Wise, everybody knows,
has an ax to grind, and he is not the man to lose such a chance as this
Harper's Ferry riot." Copied in the New York Tribune of October 31.

EFFECT OF THE INSURRECTION. 43;
a broad, pathetic farce, and bitterly and angrily complained
that the south was made ridiculous in such a way before
its own eyes and the eyes of the world.1
But the mischief that had been done could not be rem
edied by this. Even if the republicans had been stupid
enough not to see what an exposition had been made of
the south by its politicians, they would have been forced
now to subject the whole matter to a more searching ex
amination from this point of view. And in that exam
ination they did not, of course, stop at the point up to
which the Charleston Mercury had gone. If the demeanor
of Wise and of the politicians who had chosen him as their
model in the premises had been only ridiculous, the cen
sure of it would also have been less severe; for it would-
have been charged by public opinion mainly to their per
sonal account. The south had been seriously compromised
by the fact that their conduct was a frightful confession of
weakness,2 even supposing that all these ridiculous exaggera-
1 " We are satisfied that every intelligent man in the south has been
completely disgusted at the broad and pathetic farce that has been
played off before the public about the hanging of that hoary villain,
' Old Brown.' From the five hundred invaders in possession of Har
per's Ferry, and the one thousand negroes carried off to the mountains-
of Pennsylvania — from the further invasions and threats of invasion —
the arsons and fears of arson — the marches and countermarches of the
ponies and cessations of ponies — Governor Wise, the energetic, and his
troops, down to the final climax of military aid offered by Governor
Gist, of South Carolina, to the governor of Virginia, for the purpose of
making certain the aforesaid hanging of Old Brown & Co., — it is a tis
sue of disgrace, exaggeration and invention sufficient to stir the gall of
any southerner who has regard for the dignity and responsibility of the
southern people. We sincerely trust that our legislature, which meets-
to-day, will bear this in mind, and take no action whatever in regard
to ourselves or our institution that may even have the appearance of
being prompted by the Virginia farce and its terrorism." Congr. GL,
1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 65.
8 Gilbert Haven said, in a sermon entitled "The Beginning of the-

44 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
tions could be traced to selfish motives or ill-advised party
zeal. They had exaggerated, but only exaggerated. That
terror had stalked through the length and breadth of the
south could not be argued away, and the thing on which so
glaring a light had been cast by that terror could not now
be covered up by the scathing denunciations of those exag
gerations. The stroke had been dealt by not quite two
dozen men; the whole south had immediately called it a
madman's blow; and it was a blow in the air, to the ex
tent that not a single slave had lifted his hand to strike for
his freedom; and yet the news of the occurrence had made
the blood rush back to the hearts of these millions, who, in
personal courage, stood second to no people on earth, as
quickly as would the sudden appearance of some monstrous
danger. Such an effect from such a cause can be explained
only on the supposition that John Brown's act had sounded
an alarm in every conscience that awakened it from its
sleep.1 The first direct impression had not corresponded
with what had really happened, but had been governed by
the threatening specters of the possibilities, which the in
stinctive stirring of the consciousness of guilt had conjured
End of American Slavery," preached in Cambridge on the 6th of No
vember, 1859:
" How can this brief and apparently unsuccessful act be considered
as the beginning of that long-prayed for, — we can hardly say, long-
iooked for hour, — the Death of Slavery? For two reasons:
" First. It has taught the slave power its weakness. . Never has such
trembling shaken their knees before. Never has such a thrill of horror
made so many great states to quake. Over fifteen states, over a million
of square miles, there has run one feeling, one fear, one Belshazzar
sense of awful guilt and awful weakness and awful punishment. " Red-
path, Echoes of Harper's Ferry, pp. 129, 130.
'Wendell Phillips, in a speech entitled "The Lesson of the Hour,"
delivered in Brooklyn on the 1st of November, 1859, said : "Virginia did
not tremble at an old, gray-headed man at Harper's Ferry : they trembled
at a John Brown in every man's own conscience.'' lb., p. 56.

SLAVERY DOOMED. 45-
up in unintelligible vagueness. The surprise had, for a mo
ment, not allowed sober consideration to get the better of
dismay and consternation, and the south had thereby con
victed itself, in the most striking manner, of the grossest
self-delusion in regard to the " peculiar institution ; " its
momentary involuntary terror was an annihilating con
demnation of that institution, and all the more annihilating
for the very reason that the slaves had kept entirely quiet.
If that was, as the south claimed, the consequence of com
plete satisfaction with their lot, then the institution must
have been all the more objectionable ; for the terror of the
south was, in that case, an admission that only glowing
lava, under a very thin crust, was the foundation of the so
ciety built upon it, — even when tenderness, benevolence and
patriarchal solicitude were so general, in the relation be
tween masters and slaves, that the latter were inaccessible
to the most powerful temptations to produce a change in
their destiny. The more honorable the testimony that
could be inferred from Brown's complete failure in favor of
the slave-holders, the severer was the sentence of condem
nation passed upon slavery by the south, by the frightful
start the Harper's Ferry riot had given it.
The number of those who learned to understand this, and'
to appreciate its full meaning, grew daily in the north.
But to whomsoever understood it, the gallows on which
Brown was hanged appeared, immediately and necessarily,
in a very different light. Brown had to be hanged : the
law required it, and the law was undoubtedly in harmony
with state reason. Slavery had not only a legal existence,
but was the actual foundation of the whole social life of
the south ; and it was, therefore, an imperative demand of
the self-preservation of the slavocracy to punish such an
attempt with death. But was the moral warrant to hang
Brown quite as defensible, when, in the dreadful fright his act

46 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
had caused, the confession lay, that the view of the nature of
slavery which impelled him to commit it had a foundation
in fact? The law of the state and reasons of state required
that that should be atoned for with blood, which could not
only not be objected to before the tribunal of morals, but
which deserved approval. Tet passionately and bitterly as
the slavocracy had denounced the doctrine of the "higher
law," their most celebrated spokesmen, like Stephens and
Calhoun, had unreservedly expressed their conviction that
the settlement of the slavery question would and must de
pend, in the end, on whether slavery could exist before the
tribunal of morals. Not, hereafter, on the day of judg
ment, therefore, and by the omniscient God, the searcher
-of all hearts, but now, and on this earth, had a higher court
to pronounce judgment on Brown and his act, and the
judgment it pronounced on them was a moral reversal of the
•legal death-sentence of the Virginia court. The criminal
necessarily became a martyr, in public opinion, the moment
the nation was forced to proceed to the solution of the
problem of slavery.
The most manifest proof that the time was near at
hand when this would happen was Brown's act. The ir-
repressibility of the conflict could not be placed in a more
glaring light. By means of that scaffold — the first erected
in the United States for a traitor, and, indeed, for a political
criminal — the words: He who is not for me is against me,
and he who is not against me is for me — grew to the full
ness of truth. Precisely because it was conceded, almost
without contradiction, that the legal existence of slavery
had made Brown's execution a necessity,1 people could not
'The Independent (November 24), indeed, wrote: "In permitting the
sentence of death to take effect, Governor Wise will act against the unani
mous sentiment of the north. We say unanimous, for after all our
reading and inquiry on the subject, we have been able to learn of bat

AWAKENING CONSCIENCES. 47
help having, universally, a certain feeling of responsibility
for it; since not the south alone, but the entire people, bore,
before God and man, the responsibility for the legal exist
ence of slavery. Hence, if not loudly, at least irrepressibly,
the voice of conscience, in numberless breasts, demanded
an answer to the question, whether that scaffold was a tree
of malediction and ignominy for the man who had to
breathe out his life upon it, or not, rather, for the people
who were compelled by their institutions to erect it.
Brown's conduct, from the moment of his arrest until his
latest breath, irresistibly forced new multitudes, every day,
to ask themselves this question, with the honesty and earn
estness which its dreadful importance demanded, and the
number of those from whom it wrested the right answer,
and who had the courage publicly to confess to it, swelled
one man who thinks that John Brown ought to be hung ; that man is the
editor of the New York Observer, who after even such men as the editors
of the Herald and the Journal of Commerce have endeavored, from
motives of expediency, to stay Brown's execution, still clamors for it,
as with the conscience of an inquisitor." Even if this were a gross ex
aggeration, it was not destitute of all foundation in fact. But it is
only in seeming conflict with what is said in the text. People would
have been glad if the sentence of death had not been executed here, be
cause they, like John A. Andrew, were of the opinion that " whatever
may be thought of John Brown's acts, John Brown himself was right,"
and there, because they did not wish to see the dissension between the
north and the south intensified, which, by reason of this view, was an
inevitable consequence of the execution. But neither here nor there
did people for a moment fall into the delusion of believing that the ful
fillment of the wish was possible. They could not help admitting that
other considerations had to be decisive, with the Virginia authorities,
whose exclusive jurisdiction could not be contested, either on the ground
of justice or of positive law, and that these considerations left them no
other choice. What, so far as the form was concerned, appeared largely
as advice, or even as a demand, was, therefore, essentially only a wish
entertained against better knowledge, and in that wish the self-con
tradiction in which the judgment based on opposite premises was in
volved was clearly visible.

48 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
to ever greater proportions.1 The attack he and his twenty
comrades had made on slavery, with powder and lead, was
a sublime piece of folly ; but the manner in which he bore
the consequences of his act was simply sublime, without
1 Garrison, who as a non-resistant, notwithstanding his recognition of
Brown's motives, could net approve his act, exclaimed: "The sympa
thy and admiration now so widely felt for him prove how marvelous
has been the change effected in public opinion during thirty years of
moral agitation — a change so great, indeed, that whereas ten years
since there were thousands who could not endure my lightest word of
rebuke of the south, they can now easily swallow John Brown whole,
and his rifle into the bargain. In firing his gun he has merely told us
what time of day it is. It is high noon, thank God!" W. L. Garrison,
The Story of His Life Told by His Children, III, p. 493. Garrison him
self is one of the most eloquent proofs of the clearing effect of that gun
shot. He now found the arguments by which the doctrine suited to
the ideal state in the clouds might be harmonized with the action suited
to the conditions of real life. He had recently exhorted the abolition
ists : " I believe in the spirit of peace, and in sole and absolute reliance
on truth and the application of it to the hearts and consciences of the
people. I do not believe that the weapons of liberty ever have been, or
ever can be, the weapons of despotism. I know that those of des
potism are the sword, the revolver, the cannon, the bomb-shell ; and
therefore the weapons to which tyrants cling, and upon which they de
pend, are not the weapons for me as a friend of liberty. ... I pray
you, abolitionists, still to adhere to that truth. . . . Perhaps blood
will flow — God knows, I do not ; but it shall not flow through any
counsel of mine. Much as I detest the oppression exercised by the
southern slave-holder, he is a man, sacred before me. He is a man, not
to be harmed by my hand nor with my consent. He is a man, who is
grievously and wickedly trampling upon the rights of his fellow-man ;
but all I have to do with him is to rebuke his sin, to call him to repent
ance, to leave him without excuse for his tyranny. ... I have no
other weapon to wield against him but the simple truth of God."
Now he says: "lam anon-resistant; . . . yet, as a peace man —
an ' ultra ' peace man — I am prepared to say : ' Success to every slave
insurrection at the south and in every slave country.' And I do not see
how I compromise or stain my peace profession in making that declara
tion. Whenever there is a contest between the oppressed and the op
pressor, — the weapons being equal between the parties, — God knows

JOHN brown's character. 49
the slightest admixture of folly. The fear with which his
lawless violence had inspired the south was groundless; but
the slavocracy had no arms, offensive or defensive, against
John Brown, overpowered, mortally wounded and hanged.
Even in his boldest dreams, he had never ventured to hope
that he would be able to deal slavery a blow of such de
structive force as he had now dealt it, by his suffering and
his death. This fact became clearer every day to his mental
vision, and hence, he bowed with greater cheerfulness and
gratitude to God's decree, the nearer the hour of his death
approached.1 And, in his letters, he knew how to express
that my heart must be with the oppressed and always against the op
pressor. Therefore, whenever commenced, I cannot but wish success
to all slave insurrections. I thank God when men who believe in the
right and duty of wielding carnal weapons are so far advanced that
they will take those weapons out of the scale of despotism and throw
them into the scale of freedom. It is an indication of progress and a
positive moral growth ; it is one way to get up to the sublime platform
of non-resistance ; and it is God's method of dealing retribution upon
the head of the tyrant. Eather than see men wearing their chains in a
cowardly and servile spirit, I would, as an advocate of peace, much
rather see them breaking the head of the tyrant with their chains." lb.,
Ill, pp. 473, 474, 491, 492.
1 As early as February 24, 1858, he had written full of presentiment to
Sanborn : " I expect nothing but to ' endure hardness,' but I expect to
effect a mighty conquest even though it be like the last victory of Sam
son." To his brother Jeremiah he writes on the 12th of November,
1859: "lam gaining in health slowly, and am quite cheerful in view
of my approaching end, — being fully persuaded that I am worth in
conceivably more to hang than for any other purpose." He closes the
letter to his sisters, dated November 27, 1859, in which he bade them
farewell, with the words: "Say to all my friends that I am waiting
cheerfully and patiently the days of my appointed time ; fully believing
that for me now to die will be to me an infinite gain and of untold
benefit to the cause we love. Wherefore, ' be of good cheer,' and ' let
not your hearts be troubled.' ' To him that overcometh will I grant to
sit with me in my throne, even as I also overcame and am set down
with my father in his throne.' I wish my friends could know but a
little of the rare opportunities I now get for kind and faithful labor in
4

50 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the conviction that God, in His wisdom and mercy, had
allowed him to reap infinitely better than he had sown,
with such captivating simplicity of heart and persuasive
artlessness, that even his bitterest enemies could do no bet
ter than take refuge behind the word " fanatic," because
it was impossible to doubt his absolute veracity. If he had
been playing a part, he would have failed in the consist
ency of his acts on some occasion. But he was always the
same John Brown. Not a particle of the sentimentality
of the lamb brought to the slaughter, of the self-contem
plation of the saint, or the presumptuous defiance of the
great man. Whether he gave utterance to grief at the
death of his sons, or inquired how the work on his farm
was getting on, — whether he consoled his wife and chil
dren and exhorted them to be strong, or refused the minis
trations of slave-holding clergymen, because, in his eyes,
they were not Christians, — whether he did justice to his
judges for the manner in which they had presided during
his trial,1 and cordially thanked his keepers for all the kind
ness they had shown him, or from being the accused made
himself the judge, and branded the law of his judges as a
hellish perversion of justice, for on them lay the sin they
accused him of, and whose wages was death, — whether he
begged his friends to take care of his family in their pinching
God's cause. I hope they have not been entirely lost." And in the
last letter (November 30) to his family, we read : " I am waiting the hour
of my public murder with great composure of mind and cheerfulness ;
feeling the strong assurance that in no other possible way could I be
used to so much advantage to the cause of God and of humanity, and
that -nothing that either I or all my family have sacrificed or suffered
•will be lost. ... I have now no doubt but that our seeming dis
aster will ultimately result in the most glorious success." Sanborn,
The Life and Letters of John Brown, pp. 444, 588, 608, 609, 613.
1 " I fell entirely satisfied with the treatment I have received on my
trial ; considering all the circumstances, it has been more generous than
I expected."

JOHN brown's oharaoter. 51
poverty, wrote his last will, admired the beauty of the land
scape on his way to the scaffold, or exhorted his loved ones
not to consider it a disgrace to them that he had died on the
gallows, and praised God that from the seed of his death a
rich harvest would yet spring up for the poorest of men
formed in His image, and for the whole country, — he was al
ways the same " old John Brown " he had been when he emi
grated to North Elba. The ingenuous naturalness and plain
straightforwardness of the man of the people, admirably
melted into a harmonious whole, with the unstudied dignity
and tender feeling of the born gentleman, — the most homely
realism with great,ideal loftiness of soul, — touching modesty
with absolute self-reliance and blunt intolerance, — Puritanic
strictness, nay harshness, with almost womanly tenderness
and consideration, — boundless devotion and self-sacrifice
with a complete incapacity to understand opinions and con
victions different from his own, — the most implicit faith,
confidence in God and resignation to His will, with the
most unconquerable and imperious impulse to make the
altogether too slowly grinding wheels of His mill revolve
more quickly, and never experiencing the least qualm of
conscience, because, in order to produce that desired effect,
he poured blood, not oil, upon their axles, and endeavored
to grind between them the principle of supremacy of the
law, that corner-stone of all moral, political and social life.
Where feeling was too dull to allow immmediately an
understanding of the real greatness of .this wonderful and
complex character, the powerful grasp with which the
imagination seized it came to the rescue. The number of
eyes in which the stature of the man grew to mighty propor
tions increased rapidly.1 The highly-strained self-conscious-
1 The Independent wrote on the 8th of December, 1859: " No man
has ever produced upon this nation so profound an impression for
moral heroism. He made this impression at the first, but every act he

52 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ness produced by republican institutions and the peculiar
demands of a social life growing with dizzying haste, and
the abrupt changes so frequently met wrth in it, have made
the Americans more sensitive than any other civilized peo
ple to the attractiveness of a courage raised to the height
of daring. Even when the moral blameworthiness of the
manner in which it manifests itself is plain and undoubted,
they yield only too frequently to its charm. In the very cir
cles, therefore, in which only a " damned nigger " was seen
in a slave, people could not refrain from according a cer
tain admiration to John Brown.1 And even among them,
to a great extent, there was a lively feeling, that moral
courage deserved more admiration than physical courage, —
a feeling great enough not to allow them to stop at the amaz
ing foolhardiness of the riot, but, despite the secret discom
fort awakened by that reflection, to admit to themselves,
half unwillingly, how much more courage still he needed by
his act, and cheerfully dying at the hangman's hand for
that act, to brand slavery as a national crime, with regard
to which the true Christian should know but one law:
Thou shalt obey God rather than men.2
performed and every word he uttered until the day of his execution
only confirmed and increased the power of his example. He grew
greater and greater unto the end. He was greatest at the last, when
most men would have been weakest."
'Dr. Cheever says: "Others are filled with admiration of John
Brown's heroism; this sentiment is universal (1). His grand, compact,
clear answers on his examination are trumpet-tones of truth and earnest
ness. . . . Men are filled with amazement at the air of grandeur
and challenge of righteousness which the simple and noble bearing of
the old soldier, and the assertion of the sacredness of his motives and
his cause, throw over the whole movement. They admire the calmness,
integrity and force of his utterances, and the coolness and intrepidity
of his demeanor and conduct, not only in the field, but, helpless from
his wounds, in the court and presence of his enemies." The Independ
ent, November 10, 1859.
2 The Independent of the 24th of November, 1859, writes: "Noser-

THE END OF SLAVERY. 53
The number of those who would have considered it right
to obey this command in the manner chosen by him still
remained evanescently small. But in numberless minds
and hearts, wondering admiration for his motives overcame,
in ever-growing measure, the feeling of disapproval of his
act. And, from the wondering recognition of the motive,
there was but one step to the acknowledgment that the
' case had not ended with the execution of the judicial sen
tence, but that, for good or for evil, the nation would have
to hold court over the mouldering bones of the condemned,
until if had reached the final political judgment for or
against him, and that that judgment would have to be based
not on the constitution, and not on the criminal code, but on
the "higher law." How this would happen and when the
sentence would be passed, no one could tell. But the word
of menace, full of foreboding, from the Charlestown jail,
that much blood would first be shed,1 was powerless to deter
people from loudly and publicly bearing witness that it
would happen, and that the finger of the World's Horo
loge had already begun its steady course through the fate
ful hour. Such was the golden fruit of the silly act of
the sublime criminal of Harper's Ferry. "Brown's deed
and martyrdom are the beginning of the end of slavery."
vile insurrection at the south, not even a combination among the slaves
reaching through all the states, from the Potomac to the Gulf of Mex
ico and the Rio Grande, could have awakened such a sensation through
out the country as did the raid of John Brown into Virginia. . . .
Men having no personal interest to serve were ready to make war upon
slavery at the hazard of their own lives. This has commanded the at
tention of thousands who would have given but a passing thought to a
negro insurrection."
' Brown's last written words are: " I, John Brown, am now quite
certain that the crimes of this guilty land will never be purged away
but with blood. I had, as I now think vainly, flattered myself that
without very much bloodshed it might be done." Sanborn, loe. cit.,
p. 620.

54 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
The boldest proclaimed it publicly with shouts of jubilation
and an ardent prayer of thanksgiving.1 Whole towns
ventured, even now, to confess the same conviction by the
solemn tolling of funeral bells and holding divine serv
ice on the day of the execution,2 and millions were thrilled
with the foreboding that the already brittle compromise
policy would melt entirely away in the glowing heat of
blood, and that the fatal day had begun to dawn, the motto
of which would be Jefferson's words: "I tremble when I
reflect that God is just."
This feeling found most powerful expression in the
anxious zeal, with which the democrats of the northern
states endeavored to cairn the south, by the most abundant
' In a sermon by pastor Belcher, we read: " On the day that man is
hung, the whole system of slavery — that sum of human villainy — will
receive so fatal a stab that it will never recover. Therein I rejoice —
y^a, I will rejoice — seeing in it the progress of human freedom. For this
reason I shall thank God for the hanging of John Brown. There must be
a martyr to truth, and each one that falls is a spring-shower upon the
buried seed." E. M. Wheelock said in a sermon of the 27th of Novem
ber, 1859, at Dover, New Hampshire: "John Brown is the first plague
launched by Jehovah at the head of this immense and embodied wick
edness. The others will follow, ' and then comes the end.' " Redpath,
Echoes of Harper's Ferry, pp. 176, 179. Wendell Phillips clothed the
thought in a beautiful figure: "History will date Virginia emancipa
tion from Harper's Ferry. True, the slave is still there. So, when the
tempest uproots a pine on your hills, it looks green for months, — a
year or two. Still, it is timber, not a tree. John Brown has loosened
the roots of the slave system ; it only breathes, — it does not live, —
hereafter." Wendell Phillips, Speeches, Lectures and Letters, p. 290.
The Independent wrote on the 24th of November, 1859: "What is it
that will be hung up on the gallows in the gaze of all men? Not John
Brown, but slavery I . . . John Brown swinging upon the gallows
will toll the death-knell of slavery."
2 We have no space to chronicle even the names of the hundreds of
cities and town, throughout the northern states, in which public meet
ings of sympathy were held on the day of Capt. Brown's execution."
The Independent, December 8, 1859.

O CONOR S SPEECH. 55
assurances of their unchangeable devotion. Farley Gray
was guilty of no exaggeration when he wrote to ex-President
Tyler: "Many are as violent as any southern man could
be." He even exceeded the hysterical hallucinations of
Governor Wise by the consoling promise that the tap of
the drum would call fifty thousand men under arms to
hasten to the assistance of Virginia.1 Still greater de
mands might have been made and would have been cheer
fully met, if the orators of the " Union Meetings," which
were laid as a healing plaster over the bite of the aboli
tionist adder, were correct interpreters of public opinion.
The largest and most important of these demonstrations,
ushered in with charlatanical din, was the meeting that
took place on the 19th of December in the New Tork
Academy of Music. The first speaker was the lawyer,
Charles O'Conor. He was held in universal esteem, not
only on account of his intellectual eminence, but of his
character; and the originators of the meeting could not
have found a better man for the place of honor on this oc
casion. The north had never yet heard such a speech,
even out of the mouth of the most servile of its bread-and-
butter politicians. A man of high intellectual endowments
and spotless character had the mournful courage to appear
before the people in the metropolis of the free north to
preach with holy wrath the creed of John C. Calhoun.
And yet his speech was a meritorious act, because O'Conor,
with the same bold honesty as Alexander H. Stephens, fol
lowed the course of his ideas to their ultimate, logical con
sequences, and thus sent a new and dazzling beam of light
through the clouds which for generations had enveloped
1 " I am happy to tell you that the feeling here in New York is all we
could wish. An army of fifty thousand men, I am persuaded, could be
raised here at the tap of a drum to march to your aid, if necessary.
Many are as violent as any southern man could be." Tyler, Letters and
Times of the Tylers, II, p. 556.

56 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the thought and feeling of the people on this subject. If
slavery, said O'Conor, is unjust and contrary to the teach
ings of the Bible on the duties of one man to another, a
higher law obliges us to trample it under foot, no matter
what political laws may provide; but it is not only not un
just, but just, wise and beneficent.1 On the question of
principle, therefore, he took the very same ground as
Brown: The laws and constitution should not be recog
nized as the court of last resort in this question; the moral
nature of slavery must decide it absolutely and exclusively,
and all the logical consequences that follow herefrom must
be boldly drawn.2 The irrepressibility of the conflict could
1 " Is negro slavery unjust? That is the point to which this great ar
gument, involving the fate of our Union, must now come. Is negro
Blavery unjust? If it violates that great rule of human conduct, Ren
der to every man his due, it is unjust. If it violates the law of God,
which says, ' Love thy neighbor as thyself,' it is unjust. And, gentle
men, if it could be maintained that negro slavery is thus in conflict
with the law of nature and the law of God, I might be prepared — per
haps we should all be prepared — to go with a distinguished man, to
whom allusion is frequently made, and say there is a higher law which
compels -us to disregard the constitution and trample it beneath our
feet as a wicked and unholy compact. ... I insist that negro
slavery is not unjust. [Cries of ' Bravo 1 '] It is not only not unjust,
but it is just, wise and beneficent. [Applause and loud hisses — cries of
' Bravo 1' and disorder.] . . . I maintain that negro slavery is not
unjust. [Cheers.] That it is benign in its influences on the white man
and on the black. . . . We must no longer favor political leaders
who talk about slavery being an evil ; nor must we advance the inde
fensible doctrine that negro slavery is a thing which, although perni
cious, is to be tolerated merely because we have made a bargain to tol
erate it. . . . Yielding to the decree of nature and the voice of sound
philosophy, we must pronounce that institution just, beneficent, lawful
and proper. . . . The negro, to be sure, is a bondman for life. He
may be sold from one master to another, but where is the ill in that? "
Official Report of the Great Union Meeting, held at the Academy of
Music, N. Y., pp. 29, 30, 31, 33.
2 He did not even recoil from the final conclusion of his premises,
that the south would be justified in seceding from the Union, " if the

o'conor's speech. 57
not have been testified to more pointedly or more unre
servedly. But Seward had been morally crucified, because
he asserted it, and Brown had been hanged, because he had
done what, according to O'Conor, it was every man's duty
to do, if slavery was morally wrong. O'Conor, on the
other hand, had rendered a great service to the menaced
Fatherland, for, only to the bold proclamation of these
great truths, said the Weekly Day-Book, was it due, that the
grand demonstration in the Academy of Music was not a
miserable fiasco.1
But even the Day-Book had not been able to work itself
out of the mist, although the clear conciseness of O'Conor's
reasoning shone with so dazzling a light as almost to blind
the eye. Although it had to admit that the other speakers
had not been able to rise to the height of O'Conor's " philos
ophy,"2 it stated with great satisfaction that not one of
them had wept over the evils of slavery, or expressed the
hope that it would be abolished. It did not, therefore, see
that, after all O'Conor's reasoning, absolutely nothing was
gained by it, and that the northern friends of the south,
with all their saving of the Union, were only endeavor
ing to fill a Danai'des cask, so long as the north had not
climbed to the height of his philosophy. That this would ever
happen had never yet been considered possible; and if it
had ever been considered possible, one could not but be now
convinced of its impossibility by the fact that, even at this
»
north continues to conduct itself in the selection of representatives in
the congress of the United States as, perhaps from a certain degree of
negligence and inattention, it has heretofore conducted itself." lb.,
p. 26.
'Dec. 24, ib., p. 92.
2 The New York Herald agreed entirely in this opinion: "As to the
statesmanlike speech of Mr. O'Conor, it was the only one that rose to
the height of the occasion, and comprehended the true nature of the
issues between the north and the south."

58 harper's ferry — Lincoln s inauguration.
meeting, no speaker had dared to indorse what O'Conor
had said. And far as were all the rest of the crowd of Union-
savers behind O'Conor, he had gone to such an extreme
that all the thanks he received from the slavocratic camp
was a heartfelt cry of, Shame! We are filled only with dis
gust, the Baltimore Patriot told them, when you hypocrites
lick the dirt off our shoes.1 Even if the view of the Independ
ent, that the dissolution of the Union and the civil war were
to be feajjed now still less than before the attack on Harper's
Ferry, and that the real danger was that the north would
sink yet deeper into shameful servility, — even if this view
were to prove correct, for the moment, the main question
would be in no wise changed, if, in accordance with O'Conor's
demand, Calhoun's principle, that slavery was a " positive
good," were made the party watch-word of the democrats
of the north.2 The slavocracy saw so clearly, and there was
'"We perceive that the Locofoco Dough-faces in Boston, New York
and Philadelphia propose holding meetings for the purpose of appeasing
the wrath of the Locofoco Disunionists in the south at the recent exhi
bitions of foolish sentimentalism for John Brown by a handful, here and
there, of Abolition Disunionists in the cities.
"If there be any character in tlie world that we have contempt for,
it is the dirt-eating Dough-face of the free states., He has no real re
gard whatever for the south and its institutions, and yet, under pretense
of sympathy for them, he will proclaim himself our friend, keeping his
eyes steadily all the while upon the pecuniary benefit to be derived
therefrom. He will do anything that southern fire-eaters will require
of him, even to licking the very dust off their shoes. . . . They (the
American party of Maryland) are not to be deceived about the real senti
ments of the people of the free states about slavery, and they don't
want any northern or western man to eat dirt to please them. They
don't ask any such degradation ; . . . they don't require of those
people, as a prelude of political union in the next presidential election,
the surrender of their manhood or the profession of a lie on their lips
about slavery." Copied in the Independent of the 15th of December.
2 "We are not in the least danger of a civil war. . . . We are
not in the least danger of disunion. . . . The real danger lies in

o'conor's speech. 591
so much sterling manfulness among them, that they tore to
shreds this last cover under which an attempt might have
been made to hide the irrepressibleness of the conflict, with
the words: "Because your petty souls are concerned only
with your material interests, you are becoming cowardly
liars; you cannot think about slavery as you pretend."
just the opposite direction. . . . Already we see lawyers and mer
chants of the Castle Garden school, forward to prostrate themselves
inew at the feet of the Southern Moloch, abjuring and execrating the
name of John Brown. Already we see politicians anticipating the new
calls of the slave-power for federal protection, by proffering whatever
the fears or the audacity of the south may demand. . . . There is
danger that even the party which is established upon the basis of oppo
sition to slavery will begin to temporize, to seek for ' unexceptionable '
candidates in men who have neither a history to warrant them, nor a
principle to guide them. There is danger that the conscience of the
nation, which one bold, generous deed has stirred to its depths, instead
of pacifying itself by repenting of the sin that burdens it, will harden
itself under a reaction into more daring and desperate iniquity." The
Independent , December 8, 1859.

-60 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN S INAUGURATION.

CHAPTER II.
THE ELECTION FOR SPEAKER OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH CON
GRESS.
Three days after the execution of John Brown, the Thirty-
sixth Congress met in its first session. " Harper's Ferry"
was the first word uttered by the senate to the people, and
" Helper's Crisis " the greeting offered them by the house
of representatives. Even if one shared Buchanan's consol
ing belief that Divine Providence had always vouchsafed
its "special protection " to the republic,1 one could not enter,
without fear and trembling, on a period of legislation
which had been placed by the slavocracy under the sign
of this double star. There could, indeed, be no question
that the interest of the state imperatively demanded that
all the facts relating to the insurrection at Harper's Ferry
should be established in an authentic way. That Mason
moved, in the senate, the appointment of a committee in
this behalf, was, therefore, entirely proper. If'the senator'
from Virginia exposed himself, by his course, to any right-'
ful reproach, it was, at most, that he might have chosen a
better moment. There could be no fear of danger from
delay, and, considering the high degree of excitement of
all minds, it must make a provoking impression on the re
publicans that the business of the senate was, without any
necessity, opened with this question. This was all the more
certain, as the resolution expressly made it the duty of the
committee to ascertain whether any citizens of the United
' " We have much reason to believe, from the past events in our his
tory, that we have enjoyed the special protection of Divine Providence
ever since our origin as a nation." Annual message of December 19,
1859. Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 1.

TRUMBULL S ANSWER,

61

States had made themselves the accomplices of the insur
rectionists by the contribution of money, the procuring of
arms or ammunition, or in any other way. Neither could
this, certainly, be objected to; but it had a sting in it, none
the less ; for the slavocracy had, from the very first day,
left no doubt that they not only expected but wished to
find such accomplices in the ranks of the republican party.
And back of the sting lay the poison. In itself, too, noth
ing could be said condemnatory of the fact that, lastly, the
resolution imposed on the committee the task of reporting
whether any, and what, laws were required to insure the
peace of the country in the future, and to protect public
property. The formulation of the resolution, however, had
so long and so significant a history as a preparatory an
nouncement of new claims and demands of the slavocracy,
that the republicans would have been guilty of inexplicable
and inexcusable confidence if they had not, even now, seen
in it the beginning of an offensive advance against them.
Mason's announcement that he intended to ask that the
discussion of the resolution be begun the next day was
followed immediately by Trumbull's declaration that he
would move to extend the investigation asked for to the
doings, in 1855, at Liberty, Missouri.1 Whether the senate
accepted or rejected this motion was of no importance.
That it was made was, on the other hand, a matter of no
little significance. "No state can exist even a day if every
individual is to be permitted to undertake to correct the
evils, real or imaginary, from which it suffers, in his own
way, and in defiance of the laws of the land." 2 With this
1 The plundering of the arsenal by Judge Thompson and his associ
ates. The object of it was the fitting out of Kansas expeditions with
the stolen arms.
2 "No matter what evils, either real or imaginary, may exist in the
body politic, if each individual or every set of twenty individuals, out

62 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
simple, irrefutable reasoning, Trumbull frankly condemned
the act of John Brown and his companions. If this truth,
he continued, had been borne in mind, and acted in accord
ance with, when, some years ago, a similar thing was done
for slavery, this act would probably not now have been at
tempted against it. Even if he had substituted "perhaps"
for "probably," his assertion would have been a hazardous
one, which not many would have been able honestly to ac-
quiesce in. On the other hand, it was incontestably true
that, in 1855, the slavocracy and the federal authorities
had, notwithstanding all the reclamations of the opposition,
remained blind and deaf to this truth, for which they now,
from the very first moment, had evinced a more than suffi
cient understanding; and that this difference in their con
duct could be explained only on the supposition that the
highest principle of their political morality and wisdom
was that the ship of state should alwrays sail before the
wind of the slave-holding influence.
If the object of this reproach had been to awaken the
conscience of the slavocracy, Trumbull might have saved
of more than twenty millions of people, is to be permitted in his own
way, and in defiance of the laws of the land, to undertake to correct
those evils, there is not a government upon the face of the earth that
could last a day. And it seems to me, sir, that those persons who reason
only from abstract principles, and believe themselves justifiable on alJ
occasions, and in every form, in combating evil wherever it exists, f orgev
that the right which they claim for themselves exists equally in every
other person. All governments, the best which have been devised, en
croach necessarily more or less on the individual rights of man, and to
that extent may be regarded as evils. Shall we, therefore, destroy gov
ernment, dissolve society, destroy regulated and constitutional liberty
and inaugurate in its stead anarchy — a condition of things in which
every man shall be permitted to follow the instincts of his own passion.,
or prejudices or feelings, and where will be no protection to the physio
ally weak against the encroachments of the strong? Till we are pre
pared to inaugurate such a state as this, no man can justify the deec«
done at Harper's Ferry." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 5.

TONE of southern senators. 63
himself and the senate every word about this half-forgotten
episode. So foolish an intention was, of course, far from his
mind. The recalling of that outrage by the Missouri border
ruffians, led by a judge, was a material addition to the elo
quent refusal that preceded it, to allow the responsibility of
John Brown's act to rest on the shoulders of the republican
party. It opened the discussion asked for by the slavocracy
on that act by the establishment of the highly important fact
that the republicans not only were not disposed humbly and
patiently to bare their backs for the blows intended to be
inflicted with such a rod, but that they would continue to
wield with undiminished force the thorny switches, so rich
a selection1 of which could be cut. in the forest of sins of
their opponents. The " yell of delight " with which, as Hale
said, the democrats who thought only of the interest of
party had greeted the doings at Harper's Ferry, thus re
ceived the answer which it not only deserved but which
had to be given it, if John Brown's deeds were not to sup
ply a new and powerful prop to the already tottering power
of the slavocracy.
Every possibility of self-deception as to the meaning of
Trumbull's amendment was removed by the declaration
dryly made by Fessenden : We shall not be put upon the
defensive, for, in this matter, we are as pure as the ex-
tremest slavocrats; the objects mentioned in our party pro
gramme are legal and constitutional, and we shall, therefore,
not desist from prosecuting them.1
The hotter- blooded Chandler thought well immediately to
1 " We are not to be put upon the defensive. We are not responsible,
and we do not mean to admit our responsibility in one way or another.
We stand as clear and as clean and as pure, with reference to this mat
ter, as the most ultra-slavery man among you. We have our objects,
constitutional, legal, as we believe, rightful. They are avowed by us as
a party ; we have stood by them; and let me tell senators that, in spite
of all the excitement which may be raised on this question, we are pre
pared to stand by them yet." lb., pp. 32, 33.

64 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
place two great notes of exclamation after this declaration.
The question, what would be said of a similar attack by
southerners on the arsenal at Springfield, he answered with
cutting scorn by saying that the women of the place would
handcuff the seventeen or twenty-two rioters, even if they
were not mere " captains," like Brown and his companions,
but " generals," and ask neither sympathy nor an investi
gating committee. And still sharper than this bit of malig
nity was the practical point he gave the matter. Brown, he
said, had been hanged as a traitor, and I demand that the
records of the senate shall, in the most solemn form, contain
the warning that every traitor shall be hanged, no matter
from what point of the heavens be comes ; the southern gov
ernor no less than the Garrison abolitionist, who years ago
sent his challenge to the government of the United States.
The tone of the speeches of the southern senators was
not quite the usual one. They had evidently supposed that
the course of the debate would be different. They seemed
equipped onh' to make weighty charges, and for strict
criminal prosecution, and to be surprised to find themselves
even on this occasion, for a while, an accused party. They
felt, it was plain, that the well-aimed counter-blows of the
republicans had blunted the edge of the weapon from which
they had promised themselves so much. Their utterances,
therefore, became more violent and more bitter, but it was
noticeable from their speeches that their confidence of reap
ing some profit for the south out of the affair grew weaker
and weaker. And, as the republicans, without exception,
voted for Mason's resolution, although Trumbull's amend
ment was rejected by a vote of thirty-two against twenty-
two, the investigation must, indeed, contrary to all proba
bility, bring to light very suspicious facts, if only a very
small part of the hopes were fulfilled which were entertained
at first, in this respect, not merely by the slave states, but
by the whole democratic party.

situation of parties. 65
It is readily supposable that the probability, that the
resolution would prove to have been only a blow in the air,
contributed to cause the obstinate regardlessness with
which, the slavocracy sought to execute the parallel ma
noeuvre planned for the house of representatives to be
carried far beyond any bounds ever before reached.
In the electoral battles of 1859, and their results, it
had appeared very clearly in a great many ways that par
ties were in a critical period of transition. In both of
them, the representatives of more decided views had
snatched many places from those who advocated, in one
way or another, a more accommodating policy. To a
great extent, also, both real differences and personal ques
tions, to a part of which, in view of the presidential elec
tion, entirely too much weight was even now attached,
had led to a still greater splintering of parties into factions.
A further consequence of this splintering was the forma
tion of coalitions of more or less heterogeneous elements.
As it was believed that victory could not be counted on
without foreign aid, compacts were made on the basis of
an understanding as to the distribution of the fruits of the
victory; that is, the field was taken with a combination
list qf candidates, and without any common programme.
These tactics were crowned with success in many instances.
But where this was the case, it was impossible to draw,
with certainty, an}' conclusion as to the future from the
result of the election. Even with regard to the present, one
was left entirely in the dark as to what political views
were preponderant in given localities, because the allied
party groups, in order to facilitate an agreement on the
lists of candidates, had frequently intentionally placed per
sons on them with respect to whose position on the burn
ing questions of the hour, scarcely anything more than
conjectures could be made. This fact was necessarily a
5

66 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
recommendation in the eyes of such coalitions, because the
votes of those who did not themselves well know what
they thought, or what they ought to want, were most
easily obtained for such persons. . But what had recom
mended these people as candidates, might easily appear in
a very different light when they were elected. If circum
stances were such that important decisions depended on
their acts or omissions, one might prepare for very dis
agreeable surprises.
In New Tork, which had distinguished itself from the
earliest period by the unsteadiness of its party conditions,
the confusion was now greatest. As it was the heaviest
weight in the Union balance, this fact might be attended
by incalculable consequences. The people had followed the
intricacies of the game there with strained attention. But
precisely because it had been, in part, played under cover,
and because nothing reliable could be ascertained about it,
all conclusions that could be drawn from its immediate re
sults rested on a very unsafe basis. Douglas had, indeed,
in a letter of October 1, heartily congratulated Dickinson
that he had succeeded in uniting the democrats of the state
on the ground of the principle of popular sovereignty and
non-intervention — a great success which had regained for
him (Dickinson) his "true position" as leader of the
united democratic party of the great state of New Tork.1
But when this " noble triumph " was examined more closely
its. value seemed very questionable. The New Tork Trib
une claimed that Dickinson had been cheated by the
" Softs," who had achieved a complete victory in the state
convention at Syracuse in September. His personal ambi
tion had determined him to promise himself to them in
August. After he had, in accordance with his promise,
'Speeches, Correspondence, etc., of D. S. Dickinson, II, p. 523.

PARTIES in NEW YORK. 67
taken a position publicly and emphatically against the tend
encies of Fernando Wood and his adherents, they (the
"Softs") did*not allow themselves to be guided by his
wishes in the election of delegates to the Charleston con
vention; that is, they had chosen no person who intended
to advocate his nomination as a presidential candidate.
How correct this view, so far as it relates to Dickinson's
motives and hopes, was, must remain undecided. This
much, however, is certain, that there was no occasion for
congratulation on the restoration of the unity of the party.
The Mozart Hall democrats, as Wood's following called
themselves, after their headquarters, now permitted them
selves to be led only by the interests of their faction, and
chose delegates of their own to the Charleston convention,
who were considered partisans of Henry A. Wise. Al
though this split concerned directly only an internal ques
tion of the democratic party, it must have injured its
strength more or less, where the factions still contended
united against their common enemies. But this should not
have been made light of, even if the injury just referred to
did not, in itself, seem great; for these enemies had for a
long time been zealously endeavoring, and not without
success, to hoist over the special party programmes the
flag of the opposition, around which all elements might
unite which were unfriendly to the present party rulers.
The importance of these elements was by no means ignored
>by the democrats. Although John Brown had appeared
to them as a powerful helper in their need, they saw with
anxiety the result of the state elections which had taken
place in New Tork and New Jersey on the 8th of Novem
ber. Arguments on their side of the struggle played only
the part of small arms. They had placed all their hope on
the convincing power of patriotic anxiety, and the dismal
words, " Harper's Ferry 1 " had, therefore, to do service as

68 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
heavy artillery in their agitation. A Cassandra tone rang
through the mournfully solemn warning of the Constitu
tion, the organ of the administration in Washington, on the
5th of November, which intimated to both states that the}'
held the fate of the republic in their hands.1 And the New
Tork Herald, on the day of the election, gave, as an escort
to the voters on their way to the ballot-boxes, the emphatic
assurance that the news of a victory by the republicans
would "fall on the ear of the south like the knell of a de
parted Union." 2
That the number of democratic ballots in the ballot-
1 " Never in the history of our country has any state election ever
elicited such deep interest as the approaching contest on the 8th of this
month in New York and New Jersey. These are now the battle-fields
of the constitution and the Union, and the fate of the country may
soon be decided there. Their responsibility is momentous. They may
hold the fate of the Union in their hands. If they should prove to be
the great breakwaters, arrest the flood of anti-slavery fanaticism, and
rebuke the irrepressible conflict with which the Union is threatened by
Mr. Seward, all will be well. But if, on the other hand, the surges of
sectional passion and prejudice should roll over them also, they may
have engulfed the liberties of our country. If these two states should
decide in favor of the Seward agitators by elevating them to place and
power, a deep gloom will spread like a pall over the country. . . . They
have to decide by their votes whether they are in favor of maintaining
the constitution and the Union, as they were framed and formed by
the patriot heroes of the Revolution and handed down to us as a price
less inheritance of freedom, prosperity, glory, and power; or whether
they are in favor of severing the bonds, annulling the compacts and
abrogating the agreements which have bound the several states together
as one happy and united people, and dividing our country into two
hostile and antagonistic sections, contending for the mastery in irre
pressible conflict until one or the other is compelled to yield to the su
perior force of the other."
2 " If the black republican revolutionary ticket should be elected in
New York and New Jersey, the news will fall on the ear of the south
like the knell of a departed Union, and the excitement will speedily
reach a crisis and assume a practical shape which will appall and as
tound the north."

DEMOCRATIC POLICY. 69
boxes would have been smaller, if the alarm had not been
rung so energetically, may, indeed, be looked upon as cer
tain. But the number of the anxious was not so great that the
victory could have been won by this policy of intimidation.
In New Jersey the coalition candidate for governor was
elected, and that the remaining offices to be filled fell to
the share of the democrats, was due, at least in the opin
ion of their opponents, solely to their wholesale and un
scrupulous manufacture of new citizens by the premature
naturalization of immigrants. And in New Tork, their
notable defeat would have been complete, if the so-called
Brooks Americans had not taken up some democratic can
didates on their list (Utica ticket).1
The democrats inferred from their failures that they had
not yet gone far enough in the employment of the lever of
fear. The Constitution gave notice, immediately before the
meeting of congress, that the organization of the house
of representatives would have to be proceeded with more
inconsiderately than ever. Would not, it asked, the choice of
a republican as speaker " be justly regarded as a declara
tion of war against the south, and as an invitation to servile
insurrection?" It did not, of course, expect, by asking such
a question, to make an impression on the republicans. The
New Tork Tribune, on the 10th of November, had scorn
fully called its attention to the fact that notwithstanding
the cry of Woe! Woe! Woe! it had uttered to the country
on the 5th, brokers had been found in the metropolis flint-
hearted enough to buy, on the day after the state election,
United States bonds that were to fall due in 1867, at 108,
and had asked whether at last people would not desist
1 There were four of them. One was defeated and the three others
were elected by majorities of from over 300 to not quite 1,500. On the
other hand, the republicans supported by the Brooks Americans received
majorities of from over 45,000 to nearly 50,000.

70 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
from the attempt to frighten adult men by scare-crows.
From this quarter, therefore, the organ of the administra
tion had already received the fitting answer to its unquali-
fiable question. The question was, however, expressly di
rected to a different quarter, which at first glance must be a
matter of still greater surprise. " We appeal," the article
further said, " to every southern member of congress to an
swer the startling question whether the success of such men,
at such a period, would not be truly considered as inviting
the slaves themselves to insurrection and rebellion?" But
why was so great and shameless an exaggeration thought
necessary, in the south, in order to procure a hearing and
attention for the stirring exhortation to avert the danger
that threatened the country? Since when, and in conse
quence of what events, had it ceased to be self-evident that
southern representatives would not rush forward to hold
the stirrups for the republicans and help them into the
saddle? And yet people in the White House had by no means be
come so scared as to see spectres in broad daylight. That
southern representatives could bring about what was feared
by a sin of commission was considered an absolute impossi
bility there as elsewhere. But in the White House and else
where people did not feel quite certain that John Brown
and the results of the state elections had made a sufficient
impression on them to keep them from a sin of omission,
the effect of which might be the same. According to
the Congressional Globe, the two hundred and thirty-seven
members of the house of representatives were divided as
follows among the different parties: one hundred and nine
republicans, one hundred and one democrats, twenty-six
" Americans," one whig. Of the twenty-six Americans only
three were from the free states, and one of them — L. C.
Carter, of New Tork — was described as a "republican

PARTY PROSPECTS. 71
American." Of the one hundred and one democrats twelve
were " anti-Lecompton democrats." The calculations in
the press gave in part a somewhat different result. In
the elections to congress, as well as in the state elections,
coalition candidates, whose party position was doubtful,
had here and there been put up and elected. But no mat
ter how these might be classed, a sure majority cpuld not
be calculated for any party,1 and either of the two great
parties might by different combinations receive a majority.
The republicans had a majority already if all the anti-
Lecompton democrats went with them. But they looked
upon it themselves from the start as certain that this
would not be the case. They did not even venture to be
lieve that they would be able to gain enough of them to
obtain an absolute majority in the full house, even with
the help of the " Americans " from the northern states,
Whose ultimate coming over to them they looked upon as at
least conceivable. If, notwithstanding, they entered the
struggle with confidence, it was only because they ex
pected that, after a longer or shorter contest, the house
would, as it had done on former occasions, accommodate
itself to an election by a plurality. The democrats, on the
contrar}', could not win, with a plurality vote, without
some foreign support, even if the anti-Lecompton fraction —
'The New York Tribune of November 26, 1859, writes: " As to the
preponderance in such organization of the house, we are by no means
settled as to which side will have it, though we know that the opposi
tion are entitled to it. Of the two hundred and thirty-seven members,
one hundred and twenty-one were chosen distinctly as opponents of
the national administration and its Lecompton policy — elected either
wholly or in good part by republican votes. ... To make out one
hundred and thirteen republicans in the house it is necessary to count
a dozen or so elected on ' People's tickets ' in New York, New Jersey
and Pennsylvania. Some of these are republicans, others probably
not."

72 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
of which there was not the slightest prospect — voted as a
unit for the " regular party candidate." But, on the other
hand, they had a better prospect than the republicans to
unite the majority of all the votes on their candidate. The
votes of the " Americans " alone were not indeed sufficient
for this. They could not dispense entirely with the anti-
Lecompton democrats, and the decision might all the more
easily depend on whether they obtained a few more or a
few less of these votes, because it was at least questionable
whether the three " Americans " from the northern states
would be willing to go with their party if the latter voted
for the democrat. Although, therefore, the decision did
not lie entirely in the hands of the " Americans " from the
southern states, they exercised by far the greatest influence
on it. Hence the " appeal" of the Constitution, whose vio
lent urgency was very like a threat. At the very moment
that the earth received the corpse of the grim Puritan his
shade was called forth from the grave as a terrible proof
that no southern member of the house of representatives
could now refuse his co-operation to the administration party
without becoming guilty of the gravest crime against the
whole south. From this two things were unmistakably evi
dent: In the camp of the administration it was expected
on the one hand to find the aversion for the actual party
rule so strong and so deep-rooted that it would be pos
sible to overcome it only by the heaviest pressure, and on
the other hand it was resolved to make the utmost effort to
prevent the election of a republican. Hence, even before
the meeting of congress, it was undoubted that the elec
tion of the speaker would lead to an unusually hot and
stiff-necked struggle.1
' Reuben Davis, of Mississippi, who numbers himself among the " Fire-
Eaters," writes: " In private conversation I did not hesitate to express
my conviction that the chances for war amounted almost to a certainty.

glare's resolutions. 73
The first ballot furnished no ground for conjecture as to
the way in which the struggle would end. The votes were
divided among sixteen candidates. The largest number
(eighty-six) was given to Th. S. Bocock, of Virginia. The
greater part of the republicans (sixty-six) had voted for
John Sherman, of Ohio; the smaller (forty-three) for Galu
sha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania. As soon as the result had
been made known, Grow requested that he should no longer
be considered a candidate. Then, Burnett, of Kentucky,
a democrat, moved an adjournment. As his party asso
ciate, Florence, had asked for an adjournment even before
the balloting had begun, on the ground that all the mem
bers were not present, the object of the motion was evi
dently only to gain time. The democrats, who voted for it
as a unit, were still in a minority of one hundred against one
hundred and thirty. Hereupon Clark, of Missouri, rose to
speak. Burnett called him to order. There was no question
before the house, and therefore no speech was in order.
Clark replied : The question before the house is what candi
date we should choose as speaker, and I shall show that cer
tain candidates are not to be chosen. This argument paci
fied Burnett. But the call to order which he had withdrawn
was renewed by Washburne, of Illinois. The secretary who
had led the business of the last house remarked that he did
not consider himself authorized to decide the question, and
Clark anticipated the asking of the sentiment of the house
by the declaration that neither had it the power to close
his mouth: he would decide the question for himself; he
would continue his remarks, for the constitution gave him
the right to do so. The house, indeed, did not submit imme-
Arriving a few days in advance of the meeting of congress in Washing
ton, I thought I could observe in the members with whom I talked an
ardent desire to precipitate the conflict." Recollections of Mississippi
and Mississippians, pp. 378, 379.

71 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
diately to this sovereign decision, and he stated that he was
ready to renounce his desire to speak, but only to connect
this noble-minded renunciation with the reading of a reso
lution which condensed the entire tenor of his speech into
a few words and accomplished the end which it was in
tended to serve incomparably better than the longest speech
without a resolution could have done.
"Whereas certain members of this house, now in nomi
nation for speaker, did indorse and recommend the book
hereinafter mentioned,
" Resolved, that the doctrines and sentiments of a certain
book called ' The Impending Crisis of the South — How to
Meet It,' purporting to have been written by one Hinton
P. Helper, are insurrectionary and hostile to the domestic
peace and tranquillity of the country, and that no member
of this house who has indorsed and recommended it, or the
compend from it, is fit to be speaker of this house."
The galleries, by applause and hisses, immediately showed
how well they understood that the motion was a fire-brand
which must kindle a great conflagration. Whoever yet
believed that this could still be avoided must have learned
better from the further course of the debates, although no
speeches were made and only a few short remarks ex
changed. A republican, B. Stanton, of Ohio, interrupted Clark in
a new endeavor to make a speech with the remark that
it was better to adjourn, since the gentlemen who were
bent on gaining time could not be prevented from reaching
their end. Clark replied that he was pursuing the higher
purpose of bringing facts to the knowledge of the people;
but, notwithstanding, he readily allowed the putting of the
motion to adjourn, which, however, was again rejected by
a very small majority. In order to deter his party associ
ate from his purpose, Thaddeus Stevens had cried out to

DILEMMA OF THE REPUBLICANS. 75"
him : " These things must come out, and they might just as
well come out now." This was incontestable, for by his
agreement to the motion for adjournment Clark had not
wanted to renounce his "higher purposes." The resolution
was not withdrawn, and its only immediate object could
be to call forth a stormy debate before the election of the
speaker in order to exercise a decisive influence upon it.
When Stanton begged Clark to consider that it would be
very advisable to postpone the desired discussion until after
the election of a speaker, he displayed so high a degree of
ingenuousness that one must be tempted to believe he was
only playing an actor's part.
Other republicans likewise did not agree with the second
part of Stevens' statement, and Kilgore, of Indiana, ad
duced for his divergent view a reason which, even in
Clark's eyes, did not immediately appear as an absurdity
like Stanton's request, because of his intention. On the
other hand, opinions might differ widely as to whether it
was politically wise or even proper to urge it. "I wish
simply to remark to the gentleman from Missouri," said
Kilgore, "that probably he had better allow some little
time for gentlemen whose names appear published in the
New Tork Herald as having signed this recommendation
to make their own statements in this matter." And al
though he, too, was one of the subscribers, he added to this
the assurance that he, and all with whom he had spoken,
had no recollection of having ever seen the recommenda
tion; that the Helper compendium, as -he had been told,
according to the intention of those who had interested
themselves in its composition, was to contain only facts
from the census and remarks of southern people on the
effects of slavery, and that the doctrines which it actually
contained, according to the extracts from it in the Herald,
could not be more severely condemned than he condemned

76 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
them, for he represented a conservative and peaceable con
gressional district with no tendencies towards treason.1
Clark scornfully answered: "I am glad that the gentle
man is beginning to flee from the wrath to come."
Whereupon Kilgore replied that he never sought to es
cape the responsibility of his action by flight. His party
comrade, Farnsworth, of Illinois, however, seemed to have
a feeling that his utterances came very near bearing the
interpretation given them by Clark. At any rate they cer
tainly did not please him, for he spoke in a very different
tone. He left it to Clark whether he did want to have the
book read in order to give the discussion a firmer basis;
he recommended the reading of it to him; it would be
wholesome for him.
This provoking irony, however, appeared in a peculiar
light, through the repeated assurance that he had not read
the book himself. As he had subscribed the recommenda
tion, one might have thought that this statement would ex
cite universal surprise. But Kellogg, of Illinois, not only
saw nothing strange in this himself, but acted as if he could
suppose it self-evident that the entire house thought as he
did. He declared that at that time he was not able to
assert or deny whether the Herald had had a right to place
his name among the subscribers of the recommendation;
that democratic sheet was no sufficient authority for him.
On the other hand, he was able to assert, without any
modifying clauses, " that these sentiments were (are) not
entertained by republicans," and with strange logic he fol
lowed up this assertion with a motion to adjourn, in order
that the accused gentlemen might be given time to make
themselves acquainted with the contents of the book, and
to admit or deny entertaining the views for which they
were reproached.
l "A constituency . . . that has no leaning towards treason."

helper's crisis and the republicans. IX
The motion was now adopted, after Clark had stated that
he did not object, "if the gentlemen wanted time to delib
erate and prepare themselves in secret."
If the continuance of the struggle was in keeping with
this beginning, the republicans had not only every reason-
to entertain very little hope of a happy ending of it, but they
had to fear that the general position of the party would be
seriously injured by it. If one wished to leave it entirely
undecided how the signing of the recommendation by
members of congress should be judged from the various
higher points of view, it could scarcely still be questioned
that, under any circumstances, it would have been a polit
ical mistake, and it was entirely undoubted that, at least,
in consequence of the Harper's Ferry riot, it became such
a mistake. The feeling provoked by this event made it
unquestionably a more effectual means of agitation in the
hands of their opponents than the census extracts made
with a caprice conscious of its aim, with their extravagant
commentaries and provoking application, could have been
in their own hands. But the edge of the weapon might
have been greatly blunted if it were declared that, not
withstanding the signature as "member of the house of
representatives," the matter was a personal one affecting
only the gentlemen themselves, for which the party could
not justly be held responsible, so long as it declined
that responsibility. But now the party was put in a
dilemma by the vote for Sherman and. Grow, and Clark
had hemmed it in so closely by his. resolution that it
could not escape unhurt. If it dropped Sherman's can
didacy, it would have to meet the shameful charge that
it had been compelled to make a disgraceful retreat by
the abusive words of a slavocrat. If it upheld his candi
dacy, it would be difficult to refute the assertion that, by

78 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
bo doing, the party had formally approved the recommenda
tion and therefore also the doctrine developed in the book,
since, despite the protest based on the recommendation, it
persisted in making Sherman the standard-bearer of the
party. It had no right to demand that their remonstrances
against this interpretation should have any more weight
attached to it than men are wont ordinarily to attach to
words when acts seem to contradict them. But all the
republicans who had hitherto spoken on the matter had
given it to be understood, in one way or another, that they
looked upon Helper's book as a log which they should, in no
case, allow to be hung to the party's feet. None of them,
however, had given a completely unambiguous exposition
of his views. Only one thing was clearly expressed in the
remarks of all: a feeling of painful embarrassment; and
Farnsworth and Kellogg had neither expressed sorrow
for their step nor sought to justify it and openly confess
Helper's doctrine. This much, however, might even now
be inferred, with approximate definiteness, from their
utterances, that, if the pressure on them was increased, they
would see, in an exculpatory pretext, the saving via media,
¦between an honest but humiliating pater peccavi, and
stubborn persistence in the act of imprudence they had
committed. But if Sherman's ingenuity was not great
enough to manufacture a longer and heavier cloak than
the one to which these co-defendants had already clearly re
ferred, the republicans might with good reason have been
told, if they clung to his candidacy, that thev imputed to
the people a paradisaically ingenuous way of looking at
things, and snpposed that they would consider all the rea
sonable requirements of decency satisfied with a fig-leaf.
Clark's last spiteful remark, therefore, that the republicans
wanted to put all their heads together, in secret council, in

Clark's speech. 79
order to find the best means to protect themselves from
the bow they had themselves drawn, hit the nail on the
very head.1
The attempts to close Clark's mouth were not renewed
next day. The reading of the recommendation, with the
names of all the subscribers and some peculiarly violent
extracts from the book, served as an introduction to his
speech, the thema probandum of which was the closing sen
tence of the resolution. He ended his speech with the as
surance that he did not wish to delay the organization of
the house. This was certainly honestly intended, but on
the condition that his argument had convinced the majority
of the necessity of averting the disgrace and danger that
menaced the country, by the prompt election of a democrat.
He had, indeed, also said that there were men to be found
among the Americans, likewise, who would be no dishonor
to the house in the speaker's chair, and who would preside
over its deliberations with ability. But the direct question
whether he would himself vote for an American he an
swered by saying: " I would if I could not do any better."
Whether all the other democrats would go even as far as
that was at least doubtful. On the other hand, it was en
tirely certain that not one of them would be willing to go
a step beyond it. " Under existing circumstances it is the
sacred duty of the Americans to vote for the democratic
candidate." In this simple sentence the whole argument
was practically summed up. Hence nothing would have
been more undesirable to Clark than that the republicans
1 Greeley still boldly asserted that Sherman would have been "pretty
certainly elected, if the republicans had allowed Clark to ventilate
fully his ignorance and stupidity with regard to ' Helper's Impending
Crisis,' and then insisted on calling the roll, and persevered till mid
night, if necessary." Kellogg's course, who prevented this by his motion
to adjourn, he called " recreancy." New York Tribune, December 6,
1859.

80 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
should have been forced to retreat immediately by the reso
lution. It was meant to brand the forehead of the repub
licans with the mark of Cain, but also to exercise a pressure
on the Americans; and this last was its immediate practical
object. By its means, so far as they were concerned, a
coercive veto was to be entered against the organization of
the house. With what confidence Clark thought he could
reach the positive result he desired by this negative one,
could not be inferred with certainty from the evasive an
swer he had given to the question just referred to. But,
on the other hand, his speech might excite the suspicion
that he did not care so much about the positive as about
the negative result.
In accordance with the real address of the resolution, an "*
American and not a republican took the floor after Clark.
Gilmer, of North Carolina, moved an " amendment " to the
resolution that left noth i ng of it but the one word, " resolved."
The long-winded statement of reasons referring to the con
tinual intensification of sectional strife, and in which were
quoted literally the declaration of proscription made by
Clay and his associates, in the Thirty-first Congress, against
all the opponents of the compromise of 1850, and the reso
lutions of the national conventions of the democrats and
whigs of 1852 against the agitation of the slavery question,
amounted to the declaration, that it was the duty of all good
' citizens to oppose every attempt to renew the agitation of
slavery in congress or out of it.1
Burnett requested Gilmer to change his amendment into
a supplemental motion, for the republicans, to whom he, too,
did not wish to render any service, should not be allowed to
wrangle about the vote on Clark's resolution.
To this appeal Gilmer answered that he saw no con
nection between Helper's book and the election of the
1 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 18,

BURNETT AND GILMER. 81
speaker; if, however, it was thought that the election of the
speaker should be preceded by a declaration of. political
views, it would be best, in his opinion, to give it in the
form proposed by him.
But Burnett was not to be dismissed so easily. The pas
sionate ardor with which he endeavored to convince Gilmer
of the necessity of forcing a vote on Clark's resolution was
followed by a result — but a result opposite to the one he
wished. Gilmer, indeed, made advances towards him to
the extent that he added to his motion the words, " and
that no member should be elected speaker of this house
whose political opinions are not known to conform to the
foregoing sentiments," and expressly provided it with a
practical point with respect to the election of speaker. But,
on the other hand, he plainly said that he could not grant
Burnett's wish, because he condemned exasperation on one
side as much as on the other. But, latterly, the democratic
press had, by the manner in which it had treated the Har
per's Ferry affair, engaged in this obnoxious business con
sciously and with an end in view, and he would, if he was
to accede to Burnett's request, promote the agitation which
he and his friends were trying to suppress with all their
strength. In this way the situation was made sufficiently clear, in
one essential respect. The amendment to the resolution
told the republicans that they would not get the assent of
the Americans to a plurality election so long as a signer of
the recommendation was their candidate,. And the answer
given Burnett informed the democrats that the Americans
intended going their own way, despite Harper's Ferry and
" Helper's Crisis," and that the more the democrats en
deavored to turn the sectional strife to the advantage of
party, the less disposed would they be to act as shield-bear
ers for them. On the other hand Gilmer had carefully
6

82 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
avoided every word that could be considered as a promise
to give the support, direct or indirect, of the Americans,
under certain circumstances, to the one party or the other.
It was impossible, therefore, to tell when and how the
house would be organized ; certain it was, however, that it
could not take place so long as neither the democrats nor
the Americans would recede from their position.
The next speech that was made could not but destroy
all hope that the democrats would be induced to act less
stubbornly. Millson, of Virginia, appealed to his whole
parliamentary career as a proof that he had always been
moderate both in his views and in' his manner of giving
expression to them. And yet he declared that he felt " al
most under a sense of humiliation," not only at Gilmer's
motion, but at Clark's. The representatives of the southern
states should have sat silent in their seats, and the northern
representatives should " with extended arms " have brought
them the assurance that the atrocities in question were net
manifestations of the sentiments and intentions of the
north. They should not have had the least claim that the
south should have smoothed a broad and easy path for
them to do so, as had been done by these two resolutions.
But now, instead of immediately embracing the oppor
tunity thus undeservedly afforded them, the gentlemen sat
in " a sullen and most contemptuous silence." The mat
ter was vastly too important to be connected at all with so
comparatively an insignificant question as the election ot
the speaker, and Clark's resolution contained " something of
an anti-climax; " the man who purposely and consciously
used his name and influence to disseminate such a book
was not only not fit to be speaker but he was not fit to live.
This speech broke the seal on Sherman's lips. He said
he had been silent hitherto because he believed it was
only intended to prevent the organization of the house;
but the great respect with which Millson's character in-

john Sherman's speech. 83
spired him, and the deep impression the matter had seemed
to make on him (Millson), had determined him to say now
what he had to say. That he would have soon broken
silence, under any circumstances, might, however, be in
ferred from the fact that, after these introductory remarks,
he read a letter written to him ad hoe by F. P. Blair, and
dated the same day. The question raised by Clark's reso
lution, said the letter, made it seem proper to state how
the signatures to the recommendation of Helper's compen
dium were received before the appearance of the book.
Helper had laid the book before him for examination, in
order to interest the republicans, through him, in its dis
semination. He, Blair, had orally1 or in writing objected
to many details, and Helper gave his written promise to
strike out the matters in question or to change them. He
understood that, in consequence of this promise,2 the mem
bers of congress in question and other influential republicans
were induced to recommend the dissemination of an expur
gated edition of the book.
Sherman was so able a man that it might be supposed
he had not left this testimony of his volunteer (?) compur
gator quietly in his pocket, only because he had nothing
himself to advance in his justification. Even if one were
so childlike or held such lax moral principles as to con
sider it proper to recommend a political, agitative docu
ment in advance, simply because it would, in the opinion
of a third person, be worthy of recommendation, after
it had, in accordance with his demands, been written
over, one could not but object, that this blind confidence
had been reposed in a man who treated the matter so
lightly that, according to his own testimony, he could
jiot even remember whether he had made his demands
' " I either wrote to Mr. Helper or told him."
1 " I understand that it was in consequence of this assurance to me."

84: harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
with regard to the alterations orally or in writing on the
author. The letter, by its contents, was only a self-in
dictment of the writer, in the form of a justification of
the representatives accused in Clark's resolution. The very
statement that the incriminated representatives had signed
the recommendation only on account of his agreement
with Helper was formulated in such a way as to deprive it
of all value as evidence, while in Blair's own view their ac
quittal had to be based on that very evidence. But Sher
man passed that statement by with significant silence.
The declaration, however, that he did not remember sign
ing the recommendation excluded the assumption, so far
as he was concerned, that it could be proven. He added
that that should not be taken as an excuse, for, since his
name was on the printed list, there must have been some
warrant for it. Whether this remark could be looked upon
as an admission that the signing of the recommendation
was an act that needed an excuse, it was difficult to tell.
What he said on the question proper was limited to the
statement that he had never seen either Helper's original
book or the compendium. With the charge that the cour
tesies which should always be observed among gentlemen,
and which he had alwa}Ts observed, had been grossly vio
lated in his regard, he passed from the defensive to the of
fensive. " I say now that there is not a single question
agitating the public mind, not a single topic on which
there can be sectional jealousy or sectional controversy,
unless gentlemen on the other side of the house thrust such
subjects upon us. I repeat, not a single question." He ad
duced no proof of this bold, startling assertion, unless, in
deed, he believed he had produced it by saying that the
republicans had observed a "studied silence." In the ap
plause from the galleries that greeted the declaration that
the republicans would prove themselves capable of guiding

COURSE OF THE REPUBLICANS. 85
the deliberations of the house and the destiny of the coun
try while scrupulously protecting the rights of all, excited
southern ears, heard rather a direct challenge, in this con
nection, than the pacifying assurance of inviolable loyalty
and fidelity to the constitution.
Leake, of Virginia, immediately showed this by re
peatedly calling Sherman the " abolition candidate." The
annoyance he intended to cause by this unwarranted desig
nation was a petty gratification which he might well have
denied himself, as he was certainly fully equal to the task
of proving that Sherman had left his case exactly where it
was before his speech. Sherman had not, he concluded,
uttered a single syllable to describe his position on Helper's
inflammatory teachings.
Sherman was induced by this to make the further re
mark, that he had already repeatedly expressed himself
against all interference by the people of the free states in the
relations between masters and slaves. But this was saying
nothing whatever on the real question, unambiguous and
definite as it sounded. "Do you acknowledge that it was
wrong to put your name on this paper, or do you still stand
by this signature?" That was the question, and the result
to which he and his political friends, in their consideration
of the situation created by Clark's resolution, had reached,
was evidently that the simple yes or no with which it could
have been answered must not pass his lips. He, however,
not only studiously refused to utter a plain yes or no, but
his answer was no answer whatever, inasmuch as the most
salient point in all Helper's agitative reasoning was the
warfare of the rest of the white population of the slave
states against the slave-holders. Sherman, therefore, evaded
answering the main question by answering another, and
which had been raised, at least indirectly, and which, de
spite the eminent and perhaps overshadowing importance it
possessed in itself, was not controlling in this connection.

86 No one doubted that the statements made by Sherman
and his associates were in keeping with the truth, for the
signing of recommendations of every description without
any knowledge, merely to please a friend, was a vicious cus
tom so universal, that, in the jargon of American news
papers of the present day, it might have been properly called
a " national peculiarity." Moral sentiment, in this respect,
was so lax that the southerners doubtless determined to
give the matter so tragic a complexion mainly for the po
litical effect that could be obtained from it. If it could
not have been turned to such good account, they too would
have readily absolved the subscribers as the victims of a
vexatious piece of awkwardness, which any one might
have become. The powerful spectacles of interest enabled
them to see so clearly how absolutely worthless the excuse
was, that it was never known, and no attempt was ever
made to find out, why the names were signed to the recom
mendation. The republicans, on the other hand, utterly
failed to pass a correct moral judgment upon the question,
because they at first thought that the}' should consider and
examine it solely through these spectacles; for they pro
ceeded on the principle which American politicians, much
more universally than those of other nations, are wont to
consider an axiomatic truth, that it must be always inju
rious, in politics, to unreservedly acknowledge a mistake
once made to be a mistake. Moreover, the real authors of
the recommendation, like Weed, Greele}r, and their asso
ciates, could not plead ignorance. But their position in
the party was such that the interests of the party would
have been seriously injured by an unreserved and em
phatic disavowal of their conduct, and therefore, viewed
from this standpoint, there was only a choice between
two evils, and it was not easy to say which of them
was the greater. And it seemed all the more danger
ous for the republicans to allow themselves to be forced

COURSE OF THE REPUBLICANS. 87
into open opposition to these recognized leaders of the
party, because the democrats were endeavoring to give the
question so far-reaching an importance; and the withdrawal
of the recommendation would presumabty have the effect
of completely sacrificing the whole book, the agitative
value of which might, to a certain extent, be inferred from
the violence of the slavocratic denunciations of it. But so
long as speakers beat about the real question with general
ities instead of giving a direct and concise answer to it, it
could not properly be made a matter of extenuation that the
signatures were given without any knowledge of the book
or even of the contents of the very paper that bore them.
And if it was self-evidently to no purpose to bring forward
excuses which were plainly no excuses at all, must it not
ha\ 3 been worse than useless, purposely to clothe the ex
cuses in such a way as to imply that it was folly and pre
sumption to see any reason for an excuse? The position
and attitude of the republicans could certainly not appear
to unprejudiced judges in a more favorable light in conse
quence of Sherman's speech. Its form made it still more
doubtful than its contents whether the republicans were
resolved to cling to his candidacy with the utmost tenacity.
Before the second ballot, therefore, all three parties had
taken a position on the question raised by Clark, to such
an extent that the situation was fully cleared, in one very
essential respect, but only in a purely negative sense: it
could not be seen when the organization of the house would
take place and the Thirty-sixth Congress begin to work at
its legislative tasks. Never yet had the political atmosphere
been so thoroughly saturated with mists pregnant with
the storm, and the legislative power threatened to abandon
the service. But the constitution had made no provision to
meet such a case. Unquestionably, in giving the elected
representatives of the people the right to choose an officer to

88 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
preside over their deliberations, it had also imposed on
them an inviolable duty ; 1 for the fulfillment of all the other
duties and the exercise of all the other rights of the house
of representatives was connected with the precondition of
their having exercised that right. But the authors of the
constitution had not deemed it conceivable that the split
ting up of parties and the intensity of political passions
could ever make it necessary to coerce the representatives
of the people into the performance of that duty. No time
had been fixed within which it must be done; the mode
of election was left entirely to the house; no influence
was accorded the other powers of the state on what the
representatives did or failed to do in this question ; of an
appeal to the sovereign people by a dissolution and new
elections, the constitution knew nothing whatever. Tet if
the house of representatives did not begin its work, the
suspension of legislation in the meantime would not be the
end of it; but, on account of the failure of appropriations,
the entire machinery of government must finally come to a
standstill unless the means of keeping it in motion were
obtained in an unlawful manner or at least in a way out
side the law. If the representatives did not find a sufficient
check in their own consciences, the only protection against
such a catastrophe lay in the moral pressure of public opin
ion exercised upon them.
At first there was nothing to show that the exercise of
such a pressure would be even attempted with any force.
After Gilmer's amendment had been read, Washburne
moved to lay the whole matter on the table. This motion
was rejected by a tie vote. The administration party, which
had voted solidly against it, inferred from this vote that the
debate should be subjected to no limitations whatever. In
' ' ' The house of representatives shall choose their speaker and othei
officers.'' Art. I, sec. 2, § 5.

iverson's declaration. 89
what spirit and to what extent it intended to take advan
tage of that fact, Pryor, of Virginia, announced on the 7th
of December with thankworthy frankness. All the means,
said he, afforded us by parliamentary law will be ex
hausted not to permit the standard-bearer of the republican
party and his principles to take possession of the speaker's
chair; we shall assume all the responsibility of this.1 And
even now voices were heard that counseled going much
farther. If it depended on me, said Iverson on the same
day in the senate, both the senators and representatives of
the slave states would, if Sherman were elected, to the last
man leave the capitol, not to return to it again until or
dered to do so by their constituents.2
That the administration party would stand like one man
by Pryor's announcement, was certainly not doubted on the
7th of December by a single republican. But the re
publicans minded that just as little as they did Iverson's
threats. When there was a momentary lull in the roaring
1 "Now, gentlemen, shall the representatives of the people of the south
quietly submit to that gentleman taking possession of that chair, usurp
ing that power, controlling and directing the policy of the government
for the next two years, for the promotion of the aims and purposes
which his party boldly and defiantly avow? I say, never; never, sir,
so far as legitimate resistance may be opposed to his election. We will
encounter all responsibilities ; we will exhaust invention ; we will do
whatever parliamentary law will permit, in order to prevent the sad
catastrophe of the champion of the republican party and its principles
taking possession of that chair. We have taken issue on that, and
there we stand." Gongr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 50.
2 " If I had control of the public sentiment, the very moment that you
elect John Sherman, thus giving to the south the example of insult as
well as injury, I would walk, every one of us, out of the halls of this
capitol, and consult our constituents ; and I would never enter again
until I was bade to do so by those who had the right to control me.
Sir, I go further than that. I would counsel my constituents instantly
to dissolve all political ties with a party and a people who thus trample
on our rights. That is what I would do." lb., p. 30.

90
storm, in order that a vote might be taken, they voted for
Sherman, and, at first, left the speech-making almost en
tirely to the democrats and Americans.
This had no quieting effect. The longer the southern
democrats listened to their own speeches the more they
worked themselves into a heat. More and more provoking
and more and more bitter became their tone, until soon
scarcely a day passed without disguised or undisguised
threats of secession. But neither the republicans nor the
Americans allowed' themselves to be moved to yielding
their position 03^ such means. The latter, too, although in
a less blunt way, took the southern point of view, both as
to what honor and interest dem'anded, but they would not
be convinced that it was their duty to help a democrat
into the speaker's chair, because in every alliance the
weaker should follow the stronger and not the stronger
the weaker. The endlessly repeated, and of course utterly
fruitless, discussions of the rightfulness or wrongfulness of
this principle alternated with equally long and fruitless
calculations of the possible combinations by which a ma
jority would be obtained, on this ballot or that, for a candi
date, or. might be obtained for one on some future ballot.
Their object was to show who was to be held responsible
by the people in their just wrath for this unseemly and
ruinous waste of time; but by no party was it admitted that
proof of its guilt had been produced, abundantly as menacing
scorn and flattering persuasion, coarse invective and pathetic
appeals td patriotism were employed to strengthen the ar
guments. The conduct of the leaders of the other parties
also called forth growing excitement and embitterment
among the people. Naturally the desired effect could not be
expected from this, when the course of the representatives
of all parties met with the approval of their own adherents.
But such was unmistakably the case, and hence all appeals to

the annual message. 91*
public opinion were foolish. Public opinion was as divided
as the house of representatives, and, therefore, all its mani
festations only fanned the flame.
Parliamentary law afforded the democrats means enough
to obstruct the way of the republicans, and they showed
themselves as skilful as they were inconsiderate in the use
of them. But by these tactics they made no greater head
way than did the republicans. After the resultless war of
words had lasted two weeks, an earnest effort was there
fore made to reach the desired end by the manifestation
of a disposition to make certain advances toward each other
with respect to the question of persons. On the 19th of
December, after the eleventh fruitless ballot, Bocock with
drew his candidacy. The democrats, who were at first
divided, were then united upon Millson. While his speech
on the second day afforded a sufficient guaranty even to
the most extreme, there was some foundation for parading
him, in accordance with the testimony he bore of himself,
as one of the more moderate conservatives. His vote
against the Kansas-Nebraska bill was capable of being
turned to good account in this regard, although it was a
question to what extent that should be considered a meri
torious act in his case, as he had subsequently voted for
English's bill. This, however, might properly be left out of
consideration now, since opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska
bill was by no means a recommendation in the eyes of all
Americans. Anderson, of Kentucky, went so far as to ad
vance it as the principal reason why he could never vote
for Millson. By saying so, indeed, he only drew upon him
self the ironical laughter of the house, since he had voted
for Etheridge, who, in this respect, was in precisely the
same position as Millson. That the reason he gave was
merely an idle protest, however, made it all the more certain
that Anderson was fully in earnest when he declared that

92 he would vote for an American to the very end of the
struggle; and his party associates, like himself, felt no
more love for the new democratic candidate than for the
first. . The manoeuvre failed completely, and, after a few bal
lots, the democratic votes were again distributed among a
large number of candidates.
Christmas had come and gone, but the angelic greeting
of peace had awakened no echo in the hearts and heads of
the politicians. The president thought he should delay no
longer to remind the house, indirectly, that important inter
ests of the country were awaiting legislative action. His
annual message had certainly been prepared at the begin
ning of the session, since there is no discoverable reason
which could have determined him to deviate from the invio
lable custom. The annual message is always directed to the
two houses of congress, Buchanan, however, had let it lie in
his desk. But after two weeks even, the time seemed to him
to have been too long, for in the official publication of it in
the Congressional Globe the message bears the date of the
19th of December. Still, he imposed patience on himself
for fully another week. Not till the 27th of December did
he send it to the two houses of congress. In the senate, it
was read immediately, and in that way came to the knowl
edge of the people.
Whoever had no kind feelings for the president and
looked through the colored spectacles of party, could hardly
fail to adduce all kinds of arguments, more or less plausible,
to show that in this unusual course there was evidence of
a want of regard for the house of representatives.1 But
the house and not Buchanan had created an abnormal situ
ation, and hence on it and not on him devolved primarily
the responsibility for the extraordinary step the president
1 Buchanan could, however, appeal to one precedent. Pierce also had
¦sent his message to the Thirty-fourth Congress before its organization.

DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATIONS. 93
had taken. Whether he would not have done better to
have waited a while longer may be doubtful; but proof for
or against this could not be produced: it was a pure matter
of opinion. The president could, however, entirely apart
from the general question, adduce in support of his views
the weighty fact that one of the most important depart
ments would have been forced long before to suspend its
functions to a greater or less extent, were it not that this
danger had been averted by extraordinary measures, with
the assistance of private individuals. The Thirty-fifth Con
gress had allowed its constitutional duration of life to come
to a close without having passed the appropriation bill for
the postoffice department for the fiscal year 1859-60, which
also contained the deficiency appropriations for the fiscal
year ended June 30, 1859. The contractors had therefore
to be given due-bills in lieu of payment, and it was left to
them to see where and on what conditions they could bor
row the money they needed on such security. This was
not only unworthy of the Union, it was costly. The
interest on these loans up to the 1st of December amounted
to $96,660, and the contractors had, as the message pointed
out, at least an indisputably equitable claim to reimburse
ment of that amount. As in a great number of states the
election of representatives had not yet taken place, it did
not seem proper to the president to call an extra session of
the Thirty-sixth Congress in order to perform what its prede
cessor had neglected. Buchanan thereupon took occasion,
in accordance with the authority vested in him by the con
stitution, to recommend congress to pass a law before the
end of the session, fixing a day on which the elections for
representatives to the next congress should take place in all
the states. This recommendation was certainly a very proper
one ; for, as the president rightly pointed out, the like impos
sibility of convoking a full congress at a given moment

¦94: harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
might also occur at times in which the very foundations of
the republic were menaced by internal or external danger.
It was at least equally proper to refer to the fact that con
gress could not only paralyze the activity of the government,
but destroy its very existence, by neglecting or refusing the
necessary grants of money. In all probability this passage,
like the rest of the message, was written before the meeting
of congress, and therefore was really inspired only by the
failure of the Thirty-fifth Congress to do its duty with
respect to the postoffice appropriation. But what had been
going on in the house of representatives for three weeks
gave it quite a different meaning now. Buchanan had not
told the people anything new in that passage, but the pop
ular consciousness had never hitherto looked upon this pos
sibility as anything more than, so to speak, a theoretical
one; and the fact that Buchanan's admonition was based on
an actual event would not have changed this in any way.
Now, on the contrary, nascent doubts might be awakened
here and there as to whether what would occur when
the frightful possibility arose would never outgrow the
character of an academic problem. The president, without
wishing it, and perhaps even to his vexation, had given a pow
erful impulse to serious reflection on the question whether
the house of representatives was not on the best way of in
augurating a revolution in constitutional forms, by refusing
to recognize the duties corresponding to its rights. It might
be impossible to determine in advance where and how the
line ran, the overstepping of which would be the beginning
of that revolution. The most important thing was that peo
ple had become clearly conscious of the existence of such a
line, for it might be hoped that that would be sufficient to pre
vent its being intentionally or unintentionally overstepped.
It cannot, however, be asserted that this paragraph really
received the attention it, for the reasons stated, deserved

Buchanan's annual message. 95
immediately. So little attention was never before paid to
an annual message; and it would have had no claim to a
better fate, even if the struggle in the hall of the house
of representatives had not fully absorbed public interest.
Its utterances on the sectional question afforded gray-
haired, honest men many a text for instructive and edify
ing discussions on the corruption and danger of the times,
but they were like an effort to subdue a howling storm
by hypotheses as to its origin and lamentations over its
effects. The matter could not have been taken easier.
Buchanan, indeed, spoke of " advice," and tried to give it
weight by recalling that his political career reached back
into the times of the fathers of the republic. This fact
and the assurance that he had no more ardent earthly
wish than, at his departure hence, to see the country peace
ful, happy, united and powerful, was all he could base it
on, and that was much more than would have been neces
sary ; for the advice consisted in the entreating admonition
to avoid contention and harbor once more the friendly feel
ings of other days towards one another. To climb to this
statesmanlike height one did not need to have the president
of the United States as a leader, and he was not even fit to
be such a leader, since he now " cordially congratulated "
congress on the "final settlement" of the slavery question
in the territories by the Dred Scott decision, while he
clearly perceived that the great significance of the Harper's
Ferry raid lay in the fear that it was only a symptom of
an incurable disease in the though^ and feeling of the
people, which would ultimately lead to open war, between
the north and the south, for the annihilation of slavery.
He indeed declared that he did not share that fear himself.
All he could adduce, however, in support of his opinion
was that everything earthly had its time, and that even
the roughest waves always become smooth again. All that

96 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
was needed was to keep within the bounds of the constitu
tion, and the Harper's Ferry incident would yet prove a bless
ing to the country ; for the people, roused to a knowledge
of the danger, would " resolve " that rash counsels should
not imperil the constitution and the Union. Apart from
the lengthy dissertation on the Dred Scott decision, in
which honorable patriotism became a transparent mask for
partisanship, the president had, therefore, nothing to offer
the country save unctuous words without any tangible
substance — words which would have made a very good im
pression in the prayer of some country clergyman, but
which coming from the mouth of the leading statesman of
the country gave evidence of a desolate prospect for the
storm-pregnant future.
The weak-kneed old man, who, in the all-overshadowing
question of home politics, fought the breakers with pretty
speeches on the calming effect of the oil cast on them,
still stood there in such self-overesti mation, with such proud
intellectual vigor, and such imposing purity and firmness
of the political character, that he again renewed his old re
quest to congress to endow him with extraordinary powers,
in the field of foreign politics, in a tone which implied that
a refusal to grant them would be a serious sin of omission,
for the consequences of which he must decline, both before
his contemporaries and before posterit}7, to assume the re
sponsibility. To take a part in the internal troubles of
Mexico, and get authorization to send an armed force into
the neighboring republic "for the purpose of obtaining in
demnity for the past and security for the future," — the
power to establish temporary military posts in Sonora and
Chihuahua, whenever it should seem necessary to him, — the
free disposal of the fleet, in order to protect American in
terests on the inter-oceanic routes of Panama, Nicaragua
and Tehuantepec, — such were his modest wishes.

the president's recommendations. 97
It can scarcely be assumed that he had much hope of
seeing them realized. It was too plain that the domestic
question was taking possession, from month to month, of
the hearts and the heads of the people in ever-increasing
measure and in a manner which greatly weakened their
susceptibleness for foreign adventures. Even what was
going on in Mexico attracted by no means all the attention
it deserved, although there were a good many grains of
truth in what the message said about the great possibili
ties which might grow, sooner or later, out of it for the
United States.1 But, if it was hard or even impossible to
interest public opinion more intensely in questions of foreign
policy, the efforts to divert the passions of the masses from
the slavery question to other and artificially created prob
lems, efforts which had been. fruitless in the past, must now
of course prove entirely vain. That Buchanan was not com
pletely unaware of this may be inferred from the fact
that, in relation to Cuba, he confined himself to declaring
that his views with respect to its purchase remained un
changed. Notwithstanding his renewed call upon congress
to give the matter its serious attention, this created such
an impression of the president's resignation, that it would
have been a wonder, considering the feeling of the people,
if they could have been drawn away, even for a moment,
from the great question of the day, by the memory of that
broken bubble. Their minds could not be turned from it,
even by the exposition of the by no means brilliant condi
tion of the finances, and the proposition accompanying it
'I have in mind, here, the concluding passage especially: "She is
now a wreck upon the ocean, drifting about as she is impelled by differ
ent factions. As a good neighbor, shall we not extend to her a helping
hand to save her? If we do not, it would not be surprising should some
other nation undertake the task, and thus force us to interfere at last,
under circumstances of increased difficulty, for the maintenance of our
established policy." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 5.
7

98 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
to increase the revenues by raising the customs duties.
This question as well as the building recommended by
Buchanan of an overland railwa}7 might indeed yet seriously
occupy the attention of congress during this session, and
then, of course, they would not fail to excite the greatest
interest among the people. But the message could not make
them the order of the day for public discussion, because
the organization of the house was, and remained, the pre
liminary question, before the settlement of which no other
question could be taken up; and hence all the discussions
excited by the message in the press and among the people
served only to fill a void.
When the message was transmitted to the house, it after
a short debate resolved, as the house of representatives of
the Thirty-fourth Congress had done under similar circum
stances, that it should be received by the secretary and
"that it lie upon the table." Then, without having heard
the message read, it continued its fruitless efforts towards
organization in the same way as before. The democrats
now changed, their candidate or candidates at eve^ ballot,
but did not advance the matter a hair's breadth by that
means. Not until the 6th of January did there seem to be
the slightest prospect that it would enter on a new phase of
development. Winslow, of North Carolina, an administra
tion democrat, suggested that "all the opposition parties,"
as he expressed it, should endeavor to come to an understand
ing on some common plan of action by representatives.
This proposition was greeted with shouts of approval both
from the benches of his own party and from the anti-
Lecompton democrats and the Americans. These shouts of
approval, however, were the only credentials of the ten
gentlemen 1 who met on the 8th of January as a conference
' See their names, Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 430. Clark,
of New York, who himself was a member of the conference committee,
expressly said that it was " self -constituted."

OPPOSITION TO SHERMAN. 99
committee, and hence every individual member of the three
parties was left entire freedom of decision with respect to
its eventual agreements. They felt, too, on what an airy
basis they stood, in consequence. They did not come to an
understanding on a candidate whom they would recom
mend to all three parties, but only agreed upon a compro
mise on the question of the resolution. That the end desired
would be reached in this way was, to say the least, by no
means certain, for the resolution was only a means to the
end; and, from the first, there had been no difference of
opinion, among the three parties, as to the fact that the
election of a republican was not desirable. But why and
how should an agreement as to the person to be elected
follow from an agreement as to a matter meant to block
Sherman's ascent to the speaker's chair? As the repub
licans prevented a vote on Clark's resolution by all the
means of parliamentary tactics, because it did this, the
democrats, for the same reason, endeavored to force that
vote; but if a speaker were elected, this resolution, like
all other resolutions on the election of speaker, would be
wiped out. All the Americans and anti-Lecompton dem
ocrats needed to do, therefore, was to help the democrats
to elect a democratic speaker, in order to make a compro
mise on the question of the resolution superfluous. The
real difficulty did not lie in the latter, but in the fact that
the two smaller opposition parties did not want an admin
istration democrat in the speaker's chair, and it had not
been possible to overcome that difficult}7.1 A compromise
1 Winslow subsequently said : " Finding, however, that we could not
agree on anything else for the present, it was suggested that we might
come to a conclusion with regard to the resolution." And McRae, of
Mississippi, declared without the least hesitation: "The purpose for
which this committee met in the first instance was to ascertain whether
the members of the committee could agree upon some one person upon
whom the parties they respectively represented could concentrate their

100 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
on the question of the resolution, therefore, would have
been only harnessing the mule to the wagon with his tail
where his head should be.
Whether the conference committee, because they felt this
themselves, wanted to surprise the house with the resolution
agreed upon by them, or whether they feared that it would
seem to the southern Hotspurs diluted and marred by being
deprived of its personal point, cannot be definitely stated.1
That a surprise was intended is, however, certain,2 and this
makes it sufficiently plain that the gentlemen had no great
confidence in their work. One of them, Crawford, of Geor
gia, had even left before the resolution was finally drafted.
This was an omen, whether the others so considered it
or not,8 and not a deceptive one. The hopes which some
sanguine representatives might have built on Winslow's
proposition were borne to the grave on the 12th of January,
not precisely without any parade, nor yet during the solemn
votes, with a view to an organization of the house. That was the ob
ject of the consultation originally. It was ascertained, after long and
deliberate consultation by the committee, that there could be no agree
ment, that there could be no solution of the question as to how the
house could organize, by concentrating the votes of the different
parties upon a single person. That fact we arrived at conclusively and
distinctly." And the same says Hill, of Georgia: " utterly despairing
of agreeing on any plan to accomplish such a result."
' The resolution read : " Whereas, the agitation of the slavery question
is productive of no good, but solely of evil to the whole country, and
its further discussion ought to be discountenanced by all parties: There
fore, resolved, that no man who has recommended, still insists upon,
and does not now disclaim, the doctrines contained in the extracts
from the work called ' The Impending Crisis of the South,' by one
Helper, as read from the clerk's desk, and who is not opposed to the fur
ther agitation of the slavery question, is fit to be speaker of this house."
2 Winslow subsequently said: "It was understood that the terms of
the resolution were not to be made public."
' He was, as Winslow said, called away, but he afterwards declared
that he would never have voted for the resolution.

Sherman's declaration. 101
tolling of funeral bells, but with discordant janizary music.
Sherman, spurred thereto by the angry words of Houston,
of Alabama, on the previous day, opened the debate, and in
the course of his remarks declared that he was ready to
give an unreserved account of his position on every sentence
of Helper's book as soon as Clark's resolution was with
drawn; until that was done honor closed his lips, as the reso
lution was a personal insult to him. Clark answered that he
did not at all wish to attack or wound him as a man, but
that the political grounds which had made it his duty to
introduce the resolution remained unchanged, and that,
therefore, the fulfillment of Sherman's desire was out of the
question. Then Harris, of Maryland, arose as a mediator,
with the proposition that the resolution of the conference
committee, published in the New Tork Herald, should be
voted upon. The effect of this proposition on Clark was
like that of a red rag on a bull. He angrily declared that
he had known nothing of that resolution until he had read it
in the Herald; that he did not want to know anything of it
now; that he insisted on every letter of his own resolution,
and demanded a vote on it as firmly as ever. Gilmer, who
had been a member of the. conference committee, intimated
to him that he had expected this of him, but that his inten
tion had been to " force kindly " the compromise resolution
on him, and that that could still be done very well. Winslow,
the originator of the whole affair, was not, however, of the
opinion that it should be tried: he solemnly and completely
cast off his own child. As a reason for this, he stated that the
republicans, who, notwithstanding the secrecy agreed upon,
had immediately received information of the resolutions of
the conference committee, were greatly delighted with them,
and he was mindful of the saying: Timeo Danaos et dona
ferentes. Since the committee, as all its members averred,
had never ascribed to itself any authority whatever, but

102 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
had relied solely on the moral weight which would be ac
corded to propositions unanimously made by adherents of
the three parties, the scheme was deprived of all foundation
by Winslow's declaration. This could be changed in noth
ing by the talking of the matter over and over again, for a
long time more,, and by the fact that all the members of
the committee indignantly protested that they had not be
come guilty of a gross breach of confidence by babbling out
the secret. And that Clark, so far as the alleged personal
affront to himself was concerned, declared himself satisfied
with the explanations received, could not have the slightest
influence on the main question. What was gained here by
the establishment of peace was lost by the more violent
quarrels that were stirred up among others. The anti-
Lecompton democrats fell together by the ears to such an
extent that the entire house was drawn into the fight, and
the sergeant-at-arms had to be summoned with the mace, in
order to force the raging combatants to return to their seats
and put an end to the disorderly scene.
The continuation of the discussion, after Winslow's dec
laration, was not, however, entirely fruitless. Clark, of
New Tork, and McKae informed the house that the con
ference committee had drawn up a comprehensive pro
gramme, of which the resolution printed in the Herald was
only the concluding part. The motion for its adoption was
to be preceded by other manoeuvres, the object of which
was to unite the three parties against the adoption of the
"plurality rule" if an election by a majority could not be
brought about. This was a highhv significant discovery,
for did it not amount practically to a conspiracy against the
organization of the house, since the conference committee,
according to the concurrent testimony of its members, had
come, after long and earnest efforts, to recognize that it
was not able to find a candidate on whom the three parties
could agree?

m'queen's confession. 103
The conference committee and its programme were done
away with by the debate of the 12th of January, but the
southern Hotspurs did not let the wind blow this grain of
seed away. They buried it so deep in the ground that
they believed that, even without the co-operation of the
two little opposition parties, they had made sure it would
ripen into poisonous fruit. On the 19th of January the
admission was wrung from them by Colfax that they had
bound themselves to one another in writing to make use
of all parliamentary means to prevent a plurality election.
McQueen, of South Carolina, confessed that he was the
author of the declaration, and it was afterwards proven
that it had received fifty-eight signatures — fifty-seven dem
ocrats and one southern American. This number was suffi
cient to make the adoption of the plurality rule impossible,
and Burnett declared that the subscribers would carry out
their resolve, no matter how great the majority desiring
such a rule. The gentlemen, however, could not be prevailed
upon to give a direct answer to the question whether the
declaration bound them to this, likewise, for if that were
the case, it was an obligation not to allow the house of the
Thirty-sixth Congress to organize at all, unless they were
sure that a republican would not be chosen speaker. Since,
as their reluctant answers to the first questions sufficiently
proved, they by no means concealed from themselves the
fact that the knowledge by the public of a written agreement
of any kind among them was anything but promotive of
their cause, they could of course not be ignorant what effects
they might expect from the confession that this obligation
extended so far. When even northern democrats like
Vallandingham declared with serious mien that the plu
rality rule, which had already been employed twice, was
unconstitutional, there was certainly no doubt that the
public opinion of the north would almost unanimously look

104 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
upon such a written obligation as an overstepping of the
line already referred to, and would consider the signers of
it guilty of. a revolutionary conspiracy. No democrat of
the northwest, as Lamar, of Mississippi, stated when ques
tioned, had agreed to sign the obligation, and even Val
landingham announced that, notwithstanding his views
on the question of constitutionality, he would, if the case
should arise, submit to the will of the majority.
Notwithstanding the course taken by the southern demo
crats, their northern party associates still followed their lead
ing unconditionally. This fact was, with good reason, point
edly emphasized by McPherson, for it was certainly one of
lamentable significance. But although the danger that the
policy of obstruction would triumph was far from having
vanished, the impression made on public opinion by the ex
posure of the McQueen plot had undoubtedly diminished it.
And a provoking move on the chess board, made at the same
time, by Brown, of Mississippi, in the senate had a like
tendency. On the 18th of January he had moved a resolution
instructing the committee on territories to make it the duty
of the territorial legislatures, in all future bills relating to
the organization of new territories, to enact adequate laws
for the protection of slave property, and declaring it to be
the duty of congress, if the territorial legislatures refused to
do so, to interfere and pass such laws itself.1 This view had,
' "Resolved, that the territories are the common property of all the
states ; and that it is the privilege of the citizens of all the states to go
into the territories with every kind or description of property recognized
by the constitution of the United States ; and that it is the constitutional
duty of the law-making power, wherever lodged, or by whomsoever
exercised, whether by the congress or the territorial legislature, to enact
such laws as may be found necessary for the adequate and sufficient
protection of such property.
"Resolved, that the committee on territories be instructed to insert,
in any bill they may report for the organization of new territories, a

BALLOTING FOR SPEAKER. 105
indeed, been advocated by him and others before this ; but to
want to coerce the senate now by a resolution to make a for
mal and binding declaration of such a view must be looked
upon as an intentional provocation. Among the conservative
Americans of the south and the still very numerous con
servatives of the north, formerly called Fillmoreans, it could
not but produce the irritation of fear, for quiet was the
alpha and omega of their wisdom, and no more effectual
means of agitation could have been furnished the repub
licans. Nor could it fail to embitter the Douglas democrats
in the highest degree, for its direct practical aim could only
be to destroy, from the first, all possibility of the success
of the efforts which it was foreseen would be made in the
democratic national convention to bring about a recon
ciliation between the two wings of the democratic party.
The longer the struggle in the house of representatives
lasted, the more keenly were the elements on which its issue
depended made conscious by the southern radicals how
greatly this unnecessary intensification of differences was
opposed to their interests. This feeling so perceptibly
gained in strength that now, perhaps, no very great pliancy
was any longer necessary to wrest from them the resolve
finally to bring about the decision.
The democrats were the first to recognize this, and it
came near insuring them victory. In the three ballots of the
26th of January, the Americans had voted for William
N. H. Smith, of North Carolina. On the following day,
Mallory announced that they now foimally set him up as
a candidate, because the opinion had been expressed in
clause declaring it to be the duty of the territorial legislature to enact
adequate and sufficient laws for the protection of all kinds of property,
as above described, within the limits of the territory; and that, upon
its failure or refusal to do so, it is the admitted duty of congress to inter
fere and pass such laws." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 568.

106 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
many quarters, that, by so doing, the intention would be
made manifest of a serious endeavor to unite a majority of
all votes on him. After Mallory, in answer to a question
by Crawford, had said he was convinced that all the Ameri
cans could be induced to vote for him (Smith), Smith, of
Virginia, referring to a resolution of the legislature of his
state, requesting its representatives to support the candi
dacy of every " sound, conservative, national man," declared
that all democrats could and should recognize his namesake
from North Carolina as such a man, for he had never be
longed to the American part}', but was a whig, and had
"not voted on the Kansas question pro or con." The vote
was then taken. Before the result was announced, Mallory
stated that all the votes of the Americans had been cast
for Smith, and that it depended on the democrats to elect
him. Thereupon, those of them who had not immediately
listened to the appeal of the Virginian recalled their votes
and transferred them ,to Smith. Some democrats from the
northwest agreed to this only after they had been assured
that he had never been a know-nothing, and others, after he
had received so many votes, that his election lay with them.
If the announcement of the vote could have been demanded
immediately after the latter had gone over to him, Smith
would have been elected. But it should either — contrary
to custom — not have been allowed at all to change a vote or
it should have been permitted as long as any one wished to do
so. And now, three republicans from Pennsylvania, and
one American from New Jersey, who had originally voted
for Smith, withdrew their votes from him and transferred
them, some to Corwin, and some to Pennington. The
consequence of this was that Smith received only one hun
dred and twelve votes, while one hundred and fifteen were
needed to elect him.
Two of the republicans who had given the affair this

CHANGES OF REPUBLICAN VOTES. 10T
turn defended their change of vote with the somewhat
embellished declaration that they had voted for Smith
because they had erroneously supposed he was a nativist.
That was, of course, in the main, only a pretext. Their
votes were cast for a non-republican only so long as it was
certain that he could not be elected. The third, Morris,
made no secret of the reason why he changed his vote, for
he assigned as the cause of it the fact that, as he had heard,
a change of front was contemplated by the republicans,
and that another candidate would be put up.1 Corwin, of
Ohio, had declared that the republicans would not desert
Sherman until Gabriel blew the last trump, and Stevens
vouched for their steadfastness until the crack of doom.
But Morris was correctly informed, and no one wondered
at the resolve. They might indeed prefer a struggle with
out end to a change of their candidate, but they were not
such fools as to rather be defeated with Sherman than
be victorious with another; and the history of the thirty-
ninth ballot forced them, henceforth, to look at the question.
only from this point of view.
The next sitting was on the 30th of January. Before
proceeding to a new ballot, Sherman withdrew his candi
dacy, assigning as a reason that the election of a man who
directly or indirectly supported the administration would
be a national misfortune, and that it was, therefore, his
duty to withdraw, since it was now certain that a larger
number of votes could be united on another republican.
The new candidate was Pennington, of New Jersey, of whose
qualifications for the office not only the public at large but
1 He subsequently added to this the confession that he had dropped
Smith because the latter would not give him an express promise " to
organize the committee of ways and means in such a manner as to
protect the interests of Pennsylvania," i. e., in a protective-tariff sense,
Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 636.

108 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
even the house knew nothing, since he was now a member
of it for the first time. But it was that fact precisely that,
under the circumstances existing, recommended him for
the speakership. The united opposition clung to Smith's can
didacy. Three ballots were taken during the day, and in
each of them Pennington received one hundred and fifteen
and Smith one hundred and thirteen, while now one hundred
and eighteen and one hundred and seventeen votes respect
ively were required for an election. However, one step more
had been taken towards a decision, since Briggs, of New Tork,
announced that he would eventually vote for Pennington.
On the next day Smith withdrew his name, and Reagan,
of Texas, nominated McClernand, of Illinois, a Douglas
democrat. That the democrats had prevailed on themselves
to take up such a heretic in their own fold must be looked
upon as a confession that they felt themselves in the con
dition of a drowning man grasping at a straw. Etheridge,
therefore, thought that the next ballot would be decisive.
This, however, was a mistake. But while McClernand re-
eeived only ninety-one votes, the vote for Pennington rose
to one hundred and sixteen, and a new vote which had been
given him, had a weight peculiar to itself: a southern Ameri
can, Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, had gone over to
the republicans. This practically decided the question, for
now Briggs's vote sufficed to elect Pennington, and in that
event he had promised it on the 30th of January. After
eight weeks the struggle ended on the 1st of February, and
Pennington, owing to his negative merit of being a republi
can without a national, political past, was elected speaker
on the forty-fourth ballot, by one hundred and seventeen
out of two hundred and thirty-three votes.
The Washington correspondent of the New Tork Trib
une was, in one respect, right when he wrote to his
paper, on the same day, that the republicans had won a

PENNINGTON ELECTED SPEAKER. 109
more decisive victory than they had themselves, for a long
time, dared to hope for, since, up to the exposure of the
written agreement of the fifty-eight, they had based their
hopes only on the plurality rule, and Pennington had been
elected by an absolute majority. On the other hand, Clark
had, with the best of reasons, said, immediately before the
last ballot, that his resolution had been by no means fruit
less, for it had made the election of a signer of the Helper
recommendation impossible. Owing to the splitting up of
parties, some conservatives had again succeeded in blocking
the way of the southern Hotspurs and in forcing the repub
licans to desist from their stubborn advocacy7 of a provoking
step, and the storm was allayed quicker than it had been
possible to excite it. But was Sherman justified in infer
ring from that fact, that the election of a republican president
would be received as calmly as was now the election of a
republican speaker?1 It was not proven, to say the least,
that the waves would have subsided immediately if the
speaker's name was not Pennington, but Sherman, and a
president had a weight in the scales altogether different
from that of a speaker of the house. And was there noth
ing to put one in mind of the old experience, that the dan
ger is not over, but that the mariner must be doubly careful,.
when, in stormy weather, the wind, after a violent blast,
seems for an instant to be lulled to sleep?
1 In a short speech to a crowd of people who came to serenade Pen
nington, he said: "A republican speaker is elected and no calamity
comes. A republican speaker is elected, and the people rejoice. A
republican speaker is elected, and stocks advance. A republican speaker
is elected, and cotton is worth eleven cents a pound and upward — and
may it advance higher. A republican speaker is elected, and slave prop
erty remains the same in value. A republican speaker is elected, and
the Union is safe. So it will be when a republican president is elected ;
for in that event every right of every citizen of every state will be se
cured in his bands. . . . Dissolve the Union! It can't be done.
Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and Indiana have recently met and re
solved it shall not be done." The N. Y. Tribune, February 3, 1860.

110 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
CHAPTER IIL
THE CHARLESTON CONVENTION.
The democrats had lost much by their defeat, while the
republicans had gained little by their victory. In the house
of representatives, a way of transacting business had, in
the course of time, developed, which in ever-increasing
measure, caused its committees to outgrow their original
legitimate sphere, the performance of the labor preparatory
to legislation. In form, and according to the law, they still
remained only its auxiliary organs; but in reality, with
respect to the matters referred to them, they had made
themselves its masters to such an extent that it was only
exceptionally that it still exercised its unquestioned right
of sole and independent decision. As the democrats had a
majority in the senate and as the president was a democrat,
the appointing of the committees by a democratic speaker
would have enabled the democrats, in this legislative period
likewise, to frame legislation more or less in accordance
with their wishes, although, with a full house, they would
have needed outside assistance to secure a full vote in their
interest. The republicans, on the contrary, were still com
plete^7 powerless to carry any legislative measure whatever.
Pennington's election had only made it easier for them to
obstruct the path of their opponents. And the moral
weightof their success was much smaller than the possibil
ity of turning it practically to account in a positive manner,
since they had been compelled to sacrifice their candidate
in order to secure the election of an obscure republican.
But these were by no means the points of view from
which the matter should be judged, if it was to be rightly
judged. Public opinion, indeed, believed that it should

the arms bill. Ill
consider only the result of the struggle, and hence the wild
waves subsided immediately; for that result could not pos
sibly have any immediate consequences of great magnitude.
The importance of the struggle, however, was not to be meas
ured by the range of its result, but by the history of its begin
ning, development and end. The whole republican party saw
with Sherman, in the submission of the south to its conse
quences, a new proof that that section would never allow
its threats to become deeds, while the McQueen plot was a
deed. Compared with this fact, the victory of the republi
cans, which they owed mainly to this very deed, wTas only
a feather in the scales of fate. It was now certain that a
great part of the southern representatives in congress were
resolved that, if they had to choose between the loss of the
supremacy of the south over the Union and the destruction
of the federal government, they would decide in favor of
the latter. They had not been able to carry out their de
sign this time. But verily it should not have been inferred
therefrom that they would not be able to succeed in doing
so if the republicans had come into possession of the presi
dential chair, and the question was no longer of procuring
the legislation they wanted in congress, the bigger half of
which consisted of northern members, but in their respective
states. Other deeds in rapid succession followed the first one
above referred to, repeating the same admonition always
more urgently, and always just as little understood and
heeded bj7 the republicans.
There was a bill before the senate, zealously advocated
by Jefferson Davis, chairman of the committee on military
affairs, which authorized the secretary of war to sell to the
states, at the request of the governors, arms manufactured
in the federal workshops, at cost price. The republicans
opposed this provision on economic grounds. Nothing

112 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
save an amendment moved by Fessenden, but not adopted,
providing that only a quota of the entire quantity of arms
that could be dispensed with, proportional to its federal
population, should be sold to any state, intimated that they
knew anything of other and incomparably weightier objec
tions that might be made to the measure. But the southern
gentlemen told them over and over again, to their face,
that they wanted to buy the federal government's arms in
order to fight it with them, in case of need; and notwith
standing this, they had a majority of eleven in the vote on
the bill. " I am sorry to say," declared Mason, on the 1st
of March, " that the relation in which that (Virginia) and
many other states now stand to this Union (!) has put them
upon the necessity of arming themselves." The legislature
of Virginia had recently appropriated $500,000 for that
purpose; "and the appropriations will be continued from
year to year until they are fully armed and capable of
meeting all resistance." The immediato erection of work
shops of her own for the manufacture of arms had been
ordered, and persons were being sent to Europe,1 to see on
what conditions arms could be purchased there.2 It was
scarcely possible to so misconstrue such declarations as to
make them mean that Virginia considered these extensive
precautionary measures necessary in order that she might
be able to meet some new J ohn Brown. If. in consequence of
the unskilful construction of the sentences in certain places,
there was anything obscure in them, much was said in the
war of words about the election of speaker in the house of
representatives which dissipated, in advance, all doubts as
to their correct interpretation. Miles, of South Carolina,
had cried out on the 6th of January : " The south is arming,
and if it is not allowed to secede in peace, it will do so at
1,1 She is sending to Europe."
2 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 949.

ARMING of the south. 113
the cost of war." ' But if the south were arming, secession
should no longer have been spoken of as an empty word.
Arming was not a word but a deed ; and the republicans
knew that arming was no longer talked about, but was
seriously being carried into effect in several states.2 On
the 7th of March, Van Wyck, of New Tork, said in the
house of representatives: "Already you are making appro
priations of thousands to build arsenals and purchase arms,
and are now mustering forces, as you say, to threaten and
coerce the north. ... I judge from your military
preparations, you mean force." 3 But, in the same breath, he
taunted the boastful braggarts and scornfully reminded
them that they had neither manufactories of arms nor of
powder. And the entire republican party believed they
could make terms with these facts, in the same way. False
alarm! they cried all the more confidently in proportion
as preparatory acts, paving the way for the decisive deed,
multiplied. Hence the angry charges they afterwards
hinted against Buchanan, because he allowed the fire of
rebellion to burst into a bright blaze, instead of smothering
it by prompt and resolute action the moment its little
tongues of flame began to rise, fall back in great part upon
themselves. He could arraign them, for they — although
for the most part evidently more or less forced thereto —
laughed loudly, because it was sought to make the people
believe that the spectacle prepared for the stage by the
'lb., App., p. 68.
2De Bow's Commercial Review writes in February, 1860: "In these
darksome times it becomes the south to keep her arms properly bur
nished and her powder dry. If we have not the arms, surely self-preser
vation requires that they should be speedily provided. Right glad
then are we to see the course pursued recently by Virginia and South
Carolina in respect to this matter. Georgia is equally on the alert."
XXVIII, p. 234. See, also, lb., p. 240.
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1031.
8

114 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
political pyrotechnists was a real conflagration ; but they
could not clear themselves of joint responsibility for his
sins of omission by showing that their demand that the
preparations of the south for a revolution should be fol
lowed, step by step, by preparations for its suppression,
had fallen on deaf ears. Instead of allowing the pressure
of public opinion to work on the south as well as on the
president, by showing themselves as permeated with the
dreadful gravity of the situation as they were firmly re
solved to do justice to it, they, in their blindness, strove
more earnestly to lull public opinion into a false feeling of
securit}7, the further the southern radicals carried the work
of breaking down the last bridges which might have led, if
only for a very short time, to a new compromise between
the north and the south.
The daj7 after Pennington's election is one of the most
important in the history of this work of destruction. Jef
ferson Davis, by moving six resolutions,1 had laid a plot
in the senate the explosion of which, in Charleston, made
the democratic national convention the beginning: of the
end. The first three and the last two need not be spe
cially discussed here, not because they give no occasion
for criticism, but because they only develop the well-
known slavocratic doctrine on the constitutional nature
of the Union with respect to slavery in essentially the
same words in which it had been done numberless times
before. The motion received its great significance and im
portance from the fourth resolution, although it, likewise,
contained nothing new. It was only Brown's resolution
of the 18th of January, already mentioned, in a diluted
form. On the main question, they were in complete har-
1 lb., p. 658. In his book, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Govern
ment, I, pp. 42, 43, Davis has not given the six resolutions in their
original wording.

Buchanan's congratulations. 115
mony. Both declared it to be the duty of the federal
government to afford slave-holders in the territories ade
quate protection for their slave property. But while Brown
asked that, on the organization of territories, it should be
expressly made the duty of the territorial legislatures to
pass the laws necessary to secure that end, and that, if the
territorial legislature did not fulfill this duty, congress it
self should enact such laws, Davis contented himself with
saying: "and, if experience should at any time prove that
the judiciary does not possess power to insure adequate pro
tection, it will then become the duty of congress to supply
such deficiency."
Buchanan, in his message, had "cordially congratulated
congress upon the final settlement by the supreme court
of the United States of the question of slavery in the terri
tories;" and Breckenridge had said, on the 21st of Decem
ber, in a speech at Frankfort, Kentucky, that complaints
were nowhere to be heard, that the question was no longer
before congress, and that no man true to the Union had
any reason to bring it before that bod}7 again.' Both the
senators from Mississippi had now torn in two these con
soling assurances of the president, whose unalterable fidel
ity had been borne witness to on every occasion by the
slavocracy, and of the future presidential candidate of
the southern wing of the democratic party, and cast
them into the waste-basket together with the other false
promises of peace. Brown had not only done so by his
1 "In the present condition of public affairs, I can see no motive to
thrust the territorial question on the congressional arena, that has its
origin in a feeling of loyalty to the Union. At present, the slavery
question, in this aspect of it, is not before congress. No southern sena
tor or representative proposes legislation on it. No complaint of violated
rights comes from any territory. No evidence is offered that the con
stitution, the laws and the courts are not competent to protect personal
.right and private property.'' Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 837.

116 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
resolution, but clearly and curtly said that he was doing it.
As early as the 3d of January, he had said that he and
his party were irredeemably lost if they approved that part
of the message; that the Dred Scott decision could afford
them no security. The majority of the supreme court of the
United States had passed their seventieth year; their days
were numbered, and with them their decision would sink
into the grave, if their vacated seats were filled with repub
licans. " If we can have no more slave states, then twenty
years will not pass before a change of the constitution will
enable the anti-slavery sentiments of the north, under the
forms and guaranties of the constitution, as amended, to
overthrow slavery." But we can get no more slave states
if slavery be not placed under the protection • of positive
legislation.2 All this was irrefutable, but it was only saying, in dif
ferent words, that the slavocracy could not see in the
constitution itself a sufficient guaranty, because it was pos
sible, in a constitutional way, so to change it that the direct
legislative combating of slavery might yet be constitutional
in the states. This no judicial decision was able to alter, but a
law or a resolution of the senate could change it just as little.
Hence the correct final inference from Brown's proposals
was that only a change of the sentiments of the north with
regard to slavery could afford full and lasting security to
the slave states.
Davis, too, referred to this, the kernel of the whole ques
tion, when, in his second resolution, he denied the right of the
north to bring about a " change of opinion or feeling " with
respect to slavery in any way. He did not, however, like
Brown, ask for immediate fulfillment of a demand which
could have been granted only by the north, if that change
' " Not meagerly and stintedly dealt out, but fully and freely."
2 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 299, 300.

clingman's statement. 117
of feeling had taken place to the advantage of the slav
ocracy, but was satisfied with the laying down of the prin
ciple from which the demand might, in case of need, be
directly deduced. He merely stated what the duty of con
gress was, while Brown had given a very precise answer to
the question, how it was to be performed: congress must
pass laws to protect slave property in the territories, if the
territorial legislatures do not do so; and he left it unde
cided whether the action of congress would be necessary,
while Brown had demanded that the senate should imme
diately bind itself by a formal resolution to provide all
future territories, directly or indirectly, with laws protect
ive of slave property.
Clingman subsequently called attention to the fact that
Brown had found no support even among the senators
from the southern states. He intimated at the same time
that this was to be ascribed to the certainty from the first
that the resolutions would be rejected ; but he frankly
declared his conviction at the same time that the represent
atives of the south, even if the matter lay entirely in their
bands, would consider long and well whether they should act
in the premises. What the south needed, he said, was not
slave territories, but slave territories out of which slave
states would be formed. What was forced upon a man
against his will he would shake off as soon as he could, and
hence the end sought could not be reached by the means
proposed by Brown ; an effect the contrary of that intended
was to be expected.1
Clingman, therefore, reached the same result, so far as
the main question was concerned, as Douglas, but not in
the same way. But did not the slavocracy take as their
pattern the man who cut off his nose to spite his face, when
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1963.

118
they obstinately tried, at any risk, to obtain the recognition
and enforcement of the right they claimed- — a right, the ex
ercise of which could never promote their interests, and
would presumably injure them ?
It is certainly not improbable that Davis did not exclude
these considerations from his mind, although he was scarcely
thankful to Clingman for expressing himself so frankly
about them. But the cautious and diplomatically vague
construction of his sentences was determined by other rea
sons. No senator from a northern state could vote for
Brown's resolutions, while it could be presumed that only
Doug'las and his followers would object to Davis's fourth
resolution. And this was the object of the whole manoeuvre :
to have the solid representation of the south, in unison
with the administration democrats of the north, proclaim in
a formal manner a constitutional principle, the recognition
of which Douglas had, a hundred times and in such a way
that it could not be recalled, declared to be simply impos
sible now and for all future time. The question was to be
made a party matter in order to force on the Douglas dem
ocrats the alternative either of abandoning their leader, or
of allowing — at least for the next presidential election —
the two fractions of the democratic party to consolidate
into two hostile parties: the democratic caucus made the
resolutions their own.1
'lb., p. 2153. On a motion made by Toombs, and with Davis's con
sent, the adoption of the fourth resolution was made still easier for the
northern senators by modifying the words: " it will be the duty of con
gress to support such deficiency," by the addition of the phrase, " within
the limits of its constitutional powers." Davis, The Rise and Fall of the
Confederate Government, I, p. 43. Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr.,
p. 2349. That no duty of congress could go beyond the limits of its
constitutional powers was self-evident. The value of the modifying
phrase consisted in the fact that doubts as to the recognition of the
constitutional duty of congress to act in favor of slavery in the terri-

DOUGLAS S CHARGE AGAINST DAVIS. 119
Douglas subsequently charged Davis and his associates
with the presumptuous and perfidious intention of dictating
the democratic party confession of faith to the Charleston
convention. Davis would not admit that this was true, but
could only allege against it that he had moved the resolu
tions entirely on his own responsibility, and had previously
informed only a few friends of their contents. His allega
tion may have been correct, but nothing followed from it
with respect to the charge made against him. Douglas, on
the contrary, to prove it, might appeal to the fact that in
the caucus no fewer than twelve southern senators had put
that interpretation on Davis's design, and had therefore
advised against it. Davis was compelled not only to answer
this assertion with eloquent silence, but was also obliged to
admit that it had been resolved not to be°rin the debate in
the senate on the resolutions until after the Charleston con
vention, in order not to afford a pretext for the objection
that it was desired to usurp the rights of the party dele
gates elected ad hoc and to hamper the convention's free
dom of action. He gave the assurance that it had happened
contrary to his wish, for he had not shared the fear that
there was any danger whatever to be apprehended from so
ungrounded a suspicion, and he acted at the same time as
if the charge was shown to be entirely baseless by this
unnecessary consideration. But so far as the moral pressure
tories might be met with the fallacy that it was nowhere said that that
duty required the enactment of positive protective laws, but that such
laws were rather expressly prohibited, if the authority of congress,
according to the right interpretation of the constitution, did not ex
tend so far ; the resolution in no wise anticipated the decision of this
question, and in the face of the express declaration that congress
had to perform its contingent duty of intervention within the limits
of the constitution, to talk of unconstitutionality was an evident ab
surdity.

120 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
that could be exercised from the senate wing of the capitol
at Washington on the democratic convention was con
cerned, a vote of the senate and a caucus resolution were
of entirely equal value. There was a difference between
them, not with respect to effects but only as to appearances;
and as the preservation of appearances by the postpone
ment of the debate in the senate was also in the interest of
Davis and his followers, if they had the intention imputed
to them by Douglas, it must be looked upon as proved,
that at the bottom of the caucus resolution lay the inten
tion of which they must expect to be accused, if they im
mediately brought about a vote of the senate.1 Or was it
desired to make the people in their ingenuousness believe
the absurdity that a party caucus of the senators, imme
diately before the national convention, would have drafted
so significant a resolution without any regard to its prob
able effect on that body ? That the convention was had
in mind in the caucus was proved by the fact mentioned
by Douglas. But if no influencing of the convention were
intended and nothing were lost by the postponement of
a vote in the senate, then it could not be claimed that
there was any danger in delaying a caucus resolution. And
how fully conscious these democratic gentlemen were of
the extraordinary importance of what this convention did
or failed to do with respect to the destiny of the party and
the country, was sufficiently apparent from several energetio
attempts made to obtain an adjournment of congress while
the convention lasted, in order to afford members of both
'In Davis's work the resolution and two of his speeches on them
are printed — the one in part and the other in full — but he does nou
devote a single word to this question. In his two large volumes he has
indeed shown himself a master in the art of keeping silent on what is
most important in order to dwell, at dreary length, on the doctrine of
state sovereignty.

DAVIS AND THE RESOLUTIONS. 121
houses an opportunity to go to Charleston and to cast the
weight of their influence directly into the one scale or the
other of the balance.
To deny that the resolutions were meant for the ears of
the Charleston convention was to dispute the existence of
the mid-day sun. Still, Davis should be made to bear only
a, very small part of the responsibility for the consequences
of the realization of their fundamental idea, although there
is no reason to doubt the exclusive paternity of the resolu
tions which he claimed. The importance of the resolutions
must not be undervalued, but of course the thing most mate
rial is the idea the realization of which they were intended to
serve, and the responsible fame of being the father of that
idea cannot be connected with any one definite name what
ever: the frightful burthen lies on numberless shoulders,
and the names of the most of the accomplices have never
been heard of outside of a very narrow circle. Davis and
the caucus of the democratic senators endeavored, indeed,
to dictate to the Charleston convention what its programme
should be, but it was not issued by them to the world as
something new. It had long been discussed in the entire
country. The only thing that for quite a long time had
been considered doubtful was, whether the carrying out of
it would be successful, but not whether it would be tried.
And from week to week the number of those grew contin
ually smaller, who with ex-President Tyler were firmly
convinced that the breaking up of the convention would not
succeed, but that the means employed in Harrisburg twenty
years before would be tried again, and a candidate set up
without a party platform. And even where people had not
with Tyler turned things upside down, by fathering the in
tention which undoubtedly existed of breaking up the con
vention on Douglas, this consoling prophecy could indeed

122
spring only from the wish to see that intention realized.1
That prophecy indirectly admitted that he (Tyler) too con
sidered an agreement on a platform impossible, and to carry
on the electoral campaign as a solid party notwithstanding
this fact, they had of course to be willing to purchase the
continued external existence of the party at the price of
one and only one party platform. But they were not willing
to do this. Iverson had announced that fact to the Charles
ton convention and to the entire country in the senate as
earl}7 as the 9th of January, in terms so plain that the decla
ration could not be misunderstood, much as people might
wish to be able to lull themselves still further into optimistic
self-delusions.2 And the resolve to force upon the conven-
' He writes on the 19th of January, 1860, to Robert Tyler : " I think he
(Gov. Wise) will carry the electoral vote of Virginia in the convention ;
but even if he and Douglas should be inclined to break up the conven
tion, of which I should entirely disapprove, my belief is that neither
will be permitted to do it, even by their supporters. The condition of
the country is altogether too critical for this. Some man will be nomi
nated without a platform, which at most is a useless thing. We had
in 1839-40 far greater dissensions at Harrisburg, and a platform would
have shattered us to the winds.'' Tyler, Letters and Times of the
Tylers, II, 557. It may indeed be assumed that his judgment of the
situation was not entirely uninfluenced by the illusion that, even if
not probable, it was still possible that he might himself be chosen in
Charleston as the standard-bearer of the party. On the 6th of October,
1859, he had written to Robert Tyler: "I am daily, when in the midst
of men, met with the inquiry, Will you accept the nomination at
Charleston if it should be conferred? I have answered, it will be time
enough to respond when it takes place. Mr. Mann, of Washington, is
a friend of the movement. He should be there ; so should De Bow. I
have not heard from John for some time. But I ask nothing, I can
almost say I desire nothing. The historic page is the most that I look
to, and that would be embellished by the thing, and would impart to it
value. Things are too terribly out of sorts, and he who undertakes to
put them right would assume or have thrown upon him a fearful re
sponsibility." lb., p. 553.
8 "And, sir, I say now to the senator from Ohio (Mr. Pugh), and all

THE ALABAMA CONVENTION. 12&
tion the choice between a breaking up, and unconditional
acceptance of the new slavocratic doctrine, was not only
announced in language unadorned, but its execution was
already fully assured before Davis had called upon the
democratic senators to approve it indirectly in advance,
by endeavoring to pledge the party to the principle of that
doctrine by the adoption of his resolutions. On the 11th
of January, the democratic convention of Alabama, in
Montgomery, had " expressly instructed " the delegates of
the state to the national convention to withdraw therefrom
if it refused to adopt the doctrine named as the official
party creed before it nominated, candidates.1 When, there
fore, the national convention met in Charleston on the 23d
of April, the only remaining question was, how many dele
gations would follow the exam pie of Alabama. For although
in consequence of the old party custom of requiring a two-
thirds majority for a nomination, it was at least very
unlikely that the Douglas democrats would win an indispu-
the northern democracy, that, in my opinion, the southern states ought,
in the Charleston convention, to demand the plain and unmistakable
recognition of these rights of the southern people in the territories of
the United States as a condition precedent to any party affiliation with
the northern democracy ; and should the delegates from the free states
refuse to recognize these rights, then, sir, the southern delegates should
no longer hold political associations with them ; but withdraw from the
convention and take steps to raUy the southern people in the formation
of a party at home, which should be based upon the simple and sacred
proposition of equality in the Union, or independence out of it." Congr.
Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 382.
' " Resolved further, that our delegates to the Charleston convention
are hereby expressly instructed to insist that said convention shall adopt
a platform of principles, recognizing distinctly the rights of the south,
so asserted in the foregoing resolutions ; and if the said national con
vention shall refuse to adopt, in substance, the propositions embraced in
the preceding resolutions, prior to nominating candidates, our delegates
to said convention are hereby positively instructed to withdraw there
from." Garrett, Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama, p. 692.

124 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
table victory, it was certain from the start that they had an
absolute majority of all the votes. The adoption of the
slavocratic programme could therefore be effected only on
condition that a part of the Douglas democrats, despite the
great moral support to be found for the weak-kneed in the
consciousness of having the fundamental democratic prin
ciple of the rule of the majority on their side, would allow
themselves to be terrorized into sacrificing not only their
candidate and their principles, but presumably their own
political position also.
At first, however, everything seemed very favorable to
the south. The man elected president of the convention
was Caleb Cushing, Pierce's attorney-general, who, even
before the Dred Scott decision, had in an official opinion
declared the Missouri compromise to be unconstitutional.
In these national conventions, the members of which are
numbered by hundreds, who for the most part never before
saw one another, and who play for the highest political stakes
under the eyes of an excited multitude of spectators, it
is never indifferent in what kind of hands the guidance of
their business lies; and the more divergent the views and
interests of those composing them are, the more important
is the chairmanship. The slavocracy must, therefore, have
highly appreciated the fact that the chairmanship was given
without opposition1 to the adroitest, the readiest and bold
est partisan they had among the northern delegates. The
exaggerated emphasis and the convulsive pathos with which,
in his address, he claimed the certainty of victory over the
" permanent, traitorous, sectional conspiracy " betrayed,
however, only too plainly, how small his own hope was
that he would succeed in manoeuvring his colleagues from
the northern states who had not like him boasted of their
' Cushing was elected with but one dissenting vote. Official proceed
ings of the Democratic National Convention, p. 15.

ST. A- DOUGLASS

MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS. 125-
absolute power of resistance against the poison of the
" stupid and half-insane spirit of faction and fanaticism,"
out of their majority position into a minority one. "We
will do it, for we will not despair of ourselves." Could a
promise of a victory sound more like a cry of despair?
More significant than Cushing's election seemed the
second achievement of the south. The conservative major
ity of the convention got only a minority in the platform
committee.1 On the other hand, the contest between the
double delegations from New Tork and Illinois was decided
in favor of the Douglas men, and that might easily be of
much greater importance so far as the results of the con
vention were concerned; for the minority did not submit
to the majority, but appealed to the convention by bring
ing in a report of their own. The recommendation of the
majority (Avery, April 27) was to the effect that one more
resolution on the territorial question, favoring the new
demand of the south, should be added to the Cincinnati
platform of 1856. The minority report, on the contrary,
accompanied the ratification anew of the Cincinnati plat
form by pointedly calling attention to the fact that that
platform had been adopted unanimously four years before,
and that "democratic principles" were unchangeable in
their nature when applied to the same subject-matter. To
this was added the declaration that all questions concerning
rights of property arising under the constitution in any of
the states or territories were by their very nature subject
to judicial decision, and that the democratic party was
bound to submit, with respect to such questions, to all past
and future decisions of the supreme court of the United
1 According to the twenty-eighth annual report of the American Anti-
Slavery Society, page 4, sixteen against seventeen ; according to the offi
cial proceedings, etc., page 38, the majority report, however, had only
fifteen signatures.

126 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
States. Lastly, both reports strongly recommended the
acquisition of Cuba at the earliest possible moment; the
only difference between them on this question was that the
minority report expressly demanded conditions honorable
to the United States and just to Spain.1
The Douglas democrats, therefore, were ver}7 far from
imagining that the slavocracy would yield anj7thing of what
had been previously conceded to them; only they would
not grant all the new demands the slavocracy made. The
New^Tork Tribune rightly remarked that more was offered
the south in the recommendations of the minority than it
had ever before received from a national convention.2
The convention resolved to make another attempt to
come to an understanding. A successful result, however,
was considered so improbable that the motion to refer the
reports back to a committee was adopted by a majority of
only one vote (one hundred and fifty-two against one hun
dred and fifty-one). The committee again failed to agree
upon a common proposition. The two parties only modi
fied their respective recommendations, and this more as
to their form than as to their substance. The majority
made their demands in terms still more precise and defi
nite,, while the minority now declared the decisions of
the supreme court conclusive, because differences of opin-
' "Honorable to ourselves and just to Spain."
2 "This platform, it will be observed, is decidedly more pro-slavery
tnan any one ever before adopted in any national convention whatever.
Yet, four years ago, when the predecessor of this convention met in
Cincinnati, Beriah Magoffin, now governor of Kentucky, brought to
that gathering a draft of what he thought the south ought to demand ;
but put it aside unsubmitted because (he afterwards told a friend) Mr.
B. F. Hallet, of Massachusetts, chairman of the platform committee,
reported a platform more favorable to the south than he (Magoffin) had
thought proper to ask. And how, when the northern democracy readily
offer all that and more, the south rejects it and demands still more,
under penalty of disruption and defeat."

THE MINORITY REPORT ADOPTED. 127
ion prevailed in the party with respect to the territorial
question. People were now generally convinced that further efforts
to bring about an agreement were useless. The arts of
persuasion, argument, appeals to patriotism, interest and
fear — everything was exhausted ; it must at last be decided
to count the votes and thus reach a decision.
On the 30th of April, by a vote of one hundred and sixty-
five against one hundred and thirty -eight, it was resolved
to substitute the minority for the majority report.1 In this
way the practical decision was given. The vote on the
platform itself was, at bottom, only a matter of form. The
only thing noteworthj7 is that all that was done was to in
dorse the Cincinnati platform. The plank referring to the
decisions of the federal supreme court, proposed by the mi
nority of the committee, was rejected by an overwhelming
majority. The southern delegates voted against it because
they did not want to take anything unless everything they
had demanded was given them, and the northern delegates
because they considered it useless or undignified to force on
the south a concession which they scornfully repelled.
Had the southern delegates expected that the majority
of the Douglas democrats would to the last successfully
resist all attempts to divide them, and how many of them
had wished that they might do so? John Cochrane, of New
Tork, relates that one evening a conversation he was hav
ing with Bayard and Slidell, on the threatening course of
things in the convention, was interrupted by the appear
ance of Tancey and Knox Walker. Slidell had taken
them into an adjoining room, and, when after a long time
he returned, gave the gladly welcomed information that he
had succeeded in convincing the two gentlemen from Ala-
1 In the majority there were twelve from the slave states, and in the
minority thirty from the free states.

128
bama that the south had the power in its hands so far as
the nomination was concerned, because Douglas could not
unite the requisite two-thirds majority on himself. Hence
the Alabama delegation would not secede from the conven
tion. But the first business the convention had to consider
the next day was Walker's announcement that, in accord
ance with the instructions referred to of the state conven
tion, he had to declare the withdrawal of the Alabama
delegation. Cochrane infers from this that the " Union
men " of the south had honestly and earnestly endeavored
to prevent the breaking up of the convention, which was a
matter resolved on in advance by the "Fire-eaters," as a
precondition of a successful revolution.1 According to this,
Slidell had proved himself in this critical moment one of
the most active " Union men." Others, on the contrary,
insisted that he was the arch conspirator, in whose hands
in Charleston all the wires of the secessionists met.2 And
there is a possibility of harmonizing this view with Coch-
rane's story. Slidell, in that nightly scene, may have
purposely deceived him and Bayard as to the real in
tentions of the Alabama delegation — not, indeed, to lull
them into a false security, since they could not have
stopped the downward course of the rolling stone, but
because he could most effectually promote the aims of
the Fire-eaters, if he wore in the shameful play the mask
of an active and devoted friend of the Union. Cochrane,
• Speech of November, 13, 1861 — " Arming the slaves in the war for
the Union" — before his regiment, and Magazine of American History,
XIV, p. 150.
2 Thus, for instance, Haskin, of New York, said in the house of rep
resentatives on February 23, 1861: "He was the master spirit and
director of the secession movements at Charleston and Baltimore, and
in the organization of the seceders into a party, the mission of which
was the ultimate formation of a southern confederacy." Congr. Globe,
2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 265.

MURAT HALSTEAD's LETTER. 129
however, who was no unprejudiced listener, may have inter
preted Slidell's words to mean more than they were intended
to convey. His ardent wish might easily transform a con
fidently expressed hope into a definite promise. And a
partial misunderstanding might all the more easily arise, if
Slidell were neither so zealous a friend of the Union as Coch
rane believed, nor the disguised secessionist on principle
that others considered him, but one of those whom it needed
only a very little pressure to induce to go with the seces
sionists on principle, d la Tancey, but who would now have
preferred any way of untying the knot of the problem, in
accordance with their own way of thinking, to the cutting
of it. The great majority of the southern delegates un
questionably belonged to this class; but they must follow
the extremest minority, because the latter had the courage
of the initiative, and because the situation compelled every
one to come to a decision the moment any one had gone
from words to deeds, and the adoption of the minority plat
form had made the untying of the knot in such a manner
as to suit the south an impossibility.
Murat Halstead, the representative of the Cincinnati Com
mercial, had written in his letter of April 29th : " The Doug
las men came here with a regular programme, with a power
ful mass of instructed delegates and an enthusiastic corps of
outsiders. The south and the administration forces came
without a candidate, a programme, or even a conceit of a
policy. They have rested secure in the idea of their strength.
The force of the zeal and imprudence of the Douglas men
amazes and confounds, while it exasperates them." '
There was much truth in this, but the main thing was
forgotten. The southern delegates, with only few excep
tions, had become united on, and had a clear conception of,
whom and what they did not want, and hence it was cer-
l Caucuses of 1860, p. 59.
9

130
tain from the first that the Douglas men could onl}7 quit
the service of the slavocracy, but could not win the victory.
The example of Alabama was immediately followed by
the delegations % of Mississippi, Louisiana,1 South Carolina,
Florida and Texas, three delegates of Arkansas and two of
Delaware. On the following day, twenty-six representatives
of Georgia and the rest of the delegates of Arkansas joined
the seceders.
The spokesmen of the delegations accompanied the an
nouncement of their withdrawal with short speeches which
contributed to clearing the situation. In the debates on
the platform, the Douglas democrats had been repeatedly
reproached for refusing to define the attitude of the party
towards the territorial question in an undoubted manner;
for, since the Cincinnati platform was notoriously very
differently interpreted by them and by the south, its con
firmation anew left everything in complete uncertainty; it
must now receive an authentic interpretation. The reproach
was fully justified, but the motion of the majority of the
conrmittee in its original shape had not by any means in
troduced the clearness demanded into the dark question.
The motion in its original wording had only said that a
territorial legislature had no "power to destroy or impair
the right of property in slaves by any legislation whatever."
Not until it had received its final form did it speak like
wise of " the duty of the federal government in all its de
partments to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons
and property in the territories." But that the recognition
of this positive duty of the federal government was the
decisive point, and not, as it was at first sought to make
people believe, that all that was asked was the disavowal
of the Douglas doctrine on the powers of the territorial
legislature, was first proven in those speeches in such a way
' All but two delegates.

THE DEMOCRATS STILL HOPE. 131
that the fact that the democratic party had been dashed to
pieces on this rock could never again be denied or even
obscured. But this, too, gave assurance that the mass of
the Douglas democrats approved the resolves of their rep
resentatives and would stand by their leaders to the end
despite all threats and all allurements.
The rump of the convention did not for a moment feel
tempted to give up their cause as lost. If the Douglas
democrats had come to Charleston with as impudent a feel
ing as Halstead claimed, they must have harbored the in
sane idea that the Fire-eaters would not redeem their word,
or would, in the worst supposable case, carr}7 with them
only a small part of the southern representation. They
were not now overjoyful, for, after the secession of eight
delegations, one could entertain no further illusions as to
the gravity of the crisis on which the party, and with it the
country, had been made to enter. But there was no going
backward, even if it had been wished to do so; and men did
not want to go backward, for the very reason that, in the
excitement created by the struggle, defiance and the proud
feeling over the fact that finally they had not shown them
selves "Dough-faces," and that they had resisted the dicta-
tory assumption of the south, outweighed anxiety for the
future. The convention now proceeded in the usual man
ner to the nomination of candidates, as if nothing unusual
had happened. But in every respect it acted as if the in
tegrity of the party had not been affected by the with
drawal from it of the representations of four states. On
motion of Howard, of Tennessee, it was resolved, by one
hundred and forty-one against one hundred and twelve
votes, that a two-thirds majority of the electoral votes of
the states still represented should not suffice for a nomina- ,
tion, but that a two-thirds majority of the whole electoral

132 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
body should be required.1 The number of the seceders was
not great enough to make the fulfillment of this condition
impossible. The total number of electors was three hun
dred and three, and hence two hundred and two votes were
necessary for a nomination, while the still present delega
tions had two hundred and fifty-two votes. But Slidell's
claim that the slavocracy would be able to prevent any nom
ination not acceptable to them was well grounded; and the
secession had not changed that fact, since, according to
Howard's motion, the votes of the seceders would count
just as if they had been really cast. After fifty -seven fruit
less ballots, with one hundred and fifty-two and one-half as
the highest figure reached by Douglas, the convention ad
journed on the 3d of May to meet at Baltimore on the
18th of June, having previously summoned the states, whose
delegations had withdrawn, to fill the " vacancies." If this
summons were not obeyed the convention must remain a
rump, since the seceders had burned their ships behind them;
for they had met in a convention of their own under Bay
ard's chairmanship, and had adopted the Avery platform.
They postponed all further resolutions by adjourning to
meet in Richmond on the 12th of June.
Opinions differed widely as to what the further develop
ment of the struggle would probably be. But there was
no difference of opinion on this, that in the whole history
of the Union, from the adoption of the constitution to the
present, scarcely an event could be found that could be
compared in importance with this event of the Charleston
convention : two platforms and no candidate. What future
was the country facing, even if further reflection could
bring both factions to yield so far that that which had
1 ' This important question was deoided, in accordance with the views
of the slave states still represented, by the vote of New York. Proceed
ings, p. 141.

DISRUPTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY. 133
completely miscarried in Charleston might be achieved in
Baltimore ? How long can the shivered fragments, cemented
together again, bear the weight under which the originally
sound body was shattered? And where could even the
slightest indication be discovered that another effort would
be made earnestly and in good faith to cement them to
gether? If what had taken place in Charleston had been
the work of only a few politicians, the powerful pressure of
an undivided and decided public opinion might have com
pelled the making of such an effort. But what had taken
place there was in harmony with facts as they existed and
with the views that prevailed in the party in the different
parts of the country; and hence the pressure of public
opinion, where it could have any power to bring about an
understanding, took the very, opposite direction. Halstead
had written on the 1st of May, from Charleston, that demon
strative jubilation over the secession filled the whole city.1
The Charleston Mercury was telegraphed from Savannah
that the event had been greeted with " unbounded enthu
siasm," and that a salute of a hundred cannon shots had
announced it to the people.2 Similar news came from
Montgomery. And among the Douglas democrats there
were no signs of awakening remorse. Rather did they
carry their heads higher than ever before, for they felt
more than the facts warranted them to feel that they had
won a great victory. Such a victory, in truth, they had won
only over the "old Adam" in their own breasts. But the
recollection of their voluntary servitude for years made
this appear a glorious deed in their eyes. The poison of
'"There was a Fourth of July feeling in Charleston last night — a
jubilee. There was no mistaking the public sentiment of the city. It
was overwhelmingly and enthusiastically in favor of the seceders. In
all her history Charleston had never enjoyed herself so hugely." Cau
cuses of 1860, p. 76.
2 Twenty-eighth Ann. Rep. of the American Anti-slavery Society, p. 7

134 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the "spirit of faction and fanaticism" had, in very deed,
crept into their veins further than they had themselves
suspected. This was manifest from the pleasure they
found in their new role as unbending opponents of further
slavocratic pretensions. And this pleasure was so great
that they were not entirely unsusceptible to the praise which
the common enemies of both groups of the democratic
party lavished on them on that account, although fully
conscious that the fruit of their virtue and fidelity to prin
ciple might be the triumph of these very enemies.
The republicans, naturally, were just as far from forgetting
this, and hence the jubilation with which they greeted the
events in Charleston was, of course, occasioned mainly by
the prospects these events opened to them. Hence the ob
ject, in part, of the recognition they accorded the Douglas
democrats was to stir up the fires of dissension in the slav
ocratic camp. But it is equally certain that their attitude
towards the question was determined also by higher motives.
As on the one hand they allowed that recognition to be
merely a limited one, not alone because every political party
is wont to consider it a demand of its own self-interest
never to exceed certain narrow bounds in its favorable criti
cism of the opposing party, but because the merit of the
Douglas democrats really consisted only in not having
added to their old and still unexpiated sins a new and
greater one, so they felt on the other hand, independently
of the consequences which it would possibly or even prob
ably have for themselves, the liveliest satisfaction over the
downfall of the democratic party, because it must in any
event become a gain for the good cause which could not
be overestimated?
It has been repeatedly pointed out that the ever-increas
ing demands of the slavocracy sprang from a consciousness
of weakness. In order to hold their ground they had to

prospects of the south. 135
rule, and they could rule only on condition that so large a
part of the population of the northern states entered their
service that the north would lose its preponderance. But
this condition could never again be fulfilled ; and in this
lay the enormous significance of the fact that the Douglas
democrats had held their ground. It was certain, on the one
hand, that even the platform advocated by the majority of
the committee could not contain the last demand of the slav-
ocrats, and, on the other, it was not possible to exercise within
a party a more powerful pressure than had been exercised
in Charleston. In a letter of the 20th of December, 1860,
to Tancey, Raymond proved that the territorial question,
in the form it had hitherto assumed, was finally disposed of ;
that it was dead so far as the south was concerned, because,
in the struggle for Kansas, it had become convinced that
it had not slaves enough to be able to compete successfully
in the settlement of a territory. Hence to grant the south
de facto the exercise of the right it claimed was of no value
to it. It made its remaining in the Union dependent on
the unconditional recognition, on principle, of that right,
because the slavocracy could attain their end only provided
all the logical consequences of the principle were drawn,
that is, only provided the restitution to the slave states of
the right they had surrendered of importing slaves could
not be refused them.1 That this was a logical consequence
of the admission of the principle could not be disputed, and
was scarcely disputed by a single politician of the southern
states. Those who did not belong to the extremists who
had already plunged into the open agitation for the re-
introduction of the African slave trade, nor to the conserva
tives who had found rest for their souls by closing their
eyes to the irresistible course of things, and who were,
therefore, silent on this question, boldly assured the country
1 Maverick, H. J. Raymond and the New York Press, p. 403.

136 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
that the south did not think and never would think of
demanding that the logical consequence of that principle
should be carried into practice. But the whole history of
the world knows no people who ever with full consciousness
staked all their material interests and all else that was dear
to them for "a mere abstraction," and the representatives
of the slave states, who from the earliest period had been
politicians of the realistic stamp, could least of all have
fallen victims to such sublime insanity. And now in tne
national convention one of their own number arose and
told them so to their face before the whole nation, as plainly
as it had been so frequently told in recent years by a part
of their press, in their trade conventions and in some of
their legislatures. The speech of Gaulden, of Georgia, in
favor of the African slave trade was only a fuller elabora
tion of Raymond's points — highly spiced with the coarse
wit of cynical brutality, for which the meeting showed it
self truly grateful by repeated applause and boisterous
laughter.1 If the most powerful means of pressure which
the slavocracy could employ proved insufficient to make the
" abstraction " acceptable to the democrats of the northern
states, how could it ever be possible to govern the Union
by a national party which advocated the logical conse
quences of that abstraction.
The New Tork Times had written, immediately after
the secession of the eight delegations on the 2d of May:
" The democratic party is the last of the great national
organizations to yield to the irrepressible conflict which
slavery and freedom have been waging for control of the
federal government. The churches of all denominations
have given away one after another to the pressure. The
' The often quoted speech in which Gaulden promised to show " the
pure African, the noblest Roman of them all " to the gentlemen on his
plantation, is printed in Greeley, The American Conflict, I, pp. 316, 317.

THE LAST NATIONAL ORGANIZATION. 137
whig party went down before this new and resistless influ
ence some years ago; the American party melted before
it like wax in the flame; and now the democracy has also
yielded." Tes, the last national organization! Never, said Ben
jamin, on the 8th of May in the senate, had his heart been
so grieved as when he heard the news from Charleston;
for, at the first moment, one could not but believe that this
"last national organization" likewise had been broken up
into a northern and a southern half, and that with its disrup
tion the day of terror of the disruption of the Union had
come. But, he continued, on closer examination, it appeared
that not only the two states beyond the Rocky Mountains
would have unanimously stood by the south, but that the
majority of the delegations of two other northern states,
besides several individual delegates, would have gone with
it if the instructions they received had not coerced them.1
Benjamin thus only described the fruitless endeavor of a
bankrupt, whom ruin stared in the face, to figure out for
himself on paper a fortune from the amounts due him by
insolvent debtors. Tot take the individual delegates re
ferred to by Benjamin into the account was, at least so far
as the presidential election was concerned, wholly sense
less; since with powerless minorities no electoral votes
could be gained. And that these delegates represented
only a minority of the party in their states was evident
from the instructions of which Benjamin complained. The
official record of the vote in the Charleston convention
afforded an answer, and the right one, to the only ques
tion, so far as the future of the country was concerned,
of paramount importance, that is, whether the south would
continue to find in the north a following sufficient for it to
rule the Union. But, of the one hundred and eighty-three
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 967, 968.

138 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
votes of the northern states, one hundred and fifty-three had
been cast for the platform of the minority; and the vote
of thirteen states had been unanimous. If a judgment
were to be formed from the main practical consequences
of this fact, one could not but be convinced that the demo
cratic party had certainly been rent into two geographical
sections. Whether the slender threads that still held these
sections together would not yet become of great impor
tance, and of what character that importance would be,
were questions which were still involved in the darkness of
the future. For the present, they served only as a living
witness that the sections had long been a living whole.
Only from the fear of the effects of the disruption of the
democratic party into two geographical sections could the
vain endeavor spring to argue one's self and others out of
the belief that it had taken place. That all attempts that
might be made to bridge over the }7awning chasm of the
slavery question with a new national organization would
be unsuccessful was no less certain than the collapse of the
last existing national organization into two geographical
halves. A new epoch in the history of the Union must,
therefore, date from the 30th of April, 1860, because the
supremacy of the slavocracy, which had hitherto determined
its character in an ever-increasing measure, was not only
lost but irretrievably lost. Tet the thing decisive of the
question, what character the new epoch would bear, was
that the loss of the supremacy changed the attitude of the
slavocracy towards slavery in no respect, and could change
it in no respect. It was a terrible misfortune that this was
so little understood in the north, and that its frightful
meaning was so little appreciated there.
In the article quoted from the New Tork Times we read
further: "In every struggle hitherto, the slave interest has
maintained its ascendency in the ranks of the democratic

THE democracy deserted. 139
party. It has now been defeated. The northern section
of the part}7 has asserted its power, and, with new and un
looked-for firmness, has maintained its position. If it stand
still in its present attitude the sectional contest is over."
The staff of support which the slavocracy had for dec
ades found in the democrats of the northern states had
become in its hands a scepter of brass, and it was now sup
posed it would look upon the breaking of it with the philo
sophic equanimity described in the old saying about spilt
milk. " Of course," wrote Clay, of Alabama, on the 15th of
November, " we cannot live under the same government
with these people unless we could control it." l
» The New York Tribune, November 30, 1860,

140 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
CHAPTER IV.
THE CHICAGO CONVENTION.
In a letter of the 15th of April, Crittenden had written
to Hunton,1 summing up his opinion on the situation by
saying that not only must the Charleston convention, under
any circumstances, result in "a great schism" of the demo
cratic party, but that the supporters and opponents of
Seward's nomination in Chicago would come into violent
conflict with one another, and that, therefore, their new
Union party (" our new Union party ") should be confident
of the adhesion of the numerous malcontents in both the old
ones. If this expectation were fulfilled, and if the number
of the malcontents were great enough to carry the " Union "
candidate into the White House, the worst of all possibilities
would have happened ; for that party represented the degen
eration and debasement of the struggle, so far as principle
went — its sinking into the mire. The Fillmoreans of 1856
were the foundation of the new party's structure, and from
the Fillmoreans it accepted unchanged the programme,
based on principle, of having no programme. In a speech
delivered in Milwaukee, on the 26th of May, Schurz called
it the " party of dry hearts and dead weights." 2 Many of
them afterwards proved that their hearts were not so dry
as might now be supposed ; but dead weights they were
indeed, and nothing but dead weights.
On the 9th of May its convention was called to meet at
Baltimore. The nominations were made almost without a
struggle: John Bell, of Tennessee, for the presidency, and
' Coleman, Life of Crittenden, II, p. 193,
2 Speeches, p. 114.

BELL AND EVERETT. 14:1
Edward Everett for the vice-presidency. Things went more
smoothly still with the adoption of the platform. Experi
ence, it said, had shown that platforms served only to mislead
and deceive the people, and that it was, therefore, " both the
part of patriotism and of duty to recognize no political prin
ciple other than the constitution of the country, the union of
the states and the enforcement of the laws." Hence, follow
ing the constitution, the platform did not so much as contain
the word slavery. And, indeed, it contained nothing what
ever but the assertion that, by this means, everything would
be immediately put again on the right track. The dreadful
riddle of the dark sphinx was solved. A speech by Hillard,
of Massachusetts, in which he described, in highly poetic
language, the shout of joy that would resound through the
land at the announcement of this message of peace, was
listened to with evident signs of jubilation ; and the country
was saved in the simplest manner imaginable. On the next
day (May 11), Bell made a speech in Philadelphia to a
crowd of people who had gathered before his hotel.1 That
speech justified the choice of the convention in the most
brilliant manner, for it was no small achievement to roll
out the nihility of the platform so very far, without its
gathering up a grain of substance. The further agitation
and discussion of the questions, said Bell, could do no good,
but produce only mischief. Such was the1 one idea of the
speech, and it was an idea as old as the conflict between
slavery and freedom under the constitution. The people,
therefore, must have taken a deep draught of Lethe's water
now to believe the " new" party that this rotten bag, into
which the daylight shone through a- hundred holes, was
the wonder-working cloak of invisibility which might be
thrown over the slavery question and make it disappear
forever. ' The New York Tribune, May 14, 1860.

142 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
But difficult as it is to understand how thoughtful men,
intimately acquainted with the history of the slavery ques
tion, could persuade themselves that all that was needed
to bring back the country to fraternal union was the en-
tonement of a loud Gloria Hallelujah, Crittenden's calcu
lation was by no means destitute of foundation in fact;
and what Thaddeus Stevens said of the Baltimore conven
tion, that it was " a family party, and all there," 1 although
not pertinent, was witty.
The invitation to take part in the election of delegates
to the Chicago convention was sent not only to republican
voters, but also to the " people's party " of Pennsylvania, to
the " opposition party " of New Jersey, and generally to all
who wished to see an end put to the corrupt rule of the pres
ent federal authorities and to their disastrous policy.2 The
result alone could show whether it was well to have secured
confederates in this way. It was quite conceivable, how
ever, that hope was entertained of winning some. For,
leaving the slavery question entirely out of consideration,
the dissatisfaction with the existing system and its repre
sentatives was great and widespread. What now leaked
out about the prevailing corruption in official circles was
too much for even American equanimity, although during
a generation in the school of the spoils system and in
its effects with respect to this question, it had been devel
oped into a moral laxity, which a part of the politicians
seemed to consider evidence of complete moral obtuseness.
They were now rather rudely awakened from the sweet
delusion. The republicans were not the only ones to mani
fest their joy when, on the 5th of March, John Covode, of
Pennsylvania, moved, in the house of representatives, the
appointment of a committee to inquire: Whether the pres-
' Wilson, II, p 690.
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 86th Congr., p. 1040.

bcchanan's two protests. 143
ident or any other official had sought, by money, patron
age or other improper means, to influence legislation or the
execution of the laws ; to investigate the prevalent abuses
in the postoffices, public buildings, etc., and the employ
ment of money to influence elections.1
Some democrats immediately declared the motion im
proper because it had made no definite charges, but only
general insinuations. The rules, however, were suspended
by a vote of one hundred and seventeen against forty-
five, and the resolutions adopted. Buchanan answered it
on the 28th of March in a long message of protest.2 His
argument amounted to this: That the house of represent
atives indicted him, and that the president could be in
dicted only in the way of impeachment. Sherman, on the
other hand, inferred from the right to impeach the right
to investigate the conduct of every federal official, in order
to determine whether there was occasion for impeachment.3
The committee on the judiciary subsequently agreed in the
main with this opinion, and the resolution moved by him
to reject the president's protest as ungrounded was adopted
by a vote of eighty-eight to forty. Buchanan replied on
the 22d of June with a second message of protest, in which
he declared that the views represented by the house would
forbid a man of honor and principle to accept the presi
dency ; conjured up the shades of the Star Chamber and of
the Lion's. Mouth in Venice, and claimed that the civilized
world had not seen the like for centuries with the sole ex
ception of the revolutionary tribunal in the days of Robes
pierre. These exaggerations made little impression on
the house. Two hours after the reading of the message
' See the wording of the resolutions, Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
Congr., p. 997.
2 lb., pp. 1434,1435.
»Ib., p. 1436.

144 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
(June 25) the session was closed, but not until a new com
mittee had been appointed to report on the president's sec
ond protest at the next session.
The constitutional question at issue remained undecided.
That the protest which Jackson had sent to the senate on the
15th of April, 1834, was not, as was asserted by Buchanan's
democratic defenders, a precedent, was irrefutably demon
strated by 0. L. Beale, of New Tork.1 But that was no
answer to the question, Whether the house had not, by the
adoption of the Covode resolutions, exceeded its constitu
tional powers; nor to this other, Whether the president
had not, by such a formal protest against a resolution of
the house, become guilty of exceeding his. Both questions
were of equal theoretic interest; in practical importance,
however, the first far outweighed the second. Discussion
could lead to no practical result, because in the nature of
things the constitutional argumentation could not be sepa
rated from the political. No abstract reasoning could
draw for all imaginable cases a line up to which the house
had a right to go; the question must be decided in each
case in accordance with the facts, and there must always
be considerations of a more or less political character con
nected with the purely legal question of power. That, as
a consequence of this, the right line may be overstepped a
great distance, in many instances, is unquestionable. Hence,
an appeal from the decision of the house is possible. Bat
that appeal lies not to the courts, but to public opinion,
which, when its other manifestations remain unheeded, is
able to render a coercive verdict at the polls. It may in
deed easily happen that public opinion, just as little as, and
even less than, the house, would not attach proper weight
to purely legal considerations, and would think only of
what it for a moment desired, instead of inquiring what it
'lb., App., p. 425.

the covode committee. 145
should desire as to what should be the fixed and settled
practice. But this is a danger which springs from the
very nature of democracy, and cannot be removed.
In the case before us, public opinion was very cool in its
attitude towards the constitutional question. It was cer
tain, from the very first moment, that public opinion would
not ratif}7 the president's protest, if the investigations of
the Covode committee proved the truth of only half or a
quarter of what was rumored about the prevailing cor
ruption. Buchanan, indeed, not only denied that such
proof had been produced, but even claimed that the base
ness of his enemies had served merely to help him to a
brilliant triumph, because the report made on the 16th of
June by the majority of the committee recommended no
resolution accusing or blaming him or any member of his
cabinet.1 On this, it is to be remarked, in the first place,
that another committee of the house had, as early as the
11th of June, recommended a series of resolutions formally
and severely reproving him and the secretary of the navy
for abuses in the awarding of government contracts.2 Even
if public opinion, therefore, had made its judgment on the
justification of Covode's motion, dependent on whether the
abuses discovered led to a formal vote of censure, in the form
of a resolution, it would scarcely have decided in favor of the
president. Public opinion could not and would not judge
like a court of justice, which is absolutely bound by the
rules and forms laid down in the law: it had to keep en
tirely to the question of fact. And where people did not
wish'to shut their eyes to the truth, the material collected
by the Covode committee was considered more than suffi
cient to warrant a verdict of guilty, although the president
and his co-defendants had not been able to call any wit-
'Mr. 'Buchanan's Administration, p. 348.
2 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 2835.
10

146 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
nesses in their favor and no arguments were made oy
either side. Many witnesses may have laid on the colors too
thick, and viewed things to a greater or less extent from a
wrong standpoint; yet the picture drawn could not, on the
whole, be entirely at variance with the reality; and it was
not necessary to concede any more, in order to give the
sentence passed the appearance of justification. But even
Buchanan's partisans were obliged to concede much more
than this. Bocock, of Yirginia, was forced to admit that
the allegations on which the committee on expenditures of
the navy department based the resolutions referred to, were
indisputable facts; he conducted his defense of the admin
istration entirely on this line: that that had always been the
practice; that the president and the cabinet members should
not be held responsible; that there had been no wrong in
tent; that a censure was not really justified nor constitu
tionally warranted, etc.1 Buchanan himself could not deny
that wrong had been committed in the letting of contracts.
But he gave himself full absolution for it, with the declara
tion that he had left the awarding of contracts for sup
plies entirely to the heads of departments.2 But why not
apply here the words with which he afterwards met the
charge, that the influence of the secretary of war, Floyd,
had prevented, in 1860, the manning of the forts of the
southern states, which had been demanded by General
Scott: " All my cabinet must bear me witness that I was
the president myself, responsible for all the acts of the ad
ministration."* That Buchanan sinned to the advantage
of his own pocket, no one has ever supposed. But that he
knew nothing of the monstrous contracts for supplies made
in the interests of his party was, in the light of demon-
' lb., p. 2938.
2 Letter of the 18th of June, 1860, to J. G. Bennett, Curtis, H. p. 261.
»Ib., p. 307.

ADMINISTRATIVE corruption. 147
6trated facts, so improbable, that it is no wonder his assur
ance to the contrarj7 met with serious doubts. He was,
under any and all circumstances, according to the univer
sally admitted constitutional principle, to which he after
wards himself appealed, politically responsible for them.
The republicans, therefore, had not helped him to a brilliant
triumph. Public opinion, however, the highest political
tribunal in a democratic republic, considered it proved that
the administrative machinery of the government, up to the
heads of the executive departments, was rotten to such a
degree as to be both a shame and a danger to the country.
The causal connection of this corruption of the official
political world with the rule of the slavocracy was not
overlooked; and, hence, it too contributed to create a feel
ing against that rule. The blame for it was laid, in the
first place, on the shoulders of the democratic politicians,
and therefore, so far as this question was concerned, a
"change" was considered, as in the presidential campaign
of 1840, entirely sufficient to effect a reform. Hence the
republicans had little to hope from the people, whose dis
satisfaction with the powers that were, was based mainly
on corruption and extravagance of every description. They
naturally went over to the other opposition party, whose
victory did not menace the country with a new catastrophe.1
The republicans could hope for some great advantage from
the feeling of discontent provoked by these causes only to
this extent: that, presumably, they would cost those in
1 The New York Tribune of the 6th of November went so far as to
trace the " existence" of the Bell-Everett party, in the southern states,
to the bitterness generated by the "notorious corruption and extrava
gance in the administration of our national affairs.'' It considered
this bitterness so great that it ventured the prophecy : " "Whatever un
easiness may be felt at the incoming of the republicans will, on the
whole, be more than counterbalanced among the most intelligent class
¦by the going out of the democrats."

148 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
power, or the democratic candidates, a great number of
votes. On the other hand, there was a temptation for the
republicans in their endeavor to win over all the uncertain
elements that wavered between the two parties, to mod
erate their tone on the cardinal question as much as possi
ble out of consideration for the sensitive ears of their cov
eted converts. There was, therefore, a certain unmistakr
able consciousness of weakness manifest in the extension
of the invitation to all opposition elements to participate
in the election of delegates to the national convention.
To the extent that it did not betray faintheartedness,
but evidenced only a correct appreciation of the situation,
it was by no means a bad augury, for it afforded ground to
hope for discreet and well-considered action. But it was a
doubtful sign, because it had not its sole foundation in the
figures which the elections of every description that had
taken place since the origin of the party afforded for the
calculation of probabilities. It was caused, in part, by a
feeling of internal insecurity, generated by the want of
harmony among those who had already been initiated un
der the party name.
How much was still to be desired in this respect ap
peared with frightful clearness from the names on the list
of candidates for the nomination. That their number was
so great, and that the discussion of them had already been
carried on for months, both coram, populo in the press and
behind the curtains, among professional politicians great
and small, with such warmth, was of itself a cause of no
little alarm. Local preferences and the personal interests
of politicians often lead to the putting up of numerous
candidates, and each group works for its men with such
ardor that, frequently, the boundary between the allowable
and the unallowable is lost sight of. But the moment a
decision has been made, the rivalries which have their roots.

presidential candidates. 149
only in such preferences and interests usually disappear:
the partisans of the vanquished follow the standard of the
victor as willingly as if it had been their own from the
first. The over-rich harvest of candidates in the republican
camp now had its origin, in great part, in the local prefer
ences and personal interests of the politicians, and personal
animosity played such a part in the struggle, that, by a
great many, although very erroneously, it has been looked
upon as the decisive factor. But the candidates by no
means stood on entirely the same political ground ; and
the attitude they assumed, or were supposed to assume, to
wards the slavery question, was the very reason why they
were so strongly recommended by their party followers.
It must certainly be considered a question, whether it was
not at least as long a way from Seward to Bates as from
Douglas to Bell, and it was as difficult to infer with
certainty McLean's political position from his utterances
on the legal questions involved in the Dred Scott case, as
it was to make a political programme out of Everett's
oath on the constitution. How far could the fusion of the
various elements out of which the republican party had
been formed, into one homogeneous whole, have gone, when
some looked upon it as self-evident that Seward must be
their leader because he had inscribed the words " irrepres
sible conflict " on the standard he had given them, when
others demanded Bates because he was no republican at
all, and still others pleaded for McLean because he would
continue in the presidential chair, in which only a states
man should be seated, as a dispassionate and impartial
judge, to hold the scales of justice between the north and
the south?
Considering the conflicting views as to the plan on which
the struggle should be conducted in order to insure the
greatest prospect of success, an agreement on an official

150 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
party creed would have met with almost insurmountable
difficulties if the party had not been formed on what was
essentially only a negative programme. If, owing to this
fact, the rock on which the democratic party had struck
could be easily sailed around, it could also easily happen
that the advantage might, to a very great extent, be only
an apparent one. So far as the immediate question at issue
was concerned, it was entirely indifferent whether the vic
tory was lost because differences about the platform led to
a formal breach, or because many to whom the platform
agreed upon seemed acceptable would not vote with the
party for the reason that, in their opinion, the policy whose
representatives had been chosen candidates shquld never be
allowed to govern within it. Situated as the party was, the
name of its candidate had to serve as a commentary on its
platform; and, as a commentary, it would be, doubtless, of
very great importance, and might readily become decisive
of the issue.
It was, therefore, of no little importance that, in Chicago,
the real professional politicians were the dominant element
to a far less extent than was even then customary in na
tional conventions. The party was still so young and its
share in the spoils so small that these men had not had
either the time or interest to get thus early the reins into
their hands everywhere. The members of congress, unlike
their democratic colleagues, had remained away from the
convention on principle. Among the four hundred and
sixty-five delegates there were only a dozen whose names
were already known more or less to the whole country,
and even these did not belong entirely to the class of poli
ticians above described. A part of them, who must be
reckoned as belonging to it, had, indeed, come attended by
a numerous staff, and did all in their power to manoeuvre
their men into the nomination. But the great majority of

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. 151
the delegates belonged to that class of local leaders who
pursued neither directly nor indirectly any personal end,
and were, therefore, more reliable judges of the real feeling
of the people than the professional politicians who, for one
reason or another, were not unprejudiced; they belonged
to that class of local leaders who could not be induced to
allow the great cause to be imperiled in the least for the
sake of any one whatever.
The majority of the candidates could not have the least
hope of the nomination. Only after all efforts had failed
to unite the requisite majority of votes on one of the real
rivals might it happen that one of them might be taken
up, simply because somebody had to be nominated. Fre
mont,1 Fessenden,2 Dayton and McLean belong to this class.
Cameron had to be taken more seriously, for the doubt
ful state of Pennsylvania was an essential factor in the
entire calculation, and it was certain that many votes
would be gained in the state, if it was paid the compliment
of the choice of its most prominent republican politician
for the standard-bearer of the party. But Cameron had
already become so well known as a typical professional
politician that he might even have been called notorious;
and the moral earnestness and ideal elevation which had
characterized the campaign of 1856 still so permeated the
party that the delegates, even if they had been disposed
thereto by the consideration mentioned, would scarcely
have ventured to ask it to allow such a man to be the chief
representative of the proud " party of principles."
Chase, himself, who had for a long time been universally
1 He had requested, in order to avoid a split, that his name should not
be considered, and he, therefore, received only one vote on the first
ballot. 2 No vote was cast for him, although in a very narrow circle he had
been thought of much more seriously than Fremont.

152 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
considered the strongest if not the only rival with whom
Seward would have to reckon, now believed that scarcely a
hope remained for him.1 He well knew that even the dele
gation of his own state of Ohio would not be solid for
him. Whether his followers would not be great enough to
keep the scales wavering was, however, a very different
question. It would be so, probably, so long as Cameron's
candidacy was maintained by the Pennsylvania delegation,
and it was feared that the latter would be obstinate, al
though Cameron himself had, a year before, assured Sew
ard that he would not find him in his way, and that he
might confidently count on the Pennsylvania delegation.2
Bates's candidacy had a significance of its own. His
prospects of carrying off the prize were as small as, and
even smaller than, those of Chase. The Blairs boasted the
paternity of this surprising candidacy. But it became of
real importance mainly because Greeley had stood sponsor
for it. Greeley's influence was, indeed, by no means suffi
cient to procure the nomination for any one; still it was
great enough to make his opposition dangerous to any can
didate. But if Greeley was for Bates he was not for
Seward, and to Seward his opposition was of incomparably
greater importance than to any other candidate. Among
the republican papers of New Tork, the Tribune unques
tionably occupied the first place, and the American people
have always, in the choice of their presidential candidates,
laid great weight on this, that such candidates should not
1 In a letter of the 19th of March to Pike he had said : " That I shall
have some friends outside of Ohio who prefer me to all others, I know;
that many more prefer me as a second choice is plain enough. What
the result will be nobody can tell." On the 2d of April he wrote to the
same friend: " The indications are that the choice of Ohio will not be
confirmed by the republican preferences of other states." Pike, pp. 503,
505. 2 Seward to Weed, April 29, 1859. Barnes, Weed, II, p. 256.

GREELEY VERSUS SEWARD. 153
oe unacceptable to a fraction of the party in their own
state, and, because unacceptable, have to expect only luke
warm support, or even covert opposition. But Greeley
against Seward had an importance of an entirely different
kind, because the two men had, for decades, stood to one
another in the closest relation of political friendship. That
friendship had never yet been seriously disturbed, and
hence it was looked upon as a matter of course that their
personal relations were still the best. But these had been
severed as far back as 1854. Nothing, however, had been
heard of it, because their falling out was not caused by
political differences, and Seward had either not considered
it wise, or was too magnanimous, to hold up the high-spir
ited idealist, Greeley, in an entirely new role before the
astonished people.
In a long and rancorous letter of the 11th of November,
1854,' Greeley formally announced to Seward his with
drawal from the " political firm of Seward, Weed and
Greeley," because his business associates had never so much
as tried to reward his labor and services, but had rather
always opposed him, when others had intended to recognize
the debt of gratitude the whig party owed him, by procur
ing a political office for him. It was not base selfishness,
as might appear from more than one sentence in it, but
wounded vanity that had dictated the undignified letter.
Indeed, boundless vanity was so prominent a trait of this
original character, that, until his dying day, it led him, not
¦only into all sorts of ridiculous things* but even into griev
ous follies. And, on this occasion, Greeley, who owed it
more than half to hisna'i've, innate nobility of soul, that he
had become a powerful factor in the political life of the
people, surrendered himself so blindly to the whisperings
of this weakness as to leave a lasting spot upon his name.
' Barnes, Weed, II, 277-281.

154 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Outwardly the good relations between him and Seward
continued ; but Greeley only bided his time, not, perhaps,
to avenge himself, but still to make Seward feel what it
meant whether he was a man's friend or foe. But those
who have sought to trace his opposition to Seward's nomi
nation solely to this personal grudge have undoubtedly
done Greeley a great wrong. He was utterly unable to be
so petty in thought and feeling as to be capable of know
ingly injuring or imperiling, in the slightest degree, the
cause he was serving with enthusiastic and the purest de
votion in order to satisfy his wounded self-love. If, said
he, I have ever opposed Seward's nomination, the reason
was rather that, in principle and feeling, he came up to my
own requirements too nearly to be now a safe candidate for
the presidency.1 This was no treacherous kiss, but the entire
truth ; yet, if he had not had to settle that personal account
with Seward, it would, considering his great subjectiveness,
have been much more difficult for him to pass such a judg
ment on the situation, and he would scarcely have employed
all his extraordinary energy to force on the party decisions
so little in. harmony with his own views on what was de
sirable. It may even be considered highly probable that
his unconscious impulse to stifle his unadmitted self-reproach
was the cause why he grossly exaggerated the element of
truth in that objective judgment and made himself believe
that the "team" could be kept from tumbling into the
ditch on the right side by driving it into the ditch on the
left. Because Seward's candidacy was inopportune, for
the reason that his ideas on the slavery question were not
conservative enough for a great many in the party, Bates'
candidacy was the most opportune, since he had been a slave
holder himself, still lived in a slave state, had never played
a political part, was not a whig and not a republican, but
1 See the Independent of April 26, 1860.

REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES. 155
by the emancipation of his own slaves had demonstrated,
in the best possible way, the sterling character of his anti-
slavery views.1
The man who was so inclined, in questions of principle,
to butt his head against the wall, did not see that the
Chicago convention would declare the moral bankruptcy of
the party, if it adopted this way of reasoning. Fitz-Henry
Warren was certainly right when, referring to the aged
McLean, he wrote that they should not go to the cemeter
ies or catacombs in their search for candidates, but must
select a man who was still able to walk from the parlor to
thedining-room.2 To wish to place at the head of the state,
at so critical a time, a man with one foot in the grave, was
' Seward's partisans suhsequently acted as if Greeley had first begun
to turn on the former, entirely unexpected, in Chicago, and had thus
surprised them, in the most perfidious manner. This is an ungrounded
charge. As early as December 4, 1858, Greeley had declared in a letter:
"As to president, my present judgment is Edward Bates." Then he
added: "Buti am willing to go anything that looks strong. I don't
wish to load the team heavier than it will pull through." Herndon's
Lincoln, II, p. 413. And now the New York Tribune had, for months,
defended the view that, as it is expressed in an article of February 20,
1860, " the man for the hour is Edward Bates, in case the convention
cannot safely nominate Seward or Chase;" and it left no doubt that, in
its opinion, neither could be safely nominated, because it was too ques
tionable whether " these two foremost republicans " could win in Penn
sylvania, New Jersey and Illinois. Tho other republican papers which
had advocated Bates' candidacy, since the summer of 1859, had not, in
the main, gone any farther than this. In one form or another, they
all said, like the Northampton (Mass.) Gazette and Courier, " Mr. Bates
is not our first choice," but " we can imagine the nomination of a
much worse candidate." (Printed in the New York Tribune of Septem
ber 1, 1859.) And yet the idea had found so much favor that I. Wash
burn, in a letter of June 31, 1860, spoke of " a deep, widely extended
and formidable movement to nominate Bates," and ascribed to it the
fact that Sherman had not been chosen speaker weeks before. Pike,
p. 483.
'February 2, 1860; lb., p. 484.

156 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
¦at most only very hazardous, and therefore unwise; but to
select a candidate outside of the party meant the refusal to
recognize the constitutional and moral right of the party to
exist. A party which had, so to speak, come into being as
the political incorporation of a principle of right of vital
importance and of a high moral idea, would belie itself or
lyingly deceive the people, and be guilty of a suicidal act,
if it hid itself behind such a candidate because it believed
it could achieve victory only by the artifice of covering its
programme with a borrowed sign-board, the hieroglyphic
inscription on which every one might interpret according
to his liking. If the party had not faith enough in itself
to believe that it could dare stand the struggle as a party,
with flying colors, it did not deserve to win; and if it did
win because it had made all sorts of people believe that
the real field-badge was the plume of nameless color in the
hat of its hired leader,1 the country would not only not
' The Northampton Gazette and Courier had said, in the article cited :
"His (Bates') views in regard to slavery agitation are rather too con
servative to meet the more ultra politicians of the republican party."
Still, this was no proper characterization of his position. He was so
" conservative " that his letter of August 20, 1859 (the New York Trib
une, September 3, 1859), which was intended to inform the people about
it, amounted really to a warm recommendation of a new "era of good
feeling." When, in view of his candidacy, he was called upon for a
formal confession of faith, he expressed himself clearly and definitely
in a new communication of March 17, 1860 (New York Tribune,
March 24, 1860), against the extension of slave territory. But he had
not only voted for Fillmore in 1856, but the Northampton Journal, al
ready mentioned, said expressly — he " still claims to be a whig."
Hence the reminder of the New York Abendzeitung that although both
Harrison and Taylor had been no friends of slavocratic endeavors,
nothing had been gained by their election, was therefore not out of
place. The German republicans generally were decidedly opposed to
Bates' candidacy, because they understood that, as Carl Schurz said in
the Lincoln-Douglas campaign, in a speech on September 28, 1858, they
could never advance a step unless they clearly saw that " the spirit of

GREELEY AND BATES. 157
have gained anything, but the victory would have been a
greater misfortune than a second defeat like that of 1856.1
Greeley had, indeed, made a grievous mistake, not by his
angry opposition to Seward, but by his agitation in favor
of Bates. He endeavored, as he had already done in the
last senatorial election in Illinois,2 to induce the party to-
take a step which would have been an irrevocable act of
the age and the process of natural development " meant "action and
again action." (Speeches, p. 18.) But, as Fitz-Henry Warren forcibly
expressed himself, the very reason why it was desired to fetch an or
thodox, common-sense whig out of the bowels of niggerdom was be
cause such a choice would afford full security that no " action "' of any
kind was to be feared. Still it was at least very doubtful whether the
probability of success would have been really increased by this means.
Washburn had written in the letter quoted : " Put us on the defensive,
set us to explaining and apologizing, give us a candidate of whom we
only know that he is an old-line whig and never a republican, and the
canvass will be the heaviest we ever had." (Pike, p. 483.) But the
Northampton paper had to admit that Bates " might lose on the pop
ular vote in some of the northern states." The number of those was
small who still thought with Warren : " If the choice is to be between
King Stork and King Log, count me in for the former. I had rather
have a president who would take me by the nape of the neck and kick
me down stairs, than to have one who would smile me out with the
hypocritical leer of that greatest of all nuisances in the white house,
Millard Fillmore." (Pike, p. 484.) Greeley, indeed, still claimed after
the convention, that in his opinion Bates would have been a " stronger
candidate than Lincoln " (Barnes, Weed, II, p. 273).
1 " The question to be solved at Chicago, as we understood it, was not
only how we could beat the democracy, but whether a defeat of the
democracy would be a victory of republicanism. We do not forget that
there are triumphs which are no victories, and that such triumphs,
dangerous and treacherous as they always will be, may become even
worse than defeats ; for, being the triumphs of politicians instead of the
cause, they will loosen the moral bonds which hold a party together,
and substitute in their place the more cohesive power of public plunder."
Speeches of C. Schurz, p. 106.
2 He had then said: "The republican standard is too high; we want
something practical." Herndon to Lincoln, March 24, 1858. Herndon's-
Lincoln, II, p. 395.

158 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
self-surrender. It was fortunate that even where the great
est confidence was placed in his political instinct, so long as
he rode the hobby of principle, people, for the most part, as
sumed a skeptical attitude towards his counsels the moment
he ventured on the ground of opportunist, practical politics,
for which he was utterly unfitted by nature.
The reasons that could be urged against Seward's can
didacy were, in part, of an entirely opposite nature. He
may not have been too radical, but he was considered so.
A speech which he had delivered during the last winter, in
the senate, had caused a great deal of dissatisfaction among
the most decided republicans for the very reason that its
tone seemed too indefinite.1 Even if the tendency towards
a cautious veering about had been much more apparent in
it, this one speech could not, of course, have obliterated
from the minds of the more moderate and conservative
the impression which his whole attitude hitherto towards
the slavery question had made on them. The words
'February 29, 1860, Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 910-914.
The speech did not withdraw the words " irrepressible conflict," but it
conveyed the poison in homeopathic doses richly coated with sugar.
The opposition between freedom and slavery was, in it, diluted into a difV
ference between capital and labor, and, "for convenience sake," "laboi
states " was substituted for " free states," and "capital states " for " slave
states," throughout its entire length. At the same time great stress was
laid on this: "what our system of labor works out, wherever it works
out anything, is the equality of all white men." "Is it then in any, and
in which, of the states I have named (i. e., all the free states), that negro
equality offends the white man's pride? " But all this was harmless in
comparison with the question at the end of the following sentence:
" We cannot, indeed, accept your system of capital or its ethics. That
would be to surrender and subvert our own, which we esteem to be
better. Besides, if we could, what need for any division into states at
all f " That was simply — for otherwise the words would have no mean
ing whatever — Douglas' " variety " doctrine, the absurdity and polit
ical atrociousness of which Seward's enthusiastic partisan, Schurz,
exposed with merciless logic. Speeches, pp. 200-208.

OBJECTIONS TO SEWARD. 159
" irrepressible conflict " stuck to him as closely as did his
shadow. In the great border land between the Bell -Everett
party and the republicans, there were not a few who saw
in this a species of mark of Cain, and who yet had sufficient
sympathy with the tendencies of the republican party to go
with it under a different leader.
But the objection of too radical views on the slavery
question was by no means the only one that made Seward's
candidacy seem inopportune. A part of the former know-
nothings who had joined the republicans still stood so near
that border land that it would not have required much to
drive them into the arms of the Unionists. The events of
recent years had dampened their spirit to such an extent
that there was no longer any fear they would make a new
demand to give some positive consideration to their na-
tivist wishes. It was, however, not advisable to irritate
thern unnecessarily, and Seward had opposed their aims
with such firmness that if thej7 did not look upon his nomi
nation precisely as a challenge, they would view it at least
as an insulting want of regard for them.1
But there was a third objection, greater than either of
these, one on which Seward's warmest partisans have al
ways liked to be silent, and for the very reason that made
1 Barr, of New York, said on the 16th of June, in the house of repre
sentatives : " He had too often and too honestly spoken out his senti
ments in favor of the constitutional rights of Catholic and foreign-born
citizens, both in state and federal relations, to give a hope to the Chi
cago managers of securing the aid of the know-nothing Americans."
Since the republicans, so far as I know, have not believed that the anti-
nativist paragraph in their platform did them any great harm, the
assertion thus bravely made does not seem to me to be warranted, and
Barr certainly went too far when he said : " Perhaps, in this honorable
trait of his political character maybe found one, if not the chief ( !),
cause of his indecent shelving at Chicago by the representatives of a
party which owes to him all its claims to national strength at the pres
ent day." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 444.

160 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
it greater. It had its foundation not in any regard for the
uncertain elements it was desired to win, but was enter
tained independently of all considerations of that kind, by
many who on the slavery question and in all other re
spects, were just as staunch republicans as Seward him
self. They took umbrage at the "New Tork politician."
The more thoroughly people knew that under the influence
of the slavocracy there had been wide-spread demoraliza
tion in political life, the better they understood that only
imperfect and uncertain success could be achieved if they
confined the struggle over the slavery question to the solu
tion of a constitutional and political problem in the nar
rower meaning of the words, and did not strive to effect a
general moral revolution in political conditions. But a man,
who although not himself a "politician" in the worst
sense, had been nevertheless during all his political life in
the closest relation with the New Tork politicians, who for
decades of }7ears had had the reputation, throughout the
whole country, of being the worst among the bad, could
surely not be a proper person to trust with the leader
ship in this further work of reformation. And even if the
spotlessness of his own hands was not doubted, he had
never manifested any particular disgust at their dirty fin
gers, but had willingly allowed their unsavory methods to
help build up his political fortune. From the cavalier and
unhesitating way alone, in which he was wont to cast an
assenting vote whenever demands were made on the purse
of the state, people inferred a conscience that was too
broad, for others, in this respect, to allow a party under
his leadership to be considered a reform party, still less
to really become such a party. Not only men like Pike,
who desired the setting up of another candidate,1 or
' " But there was another class of objections that weighed even more
heavily among those more familiar with public affairs which are not

OBJECTIONS TO SEWARD. 16 I
Welles,1 who had been made to feel the weak side of his
character to the fullest extent, but also radical papers like
the Independent? which had strongly advocated Seward's
widely known, and which have never been publicly commented on,
from prudential considerations. These objections refer to Mr. Seward's
principles and practices in regard to the public administration of affairs.
He is a New Yorker and belongs to the New York school. If he does
not by natural instinct, he does by position and association. He is a
believer in the adage that it is money makes the mare go. At least he
acts on the belief, and always has done so since he has been in congress.
There have been many complaints of Mr. Seward for his uniform votes
for lavish expenditure, general and particular, but never any for being
too prudent or fastidious. Mr. Seward has acquired great strength
among a powerful and influential class by his uniform liberal voting
upon all money questions. And this is a source of influence of a com
manding character at all political conventions, while it is a source of
unquestionable weakness in a popular canvass. It has been felt, there
fore, that, in the approaching election, the republicans, with Mr. Seward
for their candidate, would lose an immense advantage which the venal
ity and extravagance and corruptions of this administration have put
jnto their hands. It was also felt that republican success, with a pros
pect, or at least the fear, of a continuance of a similar style of adminis
tration, would be too dearly purchased. The future and its malign
results were deeply apprehended by those who felt profoundly the abso
lute and inexorable necessity of inaugurating a republican administration
which should be not only pure but unsuspected at this already-sigial-
ized era of political prodigality and corruption. The opposition to Mr.
Seward's nomination has thus, to a very considerable extent, been in
the interest of purity and integrity of administration, as well as to se
cure an immediate triumph. Not that anybody would pretend that
Mr. Seward was in the remotest degree to be supposed a man of venal
or corrupt instincts or purposes, but only that his circumstances would
be his master." Pike, pp. 518, 519.
1 Lincoln and Seward, p. 27.
2 "A reasonable distrust of New York politics is widely diffused
among the better classes of the people everywhere, and the republican
party depends for its chief strength upon those better classes. That
distrust has been irritated by the recent proceedings at Albany, and the
6ins of our state legislature are visited upon Mr. Seward. We must not
blame the people of the United States for being afraid that the election
of a leading New York politician to the presidency would only displace
11

162 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
nomination, expressly testify that these considerations ex
ercised a very powerful influence.
As the first two objections had long been openly dis
cussed by the press, and as, so far as the third was concerned,
notwithstanding the very intelligible reserve the party or
gans imposed on themselves with regard to it, there was
no lack of all sorts of broad insinuations, the idea could
not but suggest itself that Seward's prospects of receiving
the nomination would be very generally considered ex
ceedingly uncertain. But his partisans would neither hear
nor see. When, in March, the elections in Connecticut
showed a republican victory, notwithstanding the enor
mous efforts made by the democrats,1 their huzzas and
shouts of jubilation resounded throughout the entire land.
And yet not only were the results of the elections in gen
eral, in the fall of 1859 and the spring of 1860, such that
the}7 must have emphatically warned the republicans to
pay all possible regard to the uncertain elements, but, in
Connecticut itself, the day was won only by decreased ma
jorities, and the anti-Seward current received unquestion
ably a new and powerful impulse in consequence. But as
next to New Tork the New England states were Seward's
strongest stay, there, more than anywhere else, nothing
the existing corruption at Washington by a new importation of venality
and political knavery from Albany." The Independent, May 24, 1860.
'The New York Express, "a bitter enemy of the republicans and of
all opponents of slavery," writes: " The democratic 'machine,' on the
other hand, it cannot be denied, also strained itself to the utmost to
shove the republican engine off the track. Men and money, but espe
cially money, money, money (the sinews of war), were abundant. The
administration at Washington is said to have ' shipped for the voyage,'
and all hands that could be spared from the postoffices and custom
houses — here, there and everywhere — were piped on deck. The state
was literally invaded with this class of patriots, and during the past
two or three weeks there was hardly a nook or corner that did not
ring with their declamation." The Independent, April 5, 1860.

cause of seward's defeat. 163
should have been estimated lightly that served to weaken
his position. His friends, however, continued to act as if
his nomination was a matter already settled, and, even after
they had been undeceived, they claimed with so much em
phasis that it had been such, that they almost succeeded in
permanently falsifying history. This claim has been made
so frequently and with so much positiveness that men of
unimpeachable honor, like Charles Francis Adams, whom
no one can consider capable of so lowering himself as to
utter a conscious untruth, came in the course of years to
look .upon it as a fact, although it may be shown by their
own words that at the time they not only knew the real
state of the case but had given warning of the dangers
that would be incurred by Seward's nomination.1
The crowd who are always inclined to believe what they
wish for, and are usually very meagerly informed of the
'Adams claimed in the official memorial oration which he delivered
in April, 1873, on the invitation of the legislature of New York, in
Albany, on Seward, that his defeat was a complete surprise and was
compassed by "bargain and management, manipulated by adepts at
intrigue." Yet Adams himself had, on the 3d of May, 1860, written to
Edward L. Pierce, one of the Massachusetts delegates who had asked
his ad vice :
"If the delegates of the feeble republican states say that they can
not carry their electoral tickets for him, I should be unwilling to take
the responsibility of a defeat by a stubborn perseverance in nominating
him. ... I should not at present choose to subject myself to the
charge that I had brought on defeat with my eyes open.
" It will not do to risk a distracted election on Mr. Seward either. If
the house is to choose, we shall have a repetition of the speaker's con
test with a similar result ; or else a worse one by default, and the choice
of an opponent as vice-president by the senate. I should deprecate
above all things the scene of violence to which the declaration of the
votes would almost inevitably lead. If it can be avoided by taking
any trustworthy and firm man, I should willingly do so. . . . It
is to be regretted that we have not some popular young military man
to stand in the gap just now." The State, November 28, 1885.

164 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
feeling beyond their own immediate environment, really
thought that this time, so far as a presidential nomination
was concerned, the convention had virtually nothing to do
but to go through a form. Seward himself felt surer of his
case than did his most sanguine partisans. He did not
hesitate to add to the statement that he was going to leave
for Auburn, the declaration that Washington would not
see him again as a senator.1
Tet it was not only certain that his nomination was in
the highest degree doubtful, but there was no question as
to who his most dangerous competitor would be; and in
respect to this, too, a falsification of history has been at
tempted. Raymond asserted, in an article in which he strongly
censured Greeley's activity in the convention, that Lincoln's
nomination was "purely an accident."2 And as late as
1877, R. G. White ventured to write: " This failure to meet
the expectations of the world, foes as well as friends, was
due entirely to one of those manifestations of personal
pique which have so often had an influence upon the fate
of nations.3 Mr. Seward saw the crown of his life petu
lantly snatched from him and given to one who had done
nothing to merit it, and who was so unknown to the ma
jority of his countrymen that his identity had to be ex
plained to them." 4
If this were true, the majority of the people must have
been backwoodsmen who not only had never seen a news-
'Pike, p. 516. Weed's biographer also writes: "Mr. Seward looked
forward to his nomination almost as one does upon an accomplished
fact, and so did Mr. Weed." Barnes, Weed, II, p. 262.
2 lb., II, p. 273.
3 And he would have it that "the whole civilized world" was not
only "surprised," but "dissatisfied."
1 In an article on Seward in the North American Review, March,
1877, pp. 225, 226.

Lincoln's candidacy. 165
paper, but who did not take the slightest interest in national
politics. Since the Douglas campaign, every American who
knew anything at all about the cause of the struggle over
the slavery question knew also who and what Abraham
Lincoln was, and the idea of making him the republican
presidential candidate was already over a year old.
The first positive step taken to realize this idea seems to
have been a letter of the 13th of April, 1859, written by
Pickett, of Rock Island, in which he invited Lincoln to a
conference, because he contemplated calling upon all the
republican papers of Illinois to put him up as a candidate
simultaneously. Lincoln requested him, in his answer
(April 16), to desist from his intention, because it might
injure the republican cause, and he did not believe himself
fit for the presidency.1 But when it was seen how gener
ally Pickett's views were shared by the republican politi
cians of Illinois, Lincoln's attitude on the question gradually
changed. He, indeed, wrote to Judd, on the 9th of De
cember, that he would prefer six years in the senate to the
presidency, but a request from a meeting of the party lead
ers, held in Springfield, to allow his name to be proposed
to the national convention, received an affirmative answer.
The conjecture frequently given expression to, that the
hopes of his friends then extended no farther than that
they might secure the vice-presidency for him by proposing
him for the presidency, may not be entirely unfounded.
But the nearer the time of the convention approached, the
higher he loomed up as one of the foremost candidates.
When he now (February) gave the east an opportunity to
feel for itself the immense power and convincing force of
his own peculiar and simple eloquence, it, too, pointed to
him with pride as one who might, nay must, be mentioned
' See the text of both letters in Nicolay and Hay, The Century, Sep
tember, 1887, p. 663.

166 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
in the same breath with the greatest. The New Tork
Evening Post said in an article in which it protested against
baiting the whigs by the nomination of a whig: "With
such men as Seward and Chase, Banks and Lincoln and
others in plenty, let us have two republicans, representative
men, to vote for." But once he came to be looked upon
as a possible candidate, unprejudiced examination must
have led to the conviction that Lincoln's candidacy pre
sented extraordinary advantages over all others that were
contemplated. In the first place he was unquestionably the strongest
candidate in his own state. But no republican was san
guine enough to contend that Illinois was not an uncertain
state, and its eleven electoral votes could not be estimated
lightly. He was besides — bold as the assertion may seem
at the first glance — at least as strong a candidate, in all
the other states which could be considered at all by the re
publicans, as any of his rivals, although his name might
awaken in none of them the enthusiasm with which that
of some other candidate would have been greeted. Vic
tory or defeat, however, depends not on the enthusiasm
with which votes are cast, but upon their number. Still
while it was not to be feared that he would lose votes
which might have been counted on for some one else, it
might be hoped that he would receive some which could
not have been won for the others. In his candidacy, so
far as such a thing was at all possible, the advantages of
the candidacies of both Seward and Bates were united,
while the disadvantages of both were absent. No one
could look upon his candidacj7 as a falling back on the de
fensive, for he was a genuine republican from the top of
his head to the sole of his foot, and had publicly borne
witness thereto, in a manner which was re-echoed from one
end of the country to the other. His great speech in

LINCOLN IN THE EAST. 167
Cooper Institute, in New Tork, which contributed so much
to enable the east to correctly estimate the intellectual
greatness and moral force of the uncouth western giant,
culminated in the exhortation: "Let us have faith that
right makes might, and in that faith, let us, to the end,
dare to do our duty as we understand it." And on the
other hand, he had never carried on the controversy in an
irritating or spiteful manner. "In fundamental principles,"
wrote Dr. Ray, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune, to
Edward L. Pierce, "he is thoroughly radical, but an intem
perate word has never escaped his lips." ¦
His position, so far as principles were concerned, was
just as decided as that of Seward, but, unlike the latter, he
did not stand in public opinion as the personification of
republican radicalism, and his good-natured, humorous
way, devoid of all asperity that might wound, of handling
political problems, despite his unflinching firmness, together
with his entire personality, were calculated, in an excep
tional degree, to awaken the confidence that a calm, con
siderate, and firm course of action might be expected of
him at all times.
Even his southern origin might appear as a certain guar
anty that he would not abuse his authority to destroy the
constitutional rights of the slave states. Nature had writ
ten too plainly on his attractive though homely face, that
he was neither a demagogue greedy of power, nor a fanatic
who would ever feel tempted to stamp on the nest out of
which he had come because he took no delight in the
thorns and the poisonous weeds he found in it. He, too,
was a politician in the specific American sense of the
word, and he never tried to conceal the fact that he was
one behind a hypocritical mask. But, although he had fear
lessly worked not only for his part}7, but also for his own
1 The State, November 28, 1885.

168 harper's ferry -
position in it, in accordance with the methods and with the
means of the politicians,1 he was himself neither a bread-
and-butter politician after the Albany pattern, nor had he
ever stood in such a relation to that class as a New Tork
politician, who had risen to be a governor and United
States senator, could scarcely avoid standing, and as Sew
ard certainly had not avoided.
Although Illinois, in which for a long period a man like
Douglas had cut the principal figure, could not, as a matter
of course, pass as a model state, there certainly was not so
great a difference between its public morality and that of
other places, that the man who had there won from those
' This he did even now. Herndon, who was certainly best informed
on this point, for he was " for twenty years his friend and law partner,"
writes: "I know the idea prevails that Lincoln sat still in his chair in
Springfield, and that one of those unlooked-for tides in human affairs
came along and cast the nomination into his lap; but any man who has
had experience in such things knows that great political prizes are not
obtained in that way. The truth is, Lincoln was as vigilant as he was
ambitious, and there is no denying the fact that he understood the sit
uation from the start. In the management of- his own interests he was
obliged to rely almost entirely on his own resources. He had no money
with which to maintain a political bureau, and he lacked any kind of
personal organization whatever. Seward had all these things, and be
hind them all a brilliant record in the United States senate, with which
to dazzle his followers. But with all his prestige and experience the
latter was no more adroit and no more untiring in pursuit of bis ambi
tion than the man who had just delivered the Cooper Institute speech."
As proof of these statements, Herndon prints the following interesting
letter of Lincoln to a political friend in Kansas: "As to your kind
wishes for myself, allow me to say I cannot enter the ring on the
money basis — first, because, in the main, it is wrong ; and secondly, I
have not and cannot get the money. I say, in the main tlie use 01
money is wrong ; but for certain objects in a political contest, the use
of some is both right and indispensable. With me, as with yourself,
this long struggle has been one of great pecuniary loss. I now dis
tinctly say this: If you shall be appointed a delegate to Chicago, I will
furnish $100 to bear the expenses of the trip." Herndon's Lincoln,
III, pp. 457, 458.

Lincoln's qualifications. 169
who knew him best the honorable name of "honest old
Abe," could be objected to by the rest of the country as
too lax in his political ethics. As scarcely any one yet un
derstood to what an extent the corruption that permeated
all political life was an inevitable consequence of the system
adopted in the filling of official positions, Lincoln, although
himself a "politician," seemed, in view of the demand for
a general moral regeneration, an especially commendable
selection. Against him nothing could be brought, since he could
not be objectionable even to the know-nothings. It could
only be said that he had no claim to the distinction, and
could not yet point to any achievement which might be
looked upon as a proof that he was equal to the task. This
was true, but it was equally true of every other candidate.
That alone which, conscientiously and to the best of its
knowledge, seemed to the convention to be demanded by the
interests of the country, had to govern its decision, and hence
the possibility of even the smallest "claim" based on serv
ices personally rendered the party, had to be denied. And
the tasks which awaited the nominee, in case of his election,
were not only so great, but also of so peculiar a kind, that
the political activity thus far of no republican could be a
proof that he would prove equal to them. There could be
no controversy on this point except as to the degree of
probability. But if this was to be correctly estimated, it
must be taken into account as an important factor that Lin
coln, for the reasons already given, would presumably ob
tain more votes among the great body of the people than
the other candidates. This not only made the victory of
the party more probable, but made it clear that he repre
sented in a larger measure than the other candidates the
average opinion of all the elements which stood united on
the republican platform against the slavocracy. The more

170 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
difficult the problems were which confronted him, the
greater became the importance of this fact. For, in the
United States, the power of even a mediocre president
backed by public opinion is very great, while the greatest
genius can afford no assurance that a president lacking in
that support will be able to steer the ship into port against
a merely stiff breeze.
The more correctly one interpreted the signs of the times,
the more one had to be for Lincoln, if one shared Sumner's
opinion that, after the result of the Charleston convention, the
election of any candidate the Chicago convention chose to
set up, was certain.1 For he was not looked upon as, nor
was he, the head of a group, but, in his way of thinking
and feeling, what was common to all, found expression
in such a manner that it was capable of the sturdiest and
most continuous development of its power, because a leader
could always have only a group behind him, while he neither
could nor would lead, but was only the truest representative
of the public opinion of the part}7 in its entirety. "A
people's man," Dr. Ray called him in the letter quoted
above. Such a man he was in the highest sense of the
word, and only such a man should now be placed at the
helm ; for the storm that was destined to break over the
country would bring inevitable ruin if the people did not
put their entire strength into that man's arm. This they
had to do all the more willingly and absolutely, despite
many a heavy blow, the more deeply conscious they became
that they were themselves responsible for what he did or
failed to do, for he was nothing and wished to be nothing
but the representative and executor of the general will.
Sumner's opinion, however, was not by any means shared
even by all of Seward's partisans. Charles Francis Adams,
for instance, thought that the dissolution of the Charleston
' May 4, 1860, to E. L. Pierce. The' State, November 28, 1885.

VIEWS OF CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS. 171
convention without its having reached any result, was an
admonition to the utmost caution. The republican conven
tion must now take place before the democratic, and if it
decided in favor of Seward, that fact might readily prove
the most effectual means of reuniting the separated demo
cratic brethren.1 But whoever, like him, looked upon Sew
ard's nomination for any reason as a rash act, must, like
him, come to the conclusion that it would be unjustifiable
"to sacrifice the probabilities of a victory" merely to in
dulge his notion of abstract propriety. A moment of calm
reflection must lead all such as these to recognize that the
question for the convention should not be: who among the
republicans is the fittest person for the presidency? but:
which of the persons fit for the presidency has the best
prospect of being elected? In order to achieve even the
smallest part of what it was supposed might be hoped from
the victory of the party, the first thing necessary was vic
tory itself. And the condition of things was not now what
it was four years ago. "All that time," said Adams in his
letter to Pierce, " success might have proved a serious mis
fortune." But Dr. Ray wrote him on the present situation :
"We want to win. It is necessary for the existence of our
party that we should win. Our triumph cannot be deferred,
and preserve the organization as it is."
This conviction that it must be "now or never" widely
prevailed. Even some of Seward's friends among the dele
gates shared it to such an extent that they came to be of
the opinion that they should not let the better become the
enemy of the good, that is, that the decisive consideration
should be to make sure, as far as possible, of the victory of
'"The adjournment of the democrats to Baltimore is intended to
raise up the spirit of hostility to a republican as the bond of union. I
inoline to believe that the nomination of Mr. Seward might make the
most effective rallying cry for them."

172 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the republicans in the four free states lying east of the Rocky
Mountains, in which Fremont had been defeated in 1856 :
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana and Illinois. And they
thought further, that not they but the delegations of these
states must have the most competent judgment on how
this might be done. Hence while they hoped that they
would carry Seward's nomination, they were not only pre
pared to be disappointed, but were willing, if necessary, to
make the great sacrifice of giving up their favorite. The
four delegations unanimously stated, and with great posi
tiveness, that there could be no hope whatever of victory
in their respective states with either Seward or Chase as
a candidate. This made it as good as certain, even before
the formal meeting of the convention, that Seward would be
defeated, unless he received the number of votes necessary
for an election on the very first ballot.1 Seward's defeat
did not, indeed, necessarily imply that Lincoln would carry
off the prize, but it made such a result probable in the high
est degree.2
This assertion is not based solely on what has already
been said about Lincoln's candidacy. It is demonstrated
to be an irrefutable fact by the authentic information con
cerning what wrent on behind the curtains, furnished by
E. L. Pierce, who has thus forever dispelled the old myth
according to which Seward was made the victim of base
manoeuvres. Although we have Greeley's own testimony
for it that he worked against him with all his. might,* the
1 Carl Schurz said a few days before the convention in a public
speech: "I may say that a few hours after my arrival at Chicago, I
saw that Seward's nomination was very improbable." Speeches, p. 110.
2 Thurlow Weed himself wrote immediately after the convention:
" It (Lincoln's) was the only name upon which all the elements of op
position to Governor Seward could have been united." Barnes, Weed,
II. p. 272.
3 See the letter of the 21st of May, 1860, to Pike. First Blows of the
Civil War, pp. 519, 520. 1861 is evidently a misprint.

beward's presidential prospects. 173
blot does not rest upon the history of the Union, that this,
the most fate-pregnant decision which an American con
vention had ever to make, was brought about by blind chance
in combination with base intriguers. Far from it. It was
the conscious act of clear-sighted and self-sacrificing patriots
to whom honor and gratitude in the fullest measure are due.
TheMassachusetts delegation, which was composed almost
entirely of friends of Seward of the most decided stamp,1
has the fame of having discovered the right way to the
right decision. Through a committee, it formally invited
the four delegations above referred to, to name the candi
dates who could be elected in their states. Those of Illinois
and Indiana answered simply: Lincoln; and that of Penn
sylvania joined his name with those of Cameron and McLean.
The New Jersey delegation indeed answered only: Dayton •,
but the condition of affairs in New Jersey was so like
that in Pennsylvania, 'that the Massachusetts gentlemen
were of opinion that whoever could be elected in the latter
state could be elected in the former also.
The small prospect which Seward had after this was
made smaller still by the New Torkers themselves — by the
delegates, and perhaps more yet by their numerous retinue.
Their leader was Thurlow Weed. His reputation as an
incomparable master in the ari of what is called "manage
ment," and which is considered by the ordinary American
politician as identical with a capacity for statesmanship,
was entirely well founded. But what might have been,
good tactics in Albany and New Tork was not necessarily
such here. The bold countenance of certainty assumed by
the New Torkers gave umbrage, for it was looked upon as
assumption and bravado; and their pompously theatrical
1 S. A. Bowles had written on the 5th of March to Weed : " Our dele
gation would have been satisfactory to you any way. Now it will be-
so strong for Seward as to be against anybody else."

174 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
behavior made no impression. So far as the effect was
concerned it was indifferent to what extent the importu
nately loud enthusiasm of the players was genuine. As
their spectators did not share it, they appeared to them
only like so many puppets in buskins who may indeed win
applause but can never warm up an audience.
On the other hand, it was very much to Lincoln's advan
tage that the convention was held in Chicago. Great as
was the number of volunteers who had joined the New
York delegation, what was it compared with Lincoln's fol
lowing that flowed in from every part of the state, and
which commingled with the thousands in the city itself?
And the former were for the most part politicians, while
the latter not only made on the delegates the impression that
they were, but really were, of the people, although the Lin
coln politicians were not slow in " organizing " enthusiasm.
They placed as high a value on the waving of hats, on
stamping and cheering, as the New Torkers, and the time
they spent in mixing in the fray with such weapons was
¦ certainly not lost, for the simple reason that they had en
gaged no claqueurs. The hearts of the dense mass, feverish
with suspense and carried away with intense excitement,
that surged inside and out of the great building in which
the convention was held, beat so powerfully and so warmly
for Lincoln that they would have hurrahed and cheered
themselves hoarse for him without any artificial stimula
tion to such action. But it was due to skilful leadership
that their shouting and hurrahing smote the ears of the con
vention like the deafening thunder of ocean breakers in a
si orm. The frequently repeated assertion that these dem
onstrations brought about the decision in Lincoln's favor
has been sufficiently refuted by what has been said in the
preceding pages. But it is none the less certain that it was
.shown in the Chicago convention, what a powerful influence

MEETING OF THE CONVENTION. 175
accidental local feeling may exercise in the decision of the
national question of a presidential nomination. It then,
indeed, turned to the salvation of the country, and it has
never so turned again to the same extent; but this would
certainly not warrant us to estimate lightly and leave out
of consideration the danger inherent in it.
The convention met on the 16th of May. Of the slave
states, only Maryland, Delaware, Virginia, Kentucky. Mis
souri and Texas1 were represented. The right of the con
vention to style itself a national convention was, therefore,
not unimpeachable. It indeed represented the whole party,
but the party was, in the primary sense of the word, not a
national party. At the time, it not only had no actual ex
istence in a large and geographically undivided part of the
Union, but its programme made it impossible that it should
ever have an existence in that part so long as the present
condition of affairs continued. Neither constitutionally,
nor politically, nor morally, would it be right to blame it
on this account, much less to deny it the right of existence.
In all three respects, the slave states, rather than it, were
responsible that such was the case. But this did not change
the fact that the party was a sectional one, and must re
main such in the present Union; and this fact alone, not
the justifiableness or baselessness of the charges founded
on it made by its opponents, could be decisive of the con
sequences which the success of the national programme of
this sectional party must have.
G. Ashmun, of Massachusetts, was chosen chairman of
the convention without opposition. As a whig, he had
played a certain part in the house of representatives, but
occupied no very distinguished position in the republican
party, which he had joined rather late. He probably owed
1 It was afterwards discovered that this delegation had smuggled it
self in under false pretenses.

176 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the distinction conferred on him to the fact that he was
known as an experienced and skilful parliamentarian, and
belonged to the Massachusetts delegation. But this gave-
no occasion for connecting in any way the compliment
paid ' the state by this election with the views entertained
by the great majority of the delegation on the candidate
question. On a second and more important preliminary question,
on the other hand, a resolution was adopted which the In
dependent (May 24) characterized as " a decided victory of
Mr. Seward's friends." The committee on rules recom
mended that not only a majority of votes cast but a ma
jority of the votes which would be cast, if all the states
were fully represented,2 should be necessary for the nomi
nation. The convention, by a large majority, decided in
the opposite way. This could only be approved, no matter
from what point of view it was looked at. There was
good sense in the two-thirds rule of the democrats, but to
consider the slave states as present was an absurdity. The
fiction was too silly for any one to advocate it in good faith.
That it was sought to mask with so thin a veil the demand
to grant the minority a right of veto, merely proved how
slight a hope was entertained that it would be acceded to.
What consequences the granting of it would have had
cannot, of course, be said with certainty, but in all proba
bility they would have been disastrous. Such a veto power
would have made Seward's defeat certain, but Lincoln's pros
pects would have been scarcely any better, and the nomina
tion would in all probability have been a blind drawing
from the lottery urn. Considering the condition of affairs-
' Pierce says: " He was not pressed by the Massachusetts delegation,
and his election was a surprise to most of them." The State, November
21, 1885.
2 The resolution was adopted by a majority of only one vote.

THE CHICAGO PLATFORM. 177
in the convention, the adoption of the motion meant the
announcement of the candidacies of all the "dark horses,"
and to do that in such a crisis would have been a crime
against the nation.
Before the nomination could be proceeded with, the plat
form had to be adopted. With the exception of the fifteenth
resolution, which advocated " internal improvements," in a
somewhat vague manner, and especially of the twelfth,
which, despite the evident intention of casting a bait to
the protectionists,1 proclaimed the economic policy of the
party more in the form of an oracle than of a programme,
the committee had thoroughly understood how to give their
work the clearness and certainty which every confession
of faith should have, without, however, assuming an exas-
peratingly aggressive tone. " The federal constitution, the
rights of the states, and the Union of the states must and
shall be preserved," and to this end the victory of the republi
can party is necessary. " The causes which called it into
1 The republican party was not yet committed to the protective system
in the manner in which it subsequently became. If votes had not to be
caught, especially in Pennsylvania, many a republican would have
pondered long whether he should agree to this new campaign pledge.
The resolution, was to a great extent, a tactical manoeuvre, and cer
tainly a very skilful one. How much might be expected from it is
sufficiently clear from the fact that it was very seriously proposed by
influential people in the democratic camp to cement the two wings
anew, and more firmly than before, by a bargain: concessions in the
slavery question in consideration of protective-duty concessions. See
Brown's speech of the 6th of March, and Stockton's letter quoted by
him, Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1002. Bigler said on
the 11th of December in the senate: "The operatives in the manu
facturing establishments and the mines away down in the earth (in
Pennsylvania) had felt and believed that the policy of the democratic
party was prejudicial to their interests ; and at the late election, though
they were naturally with the democratic party, they voted in a body
against us. I doubt not that vote was forty thousand in the state."
Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 48.
12

178 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
existence are permanent in their nature, and now, more
than ever before, demand its peaceful and constitutional
triumph." All further resolutions relating to the slavery
question were only mere detailed forms of these two sen
tences. The party solemnly binds itself in the first sentence
not to allow its action in opposition to slavery to go the
least step beytmd the limits traced out by the constitution.
The slave states are expressly assured of the most scrupu
lous protection of all their constitutional rights, and this pro
tection and these rights further defined to the effect that
slavery in the states is subject to their exclusive control,
and that the illegal invasion by an armed power of a state
or territory, no matter under what pretext, is one of the
gravest of crimes. But all claims of the slavocracy that
went beyond this were rejected with the same absoluteness,
and it was insisted that there was here no preaching of
a new doctrine, but simply the maintenance intact of what
had hitherto been the law, according to the wording of the
constitution and the interpretation of its framers as well
as according to federal legislation and the decisions of the
courts. The new dogma that the constitution carried slavery
into the territories was revolutionary and destructive of the
peace of the country. The threat of severing the Union,
if the people overthrew the supremacy of these heretical
doctrines, trampled under foot the principles of freedom
and political order, and was an admission of contemplated
high treason. It was therefore the duty of an indignant
people to stamp them out forever. As the fathers of the
republic had prohibited slavery in the entire territorial do
main of the Union, freedom was now, as it had always
been, the normal condition in it, and neither congress nor
the territorial legislatures, nor any individual, had the right
to give slavery a legal existence in a territory. What a
deception and a lie the much-lauded democratic principle

THE CHICAGO PLATFORM. 179
of non-intervention and popular sovereignty was, the fed
eral governors of Kansas and Nebraska had shown by op
posing their veto to the prohibition of slavery provided for
by the legislatures of these territories.
The remaining resolutions denounced the corruption pre
vailing in the administration, demanded the most energetic
measures to suppress the reopened African slave trade,
called for the immediate admission of Kansas as a state,
the adoption of the homestead law in the form resolved on
by the house of representatives,1 the granting of sufficient
'In reference to this, Schurz said in » ratification meeting: "We
endeavored to lift the creed of the party far above the level of mere
oppositional policy. The platform gives it a positive character. The
republicans stand before the country, not only as the anti-slavery party,
but emphatically as the party of free labor. While penning up slave
labor within the limits which the legislation of states has assigned to
it, we propose to plant free labor in the territories by the homestead
bill." Speeches, pp. 107, 108. All the advocates of the slave-holding
interest in the house of representatives except one had voted against
the bill mentioned in the platform. We cannot be surprised at this, for
the immense bearing of the homestead policy on the slavery question
was very plain. Referring to it, Mason said in the senate: " The bill
came from the house of representatives, and I understand the honorable
senator (Doolittle) ... to announce here to-day that this bill is a
measure intended for empire, command, control, over the destinies of
this continent: and he is right. Sir, it lets a flood of light in upon the
subject. The honorable senator has chosen — audit is a pait of the
policy of this measure of empire — to connect, as indissolubly belonging
to it, the whole slave question with the homestead policy. The honor
able senator has told us that the great feature of this policy is, by the
gratuitous distribution of the public lands, to plant throughout the
whole country now open for settlement a free white population to pre
occupy it. The senator is right; with the objects in view by the bill
that has been sent to us by the other house, the question of slavery is
connected with it, and cannot be separated. Sir, the purpose is avowed ;
and if were not avowed, it would manifest itself . . . incidentally,
'>ut of necessity, to exclude slavery." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
•Congr., p. 1634. Public opinion, however, was already so decidedly in
i:ivor of the homestead policy, that the slavocrats of the senate did not

180 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
support for the construction of a railway to the Pacific
Ocean, and declared against any change' in the naturaliza
tion laws or any abbreviation of the rights accorded at the
time to immigrants by state laws.
This platform could of course not satisfy the abolitionists,
who took their stand above all positive law, on the ground
of absolute principles. The radicals, however, who recog
nized the unconditionally binding force of the constitution,
had of course no ground to complain. The convention
had not succumbed to the temptation of leaving the posi
tion of the party on the slavery question in an uncertain
light, on a single point, in order to gain the votes of those
who, indeed, desired the same end but were unwilling to
take the means to accomplish it. Enough, however, had
not been done to satisfy the venerable Giddings. He wanted
the well-known introductory sentences of the Declaration
of Independence inserted in the platform. The motion,
consider opposition to it in principle advisable. They were satisfied
with mangling it as much as they could, in the interest of the slave
holders. Trumbull said on the senate bill: "How have you got this
bill here? Not by the votes of the friends of the real homestead; but
by the enemies of any homestead provision, united with a few friends
of the measure. They present to us a bill objectionable in many of its
features, and then talk to us about the responsibility of defeating a
homestead bill, unless we take this." lb., p. 2043. Complete harm-
lessness, however, could not be attained by these mutilations of the
bill. Of the eight senators who voted against it, seven belonged to the
south. A conference committee of the two houses came to no under
standing, but finally the house adopted the senate bill. Buchanan,
however, vetoed the bill on the 22d of June, because congress had not
the right " to give away the public lands either to states or individuals."
lb., p. 3263. The homestead law bears date May 20, 1862. Stat, at
L., XII, p. 392. Had it been adopted forty or fifty years earlier, the
words which Foster, of Maine, took for the text of his speech of April
24, 1860, might have become true : " Give the public lands to the people,
and you settle the slavery question." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
Congr., App., p. 244.

giddings' motion. 181
however, was defeated, and the oldest champion, the one
who had received most scars in the good fight which the
republican party now, at last, wished to bring to a decision,
left the hall embittered and distressed.
It may be granted that it was not necessary to make this
demand, since all concrete questions had been given a place
in the platform, and no art of interpretation could put two
meanings on any of its declarations. But after so much
emphasis had rightly been laid on the fact that the party
professed no new doctrine, it was certainly only logical to
appeal to this most ancient, and, in its universality, most
comprehensive, declaration of principles, with which the
nation had come into being. The Declaration of Independ
ence lived in the minds of the people as the In hoc signo
vinces on the standard of the war of Independence, and
hence no better inscription could be found for the standard
of the war which the people were now beginning to wage
against the dark power which they had permitted to be
come their master, in order to recover their political and
moral independence. And it was certainly a great mistake
to defeat the motion, once it had been made. For no other
interpretation could be put upon its defeat but that the con
vention recoiled from allowing the nature of the struggle
to appear in all its clearness. It was a refusal to declare
expressly that the nation was not only constitutionally war
ranted in opposing the slavocratic demands in the manner
in which the party now opposed them in its platform, but
that it was its duty, in accordance with that " higher law "
which stood above all human enactments, not to allow the
slave-holding interest to go a single step at any point beyond
the line which the people had set down in the constitution
as the limit of federal power. The party would be stronger
the more thoroughly it. recognized that its real strength
lay not in the constitution, on the right construction of

182 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN 8 INAUGURATION.
which views were becoming more divergent year after year,
but in the fundamental principles of the moral conscious
ness of the western Christian civilized world, which could
not be dogmatized out of the hearts and minds by men, by
any letter-wise biblical exegesis with its absolute incapacity
to understand them. Hence the party dealt itself a heavy
blow when it gave cause for supposing that it did not,
from faint-hearted opportunist considerations, hazard the
unreserved confession that it deduced its right of existence
from the constitution, but its duty of existence from the
indestructible source from whose living waters the nation
itself was able to draw its own historical right of existence.
But considering the importance which the popular mind
had for generations attributed to these sentences of the
Declaration of Independence, the defeat of Giddings' mo
tion must have appeared as a denial of these views, and it
was therefore of an importance which must not be under
estimated, that the convention came to a timely understand
ing of the fact that it had taken a wrong course. G. W. Cur
tis renewed the motion and the convention now adopted it.
The drafting and adoption of the platform required two
days. On account of the late hour it was resolved not to
proceed with the nomination until next morning (Friday,
May 18). The Independent (May 24) thought that Seward's
defeat was due to this accidental circumstance. It was able
to support this view by Greeley's evidence, who telegraphed
on Thursday evening to the Tribune-ih&t Seward's nomi
nation seemed inevitable, because the opposition could not
be united on any candidate.1 Greeley, however, had allowed
himself to be led to a false conclusion bv his violent anger
at the "obstinacy" with which every group clung to its
own candidate. But if no union of the opposition had yet
' Barnes, Weed, II, p. 269. See, also, his detailed report in the Trib-
une of May 22.

LINCOLN NOMINATED. 183
been effected, no group had given out that it would go
over to Seward rather than to any other candidate. But
that was evidently the decisive question, in case Seward did
not immediately receive a majority of all the votes. While
two hundred and thirty-three votes were required for a
nomination, he received only one hundred and seventy-
three and one-half on the first ballot. Lincoln came next,
with one hundred and two. Then followed Cameron with
fifty and one-half, Chase with forty-nine, Bates with forty-
eight, and the remaining forty-two votes were scattered
among seven other candidates. On the next ballot the
vote for Seward increased by only eleven, while that for
Lincoln increased by seventy-nine — among these, forty-
four from Pennsylvania, ten from Yermont and six from
Ohio. Seward, indeed, still led him by three and one-half
votes. But the gloomy seriousness expressed in the faces
of the New Tork delegation, and the storm of tumultuous
applause with which the multitude of spectators greeted
the announcement of the number of votes cast for Lincoln,
told plainly enough that there was no longer a doubt in
any quarter as to what would be the result of the struggle.
On the third ballot, Seward lost four and one-half votes,
while the vote for Lincoln rose to two hundred and thirty-
one and one-half. Before the result was announced, Cart-
ter,1 of Ohio, declared that the delegation of that state,
which had now given twenty-nine out of its forty-six votes
for Lincoln, transferred four more to him. This nominated
Lincoln, and in accordance with custom the nomination was
made unanimous. The delegation of New Tork honored
itself by having the motion to that effect made by its spokes
man, Evarts. With dignified decision the delegation refused
to accede to the request that it propose a candidate for the
1 1 find the name spelt sometimes with one " t " and sometimes with
two.

184 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
vice-presidency. The choice fell on Hannibal Hamlin, of
Maine, an old democrat of the Silas Wright school.
There was a wide difference of opinion on the nomina
tion. The disappointment of the Seward republicans was
so great that many of them at first could not entirely re
strain a feeling of indignation and bitterness, but that they
would not be sluggish in the struggle, or remain inactive in
a pouting corner, was not for a moment doubtful. " Al
though Governor Seward failed," said Schurz, "Mr. Lin
coln's nomination nailed the good old republican banner to
the mast as boldly and defiantly as ever." That they all had
to grant, and that was decisive for them. Schurz concluded
his masterly ratification speech in Milwaukee with the
words: "New Tork and Wisconsin, who stood together to
the last for Seward in the convention, will be the first and
foremost in the battle for Lincoln and liberty." Weed ac
quiesced in this without reserve.1 But, next to Seward
himself, Weed was the man most bitterly disappointed,
and hence other parties could evidently not expect the least
advantage from the ill-humor of the Seward fraction. This
became more apparent every day, for the number of those
daily increased who thought as did the member of the con
vention who, when the official announcement of Lincoln's
nomination was made, whispered to Schurz: " We might
have done a more daring thing, but we certainly could not
have done a better thing." A more unbiased opinion could
now be passed, and hence, on the one hand, Lincoln was better
appreciated, and on the other, it was more clearly perceived
how hazardous Seward's nomination would have been.
' " It is a fortunate circumstance that it is the name of a true man,
and that no personal disappointments, however severe, release republi
cans from their obligation to the cause and to the country. We can
support Lincoln and Hamlin as cheerfully, and we shall support them
as zealously, as we should have supported the candidate whom New
York would have delighted to honor." Barnes, Weed, II, p. 272.

Lincoln's strength. 185
Now that people thought there was no necessity of any
reserve on this last question, Pike stated with great positive
ness in the New Tork Tribune, that the republican members
of both houses had, almost without exception, considered
Seward's election impossible, and had, therefore, breathed
easier after the news came of the issue of the struggle.1
The abolitionists bore unwilling testimony to the fact
that the convention had acted very wisely. They said, on
the one hand, that Lincoln's nomination was "a bid for
favor from self-styled conservatives, and a hint, if not a
pledge, that republicanism, in the party sense, means not
to be so ' black' as it has been represented," and on the
other hand they did him the justice to aver that he was as
decided an opponent of slavery as Seward — " which is
really not saying much." 2
A part of the democratic newspapers passed an entirely
correct judgment both on Lincoln's strength as a candi
date and on the firmness of his position on the slavery ques
tion. Many of them, however, made their criticisms accord
with the tone of the New Tork Herald, which wrote: " The
' Pike, pp. 515, 516.
2 28th Ann. Rep. of the Amer. Anti-Slav. Soc, p. 25. It is all the more
satisfactory that the abolitionists reached such an opinion, as Wendell
Phillips was misled by his blind zeal into referring to Lincoln in these
words : " this huckster in politics who does not know whether he has
got any opinions (about slavery)." This reflection is an ugly blot on the
memory of the " silver-tongued orator." He had published in the Lib
erator of the 22d of June, an article entitled : Abraham Lincoln, the slave
hound of Illinois: "We gibbet a northern hound to-day, side by side
with the infamous Mason, of Virginia." Lincoln had to thank his bill
of 1849, for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, for this.
The provision on the extradition of fugitive slaves had so roused Phillips'
moral indignation that he entirely forgot tho rest of the bill to think
only of it. He towered to that giddy height which neither the voice of
common sense nor that of justice can always reach. See W. L. Garri
son : The Story of His Life Told by His Children, HI, p. 503.

186 harper's ferry -
conduct of the republican party in this nomination is a re
markable indication of small intellect growing smaller.
They pass oyer Seward, Chase and Banks, who are states
men and able men, and they take up a fourth-rate lecturer
who cannot speak good grammar." The Boston Transcript,
a neutral paper, however, immediately reminded the scoff
ers (May 19) of Polk, Harrison and Taylor, and advised
them to learn the lesson from their election "that contempt
for opponents is more pleasant than wise." !
'Lincoln at this time was characterized by no one so well as by the
writer in the Transcript: "In regard to his mind and character, he
seems to combine in a rare degree shrewdness with enthusiasm, practical
sagacity with passionate devotion to principles, and in canvassing the
state of Illinois against Douglas in 1858, he proved also that he was one
of those sturdy workers who can ' toil terribly.' No public man of his
party has a quicker, more instinctive perception of popular feelings and
modes of thinking, greater facility in connecting his own opinions with
those which obtain among the masses of voters, and a more insinuating:
way of proving that he ' is one of them.' "

THE BALTIMORE CONVENTIONS. 187
CHAPTER V.
THE BALTIMORE CONVENTIONa
It was to be supposed that the course of the Charleston
convention would have kept the democrats from making
the mistake which the Boston Transcript cautioned them
against. But after the doings since then in their own camp,
they should have been less tempted to ride a high horse.
A large part of the seceded delegates had acted with
out instructions, on their own responsibility. Their with
drawal could in no way bind the party in their respective
states. The latter was entirely free to approve it or for
mally disavow them, and the frightful consequences to be
expected were too evident for the conservatives everywhere
to surrender the field to the radicals without a struggle.
Thirteen prominent citizens of Georgia directed to Alex
ander H. Stephens a written request for his opinion as to
how the " catastrophe " could be averted " which put in
equal peril the union of the states and the safety of the
south." They therefore desired that delegates should be
sent to the Baltimore convention, for the suicide of the
democratic party filled them with gloomy forebodings.
In his answer of the 9th of May, Stephens agreed with
them unqualifiedly and emphatically in that view. His
argument, in brief, was this: Every one must see that it
is the most disastrous folly to make a demand unless one
is resolved to follow it up to its final consequences; that is,
if the demand made in the Charleston convention was in
sisted on, and was not granted by congress, the slave states
must secede from the Union. But that demand was in
flagrant contradiction with the attitude which the south

188 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
had maintained for whole decades, as it had set up the
principle of non-intervention and had ever defended it
with all its might. If a quarrel with the north was de
sired, there was no lack of reasons for it. But, in that case,
common sense required that they should stand on firmer
ground ; not because of the supposed shortcomings of the
friends tried in many a combat, but because of the aggres
sive acts of their enemies, were they driven to a breach.
This reasoning could not be refuted, but it could con
vince the radicals only provided they had given up all hope
of being able to bend the Douglas democrats to their will,
and preferred a defeat by their friends, to a victory of their
" enemies." But neither the former nor the latter was the
case. The Douglas democrats could not boast of having won a
victory in Charleston. The struggle was stopped after they
had repelled the onslaught of the slavocracy. The latter,
on the other hand, might have prevented the convention
from performing its main task, and so long as no candidates
were nominated, it might repeat the attempt to get the
desired concessions on the question of the platform. The
adjournment to Baltimore, did more than afford Georgia,
and the states which found themselves in the same situation
with it, the possibility of disavowing the steps independ
ently taken by their delegates. The Douglas democrats,
too, might withdraw, if this were not done, and hence it
remained impossible to put up candidates while observing
the rules which had hitherto obtained. By this means, there
fore, the final decision regarding the continued existence
of the party on which they believed the preservation of the
Union depended, might be devolved upon them, although the
cause of their disruption was the non volumus of the states
whose delegates had seceded. This revealed the policy of
the radical slavocracy up to the Baltimore convention. The

THE DEBATE ON THE RESOLUTIONS. 189
Douglas democrats had, on the one hand, to be convinced
that these would abide under all circumstances by the alter
native given by them, and, on the other, it had to be made
as difficult as possible for them to undertake the responsi
bility of a decision of the nomination question in harmony
with the non possumus, with respect to the platform, at
which they had stopped in Charleston. Both these ends
would be attained if the struggle were renewed where it
had been begun before the meeting of the Charleston con
vention and were continued with precisely the same tactics.
Davis had previously obtained a promise from the senate
that his resolutions should be placed on the calendar as a
special order, immediately after the convention. Even the
republicans had not opposed his wish. That this would
open the flood-gates for an endless stream of oratory at
the expense of the legislative duties of the senate was cer
tain. It was no less certain, however, that this debate
would separate the wrangling democratic brethren still
more widely, and the republicans, therefore, considered the
time devoted to it very well employed.
Davis opened the debate on the 7th of May. Only a few
days before he had said that, as he had remarked when he
introduced the resolutions, he would have preferred to prQ;
ceed to a vote without any long discussion. His speech
filled sixteen columns in the small and close print of the
Globe, but contained no new fact and no new argument.
The first to reply to him were neither republicans nor
northern Douglas democrats, but opponents of these — his
own colleagues, Brown and Clingman. The latter was fol
lowed by Benjamin. The speeches of Davis and Clingman
had started the discussion of the constitutional side of the
slavery question, and Benjamin now directly dragged the
Charleston convention into it in such a way that the com
plete untenableness of everything Davis afterwards adduced

190 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
.against the allegation that the resolutions were addressed
to the democratic national convention was demonstrated in
advance. The most significant sentence in Benjamin's utterances
was that in which he confidently asserted that the entire
party would within six weeks be again united on a " basis
of principles," because the majority in Charleston was only
an apparent and fictitious one, and those who, for reasons
of expediency, had refused to recognize the right principles,
would show that they did not forget that honesty was the
best policy.
This was a direct challenge to the Douglas democrats,
and Pugh was the first to take up the gauntlet. It was
not difficult for him to prove that Benjamin had selected
only the facts that suited him, that he might find merely
an apparent, fictitious majority as the result of his calcula
tion; that the vote had been taken in accordance with
the rules followed for years, and that the consolation he
pretended to derive from his arithmetic was entirely base
less. That, however, was only one side of the question.
The democrats of Charleston had before the convention
laid down the principle, in a resolution, that the demo
cratic party, so far as its influence in national politics was
concerned, was coincident with the population of the south
ern states, and that, therefore, no constitutional right or
principle which these unanimously demanded should be
ignored or refused by the convention.1 The premise to
this conclusion was, indeed, an exaggeration, but was so
near the truth that the inference from it could not be de-
' Nothing is plainer or better understood than that the people of the
southern states constitute, for all practical purposes, the democratic
party ; and that no constitutional right or principle which they unite in
demanding can be ignored or refused. Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
¦Congr., App., p. 231.

DOUGLAS IN THE DEBATE. 191
nied a considerable degree of justification. The majority
of the delegates was no " apparent " or " fictitious " one,
but that majority represented, at the best, only a small
minority of the electoral votes which could be won by the
party. The northern democrats wanted to give it the
platform and the candidates, but the credit of the victory
would have belonged almost solely to the slave states.
The latter, therefore, indisputably had reason to complain
of a fiction, but it was the fiction that the party — to
gether with all other parties — had made the foundation
of the organization of the extra-constitutional nominating
conventions — a fiction that might, under certain circum
stances, lead to this, that the application of the majority rule
would amount to a grievous violation of the fundamental
democratic principle of the supremacy of the majority.
This was the case here, in an extraordinary degree, and
contributed a great deal to make the southern radicals ven
ture to continue the struggle with such reckless determi
nation for the recognition of the conclusions drawn by the
Charleston democrats.
The five democrats who had thus far spoken had repre
sented four different views, and every speech they made
brought them into more violent collision. If things went
on this way for six weeks, Benjamin's prophecy would
scarcely be fulfilled. And these were only introductory
skirmishes: the decisive battle did not begin until Douglas
engaged in the struggle. Nobody could have hoped that
he would withdraw. He was not the man to cast himself
as a victim into the abyss, and if he had been, he would not
have done it, because he was convinced that such self-
sacrifice was worse than useless. If anything was certain,
it was that he would use all his strength to make his fol
lowers resolve to persevere to the very last, for both his
personal interest and his patriotism spurred him on to do

192 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
so. To the bitterness of the disappointment of his burning
ambition was joined the glow of moral indignation. He
saw revolting baseness in the fact that the slavocracy was
trying to deprive him of the reward for which he had served
it; for he took as the basis of his estimate of the debt of
gratitude it owed him, the real weight of the moral and
political responsibility with which he had burthened him
self by the services he had rendered it, and not the pressure
it exercised on his broad and hard demagogic conscience.
It would have been difficult to solve the psychological rid
dle involved in this, if a spark of genuine patriotism had
not always glowed beneath the cold dross of his ambitious
demagogy. The more violent the tempest that swept over
the country, the more it fanned that spark within him, and,
in his eyes, the fulfillment of his personal wishes grew to be
an increasingly imperative and urgent demand of patriotism.
Even if a miracle had suddenly deprived his ambition of all
but the merest sign of life, he would have continued his
battle for the presidency with all the stormy energy of his
being, because it became more undoubted to him every day
that only his election could avert the dangers that threatened
the country from right and left. Did Benjamin really be
lieve it so easy to run aground the man who had accom
plished more than any other for the slavocracy since the
days of Calhoun, and who now felt and thought thus?
It had never been Douglas's way to act on the defensive,
and he did not do so now. The resolutions were intended
to dictate its programme to the Charleston convention, and
the speeches on them and their adoption were now meant
to terrorize the Baltimore convention. Such was his indict
ment, and he had a more irrefutable proof of it than the
continual, direct reference of the southern speakers to both
conventions. " We have now to do only with the principles," replied

DOUGLAS AND DAVIS. 193
Davis again and again to Brown's demand for not words
only, but for action in accordance with words. But if no
practical consequences were, at the time, to follow the res
olutions, and no pressure to be exercised on the Baltimore
convention, what sense was there in wrangling for weeks
over constitutional doctrines, while all sorts of important
bills were waiting to be disposed of? Davis himself was
far from denying that the resolutions had an eminently
practical importance. His emphatic repulse of Douglas's
charge was, after all, only an idle game of words. He
made no concealment of the fact that, in his opinion, honor
as well as interest forbade the southern democrats going
any longer with the northern, if the latter persisted in
maintaining the attitude they had assumed in Charleston;
and he thus admitted all that was material in the charge.
" We all," said Douglas, " profess to believe that the dem
ocratic party is the only organization now adequate to the
preservation of the Union. He who attempts to break up
that organization looks with complacency to the only alter
native which we are told is to follow, to wit: disunion."
But you declare yourselves irrevocably resolved to disrupt
the party, because the Charleston convention decided to
preserve the platform for which all the representatives of
the southern statss had voted in Cincinnati. "If this plat
form was so frightful and so vicious, so fatal to southern
interests, and destructive of southern rights, how happened
it that every one of you indorsed it in 1856? Did you not
know what your rights were then? Were you not as much
devoted to the interest and honor of your states then as
now? How happened it that every state of the Union
voted for it then, if it is sufficient cause for disruption now ? " i
To this there was no answer. Davis's reply was only an
1 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 2153. See, also, App., p. 311.
13

194 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
admission that Douglas had found a new weapon. " If we
got the right man," he said, " we might accept him, even
with an unsatisfactory platform." '
Ahl replied Douglas, why did you not tell us immedi
ately that the whole controversy was not, as you said in
Charleston, about the platform, but about the man? Is
that your game? The platform of no moment if you get a
man acceptable to you; if not, then to let everything go to
pieces, and solemnly swear that persons are nothing to you,
but that the platform sacrifices the honor, rights and dig
nity of the south?
Davis tried to parry the blow with the venerable subter
fuge : " I was not speaking for others, I am only a small
man." 2
If Davis alone personally were concerned, it would have
been of little importance that Douglas achieved so brilliant
a victory. But, in Davis, the mask was torn from the face
of the whole radical faction. Tet the victory acquired its
full value only from the fact that, in the heat of battle,
Douglas let fall his mask also. He again had read that
part of Buchanan's letter of acceptance in which the Kan
sas-Nebraska bill or the Cincinnati platform was interpreted
to the effect that " the people of a territory like those of a
state " — therefore not solely when the territory became a
' "The senator has asked how it is that Mississippi and Alabama went
for Mr. Buchanan, and cannot now go for another candidate on the
same platform. They might. I think that would depend a good deal
on who the candidate was. The fact is that I have a declining respect
for platforms. I would sooner have an honest man on any sort of a
rickety platform you could construct, than to have a man I did not
trust on the best platform which could be made. A good platform and
an honest man on it is what we want ; but I can imagine a candidate
who could be so acceptable to those states as to secure their vote even
on a platform of which they disapproved." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
Congr., p. 2155.
* lb., p. 2156.

DOUGLAS AND DAVIS. 195
state — had to decide whether slavery should exist or not
exist, and then declared: "I do not ask that you will now
give it (the platform) that construction. I only ask that
you now adopt the platform and let it construe itself."
These words were spoken by the man who, during the last
two years, had declared again and again that the con
tinued existence of the party was neither possible nor de
sirable, if it could set up no platform that was to be inter
preted in the same way in the north and the south, and
who in the great debate of the 23d of February, 1859, had
cried out, with such emphasis: Neither do I want to de
ceive or be deceived. The Union could be preserved only
on condition that the supremacy of the democratic party
continued, and the democratic party was to render its per
petuation possible, by the two factions on the question
which alone jeopardized the existence both of the Union and
party resolving to prolong the last lying pact by means of
which, as appeared, they had endeavored to extinguish the
flames of dissension with oil.
Judged from the point of view of those who at the time
had entered into the untruthful pact in good faith, could
the proposition be looked upon even as equitable? Was
not all right to again propose " to agree to disagree " — for
"to let the platform construe itself" was only a new formu
lation of that old maxim — forfeited by the Dred Scott de
cision? The agreement was surely to the effect that it
should be binding only until the supreme court of the United
States had decided which of the two opposite interpreta
tions of the "great principle" of the Kansas-Nebraska bill
had the sanction of the constitution. Was it, therefore, not
the Douglas democrats themselves who set aside the pact
of 1854 and 1856 by demanding that the double interpre
tation should stand until further notice, although the su
preme court of the United States had decided in favor of
the more extensive claims of the slavocracy?

196 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
" By no means," replied Pugh to this charge of the radi
cals. " We still acknowledge the obligation entered into
of submitting absolutely to the decision of the federal su
preme court." But the Kansas-Nebraska bill established :
(1) That an issue subject to judicial decision must have
arisen out of an act of the territorial legislature directed
against slavery; (2) that such issue might, contrary to the
provisions hitherto in force with respect to the jurisdiction
of the supreme court of the United States, be taken to it
from the highest court of the territory; (3) that when so
taken, the decision must be made on previous argument of
both parties to the suit. None of these three conditions
was fulfilled in the Dred Scott case, and the decision of
the supreme court of the United States, which, according
to the pact of the two democratic groups, should be bind
ing on the whole party, was not yet made.1
That these criticisms were well founded could not be
questioned, and the non-fulfillment of the third condition
was unquestionably no mere formal question, but of con
siderable and material importance. If the pact had been
a civil contract, on which a court could have passed, its
judgment would doubtless have been that the Dred Scott
decision was not the decision it contemplated. But it was
a political agreement, in which, essentially, only the funda
mental idea was to make the supreme court of the United
States the arbiter between the two democratic factions.
Pugh's objections were, therefore, no sound reason, but
only a good pretext, for refusing to consider the contro
versy as decided ; for the Dred Scott decision was an au
thentic declaration of the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States on the question in controversy, and all
the arguments of all the lawyers in the Union could not in
duce one of the judges to change his opinion on this main
question. Even if the slavocracy had looked upon thepre-
1 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 86th Congr., pp. 2241, 2243.

DOUGLAS AND DAVIS. 197
text as a sufficient reason, and had accepted Douglas's prop
osition, all that would have been gained would, therefore,
have been a short delay. So far as the present presidential
election was concerned, people would have continued to
deceive themselves on the incurableness of the breach, but
the slavocracy would not have rested until they had ob
tained a decision in accordance with the provisions of the
Kansas-Nebraska bill; and then it must appear, just as it
did now, that the political contest had gone too far beyond
the constitutional question to be settled by a judicial decis
ion. The observance of the pact was, from the start, im
possible, because the controversy had been referred to a
tribunal incompetent in the very nature of things. The
radical slavocracy had not subjected itself to its decree, if
that decree went against them, because they had long been
irrevocably resolved to recognize no interpretation of the
constitution which was irreconcilable with the law of self-
preservation; and the Douglas democrats would not have
been at all able to subject themselves to it if they had
wanted to, for the political court of last resort, the public
conscience, could no longer be induced to ratify such a
construction of the constitution. Brown had declared
weeks ago that the supreme court of the United States was
not able to offer them any satisfactory guaranty, and the
democrats talked about the Dred Scott decision in a man
ner which showed clearly that they had promised more
than they could perform. The distance between the two
factions became greater and greater, — here despite, and
there because of, the Dred Scott decision.
Great as was the untruth of which Davis and his asso
ciates were convicted by Douglas, they might, therefore, to
this extent, accuse him of a still greater untruth. To Cling
man and Brown, who had already frequently played the
part with remarkable success of the enfants terribles of the

198 harper's ferrv — Lincoln's inauguration.
slavocracy, belongs the credit of having proved at the close
of the debate that the question to which faction the prize
should be awarded here was one that could not be decided.
After the most important fourth resolution had been
adopted by a vote of thirty-five against twenty-one, Cling
man moved the following addition : " Resolved, that the ex
isting condition of the territories of the United States does
not require the intervention of congress for the protection
of property in slaves."1 Brown moved that the "not" be
stricken out.
The effect of the two resolutions was almost comical.
Like a swarm of startled wasps Davis and the other radicals
fell upon the awkward bunglers. Tou have no right, and
there is no sense in it, to compel us in a declaration of
principles to pass judgment on such a question of fact. We
will not and cannot do it. " Has the ocean been lashed into
a fury to waft a feather or to drown a fly?" queried Brown.
Why have we sacrificed the entire session to the discussion
of this question if there is no necessity of acting or of ex
pressing an opinion? Kansas has abolished slavery,2 and
made it punishable to claim a negro as property, and yet
we must have no opinion and express none on the ques
tion of fact? We have all the laws and the records of
the sessions of all the territorial legislatures, said Pugh.
What information can the gentlemen get that we have
not already? I, therefore, want to know whether the reso
lutions are only a platform or aimed at legislation? Must
the principles declared in them receive practical application)
and when are they to receive it? Who is to determine
when a necessity for application arises — the gentlemen of
the south or of the north who vote for them ? Must the ,
resolutions now remain abstract principles, although one
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 2322.
*23d of February, 1860.

clingman's motion. 199
territorial legislature (New Mexico) has introduced slavery
and another abolished it, but be made the basis of legisla
tive action as soon as the presidential election is over?
These questions had been repeatedly asked during the
course of the discussion, but these gentlemen had always
avoided giving an answer. The importance of Clingman's
motion and Brown's amendment lay in the fact that they
made such evasion impossible. With whatever comments
the vote might be accompanied, yea or nay had to be voted,
and to vote against the motion as well as the amendment
would be a confession that they had wasted the time of the
senate in a frivolous manner and played a shameful game
with the peace of the country, or else were pursuing ends
which would not be openly admitted until a more oppor
tune time.
Only five senators voted for Brown's amendment, but
twenty-three votes were cast against Clingman's motion.
Out of their own mouth, therefore, eighteen senators
were convicted of fishing this way or that, in troubled
waters. But not even the slightest value could be attributed
to the adoption of Clingman's motion by a majority of
three votes, because a motion made by Collamer to add to
it the words, "and in our opinion never will," had been re
jected by a vote of thirty-three against sixteen.1 It might
well exasperate and embitter the people that the senate had
by means of the Davis resolutions allowed it to become
the principal task of the session to stir up the sectional
quarrel, although it declared, by tha vote on Clingman's
motion, that no facts existed that could justify it; but the
people could find no consolation after it had admitted, by an
' On Wilson's motion, this decision was brought up for reconsidera
tion and defeated on the 25th of May. Wilson defended his motion by
saying that the resolutions were a family affair of the democratic party.
"I want to wash my hands of all connection with any of the resolu
tions." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 2352.

200 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
overwhelming majority, the possibility, in a more or less
remote future, of positive legislative interference of the
federal government in favor of slavery in the territories.
Another motion by Clingman made still clearer how con
sciously and intentionally the slavocracy endeavored to
leave the people in the dark at first as to what they really
meant to accomplish by the resolutions.
The fifth resolution spoke in only very general terms of
" constitutional rights in a territory," for the sufficient pro
tection of which congress was bound to provide, if the ex
ecutive and the courts did not do it or refused to do it.
Clingman moved the amendment: "Provided, that it is
not hereby intended to assert the duty of congress to pro
vide a system of laws for the maintenance of slavery." He
defended his motion by saying that the vague terms of the
resolution made northern democrats also fear that infer
ence. Such a degree of ingenuousness must have been sur
prising even in Clingman. Did he believe that unclear
thought or a want of skill in the use of words was the
cause of the vague wording of the resolution? I can have
nothing, said Collamer, against the resolution; but I do
not understand what the resolution, which is unacceptable
to me only because of its connection with the other resolu
tions, has. to do in this place, if "constitutional rights" do
not mean slavery. Two of the most decided democrats
hastened to confirm this judgment of the republican, in
their own way, with bitter emphasis. Our opinions indeed
differ, said Green, as to what constitutional rights are,
but every republican and every democrat must admit that
all constitutional rights must be protected ; only the sen
ator from North Carolina says, " except slaves." And Iver
son declared that he wanted the recognition of the consti
tutional rights of the south, and did not care whether they
pleased the northern democrats or not

DAVIS'S TRIUMPH. 201
Clingman seems to have been really led by these com
ments to see that the resolutions did not mention slavery,
not because there was no thought of protective laws for
slavery, but in order that the northern democrats might
bind themselves to the principle, although the obligation
to pass such laws might be inferred from it. He endeav
ored to make amends for his mistake, as far as was still
possible, and to that end inserted the phrase " at this
time," after the word " intended." He thus spoiled the
whole affair. Amid the laughter of the house, Hale sar
castically advised him to choose the indefinite phrase " about
this time," because, in those days of strict construction,
people might take " this time" to mean " at this hour."
And Grimes excited similar merriment by his amendment,
¦offered with comical gravity, to insert after "this time" the
words "or until after the ensuing presidential election."
Indeed, in its new form, Clingman's motion looked as much
like a confirmation of the fear which the original motion
was intended to dissipate as one egg looks like another.
Tet Clingman was docile. He now saw clearly what a
-stupid thing he had done, and he wanted to let his motion
drop. To do this, however, the rules required that he
-should have the consent of the senate, and the republi
cans, of course, objected. Clingman's short-sighted zeal to
smooth the way for the northern democrats as much as
¦possible through the Caudian Forks, forced the senate, by
a vote on the charge, to answer that in the apparently so
harmless fifth resolution lurked the spectre of a slave code,
and refused, by thirty-one against twelve votes, to expressly
declare that -there was no ground for the suspicion.
Davis's triumph was complete, inasmuch as all the resolu
tions were adopted. But he could feel satisfaction over
the victory only because he had endeavored to obtain not
positive but merely negative success. Nobody any longer

202 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration,
expected that the final results of the voting would exercise
any influence on the further course of things, and they
exercised none. But the discussion made two things as
clear as the noon-day sun : The resolutions were so many
snares and traps into which the Douglas democrats could
not, with open eyes and full consciousness, trust their hands
and feet, and the southern radicals were satisfied to run the
risk of a republican victory, and to take all the consequences
of it, if the northern democrats did not give them at least
the candidate for the platform; that is, let them make
the platform the empty shell of the nut by the person se
lected as the candidate. The secession in Charleston had
been ratified in a manner which made it certain that people
were confronted not with a threat, but with an irrevocable
resolution: We cannot, we will not, we shall not allow
ourselves to be out-voted. That this was the final answer
of the Baltimore convention to the Douglas democrats was
the real result of the discussion, and that answer left only
the How and eventually the When of the disruption of the
Union an open question. Only the illusion that the Whether
was still debatable could now materially influence the How
and the When by the many and varied attempts at rescue.
The debates on the Davis resolutions, to which American
historians have hitherto paid scarcely any attention, are,
therefore, of much greater importance for the right under
standing of the irrepressibleness of the conflict than the
numberless compromise proposals and the endless negotia
tions between the federal executive and the seceded states
which they never tire of following into the remotest de
tails, although quite a voluminous library has been written
on them.
A few days after the close of the debate, Sumner deliv
ered a great speech in the senate — the first after Brooks's
murderous attack which had silenced his eloquent tongue

sumnee's speech in the senate. 20$
four years before. It was, so to speak, the benediction that
followed the democrats on their way to Baltimore ; and as
it was decided that they should now continue and complete
what had been begun in Charleston, it could not have been
spoken by a fitter person, nor could a more appropriate
text have been found for it. His theme was " the barbarism
of slavery." No sooner was it ended than Chestnut gave
an astounding illustration of the demoniacal power of the
barbarism just alluded to. His reply occupied scarcely two
minutes, but so enormous an amount of brutality and ven
omous vulgarity was condensed into the few sentences he
uttered, that the annals of congress, rich as they are in
such material, has nothing to match them. In order not
to support the "apotheosis of pusillanimity and meanness,"
the representative of South Carolina had only a sharp
angry hiss for answer to the judgment which the " incarna
tion of malice, mendacity and cowardice," deified by the
abolitionists of Massachusetts, had passed on slavery. But
no other answer was now needed, since the slavocracy were
about, by their irrevocable renunciation of all who would
not absolutely subject themselves and the Union to them,
to judge themselves, and thereby draw down upon them
selves and their accomplices the whole American people,
the judgment of heaven.
The convention could not begin again in Baltimore where
it had broken off in Charleston — that is, proceed imme
diately with the balloting for a candidate. It had first to
be decided who was entitled to a seat, and a vote. This was
a debatable question, mainly because, in some of the states
whose delegates had seceded, the demand that new dele
gates should be elected had been acted on. The seceders,
however, claimed that if they wanted to exercise their
rights again, the convention had no power to declare them
forfeited. These views were approved by all who had not,

204 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
indeed, joined the seceders, but still had sympathized with
them. Those, too, who considered it a patriotio duty to
leave nothing untried which might possibly lead to a re
uniting of the party, associated themselves with the latter.
But the question of credentials and the question of candi
dates were coincident, for it was exactly known what del
egates were for and what against Douglas, and the struggle,
at least at the beginning, had been completely shifted from
the platform question to the question of candidates.
In accordance with the intimation given by Davis, re
ferred to above, a last great effort was made by a part of
the slavocrats in this direction. According to Cochrane's
report,1 Toombs and Breckenridge especially endeavored to
bring about an understanding, and Slidell was sent as an
authorized mediator to Baltimore. The feeling he there
found, however, was so unpromising that it was only with
difficulty he could be persuaded from immediately return
ing to Washington. When Dean Richmond and Cochrane
called on him, after the first session, he asked them to in
duce the New Tork delegation to put up Horatio Seymour
as a candidate, and promised, in case they did so, the re
turn of the seceders to the convention, and the support of
Seymour's candidacy by the entire south. Although Dean
Richmond favored the acceptance of the proposal, the dele
gation rejected it, and all negotiations were broken off.
With the attempt to bribe the New Torkers by offering
them the nomination of a politician of their state, the
southern gentlemen had played their last trump. But they
had never ventured to hope that the northwestern delegates
would allow themselves to be alienated from Douglas.
Their threats seemed to embitter but not at all to intimidate
these.2 ' The War for the Union, p. 11.
1 Halstead writes: "The appearance of the seceders at Baltimore,

oushing's resignation. 205'
The committee on the election of delegates, to which all
controversies relating to credentials were referred, brought
in three different reports. The majority report declared
wholly in favor of the Douglas delegates. After a long
and excited debate the motion to substitute the minority
for the majority report was lost by a vote of one hundred1
and fifty to one hundred and one-half votes.1 Notices of
withdrawal now followed one another in quick succession.
Oregon and California went with the slave states, and a
part of the Massachusetts delegation left, because, as Benja
min Butler said, the majority of the states was no longer,
or only partly, represented in. the convention.2 Cushing,
on like grounds, and for the further reason that he no
longer represented the views of the majority, resigned the
chairmanship. Many of those who remained had heavy hearts. But
they were left no other choice. West, of Connecticut, de
scribed their situation in a few words: "We simply ask
that you shall not take a position which shall be tanta
mount to absolute ruin when we return to our constitu
ents." A nomination in accordance with the decision given by
Cushing in Charleston was no longer possible now, nay
not possible at all, because the seceders represented more
and their evident purpose and power to control the convention or de
stroy it, produced extremely hostile feeling on the part of the north
west. . . . The democracy of the northwest rose out of the status-
of serfdom. There was servile insurrection, with attendant horrors,
and Baltimore became a political St. Domingo. The south was amazed
to hear its favorite threat of secession despised and hooted at." Cau
cuses of 1860, pp. 228, 229.
1 Proceedings, p. 133.
J With respect to himself he said, amid the great excitement of the
assemblage: " I will not sit in a convention where the African slave-
trade— which is piracy by the laws of my country — is approvingly
advocated."

206 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
than a third of the total electoral votes. Why, notwith
standing this, they proceeded with the nomination, was
self-evident; but it was not so plain why, in doing so, they
were guilty of a gross inconsistency which might be taken
advantage of by their opponents. After the third ballot, a
resolution was unanimously adopted declaring that, accord
ing to the provisions under which the nominations in all
previous democratic national conventions had been made,
Douglas was the regular candidate of the democratic party,
since he had "now" received two-thirds of all the votes
that had been cast. This resolution contained an actual
untruth. Not " now," but on the very first ballot, Douglas
had received over two-thirds of the votes cast, and there
fore he was then the "regularly " nominated candidate, and
the second ballot was wrongly taken, or else he was not
now, and could never become, such candidate.
Senator Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was nominated for the
•vice-presidency. He declined the candidacy, however, two
days later, and the national committee, after consulting
with Douglas, put H. Y. Johnson in his place. Fitzpatrick
had declined because — as was of course known to every
member of the convention — he supported the Davis reso
lutions. Johnson accepted, although he — as the national
committee also well knew — had always hitherto advo
cated precisely and emphatically the very same views. The
choice of both had been made, unquestionably, not in spite
of this, but because of this. Their nomination was in
tended to prove to the south that the northern democrats
were far from being as black as the Fire-eaters painted them,
but would, conformably to the double-faced " self-con
struing platform," remain honestly and strictly true, in
the question of persons, to their character as a party with
a double face. And even after this, the gentlemen who
were so proud of having had the moral courage to answer

wicklifpe's motion. 207
for their convictions (!) and break the chains of servitude
they had borne so long did not think they had done enough.
Douglas had directed a letter to a member of the con
vention in which he again demanded, in the most precise
language, the unconditional recognition of the right of self-
determination of the territorial population with respect to
slavery: "Intervention means disunion," and "there is no
difference in principle between northern intervention and
southern intervention." '
The convention had nominated him, but afterwards
adopted, on motion of Wickliffe, of Louisiana, an addi
tional article to the platform, declaring it to be the duty
of all good citizens and of the powers of the government
to submit to the decisions, present and future, of the su
preme court of the United States, as to how far the author
ity of the territorial population extended with respect to
slavery. It is true that Douglas had not intended, in the
letter just referred to, to recall the declaration he had
made numberless times, that the decisions of the supreme
court must be controlling. But that did not solve the rid
dle, how the demand made in the letter was to be recon
ciled with the obligation entered into in the additional
platform article. To Douglas, who had known long ago
how to find a confirmation of his "Popular Sovereignty "
' Only this demand seems of any moment to me. The declaration
that they might drop his candidacy if they considered it proper, I can
ascribe no importance to. Schurz, in his speech of September 13, 1860,
advocated with great oratorical effect the view that Douglas wished
they might leave him out of consideration, because he saw it would be
impossible to elect him. (Speeches, pp. 214, 215.) The whole character
of the man makes this assumption seem to me inadmissible ; he had
never yet evinced such a fine feeling of honor, that one could believe,
with Schurz, he had found his position " disgusting." But, above all,
I see in that demand the proof that the declaration was only the cloak
he used in the role of the unselfish patriot.

208 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
principle in the Dred Scott decision, this might have been
easy. But all who were not Douglas democrats could find
the solution of the riddle only in the fact that Douglas
himself, as well as the democratic party, was double-faced:
the Cincinnati platform re-adopted in Charleston and his
letter were his northern face, and Wickliffe's additional arti
cle was the mirrored picture of his southern face. That
the convention, gn leaving the stage, made its parting bow
to the people with this face, caused that dramatic un
masking scene in the great senate debate to appear in an
entirely new light. It would have ill befitted Douglas
severely to reproach Davis, because the slavocracy wished
to make their attitude towards the platform depend on the
person of the candidate. What the slavocracy had in
tended to do, his own party had done. Now, after they
had decided the candidate question to suit themselves, they
demonstrated by action that, with regard to the platform,
they were by no means so petty, but were willing to pay
something to win southern votes for their man.
The seceders, the rejected delegates of Louisiana and
Alabama, and the delegates of South Carolina and Florida
chosen for the Richmond convention, met on the 28th
of June in Maryland Institute, in a convention of their
own, chose Cushing as chairman, unanimously adopted the
Charleston minority platform,1 and put up Breckenridge
and Lane as their candidates. The Richmond convention
gave its adhesion to these resolutions.
At the first glance, it might surprise one that a candidate
of more outspoken radical tendencies had not been pre
ferred. In his letter of acceptance, Breckenridge, indeed,
declared it to be a direct consequence of " that equality
which is, and ever has been, the vital principle of our con-
1 That is, the platform recommended by the minority of the conven
tion.

BRECKENRIDGE AND LANE. 209
stitutional union," that not the slightest obstacle should be
placed in the way of slavery in the territories either by ter
ritorial or federal laws, and claimed that it was " the plain
duty of the federal government, in all its departments, to
secure, when necessary, to the citizens of the states, the en
joyment of their property in the common territories." He
had, however, said, in a speech of the 23d of March, 1854,
in the house of representatives, that the south was as far
from asking interference in its favor as it was from being
willing to suffer interference against it.1
With respect to the power of the territorial population, he
had, however, in this very speech, alluded expressly to pos
sible limitations to which they might be subject by the
constitution, and the republicans unquestionably did in
justice to him by saying nothing about this in their refer
ences to the speech.2
But he had then, and repeatedly in the following years,
expressed himself with the greatest positiveness to the effect
that he held that the people of the territory had the right
to settle the question for themselves, and that he had noth
ing to do with a party that agitated in favor of slavery or
with any that wanted to curtail the right of self-determina
tion of the territories with regard to it.3 How far these
1 " We do not ask congress to interfere for us, and we will resist all
legislative interference against us." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 33d Congr.,
App., p. 441.
2 They quoted only the following passage: "I repeat the broad and
plain proposition, that if congress may intervene on this subject, it may
intervene on any other; and having thus surrendered the principle (! )
and broken away from constitutional limitations, you are driven into
the very lap of arbitrary power. . . I have never acquiesced in this
odious claim, and will not believe that it can abide the test of public
scrutiny." lb., p. 442.
8 " I gave it (the Kansas-Nebraska bill) my voice and vote, because it
acknowledged the right of the people of the territory to settle the ques
tion for themselves." " I am connected with no party that has for its
14

210 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
earlier views were really in conflict with his present ones
we need not examine here. His opponents could, however,
find proof enough of the reproach of inconsistency to ex
ercise a powerful pressure on a large number of voters.
The Maryland Institute convention was not unaware of
this. It had chosen him precisely because his opinions
were just varying enough in hue to keep him from being
counted among the real radicals. Its choice was deter
mined even more by consideration for the border states
than by the desire not to exact too much from the anti-
Douglas democrats of the north. It was not to be hoped
that the border states might be won for a genuine Fire-
eater, and the position they took was of the greatest im
portance not only for the presidential election, but might,
besides, after it, if the republicans were victorious, be de
cisive in the final settlement of the controversy. Brecken-
ridge's nomination was intended to hold fast those anti-
Douglas democrats who might have easily turned against
the southern democratic party by fear for the continued
existence of the Union.1 The latter, therefore, so far as it
was possible for it, had, notwithstanding its Avery plat
form and Breckenridge's letter of acceptance, put a Janus
head upon its shoulders for the purposes of the electoral
campaign.2 Four parties in the field : one with a natural, single-faced
head; two double-faced ones with the same name, and one
with no face at all — such is the grotesque picture of the
last presidential election in the old Union.
object the extension of slavery ; nor with any to prevent the people of
a territory from deciding the question of its existence or non-existence
with them for themselves."
' See Breckenridge's speeches of the 18th of July and the 5th of Sep
tember in Frankfort and Lexington, Kentucky, of July 24 and Sep
tember 6, 1860.
2 See the New York Tribune of the 27th of June, 1860.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. 211
CHAPTER YI.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.
There were four candidates in the field, and yet it was
certain from the first that there were only two possibilities,
if the parties continued to maintain the positions assumed
in their respective nominating conventions.
Personal participation of the presidential candidates in
the electoral campaign had hitherto not been usual. Cases
had, indeed, already occurred in which, when directly in
terrogated, they had published explanations as to their
position on this question or that, or had spoken a few words
to the crowds who gave them a public ovation. But these
things had never borne the character of a participation in
the agitation. Douglas broke this old rule with his wonted
recklessness. He traveled over the country to give his ad
herents opportunities to create occasions for his talking.
He spoke so often that, measured by the number of his
speeches, he stood in the first rank of agitators for his
party, and, so far as success was concerned, he unquestion
ably held the foremost place among them. The ponderous,
stormy style of oratory, the sharp dialectics, the brutal cer
tainty with which he trod the stage, and the deep chest
tones of unshakable fidelity to conviction with which he
brought forward the bewildering mixture of audacious
¦sophisms and empty commonplaces in the disguise of great
principles, gave him extraordinary power over people who
did not possess moral energy enough to be accessible to
disagreeable truths, so long as arguments could be found
to blind their eyes to them. As he had to do with such
people, as the same was true of the Bell-Everett party,

212 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
and as, moreover, the number of those was presumably
quite large who could be persuaded, under existing circum
stances, not to consider that which was in itself most de
sirable as most nearly right, but that which most certainly
guarded against the greatest evil, the gain which he might
expect from his direct canvass for votes was so great that
the disregard of the proprieties by a man of his stamp need
not surprise us. But his wishes can scarcely have blinded
him to such an extent that it can be assumed he considered
it possible he would receive a majority of the electoral
votes. So far as the southern states were concerned, he
could not, after the course of the Baltimore and Charleston
conventions, harbor any illusions, and that the majority of
the free states were safe for the republicans had never been
doubted. It did not follow herefrom, however, that he
must not have acknowledged this, or that the motive of his
action, so grossly opposed to traditional custom, could be
merely the unselfish, patriotic wish to prevent the worst —
that is, Lincoln's election. It was by no means certain that
the choice of electors on the 6th of November would be de
cisive, and if it was not, only one of the candidates would
go out of the game, which would be continued by the
other three. But that Douglas would succeed in winning
more electoral votes than Bell was generally considered
possible and for the most part even probable.
That the idea of the possibility of Bell's election was not
seriously entertained was beyond all doubt. Even if he
had far better prospects than Douglas, in the slave states,
he could build no hopes on the cotton states, and in the
free states he had no chances whatever.
This last could not be said of Breckenridge without some
qualification. Although his victory in any of the free
states could not be looked upon as probable, it would not
have been a matter of surprise if in California and Oregon

UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE RESULT. 213
the relative majority of the voting population cast their
ballots for him; and in Pennsylvania his prospects were
certainly no worse than those of Douglas. Notwithstand
ing this, however, his election was so improbable that his
own partisans, in their speculations on the future, took this
possibility very little or not at all into account. Although
he had not been a radical himself hitherto, he was the can
didate of the radicals, and both the mode of operation and
the ultimate aims of the latter were so far from receivino-
the undivided approval of the southern population that a
splitting of their electoral vote, to a greater or lesser extent,
was to be expected. Well as it suited the radicals that this
opposition was divided into the old whigs and the Douglas
democrats, it was certain that, in the border states, one or
other of them would lose some of the former or the latter.
If they won Oregon, California and Pennsylvania, the whole
electoral vote of the slave states must be cast for Brecken
ridge in order to elect him. He could not even do without
little Delaware with its three votes.
The question to be decided on the 6th of November,
therefore, was not: Which of the four candidates will be
Buchanan's successor? but: Will Lincoln be the next pres
ident, or will his election go to the house of representa
tives ?
Who, in the latter case, would be the next tenant of the
White House, was, of course, uncertain, but unquestionably
Lane had by far the best prospects. In the house of rep
resentatives the parties were so divided that there could be
little hope of uniting on one of the three candidates who
had received the largest number of electoral votes a major
ity of the votes of the states. If this was not done before
the 4th of March, the duties of the president would devolve
on the vice-president. In the narrower election for the vice-
presidency, however, there were only two candidates, and

214 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
it is clear from what has been said above that Hamlin and
Lane would be these two. That the senate would not elect
Hamlin, no matter how many more electoral votes than
Lane he might have received, could be considered certain.
In the Breckenridge party there were certainly many
who would have hailed such a result of the electoral cam
paign with joy. It may, however, be said with consider
able certainty, that it would not have been agreeable to the
real leaders of that party, that is, to the southern radicals.
They were, with full consciousness, pressing a decision, and
were altogether too clear-sighted to be able to look upon
such a victory as a decision. The last word could no
longer be spoken in Washington. The court of final resort
in American political life, the people, had taken the ques
tion before its forum in such a manner that the crisis had
to continue a permanent one so long as it had not delivered
an entirely clear decision, and precisely in this it differed
from all former crises. The politicians might, indeed, still
accelerate the rolling of the stone, but they were no longer
able to stop it, even if the fatal plunge did not yet happen.
Lane might, in a constitutional manner, become the holder
of the executive power for four years, and he was one of
those whom Davis had said the south might trust, even
with the Cincinnati platform. But Lane himself, with a
democratic majority in both houses of congress, would not
have been able to procure permanently for the slavocracy the
guaranties it demanded. The more recklessly they would
have tried to do it, the more certain, the more swift and the
more vigorous would the reaction have been. That the man
ner in which a representative of slavocratic pretensions had
got into the White House could not be objected to on con
stitutional grounds in no way altered the fact that an im
mense majority of the people had held, and still held, that
these pretensions must, for constitutional, political, econom-

UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE RESULT. 215
ical and moral reasons, be rejected. Hence, this was not a
case in which the postponement of the impending catas
trophe made its prevention possible. Even if Lane had re
ceived the largest number of electoral votes, that majority,
although they had nothing in common but opposition to
those pretensions, could see only a yoke forced on them in
laws, the passage of which had become possible only be
cause, at a very abnormal time, a minority had for the
moment come into the possession of power in an unusual
way. It would have been a rightful possession, but the
people would have been fully conscious that it was not in
accordance with their real will, and laws become living
forces, in the American democracy, only through the peo
ple's will. But if Lane did not receive even the largest
number of electoral votes, the charge would unquestionably
have been made, as it had been on the election of John
Quincy Adams, that the letter of the constitution had done
violence to its spirit, and that the fundamental principle of
American nationality, the supremacy of the people's will,
had been trampled under foot. The minority, it would have
been said, did not owe its improper supremacy to the favor
of circumstances, but that supremacy had been obtained in
an unfair manner by a scandalous, conscienceless exploita
tion of circumstances. Dissatisfaction would have been
turned into exasperation, and a demand for chastisement
and retaliation would have been added to the legal efforts
for relief. The day would have been won by passion, and
the flood of filth poured out during. its heat, together with
intrigue working with all conceivable means of corruption,
would have generated a poisonous exhalation, the effects of
which would have extended as far as the pioneers in their
log-houses had pushed the boundaries of civilization. And
this could not possibly be avoided if no party received an
absolute majority of the electoral vote on the 6th of No-

216 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
vember. The more improbable it was that an election
would take place in the house of representatives, the more
it must be expected that all base arts would be resorted to
in the fullest measure and with utter shamelessness, in order
by a disgraceful bargain to obtain the prize which had been
striven for in vain in honorable battle.
The certainty of this must have made every patriot
whose political thought and feeling were not entirely ab
sorbed by party, see a serious national misfortune in the
postponement of the decision until March. The most clear
sighted in this respect were of course the republicans, be
cause they alone could hope for a direct victory. Next to
them, the Bell-Everett party evinced the best understand
ing of the dangers involved in the resultlessness of the
election by the people. The explanation of this was not
to be sought for in the doubtfulness of their candidate's
coming into the narrower election. The honesty and
warmth of their patriotism was inversely proportional to
their political insight. Among all the lamentable possibil
ities presented by the electoral campaign, they looked upon
Lincoln's election only as a greater evil than its resultless
ness. They were thoroughly convinced that it was a most
sacred, patriotic duty to avert these two dangers from the
country, no matter at what sacrifice — that is, to others.
The idea of making that sacrifice themselves had not oc
curred to them, although the kind of self-sacrifice it required
was certainly to be found among them, in a higher degree
than in any other of the parties. It was simply self-evident
to them that the sacred duty of patriotism forbade them
to do what they expected others to do. These should be
ready to make the sacrifice of subordinating their party
interests to the welfare of the republic. If they had lent
their assistance to prevent the greatest evil, by bringing
a lesser one on the country, they would have left the

DOUGLAS ON LINCOLN. 217
service of the republic to enter the service of a party,
for they were, in principle, the neutral party. They could
not get out of the vicious circle of this reasoning, and their
dread of an election by the house of representatives was
just as fruitless .for the country as their conviction that a
settlement of the slavery question could not be attempted
without frightful consequences to the land. They were
and remained, on principle, the party of passivity, whose
existence served only to make as much free room as was
necessary for the other parties to come with all their force
into collision with one another.
Which eventuality Douglas feared most cannot be said
with certainty. He probably was not able himself to give
a clear answer to this question. He repeated the compli
ment of the Bell-Everett people, who looked upon his elec
tion as a lesser evil than the other disagreeable possibili
ties. But if he saw scarcely any danger in their victory,
in itself, still less did he see any protection against the im
pending dangers in the fact that a fervent allelujah before
the holy ark of the covenant, the constitution, was made
the sole political programme. The suggestion of suffering a
sacrifice in favor of that party, he could, therefore, con
sider .only foolish, because it was useless. Whether, after
"the disruption of the democratic party, any value could
still be ascribed to such a postponement of the decision,
must have seemed to him, at least, very doubtful. His re
peated, emphatic declarations with regard to the fatal con
sequences to be expected from Lincoln's election were, un
questionably, no comedy. He was fully convinced that
the southern radicals were fearfully in earnest in their
threats of secession, but he was not one of those who could
he frightened by such threats into every supposition as to
what they would do. However low the estimate that may
be placed on his ethics and capacity for statesmanship, his

218 harper's ferry -
force and courage cannot be gainsaid, and his insight was
so far-reaching that he would not surrender the essence in
payment for the preservation of the form. With the most
daring sophistry, he had handled the constitution like a
lump of clay which must let itself be moulded into any
form the potter likes, but he was never a doctrinarian sick
lied over with the pale cast of the thought which would by
interpretation take the supremacy of the law out of the
constitution. He had never approved its elimination. To
refuse to recognize the constitutional election of a republi
can was, in his eyes, revolution, and he thought he might
wash his hands in innocence if the slavocracy plunged into
such a revolution. A constitutional way to protect them
selves against the dangers that threatened them had been
open to them, but they would not go that way. They had
preferred a defeat without him or against him to victory
with him, and now they might see whither that led them.
To ask him to allow his own action to be determined in
any way by consideration for the Charleston and Balti
more secessionists, and at his own expense, was to add
mockery to insult. Douglas would hear only of Douglas —
such was his position; and so long as he was still eligible,
that is, at least until the 6th of November, it was certain
that no argument and no appeal to his patriotism could
force him from it. The demoralizing effects that must fol
low the going of the election to the house of representatives
could, considering his character, trouble him but little.
The most disagreeable thing to him, in this possibility, was
doubtless that it opened the best prospects for Lane, since,
as Schurz said, he " hated " Lane.
Inviolable fidelity to conviction was the imposing formula
of his absolute refusal to make out of the Douglas campaign
an anti-Lincoln campaign, in the form of a Douglas cam
paign. In some states, especially in New York and New

EFFORTS AT FUSION. 219
.'ersey, energetic efforts were made to bring about a
" fusion," partly of the two democratic parties and partly
of the three anti-republican parties. They wanted to put up
combined lists of electors, with the mutual understanding
that the electors would cast their votes for the one candidate
or the other, according to the result of the election in the
rest of the Union. If it was at all possible to gain an ab
solute majority of the electoral votes for one of the non-
republican candidates, it could be done only in this way.
Notwithstanding this, however, it was with the greatest
difficulty that the Breckenridge men could be won over to
the proposition. How greatly he was disliked by the south
ern radicals was evident from the fact that, even in the
states in which the votes cast for Breckenridge could be
looked upon only as facilitating Lincoln's victory by weaken
ing Douglas, they favored, in every way, the putting up of
a Breckenridge list of electors. It is easy to understand
why this was afterwards looked upon as a proof that they
desired Lincoln's election, in order to have a pretext for
secession. But such an inference is certainly not an abso
lutely necessary one. The only thing that follows indispu
tably from that fact is that they wanted to hurt Douglas as
much as possible, although by so doing they made Lincoln's
election more probable. But Douglas could not reproach
them very severely for this, since he repaid them in the
same coin. While he expressed himself most emphatically
in favor of the fusion tactics, considered in themselves,
he unconditionally condemned every agreement with the
Breckenridge men, because salvation could be found only in
the principle of non-intervention, while, on the other hand,
intervention was certain ruin, no matter whether it was re
sorted to in favor of, or against, slavery; that is, he even now
did not depart a hair's breadth from the declaration he had
made during the session of the Baltimore convention, in his

¦220 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
well known letter.1 Notwithstanding this, he would, of
course, not have protested if a fusion with the Breckenridge
men would have brought him a few electoral votes, which
he might not have received without it. But, if his adherents
desired, by their action, to give expression to the convic
tion that they considered Breckenridge's election a lesser
evil than Lincoln's, they would have to do it without his
sanction. To the frequently repeated declaration of the
radical slavocracy, that his popular sovereignty principle
was more ruinous to the south than the republican doctrine,
he gave the emphatic answer: just as little with you against
the republicans, as with the republicans against you.
One would do Douglas injustice if one were to seek the
reason of this solely in his personal grudge. Only because
he had recognized that the gap between the radical slavoc
racy and a great, if not the greatest, part of the northern
Douglas democracy was harder to bridge over than that
between the latter and the republicans, did he place before
his followers in Charleston the alternative of either giving
up his candidacy or of refusing, no matter at what risk,
the demand that they should go beyond the Cincinnati
platform,2 and for the same reason he had, for his own part,
to maintain this view all the more unconditionally, as, after
his nomination in Baltimore, the slavocraoy was furnished
by the Wickliffe resolution with another plank which might
have served it as a foot-bridge for a reunion for the pur
poses of the electoral campaign.
' " I think," he said, in Erie, Pennsylvania, " that every man who be
lieves that slavery ought to be banished from the halls of congress, and
remanded to the people of the territories, subject to the constitution,
ought to fuse and act together; but that no democrat can, without dis
honor, and forfeiture of self-respect and principle, fuse with anybody
who is in favor of intervention, either for slavery or against slavery."
The New York Tribune, October 3, 1860.
2 See his letter of the 23d of June, 1859, to J. B. Dorr, in the New
York Tribune, June 24, 1859.

DOUGLAS REFUSES TO WITHDRAW. 221
Jefferson Davis relates J that an effort had been made to-
induce the three non-republican candidates to withdraw in
favor of a new candidate on whom "the divided forces of
the friends of the constitution" might be united. Breck
enridge and Bell had authorized him to announce their
readiness to do so, if the project could be carried outj
Douglas, on the contrary, rejected the proposal. Davis does
not say expressly that the latter was, therefore, responsi
ble for the failure of the scheme. But as it was not at all
Davis's way to keep his judgment to himself and let the
facts speak for themselves, one cannot avoid supposing that
he desired the reader to draw that conclusion ; but did not
draw it himself, because he knew too well how little it was^
in accord with the facts. Was it necessary only to get rid
of the three candidates in order to melt the three parties
into one? If the possibility of reconciling them was to be
found in the fact that they were all "friends of the consti
tution," then what Davis was in search of was already
had. Bell's southern adherents proved from his political
past that he had been, at all times, a valiant champion of
slavery, and his northern friends, that he had never given
cause for just complaint, but that the platform of his party
consisted only of the one word "constitution," and had
therefore room on it not only for the Douglas men and the
Breckenridge men, but also for the partisans of every con
ceivable interpretation of the constitution. Why, then,.
was this not enough ? Simply because each party wanted
a candidate who was a " friend of the constitution " as it
understood the phrase. The candidate by means of whom
Davis's plan could be realized would have to be, at one and
the same time, a Breckenridge-democrat, a Douglas-demo
crat, and neither a Breckenridge nor a Douglas democrat,
but simply a constitution man. So long as no man could
1 Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, p. 52.

¦222 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
be found who presented such a political trinity in his own
person, it was not of the least use for the three candidates
to make the sacrifice expected of them: not the candi
dates but the convictions of the parties had to be put aside.
But this could not be done by any agreement of the poli
ticians. More yet: the attempt to do it would necessa
rily, in great part, have led to results the very opposite of
those intended. It was on this consideration that Douglas
based his rejection of Davis's offer. If he left the field, he
said, the greater part of his friends would support not the
new candidate, no matter who was chosen for that honor,
hut Lincoln.
How well founded was this opinion is apparent from tho
fact that the press and the speakers of the party in the
northern states chose, as the polar point of their agitation
in the electoral campaign, the claim that Douglas, through
all the years, had been the most determined and successful
leader in the fight for freedom. To him and to his popular
sovereignty principle it was due that the onslaughts of the
slavocracy against Kansas had been brought to naught; and
his course on the question of the Lecompton constitution
was adduced as unimpeachable evidence that the favor or
anger of the slavocracy had with him not a feather's weight
in the scales, when they sought to bend the law, or by force
or fraud to deprive freedom of its due.
Douglas had by his action relieved the republicans of the
trouble of refuting this claim by again going into the his
tory of the Kansas-Nebraska bill and of the trouble that
grew out of that law. The territory had again occupied
the attention of congress. On the 11th of April the house
of representatives had, by a vote of one hundred and thirty-
four against seventy-three, resolved to admit it into the
Union as a state under the Wyandotte constitution. In the
•committee on territories, in the senate, the decision lay with
Douglas, as the remaining votes wore equally divided. But

DOUGLAS AND KANSAS. 223
Douglas remained away from the meetings of the commit
tee, and said neither yea nor nay. How this could be recon
ciled with the meaning his partisans put on his course in the
Lecompton question it is difficult to say, while it can be rec
onciled without difficulty with the assertion of the repub
licans that he had declared war against the slavocracy and
Buchanan, because of Lecompton; since otherwise there
would have been no possibility of his election to the senate.
He was now competing for the highest prize — the presi
dency, — in the awarding of which the slave states had no
small influence; and as he could not say both yea and nay,
silence seemed to him the least of the evils between which
he had to choose. Naturally no documentary proof of this
can be adduced, but its probability, based on the whole
character and past of the man, becomes a certainty when
we consider the fact that he continued his shameless woo
ing of the south as long as he had a gleam of hope that he
could achieve anything by it.
On the 16th of January he had moved, in the senate,
to have the committee on judiciary introduce a bill " for
the protection of each state and territory of the Union
against invasion by the authorities or inhabitants of any
other state or territory, and for the suppression and pun
ishment of conspiracies or combinations in any state or
territory with intent to invade, assail or molest the govern
ment, inhabitants, property or institutions of any other
state or territory of the Union." 1 On the 23d of January
he defended this motion in a lengthy speech, in which he
surpassed all his previous achievements, so far as audacious
demagogy and low coaxing of the slavocracy was concerned :
in the annals of congress there is scarcely anything to
match it. For his text he had selected the well-known
letter which Governor Wise had addressed to the president
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 448.

224 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
after the riot at Harper's Ferry, and Buchanan's answer to
it. Buchanan's unassailable proposition that the laws had
riot granted him, the president, the right to do what Wise
expected of him, Douglas took to mean that the constitu
tion had not empowered the federal authorities to protect
the states, in accordance with Wise's demand, from such
attacks. With a great expenditure of doubtful logic and
empty patriotic pathos, he demolished this man of straw,
in order, by proving that the federal government had such
power, to demonstrate that it was its sacred duty to make
use of it without delay and with all its energy. It was its
sacred duty to make use of it thus because repetitions of
the doings at Harper's Ferry were to be feared, since
the real causes of them continued to exist and to operate.
"Without stopping to adduce evidence in detail, I have ho
hesitation in expressing my firm and deliberate conviction
that the Harper's Ferry crime was the rational, logical, in
evitable result of the doctrines and teachings of the repub
lican party, as explained and enforced in their platform,
their partisan press, their pamphlets and books, and espe
cially in the teachings of their leaders in and out of con
gress." 1 If that were the case, then the slave states would
evidently have received, in a fitting measure, the protection
to which, according to Douglas, they had an indisputable,
constitutional claim, and the refusal of which would justify
their withdrawal from the Union,2 only provided the bill
asked for from the judiciary committee was a penal law
1 Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 553.
2 lb., p. 554 : " Sir, it requires more patience than freemen ever should
cultivate to submit to constant annoyance, irritation and apprehension.
If we expect to preserve this Union, we must remedy, within the Union
and in obedience to the constitution, every evil for which disunion
would furnish a remedy. If the federal government fails to act, either
from choice or from an apprehension of the want of power, it cannot be
expected that the states will be content to remain unprotected."

DOUGLAS ON SOUTHERN RIGHTS. 225
against the profession or propagation of republican doc
trines by word or writing. If Douglas did not intend this,
what was the meaning of the further sentences : " Give us
such a law as the constitution contemplates and authorizes,
and I will show the senator from New Tork that there is
a constitutional mode of repressing the irrepressible con
flict. I will open the prison doors to allow conspirators
against the peace of the republic and the domestic tran
quillity of our states to select their cells wherein to drag
out a miserable life, as a punishment for their crimes
against the peace of society ? "
That is what the most courageous and the most success
ful knight of freedom had the face, some months before,
to tell the country, from his place in the senate. Was it
then still possible for him, in a glow of conviction and en
thusiasm, to plunge into the dust and mud, under the feet
of the slavocracy? And he did it unprovoked, without
any concrete inducement; nay, in gross violation of the
usages of the senate. The judiciary committee was not, ac
cording to custom, to be charged to examine the ques
tion whether any, and what kind of, legislative act was
required to avert the alleged evils, but, contrary to cus
tom, the senate, without even having itself submitted the
question to an actual examination, was commanded to
draft and propose a law which, judging from the reasons
i assigned for the resolution, must tower in enormity high
above the sedition law of accursed memory. And to this
end the senate had appointed an extraordinary committee
to make an exhaustive inquiry into all the questions raised
by the riot at Harper's Ferry. Did Douglas believe that
the rights and interests of the south were not safe enough
in the hands of this committee in which the slave-holders.
with a trusty friend from the north, had a majority, or did
he think that there was so much danger in delay that the
15

226 harper's ferry -
report of this committee should not be waited for? These
questions were, of course, asked. To answer them in the
affirmative would have been simply ridiculous. But there
was only one other conceivable reason for his course. In
three months the democratic national convention was to
meet in Charleston, and the occasion was too tempting to
an endeavor to make amends for his Lecompton and Popu
lar Sovereignty sins in the eyes of the slavocracy.
He did not need to wait the three months in order to
learn, with certainty, whether his propitiatory sacrifice
would be graciously accepted as sufficient. Jefferson Davis
immediately flung it back at him as an odious desecration
of the altar of slavery. To protect us, he said, the senator
destroys the foundation of all our rights, the sovereignty
of the states; such a bargain we shall not make. Douglas
was not rewarded with even an empty compliment for erect
ing to himself a monument of infamy, compared with which
the Kansas-Nebraska bill scarcely deserves to be mentioned.
That the resolution of the 16th and the speech of the 23d
of January had not injured Douglas in the slightest degree
with the democratic politicians of the north was a fright
fully eloquent proof of the demoralizing effects of the slav
ery question. On the other hand, the fact that the press
and the campaign orators of the party, spite of resolution
and speech, recommended Douglas as the most deserving
battler for freedom, was a symptom to be greeted with
joy. It was, of course, greatly to be lamented that so
bold an untruth could be defended with such success; but
that so bold an untruth had to be resorted to to keep the
masses from marching off into the enemy's camp threw a
flood of light on the fact that the poisoning of the thought
and feeling of the masses could go no further. The hy
pocrisy and dishonesty of the leaders furnished a meas
ure of the moral reaction that must have set in among a

DOUGLAS REFUTES HIMSELF. 227
large portion of their followers. But Douglas had allowed
himself to be misled by his rage over what had been done
in Charleston into another act of imprudence, by which he
imputed still greater hypocrisy and dishonesty to those
leaders. Even before he was nominated in Baltimore he
had himself most brilliantly refuted what they had now to
say of his services in the cause of freedom, in order to make
their old and trusted followers stand by his flag. In a
speech of the 16th of May he had in a tone of the greatest
indignation upbraided the slavocracy for their shameful in
gratitude. They had asked only for the continuation of
the Missouri line and were not able to get it; but he had
obtained for them, by his doctrine of non-intervention,
much more than they had demanded. To that doctrine
alone did they owe it that New Mexico had introduced
and protected slavery. Where, outside of New Mexico and
Arizona, had an inch of free territory been changed into
slave territory since the days of the Revolution? Non
intervention and popular sovereignty alone had brought it
to pass that a degree and a half of latitude north of the
Missouri line, hitherto free territory, and five times as large
as the state of New Tork, had fallen to their share. " Are
you not satisfied with these practical results?" And if
popular sovereignty has won for slavery New Mexico, sur
rounded on nearly every side by free territory, with its com
paratively raw climate, how can a doubt be possible that
sub-tropical, northern Mexico will also belong to it as soon
as it is acquired?1
The most insignificant republican town politician, if he
only knew how to read, had now an annihilating answer
to the claim that Douglas had never allowed the standard
of freedom to be lowered, and that his popular sovereignty
doctrine had proved the most effectual protection against
' Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 314.

228 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the greed of the slavocracy. In the speeches of the 23d of
January and the 16th of May, he had condemned himself
out of his own mouth in such a way that now, and for all
future time, every further word was superfluous. Only he
who was resolved not to hear because he wanted to deceive
himself or others could still have faith in him and in his
" great principle."
In one direction, therefore, the task of the republicans in
the electoral campaign was an exceedingly easy and grate
ful one. Where men were amenable to reason, they could
prove that, with the programme of the other three parties, a
further descent on the declivitous path on which the country
had been forced by the slavery question could not be pre
vented, and that a further descent on it would make the
republic a land of liberty in accordance with the saying:
lucus a non lucendo. There would not now have been the
slightest doubt that they would be victorious in all the free
states, and by overwhelming majorities, if, after the most
irrefutable demonstration of their principle, they had not
still to meet the one argument, that the consequence of
their victory would be the disruption of the Union.
Their platform was not, as we have seen, silent respect
ing the question, on the answering of which it actually
depended whether Lincoln would be chosen. The threat
of secession had been branded by it " as an avowal of con
templated treason," and it was most emphatically and
tersely declared that " the union of the states must and
shall be preserved." This afforded no security against an
attempt at secession : it was only a vow to oppose it by
every possible means. He who feared secession could,
therefore, not be pacified by the platform. It simply ampli
fied the question into this: whether Lincoln should be
elected at the risk of breaking up the Union and bringing
all the horrors of civil war on the country. The claim that

fessenden's reply TO DOUGLAS. 229
tneir firm declaration would dissipate the desire of the
southern radicals to go beyond a dangerous playing with
fire, could, however, strengthen the courage of those only
who did not believe in the seriousness of the threats. Where
people were convinced of this, merely a few words spoken
by Fessenden in reply to Douglas's speech of the 23d of
January, could master fear. If, he said, I could allow
myself to be deterred by such threats from exercising my
constitutional right according to my convictions, I should
deserve heavier chains than the negro ever bore, and the
word slave should be branded on my brow.1 This was an
appeal to the man and the citizen, without any regard to
his political opinions, and the number of hearts and heads
in which it was not able to awaken some echo was by no
means as great as the superficial observer must have believed.
Fear had not yet assumed, anywhere, the character of a
panic, and hence, wherever the faculty of political thought
existed, people had not completely failed to see that it would
be left entirely to the pleasure of the slave states to decide
how far the constitution should still be the living, funda
mental law of the Union, and how far a piece of dead paper,
if the perpetuation of the Union were to be purchased by
submission to the claim that these states must decide what
politica] party should be considered capable of governing.
And the self-conscious manfulness which, in all extra-polit;
ical affairs of the republic, finds so nutritive a soil, could not
possibly belie itself so completely in political life that threats
could only frighten and not likewise stimulate. If any
thing was made clear beyond a doubt by the history of
recent years, it was that their effects in the former respect
had become weaker, and in the latter, stronger. And the
history of the war proved, in an equally indisputable man
ner, that, among the entire northern population, the spirit of
'Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 258.

230 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
self-conscious manfulness was alive in a really vast measure.
But it is one thing to meet a terrible fact with iron resolu
tion and unbending energy, and another to allow a danger
which one is convinced might be averted by the omission
of an act, rightful in itself, to grow into a terrible fact, by
the performance of that act. That thousands and tens of
thousands who voted for Lincoln would not have done so
if they had foreseen the direct consequences of his election
is certain, if for no other reason, because people were still
very far from fully understanding what the continuation of
slavocratic supremacy meant to the future of the country.
The number of those who did not want to see Douglas or
Bell elected, but who might be easily convinced that, after
all, these latter would only allow the status quo to continue,
was still quite large, and it could not seem doubtful to them
how not only patriotism but common sense would decide
if the choice lay between the status quo and the disruption
of the Union. All reason and all the acts of persuasion
were powerless against the simple argument: people do not
rush out of the rain into the raging sea.
One must bear this in mind if one does not wish to do in
justice to the republican press and the republican speakers.
It was in part well-considered tactics forced on them by cir
cumstances, in the first place, to declare, as they did, fears
of secession entirely groundless; in the second, to try to
prove that the Fire-eaters would only make themselves
ridiculous by an attempt at secession ; and only at last to
speak of the necessity of standing the fiery ordeal of a
revolution in order to secure to the Union the character of
a constitutional state, not in form alone but in reality. And
by these tactics they wanted not only to prevent desertions
and to make new acquisitions more easily, but they believed
that by their means they would also be able most surely to
avert the threatened danger. Not only, reasoned they, will

THREATS OF SECESSION. 231
all the more food be afforded to the pretensions of the
south, but the radicals will all the more easily resolve upon
an attempt at secession, the more ado there is made about
threats of secession: while, on the other hand, the masses of
the population of the southern states will follow the Fire-
eaters all the less, the less the north allows itself to be
terrified. The only thing they overlooked here was that
such an effect, if it could be produced at all, presupposed a
certain amount of unanimity in the north, and if this was
not obtained, the Fire-eaters would not be intimidated but
rather strengthened in the conviction that secession, despite
its announcement a thousand times, and the preparation
for it during so many years, would have all the thorough
going success of a surprise, because contrary to all expecta
tion, and therefore, unprepared, the north would stand con
fronted by an accomplished fact. The calculation of the
republican leaders was destined to turn out wrong, because
it was certain that the political phase of the secession ques
tion was even now viewed only by a small majority in the
way they looked upon it, and that, even with respect to its
constitutional phase, a considerable minority entertained
views which left the way entirely open for secession.
The principal reason why the republican politicians fell
into this error of calculation was because their treatment of
the question of secession was based only in part on considera
tions of expediency, and was a bit of tactics adopted with
deliberation. They had adopted these tactics, because they
believed what they said, and only because they believed it
themselves did they find believers. Not what they said,
but the manner in which they said it, was influenced by the
fact that they looked upon it as good tactics to dissipate the
fears they held to be groundless. By always laying on the
colors more thickly, and constructing their sentences more
pointedly, and in more absolute terms, than they would

232 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
have done if they had not been of this opinion, they were
naturally strengthened in their conviction, so that the lan
guage of evolving facts became unintelligible to them in pro
portion as these facts more strongly contradicted their
reasoning. To the very last, they deceived the people only
because, and to the extent, they had deceived themselves.
Hence the party did not withdraw their confidence from
them, although they proved themselves false prophets.
And although, as has already been pointed out, a great
part of the responsibility for the fact that it was possible
for the rebellion to ripen wholly unhindered into civil war,
falls, on this account, on their shoulders, it was fortunate
that they saw no clearer. Civil war could have been pre
vented only by paying for it with the future of the republic
and submission to the slavocracy. And the price would
have been paid, if it had been perceived that Lincoln's
election must have secession as a consequence, and that
secession meant civil war. The intellectual and moral
elasticity not only of the masses, but of the leaders them
selves, would have melted like glass under the flame of the
blow-pipe, if they had considered it possible that the vic
tory of the republicans would have cost the people one-
hundredth part of the treasure, tears and blood which had
to flow for the restoration of the Union. Neither the lead
ers nor the masses were able to bear the frightful burden of
the civil war; they became able to bear it, and they were
able to become so, only because they had underestimated
its weight so enormously. They would never have assumed
the burden if they had not done this; and only while carry
ing it, and by carrying it, could the mighty force which it
required be developed. The republican leaders, therefore,
now really rendered, by the short-sightedness of some of
them and the blindness of others, as inestimable a service
to the country as they afterwards did by their iron energy

REPUBLICAN MISCALCULATIONS. 233
and unbending tenacity ; for, thanks to that short-sightedness
and blindness, the slavocracy was compelled, by its rebel
lion, to force the north either to let the Union go, or, by
the destruction of slavery, to set the restored Union, the
controlling power of the new world, with its full weight
for all future time as a formative factor into the progres
sive, material, intellectual and moral life of the civilized
world, which was becoming more and more consolidated as
the century advanced.
Justice requires that from among the superabundant
proofs of this want of judgment of the republican leaders,
fruitful as it was of consequences, a few should be selected,
because it unquestionably diminishes, in a certain sense, the
guilt of the other parties. If I quote the worst of the most
prominent, I do so only because their voices reached farth
est, and not to cast a shadow on their historical, posthu
mous fame, for they all, without exception, made the same
mistake. Weed had written from Washington to the Evening
Journal, on the 13th of December, 1859: " I know nothing
that resembles so much the cry of dissolving the Union as
the prophecy of the Millerites who waited for the end of
•the world. . . . The whole question is in a nutshell.
Dissolving the Union is a game for the presidency. It is
nothing but a game. That it will be played desperately
we admit, because southern sportsmen play desperately."
The leading articles of the New Tork Tribune, and of
the Independent, were written in this same tone through
out the entire summer, but went a good way farther, in S6
far as they were silent on the statement in the last sentence
or even scornfully questioned it. The former paper de-
dared, on the 11th of July: "The threat of a dissolution
-of the Union, in the event of the election of a republican
to the presidency, is as audacious a humbug as Mormon-

234 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ism, as preposterous a delusion as Millerism. Southern
braggarts threatened it. Northern demagogues echoed it.
A few simpletons feared it." Some days earlier the Wash
ington correspondent of the latter had written that the
shrewdest slavocrats no longer talked among themselves
of secession, but entertained one another on the ruin of the
republican party, which the fight for the spoils would bring
about.1 A week later Greeley drew, in the same paper, a
comparison between the present situation and that of four
years previous, and came to the conclusion that the waters
that then raged wildly were now smooth as a mirror.2 He
who was not able to see the facts in this light might find
another consolation in the Tribune. It wrote on the 28th
of July: "This threat of dissolution would be ridiculous
enough if all the great slave states should be harmoniously
united in crime. But the south could no more unite upon
a scheme of secession than a company of lunatics could
conspire to break out of bedlam."
' The Washington correspondent of the, Independent writes, on the
2d of July: "The danger of republicanism is not that the slave states
will resist its advances by the sword, or by secession ; and to-day the
shrewdest men among the southern upholders of slavery do not talk of
disunion, among themselves, but whisper of ruin to the young repub
lican party from causes within, and not without, that organization."
The Independent, July 5, 1860.
2 " Four years ago the republicans were insolently told that even the
election of their national candidates would amount to nothing, since
they would not be permitted to assume the stations thus assigned them t
Democratic canvassers and writers boldly proclaimed that their inaugu
ration at the federal city would not be suffered — that it would be pre
vented by force of arms if necessary. Governor Wise, of Virginia, in
voked a private conference of southern governors at Raleigh, at which
this treason was deliberately sanctioned and resolved on. . . . Thus
was it in 1856; but in 1860 the moral certainty of a republican triumph
evokes no menace aud excites no alarm ; . . . the feeblest nerves are
unshaken, the weakest head unturned, by apprehension of consequent
convulsion ; . . . stocks perversely refuse to fall ; federal sixes com-

seward's views. 235-
When the electoral campaign was at its height, Seward,
too, lent the great weight of his name to this view. He
had always endeavored to select his phrases, and he now
chose less forcible forms of expression, but without in
any way limiting or defining his opinion by modifying
clauses. He declared very plainly and absolutely that all
fear was groundless. In a speech at Detroit, on the 4th of
September, he called the people extravagant who thought
the country was on the high road to civil war or dis
solution.1 He struck a still higher key on the 18th of
September in St. Paul. The thunder of the threats of
secession had faded into a murmur; no one was afraid,
and no one could be bought. If that could have been said
of the population of the northern states during the last
forty years, the revolution in which the country was now
engaged would have long since come, for fear and venal
ity had always been pillars on which the supremacy of
slavery over the Union had rested.2
mand a large premium; money is abundant; interest rules low." The
Independent, July 12, 1860.
' After he had shown that, in all parties and in all sections of the
country, dissatisfaction reigned, he continued: "I do not intend to be
understood that these evils are thus far productive of material suffer
ing or intolerable embarrassment, much less that the country is, as so
many extravagant persons say, on the high road to civil war or dissolu
tion. On the contrary, this fair land we live in is so blessed with all
the elements of human comfort and happiness, and its citizens are at
once so loyal and wise, and so well surrounded by yet unbroken guar
anties of civil and religious liberty, that our experience of misrule at
the very worst never becomes so painful as to raise the question, how
much more of public misery we can endure ; but it leaves us at liberty
to stop now, as always heretofore, with the inquiry, how much more of
freedom, prosperity and honor we can secure by the practice of greater
wisdom and higher virtue? Discontentment is the wholesome fruit of
a discovery of maladministration, and conviction of public error is here
at least always a sure harbinger of political reform." Works, IV,
pp. 304, 305.
2 "For the first time in the history of the republic, the slave power

236 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
The state elections which took place a few weeks before
-the electoral campaign might make the first allegation re
garding fear and venality appear as well founded as the
second unquestionably was. Pennsylvania and Indiana be
longed to the so-called October states. We have seen how
much depended upon them. The republicans won in both
by respectable majorities. Lincoln's election might, there
fore, be considered almost certain, unless, at the last mo
ment, a revolution of feeling took place. And how could
such a revolution be so well guarded against as by the
same tactics which had already been followed by such
brilliant results? On the 13th of October, the New Tork
Tribune declared that the radical slavocracy would not
only forfeit all sympathy in the north, if it did not desist
from its threats of rebellion, but would be overwhelmed in
the south itself by the conservatives.1
lias not even the ability to terrify or alarm the freeman so as to make
him submit, or even to compromise. It rails now with a feeble voice,
instead of thundering as it did in our ears for twenty or thirty years
past. With a feeble and muttering voice they cry out that they will
tear the Union to pieces. They complain that if we will not surrender
our principles, and our system, and our right, being a majority, to
rule, and if we will not accept their system and such rulers as they will
give us, they will go out of the Union. 'Who's afraid?'* Nobody's
afraid. Nobody can be bought. Now, fellow-citizens, let me ask you,
since you are so prompt at answering, suppose at any time within the
last forty years we could have found the American people in the fiee
states everywhere just as they are in the free states now, in such a
frame of mind that there was no party that could be bought, noboJy
that could be scared — how much sooner do you think this revolution
would have come in which we are now engaged? I do not believe
there has been one day from 1787 until now when slavery had any
power in the government, except what it derived from buying up men
of weak virtue, little principle and great cupidity, and terrifying men
of weak nerves in the free states." lb., pp. 344, 345.
1 "If the chivalry persists in menaces of rebellion, in case the election
¦shall go against them, they will speedily be divorced from all sympathy
* Here hundreds of voices responded, " Nobody 1 "

THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE ELECTION. 23T
Five days later Greeley made merry, in the Independent,.
over the fools who had thought they could conjure a storm
from a cloudless sky. He considered the quotations of
the Stock Exchange proof that their smoke did not come
from a fire. The crisis of the great peaceful revolution-
was passed, and not even the water of a brooklet had been
troubled.1 The suspicion that the Stock Exchange had acted in this
way for tactical reasons could not be entertained. There
can be no doubt that it would have operated, not for, but
against, the republicans, if it had wanted to influence the
election, for the supreme commandment in the political
catechism of the great business world was still: tranquil
lity is the first duty of a citizen. It therefore unquestion
ably shared the view advocated by the republicans that
Lincoln's election would not lead to a catastrophe, and it
evidently was confident of this, because it considered the-
allegation in the Tribune of October 13th well founded.
Where sympathy for the republican party had found a
greater or lesser counterpoise only in a patriotic anxiety
for the preservation of the Union, people were naturally
very much inclined to look upon the Stock Exchange as a
in the north, and utterly overwhelmed by the undemonstrative but res
olute conservatism of the south. The Union will in no case be shat
tered. It will not even be seriously shaken."
1 " But what, then, must become of the Union ?
"Nothing." The Union, though a little wakeful, with the ardent politicians,
throughout Tuesday night, never slept sounder nor more refreshingly
than it did the night following. Stocks were buoyant and advancing
throughout Wednesday and Thursday ; even those of the slave states
advanced and were held firmly. Never was the country calmer in the
immediate presence of great events; never was it more cheerful in full
view of gravely apprehended calamities. ... So passed the crisis
of the great peaceful revolution of 1860." The Independent, October 18r
1860.

238 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
barometer that could not deceive in this matter. The feel
ing of security seemed to grow all the greater the nearer
the day of the decision approached. The Washington cor
respondent of the Independent must have counted on the
assent of all republicans when it declared, on the 22d of
October, that the renewal of the secession cry was only a
last effort to influence the election in the state of New
Tork.1 Those, too, who did not, like Greeley, think more
with their hearts than with their heads, perceived more
olearly the more they reflected on it, that even the south
west itself would put a stop to the work of its secession
ists,2 because it would not be willing to have its mails
1 " The disunion cry is, I think, nearly ended. There is a fresh shriek,
however, just now, for effect in the state of New York in the Novem
ber election." lb., October 25, 1860.
2 This was also Seward's opinion. In the speech of the 29th of Feb
ruary, which made Garrison describe him as " the incarnation of polit
ical circumspection," and who was in fact cautious and calculating even
to freezing, he had defended this view with an emphasis in which a trace
of the warmth of profound conviction might be discovered. . " Al
though a party may have never so much of prestige, and never such
traditional merit, yet, if it be lacking in the one virtue of loyalty to the
Union, all its advantages will be unavailing; and then, obnoxious, as
through long-cherished and obstinate prejudices, the republican party
is in the capital states, yet even there it will advance like an army with
banners, winning the favor of the whole people, and it will be armed
with the national confidence and support when it shall be found the
only party that defends and maintains the integrity of the Union. . . .
I remain now in the opinion I have uniformly expressed here and else
where, that these hasty threats of disunion are so unnatural that they
will find no hand to execute them. . . . No, go where you will,
and to what class you may, with commissions for your fatal service in
one hand and your bounty counted by the hundred or the thousand
pieces of silver in the other, a thousand resisters will rise up for every
recruit you can engage." " On the shores of the Gulf of Mexico " and on
" the cotton and sugar plantations on the Mississippi," the secessionists!
would be asked whether they were more just, wiser and more humant
than the fathers of the republic, and whether they could do better thai.

THE STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE ELECTION. 239
stopped and its coasts blockaded to gratify the ambition
of a few self-seeking counterfeiters of pro-slavery fanati
cism.1 The Stock Exchange became nervous at last, so much so,
indeed, that the New Tork Tribune spoke of a " panic in
stocks." And it frankly admitted that the cause of the
" panic " was to be sought for in the threats of secession.2
The alarmists naturally endeavored to make capital for
themselves out of this. But it was easy not only to parry the
blow, but to deal a heavy counter-blow. A list drawn up by
the New Tork Herald showed, indeed, an average decline
of the quotations of eight per cent., as compared with No
vember, 1858. But, in this list, only the stocks of southern
states were mentioned. Federal stocks and the stocks of
the northern states had remained as firm as ever. The fed
eral government had even just issued a loan of $10,000,000
at five per cent., and it had been taken up on the 22d of
October, in large part by the savings banks, with a pre
mium of about one-half percent.3 Was not the conclusion
which the New Tork Tribune (November 6) drew from these
Stock Exchange conditions, therefore, warranted, viz. : " the
more noise the south makes, the more she will injure her
they had done. "And by these simple interrogatories you will be si
lenced and confounded." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 914.
' " There will be no call for Mr. Lincoln to put down rebellion and
nullification in the southwest ; the people of the cotton states will do
that whenever the opportunity is offered them. They are not going to
have their mails stopped and their coast blockaded to gratify the mad
ambition of a few self-seeking counterfeiters of pro-slavery fanaticism."
2 "Created by the disunion furore north and south."
'This made all the greater impression, as the secretary of the treas
ury, Howell Cobb, was charged with having, by a demonstrative ad
vertisement of his secessionist inclinations, on a journey in the north,
industriously endeavored to make the loan a failure, in order to pro
duce a panic. He had before declared that offers below par would not
be considered.

240 harper's ferry-
own credit, and that is all she can do?" It is easy to under
stand how this conclusion was looked upon as all the more
unassailable, since information was received from the market
of southern states also which, at first sight, could have only
the one meaning, that, in the business world there, likewise,
this view had asserted itself, and it was believed that the
height of the crisis was passed during the October elections.
Thus, for instance, the New Orleans Picayune of Octo
ber 20th, reported that, with the coming of cooler weather,
the cotton trade had grown more active; that the price had
risen one and one-half per cent, above the lowest quotation,
and that money was again easy. The paper also remarked
that there was no further pressure of political questions
on the market to be feared, as the worst was over.1
What was meant by this was not at all certain. Those
who were confident that the slavocracy would grow calm,
after Lincoln's constitutional election had become a fact,
saw in it, of course, an express confirmation of their opin
ion. And when a paper like the New Orleans Picayune
expressly confirmed it, why might not the New Tork Tribune
(October 22) claim that the police would suffice to suppress
an attempt at rebellion at the seat of government, and that
a revenue cutter in the Charleston harbor would make blue
rosettes2 in South Carolina as rare as blue roses? Even
Chase, who, like Seward, had the reputation of a statesman
at stake, and thought coolly and clearly enough not to
make his wishes the main starting point for the formation
of his judgment, declared on the 1st of November, in Cov
ington, Kentucky, that he could see no reason for the fear
' " The apprehensions engendered by the political condition of affairs
have in a measure calmed down, and the inference is that as the most
adverse issue has been already anticipated, nothing is likely to transpire
that can place the market in a more disadvantageous position."
'The sign worn by the minute-men in their hats.

MEETING OF THE FIFTH OF NOVEMBER. 241
that there would bo any uprising against the legal will of
the people, and considered the deep excitement as, on the
whole, healthful.1
Immediately before the decision, the republicans made
another skilful move on the chess board, in order to turn
to account, in their own interest, the uneasiness of the
Stock Exchange which the democrats and unionists were
fostering. As Pennsylvania and Indiana might be looked
upon as safe for Lincoln, New Tork occupied more than
ever the first place in the eyes of public interest. If the
victory could yet be snatched from the republicans, it
could be done only here, and if it were not considered
probable that the attempt would be successful, it was be
lieved to be possible. And it was all the more worth while
to make a great effort, because New Tork was the nerve-
center of the economic life of the Union, and any great
disturbance of its activity made itself very keenly felt at
the most remote points of the country. What could be
accomplished by means of an appeal to the pocket could
be most easily and surely done from New Tork as a cen
ter; and the appeal to the pocket had by no means ceased
to be one of the weightiest arguments. But things were
now in such a state that the republicans might get posses
sion of some of the fruits which their opponents had shaken
' " We are approaching the close of another presidential election. The
public mind has been deeply excited by the discussions necessarily in
cident to such a transaction. . . . Thus far, however, the excite
ment has been, on the whole, reasonable and healthful. And I see no
reason to doubt that the decision of the people, whatever it may be, on
the question in debate, and between the respected citizens, who, as can
didates for the presidency, represent the principles respectively main
tained by the several parties of the country, will be received with that
patriotic deference to the will of the majority which distinguishes
Americans from every other nation." The Cincinnati Commercial,
November 2, 1860.
16

242 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
from the tree of fear, and it was even a question which
side would get the larger share. A number of prominent
business men called a mass meeting to be held on the 5th
of November, before the Stock Exchange, and both the
invitation and the speeches laid the greatest stress on
the immense depression of trade during the past weeks.
He who did not wish that this condition should last four
months longer must vote for Lincoln, since, if he is not
chosen, the election will go to the house of representa
tives, and all the sordid powers which have been so active
here during the last two weeks, and with such success, will
have full play in Washington, where they will be removed
from the direct control of the people, and that means
"death and destruction to all the commercial interests of
this city and to those of the country, inasmuch as they
bear relations to the city." l Such was the simple argument,
and it was irrefutable, for, after the October elections, a
doubt was no longer possible that the only alternative lay
between Lincoln's election and an election by the house
of representatives. What consequences Lincoln's election
would have was, of course, a very different question, and
it, too, had to be answered, in order to measure the impor
tance which should be attached to those unavoidable con
sequences of the resultlessness of the popular election.
But the republicans had talked themselves out of all doubt
that the right answer to this question was the assertion
made by Chittenden at the meeting before the Stock Ex
change, as the self-evident inference from his argument:
The agitation, the irrepressible conflict, of which we have
heard so much, will instantly cease.2 Not only with stout
hearts, but with agile feet, they took the road to the ballot-
boxes, for the shadows of anxious care had become so light
1 Chittenden's speech.
« The New York Tribune, November 6, 1860.

ACTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA. 243
that, in the excitement of the great, decisive hour, which
drove the blood in stronger and hotter pulsations to the
head, they were scarcely perceptible to their veiled eyes.
How probable it was that this saying of Chittenden
would be fulfilled was evident from an official document
to the reading of which the legislature of South Carolina
was listening in the capital of the state while the consol
ing prophecy was passing his lips before the New Tork
Stock Exchange.
South Carolina was the only state in which the presi
dential electors were chosen not by the people but by the
legislature. As a federal law provided that their election
should take place in all the states on the Tuesday after the
first Monday in November, and, according to a provision
of the state constitution, the regular legislative period be
gan only on the fourth Monday of November, Governor
Gist had called the legislature to meet in extraordinary
session on the 5th of November. The exercise of this
constitutional right, which under ordinary circumstances
would have been the only object of the session, should, in
his opinion, under existing circumstances, be used as an
opportunity to prepare the way for the exit of the state
out of the Union. His message called upon the legisla
ture, "in view of the str<5ng probability of the election to
the presidency of a sectional candidate," after the discharge
of their immediate duty, " to remain in session and take
such action as would prepare the state for any emergency
that might arise." To this end he " earnestly " recom
mended, in case of Lincoln's election, that "a convention
of the people of the state be immediately called, to con
sider and determine for themselves the mode and measure
of redress." He believed himself that they would have no
choice: South Carolina must secede. The indications war
ranted the expectation that many of the slave states would

244 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
immediately follow the example thus set them, if they did
not take the step at the same time, and that finally the
whole south would decide in favor of it. If South Caro
lina remained true to itself, it might now count on " the
long-desired co-operation of the other slave states." " The
state has with great unanimity declared that she has the
right peaceably to secede, and no power on earth can
rightfully prevent it." If the government of the United
States should attempt force, "it will become our solemn
duty to meet force by force," and, in that case, they might
rely upon him. He recommended the raising of ten thousand
volunteers immediately, and a thorough reorganization of
the militia, so that the entire military force of the state
might be called out without delay and with the greatest
effect. On the evening of the following day (November 6th) the
whole country knew that "the great probability" of Lin
coln's election had become a certainty, although the result
in some states was not yet published. In these also (Cal
ifornia and Oregon) the republicans had won. Of the
three hundred and three electoral votes, one hundred and
eighty belonged to them, although of the popular vote
they had only a relative majority. In that vote the three
other candidates had, together, a majority of over nine
hundred thousand votes. Douglas, who stood next to Lin--
coin in the popular vote, and who had received over five
hundred thousand votes more than Breckenridge, occupied
the last place in the electoral vote, having only twelve
votes, while the latter had seventy-two, and Bell thirty-
nine electoral votes, although not half as many votes had
been cast for him.
Under any circumstances this proof of how strangely the
indirect elective system by states may overturn the su
premacy of the people, according to the principle of the

245
rule of the majority, would have a theoretical interest. It
could claim more now. A "great revolution" — for as
such the republicans had repeatedly characterized Lincoln's
election — had been accomplished in the democratic repub
lic against a strong majority. The severest crisis imagi
nable had broken over the country, and the legal and actual
will of the people were no longer coincident.
That this was a fact of great political importance should,
therefore, have been recognized by all, much as it might be
debated what its consequences would be. The republicans,
however, gave little thought to it at the moment, because
they had never considered it possible to obtain an absolute
majority of the popular vote. All they saw was the elect
oral vote, and that surpassed their expectations, for Breck
enridge and Bell had gone away entirely empty-handed in
the free states, and Douglas had won in them only three
out of the seven votes of New Jersey. They were there
fore not merely glad of their victory, but filled with jubila
tion at a mighty triumph.
But joy prevailed also at their political antipodes. In
Charleston, the scenes which had followed the breaking up
of the democratic national convention were repeated. The
population crowded into the streets filled with intense fes
tal feeling; deafening hurrahs greeted the announcements
of the telegraph; congratulations and hand-shakings that
meant much were exchanged by men whose eyes were
bright with pleasure. There was here also, perhaps, many
a heart upon which anxiety or at least doubt weighed
heavily. But all that was seen were faces expressive of
only the one thought and the feeling: Beached the goal
at last I Such was the physiognomy which public opinion
imperatively demanded, and in no democracy of modern
times has the rule of public opinion been so tyrannically
exercised, and rebellion against it been so seldom ventured,

246 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
as in the slavocratic democracy of the United States. No
one had the courage immediately to attempt to raise a
dam against the flood, and before the sun had set it had
become impossible to do so. Even in South Carolina, only
a small minority really knew what they were doing, but
the intellectual leaders belonged almost exclusively to that
minority, and they did not allow the masses who followed
them blindly a single hour calmly to bethink themselves.
They proceeded without delay from words to acts which
were practically the burning of their ships behind them,
because they made not only the least retreat but the
least pause seem cowardly and dishonorable in the eyes of
the whole population. In the legislature, motions for the
calling of a convention for the purpose advocated by the
governor were made, and as soon as the first motion to
that effect was put, the question was no longer whether,
but in what manner, it would be done. And even before
a conclusion had been reached on this point, on the morn
ing of the 7th of November, the grand jury in Charleston
informed the United States district court that it had re
solved to bring its proceedings to a close, because the ques
tion raised by the result of the presidential election " in
volved the existence of the government." Whereupon
Judge Magrath answered that it had long been known
what South Carolina was always resolved to do, if what
had now occurred should take place. "Feeling an assur
ance of what will be the action of the state, I consider it
my duty, without delay, to prepare to obey its wishes.
That preparation is made by the resignation of the office I
have held. ... So far as I am concerned, the temple
of justice raised under the constitution of the United
States is now closed. If it shall never be again opened, I
thank God that its doors have been closed before its altar
has been desecrated with sacrifices to tyranny."

dissolution of the union begun. 247
The collector of Charleston and the United States district
attorney immediately followed Magrath's example. The
highest federal officials, led by a judge, had therefore de
clared, by word and deed, that in their eyes the dissolution
of the Union, so far as South Carolina was concerned, had
become an accomplished fact by the victory of the republi
cans, and that all that now remained was to settle the formal
side of the question. The courage and zeal of the repre
sentatives of the people assembled at Columbia certainly
needed no further stimulation, but they were naturally
spurred on all the more by this action of the men on whom
was primarily incumbent the guardianship of the rights and
interests of the Union. A bill was passed on the 9th by the
senate, and on the 12th by the house, which called a con
vention to meet on the 17th of December, and provided for1
an election of delegates to the same on the 7th. A timid
attempt to leave a back door still open and afford the state
a possibility of making its final resolve depend on the co
operation of other slave states had served only to cast a
still more glaring light on the fact that the overwhelming
majority took entirely the same ground as Gist and Ma
grath. After the passage of the convention bill United
States Senator Hammond resigned. His colleague, Chest
nut, had not even waited for that event.
Whether the radical slavocracy intended and would have
the courage to carry out their threats had ceased to be a
question before the first week after the choice of electors
had passed. The dissolution of the Union had begun.
There was not the slightest doubt as to what the conven
tion of South Carolina would do, and what it would do was
no longer looked upon as doubtful anywhere; it had only
to reduce to the form considered legal the decree which had
been issued all but unanimously by the head and heart of
the population. Even now the practical question was no

248longer how to prevent secession, but only how to confine
it within as narrow limits as possible, and before the end of
the year it was wrong formally to speak of the preserva
tion of the Union ; the task awaiting the federal govern
ment was its restoration. Woe to the country when its
people and government have failed to conceive how differ
ent these things are! The moment a single state had re
solved on secession in a manner considered binding by its
people, and had actually drawn the logical consequence of
that resolve, to preserve the Union meant to undo what had
been done; and the longer, more zealously, more anxiously
and more self-sacrificingly people sought to find the solution
of the insoluble problem, the more gigantic proportions did
they allow the real problem to be solved to assume, twist
ing the knot into ever greater entanglement and twining
their own arms more and more firmly and inextricably
into it.

WRONG CALCULATIONS OF THE REPUBLICANS. 249
CHAPTEK VII.
WRONG CALCULATIONS" OF THE EEPUBLICANS.
Notwithstanding the doings in South Carolina, the re
publicans interpreted the election figures to be a confirma
tion of their opinion that the storm would blow over. In
the popular vote of the slave states, Breckenridge had re
ceived only a relative majority; the other parties together
had cast about one hundred and forty thousand more votes.
But was one warranted to draw consequences from the sum
total as to the question of secession? The one hundred and
forty thousand votes more had been cast almost entirely in
the border states. Breckenridge had an absolute majority
in the cotton states, Georgia and Louisiana alone excepted.
On the other hand, this absolute majority was very great
only in Texas. Even in Mississippi, which occupied the
second place for Breckenridge, the minority greatly ex
ceeded one-third. Besides it was unquestionable that not
every vote cast for Breckenridge was a vote for secession.1
The inference of the republicans that the secessionists, apart
from South Carolina, . were everywhere in the minority,
was, therefore, entirely warranted.2 But had it to be in-
'On the other hand, Iverson claimed: "It is a fact well known to
those who understand the case, that a large portion of the friends of
Mr." Bell are the most ardent leaders in, and supporters of, this move
ment of secession." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 50.
2 There were southern papers that expressly confirmed this. Thus, for
instance, the Memphis Enquirer of November 13. It adds: " It would
seem to be a poor cause that had to be supported by a surprise of public
sentiment, and by an appeal to its generosity against its judgment."
The Wilmington (N. C.) Herald wrote: "In fact the disunionists are
greatly in the minority, and have failed to satisfy the world that they
possess all the wisdom and all the spirit of the south." Cited in the

250 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ferred from this that South Carolina was also the only state
in which the plan of secession would, perhaps, be realized?
The Stock Exchange now seemed to judge so no longer.
The question was no longer of a decline of quotations. The
alarming news had gone abroad that the south intended to
use its political grievances as a convenient pretext for re
pudiating its debt — a treat uttered, as the sequel showed,
in bitter earnest, and which made a powerful impression,
since slavery had long since led to basing the economic life
of the planter states chiefly on credit for the future crops.
Even the Independent, on the 15th of November, recom
mended great caution. But it could still support its claim
that there wa^ no real actual danger, by the fact that the
regular investment securities had not fallen.1 Hence it not
only repeated, with calm certainty, its old saying, that the
crisis of the 6th of November was at last over, and that
the, country had nothing to do except to refuse to be fright
ened, but it again declared that the fever of the south was
not of the malignant type, and that some of its symptoms
were to be hailed with joy, as evidence of returning health.2
But on the 22d of November it had to admit that the
New York Tribune of November 12, 1860. The Vicksburg (Miss.) Whig
of November 13th thought it might even say : " There need be no fear of
Mississippi. She will vote down disunion, whenever factionists make
the issue, by an overwhelming majority."
' "The regular investment securities have not fallen; and they would
unquestionably fall if the welfare of the country were in jeopardy."
2 "When it was announced that the people of the United States, in
the legitimate way, had designated Abraham Lincoln as their next pres
ident, the crisis was over — the most critical point in the struggle be
tween freedom and slavery, since the adoption of the federal constitu
tion, was passed, safely, decisively, finally passed. Everybody knows
this. Everybody acts upon it.
"To be sure there is a renewed panic in the stock market, and the
threatened repudiation by the south of the millions that it owes to the
north awakens anxiety in some business circles. . . . There will be
need of more than ordinary caution in all business transactions, for the

THE BUSINESS SITUATION. 251
country was in "a first-class panic." Still its opinion of
the political situation did not change on that account. On
the one hand, it sought consolation in the fact that the
business situation was a depressed and strained one, entirely
independent of political questions. An insufficient wheat
crop and the " bankrupt condition of the south," produced
by over-speculation in land and slaves, were, it claimed, in
great part, the cause of that situation.1 In this there was
just truth enough to allow it to serve as an argument where
one sought for proof of what one wished might be, and the
assertion was submitted to no examination. So far as the
allegation concerning the south was concerned, it could not
be questioned that the economic sins it was reproached with
had diminished its credit sufficiently to produce a certain in
activity of the market, so far as it depended on trade with
the south. But it was not possible that this could have
produced a panic, and a panic there was according to
the testimony of the Independent itself. To understand
that panic a very different fact in the economic life of the
south had to be taken into consideration — the decline in
the price of slaves. If only half of what the press of Vir
ginia now said on this subject was true, the decline could
not be traced back to the over-speculation above, referred
present. . . . The attempt to produce a panic should be put down
by refusing to be frightened. . . .
"The south is passing through a 'crisis' of inestimable consequence
to the health of the body politic. Its fever, though it breaks out with
spasmodic violence, is not of the malignant type. The pustules on the
surface, though somewhat noisome, are indications of a purifying of
the blood and a renovation of the system. ... If merchants and poli
ticians at the north take the attitude of non-intervention, going quietly
forward with their own business and the legitimate business of the
country, the people at the south will take care of the political and com
mercial slave-drivers who have brought them to disgrace and bank
ruptcy." ' The Independent, December 6, 1860.

•J.0'2, HARPERS FERRY  LINCOLN S INAUGURATION.
to, which was by no means of recent date. So sudden and
so great a fall of prices 1 could be accounted for only by the
feeling that the people had to face a serious and uncertain
future, which made the investment of capital in that form
seem unsafe. The demand lessened and the supply in
creased, because cautious and anxious men in the border
states began to compete with the slave-breeders.2 It was
indisputable that the cause of these phenomena could be
found only in the political situation. But it did not follow
from this that the way the Independent accounted for them
was correct — a thing which the republicans would not at
all admit. The Independent was not trying to deceive it
self, and still less did it try to deceive its readers, as to the
real causes of the panic. Only to the extent that these
lay in actual circumstances did that journal trace them to
the deficiency of the crop and the unhealthy growth of the
plantation system. But it insisted that these causes lay
only to a limited extent in actual circumstances, precisely
because the main cause lay in the political disquiet; for the
latter was not the natural consequence of the political sit
uation, but was artificially produced, spite of it, by unscru
pulous politicians in their impotent and scandalous attempt
to avenge themselves for the defeat they had suffered at
the polls.3 And it was not the radical Independent alone
' In the middle of November the Valley Star said : " No. 1 negroes have
already fallen more than twenty-five per cent., and second and third
rate hands from thirty to fifty per cent." And the Richmond Whig:
" Slaves have depreciated here in Richmond market — the largest slave
market in the Union — some three or four hundred dollars within a
very short period." 28th Annual Rep. of the Amer. Anti-Slav. Soc,
p. 141.
2 The St. Joseph (Mo.) Democrat wrote: "Within ten days not less
than one hundred slaves have been sold in the vicinity and shipped
south. Their owners are panic-struck, and are glad to sell at low
iprices." 1. c.
• " This panic is designed, manufactured, by the basest means, for the

FALSE HOPES. 253-
that wrote in this way. The key-note of the whole re
publican press was the same. All their organs — some in
louder and some in softer tones, some in major and some
in minor — played the same old tune for their readers day
after day, and with only slight variations. Even repre
sentatives of the alarmed business world soon joined their
voices in the chorus.1 Not many ventured to hope any
•longer that South Carolina also would, as the Washington
correspondent of the Independent had written to his paper
on the 12th of November, at least " blow off her steam." 2
But people were still confident that the endeavors of the
basest purposes. It is the poor revenge of disappointed politicians ; it
is the wicked scheming of aspirants for power ; it is the reckless venture
of men who staked their political and commercial stock in the late elec
tion and lost." And in the financial article in the same number: "In
fact there is no more just ground for a panic than for a war with France-
or the czar. . . . This is the secret of the panic: The slave power
undertaking to do through the stock market what it failed to do through'
the ballot-box. Well, gentlemen, you will not succeed. . . . The
truth is, the disunion party, south and north, is so small and insignifi
cant that, if it were not for the noise which it makes, it would never be
suspected of being alive."
l A committee of the board of currency in New York says in a report:
" But secession cannot take place either peaceably or forcibly. There
can be little doubt that a large majority of the people of the south, with
the entire north, will oppose it. It is believed that in no state save
South Carolina are the secessionists in a majority, if indeed they are
there ; but, if such should prove to be the case, they will be utterly
powerless against the united voice of the other states and the power of
the general government. The existing financial embarrassments, then,
have no real cause. They are the results of fears and a distrust of the
future, excited by threats which are not even fraught with real polit
ical dangers, much less with real hazards to the commercial and finan
cial interests of this city. In other words, it is a sheer unreasoning
panic, as ungrounded as the baseless fabric of a vision." The New-
York Tribune, November 23, 1860.
3 He added : " Her senators and representatives will undoubtedly be
here three weeks hence to draw their pay for the congressional recess. 'r
The Independent, November 15, 1860.

254 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Palmetto state to have other states join her in a carnival
of revolution would nowhere prove successful.
How deep this conviction was, was shown by the small
effect produced by a piece of news which had gone the
rounds of the press, some days before the article of the
Independent against the producers of the panic. The New*
York Tribune of the 17th of November had received the
following dispatch from Washington: "Much feeling has
been excited in Georgia by the discovery that the gov
ernor's (Brown's) message was substantially communicated
to the secessionists at Columbia as furnishing a basis for
their action before being sent to the legislature of his own
state. This proceeding looks like a conspiracy to precipi
tate revolution." Such devices of the Fire-eaters l confirm,
'Two southern witnesses may be called to testify here as to how
the masses were worked. The Southern Confederacy (Atlanta, Ga.)
wrote on the 8th of January, 1861, with reference to the elections to
the convention of Georgia: "It is a notable fact, that, wherever the
' Minute Men,' as they are called, have had an organization, those coun
ties have voted, by large majorities, for immediate secession. Those
that they could not control by persuasion and coaxing they dragooned
and bullied by threats, jeers and sneers. By this means thousands of
good citizens were induced to vote the immediate secession ticket
through timidity. Besides, the towns and cities have been flooded with
sensational dispatches and inflammatory rumors, manufactured in
Washington city for the especial occasion. To be candid, there never
has been as much lying and bullying practiced, in the same length of
time, since the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, as has been in the
recent state campaign. The fault has been at Washington city ; from
that cesspool have emanated all the abominations that ever cursed a
free people." The Reb. Rec, L Diary, p. 12. And Etheridge, of Ten
nessee, stated on the 23d of January, in the house of representatives,
that a gentleman whom it was contemplated making clerk of the house
of representatives of the confederacy had said in one of the seceded
states, before the election of delegates to the convention: "Truth will
save the Union. The plan of Lincoln and his advisers is to turn the
•negroes of the south loose, and compel the poor people of the south to
intermarry with them. With this hybrid population, they — the

GEORGIA AND THE POLITICIANS. 255
indeed, the claim of the republicans that the secessionists
were only a minority. But they bore evidence, on the other
hand, that the secessionists, unlike the republicans, did not
look upon that fact as decisive, but expected to obtain their
object notwithstanding it. Moral indignation at the means
they employed was no proof of the incorrectness of this cal
culation, and if the governor of Georgia considered it cor
rect, the republicans surely had every reason to subject
their own calculation again to a thorough examination.
Georgia, to which the other slave states had conceded the
honorable title of the Empire State of the South, was still
proud of the services it believed it had rendered in former
crises to save the Union; it had now chosen the Brecken
ridge electors by only a relative majority, and if among the
most prominent and influential politicians of any of the
cotton states there were men who might be trusted to
struggle with the radicals, they were certainly most likely
to be found in Georgia. If the radical politicians could
manoeuvre Georgia into secession, it was certain that they
would be successful in a similar endeavor in all the other
cotton states. And how could gentlemen in northern edi
torial rooms seriously believe that they were better able
than the governor of the state to judge what was possible
in Georgia? But if Brown had done what he was charged
Yankees — expect to raise cotton for their looms; in fact, to reap the
harvest of the south. But the white people of the south, however poor,
are opposed to amalgamating with negroes; they leave that to the
white people of Massachusetts. We are of the opinion that the attempt
to force amalgamation on the non-slaveholders of the south will be the
most difficult job Mr. Lincoln ever undertook. He may give his own
daughters or his neighbors to buck negroes, but the sentiment is differ
ent here." And then he (Etheridge) continued: " Why, sir, is it not a
matter of history that R. Barnwell Rhett stood in the streets of Charles
ton a few weeks ago announcing to the engaged multitude that the
people of the north had elected a mulatto vice-president?" Congr.
Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 115.

256 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
with, there was, indeed, no explanation of his action but the
one which the correspondent of the Tribune had given, and
that should at last have opened the eyes of the republi
cans to the fundamental error in their whole argument
about the danger of secession. Their reasoning led them
to the result they wished for, solely because it was always
built on one or other of the two premises presented by the
actual circumstances of the south. If they had had to con
sider only the conspiracy of the politicians or only the spon
taneous movement among the masses, their hope that the
Union would be preserved, or, at least, that only South Car
olina would make an attempt at secession, would have had
a broad and firm foundation. But the answering of these
questions had only a theoretical interest, since they had
not been actually raised. The question was: What is to
be expected from the co-operation of the conspiracy of the
politicians and the spontaneous movement among the
masses; that is, what use will the politicians be able to
make of the latter? And all the circumstances that came
into consideration allowed only one answer, viz.: The only
limit to what they will be able to do is what they will will
to do. But, so far as that was concerned, South Carolina
was no longer the only state whose politicians had begun
to follow up their words by decisive acts.
Governor Pettus had called the legislature of Mississippi
to meet in extraordinary session on the 19th of November.
He had, at the same time, invited the United States senators
and federal representatives of the state to meet him at
Jackson some days before the convention in order to
confer with him as to what he should recommend to the
legislature regarding secession. Not all who were invited
appeared, and the views of those present were divided.
Some wished, as Beuben Davis relates, to make the com
mon action of the slave states, or at least the simultaneous

the planter states and secession. 257
withdrawal of eight other states, a condition. The motion
of Reuben Davis, however, that the governor should rec
ommend the legislature to call a convention to resolve, in
dependently of the other slave states, to secede immediately
from the Union, and to carry the resolution into effect im
mediately, was adopted by four votes.1 After this resolu
tion had been passed, Pettus informed the gentlemen that
Governor Pickens had telegraphed him asking his opinion
as to whether secession should be carried into effect at
once or not until the 4th of March. The answer was given
in the resolution just passed, and the same four votes de
cided accordingly.
Although, with the exception, of course, of the calling
of the legislature, nothing was yet known of these things,
people had become gradually doubtful of the planter states.2
Even the New Tork Tribune acknowledged that this doubt
was well founded (November 24th), but thought that the
movement had in them an essentially different character
from that in South Carolina, viz. : To frighten the north
into the surrender of constitutional rights. This view was
not entirely unfounded. The powerful speech which Alex
ander H. Stephens had delivered for the Union on the 14th
of November before the legislature of Georgia, had, in his
opinion, so little effect, because people approved what
T. R. R. Cobb had said two days before: "We can make
better terms out of the Union than in it." Stephens was
of opinion that at least two-thirds of those who had voted
in Georgia for secession had done so because convinced
that that was the surest way to a reconstruction of the
1 Pettus, O. R. Singleton, W. Barksdale and R. Davis.
2R. Davis, Recollections of Mississippi and Mississippians, p. 890 ff.
Of his first resolution, Davis himself says: " It was practically a dec
laration of war."
17

258
Union on an improved foundation.1 Reuben Davis says
that, in the Mississippi convention, many brainless dema
gogues and loquacious politicians made extensive use of
this argument.2 According to the testimony of an anony
mous witness, Benjamin believed that the ablest of the
leaders were really pursuing this end;8 and the commis
sioner from Mississippi who wanted to induce Maryland to
call a secession convention assured the citizens of Balti
more (December 19th) that that was all that was aimed at.4
But how if this calculation proved wrong, and the north
did not yield to the pressure? Did the New Tork Tribune,
which was arguing with commendable energy that it should
not, imagine that then the ordinances of secession would
be repealed? If anything was certain, it was that even
those who were for secession, only because they expected
by its means to pave the way for such a reorganization of
the Union as the slavocracy desired, would not speak a sin
gle word in favor of their repeal. The step was irrevoca
ble because, on the one hand, it could not, in this case, be
1 The War between the States, II, p. 321.
2 " Many of them said openly, this is but a demonstration inviting
concession, which concession will be promptly made, and the disrupted
Union fully restored within the next twelve months." Recollections,
etc., p. 403.
8 Senator Benjamin's diagnosis of the position is " that the leaders of
the inchoate confederacy are no more at one in their ultimate plans
and purposes than, according to my best information, are the leaders
in South Carolina. Mr. Benjamin thinks that the ablest of them really
regard the experiment of a new confederation as an effectual means of
bringing the conservative masses of the northern people to realize the
necessity of revising radically the instrument of union." The Diary
of a Public Man, under date of January 13, 1861. The North Amer.
Rev., August, 1879, p. 134.
* " Secession is not intended to break up the present government, but
to perpetuate it. . . . Our plan is for the southern states to withdraw
from the Union, for the present, to allow amendments to the constitu
tion to be made, guaranteeing our just rights." Reb. Rec, I, Diary, p. 3.

THE BORDER STATES. ' 259
retraced, and, on the other, because the concessions which
would have been looked upon as sufficient were out of the
question. Gilmer, of North Carolina, said in the house
of representatives, that to secede, in order to bring about
a better organization of the Union, was like repairing one's
watch with the powerful blows of a sledge-hammer; it was
a lying pretense of the secessionists to bait the masses who
would refuse to have anything to do with them if they
confessed their real aims.
Even after people had become accustomed to the idea
that the cotton states, conditionally or unconditionally,
would secede, they felt quite sure of the border states. If
"the new northern confederacy " recognized slavery in its
constitution, or if it only preserved the present constitution,
said the Washington correspondent of the Independent in
the same article in which he had for the first time admitted
that there was serious danger to the UnioD, secession would
certainly be confined to the five cotton states.1 For this
hope, too, there was sufficient foundation in actual circum
stances, to make it easily intelligible how, as the wish is
father to the thought, it might be considered well founded.
The interests of the border states and of the cotton states
were identical neither with respect to slavery nor to the
question of secession; they were, in fact, in direct conflict
with one another.
With regard to the slave-holding interest, there were
material differences in the border states themselves. Dela
ware, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee and a part of Virginia,
out of which West Virginia was formed, may be looked
upon, in the main, as a homogeneous group.2 The rest of
1 The Independent, November 29, 1860.
2 To it belongs also the part of North Carolina which lay in the region
called Alleghania. J. W. Taylor, in his Alleghania, p. 1 (according to
the St. Paul Press), reckons as belonging to this region, " the Switzer
land of the south," thirteen counties of North Carolina, three of South

2ii0 harper's ferry — Lincoln s inauguration.
Virginia occupied a position peculiar to itself. Maryland
belonged to it by the powerful minority of its population,
and to the above-mentioned group by the large majority.
For the latter, slavery was by no means of vital interest,
for economic life was nowhere based on it completely, and,
for the most part, it either played an insignificant role in
it or was utterly insignificant.1 Hence the disposition to
risk all for the sake of slavery was confined in these states
to a small fraction of the population, while the number of
those was large who had nothing left for it. The larger
half of Virginia and an influential class in Maryland were,
on the other hand, interested in it as much as the cotton
states, although in a very different way. The former were
the producers and the latter the consumers, and, precisely
because they were the producers, they must be injured by
a confederacy based on slavery even more directly than
the other border states.
Carolina, twenty of Georgia, fifteen of Alabama, and twenty-six of
Tennessee, an area of eighty-five thousand eight hundred and thirty-five
English square miles. Page 16. See, also, Olmstead, Journey in the Back
Country, and the anonymous book, The Effect of Secession upon the
Commercial Relations between the North and the South, and upon each
Section, especially pages 66 and 69.
' According to the census of 1860, there were in Tennessee, out of a
total population of 1,109,801, 275,719 slaves; in twenty-nine of the
eighty-four counties, however, the slave population was less than 1,000;
the twenty-nine counties had in a total population of 138,623 only 13,997
slaves. In Kentucky the proportions were Btill more favorable, and the
difference between the different parts of the state was still greater :
225,483 slaves in a total population of 1,155,684; in forty-five out of the
one hundred and nine counties, the slave population was under 1.000;
in the forty-five counties there were 17,926 slaves in a total population
of 328,447. As a slave state, Missouri was in a dying condition; only
114,931 slaves in a total population of 1,182,012. In seventy-seven of the
one hundred and thirteen counties the number of slaves was under 1,000 ;
the seventy-seven counties had 20,972 slaves in a total population of
509,572. Delaware, with a total population of 113,316, had only 1,798
slaves.

THE COURSE OF SECESSION. 261
That the seceded states x would immediately form a confed
eracy had been looked upon from the first as self-evident.
But it was just as self-evident that slavery would be the
basis of that confederacy. This has, it is well known, been
violently disputed. It has even been attempted to deny
that slavery was the cause of secession at all. He who
has the slightest knowledge of the history of the conflict
can, of course, only characterize such a denial as absurd.
There is, however, no lack of direct, unimpeachable wit
nesses of the truth of the statement. The pretended viola
tions of law with respect to slavery constitute the list of
grievances in the ordinances of secession. That of Missis
sippi expressly mentions slavery as the cause of secession.2
And not the politicians only without exception but their
spiritual guides told the people, clearly and emphatically
as it could be told them, that it was the cause. "We en
treat our readers," wrote the Southern Presbyterian (Colum
bia, S. C.) on the 15th of December, " to let nothing mislead
them on this point. The real contest now in hand between
the north and the south is for the preservation or destruc
tion of slavery." 3 A year later the general assembly of the
Presbyterian church in the Confederate States characterized
slavery, in an address to all the churches of the world, as
the root of all the controversies which had finally involved
the country in the horrors of an unnatural war.4 If the
' Texas alone, perhaps, excepted, if Houston rightly judged the feel
ing of its population, which, however, seems not to have been the case.
See his letter of the 2d of January, 1861, to J. M. Calhoun, the commis
sioner of Alabama. Magazine of Amer. Hist., XII, pp. 365-369.
2 " Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery.
. . . There was no choice left us but submission to the mandates of
abolition, or a dissolution of the Union." Journal of the State Conven
tion, p. 86.
3 Stanton, The Church and Slavery, p. 187.
4 " In addition to this, there is one difference which so radically and
fundamentally distinguishes the north and the south, that it is becom-

262 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
south had broken the old national alliance on account of
slavery, it could not, if it would be consistent, help basing
the new national alliance, as the bishops of the Episcopal
church bad announced in a pastoral letter, on slavery.1
What the Confederate — in contrast with those who hoped
and expected that the west would not go with the north
but with the south — also wrote was, therefore, logical,
viz.: that "to admit any free state or a state partly free
into our confederacy would be suicidal." 2
But if the confederacy was based upon slavery, it would
have to come to the resumption of the African slave trade^
This has not only been disputed, but would seem to be
refuted by the fact that the African slave trade was pro
hibited by the Montgomery constitution. But what the
southerner, Holt,3 wrote has never been, and never can be,
refuted : " It is well understood that this step has been
taken as a mere measure of policy for the purpose of im
pressing the border states and of conciliating the Euro
pean powers. The ultimate legislation of this trade by a
republic professing to be based upon African servitude
must follow as certainly as does the conclusion from the
ing every day more and more apparent that the religious (!) as well as
the secular interests of both will be more effectually promoted by a
complete and lasting separation. The antagonism of northern and
southern sentiment on the subject of slavery lies at the root of all tlie
difficulties which have resulted in the dismemberment of the federal
Union, and involved us in the horrors of an unnatural war." Stanton,
The Church and the Rebellion, pp. 51, 52.
' "The systems of labor which prevail in Europe, and which are, in
many respects, more severe than ours, are so arranged as to prevent the
separation of parents and children, and of husbands and wives ; and a
very little care upon our part would rid the system upon which we
are about to plant our national life of these unchristian features."
November 22, 1862, Stanton, The Church and Slavery, p. 181.
2 The Confederate, No. 12, p. 99.
3 The postmaster-general was from Kentucky.

THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE. 263
premises of a mathematical proposition."1 The Charles
ton Mercury protested immediately (February 12) against
that provision. The development of the country might im
peratively demand the importation of slaves, and it was,
therefore, " short-sighted, weak and sentimental " for the
people to tie their hands by a constitutional enactment of
that kind.2 T. S. Gourdin, of Florida, threw away even
the little cloak of diplomacy in which the Mercury had
wrapped its protest. In the bluntest way he accused con
gress of gross inconsistency.3 And L. W. Spratt not only
convicted it (congress) of this, but proved to it that by
such pusillanimous concessions to the moral sentiments of
the rest of the world, it undermined the very foundations
1 Letter of J. Holt to J. F. Speed, Washington, May 31, 1861, p. 27.
2 " We deem it also unfortunate and mal a propos that the stigma
of illegitimacy and illegality should be placed upon the institution of
slavery by a fundamental law against the slave trade. In our opinion
it is a matter of policy, and not of principle, to be decided now and
hereafter, from sound views of the necessity and safety of our peoples.
We think it a proper subject of legislation. We are willing to prohibit
it by legal enactment like any other topic of legislation. But while
England imports her thousands of Coolie slaves, and France hers, under
the farcical appellation of ' apprentices,' — while they are striving by
these means to compete with us and supersede us in producing the
tropical productions of slave labor, — while we have within' our reach a
large scope of fertile territory uncultivated in Texas, and may have
long the silver mines of Arizona, and the teeming states of Mexico, to
populate and reduce to agricultural productiveness, — it seems to us
short-sighted, weak and sentimental to preclude forever, by funda
mental enactment, the adoption of a policy that may become essential
to our appropriate growth and expansion, and to our successful compe
tition with the hypocritical nations of Europe."
8 " If we believe slavery to be morally right, and find it to our inter
est to keep up the institution, let us be manly enough to maintain our
principles in opposition to the rest of the world. But for God's sake,
and the sake of consistency, do not let us form a union for the express
purpose of maintaining and propagating African slavery, and then, as
the southern congress has done, confess our error by enacting a con-

264 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
of the structure to be erected.1 The cotton states, he
said, could not make use of free workmen. They would
become the mortal enemies of slavery, and, at last, it
would be impossible to defend one's self against them.
Slavery and democracy could not share the supremacy
with one another. Even in Charleston the undermining
of the slavocratic order of society had already made
alarming progress, and it would continue uninterrupted
throughout the whole country if the cotton states were
kept from getting the laborers they needed. The policy
entered upon by that constitutional provision must, there
fore, be reversed by a second revolution.8 To such an ex-
stitutional provision abolishing the African slave trade." 28th Am.
Rep. of the Amer. Anti-Slav. Soc, p. 67.
' " If, as some asserted, at the outset of our career, it were wise to ex
hibit deference to the moral sentiment of the world, the obligation is as
perfect to respect the moral sentiment of the world against the institu
tion. The world is jusf as instant to assert that slavery itself is wrong ;
and if we forego the slave-trade in consideration of the mosal feeling of
the world, then why not slavery also? We cannot dodge the issue; we
cannot safely change our front in the face of a vigilant adversary. Every
intellectual or political evasion is a point against us. We may postpone
the crisis by disguises, but the slave republic must forego its nature and
its destiny, or it must meet the issue, and our assertion of ourselves will
not be easier for admissions made against us. And is it not, in fact,
from a sense of weakness that there is such admission? " 1. c.
2 " Thence another revolution. It may be painful, but we must
make it. The constitution cannot be changed without it. It is doubt
ful if another movement will be so peaceful, but no matter. . . .
That slavery, as sent forth by the southern congress, like the Thracian
horse returning from the field of victory, still bears a master on his
back, and, having achieved one revolution to escape democracy at the
north, it must still achieve another to escape it at the south." The
Charleston Mercury, February 13, 1861. On March 2, Brabson, of
Tennessee, said in the house of representatives: "Mr. Spratt is not
the only one in South Carolina who is now agitating the question of
seceding from the southern confederacy unless the African slave-
trade is constitutionally recognized." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th
Congr., App., p. 294.

VIRGINIA AND THE SLAVE TRADE. 265
tent, therefore, was slavery the cause of the whole struggle
that, simultaneously with the origin of the confederacy, rev
olution was demanded in the revolution, because even this
slavocratic alliance would not give full satisfaction to the
slavocratic interest — would not, certainly, in great measure,
but in great measure only or partly, because it recognized
that it could not. But if ever the time came when it could,
that is, when consideration for the border states and re
gard for European powers need no longer control it, it
would certainly have to give the slavocratic interest full
satisfaction, if it wished to avoid a new revolution. Even
the words of the Confederate quoted above were not " the
whole truth." Slavery would have to remain the seed of
the dragon, in the confederacy founded upon it, and the
fomenters of secession had recognized this long ago. When
South Carolina was yet the only seceded state, Orr had
said that " the most earnest and best heads " desired no
very close connection with the gulf states which had sucked
away so much of their (slave) blood, and that they would
be glad if the state could remain all by itself, like Rhode
Island after the adoption of the constitution.1 The con
stitution prohibited the importation of slaves, but actual
overmastering circumstances would compel the slavocratic
republic to allow Pickett's demand in its future programme :
Prohibition of white immigration (the rich and talented
excepted) and free access to the African slave market —
" should the south have four times the slaves as free men
it will be none too many."2
But to Virginia the resumption of the African slave trade
meant economic ruin. True, here also slavery lay under
a, heavy weight on account of a steady drain ; for, although
'The Diary of a Public Man, The North Amer. Rev., August, 1879,
p. 128.
2 The Existing Revolution, p. 12.

266 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the absolute number of slaves still grew slowly, their rela
tive number diminished constantly and rapidly.1 But the
raising of slaves was, none the less, one of the most impor
tant and most remunerative sources of acquisition of the
state, and as soon as the African market became accessible,
these commodities would be wholly unsalable because of
their too high price. The Richmond Enquirer, therefore,
had, when the southern convention in Montgomery in 1858
had declared in favor of the reopening of the slave trade, ex
pressed the opinion that it would be more advantageous for
Virginia, in case the Union were dissolved, to join the north,
because it would then receive a large amount from the south
for its slaves, and because the value of its land would rise
in consequence of immigration from the north, while, in a
southern confederacy which allowed the African slave trade,
it would lose two-thirds of the value of the slaves and would
witness no increase iu the value of its land.2
It might indeed be an error that in case of the forma
tion of a southern confederacy the slave-holders of the
border states would, as such, find their interests best guarded
in the northern federation. But it was entirely undoubted
'Increase of the slaves from 1830-1860 about five per cent., of free
men forty-three per cent. The Effect of Secession upon the Commercial
Relations, etc., p. 43.
2 The Edinburg Review, October, 1858, p. 571. Iverson, indeed, now
drew the opposite conclusion. Virginia and Maryland, he said, must
be reckoning without their host, if through fear of the reopening
of the African slave trade they recoiled from passing a resolution
of secession. Precisely in case the confederacy were limited to the
planter states, would he not guaranty that that would not happen
which was not otherwise to be dreaded. Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th
Congr., p. 51. Governor Gist had already shown in his message to the
legislature of South Carolina how that question could be used to exer
cise the greatest pressure in the border states : Prohibit the importation
of slaves from states not members of the southern confederacy, " and
the only alternative left them will be emancipation by their own act, or
oy the action of their confederates."

THE BOEDER STATES AND SECESSION. 267
that both the slave-holders and non-slave-holders of the
border states would, of all southerners, gain least and lose
most by the dissolution of the Union, no matter in what
way that dissolution took place. The border states were
the connecting tissue between the two halves, so firmly
united by material and ideal interests to both that the
severing of the bond must have the effect of an incision
made into the very center of life. And not only was the
incision deepest here, but the feeling was here greatest;
for on the relation of this part of the republic to the whole
jt depended that the Union was not only a political rela
tion, but had also become an economic and social fact,
and had become such more and more with every passing
year. If the border states left the Union, they would do
so only for the sake of the slave-holding interest, and yet
the latter must be injured most directlyland most seriously
by the separation. Its only well-grounded complaint was
with regard to fugitive slaves, and, precisely in this respect,
it would deprive itself of all protection by secession. And to
the bad bargain of complete unprotectedness for sufficient
protection there would have been added, in all probability,
the whole series of annoyances and vexations to which a
border region may be subjected by an unfriendly neighbor.
The slave-holders could calculate least of all on being
spared, and they might be injured most easily and seriously.
But the vexations and burthensome economic dependence
on the north would not be put an end to at a single blow
by secession. Under the vital laws of a confederacy based
entirely on slavery, the development of an industry of their
own, by the border states, would be entirely impossible, and
even if the claim, that free trade would afford full compensa
tion for the connections they had hitherto had with the north,
proved correct, it could be only after a long lapse of time.
This was true especially of credit, in which the dependence

268 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
they felt so galling found the most pregnant and most sig
nificant expression. Such far-reaching transformations of
economic life, combined with extensive changes in the high
ways of trade, cannot be completed in a day, and existing
interests all suffer heavily from them.1
The bargain would have been still worse, of course,
for the border states, if secession led to war. They would
then become the theater of war, and that meant double and
treble taxes on property and blood, and affliction of every
kind. The revolution would have been made by the planter
states in their own interests, but the border states would
have to pay the lion's share of the bill.
All this was clearly understood and fully appreciated in
the border states. Erroneous, therefore, as was the asser
tion made by the Independent, on the 6th of December, that
South Carolina would not find any imitators unless they were
procured for her by the employment of force,2 it was en
tirely probable that the border states would maintain an
expectant attitude, so long as no coercive measures were re
sorted to. Governor Hicks rejected the revolutionary solic
itations of the commissioner of Mississippi, with the declara
tion that Maryland, although it unquestionably belonged
to the south by its way of thinking, institutions and cus
toms, would not raise a finger against the Union until all
constitutional means had been exhausted and it had become
certain that the rights of the slave states were no longer to
be respected, and that it would act only in concert with
' Our belonging to the confederacy, contended Clemens, of Virginia,
must be of disadvantage to it or to us ; that is an inevitable conse
quence of the connective intermediate position of the border states.
Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 105.
2 " There is no chronic idiocy in any other southern state, as a whole.
except in South Carolina, and therefore no other southern state is going
out of the Union, unless such an event be precipitated by an unhappy
attempt to coerce her to stay in."

THE POSITION OF KENTUCKY. 269"
the other border states, " since we and they, in the event of
any dismemberment of the Union, will suffer more than all
others combined."1 Governor Magoffin issued an address
to the people of Kentucky in which, on the one hand, he
told the states anxious to secede: "We cannot sustain you
in this movement merely on account of the election of
Lincoln," and implored them, on the other, not to desert
Kentucky "in her exposed, perilous border condition."2
Virginia, too, which by reason of its power, geographical
situation, and more especially its historical position in the
Union, was by far the most important, had earlier shown
itself reserved and cautious when overtures were made to it
by South Carolina, and it did not yet cast off its reserve,
although the governor sympathized with the secessionists,
and the legislature convoked by him in extraordinary ses
sion had decided in favor of the holding of a convention.
The Fire-eaters, therefore, had never expected the enthu
siastic adherence of the border states, and, in part, had not
desired it. The reason for this had been given as early as
on the 7th of June, by J. Townsend, with the utmost frank
ness, in a speech at St. John's Colleton,3 South Carolina.
The formation of the confederacy, he said, must follow on
the heels of the republican victory at the polls, in order
that its entire governmental apparatus may be complete
and in a condition to meet every demand at the time of
Lincoln's inauguration.4 That the border states would not
join it, was true, but that was no valid objection. On the
'Dec. 19, Reb. Rec, I Doc, p.'l.
2 Greeley, The American Conflict, I, pp. 340, 341.
' Printed under the title, The South should Govern the South.
4 Yancey had said as early as July 8, 1859, in Columbia, that, in case
a republican was elected, " the only hope of the south is a withdrawal
from the Union before he shall be inaugurated, and the sword and the
treasury of the federal government shall be placed in the keeping of
that party." The New York Tribune, July 20, 1859.

270 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
¦contrary. Ultimately — he meant a few years — they would
•unite with the confederacy, and, from the first, it would
derive greater advantages from their sympathies and from
their influence in the Union than if they belonged to it.
" They will form a barrier between us and our enemies
should they attempt hostile aggression ; thus allowing us
time to get everything ready, and to stand firmly on our
feet." On the 7th of November a Virginian had confessed
the same views in joy-intoxicated Charleston. Edmund
Ruffin was an enthusiastic secessionist, and hence he de
clared that, as a Virginian, he regretted that his state had
not gone as far as South Carolina. But as the circum
stances were different, it was, perhaps, better that Virginia
and all the other border states should remain quiet, "to
serve as a guard against the north." By remaining in the
Union for the time being, they would prevent both hostile
laws and any attempt at subjection. The first drop of
blood shed on the soil of South Carolina would, however,
bring Virginia and all the other slave states to its side.1
So far at least as Virginia was concerned, this was cer
tainly right, and the fact that it was right weighed more
than all the consequences which could flow from the oppo
sition of interests between the border and cotton states, for
it must finally become the decisive element. But this was
ignored, or not sufficiently appreciated, by the republicans.
Consideration for the border states, and especially for Vir
ginia, made them now sail in the dead-water of Buchanan's
policy of passivity, and kept their arms tied, even after the
4th of March. Negotiations were resorted to, because it
was considered possible that the border states would finally
•consent to abate their demands to the minimum which could
be agreed upon and keep them in the Union, and it was not
recognized that nothing would be gained if that hope were
'Greeley, The Amer. Confl., I, pp. 335, 336.

GOVERNOR LETCHER'S DECLARATION. 271
fulfilled. Any agreement that could be reached would nec
essarily remain a dead letter, because it was impossible to
hold the border states, or at least Virginia, unless the planter
states were won back. But this could not be done, even
by concessions far exceeding what the Douglas democrats
themselves had considered the extreme limit. It could be
accomplished, if at all, only by complete submission. If
the north would neither agree to this nor let the planter
states go, it would at last have to proceed to action, do
its duty, and enforce in some way what it considered right.
But the attempt to do so would be a great stimulant to the
secessionists in all the border states, and would doubtless
lead immediately to a decision in Virginia. For a long
time it had allowed much less doubt to exist on this point
than on its wish to see the dissolution of the Union avoided
by new concessions to the slavocracy. In the message
which he sent to the legislature when it met, on the 7th of
January, Governor Letcher declared that he would look
upon the attempt of federal troops to march through Vir
ginia, in order to employ force against a southern state, as
an invasion which must be repelled by force. Hence, the
principal object which the compromise negotiations had
been seeking to obtain since the middle of January could
not be reached ; they could have only one result, and that
result they must have: to leave the planter states ample
time to pile accomplished fact on accomplished fact, and,
as Townsend had said, to be ready, when Lincoln entered
office, to begin the struggle.
The reason why this was not recognized while its rec
ognition might have been turned to account, was, in great
part, because, so far as the moral and legal considerations
of the south were concerned, the republicans never, in their
speculation on what it would probably do or not do, really
look the slavocratic point of view, but always substituted

272 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
their own, more or less, for it. The fact now made itself
terribly felt that, in both respects, the thought and feeling
of the two sides had gradually diverged so greatly that the
capacity for understanding one another had been, to a great
extent, lost. The republicans would have calculated more
correctly if, on one essential point, they had not done much
more justice to the south than must have often seemed they
did, from their words. Because they knew that the ambi
tion of unprincipled demagogues played, after all, only a
comparatively subordinate part in the secession movement,
and that the morality and religiousness of the southern
population were, on the average, not inferior to those of
any other people,1 — because they knew this, no reasoning
and no facts could overcome their feeling that moral re
pugnance to hoisting the black flag of revolution at the
risk of raising also the red flag of civil war, for the sake of
the immoral institution, must finally be victorious. But the
foundation of this feeling was a view of the institution of
slavery which had alienated the whole south — with a few
exceptions in the border states — to such an extent that the
moral basis of the political standpoint of their northern op
ponents irritated them most sorely. The churches, wrote
one of the elders of the Presbyterian church in Georgia, in
April, 1861, have done more than the politicians2 to bring
about the revolution. They have been instruments of God
and should not now abandon their own grand creation. The
success of the politicians was due chiefly to the support
they had received from the moral feeling of the people.
The churches must consummate what they had begun.'
' At least of the in any way influential classes, and even of the small
land-owners, notwithstanding their low degree of education.
2 Stanton thinks that it was probably Thomas R. R. Cobb, afterwards
a general in the Confederate army, who fell in December, 1862.
' " This revolution has been accomplished mainly by the churches.

THE CHURCHES AND SECESSION. 273
There was no need of the exhortation. And the nearer the
time approached when all reins and hearts would be tried,
the more devotedly and zealously did the preachers do their
"duty," not only as "patriots," but also as men of God
called and commanded to announce the will of the Most
High to the people. JSTo medieval monk ever carried wood
to the stake at which heretics were burned for the greater
glory of God more fully satisfied that they were doing Him
a service than did these apostles of Christ when they bore
the logs of their coarse biblical learning to the revolutionary
fire and poured the oil of their ethical authority on its flames.
So thoroughly had they preached themselves into a belief in
their doctrine of the moral and religious nature of slavery
that they could not be silent, for, even before South Caro
lina had seceded, the Presbyterian synod of the state had
proclaimed it its duty before God and man, not only to go
with it, but to lead it with prayer and benediction.1 True
I do not undervalue the name, and position, and ability of politicians ;
still I am sure that our success is chiefly attributable to the support
which they derived from the co-operation of the moral sentiment of the
country. Without that, embodying, as it obviously did, the will of God,
the enterprise would have been a failure. . . . Let the church know
this and realize her strength. She should not abandon her own grand
creation. She should not leave the creature of her prayers and labors
to the contingencies of the times, or the tender mercies of less con
scientious patriots. She should consummate what she has begun."
Southern Presbyterian, April 20, 1861. Cited in Stanton, The Church
and the Rebellion, pp. 197, 198.
' " But there is now a grave and solemn question before the people
of this state, affecting its very life and beingas a 6tate, and that ques
tion, of course, has its religious aspect and relations, upon which this
body is perfectly competent to speak. . . . There is involved, at
this immediate juncture, a duty to God who gave us our rights — a
duty to our ancestors, whose blood and suffering procured them for
us — a duty to our children, whose precious inheritance we may not
waste nor defile, and a duty to our very slaves, whom men that know
them not, nor care for them as we do, would take from our protection.
18

274 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
there was not the least trace of the Puritanic glow of con
viction in this spirit, but there was not a little of the fanati
cism of the southern priest who goes before the storming
column with uplifted crucifix. And precisely because sobei
thought was not able to assert itself against the overpower-
ful voice of feeling, the masses had not the slightest doubt
that their religious armor should be sound and strong.
To follow critically the commentaries of the Reverend
Th. Stringfellow on Colossians, III, 22, and similar biblical
texts, they had as little inclination as they had calling and
capacity; but when the doctor of theology who was so
thoroughly versed in the Bible cried out that hostility to
slavery was "high-handed rebellion against God," and
called it a " scandal," l that it was necessary to tell a Chris-
The synod has no hesitation, therefore, in expressing the belief that the
people of South Carolina are now solemnly called on to imitate their
Revolutionary forefathers, and stand up for their rights. We have an
humble and abiding confidence that that God whose truth we repre
sent in this conflict will be with us, and exhorting our churches and
people to put their trust in God, and go forward in the solemn path ot
duty which his Providence opens before them, we, ministers and elders
of the Presbyterian church in South Carolina synod assembled, would
give them our benediction, and the assurance that we shall fervently
and unceasingly implore for them the care and protection of Almighty
God." The New York Tribune, December 7, 1860.
' " Is all that He (Christ) felt, and all that He did, in reference to
¦slavery, infinitely right and infinitely perfect? If He was ' God mani
fested in the flesh,' this must be so. And if this be so, then there is in
our country the most daring and high-handed rebellion against God,
on this subject, that has ever been practiced since He said, ' Ye are my
friends, if ye do whatever I say unto you.' The principle of subordina
tion, sought to be overthrown, is vital in church and state. The infidel
principle of ' freedom and equality,' sought to be established on its
ruins, is unknown to the Bible, contradicted by all experience, and sub
versive of all government among men.
" Hoping that God in his providence will make me an humble instru
ment in opening the eyes of some such, I have penned these pages. 1
feel that the necessity for such an effort is a scandal to a Christian peo-

THE eight of secession. 275
tian people so, they could fully understand him: they felt
certain that they were marching and fighting under a con
secrated banner.
It was the same with respect to the legal question. That
secession was in a certain sense revolution was, for the most
part, not questioned even by the Fire-eaters. They claimed
the right of secession asserted by them, not as a right under
the constitution, that is, as a right deducible from the con
stitution. This, however, does not mean that secession was
considered politically and morally justifiable only under
the given circumstances, or that only a right in the sense
of the general right of revolution on which the Declaration
of Independence was based was had in view. They de
duced it from the sovereignty of the states as a positive
right, older than the constitution and above the constitu
tion, and on this point the immense majority of the rest of
the population of the southern states was in the fullest
agreement with them. Even those who under the existing
circumstances did not consider secession justified were con
vinced than when a convention chosen ad hoc by the people
resolved on it, it became absolutely legal and binding on
the Union and all the citizens of.the state. On this account,
the opposition was almost throughout only a conditional
one, and, as a rule, this was expressed as clearly and em
phatically as Stephens bad expressed it in his Union speech
of the 14th of November, a speech which really gushed
from the very depths of his heart. The number of those
was great to whom obedience to the-command of the state
was difficult, but, save a small minority — a few in the
border states excepted — they did not hesitate a moment,
for they had no question that they owed it. But this, too,
that it was their most sacred conviction that allegiance to
pie ; for certain I am that no article of the Christian faith is better sus
tained by the Bible than is that of slavery." Th. Stringfellow, Slavery,
1 1.-. Origin, Nature and History, pp. 49 and 51.

276 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the state was paramount to all duties to the Union, was not
understood at the north — especially by the republicans —
and was at first not believed. To-day no one will deny
that this conviction was real. Secession was looked upon,
in the planter states, as rebellion, only by an evanescent
minority, and hence there was in the revolution a powerful
moral force. However southern individuals may have
looked upon the question of secession politically, the mo
ment it had been decided in the manner considered legal,
and the Union grasped the sword, all believed that they
should stand up for their rights against brutal, unlawful
force.1 But the moral force in the revolution upset all the
calculations of the republicans based on the absence of
capital, industry, arms, etc., and w7ould have done so even
if every southerner had not been, so to speak, born to arms.
A population of millions, high-minded and courageous,
spread over a boundless territory, filled with such convic
tions, would have under any circumstances developed a
great power of resistance, and would probably, under any
circumstances, have considered themselves unconquerable.
1 In North Carolina, Governor Ellis and the majority of the legisla
ture belonged to the more radical slavocracy, and hence a convention
was called. The people, however, not only chose a strong majority of
"Union men " but also declared that the convention should not meet.
After the taking of Fort Sumter, however, it met and unanimously re
solved on secession on the 20th of May. Journal of the Convention of
the People of North Carolina in Raleigh, pp. 15, 16. In consequence of
a resolution of the legislature of New York which tendered money and
men to the president, the legislature of Tennessee resolved " To inform
the executive of the state of New York, through the governor, that it is
the opinion of this general assembly that whenever the authorities of
that state shall send armed forces to the south for the purpose indicated
(coercing certain sovereign states of the south into obedience to the fed
eral government) in said resolutions, the people of Tennessee, uniting
with their brethren of the south, will, as one man, resist such invasion
of the soil of the south, at all hazards, and to the last extremity." Congr.
Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 572.

A FALSE ASSUMPTION. 277
The last and deepest reason of the illusion that the
masses of the south would forsake their leaders was, how
ever, the assumption of the republicans that the revolution
was groundless. Was it conceivable that the selfishness
and desire for supremacy of a numerically small aristoc
racy, and the ambition of certain politicians, would, in the
face of an undisputed and indisputably legal presidential
election, which amounted to the maintenance of the status
quo, be able to make the masses forget the principle of the
supremacy of the law which generations had made part of
their flesh and blood ? The programme of the republican
party went in no way counter to the possessory rights of
the slave-holding interests, and Lincoln would not have been
able to go counter to them even if he had wished to do so.
In the United States the party to which the president be
longs is wont to be called, and to a great extent is really
considered, the "ruling" party, although the people are
very well aware that it is by no means always so. Prop
erly speaking, there is no ruling party except when the
president and the majority of both houses belong to the
same party. If that is not the case, and if the same party
has a majority in both houses of congress, it has the better
claim to the title. " All " legislative power belonging to the
Union has been granted to congress. The president can
not strike an iota out of the laws in force or add anything
to them ; he has only, to a certain extent, the power to
prevent congress changing the existing legal situation by
the repeal of existing laws or the passage of new laws.
The utmost, therefore, that a president whose wishes and
endeavors are not in harmony with those of congress can
do, in a legislative respect, is to maintain the status quo
during his term of office. Lincoln would have found him
self in this situation if the Union had continued. In the
new elections to the house of representatives, the demo
crats had made important gains, so that Andrew Johnson

278 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
figured out a majority of twenty -seven ' and Alexander H.
Stephens one of thirty 2 votes against Lincoln ; and, in the
senate, although the democrats there had lost some votes,
the republicans were in the minority by four votes. Hostile
legislative measures were, therefore, entirely impossible,
so long as the radical slavocracy did not create a pos.
sibility of them by helping the republicans to a major
ity by secession. The south, therefore, had it entirely
in its own power to prevent every step backward — I
mean from its standpoint — in a legal manner, and to
renew the struggle for further concessions. Even with re
spect to the appointment to offices, so far as the more
important positions were concerned, Lincoln would have
been entirely under the control of the senate through the
right of confirmation. Hence Douglas was scarcely guilty
of exaggeration when he said that a high-minded people
should look upon a president bound in such a way rather
as an object of pity than of alarm.3
Several southern speakers and papers frankly admitted
that Lincoln's utter inability to pursue a hostile policy to
wards the slave-holding interest, with any success, could
not be questioned. But it was declared, even by the con
servatives, who demanded a " fair trial " for his adminis
tration, that it would be very difficult to obtain it.4 The
radicals asserted with the Richmond Enquirer (November
19th) that what the president could or could not do had
'Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 117.
2 Cleveland, Alex. H. Stephens, p. 697. See, also, the address of the
Pine Street Meeting in New York in M. Dix, Memoirs of John Adam
Dix, I, p. 352.
8 Letter of the 13th of November to some gentlemen in New Orleans
who had asked him to deliver a speech. The New York Tribune, No
vember 20, 1860.
'Thus, for instance, the Norfolk (Va.) Herald of November 9tli
writes: "The election of Mr. Lincoln, in itself, is not calculated i •¦
cause any alarm at the south, and, indeed, the probability is thai

THE REPUBLICAN PROGRAMME. 279
no bearing on the main question ; the programme of the
republican party was a declaration of war, and the war had
actually begun with the election of the 6th of November.1
This was true in a certain sense; and just because it was
true only to a certain extent, the inability of the president
.to pursue an aggressive policy towards the slave-holding in
terest could not move the secessionists to desist from their
design, but, on the contrary, forced them to carry it out
immediately. The programme of the republican party was
a declaration of war, even if it were only the declaration
of a defensive war. It did not, however, follow from this
that the slavocracy had nothing to fear from such a war,
since, as has been repeatedly proven, the continued ex
tension and strengthening of its supremacy was a nec
essary condition of its existence. But because it was
brought face to face with the question of existence by a
defensive war, Lincoln's constitutional powerlessness with
respect to it became the greatest of dangers, because, so
far as the action of the federal government was concerned,
it made the carrying out of the conservative party pro
gramme absolutely certain. But if the first proof that, de-
will administer the government with strict impartiality; or, if any
thing, will be more regardful of the interest of the south than southern
presidents usually have been ; but it is the idea which he represents —
the deep-seated enmity of southern institutions — which has shown itself
ready to overleap the barriers of the constitution and trample on the
rights of the south, — it is this that justly wakens the solicitude and
alarms the jealousy of the southern people ; and they find it difficult to
reconcile themselves to wait and give his administration a fair trial.
But, nevertheless, it is proper that they should do so."
1 "The significant fact which menaces the south is not that Abe
Lincoln is elected president, but that the northern people, by a sec
tional vote, have elected a president for the avowed purpose of aggres
sion on southern rights. The purpose of aggression has been declared.
This is a declaration of war. An important act has been committed
for the purpose of consummating this declaration. This is an act of
war committed by state officers, acting under the dictation of a popu
lar vote."

280 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
spite the republican president, the status quo remained and
could not be changed by him, were given to the masses of
the southern people by experience, it would become, in all
probability, impossible for all time to convince them that,
notwithstanding, Lincoln's election was the first battle in a
war whose end must be the annihilation of slavery. Before
it could be shown that the republican victory at the polls
would not be followed directly by changes of any kind with
respect to the slavery question, secession had to be an ac
complished fact, or it could not be started at all. The se
cessionists scarcely made any secret of it that this convic
tion left them no choice. More than one speech in congress
gave this as clearly to be understood as if it had been ex
pressed in the plainest words.1
But there was still another reason why the secessionists
must act without delay, unless they wanted never to act. If
they did not do it now the ban under which the north had
hitherto lain would be lifted, and could never be laid again.
Often as it had been claimed that, in the whole world, the
future belonged to slavery, it was very well known that
the spirit of the age had to be reckoned with, and it was
also known to what an extent it had to be reckoned with.
This fact was now taken into consideration. We must g6
with the rest of the slave states, said McGowan on the 9th
of November in the legislature of South Carolina, because,
in the matter of slavery, we have the remainder of the
world against us, and stand completely isolated.2 That was
right, and was true of the northern democrats also. They
had been allies and servants of the slavocracy, but not of
one mind or of the same feeling with them, and hence, if
Lincoln's election were put up with, the slavocracy could
not find allies and servants in them in the future to the
1 See, for instances, the utterances of Clingman and Iverson on wait
ing for " overt acts." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., pp. 4 and 11.
2 See Greeley, The Amer. Confl., I, p. 534.

EFFECTS OF SOUTHERN THREATS. 281
same extent as in the past. It was very possible, if not in
deed probable, that, as Bigler in the senate and Valland
ingham in the house claimed, the democrats would again
get the helm into their hands. But these democrats could
not be the democrats of former days. Had it not been seen
plainly enough, in the case of Douglas, that even they could
not resist the spirit of the age. That spirit could not have
been checked under any circumstances, but now it must
advance at a powerfully accelerated pace, because fear had
vanished. It was even now only too keenly felt that the
everlasting threats of the south had merely the effect which
the shepherd lad in the fable accomplished with his false
cry of: " wolf ! wolf ! " The republicans no longer believed
in its earnestness. If the threats were not now made good
•they would become a mockery. Nobody would have be
lieved in them any longer — not even the masses of the
•southern population. It was, therefore : " Now or Never."

282 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
CHAPTER VIIL
WRONG CALCULATIONS OF THE SECESSIONISTS.
On the evening before the choice of presidential electors,
Senator Chestnut, of South Carolina, had said in Columbia
to a crowd of people w7ho had tendered him an ovation,
that the departing sun of the coming day would witness
the decision of the fate of the republic. In all probability
Lincoln would be elected. " In that event, the lines of our
enemies seem to be closely around us, but they must be
broken. They might see in the hurried paths of these
starched men of livery the funeral cortege of the constitu
tion of the country. Peace, hope, independence, liberty,
power, and the prosperity of sovereign states may be
draped as chief mourners ; still, in the rear of this proces
sion, there is the light of the glorious past, from which
they might rekindle the dying blaze of their own altars.
We see it all, feel it all ; and, with Heaven's help, we will
meet it all." '
A cruel self-delusion ! The leaders, indeed, saw much
more of the consequences of their action than they allowed
the masses to see; but if they had seen only half of what
the first year was destined to bring forth, very few of them
would have persevered in their design.
The military measures resolved upon with a great ex
penditure of enthusiasm were looked upon by most people
only as belonging to the proper placing of the scene upon
the stage, in order to make doubly certain that the north
should not, in the blindness of its first attack of rage, be
'Greeley, The Amer. Confl., I, p. 331.

POSSIBILITY OF SUBJUGATION. 28$
led into the insane attempt to make use of force.1 Reuben
Davis relates that, during the session of the convention in
Jackson, one Ayers had offered Mississippi the best ma
chines for the manufacture of hand-weapons, and was will
ing to receive payment in paper of the state, but that the
offer was rejected because no serious war was to be ex
pected.2 He (Davis) and the governor had been " cursed
with great heartiness from one end of the state to the
other" because the eighty companies which had offered
their services had been ordered into camp; the counter
manding of the order was demanded, which only the vanity
of the two gentlemen had dictated, on the ground that it
was not possible that it would be necessary to employ
these men.3 Even the central government, when the country
was in the midst of war, was still convinced that it would
not amount to any more than a short tussle. That the
battle of Bull Run was the last of the war was so self-
evident that public opinion in Mississippi angrily demanded
the breaking up of the camp and the discharge of the
troops. Pettus and R. Davis, who saw more clearly, tele
graphed to Richmond, inquiring whether the men would
probably be used in service in the field up to the 1st of
October. They received the answer that they would be
needed neither up to that time nor later.4 People were-
not simply convinced that that subjection could not be suc
cessful. So deeply had they talked themselves into the im
possibility of an attempt6 at it, that when that view was
refuted by facts, it took them a long time to convince
themselves of the seriousness of the attempt. And, pre-
1 See Rob. H. Smith, Address to the Citizens of Alabama, etc., March
30, 1861, p. 22.
2 Recollections, p. 404.
8 lb., p. 104.
<Ib.,pp. 407, 408.
• See Edm. Ruffin, Consequences of Abolition Agitation (1857), p. 8;

284
cisely as with the wrong calculations of the republicans,
every single opinion here had so much truth in it, that, in
eyes troubled by the wish, father to the thought, it seemed
irrefutable. Even northern democrats of reputation and influence,
like Vallandingham, of Ohio, and Florence, of Pennsyl
vania, had frequently declared publicly, and with great
positiveness, during the last years, that the north would
have to fight in its own house, if it ever dared in reckless
folly to employ force against the south.1 At that time,
however, it might have been believed that this was only a
coarse means of frightening the masses from the republican
party. But the wild threats were even now continued, and
they were repeated not merely by any stump speaker who
chose to make them and by demagogues of low degree.
Thus, for instance, Lane, whom the slavocratic wing of the
democratic party had wished to make vice-president, in
holy indignation told Andrew Johnson in the senate, on
the 19th of December, that the northern democracy would,
on the soil of South Carolina, oppose him and every one
else who dared wish to prevent the brave, chivalrous state
leaving the Union or to refuse it its constitutional equality
of rights.2
These prophecies were not entirely baseless. In the great
cities of the east, there were elements to be found of whom
it might be confidently expected that they might, under
' The future president of the Confederate States was assured by a for
mer president of the Union that " the fighting will not be along Mason
and Dixon's line merely. It will be within our own borders, in our own
streets, between the two classes of citizens to which I have referred.
Those who defy law and constitutional obligations will, if we ever reach
the arbitrament of arms, find occupation enough at home." Franklin
Pierce to Jefferson Davis, January 6, 1860. Goodwin, The National
History of Secession, pp. 808, 309.
2 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., p. 143.

EX-PRESIDENT TYLER'S VIEWS. 285
certain circumstances, be spurred on to no insignificant at
tempts to verify them to the extent of endeavoring to
frighten public opinion into subjection, and tying the hands
of the legal authorities. The most influential leaders of
the south, however, did not ignore that the support it might
hope to find from these elements would be too weak, even
in the most favorable case, to be able to force the north
east to confine its resistance to secession to impotent pro
tests. They thought the " fanaticism" of the New England
states capable of anything, and how far they would be able
to carry New Tork and even Pennsylvania with them they
considered at least doubtful, high as they estimated the
forces which in those states would oppose carrying the con
troversy before the forum of the ultima ratio of national
life. There were, indeed, some who thought that the com
plete " isolation " of New England could be easily attained.
Ten days after Lincoln's entry on the duties of his office,
ex-President Tyler demonstrated to the Virginia convention
that New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York must join
the southern confederacy ; that the latter would thereby
obtain the majority, and that finally, if it acted wisely, it
migh^t again have the Union with the right to the sceptre
and the crown.1 Not many, however, showed such a want
1 "I want the government of the whole Union, sir; and you can ac
quire it if you pursue a wise and determined course of policy. New
Jersey will not stay an appendage to a northern confederacy. You can
not fasten her to the north, and what is there to induce Pennsylvania
to remain? . . . Let me tell him (Cochrane of New York) that his
own great imperial city of New York cannot stay where she is. The
south is her natural ally, and Bhe must come with us.
" And now what result may be anticipated? I say to you here, play
your part properly ; open your eyes and take a full expansive survey of
all the circumstances that surround you. What will you have done if
you get three or four of the free states and all the slave states to go
with you? What becomes of Mr. Lincoln's general government? Why,
you constitute a majority of the whole number of states ; and if a ma-

286 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
of judgment. The number of those was somewhat greater
who had convinced themselves that the reorganized Union
might be made to embrace twenty-four states; New Eng
land and New Jersey alone would have been cast off, and
left to their deserved fate, to meet with certain ruin by the
diversion of all the sources of their well-being.1 The some
what more modest expectation that the sundered part of
the Union would embrace only the free Atlantic states, and
that the entire west would go with the slave states, was en
tertained by quite a considerable number. Some among
them felt so sure of the west that they supposed it would
be harder to keep it away than to win it over.2 But only
a minority yielded even to this allusion. A great majority
believed they might assume with certainty that the west
would enter a peremptory veto against the employment of
force. These views on the probable attitude of the west were
not to be traced back to the illusion that the majority of
the people in that section had any very warm sympathy
with the south in the politico-constitutional question. The
result of the presidential election made it all the more im
possible for the south to give itself up to any self-delusion
in this respect, as the votes of the Douglas democrats had
now to be added to those of the victorious republicans.
It was believed that there was question of a Must, and that
was, in a certain sense, true. The west was, indeed, under
a pressure that compelled it, and hence it was also true
that the decision lay with it. As to the rest, the oalcula-
jority power means anything, it means that you are entitled to the
sceptre and the crown. The government becomes yours most de
cidedly." Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers, II, p. 627.
1 See the article of Major W. H. Chase, of Pensacola, Fla., in De Bow's
Southern Review, January, 1861.
2 R. B. Smith, An Address to the Citizens of Alabama on the Consti
tution and Laws of the Confederate States of America, p. 20.

IMPORTANCE OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 287
tion, so far as it went, was right; but it was only half of
the calculation, and in consequence of the absence of the
other half, a result was reached diametrically opposed to
the right one.
The entire calculation was based on the Mississippi. The
immense river-system makes the whole interior of the states
a natural, firmly-knitted unit. A glance at the map suffices
to convince one that the west cannot dispense with these
highways of trade. Experience had proved this more than
seventy years before, while the Indian and the buffalo still
divided the actual possession of by far the larger portion
of that vast region. The Kentucky question was older
than the constitution, and its history had forced rather ur
gently upon the minds of the American statesmen of those
days the recognition of the fact that the free navigation
of the Mississippi was a question of life and death to the
backland.1 And during the two generations that had since
passed it had not ceased to be so. What it had then
meant to Kentucky it now meant to the whole region des
ignated the west.2 But the more important the freedom
1 According to the new work (1889) of J. M. Brown, The Political Be
ginnings of Kentucky, Kentucky's ogling of Spain was not so bad as it
appears in Marshall's History of Kentucky (1812). But whether Brown
does not paint in too bright colors may be questioned.
2Ashmore, of South Carolina, had said on the 1st of March, 1860, in
the house of representatives: "The great northwest will not go with
you. Its people, sir, are more identified with the people of the south
than they are with the people of the north. The magnificent rivers
that, flow through their limits and through our own limits join us in
bands of unity stronger than ' hooks of steel,' and which cannot be
broken at the mere bidding of the north." Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th
Congr., p. 959. In the speech of R. B. Smith, quoted above, we read:
"Assure as the Mississippi flows towards the gulf, and bears on its
bosom the great commerce of the west — and as sure as we are consumers
of western products and our tariff will be lower than that of the United
States, so sure will the trouble be, not to have the west with us, but to
keep it from us." Foote, of Mississippi, still believed, in January, 1863,

288 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
of the river was to the west, the less probable it was that
the expectations of the secessionists, with respect to a veto
on the employment of force, would be realized, for the
less disposed that section would be to allow that freedom
to depend upon a foreign power. Speakers and newspa
pers, indeed, gave the assurance over and over again, that
the free navigation of the Mississippi would be conceded
and guarantied to the west, if it demeaned itself properly.
Hunt, however, pointedly remarked that that reminded
him strongly of the burglar's invitation to the master of
the house he had broken into, to accept a seat at his own
table and enjoy its delicacies with him.1
In another and still more material respect, the secession
ists saw only one side of the question, and left the other
and more essential one out of consideration. The proposi
tion that the Mississippi had now the importance for the
entire west that it had had in the eighties of the last cen
tury for Kentucky, was true only in the sense that the free
dom of the river was a condition of the economic life of
the region. While the absolute importance of the trade
upon it had increased immensely, its relative importance
had diminished. Now the trade on the river-system occu
pied the second place, while originally it had held the first
so strongly that it would be no exaggeration to describe
the streams as the only means of transportation for trade
from a distance. The Mississippi, in which they united,
that the west might be induced to have nothing to do with the war, by
offering it the free navigation of the Mississippi. The Confederate went
much farther. It believed, or at least pretended to believe, in its com
mentary on the resolution on the subject introduced by Foote, that, by
this question, the west might be compelled to undertake the most
odious obligations to the south not only with regard to the New
England states but also with regard to the whole accursed New En
gland race. See the Confederate, No. 12, pp. 98-100.
' E. B. Hunt, Union Foundations, p. 86.

MISTAKE OF THE SECESSIONISTS. 289
was, therefore, at that time, the one great water highway on
whose unobstructed flow the whole system entirely depended.
This state of things had, since that time, changed, so that
now the trade on these streams was far inferior to the ship
ments to and from the east over the railways, over the
great lakes, the canals and the Hudson.1
The secessionists were, therefore, very greatly mistaken
when they understood the saying that the Mississippi
question exercised a coercing pressure on the west, to
mean that the south could exercise, by its means, a co
ercing pressure on the west. The freedom of trade on the
river was of even greater importance to the south than to
the west. The latter had already other avenues for its
1 " The number of tons of western produce annually at tide- water over
these routes (Erie Canal, New York Central Railroad, New York & Erie
Railroad, Pennsylvania Railroad, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad) exceed
twice the number of tons of all kinds of produce delivered at New Or
leans, and considerably exceed the same in value." The Effect of
Secession upon the Commercial Relations, etc., p. 35. "Reducing the
flour to bushels, the total number of bushels of grain received at New
Orleans was five million six hundred and eighty-seven thousand three
hundred and ninety-nine against seventy-one million three hundred
and eighty-four thousand one hundred and forty-three received at tide
water over the New York lines, or at least eighty-five million bushels
over all the five great eastern outlets. The tons of animal food received
at New Orleans the past year (1860) was ninety-five thousand seven
hundred against four hundred and thirty-seven thousand seven hundred
and fifty-nine by the New York routes, or, adding the tonnage of ani
mal food brought by the Pennsylvania and Baltimore & Ohio Railroads,
against, probably, five hundred and twenty-five thousand tons on the
five eastern outlets of the great valley. . . . The produce received
at New Orleans came almost entirely from the southern states — the
flour from St. Louis and the corn and bacon from Kentucky and Ten
nessee. It is not probable that one-fiftieth of the total exports of grain
from the northwest went down the Mississippi. Of other articles of ex
port, wool, lumber, butter, cheese, hides, etc., no portion whatever
is sent down the Mississippi — the whole going directly to the eastern
states." lb., pp. 38, 89. See, also, Hunt, loe. cit., pp. 38 ff.
19

290 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
trade, and might continually increase them to the extent
required, for it had been demonstrated that the railways
were in a condition to compete successfully with the water
highways. The south, on the other hand, if it closed the
Mississippi, would shut out not only the products of the west
which it needed itself, but would compel the same prod
ucts — and ultimately perhaps even its own — to seek
their destination or the sea by other routes. But trade has
the same tendency as a stream which by some accident has
been suddenly forced into a new bed: it digs it deeper and
wider, and hence it becomes more difficult, day after day,
to lead it back into the old one. The tying up of trade on
the Mississippi, by secession, might readily come to mean,
for the south, not a momentary sacrifice, but a heavy and
permanent loss.1
'There were people in the north who now thoroughly recognized
this. " It may be assumed that the cotton grown in Tennessee, a portion
of Alabama, all Mississippi and Arkansas and a part of Louisiana, can
be delivered at Cairo as cheaply as at New Orleans. From Cairo to
New York, $4 a bale, or $16 a ton, would afford a fair business to the
carrier. From New Orleans to New York, by the outside route, includ
ing charges at the former place, and insurance, the rate cannot be esti
mated at less than a cent to a cent and a quarter per pound. In favor
of the interior route is time, climate and uniform health. There is now
annually consumed in the northern and eastern states nearly one mill
ion of bales. Our manufacturing establishments are already receiving
large amounts through the interior routes, which will be steadily in
creased till the greater part consumed reaches them in this manner.
All the railroads connecting the interior with the eastern states are
making extensive provision for this new traffic, which is certain to be
secured by our method of low charges, and by the great advantages
which New York, Boston and Philadelphia present at the ports of
shipment. If, as now appears certain, New Orleans follows in the wake
of Charleston, that port will be speedly closed. . . . With secession
the day of her commercial greatness is past. Hereafter, the trade
peculiar to her must flow north. From the present year, shall we
number cotton received through our interior routes as an important
item in our exports. Once gained, it is a business we shall never lose.

THE west and the confederacy. 291
The secessionists had also left out of their calculation the
fact that the words: Man lives not by bread alone, is as
true of nations as of individuals. So far as all ideal inter
ests were concerned, the connection of the west with the
rest of the civilized world was established, in a hundred
times greater degree, by the highways that led to the east
than by the Mississippi. These, too, were ties that, as Ash-
more, of South Carolina, had said, bound more firmly than
hooks of steel. He who thought that the west was not
aware of this, or would not take it into account as against
an outlet for its corn, wheat and p'ork, did not know the
west. Little as it might have to show of certain refined
forms of idealism, that other kind, which finds expression
in mighty deeds, when there is need of them, was deeply
rooted in its people.
The west's joining the confederacy was, therefore, en
tirely out of the question, for, in a material as well as in an
ideal respect, it was bound to the east incomparably more
firmly than to the south by the Mississippi river-system
and the Gulf of Mexico. In what related to that connec
tion it could not allow itself to be driven back into the
position of a party that was merely endured, but had to as
sert its present position as a party possessed of inviolable
rights of its own. Nor could it surrender the like position
in relation to the south, for not all that the wit and the
power of man might do in the creation of artificial high-
With it we shall sweep the trade of the whole interior. Already are
the railroads of the western states and the connecting lines to the east
ern glutted with freights which, up to the present year, went down
the Mississippi to New Orleans. There is no doubt that the trade, both
foreign and domestic, of the great eastern cities, the present year, will
exceed in amount that of any one in their past history. They will re
tain all they had, while secession will hand over to them the greater
part of that which in times of peace had concentrated itself in the
cities of the Gulf and the Lower Mississippi." The Effect of Secession
upon the Commercial Relations, pp. 40, 41.

292 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ways could in the least change the fact, nor offer full com
pensation for it, that nature has made a unit of the country
between the Rocky Mountains and the AUeghanies, from
the northern boundary of the Union to the Gulf, the arbi
trary division of which would sow the seeds of eternal dis
cord among its inhabitants.1
It was therefore as the slave-holder, Crittenden, had ir
refutably demonstrated as early as 1858,2 absolutely imper
ative that the west should risk its last man and its last
dollar for the Union, because the existence of the Union
was for it, in the strictest sense, a matter of life or death.
What Governor Morton, of Indiana, had said was indis
putable : " If it was worth a bloody struggle to establish
this nation, it is worth one to preserve it ! " 3 but it was far
from being the whole truth. Not to have established the
nation because it could have been established only at the
cost of a bloody struggle would have involved no guilt; it
1 See Partridge, The Making of the American Nation, pp. 174-177.
2Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 35th Congr., p. 1816: . . . " How many
men are there that you have found in that region who countenance for
a moment the idea of disunion? They are all of one mind — instinct
ively of one mind. ... If there was a division between north and
south, the west might he excluded entirely from going to the markets
of New York or going to New Orleans without being subject to tolls
and taxes ; and could that be borne? . . . We want all these ac
cesses. In our very position there is a local, a natural, a destined
patriotism so far as the Union is concerned. We must be found in it."
* Speech of November 22, 1860, in Indianapolis. The New York Trib
une, December 1, 1860. The speech calls attention very forcibly to
the reasons which left the west no choice. It is more significant, how
ever, for the manner in which it insists that it would be a much smaller
misfortune if South Carolina achieved its independence by force than
if it were allowed to depart in peace. Only in the latter case would a
legal precedent have been created, and that had, above all things, to be
avoided. If the right of secession were recognized, Louisiana would in
a certain way be made the lord of the economic life of all the states of
the Mississippi valley.

EUROPE AND SECESSION. 293
would have been only the letting slip of a great oppor
tunity ; but now that it had been rightfully established,
and had been a fact for almost three generations, not to
pay any price to 'preserve it would have been an unpar
donable sin of omission. The west — whatever a part of
its politicians may have thought, said and done, while the
right of secession still seemed an academic question —
could not become guilty of it, for its people felt not only
that nature had predestined the immense region to be one
complete social and political community, but that, under
the protection of the order of things that had hitherto pre
vailed, powerfully helped by the modern means of trans
portation, it had alreadv so far fulfilled its natural destiny
that the shattering of the structure would have been a
crime against humanity, and almost impossible. The en
deavor to destroy it, in order to maintain and perpetuate
slavery, would have been the greatest and guiltiest attack
on civilization recorded in the history of the world.
Although this was not clearly recognized in Europe at
the time, the nations felt it instinctively, and, as a conse
quence, one of the principal factors in the calculation in
tended to prove the impossibility of overcoming secession
by force of arms was eliminated.
As early as the 9th of November, Mullins had stated in
the legislature of South Carolina that he knew from the
most undoubted source that the representative of one of the
great European powers had, in view of anticipated seces
sion, opened negotiations looking to an agreement with the
state securing to it the satisfaction of its increasing de
mand for cotton.1 The news, notwithstanding the good
source it was said to come from, was presumably not true.
It showed, however, what certainly was felt, that the cause
of secession — even if in great part only for selfish reasons —
» Greeley, The Amer. Confl., I, p. 835.

294 HARPER'S FERRY  LINCOLN'S INAUGURATION.
would find the warmest sympathy in Europe. With respect
to many governments, as well as to the highest class of so
ciety in most European countries, this expectation was by
no means baseless. The aristocracies of the old world had
always felt themselves drawn more to the southern aristo
crats than to their northern democratic brethren, and that
they felt so was only natural. Besides, it must have af
forded them and their governments heartfelt satisfaction to
be able to point out to their own democratic elements, to
what republicanism and radical democracy must, sooner or
later, lead; and the deterrent example bore, perhaps, good
fruit. Both humanity and religion forbade the wish that
the people of the two sections of the country should tear
one another to pieces in a civil war; a feeling of ease at
the collapse of the colossus by which, at a conceivable time,
European countries must be outflanked, was, however, only
human. The latter also might expect a great, direct ad
vantage from the catastrophe, as the southerners would,
doubtless, have duties for revenue only, because, in accord
ance with the nature of their whole economic life, they
would remain true to their free-trade principles. But lastly,
and above all, the cotton produced by them was an urgent
and universal want. Cotton was a factor with which the
politics of all western civilized nations, and especially the
most powerful of them all, had to reckon. It was the ground
work of the whole calculation of the secessionists as to the
position Europe would take in the struggle.
Hammond, of S6uth Carolina, had said in the senate on
the 4th of March, 1858: " What would happen if no cotton
was furnished for three years ? England would topple head
long, and carry the whole civilized world with her. No,
you dare not make war upon cotton. No power on earth
dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king. Until lately
the Bank of England was king; but she tried to put her
screws, as usual, the fall before last, on the cotton crop, and

EUROPE AND SECESSION. 295
was utterly vanquished. The last power has been con
quered. Who can doubt, that has looked upon recent events,
that cotton is supreme? " Mann, of Georgia, considered one-
third of the time given by Hammond sufficient to make
England fall whining on her knees. " In one year from
the stoppage of England's supply of southern slave-grown
cotton, the chartists would be in all her streets and fields,
revolution would be rampant throughout the island, and
nothing that is would exist." Wigfall, of Texas, made still
shorter work of her.' " If we stop the supply of cotton for
one week, England would be starving. Victoria's crown
would not stand on her head one week if the supply of cotton
was stopped; nor would her head stand on her shoulders."
Not because their assertions had been made so long in
the secessionist papers and by secessionist speakers, in
endless variation, but because there was plainly a great
deal of truth in them, should the republicans* not have
doubted that they were held to be true to their full extent,
and that the secessionists, therefore, considered it simply
self-evident that Europe, and especially England, would, in
a short time, be obliged to support the confederacy of the
southern states, if the north made a serious effort to reduce
them to subjection. Yes, a frightful amount of truth ! As
the war broke out in the spring, when the last year's crop
was already in the hands of the dealers and manufacturers,
a week and even a few months were not sufficient to bring
the cotton industry to a standstill. But in the summer of
1862, the old stocks and a little of the new crop that the
blockade runners had been able to carry over the ocean
were used up. The great factories were closed one after
another, and it was not long before the number of persons
out of work increased by thousands. Private beneficence
and the public means that could be disposed of under ex
isting laws were no longer sufficient to stem the tide of
misery. Parliament was obliged to interfere by legislation

296 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
in order to open up new sources of relief to the most
severely afflicted districts and to oblige the other parts of
the country to come to their aid. Despite all this, their
wretchedness grew in gigantic and horrible proportions.
Vast as was what the richer classes accomplished by self-
taxation and what the public authorities did to feed half a
million of people who had been supporting themselves by
their own labor, and protect them against the winter cold,
it was a task to which even wealthy England with all her
public spirit and all her charity was not equal. Here and
there, at least, it almost seemed a question whether the
very poorest could be saved from death by starvation.1
1 " . . . In July, 1862, the large (cotton) manufacturers began
almost universally to close their mills, and the distress was already so
great that parliament found it necessary to authorize the poor-law unions
to borrow money, and to assess the excess of rates in the manufactur
ing districts.upon the other unions of the county. The poor-rates had
risen before the end of the summer from ninepence in the pound ster
ling to ten shillings, and in some unions even thirteen shillings in the
pound, and this, too, when the property-holders, owing to the distress
of their tenants, could not collect their rents, and were consequently
unprepared for such a burden. On the 1st of October, 1862, of the four
hundred thousand operatives of Lancashire, two hundred and ten thou
sand were entirely out of employment, and most of the remainder were
working on short time, with the prospect of being entirely out of work
before Christmas. On these two hundred and ten thousand unemployed
workmen, at least as many more persons, their wives, children and
other relatives, were dependent. On the 1st of December, 1862, at which
time the famine had reached its culmination, there were two hundred
and forty-nine thousand eight hundred and thirty-six persons receiving
parish relief in fifteen poor-law unions of Lancashire, in which, in or
dinary times, not over thirty-six thousand received aid ; and in Lanca
shire and Derbyshire fully half a million of persons, whose earnings
in ordinary times were not less than $1,500,000 to $2,000,000 per week,
were wholly dependent upon charity for support, and very many act
ually perished from starvation, or the diseases induced by it. In Glas
gow, Paisley and other manufacturing towns of Scotland, and in
Belfast, Ballymena, Lisburn and other places in Ireland, the suffering
was little if at all less than in Lancashire." Report of the American

CONDUCT OF ENGLISH WORKMEN. 297
And yet the secessionists had calculated wrong. John
Bright was able to say, in Birmingham, on the 18th of De
cember, 1862: "There has been every effort that money
and malice could use to stimulate in Lancashire, amongst
the suffering population, an expression of opinion in favor
of the slave states. They have not been able to get it."
All logical deductions from the doctrine of state sov-
eignty were lost on the English workmen. They had no
understanding for these constitutional subtleties. Their
sound common sense told them that secession was rebellion,
and no sophistry could talk them out of the idea that the
sole ground of this rebellion was slavery, and they pre
ferred going hungry to buying their bread by siding with
slavery. The eminent moral strength that this required
they found not in their moral and religious convictions
alone, but, to no small extent, in the feeling that the north
was fightino- for them, since the cause of free labor in all
do "
Christian, civilized states must be the common cause of all
of them. And this instinctive conviction was powerfully
strengthened by the fact that the Americans, notwithstand
ing the enormous demands which the war made on them,
furnished very considerable means to assist them in their
really heroic struggle, and to make it possible for them to
continue it.1
This attitude of the English workmen is one of the great
deeds of the world's history, and as such it may also be
International Relief Committee for the suffering operatives of Great
Britain, 1862-63, pp. 6, 7. John Bright said in a speech at Birming
ham, on the 18th of December, 1862: " Nearly five hundred thousand
persons, — men, women and children, — at this moment, are saved from
the utmost extremes of famine, not a few of them from death, by the
contributions which they are receiving from all parts of the country."
Speeches of J. Bright, M. P., on the American Question, p. 69.
' 1 See the details in the report of the American international relief
committee. The total value of the products, flour, meat, etc., sent is
given at $350,000. Page 72.

298 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
characterized in view of its effects; for, despite Seward's
masterly diplomacy, it is probable that a comparatively
slight pressure from that quarter would have sufficed to
permit the realization of the expectations which the seces
sionists had based on the cotton question.
Cotton was, indeed, a mighty power, but cotton was not
king; and the error of calculation made by the secession
ists as to its importance for the north was incomparably
greater than the over-estimation of the pressure which it
might be made to exercise on England. The first thing to
be affected by it in the north was not, as in England, in
dustry, but trade — including in the term transportation by
land and water. The number of those in the north, there
fore, who would find themselves immediately without bread,
if no more cotton could be obtained, was comparatively
small. True, a great many in the humble walks of life
saw, unless the conflict itself opened new avenues of gain
to them, that they would have to strain themselves a little
more to earn a livelihood; but for the most part they did
not have to fear hunger. The blow fell mainly on capital,
and a considerable number of the capitalists that felt it
could only suffer a larger or smaller loss, for bankruptcy
did not stare them in the face. To expect the ecouomic
ruin of the entire north from the destruction of the cotton
trade was an absurdity of which only men could be guilty
whose head and heart were too full of great and vague
generalities to be able to let themselves down to the petty
labor of examining and comparing sober figures. Even
New York, the northern emporium of the cotton trade,
would have lost only one of tho many pillars on which its
economic prosperity rested, if cotton disappeared in a single
night and forerer from the soil of the United States.1
' " New York enjoys a business of fourteen hundred millions of dol
lars, of which two hundred come from the five cotton states. If the
whole of the charges and profits be taken into account, so far as they

WRONG CALCULATIONS. 299'
The secessionists, however, had in view, in their calcu
lation, not merely the elements of wealth directly in ques
tion, and which were important enough to warrant them
in believing that great efforts and sacrifices would be made
to prevent their imperilment. They thought the hands of
the north would be bound by the knowledge that if it sur
rendered the advantages of its economic connection with
the south, it would, by so doing, throw away the props
which had hitherto artificially supported its entire eco
nomic system. Only by the excessive profits which it had
h:therto drawn from that trade had the conflict between
capital and labor been avoided ; they must infallibly come
into collision with one another if the cost of a war were
added to the sudden loss of this gain. Slavery was al
ways, but especially in war, an inexhaustible source of
strength,1 because capital and labor were in one and the
same hand, that is, because labor was the property of
capital. The republic of slave-holders could put an incom
parably larger number of men in the field, for, if the very
last white man capable of bearing arms stood before the
enemy, the necessary labor would go on undisturbed ; the
slaves working under the superintendence of the old and
infirm would support the army. A war could not seri
ously injure the south. In the north, on the contrary,
every man who donned a uniform was withdrawn from
productive labor, and, hence, only a vastly smaller per
centage of its population could be called upon to bear arms.2
inure to New York, including freights, the income resulting to that city
on that business exceeds two hundred and eighty millions of dollars —
a sum far greater than the gross value of the whole cotton crop of the
United States, and double the gross value of the cotton crop of the five
states." The Five Cotton States and New York, p. 28.
1 " The institution," writes the Montgomery Advertiser, in March,
1861, " is a tower of strength to the south, particularly at the present
crisis."
"La

300 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Moreover, the workman who is his own master would not,
at the beck of politicians, fall on those from whom he
really drew his daily support.1 He would, indeed, make
use of his fists, but only against those whose unreasonable
and vile policy had deprived him of bread. " I have but
little doubt,' said Alexander H. Stephens, a prudent and
comparatively sober-minded and moderate man, "that the
north will go into anarchy." 2
The more the south had become accustomed to slavery,
the more it had lost the power of understanding the order
of society based on free labor. Because only stagnation
.guarantees quiet, it was thought that strength lay in it only,
since it alone afforded security. This was true in so far as
the struggle between capital and labor cannot be avoided
where labor is a factor with recognized rights, and, as a
' " Will the millions who will be thrown out of employment at the
north, because of a cessation of intercourse, commercial and political,
between the sections, rush to the conflict? Will the strikers for higher
wages wage war against their best friends and customers? Look at the
scenes now being enacted in the manufacturing towns and villages of
the north. Is there anything favorable for you there? Will those
men, at the beck of politicians, inarch south to butcher those who fur
nish them the means of their subsistence? If they would go into the
conflict, where are you to obtain your revenue to support a war? Have
you four million laborers who will tamely submit to the tax that we
can in the south lay upon our slave laborers with perfect impunity, in
order to meet the exigencies of the times? You have not. Your free
labor, as you call it — but which is in fact the slave of capital — will not
bear it. The south exports annually about two hundred millions of her
products, and her imports for the last fiscal year were less than eight
een millions; while, on the contrary, that of the north was $241,000,000.
Suppose your imports were to remain the same, where are you to find
a market for their sale if the north and south are separated from each
other by an impassable barrier, and their people stand confronting each
other in battle array, with armed thousands in the field? " Ashmore,
March 1, 1860. Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 36th Congr., p. 959. See, also,
•the Richmond Examiner of April 16, 1861.
2 Johnston and Browne, Life of Alex. H. Stephens, p. 402.

WRONG CALCULATIONS. 301
general rule, this struggle is begun more easily and is more
violent in times of economic crises. But strife also gener
ates and develops force, and, in-the case before us, to expect
labor to take sides with the slavocracy, against capital, was
to reverse the natural order of things. However capital
and labor might look at one another or settle their differ
ences in other cases, in this one, if capital turned against
slavery, it certainly had not to fear an attack in the rear
from labor, for labor stood in the front rank. With free
dom of movement and self-determination it had grown in
telligent enough not to look at the present moment only,.
and hence it was also clearly conscious that its material
interests were not in conflict with the moral powers, but
would be served better in proportion as the latter were
obeyed. Still this reference to internal confusion in the north
which must be the consequence of war was, in part, a
warning prompted by what was left of fraternal feeling,
but was in part also dictated by conscious contempt. Yet,
in the opinion of the secessionists, there was no need of
this to prove that the attempt to keep the south in the
Union by force of arms would be folly. " But, sir, there is
to be no war," said Iverson, in the senate, on the 5th of No
vember. " The northern states are controlled by sagacious
men, like the distinguished senator from New Tork (Sew
ard). Where public opinion and action are thus controlled
by men of common sense who know well that they cannot
succeed in a war against the southern states, no such at
tempt of coercion will be made." 1 One might doubt what
weight was to be attached to the ordinary rodomontades ;
but this cool certainty bore, unmistakably, the stamp of the
deepest conviction. Townsend, in the speech at St. John's
Colleton already cited, had characterized as "simply ab-
i Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 11.

302 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
-surd " the idea that the south could be overcome.1 It was
self-evident that it must win. All proof was superfluous.
Even the coolest and sharpest minds represented it as an
axiomatic truth, and hence could not, despite their better
instinctive knowledge, be persuaded to give up the delusion
that a serious attempt at subjugation would not be made.
On the 4th of May, Alexander H. Stephens wrote to his
brother, Linton: "I am prepared for and expect a long and
bloody conflict. ... I have never believed that a sep
aration of the states of the old confederation would take
place without a severe conflict of arms;" 2 and yet he had
written to R. M. Johnston on the 19th of April: " The idea
of Mr. Lincoln to urge a general war of subjugation against
us seems too preposterous for a sensible man to entertain.
But what his real designs are, I suppose it would be diffi
cult to imagine." 3
Where people condescended to give reasons why subju
gation was impossible, the one assigned by the New Or
leans Crescent of the 16th of November was sufficient, viz.,
that, considering the elements of which congress was made
up, two years at least would be required to pass the laws
and make the appropriations of money which would put
Lincoln in a condition to carry on the war. " By the ex
piration of that time, and long before, we would be in a
condition of absolute independence." 4 Only those fools,
thought the secessionists, could draw the sword who looked
upon the course of things as the New York Times, the
Chicago Tribune and the New York Tribune afterwards
1 lb., p. 18.
2 Johnston and Browne, Life of Alex. H. Stephens, p. 401.
» lb., p. 397.
4 It adds: "Coercion, however, is not possible under any circum
stances if we unite ourselves together as a band of brothers. Nor will
it be attempted. Even the abolitionists are too sensible to be guilty of
such an act of unmitigated absurdity."

RACES NORTH AND SOUTH. 303
prognosticated it, in a few caustic words : Thirty days' time
to settle the business — of the seventy-five thousand men
called for by Lincoln, twenty-five thousand to be kept in
Washington, because there was no employment for them;
the east to stand aside as a spectator: it was the west's af
fair; it would take care of the little war alone, and hang
Jeff. Davis & Co. in Washington in celebration of the
Fourth of July.1 The earliest demonstrations that this
could not be done would lead them to understand that the
north could carry on no war. Was there not something
ridiculous in its allowing its "counter-jumpers" and "mud
sills" of every description to cope with the ''chivalry" of
the south? "It is a gross mistake," wrote the Charleston
Mercury, " to suppose that abolitionism alone is the cause
of secession between the north and the south. The cava
liers, Jacobins and Huguenots who settled the south natu
rally hate, contemn and despise the Puritans who settled the
north. The former are master races, the latter a slave
' "Let us make quick work. The 'rebellion,' as some people desig
nate it, is an embryo tadpole. Let us not fall into the delusion, noted
by Hallam, of mistaking a ' local commotion ' for a revolution. A
strong, active pull together will do all our work effectually in thirty
days. We have only to send a column of twenty-five thousand men
across the Potomac to Richmond, and burn out the rats there ; another
column of twenty-five thousand to Cairo, seizing the cotton ports of
the Mississippi, and retaining the remaining twenty-five thousand in
cluded in Mr. Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand men at Washing
ton, not because there is need for them there, but because we do not
require their services elsewhere."
"Let the east get out of the way, this war is of the west We can
fight the battle and successfully, within two or three months at the
furthest. Illinois can whip the south by herself. We insist upon the
matter being turned over to us."
" The nations of Europe may rest assured that Jeff. Davis & Co. will
be swinging from the battlements of Washington at least by the Fourth
of July. We spit upon a later and longer deferred justice." Cited in
Harris, A Review of the American Conflict, pp. 241, 242.

31)4 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
race, and descendants of the Saxon serfs." * Yes, the pop
ulation of the two sections were different races, and the
whole history, all the essential qualities of these two races,
excluded every doubt as to which of them in a war — and
in such a war — would be the victor.2 Of what use to the
' Elements of Discord in Secession, p. 11.
2 The battle of Bull Run increased the conviction of the inborn superi
ority of the southern race beyond all bounds. The Richmond Whig
wrote : " The rout and dispersion, at the great pitched battle near Man
assas, bring into bold relief the great fact that the Yankees are hum
bugs, and that the white people of the slave-holding states are the true
masters — the real rulers of this continent. . . The breakdown of the
Yankees, their utter unfitness for empire, forces dominion upon us of
the south. We are compelled to take the scepter, and it is our duty to
prepare ourselves to wield it with dignity and effect. We must adapt
ourselves to our destinies, We must elevate our race, every man of it —
breed them up to arms — to command — to empire. The art military
should constitute a leading part of every white man's education. The
right of voting should be a high privilege to be enjoyed by those only
who are worthy to exercise it. In a word, the whole white population
of the south should be brought into a high-toned aristocracy, duly im
pressed with a sense of its superiority to Yankee trickery, and of its
own functions, and its obligation to freedom and civilization." Ameri
can Civil War, Correspondence with H. C. Carey, pp. 11, 12. And
the Louisville Courier wrote : "We are not brothers of the Yankees,
and the ' slavery question ' is merely the pretext, not the cause, of the
war. The true ' irrepressible conflict ' lies fundamentally in the hered
itary hostility, the sacred animosity, the eternal antagonism, between
the two races engaged.
" The Norman cavalier cannot brook the vulgar familiarity of the
Saxon Yankee, while the latter is continually devising some plan to
bring down his aristocratic neighbor to his own detested level. Thus
was the contest waged in the old United States.
" As our Norman kinsmen in England, always a minority, have ruled
their Saxon countrymen in political vassalage up to the present day, so
have we, the ' slave-oligarchs,' governed the Yankees till within a
twelve-months. We framed the constitution, for seventy years moulded
the policy of the government, and placed our own men, or ' north
ern men with southern principles,' in power.
" On the 6th of November,1860, the Puritans emancipated themselves.

WRONG CALCULATIONS. 305
«
north was its money, its larger population, its industry!
Time was the indispensable requisite to make these forces
felt, and during the time which must elapse before they
could be turned to account, the warlike superiority of the
and are now in violent insurrection against their former owners. This
insane holiday freak will not last long, however, for, dastards in fight,
and incapable of self-government, they will inevitably again fall under
the control of the superior race. A few more ' Bull Run ' thrashings
will bring them once more under the yoke, as docile as the most loyal
of our Ethiopian 'chattels.'" Elements of Discord in Secessia, p. 12.
In the case of a great many Fire-eaters the " natural hate " and " nat
ural contempt" of the "Yankees" finally rose even to beastly rage,
indistinguishable from downright insanity. The pen recoils from the
description of such things, but the picture would not be a faithful one
if these shades were entirely wanting. I have thought it incumbent
on one to give at least a few examples in a note. I take them from the
Confederate, partly because of the steady growth of its villification. In
its first number the difference of race is established after the manner
of the foregoing quotation. In the second we read:
"The great principle of all Yankeedom — immeasurable avarice;"
"the unfathomable baseness of Yankee character;" "for they (the
Yankees), too, like plague, pestilence and famine, the simoon, the
tempest and the earthquake, and other scourges of humanity, have a
history — a history filled with the outrages they have committed upon
society, and written in the tears of their helpless and hapless victims."
Number 3, entitled the " Pilgrim Fathers in the Mayflower," "the pro
genitors of that infamous and beastly race whose fitting ruler is the
' Ape Lincoln,' and whose living incarnation is the ' Beast Butler.' "
In the last number we read : " No peace, no truce, no armistice, but
open, unsparing war, until these pests of society and bane of the whole
human family, disabled, crushed, paralyzed, impotent for evil, are wholly
confined to their own barren hills, and within their own rock-bound
coast. For my own part, I would willingly see them, in the language
of their pet, Butler, ' exterminated ; ' but this, I am well aware, is im
practicable. The leviathan of the sea, the behemoth of the land, the
king of the forest, may, but worthless vermin never can, be extermi
nated." The concluding words were: "They (the Yankees) will be re
corded in history and remembered by prosperity as the Ishmaelites of
Europe, the Bedouins of civilization, the Pharisees of Christendom, the
disgrace of mankind, the dishonor of the Christian faith, the bane of
20

306 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
cavaliers would have brought about the decision. "Eng
land," exclaimed Jefferson Davis, in February, in a speech
at Stevenson, Alabama, " will recognize us, and a glorious
future awaits us; but the grass will grow in the streets of
the cities of the north now alive with commerce, for we
shall carry the war into the densely populated places where
sword and torch find food."
Never was a people worse prepared for a great war. As
to an army, so far as men were concerned, there was really
nothing to speak of. Its sole employment was in frontier
duty, and was sufficient only for that. The officers in act
ive service were, in great part, southerners, and what was
to be expected of them was soon seen. The northerners
educated at the military academy at West Point who had
entered civil life would not have sufficed for the most
urgent needs, even if every one of them tendered his serv
ices to the government. What the militia had learned
might easily prove a disadvantage, because they understood
just enough of the trade of arms to believe that they were
thoroughly versed in the military art. And not only was
the population not schooled to war, but they had no liking
for it. Their tastes and thoughts were all directed to works
of peace. Both as individuals and as a whole, they had
no longing for bloody laurels. They dreaded all war, and
the idea of a civil war made them shiver to the very mar
row of their bones. In addition to all this, the population
were divided on the question which threatened to involve
the country in war. Lastly, the executive, without any ex
perience whatever, had first to create its entire administra
tive apparatus, and, for the most part, out of untried
material, because the party had never yet been in posses
sion of the national offices.
morality — hostis humani generis — the curse of society, and the ene
mies of the human race." The Confederate, by a South Carolinian,
Mobile, 1862, pp. 9, 15, 100, 102.

EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN. 307
It would, indeed, have been a wonder if the north had
not been defeated at first. It would have been a greater
wonder still if it had stricken its colors on that account.
Not all southerners allowed themselves to be intoxicated
by the victory at Bull Kun. Alexander H. Stephens wrote,
on the 19th of July, 1861: "I have no idea that the north
will give it up. Their defeat will increase their energy."1
That is what should have been said from the first. There
was a grain of truth in what had been remarked about the
different races. But if it was " madness " to consider the
subjugation of the south possible, it was more than madness
to believe that this northern race could be sent whining
and scared into a corner with a single blow. Miles, of South
Carolina, had asked, on the 6th of January, 1860, in the
house of representatives, whether any one could seriously
believe that the southern states would "stay whipped" if
the north, at first, gained some advantage by overpowering
numbers. "Is that characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon race?
No, sir; they never stay whipped." It was a bold thing
for the " cavaliers " to claim "Norman" blood for them
selves alone ; but even they were not bold enough to read
the Anglo-Americans of the north out of the Anglo-Saxon
race. Then did not what Miles had said apply to them
also? Had they not shown often enough, in the new world
as in the old, that they were an ore that became the best
of steel through fire and blows? Not defeat, but only the
consciousness of being in the wrong, could make the sword
drop out of such hands, once it had been drawn. If the
secessionists pulled it from its scabbard, they forced it into
the hands of those at the north who had been willing to
pay almost any price for the maintenance of peace. Pre
cisely because the greater part of the northern population
recoiled at the idea of war, it was certain that it would be
'Johnston and Browne, Life of Alex. H. Stephens, pp. 406, 407.

808 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ivaged with frightful energy and persistence. That the
north had, as a conservatively-minded northern writer after
wards said, gone " to the brink of infamy " in order to pre
serve the Un ion,1 was the most irrefutable proof that it would
do its utmost to restore it. The south was told this by men
whose testimony it could not suspect. Amos L. Lawrence,
one of the magnates of the Bell-Everett party, wrote to
Crittenden, on the 29th of December, 1860, that nine per
sons out of every ten would laugh at the statement that
blood would have to be shed, but that as soon as the south
dealt a blow all dividing lines between parties would be
obliterated, and that a day would suffice to make the whole
northern population swarm around the standard of war.2
Opinions at the north differed as to whether the use of
force was justifiable, but not as to the fact that there was
no right of secession. The dissolution of the Union was,
according to the all but unanimous opinion of the north,
not a legal act. Therefore, the moment force was used by
' " The American people have not sought this war ; they were led to
the brink, not only of ruin, but of infamy, in the attempt to avoid it."
The Civil War: Its Nature and End, Littell's Living Age, LXXII (1862),
p. 144. The conservative views of the author are plainly evidenced by
the fact that he speaks of the " slave interest in the restored Union."
2 " Here, and through the whole north and west, nobody has thought
of war or arms; not a musket or a pistol has been bought or sold for
any civil Btrife. Nine out of ten of our people would laugh if told that
blood must be shed. This condition of peace, which is conducive to
calm reasoning and to reaction, may, and I fear will, be changed sud
denly. The first blow struck, by any state or local authority, at the
United States government will arouse and unite the whole northern
people; Partisan faults will be forgotten, and no retroactive legisla
tion can be accomplished^ The secessionists seem to be ignorant of
the powers which their meditated treason will give the government.
Mr. Buchanan himself seems not to be aware of the strength of the
government for the repression of rebellion. The destruction of his little
force would bring out the warlike feeling in a day." Coleman, Life of
Crittenden, II, p. 240.

THE OLD UNION. 309
the seceded states, the employment of force by the north,
in the unanimous opinion of the population, would be only
rightfully acting on the defensive, and the conviction would
immediately manifest itself that right meant here imper
ative duty. Then, even in those who had most uncondi
tionally opposed the right of coercion, all the moral powers
would be again awakened into full energy. Their attach
ment and devotion to the Union would then assume the
form of towering, gigantic, irrepressible passion which Gar
rison had branded in the republicans as "slavish subser
viency to the Union." l
In one respect, however, the calculation of the secession
ists was entirely right, and the whole population of the
north, republicans as well as democrats, was in the great
est error: the subjugation of the seceded states, in order to
restore the old Union, was impossible. The north, too, had
finally to recognize this. But did it of necessity follow there
from that it must give up the idea of restoring the [Jnion?
Was there not another possibility? Hunter, of Virginia,
had asked on the 11th of January, 1861, in the senate, why
the north, in order to save the Union, was not willing to
grant what it would have to concede if it forced the south
back into the Union, for, otherwise, that section would sink
irredeemably into barbarism?2
This Was the proclamation of the eternity of slavery,
since the alleged necessity must grow greater, from day to
day. On the other hand, Alexander H. Stephens had asked
himself what was to come after secession had been success
fully fought out, and found only the negative answer: real
' Wm. L. Garrison, The Story of His Life as Told by His Children,
III, p. 449. This, too, had been foretold to the secessionists by the most
competent people. See, for instance, the speech of S. S. Cox, of the
14th of January, 1861, in the house of representatives.
"lb., p. 331.

310 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
and lasting peace between the two republics is impossible.1
Must not this question force itself on the north also, and
would it not reach the same answer? And if it reached it,
must that answer not remove its objection to the one thing
which could restore the Union, insure lasting and real peace,
and protect the south against barbarism?
It often takes a long time for nations to recognize that
effects cannot be removed without doing away with their
causes, and frequently a much longer time before they re
solve to act upon the knowledge gained. But when their
fight against the effects is justified, and when they engage
in the struggle with their full moral energy, experience
finally leads them to do so. As early as in January, 1860,
when Crawford declared that the choice lay between union
and slavery, McKean had replied to him, that if he told
the north so, it would answer him without any difference
as to party : " Then slavery must die." 2 And when Edger
ton, of Ohio, a year later (31st of January, 1861), called out
to the southerners in the house of representatives : " Gentle
men should know that the first blast of war will be the
trumpet signal of emancipation," 3 he was far from being
right, if he was to be literally understood. But what Pot
tle, of New York, had said a few days before (January
25th), was true : " You leave us because we do not like
your institution of slavery. Do you think it will increase
our love for it to make it the cause of destroying the gov
ernment, bankrupting our business, and slaughtering our
people. These are not the incentives to love, but to fierce
and uncompromising, unrelenting hatred — incentives which
will lead to the determination to wipe out utterly and for-
» lb., p. 331.
* Congr. Globe, 1st Sess., 86th Congr., App., p. 392.
* Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., App., p. 129.

SLAVERY AND SECESSION. 311
ever an institution which brings such evils upon us." 1 In
the border states, many a one had recognized this well
enough, and expressed it frankly. The guilty leaders of
this damnable scheme of secession, wrote the Knoxville
(Tenn.) Whig, deserve the scaffold, for " it will bring about
the overthrow of slavery one hundred years sooner than
the republican party could have done it." a
'Congr. Globe, 36th Congr., p. 571.
' " The effort to break up this government, led on by South Carolina,
is a wicked, daring and damnable act, for which its guilty leaders ought
to be ignominiously executed. This whole scheme of disunion is a more
consummate abolition contrivance than ever was devised at the north
by the most ultra anti-slavery men, and will work greater mischief to
the slave population of the country. It will bring about the overthrow
of slavery one hundred years sooner than the republican party could
have done it." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 270.

312 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
CHAPTER IX.
BUCHANAN AND THE NON-COERCION DOCTRINE.
In the last two chapters we did not consider the factor
on which it perhaps depended how far the calculations of
the republicans and democrats would prove right or wrong,
and which might' and must in the near future exercise the
most direct and the greatest influence on the decision of this
question. What did the federal executive think of the crisis
which had been forced upon the Union, and what did it do
to avert the catastrophe or to be able to meet it with suc
cess if it could not be avoided? The responsibility of the
president was only a limited one, because his powers were
limited, but it extended up to the very limits which had
been assigned to these by the constitution and the laws.
He was therefore responsible to the people for what he did
and also for what he failed to do but could have done and
should have done. To be fully conscious of this and to act
accordingly should have been demanded of him all the
more unconditionally, as at the time he was the incorpora
tion of the public will of the Union expressed through the
federal government, and until congress met there could be
no action of that will with respect to the crisis, except
through him. In other words, to the extent that he did not
exercise the constitutional and public will of the Union with
respect to the secession movement, full and free play was
allowed it by the federal government up to the meeting of
congress ; and up to that same time, the exercise of that will
by him, no matter how perverse it might be, could not be
checked or corrected by any other federal power. True,
only four weeks intervened between the choioe of presiden-

GENERAL SCOTT'S MEMORIAL. 313
tial electors and the beginning of the second session of the
thirty-sixth congress ; but the doings and omissions of each
¦day now fell with terrible weight into the balance of fate.
Even the greatest political insight would not now have
sufficed to hit the right course in action and omission ; that
required, above all things, a character with the force nec
essary for a clear and firm initiative, on which peace and
war, the existence of the state, and the weal and woe of the
people for generations, depended. Hence, from the first,
the only question was, how great the injury done by the
federal executive in those four weeks would be, for the
president's name was James Buchanan. If the damage he
now did could be repaired at all, the American people
might look upon that fact as the grandest and most wonder
ful manifestation of their "special Providence."
Even some weeks before the election, Buchanan's atten
tion had been officially called to the disastrous consequences
that must follow if he stood,, with crossed arms, a mere
spectator of the course of things. Scott, as commanding
general of the federal army, had sent a memorial dated
the 29th and 30th of October to the secretary of war, in
which he expressed the fear that the slave states would en
deavor, before secession, to obtain possession of the forts
situated within their borders, and therefore declared it nec
essary to have the nine forts mentioned by him "immedi
ately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any
one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous." When
the facts began to show the timeliness of these warnings
and counsels, Scott considered it his duty to let the people
know that no share of the responsibility for any fatal sins
of omission should be laid at his door. He published the
memorial l without receiving the consent of the president,
' In the National Intelligencer of January 18, 1861,— that is, after
¦quite a number of states had seceded.

314 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
and even without having previously informed him of his
intention. It was a keen blow, but the general had made
it mournfully easy for Buchanan to deal him no less heavy
blows in return. But both he and his biographer x have
been able to do no more. The making of a well-founded
counter-charge, however, is by no means, as they assumed,
a justification. A great part of the counter-charge had no
connection whatever with the question whether, and to
what extent, the charge was well founded, and what was
of any importance in it, so far as the decision of this ques
tion was concerned, at most diminished the gravity of the
charge but did not disprove it. Here we can consider only
what really bears the character of a defense, for the fact
that Scott did what it was. not his place to do, w7hen he
constituted himself, unsolicited, the political adviser of the
administration, and that the counsel he gave — Scott was
never remarkable as a peculiarly clear-headed man — was
a wonderfully complicated piece of political and constitu
tional reasoning, should not, of course, as Buchanan's ar
gumentation would evidently have one believe, be looked
upon as decisive in passing judgment on his views on guard
ing the forts against attempts at surprise. In this question
the general, so far as its military phase was concerned, was,
by his calling, after the secretary pf war, the nearest legal
adviser of the president; and the fact that nothing was done
to protect the forts had the most fatal consequences. On
Buchanan, therefore, rested the full responsibility for these
consequences, unless he could not follow Scott's advice.
Actual inability — such was his only possible justification.
Whatever else he might be able to adduce in defense of his
conduct could, at best, be looked upon only as a proof that
he erred neither from forgetfulness of duty nor from weak
ness, but from a want of political judgment But he did
'Curtis, II, 279-814.

PROTECTION OF THE FORTS. 315
not succeed in proving even that.1 A well-founded moral
reproach doubles the frightful weight of guilt which he had
loaded on his shoulders by his wrong political calculation.
He thought enough of himself, in his narrowness, to remain
honestly convinced to his dying day that he had brilliantly
justified himself. But in reality he convicted himself of
having entertained such erroneous ideas, because he had
not the moral courage to do his duty.
Buchanan, indeed, claimed that Scott's suggestion could
not have been carried out, and referred to the general's own
declaration in his memorial that there were only four hun
dred men within reach. That these were not sufficient to
garrison nine forts is indisputable, and it is besides highly
questionable whether the president would, at the time, have
been authorized to summon the militia for that purpose or
to call for volunteers. But the mere assurance of the presi
dent is not sufficient to prove that it was impossible to draw
some troops from the border posts. Many of them, indeed,
but not all, were too distant if action was to be taken im- ,
mediately; and if it was also true that the army2 was
scarcely sufficient for the border service, what were the
dangers of an Indian sally compared to a rebellion of the
slave states? It must, however, be admitted that the po
litical effect of a denudation of the border posts of the
necessary troops might cut two ways, and that it might
not be advisable, on account of the small force that could
be withdrawn from them, to decide in favor of so extraor
dinary a measure. But that does not by any means settle
the question infavor of Buchanan. Whether the six hundred
recruits in New York and Pennsylvania to which Scott
afterwards referred were already available at the time, or
' Nor has Curtis succeeded in doing so, for he adduces nothing new.
Buchanan's arguments are only still further spun out by him.
' "Numbering at that time not more than sixteen thousand men."'

316 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
were afterwards to be "obtained," as Curtis claimed,1 1
cannot say. By what right Curtis thinks he can defend
the president because the memorial speaks of only four
hundred men, I cannot see. Was it not his duty to look
about him and to know what forces were available, and
why did he have a secretary of war? Besides, could the
president not know, without being told so by Scott, that in
this question the secretary of the navy had a great deal to
say? And if all the nine forts could not be protected, why
were not the most important at least protected as far as
possible.2 That something might have been done is proved
by the measures subsequently planned by Buchanan, one of
which, at least, it was endeavored to carry out. But ac
cording to his own testimony, he " dismissed them (Scott's
recommendations) from his mind without further considera
tion," because of "the impracticable nature of the 'views,'
and their strange and inconsistent character." * This is not
the only passage, in Buchanan's defense, whose transparency
reveals the wish that the reader should infer from it that
the policy of complete passivity was not one he had freely
chosen. But from his demonstration that the right thing to
do was to do nothing, because he had neither the legal nor
actual possibility of doing what the circumstances required,
the very contrary follows, in the most undoubted manner.
In the first place he laid stress on the fact that Scott's
memorial had been written before the election, and before
a single state had taken any actual step towards seceding.
1 II, p. 301. It is surprising to me that Curtis does not say when they
became available.
2 Black, who as attorney-general was in a position to be informed of
the possibilities, spoke as secretary of state of " the fatal error which the
administration had committed in not sending down troops enough to
hold all the forts (i. e., in the harbor of Charleston). Objections to the
draft of Buchanan's answer to the South Carolina commissioners.
Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War. p. 155.
1 Mr. Buchanan's Administration, p. 104.

PROTECTION of the forts. 31T
This might justify him in spending the one week in ques
tion calmly and quietly preparing for the menacing possi
bilities. But it is hard to conceive why it would not have-
been right to have taken measures to insure the safety of
the forts, after the 7th of November, since his attention
had been called to their necessity on the 29th and 30 th of
October. Such untenable arguments are wont to be ad
vanced only when one is not himself convinced of the
soundness of his reasoning: their number must supply their
lacking; weight.
In judging Buchanan's conduct, however, it is a matter
of no importance whether or not the influence of Scott's
advice might have been weakened by the fact that he had
anticipated events by a week's time, for the president made
the further unqualified assertion that the small number of
troops at his disposal would have made the following of it
an act of suicidal madness. He writes : " To have attempted
to distribute these five companies among the eight forts in
the cotton states, and Fortress Monroe, in Virginia, would
have been a confession of weakness instead of an exhibi
tion of imposing and overpowering strength. It would
have no effect in preventing secession, but must have done
much to provoke it."
At the first glance many circumstances might seem to
confirm this view, but even before facts had demonstrated
its erroneousness, it could, in no particular, stand a close
examination. If the four hundred men were divided among the nine
forts, the end aimed at by Scott might not have been attained
in the case of any of them. But, on the one hand, the gen
eral had only stated that nine forts were in danger, and
that, therefore, to prevent their being taken by surprise,
they should be sufficiently garrisoned; and on the other, he
had stated that at the time he had only four hundred men
at his disposal. He had not said that these four hundred

318 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
men should be divided among the nine forts. That was an
inference drawn by Buchanan" without any logical neces
sity. And even if it was Scott's intention that they should
be divided among them, Buchanan did not need to follow
him in that. The advisers given the president by the con
stitution and the laws should think for him, but not instead
of him. The constitution made him the commander-in-
chief of the army, and it was his duty to see that the
general's advice, as far as it was "unpractical," was made
practical. But if he did that instead of laying the memo
rial aside " without further consideration," the question
could not but force itself on him whether at least the forts
most in danger and politically most important — there was
not the slightest doubt as to where these were located —
should not be protected. Of course, four hundred men
could not make an impression of " imposing and over
whelming strength " even on the people who saw them
with their own eyes, to say nothing of the entire popula
tion of the slave states; but they were sufficient, especially
if supported by a man-of-war, over and over again, to ward
off any blow that South Carolina, in the then condition of
its equipment, might aim at the forts in the harbor of
Charleston. The sequel showed of what importance this
might be from a military point of view. But that was the
matter of least moment. Not the military but the political
question was decisive. Even if it were as clear as the mid
day sun that not one of the nine forts could be protected,
the president should have followed Scott's advice as far as
possible; for the element of controlling influence in the fur
ther development of the secession movement, so far as it at
all depended on the course of the federal government, was,
not what it could do at the time, but what it was resolved
to do now and in the future. It did not matter how much
might be done to protect the forts, but it mattered much

JEREMIAH BLACk ON THE CRISIS. 319
whether or not what could be done was done; that is,
whether a firm resolution was manifested by suitable meas
ures to argue with lead and steel, if the fulfillment of the
duties imposed on the government by the constitution and
the laws required it. Its position in principle should have
been proclaimed in words and in acts, in a manner which
would have put an end not only to all doubt, but to all hope
that it would recede from it.
Buchanan did not by any means ignore this to the ex
tent one might suppose from his defense to Scott's charges.
On the 17th of November he asked for an official opinion
of the attorney-general on the crisis. He thereby recog
nized that the question, What are the duties and rights of
the president under the constitution and laws? must take
precedence of all political and military considerations; for
the constitutional duty of the attorney-general, as an ad
viser of the executive, to give such an opinion, was con
fined to that question. But not only that. Military and
political considerations were allowable only within the lim
its of the rights belonging to the president. They would
not justify his going beyond these limits, — limits which
could not, perhaps, be laid down with complete accuracy;
still less would they warrant the least omission of what
was required of him by the constitution and the laws.
The task, therefore, that confronted Black demanded in
the highest measure that rare combination of powers and
qualities by which John Marshall had been enabled to ren
der such inestimable service to the Union — a clear, political
and keen judicial mind, and a character of absolute integ
rity and unyielding firmness. For if, on the one hand, the
considerations of expediency suited to the circumstances of
the moment were inadmissible because the question to be
decided was, What was the law, the constitution, on the
other, was, like all constitutions, ultimately a political, legal

320 harper's ferry -
instrument, and all its provisions had to be construed ac
cordingly; its object was the state, and its interpretation
had therefore to start with the assumption that its framers
had had that always in view ; that is, all the deductions from
the text which it was necessary to draw should have been
so formulated as to be in harmony with the laws of public
life, inherent in the nature of things, and not in evident
conflict with them, because the authors of the constitution
could not have intended, by individual provisions and in
principle, to have made the attainment of that impossible
which was the object of the whole. While the politician
should not have changed a single jot or tittle in that opin
ion, the statesman should, from the first word to the last,
have held the light for the jurist, who was acting under the
weight of the most solemn responsibility; for, although he
should have given no place to political considerations, his
judgment, if the president made it his own, must have an
immense political importance, and might even be decisive
of the existence or non-existence of the state. The diffi
culty of the task was equaled only by the badness of the
hands in which it was placed, although Black was not only
a highly estimable man, but, in character and capacity, rose
to a very respectable height above the average. Although
he had never been a real professional politician, his thought
and feeling had assumed so deep a party political hue that
he was too much of a politician for the right solution of
this problem.1 On the other hand, he was not statesman
enough, and altogether too much of a jurist. That he gave
a conscientious opinion, and the best his legal knowledge
' " Judge Black, while at the bar, had not been much of a politician.
. . . But he was a vigorous writer on political subjects, and his pen
was much in the service of his party. . . . He was a democrat of
the strictest sect, a disciple of Jefferson, and a most unflinching and
aggressive friend of Jackson." C. F. Black, Essays and Speeches of
J. S. Black, Biographical Sketch, p. 5.

321
could dictate, there can be no doubt. But, notwithstanding
this, we may assert that he did not subject the question to
a real examination. The more carefully one studies his
opinion the more does the conviction force itself on one
that he looked upon, a priori, as firmly established what
should have been his final deduction. He demonstrates
his proposition in the form of an investigation. Hence he
sees only what is agreeable to him, — breaks off the argu
ment where the further following up of the logical chain
of thought must lead to unpleasant results, — does not per
ceive that his discarding of one-half the premises and the
capricious gaps in his reasoning lead to the complete inver
sion of his own premises and of the state of the facts, and
by his judicial coldness and keenness in the statement of
the question and the inferences he draws, deceives himself as
to all this. Of subjective guilt he cannot be accused, but
that fact did not lessen the frightful weight of the blow
which he dealt his country.
The opinion 1 starts out with the proposition that the fed
eral government and the state governments are, on the one
hand, independent, and possess the supreme power within
the sphere of their competency, and, on the other, entirely
powerless outside the limits prescribed to them by the con
stitution. "The will of a state, whether expressed in its
constitution or laws, cannot, while it remains (!) in the con
federacy, absolve its people from the duty of obeying the
just and constitutional requirements of the central govern
ment." As it was expressly added that he was not speak
ing of what might be effected by revolutionary force, but
only of legal and constitutional rights, it was evidently
conceded that a state might cease, in a legal and constitu
tional manner, to be a constituent member of the Union.
' 20th of November, Op. of the Att'y-Gen'l, IX, pp. 516 ff.
21

322 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Not a word intimated how that could happen. But as the
indirect assertion of the claim is found in the sentence re
lating to the constitutional limits of the will of the state,
the evident conclusion is that the attorney-general was of
opinion that the state had a right to bring it to pass in any
way whatever. The sequel proved that Black did not hold
this view. Yet there is no question that it was not from
a want of reflection that he wrote the words which seemed
to approve the secessionists in the most essential point of
all, and that in a sentence which was entirely meaningless
if it was not intended to recognize the right of secession.
The words flowed involuntarily from his pen, and he was
not clear as to their bearing, because he immediately an
swered the question of secession both affirmatively and
negatively, forging with rigid doctrinarianism born of a
party-political spirit, a, logical chain of fallacies, working
his way from the negative given in the fundamental prin
ciple of the theory to an affirmative all the more categor
ical in proportion as the facts more peremptorily required
the actual assertion of the fundamental principle of the
theory. His dialectic art made the constitution a monster de
vouring itself, because he could not recognize the right of
secession and would not recognize as reconcilable with the
nature of tho federative state the means by which serious
attempts to assert that right might be suppressed.
The next step in the proof that the constitution was such
a monstrosity is the reference to the duty of the president
to see to the execution of the laws. The attorney-general
here claims that the president, when the law has made any
provision as to the manner in which this duty is to be ful
filled, has no discretion with respect to it, that is, that the
manner prescribed by the law is the only one allowable,
no matter how ineffectual or preposterous — a proposition

THE PRESIDENT'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 323
which, stated thus absolutely and generally, is far from un
assailable.' l
With this, the question of the duties of the president was
dismissed. Henceforth only his rights are spoken of. He
has the right to defend federal property, and this right em
braces the further right to recapture such property when
it has been illegally taken out of its possession. Both,
however, were not only a right but an imperative duty.
Tins is too clear to need proof; and it is equally clear
from what follows, why Black spoke only of rights and not
at all of duty. One need not exercise a right, but a duty
must be performed; and while sophistry is able to find ap
parent reasons for the claim that a right may not be exer
cised, the claim that the same law that imposed a duty for
bade its performance is a contradiction which no sophistry
can conceal. In the discussion that follows of the ques
tion whether and to what extent the employment of mili
tary force was allowable, he attempted to prove that the
constitution, in cases like the present, intended to give the
president, by these rights, only a useless weapon.
He admits without reserve that the law of 1795 left it
entirely to the president to decide whether the conditions
under which the calling out of the militia is allowable ex
isted. These conditions are that the federal laws are re
sisted by combinations too powerful to be put down by the
1 Congress has certainly the right to authorize a definite manner with
out making it absolutely obligatory. Every law should therefore be
examined with the view of ascertaining whether congress did not in
tend to make only this limited use of its competency. Moreover, it is
conceivable that the manner prescribed might curtail rights granted
the president by the constitution. If this is the case it is not binding,
for the law is unconstitutional ; that is, it is a law only in form but not
in reality. Whether it may, on that account, be rightly resisted, remains,
indeed, an unsettled question, until the matter has been decided by the
federal supreme court. Hence when the president disregards it, he
does so at his peril.

324 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
courts or the marshals. It must be established beyond a doubt
that it is impossible for the courts or marshals to suppress
them before a military force can be summoned, and "even
then its operations must be purely defensive." It can do
only what " a posse " would have had to do, if one of suffi
cient strength could have been summoned. It has to be
absolutely subordinate to the civil authorities, because it
could act only to assist the latter. When the resistance
was so universal in a state that all federal officials resigned
their positions, and others could not be induced to fill
them, interference by a military force would be " wholly
illegal," because there would be no civil authorities whom
the troops could support. Under such circumstances to use
the troops against the people " would be simply making
war upon them."
A bolder offense to sound common sense was certainly
never made by sophistical logic. The revolt against the
laws and the constitution needs only to exceed certain lim
its in order completely to tie the hands of the government,
by the constitution ; it has no longer the right to employ
the means which it would be its duty to use if the refusal
to obey had stopped one step short of these limits. The
framers of that constitution which for more than two
generations has been lauded as the product of the highest
statesmanlike wisdom, had, therefore, carrying cynical
morality to the extreme, provided for the case of big thieves
and of little thieves, only to make the escape of the big
ones obligatory.
An attorney-general who had to give the president an
official opinion on this question, in such a crisis, was cer
tainly obliged to pay some attention to what the supreme
court of the United States had said upon it. Black was
too good a lawyer to allow us to assume that he did not
know that the basis of his sophism had, forty years before,

Marshall's prophetic words. 325
been ground to powder under the giant blows of Marshall's
logic. In the case of Cohens v. Virginia? the attorney for
Virginia (Barbour) had said that the legislatures had it in
their power to destroy the federal government by sins of
omission: all they needed was to choose no senators and
electors. Whereupon Marshall used the prophetic words:
"We cannot help believing that a general conviction of the
total incapacity of the government to protect itself and its
laws, in such cases, would contribute in no inconsiderable
degree to their occurrence." But, at the very threshold, he
did all in his power to avert the danger that such a con
viction should find a lodging in the mind of the people.
Universal hostility to the existing system, he said, is irre
sistible; and hence, the framers of the constitution did not
attempt the impossible and try to insure it against such
hostility. But it is usurpation whenever a part undertakes
to do what the whole cannot be kept from doing. Provision
has been made for that, because such usurpation can be
opposed, and it is the duty of those to whom the people —
the whole — have delegated their power, to oppose it.2
This applies as much to a state as to any other fraction of
' Wheaton, vi, pp. 264 ff.
2 " It is very true that, whenever hostility to the existing system shall
become universal, it will also be irresistible. The people made the con
stitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will,
and lives only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power
to make or to unmake resides only in the whole body of the people ; not
in any subdivision of them. The attempt of any of the parts to exer
cise it is usurpation, and ought to be repelled by those to whom the peo
ple have delegated their power of repelling it. . . . The framers of
the constitution were indeed unable to make any provisions which
should protect that instrument against a general combination of the
states, or of the people, for itB destruction; and, conscious of this inabil
ity, they have not made the attempt. But they were able to provide
against the operation of measures adopted in any one state, whose tend
ency might be to arrest the execution of the laws; and this it was the
part of true wisdom to attempt. We think they have attempted it."

326 harper's ferry -
the whole. For the provision that the constitution, the
laws passed and the treaties concluded under it are the
supreme law was" the authoritative language of the Ameri
can people, and, if the gentlemen please, of the American
states." This simple sentence overthrew the claim that the
duty of obedience of the states to the constitution was a
different, more limited and less absolute one than that of
the population, that is, that some tens or hundreds of thou
sands, in case they acted as a state, were justified in with
drawing from its (the constitution's) supremacy, while all
the millions of individuals were, without exception, abso
lutely subject to it. It has pleased "America," in many
respects and for many purposes, to be "a nation." With
regard to all these, its government is " complete " and
" competent." In the fulfillment of these purposes, it has a
right " to control all individuals or governments within the
American territory."
These propositions could not be shaken, if the starting
point of the reasoning in support of them was the object
of the constitution. But Black did not take his stand on
this positive ground. His argument is built entirely on the
negative elements which he was able to interpret out of, and
into, the constitution. Instead of first establishing what
the objects of the constitution are and then inquiring what
means were given to the government or the president for
the attainment of these objects, he leaves the former en
tirely out of consideration, and hence really examines the
second question only from its negative side, thus invol
untarily turning his investigation into a search for proofs
of the unlawfulness of certain means.
When a state declares its independence, continues the
opinion, the question whether it is revolutionary, or is done
on the ground of a right reserved in the constitution, must
exercise no influence on the action of the president He is

duties of the president. 327
not authorized to recognize such independence. The con
gress or a convention of the other states would have to
take the necessary and appropriate measures. The presi
dent must assume that the legal relations hitherto existing
continue unchanged, and must execute the laws to the ex
tent that the defensive means placed in his hands permit,
until such time as a new order of things has been estab
lished by law or by force.
The president is therefore bound by the constitution, at
the risk of a new order of things being established by force,
i. e., of the constitution being torn and destroyed, to read
into the command given by the constitution with the most
concise peremptoriness, the words "defensive means" and
" to the extent of." And in his search for the answer to
the question what defensive means are given him and how
far they allow him to go, he dare not, evidently, approach
the interpretation of the laws with the presupposition that
it was the intention of congress to give him the means
required for the fulfillment of his sworn duty in case not
only a law met with resistance, and some persons offered
such resistance, but a state refused obedience and by its se
cession overthrew all the laws together with the entire
constitution. The attorney-general must be understood
in this way, for he now takes up the proof that the consti
tution had not given congress the power to employ the
means necessary in this case for the execution of the laws
and for its own maintenance, and that congress evidently
could not have granted, in the laws in force, powers which
it should not have conferred at all.
Whether congress has the constitutional right to wage
war against one or more states, says Black, is a question
which congress itself has to consider. Still he goes to the
trouble of examining it, and gives it an absolutely negative
answer. The constitutional provision relating to the dec-

328 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
laration of war has reference only to foreign powers, and
the right to call out the militia was granted only: (1) "to
execute the laws of the Union ; that is, to assist the federal
officers in the performance of their regular duties;" (2) "to
suppress insurrections against the state;" (3) to repel in
vasions of a foreign hostile power. " All these provisions
are made to protect the states, not to authorize an attack
by one part of the country upon another; to preserve the
peace, and not to plunge them into civil war." All the
framers of the constitution were, doubtless, decidedly con
vinced that military force as a means of holding the states
together was not only useless, but would be ruinous. The
employment of such force against a state would be, ipso
facto, its expulsion from the Union. And would not all
the states be released from their federal obligations, if con
gress, by an unconstitutional excitation of strife and armed
force, broke up the existing union ? Would any part of
the people be bound to spend their money or shed their
blood in such a struggle?
With scarcely any exaggeration we may say : So many
sentences, so many arbitrary assumptions, preposterous
claims, inconsistencies or fallacies !
It has already been pointed out that it is nowhere said
in the constitution that the militia should be called out
only to assist the federal authorities in the performance of
their regular duties; that is, that the laws should no longer
be executed when no federal officials could be procured
who were willing to try to execute them. Logic required
the opposite conclusion. It was the imperative duty of
the government to call out the militia, in order to create
anew this presupposition of a legal situation; for the re
fusal on principle to execute the laws was a refusal to pre
serve the state. A constitution which forbids the govern
ment to prevent the destruction of the state is an absurdity.

329
It is wrongly called a constitution, for it is only an inter
national treaty for no definite time, with the unlimited right
to give notice of its termination at any moment.
In the constitution we find simply, "insurrections," not
"insurrections against the state." That, in slave states,
the expression was used in the sense of the slave insurrec
tions, is true. On this account it was often claimed, but
never proved, that the framers of the constitution intended
to speak only of such.1
' Madison said, in the debate on the powers which should be given to
the federal government with respect to the militia: "As the greatest
danger is that of disunion of the states, it is necessary to guard against
it by sufficient powers to the common government." Elliot's Deb., vol.
5. p. 466. Immediately after the expression of this view the provision
was adopted, without any opposition, in the form which it stands in the
constitution: " Congress shall have power . . . to provide for call
ing forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insur
rections and repel invasions." Art. I, sec. 8, ch. 15. See, also, the de
bate between G. Mason and Madison on this clause, in the Virginia
convention. Elliot's Deb., Ill, pp. 378, 383. To Clay's question, why
they could not rest satisfied with authorizing the sheriff to call upon
the posse comitatus to execute the laws, Madison answered that that
would not be always sufficient; "public force must be used when re
sistance to the laws require it, otherwise society itself must be de
stroyed." lb., p. 384. The strongest refutation, however, of Black's
construction is given by Hamilton, in No. 28 of the Federalist: " That
there may happen cases in which the national government may be ne
cessitated to resort to force cannot be denied ; . . . seditions and
insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body
politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body. . . . Should
such emergencies at any time happen under the national government,
there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must
be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight
commotion in a small part of a state, the militia of the residue would
be adequate to its suppression. ... If, on the contrary, the insur
rection should pervade a whole state, or a principal part of it, the em
ployment of a different kind of force might become unavoidable."
Dawson's edit. , pp. 181, 182.

330 harper's ferry -
The sole object of the provisions was, unquestionably, pro
tection, but protection not only of the individual states,
but of all them — of the Union. And so long as aye did
not mean nay, and nay, aye, the federal government could
not become guilty of an attack on the rights of a state by
not allowing the Union to be destroyed, by parrying the
blow aimed at it by a state and compelling the state to keep
the peace. Precisely because these coercive means had
been given it " to preserve the peace," the government must
make use of them in order to restore the peace when a state
has broken it.
According to Black's argument, the counter-blow was the
cause, not the consequence, of the blow. The federal gov
ernment expelled a state from the Union when it endeav
ored to prevent its announced withdrawal from the Union
by the means that could prevent it; it dissolved the Union
when it opposed its dissolution ; it released all the states
and the entire people from their duty of obedience when it
compelled a state to yield the obedience it owed but re
fused. Constitutionally, therefore, what the government
did was the direct opposite of what it was in fact. But
facts cannot be nonsensical, and the possibility of a deduct
ive proof that the constitution had decreed an absurdity
must, in principle, be looked upon as excluded; only in case
it was to be found indisputably and directly in the wording
of the constitution should it be recognized as at all existing.
All construction should tend to sense, not to nonsense and
absurdity. But a duty which dare not be performed, if its
non-performance makes the performance of all other duties
impossible, is the greatest absurdity conceivable.
At the end Black sums up his opinion, to the effect that
the federal government had the right to " preserve itself in
its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and
positive aggression upon its property or its officers," but that

MESSAGE OF DECEMBER THIRD. 331
" an offensive war to compel a state to recognize the suprem
acy of the government of the United States"would destroy
the Union, immediately and completely. That, therefore,
could not be done to preserve the Union which was allow
able in defense of federal property and federal officials;
and what was defense in the latter case would be offensive
war in the former. Written constitutions may, after all,
put forth very strange blossoms in highly critical times, if
the proposition that they guarantee a government by laws
instead of a government by men is construed to mean that
politics is under the guardianship of jurisprudence, and that
the government must leave the decisive word to its legal
adviser. These constitutional views of Black were not legally bind
ing on Buchanan. He could not even find protection be
hind them. They, however, afforded him a certain moral
support, if he acted in accordance with them, and it must
be assumed that he asked for the opinion of his attorney-
general on that account, for he knew what its nature would
be, and his mind had been made up before he asked for it.
The annual message of the 3d of December, so far as it
treated this question, was, as to its contents, a copy of the
opinion, but its arguments and conclusions wouldhave been
essentially the same, even if the opinion had never been
given. The political moresk-work with which Buchanan
surrounded his constitutional reasoning must have con
vinced of the truth of this even those to whom it did not
seem already sufficiently proved by* his whole political past
and by his character.
Immediately after the first sentence about the crisis, it
could be inferred with certainty what the message would
offer. That sentence ran: "The long-continued and in
temperate interference of the northern people with the
question of slavery in the southern states has at length

332 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
produced its natural effects." The whole blame, therefore,
rested on the opponents of slavery ; the south, which had
never asked anything more than that it be let alone, was
only acting in self-defense. From this it necessarily fol
lowed that the employment of force against it would be
morally unjustifiable. If such an employment of force was
commanded by the constitution, then the constitution
made that which must be morally condemned a duty, which,
of course, should not be assumed, unless one were forced
thereto by a provision which excluded every other con
struction. It is not necessary to follow in every detail the chain of
reasoning which led the president to this inevitable conclu
sion, from his introductory sentence. It is sufficient to se
lect, and accompany with critical remarks, those parts of it
which might and even must have a practical, important
bearing in the course of events.
The election of any citizen as president, says Buchanan,
can, of itself, be no just cause for the dissolution of the
Union. Reason, justice and respect for the constitution
required that " we" should wait for some definite and dan
gerous action, before having recourse to such a remedy.
He (Lincoln) had not to make the laws, but only to execute
them; and it was a remarkable fact in our history that
congress had never passed a law — the Missouri compro
mise perhaps excepted — that curtailed in the least the
rights of the states to their slave property. Nor is it
to be assumed that such a law could, in the present or
the next congress, receive the assent of the two houses.
Some states, however, had become guilty of violations of
their constitutional duty — notably by laws relating to the
extradition of fugitive slaves. But neither congress nor
the president should be held responsible for that. It was
to be hoped that the state legislatures would repeal theso

Buchanan's argument. 333-
unconstitutional and disastrous laws. Unless they did so,
no human power could save the Union. Revolutionary re
sistance by the injured states to the federal government
would then, after they had exhausted all peaceable and
constitutional means, be justifiable.
The first part of Buchanan's argument was, therefore, a
refutation, step by step, and with invincible logic, of the
judgment with which he had begun it. As the right of
complaint of the south could not extend to opinions and
feelings, but was, in the nature of things, confined to acts,
and as its rights were sufficiently protected by the courts
against the punishable acts of individuals, all its grievances
for which there was any ground shrunk, in view of the facts
demonstrated by the president, to a few state laws merely,
and for these, as Buchanan rightly showed, the federal
government could not be held constitutionally or morally
responsible. How, notwithstanding this, these grievances
could justify " revolutionary resistance to the government
of the Union," is inconceivable. But it is just as difficult
to understand how the head of the government of a great
state could consider it his business, in a mighty, revolu
tionary movement directed not against the form but against
the existence of the state, to announce, urbi et orbi, under
what conditions he would consider the revolution " justified."
This was all the more outrageous, as he accompanied the
announcement with the declaration that he had used the
word "revolutionary" with entire deliberation and wanted
it to be understood in its broadest sense. He characterized
the constitutional right claimed as a chimera, and justly
said: "What a crushing argument" would it have been
in the struggles for the constitution, if those who feared an
imperilment of state rights from it could have been told
that any state might leave the Union at any moment!
The framers of the constitution had not been guilty of the-

334 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
"absurdity " of making provision, in the fundamental law,
for the dissolution of the state. Their desire was to erect
a structure which might resist the ravages of time and bid
defiance to the storms of centuries. But, on that very ac
count, the people of the states could protect themselves
against " the tyranny and oppression of the federal govern
ment." For the right of the governed to resist the oppres
sion of the government exists independently of all constitu
tions. But secession was revolution even if justified.
As the president had stated that the federal government
had thus far done nothing for which it could be blamed,
and that there was no reason to fear that it would do any
thing of that nature in the future, there was no reason
whatever for his saying anything about resistance to tyr
anny and oppression, and, if it was not necessary that
something should be said about it, then, under the circum
stances, nothing should have been said about it. His refer
ence to such resistance might — nay, must — make it seem
that he wanted to take back the remarks that preceded it,
to a greater or less extent. This, however, was of com
paratively little importance. It did not at all beseem the
president to express himself on the " right of revolution."
Even if he had made it as clear as he had left it obscure,
that in this connection "right " {Recht) could only mean
" reason for " (Berechligung), it would have been, under the
circumstances, a grievous wrong to do so. The fact that
he declared secession to be revolution was of itself of great
importance, for it might be made to help refute his further
reasoning, and, in the subsequent course of events, force
practical consequences to be drawn, the avoidance of which
was his most ardent wish. But, as president, he should have
known nothing whatever, in any sense whatever, of a right
of revolution. In his official capacity he should have ab
solutely denied his power to raise the question of the polit-

THE RIGHT OF COERCION. 335
ical or moral justification of secession. The official declara
tion that he held the constitution to be overshadowed by
the right of revolution turned the value of the declaration
that secession was revolution into an interrogation point.
It was his duty to let the people know that to him, in his
official capacity, secession could be nothing but revolution,
and that he must draw from the conviction that such was
its character all its logical consequences. Buchanan's
further reasoning proceeded from this proposition, but
reached a conclusion, both as to his own duties and those
of the federal government, the very reverse of it.
" Not by any human power," said Buchanan, can the
president be absolved from his sworn duty to execute the
laws. But how, when circumstances beyond his control
made it impossible for him to execute them? That is al
ready the case, in part, in South Carolina, as there is not
now, in that state, a single federal official in the service of
the administration of justice. The president is powerless
in the face of this fact; since, by the laws of February 28,
1795, and March 3, 1807, he can call upon the militia only
to assist these officials. Congress must decide whether the
existing laws can be so changed as to make the objects of
the constitution more effectually attainable. It may even
soon be called upon to decide the more important question,
whether it has authority to employ force to compel a state
to remain in the Union. But it was his, Buchanan's, duty
to declare that, after careful investigation, he could not
recognize the existence of such authority. It could be de
duced only from the principle that congress had been
oranted the right to declare and wage war against a state.
It was not expressly granted him, nor was it "necessary and
proper for carrying into execution" any of the powers
granted him. The Philadelphia convention had debated
the question, and decided that the right had not been

336
granted. More than that, it was in conflict with the entire
spirit of the constitution. Besides, if congress had the
right, its enforcement would be unwise, because it made
the future reconciliation of the states "impossible." "The
fact is that our Union rests upon public opinion and can
never be cemented by the blood of its citizens shed in civil
war." Like all things earthly, the slavery question was a
transitory one, and had already passed its zenith. But
what could not be obtained by force, and what should
not be attempted, might be reached by friendly advances.
The article on the amendment of the constitution pointed
out the way in which the Union should be saved. The
amendment to be proposed by congress to the state legis
latures needed only to establish the correct interpretation
of the constitution with respect to three points: 1. The ex
press recognition of the right of property in slaves, in states
in which that right already existed or might exist in the
future. 2. The duty to protect that right in all the terri
tories, so long as they remained territories. 3. The recog
nition of the equally absolute duty of the surrender of
fugitive slaves.
As the question of the rights and duties of the president
has been already discussed, all that is needed here, is a
criticism of the argument on the powers of congress. [ But
a word is sufficient to prove that the fundamental proposi
tion of that argument is a gross fallacy ; and, of course, the
whole structure crumbles when its foundation is destroyed.
Buchanan admitted that secession was revolution. Hence,
the question was not, whether congress had the right to-
declare "war" against a state, but only whether it might
put down a revolution. To put that question was to answer
it. Ex vi termini, every government not only has the right
but it is its duty to put down a revolution. If the suppres
sion of the revolution assumed the character of a war,

THE EIGHT OF COERCION. 337
that was merely a fact, not a question of law or of right,
and the responsibilty therefore lay exclusively on those
who were making the revolution, and not upon the gov
ernment that suppressed it.
But it is well worth while, from an historicial, constitu
tional and political point of view, to subject some other
points of Buchanan's reasoning to a critical examination.
In the first place his reference to the doings of the Phil
adelphia convention must be submitted to a close investiga
tion. It is true that a proposition was made and rejected 1 to
adopt a provision on the right of employing force against
a state. Although the federal government has only the
rights given it by the constitution, it does not follow from
that fact, in and of itself, that that power should have
been Withheld from it. If the convention was of opinion
that it was contained in other provisions of the draft of
the constitution, there was no need of its being expressly
. granted. But the president based his interpretation on
two important remarks made by Madison on the question.
He had said on the 31st of May, 1787: "The use of force
against a state would look more like a declaration of war
than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be
considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all
previous contracts by which it might be bound."2 And on
the 8th of June: "Any government for the United States,
formed on the supposed practicability of using force against
the constitutional proceedings of tha states, would prove as
visionary and fallacious as the government of congress "
under the articles of confederation.'
' That is on Madison's motion, to which there was no objection, the
clause was " postponed," and not brought up again for consideration.
2 Elliot, V, p. 140.
»Ib., p. 171. 22

338 It would seem at the first glance that this commentary
which met with objection from no quarter, on the non-
adoption of the proposed provision, excluded all doubt as
to the intention of the convention. Those who denied the
right of coercion had, therefore, always maintained this
with the greatest positiveness. But the claim, like the rest
of the principles of the extreme state's rights school, was
based not on facts but on arbitrary and false assumptions.
To be convinced of this one needs only follow the history
of the question in the convention in all its connections. If
people had done so sooner — and it was neither a difficult nor
wearisome task — with historical objectivity and coolness,
the wonderful obscurity existing in many minds on this
fundamental problem of constitutional law would have been
dispelled before it came to be of such terrible, practical
importance that it might be decisive of the existence or
non-existence of the Union.
In the first place it has been entirely overlooked that in
the debates in the convention there was evidently question
only of isolated constitutional offenses of the states,1 of a
positive or negative nature, that is, sins of commission or
omission, and not of the canceling of the constitution in
toto or of withdrawal from the Union. This is clear from
the wording of the proposed clause itself, " authorizing an
exertion of the force of the whole against a delinquent
state." The word "delinquent" here should be understood
to mean faithlessness to duty or obligation, for it must be
construed in the light of the experience the Union had
gone through under the articles of confederation: First,
refusal to yield to the constitutional demands of the fed
eral powers, and then encroachment on the jurisdictional
1 Even A. B. Hart, in his otherwise meritorious work, The Coercive
Powers of the Government of the United States of America, has not
noticed this.

madison's Views. 339
domain of the latter. If the case of secession had been
contemplated it is scarcely probable that a mere adjective
would have been chosen, and one of such indifferent color
at that. Nor need it at all surprise us that the case of
secession was not contemplated. Of course the constitu
tion had to fix the constitutional relation of the states to
the federal government. But a state which announced its
secession from the Union thereby destroyed the precondition
of its whole constitutional position. That announcement
was the renunciation in principle of all its rights, and such
renunciation was entirely in its power, in so far as it could
not be prevented. But such renunciation could neither de
prive the federal government of its rights nor absolve it
from its duties. The only logical consequence would be,
on the one hand, the obliteration of the bounds set it by
its constitutional position, vis-a-vis of the federal govern
ment, and, on the other, the duty to restore the constitu
tional relation by all possible means, and hence, in the
first place, to regain the precondition to that constitutional
relation, viz., the appurtenance of the state to the Union.
If, as Buchanan had truly said, a constitutional right of
secession was an absurdity, because the Union was not an
international confederation but a state, then the question
of secession was in no way a constitutional question, for
the constitution had to do only with constitutional rela
tions, and secession was not and could not be a constitu
tional relation.
It followed, however, directly from the first of Madison's
sentences quoted by Buchanan, that he had in view only
isolated constitutional offenses of the states. The expres
sion of the fear, that the use of force would cause the
state to consider itself released from all the obligations it
had entered into, was a plain contradiction, if he had in
tended to speak also of the case of a state's announcing the

340 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
annulment of all its obligations by a declaration of seces
sion. But that Madison must have condemned the use of
force in the latter case, because he had condemned it in the
former, would have been a most arbitrary conclusion. The
cases were radically different, and hence what was consid
ered permissible or even absolutely necessary in the one
might easily be looked upon as worthy of condemnation in
the other.
The supposition that Madison had done this is excluded
all the less, as he had originally advocated the granting of
the power which he now opposed.1 It is to be found not
'As early as 1781 he defended the view that the power was "im
plied " in the articles of confederation, and thought it better to give it
in express terms. His report to congress proposed the following form :
" To employ the force of the United States, as well by sea as by land, to
compel states to fulfill their federal engagements; . . . to make dis
traint on any of the effects ... of such state or any of the citizens
thereof, . . . and to prohibit their trade and intercourse.'' See
Madis. Pap., I, pp. 86-90. Nor was he by any means alone in the opin
ion that congress had already the right to use force. In 1786 Monroe
stated as a reason why a constitutional convention should not be called :
"Congress . . . has a right to compel (I) compliance with every
requisition which does not go beyond the powers with which it is in
vested by the confederation." Bancroft, Hist, of the Formation of the
Const, of the United States, I, p. 259. It is, however, deserving of
special remark that even Jefferson held this view most firmly. On the
24th of January, 1786, he wrote to Mr. de Meusnier: "It has been
often said that the decisions of congress are impotent because the con
federation provides no compulsory power. But when two or more na
tions enter into compact, it is not usual for them to say what shall be
done to the party who infringes it. Decency forbids this; and it is as
unnecessary as indecent, because the right of compulsion naturally re
sults to the party injured by the breach. When any one state in the
American Union refuses obedience to the confederation by which they
have bound themselves, the rest have a natural right to compel them to
obedience. Congress would probably exercise long patience before they
would recur to force ; but if the case ultimately required it, they would
use that recurrence. Should this case ever arise, they will probably
coerce by a naval force, as being more easy, less dangerous to liberty,

THE RIGHT OF COERCION. 341
only in the so-called Virginia plan,1 in which he had a ma
terial part, but also in his own draft of a constitution.2
Moreover, it is very clear from his remarks that the rea
son for the change in his views did not lie in the political
nature he wished to give the Union in the new constitu
tion. Not because a constitutional power of coercion of
the federal government was irreconcilable with the " sov
ereignty " of the states, but because he had become con
vinced that, for practical reasons, the employment of force
was not to be recommended, did he let his proposition drop.
He did not want to prove that the duty of obedience of
the states to the constitution found a limit in their sover
eignty, which, will or not, the federal government would
have to respect, but that it was advisable, and why it was
advisable, to look for something to take the place of the
use of force, in order to insure the Union against viola
tions of that duty. He did not argue against the right
of compelling obedience unconstitutionally refused, but
and less likely to produce much bloodshed." Jefferson's Works, IX,
pp. 291, 292. In a letter of the 11th of August, 1786, to Monroe, on the
necessity of measures against the Algerian pirates, we read: "It will
be said there is no money in the treasury. There never will be money
in the treasury till the confederacy shows its teeth. The states must
see the rod; perhaps it must be felt by some one of them. . . .
Every rational citizen must wish to see an effective instrument of co
ercion, and should fear to see it on any other element than the water.
A naval force can never endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed ;
a land force would do both." lb., I, pp. 606, 607.
1 "To call forth the force of the Union, against any member of the
Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." Elliot, V,
p. 128. It is noteworthy and significant that Patterson, of New Jersey,
said, in a speech in which he strongly advocated that the "federal
scheme" of the articles of confederation should be preserved: "No
other amendments (of the articles of confederation) were wanting than
to mark the orbits of the states with precision, and provide for the
use of coercion, which was the great point." lb., p. 177.
2 The North Amer. Rev., XXV, p. 265, cited by Hart, loe. cit, p. 3.

342 harper's feery — Lincoln's inauguration.
pleaded for the expediency of securing it by some other
means than force of arms. Only because that seemed pos
sible, did he and the convention object to the provision con
cerning the employment of force. The concluding sen
tence, not quoted by Buchanan, of Madison's short, first
speech, stated this expressly.1 In the second speech —
which Buchanan thought well to be silent about, also — he
repeated this, and the repetition of it dispels all doubt that
could possibly still exist after the first declaration; for this
latter speech dealt with the substitute for the use of force
which was first proposed.
On the same day on which, on Madison's motion, the
"force clause" was defeated, the convention had, without
debate and without opposition, adopted a provision that
gave the national government a "negative "on all state
laws which were in its opinion opposed to the constitution.
This resolution was brought up for reconsideration on the
8th of June. Madison defended it with great power. He
characterized the provision as the "mildest expedient"
against the manifold improprieties from which the country
had hitherto suffered from the states. If it could not be
agreed to, there was no alternative but the employment of
force.2 However, in order that the negative might have
the necessary efficacy, it must be extended to all cases.
This enlargement of the original demand seems to have
contributed a great deal towards opening tho eyes of the
convention to the fact that many and weighty objections
might be raised to the expediency of seeking to reach the
desired end in this Way. The convention returned again
and again to the question, and at last definitively rejected
this means of protection, but not until it supposed it had
' " He hoped such a system would be framed as might render this
resource unnecessary."
'Elliot, Deb., V, p. 171.

substitute for coercion. 343
found a better one in the provision that the constitution
was the supreme law, and that the states should be bound
by it.1 Whether the object intended would be attained by
this means experience alone could show. But that the
history of the origin of this provision was a refutation
rather than a confirmation of what Buchanan found in the
constitution and in the debates of the Philadelphia con
vention cannot be questioned.
Madison frankly stated that the principal reason why
recourse must be had to some other expedient was because
it was too doubtful whether the federal government would
be able to coerce a state by force of arms.2 The decisive
thing was not an objection in principle but a purely practi
cal consideration. Only one fault could be found with
that assertion. He doubted not only the feasibleness and
efficacy, but also the justice, of the use of force " when ap
plied to people collectively, not individually." s But the
quoting of this opinion of Madison, so far, at least, as seces
sion was concerned, is shown to be wholly unallowable by
the sentence immediately following: "A union of states
containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its
own destruction." He did not want the force clause, be
cause its insertion in the constitution might involve danger
to the Union ; yet Buchanan interpreted his utterances to
mean that the destruction of the Union must not be pre
vented by the federal government by armed force. If the
' lb., p. 828.
2 " Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost, enforce a
national decree against Massachusetts, abetted, perhaps, by several of
her neighbors? It would not be possible. A small proportion of the
community, in a compact situation, acting on the defensive, and at one
of its extremities, might at any time bid defiance to the national gov
ernment." 3 It is plain from this sentence, also, that unquestionably only isolated,
individual constitutional offenses were meant.

344 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
rejection of the force clause were the withholding in prin
ciple of the right to use force under any circumstances
against a state, then, indeed, the constitution had provided
for the destruction of the Union ; for the prohibition to pre
serve it in certain cases was equivalent to the command to
allow it to be destroyed in those cases.
If the framers of the constitution had really taken the
position ascribed to them by Buchanan, they would have
become guilty of the grossest self-contradiction. If they de
sired the Union to be a state, they must also have desired
the possibility of coercion. For Douglas was unquestion
ably right when he said: "The word government means
coercion. There can be no government without coercion.
Coercion is the vital principle upon which all governments
rest. Withdraw the right of coercion and you dissolve
your government." 1 Hence the right of coercion was un
doubtedly granted in the constitution, for it was not ex
pressly withheld, and the constitution had created a real
state with a real government for the totality of individuals
belonging to it, and hence also for the parts of that totality
organized as states. Congress was expressly given the
right to make all laws which should be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the powers vested in it, or in any
department or officer of the United States. But the pres
ervation of the Union, and of the government as the govern
ment, was the precondition of the execution of all the rights
granted to, and all the duties imposed upon, the federal
government; and hence Buchanan's contention, that the
use of force in the execution of any of the powers granted
was not necessary and proper, was simply senseless.
Curtis 2 denies with great positiveness and moral indigna
tion that this was Buchanan's position. The blindness and
' Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., App., p. 40.
'Life of Buchanan, II, pp. 352, 353.

THE RIGHT OF COERCION. 345
lack of conscience born of party spirit, he claims, have
ascribed views to Buchanan which he never held. As the
thema probandum of his entire work, in two volumes, is
that Buchanan was not only an excellent man and high-
minded patriot, but also an inflexible character and a states
man of surpassing wisdom, this assertion cannot surprise
us. Whether his proof of it places Buchanan's powers of
thought and judgment in a better light is, however, more
than questionable.
From later publications by Black, it appears that he had
objected to the sentence in the message relating to the power
of congress " to coerce a state into submission which is at
tempting to withdraw or has actually withdrawn from the
confederacy." The attorney -general, Curtis tells us, fully
shared the constitutional views developed in the message,
and only feared that this sentence would be superficially
read, and therefore misunderstood. The president had no
reason for such anxiety, since he had shown the difference
between coercion against a state and against individuals so
clearly. But, in the opinion of the man whom the president
must have considered an exceptionally competent judge, his
own attorney-general, the difference was not made suffi
ciently clear, and it would therefore have been advisable to
clothe the right (?) idea in words which would exclude the
possibility of a misunderstanding. Is it not much more prob
able that Buchanan did not do so because his two principal
propositions concerning the right of coercion were in irrec
oncilable contradiction? He who cannot perceive that
such was the fact, without assistance, can find the help he
needs in Curtis; for, in order to remove that contradiction,
Curtis is forced to make the message say what is not to be
found in it. According to him, its purport was that " while
the federal government could not apply force to prevent a
state from adopting an ordinance of secession, it could and

346 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
must use force, if need be, to execute its laws, notwith
standing the secession." There was not a word in the
message about preventing a state from " adopting an ordi
nance of secession," and the idea could occur to no one
that that was what Buchanan meant by the question
whether congress had the power to compel a state to re
main in the Union by force of arms. How, indeed, can
armed force prevent the adoption of a resolution, in other
words an expression of will? And as Buchanan spoke also
of states that had already "actually withdrawn," he must,
according to this interpretation, have considered it possible
to prevent by force of arms an expression of will which
had been already made. Buchanan, however, had never
soared to the height of absurdity to which his apologist
assigns him, He meant what he said, and said what he
meant.1 Hence he did not, as Curtis represents, plainly
declare it to be the right and duty of the federal govern
ment to execute the laws of the Union, notwithstanding
secession. On the contrary, he endeavored to prove that
the execution of them would, under certain circumstances,
be in great part practically impossible and constitution
ally unlawful; and he unqualifiedly recognized only the
duty of the federal government to protect federal prop
erty and federal officials from direct attacks upon them.
If Buchanan had really desired to recognize the duty of
securing the execution of the laws of the Union by force
of arms, spite of secession, then the denial of the right to
compel a state to remain in the Union, by force of arms,
was of no practical importance; it was a fiction of consti
tutional law without any reality whatever; and only in
case it was such a fiction could the principle be contradicted
• In his answer to Cass's letter of resignation we again read : " that
congress does not possess the power to coerce a state by force of arms
to remain in the confederacy." lb., II, p. 898.

THE RIGHT OF COERCION. 347
that was laid down above, namely, that the preservation
of the Union was the precondition of the exercise of all
the powers granted to the federal government and of all
the duties imposed upon it. According to Curtis, only a
very small part of Buchanan's doctrine was favorable to
the slave states, and that part was of such a nature that
it could not be turned to account; while the truth is that
only the smaller part of it was meant to be of advan
tage to the federal government or the Union, and that
that smaller portion was rendered utterly fruitless by the
greater part that resulted to the advantage of the south.
Curtis is, therefore, wholly unwarranted in claiming that
the alleged wrong interpretation was possible only to " a
merely partisan spirit of misrepresentation." Crittenden,
whom he would be very far from accusing of being gov
erned by such a spirit, was the first who, in the senate,
declared in the concisest terms that the two sides of
Buchanan's doctrine were simply irreconcilable.1 If the
states had no right to secede, then, of course, the Union had
a right to their remaining in the confederacy. But if it had
such a right, it must also have had the power to defend it.
A right that in principle cannot be defended is the most
monstrous contradictio in adjecto conceivable.
Buchanan would never have been able to adopt this
contradictory construction of the constitution if he had
been entirely clear that, in the life of states arid nations,
crises like the one which had broken over the Union are
never determined, in the first place*, by questions of law.
Actual circumstances are stronger than the law, and hence
they are decisive, even when indisputably in conflict with
the law. In the case before us, however, they were so
much in harmony with it, that, wherever thought and feel-
' " Altogether contradictory." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr.,
p. 5.

348 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ing remained even in a small degree uninfluenced by preju
dice, they would have greatly facilitated and powerfully
aided the correct and natural apprehension of the question
of law. Not only had the Union been made a real state by
the constitution, in point of law, but, by the constitution,
and under the constitution, it had, during seventy years,
actually become more and more a real state. Doctrines
which could have had a foundation in actual circumstances
at the time of the Philadelphia convention might there
fore have lost it entirely in the course of years. Then, in
deed, it would not have been peculiarly surprising if a pow
erful argument had been made in defense of Buchanan's
contradictory doctrine or of a constitutional right of seces
sion, or a right of secession above the constitution. But the
claim to a right of secession had now become so palpable
an absurdity, that it would have been seen to be such even
by a child, if it had not been asserted by a large geograph
ical section of the country. This fact alone it was that
struck numberless eyes with such blindness that they could
no longer see the mid-day sun. That there is no exaggera
tion in this comparison should, at the present day at least,
not be disputed by any reasonable man.
If a state could secede it might also be expelled; that is,
the other states might secede from it. But if there was
both the right of secession and the right of expulsion, then
the admission of every new state was a further enfeeble
ment of the Union. The recommendation of the purchase
of Cuba from Spain, repeated by Buchanan in this message,
afforded Douglas an opportunity to illustrate this in a very
forcible manner. What a splendid bargain, he said, we
could make, according to the president's doctrine. We
might buy the island for $300,000,000, and immediately
admit it as a state, to see it secede next day and have it
offered us again the day after by Spain, for one-half or fo?

THE RIGHT OF SECESSION. 349'
double the sum paid for it in the first place. And this criti
cism could not be dismissed with the remark that anything
might be made ridiculous by laying on too thickly the colors
of theoretical possibilities which could never become prac
tical. Douglas's painting was true to life. Heavy sums in
various forms had been paid for great portions of the Union,
and several states formed out of them were now upon the
point of bidding the Union good-bye. The example cited
by Douglas could be called forcible only because the event
ual loss to the Union by the secession of a state might be a
terribly severe one. If a state left the Union, taking with
it the mouth or some other material part of a stream, like
the Mississippi, the country would be much more severely
injured than it could be by the loss of any sum that might
have been paid for Cuba. As the Union had become what
it was without the island, its possession in the future could'
at best be advantageous but not necessary. Buchanan's
doctrine of the right of secession and non-coercion was
worse than Shylock's bond. The flesh of the Union might
be cut out of her at any time — not merely a pound of it
but any quantity — not only next the heart but in any vital
part — and not for the payment of a debt or obligation in
curred under the pressure of the most urgent necessity, but
simply because such was the good-will and pleasure of any
one of the states 1 More yet. All that the Union had done
to protect itself from external enemies might, at any mo
ment, be used as an engine of destruction against it, at the-
sovereign whim of the states. The acquisition of Florida
had been determined very largely by military considera
tions regarding the Gulf states. If Florida now thought
proper to secede from the Union with the fortifications
erected by it, not only would the Gulf states be robbed of
the bulwarks built for their protection, but it lay entirely
with Florida to decide whether it would turn the guns-

350 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
posted on their ramparts against these states and the rest
of the Union. If the states had the right to secede they
might, of course, do so when the Union was at war with
a foreign power as well as in times of peace, and, as a nat
ural consequence, secession would be followed by an alli
ance with the enemy of the Union. Every new state ad
mitted into the Union would increase the number of those
to whom it had absolutely made over its own life, and
every new fort built by the federal government would be
an additional loaded bomb laid by it under the foundation
of the Union.
The right of secession was sheer absurdity, and absurdity
can never be. changed into sense by any constitutional rea
soning, no matter how astute. The greater folly, however,
was not the right of secession but the doctrine of non-coer
cion. The right of secession made the Union simply a con
federation of nations, and although it was not that either
constitutionally or actually, it was possible for it to be such
a confederation. But the doctrine of non-coercion made it
an absolutely inconceivable political monstrosity: a state
prohibited to be what it legally and actually was, and whose
government should, simultaneously, do what it should not
do, and not do what it should do, because it was its duty
to do what it ought not to do.
Hale summed up the entire message, so far as it related
to the internal crisis, in these three points: 1. South Caro
lina has just cause to secede. 2. It has no right to secede.
3. We have no right to prevent its seceding.1 His reproach,
however, that the president, like the ostrich, thrust his head
into the sand instead of telling congress, as his constitu
tional duty required him, what, in his opinion, should be
done, was only partly justified. He had recommended ab
solute submission to the majority. The message, however,
•Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 9.

BUCHANAN AND SECESSION. 351
so skilfully avoided saying anything explicit about what
should be done if this recommendation were not heeded,
that it left the country entirely in the dark on that all-
important question which was really the only one before it.
But was Morris, of Illinois, entirely unjustified in saying:
" He who preaches against the wrong, and yet is not in
favor of redressing it, is a worse enemy to the government
than the avowed disunionist, because he betrays it with a
kiss." *
That Buchanan wanted to betray the Union with a kiss
not even his bitterest opponent has ever charged or even
ever suspected. But whether he did not reluctantly do so
is quite another question. The message, said the London
Times, has dealt a heavier blow at the Union than all the
ranting of the governor of Georgia and all the secession
ordinances of South Carolina.2 It could be understood
only as the announcement that the road would be left clear,
nay kept clear, so far as in his power lay, for the secession
ists, until the 4th of March. It told them that they had
nothing to fear, and yet it did not satisfy them. In draft
ing it, he had called the future president of the Confeder
ate States to his side, as his counselor,8 and the result, as he
'lb., App., p. 49.
2 " Never for many years can the United States be to the world what
they have been. Mr. Buchanan's message has been a greater blow to
the American people than all the rants of the Georgian governor or the
' ordinances' of the Charleston convention. The president has dissi
pated the idea that the states which elected him constitute one people.
We had thought that the federation was of.the nature of a nationality ;
we find that it is nothing more than a partnership." The London Times,
Jan. 9, 1861. Reb. Rec., I Doc, p. 25.
* " On paying my respects to the president, he told me that he had
finished the rough draft of his message, but that.it was still open to re
vision and amendment, and that he would like to read it to me. He d d
so, and very kindly accepted all the modifications which I suggested.
The message was, however, afterward somewhat changed, and, with

?52
himself declares, was that his southern friends turned their
back on him.1
great deference to the wisdom and statesmanship of its author, I must
say that, in my judgment, the last alterations were unfortunate."
Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,
I, p. 59.
' " After my annual message of the 3d of December . . . the
southern friends of the administration fell away from it." Buchanan
to Gen. Dix, April 19, 1861. Curtis, II, p. 542. According to Pollard's
description of the feeling among the leaders of the secession movement
(Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 57, 58), one might suppose that they fell
away only because Buchanan, by denying the right of coercion, had
blocked the game. The succeeding chapters will afford sufficient mate
rial to enable the reader to pass judgment on that view.

reopening of congress. 353
CHAPTEE X.
VOGUE LA GALERE.
Curtis1 calls it unjust to judge Buchanan's policy of pas
sivity in accordance with subsequent events, and he refers
to the fact that before Lincoln's election the republicans did
not believe that the threats of secession would be carried
out. But how can the president find shelter behind an
error of the republicans which he did not himself share?
It was not because he harbored optimistic illusions, but be
cause his judgment in this question was right from the very
beginning, that, in the fulfillment of his duty, he thought
well to recommend to congress the measures that seemed
proper to him, strongly to advocate submission to the ma
jority, and to recommend it and it alone. This plea, there
fore, cannot excuse even the slightest part of his guilt.
Buchanan, indeed, had a right to accuse congress of having
a share in that guilt. From the very first it was certain
that it would only drive the ship deeper into the breakers.
And this charge cannot be laid at the door of the democrats
alone. The republicans bear no small part of the responsi
bility. They might indeed say : Our patriotism was great
enough to be ready to make many sacrifices; but they could
not assert: We saw the right and demanded it, but could
not prevail.
• Eeuben Davis 2 thus describes the mood of congress when
it reopened : " The south was dignified and composed. All
the turbulent passions which had been displayed during the
past session seemed to have been laid aside and replaced by
' Life of J. Buchanan, H, pp. 304, 305.
2 Recollections, p. 395.
23

354 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the order and method of men bent upon serious business.
It was no longer necessary on either side to lash the popu
lar feeling into fury. ... It was plain that the south
knew what was coming and awaited the shock with stern
determination." The republicans should have inferred from this that such
a sea could not be calmed by pouring oil upon its waters.
They did not, however, ask themselves how the secession
movement could be most surely suppressed, but merely
how it could best be kept within bounds. Sherman's mo
tion, which was in accordance with custom, to refer the
president's message to the "committee of the whole on the
state of the Union," was not agreed to. The amendment
to refer " so much " of it as related " to the present perilous
condition of the country " to a special committee of one
from each state was passed by a vote of one hundred and
forty-five against thirty-eight. Expedient as this might
seem at the first glance, it was unmistakably the announce
ment that another experiment was to be made with the
brewing of compromise mixtures. The fact that the mo
tion was made by a representative from Yirginia (Boteler)
excluded all doubt as to this. No member of the house
¦certainly could have been ignorant of it, and yet the ma
jority of the republicans voted with the democrats in favor
of the amendment. But to confer about a compromise was
to negotiate concessions, and every concession on the part
¦of the republicans was the payment of a penalty for their
electoral victory constitutionally won. Their vote for Bote-
ler's amendment involved the declaration that they were
ready to discuss the granting of an indemnity for the rec
ognition of the supremacy of the law, and for submission
to the constitution. As what the south wanted, however,
was conditions, the slightest concession was equivalent to
the surrender of the fundamental principle of national ex-

DEMANDS OF THE SOUTH. 355 '
istence. The more extravagant the demands, the less could
it be excused that men closed their eyes to this fact. And
they were so extravagant that the slavocracy would have
gained much more by their defeat than they would have
acquired by a dozen democratic victories. But the end de
sired would not have been reached even if all their enor
mous expectations had been realized. Bingham subse
quently said: " It is in vain to endeavor to save the consti
tution by a sacrifice of the great principles which underlie
it, and which constitute its life."1 And if it had been pos-
1 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App.. p. 80.. Many organic
changes in the structure of the Union, which would have transformed
it into a monstrosity, were asked for. Some of, the most absurd pro
posals were made by northerners. See Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th
Congr; , pp. 77, 78, 79, 107. The pressure exercised by patriotic anxiety
on political thought was so terrible, in the case of some people,- that it was
a question whether they could still be considered responsible. In point
of ability Vallandingham stood undoubtedly in the foremost rank of
the younger democratic politicians of the north, and yet to him belongs
the unenviable reputation of having devised the most preposterous
project of all. He applied the principle similia similibus curantur to
politics, but thought that the poison should be administered in the
strongest doses, in order that it might act as a cure. The Union was
rent asunder because its equal members had actually consolidated on
the ground of the slavery question into two geographical sections, and
he would render the sectional quarrel harmless by a provision in the
constitution dividing the Union into four geographical sections. This
he concisely and clearly expressed in his statement of reasons with
which he introduced his three amendments to the constitution. The
first reads: " The United States are divided into four sections as fol
lows : '' — the free eastern states, the free western states this side of the
Rocky Mountains, the domain of the Pacific, the slave states. " Sec. 2.
On demand of one-third of the senators of any one of the sections on any
bill, order, resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the house of
representatives may-be necessary, except on a question of adjournment,
a vote shall be had by sections, and a majority of the senators from
each section voting shall be necessary to the passage of such bill, order
or resolution, and to the validity of every such vote." (That is to put
brakes on the legislative coach.) "Sec. 3. . . A majority of all the •
electors in each of the four sections in this article established shall be

356 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
sible in itself it could not have been done, because the
southern leaders, as even Stephens himself had sadly to
admit, did not want it to be done.1
The committee of Thirty-three was still-born. This was
shown irrefutably by the vote, notwithstanding the large
majority in favor of its appointment. Only the smaller
part of the republicans seemed to intend to remain firm.
But the minority was so respectable that any agreement
against which they protested could have but a very doubts
ful value. And the opposition was not confined to their
necessary to the choice of president and vice-president ; and the con
currence of a majority of the states of each section shall be necessary
to the choice of president by the house of representatives, and of the
senators from each section to the choice of vice-president by the senate,
whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them respectively."
(That is, to make the constitutional election of a president or vice-presi
dent impossible so long as slavery existed.) The second (XIV) article
reads: " No state shall secede without the consent of the legislatures of
all the states of the section to which the state proposing to secede be
longs. The president shall have power to adjust with seceding states
all questions arising by reason of their secession ; but the terms of ad
justment shall be submitted to the congress for their approval before
the same shall be valid." lb., pp. 794, 795. But what was to be done
if no agreement could be reached as to the ' ' terms of adjustment," or
if a state seceded without having received the consent of the legisla
tures of all the states of the section to which it belonged? Vallanding
ham, as an unconditional " non-coercionist," was wise enough to leave
these questions unanswered.
' He writes on the 30th of November : " I am daily becoming more
and more confirmed in the opinion that all efforts to save the Union
will be unavailing. The truth is, our leaders and public men who have
taken hold of this question do not desire to continue it on any terms.
They do not wish any redress of wrongs; they are disunionists per se,
and avail themselves of present circumstances to press their objects ;
and my present conviction is that they will carry the state with them
by a large majority." And on the 3d December : "I fear it will all come
to naught; that it is too late to do anything; that the people are run
mad. They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not
what." Johnson and Browne, Life of Alex. Stephens, pp. 369, 370.

SOUTHERN GRIEVANCES. 357
thirty-eight votes. A number of southern representatives —
two from Mississippi, one from Florida, three from Ala
bama, one from Georgia, and all from South Carolina —
took no part in the vote because, as they said, their states
had taken the matter in hand themselves.1 The doings
in the committee were in consonance with the attitude of
these two minorities, and not with the intentions which the
vote of the overwhelming majority seemed to have deter
mined. Beuben Davis, whom the speaker had chosen as
the representative of Mississippi, and who, to the great
grief of his namesake in the senate and of other colleagues,
had accepted the nomination because — as he wrote home
in his own justification — the plates of a feast of blood were
not to his taste, gives the following account of them.2
After Corwin, of Ohio, had been chosen chairman, the
representatives of the southern states were asked to state
their grievances in a memorial. As this general invitation
was not heeded, it was directed personally to him (Davis)
for the reason that Mississippi played a leading part in the
secession movement. He, however, declined drawing up a
written list of grievances, on the ground that it was un
necessary, and then expatiated extensively, bitterly and
passionately on all the wrongs which the south had had to
suffer. The answer he received was an arrogant one, and
afforded no prospect of alleviation. He thereupon moved
to report to the house that the difference between the sec
tions could not be settled, and that they must appeal to
the God of battles. This motion was rejected. On the
evening of the following day (December 13), Bust, of Ar-
' Miles, of South Carolina, declared : " The South Carolina delegation
have not voted on this question because they conceive they have no
interest in it. We consider our state as already withdrawn from the
confederacy in everything except in form." Congr. Globe, 2d Sess.,
36th Congr., p. 7.
2 Recollections, p. 399 ff.

358 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
kansas, whom the news of the ever-increasing war-feeling
in the south alarmed, introduced a resolution assuring the
people that the committee, who were working in harmony,
would" doubtless unite on a proposition which would sat
isfy the south. To Davis's reproof, that he was alleging a
known untruth, Kust had no answer to make. The resolu
tion was adopted. But, in accordance with the announce
ment he had previously made, Davis and "many" other
southerners had drafted a manifesto on the 14th, and tele
graphed it to all parts of the country. It gave the lie to
the resolution, and declared all further discussion to be use
less.1 "From that day there could be no hope of peace."
On the day following, however, Davis introduced a resolu
tion in which it was declared to be the duty of the federal
government to protect slave property as well as all other
property, on land and water. All the southern members
acquiesced in it, and agreed, if the committee adopted it, to
recommend it to the house as the final settlement of the
slavery question, but that if it did not adopt it, to take no
further part in its deliberations. It was rejected by the
casting vote of the chairman. The southerners, in accord
ance with their agreement, left the committee room, and
repaired to the house with the intention of asking to be
allowed to leave it. Davis alone, who had come before the
others, was excused, because what had been done in the
committee was not yet known. Even if the others could
be refused permission to leave the house, it was impossible
to inspire the committee, held together against their will,
with the spirit which was the first precondition of the at
tainment of a result from which the house or the people
could expect anything. Those who on the 14th refused to
believe that all hope of peace was dead needed no further
. proof of it on the 17th.
1 " Argument was exhausted."

CONFERENOE OF DECEMBER EIGHTH. 359
Buchanan in the meantime had gone a great way farther
in his policy of non-irritation and of keeping the way open
for secession. He had a conference on the 8th of Decem
ber with the representatives of South Carolina, the object
of which was to avoid a collision in the harbor of Charles
ton. The conference closed to their mutual satisfaction.
That satisfaction, however, was of short duration. Events
soon raised a bitter controversy and one pregnant with con
sequences, as to how far the president had gone in his
promises. As, of course,- no stenographic reporter had been
called to attend the conference, it can never be.document-
arily proved to what extent the direct charge of breach of
word, brought against Buchanan by the representatives and
by Floyd, the secretary of the navy, was well founded.
But enough can be indisputably proved not only to warrant
us in condemning his course politically, but to exhibit it in
a very ambiguous light.
After Miles had announced in the house that the delega
tion of South Carolina did not take part in the vote because
they considered that the withdrawal of the state from the
Union had, except as to the form thereof, already taken
place, it did not beseem the president to receive them on
such an affair. Even if it had not been his intention to ne
gotiate with secession, his reception of them must make it
appear that he was ready to do so, and that appearance he
should have avoided both for political and constitutional rea
sons. From the records of the later controversies it ap
pears beyond a doubt that the representatives had not come
to the conference supposing that it was to consist merely in
an exchange of private opinions, but that official negotia
tions, binding, at least morally, were to be entered into.
The reader may judge for himself from the following facts
whether it can be assumed that the president opposed this
supposition with the requisite clearness and positiveness.

360 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
The most material declaration of the five gentlemen was
reduced to writing on the 10th of December 1 at Buchanan's
request and handed to him. It recited that according to
their firm conviction neither the state authorities nor any
part of the population of South Carolina would attack or
molest the forts in the harbor of Charleston, " previously to
the action of the convention," nor before an accredited
representative was dispatched with an offer to negotiate
an amicable settlement of all the questions at issue between
the state and the federal government, " provided that no re
inforcements shall be sent into those forts, and their relative
military status remain as at present."
Why did the president require the delivery of the declara
tion in writing if he did not wish to refer third parties to
it as a proof that he was justified in considering South Caro
lina under certain moral obligations? And with what right
could h'e assume that the representatives wquld impose such
an obligation on their state without return? Was it not
self-evident that they agreed to give the written declara
tion only because the utterances of the president had been
interpreted by them to mean that he would consider him
self bound to them, that is to the state of South Carolina,
in the same way and to the same extent? The president
had, indeed, written on the back of the declaration that he
had guarded himself against the proviso in it, because it
might be interpreted as " an agreement on his (my) part
which he (I) could never make," and that the. representa
tives had replied that they had not intended to imply such
an agreement by that proviso. It does not, however, ap
pear when this memorandum was written, and that is of
course a question' of no small importance. It is not dated,
and mentions a subsequent conversation, but does not state
when the latter took place. As the quotation given above is
1 It is dated the 9th.

SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS. 361
to be found verbatim in the answer of the president of the
31st of December to the commissioners of South Carolina,
and as the probability, in itself not great, that the president
searched for it in order to copy it, is still further lessened,
for a reason to be mentioned hereafter, the wording of it
given by Curtis, although not expressly claimed to be
simultaneous, yet tacitly assumed to be so, is exceedingly
questionable. At all events it cannot be proved that greater
force as evidence is to be ascribed to it than to the presi
dent's answer already mentioned of the 31st of December,
and the latter has none whatever, since it is a defense
against the charge made — simply an assertion against an
other assertion. The wording of the memorandum, how
ever, by no means necessitates a negative answer to the
third question raised above. If the "agreement" was to
be understood as a formal compact, the representatives had
no reason to object to Buchanan's protestation. For they
could not possibly overlook the fact that, as Buchanan
stated in his letter of the 31st, neither party had a right to
enter into such a compact. Their written declaration shows
that they kept strictly within the limits of their own powers,
and from their answer, as related by Buchanan, to his objec
tion, it appears -only that they did not want to demand more
from him than they had to offer; but it should not be in
terpreted to mean that they would be satisfied with less, or
that they asked for nothing. But from the express refusal
to enter into a formal compact, it does not at all follow,
eo ipso, that Buchanan could not have expressed himself in
a manner which might be understood to imply a promise
of the full value which the word of a man of honor has
without any formal agreement.1 That the representatives
1 According to the relation of the under secretary of state, Trescott,
of a conversation which he had with the president about the facts, the
latter had said to him : " He was trusting to the honor of Carolina, and

362 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
inferred such a promise from his words, they asserted over
and over again, and there is not the slightest reason to sus
pect them rather than Buchanan of a known untruth. The
assumption most favorable to the latter, therefore, is that
nothing more than a lamentable misunderstanding existed, ,
and the documentary material extant must be examined
with a view, of determining which party is probably to be
blamed for it.
In his letter of the 31st of December 1 Buchanan says that
he had " freely expressed " his well-known " determination "
not to reinforce the forts before they were attacked, or
before he had certain proof that they would shortly be at
tacked. He moreover boasted that he had acted as he
would have done if he had made " a positive and formal
agreement" with competent persons. With the unreserved
announcement of such intentions, not to lapse into modes
of expression which might be taken for an assurance in the
sense intimated, great clearness and acuteness of thought, as
well as an unusual mastery of words in all their shades of
meaning, were required. But three of the members of his
own cabinet objected to both the matter and form of the
answer which Buchanan wanted to send to the commis
sioners of South Carolina in this behalf, although he had
with full deliberation reduced it to writing in the quiet of
his own office. How this draft read we do not indeed
know,2 but we do know that it did not satisfy Black, Holt
or Stanton, because it did not clearly and positively deny
the allegation with respect to the promise made, and that in
they ought not to suspect him ; he was acting under the obligation of
his honor; and I — and the state might rely upon it — would redeem it
to the uttermost.'' Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War, p. 84.
'Reb. Rec, I Doc, pp. 12, 13. It is here falsely dated the 30th.
2 Black's "memorandum," to be discussed hereafter, gives us, how
ever, a sufficient idea of its character to show that Curtls's attempt to
turn this circumstance to account for his thesis was wholly unwarranted.

CASS'S RESIGNATION. 363
consequence of their criticism the letter was given the form
in which it was sent to the commissioners.1
Whether the aged secretary of state sided in this con
troversy with the South Carolinians or with the president,
I do not know. But it seems very surprising to me that,
on the day after the second conference, Cass informed the
president — as the latter says, to his great surprise2 — of his
intention to resign. The letter of resignation dated the
12th, but not handed in until the 15th, does not say a word
about this circumstance. As Cass's announcement fol
lowed the second decisive conference so immediately, and
as the request that his resignation be accepted was based
upon the fact that his repeated and urgent advice to rein
force the forts and to send a man-of-war to Charleston was
not followed,3 it is likely that, even if Cass did not believe
1 Curtis indeed has little to say against this. But he (II, p. 376) finds
irrefutable proof that the accusation regarding the promise is unfounded
in the instructions to Major Anderson. We shall have to mention here
after what these instructions contained and how they were understood
by Buchanan. Here we need only call attention to the fact that they
are used by Curtis as a proof of his statement, because the conference of
the president with the representatives took place after the instructions
had been given. But he gives the right dates himself of the confer
ences on the 8th and 10th of December, and of the instructions on the
11th. He does not state, — at least not here, — although he knew it,
that, according to Buchanan's own testimony in the letter of the 31st of
December, the instructions of the 11th to Anderson were brought to his
notice only on the 21st.
2 Curtis, II, p. 399.
3 If Cass had repeatedly urged on the president the views on ac
count of which he now resigned, it is likely that he did so again, dur
ing the last few days. But if this assumption is well founded, it may
be further presumed that he brought to the president's notice also, if not
the entire text at least the contents of a letter of General Wool, relat
ing to the question, and dated the 6th of December. As Wool was in
command of the department of the east, to which South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Mississippi belonged, his opinions cer
tainly deserved to be heard, and he asked much more emphatically than

6Qi harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
that a promise had been given, he had, in consequence of
the course of these negotiations, lost all hope that the presi
dent would change his mind on this question. His resigna
tion was immediately accepted; Black was appointed his
successor, and Edwin M. Stanton attorney-general.1
Scott ("no time should be lost;" "at once") that full power over
the harbor of Charleston should be assured. It is certainly worthy of
note that Scott was not the only general who believed that something
might be achieved with the forces already available, if use were im
mediately made of them. The most important parts of the letter are
these: " You have eight companies at Fort Monroe, Va. Three or four
of these companies should be sent without a moment's delay to Fort
Moultrie. . . . It is said that to send at this time troops to that
harbor would produce great excitement among the people. That is
nonsense when the people are as much excited as they can be, and the
leaders are determined to execute their long meditated purpose of sep
arating the state from the Union. So long as you command the en
trance to the city of Charleston, South Carolina cannot separate herself
from the Union. . . . The Union can be preserved, but it requires
firm, decided, prompt and energetic measures on the part of the presi
dent. ... If a separation should take place, you may rest assured
blood would flow in torrents, followed by pestilence, famine and deso
lation. . . . Peaceable secession is not to be thought of. EJven if it
should take place in three months we would have a bloody war on our
hands." Reb. Rec, I Doc, p. ii.
' According to a memorandum of Buchanan furnished by Curtis, Casd
informed him, two days later, through Thompson and Black, that he
desired to withdraw his letter of resignation. If his former colleagues
had understood him correctly, this was certainly a proof that the irreso
lution of which Buchanan had accused him had developed into senile
weakness. That, according to the same memorandum, he found no
objection, at the cabinet meeting, to the annual message, except that it
did not declare still more positively against the right of congress to
make war on a state, in order to force it to remain in the Union, should,
in my opinion, have only given his advice, to see to the safety of the
forts and the continued collection of the customs duties, all the greater
weight in Buchanan's eyes. The more age had told upon him, and
the more absolutely he approved the opinions of the president on the
right of coercion, the more withering is the judgment contained in the
fact that the political and patriotic instinct of this man saw in the
policy of passivity an unpardonable mistake.

COBB AND THOMAS. 365
It is plain why, under these circumstances, as little heed
was paid to Scott as the first time, when, on the 15th of
December, he repeated his advice in a personal conference
with the president.1 Instead of sending reinforcements to
the forts, Buchanan sent Caleb Cushing to Governor Pick
ens to lay before him the reasons which should move South
Carolina to desist from secession, or at least to postpone
it.2 Even if it be an open question whether, and to what
extent, Buchanan obligated himself to the secessionists, it
is documentarily established that he negotiated with them
officially — negotiated with them, if they would concede no
more, to obtain, at least, a postponement.
Even before Cass, Cobb, the secretary of the treasury,.
had left the cabinet, " his duty to Georgia requiring it." *
Ph. F. Thomas, of Maryland, succeeded him.
These changes in the cabinet were not a matter of in
difference. From Thomas nothing was to be hoped for,
but less to be feared than from Cobb, and, to that extent,
the exchange was a gain. Stanton was so much of a novus
homo on the stage of national politics that the great ma
jority of the people did not know what to expect of him.
It was said, Ijowever, that he was not made of dough.
Black, unlike Cass, did not have one foot in the grave, was
still physically and mentally in his prime, had more initia
tive, vigorous courage and more self-conscious firmness.
The atmosphere of the cabinet had, therefore, become
purer and more bracing, and hence there was some foun
dation for the hope that the course of the executive would
assume a more worthy character. But these changes in
the personnel of the cabinet did not open the slightest
1 Among the reasons that made it plain, Buchanan himself mentions
" the president's pacific interview with the South Carolina members."
Mr. Buchanan's Administration, p. 168.
2 " The reasons which exist to prevent or to delay." Curtis, II, p. 368,
* McPherson, Political History of the Rebellion, p. 28.

366 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
prospect of a change of system. The author of the opinion
of the 20th*of November could never be the right leader in
such a crisis, because he was not able himself to find the
way out of the labyrinth of his constitutional doctrinarian
ism. It may be that the revolution would have cast him
out of it, but then better knowledge would have come too
late, and he who has sent out Saul does not immediately
follow Paul. Besides, treason still had its feet under the
cabinet table in the White House. It is now universally
conceded that Floyd, secretary of war, played the part of
the unadulterated Fire-eater, partly in order to conceal the
fact that his withdrawal was due to dishonest manipulation
of government money. Whether, on the other hand, he also
falsely surrounded himself with the halo of treason for the
same reason, or whether it really rightly belonged to him,
is still a disputed question. Since so reliable a witness as
Beuben Davis, despite the report of the committee of the
house of representatives, which Curtis looks upon as a com
plete refutation of the charges, has recently positively de
clared the latter view to be the correct one,1 it will pre
sumably continue to prevail.
If Floyd's loyalty to the Union up to the time of the
compromising revelations of the dishonesty just referred
to is not a part of the Buchanan historical legend, then it
must have been a mask, and a rather transparent one. But
whatever may be true of Floyd, it is well established that
the secretary of the interior was a secessionist agitator and
agent. Clingman's story, that, according to his own state-
' "I spent much time in consultation with Mr. Floyd, secretary of
war, who had been for twelve months, and still was, engaged in send
ing to the southern arsenals all available arms under his control. He
had put our forts in such condition that it would be easy to capt ire
them and prepare them for immediate occupation. His estimate was
that fully half of the munitions of war in his department were in the
south on the 15th of December, I860." Recollections, p. 395.

FLOYD 8 LOYALTY.

367

ment, this had been expressly approved by Buchanan,1
seems to me to exceed the limits of the credible: But it is
just as inconceivable that the president knew nothing about
it, for in his views on what private and official honor de
manded, Thompson could not find the slightest motive to
appear to be other than he was in this respect. But again,
Buchanan did not see in all this any reason to dismiss him.
It does not, however, follow herefrom, that Thompson's
ideas or the manifestation of them were agreeable or even
indifferent to the president. It might have only irritated
the secessionists if their men were dismissed from the
cabinet, and the watchword was: On no account any more
excitement or irritation, but reconciliation — win every one
over! That the president would not and could not become
other than he was, was the main cause, one which could
not be removed by any change in the personnel of the cab
inet, why a change of system was impossible. Grimes
' Clingman relates that Thompson had told him in the middle of De
cember that Mississippi had appointed him a commissioner to go to North
Carolina, and induce that state to secede : "I said to him, 'I did not
know you had resigned.' He answered, 'Oh, no, I have not resigned.'
1 Then,' I replied, ' I suppose you resign in the morning.' ' No,' he an
swered, ' I do not intend to resign, for Mr. Buchanan wishes us all to
hold on, and go out with him on the 4th of March.' ' But,' said I,
' does Mr. Buchanan know for what purpose you go to North Carolina?'
'Certainly,' he said, 'he knows my object.' He, Clingman, could not
believe this, and induced the secretary to lay the matter before the
president again. Thompson, however, told him on the evening of the
same day : ' I knew I could not be mistaken. I told Mr. Buchanan all
you said, and he told me that he wished me to go and hoped I might
succeed.' I could not help exclaiming, ' Was there ever before any
potentate who sent out his own cabinet ministers to excite an insurrec
tion against his government.' The fact that Mr. Thompson did go on
his errand, and had a public reception before the legislature, and re
turned to his position in the cabinet, is known." Selections from the
Writings and Speeches of the Hon. T. L. Clingman, pp. 526, 527.

368 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
wrote to his wife, on the 16th of December, that Buchanan
divided his time about equally between prayer and tears.1
One could not, according to Buchanan's own testimony,
have made a greater mistake. On the 20th of December
he wrote to a gentleman in New Tork: "I have never en
joyed better health or a more tranquil spirit than during
the past year. All our troubles have not cost me an hour's
sleep or a single meal." 2 This is more in consonance with
the nature and measure of his own self-estimation than
what, according to Grimes, was circulated about him among
the public. He, indeed, conceded that he might have
made mistakes, but to the end of his days he took good
care that no one should believe he knew he had ever made
any.* To the very last he could not obtain that knowledge,
because to the very last the one thing which was the
cause of all his mistakes was unintelligible to him. As his
nephew, J. Buchanan Henry, says, " he emphatically did not
believe in the ' higher law,' * that is he left the moral side of
the question entirely out of consideration. Hence it was al
ways self-evident to him that only a diplomatic treatment
of it was allowable, and could be crowned with success.
But whether he still really believed that he could attain the
desired end by diplomacy must, to say the least, be looked
upon as very doubtful. If it were true that the peril of
his country had not been able to rob him of a single heur's
sleep, the principal reason of it lay in his confidence that
the clash would not come during his administration. To
prevent it until his term of office had ended was the all-
controlling consideration in whatever he did or left un-
' Salter, Life of James W. Grimes, p. 132. He adds: " Such a perfect
imbecile never held office before."
* Curtis, II, p. 355.
» See the letter of the 21st of October, 1865, to a J. Faulkner. lb., II,
p. 643.
< lb., II, p. 674.

seward's negotiations. 369
done, and in this he met the wishes of the secessionists,
while the republicans lent him a helping hand in his en
deavor." Welles, who as a member of Lincoln's cabinet had op
portunities to be well informed, says it was a demonstrated
fact that Sewardhad carried -on secret negotiations with
certain leading secessionists to avert a collision before the
4th of March.1 His motive was the hope that, as real head
of the new administration, his superior genius for states
manship would succeed in some way in effecting a peace
able settlement of the controversy. According to his own
testimony he was still wholly uncertain as to the manner
of its settlement. On the first day of the session he had,
as he wrote Weed, told the republican senators, in answer
to their inquiry: "They would know what I think and
what I propose, when I do myself."2 If, as he relates in the
same letter, people had received him in Washington think
ing that he had a cut-and-dried compromise scheme in his
pocket, they were greatly mistaken. But the supposition
was not destitute of all foundation. The inflexibles did
not have his approval, and he felt confident that himself
and events would soon make them more pliant.3
The immediate cause of that erroneous supposition of the
politicians in Washington was some newspaper articles
which, it was thought, could be traced to him. They really
came from Weed, whose old influence on the direction of
Seward's political thought and action was still exerted to
the fullest extent. But events since the 6th of November
had brought new light to Weed. He rightly recognized
1 Letter of the 3d of December, 1860.
2 Letter of December 3, 1860. Barnes, Mem. of Th. Weed, p. 308.
8 " The republican party to-day is as uncompromising as the seces
sionists in South Carolina. A month hence each may come to think
that moderation is wiser." 1. c.
24

370 harper's feery — Lincoln's inauguration.
that the decisive question confronting the people now was
no longer the same as before that day, and that, if the re
publican party were equal to its task, it must draw the con
clusions that followed from that fact; but the conclusions
he drew from it himself were a strange admixture of what
was right and what was wrong. The articles referred to
were clothed in language so vague that they had produced
only a certain general disquietude in the more radical wing
of the party. Not until the 7th of December did one of
them, in the Albany Evening Journal, bear the character of
a programme or rather of a manifesto. It not only created
a great sensation, but exercised a wide-felt influence. It
cannot, indeed, be said that it generated the feeling and the
ideas which, in the then situation of affairs, were the funda
mental condition necessary to the final solution of the fright
ful problem. But that feeling and those ideas had hitherto
been latent. This article dealt the blow that caused them
to gush forth, and made them the motive force of a tend
ency consciously pursued.
Weed, in his autobiography, says that it " had for its ob
ject the holding of the border slave states in the Union, so
that the boundaries and strength of the rebellion might be
narrowed and weakened. It maintained that radical abo
litionists were playing into the hands of disunion leaders,
and that both would become responsible for the civil war
into which we were drifting." It " drew the line between
radical and conservative republicans and continued as an
issue before the people during the war. It was written
under a conviction of its necessity in preventing a dis
astrous division of the northern people. I believed then,
as I know now, that but for the conservative sentiment
awakened in the republican party, the north would have
been fatally divided. I believed then, as I know now, that
by insisting that the war was prosecuted to maintain the
government and preserve the Union, the democratic masses

thurlow weed's article. 371
with some of their leaders would remain loyal, while, on
the other hand, if the whole republican party proclaimed
it a war for the abolition of slavery, a united south would
prove too strong for a divided north."
So far as the border states were concerned, the article
could produce no effect, because it started from false prem
ises. But the unity of the north was, indeed, the conditio
sine qua non of the suppression of the rebellion, and the
north could be united only provided — and not as a false
pretext required by tactical considerations, but in honest
conviction — the word went forth that, until further notice,
the slavery question had ceased to be the problem of na
tional politics, and that the rebellion was the question on
which the entire people, men and women, had to take sides,
positively and without reserve. In this respect, therefore,
Weed deserves the eternal gratitude of his country on ac
count of the clearness and force with which he made this
demand. But the article had demanded more and some
thing different from what this characterization of it shows.-
If Weed had not read it over before it received its final
shape, he may, in good faith, have fallen into the error
here referred to, for the development of events must have
tended to keep what was right in his views fresh in his
memory, because it had been demonstrated to be essential,
while what was wrong in them was liable to be forgotten,
since it had conjured up a danger only for a while, but
bad actually caused no lasting injury.
According to Weed's analysis, "radical abolitionists"
and "radical republicans " must be taken as synonymous.
In reality they had. nothing in common. The former were
still a small faction and could exercise very little direct in-
fl uence in any respect. The latter, at the time, gave just as
little thought to the abolition of slavery as did Weed him
self. True the article drew the line between radical and con
servative republicans, but it did so by demanding now.

372 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
before there was any war and before a single state had
declared its secession, that people should show themselves
ready to listen to reason on the slavery question, in order
either to avoid war, or, if war became inevitable on account
of secession, to unite the whole north for the struggle to
restore the Union. The article was inspired by the idea
that even now, as Weed had already expressed himself in
a letter of the 10th of December to Preston King, the issues
of the last electoral campaign were "practically obsolete,"
because, with Lincoln as president, there was no reason for
anxiety about the territories,' and that, therefore, the repub
licans could and must show a conciliatory disposition for the
sake of the incomparably greater question. That was a
fallacy, for to the extent that they now, under the threat
of secession and before Lincoln's inauguration, receded
from the programme of the electoral campaign, they sur
rendered the principle of the supremacy of the law; and
not the preservation of the Union in itself, but the preserva
tion of the Union with the principle of the supremacy of
the law absolutely intact, as its foundation-stone, could be
rightly declared the question that overshadowed all things
else. Although we have been "all our life showing up
the dark side of the slavery picture," said the article, " in
view of a fearful calamity, there is no want of consistency
or of fidelity in going to the verge of conciliation with the
hope of averting it." Weed therefore separated from the
radical republicans not because they wanted to exceed
the official party programme and wage a war of annihilation
against slavery contrary to its express declarations, but be
cause ho thought he should no longer adhere to that pro
gramme. They did not advance but wanted to stand still;
he, however, demanded that they should retreat. The
question what stand the party should take on slavery in
' Barnes, Th. Weed, II, p. 309.

EFFECT OF WEED'S ARTICLE. . 373
case of rebellion belonged to the future, and, therefore, even
it was not the first thing discussed by him. His first ob
ject was, as appears beyond a doubt from this sentence, to
prevent that question changing from a theoretical into a
practical one, and he wanted to prevent it by sacrificing
that which gave the republican party its right to existence.
The republican party was to hold itself in readiness, in
consideration of the disclaimer of rebellion, to disclaim
that the victory of the 6th of November, won in the strug
gle for principles, was a victory of principles. It looked
like self-mockery to deny this, and to allow Ms organ to
declare two days later that it was "almost prepared " to
accept Douglas's doctrine about the territories, or, if that
was "inadmissible," to consent to another dividing line
which would perhaps be ultimately erased, like the Mis
souri line, by the south, but certainly not for long years to
come.1 Such preaching by such a man could not but find hearers.
Now the seed fell on ground which promised to yield fruit
a hundred -fold in a single day. It looked as if the good
old times of abolitionist hunting were about to return.
Demonstrations in that direction had already been made
by the mob in Boston, Philadelphia and Brooklyn — and
not of the unwashed only — with the best of success; and
the New York Tribune was not talking at random when it
expressed the fear that these were only "feelers," and that
a great movement was organizing.2 Naturally the flames of
' " But not in our generation or the next, nor indeed until the lessons
of the last six years have been forgotten."
2 " We are probably on the verge of a great pro-slavery revival. The
cry of ' the Union in dangerl ' is calculated and intended to unite ava
rice and ignorance, wealth and ruffianism, in a grand crusade against
every aspiration for universal freedom. The mob demonstrations al
ready incited in Boston, in Philadelphia, in Brooklyn, are manifestly
but feelers put forth to ascertain what the public mind will bear, ancj
destined, so far as their success will allow, to be succeeded by more de-

374 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
this fire of reaction kindled by the democrats was much too
hot even for the moderate republicans, but the wood with
which the fire was fed was cut largely by their own leaders,
and no one was more active in hewing it than Seward himself.
On the 22d of December he delivered an impromptu speech
in the Astor House, New York. Altogether contrary to his
custom, he paved the way for his political oracles by a long
series of witticisms, which, considering the frightful gravity
of the situation, coming as they did from the mouth of the
future secretary of state, should have called forth not re
peated bursts of merriment, but of indignation, as unworthy
of the time and of the man. The oracles, however, amounted
simply to Buchanan's recipe — not to be so foolish as to lose
one's sleep or one's appetite. Only patience, forbearance
and a conciliatory spirit, and it would soon be discovered
which side was in the wrong, and then it would return to the
right path. The skies had cleared considerably since the
6th of November, and in sixty days more the barometer
would indicate fair weather.1
cisive and serious attacks on the persons and property of conspicuous
anti-slavery men. The end of all this is to be a grand compromise of
northern slump, wherein justice and liberty are to be bartered for ease
in the money market, a revival of southern trade, and ten per cent.
advance on stocks. Such is manifestly the programme, which only the
stubbornness of the earnest secessionists — those who really mean seces
sion, and are not merely playing a game of brag — and that of the gen
uine republicans in congress can defeat." The New York Tribune,
December 24, 1860. On a movement in New York to induce South
Carolina to delay its secession until the democratic party could effect a
reorganization, see the Independent of December 20, 1860.
1 " They do not humbug me with their secession. (Laughter.) And
I do not think they will humbug you ; and I do not believe that, if they
do not humbug you and me, they will much longer succeed in humbug
ging themselves. (Laughter.) ... If you wish to keep them, you
have gut only one way to do it. That is, be patient, kind, paternal, for
bearing, and wait until they come to reflect for themselves. . . .
If we keep entirely cool and entirely calm, and entirely kind, a debate
will ensue which will be kindlv in itself, and it will prove very soon

Lincoln's views. T5
The conflict was as old as the constitution, and now
that it had led to a breach, the man who had proclaimed
and demonstrated its irrepressi bility declared: Nothing is
more simple and more certain than its settlement; let us
only resolve not to quarrel any more, but as brethren and
good Christians, examine where the cause of the trouble is
and remove it.
In this situation of affairs it was certainly of no small
importance and value that Lincoln's common sense was not
able to rise to the height of such wisdom. He appreciated
to the fullest extent what the party owed Weed and Sew
ard, and he was therefore in no haste to pass judgment on
this wheeling-about of theirs. He not only heard them pa
tiently, but examined and weighed all their arguments over
and over again with anxious earnestness, and the longer he
examined and weighed them, the more completely did he
separate in his mind the gold from the arid, poison-saturated
sand. Lincoln had no desire to forget that this was a quar
rel among brothers, and that brothers owed one another for
bearance and a willingness to meet one another half way.
He was also mindful that it was easier for the victor than
for the vanquished to extend the hand of reconciliation.
But above all, he was anxious to keep the question of slav
ery separate from that of the rebellion, and absolutely sub-
either that we are wrong — and we shall concede to our offended breth
ren — or else that we are right, and they will acquiesce and come back
into fraternal relations with us. ... I propose ... to hear
complaints ; to redress them if they ought to be redressed, and if we
have the power to redress them; and I expect them to be withdrawn if
they are unreasonable. ... I believe that secession was stronger
on the night of the 6th of November last, when a president and vice-
president who were unacceptable to the slave states were elected, than
it is now. That is now some fifty days since, and I believe that every
day's sun which set since that time has set on mollified passions and
prejudices, and that if you will only give it time, sixty days' more suns
will give you a much brighter and more cheerful atmosphere." Reb.
Rec, I Doc, pp. 4r-7.

376 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ordinate the former to the latter. But he could not be
talked into the belief that concessions should be made which
would deprive the victory of the 6th of November of the
character of a victory of principles. He did not, however,
see clearly, as may be indubitably shown by various utter
ances of his at this time, that every concession the pre
condition of which was not the absolute recognition of his
election, had this effect. He was fully conscious that every
proposition had to be closely scrutinized to determine
whether it did not exceed the bounds set by that fundamen
tal requirement; he felt that these bounds were too near to
warrant his expecting much from going up to them, and
was irrevocably resolved not to be forced beyond them by
Weed and Seward any more than by the secessionists.1
' In a letter of the 17th of December to Weed. Barnes, II, pp. 310, 311.
To Kellogg, who represented Illinois in the committee of Thirty-three,
he had already written, on the 11th of December: " Entertain no propo
sition for a compromise in regard to the extension of slavery. The in
stant you do they have us under again: all our labor is lost, and sooner
or later must be done over. Douglas is sure to be again trying to bring
in his 'Popular Sovereignty.' Have none of it. The tug has to come,
and better now than later. You know I think the fugitive-slave clause
of the constitution ought to be enforced — to put it in its mildest form,
ought not to be resisted." Nicolay and Hay, The Century, November,
1887, p. 78. In a letter of December 21, to E. B. Washburne, we read:
" Please present my respects to the general (Scott), and tell him confi
dentially I shall be obliged to him to be as well prepared as he can to
either hold or retake the forts as the case may require, at and after the
inauguration." lb., p. 75. We may also quote here a letter of a later
period. On the first of February, 1861, he writes to Seward: "I say
now, however, as I have all the while said, that on the territorial ques
tion — that is, the question of extending slavery under the national
auspices — I am inflexible ; . . . any trickery by which the nation is
to acquire territory, and then allow some local authority to spread slav
ery, is as obnoxious as any other. I take it that to effect some such re
sult as this, and put us again on the high road to a slave empire, is the
object of all these compromises. I am against it. As to fugitive slaves,
District of Columbia, slave-trade among the slave states, and whatever
springs of necessity from the fact that the institution is amongst us, I

orittenden's compromise. 377
In the meantime the senate had followed the house on
the wrong road. On the 6th of December, Powell, of
Kentucky, had made a motion to refer the part of the pres
ident's message relating to the present crisis to a commit
tee of thirteen. On the 18th, Crittenden introduced his
famous compromise proposition.1 It asked, in the first place,
for six new constitutional articles, and mentioned in a num
ber of resolutions all sorts of legislative acts which were
considered necessary. The material points in the constitu
tional amendments were these: (1) the restoration of the Mis
souri line, with the express provision that south of it slavery
should be recognized as existing, and that the duty of pro
tecting it should be imposed on the territorial authorities ; (2)
that, in the slave states, congress should not abolish slavery
in the places within its exclusive jurisdiction; (3) the estab
lishment of conditions — practically not possible to fulfills—
to be attached to the right of congress to abolish slavery
in the District of Columbia; (4) that the federal government
should have no right to legislate on the transportation of
slaves from state to state or in the slave territories; (5) the
determination of cases in which the federal government
should be bound to indemnify the owners of fugitive slaves;
(6) the prohibition to alter the foregoing articles and certain
provisions of the constitution now in force, by future amend
ments — a Chinese shoe which deprived the United States
forever of the possibility of a development in keeping with
the ever-changing actual circumstances of the country,
with respect to the question which, from decade to decade,
had become in a higher and higher degree the turning
point of the national life, and which was now rending the
Union in pieces. The proposition was referred to the
care but little, so that what is done be comely and not altogether out
rageous. Nor do I care about New Mexico, if further extension were
hedged against." lb., p. 79.
'Congr. Globe, 2d Sess,, 36th Congr., p. 114.

378 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
committee of thirteen, the composition of which the vice-
president announced on the 20th of December.1
It is too late to resolve to inquire about the conditions of
a life insurance policy at the moment that the person to be
insured has departed this world. This the senate had done.
On the day on which the Albany Evening Journal had
published Weed's manifesto, the convention of South Car
olina had met, and on the day on which the committee of
thirteen had been appointed, it unanimously passed the or
dinance of secession.
The senate had followed the house on the wrong road,
but its Union-saving committee immediately manifested a
sounder judgment than that of the house. On the 21st
the representatives of South Carolina notified the speaker
in the house of their withdrawal, and, on the same day, the
committee of thirteen, in their first session, resolved, con
trary to the inviolable rule which required all committee
reports to be drawn up by a majority, that, in the present
case, that only should be considered the report of the com
mittee which was approved by the majority of both groups,.
i. e., of the republicans and non-republicans. If any pro
posals were to be made which not only furnished new mat
ter for discussion, but afforded a possibility for any practical
consequences, this condition, at least, had to be fulfilled.
But that it could not be fulfilled was scarcely less certain
than that all the compromise-sirens of the Union would not
be able to sing South Carolina back into it. And just as
certain as this was it, that, if South Carolina persisted in
its resolution, a violent collision with it could not in the
long run be avoided. Proof of this was produced imme
diately, although some time elapsed before the collision
followed. Three days before the adoption of the declaration of se-
' See the names. lb., p. 158.

THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS. 379
cession, Governor Pickens had sent a "strictly confiden
tial " letter, by D. H. Hamilton, to the president, in which
he requested him to allow possession to be taken of Sumter
in order to calm public opinion and prevent a collision.
The messenger was to insist on an answer within twenty-
four hou/s. Hamilton performed his task on the day of the
declaration of secession. The answer was promised for the
next evening, but was not sent for the reason that Trescott,
the assistant secretary of state, and two representatives of
South Carolina had induced Pickens, by telegraph, to with-"
draw his letter, because the request was not in consonance
with the understanding reached between the president and
the representatives,1 and the resolutions of the convention
could not be anticipated by the governor.
On the 22d Trescott was directed, by a telegram from
Pickens, to inform the president that B. W. Barnwell, J. H.
Adams and J. L. Orr were coming to Washington to hand
him the ordinance of secession, to negotiate with him on
all questions growing out of secession, and especially on
the evacuation of the forts. South Carolina must make
these demands, and, if they were denied, finally seek to
execute them by force, not only, and in the first place, be
cause by means of the forts the Union held its band di
rectly on the economic artery of South Carolina's economic
life, but, in and of itself, because it pretended to be an ab
solutely independent state in the eyes of international law,
and an independent state that actually and permanently
recognized the claim of a foreign power to be the exclusive
proprietor of fortifications situated within its domain, was
a contradiction in itself.
' As to how Pickens on the 10th, that is before his request had even
come to the knowledge of the president, and before the declaration of
secession, " at once proceeded to take into his own hands the enforce
ment of the existing status in the harbor," see Crawford, The Genesis
of the Civil War, p. 88.

•380 But Buchanan could not grant the request, and it wfif,
therefore, certain from that hour, that what he had repeat
edly warned the secessionists of would be sooner or later
fulfilled, viz., that, even if he conscientiously followed his
programme to do nothing but ward off direct attacks on fed
eral property, " peaceable secession " would prove adelusion.
The commissioners arrived in Washington on the 26th of
December, and requested an audience with the president, in
order to hand him their credentials and exchange views with
«him, at first, in an informal manner.1 Buchanan expressed his
readiness to receive them the next day, at one o'clock. The
audience, however, did not take place, because, before the
appointed hour, news was received that Major Anderson had
recently left Fort Moultrie, during the night, after he had
spiked its guns and burned its gun-carriages, and with his en
tire little command passed over safely to Fort Sumter.2 Tres
cott relates that when he communicated this news to Floyd,
the latter declared it could not be true, since Anderson would
have acted not only without instructions, but contrary to
his instructions.3 Curtis, on the other hand, asserts that
'lb., p. 142.
2 On the military and political importance of the question of the forts
Pollard pertinently remarks:
" They (the southern leaders) saw readily enough that if the general
government secured possession of these forts, it could establish com
munications with the south, which the latter could scarcely cut off
without the aid of a great fleet (1); and that if it was once determined
at Washington to reinforce these positions against a chance to take
them by surprise, or coup de main, the south would have lost an oppor
tunity which it would be impossible to regain, and incurred a disadvan
tage which it would be most difficult to repair.
" The question of the forts was one of concealed importance in the
minds of the southern leaders. As long as attention might be diverted
from them, the south could still hold within reach the opportunity of
possessing them and securing a powerful advantage, and might thus
afford to suspend the question of war, and to linger some time at least
in the discussion of peace measures." Life of Jeff. Davis, p. 60.
• " I said, ' Governor, Colonel Wigfall has just brought us this news.

major Anderson's instructions. 381
Buchanan received the news " with surprise and regret,"
but "he never for a moment, either then or afterwards,
doubted" that Anderson had been authorized by his in
structions to take the step.1 When one examines the in
structions — those already referred to of the 11th of Decem
ber — somewhat more closely, this claim cannot but cause
great surprise, although Floyd's assertion — there is no
reason whatever to doubt Trescott's statement — is branded
by it as a known untruth. The major was forbidden,
" without evident and imminent necessity, to take up any
position which could be construed into the assumption of a
hostile attitude ; " but he was expressly authorized to place
his troops in the fort which, in his judgment, it was best to
defend — (1) if one of the forts were attacked; (2) in case
an attempt were made to take possession of one of the
forts; (3) whenever he had "tangible evidence of a design
to proceed to a hostile act." The question whether he had
exceeded his instructions could, therefore, not be answered
so long as only the fact of his removal to Fort Sumter was
known. While Floyd was aware that his removal might be
in execution of the order he had given, Buchanan did not
know whether it was in execution of that order or not. It
should have remained an entirely open question, both for
the secretary of state and for the president, until they were
accurately informed as to all the antecedent and accom
panying circumstances. Buchanan did not fully meet this
requirement, and in so far as he did not, he failed not in a
direction opposite to Floyd's, but in the same direction as
. . . and as you were coming up stairs I said I would pledge my life
it was without orders.' 'You can do more,' he said, smiling, ' you can
pledge your life, Mr. Trescott, that it is not so. It is impossible. It
would be pot only without orders, but in the face of orders. To be
very frank, Anderson was instructed, in case he had to abandon his po
sition, to dismantle Fort Sumter, not Fort Moultrie." Crawford, Genesis
of the Civil War, p. 143.
1 Curtis, II, p. 371.

382 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Floyd. The letter of the 31st of December to the South
Carolina commissioners refutes Curtis's assertion so clearly
and positively that no explanation of it can be found. In
order to prove that he "certainly never authorized any
change to be made in their (of the forts) relative military
status," the president refers to the instructions, gives the
full text of them, and then says: "Under these circum
stances it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own
responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had
tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act on
the part of South Carolina, which has not yet been al
leged. (!) Still he is a brave and honorable officer, and
justice requires that he should not be condemned without a
fair hearing. . . . My first promptings were to com
mand him to return to his former position, and there to
await the contingencies presented in his instructions." Be
fore a step could be taken in this direction, however, the
carrying out of his intention was rendered impossible by
the fact that the Carolinians had taken possession of Castle
Pinckney and Fort Moultrie. "It is under these circum
stances," continues the president, " that I am urged imme
diately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charles
ton, and I am informed that, without this, negotiation is
impossible. This I cannot do — this I will not do."
The commissioners did not admit the two last claims. In
a letter to Buchanan dated January 1, 1861, they stated that
his conference with them (December 28) had left on them
the "distinct impression that he (you) did seriously con
template the withdrawal of the troops from the Charleston
harbor." Besides, before the occupation of the two forts by
the Carolinians, he had been urged by prominent democrats
to come to a decision immediately, that is, to give an as
surance " that if the commander had acted without and
against his (your) orders, and in violation of his (your)
pledges," he would restore the status ante. " You refused

Buchanan's course. 383
to decide. . . . More than twelve hours passed, and
two cabinet meetings had adjourned before you knew what
the South Carolina authorities had done."
Ever the same misfortune : an insurmountable dread of
assuming the responsibility of a decision — to form reso
lutions, and form them quickly, which were really a decis
ion. As early as on the morning of the 27th,' Floyd had read
a written declaration, at the meeting of the cabinet, which
characterized Anderson's action as a gross violation of the
promises made by the president on the 9th, and asked for
authority to issue an order directing him to make amends
by immediately evacuating the fort. But no decision had
been reached when the conference with the commissioners
finally took place on the afternoon of the 28th. Its only
direct result was Buchanan's declaration that he received
them not in the character they claimed of diplomatic agents,
but only as private persons, and that he was " entirely will
ing" to transmit to congress any proposition they wished
to submit to him.
A half-way course in all things: he guarded against re
ceiving them as ambassadors, but received them because
they claimed to be ambassadors, and offered to serve them
with congress as introducteur des ambassadeurs. If the situ
ation quickly cleared it was due entirely to the ambassadors.
On the evening of the same day 2 they sent the president
a letter announcing that they must suspend the intended
negotiations respecting a peaceable settlement of the ques
tions growing out of the new relation of South Carolina to the
Union, until the events in the harbor of Charleston were ex
plained in a manner which removed all doubt as to the
spirit in which those negotiations should be conducted.
I According to Curtis, Floyd's letter of resignation begins : " On the
evening of the 27th inst." In Reb. Rec, I Doc, p. 10, it reads: " On
the morning of the 27th inst."
'Dated wrongly the 29th in Reb. Rec, I Doc, p. 11.

384 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
South Carolina might have taken possession of the forts at
any time during the last two months, but had resolved to
rely rather on his (Buchanan's) promises than on its own
power. They must urge him to order the immediate with
drawal of troops from the harbor — i. e., not the mere res
toration of the status ante. "Under present circumstances,
they are a standing menace which renders negotiations im
possible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens
speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought
to be settled with temperance and judgment."
We already know the material points in the answer of
the president, which it took him three days ' to prepare.
The commissioners sent him next day a long reply, which
not only sought to prove in an insulting manner that his
refusal to grant their request was in glaring contradiction
with his course hitherto,2 but also charged him as directly
with an intentional and dishonest breach of his word as
1 1 have already remarked that it is dated the 30th in the Reb. Rec
This date is given in the second letter of the commissioners also. But
in the message of the 8th of January (Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr.,
p. 295), it is given as the 31st. So likewise in Buchanan's Administra
tion, p. 182. There is great confusion in the dates. In the place last
cited, Buchanan gives the 29th as the date of the first letter of the com
missioners, and in the message the 28th. The commissioners them
selves, in the letter, say the 28th. Buchanan says that the second letter
was of the 2d of January (Administration, p. 183). In Reb. Rec , I
Doc, p. 14, it is dated the 1st.
2 From the long series of facts which they cite in favor of this, the
following may be cited : " You removed a distinguished and veteran
officer from the command of Fort Moultrie, because he attempted to in
crease his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops
to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to suc
ceed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most emi
nent member of your cabinet, rather than allow the garrison to be
strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to re
turn immediately to the arsenal forty muskets which he had taken to
arm his men." Reb. Rec, I Doc, p. 15.

Floyd's resignation. 3S5
could have been done without the employment of these ex
pressions. Concerning Anderson's step it said: " This was
war," and Charleston was called " the seat of war." It fur
ther alleged : " By your course you have probably rendered
civil war inevitable." This was in evident contradiction
with the claim that they were already at war, and it is
wholly unintelligible how the gentlemen, to whom the
Union was as much a foreign power as Eussia or Turkey,
could look upon a war between it and South Carolina as a
civil war. The letter closed with the declaration that they
intended to begin their journey home on the next day, be
cause his answer left no prospect of the success of their
mission of peace. Their reply was immediately returned to
them with the laconic note: "This paper just presented to
the president is of such a character that he declines to re
ceive it."
The three days which Buchanan had allowed to elapse
between receiving and answering the first letter witnessed
another change in the cabinet. Floyd had sent in his
resignation on the 29th, alleging as the reason for it that
his honor forbade his remaining in office after the presi
dent had refused to redeem the promise he had made to
South Carolina. He expressed his willingness, however, to
continue to discharge the duties of the position ad interim.
Curtis L tells us that " without taking any notice of this
offer, and with the contemptuous silence that should alone
have followed such conduct," his resignation was immedi
ately accepted. Such is not at all the fact. The failure
of the president to notice the insulting reproach addressed
him by Floyd must not be interpreted as the silence of
contempt, for, although he had resolved to demand the
resignation of the secretary on account of a dishonest use
of government money, he addressed him in the letter in
'II, p. 410.
25

386 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
which he accepted it as " My dear sir," and characterized
the offer of his services to continue to carry on the busi
ness of the office as " so kindly " made.1
Floyd's leaving the cabinet — the conduct of the busi
ness was at first intrusted to Postmaster-General Holt —
was certainly a gain. But Buchanan had run the risk of
losing three others of his cabinet, and thus of seeing it go
entirely to pieces. The crisis was conjured up by the
draft of the answer which he wished to communicate to
the commissioners. Black informed him through Toucey,
secretary of the navy, that the sending of that document
would compel him to resign, and that Stanton and Holt
would doubtless resign with him. The president immedi
ately cited the secretary of state to meet him. The inter
view lasted long, but seemed destined to lead to no under
standing. Buchanan thought he could not vield, because
he considered himself bound by the conference of the 9th
with the representatives of South Carolina. Crawford re
lates that he said : " You do not seem to appreciate, Judge
Black, that my personal honor as a gentleman is involved;"
but that the latter replied: " Such an understanding is im
possible; you could not make it or any agreement with
-any one that would tie your hands in the execution of the
laws, and if you did make it you must retire from it." The
president finally agreed to leave the paper with the secre
tary of state for revision. The latter repaired at once to
'the office of the attorney-general, did not change the docu-
unent at first, but reduced his criticisms to writing. The
¦" memorandum " stated, and assigned the reasons for, seven
objections, and then said: "I am aware that they (the
changes suggested) are too radical to permit much hope of
their adoption. If they are adopted the whole paper will
need to be recast."
' The epistolary addresses " Dear Sir " and " My Dear Sir " are not at
all equivalents.

black's advice to the president. 387
A comparison of the letter of the 31st of December with
the memorandum, which has been preserved to us by a copy
of it immediately made by Stanton,' shows that Buchanan
did not submit completely, but only yielded as much as he
was forced to, in order to induce Black and the two mem
bers of the cabinet who shared his views to retain their
portfolios. To Curtis's remark, therefore, that Buchanan
should not be judged by what he intended to do, but what
ho really did,2 the reply still is that his original intention
must be considered eminently indicative of his political
character. The whole history of this crisis renders it
highly probable that he was not at all convinced, but
yielded reluctantly to compulsion too powerful for him to
resist, simply because he did not care to let these three
members of his cabinet follow Cass's example.
At the end of his memorandum, Black had again ur
gently entreated the president to send reinforcements im
mediately.3 The secretaries of the war and of the navy
now really issued the requisite orders, but it was resolved
directly after to suspend their execution for the moment.
The answer of the commissioners to the letter of the 31st
was presented during a session of the cabinet, and the pres
ident exclaimed : "It is now all over, and reinforcements
must be sent." 4
'Crawford, Genesis of the Civil War, pp. 153, 155.
211, p. 382.
3 "I entreat the president to order the Brooklyn and the Macedonian
to Charleston without the least delay, and in the meantime send a
trusty messenger to Major Anderson to let him know that his govern
ment will not desert him. The reinforcements of troops from New
York or Old Point Comfort should follow immediately. If this be done
at once, all may yet be, not well, but comparatively safe. If not, I can
see nothing before us but disaster and ruin to the country."
' Quoted by himself in his letter of the 9th of January, 1861, to Secre
tary Thompson. Curtis, II, p. 402. .

3S8 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
The offensive letter of the commissioners, their departure
from Washington, and this exclamation of the president
rang the new year in, after the old had been rung out by
the report of the senate committee of thirteen, that it had
not been able to agree on any proposition. Thereupon
Crittenden, on the 3d of January, moved a resolution
declaring that whereas the Union was in danger, and that
the majorities in the two houses of congress necessary
for the passage of a proposal for amendments to the con
stitution could not be obtained, care should be taken by
law to submit his compromise proposition directly to the
people as the basis of the final settlement of the question in
controversy.1 All the advocates of a compromise had come
to set their hopes more and more on Crittenden. The
mantle of Henry Clay had fallen on his shoulders. What
Clay had twice succeeded in doing he must now accom
plish. In this faith the faint-hearted had found their chief
consolation, and now the aged patriot, by his motion, for
mally announced to the whole country that he had lost
faith in the possibility of its salvation in the way pointed
out by the constitution ; the people themselves, the sole
source of power, must be called upon to take it into their
own hands, in an extra-constitutional manner. And indeed,
if it had not been possible to accomplish anything while the
representatives of the south and the president had worked
together, what could be hoped for now, when, as he testi
fied himself, they were " bitterly hostile " to him.2 Whether
he now sent reinforcements to Anderson, or again desisted
from his intention, nothing could any longer shake the
truth of his words: " It is now all over! " while everything
must make it more and more irreversible and more glaring.
' Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., p. 237.
2 Letter of May 6, 1861, to Stanton. Curtis, II, p. 540.

CAUCUS OF SOUTHERN SENATORS. 389
On the 5th of January,1 the senators of Georgia, Florida,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas held a caucus
in which the following resolutions were adopted : (1) That
each state should secede as soon as possible; (2) that steps
should be taken to call a convention to organize a confed
eracy of the seceded states, such convention to meet not
later than the 15th of February in Montgomery, Alabama;
(3) that instructions should be asked as to whether their
representatives should remain in congress until the 4th of
March in order to defeat legislation hostile to the seceded
states; (4) the appointment of a committee consisting of
Davis, Slidell and Mallory, in order to carry out the inten
tions of the meeting.2
Pollard claims that the fourteen senators of the states
named were an actual junta who had successfully and com
pletely wrested to themselves the entire political and mili
tary direction of the revolution, and deprived the people of
all possibility of giving effect to their calm and well-con
sidered judgment,3 in any way. Jefferson Davis, on the
'Jefferson Davis, Rise and Fall, I, p. 204, gives this date. Pollard,
Life of Jeff. Davis, p. 61, gives the same date, while Reb. Rec, I, Diary,
p. 11, gives the 6th.
2 Senator Yulee, of Florida, writes on the 7th of January to Jos. Fin-
egan : " This time (until the 15th of February for the convention in
Montgomery) is allowed to allow Louisiana and Texas to participate.
It seemed to be the opinion that if we left here, force, loan and volunteer
bills might be passed, which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate con
dition for hositilities ; whereas remaining in our places until the 4th of
March it is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied and
disable the republicans from effecting any legislation which will
strengthen the hands of the incoming administration." Nicolay and
Hay, Lincoln, Century, October, 1887, p. 846.
8 " This council assumed to themselves the political power of the
south, and to control all political and military operations. They seized
the telegraph, they controlled the press, they possessed themselves of
all the avenues of information to the south, they dictated the plan of
seizing the forts, arsenals and custom-houses, and they did the whole

390 harper's ferey — Lincoln's inauguration.
other hand, sneers at it as an absurdity to attribute any
great importance to this event; according to his represen
tation, one would think that it scarcely deserved to be
mentioned. This view is^ undoubtedly, much farther from
the truth than PollardVassertion, although the latter is, in
my opinion, not free from exaggeration. In support of his
statement Pollard rightly remarks that the actual course
of events corresponded in every particular with the pro
gramme of the 5th of January.
It was immediately rumored around that the caucus had
been held, and the most material points in the resolutions
adopted became known also. But neither this fact, nor the
events in the harbor of Charleston and their consequences
in Washington, was able to deter congress from continu
ing to waste its time and strength on the Sisyphus stone of
a compromise. On the 2d of January, Buchanan plucked up courage
enough to nominate a new collector of customs (Mclntire)
for Charleston. The nomination, to be perfected, required
the confirmation of the senate. The senate, however, came
to no determination on the matter. Buchanan afterwards
wrote 1 that, if the confirmation had followed, the war would
work of revolution at Washington, while public attention was drawn
to the mere incidental movements that seconded the designs of these
few men and concealed the true seat of operations. . . . From the
beginning it was evident that the people were to have no calm and de
liberate voice in the matter. . . . That the council was not merely
' advisory,' that it represented the vigor and determination of a revolu-.
tionary purpose, is proved from the fact that its programme was carried
out with an exactness, a minute correspondence to every proposition,
that could only have proceeded from the force of command. Every
thing was done that the council ordered. They did control ' all polit
ical and military operations ; ' they did have forts and arsenals seized, as,
one by one, the dispatches from Washington indicated them ; they did
effect a convention at Montgomery arbitrarily appointed." Life of Jeff.
Davis, pp. 62, 63.
'September 18, 1861, Lippincott's Magazine, April, 1872.

bingham's bill. 391
probably have begun in January. But the senate like the
president did not want to assume the responsibility of cre
ating an occasion for a collision.
In those days it might have seemed that something bet
ter should have been expected of tlfe house. On the 3d
of January, Bingham of the judiciary committee introduced
a bill relating to the collection of customs duties, which
was, in its essential features, the so-called force bill of the
2d of March, 1833, and the days of the nullification crisis.
On the 7th of January the republican caucus rejected the
compromise proposition of the border state committee, in
troduced by Etheridge, and on the same day a resolution
moved by Adrain approving Anderson's removal to Fort
Sumter was adopted by a vote of one hundred and twenty-
four to fifty-six.1 But although these were noteworthy signs
of the house's frame of mind, it should not be inferred from
them that that body was now ready to take the initiative and
give out the watchword: Forward! They could at most
awaken the hope that it would not again tolerate a back
ward movement, and even this hope, as soon became evi
dent, had a very weak foundation. Just as the senate had
carefully kept its fingers from the nomination of the col
lector, the house did not touch Bingham's bill until im
mediately before the close of the session. At this critical
time it was seen clearer than ever before how incapable
' With respect to Seward's position on this question, an anonymous
writer relates that Orr, one of the commissioners of South Carolina, had
come to him "to urge my co-operation with Mr. Seward to strengthen
the hands of the president in ordering Major Anderson back at once to
Fort Moultrie. ... He had seen Mr. Seward during the day, who
had fully agreed with him that Anderson's movement was a most un
fortunate one, and had suggested that the matter might be arranged if
South Carolina would evacuate Fort Moultrie and allow Anderson to
re-occupy that post, both parties agreeing that Fort Sumter should not
be occupied at all by either." The Diary of a Public Man, The North
Amer. Rev., August, 1879, p. 127.

392 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
and how indisposed the house is to lead. If public opinion
goes in one direction with a certain intensity, it indeed
places itself readily and willingly at the head, quickening
the time and increasing the impetus of the movement. But
to give a steady direction to a public opinion surging in
chaos and confusion, or even to cast itself against the stream
and force it into a different channel, is not its concern. Up
to the present, however, as we have already seen, public
opinion was very far from growing intellectually and mor
ally with the crisis.
If it had been at all possible to inspire the people with a
will to take the bull by the horns, at this stage of the seces
sion movement, the president alone could have done it.
The nature of the facts postulates that he may go as far be
yond the limits assigned him by the constitution as congress,
in this respect, fails to come up to those the constitution has
laid down for it; and this the' more, the more critical the
situation is. If, however, from the nature of his mind or
his character, he is not able to do so, the ship of state can
not but become the play of the winds and waves. But
Buchanan now proved anew how eminently unfit both in
mind and character he was for such a task; and this ex
plains how it came to pass that the years of the republic's
highest moral energy were preceded by those months of
deepest darkness, during which it seemed as if the people,
in all that pertained to their political thought and will, as
manifested in what the powers of government did as well
as in what they left undone, had fallen into a condition oi
the most wretched impotence.

MESSAGE OF JANUARY EIGHTH. 393
CHAPTEE XI.
THE LAST ATTEMPTS AT COMPROMISE.
On the 9th of January the president sent to congress a
message dated the 8th which closed with the words: "This
may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially.
I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be
imperfectly, performed, and whatever the result may be, I
shall carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least
meant well for my country." Buchanan's right to this
consciousness can certainly not be disputed. But what did
that avail the people? Did they lie any more comfortably
on their bed of thorns because he was able to make a soft
pillow for himself out of the purity of his motives? Yet
thus far, the results of his policy had, according to the ac
count given of them in the message, been nothing but
sharp and poisonous thorns ; and whether he now intended
spreading over them other and thicker covers to protect
the people from their sting was a question which, judging
from the message, could be answered neither affirmatively
nor negatively, and which could be answered affirmatively
just as well as negatively. Indeed, the message was such
a heterogeneous mixture of irreconcilable assertions and
explanations that one might have taken it for a caricatur
ing satire of his statesmanlike over-wisdom had his own
name not been subscribed to it.
The president began by saying that he did not intend to
express himself either on the dangers to the country " need
lessly " conjured up, nor on the remedies for them, because
the views he had developed in his annual message had not
changed. But as, in the meantime, he continued, "every
hour of delay" had diminished the hope of a peaceable set-

394 harper's ferry -
tlement, and the fact could no longer be concealed that the-
country was " in the midst of a great revolution," the peo
ple might certainly demand the reasons why, notwith
standing, he now stood, in every particular, precisely where
he had stood five weeks before. This demand would be im
proper only in case it was impossible that James Buchanan
might have made mistakes. The presumptuous self-cer
tainty which this introductory declaration betrayed was,
however, placed in the proper light only by the further
allegation that on congress, " and on them alone, rests
the responsibility " " to secure peace and union to this
distracted country." His dread of assuming any respon
sibility was as great as his delusion with regard to his
own infallibility. This vainglorious self-overestimation of
the man so completely counter-balanced his moral weak
ness, that, by the boldest exaggeration, he transformed
a fundamental principle of the constitution into a lever
by means of which the executive might be precipitated
from his constitutional position of a power co-ordinate
with the legislature. The very right and duty to recom
mend the measures that seemed necessary to him made
the president share the responsibility of the congress.
How well aware he was of this was evident from the fact
that he referred expressly to the "recommendations" in his
annual message, although the criticisms on it were justly
condensed into the few words: It made no palpable prop
ositions, but set up the programme of a self-contradictory
no-programme. But it was above all things an undemon-
strated and most positively disputed contention that new
laws and changes of the constitution were the right and
only remedies. The country was "in the midst of a great
revolution," evidently because the supremacy of the exist
ing laws had not been maintained. But, in this regard,
the president not only shared the responsibility with con*
gress but primarily bore it. Buchanan again expressly

MESSAGE OF JANUARY EIGHTH. 395
said that it was his absolute duty "to collect the public
revenues and to protect the public property so far as this
might be practical under existing laws."
But whether, and how far, the powers and means granted
by the existing laws were sufficient, was a question that re
mained unanswered. The message, indeed, conveyed the
assurance that the president still had the intention to per
form that duty, but it did not contain a word as to what
he had hitherto done towards fulfilling it, for — on that
subject he had nothing whatever to say. Contrariwise, it
told how, in several states, federal property of every kind —
forts, arsenals, magazines — had been wrested by force from
the organs of the federal government, and declared that he
had from the first made the resolution, and inviolably kept
it, to do nothing that might " increase the excitement."
He, on the one hand, convicted himself of consciously hav
ing made no use of his legal powers — that is, of not having
performed hisduty — because, according to his political opin
ions, not good but only evil was to be expected from its per
formance, and, on the other, he showed that every day had
brought additional and greater evil. That, notwithstanding
this, not the slightest doubt arose in his mind as to the cor
rectness of his conduct was all the more surprising, since
be further pointedly called attention to the fact that the
unlawful acts referred to against federal property were
"purely aggressive and not in resistance to any attempt to
coerce a state or states to remain in the Union." From all
these facts he drew the conclusion that there should not be
a moment's delay in granting the revolutionists the price at
which the restoration of peace and the unity of the country
might be purchased from them. " The present is no time for
palliations. Action, prompt action, is required." Coming
from the mouth of a Jackson, perhaps hundreds of thou
sands, or even millions, would have hailed these sentences

396 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
with shouts of jubilation as the redeeming words which
would lift the ban that, like an Alp, weighed down their
heads and hearts. Coming from Buchanan's mouth they
meant: "Let the question be transferred from political as
semblies to the ballot-box, and the people themselves would
speedily redress the serious grievances which the south have
suffered." The president, indeed, stated in another place
that "the right and duty to use military force defensively"
against attacks on federal property and resistance to federal
officers was " clear and undeniable." But not even between
the lines can an intimation be read that he considered the
summoning of the force requisite for that purpose to be neces
sary or even desirable. Moreover, the sentence last quoted
preceded the veiled denunciation of congress for its delay
in hauling down the flag before the revolutionists. That
sentence, therefore, could not but seem to be the recogni
tion of an undeniable but disagreeable constitutional duty,
and the whole stress was, in his opinion, to be laid only on
the demand for satisfactory concessions to the slavocracy.
He at the same time assumed — again without taking the
trouble of assigning any reason for it — that the latter
would accept a new division of the territorial domain of the
Union as the basis of an agreement.
While the senate and house of representatives were list
ening to these arguments of the president in Washington,
the state convention of Mississippi in Jackson was furnish
ing them with an eloquent commentary by adopting the
ordinance of secession. South Carolina had passed a vastly
more destructive criticism on them several hours earlier, at
the dawn of day. In a very essential respect Buchanan
had not done justice to himself in his message. He was
now, in consequence of the events of the 26th of December
to the 1st of January, much more seriously bent on the
employment of force in the defensive than would appear

THE FLAG OF THE UNION FIRED ON. 397
from its wording. While he was reducing his message to
writing, a steamer with reinforcements for Major Anderson
was cleaving the waves of the ocean. Instead of confiding
this mission, as was originally intended, to the man-of-war
" Brooklyn," the passenger steamer " Star of the West " was
chartered for it. The result was a complete and shame
ful fiasco. In order not to run aground, the ship was
obliged to wait till daybreak to enter the bay. When,
after a warning shot, it hoisted the United States flag, the
strand batteries and Fort Moultrie immediately began a
sharp fire, and, as the guns of Fort Sumter remained silent,
it was obliged to veer about, after it had been struck
twice, and return to the open sea, without having effected
its purpose. As Thompson, secretary of the interior, in
tended to send his resignation to the president, he had not
hesitated to telegraph to Charleston what was to be ex
pected. Anderson, on the other hand, was wholly unpre
pared, as he could not have been officially informed, and
considered a notice of the intended expedition which he
had accidentally read in a newspaper not worthy of belief.
But that was not the reason why he looked inactively upon
the violence and the insult offered to the flag of the repub
lic. The command which would have made the lunt of his
cannoneers drop on the touch-holes of his guns hovered for
a while upon his lips. As his officers were divided in opin
ion, and as one of them supposed he might assume with
certainty that the governor would disapprove the action
of his subordinates, he thought that, in view of the inevi
table and frightful consequences, he should not assume the
responsibility. Pickens, however, declared that everything
that had happened was " perfectly justified," although An
derson had characterized it as " an act of war," and had
given notice that, if the governor did not disavow it, he
would allow no ship to pass within reach of his guns. But

398 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
the major now withdrew his threat, and requested that no
obstacles should be placed in the way of the messenger
whom he had resolved to send to Washington to report
and obtain instructions.
If Anderson is not to be judged unjustly it must be taken
into account that he was a southerner, and that all his
sympathies as a man were with the south. The rich recog
nition that has been meted out to him because, notwith
standing this, he could not, as for himself, for a moment see
the possibility of a conflict of duties, has therefore been
fully deserved. But it is another question whether on the
critical morning of the 9th of January he would not have
understood his duty somewhat differently and more cor
rectly if his heart had spoken to him in a different tone.
By his secret removal from Moultrie to Sumter, he had
shown himself a man of cool and clear judgment, and also
that he was not wanting in moral courage to take the in
itiative, even when it must be followed by grave conse
quences. But now his judgment and his will lay under the
pressure of the fact that he not only wished as an Ameri
can citizen to avoid civil war, but that he also wanted as a
southerner not to make civil war an accomplished fact,
by simply following the dictates of duty as to the con
sequences to be drawn from an act done by southerners —
without delay and without regard to what might happen
afterwards. Since the 20th of December South Carolina
had been in his eyes, and so far as it depended upon him,
an independent state recognized by international law. But
Anderson was commander-in-chief of the military force of
the Union in the harbor of Charleston. If the firing: on the
u Star of the West" was an "act of war," that is, if South
Carolina had actually begun war against the Union, it was
undoubted that he must protect its violated flag. As an
official personage, he was a soldier and nothing but a

major Anderson's conduct. 399
soldier. Politics lay entirely outside his jurisdiction, and
even if it might be right, still he had no right on account
of probable or even certain political consequences to leave
undone what, as a soldier, it was his duty to do. Only
military reasons could have given him the right to leave
the fire from Fort Moultrie and the strand batteries un
answered, but he never advanced such reasons for his sin
of omission. Weighty reasons, however, may be put for
ward to show that, from a political and patriotic point of
view likewise, it was a highly lamentable sin of omission,
although, perhaps, in the United States itself, there are even
fewer now who entertain this opinion than there were then.
If it had been at all possible, after the Charleston con
vention, to avoid the civil war by energetic action, the time
when it could be done was now long past. If the fire on
the " Star of the West" had been answered by Anderson with
only a single shot, the 9th of January would have taken
the place in the history of the republic which the 12th
of April was destined to occupy. Not a single attempt
more could have been made to prevent it. But to escape
civil war was impossible, no matter what was done or not
done. The more the secessionists were strengthened in the
delusion that secession could be accomplished without civil
war, the more enormous became the proportions that war
must assume. And conversely, the sooner it was demon
strated by deeds that the federal government was terribly
in earnest in its resolve to suppress the rebellion, the shorter
in all probability would be its duration, and the less the
sacrifice of blood and treasure. We need not examine the
question whether the rebellion would have been restricted
within narrower territorial limits by this means; but it
would certainly have begun the struggle under infinitely
less favorable circumstances. It was still, to say the least,
exceedingly doubtful whether the military preparations

400 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
thus far made in and around Charleston would have suf
ficed to compel Anderson to capitulate. Holt, the secre
tary of war, wrote Anderson a week later, that for the
present no further attempts to reinforce him would be made,
because the reports received in the meantime had dissipated
the fears earlier entertained with respect to his safety.1
And in a letter of the same date of the secretary of state
(January 16) to Scott, in which we read, on the one hand,
that "the question of Major Anderson's surrender is one of
time only," if nothing was done for him, we find on the
other that he "has a position so nearly impregnable that
an attack on him is wholly improbable." 2
Even as late as on the 22d of January, Black, in a letter
to the president, expressed the firm conviction that the
revolution could be held in check if the unfortunate policy
were abandoned that proceeded on the assumption that
greater hopes might be entertained of happily averting the
impending dangers in proportion as less strength was
shown.3 But even if Sumter and the other valuable mili
tary property of the federal government, that fell into the
hands of the secessionists during the next thirteen weeks,
1 Crawford, The Genesis of the Civil War, p. 205.
2 lb., p. 237.
3 "Let us not forget the lessons we have learned in the past three
months. The gross impostures practiced upon us recently ought to
make us very slow about believing assurances or taking advice which
comes from the enemies of the Union. Timeo Danaos. They told us
that civil war would be the result of manning the forts at Charleston.
Now they laugh at all who believed that prophecy. They told us about
the eight regiments of artillery in South Carolina; the twenty thousand
other troops; the battery that could take Castle Pinckney; the impos
sibility of occupying Fort Sumter; that the 'Brooklyn' was the only
ship of war fit to be sent down there, and that she could not cross the
bar; that the little battery on Morris Island would prevent a ship from
going up the channel ; that South Carolina would not make war upon
us if we were weak, but would if we should make ourselves strong, —
all these things were taken for true, and you know how disastrous the

major Anderson's conduct. 401
could no longer have been saved, if the war had been now
begun instead of being delayed until the middle of April,
the rebellion would none the less have been much weaker,
because it had not yet been consolidated and organized.
The states faithful to the Union would have had the im
mense advantage of a complete governmental apparatus
operating quickly and surely, at a time when as yet only
two states had seceded, and the formation of a confederacy
would have been still going on, while the militia of the north
might have been marching southward and the organization
of a great army rapidly progressing.
And lastly, far-reaching political consequences to the
disadvantage of the rebellion were to be expected if the
collision came before Lincoln's entrance into office. So at
least the secessionists thought; and even if it could not be
considered certain that what they feared would turn to the
advantage of the Union, it was certainly probable in a
very high degree. Governor Brown, of Georgia, wrote to
Pickens as late as February 2d, warning him that if Sum
ter were attacked during Buchanan's presidency, Lincoln
would receive the war as " unfinished business actually
commenced" from the democratic party, which would
stand at the head in the struggle.1 Of what great value
this would have been was shown plainly enough by many
consequences were, not merely to the credit of the administratfon, but
to the Union itself,
' Upon whose property and most dear life a damn'd defeat was made.'
" I solemnly believe that you can hold this revolution in check, and
so completely put the calculations of its leaders out of joint that it will
subside after a time into peace and harmony. On the other hand, by
leaving the government an easy prey, the spoilers will be tempted be
yond their power of resistance, and they will get such an advantage
as will bring upon the country a whole iliad of woes." lb., pp. 242,
243. •lb., p. 266.
26

402 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
a dark chapter in the history of the war. And not only
the attitude of the democrats of the northern states towards
the war would have been greatly influenced thereby, but
no inconsiderable portion of the southern population would
have looked upon it in a more or less different light if it
had been forced upon Buchanan, who had been elected
by the south and whose affection for the south had been so
frequently and so thoroughly tested. It cannot be ques
tioned that, while the secession movement was still so far
from being ended, this might have exercised a modifying
influence upon it.
It was, however, right that Anderson, after he had re
mained an inactive spectator of the cannonading of the
" Star of the West," should not have kept his resolution to use
force himself, in case he did not receive the disavowal of
the governor which he had asked for. Public opinion in
the north would certainly not have unanimously approved
his using it, and rightly so, while they undoubtedly should
and probably would have stood by him if he had answered
shot with shot, so long as the guns of the South Carolinians
were fired at the " stars and stripes." To meet force with
force was not only his right but his duty. Opinions, how
ever, were very much divided as to whether he had the
right to retaliate afterwards, and it certainly was not his
¦duty. From the moment that the batteries of the South
Carolinians grew silent, the question what consequences
should attach to the attack was a political one, and it was,
therefore, not for him to decide it. When, subsequently,
¦ he neglected to ask reinforcements from the secretary
of war, while they could have reached him, because his
policy was to keep the way open for the restoration of
the Union without the shedding of blood, he again made
a grave mistake, which, in most European countries, would

HOLT S LETTER TO ANDERSON. 403
have brought him before a court-martial.1 He thus entered
the domain from which he now withdrew, because he
rightly recognized that, to tread upon it, was an overstep
ping of his authority. The government, however, must share
the blame of this exceeding of his powers, because it had
unreservedly approved his conduct on the 9th of January,
from which fact he was justified in concluding that his
policy and that of the government were entirely coinci
dent. In a letter of the 16th of January to Anderson, Holt, sec
retary of war, not only declared that the words "an act
of war," used by the former, were wholly warranted, but
added: "Had their (the South Carolinians') act been per
petrated by a foreign nation, it would have been your im
perative duty to have resented it with the whole force of
your batteries."2 But hobbling after this came the further
declaration that the president "fully approved" his not
returning the fire, because "it was the work of the govern-
•A few days before his capitulation he writes to a lady: "Justice
compels me ... to take upon myself the blame of the govern
ment's not having sent to my rescue. Had I demanded reinforcements
while Mr. Holt was in the war department I know that he would have
dispatched them at all hazards. I did not ask them, because I knew
that the moment it should be known here that additional troops were
coming, they would assault me and thus inaugurate civil war. My
policy, feeling — thanks be to Godl — secure for the present in my
stronghold, was to keep still, to preserve peace, to give time for the
quieting of the excitement, which was at one time very high through
out this region, in the hope of avoiding bloodshed. There is now a
prospect that that hope will be realized; that the separation which has
been inevitable for months will be consummated without the shedding
of one drop of blood. The ladies must then not blame the latter part
of Mr. Buchanan's administration, nor the present one, for not having
sent me reinforcements. I demanded them under Mr. Floyd. The
time when they might have been sent has passed weeks ago." lb.,
p. 290.
1 lb., p. 205.

404 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
ment of South Carolina, which is a member of this confed
eracy, and was prompted by the passions of a highly in
flamed population of citizens of the United States." These
words made it seem even the patriotic duty of the president
to give no answer whatever, by act, to this slap on the
cheek. South Carolina was not shown that the federal gov
ernment would not allow itself to be forbidden and kept
from sending troops to the federal forts, but only told that
the federal government still claimed that right, and would
make another attempt to exercise it if Anderson's safety
seemed to require it; and it was expressly added that the
government now abstained from a repetition of the attempt,
because it might incite South Carolina to so bold and rude
a repetition of its blow that it would be impossible not to
return it. Buchanan did not see or would not see that
South Carolina could be rendered neither more pliant nor
more timorous, by leaving it the most ample time and the
utmost freedom to make itself, in all military respects, com
pletely master of the situation, while the federal govern
ment scarcely dared to stroke its wounded cheek. The
secessionists, on the other hand, saw very clearly that by
this course " the government practically conceded to South
Carolina all that she claimed (claims) in the way of sover
eignty;"1 and they, of course, drew their own conclusions
therefrom. The federal government and the population of
the northern states, who had received the intelligence of the
events in the harbor of Charleston with the most astound-
' " He (Benjamin) agrees with me that, by permitting the South Caro
lina forces to drive off by force the ' Star of the West,' the government
have practically conceded to South Carolina all that she claims in the-
way of sovereignty, though he is not surprised, as I own I am, at the
indifference, not to say apathy, with which this overt defiance to the
federal authority and this positive insult to the federal flag have been
received by the people of the north and west." The Diary of a Public-
Man, The North Amer. Review, August, 1879, p. 134.

CHANGE OF FEELING NORTH. 405
mg equanimity, must bear the grave responsibility for the
fact that people in the south were now fully convinced that
they would not risk opposing secession by force.
It is hard to understand how, despite the 9th of January,
it has been possible to assert uncontradicted a thousand
times that all the secessionists had to do was to let their
cannons speak to rouse the north from its irresolute weak
ness, and make it rise like one man to suppress the rebellion.
There was no real difference between the occurrences of
the 12th of April and the 9th of January. The only rea
son why they met with so different a reception was be
cause popular feeling in the north had changed during the
three intervening months. In April not a wish was ex
pressed anywhere that Anderson should again remain pas
sive, because it was so clearly understood that no possible con
cessions could bring the seceded states back into the Union,
that the last illusions on the subject were dispelled by the first
cannon-shot. Now, on the contrary, the anger of even most
republicans was not excited at the outrage on account of
the satisfaction they felt that the catastrophe had not yet
come, because the pressure exercised by the wishes of the
people on their intellectual penetration had not been suffi
ciently diminished. Hence the certainty that, independ
ently of the events in the harbor of Charleston, the seces
sionists would be able to record new and great successes
during the next few days, was not able to awaken either
thought or feeling to a proper appreciation of it. To this
certainty rather must it be ascribed in no small measure
that Anderson's conduct was not subjected to proper criti
cism even in quarters in which such criticism might have
been most surely expected.
On the 11th of January four stars had already been torn
from the flag of the Union. Florida and Alabama had fol
lowed South Carolina and Mississippi. The Alabama ordi-

406 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
nance of secession, conformably to the resolution of the
caucus of southern senators of the 5th of January, con
tained an invitation to all the slave states to send delegates
on the 4th of February to a convention at Montgomery,
in order to form a confederacy with a constitution mod
eled after the constitution of the United States. That
the states which had seceded up to that date would ac
cept Alabama's invitation was undoubted; for, although
the legal basis of the secession movement was the alleged
sovereignty of the individual states, it had drawn its via
bility from the first from the solidarity of the slave-holding
interest; that is, its actual precondition was, as it had ever
been, the immediate concentration of the seceded states
into a new union. Immediately after South Carolina had
driven the flag of the Union from its coast with powder
and lead, it had become an undoubted certainty that the
manufacturers of compromise projects would have a sup
ply of them to offer not only to the individual states but
also to a federal republic. How greatly the prospect that
any attention would be paid to their proposals was de
creased by this fact, in and of itself, is self-evident. If the
individual states had thought themselves strong enough not
to fear the venture of rebellion, the idea of force could only
incite a confederacy, not intimidate it. So, too, the argu
ment based on the advantages of belonging to a great po
litical structure had lost its main force, because the seceded
states would look upon themselves as great and powerful
enough not to lose the benefits of them. Lastly, pride pre
ponderated immensely over the emotions which the remem
brance of a common world-historic past had hitherto been
able to awaken. Must not the south fear to make itself ridic
ulous in the eyes of the world, if it should give any answer
but the silence of contempt to a solicitation to undo what had
been done in consideration of the granting of a part of the

NO PROSPECT OF A COMPROMISE. 407
demands it had previously made? And had not the several
states, by the fact that they had bound themselves to one
another, curtailed their freedom of action too much to al
low themselves to retrace their steps by an agreement,
even if each of them could still be asked separately to enter
into one? The leaders of the rebellion were fully con
scious that by the formation of a confederacy they would
fasten the door of agreement with a bolt which they would
not be able to shove back themselves, even if they wished to.
In the meantime the prospect that the parties would suc
ceed in agreeing upon a compromise even in congress had
not improved. The negotiations thus far had only carried
them a greater distance from the goal. The fact that the
committee of thirty-three submitted a report with definite
proposals to the house of representatives on the 14th of Jan
uary could blind no one's eyes to this discouraging outlook.
A whole array of minority reports accompanied the majority
report, and the latter was not at all what it purported to be.
Every separate motion had, indeed, been adopted by a ma
jority of the members who happened to be present when it
was made, but the report, as a whole, had not been ap
proved by a majority of the whole committee. Some mem
bers of the pretended majority had openly announced in
the committee that they would speak and vote against a
part of the propositions in the house. Love, of Virginia,
and Hamilton, of Texas, were therefore not so wrong when
they said, in their minority report, that the house and the
country were being trifled with.1 Moreover, the represent
atives of three slave states had taken no part in the delib-
' "Thus that which appears to be the report of a committee is really
no report at all, not even of those who seem to make it. With all due
deference and respect, we submit that this may be regarded as trifling
with the house and the country." Rep. of Comm., 36th Congr., 2d Sess.,
VoL I, No. 31.

408 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
erations of the committee, and those of seven more had
manifested their disapproval of the proposals, while, on the
other hand, two republicans — Washburne and Tappan —
moved to declare that what must be done was not to change
the constitution but insure obedience to it. If, therefore,
the committee, as must be assumed, correctly reflected the
views of the house, it was highly improbable that the pro
posals would be adopted by it. If, however, contrary to ex
pectation, the house did adopt them, the result, as Charles
Francis Adams showed in his separate report, would be of
no value, because it was certain that the offers made would
not satisfy the majority of the states which were to be in
duced to make a compromise. The discussion of theories,
said the minority report of the representatives of Louisiana,
Missouri, Arkansas, Delaware and North Carolina, was idle.
They had to deal with the fact that four states had already
seceded, and that all the other slave states would follow
them if they were not offered the security which they con
sidered necessary. Adams, on the contrary, said that no
good was to be expected from the proposals of the commit
tee, since its deliberations had demonstrated that the ma
jority of the dissatisfied states would hear of no settlement
the terms of which were not dictated by them, and refused
at the same time to accept as a principle the imperative
duty of submitting to the result of a constitutional presi
dential election, without the recognition of which a con
stitutional state cannot exist. But if the offers of the
committee did not satisfy even the slave states still remain
ing in the Union, they could, of course, suffice still less to
induce the states which had already seceded to re-enter the
Union; and if a settlement with the former was not pos
sible without depriving the Union of the character of a
constitutional state, one with the latter which would have
left it that character was evidently entirely out of the

PRESERVATION OF THE UNION IMPOSSIBLE. 409
question. So far as they were concerned, those compromise
proposals, no matter what they contained, could have a
meaning only provided it could be assumed either that
their representatives did not really think as they pretended
to think, or that the people could yet be determined to cut
loose from their leaders. But there were no facts to sup
port the one assumption or the other. Houston, of Ala
bama, had, it was said, declared in the committee that the
north could no longer prevent secession even by handing
the south a blank power of attorney in which it might write
what it pleased.' That there is room for a difference of
opinion as to how large a portion of the population of the
states that bad seceded in the meantime had adopted this
view will be conceded. The divergent, more moderate
news, however, might not even yet have been as generally
abandoned as they seemed to be. But when one here or
there publicly and strongly professed them, the fact was
one which was heralded about by the entire press of the
country. People no longer dared to express them or elso
were kept from. doing so by the opinions universally en
tertained of the loyalty due to the individual states. A
compromise which would merely prevent further secessions
from the Union would accomplish nothing whatever to
wards solving the fundamental question. The Union was
not " preserved," and the sword of civil war continued to
hang over it by a mere thread so long as a single state re
fused to repeal its ordinance of secession. It could neither
recognize secession without committing national suicide, nor
employ force without causing a larger or smaller number of
' " There is no use of our cheating each other ; we do not mean to stay
with you; we do not mean to stay in this government; we mean to
break it up; we can make more money without you than with you,
and if you would take that paper (a white sheet) and sign your names
to it and let us write our agreement over them, then we would not stay
with you." Proceedings at the organization of the Loyal National
League at the Cooper Institute, p. 34.

410 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
slave states to leap over the compromise just concluded, with
uplifted shield and hand on the hilt of the sword, to the
side of the seceded state.
In answer to the apparent reasons which might be ad
duced in support of the claim that, if the committee of
thirty-three had been more adroit, they might have ob
tained other and better results, attention might be called
to the fact that, in all material points, the events in the
senate accurately reflected the course affairs had taken
in the house committee. Powell, of Kentucky, moved on
the 16th of January that the Crittenden compromise should
be amended so that the cession of the territorial region
south of the Missouri line to slavery should be expressly
extended to all territory "hereafter to be acquired." La
tham, of California, a democrat, of whose honest and un
selfish friendliness to a compromise there was not the
slightest doubt, vigorously opposed it. "Instead of being
a peace offering," he said, "it will be a fire-brand thrown
into the solution of this whole subject." Notwithstanding
this, the motion was adopted by a vot.e of twenty-nine
against twenty-four. But immediately after, Clark's reso
lution reciting that the question was not one of changing
the constitution, but of enforcing obedience to it, came up
for discussion, and it, too, was adopted by a vote of twenty-
five to twenty-three. Some of the extreme southerners
had abstained from voting, and subsequently justified their
course by claiming that it was necessary to discover how
the republicans thought; they were the ruling party, and
it was to no purpose to work at compromises which they
did not approve. A motion and a resolution which agreed
like fire and water, adopted within an hour, and only be
cause the southern radicals wanted to show in a glaring
light that they were convinced that all the labor at a com
promise was a search after the philosopher's stone! The
bitter censure they were subjected to on this account would

POSITION OF THE SOUTHERN RADICALS. 411
have been justified only provided that all that was needed
wan to find a majority in congress for any compromise
project whatever, no matter how constituted or how small
it might be. Their conduct was calculated to dispel this
illusion which was entertained to a greater or less extent
by all compromise seekers. They therefore deserved thanks
for it, and it is only to be lamented that the lesson taught
by them was so little understood. Not their action, but
only one of the motives for it, was deserving of censure.
They had abstained from voting partly because the failure
of the endeavors to reach a compromise would, at least,
not have been disagreeable to them. That was blame
worthy, but it did not refute the allegation that a compro
mise which the republicans refused to approve could not ful
fill its end. But was the way to win over the republicans
to go beyond the demands made by a southern senator,
and put forward new claims which even a genuine dem
ocrat violently opposed? That was the way to strengthen
the knees of those republicans who would still have will
ingly paid a high price in order to save the country from
the consequences of the party victory of November. And
every step taken by the south which had this effect now
fell in the balance with all the greater weight because, at
last, a spirit began to stir among the republicans outside of
congress which was calculated to influence their timorous
party associates in the capitol at Washington in the same
manner. The importance of the adoption of Clark's amend- .
ment to the Crittenden promise could be measured rightly
only when it was taken in connection with the fact that
the legislatures of northern states began by formal resolu
tions to place money and men at the disposal of the presi
dent. No direct conclusions, however, could be drawn from these
significant indications of feeling, as to the clearing of peo-

412 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
pie's judgments. Not only the northern democrats but
also a very large number of republicans still looked upon
it as their highest patriotic duty, despite the incessant ad
vance and increasing height of the flood of secession, to
hold fast to the faith that it might yet be swept back with
the besom of compromise. Lincoln's future secretary of
state thought it incumbent on him again to advocate this
view with the whole weight of his authority, not only by
word but by deed. The people were still under the in
fluence of the news that Georgia (January 19) had seceded,
when the senators of Florida and Alabama, and Jefferson
Davis, during the session of January 21, announced in a
formal and solemn manner, that, in consequence of the se
cession of their states, they had ceased to be members of
the senate. On the following day, the vice-president in
quired what should be done regarding the vacancies in the
committees, and referred at the same time to the fact that
nothing had been said in the journal of the senate on that
occurrence. Seward contended very positively against Ben
jamin that nothing should be said. If complete silence
were preserved about the matter, the senators who had
withdrawn, or other senators from the states in question,
would, " at their own time and in their good pleasure,"
again take possession of the vacant seats, which he hoped
would soon be the case. Posterity would only honor this
incompleteness of the chronicles of the senate.' His motion
to lay the matter on the table was adopted by a vote of
thirty-two against twenty-two, although attention had been
called, to the fact that it was necessary to take a definite
stand on the question which had been raised by the conduct
of the senators above named, for the very reason that the
number required to reach any conclusion had become un
certain. 1 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 86th Congr., p. 501.

THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 413
Whether the hope expressed by Seward was intended to
be synonymous with a wish or an expectation could not be
determined with certainty from the wording of the sen
tence. Seward's whole bearing at this time leaves scarcely
a doubt that it was meant to be the latter, and we may as
sume that it was so meant with all the more certainty, as,
simultaneously with the news of Georgia's secession, a
message came from Bichmond which was highly calculated
to afford new food to patriotic illusions.
On the 19th of January the legislature of Virginia had
adopted resolutions the object of which was " to make a
final effort to restore the Union and the constitution in the
spirit in which they were established by the Jathers of the
republic." AU the states were invited to send commis
sioners to Washington to advise with one another about a
settlement which would give the slave states "adequate
guarantees for the security of their rights." When they
had agreed on the necessary changes of the constitution,
they were to transmit their proposition to congress, with
the request that it should take steps to have it adopted in
the manner provided for in the constitution. Crittenden's
compromise with Bowell's amendment and a few addenda
would satisfy Virginia. Ex-President Tyler was to be sent
to the president and Judge Eobertson to the seceded states,
to request that, in view of this peace conference, all meas
ures which might lead to a collision with armed force
should be desisted from.1
One would have thought that people would have been
kept from basing any great expectations on this attempt
at a settlement by the fact that it was not able to inter
rupt the progress of secession. Louisiana seceded on the
26th of January, after a motion to delay its withdrawal
from the Union had been defeated in the convention, by a
' lb., p. 601.

414 large majority, on the day before. That the consideration
of this fact had obtruded itself on the mind of the presi
dent could not be inferred from a single word of the mes
sage with which he transmitted the resolution to congress
on the 28th of January. The message, indeed, pointedly
called attention to his want of power to make binding
pledges of the nature desired by Virginia. So far as this
could not be traced to the wish, so frequently and so prom
inently brought into relief, to shift all responsibility, as
far as possible, from his own shoulders, its only object was
to make the exhortation addressed to the seceded states
and to congress, to accept the invitation extended by Vir
ginia, all the more impressive. If the former, he said, will
refrain from all acts of the nature described, "the danger
so much to be deprecated will no longer exist," and he
begged the latter "to abstain from passing any law"
which might have the dreaded effect.1 He accompanied
this request with the declaration that he would never de
spair of the republic, and was confident that the mediation
of Virginia would prove the means chosen by Providence,
by conditions just and honorable to all parts of the coun
try, to perpetuate the Union. No reasons were assigned
for this consoling faith, unless the reference to the history
of Virginia be considered such. It showed that that state
carried out whatever it took in hand, "if it could (can) be
done by able, enlightened and persevering efforts."
This if was the decisive word. It weighed more than
all the rest of the message and the resolutions. Until the
question it implicitly contained could be positively given
the desired answer, the resolutions and the message could
' This request shows very clearly in what light we are to view
Buchanan's excuse, made to relieve himself of responsibility, that con
gress "refused with pertinacity " to take the measures necessary to
suppress the rebellion. Mr. Buchanan's Administration, p. 153.

reynolds's bill of January thietieth. 415
have only one certain result: a free field was insured for
the progress and consolidation of the secession movement
for some weeks more. This could be prevented only in
case its leaders were so blinded by their impatience that
they would not heed the exhortation of the president. He
had "much confidence" of seeing his request granted by
congress, and it was certain £hat he would not be disap
pointed. The house immediately manifested its readiness in the
most forcible way. In the name of the committee to which
the message of the 8th of January had been referred, Bey-
nolds, of New York, introduced a bill on the 30th which
empowered the president to call out the militia or engage
volunteers in the service, not only to protect the forts, maga
zines, arsenals, etc., but also to restore to the possession of
the Union those that had been, or might yet be, taken from
it. Such an authorization, as Buchanan rightly remarked,1
was equivalent to a command, and hence, if the bill be
came a law, civil war would have been begun. But the
committee not only did nothing to have the bill passed, it
not only prevented all action of the house, but it hindered
all discussion. Before a word could have been said on the
contents of the bill, Keynolds himself moved that it should
be referred back to the committee. The motion was car
ried without the slightest objection, and the bill was thus
buried.2 Virginia could not have been given the assurance more
promptly or more plainly that the way^ would be left en
tirely clear for it. But the answer to the question impliedly
contained in that if of the message had been given even
earlier and in just as unambiguous a manner. News had
been received the day before, that the invitation to send
commissioners to a peace conference had been absolutely
'lb., p. 157.
2 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess.. 36th Congr., p. 646.

416 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
declined by South Carolina, with the declaration that it
had no negotiations to make about concessions, as it did not
want to return to the Union. To what extent it might be
inferred from the fact, that all the other seceded states had
also refused to send commissioners to the conference, that
they thought precisely the same way on this point, need not
be examined here. Thaddeus Stevens's allegation, that this
answer of South Carolina deprived Virginia's attempt at
mediation, like all other attempts at a compromise, of a
foundation,1 was irrefutable.
The allegation was irrefutable, but, naturally, it did not
pass uncontradicted on that account. That it came from
the mouth of so radical a republican as Stevens was suffi
cient proof to many people that it could not be tenable. It
became much more difficult, even for those who found sat
isfaction in such arguments, to preserve full faith in their
illusions. Virginia's mediation was to smooth the turbulent
waves, and yet one of Virginia's representatives, imme
diately after the reading of the message — that is, before
South Carolina's resolution had been known — had in a long
speech said: "The dispute has become incapable of accom
modation." 2 The exhortation to desist from vainly con
tending against the inevitable, to listen to the voice of
reason, and be confident that it was the will of Providence
that freedom and civilization should be promoted by the
rupture of the artificial tie, was the sentence in which
Pryor's speech culminated.3
' "Thus ends the negotiation; thus ends concession; thus ends com
promise, by the solemn declaration of the seceding party that they will
not listen to concession or compromise." lb., p. 621.
2 lb., p. 601.
3 "Instead, then, of vainly essaying to counteract the designs of
nature, let us heed the voice of reason ; instead of lamenting the rupture
of an artificial tie, as involving the ruin of all our hopes, let us lean on
the wisdom of Providence, persuaded that as He has already distin-

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS'S SPEECH. 417
Even among the republicans, these words did not fall on
deaf ears. In one respect the moderate Charles Francis
Adams, in his speech of January 31st, went a step beyond
the allegation of Stevens on the previous day. What the
latter had said of the seceded states Adams extended to
the representatives of the south who were still seated in
congress. "You want the Union dissolved. You want to
make it impossible for honorable men to become recon
ciled." Such was the charge he flung in their faces. He
announced, on the other hand, that, under certain circum
stances, he would perhaps go so far as to advocate a peace
able separation, "although he (I) could (can) not see the
authority under which it could (can) be originated." l
This difficulty might, perhaps, become of even decisive
importance. If the people had positively demanded such
a solution of the problem by an overwhelming majority,
it would undoubtedly have been surmounted in some way,
no matter what became of the constitution. Although
it certainly deserved serious consideration that influential
patriots, of vision as clear and judgment as sober as Adams,
declared themselves tempted to go over to the side of those
who had immediately given out the watchword, "Let the
erring sisters depart in peace," it had not become any the
more probable on that account that public opinion would
finally, with irresistible pressure, force both the president
and congress to go that road unimpeded by any constitu
tional scruples. The fact that people were compelled more
and more to face the question, to what extent the desire of
reconciliation still existed in the slave states at all, had, on
the whole, a totally different effect. It was only a minority
guished the epoch of revolution as the most glorious in the annals of
America, He intends still further to advance the cause of freedom and
civilization by means of another dissevered nationality." lb., p. 603.
'lb., App., p. 127.
27

418
of the people, although not a wholly inconsiderable one,
that had become steadily strengthened in the conviction
that the prolongation of the suspense could tend only to
disaster. The majority became more mellow, instead of
at last confessing that the efforts to effect a compromise
were a foolish chase after a phantom. But by what right
was a growing readiness to recognize secession inferred
from an increasing inclination to meet the south half way?
Logic evidently required the drawing of the opposite con
clusion; that is, what had previously been said of the
"Union-savers " of the old stamp was true, in a still higher
degree, of the republicans, who had since grown " weak-
kneed." To the extent that the concessions were felt to be
sacrifices, the willingness to agree to them was a correct
measure by which to estimate the value of the Union. The
north would have preferred to pay the price of its preserva
tion in this form. But as it could not do that, because the
south refused to accept the payment, it did it in the form
in which it was forced to against its will; and, on that very
account, the price paid was not merely equally great, — it
was tenfold greater. Hence, when one examines the mat
ter more closely, one finds nothing wonderful in the fact
that the moral weakness with which people at the north,
really or apparently blind and deaf to all facts, continued
to roll the Sisyphus stone of compromise projects, was trans
formed in a night into an energy that was proof against
everything, and eager for the fray.
He who had ears to hear correctly must have so inter
preted the speech which Seward delivered in the senate
while Adams made this declaration in the house. That
people judged Seward's speech at the time only in accord
ance with its probable immediate effect was not only nat
ural, but in a certain sense justified, aud it must have
created a much more depressing impression than Adams'
declaration.

PETITION OF NEW YORK CITIZENS. 419
The presentation of a petition of citizens of New York,
praying for the acceptance of a compromise on the basis of
the project agreed upon by the border states, afforded
the formal occasion for Seward's speech. What its char
acter would be could be inferred from the manner in
which he referred to the imposing length of the paper
covered by subscribers' names. These introductory remarks
were followed by the express refusal to take any position
on the concrete proposition of the petitioners. He neither
directly criticised it nor gave the slightest intimation as to
the bases on which, in his opinion, a settlement could and
should be made. But he lavished the highest praise on the
"spirit" which had dictated the petition, exhorted the
petitioners to continue to work in every possible way in
the same spirit, and regarding himself declared: "I have
thought it my duty to hold myself open and ready for the
best adjustment which could be practically made." ' The
author of the phrase the " irrepressible conflict " avoided
entirely the discussion of the question whether in the nat
ure of things a settlement acceptable to both parties could
still be devised. He indeed admitted the possibility that
none might be found, and in that case, unlike Adams, he pos
itively demanded that what could not be accomplished by
kindness should be done by force. " If then this Union is to
stand or fall by the force of arms, I have advised my peo
ple to do as I shall be ready to do myself: stand in the
breach, and stand with it or perish with it." 2 But, at the
same time, he expressed not only the hope but the confi
dent expectation that an agreement would be reached.
He, however, gave no reasons for that hope and expecta
tion. Their place was taken by the assertion that all who
opposed the Union would be swept away " as moths on a
1 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 657.
'lb., p. 658.

420 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
summer eve, when the whirlwind of popular indignation
arose (arises) that would (shall) be excited at the full discov
ery that this Union is endangered through faction or even im
practicability on our part." The boldness of this prophecy '
was all the greater as it gave it to be clearly understood
that he did not promise himself any success on the road
which had been thus far followed. He placed all his con
fidence in the one means furnished by the constitution, the
employment of which had never yet been tried: the calling
of a convention. Why he believed that he could so con
fidently assume, first, that the seceded states would send
representatives to a convention, and secondly that that con
vention would manifest less of a spirit of faction and more
fertility of resource than congress and the peace conference,
he did not say. On the other hand, he laid strong em
phasis on the assertion — just as Webster had done in his
day — that the struggle of the sections over the territories
" has ceased to be a practical question," and most positively
denied that any conclusion as to the possibility or prob
ability of an amicable settlement could be drawn from the
want of success which had attended their endeavors to
effect a compromise for two months past, and which would
perhaps attend them for a month more.
Compared with this speech, Adams's declaration was so
unimportant that it was not worth while to waste a word on
it. Adams had expressed a personal opinion which claimed
attention beyond the comparatively narrow limits of his in
fluence only in so far as it was considered an indication of a
certain frame of mind. Seward's speech, on the other hand,
was considered as a governmental programme. He was not
only the designated secretary of state of the coming ad-
' He went so far as to say: " Then, sir, this country will find sudden
relief in the prompt and unanimous ( I) adoption of the measures for its
Balvation."

WILLIAM H. SEWARD

SEWARD AND THE REPUBLICANS. 421
ministration, but he looked upon it as a matter of course
that he would be its actual head, and a great many in the
party thought so likewise. Hence his words were not to be
taken as those of a senator, but of the future federal exec
utive, and what they announced amounted to this: that
until further notice no change was to be made in the pres
ent policy of the president: not to strike the flag before
rebellion, but to maintain a passive attitude of expectancy,
while continuing, at the sacrifice of the fundamental prin
ciple of the supremacy of the law, to bargain with the con
ditional rebels about a very doubtful improvement of the
constitution, until such time as the rebellion thought the
right moment had come to put an end to the undignified
and disastrous comedy of self-delusion. Then indeed, but
not till then, should logic get its rights, and it be recognized
that a nation must treat as rebellion what it declares to be
rebellion. The New York Tribune (February 4) informed Seward
that the republican party would not follow him on the road
which, judging from this speech, he intended to follow. An
immense majority of the party saw no necessity of choos
ing between their principles and the Union; but if they
must choose between them, they would prefer their princi
ples to fifty Unions.1 It is very doubtful, however, whether
this was believed even in the editorial rooms of the paper
itself. On the 29th of January it had urgently exhorted
public opinion to resistance, because only a few more votes
were wanted to force the Crittenden compromise through
' " In this readiness (to renounce republican principles for the sake of
the Union) the senator differs totally from the almost incomparable ma
jority of the republican party, and from the president-elect. They re
gard these principles as sacred. They will not forswear them at the
bidding of a world of seceding and treasonable slave-holders. They see
no necessity to choose between them ; but if such a choice must be
made, they prefer their principles to fifty Unions."

422 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
both houses of congress. And Greeley subsequently ad
mitted that in his opinion it would have been adopted by
an overwhelming majority if it had been submitted to a
direct popular vote; for, since the presidential election, the
conservatives had made great gains in all the local elec
tions, and although very few republicans would have voted
for the compromise, many would have abstained from vot
ing, while their opponents would have brought their very
last man to the ballot-box.1
The assertion, indeed, seemed particularly bold at this
time. The fact that, a day after Seward's speech, a repub
lican introduced a new compromise proposition, with ex
tensive concessions, in the house of representatives,2 was
only one of the many feathers that showed how the wind
blew. While, on the one hand, the pressure that weighed
down economic life — especially in the larger cities of the
east — found an increasingly forcible expression in polit
ical feeling,3 there came, on the other, from the seced-
' Recollections, pp. 396, 397. See, also, the New York Tribune of the
4th of February, on the occurrences in Philadelphia and the attitude of
the Pennsylvania legislature. Dodge, of New York, a member of the
committee who brought the petition presented by Seward to Washing
ton, said in the peace conference: " When we came to Washington we
met seventy republican members of the senate and the house of represent
atives. We had with them a most satisfactory and delightful interview.
It gave me renewed hope for my country and her interests when I
heard the expressions of conciliation and good will which these gentle
men used. I felt my confidence renewed." Chittenden, Debates of
the Conference Convention, p. 191.
2 Kellogg, of Illinois. When his colleague, McClearnand, alluded to
the close personal relation in which he (Kellogg) stood to Lincoln, Kel
logg repelled the insinuation that it seemed to contain, with the words,
" that no human being is responsible for the proposition but myself."
Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 390, 391.
'Dodge said in the peace conference: "How stands the matter in
those cities to-day? Now, just when the spring trade should be com
mencing, go to the extensive and magnificent establishments for the

FEELING in THE SOUTH. 423
ing states, surprising reports concerning the setting in of
a reaction in favor of the Union. As the correspondents
of a paper like the New York Tribune warranted the truth
sale of goods in any of the cities I have named, where goods are sold
which in prosperous times found their way into almost every family to
a greater or lesser amount in this great country. What will you see in
those cities now? The heavy stocks of goods imported last autumn, or
laid in from our own manufactories, remain undisturbed and untouched
on the shelves. The customers are not there — they have not made
their appearance. The few who have come at all, come not as buyers,
but as debtors who cannot pay, and whose business is not to make
purchases but to arrange for extensions. The merchants, in despair,
are pouring over their ledgers, checking off the names of their insolvent
debtors, a new list of whom comes by each day's mail. The clerks sit
around in idleness reading the newspapers or thinking mournfully of the
wives and children at home, who will go unclad and hungry if they are
discharged from their places, as they know they must be if this condi
tion of things shall continue. All alike, employers and employed, with
all dependent upon them, are looking anxiously, and I wish I could say
hopefully, to the congress of the United States, or to this conference, as
the only sources from which help may come.
"There are thousands and tens of thousands belonging to these
classes all over the country who must have relief, or their ruin is inev
itable. And then look at that other class, numerically larger, per
haps, certainly not less worthy of our regard, who are dependent upon
these ; I mean the mechanics, the day laborers, and those in turn de
pendent upon them. What are they to do? If some change does not
come, if something is not done again to start the wheels of commerce
and business, what is to become of them?
" And look too at New England! She has lately been the workshop
of the south and west. She has furnished their people with her manu
factures — they have been her market. An excellent market, too, have
they furnished her; she has grown rich through their consumption.
How stands the matter with New England to-day? True, some of her
shops are running, but many more are still. The noise of the loom, the
rattle of the shuttle, have ceased in many of her factories, while others
are gradually discharging their operatives and closing their business.
But I will pursue this branch of the subject no farther. No one ac
quainted with the facts will deny that the whole country is upon the
eve of such a financial crisis as it has never seen — that this crisis will

424 harper's ferry — Lincoln s inauguration.
of this joyful news,1 it was readily and very extensively
believed. And how could this movement be more effect
ually supported than by making further advances. The
thing now was to strike the iron, for only the blindest party
spirit could deny that it was hot. The people of Virginia
had shown that they were not behind the legislature in
patriotism. The latter had issued the invitation to a peace
conference, and the former had sent a majority of friends
of the Union to the state convention. Was not that the
shining bow in the heavens extending over the dark clouds
of the departing storm and promising peace to the land?
Even the fanatical New York Tribune could not, with all
its fanaticism, help confessing that this was "an eminently
hopeful and encouraging sign of the times." 2 If there had
only not been other signs of the times which glared into
eyes with normal retina and optic nerve much more daz-
zlingly !
On the day on which Kellogg introduced his compromise
proposition, Texas had, in the convention at Austin, re
solved on secession.3 On the day on which Virginia elected
come as sure as that the sun will rise unless we do something to avert
it." Chittenden, Debates of the Conference Convention, pp. 193, 194.
1 Thus, for instance, the Charleston correspondent wrote on the 2d of
February: "I wrote to you this morning in respect to the political
clouds which are gathering over the secessionist horizon ; and private
letters, received in the course of the day, from Georgia, Alabama and
Louisiana, confirm the worst fears of the South Carolina authorities.
According to the accounts it seems that Upper Alabama is in open re
bellion against the Yanceyites, while even in the other parts of the
state the proceedings at Montgomery are beforehand denounced as the
work of designing politicians, whose ambition has been foiled by
the freemen of the north. . . . Yancey and Cobb have been burned
in effigy in several localities." The New York Tribune, February 8,
1861. 2 New York Tribune, February 7, 1861.
8 The ordinance was to be submitted to a popular vote on the 23d of
February, and go into force on the 2d of March, in case it was adopted.

THE CONGRESS IN MONTGOMERY. 425
a majority of friends of the Union to its state convention,
the North Carolina house of representatives unanimously
resolved that the state should join the seceded states 1 in
case the efforts at reconciliation were not successful ; and,
on the following day, Taylor, of Louisiana, declared in the
house of representatives, that even if all the numberless
compromise proposals were unanimously adopted by both
houses of congress, secession would not be stopped by them.2
On the day on which the peace conference met in Wash
ington, the congress of the seceded states convened in
Montgomery, and it acted while the former talked, and its
talk only piled proof on proof that, in the nature of things,
action productive of fruit was impossible.
The men in Montgomery knew how to appreciate the
value of time, and as, so far as the main thing was con
cerned, there was a complete agreement of views and de
signs, what was most essential was soon done.
With the constitution of the Union as a model, the draft
ing of a provisional constitution for the " Confederate States
of America " was, despite some radical changes, an easy
task. As there was question of only a provisional consti
tution, it could afford to estimate the danger of possible
blunders lower than the time. And, so far as the duration
of the constitution was concerned, the convention guarded
against any peril from it by simply empowering congress
to alter or amend the constitution.3 The constitution was
adopted as early as the 8th of February. On the next day,
it proceeded to the election of a president and vice-president.
Its choice fell on Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Ste
phens. The former arrived in Montgomery on the 17th of
'Reb. Rec, I, Diary, p. 17.
2 Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 752.
8 Art. V. " The congress, by a vote of two-thirds, may at any time
alter or amend the constitution."

426 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
February, and was inaugurated on the following day. His
first governmental acts were the nomination of the members
of his cabinet, and of a commission who were to carry on the
negotiations provided for in the constitution with the federal
government respecting a peaceable and amicable agreement
with relation to what had hitherto been federal property and
to the federal debt. The consolidation of secession into a
powerful confederacy of six states, with the claim to as ab
solute a separate existence in the eyes of international law as
the Union, had thus become an accomplished fact. The con
tradiction, therefore, that had, since the 20th of December,
lain in all the talk about the preservation of the Union,
should now have been recognized and acknowledged by all.
The fact that a few dozen of men had been expressly named
for the purpose of squaring the circle, and that the pretty
name of peace conference had been given to their conclave,
could not, of course, endow them with the capacity of per
forming that task. They were themselves, as we shall yet
see, better aware of this than was, perhaps, assumed. But
they acted as if they believed in the possibility of the im
possible, and hence on them lay a great part of the blame
that the delusion was still harbored very widely among the
people. The conference, which had chpsen ex-President Tyler as
chairman, met with closed doors and under the express ob
ligation not to allow anything concerning its proceedings
to be made public. Hence, only the vaguest conjectures
could be made concerning the proposals to be expected
from it. It was even entirely uncertain whether the con
ference would agree on any proposals whatever. This fact,
however, only contributed to make it in a certain sense
the most decisive political factor. The shackles which had
been put on the legislative powers by its very convocation
were fastened all the more tightly on them by the impos-

public opinion in democracies. 427
sibility they were under of following its proceedings from
day to day. It is, as a general rule, characteristic of a
democratic republic, that the legislative powers do not lead
public opinion, but, even when they seem to lead it, march
only at its head; and they recoil from taking a resolute
initiative in proportion to its responsibility — that is, to the
seriousness of the consequences that must follow from it.
But the prevailing tone of public opinion was decidedly
opposed to a decision, so long as it believed it at all pos
sible to evade one, and so long as the peace conference had
not yet spoken it could not be convinced that that was impos
sible. There were, indeed, only few who felt confident
that it would find the ardently desired solution of the
problem; but there was no doubt that back of the demand
that it should be considered an open question, whether the
conference would find that solution or not, there was a power
ful majority. The president and congress had therefore, un
less they wanted to come in conflict with public opinion, to
be intent only on the preservation of the state of suspense,
until the conference had reached some result and made it
known. Their own views had hitherto made them averse
to the taking of any action. Now their watchword was
inaction and passive expectancy. Speeches and motions
continued to be made in congress as plentifully as ever,
but all resolutions which could have bound it in any way
were quickly and systematically defeated. It was repeat
edly and openly remarked that it was determined to take
such a course out of consideration for the^conference. Nor
was this all. More than one resolution was passed which
could not be explained or justified by saying that it was
desired, by maintaining the status quo, to retain full liberty
of decision until the proposals of the conference were re
ceived. As early as on the 11th of February, Craig, of North

428 harper's ferry  LINCOLN 8 inauguration.
Carolina, introduced in the house of representatives a
" joint resolution " which required the president to recog
nize the Confederate States, and demanded the reference
of this motion to the committee on foreign affairs.1 The
demand was acceded to without any discussion. It was,
of course, unwarranted to draw any inferences from this
as to the position of the house on the main question. But
to have been thus considerate even in purely formal action
was highly unbecoming, and betrayed a disquieting amount
of weakness, obscurity and uncertainty. Secession was
either the exercise of an indisputable right or it was rebel
lion. In the former case, the recognition of the confed
eracy was a matter of course, and in the latter, the motion
not only did not need to be discussed, but congress had no
right whatever to consider it. It therefore should not
have been referred to a committee, but should have been
unceremoniously rejected, and its authors branded as fo-
mentors of high treason.
It must not be inferred from this resolution that the
house was inclined to strike the flag before rebellion.
But was the house firmly resolved to put down and trample
upon rebellion, if it could not be induced, in a friendly way,
to haul down its own? Whether an affirmative answer
could be given to this question now seemed more doubtful
than it had up to the moment that Virginia appeared in
the role of a mediator.
The bill which the committee on military affairs caused
to be introduced by Benjamin Stanton on the day of Davis's
inauguration 2 differed very materially, but not at all to its
advantage, from the bill which Reynolds had introduced
in the name of the Howard committee, only to occasion its
immediate burial himself. The latter wanted to give ^he
'Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 853, 854.
»Ib., p. 1001.

benjamin stanton's bill. 429
president the military power and means necessary not only
to insure the safety of, and to hold, such forts and other fed
eral property as was still in the hands of the government,
but also to regain possession of what had been wrested
from it in an illegal manner. The new bill was entirely
silent on this subject. To the cases in which the president
might, according to existing laws, call out the militia and
employ the regular army, it added " the case of insurrec
tions against the authority of the United States," and, fur
ther, gave him the right to call for volunteers in all these
cases. If, in the opinion of the president, what had been
done hitherto amounted to an insurrection against the au
thority of the United States, he might, unquestionably,
under the provisions of this bill, have had recourse to force;
but the legal obligation of considering the recovery of fed
eral property unlawfully wrested from the government as
a sufficient ground for the employment of force was not
expressly mentioned. While the Reynolds bill would have
forced the president to act, the Stanton bill shifted the
responsibility of the decision entirely from his shoulders,
and slyly intimated that further perseverance in the pas
sivity he had hitherto maintained would not be undesirable.
Stanton himself called it "the most harmless thing in the
world," intended only to supply "an accidental omission"
in the law of 1795. Even that was, however, more than
some of his party associates thought they should answer for.
Corwin, the chairman of the committee of thirty-three,
moved on the 26th of February that the further discussion
of the bill should be postponed until the 28th, whereupon
Stanton pointed out that this was a masked motion to re
ject, because there would not be time enough left to get
the assent of the senate. This was not contradicted, but
notwithstanding, or rather for that very reason, Corwin's

-430 motion was adopted by a vote of one hundred to seventy-
four.1 Corwin's immediate motive for removing the sword
from the field of vision of sensitive southern eyes was his
desire that not even the slightest shadow should fall on the
sweet morsel with which he wanted to attract them. One
of the motions of the committee of thirty-three was that
by a constitutional amendment the free states should be
deprived of the right to propose any constitutional amend
ments whatever with regard to slavery in the states, and
to require the consent of all the states for the adoption of
such constitutional amendments. In accordance with a mo
tion first made by Seward in the senate committee of thir
teen,2 Corwin now strengthened this motion so that any
amendment of the constitution which granted congress
any power over slavery in the states3 should be forever
prohibited. He at the same time expressly declared that
he made the motion as chairman of the committee of
thirty-three.4 He had no right whatever to do this, as the
question had not come before the committee at all, but
Corwin had assured himself personally of the agreement of,
a majority of the members. Under the circumstances that
was no meaningless question of form. The possibility of
the opposition making its views prevail had to be confined
within the narrowest limits, and the proposal was to be
helped forward in the house and in public opinion by falsely
labeling it the motion of the committee.
If anything could still be accomplished by such trickery,
only inconceivable incapacity could account for the faot
» Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1232.
2 See Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 41.
' " To abolish or interfere, within any state, with," etc
•?Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1236.

stanton's speech of February twenty-eighth. 431
that congress had not succeeded long ago in sweeping
every cloud from the heavens. And could what it was in
tended to do deserve to be judged any more favorably than
the manner in which it was intended to do it? Johnson,
of Arkansas, had said in the senate on the 19th of February
that the deluge of petitions with advice as to the best
means of conjuring the crisis which were presented to con
gress were as valueless as the singing of "psalms to a
dead horse." And now this offer which had, indeed, pro
cured to the south the bootless satisfaction of an a^t of
moral self-debasement on the part of the north, but which
at the time could scarcely have been considered by the
former a material concession, and certainly had not been
so considered, was to induce the seceded states to dissolve
the confederacy they had just formed, and cement anew
the ruptured Union into one of " perpetual " duration !
Was not such a hope evidence of a lack of political judg
ment vastly greater than even the greatest obscurantist in
congress should have been accused of?
The right answer to the question whether, in fact, such
foolish hopes were entertained in congress may be inferred
from the following sentences of a speech delivered by
Stanton on the 28th of February. When the Union still
contained fifteen slave states, it was, he said, "a matter of
very little consequence whether such an amendment as
that were incorporated in the constitution or not. But the
state of the country is now radically and essentially changed.
Seven or eight states now deny their allegiance to this gov
ernment, have organized a separate confederacy, and have
declared their independence of this government. Whether
this independence is to be maintained or not is with the
future. If they shall maintain their position, and if pub
lic opinion in those seceding states shall sustain the au
thorities there for a year or two to come, so as to show

432 harper's feery-
that nothing but a war of subjugation and conquest can
bring them back, I for one am disposed to recognize that
independence. Now, in this state of things, if the remain
ing seven slave-holding states remain in this confederacy,
they are entitled to additional guaranties."1
From these sentences it is evident that Stanton ex
pressed his real views and intention when he called the
militia and volunteer bill introduced by him " the most
harmless thing in the world." But the incomparably more
important fact is also deducible from them, that at least
the direct object now aimed at, by the endeavors to effect
a compromise by means of amendments to the constitution,
was no longer the restoration of the Union, but only the
preservation of what still remained of it. The question
was no longer the winning back of the seceded states, but
the prevention of the secession of the remaining slave
states. The task which it was intended the Virginia peace con
vention should perform was in reality confined to this,
and its performance was all that was expected even by
those who hoped it would do anything. As early as the
fifth day after it had met, an anonymous politician re
marked in his diary that that was what all its endeavors
threatened to amount to.2
It was subsequently frankly said by various members
of it, that that alone could be hoped for, and even that
alone was intended. " We are here," said Coulter, of Mis
souri, " because the border states are alarmed for their
'Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1284.
2 " I can anticipate nothing from the peace convention. The Vir
ginians are driving things, as I told Mr. Seddon to-day, much too vehe
mently ; and the whole affair assumes the aspect rather of an attempt
to keep Virginia from seceding than of a settled effort to form a bridge
for the return of the already seceded states." The Diary of a Public
Man, The North Amer. Rev., August, 1879, pp. 134, 185.

THE PEACE CONVENTION. 4133
own safety. We wish them to remain in the Union. The
purpose of our consultations is to make an arrangement
under which they can stay in the Union." l
The people did not look upon the matter in this way,
and in many respects their expectations were greater. If
information had been furnished them of the deliberations
of the convention, they would have had only themselves
to blame if they did not perceive that even the carrying
out of this limited programme was impossible.
Not only the seceded but five free states were unrepre
sented in the convention. The allowance of time between
the invitation to, and the meeting of, the convention was
too short for California and Oregon. But why were Mich
igan, Wisconsin and Minnesota not represented in it? Any
one who had taken notice latterly of the tone of the press
could find no difficulty in answering this question. "Until
that flag," wrote the Springfield (111.) Journal on the 6th
of February, " is unfurled over Moultrie, and every other
stolen fort, arsenal, custom-house and navy-yard, until the
laws of the government are obeyed, and its authority recog
nized, let us never talk about compromise." In the north
west the proud consciousness of strength was too great, and
the feeling too intense and impulsive, to allow men to calcu
late and weigh as they did in the east, more sicklied over
with the pale cast of thought. " We are asked," wrote the
Detroit Advertiser on the 3d of February, " to concede, just
as we have gained our point, all that we have been- strug
gling for for the last six years." No talk could change
this fact, while the common sense and self-reliance of the
west revolted against the idea of allowing themselves to
be looked upon as fools. To deny their manhood was not
the way of western men. And why should that be a virtue '
and a command of patriotism for the whole people which
' Chittenden, p. 399.

434 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
was contemptible in individuals? This manner of viewing
the situation was here, in the case of the most influential per
sons in the party, not weakened but strengthened by the
course of events. That congress continued its fruitless en
deavors to distill a healing draught from the numberless
mixtures furnished it by its own members and from among
the people, could not be prevented. The peace convention,
on the other hand, had no official existence, and the send
ing of representatives to it was a matter for the states to
freely decide for themselves. Keeping away from it, on
the other hand, was a demonstration, and was intended to
be. South Carolina had answered Virginia's invitation
clearly and curtly: I will not. The non-participation of
the three northwestern states meant the same thing: We
shall have nothing to do with your convention; no more
bartering of our right and of the supremacy of the law!
Before the peace convention with its resolutions had been
dismissed forever, two documentary proofs of this came to
the knowledge of the entire people. Confidential letters of
the two senators from Michigan to the governor of the
state found their way into the press, and were read in the
senate.1 The object of both letters was, indeed, to have
delegates sent to the convention even at the eleventh hour.
The wish that they should be sent was, however, grounded
on the entreaties of Massachusetts and New York, which
afterwards became convinced that no republican state
should send representatives to it but those which were now
there and could not get away, and hence earnestly urged
that assistance should be immediately sent them in order to
oppose those states which it was feared would yield. "I
hope," said Chandler's letter, "that you will send stiff-
backed men or none." And he added in a postscript:
" Some of the manufacturing states think that a fight would
'Chittenden, pp. 467-469.

chandler's letter. 435
be awful. Without a little blood-letting, this Union will
not, in my estimation, be worth a rush." Less forcible, but
not less weighty, was Bingham's declaration : " It may be
justifiable and proper, by any honorable means, to avert
the lasting disgrace which will attach to a free people who,
by the peaceful exercise of the ballot, have just released
themselves from the tyranny of slavery, if they should
now succumb to treasonable threats, and again submit to a
degrading thraldrom."
That the delegations of Massachusetts and New York '
thought so likewise is evident from what has been already
quoted. Bingham, however, further remarked in his letter:
"We have been assured by friends on whom we can rely,
that if those states [Michigan and Wisconsin] should send
delegations of true, unflinching men, there would probably
be a majority in favor of the constitution as it is, who
would frown down rebellion by the enforcement of laws."
But assuming even that this hope should prove unfounded,
the minority was certainly powerful. What moral weight,
then, could the proposals of this improvised extra-constitu
tional saving commission have? A ship in a storm cannot
be fastened with a thread as with grappling irons. The
peace convention might, perhaps, be able to stir up a disas
trous quarrel in the republican camp, but it could not ex
tinguish the burning fuse in the states that had not yet
seceded, and this not merely or even mainly because so
large a number of free states would not co-operate with
them in doing so. This last fact would, indeed, have suf
ficed to render its endeavors futile; but it was not the act
ually decisive element. The attitude of the delegates of
the southern states made the convention resemble a weaver
industriously throwing his shuttle with its thread from one
side to the other of a loom without a warp.
' Only the majority.

436 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
The committee charged with the elaboration of a compro
mise proposition required ten days to prepare its report,
and hence the real work of the full session of the conven
tion did not begin till the 15th of February. Then the
flood of general discussion began to pour out in such vol
ume day after day that several members compared the con
vention to the " circumlocution office " in Dickens's Bleak
House, " showing how not to do it." The members not
only talked vaguely all around the propositions, but cir
cumstantially discussed the question whether the conven
tion itself had any meaning or justification. Despite this
general character, however, the debates were attended by
one very important result. It was shown, on the one hand,
as Tuck, of New Hampshire, said, that the majority of the
northern democrats " supported southern views of south
ern interests as earnestly and emphatically as any southern
man had done; " ' and, on the other, that their wooing met
with no encouragement whatever from the southern dele
gates. Seddon, of Virginia, had immediately handed in a report
of his own, in which, notwithstanding the commendable
calm and moderation of the terms in which it was couched,
gave it to be understood plainly enough that the delegates
might have remained quietly at home if they thought that
the slave states would be satisfied with such an offer as the
proposals of the majority of the committee. Virginia had
said what she would be satisfied with — the Crittenden
propositions with certain additional amendments; "the
propositions reported by the majority did not give but ma
terially weakened the Crittenden propositions themselves,
and failed to accord the modifications suggested." Such was
the substance of what he said. To this, however, was
added a rather covert declaration that he considered it "in-
1 Chittenden, p. 177.

POSITION OF ILLINOIS. 437
dispensable " to secure the slave states their proper power
in the constitution; he was willing to discuss how that
could be done, but submitted that a suitable way would be
" a partition of power in the senate between the two sec
tions," and " a recognition that ours is a Union of free
dom and consent, not constraint and force." 1 This meant :
the transformation of the federation made up of equal
states into a confederation formed of two groups of equal
states. Even apart from these last demands, which in a way en
tirely different from the preceding statements and inferences
were the expression of personal views, it was manifest from
these declarations that the convention was chasing after shad
ows. Not in its form, indeed, but in its tenor, the report was
the announcement that Virginia had really invited its fellow
states to submit its ultimatum to their vote. The proper
answer had to be waited for for a time, but it was received
at last. " If Illinois had understood," said Cook, " that she
was only to come here for the purpose of agreeing to the
propositions of Virginia, as announced in the resolutions
which accompanied her invitation, the conference may be
assured that Illinois would not have appeared here at all. She
understood that she was invited to a conference, in which
all the states were to meet upon a basis of perfect equal
ity." 2 But Chandler had said of Illinois that, like Ohio,
Indiana and Ehode Island, it looked as if it was getting
weary. Seddon's blows, therefore, had not made the iron
any more flexible: they had forged it all the harder/ And
the more earnest the discussion became and extended to
individual, concrete questions, the larger became the num
ber of sputherners who sided with Seddon, and the more
heavily did they lay on in the same way. " I feel," said
'lb., p. 48.
» lb., p. 313.

438 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
Guthrie, of Kentucky, " that my mission here is ended and
that I may as well withdraw from the conference."1 "If
I thought," said Stephens, of Tennessee, " that the spirit of
the north was truly represented in this conference, I would
go home and advise my state to secede, and if she did not,
I would abandon her forever." 2 " The propositions con
tained in the report of the majority," declared Reid, of
North Carolina, " as that report now stands, can never re
ceive my assent. I cannot recommend them to congress or
to the people of my own state." 3 " I know the people of
the south," exclaimed Barringer of the same state, and I
tell you this hollow compromise will never satisfy them."4
A hollow compromise! Such were the thanks that the
northern delegates received not only for entirely abstaining
from turning their victory with respect to slavery to any
advantage, but also for asking forgiveness for the fruitless
victory by the granting of a multitude of highly important
rights and privileges to the slave states, which they had
hitherto not had, and above all by the admitting into the
constitution the principle that none of its more material
provisions for the protection of the slave-holding interest
should be changed without the assent of all the states.
While its duties remained what they had always been, nay
while they were largely increased, the Union was, perma
nently and in principle, so far as its rights in relation to
slavery were concerned, to surrender its character as a fed
erative state, and as a unit state {Gesammtstaat) renounce
forever all power of development, that is, its life, with re
spect to a particular interest which was a common danger
to all the states. And what was it to get in return for this
sacrifice? Less than the shadow of a shadow.
'lb., p. 369.
* lb., p. 382.
« lb., p. 434.
« lb., p. 436.

FIELD S MOTIONS. 439
Field, of New York, put the motion in various forms ex
pressly to declare in the constitution the indissolubility of
the Union. Rives, of Virginia, called that "a mere ab
straction," and several northern delegates also opposed any
consideration of that question of principle. They claimed,
on the one hand, that such a declaration was useless, because
it would be simply the declaration of what was indisputable
and self-evident, and, on the other, that it would be the
sealing of the disruption of the Union, since the adoption
of such a position on that principle would render the return
of the seceded states forever impossible. For these self-con
tradictory reasons Field's motions were defeated. This, how
ever, could be understood, if the northern delegates whose
votes brought it about really considered it still possible, by
means of the propositions of the conference, to induce the
confederacy to decree its own dissolution and the members
of it to return to the Union ; in order to make the actual
restoration of the Union possible, the right of secession
would thus have been left an open question. This, how
ever, was, in any case, only one side of the question, the
answer to which had to govern the decision of the delegates
on Field's demand. In the first place, it had undoubtedly
to be asked whether the concessions contemplated would
oppose a barrier to further secessions. The sole object of
the conference was to reach an agreement by means of
which the Union might be preserved, or at least what still
remained of the Union. If now the concessions were to be
irrevocable, logic imperatively required that that for which
alone the concessions had been made should be insured in
the same way for all time. If, however, for reasons of ex
pediency it was thought not advisable to insist on this, it
had at least to be demanded that the declaration should be
made in the most unambiguous manner: as we understand
it, the slave states accepting this agreement bind them-

440 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
selves permanently and without reserve to surrender all
claim to the right of secession. Unless this were done, there
was no use in talking about a contract at all, for mutu
ality enters into the idea of a contract; here, however,
the one party had only given and the other only received.
But that was the way in which the gentlemen of the south
understood the " compromise " that was to be entered into.
They did not so declare; they even expressly refused to so
declare ; and not only that, but, in the form of a motion,
they put on record their opposition to the principle the ex
press recognition of which Field had demanded. For that
is the purport of the amendment moved by Buckner, that,
from the indissolubility of the Union intended by the consti
tution, a right of the federal government should not be de
duced to employ force against a state which did not comply
with the obligations imposed by the constitution with that
intent. In this way, indeed, Field's motion became a mere
abstraction. Still all the slave states represented in the
conference, with the exception of Tennessee, voted for
Buckner's amendment. On the other hand, all the free
states voted against the amendment, which, however, was
only the doctrine proclaimed by Buchanan. Were the
haughty gentlemen of the south unable to comprehend this
vote? Frelinghuysen, of New Jersey, had indeed preached
the doctrine of the patriotic wisdom of accommodating one's
self to circumstances and of the folly of testing whether
the country had a government or not, with a frankness and
force that were simply appalling.1 But this vote should
have only made the question still more urgent, whether,
after all, there was not a limit, the exceeding of which
would bring the south face to face with a resolute and solid
north. The claims, however, which the gentlemen of the south
'See lb., pp. 185, 188.

VIRGINIA AND COERCION. 441
thought they might make on the yielding temper of the
north were not exhausted even after the announcement
that all the latter expected in return for all it would be ready
to offer was merely the hope that all, or perhaps only some,
of the states which had not yet seceded would for the pres
ent abstain from terminating their connection with the
Union. "Virginia will not permit coercion," exclaimed
Seddon with emphasis on the 19th of February; where
upon Morrill, of Maine, said: " I wish to ask the gentleman
from Virginia a plain question, and I wish to receive a
frank answer. If this conference agrees to the amend
ments proposed by the majority of the committee, will Vir
ginia sustain the government and maintain its integrity,
while the people are considering and acting on the propo
sals of amendment to the constitution? If she will not do
this, if this proposition does not meet the heart of Virginia,
there is no use."
Seddon interrupted him: "I can let Virginia speak for
herself. She has spoken for herself in most emphatic lan
guage. She has told you what will satisfy her in the reso
lutions under which this body is convened. I have no right
whatever to suppose that she will accept less. She is sol
emnly pledged to resist coercion. She will resist it to the
very last extremity." '
The annulment of the constitutional presidential election,
so far as the programme of the victorious party relating to
slavery was concerned; the granting of new rights and
privileges to the defeated party for all future time; the
permanent and- irrevocable surrrender of the right legisla
tively to assert or enforce the will of the majority no mat
ter how great, with respect to the question in controversy ;
the refusal of the promise to consider themselves bound
by the agreement; the announcement that they would cut
'lb., pp. 146, 147.

.442 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
loose from it, if the seceded states rejected it; the decla
ration that, even after it had been formally concluded, it
would be not only undoubtedly annulled but cut to pieces
with the sword, unless expression was given by acts to the
conviction that both president and congress, not without a
breach of their oath to support the constitution, might sac
rifice the rights of the Union for the benefit of the seceded
states, — such was the bargain proposed by the defeated
party to the victors, accompanied with a claim to grateful
recognition for their self-sacrificing advances, and seasoned
with many a bitter reproach. Against Chandler's opinion
that blood must flow in order to restore some value 'to the
Union, arguments might still be found which might in
good faith be considered valid. But there were no such
arguments for a Union purchased on such conditions as
these. It would have been worse than worthless ; for, in ad
dition to its worthlessness, the brand of ignominy would
have been ineffaceably burned into it. The American people
would, by self-degradation added to sacrifice of their po
litical being, have purchased the false appearance of con
tinued national existence. The verdict of history will there
fore doubtless be that the best patriots were those dele
gates on whom Price thought he was passing the most
dreadful and destructive sentence when he charged them
with having from the very first day striven to oppose in
principle the patriotic endeavors of the conference.1
To judge from what was officially published, this opposi
tion was completely defeated, and Virginia might boast of
having obtained its immediate object. The conference had
come up to the hopes entertained of it to this extent: it had
made definite proposals to the people. It adjourned sine die
on the 27th of February, after it had addressed a letter
to congress, which closed with the words: "They" — the
' lb., pp. 400, 401.

PROPOSALS OF THE CONVENTION. 443
twenty-one states of the conference, represented by one
hundred and thirty-three delegates — " have approved what
is herewith submitted, and respectfully request that your
honorable body will submit it to conventions in the states as
an article of amendment to the constitution of the United
States." That had a very imposing sound. What the dele
gates of twenty-one states had approved as a basis of agree
ment must certainly recommend itself sufficiently to claim
that its examination should be approached not only without
bias but with a certain amount of cheerful hopefulness.
But even if the conference had not become guilty of a
formal untruth, the concluding sentence quoted above prac
tically amounted to a pious fraud. Each of the seven sec
tions of the article of amendment had, indeed, been approved
by a majority of the votes of the states, but the majorities
for the several sections had been differently composed, and
the amendment as a whole had not been submitted to a vote.
But as the states were far from being represented according
to their population, but had sent an arbitrary number of
delegates to the conference, and as diametrically opposite
views were represented in several delegations, and the ma
jority of votes in each delegation was considered the vote
of the state, it was uncertain whether the separate sections
had been approved by a majority of the delegates. Back
of the proposition as a whole there was neither a majority
of the votes of the states nor a majority of the delegates,
that is, the proposition as a whole had no existence what
ever, and yet the conference petitioned that it should be sub
mitted as a whole to the state conventions for adoption.
And even that was not "the whole truth."1
The vote on the first section, which dealt with the terri
torial question, had been taken on the 26th of February,
and the result was its defeat by the votes of eleven states
'lb., p. 449.

444 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
against eight. The excitement was great. For a time it
was impossible to continue the business before the confer
ence in a parliamentary way : it had been transformed into
an unorganized crowd of men, every one claiming the floor
and interrupting every one else. Finally reconsideration
was moved and adopted, but the question was not taken
up again immediately, but an adjournment voted till the
evening. In so short a time, however, sufficient pressure
could not be exercised to induce the requisite number of
members to change their vote. When the conference met
again at the hour fixed, Wickliffe, of Kentucky, again
moved another adjournment till next morning because it
was " certain that the vote had better not be taken that
(this) evening." 1 No further debate was attempted by
either side on the next day. A vote was immediately taken,
and the result was nine ayes against eight noes. The
minority, therefore, had gained only one vote (Illinois) and
still had become the majority, although on the 26th three
more votes had been cast against the section under consid
eration. Where were the other votes? A full vote had not
been cast even on the 26th. Kansas and Indiana were ab
sent from the list of votes. The reasons for this were given
when the vote was taken on the following day. The vote
of Kansas was " divided," and Indiana abstained from vot
ing because the instructions of the legislature forbade the
delegates to accept any proposition without first having
submitted it to it, and it had not been possible to do that.
But why were Missouri and New York, which had taken
part in the first vote, voiceless at the second ? So far as
Missouri is concerned, Chittenden's notes afford no answer.
But there can be scarcely any doubt as to the right ex
planation. It had not resisted the pressure brought to bear
on it, but neither had it entirely yielded to it. The delega-
1 lb., p. 439.

RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE. 445
tion no longer prevented the adoption of the section, but
refused its co-operation, and that tacitly : it did not even
want, by declaring its abstention from voting, to show that
it had rendered the compromise proposition possible. The
transformation of the minority into a majority was therefore
only a deceptive appearance. And yet even this had been
effected merely by the fact that an entirely accidental cir
cumstance was exploited in a way that made the deceptive
appearance a conscious deception. Field, the chairman of
the New York delegation, had, as an attorney, to attend a ses
sion of the United States supreme court. He thought he
could fulfill his duty to his clients without neglecting his po
litical duties to his state, since the delegation had resolved
to abide by its vote against the section, and the votes of the
states had hitherto been cast by the chairman without re
gard to the question whether the vote represented the views
of a majority of the members present at the moment. Now,
however, attention was called to Field's absence, and the
question whether his vote should, notwithstanding that
fact, be counted, was answered in the negative. The con
sequence was that the votes of the delegates were equally
divided, and New York's vote lost to the opposition. The
most important provisions, therefore, of the compromise
proposition were not only not approved by the majority,
but the majority of the delegations was in reality against
it, and among the delegations which would have nothing
to do with the provisions just referred to was the delegation
of Virginia itself.
The result of the conference was therefore a vain de
lusion. The endeavor which Virginia had caused to be
made to effect an agreement in an extra-constitutional
manner had completely failed. The conference petitioned
congress to recommend the state conventions to adopt
what had not received its own approval.
Could it seem conceivable that congress would consent

446 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
to do that? And of what use could it be if it did consent?
If it consented to it, it must be because the propositions
in themselves seemed acceptable to it. For, of course,
it was sufficiently well informed of what happened in
the conference to know that the moral authority with
which it was clothed was an untruthful fiction. Naturally
the opponents of the conference took good care that these
facts should become known to the entire public. But what
foundation was there for the assumption that these prop
ositions in themselves would satisfy congress and the pub
lic better than the numberless others which had been
previously made? If any fact had been settled beyond a
doubt by these endless discussions, it was that it was wholly
indifferent whether the weight with which the questions in
controversy were laid in the two scales of the compromise
balance was somewhat increased or diminished. The com
promise did not succeed, not because in the proportions
of the mixture a mistake of a few grams had been made,
but because from the very nature of the ingredients any
medicine that could be compounded out of them must
seem to the one side or the other worse than the disease it
was meant to counteract. The supporters of the compro
mise propositions did not pretend that they advocated them
because they were the best that had been made or could
be made. Many of them even declared expressly that they
did so, although they decidedly preferred others. They
honestly confessed that they made a great sacrifice of their
convictions, and that they had been determined thereto
solely by the value of the label, " Peace Conference." Bat
by making this confession they passed final judgment on
the endeavors to reach a compromise, for all it meant was
this : let us try by a fraudulent label to dupe ourselves and
the people into a settlement; without this self-deception,
none can be devised.
To such an absurdity was the thought of highly gifted

Douglas's declaration of February twenty-first. 4:47
men ultimately led by their patriotism, because, on the
one hand, they clung with the strength of despair to the
conviction that the Union must be saved, and, on the other,
because the idea that its salvation could be wrought out by
other means than a compromise seemed madness to them.
Douglas, who had advocated the right of coercion with
such invincible logic and such refreshing energy, had said
on the 21st of February : " I have too much respect for the
intelligence of the senators to believe for one moment that
they hope to preserve this Union by military force. . . .
You must do one of two things: either settle the difficulty
amicably or by the sword. An amicable settlement is a
perpetuation of the Union. The use of the sword is war,
disunion and separation, now and forever." ' The explana
tion of the delusion as to a compromise evidenced by these
words was simple, and just as simple was the contents every
compromise must have, which could make an amicable set
tlement of the controversy possible. McLean, of New York,
embodied them in the following constitutional amendment,
providing that disunion and treason might be rendered law
ful: "Whenever a party shall be beaten in an election for
president and vice-president, such party may rebel and take
up arms, and, unless the successful shall adopt as its own
the principles of the defeated party, and consent to such
amendments of the constitution as the latter party shall
dictate, then, in such case, the Union shall be at an end." 2
True to the old saying that a drowning man grasps at
a straw, the congress persevered to the last moment in the
work of compromise, and there were still people enough
who uttered a shout of jubilation when it closed its life in
the act of snatching at one with convulsive efforts.
The Crittenden propositions had been rejected on the
'Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Conjjr., p. 1081.
»Ib., App., p. 222.

448 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
27th of February by the house of representatives by a
large majority (one hundred and thirteen against eighty),
and scarcely any one could still expect any effect from
the adoption of the "first series" of resolutions of the
committee of thirty-three.1 As matters now were, the
slave states could see in them only a non-binding assur
ance that the north honestly and earnestly desired to
earn a certificate of laudable good conduct: a few drops
of rose water trickled into the flames of a blast furnace,
while at the same time fresh coals were shoveled into it
by the declaration that it was the duty of the government
to execute the laws, to protect federal property, and to
preserve the Union. The advocates of a compromise
rested their hopes on the constitutional amendment as
drafted anew by Corwin. A majority of two-thirds, how
ever, was necessary for its adoption, and the vote on the
27th was only one hundred and twenty-three ayes against
seventy-one noes. But the matter was not given up as
lost, and by the following morning the requisite number
of dilatory ones was obtained, and the weak-kneed over
thrown. Reconsideration was first carried and the reso
lution then adopted by one hundred and thirty-three votes
against sixty-five.
The straw was now first caught sight of. The decision
of the house could acquire the possibility of practical im
portance only after the senate had made it its own by a
two-thirds majority. But whether it would do that was,
however, exceedingly doubtful, and if it did, there would
be a formal and legal but by no means an actual possibility
of the proposition having a practical importance.
The advocates of a compromise in the senate engaged in
the work, of reconciliation even more devotedly and per
severingly than the house. But they believed that the good
' Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., p. 1261.

Crittenden's joint resolution. 449
fight had to be fought with a different battle-cry. They
had, however, to choose between two. On the question
which deserved the preference, a violent quarrel occurred,
and the 4th of March, on which the life of the Thirty-
sixth congress was to end, was fast approaching.
The committee to which the letter of the peace confer
ence had been referred moved, through Crittenden, on the
28th of February, a joint resolution framed as follows:
" Whereas," on Virginia's invitation, delegates from Maine,
etc., have met in convention and petitioned congress "on
the part and in the name of said states to propose the fol
lowing" to the states as an amendment to the constitution,
it is therefore hereby resolved to submit the foregoing to
the states as a constitutional amendment. A more singular
motion can scarcely be found in the annals of congress. In
the first place, among the states enumerated by name was
Wisconsin, which had not been actually represented in the
conference. Such a demonstrable and notorious objective
untruth in the preamble of a motion of such great impor
tance was strange enough. But stranger still, and more
significant, was the second demonstrable untruth that the
conference had made its petition " on the part and in the
name of said states" — which it had no right to do — and
'that untruth also had been incorporated into the preamble
of the motion. But the most astounding and most important
thing of all was that congress was to submit the constitu
tional amendment to the states, not because it approved its
contents, but because an extra-constitutional conference
'had requested it and considered it well adapted to preserve
peace &nd insure the safety of the Union. This last also,
¦as ihas been shown, was not in 'harmony with the facts, and
it was therefore a really monstrous claim t/he committee
made on congress, or that congress would .have made upon
the states if it adopted the motion of the committee. Only
29

n

450 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
on the shaky ground of false pretenses was the new founda
tion to rest on which the shattered Union was to grow
together again into a storm-proof structure.
Scoffs and sneers were the answer that the gray-haired
Union-saver, who, in patriotic anxiety of mind, venerable
and worthy of all commiseration, stood expectant, received
from those whose assent was the first precondition of self-
delusion in congress as well as out of it. Hunter not only
showed why, under these provisions, what was conformable
to law would be more doubtful than ever, but even claimed
that under them the slave states would fare much worse
than under the present constitution with the Dred Scott de
cision.1 Mason and Green entirely approved these views,
and Wigfall declared that such a change of the constitu
tion would drive the seceded states out of the Union if they
had not already left it.2
But Crittenden's conviction that this straw was the best
one to grasp at could not be shaken by such means. Even
if this were true, it is hard to perceive how he could expect
anything from it. The house of representatives had given
the preference to another, and nothing warranted the hope
that it would change its mind within twenty-four hours.
But a resolution on which both houses agreed was the in
dispensable precondition of anything further, and congress
had only one more working day, as the 3d of March fell
on Sunday. From this point of view, therefore, it was
entirely indifferent whether congress adopted the proposi
tions of the peace conference or the Crittenden proposi
tions, and the endless discussions on the final fate of the
latter at the time, and afterwards in historical literature,
bear, on this very account, no proportion whatever to their
real importance.
' Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., pp. 1307-1309.
2 lb., p. 1373. In his opinion the basis of all negotiations should be
the express recognition of the right of secession in the constitution.

THE CORWIN AMENDMENT. 451
This and the further consideration that the attitude of
the republicans towards the various compromise proposi
tions was not unimportant determined a part of the most
honest advocates of a compromise not to follow Crittenden
in this question, but to labor with all their strength for the
adoption of the resolution of the house with the constitu
tional amendment as drafted by Corwin. Douglas espe
cially entered the lists in favor of this last with all his
stormy energy, although he had said on the 3d of January
that if the slave states were offered nothing else, such a .
constitutional amendment would be the best means to drive
them out of the Union.1 This itself showed plainly enough
what would be gained by the adoption of the Corwin
amendment. But the course of the debate forced from
Douglas a further declaration, equivalent to the formal
admission, that here, too, there was question really only of
a straw. He opposed a change in the wording of the
amendment, moved by Pugh, by calling attention to the
fact that the house had already adjourned, and that there
fore any change meant rejection. An effort was made to
weaken this objection by reminding him that, according to
custom, congress might meet and pass resolutions during
the morning hours of the 4th of March. One might have
felt tempted to look upon this consolation as downright
mockery. Douglas declined it with an argument that was
irrefutable, but which took the ground from under his
own feet. If submitted to another vote, he said, the Cor-
' " If you had exhausted your ingenuity in devising a plan for the ex
press purpose of increasing the apprehensions and inflaming the passions
of the southern people, with the view of driving them into revolution
and disunion, none could have been contrived better calculated to
accomplish the object than the offering of that one amendment to the
constitution, and rejecting all others which are infinitely more impor
tant to the safety and domestic tranquillity of the slave-holding states."
Congr. Globe, 2d Sess., 36th Congr., App., p. 42.

452 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
win amendment would not again receive the requisite
majority in the house. This was as certain as it could
be without actual trial; but precisely on that account did
it seem a piece of downright mockery, and not of the sen
ate alone but of the entire people, when, with that confes
sion on their lips, they ventured to laud the "joint resolu
tion," and demand its adoption as a redeeming deed.
This was held up to Douglas in the most varied forms —
politely and roughly, sarcastically and indignantly. But
he and his associates pressed forward all the more forcibly
and pleaded all the more persuasively. Not until the Cor
win amendment was securely housed would they promise
that they would surely not fail to assist in the further work
of salvation. Then the vote on the resolutions of the peace
conference, as well as on the Crittenden propositions, should
be proceeded with immediately, measures for which Pugh
wanted to sedure precedence by moving them as an amend
ment to the " joint resolution."
Persistence and the simple tactics of voting down, re
gardless of their tenor, all counter-motions, led them to
the goal. The struggle which was resumed afresh On Sun
day evening, after it had been interrupted at midnight on
Saturday, and in which the over-crowded galleries — filled
mainly by those who had flocked to Washington to witness
Lincoln's inauguration — had participated with stormy dem
onstrations, dosed with the adoption of the " joint resolu
tion." "All feel that it is the harbinger of peace," exultingly
wrote the Commercial in its report of the wild jubilation
with which the galleries had greeted the announcement of
the result of the vote in the house of representatives."1 Peace
must, indeed, now be fully insured, for the great measure
had been successful : neither the waves nor the storm could
'Reb. Rec., I, p. 16.

impotence of congress. 453
any longer carry away the, straw at which the sinking coun
try grasped. We are told that when a drowning man's
senses begin to leave him purple flames rise before his. eyes
and marvelous melodies resound in his ears. It was not,
as the fools believed, the brightening, rosy dawn heralding
the coming of the day, but the last ray of the departed
light glimmering, scarcely perceptible, for a second, on the
far horizon, through the darkness of the deepening night.
Thirty -six senators had participated in the vote; that is, two
more than the number required to pass the resolution —
twenty-four ayes to twelve noes; that is, the exact two-
thirds majority necessary to adopt it. I vote aye, Pugh
had declared, only because my friends wish me to. A
bread-pill, Mason had said contemptuously, and Clingman
and other slavocrats had emphatically agreed with him. A
bread-pill, repeated Wade several times, laying stress upon
the word ; but we will give no more bread-pills. You for
merly offered them yourselves, and have all the less reason
now to refuse them, even if they be only bread-pills, Doug
las had urged; but of the claim that they were an effica
cious remedy there was not a trace now to be found in his
utterances. The impossibility of agreeing upon any prop
osition by means of which anything could be gained was
only placed in the most glaring light by apparent success.
And this seeming success was the only result of the long
and stormy sessions of the 2d and 3d of March. The prop
ositions of the peace conference were rejected by twenty-
seven against eight, and the Crittenden propositions by
twrenty against nineteen votes.
The entire session had been, from the very first day, an
unbroken chain of proofs of the absolute impotence of con
gress in presence of the catastrophe that had come. Not
a single act to keep it within bounds or to lessen its force.
Words, nothing but words, because men neither wanted to

454 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
do what they could, nor could do what they would. That
the lack of the necessary moral force, and especially of the
necessary political insight, played a part here was undeni
able, and evident enough. But, after all, these were only
promotive elements. The cause was exclusively the histor
ical development of the slavery question, and the question
of state sovereignty growing out of the actual circumstances
of the country. Hence, even the parting greeting of the
rump of the Thirty-sixth congress to the country could not
be an act — a deed. " Adopted in order that we may seem
to have done something." The Corwin resolution bore
that superscription as plainly as if it was printed in capital
letters. The most decided slavocrats had not been able to
help voting for the Corwin proposition, but, as a compro
mise, they had expressly and decidedly rejected it. The
masses in the center clung, indeed, to the hope in the healing
power of time, and it therefore seemed to them a gain that
congress made any offer; for, insignificant though it was,
might it not be the bes/innino* of the doing of something
more ? And among the republicans who voted aye there was
scarcely one who could be deceived by the shimmer of the
colors because the soap-bubble was blown from the pipe of
their master, Seward: they only wanted to defend their
right in their own eyes, the eyes of the people and of the
whole world, to the consolation expressed in the words,
salvavi animam meam, by pointing to that resolution.
The day broke cold and cloudy ; but the sun shone as
warmly as in May, when, immediately before the beginning
of the inauguration ceremonies in the house and the senate,
their adjournment sine die was declared. Did the fates
wish to announce the future in signs, and how were these
signs to be interpreted?
Disguised, and on a railway train on which his presence
could not have been suspected, Lincoln had arrived on the

LINCOLN IN WASHINGTON. 455
23d of February, and Scott had made extraordinary mili
tary precautions for the inauguration. Whether it was
owing to these measures that Lincoln had reached Wash
ington alive and that the inauguration took place without
disturbance is a question which it will never be possible to
answer with certainty. Even if it be thought that it must
be answered in the negative, it must be conceded that the
great excess of caution could not be so serious a mistake
as the least defect of it. For the regular taking possession
of the office and the possession of the federal capital might
easily be decisive of whether there would ever be another
president of the United States. Despite the inauguration,
Lincoln was president only in name and by right. That
he and Scott could have considered these measures neces
sary was the formal recognition that facts and right were
in irreconcilable conflict with one another. Little as it
had been intended by them, they thereby furnished incon
trovertible evidence that there were now only two possibili
ties: either people had to be reconciled to allowing the
law to conform to the facts, or that which was conformable
to law had to be made a fact by force. Wholly independ
ently of the change of persons on the 4th of March, there
could be no third course. Even if Lincoln had, by a miracle,
transformed himself in a night in every respect into the
most faithfully reflected picture of Buchanan, this would not
have been changed in the least. The agony of the Union
under the constitution of 1789 must come to an end on that
day, because on it facts again asserted their full rights;
that is, on that day the force had ceased to act which alone
had been able to prevent them so long from making them
selves irresistibly felt. Not on the 12th of April did the
dice of war roll out of the box of fate. That had already
happened on the 4th of March,— not because Abraham
Lincoln took the place of James Buchanan, but because

456 harper's ferry — Lincoln's inauguration.
congress no longer stood between the president and the re
bellion. Because the legislative power had authority to
take steps looking to a constitutional settlement, the delu
sion that it might succeed, aided by the wish of the seces
sionists not to bring about a decision during Buchanan's
term of office, had been able to postpone the crash for some
months. The president did not have that authority, and
hence the continuation of this condition of suspense was
simply impossible. The policy of the administration re
mained at first precisely the same. That, notwithstanding
this, a very different moral and political judgment must be
passed upon it, because the results of the policy of the pre
ceding administration had to supply it with a basis, in no
way alters the fact that Lincoln maintained the passivity
observed by Buchanan. Beyond that, he no more than
Buchanan, could go, even if he had wished to. If he, as
Wigfall had very confidently prophesied on the last day
of the session, had received and recognized the commission
ers of the confederacy, it would have been legally as null
as if the dalai-lama had done so. He had, indeed, the
formal right to order the evacuation of the forts which
were still manned by federal troops; but even that woula
have been attended by no legal consequences, and he could
not give them all up without knowingly violating the offi
cial oath he had just taken. Somewhere and in some way
he must oppose at least passive resistance to the progress of
the rebellion, unless he wished to become guilty of the most
enormous usurpation and thereby lay his political bead on the
block. But the confederacy could not allow itself, at any
point or in any way, to be ordered to halt in the practical and
legal shaping of its independent political existence; for its
foundation was on quicksand so long as it had not accom
plished everything which the principle demanded. Reasons
of expediency might induce it to make far-reaching con-

POSITION OF THE CONFEDERACY. 457
cessions, but only in the form of international treaties. The
least breach of the principle would imperil its all. The end
of Buchanan's presidency had cleared the way for it, but
the simultaneous end of the Thirty-sixth congress com
pelled it to go forward. That was something its leaders had
never sufficiently considered and it upset all their calcula
tions. The game now stood in such way that whoever
had the next move was sure to win. Lincoln could wait
until the Thirty-seventh congress met in its first session, and
he waited. The confederacy, on the other hand, had to
act after it had given the lie to Wigfall's prophecy, unless
it wanted to make a fool of itself in the eyes of its own
people and of the entire world. Only so long as military
reasons made it seem necessary, should it have rested satis
fied with the endeavor to obtain possession of all the forts
situated within its limits. Its invitation to come to an
amicable agreement was clothed in the form of a proposi
tion made by one power to another. By so clothing it, it
forewent the political reasons which might have been ad
vanced for its waiting longer, from the moment that its
pretension to be an independent power was rejected. But
it thereby also deprived both the federal government and
the states loyal to the Union of the possibility of allowing
new acts of violence to be considered, like all those hitherto
committed, simply as facts. They must now, as the log
ically inevitable consequences of the principle proclaimed,
be looked upon as war. If the confederacy began war
against the Union it would sweep from under its feet with
one blow the foundation on which secession had raised
the whole structure of its success. Not a difference of
opinion in the north on the right of secession, but on the
expediency and the right of using force, had led it from
victory to victory without meeting any resistance. If
now the confederacy passed from the ground of law to
the ground of force, then, ipso facto, the use of force by the

458 harper's ferrv — Lincoln's inauguration.
north would be no longer a question of law. The non-
coercion doctrine which had sprung into existence through
it would be broken by its blows into a thousand splinters
which could still claim a place, only in the obscurest corner
of some old political curiosity shop. The erroneous doc
trine had been deduced from the constitution, but the con
federacy had taken its stand entirely, exclusively and
irrevocably on international law, and had thereby broken
the chains which had thus far bound the arms of Nemesis.
The augury did not deceive. The gravest crisis was
passed. The darkest hour was over, and day was ap
proaching. From the last moment of the life of the Thirty-
sixth congress all further attempts to save the Union had
become impossible, and the possibility of restoring it had
thereby been won. Its restoration, indeed, could be effected
only by blood and iron, and hence the country must see
terrible days before the sun of the 4th of March could
emerge victoriously from the clouds which had hidden its
rise with a dark veil. But the confederacy must compel
the northern population to resort to these means, and the
moment they were forced to resort to them they became
themselves again, and the restoration of the Union was as
sured. Of the Union, but not of the Union reduced to ruins
under the constitution of 1789. The assertion, made num
berless times by the secessionists, that that Union could not
be again welded together by the blows of war if it were
once broken, proved true. Notwithstanding much success
in details, less than nothing was accomplished towards
reaching tho real end aimed at so long as that was at
tempted. But the secessionists had assumed as a matter
of course that the north would abandon the restoration of
the Union when it had become convinced by experience
that the restoration of the former Union was impossible,
and that was a disastrously false conclusion. The slavoc-

RESTORATION FORESHADOWED. 459"
racy had frequently been warned by the more wary among
themselves that secession was suicide. This proved as true
as the former assertion. As the government of the con
federacy was in downright earnest with the assurance that
it desired an amicable settlement with the Union, so the
Union was in downright earnest with its repeated solemn
declarations that it only wanted to force the seceded states
back into the Union, and would not in the least touch one
of its rights under the old constitution. And as the gov
ernment of the Confederate States had not been able to
fulfill that wish, so the government of the Union could not
redeem those promises. When the confederacy forced the
sword into the unwilling hand of the north to fight for the
Union, it compelled it at the same time not to lay it aside
until it had destroyed slavery with it; for in the very nat
ure of things the destruction of slavery was the precondi
tion of the restoration of the Union.
The morning was cold and cloudy. It verily beseemed
it to be so, for during three long months the legislative
and executive powers had moved only their tongues, but
never a finger to arrest the breaking up and crumbling to
pieces of the republic whose proud, gigantic structure had
excited a marvelous feeling of discomfort about many a
European throne. Hard, but not too hard, are the words
already cited from the lips of an American, that the people
had gone to the limits of infamy to escape the necessity of
a manly struggle for the nation's existence. And yet on
that 4th of March the restoration of a Union incomparably
stronger, more majestic and richer in promise for the future,
was beyond a question, for the corner-stones of the new
foundation were to be the burial mounds of the three dark
powers which unbound the furies of civil war: the doc
trine of non-coercion, the slavocratic interpretation of state
sovereignty, and slavery.

YALE UNIVERSITY

1837b